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6

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

HISTOEY OF CAVALEY

gxom lljc ^nvlmi Crimes,

WITH LESSONS FOE THE FUTURE.

B7

LIEUT.-COL. GEORGE T. DENTSON,

coMifAifniya rna novERxonanxKitAVs sonr oi-Ann. cava da,

AUTHOR OP " MODERN CAVALRY," F.TO.

SToiibon :
MACMILLAN AND CO.

1877.

[The RUjht of Tianslaliun and Ji<:/jro<htctiun is Rcatrved.]

ii

LONDON :

B CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS,

BREAD STRKET HII.L,

QUEEN VICTORIA STREET.

TO HIS MAJESTY

ALEXANDER II.,

EMPEROR OF RUSSIA,

THROUGH WHOSE MUNIFICENT ENCOURAGEMENT

IT HAS BEEN WRITTEN,

THIS BOOK IS,

BY EXPRESS PERMISSION, RESPECTFULLY

gebkirtctr.

u

a

a

t(

n

ir
tl
ir

tl:

PREFACE,

A SPECIAL history of the cavahy service has never, I
believe, been written in any language. This fact
attracted the attention of His Imperial Highness the
Grand Duke Nicholas, Inspector-General of the Kussian
cavalry, and feeling that so important a subject deserved
the closest study, he laid the matter before the Emperor
of Russia, and in the year 1874, with His Imperial
Majesty's sanction, offered three prizes for the three
best books on the history of that service. The com-
petition was thrown open to the officers of all foreign
armies.

As it has been intimated to me that the commission
appointed to deal with the matter have no objection
to my doing so, I now publish the English edition of
my work without awaiting a decision.

In the following pages I have recorded all the strik-
ing features in the history of the cavalry service from
the earliest period to the present time. I have com-
menced with the earliest use of the horse in war, and
have endeavoured to lay clearly before the reader the
various changes that have taken place, and the causes
that have led to them, throughout the long period which

viii PREFACE.

luis olapacil since tliu horse waR first usod in the war
chariot. 'I'ho sixth or conchuling stiction is devoted
entirely to deductions which arc drawn as to the
])rohablc use of cavahy in the future.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging the great
assistance I have received from the admirahle pro-
gramme which was issued as a guick; to intending
competitors by the Russian government. I have also
to express my thanks for the courteous permission
clicerfully accorded to me by the authorities in St.
Petcrslnirg to take to my rooms books from the mag-
nificent library of the General S'^aff. To Count Heyden,
Chief of the Staff, and to Captain Schencliine of the
General Staff, my thanks are especially due. To Major-
General Gorloff, Aidc-de-Camp to His Majesty the
Emperor of Russia, and Military Attache to the Russian
Embassy in London, I am under deep obligations for
information and assistance kindly given me.

To B. Homer Dixon, K.N.L., of llomewood, Toronto,
I owe the advantage derived from the opportunity
of studying, in his splendid collection of arms and
armour, the system of armament during the j)eriod of
chivalry. I have also to thank Gold win Smith, Esq.,
M.A., for his kind assistance in reference to several
l)oints in classical history.

To the library of the Royal United Service Insti-
tution I am also indebted, my thanks being specially
due to T. D. Sullivan, Esq., late 56th Regiment, the
librarian.

GEORGE T. DENISON.

Heydon Villa, Toronto.

CONTENTS.

PERIOD I.

TO THE FALL OF THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Origin of wars — Earliest weapons — DofenKivc anuour Hoon adopted —
Cliariots euiploj-ed to convey warriors into action — Chariota in the
Trojan War — In Egypt — In Assyria — In Persia — Chariots improved
by Cyrus the Great —Ancient Britons.

CHAPTER I.

Eauhest Cav.lry

12

Section I. — Scythian and Assyrian Cavalry.
Scythian horsemen — EarHest I'so of horsemen in Assyria.

Section II. — Persian Cavalry.

Cavalry under Cyrus the Great— Battle of Thynibra — Cavalry of Xerxes —
Cr.valry in the retreat of " Tlie Ten Thousand."

CHAPTER 11.
(JREEK Cavalry 21

Section I. — Athenian and Thessalian Cavali-y.

Greeks not a cavalry nation — The i' var against Thebes — The Trojan
War — Thessalian cavalry — Lycui^uo said to have organized cavalry —
Messenian war — Character of early Greek cavalry — Battle of Marathon
— No cavalry in the Grecian army at Marathon— Operations before
the battle of Plataja — Battle of Plata;a — Subsequent increase of the
Greek cavalry — The Peloponnesian War — Ships built specially to
conve}' cavalry — Battle of Deliuni — Armament and organization of
Greek cavalrj' — Athenian cavalrj' — Spartan cavalry — Battle of Leuetra
— Battle of Mantinea.

X CONTENTS.

Section II. — Greek Cavalri/ under PhiUp and Alexander.

Organizatidii of Macedonian army — Armament and tactics of the cavalry —
Battles of GninicuH, Issiis, and Arbela — Improvements effected by
Alexander in organization — Use of flying columns.

Section III. — Training of Greek Cavalry.
Gynmastic exercises — Agrsilaus — Horsemans'iip.

Section iV —Xennplion's " Treatise on, Cairtlry."

The most ancient work of its type — Choice of horses — Drilling on rough
gromid — System of scouts — Posting sentries iviC. pickets.

CHAPTER in.
Roman Cavalry 46

Section I. — Early History.

Infantry at first most important portion of Roman armies — Organization
of cavalry under Ronmlus— Augmentation of cavalry by Tarquinius
J'riscns — By Servius TuUins — Regulations affecting early Roman
cavalry — Social status of the cavalry — Battle of Lake Regillus — Battle
with the Volscians, 442 B.C. — Sextus Tempani us— Battle of Sentinum.

Section II. — Armament and Tactics of Early Roman Cavalry.

Armament — Tactics — Used mainly to recoimoitre — Dismount to fight —
The Turma — Ala, or wing.

Section III. — Cavalry in the Wars ivith Hannibal.

Hannibal a great master in the art of war — His cavalry admirable—
Numidian cavalry — Their armament and tactics — Battle of the
Ticinus — The Trebbia — Cannje — Scipio Africanus — His efforts to
improve Roman cavalry — Improvements in drill — Equipments of
Roman cavalry at this epoch — Shoeing of horses.

Section IV. — Campaigns of Scipio Africanus, &c.

Battle of Iling — Skilful tactics of Scipio — Battle of Zama-Sylla — Battle
of Orchomene — Lucullus at Tigrauocerta — Battle of Artaxata.

Section V. — Cavalry under Julius Cicsar.
Battle of Pharsalia — Skilful employment of infantry against cavalry.

Section VI. — Foreign Cavalry in the Roman Armies.

Cavalry of the Gauls — Their armament — Tactics — Wars with Caesar —
Vercingetorix - His system of warfare — Siege of Alesia — Defeat of
Vercingetorix — The Germans had but few cavalry — Their armament
and tactics — German cavalry in CiBsar's army— The Goths, Wisigothn,
and Ostrogoths — The Vandals — The Franks — The Spanish cavalry —
Voltigeurs — Arms and Tactics.

CONTENTS.

XI

Seel inn ]' 1 1. —Parthian Cavalr :

Ciun|iaig-ii of Cnissiis— Iiuinoiiso Kiiporiority of Parthian cavalry — Heavy
cavalry and horse archers — Tlieir eqiiipnieiit and system of tactics —
Battle near the IJiver lielik- -Terrible defeat of army of Crassus —
I'arthia the only rival to Rome — Campaign of Ventidius — Expeditions
of Antony, 'irajan, and Severus.

Section VJII. — Tactiat^ Outponts, Patrols, tCc, (/ Roman Period.

Section IX. — Cavalr;/ under the Emperors.

Decadence of the military spirit— Great increase of barbarian mercenaj-ics
— Degeneracy of the Legions — Snccesses of barbarian horse — Exalta-
tion of the heavy-armed cavalry — Great increase of cavalry in all
armies — Battle of Turin — ^Battle of Mnrsa — Cavalry under Belisarins-
Procopius — His views on archers — Cavalry under Attila — Battle of
Chalons, A.D. 451 — Full of lloman Empire.

PERIOD II.

FROM THE FALL OF THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE TO THE
INVENTION OF FIREARMS.

CHAPTER IV.

Feudal Cavalky

120

Section I. — Origin of the Feudal System, — Battle of Poictiers, 732.

Kil'ect of barbarian conquest of Rome on social system — Influence of
German customs — The allodial system — The division of kingdoms
into hundreds, provinces, and dukedoms— The military organization —
The establishment of y/^ls and growth of the feudal sj'stem — Horsemen
in armour decide fate of battles — Charlemagne — Cavalry composed of
nobility — Little information known f.s to art of war at this period —
Battle of Casilinnm — Battle of Tours or Poictiers, a.d. 732. — System
of tactics- Cavalry under Ci)arles the Bald of France.

Section II. — Cavalri/ of the Turks, FranLs, and Greehs in the tenth

Centunj.

Turkish and Saracen cavalry — Armament and tactics — The Franks —
Equipment and armament of their cavalry— Cavalry of the Greeks —
Armament and tactics — Hungarians — -Their cavalry — Invasion by
them of Central E'.jrope- -Henry 'The Fowler' — Extraordinary results
of his military genius — The fortification of cities — Reorganization of
feudal cavalry — Inijirovement in cavalry drill — Institution of species
of tournament — Battle uf Mersebiirg — Otho I, — Battle of Augsburg.

Xll

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V.
Chivalrv 141

Section I. — Iii-ititation and Rules of the Order.

ll« origin soiuowliat uncertain — About the middle of tenth century — Its
close connection with tlie feudiil system — Its cosmopolitan character-
Philip le liardi — Education of knif>'ht — Ceremony of hivestiture —
Esquires — Their duties — Religion and love the guiding sentiments of
the order.

Sejtion II.'- Equinnient, Armament, and Tactics of KHUjhts.

KnightF very heavily ar«ned — At first in chain mail, afterwards in soUd
plates — Eipiipment of squires— Description of armour — Tactics of
knights— No power of manoeuvring— Fighting done in single line —
The mounted archers — Training of knights — Infantry of this period
of no value, and but little used— Tournaments — Art of war during
chivalry at very low ebb — Battle of Hastings — Battle of Bouvines —
Great weight of armour— Extraordinary incidents in the Battle of
Bouvines — Sergents-d'armcs.

CHAPTER VI.

The Ceusades

1G8

Peter the Ilennit — Mismanagement of first Crusades— Composed of un-
disciplined hordes — First regidar crusade under Godfrey de Bouillon
and others — Its inunense numbers— Main strength cavalry — Tactics of
contending armies — Armament of Saracens — Want of military art
among the Crusaders — Solo dependence placed on the heavy cavalry,
as well in besieging towns as in garrisoning fortifications — Sieges of
Nicea— Antioch — Jerusalem — Saladin — Richard Coeur-de-Lion of
England — Battle of Assur — Louis IX. of France — Battle at Damietta
— Knights fight as pikemen.

Section 11. — Cavalry of Russia and Poland during this period. — Invasion

of the Mongols.

Sarmatian cavalry — Norman sea-kings— Rurik — Oleg — His expedition
against the Greeks^ — Second expedition — Igor's expeditions — Yaroslaf
—Tactics and armament of early Russians — Polish cavalry — Allodial
system — Organizati(jn of troops — Hussars — Their armament — Mongo-
lian invasion — Genghis Khan — Baton, or Peta — Armament and tactics
of Mongols — Battle on the Kalka or Kaletz — Battle at Kalonuia—
Destruction of Moscow — Invasion of Central Europe by Batou —
Battle of Leignitz.

CHAPTER VII.

Decline of Feudalism and Introduction of Fikst Regular

Cavalry, 12i)0— 1445 190

Section I. — Results of the Crusades.

Serious effect on feudalism — Growth of cities — Increase of kingly power
—Employment of paid troops Improvement of the infantry-
Increase in weight of armour— Mercenary troops of the citice—
Their cliarncter- Tactics.

CONTENTS.

xm

Section II.— Mercenary Companies.

Paid troops of Canute— William the CoiKineror— Henry IT. and Philip
Augustus — Braban^onij — Richard (JaMir-dc-Lion — Rate of pay in
Edward III.'s army — Genoese crossbowmen— Free companies— -Con-
dottieri — Tlieir ravages — The great companies in Italy— Guarnieri —
Montreal or Moriale's company — Sir John Ilawkwoo.i — Alberic de
B'irbiano— His company of St. George — System of fighting of these
companies — Small losses in battle of this age - Battle of Zagonara,
1423— Battle of Castracaro, 1467.

Section III. — EiKjliah Archers and Swiss Infantry.

English arcliers highly famed — Tlieir weapons and skill — The Genoese
crossbowmen — Sir William Wallace — His skilful use of pikemen —
Battle of Stirling — Battle of Falkirk — Formation in squares or clumps
en echiquier — Battle of Bannockburn — Same system of tactics em-
ployed— battle of Halidon Hill — Battle of Crecy — Marks two epochs
— Use of gunpowder and improvement of infantry — Men-at-arms
dismount to fight on foot — The real revival of infantry begins at
Crecy — Battle of Courtrai — Swiss infantry at this period — Battle of
Morgarten— ^Battle of Sempach — Battles of Granson and Morat, 1476,
ctmiplete the reputation of Swiss infantry — Battle of Poitiers —
Skilful generalship of the Black Prince — Battle of Homildon Hill —
Battle of Agincourt — Effect of these actions on the military art.

Section IV. — Introduction of Regular Armies.

Huscarles of Canute— Charles VII. of France — Formation of compagnies
d'ordonnance — Composition and armament of these companies —
Archers — Charles the Bold organizes squadrons.

PERIOD III.

FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF FIREARMS TO FREDERICK

THE ORE A T.

CHAPTER VIII.

IXTUODUCTION OF FlREARMS 225

First mention of heavy cannon, 1,^01 — Invention of portable firearms —
Rifled barrels— The wheel-lock — The matchlock— Ti>e snaphaunce —
The bayonet — The iron ramrod — Breech-loaders.

CHAPTER IX.
Use of Firearms by Cavalry

228

Army of Charles VIII. of France in 1494— Details given by Paul Jove-
Overpowering force of artillery— Machiavolli's Treatise un the Art of

XIV

CONTENTS.

War — Use of cavalry liy Count Cariiiis^miola — Immenao weif^ht ol!
armour about tlie end of the Hfteentli centurj' — Views of Machiavelli
— Steadineps of infantry increasing their power— Use of petronels by
knights — Increase in power of lirearms and increase in weight of
cuirass — Disappearance of tassettes, passe-gardes, greaves, and
solerets — Lance falls into disuse — Groat spread of use of tirearms by
cavalry — Arquebus-d-roaet — The pistol— German Reitres use pistols to
a great extent — Their tactics and armament — Formation of French
cavalry — Battles of Pa via and Dreux — Battles of Moncontour and
Courtras — Cavalry action at Mookorkeydc in 1574.

CHAPTER X.
EuBorEAN Cavalry in the Sixteenth Century

242

Section T. -Its Organization into Different Types.

Argoulets — Albanians — Genetaires — Arquebusiers-a-cheval — Carabins —
Dragoons — Marshal de Brissac— Alexander of Parma — Cuirassiers —
Maurice of Nassau — Cornets — Hussars — Their armament — Cavalry of
the Turks — Spahis — Their armament — Battle of Mogatch, 1.526.

Section II. — Spanish Cavalnj in Mexico ami Peru.

Mexican troops opposed to Cortez — Their tactics — Battle of Tabasco —
Aztec ideas of Spanish cavalry — The Tlascalans — Immense influence
of small force of Spanish horsemen.

CHAPTER XI.

Cavalry in the Thirty Years' War. Gustavus Adolphus,

Tilly, and Wallenstein 255

Section I. — Gustavus Adolphus,

His great reforms — Introduction of uniform clothing — Changes in tactics
and in anus — Suppression of caracoles in the cavalry — Combination
of firing and charging at speed — His system of forming up his army
— Arms of Swedish cavalry.

Section II. — Cavalry of the Imperial Army, Battles of Breifanfeld and

Lutzen.

Formation of cavalry under Tilly and Wallenstein — Arms and accoutre-
ments— Fight at Burgau — Battle of Breitenfeld — Buttle of Lutzen —
Death of Gustavus Adolphus— System of outposts at this period.

CHAPTER XII.

Cavalry in the Wars in England between Charles i. and thk

Parliament 2G8

Great ability of Cromwell as a cavalry general — Prince Rupert — Action
with Colonel Sandys — Battle of Edgehill — Battle of Gainsborough —
Skilful tactics of Cromwell — Marston Moor — Extraordinary results of
cavalry charges — Battle of Naseby — Marquis of Montrose — " Bonnie
Dundee."

CONTENTS.

XV

CHAPTER Xril.
Russian Cavalry at this Period — Cossacks

273

First mention oE Cossacks — Ploskina — Zaporog Cossacks — Cossacks paid
no taxes — Their aruiament — Great value for outpost duty.

CHAPTER XIV.

French Cavalry — Campaigns of Conde, Turenne & Luxembourg 276

Section I. — Organization of Cavalnj under Louis XIV., Armament and

Equipment.

Mousquetaires — Mounted grenadiers — Gendarmes — Light-horse of the
guard — Carabineers — Dragoons — Hussars — Charges made at the trof.
— Formation of cavahy in three ranks— Conde — His great abihty —
Battle of Rocroy — Skilful use of cavalry — Battle of Nordlingen —
Battle of Junes — Skilfrl adaptation of plan to the nature of the
ground — Battle of Zintzheim — Another instance — Marshal Luxembourg
— Battle of Fleurus — Combat of Leuze — Action at Neerwinden.

CHAPTER XV.

MoNTEcucuLi — German Cavalry — The Battle of St. Gothard,
1664

289

Memoirs of Montecuculi — System of formation of infantry and cavalry in
Germany — Cavalry divided into cuirassiers and light cavalry — Their
arms — Montecuculi's views on the lance — On dragoons — Montecuculi
not a cavalry officer — His cavalry not so eflBcient as in preceding
generations — Battle of St. Gothard, 1664 — Heavy and slow tactics of
Montecuculi in this battle.

CHAPTER XVL

Early Part of Eighteenth Century. -Campaigns of Marlborough
AND Prince Eugene 292

Battle of Hochstadt or Blenheim — Decided by cavalry — Skilful dispositions
of Marlborough — Comments on the cavalry action — Battle of Ramilies
— Also won by cavalry— Battle of Mnlplaquet — ^Charge of cavalry
£ gainst entrenchments — Passage of the lines of tlie Mehaigne in 1705
- TTse of cavalry in this affair — Passage of lines of Bouchain in 1711
— i.dttle of Almanza.

CHAPTER XVIL

Charles xii. and His Cavalry. — Battle of Pultowa .... 300

Extraordinary character of Charles XIL— His wonderful energy — His
reforms in the cavalry service — His pursuit of the Saxons under
Schulenberg— Rapid manoeuvres of cavalry under Charles XH. —
Battle of Pultowa — Skilful arrangements of Peter the Great— Line of
battle strengthened with redoubts — Defeat of Charles— Vigorous pur-
suit of debris of Swedish army by cavalry and infantry carried en
croupe.

XVI

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XVI 1 1.
Cavalry under Pbter the Great.— The Regular Army in Russia 304

No regular army before I'etcr tlio (ireat— Grcivt increase of dragooDs in
his reign — Their armament and formation— Light cavalry— Battle of
Lessnoy — Capture of Swedish convoy under Levenhaupt.

CHAPTER XIX.
Marshal Saxe — His Ideas on Cavalry .

308

i

I

Reforms introduced by him — The cadenced step — Re-establishment of lance
— Heavy cavalry and dragoons — Arms and e(iuii)ments — Tactics — His
opinion in favour of cuirasses — Breoch-h)ading carbines invented bj'
him — The charge at speed — Effect of energy of Charles XII. and
writings of Marshal Saxe — Increased mobility of cavalry — Influence
on cavalry in time of Frederick the Great.

PERIOD IV.

FROM FREDERICK THE GREAT UNTIL THE INTRODUCTION OF
RIFLED FIREARMS.— 17 iO TO 1854.

CHAPTER XX.
Cavalry under Frederick the Great . .

312

Section I. — Organization and Tactics of his Cavalry,

Frederick the Great's cavalry on his accession to th"> throne — Tactics at
Molwitz — Prohibition of use of firearms by cavalry— Charges at speed
rehed upon — Careful training of the cavalry — Charging great distances
in serried order — Manoeuvres at speed — Guibert's eulogy upon them —
Cavalry at its zenith — Effect of new system on hostile infantry and
cava)'- -Orders of Frederick to his cavalry — This system compared
with L. /ench and Austrian — Formation of his cavalry — Tactics in
action — Arms and organization — Improvements in manoeuvring—
Cavalry employed in large masses — Introduction of horse artillery —
General Warnery— His military writings — General Seidlitz — His extra-
ordinary energy — Anecdotes of him — General Zeithen — His character
— Great change in manner of drilli.ig the individual horsemen under
Frederick after Peace of Dresden — System of elementary tactics the
same in all tlie different kinds of cavalry — Great effect of the careful
organiza -jn and training of cavalry under Frederick.

Battles of Hohenfriedberg,
Zorndorf.

Section IT, — Actions of Prussian Cavalry,

Sohr, Ilochkirch, Prague, Leuthen, and

CONTENTS.

xvn

CHAPTER XXI.
Adstrian Cavalry in Fhedkrick the Great's Wars

332

Austrian cavalry consisted of cuirassiers/lragoons, and hussars — Differences
between Austrian and Prussian cavalry — Great superiority of Austrian
horsemen in outpost work and partisan operations-- Inniiense ndvan-
taj^es of this superiority — Only counteri)alanced by the superiority of
Frederick's troops in battle— -The Uhlans — Tlieir arms— Croats-^
Hungarian mounted riflemen— Diniculties of Frederick infinitely
increased by the swarms of Austrian light liorse which surrounded
him— Loss of garrisons of Budwcis, Tabor, and Frauenberg — Stfect
of Austrian liglit cavalry in campaign of 1744 — Cariyle's remarks
upon it— Skirmish at Teinitz, lUth November, 1744 — Surprises of
Sohr and Plochkirch — General Lloyd on reconnoitring — Partisan raid
of General Haddick upon Beriin, 17th October, 1757— Attack and
capture of Prussian convoy under Colon 3I Mosel, 1758 — Influence
of Frederick's successes on the armies of Europe — Servile imitation
adopted in most countries — General Lloyd's views.

CHAPTER XXII.
Russian Cavalry in the Latter Part of the Eighteenth Century 341

y Effect of example of Frederick the Great—
' struction to a cavalry coloncil — Potemkin-

<L — Battle of Cagool.

Armament of cavalry — In-
-Ruiniantzoff and Souvoroft'

CHAPTER XXIIL

Latter Portion of the Eighteenth Century — Revolutionary

Wars of America and France 344

Changes in European armies — Increase of light cavalry in French anny —
Changes in drill—Prussian cavalry — Austrian cavalr}' — Great falling
off in the efficiency of the cavalry — The Revolution of 1770 in
America — Use of rifles — Introduction of special regiments of riflemen
— Revolution in JVance — Conscription of March, 1793 — Conscription
of July, 1793 of 1,200,000 men — Consequent clianges in the organiza-
tion of amiies — Divisions and corpad\irmee introduced — French cavalry
— Evil system of dividing them — Changes by Napoleon and General
Hoche — (ireat effect on the system of tactics of the enormous size of
armies — The column formation — Skiniiishers — Increase in the use of
artillery — Arms of cavalry at this period — Operations in the early
campaigns — Capture of the Dutch fleet at Texel by Frencii hussars —
Defeat of General Chazot and 10,000 French by 1,500 Prussian hus-
sars—Combat in November, 1793, near Quesnoy — Villers-en-Couche —
Austrian cavalry at Handschuslieim and Mayence in 1795, at Wurzburg
in 179G— French cavalry in Italy in 1796 antl 1797— Battle of Roveredo
— Invasion of Egypt — The Mamelukes — Tlieir arms — Organization
and tactics — Napoleon's opinion of them — Actions of Frencli with the
Mamelukes — Skirmish at Ramanieh — Napoleon's tactics against the
Mnniehikes— Battles of the Pyramids, Sediman, Mount Thabor, and
Holiopolis —Napoleon's revival of tlie pikes of Agincourt — His
dromedary dragoons.

xvin

fONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIV.
Cavalry under Napoleon

362

t

High opinion of cavalry iiold by Napoleon — Changes made by liini in
organization ol' French Ciivalry— Camp at Boulogne — Napoleon's
thorough appreciation of value of light cavalry to reconnoitre, &c. —
Re-introduction of cuirassiers — His corps of guides — The consular
guard — The carabineers — The cuirassiers — The dragoons — The lancers
— The chasseurs-a-cheval — The hussars — Establishment of cavalry
schools — Napoleon's method of using cavalry — Mutual support of all
three arms — Battle of Castiglione — Marengo — Charge of Kcllerman's
cavalry — Result of this charge — Combat of Wcrtingen — Campaign
of Ulm — Pursuit by Murat of the Archduke Ferdinand and General
Werncck in October, 1805 — Great successes of Murat — Battle of
Austerlitz — Campaign of IHOG — Battle of Jena — Pursuit of Prussian
troops — Extraordinary successes of French cavalry — Entire destruction
of Prussian army — Battle of Eylau — Great cavalry charges — Subse-
quent cavalry operations — Superiority of Cossacks — Battle of Ecknmhl
— Capture of guns by cavalry — Cavalry combat at Ratisbon — Battles
of Wagram and Dresden — General Steingel — Napoleon's views on ob-
taining information — His skilful use of cavalry — Cavalry generals
under Napoleon — Murat — Kellerman — Bessieres — Montbrun — Lasalle.

CHAPTER XXV.

Cavalry under Napoleon — continued. . .

387

Section I. — Russian Cavalry under Alexander I.

Napoleonic wars bring prominently before Europe the llussian army —
Especially the Cossacks — Russian cavalry in 1810 and 1811 — Cossacks
— Their arms, &c. — Battle of Austerlitz — Heilsberg — Krasnoi — Gallant
conduct of Neworofskoi — Battle of Borodino — Charge of Caulaincourt's
cuirassiers upon redoubt — Katzbaeh — Culm — Leipzig — F6re Champe-
noise — Gallant charge led by the Czar — Cossp.cks in the minor operations
of the war — Campaign of 1812 — Destruction of French cavalry —
Ketreat to Malo Jaroslavitz — Cossacks in the pursuit to Wilna —
Comments on their value — Partisan operations in 1813 — Capture of
Hamburg — Lunenburg — Chernicheff at Halbertstadt — Capture of Cassel
— System of fighting of Cossacks — Examples — General Brack's views
on Cossacks — General Morand's — Captain Ganzauge.

Section II. — Austrian, Prunsian, and English Cavalry in the Napoleonic

Wars.

The Austrian cavalry — The Prussian cavalry — Battle of Lutzen — Hanau —
Suprise of Eocquencourt — The English cavalry — Battle of Salamanca
— Combat at Garcia Hernandez — Battle of Waterloo.

CHAPTER- XX VL

The Cavalry Service from the Time of Napoleon until 1854

418

Cavalry in Russia under Nicholas I. — Battle of Elizabethpol— Madatoffi at
Schumla— Polish War of 1830, 1831— Battle of Dembe Velky—
Partisan campaign in Lithuania — Mahnratta cavalry in India — Lord
Lake's campaign — War in Algiers.

CONTENTS.

XIX

PERIOD V.

FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF RIFLED FIREARMS TO THE

PRESENT TIME.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Influence of the Intuoduction of Kifled Firearms. — The

Crimean Wau — The War in Italy 1859 42.J

Effect of rifled arms — Crimean War — JIarcli to Balakliiva — Battle of
Balaklava — Battle of Bushire— Italian war of 185'J— Battle of Montc-
bello — Views on cavalry at tliis period.

CHAPTER XXVIII.
The American Civil War, 1861-65 . . . .

436

Character of the American people — Its influence on the war — Use of
revolvers — Extraordinary contempt for the sword — Partisan corps of
mounted riflemen — Extraordinary successes gained by them — Morgan's
raids— Stuart's raids — Forrest's raids — General increase of cavalry in
the Northern armies in 18G3 — Grierson's raid through Mississippi —
Stoneman's raid in Virginia in Maj', 18()3 — Wilson's invasion of
Alabama with un army of cavalry in 1HG5 — Capture of Selma, Mont-
gomery, Columbus, and West Point — Operations of Slieridan's cavalry
— Fight at Waynesboro, March, 1805 — Flank march of Sheridan's
cavalry around the Confederate right — Battle of F?ve Forks — Valuable
services of the mounted rifles — Sir Henry llavelock's comments on
this action — Pursuit of Lee's army — Action at Namozine Creek — Action
at Sailor's Creek — Tactics of Sheridan in this affair — Great value of
the mounted rifle principle— Final surrender of Lee's army at Appo-
mattox Court-house — Comments — Great value of the experiences of
this war.

CHAPTER XXIX.
The Austho-Prussian War of 1866 . . .

485

Cavalry in the Prussian army — Austrian cavalry — Italian cavalry — Un-
important services of the horsemen in this war — Battle of Gitchin —
Battle of Nachod — Retreat from Kiiniggratz — Action at Tobitschau —
Charge by Bredow's cuirassiers, capture of eighteen guns — Charge of
• Hanoverian cavalry at Langelzalza — Destruction of two Prussian
squares — Outpost work very badly performed by cavalry of both
armies — Austrian cavalry particularly inefficient in the minor
operations.

XX

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXX.

TiiK Fuanco-German War, 1870-1871 492

This war tlio jirst in wliicli improved lircanns wero used by botli ftrnues —
The cavalry in the coiiteiuliii^' armies — Tlieir force, equipment, and
organization — Tli(> French officers not ellicicnt — Uely too much upon
tiieir laurels — Their outpost service wretchedly performed — The loss
of the campaign fi^reatly owin<^ to the gross incapacity of their cavalry
in this respect — German outpost work carried on with great skill —
Inuucnso results gained — The superiority of their light cavalry —
Battle of Weisscnbcrg — Battle of W(crth— Charge of iVIichcl's cuir-
assier brigade — A useless sacrilice with no result — The pursuit of
McMalion after Woerth — Brilliant services of the German cavalry
in covering the march of their armies— Battles of Mar.'i-la-Tour or
Vionville and Gravelotte — Charges of cavalry at Vionville — Flank
inarch of McMahon to Sedan — Mismanagement of French cavalry —
Their failure to cover this march — Striking contrast on the part of
the German horsemen — Surprise of Beaumont — Battle of Sedan —
Charges of cavalry — Letter on tliis subject — Comments — Battles of
Amiens, Orleans, and Soigny — The " Franc-tireurs " — Uhlans, not
being mounted rifles, unable to cope with them — Infantry battalions
sent with Uhlans after this period — Strong argument in favour of the
mounted rifle principle — Servian War — Use of revolver.

PERIOD VI.

ORGANIZATION, ARMAMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT OF
CAVA LEV IN MODERN WARFARE.

CHAPTER XXXI.
Oharacjteristics of Cavaluv

507

Cavalry noted for impetuosity — Summary of the changes in the cavalry
force — From chariots to Alexander and Hannibal and to Frederick
the Great — The present condition of the art of war adverse to
cavalry — Necessity for reforms to suit the times — Characteristics of
cavalry — Necessary to cover an advance — To lead in a pursuit — To
cover a retreat.

CHAPTER XXXII.
Organization of Cavalry into Different Kinds

513

Section I. — Cavalry Proper.

Necessity for changes in organization — Franco-German War proves many
points — The new rifle prevents charges on Frederick's system, except
with losses that amount to destruction — Instances at Woerth, Vionville,
and Sedan — The sacrifice however sometimes required —Some cavalry

CONTENTS.

XXI

intended for cliarj^inn; tlieret'oro necessary — Argmnents as to mctliod
of aiiniiifr — The revolver — The carbine — Tlie sword — Its hannlessness
— Iimtances — General Steplien D. Lee's opinion — Col
views — Fulnre tactics of infantry against cavalry — Ui
attacking infantry — Argmnents on this point.

onel Gilnioi-'H
Uest method of

Section II. — Mounted Rijies.

Value of light cavalry for outposts and advanced guards — Value of
mounted nih.H — Dragoons not cflicient in former wars- Reasons of
tiiis — Conditions now all dianged — Weapons and tactics of infantry,
as well as weapons of mounted rifles, totally different from those of
past ages — Arguments on this point — Views of Cuneral S. D. Lee.

CHAPTER XXXIir.
Armament and Equipment

531

Section I. — Heavy Cavalry.
CoDiposition — Uniforms — Equipment — Arms.

Section II. — Mounted Rifles.

Dress — Equipment— Arms — Sword — Should be attached to the saddle — A
few hatchets should be carried.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Employment of Cavalry in a Campaign .

535

Cavalry more required for outpost work than ever — Effect of railways,
telegraphs, &c. — Cavalry should be sent far in advance of main army
— Should not regulate its movements by its own anny — But by the
enemy — It should press the enemy's outposts continually — Mounted
rifles might be used in line of battle as infantry in case of need —
Especially in defensive battles — Should be used to cut off a beaten
. army in retreat.

CHAPTER XXXV.
Morale 639

Great value of a high morale — Instances— Causes of morale — Attention
should be paid to create a good morale in the troops.

zxu

CONTENTS.

CIIAITKR XXXVI.
TxiE Genkral-in-Chibf of Cavalut . . . ,

543

Good general of cavalry rarely found — Peculiar combination of talent
rc(iuired — fnijietuoHity required as well as caution — Capacity to dis-
cover the dcHigns of tlie enemy a great requisite in a cavalry general
— General Shelby — Long peace training injurious — Destroys tho
inventive reasoning faculty — Instances in Crimean War — Kinglakc's
views on this point — Effort of Prussians to remedy this evil —
Interesting convcrsatioTi of Socrates — The inventive faculty the
distinguishing characteristic of all great generals — As, for institnce,
Alexander — Hannibal — Henry the Fowler— Tiie Black Prince — Gus-
tavus Adolphus — Turenne — Frederick — Napoleon — No great com-
mander in liistory who was a blind follower of precedent — All great
generals reformers.

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS.

liAiTLE OF Cann.1'; Tu face patjc 07

Battle of Ilino , „ 77

Battle of Zama „ „ 81

Battle ok Blenueim or Hochstadt „ „ 294

Battle of Mauengo „ „ 309

Map to Illustrate Pursuit of Prussians by Murat in 180G„ „ 374
General Demdinski's Partisan Campa.qn in Lithuania

IN July 1831 „ ,,420

Morgan's Raid in Kentucky in 1862 „ „ 440

Plan to Illustrate General Stuart's Raid in Penn-
sylvania in October 1862 „ ,,451

Grierson's Raid in Mississippi, 1863 „ „ 466

Plan of Retreat and Pursuit of General Lee's Army

from Richmond to Appomatpox, March and April, 1865 „ „ 481

■WBBB

mMillllM

0

>

A HISTOEY OF CAVALEY.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

It seems to be established by Scripture that in the
earliest times human society commenced practically by
a group of families ; that in the infancy of the world
the patriarchal government alone sufficed, and that there
were no wars on account of the sparseness of the popu-
lation, the abundance of pasturage and animals of the
chase, and the close relationship that existed in the race
for a considerable time.^

The first cause of strife arose, in all probability,
from contention for the best fields for pasture, and for
the possession of the most available springs and streams.
As families multiplied, and population became more
dense, the causes of strife increased in the same ratio.
At a time when almost everything was in common, and
the rights of property had not been defined, the hunters
and shepherds seeking to supj^ly ^heiv wants were apt to
encroach on the rights and properties of their neighbours.
Aggression naturally produced resistance and retaliation,
families calling their relatives to their aid, until numbers
would be engaged on each side, and deadly feuds lasting
for generations would be- originated.

These conflicts and feuds naturally led to families
uniting into tribes for mutual protection, and the same
cause in time led to the formation of great nations.
Ambition then became added to the causes of war,
^ Lord Arundel of Wardour. Tradition.

;

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

assisted by the love of excitement, the fanaticism, and
the patriotism of peoples.

It Keems probable that offensive weapons were dis-
covered, and in use, long before being required in warfare,
for in the very infancy of the world man must have had
means of defending himself against wild beasts, as well
as of killing those animals which were necessary for his
sustenance. The club has probably been the first weapon
invented, soon after the pointed stick used as a pike or
javelin, and then came the successive improvements of
the point hardened by fire, the pointed bone, the sharp-
ened stone or flint-head, and lastly, of the brass, iron, or
steel points as used in the lance of modern times.^

The knife, as one of the earliest needs of man, must
have been soon invented. When lengthened and sharp-
ened it became a poignard, and the step is short from
the poignard to the sword. ^

As to projectile weapons, stones thrown by the hand
were without doubt the first weapons of this character,
and they were still in continual use as late as the Trojan
"War. Then perhaps came the simple club, thrown by
hand also, and after that the stick sharpened at the
point, and thrown as a javelin. In increasing the range
of these missiles, and aiding the natural force of the
human arm by extraneous means, the sling was probably
the first invention, followed by the bow, the ballista, and
the catnpult.

The use of projectile weapons was necessarily closely
followed by the invention of defensive armour, to protect
the warrior from missiles that could not be warded off
by hand-to-hand weapons. The shield or buckler made
of wood, or the skins of beasts, was probably the first
piece of defensive armour ; cuirasses and helmets of
leather came into use next, and soon afterwards copper
and iron must have been used in their construction.

When numbers of combatants became gathered

together for the purpose of attacking their enemies, or

of defending themselves against aggression, they would

ut once perceive the importance of some order being

' De Galland, 3, 4, 5. ^ Ibid. 2, 3.

i

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 3

observed, and to secure this they would see the necessity
of electing one or more chiefs to whom strict obedience
should be accorded. As numbers increased, subdivisions
in command would be made, and the rules regulating the
method of discipline and fighting would become more
numerous and complicated.

At this period in the history of war it is evident that
strength, activity, and endurance, combined with skill
in the use of weapons, w^erc the great qualifications for a
soldier, and that the skilled warrior who had the greatest
amount of endurance was likely to be the most successful.
He therefore, who, encumbered with defensive armour, had
a long distance to march before coming to close quarters
with his adversary was at the disadvantage of being partly
out of breath at the commencement of the conflict.
This has in all probability been the cause of the first
employment of the horse in war. It has soon been
perceived that the soldier who could be carried without
fatigue and placed fresh upon the spot where he would
be obliged to exert every energy in deadly conflict,
would have a great advantasje in a hand-to-hand strusjgle
over one who had been obliged to march heavily laden
for a long distance. This evidently led to the invention
of chariots of war.

Some waiters have held that chariots were invented
for the sake of the advantage gained to the warrior by
his being elevated or dominating over his opponent.
The earliest records, how^ever, prove clearly that such
could not have been the intention, as the chariots were
used simply to carry the most distinguished chiefs to
meet the enemy. On approaching the foe, the warrior,
after throwing his projectile weapons, alighted to engage
in a hand-to hand combat, while the charioteer turned
the chariot for flight, and waited near with his horses'
heads facing the camp. The warrior, if wounded or
hardly pressed, could then conveniently retreat to his
chariot, which was open to the rear, and low to the
ground, and leap in and be carried to the safety of his
own lines.

Had the idea of dominating over the enemy been

B 2

A HlSTOllY OF CAVALRY.

the object of the use the chcariot, it is evident that
the shape wouhl hav een very different, that it would
have been much high.r, and parapeted all around and
projectile weapons alone used from it. When Cyrus
invented chariots for this purpose some hundreds of years
after the ordinary war-chariot had been in constant
use, he caused them to be made upon a totally different
principle. Homer, however, is very clear indeed upon
this point, and gives many instances of the method of
using them at the siege of Troy.

In the fourth book of the Iliad, speaking of Agamem-
non, he says, " He left his steeds indeed, and his brass
variegated chariot, and these his servant Eurymedon, son
of Ptolymeus, the son of Pirais, held apart panting.
Him he strictly enjoined to keep them near him against
the time when iveariiicss should seize his limhs com-
manding over many." ^ In the same book, Diomede, when
entering the battle, having called upon his friend
8thenelus to come and be mindfid of impetuous vale or,
"from his chariot leaped with his arxT^s upon the earth,
and dreadfully sounded the brass on the breast of the
prince as he moved raj)idly along." -

The method of fighting at the siege of Troy appears
to have been of a very desultory and irregular character.
The chief warriors who had chariots were called the
cavalry or horsemen, and were placed in the front line.
The worst soldiers, in whom there was least reliance,
were placed in the second line, while the phalanx of foot-
soldiers, the main stay of the battle, formed the rear or
third line.^ On approaching the enemy, the chiefs en-
deavoured in the first place to wound or slay their oppo-
nents by throwing javelins with brazen points. Upon
coming closer, they were accustomed to stretch out
and strike with the long spear from tlie chariot. They
then dismounted, and the real struggle took place on
foot.

The weapons used were mainly brass-pointed lances or
spears, and swords. The defensive armour was of brass,
and they carried oxhide shields. A description of Ajax's

1 Iliad, iv. 22fi.

Ibid. iv. 420. ^ Ibid. iv. 296.

INTRODUCTORY C!H AFTER.

sliiekl in the sevcntli book of the Iliad ^ shows it to have
been covered with seven layers of oxhide, and an outside
or eighth layer of brass. The weapon most used was
the spear, the sword beiiig merely an auxiliary arm. In
the account of the battle in the latter part of the fourth
book of the Iliad, the style of fighting is clearly depicted,
and one incident in that description illustrates plainly
the relative uses of tjie sword and spear. " But him
^tolinn Thoas struck, rushing on with liis spear, and the
brass fastened in his lungs : Thoas came near to him,
and drew the mighty spear out of his breast, then he
unsheathed his sharp sword and with it smote him in
the midst of the belly, and took away his life." -

Again, in the seventh book, in the combat between
Ajax and Hector, the struggle began w^th spears, then
they threw huge stones with the hand at each other, and
at last in close quarters, fought with their swords till
stopped by the heralds.^

While this kind of struggle w^as going on the
charioteers of either party had their chariots near, ready
to carry away to the safety of the camp or lines those
warriors who became wearied or wounded, or sorely
pressed. The warrior retreated, fighting, to the chariot,
and after mounting defended the rear of it while the
driver urged the horses out of the conflict. The critical
moment at which the chief endeavoured to leap upon
the chariot was often fatal ; for there are many instances
in Homer where death overtook them in the act, as for
instance, in the beginning of the fifth book of the Iliad,
where Idomeneus killed Phcestus. " Him, just as he
was mounting his chariot, spear-famed Idomeneus with
his long lance wounded in the right shoulder, he fell
from his chariot and hateful darkness seized him." *

The chariot was simply used for the purpose of rapid
conveyance, and there is no evidence in Homer of it
being hi itself used as an offensive weapon, nor is^ there
any record of horses being mounted and made use of
for the saddle. In the fifteenth book of the Iliad, in
a simile. Homer refers to a man mounting horses in
' Iliad, vii. 225. '^ Ibid. iv. 527. ^ Ibid. vii. 245. * Ibid. v. 45.

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

J 'I '■

driving tliem from pasture, and vaulting from one
to another as a feat creating surprise ; which leads to
the inference that horsemanship as an art was almost
unknown in his day.

It is asserted by P^re Amyot that chariots of some-
what the same style as those mentioned in Homer were
in use in China as far back as 2600 B.C., and that
cavalry also were in use about the same time in that
country.' It is difficult to say, however, whether these
statements are based upon reliable evidence. The
Chinese pride themselves greatly upon their antiquity,
and one is apt to fancy that some of their history is like
the Welsh gentleman's pedigree, which contained a note
opposite the name of the tenth or twelfth member of his
family, to the effect that about this time lived Adam
in the garden of Eden.

Chariots were used in India at a period more remote
than the siege of Troy. In Egypt also chariots were
in use in the eighteenth century before the Christian
era, or more than five hundred years before the Trojan
war. When Joseph was taken into favour by Pharaoh,
he made him ride in the second chariot which he had,^
showing that chariots were in use for some purpose at
that early date. This is the earliest mention of the use
of the horse in history.

At the time of the exodus of the children of Israel
from Egypt, Phaiaoh " made ready his chariot and took
his people with him, and he took six hundred chosen
chariots, and all the chariots of Egypt, and captains over
every one of them,"* and pursued after the Israelites
with " all his horses and chariots and his horsemen and
his army." *

It is somewhat doubtful whether Pharaoh had any
cavalry, properly so called, for the horsemen mentioned
in connection with the chariots were probably the men
who fought in them and managed the horses, and not
horsemen in the modern acceptation of the term. Horse-
men are not represented on Egyptian monuments, even

* Baidin, article Cavalerie. ^ Genesis xiv. 28. ' Exodus xiv.
6, 7. ^ Ibid. xiv. 9.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 7

iiv)on those of a later date, while chariots are continually
represented. This seems to prove that when the custom
of engraving monuments and monumental tablets first
arose, there were only in use in armies chariots with
their combatants and attendants, and foot-soldiers, but
no cavalry, for in depicting armies the artist would
certainly h.ave illustrated all three branches of the service
if there were so many. It is just possible that after
generations of artists had been representing armies
by chariots and foot-soldiers alone, conventional rules
of art may have arisen, which have prevented the repre-
sentation of real horsemen for many years after they
were actually in general use.

In reference to the difficulty of the word horsemen
being applied to charioteers, it is quite easy to under-
stand how, before the introduction of cavalry, it would
be applied to the only species of force connected with
horses, particularly when the word is used to distinguish
men fighting on chariots from those on foot.

At the same time it is not impossible that when
horsemen really came into use, the same word might be
applied to signify cavalry which had formerly been
used to designate the men who fought in the chariots
and managed the horses. The Hebrew word had
evidently different meanings, for it sometimes is used to
indicate the horses themselves irrespective of their attend-
ants or riders. As the same word is used to designate
cavalry in the later books of the Bible, when cavalry
were employed in great numbers, it has led commen-
tators to translate it in the same way throughout ; but
there is no doubt that all the external evidence tends
,to show that there were no real cavalry in the time of
Moses.

In the Assyrian sculptures chariots appear first, and
as horsemen come into use they also are represented.
It is strange that cavalry could have been in use in
Egypt without any positive evidence appearing in the
inscriptions, especially when we remember how complete
their sculptured records are.

It is impossible to fix with any certainty the period

8

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

i

r' 'I
1); ■

of the first use of the war-chariot, although it is certain
that the account in Genesis (ch. xh., v. 43) 1715 B.C.,
is the earliest historical evidence we have of the use of
the chariot for any purpose, as Exodus xiv. 9, is of their
use for purposes o£ war.

Virgil and Pliny both attriljute their invention to
Erichthonius, the fourth king of Athens, who is said to
have died in 1437 B.C. This is contradicted by the
testimony of Moses, as to their use in 1715 and 1491
B.c.^ The Canaanites also used iron chariots in 1444
B.c.^ The Syrians used them against King David in
1037.' The Assyrians used Avar-chariots as far back as
the reign of Tiglath Pileser T., who lived about the year
1120 B.C.* The early representations of these chariots
show that at first they were small and low to the ground,
with wheels of six spokes. They were usually drawn
by two horses, sometimes by three, but never by four.
The third seems to have been attached with a thong or
rope on one side or the other, and must have been
intended as an extra or spare horse, to supply the place
of one that might be killed or disabled.®

The Assyrians used the bow and arrows almost entirely
in their chariots,® two quivers, crossed diagonally, appear
on the outside of the body of the car, which is low, not
rising more than about three feet.^ The warrior or
archer had a charioteer who managed the horses, and if
a chief of distinction, had also an attendant who carried
a shield and protected him while he was using tiie bow.
In a few cases where the king is represented, or some
personage of very high condition, two guards are shown
protecting the monarch on either side with circular
shields.* A spear was also fixed in a socket in the side
of the chariot as a reserve weapon. The warriors seem
to have usually fought with their bows from the car, but
they sometimes alighted, and moved to the front of the
horses, to enable them to shoot their arrows with better
and steadier aim.^ The attendant in this case also

' Judges i. 19. ^ Joshua xvii. 18. ^1 Chronicles xix.

18. * Rawlinson, Ancient Monarchies, i. 423. ^ Ibid. i. 409.

6 Ibid. i. 421. ^ Ibid. i. 413. « Ibid. i. 412. » Ibid. i. 421.

^i

1

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 9

alighted, and protected his chief with the buckler or
shield.

In the later chariots the wheels were much higher and
the body raised about a foot above the axle, so that the
chief while in it dominated over the field, and had an
advantage over any assailant attacking him on foot. The
warrior also carried a small sword suspended at his left
side with a strap, but he is never represented as using
either it or the s]:)oar which was always nt hand.

Isaiah describes the Assyrians in his day (7G0 b.c.) as
a people " whose arrows are sharp and all their bows are
bent, whose horses' hoofs should be counted like flint,
and their wheels like a whirlwind."^ Tlie allusion to the
hoofs being like flint is interesting, as showing the great
value that must have been placed on sound hoofs, in an
age when shoeing had not been invented.

Xenophon tells us that the Assyrians used their chariots
in the front line somewhat as they were used in the
Trojan War, and that the warrioi's dismounted and fought
as skirmishers on foot in advance of the army, evidently
using their bows and arrows. ^ On the near approach of
the enemy, they mounted their chariots and retired to
their own lines. The foot-archers, the javelin men, and the
slingers, then discharged their weapons at the advancing
foe, and lastly, the heavy armed infantry, the main force
of the army, became engaged in close conflict.

Cyrus the Great, king of Persia 559 B.C., was one of
the flrst military reformers, and if any reliance can be
placed upon the history of his life by Xenophon, the art
of war must have been much advanced by his wise im-
provements. The Cyreneans were accustomed to flght
from their war-chariots and to remain in them in the
field, although the chariot w^as simply used to convey the
warrior, and does not ever appear to have been itself
employed as a weapon or engine of war.^ The people of
Medea, Syria, Arabia, and other parts of Asia, used them
in the same way, and it is evident that they simply
performed a species of skirmishmg duty in front of the

' Isaiah v. 28. ^ Xenophon, Cyropredia, iii. 3, 60. ^ Xenophon,
Cyropsedia, vi. 1, 27, 28, 2y.

10

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

\.'' :!

army covering its advance, the warriors in them using
missile Aveapons only, but never coming to close quarters,
and retiring when the javelin men and heavy-armed
infantry came into action.

The Trojan way of managing chariots has already
been described, and these two methods were alone in use
in the time of Cyrus.

Cyrus seems to have perceived a great waste of power
in both these systems, and to have been the first to
endeavour to use the momentum of the weight and
.speed of the horse and chariot, as an offensive (we may
almost say projectile) weapon. He held the opinion that
when the bravest of the men were mounted upon chariots,
men who naturally constituted the chief strength of the
army, they acted the part only of skirmishers at a dis-
tance, and contributed nothing of any importance to the
attainment of victory. He saw that 300 chariots re-
quired 300 combatants, and 1200 horses, and that the
drivers were picked men in whom the warriors could
best confide, and there were three hundred of them who
did not do the enemy the least harm.^

He therefore abolished both these methods of using
them, and invented a new sort of chariot, with wheels of
great strength so as not to be easily broken, and with
long axletrees to prevent it being overturned. The
driver's seat M'^as like a turret of strong timber. The
driver himself was covered to the eyes in complete
armour, and could manage the horses by reaching over
the seat which came up to his elbows. '^ The axletrees on
each side of the wheels had steel scythes attached about
three feet in length, and others below pointing to the
ground, evidently to prevent an enemy seeking safety l)y
falling down and allowing the chariot to pass over. The
horses were also clad in armour, with forehead pieces,
breastplates, and sideplates, and the whole formed an
engine intended by its momentum to break through the
line of the enemy, and create loss and confusion in his
ranks.^ Cyrus himself equipped 100 chariots in this

* Xenophon, Cyropaedia, ri. 1, 27, 28, 29, 30. « ibid. vi. 1, 29 ;
vi. 2. 17. « Ibid. vi. 1, 50; vi. 4, 1.

liiii

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

11

manner; liis ally, Abradatus of Susa, provided 100 more,
and Cyrus persuaded Cyaxarcs to alter another 100 of
the Medean chariots from the Trojan and Libyan form
to his new pattern, so tliat at the battle of Thymbra
Cyrus had 300 chariots armed with scythes.^ They did
good service, and according to Xenophon, charged with
impetuous fury upon the heavy masses of the enemy,
closely followed by the infantry, who rushed in and cut
to pieces those whom the chariots had thrown into dis-
order.'-^ The success of the invention was so great, that
the scythed chariots were retained in use for many
generations by the successive kings of Persia.'

The ancient Britons used war-chariots against the
Romans. They drove them among their enemies, throw-
ing javelins until they had penetrated their ranks, when
they dismounted and fought as infantry, the drivers
taking the chariots out of the meUe, and placing them
within reach of their masters, to be ready in case they
found themselves too closely pressed. Caesar speaking
of them says, "Thus these barbarians had the agility of
cavalry, and the steadiness and firmness of infantry,"
and he bears strong testimony to their skill and useful-
ness in war.*

Herodotus mentions the Zaveces, a nation of Africa,
bordering upon the Maxyan Libyans, among whom it
was customary to employ the women to drive the
chariots.®

' Xenophon, Cyropaedia, vi. 2, 7, 8. « jbid. vii. 1, 31, 32. s Ibid.
vii. 1, 47. * Caesar, Com. iv. 33. ^ Herodotus, iv. 193.

PERIOD 1.

TO THE ^ALL OF THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I,

Earliest Cavalry.

SECTION I. — SCYTHIAN AND ASSYRIAN CAVALRY.

It is impi ssible to fix the period at wln(^h cavalry, in
the proper sense of the word, were first used. They
were not known in Greece at the time of the Trojan
War, or when Homer wrote, or some evidences of it
would have appeared in his writings. There is no satis-
factory record of such a force in the Bible until after the
time of David, but when Herodotus wrote they were
generally in use in Asia, and had been in use for a long
time.^ It is generally supposed that horsemen fighting
as cavalry and riding on horseback came into use about
120 years after the Trojan War, but this is merely an
approximate conjectur(\'"

It is very probable, although there is no historical
evidence of it, that the Scythians were the first people
to use the horse to ride upon. Living a nomadic life,
upon great plains, in a country where horses existed in
great numbers, where the climate and soil were favour-
able to their increase and maintenance, and subsisting as
the Scythians did principally upon their flocks and herds,
they would naturally at a very early period discover the
use of the horse for equestrian purposes. Once the

' Herodotus, i. 79.

2 Bardin, 1097.

ClIAl'. I.J

EAi;i:iKST CAVALHY.

18

custom was originated, l)ut a very .short time would
elapse before it would l)e universal, and before the whole
peo[)le woidd beeome so habituated to riding as almost
to live upon horseltaek.

They were evidently very skilfid with horses, and
continually in the habit of mounting them, long before
the (Jreeks had conceived the idea of men riding upon
horses at all, for it is clear that the fable of the Centaurs
was originated by the (Jreeks having seen or heard of
the horsemen, whom tlu-y mistook for single animals
half-man and half-horse. This would be the most natural
idea of a non-riding nation in reference to a people who
were continually on horsebaek. The Scythians do not
appear to have used chariots of war at all, so that all
the evidence seems to point to them as the earliest
cavalry nation, unless indeed reliance can be placed
upon the statements of Pere Amyot in reference to
the Chinese,

Their weapons were l)ows rmd arrows. The arrow-
heads, according to Herodotus,^ were brass or bronze,
although Ammianus Marcellinus,^ describing the same
people 800 years afterwards, says that the arrow-points
were of bone. Besides their bows and arrows they used
lances, knives, and battle-axes. They wore bronze breast-
plates, and were good archers and excellent riders."

The Scythians fought tumultuously, without any fixed
order, in groups of trianguhir shape, firing their arrows
at a distance, and retreating if attacked, but rarely if
ever coming to a close hand-to-hand combat,* By this
system they wearied their enemies out, and a force
invading their country was continually in a species of
investment, which ever pressed upon them, but against
which a crushing blow could not be delivered. There
was no art and but little organization among them, the
most skilful chiefs being the foremost in leading them
into action,^

Recent researches into the monumental tablets and
inscriptions of Assyria, as well as the close study of late

' Herodotus, iv. SI. - Ammianus Marcellimis, xxxi. 2.

5 Rawlinson's Parthia, 119. ■• Carrion Nisas, i. 79. ^ Ibid. i. 79.

u

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

1

Uli

years given to the bas-reliefs and other sculptured
remains which have been discovered, have thrown great
light upon the early history of the Assyrians, as well as
upon their manners and customs. These discoveries
enable us to follow with much accuracy the origin and
development of the cavalry service, and the consideia-
tion of them will be the more interesting as they are
the only records we have of the first conception and
subsequent growth of that arm.

Cavalry do not appear to have been used in Assyria
before or during the reign of Tiglath Pileser I. who
ascended the throne in 1120 B.C., or shortly after the
Trojan War. This is shown by the fact that in a long
inscription by him cavalry are not referred to, while
chariots are repeatedly mentioned, Assur-izir-pal reigned
in the year 885 b.c. In the sculptures of his time
chariots appear in great numbers while there are very
few instances of cavalry, showing thai, they were a new
force not much understood and but little used.^ Later
on, in the years 722 to 705 B.C., in the representations of
the reigns o:' Sargon and Senuacheiib, the cavaky have
largely increased, and are continually shown in the scenes
of battles, while the king alone, or but very few of his
nobles, appear to make use of the chariot.

At first the cavalry horses are very peculiarly equipped ;
they wear a head-stall, a collar, and a string of beads ;
the trappings being almost the same as those in use by
the chariot horses of the time. They use the same kind
of bic, being a heavy species of snafile, with the same
straps and ornaments. The collar, which is highly
decorated, is curiously arranged around the neck about
half-way up.^ It is hung round with pomegranates and
tassels. The cavalry soldiers ride without any saddle.

It is strange that these cavalry should have had their
horses equipped in exactly the same way as those used
in the chariots, even so far as to have the collar, which
could have been of no use to a horseman. It may have
happened in the outset that on occasions wheie the
warriors desired to move upon ground where their

* Rawlinson, Ancient Monarchies, i. 423. ^ Ibid, i, 424.

CHAP. I.J

KclRLIEST CAVALRY.

15

chariots conld not be driven, they may have been in the
habit of detaching the horses from the car and mounting
them, probably, for instance, to follow a flying foe over
broken ground.

Their seat in the earliest figures is very remarkable ;
the knees are drawn up as high as the horse's back, and
are pressed close against the neck and withers, the legs
and feet being naked and hanging close to the shoulder.
This shows that the mounting of the horse was a new
idea, and that they had not as yet discovered the proper
and natural m'slj of sitting. These cavalry represent
the very earliest idea of mounted soldiers. This is
shown by the fact that the horseman, whose chief weapon
is the bow, is accompanied by an attendant also mounted,
who is without any offensive weapons and wears a skull-
cap and tunic, and whose sole duty seems to be to hold
and guide the horse of the mounted archer while he is
discharging his arrows. This strongly supports the
assumption that the horses in these time;? must have
been taken from the chariot — the soldier riding upon
one and the charioteer whose duty it was to manage the
horses riding the other and guiding and directing both.
Horsemanship must have been i i its very infancy when
a practice such as that described was in use. The archer,
who was clad in an embroidered tunic and a pointed
helmet, besides his bow carried also a sword and shield,
but there is no instancie of these weapons being depicted
in actual use.^

After this type of horsemen the next period shows
many changes. The cavalry are of two kinds, part
being archers and the other spearmen, and great ad-
vances have been made in the art of horsemanship. A
pad or cloth, either square or the shape of a modern
saddle-cloth, has supplied the place of a saddle. It is
usually fastened by a single girth, although sometimes
a breast-strap and a species of crupper are also used.^
The headstall and breast-leather are very highly orna-
mented. There is a marked improvement in the seat of
the riders in the later sculptures ; the seat on the horse

* Rawlinson, Ancient Monarchies i. 424. ^ jbid. 42.5.

16

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEKIOD I.

is much more correct and graceful, and so much have
they improved in the management of their horses that
the attendants are no longer seen, but the soldiers control
their chargers unaided. The spearmen hold their reins
in the left hand and use the spear in the right, while the
mounted archer boldly lays his reins on his horse's neck
while he discharges his arrows ; the horses evidently
being trained to stand still or to continue at speed with-
out the use of the bridle. The collar sometimes is shown
and is sometimes wanting, which seems to intimate that
it began to be used, as already suggested, through the
horses beinsf temporarily detached from the chariots,
that it was retained at first from habit, and afterwards
simply for ornament, for it seems to have beci highly
decorated.

The uniform of the horsemen is also improved. They
are weU clothed in tunics ornamented with a fringe
around the skirt, a broad belt round the waist, and
sometimes one across the shoulder bearing a short sword,
tight-fitting trousers with a laced boot and the pointed
helmet complete the dress.^ The arms are bare from the
elbow. Later, in the reign of Sennacherib, 705 B.C., the
cavalry were equipped with a coat of mail covering the
whole body, leather breeches, and jack-boots or greaves,
the costume being worn by both archers and spearmen.'"*
The archers used bows about four feet long, firing arrows
about three feet in length which were carried in a quiver
on the back. Sometimes the spearmen had bows which
were carried slung across the shoulder as a reserve
weapon in case of the spear being broken.

In the reign of Essarhaddon, 681 B.C., the cavalry
bowmen were still further protected by large saddle-
cloths or coverings, which were united to a breastpiece,
and which extended to the rear, so as to cover the greater
part of the horse. This, which was made of hide or thick
felt, must have been a great protection against ordinary
missile weapons.

Herodotus^ says that Cyaxares the Mede was the first

' Rawlinson, Ancient Monarchies, i. 426,
' Herodotus, i. lOJi.

2 Ibid. 427.

'^^/

CHAP. 1.]

EAKLIEST CAVALRY.

17

to organise " the Asiatics into cohorts, dividing them
into spearmen, archers, and cavalry."^ King Cyaxares
died in 585 B.C., after reigning forty years. Sennacherib
lived about 100 years before him, and in his time, if not
before, the Assyrians were organised in distinct corps.
In the sculptures of his reign are found bodies of
cavalry on the march unaccompanied by infantry —
engagements where cavalry alone are fighting the enemy
— long lines of spearmen marching in double file, and
sometimes divided into companies, and archers drawn up
together in companies, each distinguished by its own
uniform.^ The slingers also are shown together, and all
clothed and armed alike.

SECTION II. — PERSIAN CAVALRY.

Cyrus the Great made many improvements in the
Persian army, and, if Xenophon is to be believed, was
the originator or founder of the Persian cavalry. His
desire of having a force that could pursue rapidly a
broken and retreating foe was the moving cause which
led him to organize a mounted corps. ^ His idea at first
was not to use the momentum of the horse to aid in an
opening attack, but more to harass and cut off the
retreat after the infantry had defeated the enemy's
masses. He armed them and their horses with breast-
plates, and the men with lances that could either
be thrown or held in the hand. He did away with
the bows and javelins and the custom of skirmishing
at a distance, and in fact organized a heavily-armed
force of lancers, and trained them for hand-to-hand
fighting. He formed them in squadrons of 100 in front
and 8 in depth.*

At the battle of Thymbra Cyrus feared to i-isk his
horsemen against the Lydian cavalry of Croesiis, who
were very skilful in the use of the long lance and
managed their horses with admirable addres?'. He

^ Lemprik'e, Classical Dictionaiy, Cyaxares. ^ Eawlinson,

Ancient Monarchies, i. 462. ^ Xenophon, Cyropsedia, ii. 1 j iv. 3,
9 to 15. * Bardin, Milice Perse.

0

^w

18

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period r.

li

I

consequently gathered all the camels that were with his
army carrying provisions and baggage, and ounted
upon them men in cavalry accoutrements, he placed
these in the first line, commanded his infantry to
follow, and his newly-organized cavalry were all placed
behind the infantry, showing that he had not yet
learned to place much reliance upon his horsemen.
By this stratagem the horses of the Lydian cavalry,
alarmed at the appearance and smell of the camels,
wheeled round and. recoiled in confusion, and although
the Lydians dismounted and engaged valiantly with the
infantry of Cyrus, after a hardly-contested struggle they
were defeated.^ Xenophon, in his account of this battle,
gives much credit to the Persian cavalry, but the
account above, which follows closely the text of
Herodotus, is likely to be the more truthful.^

After Cyrus the cavalry became the most important
part of the Persian armies. They were very heavily
armed, both men and horses, in iron and bras&, and so
laden with it as to be able to compete with difficulty
with horsemen more lightly equipped.^ They were
accustomed, as were the Assyrians, to fetter their horses
at night, ^ a pernicious habit which ren4ered them useless
in case of a surprise, and rendered intrenchments around
the camp a necessity,^

When Xerxes invaded Greece, 480 B.C., he had in
his army 80,000 cavalry, besides camels and chariots.
Among them were 8,000 Sargatians, a nomadic race of
Persian extraction, armed with lassoes and daggers only.
Their mode of fighting was to throw the lasso at a
distance, and having entangled their enemy they drew
him towards them and despatched him with the dagger.®
The Median cavalry wore sleeved breastplates, with iron
scales like a fish. They carried bucklers made of osiers,
short spears, long bows and arrows, and a dagger upon
the right thigh. The Cissians were similarly equipped.
The Caspian cavalry wore goatskin mantles, and carried

' Herodotus, i. 79, 80, ^ Xenophon, Cyropsedia, vii. 2, 46.

' Duparcq, 27. * Xenophon, Cyropaedia, iii. 3, 24, 27. * Xenophon,
Anabasis, 100, 101. ^ Herodotus, vii. 85.

Iii 111 I i
itillll

CHAP. I.]

EARLIEST CAVALRY.

19

bows made of cane, and cimeters.^ The Libyans, clad in
leathern garments, made use of javelins hardened by fire,
and all rode in chariots. The Arabians, in cloaks fast-
ened with a girdle, with long bows carried on the right
side — all rode camels ; they were stationed in the rear,
away from the rest of the cavalry, that the horses might
not be frightened.

In this war the cavalry were used, as in later times,
for in the battle or skirmish at Mount Cithseron, just
before the battle of Plataia, the Persian cavalry charged
in squadrons, their general Masistius, in a golden cuirass,
leacling the advance.^ When he fell, his followers,
attempting to recover the body, cheering one another on,
pushed their horses to the charge, and a sharp struggle
of a hand- to hand character took place.

At this time, also, the Persian cavalry understood
equally well the skirmishing order of fighting, and used
their missile weapons with great effect in harassing and
wearying their enemy.^ Mardonius sent his mounted
archers to attack the Grecian army shortly before the
battle of Platsea. They rode up shooting arrows and
hurling javelins, but refusing to enter into a close
engagement. This action of the Persian cavalry caused
great distress to the Greeks, and compelled them to
move their position, and appears to have been the cause
of bringing od the battle of Plataea.

About 100 years later, when Xenophon served in
Persia under Cyrus the younger, the scythed chariots
were still in use as well as the cavalry both heavy armed
and light. At this time the leaders or generals used both
chariots and saddle-horses. Cyrus was riding in his
chariot when the enemy were reported advancing; he
immediately leaped from the car, put on his breastplate,
and mounting his horse, took his javelin in his hand,
and gave the orders for the marshalling of his army.*
He had 600 chosen cavalry as a body-guard, all armed
with breastplates, thigh-pieces, and helmets ; their
horses had defensive armour on the forehead and breast,

Herodotus, vii. 84 to 87. ^ jbij. ix. 20 to 24.
49, 50. * Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 8, 3.

8 Ibid. ix.

0 2

^sr

20

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD I.

and the horsemen carried swords. At the battle of
Cunaxa he charged with his 600 horse against the guard
of 6,000 who were stationed in front of the king Arta-
xerxes, put them to flight, and killed their commander
Artagerses with his own hand; the fighting being
evidently close hand-to-hand work. Tissaphernes, who
commanded the cavalry of Artaxerxes in this action,
charged with his horsemen through the Greek peltasts.
The Greeks opened their ranks and cut down the horse-
men with their swards and hurled their javelins at
them, which proves that the cavalry must have ridden
boldly on.

After the death of Cyrus the younger, Xenophon de-
scribes how the 10,000 Greeks suffered from the want of
cavalry, being harassed by the Persian bowmen, archers,
and slingers, who, keeping at a safe distance, hurled
their missiles upon the heavily armed Greeks, and if
attacked, retreated swiftly, shooting backwards as they
rode.^ Xenophon organized a small force of cavalry
with the baggage horses. They were provided with
leathern jackets and breastplates, and were most
serviceable in the retreat.

In the war between Darius and Alexander the Great,
the Persians still retained the war-chariots, which seem
to have lost their effect to a great extent by the skill
with which the soldiers of Alexander attacked and
evaded them. The cavalry were very numerous, and
consisted of heavy-armed horsemen, who fought at close
quarters with both swords and lances, and light cavalry,
who used bows and arrows and javelins, and depended
entirely upon harassing their opponents with their
missile weapons.

' Xenophon, Anabasis, iii. 3, 7.

CHAPTER II.
The Greek Cavalry.

SECTION I. ATHENIAN AND THESSALIAN CAVALRY.

The Greeks were not the first people to employ
cavalry in war. The want of pasture, the rocky and
mountainous character of the country, and its general
inadaptability to the use of the horse, naturally led
them to depend at first entirely upon their infantry,
and prevented for a long period that extensive use of
horsemen which was so common at an early age among
the Scythians, Persians, and Assyrians.

The earliest war of which mention is made in Greece,
that of the seven chiefs against Thebes, in 1225 B.C., is
so evidently a mere fiction that no useful information
can be obtained from the records of it. The evidence,
as far as it goes, however, shows that cavalry were not in
use at that period. The next war in the order of time
of which we have any historical account is the siege of
Troy, which occurred forty years later, about 1184 B.C.
Homer has given a very full and detailed account of
this war, and enables us clearly to understand the arms
and method of warfare of his age. He shows us plainly
that although the Greek chieftains had adopted the
chariot as an engine of war, and used it in the same
manner as their opponents, yet that cavalry proper
were entirely unknown as a military force to both the
contending armies.

It is a most probable conjecture that the war chariot
was an invention of the inhabitants of Asia Minor, or

99

A HISTORY ^^ CAVALRY.

[period I.

Egypt, and was adopted .e Greeks in imitation of

them. Herodotus ar .^pressly that the Greeks
learned to yoke four i . ahreast from the Libyans.^

The Thessalians were without doubt the first in Greece
to use cavalry, and most probably made use of them
long before they were known in Greece proper. The
plains of Thessaly were covered with abundant pastur-
age, the climate as well as the soil was admirably suited
to horses, and in that province they must have been
more numerous and vigorous than in most countries.
Virgil says that the Lapithse, a people of Thessaly, first
mounted on horseback, applied the reins, turned the
horse in the ring, and taught the horsemen under arms
to spurn the plain.^

The Thessalians, being the first to use cavalry, the
other nations naturally turned to them to secure troops
of that description to aid them in their wars. We find
when the Pisistratidse had usurped the government of
Athens and banished the Alcmseonidae, that these latter
secured the aid of the Lacedaemonians, who sent a large
force by sea to attack Athens. The Pisistratidse, hearing
of the intended invasion, sent to Thessaly and obtained
the assistance of 1,000 cavalry. Eelying mainly upon
these troops, the Athenian tyrants cleared all the plains
of the Phalereans and made the country practicable for
cavalry, and when the Lacedsemonians landed the
Thessalian mercenaries were sent against them. They
charged upon them vigorously, killed large numbers,
including Anchimolius the general, and drove the sur-
vivors into their ships, and so ended the first expedi-
tion. On the second attempt some time afterwards, the
Lacedsemonians were more fortunate and defeated the
cavalry, who, discouraged by the loss of some forty men,
immediately departed for Thessaly.* After this time we
constantly hear of the Thessalian and Thracian cavalry
in the wars in Greece, down to the time of Alexander,
when they formed some of the finest regiments of
cavalrj' in his army.

Herodotus, iv. 189.
▼. 63, 64.

^ "Virgil, Georgics, iii. 115. ^ Herodotus,

1.

CHAP. II.] THE GREEK CAVALRY. 23

Plutarch states, upon the authority of Philostephanus,
that Lycurgus was the first organizer of the Spartan
cavalry, that he formed them in troops of fifty each
who were drawn up in a square. This is doubtful,
however, for Plutarch goes on to say that Demetrius the
Phalcrean says that Lj'-curgus never had any military
appointment, and that there was the profounr" st peace
when he established the constitution of Spartc There
is the corroborative evidence of Xenophon in his
"Treatise on the Lacedaemonian Government," where
he states that Lycurgus divided the army into cavalry
and heavy armed infantry, six companies of each.

Sixty years after Lycurgus, in the first Messenian
war, 743 B.C., cavalry were used. According to Pausanias,
the Spartans and Messenians had each 500 horsemen
and light armed troops.' In one of the battles the
heavy armed phalanges were separated by a ravine, and
could not come to close quarters, while the cavalry and
light armed troops alone were engaged. In another
conflict, he says that the cavalry on both sides were
very few in number, and did nothing memorable, and
he adds that the people of the Pclopoimesus were not
skilful at that time in the use of cavalry, which pro-
bably accounts for the fact, that in the last action of
the war, which took place at the foot of Mount Tthome,
there appears to have been no cavalry on either side.

Among the early Greeks, the mounted service was not
popular, for they paid but little attention to their cavalry,
and had very few of them in their armies. Those who
were wealthy and able to furnish horses were compelled
to do so, but they were accustomed to give the horses to
substitutes who were also enrolled to serve, while the
wealthy citizens themselves served on foot in preference.
The whole confidence was placed in the phalanx of heavy
armed infantry, and though often defeated through the
want of cavaky, they did not for a long time supply
the deficiency.^ They endeavoured to give the required
assistance to the phalanx, by means of light armed
infantry who fought with javelins, slings, and bows

' Maizeroy, 43, 44, 45. -' Maizeroy, 46.

fn

24

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD I.

and arrows. The archers, though never numerous, were
very useful in action.

The small force of cavalry that was maintained was
necessarily most inefficient. The men did not own the
horses they rode, and consequently were not accustomed
to them, so that we may safely assume that they were
badly drilled and individually unskilful in the use of
weapons on horseback. When therefore the Greeks
had cavalry in the field they were generally too weak
both in numbers and discipline to be divided upon the
two flanks, and were consequently placed upon one flank
or in front to open the action, or what was more common
in the rear to act as a reser\^e. This was the usual
method among the Greeks from the Messenian war until
the invasion of the Persians under Xerxes. The Thes-
salians were the only nation that were attached to the
use of cavalry, and of all the Greeks they alone preferred
serving in it rather than in the infantry.

When the decisive battle took place at Marathon,
which settled the fate of the first Persian invasion, the
Athenians had ten thousand heavy armed infantry all
spearmen. Their allies the Platseans, one thousand
strong, were similarly armed, but neither of them had
cavahy or archers. The Persians had large numbers of
horsemen, and were well supplied with archers. Miltia-
des adopted two precautions to guard his army as much
as possible from the Persian horse, for he evidently felt
strongly the importance of counteracting the influence
of the hostile cavalry. In the first place, he extended
his line so as to prevent his flanks being turned by the
enemy's horse, which usually fought on the two wings,
weakening his centre considerably in order that the
flanks might be safe ; his next step was to abandon the
usual slow pace of the phalanx, and to lead on his men
at a ran, partly to take the Persians by surprise, but
principally to get into action before the cavalry could
mount and form up and manoeuvre against him.

The system among the barbarians of fettering their
horses in camp was no doubt known to Miltiades, and
he was governed in his movements accordingly. We

CHAP II.] THE GREEK CAVALRY. 2fl

have no record in Herodotus of the Persian cavalry-
taking part in the battle, although he states that they
landed at Marathon, because the ground was favourable
to the use of horsemen. Miltiades protected his flank,
as already mentioned, by extending his line so as to rest
on marshes which at the season of the year at which the
battle was fought were impracticable for cavalry, and
the hurried and impetuous attack most probably gave
the horsemen no time to equip themselves or their
chargers, or to form their ranks so as to take part in
the action/

At Thermopylae no cavalry appear to have been used
on the side of the Greeks, but Xerxes had 80,000 horse-
men as well as 20,000 Libyans and Arabians who used
chariots and camels. Herodotus says that the Greeks
resolved to await the invader in Thermopylae, having
weighed everything beforehand, and having considered
that the barbarians in that position " would neither be
able to use their numbers nor their cavalry."

After the return of Xerxes to Persia, and when the
Greeks marched through the Isthmus to attack Mardo-
nius, there is no mention made of any cavalry in their
army. The Persians, however, not only had large num-
bers of their own cavalry, but the Thebans, who were
in alliance with them, furnished a force of cavalry which
seems to have been very effective, and to have done good
service in the skirmishes before the battle of Platsea, as
well as in covering the retreat after it.

It is hard to explain how it happened that the Greeks
had no cavalry in their army, while those Greek nations
who had joined the Persians and were fighting with
them furnished horsemen who evidently were very skil-
ful in the management of their horses and weapons.
It may have been caused by the extreme confidence that
the Greeks had in their heavy armed infantry, and their
desire, in an important conflict, that their whole force
should be of that type which they considered the most
useful. There is another solution more probable still,
and the fact of the Greek nations in alliance with

* Creasj^, Marathon.

S6

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

Mardonius furnishing cavalry is strongly corroborative
of it, namely, tliat the Persian cavalry were so numerous
and so skilful that the small force of horsemen that it
would be possible for the ' I'eeks to raise could not
expect to withstand them ; while they would be obliged
to remain in the plains and in situations where the
Persian cavalry could get at them. By having no
cavalry whatever, and confining their efforts to organis-
ing a powerful infantry, they knew they would have an
army which, unencumbered with horsemen, could operate
on broken ground, and by keeping among the mountains,
neutralize that portion of the Persian army that gave to
it its great strength. The circumstances all favour this
theory. Mardonius moved out of Attica, because it was
not suitable for his cavalry, and marched to Thebes,
where the neighbourhood was adapted to the use of that
force.' This shows the reliance he placed upon his
horsemen.

The Greeks marched from Eleusis to the foot of Mount
Cithaeron, and formed up there, avoiding the plain.
Mardonius sent his cavalry under Masistius to attack the
Megarians, who alone of the Greeks, to the number of
3,000, held an advanced post in the plain. ^ The Megarians
were soon reinforced by large bodies of Greek infantry.
Herodotus says that the Persians charged the Greeks in
squadrons and did them much mischief. Masistius was
killed in the struggle, and the fight swayed backwards
and forwards over his body ; the cavalry charging at
speed, and being firmly met and charged in turn by the
heavy armed infantry, who drove them off the field, and
retained the body of the dead general.^ Nothing could
show the admirable qualities of the Greek infantry-
better than the firm manner in which they met the finest
horsemen of their age.*

The Persian cavalry seem to have been energetic and
enterprising, and to have performed the duties particularly
pertaining to cavalry in a very effective manner. The
Greeks were continually receiving large reinforcements

' Herodotus, ix. 13.
* Herodotus, ix. 23.

Ibid. 20, 21. 3 Plutarch, Aristides.

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

27

as well as provisions by the passes of Cithseron that lead
to Platcea.^ Mardoniiis detached a party of cavalry in
the night to make a detour, in the hope of striking a blow
at the communications of his enemy. Upon issuing
on the plain these horsemen came upon a convoy of 500
beasts carrying provisions from Peloponnesus to the
Grecian army. They immediately attacked and captured
the convoy, killing many of the escort as well as of
the beasts, and carrying off the remainder to their own
lines. This is probably as early a record as there is of
cavalry being detached in this way to operate upon the
enemy's rear.

The mounted archers were, of the Persian army, the
greatest annoyance to the Greeks. They harassed them
by riding up and hurling javelins and arrows, but care-
fully avoiding a close engagement.^ These cavalry cut
them off from the river Asopus, so that the Greeks
were much distressed for want of water. Their attend-
ants, who were sent to Peloponnesus to get provisions,
were also shut out by the cavalry and unable to reach
the camp. For a while they were in a most dangerous
position, and were obliged to consult how to get away
to an island on the Asopus, where they hoped to be
free from the attacks of the cavalry.^ They resolved
to march in the night, that they might not be seen,
and that the enemy's horse might not follow and
annoy them.

This brought on the battle of Platsea, which resulted
in a complete victory for the Greeks.* The Boeotian
cavalry did good service to the Persians in covering the
retreat.^ The Theban cavalry fell in after the battle with
the Megarians and Phliasians who were coming up to
join the Greek army, and charged upon them.** Hero-
dotus says they threw down and killed six hundred of
them, and drove the rest headlong to Mount Cithaeron.
The whole account seems to give the idea that
the charge was pushed home, and vigorous in its
character.

' Herodotus, ix. 38, 39. 2 ibid. 49.
6 Ibid. 68. « Ibid. 69.

3 Ibid. 51. * Ibid. 62, 63.

28

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

In this war, the Greeks so felt the want of an effective
force of cavalry, that in the first general assembly of the
Athenians, held after the retreat of the Persians, Aristides,
proposed to raise in Greece 10,000 infantry and 1,000
cavalry, and 100 ■'/essels to be maintained to carry on the
war against the barbarians.^

After this period the Greek cavalry was soon put upon
a more efficient footing, and in the next conflict of which
we have a detailed and complete account, that is to say
the Peloponnesian War, the cavalry exercised an important
influence. At the opening of the war the Athenians had
13,000 heavy armed infantry, exclusive of garrisons, and
1,600, on the guard of the city ; " they had, including the
archers that were mounted 1,200 horsemen, 1,600 archers
and 300 triremes fit for the sea.' The cavalry were not of
a good quality, however, for in two skirmishes in the first
year of the war they were defeated and shut up in
Athens.^ In the third year of the war, in a battle under
the walls of Spartolus, although the heavy armed infantry
of the Athenians defeated the heavy armed Calchideans
and drove them into the town, the horse and light armed
Calchideans got the better of the horse and light armed
troops of the Athenians, and so harassed the Athenian
army in their retreat with missile weapons, as to cause
great loss, without coming to close quarters at all.* This
proves that up to this date the Athenian cavalry had not
acquired any reputation, and could not compete with the
horsemen of Macedonia or Thessaly. '

In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War we see
that the Athenians had transport ships, especially to
convey cavalry, and that two hundred horsemen were
carried by sea in the attack made that year upon Corinth,
Thucydides, speaking of the battle which en8U(jfl, says
that the advantage to the Athenians from having this
small body of horse, while their opponents had none, gave
them the victory. ^

At the battle of Delium, 424 B.C., Pagondas won

^ Plutarch, Aristides. * Thucydides, book ii., year i. ^ Ibid,
book ii., year 1. * Ibid, book ii., year 3. ^ Ibid, book iv.,

year 7.

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

29

the victory by means of vo troops of horse that he
despatched around a hill to fall upon the rear of the
Athenians, who were till then victorious.* The Athenians,
imagining a fresh army was coming up, were struck with
consternation and utterly defeated and driven off the
field. In this battle the cavalry and light armed, troops
of both armies were ranged upon the two wings. At the
first battle of Mantinea, in 418 B.C., the cavalry on both
sides were placed upon the wings in line with the heavy
armed infantry, but they do not appear to have exercised
any important influence in the battle.^

At this epoch we see mention made for the first time
of the custom of attaching an infantry man to each
horseman. Thucydides says that the Boeotians assembled
at Phlius, shortly before the battle of Mantinea, con-
sisted of 5,000 heavy armed, 5,000 light armed, and 500
horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot. These
attendants were drilled to fight with the cavalry. Each
horseman had his own foot soldier, who fought near
him, and served and aided him, if occasion required.'
This same kind of force was in use afterwards among
the Germans, where the foot-soldiers followed the
cavaliers, running and holding onto the manes of the
horses.

In the expedition against Sjrracuse, the Athenians
were much embarrassed by the want of cavalry, and in
their first battle they were obliged to adopt an entirely
new formation to counteract the effect of the powerful
cavalry of tho Syracusans. The Athenian army was
drawn up with one half in a first line of eight in depth,
the remainder also eight deep, formed in a hollow square
with the train and equipage of the army in the centre.*
The Syracusans were drawn up sixteen in depth. After
a hard conflict, the Athenians were victorious, but were
unable to follow up the victory on account of the enemy's
cavalry, which effectually c ov-rp.d the retreat.

As then* army suffered so mui.1- from the want of a
mounted force the Athenians sent the.^ the following

' Thucydides, book iv., year 8. ^ Ibid, book v., year 14.

8 Maizeroy, 54. * Thucydides, book vi., year 16.

II

i

so

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

spring to Catana 250 horsemen with all the equipments,
but without horses, which were afterwards obtained in
Sicily, from the Egestians and Cataneans, and by purchase
from neighbouring nations/

During the Peloponnesian war, the Spartans being much
depressed at their losses at the island of Sphacteria, and
the occupation of Cythera by the Athenians, contrary to
their usual maxims organized among themselves » body
of four hundred, horse- and archers.'^ Prior to this Ara&
they had depended upon their allies, such as the Thebans
and Phocians, to furnish what cavalry they required in
their expeditions outside of Peloponnesus.^

The Greeks had in their armies three species of
cavalry, the *' Cataphractes " {KaTd(ppaKTr)s), the " Greek,"
and the "Tarentine." The heavy armed, called, the Cata-
phractes, were not much used. They wore a casque
which covered half the face, and protected the neck and
ears,* a cuirass of plates of iron or horn in scales, which
covered the body in front and rear, while the thigh and
right arm were protected by hide covered with plates of
metal. ^ The horses also were provided with defensive
armour ; the horsemen wore boots and spurs, and their
weapons were the lance, the long sword, and sometimes
the javelin.

The tactical unit was the " ilc " (txij), a troop of sixty-
four horses.^ The order of formation varied at different
times and among the different nations. The Thracians
formed the ** ile," in the shape of a wedge with the point
towards the enemy. The Thessalians ranged two "iles"
in the shape of a lozenge, of which one point faced their
opponents.' The other Greeks, who also sometimes used
the lozenge, formed up the "ile" in a square or rectangle,
the four rear ranks acting as a reserve.^ Under Epami-
nondas the *' ile " was divided into four sections of six-
teen horses each ranged four in front by four in depth,"
but the most common formation of the ** ile " was

' Thucydides, book vi., year 18. 2 ibid, book iv., year 8.

^ Maizeroy, 58. * Rocquancourt, 1, 54. ^ Carrion Nisas, 1, 87.
* Rocquancourt, 1, 58, 59. '^ Humbert, 20, 21, * Carrion,

80, 81. » Bardin, article " Ile."

CHAP, n.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

31

sixteen in front by four in depth: — Two "iles of 64
horses each formed an " epitarchie ; " two " epitarchies "
formed a " tarentinarchie " of 256 horses; two " taren-
tinarchies" formed a "xenagie" or "hipparchie" of 512
horses ; two " hipparchies " formed an " ephipparchie " of
1,024 horses; two '* ephipparchies " formed a "telos"
of 2,048 horses J two "telos" formed an "epitagme" of
4,096 horses.

There was in use among the Greeks another species of
cavalry more lightly armed, called the " Greek," who
carried only the lance and the sword, and whose horses
Avere not protected with armour.^ They wore casques
similar to those worn by the Cataphractes, a corselet of
tanned leather or a coat of mail, a buckler, and boots
and spurs.

The medium, or " Greek " cavalry, so called from being
the species most commonly used in Greece, were divided
into three different types, called " bopv<f)opoi," " KovTo<f)cpoi,"
and *' \oyxo'f>^poi." These names arose from the dif-
ferences in the length or shape of the lances, and the
manner in which the different corps used them. They
were lightly armed, but sufficiently so to close with the
enemy in fighting with the lance and sword. Some of
them carried bucklers but not all.^ The Zopvj>opoL used
lances a little longer than those used by the Kovrojiopoi,
or \oyxo<f)opoi : the last two used shorter lances which
they used both for thrusting and throwing. There
was a cord attached to the shaft, so that after
throwing it the horseman could pull it back again for
further use.

The " Tarentine," or light cavalry, were not regularly
organised. They were sometimes armed with javelins
and sometimes with bows and arrows. They charged
with the sword or battle-axe, carried a small buckler as
a defensive arm, and sometimes wore corselets of tanned
leather.* The lightest cavalry used darts or javelins
thrown from a distance ; and some were even trained to
throw missiles to the rear while in flight after the manner
of the Parthians. They never came to close quarters as

> Humbert, 21. 2 Maizeroy, 69. " Duparcq, 48, 49, 51.

32

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

they were too lightly armed to stand the shock. The
mounted archers were also reckoned in this class, the
Cretans surpassing all the other Greeks in the use of the
bow on horseback.^ The term " aKpo^oXiarai " was
applied generally to all those who fought in this manner
from a distance.

The position occupied by the cavalry in action was
not fixed by any arbitrary rules, but depended some-
what upon the nature of the ground. The Tarentine,
or light cavalry, intermingled with light infantry, was
sometimes placed in front of the " Greek " or medium
cavalry, sometimes upon its wings.^ The Cataphracta,
who were held in reserve until the battle was fairly
joined, then charged the enemy, and opened a road for
the others who followed up a success and completed
the victory.

The cavalry of the Greeks used neither saddles nor
stirrups, nor were their horses shod. The cavaliers
either mounted their horses bare-backed, or placed upon
them a light rug, or mat of skin, or cloth upon which
they sat.

The Athenians recruited and maintained their cavalry
with much more care than did the Spartans. They
kept up a force of 1,200 horse, each of the ten tribes
furnishing 120 cavaliers with the phy larch, who being
chosen by the tribe commanded the contingent. When
united, the whole force was placed under the orders
of two hipparchs who were elected annually to the
command.

The Spartans, who did not value cavalry, had a small
force only, and even these were chosen from among the
least vigorous of their people, and those of the lowest
morale. Xenophon says that at the battle of Leuctra
" the Lacedaemonian cavalry^was at that time in a very
inejfficient condition, for the richest men maintained the
horses, and when notice of an expedition was given the
men appointed came to ride them, and each taking his
horse and whatever arms were given him proceeded at

* Maizeroy, 68.

^ Rocquancourt, i., 54.

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

33

once to the field, and thus the worst and least spirited of
all the men were mounted on horseback."^

At this battle the Theban cavalry were only about 500
in number, but were veteran troops well organised and
drilled, and rapid in their movements. They at once
fell upon the Lacedaemonian cavalry, defeated them and
drove them in confusion upon the ranks of their infantry,
and prepared the way for the heavy Theban phalanx
with which Epaminondas hurled his decisive blow upon
the right wing of the Spartan army.

At the battle of Mantinea 363 B.C., the principle upon
which Epaminondas ranged his troops was similar to
that at Leuctra, the left wing being refused instead of
the right. His cavalry on his right wing were formed
in a strong wedge-like body, with companies of foot
supporting them. To the left of his army, on some high
ground, he posted a portion of his cavalry with parties
of infantry interspersed among them to hold in check
the Athenians who were on the right of the Lacedae-
monian army. His plans were crowned with complete
success ; the cavalry on his right overthrew the cavalry
opposed to them, and drove them from the field. The mass
or phalanx with which he made his attack on the left of
the enemy broke through the line and won the victory.
The Athenian cavalry on the right being held in check
by the superiority of the Theban squadrons, took no
part in the fight. ^

SECTION II. — GREEK CAVALRY UNDER PHILIP AND

ALEXANDER.

The squadron of the Scythians, Thracians and the
Macedonians had a triangular form, and was called a
wedge or spur ; Philip King of Macedon, father of
Alexander the Great, is said to have been the inventor of
this method of formation.^ He placed the officers on the
angles, and the most skilful soldiers in the outside ranks,

' Xenophon, Hellenics, 496.
^ Mottin de la Balme, 6.

2 Ibid, book vii., ch. v. 23, 24, 25.

D

*!

.1 I:'

fi :

34

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

mi

[period I.

leaving the centre to be filled up with weaker and less
trained men.

In the reigns of Philip and Alexander the military-
power of Greece reached the zenith of its splendour, and
the Macedonian army at that period was a model of a
perfect Grecian army ; ^ its organisation was not much
less elaborate than exists in the best armies of Europe at
the present day.**

They had both field and siege artillery, as well as a
transport corps with its train of horses, mules, and carts,
the whole being under military ofiicers. The phalanx of
infantry was a mass, 256 men in front by a depth of
16 ; in all 4,096. Attached to the phalanx were 2,048
liglit armed infantry and two regiments or hipparchies of
512 horses each.

The cavalry were of three kinds : the heavy, who wore
coats of mail, helmets and brazen greaves, and carried
swords and short thrusting pikes ; the light cavalry, who
were used mainly for outpost duty, and were armed with
lances about sixteen feet long ; and the dimachi
{Sifiaxoi), who were formed by Alexander the Great, and
were similar to the modern dragoons, being intended to
fight both on foot and on horseback.

The dimachi (Bifidxoi) were armed more heavily
than the other cavalry, but not so much so as the heavy
armed infantry. Alexander attached to them valets or
attendants, whose duty it was to hold the horses while
the horsemen dismounted to fight on foot. This seems
to have been the first instance of the use of dragoons,
and we see in it again the same idea that led to the use
of the early war-chariots — that of carrying an armed
soldier speedily and without fatigue to the scene of
conflict. The art of war by this time had so improved,
that the importance of rapidity of movement in antici-
pating an enemy in seizing an important position had
come to be fully understood, and Alexander, one of the
greatest military reformers, saw the advantage to be
gained by a force such as described, which could operate
upon broken ground where chariots could not be used.
' Graham, 34. ' Maodougal's Hannibal, 14.

CHAP. 1

!•]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

35

3 seems

Alexander improved the cavalry considerably, drew
them up in shallower lines eight in depth, and left
intervals between the troops in which he placed light
armed infantry to aid and assist the horsemen. The ile,
or troop in time of war he increased from 64 to 250
horses.^ The phalanx of heavy armed infantry was the
base or reserve of his army. With his cavalry and the
hypaspistes (a chosen body of about 6,000 light infantry
equipped and armed specially for offensive movements,
and having great mobility), he usually opened the attack
upon the enemy, while the phalanx followed up the
success.

Alexander was the first among the Greeks to employ
cavalry to a great extent in his army. The proportion
of cavalry to the infantry before his time averaged from
a twelfth to a fifteenth. On his expedition to Persia he
set out with 5,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, or in
the proportion of one to six. At Arbela he had 40,000
infantry and 7,000 horse. Not only did he increase the
proportion, but he increased the rapidity of their move-
ments, and their ability to manceuvre in masses. His
fiery and impetuous nature led him naturally to favour
the cavalry service, and we find him in nearly all his
battles leading the cavalry of his right wing, opening
the action with a charge, and always appearing at the
decisive point at the head of a victorious body of horse-
men.

He was the first apparently to have the idea of
using the horse and his rider as a projectile weapon so to
speak. He understood the advantage of hurling masses
upon the enemy and breaking through them by the mere
momentum. While Alexander was delivering crushing
blows with his horse and with the lighter infantry, the
phalanx on the left centre was the mainstay or point
d'appui of the line of battle, the left being refused and
fighting mainly upon the defensive until the crisis of
the action, when it charged.

The main strength of Alexander's cavalry consisted of
two chosen regiments, one Macedonian and the other

^ Lecomte, 53, 54.

D 2

rir

I i

3G

A HIHTOKY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

i !

'■;|iii

ill!

Thessalian. Each corps consisted of about 1,500 men.
They were armed as heavy cavalry, or cataphracts, with
long lances and swords, the men and horses both being
well equipped with defensive armour.

In addition to all his other cavalry, Alexander had
a corps d'elite composed of young Macedonians distin-
guished by their birth, courage, and address. They were
called his " friends." They fought around him and with
him. He caused Lysippus to cast in brass statues of
twenty-five members of this corps who were killed at the
battle of Granicus, and placed them in the city of Dium.

At the battle of Granicus Alexander crossed the ford
at the head of the cavalry of his right wing. Arrian
says, " Never was there a more obstinate conflict of horse
known." The Persians fought chiefly with barbed jave-
lins, the Macedonians with spears ; Alexander, observing
where the Persian officers and their horse stood thickest,
there made his first effort. The Macedonians, well
disciplined, well led, and armed with lances for hand-to-
hand fighting, soon defeated their opponents, who seem
to have relied upon missile weapons, and to have awaited
the charge on the river bank.^ Alexander, who fought in
the thickest of the mSlee, had part ^f his helmet carried
away, and was slightly wounded, while his friend and
companion Clitus saved his life by cutting down Spithri-
dates, who was attacking him from behind. The light
armed foot in this passage fought among the horse, and,
according to Arrian, inflicted great damage upon the
Persians.

In this action Alexander showed all the qualities of
a great cavalry commander, for after defeating the horse
of his enemy and driving them from the field, he did not
follow them any distance, but immediately faced about
and charged violently upon the foreign mercenaries, who
were still firmly holding their ground. The Macedonian
phalanx of heavy armed infantry attacked these mer-
cenaries at the same time, and as Arrian says, "the
whole body of horse " also charged vigorously, we must
assume that the cavalry of the left wing must have

' Arrian, i. ch. xvi.

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

37

struck upon their right and right rear, while Alexander
charged upon their left and left rear. The result was
a complete victory ; all the foreign mercenaries in the
Persian army were killed, except 2,000 who surrendered
themselves prisoners.

Nothing could be better than the conduct of Alexan-
der in this action as a commander of cavalry. The
battle in its main features is very similar to the battle
of Rocroy, where the great Cond^ won the victory by
a like use of his cavalry. How diflferent from Prince
Rupert at Naseby and Marston Moor, or Jean de Wert
at Nordlingen !

At the battle of Issus Alexander again fought on
the right wing, and charged across the river in
face of a flight of arrows, but the moment they came
to hand blows the enemy turned their backs and
fled.^ The Greek mercenaries in the army of Darius
in this battle also fought desperately, and inflicted heavy
losses upon the Macedonians before they were defeated.
As soon as the mercenaries gave way, Alexander with
his cavalry pressed the pursuit vigorously, so much so,
that Darius had to abandon his chariot with his cloak,
bow, and shield, while he escaped on horseback under
cover of the night.

At the battle of Arbela, Alexander, as usual, fought
on the right wing at the head of his cavalry, where the
decisive struggle took place in preventing the Persians
from turning the right flank of the Macedonian army.
The Persian line far overlapT^ed their opponents, and the
turning movement woulc have succeeded, had not
Alexander, in anticipation of it, formed a reserve or
second line, from which he ordered up the auxiliary
horse under Menidas to attack them while in motion
and drive them back. A desperate struggle ensued, and
here was seen the importance of fresh reserves in a
cavalry action. Menidas, overpowered, began to fall
back, when Aretes, with the Pseonians, was ordered to his
relief, and the barbarians gave way. But another body
of Bactrians coming to the aid of the flying Persians,

' Arrian, ii. ch. 10.

38

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

rallied them and restored the fight. After a hard
struggle Alexander, with the force of cavalry under his
immediate command, formed into a sort of wedge or
column, made the decisive charge upon the Persian line
and broke through a gap that had opened in it.' The
success of this charge was followed up by the phalanx,
which broke into the barbarian ranks with irresistible
force. Then Darius gave up all for lost and fled.
Parmenio, on the left wing, by this time had got into
action, and was suffering severely under the attacks of
the right wing of the Persian army. A body of the
enemy's cavalry had also pierced through a gap in the
Macedonian line between Parmenio and Alexander,
and had penetrated as far as the camp where the
baggage and cpntives were under the guard of the
Thracian infantry. The fate of the battle was trembling
in the balance when Alexander, calling back his cavalry
from the pursuit on the right, fell with great fury upon
the light horse of the enemy's right wing. After a hard
fight he defeated them, and then pushed on to Parmenio's
assistance. His Thessalian horse of his left wing had
already attacked, with such valour, that on Alexander's
appearance the whole Persian right broke and fled.
Alexander at once turned again with his horsemen, and
retracing his steps took up the pursuit of Darius and
kept it up till dark, Parmenio following up the victory
(Q his part of the field.

The Persians in this action used a large number of
armed chariots which were placed in front of the line of
battle. The Greeks by this time, however, had learned how
to meet them to the best advantage. The Agrians, who
were light armed troops, and the darters under Balacrus
were placed in front of the Greek line, and with their
missile weapons destroyed many of the chariot horses
and their drivers. They also seized the horses by the
reins and stopped them, and threw the drivers from
their seats and slew them. Some made their way
through the middle of the army, for they opened their
ranks as Alexander had ordered wherever the chariots
' Arrian, iii. ch. 13, 14, 15.

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

89

approached, and afterwards closed up again and remained
firm and unharmed.^ The cavalry in the reserve after-
wards captured most of those who got through.

Alexander passed the river Lycus, and halted there
to refresh his men and horses till midnight, when he
started on again in pursuit, arriving at Arbela the next
day, a distance of 600 furlongs (about seventy miles
English) from the battle-fielc.

There is no battle in history in which a better apprecia-
tion is shown of the cavalry service, nor a better use
made of it, as well in action as in the pursuit.

After this battle Alexander altered the organisation of
his cavalry by appointing two decurios to every
troop. Before this time there had been no decurios in
the mounted service.^ He made these appointments
partly, it seems, to have his cavalry better oliicered, but
probably also to give him an opportunity to promote
some of his auxiliaries, who had served him with great
courage and fidelity.

He also after this constituted a troop of " darters "
to fight on horseback, and he continually employed flying
columns consisting mainly of cavalry of all kinds, with
which he made raids or inroads upon the tribes in the
neighbourhood of his line of march.'

It was with a flying column mainly composed of
cavalry with some picked infantry that he pursued
Darius after the battle of Arbela, when he heard that
the Persian king had fallen into the hands of his Bactrian
satrap Bessus. After marching almost incessantly for
three days and nights, his infantry from weariness could
not keep up, whereupon he dismounted 500 of his horse-
men, and placed his captains of foot and others of the
best infantry (men who were heavily armed) upon the
horses, and pushed on in pursuit all night, ordering the
remainder of the infantry, as well as the dismounted
cavalry, to follow slowly on foot. He came up with the
barbarians early in the morning, and put them to flight
instantly. Bessus escaped with 600 horse after having

* Arrian, iii. rh. 1.3.

2 Ibid. 16.

^ Ibid. 24.

40

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

assassinated Darius, who died of his wounds shortly
before Alexander saw him.

The energy and impetuosity of this pursuit will com-
pare favourably with anything of the kind recorded in
history, and the fact of Alexander dismounting a portion
of his cavalry to mount infantry men upon the horses
deserves close attention, showing as it does the apprecia-
tion that great master of the art of war had of the
value of a force of dragoons which, with the rapidity of
movement of cavalry, would yet when brought into
action have the solidity and defensive power that well-
organised foot-soldiers alone can have. Further on in
this work the gradual development of this idea will be
shown, and the various attempts made from age to age
to utilise the principle will be recorded, in order that
the question may be intelligently discussed, as to whether
the improvements of modern military science have made
the dragoon force more or less useful than in previous
times.

It may here be mentioned that in the wars of Alex-
ander, as well as long previously, light cavalry were
used for outpost duties — that scouts w^ere used for re-
connoitring, and patrols and sentries and videttes seem
to have been employed very much upon the same general
principles as are in use at the present day.

SECTION III. — THE TRAINING OF THE GREEK CAVALRY.

The Greeks paid great attention to the training of
their soldiers. From their infancy almost they were
accustomed to gynmastic exercises tending to increase
their strength and activity. Wrestling and pugilistic
encounters were, however, left to professional athletes,
and were simply used as exhibitions of bodily strength
and skill. Proficiency in them was not considered of
any advantage to the soldier.^ The Grecian youth were
exercised in running, leaping, throwing the javelin,
climbing, &c. They also practised all the evolutions
in which they might possibly be engaged in action,

^ Dnparcq, iiS.

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

41

using pikes without iron points. The cavalry soldiers
were'' carefully trained to mount and dismount from their
horses, and were exercised in vaulting upon wooden
horses in order to become proficient in an accomplish-
ment that was very necessary in an age when they had
not the aid of the stirrups by which modern horsemen
mount so easily.

Xenophon has described the steps taken by Agesilaus
to form a body of cavalry when in Phrygia, and that
skilful general seems to have taken the greatest pains in
getting recruits to obtain approved riders, drawing his
levies from horse-breeding districts, in the idea that the
recruits from those sections would be expert horsemen.
When he had collected his forces at Ephesus, he drilled
them continually, and to incite them to take pains he
offerc 1 prizes to the troops of horse to such as should
ride best. The places of exercise were consequently
crowded with men practising, the horse course full of
horsemen riding about, and javelin men and archers
aiming at marks. This cavalry, so carefully drilled,
aided materially in gaining the successes which followed
in the campaign.

In his " Treatise on Horsemanship," Xenophon gives
an elaborate description of the method of mounting in
use in his age, and it seems that even then the horse was
mounted from the left side. He says the rider " must
take the rein, which is fastened to the lower part of the
bit, or to the chain that goes under the chin, in his left
hand in a convenient manner, and so loosely that he may
not, either as he raises himself by grasping the mane
near the ears, or jumps on the horse's hack with the
assistance of the spear, pull the animal back." This
seems to intimate that there were two methods of vault-
ing upon the horse ; one somewhat similar to tlie way in
which a groom will now get on a horse bare-back by
vaulting with the hands resting on the withers ; the
other by means of the assistance of the spear. There is,
according to Berenger, a collection of antique plates in
the British Museum in which there is one representing a
soldier going to mount his horse by the aid of his spear.

1 'I ■

42

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

PERIOD I.

)' I II !

V I

Ji

m

I

The spear is planted at the side of the horse, and has a
hook upon the shaft, on which the man placing his foot
easily bestrides the horse.^ This explains the above
passage. The same writer adds that Livy mentions
likewise this met'iod of getting on horseback as prac-
tised by the Roman soldiers.

In mounting from the right side Xenophon says it is
very proper to practise it as well as the other, as there
is nothing more to learn than to perform those move-
ments with the left hand and foot which the rider had
previously performed with the right.

The horseman was taught to sit well upright upon
his thighs, and not as if seated on a chair ; and was
taught to cling to his seat with his thighs, letting his
legs from the knees down hang loosely. The body of
the rider was carried erect, so that he could have full
command over his weapons. The reins were carried in
the left hand as at present, the arm being kept close to
the side.

The horsemen were drilled in sham combats with each
other, using spears and javelins blunted with balls, and
by alternately retreating and charging, they gained the
necessary skill in the use of their horses and weapons
which was required in actual warfare.

SECTION IV. — XENOPHON's TREATISE ON CAVALRY.

This is the most ancient work we have which treats
specially of the cavalry service, and is very interesting
as an expression of the ' 'ews of a skilled soldier who
throughout all his writings seems to have shown not only
a thorough knowledge of the cavalry service, but an
appreciation of and fondness for it of a very marked
character.

The treatise is addressed to some particular person, sup-
posed to be his son Gryllus, who served in the Athenian
cavalry, and it details fully all the duties of a com-
mander of horse in the Athenian service, how the force
may be maintained at the proper number, how to equip

' Xenophon, 284 nnle.

PERIOD I.

CHAP, n.] THE GREEK CAVALRY . 43

them properly, and how to exercise them in peace and
in war.

The work shows that, in very many essential points,
the Greeks of his age had attained a considerable skill in
the management of their cavalry. The weapons and
system of fighting, both among the infantry and horse-
men of that time, were so different from the arms and
system at present in use, that the mere details of drill
are of but little interest to us now, but upon the general
principles which govern the use and employment of
cavalry Xenophon's views merit close attention.

In his first chapter he impresses upon the reader the
absolute necessity of great care in the choice of horses
for the cavalry service — kicking and unmanageable
iiorses are to be avoided, and well-trained ones alone
kept in the force. Attention is also to be paid to their
feet, that they may be in a condition to be ridden on
rough ground, and he advises having the horses stand
upon smooth round stones while being groomed, so as to
harden the hoof, the use of iron shoes being unknown in
his day.

The next point he urges is to exercise the men
thoroughly, so that they may be well able to vault on
their horses readily, and to ride them easily upon all
kinds of ground. As soon as the riding-school course
was completed, and the recruit could sit firm, then he
was to be taught and drilled as much as possible to
throw the javelin on horseback. Having armed both
men and horses with defensive armour, the next duty of
the commander was to inculcate obedience, " for without
obedience there will be no profit either in good horses or
in firm-seated riders, or in fine arms."

Xenophon also advises the cavalry in drilling to ride
out into the country, to leave the beaten road, to gallop
their horses over ground of all sorts, and to have mock
combats in such pjaces. General Seidlitz, Frederick the
Great's best cavalry general, used to exercise his regi-
ment in this way over rough ground so violently that
Frederick once found fault with him on account of the
number of deaths caused by it Seidlitz coolly answered,

I

44

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

|l ■ !•

I

1

' Hi

i i

I

" If you make such a fuss about a few broken necks,
your Majesty will never have the bold horsemen you
require for the field."

The phylarchs, or commanders of squadrons, are
urged to attend to the details of equipping, and super-
intending the exercises of the contingents under their
immediate orders, and are told to endeavour to excel
all their men in horsemanship and all the other duties
of a cavalry soldier, setting thereby a good example,
and securing also more respect and a more ready
obedience.

The lance, he says, should be carried pointing forwards
over the horse's head between his ears. The movements
he details, however, are generally parade movements to
be performed before the Senate in order that the force
might be approved, as it was the law in Athens for no
man to serve in the cavalry without having first been
inspected and approved.

In marching on active service he suggests that in
order to give rest to the backs of the horses, as well as
to aflbrd relief tO the riders, the commander should move
them at a moderate pace, and at times dismount the
men and let the force march leading their horses. This
is an idea that should always be borne in mind in
making forced marches, for it is a great relief to both
man and horse, and gives a considerable amount of rest
with very little loss of time.

The method given for increasing or diminishing the
front of the column is Tr»uch the same as that in use in
modern times. He says in marching through narrow
passes you must lead your men in single file. In
broad roads extend the front of each tribe, and in
the open plain you must form all the tribes in a solid
body.

He advises extraordinary scouts in advance of the
ordinary ones in an enemy's country +o give timely
notice of the proximity^ of the foe. His idea is
evidently that ^ . addition to the usual advanced
guard there should be small reconnoitring parties still
further in advance ; a precaution of value in all ages.

[period I.

n necks,
nen you

ODS, are
d super-
ier their
to excel
er duties
example,
re ready

forwards
jvements
Qieiits to
the force
.8 for no
irst been

CHAP. II.]

THE GREEK CAVALRY.

45

He advises a commander of cavalry to acquire in time
of peace an accurate knowledge of the enemy's country
as well as his own, for he says truly that " a leader who
knows the roads is a totally different person from one
who is totally ignorant of them ; and in forming plans
against the enemy, he who has a knowledge of the
country has a vast advantage over him who is a stranger
to it." When General Von Moltke, in the summer of 1 868,
travelled incognito over the eastern districts of France,
in anticipation of the war which broke out two years
later, he was following to the letter the advice given by
Xenophon to his son over 2,200 years previously. The
result proved that the advice had not lost its value by
the lapse of so many centuries.

The instructions as to the posting of pickets and
sentries are admirable. He advises secresy, so that
they may be a security to their friends and an ambush
for the enemy. Outposts concealed are less liable to
surprise, and more to be dreaded by the enemy, and
an attacking force not knowing where to meet resistance,
watches every spot with suspicion, and cannot move so
freely or so rapidly.

The whole treatise shows a great experience in
the cavalry service, a complete knowledge of the
duties of a commander, and is marked throughout by
a keen appreciation of human nature and of those
moral influences which so much affect a body of
soldiery.

' i'

' I

MM

CHAPTER III.
Roman Cavalry.

section i. early history.

The infantry was the most important portion of the
Roman armies. It was with their infantry that the
Romans conquered the world, and to it that the greatest
care was devoted in order that it might be always
maintained in the highest ptate of efficiency. They
were well equipped both wich defensive armour and
oflFensive weapons, and were drilled and exercised con-
tinually, so that their discipline was always as perfect
as attention could make it. The Roman infantry at the
earliest period was drawn up in the phalanx formation,
in which they probably copied the Greeks,^ but they
very soon adopted the system of maniples by which the
legion was divided into a number of small fractions,
which gave it much greater mobility. Under Caesar
several maniples were united, and the cohort became the
tactical unit. Under the empire this was also the custo-
mary formation, the cohorts consisting of about 555
men each.^

The Romans, like the Spartans, were not naturally a
cavalry nation, although their highest order in the state
served in that force. It is, however, a fact worthy of
mention that no officer of the legion during the time of
the Republic was permitted to serve mounted. In times
of great emergency when a Dictator was appointed, he
' Bardm, 3075. ^ Gibbon, i. U.

CHAP. 111.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

also, although invested with supreme power, was not
allowed to ride on horseback unlefts he first obtained
permission from the people.^

If the early legends which form the basis of the first
period of Roman history are entitled to any credence,
it is clear that the mounted service was both understood
and made use of \o a certain extent from the very
foundation of the state — although the persons whose
names are mentioned in connection with it were probably
mythical.

Up to the time of the second Punic War, however,
the Koman cavalry were weak in numbers, and, although
brave and gallant soldiers, were not very efficient as
horsemen. In their early wars we see that the issue of
nearly all the battles depended almost entirely upon the
exertions of the legionary infantry, and there are not
many instances of successes gained through the eflforts
of the cavalry ; the most noted being the capture of the
town of Trossulum in Tuscany by the Roman knights
alone without assistance.^ On account of this feat the
equites were sometimes called Trossuli.^

When Romulus, according to the legend, organised the
new community, and divided it for civil and military
purposes into tribes and curiae, each tribe maintained ten
curiae of 100 men each ; so that the three tribes together
furnished a force of 3,000 infantry, which was the main
military strength of the state.* In addition to this
Romulus also instituted a body of horsemen caUed celeres
or equites, who were formed into three centuries of 100
men each, taken equally from the three tribes. They are
said to have been armed with the sword and javelin,^ and
were accustomed to fight either on foot or on horseback.
They were of patrician rank, and were chosen young men
who served about the person of the king in peace and
war, as a species of body-guard.^

Tarquinius Priscus seems to have valued the cavalry
service more highly than his predecessors, and made

' Roman Antiquities, 117. ^ Bardin, 1118. ^ Lempri^re,
Trossulum. * Roman Antiquities, 137. * Bardin, 1118.

® Lempri6re, Celeres; Livy, i. 15.

48

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

more use of it, for he doubled its numbers by adding
100 men to the century of celeres of each tribe, who
were known by the name of Ramnes, Titienses, and
Litceres posteriores} The early records say that he
made much use of these horsemen in his wars and
derived great advantage from them.^

Servius Tullius reorganised the army and the state.
The three double centuries became six ; they were the
six patrician centuries of equites often referred to under
the name of the sex suffragii.^ To them were added
twelve new centuries of knights formed from the richest
members of the community, property, and not birth,
being the qualification.^ These no doubt contained many
plebeians, but must also have contained some patricians,
for it is not probable that the whole body of the patri-
cians were in the six old centuries. No one was admitted
into the centuries of equites in the early times of the
Republic unless his character was unblemished, his pro-
perty qualification sufficient, and his father and his
grandfather had both been born freemen.

The eighteen centuries of knights, established under the
constitution of Servius Tullius, were all furnished with
horses at the expense of the state, and with an annual
payment for their support. Afterwards, about the year
403 B.C., another class of equites came into use in addition
to the old force, and consisted of those citizens who had
a sufficient fortune to serve in the equestrian ranks, but
had no horses allotted to them by the state.^ This class
furnished their own horses, and served in the cavalry in
preference to the infantry, but do not seem to have been
considered as holding the full rank of equites.

The censors made a public inspection during their
censorship of the equites who were intrusted with horses
by the state. They marched past the censors on foot in
single file, each knight leading his horse. ^ If the censors
were dissatisfied with the character of the knight or the
condition of his horse or his equipment, and considered

^ Roman Antiquities, 137. ^ Arnold, History of Rome, IG.

' Roman Antiquities, 137. * Livy, i. 43. '' Roman Antiquities,
138. 6 Ibid. 73, 138.

\m

PERIOD I.

adding
be, who
ics, and
that be
ars and

le state,
v^ere the
;o under
e added
e richest
)t birth,
ed many
itricians,
le patri-
admitted
}8 of the
his pro-
and his

iinder tha
bed with
n annual
; the year
L addition

who had
anks, but

his class
avalry in
lave been

mg their
h horses

n foot in

le censors
ht or the

onsidered

Rome, IG.
\.ntiquities,

CHAP, in.]

ROMA^' CAVALRY.

49

him unworthy of his rank, they struck his name from
the roll, deprived him of his horse, and in some instances
compelled him to serve on foot. This punishment was
looked upon as a great disgrace.

In the year 251 B.C. 400 Roman knights refused
to obey the command of the Consul Aurelius Cotta to
work upon some fortifications in Sicily.^ He reported
them to the Censors, who degraded them all from their
rank and deprived them of the right of voting. ^

The cavalry were enlisted for ten years, the infantry
for sixteen, or twenty if required.^ If the knight who
had served ten years still wished to retain the horse
furnished by the state and continue his service in the
cavalry, he could do so provided he was capable of
performing the duty efficiently.*

The social class from which the cavalrv were drawn in
Rome was the highest both in rank and wealth in the
community. This seems to have been a custom common
to all nations in the early ages except some of the Greek
states. The ruling order or class, as we have seen in
the references to the Assyrians and Egyptians, fought
in chariots, and afterwards on horseback, and it was
evidently looked upon as a social distinction to serve
in the mounted force. The Roman knights had many
exclusive privileges, and soon became a distinct order
in the state. The active part the knights took in
suppressing the conspiracy of Catiline increased the
power and influence of the equestrian order to such
an extent, that Pliny says that from that time it
became a third body in the state, and to the title of
Senatus Populusque Romanus there began to be added
Et Equestris Ordo. They were distinguished by wear-
ing a gold ring peculiar to their order and its distinctive
badge.

In the neighbouring states the cavalry were also
composed of the aristocratic classes, for we read that
in the victory gained by L. Papirius over the Samnites
in the year 293 B.C., the mass of the routed army fled

* Frontin, iv. 1, s. 22. ^ Arnold, 437. » Roman Antiquities,
U."). * Bardin, 3584.

i I

31 ! I

II I

ic

00

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

either to their camp or to the town of Aquilonia, but
the cavalry, contahiing all the chiefs and nobility of
the nation, escaped to Bovianum.^

In Kome the class of equites existed long after it
was used as a distinct corps of cavalry serving in the
army. In the later periods of the Republic the cavalry
were supplied almost entirely by the allied states. In
the Gallic war Caesar had no body of Roman cavalry,
for he was escorted to his interview with Ariovistus by
a number of his legionary soldiers whom he mounted
upon the horses of his Gallic cavalry, as he was afraid
to trust his safety to the horsemen furnished by his
allies.2

The equites, although not serving as a distinct corps
in :he later wars, are frequently mentioned, for they
cj-^.ear to have been employed almost altogether in
positions of trust,^ either as officers in the cavalry of
the allies,- or in command of the legions, or as staff-
officers assisting the general-in-chief, or as singularii or
volunteers, who were employed as they might be most
useful.*

In the time of Augustus the knights occupied a most
important position, all the higher officers of the army
were chosen from among them, as well as the chief
magistrates, so that it was esteemed a great privilege
to be admitted into the order.^ It was also the best
introduction into public life, as without it a young
man was excluded from all military rank above that of
centurion, as well as from all civil offices of any
importance.

All those equites who were on active service were
obliged to live in Rome, and during the Empire they
still retained a considerable degree of social importance.
As late as Valentinianus and Valens they occupied the
second rank in the city and were not subject to corporal
punishment.^

The officers of the cavalry ranked higher than those

^ Arnold, 345. ^ Caesar, i. ch. 42. ^ Roman Antiquities, Equites,
* Bardin, 4887. ' Roman Antiquities, Equites. ^ Roman

Antiquities.

im '■

PERIOD I.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY,

61

1

holding a similar position in the infantry. The cavalry
decurion was of equal rank with the centurion of the
legion.^

We have very little information as to the system of
drill and method of fighting in use among the Romans
in the very early ages. In the account Livy gives of
the battle between the Romans under Valerius and
Brutus, and the people of Veii under the banished
Tarquin and his sons, he says that Valerius led up the
foot in a square battalion (evidently in the phalanx
formation), and Brutus marched before with his horse
to reconnoitre. The Veientians came up in the same
order, Aruns, Tarquin's son, in command of their horse.
The cavalry must have charged each other with lances,
for it is stated that Brutus and Aruns transfixed each
other with their lances and both fell lifeless from their
horses.^

At the battle of Lake Regillus the cavalry appear to

ave fought with spears or lances. After the battle had

€en raging for some timie with varying fortune, and the

omans were almost despairing of success, the Dictator

osthumius went to the cavalry in the reserve and

ntreated them to dismount from their horses and join

he fight, as the infantry were exhausted with the severe

itruggle that had been going on.^ They dismounted,

hurried to the front, and formed in the first line, and

fought with the tired foot-soldiers, who, inspirited by

this action of the young noblemen, increased their

exertions, and soon the Latins were beaten back and

outed. The horses were then brought up to the cavalry,

ho mounted and pursued, followed by their infantry,

nd soon captured the enemy's camp.

Livy mentions that in the year 481 B.C. the Consul
Caeso Fabius routed the army of the iEqui solely by a
harge of his cavalry, but that the infantry refused to
ursue them when routed on account of their hatred of
he consul*

In the battle between the Romans and the Sabines,
n the year 447 B.C., when the Sabines suddenly turned
1 Bardin, 4250. ' Livy, ii. 6. » Ibid. 20. * Ibid. 43.

E 2

62

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY,

[period I.

the flank of the Koman line, about GOO cavalry of two
legions leaped froir their horses and rushed forward and
restored the battle, then remounted their horses and
gallopped across to the other wing announcing their
success, and by a charge contributing also to victory in
that portion of the field. ^

Another remarkable instance of the good services of
the Koman knights occurred in a battle fought in the
year 422 B.C., between the Romans under the Consul
Caius Sempronius, and the Volscians. The Roman
infantry in the battle do not appear to have been in a
good state of efficiency, the historian complaining thfit
there was more Roman discipline in the Volscian than in
the Roman army. The Volscians attacked boldly, the
Romans hesitated, wavered, and although there was no
absolute flight, they were giving way at all points, when
Sextus Tempanius, a commander of a troop of horse,
called to his men to leap from their horses, to follow his
spear as their standard, and to show that no cavalry
were equal to them as cavalry, no infantry as infantry.
Their onset was made with such spirit that the fight was
restored, the Volscians were obliged to make way for
them, and they broke through the lines which closed
behind them, cutting them off" from their own army.
The Volscians showed front both ways, opposing Tem-
panius in the rear, and still continuing the battle against
the Romans, who made desperate efl'orts to rescue their
horsemen. Tempanius, unable to cut his way back,
succeeded in reaching an eminence, where these young
Roman knights formed a circle as the Scottish knights
and nobles did at Flodden, and fought till night
separated them, when both armies took a panic and fled
in opposite directions, leaving Tempanius in undisputed
possession of the field. ^ He did not move till daylight,
fearing an ambush, but then, finding the neighbourhood
deserted, he led his little band back to Rome, where a
warm welcome was accorded to them.

These actions, the details of which are fully recorded
in Livy, show that it was sometimes the custom of the
1 Livy, iii. 62. 2 ibid. iv. 38, 39.

,.„A,.. in.] ROMAN OAVALKV. 53

Roman kniglits to fight dismounted, but it could not
have been the intention to use them generally in that
way, or it is probable they would have been more
heavily armed with defensive armour.

At the battle of Sentinura, the Roman and Campanian
cavalry charged the Gaulish horsemen twice and with
ttfect, when they were encountered by the war-chariots
of the enemy, a force wholly strange to them, which
friglitened their horses, threw them into confusion,
and drove them in rout back upon their infantry.^ The
war-chariots in this action seem to have done effective
.service, but evidently more on account of their novelty
and the moral effect they produced, than on account of
any real value in them.

SECTION IT. — EQUIPMENT, ARMAMENT, AND TACTICS OF
THE EAKLY ROMAN CAVALRY.

The equipments of the first Roman horsemen were of
a very simple character. They seem to have worn a
species of tunic which left the limbs naked, in order
that they could mount and dismount with the greatest
facility.^ They did not use either saddles or stirrups,
but had a pad or covering upon which they sat, and
which was kept in its place by a girth, a breast leather,
and a crupper.^ They wore no cuirass, their sole defence
being a round shield covered with ox-hide, and a helmet.
Their lances, according to Polybius, were useless for two
reasons : in the first place they were very light and weak,
so that the least thing would break them ; in the second,
place, they were only pointed with iron at one end, so
that when they were broken in the first charge, which
was usually the case, the piece remaining in the knight's
hand, not being sharpened with iron, was of no further
use. Polybius speaks very contemptuously of the
bucklers used by the Romans in early times, saying that
they were no defence as they were not strong enough to
resist anything, and even if properly made, the leather

1 Arnold, 340. « Duparcq, 117. " Polybius, book vi.

ch. 4 ; Humbex-t, 27.

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A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

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softened and spoiled with the rain to such an extent as
soon to render them worthless. The early Roman
cavalry carried swords as well as lances and javelins.'
As they were very lightly armed, in fact almost destitute
of protection, they incurred great risks in action.

They afterwards improved their cavalry by borrowing
the system of the Greeks. They adopted a lance longer
and stronger and ironed at botli ends, the handle being
almost one-third from the rear end. The bucklers were
also improved, were made smaller and stronger, and of a
square or oblong form. The swords were broad in the
blade, only thirteen inches long, and very sharp in the
point. They were worn on the right thigh until the
time of Vespasian, when they were put on the left, and
a dagger worn on the right.'* Helmets were also worn
at first of leather, afterwards of metal. At the time that
the cavalry were without defensive armour, the infantry
were all supplied with cuirasses. Although we see
that in the battle already referred to, which took
place between Brutus and the Tarquins, the cavalry
commenced the action, it must not be supposed on
that account that the cavalry were in the habit of
opening the battle, for we see many instances where the
cavalry were in the rear as a reserve, and in the crisis of
the engagement were brought up on foot to the aid of the
infantry. One instance occurred at Lake Regillus, another
in the action between the Romans and the Sabines in
447 B.C., and again in the case of Sextus Tempanius,
all of which actions are referred to in this chapter.

The reason for the cavalry opening the action between
Brutus and Tarquin is easily gathered from the account
in Livy, which says that Brutus marched before with his
iiorse to reconnoitre. Aruns Tarquin with the enemy's
horse came np in the same way, and when he recognised
Brutus, accompanied by the lictors of a consul, all in-
flamed with rage, he cried out, " There is the villain
who has banished us from our native country ! See how
he rides adorned with the ensigns of our dignity. Now
assist me, gods, the avengers of kings!" and he put
1 Bardin, 1118. 2 Roemer, 279.

KOMAN CAVALRY.

0.1

ClIAV. III.]

spurs to his horse and drove furiously against Brutus/
They transfixed each other, and both fell dead, and the ac-
tion between the horse commenced at once. This shows
that a violent personal animosity brought on this tight be-
tween the reconnoitring parties, and is no proof of a custom,
against the existence of which there is some evidence.

It seeras probable that the cavalry were organised,
equipped, and maintained fcjr two objects : to recon-
noitre, in which service they did not re(iuire heavy
armour, as they could perform that duty without coming
to close quarters ; and as speed in movement was a great
object, it could be attained much better by keeping the
men as lightly armed as possible. In the second place,
it seems that during the action the horsemen were held
in the rear, not so much as a reserve, but more probably
to be used in case of a victory to pursue a flying foe. It
will be seen that for this purpose also heavy defensive
armour would not be required, as in the panic of a
retreat -they would not expect any serious resistance
from the fugitives, while being lightly armed they could
pursue with much greater rapidity.

Had the intention been to hold the cavalry in reserve,
and to dismount them to fight on foot in the line of
action in case of disaster to the infantry, it is clear that
they would have been armed more heavily even than the
foot-soldiers, for they would have been considered the
mainstay of the battle, and being carried on horseback
could without fatigue have worn much heavier armour
than if they were not mounted. Their old method of
using horsemen seems to have been maintained until the
wars with Hannibal, when many changes were made in
the equipmeiic and management of the Roman cavalry.

