


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


1781

*John Baptist Celli,*

Academy of FLORENCE

12 21



C I R C E,

Translated from the ITALIAN of

*John Baptist Gelli,*

OF THE

ACADEMY of FLORENCE.

*Otii Cato reddendam Operam putat.*

Præf. Just. Hist.



L O N D O N :

Printed by JAMES BETTENHAM,

M D C C X L I V .

C I R C U S

Translated from the Italian of

John Baptist Gelli

OF THE

ACADEMY OF FLORENCE

On the Calculation of Time

1742. 12. 18.



L O N D O N

Printed by James Baskin

M D C C L X X



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H. Gravelot inv.

J. Baskin sculp.

TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
ALLEN  
Lord Bathurst.

MY LORD!

THE *obscure Merit* of my  
Author, I am persuaded,  
will be a sufficient Recommen-  
A 2 dation

iv *DEDICATION.*

dation to your Lordship, who has through Life shewn, that it gives a generous Mind equal Pleasure to call true Merit into Light from any Disadvantages, as to do it Justice and Honour when shining in its proper Sphere. This proves a Heart well refin'd both from Pride and Envy, Passions that too often render Men entrusted with superior Fortunes, useles or hateful to the World and unhappy in themselves. By such, Men of Genius must expect to be treated like the Glow-worm, which though it strikes every Observer with Admiration, is pass'd coldly by and left to adorn a Ditch. A happy Con-  
noursb                      s A                      currence

## DEDICATION. v

currence of Circumstances engaged your Lordship early in the strictest Ties of Friendship with Men of that Sort of Greatness, which Desert alone can give; Men of that Cast of Mind which is never suspected of base or selfish Views. In a Word, whose Familiarity could have been purchas'd with nothing less than an engaging Disposition, an enlarged Understanding, and a Parity of Turn for Conversation. The Observation might be sufficiently justified by your long Intimacy with Dean *Swift*, Mr. *Addison*, and Bishop *Atterbury*, than whom none were ever more nice or disinterested in the Choice of a few Friends. But

vi *DEDICATION.*

But I can scarce forbear exclaiming

*Oh! noctes Cœnaque Deum ----*

When I remember to have seen at your Lordship's Table, my Lord *Lansdown*, Mr. *Prior*, Mr. *Congreve*, Mr. *Gay*, Mr. *Fenton*, and Mr. *Pope*; whom I reserve for the last, as Heaven has done. Thus *Virgil*, in describing a Group of such Master-Spirits, concludes with his principal Figure,

*His dantem Jura Catonem.*

These are a Sort of Companions that always know their Friend, and from whom He is  
sure

## DEDICATION. vii

sure to be known and will be judg'd of by Posterity.

For Time who, as the Virtuosi assure us, soon devours the frail Materials with which Folly or Envy attempts to disguise genuine Inscriptions, never fails to present the Original Characters fresh and fair, and more happily preserv'd by the very Arts employ'd to injure them. I am,

MY LORD,

*Your most obliged*

*Humble Servant,*

H. Layng.



T H E  
P R E F A C E.

**I***T may be expected, (and I would not have the Reader every way disappointed) that I should say something of a certain Paraphrase, Traducement, Carricatura, or what you please, of this Book, by the late Mr. Thomas Brown of facetious Memory. And I can safely say, that if I could, upon a strict and disagreeable Enquiry, have met with his Translation sooner, it would have saved me the Trouble of making this : and if I had not found his at all, it would have saved me that*

*of*

of printing mine. But it appeared to me so contrary to the Character of a Writer once in the highest Esteem, though since almost lost, by being condemn'd by the Inquisition, that he seem'd to suffer as wrongfully from his Translator as from his Judges. And I must own it gives me a Pleasure, which I hope is of the generous Kind, to think that I have endeavour'd to rescue a worthy Person from bad Company that had used him ill; and put him into a Capacity of delivering his natural Sense without the expressive Epithets of Billingsgate, the flowing Eloquence of Water-Language, or the strong Metaphors of a Gin-Shop.

Perhaps, after all, Mr. Brown, for he was a Wag, intended to adapt his Performance to the Subject, by giving, instead of a Version, a Metamorphosis of his Author; and like that before him too by changing a Philosopher into a Beast. If so, never was Writer more happily brutaliz'd. And sure that Pen must be able to work as mighty Wonders

as

as Circe's Wand, that could convert an excellent Moral convey'd with all the Advantages of Learning, and Purity of Language, enliven'd with a most pleasing Fable, into a pert flat Composition cook'd up to be a Classic for an Ale-house. It may be no more proper to refer the Reader to the whole Book, than it would be polite to send a delicate Person to a Place that he might convince himself of its Offensiveness. But a cursory Examination shew'd me that in the very Title-Page he misrepresents the Intention of the Author, which he says was to display the Infelicities of human Life. A most delightful and useful Plan truly! Whereas Gelli in the Epistle Dedicatory declares, that he proposes to shew how those Evils may be avoided, which from a wrong Choice Man brings upon himself. These Accounts of the Book are so unlike, that lest he should be confronted by the Pages immediately following, from mere Modesty, he leaves out the whole Dedication. If he were only to be charg'd with Faults of this kind, I mean, only  
false



*false or mischievous Representations, they might be easily pointed out and answer'd. But there is an Air of Buffoonry that runs almost through the whole, to which no Man can be hardy enough to reply, that would not fence with Harlequin, or dispute in Syllogism with Merry-Andrew. From Page 50 to 55 there are intolerable Indecencies, to which the Original gives not the least Countenance. Page 82, 154 monstrous: 165, 184, 186, to 190, 230, 240, 251, to say the best of it all his own. From 159 to 161 he makes an unnatural Excursion to abuse his Majesty Lewis XIV of France, for no other possible Reason but because he dar'd. Sterne, p. 208, which he renders stares from the Similitude of Sounds, ought to be red leg'd Partridges. Page 95, insufferable Buffoonry, which there is not a Word in this Author to justify. Page 78 he tells us, as a bon mot, that Wealth is like a ruinous Building [Scese] which generally falls in the weakest Place. Now though this Observation be so very just that I dare*

2

*say*

*say it will hold good, in all kinds of Architecture military and civil; yet I should rather say, that Riches like a Catarrh or Defluxion, for so the Word also signifies, tend to the weakest Part.*

*This little out of much, I think sufficient to shew that Gelli has been abus'd, it remains to prove that he deserv'd better Treatment. Now when we would speak of the Esteem an Author was in during his Life, we should consider the Character of the Age and Country in which he liv'd. For as to say that a Writer was in vogue here at Court in the Days of our King James the First, seems to carry in it more of Satire than Panegyric: So what can be a higher Encomium, than to have been admir'd at Florence in the 16th Century, and under that excellent Judge and more than princely Patron of learned Men, Cosmo the First?*

*This has been very justly stiled the third Age of the World, in which the liberal Arts have been rais'd to such Perfection as to stand for Epochas, for*  
Gages

*Gages of human Wit : like those Marks on the Obelisk that shew how high the Waters of the Nile have reach'd, but which they have never exceeded.*

*The first Age, which yielded so luxuriant a Crop of Poets, Philosophers, Orators, Historians, Painters and Sculptors is the time, a little preceding Philip of Macedon, and lasting somewhat after Alexander the Great.*

*The second is bounded on one Side \* by Cæsar and Cicero, on the other by Suetonius and Tacitus.*

*The third is that ever memorable Æra for Christendom, when Constantin Paleologus was expell'd the Greek Empire by Mahomet the Second. Then it was that the Arts flying before an Inundation of barbarous Eastern Enthusiasts were receiv'd, caress'd, and almost ador'd by the Princes of the House of Medici. Nor was their Patronage ill bestow'd, which within the Compass of a Century gave birth to the Michael Angelos, Raphaels,*

\* See Pieces fugitives par Voltaire. And Giambullari dell' Origine della Lingua Fiorentina, altramenti il Gello.

Titians,

Titians, Ariostos *and* Taffos. Leo the Tenth laid out the public Spirit so peculiar to his Family in reviving the Taste of ancient Rome; which it must be own'd be retriev'd to such a Degree, that the Genius of the Augustan Age seem'd to awake fully refresh'd from a sound Sleep of above a thousand Years.

The Province left for Cosmo was to correct and polish his own native Language. To effect this he erected a learned Society at Florence call'd the Crusca. Gelli, or Gello, for he is indifferently call'd either, was so distinguish'd a Member of that Academy that he is frequently called its second Founder. To execute this Plan of their Prince, Gelli publish'd a Treatise della Lingua Toscana, and Giambullari, who was reckoned one of the most learned Men in Italy, \* printed another dell' Origine della Lingua Fiorentina, which, as a Testimony of his great Esteem, he entitled, Il Gello. These two with the concurrent Labours of their Bre-

\* Giambullari passa pour un des plus sçavans Hommes d'Italie. See Ghilini Theat. des Hommes illust.

*tbren brought the Tuscan Language to such Perfection, that it has ever since been esteem'd the Standard Italian, and all the rest are look'd upon as so many Dialects of it. So that I think we have gain'd one Point for Circe, from what has been said of its Author, that probably, as Hamlet says of his Play, the Original was wrote in excellent Italian. And I believe it would be very difficult to find a Book, that could give so just an Idea of the State of Literature of that Age and Country.*

*The Circe was soon translated into the principal Tongues of Europe; and has the Honour of giving Birth to the \* philosophical Idiom which was by It first introduced into the modern Languages.*

*His Skill in Criticism may be collected from the many Lectures he published on the Poetry of Dante: As may his Knowledge in philosophical Matters from the Treatises which he was prevailed upon by the urgent Entreaties of Simon Portius †, to translate for him from his Works into Italian.*

\* Vide Fontanini della Eloquenza Italiana, p. 117.

† See l'Authour de la Vie des Academiciens de Florence.

*I find*

*I find Gelli also a Writer of Reputation in the way of Wit, as Author of two Comedies, La Sporta, and L'Errore: But the Capricii del Bottaiò, or Humours of the Cooper is so capital a Piece of Drollery, that Mons. Duchat in his Notes upon Rabelais on some of the most humorous Passages, says, that if the Dates of the Publication of the two Pieces would allow of it, Il n'hesiteroit point a croire, que Rabelais l'auroit paraphrasè.*

*He also translated, one would think, to shew the Versatility of his Pen, the Tragedy of Hecuba from Euripides: and was engag'd in a Work that requir'd an intimate Acquaintance with the Latin Tongue, by Paulus Jovius, who himself was even in those high Times by common Consent stiled*

*Romanæ gloria Linguae.*

*Now to have been distinguish'd by some Proofs of Approbation by the foremost Writer of the Age in which one lives, I think too great an Honour, not to be claim'd for my Author, since I must*  
*always*

P R E F A C E. xvii

*always esteem it the greatest that ever happen'd to myself.*

*This I have the more insisted on, because the great Thuanus says of Gelli roundly, that he had not the least smattering of Latin \*. From whence I could not but make this Reflexion upon voluminous Writers, that if it be very pardonable when Sleep sometimes steals upon them, it is very deplorable that during that Interval so many Dreams should issue into Light through the Ivory Gate.*

*It was the more effectually to secure Gelli from this false Representation, that I have in a few Notes pointed out the Passages of the Greek and Roman Writers that he translates or alludes to; which though they are few in comparison of what might easily have been produc'd, will, with what has been said, sufficiently evince the great Extent and Variety of his Learning.*

*A Writer of his Knowledges, as well as Humour, might certainly have more enliven'd the Fable by Episodes, Descrip-*

\* Nullis Litteris Latinis tinctus.