As late as the battle of Cannae the Roman knights leaped
otf their horses to fight the Carthaginians.^ Hannibal,
seeing it, said, " This pleases me better than if they were
delivered to me with their feet and hands tied."^

The turma was the tactical unit of the Roman equites,
and consisted of three decuriae of ten men each, com-
manded by three decurions. The senior decurion had

' Livy, ii. 6. 2 Plutarch, Fabius, 135. ^ Folard. Polybius, iv. 392.

56

A HISTORV OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

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commaii " of the tiirma. Besides these officers were three
others chosen by them, who acted as serrefiles,* so that a
turraa consisted altogether of thirty men and six officers,
{dl under the command of the senior, or in his abse ice
of the second decurion. It was formed for action in
throe ranks, with ten men in front, and sometimes four
in depth by eight in front. The commander of the
turma led in front of the centre, the second and third
decurions were on the right and left flanks respectively,
in line with the front rank. The three serrefiles were in
rear, one in the centre, the others on either flank. There
was a flag or ensign to each turma.

There were ten turmse to each legion, or one to each
cohort, so that the legionary cavalry formed about one-
eleventh of the legion.^ They were usually drawn up
on the two wings, although they were sometimes placed
in front, and sometimes in the rear of the infantry.'"^ The
legion of the allies consisted of the same number of
infantry as the Roman, but the cavalry were twice as
numerous, there being 640 to the legion of allies, and
320 to the Roman. The turma formed up with intervals
equal to their own front, and each file occupied about
five feet of space, in order to give the soldier room to
use his missile weapons. These small tactical units gave
great facility for manoeuvring, and tended to prevent
confusion, which in large bodies of poorly trained troops
would easily arise.

When sixteen turmse of auxiliary troops were united
they formed a wing or a/a, and this was commanded by a
prefect. The cavalry upon the wings were generally
aided by light infantry, who were mingled with them
and skirmished during the battle ; the remainder of the
cavalry placed i".i rear of >\he infantry followed up the
victory. The allied cavalry, as we have seen, were much
more numerous than the Roman. They seem to have
performed the duties of light cavalry and to have been
used principally for reconnoitring and foraging. They
were often raised in the country where the war was
carried on, and formed of those wno were partisans of
* Liskenne, ii. 30. Tbid.

CHAP. HI.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

57

Rome. When cliti^v^n up for action they were placed on
the wings, and were called equites alarii to distinguish
them from the Roman cavalry called equites legionarii.

Before the Punic War the Romans, although they
considered the cavalry as the most honourable service,
and filled its ranks with the young men of the highest
position in the state, had never appreciated the true
genius of the arm, and had neA'^er understood the proper
method of drilling it or employing it in war. There
does not appear to have been any design in their
management of the force except that which has been
already intimated, of using it to reconnoitre and to
pursue. The speed of the horse was utilised by them for
these purposes simply, but the idea of using a mass of
cavalry as a projectile weapon, to be hurled at speed upon
an enemy, to crush down all opposition by its weight
and velocity, was not thoroughly appreciated by them.

They used them often on foot, and it is strange that
they never organised a force of heavy armed dragoons
that could have dismounted and taken their place in line
with the triani or best of the foot soldiers. They did not
organise such a corps, but continued to maintain a force
badly equipped and armed, and quite unfitted for the
great sphere that was open to cavalry in an age when
projectile weapons had a range of but a few yards.

'SECTION III. — CAVALRY IN THE WARS WITH HANNIBAL.

Hannibal, who was one of those great masters of the
art of war who nppet«,r only at intervals separated by
centuries, and who have always left a deep impress of
their genius upon the records of the military science,
was tlie first in Western Europe to estimate the cavalry
service at its true value, and to clearly understand the
full benefits to be derived from the proper tise of it.
Like Alexander in the east, Hannibal in the west
obtained a series of the most brilliant successes against
the finest infantry of his age, by the skilful use of a
numerous and well-trained cavalry.

Hannibal left the Pyrenees to invade Italy with 50,000

53

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEEIOD

infantry, and 9,000 cavalry, all picked soldiers who had
fought in the wars in Spain until they were tried
veterans. The proportion of cavalry to the infantry
was much greater than in the Roman armies, and almost
the same as in the army Alexander the Great led into
Asia Minor. The cavalry of the Carthaginians was,
however, infinitely better in quality than that of the
Romans. They were divided into heavy and light.
The heavy cavalry wore coats of mail, helmets and
brazen greaves, and carried a sword and a short thrust-
ing pike as offensive weapons.^ They were formed up
according to the Greek custom in troops of sixty-four
men each, eight in front by eight in depth. The cavalry
of his Gaulish allies were heavy cavalry using large
broadswords, and being equipped and formed up and
manoeuvred in the same way as the Greek Cataphraeti.

The Numidian cavalry, which formed the light horse
of Hannibal's army, were reputed to be the finest light
cavalry of the age. There are such conflicting accounts
as to their armament and equipment, that it is difficult
to describe their method of fighting with much certainty.

Their horses were small thin animals, and ere
ridden without saddles, as in all the other ancient
cavalry.^ The men were poorly equipped, in fact almost
naked, and managed their horses with a whip or thong
of leather. The services performed by these horsemen
under Hannibal were so great that it is hard to conceive
that they were so poorly supplied. They used no reins
nor bridles, for Polybius, in describing the battle of the
Ticinus,* speaks of the heavy cavalry with reins, being
placed in the centre, and the Numidians upon the wings ;
the inference of course being that the Numidians used no
reins. The Numidians are also referred to by ancient
writers as *' gens insciafreni " and " Numidce infreni."*

On the column of Trajan the Numidian horsemen are
represented as almost entirely naked, their only garment
being a small cloak or mantle worn across the shoulders
and flying loosely in the air.' Montfaucon describes one

* Macdongall's Hannibal, 11. ' Beamish, 29, 30. ^ Polybius,
iii. ch. 13. * Silius Italicus, quoted in Beamish. 31. ^ Lempriure,
Numidia. Virgil.

PERIOD I.

CHAP,

III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

69

figure so dressed. A lioman soldier is trying to drag
him from his horse by the hair of the head. The horse,
a small slight animal, has neither saddle nor bridle, nor
pad nor straps. Strabo says that the Numidians directed
their horses where they wished with a small rod, and
that, without being led, their horses would follow them
like dogs.^ In view of this accumulated testimony, it is
probable that the Numidians must have been able to
manage their chargers without bridles. Folard, however,
does not place anj' reliance upon the figures on the
Trajan column, treating them as " une pure reverie de
sculpture."'^ It seems probable that Folard is right
except in reference to the want of bridles, but the
corroborative evidence of Polybius, Strabo, Silius Italicus,
llerodianus, and Virgil, confirms the statement that the
Numidians used no reins.

The Numidians may have been accustomed in their
own country to serve almost naked, but it is not at all
likely that, v/heu they were enrolled in Hannibal's army
and were serving in Spain and Italy, they were not
supplied with some light clothing. They were armed
with javelins and a buckler. They were not fitted for
fighting in line or by squadrons, although Hannibal seems
to have trained them to such an extent, that he was able
to form them in squadrons of sixty-four each, and draw
them up on the wings of his army in the front line.

Their principal use was, however, to harass the enemy,
to reconnoitre, to forage, to attack convoys, to annoy a
rear-guard, and to make raids on the baggage of their
foe. They were bold and enterprising, exceedingly
hardy and very rapid in their movements.^ Their great
strength lay in their cajjacity to harass and aniioy ; their
tactics, like those of the Parthians, consisted in charging
p in irregular groups, and throwing their javelins with
wonderful skill, falling back when attacked and pressing
on again when occasion oftered, repeating this manoeuvre
with a rapidity which proved the speed, the strength,
and the surefootedness of their horses.

In ambuscades, surprises and skirmishes they excelled,
1 Beamish, 30. « Folard, iv. 116. » Ibid.

I

60

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period 1.

and they were the most useful in broken ground and in
the midst of obstacles. It is no wonder that Livy said
th*"^. they were the best cavalry in all Africa.

L one can calculate the enormous advantage such a
force must have been to Hannibal. AVithout it and his
heavy cavalry he could not have held his own in Italy
for one single campaign ; with them he fought victoriously
in a hostile country far removed from his base, in fact
practically cut off from it, for sixteen long years. Had
the Romans been as well supplied with horsemen or been
superior to him in that force, he would almost at once
have been obliged from want of food to surrender, or to
have evacuated Italy. It is the first instance in the
history of Western Europe of the enormous advantages
to be gained by an overwhelming force of cavalry. As
we proceed in this work this same idea will continually
recur, until example heaped upon example will show as
plainly as can be possible the great value of a cavalry,
numerous and properly equipped and handled.

Hannibal not only fully understood the value of
cavalry in all the minor operations of war, but he was
the first in the West to use cavalry on the field of battle
in accordance with the true spirit and genius of the
force. Under him, the horsemen in large masses were
hurled with impetuous fury upon the foe, the victory
being gained by the overwhelming rush of the charging
squadrons. No man knew better how to pave the way
to victory, by the use of his cavalry before the action,
or to secure success by skilful charges of his horsemen
upon the field.

The first engagement that occurred between Hannibal
and the Romans in Italy took place on the banks of the
Ticinus. It was almost entirely a cavalry action, and it
established at once the superiority of the Carthaginian
cavalry, and evinced the extraordinary skill displayed
by Hannibal in his method of handling it.

Publius Scipio, who commanded the Roman army, was
advancing with his cavalry and some light armed troops
to reconnoitre the enemy, whom he had heard were
approaching, when he met Hannibal at the head of his

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

61

cavalry alone, who was engaged in the same duty.^ This
brought on the action of the Ticinus, which was the
first conflict between Hannibal and the Romans in Italy,
and is important not so much on account of the numbers
engaged as for the moral effect it produced, which was
felt long afterwards.

Publius drew up his force in a single line most pro-
bably in turmae, with intervals between them. The
Gaulish allies were in the centre, the Roman cavalry on
the flanks.' In the spaces between the turmse, and in
the centre, the light armed infantry were placed to give
strength to the line.

Hannibal drew up his heavy cavalry in single line,
most probably in troops or squadrons of sixty-four men
each, with intervals between them, and his force being
more numerous he was able to place his Numidian
cavalry upon the wings, so that they overlapped the
lines of his opponent.

It can be seen at once that Scipio, having light armed
infantry intermixed with his cavalry, could not have
intended to make a very vigorous charge, but evidently
designed to act upon the defensive as much as possible,
and the light armed troops were not sufliicieutly armed
or stable in their formation to oppose any real resistance
to the cavalry, as strong bodies of heavy armed infantry
might.

Hannibiii saw the weakness of this formation at a
glance. His chiefs and horsemen, impatient to open the
action, asked to be led on, and the order was given to
charge. There was no time for the light armed infantry
to harass them much.^ Polybius says, " They had scarcely
thrown their first darts, when, frightened by the Car-
thaginian cavalry who came upon them, afraid of being
trampled under the feet of the horses, they fled back
and escaped by the intervals between the squadrons."
The Roman horse also moved on to meet them, and a
close hand-to-hand struggle took place, many dismount-
ing and fighting on foot after the melee had commenced.
The Numidians swept around the flanks and fell upon
' Folard'R Polybius, iv. 116. 2 ibid. 117. ^ Ibid. 116, 117, 118.

G2

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[pEnioD I.

the light armed troops who had retired to the rear and
crushed them under the feet of their horses. Having
destroyed these auxiliaries, the Numidians then wheeled
round and fell upon the rear of the Koraan centre, which
was still engaged with the Carthaginian heavy cavalry,
and soon put them to flight, and a complete victory was
thus gained by Hannibal.

The above account, which is taken from Polybius,
clearly shows that the attack of the Carthaginian heavy
horsemen was very spirited, and seems to have taken the
Roman light armed troops by surprise. This action
established the superiority of Hannibal in the open
country, and the moral effect was lasting. Scipio re-
treated immediately, and passed the plains with all haste
to a bridge over the Po, where he crossed his army, " not
believing himself in safety," says Polybius, "in a flat
country, in the neighbourhood of an enemy which was
much superior to him in cavalry."

The conduct of the Roman general in the opening of
this campaign was very faulty. He must have known,
or should have known, that Hannibal was very superior
to him in cavalry, both in regard to numbers and to
quality. He should also have known that his own
infantry was superior to that of the Carthaginians, that
it was better disciplined and more full of confidence.
The Romans had always hitherto placed their main
reliance upon their infantry, and had always looked to
it to secure victory to their standard. It is difficult
therefore to conceive for what reason Publius Scipio
fought the first battle of the war with the weakest
portion of his own army, against the strongest and best
portion of his enemy's. The moral effect of the first
victory in a war is incalculable. It is rarely that an
army beaten in its first conflict can recover that con-
fidence and that moral force which contribute so much
to success.

The next great battle fought by Hannibal was that of
the Trebbia, and there again the most able generalship
was shown by the Carthaginian leader, while the Romans
committed faults without number. Hannibal had taken

CHAP. HI.] ROMAN CAVALRY. 63

up a position with his army about five miles south-east
of Placentia, cutting off the communication of the
Roman Consuls with Rome and Ariminum. The Romans
then marched out of Placentia to the west, and crossed
the Trebbia and camped on its left bank, probably to be
near the towns in which their magazines and supplies
were stored.

Hannibal again used his Numidians to bring on an
action on ground of his own choosing, where he had
facilities for preparing an ambush, from which a detach-
ment could fall upon the flank and rear of his opponents
at the crisis of the action. The Numidians were sent to
lay waste the country in the neighbourhood of the
Roman camp. Sempronius (who commanded the
Romans) led out his cavalry and a large body of archers
and drove them back to their lines, and after a heavy
skirmish Hannibal drew off his troops and left Sempro-
nius elated with an apparent success.

In the night he placed his brother Mago with 2,000
picked soldiers, half infantry and half cavalry, in the
bed of a watercourse, in front of his right flank, where
they were perfectly concealed. At the break of day,
before the Romans had been tible to eat their morning
meal, he sent his Numidians across the river to threaten
their camp, and to endeavour to entice them into a
general action. Sempronius fell blindly into the trap.
He sent his cavalrv to attack the Numidians, ordered
out 6,000 archers on foot to follow his horsemen, and at
length in person led the remainder of his army out of
their entrenchments. The success of the previous day
had rendered him vainly confident. It was mid-winter,
very cold, the Trebbia was swollen breast-high, the
Romans were fasting. Hannibal awaited them on his
own ground, his men warm and fresh and vigorous, well
fed and in high spirits. In face of all this Sempronius
led his men through the swollen stream, and with an
army enfeebled with the cold, fought a general action
with a river in his rear.

This battle of the Trebbia is a convincing proof of
the fact that Hannibal owed nearlv all his successes to

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64

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEHIOD I.

his numerous and well led cavalry. When the Romans
had followed the Numidians across the river, Hannibal
sent on to the succour of his cavalry his light armed
infantry, and the slingers from the Balearic Islands,
numbering about 8,000 men, following closely himself
at the head of the main army. He formed up his
infantry, consisting of Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans, to
the number of 20,000, in a single line in the phalanx
order. The cavalrj'-, including his Gallic allies, amount-
ing to 10,000, were equally divided upon the wings, as
also were his elephants.

Polybius, whose account we follow, says that " Sem-
pronius recalled his cavalry, who fatigued themselves
uselessly against the Numidians, who were skilful horse-
men, accustomed to fly in disorder at the first shock, and
to return as boldly to the charge the next moment."
Sempronius formed his infantry in three lines, the
cavalry 4,000 strong upon the wings.

The Roman velites were soon driven by the Cartha-
ginian light armed troops, through the intervals of their
lines, as they had thrown away nearly all their darts
and javelins, in their skirmish with the Numidians in
the early morning. The main lines then came into
action, when the Carthaginian horsemen, more numerous
and energetic, fell upon the Roman cavalry with such
impetuosity that in an instant they were routed and
driven in confusion off the field. Bodies of lig!it armed
infantry and Numidians, who appear to have followed up
and supported this charge of the heavy cavalry, fell
upon the exposed flanks of the Roman legions, prevented
them from defending themselves from the attack in
front, and soon threw them into disorder.

At this moment Mago moving out from his ambush
fell furiously upon the rear of the centre of the Roman
line, the cavalry, turning from the pursuit, also joined in
the attack, so that the flanks of the Roman army, their
cavalry and their velites, v/ere utterly routed with heavy
loss, and thrown back upon the river.

The Roman heavy armed infantry of the centre,
however, proved themselves worthy of the great reputa-

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

66

tion they had so long maintained. At this crisis, they
had the Carthaginian phalanx in good order in front of
them (for Hannibal had evidently not pressed the action
in the centre), both their wings had been defeated and
driven off the field, their reserves had been routed, a
fresh force issuing from an ambush was attacking them
in the rear, the whole plain was swarming with victorious
hostile cavalry, and a swollen river lay between them
and their camp, and yet they never thought of surren-
der. The decision of the Roman consul was prompt,
the discipline and obedience of the men perfect, and
closing up their ranks and steadying their formation,
they burst through the enemy's line of battle, defeated
the whole centre of Hannibal's army, cut it asunder and
forced their way clear through to Placentia. Seipio in
the night with the ddbris of the army passed by the
Carthaginian camp and joined Sempronius in that
place.

This battle is a remarkable evidence of the admirable
qualities of the Roman heavy armed legionary, and of
the high character of the Carthaginian horse ; nor can
any doubt arise as to Hannibal owing his success entirely
to his splendid cavalry.

Had the Roman Consul shown more skill in refusing to
fight except under favourable auspices, had he occupied a
position where the wings of his army would have been
protected from being turned by the hostile horsemen, and
where the wonderful skill, bravery, and steadiness of the
Roman foot could have been employed to advantage, the
result might have been different ; for the Trebbia proved
that the Carthaginian infantry could not withstand the
attack of the heavy Roman legionaries.

An account of the battle of Cannse, where Hannibal
gained his most decisive victory over the largest and
most powerful army that Rome had ever been able to
bring into the field against him, will give another illus-
tration of the immense advantages which that great
general was able to secure from the use of his cavalry in
action.

A few days before the battle a skirmish took place

F

66

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[rEllIOD

hotvveeii Hannibal and his cavalry and light infantry,
and the advanced guard of the Romans, which was
commanded by the Consul Varro. At the first charge of
the Carthaginian cavalry, which as usual was delivered
with great vigour, the Romans were thrown into con-
siderable confusion, and would have been utterly routed,
but that Varro had placed some cohorts of legionary
heavy armed infantry, in the intervals of the cavalry.
This precaution, says Polybius, gave him all the advan-
tage in the combat.

At the battle of Cannae, Hannibal's army was drawn
up in a loop or bend of the river Aufidus. The heavy
Gallic and Spanish cavalry, 8,000 strong, were placed on
his extreme left, their left flank resting on the river ;
next to them were half of the African infantry. In the
centre the Gallic and Spanish heavy armed foot were
drawn up in heavy battalions (^tXtr/p;^?;) about 1,024 men
each. On their right came the other half of the African
infantry, and next to them on the extreme right 2,000
Numidian cavalrv.

The Roman array was formed up opposite to them.
The Roman equites, 2,400 in number, were placed on the
right wing, in front of Hannibal's 8,000 heavy cavalry.
The infantry were in the centre, in the usual formation of
three lines of hastafi, principes, and triarii in maniples
with intervals equal to their own front. The maniples
were lessened in front, and the depth increased, so that
they were sixteen ranks in depth by ten files in front.
This was done to gain the advantage of the immense
superiority in numbers on the side of the Romans. The
cavalry of the allies were on the left, opposed to the
Numidians.

The slingers, and other light troops of the Cartha-
ginians as well as the light troops of the Romans, were
placed in front of the main lines, and they opened the
battle, fighting for a long time with much bravery, but
without any decisive result.

Hannibal had not failed to notice the great efficiency
of the Roman infantry, and attributing their value partly
to their arms, he had given to his African veterans the

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CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

67

aims aud weapons he liad captured from the Romans.
The Gallic and the Spanish infantry, who were armed
with bucklers and swords, were advanced by battalions
in a species of double echelon from the centre. Polybius
describes it as the convex of a crescent ; the design
being to commence the action with those troops, and to
sustain it with the Africans, who, while holding a place
in the main line, also partly served the purpose of a
reserve.

While this was being done, Hannibal brought his
cavalry into action. He ordered the 8,000 of his heavy
cavalry on his left to charge the 2,400 Roman knights
who were opposed to them. As may be supposed, the
latter were instantly put to rout and driven headlong
from the field. The Numidians were ordered meanwhile
to simply keep in play the main body of the Roman
allied horse, who were in their immediate front, to make
demonstrations, but to avoid a decisive conflict as long
as possible. The victorious Carthaginian horse having
driven the Roman cavalry of the right from the field,
wheeled around, and passing by the rear of the Roman
army, charged the Roman allied horse in their rear,
while the Numidians attacked them in front. The allied
horsemen were cut to pieces.

In the meanwhile the Roman infantrv had attacked
the salient point of Hannibal's main line, had pressed it
back to its original position and beyond it till the whole
centre was bent back into a re-entering angle, into which
the Roman infantry, elated with the success, were crowd-
ing onward. At this point the two bodies of African
infantry wheeled inwards and attacked the Romans in
flank as they pushed on. . The cavalry of Hannibal,
having destroyed the opposing horse, were free +o aid
their comrades of the infantry, and fell with great vigour
upon the rear of the Roman legions. From that time
it became a mere butchery, the loss of life being greater
ia proportion to the numbers engaged than in almost any
battle of antiquity.

Hannibal's management of his cavalry in this action,
as well as at the Trebbia, reminds us of the tactics of

F 2

68

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

.vi

!li

I .'l'

Alexander at Issus and at Arbela. The whole details of
the fight at Cannae, as given by the ancient historians,
prove that the cavalry must ha', j attained a very high
degree of discipline, or they could never after a victorious
charge have been kept so well in hand, have been recalled
so readily, and so soon led again to the charge, to be
again recalled, and again thrown into action.

His extraordinary skill displayed in the distribution
of his cavalry, hv which he opposed 8,000 to 2,400, and
held back his Numidians on the left, until they were
assisted by the victorious horse from the other wing, is
beyond all praise, and proves how thoroughly he appre-
ciated one of the best established principles of modern
war, that of opposing masses of your own army to
fractions of the enemy.

The wars with Hannibal and the numerous defeats
suffered by the Eomans through the want of good
cavalry, soon caused them to make great efforts to supply
the deficiency. Publius Scipio, the son of the Roman
Consul who commanded at the battle of the Ticinus,
was appointed to the command of the Roman armies in
Spain, after the death of his father and uncle. ^ This
great general, afterwards surnamed Africanus, the con-
queror of Hannibal at Zama, was no sooner intrusted
with high command than he devoted himself with
energy to the improvement of the cavalry service.

The cavalry were modelled upon the Greek system,
which was then considered the best. They \vere pro-
vided with the casque, the cuirass, the oblong buckler,
boots, a double ironed lance, a javelin, and a curved
sabre.' Scipio took the greatest pains to superintend
persona' y their drill and exercises. We find from
Polybius (who gives an account in the second chapter of
the tenth book of the manoeuvres that he introduced)
that each horseman was taught individually to make the
right or left about face or turn. The decuriae and turmse
were exercised in wheeling to the right and left, then
going about by files, and wheeling back again, so as to
occupy the same ground as before the first wheel was
^ ildBkenne, ii. 31. > Ibid.

HAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

60

made. They were accustomed also to wheel about, and
to wheel three quarters right or left about, by turmae.
Sometimes also one or two files from the centre or
flanks would be moved forward some distance, and the
remainder pushed on at the galop were exercised in
ranging themselves exactly in the intervals. This
manoeuvre seems to have been designed more to impart
steadiness to the troops than for any other purpose.

Scipio also drilled them in changing front upon one
wing or the other by the flank march of the turmse, or
by oblique echelon ; he considering that breaking into
column and marching the whole column in the new
direction and then fronting, was simply the same move-
ment as a column of route, and was faulty, inasmuch an
the difierent troops arrived so much more slowly into
their respective positions.

He exercised his soldiers to advance as if upon the
enemy, and to retreat in such a way that even at speed
the order should not be broken, and that the intervals
between the squadtons should always be maintained, for
he considered nothing more useless and more dangerous
than for cavalry to be led to the charge with their ranks
disordered.

He iLspected and drilled his cavalry personally, he
made th(3m move out of the town into fields, where he
himself taught them all the movements he required them
to learn, and put them through all their exercises. In
order the better to superintend their drill, he did not
adopt the usual custom of the time and take up his
position at the head of the troops, where all could see
him and he could see none, but he maintained his
authority over the soldiers, by riding about everywhere
among them, from squadron to squadron during their
manceuvres, watching everything carefully, giving the
most clear and detailed e:tplanations to those who seemed
to hesitate, and correcting faults where they were com-
mitted. Such was the care that Scipio took to have
every individual soldier clearly understand his duty.
Demetrius Phalereus speaking of this method says :
"In an army the strength of the whole is composed. of

70

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY,

[period I.

the strength and instruction of each company, and of
each particular soldier."

Scipio reaped a full reward for the trouble he had
taken with his horsemen, in his campaigns in Spain, and
afterwards in the crowning achievement of his life,
when at Zama, in one battle, he gained for his native
land not only security from destruction but the empire
of the world.

The Romans from the earliest times used the bridle
and reins, but at this epoch had neither saddles nor
stirrups. In place of the saddle, which was not used
until about the year 340 a.d.,^ and was not perfected
until some fifty years later, under Theodosius the Great,^
the Roman cavalry used a double covering or pad of
cloth, hide, or skin ; ^ the lower covering was larger than
the upper, and was sometimes plain, sometimes bordered
with a fringe. It was held in its place by a girth, a
crupper, and a breast-leather or strap. Over it was a
smaller pad, the lower edge of which was festooned and
sometimes ornamented with tassels.* The breast-strap
and crupper were also adorned with tassels, crescents, and
other decorations. The two cloths or pads were fastened
together by four buttons with straps, or else tied
together with ribbons.^ There were no stirrups in use
until nearly two hundred years after the invention of
the saddle, or about the end of the sixth century.

Vegetius describes how the young soldiers were
trained to vault upon their horses with a naked sword
or spear in their hands, and this exercise, he says, was
continually required from the oldest veterans as well as
from the young recruits. They were taught this exer-
cise first upon wooden horses and without arms, until
they were somewhat accustomed to it, and then with
arms.® These exercises were conducted in winter under
cover, and in the summer on the drill ground. They
were trained to mount from both the right and left
sides.

» Bardin, 4809. - D'Aldeguier, 32. s Liskenne, ii. 34.

* Humbert, atlas plan, ii. ' Liskenne, ii. 34. " Vegetius, i.

ch. 18.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

71

Livy, book iv. chap. 33, in the account of the battle
between the Romans under the Dictator Mamercus
iEmilius and the Fidense, tells an extraordinary story of
the Roman Master of Horse, Aulus Cornelius, intio-
ducing a new mode of fighting among the cavalry, by
commanding his men to take the bridles oflf their horses,
and leading them to the charge with unbridled steeds.
Livy states that the plan was crowned with success. If
this story has any truth in it, it is evident that Aulus
Cornelius determined there should be no hesitation, but
that the charge should be pushed home. It is a curious
circumstance in this connection that General Hood, of
the army of the late Confederate States of America, has
always maintained that if the reins of the cavalry could
be cut at the moment of the charge, the horses would
break down the opposition of any infantry, r.nd that the
charge would always be successful.^

There is a difference of opinion about the shoeing of
horses among the Romans. It is certain that they did
not use the iron shoe fastened with nails in the modern
fashion.2 It is not known when shoes of that kind were
first invented, or in what country they first came into
use, but certainly not during the Roman period. In
Greece, in the time of Xenophon, we have his positive
testimony to prove that no horse-shoes of any kind
were in use among the Greek cavalry, for his instructions
as to the best means of hardening the hoof are very
explicit.^

It is certain, however, that the Romans had conceived
the idea of an artificial protection to the horse's hoof,
for it is a well-established fact that mules and beasts
of burden were sometimes provided with a metal or
wooden shoe (called soled), which was held in its place
by thongs of leather crossed over the hoof.^ This,
however, seems to have been the exception rather than
the rule. Suetonius says that Nero employed 2,000
mules in drawing his equipages and train when he went

^ Personal conversation. Modern Cavalry, 166. ^ Liskcnne,

ii. 35. 3 Xenophon, Hipparchicus. * Liskenne, ii. 35. Bardln,
1080.

72

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

I ;'»''l

to compete for the prize at the Olympic games, and that
all these mules were provided with shoes consisting of a
plate of silver attached to the hoof by thongs.^ The
mules used by Poppea are said, on the same authority,
to have been shod with gold. All these statements
prove the use of horse-shoes of one kind during the
Empire, and although there is no direct testimony to
prove that the horses of the cavalry were shod, and in
spite of the silence of medals and monuments on the
point, some commentators have assumed that the
Eomans would have been certain to be as attentive
and careful as to their chargers' feet, to preserve
them in good condition, as they would be with their
baggage animals.

M. Liskenne argues that without shoes they could not
have made the long and difficult marches that must
have been necessary in an empire extending from Britain
to the banks of the Tigris, and insists that they were
supplied with shoes attached to the hoof, and so closely
taking its form as not to cause them to be distinguished
in monuments or medals. ^ Humbert agrees with M.
Liskenne, and says distinctly that the cavalry horses
used shoes. ^ Bardin does not seem to agree with these
authorities, for he says generally that stirrups and horse-
shoes were not used by the Eoman cavalry/ The matter
is one that cannot be settled satisfactorily, and must
rest on conjecture under any circumstances. There may
have been instances, and most likely there were instances,
where cavalry horses were provided with the protection
to the hoof which was given to draught animals, but it
is hardly probable that it could have been an universal
custom to shoe all cavalry horses, for if so, positive
evidence of the fact would surely have been preserved
in some way.

The earliest positive evidence of the use of horse-shoes
nailed to the hoof is that furnished by the skeleton of
a horse found in the tomb of Childeric I., with shoes
fastened in that way. The tomb was accidentally

in

^ Liskenne, ii. 34, 35.
1080, 3076.

2 Ibid. 35. 8 Humbert, 27. * Bardin,

CHAP. HI.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

73

discovered at Tournay in 1653.' Childeric reigned a.d.
458 to 481, so this fixes the date of horse-shoes as far back
at least as 480.

The Roman cavalry attained its highest value under
Scipio, and for a considerable period after his time it
was maintained in a good state of efficiency. The
division of the legion into maniples, and its usual
formation with intervals between them, gave facilities to
the cavalry, drawn up as it was in such small tactical
units as the turmoe, to charge through the openings
upon the enemy, and so aid their infantry in the crisis
of an action. A portion of the cavalry were generally
held in reserve in the rear to give this assistance in case
of need.

Scipio and Lentulus in Spain and Africa temporarily
orgauised cohorts by simply uniting three maniples into
a single body and using that larger corps as the tactical
unit.^ This innovation was probably caused by the fact
that Scipio was engaged with an enemy possessing a
powerful and effective cavalry force, and had discovered
that in operating against such a foe it was necessary to
consolidate his infantry and reduce the number of in-
tervals in his line of battle, at the same time that he
increased and strengthened his tactical units.

The division of the legion into cohorts as a distinct
and permanent organisation did not take place until the
Consulate of Marius, when they became the regular sub-
division, the legion containing 10 cohorts ; and from
that time, although differing in strength, the same name
was maintained during the Empire.^

In the reign of Adrian the first cohort was increased,
and was composed of the picked men of the legion, and
was given many privileges which the other cohorts did
not enjoy. It was generally double the strength of the
others, and comprised 800, 1,000, or 1,200 men accor-
ding as the legion was of the strength of 4,000, 5,000,
or 6,000 men. The standard or eagle was intrusted to

^ Boutell, 279. « Bardin, 1337. » Roman Antiquities, Exercitus.
Bardin. 1337, 1338.

74

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

this cohort, which was called the cohors milliaria, and
which also protected the images of the emperor.

The cavalry were placed generally upon the wings,
the heavy armed being placed next to the infantry ;
next to them on the outer flank the light armed cavalry
took up a position, to enable them either to protect the
flanks of their own army or, if possible, to envelop and
attack the flanks and rear of the enemy. A reserve of
cavalry was generally kept in the rear after the forma-
tion of the legion into cohorts, which was also an organi-
sation that enabled cavalry to give immediate support
to the infantry when closely pressed.

SECTION IV. — CAMPAIGNS OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS — BATTLES
OF ILIJSG AND ZAMA AND THE MITHRIDATIO WAR.

The battle of Iling in Spain, between Scipio Africanus
and Asdrubal, the son of Gisco, is generally considered to
be the highest development of tactical skill in the history
of the Roman army, and as such it merits close study,
more particularly as the cavalry service performed a most
important part in the action.

Asdrubal and Mago had in their army 70,000 infantry,
4,000 cavalry, and 32 elephants. Scipio was much
weaker in numbers, his army consisting of 45,000
infantry and 3,000 horse. Asdrubal, having assembled
his army in the spring of the^ year 205 B.C., marched to
a town called Iling, or Elinga, and encamped in its
vicinity at the foot of a mountain, where he fortified his
camp, and where he had in his front a plain very suitable
for battle.^

Scipio's situation at this period was very critical, and
gave him great uneasiness. His Roman legions alone
were too weak for him to risk a general action against
such a superJA'i force, while he had not sufficient confi-
dence in his Spanish allies to venture to employ them
boldly in any decisive engagement. He decided, there-
fore, to appear to have every confidence in them to make
the enemy believe that he trusted them fully, but at the

^ Polybius, xi. ch. 5.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

75

moment of action to employ bis own tried legions at the
decisive points, leaving his allies as a mere stop-gap in
the line of battle.

He therefore marched to within a league of the Car-
thaginian position and there encamped, but foreseeing
that Asdrubal would be likely to molest his working
parties in entrenching the camp, he had placed his
cavalry in ambush behind a hill, from which concealment
they charged suddenly upon Mago and Massanissa, who
with the cavalry and Numidians came out to attack
them.^ The stratagem was crowned with success, and
the Carthaginians were driven in confusion back to their
own lines with heavy loss. This skirmish had the effect
of inspiriting the Romans, and tended also to confirm
the allegiance of their allies.

For several days the two armies remained opposite to
each other, each day being drawn up in line of battle in
the plain which lay between the camps, but without
bringing on a general action,^ the light troops alone at
times having partial combats and skirmishes.

Scipio during several days had carefully marked the
order in which Asdrubal had formed up his army, and
had seen that his best troops, the African infantry, occu-
pied the centre of the line, that his allies were on the
flanks of the Africans, and the cavalry and elephants
upon the wings. Asdrubal had evidently so drawn up
his army, in order to oppose his best troops to the legions
which usually occupied the centre of the Roman line of
battle, and which were by far the bravest and best dis-
ciplined infantry of the age. He had seen Scipio's army
day after day, with its long lines deployed upon the
plain in their accustomed order, and had marked that
the Spaniards, Scipio's latest and least trusted allies,
were ranged upon the flanks.^ His dispositions therefore
to meet his opponent were the best that he could have
adopted.

Scipio had moved out time after time purposely to
deceive Asdrubal on this point, intending at the last
moment to change the formation to one that would take
' Polybius, xi. ch 5. « Ibid. ^ ibij^

7G

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

his enemy by surprise, and give to his own troops a
marked advantage.

When the day arrived upon which Scipio had deter-
mined to risk the fate of a battle, he took every precau-
tion that a skilful soldier could devise. His troops wore
early in motion. Special orders had been issued to the
tribunes and officers to see that the men were all provided
with breakfast, and armed and equipped ready to march
before the day broke. The cavalry and light armed
troops moved out first, followed by the main body, whicli
was formed up on the plain in a new order, the Spaniards
forming the centre of the line, while the Roman legions
were equally divided upon the wings. The cavalry
advanced up to the enemy's camp and threatened an
attack. Asdrubal seeing the advance, and seeing in the
distance the Roman army, in the dull light of the dawn,
ranged upon the plain, sent out his light troops and
cavalry in all haste, hurriedly equipped, and without
food, to hold the Roman cavalry in check, while he him-
self with the remainder of his troops, also fasting, moved
out and formed up in the usual order, his elephants being
in front of the wings.

By this time the sun had risen, and Scipio's light
troops retiring through the intervals formed up in rear
of the wings, and exposed to Asdrubal's view the Roman
army in its new and unaccustomed order. There was no
time for him then to make any change in his dispositions.
He saw that his Spanish allies would have to bear the
brunt of the attack of the choicest troops in the. ranks of
his foe, and that the fate of the day might be decided by
the result of that conflict.^ He had not much time to
think, however, for Scipio moved on him at once, and his
manoeuvres were certainly calculated to surprise him.

Scipio advanced, as already mentioned, with the
Spanish allies in a species of phalanx formation in the
centre — the Roman troops on the wings were formed in
a close line, by placing the maniples of principes in the
intervals between the hastati. The triarii were formed
behind them as their rear ranks, so that each cohort was

^ Polybius, xi. ch. 5.

[period I.
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CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

77

ranged iii a species of close order, thirty-two files in front
by twelve in depth. These had closed up after the
velites and cavalry had retired through the intervals
and formed in their rear, the velites behind the heavy
infantry, the cavalry behind them. The yelites were
formed up in maniples with intervals. The cavalry,
1,500 on each wing, in squadrons of three turmse, had
also intervals between the squadrons.

The tactical arrangements for the battle had evidently
been carefully prepared in advance, and explained to the
officeis. Scipio himself took command of the right
wing and Julius Silanus that of the left. The whole
Koman army then advanced in line, the Carthaginians
moving forward to meet them, when at the distance of a
few hundred yards the two wings wheeled outwards into
columns and marched the right wing to the right, and
the left to the left until the heads of the columns were
opposite the respective tianks of the line of Carthaginian
infantry, then the cohorts, wheeling right and left back
into line, formed themselves in order of battle in front
of the wings of the enemy, and with increased speed
hastened on to the attack.^ The columns of velites and
cavalry did not halt in the outward march but moved on,
and as soon as the heads of the columns cleared the
flanks of the infantry each maniple of velites, and each
squadron of cavalry, wheeling to the left on the right
wing, and to the right on the left, by the simple
manoeuvre known as right and left form or "to the
reverse flank right or left form," successively wheeled
into line and moved up so that the troops were reversed,
those on the right becoming the loft, and vice versd. By
this means Scipio's line elongated itself on each flank,
and overlapped and enveloped the flanks of the enemy.

In the meantime Scipio ordered the Spaniards to
move very slowly (in fact he refused his centre), his
order of battle being the double oblique, his two wings
being thrown forward to commence the action. The
battle was opened by his cavalry attacking the Car-

^ Polybius, xi. ch. 5,

78

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEEIOD I.

thaginian cavalry in front and flank, the velitea who
fought in the intervals attacking the elephants with such
success that they were driven back upcu their own linea
where they created a deal of injury. Scipio here reaped
the reward of his great care in organizing and training
his cavalry, for they at once put the Numidian horse-
men to rout and drove them from the field. The
Roman legi " as in their heavy formation and steady
discipline were more than a match for the Spanish
auxiliaries, who, never equal to compete with them, were
still less in a position to withstand them this day, being
enfeebled as they were from want of foud. They also
were soon routed on both flanks with heavy loss.

During all this time while the battle was being decided
AsdrubaJ's choicest troops stood in their ranks, idle
spectators of a disaster that they could not prevent.
Asdrubal feared to move his African infantry to the
assistance of his wings, as the phalanx of Spanish allies in
the centre of Scipio's army was moving slowly up, and
ready in good order to take advantage of the first false
move, while it was still too far ofl^ for him to hazard an
advance of his centre.

The African infantry maintained their high reputation,
however, and when their wings were utterly disordered
and in flight, they retired in good order, covering the
retreat with their ranks well closed up, and so saved the
debris of their army.

This action is worthy of close study, as it is without
doubt that of all others in which the Romans displayed
the greatest tactical ability, ^t proves that the Roman
army must have acquired an tAtraordinary steadiness in
manoeuvring, and that Scipio must have been exceed-
ingly confident in the power of his army to manoeuvre,
or he would never have dared to attempt so com-
plicated a movement in the face of an active enemy
well supplied with an eflScient fc ce of cavalry.

The care that Scipio took in personally drilling and
exercising his cavalry evidently made them a highly
trained force, and he has known exactly how far he
could trust to them. The same confidence in the ability

CHAP, ni.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

79

of his army to mancBuvre led Frederick the Great to
adopt the oblique formation, for he found he could do
with in punity what no other army of his age could
attempt without eT'treme risk of disaster.

Another interesting feature in connection with this
battle is in comparing it with some of Hannibal's, and
tracing the effect of Hannibal's generalship in training
his opponents. Twelve years before, Scipio was a lad of
seventeen accompanying his father, who was then com-
manding the Koman army as one of the consuls in the
first skirmish of the war on the banks of the Ticinus.
He was also in the battle a short time after at the
Trebbia, and two years later fought again in the disastrous
field of Caunse. He had seen iu his first action the
Roman cavalry defeated by the invading horse, and his
father (whose life he is said to have saved by the most
brilliant gallantry) severely wounded, and saving the
remains of his routed army with the greatest difficulty.
The bitter experience of his first battle evidently taught
him for life the value of well-trained horsemen. At the
Trebbia, where he doubtless was also engaged, he saw
another crushing defeat suffered by his countrymen, and
saw that it was caused by the cavalry (the weakest of
the Roman troops) being overwhelmed upon the wings,
while the centre, where the main strength of the Romans
lay, could not effect anything before the fate of the battle
was decided. At Cannae he had again seen ruin and
disaster fall upon his people by the superior cavalry,
and the more skilful tactics of the great Carthaginian
leader. The eft'ect of this hard practical experience
showed itself from the outset of Scipio's career as a
general. His first idea was to perfect his cavalry as we
have already seen ; and when he was obliged to fight an
action, the memory of his cold, enfeebled, and fasting
comrades at the Trebbia rose up before him, and imitat-
ing the tactics of his father's opponent, he forced the
enemy into action fasting, refused his centre composed of
inferior troops, opened the battle by overlapping the wings
of his foe with his carefully disciplined horsemen, and
won a brilliant victory, one that in its main features is

80

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

but a repetition of his first general engagement, with the
parts and the results rt^versed.

The consequences of the battle of Iling were the
conquest of Spain, and the evacuation of the whole
country by the Carthaginians. Within four years Scipio
had carried the war into Africa, and after a considerable
amount of fighting Hannibal had been recalled from
Italy, anc* both of the contending parties gathered their
strength for a final and decisive battle, which it was felt
would decide to whom should belong the empire of the
then known world.

This battle, oii^ of the most important in its results,
and one of the most decisive, took place near Zama, a
village about five days* march to the south-west of
Carthage, in the year 202 B.C.

Scipio's army consisted it is supposed of about 40,000
men, although the records are obscure upon the point,
but in his army he counted 6,000 infantry, and 6,000
Numidian cavalry, which Massanissa had brought to his
standard shortly before the action.^ Hannibal is supposed
to have had about 2,700 newly-raised, and not very
efficient Carthaginian horse, 2,000 Numidian cavalry
only, about 50,000 infantry, and 80 elephants.

Here, again, we see that the flight of years had
brought many changes, and that the relative strength of
the cavalry in the Roman and Carthaginian armies had
been reversed, since Hannibal, sixteen years previously,
in the vigour of his early manhood, had first met his
Roman enemies in battle array. He had 24,000 of the
veteran infantry who had served with him so long in
Italy, and had acquired such steadiness of discipline, and
such skill in the use of their weapons, as made them
equal to the best Roman legions. His cavalry were
weak in numbers, newly raised, and poorly equipped,
while of Numidian horsemen he had but 2,000. Scipio,
on the other hand, had a force of cavalry trained with
the greatest care, well armed, and in the highest state of
efl&ciency. Hannibal must have known this, but what
must have been his thoughts when he saw ranged against

^ Lecomte, 109.

ERIOD I.

ith the

ire the
whole
Scipio
lerable
I frcim
I their
as felt
of the

esults,
ima, a
est of

10,000
point,
6,000
to his
)posed
very
ivalry

3 had
gth of
s had
ously,
et his
Df the
ng in
e, and

them

were
ipped,
icipio,

with
ate of

what
gainst

CHAP. 111.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

81

him 6,000 Numidian cavalry, men whose value he appre-
ciated so well, the force upon which he had relied so
much in his early wars, the force which had never failed
him in action, and to which he owed his success in so
many battles, and his army, food and safety in so many
campaigns.

Hannibal ranged his army in three lines, or phalanges,
for he injudiciously drew up his men without intervals.
The eighty elephants were placed along the front, 12,000
Ligurian, Gallic, and other mercenaries formed the first
line, the new levies of Africans and Carthaginians were
drawn up in a second, close behind the first, while Han-
nibal's veterans from Italy, 24,000 strong, acted as a
reserve, and were ranged in one line without intervals at
some distance to the rear, so that fugitives from the front
might retire around the flanks ; the native cavalry he
placed on his right wing ; the 2,000 Numidian horse on
bis left.'

Scipio, who was a great master of the art of war, and
who proved his great ability in nothing more than in the
originality with which he made necessary changes in
organisation and tactics without any regard to custom or
precedent, formed his infantry in three lines as usual, but
placed the cohorts of the principes exactly behind the
cohorts of the hastati, and the triarii behind them, so
that his army was virtually formed in a line of columns
with intervals between them. The intervals were filled,
in line with the front rank, with the velites, so that from
Hannibal's position the Roman army would appear to be
drawn up in a phalanx without intervals. This disposi-
tion was made by Scipio to leave openings for the
elephants to get through, or to be driven through to
the rear by the velites and other light troops, who were
especially charged with that service.^

The Eoman cavalry, under Laelius, was on the left
flank, while Massanissa, King of Numidia, with his 6,000
horsemen, fought upon the right. The cavalry skir-
mished against each other for a time, but Scipio, wishing
^ get rid of the elephants before moving his infantry,

^ Polybius, XV. 1.

Ibid.

o

82

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD I.

1

I

■ ■M

stood firm, until Hannibal opened the action by ordering
them to advance. The noise of the Roman trumpets
frightened the elephants, and put them in confusion, the
velites attacked them with javelins, the cavalry also set
upon them, so that some were driven through the open-
ings Scipio had left in his line ; some were driven by the
flanks off the field, and some in their terror turned and
broke through the cavalry on the left of Hannibal's
army, throwing them into disorder. Massanissa saw the
opporturlty, and with the skill of an old and experienced
cavalry officer, charged at once impetuously upon them,
and drove them at the first onset in utter rout from the
field. Laelius, superior to the cavalry in his front, was
equally successful, and pursued the fugitive horsemen
with great vigour.

In the meantime the infantry had come into action.
The mercenaries of the first line were soon hardly pressed
and not being well supported by the Carthaginians in
the line behind, believing themselves betrayed, fell back,
and even attacked their supports, so that there was great
confusion, and many were slain, the hastati being also
somewhat disordered by the intensity of the struggle.
They were supported by the principes, and soon regained
their steadiness.^ Hannibal, seeing the fugitives flying
towards his reserves, and fearing these might also be
thrown into confusion, ordered his veterans to present
their pikes, and compel the routed troops to escape
around the flanks.

Scipio recalled his hastati from the pursuit, formed
them up again, and moved up his principes and triarii
on the wings in line with them, and then another battle
commenced between Hannibal's veterans and the Roman
infantry. Polybius says, " The numbers, the resolution,
the arms, of the two sides were equal, and they fought
with such obstinacy that they died in the ranks where
they fought, and no one could judge which would have
the advantage," when Lselius and Massanissa, leading
back their victorious horse from the pursuit, fell upon
the rear of Hannibal's phalanx at the crisis of the

^ Polybius, XV. 1.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

ftS

struggle, when the fate of the battle was tremblinff in
the balance. This turned the scale. The Carthaginians
were utterly routed, for the plain in which the combat
took place left them at the mercy of the cavalry, who
pursued them with unrelenting vigour. Hannibal escaped
with difficulty, and thus ended this great action which,
as Polybius says, made the Romans masters of the
world.

There is no doubt that this battle was won by the
cavalry, which was thrown into action very skilfully at
the proper moment, and was most ably led by the two
generals in command, who by their return from the
pursuit in order to take part in the action where the
decisive result was to be gained, proved themselves to be
cavalry commanders of the highest type.

The Roman cavalry at the close of the second Punic
War was in the finest condition, and its uses were better
appreciated and understood than at any other period of
Roman history. Afterwards it was much more numerous
in their armies, and its proportion to the infantry much
greater, but still the quality was not as good, the disci-
pline not as perfect, nor were the generals so skilful in
using it efiectively.

About one hundred years after this time we find
Sylla carrying on the war against the generals of
Mithridates in Boeotia in 86 B.C., with an army of
15,000 infantry and only 1,500 cavalry, while the
cavalry in his opponents* army was exceedingly nume-
rous.^ At tL*^. battle of Ovchomene Sylla, in order to
protect his w.ngs against the hostile horse, dug two
intrenchments on his right as far as a marsh, which lay
behind Archelaus, and on his left as far as the river
Melas, which wound round the right of the enemy's
camp and fell into the marsh in rear of it. By this
method he protected his flanks, neutralised the cavalry
opposed to him, and in the action succeeded in driving
them into their camp, storming it, and destroying the
army which, inclosed between the marsh and river, was
cut oflf from all retreat. The conduct of Archelaus in

' Liskenne, ii. 157.

G 2

84

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

li liu

ill

|;i.f '} '
'1 1*1' \

[period I.

allowing a weak force to cross a great plain to close him
up in an angle between impassable obstacles when he
was so immensely superior in cavalry, cannot be too
severely condemned.

Lucullus, who commanded the Eoman army at one
period of the Mithridatic war, used his cavalry with
great ability, and owed his success at the battle of
Tigranocerta, over an immensely superior army, to the
judicious management of his horsemen.^ Tigranes,
whose army consisted of 150,000 infantry, 20,000
archers and slingers, 35,000 pioneers and road-makers,
and 55,000 cavalry, of whom 17,000 were clad in heavy
steel armour, encamped on a large plain with the river
Tigris before him. Lucullus, with 10,000 infantry,
3,000 horse, and 1,000 slingers and archers, marched
out to attack this enormous host, and crossed the
river in front of the extreme right of the enemy.
Tigranes, seeing the handful, laughed at their boldness,
saying, *' If they come as ambassadors there are too
many of them ; if as soldiors, too few,"^ Lucullus had
noticed that a hill level upon the top and sloping easily
dovsn to the enemy's right flank and close to it and
dominating it, had been left unoccupied by Tigranes,
and he at once conceived the idea of -seizing it by a bold
push with his cavalry, and from it to commence an
attack direct against the flank and rear of the enemy's
right wing, which was composed of his choice? o cavalry,
those already mentioned as being clad in complete
armour of steel. The Thracian and Gaulish horae
moved rapidly up the hill and from there charged the
enemy in flank.^ They were ordered to make no use of
their javelins, to ride sword in hand, to come to close
action at once, and to strike at nothing but the shafts of
their opponents' lances, as when those were broken, the
horsemen, immured in iron and without other weapons,
were helpless. This done they were to strike with their
sabres at their enemies' legs and thighs, which alone of
their bodies were unarmed.

1 Plutarch, Life of Lucullus. ^ Liskenne, ii. 171. ' Plutarch,
Life of Lucullus.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

85

This bold charge of a small body of horse led by
LucuUus himself and supported by two cohorts of picked
infantry, was crowned with complete success. The heavy
armed horsemen, clumsy and slow in their movements,
struck violently on the flank, broke at once in con-
fusion, and were doubled up and driven in upon the
infantry, so that in a few minutes the wh^^^ army was
in flight. Tigranes, utterly astounded and struck with
panic, was one of the first to ride off" with a few attend-
ants. It seems hardly credible, yet Plutarch states
that the Komans lost but five killed and one hundred
wounded, while of the foot of the enemy 100,000 were
slain in addition to a great proportion of the cavalry.^

This action serves to show clearly that discipline and
facility of manoeuvring are absolutely necessary to give
cavalry its great value. There is little doubt that the
immense swarms of horsemen under Tigranes, akhough
probably well mounted, well armed, and skilful riders,
were yet only sufficiently drilled to advance in the at-
tack, and to retire, but had never been accustomed to
manoeuvre, and were quite unable when threatened on
their flank, to make a sudden change of front, so as to
face their enemy, and if necesssary, meet him with a
charge.

Unable to manoeuvre, and struck on the flank where
they could not resist, the novelty of the danger, and
their ignorance of the means to remedy it, naturally?- left
to them no resource but flight.

In the battle of Artaxata {67 B.C.) in the Mithridatic
war, when Lucullus again fought against King Tigranes,
he used his cavalry with considerable ability. Tigranes
had posted in front of his army a large body of his best
heavy cavalry, supported by some light squadrons of
Mardian archers, and Iberian spearmen, in whose courage
and skill he placed more confidence than in any of his
other horsemen.'^ Lucullus sent his cavalry across the
river Arsanias first to attack these advanced troops, and
80 to cover the passage of the river by his infantry. The
^ Plutarch, Life of Lucullus. ^ Ibid.

86

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD I.

Roman cavalry defeated the hostile horse at the first on-
set, and pursued theiti in different directions. Lucullus
at once recalled them from the pursuit, to aid him in the
action with the remainder of the enemy's forces, and
leading a charge in person against the body of royal
guards that were around the king, put them instantly to
flight, and a complete victory ensued.

ii

SECTION V. — CAVALRY UNDER JULIUS CAESAR — BATTLE OF

PHARSALIA.

The battle of Pharsalia, B.C. 48, is interesting as illus-
trating a certain reaction in the success of the turning
movements by cavalry, and showing how Julius Caesar,
that consummate master of the art of war, adopted pre-
cautions which protected him successfully against the
flank attack of an immensely superior force of cavalry,
a manoeuvre that during one hundred and fifty years
before his time had almost invariably secured the victory
t/O the general who skilfully employed it.

The two armies met on the plain of Pharsalia near the
river Enipeus. Pompey drew up his forces with his
right resting on the river, having 600 horse only on that
flank, his infantry were in the centre of his line, and the
remainder of his cavalry, being the great bulk of it, was
massed upon his left wing, for the purpose of turning
Caesar's right in the action, and throwing him back upon
the fiver. His dispositions were skilful, but he should
have held a reserve of cavalry in hand, especially as he
was so superior in that arm, and as victory generally
inclines in cavalry actions, to that side which can bring
the last reserves into action.^

His army was much more numerous than that of
Caesar. He had 7,000 horse, and 45,000 infantry.
Caesar had only 1,000 Roman cavalry, and 22,000 in-
fantry, but he formed his army with wonderful ability.^
His left rested on the river, and consisted of the eighth
and ninth legions under the command of Antony.^ In

^ Plutarch, Pompey and Ctesar. - Liskenne, ii. 301. ^ Lecomte,
150.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

87

was
lining
upon
lould
as he
lerally
bring

)nity.'
ighth
3 In

aconite,

the centre Cnseus Domitius commanded the cohorts,
while on the right, Caesar's favourite coi-ps, the tenth
legion, was drawn up under the command of P. Sylla.
These corps were formed in three lines, forty cohorts
being in the first, twenty-four in the second, and only
sixteen in the third. Each legion formed part of all
three lines. The cavalry, only 1,000 strong, were placed
on the right in line with the front rank at a short dis-
tance from it, facing over 6,000 of Pompey's cavalry
which we have seen were massed there.

Caesar, knowing from the disposition of the hostile
army that Pompey designed to envelop his right with
his cavalry, moved six of his best cohorts from his third
line and placed them in rear of his right wing.^ He ex-
plained to "-yhem that they were not to stir until the attack
commenced, so that their presence should not be discovered.

When the attack opened, Caesar's cavalry did not
make any resistance, but at once fell back into a position
at right angles to the front of battle, and to the right of
the six cohorts containing 3,000 infantry, who had at
once changed front to the right to face the advancing
cavalry. 2 These brave infantry seem to have charged the
horsemen with great courage, not throwing their javelins
but using them as spears according to Plutarch, and
thrusting them at the faces of the horsemen as Caesar
had commanded them. The cavalry, strange to say, were
defeated at once by these cohorts, and fled in disorder,
abandoning a large number of slingers and archers who
fought with them and who were at once put to the sword.
Caesar's cavalry, which had held back on the right of the
cohorts until their onset had checked and confused the
hostile horse, immediately charged boldly upon them, com-
pleted the rout and continued the pursuit when they fled.

The victorious infantry wheeled to the left, advanced
upon the uncovered flank of Pompey's infantry, and
wheeling again to the left, overlapped it, and charged them
in flank and rear at the same instant that the tenth
legion pressed upon them in front. The result was not
long doubtful. Pompey saw at once that the day was
^ Liskenne, ii. 301. ^ Plutarch, Csesar and Pompey.

88

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[

PERIOD I.

lost, and turned in flight to his camp, f which he
again fled shortly after, on Csesar folio wii, the debris
of his army into their lines and storming them.^
Pompey's loss in this action was 15,000 killed and
24,000 taken prisoners. Caesar lost about 200 soldiers
and thirty centurions.

Csesar's dispositions to guard himself as much as
possible from the turning movement which he foresaw was
intended, a hich he had so much reason to dread, were
ably conceivx. and show great marks of genius. He
felt that all would depend upon the firmness and
steadiness of the six cohorts, and his refusing to let his
own cavalry come into action until after Pompey's horse
had made their charge upon the infantry proves that he
understood the value of the last reserves in a cavalry
action, and shows how ingeniously he contrived, with
only one-sixth of the enemy's force, to be virtually able
to throw 1,000 fresh horsemen into the fight to turn the
scale in his favour at the crisis of it.

SECTION VT — FOREIGN CAVALRY IN THE ROMAN

ARMIES.

ml

Before following the history of the Roman cavalry
further, it will be desirable at this point to refer briefly
to the cavalry of Gaul, Spain, and Germany, as those
nations produced mounted troops that both in alliance
with Kome and in the ranks of her enemies gained a
high reputation on many a hard-fought field.

The Gauls were noted from the earliest times as
furnishing good cavalry. Strabo says that their cavalry
was much better than their infantry.^ They used war-
chariots at a very early period.^ According to Livy,
when Ambigatus sent his nephew Bellovesus to found
a colony in Italy in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, he
set out with a large force of both horse and foot, and
established himself in the neighbourhood of Milan.*
Many years afterwards, when Brennus captured Rome,

1 Plutarch. 2 Bardin, 3499. » Duparcq, 201. * Livy, v.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

89

he had according to Livy, a great number of cavalry,
who spread over the country, and performed the duties
of advanced guards, patrols, and reconnoitring parties
very efficiently.^

In the invasion of Italy by the Gauls, which took
place in the year 227 B.C., their army consisted of
50,000 foot, 20,000 cavalry, and a large number of war-
chariots.

The Gauls estimated their cavalry at much higher
value than their infantry. They used every effort to
seizure fine horses, and paid very high prices for them.^
T ley were armed with a javelin and a long sword
^ ithout a point, and sometimes with bows and arrows,
and at first used only the casque and the buckler, the
legs and feet being naked and the body covered with a
sack or tunic of leather.^ They afterwards wore large
trousers, a shirt with sleeves, and the tunic over them.
The maps of the people wore the whole beard, the chiefs
and nobles the moustache only.*

The Gauls afterwards adopted heavier defensive armour,
and are said to have invented the cuirass of iron, which
they used to a great extent in later years. ^ The casque
was ornamented with horns of the deer, or a metal crest
with a thick plume of feathers, which added to the
appearance of the soldier.^ The buckler, which was
rather small, was also adorned with devices.

Soon the Gauls, in imitation of the Romans, borrowed
the heavy armour and equipment of the Greek cataphracti.^
There were also a species of cavalry called crupellarii by
Tacitus, who were, according to Roquefort, soldiers or
gladiators armed in full armour from head to foot, and
appear to have been more heavily armed than the
cataphracti. These crupellarii, however, are but rarely
mentioned.^

The Gauls had very little tactical skill. They usually
occupied the wings with their cavalry, a,lthough some-
times the chariots were placed on the outer flanks.^

^ Livy, V. 37, 39. 2 Csesar, iv. 2. s Humbert, 40.
202. 8 Ibid. Bardin, 1767. " Daparcq, 202.

41.

8

* Duparcq,
'' Humbert,

Bardin, 1765. » Humbert, 41.

90

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

They formed in one line of battle, and do not appear to
have used reserves. They sometimes massed their army
in square, closing the bucklers together, so as to make
an impenetrable formation.^

The tactics of the cavalry were based upon the proper
principle. Their main idea was to succeed by the
rapidity and force of the charge, which was usually
made in a compact mass by the heavy cavalry in order
to burst through the enemy's lines, and so make an
opening by which the light cavalry getting through
might fall upon their opponents in flank and rear.^

Some of the tribes of the Gauls had a cavalry that
was organised in little troops or bands of three each,
composed of a cavalier, or principal combatant, and two
assistants or esquires. Pausanias says that the cavalry
of Brennus was organised in this way, the intention
being that if the horse of the chief soldier was killed,
he could have it replaced by one of those ridden by
his attendants, or if he himself was killed, that his
place might be filled by one of his followers. We see
m this the origin of the " lance " or " lance fournie " of
the middle ages.^ These small parties were called " Tri-
macresie."

Hannibal had a large force of Gaulish auxiliaries in
his army, and they formed a portion of the cavalry
which we have seen did him such good service in the
campaigns in Italy.*

Caesar also, on taking the command in Gaul, imme-
diately made great efforts to organise a powerful force of
cavalry, which he was enabled to raise to the number of
4,000.* They were composed entirely of Gaulish allies,
in whom at first he did not place implicit confidence, for
we see that in the interview he held with Ariovistus,
where it was arranged that he should only be accom-
panied by 500 horse, he mounted that number of
his best infantry from the 10th legion on the horses of
his allies, and took them with him.®

Afterwards, in the action in which he defeated

» Duparcq, 203. » Humbert, 41. ^ Bardin, 5124. * Ambert,
178. » Caesar, i. 15. « Liskenne, ii. 204. Csesar, i. 42.

an

the

CHAP, ni.] ROMAN CA.VALRY. 91

Ariovistus, he used his cavalry with great effect in the
pursuit, which seems to have been maintained by them
for fifty miles, and in which heavy loss was inflicted
upon the fugitive Germans.^

During the wars in Gaul, Csesar had increased his
cavalry to 10,000, but a portion of them consisted of
German, Spanish, and Numidian auxiliaries. For a long
period afterwards the Gauls furnished the greater part of
the cavalry of the Roman armies.^ 1 ucuUus had a force
of Gaulish horsemen, as already mentioned, at the battle
of Tigranocerta.^

Vercingetorix, the Gaulish chieftain who led the great
revolt against Csesar, used his cavalry very extensively,
and evinced a remarkable knowledge of the value and
uses of a mounted force. Csesar says that upon his
appointment as leader of the army of the Gauls, he set
himself to obtain above everything a good corps of
cavalry.*

After Cseiiar, by his rapid movements, had gained two
or three slight successes, Vercingetorix called his council
together, and suggested, as they were superior to the
Romans in cavalry, that they should not employ that
force in any general engagement, but simply to ravage
the country arounr" Csesar, to cut off his foraging parties,
to destroy all provisions, to bum the villages, to leave
the country a desert, and to besiege the Roman army
with £.n intangible cordon of horsemen, and so to starve
it into submission.^ This resolution was adopted, and
for a time acted upon. Twenty villages and towns were
burnt in one day, and if the Gauls had persisted in the
plan, and carried it out as vigorously and as energetically
as it was carried out against their descendants by the
Russians in 1812, there is little doubt that the result to
Csesar would have been almost as disastrous as the
campaign of 1812 was to the great Napoleon.^

Vercingetorix was induced against his will to spare
Avaricum, and to rely more upon operations in the
field.^ Avaricum was, however, taken, and 40,000 of

^ Csesar, i. 63, 2 Liskenne, iL 209. ^ Csesar, vii. 13. ♦ Ibid. 4.

•^ Ibid. 14. « Ibid. 15. T Ibid. 28.

92

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

Iti

'li

i^V?,

ill

its inhabitants destroyed. Vercingetorix then demanded
15,000 cavalry, and continued to destroy the provisions,
to burn houses, and to cut off convoys.^ Caesar, seeing
the danger he was in, decided to fall back nearer to the
Roman provinces, which were his base of operations.
Vercingetorix, impatient in disposition, and believing that
Caesar's army was in flight, risked a general engagement,
in which he was beaten with immense loss.^ He there-
upon threw himself into Alesia, which was then con-
sidered almost impregnable, and awaited an attack.
Caesar decided to blockade him in that place, and by
strong lines of countervallation reduce him by famine.^

Vercingetorix still used his cavaby skilfully. Before
Caesar could completely close in his lines, the Gaulish
cavalry, 15,000 strong, cut through without difficulty,
and were directed to raise a large army with which to
come to the relief of the besieged.* Caesar had by this
time recruited among the Germans 10,000 cavalry, and
his infantry reached 70,000 or 80,000 more. Before
the aid came to the Gauls, Caesar's lines of circum-
vallation were so strong that Alesia could not be
relieved, and soon surrendered at discretion. Had
Vercingetorix been permitted to carry out his own plans,
and been opposed by anyone of less ability than the
great Caesar himself, the fate of the Gallic revolt would
probably have been very different.

The Germans were a warlike people. Their principal
force consisted of the infantry, although they also used
cavalry.^ They were poorly supplied with defensive
armour, and wore dresses made of skins badly shaped,
and which were not large enough to cover the whole
body, so that although living in a cold climate they
were half naked.^ The cavalry and infantry were simi-
larly equipped. They used bucklers made of wicker-
work, and ornamented with brilliant colours. They
were sometimes round, but generally elongated ; the
horseman using one somewhat smaller than that of the
foot-soldier. Although they had often fought against the

■ CiEsar, vii. 6R. 2 jbid. 66.

* Boutaric, 46. « Caesar, iv. 1 .

«Ibid. 68.

* Ibid. 71.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

98

nsive
laped,
whole
they
simi-
icker-
They
the
)f the
st the

d. 71.

Romans, and obtained spoils of armour from the slain or
the prisoners, and although traders from Rome and
neighbouring countries were welcomed among them, it
is strange that they did not improve their defensive
armour, for they appear to have rarely or ever used the
cuirass or helmet/

Their oflFensive weapons consisted gimply of a lance,
or small pike, called a.framea, which had a short point
of iron sharpened. It was used as a lance generally,
although sometimes thrown as a javelin. The right to
carry this weapon was bestowed upon no one who was
not worthy or qualified to bear arms, so that when a
young man arriv^ed at the age when he was considered
able to take his place in the ranks, one of the chiefs, or
some relative, handed to him in the public assembly the
framea and the buckler.^ This public ceremony made
him a soldier, and seems to have given him a vote in the
assemblies, for the people were always under arms when
discussing any public affairs.^

Their horses were not very good, nor were they in the
habit of buying valuable animals, as seems to have been
the custom among the Gauls. They preferred their own
native horses, which were of a very poor quality, but
which by continual exercise they were able to render
very hardy and useful.*

The German cavalry often leaped from their horses to
fight on foot like the early Romans, and they taught
them to stand steady until they returned to them. They
rode them with'-ut pad or saddle-cloth of any kind, and
dismounted and remounted with surprising agility. The
custom of using pads to ride upon was considered among
them as a gross luxury, and a shameful evidence of
efieminacy ; so much so, that no matter how few they
were, they would attack without hesitation a large body
of cavalry equipped with saddle-cloth and pads.^

An instance of this occurred when Caesar was fighting
against the Suevi, who invaded Gaul in great numbers
in the year 55 B.C. A skirmish took place near the river

' Duparcq, 212. 2 Boutaric, 46. ^ Bardin, 2412. * Csesoi-,
iv. 2. 6 Ibid.

94

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

f

Meuse between 800 of the German cavalry and 5,000
of Caesar's horsemen. The Germans were not the least
impressed by the difference in numbers, but commenced
the attack at once, put the Gaulish cavalry into confusion
and then dismounted and fought on foot among their
mounted enemies, killing their horses, throwing them to
the ground, and putting them to flight.^ Caesar's cavalry
in this action, though immensely superior in numbers,
was completely defeated with heavy loss. So de-
moralized were they by this skirmish, that Caesar, when
marching against the enemy the next day, placed hia
cavalry in the rear-guard.

In the year 58 B.C., when Ariovistus was at war with the
Romans unJer Caesar in Gaul, he had in his army a corps
of 6,000 cavalry, to which were attached 6,000 chosen
infantry, so that they should support each other. If a
horseman fell wounded from his horse the foot soldiers
surrounded and protected him, and one of them mounted
the horse if it was still unwounded.^ These infantry
men were exceedingly agile and skilful, and by holding
to the manes of the horses to aid them, they could keep
up with the cavalry in their most rapid manoeuvres.
This force was very useful in skirmishes of cavalry, their
skill and endurance being great, and the weapons of the
age being suitable only for close fighting.

Later in the war in Gaul, when Vercingetorix had
drawn most of the Gallic tribes into the revolt against
the Romans, it became necessary for Csesar to look
elsewhere for allies to furnish him with cavalry. We
find that in the action before Neuvi, in 52 B.C., Caesar
used 600 German cavalry who had served under him
since the commencement of the war. He says in his
Commentaries, that the cavalry of Vercingetorix could
not stand against them, but were defeated and driven
back to their main body.* As, however, Csesar threw
them into action as a reserve, after the fight had been
going on for some time between his other cavalry and
the enemy's horse, it is doubtful whether the success is
not to be attributed more to the fact of a fresh body

> Caesar, iv. 12, 13. 2 i^jd, j 43. 3 ibid. vii. 13.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

95

had

fainst

look

We

sesar

him

his

ould

being thrown into the action at its crisis, rather than
to any superior qualities on the part of the German
horsemen.

Caesar, who had seen that the Gauls were very superior
to him in cavalry and light troops, and that he was
surrounded by a hostUe population, and unable to obtain
any assistance in the shape of a mounted force from
either Italy or the Roman provinces, turned towards
Germany for support, and sent across the Rhine to those
nations that he had pacified in the preceding years, and
asked them to furnish him with the cavalry and light
infantry of their armies.^ When they arrived, however,
they were in a wretched condition, the horses being in
many instances unfit for service. He made great efforts
to render them efficient, and distributed among them
the horses that happened to be in his lines belonging
to the tribunes, the other officers, and the veterans.
He also obtained horses wherever he could so as to
have them thoroughly supplied ; so successful was
he in this endeavour, that he very soon had a nu-
merous and most efficient corps of German horsemen.
Appian of Alexandria says they numbered as high as
10,000 men.'*

Afterwards, when the Romans carried on their offensive
wars against the Germans, which lasted for nearly two
hundred years, the constant campaigning against a much
more skilful foe taught the Germans many lessons in
the art of war.^ They gradually adopted better arms,
and defensive armour, and improved their system of
tactics to a great extent, so that in time the war on their
part, instead of being defensive, became aggressive, and
after that it may be said that the Germans, more than
any other people, contributed to weaken and destroy the
Roman Empire of the West.*

The Goths were a portion of the German people
and had a high military reputation. The Visigoths had
but few cavalry, while the Ostrogoths maintained a
numerous body of horsemen in their armies. Theodoric,

^ Caesar, vii. 65. ^ Ligkenne, ii. 250. ^ Humbert, 43.

*Duparcq, 216.

96

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

mmn

invading Italy in 489, had an effective force of that arm,
and after having conquered Northern Italy ho established
at Ravenna, his capital, a system of military instruction
for his cavalry. He set the example himself to his
young men, and taught them to excel in the use, not
only of the lance and sword, but of the missile weapons
which they seemed inclined to neglect. They were
continually exercised, and reviews were 'periodically
held in order that they should be maintained in a
proper state of efficiency.' They were clad originally
in skins of beasts, as were the other Germans, and
carried a buckler and lance. In later times they used
various other arms, such as the bword, the bow, and
the battle-axe.^

The Vandals, another German race, used the lance and
sword only, and after their conquest at Carthage fought
always as horsemen, in order that they might more
rapidly ruia and devastate a co> .ntry. They employed
Moorish mercenaries as archers,^ and under Genseric
always embarked a sufficient number of horses upon
their numerous vessels, when they were engaged in their
piratical expeditions,* and upon arriving upon a coast dis-
embarked their chargers, mounted them, and spread over
the country, creating general consternation, destroying
everything and retiring to their fleets, after having
hurriedly gathered all the spoils within reach. ^

The Franks at first fought altogether on foot, but
after their conquests, having discovered the value of
cavalry, they raised among the Gauls a force of auxiliary
horsemen.^ There is no proof that cavalry were used by
them at the battle of Soissons in 486, but in the year
496 Clovis, at the head of his cavalry, completely defeated
the Germans at Tolbiac. In subsequent years the
Gaulish cavalry decided the fate of many actions fought
by his successors.'

The Spanish CAVAiiRY. The Spaniards in the early
times were armed (as were the cavalry of nearly all the

» Gibbon, iv. 15. 2 Humbert, 44. a Duparcq, 218. * Gibbon,
iii. 486. 6 Humbert, 45. « Ibid. ^ Mottin, 215.

CHAP. 111.]

ROMAN CAVALRY

97

early
11 the

nations of anti(]uity) with a lance pointed witli iron,
which, while used in the hand to thruHt, was still avail-
able to throw as a projectile in case of need.' They
also used a good cut-and -thrust sword, and seem to
have been the inventors of that particular kind of
weapon — for Polybius says that the Roman legions in
his time were armed with the Spanish sword.^ They
used the poignard also. For defensive armour they
wore a species of casque with a visor fixed under the
chin, and a crest adorned with red feathers or horsehair,
a garment of linen quilted and thick, a leathern
cuirass, and a buckler made of sinews and hide.

There was one species of Spanish cavalry who were
accompanied in action, as those of the Germans already
mentioned, by an equal number of foot- soldiers, but it
was their custom to mount behind the horsemen, and
ride double in order that they might move rapidly
to any decisive point, and then the infantry alighting,
the two arms mutually supported each other.^

It was also the custom among them that if the infantry
thus carried were closely pressed and required a rein-
forcement of foot-soldiers, the cavalry were trained to
dismount, to fasten their horses by pickets which were
attached to the bridles, and which they drove into the
ground, and to form up in line alongside of their
comrades.*

This gave the idea of voltigeurs, which were organised
in the French army at Boulogne in 1804, to be drilled
and manoeuvred on this principle. The experiment
was soon abandoned.

Hannibal enrolled a number of Spanish cavalry in his
army on leaving Spain for Italy, and at the battle of
the Ticinus, they fought armed with cuirasses, their
horses being supplied with bits.*

It was customary among the Spaniards to place the
cavalry in the rear, as a reserve to be employed as soon
as the infantry had gained any success, iu order to fall

tibbon,

' Duparcq, 195, 196. 2 Polybius, vi. i.

* Duparcq, 195. ^ ibid. 197.

Duparcq, 197.

H

98

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

upon the enemy while in confusion, and to pursue them
when in flight.

Livy says that the Spanish cavalry often prevailed
over the Numidians, but in face of this statement it is
nevertheless generally admitted that the Spanish cavalry
were not equal either to the Gaulish or Carthaginian
horse. Their infantry must have been of good quality,
for Quintius Sertorius, the Roman general, preferred
them to the Roman troops, particularly for the defence
of fortified posts.

j

V!

SECTION VII. — PARTHIAN CAVALRY.

During the time that Julius Caesar was pursuing his
conquests in Gaul and Britain, and adding great stretches
of territory to the Roman Empire in that direction, a
war was being waged at the other extremity of the then
known world, in which the Romans were attempting to
extend their power to its furthest limits. The success
of Julius Caesar was not more marked in the west, than
was the failure of Crassus in the east.

The defeat of Crassus was probably the most serious
blow that a Roman army had ever sufiered since the
mournful day of Cannae. And it is a curious circum-
stance that in this second disaster the Romans again
owed all their ill success to the superiority of the hostile
cavalry. In Parthia the inhabitants carried out success-
fully the same idea of harassing their invader with
mounted men that Verciugetorix had conceived about
the same period, but had been unable to put into
execution.

Crassus marched into Parthia in B.C. 53 with an army
consisting of seven legions, about 35,000 men with 4,000
cavalry and nearly 4,000 light infantry.' Instead of
marching through the mountainous parts of Armenia
where he would have been among a friendly people, and
where his force could have operated to the greatest
advantage, he injudiciously passed the Euphrates at

Zeugma, and took

his route across

' Plutarch, Crassus.

the great plains of

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

99

Mesopotamia, where the Parthian cavalry, which was
the main force of his enemy, would have every advantage
of ground.

Orodes, the King of Parthia, sent his lieutenant or
general, Surena, to oppose Crassus, while lie himself
made an inroad into Armenia, whose king, Artavasdes,
was about taking the field in alliance with Crassus.'
Surena had nothing but cavalry in his army. This was
noc the habitual custom of the Parthians, for their armies
often contained four or five times as many infantry as
cavalry, but as the king was entering upon a campaign
in the mountains of Armenia, he naturally took the
infantry with him, leaving the cavalry to his favourite
general, who, if called upon to fight, would only be
obliged to do so upon open plains, exactly suited to the
use of that arm.*

Surena's army was composed of two kinds of horse-
men— the heavy and the light. The heavy armed cavalry
were clad almost entirely in mail armour, wearing
cuirasses and thigh-pieces of leather with scales of brass
or iron sewn over them, and helmets of polished iron.
They carried no shield, their armour being a sufficient
protection. They carried a large lance or spear, one
much more formidable than those in use in most nations
of the time, and far more than a match for the light
weapon then carried by the Eoman cavalry. They used
also bows and arrows of unusual size, that would pierce
any ordinary armour, and so swift was i he flight of the
arrow that it was not seen until it had struck. They
carried in the girdle a short sword or knife for close
combat.'

They were accustomed to charge in a close line at
speed, relying mainly upon their lances and the force of
the shock. Their horses were heavily armed with breast-
pieces, and had pieces of the same species of leathern
scale armour, as that used by their riders, their sides
and flanks being protected in the same way.

The light cavalry, which was the most eficctive in

Plutarch, OrasHiis. ^ Ravvlinson's Porthia, 100.

•■' Ibid. 4(t4.
Jl -2

100

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

action, was in strong contrast to the heavy, and it com-
prised the main portion of the mounted force." They
were magnificent riders, trained from the earliest youth,
so that man and horse moved almost with the volition of
one being. The horses were fleet and active, were
managed by a headstall and single rein, and ridden with
hardly any equipment. The rider was clad in a simple
tunic and trousers, and his principal weapon was a bow
of unusual length, and a quiver full of barbed arrows.
These arrows could be driven with great force and with
equal ease, either while stationary or while advancing or
retreating, and on this account their tactics consisted in
simply swarming about an enemy's column, never coming
to close quarters, but continually plying it with barbed
shafts ; retreating, shooting when attacked ; advancing,
shooting when the enemy retired, and hovering around
them if halted at bay, wearying and destroying them
with a system of tactics they were unable to meet with
success .'^ As this required immense quantities of arrows,
they had large reserves carried with the baggage upon
camels, so that in action they could be furnished with
fresh supplies when they were short. The light horse-
men seem to have carried a sword, and the customary
knife at the belt.'

The number of cavalry under the command of Surena
is not given by any of the ancient historiana. Plutarch
says, a " vast number." Velleius Paterculus says, " an
immense force." Rawlinson refers to these authors in his
History of Parthia, and mentions that the Parthians met
Antony shortly after with 60,000 horse, which would
lead to the natural inference that Crassus must have
been opposed by probably 40,000 or 50,000 cavalry.*

After crossing the Euphrates, Crassus, who had recon-
noitring parties of horse far in advance, soon received
reports that, although not a man was to be seen, yet
there were vestiges of large bodies of cavalry which
seemed to be retreating before them. On the third or
fourth day after crossing the river, while marching over

2 riutarch, Crassus. ^ Rawlinson,

' Rawlinson, Parthia, 101
400. 1 Ibid. 162, note.

CHAP. 111.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

101

an

over
linson,

a desert country, exposed to great heat and without
water, the remains of one of his patrols or reconnoitring
parties of horse came in with the information, that they
had been attacked by Parthian cavalry, that their
comrades had been killed, and that they had made their
escape with the greatest difficulty. They reported the
enemy to be very numerous, and in the highest spirits.
Crassus at once formed his army in battle array in one
long line, the infantry in the centre, the cavalry upon
the wings. He extended his line as much as possible, in
order to prevent his army being surrounded, but after-
wards, evidently feeling that no extent of front could
^ 'event that difficulty, with so numerous a force of
horsemen before him, he wisely altered his formation,
and drew up his legions in close order.

Plutarch is rather obscure in his description of the
order of battle adopted by Crassus. It seems most
probable that his men were placed in three bodies of
twenty-four cohorts each, twelve fronting each way, and
back to back to each other, so that they would form a
solid oblong. Between these three masses and upon the
flanks were divided the cavalry and light troops. The
younger Crassus, who had served with great distinction
under Caesar in Gaul, and who had joined his father for
this campaign, commanded one wing ; Cassius, who after-
wards assassinated Csesar, commanded the other. Crassus
himself took up his position in the centre.

In this order they marched forward to the banks of
the river Belik or Balissus, where the wearied soldiers
were able to obtain water to quench their thirst, after
the fatigues of a march over the heated desert. The
officers advised Crassus to camp on the banks until
morning, but Publius Crassus, with the natural impetuo-
sity of a young cavalry officer, and incited by the eager-
ness of the horsemen whom he commanded, urged his
father vehemently to move on at once to the attack.
Crassus, influenced by his son, commanded his army to
take some refreshment as they stood in their ranks,
and hardly waiting till they had finished, he again
resumed his march with increased haste.

102

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

Surena awaited him with a portion only of his light
cavalry of the advanced guard being visible. His heavy
horsemen were concealed behind them with coats and
skins thrown over their brilliant armour, so that its
glitter might not betray their presence. When the
armies were within fighting distance the Parthian kettle-
drums broke out into their discordant clang, the steel-
clad warriors uncovered their arms, and appeared like
squadrons of fire, with the sun gleaming upon their
breastplates and upon their highly-polished helmets of
steel.'

In front of them sat Surena upon his charger, tall,
erect, and well made, surpassing in size and beauty all
the men of Parthia. Though only thirty years of age he
had won a great reputation in the field for distinguished
bravery. Plutarch says that his almost womanly beauty
did not promise such courage as he was possessed of. Like
Murat, Dundee, and many other celebrated generals of
cavalry, he must have been a great dandy, for he was
splendidly dressed, his face painted, and his hair curled
and parted in the middle.

At first he seems to have decided to open the attack
by a charge of his heavy armed lancers, but probably
when he saw the immense depth and solidity of the
bristling masses of Roman infantry, and the firmness of
their demeanour, he considered it wiser not to risk a
general charge. His cavalry therefore wheeled outwards
and surrounded the Romans. Crassus thereupon ordered
his archers and light infantry to charge. They were
met, however, by the mounted bowmen, who plied them
with such showers of arrows, driven with such force and
execution, that they were at once hurled back upon the
main body. The Parthians then began to swarm around
the Romans, and witli their large bows they kept up a
continual shower of arrows, which were launched with
such power as to pierce shield, breastplate, or greaves,
inflicting fearful wounds.

The Romans were now in a desperate condition.
When they cliarged forward, their assailants retired, still

' Plntavpli, Orassns.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

103

h ing up without cessation the terrible shower of
death-dealing shafts ; when they fell back into their
original line, the swarm of horsemen followed closely,
and the pitiless rain of barbed arrows still pelted upon
them. The only ray of hope before them was that in
time the missiles would be all launched, and rest would
then come. This hope soon failed them, for they saw
those in the front who had exhausted their quivers,
making way for others while they retired, and renewed
their supply from the reserves carried upon camels in
the rear.

Crassus, in his despair, at last gave his son permission
to take a portion of the troops, and by a bold charge,
endeavour to obtain some relief. Young Publius took
with him the 1,000 Gallic cavalry that Caesar had se^t,
and with 300 other cavalry, 500 archers, and eight
cohorts of infantry, he charged boldly against the enemy,
who immediately fled, partly because it was not their
policy to fight at close quarters, and partly to draw the
detachment away from the main body. The young
Roman immediately followed in pursuit with all haste,
thinking a victory was being gained, and in this manner
was drawn a considerable distance from his father, and
entirely out of sight of the main army. Then the
Parthians turned at bay. They formed a line of their
heavy cavalry in front to check a further advance, and
surrounded the party with irregular horse. The Pomans
closed together and defended themselves as well as they
could, but their position was worse than ever. The
shower of arrows commenced again ; the soldiers fell
fast in their ranks, the arrows sticking in them as they
rolled in agony in the sand. When Publius Crassus
called upon them to attack the heavy armed cavalry,
they showed him their >iands nailed to their shields, their
feet fastened to the ground, so that they could neither
fight nor fly. He then led his cavalry to the charge,
but his men with their light short iavelins and scanty
armour, could make no impression upon the heavily armed
Parthians, whose spears were so much more formidable.
The Gauls fought bravely, seized the barbarians' pikes.

104

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period r.

and dragged them from their horses upon the ground,
where they could scarcely stir from the weight of their
own armour. Some of them despairing of gaining any
success by ordinary means, dismounted from their horses,
and setting under those of the Parthians, stabbed them
in the belly where the armour did not protect them, and
so overturned both horse and rider, often being trodden
to death themselves. They then endeavoured to retreat
to the main body, but finding they could not do so, they
took up a position on a hill, placed their horses in the
middle, and assuming a circular formation, locked their
shields together all around, hoping to save themselves
in that way.

It was all in vain, however. The young general,
badly wounded, was advised by some of his officers to
endeavour to save himself by flight, they ofiFering to
accompany him. His answer was, " There was no death,
however dreadful, the fear of which could make him
leave so many brave men dying for his sake." He
desired them to save themselves, and dismissed them,
and then ordering his shield-bearer to kill him, he offered
his side to him to strike the blow, and so died. The
rest fell gallantly fighting ; and of this detachment
of about 6,000 picked soldiers, 500 only were taken
prisoners, the remainder being left dead upon the
field.

This disaster must have all occurred within two or
three hours, and soon Crassus saw the Parthians return-
ing, with loud shouts and songs of victory, which
increased his intense anxiety for the safety of his son,
when all doubts were set at rest by their coming forward,
bearing the head of the gallant young cavalry officer
aloft upon a pike, and displaying it to the anxious and
dispirited Romans. Again the legions were assailed
with the same vigour. They still fought however in
their ranks, sternly resisting and bravely enduring the
showers of missiles, and the pike-thrusts of the mailed
horsemen, unable however successfully to defend them-
selves, or to inflict loss upon their assailants. So in
monotonous carnage the day wore away, and night

CHAP.

in.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

105

brought temporary relief to the distressed army. The
Parthians, according to their custom of going a long
distance to bivouac, retired far from the Romans, and
gave them an opportunity, which they at once seized,
of retreating to the neighbouring town of Carhge. From
there they retreated the next night, but at daylight were
again attacked by the Parthians, and were able, with
some loss, to reach the protection of a hill, when Surena
opened negotiations for a surrender. In the interview
which took place, a struggle ensued, in which Crassus
was killed. So ended the Roman invasion of Parthia in
that year. Of the 40,000 who crossed the Euphrates,
20,000 were slain, and 10,000 made prisoners, barely
one-fourth succeeding in effecting a retreat.

The history of war does not afford a more brilliant
illustration of the great value of the cavalry service,
nor any instance where so great a result was due solely
to the unaided efforts of horsemen. It is remarkable
how thoroughly the Parthians appreciated the true value
and real use of the horse for military purposes, and how
skilfully they utilised two great advantages in war,
namely, superior speed in movement, and superior range
of missile weapons. These two points well understood,
and ably handled, should always secure success.

The Parthians by this war gained the respect of the
.Romans, for they were really the only check to the
advance of the power of the Roman Empire towards the
east. The disaster suffered by the army of Crassus
created a great impression in Rome. Their writers from
that time grudgingly admitted Parthia to be their only
rival, and the second power in the world. In fact the
tide of success for the time had turned, and t he hordes
of the Parthian cavalry carried the standard of their
empire victoriously over Syria and Asia Minor, rolling
back the Roman legions as far as the Egean Sea and the
shores of the Hellespont, so that for a full year Western
Asia changed mastery, and Parthia was the dominant
power. ^

Such were the extraordinary results of a few differences

* Rawlinson, Parthia, 189.

106

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

r

in tactics and weapons between the armies of ^^reat

empires. The Romans at once saw their we js and
immediately" took steps to remedy it. Ventidius, an able
general, who, in b.c. 38, first gave a check to the Parthian
forces, seeing the necessity of meeting the arrows of the
enemy with a missile weapon of equal if not greater
range, had carefully provided himself with a numerous
body of slingers, and by entrenching in high ground and
by manoeuvring skilfully upon leaving his lines, he suc-
ceeded in obtaining a victory, partly by the good services
of his slingers who galled the Parthian cavalry severely,
and partly by the chance of Pacorus, the king's son, who
commanded the enemy, being killed at the crisis of the
action.^ This battle turned the scale again, and confined
the authority of the Parthian monarch to the limits of
his empire, and the Roman eagles once more held their
sway from the Atlantic Ocean to the banks of the
Euphrates.

This success was secured by the improvements in or-
ganisation, armament and tactics of the Roman generals.
They met the Parthian loose array and missile weapons,
with increased cavalry, and a large irregular force of
slingers, and to give every advantage to this last arm
they supplied them with leaden bullets instead of stone,
in order to give an ipcreased range to the projectile, and
more force to the blow.*^

When Antony afterwards invaded Parthia he had
10,000 Gallic and Spanish cavalry, 30,000 light armed
troops and cavalry of his Asiatic allies, and Armenia was
to furnish him with 6,000 horse besides infantry, so that
he probably had from 30,000 to 35,000 cavalry, and his
whole force consisted at the outset of about 113,000 men.
Although he had this large army the expedition was a
failure, one of bis lieutenants, Statianus, with a detach-
ment of bi»^ army, was surrounded and his whole force,
10,000 strong, was cut to pieces, and Antony, after
sufi'ering much loss, efiected a disastrous retreat, being
continually harassed by the hostile cavalry. He was
only able to bring about 70,000 men out of the country.

> Rawlinsnn, 192. ^ Ibid. Parthia, 194.

CHAP. HI.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

107

After this period the Komana made four great ex-
peditions against Parthia, of which that commanded by
Avidius Cassius was the only one that was entirely
successful. The Romans were able, as under Trajan
and Severus, to march, steadily into the country, and
even in some instances to capture the capital, but they
could not hold it, and to retire after an occupation almost
certainly brought on disaster.^ Then the swarms of light
horse clung to their retreating columns, cut off the
stragglers, prevented them from getting provisions, and
incessantly galled them with their arrows.

The Parthians did not use war-chariots nor elephants,
their supplies and reserve stores of ammunition and
provisions were always carried upon camels, which were
used in large numbers for this purpose.

There was one point in their ^lilitary system that was
a serious weakness to them. They were always in the
habit of drawing oft' at nightfall if engaged in a pursuit,
and bivouacking at a considerable distance from the
enemy, and were accustomed to abstain from all military
operations during the night. They were obliged to do
this in order to hobble or tether their horses and give
them time to pasture, which of course could only be
safely effected at a considerable distance from their
opponents, as a long time would necessarily be required,
to secure their horses, equip them, and to form up armed
ready for action.^ This habit gave a retreating army an
opportunity of marching in any direction at night and
of gaining many advantages in that way. The Parthians
never fortified their camps, so that the necessity for
separating themselves from their enemy at night was all
the greater.

In the foregoing pages some particulars have been
given of the cavalry of all the important nations of
antiquity, more especially of all those of which history
has left us any clear account. The wild tribes who lived
beyond the influence of Greek and Eoman civilisation,
have not left any records by which their manners and
customs have been handed down to us, but we may

' Ra-wHnson. ^ Ibid. Parthia.

i

■

108

A HISTORY OF CAYALRY.

[period I.

safely assume that the weapons and tactics of the more
remote tribes would not vary much from those in use
among the nations which bordered on the Roman Empiro,
and of whose system of fighting Roman historians have
given us some details.

SECTION VIII. — TACTICS, OUTPOSTS, PATROLS, &C.

We have gone back into the mists of antiquity
groping for the origin of the use of the horse in war, and
we have seen that the first idea was simply the rapid
conveyance of the warrior to the place of combat ; then
the use of the horse mounted for the same object — then
the fighting from the horse itself, and lastly the develop-
ment of the idea of the charge and the use of the weight
and speed of the horse as an element of force. We
have seen the cavalry attain its zenith under Hg-nnibal,
when it performed the most important part in the actions
of his age, reaching the perfection of cavalry tactics,
and that for two hundred years after the mounted force
held its high position. At Pharsalia the tide begins to
turn, and infantry learns to hold its own against the
horsemen.

In Parthia also the principle of uniting great range of
projectiles with superior mobility reached its highest
development, and effected marvellous results for a Jong
period. This system has never in the world's history
been better understood, and more effectively put into
practice, than by the Parthians about the tiiiae of the
Christian era.

The use of cavalry for outposts, pa,trols, and recon-
noitring parties was at this period thoroughly under-
stood, and was based upon the same principles as those
in use in modem times. The story of Alexander, King
^ of Macedon, riding up to the outposts of the Greek
' army shortly before the battle of Platea, and asking to
see Aristides the Athenian general, reads almost as if it
had happened yesterday, for the sentries would not let
him through their lines, but detained him while some
were sent back with his message to the general, and to

CHAP.

III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

109

obtain orders what to do, and the conference took place
at the outposts.^

Crassus had reconnoitring parties of horse in his
front and considerably advanced. Cyrus the Great
posted advanced guards and outposts beyond and around
his camp, and also sent small patrols of five or ten in
number continually and quietly to make the circuit of
the camp during the night, as a guard against the
approach of an enemy.^ On the march also he used
explorers or scouts who went in advance of his cavalry,
which always marched before the main army.^

Hannibal had his patrols of Numidian cavalry and
reconnoitring parties, continually swarming over the
country in the neighbourhood of his army, nor do we
read of his being ever surprised from the want of proper
outposts.

The Romans understood the art of camping and
entrenching their camps better than any other nation,
and their system of outposts and patrols was equally
good* They always had a guard before the gates of the
camp, especially on the side facing the enemy.* There
were also inlying pickets inside of it, in readiness to
sustain the guards, but in addition to these precautions
outposts composed of both infantry and cavalry were
placed well in advance to guard the avenues to the camp,
and to sustain the patrols and reconnoitring parties.

The cavaliy alone furnished the most advanced posts,
and they formed a chain of videttes and smaller posts.
Their outpost system was so perfect that Roman generals
were rarely or never surprised, and never except by
neglecting their usual precautions.^ The most exact
vigilance was required of the advanced troops and
videttes, the least fault was severely punished, and the
soldier who left his post was put to death without pity.

^ Herodotus, ix. 44. ^ Xenophon, Cyi'opsedia, iii. 3, 28. Ibid,

iv. 5, 5. 3 Ibid. vi. 3, 2, 6. * Guischai-dt, i. 146, 147. ^ Ibid,
ii. 181, 182.

no

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

SECTION IX. — CAVALRY UNDER THE EMPERORS.

In the earlier times of the Republic it will be re-
membered that the armies were composed of those
citizens who had a country to love, property to defend and
an interest in maintaining laws which they themselves
enacted. In time, as the dominion of Rome became
extended and immense numbers of allied troops were
brought to her standard, the army was soon composed
mainly of mercenaries, instead of being the armed
citizens of a free state, whose social and civil institutions
were based upon its military organisation.^

The cavalr}'', which was at first composed of the
wealthiest and best families of the nation, in the time of
the Empire consisted entirely of levies from the provinces
and from the poorer classes in the community. The
equites, no longer used as the cavalry force of the army,
not numerous enough to be of any service as a separate
corps, and of too distinguished a class to fight in the
ranks, when war, degenerated from a patriotic duty, had
become degraded into a trade, were generally engaged in
the administration of justice and in the care of the
revenue.^ Numbers of them did still continue to adopt
the profession of arms, but they were always employed
on the staff of the generals, or were immediately given
the command of a troop of horse or a cohort of foot.

The cavalry in the time of the early emperors carried
the javelin, the long broadsword, and sometimes the
lance and iron mace.^ Their defensive armour consisted
of a helmet, a shield, light boots, and a coat of mail.
They were divided into regiments of 726 horse, composed
of nine troops of 66 men each and one of 132 men,
which was in connection vith the first cohort. They
were naturally connected somewhat with the legion, but
were usually placed upon the wings, or in the line of
battle, or in reserve.

The overgrowth and wealth of the Roman Empire, the
luxury and extravagance which naturally crept into the
' Gibbon, i. 10. 2 ibiti I 16. ^ Ibid. 17.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

Ill

manners of the people, in time sapped the strength of
the state, and were soon seen to have their eflect upon the
army. The patriotism, the national sentiment that in
early times distinguished Rome beyond all nations,
gradually died out. The loyal courage of the citizens
when every man was a soldier, when none could aspire
to high ollice who had not served his term in the ranks,
was soon lost when Rome, the centre of a vast empire,
became far removed from the dangers and hai-dships
of war.

From the appearance of Hannibal before the walls of
Rome in 211 B.C., until Alaric encamped before it with
his army of Goths in 408 a.d., a period of six hundred
and nineteen years elapsed, in which the seat of empire
was never once insulted by the presence of a hostile
army.^

The Roman infantry, which when it conquered the
world was but an armed people, soon became filled also
with barbarian mercenaries, and with the most worthless
classes in the community, who were attracted by high
pay to serve in the ranks, while the better class of the
citizens and those of wealth and distinction, idled away
their lives in the enjoyment of the efieminate and
extravagant luxury of an overgrown capital.

Such was the aversion among the degenerate Romans
to the profession of arms that the youth of Italy in
many instances cut off the fingers of the right hand to
escape military service. ^ This practice was so common
as to render necessary special laws forbidding it, and
fixing the punishment in case of transgression.

The mercenary troops, who under the Empire alone
composed the armies, soon wrested from their weak and
luxurious masters concession after concession. They
soon felt their power and appointed emperors of their
own choice, and the emperors well knew that they only
held the throne by the consent of their soldiers. The
effect of this upon the discipline of the army was very
injurious, and was speedily and severely felt.

Septimius Severus being declared emperor by the

' Gibbon, iii. 2U.

2 Ibid. iii. 130.

112

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

Pannonian legions and securing that position through the
exertions and good will of the military forces, thought it
his policy about the year 193 to commence the evil
practice of relaxing discipline in the army.^ He in-
creased their pay beyond what it had ever been pre-
viously; he instituted the custom of giving them
donations on occasions of public festivity, and allowed
them to live idly in their quarters. The officers were
allowed to set an example of luxury, and the general
tendency was soon seen in the enervation of the troops,
in their incapacity to endure the hardships of military
life, and in their growing impatience of a proper
subordination.

Caracalla carried out the principle of pandering to the
legions to a much ^greater extent, the state being ex-
hausted to enrich a useless and insubordinate soldiery.^
The Emperor Alexander Severus saw the ruinous laxity
that had crept into the army, and was very anxious to
restore to it some semblance of that discipline which
had done so much to build up the Empire. So bad, how-
ever, was the state of affairs, that even he was obliged
to pay them vevy highly, to relax the old rule by which
each soldier on the march carried seventeen days' pro-
visions on his shoulders, and to form numerous trains of
mules and camels to wait upon their haughty laziness.^
He found it impossible to put a stop to their luxury, and
therefore ingeniously tried to guide it usefully into a love
for good arms, fine trappings, well-bred horses, and
shields ornamented with gold and silver.

The laziness and degeneracy of these troops was next
shown in their unwillingness to bear the weight of
defensive armour. Vegetius, who is supposed to have
written under Valentinian H. in the latter part of the
fourth century, gives a most melancholy picture of the
evils existing in his day, in reference to the arms of the
legionaries.

He says that, from the foundation of Rome until
the time of the Emperor Gratian, the Roman infantry
had always worn the casque and the cuirass, but that
1 Gibbon, i. 146. ^ lyj. IGl. ^ Ibid. 180.

CHAP. III.]

KOMAN CAVALRY.

113

Avhen sloth and negligence had rendered the exercioes less
frequent, the soldiers carrying them only rarely, soon
found them too heavy to wear, and demanded of the
Emperor, first to be relieved of the cuirass, and then of
the helmet. As the Romans abandoned the armour they
had carried victoriously all over the world, the barbarians
began to adopt it, and th3 cavalry of the Goths, Huns,
and Alani were clad in defensive armour. The Roman
infantry soon found themselves opposed with their heads
and bodies defenceless against the Goths, who destroyed
them by the multitude of their archers. In spite of many
defeats, and the ruin of splendid cities, no general dared
to compel his soldiers to resume the use of heavy armour.
The result was that the soldier thought more of flight
than of fighting. Vegetius makes an eloquent appeal
in favour of the restoration of armour.' " Those who find
the old arms so burdensome," he says, " must either receive
wounds upon their naked bodies and die, or what is
worse still, run the risk of being made prisoners, or of
betraying their country by flight. Thus, to avoid fatigue,
they allow themselves to be butchered shamefully, like
cattle."

One can hardly imagine that the above description
refers to the successors of the splendid infantry that fought
at the Trebbia, and which in a thousand years of victory
had won so high a reputation. The legions which had
maintained the dignity of the Roman name along the
immense frontiers of the empire, retained their miHtary
qualities long after the seeds of decay had been destroy-
ing the life of the state at its heart. They soon how-
ever became corrupted by the laxity of the emperors,
and soon deserved such a character as that given them by
Vegetius. The barbarians were not long in discovering
their weakness, and lost no time in taking advantage of it.

The Romans, in the mean time, relying on the g'reat
distance of the frontier from the home provinces, fon^^^'"
believed themselves secure from barbarian invasion. The
<lelusion was rudely dispelled by an irruption of the
Goths, in the reign of Pliilip, about the year 248, which

' Vegetius. i. c. 20.

I

fil'

114

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

awakened them to their danger. The Koman troops,
composed of cowardly mercenaries, betrayed the most
important posts, and took service under the standard of
the invader from fear of the punishment due to their
tre ;hery. The inhabitants of the Koman province of
Mcesia ransomed their lives and property by the pay-
ment of a largj sum of money.'

A year or two later, the Goths attacked the same
province again, and the Koman army was destroyed,
and the Emperor Decius killed ; and from this time the
great power, whose troops for so many years had been so
unifonnly victorious, was continually suffering defeats
and losses, and was learning year by year to place less
reliance upon the infantry legions.^ The decline of the
Koman infantry gave the barbarian horsemen, who
swarmed around the frontiers, frequent opportunities to
gain successes, and in time gave to the cavalry service a
somewhat fictitious reputation, and led the Komans to
believe that their defeats were to be attributed more to
the superiority of the cavalry service as an arm, than to
the insubordination and degeneracy of their own troops.

This idea gaining ground, the Komans naturally turned
their attention more to the cavalry, increased that force
considerably, and relied much upon it to maintain their
position in the field.

By the year 312 the cavalry force had much increased.
In the battle fought in that year near Turin, between
Constantine and the generals of Maxentius, the principal
strength of the army of the latter consisted in its heavy
cavalry. The horses of this force, as well as the men,
were clothed in complete armour, well fitting and adapted
to the motions of their bodies.'^ They were very heavy,
and in the direct charge were almost irresistible, They
sometimes, is they did in this battle, charged in a mass
of wedge shape, the point directed towards the enemy.
They must, however, have been unwieldy and unmanage-
able, for Constantine, by skilful evolutions and mancBuvres,
succeeded in dividing the heavy body of horsemen, and
by his superior tactical skill gained a decisive victory.

' Gibbon, i. 290.

2 Ibid. 291.

8 Ibid. 477.

CHAP.

III.]

KOMAN CAVALRY.

115

This species of heavy armed cavalry seems to have
been copied from those in use by the nations of the East.
In 351 Constantius, the son of Constantine, won a signal
victory over Magnentius at the battle of Mursa by thf>
use of his cavalry/ wh.ch were heavy armed cuirassiers,
glittering in scaly aimour, and who with ponderous
lances broke the firm array of the Gallic legions by the
imi losity of their charge. From the time of Constan-
tine the cavalry composed the principal part of the
Eoman armies, and in the reign of Justinian the Byzan-
tine army in the field consisted almost entirely of heavy
armed cavalry. The barbarians being then almost all
horsemen, had placed the cavalry service in high honour.
The most important portior of the army of Belisarius in
this reign was his body of mounted guards, who were
picked soldiers, chosen for their strength, courage, and
skill, as well as for the good quality of their horses and
armour. The infantry occupied a very secondary position
in his army, the cavalry being almost entirely relied
upon. Many of them were armed with the Scythian
bow. Procopius defends the use of the archers,^ which
some critics of his time had been inclined to despise : —

" Such contempt might, perhaps, be due to the naked
youths who appeared on foot in the fields of Troy, and
lurking behind a tombstone, or the shield of a friend,
drew the bowstring to their breast and dismissed a feeble
and lifeless arrow. But our arches (says the historian)
are mounted on horses, which they manage with admir-
able skill. Their head and shoulderb are protected by a
casque or buckler, they wear greaves of iron on their
legs, and their bodies are guarded by a coat of mail. On
their right side hangs a quiver, a sword on their left, and
their hand is accustomed to wield a lance or javelin in
closer combat. Their bows are strong and weighty, they
shoot in every possible direction, advancing, retreating,
to the front, to the rear, or to either flank, and as they
are taught to draw the bow-string not to the breast, but
to the right ear, firm indeed must be the armour that can
resist the rapid violence of their shaft."

• Gibbon, ii. 195. 2 ibid. iv. 120.

I 2

I

i

IIG

A HISTORY OF CAVA1.RY.

[I'EBIOD I.

The above extract gives a very good idea of the arma-
ment and equipment of the cavalry of that age, and it is
remarkable how closely the Romans had imitated those
Parthian archers, whose tactics had cost them so dear in
so many campaigns.

The great increase of cavalry, the weight of their
armour, and the quality of their horses, were all in vain
to save the falling Empire. Arms, equipment, or tactics
could do nothing to save a nation where the guiding
principle was lost, where there was no longer a feeling of
patriotism, where the national life was dying out, and
where the indulgence of selfish luxury was the ruling
sentiment of the people.

The barbarian tribes, hardy and warlike, fighting
chiefly on horseback, soon flooded over the provinces,
gathering immense booty in the wealthy and civilised
countries of Southern Europe ; and at last, in the year
410, eleven hundred and sixty-three years after the
foundation of Rome, the Goths, under Alaric, captured
the imperial city, and the mistress of the world was
handed over to the licentious fury of the fierce tribes of
barbarians.'

A few years later, the great barbarian ruler, Attila,
King of the Huns, threatened the Roman Empire, and
compelled it to make treaties most humiliating in their
terms. He united Germany and Scythia under his rule.
His army was of enormous strength,^ containing 500,000
men of various nations that acknowledged him as king.
The Huns, who formed a considerable part of his army,
are well described by Ammianus Marcellinus, and we
learn from him that they never lived in fixed habita-
tions, but wandered about on horseback, followed by
cattle drawing cars on which their women and children
lived. They were inured to all hardships, and were
clad in dresses made of skins. They rode small horses,
ugly but vigorous, and swift in their paces, and they
seem to have almost lived in the saddle, buying and
selling, eating and drinking mounted, and sometimes

Gibbon, iii. 282.

2 Jornandes, ch. 35.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

117

even sleeping resting upon the necks of their horses.'
They charged in battle without order, in separate bands
under different chiefs, and fell upon their opponents with
loud shouts. In case of solid resistance, they retreated,
scattering to rally and charge again at the first opportu-
nity. They knew nothing of fighting on foot, or of the
art of defending or attacking fortifications. They used
the bow with wonderful skill, their arrows being pointed
with bone instead of iron, and having a very extended
range. For close quarters they used a snare or net, to
entangle their enemy, while they destroyed him with the
blows of the sword which they carried. Besides the
Huns, Attila had also in his army many other nations,
some of whom wore cuirasses of horn mail, and carried
enormous lances.^ There were contingents from all parts
of Germany and Scythia. At the head of this horde
Attila invaded Gaul in 451, and besieged Orleans. On
the approach of the Roman General -<Sltius, with his allies,
Theodorio, king of the Visigoths, and Sangipan, king of
the Alans, Attila raised the siege, and retreated to the
fields of Catalaun, and in the neighbourhood of Chalons
was fought one of the greatest battles in the world's
history.

Attila commanded the centre of his army, where were
placed his best troops. His right wing was commanded
by Ardaric, king of the Gepidae, his left by the kings of
the Ostrogoths, ^tius commanded the right wing of
the allied forces. King Theodoric the left, while Sangipan,
king of the Alans, whose fidelity was suspected, was
placed in the front line in the centre.

A height which occupied an advantageous position
between the two armies had been taken possession of by
Thorismond, King Theodoric's son, with some Visigoth
cavalry. This gave ^Etius a great advantage. Attila,
seeing the importance of the post, sent some squadrons
to occupy it. Thorismond, having reached the summit,
charged the Huns with vigour, and drove them off
without difficulty. Attila then made a furious attack
upon this portion of the Roman line, and supported it
' Ammianus Marcellinus, xxxi. 2. ^ Thierry, i. 1 33.

118

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period I.

by some of his best troops, which were detached from
the centre for the purpose. The Romans having the
advantage of the ground, maintained their line and
repulsed the enemy. Theodoric, the gallant old king of
the Visigoths, led a splendid attack with the left wing
against the Ostrogoths on Attila's right.* The charge
was vigorous in the extreme ; the aged monarch, struck
down by a javelin as he charged at the head of his men,
was trampled to death by the rush of his advancing
squadrons, who swept aU before them, and then,
wheeling to the right, fell full upon the flank of the
Hunnish centre, which was closely engaged with the
Alans. Defeated upon his two wings, and with his
centre outflanked, Attila retired to the shelter of his
camp, where his archers dismounted, and protected by
the barrier of waggons, soon checked with their arrows
the advance of the pursuing horsemen.

Attila remained sullenly in his camp the next day,
expecting an attack, and prepared for a desperate
resistance. The plain was covered with dead and dying,
the cai'nage on both sides having been fearful ; and the
victorious allies, impressed with the resolute attitude of
their enemy, deemed it prudent to avoid an attack, and
allowed him to retire without molestation.

This victory was won by cavalry, and although the
records of it are very obscure, we can trace in the plans
of ^tius a resemblance to the tactics of Scipio at Iling.
-^tius, like Scipio, had a large contingent of allies that
he could not trust, and he adopted the same policy of
placing them in the centre, while with his best troops
he attacked the two wings of his opponent's army.
Attila, like Asdrubal, placed his best troops in the
centre, and when the flanks were defeated, these soldiers
covered the retreat, saved the remains of the army, and
prevented a check becoming a disaster. This victory is
interesting as the last one ever gained by imperial Rome.

We have now traced the history of cavalry from the
earliest times down to the period when the Roman

^ Jomandes, xl.

CHAP. III.]

ROMAN CAVALRY.

119

Empire is falling to pieces, when the ancient civilisation
is destroyed, and when the tumults and confusion caused
by such a general upheaval, and the consequent
destruction of art, science, and literature, are gradually
producing the dark ages. We will leave the question
we are discussing at this point, where history seems
almost lost in a mist, and in the next portion of the
work begin groping again to pick up on this side of
that period the threads of the tangled skein which we
now drop.

I )

J

:^

PERIOD 11.

FROM THE FALL OF THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE
TO THE INVENTION OF FIRE-ARMS.

CHAPTER IV.

Feudal Cavalry.

m

1^

K I

SECTION I,— ORIGIN OF FEUDAL SYSTEM. — BATTLE OF

POICTIERS, 732.

In the last period the history of cavalry was brought
down to the time when the Roman Dominion of the
West had fallen to pieces, and it will be well to consider
now the condition and growth of the cavalry service, in
the various nationalities that arose upon the ruins, and
were formed of the disjointed fragments of the shattered
empire.

After the conquest of Rome by the various German
tribes, the habits and customs of the German people
naturally exercised a most important influence upon the
civilisation of the age, and for many centuries the effect
can be traced in the development of a difi'erent type of
government, both in a civil and military point of view,
from that which had existed under the Romans.

One important institution of German origin, namely,
the "Feudal System," which soon became established,
rapidly spread all over Europe, and has more or less
afliected the tenure of land to the present day. This
institution, being for many generations the basis of the

CHAP. IV. J

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

121

military systems of the nations of Europe, merits some
consideration.

It is certain that long before the invasion of the Roman
Empire, there existed among the Germans certain noble
or privileged classes or families. This is established by
Tacitus, who draws the distinction between the " nobiles,"
or " principes," and the plebeian orders. Aristocratic
families, from which the chieftains of the tribes were
elected, are also alluded to continually in historical works.

At first the German tribes, wandering in vast tracts of
forests, living mainly by the chase, and continually en-
gaged in war with neighbouring nations, did not value
property in land, which was then held in common. At
this period the young warriors were accustomed to band
themselves into military fellowships or companies, and to
elect one of their number as leader or general. This was
done by raising upon a shield, him who among them
was believed ,to possess in the highest degree the courage
and military skill required by a commander.^ Sometimes
a chief, already famous, and enjoying an exalted reputa-
tion, would gather around him an army of young men
attracted by his fame, who would enrol under his banner,
and grant him implicit obedience. These parties would
migrate, and invade other countries in search of land to
settle upon. The Suevi divided their nation into tens,
hundreds, and thousands, and the land was held in
common by the different districts or cantons. They also
sent out large parties, annually, to migrate in ' arch of
new fields, as bees swarm when the hive becomes over-
crowded.

These hordes, whenever victorious, settled in the new
territory, and divided the land equally among the free-born
warriors. These grants were hereditary, and were termed
Allods, from Od, an estate ; their boundaries were carefully
marked, — and each owner dwelt within the limits of his
own estate.^ An Allod could not be sold without the
consent of the family, nor could the government confiscate
it for any wrong-doing of a present proprietor, who held
it, and the freedom it gave him, as an inalienable right.
' Menzel, Part i. sec. ix. * Ibid. xiii.

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

These free-born allodial proprietors, and their slaves
captured in war and compelled to serve them, were the
only two classes among the early Germans ; ^ it being
supposed that the so-called nobles or principes were
simply the eldest sons and heirs to the estates, which
gave them a rank higher than that of their younger
brothers. In time some of the slaves became manu-
mitted, and portions of land were furnished them by
their masters upon certain conditions of service, and the
payment of a yearly tribute. Sometimes in conquering
a country they left a portion of the land in the hands of
the original inhabitants, stipulating that they should
perform certain services in return.^ This produced a
class not slaves nor yet free, but me"*?ly dependent as
vassals to the feudal lord. Their property in the land,
subject to the duties to be performed, was fixed and well
understood, but was called " Fe-od " or " Fief " (which
means transferable property), in contradistinction to
AUod or freehold. This was the foundation of the feudal
system.

Soon the principal chief or king became an hereditary-
officer, and extensive kingdoms were established which
retained much of the ancient Germanic constitution.
After the establishment of the monarchical government ^
the royal allotment of conquered land was much greater
than that of any of the free-born warriors, and consisted
of a large domain where the king held his court, as well
as other allods in various parts of the country. These
extra grants were made to support him and his court,
so as to prevent the necessity of direcc taxation.

The division of the allodial proprietors in these king-
doms was, in imitation of ancient customs, made by tens
and hundreds. The smaller division soon disappeared,
and the hundreds became cantons, several of which
formed a Gau or pro^dnce.* The hundreds, into which
England was parcelled about 1,400 years ago by the
Anglo-Saxons, a German tribe, are in existence to this
day as a recognised territorial division. The judges or

1 Menzel, Part i. sec. xiv. ~ Boutaric, 103. ^ Menzel, Part i.
sec. Ixxiv. ^ Menzel, Part i. sec. Ixxv.

CHAP. IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

123

presidents, who were formerly elected over each province
by the popular vote of the assembly, were under the
monarchy appointed by the king. The chief officer of
the province was known by the title of Graf or Count
(comes), and he commanded the contingent furnished by
the Gau in time of war. When the kingdoms increased
largely, including subdued nations, these latt'jr were
sometimes allowed to retain their former rulers, on con-
dition of furnishing contingents in the field. This gave
rise to the ducal dignity.

The state was thus divided into dukedoms, provinces,
and hundreds. The army consisted of the whole nation,
and was commanded by the chief men of the hundreds,
by the Grafs or chiefs of provinces, by the Dukes, and
over all by the king.' The army was a militia pure and
simple, and there was no standing force. When the
nation was summoned for an assembly to discuss affairs
of state in time of peace, it was called the Arimannia,
from mamiire, to cite. When brought out for war it was
called the arriere-ban, or Heerbann (from Heer, an army,
and bannire, to summon). The orders proceeded from
the monarch to the dukes, from them to the counts, from
them to the centners or chiefs of hundreds, who com-
municated them to those under them. Each man
followed to the wars the same chief who governed him
in time of peace. The discipline was well maintained,
and the punishment for offences severe.

The allodial freemen had many privileges. They were
exempt from taxation and from the compulsory labour
which was required of tributary subjects. They assisted
in the proceedings of justice, and had their share of
legislative authority in the general assembly of the
people.^ They had the liberty of carrying arms and
using them to avenge injuries, and they paid no perma-
nent ground rent as did the subjected Romans who held
lands. In return for all these advantages, the free land-
holder was compelled to serve in the Heerbann, during
which service he had an undisputed right to his share of
the general plunder. He had also to furnish horses and

^ Menzel, Part i. sec. Ixxv. - Lbwy, 4, 5.

124

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[I'EBIOD 11.

waggons in time of war, and in case of need was ex-
pected to give presents and supplies to the king and his
court.

Any freeman who neglected to attend the summons
to join the army lost his privileges, but sometimes a fine
would be accepted in lieu of personal military service.
Among the Anglo-Saxons, the kings confiscated the
allodial lands of those who deserted, and conferred them
upon the counts of the provinces. A large portion of
these freemen, in war time, served in the infantry forces,
the higher classes among them and the wealthiest alone
fighting as cavalry.' The increase in cavalry and the
improvement of that force tended greatly to change the
allodial into the feudal system.

When the migrations had ceased and the monarchs
became settled in their kingdoms the feudal system
became perfected, particularly in France, where the
kings divided the lands they had gained as fiefs, among
their friends and confidants {Jideles or antriistiones), who,
being usually high officers of the court, held a higher
position in the general assembly than the ordinary
allodial proprietors. The king gave privileges to his
feudatories from time to time, until they were at length
formed into a class of nobles, who outranked the ancient
nobility who were simply freemen.- The advantages of
holding royal fiefs became so great, that many allodial
proprietors surrendered their estates to the monarch, and
swore allegiance to him as their feudal lord, upon re-
ceiving back their lands in fee. Thus the feudal system
increased until almost all the land was held in fee from
the monarch.

The holders of large fiefs soon adopted the plan of
increasing their power and influence, by letting either to
other noblemen, or to freemen, large portions of their
estates, which these latter held as their vassals. This
process was called sub-infeudation, and soon became very
general, so that almost all fees were of this type.

About the time of Charlemagne horsemen in armour
began to decide the fate of battles. The Germans had

] Lbwy, 11. - Menzel, Part i. sec. Ixxvii.

CHAP. IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

125

copied from the Romans the use of armour, and had
gained many advantages over thoir opponents by so
doing. The Franks under Ch^vis had also adopted this
species of defence, and in the battle against the Visigoths
the king himself owed his life to his armour.

The service in the cavalry was connected with the
possession of benefices or fiefs in the days of Charlemagne,
when that force formed a very important portion of the
ai'my. The horsemen were separately mentioned when
summoning the troops into the field.' As no regular
pay was given to the soldier, the fiefs were intended to
provide the funds for supplying a mounted knight with
the necessary attendants, horses, and equipment, the
cost of which was very heavy and beyond the means of
the ordinary freeman.

The cavalry was consequently entirely composed of
nobles, who formed the chief force of the nation. To
such an extent was this the case," that the term unites, a
soldier, became limited in its meaning, and during the
eleventh century signified only a noble horseman, or
knight, and was never applied to any of the inferior
grades in the army. The terms chevalier, caballarius,
caballero, originally meaning a horseman, also came to be
considered as titles of nobility.

In Spain every citizen who possessed a sufficient
amount of property was bound to serve the king in war
as a horseman (caballero), and in return for this service
he was entitled to the same rights and privileges as the
landed aristocracy.*^

The feudal system was carried into England by William
the Conqueror, and the greater portion of the country
parcelled out among his followers in large fiefs. The
privileges of the nobles were however much more re-
stricted than in other countries, while the masses of the
people were in the enjoyment of greater liberty. The
military system was based upon the same principle as
was in use in Europe, and the mounted knights who
served under the king were the highest class in the
state.

^ Lowy, 13. 2 Ibid. 14. 3 Ibid. 21.

126

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY,

[period II.

During the period that these changes were going on in
the military and political systems of Europe, the records
of the art of war, and the accounts preserved of the
different important battles fought, are so obscure and so
imperfect that but little can be said conci rning them. It
is almost certain however that even were we in possession
of authentic details upon the subject, we should find but
little of value in connection with the military art. The
decline of civilisation and the ascendency of barbarism
affected war as it did all other arts and sciences, and it is
not likely that the barbarians were much acquainted with
either discipline or tactics. Of the battles of Soissons
and Tolbiac fought by Clovis we can say but little. We
have fortunately some interesting particulars of the Battle
of Casilinum fought iu 554, where the Eunuch Narses
won a most decisive victory over the Franks under
Bucelinus by the tactical use of his cavalry.

Bucelinus had 30,000 effective infantry in his army,
but no cavalry. Narses, who commanded the troops of
the Emperor of the East, had only 18,000 men, of whom
a large portion were cavaby in armour and using bows
and arrows.^ He drew up his forces in line, the heavy
infantry in the centre, the cavalry upon the wings, the
archers and slingcrs in the rear. As he was drawing out
his prmy for battle,"^ he was told that one of the chiefs of
the Heruli, which formed a large contingent of his com-
mand, had slain one of his own servants for some trivial
ofience. He at once inquired into the case, and executed
the officer upon the spot. The Heruli, indignant at his
severity, refused to go into action. Narses said 'J they
did not, they would lose the honour of the victory, and
proceeded without them — arranging that if they came up
they could act as a second line or reserve.

Bucelinus formed his army into a wedge-like order,
with the point towards the enemy, and charged vehe-
mently against the centre of the Eoman line, which was
soon broken and obliged to give way. Narses was not
discouraged, but swung forward his two wings of cavalry,
who armed, some with bows and arrows, some with
' Gibbon, iv. 277. ^ Daniel, Milice Fran^aise, i. 19, 20.

C: TAP. IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

127

javelins, and some with lances, fell upon the flanks and
rear of the Frankish infantry,' who were not protected
either by helmet or cuirasses, and were armed only with
sword, battle-axe, and buckler.^

The highly trained Eoman archers who, clad in com-
plete armour, harassed with their arrows the unwieldy
mass of defenceless barbarians, soon threw them into
confusion and checked their victorious charge. At this
crisis, the Heruli under their leader Sin dual, forgetting
their revengeful feelings in the excitement of battle,
charged impetuously the pointed head of the column
which had pierced the Roman line of battle. This
settled the fate of the day, and the barbarians, sur-
rounded and defeated, were almost annihilated. The
historian Agathias makes the almost incredible state-
ment that only five Franks survived out of thirty
thousand, while the Roman loss was only fourscore.

One of the most important and most interesting
battles of the dark ages was that fought at Tours or
Poictiers in the year 732, between Charles Martel and
the Saracens under Abderrahman, for on that field was
settled the fate of Christian Europe. The Saracen
caliph crossed the Pyrenees at the head of an army,
variously computed at from 80,000 to some hundreds of
thousands. One monkish chronicler puts the losr of
the Arabs at 375,000, which is evidently a gross exag-
geration, but it is a proof that the numbers must have
been very great. The accounts of the battle are in-
complete and very deficient in military details.

The foUowiiig account, taken from the Arabian chroni-
cler, gives the best idea of the combat. After saying
that there was war between the Count of the Frankish
frontier and the Moslems, and how the Count raised an
army and fought against them, the chronicler says : —

" But Abderrahman drove them back, and the men of
Abderrahman were pufied up in spirit by their repeated
successes, and the ' were full of trust in the valour and
the practice in war of their Emir. So the Moslems
smote their enemies and passed the river Garonne and
» Daniel, i. 20, 21. 2 Qibbon, iv. 278, 279.

128

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

; hi

m

laid waste the country and took captives without number,
and that army went through all places like a desolating
storm. Prosperity made these warriors insatiable. At the
passage of the river Abderrahman overthrew the Count,
and the Count retired into his stronghold, but the Moslems
fought against it and entered it by force and slew the
Count, for everything gave way to their cimeters, which
were the robbers of lives. All the nations of the Franks
trembled at that terrible army, and they betook them to
their king Caldus (Charles Martel) and told him of the
havoc made by the Moslem horsemen, and how they
rode at will through all the land of Narbonne, Toulouse,
and Bordeaux, and they told the king of the death of
their Count. Then the king bade them be of good cheer,
and offered to aid them. And in the 114th year (of the
Hegira) he mounted his horse, and he took with him
a host that could not be numbered, and went against the
Moslems. And he came upon them at the great city of
Tours ; and Abderrahman and other prudent cavaliers
saw the disorder of the Moslem troops, who were loaded
with spoil, but they did not venture to displease the
soldiers by ordering them to abandon everything except
their arms and war-horses. And Abderrahman trusted
in the valour of his soldiers, and in the good fortune
which had everywhere attended him. But such defect
of discipline is always fatal to armies. So Abderrahman
and his host attacked Tours to gain still more spoil, and
they fought against it so fiercely that they stormed the
city, almost before the eyes of the army that came to
save it. And the cruelty and fury of the Moslems
toward the inhabitants of the city were like the fury and
cruelty of raging tigers." *' It was manifest," adds the
Arab, " that God's chastisement was sure to follow such
excesses, and fortune thereupon turned her back upon
the Moslems."

'* Near the river Owar (Loire) the two great hosts of
the two languages and the two creeds were set in array
against each other. The hearts of Abr" aahman, his
captains, and his men, were filled with wrath and pride,
and they were the first to begin the fight. The Moslem

CHAP, IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

129

iman
and
the

je to

llems
and
the

Isuch
ipon

IS of

[rray
his
ride,
slem

horsemen dashed fiercely and frequently forward against
the battalions of the Franks, who resisted manfully, and
many fell dead on either side until the going down of
the sun. Night parted the two armies, but in the grey of
the morning the Moslems returned to the battle. Their
cavaliers had soon hewn their way into the centre of the
Christian host. But many of the Moslems were fearful for
the safety of the spoil which they had stored in their tents,
and a false cry arose in their ranks, that some of the
enemy were plundering the camp, whereupon several
squadrons of the Moslem horsemen rode ofi" to protect
their tents. But it seemed as if they fled, and all the
host was troubled. And while Abderrahman strove to
cheek their tumult and to lead them back to battle, the
warriors of the Franks came around him, and he was
pierced through with many spears, so that he died.
Then all the host fled before the enemy and many died
in their flight. This deadly defeat of the Moslems, and
the loss of the great leader and good cavalier Abderrah-
man, took place in the hundred and fifteenth year." '

These extracts do not give a clear idea of the tactics
of the opposing forces, but one can gather from them
that the Saracens relied upon their cimeters, and con-
sequently fought at close quarters, while the Franks used
lances as well ; for Abderrahman seems to have been
killed by spear-thrusts. The Arabs say the battle lasted
two days, the Christian chroniclers say six or seven days.
This leads to the inference that the fighting must have
consisted of desultory skirmishes of horsemen carried on
all over the plain with varying success. With such un-
wieldy and undisciplined hordes it is very improbable
that a pitched battle could be fought on an open plain,
without one party or the other winning a decisive victory
in one day. The death of Abderrahman, following the
confusion caused by the report, true or false, of an attack
upon the camp, was quite sufficient to turn the scale of
victory in fsivour of the Franks, and the loss of the
vanquished in the pursuit would make the result very
decided.

' Creivfy, DeoiHivr Battles : Tours.