*tions and Machinery; but it required just as much Judgment as His to keep the Moral still in view. And he is contented with only as much Fiction as was necessary to keep the Discourse from stagnating into a heavy Lecture, without being too solicitous about changing the Scenes or diversifying the Characters of his Speakers. But herein he follows Cicero's Advice in a similar Case, who blames Aristo, in his Treatise of Old Age founded on the poetical Story of Tithonus, for indulging too much in the fabulous Part, which must give an Air of Levity very improper for the Design. As there is nothing more frequent than for injudicious Painters in the Glare of a meretricious Colouring to lose the Dignity as well as Simplicity of the Subject. But Gelli carries us like some Roman Road a short because a straight Way; on a moderate Eminence that presents us incidentally with delightful Prospects, but never leads us from our Point for the sake of them.*





*Dedicat: 1.*



Cosimo de Medici Duca di Firenze

*N. Parr Sculp*



T O T H E

Most illustrious and excellent Prince

COSMO de MEDICI,

Duke of FLORENCE.



F all Creatures in the Universe, Man alone seems to me, most excellent and serene Prince, to have it in his Power to choose for himself both his present Condition, and his ultimate End. And in pursuit of his Design, he may proceed clear of any natural Impulse, under the sole Influence of his own Free-will. Whereas who considers carefully the Nature of his fellow Creatures, according to their respective Species, will find certain Directions constituted under unalterable Laws, by the great Author of all Things, which they are not to violate in Order to render their appointed Condition

## xx DEDICATION.

better or worse. But Man is at Liberty to make his Option of the State that pleases him best. *Proteus* was not more susceptible of the Shape, nor the *Cameleon* of the Colour that he likes to assume. He may be either a gross Animal or a divine Creature; and quit any old Track for what new Course he pleases to prefer. Hence it is plain, that if he be fixed by hard Fate or a wrong Judgment in such a Situation, as to converse only with sensible Objects, and to have his Eyes so wholly turned towards them as never once to be cast up towards Heaven, his Lot is little different from the Beasts, or rather is not to be distinguished from that of Animals quite devoid of Reason. Again, when he can extricate himself and return to his true and proper Employment; can soar from low and base Concerns, to sublime and pure Entertainments, he arrives at the Perfection of his Nature, like those happy Spirits, who beyond the Limits of this corruptible World pass their Existence in the Contemplation of divine Truths.

DEDICATION. xxi

Truths. This I have endeavoured to demonstrate and to recommend, as it is the Duty of every one, according to his Abilities, in the course of the following Dialogues, built upon the Plan of the very learned *Plutarch*.

And as Man is naturally led to express his Adoration of the Deity, not only by his Heart and Lips, but by some visible Sign, some Offering of the best he has: so is it the indispensable Duty of Subjects to pay the Tribute of Honour in the best manner they can to their Prince. Who, to use the Language of the same Philosopher *Plutarch*, is the express Image and Representative, in his peculiar District, of the great universal Love diffused through the World. I therefore, being both by Nature and by Choice a Subject of your Serene Highness, and being sensible from all the Motives of Gratitude under what various Obligations I am to pay my Devoirs, that my Inclinations may atone for the Defects of my Abilities, have presumed with all Humility to present  
you

you with the following poor Compositions. Hoping still, that as the same supreme Being in all his Majesty rejects not the meanest Offering of the humble and the sincere ; so you, Sir, will be pleased to accept of this small Gift only as the best Thing I had to present. How unworthy it will appear of your Greatness, and how short of my Obligations, I am but too sensible, and therefore must conclude that I once more pray you only to regard the good Intentions of one that desires nothing more than to serve you, and to prove himself, as in Duty bound,

*Sir,*

*Your faithful and*

*devoted Servant,*

*Dated at Florence 1548.  
the First of March.*

*John Baptist Gelli.*



## THE ARGUMENT.

*Ulysses returning to Greece from the Destruction of Troy, being driven by contrary Winds to many different Parts of the World, arrived at length at the Island of Circe. Where being courteously received, he stayed some Time to enjoy the Favours of the Goddess. But having an invincible Desire of seeing once more his native Country, he demanded Licence to depart; and at the same Time insisted that she should change back into Men, all the Greeks that she had transformed into divers Animals about her, and give them full Liberty to return with him to their own Homes. The Enchantress readily complies with his Request upon this Condition, that he should ask this Favour for those only that desired it themselves; and that all the rest should remain with her, to finish their Lives under the Shape of those Beasts they then represented. And that*

*be*

## The ARGUMENT.

*he might come at their real Sentiments, she by art Magick restored to each of them the same Power of Language they enjoyed in their human Form. Ulysses traverses the whole Island, and frequently makes his Proposals, but every one for Reasons which he gives peculiar to himself, obstinately refuses to accept of the offer, and declares that he will by no Means quit his present Condition to turn Man again. At Length he meets with one who, convinced of the Excellency of the human Nature from the Superiority the Understanding gives it over other Animals, intreats to become again the Man he was. Ulysses recovers him to his pristine State; he, as 'tis natural to Man, returns his Thanks to God the Author of all that's great and good; and they in Transport set sail for Greece together.*





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O F T H E

S U B S C R I B E R S .



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the Prince of Wales.

Her Royal Highness  
the Princess of Wales.

His Grace the Duke of Leeds.

His Grace the Duke of Portland.

The most noble the Marquis of Hartington.

Right Hon. the Earl of Denbigh.

b

Earl

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# CIRCE.

Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

---

## DIALOGUE I.

Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and the Mole.*

*Ulysses.*



AND yet 'tis true, fair daughter of the Sun, illustrious *Circe!* amidst this vast profusion of delights, and full possession of celestial charms, after so long an absence, this strong desire of seeing home will suffer me to know nor rest, nor peace. But e'er we part I beg to be resolved, if there be any *Greeks* disguised

B

under

under the hideous forms of lions, wolves, bears, and other savages that glare upon us.

*Circe.* As I can hide no truth from dear *Ulysses*, I fairly own there are; but why that question?

*Ulyf.* Let us a while enjoy the prospect which that seat upon the rock commands, and I will tell you all. The infinite variety that will present itself to our view, will either furnish discourse, or serve to enliven it. The little action of the waves heav'd gently by the breeze diversifies the scene; and the soft *Zephyrs* seem in their passage to have robbed the flowery shrubs of half their odours.

*Circe.* As I aim at nothing but to please you, you have nothing to do but to propose.

*Ulyf.* The reason then, fair *Siren*, why I ask if any *Greek* be concealed here under the figure of a beast is, because I purpose, if ever *Ulysses* had any interest in that breast, to beg,—with tears to beg, that they may be recalled to their human shape, and be the glad companions of my voyage.

*Circe.* And what reason can you give for this request?

*Ulyf.* What reason? The pity that I feel for every wretched countryman, within this  
fighting

*Ulysses, Circe, the Oyster and Mole.* 3

fighting bosom. What blessings must they in transport pour upon me, to find themselves redeemed from this so vile and miserable a state? Or else, what an eternal stamp of ignominy must my name be branded with, to have it said, this was the man that left his miserable friends transformed to brutes, nor ever once endeavoured to rescue them from the mean condition of the beastly herd?

*Circe.* But, on the contrary, if instead of all these blessings, all these thanks, to you and to the Gods, your flattering fancy promises, you find each moment from their recovery employed in bitterest curses, and most execrable vows, how will it repent the generous *Ulysses* of his misplaced benevolence, and too officious love?

*Ulys.* Ha! ha! to recover a lost friend from beast to man, must, without doubt, prove an unpardonable injury.

*Circe.* Ay most unpardonable.—But make the trial—I consent—only with this proviso, that this be practised on none but who themselves are willing to submit to it.

*Ulys.* Agreed; but how can this be done? How shall I know their inclinations, since, poor wretches! I shall neither understand them, nor they me. This, *Circe*, favours too strongly of a banter.

## 4 DIALOGUE I.

*Circe.* As for that I beg you'll give yourself no trouble ; that's already granted.

*Ulys.* Granted ! What ? That they shall have the use of language, and the same language that they used before their metamorphosis ?

*Circe.* The same. The power that converted them into brutes, shall now be exercised in recalling their past ideas, and the full force of all their reason \*. To lose no longer time, d'ye see two shells that stick upon that rock ? See ! now they open, now they close again. A little o' this side, d'ye mark me ? is a small heap of earth, not far from the water, at the foot of yonder palm tree.

*Ulys.* I see them both distinctly.

*Circe.* The shells contain an oyster, and the hillock harbours a mole ; both were men, both *Greeks*, as you will find by their discourse. And that you may examine them with the greater freedom, I will remove to some distance, and divert myself along the strand, where, when you fully have satisfied your curiosity, you may be sure to find me ; and when you have *their* consent, you freely shall have *mine*. *Exit.*

\* Νῆς ἢ ἔμπροσθεν ὡς κοπάριον πλοῦ. *Hem. Od. x. 240.*

*Ulys.*

*Ulysses, Circe, the Oyster and Mole.* 5

*Ulyf. folus.* Why this is a master-piece of her art! But is it possible that by her powerful charms, they shall be able both to converse and reason with me? I must own it seems to me so much to pass the bounds of probability, that I scarce dare risk the banter it exposes me to. But then, say, who is here to laugh at me? None but herself; and it must be beneath the sprightly humour of a Goddess to lay so dull a scheme, as to draw in a friend to expose himself, merely for the poor ill-natured pleasure of laughing at him. Well — then 'tis resolved — and I'll begin. But how? For I know no other names for these people than that of the animals they represent. Let us try then: You Oyster; master Oyster.

*Oyster.* What would *Ulysses* have with me?

*Ulyf.* My name too! now am I quite ashamed not to be able to return the compliment: but answer, and boldly too, if, as *Circe* says, thou art a *Greek*.

*Oist.* I answer rather that I *was* a *Greek*; I have reason to remember it: I lived near *Athens*, my name was *Ithacus*, and I was miserable enough to be a fisherman.

## 6 DIALOGUE I.

*Ul.* Then I congratulate thee, old *Oister*, that thou hast found a friend, who hearing that thou wast born a man, out of the universal love he bears his species, and above all, his countrymen the *Greeks*, has undertaken to entreat the Goddess, that she will instantly restore thee to thy former shape, and send thee a glad partner of his return.

*Oist.* I should not be insensible of the force of that wisdom and eloquence for which the sage *Ulysses* so justly was renowned among the *Greeks*, were not the one employed to draw me from the uninterrupted happiness I now enjoy, and the other prostituted to reconcile me to manhood, the most miserable estate any animal in the universe can be doomed to.

*Ul.* Sure, *Ithacus*, thy shape suffered less than thy understanding in the change.

*Oist.* If you speak as you think, I am persuaded that your understanding would not suffer by any change. But rallery apart, let us without prejudice examine the point, and you will find that I, who have experienced both estates, shall demonstrate the truth of every thing I assert.

*Ul.* Come on then, for I love demonstration dearly.

*Oist.* At-

Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and Mole.* 7

*Oist.* Attend then ; but first I must demand your word of honour that, when I throw open my upper shell in order to exalt my voice, as must happen in the course of our dialogue, you will keep a strict eye, that none of yon sly villainous crabs chuck in a pebble, which they carry in their claws, between my shells, and so hinder me from shutting myself up.