130

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

"This victory of Charles Martel, followed by the
successes of his son Pepin, expelled the Saracens from
the boundaries of France, and Charlemagne, his grandson,
put a final check to their progress in Western Europe by
driving them out of part of Spain, and annexing the
territory between the Pyrenees and the Ebro to his
empire, under the name of the Spanish March." '

Some years subsequently, in the reign of Charles the
Bald, the cavalry formed the principal portion of the
army. In a battle fought between the king and Robert
le Fort, who had command of the troops of the Duke of
Brittany, the most important force on each side was the
cavalry. Charles had a large body of Saxon horse,
which had been sent to his assistance by his brother
Louis of Germany. This corps he placed in front of his
line to withstand the attacks of the Breton cavalry, who
appear to have been very skilful horsemen. The late
Dukes of Brittany had bestowed much attention upon
their army, and had organised a mounted force somewhat
similar to those of the ancient Parthians. They W' e
armed with javelins, and were formed up in small bands,
which rode up and manoeuvred around the enemy, care-
fully avoiding the charge, throwing their javelins at
a moderate distance, and retiring swiftly. If pursued,
they threw their missiles while in flight with such skill
as rarely to miss their aim. They soon dispersed the
Saxons, and then used the same tactics against the in-
fantry, who, armed with pikes and swords, which were of
no use at a distance, were badly defeated by troops with
whom they could not come to close quarters.^

Charlemagne was the greatest monarch of the dark
ages, his empire consisting of France, part of Spain, nearly
all Italy, Germany, and a portion of Hungary. From
his death until the crusades, the world, so to speak, was
occupied and disputed by the three great empires, or
nations, of the Greeks, the Franks, and the Saracens.'

The defeat of Abderrahman, and the successes of
Charlemagne, had virtually put a stop to the increase of
the Saracen power in Spain, whither it had extended after

1 Gibbon, v. 19, ^ Rocquan, i. 214. " Gibbon, v. 364.

CHAP. IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

131

sweeping along the whole southern boundary of the
Mediterranean, from Arabia, through Egypt, Lybia,
Mauritania, and across the Straits of Gibraltar, in the
incredibly short period of about one century. From the
east, however, the onward march of the Saracen, or
Turkish conquest, was still advancing towards Germany,
and the conflicts and battles connected therewith form
a link in the history of the cavalry service of much
interest to the military student.

of

of

Ifter

SECTION II. — -CAVALEY OF THE TURKS, FRANKS, AND
GREEKS, IN THE TENTH CENTURY. — BATTLES OF
MERSEBURG AND AUGSBURG.

The Turkish and Saracen cavalry were most effective
light horsemen. They rode with wonderful skill, and
managed their horses, which were noted for their admir-
able spirit and swiftness, with great dexterity. They
were proficient in all the evolutions of irregular warfare,
and were continually practising on horseback and in the
field the use of the bow, the javelin, and the cimeter.
The lance seems to have been slung behind the shoulder
while the horseman was using the bow, and when occasion
offered it was taken in hand for close fighting.

The best horses were sometimes protected on the breast,
by armour of iron or hide, while the horsemen themselves
wore cuirasses. They did not encamp in regular entrench-
ments, but covered their bivouac or tents by a thick
cordon of posts and sentries, thrown forward to a great
distance, which made it very diffixjult to surprise them.

Their armies were organised in a number of large
troops or bands, who formed up with small intervals.
Their system of fighting was very irregular, and consisted
of chai'ging up and falling back if firmly met, being
always on the alert to dash in whenever an opening
occurred, or any confusion showed itself in the ranks of
their opponents. Tf they were successful in a charge,
they followed the fugitives most mercilessly, plying their
sharp cimeters with deadly effect.'

^ Leon, Institutes, 18.

K 2

!|

132

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

The Saracens proper, of Arabian origin, in their military
customs were very similar to the Turks. They fought
principally as cavalry, the infantry of their armies being
composed of Ethiopians, who were armed with large
bows. Their cavnJry were somewhat more heavUy armed
than the Turkish, as they wore casques, cuirasses, boots,
gauntlets, and other defences, which had been in use
among the Romans. They were much given to embellish-
ing their girdles, and the bits of their horses, with silver
ornaments.

They fought more steadily than the Turks or Huns,
and used the lance, the sword, the battle-axe, and the
bow. Sometimes, in hurried marches, they took up their
infantry " en croupe " for short distances. They protected
their camps with defences, and posted numerous guards
during the night.

They formed their order of battle in an oblong or
square, and awaited the attack. After the first shock they
fought at close quarters with great vigour. Their marches
were often made in a hollow square formation, so that at
once upon attack they could assume their usual line of
battle.

The Turks were Very averse to come to close quarters
with a steady infantry that directed its attention to
killing their horses ; nor did they willingly face well-
drilled cavalry in a level plain, if the cavalry were com-
pact and in good order. The Arabs were not accustomed
to fight on foot, and when they attempted it generally
suffered heavy losses.

At this epoch the Franks, by which term the inhabit-
ants of Western Europe are included, were a brave and
hardy race of soldiers. Their infantry and cavaby were
both accustomed to fight hand in hand. Their cavalry
were armed with bucklers, lances, and very long swords,
suspended to shoulder-belts, although some wore them
on waist-belts. They formed for action by tribes and
families, and not in turmse, as had been the custom
among the Romans. Sometimes they were banded to-
gether in companies or confraternities, although by this
time the feudal system of ranging the troops under their

CHAP. IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY,

133

of

grafs, or counts, must have been coming into use. In
the age just preceding the institution of knighthood, the
Franks were rude and unskilful in their use of cavalry,
and the horsemen often dismounted and fought on foot.

Whether fighting on foot or mounted, they rushed
upon the enemy with vehemence, and relied for success
mainly upon the impetuous charge, followed by honest
hand-to-hand fighting. The discipline among them was
not very good, as can be readily imagined in an army
composed of nobles and freemen, who still looked upon
their king as holding ofiice simply by the voice of the
people.^ They turned out for war willingly, but were
impatient of protracted campaigns, and abandoned their
standards and returned home if the war was prolonged.
Their cavalry charged rapidly with the lance in serried
order, aijd required level plains to operate upon with
advantage. They do not appear to have used reserves.

The IJmperor Leon gives many details as to their
habits, and advises his troops, in case of campaigning
against them, to avoid fighting them in pitched battles,
but to harass them on difficult ground, to entice them
into ambushes, to attack their camps at night with
mounted archers, and to prolong the war in every pos-
sible way, in order to weary out their patience, and
compel them to consvime their provisions.

The Greek army at this period is fully described by
the Emperor Leon, and we are enabled to discover, with
some certainty, the state of the cavalry of the Eastern
Empire during his reign.

The mounted archers wore coats of mail covering the
body, and a helmet of polished iron, adorned with a
crest. Their principal arm was the bow, of moderate
strength, which was carried in a case to preserve it in
good order, while they also were provided with a quiver
containing thirty or forty arrows, a lance of medium size,
with a pennon attached, a sword on a shoulder-belt, and
a poignard in the girdle. Each man was also provided
with a file, an awl, and a reserve of bow-strings.

The young horsemen, who were not skilled in the use

' Gibbon, iv. 373.

134

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

fpERIOD II»

of the bow, used the large buckler and tv?o javelins.
They wore gauntlets of iron, and used ornamented
housings for their chargers. The horses, particularly
those of the officers, had breastplates, and frontlets of
iron or of felt. Neck-pieces and side-pieces were placed
upon the chargers of those who fought in the front ranks,
so that they were almost covered with armour. The
bits were suitable and strong. The saddles, which by
this time were generally in use, were roomy in the seat,
had two stirrups, a valise, and a saddle-bag, in which
could be carried three or four days' provisions. Shoes of
iron were in use also in this age, fastened by nails to the
hoof. The horse-trappings were ornamented with a tuft
or plume upon the head, ' i^^eral on the saddle-cloth, as
well as one hanging under tne horse's jaw. Attached to
the saddle was a sheath containing a battle-axe, with a
blade on one side and a point on the other.

The soldier was provided with a great-coat or cloak,
made loose and easy, and intended to be worn as the
modern cloak over the arms and armour, so as to
protect the wearer in bad weather, and to preserve his
cuirass, his bow, and his other trappings from injury
from the rain. They were used on vidette duty, and
while engaged as scouts, partly for warmth, and partly
to hide the glitter of the arms, from betraying their
presence from afar.

The cavalry were formed up only four deep, because
they had discovered that the surplus was useless, for
among horsemen the rear ranks cannot press forward and
support those in front, as can be done among infantry in
the phalanx formatioji, and the rear ranks, whether
archers or lancers, could not give much aid to those in
the front.

In action the pennons were taken off the lances, as
they were likely ito be in the way, and were placed in
cases. Small parties of cavalry were sent out from each
turma in advance of the main body to reconnoitre the
ground, and warn their comrades of any ambush or
snare, into which the enemy might be endeavouring to
lead them.

CHAP. IV.]

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

135

kause

, for

and

in

bther

Be in

The cavalry were usually drawn up on the right and
left of the infantry, the best troops being placed on the
outside flanks. They were trained not to follow too
impetuously the enemy's horse if they succeeded in
putting them to flight, but to keep well in hand, for fear
of falling into an ambush, or of becoming separated
from their own infantry. They never dismounted to
fight on foot, except in cases of great emergency. The
ordinary disposition for battle was in two lines and a
reserve. In case of a repulse the first line fell back
upon the second. They trusted very much to the bow,
and it was felt to be a public misfortune that archery
was fnlling into desuetude.^ The Emperor Leon advises
and commands the military youth of his empire to
practise the exercise of the bow assiduously, and to con-
tinue doing so until reaching the age of forty years.

Such was the state of the cavalry service in these
nations when first the Hungarians or Turks (as they
were called by the Greek historians) began to loom up
in the east, and to threaten with conquest and destruction
the people of Germany and Western Europe. Their
military force, to which we have already referred, was
very numerous, and was divided with their allies into
seven equal corps or divisions, each of which consisted of
about 39,000 warriors. Seven hereditary chiefs, or
voiSvodes, commanded these bodies, and formed a council
ovei which a supreme ruler was elected to command.^

They marched accompanied by women and children,
and by immense numbers of cattle and sheep, which fed
upon the plains over which they wandered. This made
it necessary for their light cavalry to occupy the country,
and to patrol to a very great distance from the main
body. This moving population had gradually swept
through Scythia, until they had approached the limits of
the Byzantine and Frankish Empires, and had invaded
the latter in Bavaria, where in the battle of Augsburg
the Parthian tactics of the Turkish cavalry, in attacking
and retreating, confused and bewildered the Christians,

» Gibbon, v. 68.

2 Ibid. 412.

136

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[I'EKIOO II.

who for a while were victorious, and caused them to
suffer a thorough defeat.

Their wandering armies of light cavalry spread over
Germany with great rapidity, a circuit of fifty miles
being sometimes ravaged in one single day. They were
seen at Bremen, Pavia was burned by them, they
penetrated even beyond the Pyrenees, and although the
churches of Italy added the pitiful appeal to the litany,
"0 save and deliver us from the arrows of the Hun-
garians," their victorious career was only stopped by the
waters of the Straits of Messina, and the lives of the
people only saved by the payment of a composition per
head. For thirty years the Germanic Empire or kingdom
was subject to tribute to these warlike horsemen. Such
was the speed and daring of these invaders, that light
troops of three or four hundred cavalry would make the
most daring raids, as far as the very gates of Thessalonica
or Constantinople.^

Such was the melancholy state of Europe at the
beginning of the tenth century, when all Christendom
was at the mercy of predatory bands of light horsemen,
whose tactics and morale had given them the ascendency.
It was at this crisis that there came upon the stage one
of those great military reformers, who by improvements
in the tactics, armament, or method of fighting of the
people, change the whole course of history, and build
up or destroy nationalities by a few successful battles.

Henry L, surnamed the ** Fowler," a Saxon prince, who
was elected Emperor of Germany in 919, ^as destined
to check the progress of the Hungarians, and to deliver
the empire from their yoke. He saw that the sole
difficulty was the want of an efficient military organi-
sation, and that it would require time to complete it.
He therefore took the first opportunity to buy a peace
or truce for nine years, by the payment of a yearly
tribute, and then bestowed his attention to his military
preparations.

He saw that one need was the fortification of the
cities, and the establishment of forts, to give protection
G ibbon, v. 17; Menzel, i. 307.

CHAP. I V.J

FEUDAL CAVALRY.

137

le
)n

against sudden inroads of barbarian horse. He desired
that the garrisons of these towns should supply him
with a force that he could take to the field independently
of the feudal lords, whose power had been ra^>idly in-
creasing and was becoming excessive. The garrisons
were composed of ancient freemen, who had originally
formed the arrl^re-han, but had become vassals of feudal
chiefs. By the new organisation they were secured their
freedom, and they at once became a powerful support to
the throne. They were trained carefully to fight in close
ranks, whose solid masses were specially designed to
resist the furious charge of the Hungarian horse. Thus
the cities were made to furnish a well-disciplined body
of free-born infantry.

To supply a force of cavalry, Henry had recourse
naturally to the feudal aristocracy. He was well aware
of the loss of power caused by the disorderly and
irregular manner in which the dukes, grafs, and other
chiefs, displaying their own banners and followed by their
bands of vassals, rushed to the attack in daring but
tumultuous rivalry.

In dealing with proud nobles impatient of restraint,
ignorant of discipline, and strangers to obedience, it was
necessary for the emperor to devise some scheme flatter-
ing to their pride, and appealing to their chivalrous
notions of honour which would induce them willingly
and cheerfully to bestow the time and trouble necessary
to train them to fight in close ranks. He well knew
that it was by strict discipline and skilful manoeuvres
alone, that the Hungarian horsemen could be met with
success.

Henry is said to have established a chivalric institu-
tion, giving rise to new manners and a new enthusiasm
which produced very marked results. The tournament,
according to some German writers, was instituted by him,
in which the knights carried on every species of warlike
drill and exercise, making trials of skill in pairs and by
troops, in presence of the ladies whose glances were
supposed to incite the knights to the greatest efibrts.
Banquets and dances being the sequel to the harder

138

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEEIOD II.'*

employment of the day, rendered these exercises the
most popular amusements of the age.

It is most probable that these trials of skill were
simply instituted for the purpose of drilling the knights,
and were not similar to the tournaments of subsequent
ages, although they may have been the origin of them.^
The tournament proper cannot be traced back further
than the middle of the 11th century.

A brotherhood or confraternity of arms subsequently
arose bound to the observance of peculiar laws, to fight
only for God, to abstain from all dishonourable means of
success, and to live and die solely for honour.'^ As all
freemen might hope by brave deeds in the field to enter
this body, it tended to place the vassal in a better
position and more on a level with his lord as a confederate
in the same chivalric fraternity.

The free citizens, seeing the advantage of serving
mounted, and tempted by the desire of becoming knights,
formed themselves into cavalry and created a fresh body
of infantry out of their apprentices and workmen.

These facts all prove the great attention paid to the
improvement of the military art during the nine years of
truce. On its expiry in the year 933, the Hungarian
ambassadors came to demand payment of the yearly
tribute. The legend tells that Henry caused a mutilated
mangy dog to be thrown before them and at once declared
war.^ The Hungarians instantly crossed the frontier in
two large armies, the smaller of which, 50,000 strong,
was defeated at Sonderhausen by the arriere-ban of
Saxony and Thuringia, who in nine years of peace had
been well trained to meet the invader.

The decisive battle, ho v, ever, took place at Merseburg,
where the mp.in body of the Hungarians was met by
Henry himself at the head of his carefully disciplined
and well-equipped army. His knights, or cavalry, used
both bucklers and lances. The emperor addressed his
troops on the morning of the fight. " My companions,"
said he, " maintain your ranks, receive on your shields the
first arrows of the Pagans, and prevent their second
* Hallam, iii. 400. ~ Menzel. ^ jbid. i. 321.

8

e

THAP. IV.] FEUDAL CAVALRY. 189

discharge by the equal and rapid career of your lances."'
Here we see the spirit of Alexander the Great and of
Hannibal again showing itself. Again we see the idea
of the impetuous rush of the charging horsemen being
used to crush by the mere momentum the irregular and
indecisive tactics of the skirmishing Hungarians. With
equal speed and endurance Henry's tactics could not fail
of success.

Although Henry adopted this plan with his main body
of cavalry, he did not disdain to fight his foes with their
own weapons, for he had also carefully prepared a force
of light horsemen armed with crossbows, who distracted
the enemy's attention during the whole day by skirmish-
ing with his cavalry.^ Nor did the emperor neglect to
secure every tactical advantage in the battle, for turning
their line with the flower of his cavalry, he headed a
decisive charge in the crisis of the action full upon their
flank, and put them to complete rout. His conduct after
the battle proves his great capacity as a cavalry general,
for the pursuit was prompt and vigorous.^ There was no
rest given to the fugitives, who were cut down as they
were overtaken. The carnage was excessive, there being
no cessation until the scattered remnants of the routed
barbarians were driven across the Bohemian frontier.

The victory was decisive, so much so that the balance
of morale between the two nations was reversed, and the
Hungarians from that time had as great a terror of the
Germans as the Germans formerly had of them. Twenty
years later a new generation of Turks had grown up, who,
to the number of 100,000 horse, invaded the territory of
King Henry's son. Otto the First, who handled with great
ability the cavalry which his father had organised. The
barbarians, confiding in their great numerical strength,
boasted that their horses should drain every river in
Germany. They besieged Augsburg, which was bravely
defended. Otto called out the arriere-ban of the empire,
and the Bohemians joined him.^ The two armies met
near Augsburg on the 10th August, 952.* The Hun-
garians crossed the Lech secretly, and fell upon the rear

1 Nolan, n. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Menzel, i. 334.

t ;:

140

A HISTORY CE CAVALRY.

[P.

"TOD II.

of the German army, defeated tL Bohemians, and pressed
hard upon the Swabians.^ The battle swayed backwards
ard forwards with varying success. The emperor
himself fought sword in hand, at the head of his mailed
cavalry, striking by repeated charges upon one point
until success was gained, which was promptly followed
and perfected by the light cavalry, while the heavy
cavalry were gathered up and kept in hand, to strike
again and again with impetuous charges, where the
fortune of the field was in doubt. The result was long
undecided. The Hungarian horsemen, excellent light
cavalry, scattered and gave way before the heavy charges,
but soon rallied and attacked again, skilfully avoiding
coming to close quarters, yet always harassing and
wearying their opponents.^ The good discipline of King
Otto's troops, and his own cautious and able generalship,
alone gave him the victory.

1 Gibbon, v. 420.

2 Ibid.

I

CHAPTER V.

Chivalry.

section i. — institution and rules of the order.

About the period of the battles of Merseburg and
Augsburg, that is to say about the middle of the tenth
century, an institution arose in Europe which exerted a
most extraordinary influence upon that continent for
some hundreds of years.

Chivalry was without doubt one of the most important
causes of the elevation of society from barbarism to
civilisation. It gave the tone to the morals of the people,
it gave new rules for deciding social precedence, it was
the nucleus and foundation of the military power of
nations, and its customs and regulations contain the
substance of the """t of war during its existence.

As every knight or member of the order of chivalry
was beyond everything a cavalier, as his title to his rank
was primarily based upon his reputation as a cavalry
soldier, no history of the cavalry service would be com-
plete without a full reference to the time when that
service contained within its ranks all the warriors, the
statesmen, the nobles, and the generals of the age, and
when the highest ambition of the proudest feudal chief
was to be able as a skilful cavalier to enter the order of
knighthood.

The origin of the order of chivalry is somewhat uncer-
tain. As one of the rules connected with it entailed
certam observances in the inauguration of the kniglits,

ill!

j'^f

142

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

somewhat similar to the rites used in granting arms to
the youth among the early Germans, as described by
Tacitus, it has led some writers enoneously to date back
the institution to those remote times. Otl?ers have con-
sidered that it was in existence as far back as the reign
of Charlemagne, because rare instances have been re-
corded in his time and earlier where sons of monarchs
assumed arms with certain ceremonies of investiture.
There is no doubt, however, that the custom of granting
ar-ms to the young men on arriving at maturity with cer-
tain solemnities, was in use among most of the tribes of
Europe from time immemorial.

But the ceremonial of investiture of knighthood was
but a small part of the institution of chivalry, and but an
empty form connected with it. The guiding principles
of the order were, the spirit of high honour contained in
its rules, the courtesy shown to all, the charity to the
oppressed, and the abstract love of justice. These were
the striking peculiarities which produced such wonderful
and beneficial results in humanising mankind, and which
formed the real institution of chivalry, and in that
view, knighthood dates from the middle of the tenth
century.

The best authority on this subject is perhaps M. La
Curne de Ste. Palaye, and in the introduction to a late
edition of his " Memoires sur I'.Ajicienne Chevalerie " by
Ch. Nodier, there is given a very interesting account oi
the institution of knighthood. It is as follows : — "Towards
the middle of the tenth century, some poor nobles, united
by the necessity of a legitimate defence, alarmed by the
excesses caused by the multiplicity of sovereign powers,
took pity on the miseries and tears of the people. They
grasped each other's hands, invoking God and St. George
to witness that they devoted themselves to the defence
of the oppressed, and took the weak under the protection
of their sword. Simple in their dress, austere in their
morals, humble after victory, firm and stoical in adver-
sity, they soon acquired an immense renown. Popular
gratitude, in its simple and credulous joy, fed upon mar-
vellous recitals of their deeds of arms, exalted their

CHAP. V.']

CHIVALRY.

%m

ja

ar

X-

valour, and united in prayer their generous liberators
with the powers of heaven. So natural is it for mis-
fortune to deify those who console it."

" In those old times, as strength was a law, courage
should be a virtue. These men afterwards called knights,
carried it to the very highest degree. Cowardice was
punished among them as an unpardonable crime, and so
it is to refuse assistance to the oppressed. They held a
lie in horror, they branded with infamy, treachery and
breach of faith, and the most celebrated lawgivers of
antiquity have produced nothing comparable to their
statutes."

" This league of warriors retained during more than a
century all its original simplicity, because the circum-
stances in the midst of which it arose changed slowly ;
but when a great political and religious movement
announced the coming revolutions in the human mind,
chivalry took a legal form and a rank among recog-
nised institutions."

Before this we have seen that the feudal system had
already given an ascendency to the landed aristocracy,
anv. to the heavy armed horseman. Discipline had also
been at a very low ebb, and the infantry service had
fallen into disuse, or was of a very inferior quality. The
unsettled state of Europe, and the continual wars and
skirmishes between rival feudal chiefs, had destroyed the
art of manoeuvring in large masses, and had given con-
stant opportunities for the display of personal prowess.
This paved the way for the foundation of chivalry, for
the confidence of these mail-clad horsemen in their
personal skill in the use of arms, increased their courage,
and made them more adventurous and more greedy of
renown. So individual honour and glory became the
soul of chivalry and its primary principle. This idea is
more clearly shown by the customs of the knights-errant,
who fought not from national sentiment or religious
feeling, but from a desire of obtaining glory, and from a
sort of abstract spirit of justice.

Chivalry, although a cosmopolitan institution, and
based upon the same general principles throughout

144

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II

Europe, was nevertheless closely connected with the
feudal system, and was to a certain extent affected by
the variations in that system in different countries.
Where the aristocracy w^ ; limited in number, the rules
for admission into the order were more stringent, and
those attaining to the dignity of knighthood less nume-
rous. In France and Arragon there were few initiated,
while in England and Castile they were admitted in
great numbers.

The rules for deciding whether a candidate for the
honour of knighthood was eligible or not seem to have
varied mainly as to the question of birth ; in France,
for instance, noble birth being absolutely essential, while
in Spain, England, or Germany, it was not always required.
The code of St. Louis was so strict as to enact that " if
any man whose father is a plebeian be made a knight,
the king or baron on whose estate he is domiciled may
order that the spurs of such a pretender be struck off on
a dunghill."^

Philip le Hardi in 1281 fined the Count de Nevers
for knighting two brave brothers who lacked the requi-
site degree of nobility on the father's side, and fined the
two knights also ; but afterwards learning that they were
very gallant soldiers, he relieved them of a great portion
of the fine, and confirmed them in their rank.
• Chivalry placed the feudal nobles and knights of all
nations upon an equal footing with each other, and gave
to the younger sons of the nobility, who could not hold
the position of feudal barons, an opportunity of winning
by their swords and prowess a rank which, while not
representing the possession of wealth or land, still placed
theim socially, and in a military point of view, on a par
with the senior members of their families.

These young men usually attached themselves to the
following of some rich lord or prince, at whose court
they could look for constant employment, for opportuni-
ties for advancement, and for maintenance and support.
They usually received pay in some form or other, and
were, virtually, stipendiary soldiers. Their great ambi-

' Lowv, 30. ^ :

^

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

UO

tion was to win the spurs of knighthood in their master's
service, an object of ambition earnestly toiled for and
eagerly desired, as it raised the recipient to a certain
equality with his lord, and entitled him to privileges that
wealth alone could never give.

The young lad commenced his education for the
dignity of knighthood at his seventh year, prior to which
time he was in the care of the females of the family.^
At the age of seven he v/as either sent from home to the
castle of some friendly lord, where he acted as a page,
and serv ad his master in that capacity, or he was set to
perform the same duties for his own parents. Until the
age of fourteen the lad served as page, his position not
being much better than that of the domestics of the
household, and during the whole period he was constantly
trained in bodily exercises, and to a certain extent in
horsemanship. At fourteen he . ttained the rank of
squire. This was considered a position of importance,
and the promotion was marked by a religious ceremony,
to impress upon the youth the use he was expected to
make of the sword, then for the first time placed in his
hands.

The page was led to the altar by his father and mother
carrying lighted tapers.^ The officiating priest took from
the altar a sword which had been placed there, and after
blessing it, girded it al vit the young nobleman, who
from that time had the right to carry arms. The squire
then devoted himself to the use of arms, and to a variety
of exercises calculated to increase his bodily vigour and
activity, and in company with his comrades continually
practised the management of the lance and sword on
hoiseback. There were many distinctions mainttdned
between the squires and the knights, both in dress and
equipment.

The squires were only allowed ornaments of silver ;
gold being reserved for the exclusive use of the knights.
Their defensive armour was much lighter than that used
by their masters, both at war and in the tournament.
They were forbidden to wear scarlet, though they might
' Lowy, 30. 2 ste. Pdaye, i. 9.

146

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

Ri' '

dress in furs or silk. They performed services of every
sort : some acted as carvers at the table, some poured out
wine, some offered water for ablution. Services con-
sidered menial among the Romans, and also at the
present day, were then performed by noblemen of the
highest birth. The squires so serving at table did not
join in the conversation, but were enabled in that way
to learn the manners of society, and the habits of cour-
tesy. The Count of Artois, brother of King Louis IX.,
waited upon the king at dinner at the Court held by
St. Louis at Saumur, and he was assisted by the Count
de Soissons.

In war, however, the squires accompanied their masters
as aids and assistants. They carried his armour among
them, one carrying the helmet, another the lance, another
the sword, &c. One also led the charger, which was a
large powerful animal that was only used in action.
On the march the knight rode a palfrey or easy-paced
horse, and on the approach of danger he mounted his
charger, and his squires proceeded to arm him. This
was a duty requiring great care and skill, as the safety
of the combatants depended often upon the attention
that had been bestowed on arming them. Neglect in
fastening the visor on Henry II. 's helmet is supposed to
have been the cause of his death.

When the knights were fully armed and mounted
upon their battle horses and the action was about com-
mencing, they were ranged in single line, the squires
forming a second rank behind their lords. The knights
charged in full career, with lances in rest, while their
attendants remained idle spectators of the fight. If
the knight was unhorsed, he raised himself from the
ground, if able to do so, and taking his mace or sword
or battle-axe, continued the combat on foot. Each squire
attentively watched his own master during this struggle,
and if hardly pressed, came to his assistance, giving him
a fresh horse in case of need, or new arms. He also
defended him from blows if wounded, and used every
possible means to aid him, but in doing so confined
himself strictly to the defensive. If the knight was

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

147

id

las

victorious and captured any prisoners, it was the duty of
+he squires to receive and guard them.

These officers, thus close and interested spectators of
the manner of carrying on war, were taught by example
how to conduct themselves in action. In this way they
served a species of apprenticeship, and were qualifying
themselves for the dignity of knighthood.

The squire arriving at the age of twenty-one years
was then considered sufficiently educated and eligible for
admission to the order, which was only conferred upon
his jiving proofs of valour and skill m the use of arms
in the field. He was, however, invested with arms, and
entitled to engage in the front line, from which he had
hitherto been debarred.

The investiture of the knight was more formal than
the granting of arms to the squire. The young gentle-
man passed the night before the ceremony in prayer
with a priest and his sponsors, in a church or chapel.
In the morning he took a bath, put on a white dress as
a symbol of purity, and listened to a sermon on the
duties he was about to assume. He then advanced to
the altar with a knight's sword slung around his neck,
which he presented to the priest who blessed it. The
novice then kneeling down was invested with a complete
suit of armour. The ceremonies varied somewhat in
different countries and at different times, but the acco-
lade or stroke on the shoulder with the sword was never
omitted, and was generally given with the words, *' In
the name of God, of St. Michael, and St. George, I make
you knight." Sometimes the words were added, "Be
brave, bold, and loyal."

Knights were made on the field of battle by the
simple accolade, and the formula of words mentioned.

There were two elements connected with chivalry at
different periods, which, although not of much interest
in a military point of view, yet cannot be passed without
notice, namely, religion and love. The Crusades, partly
the outcome of this religious feeling, had the efi'ect of
increasing it very materially, so that when the institu-
tion was in its highest vigour, its connection with the

, L 2

us

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

Chiircli was very intimate. This is shown by the reli-
gious character of all the ceremonies of investiture, the
vigils in the chapel, the early mass, the bath, the symbol
of baptism, the blessing of the arms, the sermon, &c.
The knights were taught to consider their first duty that
of maintaining the gospel by their swords, and at one
time it was customary for them to hold their unsheathed
weapons upright before them, during that portion of
divine service when the gospel was being read, intimating
thereby their willingness to defend their faith at the
point of the sword. The cause of this curious connection
of religion with a military order is evidently to be found
in the desire of the priesthood to turn to the advantage
of the Church a popular idea that was exerting a very
powerful influence.

The other guiding sentiment, that of love, can have
its origin traced to the early habits of the Germans, who
were remarkable for the extraordinary respect with which
they treated the women of their tribes.* The increase of
wealth in the hands of the nobility, and the luxurious
and cultivated habits of social life, which are the natural
results of riches, tended also to give the ladies greater
influence, as their means and position gave them every
opportunity of acquiring all the refinements in dress, in
conversation, and in manners, which have so much effect
in securing the admiration and respect of the stronger
sex.^ There is also an instinctive desire among men to
display their superior strength, courage, and dexterity
before the objects of their admiration. The influence of
love thus naturally soon became paramount in an order
whose animating sentiment was the ambition of ac-
quiring personal renown by deeds of arms in action and
daring adventures in the field.

At first religion was the prevailing sentiment, and the
efiect was perceived in the Crusades, and for a long
period this influence was powerfully felt in the order.
The exaggerated ideas of love which afterwards became
so common among the knights began to show themselves
as the feeling in favour of the Crusades died out, and

' Tacitus, Germany, ch. viii. ^ Hallam, iii. 396.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

U9

the
long
rder.
bame
lives

and

although for a long period the two sentiments of religion
and love were combined together, yet at first one was
the prevailing idea, and then gradually the other assumed
that position. In the time of Edward III., and down
almost to Henry VIII. of England and Francis I. of
France, the knights made the most fantastic vows in
honour of their mistresses. The two ideas were, how-
ever, long recognised as the guiding principles of chi-
valry, and God and love were taught to be honoured
and maintained as a single duty.

Boccaccio returns thanks to God and Love for the assist-
ance given him in writing the Decameron.^ Froissart,
making a collection of poetry, announces that he under-
takes the work with the help of the same powers. The
courtesy to ladies was very marked, the protection to the
widow and orphan, and to the distressed, was an obligation
looked upon as a religious duty, and the weak and the
oppressed never appealed to the knight for aid in vain.

The effect of this feeling, in gradually eradicating the
vices and treachery that had been common among the
barbarous tribes, was extraordinary, and the kind and
courteous treatment of prisoners of war so very different
from the cruelties of the early ages, did much to Chris-
tianise and civilise the world. The benefits of chivalry in
this way can hardly be over-estimated.

SECTION II. — EQUIPMENT, ARMAMENT, AND TACTICS.

The knights were always clad in armour. At first they
wore coats of mail composed of steel rings interwoven,
or of scales. When this was the prevailing defence, the
head was protected by a closely fitting cap of mail, made
in the same way as the body armour. It covered the fuce
to the forehead, left the lower portion unprotected, but
had a flap or curtain hanging down to defend the ears
and back of the head.^ They wore a helmet over this
cap of mail, but it was only put on at the moment of
going into action.

In time as solid armour came into general use tlie
helmet assumed a conical shape, and was round at the
' Lbwy, 41. 2 iiji.-i^ 81.

150

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II,

top ; a skull cap only was worn under it to protect the
head from its weiglit.^ It was added to by plates of
metal for the protection of the neck, and a visor or cover-
ing for the face was adopted, which varied in shape and
arrangement almost indefinitely. Sometimes bars were
placed across perpendicularly, sometimes crosswise at
right angles, and sometimes perforated plates, covered the
face with small openings to see and breathe through.
Crests of various devices surmounted the helmet.

The squires, foot-soldiers, and mercenaries wore the
bascinet, a lighter kind of head covering, which had pro-
jections in front and rear, and sometimes ear-pieces
covered with metal scales and clasped beneath the chin.
The knights often wore these light head-pieces when they
did not expect an immediate attack, yet did not desire to
be entirely defenceless in case of a sudden emergency.''
.. As to body armour the knights were most heavily
armed, more so, probably, than the cataphracti of the
ancients. In the early times of chivalry, the defence for
the body consisted of chain and scale armour ; the
hauberk of wrought-iron rings, set on a garment of leather,
and worn over a buff, or leathern, or quilted under
garment, being the principal protection. These ringed
coats were of four sorts — some being made of flat rings,
sewed on side by side, some of oval rings overlapping
each other, some of lozenge-shaped pieces of metal, and
some of scales.' In addition to these varieties was the
coat of real chain mail.

The hauberks, or coats of mail, reached to the hips in
the tenth century, and in the next were lengthened till
they reached the knees. William the Conqueror's Norman
knights, in the invasion of England, were so armed, and
are so represented in the Bayeux tapestry. In the first
crusade the knights are supposed to have been armed in
this way. In the twelfth century the rings were inter-
laced, and the mail was often strengthened by having
them double. The coats of mail were very pliable, and
were worn loosely over the body. The same material
was used for covering the feet and legs.*

Lbwy, 81. 2 bid. 82. 3 Demmin, 41. * Lowy, 85, 86.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

Ul

86.

The Gambcson, or under garment, was generally
stuffed with wool and quilted, and was a protection as
well against weapons as against injuries caused by the
chafing of the armour, the weight of which was very
burdensome.

In course of time the chain mail was first added to,
and then superseded by plate armour, which was made
of solid pieces with movable joints, to meet the require-
ments of the human frame. These were first attached
to the arms and legs, afterwards they were applied to the
protection of the body, and for a long period a species of
mixed plate and chain armour was preferred by the
knights. The heavy plate armour was often worn over
the hauberk, the horsemen believing the polished plates,
from which the sword or lance glided easily, to be a
better defence than the coat of mail, which was not proof
against injury. The invention of gunpowder also placed
the solid armour in higher favour than ever, as it was a
better protection against fire-arms. This kind of defence
was maintained in use until the end of the seventeenth
century, when it was reduced, the breast and back pieces
only being retained, and being much about the same as
those at present used by the cuirassiers of most European
armies.

With the plate armour came into use also the hook, or
lance rest, which was attached to the breastplate, to aid
the knight in holding his lance up steadily while making
a charge, whence comes the phrase of putting the lance
in rest as in the passage : —

" A thousand spurs are striking deep,
A thousand spears in rest ;
A thousand knights are pressing close
Behind the snow-white crest."

When chain armour was in use the horses also were
covered with it, as they were armed afterwards with
solid plates, when their riders adopted that kind of pro-
tection. Before the introduction of fire-arms, these
powerfully armed knights were almost impregnable, and
the art of defensive warfare was far superior to the
arts of destruction. This, of course, gave an enormous

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152

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

influence to the nobility, who alone were able, or permitted,
to provide themselves with the elaborate equipment of a
knight. They were, however, very unwieldy, and para-
lysed by the weight of their armour, so much so that
rapid evolutions could not be carried out by them,' and
sometimes, as at Agincourt, the superior activity of
the light-armed infantry was more than a match for
them.

The French knights also suffered severely in the con-
tests with the troops of the cities of Flanders.

The heat of summer was insupportable to the wearers
of heavy armour, while the slightest impediment delayed
them, or threw them into confusion.

The different parts of armour, in addition to the Gam-
beson, or under garment, were — '

1. The hauherk, or coat of mail.

2. The breast and hack plates, or cuirass.

3. The helmet, or head-piece. The larger head
coverings being called heaumes or helms, the later ones
helmets.

4. The haussecol, or gorget, covering the throat.

5. The pauldrons, or epauUeres, covering the
shoulders.

6. The brassards, or rear and vambraces, covering the
arms.

7. The gantelets (mitten, or fingered), covering the
wrists and hands.

8. The cuissards, or cuisses, covering the thighs.

9. The tassettes, covering the hips (or rather the
pockets, derived from the German word for pocket).

10. The greves, jambes, oTJambeaux, covering the legs.

11. The genouillidres, covering the knees.

12. The sollarets, or sabbatons, covering the feet.
The shield was made sometimes of metal only, and

sometimes of wood covered with hide or metal, and
bearing armorial devices. It varied in shape, and, when
not required in action, was carried by a strap over the
shoulder.

The spurs were fii'st formed of a single spike, but in

spurs

a

Ldwy, 88.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

153

the fourteenth century a rowel was adopted, of the style
used in modern times, but the rowels were of a far larger
size than are now worn anywhere, except, perhaps, in
Mexico and South America. The spurs of the knights
were of gold, and were the best known mark of his rank ;
" winning his spurs " being synonymous with attaining
the grade of knighthood. A surcoat of fine cloth or silk,
adorned with the colours and devices of the knight, was
worn over the armour.

Saddles are said to be first mentioned by Sidonius
ApoUinaris in reference to the Visigoths.' In the
eleventh century large projections were added to the
saddle in front and rear, to support the heavy armed
knights, and make their seats more comfortable and
more secure.

The principal weapon was the lance, which was looked
upon as the most noble of all arms, its use being forbid-
den to the plebeian ranks. They were of great size, and
made of the wood of the aspen, pine, sycamore, or ash
trees, with an u'on head, heavy, blunt, and broad. A
flag was attached, just below the iron head, which indi-
cated the rank of the bearer,^ for although the knights
Avere all considered to be upon an equality, there was a
distinction between those who were wealthy and able to
furnish a contingent of armed men at their own expense
and the knight who went to the field with his personal
attendants only. The former was entitled a knight, or
chevalier banneret, while the latter was simply a knight
bachelor. The bannerets carried a small pennon, or
square banner, attached to their lances,' while the ordi-
nary knight carried a small flag which was indented, and
terminated in one or two points.

The lance had a small shield or vamplate screwed to
the shaft just above the gripe, fti the protection of the
hand. Sometimes it had a hole in the centre, and was
slipped on over ^he point and pushed back to tb*^- handle,
where the increased size of the wood held it firm.

In addition to the lance the knight was armed with
a sword which varied much in shape, sometimes being

^ Lowy, 93. 2 Ibid. 62. ^ ibid. 38, 39.

104

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

double-edged, sometimes only single. They were gene-
rally straight, but curved falchions were often used.
They were of all lengths, some two-handed, and as much
as seven or eight feet in length. These large two-handed
Bwords were not used by the knights on horseback, for
they always dismounted when they wished to use them.
A small sword or dagger was sometimes attached to the
pommel of the knight's saddle, while the heavy sword
was usually worn on a belt on the left side. These
weapons were held in high consideration, and were
elaborately ornamented, the hilts being often studded
with jewels, and the blades bearing inscriptions. The
sword could only be worn by freemen, and delivering it
up was the usual form of surrender.

The dagger was always a portion of the knight's
equipment, and was worn at the right hip. It was used
to give the final blow, when the knight had thrown his
opponent to the ground and conquered him.

Battle-hammers were used long before the institution
of chivalry. Charles Martel took his name from the
martel or hammer, which was his favourite weapon, and
was used by him at Tours in 732, These weapons had
a hammer at one side and a pick at the other ; they were
used during the middle ages as late as the fourteenth
century,^ and were looked upon as knightly weapons.
So also were the battle-axes, which varied much in size
and shape, and were very generally used. The mace or
club of iron or of wood with spikes, was anoi:her weapon
sometimes used by the knights, but common also to the
lower orders.

The tactics of the knights were of the simplest character,
and the organisation into tactical divisions was, com-
paratively speaking, unknown to them. The only sem-
blance of a tactical unit seems to have been the " lance
foumie," which was composed of the knight who carried
his lance, and his satellites or attendants.

In referring to the Gaulish cavalry in the time of
the Romans, we have already seen the idea in use in
the Trimacresie mentioned by Pausanias. These little

^ Lowy, 75, 76.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

155

n
le

parties consisted of only the chief and two attendants,
while the " lance fournie " contained more followers.
The number varied in different countries and at different
times, and it became a more recognised institution in
the later periods of chivalry, and upon the formation
of mounted gendarmerie. At first the lance consisted
simply of the knight, his esquire, a coutillier who was
of nearly the same rank as the squire, a page, a valet,
and three archers all mounted.^ This little corps was
the unit for all purposes of administration, the knight
evidently maintaining and supplying with necessaries
his own immediate followers. The knights bannerets
commanded several of these lances, and in the old
chronicles the strength of an army was always recorded
in lances. Where we say now sixty or seventy squadrons
they would say 200 or 300 lances, always including the
attendants in the term " lance."

According to Bardin, the capitul aires show an or-
ganisation of the lances in the feudal armies of some
countries by which ten " lances " containing some fifty
or sixty horsemen formed a bacdle, and that five of these
united together formed a species of regiment of fifty
lances, or about 300 cavalry, under the command of a
knight banneret.^

It is known also that armies were divided into three
portions, the van or centre and the two wings, which
were generally under the command of the leading
generals. The lance fournie varied in numbers from
three satellites to fourteen, but six or seven was the
ordinary strength.

The knights fought in action in single line, and their
tactics consisted in charging, lance in rest, with the
object of unhorsing their opponents. After the shock,
the struggle generally merged into a close hand-to-hand
fight with swords, battle-axes, maces, and hammers.
The squires formed a second line, having the other
followers in their rear. They were not armed sufficiently
to charge in line of battle like the knights, although the
squire sometimes advanced and filled the place of his
1 Bardin, 3022, 3023. 2 xbid. 3022.

r^T"

156

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY,

fpERIOD II.

master in case of his death. The real duty, however,
both of the squire and the other attendants, was to aid
and assist the knight in the combat, to raise him if
wounded or unhorsed, to remount him, and to supply
him with fresh weapons. The squire wore a corslet of
mail and a light helmet. His arms were the sword, the
battle-axe, and the poignard.

The archers were young gentlemen who were aspiring
to the rank of squire, and who attached themselves to
some knight to fight in his suite. They were armed
lightly with a casque and gauntlets of mail.^ They some-
times dismounted to fight on foot, in which case the pages
held their horses. The archers-k-cheval formed the
light cavalry, and although Humbert says they used the
bow, yet Bardin distinctly states that the French archers
did not fight with the bow but with the crossbow, and
that, properly speaking, they should be designated
Arbal^triers-^-cheval.

Their proper place was in rear of the squires, although
they often skirmished before the action in front of the
line of battle, and when driven in, or when they saw
signs of hesitation in their opponents, they retired around
the flanks and left the plain open for the charge of the
heavy armed knights. They sometimes also fought on
the flanks, and in case of victory they were used in
following up the pursuit. There was no system of tactical
formation by which bodies of troops manoeuvred together,
and mutually supported each other in masses. In fact, the
tactical art was almost unknown, and a battle was not
won by manoeuvres or by skill, but by mere brute force.
The field of battle was simply an aggregation of thousands
of single combats or duels. The only idea of tactics was
to get the advantage of the wind or sun, as having either
facing them exercised an important influence on com-
batants, who only saw through a narrow aperture with
difficulty, and whose vision the glare of the sun, or the
slightest dust, would materially impair.

The great spread of chivalry, and its universal character,
caused this want of tactical ability to be unnoticed, for

' Bardin, 223.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

157

as all nations fought on the same principles, they did not
perceive the necessity or advantage of manoeuvring. The
generals were not tacticians, but were simply the warriors
most noted in the armies for their personal skill and
bravery in hand-to-hand fighting.

The training in peace, as already mentioned, was very
severe and incessant — the gymnastic exercises being of
the most' difficult and laborious type — so that it is certain
that at no period before or since was individual prowess
and perfection of personal training so completely attained
as during the palmy days of chivalry. The object of
life, from early youth upwards, was to obtain the fullest
development of strength and skill in the use of arms and
horsemanship of which the human frame was capable.
The business of life was the preparation for, and the accom-
plishment of feats of arms in war ; the amusements and
recreations of peace were found only in the chase and in
the mimic conflicts of the tournament.

But the military art was lost for the time. Each
knight, aided by his squires, fought a small battle on his
own account, and instead of a general action being guided
by scientific rules, it was but an aggregation of confused
combats between chiefs, who were all on a dead level of
equality with each other.

The immense social influence of chivalry, the great
protection given by armour, the neglect of the infantry
service, and the contempt into which that service naturally
fell when composed only of the lowest classes, all tended
to give the knights an exalted idea of the cavalry service,
and a contempt for the infantry that was not justified.

A good infantry, well armed with powerful pikes, and
carefully disciplined, could have always defended them-
selves against the attacks of the undisciplined and ill-
combined bodies of heavy armed horsemen, whose efforts
must have lacked solidity of order and unity of direction.
But when all Europe relied on the mounted knights,
when no man of position or influence dreamt of serving
in anything but the cavalry, who was to take the lead 1
Who to organise the infantry of the classes fit for soldiers,
and to arm them with the weapons fit for service ?

168

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

i

The day did come, as we shall see subsequently,
when the people of Switzerland, who, by the physical
character of their country, could not maintain cavalry,
and were obliged to rely mainly upon their infantry, did
organise a force of foot-soldiers which, when brought
into contact with the proud chivalry, taught them that
prowess was not everything, but that order, solidity, and
art exercised a very important influence in war.

The feudal armies, in fact, were not organised upon a
jjrinciple that would permit of the growth or use of tac-
tical skill. They were composed of raw levies of soldiers,
who were, individually, thoroughly trained to the use of
their weapons, and well equipped, and, taken singly, were
probably as fine material as ever fought in action ; but
their feudal tenure usually required only forty days' ser-
vice a year, so that they were only mobilised just as they
commenced a campaign, and there was no time to teach
them to act harmoniously together in masses. High
tactical skill can only be acquired by thorough training,
and can never reach perfection except in a military
system based upon a standing army.

The great development of the art of manoeuvring and
handling troops in large masses among the Romans,
especially in the days of Scipio, may be attributed to the
fact that the service in the Roman army varied from ten
to twenty years.

The tournaments, which were the only military exer-
cises among the knights of the middle ages, were not of
much use as schools of tactics, for the jousts and passages
at arms taught only dexterity in the use of weapons in
single combat. Even in the exercises where two parties
fought, one on each side, there was no appearance of art
in the manner of fighting. The contests were simply a
series of duels, where no element was brought into play
except downright hard blows, skill in the use of weapons,
and endurance. When we remember that a suit of tilting
armour weighed as much as 200 lbs., we can readily
understand that endurance was a very important quality.

The tournaments were not maintained solely for the
purpose of improving the dexterity of the knights,

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

159

although that was one object. They were almost the
only amusement of that age, and were very popular,
inasmuch as they gave an opportunity for gathering large
numbers of the nobility together, where they could
display their knightly graces, in the management of their
horses and weapons, in the presence of the ladies. The
games or exercises generally commenced with a combat
between two parties led by two leaders. The weapons
were blunted, and the regulations made for the purpose
of preventing serious wounds were very full and par-
ticular. The squires and attendants formed behind their
masters as if in action, to assist them if dismounted.
The armour used in tilting was very much heavier than
that used in war, as no man could have worn tilting
armour through a contested battle. In fact, knights were
occasionally smothered in their armour in the tourna-
ments.

Simulated attacks and defences of fortresses or en-
trenchments were also one of the displays common at
tourneys, but they taught no art of manoeuvring, they
were all simply rehearsals of the same type of severe
hand-to-hand struggles between knights.

During the period of chivalry, as we have said, the art
of war was at a very low ebb. The infantry had
gradually declined until their influence on the result of
battles was reduced to nothing, and we look in vain for
evidences of tactical skill in the battles of the age. In
one or two actions only do we see the slightest trace of
battles being won by the use of stratagem, or of
manoeuvres upon the field.

The battle of Hastings, fought on the 14 th October,
1066, between William the Conqueror at the head of his
Norman chivalry, and the Saxons under Harold, is the
most striking instance of the tactics of the time. King
Harold took up a defensive position and protected his
front by a fence made of shields and wicker-work. His
army was composed mainly of foot-soldiers, while
William's was almost altogether cavalry. We have
fortunately a very detailed account of this battle, by
Robert Wace, who wrote it in the reign of Henry II.,

160

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEHIOD II.

about ninety years after the battle, when the facts were
fresh in the memory of the people.

This account gives an accurate picture of the method
of fighting of that time, and as it contains the details of
the most important, most decisive, and most skilful
battle of the age, it will be of great interest to the reader
to reproduce some extracts from it, in its quaint and
picturesque phraseology. After describing the landing
and the approach of the two armies towards each other,
the poet proceeds ' —

" William sat on his war horse, and called out Rogier,
whom they call de Montgomeri. * I rely much on you,'
said he ; * lead your men thitherward and attack them
from that side ; William, the son of Osber the seneschal,
a right good vassal, shall go with you and help in the
attack, and you shall have the men of Boilogne and
Poix and all my soldiers. Alain Fergant and Aimeri shall
attack on the other side ; they shall lead the Poitevins
and the Bretons, and all the barons of Maiue, and I, with
my own great men, my friends and kindred, will fight in
the middle throng where the battle shall be the hottest.

" The barons and knights and lancemen were all now
armed ; the men on foot well equipped, each bearing
bow and sword ; on their heads were caps, and to their
feet were bound buskins. Some had good hides which
they had bound round their bodies, and many were clad
in frocks, and had quivers and bows hung to their girdles.
The knights had hauberks and swords, boots of steel, and
shining helmets; shields at their necks, and in their
hands lances. And all had their cognisances, so that
each might know his fellow, and Norman might not strike
Norman nor Frenchman kill his countryman by mistake.
Those on foot led the way with serried ranks bearing their
bows. The knights rode next supporting the archers from
behind. Thus both horse and foot kept their course and
order of march as they began, in close ranks, at a gentle
pace, that the one might not pass or separate from the
other. All went firmly and compactly, bearing them-

• Robert "Wace's Roman de Rou, translated by Taylor, page 171,
et seq.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

161

selves gallantly, and in each host stood archers ready to
exchange shots.

" Harold had summoned his men — carls, barons, and
vavassors, from the castles and the cities, from the ports,
the villages, and boroughs. The villains were also called
together from the villages, bearing such arms as they
found — clubs and great picks, iron forks and stakes. The
English had enclosed the field where Harold was with
his friends and the barons of the country, whom he had
summoned and called together

" Harold knew that the Normans would come and
attack him hand to hand : so he had early enclosed the
field in which he placed his men. He made them arm
early and range themselves for the battle, he himself
having put on arms and equipment that became such a
lord. ... He commanded his people, and counselled his
barons to keep themselves all together, and defend them-
selves in a body ; for if they once separated, they would
with difficulty recover themselves. ' The Normans,' said
he, ' are good vassals, valiant on foot and on horseback,
good knights are they on horseback, and well used to
battle ; all is lost if they once penetrate our ranks. They
have brought long lances and swords, but you have pointed
lances and keen edged bills, and I do not expect that their
arms can stand against yours. Cleave whenever you can,
it will be ill done if you spare aught

" The English peasants carried hatchets and keen edged
bills. They had built up a fence before them, with their
shields and with ash and other wood, and had well joined
and wattled in the whole work, so as not to leave even a
crevice, and thus they had a barricade in their front,
through which any Norman who would attack them
must first pass. Being covered in this way by their
shields and barricades, their aim was to defend themselves;
and if they had remained steady for that purpose, they
would not have been conquered that day ; for every
Norman who made his way in lost his life in dishonour,
either by hatchet, or bill, by club, or other weapon.
They wore short and close hauberks and helmets, that
hung over their garments They stood in close

M

Ifi2

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

I

ranks, ready and eager for the fight, and they had mor -
over made a fosse, which went across the field guarding
one side of their army.

" Meanwhile the Normans appeared advancing over
the ridge of a rising ground, and the first division of their
troops moved onwards along the hill and across the valley.
Then another division still larger came in sight, close
following upon the first, and they wheeled toward
another side of the field, forming together as the first
body had done. Then a fresh company came in
sight, covering all the plain ; and in the midst of them
was raised the gonfanon that came from Rome. Near
it was the Duke, and the best men and greatest strength
of his army were there. The good knights, the good
vassals, the brave warriors, were there, and there were
gathered together the gentle barons, the good archers,
and the lancemen, whose duty it was to guard the Duke
and range themselves around him. The youth, and
common herd of the camp, whose business was not to join
in the battle, but to take care of the harness and stores,
moved ofi" towards a rising ground.

** Harold saw William come, and beheld the field
covered with arms, and how the Normans divided into
three companies, in order to attack at three places. His
brother Gurth drew near, and they placed themselves
by the standard, each praying God to protect them.
Around them were their kinsmen, and those barons who
were their nearest friends : and they besought all to do
their best, seeing that none could now avoid the conflict.
Each man had his hauberk on with his sword girt, and
his shield at his neck. Great hatchets were also slung at
their necks, with which they expected to strike heavy
blows. They were on foot in close ranks, and carried
themselves right boldly.

" The Normans brought on the three divisions of their
army, to attack at different places. They set out in three
companies, and in three companies did they fight. The
first and second had come up, and then advanced the
third, which was the greatest ; with that came the Duke,
with his own men, and all moved boldly forward.

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

1G3

" As soon as the two aimies were in full view of each
other, great noise and tumult arose. You might hear
the sound of many trumpets, of bugles, and of horns ; and
then you might see men ranging themselves in line,
lifting their shields, raising their lances, bending their
bows, handling their arrows, ready for assault and for
defence. . \ '

"Forthwith arose the noise and cry of war, and on
either side the people put themselves in motion. The
Normans moved on to the assault, and the English
defended themselves well. Some were striking, others
surging onward, all were bold and cast aside fear. And
now behold that battle was gathered, whereof the fame
is yet mighty.

" From nine o'clock in the morning, when the combat
began, till three o'clock came, the battle was up and
down, this way and that, and no one knew who would
conquer and win the land. Both sides stood so firm and
fought so well, that no one could guess which would
prevail. The Norman archers with their bows shot
thickly upon the English ; but they covered themselves
with th<;ir shields, so that the arrows could not reach
their bodies, nor do any mischief, how true soever was
their aim, or however well they shot. Then the Normans
determined to shoot their arrows upwuid into the air,
so that they might fall on their enemy's heads and strike
their faces. The archers adopted this scheme, and shot
up into the air towards the English, and the arrows in
tailing struck their heads and faces, and put out the eyes
of many, and all feared to open their eyes, or leave their
faces unguarded.

" The Normans saw that the English defended them-
selves well, and w^ere so strong in their position, that
they could do little ag it them. So they consulted
together privily, and arranged to draw off, and pretend
to flee, till the English should pursue and scatter them-
selves over the field ; for they saw that if they could
once get their enemies to break their ranks, they might
be attacked and discomfited much more easily. As they
had said, so they did. The Normans by little and little

M 2

164

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

ii

fled, the English following them. As the one fell back,
the other pressed nfl-er, and when the Frenchmen re-
treated, the English thought and cried out that the men
of France fled, and would never return. Thus they were
deceived by the pretended flight, and great mischief
thereby befell them ; for if they had not moved from
their position, it is not likely that they would have been
conquered at all."

This stratagem gave William the victory, for as soon
as they were broken in the pursuit, he turned upon the
English, and a desperate struggle ensued, in which he
was successful. A charge of cavalry, led by the Norman
Duke, is described in the following words : —

" Then those who kept close guard by him, and rode
where he rode, being about a thousand armed men, came
and rushed with closed ranks upon the English ; and
with the weight of their good horses, and the blows the
knights gave, broke the press of the enemy, and scattered
the crowd before them, the good Duke leading them on
in front. Many pursued and many fled, many were the
Englishmen who fell around and were trampled under
the horses, crawling ujDon the earth, and not able to rise.
Many of the richest and noblest men fell in the rout,
but still the English rallied in places, smote down those
whom they reached, and maintained the combat the best
they could, beating down the men and killing the
horses."

Nothing could give a more vivid idea of the manner of
fighting in the eleventh century than this interesting
narrative, which has the great advantage of being written
shortly after the battle, and of being confirmed in many
particulars by the Bayeux tapestry.

The next battle concerning which we have any details,
is that of Bouvines, in Flanders, fought in 1214 between
Philip Augustus and the Emperor Otho, in which the
former won a decisive victory.

Philip's army was composed mainly of cavalry, and he
manoeuvred to draw the emperor out of some broken
country into the plain, where his horsemen could act to
advantage. Otho, hearing that the French king waH

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

1G5

of

he
Ken
to
ivaH

marching away, and believing that he was avoiding the
combat, followed him.' Philip hearing of it, sent the
Viscount de Melun with some light cavalry and cross-
bowmen, to make a reconnaissaiice in the direction of
the enemy. He soon met the army of tlie emperor
marching in good order, their horses clad in armour, and
the cavalry drawn up in rear of the infantry. This
being the usual formation in marching out for battle, the
viscount at once saw that they purposed bringing on a
general action, and despatched the Chevalier Guerin
with the intelligence to King Philip, while he himself
remained to watch their movements.

The German army had a large number of infantry,
and the chroniclers say that they were drilled to fight
on the level plain, and even against cavalry. They were
armed with pikes. The emperor drew up his army with
the infantry in front, and his heavy cavalry in rear. The
English allies were on his right, the Flemish oi; the left.
The French adopted a similar formation, their infantry
occupying the front line, the chivalry di'awn up in line
behind them. We see in the accounts of this battle a
glimmering of tactical arrangement, for it seems that the
heavy horsemen were ranged in squadrons, with intervals
between, through which the infantry marched, after
crossing the bridge of Bou vines, in order to take up their
position in front. The squadrons most probably were
the followings of the different knights bannerets, who
were drawn up together, and so formed tactical units.
The light horsemen were on the wings supported by
heavy cavalry. The battle was opened by the Chevalier
Guerin, sending a body of 150 light cavalry, to charge
the Flemish gendarmerie of the enemy's left wing. He
seems to have taken this course, not with any idea that
the small body of lightly armed troops could gain any
decisive result, but with the intention of throwing his ■
opponent's ranks into confusion, before leading his main
body of heavy armed knights to the decisive charge. .'
He evidently appreciated the value of the last reserve
in a cavalry action, and succeeded in obtaining that
' Dauiel, Milice Fran9aise, i, 211, 212, 213.

166

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period 11.

advantage by the course he adopted. His plans were
crowned with success.

The battle in the centre commenced by a fight betweeji
the two bodies of infantry, in which the French foot sol-
diery, raw levies, hastily collected, and badly drilled,
were at once defeated by the German battalions, who
pressed on, and threw the French horsemen somewhat
into confusion. They nearly captured the French king,
who was dismounted by the stroke of a javelin which
caught in his armour. A desperate struggle ensued, in
which close hand-to-hand fighting of the usual deter-
mined character was continued for a long time, until the
superior skill of the French cavalry decided the day in
their favour.

A charge in flank is also mentioned in this battle, as
well as a countercharge to destroy the effect of it, which
proves that some idea of tactics was beginning to show
its' elf. Another matter mentioned in the account of this
action is of great interest, as the first evidence of a reac-
tion in the opinion as to the relative values of the cavalry
and infantry.

The heavy armour of the nobles, their skill in the use
of weapons, the weight and strength of their horses, and
the contempt into which the infantry service had fallen,
had resulted, as we have already seen, in making the
cavalry not only the all-important, but practically the
only service, in the armies of the day. Ideas are always
apt to be carried to extremes, and the knights putting
their trust in armour, and relying mainly upon its pro-
tection for success, increased its weight, and multiplied its
pieces, until it became so burdensome that the Avarriors
were worn out by the exertion required to carry it, and
half stifled by the closeness of the head covering.

When a knight was unhorsed, he was often unable to
get up without assistance, and after a little exertion it
became necessary for him to take off his helmet to regain
his breath. It must have been about this period that
one of the German emperors made the remark, that
" Armour protects the wearer, and prevents him from
injuring others."

CHAP, v.]

CHIVALRY.

167

The difficulty caused by the excess of armour is
strongly shown by two incidents which occurred in this
action. The Count of Boulogne, wh commandeJ the
right wing of the allied army, fought with great obsti-
nacy. At the commencement of the action he had
drawn up a body of chosen infantry pikemen into a
hollow battalion, two deep, in a circular formation, in
the centre of which he took up his position. In the
front of this circle, which bristled with pikes in every
direction, an opening was made when he wished to
charge. From time to time, as he became exhausted, ho
retreated to the circle, which gave him an entrance, and
protected him from the hostile horsemen, while he took
off his helmet, and recovered his breath.

Thft other incident is that of two bodies of hostile
knights, or gendarmerie, while fighting against each
other, stopping, as if by mutual consent, in the midst of
the struggle, and all relieving themselves of their
helmets to get fresh air, and to obtain rest.^

It could not take long, under these circumstances, for
the infantry to begin again to hold their proper relative
position, and the fact of the hollow circle of the Count of
Boulogne successfully serving as a place of refuge to him
from the attacks of the heavy cavalry, speaks volumes
as to the steadiness and discipline of his chosen pike-
men.

At this battle, also, we see that Philip Augustus had
a body of infantry, somewhat of a regular character,
called " sergents d'arrms" The infantry levies of the
communes were also distinguished by the name of " ser-
gents." These troops were of a much better quality,
and of a higher rank than the ordinary rabble that formed
the foot-soldiers of the feudal armies, and were com-
manded by nobles. The name serviens, or sergentjS, is
sometimes used to signify a bodyguard only, but is also
often applied to the whole body of the soldiery under
the rank of knight, but particularly all those who fought
behind the knights in the second rank.

^ Daniel, Milice Fran9aise, i. 214, 215.

;*

i'l

CHAPTER VI.

The Crusades.

In the latter part of the eleventh ceniary, after the
institution of chivalry was firmly established, an immense
movement took place in Europe, which. aflFected the
history of that continent and Asia for about two
hundred and fifty years.

As already mentioned, religion soon became intimately
connected with knighthood, and exercised an enormous
influence over the members of it. At a period when
religious superstition had unbounded sway over all
classes, when military exploits were considered the only
object of life among the nobility, and when the in-
stitution and spread of the order of chivalry had
checked the petty feuds and wars between Christian
states, Europe contained an inflammable mass of material,
that the slightest spark would set in a blaze.

At this time Peter the Hermit, an enthusiast well
fitted for the work, went through Christendom preaching
in favour of a crusade, to deliver the Holy Sepulchre
from the possession of the infidel. All Europe was soon
ringing with the story of the wrongs and cruelties
practised upon the pious Christian pilgrims, who in
great numbers were continually visiting the Holy Land.
Pope Urban H. at once took advantage of the oppor-
tunity, and used his influence to range the chivalry of
all nations under the banner of the Church.

Fired by religious enthusiasm immense hordes collected,
quarrels between the feudal lords and sovereigns ceased,
while all united together to carry on a Holy War against

CHAP. VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

169

the Moslem. The Crusades are the most striking and pecu-
liar feature of the middle ages, and the records of them
convey much instruction to the military reader, not so
much on account of any influence that they exerted on
the development of the art of war, as for the light
thrown upon the method of warfare of the time.

The first crusaders were an undisciplined rabble, con-
sisting of fanatics of the worst class, who did more
injury to the Christian nations through which they
passed, than to the infidels they had sworn to conquer/
Without organisation, without a commissariat, without
supplies, or the means of obtaining them, they first
begged, then robbed and plundered, until they were set
upon by the exasperated inhabitants of Hungary, and
massacred in immense numbers.^ A few only, under
Walter the Penniless and Peter the Hermit, crossed the
Bosphorus, when, quarrelling among themselves, they
separated, and were destroyed in detail by the armies of
the Sultan Solimaun.^

Other plundering bands started for the Holy Land,
and committing worse outrages than their predecessors,
were set upon and destroyed, without one ever reaching
Palestine.^ Then the chivalry came upon the scene, and
the most skilful generals of the day stepped forward to
lead and control the great movement of Christianity
against infidelity, of Frank against Turk. Codfrey de
Bouillon, Raymond of Toulouse, Robert of Normandy,
and the Count of Flanders, as well as other nobles of
great distinction, gathered around them the flower of
the nobility of France and Italy, with some few of the
knights of England and Germany, and with an immense
army undertook the first organised military crusade.

They marched by difierent roads, in order the easier
to supply the troops with food on the way, timing their
movements so as to concentrate at Constantinople. Their
arrangements in this respect are in marked contrast to
the ill-advised and wretched management of the rabble
that had preceded them. In spite of this they had not

Michaud. • Mackay. ^ Ibid. ii. 19.

Ibid. 20.

170 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [pekiod ii.

learned the art of provisioning an army, nor had they
the facilities for doing so with advantage.

Under the system of warfare in Europe in that age,
the campaigns were of short duration, and armies sub-
sisted almost entirely upon the country in which they
fought,^ and rarely had either convoys of supplies fol
lowing them, or magazines established upon which to
rely. When compelled to concentrate either for battle
or to conduct a siege, the feudal armies constantly
suffered from want of food, and the crusaders, after
entering the enemy's country in Asia Minor, endured
greater hardships, and lost far more lives by famine,
than by the sword of the Saracen.

This crusade under Godfrey and the other leaders
contained an immense number of cavalry and infantry.
The historians of the day compute the army at 100,000
horse and 500,000 foot. The cavalry alone were of any
value, the infantry being a mere undisciplined rabble,
unable to exercise any influence either in the open field
or in the siege of fortified towns. The force was divided
by nations, and each nation had its own quarters in
camp. The knights wore the hauoerk of chain armour,
and a casque or helmet, and carried the lance, the sword,
a poignard, a mace, and the bow and crossbow. The
infantry used the sling, and long bucklers.

The Saracens fought principally on horseback, and
used the bow with great eflfect. They pursued the Par-
thian system of tactics, avoidiLg a direct charge, but
returning and pouring in fresh clouds of arrows, the
moment the crusaders withdrew from the pursuit. The
greater speed of their horses gave them a considerable
tv intage in their manoeuvres, especially as the heat of
the climate, and the weight of the armour of the Chris-
tions, rendered continued and violent exertion almost
impossible.

The great distinction between the two hostile armies
may be briefly summed up in the words " heavy " and
"light." The Christian knights were emphatically
heavy cavalry. They formed in solid line for the charge,

^ Hamley, FroissMU*t.

CHAP. VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

171

and with their stout lances their onset was terrible, while
in the hand-to-hand conflict, nothing could withstand the
crushing blows of their ponderous swords, maces, and
battle-axes. The Saracens were superb light cavalry,
equipped for and accustomed to rapid manoeuvres. They
handled the keen cimeter with wonderful dexterity, and
threw their javelins, or shot their arrows, with remarkable
skill. Their armour, although of the same description of
chain mail, had equal powers of resistance, but was
lighter and more flexible, and much superior to the
clumsy and weighty armour of the first crusaders.

This oriental chain mail was of excellent workmanship
and beautifully adorned with gilding. The helmet, or
bead-piece (which was provided with a nasal which, pro-
longed above the crown, carried a plume on the crest)
was light, and highly ornamented with gilding and
damascene work in gold. The shield was small, round,
and had a boss or point in the centre. The inferior
soldiers were all archers. The Saracens soon adopted
the lance.

They could not stand against the weighty and ponder-
ous charge of the western knights, and at first were con-
tinually defeated, but in time they gained experience,
and avoided the direct charge. More active and rapid
in their movements, they rushed first upon one flank,
then on the other, charging up and retreating, but ever
ready to take advantage of any opening. Dexterous and
brave horsemen, and perfect masters of the art of swords-
manship, the agile Saracens would cut down the lances,
parry their thrusts, and if a weak point could be found
in their opponent's armour, drive home a deadly blow,
with their finely tempered blades.

Although the numbers of the crusaders were so great,
the individual courage and training of the knights so
high, and the moral enthusiasm of the whole mass so
exalted, yet the results were not satisfactory, the success
only partial and evanescent, and the losses and suff'ering
endured terrible beyond description. The Crusades teach,
more powerfully than any argument, the absolute neces-

172

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II,

sity in war, of thorouorli organisation, strict discipline,
find undivided command.

Chivalry had however so thoroughly taken possession
of the people of Europe, that the knights, wrapped up
in the pride of their connection with so distinguished an
order, never gave any thought to the infantry service, or
paid any attention to organise it, so as to make it of use
in its peculiar sphere. The result was an army of heavy
armed cavalry, unwieldy and cumbersome, composed of
highly trained and brave soldiers, followed or accompanied
by a confused mob, whose only use appears to have been
to eat up the provisions that were so difficult to obtain,
and to delay and embarrass the movements of the only
soldiers in the army.

So thoroughly had the cavalry service usurped the
functions of all the others, and so useless were the so-
called infantry, that it became necessary for the knights
to take upon themselves the duty of attacking and
defending fortresses, of guiding and directing the works
necessary in a siege, of constructing engines and towers
for the purpose, and of working them when constructed.

Instead of organising bodies of pikemen and archers,
instead of utilising the foot-soldiers, in forming them
into garrisons for the defence of the fortresses and cities
which they captured on their march, they weakened
their eflfective force in the field, by making detachments
of their heavy armed horsemen, and cooping them up to
guard walled towns.

There is no service that requires less tactical skill, and
less training, than that of defending a fortification, par-
ticularly in the middle ages, when artillery was not so
perfected, or so scientific in its use, as at the present day,
and the fact of the knights performing the duties them-
selves, shows how completely the idea prevailed that the
cavalry alone were able or qualified to perform any
service whatever.

At the siege of Nicea the whole Christian army camped
about it, and employed all the machines known to the
Romans ; the Greeks, who were with the crusaders, aiding
and assisting them in the work. We find here the

CHAP. VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

173

knights a ad nobles dismounted, and engaged most actively
in all the operations of the attack, the officers of the
highest rank performing the same duties as the commonest
soldier. They commenced by making many assaults, in
which they were repulsed after useless displays of the
most astonishing valour; and we see accounts of
Eaymond and Godfrey, the two most prominent leaders
of the Christian host, fighting in the towers, and
personally using crossbows and other projectile weapons.
Mines were also used in the siege. E.aymond, having
undermined, and so destroyed one of the principal towers
of the city,' caused such consternation that the place
surrendered to the Greek emperor the following day, in
order to be protected from the rapacity of the crusaders
from the West.

The siege of Antioch is marked by the same peculi-
arities that were shown in the siege of Nicea, except that
the Christians seem to have relied upon a blockade, rather
than upon direct operations. The knights were engaged
continually in foraging for provisions, in defeating
attempts to raise the siege, and to throw supplies into
the city, and in driving back sorties which the garrison
were continually making.

By this time they had discovered the want of an
infantry force, and the uselessness of the vagabonds who
were in their following. To rectify as much as possible
this defect, they organised a military force that was very
formidable to the Saracens. The beggars and stragglers
that hung around the Christian army were employed in
the labours of the siege, and were placed under the orders
of an officer who was entitled the " Roi truand" or king
of the vagrants.'' They were paid out of the general
treasury for their services, and when they were able to
buy arms and clothes they were forced to enter one of
the regular troops of the army. Embarrassing camp
followers were thus made valuable auxiliaries.

Although Antioch was besieged seven months, the
crusaders would have failed to take it, but for a piece
of treachery on the part of one of the officers of the
^ Michaiid, i. 102. 2 ibid. U5.

174

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

garrison named Pliirous, who agreed to deliver up one of
the towers in the wall to Bohemond, prince of Tarentum.
When the time came for the treason to be consummated,
the tower was scaled by sixty knights in armour, followed
by large numbers of others also heavily armed, and most
probably all dismounted cavalry. They seem also to
have been armed with lances and swords in this affair,
which was entirely successful, and secured to them the
possession of the city.

In the siege of Jerusalem we see the same custom of
the important duties beiug all performed by the knights.
After their first ill-advised and enthusiastic attempt to
storm the city they found it necessary to commence the
operations with more deliberation, and to construct the
requisite machines of war, by the use of which alone so
strong a fortification could be reduced.

Here, again, the want of system in reference to the
provisioning of the army caused the crusaders to endure
cruel hardships, and to suffer serious losses. A Genoese
fleet coming to Jaffa with large supplies of provisions
and ammunition of all sorts, and accompanied by a great
number of Genoese engineers and carpenters,* supplied
two of the most urgent wants of the crusaders, and
revived the spirits and courage of the army.

The knights and barons themselves became again
laborious workmen in this siege, and worked energetically
in the construction of the engines of war and the towers
to be used in the attack. Three of these towers were
built, which were higher than the walls of the city, and
each of them had three stages, one for the workmen who
directed its movements, and the two higher for the
warriors or knights who were to fight from it, and assault
the walls by means of a drawbridge which was con-
structed on each tower to give them easy access.

Missiles of all kinds were thrown from engines and
by hand, while slingers and crossbowmen hurled their
projectiles unceasingly against the ramparts. The three
towers advanced simultaneously on three sides of the
city, while parties of knights with scaling ladders at-

^ Michaud, i. 208, 211.

CHAP. VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

175

of carnage

tempted to assault by that nietliod at different points.
Godfrey took his place on the highest platform of his
wooden fortress, accompanied by his brother Eustace and
Baldwin du Bourg,^ and, surrounded by knights, they
sent showers of javelins into the city. The other leaders,
Raymond, Tancreci, the Duke of Normandy, and the
Count of Flanders, all fought in the front ranks. After
fighting without success for nearly two days, Godfrey's
tower advanced near enough to have its drawbridge
lowered, and then the knights, rushing in to close
quarters, soon had possession of the walls, and drove the
Saracens through the streets of the city. The crusaders,
pouring in at every point in the fury of the assault,
massacred without pity, and a fearful scene
ensued that baffles all description.

These accounts of the capture of Nicea, Antioch, and
Jerusalem show that the knights were almost entirely
relied upon for every species of military duty, and prove
that the military art of the time was very defective,
and such as entailed a great waste of available power.

Among the Saracens also the same exaltation of the
cavalry service existed, and their armies were composed
to a very great extent of mounted men. At the battle of
Doryloeum in Phrygia, the army of Soliman is loosely
computed at from 200,000 to 350,000 horsemen.^ They
were armed with the long Tartar bow, the crooked sabre,
and the javelin. They did not fight in the direct
charge, but by continual irregular evolutions, in which
they kept up a constant volley of arrows. While the
horses were fresh and the quivers full the Saracens had
the advantage, but after a long and desperate struggle
in which 4,000 Christians fell pierced by the Turkish
arrows, a flank attack by Ra3rm.ond of Toulouse turned
the scale, and a brilliant victory to the crusaders was
the result.

In the battle before Antioch, where the; Saracens
under Kerboga were attacked by the crusaders, the
Turkish army is computed at 100,000 horse, and 300,000
foot,^ some writers even going as high as 600,000 of all

' ^lichaud, i. 218, 219. ^ Gibbon, v. 577. » Michaud,i. 158.

176

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period ii.

arms. The lianlsliips of the siege of Antioch by tli<>
kniglits, the much more terrible suliering and famine
of the Christians when themselves besieged, had so
weakened their army, that of the 60,000 mailed horse-
men wiio had i)roiidly marched against Antioch, scarcely
200 were mounted and fit for battle. Godfrey de
Bouillon, their great leader, was reduced to the necessity
of borrowing a horse to ride into action.^ The knights
were therefore in this instance compelled to fight as
infantry soldiers, but with the arms and weapons of
horsemen. They marched in twelve divisions, and were
attacked by the Turks, who discharged clouds of arrows,
and rushed upon the crusaders, who met the attack with
firmness, repulsed them, and penetrated their ranks.

The Saracens, who usually did not wear heavy armour,
had in this action a body of 3,000 horse clothed in steel
and armed with clubs.^ This body was very efficient,
and carried confusion and terror into the ranks of the
Christians. After a closely contested fight, in which
despair and a frenzied religious enthusiasm, worked up
with considerable skill by their leaders, caused the
crusaders to fight with the most extraordinary fury,
they were at last victorious, and routed the Turks,
captured their camp with its stores and supplies, and
put to death about 100,000 of them.

Under Saladin the Saracen horsemen were both heavy
and light, and he maintained a bodyguard of one thou-
sand mamelukes, who were clad in armour, , d wore
over it saffron coloured silk tunics.^ He himself wore
the same dress. His cavalry were nearly all light horse-
men, and were utterly unable to stand the direct attack
of the crusaders, clad in mail, and led by tae fiery
Richard Cceur de Lion. In the actions between the
chivalrous Saladin and the lion-hearted English monarch,
the Saracens pursued closely the Parthian tact'cs that
had been so disastrous to Crassus, but the crusaders,
mainly cavalry, were armed with coats of mail strong
enough to resist the arrows. Kichard skilfully kept his

} Michaud, i. 172.
ch. ii. 155, 156.

2 Ibid. 173. 3 James's Life of Richard I.,

CHAP.

V..]

THE CRUSADES.

177

army in closely serried ranks, and avoided the action,
until when near Assur, he had drawn the Turkish hordes
into a plain cooped up between mountains and a forest.
Then he turned at bay, and charging at the head of his
English nobles and the whole Christian host, he shattered
the Saracen formation, and hewed his way through their
thickest ranks. As far as the sweep of his heavy sword
reached all went down before it or fled ^-om it. The
Turks, unable to get away, were cut down in great
numbers, and although they fought desperately, they
were completely defeated with immense loss.

Chivalry reached the zenith of its glory at this period,
nor was there, in the long roll of great soldiers connected
with it, a more gallant knight than the lion-hearted
Kichard.

A number of crusades took place from time to time,
until in the year 1248 Louis IX. (St. Louis) of France
led a large army to Egypt and landed near Damietta.
The details of this landing are interesting. A number
of the knights under Joinville, Baldwin of Rheims, and
the Count of Jaffa, went ashore first and drew up in
order of battle to cover the disembarkation of the re-
mainder. The Saracen cavalry at once charged upon
them to drive them into the sea. The tactics employed
by the dismounted heavy cavalry to protect themselves
were very judicious, and foreshadowed the coming revival
of an infantry force armed as pikemen. They formed up
in serried ranks, placed their bucklers upright in the sand
before them, and, resting their long lances on the top of
their shields, presented an impenetrable array of steel
points, before which the Moslem horse fell back in con-
fusion.' The troops constantly landing from the fleet,
formed under the protection of this battalion and effected
the movement without loss or annoyance.

Although the Crusades lasted for over two hundred and
fifty years, during which time all the nations of Europe
furnished their contingents to the Christian rmies, and
although millions of treasure were expendeu and two
millions of lives lost, yet we look in vain for any marked

' Michaud, ii. 382 ; Mackay, ii. 93.

JS".

178

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period n.

result upon the military art. Although the deficiencies
in their system of war were clearly shown at every stage
of the struggle, there was no systematic effort made to
remedy them. It is one of the most curious features of
the Crusades, that no great military reformer arose to
rectify the errors and to reorganise the armies of the Cross
so as to chain success to their banners. Never was the
necessity for reform in the military forces more clearly
manifested, never were armies taught their weak points
by more direct and more bitter experience, never was
there a better opening for a great genius to have effected
extraordinary results. The required reorganiser did not
appear, however, and nothing more strongly proves the
absolute hold that chivalry had obtained in the minds
of all classes.

Although the Crusades had proved so strikingly the
inability of cavalry to act upon every description of
ground, although they had shown so plainly that cavalry
alone could not perform all the numerous and varied
duties required of an army in the field and were not
suited for every emergency of war, yet many years elapsed,
and many campaigns were fought, before the infantry
service regained its proper relative position in armies.

Before proceeding further in detailing the gradual re-
vival of the infantry service, it will be in place here to
say a few words with reference to the cavalry of other
nations, not connected with either chivalry or the
Crusades, but who cannot be altogether overlooked.

SECTION II. — CAVALRY OF RUSSIA AND POLAND DURING
THE PERIOD OF THE CRUSADES. — [NVASION OF THE
MONGOLS, &C.

Ancient Sarmatia was but little known to the Greeks
and Romans, and fabulous stories of countries where con-
tinued night existed, and other legends of like value, are
the only references we find in early history to that portion
of Europe.' Later on we obtain scanty details of infor-
mation as to the wandering tribes that moved about the
great plains of that country. The emigration, union, and

' Karamsin, i. 2, 3.

CHAP. VI,]

THE CRUSADES.

179

dissolution of these tribes, form a continually shifting
picture, that renders it exceedingly difficult to give more
than a loose and indefinite idea of the different changes
in the population, government, and manners of the early
inhabitants.

We have already referred to the cavalry of Scythia in
remote times, and we are able to obtain from Ammianus
Marcellinus some information as to the Sarmatian horse-
men in the fourth century of the Christian era.* The
strength of their armies was mainly composed of cavalry,
and they h^d the habit of leading one or two spare horses
on the march in order to have a fresh mount at hand so
as to ensure great speed and greater endurance. This
gave them facilities for a rapid advance or retreat, which
often surprised their enemies.

They invented and made use of a cuirass of scale
armour. The scales were made of slices of horses' hoofs
Rewed on linen, and were capable of resisting the sword
or javelin. The Sarmatians carried a long lance, a
powerful bow with a quiver of arrows, and a short dagger.
The scarcity of iron compelled them to point their
weapons with fish-bones, and to make them more deadly
the points were poisoned.

The Norman sea kings, who carried their conquests over
many parts of Europe, and who were seen victorious
in France, in Naples, Sicily, and Apulia, had spread from
the shores of the Baltic into Russia ; and Kurik^ a Norman
or Varangian prince, founded the Slavonian or Russian
monarchy in the year 862.

In 906 Oleg, the Regent of the monarchy during the
minority of Igor the son of Rurik, declared war against
the Greek Empire. A number of the native tribes ranged
themselves under his banner, along with the Varegues
or Normans, and the army set out, the infantry by the
river Dnieper in 2,000 small boats, the cavalry marching
along its banks.

In this we see the influence of the Norman character,
for the sea was their native element. Their expeditions
from their own countrj/ being all made by water gave

' Ammianus MarcellinuB, xvii. 12.

N 2

180

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

them the title of the Sea Kings. They therefore sailed
down the river, carrying their boats and supplies by land
around the cataracts in the same manner as was adopted
by General Wolseley in the Red River Expedition of 1870
in Canada, where 1,200 soldiers and nearly as many
voyageurs, or boatmen, went by water and land a distance
of over 600 miles, carrying supplies for three months,
and being obliged to convey by main strength all their
boats and baggage over forty-seven different portages.'
The desert country through which General Wolseley
marched having no roads of any description, and covered
as it was with the original forest, rendered it absolutely
necessary for him to go by water. The same causes may
have rendered the river the easiest route for Oleg to
follow, and may have been the reason of its being adopted.

The historian is silent as to whether the cavalry were
allowed peaceably to march through Bulgaria to Constan-
tinople, but it is probable that they followed the coast of
the Black Sea, and were in the neighbourhood of Con-
stantinople during the time that Oleg was besieging it ;
for it is stated that the country all around the city was
ravaged and burnt, and this was likely to be the work of
the cavalry. The Greeks bought a peace with money,
and no pitched battle was fought.

Oleg is said to have made a second expedition against
Constantinople, but the silence of the Greek historians
renders its occurrence very doubtful. In 941 Igor made
a descent upon the Eastern Empire, but was defeated
with heavy loss, through the means of the terrible Greek
fire which was poured upon his troops from numberless
tubes and engines of destruction.^ In 943, with a powerful
army, oi both infantry and cavalry, Igor made another
expedition against the Greeks, but the emperor again
bought a peace by presents, and by numerous concessions.^

In 1043 Yaroslaf, great - grandson of Igor, made
another expedition against Constantinople, which was
also unsuccessful, partly through a storm, and partly
through the use of Greek fire by his opponents.

' Huysshe, Red River Eypedition.
Karamsin, i. 184.

2 Oibbcn, V. 430.

CHAP.

VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

181

430.

The Normans had improved the military art among
the Sclavonians or Russians. They formerly fought in
irregular groups, as the ancient Scythians, but under
Norman influence tactical divisions were made, and
columns were ranged in order, with flags or standards to
each body. Trumpets were used to give signals for
movements, and to encourage them in the advance.
Their attacks were made in battalions with serried ranks.
They had an efficient force of cavalry, partly composed
of foreign mercenaries, and partly of natives of the
country. The use of advanced guards to cover the
march of the army was well understood and regularly
adopted, so that their armies moved secure from surprise.^
The troops were constantly drilled and exercised in the
open field, both in sham fights and in the regular
manoeuvres required in battle.

The defensive arms in use among the Russians at this
epoch were cuirasses, arm-pieces, or brassards, and large
helmets. A lance or pike, bows and arrows, and a two-
edged sword, were the offensive weapons. The tactical
divisions were each one thousand strong, under the com-
mand of an officer called " Tissiatchsky."^ These batta-
lions were subdivided into ten companies of one hundred
each, commanded by centeniers, which were also divided
into ten sections of ten men each, commanded by
" deciatsky." A special corps of chosen men formed
the guard of the prince, and were charged to defend
his life, and set an example of valour to the rest of
the army. The prince commanded the whole army,
and under him, but over the " Tissiatchsky," were the
" voievodes," who commanded the brigades or divisions.
The Varegues formed a separate corps, and in addition
to the right, which belonged to all the troops, of a share
in the booty, they were accustomed to receive a regular
pay.'

The archers generally commenced the action. The

soldiers did not put on the cuirass until the moment

they were going into action, for, to relieve the men, the

armour was carried upon chariots. The enemy often

' Kammsin, i. 298, 2 ibid. i. 299. » Ibid, i: 300.

i!!*H

I' ■'

182

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

profited by this circumstance to fall upon them while
unarmed.

The Polis^ iny for many centuries consisted mainly
of cavalry, i . which service they excelled. The old
system of allodial tenure was maintained in Poland for
many centuries after it had lapsed into the feudal system
in the other parts of Europe. The nation, until modern
times, consisted of a great body of free landholders, or
nobles, who preserved inviolate the right to assemble in
person and discuss public affairs. These nobles, who,
clad in furs and magnificently armed, appeared mounted
on horseback in the assemblies, formed the legislature of
the nation in peace, and its army in war. Their sove-
reign was elected by the free choice of the allodial pro-
prietors, and so impatient were they of restraint, and so
highly did they value the rights of freemen, that all
decisions were required to be unanimous. These proud
horsemen looked upon trade and commerce as degrading,
and the pursuit of arms as the only occupation fit for a
gentleman.^ Their love for equality was so strong, that
hereditary offices were unknown among tnem, every
position or station of eminence b*^ing held only for life.*

Tlie arms of the Polish nobility were ornamented to
the highest degree. They used poignards and cimeters
set with brilliants, bucklers of costly workmanship,
battle-axes enriched with silver and decorated with
emeralds or sapphires, and bows and arrows. The horses
were often clad in iron, and each knight wore a
splendid signet-ring, which, in imitation of the Roman
equites, was the badge of his rank as a member of the
equestrian order. ^

The army was divided into difierent parts : the
national troops, a small body of regular soldiers equipped
and paid by the Republic, the pospolite or general
assembly of all the free citizens or nobles on horseback,
the armed valets, and the mercenaries who were generally
Germans.* Nearly all these bodies fought on horseback.

> Salvandy, i. 72.
352; Salvandy, ii. 195.
126.

2 Ibid. i. 71 ; Alison, i. 351. " Ibid.

* Alison, i. 353 ; Salvandy, ii. 125,

THAI'. VI,]

THE CRUSADES.

183

The heavy cavalry in particular constituted the main
strength of the army. Tt was divided into cuirassiers
and hussars, and they were all included under the term
" Towarzirz," ^ or " companions," as they were all of equal
rank to each other, and to the king, who was only
primus inter pares and accustomed to address them
by the term companions.^ The cuirassiers were clad in
cuirasses and helmets of steel, and carried the lance, the
sabre, and the bow. The horses were also provided with
defensive armour. The hussars wore a hauberk, and
depended mainly upon the sabre.^ At a later period these
horsemen carried two sabres, one slung on the side of the
rider, the other under his left thigh fastened to the
saddle. Both were distinguished by the splendour of
their equipment, and the number and quality of the
mounted servants who followed them into action. Furs
and the skins of beasts were much used in their dress.*

They seem to have fought in action in the middle ages
somewhat in the same way as the knights of chivalry,
the nobles or Towarzirz fighting in the front rank, and
their servants or attendants forming in rear to aid and
assist them.^ Afterwards the Polish hussars were formed
up in squadrons, of 100 hussars in the front rank, with
four ranks in rear composed of the four servants of each
hussar. These servants were lightly armed horsemen.
The hussars according to Zeddler carried lances nineteen
feet long with a coloured pennon.^

At a very early period we read in Eussian history of
bands of soldiers called Drujina or Droojins. They seem
to have been a sort of guard or retinue, formed of the
ruling class, which was always maintained by the Russian
princes. They occupied a very honourable position, being
a nobility or sort of council in time of peace, and a coiys
d' elite in time of war. The Drujina at first were com-
posed exclusively of the Varegues, but after a time they
were increased by the introduction into their ranks of
those of the natives who were most distmguished for

' Salvandy, ii. 128.
i. 62. 8 Ibid. 64.

« Zeddler, ii. 285.

2 Ibid. ii. 129 ; Coyer's Hist de Sobieski,
* Alison, i. 353, ^ Bardin, 3538.

18 1

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period ir.

strength and bravery. They afterwards were divided
into two classes, the first consisting only of Boyars or
nobles, the second of all clfisses, and this last formed
afterwards the Dwor, from which comes Dwarane, or
possessors of serfs. These Drujina were peculiar to
Kussia, not being found elsewhere in Europe. The
members of the Drujina remained always attached to their
prince, the attachment being of a personal character, for
they seem to have had little sympathy either with the
country they came from, or that in which they resided.
This was caused by the feeble economical development of
the different peoples that formed the Russian nation,
there being nothing to tempt them to secure land or
settle permanently upon it. The support of these bands
was guaranteed by military requisitions, and by the
property of the prince. About the end of the twelfth
century the princes became settled, and the Drujina
obtained the right to hold land. To aid the Drujina in
war the princes often hired the Varegues, the Petchinage,
and the Torkye. They were all cavalry.^

In the early part of the thirteenth century a terrible
irruption of Mongolian horsemen, under the leadership of
the sons of Gengis Khan, swept over Russia and the
eastern portions of Europe, devastating and destroying
everything before them. They had already swept over
almost the whole of Asia. China had suffered under their
cruel invasions. From the Pacific to the shores of the
Black Sea these hordes of Tartar horsemen had overturned
monarchies and conquered and despoiled the inhabitants.

Gengis Khan had established a military system that
proved the great ability of that celebrated commander.
His army, consisting entirely of cavalry armed with bows,
cimeters, and iron maces, was divided by hundreds,
thousands, and tens of thousands, under their respective
commanders. The numbers in his armies were almost
fabulous, and are no doubt greatly exaggerated. The
battles of Europe seem but petty skirmishes when
compared to the conflicts that have taken place on the
plains of Asia.^ Seven hundred thousand

' Goudim Leffoovitch, 5. 2 Gibbon, vi. 210.

Mongols are

o

CHAP. VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

185

said to have fought under Gengis and his four sons, against
400,000 of the army of Mohammed, Sultan of Carizime,
who reigned over a territory extending from the Persian
Gulf to the borders of India and Turkestan. In the
battle which took place between them on the plains north
of the Jaxartes, 150,000 Carizmians were slain.

After the death of Gengis, his son Octal, having sub-
verted the Northern Empire of China, decided to invade
the most remote countries of the West. The roll of his
military force contained the names of 1,500,000 fighting
men. He placed 500,000 of these under his nephew
Baton, or Peta, and sent him in 1235 towards the setting
sun.^ In six years this enormous horde had marched
one-fourth part of the circumference of the globe. They
were followed by immense trains of waggons, conveying
their baggage and artillery, and by great herds of cattle.
They crossed the rivers on the ice, or by swimming, or in
leathern boats, which were used for transporting their
waggons and artillery. Their families accompanied them,
and lived in tents which were carried in the rear. The
soldiers fought mainly with arrows, avoiding the close
struggle, and striving to destroy their enemies from afar
with projectile weapons.^ The Khans and principal chiefs
took p' 'St in the rear, and directed the movements of their
men by means of difierent prescribed signals.

Their arrows were long and sharp, they carried enor-
mous cimeters, lances provided with hooks, and bucklers
of willow or osier. The produce of the chase, and the
flesh of their flocks, formed the principal food of the
Tartars. In summer they moved northwards, encamping
in the neighbourhood of rivers or lakes. In the winter
they migrated southwards in search of warmer climes,
and among the mountains sheltered themselves against
the icy winds of the north.'

These tribes assembled in immense numbers every year.
These gatherings, called Couraltai, were always held on
horseback, where the warriors consulted, and deliberated
upon the distribution of pasturage, and their movements

' Gibbon, vi. 217. ^ Karamsin, iv. 19. a Michaud, ii. 313.

ISO

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period 11.

in peace or war.^ These assemblies formed the sole legis-
lative power of the people, and framed the laws, which,
from their primitive habits, were of the simplest character.
The entire population was military, their noblest occupa-
tion being war, their strongest sentiment the love of
glory. Their encampments in peace, even their hunting
parties, resembled warlike exhibitions.^ They were most
skilful horsemen, ever in the saddle, where they often ate
and slept without dismounting. Their bow was of
great size and extensive range, and their arrows struck
with terrible force.

In rapidity of movement, in dexterity, in quickness of
evolution, they surpassed all nations. They were never
more dangerous than when apparently defeated, for their
perfidious retreat was often more injurious than the
boldest and most gallant charge. In stratagems they
excelled, while their cruelty was without limit. Ignorant
of the art of defending towns or of fortifying cities, they
yet understood how to construct the most formidable
machines of war, and how to conduct skilfully the most
intricate operations of a siege. Their garments were of
the simplest form, and the skins of their herds furnished
a warm and durable material. Their wandering life
rendered them experienced in all the difficulties of the
march, and neither the height of mountains, the width
of rivers, or the steepness of precipices ever found them
without resource, or ever impeded them in their
movements.^

Their discipline was strict and the obedience to their
leaders perfect, and although moving in such immense
hordes, the order and regularity of their movements
impressed their enemies as much as their courage and
cruelty struck them with terror. They never made peace
but with a conquered enemy,* and he who fled from
battle or abandoned his comrades in danger was punished
with death.

The approach of the first Mongolian horde was heralded
by the arrival in the Principality of Kiev of large num-
bers of the Polovtsi, who on the advance of the Tartar

• Michaud, ii. 313. 2 ibid. ii. 315. 3 ibid. * Ibid.

CHAP. VI.]

THE CRUSADES.

187

horsemen fled with their wives, their cattle, and their
valuables. The Russians under their princes gathered
a large army on the banks of the Dnieper, and in the
first skirmish were completely victorious over a detach-
ment of the enemy. This success is attributed to the
great skill and bravery displayed by the Russian archers
in the action.

Elated by this victory the Russians crossed the river
and marched towards the enemy.^ At the end of nine
days the two armies met on the Kalka or Kaletz, near
Marioupole, in the government of Ekaterinoslaf, and
on the 31st May, 1223, a decisive battle took place,
which resulted in a complete victory for the Mongols,
caused pai'tly by the treachery of the Polovtsi refugees,
who deserted in the action, and slew their Russian allies
for the sake of plundering their horses and arms, and
partly by the great number and extraordinary skill and
activity of the Tartar cavalry. The Tartar historians say
that the Mongols drew the Russians by design, some
distance into an open desert, where they would be fully
exposed to the attacks of the mounted archers and
swordsmen, and where they would be obliged to fight for
several consecutive days.^ Russia had never sufiered such
a frightful disaster. The invaders pursued their success
with great vigour, and so great was the loss of the
fugitives, that a superb army, numerous and full of
valour, vanished like a shadow, one tenth part only
escaping."

After this victory the Mongols disappeared for some
years, until in 1237 they again approached under the
command of Bati, the nephew of Octal, and having
defeated Youri, Prince of Rezan, and captured the city,
they won a victory over Vsevolod, at Kalomna, burnt
Moscow, and put the inhabitants to the sword.

Vladimir, Gorodetz, Galitch, Rostof, and many other
cities were soon destroyed, the inhabitants being put to
death or dragged away into slavery ; and at last, in 1240,
after desperate struggles and brilliant displays of un-
availing valour, the splendid city of Kief was stormed
' Karamsin, iii: 288, 289. ^ ibid. iii. 291. 3 ibid. iii. 289.

II

188

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period ii.

by the barbarians and destroyed, and this ancient place,
this illustrious capital, the mother of Russian cities, dis-
appeared for ever, and it was long ere a new city arose
upon the site.^

After the conquest of Russia, Bati led the multitude
of Mongols in victorious career towards Poland and
Germany, ravaging and destroying everything in the
line of his march. The horrors of the barbarian inva-
sions were again repeated upon the plains of central
Europe. The cities of Lublin, Warsaw, and Cracow were
destroyed, and from the Carpathian mountains to the
shores of the Baltic, the plains were cut up by the tramp
of the Tartar horsemen, while burnt villages and devas-
tated fields marked their passage.'' The Duke of Silesia,
the Polish Palatines, and the Grand Master of the Teu-
tonic order, united in vain to arrest the progress of the
destructive torrent. The great battle took place on the
plains of Lignitz, near Wahlstall, on the 9th April, 1241.^

The Polish army was composed principally of cavalry,
all heavily equipped, and partly clad in armour. They
seem to have been drilled to fight, as cavalry should
fight against cavalry, by the force of the charge. The
example and teachings of Henry the Fowler, and the
victories won by him and his son Otho, at Merseberg
and Augsburg, against an enemy who pursued the same
tactics as the Mongolians, could not have been forgotten
although 300 years had elapsed. Prince Henry the Good
and Mizeslav, Prince of Upper Silesia, commanded the
Polish army. They drew it up in five corps, very skil-
fully keeping some in reserve, for they seem on both
sides to have appreciated the value of the last reserves
in a cavalry action.

The battle was opened by a vigorous attack upon the
left wing of the Mongols by the right wing of the
Christian army. This attack was at once successful ; the
lightly armed and lightly equipped Mongols, being no
match in the direct charge for the heavy armed Polish
horsemen.* The Tartars retreated for a while, and when
the force of the charge was spe-^t, rallied and drove back

' Karamsin, iv. 13. 2 Michaud, ii. 323. ^ ibid. < Nolan, 13.

CHAP. VI.] THE CRUSADES. 189

the Poles upon their reserves. These then charged in
their turn, overthrew the barbarians and pursued them.
Suddenly, according to the Polish historians, '* a spell, the
efifect of enchantment, began to work," and their country-
men fled.. This spell was simply the result of the unex-
pected rallying of the Mongols, of the unaccustomed
tactics of a retreating foe, that were more dangerous
flying than charging. The novelty of the system of
tactics, the confusion unavoidable after a successful charge,
and the attack of fresh reserves, all formed a spell which
was quite sufficient to turn the scale and send the un-
wieldy horsemen of the West back upon their lines. ^

Prince Henry, evidently a skilful general, had still a
force in reserve which he led in person to restore the
fortune of the day. The Mongolian leader, Bati, ad-
vanced to meet him, but unable to withstand the direct
onset, evaded it, and returned again and again to the
charge. At last, when all the corps of the Christian
army had been exhausted in pursuing and charging their
light and intangible opponents, Bati, with a last reserve,
poured down and swept the wearied remains of the Polish
army from the field.

Such was the great battle which checked the Tartar
invasion of the West, for, although victorious, the
invaders had met an opposition more desperate than
they had yet encountered, and instead of pursuing their
conquests further in that direction, they turned to the
south, crossed the Carpathian mountains, and ravaged
the plains of Hungary. In their movements in that
country we do not obtain any details of interest in
reference to the question we are discussing.

' Nolan, 14.

CHAPTER VII.

Decline of Feudalism and Introduction op First
Regular Cavalry, 1290 — 1445.

W

section I. — RESULTS OP THE CRUSADES.

It has been observed by some superficial writers that
the Crusades did not influence the military art in any
m irked degree ; but although these great expeditions
did not immediately produce striking alterations in the
manner of conducting war, yet they indirectly caused
great changes in the sov^ial, political, and military systems
of Europe.

The Crusades struck a serious blow at feudalism. The
nature of the* feudal tenure, particularly suited to the
petty quarrels between neighbouring lords or small states,
was not adapted to the wars between great kingdoms.
The term of service which the vassal owed his chief was
generally forty days only, and sometimes even less.
Armies gathered under such a system could burn an open
town, or make a plundering raid, but could not under-
take a protracted siege, or enter into a lengthened
campaign.^

This weakened the power of the monarchs, and
rendered extensive conquests by them impossible. It
caused them also to be dependent to a great extent upon
their powerful vassals, who for a long period exercised
a preponderating influence. The petty quarrels and
continual conflicts in the early days of feudalism caused
' Hallam's Middle Ages, i. 260.

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

191

the tie between the lord and his vassal to be of the closest
character and mutually advantageous. Afterwards, when
private wars ceased, and the authority of the kings became
paramount, the tenants felt keenly the burden of their
tenure, and no longer required the protection of the chief,
which formerly had been so valuable a privilege.

The rise of chivalry, as we have seen, tended to prevent
these petty struggles, and the Crusades closely following
the institution of the order, gave a vent to the warlike
feelings of the age, and combined all Christian nations
against a common enemy. The great nobles, who led
their vassals to the Holy Land, were not followed through
any obligation arising out of the feudal tenure. They
were simply the chiefs *^of bands of volunteers or ad-
venturers,' and the richer knights equipped and main-
tained those of their folio i'ers who were too poor to
support themselves. The expenses incurred in these ex-
peditions impoverished the noble families, and ruined
many of them, compelling them to sell their estates, either
to provide means to equip their soldiers before setting
out, or to repay debts incurred while abroad.

The Crusades lasted two hundred and fifty years, and
during that period it is manifest that the feudal
principle could not fail to be impaired by a state of affairs
so hostile to its existence. The lower classes were
gradually elevated, in proportion as the powerful families
lost wealth and influence, and the monarchical principle,
gaining in strength, consolidated itself.

The cities, increasing in population and wealth, soon
began to feel their strength in the embarrassments and
needs of the nobles. ^ They soon obtained great liberties
by gradual encroachments, and by 'concessions purchased
at high price from their impoverished feudal chiefs.
Charters were granted, by both the king and the barons,
to many of these communities, and by the end of the
thirteenth century the custom had prevailed all over
France. The cities of Italy had gained their liberties at
an earlier period.

The kings, to secure in their favour the influence of the
' Bardin, 1761. 2 Hallam, i. 255.

192

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period ii.

cities against the great barons, in the disputes which
continually arose between the crown and the nobles, took
these free communities under their protection,' and
guaranteed them against the encroachments of the feudal
chiefs. Philip Augustus granted letters of safe-guard to
communities dependent upon barons, while in the next
reign Louis VIII. pretended to the immediate sovereignty
over all chartered towns, in exclusion of their original lords.

The security of these cities and the freedom enjoyed by
the inhabitants caused numbers to avail themselves of the
great inducements held out, and to become citizens. The
population was swelled in this way until the free cities
became exceedingly powerful, and began to raise armies,
and to make separate alliances with foreign states.

Although these changes were more of a political than
of a military character, they yet had a most important
influence upon the art of war, and for a time affected very
materially the relative values of the infantry and cavalry
services.

We have seen that the Crusades had a tendency to
weaken the feudal principle, and to accustom the minds
of all classes to a voluntary stipendiary service, in place
of one of absolute obligation. The circumstances of the
Crusades rendered this inevitable. The increasing power of
the crown also enabled the kings to establish a mercenary
in place of a feudal army. This they did very willingly,
for they naturally preferred the obedience and dis-
cipline of the one to the insubordination and freedom
of the other.

The wars of England, in Normandy and other parts of
France, under Henry II. and Richard L, could not be
carried on by troops gathered for forty days under the
feudal system. The custom therefore soon arose of
retaining the troops over the stipulated time by the
allowance of a certain rate of pay. This was soon
followed by the tenant buying relief from service with
money, which the king employed to pay those willing to
serve.

The cities also raising large bodies of troops found that

' Hallam, i. 2oB.

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

193

they could not furnish as many horsemen as could be
supplied by the ancient system, when military service
was connected almost altogether with the possession and
culture of land. They consequently raised large numbers
of infantry, who, unlike the rabble which followed the
feudal armies, were free artizans and mechanics, who had
rights and property to defend.

When the infantry came to be organised from among
the better classes, the first step was made towards the
revival of that arm. During the palmy days of chivalry
the infantry were not only composed of serfs of the
lowest character, but there must have been great diffi-
culty in providing leaders for them, when all soldiers of
any pretensions fought in the cavalry, and considered
the infantry service as degrading to the rank of a gentle-
man. They were therefore neither drilled nor organised
to be of any service whatever, but were an undisciplined
mob, neglected, and without leaders.

It can therefore be easily understood that when the
free-born citizens of the chartered cities organised for their
own defence, attention was bestowed upon the arma-
ment and discipline of the force, and more reliable foot-
soldiers began to appear upon the battle-fields of Europe.
. About this time, however, changes began to be made
in the armour of the knights and men-at-arms which
tended to retain the superiority of the cavalry over the
inftmtry. The weapons of offence for a time had to a
certain extent overmatched the art of defence. The
chain-mail, it was found, was often broken or torn by
the lance thrust, and even if it held firm, the wearer was
badly injured and bruised by the blow. The mail was
also a very imperfect defence against the downright
stroke of mace or battle-axe, and archery was becoming
so improved, and crossbows so powerful, that chain-mail
was found to be but an inefficient protection,

This led to many changes in armour. Plates were
first applied to defend the most exposed portions of the
body, and were at first worn over the chain-mail. Arm
and thigh pieces, knee, elbow, and shoulder guards, were
soon added, and during a great portion of the fourteenth

0

>l

194

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

in

[period II.

century mixed armour of this kind was generally used,
the plate additions increasing from time to time, until
about the end of that century complete plate armour
came into use, the mail being generally given up,
although instances are recorded of its being used under
the heavy armour as late as the sixteenth century.^

From the time of the introduction of plate armour,
the means of defence were superior to the arts of destruc-
tion, until some time after the invention of gunpowder,
when fire-arms were sufficiently improved to render
defensive armour useless. During the early use of this
heavy armour, cavalry again became for a time the all-
important arm, and retained its high position for a
considerable period.

Having touched upon the political and social causes
which affected the military systems abo> t the end of the
Crusades, it will be in place here to consider closely the
tactical and technical reasons, which also had their share
in the revival of the art of war, and the re-introduction
of the infantry as an important portion of armies.

The knights and generals who had fought in the Holy
Land had it forced upon them, in campaign after cam-
paign, that there were many emergencies in war where a
well-organised and well-drilled force of infantry would
have been much more available than the armed knights,
and much less costly to maintain. Many of the knights
also lost their horses in the East, and were obliged to
fight on foot, and they must soon have learned that a
mounted force was of little use for defensive purposes.
The landing of the army of St. Louis at Damietta, where
the knights dismounted and received the charge of the
Moslem horse with firm array, and with levelled lances,
also proves the dawning of the idea of an infantry force
of pikemen.

The military art was not studied, however, as a science,
and the prejudices of chivalry were so deeply rooted,
that men eager for distinction still fought in the
ranks of knighthood, and maintained the principles of
the order, and its method of fighting, far into the

* Boutell, 113.

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

195

sixteenth century, and long after the invention of
gunpowder should have exerted a great influence upon it.

The cost of maintaining a knight, however, was very-
great, including, as it did, his esquire and followers, and
it can be readily understood that when mercenary
armies became the mainstay of monarchies, efibrts would
be made to utilise an infantry force that could be
easily raised, and could be maintained at a cost far below
what would be required to secure the service of knights
and men-at-arms.

The cities of Italy were probably the first in the
middle ages to raise armies and hire foreign troops.
This was done by Pa via and Milan as far back as 1057.^
Milan, before the middle of the twelfth century, had a
very great population, far beyond that of the capitals of
the great kingdoms. The city was strongly fortified,
and the industrious citizens were free from the attacks
of armed pillagers and the oppression of feudal tyrants.
The artizans had the right to bear arms in their own
defence, and the military organisation was based upon
the division of the people into trades, who marched
under their distinctive banners. Milan, in 1288, had in
her army 8,000 gentlemen, or heavy cavalry, and
240,000 men capable of bearing arms, while her territory
did not exceed probably 600 or 700 square miles.''

The power of the cities of Germany at this time was
also ver)'- great. The citizens emulated the knights in
skill and bravery, and far surpassed them in military
knowledge, fighting in serried ranks and with better
order. ^

Although the infantry of these cities, both in Germany,
France, and Italy, were much better than the foot-soldiers
of the feudal armies, they were not as yet able to meet
the men-at-arms of the age with any chance of sue .?S3.
The plate armour, which had replaced the coat of rja-l
that had been the principal defence m the early Crusades,
was impervious to the blows of either spear, javelin, or
arrow, so that the heavy armed cuirassiers who were

' Hallam, Middle Ages, i. 368. « Hallam, i. 392. « Menzel,
ch. 180.

I

U.I ■■ i<

I I:

n

lOG

A HISTORY OF 0A\ AUl'i.

[period II.

generally in use in the armies of the latter part of the
thirteenth, and during the beginning of the fourteenth
century, were invulnerable to the attack >f the militia
levies of the cities.

Many contests took place in the various revolutions in
the Italian cities, between the men-at-arms and the
artizans and lower classes of the people. The weight of
armour rendered the horsemen unwieldy, and unless
they took possession of the streets by surprise, the popu-
lace could easily erect barricades, and defy any number
of the heavily armed lancers. If, however, a prince or
usurper could attack by surprise, he, as it was called,
" rode the city," that is, charged with his cavalry through
the streets, so as to prevent the people erecting barri-
cades.^ This expression is continually used by the his-
torians of the fourteenth century, and gives an idea of
the relative merits of the services at the time.

The tactical formation of the troops of the chartered
cities was very simjjle in its character, and yet judicious,
inasmuch as the organisation was always complete. The
different trades or guilds formed the tactical divisions,
and each had its own banner, and a captain to lead it in
the field. Eribert, Archbishop of Milan in 1039, invented
a standard called the Carroccio, which formed a common
rallying point, the pivot of every movement. It was a
chariot or waggon painted with vermilion, and bearing
the city standard elevated upon it.^ This was intended
to give a sort of concentration to the army, and supplied
in a rude way the want of more regular tactics. For
some time the militia was mainly composed of infantry,
the proportion varying from six or ten to one.

In time, as the burden of turning out for war began
to press heavily upon the industrious citizens, and as
they increased in numbers and wealth, the employment
of mercenary troops from abroad increased, and armies
gradually became less numerous, and the proportion of
heavy armed cuirassiers to the infantry much greater.
This was caused partly because the plate armour gave
the horsemen an immense advantage over the lighter
' Hallam, i. 428. a Ibid. 466.

mm

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

197

armed infantry, and rendered them almost invulnerable,
but the principal reason seems to have been the improve-
ment in the tactics of the men-at-arms, which necessarily
resulted when the mercenaries were organised in bands,
and permanently maintained under drill and discipline.

These bands of free lances, composed of adventurers
whose sole occupation was that of war, and who were
continually kept under a certain degree of discipline,
must have manoeuvred in the field and charged in action,
with much greater order and unity of direction, than did
the confused and tumultuous mob of feudal knights,
who fought in the desultory conflicts of the preceding
centuries.

SECTION II. — MERCENARY COMPANIES.

Mercenarj'- troops were substituted for the feudal
militia, or used as auxiliaries to it, long before the custom
arose of employing bands of professional soldiers, who
hired out their services to the highest bidder. At first
it was usual, as already mentioned, to pay the tenants
for services extending beyond the number of days which
were fixed as an absolute obligation.

At a very early period, both in the English, French,
German, and Italian armies, the payment of troops for
their services was the constant habit. Canute the Great
had paid soldiers in his guard in the early part of the
eleventh century. Harold II. is also said to have had
Danish soldierb in his pay. William the Conqueror's
army, with which he conquered England, was a peculiar
example of a mercenary army based upon the feudal
principle. It consisted of 60,000 men, partly paid by
regular pay, partly his own feudal tenants, and partly
gathered by the promise of a fair distribution of booty
in case of success. After the victory at Hastings,
England was parcelled out into fiefs, and a great portion
of it granted to the soldiers of his army. He afterwards
employed hired troops, as did his son William Rufus.

In the wars of Henry II. of England and Philip
Augustus of France, hired troops formed a considerable

r"

r;

li

t

198

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

portion of the armies. Eacli of these monarchs had large
bodies of mercenaries in his pay, recruited, as is believed
from the name Brabancons, from Brabant or the Nether-
lands. These troops, which were always disbanded at
the close of a war, abandoned their military duties with
regret, and, unfit for the useful occupations of peace,
gathered in lawless companies and oppressed and pillaged
the peasantry without pity.'

P^re Daniel says that in the time of Philip the Bold
all feudal tenants received pay from the king, even during
the term of their stipulated service. This must have
been occasioned by the poverty of the tenants, which
rendered them unable to defray the expenses, particularly
in distant expeditions.^

The mercenary troops of the time of Louis the Younger
and Philip Augustus were soldiers in w^ar and bandits in
peace. CJne of the first expeditions of Philip was against
these brigands, whom he defeated in the Province of Berri
and slew 7,000 of them. Their numbers must have been
very great, for we see a few years later large bodies of
them in his pay, as well as in that of King John of
England.^

The chief of the Brabancons in the pay of Philip
Augustus was named Cadoc, and it will give some idea
of the large force which he commanded under the king
when it is stated that the daily pay received by them
was 1,000 livres a day, which was an immense sum in
that age.'

Richard Coeur de Lion, in his last war with France,
had large bodies of Brabancons in his service under a
famous leader named Marchader or Merchades ; but it
was during the wars of Edward IIL with France, that
the organised mercenaries began to occupy so important
a position in the military systems of Europe.* Edward's
whole army in his French wars was under pay, contracts
being usually made with men of rank and influence, who
raised and commanded corps and received a daily pay
for each soldier furnished by them. The wages were

^ Hallam, i. 263. 2 Daniel, i. 63. » ibid. 105. * James'a
Life bi Richaxd, ii. 445.

K . f-

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

199

very high, which leads to the inference that the private
lancers, and even the archers, must have been recruited
among the middle classes, the smaller gentry, or the rich
yeomanry of England.'

The rate of pay in 1346 was — ^for an earl, 6s. 8d. a
day ; for barons and bannerets, 45. ; for knights, 2s. ; for
squires, Is. ; for archers and light cavalry, 6d. ; for foot
archers, Sd. ; for Welsh infantrymen, 2d. These sums
multiplied by about twenty-five will give an idea of the
relative amounts at the present value of money, and will
show how high the rate of pay was.^

This high pay procured good soldiers of the better
classes, and being national troops mainly, they were more
reliable than the foreign mercenaries which were used to
a great extent in Europe. At the battle of Crecy, Philip
of France had in his army 15,000 Genoese crossbowmen
who were mercenary troops. The remainder of hia
infantry were simply feudal militia of the most undis-
ciplined character.

By this time it had become the common practice for
soldiers of fortune to enrol themselves under the orders
of favourite captains, and hire their services in organised
bodies to whoever were willing to pay for them. These
companies were much more employed by the free cities
and republics of Italy, and exercised a much greater in-
fluence on the history of that country than of any other,
although for a time they were very troublesome in France
and Germany. They were known by the titles of
Brabancons, Cotereaux, Routiers, and in Italy the chiefs
of the bands were called Condottieri, which name was
sometimes used to designate the companies as well. It
was an evil hour for both the people and the sovereigns
when the loyal feudal militia was replaced by these
gangs of mutinous hirelings, generally foreigners, whose
conduct in action, though often brave and soldierlike,
inadequately redeemed their misconduct in peace, and
their vexatious and violent rapacity.

The great movement made by the provinces of France
after the battle of Poitiers to rescue the monarchy from
* Hallam, i. 265. ^ ii,i<j. note.

200

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

English oppressior based upon a system of mercenary
soldiers. The ci' ad provinces levied taxes to pay

the troops. I aoc alone maintained 10,000 men,

5,000 of then ig heavy men-at-arms, 1,000 sergents-

d-cheval, and -.^ , jO crossbowmen and pavoissiers. It is
remarkable that in granting these supplies and raising
these troops the citizens stipulated for the right to enrol
in the bodies of cavalry, in which nobles alone had pre-
viously been admitted ; so that after that period armies
consisted of the noble, the middle, and the plebeian classes.^

The free companies of adventurers were composed
of the poorer nobles and knights who had no patrimony
and no profession open to them save that of arms.^
They were generally all mounted, and consisted of
knights, esquires, and archers. These bands do not
appear to have been much employed in England, al-
though they were continually used in the armies of the
English kings while at war on the Continent, con-
sequently England did not suffer in peace from the
ravages of the disbanded mercenaries.

In France, however, in the midst of peace, the great
companies kept together, and levied contributions as if
on a conquered countiy.^ They were the worst kind of
bandits, murder, robbery, and destruction marking their
progress at every step. Many attempts were made to
destroy or scatter them.

It was in Italy, however, that the great companies
assumed the largest proportions, and exerted the most
important influence upon the history of the country.
They were chiefly composed of Germans, and were quite
indiflerent to the cause for which they fought, their only
inducement being the highest pay and the greatest
plunder. They passed from one service to the other
without the slightest compunction, and apparently
without any discredit.*

In time of universal peace, however, these adventurous
soldiers lost their only means of livelihood, and were
left in a very unpleasant position in a foreign country.
The result was that when peace was made the companies,

' Boutaric, 254. 2 ibid. 257. » ibid, * Hallam, i. 470.

CHAP. Vll.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

201

thrown upon their own resources, their employment
gone, their pay and rations stopped, their chances of
plunder at an end, naturally closed together for mutual
protection, and made up their minds that if others did
not go to war they would do so, and still continue to
earn a living with their swords. A partisan named
Guarnieri, in 1343, was the first to unite these dis-
banded and dissatisfied mercenary cavalry under his
command. His plan was not to make war, but to levy
contributions and pay and support his troops by a
system which, without the dangers and risks of battle,
would sc^iire as good or better remuneration.^

From that time for many years companies of adven-
turers organised upon the same principle, were the
scourge and disgrace of Italy. A knight of Rhodes,
named Montreal or Moriale, annoyed with the King of
Naples, decided in the year 1353 to gather under his
orders as many as possible of the disbanded soldiers and
deserters who infested all parts of Italy. He con-
cluded that if he could organise these small bands of
petty thieves into a regular army of banditti, all Italy
would become subject to his imposts.^ His army soon
consisted of 1,500 men-at-arms of great reputation for
bravery, and more than 20,000 men of other grades.
His company was a moving republic, bound together by
a common danger and a common love of plunder. Im-
mense sums were extorted from the rich cities of Tuscany
and Romagna, to secure them protection from pillage,
Montreal was soon put to death by the Tribune Rienzi,'
in whose power he had incautiously placed himself.
After his death Conrad Lando commanded the " Great
Company," which had increased to 5,000 cuirassiers, and
to a total of 20,000 men.

The greatest of all the partisan leaders of the age,
and he who, as a distinguished general acquired a greater
renown than all others, was an Englishman named Sir
John Hawkwood, who was known to the writers of the
time as Aucud or Agutus. He led a band of free

^ Hallam, i. 470, 2 J)q Cerceau, Life of Rienzi, 346, 347. ^ Ibid.
393.

I
i I

202

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

companions into Italy after the peace of Bretigny, and
after a tine was appointed commander-in-chief of all
the armies of Pope Urban V.

Hawkwood is remarkable from the fact that he is con-
sidered to have been the first real general of modern
times, and this serves to prove that the system of mer-
cenary bands of professional soldiers, who devoted their
whole lives to the art of war, had a great influence in
bringing about a revival in the scientific principles of
conducting battles and campaigns. The Italian historians
all speak with admiration of his skilful tactics in battle,
his stratagems, and his well-conducted retreats. Before
this period the historians do not seem to have understood
either tactics or strategy, and the accounts of battles
give little details save of individual combats.^

Hawkwood is noted not only as the greatest but as the
last of the foreign condottieri or captains of mercenary
bands. Alberic di Barbiano about this time in 1379 in-
stituted the system of employing native mercenary troops,
a system which soon superseded the employment of
foreigners. His company of St. George was the school
of a succession of great generals, who improved the art
of war to a great extent, and formed the rudiments
of that science which afterwards was developed and
perfected under Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon.

We cannot leave the consideration of these mercenaries,
who for so long exercised so great an influence upon the
wars of Europe, without a slight reference to their
custom of fighting. As the armies on both sides were
composed of hirelings, who had little or no interest in
the result of the wars, and whose sympathy was often
greater towards each other than with the employers
whose cause they were paid to defend, it can readily be
imagined that the fighting was always half-hearted, and
often but a mere pretence.

The consequence was that at no period of the world's
history have wars been conducted with so little personal
danger to the soldier. Decisive battles, said to have
been warmly contested, are recorded in Italian history,

» Hallam, i. 472.

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

203

in which very few lives were lost, even among the van-
quished. This was caused partly by the completeness of
the armour, partly from the other causes already men-
tioned, and partly from the desire on both sides to
make prisoners rather than to slay, in expectation of
securing the ransoms which it was the custom at that
time to pay.

The losses were so small as to be ridiculous. Machia-
velli says, when the Florentine army raised the siege of
Furli to go to the relief of Zagonara in 1423, that *'on
encountering the enemy they were soon routed, not so
much by the bravery of their adversaries, as by the
severity of the season ; for having marched many hours
through deep mud and heavy rain, they found the
enemy quite fresh, and were therefore easily vanquished.
Nevertheless in this great defeat famous throughout all
Italy no deaths occurred, except those of Ludovico degli
Obizi, and two of his people, who having fallen from
their horses were drowned in the morass."^

Again at Castracaro in 1467, in the war between the
Venetians and the Florentines, Machiavelli says that
*'a few slight skirmishes took place between the
armies ; yet in accordance with the custom of the times,
neither of them acted on the oflfensive, besieged any town,
or gave the other an opportunity of coming to a general
engagement : but each kept within their tents, and be-
haved with the most remarkable cowardice." After some
time being wasted in this way, at last a regular engage-
ment took place which continued half a day. " Some
horses were wounded and prisoners taken, hut no death
occurred." ^

In fact, all the evidence seems to prove that the losses
in the Italian, campaigns of the fifteenth century were
of the most trifling character. The lance's point could
not penetrate the breast-plate, the sword could not crush
the helmet, nor could arrows or cross-bow bolts pierce the
solid armour. When a knight was unhorsed it was even

' Machiavelli, History of Florence, book iv. ch. 1.
ch, 4.

2 Ibid. vii.

■>'

204

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period ii.

then a difficult matter to kill him, and it always paid
better to save him for his ransom.^

For the convenience of the reader we have continued
the sketch of the mercenary troops and condottieri down
to the fifteenth century, in order to treat the question all
together ; but during this same period in other parts of
Europe infantry forces were appearing and exerting such
an influence upon battles as to materially affect the
progress of the art of war. We shall therefore go back
somewhat in the order of time, and consider the archers
of England and the Swiss pikemen, and endeavour to
trace the effects of their victories, in reference to the
development of the military science.

SECTION III. — ENGLISH ARCHERS AND SWISS INFANTRY.

The best infantry of the fourteenth century were
without doubt the English yeomanry, composed prin-
cipally of archers well organised and wonderifully skiKul
in the use of the long bow. They were commanded by
nobles who did not disdain the service, and the king took
the greatest care to encourage and improve the force. The
yeomen, the strong and vigorous workers of the soil, were
continually practising in peace in their own fields the use
of the bow, which, at first enjoined upon them as a duty,
soon became one of the most popular amusements of the
people.

Almost every village had its archery butts, and the skill
attained by the English bowmen seems almost incredible.
They were able to shoot twelve arrows a minute, and
many were able to shoot a second arrow into a first
already fixed in the target.'^

The weapon was the great bow over five feet in length,
made of yew, and was capable of despatching a strong
barbed arrow 240 yards. The arrows were very sharp
and feathered at the base. They were carried bound
together in a sheaf, and fastened to the waist, and some-
times in a leathern bag, but were never carried in a
quiver.^

» Hallam, i. 475. ^ Bardin, 225. ^ Violet-le-Duc, 173.

*^ :l!

skiU
dible.
and
first

CHAP. VII. J

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

•205

When the buttle wus about commencing the archer
loosened his sheaf, and placed some arrows under liis left
foot, the points outwards, and picked them up one by one
as he required them. The late Emperor Napoleon III.
says in his work on artillery, that a first-rate English
archer, who in a single minute was unable to discharge
his bo^^^ twelve times, with a range of 200 yards, and
who in these twelve shots once missed his man, was very
lightly esteemed.^

The personal competence and civil freedom of these
yeomen rendered them fearless and self-reliant, a spirit
which was encouraged rather than resented by the English
nobles, who treated them with great consideration, com-
manded their companies, and dismounted and fought
beside them in action. The French nobles treated their
infantry on the contrary with great harshness, oppressed
them in camp, and rode over them without compunction
in the field, as for instance at Crecy, where the knights of
the French army charged over and through their own
allies, the Genoese cross- bowmen.

The number of archers that England could bring into
the field was very great. In 1386, in addition to the army
led by the Duke of Lancaster to Castile, Froissart says
that the English forces consisted of 10,000 men-at-arms,
and 100,000 archers.^ He also mentions that in 1394, the
King of England invaded Ireland " with 4,000 knights
and squires, and 30,000 archers, all regularly paid every
week, and so they were well satisfied." ^ The Irish cavalry
of this period were light irregular horsemen, using neither
saddles nor stirrups, and fighting with spears and javelins.

The Genoese cross-bowmen acquired also a high reputa-
tion as infantry soldiers, and large numbers of them used
to be employed by neighbouring states. Philip de Valois
at the battle of Crecy had a body of nearly 15,000
Genoese mercenary arbaldtriers, and according to Pfere
Daniel these cross-bowmen served him also on the sea.*
As Genoa was a maritime republic, it is natural to

^ Lacombe, 135; Bardin, 225. ^ Froissart, book iii. oh. 37.

* Ibid, book iv. ch. 64. * Daniel, i. 109.

206

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

suppose that her people would be well qualified to serve
in the navy.

The English archers always seem to have fought
against men-at-arms with great bravery, and do not
appear to have been awed by the superior weight,
splendour, or trappings of the haughty knights. In
the many border wars which were continually going on
between England and Scotland, the archer infantry
repeatedly gained successes over the Scottish nobles,
which were the first instances of the foot-soldiery
beginning to meet the cavaby upon anything like equal
terms.

It io very interesting to trace the growing importance
of the infantry in these conflicts between the English
and Scottish forces. Sir William Wallace, a man of
extraordinary natural ability, improved the tactics of his
time very materially. In the battle of Stirling, 1297,
the skilful manner in which he allowed a portion of the
English forces to cross the river Forth, and then attacked
and defeated them under the eyes of the remainder of
the army, who could not come to their assistance, gives
the strongest proof of his ability as a general.