*Ul.* What pray should they do that for?

*Oist.* Only that they may gag me, and so thrust in that same claw to tear me out and eat me\*, that's all, Sir. And that's what they are creeping up so close to put in execution.

*Ul.* A very refined plot truly! But pray who taught you thus, either to secure yourself, or to foresee their designs upon you?

*Oist.* Nature ; that never fails us in necessaries.

*Ul.* Go on then ; and speak without suspicion or fear, while I stand your pledge.

*Oist.* Have patience then, and tell me a little *Ulysses*, if you men, who pride yourselves in being more perfect, and more wise, than other animals, by all the boasted ad-

\* *Veteratoriam hanc cancri calliditatem late describunt.* Opi-  
pian. Plut. Plin.

vantages of reason, if you, I say, don't always more value those things that you esteem to be better than others.

*Ul.* Certainly; the perfection of human reason consists in discerning the value of things, and then ranging them in their proper classes, according to the degrees of their merit. To prize things equally must proceed from not being acquainted with the relations they stand in; and is an infallible sign of ignorance.

*Oist.* And don't you love one thing more than another?

*Ul.* Yes; because our love or hatred must rise in proportion to the value we discover in any thing. Every thing that appears lovely must excite desire, and whatsoever is unamiable must create dislike.

*Oist.* If you love one thing more than another, will not that love express itself in a greater concern for the thing beloved?

*Ul.* No doubt of it.

*Oist.* D'ye think Nature does not do the same thing? Or, which is all one, that Intelligence that directs Nature? And must not she do it more effectually, it being impossible that Nature should ever err; as I have heard your philosophers a hundred times assert at

*Athens,*



Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and Mole.* 9

*Athens*, when I have been with my pännier of fish in the schools?

*Ul.* That I grant too.

*Oist.* Nay then you grant all I contend for, if you allow so much, it must follow by just consequence that we are your betters.

*Ul.* How so?

*Oist.* Because if Nature takes more care of us, she has more love for us, and that can only follow from the reason aforesaid.

*Ul.* Why, who would have thought to find so much logick between a pair of shells? I protest, old fishmonger, I'll back thee against the first logician in all *Athens*.

*Oist.* I know not what you mean by your logick; I speak the language that Nature dictates; and what she suggests, if attended to, will always be found right.

*Ul.* As witness the proposition before us; that she sets a higher degree of value upon the brute creation than on man.

*Oist.* This is so evident a truth, that a small degree of consideration will give you the full force of the demonstration. And to tire you but once for all, let us go back as far as we can, up to the first time that *either you or me* make our appearance in the world: I mean, let us take our estimate from  
our

our birth-day. Now which of us two does she seem to be most solicitous about? About those that are dropt stark naked, and exposed to the wide world; or those that she has been at the pains to set out thoroughly furnisht and equipt? This animal with a tough hide, that with a warm fur; this armed with scales, that beautifully adorned with feathers. Here I think one cannot long doubt whose preservation she seems to have most at heart.

*Ul.* That is not the reason why we are born naked, or covered with a skin so very delicate, that the slightest impressiion is capable of offending us. The true reason of this was, because as she intended we should exercise more than you all the internal senses, especially the imagination, in order to keep them in readiness to serve the understanding, it was necessary that all our parts, particularly those that are the immediate organs and instruments of sensation, should be supplied with a fluid more active and subtle, more spirituous and capable of a higher degree of rarefaction, than yours. Whereas, were we like you filled with fowl humours, and heavy blood (from whence you are of a stronger texture, and of more robust limbs; but we generally

Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and Mole.* 11

generally longer lived, which by the by argues a better mixture in our constitution) our sensibility which is affected by very minute objects would like yours be but very slow and imperfect. For as your *Physiognomists* observe, our dispositions depend upon the configuration of the parts \*. He that resembles a lion will behave like one; and the manners of a bear ever correspond with the likeness of a bear. The observation holds good through our own species; those that are composed of grosser humours are of slower parts, and where you find the skin soft, and the flesh supple, you may promise yourself a certain delicateness of apprehension. So that when Nature designed to make us rational creatures she was obliged to make us just as we are.

*Oist.* I can never believe that she which made all things, was under the impulse of any necessity to determine her operations, which she could accommodate to her own purposes. And could have pursued quite different methods, and other means to accomplish her end. As for instance, she could have given water the burning quality, and fire the freezing one.

\* So Aristotle in *Physiognomica*, and *Bapt. Porta*.

Ul. Not

*Ul.* Not with safety to that uniformity, that harmony, that we so justly admire, and is so conspicuous, throughout the universe.

*Oist.* But if a different disposition of things had better pleased her, different beauties must result from it, perhaps no way inferior to the present.

*Ul.* Nay if once we fall into guess-work, and bare possibilities, we must be lost. But to return to our argument; what does it signify if she did turn us out naked, and at the same time furnished us with either skill or strength enough to strip you of your skins to clothe ourselves withal?

*Oist.* Ay, but how full of dangers many times is the attempt? How many have suffered in it? Not to insist on the labour that must succeed: In the trouble of spinning, weaving, and dressing them, before they can be fit to be worn?

*Ul.* What you call labour is in truth a mere amusement.

*Oist.* It may seem so to you; and for ought I know to others, who are quite at their ease; but ask those that live by these amusements, and I am mistaken if they don't call them by another name, and they are the best judges of the pleasure of working.

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ing. For my own part, when I was a man, I had such an abhorrence for work, that it was solely to avoid it that I turned fisherman. For there is no danger that I would not prefer before labour. The life of a labourer seems to me to be exactly the life of an ox, who is all his time in the geers, and when his labour is done, he is rewarded by a good thump of a sledge upon the forehead.

*Ul.* He that to avoid labour could turn fisherman, justifies the old proverb, that *Laziest folks take the most pains*; if a man flies from trouble, I observe it generally follows him. Of all trades yours, unless a man should chuse it out of a particular turn for it, must be the most disagreeable, as it is perpetually exposed to the sudden changes of heat and cold, and all the uncertainties of wind and weather.

*Oist.* You see I think so; and therefore absolutely refuse to become a man again. Who seems to me (besides being exposed by Nature naked and helpless) wholly unprovided of a place of residence; without a house to hide his head in from the inclemencies of the seasons; the vagabond and exile of the world!

*Ul.* Pray

14 DIALOGUE I.

*Ul.* Pray Sir, what curious dome has she provided for you?

*Oist.* I beg you, Sir, not to overlook the beauties and conveniencies of this pair of shells. See with what ease do I throw them open? With what readinefs do I shut them, just as I want either to eat or sleep or to defend myself? Not to mention the snail and the tortoise; with what facility do they bear their houses about with them?

*Ul.* How few such can you name out of the whole brutal world? For example, there's the whole nation of the birds, what mansions have they built for them?

*Oist.* I answer; for their winter habitations the safe caverns and deep grottos of the earth; for their summer seats, the retirement of the groves, or the whole range of the mountains.

*Ul.* Delightful apartments truly! and finely furnished with all manner of necessaries!

*Oist.* What they want in furniture they make up in comfort and satisfaction, which are great rarities in some of your castles and palaces.

*Ul.* Then it must be our own faults; since we are our own architects, and consequently, may build them to our own taste.

*Oist.* That

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*Oist.* That taste is no security against the trouble of defending them, the expence of repairing them; and what is more, against the danger of their tumbling upon your heads. Not to mention the horrors men sometimes are thrown into from the mere apprehension of earthquakes, which you know in our own country are so very terrible, that I have known men quit their houses, to sleep in the fields by night, and all the day long run up and down screaming like a flock of frightened hens praying and adjuring the Gods with lighted torches, and all the nonsense of charms that superstition can suggest: So that the softest thing one could say of it was, their fears had drove out their wits.

*Ul.* These are instances so very rare, that they are of no account.

*Oist.* Further; you cannot always chuse your situation; and when you have, there you are nailed down without the power, as many of us have, of carrying our houses on our backs.

*Ul.* A great disadvantage truly; when a man has pleased himself every way in the choice of his situation, not to be able to run away from it. Don't you know *Chi sta bene,*

*non debbe mutarsi*; “ he that is well has no  
“ business to risque a change.”

*Oist.* And is it really no disadvantage to be pin'd down to a bad neighbour, who may be always plaguing one by his ill-nature, or offending you by some disagreeable trade? whereas we under such circumstances have the whole world before us to settle in. So that to return to our first proposition, as Nature has taken more care of us, and as she cannot err in her choice, it must follow, that we are better and more valuable than you, which was the thing to be demonstrated.

*Ul.* Was there ever such sophistry! Whereas the true reason why she may seem to provide more for you than for us, is because she knew you had not faculties enough to provide for yourselves. But I think one short question will cut this argument short: Pray which is highest in rank, the master or the servant?

*Oist.* The master, considered merely as such.

*Ul.* Right; and thus it is in the nature of things, that which is considered as the end, is more noble, and of more esteem than the bare means in order to serve that end. Now that we are the end for which you were  
created



Ulyffes, Circe, *the Oifter and Mole.* 17

created is evident, because all that you are good for is employed in, and directed to our service. You carry our burdens, do our drudgery, and plough our ground, when alive; for which we do you the honour to wear your skins, and eat your flesh, after you are dead.

*Oift.* By parity of reason that same ground is more excellent than you. Your lives are spent in it's service; and when you are dead, it generously repays you by devouring you; that therefore is the ultimate or final cause of your creation.

*Ul.* I deny the consequence; which you will easily see to be false, if you please to consider that final causes are of two sorts.

*Oift.* I would fain spare you the trouble, *Ulyffes*, which I see you are going to give yourself, of entering upon a question which I have so often heard handled by the Philosophers in the porches at *Athens*, where, as I told you before, I used to ply with my fish; in which they seemed to me readily to discuss what, I believe, neither they nor any body else understand. Besides I perceive the dew begins to fall, with which I never fail, by flinging my shell up, to regale myself, and that too in a condition so void of care, so

C

undisturbed

undisturbed by thought, that I never remember to have enjoyed the like in the state to which you would bring me back. So that I hope, by this time, you begin to cease to wonder, that I am resolved to continue just as you see me. If your notions clash a little with mine, please to keep them to yourself, for I am determined not to be troubled with them. After supper it is my method to shut up, and compose myself to rest, without leaving room for so much as one uneasy reflection, which is more than the wisest among you can often boast of. And I am more pleased with my own contentment, than with any thing that it is in your power to bestow on me in lieu of it. *Exit.*

*Ul.* Well! I have certainly set out with very ill luck. That I should light on such a perverse creature! who must have been a wretch of a low degree of reason: His very trade proves it. Those that can bestow their whole time in attending upon birds and fishes have very seldom an understanding three degrees better than they; always excepting some ingenious young men of quality who condescend to set their wits against such animals. What a relish must he have of the pleasures of the world, that could prefer a little dew

*Ulysses, Circe, the Oyster and Mole.* 19

to the most exquisite of them? E'en let him remain the wretch he is, as a just reward for so much insensibility. In the mean time we will proceed to reason a little with the inhabitant that *Circe* tells me resides in this mole-hill; we shall find him perhaps a grave and discreet personage. Now for it. Mole, why Mole I say.

*Mole.* What wouldst thou have with me, *Ulysses*? Or how have I deserved that thou shouldst thus break in upon my peace?

*Ul.* Did you but know how I have employed my interest with *Circe*, and how far my prayers have prevailed for you, the least spark of gratitude would incline you to forgive me this intrusion.