In the battle of Falkirk, in the following year, it is
curious to see how closely Wallace had foreshadowed the
modern method of resisting cavalry. He had in his
army only 1,000 mounted men, and less than 30,000
archers and spearmen, while the forces of King Edward
I. consisted of 7,500 men-at-arms, and it is said 80,000
foot-soldiers. Wallace was obliged to give battle against
these overwhelming numbers, the 7,500 horsemen being
the great strength of the English army. The old chro-
nicler has fortunately given a description of Wallace's
order of battle with such minuteness that we can see
the whole arrangement at a glance. He ranged his army
upon a slightly inclined plane, and formed his infantry
in circles or clumps, or what we should now technically
call " squares," the outer ranks being composed of pike-
men, who, kneeling, prf sented their pikes as an obstacle
to the charging horsemen ; while behind them, in the
centre of each clump or " square," stood the archers, who

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

207

were to gall their opponents with their arrows. Behind
these squares Wallace ranged his cavalry in reserve,
evidently hoping to ^reak his opponents' ranks with his
pikemen, and to complete the victory with his horse-

men.

The great numbers of the English, the fact that they
were experienced in the wars on the Continent, and
perhaps the novelty of the idea to the Scottibh infantry,
and the want of steadiness and discipline among them, led
to the defeat of the clumps of spearmen and archers, and
the whole Scottish army was mobt disastrously beaten.^

In this method of tactical formation we see the pro-
totype of the mingled regiments of pikemen and mus-
keteers which existed so long in the armies of Europe.
We see also the ideas of the square, of the formation en
echiquier, of the cavalry in reserve, the value of which
principles are recognised even to the present day.

Shortly after this, at Bannockburn in 1314, Robert
Bruce copied closely the tactics of his great countryman.
The leading feature of the order of battle was the
clumps of spearmen, with the cavalry in reserve. Here
again the preponderance of the cavalry was all on the
side of the English, Bruce's small force of horsemen being
utterly unable to compete with them on the open field.
Just before the action a sharp skirmish ensued between a
body of Scottish spearmen under Randolph, and 800
English horsemen under Clifford. After a hard fight
the spearmen were victorious, and the cavalry broken
and driven ofF.^

Now, however, the English archers were beginning to
attract attention by their great skill and bravery, and they
were brought, up to harass and break the serried ranks
of the squares of spearmen. This movement on the part
of the English would have soon given them the victory
(for the spearmen could not defend themselves), had it
not been for the prompt decision of the Scottish king.
He at once led on his reserve of cavalry, charged the
archers vehemently, dn^ drove them back. The English
horsemen then advanceu "'i turn, when Bruce fell back

' Burton, History of Scotland, ii. 3t' ^ Burton, ii. 380.

208

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

through the intervals of the clumps of spearmen, and
left them to withstand the onset of the English chivalry.
The Scottish infantry stood as firm as rocks, and the
horses at that time not being heavily armoured, were
wounded and killed in great numbers, throwing the
whole force into confusion, and paving the way for an
attack of the cavalry under Bruce, which completed the
victory. From this time we begin to see the great
influence of the English archers.^

At the battle of Halidon Hill, near Bev'v>^ck, in 1333,
the Scottish cavalry dismounted to charge m)i'e steadily.
They were, however, received with such valour by
King Edward, and were so galled by the English
archers, that they were thrown into disorder and utterly
routed.

The battles of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, three
of the most gallantly contested and decisive victories of
that age, were won neither by the nobility of England
nor the feudal tenants, for these classes were fully
matched in the French army, but the success was entirely
due to the matchless skill and bravery of the English
bowmen.

In the first action, that of Crecy, in 1346, Edward
III. had an army consisting of 4,000 men-at-arms,
10,000 archers, 10,000 Welsh infantry, and 6,000 Irish.
These Welsh and Irish troops were of a light and irre-
gular character, of no use in the front line of action, but
well fitted for following up a pursuit. Cannon were
used in this action, and it is said to have been the very
earliest instance of their use in a pitched battle among
civilised nations. The battle of Crecy is noted as a great
epoch in the art of war for several reasons. In the first
place, on account of the introduction of gunpowder, a
discovery which revolutionized the art of war, and in
which improvements have been and are continually being
made ever since.

The mechanical skill of the day was not sufficient
however to render the use of gunpowder very efficacious.
The inventive faculty seems to have been far in advance

1 Burton, ii. 383, 384.

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

209

of the nicety in workmanship necessary to give full effect
to the various inventions. Through the clumsy and in-
efficient manner in which the different cannon and other
firearms were made, the value of gunpowder and its
immense influence was very slow in being perceived.

Revolving pistols similar to the deadly weapon of
to-day, breech-loading rifles on the same principle as the
present English Snider, cannon on the principle of the
breech-loading Armstrong, were all invented and made
hundreds of years ago, and specimens of them can be
seen in the Tower of London and elsewhere. They all
failed however in the workmanship, and on that account
they at once fell into disuse. The great improvement in
the mechanical skill of modern times has enabled so-
called inventors to furbish up the old discoveries and to
construct in an efficient manner the neglected inventions
of bygone ages.

It can readily be understood therefore that at first
gunpowder would not produce a striking effect, and this
accounts for so little importance being given by the old
chroniclers to the use of cannon at Crecy.

Another peculiarity which marks Crecy as a great
epoch in the art of war is the extraordinary influence
exerted by the English archers in a pitched battle against
the proudest chivalry in Europe. At Crecy also we see
the first instance of men-at-arms in a great action
deliberately dismounting and fighting on foot with their
lances as pikemen. St. Louis's knights, we have seen,
used the same tactics at Damietta, but it was in a combat
or skirmish covering a landing from vessels, and is no
proof that the army in a regular engagement would have
adopted 3uch a course.

Edward III. at Crecy took up a defensive position and
evidently intended to await an attack, and his manner of
drawing up his army proves that he understood fully the
principle (unknown among the Crusaders) that cavalry
cannot await an attack and maintain itself on the defen-
sive. To give stability and order to his line, to oppose a
firm and solid resistance to the charge of the hostile
cavalry — which was far superior in numbers to his own —

p

210

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

1 1

[period II.

it was necessary for him to convert his lancers into heavy
armed pikemen and form them in his line of battle as
infantry.

In rear of his army he inclosed a large park or en-
trenchment for his baggage-waggons and horses, for he
determined that all his army should fight on foot that
day. His troops were drawn up in three divisions ; the
first line under command of his son, Edward the Black
Prince, the second under the Earl of Northampton, the
third under the king himself. The men-at-arms were in
the centre, the archers on the flanks, and it seems that at
the opening of the action they were extended across the
front of the men-at-arms. In this order they calmly
awaited the French monarch, who was advancing with
an immense army many times greater than that of the
English.'

The French were ranged in three lines also. It is the
first battle fought in France of which history has left us
complete details of the formation. The front line, accord-
ing to Froissart, consisted of 15,000 Genoese crossbow-
men ; the second line, under the command of the Count
of Alen9on, comprised 4,000 gendarmes and a large
number of infantry ; the third line, under King Philip,
consisted principally of the French noblesse and chivalry.

The Genoese arbaletriers opened the action by advan-
cing and shooting their bolts against the English. A
shower had relaxed the string of the crossbows so that
the missiles fell short. The English yeomen, who had
been able to keep their bowstrings dry, at once opened
up with terrible volleys of their clothyard shafts which
fell like hail. When the Genoese felt these arrows, which
pierced their arms, heads, and armour, some cut their
bowstrings, others flung their crossbows on the ground,
and all turned about and retreated. The French had a
large body of men-at-arms on horseback supporting them.
When the king saw his mercenaries giving way, he called
out in anger to his cavalry to charge them, which was
done, and a struggle took place between the two parties
of the French army which threw them into confusion.

' Froissart, i. ch. 127.

CHAP. VI I. j

DECLINE OF FE JDALISM.

211

The disorder was much augmented by the continued
Hight of arrows which the English archers kept inces-
santly pouring in. The Welsh and Irish infantry, with
long knives, mingled in the mMee and slew many, their
weapons being particularly well suited for a close, irregular
struggle.'

The French horsemen, according to Froissart, seem to
have extended beyond the front of the English archers
and to have gone around them and attacked the men-at-
arms in their rear. This attack was so vigorous that the
second English line came to the Prince's assistance, and
messages were even sent to bring up the third line, which
King Edward refused to do, partly because he could see
that the result was secure, and partly also to encourage
his army by a show of extreme confidence.^

The result of the battle was a most decisive victory to
the English, and to the archers belongs the credit. The
men-at-arms on foot, using their lances as pikes, had also
proved that they were able to hold their own in that
way against the best horsemen of the day.

The real revival of the infantry force may fairly be
said to date from the day of Crecy. Morgarten, fought
some years previously, and of great influence no doubt
in its way, was not so striking an example as Crecy, and
could not have had so much effect upon the art of war.

The difference in the manner in which the infantry
were treated by the English is in marked contrast to the
conduct of the French nobility. It had for a long time
been customary in France to place the feudal infantry in
front, not with any idea that they could perform any real
service, but to take the edge, as it were, off the freshness
of the opposing chivalry. When the foot-soldiers were
driven back, the knights had no compunction in riding
through them, or over them, and treated them, with
great neglect, and greater cruelty. If they fought gal-
lantly, and maintained their position too long, it equally
brought down upon them the anger of the haughty
nobles, who punished them as severely for gaining

' Froissart, i. ch. 129.

Ibid.

P 2

. 'il

212 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period h.

successes, which were considered the perquisites of the
chivalry, as for sutt'ering defeat.

Their cruelty to the Genoese mercenaries at Crecy was
even greater than usual, but these foot-soldiers were paid
foreigners, for whom there was no sympathy. The ap-
pearance of the crossbow-men in Philip's army shows,
however, that the infantry were gradually assuming a
certain recognised position. The King of France would
never have employed so large a body of infantry at great
cost, if they were not considered necessary to meet the
English archers, whose fame had been spreading over
Europe. Their being placed in the front line to open
the battle looks as if great reliance was placed upon
their ability to neutralise the efforts of the English
archers. The anger of the French king on the defeat of
his mercenaries was evidently caused by his disap-
pointment.

The battle of Courtrai in Flanders, in 1302, was one
of the earliest instances of the successful employment of
infantry against men-at-arms. It was fought between
the French chivalry, under Count Robert of Artois, and
the sturdy burgesses of the Flemish towns, who were be-
coming rich and independent through their industry and
energy. They were armed with pikes as a defence
against the heavily-equipped French horsemen, and they
handled their weapons with such steadiness and bravery
as to completely defeat the knights with very great
slaughter.' This appears to have been the first general
action in which infantry pikemen were pitted against the
mounted chivalry.^ The pikemen employed by the
Count of Boulogne at Bouvines, in 1214, was an earlier
instance of the use of the pike, but it was an exceptional
case, and not a general adoption of it as a weapon for
offensive and defensive purposes.

The Swiss infantry about this period began to attract
attention, and they soon won a reputation all over the
Continent as infantry pikemen. The battle of Morgarten,
15th November, 1315, was the Marathon of Switzerland,

White's History of France.

Bardin, 4121.

CHAP, vn.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

213

and from that period that country enjoyed a certain
degree of liberty.

This action was fought between 20,000 Austrians,
under Duke Leopold, and 1,300 Swiss. The natural
features of the ground had more effect upon the result,
however, than any principle or system of tactics. Mont-
fort of Tettnang, who commanded the Austrian cavalry,
led them into the narrow pass of Morgarten, lying
between Mount Sattel and the lake. Fifty men on the
eminence overlooking the defile, which was filled with
the hostile army, raised a sudden shout, and rolled down
rocks and stones upon the crowded ranks. The con-
federate Swiss, to the number of 1,300, seeing the confu-
sion caused by this attack, descended the mountain
which bordered the defile, and charged furiously upon
the flank of the disordered column. With their powerful
maces and clubs they dashed in pieces the armour of the
enemy, and delivered terrible thrusts with their long
pikes. The narrowness of the defile admitted of no
evolutions, and a frost having injured the roads, the
horses were impeded in all their movements. Some
leaped into the lake, all were thrown into disorder, and
at last the whole mass of horsemen gave way, and fell
back upon the infantry, and these, cooped up in the
defile, could neither escape nor open their files, and so
were run over by the fugitives, and many of them
trampled to death.' A general rout ensued, in which
great numbers were slain.

This battle, very difl'erent from Crecy, simply taught
the lesson that cavalry cannot scale precipices, or storm
mountains, and the generals of the age should not have
required so bloody an example to teach them so simple a
lesson.

Crecy, fought on the open field in a fair stand-up sort
of way, was the pure result of a tactical system, which
owed no adventitious aid to any irregularities of ground,
or strength of position, and was therefore a far more im-
portant action in a tactical point of view, than any that
had occurred for several hundreds of years previously.

• Borthwi(!k's Book of Battles, 204.

I

214

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY

[period II.

The battle of Serapacli was another victory gained by
the Swiss infantry, who were mainly armed with spiked
clubs called morning stars, and swords, and battle-axes.
It was fought on the 9th July, 1386. Leopold III.
Archduke of Austria, who commanded the Austrian
chivalry, caused them to dismount, and fight on foot
with their lances. It is said, that in order to be more
active while dismounted, the knights cut off the peaked
points on their boots, which in the absurd fashion of
he day were of extravagant length.

The knights formed in phalanx order, their front
bristling with the lance points, against which the Swiss
infantry exerted themselves in vain. The battle was
won ficcording to tradition, and to contemporaneous
accounts, by the devotion of Arnold of Winkelried, who,
calling upon his comrades t j have a care for his wife and
child, rushed upon the enemy's spears, grasping as many
as he could reach, and by the sacrifice of his life making
a gap, through which his comrades succeeded in getting
into close quarters with the foe.'

" Four lances splintered on his crest.
Six shivered in his side ;
Still on their serried ranks he pressed,
He broke th r ranks and died." ^

Then crashed the helmets and armour under the blows
of the morning stars. The lances, once the order was
broken, were of no use in the melee, and the lighter
armed Swiss soon defeated them with great loss.

The battles of Granson and Morat in ] 476 were won
by the Swiss pikemen over the cavalry of Charles the Bold.
They completed the reputation of the Swiss as steady
infantry, and were severe blows to the expiring chivalry.

The battle of Poitiers, 19th September, 1356, shows a
still further development of the art of war, and is
another illustration of the great value of the English
bowmen, and of the growing feeling in favour of infantry
in action. The French army consisted of about 60,000

^ Book of Battle Songs, 108. ^ Battle of Sempach. Translated
by Scott.

CHAP.

VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

215

won

men under the command of King John in person. The
English army under the Black Prince was only 8,000
strong ; but skill in generalship was beginning to be
understood, and the English prince, it seems to us, proved
in this action that he was the ablest tactician of his age.
His measures were well conceived and skilfully carried
into execution, and give greater proofs of scientific
ability than are found in any previous battle of the
middle ages.

He drew up his army on a hill in a strong position,
broken up by hedges, vines, and bushes, and difficult of
approach, the only avenue leading to it being a defile
between hedges. This defile he lined with numbers of
archers and in rear of it, drew up his men-at-arms, on
foot, with the remainder of his archers on the flanks in
triangular masses. His horses and baggage were parked
and secured by an entrenchment in the rear, as was done
ten years before at Crecy.

The French army was drawn up in three lines, in rear
of each other. Their attack was made by three hundred
of their best horsemen, followed by a number of gen-
darmes on foot : the intention being to carry the defile
by a rush, and under cover of the horsemen, push through
a large body of heavy armed troops on foot, who were to
attack the English dismounted men-at-arms. As the
Black Prince had entrenched and defended his position
by obstacles, it is probable that the plan of attack
adopted by the French was the only direct one open to
them, for the ground was evidently unfitted for horsemen. '

The result was "sastrous, through the efforts of the
bowmen who lineu the defile. They poured in tiieir
deadly arrows at the closest range, and with fearful force,
and the narrow road was soon filled with the dead and
dying horses, and men falling in heaps, under the pitiless
volleys of the English shafts. A few succeeded in clear-
ing the defile, only to be killed or captured on emerging.

The dismounted gendarmes, unable to clear the narrow
passage before them, disheartened by the carnage taking
place in front of them, and harassed by the arrows that

^ Froissart, ch. 16L

^ULJi

21G

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

began to fall fast among them, soon gave way and
retreated in confusion upon the second line, carrying with
them the depressing news of the disaster.

At this crisis the English prince gave proof of that
military genius wliich made him the greatest general of
his age. Altliough weak in numbers, although compelled
to await the action upon the defensive, and to fortify
his position, his quick coup d'ceil saw that the instant had
arrived to change his plan of battle, and, abandoning the
defensive, to assume a vigorous and dashihg offensive
policy.

That rapid decision evinced genius, but his method of
carrying it into execution gave proof of tactical ability
lar beyond the times. He detached a body of 600
cavalry and a large force of archers to support them, and
by a dctOur around a hill, out of sight of the enemy,
he was able to execute a well-directed attack upon the
left flank and rear of the second line of the French army,
then somewhat shaken by the fugitives from the front.
At the same time he mouuted all his horsemen and led a
furious charge direct upon the enemy as the detachment
them in flank.

In that age of imperfect tactics and ignorance of
manoeuvres, one can readily imagine the terribly demora-
lising effect of a flank attack upon the undisciplined
levies of a mediaeval army.

The French gendarmes, evidently in imitation of the
English at Crecy, received the attack, dismounted, and
were at once routed by the gallant charge of the English
knights. The French did not seem to understand that
at Crecy the main reliance of the English was placed
upon the archers, and that the men-at-arms were dis-
mounted to support them and give a stability to the line
of battle. The French dismounting on the open plain,
when they were unsupported by archers of any value,
was a waste of available power, for they had cavalry
Enough to have poured in fresh reserve after reserve until
the victory was assured.

The French generalship was as bad as it could well be.
The French king was in his own country, his cavalry

CHAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

217

immensely superior, while the Black Prince was in a
hostile territory, short of provisions, and greatly out-
numbered. King John should have cut off the English
foraging parties, watched their movements, refused to
attack in so strong a position, or if he did attack he
could easily have turned either flank and avoided
marching through so dangerous a defile ! The Black
Prince saved his army from a great danger, but he was
much aided by the mismanagement of his enemy.

Viewed altogether Poitiers marks a distinct step in
advance in the art of war — for it shows an appreciation
by the English general of the respective values of
the two services, and how to employ each skilfully in
its own sphere. His arrangements to use his men-at-
arms as infantry in the beginning of the action, and his
rapid change from cautious defence to the impetuous
charge of cavalry in the crisis of the battle, we will
venture to assert, evinces a knowledge of the charac-
teristics of the different arms not shown by any general
of his time or for hundreds of years before him.

The battle of Homildon Hill, fought in 1402 between
the Scotch Under Earl Douglas and the English under the
Percys, is another remarkable instance of the increasing
j)Ower of the English infantry against cavalry in the open
field. Douglas drew up his army in a deep square on
Homildon Hill which was an excellent position to resist
cavalry. The English army was drawn up on the
opposite eminence, which the Scotch allowed them to do
without resistance. Had Diiuglas at once charged with
bis 1,000 Scotch knights and men-at-arms and reduced
the fight to a close hand-to-hand conflict it would have
been his best policy, but he awaited tha attack, and the
English, instead of charging with their cavalry, sent on
the archers who, slowly advancing, poured their volleys as
thick as hail upon the Scots, who wedged closely together
were struck down without a chance of returning a blow.
The effect was dreadful, for the English shafts pierced
with ease the light armour of the Scots, which was no
defence against the deadly missiles. The better- tempered
armour of the knights was found utterly unequal to resist

218

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period 11.

the arrows, when, owing to the steady advance of their
phalai'.x, the archers took a nearer and more level aim.
Numbers of the barons and gentlemen were killed and
mortally wounded. The horses, goaded and maddened,
reared and plunged and became unmanageable. The
Scotch, to the number of one hundred, under Sir John
Swinton, charged desperately, but were struck down and
dispersed. Douglas then charged with his cavalry. The
archers fell back on their own horsemen, still pouring in
volley after volley, slowly retreating, and inflicting appal-
ling carnage. Walsingham states that the coat of mail worn
by Douglas had occupied a skilful workman three years
in its construction, yet he was wounded in five places by
the arrows, and captured. This action was won by the
bowmen alone ; there was no hand-to-hand fighting, the
cavalry being only employed in the pursuit.^

The next important European battle was that of
Agincourt, fought on the 25th October, 1415, between
Henry V. of England, and the French army under the
Constable of France. The English forces were less
than 10,000 men, the French nearly 100,000. The
battle in its main features was very similar to Crecy
and Poitiers, the archers again exercising a great
influence upon the result of the action.

Henry showed considerable skill in forming his army
for battle. He took up a strong position on a narrow
piece of ground between two woods which protected his
flanks. He placed in ambush in advance of his flanks,
two detachments, one consisting of 200 archers, the
other of 400 men-at-arms, who were to fall upon the
flank and rear of the French, when the battle had fairly
joined. In this he followed the example of his great
uncle the Black Prince, who first in later times used
this plan of tactical action. It will be remembered that
this stratagem was identic??! with the ambush of Mago
at the battle of the Trebbia.

The English army was formed in three divisions.
The archers were placed in front of the men-at-arms in
the form of a wedge on each flank, and along the front in
' Tytler's History of Scotland, ii. 430, 431, 432.

of

riiAi'. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

219

line. The archers' equipment had received an addition
which was first employed in this action, and was evidently
an adaptation of the pike and its successor the bayonet
of the present day. The archer carried his bow and
arrows, a bill-hook, a hatchet or hammer, and a long
stake sharpened at both ends, which he was to fix
obliquely in the ground before him so as to serve as a
firm pike to resist the direct charge of cavalry. The
u[)per end was tipped with iron and presented a formid-
al)le obstacle to advancing horsemen. It was a new
precaution, never before used in a war by Christians.
These pikes formed a rampart that could be erected at
once and taken down and put up again at every change
of position. Agincourt forms another epoch in the im-
provement of the infantry service, and in its increased
ability to defend itself against cavalry.

The men-at-arms fought on foot again in this action.

The French chivalry were soon put in confusion by the

constant volleys of arrows which the archers poured

in upon them from behind their rampart of pikes, and by

being overcrowded in the narrow space between the

woods. The flank attack of the two detachments at

this juncture completed their disorder, and then the

English king gave the order to advance, and archers and

men-at-arms charged upon the enemy. Being lightly

equipped they fell with their battle-axes upon the French,

who by this time were so crowded together that they

could neither fight nor fly, and hewed them to pieces

almost without resistance. Henry showed great ability

in changing from the defensive to the oflensive at the

proper moment and a brilliant victory w^as the result.

The losses of the French army in nobles and gentlemen

both killed, wounded, and prisoners, were enormous,

the killed as well as the captured being both greater by

far than the whole numbers contained in the English

army. The English losses were comparatively trifling.

The war between France and England had alreadv
been carried on with little intermission for over seventy
years, and the armies had naturally changed from the
feudal to the mercenary type. The battles of Crecy,

220

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

Poitiers, and Agincourt, had del'v^ered a death-blow to
the institution of knighthood, and the method of war-
fare based upon it. Troops became organised in bands
under regular leaders, infantry masses were acquiring
an importance that could not be ignored, the features
of the ground were beginning to be considered, pikes
had been invented, and the day for the irregular combats
between lines of knights burning to distinguish them-
selves by deeds of arms, had passed for ever. A new
system was evolving itself from the ruins of chivalry and
feudalism, and the time was fast approaching, when
the standing armies of monarchs were to become the sole
defence of states.

SECTION IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULAR ARMIES.

The earliest instance we have in public national history
of the establishment and maintenance of what might be
termed a standing army, occurs in the reign of Canute
the Great, King of England, Denmark, and Norway,
about the year 1025.

Canute maintained permanently under pay a body
guard called huscarles. They consisted of 6,000 men,
and great attention was bestowed upon them to secure
uniformity of discipline, and to separate them decidedly
from the people. They were distinguished by their dress
and golden ornaments, and displayed a military spirit of
mutual union and order very remarkable for the age.

To Chailes VII. of France, however, is due the credit
of being the first to establish a permanent army, and by
that means to secure internal order in his kingdom, as
well as an efficient national defence.

Charles had succeded in 1444 in driving the English
out of the greater portion of the kingdom of France,
and a long truce was concluded between the two rival
powers. This left him with a large army of paid mer-
cenaries, no longer required, but who, if once disbanded,
would he feared combine in great companies, and make a
subsistence by plundering and robbing the people in every
part of the country. In order to guard against this, to
secure the internal peace of the kingdom, and to establish

fllAP. VII.]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM,

221

firmly the royal authority, Charles VII. decided to form
a permanent paid army consisting of the best soldiers he
could select. This decision was arrived at in 1445, and
was kept secret until the organisation of the new force
was completed. The provost marshals in all the Provinces
were ordered to have their archers in readiness to take
the field, and co fortify themselves with the assistance of
the magistrates of the towns, and the nobles of the
country, and to patrol all the great roads, to prevent the
disbanded mercenaries from pillaging, or uniting in
bands against the authority of the king. These pre-
cautions, being taken, the king chose fifteen captains, men
of position, honesty, experience, and courage, explained
his design to them, and asked their assistance in estab-
lishing a permanent force. He ordered them to choose
from all the troops in the army the best men, those on
whom the most reliance could be placed for preserving
exact discipline, and to form them into companies.

The enrolment was completed, the service rolls sub-
mitted to the king, and an edict was made establishing
fifteen companies of ordonnance. A proclamation an-
nounced the fact to the army, and ordered all those
soldiers not enrolled in the corps, to disperse, and go at
once to their own homes, without committing any dis-
order upon the route, without leaving the main roads,
and without banding themselves together, under the pain
of death.'

So judicious were the preparations and so well carried
out, that the disbanded soldiers went quietly to peaceful
pursuits, and after fifteen days they were no more to be
seen upon the roads.

The fifteen companies so formed by Charles VII. were
all cavalry, and contained, according to most writers, 100
lances each, although an ordonnance of the month of
December 1445, fixing the garrison of Poitou at 200
lances, divides them into three companies, one of 110
lances under the Seneschal de Poitou, one of 60 lances
under the Mareschal de Loheac, and one of only 30 under
Captain Floquet.*

' Daniel, i. 153.

Boutaric, 312.

Il

li

ii '"11 S

'■Si t

,;.['

im i

222

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period ii.

It is probable, however, thct the fifteen companies con-
tained 1,500 lances. Each lance consisted of six men :
the man-at-arms, three archers, a coutillicr or squire,
and a page or valet. They were all mounted, and made
a total of about 9,000 cavalry. There were also usually
attached a number of gentlemen volunteers, who served
without pay, in the hope, in case of a vacancy occurring,
of their being taken on the regular establishment.^

The lance foiirnie at this time had 13 horses, the
man-at-arms had four, each archer two, the coutillier two,
and the page one.^ The staff consisted of a captain,
lieutenant, a guidon, an ensign, and a mareschal de logis.^
These officers were chosen as the noblest, the richest, and
the most skilful soldiers of the company, which was all
composed of gentlemen.

Discipline was well maintained, and the captains were
held responsible for any disorders or offences perpetrated
by the men of the companies/ They were kept in gar-
rison in the towns, in order that the discipline should be
carefully kept up, the men retained under subjection,
and that opportunities should be given for drilling and
manoeuvring together.

The troops were not paid directly by the king, al-
though absolutely under his orders. The different muni-
cipalities were compelled to maintain the troops quar-
tered among them ; the cities, towns, villages, and
country parishes all furnishing their quota towards the
pay and food of the soldiers.^

The benefits of this system were immediately felt, and
no measure could have been more politic and more
popular among the people than this institution of a per-
manent defensive force. Confidence at once sprang up
among all classes. The authority of the crown became
paramount throughout the kingdom, and artizans worked
at their trades, and peasants and farmers cultivated their
lands, and raised cattle and sheep in security against
robbery and outrage.* Except in the neighbourhood of
a foreign army in time of war, industry was encouraged,
and could depend upon reaping the product of its toil.''

' Daniel 104. - Gay de Vernon, 7. '' Humbert, 64.

* Daniel, i. 155. * Ibid. « Hallam, i. 266. ^ Daniel, i. 155.

CHAP.

VII,]

DECLINE OF FEUDALISM.

223

and

the

and

The companies of gendarmerie were heavily armed.
The man-at-arms was armed from head to foot in plate
armour like the knight, and for weapons carried the
short lance, a two-handed, sword, and a battle-axe or
mace.^ The archers and esquires, less heavily armed, had
the cross-bow, the lance, sword and poignard, and the
mace which hung at the saddle-bow. They wore an
iron breastplate over the coat of mail. Some wore the
hauberk or brigandine, a light cuirass made of scales of
iron sewn on leather.

About the same time Charles VII. organised the free
archers, which were established on the principle of each
parish furnishing one archer chosen by kings' officers
called ''elu." The most skilful bowman v/as to be selected
and equipped with helmet, sword, dagger and brigandine,
and he was obliged every Sunday and feast-day to
practise archery fully equipped in his arms, for a certain
length of time in order to become dexterous in their

2

use

The archer was exempt from all charges and taxes of
every kind, and while under pay received four francs
a month from the parish. This was not, properly
speaking, a permanent force, but a species of militia.
Louis XI. increased the effective force of archers to
1G,000 men. They were divided into four corps of 4,000
each, and each corps was subdivided into eight com-
panies of 500 each.' The force, however, being composed
of men drilled singly to the use of the bow, but having
no opportunity of acquiring that mutual confidence and
regularity of movement which constant exercising in
bodies in time of peace always produces, proved when
brought together for a campaign to be of little use, and
to have lowered the character of the French infantry to
a great extent, so much so, that the kings endeavoured
to supply themselves with foot-soldiers by mercenaries
hired from abroad. Louis XL commenced the practice
of employing Swiss, a custom that was in use in France
till the Revolution.* He had at one time as many as

Gay de Vernon, 8. " Duparcq. ii. U. ^ Ibid. 15. ♦ Ibid. 16.

224

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period II.

10,000 Swiss infantry in his pay, besides a large number
of German lansquenets.

By this time the cavalry had ceased to range them-
selves in single line for the combat, which had been the
custom under the feudal system and the age of chivalry.
The archers soon came to be mingled with the men-at-
arms, and shortly after they began to form in squadrons
ranged in three ranks, as each man-at-arms was followed
by two archers. It is impossible to fix the date of these
changes. La Noue says that the French gendarmerie
fought in single line up to the reign of Henry II.*

It is said that the system of forming cavalry by
squadrons was well understood by Charles the Bold of
Burgundy, and in use by him in his army. ^ He published
a book of military regulations to be followed by his
troops, which is the first book on military tactics or drill
in the renaissance of the art of war.'

Cavalry evolutions were not known, however, before
1473, for the cavalry service could not arrive at any
degree of perfection before the sovereign was sufficiently
powerful to control his nobility, and compel them to
submit to discipline.

' Duparcq, ii. 24. 2 jbid. 3 Humbert, 66,

PERIOD III,

FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF FIREARMS TO
FREDERICK THE GREAT.

CHAPTER VIII.

Introduction of Firearms.

The military art about the middle of the fifteenth cen-
tury was in a state of transition, and various influences
were beginning to so affect it as in time to produce a
complete revolution in the manner of conducting war,
and to pave the way for the system at present in use.

The English infantry and the Swiss pikemen had given
a severe blow to chivalry, and it only required the intro-
duction of missile weapons, of suflBcient force to pierce
the massive defences of the men-at-arms, to deprive
them of their great prestige, and to bring them more on
a level with the other forces.

The changes, however, were very gradual, for it took
many years for the invention of gunpowder to be so
utilised, and the weapons adapted to it to be so improved,
as to render its use more effective than the old projectile
weapons, which had been brought to perfection. Con-
sequently we find for a very long period both types
of missile weapons used contemporaneously in most
aimies.'

Heavy cannon are first mentioned in the year 1301,
when the town of Amberg, in Germany, had constructed
a large gun.* Ghent had them in 1313 ; Florence in
' Daniel, i. 319. " Demmin, 52.

1 1'.,

226

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period in.

1325 ; the Germans in 1328. Edward III. used them
at the siege of Cambrai in 1339, and at Crecy in 1346.
In Switzerland they were not introduced till a later date.
The first cannon cast in Basle were made in 1371 ; at
Berne in 1413. Cannon were introduced into Russia in
1389, and the Taborites used howitzers in 1434.'

Portable firearms were a somewhat later invention,
and they are first mentioned among the Flemings about
the middle of the fourteenth century. They were adopted
at Perugia in 1364 ; at Padua in 1386 ; in Switzerland in
1392. They were also used at the battle of Rosebecque
in 1382, and at the siege of Trosky in Lithuania in
1383.'

They were continually being improved until in 1420
we find that, at the siege of Bonifacio in Corsica, leaden
bullets fired from small hand-cannon even penetrated
the solid armour.' There were many various kinds of
portable arms. The first was a weapon clumsily con-
structed of iron, and fastened to a rough piece of wood.
It was fired by a match applied to a touch-hole on the
top. This cannon was often served by two men. Small
hand-guns of this style were used by the cavalry, and
were called petronels, because they rested against the
cuirass. Then came the improvement in the stock, en-
abling it to be fired from the shoulder, with a touch-hole
on the right side.*

Many improvements were made in the appliances for
igniting the charge. The match was first attached to a
serpentine or small linstock, then the matchholder was sup-
plied with a trigger without a spring ; and about the latter
half of the fifteenth century the arquebus was invented,
which was supplied with a matchholder, a trigger, and
spring. This was a very good weapon, and the prototype
of the weapons of the present day. The wheel-lock was
the next, invented in 1515 at Nuremberg, but did not
entirely replace the matchlock, which was more simple
and sure, and less liable to get out of order.'

The rifled barrel was invented in Germany, some say

' Demmin, 63,
Ibid. 68.

2 Ibid. 67.

3 Ibid. 67.

* Ibid. 68.

CHAP. VIII.] INTRODUCTION OF FIREARMS.

227

at Leipsig, in 1498, some say at Vienna. The bullet was
driven in with a mallet. This weapon was not employed
as a military arm on account of the trouble in loading,
and the time required to do it. It was not till after the
American revolutionary war that the French in 1793
adopted it in their army, under the name of the carbine
of Versailles.

The snaphaunce was the next invention in the shape
of a lock, and was the forerunner of the flint-lock. The
snaphaunce is first mentioned in 1588. The flint-lock is
supposed to have been invented in France about the year
1640, and soon afterwards the bayonet with a socket was
introduced into the French army by Vauban.' The old
matchlock, however, was not entirely replaced with the
new gun with the hammer until the year 1 700.

Prince Leopold I. of Anhalt Dessau introduced the
iron ramrod among the Prussian infantry in 1698.
Cartridges were first used in Spain in 1569, but were
not used in France till 1644. Gustavus Adolphus in-
vented the cartridge-box in 1630. The percussion-cap
musket was invented in 1807 by a Scottish armourer
named Forsyth.

Breech-loading firearms, as already mentioned, date
from the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th
century. They were all of German invention. Marshal
Saxe invented a breech-loader, and armed a regiment of
Uhlans with them. They did not work well, however,
probably from defective workmanship. Repeating guns
and revolvers are also old inventions, but the revolvers
were of little practical use till the Colt pistol was made,
which is now the best of all, and more used than any
other.

We have thrown together in this chapter a synopsis
of the dates of the principal changes in the various kinds
of firearms, as an introduction to the consideration of
the important influence which the invention of gun-
powder had upon the cavalry service.

' Demmin, 70.

Q 2

'1 1

il

i

m

mr

[|i.

^■tlii

CHAPTER IX.
Use of Firearms by Cavalry.

Nothing probably will give a better idea of the com-
position and equipment of tlie armies of the latter part of
the 15th century than the details, given by the historian
Paul Jove, of the entry of Charles VIII. King of France
into Eome, in 1494, with a fine army evidently well
organised and equipped, and superior to the armies of the
time. Machiavelli states that he conquered Italy with
"a piece of chalk" — a figurative expression, meaning
that he had only to mark out the cantonments and billets
for his troops as he marched onwards.

Paul Jove begins by stating (as a fact worthy of
attention from its novelty) that the different bodies of
cavalry and infantry were perfectly distinct and separate.'
The first battalions were Swiss and German mercenary
infantry, who marched in cadenced step to the sound of
music, and the historian praises highly the f'.ne appearance
and incredible order with which they moved under their
flags. Their arms were short swords and pikes ten feet
in length, of wood pointed with iron. About a quarter
of the infantry carried halberds with heavy battle-axes
attached, while one hundred of them out of every thou-
sand were armed with escopettes, a species of arquebus.

These details as to the infantry are interesting, as
showing the commencement of that system of mingling
pikemen and musketeers in the same regiments, which for
so many years was the regular method of fighting in
Europe.

' Carrion, i. 452.

CHAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

229

After these infantry came 5,000 Gascons, nearly all
slingers or crossbowmen. They were light irregular
troops, but highly trained in the art of throwing the
javelin, the stone or the arrow.'

Then came the cavalry, a force conscripted from the
nobility of France. This pre-eminence in the composition
of cavalry was the natural result of chivalry, and, resting
upon custom and tradition, was long the established
principle. Even two centuries after this time, under
Louis XIII., the infantry were punished with the stick,
an instrument of chastisement forbidden in the cavalry,
where the sabre only was used, because, as the regulations
explained, the cavalry were composed nearly altogether
of gentlemen.

These cavalry were magnificently equipped with heavy
armour covered with cloaks of silk, and wearing collars
and bracelets of gold. The horses were tall, powerful
animals, with the tails and ears cut. The armour was
beginning to lighten itself a little, for these French
knights had abandoned the use of the horse armour
made of hide, which was still retained by the Italian
men-at-arms. The cavalry were divided into lancers or
men-at-arms, and archers or light cavalry. The lances
were strong and eflective weapons, well ironed, and in
addition to them the knights carried maces.

The man-at-arms, his page, and his esquires, were
ranged together, and evidently formed the heavy
cavalry, while the archers were detached and formed up
separately, as a distinct corps of light horsemen.*

These archers, although employed detached, were never-
theless still connected with the chevalier, in whose lance
they were reckoned for all administrative purposes.
They were armed with the long bow as used by the
English, and shot long arrows. Their armour consisted
simply of the breastplate and casque. Some of them
carried javelins, which they used to pierce the men-at-
arms whom they might succeed in unhorsing.

Four hundred chosen mounted archers of the guard
surrounded the king, who was accompanied by two
' Carrion, i. 454. 2 ibid. 456.

m }

I

' '~ ,

* i

230 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period hi.

hundred French noblea heavily equipped with brilliant
armour, and carrying heavy maces.

The artillery of this army was the finest that had yet
appeared in Europe. It consisted, according to Mezerai, of
140 heavy cannon, and a great number of smaller pieces.
They were mounted upon carriages drawn by horses, and
worked by gunners who were skilfully trained to their
use.

It is generally admitted that the overpowering force of
artillery in his army enabled Charles VIII. to traverse
Italy almost without opposition, as the Italians were
poorly provided with inferior artillery drawn by oxen.

Shortly after this epoch appeared Machiavelli's
" Treatise on the Art of War," which shows on his part
a very clear insight into the principles of warfare, and a
very correct appreciation of the reforms required.

Machiavelli wrote at a most interesting period, just
when the military institutions of the middle ages were
beginning to fade away before the improvements and
changes in arms, which have led to the modern system
of conducting war. His views therefore are of much
interest to the military reader, as they convey the
contemporary ideas of the transition period.

He argued strongly against the system of employing
mercenar}'^ bands, and advocated the training of the
citizens to the use of arms, and compelling them to turn
out in defence of the State — saying that the best soldiers
of Greece and Rome were also the best citizens.

Although all the prejudices of the age were in favour
of the cavalry, Machiavelli saw the future influence of
infantry, and without hesitation laid down the principle
that the infantry is the solid and real strength of armies
and of nations.

He says that the infantry of his day wore the
demi-cuirass, or breastplate, and carried a spear, or
pike, eighteen feet long, and a broadsword. Very few
wore backplates, greaves, or gauntlets, and none at all
either casque or helmet. Some few carried halberds,
with heads like a battle-axe, and a few also were armed
as musketeers. Machiavelli published his Art of War

•HAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

231

about the year 1516, or twenty-two years after
Charles VIII. entered Italy ; so it will be seen that the
custom of mingling pikemen, halberdiers, and mus-
keteers in the same regiments had by that time become
generally the practice in Europe.

This system of armirg infantry was in use among the
Germans and Swiss, but was originated among the latter ;
for being poor, and desirous of defending their liberty
against the encroachments of the German princes, who
maintained a powerful cavalry, which the poverty of the
Swiss prevented them from doing, they were obliged to
devote their attention to the best method of fighting on
foot. " The pike enabled them," says Machiavelli, " not
only to keep off the horse, but very often to break and
defeat them."

The Germans, who copied the method from the Swiss,
put so much confidence in this sort of infantry, that with
15,000 or 20,000 of them they would attack any number
of horse. Machiavelli says there had been many
examples of this about the time he wrote, and that the
general opinion of their excellence, from the many
remarkable services they had rendered, was so favourable,
that from the time of Charles VIII.'s expedition into
Italy, all other nations had adopted the same weapons
and manner of fighting, the Spaniards, in particular,
having obtained very great reputation by the use of such
a force. *

Philip Visconti, Duke of Milan, being invaded by an
army of 18,000 Swiss, sent his general. Count Carmig-
nuola, at the head of 6,000 cavalry, and a smaU body of
infantry, to attack them. The Milanese were defeated
with great loss. Carmignuola, who was evidently an
able general, perceiving the advantage that the pikemen
had over his horsemen, raised a fresh army, and again
attacked the Swiss. This time he dismounted his gen-
darmes on going into action, and converting them into
pikemen, they fought so well on foot, that, being weU
armed and fresh, they defeated the lightly armed and

^ Machiavelli, Art of War, iv. pp. 55, 56, Famesworth's Edition,
London, 1775.

232

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period hi.

,i ■!

defenceless Swiss with immense loss, 15,000 being killed,
and the remainder taken prisoners.*

To secure invulni.'rubility, the cavalry of the end of
the fifteenth century an<l tlie l)eginning of the sixteenth,
had so overloaded themselves with armour as to deprive
them of all rapidity of movement, and to render them
almost incapable of injuring their opponents. Machia-
velli appreciated fully the disadvantages of this system.
He says : " I am not of opinion, however, that we ought
to depend any more upon cavalry, in general, than they
did in former times, for we have often seen them shame-
fully beaten of late by infantry." And he quotes in
support of his view the uselessness of the cataphracti
in the army of Tigranes, at the battle of Tigranocerta,
where they were so overloaded with defensive armour as
to be hardly able to see, much less to annoy the enemy,
and if unhorsed were unable to get up again, or use their
arms. In his History of Florence he gives several
instances showing that history had repeated itself, and
that cavalry men of his day, when unhorsed, had been
suffocated in the mud through inability to rise.

He then gives his ideas as to the proper uses of
cavalry in the following words : "It is right, however,
to have some cavalry to support and assist infantry, but
not to look upon them as the main force of an army, for
they are highly necessary, to reconnoitre, to scour roads,
to make incursions, and lay waste an enemy's country,
to beat up their quarters, to keep them in continual
alarm, and to cut off their convoys ; but in field battles,
which commonly decide the fate of nations, and for
which armies are chiefly designed, they are fitter to
pursue an enemy that is routed and flying than anything
else." 2 It is remarkable that a man like Machiavelli, a
politician and a writer, but not a soldier, should have
had such correct ideas upon the art of war when its
principles were so little known. We have referred at
some length to his writings here, as he seems to be the
fir^t scientific writer on the art of war of modern times,

' Machiavelli, Art of War, iv. 58.

2 Ibid. 62.

(iiAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

233

and his views are of great mtercst, as showing the dawn
of the renaissance in the military art.

About the beginning of the sixteenth century the in-
fantry service had evidently begun to assume a position
much better than it had previously held, and was beginning
to rival the heavy armed cavalry even upon the tield of
Ijattle. This was brought about by two causes — first,
the great weight and consequent sluggishness of the
unwieldy horsemen, which prevented charges being
pressed home with vigour ; and secondly, the effect of
the superior organisation and armament of the foot-
soldiers. The pikes, which were used to prevent a charge
of cavalry, were so long and powerful that when the
infantry were steadily formed, and the pikts firmly pre-
sented, it was almost impossible for cavalry to break
their ranks. The arquebuses and muskets which were
used with them also enabled the foot-soldiers to inflict
some loss upon the horsemen without much danger to
themselves, and even if the infantry were somewhat
shaken, the halberdiers with their battlcraxes were a very
formidable foe to encounter. As soon as the improve-
ments in firearms enabled the musketeers and arque-
busiers to inflict wounds in spite of the heavy defences
worn by the gendarmerie, the turning point was gained,
and the infantry at once asserted its superiority.

It was long however before the firearms reached such
power as to be able to penetrate armour, and then it was
only at point-blank range and by a perpendicular blow
that the bullet would pierce the heavy breastplates. Con-
sequently the defensive armour, which had been much
strengthened at the introduction of gunpowder and fire-
arms, was long retained by the cavalry, who set about
to apply to their own use the new invention which they
at once felt was the most dangerous weapon their service
had yet encountered.

The knights, or heavy horsemen, at a very early period
made use of the petronel, a species of hand-cannon, so
called from being rested against the cuirass (poitrail)
when fired. These petronels were plain tubes with a
straight wooden stock, and were fired with a match

234

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

1 i

%'

i'l

applied to a touch-hole on the top. The end of the
stock resting aga.'^st the breast, while the muzzle was
steadied by a rest with a fork or crotch which stood up
ixom the pommel of the saddle.

At the outset, before these firearms had acquired
sufficient power of penetration to pierce the massive
breastplates of the cavalr)% the horsemen riding up
and firing from petronels upon lightly armed infantry
would have a certain advantage over them, as, being
invulnerable themselves, they could still inflict loss upon
their opponents. Armour, which had increased in
strength about the time of the introduction of firearms,
was somewhat lightened about the middle of the six-
teenth century ; but the movement in that direction was
check»„H., and towards the latter end of the century the
armour was heavier than ever for a short time.^

The constant improvements in the arquebus soon
rendered necessary an increased strength in the cuirass,
and in order to be enabled to carry the extra weight,
unnecessary portions of the armour were abandoned.
The first step in the abolition of armour took place
about the latter half of the sixteenth century, when the
greaves and sollarets (defences for the feet) began to be
laid aside altogether. The next step was the disappear-
ance of the " braconniere " and *' tassettes," which were
replaced by large cuissards, or thigh-pieces, which reached
to the knees.'* The passe-gardes, or elevated shoulder-
pieces, were abandoned about the same time, and simple
and compact epaulier^" took their place. The greaves
and sollarets were repi^^ed by long heavy leather boots.
Armour modified in this way lasted a long period, being
in use somewhat in this form for nearly a century.

As the firearms improved so did the infantry improve
their relative position in reference to the cavalry ; and
partly from this cause, and partly from the difficulty of
obtaining the large and powerful horses required for its
use, the lance, as a weapon, began to lose its old pre-
eminence and to be less relied on b)'' the cavalry.

The greater the prt)gress in the application of gun-
' Daniel, i. 290. 2 Boutell, 156.

CHAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

236

powder to military purposes, the more the horsemen
naturally desired to make use of it and apply it to their
own service. The result was a rapid spread in the use
of firearms in the cavalry service all over Ev'^pe.

The petronel, as we have already sflid, was the first
firearm used ; it was sometimes called the arquebus-a-
croc. The arquebus-a-rouet, or wheel-lock, which was
invented in Nuremberg in 1515, was soon used by the
cavalry because its management was more easy on
horseback.'

A new weapon was invented early in the sixteenth
century, called the pistol, some say from its being first
made at Pistoja, in Italy, but Demmin, who is a good
authority, derives it from pistallo, which means pommel.
Pistols are said to have been first introduced into Eng-
land in 1521, and into France about 1531.^ They were
in use by the French infantry at Cerisoles in 1544, who
used them under the protection of the pikemen.* The
German cavalry, or Reitres, used pistols at the battle of
St. Quentin in 1557.*

The invention of the wheel-lock pistol was a great
advantage to the cavalry, as it gave them a weapon easily
managed on horseback and one capable of inflicting a
deadly blow. The pikes, the arquebuses of the infantry,
and the clumsiness of the horsemen, who were unable to
charge faster than a slow trot, soon caused the cavalry
to forget that their great advantage consisted in the im-
petuous charge and the violent shock of men and horses,
and led them, contrary to the genius of the service, to
employ firearms against infantry similarly armed. It is
extraordinary how the prejudices of an age impede the
improvements and reforms which cor stant changes are
continually rendering necessary. The spirit of chivahy
had not yet died out, and the feeling in favour of horse-
men was -io great that it was actually believed that
horsemen, mounted upon animals that raised them up a
distinct mark for missiles, could abandon their impetuous
charges and rely mainly upon the use of projectile

* Humbert, 77 ; Demmin, 519. » Webster, word "Pis il."

3 Vaiiderburch, 175. * Bardin, 4430.

236

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period hi.

m

1 i

!! I i'

weapons, requiring careful and steady aim, against in-
fantry who, firmly ranged on solid ground, were using
more powerful weapons of the same type with every
advantage in their favour.

The Germans seem to have first used the pistol with
much effect. They adopted a system of forming their
cavalry in very deep bodies, sometimes as many as six-
teen ranks in depth. Their method of fighting was by
riding up to the enemy without charging, and upon
arriving within range of their pistols they fired two
pistol shots each, and then the front rank wheeled to
the right or left and unmasked the second, which took
up the fire, while the leading rank were retiring to the
rear, where they formed up in reserve, and recharged
their pistols.* Each rank did this in turn, until the
whole force had discharged their, weapons.

This system, which for a time worked well on account
of the weight of fire secured by it, was soon neutralized
by the custom which arose among the French cavalry, of
charging upon them with a rush while they were carry-
ing on their firing. A charge of this kind almocii always
resulted in the overthrow of those horsemen who
depended entirely upon their pistols.'^

The use of the lance having gradually 'Msappeared,
the pisto' .acquired a position better than it should, and
from small causes the tactics of cavalry became vitiated
to the last degree. Its great force was, for a time, lost
or forgotten. The diminution of the pace of the charge
to the trot, and the use of firearms in place of lance and
sword; were the two causes ^hat made it of but little use
in war for a long period.*

The German Reitres were much more lightly armed
than the heavy cavalry, and being mounted on faster
horses, and using swords and pistols, they often, by
their activity, defeated the French gendarmerie. They
were of the type of the modern cavalry, but relied too
much upon their firearms, which at that time were
certainly no match for hand-to-hand weapons in a
cavalry encounter.

' Duparcq, ii. 68. » Ibid. 69. « jbid. 71.

CHAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

237

The Germans were the first to use the deep formation
in their cavalry, and it was copied from them by the
French under Francis I. In the time of the Emperor
Charles V. the German cavalry, armed with pistols, were
ranged fifteen and sixteen ranks in depth, the French
at the same time using the old formation in single rank,
as in the days of knighthood. They, however, after-
wards adopted the same formation.

According to La Noue, Charles V. was the first to
form cavalry into squadrons, a custom that was soon
adopted all over Europe, and has been in use ever since.
The Emperor Napoleon III. in his work on artillery says
that the Germans formed their squadrons in deep masses
before the time of Charles V., and that he simply
regulated a formation already in use.

Although Francis I. had increased the depth of the
squadrons, the new formation was soon abandoned, and
the French gendarmerie fought in single line, until
about 1557-1558, when they were completely defeated
by the heavy bodies of Spanish lancers at the battles of
St. Quentin and Gravelines. At the battle of Dreux in
1562, the squadrons of Reitres overthrew the gendar-
merie, and at this epoch the latter were obliged to
renounce the single rank formation, which was a most
unsatisfactory change to the French noblemen, who all
wished to fight in the front rank.

Before the use of squadrons, the gendarmes as well
as the light horse were ranged not in one single line, but
in lines one behind the other, at intervals of about forty
paces.' This was not a bad formation, as it enabled
fresh lines or reserves to be continually coming into
action. The light horse assumed the deep formation
long before the heavy men-at-arms.

Under Henry II. of France cavalry were formed in
heavy squadrons of four hundred men each, formed upon
ten ranks in depth and forty in front.^ They were soon
reduced to 200, still retaining the same depth. After
wards under Henry IV. the depth was reduced to six

' Daniel, i. 232. ^ Bardin, 2155.

I

i I'

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I

it'

m

238

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

ranks, and about 1633, the squadrons were placed in
regiments, and were ranged in four or three ranks.'

According to the Cavalier Melzo, a custom was in use
in the early part of the sixteenth century of ranging
arquebusiers-^-cheval before the lancers. They fired
upon the enemy, and when they had shaken their order
by the fire, or when the enemy were approaching too
closely, they retired through openings in the line, or
around the flanks, and enabled the lancers to charge,
followed by a line of cuirassiers who supported them,
and pursued the fugitives in the event of success.*
Behind these again were another line of arquebusiers-^-
cheval.

This was soon followed by the practice of intermixing
bodies of infantry musketeers with the cavalry. As the
horsemen by this time had adopted the trot as the pace
for charging, the musketeers were expected to keep up
with them, and by their fire aid in breaking the ranks of
the enemy. This, like most compromises, reduced the
effective force of the cavalry, which could only be
thoroughly attained by a charge at speed ; and yet did
not give the mixed force either the weight of fire, or the
steadiness of formation which a well-organised body of
infantry of the same strength would have had.

These facts all serve to show how completely the
soldiers of that age misunderstood the real value and
uses of a cavalry force — and how completely the inven-
tion of firearms had upset the whole principles of
warfare.

At the battle of Pavia in 1525, the Marquis of
Pescara. used (for the first time) this system of inter-
mingling infantry with cavalry.^ The great mistake made
by Francis I. was in charging with his hea'^y men-at-
armS; into the midst of the imperial army, at a time
when his artillery had checked their advance, and was
just about driving them back in disorder. He led his
horsemen to the attack, and his movement at once
masked the fire of the cannon. The imperialists rallied
and attacked and surrounded him — 1,500 Basque arque-

' Nolan, 16. « Ba.-din, 2155. " Daniel, i. 233. ♦ Nolan, 16.

CHAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

239

busiers being employed by Pescara as skirmishers, to
open a heavy fire against the French gendarmerie,
heavy losses were inflicted on the horsemen who could
neither attack these musketeers, nor defend themselves
from their fire. The French king ordered his men to
open out, to lessen by that means the deadly effect of the
bullets, but it was all in vain, for then the infantry
penetrated their ranks, and killed great numbers of
them.^

The king, after performing prodigies of valour, was
taken prisoner, with many of his generals and officers.
No victory could have been more decisive than that won
by the imperialists, and it was supposed to have been
secured by the fact of the infantry and cavalry being
mixed together. As a matter of course that idea soon
became general, so that for a time the practice of inter-
mingling the services was adopted in most armies.

We constantly read in the accounts of battles after
this time, "nstances of the use of firearms among the
cavalry, and of the placing of bodies of infantry arque-
busiers in the intervals between the squadrons of
horsemen.

At Dreux in 1562 we find squadrons of gendarmes and
light cavalry placed in the intervals of the battalions of
infantry.^ At the battle of St. Denis in 1.567, the Pro-
testant arquebusiers withheld their fire until the cavalry
had come within fifty paces, when they poured in a
I'^.adly voUey with great effect.^ This plan adopted by
Coligny worked so well, that it enabled him to secure
the retreat of his army.

The battle of Moncontour (1569) is important as show-
ing the method of warfare at that period. At this time
the German and Swiss infantry used the pikes only.
The French infantry were principally armed with the
arquebus, although some carried halberds and a few had
pikes.

The French cavalry relied mainly on their lances,
while the German Reitres depended on 'Jieir pistols, and

' Liskenne, iv. 353. ^ Duparcq, GueiTes de Religion, G9.

=* Ibid. 70.

il

240

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period 111.

fought, as already described, in deep formation, firing
by successive ranks. The Protestant general had coupled
his French and German squadrons of cavalry together, in
order that while one body used the lance, and the alternate
one used the pistol, they would mutually support each
other, and thereby gain the advantage of both the fire-
arms, and the lances. The increased feeling in favour of the
use of the arquebus in aid of the cavalry, is shown by the
arrangements of Coligny in this action, where, after
mixing his corps of cavalry, as mentioned, he further
supported them by arquebusiers, who being picked
soldiers, were detached not to move (as was his usual
practice) at the stirrup of each cavalier, but a little in
front of them as skirmishers.

During the action the royal gendarmes were enabled
by the great weight and vigour of their horses to defeat
the Protestant cavalry, who were more lightly mounted.
Coligny restored the action by the fire of three regi-
ments of French arquebusiers, whom he ordered to
aim only at the horses, and whose efforts he supported
by a charge of six cornets of Reitres. He would probably
have gained the action but for the timely advance of the
reserve, composed of Swiss infantry, which moved on in
steady order under the command of Marshal Cosse.^

At the battle of Courtras, fought on the 20th of
October, 1587, Henry IV. of Navarre adopted a new
method of formation, based upon the prevailing idea of
the time. The infantry were placed upon the wings,
the cavalry occupied the centre, and the king placed
small parties of arquebusiers-^-pied between the different
squadrons of cavalry.'"^ These parties consisted of twenty
men each, in four ranks, five abreast. The front rank
laid down, the second knelt upon one knee, the third
stooped, and the fourth stood erect, so that they could
all fire at once. They were ordered no. to fire until the
enemy's cavalry were within twenty yards, so that the
aim should be well directed. They were men chosen for
their bravery and steadiness, and the importance of their
firmness was carefully impressed upon them.

Carrion Nisas, i. 510, 511. - Vanderburch, 17,

CHAP. IX.] USE OF FIREARMS BY CAVALRY.

241

The Royalist cavalry commenced to charge at a
distance of 800 metres, and were pretty well blown
before coming to close quarters. King Henry waited
till they were within twenty paces, then the infantry
poured in a volley, and the cavalry charged vigorously
upon the disordered horsemen, and at once put them to
rout.

An interesting cavalry action took place at the battle
of Mookerheyde in Holland, on the 14th of April, 1574,
between the Dutch troops under Count Louis of Nassau,
and the Spanish army under Avila. The Spanish cavalry
were drawn up with the mounted carbineers in the front
rank, the lancers and German black Reitres in the rear.
Count Louis charged with all his cavalry upon the
enemy's horse, and soon drove the carbineers in rout and
confusion before him ; his men, however, having wheeled
after their attack in order to reload their pieces, were
promptly charged at speed by the lancers and cuirassiers,
who had remained firm in reserve. This attack was
made with great spirit, and at the proper moment.^
After a short struggle Count Louis's carbineers were
overthrown with heavy loss, and the fate of the day
decided.

' Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic, 558.

B

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CHAPTER X.
European Cavalry in the Sixteenth Century.

SECTION I. — its organisation INTO DIFFERENT TYPES.

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In the last chapter was shown the growing tendency
in the cavalry of relying mainly upon firearms as
weapons of offence, and this feeling was soon followed
by special organisations of cavalry based almost entirely
upon the idea of making use of the arquebus, pistol,
and carbine.

For a long period the cavalry had been of different
types, the men-at-arms being the heavy, and the archers
the light troops ; but they were not separated in their
organisation for many years, the archers being simply
followers and auxiliaries of the gendarmes, in whose
lances they were included. In Charles the Eighth's entry
into Eome in 1494, we first see that portions of
these light horsemen were banded together for tactical
purposes.

Argoulets. — Louis XII. is said to have instituted a
corps of light cavalry called Argoulets, who fought in
a loose skirmishing order. They were lightly armed
with a light cuirass, and cabasset to protect the head.
They had as offensive weapons the sword, the mace, and
the cross-bow, and afterwards the arquebus-^-rouet,
which they were the first to adopt. ^ It was carried in
a bucket, or boot of stiff hide, fastened to the saddle.

Two thousand argoulets were introduced into the
French army in 1499. They were raised in imitation of
the light horse of the Venetian armies. The Albanian

• Gay de Vernon, 12, 13.

CHAP. X.] CAVALRY IN THK KJth CENTURY.

243

cavalry was another species of light horse, dift'eriug little
from the argoulets.' It seems in fact that argoulet was
the name given to a particular type of cavalry, and that
the Albanian were of this type, but so called from being
recruited in Albania. '^ This would account for the fact
that the Albanian, Stradiot, and Argoulet horsemen are
often confounded by historians.

Albanians. — Charles VIII. took 8,000 Albanians into
his pay in 1496.^ Louis XII. shortly afterwards
appointed a colonel-general to command them, and they
became the nucleus and foundation of the French light
cavalry. They were retained in the French army until
the reign of Henry III., a squadron of them serving in
the battle of Courtras under Marshal Joyeuse.

The Albanians formed companies of 300 or 400 men,
and were altogether mercenary troops, furnishing their
own horses. They were clad somewhat in the Turkish
fashion, except the turban, and fought either on foot or
on horseback. Their distinctive weapon was the arzegaye,
a species of short lance, which they handled with wonder-
ful skill.* It was ironed at both ends.

Genetaires. — Troops of this type were in use in
many of the European armies at this time. In the
•Spanish forces they were known as genetaires, from the
Spanish word gineta, a short lance.^ They had all the
customs and paces of the Saracens or Moors. They
formed the light cavalry of the Spanish army, and held
the place of tlie hussars. They were clad, like the French
Albanian cavalry, in the Turkish manner, using the
arzegaye, and also the buckler. Their horses were small
well-formed animals, still called in French and English
genets, from the troops who formerly used them. They
rode with short stirrups, and used the Moorish bit.

When firearms came into use the argoulets soon
adopted the arquebus, and afterwards the escopette and
the pistol. The term argoulet became one of reproach
under Charles IX., and they are not mentioned after the
battle of Dreux, in 1.562.* The carabins succeeded to

' Daniel, i. 167. * Bardin, 156. « Ibid. * Daniel, i. 168.
* Bardin, 2569. • Ibid. 232.

K 2

I •

244

A IllSTOUY OF CAVALRY.

IP*
■ ii'i

:tS

[period III.

them in the French army, and the old name was soon
forgotten.

Another body of cavalry were the Arquebusiers-a-
CHEVAL, a national force of French cavalry, who, armed
with the arquebus, served as skirmishing or light troop.s
to cover the flanks and aid the heavy cavalry, who were
armed with lances. They served with the carabins and
the dragoons, and differed from them mainly from the
fiict that the carabins were foreigners, and the dragoons
simply mounted infantry.'

Carabins were instituted first in France under Henry
II. They were composed mainly of Gascons, Basques,
and Spaniards, and used a short arquebus-il-rouet, a
pistol, and probably a sword.'' They were the substitutes
for the Argoulets and Stradiots, and formed a lifflit
cavalry for the army. They were first formed in regi-
ments in the reign of Louis XIII.

Dragoons also came mto use about this period.
According to P^re Daniel, the creation of this arm is
due to Marshal de Brissac, who is said to have first used
them in Piedmont.^ Duparcq, however, gives the credit
of the introduction of this arm to Pierie Strozzi, who in
1543, that is to say seven years before the wars which
De Brissac carried on in Piedmont, placed 500 arquebusiers
on horseback, in order to save them from fatigue, with
the idea of their fighting on foot in case of need.*

Charles the Bold, however, had already conceived the
idea, for he exercised his archers to dismount, and fasten
their horses together, and to march quickly in order,
preceded by pikemen, who, placing their pikes before
them, knelt down and enabled the archers to shoot over
their heads. When the arrows had thrown the enemy
into disorder, the pikemen were instructed to charge
upon them.'

The habit of taking infantry up en croupe was well
known long before this period, and constantly employed
in most countries. And, as already mentioned, Alexander
the Great had invented dragoons, or at least employed

^ Daniel, ii. 334.

» Bardin. 340.
* Duparcq, ii. 72

^ Duparcq, ii. 72.
Ibid. 36.

•iiAP. X.] CAVALRY IN THE IGth CENTURY,

245

them in the Dimaclii (Btfioxoi), which formed an
important portion of his cavahy.

The French, liowevcr, seem to have been the first
to have revived the use of draf]joons, and the other
powers seem to have copied from tliom, and to have
adopted them in their armies.

The death of Henry II. at a tournament, and the
consequent abolition of these exercises, had a very serious
offect upon the use of the lanec in the cavalry service.
The difficulty of getting horses suitable for its employ-
ment, added to the great weight of armour, and the
continual improvement of firearms, soon li d to its entire
abandonment, and cavalry began to use firearms almost
exclusively.

From 1550 to 1553, the Marshal de Brissac employed
companies of arquebusiers, which he placed on horseback
to enable them to move more rapidly upon positions
where their presence was required, and where they would
be obliged to dismount to fight with advantage, his
object being to supply in this way increased mobility to
certain portions of his infantry. This was the real idea
and object of dragoons, and seems to have been the first
systematic use of this type of soldier in modern times.'
Afterwards, under the reigns of Charles IX. and Henry
III., the dragoons did good service, as well as under
Henry IV.

Prince Alexander of Parma, as early as 1552, wishing
to surprise the Duke of Alen9on, mounted several com-
panies of infantry upon pack-horses, and moved them
rapidly towards the enemy.^

The dragoons, in the first place, w^ere simply infantry
mounted, and the horse was used solely for the purpose
of rapid movement, the fighting being always done on
foot. This gradually changed, the men being averse to
dismount, so that they soon became accustomed to fight
more on their horses than on foot, which after a time led
to this arm falling into disfavour.

Cuirassiers.— The cuirassiers were another type of
cavalry, somewhat like the German Reitres. They were

' Humbert, 81. ' Bcami.sli, 330.

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246

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

first organised by Prince Maurice of Nassau in the wars
in the Netherlands. Prince Maurice, who was one of
the ablest generals of his age, and is recognised as one
of the regenerators of the military art, was unable to
procure the horses suitable for lancers, and the attack of
that arm requiring open and firm ground, while the seat
of war in the Netherlands was generally broken and
enclosed, he considered the weapon useless, and abandoned
it in his army.^

He organised instead a force of horsemen more lightly
armed, but still protected by cuirasses, and armed with
long-stocked pistols, and cut-and-thrust swords. When
charged by the Spanish lancers, Maurice had trained his
horsemen to fire a volley, and then opening out quickly
from the centre, to fall sword in hand upon the flanks
of the advancing enemy. Being much more lightly
equipped, and capable of more rapid movement, this
manoeuvre was generally successful.^

This was a variation from the practice of the German
Reitres, who usually fell back to reload after firing.
Henry IV. is said to have won the battle of Ivry in
1590 through the Reitres, in retiring after having de-
livered their fire, being unable tc find openings in the
second line through which to make vieir way to the rear.
The result was that they rushed in confusion upon the
main body of heavy lancers which the Duke of Mayemie
was leading up to the charge, and throwing them into
disorder, destroyed the solidity and force of their onset.

The cavalry organised by Prince Maurice were called
cuirassiers, from the cuirass, which was their principal
defence.^ They were a very effective body, and con-
tributed mainly to his victories. This type of horsemen
has been maintained with slight modifications in most
of the armies of Europe down to the present time, the
sword, however, assuming the principal position, the
pistol being retained simply as an auxiliary weapon.

In the reign of Henry IV. of France there arose also
the practice of attaching fifty carabins to each company
of light horse (pistoliers or cuirassiers being then con-

1 Rocqimncoiirt, i. 31.3. ^ Beamish, 328. " Ibid. 329.

CHAP. X.] CAVALRY IN THE 16th CENTURY.

247

H

sidered light cavalry). These carabins usually formed
upon the left of the squadron under the orders of the
captain of it, who gave them the signal to advance.
They were accustomed to approach within 200 paces of
a body of lancers, or 100 paces of a squadron of cuiras-
siers, and discharge their carbines by successive ranks,
retiring rank after rank in rear of the squadron to which
they were attached. If carabins were also in the ranks
of the opposing force, they would skirmish in open order,
to draw off the fire from the cuirassiers as they advanced
to the attack.^

In fact it is almost impossible to enumerate all the
various combinations that were used from time to time
in the union of the different species of soldiers, in the
method of using them in support of each other, and in
tlie distribution of the weapons, &c. Every year almost
showed variations and novel ideas, according to the
notions of the different generals and officers who com-
manded armies or corps in different countries. It is
only possible here to mention the more important and
more striking combinations.

Al)out the time of Prince Maurice we also see the
word "cornet" applied to a tactical subdivision of
cavalry. The strength of a cornet seems to have varied
from 100 to 300 men. In Prince Maurice's instructions he
speaks of one cornet containing 100 horsemen, and another
140, while D'Avila mentions the Duke of Mayenne
having a cornet of 300 cavalry at the battle of Ivry.^
The strength of cavalry was for a time enumerated by
cornets instead of the old method of counting by lances.
The name was derived from a cornet or standard carried
by the corps.

In Stowe's Annals we read that at the oattle of
Zutphen, in 1586, Sir William Russell fought valiantly.
" He with his cornet charged so terribly that when he
had broke his lance, he with curtle-axe so played his
part that the enemy reported him to be a devil and not
a man, for where he saw six or seven of the enemy

' •■

' Daniel, i. 169. * Beamish, 32r).

248

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period hi.

together, thither would he, and so behave himself with
his curtle-axe that he would separate their friendship." ^

Under the ordnances of the Emperor Charles V. there
were reckoned in a cornet 60 lancers heavily armed, 120
cuirassiers (or demi-cuirasses), who were armed with the
breastplate only, and 60 light horse, armed with long
arquebuses. This formed virtually a regiment consist-
ing of three troops or squadrons of different species of
cavalry. He also had the advantage of having in his
armies the national light cavalry of Spanish origin
already referred to, the genetaires, who, somewhat analo-
gous to the hussars of the kings of Hungary, became
the model Tor the creation of corps of light cavalry in
other nations.^ They were organised in escarres or
squadrons. Regiments were also organised in Spain
earlier than in other countries.

In Hungary appeared the hussars, a light cavalry of
a very formidable character. They were at first a species
of militia, or arriere-ban, being instituted about the
middle of the fifteenth century, by an ordnance which
obliged every twentieth man to take the field. These
horsemen were called " hussars " from the Hungarian
huss, which means the twentieth, and ar, pay.^ Pere
Daniel describes their armament, and from him we learn
that they used large swords, either straight or curved,
and worn on the waist, while some of them carried
long, straight, thin swords, intended mainly for thrust-
ing. Their movements at this time were very irregular,
and consisted mainly of skirmishing in loose swarms
around the enemy. They managed their horses very
skilfully. Their saddles were of very light wood, and
placed upon blankets folded. Over the saddles were
worn skins, with the fleece outwards, which covered the
pistols and housings. The horses were ridden with
bridoons instead of bits, so that they could pasture at
the shortest halt without unbridling. These troups
were well suited for foraging, reconnoitring, and out-
post service. They have been maintained down to the

t* ;

' Stowe's Annals, folio edition of 1615, p. 736.
« Beamish, 323.

2 Bardin, 3485.

CHAP. X.] CA.VALRY IN THE 16th CENTURY. 249

present time with but few slight alterations in dress and
arms. Light cavalry dressed and armed after the
fashion of the Hungarian hussars have been organised
and maintained in nearly all the European armies for
many years past.

The Turkish cavalry at this period had attained a high
reputation ; they were essentially light cavalry, and
relied mainly upon the curved sabre, or cimcter. They
fought in loose order, and by very irregular evolutions.
They were armed with cuirass and casque, and used bows
and arrows as well as the sabre.^ They did not stand
the direct charge, but, as was their custom in all ages,
gave way before an impetuous attack, to return again to
harass the flanks, and to wear out their foe by constant
skirmishing.^ They were long considered to be the best
cavalry in Europe. They were accustomed to form in
the shape of a wedge, in order to pierce the ranks of
their foe, and once they succeeded in breaking the order,
they scattered, and mingled in the mMee, in which their
wonderful dexterity in the management of their sharp
cimeters gave them a great advantage.^

Their horses were not large, but were spirited, and
well trained and bitted. With the exception of the
saddle, their equipments were light. The lance, although
soixietimes used, was not a favourite weapon with them,
as it was not useful in the melee.*

The Turks did not wear heavy armour, and the conse-
quence was, that, being lightly armed, and mounted on
active horses, they displayed a wonderful activity in the
use of their weapons in a hand-to-hand fight. It was
this quickness that made them such excellent light
cavalry, but rendered them unfit to sustain the shock of
horsemen heavily armed, charging with serried ranks,
and in good order.'

The Turkish cavalry was composed of Spahis, or regu-
lar horsemen, and volunteers, the latter of various tjrpes.
The Spahis were armed with lances, javelins, and sabres.
Some also had carbines, others bows and arrows. The

' Tjamartine's History of Turkey, ii. 31. 'i. ^ Humbert, 70.

^ Nolan, 29. " Ibid. 25. ■' Montecuculi, 221.

? i!

\

250

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period hi.

u'

1!^ I'i

ill;:!

European Turks made use of firearms before they were
much used among the Asiatics. After pistols were in-
vented they carried them, both in holsters on the saddle
and in the waist-belt or girdle. Coats of mail, of light
construction, were often used among them during the
seventeenth century.^

The Turks maintained many advanced posts of cavalry
in front, in rear, and upon the flanks of their positions,
and their outpost work was generally very fairly per-
formed.

A great battle took place on the 29th of July, 1526,
at Mohacz, or Mogatch, between Soliman " The Magni-
ficent," Sultan of Turkey, and the Hungarian army
under their king, Louis II. It was principally a cavalry
action, and is of importance as showing the result of a
conflict between the heavy armed Hungarians and the
more lightly equipped Turks. Soliman's army consisted
of 200,000 men, while the King of Hungary had but
30,000, many of them being heavy armed knights and
nobles, whose solid and impetuous charge nothing in the
Turkish ranks could attempt to withstand.

Soliman's plans evinced great skill. His army was
ranged in three lines — the army of Asia, under Ibrahim,
forming the front line ; the army of Europe, under
Kosrew Pasha, forming the second ; while the Sultan in
person, with his janissaries, or guards, took up a position
in rear, on an eminence, as the reserve.

The front line were ordered to open before the charge
of the Hungarian squadrons to avoid the shock, and to
endeavour to attack them in flank and rear as they
passed. The Hungarian cavalry, under the command of
a Bishop named Tomori, attacked in a splendid charge,
and swept through the front line, which at once gave
way before them, but coming blown and disordered upon
the second line, they were checked, and being attacked
on both flanks and rear by the first line, were annihilated.
This charge was immediately followed by the advance of
the king, with the bravest of his knights and heavy
horsemen, who burst through both lines beneath a cloud
' Warnery, Remarques sur le Militaire de Tmcs.

CHAP. X.] CAVALRY IN THE IGth CENTURY.

251

of arrows, and penetrated to the hill, upon which Soli-
man and the janissaries, 30,000 strong, were waiting in
reserve. Then the batteries of cannon opened upon the
Hungarians in flank, and destroyed many of them. The
survivors, however, did not lose heart, but still rode
boldly onwards, mounted the eminence, and attacked
the Sultan himself. A group of pages and eunuchs gave
up their lives to save him ; already the knights were
near enough to strike his cuirass with their spears, when
a body of janissaries ran up, and, by violent exertions,
saved the monarch, and struck down his assailants.
The Hungarian army by its bold attack was in the midst
of an overpowering enemy, being entirely surrounded by
the two armies of Europe and Asia, the cannon of the
batteries, and the heavy masses of the janissaries. The
artillery cut them to pieces, the light horsemen struck
them down in attempting to get away, and those who
escaped the sword died in the marshes, where, fleeing for
safety, they and their horses were suffocated or drowned.
The unfortunate King Louis so lost his life, and his body
was never recovered.' The loss of the Hungarians was
enormous.

v

SECTION II. — SPANISH CAVALRY IN MEXICO AND PERU.

We will now turn our attention from the East to the
West, and briefly refer to the operations of Cortez in
Mexico, where the presence of a mere handful of cavalry
exercised as important an influence as can well be
imagined. The circumstances of the conquest of Mexico,
particularly of the services rendered by the few horse-
men who accompanied Cortez, are of great interest from
the fact that the mounted men were there used, for the
first time on record, against organised armies of soldiers
who had never seen or heard of horses.

The Mexicans were not altogether ignorant of the
military art. They had armies fairly organised and well
drilled, and appear to have had an institution somewhat
' Lamartino's History of Turkey, ii. 315, 316.

252

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

similar to the order of knightlioocl. Admission to tliis
order was the reward given by the Aztec princes for
martial prowess, and entitled the recipient to wear
ornaments on his arms and person.^

The dress of the officers was magnificent. The principal
defence was a light tunic of quilted cotton, so thick as to
serve as a protection against the light missiles of Indian
warfare. Instead of this, and sometimes over it, the
wealthier chiefs wore cuirasses made of thin plates of
gold or silver, over which was thrown a surcoat of
gorgeous feather work. The helmets were of wood or
silver, fancifully decorated with brilliant plumes, gold
ornaments, and precious stones. Collars, bracelets, and
earrings, of the same rich materials, were also very
much used.^

The armies were divided into bodies of 8,000 men, and
these again into companies of three or four hundred men,
each under separate commanders. Each company had
its banner, as also had each division of 8,000, while the
commander-in-chief of the whole army displayed the
national standard, which contained, in gold embroidery
and feather- work, the armorial ensigns of the state.^

Their tactics were simple, and yet somewhat advanced.
They were proficient in ambuscades, surprises, and all the
ruses of guerrilla warfare. They advanced in battle in
admirable order, singing and shouting their war-cries.
The discipline was strict, disobedience of orders being
punished with death. Their weapons were slings, bows
and arrows, javelins, and darts.*

Such was the military system of the populous, wealthy,
and warlike nation that Cortez, the Spanish cavalier, set
out to conquer. The force at his disposal amounted to
110 mariners, 553 soldiers, including thirty-two crossbow-
men and thirteen arquebusiers. He was also provided
with ten heavy guns, four falconets, a good supply of
ammunition, and sixteen horses, which had been trans-
ported with great difficulty, and at enormous expense.
Such was the paltry force at his disposal in setting out on

' Prescott, Conquest of Mexico, i. 24. ^ Ibid. i. 2.^). ^ Ibid,
i. 25. * Ibid. i. 241.

ciiAi'. X.] CAVALRY IN THE 16th CENTURY. 253

a career of conquest that reads more like an extract from
an extravagant romance than a page of authentic history.

The first great battle took place at Tabasco, on the
25th March, 1519, when, with his small army, Cortez won
a decisive victory over an Indian force of 40,000 men,
drawn up in five divisions of 8,000 each. Cortez directed
an attack on the enemy's position in front, with the main
portion of his men, aided by the fire of the artillery,
while he made a detour himself and fell upon their rear
with the sixteen horsemen who formed his small cavalry
contingent. The attack was bravely resisted in front,
and the battle was continued for more than an hour, the
Spaniards being sorely pressed by the immense hordes of
Indians which swarmed around them. Soon however a
tumult and confusion arose in the rear of the enemy's
lines, and over their heads were seen the Spanish
chivalry, their horses dashing and plunging through the
thickest ranks, their war-cries sounding loud and clear,
and their sabres flashing in the morning sun as they
delivered crushing blows in every direction.^

This sudden charge of sixteen horsemen virtually
defeated an army of 40,000 brave soldiers, till then
gallantly striving, and with some success. The surprise,
the attack in rear, the monstrous apparition of mounted
men, so new and so fearful a sight, caused a panic to
seize the whole mass, and the main Spanish line charging,
the entire force threw down their arms and fled from the
field.

It is a curious fact, and is corroborative of the usual
explanation of the origin of the fable of the Centaurs,
that these poor Indians, seeing the mounted men,
believed the horse and his rider to be one and the same
animal.^ They were naturally intensely terrified at the
sight of them.

The next fighting took place with the Tlascalans, the
people of a small republic, which lay between Mexico
and the sea. Their military system was somewhat
similar to that of the Aztecs. A species of feudal tenure
is said to have existed among them, as well as an order

• Prescott, i. 156. ^ jbid. i. 157.

204

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

'^' i.

of kiiightlio(3d, in which the neophyte watched his arms
in the temple for fifty or sixty days, then listened to a
grave discourse on his new duties, when his arms were
restored to him. In the actions with these people the
small force of horsemen mainly contributed to the
Spanish success, the firearms and cannon also having a
very important influence. The Tlascalans in the action
which took place on the 5th September, 1519, were in
great strength, their army being drawn up in five
battalions of 10,000 men each.

The common soldiers in their ranks were almost naked.
They were armed with bows and arrows, slings and
iavelins. They could discharge two or three arrows at
a time with good aim. The most dangerous weapon was
a javelin, with a thong to withdraw it after throwing it.'

The chief warriors wore the quilted cotton mail, which
was adopted by the Spaniards. It was about two inches
thick, and was a tolerable defence against light missiles.
Over this it was that the wealthier officers wore the
cuirasses of gold and silver. The discipline, the bravery,
and the steadiness of Cortez's little band, aided as it was
by firearms, horsemen, and artillery, gained the victory
after most desperate fighting.

It would take up too much space to follow further the
operations of Cortez, and those of Pizarro afterwards in
South America. We have simply referred to the war as
an important episode in the history of the cavalry service,
and having described the arms, armour, and organisation
of the Indians of that day, may conclude by saying
that the horsemen, from the commencement to the end
of the struggle, formed the most valuable portion of the

invading armies.

Prescott, i, 241.

CHAPTER XI.

Cavalry in the "Thirty Years' War." Gustavus
Adolphus, Tilly, and Wallenstein.

SECTION I. — GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

f the

In the Thirty Years' War the military art went through
several phases of development, Gustavus Adolphus,
King of Sweden, the great central figure of that conflict,
having been the most noted military reformer of modern
times.^ In fact, he made a greater progress in tactics
and the military art generally than any commander
before or since his time. He was, practically, the creator
of a new art of war, which, in its essential points, sub-
sists to the present day. His appearance on the European
stage marks therefore a distinct and important epoch,^

Gustavus Adolphus belongs to a type that appears
but rarely on the pages of history. He was well edu-
cated, thoroughly acquainted with the military institutions
of antiquity, and understood fully the principles upon
which Alexander, and Hannibal, and Csesar won their
imperishable renown. He was a great innovator upon
the military systems of his time, and although some of
his changes were real novelties, most of them were
rather the result of an intelligent recurrence to the ideas
of the ancient masters than, properly speaking, new
inventions.

He improved the discipline of the army very materially,
and was the first to introduce the order and regularity
^ Beamish, 334. « Decker, 36.

M

256 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [pkriod in.

which aro so important elements of success in military
operations. He originated the idea of clothing the
soldiers well in uniform dresses, according to the divisions
to which they belonged. Up to his period the soldiers
were clad in every variety of costume that individual
caprice dictated ; and armies were usually composed of
ragged and insubordinate mercenaries. Tilly's doctrine,
" a ragged soldit^r and a bright musket," shows the
general opinion of the age on the point. By having his
soldiers well clad, Gustavus rendered his army more
capable of enduring the vicissitudes of the climate and
improved the esprit du corps and the general appearance
of his troops.

It was customary at this period to form the infantry
in battalions ranged in massive squares or oblongs, the
centre being composed of cuirassed spearm.n or pikemen,
while they were surrounded in front and flanks by
musketeers. This formation was the legitimate outcome
of the system of mingling musketeers and pikemen, to
which we referred in the last chapter. The use of fire-
arms had become so general, and was so much relied
upon to decide the fate of battles, that the cavalry as
well as the infantry depended mainly upon those;
weapons. The traditions of the former prowess of the
horsemen, however, as well as the yet incomplete state of
the musket, which was loaded slowly, and which carried
with little precision, rendered necessary a force of pikemen
who, armed with breastplates as a defence against the
pistol shots of the cavalry, could oppose with their pikes
an impassable barrier to the advancing horsemen. Again
in charging positions, when the battle closed to " push
of pike," the pikemen of the opposing sides came to
the front and charged with levelled weapons.

The system was based upon the heavy and unwieldy
phalanx of the Greek armies. Gustavus Adolphus, with
that clear-sighted genius which was his distinguishing
characteristic, saw that a system well suited to an age
that was unprovided with missile weapons of either range
QT force, was most unsuited to his time, when projectile
weapons of great power had been invented, and had

f'HAP. XI.

THE THIUTY VKARS' WAR.

257

age
ange
jctile

had

partly superseded the '' armcs blanches." Cannon also
were being nun'h more used upon the field of aetion,
and were jissuniing a very inipoi't;int position in armies,
and the carnage infiietcd by artillery upon the heavy
masses of infantry was another reason that induced liini
to change its formation.

Imbued with the militaiy principles of antiquity, ho
formed his troo[)sup()n tlie model of the lloman Legion,
not in a slavish maimer, but by adapting the idea to the
circumstances of his age, and the altered conditions of
warfare.' lie redu(;ed the enormous regiments of 2,000
and 3,000 men, to 1,200, and afterwards to 1,000, and
relied more upon freedom of action and rapidity of
movement than upon clumsy and unwiiddy strength."

He 1 -luced the de|)th of the infantry from twelve to
six, Sep, jated the pikemen from the musketeers, and
formed them into small bodies,'^ so that they should be
more movable, and better abh,' to support each other.
By the reduction in depth of the ranks, he secured a
greater front, and a lieavier fire of musketry, while
cannon had less opportunity for destructive fire. The
divisions were so draw a up that the musketeers could file
out between the inter^'als of the spearmen, and again fall
back like the Roman velites through the same intervals,
when the pikemen came to close quarters. The pik'^s
were shortened from eighteen to fourteen feet, and the
most cumbrous part of the armour was done away with.

Gustavus Adolphus has also the credit of inventing
the column, as well as the custom of the front rank
kneeling to fire, and the system of firing by platoons.*
He introduced portable leathern artillery, and the use of
cartridges, to carry which he supplied his men with
pouches and abolished the bandoleers. He increased the
proportion of officers to the men, in or''^ ^ that the whole
and every part of his army should be brought under
complete and effectual command.* He lightened and
improved the musket, and did away with the rest or
foiirchetie.

' Chapman, !>1. "- Pouniish. ?,^:\ ^ Mitdipll. 1 :..",.

* l-cnuish, :').■»."). " Clinpniaii, 1*2.

'!* '.

.;» J

258

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

Another important principle that we first see employed
by the Swedish king was the combination and mutual
support of the three arms, using each in its proper
spliere, but in connection with the others.^ He formed
his troops in two or three lines ranged parallel one
behind the other, or en echiquier, the cavalry behind
the infantry to sustain it or upon the wings to be applied
in mass, the artillery distributed upon the best positions
aong the line, to sustain the infantry and cavalry.

In the Polish war Gustavus lightened the muskets.
They were mostly match-locks, which long maintained
the preference over the flint-locks then beginnmg to come
into use, but which were at first badly constructed and
very clumsy. The musketeers at this time often carried
pointed stakes, called " hog's bristles," or Swedish
feathers. They were stuck in the ground a few paces
before the line of infantry, inclining outwards, and
formed a defence, against a charge of cavalry, for the
musketeers who maintained their fire under the cover of
them.^ Thisi it will be remembered, was simply a renewal
of the expedient used by the English archers at Agincourt.
These pikes were only used for a very short period. The
side-arm of the musketeer was the sword, his only de-
fensive armour the helmet. The pikemen used cuirasses
and thigh-pieces, and carried also swords or axes.

The pikeman, in receiving the charge of cavalry, held
his weapon in a slanting position, with his left hand
staying the butt against his right foot, while in his right
hand he held his battle-axe, or drawn sword. It is a
curious circumstance worthy of mention, that in the year
1628 Gustavus had 3,000 bowmen in his army. During
the Polish war, there was in the Swedish army a corps
that marched on snow-shoes, and was used as a corps of
observation when deep snow prevented regular operations.
In this connection it may be stated that the troops of
the British army stationed in Lov/er Canada have always
been trained to march in heavy order upon snow-shoes.

Gustavus Adolphus was also a great reformer in
the cavalry service, and may be said to have been
' Decker, i. 36, 37. - Chapman, 93.

CHAP. XI.]

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

259

the first to appreciate the true uses of that arm in
the position in which it was placed under the system
of modern warfare. His ameliorations were very im-
portant, not so much in the arms and equipment, as in
the tactical method of using it.

When he came upon the scene the cavalry tactics of
the age were of the clumsiest and slowest type. The
squadrons were large, the mi^n heavily armed, and moving
at slow pace, they relied mainly upon their muskets and
pistols. The charge at speed was unknown. Gustavus
organised his cavalry into regiments, consisting of eight
troops, each containing about 70 men ; the regiment
therefore, when full, having a strength of about 560 men.*
These regiments were formed four ranks in depth, and
afterwards in three, which was a great reduction from
the massive formation in use before his time. The
weight of the cavalry appointments wns also lessened as
much as possible. He retained only the cuirass and
helmrt in the heavy cavalry, the light cavalry wearing
no defensive armour.^

He suppressed the caracoles and half wheels, and half
halts, which were commonly practised in his time in order
to draw the fire of the enemy before riding closely up, and
ordered his troops to ride boldly up to the enemy's line,
when the front rank, firing a single volley with their
pistols, were to draw swords and dash in among the
troops opposed to them, the second and third i-anks
generally reserving their fire, to be used when the
enemy's line was broken.

It was in the hand-to-hand combat that Gustavus
taught his cavalry to be famous. He wished them to
depend upon the keen edge of the sword, and the shock
of the charging men and horses, and he was therefore
the first to revive the ideas of Alexander and Hannibal,
and to introduce into modern Europe the true principles
of cavalry tactics.'

Gustavus is generally reported to have mixed his
infantry and cavalry in the- manner of the ancient
Komans. Scliiller says he mach' ii]) for his want of
' ('hapman, !I5. - Fonscolonibe, .'il. •' ('hapninn, Vt7.

V !

'I II

I

s -Z

260

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

^1'

1^

cavalry by mixing inftintry among the horse, and says
that this practice frequently decided the victory. It
seems, however, that writers have misunderstood his tac-
tical arrangements, and have thouoht that he mixed up
the different arms, when he simply combined them ju-
diciously, to enable them mutually to support each other.
His evident desire to give his cavalry more freedom and
greater mobility, to rely mainly upon their dexterous use
of hand-to-hand weapons, seems to contradict the notion
that he would ever have hampered and clogijed the move-
ments of his horse, by mixing bodies of intantry among
them. We can easily understand his placing his infantry
and cavalry alternately in the line of battle, or " en
^chiquier " with artillery interspersed along the line. In
fact, we know this w^as his constant practice. When an
advancing enemy had been well shaken by the fire of
cannon and musketry, he then launched out liis cavalry
through the intervals at the charge, to fall upon the dis-
ordered masses of the foe. That wus however a very
different species of tactics to the method used before
his time of mixing the arms, and making them move
and, work together at the same pace. Gustavus evidently
appreciated too well the value of the speed and weight
of the horse, to take from his cavalrv their greatest ad-
vantage, and to tie them down to the slowness and tor-
pidity of an auxiliary force of infantry.'

In the Swedish army the cuirassiers, or heavy cavalry,
were armed with the helmet and cuirass, a long sword,
and two pistols.^ The dragoons or cavalry of the line
wore the helmet only as a defence, and carried the long
fusil or musket, and a sword. They were at this time
used more as cavalry than as mounted infantry, which
was the original object of their organisation. The light
cavalry wore no defensive armour whatever. The heavy
cavalry was generally held in reserve to sustain the army,
and the third rank generally formed a support to the
other two. Gustavus is also said to have attached small
pieces of light artillery to the regiments of cavalry.'*

^ Mitchell, lf»4. ^ Fonscolombe, 51 ; Decker, i. 37; Humbert,
8. » Humbert, 90.

(ii.\r. XI.]

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

261

Hme
lich

SECTION IT. — CAVALRY OF THE IMPERIAL ARMY

BATTLES OF BRElTENrELD AND LUTZEN.

The cavalry in the armies of Tilly and Wallenstcin
consisted of cuirassiers, carbineers, dragoons, hussars, and
Croats,^ The cuirassiers were all arme<l with heavy de-
fensive armour, and were mounted upon large and power-
ful chargers. They were drawn up by Tilly ten ranks in
depth, and by Wallenstein in eight. They could move
but slowly, and depended much upon their firearms.

The carbineers were used much in the same way, riding
up and firing by successive ranks and retiring to reload.
The dragoons, who used long muskets, sometimes fought
on foot, but generally fought much upon the same prin-
ciple as the heavy cavalry. The light cavalry were
drawn up in a shallower formation, Tilly ranging them
six in depth, and Wallenstein five.

The hussars were very handsomely clad, their uniforms
and trappings being all richly decorated. The most im-
portant body of light cavalry in the Imperial armies was
composed of the Croats, who formed an irregular force
of great value. Their principal use was in surprising
convoys and baggage, cutting oft' communications, &c.
They were not treated as other troops in capitulations and
surrenders, for they ^^•ere usually excluded, and cut down
as heathen barbarians.^ We read of a sharp conflict
between 4,000 men, principally Croats, under Colonel
Spar at Burgau, and a detachment under Gustavus
Adolphus, in which the Imperial cavalry were thoroughly
routed by the Swedish troops.'' This action had a most
demoralizing eftect upon these irregular horsemen.

The two most important battles of this ag<' wove those
of Breitenfeld, or Leipzig, in 1631, and Lutzen in the
following year ; and in both actions we find the cavalry
service reviving and again beginning to exert an im-
portant influence upon the result of battles.

At Breitenfeld, the Imperial army, 35,000 strong,
occupied a rising ground on the plain. Tilly, the com-
' Beamish, 336. « Mitchell, 160. 3 ibid. 227.

)'}

262

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

I;

mander-in-chief, occupied the centre, while Furstenburg
commanded the right, and Pappenheim, the boldest
cavalry officer in the Imperial forces, commanded the
left. The army was drawn up in one line of great
depth, the cavalry upon the wings, the artillery ranged
upon a hill along the rear of the line.

The Swedish and Saxon army advanced in two columns,
having to pass a small rivulec near Podelwitz in Tilly's
front. In order to defend the passage of this stream the
battle was begun by a charge of 2,000 cuirassiers, led by
the fiery Pappenheim, upon the van of the Swedish
army, which consisted of three regiments of Scott .>h
infantry. The Scots had some advantage of ground,
and, being supported by a body of dragoons, drove back
the enemy.' Pappenheim soon rallied his troops and
attacked the flank of the advancing Swedes. General
Banner immediately wheeled the leading divisions to the
right, and held the opposing cavalry in check, while the
king was drawing up the army in battle array.

The cuirassiers, being repulsed, retreated so precipi-
tately back to their lines that they left the Holstein
regiment of infantry, which had been despatched to their
assistance, alone upon the plain, subject to the onslaught
of the pursuing Swedish horsemen. Their heavy and
unwieldy tactics here proved very faulty. They formed
square with the pikemen, by some oversight or mistake
in the centre, surrounded by musketeers who were at
once cut down by a charge of the Finland cavalry. The
spearmen, although able to defend themselves against
the horsemen, were attacked by two companies of
Swedish musketeers and completely routed, their colonel,
the Duke of Holstein, being slain. ^

The king's army, 20,000 strong, then formed for
action, inspirited by the result of this preliminary
skirmish. It was drawn up in two lines and a reserve.
Gustavus commanded the right wing himself. General
Horn commanded the left, and Teuffel the centre.

It is said that Gustavus in this action had a reserve
of artillery, being the first instance of the kind
• Mitchell, 189. '^ Ibid. 190.

in

in

CHAP. XI.]

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

263

history. The main action began by a desperate cavalry
combat which took place on the right of the Swedish
army, where Gustavus Adolphus and Pappenheim, at
the head of the rival masses of horsemen, charged
furiously against each other. After close hand-to-hand
fighting, Pappenheim and his heavy cuirassiers were
di'iven headlong from the fio]d. Gustavus, wheeling
from the pursuit, captured the Imperial artillery and
turned their fire upon the heavy masses of his infantry
in the centre.

In the meantime, Furstenburg, at the head of the
Imperial right wing, had defeated the Saxon army of
allies, which was formed upon the Swedish left, and
drove them, completely beaten, in confusion from the
field. Tilly could not restrain his troops in the pursuit,
and Gustavus, taking advantage of their absence,
attacked the uncovered flank of the enemy's centre and
routed it. Furstenburg soon rallied his victorious troops,
and returned with about 8,000 men to fall upon the
Swedish left. The second line was moved up to support
the flank and placed en potence, and the reserve also
arriving to their assistance, the battle was restored in
that ^art of the plain. By this time the day was fast
waning. The Imperial centre was broken, its left wing
driven from the field, and the victory w^as almost won.
The fighting was however gallantly maintained by the
Imperial cavalry. Four troops of cuirassiers at this
crisis charged up to the very heads of the Swedish pikes,
and, with their pistols, picked off" every ensign in Lums-
den's regrn'.ent ; but it was all in vain. The Swedes
doubled thv. ''- front by moving up the three rear ranks
between the i,hree front, so that the infantry assumed a
formation three deep, and the first rank kneeling, the
second stooping, and the third standing erect, they
poured in a heavy and well-sustained fire, while the
cavalry attacked the flanks and rear of the veteran troops
which still maintained the fight along the enemy's
position.*

It was a most decisive victory ; the loss in Tilly's

' Chapman, 263.

i

,- t

204

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

army being enormous, both in killed, wounded, and
prisoners.

No one can read the details of this battle and compare
them with the particulars of the battles of Pavia,
Mohacz, Moneontour, Courti-j^s, &c., fought in the preced-
ing age, without being struck with the great development
of the art of war in a short period. In Breitenfeld we first
see a battle fought upon the same general principles as
are in use at the present day. The combination of the
three arms is clearly shown, the revival of the cavalry
service plainly foreshadowed, and the tactical mana;u vres
of Gustavus in guarding his wings are superior to any-
thing of the sort since the palmy days of the military art
among the Romans.

Lutzen, fought shortly after, on the 6th November,
1632, between Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein, was
very similar to Breitenfeld in the principles of the tactics
employed in both armies. The Imperial army contained
about 17,000 men at the commencement of the action,
which was increased to 27,000 during the engagement
by the arrival of Pappenheim at the head of 10,000 men.
It was drawn up in two lines with a reserve, and Wallen-
stein had strengthened his position by loopholing and
occupying some walled gardens on his right front, and
by deepening the ditches on the road and lining them with
musketeers.' The Swedish army, 20,000 strong, w^as
ranged upon two lines ; the infantry six deep ; the
cavalry, according to some winters, three deep, although
Harte in his History of Gustavus Adolphus says that at
this period i^ w^as his custom to draw up his cavalry four
ranks in dcj^^^x.^ The infantry occupied the centre, the
cavalry the wings ; a reserve of infantry, under Colonel
Henderson, was placed in the centre between the two
lines, and in rear of the centre a separate cavalry reserve
was posted under the command of Colonel Oehm.

The battle v-t,s commenced with a general attack by

the Swedish line upon Wallenstein's position in which

the high road was carried, and the batteries beyond it

captured by the infantry brigades of the centre of the

' Chapman, 372. - Beamish, 339.

CHAP. XI.]

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

265

king's line.' Being unsupported in time, however, by
their cav ahy, wliich had been decayed 1 )y the obstructions
of the ground, they were obliged to fall baek.

The braA^e Swedish king, at the head of the cavalry of
his right wing, had already attacked and dispersed the
lightly mounted Poles and Croats, who were posted on
the enemy's left, and their disorderly flight had carried
confusion among tlie remainder of the cavalry. At this
moment he was informed of the repulse of his infantry
in the centre, and committing to General Horn the con-
duct of the pursuit of the hostile horsemen, he at once
led the regiment of Steinbock cuirassiers to the support
of his centre and left, which were being hardly pressed.
lie outstripped his followers, and arriving at the decisive
point, rode forward to reconnoitre the best place to
attack. Unfortunately he advanced too close to the
enemy's ranks, and was wounded in the left arm. Soon
after, a second shot l)rought him down from Lis horse,
and a body of Croats charging, killed him as he lay
mortally wounded upon the ground.^

The Swedes, inflamed with rage at the loss of their
dearly loved monarch, attacked with such fury that the
whole Imperial army was being pressed back at every
point, and the victory was almost decided. At this
important crisis, Pappenheim, the fiery cavalry officer,
the hardest fighter in the Austrian service, appeared
upon the field with his cuirassiers and dragoons. He
was at Halle, a considerable distance from the field of
battle, the evening before, when he received a despatch
from Wallenstein to hurry up with all speed to the scene
of action. On receipt of the order, his men were en-
gaged in sacking the town. He instantly sounded " to
horse," and set out at speed at the head of his cavalry,
ordering the infantry and artillery to follow as fast as
they could be got together.

His arrival in the battle at once changed the aspect
of affairs. He rallied the fugitives, and led them again
to the charge, aided by his own horsemen. His im-
j)etu(ms bravery carried him furiously into the thickest

' Chapman, .375.

■^ Schiller, 238.

fl

266

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period III.

of the Swetlisli ranks ; hia example inspired his men,
and inflamed their courage, so that all went down before
them. Wallenstein rapidly availing himself of the
favourable moment, re- formed his line, and leading it again
to the charge, the Swedes were driven back with en(3r-
mous loss, and the twice captured cannon were again
taken from them. Piccolomini and Tersky ably seconded
the efforts of Pappenheim, the Swedish regiment of
Blues being cut down after a desperate fight by Piccolo-
mini's cuirassiers. Seven times did that gallant cavalry
leader charge, six times was he wounded, and seven
-xorsea were shot under him before he was carried in the
general rout off" the field. Wallenstein was hit several
times, while Pappenheim, the only cavalry leader of
Germany who could be compared with Gustavus Adol-
phus, had his gallant spirit stilled for ever, upon the
same field that had been so fatal to his great rival.

The death of Pappenheim ended the good fortune of
the Imperial army. He had blazed across the struggle
like a meteor brightening their prospects, and lighting
them on to victory : when he fell, it was as if the sun
had gone down, and the dejected cuirassiers fled from
the field of battle in blank despair.

The Swedes, again rallying, threw the remains of the
first and second line into a single one, and made a final
and successful charge, when night coming on, put an
end to one of the most sternly contested and bloody
battles that has ever been fought.

The influence of the cavalry in this action is very
marked, and is a proof of the great value of the reforms
effected by Gustavus Adolphus in the method of em-
ploying it. One of the great reasons, however, that
caused its increased influence, was evidently the extra-
ordinary capacity of the Swedish king as a cavalry
commander. The impetuosity of Pappenheim's disposi-
tion also affected the operations of the Imperial cavalry
very materially.

How different was the battle of Lutzen from the battle
of Bouvines with its boasted chivalry, with its Count of
Boulogne, and his circle of pikemen ! How different

OIIAP. XI.]

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

267

from the bloodless battles in Italy, with their iron-cased
soldiers, their clumsy manoeavres, and their losses by
suftbcation in the mud !

Something had put a bolder and more gallant spirit
into the leaders of this age. The Duke Bernard of
Wiemar took the command after the death of the king,
and his prompt decision of character at that crisis is
deeply marked upon the pages of history. Ketreat was
suggested to him. The fiery duke answered that i^- was
a question of vengeance, not of retreat. He then assumed
the command, and ordered the lieutenant-colonel of the
Steinbock regiment to advance. H(} hesitated to obey
the order, and was at once run through the body by the
impetuous Bernard, who, placing himself at the head of
the regiment, led a victorious charge.

The outpost and reconnoitring service was fairly per-
formed in these wars. Patrols were used very freely,
and were sent to great distances in every direction.
When the enemy was far removed, the patrols were
smaller in number, consisting of one sub- officer and six
or seven men. When the armies were closer to each
other, the patrols were larger and more numerous. The
reconnoitring parties then consisted of an officer and
about twenty men in each.'

Information was obtained by spies, and by prisoners
who were always closely questioned when captured ; and
the small parties of cavalry were always on the watch
for couriers carrying despatches, from which, of course,
the most useful information could be obtained.

' Duparcq, ii. 150, 151.

I 1

CHAPTER XTT.

Cavat;ry in the Wars in England between Charles 1.
AND THE Parliament.

The great Civil War in England,. 1642 to IGi^O, pro-
duced some very able cavalry leaders, ami the mounted
service was skilfully handled, and exercised a most
important influence upon the result of the battles.
Cromwell, the great cavalry general of the Parliamen-
tary army, had as much downright solid energy as
Gustavus Adolphus, and as i..ach impetuosity in leading
a charge as his celebrated opponent, the fiery Prince
Rupert ; while his shrewd common sense, and his iron
will, made him one of the greatest rulers aud soldiers
that ever lived. A plain country genthmian, forty-four
years of age, without military training or experience of
any kmd, he raised a regiment of cavalry at the com-
mencement of the war for the Parliamentarv service,
which, distinguished above all in the army for steadiness
as well as brilliant gallantry, was soon known by the
soubriquet of "The Ironsides." Within three years this
country gentleman was commander-in-chief of the army,
and within ten years was the most absolute ruler that
e^ er swayed the destinies of England.

Prince Rupert, with equal, if not greater impetuosity
than Cromwell, lacked the prudence and caution required
in any important command. The energy of these two
officers imprinted a character upon the cavalry operations
of the war, very difterent from that of former ages. The
dash and vigour of the cavalry charges rendered them

CHAP. XII.] CAVALRY IN OUR CIVIL WARS.

269

cqiuil to the feats of the hoi-Henieii of Gustavus Adolphus
and Pappciiheim. The cavalry were organised into cuiras-
siers and dragoons ; the pistol and sword Ix'ing the
principal weapons of the former, while the latter carried
muskets.

The first conflict of the war was a skirmish between a
small party of cavalry, under Prince Rupert, and a body
of the rebel horse, under Colonel Sandys. The Prince
no sooner saw the enemy than he chiirged at full speed
as they were defiling from a lane. The sudden onslaught
gave him the victory. This exercised a great moral
influence over the future ojx'rations, and gave a high
reputation to the Royalist horse, which the " Ironsides"
alone were able to wrest from them.^

At the battle of Edge-hill, in 1642, the Royalist
cavalry, on both wings, defeated the horse opposed to
them, but pursued the fugitives so far that, before they
returned, the centre of the King's army had been badly
handled by the rebel infimtry. Prince Rupert through-
out the war seems to have failed to learn the importance of
keeping his men in hand, and of remembering always to
reserve his conmiand to be applied at the decisive points,
at the critical times when required.

The combats of Grantham and Gainsborough were
decided by the cavalry. In the first action the opposing
dragoons fired at each other for about half an hour, when
Cromwell led his horsemen on at the charge sword in
hand. The Royalists injudiciously awaited the shock
standing, and, as a matter of course, were driven off the
field in headlong rout, and pursued for miles with heavy
loss.^

At the battle of Gainsborough, Cromwell, who had
been skirmishing with the advance of the enemy, drove
them over the crest of a hill, and came suddenly upon a
very large body of horse, who were advancing to take
him by surprise. Holding back three troops, under
Major Whalley, as a reserve, Cromwell at once charged
vehemently upon the Royalists, and his steady horse-
men pressing in after him, with sword and pistol, soon
^ Clarendon's History, voL ii. part i. p. 25. ^ Xolan, 20.

270

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[fkriod iir.

11

/Jill

defeated the enemy, and pursued them vigorously. The
Royalist reserve, under General Cavendish, charged the
Lincolners and routed them, wh(!n Cromwell, whose
quick decision grasped everything, turned with the three
troops, in reserve under Whalley, and fell upon the rear
of Cavendish's horsemen, and drove them oif th(5 field
with the loss of their leader, who was slain in the

Marston Moor, 2nd July, 1G44, was another celebrated
action, and its result was decided by the cavulry. The
King's army was commanded by Prince Rupert and the
Marquis of Newcastle. The Parliamentary army was led
by the Earl of Manchester and Cromwell, and laced the
east, while their opponents faced the west. The battle
opened by an attack of the left wing of Manchester's army,
the cavalry, under Cromwell, charging the cavalry of the
Royalist right, under Prince Rupert. A desperate fight
ensued between these two celebrated generals, and the
fate of it was decided by Cromwell's precaution of always
holding a reserve in hand. This fresh body suddenly
falling upon the Royalists, while engaged in a hand-to-
hand, struggle, turned the scale, and gave the victory in
that part of the field entirely to the rebels, who forced
the right wing of the King's troops back in rear of their
left.

While this had been going on in one part of the field,
the exact counterpart had taken j^lace on the opposite
wings of the contending armies. The Royalist left wing
had been charged by the enemy, under Sir Thomas
Fairfax, and were at first put into confusion.^ Lucas,
who commanded the Royal horse, soon restored order to
his forces, and made a vigorous charge upon the Par-
liamentary cavalry of the right, defeated them, and
routed also the infantry of that wing. The result was
that the two armies swung round on the centre to such
an extent, that in the evening they each occupied the
ground held by the other at the commencement of the
action.' A decisive charge of Cromwell's cavalry, which
he had collected from the pursuit, at last decided the
1 Nolan, 20. 2 n^id. 22. 3 Hume, v. 276.

CHAP. XII.] CAVALRY IN OUR CIVIL WARS.

271

fjitc of the day, and gave to tlie rebels a most important
victory.

Naseby, fought on the 14th June, 1G45, was somewhat
.similar in its eharucter to Marston Moor, l)Ut was still
more like the battle; of Nordlingen, which will be referred
to substHjuently. Again, Ruj)i!rt on the right wing, by a
charge of cavalry, defeated the Parliamentary left, and
drove it oft", pursuing with mad impetuosity to a great
distance. Cromwell, at the same time, had chargcid the
Royalist left, under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and rout(;d
it. Unlike Rupert, however, his calm judgment never
left him for an instant, even in the hot excitement of a
cavalry charge, lie soon rallied his men, re-formed them,
and led them into action, where he at onee fell upon the
flank and rear of the exposed infantry of the King's left
wing, then engaged in a desperate struggle with the
rebel foot. Rupert, in wild pursuit, his horsemen blown
and scattered, did not return till the day was lost, and
with it the King's crown. The difterence in the conduct
of the two cavalry officers conveys a great lesson as to
the duties of a commander of horse, and is another proof
of the necessity of combining caution with energy and
impetuosity. Cromwell was as imi3etuous as the fiery
Rupert, but his impetuosity was always directed with
judgment, and while no one could surpass him in the
tremendous vehemence with which he forced his way
into the hostile ranks, neither could anyone surpass him
in quick decision, and in the cool deliberation with
which he could check himself while in full career, and, if
necessary, assume a defensive policy.

It is said that a few of the officers who served in the
Civil War in England had served in Germany, and had
charged under the great Gustavus and the gallant
Pappenheim on many a hard-fought field. If so, the
experience and the accounts of that war must have had
their influence upon the hard-riding English country
gentlemen and yeomen who formed the horsemen of the
time, and whose native vigour would make them apt
imitators of any system of warfare that required daring,
energy, and downright hard blows.

272

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [ieuk.i, m.

■i: k4

Vii

Before leaving the English cavalry of this period,
mention should be made of the Marquis of INIontrose,
who, in the campaigns in Scotland, gave proof of military-
capacity of the highest type, and who adopted a system
of mingling infantry with the cavalry, not in masses,
but in small parties composed of Highlanders, a hardy
race of mountaineers, who, swift of foot as the deer, kept
up with the horsemen, and with broadsword and shield
fought at close quarters, and with wonderful braverv.
The campaigns of Montrose in the Highlands of Scot-
land in 1645, for boldness and skill, will compare favour-
ably with anything in history.

The next generation produced in Scotland Grahame
of Claverhouse, better known as " Bonnie Dundee," who
was a cavalry officer of the highest quality, his impetu-
osity being unsurpassed, his energy and determination
unequalled ; while his skill in tactical and strategical
movements was evinced in the strongest manner. With-
out the opportunities of displaying his ability, that most
great generals have had, we have still enough informa-
tion left concerning him to show that, with the single
exception of Cromwell, the British Islands never pr(j-
duced a better cavalry commander.

t'

CHAPTER XIII.
Russian Cavalry at this Epoch — Cossacks.

About the end of the fifteenth century we begin to
hear of the cavalry known as the Cossacks, and as we
shall subsequently refer frequently to their operations,
and have to relate the most important results produced
by their exertions, it will be of interest to say a few
words about their early history.

The Greek Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenetus
makes mention in the ninth century of a country named
Cosaquie, situated near the foot of the Caucasus. It is
said there existed, before th-j invasion of the Mongols, a
Tartar people called Cossacks, who lived on the banks of
the Don and the Volga. In 1021 they submitted to the
Grand Prince Mstislaff, who had them in his army in his
war in 1023 against his brother Jaroslaf. During the
Tartar yoke there were no Russian Cossacks, but after
that yoke was thrown off numbers of Russians estab-
Hshed themselves in the former habitations of the
Cossacks, and adopting a similar habit of living, natu-
rally received the same name.^

The historical Russian tablets of the twelfth century
often mention the existence of a free military organisa-
tion in the country lying between the Black Sea and the
Caspian. They were composed of emigrants of all
nations, but especially of Russia, Poland, and the Cau-
casus. They seem to have lived by war and plunder.
The Tartars called them by the word '* Khasaks," meaning

* Haxthausen, La Force Militaire de la Russie, p. 147.

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274

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEEIOD III.

i'.a

revolted oi* free. Afterwards these bunds became more
thoroughly organised, and being settled in some par-
ticular districts, received the names of the territories ;
for example, the Don Cossacks, the Oural Cossacks, the
Zaporog Cossacks, Yalek Cossacks, &c.^

It is said there were Cossacks in the army of Genghis
Khan, in the year 1224, under the command of a Voie-
vode named Ploskina. This Cossack leader induced the
Great Prince Mstislaff Eomanofvitch of Kief to come
out of his fortress, guaranteeing his safety, and kissing
the cross as an oath testifying his good faith. On
getting the prince in his power he tortured and killed
him. This incident proves the lawless and savage charac-
ter of these troops at that time. , These same bands served
in the Byzantine army under the name of " Alani." ^

The Cossacks are mentioned in the reign of Vassili
Vassiliavitch, when the Moscow militia fought against
the Tartar Sultan Mustapha in 1444.^ We hear of them
also in Poland in 1516, and before 1579 the Zaporog
Cossacks had fought against the Turks, with the armies
of the Emperor Rodolph II.

The Cossacks paid no taxes ; they received some land
in possession, in return for which they were obliged to
serve in time of war, as also were the noblemen and the
children of the Boyars.* They were allies, so to speak, of
the king, but at the same time were under his protection.
All the soldiers of a district composed a horse regiment,
which was named either after the name of the town, or
of its Voievode. They were divided into hundreds,
fifties, and tens, under the command of " sotniks " and
** ouradniks." They were armed in the same manner as
the other Russian troops, that is to say, with sabres, lances
and bows and arrows, and afterwards with pistols and
carbines.® Each regiment had its standard (chorigoy),
a drum, and musical instruments. The Don Cossacks
were the most numerous, and they are said to have had
artillery. They always obeyed the summons of the Czar,
but no one ever appeared among them to demand taxes.

' Ivanhoff.
covitch, 10.

2 Zeddler, ii. 235.
6 Ibid. 28.

» Ibid.

* Oondim LeGf-

!! ■

CHAP. XIII.]

RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

275

In the reign of Alexse Michseloviteh, 1655, it was ordered
that each man taken for the cavalry should appear on a
good horse, with one carabine and two pistols. Although
they were principally cavalry, there were also foot regi-
ments of Cossacks.

These irregular horsemen were most valuable auxili-
aries, and from this period they always formed a very
important portion of the Russian army. They were
most useful for outposts and the minor operations of
war, and in the campaigns of Russia during the eight-
eenth and the beginning of the present century they
exercised a most important influence.

i li

T 2

J

L

ii

:i:il!i

illll

1

i

:j;Vi

§i

■ ; I ■ :!

!iiw

CHAPTER XIV.

French Cavalry — Campaigns of Cond6, Turenne,

AND Luxembourg.

SECTION I. organisation, ARMAMENT, AND EQUIPMENT

OF CAVALRY UNDER LOUIS XIV.

At this period the cavahy of all European nations,
except that of the Turks, was composed either of
cuirassiers or of horsemen, who, although equipped and
uniformed in various ways, were yet in reality simply
dragoons. After the time of Gustavus Adolphus the
cavalry seemed gradually to have fallen back somewhat
in their tactics and method of fighting, and for a long
period the system of providing cavalry with firearms,
and relying mainly upon them, again came into use.

Louis XIV. increased the number of his guards or
household troops very materially, and spent enormous
sums in uniforming and equipping them, so that they
were probably the most magnificent and expensive body
of soldiery at that period maintained in Europe.' A
large portion of them consisted of cavalry, there being
four companies of body-guards, one company of
gendarmes, one of light horse, and two companies of
mousquetaires.^ The companies of body-guards consisted
of 360 men each, with a captain, three lieutenants, three
ensigns, twelve exempts, twelve brigadiers, twelve sub-
brigadiers, and six standard-bearers. Each company
was divided into six divisions, called brigades, com-

• Daniel, ii. 81. » Ibid. 82.

CHAP. XIV.]

FRENCH CAVALRY.

277

manded by the throe li(aitenants and the three ensigns,
according to their seniority.^

They were armed when on active service with the
sword, pistol, and a mousgueton, a species of short
musket. They were accustomed to fight with the pistol
and sword, the mousqucton being only used in guarding
a defile, in pursuit of a routed enemy, or in any service
of a similar nature.

In 1G76 Louis XIV. created a company of mounted
grenadiers to form part of his guard. It was composed
of 130 men, forming one squadron of three "hrujades."
It had three liciutenants, three sub-lieutenants, three
marechaux des logis, six sergeants, and six " appointez."'^
They carried the sword, th(j fusil, and two pistols, and
fought both on foot and on horseback, distinguishing
themselves as cavalry at Leuze, and as infantry at
Valenciennes, where they stormed by a coup-de-main a
fortress of the strongest kind.

The company of gendarmes contained about 200 men,
with two captains, three ensigns, and three guidons,
besides a number of officers of lower rank. In 1657
their arms consisted of the sword, the pistol, and in time
of war a portion of them were supplied with rifled
carbines. The uniform was of scarlet, and without
defensive armour.

The company of light horse of the guard consisted of
200 men, two lieutenants, four cornets, ten marechaux
des logis, besides the inferior officers. This company,
like all the other light horse, had attached to them in
time of war a body of fifty carabins, under the command
of the officer of the company. They usually opened the
action by firing upon the enemy. This practice was in
use about the year 1620, when afterwards Louis XIV.
organised these bodies of carabins into regiments of
carabineers. They were no longer attached to the coijjs
of chevaux legers, and the company, which had been
under the command of the captain of the light horse of
the guard, was formed into a company of mousque fairest
The chevaux legers were armed with swords or sabres,
' Daniel, ii. 83. 2 ibid. ii. 128. » Ibid. ii. 143, 144.

378

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY,. [period hi.

and pistols. Afterwards they were also supplied with
twenty carbines, which were given to the twenty men who
formed the rear. They were used only on rare occasions,
before they came to close quarters. They were also clad
in scarlet, without defensive armour.

Two companies of mousquetaires completed the cavalry
of the guard ; they consisted each of 250 men, with the
usual supply of officers. They served both on foot and
mounted, and were veritable dragoons. At Cassel, as
the army was forming up for the battle, the Marshal
d'Humi^res perceived behind some hedges three battalions
of the enemy. He immediately ordered the mousque-
taires to dismount and attack these battalions, which
they did, seconded by an infantry regiment, and soon
defeated the enemy and drove them off. They then
remounted and formed up in the order of battle as cavalry.
They were armed with muskets, swords, and pistols.'

Besides the household troops there were large bodies
of heavy cavalry in the army, called gendarmerie, as well
as carabineers, light cavalry, and dragoons.

The carabineers were first formed into a regiment in
1693 by Louis XIV. It consisted of one hundred com-
panies of thirty men each, or 3,000 men and 411 officers.
This corps was organised into twenty squadrons of five
companies each.* They were armed with large swords
and rifled carbines, and were supplied with bullets of
two sizes, the larger to be driven in with a mallet to
secure the adjustment of the ball to the grooves, and
the smaller size to enable rapid loading of the piece in
case of need. They were also supplied with pistols.

The dragoons, who fought both on foot and on horse-
back, were armed with long straight swords, and with
muskets and bayonets, instead of the mousqueton or
carabine. They also carried an axe, or entrenching tool,
at the saddlebow. The regiments of the line were
formed in five squadrons of 150 men each, and were
ranged in three ranks. The squadrons were subdivided
into three companies, so that the whole regiment con-
tained about 750 men.' It was during this period, that

» Dani«l, ii. 152. « ibid. H. 343. « Carrion Nisas, ii. 110.

CHAP. XIV.J

FRENCH CAVALRY.

279

is to Kfiy, about the latter half of the seventeenth
century, that dragoons were used to the greatest extent ;
in fact, almost all the cavalry, as we have said, were
virtually dragoons. They were often used on foot as
infantry when no infantry were at hand for the purpose.
In 1664, six days before the battle of St. Gothard,
dragoons were used as infantry in a reconnaissance.^

On the accession of Louis XIV. to the throne he found
only one regiment of dragoons in the French army. In
1659 he created a second ; and it will give some idea of
the system of cavalry tactics of the period when it is
mentioned that in 1690 the total force of this kind in
France had increased to forty-three regiments.' One
reason for this increase is said to have been that it was
found that in long wars the dragoons were the most
suitable, as they had greater solidity than the other arms,
and were better able to endure fatigue. Napoleon I.
imitated the idea in Spain, and for the same reason.

Hussars v/ere also introduced about 1691. They were
expected to rely much upon the sabre. They used short
stirrups, and manoeuvred very loosely. The cuirassiers
and light cavalry ranged as the others in three ranks,
did not fire as formerly by successive ranks, each retiring
to load after having fired, for it seems, on the contrary,
that all three ranks fired at once, and then generally
charged sword in hand.^

The charge, however, was not very vigorous, for they
usually moved at the trot. They sometimes advanced
at a slow pace, pistol in hand, and then after firing at
close range, took to the sword when the mSlee com-
menced.'' The cavalry service had somewhat fallen back.
They did not press on with even the vigour of the
horsemen who were led by Gustavus Adolphus, Crom-
well, and Pappenheim, while the charge at speed with
hand-to-hand weapons, which had been the custom of
the cavalry of Hannibal, was yet to be revived.

The cavalry formed in three ranks, generally at twelve
paces behind each other, although under Turenne the

* Duparcq, ii. 210. ' Rocquanoourt, i. 378. ' Duparcq, ii. 211.
* Ibid.

280

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEIUOU III.

i f.

li

distance was only six paces. Turenne was not at all in
favour of the use of firearms by cavalry, and at the
battle of Zintzheim he ordered them to use the sword
alone. The French horsemen were not very well drilled,
were unable to manoeuvre at the gallop, and their
charges were very irregular, but when well led they were
capable of performing good service, as was proved by the
battles of Kocroy, Dunes, and Leuze.

The cavalry were formed up for action on the wings,
the infantry being in the centre. Turenne, according to
M. de Quinci, often intermingled the cavalry squadrons
with the infantry battalions, and Montecuculi, on the
same autliority, is said to have used the same formation
in his orders of battle, with the object of enabling the
different arms mutually to support each other.

De Quinci also says that it was the universal custom
in Europe to place the infantry in the centre and the
cavalry upon the wings.

Although the cavalry had once again fallen back upon
fire-arms as their principal weapon, and although in most
European countries the horsemen were almost all dragoons,
still the example of Gustavus was too recent not to have
had an effect for a time upon cavalry tactics. It only
required a bold commander of horse to appear upon the
scene, and at once his presence was felt, and the cavalry
exercised an important influence upon the result of
battles. This was clearly shown in the Civil War in
England, when Cromwell's " Ironsides " met the dashing
cavaliers of the gallant Prince Rupert. At the same
time that the English horsemen under their able leaders
were exercising a most decisive influence upon the actions
taking place in that war, another brilliant cavalry com-
mander made his debut in France, and won a victory by
the impetuous use of his horsemen that would compare
favourably with the celebrated battles of Alexander the
Great.

The Great Cond^ was a born soldier, and in his first
battle at Rocroy, when a lad of only twenty-one years of
age, he gave evidence of the greatest military genius. His
impetuosity and boiling courage particularly qualified

CHAP. XIV.]

FRENCH CAVALRY.

281

him to command a cavalry force, and it was by the
wonderfully skilful as well as energetic use of his horse-
men, that the field of Rocroy was gained, and his
reputation as a general established for ever by one
spring morning's work.

The Spanish army, under Don Francisco de Melo, had
invaded France in May 1643, and was besieging Rocroy.
Their army consisted of 26,000 picked soldiers, the
infantry being considered then the bravest and steadiest
in all Europe, while De Melo was an old and experienced
general of high reputation. Conde, then known as the
Duke d'Enghien, had in his army only 14,000 infantry
and 7,000 horse.^

Between the two armies, when Cond^ took the com-
mand, lay a very broken and marshy country, full of
defiles and woods, and very defensible, so that the
Spaniards might have disputed the advance of the
French with every prospect of success. This they failed
to do, and Condd sent on Gassion with a body of cavalry
to throw supplies into Rocroy, and to reconnoitre the
enemy. '^ This he did successfully, and Condd was enabled
to get through the broken district and form up his
troops for action close to the town. His army was
ranged in two lines, the infantry in the centre, the
cavalry upon the wings, with a reserve in rear, composed
of some companies of gendarmes and light horse.
Platoons of fifty musketeers were placed in the intervals
of the squadrons.

The Spaniards were drawn up in a similar order, but
De Melo had placed 1,000 musketeers in a little wood in
advance of his left, to charge the French as they
advanced their right wing. Condd took command of
his right, Gassion being under him. The Mardchal de
rH6pital commanded the left, while De Melo himself
was opposed to the Mardchal and the Duke of Albu-
querque commanded the Spanish left in front of Conde.
The attack was commenced by the young French
prince, who at once fell upon the 1,000 musqueteers in
the copse, and cut them to pieces.' He then turned to

' Rocquancourt, i. 440. « ibj^i^ 441, a Life of Cond6, 19.

I

282

A HISTORY OP CAVALRY.

[period hi.

the left and fell upon Albuquerque, while he sent GasBion
at the same time to turn his flank. This charge was
crowned with complete success. In a few minutes the
whole Spanish cavalry of their left were dispersed and
flying. Detaching Gassion with a small force to pursue
the fugitives and prevent them rallying, Condd turned
to the left with his horsemen, and struck the exposed
flank of the German, Walloon, and Italian infantry,
who were upon that wing of the Spanish army.^
Fortune smiled upon the young general, and wherever
he appeared success followed him. In a very short time
the whole Spanish left wing was utterly broken and
routed.

While victory was with Cond^ in his part of the
battle, with the Marechal de I'Hdpital everything had
gone wrong. News was brought to Condd that De Melo,
with the choicest Spanish troops of the right wing, had
repulsed the French left with such vigour that all had
gone down before them, that De I'Hdpital had been
driven back, his cannon taken, his infantry cut to pieces,
and the fugitives thrown in confusion upon the reserves.

When these disastrous tidings reached Conde, he was
in rear of the Spanish right, pursuing the fugitives he
had beaten. His extraordinary genius, his quick cowp
d'oeil enabled him to form his decision with lightning
rapidity. Rallying at once the cavalry of the wing he
commanded, he thundered along the whole rear of the
Spanish army, and fell furiously upon the rear of
De Melo's cavalry, who were pursuing the fugitives of
De rH6pitars command. In an instant the fortune
of the day changed. Everything went down before his
impetuous onslaught ; the once victorious Spanish
division was speedily conquered, the cannon recaptured,
the prisoners released, and the defeated enemy scattered
and sent flying in every direction.

The Spanish infantry of the centre however still stood
firm. This old and renowned force, which for a hundred
years and more had been deemed almost invincible, was
commanded by the gallant Count of FueL!;es, and by its

' Rocquancourt, i. 441.

CHAP. XIV.]

FRENCH CAVALRY.

283

steadiness and extraordinary courage was still nearly
securing the victory. Three times did the French cavalry
under their brilliant leader charge vehemently upon their
serried ranks, but in vain. The Spaniards had formed in
hollow squares with their artillery in the centre. With
the coolness of a parade movement they poured in a tre-
mendous fire of musketry, and when the French horsemen
had arrived within fifty yards they opened spaces through
which the cannon vomited forth a storm of missiles that
carried terrible destruction among the advancing cavalry.
Three times in this way the troops of Condd were driven
back as waves from a rock. Then he ordered the whole
of his reserve to advance, and the Spaniards, hemmed in
on all sides, asked for quarter. Condd advanced to grant
it, when the enemy, misunderstanding his movement, and
thinking he was about to charge, fired a heavy volley,
which so exasperated the French, who attributed it to
treachery, that they fell upon them and massacred almost
the whole force.' A reinforcement of Spaniards, under
General Beck, which was coming up, meeting the fugi-
tives, fell back on the approach of Gassion, whom Condd
had detached to check their advance, so that the victorv
was of the most decisive character, and may be attributed
almost entirely to the cavalry.

This action is remarkable as showing the extraordinary
effect that the presence of one man of genius can have
upon the results of a cavalry action. Wherever a great
cavalry officer has appeared his influence has almost
invariably affected materially not only the tactics of the
service, but the issue of the war.

This action revived the credit of the cavalry service,
and for a short time, checked the growing reputation of
the infantry. It did not add anything to the military
art, for the conduct of Cond6 was much like that of
Alexander at Arbela.

Two years after this, on the 4th August, 1645, an
action took place at Nordlingen between the French and
Bavarians, in which the cavalry also performed an im-
portant part. The Bavarian army took up a strong

' Life of Cond6, 20, 2 L

284

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period in.

position, with oach wing resting upon a hill, the centre
being covered by the village of Allcrheim, which lay
about three hundred yards in front of their line, and
which, being entrenched and loopholed, made a strong
position. General Merci himself (commanded the centre
of the Bavarians, General Glcen the right wing, and the
famous cavalry officer Jean de Wert the left wing.

The Marshal de Grammont commanded the French
right wing, Turenne the left, and the Count de Marsin
the centre, CDndd being in supreme command. An
attack was made by the French upon the village of
Allerheim, which was unsuccessful, but General Merci
was slain in repelling it. At the same time Jean de
Wert had attacked the French right with such vigour
that he defeated it. The Marshal de Grammont, who
received the attack at the halt, and with a fire of carbines
or musketry, was at once overthrown and taken prisoner.
The second lire suffered the same fate, and Jean de Wert,
following the fugitives, allowed his men to get out of
hand and scattered pillaging the camp, instead, of using
them to fall upon the exposed flank of the French line.
In the meantime, Turenne, after a most obstinate struggle,
had succeeded in defeating the Bavarian right, and,
falling upon their flank, had driven them back and
enclosed them in the village of Allerheim, where great
numbers surrendered.

Jean de Wert, with his victorious wing, at last re-
turned, but too late ; and then, instead of moving across
to the rear of Turenne, he first went back to his original
position, losing by that more time, so that all he could
do was to cover the retreat and lead the broken remnants
of the army from the field.* This battle is instructive to
the cavalry officer as another illustration of the importance
of keeping victorious horsemen well in hand.

The battle of Dunes, fought on the 14th June, 1658,
to cover the siege of Dunkirk, was a remarkable action,
showing a great advance in the military art. The skill
displayed by Turenne was very striking, and the influence

^ Ramsay's Histoire de Turenne, i. 132, 133, 134; also Turenne's
Memoirs.

CHAP.

XIV.]

FRENCH CAVALRY.

28.')

of his reflection and talent in availing himself of every
point that could ensure success was beyond anything
that had been done up to his time. At high tide he
availed himself of thi; fire of an auxiliary English fleet
which lay off the coast, while, when the tide ebbed, he
used the beach to enable him to effV'ct a turning movement
around the enemy's flank. Everything appears to have
been considered and arranged to the greatest advantage.

The Spanish army consisted of 6,000 infantry and
8,000 cavalry. Don John commanded the right, which
rested on the sea. The Great Condd commanded the
left. The French army had 6,000 horse and 9,000 in-
fantry, and was ranged upon two lines, with a reserve.
The Marquis de Crdqui commanded the right, Castlenau
the left, and the Marquis of Gadagne and De Bellefond
the centre. When the battle was fairly joined, the tide
had gone out, and the Marquis of Castlenau, with the
cavalry on the French left, was able to march along the
strand and pass the right flank of the Spanish line.
When wheeling against them he penetrated between the
two lines of the hostile army, and spread confusion in all
that part of the field. Condd however, on the other
wing, had fought with his usual bravery, and leading a
charge of cavalry against the troops of the Marquis de
Crdqui, defeated him, and would have succeeded in
throwing relief into Dunkirk but for the arrival of
Marshal Turenne with some cavalry of the right wing,
which he led at the charge to Cr^qui's assistance. After
a desperate struggle, in which Condi's horse was shot
under him and he himself almost taken prisoner, the
victory was won by Turenne and the whole Spanish
army driven in rout from the field.

This battle is mainly interesting from the fact of the
cavalry using the strand on the fall of the tide to effect
a turning movement upon the Spanish right, a stratagem
that Don John had evidently neither anticipated nor
guarded against. This is a very striking instance of a
plan of battle being arranged to suit the peculiarities
of the field of action.

At the battle of Zintzheim, on 16th June, 1674, the

m

286 A HISTORY OP CAVALRY. [period hi.

dragoons of the French army, having arrived in front
of the enemy's position before the remainder of his
troops had come up, Turenne at once employed them to
open the action by an attack upon the town of
Zintzheim,^ which formed the support of the right of the
Duke of Lorraine's army, and covered the passage of th«>
river Elsatz, which lay between the two armies.^

The dragoons, under the command of the Chevalier
d'Hocquincourt, dismounted, and forming up as infantry,
made a vigorous attack, through the gardens, vineyards,
and broken ground, which was promptly supported by
the infantry. They soon drove the enemy into the town
itself, and pressing on through the water of the moat,
and forcing oj^en a gate in the wall, thus effected an
entrance, captured 400 of the garrison, and slew or
dispersed the remainder.

The cavalry and the rest of Turenne's army, crossing
the stream, moved on to attack the enemy's main line
of battle, which was drawn up on a high ground,
bordered on one flank by vineyards and hills, and on the
other by a long hedge. The summ.it of the hill was
somewhat open, and fit for cavalry operations, and the
Imperial army, composed mainly of cavalry, was drawn
up across it. Turenne at once, contrary to the usages
of the time, adapted his formation for battle to the
peculiarities of the ground, and placed his cavalry in the
centre, and his infantry upon the wings. This was done
to enable the infantry to advance through the vineyards
on his right, and along the hedge on his left, and as he
was superior in that arm, he pressed them on, continually
outflanking and turning the line of his opponents, and so
supporting the steady advance of his horsemen, who
after desperate fighting were gradually able, with the
assistance of their infantry, to press back the hostile
cavalry, and obtain room to deploy their lines upon the
summit and bring all their force into action.

This battle was a remarkable instance of the adaptation
of the formation for battle to the character of the field
of action. The ground being suitable to the operations

> Ramsay's Turenne, i. 503. « Buisson, Vie de Turenne, 432, 433.

CHAP. XIV.]

FRENCH CAVALRY.

287

of infantry on the flanks, the combat was carried on on the
principle of the double oblique, the two wings continually
being pressed forward, and so compelling the retreat
of the centre. From this time the peculiarities of the
battle-field are seen to exercise a certain influence upon
the formation of troops for action.

Luxembourg followed closely in the steps of Turenne,
and knew well how to accommodate the disposition
of his troops to the nature of the ground.' He under-
stood fully the principle and the advantages of the
oblique order. The battle of Fleurus, fought on the
1st July, 1690, is a very good illustration of that kind
of formation for battle. The centre and left wing of his
army were drawn up as if to attack the position of the
Prince of Waldeck in front, while the right wing made
a turning movement, and fell upon the left flank of the
enemy's line. The cavalry of the left of Luxembourg's
army was deployed on each side of the village of Fleurus
in the fields, while the infantry were strongly posted in
the place itself. The turning movement was Successful,
and decided the fate of the battle, which would otherwise
have been doubtful, for the French cavalry on the left
were at first defeated, and thrown back in confusion, as
well as the infantry supporting them.

The combat of Leuze, in 1691, is another illustration
of the ability of Marshal Luxembourg, and is of interest
as a most skilful employment of cavalry. Luxembourg
knew that the Prince of Orange was about falling back
across the river \ 'liich lay in his rear, and he suspected
that the Prince, relying on the great distance there was
between the two armies, would leave a rear-guard
of cavalry to cover the retreat, without attaching
infantry to support them.** When he knew the movement
was commencing, Luxembourg, with a good force
of cavalry, made a rapid night march, and early in the
morning came upon the cavalry rear-guard of Orange's
army, which was just about crossing the bridges. He
came upon them so suddenly that they were not formed
in line of battle, and had no time to prepare to receive
' Grahaiae, 146. ' Feuquitre, in Liskenne, iv. 648, 649.

288

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period hi.

the attack. They were at once thrown into confusion,
and very severely handled. In this action Luxembourg,
with twenty-eight squadrons, almost all composed of the
guards of the King of France, defeated the seventy-five
squadrons of the allied troops and captured forty
standards. The fame of the victory resounded through-
out Europe, and was considered worthy of being
commemorated by a special medal, which Louis XIV.
caused to be struck for the purpose.^

The cavalry did good service at Neerwinden in 1693,
where Marshal Luxembourg defeated the Prince of
Orange. The attacks made by the French along the
front of the enemy's position had failed three times,
when on the fourth attempt the cavalry charged t. fough
or over the field entrenchments, and taking Neerwinden
in reverse, so assisted the infantry as to decide the fate
of the day. It is strange that upon this very same
ground, a few years later, the famous Duke of Marl-
borough carried the lines of the Mehaigne by his
cavalry, who, filling the ditch with their trusses of hay,
rode across the entrenchments and carried the position
by a coup de main.

^ D'Aldegmer, 53.

lit I

CHAPTER XV.

MoNTEcucuLi — The German Cavalry — The Battle
OF St. Gothard, 1664.

In the latter half of the seventeenth centurv, the
most prominent general of the German service was
Montecuculi, the great opponent of Turenne, and one of
the ablest soldiers of the age. His memoirs on the Art
of War, on the military system of the Turks, and his
account of the campaign of 1664, are most important
contributions to military literature, and contain evidence
of very marked ability on his part.

From the pages of these memoirs we obtain much
valuable information in reference to the cavalry service
in Germany, and the wars in which Montecuculi was
engaged. The infantry were composed of pikemen and
musketeers ;^ the pikemen being employed to defend the
force from the charge of cavalry. The cavalry were
organised in squadrons of 150 strong, or three ranks of
fifty men each.^ Sometimes where heavy masses were
required, two squadrons were united. The distance from
one squadron to another was usually eighteen pacos, and
Montecuculi approved of placing in these ictorvals small
pelotons of musketeers, eight in front by fi'/e in <leprh ^
He fully appreciated the value of reserves, and advocated
drawing up the army for action in two lines, the cavalry
in each line having cavalry reserves in rear, so that
according to his ideas the horsemen were to be drawn up

Montecuculi, 27.

- II)iil. 'X.\.

^ Ibid. 37,

290

A HISTORY OF CAV-^ALRY

[period hi.

riie dragoons he

in four lines, one behind the other,
placed on the wings.

The cavalry he divided into cuirassiers and light
cavalry. The cuirassiers he armed with casques, breast
and back plates, and gauntlets of iron reaching to the
elbow. The offensive weapons were the long sword,
pistols, and some mousquetons. The force was required
to be firm, steady, and solid. The light cavalry were
employed for escorting convoys, for reconnoitring, for
foraging, &c., and were armed with sword and carbine,
and were maintained in but small numbers.

Montecuculi has been often quoted as a great authority
in favour of the lance as a cavalry weapon. He says
that of all arms which are used on horseback, the lance
is the best, but it is necessary that it shall be well
supported, that the lancers must be vigorous, armed
from head to foot, have first-class horses, and a level,
firm, and unobstructed ground, upon which to operate.
If all these points are secured, and a body of cuirassiers
are at hand to follow up any success, he thinks great
results might be attained. But, if the lance is not thus
aided, if the man, the horse, the ground, are not exactly
suitable, if there are no cuirassiers at hand to follow up
the attack, Montecuculi says the lance is useless.^ So
that, after all, his opinion in favour of that arm is not
so decided as it might be.

Montecuculi understood the use of dragoons thoroughly ;
he says, " Dragoons are still infantry to whom horses
have been given to enable them to move more rapidly."^
The infantry he looked upon as the principal force and
the main portion of an army, but he still considered
that the heavy cavalry should be equal to one half of
the infantry, and the light cavalry only one quarter of
the heavy.

With all Montecuculi's great genius for war, he was
not a cavalry officer ; and his cautious calculating method
of gaining campaigns, by careful manoeuvring and marches,
was not the style of warfare to bring prominently for-
ward the cavalry service. The cavalry during his time
> Montecuculi, 225, 226. « i^jd. 228.

CHAP. XV.]

GERMAN CAVALRY.

291

"2

was
;hod
;he8,
for-
time

was not distinguished by any important exploits ; the
heavy armour and torpidity of action which had crept
into it made it far less efficient than in the preceding
generation, when such impetuous spirits as Pappenheim,
Piccolomini, and Tersky, imparted life and vigour to the
movements of their followers.

Montecuculi won a great victory over the Turks at
St. Gothard in Hungary, on the 1st August, 1664. The
Turks had a very large force of horsemen, which he was
fortunately able to prevent crossing the river to attack
him, so that about 30,000 Turkish cavalry were unable
to take a very active part in the battle.^ Montecuculi's
dispositions were evidently made to resist superior bodies
of light cavalry. His infantry were ranged in six ranks,
the two front ranks musketeers, the four rear ranks
being pikemen.* Between the squadrons of cavalry he
placed small parties of musketeers of twenty-four or
thirty each, who, in case of being obliged to give way,
were ordered to join the nearest infantry battalion. The
musketeers were to fire by alternate ranks, so that a
portion should be always loaded.

The heavy cavalry, strange to say, and it speaks
volumes for the rej)utation of the Turkish light horse,
were ordered not to leave the infantry to pursue the
enemy. The whole army was directed to advance in
case of success en masse slowly. The light cavalry alone
were allowed to pursue the fugitives. These orders for
action show clearly the heavy defensive style of tactics
that Montecuculi had laid down for his cuirassiers. This
system was probably required against the Turkish light
horsemen, who in the melee were more than a match for
the unwieldy western cuirassiers. The only hope of
success for the Turks was in wearying the heavy cavalry
in pursuits and manoeuvres, and in tempting them to
break their solid masses, against which, when firmly
held together, they could not oppose any effective
resistance.

Montecuculi, 457,

2 Ibid. 442.

U 2

CHAPTER XVI.

Early part of Eighteenth Century. — Campaigns
OP Marlborough and Prince Eugene.

The Duke of Marlborough and his friend and ally
Prince Eugene of Savoy were two of the most celebrated
generals in the history of war, and both made a very
effective use of their cavalry in action. The most
important and decisive battle of the time was won by
their combined efforts at Hochstadt, or Blenheim, on the
13th of August, 1704.

This battle was decided almost altogether by the
judicious use of the cavalry of the allied army, which
was very numerous, and of a very fair quality. It is
computed that in Marlborough and Eugene's combined
army there were 32,000 infantry, and about 20,000
cavalry ; while in the French army there were 82
battalions, and 152 squadrons, making in all 56,000
troops. Marshal Tallard, who commanded the French
forces, drew up his army in a strong position behind the
river Nebel, while his right was posted in the village of
Blenheim, and so rested on the river Danube. His
centre lay on sloping ground, and was composed almost
altogether of his cavalry, which to the number of about
fifty squadrons held the line from Blenheim to Ober-
glaugh. The cavalry of the Elector's army, being placed
on the right, brought nearly all of that force together in
the centre. The infnntry were placed in great force in
the village of Blenheim, which Tallard evidently con-
sidered the key of the position. The army was drawn

CHAP. XVI.] EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CAMPAIGNS.

293

up in two lines ; but in the centre of the second line of
the Ctavalry were placed three brigades of infnntry.

Marlborough, on coming up to attack, saw the defects
of Tallard's dispositions. He at once perceived that the
long lines of cavalry in the centre, defending a position
behind a stream, made a weak point, where a vigorous
attack of his superior cavalry would break the hostile
line, separate the wings from each other, and enable him
to coop up the troops in Blenheim, and strike the whole
left wing of the Elector's army in flank, and drive it
from the field.

Marlborough at once made his arrangements for
forcing the passage of the Nebel, and formed his army in
four lines, the first of infantry, the second and third of
cavalry, and the fourth of infantry in reserve. This
was a formation admirably adapted to the nature of the
ground, and the position of the enemy. The first line
of infantry was to secure the passage of the stream and
the erection of bridges, and to cover the crossing of the
cavalry, while the fourth line of infantry remained on
the bank to form a reserve in support of the manoeuvre.
The pontoons were immediately brought up, five bridges
constructed, and the stone one repaired. To confirm
Tallard in the idea that Blenheim was the important
point, Marlborough directed a powerful attack against
that place which was vigorously but unsuccessfully main-
tained for some time, while his dispositions in the centre
were being completed. The infantry of this attacking
column was charged in flank by three squadrons of
French gendarmes. Lord Coutts sent for a re-inforce-
ment of cavalry : five squadrons soon arrived and were
at once attacked by an equal number of French gendarmes
who saluted them with a 'ire of mousquetons, or carbines.
The allied horse charged at once sword in hand, and drove
them back through the intervals of the infantry, when,
being galled by musketry, in front and flank, they were
obliged to fall back. On the right of the allied army.
Prince Eugene on coming into action had been opposed
with determined bravery by the Elector of Bavaria and
his anny. The struggle lasted for some hours with

294

A HISTORY OF

VLRY.

[period III.

varying success, during all ■"" time Marlborough was

endeavouring, in the cen+ get the large masses of

his cavalry across the fc and marshy valley of the
Nebel, and to effect a secure lodgment on the opposite
bank. This was only effected after hard fighting, in
which at one time Marlborough's cavalry were driven
back to the rivulet, and obliged to rally under the pro-
tection of their infantry. The second line of cavalry,
then advancing, again pressed back the French squadrons,
but, being galled by a fire of musketry and artillery from
Blenheim, the advance was checked.

At five o'clock, Marlborough had at last succeeded in
completing his arrangements for his grand attack upon
the centre of the enemy's position. During the pre-
liminary struggles, while Marlborough was trying to
advance, Tallard had interlaced the cavalry with the
nine battalions of infantry that had been in the second
line. To counteract this three battalions of Hanoverian
infantry were placed in a similar manner at the corre-
sponding point of the allied position, and supported by
some pieces of artillery. Amidst a tremendous fire of
musketry and cannon, Marlborough's cavalry, with the
three battalions, moved slowly up the ascent against
over 10,000 French horsemen, who waited to receive
them. So hot was the fire that, when the assailants
drew near, their advance was checked, and they fell back
about sixty paces. The fire of artillery was vigorously
maintained for a short period. Soon the French mus-
ketry volleys became less sustained, and their infantry
began to shrink from the tempest of balls which inflicted
deadly losses in their ranks.

After a slight pause, Marlborough made another ad-
vance, and the French horsemen gave way. The nine
infantry battalions were cut to pieces or captured.
Tallard, rallying his defeated cavalry, formed a second
line at some distance to the rear, and made another
effort to retrieve the day, but in vain. Marlborough
saw the decisive moment had arrived, and ordering the
trumpets to sound the charge, he led his cavalry forward
with tremendous force. The French horsemen, dis-

BATTLE OF BLENHEIM OR HOCHSTADT

To face page 294.

I

CHAP. :

coura;

disma

of th^

their

about

virtuii

Tallai

up in

rende

right

captu:

of his

Elect(

a mos

Alt
action
so dec
prove
and t
faulty
were s
habit
genen
to a g
must
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in har
when
swept
and m

Mai
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in ma
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CHAP. XVI.] EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CAMPAIGNS. 21)0

couraged with the result of the previous combat, and
dismayed by the imposing effect of the advancing rush
of the charging squach'ons, fired a scattered volley from
their carbines at a distance, and immediately wheeled
about and fied. The victory was won, the allied cavalry
virtually inundated the whole plain in the centre of
Tallard's position, swept around Blenheim, and cooped
up in it the bulk of the French infantry which sur-
rendered at discretion, then rolled up the debris of the
right of Tallard's cavalry in the village of Sonderheim,
captured the Marshal himself, his staff", and a large force
of his horsemen, and attacking the exposed flank of the
Elector's army, precipitated their retreat, and completed
a most decisive victory. ^

Although the successes gained by the cavalry in this
action were so great, although the part played by it was
so decisive and so important, yet the whole particulars
prove that the service was not properly understood,
and that it was only because the system was equally
faulty on both sides that Marlborough's successes
were so great. We still see in this action the pernicious
habit of mingling infantry with the horsemen, even in a
general attack, and we see the cavalry still using firearms
to a great extent. Marlborough's first charge (so-called)
must have been delivered at a very slow pace, for the
infantry and artillery evidently kept up with the cavalry.
Tallard's system of tactics was equally bad, for he
evidently expected to defend a position in an open plain
with cavalry at the halt. Who can doubt for one instant
that, if Tallard had ordered a charge at full speed, sword
in hand, upon the English cavalry at the critical moment
when they recoiled the sixty paces, he would not have
swept the whole force back in confusion upon the fords
and marshes of the Nebel in their rear ?

Marlborough was equally faulty in not relying more
upon speed. He appreciated the effect of the w^eight
in massing' such large bodies of horse, but he left out
an important item when he neglected the speed. Again,
the moral effect in war is the most powerful element in

^ Coxe's Life of Marlborough.

'

296

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period hi.

attaining success, and the imposing effect of a Imld
advance at full speed would have had quite as serious an
influence upon the motionless lines of horsemen as all
the bullets that could be sent about their ears.

We see in this battle the idea of using cavalry in
heavy masses, of pouring them, so to speak, over a whole
section of a field of battle, in order to produce important
results by the swee]) of enormous lines of charging horse-
men. The battles of Marlborough laid the foundation of
the system of Frederick the Great, who, of all generals
of modern times, most clearly appreciated the effect of
the shock of a whole wing of cavalry at full gallop in
close order and with a regular alignment. Frederick
simply added the speed to Marlborough's system.'

The battle of Ramilies, fought on the 23rd May, 1706,
was very similar to Blenheim in its main features, but
the number of cavalry engaged on both sides was much
greater. The allied forces consisted of 35,000 infantry
and 29,000 cavalry, to which the French opposed 40,000
infantry and 35,000 cavalry. Marshal Villeroy, who
commanded the French army, had imitated somewhat
Marshal Tallard's dispositions at Hochstadt, his right
wing resting on the Mehaigne in the village of Tavieres,
and the cavalry being ranged along the plain between
that point and Ramilies. After a feigned attack on
Villeroy's right, Marlborough made his real attack against
the enemy's lines of cavalry, and his own horsemen being
drawm up in three lines gave him the advantage of
having fresh reserves to bring into action. A body of
fourteen squadrons of dismounted dragoons, together
with two infantry battalions which Villeroy had sent to
reinforce his position at Tavieres, were intercepted by a
charge of some cavalry from the allied third line, and
either cut to pieces or driven into the river. The main
body of cavalry then charged, as w^as done at Hochstadt,
and drove the French back upon their second line, which
at once in turn attacked the victorious allied horse, and
drove them back in confusion upon their supports.
At this critical moment, Marlborough came up with

^ Gi'ahame, 170.

a
id
in

It,

th

CHAP. XVI.] EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CAMPAIGNS. 297

seventeen scpadronH from the right, and the squadrons
which had attacked and defeated the dismounted dra-
goons, coming up on the othtT flank at the moment,
restored the battle, checked the; advance of the French
horsemen, and enabled the allied lines to regain their
order.

Marlborough, seeing that the decisive struggle was
taking place among the cavalry, had ordered up from his
right every availaljle horseman. Twenty fresh squadrons
arrived at full speed, and formed a fourth line in rear of
the right flank. This turned the scale, and the French
right wing was swept back upon their centre — their
whole position pierced, and their line outflanked and
enfiladed. A vigorous attack in every part of the field
completed the victory, and the French retreated in
hurried rout, with the loss of many prisoners.

In this battle we see the more decided use of reserves,
and the important effect produced by them in cavalry
actions.

At Malplaquet, on the 11th of Septeml)er, 1708,
Marlborough again employed his cavalry to break the
enemy's line of battle, and here again the attack was
made in the centre. This charge of cavalry is the more
remarkable, as it was made against a strong line of
entrenchments which the French had thrown up to
defend their position. Marlborough's cavalry, under the
Prince d'Auvergne, penetrated through some gaps between
the redans, and deploying, were enabled to drive back the
defenders. Being quickly and bravely supported by a
large force of infantry, the lines were held by the English,
although the reserves of the French cavalry had checked
and repulsed the allied horsemen.

About this period the practice of strengthening lines of
battle with field entrenchments was coming very much
into use, and for a time war was conducted very much
upon the principle of taking up strong positions, and
defending or attacking them, or manoeuvring to enforce
the evacuation of them. Marlborough on many occa-
sions used his cavalry very skilfully in forcing lines
of entrenchment of this kind. A celebrated instance

298

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period hi.

I

occurred at the passage of the lines of the Mehaigne in
1705. These lines were very formidable, and had
occupied three years in their construction. They ex-
tended from Namur on the Meuse to Antwerp. The
strongest position or. the whole line was that between
Leuwe and Helishoim, where the steep and slippery
banks of the little Gheet, formed a ditch in front of the
entrenchment, which consisted of a series of redans
connected with a curtain. Marlborough decided to
attack at that point, as being likely to be less carefully
guarded than the more exposed portions.

On the 1 7th July, Marlborough made a feigned attack
on the other extremity of the lines, near Namur, and
made a general movement of his whole force to the left,
as if to support it. This deceived Villeroy, who moved
the great bulk of his forces to the right, leaving the
lines near Leuwe but thinly guarded. Then ordering all
his cavalry to provide themselves with trusses of hay
instead of fascines, which would have given an intimation
of the projected attack, Marlborough moved rapidly
during the night with a large force of cavalry and twenty
battalions of infantry, and the cavalry fording the Gheet,
and filling the ditch of the entrenchments with their
trusses of hay, soon effected a passage, and charging the
French who were coming up to attack them, gave time
for sufl&cient troops to arrive and cross the entrenchments,
so that a secure lodgment was effected, and the whole
French army obliged precipitately to retreat.*

In the passage of the lines of Bouchain in 1711, the
cavalry also performed most valuable services, and
covered the crossing of the main body and its formation
in line of battle.

The battle of Ahnanza, fought in Spain in 1707, was
a most hard-fought and decisive battle. The English
infantry fought most gallantly, and broke the French
centre ; but the Duke of BerwicV , who commanded the
French, had a much superior force of cavalry, with which
he defeated the wings of the allied army, and then

' Coxe's Life of Marlborough.

CHAP. XVI.] EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CAMPAIGNS. 299

pursuing with his horsemen thirteen battalions of the
English infantry that had cut their way through to a
wood, succeeded in compelling them to surrender. The
allied troops in this action were badly formed up, the
different arms being all mingled together. The victory
to the French was most decisive, and virtually ended the
war in Spain.

CHAPTER XVII.
Charles XII. and his Cavalry. — Battle of

PULTOWA.

Charles XII. of Sweden was a man of such extraor-
dinary vigour, and of such supernatural energy, that it
was impossible for him to have engaged in war without
serving to a great extent in the cavalry force, and
without his iron will and fiery impetuosity affecting very
materially the tactics and employment of that portion of
his armies in the field.

He unfortunately did not possess that caution which
is so important a requisite in a commander. Had his
judgment been good, and his measures directed with
greater wisdom, he would have been the ablest soldier of
modern times.

He paid the closest attention to his cavalry, used it
most skilfully in action, and in fact paved the way for
the improvements made by Frederick the Great, and set
the example to General Seidlitz, who, judiciously
developing the idea, rendered the cavalry of the
celebrated Prussian monarch as fine a force of Jiorsemen
as ever existed.

Charles XII.'s energetic temperament led him to delight
in hand-to-hand combats at full speed. His wild energy
could not brook the tame and sluggish advance, and the
slow and methodical firing of pistols and carbines at a
distance. He liked better the charge with the bayonet
for the infantry, and sword in hand for the cavalry. He
absolutely prohibited defensive armour of any kind

CHAP. XVII.]

CHARLES XII. 'S CAVALRY.

301

among his horsemen, in order to increase to the utmost
their capacity for speed and endurance. The use of
firearms among them was positively forbidden, and the
employment of hand-to-hand weapons alone permitted.

This system of cavalry tactics was the natural outcome
of his daring and chivalrous spirit. He led his horsemen
sword in hand against infantry, cavahy, or entrench-
ments, over any kind of country. No difficulties daunted
him, for he forced his way through all opposition.'

In the pursuit of a routed foe, his restless vigour was
specially manifested. He followed the retreating Saxons,
under Marshal Schulenberg, for nine consecutive days
without unsaddling, and on overtaking them at Sanitz,
near Punitz, he charged boldly with two regiments of
cavalry only, against 10,000 of them, rode over the
infantry who threw themselves down to evade their
impetuous onset, drove the Saxon cavalry from the
field, and then returned to attack the infantry and guns,
who only escaped him by night coming on, under cover
of which they crossed the frontier. Charles in this
action captured all the cannon. The fighting was
altogether with the sword, which was a long straight
weapon, and used principally for thrusting.^

The cavalry, under Charles XH., were taught to
manoeuvre with a rapidity that up to his time had been
unknown. It is said that in 1707 he rode two horses
to death, at the review of a regiment,^ proof conclusive
that he at least moved about with a celerity that must
have had a great influence upon the movements of his
horsemen.

The battle of Pultowa in 1709, fought between Peter
the Great of Russia and Charles XII., resulted in a
most decisive victory for the Russians, and virtually
ended the military career of the King of Sweden.

The measures taken by the Czar were very ably
conceived, and skilfully executed. He felt it important
to have his position strengthened by entrenchments, but
seeing that a continuous line of works confined an army
to a defensive system of tactics and prevented a rapid
' Nolan, 18. - Ibid. » Beamish, 42,

302

A riSTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PKRIOD III.

change to an offensive policy, he covered the front of his
position by a line of seven detached redoubts, separated
by great intervals, and containing two battalions each.
By this means his infantry and cavalry could readily
advance between the redoubts, and attack or pursue the
enemy if they were repulsed.

Charles XII., although badly wounded and obliged to
be carried in a litter, made the attack on the morning of
the 27th June, just before daylight, with a large body of
cavalry supported by infantry. The Russians resisted
bravely, and the Swedes were only able to capture two
redoubts which were not finished. Six battalions of the
Swedish infantry and ten squadrons of cavalry of their
right wing were repulsed, cut off from the remainder of
their army, and obliged to retreat to the shelter of a
wood. '

The struggle between the cavalry swayed backwards
and forwards with varying success, the Swedes being well
supported by their infantry, the Russian horse not being
able to receive such prompt aid from their foot soldiers,
who being in entrenchments could not move up so rapidly,
liieut. -General Baur was therefore ordered to fall back
from the right side of the entrenchments to give the
Russian infantry an opportunity to come into position.
He was also ordered to fall back if attacked by infantry,
but to stand firm against the cavalry. The result was
that tbo Swedish cavalry were checked by the infantry
and cannon of the Russian lines, and suffered such heavy
losses as to be obliged to fall back out of range of the
artillery. The Russians then under Prince Mentchikoff
and Lieut. -General Renzel, with five regiments of cavalry
and five battalions of infantry, moved upon the Swedish
troops which had been cut off and driven into the wood,
and charged them, defeated them completely, and made
the greater part prisoners.

The Emperor then arranged his army to renew the

action. H ! moved a portion of his infantry forward on the

flank of the line of entrenchments, so that if the Swedes

attacked they would be met in front with determined

' Journal de Pierre le Grand, ii. 12 to 2ii.

CHAP. XVII.] CHARLES XII. 'S CAVALRY.

303

resistance, while they would be at the same time attacked
in flank by the wings which were advanced. Charles,
aided by Field-Marshal Ehoinfeld, formed his army for a
final effort, the infantry being in the centre, the cavalry
on the wings. Peter the Great adopted a similar for-
mation, advancing all his line from the entrenchments,
and moving six regiments of cavalry from the right wing
to the left. Then at nine o'clock in the morning the
action recommenced on the Russian left, and soon ex-
tended along the whole front of the two armies. After
a desperate struggle the Swedes were utterly defeated,
large numbers being slain and many more being taken
prisoners. The pursuit of the Swedes was vigorously
kept up. The debris of the army under General
Lcevenhaupt had reached Perevolotzna on the banks of
the Dnieper, but were unable to cross, before General
Prince Mentchikoff with a large force of cavalry, with as
many infantry, carried en croupe, came up, and sum-
moned them to surrender. After a short parley they
.surrendered to the number of 14,000 men. The King
of Sweden with a handful of men succeeded in escaping
into Turkey.

The victory was one of the most decisive in the
world's history, and shows great military ability on the
part of the Emperor, in the skilful manner in which he
arranged his redoubts, and supported bis cavalry with
artillery and infantry. In fact we see in this battle a
further development of the idea of the mutual support
between the mounted and iufiiutry services.

CHAPTER XVIII.
Peter the Great. — The Regular Army in Russia.

There was no really effective regular army in Russia
before the reign of Peter the Great, and to that cele-
brated monarch is due the credit of having established
the Russian army upon a permanent and effective
footing.

Dmitry Donskoi was the first that divided the army
(voisko) into regiments {polke). Before the Tartar
invasion the principal strength of the army was the
infantry, but after that time the cavalry composed the
main force. ^ There was, however, no regular army
properly organised till the reign of Peter the Great.
He established it upon a true military basis, and taught
it to fight, not in the manner of irregular levies, but
upon the correct principles of the art of war.

When Peter ascended the throne the army consisted of
two dragoon regiments and twenty-seven infantry. The
great Czar at once perceived the extreme weakness of his
cavalry force, and the value of the mounted soldiers to
an army. He therefore very soon began to increase his
dragoons. Eight regiments were organised in 1701.^
The next year he added another. The following year
two more dragoon regiments were formed. In 1704,
four more. In 1705, six. In 1706 and the following
year six more, and in 1711 another. This made a
total increase of from two regiments only in 1700, to
thirty regiments in 1711.

• IvanhofF, 3. -' Ibid. 15.

He also organised in 1709

ciiAi'. xviii.] PETEll THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

305

three legimeuts of dragoon grenadiers. These carried no
flags.'

The dragoons were organised for the express purpose
of fighting both on foot and on horseback, their arms
and equipment being specially designed for that object.
They had muskets with which they fought when dis-
mounted, and long straight swords and pistols, for use
when fighting as cavalry on horseback. The intention
of using them principally as dragoons, and upon foot, is
clearly shown by the fact that one-fifth of the men
carried axes, one- tenth of them large shovels, and one-
tenth spades, all carried in the same way attached to the
saddles. These implements were evidently intended to
enable the dragoons to cut down abattis, and throw up
field entrenchments to cover them when using their
mu8k(}ts in defending important posts.^ From 1700 till
1708 the muskets were provided with a species of sword-
bayonet, which served both as a sword and as a bayonet.
The dragoons were clad in blue coats ; the collars,
facings, and lining being of white or red. The vest
and trousers were of chamois leather. Spurred boots were
also worn ; the head-dress was a three-cornered hat. In
1802, this was changed for the casque. After the year
1708, the muskets were provided with a bayonet like
that used by the Swedes. The ensigns, paymasters,
standard-bearers, sergeants, and corporals of the
dragoon regiments were not provided with fusils, but
used the pistol only in addition to their swords.

The formation of these regiments was in three ranks,
except when the men were dismounted and formed up
to fight on foot, in which case they were accustomed to
be ranged in four ranks.

The proportion of the cavalry to the infantry in Peter
tlie Great's time was very great. In the year 1720
the infantry were only 57,956 in number, while the
cavalry comprised 36,333 horsemen.^ This is an evi-
dence of the high value placed upon the mounted
force by one of the greatest soldiers in the world's
history.

' Tviuihoff, l.'i.

-' Ibid. '27.

•' Ibid. 3G.

306

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period 111.

Peter tlic Great, v/hile fully appreciating the value
of dragoons, also understood equally well the great
advantage of un eff'3ctive force of light cavalry. He
had large numbers of irregular horsemen in the
Cossacks, but desiring some regular light cavalry, he
ordered, in 1707, the organisation of 300 light horse,
composed of Hungarians, Servians, Moldavians, and
Wallachians. In 1711 he increased this force to eight
regiments. They v^ere soon reduced, however, as the
expense of maintaining them was very great.

Peter's appreciation of the value of these light horse-
men was however so great, that in 1723 he again
authorized the formation of a corps of hussars, giving
land to those who had families, and to them all the
same pay as was given in the Austrian army at the
time. He had the intention also of raising a large
regular force of hussars, but it was never done till the
year 1740.'

In 1721 the life-guard regiment of horse was
organised, and was composed of noblemen, the idea
being that the regiment should serve as a sort of school,
to teach and prepare the officers for the cavalry service.
This system was in operation for ni^e years.

The light cavalry were employee, in outpost service,
and in the minor operations of a campaign, while the
dragoons were employed more for use on the field of
battle. The cavalry were generally placed on the flanks
of the army. On approaching the enemy the cavalry
usually attacked at once, and if checked, fell back upon
* the support of the infantry, who received the attack,
and if overmatched, retired in good order. The Kussian
troops at this period were not very proficient in
manoeuvring in the open field, but were very steady,
fought bravely in repelling an attack, and defended
fortifications with the most dogged pertinacity. Peter
the Great used this capacity of his troops with wonder-
ful skill, at the battle of Pultowa, where it will be
remembered he employed a number of detached redoubts
to strengthen his line of battle.''

1 Ivanhoff, 38. 2 Goudim Leffcovitch, 38.

mg

CHAP, xvin.] PETER THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

307

'J
in

At one period Peter the Great had the enormous
force of 84,000 cavalry of all kinds in his army.*

The Russian cavalry did very good service in the
attack made by the Russian army upon the Swedish
General Loevenhaupt, who was endeavouring to convoy
a large quantity of stores to King Charles XIL, in
Sept. 1708. A skirmish took place on the banks of the
Rysta, where the Swedish commander had drawn up
]iis rear-guard in battle array to check the advancing
Russians, and give time to the trains to get away. On
the morning of the 27th Sept., the Russian dragoons
came up, and began to fire with both musketry and
guns. After a severe skirmish Loevenhaupt fell back
to Lessnoy, where he concentrated his troops for a
desperate fight.

The Czar followed him closely. To hide the advance
of his troops, he despatched 1,000 dragoons under
Colonel Campbell. The Russian column consisted of
an infantry regiment, a dragoon regiment, and two guards
regiments. On account of the character of the ground,
Peter the Great ordered the dragoons to dismount, and
to form up in battle order alongside of the infantry. A
severe struggle took place, in which the dismounted
dragoons fought well in line of battle as infantry, and
the fight ended in the success of the Russians, who
drove the Swedish advanced guard back upon their main
force. After a very bravely contested action with vary-
ing success, the night separated the combatants, and
under cover of it the Swedf^ retreated, leaving behind
them all their baggage. Tne next day, being closely
pursued, Loevenhaupt abandoned his convoy, which he
burned, and continued his retreat, being closely followed
by some regiments of Russian dragoons, and a force of
Calmucks and Cossacks, under General Floug, who came
up with the rear-guard at Propoyske and defeated it.

This was a most important instance of the destruc-
tion of a convoy, for the supplies lost were immense, and
the blow to the Swedish army irreparable. In this aflfair
the cavalry took a great part.

Groudim Leffcovitch, 38.

X 2

CHAPTER XIX.

Makshal Saxe — His Ideas on Cavalry.

I'
J I

m

ii

Marshal Saxe was an able general, and being a care-
ful observer as w 11 as a profound thinker, he was very
quick to discover faults and abuses, and to see the
reforms required. His writings show a keen apprecia-
tion of the principles of the military art, and are the
best works on the science of wfir that were published iu
his time.

Among other reforms. Marshal Saxe introduced the
cadencetl step into the French army,' and it soon became
the common practice in most countries. He also re-
established the lance as a cavalry weapon, it having dis-
appeared long before his time. He called the cavalry so
armed, Uhlans; they are still in use in some of the
armies of Europe, under the same name.

His ideas as to the organisation and armament of
cavalry, as well as it? method of fighting, were very good,
• nd prove that he well understood the characteristics of
that arm. He considered that cavalry should be lightly
armed and equipped, in order to endure fatigue and to
make rapid marches, and be kept continually exercised
and hardened so as to be always in good training.*

He divided cavalry into two kinds, heavy cavalry and
dragoons. The heavy, being costly to maintain, was not
required in large numbers. It was to be mounted on
strong powerful horses, trained to simple and solid move-
ments, to keep close together, and never to lose its order,
' Eocquancourt, i. 177. ^ Saxe's Reveries, i. 130, 131.

(irAi'. j;ix.] MAR8HAL SAXE ON CAVALRY.

309

of

)cl,
of

tiy

to

30(1

or to become scattered.' This force, like the heavy
artillery, was to Ije kept with the maiu army, never to be;
used for escorts, for detachments, or reconnaissances, but
only for the charge in regular engagements.

The heavy horsemen he armed with cuirasses and
helmets, — the front ranks with lances. He siipiDlied
them also with a good sword, four feet in length, a car-
bine, but no pistols.^ The me^i. were to be carefully chosen,
five feet six or seven inches in height, and not corpulent.

The dragoons, according to the Marshal, were to be
twice as numerous as the heavy cavalry, and mounted on
small active horses. Their manoeuvres were to be effec-
ted with celerity, and they were required to understand
the evolutions of the infantry service, as well as those of
the cavalry. He armed them with the musket, sword,
and lance ; the latter weapon to serve them as pikes,
when fighting on foot. The men, he says, were to be
small, about five feet or five feet and an inch high. The
cavalry and dragoons he ranged both alike in three ranks.

When the dragoons dismounted they formed with
their ranks open, so that they could wheel to the right by
half-quarters, or one-eighth of the front of each rank, by

8/

o
o ,

o.

"S..-

7-8i-

8,

O.

i'

o

O."

■8 ....^

o

o

o

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jSL

^-8

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o

which the squadron would be formed in eight ranks
facing the right. They then dismounted, fastened their
horses together, and formed up where the squadron had
formerlv fronted, the right-hand man of these rows and
the left remained mounted and took charge of the horses.*
To the dragoons he committed all the minor services of the
army, the escorts and reconnoitring and outpost duties.

The Marshal does not explain clearly how his dragoons
were to use the musket, lance, and sword on foot ; he
certainly could not have meant that they were all to

' Saxe's Reveries, i. 133. - Ibid. i. 134. » Ibid. i. 136, 137.

310

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [fekiod hi.

have dismounted and fought overburdened with so many-
weapons. His idea evidently was to have the front rank
armcid with lances, the rear ranks with muskets, and when
dismounted they were to form, like the infantry regiments
of the preceding age, a mixed force of pikemen and
musketeers.

Marshal Saxe argued in favour of armour, but his
reasons for urging its use were novel. He considered
that, if the horseman could be defended from sword and
lance thrusts by moderately light defensive armour,
it would force hostile cavalry not so armed to rely alto-
gether upon firearms ; and as he held the view that
cavalry which relied upon missile weapons would
always be beaten by a bold charge, he thought that
heavy armed cavalry who, regardless of the fire, rode
boldly on would socn put their enemies to flight with
comparatively slight loss. He seems to have forgotten
in his theory that just in the proportion in which he
increased and strengthened the armour would the
mobility be diminished, and there would be left to the
lightly equipped horsemen increased range of projectile
weapons and greater mobility. It has been already
shown, in the account of the Parthians, what is the result
of the judicious application of these two advantages.

Marshal Saxe invented a carbine which loaded at the
breech, and supplied his regiment of Uhlans with it. It
had many inconveniences, most probably caused by the de-
fective mechanical skill of the time.' He had the carbines
carried on a bandolier. The lances, which were twelve feet
long, weighed about six pounds, and served as tent poles,
saving thereby the carriage of poles for that purpose.*

His instructions for the guidance of cavalry on the
march are very good, the closest attention being enjoined
to the preservation of a steady and uniform pace. He
also taught cavalry the caracol, and wheeling to the right
and left by the half-quarters or eighths of ranks, to take
ground in either direction, and, in the case of dragoons
as already mentioned, when it was desired, to dismount
them for action.

* Lloyd, i. xi.

2 Saxe, i. 147.

CHAP. XIX.] MARSHAL SAXK ON CAVALRY.

311

les,

He

ht
ake
Aons

When the cavalry charged, Saxe could not impress too
forcibly upon them the importance of keeping together,
and of never pursuing in disorder. The standard, he
waid, should be their principal thought, and they should
always rally to it. In charging they started at a slow
trot and grjidually increased the pace to the gallop. At
twenty or thirty paces from the enemy they closed
together at full speed. The, Marshal held that cavalry
sliould l)e taught to galop for long distances in good order,
and said that any squadron that could not charge 2,000
paces at full speed without breaking was not fit for
active service.' He considered this an absolute necessity
in the heavy cavalry iv, well as in the dragoons, who
were expected to be able to skirmish with facility ; their
third rank being specially drilled to work in open order,
and to retire rapidly and form up in rear.

He advised that the horses should be continually
exercised in winter to keep them in training, and that
they should be thoroughly accustomed to the firing of
musketry and cannon, so that the noise, fire, and smoke
should have no effect upon them.

The impetuous energy of Charles XH., and the writings
of Marshal Saxe, gave to the cavalry service much greater
mobility, and without doubt must have had a very
marked influence upon Frederick the Great, to whom
was reserved the credit of restoring to cavalry its value and
reputation, after 2,000 years of vicissitudes and fluctua-
tions. He did away with many false ideas, and revived,
in equal if not greater splendour, the glories of that
service which, in the time of Hannibal and Alexander,
cflected such important results and won so imperishable
a renown.

The improvements in armament, in organisation, and
in tactics culminated under Frederick the Great. In the
next period we will trace the operations of the cavalry
under the influence of what may be termed the Prussian
or Frederick's system, which for so many years has been
the guiding principle of the cavalry service in most
armies.

^ Saxe, i. 16G.

PERIOD IV.

FROM FREDERICK THE GREAT TILL THE INTRODUC-
TION OF RIFLED FIREARMS, 1740 TO 1854.

CHAPTER XX.
Cavalry undek Frederick the Great.

SECTION 1. ORGANISATION AND TACTICS OF HIS CAVALRY.

When Frederick the Great ascended the Prussian
throne he found his army very highly disciplined and
capable of manceuvring with considerable precision, but
the system of tactics was very faulty. The cavalry was
composed of large men mounted upon powerful horses,
and carefully trained to fire in line both on foot and on
horseback. The force was of the heaviest type and quite
incapable of rapid movement. In fact, the cavalry of
all European States had degenerated into unwieldy masses
of horsemen, who, unable to move at speed, charged at a
slow trot and fought only with pistol and carbine.

Frederick, who in his first battle at Molwitz interlaced
battalions of infantry among his cavalry, and with good
results, was not long in seeing the error of this system
of fighting; and following the example set him by
Charles XII. of Sweden, he began to effect those reforms
in his cavalry which soon made them the most efficient
body of horsemen that ever existed.

His first change was to prohibit absolutely the use of
firearms mounted, and to rely upon the charge at full

fHAi'. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

313

laced
Igood
Istem
by
lorms
Icient

5C of
full

speed, sword in hand. He taught his horsemen to dis-
regard the fire of the enemy's squadrons, and to rush in
with the utmost vigour, and in order that this charge at
speed should be as effective as possible, he lightened the
equipment and armament of his soldiers, and took every
possible measure to enable them to move rapidly and in
good order over every kind of ground.

His great care was to train his squadrons of cavalry
to preserve a close order, and a correct alignment in an
advance of considerable distance. By constant attention
and continual drilling, the Prussian cavalry were able
when the Seven Years' War commenced, to go through all
their manoeuvres in perfect order at full speed.

Guibert, in his Eulogy of the King of Prussia, de-
scribes the extraordinary perfection in manoeuvring the
cavalry had attained under his careful instruction. He
says : " It is only in Prussia that the horsemen and their
officers have that confidence, that boldness in managing
their horses, that they seem to be confounded with them,
and to recall the idea of the centaurs." "It is only
there that sixty or eighty squadrons of 130 or 140
effective men each can be seen going through the
manoeuvres that a whole wing of cavalry well commanded
can execute in the field. It is only there that 8,000 or
10,000 horsemen can be seen making general charges for
many hundreds of yards, and halt after making them
in perfect order, and immediately commence a second
movement against a new line of the enemy which is
supposed to present itself. In all his camps, at all his
reviews, wherever Frederick sees his cavalry, it is to
these important charges in large numbers that he gives
the most attention, these that he values the most
highly."

Marshal Saxe had already laid down the principle
that cavalry, to be of service, should l)e capable of
cliarging at speed for 2,000 yards in good order. Frede-
rick saw the importance of this idea, and used every
effort to reach this standard. His older generals opposed
his innovations, but he was ably supported and assisted
by Seidlitz and Zicthen, and when such a monarch and

314

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY,

[period IV.

1! i

such gfmerals of cavalry appeared in the same army, it
is not surprising that the world was soon ringing with
the fame of the horsemen, who were organised, trained,
and commanded by such brilliant and impetuous leaders.
Out of twenty-two grent battles fought by Frederick,
his cavalry won at least fifteen of them.^

Cavalry at this time reached its zenith. Everything
had paved the way for it, and it only required the genius

to see the opening, and take advantage of it, to

give

cavalry the greatest successes. For nearly fifty years
both the horse and foot in all armies had been relying
mainly on firearms. The infantry had abandoned the
pike, and adopted the bayonet, which, although a good
enough defence against cavalry charging at a slow trot,
was not very available against a charge at full speed.
The slow and unwieldy horsemen, against whom Seidlitz
and Ziethen led the active cavalry of the great Frederick,
could not with their useless and clumsy pistols and
carbines check the advance of charging squadrons, which,
inspirited by their rapid movement, would be carried
violently through tiie hostile ranks, Warnery says, and
we can well believe him, " Experience has convinced me
in more than a hundred occasions, for I have never seen
a squadron depelid upon its fire, that it has not been
overthrown by that which came upon it at speed without
firing."

The infantry also, unaccustomed to the new style of
fighting, would at first be taken by surprise and defeated ;
and once broken, the ^arnage would be so great as to
have a very serious moral effect upon the remainder of
the army. One or two successes would so improve the
morale of the cavalry, and so dispirit the infantry, that
in every succeeding action the horsemen would more
easily break the ranks of the foot soldiers, and in the
confidence of success, the charge would be so boldly and
violently given as to crush everything before it. This
has evidently been one reason of the wonderful and
continual successes ^/ the cavalry under the

great

Nolan.

more
the
and

This
and

great

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY. 315

Seidlitz and the other Prussian leaders during the Seven
Years' War.

At no time in ancient or modern history, not even in
the wars of Hannibal and Alexander, have more brilliant
deeds been performed by the cavalry than were achieved
by the horsemen of Frederick the Great in his later
wars ; and the secret of their success lay in the careful
training of the individual soldier, in the constant ma-
noeuvring in masses, in the reliance upon the sword, and
in the fiery energy as well as the prudent judgment
of the great generals who commanded it.

In Frederick's first battle, MoUwitz, where his cavalry
were still in the unwieldy state in which he had found
them on his accession to the throne, the Imperial cavalry, •
who had gained some experience in fighting against the
Turks, charged the Prussian horsemen with the sword,
and defeated them. This probably had a great impres-
sion upon Frederick, and most likely led to his making
so many changes in his tactics.

Frederick not only ordered his cavalry to charge,
sword in hand, but he recommended his officers always
to be the first to charge ; ^ he being of the opinion that
the offensive was the proper, and only principle, on
which cavalry should act. He encouraged his horsemen
to the utmost, as may be gathered from the following
passages in his regulations for his cavaby. " They will
move off" at a fast trot, and charge at the galop, being
careful to be always well closed together. His Majesty
will guarantee that the enemy will he beaten every time
they are charged in this way" In a note to this is the
following inspiriting addition : " N.B. — If it is found that
any soldier is not doing his duty, or is wishing to fiy,
the first officer or sub-officer who perceives it will pass
his sword through his body." It will be seen by these
extracts,^ that Frederick used every available means to
encourage his cavalry to perform great deeds.

Under this system it can readily be conceived how
soon the Prussian cavalry, compact and charging im-
petuously, would acquire a great superiority over the

* Duparcq, ii. 295.

H

316

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV,

Germans with their slow movements, and over the French
horsemen with their loose and scattered formation ; for
the French at this time had two modes of attack — close
and at a trot, which they called en muraille, and at
speed and dispersed, which they termed en fourageurs.
The Prussian hussars and light cavalry soon learned to
charge boldly against the heaviest Austrian cuirassiers
and dragoons, whom they often overthrew and routed.

In addition to his changes in the general principle of
using his cavalry, Frederick made many valuable im-
provements in their organisation and method of tactical
formation. The force consisted of cuirassiers, dragoons,
and hussars. A regiment of cuirassiers contained five
squadrons, each comprising two companies of seventy
men each. They were usually formed up in three ranks,
the third being retained to fill gaps that might appear
in the front ranks in the charge. The pace of the charge
being increased to the galop made this formation in three
ranks very difficult to preserve, the second rank between
the other two being much constrained. Thus the forma-
tion upon two ranks was soon ic necessary sequence of
the increased mobility of the cavalry service, and was
adopted both in France and Prussia, in the latter part
of the Seven Years' War.^

In operating on the field of battle, Frederick ordered
that in the charge the cavalry should form in two lines,
the first with very small intervals between the squadrons,
the second in a much more open order ; the intervals
being about equal to the front of each squadron. The
s'econd line formed a reserve through which the first line
could retire, and at the same time watched the wings, so
as to anticipate a flank movement, if such should be
attempted. The Prussian monarch was very strongly
in favour of flank attacks, and commanded his officers to
fall upon the enemy in that manner whenever practi-

if! '

cable, assuring them that whether on the halt or on the
march, an onset upon the enemies' flank would always
overthrow them.

In training his cavalry in peace, Frederick often prac-

^ Duparcq, ii. 297.

!

oHAi'. xx.] KUEDEUIOK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

317

be

Is to

Itcti-

the

^ays

Iraf^-

tisod them in charging in serried lines without any
intervals whatever, rightly judgiLg that, being trained
in that way, they would before ai' enemy manoeuvre all
the more easily, when formed with small intervals of five
or six paces between the squadrons. The squadrons
were divided into two divisions of twenty-four files
each, which contained two pelotons of twelve files each,
and these pelotons were again subdivided into escouades
or sections of six files.

The cuirassiers, as their name indicates, wore the
(tuirass or breastplate. They had in each regiment 37
officers, 70 non-commissioned officers, and 12 trumpeters.
The most of the di-agoon regiments wore of the same
force, composition and formation, as the cuirassiers.
One dragoon regiment, however, had three squadrons,
and two others ten squadrons; these were the only
exceptions.

The hussars were organised in regiments of ten
squadrons each, but the squadrons were not so large.
Each regiment contained 51 officers, 110 sub-officers,
and 1,440 horses; a much larger proportion of officers
than in the Austrian service.

Although Frederick forbade his horsemen to use
firearms when together in large bodies, he yet appre-
ciated the importance of availing himself of them
among isolated parties of his cavalry, especially when
they were serving as flankers, or as videttes ; and that
they should be efficient, the men were exercised in firing,
and taught to load quickly and to aim carefully.

As his cavalry were used continually on outpost duty,
ou detached service of every kind scattered about in
.small parties, and often singly as videttes, it was necessary
that they should be men in whom every confidence could
he placed. They had opportunities almost every day
to desert, and were constantly obliged to arrest spies
and deserters. They were consequently chosen with
great care from among the sons of small landed pro-
prietors and farmers, the parents being held responsible
for man and horse in case of desertion. All these points
show how carefully Frederick had considered every

318

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

detail, and how anxious he was to secure- a good cavalry
force. He was well repaid for his exertions in this
connection, for to his cavalry he owed nearly all his
great successes.

Among other improvements in the tactical movements
of his cavalry, Frederick is said to have introduced the
system of forming line to the front from column by the
oblique march of troops or squadrons, across by the
straightest line to the position each was to assume in
the new alignment. The system, before his day, was to
wheel the head of the column to the right or left, and
as soon as the whole column was upon the new line to
wheel into line. These frequent wheelings and exposures
of the flanks to the enemy did not please the king. He
wished to avoid showing his flank to the enemy, and to
march the shortest way obliquely towards them. When
Frederick proposed it to some of his old officers they
said it was a thing that had never been either done or
thought of. " It has been thought of," said the king,
" and shall be done." It was then said that the horse-
men would have to be taken to the riding school and
drilled for the purpose. "They shall," said the king, "and
the horses too." It was then observed that many would
get broken limbs before they would be able to perform
this manoeuvre. " What signifies that," said the king,
" if it should be the means of gaining a victory '? " The
experiment was tried, first with a few and afterwards
with a larger number, and succeeded admirably. The
above, which is detailed in Count Algarotti's " Letters
Military and Political," shows very clearly how ener-
getically Frederick pushed on his reforms, in spite of the
traditions and prejudices existing in the army in his
time.

The cuirassiers, or heavy cavalry, were generally
placed in the first line, the hussars being used on the
flanks and in reserve, their principal employment
however being in the minor operations of war. The
dragoons occupied an intermediate position between the
hussarJ.^ and the cuirassiers, and were employed with both
of them. Frederick, more than any other general, used

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

319

The
}ters
;ner-
the
his

rally
the

nent
The
the

both

used

his cavalry in every kind of service, the cuirassiers being
often called upon to perform the duty of light horsemen,
and the hussars being often used in serried squadrons
on the battle field, as if they were heavy cavalry of the
line.

The method adopted by Frederick of working his
cavalry, of employing them in large masses, and pro-
hibiting them from firing, exposed them more than ever
to the deadly effects of the fire of artillery and infantry ;
and he soon perceived that occasions would arise, in
which these two arms would have constant oppor-
tunities of opening a destructive fire upon his horsemen,
without much chance of retaliation on their part. To
remedy this defect the king saw that it was necessary to
discover some auxiliary force that would protect his
horsemen altogether, or in part, from this disadvantage.
This led to the invention and organisation of horse
artillery, which, by its rapidity, could follow all the
movements of the cavalry, and camping and fighting
with it, would be able to keep the enemy's batteries
and infantry at a distance, and by its fire pave the way
for the charge of the horsemen. By this in\rention,
which was one of the most striking results of Frederick's
genius, the cavalry, without losing in mobility, gained a
new and important means of attack and defence.
Frederick even attached these batteries of horse artillery
to his hussars and light troops.*

One of Frederick's cavalry officers, Major-General
Warnery, has left some excellent works on military sub-
jects, his "Remarques sur la cavalerie" being the best
work of the age on the organisation and tactics of cavalry,
and being interesting as illustrating the ideas of the
principal Prussian cavalry officers on that subject : for it
is generally admitted that the views of Warnery are
based upon the opinions of Seidlitz, under whom he
served, and with whom he was on terms of close personal
friendship. His other works, though of less interest, are
valuable. His ** Remarques sur le militaire et la marine
dcs Turcs et des Russes " contains much useful informa-

Rocquancourt, ii. 60.

'

•^)i{)

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[I'KUIOD IV.

tion on the military forces of tliosc coimtrics at his
epoch. His other vvorks are all ou military subjects.
His "Campagnes dc Frederick II Roi de Prusse de 1756
a 1 762 " has been very severely criticised, but yet con-
tains a great number of instructive and interestinj;
details.

Warnery had an intense admiration for Seidlitz. He
calls him " this grand man " when he refers to him, and
says tliat it was impossible to push the cavalry to greater
perfection than did Seidlitz. Speaking of Seidlitz's own
regiment, Warnery says, that it served as a model
to all the cavalry in the universe. Frederick was par-
ticularly fortunate in his choice of officers, his generals
Seidlitz and Ziethen being men of extraordinary capacity.
The ergy and promptness of decision of the former,
was *, oil evinced by an incident which occurred when he
was quite a young officer, and which is a splendid illus-
tration of the spirit which should animate a cavaliy
commander. It is translated from Comte de Rochfort's
" Idees Pratiques sur la Cavalerie." " Seidlitz, to whom
Frederick owed the greater part of his success, was so
skilful, so vigorous a horseman, that he could not con-
ceive how an officer of cavalry could be made prisoner if
his horse was not killed.

" Once he expressed this opinion while escorting the
king when he was captain of the guard. Frederick,
whom nothing escr^ped, was struck v/ith his remarks, and
decided to put him to the proof. The opportunity £oon
presented itself.

" The escort was obliged to pass over a bridge ; the
king stopped in the middle of it, and turning towards
Seidlitz, who was surrounded in front and rear, said to
him :

" ' You pretend, Monsieur Seidlitz, that an officer of
cavalry ought never to be made prisoner ; certainly it is
the idea of a brave man, nevertheless there are occasions
where one could surrender without dishonour. Suppose,
for instance, that we were enemies, you would not at-
tempt to pass by force. What would you do then ? '

" Seidlitz, prompt as thought, drove in his spurs and

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

321

y tlie
erk'k,
and

3011

the
.^ards
lid to

>po8e,
at-

and

threw himself witli his horse into the torrent, and with-
out suffering any injury, returned to the retinue near
the king, whom he saluted, saying, ' Sire, behold my
reply."'

Seidlitz possessed the secret of knowing when to be
bold, even rash, and when to be cautious. No man ever
combined prudent and careful judgment with such indom-
itable energy and impetuosity. In his boyhood he was
noted for his bold and adventurous pranks. At seven
years of age he rode between the sails of a windmill in
jfull action. At twenty-three he was a major, and had
already distinguished himself in several battles. At
thu'ty-two he was colonel commandant of a cuirassier
regiment. At thirty-five he was made a lieutenant-
general and commander-in-chief of the cavalry.* His
most brilliant action was the battle of Rosbach, in 1 757,
where with the horsemen alone he won a most decisive
victory. His expedition against Gotha, where with 1,500
men he captured a town strongly occupied with infantry
and artillery, was another of his bold exploits, his whole
dispositions showing the greatest ability.

Ziethen was one of Frederick's favourite cavalry
generals, and united, says his biographer, " wisdom with
courage, contempt of danger with perseverance, and dex-
terity with presence of mind, and activity with the most
perfect command of temper. He conceived his plans
with the progressiveness of the rising storm, and exc-
(^uted them with the rapidity of the thunderbolt."^ He
was colonel for a time of the celebrated Ziethen hussars,
called the " death's-head hussars." He served upwards
of seventy years, and died at the age of eighty-six. His
promptness of decision was remarkable. He once said
to the king, " The moment I see the enemy my disposi-
tions are already made." This quick coup dceil was the
•secret of his great success as a general of horse.

In tlie account of Frederick's campaigns and battles
the name of Ziethen continually appears and always
most creditably. In reference to some of these actions
we shall have to refer more particularly to his exploits.
' Beamish, 42, 43. ^ Ibid. 44.

322

A HISTORY OF CAVALRl.

[PEBIOD IV.

Under Frederick the Great we find a very marked
change in the manner of di'illing the individual horsemen
and so preparing the units carefully before manoeuvring
them together in large masses. Frederick seems to have
been the first to bestow great attention to the instruction
of each cavalry soldier in horsemanship and in the use
of his sword. In the days of chivalry we know that
the knights were drilled and exercised from the age of
fourteen with constant care in riding and in the use of
the lance, sword, mace, and battle-axe, and they were
probably as skilful in the use of their chargers and
weapons as the cavaliers of the Prussian monarch ; but
they were trained only for single combat, their skill was
intended only to perfect them in individual feats of
arms. Frederick made a great step in advance when he
made the individual training merely the foundation of,
and the preparation for, rapid manoeuvring and fighting
in enormous masses.

After the peace of Dresden great attention was paid
to the horsemanship of the cavalry. In every regiment
a riding school was established, and rough riders and
riding masters were appointed, by whom the men and
horses were continually exercised ;' the soldiers being
taught every detail of the eqiiCstrian art and being con-
stantly practised in swordsmanship when mounted. By
this means each particular horseman acquired a personal
(confidence in his own powers in the management of his
horse as well as in his ability to defend himself with his
sword. In fact, no soldier was admitted into the regiment
to go through field manoeuvres until he was individually
thoroughly instructed and well established in his seat in
the saddle.

The great care bestowed upon the training of both
horses and men in the riding schools was the secret of
the ability of the Prussian cavalry to manoeuvre in large
bodies with such remarkable speed. They were able, as
already stated, to perform all the evolutions required in
the field at the galop, in good order and with perfect
alignment.*

^ Beamish, 358. ^ Rocquancourt, Humbert, 105.

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

323

as

in

Feet

ScitUitz aud Ziethen both bestowed great attention to
the instruction of the cavahy. After the men had been
well trained in the riding schools, they were manoeuvred
in large masses over rough ground to prepare them for
service before an enemy. Seidlitz was accu-tomed ;>
exercise his regiment at iuV. speed over very broken
ground, and men were often killed. Frederick once
found fault with him on account of the number of deaths
so occasioned. Seidlitz coolly answered — " If you make
such a fuss about a few broken necks, your Majesty will
never have the bold horsemen you require for the field."
This anecdote is a striking illustration of the spirit in
which the cavalry of the great Frederick were trained
and handled.'

As already mentioned, the cavalry on level plains
sometimes charged in close line without intervals, or, ae
the French say, en muraille, as Seidlitz did at Zorndorf
in 1758 with seventy squadrons in closely serried order,
a fact that speaks volumes as to the manoeuvring powers
of the Prussian horse.'' The intervals between the
squadrons varied, being regulated evidently by the nature
of the ground and the tactics of the enemy.

The cavalry generally retreated, in case of need, by
echelons, and were taught to rally to the front instead of
to the rear, or, in other words, to rally after a charge
while pursuing ; a most important precaution, tending to
prevent a reckless and disorderly pursuit and enabling a
commander to follow up a victory with greater certainty,
to resist an attack of the enemy's reserves with more
chances of success, or to turn against the flank or rear
of any body of the enemy's troops which their advance
might enable them to attack Avith advantage.

The system of elementary tactics in the Prussian
cavalry was alike in all the various kinds, the cuirassier
being trained exactly the same as the hussar ; speed,
orderly manoeuvres, charges in line, or en fourcigeurs,
being equally required from both. They were all drilled
to charge across ditches, to leap hedges, to cross hollow
roads, villages, and defiles, to search woods, to make
Nolan, 33. ^ Humbert, 105.

y 2

324

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

reconnaissances, in fact, to do everything they might he
called upon to perform before an enemy.'

It can readily be imagined what power a force of
cavalry so drilled would have in action when h^d by
energetic commanders, and when relying upon the
sword and close hand-to-hand fighting. These horse-
men soon learned to despise the use of firearms, and to
disregard them in the hands of their opponents. When
we learn the particulars of Frederick's preparations for
war, and the extraordinary care bestowed. by him upon
his troops, we no longer wonder at his remarkable
successes, and feel that he had fairly earned them.

Having recounted the changes made by Frederick in
the art of war, particularly in the organisation, arma-
ment, and tactics of his cavalry, it will be instructive to
follow them into the field, and, in tracing the result of
his reforms, refer to a few of the more brilliant successes
of his horsemen, which all convey lessons of value to
the cavalry officer.

; t!

i

SECTION II. — ACTIONS OF PRUSSIAN CAVALRY — BATTLES
OP HOHENFRIEDBERG, SOHR, HOCHKIRCH, PRAGUE,
LEUTHEN, AND ZORNDORF.

The battle of Hohenfriedberg, fought on the 4th June,
1745, was won by Frederick, and to a great extent
through the services rendered by the cavalry. Ziethen,
with the cavalry of the left wing, crossing Strigau water
by a ford, at once charged fiercely upon the Austrian
right over difficult ground. The Austrians, unaccustomed
to such vigorous treatment, were soon thrown into con-
fusion and routed. They excused themselves by saying,
" Vie could not charge the Prussians, partly because of
the morasses that lay between us, and partly because
they rushed across and charged us." They were evidently
discouraged, in fact dismayed, by the confident way in
which the Prussians came on, as if sure of success.* In
some parts of the field the Austrian regiments would not

^ Wameiy, 73.

Carlyle, iv. 118.

ciup. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAI'S CAVALRY.

326

in

In

not

charge at all, but merely kept firing their carbines at the
halt, and when the time came ran.^

This action shows that the Prussian training enabled
their horsemen to attack over ground that the Austrian
cavalry could not operate upon, and compelled the latter
to await the charge at the halt, and consequently to be
beaten. In the centre of the army, the cavalry of
Frederick also performed the most important services.
Licutenant-General Gessler, with the dragoon regiment
of Baireuth, was in the second line, and happened to be
exactly in rear of a gap that had opened in the Prussian
front during the manoeuvring that preceded the general
attack. While watching the result of the close struggle
that was going on desperately between the opposing
lines of inmntry, he saw the battalions in front of him
getting shaky and confused, the heavy fire of the
Prussians and the stress of battle beginning to tell
heavily upon them. The instant had arrived for action ;
requesting the infantry to open the gap a little wider to
give him room, he led his horsemen through in two
columns, sabre in hand, with fierce impetuosity, and
dashed pell-mell into the wavering Austrians. Everything
gave way at once, twenty battalions were broken
instantly, and thousands of prisoners taken, with
standards, kettle-drums, &c. That charge turned the
fate of the battle, and the Austrian commander drew oiF
the shattered remains of his army as best he could.^

The contrast between the cavalry of the Prussians
and that of the Austrians is very marked in this action,
and shows how much superior the horsemen of Frederick
were upon the field of battle, in all that constitutes a
good cavalry force.

At the battle of Sohr, on the 30th September, 1745,
another splendid illustration was given of the superiority
of the Prussians in the field. The Austrian army
through the night had glided around Frederick's right
flank through the woods, in perfect silence without even
a pipe lit, and with a thick veil of hussars in front.
They secured a lodgment on some heights on the Pmssian
» Carlyle,iv. 118. = ibid. 119.

pi

326

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

right, nud soon placed twenty-eight gunt* in positioii
with Mty squadrons of horse in three lines forming their
left wing. Frederick was obliged under fire of cannon
to change his front to the right, the Austrian horse
sitting idly in their saddles watching the hurried
manceuvre. Not so with the Prussians. The king
ordered Buddenbrock to charge them up hill with his
cuirassiers. That general and his horsemen went into
them at a furious rate. The Austrians made no counter-
charge, no advance, but stood motionless in their ranks
and opened a sputtering fire of carbines upon the rapidly
advancing foe. Buddenbrock's followers paid no atten-
tion to the fire, but crashed through them in an instant,
tumbled them back in wild confusion, back upon the
second line, and rolled both further back upon the third
and swept the whole mass off the heights clear away into
the forest, out of which they returned no more during
the action.^ This one charge of cavalry turned the scale,
the infantry soon captured the battery, and the whole
Austrian left was driven from the field. Buddenbrock's
cavalry had not yet finished their work, however ; having
nothing further to do upon the right, they were moved
rapidly across to the Prussian left, which had been
refused up to that time. Reinforced by Buddenbrock
the left wing of the Prussian cavalry dashed vehemently
against the cavalry of the Austrian right, who did not
stand the storming rush of ib'^ Prussian horsemen, but
wavered and broke in flight tv...ardsthe woods in the
rear. The Prussians did not follow them, but turned to
the right upon the exposed flank of the Austrian infantry,
rolled it up, cut off" a slice of about 2,000 prisoners, and
put "the remainder to flight." This was the final blow
that settled the victory, and is as good an example of
skilful cavalry tactics as any we have met with in our
researches.

In the surprise of Hochkirch, 14th October, 1758, the

Austrian army again turned Frederick's right wing, and

attacking in the night, drove his araiy from the ground.

Here, agair however, the cavalry ^lerfcimed the most

' Carlyle, iv. Un. 2 ^ja. ^4,^

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY. 327

valuable services, cheeking the advance of the attacking
force very materially, and thereby preventing a ser:' >u.s
disaster. Ziethen, with his usual vigilance and caution,
had his hussars all dressed, their horses saddled and
ready on the first alarm to ride into action, and was
soon charging in his vigorous style, dashing in upon the
Austrians so vehemently, that they could do nothing in
his part of the field, and Frederick was able when the
day broke to withdraw his army in good order into a
new position.' Had it not been for the bravery and
vigilance of Ziethen and his hussars, this retreat could
hardly have been accomplished without irreparable
losses.

At the battle of Prague, 6th May, 1757, there was
some very heavy cavalry fighting on the left wing of the
Prussian army, which had turned the Austrian right by
a flank march in broad daylight. The Austrians, on
seeing the manoeuvre the enemy were carrying out, at
once hurried their cavalry to the right wing, which was
thrown back and formed at right angles to the original
line. The horsemen, to the number of 104 squadrons,
were arranged in three lines, with intervals equal to tlie
front of a squadron.

The Prussian cavalry of tliat wing, under Prince
Schonaich, comprised only sixty-five squadrons, but in
their usual furious style they charged at once at full
speed. The Austrians stood still until the advancing
horsemen came within fifty paces, when they poured in
a volley with carbines, and then advanced at good pace
against them. Being outflanked by superior numbers,
the Prussians were checked, and twice repulsed. In the
third attack, however, General Ziethen, A^sHth his hussars
and a regiment of dragoons, charged with such vigour
that the Austrian cavalry were entirely defeated and
driven back upon their own infantry, throwing their
lines into great confusion. General Warnery gives the
particulars of a very interesting attack made by his
regiment upon the hussars of Haddick, in which he
skirted a pond, resting his right upon it, as he made the

> Carlyle, v. 292,

\i

328

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

circuit to prevent his being outflanked.^ The action of
Warnery's regiment tended materially to the success of
the Prussian cavalry in this action.

The bactle of Rosbach, 5th November, 1757, was
probably of all others that in which the cavalry exercised
the most important influence, for it was won almost
entirely by that arm ; a very few regiments of infantry
having come up in time to take part in the affair. The
allied forces moved to their own right, in order to turn
the left flank of Frederick's army. The Prussian king
soon saw their intention, and immediately made his
arrangements to frustrate their design. He moved his
cavalry rapidly behind some hills which concealed their
march, and formed them up in lines, exactly across the
route by which the allied forces were advancing. On
their near approach, the Prussian cavalry, led by Seidlitz,
attacked vehemently the heads of the columns before
they had time to deploy, and drove them back in confu-
sion. They attempted to rally, but the Prussian.s
renewed the attack so quickly, that all their eff"ort8 to
re-form were ineffectual, and they were routed. The
allied infantry then endeavoured to form, but Frederick
attacking them promptly with six or eight baticJions
which had come up, was able, with the assistance of the
cavalry and the artillery, to break the few troops which
attempted to deploy at the heads of the columns, and
soon drove them back in rout.

Prince Soubise, who commanded the allies, moved up
his reserve of cavalry in the hope of restoring the action,
and giving time to his troops to rally and deploy, but
the Prussian horse soon dashed in upon them, and sent
them off" in headlong flight. It was then all over, the
approach of night alone staying the pursuit.

The next day at dawn the king, with the hussars and
dnigoons, followed the retiring enemy. He soon came
upon the French rear-guard, who were posted in some
inclosed gardens and in a chdteau. Frf>derick, who
understood the use of dragoons, as well as all the other
arms, immediately dismounted them, and forming them
' Waraery, 108, 109, 110.

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY.

329

ilier

up on foot, drove the enemy from the gardens, and was
about attacking the chateau when they abandoned it,
and fled across the river Unstrut, burning the bridges
behind them. This use of the dragoon is instructive, as
showing that the highest appreciation of the use of the
armes blanches did not prevent Frederick from using
firearms on occasions where their use was likely to be the
most advantageous.

Berenhorst, speaking of this action, well describes the
spirit of the Prussian system of cavalry tactics : " The
genius of the Prussian cavalry sprang forth here from
the fields of Reichardtswerben, and led them on to
victory. When the cavalry in order of battle, like a
pent-up flood, is held read}', and at the first signal
poured down in torrents, floods the fields, sweeping all
before it, then has cavalry reached the ideal of perfec-
tion, and to this ideal Seidlitz attained with the Prussian
cavalry on that day."^

At Leuthen on the 5th December, 1757, Frederick
won a great victory over the Austrians by a skilful
employment of the oblique order of battle. In this
action the Prussian cavalry of their right wing were
strengthened or supported by four battalions of infantry,
which the king had placed in rear of the cavalry of that
wing, to protect their flank. These battalions are said to
liave performed most valuable services, by driving back
with their fire a portion of Nadasti's cavalry which had
charged the Prussian horse in flank, and had thrown
several regiments into confusion. On the left wing
Frederick had posted Driescn, with a force of cavalry to
protect the flank of his infantry, and with strict
injunctions to take nothing else in hand.

Driescn, drawn up in a hollow, waited patiently till
Lucchesi with the numerous cavalry of the Austrian
right, charged upon the Ihmk of the Prussian infantrj',
waited until he galloped by and was met by the storm
of bullets from the Prussian line. Then in perfect order
he emerged, and charged vehemently upon the flank and
rear of the Austrian horsemen. Utterly astonished and

» Nolan, 3G.

330

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

; i;

confounded with heavy fire in front, and Prussian steel in
rear, they turned in flight and scattered in every
direction.^

T'he cavaby in this, as in all Frederick's battles,
conifibuted very materially to the victory, and were
bravely led and skilfully commanded. The Austrians
were learning by this time something of the spirit in
which cavalry should be handled, for it appears that on
their left Nadasti dashed out with his cavalry upon
Ziethen, before Ziethen charged, and it was in that
charge that the Prussian horse owed something to the as-
sistance of the four infantry battalions placed in their rear.

Seidlitz virtually decided the battle of Zorndorf by a
charge of his cuirassiers. The Russians had made a
desperate charge upon the Prussian lines, and so fierce
was the onset that the king's infantry were compelled
to retire in disorder. This occasioned a considerable
opening in the Prussian line, and left their whole left
flank uncovered.^ The Russians, confident of -sdctory,
plunged wildly forward with loud shouts of triumph,
sweeping all before them, and capturing twenty-six
pieces of cannon. The day seemed irretrievably lost,
when Seidlitz, who with about 5,000 horse had got across
the marshy Zabern hollow, dashed vehemently upon the
flank of the advancing Russians, who in the flush
of success had lost their order, and were in confused
masses. In an instant they were thrown into utter
ruin, by the rushing squadrons, led by the impetuous
Seidlitz.

They fought bravely, however, refusing to fly, the
Prussian horsemen salDring them, till from very fatigue
they were obliged to desist.^

After this the second line or rear half of the
quadrilateral into which the Russian army was formed,
was brought up in good oider to make another effort to
win the day. Frederick brought up his right wing
and made rapid preparations to attack again. His
infantry were just getting within musket range when the
Russian cavalry, supported by their foot, charged boldly
» Carlyle, v. 204. ^ Towors, ii. IIG. ^ Cai-lyle, v. 267.

the

CHAP. XX.] FREDERICK THE GREAT'S CAVALRY. 331

against the coming attack. This chai'ge checked the
Prussian advance, broke through their centre, and a
battery and a battalion of infantry were taken prisoners.
Frederick rushed forward and personally tried to rally
his troops, but without success. The fate of the day
was again trembling in the balance, when again Seidlitz
appeared at the head of sixty-one squadrons, brought
from the other end of the field, and charging swiftly
upon the victorious Eussian cavalry, drove them back
before him, back into the morasses of the Mutzel, so that
they returned no more during the battle. Frederick
openly acknowledged that he owed his success to
Seidlitz. This action was so closely contested and so
indecisive, that both sides claimed the victory.

; «'■

if:!

:t

Hi.s

the

)ldly

67.

I'

CHAPTER XXI.
Austrian Cavalry in Frederick the Great's Wars.

The cavcalry in the Austrian army at this epoch con-
sisted of cuirassiers, dragoons, and hussars. At the
celebrated battle of Prague, the horsemen were in the
following proportions : seventy-seven squadrons of cuiras-
siers, forty-two squadrons of dragoons, and thirty-five
squadrons of hussars.

There was a marked difference in the cavalry of the
Prussian and Austrian services, Frederick, as we are
aware, had devoted his principal efibrts to render his
cavalry effective in manoeuvring, and charging in large
masses upon the field. The great attention bestowed
upon this point caused less care to be taken in training
them fully in the minor duties that fall upon cavalry.
They were consequently not so well trained in outpost
and reconnoitring work.

The Austrian army, on the contrary, had large bodies
of irregular light cavalry, quite incapable of withstanding
in the open plain the impetuous rush of the serried
squadrons of the Prussian king; but in scouting, re-
connoitring, and covering the front of an army, they
were more than a match for their opponents. They
excelled in swarming about in woods and broken ground,
attacking detached parties whenever opportunities oc-
curred, but if vigorously pressed they usually fell back,
leisur(4y taking advantage of every inequality of the
ground to cover their retreat.

The well-performed outpost service of the Austrians

CHAP. XXI.]

AUSTRIAN CAVALRY.

333

was of incalculable value to them, and Frederick was
continually incurring terrible risks through his weakness
in this particular. The splendid materitd however in his
cavaliy, and their magnificent training and morale,
almost always on the field of battle secured, by hard
fighting, the safety that their ill-managed outpost work
often so seriously endangered.

Frederick continually refers to the great difficulties
he encountered, through the extraordinary vigilance and
dexterity of the Austrian hussars, in concealing the
movements of their army. In 1744, he says, that the
Austrians had 10,000 Hungarian hussars, who cut off
the communications of his army, in a country much
intersected with morasses, forests, hills, and defiles.^
They were able, he relates, to discover all that passed
in his camp, while he could not send out patrols without
calculating on the probability of their loss. So that in
fact his army was virtually confined to the enceinte of
the camp. This added enormously to the difficulty
of foraging and obtaining provisions.

The Austrians had a force of Uhlans in the Seven
Years' War, which were raised among the inhabitants of
the Ukraine. In person, dress, and manner of fighting,
they resembled the Tartars and Calmucks. They were
armed with a lance about fifteen feet long, pistols, sabres,
sometimes with carbines, and sometimes, according to
General Lloyd, even at that date, with bows and arrows.
Large numbers of Croats, a species of irregular light
cavalry, also served in the Austrian army in all the wars
against Frederick, so that in that type of mounted
soldier, the Austrians had a great advantage over
him.

In this war the Hungarians organised a corps of
mounted riflemen, which rendered most important ser-
vices. They were armed with rifles having conical
touch-holes. They formed a part of the army of the
Duke of Brunswick.*

Carlyle's history of Frederick the Great teems with
references to the excessive difficulty the king had in
^ Frederick's Memoirs, i. 2U. ■ Bismarck, 335.

w

I'

334

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

I !

If i>

obtaining information of his enemy's movements. In
1741, on the opening of the campaign, Frederick was in
profound ignorance of what was going on beyond his
own lines, through the clouds of light troops that in-
fested the whole country in front of him. His scout
service could not live among them, his reconnoitring
parties were stopped, and the enemy were covered by
an impenetrable veil.'

In September and October, 1744, Frederick was placed
in great straits, through this superiority of the enemy's
light cavalry. They lurked in bushy wildernesses, in
rocky vaUeys, in scraggy woods. Driving them off, or
defeating them, was all in vain, for they fled rapidly,
and returned promptly on the cessation of pursuit.
Foraging was almost impossible, and only to be accom-
plished by sending out whole regiments together to
perform the service. Letters and orders coidd not be
carried from point to point without being intercepted.
Carlyle states that at this date the irregular horse shut
out the light of day, that as many as six orderlies were
despatched to an outlying general, and not one of them
could get through to him. Three letter-bags destined
for the king were taken, so that for four weeks he was
absolutely shut out from the rest of Europe, and knew
not in the least what the Emperor, the King of France,
or any other king was doing.^

At the skirmish of Tein Bridge, the irregular horse
attacked the Prussian rear-guard under Zicthen, and
although forcing the passage of the river, when they
came to close quarters, the iron discipline and steady
charges of the well-trained hussars enabled them to
beat them off and retire in good order.

In October 1 744, when Frederick took up his position
in the camp of Konopischt, he foresaw that his garrisons
in Budweis, Tabor, and Frauenberg, would run risk of
capture. He sent therefore eight successive messengers
with orders to them to rejoin him. The whole eight
were captured by Austriiin parties of light horse, so that

u

^ Carlyle, iii. 224.

2 Ibid. iv. 26.

CHAl'. XXI.]

AUSTRIAN CAVALRY.

335

tion
sons
of
gers
ight
tliat

no order arriving, all three garrisons, containing 3,000
men, were taken prisoners.'

Tlie whole campaign of 1744 was unfortunate to
Frederick, and his ill success seems attributable more
to the services of the cavalry of the Austrians as
outposts, than to any other cause. Carlylo says :
"While old Traun is kept luminous as mid-day, the
circumambient atmosphere of Pandours is tenebrific to
Frederick, keeps him in perpetual midnight. He has
to read his position as with flashes of lightning for most
part, a heavily laden, sorely exasperated man."*

In the passage of the Elbe by the Austrians at Teinitz
on the 19th November, 1744, the light cavalry swam
or waded the river, above and below the point at which
the passage was effected, and got into the woods in the
rear. Ziethen and Wedell, who were defending the
[lassage bravely, sent out scout after scout to bring aid,
but every one was killed, so that no help could come,
and tliey were obliged to fall back fighting.

The battle of Sohr we have already seen was a
sur})rise. Thirty thousand Austrians marched around
Frederick's right flank under cover of a veil of hussars,
who had their outposts squatted in the bushes within
500 yards of the Prussian camp. This was all owing to
tlie excellent qualities of the Austrian cavalry for out-
post duty. Frederick was obliged to deploy his lines
under a heavy fire of artillery, and would certainly have
been defeated had the Austrian cuirassiers and infantry
been anything like equal to the Prussians in soldierly
skill upon the battle-field.

The battle of Hochkirch was also a surprise, and very
similar to that of Solir, but Ziethen had learned to
understand his foe, and with sleepless vigilance held his
hussars ready, and so saved the army.

General Lloyd, who served in the Austrian army, says
that " At the head of 200 chasseurs and 100 dragoons,
he, during the whole campaign of 1760, kept so near
the King of Prussia's army, that he never lost sight of it
for an hour, though the Austrian army, and tbs corps
' Carlylo, iv. 35, 36. - Ibid. iv. 37, 38.

336

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

lie belonged to were generally two or three marches off,
and though he was always in sight of the enemy, and
scarce a day passed without some skirmish, yet in the
course of the campaign he did not lose twenty men."'

The above incidents and passages will give an idea of
the wonderful skill with which the outpost service was
performed by the irregular horsemen who foughi under the
Austrian flag. Had Frederick been as well provided
with light cavalry his successes would have been much
greater, and he would rarely have found his army in the
dangerous, in fact desperate, situations in which it was
so often placed.

In addition to the reconnoitring and advanced post
service, in which the Austrian cavalry were so efficient,
they were equally effective in another very impor-
tant branch of the duties of cavalry in a campaign,
namely, in detached service, in partisan raids, and in
operations in rear of the enemy against his lines of
communication.

The most remarkable of these operations was the
partisan raid of General Haddick, with about 4,000 men
and four cannon, upon Berlin on the 17th October, 1757.
His force consisted mainly of Croats, and by concealing
his movements as much as possible by marching through
the woods, he obtained a good start, and his numbers
being unknown were greatly magnified by rumour.
General Rochow, commandant of Berlin, had a force
under his command equal to that of Haddick and capable
of defeating it, but imposed upon by the rumours that
had reached him, as well as by the bold front shown by
the Austrian leader, who at once attacked the Silesian
gate and was soon in possession of the suburb of the
city, he retreated to Spandau with the royal family and
archives, and left the capital of Prussia to make its own
terms with the Austrian commander.

After a good deal of bargaining, Haddick accepted a
ransom of 27,000/. sterling, and marched off" after a halt
of twelve hours, skilfully evading any attempt to cut
him off* and effecting a safe retreat behind the river

» Lloyd, ii. 53.

CHAP. ZXI.]

AU8TTIIAN CAVALRY.

337

ted a
hcalt
> cut
river

Spree. The whole affair \/as most skilfully planned and
boldly executed, and had a very great moral effect for a
time. It is a proof of the excellent capacity of the
Austrian cavalry for this kind of service.

The attack and capture of the Prussian convoy under
command of Colonel Mosel in its march from Troppau
to Olmutz on the 30th June, 1758, was the most impor-
tant operation of that kind during the Seven Years'
War, and had a most decisive eflFect upon the result of the
campaign, compelling as it did the raising of the siege
of Olmutz and the retreat of Frederick into Bohcnia.

Colonel Mosel set out from Troppau on the 26 :h June
with nearly 4,000 waggons and an escort of eight
battalions, 3,000 recruits or convalescents in four bat-
talions, and 1,100 cavalry.' Marshal Daun, who com-
manded the Austrian army, took steps to waylay his
march, feeling confident that if he wished to save
Olmutz he must raise the siege either by cutting off the
convoy or fighting a pitched battle. In the hope of
deceiving Frederick he manoeuvred as if about to offer
battle while he detached Major-General Loudon, the best
partisan soldier in his army, to attack the convoy from
the west, while Ziskowitz was sent to attack it from the
east. Frederick, not deceived by the manoeuvres of
Daun, and feeling that all depended upon the safe arrival
of the convoy, despatched General Ziethen to Colonel
Mosel's assistance with twenty squadrons and three
battalions.^

General Loudon performed his task with great ability ;
he concealed his march from the Prussians successfully,
and on the third day out Colonel Mosel was attacked
near Gunersdorf. Loudon occupied the heights which
commanded the defile between Bautsch and Alt Liebe,
placing his Croats and Hungarians in the woods, and
formed his cavalry to the right in the plain, across the
road, so as to envelop the head of the column as it
debouched from the defile. In the meantime he drew a
close cordon of posts across the route between himself

' Jomini, Grand Operations, ii. 106. ^ Frederick's Memoirs,
ii. U.

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and Frederick, and much nearer to Olmutz, so as to
prevent the possibility of news being conveyed to the
Prussian king of the danger the convoy was about to
encounter.* These cavalry posts performed this service
admirably, so that Frederick only heard of the loss of
his convoy a day after it had occurred.

In the first attack, near Bautsch, Loudon was not suc-
cessful. MoseFs dispositions were so well taken, and
his troops fought so bravely, that the Austrians were
driven back with the loss of some 500 men. The same
evening General Ziethen joined Mosel with strong
reinforcements, and both officers halted the next
day to enable the long train of waggons to close
well up. On the morning of the 30th June the whole
force set out again, and on entering the defile of
Domstcedtel they found no sign of the enemy until
about 120 waggons had got out into the plain beyond,
when the Austrians appeared upon the heights, and
opened a heavy fire of artillery upon the mouth of the
defile. Ziethen ordered the waggons to be massed as
fast as they came up in front of the defile, and took steps
to drive olf the attacking forces. His first attack was
successful, but being charged in flank by the Saxon
dragoons, his troops were driven back upon the train.
General Ziskowitz directed his efforts towards the middle
of the convoy, while Loudon renewed his attack upon
the head. After most obstinate fighting, in which the
young recruits fought and died in their ranks without
v^avering, the overpowering numbers of the Austrians
prevailed, and Ziethen was obliged to retreat back to
Troppau, abandoning the whole convoy with the excep-
tion of about 250 waggons, which General Krokow, who
commanded the advance guard, was able to get through
in safety along with the remains of those troops which
had formed the foremost division of the escort.*

The Prussian generals deserved no blame for their ill
success, for the guarding of a convoy through broken
country is, of all things^ the most difficult task a cavalry

Jomini, Grand Operations, ii. 107, 108.
242, 244, 245.

Carlyle, v. 241,

CHAP. XXI.]

AUSTRIAN CAVALRY.

339

officer can be called upon to perform. In addition to
this the numbers of the attacking party were much
superior, and quite sufficient to ensure success.

The incidents we have narrated, while instructive as
examples to study, are also useful as tending to convey
to the reader a tolerably clear idea of the manner in
which the cavalry were made use of in the wars of that
age, and they all tend to show the striking contrast that
existed betwen that service in the two contending armies.

The great successes of the Prussian monarch in these
campaigns, in the face of enormous odds, gave the
Prussian army an extraordinary reputation, and estab-
lished Frederick as the most skilful general of the age.
The reforms in drill and organisation introduced by him
were naturally copied and imitated by the other European
nations, until the Prussian system became the model for
the whole civilised world.

This naturally had an important influence upon the
cavalry, and for many years, in fact we may say almost
to the present day, the cavalry systems of most armies
were based in theii* main features upon the Prussian
cavalry of Seidlitz and Ziethen. In 1749 the Count de
Melfort, one of the best French cavalry officers, visited
the Prussian camps, and conferred with the Prussian
cavalry generals on the tactics of that arm.' Marshal
Saxe had also visited Frederick's court, and the inter-
change of ideas naturally resulted in a more cos-
mopolitan system of working cavalry, and soon in
England, France, Hanover, and Austria the cavalry
were organised, drilled, and manoeuvred in action as
closely as possible after the example set by the Prussian
horsemen. It was left to Napoleon to perfect the method
of using cavalry by employing it skilfully in every phase
of its duty, for he knew how to use it in covering the
movements of his army in the campaign, in making
decisive charges in action, in following up successes, and
in covering retreats. His cavalry, however, were never
so thoroughly and perfectly trained to manoeuvre at
speed as were the Prussian horsemen. The constant

1 D'Aldeguier, 69.

Z 2

I

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S40

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD IV.

wars and tremendous labours of Napoleon rendered it
impossible for him to devote the same close personal
attention to his horsemen that Frederick continually
bestowed upon his.

For a time the Prussian army was imitaced by other
nations with ridiculous closeness, so much so as to
draw upon them severe strictures by military writers.
General Lloyd, who served in several of the campaigns
against Frederick, writing some years afterwards,
comments harshly upon the great attention paid to the
numberless and insignificant trifles with which all the
armies of Europe at that time abounded. He says their
whole science was reduced to adjust a hat or a button.
" They attribute," he writes, " the glorious victories of
the King of Prussia to these and like puerilities."
*' Short clothes, little hats, tight breeches, high-heeled
shoes, and an infinite number of useless motions in the
exercises and evolutions have been introduced without any
other reason than their being Prussian."' This extract
will give an idea of the great influence the Prussian
military system exercised over the armies of Europe
during the latter portion of the eighteenth century.

^ Lloyd's History, Preface, p. ix.

\

CHAPTER XXII.

Russian Cavalry in the latter part of the
Eighteenth Century.

Peter the Great had placed the cavalry upon a very
effective footing, but nevertheless various changes were
subsequently made from time to time to suit the ideas
of the age. In the reign of Elizabeth the cavalry were
divided into squadrons, and the cuirassiers were supplied
with iron breastplates, long straight swords, two pistols
each, and jack-boots.^ They were mounted on heavy
German horses. Movements from the flanks by threes
were also adopted about this time, and the example set
by Frederick the Great in the management of his cavalry
was closely imitated by the Russians, as by all other
European nations.

In 1763 a commission was appointed for the special
purpose of reorganising the Russian army upon the
Prussian model. It was therefore arranged that there
should be one heavy cavalry regiment for every two
regiments of infantry, and a squadron of hussars and
100 Cossacks for every two squadrons of heavy cavalry.
The cuirassiers were reduced and replaced by carbineers,
who were armed with carbines without bayonets, after
the custom in France under Louis XIV.*

From 1763 till 1775 the heavy cavalry were armed
with large swords, two pistols each, and iron breast-
plates. The carbineers used long carbines and heavy
swords. The hussars carried a sabre, a pistol, and a
' Tvanoff, 52. » ibid. 83.

342

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

{!■:

)ir

[period IV.

short carbine. The cavalry in 1786 wore leather
breeches, jack-boots, spurs, and swords with brass hilts
and leathern scabbards. The dragoons and carbineers
had their carbines fastened to the saddles, which were of
the German pattern, and were placed upon a folded rug
or pad. The Hungarian saddle was used by the light
cavalry. It was placed on a pad of felt made of cow-
hair. All the cavalry had holsters. Each troop carried 20
axes and four spades. They still formed in three ranks.'
About this period, in 1766, the "Instruction to a
Cavalry Colonel " was issued, and in it we see a much
greater attention given to the details of drilling the
individual soldier. The division of the squadrons into
troops and into subdivisions was also made in 1766.
Each iroop was supposed to contain about seventeen files,
but in reality there were often only sixty or eighty men
in a squadron. In the " Instruction to a Cavalry Colonel "
great attention is directed to the art of riding the horse
properly, and to the thorough training of the horses.
In order to improve the horsemanship, riding-masters
were appointed to each regiment, who were to teach all
the officers in the regiment, as well as two soldiers from
each division. Five soldiers were also chosen from each
regiment to be trained to act as riding-masters, and no
one could be appointed as an under officer or corporal,
unless he was acquainted with the duties of a riding-
master. It was considered that no officer was of any
value who was not a thorough horseman, nor soldier of
any use who could not sit firm upon his horse. This
idea of the drilling of the individual horseman is a
reflex of the principles adopted by Frederick the Great,
which have already been referred to.*

Potemkin, Rumiantzoff, and Souvoroff made several
improvements in the Russian cavalry in the latter part
of the century. Rumiantzoff, who had fought in the
Seven Years' War, and was imbued with the spirit of that
age, advocated the use of the " armes blanches " alone.
In the campaign of 1774, when he had the command,
he ordered his cavalry to be formed in two ranks,
^ Ivanoff, 92, 93. « Ibid. 96.

CHAP. XXII.]

RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

343

between the squares of the infantry, but even with the
rear of the squares, and with very small intervals. Fire-
arms were forbidden to be used, except by order of the
colonel, and upon his responsibility alone. The largest
organisation of cavalry was the brigade, consisting of
two regiments.

Souvoroff, who was very highly spoken of as a par-
tisan officer in the Seven Years' War, was most impetuous

m his movements. In 1768, with one regiment of

infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, he marched 1,000
versts in one month, defeating his opponents wherever he
met them.' At the taking of Turtukai he handled his
cavalry very judiciously. He considered the sword as
the best weapon for horsemen.

Potemkin paid careful attention to the cavalry. He
valued the dragoons and light cavalry highly. He
doubled the number of the dragoons, and reduced the
heavy cavalry. He improved the dress and equipment,
cutting the hair short, and abolishing powder. He also
organised new regiments of chasseurs and hussars, and
improved the Cossacks. He adopted the Hungarian
saddle, it being light, cheap, and easy to the horse. He
was anxious to secure a good seat, a skilful use of the
sword^ and a power of manoeuvring steadily, wheeling
by divisions and files. ^

At the battle of Cagool, 2l8t July, 1770, the cavalry
present were two regiments of cuirassiers, three of cara-
bineers, two of hussars, and six Cossack regiments, with
a provisional regiment of five squadrons.

This cavalry, by rapid and vigorous charges, under
Count Soltikof and Prince Dolgoroukofi", at the close of
the battle, decided the victory in favour of the Russians.

Although the use of firearms by the cavalry had been
forbidden, the habit was so strong that it was impossible
to prevent it in the presence of the Turkish cavalry (the
Spahis), who were very numerous and efficient. At this
battle of Cagool, a great portion of the carabineers being
stationed between two large squares, began firing on
horseback in a very irregular manner.

1 Ivaaoff, 97. « ibid. 121.

Eli

11

I

\\

CHAPTER XXIII.

Latter Portion of the Eighteenth Century — Revo-
lutionary Wars op America and France.

From the close of Frederick's wars until the outbreak
of the Revolution in France, the continent of Europe
was at peace, and the different governments availed
themselves of the opportunity to reorganise their armies,
and to adopt those improvements in tactics which
Frederick had brought into notice.

We find during this period that great attention was
paid to the military art, that many works were written
upon tactics, and that the whole subject was thoroughly
discussed in all its bearings, the illustrations and
arguments being almost all drawn from the experiences
of the Seven Years' War.

In France many changes were introduced, and particu-
larly in the organisation and tactics of the cavalry. On
the 1st January, 1766, the cavalry were, by ordonnance,
formed upon two ranks only, and the intervals between
the squadrons made equal to one quarter of the front of
the squadron. For some time after this, the rear rank
retained the distance of twelve paces behind the front
rank. They still were taught to fire together, but they
also charged sword in hand, both at the trot and at the
gallop. The charges at the gallop were not very steady,
on account of the want of care in the preparatory drill.
This was, however, a great step in advance of the pre-
vious system in use in the French cavalry.

Another improvement in the French army, evidently

!!i

CHAP. XXIII.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION.

346

the result of the example set by the Austrians in their
splendid outpost service, was the organisation of a
numerous and efficient body of light horse, which was
much more required than ever, on account of the great
increase in the size of armies, and the consequent
necessity for a more extended and more active system
of advanced posts. ^

These light horsemen were well equipped for the
duties for which they were organised, being armed with
a carbine, a pistol, and a sabre, which last weapon they
soon learned to rely upon mainly. These horsemen
carried a very heavy load upon their chargers, however,
in the shape of a weighty saddle, a cloak and valise,
beside forage and provisions. Marshal Saxe had seen
the evil of this, and had expressed himself strongly
against superfluous baggage — an important point that
the cavalry officer should never lose sight of.

Under Louis XVI. further improvements were made
in the cavalry service : the rear rank was closed up to
within two paces of the front rank, and the movement
by groups of three files, which had followed the in-
troduction of the manoeuvre copied from the Germans,
called Wiederzuruck, by which changes of front were
made to the rear, was abolished, and the movement by
sections of four files was adopted. This is now the general
system in all civilised countries for the movement of
small bodies of cavalry to a flank.^ Schools of horseman-
ship were also established, and greater care taken in the
individual training of the horsemen.

On the outbreak of the Revolution the French cavalry
consisted of 30 regiments of heavy cavalry, containing
12,960 men ; 17 regiments of dragoons, containing 6,528
men ; 4 regiments of hussars, containii^g 1,280 men, and
3,414 cavalry of the guard, making in all over 24,000
horsemen.'

The Prussian cavalry retrograded in the last years of
Frederick's reign. The best officers had grown old or
had died, and the army was filled with new soldiers.
Although the principle upon which it was organised was

> Humbert, 113, » Ibid. 118. « Carrion Nisas, ii. 389, 390.

I

346

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

good, and the traditions of the service of the highest
type, yet it had fallen off immensely during the years
that elapsed after Frederick's death, so that on the
outbreak of the revolutionary wars it did not produce
the striking results that might have been expected of it.
The falling off seems to have been more in the generals
than in the cavalry itself, for in the early campaigns of
this war the Prussian cavalry in small bodies proved
themselves more than a match for the French horsemen,
but there did not appear any general who could use
them in great masses on the battle-field, as they were
constantly used by Frederick.

The Austrians had modelled their cavalry as much as
possible after the Prussian system, and in the last
campaigns in Bohemia and Turkey, under the cele-
brated General Loucton, the force had acquired a high
morale. In the year 1792 the Austrian cavalry was
very numerous, and comprised 12 squadrons of car-
bineers, 54 squadrons of cuirassiers, 42 squadrons of
dragoons, 36 squadrons of light horse, 74 squadrons of
hussars, and 8 squadrons of uhlans ; in all, 226 squadrons,
containing 44,000 men.'

The revolution in America of the thirteen colonies
against Great Britain broke out in 1776, and the war
lasted for seven years, until, in 1783, peace was made by
the acknowledgment of the independence of the United
States. This was effected mainly through the assistance
given by the French Government to the Americans,
whom they aided with troops, ships, arms, and money.
The war, however, fought as it was in a country almost
covered with forests and wildernesses, did not give any
facilities for the' use of cavalry, nor do we find that force
exercising any great influence upon the fate of the war.
A few partisan corps were organised on both sides, and
did good service, but it was upon a small scale, and the
records do not convey any practical instruction to the
cavalry officer. The broken and intersected character of
the country had the effect of producing a system of
fighting from under cover with long-ranged rifles of

' Jomim, Grand Operations, v. 17.

CHAP, xxiii.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION.

347

by

ted

of
of
of

great precision of aim. These rifles were used very
much by the American troops, who, being undisciplined,
were only fitted for that desultory and irregular kind of
fighting. This war had the effect of introducing special
bodies of riflemen into European armies. These corps
for a long period were maintained for the purpose of
skirmishing. All infantry troops are now armed, how-
ever, with this same type of weapon.

The Revolution in France, which followed closely that
in America, had a great effect on military affairs, not only
in the system of tactics, but also in the method of
recruiting and organising armies. When the people
dethroned the monarch, and took possession of the
government of the country, it was a terrible shock to
the prejudices and sentiments of the whole of Europe,
which for so many centuries without intermission had
been governed in almost every part upon the monar-
chical principle. The result was a combination of almost
all the kingdoms of Europe in aid of the French
monarchy, and to check the growth of a spirit of demo-
cracy, the spread of which was much to be dreaded.

This combination of so many countries against the
people of France naturally led to extraordinary steps
being taken by the rulers of the new republic to meet
successfully the threatened attacks. They therefore
decided to compel the population to fight in defence of
the country, and in March, 1793, decreed a conscription
of 300,000 men in addition to those already under arms.
As the exigencies of the war increased, a larger force was
required, and in the following July a further levy was
made of 1,200,000 men. These immense numbers
were drafted into the old regiments, in order that they
might be readily drilled ; but for a time the discipline
was very imperfect, and the troops unable to manoeuvre
with any steadiness.

These great masses, so much more numerous than the
armies of preceding ages, required a different organisa-
tion to insure a rapid execution of orders and a proper
system of responsibility. This led to the formation of the
troops into divisions and corps d'arm^Cy composed of all

348

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period iy.

three arms of the service. The brigades were commanded
by generals of brigade, the divisions by generals of divi-
sion, and the corps d'armee by general officers, with a
commander-in-chief over all.^ By this means these large
numbers were more easily handled and manceuvred.
Three battalions of infantry made a demi-brigade, six
battalions made a brigade, two brigades a division, and
two or more divisions a corps d'armee. To each division
was usually attached two regiments of light cavalry,
dragoons or heavy cavalry, a battery of field artillery,
and one of horse artillery.'*

The cavalry of the French army in 1793, while
numerous, were still weak in proportion to the strength
of the whole army. They consisted of two regiments
of carbineers, sixteen regiments of heavy cavalry, who
fought only with the straight sword and pistol, twenty
regiments of dragoons, twenty-five regiments of chas-
seurs d cheval, and twelve regiments of hussars. These
hussars were armed with the carbine, curved sabre, and
pistol, and were organised like the dragoons. There were
about 22,000 chasseurs, and 11,000 hussars, or in all
33,000 light cavalry. The hussars were seldom expected
to charge, and only in cases of emergency, while the
chasseurs were used in the charge constantly, and also
continually as light troops for outpost service, so that
they were really the most useful of all the cavalry.
These regiments were usually composed of four squadrons
of about 200 men each.'

This system of dividing up the cavalry among the
divisions was soon found to be faulty, as in small bodies
they were unable to perform any important service.
General Hoche was the first to see the weakness of the
system, and upon his appointment to the command of
the army of the Sambre and Meuse, in 1797, he united
the hussars, dragoons, and chasseurs together in separate
divisions,* a measure which was a great improvement
upon the preceding arrangements.

Napoleon, in Italy, found the same evil in his army,

' Carrion, ii 412, 413, 414. 2 Rocquancourt, ii. 191. ^ Car-
rion Nisas, ii. 414, 415. * Rocquancourt, ii. 195.

CHAP, xxni.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION. 349

but did not organise spec-il divisions; he secured the
same result by detaching from the infantry divisions the
regiments of cavalry, and brigading them with the
cavalry of the reserve.

The great numbers of the Revolutionary armies had
another very important influence upon the system of
tactics employed in action. Frederick the Great's army
was small, compact, and drilled to the highest perfection.
He could execute flank marches under the eyes of his
enemy with the steadiness and order of a parade move-
ment. He could deploy his troops, or change his front
under fire of artillery, as we have seen he did at the
battle of Sohr. He could re-form his line with perfect
regularity after a night surprise and defeat, as at
Hochkirch. He had, in fact, a h ^hly-trained imple-
me t, with which he could do anything. This affected
his tactics materially. His men fired rapidly with great
precision, and to avail himself of this superiority he
fought them in lines, and their manoeuvring capacity
was so great that, instead of the direct attack, he almost
always used the oblique order, and marched his army
against one or other flank of the enemy.

The French generals of the Revolution had immense
numbers of enthusiastic soldiers under them, filled with
zeal and love of glory, but poorly drilled, both in the
musketry exercise and in field manoeuvres. For years
before the war broke out the military writers had been
discussing the great question of the comparative merits
of the column formation and that in line, as the method
of attack for infantr}^ Folard had written voluminously
in favour of the column, and he had bq^n followed by
Menil-Durand and others, and a large school held the
view, that the direct attack in heavy columns was the
correct system for infantry to adopt.

Circumstances rendered this kind of formation the
only one open to the French. Their undisciplined
masses of enthusiastic recruits could not manoeuvre
with sufficient steadiness to compete with the regular
forces of Prussia and Austria. They therefore adopted
the system of attacking directly the positions of the

I ■■<

350

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

enemy in great columns, covered by large masses of
artillery, which gave them the support they required.
To aid in these attacks and to pave the way for them, the
French adopted the custom of throwing forward clouds
of skirmishers, or tirailleurs, composed of the best
marksmen, who, like the velites of the Koman legions,
commenced the action by a heavy fire upon the enemy,
to cover the advance of the massive columns, which,
following in their rear, were i sort of revival of the
ancient phalanx.

These skirmishers did not require a high amount of
tactical skill to perform the services demanded of them,
and gave an opportunity of using to the best advantage
a class of men who would otherwise have been un-
able to render effec'Ve aid. The heavy columns
which mp^^^ed to the attack under this cover were
composed of raw troops, who gained confidence and
courage from the weight of numbers; for it requires
high training and experience to enable troops to fight
boldly in line. It is the natural instinct of men to crowd
together in masses under visible danger, and the French
system followed that instinct in the deep masses in
which their infantry attacked. They were called
columns, and were columns originally, but in action they
often became nothing but heaps of men crowded
together in disorder.

This system among the infantry naturally led to a
more extensive use of artillery ; horse ftrtillery being
also employed in large force in connection with the
cavalry. Napoleon augmented that arm very materially,
and attached batteries to every division of cavalry.

The cavalry were armed with the straight sword and
pistol ; the dragoons with fusils, pistols, and swords ;
the chasseurs with carbines, pistols, and curved sabres ;
the hussars with pistols and sabres. They were used
for outposts, patrols, and reconnoitring parties. In the
early actions of the Republic the cavalry did not make
charges upon tV^ battle-field, but were used more in
partial combats, where their individual address and
enthusiasm had a considerable influence upon the result.

f

CHAP. XXIII.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION.

351

The heavy cavalry did not exercise much influence in
battle until Napoleon came upon the scene.

One of the most extraordinary and striking incidents
in the history of the cavalry service occurred in the
campaign in Holland in the month of January, 1795.
The moats and canals in that country caused it to be so
intersected in the summer that cavalry could hardly
operate in it at all, but in the winter of that year all
the ditches And watercourses were frozen, and gave a
free j)assage to horsemen and horse artillery over the
ice. The arsenal of Dordrecht was taken in this vay,
the troops crossing the frozen Lake Biesbos to attack
it ; while, at the same time, the French general, hearing
that a portion of the Dutch fleet was frozen up in the
neighbourhood of the Texel, and fearing that it might
get clear and set sail for England, despatched a large
force of cavalry and flying artillery against it. They
moved rapidly through North Holland, crossed the
Zuyderzee on the ice, and the strange spectacle was
presented of cavaliers and light artillery investing ships
of war and summoning them to surrender.

The commanders of the vessels, confounded at the
idea of being charged by cavalry, a species of attack
they had never anticipated, surrendered without resist-
ance, and to the French hussars belongs the credit of
having been the only cavalry that ever captured a fleet
of war vessels on the sea.^

The Prussian cavalry, during the fiist wars of the Kevo-
lution, did not obtain any striking successes in winning
victories, but in combats and isolated instances did good
service. One of the most successful affairs in the first
campaign was the defeat, on the I7th of September, 1792,
of General Chazot, who, at the head of some 10,000
men, composed the rear-guard of Dumouriez's army.
He was charged vigorously by 1,500 Prussian hussars,
accompanied by four pieces of horse artillery. His
troops were at once routed, and fled in wild confusion
back upon the main army, and through it far upon

' Rocquancourt, ii. 233, 234 ; Alison, i. 343, 344.

\!'¥:

352

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PKRIOD IV.

the road to Paris.* ^he whole French army was nearly
defeated by this single > harge of a small force of
cavalry — a clear illustration of the moral effect of a
charge of horsemen upon raw levies of infantry.

The Austrians, in November 1793, defeated a column
10,000 strong, which attempted to raise the siege of
Quesnoy. In this action a French square of 3,000 men
was broken and totally destroyed by the Imperial
cavalry.*

In all the wars of the latter part of the last century
the cavalry of the Austrians and Prussians was much
better than that of the French, and although no great
victories were won by the charge of large masses of
horsemen, as so often happened under Frederick the
Great, yet in all their operations the cavalry of the
allies proved themselves to be bold and efficient soldiers.
At Villers-en-Couch^e about eighty-six Auatrians and
two hundred English light dragoons attacked a force of
about 10,000 French infantry and cavalry. I'he charge
was so vigorous and successful that the French horsemen
were driven back upon the infantry, and the infantry
also routed, the whole body being driven in confusion to
Cambray, with the loss of 1,200 killed and wounded,
and three pieces of cannon. This was a most astounding
success to be gained by 300 horsemen.' The Emperor
of Austria gave the order of merit to all the officers, and
the English regiment of the 15th Hussars carries to-day
the name " Villers-en-CoucMe" as one of its badges.

At Handschusheim, in 1795, the Austrian cavalry
mainly contributed to the defeat of the French, while
in the attack upon the lines of Mayence the Austrian
horjemen again covered themselves with glory. A few
squadrons of cavalry were attached to each of the three
columns of attack, and a large reserve of cavalry was
held in hand to follow up any success. The infantry
soon effected a lodgment, and the horsemen closely
following, rode in and achieved a complete victory with
but little loss.*

' Alison, i. 188. ^ jbid, 278. s Beamish, 288. * Nolan,
45.

I

CHAP, xxiii.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION.

368

lolan,

At Wurzburg, in 1796, the Austrian cavalry also con-
tributed mainly to the victory, and it seems to have
been the first general action in the Eevolutionary wars
in which the cavalry were employed in large bodies, and
exercised an important influence on the general result.
The Austrians won the victory through the skilful use of
reserves which were thrown in successively until the fate
of the action was decided.^

In the campaigns of 1796, 1797, in Italy, the cavalry
did but slight service. After the battle of Roveredo,
Napoleon sent his aide-de-camp Lamarois, with only fifty
dragoons, to ride through the fugitives into the defile of
CaUiano, by which means large bodies of infantry were
cut off and captured.

The upheaval of the Revolution, and the daring ambi-
tion of Napoleon, led among other remarkable events to
the French invasion of Egypt, and to a series of battles
between the enthusiastic soldiery of France and the
dashing horsemen of the East. These actions are of
intense interest to the cavalry ofl&cer, as they were most
peculiar in their character, the army on one side being
composed almost entirely of irregular light horsemen of
wonderful skill in the individual use of the horse and
the sword, but without any regular discipline or capacity
for manoeuvring.

The Mamelukes of Egypt were the actual rulers of
the country, and were composed of Circassians, Albanians,
Servians, and Bosnians, who, torn from their parents in
infancy, were sent into Egypt to occupy that province.
They were soldiers by profession, never engaged in any-
thing else, and prided themselves solely upon their
horses, their arms, the splendour of their accoutrements,
and their individual military prowess.^

This force consisted of 12,000 horsemen, and was
commanded by twenty-four beys, who each maintained
and equipped about 500 or 600 Mamelukes. Each
soldier was followed by two attendants, somewhat upon
the principle of the lance fournie of the middle ages, or

^ Archduke Charles, Principes de la Stratf^gie. Chap. x.
2 Alison, i. 506.

A A

II

354

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

the Trimacresie among the Gauls. They formed alto-
gether a magnificent body of horsemen, but were very
deficient in discipline, and steady manoeuvring at speed
was unknown to them.

Their servants do not appear to have been intended to
take any part in fighting in the field. One servant
carried the baggage and provisions uT)on a horse, the
other carried a carbine. The Mamelukes were armed
with a pair of pistols and a poignard in the girdle,
another pair of pistols upon the saddle, a sabre, and a
blunderbuss. They were clothed in shawls and turbans
with voluminous folds, almost serving the purpose of
armour, although according to Napoleon they wore coats
of mail and casques. They trusted more to their
dexterity in the management of their chargers to evade
a sabre stroke, than to parrying with their finely-tempered
light blades, which would not stand a severe blow.

Napoleon gives some interesting particulars in reference
to the Mamelukes in his memoirs. He says that "two
Mamelukes would hold their own against three French,
because they were better armed, better mounted, better
drilled. They had two pairs of pistols, a blunderbuss, a
carbine, a helmet with visor, a coat of mail, and many
horses and servants on foot to aid them. But 100
French cavalry would not fear 100 Mamelukes, 300
would conquer a like number, and 1,000 would beat
1,500, so great is the influence of tactics, order, and
manoeuvres." *

The French cavalry generals, when they had become
acquainted with the system of fighting of the Mame-
lukes, were accustomed to meet them in many lines.
When the first line moved up the Mamelukes would
attempt to outliaiik them ; the next line would there-
upon ndvance to the right and left to the succour of the
first, tije J^lLimclukes Avould tlicii wheel out again to
outflanlv tlio second line ; at this moment the French
generals usually gave the order to charge, and always
broke them and drove them ofi". The early actions,
however, were all won by the infantry and artillery.

' Liskcmie, iv. 355.

I

IS,

CHAP. XXIII.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION. 355

The horse appointments of the Mamelukes were very
massive and highly ornamented. The bits were so large
and powerful that the most fiery steeds were readily
checked in full career. The stirrups were short, and the
saddle had the pommel and cantle so high, that the
horseman could hardly be unseated even if wounded.
As tliey carried no baggage whatever, the horse was not
overloaded, although the trappings were heavy.

Such was the force the French army had to encounter
in Egypt. Napoleon had but few cavalry, and they
quite incapable of coping individually with the Eastern
horsemen, so th t he was obliged to rely altogether upon
his infantry and artillery. The first skirmish to^k place
at Ramanieh upon the Nile, Desaix, who was attacked,
commanded the second division, and formed his troops
in squares, with artillery at the angles, and the baggage
in the centre, and succeeded in dispersing his assailants
by one discharge of grapeshot.

Napoleon's dispositions for fighting the Mamelukes
were peculiar, and yet admirably fitted for the enemy
he hp,d to encounter. He formed his army into five
divisions. Each composed one square, six deep, with
the artillery at the angles, and companies of grenadiers
in platoons kept in readiness to support menaced points.
The cavalry, then only 200 in number, were placed in
the centre of the square. The troops marched in this
formation, the front of the square marching in line, the
rear the same way, the two side faces marching in
column. When attacked, the whole halted, faced out-
ward, and steadily and firmly awaited the charge.
When the French were to advance to he attack, the
three front or outside ranks formed column and charged,
while the square remained in the same formation but
only three deep, and constituted the reserve.

The five divisions so organised, moved on towards
Cairo, continually watched and surrounded by the Mame-
lukes, who were ever ready to take advantage of any
carelessness. The first great battle took place at the
Pyramids, or more properly at the village of Embabeh,
near Cairo, where Mourad Bey, with about 8,000 superb

A A 2

356

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

horsemen, and a large body of ill-trained infantry, had
prepared to deliver battle to secure the safety of the
capital city. An entrenchment with some forty pieces
of artillery had been constructed near the bank of tJK^,
river, the cavalry, with their right resting upon it, spread
out to the left upon the wide sandy plain that stretched
across to the Pyramids. Napoleon, seeing that the
cannon were stationary, and not upon carriages, and
could not be aimed in a:*^ ' but one direction, decided to
move to the right so as to avoid their fire. Mourad
Bey, who saw the manoeuvre, and understood the effect
of it, with the rapidity and decision of a skilful general,
resolved to charge the French columns at the momcx^t
they were efiecting their flank march.

The charge was made by about 7,000 horsemen, in a
great confused swarm. Desaix had hardly time to com-
plete his formation before some of the foremost riders
were upon him. His men were consequently somewhat
broken, and thirty or forty of the bravest Mamelukes
penetrated the ranks, and were killed in the midst of
the French square. The other divisions were all formed
ready awaiting the charge. It was an imposing sight
for the French soldiers to encounter. The immense
hordes of magnificent horsemen, brilliantly equipped,
and mounted upon the swiftest horses, came down upon
them at full gallop, the glitter of their arms and accoutre-
ments fitfully flashing from the rolling clouds of dust,
that marked, yet partially screened their advance. The
loud shouts which rent the air, and the thundering noise
of the numberless hoofs that beat the ground, painfully
impressed the French infantry, who, th-" ^^h not panic-
struck, yet most anxiously awaited the result. Soon
the artillery began to pour in rounds of grapeshot, and
then the musketry fire went pealing along the front of
each massive square. Volley after volley poured out
rapidly from the successive ranks, and at each discharge
horses and riders in hundreds, struck by the pitUess
tempest of bullets, rolled in the sand, shaking the ad-
vance of the survivors, and causing them to swerve from
the fronts of the squares.

CHAP. XXIII.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION.

357

With matchless bravery, however, they penetrated
the intervals between the French divisions, and riding
around with daring recklessness, attacked every face at
once. Unable to break the solid and steady formation
of the French infantry, they wheeled their horses round,
and reined them back upon the bayonets, hoping in that
way to force an entrance into the firm masses of the
foot-soldiery. They fired their pistols and carbines at
the distance of a few feet, and furious at their ill success,
hurled the weapons at the heads of their foe. After a
desperate struggle in which those who had lost their
steeds creeping along the ground cut at the legs of
the front ranks with their cimeters, the Mamelukes,
thoroughly beaten, fled in confusion, leaving a rampart
of dead men and horses around the squares, terrible
]iroofs of the pertinacity and bravery with which they
had fought. The losses of the Mamelukes were very
heavy, while the French loss was only about 200.^

This action settled the question decidedly as to the
capacity of the French infantry to withstand the
Egyptian horsemen, and forms a good illustration of
the necessity of thorough discipline in the cavalry
service, as well as individual skill in the use of arms.
Had the Mamelukes been well drilled, to charge in order
in large masses, and been properly supported by a
sufficient force of horse artillery, who can doubt that
they Wk uld have swept the French infantry like chaff
before them ? As it was, with their imperfect tactics,
and their total want of artillery, they were very nearly
successful, a very few batteries of horse artillery would
have caused frightful losses in the massive formation the
French were obliged to adopt, and if they had deployed
to avoid the artillery fire, they would have been exposed
to the charge of the horsemen.

In the combat of Sediman, shortly after the battle
of the Pyramids, during General Desaix's expedition
into Upper Egypt, an incident occurred which serves to
prove that it is the fire of an infantry square that alone
can save it against good cavalry, and not the bayonets.
' Alison, i. 509, 510 ; Due de Rovigo's M^moire&, i. 56, 57.

358

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD IV

In this action Desaix's division was formed in one large
and two small squares, on the approach of a large body
of Mamelukes, who were seen coming to the attack.
The commandant of the smaller square on the right,
rendered over confident, probably by the result of the
battle of the Pyramids, ordered his men to withhold
their fire until the horsemen were within point-blank
range.' This they did, and poured in a volley at very
close quarters. It ^^ as too late, however. The rush
of the galloping horses was too vehement to be checked
suddenly, and the square was broken and a number of
the men killed ; the wouT^dpd horses and men not
falling until they had traversed the square, and then they
fell, scattering at various distances, pierced with the
bullets they had received just at the instant before the
shock. General Desaix reprimanded the commandant
very severely for his fault, which had nearly caused the
defeat of his whole force.'^

During the siege of St. Jean d'Acre in- the following
year. Napoleon heard of the approach of a large Turkish
army which was advancing to attack the French, and
raise the siege of the town. This force, which consisted
of the remains of the Mamelukes, the Janissaries of
Damascus and Aleppo, and an innumerable horde
of irregular cavalry, alarmed Napoleon, and obliged him
to take steps to defeat it. Kleber was sent from Acre
to join Junot, who was occupying an advanced post at
Nazareth. On his march he encountered a body of 4,000
horse, which he defeated by the same system of tactics
and the same rolling fire that had been so successful in
Egypt. On the 16th April, 1799, Kleber advancing to
attack the Turkish camp near Mount Tabor, met the
whole Turkish army moving up against him. He at
once drew up his small force in squares with the artillery
at the angles. He had barely completed his arrangements
when the whole mass of the enemy's forces, consisting of
15,000 cavalry and as many infantry, came thunder-
ing down upon his little army, as if to sweep the
handful from the field by one impetuous charge. The
' Humbert, 155. - Memoires, Due de Rovigo, i. 70.

I

CHAP. XXIII.] WAKS OF THE REVOLUTION.

359

steady and co ardent French veterans never wavered an
instant, the musketry and artillery fire was at once
opened, and the steady aim and the continuous tempest
of well-directed bullets soon made great gaps in the
enemy's masses, and soon erected a rampart of dead
men and horses in front of the squares, behind which
the French infantry gallantly maintained the unequal
combat for over six hours. ^

Napoleon, who had marched to Kleber's assistance with
a large reinforcement, then arrived upon the heights
which overlooked the field, and detected Kleber's position
in the midst of the turbulent swarm of Orientals, by the
regular and incessant volleys which flashed out from
the French squares and marked their presence from afar.
Napoleon's resolutions were promptly taken. A detach-
ment of cavalry and light artillery was despatched under
General Lecourbe, against the Mamelukes who were in
reserve, while Napoleon himself, with Bon's division in
two squares, advanced to attack in flank and rear, the
Turks who were engaged with Kleber. The immense
superiority of the discipline and tactics of the French
troops soon gave them the victory, and the Turks with
heavy losses were driven from the field.

This extraordinary victory over 30,000 enemies, half of
whom were cavalry, was accomplished by only 6.000
French veterans.

The last great battle which took place in Egypt
between the French and the Mamelukes was fought at
Heliopolis, on the 20th March, 1800, and resulted, like
all the other actions between them, in a glorious victory
for the former.

Kleber, who had concentrated his army from all parts
of Egypt, had only 12,000 men w^hom he formed up in
four squares, with artillery at the angles, and the cavalry
in the intervals between the squares. Companies of
grenadiers were made use of to double the corners, and
were ready for offensive movements in case of need. An
attack was made upon the camp of the Janissaries in
the village of Matarieh, which was advanced far in front

^ Alison, i.

59-^

i

360

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV,

of the remainder of the Turkish army, and it was soon
captured, and large numbers of its defenders killed.

The Turkish main army then advanced to attack the
French, who formed a line of squares with the artillery in
the intervals, and the cavalry in rear of the centre,
ready to charge through at the critical moment. The
disposition of Kleber's army was very well conceived,
and proved most advantageous in the action. The
battle commenced with the fire of artillery, which was
much more effective on the part of the French than on
that of their opponents. The cannonading so galled the
Turks that they prepared for a general charge. The
concentration of their masses warned the French of the
coming onslaught ; 20,000 horsemen at full speed,
shaking the ground with their thundering tramp, was
enough to try the stoutest heart. The French stood firm,
however, while the artillery poured volley after volley of
grapeshot, with hurried vigour into the advancing
masses. The front rank were nearly all swept away by
the storm of missiles which filled the air, and the rear
ranks, dismayed at the carnage, wheeled about and fled,
before a single musket-shot had been fired.^

The Grand Vizier rallied his troops and attacked again,
but it was impossible to withstand the tempestuous
volleys of the French squares, which dealt death and
destruction far and wide through the immense swarms
which surrounded them. In a sh(>rt time the whole
Ottoman host fled in utter rout, leaving Kleber complete
master of the field, and of their camp.

In these campaigns the French adopted the system
of forming their infantry skirmishers in little squares or
groups, of four men in each, in order to resist attacks of
Bedouins or Mamelukes. Bonaparte also had provided
his infantry with pikes, ironed at both ends, which were
intended to be placed in the ground in front of the
soldier as a defence against the charge of cavalry, or to
be used as a protection around the circuit of the camp.
The great heat of the climate was so oppressive to the
French troops, that Napoleon was afraid to overburden

^ Alison, ii. 165.

I

'"*.

CHAP. xxiii.J WARS OF THE REVOLUTION. 361

his men by compelling them to carry this extra weight,
and the pikes were consequently never used. It will be
remembered that this was the same device that was used
by the English archers at Agincourt against the charges
of the French men-at-arms.