*Mole.* I know it all; I overheard what passed between that other *Greek* and you; I mean the *Oyster*.

*Ul.* What? that I had the grant of rescuing thee from this prison, of conferring manhood upon thee; and, if thou art a *Greek*, of conveying thee safe back to thy own country?

*Mole.* A *Greek* I was; and of the most delightful part of all *Etolia*.

*Ul.* The stronger then must be thy wishes to resume thy old shape, and to revisit thy native soil.

20      D I A L O G U E      I.

*Mole.* You speak of alterations that I have not yet been fool enough to consider.

*Ul.* How? Is it folly then in your language to wish to change from worse to better?

*Mole.* No; but it is so to make interest to change better for worse, which is the present case. Sir, the state of the bargain is this, to barter uninterrupted tranquillity for all that anxiety of mind, and racking cares, which human nature is so plentifully supplied with.

*Ul.* You are giving a proof indeed, that you were listening to that fool of a Fishmonger with whom I was talking.

*Mole.* I listen to nothing less than to experience, the strongest proof; and what is more, to experience, grounded on my own employment.

*Ul.* In what manner did this same experience prove that we are less happy, or more miserable, than you?

*Mole.* I shall confine myself to the observation of one only miserable circumstance that attends you; which I say my own employment naturally threw in my way to make. Then I shall leave you to your own thoughts, to make the application, and to draw consequences.

*Ul.* Say

Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and Mole.* 21

*Ul.* Say on; but first, What strange employment could that be which led you into such gross mistakes?

*Mole.* I was an husbandman, a day labourer indeed.

*Ul.* Why this is falling out of the frying-pan into the fire with a witness, to escape from a fisherman, and to stumble upon a clodpate, who, unless he has undergone a thorough transformation, must be ten times stupider than he.

*Mole.* *Ulysses*, it will better become you to mind what I say, than to reflect on what I was. Take this with you, that every man is a man; and if you are attentive, I don't doubt but we shall soon have you lamenting your hard luck, that you missed the favour of being changed yourself by the Goddess, as well as your neighbours.

*Ul.* If you only require my attention, you may depend on that.

*Mole.* What animal then do you find throughout the universe, of which there are infinite species, terrestrial or aquatick, for whom the earth does not of itself provide proper sustenance, except man alone? Who unless he is weary of his being, must undergo the perpetual drudgery of ploughing,

sowing, and all the fatigues of husbandry?

*Ul.* This is a mistake grounded upon mere luxury; whereas were we but contented to live as you do, we need be at no more pains than you.

*Mole.* Well then pray what herb, what seed, or what fruit, does the earth spontaneously produce, I mean without the assistance of art, which is a proper food to preserve either your health or life?

*Ul.* Did you never hear how the first and best of men fared in the so much boasted golden age?

*Mole.* That I take to be a fable too gross for the wise *Ulysses* to swallow.

*Ul.* Granting all that you say to be true, and that man is obliged to this circle of tilling the ground, pruning his vines, and grafting his trees, is he not sufficiently rewarded by the pleasure that attends the task? It is at most but a recreation that Nature cuts out for him, having his welfare too much at heart to suffer him to pass his time in idleness. And that this is true, the recompence of his toil abundantly shews. For there is nothing more agreeable, or that gives us an opportunity of shewing that skill and management

Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and Mole.* 28

nagement; that sets us so much above you  
beasts.

*Mole.* Say rather, that it was inflicted up-  
on you, as an effectual means to secure you  
from enjoying one hour's peace; for beside  
the trouble of making the most of what  
you have, you are plagued about what  
you have not. And as the produce of the  
earth is very uncertain, when there happens  
to come a scarce year, all that time is spent  
in dreadful apprehensions how far it may go;  
and not a morsel can be swallowed without  
the fear of a famine before your eyes; which  
can never be our case, when provision be-  
gins to come short in one place, we imme-  
diately look out for another, without being  
much embarrassed by removing our luggage.

*Ul.* Then I presume you never heard of  
such a thing as commerce, and of supplying  
the necessities of one country by the redun-  
dancy of another.

*Mole.* But with what fatigue from jour-  
neys, what dangers from voyages? And what  
is more, with what disquietude of mind!  
Let this suffice, to shew that your life is one  
continued scene of distress, now labouring  
under one misfortune, now struggling with  
another. So that, what you cannot retort

upon us, you have reason at your birth to shed those tears, that are but a prelude to the misery that must ensue.

*Ul.* That's absurd; because when we shed those tears we are neither conscious of good or harm.

*Mole.* Be that as it will; you begin from that moment to find the inconveniencies of the climate to which you are doomed; which, as I said before, is made suitable to every animal but you. And for that reason you alone are by Nature supplied with tears.

*Ul.* How! did you never hear of a horse's shedding tears\*?

*Mole.* Yes, but I never believed it. And those drops that have been so well attested to fall from their eyes, I take to be nothing

\* *Virg. Æneid. Lib. XI. Carm. 90.*

*Post bellator equus positus insignibus armis  
It lachrymans, guttis humectat grandibus ora.*

It is sufficient to justify a poetical philosopher, (*Poeticum enim esse Cynæon philosophiæ ait Synesius, Ep. 1.*) that *Aristotle* and *Pliny* say, horses often weep at the loss of their master; but what *Suetonius*, an historian, says of *Cæsar's* horses weeping at their master's passing the *Rubicon*, gives unquestionable authority. So *Hom. Iliad. XVII.*

*Their godlike master slain before their eyes  
They wept, and shar'd in human miseries.*

*Mr. Pope.*

more



more than a superfluity of moisture, which so delicate a creature as a horse is, may well be subject to. And even according to the supposition, I dare say, 'twas for some misfortune that grieved him, that he must leave a loved master, or a loving companion; and that it was never pretended that he has been seen to weep, like you, the minute he was foaled. But you have reason enough for it, to think that you must implore the assistance of some good-natured nurse, to swaddle you as well as feed you, not having it in your power to supply yourselves with what is necessary to your support. And therefore to give you as little trouble as possible, I for my own part declare, that I will sooner die as I am, than be gulled by your offer.

*Ul.* I believe, Mole, I must be obliged to repeat to you the speech I made to the Oyster, that the same moment robbed you of your manhood and your sense together. Sure you must be very ignorant, not to know what sort of creatures you are: If you were indeed compleat in your kind, perfect animals, I would say something to you.

*Mole.* Why pray, what hinders us from being so?

*Ul.* What?

*Ul.* What? Why your friend there has neither the faculty of smelling or hearing, or the power to move himself an inch. You, as I take it, are blind \*, and what is worse too, after being acquainted with what the pleasures of sight are; by much the most instructive of all the senses.

*Mole.* Hey day! but how does this prove us to be imperfect? That you are pleased to call us so I grant; and perhaps we may be said to be so, in respect of those that have all the senses. But I don't understand how we can properly be said to be imperfect, unless we were defective in any thing that belongs to our own species.

*Ul.* But is it not better to have them all?

*Mole.* No; it would be no advantage to me, as a Mole, to be able to see: Nor to the Oyster to be able to see or hear, or to ramble up and down. Deal ingenuously with me; can you conceive any other use in being able to ramble from place to place; beside the power of fetching what one wants?

\* The proverb in *Suidas*, ἀσπλάρατος τυφλότερος, *Talpe scior* is sufficient to justify *Gelli*. But he, *Pliny*, and *Aristotle*, knew that the Mole had small eyes as well as the most enlighten'd modern Philosopher. *Vide Plin. Lib. IX. Cap. XXXVII. ex Aristotele.*

Ulysses, Circe, *the Oyster and Mole.* 27

*Ul.* Certainly Nature gave it for no other reason; and therefore the old saying holds good, that *all motion implies necessity.*

*Mole.* And you think if you had every thing you wanted within your reach, you yourself should never stir out of your place?

*Ul.* Why should I?

*Mole.* What occasion then can the Oyster have for locomotion, who is supplied with every thing he wants as he sits still? So for the faculty of smelling; what use could it be of to him, that has nothing to hunt after, but has every thing he wants brought home to him? Thus I, who out of choice am always underground, where I find myself perfectly at ease, what advantage would fight pray be to me?

*Ul.* But one would be glad to have more than one has a mere necessity for.

*Mole.* Why? especially if it be not suitable to one's nature. For my part I have no more ambition to surpass the perfection of my own kind, than you have reason to wish for the luminous body of a star, or to envy a bird the advantage of a pair of wings.

*Ul.* You suppose what would be highly inconvenient to such a creature as man.

*Mole.*

## 28      D I A L O G U E      I.

*Mole.* But if all other men were so made you would think yourself hardly dealt with to be excepted.

*Ul.* I believe it.

*Mole.* And won't you believe that to be just my case. If my brethren the Moles could all see, I should be uneasy for want of eyes; but as I am upon an equal footing with the rest, I beg to be no longer troubled with your proposition. I find I am perfect in my own kind, and what is more, perfectly easy, and so shall endeavour to remain, without hazarding happiness in a human form. Probably you have some business of your own; if not, don't hinder those that have; I cannot possibly be longer absent from some few concerns under ground. *Exit Mole.*

*Ul.* Am I awake! or is this all imagination? If this be not a dream, yet I, however, can't be what I was: I am no more *Ulysses*. He could not be baffled thus, in proving to these two people so plain a truth. *Ulysses* was famed for proving to the *Greeks* whatever he had a mind they should believe. It must be so then, that the fault must be in them; and it was my luck to meet two wretches not capable of taking an argument. And, upon reflection, 'tis no great wonder if the Fisherman

*Ulysses, Circe, the Oyster and Mole. 29*

man be no wiser than the Ditcher. So that I have no reason to suspect the same success with the rest of these creatures. For as they were of different professions and ranks in the world, it is not likely they should all have the same turn. But first I must go in quest of my Goddess, and inform her of every thing that has passed, and insist upon her promise, of having the privilege of examining the rest; for it would be barbarous to deprive others of the benefit of the proposal, merely upon the account of the stupidity or obstinacy of a couple of blockheads.

*Exit Ulysses.*



CIRCE.




## CIRCE.

Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

## DIALOGUE II.

*Ulysses, Circe, and the Serpent.*

*Circe.*  HAT report may we expect, *Ulysses*, from your friends the *Greeks*?

*Ulysses.* I have yet found none, except the two you singled out; whose lives were spent in two such miserable and laborious employments, that it is no surprize to find them averse to accept of a proposal that must bring them back to so much wretchedness.

*Circe.*

Face Dialo: 1.



H. Gravelot a veteri pictura delin.

N. Parr Sculp.





*Circe.* To prevent you from imputing so odd a rencounter to mere chance, I frankly confess it to be a scheme of my own; to give you a little insight into the comforts and pleasures of low life, which are so much the subject of panegyrick among your writers. To convince you that the most vile, and what you call the most imperfect animals, prefer their present situation, for reasons which they themselves assigned.

*Ul.* But still it must prove them to have been the dullest of all creatures, when they found themselves miserable in one way of life, not to think of looking out for another.

*Circe.* So far from it, that I think it shews greater management to be able to suit one's self to our own circumstances, be they what they will, than to endeavour to change them. As the dexterity of a gamester is seen by making the best of a bad cast, which shews his skill at least, if not his luck: So if a wise man can't command Fortune, he will take care to leave as little in her power as possible.