Another interesting and peculiar incident of this expe-
dition was the organisation by Napoleon of a regiment
mounted on dromedaries, which constituted a species of
dragoon force very efficient upon the desert, where horses
marched with great difficulty.' The corps was composed
of carefully-chosen infantry soldiers, armed with muskets
and bayonets, and riding upon a kind of Turkish saddle,
which covered the hump of the animal. They were able
to carry ten days' provisions with them. On going into
action they halted, and the dromedary knelt down
motionless, while the riders dismounted, formed up as
infantry, and fought either in line or in square, as occa-
sion required. At first each animal carried two soldiers,
but it was found better to have only one, the place of
the other being used to carry provisions.

^ Humbert, 165.

'

1. 1. J

/1

, -

CHAPTER XXiV.
Cavalry under Napoleon.

Napoleon had a very high opinion of the cavalry
service, and understood thoroughly tdl the various phases
of its duty. No man knew better the importance of
good light cavalry for the purpose of covering the move-
ments of an army, and for searching out and watching
the marches and designs of the enemy.

He was e(|ually impressed with the value of cavalry
used in large masses, to make great attacks upon the
battle-field, and knew how to turn the scale of victory
by pouring torrents of well-drilled horsemen upon a
whole wing of an opposing army, to sweep it from the
field by the mere force of numbers and impetuosity.

He soon changed the system of organisation in the
French arm)^ and gathering together the scattered
regiments of horse, he formed them into brigades and
divisions composed of troops of the same type. He was
so impressed with the importance of using the heavy
cavalry in large masses, that he went so far as to com-
bine the divisions into corps d'armee. In 1805, the
cavalry coiys d'armee of Murat reached the enormous
number of 22,000 men, composed of cuirassiers and
dragoons, with 1,000 horse artillery. In the campaign
in Russia, in 1812, on crossing the Niemen, there were
in Napoleon's army, in addition to the divisions of light
cavalry attached to each corps d'armee of infantry, four
corps de reserve of cavalry under Murat, commanded by
Nansouty, Montbrun, Grouchy, and Latour Maubourg,

■"^

fiiAi'. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

3G3

which contained in the aggregate 38,200 men in 208
squadrons. '

Shortly after Napoleon's accession to the imperial
throne, he established a great camp at Boulogne, where
his army was carefully exercised in manoeuvring in large
masses. The system of tactics in the cavalry was based
upon the ideas of Frederick the Great, nor did Napoleon
make any improvements in their mancxsuvres. He was
himself an artillery officer, and but little acquainted with
the minutiae of cavalry drill. Frederick, on the contrary,
was thoroughly well versed in all the details of the
tactical manoeuvres of all three arms, and the result was
a perfection of training among the individual horsemen
in his army such as was unknown among the troops of
Napoleon.

Napoleon, however, well knew the value of the cavalry
service in every sphere of its duty. He fully appreciated
the use of light cavalry for outpost and reconnoitriiig
purposes, and was far superior to Frederick the Great in
that most important quality of the general-in-chief — the
capacity to discover the position, the designs, and the
movements of the enemy. Frederick, us we have seen,
was continually incurring risks and defeat through his
inability to discover the plans of his opponents. Napoleon,
on the contrary, was almost always well informed. He only
failed in this particular after the disastrous campaign
in Russia, where his whole cavalry force was left either
buried in the snows, Ox captured in the long and terrible
retreat. The inefficiency of his cavalry before Lutzen in
1813, both in experience and numbers, left him in igno-
rance of the proximii_;' of the allies, and caused him to
be surprised into a general action, almost the only
instance in his history of his being taken unawares.

Napoleon, feeling that his cavalry had not the man-
oeuvring capacity that .-endered so effective the Prussian
horsemen of Frederick, endeavoured to secure the same
results by overpowering numbers, who, rendered confident
by the feeling of strength which such superiority would
give them, would be able to make successful charges at

' Boutourlin, Campaign of 1812.

[

364

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

the trot, at which pace alone tney could preserve order
in movements en masse.

This slower pace made the losses by the fire of opposing
infantry so much heavier, that Napoleon took steps to
protect his cavalry as much as possible from this danger.
He consequently reintroduced cuirasses, and supplied a
number of the regiments of the heavy cavalry with them,
as well as with casques, or helmets, to protect the head.
The carabinier regiments were afterwards also provided
with these portions of defensive armour.

The cuirassiers soon acquired a very high reputation,
and on many a field of action performed feats which
shed a lustre upon the cavalry service, and had a great
influence upon the result of the campaigns.

Napoleon Lad many different types of cavalry in his
army. After the combat of Borghetto, in 1 796, he
organised a corps of Guides, whose principal duty was to
watch over his personal safety.^ They were all veterans
who had served for ten years, and were chosen with
great care. This corps formed the origin and nucleus of
the Consular Guard, which afterwards was increased, and
became almost an army, under the name of the Imperial
Guard.

There were two regiments of carabineers in the French
army. In 1791 their armament consisted of a carbine
.with bayonet, pistol, and a straight sword. In 1794
at Landau, the carabineers, having encountered some
battalions of tiraillevrs, without arms, gave to them their
carbines and bayonets. Afterwards in Austria they
captured a store of English arms in a chateau, and
provided themselves once more with mousquetons, which
they had still at the battle of Austerlitz.^ In the wars
of 1809, and until they were changed to cuirassiers,
they had the small musket without the bayonet.

The cuirassiers were originally organised in December
1802, when three regiments were formed, from the
fifth, sixth, and seventh regiments of cavalry. These
cuirassiers were found so effective, that in 1804 nine
more regiments were provided with the cuirass, and the
' Humbert, 126. ^ Ambert, 131.

^^^

CHAP. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON. 366

casque was given to all tjie cuirassier regiments in pl^ce of
the shako.' The two carabineer regiments being also
changed, made the total force of cuirassiers in 1812
amount to fourteen regiments.

The dragoons formed ar important portion of
Napoleon's cavalry. In 1802 he had twenty-one regi-
ments dressed in green uniform, faced with other colours,
and with the casque as the head-covering. They were
foot-soldiers on horseback, but soon became real cavany,
although with a greater capacity to fight dismounted
than any of the other horsemen. The dragoons, who in
the campaigns on the Rhine had not succeeded well,
were sent into Spain when the war commenced in that
country, and under Soult, Suchet, and St. Cyr, they
soon acquired a very high reputation. The guerrilla
warfare which noon broke out in the Peninsula, rendered
the dragoons the most eflScient type of soldier that
could be employed. In 1812 Napoleon had increased
his dragoons till they amounted to thirty regiments.^

In 1807 Napoleon formed a regiment of Polish Lancers
at Varsovie, consisting of about 1,000 men, which was
attached to the Imperial Guard under the name of
chevau-legers landers. They were armed with a lance,
with a pennon, a hussar sabre, and a pair of pistols. In
1810, a second regiment of light-horse lancers was
organised, and called the red lancers, from their scarlet
uniforms. In July, 1812, a third regiment of the same
type was created. It wos composed of Poles, and
contained five squadrons. These three regiments all
formed part of the Imperial Guard. ^

A decree of the 25th November, 1811, ordered a
regiment of light-horse lancers to be attached to each
division of cuirassiers. The first regiment, which appeared
in 1812, was armed with carbines, carried on the left
side, the second with the mousqueton, and both had
bayonets. Nine regiments of the dragoons were
converted into lancers in 1811.

Napoleon, in his wars in Germany, had been met by

» Ambei-t, 146. ^ General Foy, i. 112 ; Ambert, 156. ^ Ambert,
171, 173.

366

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

the Uhlans and Cossacks of Austii'i and Russia, and
soon perceived the necessity of having a force of the
same kind to oppose them. The lancers, organised for
this purpose, did good service on many occasions.

Another species of cavalry was that known as the
chasseiirs-d-cheval, which formed a large portion of the
French cavalry. In 1799 there were twenty-five regi-
ments, in 1804 there were twenty -four regiments, and
in 1812 and 1813 thirty-one.' They were armed with
sabres, pistols, and mousquetons.

When Napoleon ascended the throne there were ten
regiments of hussars in the army. In 1812 and 1813
they were increased to thirteen regiments. This force
has been described already on a previous page, and was
commonly used in most European armies.

Napoleon established a number of cavalry schools in
which officers and instructors for the force were trained
with great care.

Having described the composition and force of the
horsemen in the army of the great Napoleon, it will be
in place now to consider the manner in which that
extraordinary general employed it in his wars, and
the result of its exertions on the more important
battle-fields.

Napoleon knew, as we have said, the importance of
the cavalry in preparing the way for a battle, in covering
the movements of the infantry and artillery, while
concentrating and taking up their position for action,
and in aiding them during the progress of the fight, by
charges in support of attacks, or against advancing
columns of the enemy. He also knew when to launch
them against a shaken and defeated foe, in order to
follow up a success and prevent them rallying.

Napoleon maintained a close relationship between
the different arms. His first line was usually drawn up
deployed in battle array. The second liiiC was formed in
squares of battalions, the heavy cavalry being in reserve,
the artillery and light-horse being in front and upon the
flanks. If a charge of horse broke the front line, it

' Ambert, 184, 187.

'

of t

»0"Tt.Ti rjBijfAl-i

:hap. XXIV.] CAVALKY UNDER NAPOLEON.

367

passed disordered through the intervals of the squares,
from whose front and flanks it received a heavy fire, and
then while blown and dispersed, the cavalry of the
reserve fell upon it, and never failed to send the
disordered mass back in confusion, to run the gauntlet
of the fire of the squares a second time.

In the wars of the Empire, the principle of the neces-
sity of the mutual support of all three arms to one
another came to be thoroughly understood, and Napoleon
always supported his attacks of infantry and cavalry
with artillery, and always had his cavalry and infantry
ready to support and aid each other.

While impressed with this idea, however, he did not
overdo it, by scattering and mixing the arms together,
as was done in the generations preceding him. He often
massed large quantities of artillery, in immense batteries,
to create a great effect upon the enemy, as for instance
at Wagram, where he concentrated a tremendous force
of field artillery, which by its weight of fire crushed the
centre of the Austrian line, and paved the way for
Macdonald's celebrated attack. His cavalry also, as we
have said, although partly divided to support the
different corps of infantry, was still retained in mass in
sufficient force to enable sweeping charges to be made
upon decisive points of a battle-field, as for instance at
Eylau.

Napoleon kept his cavalry well up to the front on the
day of battle, and they often suffered heavy loss by
artillery fire, from the impossibility of keeping them out
of range of missiles.

An account of a few of the more remarkable instances
of the use of cavalry in the wars of Napoleon will
illustrate in the best way the system of tactics and fight-
ing in use among the horsemen of that time.

At the battle of Castiglione, the Austrians, attempting
to extend their wing too fiir, thereby weakened their
centre, a fault not to be committed with impunity under
the eagle eye of Napoleon. The French general at once
massed a formidable column of infantry for a heavy
attack, nnd supported it with his cavalry. This

368

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

I j

desperate charge soon pierced the weakened line, anri the
Austrian army was cut asunder. One part retr oA
across the Mincio, while the other, attempting to jin
Quasdanovitch, was closely pursued by the dragoons
under Junot. It was checked at Salo by a French
detachment which had occupied the place, and being
pressed in rear by the pursuing cavalry, the force dis-
banded with a loss of 3,000 prisoners and 20 cannon.

From this time Napoleon always, whenever possible,
used his horsemen "^qjorously in following up a beaten
and flying foe.

We have already ^ ..rred to the operations in Egypt
in 1798, 1799, and 1800, and the next battle in which
the cavalry played an important part was that of
Marengo, where a single charge of French horsemen
turned a defeat into a glorious victory in less than ten
minutes, and thereby settled the fate of a whole
campaign.

Napoleon, by his celebrated passage of the Alps, had
thrown himself upon the communications of the Austrian
general, who was thus obliged to fight an action upon
the result of which the safety of his army depended.
Melas, who commanded the Austrian forces, had for
some days after the battle of Montebello remained with
his army in Alessandria, a very strongly fortified town.
This somewhat deceived Napoleon, who feared his
escaping by some detour around one of the flanks of
his army. The French divisions were consequently dis-
persed at considerable intervals, when Melas, debouching
from Alessandria early in the morning of the 14th June,
1800, fell upon the advanced portion of Napoleon's army,
under Victor and Gardanne.

The immensely superior forcd of the Austrians enabled
them, after a desperate struggle, to force back the French
right across the wide open plain which lay between
Marengo and St. Juliano. In this retrograde movement
a splendid opening was given for the use of the superior
cavalry of the Austrian army. The French, wearied
with the tremendous eflbrts they had made for four
hours to maintain their position, at length fell back

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CHAP. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

3G9

a.

.a

rapidly, followed closely by theii opponents, who,
preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, spread terrible
destruction among the flying masses.

The retreat was commenced in echelon of squares,
and for a time with admirable steadiness, but the Aus-
trians combined the action of all arms with the greatest
skill in the pursuit. The Imperial cavalry swept around
the retreating columns, being only checked by the most
vigorous efforts of the French horsemen under Kellerman
and Charapeaux.^ While, however, the Frencli cavalry
could arrest temporarily the pursuing dragoons, they
could not stop the onward mfirch of the Hungarian
infantry, which, advancing steadily, poured in a most
destructive fire, nor could they silence the artillery,
which, in the intervals between the battalions, moved
onwards, incessantly discharging volleys of grapeshot.

This combined attack soon had its effect. The whole
plain was covered with fugitives, and the day seemed
irretrievably lost to the French. The arrival of Napoleon
himself, with a body c f fresh troops, temporarily revived
the spirits of his men, and checked their retreat, but all
in vain. The fortune of the battle was still on the side
of the Austrians. Melas deemed the victory won, and
had ridden to the rear, leaving his chief of staff to follow
up the success, when Desaiy with the French reserves,
arrived and entered into action.

It was at this crisis, when the fate of a most decisive
action was trembling in the balance, that a celebrated
charge of cavalry was made, which, without doubt,
turned the scale. The Austrians were pressing on in
huge columns as to an assured victory. The formidable
appearance of the mass of -6,000 victorious Hungarians
caused the troops of Desaix to waver and halt.^ Keller-
man, at the head of only 800 horse, was concealed
behind a vineyard with festoons of vines from tree to
tree, which rising high completely intercepted the view.
Kellerman, watching the struggle, saw his infantry
comrades wavering, and the Austrians pressing on.
Moving rapidly out of his concealment, he fell suddenly
' Alison, ii. 105. « ibid. ii. 106.

B B

370

A HISTORY OF (JAVALllY.

[period IV.

'

upon the exposed flunk of the heavy column, cutting it
asunder, capturing 2,000 prisoners, including Zach, the
chief of staft', and driving the remainder in utter rout
back upon the supports advancing in their rear. Keller-
man's own statement is concise. He says : " I see it. I
am in the midst of them. They lay down their arms.
The whole affair did not occupy so much time as it took
me to write these six lines."'

This great achievement won the victory for the French.
The Austrians retreated into Alessandria. An armistice
was concluded the next day, by which all Piedmont and
the Milanese were handed over to the French, and the
Austrian army allowed to retreat beyond the Miucio.
By this battle Napoleon obtained the cession of twelve
fortresses, armed with 1,500 cannon, and all this was the
immediate result of the stubborn resistance of Desaix's
infantry, aided most effectually by the magnificent
charge of Kellerman's handful of horse.

The first combat of the campaign of 1805 took place
at Wertingen, on the 8th of October, betw^een 8,000
cavalry, under Murat, and twelve battalions of Austrian
grenadiers, with four squadrons of cuirassiers under
General Auffemberg.

The Austrians, who were marching in fancied security,
were suddenly enveloped by the immense force of French
horsemen. Auffemberg at once formed his division in
one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and
awaited the attack.^ The French dragoons charged
impetuously, and soon swept away the small body of
Austrian cavalry, but were unable to effect an entrance
into the square, which maintained a steady fire from
every face. In vain the heavy cavalry, under Nansouty,
made repeated charges with heavy losses. The issue was
long doubtful, until some grenadiers arrived under
Oudinot, and, supported by artillery, soon staggered and
shook the Austrian formation, and gave an opening tc
the horsemen, who, plunging into the gap, broke th(
square, and won a complete victory. Three thousant
prisoners were taken, as well as all the enemy's artillery.
' Alison, ii. 106. " Ibid. ii. 318,

II

CHAP. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

871

This combat, being the first in that campaign, gave
great confidence to Na})oleon*s cavalry, and paved the
way to many subsequent successes. In this campaign
of Ulm, we see a still further development of the use of
cavalry, for the purpose of pursuing a disheartened and
retreating enemy. After several actions, and most
brilliant strategical manoeuvres, Napoleon had cut off
the Austrian army from its line of communication and
inclosed it in Ulm. His investment w^as almost com-
pleted, wlien Mack, who commanded the Austrian
forces, decided to send the Archduke Ferdinand with
all the cavalry and light troops, to make an attempt to
cut through the fast-closing French lines, and so effect
his escape into Bohemia.

The column set out on two roads on the 15th of
October, while the fight at Elchingen was being furiously
contested. The Archduke commanded one column, and
General Werneck the other. Murat received orders to
pursue vigorously.' He came up with their rear guard
at Nerenstetten the evening of the next day, and captured
2,000 prisoners. The following day he again struck them
at Neresheim, and captured many more prisoners.^ On
the day after the indefatigable Murat again caught up
with the exhausted Austrians and sujTounded them,
and 8,000 men, under General "Werneck, despairing of
safety, surrendered at discretion to the French cavalry.

Murat then followed, by way of Gundhausen and
Nuremberg, the cavalry of the Archduke, which fled in
that direction. On the same night on which Werneck
surrendered, the great park of munitions and stores
was also seized with the artillery and treasure. The
19th October was also occupied in the pursuit, and on
the 20th Murat forced another combat. After several
charges on either side the Austrians were dispersed, and
many taken prisoners. The Archduke Ferdinand
escaped with some 3,000 horse, the only remnant of
the large division that a few days before had set out
from Ulm.

Murat altogether had captured 12,000 men in four
' Alison, ii. 350. » Humbert, 179, 180.

B R 2

3-->

(U

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

days, during which time he had kept up the pursuit
ineossantly, marching about tliirty mih's a day. In
addition to the prisoners he had also captured 120 pieces
of cannon, 500 waggons, 11 flags, 200 officers, and 17
generals. In fact the cavalry had performed a glorious
part in the campaign, and their vigorous use in the
pursuit was equal to anything of the kind that had
happened since Charles XII. rode his cavalry after the
flying Saxons for nine days without unsaddling.

This was the first instance of the kind in Napoleon's
wars, but we find many examples of the use of the same
system in his subsequent history. In the advance,
which at once took place upon Vienna, the cavalry
under Murat performed most valuable services, pressing
the retreating foe with vigorous pertinacity at every
step.

In the next great action, that of Austerlitz, we see
Napoleon placing his cavalry in that portion of the plain
in which they could best operate, and where the nature of
the ground was most favourable to their use. There
were a succession of charges of cavalry in this battle,
the success swaying from side to side as fresh reserves
w^ere poured in. In one of these charges Kellerman's
cavalry were attacked by the Austrian cuirassiers
under Prince Lichtenstein and instantly broken. The
Austrians following up the success broke through the
first French line, and swept through the intervals of the
second line, when they were charged in turn by Murat
with the cavalry of the reserve, and driven back through
a terrible fire which opened upon them from the flanks
of the squares and columns of the French infantry, and
stretched half their number upon the plain.*

As an armistice was concluded shortly after this battle
the cavalry did not have occasion to perform any special
service in the pursuit. The following campaign, that of
Jena, however, shows a still further development of the
use of cavalry both in action and in following up a
success.

Napoleon, with his usual wonderful strategical ability,

^ Alison, ii. 370.

ilS

CHAP, xxiv.] CAVALKY UNDER NAPOLEON.

373

a

y,

liad thrown his army into the theatre of operations, so
as to strike the Prussians unex})eetedly in flank and
rear before they were (concentrated or ready to receive
him. The decisive action took place at Jena on tiie
14th October, 1806. This battle was opened by Ney,
whose fiery energy led him to begin the attack before
his troops were properly supported. His cuirassiers at
the outset, by one bold charge, carried a battery of
thirteen guns posted upon an eminence. The Prussian
horsemen also charged bravely upon the infantry under
Ney, who, forming in square, held their own until
Napoleon despatched some cavalry to extricate them.

After a closely-contested struggle along the whole
line, in which the superior numbers of the French
enabled them to press back their foe at every point, the
villages which the Prussians had held were all taken,
and their dispirited soldiers were retiring slowly and
sullenly, but in good order. Napoleon saw that the
moment li.id arrived to send in the cavalry to complete
the victory. Murat, at the head of 12,000 horse, fresh
and in high spirits, moved on in perfect order, and
charged with loud cheers upon the retreating foe. The
effect was instantaneous. Nothing could withstand the
overwhelming torrent of horsemen that flooded over the
plain and swept all before it. In vain the wearied and
dispirited Piiissian cavalry endeavoured to check their
advance and cover the retreat of their infantry and
artillery. The superior numbers and solid weight of
the heavy squadrons of French cuirassiers broke through
all opposition, the Prussian cavalry being driven oflF, tlie
guns captured, and the foot-soldiers sabred. Prince
Hohenlohe, who commanded the Prussian army, in an
order sent at this moment to General Euchel, who was
coming up with the reserves, gives a graphic picture of
the effect of this charge of Murat and his ponderous
horsemen.

After telling him to make openings to let the fugitives
through his lines, he says : " Be ready to receive the
charg3 of the enemy's cavalry, which in the most furious
manner rides on, presses and sabres the fugitives, and

374

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

has driven into one confused mass the infantry, the
cavalry, and artillery." ^

The victory was complete, and Davoust having
d(ifeated the other portion of the Prussian array on the
same day at Auerstadt, the fugitives from both fields
fled in the direction of Weimar, and Napoleon set to
work to make his dispositions for following up the
pursuit. The vigour with which that great general
pressed a beaten foe was one cause of his great
successes as a commander.

The cavalry in the operations after Jena performed the
most valuable services. Murat reached the town of
Weimar upon the heels of the fugitives, and while a
portion of his horsemen penetrated into the town with
them, the remainder passed around it and cut off the
retreat, so that in a few minutes 15,000 Prussians and
200 pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the French
cavalry.

The nexfc day Murat, still pressing on with untiring
energy, and closely followed by the infantry of Marshal
Ney, arrived before Erfurth, which at once surrendered,
and with it 14,000 prisoners, 120 cannon, and immense
military stores.^ The scattered debris of the Prussian
troops were retiring into the neighbourhood of Magde-
burg, and Murat, under the orders of Napoleon, moved
from Erfurth towards that point, driving the fugitives
all in that direction, knowing that they would ere long
become his prisoners.

From Magdeburg, Murat, by rapid marches, moved
to 8pandau,, which surrendered at his first summons, on
the same day that Davoust entered Berlin. Prince
Hohenlohe, intercepted on his march to Berlin, took the
route to Grandsee and Zeydenich for Stettin ; but here
again the indefatigable Murat, by forced marches, had
got the start even of the cavalry of his advance guard,
and at Zeydenich, on the 26th October, Hohenlohe was
vehemently assailed by Lasalle's hussars and Grouchy's
dragoons, emd his troops defeated with the loss of
1,000 men.

' Alison, ii. 455.

2 Ibid. ii. 449.

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CHAP, xxiv.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON. 375

The following clay more fisfhtiiig took place, in which
the Prussian gendarmes oi viie Guard were enveloped
by the French horsemen and obliged to surrender in
the open field.

Hohenlohe, cut off from the direct road to Stettin,
hoped by the circuitous route of Prentzlow to make his
way through, but Marat, hearing of the change of direc-
tion and divining his enemy's designs, marched his
horsemen across the country all night, from one road to
the other, and intercepting him on the morning of the
28th October, attacked his troops in front and flank
two leagues beyond Prentzlow. The wearied and
demoralized Prussian cavalry were at once overthrown
arid driven back upon the main body, when, at this
critical moment, the inftmtry of Marshal Lannes, which
had marched, all night with untiring perseverance,
appeared in force upon the right flank. After some
hard fighting the Prussian commander was obliged to
surrender, and 16,000 infantry, six regiments of cavalry,
forty-five standards, and sixty-four cannon fell into the
hands of the French.^ Milhaud, with a detachment of
Napoleon's light cavalry, about the same time captured
at Passelwich 6,000 Prussians, and among them 2,000
cavalry with their horses and equipments.^

On the next day, the 29th October, General Lasalle,
with a brigade of hussars, advanced to Stettin and sum-
moned it to surrender. On the second summons the
place capitulated, and a fortress containing 160 cannon
and a garrison of 6,000 was taken without a shot being
fired.

This being accomplished, Murat immediately turned
to the west and followed without cessation the troops
which, under Blucher, were retreating towards Lubeck.
On the 30th October General Bila, with 4,000 Prussians,
was attacked at Anklam and the whole force captured.
On the 1st November Blucher's rear-guard was defeated
at Nossentin with the loss of 500 prisoners. He was
again beaten at Wismar on the 4th November. On the
6th Lulieck was taken by iissault, the Prussian infantry

' Alison, ii. 4r)2. « Humbert, 19G.

37G

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

being captured or slain, and after another check at
Schwartau, Blucher was at last compelled to capitulate
at Ratkau on the 7tli November, by which 4,000 infantry,
3,700 cavalry, and forty cannon fell into the hands of
the French horsemen.

The campaign had scarcely lasted one month. Two
cavalry fights, one at Hchlitz on the 9th October, and
another at Saalfeld the next day, had paved the way for
the great battles, of Jena and Auerstadt on the 14tii of
the same month. So complete was the victory, thanks
to the overwhelming charge of Murat's horsemen, that
when followed up by that impetuous cavalier in a pursuit,
unsurpassed for vigour and pertinacity, it resulted in
the entire destruction of the whole Prussian military
system.

We have given a full sketch of this pursuit of the
debris of the Prussian army as a good illustration of the
rdle cavalry should play in following up a victory and
completing a success.

Napoleon's next campaign was in Poland and East
Prussia, where he at once marched to meet a powerful
Russian army which was on the way to aid the Prussians.
The campaign opened by the occupation of Warsaw by
the French on the 30th November. This was followed
by the advance of Napoleon's army and the battles of
Pultusk and Golymin on the 26th December, 1806. In
the first of these battles Benningsen used his Cossacks to
form a screen behind which he most skilfully made his
dispositions for battle. The battle of Eylau, which
followed on the 8th February, 1807, was one of the most
closely-contested and bloody battles recorded in history,
and both armies claimed to have won the victorv. In
this action the cavalry on both sides performed most
valuable services.

The battle wiis opened by Napoleon with a heavy
attack upon the Russian right and centre by the corps of
Augercau and Soult, preceded by 150 pieces of cannon.
As soon as the troops of Augereau had advanced a few
hundred yards the Russian batteries opened a most de-
structive fire upon them from 200 guns, which inflicted

CHAP. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

377

terrible losso' in the crowded and massive columns.
"While shake, by this cannonade, a heavy snowstorm
came on, hiding the view and darkening the atmosphere.
The Russians took advantage of the opportunity, and a
large body of infantry, under Tutschakoif, attacked the
French division on one flank while a powerful force of
cavalry struck them upon the other..

So thick was the snowstorm that the attack was
totally unexpected, and the Cossacks were upon the
wavering columns before they were seen or steps taken
to meet the charge. The result, was soon decided.
Augereau's corps, struck on both fiav.ks by infantry and
cavalry, were attacked with the utmost vigour. Their
muskets were almost useless from the wet and snow
which caused them to miss fire, their columns were at
once broken and driven back upon the, reserves with such
carnage that of 16,000 men but 1,500 escaped destruc-
tion. This disaster almost ruined Napoleon's army ; the
Russian right and centre pressed forward, their light
troops entered Eylau, and a heavy column approached close
to the mound upon which the Emperor was standing and
very nearly captured him.

Napoleon's measures were prompt, his calmness and
decision admirable. He ordered up his Old Guard to
attack one flank and a brigade of Murat's horse to attack
the other flank of the advancing Russians, who, elated with
victory, pressed on with disordered ranks. Before they
could organise to meet the coming storm the French
were upon them and almost the whole division cut to
pieces on the spot.' This saved the French centre, but
the disorder caused by it was so great that a vigorous
effort had to be made by Napoleon to restore the battle
by a desperate attack with his right wing against the
Russian left.

This attack was made by Da^oust's corps, assisted by
a grand charge of the whole cavalry, which was massed
for that purpose. The horsemen amounted to the
enormous force of 14,000 men, supported by 25,000
infantry, and 200 cannon. Again a snowstorm aided the

* Alison, ii. 484.

378

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

cavalry, but this time on the side of the French. Murat,
at the head of his seventy squadrons, was close upon
the Russian lines before his approach was discovered.
The shock was irresistible. The front line was thrown
into disorder, the cavalry obliged to fall back, and a
most obstinate struggle ensued. The Russian battalions
though broken would neither fly nor surrender, but
uniting in little knots, maintained the fight with dogged
pertinacity. Some French horse forcing their way
through the Russian lines penetrated far among their
reserves, but being charged while in confusion by
Platoft"s Cossacks of the Don, thoy were at once
destroyed. The long lances of the Cossacks, their
wonderful dexterity in using them, and tlie activity of
their horses, gave them a. great advantage in the mMee,
over the unwieldy and ponderous cuirassiers.

At Serpallen in this part, of the field, Benningsen sent
his cavalry to charge the flank of Morand's infantry,
which caused them to fall back more than 300 yards.
After most obstinate fighting in which the carnage was
fearful, the action ceased about ten at night, neither party
having gained a victory. In fact, an impartial judge
would say that both were defeated, for Benningsen
retreated, and Napoleon discovered it just in time, to
prevent him from also falling back, as he was in fact
obliged to do a few days after.

The battle of Eylau has been often referred to by
writers on cavalry tactics ; and the circumstance of the
snowstorm rendering the muskets of the infantry useless,
mentioned, to illustrate the fact that in heavy rains and
snows, infantry might often be placed at the mercy of
cavalry, who relying upon the " armes bhmches " could
charge the foot-soldiers, when deprived of their great
defensive power, the musketry fire. At the present
day, however, since the discovery of fixed ammunition,
such a thing cannot again occur, and that point loses
therefore its interest to the cavalry oflicers of the
future.

It is also stated by Thiers that the Russian infantry
in this action, seeing that they could not resist the

'

I ]

CHAP. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

379

overwhelming rush of the French horsemen, lay down
to let them pass over, when they rose up again and
fired into their rear after they had gone by.

The Russian cavalry after Eylau performed most
effective service. Murat attempted to pursue Benningsen
towards Konigsberg. He had under him twelve regi-
ments of cuii'assiers. After a hard engagement he was
defeated and driven back, with the loss of 400 killed and
300 prisoners.

It was in this campaign that Napoleon for the first
time felt the difficulty of carrying on a war against a
nation whose armies were covered by such efficient light
cavalry as the Cossacks. In subsequent wars, in the
disastrous retreat of 1812, in 1813 and in 1814, on the
plains of Germany and the east of France, numberless
blows were struck against him, by the irregular light
horsemen of Russia.

After this defeat of Murat's cuirassiers, the Cossacks
became bolder and more enterprising*. Their incursions
were incessant, night and day were alike to them in their
unceasing vigilance ; the French foraging parties were
cut off", their messengers intercepted, their positions con-
tinually attacked. So effective were the Cossacks in the
duty of light cavalry, that the French could not levy
contributions, and could not feed their army except with
great difficulty. In ten days Napoleon found that he
was obliged to fall back into winter quarters, having lost
in that short time 1,500 cavalry, captured by the
indefatigable horsemen of the Russian Emperor.

It is a fact well worthy to be remembered, that this
was the first campaign that Napoleon ever fought in
which his successes were not decisive and vigorously
followed up. To the Russian cavalry can be attribut d
the great change, and we shall soon see how the influence
of these irregular and undisciplined horsemen was in
the end the most important influence in destroying the
gigantic power founded by the marvellous military genius
of the great Napoleon.

Some heavy cavalry fighting occurred at the battle of
Eckmuhl on the 22nd of April, 1809, where a battery of

I

380

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

sixteen Austrian guns was captured by a charge of
Bavarian horsemen. In the retreat towards Ratisbon at
the conclusion of the battle, tlie Austrian cuirassiers and
hussars were drawn up in front of Egolfsheim, to cover
the retreat of their infantry and artillery. The French
columns were obliged to halt until their cavalry came up
to support an engagement. The Austrians charged first,
and we find the practice of firing while mounted again
showing itself. The cuirassiers of Nansouty and St.
Sulpice received the enemy with a discharge of firearms,
followed by an attack at the gallop, which threw back
the Austrians upon their reserves. These charged again,
and the whole force mingle^l together, swayed l)ackwards
and forwards, in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, in
which the noise of steel clashing against steel, of sword
blades ringing upon casque and cuirass, raised a din
above the other sounds of battle. The sun set and the
moon arose before the loud clang arising from the melee
had ceased. The Austrian cuirassiers, armed only with
breastplates, fought at a disadvantage with the French
horsemen, who were protected all around. After fearful
losses they w^ere obliged to give way, and the struggle
settled definitely the superiority of Napoleon's cavalry.^

At Wagram the cavalry made many charges on both
sides. The Austrian cuirassiers, charofing in flank the
infantry of Massena, just as they were disordered by a
successful attack upon the village of Aderklau, drove
them back, and put almost the whole of Massena's corps
into confusion, which the mo.st desperate efibrtfi of
Napoleon himself, with large reinforcements, alone cor Id
repair. The cuirassiers of St. Sulpice, by repealed
charges, checked the advance of the threatening columns
of the enemy's infantry, and under cover of the cavalry
and artillery the French lines were soon re-formed.

Heavy cavalry fightin^<3 took place on the French right,
where Davoust was turning the Austrian left, but these
combats contain no feature of special interest. They
serve as a further illustration, however, of the effect of
fresh reserves thrown into a cavalry action. The French

' Alison, iii. 189.

h

d

\

r(

a

at

w

T

CHAP. XXIV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

381

horsemen under Grouchy were at first victorious, and
drove back Rosenberg's cavahy with great shiughter.
Hohenlohe's cuirassiers were at once brought up to
restore the action, and Grouchy was in turn defeated,
and forced to the rear, when Montbrun, coming to his
assistance with a fresh corps, charged the Austrians
when blown and disordered by their success, and settled
the fate of the struggle in favour of the French.

In the left of the field the French cavalry lost so
severely by artillery fire as to be unable to effect any-
thing, and the result was that the horsemen, worn out
by the exertions of a long day's fighting, and weakened
by their serious losses, were unable to operate with any
vigour in the pursuit, so that scarcely any prisoners were
taken, and no guns. Napoleon was much displeased,
and blamed severely his cavalry generals. " Was ever
anything seen like this ? " said he. " Neither prisoners
nor guns. This day will be attended with no result."'

At the battle of Dresden, Murat, who commanded the
French horsemen, was able, under cover of the mist and
rain, which concealed his movements, to steal around
the allied left flank, and to form up his whole force close
to and perpendicular to the enemy's lines, without being
discovered. Then in the heat of the battle, while pressed
by the French infantry, 12,000 chosen horsemen sud-
denly burst out of the mist upon the enemy's flank and
rear. In an instant their lines were scattered and cut to
pieces, three-fourths of the entire corps which formed the
left wing being killed or captured. This gallant charge
gave Napoleon the victory.^

The cavalry were employed very effectively in many
of the subsequent campaigns of Napoleon, as, for instance,
at Leipsig, F^re Champenoise, and Waterloo, but as by
this time the other European nations were beginning to
use the cavalry somewhat upon Napoleon's system, and,
as we shall have occasion, when considering the cavalry
of the other countries, to refer to these battles, we -will
not discuss them at this moment, but treat of them in a
subsequent chapter.

' Due de Rovigo, iv. 114 ; Alison, iii. 253. - Alison, iv. 138.

382

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

The illustrutiona wo have given, however, will servo,
to convey to the rc^ader a clenr idea of the manner in
which Napoleon used his cavalry, and the effects it pro-
duced in his campaigns. He valued very highly the
services of light horsemen in obtaining intelligence of
the enemy's movements. We have already referred to
his great ability in gathering an idea of the designs of
his opponents. His writings teem with passages showing
the extraordinary care he bestowed upon this point.

He valued most highly the same quality in his cavalry
officers. His remarks on General Steingel, who was
killed in the early campaigns in Italy, show the high
appreciation he had of that officer, and his idea of what
a light cavalry general should be. He says : " General
Steingel, an iilsatian, was an excellent hussar officer ; he
had served under Dumouriez in the campaigns of the
North, he was adroit, intelligent, vigilant. He united
the qualities of youth to those of advanced age ; he was
a true general of advanced posts.

" Two or three days before his death he was the first
to enter Lezegno. The French general arrived there
some hours after, and everything he required was ready.

" The defiles and fords had been reconnoitred, guides
had been secured ; the priest, the post-master, had been
examined ; communications had been opened up with
the inhabitants ; spies had been sent out in many direc-
tions ; the letters in the post had been seized, and those
whicli could give military information translated and
analysed, and measures were taken to form magazines of
subsistence to refresh the troops."^

Napoleon's views on the various methods of obtaining
intelligence are so comprehensive and so forcible, that
every cavalry officer should be well acquainted with
them. They are fully detailed in a letter to his brother,
King Joseph of Spain. He says : " We have no accounts
of what the enemy is about— it is said no news can be
obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in an army,
as if spies were common. They must do in Spain as
they do in other places. Send parties out. Let them
' Brack's " Avant Postea de Cavalerie L^gfere."

CHAP. XXIV.] CA vALRY UNDER NAPULEON. 383

carry off the alcade, the chief of a convent, the master
of the post or hi.s deputy, and, above all, the letters.
Put these persons under arrest until they speak question
them twice each day, or keep them as hostages. Charge
them to send foot- messengers, and to get news. When
we know how to take measures of vigour and force, it is
easy to get intelligence. All tlie posts, all the letters
must be intercepted ; the single motive of procuring
intelligence will be sufficient to authorise a detachment
of 4,000 or 5,000 men, who will go into a great town,
will take the letters from the post, will seize the richest
citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, &c. It is beyond
doubt that, even in the French lines, the inhabitants are
all informed of what passes ; of course out of that line
they know more ; what, then, should prevent you seizing
the principal men ? Let them be sent back again with-
out being ill-treated. It is a fact, that w^hen we are not
in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is
not well instructed it is because he is ignorant of his
trade. The services which the inhabitants render to an
enemy's general are never given from affection, nor even
to get money ; the truest method to obtain them is by
safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their
goods, theii' towns, or their monasteries."

Napoleon used his cavalry very skilfully to cover his
own movements, and the result was that his brilliant
strategical plans were generally successfully carried out
through the perfect manner in which his cavalry aided
him in masking his designs from the enemy. His ability
to discover the intentions of his opponents was not
more marked than his capacity to conceal his own.

His expedition to Egypt was almost a surprise. His
departure from that country would have failed but for
the secresy with which it was effected. His campaign
of Marengo succeeded through the ability with which
he deceived all Europe as to the course he was about to
adopt. His march to Ulm in 1805, covered as it was
by the admirable horsemen led by the gallant King of
Naples, was hidden from the Austrian general until his
right was turned, his communications cut off, his army

384

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[rKUIOD IV.

cooped up in a fortross, niul no resource \v.ft open to him
save to surrender. In this ('am|);iign Napoleon's cavaLy
formed a screen, behind which Mack could see nothin;^',
and so a magnificent strategical combination was suc-
cessfully completed.

In the campaign of Jena, in 1806, wu have seen how
Napoleon took the Prussians entirely by surprise, which
was also in a great measure due to the judicious manner
in which the ctivalry were employed to cover his move-
ments. In Spain also Napoleon's marshals used their
dragoons after the example set them by their great
leader. There, however, the French worked at a great
disadvantage, as the whole population was bitterly
hostile, and a national war was being waged. The
dragoons, however, won great glory in the Spanish
campaigns, and were the most useful force that could
have been employed in the style of guerilla warfare, which
was carried on for so long a time in that country.

Napier says, in his " History of the Peninsular War,"
that in the operations in Portugal, before the battle
of Vimiera in 1808, the number and activity of
Junot's cavalry completely shrouded his position from
the English general, and hemmed in the British troops
so closely that they could obtain no information of
what was going on outside their lines.' After the battle
of Valencia we see Marshal Suchet sending detachments
of dragoons in pursuit of the flying Spaniards, each
dragoon having an infantry man behind him. These
parties by their rapid movements prevented the enemy
from rallying, and completely dispersed them.^ In this
war the French dragoons often dismounted to use their
carbines on foot.

Napoleon's wars produced some very good cavalry
generals, although hardly any that would be classed as
the equals of Seidlitz and Ziethen. Many had the dash,
the elan, but lacked the cautious judgment that is so
necessary a qualification for a cavalry commander.
Napoleon had not a single cavalry general who could
be considered so great a genius as Oliver Cromwell.

I Napiei^ 55.

2 Ibid. 421.

ciiAi>. XXIV. J CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

885

Murat stands out as the most brilliant and striking
figure of the galaxy of famed soldiers who surrounded the
great Napoleon. His daring intrepidity was unequalled,
his energy unsurpassed, while his ehivalrous demeanour,
his hantlsome faee, and noble carriage, made him a
universal favourite among the horsemen he commanded.
His showy uniform, his great stature, tlie incomparable
seat with which he bestrode his magnificent and brilliantly
equipped chargers, attracted universal attention. His
indefatigable energy and his marked bravery were the
two qualities that gave him his high reputatioi' and so
many successes, but his judgment was not so good. No
one knew this better than Napoh^on, who said of him :
" He was a paladin in the field, but in the cabinet
destitute of either decision or judgment ; he loved, I
may rather say, adored me ; he was my right arm, but
without me he was nothing. In battle he was perhaps
the bravest man in the world : left to himself he was an
imbecile without judgment," '

One incident in Murat's career shows more powerfully
than any other the extraordinary energy and impetuosity
of his character. On the invasion of Russia in 1812,
Murat commanded the cavalry of the advance. From
the 24th June, when the French army crossed the
Niemen, until the 14th Septeml)er, the invading host
had toiled on day after day, continually skirmishing with
the Russian rear-guard. Murat with his horsemen
headed the pursuit. From morning till night, under a
burning sun and enveloped in clouds of dust, their
horses continually dropping from fatigue, the French
squadrons steadily and perseveringly moved onwards.
Every hour Moscow was in the minds of the soldiers.
It was the object of the journey, the resting-place from
their toil, the prize of all their labour. After fighting
sixty battles and combats, and after three months of
incessant marching, Murat at last arrived at Moscow,
which the Russians had evacuated. He entered the
city with his horsemen, and found it deserted. In the
true spirit of an impetuous cavalry officer, he never

' Alison, iv. 101.

C 0

•s

I I

386

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

halted, but moved on through the city, out from the
further gates, and coolly took up the pursuit of the
Russians, calmly setting his face towards Asia and the
boundless plains of the East.' That one fact, betokening
such restless and untiring energy, is to the mind of ^he
writer a stronger testimony to Murat's character, Li a
commander of horse, than any one act in his long and
chequered career.

Of the other cavalry officers, Kellerman gave evidence
of great ability in the charge effected by him at Marengo,
as abeady mentioned, and in many other battles he
showed that he possessed the qualifications of a good
cavalry chief. Marshal Marmoat considered that Keller-
man, Montbrun, and LasaUe were the only three good
leaders of horse that the French army produced in the
twenty years of Napoleon's wars. Bessi^res, who com-
manded the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, was also an
efficient officer. Steingel had the qualities requisite to
make a good cavalry leader, but he was unfortunately
killed at an early age, before the opportunity had been
given to enable him to acquire a great reputation.
Napoleon however has left a record of his qualifications
which we have already transcribed.

* Segur, ii. 37.

CHAPTER XXV.

Cavalry under Napoleon (continued).

SECTION I. — RUSSIAN CAVALRY UNDER ALEXANDER I.

The Napoleonic wars, in addition to developing in the
French armies a very effective cavalry force, one equally
useful both upon the field and in the minor operations of
war, also brought forward prominently the vast hordes
of irregular cavalry which served under the Russian
standard.

The vaulting ambition, the restless energy, and the
warlike ciiaracter of Napoleon led him into wars in every
clime, from the burning sands of Egypt to the snow-
clad steppes of Russia. No general ever lived who had
so vast and so varied an experience. He fought against
highly trained professional soldiers in Prussia and Austria,
and against tumultuous risings of the population in the
national war waged against him in Spain. And to com-
plete his experiences, he fought a campaign in Russia in
1812, against a foe whose principal strength consisted of
swarms of irregular horsemen from the plains of Scythia,
a foe somewhat similar to that which proved so disastrous
to Crassus — a force such as rendered Parthia the only
rival to Rome.

The operations of the Russian cavalry, and particularly
the Cossacks, in 1812 and 1813, merit careful considera-
tion in a cavalry history ; for to the services rendered by
that force may be attributed the fall of the most powerful
military empire since that of Rome.

c 0 2

388

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

The army under the Emperor Alexander I. in 1810

contained, in addition to the other forces, six regiments

of cuirassiers, thirty-six of dragoons, eleven of hussars,

and five of Uhlans. These were all regular troops. In

the Guard there were also two regiments of cuirassiers,

one of dragoons, one of hussars, one of Uhlans, one of

Cossacks, and a corps of 100 Cossacks of the Oural.

The regiments were composed of five squadrons each,

the hussars and Uhlans of the Guard five squadrons also,

while the others had ten squadrons each. The regiments

of Cossacks of the Guard however had only three

squadrons.' In the line each squadron had 151 horses,

in the Guard 159. Two new regiments of cuirassiers

were organised in 1811, and at the same time the cavalry

were separated and formed into divisions, there being

two of. cuirassiers, eight of cavalry, and one of the

cavalry of the Guard. Each division of cuirassiers had

five regiments, the cuirassier regiments of the Guard

being included in the first. The divisions of cavalry

were composed of four regiments of dragoons and two

of hussars or Uhlans. The fourth division however had

one extra regiment of hussars ; while the eighth division

had only three regiments of dragoons and one of hussars.

The great strength of the Russian cavalry, however,
consisted not so much in the regular regiments of horse,
as in the Cossacks, who, iu great swarms, crowded to the
ranks when the war broke out, and performed services of
incalculable value in the campaign.

Nearly the whole of the Cossacks of the Don rallied
around the standard v.f PlatofF, and by their indefatigable
activity as light-horse, mainly contributed to the extra-
ordinary successes gained by the Russians in the latter
part of the war of 1812.* These Cossrcks, accustomed
to horses from childhooc engaged continually in agricul-
ture and the raising ot great herds of cattle, form a
hardy and vigorous race of horsemen, such as are not to
be met with in any other country of Europe.

The Cossacks were armed originally with lances,
swords, and pistols, the lance being the principal weapon,
' Boutourlin, i. 95. 2 Alison, iv, 15.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

389

and mainly relied on by them in their skirmishes.
Their horses were small but swift, well-bred, and capable
of enduring great fatigue and protracted marches on the
most scanty supply of food. The horses being able to
walk very rapidly (according to Sir Eobert Wilson as
much as five miles an hour) enabled them to make forced
marches with ^reat facility, while 'their speed, when
pushed to the ul ost, was equal to that of the swiftest
chargers in Europe. The pistols were carried in the
girdle, and not upon the horse. The Cossack used no spurs,
but carried a short whip on the wrist, and from perfect
confidence in his horse, in his skill in riding, and in the
use of his weapons, he never feared to face any foe in
single combat.*

They did not at the commencement of the war attack
in regular squadrons, as did the other cavalry, but in
the usual method of the horsemen of the East, in a
swarm or loose charge, when each man selecting his own
opponent, they all swooped down together with loud
cries upon their foe. Afterwards, as the war went on,
they acquired more discipline, and learned to charge boldly
against the best regular cavalry in the French armies, as
well as against infantry formed in serried squares.

Many important battles were fought by the Russian
troops under the Emperor Alexander against the armiea
of Napoleon, and in most of them the Russian cavalry >
did their duty well. At the battle of Aust'^rlitz, while
a desperate struggle was going on in the centre of the
hostile lines, between the Russian infantry reserves under
the Grand Duke Constantine, and a French division
under Vandamme, 2,000 Russian cuirassiers of the
Guard, led by the Grand Duke in person, fell suddenly
upon the flank of the French infantry. The charge
was made in the finest order, and with irresistible fury.
In an instant the French column was broken, a large
portion of it trampled under foot, and an eagle captured.
Napoleon was an eye-witness of this splendid charge,
and immediately launched against the hostile horsemen
the cavalry of his guard under Bessi^res and Rapp.

' Alison, ii. 465 ; Wilson, 27, 28.

390

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

The sudden onset of fresh squadrons, before the Russians
could re-form after their glorious charge, at once over-
threw the victorious cuirassiers, captured their artillery,
and sent thtm back over the dead bodies of the square
they had destroyed. They soon rallied, however, and
returned to the attack, and then the two corps of
Imperial Guards meeting in full career, a fearful crash
of charging horsemen took place, followed by the most
desperate cavalry fighting that had occurred during
the war. They fought on both sides with the most
determined bravery, and with frightful carnage. At
length the Russians had to fall back on Austerlitz, and
this encounter had a great influence in deciding the fate
of the battle.'

We have already referred to the gallant exploits of
the Russian cavalry on the field of Eylau, where the
Cossacks under Platoff charged successfully the victorious
horsemen of Murat, in the celebrated cavalry action that
took place on the Russian left in that battle.

In June 1807, after Benningsen had moved out from
his position at Heilsberg to attack Ney, he found it
necessary on the concentration of the French army to fall
back again to his entrenched camp. The rear-guard under
Bagrathion, while covering this retreat, found it neces-
sary to make a stand to give time to the carriages and guns
in the rear to defile across the AUe, by the four bridges
which spanned it at that point. Bagrathion formed his
force, consisting of only 5,000 foot and 2,000 horse, at
Glottaw, and sent forward his cavalry to check the
pursuers. The infantry formed squares to withstand the
attack of Murat, who, at the head of 12,000 horsemen,
pressed vehemently upon them. On this day the
Russian cavalry displayed the most astonishing valour.
The odds against them were fearful, but such was the
steadiness and intrepidity of the Russian troops, that
not a square was broken, nor were the squadrons of horse
dispersed or routed. After a sanguinary fight for a long
time without any decisive result, the Russian commander
having gained time for the whole of the baggage and

' Alison, ii. 371.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

391

artillery in his rear to effect the passage of the river, at
length fell back slowly, and crossed the bridges without
serious loss, and in good order. This action reflects the
highest credit on the Russian cavalry.'

In the advance of Napoleon upon Moscow, it was not
long before the Russian horsemen began to acquire
a high reputation. The first engagements of the cam-
paign took place on the 9th and 10th of July, and in
both instances the Cossacks were met by Polish cavalry,
and in both cases were completely victorious.*

Nor can we refrain from mentioning here the action
which took place near Krasnoi between the Russian rear-
guard, 6,000 strong, with 1,200 horse, under General
Newerofskoi, and the leading column of the French
army under Ney and Murat. Newerofskoi was sur-
rounded and vigorously assailed by 18,000 horse, but he
bravely determined to fight it out, and refused positively
to surrender. Forming his force into two squares, which
he afterwards united into one, he retired slowly and
steadily across the broad open plains through which hia
course lay, continually repelling the charges which were
repeatedly made by the numberless French squadrons,
who charged him more than forty times during the
day. On several occasions the French succeeded in
breaking into the ranks, and even cut down Russian
officers in the centre of their squares. But continually
closing together and presenting a firm array and a well-
sustained fire, they kept off" the enormous host by which
they were surrounded, efiected their retreat during the
whole day, and reached Korytnia at night with unbroken
ranks, but with a loss of 1,000 men and five guns.
This is one of the most striking instances on record of
a successful infantry defence against an overwhelming
force of horsemen upon an open plain.

At the battle of Borodino a most brilliant charge of
cavalry was made by Ouvaroff at the head of the Ist
corps of cavalry, and some regiments of Cossacks, upon
the left flank of Prince Eugene's corps. He crossed the
Kolotza and first overthrew Ornano's brigade of cavalry,
» Alison, ii. 531. 2 xbid. iii. .^IT.

392

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV,

which was upon that flank. An Italian division under
General Delzon saved itself by promptly forming in
squares. The baggage and artillery waggons fled in eon-
fusion, and the Viceroy Eugene himself narrowly escaped
capture by getting into one of the infantry squares.
Napoleon, alarmed at the confusion, and deeming the
attack serious, galloped to the spot, followed by the
cavalry ai 1 artillery of the Guard. Ouvaroff", finding him-
self threatened by greatly superior forces, withdrew across
the river, his gallant charge having created a most import-
ant diversion by withdrawing a portion of the reserves
from the decisive point of the battle-field. This charge
sensibly checked and delayed the success of the French.'
The battle of Borodino is remarkable in a cavalry
point of view, on account of the celebrated capture of
the great redoubt by a charge of cavalry. Napoleon
made preparations for a tremendous attack with an
enormous infantry force, aided by 200 guns, while he
directed a charge of cavalry to endeavour to penetrate
the Eussian lines, and wheeling around to enter the
redoubt by the gorge. Caulaincourt, with Montbrun's
cuirassiers, was ordered to make the charge. Alison
describes what followed. " You will see me immediately
dead or alive," was the answer of the brave general, and
he set oflF at a gallop at the head of his followers, and
the glittering mass was soon lost in the volumes of
smoke as he approached the entrenchment. The Rus-
sians hastened by all possible means to support the
point of attack. The corps of Osterman was placed in
front, and the regiments of the Guards, Preobazinski and
Semenowskoie, were stationed as a reserve in their rear.
Caulaincourt, advancing with the utmost rapidity, over-
threw the regiments of Russian horse whom Kutusof
had opposed to him, while the great redoubt continued
to vomit forth an incessant fire upon its assailants.
Eugene with his infantry was advancing to the attack ;
the bayonets of his troops were already gleaming on its
slopes, when the columns of cuirassiers were seen ascend-
ing through the clouds of smoke which enveloped the

" Bouiourlin, i. 341.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

393

entrenchment. Its sides seemed clothed in glittering
steel, and the fire from its summit, after redoubling in
fury for a few seconds, suddenly ceased. The flames of
the volcano were extinguished in blood, and the resplen-
dent casques of the French cuirassiers appeared when
the smoke cleared away, above the highest embrasures
of the entrenchment."'

Grouchy, following up this attack with his cavalry,
advanced against the troops of Osterman while drawn
up on the heights in rear ; but being charged by the
two cavalry regiments of the Russian Guard, they were
defeated with great loss, and obliged to fall back upon
the infantry.^

At the Katzbach, 26th August, 1813, the victory was
mainly due to the excellent services rendered by the
Russian cavalry of Sacken's corps, under the command
of Wassilchikof and some Cossacks under Karpofi".
These brave horsemen charged Sebastiani's cuirassiers,
as they debouched from the defile of Kroitsch, at Neider
Grain, and by attacking them boldly in front and flank,
drove them back into the defile, and the whole of the
French left were in this way thrown into confusion and
obliged to retreat. This compel] ed Macdonald to retire
with his entire army, and in the pursuit the allies won
many trophies and prisoners.^

At the battle of Culm, on the 30th of August, the
allies had 10,000 admirable horsemen to bring into
action against Vandamme, who had only 3,000 cavalry
in his army. The allies massed their squadrons on their
own right, in front of Vandamme's left, where the open
plain was suitable to the use of that force. The battle
opened with a vigorous charge of the Russian cavalry
upon the left flank of the French line, which was totally
unsupported, and unable to oppose an effective resist-
ance. This attack swept all that portion of Vandamme's
line back upon the centre and right, and so threatened
his communications with Pirna as to seriously alarm
him. He at once despatched a fresh brigade to stem
the torrent of advancing horsemen, but in vain ; they

' Alison, iii. 564, 565. ^ Boutourlin, i. 344. ^ Alison, iv. 146.

394

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

t.

only added to the confusion, being at once overwhelmed
by the victorious cavalry. This compelled a retreat
which, being intercepted by a corps of Prussians under
Kliest, turned the French defeat into a disaster.
Vandamme and a ^eat portion of his army were made
prisoners of war. The French cavalry, under Corbineau,
however, set an example of what horsemen should do
under such circumstances. Seeing his retreat cut off,
his force surrounded by immensely superior numbers of
victorious enemies, Corbineau took the bold plan of
cutting his way out. At the head of his horsemen, he
dashed up the steep and almost impassable defile, filled
as it was with advancing Prussians, with such vehemence,
that he broke right through their column, cut down
their gunners, captured their pieces (which, however, he
could not carry off), and succeeded in effecting his
retreat. This is a good illustration of the maxim that
cavalry should never surrender in the field, and a proof
of its correctness.

On the 16th October, 1813, at Leipzig, the greatest
battle of modern times commenced, and at the very
outset a most brilliant charge was made by two
regiments of Russian cuirassiers, led by Lewachow
against the French right. Soon afterwards Napoleon
ordered an attack in great force against the allied centre
and left. Kellerman, at the head of 6,000 horse,
advanced boldly, overthrew Lewachow, and was driving
all before him, when the Austrian cuirassiers of the
guard, six regiments in all, under Count Nostitz, having
rapidly crossed the Pleisse, arrived at the critical
moment, and instantly charged vehemently, with loud
shouts, upon the flank of Kellerman's squadrons, who
were pressing on with ranks disordered by success. The
fresh reserves and the flank attack at once settled the
fate of the combat. Kellerman was instantly routed
and driven back to the protection of the artillery and
infantrr of the French lines, where he soon re-formed.
This decisive charge of the Austrian cuirassiers saved
the allies from a serious defeat in the left centre of their
position.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

395

Almost at the same time, or shortly after this combat,
another desperate efi'ort was made l)y the French cavalry,
under Latour Maubourg, and Murat, to break through
the allied lines in their right centre to the east of
Wachau. These gallant cavalry leaders, at the head of
a mass of 4,000 or 5,000 cuirassiers, without either a
second line or a reserve, moved on in admirable order,
and striking the infantry of Prince Eugene of Wirtem-
berg in flank, threw it into confusion, overwhelmed ten
squadrons of the Russian Guard which tried to check
them, and captured a large number of cannon. The
charge was successful, and so terrible in its results
that the whole centre seemed broken. The Emperor
Alexander and the King of Pnissia were obliged to fall
back to avoid capture, and a disaster to the allies
appeared inevitable. The Emperor of Russia, with
admirable coolness, ordered up the Red Cossacks of the
Guard under Orlofl" DenizoiF to charge one flank of the
victorious horsemen, while Barclay, with the reserve
cavalry, was at once commanded to advance to their
support. The dispositions of the Emperor saved the
battle. The Cossacks under Denizoff" struck the French,
when, their leader Latour Maubourg seriously wounded,
their horses blown by their charge, and their ranks
broken by the capture of the batteries, they were unfit
to oppose any efiective resistance. In an instant the
whole mass was pierced through and routed, twenty-four
guns recaptured, and the French cuirassiers driven back
with great loss to their own lines. In this one battle,
in the course of a few minutes, were two victorious
charges of cavalry turned to defeat by the neglect of not
holding reserves in hand.

Many other cavalry actions took place in many
of the subsequent battles of the war, but it would
be mere useless repetition and a tedious swelling
out of this work beyond its necessar}^ dimensions
to insert any further illustrations. There is one
battle however which cannot be overlooked, as it was
fought between 22,000 cavalry and 128 guns, against
a French force of almost the same numbers, but

396

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

and

consisting of 17,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry,
eighty-four guns.

This battle, which took place at Fere Champcnoise,
on the 25th March, 1814, was opened by the advanced
guard, which consisted of the Russian chevalier guards
and cuirassiers. They attacked vigorously the retreating
French, who, forming their infantry in squares, were
steadily falling back protected by their artillery and
cavalry. The allied horse, coming up in great numbers
under the Grand Duke Constantine and General Nostitz,
soon overthrew the French dragoons, and captured some
forty-four guns. A rain-storm wetting the muskets
rendered them useless, and the French infantry deprived
of their artillery, their weapons dumb and harmless,
were seized with a panic, and soon fled in coniusion
through Fere Champenoise. The gallant conduct of a
regiment of heavy cavalry, under the command of the
brave General Le Clerc, who charged with the utmost
vigour to cover their retreat, and the approach of night,
alone enabled the French marshals to restore order to
the remains of their army.

WhUe this was going on in one portion of the plain,
the Emperor Alexander in person, accompanied by the
King of Prussia and a large body of cavalry, feU in with
a French division under General Pacthod, who was in
charge of a great convoy of guns and provisions, and
who had been bravely resisting the attacks of Generals
Korf and Wassilchikoff, who had attacked him boldly
with some of the finest regiments of the Russian cavalry.

Sir Archibald Alison gives a most vivid description
in his " History of Europe " of the gallant fight that
ensued after the arrival of the Russian Emperor upon
the field.

" As soon as Alexander was aware that this corps con-
sisted of enemies, he took the most prompt measures
to encompass them and acconiplish their destruction.
The Russian and the Prussian cuirassiers of the guard
were formed on the right — Korf's hussars, who had
moved parallel to them in their cross march, in front —
and WassilchikofF's dragoons on their left rear. Thus

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

397

9,000 chosen horse supported by seventy guns were
ready to assail about 6,000 infantry without cavalry,
and with only sixteen pieces of cannon. Having thus
environed the enemy, Alexander, to prevent a useless
effusion of blood, summoned the French general to
surrender. Pacthod, albeit sensible that escape was
hopeless, nobly refused, and briefly haranguing his
soldiers, exhorted them to die like brave men in defence
of their country. Loud cheers followed the generous
appeal, and immediately the firing began. Formed
into squares, with the ammunition and carriages in the
centre, they bravely began a rolling fire, still continuing
to retreat towards Fere Champenoise, and for some
time repelled all the charges of the Eussian horse. At
length however the guns, one battery of which was
under the immediate command of Lord Cathcart, to
whom the Emperor," who was on the spot, had given its
direction, were brought to bear upon them. Such was
the deadly precision of their fire, that lanes were soon
made in one of the squares, and the cavalry breaking in
at the apertures, the whole were cut down or made
prisoners. Meanwhile the intelligence spread like
wildfire through the Russian columns that the Emperor
was in danger : with inconceivable ardour the troops
rushed forward ; hussars, light dragoons, uhlans, and
cuirassiers came up at speed or full trot, and dark
clouds of dust darkened the air, and at last 13,000 were
on the field. Still the other squares of the French
refused to surrender ; they even fired on the Emperor's
aide-de-camp Rapatel, whom he had adopted as a legacy
from Moreau, who fell dead on the spot ; and Alexander,
seeing there was nothing else to be done, gave the signal
for a general charge. At the head of his chevalier
guards, that brave prince threw himself upon the
squares, and dashed in at one of the openings made by
the cannon ; the guards, roused to the highest pitch by
the presence and danger of their beloved Czar, followed
with irresistible fury, and the square was penetrated on
all sides. Still the French, with heroic resolution,
refused to submit ; some in tears, others almost frantic

398

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

11

1.
■)"■
Hi

liM

[period IV.

with indignation, kept firing till their last cartridge was
exhausted ; and Pacthod, in the centre of the square,
only surrendered his sword to the Emperor in person.
Three thousand of the French, many of them national
guards, fell nobly resisting on this fatal occasion."'

The examples quoted in the foregoing pages will
convey to the r(\ader a pretty clear idea of the method
of fighting in action, adopted by the rival forces of
cavalry in the wars of Napoleon, but the influence
of the light horse of the allied armies, and particularly
of the Cossacks of Russia, in the minor operations of
war, were of so important a character as to require very
careful consideration. We have seen the extraordinary
influence exerted upon the operations of Frederick the
Great by the irregular and undisciplined horsemen of
the Austrian service, who, although totally unable to
stand before the highly trained cavalry of the Prussian
king, were nevertheless far more than a match for them
in detached or outpost service.

Napoleon also met his first check, from the same
cause, namely, the superiority of his enemy in light
horsemen suited to partisan warfare. We have already
drawn attention to this point, in our last chapter, in
referring to the services of the Cossacks under Benningsen
after the battle of Eylau. This was the first instance in
Napoleon's life, in which he was obliged to retreat after
a pitched battle. Although technically victorious at
Eylau, it was really a drawn battle, but one that would
have been rapidly turned into a great success, had it not
been for the Cossacks.

From this period we can trace, from step to step, the
tremendous influence these irregular horsemen exerted
upon his fortunes, until at last in the campaign of 1814,
Napoleon, driven to the wall, was obliged to abdicate
his empire. It was after the arrival of Napoleon at
Moscow that the Cossacks began to make themselves
seriously felt in the operations against the invading
army. For some time, a species of armistice was
tacitly observed between the main armies, and it

^ Alison, iv. 382, 383.

ciiAP. xxv.J CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

899

was at this period that the irregular horsemen com-
menced a partisan warfare of the most destructive
character on the flanks and rear of the French position.
These troops cut off the foraging parties, and soon
formed a cordon around Moscow, which, occupying all
the roads, captured the convoys of supplies and virtually
held the army of Napoleon in a species of investment.
The scarcity of provisions so occasioned was soon most
severely felt ; forage for the cavalry horses was so difiicult
to obtain, that the dragoons were obliged to go to great
distances in search of fodder, and moving out so far
away from theii* lines, they were often cut off and cap-
tured by the Cossacks, who swarmed throughout the
whole countiy. In three weeks, in the month of Octo-
ber, these light troops in the neighbourhood of Moscow
actually captured as many as 4,180 Fn ich soldiers with-
out a battle being fought. Murat at this time reported
that one half of the whole force of French cavalry, that
had survived the advance to Moscow and had reached
that place, had perished in the indecisive but incessant
skirmishes that had been going on at the outposts.'

This reduction of the French cavalry weakened their
army seriously, and made the subsequent operations of
the Cossacks on the retreat more decisive, on account of
the great superiority they had acquired. The operations
were resumed by the Kussians on the 18th October, when
an attack was made upon the troops under Murat, at
Winkowno. The attack on his left rear, by Count
Orloff''8 cavalry, soon threw Murat's troops into confusion,
and compelled him to retreat, with the loss of 1,500
prisoners, 38 cannon, and his whole baggage.

Napoleon at once set out for Kalouga, but being
checked in his march, by the battle of Malo Jaroslawitz,
he rode on to inspect the scene of action. While he
was moving, in apparent security, in the midst of his
army, the cry was raised of the Cossacks. "It is
Platoflf 1 they are 10,000." At first Napoleon would not
believe it, and he was in imminent danger of being cap-
tured. His aide-de-camp. General Rapp, was unhorsed,
' Alison, iii. 575, 576. 2 n,id. iii. 578.

II'

400

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[I'EKIOD IV.

and the vigorous efforts of the escort who fought bravely,
and the advance of the grenadiers h,cheval and the dragoons
of the guard, alone saved the Emperor from being taken. '

This attack was made by Platoff, with ten regiments
of Cossacks, and the 20th regiment of Chasseurs, w'th
the object of seizing a park of artillery. The guns were
taken, but only eleven carried oti", from the want of
horses, and the rapid approach of the cavalry of the
Imperial Guard.*

This affair had the most important consequences, and
affected materially the result of the war. it dispirited
Napoleon, proved to him the superiority of the light
troops of the enemy, the weakness and inferiority of his
own cavalry, and this at a moment when everything
depended on his acting boldly and decisively. A council
of war was held the same night, and the great question,
as to whether an attempt should be made to force the
passage by way of Medynn, or whether the retreat
should be ordered to the old road from Smolensk to
Moscow, was hotly discussed," Murat vehemently urged
the bolder and more impetuous course, but the other
officers disagreed with him, and it is said that the report
of another warmly contested fight with the Cossacks
near Borowsk, a few miles to the rear of the army,
turned the scale, and led Napoleon to retreat ; a course
that in the end proved disastrous to him.* At the same
moment that he retreated, Kutusof also fell back to
Kalouga, proving that Murat's advice was the better,
and that his plan would have proved successful. The
operations of the Cossacks, therefore, secured this great
advantage to the Russians.

Thus began the celebrated retreat on the 26 th October,
1812, which was continued until the i3th December, and
during that long period scarcely a day passed in which
the Cossacks did not render valuable service, as Platoff
pressed continually the French rear-guard. The want
of provisions now began to be felt by the retreating
army, and the most frightful disorders resulted from the

' BoutourliD, ii. 165 ; Alison, iii. 680.
3Segur, ii. 114. " Ibid ii.. 117, 118.

Boutourlin, ii. 165.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

401

suflFerings caused by this want. Baggage waggons were
abandoned at every step, the horses failing from starva-
tion. The troops soon began to scatter in search of
food, and horses, that were required for other purposes,
were slain in great numbers to feed the famishing
soldiers.

At Wiasma a severe action took place on the 2nd
November, where the French rear-guard, being inter-
cepted by General WassilchikofF, onl}?- escaped with great
difficulty and with the loss of 6,000 men. The Cossacks
constantly hovered around the retreating masses, and
the troops, dying of starvation in their ranks, were
either massacred by the peasants or captured by the
Cossacks if they straggled in search of food. The in-
tense frost added to the horrors of the retreat, combining
to make it the most terrible disaster in the history of war.

It is commonly supposed that it was the severity of
the weather that was the principal cause of the failure
of the expedition of Napoleon into Russia, but the more
the details of that extraordinary campaign are studied,
the more clearly will it appear that the real cause of the
destruction of the French army was the great superiority
of the Russians in light troops.* The immense distance
to which Napoleon had penetrated from his magazines
and base of supplies rendered it exceedingly difficult to
feed his troops, a difficulty that was greatly augmented
by the immense numbers that were massed under his
standard.

As soon as the superiority of the Cossacks in outpost
and detached service was fully established, foraging was
put a stop to, and famine and want soon relaxed the
discipline ,and destroyed the energies of the French
troops. It was this more than the cold that ruined the
French army. Alison says that " the campaign would
have been equally fatal to them even though Moscow
had not been burned or the ^rosts of winter had never
set in."

'* When an army rushes headlong into the middle of
the Scythian cavalry, without having the means from

' Alison, iii. 599.

D D

402

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

resources of its own of providing itself with subsistence
and forage, it is certain to be destroyed. Alexander the
Great wisely avoided such a danger, and contenting
himself with a barren victory over the Scythians on the
banks of the Oxus, turned aside from their inhospitable
country. Darius, with all the forces of Persia, pene-
trated into it and perished. The legions of Marc Antony
and Crassus sank under the incessant attack of the
Parthian horse ; the genius of Julian proved inadequate to
the encounter ; the heroism of Richard Coeur de Lion was
shattered against the innumerable squadrons of Saladin.
The very magnitude of the carriages with which an
European army invades an Asiatic territory proves the
immediate cause of its ruin by augmenting its encum-
brances and accelerating the period when, from being
surrounded by the light horse of the enemy, it must
perish from want. The enterprise of Napoleon against
Russia thus proved abortive from the same cause which,
in every age, had defeated the attempts of refined nations
to penetrate the Eastern wilds ; and it is a striking ^ roof
of the lasting influence of general causes on the greatest
of human undertakings that the overthrow of the
mightiest armament which the power of civilised man
ever hurled against the forces of the East was in reality
owing to the same causes which, in every age, have given
victory to the arms of the shepherd kings."^

This campaign caused the introduction of partisan
warfare. Colonel Davidoff", who wrote a treatise on the
subject, recommendei' and carried out this system of using
light troons, and in the course of the retreat inflicted
many losses upon the French by attacking unsupported
points along their line of communications. Several de-
tached parties of French were captured by these partisans.
The advanced guard of General Baraguay d'Hilliers,
under Augereau, were made prisoners at Liakhowo to the
number of 2,000 by Count Orloff" Denizotf aided by
Davidoff", Seslawin, and Figner." A depot of 1,300 Frei. '•
at Klemenstiewo was also surprised and the whole ^ufce
captured by Colonel Bistrom, at the head of a detached
* Alison, iii. 599. ^ Boutourlin, ii. 201.

OHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

403

by

corps consisting of two battalions of chasseurs of the
guard, a squadron of cuirassiers, and 100 Cossacks.^

The Eussiau cavalry at this time produced some first-
class leaders of horse, of whom PlatofF stands out the
foremost. Ouvaroff, Palen, Orloff Denizoff, Davidoff
Tchernicheff, Figner, and Seslawin also performed the
most distinguished services, while in the campaign of
1813 and 1814 the Grand Duke Constantine proved him-
self to be a most gallant and brilliant cavalry commander.

In the campaign of 1813 the partisan operations in
rear of the French army were much more numerous, and
carried out in a much bolder manner^ than in any of the
previous campaigns of the age, and in these operations
the Russian cavalry and their generals shone conspicuous.

The first important afiair of the campaign of 1813 was
the capture of Hamburg by a partisan corps consisting of
3,000 foot and 3,000 Cossacks under Tettenborn, an active
and energetic officer. Shortly after Tchernicheff, Ben-
kendorf, and Doernberg, uniting their Cossacks and light
troops, made a forced march of fifty miles in twenty-four
hours to relieve the people of Lunenberg, and having
defeated General Morand, with the loss of 1,000 killed
and wounded, captured the remainder of his force, con-
sisting of 2,000 men. These successes were aU-important,
as they encouraged the population to rise and throw off
the French yoke, and the German insurrection soon
became general.

Later on, in the campaign after Napoleon's victories of
Lutzen and Bautzen, the partisan operations in his rear
disquieted him greatly, and had a marked effect upon
his mind. The recent experiences of the campaign of
Moscow were very vivid in his recollections, and his fear
of the Cossacks, and other light cavalry of the allies, was
not to be wondered at. A partisan corps captured a
considerable park of artillery on the 27th May, a few
days after the battle of Bautzen, while about the same
time Woronzoff's cavalry had fallen in with a large body
of French horse near Dessau, and had defeated them
with the loss of 500 prisoners.

' Boutourliu, ii. 203.

D D 2

llN

404

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

Two days after, on the 29 th May, General Tchernicheff,
who was lying near Magdeburg, hearing that the West-
phalian general, Ochs, was at Halbertstadt, with a
convoy of artillery, decided to surprise him. He set out
on the 29 th, with a strong force of hussars and Cossacks,
and moving rapidly all afternoon and night, arrived at
five in the morning within reach of the enemy, after
having marched fifty miles. General Ochs was com-
pletely surprised, and at once routed with the loss of all
his guns, and the capture or destruction of his whole
force of 1,200 men.'

From Halbertstadt Tchernicheff recrossed the Elbe,
and took up a position at Bernberg, while he arranged a
combined movement with Woronzoff to surprise General
Arrighi, who was at Leipzig, with 5,000 men and consi-
derable magazines. Tchernicheff, by a forced march of
thirty-one miles in one day, joined Woronzoflf, and, when
united, they attacked Arrighi, who was quite unprepared
to receive the onset. Just as the victory was about
being completed, the action was stayed by the news of
the armistice that had been arranged between Napoleon
and the allied commanders.

On the renewal of the war, Tchernicheff again proved
the great value of a partisan corps of cavalry if well
handled. Having taken a prominent part in driving
Oudinot into Magdeburg, with heavy losses, after the
battle of Grossbeeren, he boldly c^ried his operations
far in the French rear, and with the most signal success
into the very heart of Westphalia.^ At the head of
3,000 horsemen and four light guns, this dashing officer
crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and marching with lightning
rapidity ,*oross Germany, reached Cassel, the capital of
West^^/'ij, on the 30th September. His bold advance
and fiixU demeanour created great consternation among
the French authorities. Jerome Bonaparte, the King of
Westphalia, was obliged to fly from his capital without
firing a shot, and the gallant cavalry partisan entered at
the head of his Cossacks, amid the applause of the
people, and proclaimed the dissolution of the kingdom

* Alison, iv. 81,

2 Ibid. iv. 159.

ii'

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON. 405

of Westphalia. TcheruichefF remained in possession of
Cassel for a whole week, and effected his retreat safely
without the loss of a man, carrying with him as trophies
the stores of the arsenal, the royal horses and carriages,
and an immense amount of plunder.

The moral effect of this cavalry raid was greater than
the winning of a decisive victory. It proved the hollow-
ness of the position held by Napoleon in the military
kingdoms he had established, and its influence was at
once forcibly felt all over Germany.

The Cossacks, who at first fought in a loose manner,
soon acquired a considerable ability in manoeuvring, and
from their speed and activity were generally more than
a match for the French cuirassiers, who, weighted down
by their trappings, were soon wearied out by the inces-
sant skirmishing.

One or two examples, taken from Captain Nolan's
" History and Tactics of Cavalry," will serve to convey
a clear idea of the method of fighting, and the superiority
of the Cossacks in partisan warfare.

"On the 19th August, 1813, when the armistice had
expired, the French troops began to push the allies back
on Berlin and Potsdam. Colonel Bichalow received orders
to make a reconnaissance in the direction of the Luchen-
walde, with a regiment of Don Cossacks. These men
had bivouacked on the Treboin road, and advanced
through Scharfenbriick and Waltesdorff. The French
pickets retired at our approach, and afforded us a full
view of the fields to the north and east of the Luchen-
walde. Presently a large body of cavalry issued in haste
from the town, and formed in our front in close column
of squadrons ; the skirmishers fell in on their flanks, and
we had this heavy^ column only ])efore us, The Cossacks
could gain but little against so large a foi ce, but as there
was no great risk in assailing it, they were ordered for-
ward. The French advanced at a trot, and, to prevent
the Russians getting in betwixt the squadrons, they
closed up, and bore right down on the centre of our
line, which naturally opened out ; the Cossacks attacking
the flank and rear of the column. The French, having

! !i

406

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

no one in front to oppose them, halted, whikt their tor-
mentors kept spearing the flank files, and firing into the
mass, which soon got into complete confusion, and could
undertake no evolution of any sort. The Cossacks,
though they never attemptpd to disperse the mass by a
dash at them, still, conscious of their superiority in
riding, continued to shoot and spear them, executing
partial charges when opportunity oflered. Meanwhile
the flank files of the French faced outwards, and unslung
their carbines, and, thus formed in square, they kept up
an irregular fusilade for about half an hour. The heads
of French infantry columns were now seen advancing
from Luchenwalde towards the scene of strife, and as
soon as their artillery opened fire, the column of heavy
cavalry was released from its dangerous situation.
Colonel Bichalow withdrew his troops by way of Scharf-
enbriick, without being pursued by a single French-

'» 1

man.

On the 18 th September, 1813, another fight took
place near Miihlberg, between General Slowaisky with
1,200 Cossacks, and a force of 2,000 French dragoons.
Captain Ganzauge gives the details as follows : —

" The French completed their movements whilst the
Cossacks were forming up. They were formed in one
line en muraille, with a small reserve in rear.

" The Cossacks fell on, and were received with a
discharge of carbines. The French did not draw swords.
Their fire at first sent the Russians to the right about,
and whilst they were re-forming, the enemy wheeled into
column, and opened out, so as to get their intervals, and
wheeled again into line. We expected they were about
to charge, but their object appears simply to have been
to extend their line, and prevent their being outflanked,
a common mode of attack with the Cossacks.

" The arrangements being completed on both sides
about the same time, the CossacJ^s were strictly ad-
monished not to shrink from the enemy's fire, their
officers receiving orders to cut down the first man that
turned.

' Nolan, 81, 82.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

407

" Several squadrons were told off to attack the enemy
in flank and rear during the conflict. All these orders
were steadily obeyed ; they pressed in upon the French,
and surrounded their squadrons ; here I saw myself
many of the French dragoons cut down or speared, after
firing off* their carbines, before they could draw their
swords. The French steadily defended themselves at
first, as well as cavalry standing still can do against such
active adversaries, who swarmed about them on all sides ;
however, presently some of them turned, and their
example was soon followed by the remaining squadrons.
The reserve, instead of advancing to restore the fight, joined
in the flight ; in a short time everyone was galloping
towards Jacobsthal, and the entire plain was covered
with scattered horsemen. Not one troop was to be seen
in close order ; it was a regular hunt ; and most of those
who were taken prisoners in it, had previously fallen off
their horses. At last we came upon a line of cuirassiers,
in emerging from the wood, and their steady and imposing-
attitude brought us suddenly to halt, without any word
being given ; we were quite satisfied with our victory,
and turned back to Miihlberg." ^

General Brack gives us the following important testi-
mony as to the influence of the Cossacks as light troops.
He says : " The Cossacks were an arm which rendered
the war highly dangerous, especially to such of our
oflScers as were entrusted with making reconnaissances.
Many among them, and especially of the general staff,
selected by the major-general, preferred forwarding the
reports which they received from the peasantry, to going
to a distance and exposing themselves to the attacks of
the Cossacks. The Emperor then could no longer know
the state of affairs." No testimony could possibly be
stronger than the above, as to the efficiency of these
irregular horsemen.

The following opinion of a French officer. General

Morand, as to the value of the Cossacks and their

services in the war of 1812, is clear and to the point.

He says : " But these rude horsemen are ignorant of our

^ Ganzange, as quoted in Nolan, 83, 84.

Il'>

408

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV,

divisions, of our regular alignments, of all that order
which we so overweeningly estimate. Their custom k
to keep their horse close between their legs ; their feet
rest in broad stirrups, which support them when they
use their arms. They spring from a state of rest to a
full gallop, and at that gallop they make a dead halt ;
their horses second their skill, and seem only part of
themselves; these men arc always on the alert, they
move with extraordinary rapidity, have few wants, and
are full of warlike ardour. What a magnificent spectacle
was that of the French cavalry, flashing in gold and
steel under the rays of a June sun, extending its lines
upon the flanks of the hills of the Niemen, and burning
with eagerness and courage ! What bitter reflections
are those of the ineffectual manoeuv" which exhausted
it against the Cossacks, those irregu ai forces until then
so despised, but which did more for Russia than all the
regular armies of that empire ! Every day they were
to be seen on the horizon, extended over an immense
line, whilst their daring flankers came and braved us
even in our ranks. We formed, and marched against
this line, which, the moment we reached it, vanished,
and the horizon no longer showed anything but birch-
trees and pines ; but an hour afterwards, whilst our
horses were feeding, the attack was resumed, and a black
line again presented itself; the same manoeuvres were
resumed, which were followed by the same result. It
was thus that the finest and bravest cavalry exhausted
and wasted itself, against men whom it deemed un-
worthy of its valour, and who, nevertheless, were suffi-
cient to save the empire, of which they are i,he real
support and sole deliverers. To put the climax to our
affliction it must be added, that our cavalry was more
numerous than the Cossacks, that it was supported by
an artillery, the lightest, the bravest, the most formidable
that ever was mowed down by death ! It must further
be stated that its commandant, the admired of heroes,
took the precaution of having himself supported in
every manoeuvre, by the most intrepid infantry ; and,
nevertheless, the Cossacks returned covered with spoils

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

409

and glory, to the fertile banks of the Danaetz, whilst
the soil of Russia was strewn with the carcases and arms
of our warriors, so bold, so unflinching, so devoted to
the glory of our country." ^

It is an interesting and instructive fact that these
horsemen were in 1813 and 1814 armed and accustomed
to operate upon a somewhat similar system to that
which, we shall find, was used most extensively and
successfully by the cavalry engaged during the American
Civil War. In the campaigns on the Elbe and Rhine
the Cossacks fought often as mounted infantry. Having
referred to the great services of these troopers, we will
copy the following letter from Captain Ganzauge, of the
Prussian Lancers of the Guard, to Captain Nolan : —

" During great part of the last war against the French
I was attached to the Cossacks of the Don. These men
were at that time but little accustomed to the use of
firearms. Whilst advancing into Western Europe the
advantages of firearms became apparent, more particu-
larly when acting on intersected and difficult ground ;
and the Cossacks managed to arm themselves with
French infantry muskets which they picked up on the
field. Then originated amongst them the practice of
dismounting by turns, where the ground was favourable,
and thus engaging the enemy in skirmishing order. I
have myself seen them in this way beat cavalry very
superior to them in numbers, and infantry also, when
either the cavalry or the infantry attempted to attack
them singly. In such cases the infantry soldiers
opposed to them were afraid of the mounted men, who
stuck close to their dismounted comrades with the led
horses ; and these dismounted men were ready to jump
into the saddle at any moment and rush upon the enemy
if they gave way or were driven from their cover.

" To this manner of skirmishing I attribute entirely
the success of these Cossacks during the campaigns on
the Elbe and the Rhine, and the decided superiority
they acquired over the enemy's cavalry in all outpost
work and detached warfare."

^ In Nolan, 86, 87.

410

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD IV.

SECTION II. — AUSTRIAN, PRUSSIAN, AND ENGLISH CAVALRY
IN THE NAPOLEONIC "WARS.

The Austrian cavalry, which at the outset of the
revolutionary wars was superior to that of the French,
soon lost its ascendency, and was often defeated by the
cuirassiers of Napoleon. At Austerlitz, however, the
Austrian horsemen, who covered the retreat of the allies,
fought with the greatest gallantry to enable the retiring
infantry to withdraw from the field.

In many a battle the Austrian cavalry showed the
most distinguished bravery, and often rendered import-
ant services in covering the retreat of their beaten
armies, as, for instance, at Eckmiihl, Egolfsheim, and
Ratisbon, of which the details are recorded in a former
chapter. At Ratisbon forty squadrons of Austrian
cuirassiers checked the whole French cavalry for more
than three hours, and gave time to the army to recross
the Danube.

The Prussian cavahy in the campaign of 1806, though
well equipped and organised, were no match for the
French horsemen, who, accustomed to victory, defeated
them without difficulty at Jena and Auerstadt, and in
the retreat followed them up, as we have seen, so closely
and so vigorously that the Prussian army could not
again appear in the field.

In 1813 and 1814 the allies had large bodies of
cavalry, but a vicious habit had come into use of placing
them in line of battle with the infantry, as was done
by the French marshals at Blenheim and Ramilies.
Napoleon, who used his artillery very freely against
them, soon neutralized their influence, and so demoralized
and discouraged them that his horsemen, although then
newly raised recruits, were often able to defeat them.

At Lutzen the allies had immensely superior forces of
cavalry, which they did not seem to know how to
employ in action, for they remained almost idle spec-
tators of a battle where the infantry were badly defeated.
Napoleon, who knew the weakness of his own horsemen

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

411

and the strength of his enemies in that arm, fully
expected that it would be used vigorously against him,

up

moving

and made his preparations to meet it by ^v,,.^^ „^,
his infantry in large squares, supported by artiUery,
while he retained his cavalry in rear in reserve. The
allied horse not being used, however. Napoleon won a
victory.

After Leipzig the allied cavalry were in enormous
numbers, amounting altogether to about 60,000, and
should have eflFected greater results than they did in
following up the retreat of Napoleon's beaten army.
Tchernichetf, Orloff Denizoff, and the Cossacks harassed
the French troops and cut ofi' the stragglers ; but there
was no such pursuit as that of Murat after Jena.

Twenty squadrons of Prussian cavaliy, under Colonel
Dolfs, won a decisive success over General Maison's
division of French troops on the 26th May, 1813, near
Hanau. He attacked Maison, who had his men formed
in eight squares, aided by eighteen guns, and in fifteen
minutes had thoroughly defeated him, killing, wounding,
or capturing the whole force with the exception of a
small body of cavalry that escaped.'

The Prussian cavalry pursued the French army very
vigorously after Waterloo, although 1,500 of them under
Colonel Sohr, advancing incautiously, were surprised and
captured at Rocquencourt, near Versailles, on the 1st
July, 1815, in the last combat of the long and hardly
contested wars of Napoleon. '^

The system of tactics among the European cavalry
during this epoch was almost the same in all countries,
the Cossacks alone being somewhat peculiar in their
irregular method of fighting.

The English cavalry did well in the war in Spain, and
maintained there the high reputation they had acquired
in the campaigns in the Netherlands in 1793-94. At
the battle of Salamanca the fate of the day was mainly
decided by the gallant charge of the British cavalry of
Le Marchant and Anson led by Sir Stapleton Cotton.
The effect was instantaneous; in a few minutes the

Nolan, 65.

Humbert, 237.

12

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

whole French left was thrown into confusion, 2,000
prisoners taken, five guns captured, and the broken rem-
nants of the French divisions, thoroughly routed, were
driven into a wood, and in a military point of view
annihilated.^

Serving in the English army at this time was a force
of Hanoverians and Germans, who were organised in
a separate corps under the title of the King's German
Legion. Attached to this Legion were two regiments of
heavy dragoons, and three regiments of hussars. These
horsemen acquired the highest reputation. The 1st
regiment of hussars, commanded by Colonel Von Arent-
schildt, was admitted to be the best light cavalry corps
in the army for outpost service, while the most brilliant
cavalry charge in the Peninsular War was made by the
heavy brigade of dragoons of the German Legion, under
General Bock at Garcia Hernandez, the day after the
battle of Salamanca. The particulars, which are con-
tained in Beamish's history of the King's German Legion,
are interesting and instructive.

" The French infantry and artillery being at first con-
cealed by the inequalities of the ground, the brigades
were ordered by Lord Wellington to attack the cavalry,
and their pace was accordingly increased to a gallop.
The German regiments, confined by the narrowness of
the valley, had been unable during their progress through
it to move upon a larger front than sections of threes,
and now, being in echelon of squadrons, they attempted
to form line upon the first squadrons without halting.
Hurried forward, however, by the excitement of the
moment, the leading squadron of the first regiment
under Captain Von Hattorf, having also in front General
Bock, the field officers of the regiment, and Lieutenant-
Colonel May of the English artillery, who brought the
order from Lord Wellington, dashed on without waiting
for the remaining squadrons, and made straight for the
enemy's cavalry.

" The left wing of the French horsemen retired from
the charge of Anson's brigade, and those in front went
' Napier, Book 18, chap. ill.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON. 413

about on the approach cf Hattorf s squadron ; but in the
pursuit the flank of the squadron became exposed to the
fire of the infantry on the heights, by which Colonel
May and several men and horses were wounded, and the
pursuit was discontinued.

" Captain Gustavus Von der Decken, who commanded
the third or left squadron of the regiment, seeing that if
he advanced according to the order given, his flank
would be exposed to the fire of a dense infantry square,
formed the daring resolution of attacking it with his
single squadron.

" This square stood on the lower slope of the heights,
and obedient to the signal of their chief, the German
troopers advanced against it with order and determina-
tion, while a deafening peal of musketry from the enemy
greeted their approach. Arrived within a hundred yards
of the point of attack, the gallant squadron officer, struck
by a ball in the knee, fell mortally wounded, and Lieu-
tenant Von Voss, with several men and horses, were
killed ; but instantly Captain Von Uslar Gleichen, who
commanded the left troop, dashing forward, placed him-
self at the head of the squadron, and reanimating his
followers by word and example, while another shower of
bullets carried destmction among their ranks, the in-
trepid soldiers forced onwards, and bringing up their
right flank, appeared before the enemy's bayonets on
two sides of the square.

" The two front ranks, kneeling, presented a double
row of deadly steel, while in rear of these the steady
muskets of four standing ranks were levelled at the
devoted horsemen. At this critical moment, when the
sword was about to be matched against the firelock,
and the chivalrous horseman against the firm foot-
soldier, when victory hung yet in equal scales, an
accidental shot from the kneeling ranks which, killing
a horse, caused it and the rider to fall upon the bayonets,
gave the triumph to the dragoons.

"For a path was now opened, and the impatient troopers
rushing in amid the blazing fire while men and horses
fell fast before the muskets of the French infantry, their

T

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414

A HISTORY OP CAVAJRY.

[period IV.

firm formation was destroyed and the -hole battalion
were either cut down or taken prisoneis.

" Captain Von Keitzenstein, who commanded the
second squadron, seeing the success which had attended
the daring onset of his comrades on the left, and being
also impeded in his forward movement by the difficulties
of the ground, decided upon following up the discomfi-
ture of the infantry and attempting the second square
which stood on the edge of the heights. He was received
with a steady and destructive fire by which Lieutenant
Huegel was killed and Lieutenant Tappe severely
wounded ; but the moral force of the French infantry had
been shaken by the fearful overthrow which they had just
witnessed, and some timid individuals leaving their ranks,
Reitzenstein rushed in with his heavy followers, the
square broke, and the greater part of the battalion was
cut down or captured.

" A third square was instantly formed by those few who
had escaped from destruction, and some cavalry came to
their support. Against these Captain Baron Marschalck
led the third squadron of the second regiment, and being
jc.aed by the left troop of the second squadron, under
Lieutenant Fumetty, charged and dispersed the enemy's
cavalry, then riding boldly at the infantry, broke and
completely overthrew them." '

Tliif: charge has received the highest praise from all
quarters. General Foy, in his History of the Peninsular
War, says expressly that it was the boldest and most
gallant cavalry charge of the whole war in Spain. The
Duke of Wellington in his reports said that he had never
witnessed a more gallant attack.

Waterloo, the decisive and final battle of the wars
arising out of the French Revolution, was the culminating
triumph of the British army. In this action the English
cavalry behaved witli the most distinguished gallantry,
as did also their brave opponents, the dragoons and
cuirassiers of the French Emperor. '

The action at Waterloo was commenced by a tremen-
dous attack on the British centra and left, on both sides
* Boamish, History of King'^ German Legion, ii. 81 — 84.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

415

of the farm of La flaye Sainte, by a force of 2j,000 men,
under Ney and D'Erlon, in four massive columns, power-
fully supported by artillery and cavalry. This enormous
force, aided by the fire of seventy-four guns, moved on
in perfect order and soon swept away the allied first line,
which fled in confusion through the intervals of the
second ; but in that second line stood the fiery General
Picton, the gallant old soldier who had led his troops to
victory on so many fields, with two small brigades drawn
up in a thin line only two deep. He had only 3,000
men, and the advancing columns in his front were four
times his strength, but he firmly awaited the attack.
The French approached closely and began to deploy.
Picton seized the opportunity, poured in a deadly volley,
and, with a fierce hurrah, the English soldiers dashed in
with the bayonet. The brave old soldier, while gallantly
leading this charge sword in hand, was shot through the
head and expired instantly. The French however recoiled
in confusion, and then the English cavalry brigade, under
Ponsonby, dashing through the openings of the infantry,
burst upon the French columns with a fury that nothing
could withstand. The whole mass was broken, dispersed,
and routed, 2,000 prisoners and two eagles were taken in
a few minutes, while the victorious horsemen, carried
away with their success, and supported by Vandeleur's
brigade on their left, charged the guns in rear, captured
twenty-four pieces, cutting the traces and the throats of
the horses and so rendering them useless for the remainder
of the action.

Still pushing on, these English horsemen charged a
third line of cannon and lancers, driving them back in
utter rout. Napoleon, seeing the confusion, instintly
ordered -.ip Milhaud's cuirassiers from the second line,
and these fresh horsemen, clad in steel, coming upon
Ponsonby's broken and disordered squadrons, easily over-
threw them with serious loss. Ponsonby was killed, and
scarcely one-fifth of his men regained their lines.

This charge however, though disastrous to the English
horsemen, was a great success when the results are con-
sidei'c-> for be.ddes destroying a column of 5,000,

416

A HISTORY OP CAVALRY. [pbbiod iv.

II 1

capturing 2,000 prisoners, and rendering useless for the
remainder of the day as many as eighty pieces of cannon,
it had checked a powerful and dangerous uttack, and for
the time restored the fortune of that portion of the field
to the British army.

At the same time Napoleon pressed on the attack on
La Haye Sainte, and soon carried it and moved on against
Wellington's lines beyond it. Milhaud's cuirassiers
charged and destroyed a Hanoverian battalion, when,
being charged m turn by the English household cavalry,
they were routed with great loss ; but the English horse-
men pressed on with reckless impetuosity, the reserves,
carried away with enthusiasm, joined in the rn^Ue, and
being charged by the French lancers while disordered by
their success, were at once driven back in confusion to
their lines. The 12th and 16th English regiments of
cavalry now coming up charged the lancers in turn and
drove them back to the foot of the valley.'

Napoleon then determined to make a desperate eflfort
with his cuirassiers to break through the allied left and
sweep it from the field. Wellington's dispositions to
meet this attack were very skilfully conceived. He
placed his infantry in squares, en ^chiquier, with the
artillery in the intervals, and so awaited the attack.
The French opened with a tempest of shot and shell, to
avoid which the English laid down. When the cavalry
approached they rose and poured in volleys of musketry
from the faces of the squares. The cannon in front of
the lines were worked to the last moment by the British
gunners, who sent a storm of grape and canister into
the advancing horsemen and then took refuge in the
squares. These cannon repeatedly fell into the hands of
the cuirassiers, who valiantly charged over and over
again in the hope of driving back the British lines.
After every repulse, however, the gunners rushed out and
poured the most destructive volleys into the retiring
squadrons.

Nearly the whole of Napoleon's splendid cavalry was
destroyed in these fruitless but gallant charges, on the

^ Beamish, 74.

CHAP. XXV.] CAVALRY UNDER NAPOLEON.

417

allied left ; and after the most desperate efforts, and
repeated charges, they were obliged to fall back with
diminished numbers and disordered ranks, a mere wreck
of the brilliant squadrons that had formed up that
morning in so imposing an array in the fields around
La Belle Alliance. The injudicious use of all the cavalry
of the reserve in the early part of this action, as well
as the destruction of the Imperial Guard, were the great
causes of the almost total destruction of the French
army. A fresh reserve of cavalry, such as those brave
horsemen who were left dead upon the slopes of Mount
St. Jean, would have covered the retreat of the army
and prevented a defeat being pushed into a disaster.

During these wars the English cavalry, like that of
the other European nations, consisted of the Life Guards,
the Dragoon Guards, or heavy dragoons, and the light
dragoons and ussars. They were armed generally with
swords, pistols, and carbines. There were no lancers in
the English army until after Waterloo.

E 13

M'ti

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CHAPTER XXVI.

The Cavalry Service from the Time of Napoleon

TILL 1854.

During the period which elapsed between the close of
the great wars of the Revolution and the introduction
of rilled firearms, that is to say from Waterloo until the
Crimean war, there were no great campaigns, and no
marked improvements in the military art.

The most important conflicts of that period were the
campaigns of 1828-1829, between Russia and Turkey,
the Polish Insurrection of 1830-1831, the wars of the
French in Algiers, and of the English in India. In the
details of these campaigns we find but little change in
the system of cavalry operations. There are however
a few points that may be briefly touched upon.

A certain degree of activity in the organisation of the
cavalry in Russia marked the early part of the reign of
the Emperor Nicholas. There seem to have been two
epochs in the reorganisation of the cavalry in this reign.
Two dragoon divisions were changed into a hussar
division and a lancer division, and the whole cavalry
force was much diminished, the reduction being based
on economical grounds. After the ^olish war of 1831,
the cavalry came to be more valued, and they were
much increased, all the regiments being raised to eight
squadrons, and reserves provided. '

In 18.46 a war took place between Russia and Persia.
The most important action was fought at Elizabethpol,

' Ivanhoff, 228, 229.

CHAP. XXVI.] CAVALRY FROM 1815 TO 1854.

419

where the Persians had a very large force of cavalry.
The Persians drew up their army with the infantry in
the centre, and great masses of cavalry on the flanks,
and attempted to outflank and envelop the Russian
wings. The Russian artillery fire checked their advance
and compelled them to swerve from the direct attack.
The stubborn resistance of the Russian amay repelled
the attacks of the cavalry on both wings, while a
gallant attack from the centre upon the line of Persian
infantry pierced their ranks, and the victory was
complete, the Russiar cavalry pursuing vigorously and
capturing many prisoners.

On the 29th of August, 1829, in the operations around
Schumla, General Madatoff" was sent with the 2nd
brigade of the 3rd hussar division, the 1st Uhlan
regiment, and six light guns, to reconnoitre in rear of
the Turkish army, and to prevent them from bringing
provisions to Schumla. He made a successful raid and
captured ninety-seven men, fifty horses, a quantity of
cattle, and 106 waggons with provisions.

During the Polish war the separate detachments of
Creutz and Rudiger were composed very largely of
cavalr)', the value of that ser\dce for moving rapidly
from point to. point, rendering it specially suitable for
defeating detached parties of the enemy, and for pre-
venting risings among a disaflfected po^ elation. General
Creutz's command in 1831 consisted of 9,043 infantry,
5,137 cavalry, including Cossacks, and 71 cannon, while
in the command of General Rudiger at the same time,
the proportion of cavalry was even greater, the numbers
being, infantry 6,686 ; cavalry (including Cossacks),
6,762 ; and 24 guns. The large number of cavalry in
these commands caused them to be of great service.'

The Polish cavalry in this war were also very eff'ective,
and some very efticient cavalry leaders appeared in the
ranks of the insurgents. At the battle of Dembe Velky,
3l8t March, 1831, General Skarzinski, with a brigade of
cavalry, made a vigorous charge upon the centre of the
Russian lines, which virtually decided the victory, nine

' Okounef, Campaign of 1831. Appendix.

E E 2

II

420

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

pieces of cannon being taken, and a number of prisoners.
In the pursuit which followed the victory, the cavalry
also rendered effectual service.

Dveruitzky was one of the best Polish cavalry officers.
In his expedition into Volhynia, in 183 1, his force consisted
of 2,700 cavalry, 1,300 infantry, and a few guns, but
after fighting gallantly at Boreml, he was thrown back
upon the Austrian frontier, where he was obliged to
surrender to the Austrian troops.'

The most striking and interesting feature of the Polish
war to the cavalry officer was the well-executed partisan
campaign of the Polish General Dembinski, in July
1831, in Lithuania. This affair was very similar in its
character to the cavalry raids of the American Civil War,
which we shall hereafter have to consider at some length.
It is of value to the cavalry officer, as an illustration of
what is possible to a commander of horse who is possessed
of a brave and indomitable spirit. In the beginning of
July 1831, the Polish army was at Kurszany, where it
was decided to divide it into three bodies, one of which
Dembinski agreed to lead back to Warsaw by a wide
detour through the heart of Lithuania, which was swarm-
ing with Russian troops. The detachment consisted of
3,800 men, with six cannon. Dembinski left Kurszany
on the Dth July, marched by Mieszkucie upon Poniewiez,
and from there to Owanta, where his rear-guard had a
hard fight with the pursuing column of General Sawoiny.
When night came on he renewed his march to Podbrodzie,
where his infantry-^-cheval galloped up and dismounted,
and fought with great gallantry in seizing the position.
From there he turned north, and marched for some dis-
tance to deceive his opponents, then turning sharp to the
east, he moved rapidly upon Daniszew, where he crossed
the Wilia.^ Skilfully eluding the various columns
endeavouring to intercept him, he moved to Zboiska,
when he crossed the Niemen, and then marched by way
of Wola, Bielsk, and Nur, to Warsaw, which he reached
on the 3rd August.^ In this campaign Dembinski

' Soltyk, ii. 98. 2 jbid. ii. 330 to 33G. ^ Dembinski's

Memoireet, 316.

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CHAP. XXVI.] CAVALRY FROM 1815 TO 1854.

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crossed one grcjit rivor and six small ones, and moved
with such rapidity, and deceived his pursuers with such
skill, that he led his corps intacit to Warsaw — a distance
of 130 Polish miles, in twenty-five days. He seized
large quantities of supplies, and considerable sums of
money, and while on the march organised two of his
guns as artillery-h,-cheval. His forcM'd marclies were
accomplished by an ingenious plan whicli he adopted of
seizing a number of liorses, and supplying each infantry
liattalion with fifty horses to carry the men who were
most fatigued. He says he owed his safety princijjally
to this system of resting his wearied foot-soldiers.' He
also organised a force of mounted infantry by placing a
number of them on horseback. This force was most
useful to him, and saved delay in attacking small posts
tliat lay in his way.'

In India, during the last hundred years, the English
have carried on a great number of wars, in most of which
cavaliy have been much used on both sides. The native
forces in many of the states contained large masses of
horsemen, the most noted probably being the Mahratta
cavalry, whicli comprised a large force of the type
common in the East. When Hyder Ali attacked the
English in the Carnatic in 1780, his army consisted of
28,000 cavalry, 15,000 regular infantry, besides a number
of labourers, pioneers, &c. These horsemen charged in
irregular bodies, but were unable to break the firm array
of the British troops. **

The speed of the native armies always gave a great
advantage over the English, who, after defeating them,
could never pursue them with vigour on account of their
great mobility. The operations of Lord Lake, in 1803
to 1806, are the first campaigns of inten^st to us, inas-
much as that officer fully appreciated the value of the
horse, and utilised it very skilfully.

Lord Lake had been trained in his early boyhood in
the wars of the Great Frederick, and had seen the value
of horsemen as trained and organised by that celebrated

^ Dembinski's M(<moires, 3.34. ^ Dr_ e. H. Nolan, Histoiy of

British India, ii. 378,

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commander. Frederick had already invented horse -
artillery. Lake adopted this idea, and attached two
light six-pound guns to each regiment, worked by men
selected from the ranks. These guns were also supplied
with spare horses, so that nothing should delay their rapid
movement, or prevent them being always able to keep
up with the cavalry.

During the winter of 1802, and spring of 1803, this
general carefully drilled and exercised his force, which
consisted of three English dragoon regiments, and five
regiments of auxiliary light cavalry, with sixteen guns,
equipped and horsed, so as to be able to accompany the
horsemen at speed. The result was that Lake had an
effective force, which combined fire with rapidity of
movement.

A force of this kind was necessary to meet the enemy
which it was intended to encounter. The Mahrattas, as
we have said, had in their armies large bodies of
light horse of predatory instincts, who fought like the
Parthians or Cossacks, and moving with a celerity far
greater than that of the English troops, could attack
unguarded points, and escape when beaten or pursued.

Holkar, who, after the defeat of the Scindiah and the
Berar Rajah, in the bittles of Assaye, Argoum, Delhi,
and Laswarie, commenced operations against the English,
had under his command over 60,000 light horse of the
true Mahratta type, and about 130 guns.'

The campaign opened in 1804. At first the Mahratta
chieftain was successful, for he defeated a combined
movement made against him by Colonels Murray and
Monson. On the approach of the main army, however,
under Lord Lake, Holkar separated his army, sending
the regular infantry and guns southwards, while he
Btarted himself, with his immense force of horsemen, on
a raid towards the north.

Lake's measures were promptly taken. Leaving his
own infantry and heavy guns, under General Eraser, to
look after the enemy's foot-soldiers, he set out with six
of the regiments of cavalry he had so carefully trained,

> Havelock, 129.

CHAP. XXVI.] CAVALRY FROM 1815 TO 1854. 423

with some horse artillery, and the " galloper" guns
attached to the regiments, and one brigade of native
infantry, which was carefully selected for its marching
powers. The baggage was reduced to the lowest possible
point, and every precaution taken to insure rapid
movement.

With this force the chase began, and was continued
day after day from the 31st October till the 16th
November, Holkar keeping always twenty-five to thirty
miles in advance. On the 16th November, "when liOrd
Lake halted for the day, Holkar was thirty-six miles
ahead, and the English commander concluded to surprise
him by a night march. The surprise was complete, the
English horsemen reaching the camp at daybreak. The
Mahratta horses were fastened head and heels by ropes,
the men sleeping wrapped up in blankets, when the
artillery opened upon them, and the British light dragoons
dashed through the camp with a rush, cutting the fugi-
tives down in every direction. The plain was soon
covered with dead bodies. Holkar escaped with
difficulty.^

The pursuit was maintained over ten miles, making
altogether including the march of the day before, and
the night march, a distance of seventy miles passed over
in twenty-four hours ; an unparalleled effort when it is
considered that it was done after the force had made a
long and harassing march of 350 miles in about fifteen
days.

Lord Lake's loss was only two dragoons killed and
about twenty wounded, with seventy-five horses. The
loss of the enemy was 3,000 killed on the field. This
was a marvellous success of 3,500 men over 60,000, and
may be attributed to a great ertent to the skilful
combination of speed with effective fire.

Another operation of like character was the pursuit
of Ameer Khan by General Smith with the same force
of cavalry which Lord Lake had placed under his orders.
This time the cavalry marched over 700 miles in forty-
three days, and only succeeded in bringing Ameer Khan

' Havelock, 135.

424

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period IV.

to action once, on the 2nd March, 1805, at Zulgarh, at
the very foot of the Himalayas. After a hard fight the
English were completely victorious, but even then the
horsemen of the enemy were able to escape in large
numbers by their great speed.

On the 2nd April, 1805, Lake, by a night march, again
surprised the remnants of Holkar's cavalry, and coming
upon them suddenly before they could mount their
horses, killed 1,000 of them, and pursued them over
fifteen miles with a loss to his own force of less than
twenty.

These are good instances of the value of organising
and equipping cavalry to give them both the speed and
the fire, to make them efi'ective when called upon to act.
The British troops found the want of a force of this
type in the Mutiny of 1857, as they were always able
to defeat the mutineers, but seldom able to catch them.

The French cavalry in Algiers had a great deal of
experience in fighting against superior numbers of light
horsemen, who, like the Mamelukes, were better fitted
for single combat than for combined movements in
masses. A number of battles were fought at difierent
places, at Bouflaric in 1832, at Zig and Chiffa in 1835,
at Tafna in 1835, and at Isly in 1844, in all of which
the French were victorious. As these actions were very
similar in their general features to the battles with the
Mamelukes already described, we will not enter into any
details.

PERIOD V.

FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF RIFLED FIREARMS
TO THE PRESENT TIME.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Influence of the Introduction of Rifled Fire-
arms.— The Crimean War. — The War in Italy, 1859.

As far back as the 17tli century the principle of the
rifled barrel, and the increased precision of fire so to be
obtained, was well known, but as the weapons were
loaded from the muzzle, the bullets had to be forced
with difficulty into the barrel, in order to cause them to
fit into the grooves and so acquire the rotary motion.
This rendered the process of loading troublesome and
tedious, and quite unsuited for troops intended to fight
in line of battle at close ranges.

Although the principle of the breech-loading weapon
had been known long before (in fact it can be traced as
far back as the year 1540) ' the mechanical skill of the
age was so defective that every attempt to utilise the
idea failed, and so the only rifles were those loaded
from the muzzle.

The American Revolutionary War, as we have seen,
gave an increased use to these weapons, particularly in
the hands of skirmishers, so that most armies had special
corps of light infantry, armed with rifles and intended to
act as tirailleurs. ,

' Humbert, 320.

426

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

The time had now come, however, when a new inven-
tion, which obviated the difficulty in loading, was about
to cause the gcDcral use of the rifled firearm in all
armies, and in every branch of the service. As far back
as 1823, Captain John Norton, of the 34th Kegiment
of the English army, invented the cylindro-conoidal
shot, which was the basis of all the modern improve-
ments in small arms.' He was not encouraged, however,
in his efforts, and it was not until 1853 that the elon-
gated bullet upon the same principle, which was invented
by Captain Minie of the French service, began to be
used in European armies.

This bullet, which expanded after loading, by the force
of the explosion, and so took the shape of the grooves,
at once did away with the difficulty of loading, and gave
to the infantry a weapon which, to greatly increased
range and power of penetration, added much greater
precision in aim.

This was the second great blow that cavalry received
through the introduction of gunpowder. In the first
place the great power of penetration obtained by the
use of firearms had soon caused the abolition of armour,
and the revival of the infantry force. This second in-
vention, which trebled the range and increased the
accuracy of fire, could not fail to alter materially the
relations between cavalry and infantry. This being
soon followed by several effective and practical methods
of loading at the breech, the rapidity of fire has been
increased fourfold, so that a body of cavalry charging
upon a force of infantry would now have to run the
gauntlet of at least ten shots, well aimed, where in the
time of Frederick the Great or Napoleon, one volley
alone would be fired.

It cannot be denied that these important inventions
must materially afiect the tactics and employment of
cavalry in modern wars, and it becomes important to
consider carefully what changes should be made in the
organisation, armament, and employment of cavalry, in

* Beamish, 145.

CHAP. XXVII.]

THE CRIMEAN WAR.

427

order to meet the difficulties that are day by day
gathering around it.

The best way to deal with the subject seems to be
to trace closely the effect of rifled and breechloading
weapons upon the mounted service, in those wars which
have lately taken place, and upon the experience thereby
gained, to base our suggestions as to the future arma-
ment and use of cavalry in war.

The first war in which the Minie rifle was used was
that between Eussia and the allied powers of Western
Europe, in the Crimea, in 1854. In this war the opera-
tions were almost altogether confined to a protracted
and closely- contested siege, and there were very few
opportunities for testing the value of the cavalry as
against the infantry. At the battle of the Alma, the
allies had only about 1,000 cavalry, a force totally in-
adequate to compete with the much superior numb'^rs of
the Russian horse. There were consequently no charges
of cavalry during the action, and even after it, Lord
Raglan, the English commander, would not allow his
horsemen to follow up his success, from fear of having
them cut to pieces by the Russian cavalry and artillery.

In the operations preceding the battle of the Alma,
and subsequent to it in the flank march to Balaklava,
the cavalry of both armies gave very little evidence of
capacity for outpost and reconnoitring service. Forty
years of peace had brought a new generation ' into the
field, and though admirably drilled in manoeuvring, the
practical business of war was but little known.

So inefficient was the outpost service on both sides,
that the English army in marching to Balaklava, on
arriving at McKenzie's Farm, on the road from Sebas-
topol to Baktchi-Serai, fell upon the rear of the Russian
army, as it marched across the high road. Lord Raglan,
the British commander-in-chief, was surprised, and in
great danger of being captured, while the Russians,
equally taken unawares, believed they were attacked in
force, and withdrew rapidly. The English cavalry, under
Lord Lucan, had blundered off" on the wrong road, and
in strict adherence to the rules laid down in the drill

"J

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428

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

books, were marching on one road, strung out in an
advance guard formjition, leaving the other roads, and
the whole country around the line of march, unwatched
and unexplored.' So defective was the outpost service,
that two large armies, with their baggage, crossed each
other's path, and actually at one point came into contact
without discovering each other's designs, and without the
cavalry coming together. This one fact speaks volumes
as to the inexperience of the cavalry officers on both
sides, in a most important sphere of their duty.

There were no further cavalry operations after this
flank march, until the 25th of October, 1854, when the
battle of Balaklava took place, in which the main
portion of the fighting was done by the cavalry. In
the early morning the Russian army, under General
Liprandi, moved upon the allied position near Balaklava,
in the hope of driving the allied troops out of that
important point, which served as the base of operations
for the English army in the Crimea.

Outpost duty was still but little understood in the
allied army, and a monotonous repetition of the formula,
" Halt ! who goes there ? " " Rounds." " What
Rounds ? " " Visiting Rounds." " Visiting Rounds,
advance ! all's well," had not yet taught them the
practical duty of advanced posts. As Kinglake well
says, " When these words have been reiterated by the
same men a few thousand times, they are as lulling as
the monotone waves that beat and still beat on the
shore." "A man's wits may easily be deadened, they
can hardly be sharpened by formula." *

The result was that the field officer of the day notified
the pickets of the advance of the enemy and saved
them from capture, a warning that should have first
come from themselves. This incident shows the great
difficulty of having this duty efficiently performed, and
the importance of thorough training in this branch of
the profession of arms.

The Russians came suddenly upon the line of advanced
redoubts, storming them in succession, and either

• Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea, ii. 77, 79, 80. 2 Ibid. ii. 407.

CHAP. XXVII.]

THE CRIMEAN WAR.

429

capturing or killing the Turkish garrisons whi(;h hold
them, and then pressed on towards Balaklava. A large
foree of cavalry, consisting of some thousands in
number, covered the advance, and four squadrons moving
towards Kadikoi, were met by Sir Colin Campbell,
with the 93rd Highlanders, who fired upon them while
deployed in line only two deep. This caused the Russian
horse to swerve to their left, and fall back to their lines.

This action has been much talked of, particularly by
English writers, as a great triumph of infantry over
cavalry, but it really teaches nothing. An English
officer of cavalry of great reputation, who was present
on the occasion, expressed his opinion positively to the
writer, that the Russian squadrons had no intention
whatever of charging, but were simply at the time
making demonstrations to oblige the allied troops to
display their arrangements, and that when the 93rd
showed their line upon the hill, the object was gained,
and the cavaby withdrew. Sir Colin Campbell, who
was an experienced soldier, knew exactly what the
horsemen were doing, and made his arrangements ac-
cordingly. He approved of the skill displayed by the
Russian commander, for, turning to his aide-de-camp, he
said, " Shadwell, that man understands his business." ^

Shortly after this affair. General Scarlett, with a
portion of the English heavy cavalry brigade, in moving
across into the South Valley, suddenly discovered a
great mass of the Russian cavalry, on a rising ground
on his Hank, apparently moving straight down upon him.
The Russian column halted for a moment on seeing the
troops in front of them. Scarlett did not hesitate an
instant, but wheeling into line to the left led an impe-
tuous charge straight at the centre of the opposing
column. This charge, delivered at full speed upon a
force at the halt, was necessarily successful, especially
as the Russian supports had moved on so far as to be
virtually closed upon the front line, and so to have lost
their value as supports. Scarlett was promptly and
vigorously aided by charges that were made by the other

' Kinglake, ii. 425.

430

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

squadrons of his brigade upon both flanks of the Russian
horsemen at the crisis of the fight.

The result was that the Russians were obliged to
withdraw, their retreat being safely effected, and without
being followed by the English horsemen. The conduct
of Lord Cardigan, who, with the Light Brigade under
his orders, was an idle spectator of the fight, in neglecting
to charge upon the flank of the opposing horsemen, was
very faulty, and an evidence of the depressing effect
of the routine and regularity of a lifetime of peace
service.

About an hour or two after this fight, the celebrated
charge of " the Six Hundred " took place. It arose
through a misunderstanding of the order directing the
advance, and consequently Lord Cardigan led an attack
for a mile and a quarter down an open valley, where his
troops were exposed to the fire of artillery and riflemen
in front, and on both flanks for the whole distance.
The charge was most gallantly made, the whole force
displaying the most astounding bravery, but it was all
in vain. The fire of cannon and small arms almost
destroyed the brigade, 195 men only returning from the
disastrous ride.

This action teaches little to the cavalry officer, and is
only to be noted on account of the dashing and gallant
manner in which these English horsemen obeyed their
orders, and rushed on to what seemed certain death.

To cover their retreat, the French 4th Chasseurs
d'Afrique, under General D'AUonville, charged some
Russian artillery on the Fedoukine hills. This charge
was made in the scattered formation called " en foura-
geurs," and was successful in forcing the withdrawal of
some Russian batteries, which had been firing upon the
English horsemen. The charge was well timed, and
conducted with boldness and skill.

The losses of the Light Brigade are said to have been
considerably augmented by the fire of riflemen who
were posted upon the range of hills which skirted the
North Valley. This was the only instance of the use
of the rifle in this affair. Here, however, we first see in

CHAP. XXVII.]

THE CRIMEAN VVAB.

4:n

European warfare the revolving pistol, a weapon as
deadly in its character as anything ever invented. Many
of the English officers had provided themselves with
these pistols, and, in the charge of " the Six Hundred,"
used them with effect, particularly when retreating in
disorder after the attack.

The late Colonel Jenyns, C.B., of the 13th Hussars of
the English army, was a captain in the regiment at
Balaklava. He was making his way back during the
retreat to the English lines, on a horse which was
mortally wounded, when he was intercepted by three
Kussian cavalry, an officer and two men. His horse was
so weak from loss of blood that he could not use his
sword, so he drew his revolver and held the whole three
at bay for a time. At length the officer made a dash
in upon him with his sabre, but the colonel shot him
before he came within reach of him. The other two
molested him no further, and he reached the lines safely.
Many instances of the use of the revolver are mentioned
in connection with this war.

In the battle of Bash Kadiklar, fought on the 19th
November, 1853, between the Russian army under
Prince Bebutoff, and the Turks under Eeyss Achmet
Pacha, a gallant charge was made by the dragoons and
the line Cossacks, from the flank of the Russian army,
against the Turkish right. The charge was completely
successful. The Turkish squares were broken, their
whole right flank and part of the centre overturned,
twenty cannon captured, and the victory decided. On
the Russian right flank, Prince Chavchavadzy, with three
divisions of Nijagorodskoy dragoons, 100 militia cavalry,
and four guns, held in check 5,000 Bashi Bazouks and
Kourds during the whole action, and near the close of
it in a gallant fight, defeated a regiment of Turkish
cavalry, supported by eight guns and eight battalions
of infantry, and drove the whole force ofi" the field with
the loss of two cannon.'

At the battle of Karook Dara, in Asia Minor, on the
24 th July, 1854, the Russian Tverskoy dragoon regiment,
» Bogdanovitch, The War in the East, vol. i. 247, 248.

;Ht

il

ri

432

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

under the command of Major-Goncrul Count Nerodc
II., and (/olonel Kookolevsky, attacked a Turkish batter^
with great steadiness, under the heaviest fire in front
and flank. Having overtlirown the enemy's horsemen,
they captured the guns and carried off four of them.
Immediately after this another charge was made by the
Nijagorodskoy dragoons under Prince Chavchavadzy, in
which several Turkish squares were brok(;n and one
battalion cut to pieces, the dragoons s^'iffering heavily ;
out of thirty-three officers there were killed and wounded
twenty-three, half the soldiers being also placed hora de
combat.

The Nijagorodskoy di'agoons, in a subsequent charge,
recaptured two guns that had been lost, and took four
from the Turks.*

Shortly after the Crimean War, in the war between
Great Britain and Persia, in t857, a splendid cavalry
charge was made by the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, upon
a Persian square containing 500 men, well formed, and
ready to receive the attack. Adjutant Moore, of the
3rd light cavalry, was the first into the square. He
let his sword hang by the sword-knot, and taking a rein
in each hand, jumped his horse on to the bayonets. The
horse was killed, but the square was broken and anni-
hilated, while Moore was not even wounded.

In the Italian campaign of 1859, the cavalry did not
play any important part, chiefly, it is said, on account
of the difficult nature of the ground, it being cut up
with vineyards, trees, and ditches. At Magenta some
charges of cavalry were made, in small numbers, on both
sides, in which the French claim successes. At Solferino
several cavalry charges were made, on a larger scale, by
both the Austrians and the French, on the plains around
Medole. The fighting was almost altogether between
the rival forces of horse, and swayed alternately in
favour of either side, as fresh reserves were poured in ;
the general result being in favour of the French. General
Desvaux captured 600 Austrian infantry in one of his
charges, while the Chasseurs d'Afrique are said to have

» Bogdanovitch, vol. ii. 188, 189, 190.

CHAP. XXVIl.]

THE CRIMEAN WAR.

433

broken one square which had not quite completed its
formation.

In fact, in this campaign the cavalry did not perform
very important services. It seemed as if there was a
fear which prevented them being launched in large
masses against portions of the enemy's line, and
probably the knowledge, on both sides, of the deadly
effect of the long-range rifle, prevented the horsemen
from being sent against bodies of infantry armed with
the new weapons.

At Montebello, Colonel Morelli, commandant of the
regiment of Montferrat, at the head of twenty-two
Piedmontese lancers, charged a square of Austrian
infantry. They broke through the square, but eleven
were killed and the others all wounded. Colonel
Morelli charged three times after receiving a mortal
wound.

The deadly effect of the new rifles, on account of their
long range, at once created a sort of panic in reference
to the cavalry service, and the professional soldiers, fully
appreciating the great effect the new invention must
have upon the mounted service, at once held that their
sphere of usefulness was much diminished, and the
opinion soon became general that the days of the
cavalry were numbered, and that the force would have
to be either abolished altogether, or else greatly reduced.

The reader can hardly have followed us through the
preceding pages of this work, without being struck with
the peculiar way in which ideas have arisen and have
been carried to excess, and how opinions have swayed at
one time in favour of cavalry, at another time in favour of
the infantry, and how often these opinions have been
carried to extremes.

At this period it seemed as if the feeling against
cavalry was to be carried ^^^'ndly to the last extremity,
but as in the case whc the chivalry first felt the
influence of the rising power of the infantry, as repre-
sented by the Swiss pikemen and the English archers, as
when the introduction of gunpowder struck another
blow at their predominant position, the vested interests,

F F

'in

434

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

the professional prejudices, the esprit du corps of the
knights, long upheld the cavalry service ; so the same
feelings again came to rescue the force from being
rbolished. The pride, the esprit du corps, and the
influence of the cavalry sei'vice, were all aroused in its
favour, and the point vehemently maintained that,
although cavalry might not be used in exactly the
same method as formerly, nevertheless its day was not
past, and there was still a vast field of usefulness
before it.

It could not be denied that the limits to the action of
cavalry upon the battle-field had been much narrowed,
and that the opportunities of making successful charges
would be much less frequent, while the losses to horsemen
if checked in an attack would be greatly increased.
This led to many changes being made in European
armies.

In Eussia, important modifications were made in the
army in 1856. The cuirassiers of the line were
abolished, as weU as some regiments of dragoons, and
fourteen other regiments, of cavalry, more lightly
equipped, substituted in their place. The abolition of
the cuirass was evidently the result of the increased
power of penetration of the Minie rifle, which rendered
such defences almost useless against infantry fire.

In Austria also, after the war of 1859, the cavalry
w^ere much reduced. At that time, the cavalry consisted
of eight regiments of cuirassiers, eight of dragoons,
twelve regiments of Uhlans, and twelve of hussars. The
heavy cavalry had six squadrons in each regiment, the
light cavalry eight, with the exception of the sixth and
eleventh regiments of Uhlans, which had only four
squadrons each. In addition to these, were two regi-
ments of volunteer hussars, of four squadrons each,
making an aggregate of 96 squadrons of heavy, and 192
of light cavalry.^

In Miirch 1860 the cavalry were diminished, the
heavy by two regiments, the dragoons were suppressed
with the exception of the fifth and seventh regiments,

» Renard, 33.

(
1

s
t

t

a
ii
n
fi
bi

CHAP. XXVII.]

THE CRIMEAN WAR.

435

and the first, second, third, and sixth, which were
changed into cuirassiers. The light cavalry were
reduced at the same time to the ertent of twenty-four
squadrons. According to General Renard, the cuiras-
.siers, though still retaining the name, had abandoned
tlie use of the cuirass.

In Prussia, on the contrary, the cavalry, which before
the Italian war amounted to eighty squadrons of heavy
and seventy-two squadrons of light cavalry, was
increased to 100 squadrons of each. This was done to
make up for the cavalry of the Landwehr, which in the
future was to be retained for a reserve, and was not to
be marched to the frontiers with the first army.

F !• 2

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ii

The American Civil War. 1861 — 1865.

At this period, before rifled firearms had been fairly
and thoroughly tested, a great civil war broke out in
the United States of America, in which the Southern,
or sk.ve-holding states, endeavoured to separate them-
selves from the Northern and Western States, and esta-
blish an independent republic, free from the control of
the Union. This war, which was most hotly contested,
was carried on with great determination on both
sides for over four years, the theatre of war extending
almost across a continent, and the numbers engaged
reaching an enormous figure.

The details of this conflict are very interesting and
instructive, for the circumstances under which the war
broke out, and the manner in which it was carried on,
were peculiar to the continent. From 1812 until 1861
the United States had only had but few wars, the
Mexican campaigns being the most important, the others
being merely frontier conflicts against the Indians of
the plains.

The standing army was consequently very weak in
numbers, and not sufficient to have impressed upon the
people the rigid rules and prejudices of the professional
soldier. The newness of the country, the struggle that
the whole population, for one or two generations, had
been carrying on in striving to carve out homes for
themselves in the wilderness, the experience gained in
clearing up homesteads, while surrounded by wild beasts,

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERIC/.N^ CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

437

by hostile Indians, and lawless adventurers, had all a
marked effect in forming the character c the people.

The rifle in the frontier districts was as necessary an
implement as the axe. Everyone almost understood its
use, and great numbers were distinguished for the
unerring skill with which they could strike their aim.
The English regular armies in the Revolutionary war
felt the terrible efficiency of the American irregular troops
in the use of these weapons. In the war of 1812 the
Canadian volunteers, men of the same type, brought up
under the same influences, surrounded by the same
dangers and trials, but hardier and more enduring from
their more healthy and rugged climate, enabled the
English regular troops with their assistance to meet
boldly, and often to defeat, the American armies.