*Ul.* *Circe* understands human nature too well not to know there is a wider difference between men, than between any other animals

mals of the same species. In some you discover such a compass of knowledge, such a vivacity of imagination as may justly rank them with the immortal Gods. In others you perceive so poor a stock of ideas, and an apprehension so very sluggish as levels them with the beasts. Which has made some doubt if all may be said to be endued with a rational soul. Whereas cast your eyes among lions, bears, or what kind of brutes you please, you will find the difference scarce discernible. And as for those two with whom I have had the pleasure to dispute, I take them to be of that class of people, who for want of judging what is good or bad for them, are always apt to fancy every condition better than their own.

*Circe.* If good or bad were to be discerned by quickness of parts, or strength of judgment, I should say something for your opinion: But as experience is their only rule, that being a touchstone that must shew things to be just as they are; the case is quite altered. But hold a moment; here is another disputant for you; I mean that Serpent, now he crosses the path, now see! he makes towards us. If I remember rightly, it was a *Greek* I changed into that shape. He perhaps

*Ulysses, Circe, and the Serpent.* 33

haps will answer more to your satisfaction than the former two. However for the present I give him power to converse with you.

*Ul.* I fancy he knows we are talking of him, by his keeping his eyes so fixed upon us.

*Circe.* It may be so; do you try him whilst I withdraw a little to join the nymphs who are diverting themselves, I see, upon the shore.

*Ul.* I confess myself in the main so well entertained with the two last creatures, that though I could not carry my point with them, I am resolved to try my luck once more; so, Serpent, I say, Serpent, there.

*Serpent.* What wouldst thou have, *Ulysses*? But oh! unhappy me. Do I then understand, and do I speak? Sure I am relapsing into manhood! Oh! forbid it all ye powers.

*Ul.* What reason canst thou give for all this horror, at the thoughts of being what thou wast? I presume the miserable condition of thy former life.

*Serp.* Oh! no, 'tis the state itself; 'tis humanity itself I dread. The sad receptacle of all woe.

## 34      D I A L O G U E    I I.

*Ul.* I begin to doubt if my present experiment will prove more successful than the former. But Serpent, once for all, I charge thee hear me. Know then, the Goddess, wearied by my entreaties, has given me full power to unbind the charm that holds thee metamorphos'd. And, as thou art a *Greek*, I make thee here an offer of the inestimable grant.

*Serp.* If you have that love for me you pretend, I beg you to make the tender where it may be more acceptable. All my ambition is, to end my days just as I am. I should be glad to oblige you; but really it would be making too foolish a bargain, to change circumstances with one of you.

*Ul.* Your reason.

*Serp.* I thought you had reasons enough given you to day already.

*Ul.* Alas! the two wretches I discours'd with, were creatures of so base a condition, and so poor an education, that 'twas impossible to pay the least regard to any thing they said.

*Serp.* And yet even these, you see, could give you reasons for not accepting your offer.

*Ul.* Why, one of them, you must know, who was a poor fisherman, could not bear

the thoughts of having his lodgings always to seek, whilst the rest of the creation has them ready provided. This creature in holes and burroughs, that in bushes or upon trees; one always in the water, others on land and water indifferently. The other, who was a husbandman, dreaded the thoughts of returning to his labour; and except the ground be kept in perpetual exercise, by manuring and sowing, he found it produced nothing for man's use, as it did for all other animals in the world.

*Serp.* And I, who in the days of my humanity was a physician, shall make my objection against a cause of misery of a superior nature. Misery above the power of art to redress; and grievances not, like theirs, to be remedied by agriculture; defects not to be supplied by architecture.

*Ul.* Name them.

*Serp.* I mean the pcoriness of your constitutions, which subjects you to such a list of diseases, that you can never be said one moment of your lives, like one of us, to be perfectly in health: Are never so secure as not to be in danger from every little excess of catching a distemper.

## 36 DIALOGUE II.

*Ul.* This, as I told the other two, must of necessity be so; as Nature intended in us to carry on her operations in a very subtle manner; which could not be effected, if we were composed of more clumsy materials. If our humours had been inspissated, our blood heavier, and our texture coarser, as it is with you.

*Serp.* Say rather, 'twas to confirm you the most crazy puny wretches in the universe.

*Ul.* Well, granting our situation to be as ticklish as you represent it; you can't deny us to have a superior judgment, to avoid what may prove injurious to us.

*Serp.* In some measure I confess it, but 'tis so very tedious, that you find few are at the pains to exercise it. But to prove that this happens out of the mere spite Nature owes you, she has at the same time given you an appetite so insatiable, and a will so ungovernable, that you are ever inventing new dishes; and if one chances to hit your liquorish palates, you give yourselves wholly up to gluttony without restraint; or at least are with the greatest difficulty kept within the bounds of only satisfying nature: which must lay in a magazine of such different and dangerous diseases.

*Ulysses, Circe, and the Serpent.* 37

*Ul.* Pray what is the food you allude to, which Nature herself does not point out for our sustenance?

*Serp.* How can you ask the question? when you know it to be of infinite sorts. But to be particular, I mean all that you employ to give a relish to other things, which at the same time are not themselves singly eatable; such as salt, pepper, and the whole tribe of aromatics.

*Ul.* Now for my part, I always thought the reverse, and received it for an acknowledg'd truth, that salt was absolutely necessary to preserve the life of man.

*Serp.* If there be any truth in the notion, it only proves, that you have such a redundancy of humours through intemperance, as to demand so great a drier to absorb them. Whereas were the food simple, and the quantity moderate, it would not find too much moisture to feed on. But the fact is, that these things, by heightening the taste, so provoke the appetite, that people are more intent upon humouring their palates, than of satisfying their stomachs. The consequence of which must be, that such mixtures must inflame a thirst not to be quenched but by a profusion of liquor much too great for Na-

## 38      D I A L O G U E    I I.

ture to dispose of; which lays in a store for catarrhs, defluxions, apoplexies, gouts, and rheums. Not to mention a thousand other distempers that usually succeed, not to be carried off but by strong evacuations, and yet none of these things fall to our lot.

*Ul.* Why, truly, so far I own there is some truth in what you say.

*Serp.* Now see how differently, out of pure affection, she has dealt with us! We have no unruly appetites to crave what is not proper for us. We never exceed in quantity; neither have we art enough to vary our food, or to make such fallacious mixtures, as shall provoke desire where there is no hunger. Don't you observe farther, that in order to allure you effectually to your destruction, you are tempted to mix with your food such things as are properly the objects of another sense, the smell? I mean the perfumes you make use of as ingredients in your compositions; of which, that you may not be too proud, give me leave to tell you, that they are no very cleanly part of some of us. Whereas we find no pleasure from that sense but what our meat yields, and that only as long as we are eating just enough for our support.

*Ul.* The



Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Serpent.* 39

*Ul.* The reaſon of this ſeems to be, that as man has a larger quantity of brain than any animal, in proportion to his ſize, and that you know is naturally of a cold temperament; ſhe has put it in our power to invigorate and warm it by perfumes, which have a hot quality, in order to aſſiſt her in performing the functions of the internal ſenſes, for the ſervice of the underſtanding. And much obliged to her we are for this advantage which ſhe has given us over you, who are inſenſible of any delight from odours, but what ſteam immediately from your food.

*Serp.* Shall I tell you the plain truth? Why then it is yet a doubtful point with me, whether your excellency that way be a real advantage or a miſfortune to you, there being ſo many bad ſmells to be met with for one good one. Or perhaps perfumes, after all, may not be improper for thoſe who fill themſelves with groſs humours, that muſt produce offensive ſmells. Another argument of the debility of your make, ſubject, nay doomed, as I ſaid, to ſo many infirmities, that are not ſo much as known to us; they reckon up, I think, above fifty different diſorders incident to the eyes alone.

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*Ul.* Allowing it, yet we have the means at hand to remedy them all.

*Serp.* Pray from whence?

*Ul.* From physick; and for the truth of this I appeal to yourself as a proper judge in the case, being, as you profess, one of the faculty.

*Serp.* This is the point I have been labouring to bring you to; because in this I esteem mankind the most unhappy race upon the earth.

*Ul.* You'll tell us why too, I hope.

*Serp.* Because I am firmly of opinion, that physick does much more harm than good in the world. Nor is this my private opinion alone, the whole world seems in a great measure to give into it. You know there are whole states in *Greece*, that have both banished the doctors, and put down their trade.

*Ul.* Why so? can you deny that physick is one of the seven liberal arts; that it has truth for it's object, and the benefit of mankind for it's end? This you must allow, unless you are apt to decry what perhaps you never understood. It being very common, when people are ignorant of a thing, to pretend that it is not, to be known; by which they in some measure bring others down to a level with themselves.

*Serp.*

Ulysses, Circe, and the Serpent. 41

*Serp.* I shall not go about to deny it to be an art, real, beneficial, and worthy of all esteem. Neither shall I dissemble that I was ignorant in the art, in the same sense that the rest of my brethren of the faculty were. But as far as it is to be understood, my skill was so great, and my reputation so well established, that I was always named with the first Physicians in all *Greece*. You yourself shall be my witness, who could not but have heard a thousand times of the famed *Agefimus* of *Lesbos*.

*Ul.* Art thou that famous *Lesbian*? And art thou *Agefimus*, or shall we speak more properly, and call thee his ghost?

*Serp.* I am the very he. You must know then that I embarked for the sake of traveling, and in my voyage arriving at this island, with the whole crew, was transformed as you now see me.

*Ul.* Then let me bless the fortunate encounter, that gives me an opportunity of conversing with a person whose fame is yet so fresh amongst his countrymen. Why this will indeed secure my welcome to the *Greeks*, that I have been able to recover to them a man of such consequence,

*Serp.* You

*Serp.* You talked of reasoning closely, but are wander'd very wide of it: But to prevent all such interruption, I declare beforehand, that I will never consent to your proposal. And that you may see I have not taken up this resolution rashly, to resume our discourse, I assert, that physic may be considered two ways. First, as a science; and as such it is undoubtedly certain and conclusive; because she is conversant only about universals, whose essences being eternal and immutable, they can never deceive us in drawing consequences. And this being the knowledge of things by the relations they stand in, it is justly called a science, as being an object of speculation, whose sole and ultimate end is to lead to the truth. In this light many may be said to understand physic; and I myself will venture to profess that I knew my share of it. But it may also be considered as an art; now all arts being, as you know, grounded upon experience, as such it is very fallacious. And that it is so, the physicians themselves are ready to allow, when they tell us, that even experiments \* themselves, in this art, are

\* This seems to be the right sense of that aphorism of *Hippocrates*, ἡ δὲ αἰετὰ σφαλῆν.

very

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very deceitful. This then is of the active kind, which has practice for it's end, and particulars for it's object. And here our knowledge comes very short, as every day's experience abundantly proves.

*Ul.* If you were so ignorant in the practical part, to what do you impute your own vast reputation?

*Serp.* To the folly of other people; for, let me tell you, men seldom mind what you do, if you have but art enough to impose upon them by what you say.

*Ul.* Well! surely mankind is under the fatality of being very short-sighted, in things that concern them most.

*Serp.* And above all things, so, in what concerns their health, through the immoderate desire of living on. This I think is evident from their rewarding our blunders, which they would punish in any other set of men. And those too are so notorious, and so monstrous, that it would be bad for us, says a wise man, if the earth were not always ready to cover our mistakes. I think they tell ye of the same philosopher, that being asked one day how he came to enjoy so uninterrupted a state of health? *Because,* says he, *I never hire a Physician to destroy it.*

*Ul.* That

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*Ul.* That other great countryman of ours was exactly in the same way of thinking, who used to say, that *A good Doctor never physicks himself.*

*Serp.* Well; but go on, let us hear that other wise observation of his.