One of the most remarkable instances of the capacity
of the Canadian militia in that kind of warfare was the
battle of Chateauguay in 1813. In this action some
four hundred Canadians, with their axes and their rifles,
posted themselves across the path of an American army
of some 7,000 men, under the command of General
Hampton. Skilful axemen, deadly shots with their
rifles, these Canavlians used both weapons, and slashing
down long lines of trees in the form of abattis, they
impeded the march of the American column, while with
their rifles they poured in well-directed volleys upon
the front and flanks of their enemy. The Americans,
entangled in the forest, unable to penetrate the masses
of fallen timber which surrounded them, and suffering
from the dropping fire of small arms, withdrew in haste,
followed and harassed by the victorious Canadians.
Every invasion of Canada was defeated by the bravery
and determination of the Canadian people, and when
the war ended the United States did not hold one inch
of Canada, while British troops held a large portion of
the State of Michigan.

The traditions of this war and the frontier fights with
the Indians had given to the people of the United
States a high opinion of firearms. They had already
adopted the idea of mounted riflemen in 1812, having

438

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

I ■ ■;.

^1

I

'u

[period v.

organised a regiment of Kentucky frontiersmen, who
were all mounted and armed with rifles and pistols.
The only real victory won by the American troops in an
open action in that war was directly attributable to the
services of these mounted riflemen. It was the battle of
Moravian Town, in Western Canada, on the 5th October,
1813. Colonel Johnson, who commanded the Ken-
tuckians, (charged upon the British infantry, broke them,
and captured a number of prisoners. He then turned
to his left and attempted to charge a large force of
Indians, who were stationed in the edge of a growth of
timber, but he found that the ground was swampy and
that his horses began to sink. Seeing t.'us he ordered
his men to dismount and make the attack on foot.
Tecumseth, the Indian chief, was kiUed and his braves
defeated. One cannot imagine a more striking example
of the advantage of a mounted rifle corps equipped to
fight on foot in case of need ; this regiment fought in
two capacities in about as many minutes.

The Colt's revolver had also been invented in America
prior to the year 1838, and attempts were made by
Colonel Colt to have it introduced into the army during
the Seminole war in Florida. An army board, appointed
to report upon it, was not favourable to its adoption ;
and a large number of the pistols, being sold at cheap
rates, gradually got over into the hands of the Texans,
who were then engaged in a predatory war with the
Comanche Indians.

These revolvers soon acquired a high reputation, and
in the Mexican war were eagerly sought after, and high
prices paid for them. A regiment of Texan mounted
rangers, armed with these weapons, was attached to the
American army during the Mexican war, and at once
demonstrated the value of the pistol in a hand-to-hand
fight with cavalry. In every encounter the revolver
proved its deadly eflect, and soon a cry was raised for the
resumption of their manufacture. They therefore soon
became plentiful, and in all the frontier states most men
were supplied with them, and were ve 7 skilful in their use.

Th^ lawlessness and want of order in the new settle-

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

439

ments, where every man carried his life in his hands,
rendered the custom of carrying revolvers or bowie
knives almost universal.

The exigencies of a new country, the absolute want
of regularity and order, the necessity of adapting an<l
arranging everything to suit circumstances, the con-
tinual habit of contrivinor and inventinfj methods of
meeting difl&culties of the most varied and complicated
character, which were continually arising in the bush,
had the natural result of making the American people
use the power of reason to the highest possible extent.
This devalo23ed their invertive faculties to the utmost,
and it has resulted in producing the shrewdest and most
self-reliant people in the world. The power of invention
of the native Yankee is proverbial.

Such was the population, such the state of their arms,
and such their ideas of weapons when the war broke
out, and the regular army was swamped and lost in the
vast hordes of volunteers who tnronged to the standards
of the two rival powers. It will be interesting to follow
the course of this war, and see how their shrewd practical
common sense and the absence of prejudice and red
tape led them to adopt a system of tactics, somewhat
new and peculiar to themselves, but still wonderfully well
adapted to their circumstances and to the state of the
art of war at the time.

The training and customs of the people had a great
effect upon the results of the war, and the difference in
the quality of the troops raised in various portions of
the country was soon perceived in a very marked
degree.

The New Englanders were a manufacturing people,
and the troops from the North-Eastern States were
mainly recruited from the manufacturing classes. The
Southerners, on the contrary, were almost all agricul-
turists and well accustomed to the use of weapons ; while
the North-Western States furnished a hardy class of
frontiersmen and farmers to the armies of the Union.

The Southerners were soldiers of the best quality, but
were greatly outnumbered. In the Department of the

440

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

East, that is to say in Virginia, where they were opposed
by troops raised m the manufacturing districts and large
cities of the New England States, their marked superiority
soon showed itself, and in all the battles of the war in
that part of the continent the ascendant of the army of
Northern Virginia was plainly manifest.

In the western theatre of the war the Federal armies
were more successful. The hardy western settlers greatly
outnumbering the Southerners in the valley of the
Mississippi, and equally good material for soldiers, won
the first success of importance in the capture of Fort
Donelson, and from that time the Federal troops slowly
but surely moved on to the conquest of all that portion
of the confederacy, being vigorously opposed by tnc
Southern troops, who hotly contested every foot of their
progress.

The war opened very slowly, as both sides were totally
unprepared for hostilities, and armies had to be raised,
organised, armed, and drilled before operations in the
field could be commenced. At the outset the cavalry
was organised in very small numbers indeed. In the
first great battle, that of Bull's I^un, on the 21st July,
1861, the Federal army, consisting of some 40,000 men,
had only seven companies of cavalry, hardly one small
regiment, while on the Southern side the proportion was
not much greater. These shrewd people, who at the
opening of the war acted upon the ideas, at that time
very prevalent, of the uselessn, ss of cavalry as against
the new infantry firearms, soon discovered their mistake,
and the mounted service increased rapidly, so much so
that in the latter part of the war the Northern States

.lintained no less than 80,000 cavalry, almost all
mounted riflemen.

In Virginia the war was from the outset conducted
with more science and skill than in the valley of the
Mississippi ; Generals Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, " Stone-
wall " Jackson, and their lieutenants, being all officers of
the very highest ability and training. In the west, on
the contrary, the war partook more of the character of
partisan operations for the first two years, and during

CHAP. xxYiii.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861 18G5.

441

this period the corps of mounted riflemen began to
acquire a great reputation.

Major General John 11. Morgan, a Kentuckian, who had
no professional training as a soldier, is said to have been
the first to see the value of a force of mounted riflemen,
and to put into use a new system of working cavalry so
as to give to it the benefits of the improvements in
firearms.

The knights of old, when first staggered by the inven-
tion of gunpowder, which gave to the infantry so great
an advantage over them, determined to apply the new
weapon to their own use, and adopted the petronel and
heavier armour, and so for a time retained their superiority
over the infantry.

The same idea struck Morgan, and he at once saw that
the long-range weapon gave the di'agoon or mounted
rifleman a great advantage, which he did not have with
the old uncertain and short-range carbine. He organised
<a force of cavalry therefore which could move rapidly,
and fight either on foot or mounted as occasion might
require.

Another reason led to the introduction of mounted
riflemen that will seem strange to the European reader,
particularly to the European cavalry officer. There is
no principle more firmly established among the profes-
sional writers on cavalry tactics than that the sword is
the most deadly and efiective weapon that can be placed
in the hands of a horseman. The moral efiect of horse-
men charging sword in hand is very great in all European
armies ; and no principle is laid down more positively
than the maxim that cavalry relying on firearms must
certainly be beaten.

In America, strange to say, the exact reverse is the
fact. There the people had the greatest contempt for
the sword, their small force of regular cavalry trained
upon the European plan, alone placing implicit confidence
in it. The habit of the individual citizen of being often
armed with a revolver, and having almost always a rifle
'■^ his own, as well as the wonderful skill acquired in
their use, gave them naturally a high opinion of their
favourite weapons. At once a feeling of contempt for

442

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

the sword sprang up in the Soutliurn armies, and although
at the outset of the war the Northern caviJry, and par-
ticularly the regulars, used the sabre, the Southern troops,
both mounted and dismounted, so despised the weapon
that nothing could make them give way to a charge of
cavalry sabre in hand.

A distinguished Southern general told the writer that
this contempt of the Southern infantry for the sword
was marvellous. He said he had seen lines of skirmishers
and lines of battle of infantry charged by Northern regular
cavalry, and when his men would see them coming the cry
would be raised along the line, " Here, boys, are those fools
coming again with their sabres ; give it to them !" and
they would laugh and joke at the idea as if it were the
extremity of foUy.

The writer has often heard officers of General Morgan's
command speaking the same way. In referring to actions
with bodies of Federal cavalry they would say : " They
charged down upon us with their sabres, but when we
saw that we knew we had the fight all in our own hands,
for it was simply silly for them to think they could do
anything with us in that way."

So strong was this feeling in the west at the outset of
the war, that the hastily raised and imperfectly equipped
Southern cavalry, armed as they often were at first
simply with double-barrelled -fowling-pieces loaded with
slugs, would charge at speed at a line of hostile cavalry,
firing both barrels into the enemy's faces, and would
then dash through, striking with the butts of their
guns.

With this type of soldier to recruit from, and under
these circumstances, Major-General John H. Morgan
revived and improved the principle of the dragoon
organisation, and applied it successfully to the fullest
extent.

General Basil W. Duke, in his " History of Morgan's
Cavalry," says : " Whatever merit may be allowed or
denied General Morgan, he is beyond all question en-
titled to the credit of having discovered uses for cavalry,
or rather mounted infantry, to which that annfwas

OHAP. xxvin.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

443

never appiioJ before. While other cavahy officers were
adhering to the traditions of former wars, and the
systems of thj schools, however inapplicable to the
demands of their day and the nature of the struggle, he
originated and perfecte<l not only a system of tactics,
a method of fighting and handling men in the presence
of the enemy, but also a strategy as effective ati it was
novel.

" Totally ignorant of the art of war as learned from
the books and in the academies, an imitator in nothing,
self-taught in all that he knew and did, his success is
not more marked than his genius.

' ' The creator and organiser of his own little army,
which at no time reached 4,000, he killed and ivounded
nearly as mimy of the enemy, and captured more than
15,000. The author of the far-reaching 'raid,' so
diiferent from the mere cavalry dash, he accomplished
with liis handful of men results which would otherwise
have required armies, and the costly preparations of
regular and extensive campaigns."

Morgan's men were armed in a very nondescript
manner at first, but as the war went on he captured such
quantities of arms from the enemy as enabled him to
supply his men fully with rifles and pistols. At first
some had rifles, some shot-guns, some sabres, some
revolvers, but they were soon supplied with carbines or
rifles and revolvers, and the sabre was rarely, if ever,
used.

Morgan's troops were di-illed upon " Maury's Skirmish
Tactics for Cavalry," to which Morgan himself added
a great many movements so as to provide for the evolu-
tions of regiments and brigades. The formation of the
companies, the system of counting off, of dismounting, of
deploying to front flanks or rear, was the same as in the
regular cavalry, and his force was also carefully trained
in all the movements necessary to change from line into
column, from column to line, to take ground in different
directions, and to provide for the employment of
supports and reserves, &c.
• General Duke's description of the method of fighting

444

A HISTORY OP CAVALRY.

< 111

!, " ■,,

l\'^'>
t'}'

[period v.

adopted by General Morgan will be interesting to the
cavalry officer.

"If the reader will only imagine a regiment drawn
up in single rank, the flank companies skirmishing, some-
times on horseback, and then thrown mit as skirmishers
on foot, and so deployed as to cover the whole front of
the regiment, the rest of the men dismounted (one out
of each set of four, and the corporals remaining to hold
the horses), and deployed as circumstances required,
and the command indicated to the front of, on either
flank, or to the rear of the line of horses, the files two
yards apart, and then imagine this line moved forward
at a double quick, or oftener a half run, he will have an
idea of Morgan's style of fighting.

"Exactly the same evolutions were applicable for
horseback or foot fighting, but the latter method was
much oftener practised — we were in fact not cavalry, but
mounted riflemen. A small body of mounted men was
usually kept in reserve to act on the flanks, cover a re-
treat or press a victory, but otherwise our men fought
very little on horseback, except on scouting expeditions.
Our men were all Imirable riders, trained from childhood
to manage the wildest horses with perfect ease, but the
nature of the ground on which we generally fought,
covered with dense woods, or crossed by high fences, and
the impossibility of devoting sufficient time to the train-
ing of the horses, rendered the employment of large
bodies of mounted men to any good purpose very diffi-
cult. It was very easy to charge down a road in column
of fours, but very hard to charge across the country in
extended line and keep any sort of formation. Then we
never used sabres, and long guns were not exactly the
weapons for cavalry evolutions. We found the method
of fighting on foot more efiective ; we could manoeuvre
with more certainty and sustain less and inflict more
loss. * The long flexible line curving forward at each
extremity,' as an excellent writer described it, was very
hard to break ; if forced back at one point, a withering
fire from every other would be poured in upon the as-
sailant. It admitted, too, of such facility of manoeuvring ;

CHAP, xxvin.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865. 445

it could be thrown about like a rope , and by simply
facing to the right or left, and double-quicking in the
same direction, every man could be quickly concentrated
at any point where it was desirable to mass them.

" It must be remembered that Morgan very rarely
fought with the army ; he had to make his command a
self-sustaining one. If repulsed he could not fall back
and re-form behind the infantry. He had to fight
infantr}'', cavalry, artillery ; take towns when every
house was a garrison, and attack fortifications with
nothing to depend on but his own immediate command.
He was obliged, therefore, to adopt a method which
enabled him to do a great deal in a short time, and to
keep his men always in hand whether successful or
repulsed. With his support from four to five hundred
miles distant, an officer had better learn to rely on
himself."

In reference to the armament of Morgan's command,
the weapon that was always preferred by both officers
and men was the medium Enfield — but, as in many of
the other Southern partisan corps, the men were at first
armed with what they could get. The consequence was
that when Morgan's regiment was organised, one company
was armed with the long Enfield, another with the
medium, and a third with the short Enfield — a fourth
had Mississippi rifles, a fifth shot guns or fowling-pieces,
while the sixth company carried a species of Enfield
carbine. Nearly every man had a revolver, some two ;
when they had captured sufficient, each man was provided
with a pair. The pistol best liked and most used was
the army Colt revolver.'

In addition to the mounted riflemen Morgan had two
mountain howitzers that could be drawn by two horses
each, over almost any kind of ground. These cannon
were of the greatest service, and the men became much
attached to them. They called them aff"ectionate]y the
" bull pups," and cheered them loudly whenever they
were being taken into action.^

Such was the armament and method of fighting of
^ History of Morgan's Cavalry, 178. « ibid. 179.

44G

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

I ! '

if

iU'i
IB ki

[PEUIOD V.

Morgan's cavalry, and a few words upon the feats
performed by these horsemen will tend to prove how
effective they were in the peculiar circum8tanc(\s in which
they were placed.

Morgan was said to be the author of the far-reachinir
raid. It was probably an original idea with him, for it is
extremely likely that he had never heard of the opera-
tions of Tehernicheft", Tettenborn, and other partisan
leaders, in the rear of the French array in 181)^. His
" raids," however, were upon almost the same principle
as those of Tchernicheff, or thiit of Dembinski, except
thaL he used no infantry and did have two guns.

His first important raid was made into Kentucky in
1862. He started from Knoxville, Tennessee, on the 4th
July, and moved through Sparta and Glasgow to Lebanon,
where large supplies of stores of every kind were
captured. From Lebanon Morgan marched to Harrods-
burg, from there on to Lawrenceburg, and then to
Midway, a station on the railroad between Frankfort and
Lexington. This latter place was the head-quarters of
the Federal forces in that region, and both at that point
and at Frankfort were large bodies of Federal troops,
much superior to the force which Morgan had under
his command.

By skilful marches, by scattering his forces and
threatening several points at once, the Federal officers
were entirely bewildered, and did not know where to
expect a blow. The extreme mobility of his flying
column also rendered it difficult to obtain a. y correct
information as to Morgan's force or his intentions. The
marching capacity of the column may be judged from
the fact that at the time it reached Midway it had
marched over 300 miles in eight days, and the men were
still fresh and in high spirits.

At Midway, with greatly superior forces on each side
of him, the most extraordinary use was made of the
telegraph by a Canadian named Ellsworth, who was a
most skilful telegraph operator attached to Morgan's
staff. By "tapping" the wires he interfered with the
arrangements of the Federal generals, sending their

m

Chailanoo^a

MORGANS RAID IN KENTUCKY IN 1862.

J FEDERAL FORCES

l CON FEDERATE FORCES

-*■ ROUTE OF MORGANS COLUMN

To face p. 4^.

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CHAP. XXVIII.] ..AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1881-1865.

44^

troops in wrong directions by forged orders which he
despatched in place of those he intercepted.

This raid was very successful, and the results may be
best summed up in the words of General Morgan's
Report. " I left Knoxville on the 4th day of this
month, witlx about 900 men, and returned to Livingston
on the 28th instant with nearly 1,200, having ])ecn
absent just twenty-four days, during which time I have
travelled over 1,000 miles, captured seventeen towns,
destroj^ed al. Jie government supplies and arms in them,
dispersed 1,500 home guards, and paroled nearly 1,200
regular troops. I lost in killed, wounded, and missing of
the number that I carried into Kentucky about ninety." ^

General Buell's army was obliged to fall back to
Louisville in August 1862, in consequence of a second
raid made by Morgan's corps, in which he took possession
of the Louisville and Nashville- Railroad, in Buell's rear,
at Gallatin, and so cut off' his communications with his
base.^

At the battle of Hartsville, shortly after the capture
of Gallatin, a fight took place between a portion of
Morgan's command and some Federal cavalry who
charged them with the sabre ; the account of it gives a
good idea of Morgan's style of fighting. General Duke
describes the 'attack. "Throwing down the eastern
fence of the meadow, some 300 poured into it, formed a
long line, and dashed across it with sabres drawn,
toward the line of horses which they saw in the road
beyond. Companies B, C, E, and F were by this time
dismounted, and had dropped on their knees behind a
low fence on the road side, as the enemy came rushing
on. They held their fire UT-til the enemy were within
thirty yards, when they opened. Then was seen the
effect of a volley from that long thin line which looked
so easy to break and yet whose fire was so deadly.
Every man had elbow-room and took dead aim at an
individual foe, and, as the blaze left the guns, two-thirds
of the riders and horses seemed to go down. The
cavalry was at once broken and recoiled. Our men
1 Duke, 205. = Ibid. 214.

• 'V

448

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEEIOD V.

sprang over the fence, and ran close up to them, as they
endeavoured to retreat rapidly through the gaps in the
fence by which they had entered, and poured in such
another volley that the rout was completed. However
they re-formed and came back, but only to be repulsed
again."

They were then pursued by the mounted men, who
followed them for some three miles, when Johnson
rallied in a strong position on a hill, dismounted his
men, and formed them up to check the pursuit. The
pursuers followed up swiftly, and seeing the disposition
made by the enemy, rapidly formed up, dismounted
under cover of a hill, charged and carried the position
on foot.

The Federal force on this occasion was carefully picked,
and composed of the best cavalry in the Federal army,
and placed under General Johnson, who was selected as
their best and most dashing cavalry officer, and sent out
specially to destroy Morgan's command. It will be seen
that Johnson relied on the sabre. He was totally
defeated, and he himself and a large body of his men
captured. General Duke bears testimony to the great
gallantry displayed by both oflficers and men of tlie
Federal force, and after referring to their attempt to use
their sabres, he says General Johnson " was evidently a
fine officer, but seeded not to comprehend 'the new
style of cavalry ' at all."

This contempt for the sword is very peculiar. In-
stances can be found without number of cavalry who
would rather themselves rely upon their firearms than
their sabres, but there is no war recorded in history in
which the charge, sword in hand, at speed, did not exert
a great moral influence upon the enemy until we reach
the novel experiences of the American Civil War.

In July, 1863, General Morgan made his boldest and
most extensive raid through Kentucky and Indiana, and
but for a sudden and totally unexpected swelling of the
Ohio river, which rendered all the fords impassable, he
would have been entirely successful. After doing great
damage in the enemy's rear, he was at last cut off" on the

CHAP, xxvin.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAK, 1861-1866.

449

l)ank8 of the Ohio, aud captured with a great portion of
his command. On this raid Morgan moved with great
rapidity. He marched from Summansville, Indiana, to
Williamsburg, east of Cincinnati, a distance of more
than ninety miles, in thirty-five hours. This was the
greatest march he ever made.

The above particulars will give a good idea of the
style of fighting adopted by Morgan, and of the general
result of the system. He was the first of the Southern
ofiicers to set the example of making extensive raids in
the enemy's rear, but it was not long before the example
was followed by other officers in both armies.

In the army of Northern Virginia, the Southern
cavalry, under General J. E. B. Stuart, performed
valuable service, and displayed a gallant and dashing
spirit. Under this brilliant commander the Confederate
horsemen on two occasions made raids around the whole
position of the enemy, moving by one flank and return-
ing by the other. The first great raid was that made
around McClellan's army in front of Richmond, in June
1862. It was in reality a reconnaissance on a large
scale, but partook somewhat of the character of a " raid,"
as a great deal of damage was inflicted upon the
Federals by the destruction of stores of ammunition and
provisions.

Stuart made the complete circuit of the Federal army.
His force consisted of 2,500 cavalry, and two pieces of
horse artillery. Setting out from Taylorsville, the little
column forced its way through the Federal lines, driving
off' the various bodies that attempted to resist their
advance. A numl^er of transports on the Pamunkey were
also taken and destroyed, and convoys of supplies in
great quantities seized and burnt. Having passed the
rear of the whole Federal army, and destroyed the rail-
road, Stuart eff'ected safely the passage of the Chicka-
hominy river on their left flank, and safely returned to
the Confederate lines, haviug thoroughly acquainted
himself with the enemy's position, which was the main
object of the expedition.

This was partly in the nature of an armed reconnais-

G G

450

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

5 t!

I J'

'm

sance, and partly secret, as they tried to avoid fighting,
and to concal their movements as much as possible,
while they v e quite ready to attack whatever appeared
to bar tl passage. Colonel Von Borcke, in his

"Memoirs ui the Confederate War for Independence,"
says that in this raid " they destroyed the enemy's
communications, burnt property to the amount of
millions, captured hundreds of prisoners, horses, and
mules, and put the whole Federal army in fear and
consternation."

The information gained by this raid was exceedingly
valuable, and enabled General Lee to plan the splendid
operations called "the seven days' battles," in which
" Stonewall" Jackson, a few days after, fell upon the
flank and rear of McClellan's army with such perfect
confidence and such terrible effect.

A few weeks later, on the 22nd August, 1862, General
Stuart made another dash upon the rear of General
Pope's army at Catlett's Station, on the Orange and
Alexandria railroad. General Pope himself narrowly
escaped capture, through having left his ^lead-quarters
on a reconnaissance. Colonel Von Borcke sums up the
result of the affair as follows : " We had killed and
wounded a great number of the enemy, captured 400
prisoners, among whom were several officers, and more
than 500 horses ; destroyed several hundred tents, large
supply depots, and long waggon trains; secured in the
possession of the quartermaster of General Pope 500,000
dollars in greenbacks, and 20,000 dollars in gold, and,
most important of all, had deprived the Federal com-
mander of all his baggage and private and official papers,
exposing to us the effective strength of his army, the
disposition of his different corps d'arm6e, and the plans
of his whole campaign."

Upon the information thus acquired. General Lee
planned the turning movement by General Stonewall
Jackson through Thoroughfiire Gap, which culminated
in the second battle of Manassas, and the total defeat of
General Pope's army.

In this battle some heavy cavalry fighting took place,

SRIOD V.

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km

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

451

which proved that Stuart's cavalry, though excellent in
raiding and reconnoitring, and in irregular fighting, were
still accustomed to charge boldly in the open field. A
large body of the Federal cavalry were covering the
retreat of their broken inftintry, when General Stuart,
with Robertson's brigade, moved upon them. The 2nd
Virginia Cavalry, under Colonel Munford, was in advance
of the other two regiments, and at once charged vehe-
mently upon the enemy. Their impetuous charge broke
the first line, and drove it back upon the second line,
which, charging in turn upon Munford's horsemen while
disordered by the pursuit, drove them back in confused
flight, snooting and sabring many of the men. At this
crisis the two remaining regiments of the Confederate
brigade came up under General Stuart, and at once
charged furiously on the hostile lines. This attack, by
fresh reserves, again turned the scale, the Federals were
driven back in utter rout, with the loss of many killed
and wounded, and several hundred prisoners and horses.'

On the 9th October, 1862, General Stuart made his
greatest " raid," that through Pennsylvania around the
Northern army. He set out with a force of 1,800 cavtdry
and four pieces of horse artillery, and on the 1 0th crossed
the Potomac river and moved rapidly towards Mercers-
burg, which was reached at noon, and then Chambersl mrg,
which was occupied at dark. The telegraph lines were
cut in every direction, the railways obstructed, and large
numbers of horses captured. All the public stores and
buildings were destroyed. At Chambersburg General
Stuart's position was very critical. He was directly in
rear of the whole Federal army, in a hostile country, and
some ninety miles from his own lines. He considered it
too dangerous to attempt to return by the route he had
come, and decided to make a wide sweep to the east
and cross the Potomac some distance below the Federal
army in the neighbourhood of Leesburg.

Every precaution was taken to deceive the enemy.
Stuart first marched towards Gettysburg, then turned
south towards Hagerstown, and then turned east again

Colonel Von Borcke's Memoirs,

G G 2

452

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period V,

towards Emmetsburg, through which he passed and
moved towards Frederick ; then turning short to the
east again he marched in the night through Liberty,
Newmarket, and Monrovia, where he cut the wires and
th(; railroad. At daylight he reached Hyattstown, on
McClellan's line of communications with Washington,
where he captured a few waggons, and then pushed on
to Barnesville.

At that point Stuart learned positively that General
Stoneman, with 4,000 or 5,000 men, was near Poolesville
guarding the fords on the river. To deceive his opponent
General Stuart started directly for Poolesville, but instead
of moving upon that point avoided it by a march through
the woods, leaving it two or three miles to his left, and
so got into the road from Poolesville to the Monocacy.
Guarding his flanks and rear, he then pushed boldly
forward, and soon met the enemy marching towards
Poolesville. This was the first serious attack he had
encountered on the expedition, and here the ability of
the cavalry to fight dismounted was of great service. The
story had better be told in General Stuart's own words : —

" I ordered the charge, which was responded to in
handsome style by the advance squadron (Irving's) of
Lee's brigade, which drove back the enemy's cavalry
upon the column of infantry idvancing to occupy the
crest from which the cavalry were driven. Quick as
thought Lee's sharpshooters sprang to the ground, and
engaging the infantry skirmishers, held them in check
till the artillery in advance came up, which, under the
gallant Pelham, drove back the enemy's force upon his
batteries beyond the Monocacy."^

Occupying the crest, which he used as a screen to
cosher his real movement, Stuart made a rapid dash to
his left to White's Ford, which was guarded by 200
infantry strongly posted in the cliffs. A few shells from
the small guns, and the attack of the dismounted cavalry,
soon drove off these enemies, and the passage of the
ford was effected with all the regularity of the passage

General Stuart's Repoi*t.

ciiAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

453

: as

and

leck

the

his

to
to
200
rom

the

of a defile at drill. The eiK^my came up just as the
whole force had safely effected its crossing.

Stuart's loss was trifling, while the information gained,
the. moral effect secured, and the consternation caused in
tlie Northern forces were of the greatest imi^ortance.
His cavalry marched on this expedition from Chambers-
l)urg to Leesburg, some ninety miles, in thirty-six liours,
(jne of the most remarkable marches recorded in history.

The importance of cavalry being able to dismount and
fight on foot is plainly manifested in the skirmish near
Poolesville which has just been described. Here the
same men charged as cavalry, drove back the enemy's
liorsemen from the crest of a hill, and then dismounting,
1 >y their fire checked the advance of the enemy's infantry
long enough to enable the artillery and remainder of the
column to come up to their assistance.

In June 1863 Stuart's cavalry corps had reached the
large number of 12,000 men with twenty-four pieces of
artillery, and on the 9th of that month the cavalry battle
of Brandy Station took place, which was the greatest
cavalry action of the entire war, 12,000 being engaged
on the Southern side and about 15,000 on the Northern.

This fight was very peculiar in its character, for the
troops on both sides fought dismounted with their rifles,
while at times most gallant charges and counter-charges
were made at speed. The line of battle extended nearly
three miles, and along the woods of the Rappahannock
the multitudinous firing of the dismounted sharpshooters
sounded like the rattle of musketry ir a regular battle.
During the action a well-devised flank attack was made
by two Federal brigades under General Percy Windham,
who, by a circuitous march, had succeeded in turning
Stuart's rear and thereby very nearly decided the fate of
the day. Two Confederate regiments coming up from
the rear made an impetuous charge and drove this force
off" in complete rout, with the loss of a battery of
artillery and a large number of killed, wounded, and
prisoners.'

The battle was finally decided by an impetuous charge
^ Von Borcke's Memoirs.

454

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

of Willicam H. Leo's and Jones's brigades against the
Federal right, whicli was entirely successful and swept
all before it. The Federal position being thus turned,
they fell Ijack, and crossing the Rappahannock, prevented
pursuit by a heavy fire of artillery from a num])er of
batteries placed upon the opposite bank of the river.

General Stuart was killed on the 1 1th May, 18G4, while
bravely fighting, with only 1,100 men, against General
Sheridan, who was making a dash upon Richmond with
a mounted force 8,000 strong in the hope of cap-
turing it, as Haddick did Berlin in the wars of Frederick
the Great. Stuart was a most efficient cavalry officer,
his energy and impetuosity were unrivalled, while his
tact and promptitude of resource saved his command on
many critical occasions. His power of obtaining infor-
mation of the enemy's movements was extraordinary.
His loss was severely felt Ijy the whole army, but by none
more than by General Lee, who had planned all his best
campaigns upon the information gained for him by
Stuart and his cavalry.

In the continuous fighting from the Wilderness to
Hanover Court House and Petersburg, in 1864, General
Lee had great difficulty in getting his reconnoitring
work properly done. He sent one cavalry officer after
another to obtain information, repeatedly ejaculating at
one important crisis, " Oh, for an hour of General
Stuart ! " Turning to his staff, he remarked, " I can do
nothing if my young men cannot keep me well
informed."

Stuart was the ablest cavalry officer that the war
produced, unless an exception be made in favour of
General Forrest, who, although totally uneducated to
the military profession, gave proof of an energy and an
iron will such as distinguished Oliver Cromwell, and a
soldierly aptitude for command such as could not be
surpassed.

A few pages cannot be better employed in a " History
of Cavalry," than in referring to the gallant operations
-of Forrest and his cavalry in the war in the South
Western States.

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 18G1-1865. 455

General Forrest is six feet one-and-a-half inches in
height, broad-shouldered, full-chested, and well built,
with erect carriage. He was personally a man to attract
attention long before he had acquired any fame, and at
the commencement of the war was empowered to
organise a regiment of volunteer cavalry. The first
action in which he was engaged was an extraordinary
fight between his regiment and a gunboat carrying nine
heavy guns, and protected by iron plates. The gun-
boat had been sent to Canton, on the Cumberland river,
to destroy a quantity of Confederate stores which were
lying there. Forrest heard of the intended attack, and
by a night march of thirty- two miles reached the point
before the arrival of the gunboat. He at once dis-
mounted his men and placed them under cover of trees
and logs, along the bank of the river. The gunboat
moved up, anchored, and opened a heavy fire of grape-
shot and canister. Forrest's men, skilful marksmen
and well sheltered, fired through the open ports, at close
range, with such perfect accuracy and such deadly effect
as to compel the vessel to close her jDorts and get away
as fast as possible.

At Fort Donelson, in February 1862, in the operations
that ended so disastrously to the Confederate cause,
Forrest, who commanded the cavalry there, gave proof
of his striking capacity as a commander of horse, and
attracted public attention by his conduct, which shone
out lirilliantly in comparison with that of the other
leading officers. After a desperate sortie in which
Forrest, on the extreme right of the Federal lines,
turned their flank and drove them back a considerable
distance, the Confederate commanders determined to
surrender.*

Forrest heard of the intention with marked dissatis-
faction, and spoke so vehemently in expressing his
feeling that General Pillow suggested that he should be
allowed to attempt to escape with his command.^ This
was sanctioned on condition that he started at once
before the flag of truce was sent out. He set out with
' Campaigns of Forrest, 75, 80, 81. ^ jbid. 91, 92, 93.

|l

456

A HISTOIIY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

his command and carried it .safely away, wliile the
remainder of the force waH Hurrendered th(! following
day. This affair eHtablislK'd Forre.st'H n^putution, and in
every subsequent operation in which lu; was engaged
he gave; proofh of his extraordinary ability as a (uivalry
commander.

A few days after the battle of 8hiloh or Pittsburg
Landing, in which Forrest's cavalry had done good
service, the Confederate troops were falling back,
Forrest, with some 150 men, forming the extreme rear.
Iiear Monterey a Federal force of two regiments of
cavalry and one of infantry came against him. A
reinforcement joining him raised his force to 350
troopers. Forrest, with his characteristic impetuosity,
decided to charge boldly against the immensely superior
numbers of the foe.

The charge was made at speed, and when within
twenty yards of the enemy the Confederates fired a
volley with their shot-guns, which were formidable
V capons at that short distance, and then rushed in with
swords and pistols. So sudden and so impetuous was
the onset that the Federal cavalry were at once over-
thrown, and driven in confusion through the infantry
in their rear, who were broken and scattered by their
own disordered horsemen. They had no time to rally,
however ; for Forrest was upon them like lightning, and
with swift play of sabre, and rapid firing of the deadly
revolver, the flying infantry and horsemen were pursued
with merciless carnage.' The loss was very heavy, and
many prisoners were taken. In this charge Forrest was
severely wounded.

In July 1862 Forrest, with 1,000 troopers, set out on
an expedition against a detachment of Federal troops,
under command of General Crittenden, which was
lying at Murfreesboro. After some desperate fighting
the attack was entirely successful, and the Federal
general and 1,765 prisoners were taken, besides large
numbers of horses, waggons, &c., as well as great
quantities of arms, clothing, and supplies. This capture
^ Campaigns of Forrest, 147.

CHAP, xxviii.] AMERICAN f lYiL WAR, 1861-1805.

457

enabled ForreHt to arm his tiooiKS with Ijctter we.ipoiia
than tli(!y iiiid previou.sly l)een oldiged to use.

At Trenton, in Deeember 18G2, he charged the enemy
with a })ortion of his eavahy mounted, and drove them
into a fortified position, whieli tluy had strengtliened
with a breastwork (jf cotton bak'S and hofjsheads of
toba('>co. Halting within fifty yards, \h\ withdrew his
force some two or three; liundred yards so as to obtain
cover, and then dismountin/,' these same men and
bringing up some guns, lie opened such a fire of small
arms and artillery that tli(! Federals soon surrendered,
and his small force, consisting only of his cavalry escort
and a few artillery, in all not more than 275 men, were
able to sum up the fruits of their victory. They
amounted to 400 prisoners of war, 300 negroes, 1,000
horses and mules, thirteen waggons, seven caissons, 20,000
rounds of artillery, 400,0v0 of small-arm ammunition,
together with a great quantity of equipments, stores,
&c. This was all obtained by ji gallant charge of about
200 horsemen which drove the enemy into their en-
trenchments, folloAved by a bold attack b)^ these same
horsemen, acting dismounted as infantry. The American
Cival War teems with instances proving that their
mounted riflemen were able to do what it is said
European cavalry have often failed in, namely, to act
with boldness and skill, both on foot and on horseback.'

On his return to the Confederate lines Forrest fought
a desperate action at Parker's Cross Roads, with 1,200
men, against 1,800 Federals. His order of ^ attle was
in one line of dismounted riflemen, with about 100
mounted on each flank, and six guns, along the line,
• two in the centre, and two near each wing. The Federal
force was defeated after hard fighting, its retreat cut oflf,
and white flags hoisted with the object of surrendering,
when two Federal brigades came up in Forrest's rear,
with several pieces of artillery, and opened fire upon
him. The beaten force at once resumed their arms and
renewed the fight. Forrest, at the head of seventy-five
horsemen, charged boldly at the guns of the fresh force,
^ Fon-est's^Campaigns, 201, 202.

458

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

w

S i

dispersed their gunners, threw the infantry supports into
confusion, and carried off the caissons of three of the
pieces. This gave time to liis dismounted men to regain
their horses and to mount. When mounted they were
again able to resume the offensive ; and moving rapidly
out of reach of the immensely superior numbers of
the Federal infantry, Forrest with his ^characteristic
impetuosity made a dash upon the waggon train of the
enemy, seized it, and carried it safely from the held. In
this action Forrest used a large portion of his cavalry
dismounted to form in line of battle as infantry, and so
to drive his opponents out of a strong position.

When attacked suddenly in rear, he made a brilliant
charge of cavalry with those men who had been held in
hand mounted, and gave an opportunity for lii>, force t )
regain their horses. Then the whole command resuming
its cavalry rdle, dashed around the rear of the enemyV
lines, and carried off tho whole Ijaggage train and
supplies.

This is another gootl illustration of the admirable
fighting qualities of For.'est's cavalry, and of their
ability to act boldly and effectively either mounted or
dismounted. This may be attributed to the superior
intelligence of the Southern gentlemen of whom his
force was mainly composed, men of extraordinary self-
reliance and strong common sense ; men who knew
perfectly well when each system of fighting would bo
most advantageous, and who had gained their experience
of the practical work of war upon the battle-field. It
must be admitted that the circumstances in America
were peculiar to the continent, and that the same system
might not be quite so successful in European armies, filled
with peasants of less intelligence than the American
citizens.

At the battle of Chickamauga, fought on the 1 9th and
20th of September, 1863, Forrest's cavalry, as well as all
the other cavalry of the Confederate army, fought on the.
flanks of the army in line of battle, ])eing dismounted
as infantry, a small force only being kept mounted to
act promptly in case of emergency. These dismounted

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

459

cavalry fought as bravely and to as much purpose as the
best infantry in the army. After the victory was gained
Forrest, putting his men again in the saddle, pressed on
after the retreating Federals, and captured a number of
prisoners. He penetrated within half a mile of Chatta-
nooga, and after vainly urging his commander-in-chief
to follow up and perfect the victory, he returned to
the Confederate lines, deeply mortified at the apathy
displayed, but carrying with him large numbers of
prisoners.^

In repelling a Federal cavalry raid, under General W. S.
Smith, in February 1864, a series of fights took place.
The most important was at Okoloua, where Forrest used
with extraordinary skill his favourite system of fighting,
sometimes mounted and sometimes dismounted, as the
exigency of the moment required. The Ijattle opened
by a fire from the Confederates ; then three regiments
aliffhtinoj from their horses and forming in line on foot
charged the Federal position, while Forrest himself with
one regiment mounted swept around and charged the
right flank of the enemy's line. This combined attack
was successful, and the Federals falling back took up a
second position.

Pressing on in pursuit, Forrest came upon the enemy
drawn up in four strong lines on a ridge. His troops
were scattered somewhat by the long pursuit, so he
drew them back to a favourable position, and with the
small force he had in the advance drew them up in line
to resist a counter attack.

Th(. Federals charged boldly upon him in successive
lines, which were all repulsed by the withering volleys
of the dismounted sharpshooters, except the fourth or
last body, which broke through his lines. And now
comes the strangest part of the story. The dismounted
Confederate cavalry, although broken and mingled with
a mass of charging horsemen, would neither yield nor
fly, but at once commenced waging a hand-to-hand
combat with their revolvers against their mounted
antagonists.* This was said to have been one of the most
' Campaigns of Forrest, 351, 352. " Ibid. 400,

460

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

lilii

inn

-!■ II

fiercely contested struggles of the war. It ended in
favour of the Confederates and their revolvers. The
Northerners were broken and dispersed, and many
captured. Those who broke through and rode on to
the rear were liadly handled by the Confederate reserves,
many being killed and wounded, and many taken
prisoners.

Fort Pillow, a strong work armed with fiix pieces of
artillery and garrisoned by 580 men, was stonned by
Forrest on the 12th April, 1864, with his cavalry, whom
he dismounted for the purpose.'

At tlie battle of Tishimongo Creek, 10th June, 1864,
two strong lines of Federal inftintry pressing upon three
of Forrest's regiments, which were dismounted, charged
so bravely that they came steadily i. > to within thirty
paces of the Confederates, who then drew their revolvers,
and at close ninge used them with such deadly effect, that
they at once drove back the enemy with great slaughter
and pressed after them, using their pistols freely in the
pursuit. They were then halted and re-formed, and
the horses being brought up they mounted and harassed
the Hying Federals in their retreat. In this action
Forrest had only 3,200 men, as against nearly three
times that force under General Sturgis, and yet in two
days he had driven the Federals fifty-eight miles, with
the loss of nineteen guns, twenty-one caissons, 200
waggons, and thirty amljulances, with large quantities of
supplies.^ More than two thousand prisoners were taken,
and 1,900 of the Federal dead were left upon the battle-
field or on the line of retreat. If success be any test of the
value of cavalry organised upon the system used by the
Americans in their Civil War, this terrible defeat of a
greatly superior force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery
by a small movable column of mounted riflemen ought
to settle the question.

In the brilliant dash upon Memphis on the 21st

August, 1864, Forrest captured by a coup de main a

large city occupied by greatly superior forces of the

enemy, captured a number of prisoners, and safely

^ Campaigns of Forrest, 437. ^ jbid. 480.

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

461

effected his retreat with little or no loss. This affair is
interesting to the professional soldier from the fact that
the Confederate advance-guard, only forty strong, com-
posed of picked moimtt 1 men, charged a battery of six
pieces of artillery, revolver in hand, and captured the
guns, killing and wounding some twenty of the gunners.^

Forrest had made his cavalry perform almost every
species of service that falls to the lot of land forces —
they had acted as cavalry and as infantry, they had
fought in line of battle, as at Chickamauga, they had
driven off gunboats, they had stormed fortifications, and
built bridges. Tliey were, however, not to close their
career without having an extraordinary and novel
experience.

In October 1864 Forrest decided to make an effort
to impede the navigation and use of the Tennessee
river, which was filled w^itli Federal gunboats and
transports. Choosing a strong position on the bank of
the river, he concealed his force, masked his guns in
position, and awaited the approach of the enemy's vessels.^
On the 29th October the steamer Mazeppa, with a barge
in tow, was attacked and disabled, her crew running her
on the opposite bank and escaping. Captain Gracy, of
Forrest's cavalry, swam across the river anti brought a
yawl ])ack, and the vessel was soon in the possession of
the Confederates, with her cargo containing large
supplies of military stores.

The gunboat Undine, convoying the steam transport
Venus, came down soon after, and after a vigorous fight,
in which the artillery played upon them, while the Con-
federate sharpshooters kept up a deadly fire upon the open
portholes of the gunboat, both vessels were captured by
the cavalry, and, being repaired, were manned by detach-
ments chosen from the comm.ard, and the Conftxl-iTite
flag was soon floating from bcl b ^^essels. Forrest made
a trial trip with his fleet as far as F(7it Hieman to sec
that all was in condition for service ; the horsemen on
shore making the air ring with cheer after cheer for

I;!-

' Campaigns of FoiTest, 540.

- Forrest, 592.

462

A HISTORY OF < ;a\ A ..RY.

[period v.

their comrades who had taken service on the novel
element.

The Federals soon brought down m overpowering
force of gunboats to restore their su^ emacy upon the
river. The Confederates had been obliged to retain the
Federal engineer of the Venus to manage the engine, and
he, having treacherously cut the tiller rope, the vessel
became unmanageable, and, running her ashore, Colonel
Dawson, who had been placed in command, abandoned
her, and his men resuming their horses, again became
cavalry. A day or two after, the Undine, being greatly
overmatched, was run on shore, abandoned and burnt, the
troopers scampering off to their horses, fonder of their
saddles than ever. Thus terminated the operations of
Forrest's cavalry afloat, the destruction of several vessels,
the interruption of the enemy's communications for
several days, and the great moral effect, being the only
advantage to the Confederates.

We shall conclude our references to the operations of
Forrest's cavalry with an account of the pursuit and
capture of Colonel Streight's command in Alabama in
May 1863.

Forrest, perceiving that Streight meditated a sweeping
raid into the interior of the Confederacy, took vigorous
steps to oppose him.

He first came up with him at Day's Gap, and after
a skirmish the Federals fell back to a good position on
Sand Mountain. Forrest at once attacked but could not
succeed in carrying the position, and after desperate
fighting he withdrew his men to re-form them for another
attack. Streight took advantage of the opportunity to
fall back, and after a running fight for some miles, made
another stand at Long's Creek. Heavy fighting took
place there, and the Federals were again routed. After
retreating some ten miles, and night having come on,
Streight again halted, but the swift-riding, hard-smiting,
restless Forrest was close upon his tracks, another fighi
took place in the thick darkness, and again the Federal
horsemen fled in confusion.

The never-tiring Confederate leader still pushed on

CHAP, xxvni.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1831-1865.

463

and pressed them for six miles, where another stand was
made, another night action fought, another victory won
by the Southern cavahy.

Forrest then halted two hours to feed and rest his
men and horses, who had been without food and rest for
nearly twenty-four hours. It was necessary also to let
his stragglers come up, to overhaul his ammunition, and
to re-form his command.^

At daybreak Forrest led the way again, and his men
cheerfully renewed the pursuit. At Blountsville at 11
A.M. they again overtook the enemy, and soon drove
them out of the place, capturing some ammunition and
supplies. A running fight then took place with the
rear-guard for ten miles to the Black Warrior Creek,
where more fighting took place, and, night coming on,
another halt was ordered by Forrest for three or four
hours to feed and rest his weary men and horses.

At midnight the pursuit was again resumed, and after
marching fifteen miles they reached Wills Creek, where
the enemy were again struck, and driven easily with the
loss of some prisoners, forage, and horses. Another halt
of a few hours took place to feed the horses. This
desperate rate of marching was beginning to tell severely
upon Forrest's command. So many horses had given
out, so many stragglers had fallen behind, that Forrest
set out from this point with only 600 men for the final
struggle, and these men, worn out by three days and
nights of {ilmost continuous riding and fighting, showed
signs of exhaustion, and many had fallen asleep on their
horses. Forrest revived and encouraged them by a
vigorous speech, and the small column moved on again.
They soon overtook the flying enemy, and a running
fight for ten miles took place to the Black Creek, which
the Federals crossed by a bridge which they burned under
cover of their artillery.

A young Southern lady, a resident of the locality,

seeing the necessity of a ford for the Confederates, came

up to General Forrest and offered to show him an old

unused one not far off. She got up on his horse behind

^ Campaigns of Forrest, 264.

n

464

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

the general, and galloping to the point showed it to him
under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, and the
Confederates in a short time were across the river in full
pursuit.

Grddsden was soon reached, and then Forrest, selecting
300 of his best mounted men, again led the advance,
and after a race of nine or ten miles, the enemy were
again overtaken about 5 P.M. on the 2nd May, at
Turkeytown, where another sharp fight took place.
Streight had prepared an ambush, but Forrest's impe-
tuous rush at full gallop, his men firing right and left,
with pistols and rifles, carried him past the ambuscade
with little loss, and Ijroke the Federal lines beyond ;
killing, wounding, and capturing a number of them. It
was now dark, and again the enemy were flying. Forrest
halted for the night, to let his scattered troops come up,
and to give his horses the rest that had become absolutelv
necessary.

By sunrise on the 3rd, the remnants of the Confede-
rate force, now only 500 effective men, were again on
the march, and about 9 a.m. the Federals were over-
taken, and driven for some distance, when they rallied,
and formed up, once more to give battle. Forrest,
whose impetuous spirit and boiling courage led him
instinctively to deal hard crushing blows, was never-
theless always watchful to gain his object by stratagem,
if that were possible, and he thought the time had now
come to try to obtain a surrender.' His force was so
small, that while the negotiations were going on he was
obliged to make the most skilful disj)lays of his com-
mand, and ]3y showing portions of it rapidly at diflferent
points, to impose upon the Federal commander.

At last a surrender was agreed upon, and Forrest, to
conceal the paucity of his numbers, said that on account
of the difficulty of obtaining forage, he would only take
two regiments to escort his prisoners to Rome, some
miles distant, and that the remainder of his force would
be sent to neighbouring towns. To deceive Colonel
Streight, he gave fictitious orders in his hearing, directing
^ Campaigns of Forrest, 273.

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

465

fabulous corps on his flanks, to be marched to dif-
ferent points. 1,700 men then capitulated to about 500.

This afiair has been detailed at some length, as there
is probably no instance in history where a pursuit by
cavalry has ever been conduc ted with greater energy and
perseverance than this most celebrated of all Forrest's
operations.

For three days his men had marched an average of
forty-one miles each day, fighting for hours several times
daily and nightly, and after that, in the last forty-eight
hours of the expedition, he had led his men, wearied and
jaded as they were, a distance of full ninety miles. At
the surrender, the Confederates formed up in line to
receive it were so overcome with sleep that they were
nearly all nodding, unable to keep their eyes open.'

The above accounts of a few of the more important
actions of Morgan, Stuart, and Forrest, will give a
pretty clear idea of the manner of fighting which was
carried on in the American Civil War by the type of
cavalry which came into use with it. To the Southern
generals, Forrest and Morgan, both unprofessional men,
is to be attributed the credit of having originated
and adopted a system of cavalry tactics (we may even
say strategy), that was new in many of its features, and
a most successful adaptation of the modern improved
firearms to the use of horsemen.

The principal idea, that of using missile weapons on
horseback, and of employing the horses simply to carry
men to points where they were to be employed on foot,
has, as we have seen, been often thought of, and repeated
attempts made to apply the principle practically. Alex-
ander had his dimachos, the Parthians used their arrows,
the Romans dismounted to fight on foot, the knights
used petronels, the men-at-arms arquebuses and pistols,
and dragoo s were much used subsequently, but not
often to advantage. In the deductions we purpose
placing at the end of the historical portion of this work,
we will consider the reasons for this failure, and whether
those reasons exist at the present time.

» Campaigns of Forrest, 276, 277.

H H

466

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

s

In the Ame^ Civil War the cavalry performed

great services . these services were performed in

their capaci^ xiounted riflemen. The Southerners

originated Jiployment of cavalry in this way, and

were very K^^iccessful until the Federals had learned
their system, and in time, with their superior resources
and overpowering numbers, beat the Confederates with
their own weapons. We have detailed the operations of
the Southern cavalry first, and will now proceed to show
the great results gained by the same type of horsemen
in the Northern armies in the closing years of the war.

In the spring of 1863, it was at once seen that the
United States authorities had become fully impressed
with the value of the new style of cavalry, and aware
of the importance of having a large force to be employed
in raids and excursions into the enemy's lines. During
the previous winter, immense efibrts had been made to
organise large bodies of mounted riflemen, well equipped
and well armed, and trained to fight on the new system.

The first great successful raid on the part of the
Federals was that through Mississippi in 1863 com-
manded by General Grierson. He set out from La Grange,
Tennessee, on the 1 7th April, with a brigade of cavalry
some 2,000 strong, and went through the heart of the State
of Mississippi, ransacking the whole country, destroying
supplies, cutting railways and telegraph lines, and burning
bridges, stores, &c. He passed through Pontotoc and De-
catur, and reached the Southern Railroad at Newton on the
24th April.' Having destroyed some cars, engines, and
bridges, he moved on to Georgetown, where he crossed
the Pearl river, and moving over to the New Orleans
and Jackson railroad, cut it at Hazelhurst, destroying
stores and trains, and then moved down the railway to
Brookhaven, where he burned the railway depot at that
point and the cars found in it.^ He arrived at Baton
Rouge on the 2nd May, having travelled over 300 miles
through the heart of the enemy's country, inflicting serious
blows upon his communications, and without sufiering

^ Johnston's Narrative, 168, ^ PoUard's Second Year of the War,
268.

GRtERSONS flAlO IN MISSIdSIPPI.

1863.

dJ FEDERAL FORCES
^1 CONFEDERATE FORCES

HOur^ OF GRItRSONS COLUMN

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Run.

G ULF O F
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Tofacepaye 466.

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CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861 18G5. 467

any loss. This raid of Grierson was greatly aided by
the expeditions under Dodge and Streight, whicn
employed the Southern cavalry under Forrest, and pre-
vent^id them from being detached to interrupt the
march through Mississippi.

A few days after Grierson's raid the campaign of 1863
opened in Northern Virginia with another cavalry expe-
dition by the Federal horsemen under General Stoneman,
in the rear of General Lee's army. This was intended
to have a co-operating eflfect upon the attack which
General Hooker was about making at Chancellorsville
against the Confederate left rear. Averill set out first
to draw the Southern cavalry to their left, in order to
leave the way open for Stoneman with the main force to
make a dash into the rear of General Lee's position.
Averill had a sharp action with General W. H. F. Lee's
brigade of cavalry at Rapidan station on the 1st May,
and during that day Stoneman with the main force,
consisting of about 10,000 men, marched by Racoon ford
to Louisa Court House, which he reached early on Satur-
day morning, the 2nd May, Averill the same day falling
back to the right rear of Hooker's army. W. H. F. Lee,
with only 900 men, had a skirmish with a portion of
Stoneman's command on the 2nd between Gordonsville
and Louisa Court House, but was obliged in the end to
fall back before the superior forces of the enemy. On
the evening of the 2nd Stoneman was at Thompson's
Cross Roads, in the rear of the Confederate army, and
directly between it and its base. At this point he
decided to spread his command and strike out in every
direction. Consequently one portion, consisting of on.e
regiment under Colonel Wyndham, pushed south to
Columbia, on the James river, and there destroyed all
the public property, captured a number of horses and
mules, and rejoined Stoneman the same night at
Thompson's Cross Roads. W. H.. F. Lee followed and
harassed him, but being greatly overmatched could effect
nothing important.'

Another detachment under Colonel Kilpatrick moved
^ Hotchkiss and Allen, 105.

H H 2

468

A HISTORY OP CAVALRY.

[period V,

eastward to Hungary Station on the Fredericksburg
railway, reaching there early on Monday the 4 th.

Here he destroyed the depot and tore up the railway
on the direct line between Richmond and the Southern
army. From Hungary Station he moved to Meadow
Bridge on the Central Railroad, which he destroyed,
together with an engine. From there, crossing the
Pamunkey river at Hanover town and then the Mata-
pony, he swept through Essex and the adjoining counties
and reached Gloucester Point in safety on the 7th,
having on the way destroyed some waggon trains and
small depots of supplies.

A third detachment, under Colonel Davis, marched
down the South Anna, struck the Fredericksburg Railway
at Ashlands Station, and destroyed it, and intercepted an
ambulance train from Chancellorsville, upon which they
captured a number of prisoners. Here they destroyed
some engines, and moving across to the Central Railroad,
bui*ned the depot and tore up the tra- Ic. Moving then
southwards towards Richmond, they turned eastwardly in
the direction of Williamsburg. Being intercepted by a
force sent out to cut him oflf, and being repulsed in an
attack upon them. Colonel Davis turned with his
command to the left, crossed the Pamunkey and Mata-
pony rivers, and finally reached Gloucester Poini in
safety.

Other parties, destroying all the bridges, &c., in their
neighbourhood, rejoined Stoneman at Thompson's Cross
Roads, on Tuesday, the 5th, when the -vhole conunand
except those portions under Davis and Kilpatrick were
concentrated at Yancey ville, and commenced a retrograde
march by way of Racoon ford and Kelly's ford, to
rejoin Hooker, which was effected on the 8th May.

This raid, though apparently successful, was in reality
a failure. The damage inflicted on the communications
of the Southerners was very slight, and readily repaired.
The expedition, although having a free rsinge through a
wide sweep of Southern territory, did bo g little damage,
took, comparatively speaking, no pri^oiiors, nr.d exercised
no moral effect. The great battle of ('ri;\ib:'ellorsville

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865. 469

had been fought in their absence, and after three days*
fighting, the Confederate general had won the moat
brilliant victory of the war, and extricated his army from
a most perilous position, by one of the boldest and most
adventurous plans of battle ever adopted, and one which
was splendidly successful, through the want of cavalry
on the part of the Northern army on their right
flank.

Chancellorsville was won by the flank march made by
Jackson's corps around Hooker's right, by which the
Southern army, far inferior in numbers, di"\dded itself,
and placed the Northern army between its two weak
fractions. This was successful only because it was a
complete surprise. Had Stoneman's 10,000 cavalry
been swarming over the co^mtry in the neighbourhood
of Hooker's exposed flank, Jackson's columns would have
been enveloped and destroyed while winding along the
narrow roads and difficult defiles of the "Wilderness,"
through which his flank march was so successfully and
skilfully made.

Stoneman's raid is a good example of an ill-advised
and ill-timed adoption of a course of action, which, if
judiciously employed, might produce most important
results.

Had Stoneman turned north when he found himself
in Lee's rear, and moved boldly up against his lines, he
would have efiected a most important diversion, and
might have arrived in the crisis of the battle, when an
unexpected attack of 10,000 men in the Confederate reai-
would almost certainly have entailed the destruction of
their whole army.

We will now give some particulars of the great Federal
cavalry raid under Wilson through Alabama in 1865,
which was so successful, and had so important an
influence in ending the war in the south-west.

During the early part of 1865 the cavalry corps of the
Federal army of the Mississippi Department, numbering
22,000 men, had been encamped on the north bank of
the Tennessee, between Waterloo and Gravelly Springs.
They were under the command of General Wilson, a

il

i

I In I

470

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD V.

cavalry officer of high reputation in the army. Wilson
for many weeks had been devoting his entire energies to
the drill, organisation, equipment, and discipline of his
command. Having the inexhaustible supplies of the
United States Government to draw from, his men were
magnificently armed and supplied, and every care was
taken in giving them thorough instruction, and in
bringing the whole force into the most complete state of
efficiency and mobility. The troops were drilled in the
double-rank formation. They were somewhat short in
horses, so that the mounted force was only 17,000
strong.*

In front of Wilson was the indomitable Forrest, an
antagonist to be approached with care, but how different
was his position ! While Wilson was drilling and equip-
ping his force with every facility, Forrest had to scatter
his men to obtain food, to get clothing and remounts,
and to recruit his weak regiments.

On the 18th March, General Wilson set out on his
expedition through Alabama. It was not intended
as a mere raid. The Confederate troops had become so
thinned by four years' desperate fighting, and the
Northern cavalry had been organised upon such a large
scale, that in this case a wh.^le invading army was
composed of cavalry.^

The force consisted of 12,000 horsemen, with artillery,
and 1,500 dismounted men to guard the trains, and to
be mounted as fast as horses could be obtained. Every-
thing that could give mobility to this column had been
considered. Every trooper carried five days' light rations
in haversacks, twenty-four pounds of grain, 100 rounds
of ammunition, two extra horseshoes. Pack animals
carried five days' extra rations of hard bread, and ten of
coffee, sugar, and salt ; while forty-five days' rations of
coffee, twenty of sugar, fifteen of salt, and eighty rounds
of extra ammunition, were carried in the waggon train
The supply train numbered only 250 waggons, and it
was considered that, with what could be gleaned from

m

^ Andrews, 243 ; Forrest, 659.

2 Forrest, 659.

CHAP, xxviii.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

471

of

the country, the column had a sufficient supply for a
campaign of sixtv days.'

They had also a light pontoon train of thirty boats,
transported by fifty waggons. To meet this moving
army, Forrest only had some 6,400 men, widely scat-
tered, and maintained in supplies with the greatest
difficulty. When Wilson did move, he moved so rapidly
as to strike Forrest before he could get his men con-
centrated, and consequently he was able to force him
back with little difficulty.

Wilson's movement south commenced on the 22nd
March from Chickasaw, and to deceive the enemy and
enable the force to be more easily fed, it marched by
divergent roads ; Upton's division moving by Russel-
ville. Mount Hope, and Jasper; Long's division by
Cherokee Station, Frankfort, and Thornhill, to the same
point. McCjok's moved by Eldridge, also to Jasper.
From Jasper the whole command united marched by
Elyton to Montevallo. Here fighting began with the
Confederate cavalry, under Roddy and Crossland. The
weak force of the enemy were soon driven back to Six
Mile Creek, where they again made a stand, and were
again forced back towards Randolph. The next morning
some of Wilson's scouts captured a Confederate courier
with despatches, which laid bare before him the disposi-
tion of Forrest's command, and the weakness of the force
in front of him. He decided to press him without
cessation, and drive him by main force into the works
around the city of Selma, which was the objective point
of the campaign. Six miles north of Plantersville, at
Ebenezer Church, a desperate fight ensued. Forrest had
only 1,500 men, and six guns, with which to oppose a
force of some 9,000 of the Federals.^

General Long's division of the Northern Army, which
was in the advance, opened the action — the 72nd Indiana
mounted infantry, being formed up, dismounted, drove
back the Confedfr^^e advanced lines, and followed up
the success with a c,L..^<re of four troops of the 17th
Indiana mounted infantry, at the gallop, sword in hand.
^ Andrews, 244. " I'orrest, 666.

472

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

This charge drove the skirmishers in upon the main line,
broke through it, and, turning to the left, rode round to
their own lines with some loss. The Confederates soon
regained their steadiness, and continued the fight.
Upton's division, which had been advancing by a road
to the east, hearing the firing and noise of the action,
turned to the right, and, moving rapidly up at a trot,
soon came into action, and dismounted, and deployed so
as to strike the Confederate right flank. This turned
the scale of the battle, and the Confederacc. were driven
back with severe losses. This fight took place on the
1st AprU, and Wilson and his command bivouacked
that night near Plantersville, within nineteen miles of
Selma.

The next morning, at daybreak, the advance was
pushed on towards that place. This most important point
was fortified with a bastioned line, extending from the
river three miles below the city, on a radius of the same
distance, around to a point on the river above. These
fortifications were protected, both to the east and west,
for a long distance, by deep, miry, and diflScult streams.
The profile of the earthworks was as follows : Height
of parapet six to eight feet, thickness eight feet, depth
of ditch five feet, width ten to fifteen feet, height of
stockade on glacis five feet.^

Here this cavalry army was before a strongly fortified
position with a continuous curtain wall, flanked with
bastions, and having a stockade on the glacis outside the
ditch. Wilson had his forces in position about 4 p.m.,
and Forrest, with an inadequate force of 3,000 or 4,000
men, endeavoured to defend the place. Long's division
of the Federal cavalry commenced the assault. His
command was formed in line of battle dismounted, the
17th Indiana on the right, then the 123rd Illinois, the
98th Illinois, the 4th Ohio cavalry, and the 4th Michigan
cavalry, in all 1,500 men. They charged across the
open ground six hundred yards, climbed over the stock-
ade and defences, under heavy fire, and succeeded in
effecting an entrance and driving the Confederates in

* Andrews, 252.

CHAP, xxvni.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865. 473

confasion towards the city.* Upton's division charged
over the stockade the same way, the men getting on each
other's shoulders to climb over. The place was taken,
Forrest escaping with his staff and a number of his men
by the BurnsviUe road.

In this affair Wilson's 9,000 cavalry with 8 guns
captured 31 field-guns and 1 thirty-pounder Parrott,
2,770 prisoners including 150 officers, a number of
colours, and large quantities of stores of every kind.
Wilson remained at Selma for some days, gathering in
his detached parties, and energetically engaged in build-
ing a bridge across the Alabama river, at this point 870
feet wide. On the 10th he crossed his command to
the south bank, having first destroyed the foundries,
arsenals, arms, stores, and mUitaiy supplies of every
kind in Selma; materials of war, which had made it
one of the most important depots in the Southern
States, and its loss a most disastrous blow to the falling
Confederacy.^

Wilson had succeeded in capturing enough horses to
mount all the dismounted men, and replenishing his
supplies, and destroying his surplus waggons, and
taking every step to give mobility to his command,
he set out by way of Montgomery into Georgia, in-
tending to destroy what he could and join Sherman
in North Carolina. Montgomery was soon taken,
90,000 bales of cotton being burned in anticipation
by the Southern troops.' All the public stores were
here destroyed. On the 14th AVilson moved into
Georgia; on the 16th the fortified posts of Columbus
and West Point were taken ; on the 20th he entered
Macon, where news of the armistice reached him, and
hearing that Jefferson Davis was trying to make his
escape, he sent forces in pursuit, and succeeded in
capturing him on the 11th May.*

This was one of the most remarkable cavalry opera-
tions of the war, for, as we have said, it was not
a mere raid or dash, but an invading army determined
to fight its way through. Its success was greatly to be

' Andrews, 264. ^ Ibid. 258. » Ibid. 259. « Havelook, 112.

474

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

1

¥ 'J

attributed to the utter exhaustion of the Confederacy
at that late period of the struggle. It is certainly,
however, one of the most extraordinary affairs in the
history of the cavalry service, and almost recalls the
romantic episodes of the Crusades, where the armies
consisted almost solely of knights, who dismounted to
attack fortified places. It is a striking Olustration of
what can be done by the judicious use of a force of
mounted riflemen, if bravely led and skilfully com-
manded.

We shall conclude the references to the operations
of the horsemen in the American Civil War with an
account of one of the most important services ever per-
formed by a body of cavalry in modern times. The
operations of Sheridan's corps of mounted riflemen in
the spring of 1865 in the neighbourhood of I'etersburg
and Kichmond, operations which virtually exercised
a controlling influence upon the fate of the war, and
secured the evacuation of Richmond and the ultimate
surrender of Lee's army, will well repay the careful
study of the cavalry officer.

For four years a succession of Northern armies, led by
a succession of their best generals, had made unceasing
efforts to capture the capital of the Confederacy. They
had arrived within sight of it once before, only to be
hurled back in utter rout with fearful losses. In almost
every great battle the Southerners had been victorious,
the generalship of their commanders and the bravery
and steadiness of their men being superior to that of
their opponents. Time brings queer changes, and it
was the sad fate of the Southern people to succumb
to a system of tactics which they themselves had
originated, but which their assailants had perfected and
employed upon a more extensive scale.

Grant had fought his way to his position to the south
of Petersburg, where, with a close and secure base at
City Point, he was able to feed without difficulty his
immensely superior army ; and was carrying out his
policy of wearing out the Southern cause by the " mere
attrition" of constant hammering at their fines. From

CHAP, xxviii.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-18 5.

475

June 1864 until the spring of 1865 General Grant had
been to the south of the James river, but all his eflForts
to drive the Southerners from their lines had failed, and
Lee's ragged but gallant army held their own in spite of
the vigorous attacks of overwhelming numbers.

In January 1865 Grant seems to have conceived the
idea that if he could cut off the communications of
Richmond with the heart of the Confederacy he would
stop the supplies and so enforce an evacuation of the
place or a surrender. This duty he laid out for his
horsemen.

There were three main lines of supply from the interior
into Richmond ; the James river canal on the north,
the Danville railway on the south of it, leading to Rich-
mond, and more to the south stiU a railway from
Burksville to Petersburg called the South Side Railway.
To cut these was now Grant's great object. Sheridan,
with a large force of cavalry some 10,000 strong and a
much larger force of infantry, was in the vaUey of the
Shenandoah, north of the James river, watched by General
Early with a very weak force of Confederates.

Sheridan was ordered in the early spring to defeat
Early, to push on to Lynchburg and there destroy the
canal, and crossing the James river, make a raid southerly
cutting the two railways, and sweeping down, to join
Sherman in North Carolina. Sheridan set out on the
27th February and reached Waynesboro on the 2nd
March, when General Early, fearfully overmatched, was
virtually run over by the swarm of Federal horsemen.
Then pressing on he reached the canal, and blowing up
the locks and breaking down the banks, so destroyed it
as to make it utterly useless. He was unable however
to cross the James river, which was much swollen, and
turning to the east followed its banks towards Rich-
mond, which he passed to the north, and on the 10th
March reached the Pamunkey at White House, where he
opened communications with Grant's extreme right. On
the 26th of March he crossed the James river at City
Point and took up his position in Grant's rear. Grant s
lines extended from City Point for twenty-five miles

476

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

it i

[period v.

towards tlie south-west, and were strongly entrenched.
Ijee's lines, on a shorter arc, extended in the same
direction, but the exposed country to the west left an
open field for the employment of the immensely superior
force of cavalry now at Grant's disposal.

He decided therefore to use his horsemen in wide
turning movements to sweep around Lee's exposed flank,
and turning it and driving it back towards Richmond,
to press on and cut the railways, which were the only
remaining sources of supply to the Confederate army.

Lee was ^rery inferior in strength to the Federal forces,
which amounted to 160,000 of all arms, while he had only
about 45,000 or perhaps less. Grant was consequently
able to fully defend his lines while he detached a large force
to execute turning movements around Lee's right flank.
The force detached for this purpose consisted of the
whole of Sheridan's cavalry supported by the second and
fifth army corps, and as it circled around to the left the
positions taken were continually entrenched in order to
protect the army against an attack in flank while
moving on.

Sheridan set out with his cavalry corps, 10,000 strong,
on the 29th March, 1865, moving by Reams Station
towards Dinwiddie Court House, which was occupied
that night ; the second and fifth corps being on
Sheridan's right and keeping up the communications
with the left of the main position. The positions assumed
that day were entrenched in anticipation of an attack,
which was made the same afternoon by a Southern
division and repulsed. Early on the 30th March General
Merritt, with four brigades of cavalry, set out to recon-
noitre towards Five Forks, the strongly entrenched post
which was the point d'appui of Lee's right flank. The
Confederate cavalry pickets were driven into the works
by the Federal dragoons, who in turn had to fall back.

During the 30th the infantry corps also moved up
and by that night were on the Boydtown Road, between
Gravelly Run and Hatcher's Run. On the morning of
the 31st a general attack was made by the whole
Federal infantry force in the neighbourhood of the

CHAP, xxvin.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865. 477

Confederate position, which was along the White Oak
Koad, and was strongly fortified with entrenchments and
abattis. The attack was repulsed and the Federals driven
back to the Boydtown Road, where they rallied.

Sheridan on the left had moved forward at the same
time, and the Confederates had an opportunity of
directing their efibrts against him. An attack was made
by Fitz Lee's Confederate cavalry and two infantry
divisions, which was repulsed. A second attack drove
a portion of Sheridan's cavalry to the east, and they were
obliged to make a detour to rejoin the command. An
obstinate and hotly-contested fight then took place to
drive Sheridan back, but his horsemen dismounted, and
using repeating rifles and firing from the cover of slight
breastworks hurriedly made of rails, defeated the enemy,
who, with all his cavalry and two infantry divisions,
made most desperate efforts to drive them back from the
position they had gained. "When night came on these
cavalry held their ground against all three arms, and sa
ended the first dav's action at Five Forks.

Sir Henry Havelock, in his work on " The Three Main
Military Questions of the Day," from which we obtain
many of the foregoing details, commenting on this action,
makes the following remarks on the comparative merits
of the different systems of using horsemen : — " There is
no British cavalry officer of experience in war that reads
this but will candidly admit that under similar circum-
stances, commanding cavalry whose carbines only carry
300 or, v/ith some rifles, 600 yards, his men dressed in a
manner wholly unfitting them to work on foot, braced and
strapped down within an inch of their lives, encumbered
with long spurs and tripped up by jingling steel scabbards,
he would first have fruitlessly attempted to keep back
the advancing infantry by mounted skirmishers, whose
fire is about as effective as that of so many boys' popguns,
then perhaps charged repeatedly each time with great
loss to his men ; then finally, consoling himself with the
axiom that * cavalry are an offensive and not a defensive
arm,' he would have come to the conclusion that that
was no place for his troops opposed, unsupported, to all

478

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

f

three arms, and after tremendous loss of life and horse-
flesh, all to no purpose, would have retired on the main
body, leaving the disputed ground to the enemy, and
causing the whole three days' work by which it had been
gained to be done over again at some future time." '

The defensive power of Sheridan's cavalry was
evidently the means of enabling the corps on his right to
rally and regain their position, and prevented a defeat,
and this defensive power could not have been effectively
secured under any other system of tactics or arma-
ment. Grant, in his final report, speaking of Sheridan's
conduct on this occasion, said : " Here General Sheridan
displayed great generalship. Instead of retiring with
his whole command on the main army to tell the tale of
superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on
foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take care of
the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a
vast extent of ground, woods, and broken country, and
made his progress slow." *

On the morning of the 1st April Sheridan had
planned a movement to turn the Confederate flank and
cut off a portion of their line ; this was frustrated by
the slowness of Warren's corps in moving up, and by
the Confederates rapidly retreating towards their position
at Five Forks. He the i made a feint with his cavalry
to turn their right, while the 5th corps turned them on
the left and cut off their communication with Petersburg
and the remainder of Lee's army.

General Merritt, with three brigades, drove the Con-
federate right, by several impetuous mounted charges,
into their outer lines of temporary works, then dis-
mounting they attacked these lines and drove the enemy
out of them. Everything was now ready for the general
attack. The 5th corps was ordered to swing the right
forward, and, turning the Confederate left, sweep it into
the main works at Five Forks. This was soon done,
and the Federal infantry pressing on attacked the
works from the east. At the same time the cavalry
having, as we have said, driven the enemy into hia
' Havelook, 79. « Ibid. 82.

riiAP. xxviii.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865.

479

works from the west, now prepared to make a simul-
taneous assault upon the lines from that direction.

Three brigades were dismounted and made the attack
vehemently. The slaughter was terrific, and several
times the men, appalled by the carnage, staggered back ;
but they were urged and cheered on untU the enemy,
exhausted and attacked on three sides, rushed to the
rear, which was the only escape open to them.

The dismounted cavalry swarmed over the works at
many points, meeting their comrades of the 5 th corps
of infantry, who had entered on the opposite side. The
rout was complete. Merritt's mounted reserve brigades
dashed forward in pursuit at once, "and riding into
their broken ranks so demoralized them that they made
no serious stand after their works were carried, but fled
in disorder." Five thousand or six thousand prisoners
were taken, and the fugitives cut oflf from Lee's army.
This caused a total loss of about 13,000 to the already
weakened legions of the Confederate cause. The battle
of Five Forks virtually decided the fate of the war.

General Lee was now compelled either to evacuate
Richmond and Petersburg and retreat into the western
part of Virginia and endeavour to maintain the war
there, or else to submit to be entirely invested and cut
oflF from all communication with the surrounding country,
which would in a very short time have necessitated his
surrender from want of food.

He decided, therefore, to retreat in the direction of
Dan\iUe, or, if that were impossible, then towards
Lynchburg, where the mountainous nature of the
country would ^ e facilities for defence to his greatly
over-matched army.

In this pursuit the cavalry performed the most import-
ant part, and it may fairly be said that Sheridan was
able to cut off Lee's retreat solely from the fact of his
cavalry being capable of dismounting and occupying
and holding defensive positions. As these operations
were conducted in a late war, and under the condition
of very good firearms on both sides, the details will be
instructive and interesting.

480

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[P£RI0D V.

General Merritt moved with the cavalry in pursuit on
the morning of the 3rd April, Lee having commenced
his retreat the previous night. Merritt came up with
the Confederate rear-guard at the Namozine Creek,
where they had destroyed the bridge and entrenched
themselves to defend the passage. He immediately
forded the creek, and by a flank movement, aided by
artillery, turned the enemy's position, and so compelled
them to retire. The cavalry followed up the pursuit
twenty miles, Sheridan with the 5th corps of infantry
following them with all speed.* During the day the
Southern rear-guard lost 300 prisoners, four guns, and
two colours. At daybreak the pursuit was resumed,
nine brigades of cavalry leading the way. The
Southerners were overtaken at Bethany, strongly posted
and fortified, and no attack could be made that night,
buo about 11 P.M. Sheridan, hearing that the enemy were
retreating, resumed the pursuit, and at 6 a.m. on the 5th
reached Jettersville, where they found the 5 th corps of
infantry, which had marched directly to that point.
This cut off Lee*s retreat towards Danville and forced
him towards Lynchburg.

While Grant followed with the main army, Sheridan,
in the advance, came up with the Confederate rear-
guard, 10,000 strong, between Deatonsville and Sailor's
Creek. And now occurred an extraordinary and original
method of using cavalry in a pursuit. Sheridan saw
that the force of the Confederate rear-guard was too
great for him to be able to defeat them by a direct
attack. He decided therefore to move westwardly to
get upon their flank, when the leading division of his
cavaliy was ordered to attack the flank of the train and
the escorting column. As the enemy were strong in
numbers, and splendid soldiers, this division could only
delay and harass them on their march, but the other
divisions moved on in rear of the line of dismounted
horsemen which held fast and annoyed the enemy with
their fire. Each division in turn attacked the column
further on in flank, so that moving on successively

^ Havelock, 90.

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CONFEDE.RATE FOHCES I I

ROUTE

FEDERAL FORCES.
ROUTE

CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1866.

481

Crook's, Custcr'a, and Dcveii.s' divisions swept ahead of the
retreating eolumn, crossed Sailor's CJreek before them,
and rapidly taking position on the high grouml on the.
far side of the stream, they formed in line, dismounted,
and placing thcmselviis directly across the path of the
€nemy, with their firearms they disputed his passage.

The result of this manoeuvre on the part of Sheridan's
cavalry was the capture of sixteen guns, 400 wp^gons,
and many prisoners. The strength of the position they
had assumed, and the defensive power obtained by the
eflfective fire of their dismounted men, with thei^lbng-
range repeating rifles, enabled them to intercept on their
retreat, and delay, until they were captured, three whole
divisions of the Confederate infantry. •

By the same method of tactics the pursuit was
resumed, the retreat to Lyncli])urg cut ofl' by wide
turning movements of the cavalry, who, dismounted,
checked the retreat, and so brought about the surrender
of the whole of Lee's army at Appomattox Court House,
on the 9 th April.

Sir Henry Havelock's comments on this affair are well
worthy of consideration, as the views of an officer of
high training and great experiejice in the field. He
says: — "The mode in which Sheri(Jfan, from the special
arming and training of his cavalry, was able to deal with
this rear-guard, first, to overtake it in retreat, then to
pass completely beyond it, to turn, face it, and take up
at leisure a position strong enough to enable him to
detain it, in spite of its naturally fierce and determined
(jff'orts to break through, is highly characteristic of the
self-reliant, all-sufficing efficiency, to which at this time
the Northern horsemen had been brought. The practical
experience of nearly four years of continual war, the
entire and untrammeled confidence placed in good men
amongst the Northern leaders, when they proved them-
selves to be so, and the complete freedom left them of
devising and executing the improvements their daily
experience suggested, had enabled Sheridan, and one or
two more of similar bent of mind, to shake them-
selves free of the unsound traditions of European cavalry

t I

c

482

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

theory, and to make their own horse, not the jinghng,
brilliant, costly, but almost helpless unreality it is with
us, l)ut a force that was able, on all grounds, in all
circumstances, to act freely an<l efficiently, without any
support from infantry.

" Not only is there no European cavalry, with which
the writer is acquainted, that could have acted the part
now played by the force under Sheridan, Ijut there is
not on record, that he is aware of, an instance in the
eventful wars of the last or the present century in
Europe of a strong rear-guard having been thus
effectually dealt with." ^ Again ho says : " Had it been
any European cavalry, unarmed with ' repeaters,' and
untrained to fight on foot, that was barring the way, any
cavalry whose only means of detention consisted in the
absurd ineffectual fire of mounted skirmishers, or in
repeated charges with lance or sabre, the Confederate
game would have been simple and easy enough.

"They would merely have had to form battalion or
brigade squares with their baggage in the midst ; to have
placed these squares in echelon so as to support each
other, and then, advancing, to have steadily shot their
way through the opposing horse. Who does not recollect
Napier's celebrated account of the two squares, one com-
posed of the 5th and 77th British regiments, the other
of the 21st Portuguese, at El Bodon, breaking their way
out, 'issuing unscathed, like the holy men from the
Assyrian furnace,' through the surrounding clouds of
Montbrun's splendid and eager French cuirassiers '(
What reader of military history but will at once recall
the instance of the safe retreat of the English infantry
for three miles over the open plain at Fuentes d'Onor,
leaving 500 of these same chosen horsemen, who had
vainly essayed to bar their progress, stretched prostrat(^
on the field ; or the similarly successful retreat of the
Russian squares at Cra6ne and at Rheims in 1814?
The Confederate rear-guard, now under the veteran
Ewell, were men who had shown themselves, in a
hundred tried fields, from Bull Run downwards, to he

» Havelock, 97, 98.

CHAP, xxviii.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-18G5.

483

rioldiers fully capable of appreciating and following these
well-known and brilliant precedents, had but the circum-
stances been similar. But not the men, but the times
and the means were completely changed. The mounted
rifle plan of fighting on foot from behind cover made the
detaining fire of the Federal cavalry as galling and
effectual as th. t of the best infantry; while by their
method of the alternate passing on of mounted bod'es
in rear of their dismounted skirmishers, these mounted
bodies again dismounting in selected positions further
on in their turn, they were enabled to present to the
Confederates an impenetrable hedge, constantly falling
back, and thuvS avoiding actual contact, but unbroken,
continuous, sheltered by obstacles of ground, and con-
stantly emitting in their faces a fire most deadly in its
precision and sustained rapidity. They were thus
enabled always to keep ahead and always to present
an impassable barrier to further retreat, while they
themselves, from being completely covered, avoided
any serious loss. The Confederates could not form
square against them, because on this formation their
' repeating ' fire would have told with tenfold effect." '

It must be remembered also that these arguments of
Sir Henry Havelock are strengthened materially by the
fact, that in the instances he mentions at El Bodon,
Fuentes d'Onor, Cra6ne, and Rheims, as well as in
many other instances of like nature, the infantry were
armed only with flint-lock muskets of short range and
uncertain aim, while the Confederate troops had rifles of
long range, of precision of aim, and great power of pene-
tration. We may fairly assume that Sheridan, with his
mounted riflemen, accomplished what regular cavalry
could not have done, particularly when we remember
that the ground was broken and intersected.

The accounts of actions contained in the foregoing
pages serve to show, that in the American Civil War
the contending parties had certainly originated and im-
proved a system of working cavalry that was capable of
producing great results. No one <'an read the accounts

' Havelock, 99, 100.

I 1 2

484

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period V

of Morgan's raids, of Forrest's expeditions, of Stuart's
great sweeping reconnaissances, of Grierson's operations
in Mississippi, of Wilson's invading army of cavalry, of
Sheridan's turning movements at Petersburg, of his
fighting in line of battle, of his pursuits, &c., without
feeling that the mounted rifle principle had been
wonderfully effective, and that it is the proper method
of using horsemen under the improved state of pro-
jectile weapons.

The professional cavalry ofl&cer in Europe, wrapt up
in the traditions of the wars of Frederick the Great and
Napoleon, bearing in mind the failure of the dragoon
principle in the seventeenth century, and holding it as
a fixed principle that cavalry relying upon firearms are
necessarily worthless, has never given the proper weight
to the teachings of the American Civil War.

It has been argued that the country was not suited to
the use of cavalry proper, that the raw levies had no
opportunities of becoming sufficiently trained to make
mounted charges on a great scale, and it has been held
that although mounted riflemen had been so effective, it
was no proof that well-trained cavalry, upon the old
principle, would not have done equally well, if not
better. It seems- to have been forgotten, that four
long years of war, with constant drilling and fighting,
must have produced as efficient troops as could be found.
General Lee's army at Chancellorsville was as effective
and well-disciplined an army as then existed in any part
of the world, and the battle of Chancellorsville is strong
proof of the truth of the statement.

Having therefore considered the part taken in the
American Civil War by the cavalry, we will now
proceed to consider the campaigns of 1866 in Austria,
and 1870-71 in France, and see whether the results
produced by the cavaliy proper, on ground admirably
suited to their use, and under the improved weapons,
were such as to surpass in value those obtained by the
new style of cavalry on the American continent.

CHAPTER XXIX.
The AusTRO-PfiussiAN War of 1866.

In this campaign the cavalry in the Prussian arm}'-
amounted to about 30,000 men, besides 7,200 in the
depot squadrons. This force was composed, including
the cavalry of the Guard, of ten regiments of cuirassiers
of four squadrons each, armed with cuirass, helmet,
sabre, and pistol, fifteen regiments of Uhlans of the
same strength, armed with lance, sword and pistol, ten
regiments of dragoons, armed with sword and needle
carbine, and thirteen regiments of hussars similarly
armed.' The cuirassiers and Uhlans formed the heavy,
the dragoons and hussars the light cavalry.*

The landwehr cavalry consisted of twelve regiments,
six of heavy and six of light, armed and equipped like
those of the regular army.

The Austrian cavalry had been somewhat reduced
after the war of 1859, and, on the opening of the cam-
paign of 1866, consisted of twelve cuirassier regiments,
who were without the cuirasses, which had been abolished
shortly before the war. These regiments were of four
squadrons each, except one of five ; and in addition,
each had a depot squadron.' Two regiments of dragoons,
fourteen of hussars, and thirteen of Uhlans, completed
tlie force, which had an eflective strength of about
26,()21 men.4

The cavalry of the Italian army at this time consisted
of four regiments of heavy cavalry of the line, seven
regiments of lancers, seven regiments of light horse, and

' Rustow, 37. 2 Hozier, 88. » Rustow, 24. < Hozier, 97.

486

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

one regiment of Guides. All the regiments, except the
Guides, had six field squadrons of 150 men each, besides a
depot squadron. The effective force amounted to about
12,600 horsemen. The regiment of Guides consisted
of seven squadrons, and had altogether 60 officers, 1,074
men, and 858 horses. It was not maintained for service
in line of battle, but was chiefly intended to furnish the
orderlies for the general officers. The heavy cavalry, as
well as the lancers, carried the lance.*

In this war the cavalry did not exercise any important
influence upon the result, nor did they render any
valuable services in either army. We look in vain in
the records of the war for great charges of cavalry in
mass, such as were the striking features of most of
Frederick the Great's battles, and of many of Napoleon's.
No action, save that of Nachod, was won, or even partly
won, by the charges of the Prussian horse, while the
Austrian light cavalry, the successors of those who had
enshrouded the great Prussian monarch in an atmosphere
of pandours, and shut him off" from all information, had
so fallen back from their former reputation that they not
only did not cone al the movements of their own army
from the enemy, but actually were so negligent in
watching the foe as to permit the Prussian Guard corps,
at the battle of Koniggratz, to penetrate into the heart
of the Austrian position, seize the key of it, and so secure
the victory.

An attempt was made at the battle of Gitchin, by the
cavalry under General Edelsheim, to check the Prussian
advance, and endeavour, by a charge at speed, to change
the foi'tune of the day in favour of the Austrians. The
Prussians had occupied the village of Podultz, which had
been set on fire by a shell just Tjefore they occupied it.
Edelsheim, at the head of three of Austria's finest cavalry
regiments, with desperate valour, made a dash at the
burning village. The horses recoiled from the flame?
and smoke, and the force was obliged to retire with some
loss. Afterwards the Prussians, pushing on in pursuit of
theii" foe, were charged again by the Austrian hussars.

^ Hozier, 108, 109.

nmg,

CHAP. XXIX.] AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866.

487

The advancing Prussians did not form square, but
received the charge in line, trusting to the rapid fire of
their breech-loading needle-guns to secure to them the
victory. Their confidence in their weapon was not mis-
placed, and the brave horsemen recoiled, with hea^y
losses, before the unceasing and pitiless storm of bullets
which hurtled through their ranks.'

The combat of Nachod, on the 27tli June, 1866, was
opened by a cavalry fight between the Prussian Uhlans
and dragoons and the Austrian cuirassiers, in which the
latter were beaten, after a severe hand-to-hand struggle.
It was a fight between lancers and swordsmen, and
similar to the cavalry engagements of preceding centuries.
The heavy men and horses in the Prussian ranks were
able, by their greater weight, to press back the lighter
Austrians, but the details of the fight shed no light
upon the effect of the modern weapons on cavalry
tactics.

After the Austrians were defeated at Koniggriitz, the
effect of the modern firearms was plainly apparent. The
retreating infantry were falling back at all points, from
Chlum towards the south of Kosnitz, when the Prussian
artillery and cavalry pressing on, began to harass them.
The Austrian guns, covering the retreat, played upon
the pursuing troops, and when the Prussian cavalry,
excited l)y the victory, rushed with wild impetuosity
against the retreating infantry — these, though run-
ning, still maintained their formation, and turned,
when the horsemen came too close, to stand and deliver
volleys, which drove them back with many a saddle
t'mptied.-

The Austrian cavalry were near to cover the retreat,
but were unable to charge the pursuing infantry, on
account of the heavy fire which they could not fac(;
without risk of destruction ; Imt when the enemy's
tsavalry pressed on, and so masked the fire of their guns
and foot-soldiers, the Austrian horsemen charged boldly,
and fighting desperately, sacrificed themselves to cover
the retreat ; ^ the charges swaying backwards and for-
' Hozier, 18C. - Ibid. 251. » Ibid. 252.

488

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

wards as fresh bodies were thrown into action. There
do not appear to have been any infantry broken by the
cavalry on either side, the defeated and flying Austrian
troops, halting and showing front if pressed too closely,
were always able, with their deadly rifles, to keep oft"
the pursuing dragoons.

The cavalry in both armies were well organised and
equipped, and brave and gallant soldiers, as was proved
by many of the skirmishes which took place, in which
both sides charged at speed against each other, and
fought with desperate energy at the closest quarters :
as, for instance, at Saar, on the 10th July, and at
Tichnowitz the next day. On the 15th July a gallant
charge was made by Colonel Bredow's regiment, the
5th Prussian Cuirassiers, against an Austrian artillery
train, on the road between Olmutz and Tobitschau. As
this is an excellent illustration of a successful and w^ell-
devised attack, we will reproduce the details from
Hozier's " History of the Seven Weeks' War" : —

" Bredow, under cover of some undulating ground^
formed his regiment in echelon of squadrons for the
attack of the guns. The first squadron he kept towards
his right, to cover the flank of his attack from any
Austrian cavalry which might lie in that direction ; the
second and fourth squadrons he directed full against the
front of the battery, and supported the second with the
third as a reserve.

" The squadrons moved forward in perfect lines, slowly
and steadily at first, seeming to glide over the field,
gradually increasing their pace, regardless of the tre-
mendous fire directed upon them, which emptied some
saddles. When within a few hundred paces of the
battery, they broke into a steady gallop, which increased
in rapidity at every stride that brought the horses nearer
the Austrian lines. All the time of their advance the
gunners poured round after round into them, striving
with desperate energy to sweep them away before they
could gain the mouths of the cannons. Eapid- flashes
of flame breaking from the mouths of the guns accom-
panied the discharge of the shells, w^hich were being

CHAP. XXIX.] AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866.

489

blurted forth with a nervous haste, through the thick
clouds of smoke that hung heavily before the muzzles.
The flank squadrons, trending a little away from their
comrades, made for either end of the lines of guns, in
expectation of finding there some supporting cavalry.
The two centre ones went, straight as an arrow, against
the guns themselves, and hurled themselves through the
intervals between them upon the gunners. Then the
firing ceased in a moment, and the smoke began to drift
slowly away ; but all noise was not hushed : shrieks from
men cut down by the broad blades of the cuirassiers,
cries for quarter, the rapid tramp of snorting and excited
horses, the rattle of steel, shouts, cheers, and imprecations
from the excited combatants rose up to heaven in a wild
medley, along with the prayers which were being offered
up by another armed host not many miles distant, at
Briinn, where, on this Sunday, the army of Prince
Frederick Charles was engaged in a solemn thanksgiving
for their hitherto victorious career. Eighteen guns,
seven waggons, and 168 horses, with 170 prisoners, fell
into the hands of the Prussian force. A noble prize to
be won by a single regiment ! It lost only twelve men
and eight horses, for the swelling ground, and rapid
motion of the gliding squadrons, baulked the aim of the
gunners, who mostly pointed their pieces too high, and
sent their shells over the heads of the charging horse-
men. Of the eigliteen captured guns, seventeen were
conveyed to Prosnitz. One was too much disabled to be
moved.

" While the Prussian cuirassiers were engaged in
drawing the captured guns to a safe place, a squadron
of hostile cavalry deployed from Nenakowitz. Colonel
Bredow placed himself at the head of his first squadron,
and charged to cover the retreat of his regiment's spoils.
This squadron dashed with a heavy surge upon the
hostile ranks ; the lighter Austrian horsemen, borne
down and scattered by their ponderous shock, broke in
wild confusion, could not rally, and were driven far
beyond Nenakowitz." '

' Hozier, 374, 375.

490

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD V.

In this fight Colonel Bredow proved himself a dashing
and efficient o3icer, and the above account of it contains
in fact a vo?ume of instruction, as to the proper method
of attacking artillery. Here Colonel Bredow protected
his flanks, held a reseiTC in hand, turned the flank of
the guns, captured them and carried them ofi", and, by his
foresight in keeping one or two squadrons in hand, was
enabled to defeat an attempt of the enemy to rescue the
guns. Had he thrown his whole regiment at once into
the fight, the success could not have been any greater,
while the chances were, that the fresh Austrian squadron,
coming down upon them while disordered by success,
would have defeated them.

The most gallant charge of the war took place in the
battle of Langelzalza on the 27th June, T866, where
the Duke of Cambridge's Hanoverian regiment of
dragoons dashed upon the Prussian retreating infantry
and captured some prisoners. The heavy cavalry of the
Hanoverian army made a most gallant charge, breaking
two Prussian squares, and capturing a Prussian battery
of artillery. The horsemen of Hanover, however, suf-
fered fearfully from the deadly rapidity of the needle-
gun.^ These cuirassiers charged over several hundred
yards of open ground, and their loss in killed and
wounded was about one-third. This was the only instance
of the kind during the campaign, and the Prussians
were retreating when the attack was made.

This war occurred one year after the close of the
American Civil War, but the experiences of that war seem
to have had no efi'ect upon the system of warfare in
Europe. The little use made by Benedek of his light
horse is a proof that he had not been much impressed
by the struggle which had shortly before taken place in
the New World. Although in its own country, among a
friendly population, where every information might
readily have been obtained, the Austrian cavalry had
done but little service in acquiring knowledge of the
enemy's movements. They had made no raids upon the
Prussian flanks or rear, had cut off" no convoys, destroyed

» Hozier, 279.

war

CHAP. XXIX.] AUSTRO-PKUSSIAN WAR OF 1866. 491

no railway lines, cut no telegraphs, wearied and harassed
no outposts, and, in fact, had neglected a great many
duties that the mounted riflemen of America were
continually and successfully perfonning.^

The Prussian cavalry in their outpost work had not
yet learned the proper and effective method of covering
the advance of an invading army. Their cavalry in this
war regulated its movements by the march of the
invading columns, and did not precede them to a very
great distance ; while the Austrian cavalry, as we have
said, kept within a small radius, and without enterprise
or dash only fought when they were attacked by the
advancing Prussian horse. When the hostile cavalry did
meet, when they did engage, no doubt they were well
drilled, manoeuvred steadily, and fought on both sides
with the greatest gallantry ; but can the reader compare
the services of the horsemen on both sides with those
performed in the United States, without admitting that
the services rendered, and the results gained by the
mounted riflemen in America, were not infinitely greater
than those of the horsemen in Bohemia in 1866 ? Nor
can anyone doubt that the American system was more
suited to the improvements in the modern projectile
weapons.

The war of 1866 was closed rapidly, with little cam-
paigning, and with really only one decisive battle, so that
the question of the effect of breech-loading weapons
upon modem warfare was not fairly settled. In 1870-
1871, however, a desperate war iDetween France and
Germany, in which both armies used the most improved
firearms, gave an opportunity of testing practically a
great many theories as to the proper system of tacticrs
under the present condition of the art of war.

It will be of great value to us to study the results of
this campaign closely, and see what lessons it teaches us
on the important question as to the future method of
employing cavalry in war.

• Hozier, 419.

CHAPTER XXX.

The Franco-German War, 1870-71.

The war between France and Germany in 1870 was
the first occasion upon which the improved projectile
weapons were used by trained armies on both sides ;
and consequently it is the only source from which we
can obtain the information upon which to form a
practical opinion as to the eiFects of their use upon the
relative values of the various arms of the service.

Both the contending armies had large bodies of
cavalry, carefully equipped and well drilled, although
the proportion of horsemen to the other arms was less
than in former wars, more through the great increase in
the size of armies than from any diminution in the
strength of the mounted force.

The French cavalry on its war footing consisted of
eleven regiments of cuirassiers and one of carbineers,
making twelve regiments of heavy or reserve cavalry.
Thirteen regiments of dragoons and nine of lancers
formed the cavalry of the line, while the light cavalrj-
was composed of seventeen regiments of chasseurs, nine
of hussars, and three of Spahis (a native African cavalry).
The Guards regiments and the light cavalry had six
squadrons each, one being the depot squadron. The
other regiments had four field and one depot squadron
each.* The entire strength on the war establishment was
40,000. This force was organised in brigades composed

^ Borbstaedt and Dwyer, 126, 127.

CHAP. XXX.] FRANCO-GRRMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

493

usually of two regiments, two or three brigades forming
a cavalry division.

Each French corps d'armCe of three or four infantry
divisions had a division of cavalry attached, which was
under the direct orders of the commander of the corps, so
that the commanding officers of the infanl.y divisions
had no horsemen u^der their immediate orders. This was
different to the German system, which gave one cavalry
regiment to each division of infantry. The want of a
small mounted force was on several occasions seriously
felt by the French divisional generals, as, for instance,
at Weissenberg, where General Abel Douay, with the
2nd infantry division of the 1st corps d'armee, had not
even a quarter of a squadron of cavalry to reconnoitre
his front, although well advanced and exposed to an
attack, which a day or two afterwards ended in the
complete rout and partial destruction of his division.'

In addition to the cavalry divisions attached to the
French corps d^armee there was a cavalry reserve corps
consisting of three divisions, making a total cavalry
reserve of forty-eight squadrons, thirty guns, and six
mitrailleuses.

The cavalry were armed as follows : — The cuirassiers
had the sabre and pistols only ; the lancers had the lance,
the sabre, and the pistol ; the light cavalry (chasseurs
and hussars) as well as the dragoons were armed, besides
their sabres, with chassepct carbines having a range of
800 paces.^ These last, though really mounted rifle regi-
ments, were practically cavalry, and were used mainly
in that capacity, although there were several instances
of their being used dismounted as inftintry.

The North German cavalry consisted of ten cuiras-
sier, twenty-one lancer (Uhlan), twenty-one dragoon,
eighteen hussar, and six other light cavalry regiments.
These seventy-six regiments had one depot and four
field squadrons, or about 600 horses each. The cuiras-
siers and lancers were heavy cavalry, all the others light.
The total cavalry of the German army, including the

' Borbstaedt, 256.

2 Ibid. 151.

494

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

South German troops, amounted to 369 .squadronn, (jr
about 56,000 men.

The organisation was different from that in the
French army. The German infantry divisions had (.'adi
a regiment of cavalry attached, while the remaind»!r of
the cavalry were organised in divisions and distril)utcd
through the different armies. There was no corpn
d'armee of cavalry as in 1866, the division organisation
being found to be the most convenient. Each of these
cavalry divisions, which consisted usually of two l)rigades
of two regiments each, had one battery of horse artillery
attached.

From the very outset of the war of 1870 the supe-
riority of the Germans in organisation and military
capacity was plainly shown. The wars of the Great
Napoleon, followed by the successes in the Crimea, and
more particularly in 1859 at Magenta and Solferino,
had led the French to believe that they were invincible,
and caused them to rest upon their laurels without
taking the proper care to keep up with the improve-
ments in the military art. The experiences of the Civil
War in America had taught no lesson to the French,
they considering, as the armies there were not originally
formed of professional soldiers, that the teachings of the
campaigns could be of no value.

They seemed to forget that four years of continual
fighting in the field with varying success would produce
professional soldiers of the highest type, men whose
practical knowledge of the business of war would be
greater than if their whole lives had been devoted to
peace training. The French, therefore, had gained no
advantage from the example of the system of working
cavalry that had been in use in America ; and conse-
quently from the very first their outpost service proved
an utter failure, and their horsemen, though brave and
gallant soldiers, were so badly handled, and their
employment so little understood, that they were use-
lessly sacrificed at Woerth and Sedan to no purpose.

Nothing stands out in greater relief in the account
of the war of 1870 than the shameful inefficiency of the

CHAP. XXX.] FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

495

FreiK^h in their outijoat service. It was either absolutely
neglected, as at Beaumont, or else so wretchedly
performed, that it wan a c(mimon thing during tht'
campaign for Fnaich troops to be surprised in their
encampments in broad daylight. The German cavalry
four years before had been opposed by the Austrian
horsemen, whose outpost work was also very inefl&ciently
performed. The Germans consequently gained more
boldness in carrying out their reconnoitring, and im-
mensely aided by the miserable incapacity of the French
light cavalry, in the minor operations of war, were able
to perform the most important services from the
commencement of hostilities by untiring watchfulness
and far-reaching reconnaissances in every direction.

The impunity with which the German patrols were
permitted to roam through the enemy's country, and
even in rear of their lines, led to the boldest and most
adventurous rides on the part of very small bodies of
horsemen, who were able to gather and carry back the
most important information as to the enemy's position
and movements. The careful and diligent instruction
that had been given in peace time to the German
troopers in this most necessary duty was of great
service to them when called upon to act in earnest in
the field.

On the night of the 23rd to the 24th July a
Prussian patrol of Uhlans penetrated the French lines
and blew up a viaduct of the French railway at
Saargemund, and from this time the Prussian cavalry
began to show their superiority. On the 26th July a
Wtirtemberg staff officer, Count Zeppelin, with a small
patrol of four officers and four privrtes, succeeded in
making his way through the French outposts near
Lauterburg, and rode for thirty-six hours through the
whole of that district. The party were surprised in
the Shirlen Hof, a small inn south of Woerth, and ten
miles in rear of the French outposts. Count Zeppelin
managed to escape, and carried back information of
great value in arranging for the advance of the Crown
Prince's army a few days after.

\\

496

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD V.

The Fren ^ at this time did nothing with their
cavalry ; in fact, General Abel Douay, with the second
infantry division, had no cavalry, and, thrown forward
in an exposed position, was virtually surprised at
Weissenberg, and overrun by the well-covered advance
of the Third Army. This gav'3 the firot success to the
Prussians, and two days afterwards, at Woerth, the
French right wing, still unprepared and dispersed, was
badly beaten by the advancing Prussians. The French
fought bravely and well in both these actions, but were
surprised and greatly outnumbered.

At the battle of Woerth, however, a charge of French
cavalry was made by Michel's cuirassier brigade, from
the right wing of MacMahon's position, against the
Prussian left, which was steadily advancing through
Morsbronn, and threatening seriously to turn the flank
of the French army. This body of cavalry, 1,000 strong,
in three lines, advanced over difiicult ground towards
Morsbronn. They braved the musketry fire which at
once opened on their left flank, and rushed on to strike
the Prussian infantry, while forming after their advauce.
These troops received the attack, however, just as they
stood, without forming either battalion or rallying
.squares, but in those formations which enabled them to
use their fire to the greatest advantage. In a few
moments the cuirassiers suffered fearful losses. The
remnants charging past, tried to gain the open ground,
and many were 'captured, very few cutting their way
through and esca^^ .^g by a wide detour. After run'^Mig
the gauntlet of the fire of the infantry and suffermg
terrible losses, the broken remains of the brigade had a
sharp hand-to-hand fight with a Prussian hussar regi-
ment which they met in their way. Michel's brigade
and the 6th French Lancers, which charged with them,
were almost d'^-stroyed ; very few of them again reached
the army. The Prussian hussars lost one man killed,
tweuty-three wounded, and thirty-five horses. The
losses of the infantry were very inconsiderable.

This sacrifice of the cavalry brigade served no other
purpose than to gain ^'me ^'^r the retreat of the French

confide

CHAP. XXX.] FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

497

right wing. The charge was gallantly made, the men
rode boldly on, there was no hesitation, and yet the fire
oi the infantry, who, it will be remarke'\ relied solely
on their needle-guns, and did not e""^en form square, was
sufficient to defeat and destroy them. We shall find
other examples in this war of the little chance cavalry
have of successfully using the old system of cavalry
tactics.

After the battles of Wcertii and Spicheren the French,
discouraged by their defeats, were obliged to retreat
rapidly in difierent directions, the debris of the right
wing, under MacMahon, moving by a wide detour to
the south around to Chalons, the remainder of their
army falling back upon Metz.

It was in the advance of the German armies at this
time that the cavalrj'^ shone out so brilliantly, and
proved that, although great improvements had been
made in the weapons of the other arms, and the chances
of success for cavalry on the battle-field much dimi-
nished, there was still a wide field of usefulness open
to it, when skilfully handled.

The cavalry at once pressed forward one or two days*
march ahead of the main body of the infantry, keeping the
enemy constantly in view, and, spreading far and wide
over a great extent of territory, formed an impenetrable
curtain or veil, which screened the movements of the main
army, and enabled it to march at ease and with perfect
confidence under the shelter so secured. These duties
were performed in the most admirable manner, with
boldness, energy, and skill, and proved conclusively the
enormous advantage to an army of a superior and well-
managed body of horsemen.'

When most nations had been reducing their cavalry, ^
in the ojiniou that its sphere of usefulness was gone,
the Prussians, and the other North Germans, had
strengthened rather than reduced the arm, and had
kept steadily in view the great value of a mounted force.

These wide-spreading detachments of horse complf *;ely
hid from the French generals all knowledge of the

> Borbstaedt, 352.

K K

SI-

498

A HISTORY OF CAVALRf .

[period V,

tions and designs of the Prussians. Patrols and small
parties of Uhlans and hussars seemed to show them-
selves from almost every point of the compass, and it
was impossible to discover from behind which portion of
the moving veil of horsemen the dense masses of the
Prussian invading host would burst forth to attack.

The German corps dJarnwe marched some twenty or
thirty miles in rear of these advanced posts in perfect
freedom, and without the slightest risk of being delayed
by the sudden appearance of hostile detachments in
front or flanks. The horsemen meanwhile swept forward,
pressed MacMahon far south of Metz, and occupied the
whole country between his troops and Marshal Bazaine.
They soon reached the Moselle. Nancy, the capital of
Lorraine, surrendered on the 12th August to six Uhlans,
who were soon followed by a larger party. The line of
the Moselle was occupied by the cavalry nearly down to
the walls of Metz. And these bolci and dashing exploits
of the German horsemen were the absolute cause of pre-
venting very considerable reinforcements from MacMahon
joining the main army.

The Germans then having crossed the Moselle, near
Pont-a-Mousson, the cavalry in lorge force swept
nc^'^hward to turn the right flank ot the French army
around Metz. By this time it was clear that the French
purposed retreating upon Verdun, and it became impor-
tant to intemipt, and, if possil)le, cut off* their march.
The main forces of the Prussians were still far to the
rear, but pressing on by forced marches. The cavalry,
well advanced, were endeavouring to hold the enemy in
check until the arrival of the infantry of the main body.
On the morning of the 15th August, the Prussian
advanced horsemen struck the Metz-Verdun road, and
were able to hold in check the French cavalry, and prac-
tically to delay the retreat for nearly twenty-four h.-^urs.
General Forton's cavalry division, which formed the
advance of the French army in their march, came across
Von Redern's brigade of the 5th Prussian cavalry division,
with a battery of horse artillery. This small force of
horsemen maintained a bold front, and, by an artillery

CHAP, x:

fire, cli
the Fr<
the pa]
for Gei
have eji
way an
lioweve
ville, ai
sealed.

The ]

marchii]

severe fi

to checi

away.

the grej

investmc

At th

Vionvilh

numbere

strength,

threatene

Flavigny

robert.

or artille]

the attac

made, av

ledge tha

command

roDs of th

He charg

Lancers i

tionally,

they rode

gunners c

full speed

received tl

The lines ^

deadly ex(

by the im-

be rallied

CHAP, xxx.] FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

491)

fire, checked the march of the whok' southern column of
the French army. The inefficiency nnd want of dash on
the part of the French horsemen was here very marked,
for General Forton had a sufficient force of cavalry to
have easily brushed the small Prussian brigade out of the
way and enabled the march to be continued. Instead,
however, of pushing forward, he fell back towards Vion-
ville, and practically the fate of Bazaine's army was then
sealed.

The next day the German infantry divisions, by hard
marching, began to come up one after the other, and, by
severe fighting at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, were able
to check the French, who were again attempting to get
away. This threw them back upon Gravelotte, where
the greatest battle of the war resulted in Bazaine's
investment in Metz, where he subsequently surrendered.

At the crisis of the battle of the 16th August, at
Vionville, the French forces, which at first greatly out-
numbered the Prussians, were pressing on in great
strength, and the exhausted troops of Alvensieben were
threatened by a vigorous attack, near Vionville and
Flavigny, by the French 6th Corps, under Marshal Can-
robert. Alvensieben had no reserves of either infantry
or artillery, and decided that his only hope was to check
the attack by a charge of cavalry. This charge was
made, avowedly as a sort of last resort, with the know-
ledge that the men would be sacrificed. General Bredow
commanded the brigade, which consisted of three squad-
rons of the 7th Cuirassiers and three of the 16th Lancers.
He charged in one line, but from the delay of the 16th
Lancers in deploying, the charges took place, uninten-
tionally, in echelon. Under a heavy fire of artillery
they rode onward, the guns were soon reached, the
gunners cut down ; and then on rushed the horsemen, at
full speed, upon the lines of infantry in the rear, who
received tlie charging squadrons with volleys of musketry.
The lines were broken with a rush, sabre and lance doing
deadl)- execution. Excited by the success, carried away
by the impetuous fury of their charge, they could neither
be rallied nor re-formed. A number of mitrailleuse were

K 2

oOO A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period v.

taken, when suddenly the scattered horsemen were
pounced upon, in their disorder, by the French 7th
Cuirassiers, and some Spahis and Chasseurs. In their
hurried retreat they were very badly handled, and
suffered great losses ; but the sacrifice was well repaid,
as it checked the attack of the French 6th Corps, which
would otherwise have been fatal. This was the boldest
charge of the war, and the only one that was to a certain
extent successful.^

A charge by the 1st Dragoons of the Prussian Guard,
made later in the day to relieve Wedell's brigade, was
unsuccessful, the fire of the unbroken French infantry
driving them back with heavy losses.^ Shortly after
General von Barby, with six regiments of cavalry of the
Prussian left, charged ten regiments of French horse,
under General Clerembault, who, strange to say, received
the onset with a carbine fire on the open plain. The
Prussians disregarding it fell on vigorously with the
sabre, and the short hand-to-hand struggle was soon
settled in favour of the Germans, whose superior weight
and horsemanship made them more than a match for
their opponents.

The battle closed just as it got dark by a charge of
the 6th Prussian cavalry division, in which Ranch's
brigade of hussars broke some French infantry squares.
This was caused by the darkness concealing their approach
until they were close. A violent fire, which was poured
upon them from all quarters, compelled the rapid retreat
of the division.^

The battle of Gravelotte was almost exclusively one
of infantry and artillery, and gives no examples of cavalry
tactics.

In the subsequent operations between zhe 1 8th August
and the battle of Sedan the contrast between the cavalry
of the two armies and the method in which it was used
was still strongly marked. MacMahon w^as obliged, at
the dictation of the Government in Paris, to make a
detour to endeavour to relieve Bazaine and effect a
junction with him. This scheme was feasible only if
' Borbstnedt, 405, 406. 2 ibi<j. 415. 3 jHid. 420.

CHAP. X

skilful

upon t

was an

trieved

but th(

The^

that th

cavahy

flank o

small J

have I

army, \

such a (

CHAP. XXX.] FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

601

skilfully and secretly carried out, and its success depended
upon the design being concealed from the enemy. Here
was an opportunity for the French cavalry to liave re-
trieved their reputation and materially aided their army,
but they failed signally in every particular.

They were very unskilfully handled. It is manifest
that the only possible chance of success was for the French
cavalry to have been thrown in all its force to the right
flank of the army, there to have spread in a long line of
small posts supported by reserves, so that a veil would
have been thrown over the operations of the French
army, which could have marched freely and rapidly under
such a cover. The concealment of the French march for
one or two days would have improved their chances of
success immensely. Instead of this, however, there were
!is many horsemen almost upon the French left as upon
its right, many more in front, and many also scattered
under the control of the commanders of the infantry
corps d'arm^e.

In fact, half the reserve cavalry had been at first placed
on the right to cover the movement, but on the 25th
August it was moved forward to Le Ch^ne, leaving the
whole flank of the French line of march exposed in the
only direction from which an attack could co^ne, while
Bonnemain's reserve cavalry division was uselessly idling
on the extreme left, where an attack could not possibly
have been expected.* The French army consequently
moved north-eastwardly with only the cavalry attached
to the infantry corps to guard the flank.

The result was as might be expected ; the Gcrm.iTm
soon discovered the change in the French plans, and the
whole invading army wheeled to the right and mnrched
against them. Impenetrable clouds of horsemen spread-
ing far and wide in froiit hid their march, and soon
enormous hosts of infantry were close upon the flank
and rear of the French colun.\ns, who moved on in blind
confidence, neglecting the simplest precautions.

The blow fell first on the 30th August upon the
5th F ench Corps, under General de Failly, which was
' Bonie, 111 ; Borbstaedt, 51 (i.

if-

I

502

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

encamped on the north of Beaumont. From some
unaccountable cause the French had entirely neglected
to send out cavalry to reconnoitre the woods south of
Beaumont. This was the more inexcusable as they had
every reason to believe that any attack was likely to
come from that direction.

The Prussians moving up under cover of the woods
approached close to the camp, and could plainly see the
French troops cooking and lying scattered about without
the slightest suspicion of their danger. The German
shells suddenly bursting among them was the first notice
of an attack which was vigorously made and entirely
successful. The French artillery had no time to harness
theii" horses, and so their guns were taken, and all theii-
tents, baggage, and stores captured.^

This was the prelude to the final disaster at Sedan.
In this last action under the Empire the cavalry again
proved that they did not lack the courage which has
always distinguished the French soldiery. Toward the
close of the battle General Ducrot wished to make a
last desperate effort to arrest the enemy by a grand
cavalry charge, and following it up, to break through his
lines. General Margueritte, with the Reserve Cavalry
division, was to have made the charge, and having broken
through the enemy's position, was to wheel to the right
and roll up their lines in that direction. The 2nd
Reserve Cavalry division, under Bonnemain, was to
support this attack, while the several regiments of
divisional cavalry of the 12th Corps wf^re massed
together and brought forward to act as a reserve.

The whole force moved forward to attack ; they
swooped down like a whirlwind, threatening to overwhelm
the Prussian infantry who were advancing to the attack.
The charging horsemen soon burst through the skirmishers
and pressed on towards the German battalion, which, in
deployed lines and steady formation, received them with
a perfect tempest of bullets from the swift-loading
needle-guns. Every effort to bear up against such ti
fire failed. The horsemen, though bravely striving and

• Borbstaedt.

CHAP. XXX.] FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

503

gallantly returning to the attack, were mown down in
Huch numbers as to leave piles of the dead and dying
men and horses all along the front of the Prussian lines.
The whole affair was a useless and terril)le sacrifice of
l^ravo men.

The wiiter received a letter shortly after the battle
from a distinguished officer of much experience who
took great pains to inquire into the facts of this attack.
The details are well worth reproduction. He says : —

" The question of cavalry charging infantry with
breech-loaders is, I think, settled conclusively by this
campaign. Wherever it has ])een tried l)y the 8th and
9th French Cuirassiers at Wcsrth, liy the 7th Prussian
Cuirassiers at Vionville on the 16th August, or by the
two French light cavalry l^rigades on their extreme left
at Sedan, the result has Ijeen the same — a fearful loss of
life with no result whatever.

" General Sheridan was an attentive eye-witness of
the four charges made by the French light cavalry at
Sedan, and gave me a most minute account of them. I
examined the ground most carefully only thirty hours
after, while the dead men and horses all lay there, so
that I formed as correct an idea of it as if I had seen it.
The first charge delivered by the 1st French Hussars
was made under the most favourable circumstances
possible. They were very well handled. As the Prus-
sian infantry skirmishers in advance of the main body
(^ame over the hill behind which they had been waiting,
they were led round under cover of the brow till they
got completely in rear- of and on the right flank of
the skirmishers. They thus got within 100 yards of
them before they were seen, and then charged most
gallantly, charging down the whole line. But even
lender these advantageous circumstances the charge had
no result worth speaking of. The Germans ran into
knots and opened tire ; a very few who ran to the rear
— say twenty-five or thirty — were cut down. On the
other hand, the fire of these clumps and rallying squares
completely destroyed the hussars. The two rear squad-
rons wisely swerved oft' imd regained the shelter of the

504

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[I'EHIOD V,

hill. Those who wont down the line were all killed,
wounded, or driven down on the Pnissian side of the
slope into a village and there eaptunMl. Jt did not
delay the advance of the Prussian infantry five minutes.
The succeeding chargi's made by tlie 1st, 3rd, and 4tli
regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique and the 6th Chasseurs
came to nothing, though they were most gallantly and
perseveringly made. The Prussians simply waited for
them in line till they got to within 150 yards, and then
just mowed them down with volleys — they were shot down
before they could get within fifty yards. It was a use-
less, purposeless slaughter. It had, practically, no result
whatever. The hill-side was literally covered with their
dead and the bodies of their little grey Arab horses.
These two brigades of five regiments must have lost
quite 350 killed, besides their wounded and prisoners.
There can be no greater scandal than to say they did
not charge home. General Sheridan assured me they
behaved most nobly, coming up again and again at the
signal to charge.

" They were sheltered from fire till the last moment,
were carefully handled, and skilfully and bravely led.
The ground they charged over was not more than 400
yards, yet the result was virtually their destruction as a
military body without any eiFect whatever.

" I took great pains to ascertain the facts. A friend
of mine whom I had known in Africa ten years before,
was a major commanding two squadrons of one of these
regiments. He showed me the roll of his two squadrons
with each man's name mailced oflF. The result was 58
men of all ranks left effective out of 216 that went
into action. The whole time they were under musketry
fire must have been leas than a quarter of an hour."

After the battle of Sedan the war mainly centred in
the two great sieges of Paris and Metz, the cavalry still
doing good service in keeping up the communications and
covering the operations. Several nstances occurred in
the operations in the provinces of France of successful
actions of cavalry, but they were all on a small scale.
At the battle of Amiens nome German squadrons rode

CHAP. XXX.] FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871.

605

down a battalion of marines and raptured several guns.
The 4th German Hussars also captured a l)atteiy at the
battle of Orleans and carried it off, while the 11th
Prussian Lancers also took a French battery at Soigny.
These successes won on the battle-field were not propor-
tionate to the large mass of cavalry, nearly 70,000
strong,^ which the Germans brought into the field.

Early in the siege of Paris the French had organised
small partisan corps unde.' the name of " Franc tireurs."
When these Franc tireurs became numerous the
Uhlans could no longer move freely to great distances,
but were almost always accompanied by battalions of
infantry, who marched with them to clear villages and
obstructed country of these volunteer riflemen, who
fought with great bravery.

This proves conclusively that the great successes of
the Prussian horse in the early part of the war were to
be attributed more to the extraordinary inefficiency of
the French cavalry, particularly in the way they were
used, than to any wonderful superiority in arms or
organisation of the celebrated Uhlans.

The system of attaching infantry to the cavalry neces-
sarily deprived the horsemen of their speed, and clogged
them so that the whole force in point of mobility was only
equal to the same number of foot-soldiers. In fact, the
great value of cavalry, its speed, and far-reaching power,
was gone the moment it had to march under the protec-
tion of infantry.

A careful study of the method of arming and
employing cavalry in the American Civil War should
have shown the Germans that if their horsemen had
been armed with rifles or carbines they could have done
equally well or better all that they performed in the
early part of the war, and would have been fully capable
of coping with all the " Franc tireurs " that they were
likely to meet in detached warfare.

In America, the mounted riflemen were continually
taking towns and villages; although well defended by
infantry and artillery. The "home guards," which
represented the same type of force as the " Franc tireurs,"

' Borbstaedt, 93.

inn., wi

506

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period v.

never cliecked the onward and rapid progress of the
Southern horse, who wouhl have ridiculed the idea of
being delayed and hampered by conforming to the march
of infantry in a raid or partisan operation.

The experience of the Franco-German war is very
remarkable on this point, for the brilliant exploits of the
Prussian cavalry in the beginning of the campaign
would lead one to expect that they would not have been
much embarrassed by the opposition of such undisciplined
and irregular troops. This is the most striking lesson
that the war after Sedan aflbrds to the cavalry officer,
and it requires very little thought to perceive the weak
point and the remedy for it.

This was the last great war from which we can obtain
information as to the cavalry operations of the future.
As I am writing, a struggle is going on between Turkey
and Servia in reference to which one can only get vague
and inaccurate accounts from the public press, so that it
is impossible at this moment to say whether the fighting
contains any useful experiences. The horsemen, as far
as can be discovered, have exercised no important
influence as yet. The following extract cut from a news-
paper, if true, is a good illustration of the value of the
revolver, and worthy of perusal : —

" In the battle of Saitschar, a Servian officer, Captain
Frassauovitch, distinguished himself greatly. He took
his sabre in his teeth, and, revolver in hand, charged
through a Turkish demi-battalion, captured the colours
and carried them off, leaving a dead or wounded Turk
behind him for every barrel of his weapon."

We will here close the historical sketch of the cavaby
service. We have traced the force from the misty
periods of the most remote antiquity, through all the
changes and vicissitudes of the intervening centuries,
down to the present day. Its gradual development to
its present condition we hope we have made clear to the
reader. It will fitly conclude our labours to consider in
the light of the experiences of the past and the know-
ledge of the present, what may be the best system of
organisation, armament, and employment in war of the
horsemen of the future.

PERIOD VI.

?:f

''M

THE ORGANISATION, ARMAMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT
OF CAVALRY IN MODERN WARFARE.

CHAPTER XXXI.

■m

Characteristics of Cavalry.

The cavalry service from the earliest period, when the
horse was used simply to convey the chief warriors to
the battle-field, down to the present time, has been
marked by certain peculiarities which have distinguished
it from the other arms.

The speed of the horse, and the impetuous spirit that
the constant habit of riding seems to impart to the
horseman, have in all ages caused the cavalry service to
be noted for its dashing and chivalrous temperament.
While steadiness and solidity have marked the infantry
and artillery arms, boldness and vigour have characterised
the cavalry.

At first, the speed only of the horse was used, the
warriors dismounting to fight on foot ; soon the idea
arose of employing man and horse as a projectile
weapon, so to speak, and hurling them at speed upon
the enemy's ranks. For many ages this was the regular
method of employing horsemen, and it can readily be
perceived that, under such a system, cavalry could
not act upon the defensive, but were obliged to act
always ofiensively. The result was that while infantry
could operate upon any kind of ground, could attack or

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508 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period vi.

defend with equal facility, tlie cavalry could only act
upon level and unobstructed country, and always upon
the move : cavalry proper could never assail strong
positions, if covered by obstacles, and could not resist
an attack at the halt.

These facts led to the employment of infantry in
great numbers as soon as the introduction of fire-arms
and pikes gave them a chance of defending themselves
against the onset of charging horsemen.

The great value of cavalry in outpost and detached
service, on account of their mobility and speed, always,
however, kept up their reputation and rendered necessary
the maintenance of large bodies in all armies. For this
service they have always been pre-eminently qualified,
no matter how armed or equipped, or against what
enemies they have been opposed. The light horse
of the Greeks, of the Persians, of the Eomans, all
were of great service in outpost duty, as have been
all good light cavalry in every age and under all
the changing conditions of warfare, from the time that
the Assyrian charioteers began to mount their chariot
horses, down to the period when the Prussian'^Uhlans
spread terror far and wide through the fields and country
villages of France.

In this important characteristic their fitness for
scouting, reconnoitring, raiding, &c., cavalry have always
been the foremost arm and without rival. In covering
an advance, in pursuing a retreating foe, their capacity
has always been unequalled, but upon the battle-field
there has been a constant and unceasing struggle, which,
with varying success, has been, and probably may be,
carried on continually.

It is curious to trace, as we have in the preceding
pages, the ever-varying conditions which have given
success now to the cavalry and now to the infantry,
with an almost impartial uncertainty.

The infantry in the earliest times were the only force
and the mainstay of armies. The charioteers soon began
to assume a superiority, and for a time formed an im-
portant item in the military systems of states. Then

CHAP. XXXI.] CHARACTERISTICS OF CAVALRY.

609

the cav^aliy, under Alexander the Great, used on a new
system, hurled with unaccustomed speed upon the
enemy, won successes which gave them for a time a
dominating intluence.

The Roman infantry long held the highest position, till
the successes of Hannibal's cavalry again turned the
scale in favour of the horsemen. Improvements in drill
and steadiness, and careful measures taken to meet with
the best advantage the horsemen of Pompey, led under
Julius Caesar to another revival of the prestige of the
Roman infantry. Laxity of discipline, the corruption
and luxury of the Roman infantry, produced; as we have
seen, under the Empire, a demoralized army that suc-
cumbed to the barbarian horse and again caused the
belief that cavalry alone were of service on the battle-
field.

The introduction of feudalism and the growth of
chivalry led to the exaltation of the cavalry force and
the abandonment of the use of infantry, until the English
archers and Swiss pikemen had invented a method of
meeting the armies of the age, and with bows, arrows,
pikes, and subsequently fire-arms, had learned to beat off
the charges of the mailed chivalry.

Again the horsemen rallied from the blow, and ingeni-
ously contrived a plan that, for the time, restored to
them the advantage. They could not force the serried
pikes, which formed an impassable obstacle to the use of
their " armes blanches" and under this protection the
infantry were able to fire at them with some effect
from their arquebuses. To meet this the horsemen
strengthened their armour, and being carried, were able
to wear it of such weight as to be a considerable
protection, and then, taking the infantry weapon, the
petronel or arquebus, they rode up, protected themselves,
and fired into the squares of the poorly-defended
infantry.

This again maintained the prestige of the mounted
forces, until fire-arms became so powerful as to render
armour useless. It was gradually lightened, and the
horpemen carried on their fighting by rank after rank

Ml!

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510

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

firing their pistols at close range until an opening was
made, by which they could disperse and then cut down
the foot- soldiers. The infantry were for a time after
this masters of the situation to a great extent, until, not
valuing the cavalry at its full woiuh, and seeing the
great advantage of the fire, they invented and adopted
the bayonet as an inefficient substitute for the pike, calcu-
lating that the increased fire would counterbalance the
loss of the difierence between the pike and the bayonet
as a defence against a charge. The bayonet alone was
never in itself a sufficient defence against a well-directed
charge of cavalry, and we do not believe that a body
of infantry ever existed that with the bayonet alone,
unsupported by fire, could have checked the determined
charge of good horsemen.

This was the system when Frederick came upon the
scene. Everything had paved the way for great successes
by good cavalry. The infantry well drilled, accustomed
always to fight upon the most level and unobstructed
ground that could be discovered, armed and trained to
resist a system of cavalry tactics of a slow and clumsy
kind, were naturally soon overcome when charged impetu-
ously by masses of well-drilled and well-led horsemen.
The wars of Frederick and the constant and brilliant
successes of his cavalry gave that arm a high reputation ;
and the infantry making no change and discovering no
new scheme or weapon to regain their superiority, the
result was that in Napoleon's wars cavalry exercised a
most important influence on the battle-field. So matters
stood until the rifled fire-arm was invented ; then came
the discovery of the breech-loader, with its length of
range, its precision of aim, its marvellous and terribly
destructive rapidity of fire.

The chang has now been made in favour of the
infantry, and the whole experience of the past shows
that it is useless for the cavalry to look back upon the
history of bygone ages and claim that cavalry must
succeed because they have succeeded. We must rather
do as our predecessors have done, give up attempting to
apply an old and exploded system of using cavalry now

CHAP. XXXI.] CHARACTERISTICS OF CAVALRY.

511

that the conditions which alone made it so successful in
the past have all changed.

When, in the sixteenth century, the discovery of fire-
arms and the use of pikes gave the infantry so great an
advantage, the horsemen of that day took two mersures
to apply to their own service the weapons that Avere so
deadly in the hands of their opponents. One method
was a recurrence to the earliest use of the horse in war —
it was to arm soldiers as infantry, and to use the horse
only for the purpose of rapid locomotion. Thus dragoons
were formed and used for many generations. The other
system was the riding up and firing with pistols into the
faces of the infantry soldiers. When we come to treat
of the organisation of the cavalry for the future we will
consider fully the best reforms to enable cavalry to gain
the greatest advantage from the modern method of
fighting.

As to the characteristics of the arm when cavalry are
fighting against cavalry, it is a peculiar characteristic of
the force that the side which brings the last reserve into
action is most likely to be successful. Thus it is neces-
sary for cavalry always to keep reserves in hand. Cavalry
is never weaker or easier to overcome than immediately
after a success. The men and horses are blown, the lines
disordered, confusion reigns paramount, orders are not
heard or attended to, and a fresh force falling upon it in
that state will invariably put it to rout.

Cavalry is always dependent upon the condition of the
horses. If they are not in an efficient state, if their shoes
are not carefully looked to and sore backs guarded against,
they are destroyed, and the force becomes worthless.

Another peculiarity of cavalry is that it should never
surrender, at least in a country at all open. This is one
of the best established maxims of the force. It should
always attempt to cut through, or if that is impossible,
by scattering to elude pursuit. Herein it difiers from the
other forces, who are only supposed to escape if they can.
The anecdote, related in the twentieth chapter, of Seidlitz
jumping with his horse off a bridge, is a good illustration
of this principle.

■[■: \y'

612

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

Cavalry is a very difficult arm to handle in the field ;
it easily gets out of hand, and becomes dispersed. It
can only be employed mounted, where the ground is
favourable. Cavalry proper is not suitable for defence,
and can only resist an attack by making an anticipatory
onset. Its reputation is not affected by a repulse, for
cavalry that has been overthrown and driven off the
field in confusion has often rallied and reappeared con-
fident and victorious.

Cavalry is as necessary to cover the retreat of a beaten
army as to pursue an enemy when victorious. The
charge of cavalry should be rapid and unexpected, and
must be made with confidence and pushed "home."
When the order to charge is once given, caution should
give way to impetuosity.

Cavalry-men require to be more intelligent and better
drilled than in the other forces. On outpost duty,
patrolling, and reconnoitring, the men are often obliged
to be self-reliant and to use their own judgment. This
does not occur to anything like the same extent in the
infantry or artillery.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Organisation of Cavalry into Different Kinds.

section i. — cavalry of the line.

It is plainly apparent to the thoughtful observer of
the progress of the military science during the last twenty
years, that the vast improvements in modern weapons
have to a great extent changed the conditions of war-
fare, and that the sphere of the cavalry service has been
much narrowed upon the battlefield, and its chances
of success considerably diminished. The system of
Frederick the Great has served its purpose, and it is left
to our arm now to look about and devise a new system
to suit the present state of affairs^

The experiences of the last war in France have estab-
hshed a few points very conclusively. In the first place,
it has been shown that the bravest cavalry, charging in.
the boldest manner, are almost certain to be cut to pieces
by the terribly destructive fire of the breechloading rifle.
The Prussian infantry, confident in the power of their
weapons, met the charging horsemen of France in line,
and drove them back with their fire alone. At Woerth,
at Mars la Tour, at Sedan, no matter by which side the
charge was made or by which infantry received, the result
was equally disastrous to the cavalry.

At Wcerth the French cuirassiers, who charged with
great bravery, were cut to pieces ; but their charge was
not altogether in vain, for it checked the Prussian

L L

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514

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

advance and materially covered the retreat of the French
army.

At Vionville the charge of Bredow's cuirassiers was
almost fatal to tliem, but it must be counted as a success,
as it checked an attack that otherwise would in all proba-
bility have defeated the Prussian army, and thereby mainly
contributed to the victory. A great sacrifice was un-
doubtedly made, but the result well repaid the losses.
These were the only successful charges of cavalry of any
importance, while the totally unsuccessful charges were
very numerous. For example, about noon on the 16th
August, at Flavigny, nenr Vionville, General Frossard
ordered General du Prenil to charge the Prussian lines
at once, or that all would be lost. The charge was made
gallantly in two lines. They rode boldly on, but were
mown down in such numbers that they were thrown into
disorder and repulsed. The losses of the French cuiras-
siers were 22 officers, 208 men, and 243 horses killed or
wounded in a few minutes. The losses of the infantry
in the same affair absolutely nothing.

The charges at Sedan teach the same story — tre-
mendous losses for the cavalry, and no result. The
lesson the war of 1870-71 teaches, therefore, is, that at
the cost of immense loss of life, and probable destruction
of the cavalry force, time may be gained, an attack
checked at the critical moment, and the fortune of the
day turned while trembling in the balance ; and of
course, if a victory is won by the sacrifice, it is worth the
cost. But the conditions of modern warfare are such
that the occasions when these sacrifices may be demanded
are likely to be rare, and the opportunity of using them
to advantage seldom met with. The action of cavalry
on the battlefield, especially on the old system, has
consequently been very much narrowed.

Still, however, the occasions will arise in which cavalry
may be thrown into the field to charge infantry or artil-
lery, and therefore all armies should have a certain
proportion of cavalry proper, trained, equipped, and
organized, with that object in view.

Taking that as admitted, we may conclude that one--

m

^!;i'

CHAP. XXXII.] ORQAlflSATIONOF CAVALRY.

515

fourth of the cavalry should be of that type, and then
the question arises as to how it should be armed,
equipped, and organized.

The idea naturally suggests itself, whether some use
might not be made of tlie great improvements in weapons,
so that the cavalry could apply to their own use some of
the new inventions. The horsemen did this with advant-
age for a time on the introduction of firearms, and
although subsequent changes rendered a recurrence to
the arms and system of Alexander the Great judicious,
it is no proof that at the time the knights adopted the
petronels it was not the best course for them to pursue.

The first idea would be to arm the cavalry with the
same deadly weapon, the breech-loading riHe, but as it is
a weapon requiring careful and steady aim, and an accu-
rate adjustment of the sights, it is manifestly quite
unfitted for use by mounted men, especially as the
dragoon stands boldly out, both man and horse, an open
and clearly esiposed target for the crouching foot-soldier,
who could haidly be discovered by the horseman at any
considerable distance. The use of the rifle from the
horse's back must therefore be considered as an expedient
never to be resorted to under any circumstances either
against cavalry or infantry. We may, therefore, confi-
dently assume that for caA'^alry to be used as cavalry,
for charging, they era gather no assistance from the
improved rifle.

Then comes the other expedient, the use of the re-
volver; and here we see some chance of aid to the
horsemen. We will, therefore, consider what arguments
there are in favour of the use of the revolver by cavalry
in the future.

The invention of this arm has given to the cavalry an
improved weapon, quite as advanced in proportion to
the old horse-pistol as the breech-loader is to tha old
musket. The revolver is apparently the most deadly
weapon that has ever been invented. The sword, lance,
carbine, long rifle, or cannon, do not have the same
murderous efi*ect. The reasons for this are numerous.
In the first place, it is only used at short range, when

L L 2

|l:,U

I m

616

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEBIOD VI.

men are mingled together in close fighting, and most of
the shots tell. Then it is not a weapon requiring care
and steadiness in aiming. The man merely looks at the
object and pulls the trigger, and tho sympathy between
the hand and eye is much more likely to carry the ball
straight, than an attempt at mechanical and mathematical
precision of aim under fire, when men do not distress
themselves with too much accuracy in bringing the two
sights and the object into a right line.

Again, in close fighting, the revolver's bullet cannot
be warded olf like a sword or lauce thrust. If it strikes,
the wound is severe. It does not require the speed or
weight of the horse to give it impetus, as does the lance,
or the perfect training of the charger, which is necessary
for an effective use of the sabre when mounted. Again,
it reaches faicher than sword or lance, and men armed
with these weapons might easily be shot down, before
having an opportunity of getting near enough to use them.

The experience of the past ages has certainly been
that cavalry v/hich used the pistol would invariably be
defeated by cavalry which charged boldly on with the
sabre. This is easily explained. The flint-lock horse-
pistol formerly in use had a very short rangej and was
undoubtedly a very inefficient weapon. It was, in fact,
comparatively worthless, for the shaking of the horse
was apt to derange the powder in the pan, or the flint
might miss fire, or the fire not reach the powder, and
even when it did go off", the chances were that the ball
had snaken out, and if not, that it would not carry
straight. In those days it may easily be imagined that
a body of troops depending on such arms in preference
to good swords would certainly be defeated, and
deservedly so.

But now, with revolvers, the whole features of tbe
case are changed. These arms will carry from 200 to
300 yards, and comparatively good shooting can be
made with them uo to 75 or 100 vavds, while in a mSUe
they are most deadly weapons. It is manifest that the
experiences of the use of the old flint-lock pistol with its
single barrel, and the rules and traditional maxims based

1

CHAP. XXXII.] ORGANISATION OF CAVALRY.

517

upon them, are not applicable to anything like the same
extent, in reference to the long range, sure-firing, repeat-
ing pi.stol.

The sword has not improved materially in twenty
centuries, and therefore the vast improvements in the
pistol must necessarily modify the views as to the rela-
tive merits of the two arms. The revolver was much
used in the American Civil War against sword, carbine,
and musket, and a few instances will convey some
instruction, and serve to aid us in considering what
prospect there is for cavalry of the future using the
new pistol as an important means of success.

A fight took place in Virginia in November, 1864,
between a squadron of Mosby's Confederate partisan
cavalry, under Major Richards, and a squadron of
Federal cavalry under Captain Blazer. After a sharp
hand-to-hand fight, in which the Confederates used the
revolver solely, the Federal squadron was completely
defeated ; the casualties were, on the Southern side, only
one man killed and several wounded, but so deadly was
the effect of the revolver, that Blazer's loss was twenty-
four men killed, twelve wounded, and sixty-two prisoners
and horses. This was in killed and wounded 36 out of
100 — more than one-third — while killed, wounded, and
prisoners comprised virtually the whole force. ^ The pro-
portion of the killed to the wounded is an extraordinary
proof of the deadly effect of the revolver.

Compare this with the fight at Egmont-op-Zee, on the
2nd October, 1799, between the English dragoons and
some French cavalry, where two troops dashed into 500
victorious French horse, and after a mHee drove them
off. Then the 500 French returned and met at the
charge the English reinforced by one troop ; a second
fight then ensued, and yet in both conflicts, the sword
being used on both sides, only three English troopers were
killed and nine wounded. In a fight of the same kind
with revolvers how different would have been the losses !

At Heilsburg, June 18th, 1806, a fight took place
between a division of French cuirassiers and two regi-
' Soott'8 Partisan Life with Mosby, 371.

' 'f i!:ilt

518 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period vi.

ments of Prussian horse, in which it is said tliat a French
officer camo out of the fight with fifty -two new wounds
upon him and a German officer received twenty. Imagine
a man receiving fifty-two hince and sword wounds without
loss of life or limb 1 How many shots would a man
receive from a revolver before being placed Aors da
combat f

Again, take the account of the charge of Morgan's
cavalry upon a Federal regiment of infantry at the battle
of Shiloh, in America, in 1862. General Duke, in his
history, says, *' We came close upon them before the
Federals fired. They delivered one stunning volley, the
blaze almost reaching our faces, and the roar rang in our
ears like thunder. The next moment we rode right
through them, some of the men trying to cut them down
ivith the sabre and making ridiculous failures, others
doing real execution with gun and pistol." ' This is a
remarkable testimony to the value of the revolver, and
shows out another peculiarity of the American cavalry,
that of combining dashing charges at speed with the use
of firearms, for Morgan's men seem to have used their
pistols without losing the momentum.

General Stephen D. Lee, an officer of experience in the
American war, says distinctly, " The sword has lost much
of its effectiveness by the improved revolver, with which
the cavalryman unll make the dashing charge with more
confidence. My experience was that the cavalryman
was timid with his sabre in fighting against the revolver,
and for the least excuse, will drop the sabre for the
revolver. .... In every instance under my
observation the revolver replaced the sabre with the
morale, with the trooper, and against the enemy."
" Again in the hand-to-hand conflict, -which rarely occurs
now (owing to the improved firearms), the momentum or
yluck decides the aft'air before the eighteen rounds in
hand are exhausted ; and the momeiitum with good
cavalry is as readily obtained with the revolver as with
the sabre, my observation being that the sabre is timid
against the revolver. The revolver is the aU-important
^ Duke's History of Morgan's Cavalry, 150.

CHAP. XXXII.] ORGANIBATION OF CAVALRY.

flit

weapon with the cava.ry man in motion, and is indispen-
sable in his equipment."

This evidence of an officer of great experience ia
certainly entitled to weight, and it is particularly to be
remarked that while he depreciates the sabre, and highly
values the pistol, that he is also equally convinced that
it should be only used as an adjunct to the momentum.
In fa^t, he would use cavalr}-- as did Alexander and
Hannibal, merely exchanging the old arm for an improved
and more deadly weapon.

Colonel Gilmor, one of the hardest fighters in the
Southern service, gives the same testimony in his ** Four
Years in the Saddle." Speaking of one fight in which he
used his sabre, and successfully, he makes the remark,
" Had I drawn my pistols mstead of sabre several
would have fallen, ioT we were at close quarters."

In another place he gives a most striking example
of the value of the revolver, "We had nearly all got
through a fence when I saw Kemp engaged with a
powerful fellow, who was closing in upon him with
sword upraised. Kemp always carried two pistols : in
one he had but one load, that he fired at hii adversary,
but missed, then threw the pistol at him and struck him
in the breast. The trooper closed in upon him before
he could draw his second pistol, and seizing him by the
hair, tried to drag him off the horse, at the same time
lashing him across the shoulders with his sabre. Kemp
held down his head and took it all, the while trying to
draw his pistol. I had cut my way to him, and had
raised myself with uplifted sabre to cleave the fellow's
skull, when Kemp discharged his pistol into his stomach
and he was free." '

Speaking of another figiit where his men were all
mixed up with the enemy, cutting and slashing at each
other right and left, he says, *' Very few pistols were
u^ed, or our loss would have been twice as heavy."

Major Scott's " Partisan Life with Mosby " also teems
with evidence of the same nature. He refers to one
fight of 100 of Mosby's men with about the same force

» Gilmor, 235.

020

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

of Fedtral cavalry, in which the Southerners used the
pistols. The Federals were thoroughly defeated, with
the loss of tiventy-six killed and ivounded, fifty-four
prisoners, and eighty horses, while the Confederate loss
was absolutely nothing. An account is also given of a
Federal lieutenant with an orderly, who was surprised
by a few of Mosby's men. With his revolvers he alone
opened a fight, and in a few minutes had killed or
wounded four of his as^^ailants and driven off the
remainder. Scott says, ^oon the gallant officer was
master of the field. It was death to stand before that
unerring pistol."

We have entered rather fully into the experiences of
the American war, '^s to the use of the revolver by
cavalry, as it is the only instance where that weapon
was generally used on both sides, and it is important to
gather all the information possible in striving to suggest
some new scheme by which cavalry may improve to the
utmost their chances of success.

The Franco-German War however furnishes a most
extraordinary proof of the inefficiency of the sabre as an
oflfensive weapon. The German medical staff" have lately
issued a report upon the deaths and wounds inflicted by
the various weapons upon the German troops. The losses
of the Germans in the whole war of 1870-71, amounted
to a total of 65,160 killed and wounded. Of these 218
only were killed and wounded by the sabre and clubbed
muskets. Unfortunately the sabre wounds are not given
separately, but assuming that these casualties were all
inflicted by the sabre, the result is still most remarkable.
Of the cavalry, 138 were killed and wounded by the
sabre out of a total of 2,236. The most striking point
of all however is the very small proportion of the killed
to the wounded. The total killed by the sabre being, all
told, only six ! ! — the wounded 212. In all the cavalry
fighting at Woerth, at Vionville, at Sedan, in the battles
on the Loire, and in the Northern provinces ; in all the
outpost service, extending over almost half of France,
the only deatlis caused by 40,000 cavalry with the sabre,
in six months' campaigning, amounted to six, while in

CHAP, xxxii.] ORGANISATION OF CAVALRY. 521

the instances we have just mentioned — out of 100 men,
Mosby's cavalry in one skirmish killed twenty-four and
wounded twelve with their revolvers, and in another
instance out of a similar number, twenty-six were killed
and wounded in the same way.

The writer has heard the sneer made that the American
cavalry would not charge boldly with the sabre, and that
the reason they did not use that method of fighting was
because they dreaded the cold steel. We would ask the
reader which system, testing it by the results, is the most
deadly, or requires the most pluck — that in which, in a
paltry skirmish of a few minutes' duration, 24 men were
killed out of 100, or that in use in the Franco-German
War, in which the deaths from the sabre in six months'
campaigning, amounted to an average of one a month,
out of 60,000 cavalry ?

For the cavalry proper we may fairly conclude that
they should be armed with swords and revolvers. At
present cavalry are only likely to be ordered to charge
infantry when it is somewhat shaken and confused, and
when the charge may be made to advantage. If the
experience of the Franco-German war is to be taken as
a guide, the infantry will receive the attack in lines, or
if skirmishing, in groups which will fire steadily upon
the horsemen to the last moment. This fire is certain to
shake and disorder the ranks of the cavalry to such an
extent that the horses can easily swerve piist the groups
and through the intervals, fully exposed all the way to the
fire of the infantry. On returning they would be equally
exposed to tremendous losses. The chances are that
the groups, if firmly held together, would, to a great
extent, m.aintain themselves, and, unless broken, the
losses they would receive in such a charge would be
nothing.

Any groups that would be l)roken, any fugitives that
would run to the rear, might, of course, be cut down by
the cavalry, but otherwise the chances would be all in
favour of the infantry. A charge in serried lines, well
closed together, and moving on in perfect order, would
probably smash through the infantry if they only rode on

:l|i|illl

1 !■ MlJ
I hi'

622'

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

boldly. The troops of Frederick continually did so ; but
now the conditions ai ^ changed. Except under the most
extraordinary circumjtances, the cavalry would be
exposed to fire for some hundreds of yards, and the
losses of men and horses would naturally be so great,
that the attack at the moment of contact could not be
made in order, but would necessarily be in loose, shaken,
and confused lines. Now, with the sabre alone, even
when surrounding groups of infantry at close distance,
how can the horsemen inflict much inj iry upon
them ? The blow could be received on the rifle, the
thrust parried by it, the only real advantage woulr! ''^o
that gained by the momentum of the horse anJ -^; r,
moving at speed. This momentum, however, acquires no
additional force through the sabre, and would be equally
efiective were the man unarmed. This principle was
well illustrated by Colonel Shewell in the Balaklava
charge. He returned his sword, and with a rein in each
hand, led his men at full speed into the centre of the
Russian horse. He was successful, forced his way
through, and got ofi", although practically unarmed.'
Adjutant Moore, at Bushire, in Persia, let his sword
hang by the sword-knot, and, taking a rein in each
hand, burst through the hostile square without being
wounded.

Now, suppose that cavalry of the future in attacking
infantry were to charge at full speed revolver in hand,
each man taught to fire at the galop, and each man
instructed that he was, without halting, to shoot a gap
for himself in his own front, and so to effect an entrance :
why should not this be a more effective system than
riding up with the sabre ?

Two or three shots from each man at within say
seventy-five paces, should certainly cause some loss —
distract the aim of the infantry, shake their formation,
and lead the most timid to fall to the rear. Then suppose
a hand-to-hand fight to ensue, would not the revolver be
the most deadly of idl weapons ?

Careful training would produce cavalry that could fire

' Kinglake, ii. 560.

ana!

•<-]->, i

CHAP, xxxii.] ORGANISATION OF CAVALRY.

523

ffer

with great accuracy with their revolvers at full speed,
and as it will be readily admitted that horsemen intended
for charging in the future must be thoroughly well
drilled, there is no reason why this should not form an
important portion of their instruction. And once the
momentum could be secured, in addition to an effective
use of the repeating pistol, would not a cavalry force be
obtained that would be far more likely to break infantry
than if armed with the sabre ?

Great stress is laid upon the moral effect of the flashing
sabres upon the minds of the foot-soldiery ; but if we
anab '^ ih'ir, moral effect we soon come to the conclusion
that the sabre itself has but little to do with it. Suppose
th;; cavalry to come up at a slow walk, sword in hand, or
:v] , the cavalry to await the attack at the halt, how
u^iifince would the sabre have on the minds of

ni

the miaiiir* ^ Comparatively speaking, none. Suppose
serried line? • ' 'lorsemen in good order charging at
furious speed with th.^ )rds in the scabbards, would

ence exerted by the rush

-,q

U!

there not be a great

of the advancing masses •• .nd if the "'^eed was
maintained, would not the iiitu-iitr shrink fic^ the
shock, more than from the attack of the h^^j- -^t ~ . ^^d
in hand, at a slow pace ?

We are satisfied that the momentum is the gi .dJ po rer
after all, both moral and physical, and if to that the
revolver with its deadly fire be added, the morale should
be greatly increased. The great confidence of the in-
fantry in their firearms would also lead them to fear the
rapid volleys of the pistol more than the flashing of the
sabres.

It seems therefore that if cavalry are to he used for
charging on the battlefield against infantry or artillery,
that all the arguments point to the advantage to be
derived by organizing, arming, and training the regular
cavalry to use the revolver skilfully at speed, and to.
employ it at close quarters instead of the sabre. The
sabre should be maintained for use in the pursuit and
in combats with the enemy's horsemen, where, through
being able to attack without heavy losses in the advance.

i. 1 1

624 A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. [period vi.

order might be better preserved and the sabre used to
a greater advantage. In the Confederate army they
seemed to allow each individual soldier to use whichever
weapon he felt most confidence iu, and the result wa3
that charges were often made where the men used swords
and pistols side by side at the same time.

Any army that organizes a force on this principle, if
the men are only thoroughly drilled to appreciate that
the firing should not slacken the rush of the charging
oquadrons, will have a great chance of winning brilliant
cavalry successes. The fear of the revolver bullets will
shake the aim and render the losses lighter, while the
horseman, having an effective weapon at close range, will
instinctively hurry on to close quarters, knowing the
advantage he will thus obtain. A few cavalry successes
of this kind would improve the morale of one arm and
depress that of the other, and then victory would follow
victory.

A large revolver is also not altogether useless as a
defence against the sabre. In the American war it was
constantly used to ward a sabre cut or parry a thrust, as
well as to pour in sharp and deadly discharges.

The more this subject is considered the more clearly
apparent is it that great eftbrts should be made to secure
the advantages of this splendid weapon to the cavalry
service. This doctrine is of course rank heresy in the
eyes of all the old-fashioned cavalry officers, who, reason-
ing solely from the past, uphold the sword because it
has been the most successful weapon in the cavalry
heretofore. But it is a blind following of precedent that
alone supports this view. An intelligent consideration
of the past history of cavalry shows that from time to
time changes have always been made to suit the state
of warfare of the age, and we hold that a change should
be made now, and that cavalry intended for the battle-
field should rely greatly upon the revolver.

So much for cavalry proper.

CHAP. XXXI 1.] ORGANISATION OF CAVALRY.

ft2ft

SECTION II. — MOUNTED RIFLES.

We have said that the cavalry proper should only
consist of one-fourth of the mounted force of an army.
The sphere of cavalry on the battlefield has so narrowed
that it would be a mistake to maintain too large a force
of a kind not likely to be much used. The light cavalry,
however, intended for the minor operations of war, the
force upon which the army should depend for information,
for protection, for convoying, raiding, &c., will always have
the most important and most vital services to perform
in covering the marches and camps of the main body.

No studeac of military history can fail to have been
impressed with the extraordinary influence which the
operations of the light troops and outposts have always
exerted for good or ill, as they have been either well or
badly performed. The instances in the preceding pages
are so numerous and striking as not to need reference.
It may simply be said that perhaps nothing tended more
to the defeat of the French in 1870 than the wretched
inefficiency of their horsemen as outposts, and the careful
performance of that service by the German cavalry.

Again, speed in movement is one of the greatest
elements of success in war. 3o much was the Great
Napoleon imbued with this idea that he expressed the
opinion that an army of 10,000 men which could average
twenty miles a day would produce as great an efiect on
the success of a campaign as one of 20,000 that only
marched ten miles a day. If this is true, and it is un-
doubtedly the correct principle, by placing 10,000
men upon horses they should be equal in value to
20,000 men. But we have seen 3at cavalry cannot
defend a position, cannot even act effectively upon the
defensive, that they cannot act on every description of
ground, or attack entrenched positions ; therefore, in
most instances, these circumstances would detract from
the value of the 10,000 men and counterbalance the
effect of the extra speed. But if these men, on arriving
at the point where they are required, can dismount and

9H

A mSTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PFaiOD Vii

fight on foot as infantry, they can then be used on any
kind of ground, and need not fear the danger of beino"
cut off in case of being obliged to retreat. This fact
led to the formation of draofoons.

When Alexander the Great was pursuing Darius we
remember that he placed 500 of his best infantry on the
same numbei of cavalry horses, and thus hastened on
towards the enemy. Before his time chariots were used
with somewhat the same idea. In later times the
principle was revivt ., and dragoons formed for many
years an important portion of armies. Napoleon had a
good opinion of this force, he said that cavalry of all
descriptions should be furnished with firearms and know
how to manoeuvre on foot.'

The value of a dragoon force able to move quickly to
a decisive point, there to fight on foot, has been appre-
ciated to a certain extent from the earliest periods.
There have been causes, however, which for many years
have led to this force being but little valued. The
extraordinary successes of the charging horsemen of
Frederick the Great threw the dragoon force into the
shade, and led to the belief that the system was faulty.
There were also many other weighty reasons which in
past times prevented the full value being derived from
this method of arming and employing horsemen.

Formerly battles being fought on open plains gave
but little opportunity for dragoons to dismount to operate
with advantage. Where the ground was open and level,
in the then condition of the armament of the infantry,
it was often better for the dragoons to act as cavalry, and
charge the infantry at speed ; consequently, the dragoon
regiments became, in most armies, l ly cavalry, and
were almost invariably used in that capacity. In fact,
their equipment was not designed to enable them to
fight on foot with advantage, and thus the dragoon
principle had fallen into disfavour.

In this matter also we must be guarded against preju-
dices which are based upon difficulties which existed
under the former state of the military art, especially if
' Liskenne, vi. 356. . *

CHAP, xxxii.] ORGANISATION OF CAVALRY.

527

those difficulties do not exist at present, or may be
remedied. The dragoons, except in the American war,
were formerly armed with the old-fashioned smooth-bore
carbine, a weapon of contracted range and uncertain aim.
In former wars, when so armed, the infantry also being
armed with the clumsy musket, battles were fought in a
very different method to that in which actions are now
contested. In the time of Frederick the Great and
Napoleon, the short range of projectile weapons caused
the armies to be drawn up close together at the com-
mencement of the action, and the stress of fighting began
practically with infantry, at the close range of about
300 yards, and continued up to 40 or 50 yards, and
often to the shock of bayonets, before the victory was
decided and one side fell back. Now, however, the
circumstances of the case are very diffeient. In the
Franco-German war the firing of the infantry lines against
each other often commenced at the distance of 1,500
paces, and they rarely came within 200 paces without
one party giving way. In fact, the real zone, so to
speak, in which infantry actions were usually decided,
and f'^e sharpest musketry fire took place, was from say
600 down to 150 paces, the crisis of the fight being
generally at about 400 paces. We see therefore that,
with the present weapon, a defending force can commence
to annoy an approaching enemy at over 1,000 paces, the
fire increasing in effect gradually, until at 600 paces it
becomes very deadly, and for that whole distance an
advancing force would be subjected to terrible losses.

Adding the rapidity of fire, and certainty of aim, to
this long range, we find that the zone in which infantry
actions are fought, or to speak more accurately, the
dangerous zone in which musketry fire is effective, is not
only increased from about 250 yards to more than
double that distance, but that the number of missiles
discharged in each hundred yards of the zone has been
quadrupled, and with more accuracy, and greater power
of penetration.

Bearing all this in mind, we can see that under the
old system of warfare, dragoons dismoupting.to defend «

628

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

position, and placing their horses under cover, say 100
or 200 yards to the rear, would only have an opportunity
of making an eflfective fire at short range, and in case of
a rapid and vigorous attack, would only be able to fire
a very few ineffective rounds before the infantry would
have crossed the narrow zone, in which alone their arms
could inflict any damage. Again, in those days the
action was not decided either way until the opposing
forces had come to close quarters, often evon to the shock
of bayonets. Si pposing, then, the dragoons to be over-
matched and obliged to withdraw, if they retreated to
the horses when the enemy were close upon them, they
would be caught in tb " istant of mounting, and badly
handled. The fear of this would lead them to break for
their horses too soon, and they would often consequently
be defeated from that cause.

Now how different are the conditions of such a fight !
The dragoons, or mounted rifles, can place their horses
in the rear, and taking up a defensive position, can begin
to annoy at 1,000 paces, to inflict loss at 600, and after
+hat to pour in deadly volleys, so that the action can be
decisively settled before the approaching enemy would
come within 200 yards. There would be nothing to pre-
vent mounted riflemen, provided their horses were under
cover, say in a wood, or behind a village, to remain
fighting until the enemy were within 150 yards, and
then run to their horses and mount, and galop away in
case of being overmatched.

It will be at once admitted that the modern weapons
and system of fighting have given an opening for the use
of mounted rifles, such as that arm never had under the
old method of armament. The much greater breadth of
the zone of fire, the great increase of the distance at which
the result is now decided, has completely revolutionized
the conditions under which dragoons used to fight. The
time taken by the dismounted horseman, in case of
defeat, to regain his horse has not been increased, while
in the future the time he will have to accomplish it in
will he quadrupled. The power of his weapon, dismounted,
both in range, rapidity of fire, and execution, has been also

i

CHAP. XXXII.] ORGANISATION OF CAVALRY.

639

marvellously increased. It is folly of the worst kind to
o.pply the liiLxims based upon a certain condition of
aflfairs, and to act upon them, when the conditions which
alone gave force to the maxims have been reversed or
done away with.

This is not mere theory. Who that has read the
accounts of the mounted riflemen in America can deny
their great usefulness and efficiency ? Tne horsemen in
that country could perform outpost duty with wonderful
ability — they could dismount and fight in line of battle
against infantry, cavalry, or artillery ; they could attack
fortifications, capture gunboats, storm stockades, in fact,
do anything that could be expected of soldiers. And it
is marvellous that the Prussians or French had not
adopted the idea, and used it in 1870-71.

Does any one believe that the Germans have not learned
a lesson from the experiences of the latter part of the
war in France, when the franc-tireun compelled the
celebrated Uhlans to march under the protection, or with
the support of infantry ? The lesson then taught should
not be lost. The chances are that in the next European
war, whichever nation employs the mounted rifles exten-
sively will be found winning decisive campaigns by the
wise adoption of a necessary reform. In fact, at this
moment the Germans are arming a large proportion of
their cavalry with long-range carbines, with the object
of enabling them to act as mounted riflemen.

Another great advantage in mounted rifles is, that if
accompanied by light artillery, a movable army is
secured, which with the rapidity of movement of the best
cavalry combines the power of acting on every description
of ground, either ofiensively or defensively. This makes
this force the best suited for outpost duty, for which it
should be specially trained. The men should be taught
to dismount and manoeuvre on foot, three men of every
section of four dismounting, the remaining one taking
care of the horses. Number three of each section should
hold the horses, as he would have one on his left side
and two on his right. Great care should be taken to
practise these men to move about, advancing and retiring

M M

530

A HISTORY OB' CAVALRY.

[period VI

with the horses, so as to secure cover, to follow the
advance of their dismounted comrades, and to move
rapidly up, in case of a necessity for remountino- the
whole force.

A mounted force of this type would be useful in every
situation, and particularly on dv^.tached service. General
Stephen D. I.ee, already quoted from, says : " The equip-
ment of the cavalry man with the recent repeating rifle,
and revolvers of modern invention, in my opinion has
increased his efficiency, proportionally, more than either
the infantry or artillery arm has been by the inventions
applicable to those arras. It enables the commanding
general almost to detach an army corps of infantry with
the celerity of cavalry, for an important blow at a dis-
tance, or even on an extended battle-field for a critical
flank." " A large body of cavalry, as now armed,
is a match for almost any emergency, it is an army in
motion, and on a flank its blow is terrible, and against
communications, magazines, &c., its damage disastrous."

CHAPTER XXXni.

Armament and Equipment.

t. — heavy cavalry, or cavalry of the line.
I i foioc a^ id be composed of powerful men on

so<,

Jd

l)e trained to the greatest

strorrvr ■iorR:,o. a^,

possible steadme!^ /'k- ..ims, as already mentioned,

should consist simply oi I wo r ^1^:1 and a sabre. One

revolver should be carried on rh(

'he other on

the horse.

As to dress there are a few general points tliat .-l^
mentioned. The uniform should sit close to the bouy
l)ut not too tight, in order to give perfect freedom to the
use of the limbs. A light metal helmet is the best head-
piece, and a good protection against a sword-cut.
Cuirasses, to be a defence against modern arms, would
have to be so heavy that men could hardly carry them,
and unless buUet-proof they would be injurious rather
than otherwise. As speed is important in getting over
the dangerous zone of fire as quickly as possible, the
cuirasses should be abolished, and light chain shoulder-
straps as a protection against sword-cuts, and gauntlets,
with light steel bars to the elbow, should be the only,
species of defensive armour.

Jack-boots reaching to the knee are also very useful
to horsemen, as they keep the feet dry, protect the legs
somewhat in the crowding in the ranks, and when pulled
off at night enable the soldier to sleep comfortably, with
dry trousers around his ankles, which could not be the
case with the leather-covered overalls used in some

armies.

til

M M 2

532

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

fPEIlIOD Vt.

Cavuliy 80 cqui|)i)cd riding witli pistols against an
op; osing force ot cavalry armed with sabres would be
almost invulnerable, while able themselves to infliet
fearful losses. The helmet wouhl protect the head, the
chain-straps the shoulders, the jack-boots the legs, and
with armed gauntlets and the revolver in one hand, the
chances in favour of the horsemen coming out of a mclce
with swordsmen without serious injury would be very
great.

The losses inflicted by the sabre, even when the oppos-
ing parties are closely mingled together, often astonish
one by their trifling nature. Colonel Von Borcke, in his
" Memoirs of the Confederate War," gives an account of
a night surprise, in which two Southern cavalry regiments
charged through each other by mistake. He says, "The
Ist and 3rd Virginia, under this mutual delusion, had
charged through each other in a splendid attack before
they discovered their error, which was fortunately
attended with no worse consequences than a few sabre
cuts."

Every care should be taken to cut down the luggage
of cavalry men to the lowest possible point. They
should carry but little more than is upon their backs,
reserve supplies of clothing being kept in waggons far to
the rear. The men should not be allowed to carry their
valises on their horses while campaigning, as they would
be sure to be filled as full as possible, and the horses
would sufl'er.

Dragoons and cavalry should have a long overcoat, or
cloak with sleeves, split up a little behind to spread on
the horse, and made so that the belts might be worn
over it in case of need, as well as under it. The cloak
without sleeves is very awkward and clumsy.

Hozier, in his history of the war of 1866, speaking
of the dress of the Prussian soldiers, makes a remark which
strongly supports the idea of not allowing the cavalry
to carry valises. He says that the Prussian infantry
were " weighed down by their heavy knapsacks, which,
although of a better construction than those of most
armies, ivere hardly required, and though present were

(iiAP. xxxiii.] ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT.

088

seldom looked into in the actual campaign. Railways
and improved roadH have made great alterations in the
necessities of a warrior, both by shortening the duration
of campaigns and facilitating transport." " Soldiers
need no longer be weighed down by heavy loads upon
their backs, held back from their real use, marching and
fighting, to be converted into beasts of burden." '

This applies with equal if not greater force to the
cavalry, whose speed and endurance constitute their
great value.

II. — LIGHT DRAGOONS, OR MOUNTED RIFLES.

This force should be dressed more lightly than the
other, and do not require the helmet or gauntlets, as
(jvery point must be considered that will tend to render
them effective dismounted. A light head-dress, fitting
(dose to the head, should be used instead of the helmet,
as the mounted riflemen may often be obliged to skirmish
through woods and broken country. The boots should
be worn outside the trousers, but might be lighter than
those of the heavy horsemen. The carbines should be
carried in a bucket on the saddle behind the right leg,
and it would seem as if a weapon somewhat larger than
the ordinary carbine would be the best kind of arm for
this force. The infantry long rifle is not suited for use
on horseback, as it is too large and clumsy. A medium
might easily be secured between the two. This carbine
should be a breed. • '^ader, not a repeater.

A revolver should be carried on the waist-belt as a
reserve weapon for close quarters, either mounted or
dismounted, while a sword might be attached to the
saddle to be used only when mounted, and then only in
case of fadure of ammunition or some other contingency.
It might be available, for instance, in a pursuit when the
enemy were broken and flying. In the Confederate army
many of the mounted riflemen had no swords at all.

The sword should not be attached to the man, as it

is a most troublesome encumbrance to a rifle skirmisher

when dismounted. In fact the sword, the high shako

and plume, the tight strapped trousers, and the spurs,

' Hozier, Seven Weeks' War, 445.

r>34

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

all combined to make the jld-fashioned dragoon when on
foot as useless and clumsy a foot-soldier as could well
be conceived, and was one reason of the failure of
the dragoon principle in the past.

It was extraordinary that this was not remedied
formerly, for the sword is a weapon of but little use
dismounted. The carbine should rarely if ever be fired
from off the horse's back, for any mounted charging
should be done with the revolver or sabre. The same
arguments in reference to cutting down the weight
carried to the lowest possible point, apply with equal if
not greater force to the mounted riflemen, upon whom
should devolve all the detached service.

This force should also carry among them a few small
axes or hatchets, attached to the saddle in leathern casc3.
There should be a few in every troop, for they arc
required for breaking down fences, making breastw^orks,
cutting wood for fires — making liuts and shelters, cut-
ting down telegraph poles, &c. As it is absolutely
necessary that cavalry should always have axes with
them, it is better that some of the men should carry
them, rather than that they should be carried in
waggons.

Tills fcrce being mainly employed for outpost and
detached service, should be composed of intelligent men,
and should be plentifully supplied with maps of the seat
of operations, which all the non-commissioned officers
should understand how to read and use.

With reference to the horses it may simply be said,
that the heaviest and most powerful horses should be
given to the heavy cavaliy, w^hile the lighter animals
should be given to the dragoons. It must also be
remembered that the value of cavalry of any kind
depends mainly on the horses, and that every effort
should be made by careful feeding, shoeing, saddling,
&c., to preserve them in a good condition.

It is the strength and lasting qualities of the horse
which make the mounted man formidable. The animal
should not be made therefore to carry unnecessary weight,
^nd all cavalry officers should bear this point in mind.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
Employment of Cavalry in a Campaign.

Although the sphere of cavalry on the battlefield
lias undoubtedly been much narrowed, it is a question
whether its use in the other operations of a campaign
is not likely to be much enlarged in the future. The
great power which the new firearms give to the mounted
riflemen have increased their effectiveness so materially
as to enable them to be usefully employed far oftener
than under the old system.

The railway, telegraphic, and other communications
of an army are so important, and so essential to be pre-
served, that a force of horsemen are as necessarv to
guard them as they are useful to threaten and attack
those of the enemy. A large force of mounted riflemen,
accompanied by a few pieces of artillery, can almost live
on the country, and by the rapidity and secrecy of their
movements, can avoid and escape large bodies, while,
from their armament and fighting capacity, they can
either attack smaller forces or defend themselves if
assailed.

At the opening of a campaign these horsemen should
be sent on as outposts or advanced guards. They should
be under a general of cavalry, and should be instructed
to push boldly on in an impenetrable line, strong but
flexible. This belt of horsemen, self-reliant, able to
defend or to attack, not to be checked by small parties
of infantry under cover, should sweep forward, feeling
the whole countr}- on the way, and moving on until the

d36

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

enemy's advanced posts are struck. Once this is done
the touch should never be lost. A firm pressure should
force back the weak points, a stern resistance should
hold in check the strong points, and without much risk,
the position and strength of the enemy should be pretty
well ascertained.

There is nothing to prevent a force of this kind
pressing on two or three days' march in front of the
main army, which, moving in perfect security behind it,
would march comfortably, with greater ease, and without
fear of surprise. Cavalry also, marching faster than
infantry, should naturally be in front, and if at a good
distance, could be kept more scattered, and consequently
healthier and better fed. In fact, it seems waste of
words to argue in favour of this principle. Experience
has shown it always to work well. The Austrian horse
against Frederick the Great took up the touch of his
posts, and pressing them closely, never lost the hold of
them as, for instance, notably at Sohr and Hochkirch.
The Cossacks against Napoleon worked the same way.
The Germans in 1870 moved covered by horsemen
far in advance ; but as soon as the franc-tireurs
were organized the equipment and system of fighting
of the Prussian cavalry rendered them almost useless
against foes who must have been contemptible in
themselves.

Small scouting patrols should be used very freely ;
in fact, the whole front and flanks of an army should be
swarming w^ith them. They form the antennae, the
feelers, of an army. They are the eyes, the ears, and
often the feeders of the force. A general without good
cavalry gropes his way in utter darkness, is as a blind
man, moving slowly and with indecision, not knowing
where to strike, or where to expect a blow.

The genius of Frederick the Great, the marvellous
skill and steadiness of his wonderful army, and the
extraordinary ability of his leading generals, barely
enabled him to issue successfully from a struggle where
the most important element against him, was the force
of irregular light horsemen that swarmed around him.

I.

CHAP. XXXIV.] EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY.

537

Napoleon, after conquering almost the whole of Europe,
succumbed to the same cause.

Cavalry officers should bear this in mind ; should be
deeply impressed with the heavy responsibility that rests
upon their force, to acquire information of the enemy's
movements, to hide the dispositions of their own army,
and to secure them carefully from surprise. This duty
the cavalry, armed as mounted riflemen, can now per-
form with efficiency, and with much greater boldness than
ever. They need not wait for infantry supports to come
up to clear an obstruction, they need not retire for want
of an infantry force to defend a position. In fact, in the
wars of the future the horsemen should shine out more
brilliantly than ever.

So much for the way in which the cavaby should be
thrown to the front to cover an advance. That is one
portion of their duty. Another important one is to
make great raids upon the enemy's communications.
There is no need to enter into details, but we may simply
refer to the raids of Stuart, Forrest, Morgan, Wilson, and
Grierson, as good illustrations of the use that mounted
riflemen can be put to in that way.

In the battlefield they might be used for turning
movements around a flank, especially as the direct attack
in front will in the future always be attended with such
serious losses. In defensive battles they could also be
employed in line of action dismounted, their horses well
to the rear, in which duty they should be as capable oi
fighting effectively as the best infantry. Forrest's men
did this at Chickamauga, and after the victory mounted
and took up the pursuit.

Again, if the charging with the revolver turned out
successfully in practice, the mounted riflemen, with their
pistols, should be able to make mounted charges almost
as well as the heavy cavalry. They would certainly be
able to act effectively in support, and should be able to
give most vabiable assistance in a cavalry fight. The
American cavalr -"vjught well on foot, and charged boldly
when they had the opr. nudity mounted, and there is no
reason why they could n* ■ uo so.

538

A HISTOflY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

After the battle, in a pursuit, the mounted rifles would
then be of the greatest value. Not by direct atta in
rear, but by wide turning movements to interc and
cut off the retreat. The operations of Sheridan, a the
retreat of Lee's army in 1865, are detailed fully m the
twenty-eighth chapter, and form the best illustration of
this method of pursuing a beaten army.

CHAPTER XXXV

Morale.

There is one influence of the highest importance, which
the cavalry officer should thoroughly understand and
always bear in mind, and this is the morale. Napo-
leon fully appreciated the value of it. He said that
" the moral " in war is to the physical in the ratio of
three to one. There can be no doubt as to the correct-
ness of this pr'nciple, for the morale of the soldiers has
always exerted more influence upon the result of battles
than the mere physical force.

At the present day, however, when men do not fight
at close quarters, but with deadly weapons at longer dis-
tances, the physical force is rarely or never brought into
play ; never, in fact, in the infantry, and only rarely in
the cavalry. Now, therefore, the moral effect is what
decides battles, and the art of war resolves itself into the
art of improving the morale of your own men, and
depressing that of the enemy.

Take, for example, two lines of infantry marching
towards each other. They will never close, and the
greater physical power of one line press back the weaker
force of the other : but first one will waver, then halt,
and finally fall back, with a greater or less degree of
order according to the courage or discipline of the troops.
In the same way, cavalry charging infantry will often
turn on receiving a volley in their faces. It is not the
physical force of the volley which does this, because those
who turn are not those who are struck, but the mere

640

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

moral effect on the minds of the men produces the result.
There is, in fact, no limit to the successes which will be
gained by forces with a high morale over extraordinary-
odds, where their opponents are in a demoralized
condition.

It was moral force, not physical, which led to the
successes of the handful of troops under Cortez and
Pizarro against the myriads to whom they were opposed. A
more remarkable instance was the Indian mutiny of 1857,
when the sepoys, armed, trained, organized, and main-
tained, exactly in the same manner as the British regulars,
were defeated by the English troops over and over again,
although their superiority in numbers over the latter
was enormous.

The elements which contribute to the morale of soldiers
in battle are almost innumerable, and every officer should
pay the closest attention to this point. Confidence in
their commander is one of the most important points in
securing a high morale in troops. Stonewall Jackson
in the American war had so won the confidence of his
men that they could not be defeated when he was in
command, and the enemy was so demoralized when
before him, that fugitives from the front line calling out
" Jackson is coming," have spread a panic among the
reserves without their even having been under fire.

Winning the first success in a campaign is another
most important consideration, and its effect will be felt
all through a war. This can be seen strongly marked in
history from the earliest times. Taking the initiative
is another good method of encouraging the soldiery.
Cavalry should always bear this in mind, and remember
that the boldest and most dashing course is almost
always the best.

Napoleon says, " The worst plan to adopt in war is
always that which is the most pusillanimous, or com-
monly called prudent, and that true wisdom consists in
energetic resolution." This is the wisest of all Napo-
leon's maxims. The more one studies military history,
the more he will become convinced, that the first great

CHAP. XXXV.]

MORALE.

541

quality of a general is a sound judgment, but that the
next is an indomitable energy, aL'i an iron will ; with-
out this the best judgment in the world is worthless.
Energy, indefatigable, indomitable energy — is perfectly
invaluable in a general, and a cavalry general requires it
most of all.

Stonewall Jackson possessed this quality in a very
high degree, Kis impetuosity enabled him to move his
command, consisting mainly of infantry, at such speed,
that his corps received the nickname of the " foot "
cavalry.

In one critical period in the army of Vivginia, one of
General Jackson's staff expressed his fear that the army
would be compelled to fall back. The general replied
sharply, " Who said that 1 No, sir, we shall not fall
back ; we shall attack them." And he did attack them,
and defeated them completely at Chancellorsville in a
day or two afterwards. His only order after getting his
men into position was his favourite battle-cry, " Press
forward" — this >7as his message to every general, and
his answer to e\ ery inquiry. When he was mortally
wounded after dark, his only message to General Lee
was that " the enemy should be pressed in the morning."
It was this indomitable will and fiery energy that
improved and strengthened to such a remarkable
degree the morale of his men, and so demoralized his
opponents.

Arrian refers to the demoralization in the army of
Darius the night before the battle of Arbela, from long
watching and fear, which, as he says, " was firmly rooted
in the hearts of many of them, and made cowards
of them." He says this contributed not a little to
their overthrow.'

Kostopchin, Governor of Moscow in 1812, adopted a
curious plan to encourage the m,orale of his men. He
caused the most diminutive of the French prisoners to be
selected, and publicly exhibited to the people, that the

' Arrian, book iii., chap. xi.

542

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEKloU VI,

latter might derive courage from the .siglit uf their weak-
ness. This was a happy expedient, and could not fail to
improve the morale of the troops.'

The influences which affect the morale arc so numerous,
so varied, that it is impossible to do more than just touch
upon the subject here. There is no doubt however of the
enormous importance of studying the feeling closely, and
using every effort to preserve it in an active condition in
the minds of the soldiery.

^ Segur, ii. 21.

CHAPTER XXXVI.
The General-in-Chief of Cavalry.

La, Cavalerie paratt, de toutes les armes, la plus difficile ^ manier.

— Jacquenot de Presle.

Although good officers of infantry, as well as efficient
commanders of artillery, are found at all times in all
armies, there is nothing rarer than a perfect general of
cavalry. The several arms are so distinct in composition,
armament, and method of fighting, that the leaders of
each require different talents and dispositions.

The cavalry commander requires the rarest combina-
tion of talent. He must have the great prudence which
is always required in an officer holding a responsible
post ; and at the same time he must possess extraordinary
rashness and bravery, and combine the greatest calm-
ness with the greatest impetuosity.

For with cavalry the greatest prudence must be used
in the conception of a plan, the greatest boldness and
impetuosity in the execution of it, the greatest calmness
in retreating under disaster, and the greatest caution in
pursuing in the event of success.

It is necessary that a commander of cavalry should
strike with the impetus of a thunderbolt, that hesitation
should be a word unknown to him. But in the wild
rush of the cavalry charge, in the excitement of the
headlong pursuit, in the fury of the swaying m^Ue, with
sabres flashing, bullets hissing, and revolvers plying
death and destruction around, then the cavalry com-
mander has need of all his calmness. He must think

644

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

quickly, and act promptly, and the rare talent that
enables a man to control and direct with judgment the
movement of charging horse under such conditions, is
v.'hat makes the great cavalry general. No wonder
that so few have appeared upon the pages of history.

All celebrated cavtdry officers have been noted for the
zeal, the impetuosity, the fire of their dispositions, and
they have excelled each other only in possessing to a
greater degree the caution and prudence necessary to a
responsible command. There may have been cavalry
officers of reputation who have altogether lacked the
caution, but there never was one with the slightest claim
to the name who lacked the energy and the impetuosity.

In commanding the advanced posts of an army the
cavalry general cannot exhibit too much caution, and
here the caution requires the exercise of the most rest-
less activity. When before an enemy every imaginable
road and by-path should be watched and patrolled, every
possible point examined, every conceivable precaution
against surprise taken. In pressing on to search out the
position of the enemy nothing should prevent the most
extreme boldness. In fact the general principle should
be laid down that the boldest course is always the best.
The well-known writer. Archdeacon Denison, of Taunton,
says in one of his writings, " I cannot abide that nasty,
mean little virtue commonly called prudence." That
one sentence indicates that he would probably have made
a good cavaby officer.

Another requisit*^ quality of a cavalry commander is
the faculty of divining by intuition from the slightest
signs the designs and intentions of the enemy. General
Shelby, who commanded the Confederate cavalry in
Missouri in the American Civil War, seems to have
been naturally qualified for a cavalry commander. His
cautiousness in picketing, patrolling, and guarding
against surprise was almost a mania, and without parallel.
His boldness in never retiring before an enemy without
fighting was equally marked. Whenever reports were
brought in of an advancing enemy his question always
was, " Did you see them ? " If this was answered

CHAP. XXXVI.] GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF CAVALRY.

54

affirmatively, ho immediately followed it up with, " Did
you count them V " No, General." " Then we'll fight
them, by Heaven 1 Order the brigade to form line, and
the artillery to prepare for action front." Thus ho never
turned his back upon an enemy without knowing his
exact power, and without inflicting more or less injury
upon the advancing squadi'ons.'

This is the spirit in which cavalry should be handled.
In guarding against surprise, in taking every conceivable
measure to insure success, the caution should almost
approach timidity. In boldness and reckless daring,
when the time for action comes, the rashness can hardly
be excessive.

A general of cavalry should have unbounded fertility
of resource, should shake himself free from the trammels
of routine and red tape, and adopt his measures intelli-
gently to suit the varying contingencies of actual
warfare.

Long peace training, upon rigid and inflexible
rules, has always had its influence in narrowing and
contracting the natural powers of the officers. Men are
taught with great care the routine of elementary drill,
field movements, &c., on rules laid down with mathe-
matical precision. This is all very well as far as it goes,
but the training should not stop there. By this system
the faculty of thought is never exercised, the power of
reasoning never brought into play. Stolid obedience of
orders, and a rigid adherence to routine and red tape, are
considered in many armies as the highest type of military
discipline and the best evidence of efficiency.

The effect of all this upon the intellect has never been
properly appreciated. Officers living all their lives in an
atmosphere where the repetition of apparently unmean-
ing duties forms the every-day occupation, where rule
and line have laid down in advance the manner of
performing every minute detail, cannot acquire that
decisive, vigo'- as promptitude of judgment and fertility
of resource so necessary in tbr* ever ciianging conditions
of active operations. The greatest mi +nra^f '^-lents must
^ Edwards's History of Shelby and his Men, 80.

546

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[PEftlOD VI.

certainly feel the depressing and rusting effect of want
of exercise.

No system could be more ill judged. One might as
well teach a child his alphabet, teach him every letter
and its pronunciation, make him go over it day after
day and year after year, and then on examination expect
him to read without ever having taught him to spell, as
to make officers repeat manoeuvres year .after year, and
expect them, by inspiration, to know how to apply them
practically in the ever-varying contingencies and trying
straits of actual war.

The effect of this system was clearly apparent in the
English army in the Crimean War. Lord Cardigan and
Lord Lucan were officers of this type, trained in this
narrow school. We have already seen how the English
cavalry blundered off on a wrong road in a single line,
in blind adherence to routine, and, as advanced troops,
were about as useful to the army as if they had been in
China.

Again, in the cavalry action at B. laklava, we have
seen Lord Cardigan and the light brigade sitting on their
horses, idle spectators of a fight in which the enemy's
flank was exposed to a direct attack. Kinglake, speaking
of this extraordinary inefficiency of the English cavalry
chief, makes the remarkable statement that, " supposing
the natural capacity equal, there is no stirring missionary,
no good electioneerer, no revered master of foxhounds
who might not be rtiore likely to prove himself equal to
the unforeseen emergencies of a campaign, than the
general officer who is a veteran in the military profession,
and at the same time a novice in war."'

The Prussians long ago felt this weakness, and though
their discipline is strict, by their system of autumn man-
oeuvres they train their officers to think, and accustom
them to act upon their own responsibility to such an
extent, that it is probable no campaign was ever fought
in which the corps and divisional commanders acted
more upon their own responsibility than in that of 1870.

It is curious and interesting to note that this weakness

^ Kinglake, ii. 484.

CHAP. XXXVI GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF CAVALRY.

547

in the milii:ary profession is as old as the history of the
science of war. Xenophon, one of the very earliest
writers on tiic subject, gives an account of a convei-sation
between Socrates and an Athenian youth, who had
attended the lecture!.; of one who taught the military
art. Socrates ar;ked him how the professor began to
teach him generalship. " He began," replied the youth,
"with the same thing with which he ended, for he taught
me tactics and nothing else." "But," said Socrates,
" how small a part of the qualifications of a general is
this ! " And, after mentioning various qualifications, he
went on to say, " But did your instructor teach you to
arrange an army merely, or did he tell you for what
purpose and in what manner you must employ each
division of your forces ? " " Not at all," replied he.
" Yet there are many occasions on which it is not proper
to draw up an army or to conduct it in the same way."
" But, by Jupiter, he gave me no explanation as to
such occasions." " Go again then by all means," said
Socrates, " and question him : for if he knows and is
not quite shameless he will blush, after taking your
money, to send you away in ignorance."

In addition to all the other faculties, a cavalry general
should be possessed of a strong inventive genius, and be
self-reliant enough to strike out a new line and adopt
reforms where he sees them necessary. We have seen in
the whole progress of tuis work how reformers have
arisen from time to time, and how their successes have
almost invariably been attributable, to a great extent,
to the inventive genius that has been one of their
distinguishing characteristics.

Alexander the Great invented the impetuous attack
with horsemen, and was a reformer to that extent,
and the new and unaccustomed tactics aided him greatly
in winning his victories. Hannibal's dependence on
horsemen, and the skilful method in which he employed
them, was a surprise to the Romans, and won him many
successes. Scipio Africanus imitated and improved the
system, and beat Hannibal with his own weapons.
Henry the Fowler was another instance, the Black

N X 2

548

A HISTORY OF CAVALRY.

[period VI.

Prince another, both men of inventive genius. Turenne
ingeniously adapted his plans to the nature of the battle-
field, and that was an invention also as far as he was
concerned. Grustavus Adolphus and Frederick were both
either original inventors, or they applied old ideas
with a skill that gives them equal credit ; while Napoleon
astonished the world by a system of strategy and
tactical employment of all three arms, which was almost
perfection under the then existing conditions of the art
of war.

It is impossible to point to a great commander in his-
tory who was a blind follower of precedent. The great
men have always made changes to suit the conditions of
warfare at the time. Improvements in arms and the
various inventions which affect social life, such as
steam, telegraphing, &c., all have their influence on the
military science, and the best general is he who can
ingeniously secure the greatest results from the material
at his command and the circumstances in which he is
placed. The cavalry general of all others should be
imbued with this idea, and should use every effort to
gain every possible advantage for his branch of the
service.

INDEX.

A.

ABDERBA.HMAN, 127, 129

Adrian, 73

iEtius, 117

Agamemnon, 4

Agesilaus, 41

Agincourt, battle of, 208, 218, 219,
220

Agrians, 38

Agriculturists, armies composed of,
439, 440

Ajax, 4, 5

Alani, 113, 274

Alaric, 111

Albanian cavalry, 242, 243

Alberic de Barbiano, 202

Albuquerque, the Duke of, 281

AlcmeonidiB, the, 22

Alen9on, Count of, 210

Aleppo, Janissaries of, 358

Alessandria, 368

Alesia, siege of, 92

Alexander the Great, 20, 84 ; his im-
provements, 35 ; his chosen regi-
ments, 35, 36 ; his " Friends," 36 ;
references to him, 139, 244, 402, 509,
526, 547

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, 395,
396, 397 ; his cavalry, 387-409

Alexander of Parma uses dragoons,
245

Alexee Michjelovitch, 275

Algarotti's Letters, 318

Algiers, French cavalry in, 424

Alison's, Sir Archibald, account of
Fere Champenoise, 396, 397, 398;
remarks on Cossacks, 401, 402

AUe, the river, 390

Allerheim, village of, 284

Allodial tenure, 121, 122 ; system Ja
Poland, 182

AUods, 121

Alma, battle of, 427

Almanza, battle of, 298, 299

Alps, passage of the, 368

Alvensleben, General, 499

Ambigatus, 88

Ameer Khan, 423

American Civil "War, 436-484 ; teaching

of, 484
American Revolutionary War, 227,

346, 347
Americans, their character, 436, 437
America, War in, 1812-15, 437, 438,

439
Amiens, battle of, 504, 505
Ammianus Marcelliuus, 179
Amyot, Pire, 6
Anchemolius, 22
Anklam, 375

Anglo-Saxons, custom among, 12
Anson, General, 411, 412
Antioch, battle of, 176, 176; capture

of, 174; siege of, 173, 175
Antony, Marc, 86, 100, 106
Antrustiones, 124
Antwerp, 298
Appomattox C'ourt-house, surrender of

General Lee's army at, 481
Arabians, 19, 26
Arbaletriers-k-cheval, 156
Arbela, battle of, 37, 64
Archelaus, 83, 84
Archers-i-cheval, lb6
Arcliers, English, 202, 509 ; Parthian,

100, 105 ; views of Procopius upon,

116; treatment of, in England, 205
Ardaric, 117
Aretes, 37

Argaum, battle of, 422
Argoulets, their arms and equipment,

242
Arimannia, the, 123
Ariovistus, 91, 94
Aristides, advocates the formation of

cavalry, 28
Armament and equipment of cavalry,

531-634
Armament of knights, 149-156

&

m

550

INDEX.

Armament of Parthians, 99

Armenia, 98, 99, IOC

Armour, tlufensive, 7 ; solid, 151 ; of
plate, 193, 194; lighter under
Charles VIH., 225'; first steps to-
wnrJs iibolishing it, 234 ; return to
heavier, 234 ; Saxe's views on,
310

Arnold of Winkelried, 214

Arqiu'liusieisil-cheval, 244

Arrighi, General, 404

Arrows of English, how carried, 205

Arsanias, the river, 85

Artagerses, 20

Artavasdes, 99

Artaxatn, battle of, 85, 86

Artaxerxes, 20

Artillery of Charles VIII., best of the
age, 230

Artillery, leathern, 257

Artillery, horse, invented by Fred-
erick the Great, 319

Aruns, 51, 54

Arzegaye, the, 243

Asdrubal, 74, 75

Asopus, the river, 27

Assaye, battle of, 422

Assur, battle of, 177

Assyria, first use of cavalry in, 14

Assyrian arms, &c., 8 ; cavalry, equip-
ments of, 14, 15, 16 ; charioteers,
508 ; chariots, 8 ; sculptures, 7

Athenians, 24

Athenian cavalry, 28, 29, 32

Attila, King of the Huns, 116, 117,
118

Aucud, or Agutus (Sir John Hawk-
wood), 201, 202

Autfemberg. General, 370

Aufidus, the river, 66

Augereau, -Marshal, 376, 402

Augsburg, battle of, 139, 140

Augustus, 50

Auerstadt, battle of, 374

Aulus Cornelius, 71

Aurelius Gotta, 49

Austerlitz, 364, 372, 389

Austrian cavalrv, in Frederick the
Great's Wars, 332-340

Austrian cavalry in time of Napoleon,
410, 411

Austro-Prussian War of 1868, 485-
491

Avaricum, 91

Averill, General, 467

Avidius Cassius, 107

Avila at Mookevheyde, 241

Axes caniedMjy cavalvy, 342, 634

Axes given to dragoons, 305

Aztecs, the, 252, 263

B.

Bacele, the, 155

Bagrathion, 390

Baireuth, dragoon regiment of, 325

Baktchi Serai, 427

Balaklava, battle of, 428 ; flank march

to, 427
Baldwin du Bourg, 175
Baldwin of Hheims, 177
Balista, the, 2
Banner, General, 262
Bannockburn, Battle of, 207, 208
Baraguay U'Hilliers, General, 402
Barclay, General, 395
Bascinet, the, 150
Basle, cannon at, 226
Bash Kadiklar, battle of, 431
Baton Rouge, 466
Baton or Peta, 185 ; his army, 185,

187
Battles, Skirmishes, &c.

Agincourt, 208, 218, 219, 220

Alma, 427

Almanza, 298, 299

Amiens, 504, 505

Anklam, 375

Antioch, 175, 176

Artaxata, 85, 86

Argaum, 422

Assaye, 422

Assur, 177

Auerstadt, 374

Augsburg, 139, 140

Austerlitz, 372, 389

Balaklava, 428

Bannockburn, 207, 208

Bash Kadiklar, 431

Bautzen, 403

Beaumont, 502, 503

Belik or Balissus, 101-1G5

Black Warrior Creek, 463

Blenheim or Hochstadt, 292-296

Blountsville, 463

Boreml, 420

Borodino, 391, 392

Bouifaric, 424

Bouvines, 164, 165

Brandy Station. 453, 454

Breitenfeld, 261. 262, 263

Bull's Run, 440

Burgau, 261

Bushire, 432

Cngool, 343

Cannce, 55

Canton, 455

Casilinum, 126, 127

Cassel, 278

Castiglione, 367, 368

Castracaro, 203

Chalons, 117, 118

Chancellorsville, 469

■

irch

85,

i-:^

INDEX.

551

Battles, !iC.—{contimud).

Battles, kc— (continual).

jDhickamauga, 458, 459

Krasnoi, 391

ChiflFa, 424

Langelzalza, 490

Courtrai, 212

Laswarie, 422

Courtras, 240

Leipzig, 394, 395

Crecy, 199

Lessnoy, 307

Culm, 393

Leuthen, 329

Cunaxa, 20

Leuze, 287

Damietta, 177

Lignitz, 188, 189

Day's Gap, 462
Delhi, 422

Long's Creek, 462

Lutzen, 403, 410, 411

Dembe Velky, 419, 420

Magenta, 432

Malo Jaroslawitz, 399

Dessau, 403

Dniener, 187
Doryleeum, 176

Malplaquet, 297

Marathon, 24

Dresden, 381

Marengo, 368-370

Dreiix, 237

Mars le Tour, or Vionville, 499,

Dunes, 284, 285

500

Ebenezer Church, 471, 472

Mayence, 352

Eckmuhl, 379, 380

Merseburg, 138, 139

Edgehill, 269

Mogatch, or Mohacz, 250, 251

Egm ^t-op-Zee, 517

Molwitz, 315

El Be. jn, 482

Moncontour, 239, 240

Elchiugen, 371

Montebello, 368, 433

Elizabethpol, 419

Monterey, 456

Eylau, 376

Mookertieyde, 241

Falkirk, 206

Morat, 214

Fere Chanipenoise, 396-393

Moravian Town, 438

Five Forks, 476, 477

Morgarten, 212, 213

Fleurus, 287

Mount Ithome, 23

Fort Donelson, 465

Mount Thabor, 358

Fuentes D'Onor, 482

Murfreesboro, 456

Gainsborough, 267

Muhlberg, 406, 407

Garcia Hernandez, 412

Mursa, 116

Gitchin, 486, 487

Nachod, 487

Glottaw, 390, 391

Naseby, 271

Golymin, 376

Neerwinden, 288

Grausori, 214

Neuvi, 94

Grantham, 269

Nordl^ngon, 283, 284

Graveliues, 237

Nossentiu, 375

Gravelotte, 500

Okolona, 459, 460

Gi'ossbraeren, 404

Orchomene, 83, 84

Halidon Hill, 208

Orleans, 605

Hanau, 411

Owanta, 420

Handschusheim, 352

Parker's Cross Roads, 467, 458

Hartaville, 447

Pavia, 238, 239

Hastings, 159-164

Pharsaiia, 86-88

Heilsburg, 390, 517, 518

Platsea, 19, 27

Heliopolis, 360
Hochkirch, 326, 327

Poictiers, see Tours.

Poitiers, 214

Hochstadt or Blenheim, 292-2y4

Poolesville, 452

Hohenfriedberg, 324-^J5

Prague, 327

Homildon Hill, 217

Prentzlow, 375

Iling. 74

Propoysko, 307

lal), 424

Pultowa, 301-303

Ivry, 246

Pultusk, 376

Jaxartes, 185

Pyramids, 356, 866

Kalka or Kaletz, 187

Ramanieh, 356

Ealomua, 187

Kamilies, 290, 297

Katzbach, 393

Rapidau Station, 467

Karook Dara, 481

Ratiabon. 830

Kbniggratz, 487, 488

KegUluR T<akn, 51

552

INDEX.

Battles, &c. — (continued.)

Rocroy, 281-283

Rosbach, 328, 329

Roveredo, 353

Saar, 488

Sailor's Creek, 480, 481

Salamanca, 411, 412

Sand Mountain, 462

Schwartaw, 376

Sedan, 502, 603

Sediman, 357, 358

Sempach, 214

Shiloh, or Pittsburgh Landing,
456

Sohr, ."^25

SoissoLS, 96, 126

Solferino, 432

Sonderhausen, 138

Spicheren, 497

St. Denis, 239

St. Gothard, 291

St. Quentin, 237

Stirling, 206

Tabasco, 253

Taflfna, 424

Tein Bridge, 334

Teinitz, 335

Thymbra, 11, 17

Tichnowitz, 488

Ticinus, 60, 61

Tigranocerta, 84, 85

Tishimongo Creek, 460

Tloscalans, with the, 254

Tobitschau, 488

Tolbiac, 96, 126

Tours, or Poictiers, 127-130

Trebbia, 62, 63, 64

Trenton, 457

Turkeytown, 464

Villers-eu-Couchee, 352

Vimiera, 384

Vionville, 499, 600

Wagram, 380, 381

Waterloo, 414-417

Waynesboro, 475 (

Weissenberg, 496

Wertingen, 870

Winkowno, 399

Wismar, 375

Woerth, 496

Wurzburg, 353

Zagonara, 203

Zeydenich, 374

Zig, 424

Zintzheim, 286-287

Zomdorf, 330

Zulgarh, 424

Zutphen, 247
Baur, General, 302
Bautzen, battle of, 408
Bavarian horsemen at Echmubl, 380
Bayenx tapestry, 164

Bayonet, the, 227
Bazaine, Marshal, 498-500
Beamish's History of the King's Ger-
man legion, 412
Beaumont, surprise of, 602
Bebutoff, Prince, 431
Beck, General, 283
Belik river, or Belissus, battle of, 101-

106
Bellovesus, 88
Beuedek, Marshal, his inefficient use of

his cavalry, 490
Benningsen, General, 376, 378, 390,

398
Berar Rajah, 422

Berenhorst's remarks on Rosbach, 329
Berlin, capture of, by Haddick, 336,

337 ; entered by Davoust, 374
Bernard of Weimar, Duke, 267
Berwick, the Duke of, 298
Bessi^res, Marshal, 386
Bessus, 39
Bethany, 480
Bichalow, Colonel, 406
Biesbos, lake, crossed on the ice, 351
Bila, General, 375
Bistrom, Colonel, 402
Bivouacking, 107

Black Prince, the, 210, 215, 216, 217
Black Warrior Creek, skirmish at, 463
Blazer, Captain, losses in his command,

617
Blenheim or Hochstadt, battle of, 292-

295
Blountsville, skirmish at, 463
Blucher, Marshal, 376
Boccaccio, 149
Bock, General, 412
Boeotians, 29

Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, 171
Bon, General, 359
Bonnemain's Cavalry, 601, 502
Boots, Jack boots, 631
Border wars, England and Scotland, 206
Boreral, Action at, 420
Borodino, Battle of, 391, 392
Bouchain, the lines of, 298
Bouffaric, battle of, 424
Boulogne, Count of, 167, 212; his

tactics at Bouvines, 167
Boulogne, camp at, 303
Bouvines, battle of, 164, 166
Bow, the, 2 ; used by English, 204
Bowmen in Gustavus' army, 267
Boyars, the, 184, 274
Braban9ons, the, 198
Bracconniere, abolished, 234
Brack, General, remarks on Cossacks,

407
Brandy Station, battle of, 453, 454
Brassards, 152
Bredow's Cuirassiers, 614

INDEX.

563

Bredow, Colonel, 488 ; his charge at

Vionville, 499, 600
Breech-loadiiif; cannon, 209 ; carbine

invented Marshal Saxe, 310; rifles,

209, 227 eapons, 425
Breitenfeld, battle of, 261, 263
Brennus, 88, 90

Bridles and reins, 58, 59, 60, 70
Brissac, Marshal de, uses dragoons,

244, 245
Britons, ancient, 11; their chariots, ibid.
Brookhaven, 466
Bruce, Robert, 207, 208
Brutus, 51, 54, 55
Bucelinus, 126, 127
Buddenbrock, General, 326
Budweis, garrison, of, 334, 335
Buell, General, 447
Bull's Run, battle of, 440
Burgau, battle at, 261
Bushire, battle of, 432

Cadekced step, introduced, 308

Cadoc, Chief of Braban9on3, 198

Ctesar, Julius, 86— 93

Cagool, battle of, 343

Cairo, 366

Caius Sempronius, 52

Calliano, defile of, 363

Cambrai, cannon at siege of, 226

Cambmy, 362

Cambridge, Duke of, regiment, 490

Campbell, Colonel, 307

Campbell, Sir Colin, 429

Camping, Parthian system of, 107

Camps of Turks, 131

Canaanite chariots, 8

Canadian riflemen, 437 ; volunteers,

437
Cannee, battle of, 56, 65, 66, 67, 68
Cannon at Berne, 226 ; first used at

Crecy, 208
Canroben, Marshal, 499
Canton, fight at, with gunboat, 455
Canute the Great, 220 ; paid soldiers

of, 197
Carabineers, arms of, 364
Carabins, the 244, 277, 278
Caracalla, pandering to the troops of,

112
Caracoles 8U{>pre88ed, 269
Carbine the, invented by Marshal Saxe,

310 ; for mounted rifles, 633 ; v *"

VersaUles, 227
Cardigan, Lord, 430, 646
Carhae, 105
Carlyle's "History of Frederick the

Great," 333, 834, 335
Carmignuola, Count, 231

Caruatic, the, 421

Carroccio, invented by Eribert, Arch-
bishop of Milan, 176

Cartridges, first used, 227

Casilinum, battle of, 126, 127

Caspians, 18

Cassel, battle of, 278 ; captured by
Tchernichefl", 404

Cassius, 10]

Castiglione, battle of, 367, 368

Castlenau, the Marquis of, 285

Castracaro, battle of, 203

Cataphracti, Greek, 30, 31

Catapult, the, 2

Cathcart, Lord, 397

Caulaincourt, General, captures a re-
doubt by a charge of Cuirassiers, 392,
393

Caution, required in a general, 543

Cavlry, earliest, 12 ; Scythian, 12, 13
little confidence of Greeks in, 23
organisation among the Greeks, 24
force increased under Romm En'-

ferors, 114 : efiiciency of, under
'rederick the Great, 313-S30 ; tactics
of, very slow and clumsy before
Gustavus, 269 ; attached to divisions,
848 ; arms of, under French Republic,
860 ; under Napoleon, 362-386 ;
German, in 1870, admirable services
as light troops, 497, 498 ; of the line,
513-524

Cavendish, General, 270

Censors, Roman, 48, 49

Centaurs, fable of, 263

Centeniers, 181

Ceremonies of investiture, 146

Cerisoles, pistols used at, 236

Chain shoulder straps, 531

Chalons, battle of, 117, 118

Chambersburg, 451

ChancellorsviTle, battle of, 469

Changes, necessary, 46w

Characteristics of cavalry, 606-512

Chariots at Arbela, 38 ; Assyrian, 8 ;
of Britons, 11 ; invented by Cjrus,
9 ; of war, invention of, 8, 21, 22 ;
system of fighting, 3 ; species invented
by Cyrus, 4

Charlemagne, 124, 130, 131

Charles the Bald, 130

Charles the Bold, 224, 244

Charles VIIl., his army, 228; entry
into Rome, 228, 229 ; employs
Albanians, 343

Charles V forms squadrons, 237

Charles Martel, 154

Charles IX., 246

Charles XII. of Sweden, 300, 801, 302,
307, 311, 312, 372

Charles VII, of France, 220; forms
permanent a. my, 221 ; raises fifteen

564

INDEX.

compagnies d'ordonr ance, 221 ; raises

corps of archers, 223
Chasseurs d'Afiique, 4th, 430
Chassenrs-k-cheval of Napoleon, 365
Chateauguay, battle of, 437
Chattanooga, 459
Chavchavadzy, Prince, 431, 432
Chazot, General, 351
Chevaux legers, 277
Chickahominy River, 449
Chickamauga, use of mounted rifles,

537 ; battle of, 458, 469
Chiffa, battle of, 424
Childeric I., horseshoes found in the

tomb of, 73
China, chariots in, 6 ; invaded by

Mongols, 184, 185
Chivalry, great hold of, 172 ; origin of,

141, 142 ; La Curne de Ste. Palaye

on, 142; rules for admission to, 144
Cissians, 18
Cities, begin to raise armies, 192 ;

growth of, 191 ; liberties of, ibid.
Citizens go into the cavalry, 138
City Point, 475, 476
Civil wars in England, 268
Clerembault, General, 500
Clitus saves life of Alexander the Great,

36
Clovis, 96
Club, the, 2
Cnteus Domitius, 87
Coats of mail, 149, 150
Cohorts, 73

Coligny at St. Denis, 239, 240
Coitus revolver, 438, 441, 445
Columbus, taken by General "Wilson,

473
Column, institution of, 349, 350 ; in-
vented by Gustavus, 257
Commission to reorganise Russian

army, 341
Compagnies d'ordonnance, 221, 222 ;

their organisation and armament,

228
Company, the Great, 201
Comparison between the Austrian and

Prussian cavalry and the American,

491
Conde, the " Great," 280-285
Condottieri, 199
Conrad Lando commands " the Great

Company," 201
Conscription, adopted in France, 347
Constautine, the Emperor, 114, 115
Constantine,the Grand Duke, 389, 396,

403
Constantino Porphyrogenetus, Em-
peror, 273
Constantinople, 169, 180
Con Stan tiun, 116
Consular Guard, the, 364

Convoy of Loevenhaupt taken, 307

Corbineau, General, gallant conduct of,
at Culm, 394

Corinth, attack upon, 28

Cornet, the, its strength, 247

Cornet, under Chi\rles V., 248

Corps d'armee organised, 347, 348

Cortez in Mexico, 251, 540

Cosaquie, 273

Cossacks, the, '^73-275 ; 887, 388, 390,
393, 396, 39>s,, 399, 400, 401, 405,
407, 408, 409 , immerse value of,
376-379; under Peter the Great,
306

Cosse, Marshal, at Moncontour, 240

Cotereaux, 199

Cotton, Sir Stapleton, 411, 412

Count, title of, 123

Couraltai, 185

Courtrai, battle of, 212

Courtras, battle of, 240 ; infantry and
cavalry intermixed at, 240

Coutillier, the, 155

Coutts, Lord, 293

Crassus, 98-102, 109, 402

Crassus Publius, 101-103

Crecy, battle of, 199, 208-211 ; cross-
bowmen at, 205 ; English archers at,
209 ; marks two great epochs, 209

Crequi, the Marquis de, 285

Crests, 150

Creutz, General, 419

Crimean war, 427-432

Croats in Austrian army, 333 ; valuable
light cavalry, 261

Cromwell, his character, 268, 270, 271

Crook, General, 481

Crusades, the, 168 ; did not influence
military art, 190; effects on feudalism,
ibid. ; first military, 169 ; numbers
in, 170 ; infantry mere rabble in,
ibid. ; make no improvement in art of
war, 178 ; military art defective,
175 ; results of, 190-197 ; reasons of
revival of military art after, 194

Cuirasses, 2, 162, 179, 531

Cuirassiers, 245 ; established by Napo-
leon, 364, 365 ; of Frederick the
Great, 317

Cuissards, 152

Culm, battle of, 393

Cunaxa, battle of, 20

Custer, General, 481

Cyaxares the Mede, 16, 17

Cylindro-conoidal shot, the, 426

Cyrus, 4, 17

Cyrus the Great, outposts of, 109

D.

Daoger, the, 1 64
D'AIlonville, General, 430

T

INDEX.

556

Damascus, Janissaries of, 353

Damietta, battle of, 177

Danville Railway, 475

Darius, 20, 38, 402, 526, 541

Darters organised by Alexander, 89

Daun, Marshal, 327

D'Auvergue, Prince, 297

Davidoii', Colonel, on Partisan warfare,

402, 403
Davis, Colonel, 468
Davoust, Marshal, 374, 377, 380
Days Gap, skirmish at, 462
Dcciatsky, 181

Decius, the Emperoi', killed, 114
Decurios appointed by Alexander, 89
Degeneracy of Roman army, 116
De I'Hopital, the Marechal, 281, 232
Delhi, battle of, 422)
Delium, battle of, 28
Delzon, General, 397
Dembe Velky, battle of, 419, 420
Dembinski, General, 420, 421
Denison, Archdeacon, saying of, 544
Denizoff, Orloff, 395
De Quinci, 380
D'Erlon, General, 415
Desaix, General, 355-358, 369
Dessau, action at, 403
Desvaux, General, 432
Devens, General, 481
D'Hocquencourt, the Chevalier, 285
D'Humieres, the Marshal, 278
Dictator not allowed to ride, 47
Dimachi, 34, 245
Diomede, 4
Dismounting to fight oq foot, 209, 214,

215, 231, 244, 278, 465
Divisions organised, 347, 348
Dmitry Donskoi, divides Russian army

into regiments, 304
Dnieper, battle at the, 187 ; the river,

179
Doernberg, 403
Dolfs, Colonel, 411
Dolgoroukoft', Prince, 343
Domstsedtel, defile of, 338
Don Cossacks, 274
Don Jolin of Austria, 285
Dordrecht, taken, 351
Dorylseum, battle of, 175
Douay, General Abel, 493, 496
Douglas, Earl, 217; his coat of mail

pierced, 218
Dragoons, great increase of 279 ; Monte-

cuculi's views of, 290 ; Napoleon's

use of, 279 ; Saxe's views on, 309 ;

supplied with spades, 305 ; under

Louis XIV., 278 ; under Napoleon,

365 ; when or^auised, 244
Dresden, battle of, 381 ; peace of, 322
Dreux, battle of, 237, 239
Dreisen, General, 829

Dromedary dragoons organised by

Napoleon, 361
Dnijina or Droojins, 183, 184
Dutal dignity, origin of, 123
Ducrot, General, 502
Duke of Brunswick, 333
Duke d'Enghien (Conde), 281-283
Duke, General Basil W., " History of

Morgan's cavalry," 443, 444
Duke of Lancaster, archers in army of,

205
Dumouriez, 351
Dundee, "Bonnie," 272
Dunes, battle of, 284, 285
Dunkirk, siege of, 284, 285
Du Prenil, General, 514
Dvernitzky, General, 420
Dwarane, 184
Dwor, 184

Early, General, 475

Ebenezer Church, action at, 471, 472

Eckmuhl, battle of, 379, 380

Edelsheim, General, 486, 487

Edge Hill, battle of, 269

Education of young knights, 145

Edward III., 208 ; pay of his troops,
198, 199 ; uses his lances as pike-
men, 209-211

Egmont-op-zee, battle of, 617

Egolfsbeim, 880

Egypt, chariots in, 6 ; French invasion
of, 353

El Bodon, fight at, 482

Elchingen, battle of, 371

Elector of Bavaria, 292, 293, 295

Elizabeth Empress of Russia, arma-
ment of cavalry under, 341 ; divides
cavalry into squadrons, ibid. ; move-
ments by threes adopted, ibid.

Elizabethpol, battle of, 419

Elsatz, the river, 286

Embabeh, 355

Emperors, Roman, cavalry under, 110;
arms of, 110, 111 ; decadence of
army under, 111, 112

Emperor of Austria gives order of
merit to officers engaged at Villers-
en-Couchoe, 352

Employment of cavalry, 535- ^J8

En Croupe, Infantry, 244

En echeciuier, system of, 258

English Archers, great skill of, 204

English cavalry, time of Napoleon,
411, 417

English Fleet at battle of Dunes, 285

Epaminondas, 33

Epauliercs, 152, 284

Ephipparohie, 31

•'556

INDEX.

• Epitnj^me, 31
Epitarchie, 31
Equipment of Knightu, 149-156 ; of

Roman cavalry, 63-57
Erfurth, capture of, 374
Eribert, Archbishop of Milan invents

the Carroccio, 176
Ericthonius, 8

Esquires, services performed by, 146
Essarhaddon, 16
Eugene of Savoy, Prince, 292, 391,

3<J2
Eugene of Wirtemburg, Prince, 895
Euphrates, tlie river, 98
a:^urope, condition of in tenth century,

136
Eurymedon, 4

Exercise.; of knights, 158, 159
Exporience, remarkable, of Napoleon,

387
Eylai., battle of, 376, 398

F.

Failly, General de, 501, 502

Fairfax, Sir Thomas, 270

Falkirk, battle of, 206

Famine, losses of Crusaders by, 170

Fedoukinc hills, 430

Feods, or fiefs, 122, 123

Ferdinand, the Archduke, 371

Fere Champenoise, battle of, 396-398

Fettering horses, 24

Feudal cavalry, 120

Feudalism, decline of, 190

Feudal principle weakened by the
Crusades, 192 ; tenure among Mexi-
cans, 254

Fideles, 124

Figner, 402, 408

FireaiTOS, introduction of, 225 ; port-
able, inventea, 226 ; used at Perugia,
Padua, Bonifacio, Rosbecque, Troiiky,
and in Switzerland, 226 ; use of, by
cavalry, 228, 234, 235, 343

Fitz Lee, General, 477

Five Forks, 476, 478, 479

Flanders, Count of, 169, 175

Flavigny, 514

Fleet, Dutch, taken by ivalry, Sol

Fleet, English, at battle of i • anes, 285

Fleurus, battle of, 287

Flint lock, the, 22'/

Floquet, Captain, 221

Florence, cannon in, 225

Florentine army, 20?

Floug, General, 307

Flying columns under Alexander, 39

Folard on the column, 349

Foot-soldiers attached to cavalry, 94

Foreign cavalry in Roman armies,
88-98

Foreign mercenaries employed, 196

Formation of cavalry, 134

Forrest, General, 454-465

Fort Donelson, capture of, 440.

Forton, General, 498, 499

Fort Pillow, stormed by disi .od
cavalry, 460

Fourchette abolished, 257

Foy, General, remarks on Garcia Her-
nandez, 414

Francis I., 237 ; at Pavia, 238, 239

Franco-German War, 492-506 ; organi
sation of French cavalry, 492, 493
organisation of German cavalry, 493
494 ; outpost duty of French very
badly performed, 493-495

Franc-tireurs, 605, 529, 536 ; effect of
them upon Uhlans, 505, 506

Frankfort, 446

Franks, the, 96, 132 ; their cavalry,
132 ; armament, ib. ; tactics of, 133

Eraser, General, 422

Frassanovitch, Captain, 506

Frauenberg, garrison of, taken, 334,
335

Frederick the Great, 296, 300, 311,
509, 548 ; his cavalry, 312-331 ;
cavalry very unwieldy on his acces-
sion, 312 ; Guibert, eulogy of, 313 ;
prohibits use of firearms when
mounted, 312, PIC ; regulations for
his cavalry, 315 ; relies upon the
chargp, 313 ; style of fightmg under,
314, 315

Free companies, composition of, 200

Free lances, 197

Frenci' cavalry, 276-288 ; nobles treat
infantry cruelly, 205

Froissart, 149

Frossarci, General, 514

Fuente^. Count of, 282, 283

Fuentes d'Onor, action at, 482

Fumet*.v, Lieutenant, 4i4

Furli, raising biege of, 203

Furstenberg, 261, 263

O.

Gainsborouoh, combat of, 269

Galitz destroyed by Mongols, 187

Gambeson, the, 161

Gantelcts, 152

Ganzauge, Captain, remarks on the

Cossacks, 406, 409
Garcia Hernandez, action of, 412
Gardanne, General, 368
Garrisons of Henry the Fowler, 137
Gassion at Rocroy, 281-288
Gau, or Province, 122, 123
Gaulish cavalry, 89 ; their tactics, 90
Gauls invade Italy, 89

INDEX.

557

er-

im-
>3;
93,

ery

tof

ry.
83

34,
11,

ti;

les-
3;
len
for
the
er,

eat

General-in-Chief of cavalry, 643

Genetaires, 243, 248

Genets, 243

Gengis Khan, 184, 274 ; his array,
184, 186

Genoese crossbownien, 205, 210-212 ;
engineers, 174 ; fleet come to Jaffa,
ib.

GenouiUiferes, 152

German cavalry, time of Csesar, 92 ;
their arms and tactics, 92, 93 ; dis-
mounting to fight on foot, 93 ; foot-
soldiers attached to them, 94 ; im-
provements in, 95

German cities very powerful, 196

German customs, the origin of feudal-
ism, 120-122

German legion, the King's, 412-414.

German outposts in 1870, 496

Gessler, Lieut. -General, 326

Gheet, the, 298

Ghent, cannon in, 226

Gilmor, Colonel, on the revolver, 619

Gineta, the, 243

Gitchin, battle of, 486, 487

Glasgow, 446

Gleen, General, 284

Glottaw, action at, 390, 391

Godfrey de Bouillon, 169, 173, 176,
176

Golymin, battle of, 376

Gorget, the, 152

Gorodetz destroyed by Mongols, 187

Gotha, expedition of Seidlitz against,
321

Goths, the, 95, 113

Graf, the, 123

Grahame of Claverhouse, 272

Grammont, Marshal de, 284

Grandsee, 374

Grand Vizier, the, 360

Granicus, battle of, 36

Granson, battle of, 214

Grant, General, 474, 478

Grantham, combat of, 269

Gratian, the Emperor, 112

Gravelotte, battle of, 499, 600

Greatcoats, 134

Greaves abolished, 234

Greek cavalry, 21, 80, 31, 40 ; under
the Emperor Leon, 133-135 ; their
arms, 133, 134

Grenadiers mounted, 277

Greves, 152

Grierson, General, 466

Grossbeeren, battle of, 404

Grouchy, Marshal, 362, 374, 381, 393

Gryllus, 42

Guantlets, 631

Guard, the imperial, 364 ; the consular,
ib. ■* ■

Guamieri, his system, 201

Guerin, the chevalier, 16 J
Guibert, his eulogy of Frederick, 313
Guides, organised by Napoleon, 364
Gundhausen, 371
Gunersdorf. action near, 337
Gunpowder first used at Crecy, 208
Gustavus Adolphus, 248-256 ; invents
cartridges, 227 ; the death of, 265

H.

Haddick, General, 327 ; raid on Ber-
lin, 336, 337

Halbertstadt captured, 404

Halidon Hill, battle, 208

Hamburg, capture of, by partisans, 403

Hammers, battle, 154

Hampton, General, 4?7

Hanau, fight near, 411

Handschusheim, battle of, 352

Hannibal, 57*62, 80-82, 97, 139, 600,
647 : cavaliy, 67-60.

Hanoverian cavalry, 490

Harold II., paid soldiers of, 197

Hartsville, battle of, 447

Hastings, battle of, 169-164, 197

Hauberk, the, 160, 162

Haussecol, the, 162

Havelock, Sir Henry, on Sheridan's
operations, 477, 478, 481-483

Hawkwood, Sir John, 201, 202

Hazlehurst, 466

Heavy cavalry equipment, 631

Hector, 4

Heerbann, the, 123

Heilsberg, battle of, 390, 617, 518

Heliopolis, battle of, 359

Helisheim, 298

Helmet, the, 2, 149, 160, 152, 631

Henry the Fowler, 136, 137, 138 ; at
battle of Merseburg, 138 ; he pur-
chases a truce, 136 ; he fortifies
towns, 137 ; organises infantry, 137

Henry II. 197, 237 ; death of in a
Tournament, 146, 246 ; institutes
Carabins, 244

Henry II. of England, 197

Henry III. of France, 243

Henry IV. of France reducee the deptli
of squadrons, 237 ; at Courtras, 240 ;
dragoons under, 245 ; at Ivry, 246

Henry V. of England, 218, 219

Henry the Good, 188

Herodotus, 26

Heruli the, at Casilinum, 126, 127

Highlanders mixed with cavalry, 272

Highlanders, the 93rd, 429

Hipparchie, the, 81

Hocne, General, unites the cavalry,
348

Hochkirch, battle of, 826,- 827, M9 i
a surprise, 385

558

INDEX.

Hochstadt, or Blenheim, battle of, 292-
295

Hog's bristles, 258

Hohenfriedberg, battle of, 324, 325

Hohenlohe's cuirassiers, 381

Hoheulohe, Prince, 373-376

Holkar, 422-424

Holstein, Duke of, slain, 262

Homer, 4

Homildoii Hill, battle of, 217

Hood, General, 71

Hooker, General, 467-469

Horn, General, 262-265

Horse, first (use in war, 3

Horse appointments of Mamelukes,
355

Horse artillery, 350

Horse armour, 131

Horsemanship, Xenophon's treatise on,
42-45

Horse, proper type for cavaliy, 534

Horseman, meaning of word, 7

Horsemen in armour deciding the fate
of battles, 124, 125

Horses among the Germans, 93

Horseshoes, 71 ; of gold used byPoppea
for her mules, 72 ; views of writers
on, 72 ; first nailed to the hoof in
480, A.I)., 73

Howitzers in General Morgan's com-
mand, 445

Hozier, his views on dress, 632, 633 ;
his History of Seven Weeks' War,
488

Huegel, Lieut., 414

Hungarians or Turks, i35

Huns, the, 113-116 ; tactics of, 117

Hussars, 183-248 ; Austrian, in Fred-
erick the Great's Wars, 333 ; French,
,.apture the Dutch fleet, 361 ; 15th,
English, at Villers-en-Couchee, 352 ;
introdutied into France, 279 ; of
Frederick the Great, 317 ; their
character, arms, &c., 248, 249, 279 ;
under Napoleon, 366

HyderAli, 421

Ibbahih Pasha at Mogatch, 250

Ice, troops crossing by the, 351

Idomeneus, 4

Igor, 179, 180

lie, 80

Hiad, the, 4

Hing, battle of, 74-77

Imperial Guard, the, 364

Impetuosity necessary in a general,

543
India, cavalry in, 421-424
Indian ideas of horsemen, 253

Individual horseman, training of, 322
Infantry in cnisades useless, 172
Infantry service improved in the begin-
ning of the 16th cci.airy, 233 ;
causes of this, 233 ; of cities of a
better class, 193
Instruction to a caviilry colonel, 342
Intelligence, Napoleon's views on ob-
taining, 382, 383
Invasion of the Huns, 135, 136
Invading army of cavalry. 469-473
Irish infantry in English army, 208,

211
Ironsides, the, 268, 269
Isaiah, 9

Isly, battle of, 424
Issus, battle of, 37

Italian cities, raise ai-mies, 195 ; revolu-
tions in, 196
Italy, invasion of, 89
Ivry, battle of, 248

Jack boots, 531

Jackson, "Stonewall," 440, 450, 489,

540, 641
Jaffa.. Count of, 177
Janissaries of Damascus, 358 ; Aleppo,

358
Jaroslaf, 273
Javelin, the, 2
Jaxartes, battle of the, 185
Jean de Wert, 284
Jena, campaign of, 372, 374
Jenyns, Colonel, at Balaklava, 431
Jerome Bonaparte, 404
Jerusalem, siege of, 174, 175
John, King of France, 216-217
John, King of England, troops of, 198
Johnson, Colonel, 438
Johnson, General, 448
Johnstone, General JosephjE., 440
Jo'nville at Damietta, 177
Jones, General, 454
Joseph, King of Sjiain, letter from

Napoleon to, 382, 383
Julian 402

Julius Caesar, 86-88, 609
Junot, General, 358, 368
Junot's cavalry before Vimiera, 384
Justinian, cavalry under, 116

K.

Kadikoi, Sir Colin Campbell at, 429

Kseso Fabius, 51

Kalka or Kaletz, battle of, 187

Ealomna, battle of, 187

Kalouga, march towards, 399, 400

INDEX.

069

Kai-pnff, at Satzbach, 393
Karook Dara, battle of, 431
Katzbach, battle of, 393
Kellerman, 386 ; his gallant charge at

Marengo, 369, J70
Kellerman at Leipzig, 394
Kemp of Gilmor's cavalry, 519
Kentucky mounted riflemen, 4&8
Kerboga, 175 ; his army, 175
Khasaks, 273

Kiev burnt by Mongols, 186, 187
Kilpatrick, Colonel, 467
King of the Vagrants, the,' 173
Kinglake on peace trrining, 546 ; on

outpost duty, 428
King's German Legion, 412-414
Kleber, General, 358-360
Klemenstiewo, capture of, 402
Kleist, General, 394
Knife, the, 2
Knights Banneret, 15S ; Bachelors,

ibid. ; dismounting, 172 ; method of

fighting, 146 ; Roman, 48 ; very

costly to maintain, 195
Knoxville, Tennessee, raid from, 446
Koniggratz, battle of, 487, 488
Konigsberg, pursuit to, 379
Konopischt, camp of, 334
Kookolevsky, Colonel, 432
Korf, General, 396
Kosrew Pasha at Mogatch, 250
Krasnoi, battle of, 391
Krokow, General, 338
Kroitsch, detile of, 893
Kurzany, 420
Kutusof, Prince, 392, 400

L

La Bellh Alliaxce, 417

La edaemcnans, 22

Lffiliiis. 81

Tm Hayo Saince, 415, 416

Lake, Lord, liis use of cavalry, 421,

422-42 .
Lance, the, 153 ; forbidden to plebeians,

ii -d. ; Mo itecuculi's opinion of, 290 ;

usee', as pi las at Damietta, 177
T>ance fournie, 90, 164, 155, 2'22
Lancers, Polish, organised by Napo-

i-or, 368
Lamarois at Galliano, 353
Langddlp. Sir Marmaduke, 271
Langelzalza, battle of, 490
Languedoc, troops rpased in, 200
I^nnes, Marshal, 375
Lapitha), ?2

Lasalle, Genei-al, 374, 375, 386,
Laswprie, battle of, 422
Latour Mauboiirg, 362, 396
Leaden balls used in slings, 106

Lebanon, 446

Le Clerc, General, 396

Le Conrhe, General, 359

Lee, General Ui.bert E., 440, 450, 467,
468, 474, 476, 478, 479, 480, 481,
484

Lee, General W. H. F., 454, 467

Lee, General Stephen D., views on the
rpvolver, 518, 619 ; on cavalry, 630

Leipzig, see Breltenfeld

Leipzig, battle of, 394, 395, 411

Le Murchant, General, 411

Leon, the Emperor, on Greek cavalry,
133

Leopold, Duke, 213

Leopold I. of Dessau, invents ramrods,
227

Leopold in. Duke of Austria, 214

Lessnoy, battle of, 307

Leuctra, battle of, 32

Leuthen, battle of, 329

Leuwe, 298

Leujse, combat of, 277, 287, 288

Lewachow, General, 394

Liakhowo, 402

Libyans, 19, 25

Lignitz, battle of, 188, 189

Liprandi, General, 428

Lithuania, Partisan raid in, 420, 421

Livy, 88

Lloyd, General, on outpost duty, 335 ;
on Croats, 333

TiOevenhaupt, General, 303, 807

Loheac, Mareschal de, 221

Long's Creek, skirmish at, 462

Long, General, 471, 472

Lorraine, Duke of, 286

Losses by the sword in the Franco-
German War, 620, 621

Losses in battle in Italy in 15th cen-
tury very trifling, 203

Loudon, General, 337, 338, 346

Louis of Nassau, 241

Louis II. of Hungary, 250, 251

Louis VIII. claims sovereignty over
towns, 192

Louis IX. cnisade of, 177

Louis XI. employs Swiss, 223

Louis XII. raises argoulets, 242, 243

Louis XIII., discipline under, 229 ;
fo-ms regiments of carabins, 244

Louis XIV., cavalry under, 276-288 ;
his guards, 276, 277 ; his mousque-
taires, 276,

Louis XVI., 345

Louis the Younger, troops of, 198

Lower classes elevated by Crusades, 190

Lubeck, retreat to, 375

Lucan, Lord, 427, 546

Lucas, General, 27 J

Lucchesi, General, 329

Luchenwalde, the, 405

560

INDEX.

Lucullus, 84-86, 91

liiunatli'ii's rcKiiiinnt, 263

Lunenberg, reli«f of, 403

LutJien, battle of, 261

Liitzen, inerticneiicy of Napoloon's

cavalry at, 363 ; battle of, 403, 410,

411
Luxembourfj, Marshal, 287
Lycurgus, organiser of cavalry, 23

M.

Maoponald, Marshal, 367, 393

Macedonian cavalry, 33 ; army organi-
sation, 84

Machiavelli, his history, 203 ; Treatise
on War, 230 ; foresees the future
influence of infantry, 230 ; his ideas
of arms and e(iuiviment, 230, 231 ;
his ideas on cavalry, 232

Mack, General, 371

MacMahon, Marshal, 496, 497

Madatoff, General, at Schumla, 419

Magdeburg, pursuit to, 374

Magenta, battle of, 432

Magnentius, 116

Mago, 63, 64

Mahratta cavalry, 421-424

Mail, coats of, 149, 150

Maison, General, 411

Malo Jaroslawitz, battle of, 399

Malpla(juet, battle of, 297

Mamelukes, the, 353-357 ; their ser-
vants, 354 ; their arms and equip-
ment, 854 ; Napoleon's views on, 354;
method of fighting, 354 ; horse
appointments of, 355

Mamercus iEmilius, 71

Manassas, second battle of, 450, 451

Manchester, Earl of, 270

Manoeuvring power of Frederick's
army, 349

Manoeuvres introduced by Frederick
the Great, 318

Mantinea, battle of, 29 ; second battle
of, 33

Manufacturing classes, armies com-
posed of, 439

Marathon, battle of, 24

Marc Antony, 402

Merchader or Merchades, 198

Mardonius, 19, 25-27

Marengo, battle of, 368-370

Margueritte, General, 502

Marius, 73

Marlborough, Duke of, 288, 292-299

Marmont, Marshal, 386

Marschalk, Baron, 414

Marsin, Coi'.nt de, 284

Marston Moor, battle of, 270

Mattel, Charles, 127-iaO

Masistius, 19, 26

Massanissa, King of Numidia, 76, 80.
81, 82

Matarieh, attack on villujio of, 359.
360

Massena, Marshal, 380

Matchlock, the, 226

Maurice of Nassau, 246

May, Lieut. -Colonel, 412, 413

Mayenco, attack upon lines of, 352

Mayenne, Duke of, 246, 247

Alazeppa, steamer, captured by Forrest's
cavalry, 461

Mechanical skill in middle ages bad,
209

Medians, the, 18

Medynn, 400

Megarians, the, 26

Mehaigne, the, 296 ; lines of, 288

Melas, General, 368

Melfort, Count de, visits Frederick,

339
Melo, Don Francisco de, 281
Melun, the Viscount de, 165
Melzo, Cavalier, 238
Memphis, raid on, by Forrest, 460
Menidas, 37

Menil-Durand, on the column, 349
MentchikofT, Prince, 302, 303
Mercenary armies, 192 ; companies,

197 ; ravages by, 200
Mercenaries, foreign, employed, 196
Merci, General, 284
MeiTitt, General, 476, 478-480
Merseburg, battle of, 188, 139
Mesopotamia, 99
Messenian war, 23
Metz, retreat upon, 497 ; advance of

Germans upon, ibid.
Meuse, the, 298
Mexican campaigns, 436
Mexican army, 252 ; their tactics,

dress, and arms, ibid.
Mexico, Spanish cavalry in, 261, 252
McClellan, General, 449, 460
McCook, General, 471
McKenzie's farm, 427
Michel's cuirassiers, charge by, 496
Midway, use of telegraphs at, 446,

447
Migration of tribes, 123, 124
Milan, 88 ; army of, 196
Miles, 125

Milhaud, General, 376
Milhaud's cuirassiers, 416, 416
Militaiy art defective in the Grusadea,

176
Miltiades, 24
Mincio, the river, 363
Minie, Capt. , 426 ; bullet, ibid. ; rifle

used, 427
Mithridates, 83
Mithridatic war, 83-85 "

r

INDEX.

501

Mixed regiments of pikemen and mus-
queteerB, 207

Mixing infantry and cavalry, 259, 260

Mizeslav, Prince of iSilesia, 188

Mstislair, the Griind Trince, 273, 274

Moesia Invaded, 1 14

MoL'atch, battle of, 250, 251

Mohammed, Sultan of Carizime, 185

Molwitz, battle of, 312

Moncontour, battle of, 239, 240

Monson, Colonel, 422

Montbrun, 362, 381, 380

Montebello, battle of, 368, 433

Montecucidi, his memoirs, 289 ; organ-
isation of cavalry according to, 289,
290 ; mixing the arms, 280

Monterey, action at, 456

Montfort of Tettnang, 213

Mongols, invasion of, 184 ; destroy
Lublin, Warsaw, and Cracow, 188

Mongolian habits and tactics, 186

Montgomery, capture of, 473

Montreal or Moriale, 201 ; immense
company raised by him, ibid.

Montrose, Marquis of, 272

Mookerheyde, battle of, 241

Moore, adjutant, at Bushire, 432, 522

Morale, 539,-542

Morand, General, 378 ; defeated, 403 ;
remarks of, on the Cossacks, 407,
408

Morat, battle of, 214

Moravian town, battle of, 438

Morelli, Colonel, 433

Morgan, General John H., 441 ; use of
mounted rifles by, ibid. ; arms of his
cavaliy, 445 ; method of, tactics of,
443-449

Morgarten, battle of, 211-213 ; com-
pared with Crecy, 213

Morsbronn, cavalry charge at, 496

Mosby's cavalry, 517, 519, 520

Moscow burnt by Patou, 187 ; advance
upon, 391, 398, 399; retreat of French
from, 400-403

Mosel, Colonel, convoy under, 337,
338

Moses, 8

Mounted rifles, 625-530 ; equipment,
533, 634 ; great increase of, in
Federal armies, in 1863, 466

Mounted rifle principle, 40, 515

Mount Cithseron, skirmish at, 19, 26

Mont St. Jean, 417

Mount Thabor, battle of, 358

Mourad Bey, 356, 356

Mousquetaires, 276-278

Mousqueton, the, 277, 278

Muhlberg, action at, 406, 407

Munford, Colonel, 451

Murray, Colonel, 422

Murat, 862, 370, 371, 373-375, 377,

378, 381, 385, 390, 391, 395, 400 ;

his pursuit after the Austrians after

Elehlngen, 371, 372 ; his energy at

Moscow, 386
Murfrcesboro, cavalry fight at, 456
Mursa, battle of, 115
Mustaphn, the Sultan, 274
Mutilation to escape service 'among the

Romans, 111
Mutzel, the morasses of the, 330

N.

Naohod, battle of, 487

Nndasti's cavalry, 329-330

Namozine Creek, 480

Namur, 298

Nancy, captured by six Uhlans, 498

Nansouty, 362, 370, 380

Napier's History of Peninsular War,
384

Napoleon, 358-360 ; appreciation ot
light cavalry, 363 ; augments horse
artillery, 360 ; brigades the cavalry,
349 ; dragoons in his army, 365 ;
diff'erent types of cavalrj' in his army,
364 ; establishes corps of guides, 361 ;
establishes cavalry schools, 366 ; his
dispositions against the Mamelukes,
355 ; his use of cavalry in action,
366 ; his use of artillery at Wagram,
.'?67 ; his letter to King Joseph, 382,
383 ; mutual support of the three
arms under, 366, 367 j maintains a
large force of cavalry, 362, 363 ; on
mounted rifles, 625; on "Morale,"
640 ; increases the hussars and chas-
seurs-k-cheval, 366 ; organises drome-
dary dragoons, 361 ; perfects method
of using cavalry, 339 ; use of dra-
goons by, 279 ; re-introduces cui-
rasses, 364, remarks on Mamelukes,
354

Napoleon's wars, cavalry in, 509

Napoleon III., on archers, 205

Narses, the Eunuch, 126

Naseby, battle of, 271

Nazareth, 368

Nebel, the river, 292-295

Neerwinden, battle of, 288

Nerenstetten, 371

Nero, 71

Nerode II., Count, 432

Neuvi, battle of, 94

Nevers, Count de, fined by Philip of
France, 144

Newcastle, Marquis of, 270

Newerofskoi, General, 391

Ney, Marshal, 373, 374, 390. 415

Nicea, siege of, 172, 175

Nichola.s, the Emperor, 418

O O

a.iw«^^vj

662

INDEX.

Nijagorodskoy, dragoons the, 431, 432
Nolan 'a History and Tactics of Cavalry,

405
Nordlingen, battle of, 271, 283, 284
Norman sea kings, 179
Normans, improved military art among

the Russians, 181
Northampton, Earl of, 210
Norton, Captain John, 426"
Nossentin, combat of, 376
Nostitz, Count, 394, 396
Numidian cavalry, 58-64
Numidians, the, 75, 80-82
Nuremberg, 371

OcS8, General, 404

Octal, son of Gengis, 185

Oehm, Colonel, 264

Okolona, action at, 469, 460

Oleg, 179, 180

Olmutz, 337

Orange, prince of, 287

Orchomene, battle of, 83, 84

Origin of feudal system, 120-125

Orleans, battle of, 505

Orleans besieged by Attila, 117

Orloff Denizoif, 395, 399, 403, 411

Ornano's cavalry, defeat of, 391

Orodos, king of Parthia, 99

Osterman, 393

Ostrogoths, the, 95

Otho, the Emperor, 164, 165

Otho I., 139

Oudinot, Marshal, 370, 404

Ouradnik, 274

Oural Cossacks, 274

Outposts, 45, 108, 109

Outposi duty by Numidian cavalry,
69, 60

Outposts of Hannibal, 109 ; of Romans,
ibid. ; services of Austrian against
Frederick excellent, 332-335 ; in
Crimean War, bad, 428 ; in Austro-
Prussian War, very badly performed,
486, 487 ; value of cavalry for, 508

OuvarofF, charge by General, 391, 392,
403,

Owanta, action at, 420

P.

Pacorus, 106

Pacthod, General, 396-398

Pads, 70

Pagondas, 28

Palen, 403

Pamunkey River, 449

Pandours, 335

Papirius, L., 49
Pappenheim Count, 262, 266
Parker's Cross Roads, battle of, 457,

458
Parmenio, 38
Parthian cavalry, 98, 100
Parthiaus, rivals to Rome, 105 ; great

effect of their victory, ibid,
Passegardes, abolished, 284
PflsseWitch, capture of rrussians at,

375
Patriarchal government, 1
lutrols, &c., 108, 100,
f "iitrols under Gustavus, 267
raur.'iT.s, 152
Paal .fove, his account of Charles

>'];•'« army, 228
Pavia, army of, 195 ; battle of, 238,

239
Paying soldiers, system of, commeucid,

192
Peace training, effect of 'ing, 545, 546
Pelhan:, the gallant, 452
Peloponnesian War, 28
Peloponnesus the, 23, 27
Peninsular War, dragoons in, 365
Peru, Spanish cavalry in, 254
Percussion musket, the, 227
Perevolotzna, 303
Persian cavalry, 17, 25, 26, 419 ; their

armauioiit, 18
Pescara, Marquis of, 238, 239
Peta, or Baton, 185 ; his army, 185,

187
Petchinage, 184

Peter the Great, 301, 304, 341, esta-
blishes a regular army, 304
Peter the Great, great increase in

dragoons by, 304 ; equipment of

dragoons under, 305 ; tactics of dra-
goons under, 305 ; Cossacks under,

306
Peter the Hermit, 168
Petersburg, operations around, 474

477
Petronels, 226 ; use of by knights,

233, 235
Phalerians, 22
Pharaoh, 6

Pharsalia, battle of, 86-88
Philip Augustus, 164, 165, 167, 197.

198 ; gives safeguards to cities, 192
Philip the Bold, army under, 198

„ of France, 210

„ le Hardi, 144

,, fines Count de Nevers, 144

,, of Macedon, 33

,, de Valois, 205
Phirous, treachery of, 174
Piccolomini, 266
Picton, General, 415
Pike, the, 2

INDEX.

563

Pikes revived by Napoleon, 360, 361
Pikes, use of as lances, at Damietta,

177
Pikemen, Swiss, 204, 509 ; under Gus-

tavus Adolphus, 256
Pillow, General, 455
Pisistratidffi, 22
Pistol, invention of, 235 ; derivation

of word, 235 ; first introduction into

England, 235 ; used at Cerisoles in

1544, 235 ; used by Reitres at St.

Quentin, 235 ; German system of

using, 236
Pizarro, 254, 540
Platsea, battle of, 19
Platseans, the, 21
Plate armour, introduction of, 193,

194
Platoff, the Hetman, 378, 387, 390,

399, 400, 403
Ploskina, the Voievode, 274
Plutarch, 22
Podultz, village of, 486
Poictiers, or Tours, battle of, 127, 130
Poitiers, battle of, 199, 208, 214
Poitou, Seneschal de, 221
Poitou, garrison of, 221
Poland, early cavalry, of 178 ; arms,

tactics, &c. of, 182
Polish army, 182
Polish lancers, organised by Napoleon,

365 ; their arms, &c., 366
Polish war, 258 ; of 1830-31, 418-

420
Polovtsi, attacked by Mongols, 187
Polybius, 53
Pomppv, 87, 88, 609
Ponsonoy, Sir W., 415
Poolesviile, skirmish at, 452
Pope, General, 450
Pope Urban II., 168
Potemkin, Prince, 342, 343
Prague, battle of, 327, 332
Preutzlow, action at, 375
Preobazinski, guard regiment, 392
Procopius, views of, on archers, 115
Propoyske, skirmish at, 307
Prussia, the king of, 395, 396
Prussian cavalry, imitation of it by all

nations, 340 ; time of Niipoleon,

410, 411
Provisioning an army, 170
Pultowa, battle of, 301-303, 306
Pultusk, battle of, 376
Pursuit, Napoleon's vigour in, 368
Pyramids, the battle of the, 355-357

QUASDANOVITCH, 368

Quesnoy, siege of, 352

Raglan, Lord, 427
Raids —

Morgan's into Kentucky, 1862,

446
Morgan's upon Gallatin, 447
Moi^an's into Ohio, 448, 449
Stuart's round McClellan's army,

449, 450
Stuart's on Catlett's station, 460
Stuart's through Pennsylvania,

451-454
Forrest's on Memphis, 460, 461
Grierson's in Mississippi, 466
Stoneman's in Virginia, 467, 468
Wilson's through Alabama, 469
Ramanieh, skirmish at, 355
Ramilies, battle of, 296, 297
Randolph, 207
Rapatel, killed at Fere Champenoise,

397
Rapidan station, action at, 467
Rapp, General, 399
Ratisbon, cavalry action at, 380
Ratisbon, 410

Ranch, General, 500 «

Raymond of Toulouse, 169, 178, 176
Reconnoitring, 134
Red Cossacks, 395
Redor.ot captured by cuirofisiera at

Borodino, 392, 393
Red River Expedition, 180
Reduction in size of regiments by

Gustavus Adolphus, 257
Reforms in cavalry in Austria, 484 ;
effected by Gustavus Adolphus, 256,
257 ; in cavalry in Prussia, 436 ; iu
cavalry in Russia, 434
Regillus, battle of Lake, 51
Regiments, organised in Spain, 248
Regular armies, introduction of, 220
Regulations for Frederick's cavalry, 316
Reitres, German, use pistols, 236
Religion ind love ruling sentiments of

chivalry, 148, 149
Renzel, Lieutenant-Gcneral, 302
Retreat of French from Moscow, 400-

403
Revolutionaiy wars of America and

France, 344-361
Revolving pistols, 209, 227
Revolver, charges with, 461 ; use tff
at Balaklava, 431 ; use of, 506, 616-
619, 522, 523 ; views of Colonel
Gilmor, 519 ; views of General S. D.
Leo, 618, 619
Reyss Achmet Pacha, 431
Rheinfeld, Field-Marshal, 803
Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 176, 177, V96,

402
Kichmond, evacuated, 479

564

INDEX.

Richards, Major, 517

Rienzi, puts Montreal to death, 2.'1

Rifled barrel, the, 226, 227

Rifled fire-arms, introduction of, 425

Riflemen, use of, in America, 346, 347

Rifles, e(Ti(-t of, on cavalry, 433

Robert of Ncrmnndy, 169, 175

Robert of Artois. C ant, 212

Eochefort, '^uiw. <ip, anecdote of

Seidlitz. 3..), S21
Rochow, Geneva]. ?%
Rocquencourt, sur] I'so of. 411
Rocroy, battle of. •/%, 2dl
Rodolph II., the iim^iror. C";
Roi Truand, the, 173
Roman cavalry, 46 ; at the close of the

second Punic war, 83
Roman de Ron, the, 160
Romulus, organisation of his cavalry,

47
Rosbach, battle of, 321, 328, 329
Rosenberg, General, 381
Rostof, destroyed by Mongols, 187
Rostopchin, Governor of Moscow, 541
Rentiers, 199
Roveredo, battle of, 353
Ruchel, General, 373
Rudiger, General, 419
Rumiautzofi', 342, 343
Rupert, Prince, 268-270
Rurik, 179

Russell, Sir William at Zutphen, 247
Russia, early cavaliy of, 178
Russian cavalry, 273 ; under Alexander

I., 387-409 ; composition in 1810,

.^87; in latter part of 18th centuiy,

341-343
Russians, defensive arms of, 181
Russian Tablets, the, 273
Rysta, the, 307

S.

Saar, action at, 488

Saargemnnd, 495

Sabiues, the, 51

Sacken's corps, 39.3

Saddles, 70; first mentioned, 153; pro-
jections added, 153 ; time of Leon,
134 ; Hungarian, used by Russian
Light Cavalry, 342, 343

Sailor's Creek, battle of, 480, 481

Saladin, 176, 402 ; his body guard, 176

Salamanca, battle of, 41 ' 412

Salo, 368

Sand mountain, skirmish at, 462

Sandys, Colonel, 269

Sangipan, King of the Alans, 117

Samtz, 301

Saraoen armament, 170

Saracen camps, 131 ; conquests, 130,

131 ; '■'lain mail, 171 ; light cavalry,

170; 'itirs, 131,170
Sargntiai! •. 13
f^.irgoii, ■; i
.-armavirtiis, ?9
Sawoiny, < '
Saxe, Maisha), oOS-313 ; on sujier-

fluous baggage, 345 ; visits Frederick,

339
Scarlett's, General, charge, 429
Schlitz, action, ut 376
Schiinaich, Prince, 327
Schulenberg, Marshal, 301
Rchumla, operations round, 419
Schwartaw, action at, 376
Scindiah, 422
Scipio Africanus, 68, 73-76, 80, 81,

547 ; his system of drilling, 68, 69
Scipio, Publius, 60, 61
Scott's partisan life with Mosby, 519,

520
Scythia, 179

Sebastiani's cuirassiers, 393
Sebastopol, 427
Secrecy, well maintained by Napoleon,

383, 384
Sedan, march of MacMahon to, 500,

501 ; cavalry badly handled, 501
Sediman, combat of, 357, 358
Selma, captured by Wilson, 472, 473
Seidlitz, General, 43, 300, 313, 314,

819-321, 323, 328—331
Semenowskoie, gua'd regiment, 392
Sempach, battle of, 214
Sempronius, 63
Sennacherib, 14, 17
Seutinum, battle of, 53
Septimius Severus, his concession to

his troops, 12
Sergents d'armes, 167
Serpentine, the, 226
Sertc:ius, Quintus, 98
Servian war, 506

Services performed by esquires, 146
Servius Tullius, 48
Seslawin, 402, 403

Seven Years' War, effect on the mili-
tary Art, 344
Severus, the Emperor Alexander, 112
Severus, expedition of, into Parthia,

107
Sextus Tempanius, 52
Shelby, General, 544
Sheridan, General, 454, 474-484, 508
Shewel, Colonel, at Balaklava, 622
Shields, 2, 152, 171
Shiloh, charge of Morgan's cavalry,

618 ; battle of, 456
Shoes, horse, importance of, 609
Shoulder straps of chain, 631
Silanus, Julius, 77
Silesia, Duke of, resists Mongols, 188

INDEX.

565

)nce8sion to

on thd mili-

" Six Hundred," the charge of the, 430
Skarzinski, General, 419
Skirmishers to cover attack, 360
Skirniislies, see Battles.
Skirmishing introduced in American

Revolution, 347
Slingers improved under Ventidius, 106
Slings, leaden bullets used in, 106
Slowaisky, General, 406
Smith, General, 423
Smolensk road, the, 400
Snaphaunce, the, 227
Snow-shoes used by GustavusAdolphus,

258 ; usf' ^n Canada by British

troops, 2u6
Snowstorm, effect of, at Eylati, 377,

378
Social class of Roman cavalry, 49, 60
Socrates on generalship, 547
Sohr, battle oi, 325, 849
Soissons, battle of, 96, i26
Solea, the, 71
Solferino, battle of, 432
Soliman, army of, 175 ; arms and tac-
tics of, ib. ; the "magnificent,' 250,

251
Sollarets, 152 ; abolished, 234
Soltikoff, Count, 343
Scndeihausen, battle at, 138
Soinik, 274
Soubise, Pijnce, 328
Soult, Marshal, 365, 376
South Side Railway, 475
Soworoff, 342, 343
Spades carried by cavalry, 342 ; given

to dragoons, 305
Spabis, the, 249, 343
Spandau, suiTender of, 374
Spanish cavalry, 96 ; their swords, 97 ;

foot soldiers attached to, ibid, ; in

Mexico, 251
Spar, Colonel at Burgau, 261
Sparta: 446

Spartan cavalry, 80, 32
Sphicheren, battle of, 497
Spurs, 152, 153
Squares, hollow, 132
Squires, duties of, 156
Statianus, 106
Steingel, General, Napoleon's remarks

on, 382, 386
Stettin, retreat to, 374 ; surrender of,

375
Sthenelus, 4
Stirling, battle of, 206
Stirrups not in use till the 6th century,

70
Stoneman, General, 462,467-469
Strabo, 88
Stradiots, 243
Streight's cavalry, pursuit of by For-

fMt, 462-465

Strife, first cause of, 1,

Strozzi, Pierre, said to have used dra-
goons, 244

St. Cyr, Marshal, 365

St. Denis, battle of, 239

St. George, Company of, 202

St. Gothard, battle of, 291

St. Jean d'Acre, siege of, 358

St. Louis of France, 209

St. Quentin, pistols used at, 235

St. Sulpice at Ratisbon, 380 ; at Wa-
gram, ibid.

Stuart, General, his great ability, 454

Stuart, General J. E. B., 449-464

Sturgis, General, 460

Sub-infeudation, 124

Suchet, Marshal, 365

Surena, 99, 100

Surrender, cavalry should never, 509

Swedish army, arms, &c., 260

Swedish feathers, 258

Swinton, !Sir John, at Homildon Hill,
218

Sv.iss infantry employed in Franco,
223, 224 ; pikeraep. "158, 20*

Sword, great contP'ii^,: for in American
armies, 441, 448 ; causes oI* con-
tempt for, 441, 442 ; proofs, 442;
losses by in Franco- German war,
620, 521 ; should be attached to
saddle, 523, 524 ; among the Romans,
64 ; views of General S. D. Lee on,
518, 619

Sylla, P., 83, 87

Syracuse, expedition against, 29

Syrian chariots, 8

T.

Tabasco, battle of, 253

Tabor, garrison of, taken, 334, 335

Tacitus on the customs of the Germans,
121

Tactical abil. y wanting iinder chivalry,
156, 157

Tactical formatioii of troops of the
cities, 196

Tactics of Frederick's cavalry, 323,
324 ; effects of French Revolution,
347. 348 ; at lliug, 76-78 ; of
Knights, 146, 147, 155, 159; of
mercenary companies, 202, 2o3 ; in
modern times, 527, 528 ; of Roman
cavalry,, 56 ; of Saracens, 131

Taffna, battle of, 424

Tallard, Marshal, 292-295

Tappe, Lieutenant, 414

Tarentinarchie, 31

Tarentine cavalry, 31

Tarquinius Priscus, 48, 88

Tflfsettes, 162 ; abolished, 284

566

INDEX.

Tavieres, the village of, 296
Tcheniicheff, General, 403-405, 411
Tecumseth, the Indian chief, 438
Tein bridge, skirmish of, 334
Teiuitz, skirmish at, 335
Telegraph, tapping lines, 446, 447
Tclos, 31
Tennessee River, Forrest's operations

on, 461, 462
Tersky, 266
Tettenbom, 403
Teuffel, General, 262
Texnn Mounted Rangers, 438
Texel, the Dutch fleet taken at, by

French hussars, 35 1
Theban cavalry, 27, 33
Thebes, war of the seven chiefs against,

21
Theodoric, king of the Wisigoths,

117
Theodoric, 95
Theodosius the Great, 70
ThermopylfB^, 25
Thessalians, the, 22, 24
Thiers, his remarks on Eylau, 378
Thirty Years' War, the, 255
Thorismond, 117
Thoroughfare Gap, 450
Thracian cavalrj-, 22
Threes, movement by, 341
Thymbra, battle of, 11, 17
Tichnowitz, action of, 488
Ticinus, battle of, 60, 61
Tiglath Pileser, 8
Tigranes, 84, 86
Tigranocerta, battle of, 84, 85 ; Machia-

velli's comments upon, 232
Tilly, his cavalry, 261-263 ; saying of,

256
Tirailleurs, 425

Tishimongo Creek, battle of, 460
Tissiatchsky, 181
Tlascalans, the, 253
Tobitschau, action at, 488
Tolbiac, bactle of, 96, 126
Tomori, Bishop, at Mogatch, 250
Torkye, 184

Tournament, the, 137, 138, 158, 159
Towarzirz, 183
Towers used in sieges, 173 ; in siege of

Jerusalem, 174
Training of Greek cavalry, 40
Training by Scipio, 78, 79 ; of ind?>

vidual horseman, 322
Trajan's expedition to Parthia, 107
Trajan's column, 58, 59
Trebbia, battle of, 62-64
Trenton, capture of by cavalry, 457
Tribes formed for protection, 1
Trimacresie, 90, 154
Troppau, 337
Trossnlura, taking of, 47

Troy, siege of 4, 21 ; method of fight-
ing at, 4, 5, 6

Turenne, 284, 286, 548 ; ranged cavalry
at six paces' distance, 279, opposed
use of firearms by cavalry, 280

Turkeytown, skirmish at 463

Turkish cavalry, 16th century, 249 ;
their arms and tactics, 249

Turks, cavalry of in 10th century,
131-133 ; or Hungarians, 135

Turma, the, 55-57,

TutschAofi", 377

Tverskoy dragoons, 431

Uhlans, 308, 333

Uhlans in France in 1870, 498

Uniforms first instituted, 256

Ulm, campaign of, 371

Undine gunboat captured by Forrest's

cavalry 461, 462
Upton, General, 471, 473
Urban II, Pope, 168

V.

Valentia, Marshal Suchet's use of

dragoons at, 384
Valenciennes, taking of, 277
Valens, 50
Valentinianus, 50
Vam plate, 153

Vandamme, Marshal, 389, 893, 394
Vandals, the 96
Varegues, or Varangians, 179, 181, 183,

184
Vassili Vassiliavitch, 974
Vegetius, 112, 113; ontraining cavalrv,

70
Ventidius, 106

Venus, transport captured, 461
Vercingetoiix, 91-94 ; his strategy,

91, 92
Victor, Marshal, 368
Vienna, advance upon by Murat, 372
Villeroy, Marshal, 296, 298
Villers-en-Couchee, skirmish at, 352
Vimiera, battle of, 384
Vionville, battle of, 499, 500, 514
Virgil on chariots, 8, 22
Visconti, Philip, Duke of Milan, 231
Vizier, the Grand, 360
Vladimir, destroyed by Mongols, 187
Voievodes of Hungarians, 135, 181
Volsciaus, 62
Voltigeurs, 97

Von Areiitschildt, Colonel, 412
Von Barby, General, 600
Von Boruke, Colonel, memoirs, 450

632

INDEX.

667

Von der Decken, Captain Gustavus, 413
Von Hattorf, Captain, 412, 413
Von Moltke, 45
Von Redern, General, 498
Von Reitzenstein, Captain, 414
Von Uslar Gleicheu, Captain, 413
Von Voss, Lieutenant, 413
Vsevolod, 187

W

Wace, Robert, 159

Wachau, action at, 395

Wagram, battle of, 380, 381

Wa]deck, Prince of, 287

Wallace, Sir William, 206 ; his system

of squares, 206
Wallensteiu, his cavalry, 261, 264
Walter the Penniless, 169
Wamery, his remarks, 314, 319, 327,

330
Warsaw, occupation of by French, 376
Wassilchikoff, 393, 396, 401
Waterloo, battle of 414-417
Waynesboro, battle of 475
Weapons, when invented, 2
Wedell's brigade, 600
Wedell, General, 335
Weimar, capture of, by Murat, 374
Weissenberg, battle of, 496
Wellington, Duke of, 412-414
Welsh infantry in English army, 208,

211
Werneck, General, 371
Wertingen, combat of, 370
Westphalia, partisan operations, in,

404, 405
■\\ halley. Major, 269, 270
Wheel-iock, the, 226, 235
Wiasma., action at, 401
Wiederzuriick, 345
Wild tribes, tactics of, 107, 108
William the Conqueror, 125, 159-164;

his irmy, 197
William Rufus, his army, 197
Will's Creek, skirmish at, 463
Wilson, General, 469
Windham, General Percy, 453, 467

Winkowno, battle of, 399
Wisigoths, the, 95
Wismar, action at, 376
W€Prth, battle of, 496, 513
Wolseley's, General, expedition, 1 80
Women, respect for, among Germans,

148
WoronzofFs cavaliy, 403, 404
Wurzburg, battle of, 353

Xenagie, 31

Xenophon, 19, 547 ; treatise on caval-
ry, 42-5 ; on chariots, 9 ; treatise on
horsemanship, 41

Xerxes, 18, 24, 25

Y.

Yalek Cossacks, 274
Yankee inventive faculty, 439
Yaroslaf, 180
Youri, Prince of Rezan, 187

Z.

Zabkun hollow, 330

Zach, General, taken prisoner at Ma-
rengo, 370

Zagonara, battle of, 203

Zama, battle of, 70, 80-83

Zaporog Cossacks, 274

Zaveces, 11

Zenith of cavalry under Frederick,
314

Zeppelin, Count, 495

Zeydenieh, action at, 374

Zig, battle of, 424

Ziethen, General, 313, 314, 321, 323,
327, 330, 334, 335, 337, 338

Zintzheim, battle of, 280, 285-287

Ziskowitz, General, 337, 338

Zorndorf, battle of, 323, 330

Zulgarh, battle of, 424

Zutphen, battle of, 247

Zuydcrzee crossed on the ice, 351

LONDON :

R CLAY, SONS, AMD TAYLOR PRINTEIM,

BREAD STREET HILL,

QUEEN VICTORIA STREET.

/

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