*Ul.* Which do you mean?

*Serp.* That *A good advocate is never fond of standing a law-suit.* But, what is still worse, in order to keep up the reputation of the farce, they will pretend that they really do take physic themselves. So you shall see them go very formally to the apothecaries, and prescribe for themselves; after that, all the world may see it carried very gravely to their houses; but they'll take care that nobody shall see them throw it out of the window: and this has been practised to my knowledge.

*Ul.* As for that, I am not at all surprized, since our whole life is nothing but the circulation of those tricks that each man plays upon another.

*Serp.* True; and then you may be sure, that men will take care to lay on those cheats the thickest, the belief of which brings most profit to the actors.

*Ul.* You

*Ul.* You see therefore, and indeed the observation is very old, that the confidence which the patient has in his Physician, very often does him more service than the prescription: Now he that knows best how to impose upon him, will always gain most confidence.

*Serp.* I myself am an instance of it; and know, that a glib persuasive knack of talking, especially among the ladies, (whose good word raises more Doctors than their skill) got me the reputation you are pleased to compliment me with. But to return; you see they have not a clear notion of what they are about, because you find them frequently huddling together many remedies for one single complaint.

*Ul.* No! why I thought their putting many ingredients together, was a proof of their greater knowledge in the art.

*Serp.* Quite the reverse; because he that gives many medicines for one disorder, demonstrates that he does not know it's true proper specifick. For as all effects are produced from one simple principle naturally, though the like may proceed from the concurrence of many causes accidentally, (as heat, for example, is the natural effect of fire, though

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though it may be produced accidentally from the friction of solids, the fermentation of fluids, or the like) thus every illness has it's proper remedy, which he that knows will infallibly cure. So that when you see a Physician loading his patient with many remedies, you may safely say, that man does not know the true one, but is feeling about for it, and if he has luck on his side, for ought I know, he may hit on it.

*Ul.* Aren't we then in a blessed condition when we fall into your hands?

*Serp.* You see how it is; and therefore many will tell you, 'tis better depending upon a lucky Physician than a learned one.

*Ul.* What do you mean by a lucky Physician?

*Serp.* One that sends the major part of his patients well out of his hands. For that man properly may be called a lucky man, that has had success in the major part of his actions. Nay if the numbers are equal, or only pretty near upon a balance, I think he may be said to be of the fortunate side. Because, as I said, the application of universals to particulars is so very nice a thing, that the patient, as well as the Doctor, must have good luck if he does no mischief.

*Ul.* What



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*Ul.* What a scene have we here opened against mankind, and their avarice; which prompts them, for the sake of a little gain, to undertake they know not what?

*Serp.* Right; but for much more against Nature, that has been so careful of us, and so negligent of you, by giving you a delicate constitution with an irregular appetite, and to finish all, has instructed you in the art of physic, which, upon the footing it now is, I affirm again, does much more harm than good in the world.

*Ul.* But how has Nature provided better for you in this point?

*Serp.* Both by a firm texture, and regular inclinations; which have not so much as the least hankering after what may be pernicious to us. And then against accidents has furnished us with a much more certain rule for the recovery of lost health.

*Ul.* This is so very extraordinary a position, that I hope you can prove it better than by a bare assertion.

*Serp.* As for the goodness and strength of our make 'tis so obvious, that I shall not take up your time by insisting on it. Then to shew how orderly our appetites are, consider, pray, first the simple nature of our diet,

diet, and that you shall never see one of us discover the least inclination but to the very food calculated for us: Nor to that neither, but in such quantities as are necessary for our support. Whereas with you the whole is reversed; you are supplied with an infinite variety of eatables, and all bad for you; then as to the quantity, when you are thoroughly pleased, you know no bounds but the power of eating no more.

*Ul.* In this I grant you have the advantage of us.

*Serp.* What shall I say as to liquors? that whilst we never exceed the quantity absolutely necessary to life, you give yourselves up in so dissolute a manner to the pleasures of wine, that besides the scandal of drunkenness, you may ascribe to it a thousand different distempers.

*Ul.* This is a subject that I fancy you had better drop; because Nature has herein manifestly given us the preference, since it was for us alone she provided that precious liquor.

*Serp.* I allow it, if she at the same time had given you proper limitations in the application; but upon the present establishment, 'tis just like the grant of a thing much more  
likely

likely to do harm than good, to one that has neither discretion nor temper in the use of it.

*Ul.* You may rail 'till you are tired against wine, without making me a convert.

*Serp.* Your gallantry is still more fatal t'ye: How many deaths may we impute to it? Whilst Nature is too fond to leave us in this respect without restraint. Our times for pursuing it are stated, and those too with a due regard to our own health, and a proper season for the education of our young.

*Ul.* Are there none then amongst you under the perpetual influence of this passion?

*Serp.* If there are any, 'tis only such as you have adopted into your service, and instructed in your own manners. For your domestick animals are the greatest breeders. But let us pass to the next topick of so much account in the scheme of health, and consider a little the nature of the air. The quality of which is of so great importance, as our bodies are filled with it in every act of breathing. Now where did you ever find one of us in a climate improper for us, unless we have been forced thither by some of you. Whilst out of avarice, or a hundred other motives, you quit the place designed

for you to catch your deaths in a foreign region.

*Ul.* This is not to be denied.

*Serp.* As for sleep, diet, and the other necessaries of life, I shall avoid speaking to them, because I know you are already convinced that you don't endeavour to make a proper use of them; which depends neither upon art or fancy. Whilst we who follow Nature in them all are from thence, you see, *Ulysses*, subject to so few infirmities, and even for those few that are incident to us, we are each of ourselves directed to it's proper cure.

*Ul.* And is this certain?

*Serp.* As certain as fate: And this single point is sufficient to determine the dispute before us. Since each species of animals is instructed in a cure for the distempers to which it is liable. And that not only the species, but each individual in it.

*Ul.* I protest now you make me stare.

*Serp.* If it seems so strange to ye, I would not have you rest satisfied with my bare word for it. Let us begin to examine at home, and you will find amongst us serpents, that each of the kind, as soon as awaken'd by the spring, perceiving his skin  
starkly

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starkly and rivelled, by lying the whole winter folded up in one position, makes directly to the *finocchio*, and crams himself with it, till it makes him with ease cast his old slough. When our sight is impaired, we have immediate recourse to the same plant, which preserves in us such a strength of vision. Have not the lizards recourse to a certain herb, with which they cure themselves when stung by one of us? The wounded \* stag flies immediately to the dittany: And when bit by the *phalangium*, which is a very venomous kind of spider, they know how to cure themselves with † crawfish. The swallows || when they perceive a humour coming

\* This is generally said of the wild goat: So *Virg. Æneid.* XII. 412.

*Non illa feris incognita Capris  
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæserit sagittæ.*

*Theophrastus, Plutarch, and Cicero say the same thing. Solus Plinius hanc proprietatem Cervis ascribit ait Camerarius.*

† This remedy seems to lye so little in the stag's way, that to justify him, it may be necessary to shew that *Oppian* says the same thing, *Cervos ita affectos fluvidos petere, ibi cancellos comedentes sibi medicinam facere.* What strength does it give to the comparison, if we suppose the Psalmist's Hart under these circumstances, *desiring the water brooks, viz.* by Nature hot, burnt up by a thirst from the climate, the season, and the soil, inflamed by invenomed wounds, and impelled by instinct to seek a cure, as well as hurried by appetite to find a respite to his agonies?

|| *Celandine, called Hirundinaria, quia scilicet hirundines hujus herbe succo oculis medentur.* Skin. Diët. Etym.

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in the eyes of their young ones, know how to cure them by celandine. The tortoise cures our bite with hemlock. The † weasel, before he enters the list with the rat, fortifies himself with rue for the combat. The stork recovers himself with origanum; the wild boar with ivy. Does not the elephant defend himself against the poison of theameleon with olive leaves? The bear makes use of ants to rouse him, after having eaten greedily of your sleepy mandrakes. The rock pigeon, blackbird, and partridge, purge themselves with laurel; the tame dove-turtle, and the hen with chickweed. The dog and the cat make themselves soluble by swallowing quitch-grass sopped in dew. But not to tire you with too much natural history, single out what species of animals you please, and you shall find them supplied with the skill to remedy the particular disease to which they are subject. Nor is this knowledge given to whole societies, but to each individual contained under them; so that we are saved the pains of learning our art from others, are

† These are *Aristotle's* words, only the serpent is put instead of the rat. *Arist. Lib. IX. Hist. Anim. Cap. VI.*

*Mustela vero quoties dimicatura cum serpente, rutam comedit.*—

never puzzled with doubtful cases, and are prevented from the expence, which you wretches are at of seeing him that puts you to death. And perhaps at the same time you are not sensible that you think, the more you give your Doctor the better; and that you take care that the fees shall be presented in the choicest pieces\* you can collect.

*Ul.* Not every one, dear Serpent; but I suppose you have your fools too as well as we.

*Serp.* No, Sir, take it for granted there is none of us, (though some may be more ready or subtle than others) without the intelligence proper to our species. Whereas with you, if every madman should wear a white bonnet, you would meet, I am afraid, but with very few black ones †.

*Ul.* Perhaps those whom you call madmen, are the wisest as well as the happiest people we meet with. Which puts me in mind of one who, after the recovery of his right senses, was asked by a Lady for the receipt, for a son of hers, who was in the same way; but he begged to be excused, for

\* This must allude to the Virtuosi at that time making collections of rare pieces.

† Literally, *You would look like a flock of geese.*

that he would not do the young gentleman so great an injury as to rob him of his distemper. Which proved that he never thought himself so happy as in that interval.

*Serp.* And what could be his reason for thinking so, unless that he found himself then free from those reflections that embitter human life, and aggravate it's misfortunes?

*Ul.* This is what I shall not now dispute with you. But to return to our argument; if you have really fewer infirmities, it is because your lives are shorter, and that itself is a melancholy reason; a miserable security from misfortunes.

*Serp.* It may be deemed so to us indeed, who have every necessary provided, every infirmity cured, every grief banished, and every passion subdued to our hands. But the fear of death with us is very light, being never anticipated, as it is with you, by thoughts about it. Nor are we acquainted with the mighty loss of falling into nothing. Whereas to you, shortness of life ought to be esteemed a real blessing, to whom longevity must imply a longer struggle with diseases, and where to lengthen out days must be to multiply sorrows. Every fit of the head-ach alarms your apprehensions of death; so that every  
bodily



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bodily disorder raises a more acute one in the mind. For which reason some have asserted, that “yours cannot so properly be called life, “as a continuation of the fear of death.”

*Ul.* These are words.

*Serp.* Nay, some who have more severely animadverted upon your condition, have pronounced, that “it is better never to have “been born; but that those are in the next “degree of happiness who expire in their “swaddling bands.” How many, from the like reflections, to free themselves from so great a train of ills, have with their own hands forced a way to death. A thought so full of horror, that it has never yet found admittance with one of us!

*Ul.* Some poor spirited wretches, who have neither the skill to prevent calamities, nor the courage to endure them. But for one of these you'll find a million shrinking at the thoughts of death.

*Serp.* That's very true; and do you know the reason of it?

*Ul.* What is it, pray?

*Serp.* The fear of falling into a yet more miserable estate after it; which is a panick early and deeply impressed, from the descriptions in your writers, of I know not what

regions of *Pluto*; where there are endless torments prepared for those who, to gratify desire, dare to transgress the line of reason. Concerns that never trouble us! But could men once be brought to believe, that the same stroke would put an end to life and sorrow, each day would present you with scenes shocking to human nature. So many there are among you that are miserable yet bear with life; so few that are happy and enjoy it.

*Ul.* I perceive now, *Agessimus*, that so much obstinacy is incapable of being convinced, and therefore think it high time to drop the dispute. Especially since by what last escaped you, you must be void of reason, because you grow sceptical in Religion: Which may perhaps be proper enough for a brute as you are, and so I pity you. And as you are my countryman, I make you still the offer of the favour *Circe* has granted me, of recalling you to manhood; and of conveying you to *Greece*.

*Serp.* I refuse it now; and may all that's powerful defend me ever from accepting it.

*Ul.* Is it possible then, that you can be so insensible of your miserable and despicable state?

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state? and that you are the animal of the world most abhorred by men\*?

*Serp.* That's one of the greatest comforts we have. The love that you men bear to any animal is always for your own sakes, and for the use you can make of it.

*Ul.* However it is evident, in your holes and caverns, you sleep away the major part of your time, without any pleasure.

*Serp.* So do you too, friend, and let me tell you, not half so pleasantly as we do.

*Ul.* Strange! to hear one bragging how well he fares, whose entertainment is dust, or else some sorry reptile; and whose choicest liquor is water.

*Serp.* What does that prove, if we desire no better?

*Ul.* Not to mention the unfettled state of your brain, which must always be, where the ideas are so confused, and the imagination so giddy,

*Serp.* Ay! what do you know of that?

*Ul.* What I know is from my observation of you animals, whose progressive motion is performed by sticking the scales of your forepart into the ground, and so by gathering

\* *Angue magis odiosum*, was a Latin proverb.

your

your hinder parts up to it. Now what I observe is, that when you find any obstacle in your way, you take a quite different rout, without any regard to the road you set out in. What can this be owing to, but a confused head, and a memory shorter than that of a gnat. Hence I conclude, that you are never determined to any certain point, but are wholly directed by Chance.

*Serp.* I should have a confused head indeed, if from a state of happiness and ease I should consent to turn man again, whom I know to be entirely governed by caprice and whim. And as for my memory, that must be much shorter than it is, before I agree to revert to a state so full of complaints and afflictions. Not to fatigue you then any longer, I can never bring myself to accept of a favour that must submit me to so many infirmities, and cause me to be haunted with so many desires, that may not with safety be gratified: Where every little excess is repaid with innumerable disorders; and what is the worst of it, where one must be baited with the perpetual fears of death, and yet live every moment in danger of it. Let me not therefore detain you, while I indulge a little in rubbing my skin, in order to preserve it  
clean

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clean and supple, against yond juniper tree. A sensation not to be equalled by any that I can recollect in your state; because I find the pleasure pure, and without allay, whereas with you, the sweet is so mixed with the bitter, that the latter is by far the most predominant, and leaves a more lasting impression. So that it has been rightly observed, that "a thousand enjoyments are not a recompence for one pain." *Exit.*

*Ul.* Well! at length I am convinced, that I have been conversing with what, after all, are but brutes, endued with the power of speech without judgment, which makes them overlook principal points to dwell on trifles. However, I'll not desist from my glorious enterprize, but find the Goddess out, to present me to some that are worthy of the offer. For as the proverb has it, *You may easily do a person an injury against his inclination, but it is very difficult to serve him against his will.* *Exit.*

CIRCE.



## C I R C E.

Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

## DIALOGUE III.

*Ulysses, Circe, and the Hare.*

*Ulysses.*



IF I had not been favoured with unquestionable proofs of *Circe's* love, I must own I should suspect the Goddess was neither willing to grant my request, nor yet inclined flatly to deny it; and therefore had chosen to amuse me, by presenting only such as she knew were invincibly

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bly bent against this change, that finding these beyond all powers of persuasion, I should through mere despair desist from the attempt.

*Circe.* Let not *Ulysses* entertain a thought so unworthy of my love to him, or the respect I owe to the dignity of my own mind, which abhors a trick. Though you know one may, without cruelty, be a little shy in granting a favour.

*Ul.* Right: But you put me upon disputing with the most obstinate of all wretches; when I made him the offer of restoring him to his shape, and of conducting him to *Greece*, he looked upon me through the prejudice of his perverseness, as if I intended him a real injury, and remonstrated vehemently how great a sufferer he should be by the change.

*Circe.* As you would have done yourself, had you been in his case.

*Ul.* When he was a man, it is true, he was a practitioner in physick, and those you know are conversant with little else but misery, and complaints, noisomness, and infirmity, sighs, and groans; of which retaining still a lively idea, (for what offends makes a more lasting impression than what pleases us)

us) he is shocked at the thoughts of returning to so disagreeable a state.

*Circe.* The case is general; misfortunes and complaints every where abound; contentment and happiness are great rarities.

*Ul.* Then he was not so wise a man as he is taken for, that, amongst the blessings for which he daily offered up his thanks to Heaven, never omitted to praise the Gods, that he was formed a man and not a brute.

*Circe.* He did it in compliance with the opinion prevailing amongst men, drawn from abstracted and tedious consequences. Whereas surely these people are to be looked upon as the best judges, who having experienced both conditions, have sensible demonstration for their evidence; which is not only the most excellent, and less liable to error, than any other degrees of assurance, but the very ground and basis of all knowledge.

*Ul.* I grant it; if the senses of mere animals were to be compared to ours, whereas they are much less perfect.

*Circe.* Of which I don't believe one word, because I find many of them excelling you in each.

*Ul.* It is undeniable, that some have a particular sense more exquisite, as the sight  
of



of the Eagle, the smell of the Dog, and the hearing of the Goose, plainly shew. But we surpass them as much in our judgment upon sensible objects, by having the common Sensory more perfect; so that we draw juster consequences, and are better qualified to compare the representation of one sense and that of another. But come on — let us try once more. — Sure all cannot be so far lost to reason as these three first, who were deservedly turned into such sorry animals, that their shape might match their understandings.

*Circe.* I agree: You shall discourse with that Hare, which you see grazing in the shade of yon oak: Make up to her, and challenge her from me, that she enjoys the power of speech.

*Ul.* Hare; so may the Gods receive thy petitions as thou attendest to mine, which is, that thou wouldst stay and answer me, as *Circe* says thou canst.

*Hare.* Alas, what can this mean? And do I hear the sounds of human language? and understand them too? Oh! ye cruel Fates, why have you dragged me back to so much misery?

*Ul.* Call't

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*Ul.* Call'st thou it misery to understand the speech of men?

*Hare.* Ay, misery and unhappiness itself; unless their nature has undergone a thorough change since I was of the species.

*Ul.* Why so?

*Hare.* Because from every quarter my ears were pierced with moans and mutual complaints.

*Ul.* (*aside*) Now have I fled into the jaws of *Scilla* to take refuge from *Charybdis*. The Physician, from his calling, conversed with few besides the distressed and unhappy, and this, as far as I can guess, with none but the melancholy or mad.

*Hare.* This, as I was saying, made so strong an impression upon me, that I would a thousand times have fled into the woods, far from all prints of human footsteps, had it been consistent with my nature, without suffering the greatest difficulties, to subsist in a place of solitude.

*Ul.* But have not other animals their complaints, and their manner of expressing them too?

*Hare.* They have: And when any of our own species have a particular passion to discover, we understand the sounds that are affixed

affixed to it. As it is natural to every creature, by a variation of signs, to explain their grief or joys; but then these different modulations only signify the affection in general: now this is much more tolerable than your human way, which beside the piteous manner of expressing yourselves, with sighs, groans, and melancholy accents, exaggerating your own miseries, communicate them to those that hear them. For my own part, besides these infectious lamentations, I can charge my memory with little else but relations of murders, treasons, robberies, and assassinations, perpetrated by one wretch upon another, so that I can safely say; I suffered more by the impressions made upon me from without, than from any sorrow springing originally in my own mind.

*Ul.* Pray (unless you have any objection) tell me what might be your employment when you was a man?

*Hare.* Why, to tell you the truth, I altered my condition so often, that I cannot directly answer you. But what may be your reason for asking that question?

*Ul.* The natural love I shall ever bear my countrymen. It was this put me upon soliciting the Goddess of the island, to restore

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tō human shape all the *Greeks* that sojourn here, and learning from her that you was one, I here make you a free offer of the boon, being myself a *Greek*, and my name *Ulysses*.

*Hare.* To me! oh never, never, whilst I have any choice left.

*Ul.* But why? Is it not better to be a man than a savage creature?

*Hare.* I answer from my own knowledge in the negative.

*Ul.* But are you really serious? and are determined to let life take it's course in this same shape?

*Hare.* Even so; because as I am, I am contented and easy in my way, which when a man I never found myself to be.

*Ul.* This might be your own fault, by being perhaps too unreasonable to be content with any thing.

*Hare.* I should suspect as much myself, if I had seen any person in any station whatsoever, (and my acquaintance was general) whom I found perfectly contented! But to reason upon the case, How is it possible any man can be perfectly easy? For either it is his lot to be loaded with the care of governing other people, or his fate not to have the government of himself.

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*Ul.* In either of which situations I assert, that with a little prudence, a person may be very happy.

*Hare.* I roundly deny that he can be so in either. If he be a Prince or Governor, if he endeavours to discharge the duties of his office, it is impossible he should have an hour's ease. He is the butt of all plots and conspiracies, which he has reason enough to fear, perpetually springing up out of the envy that is the attendant on his station. The Prince within his district represents the great and good Governor of the Universe, whose care extends itself to all things: So that the saying is true enough, that "his subjects sleep for him;" But what pleasure is reserved for his share?

*Ul.* Pleasures of the most exalted kind, to see nations civilized by his care, and mutually contributing to each other's happiness; from whence he reaps a harvest of glory and honour, that repays him with immortality.

*Hare.* But where are these happy creatures to be found? Only among us, that follow only what Nature directs: Whereas you that go beyond her prescriptions, find your desires impatient and boundless. Hence all the train of seditions, tumults, and conspiracies, which

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every where so much abound, that for my own part, I should prefer a situation among craggy rocks, in the most abandoned solitude, inhabited only by the most savage beasts, before a seat in the best administered government upon earth.

*Ul.* But you forget, that under a good and well-governed administration, there is no room for the perturbations you describe.

*Hare.* And how pray is your peace preserved? Why, so great is the perverseness of human nature, that offenders are restrained by such penalties and tortures, that the Judge who pronounces the sentence, and the spectator that sees it executed, suffer little less than the malefactor. So much the cruelty of your nature exceeds ours, we never quarrel with those of our own species, and seldom with those of another, unless prompted to it by hunger, driven by fear, or forced to it in our own defence.

*Ul.* Why truly it is not to be denied but that sovereign Princes, as they ought to have the welfare of their subjects at heart, must meet with more incidents to disturb than to please them: But as it can fall to the lot of very few men to be Princes, let us rather take in the majority, and consider the state  
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of a private man, who is fupposed to have few concerns befides thofe for his own family.

*Hare.* The cafe is juft the fame with a private man; for either he is rich or poor. Riches, as they are acquired by care are ever attended by it; and the fear of lofing them never permits the poffeffor to enjoy them a moment quietly. Sometimes the apprehenfions of a war, which time and the courfe of things muft neceffarily bring on, are the bugbear; one while the wife is in fault, another the children; to day the fervants, and to morrow the very labourers are villains. In a word, as gold is every body's aim, fo it requires great circumfpection to fecure it. If your private man be poor, I fhall not take up fo much of your time as a defcription of his mifery would require; for of all conditions the poor man's is the leaft tolerable.

*Ul.* That is more than I fhall readily allow, becaufe many of our wife men have both wrote in praife of poverty, and ftudiously courted it, by contemning riches, and throwing them away, that they with the lefs interruption might attend upon their fpeculations.

*Hare.* The greatest part of them, I dare answer for it, and perhaps all of them, did it out of vanity, to pass upon the world for something great and extraordinary. Besides, there have been instances of those that have thrown away an ounce to get a pound. For it is the way of the world to load you with what you seem to despise.

*Ul.* You love to hear yourself talk. I say that I have known many a one live contentedly in a state of poverty; particularly among the Philosophers.

*Hare.* And I assure you they were in the right on't; it being the only way they had to secure themselves from the contempt of the world. Though I am persuaded the more knowledge a man has, the more impatient he is of poverty.

*Ul.* Whence should it proceed?

*Hare.* From reflections on the partiality of Fortune, in denying him the favours which she scatters with profusion on a thousand fools.

*Ul.* You put me in mind of a friend of mine, who used to say, that *It is with riches as with a defluxion or catarrh, they generally fall upon the weakest part.*

*Hare,*



*Hare.* What aggravates the misery of their condition is to think, that Nature seems to take a step out of her ordinary course on purpose to oppress them. For whereas she abundantly provides for her whole family, in this her method is reversed, and one part of it is overwhelmed with satiety, whilst the other pines in want: And this only from a fault in the disposition, where every one is permitted to take just as much as he is able, which can never happen to one of us. Because no one either desires, or indeed can possess more of the good things that Nature supplies him with, than another.

*Ul.* You are of their opinion I find, who hold that robbery has lost it's name. For the thing stolen has undergone so many thefts already, that now all right to it is lost but what possession gives.

*Hare.* To close the argument: Let this convince you, Sir, that poverty is an evil of the first rate, since to avoid it, Men will submit even to be servants one to another. A thing so shocking that there is not amongst us an animal so base as not to prefer death to a sorry subsistence so dearly purchased, every one being necessarily his own master.

*Ul.* By your leave, there may be other motives besides poverty that may make men content to be slaves; witness the great number of the rich that are so.

*Hare.* These, according to a true estimate, are the poorest of all creatures; labouring under the worst sort of poverty, a poverty of spirit, or a meanness of understanding, which out of an indulgence to a depraved appetite for fame or titles, would be contented thus to sacrifice their rest.

*Ul.* This cannot be the case, because many such were before that in very happy circumstances.

*Hare.* Pray who were they? for I never yet saw the man who could say either that he wanted nothing, or was not desirous of getting more. Unless some few, who towards their latter end have out of spite endeavoured to get rid of those riches which cost them so much pains in their youth, that they thought their death was hastened on by them.

*Ul.* These are mistakes in Judgment, not faults in Nature.

*Hare.* This seems to me to be the same thing, since pernicious mistakes flow from your very nature. Whereas our nature never

ver leads us into any. I remember when I was at the age in which one begins to have some dawnings of reflection, that being under the care of a tutor set over me by my father, who was a man of fortune and quality in *Etolia*, as he was instructing me in some part of the Mathematicks, according to the method of our *Greek* education, I hit upon a thought, that the mind of man was a meer uninscribed tablet \*, wholly devoid of all ideas but such as are imprinted on it. This single reflection, though I had no reason to complain of any unaptness in my self to learn, or severity from my preceptor in teaching, yet out of a mere restlessness of temper natural to boys, gave me great uneasiness, under circumstances in which I lacked nothing to make me happy.

*U.* I would fain know what conclusion you will draw, from the acts of an understanding which you own to be immature, and consequently, in a state of imperfection.

*Hare.* Well; the next alteration in my condition was at the death of my father;

\* *Gelli* seems very artfully to insinuate a notion which it was not safe for him to assert, but was reserved for our great countryman *Mr. Locke* to demonstrate, with all that freedom of thought with which he delighted to subvert the most venerable errors.

this embroiled me with my brothers, till a proper division could be made of his estate. However, it was some comfort to be able to see that there must be some time an end of our quarrels, and then the remainder of my life, I resolved, should be one calm scene of uninterrupted tranquillity. Which was just the reverse of what was really my lot. For as my fortune consisted partly of lands, and partly of money, each of these brought with them their respective troubles. My lands engaged me with Farmers, and my money involved me with Merchants. And he that should be in league with a band of Highwaymen, would have to do with honefter people than either of them. But though I could find them pretty well agreed, as to the main point of getting all I *had* to themselves, yet I could perceive each in his own station to be very discontented. The farmer found fault with the seasons, and the men of business with the times. This complained of his hard luck, and laid the blame both on the Heavens and the Earth. The other entertained you with nothing but the cruelty of Fortune, the perils of Voyages, quarrels of Princes, and the deadness of Trade.

Ul. It

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*Ul.* It is very true, that each man has his own grievances, and it is as true that each of you has his also.

*Hare.* But where we meet with one you feel a thousand. Farther, give me leave to observe, that the common occurrences of life, to defend one's property (for all men are cheats, though in different ways) throws you into the hands of an infinite number of tradesmen and lawyers. Now I can't charge my memory, that I ever found one of these pleased with his own circumstances: Because these having all the same view of raising a fortune, lamented their being obliged to be in a perpetual state of wrangling and quarrelling, which however was necessary to it.

*Ul.* I think he has much more cause to lament, that has any thing to do with them; as for their part, I fancy they suffer very little from other people's quarrels, which are their harvest.

*Hare.* He that is always plaguing others, can have no peace himself. Consider what it must be, to be hated by those that do not employ you, and always suspected by those that do.

*Ul.* Right; and this puts me in mind, that when a question was started in one of the  
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the schools, which ought to have the precedence, a Lawyer or a Physician? it was answered, that “ Custom had determined “ the point; for that the thief always goes “ before the hangman.”

*Hare.* Tired with the discontentedness of these people, and desirous of ease myself, if there be such a thing as peace, said I, sure, she must have taken up her habitation in one of the colleges of our Priests. These, being separated from the cares of the world, are acquainted with no other but that of serving their Gods; are exempt from the troubles that attend property, by having all things provided for them in common; and from any political concerns, by being subject to one of their own order. Charmed with the delightful idea, I resolved to quit the world, to live in peace with them. But alas! a slight acquaintance with their manners convinced me, that discord and unhappiness were no strangers amongst them. For each of them at all adventures aspiring to be their chief, stuck at nothing to disserve and undermine the rest: I soon discerned likewise with what reluctance they submitted to their several subordinations, and the difficulty they found, to maintain themselves in that esteem  
in

in the world which is their support. Add to this the disagreeableness of an inactive reclusive life, and the labour it requires to persuade men, that they are more in the interest of the Gods, than those that serve the world with only such laws as God and Nature gave us. These disagreeable circumstances made me fling my resolutions of retirement so far from me, that they have never since been able to reach me. My next trial was to take upon me the state of a Man of Quality, and to fill up my vacant hours with the amusement of hunting, and such like diversions.

*Ul.* Whoever proposes to find happiness in that sort of life, and much more in the army, I dare pronounce him, from my own experience, mistaken.

*Hare.* As for the army, I had no turn to it; thinking it absurd to seek for peace in a state of war. Besides, it seemed to me highly ridiculous, when neither the publick good, or one's own private honour, or some justifiable occasion demands it, to sell one's life at any rate. For as we can come but once into the world, I think one would not be bought out of it at so poor a recompence, as all the treasure that is already coined, or is breeding in the world. Seeing farther, that it  
was

was impossible to keep up the port or dignity of a man of rank without a great number of servants, who are all in a different interest from their master, and are incessantly doing one thing or other to plague him; I threw up all thoughts of that kind of life. At last, thinking that to serve a Prince in some honourable post would answer the end I proposed, I determined, with the small abilities I was master of, to set out and make an offer of them at Court, where I was as much baulked as in my former schemes. For besides the fatigues of attendance, and the sacrifice one must make of time, quiet, and health, the necessity of bearing with the envy that reigns in Courts, and the ingratitude of Princes, which their Ministers would accuse them of, should they give them half their kingdom, cost me many hours of happiness, and left me very little to make satisfaction for the want of them. At length, through mere despair, I resolved to tempt the dangers of the Sea, where good luck threw into my way what I had so long been in quest of in vain. For being happily brought to this fortunate island, *Circe* transformed me into what you see, Sir, a Hare. Which change she wrought upon me, by steeping



steeping my faculties in a sweet oblivion ; in which state, if it be true that I have fewer ideas than when I was one of you, I am sure I have fewer fears.

*Ul.* Ridiculous! to hear the most startlish, timorous of animals boast of his courage.

*Hare.* Against all of our own species we dare ; which is my security ; and a greater than the anger of the Gods has granted you.

*Ul.* Well, allowing that every human condition you have named, abounds with these and yet greater cares ; however, I don't find you have any very exquisite pleasures, in your present state, to brag of.

*Hare.* If you come to that ; pray what pleasures do you men enjoy, which are not embittered by the more predominant ingredient of trouble ? This made one of the oldest of our *Greek* poets declare, that “ The pleasure now flourishing in the world is not sincerely and genuinely such, but sorrow clothed in her robes.”

*Ul.* How did he make that out?

*Hare.* Why, “ when the fatal box was opened, and *Pandora* filled the earth with unnumber'd evils, Pleasure amongst the rest took her flight about the world, and  
“ with

“ with her bewitching charms so engaged  
 “ mankind, that not one was left to cast up  
 “ a pious thought, or wishful look, towards  
 “ Heaven. Enraged at this, the Father of  
 “ the Gods dispatched the Muses to try if  
 “ by their harmony they could allure her up  
 “ to Heaven. But first they made her quit  
 “ her robe, to qualify her for those uncor-  
 “ ruptible mansions, where all things appear  
 “ in undisguised purity. Sorrow in that in-  
 “ stant wandering up and down the earth,  
 “ by all shunned and hated, took up the  
 “ robe, and hoping thus disguised not to be  
 “ detested, put it on, and ever since, in  
 “ Pleasure’s semblance, has imposed upon  
 “ mankind.”

*Ul.* What would the old Bard teach us by this story?

*Hare.* That those things which men take  
 for delights, are in truth so many punish-  
 ments. Which he thus accounts for, that  
 “ Sorrow imposes on the world in Pleasure’s  
 “ habit, and they never discover the cheat  
 “ but in the end.” Give me leave to men-  
 tion one thing, which all mankind, how  
 different soever in their circumstances, agree  
 to rank among their pleasures, yet I will  
 maintain it to be nothing else but mere essen-  
 tial

tial misery; and that is a hankering after play, or gaming.

*Ul.* I fancy, Sir, you mean losing; for there is no harm in playing, they say; but losing is, I own, a bad thing.

*Hare.* They are both bad; though I agree with you, that the loser has generally the worst on't. And if every thing that causes violent perturbations in the mind is to be avoided, even to win is not desirable, though it seems to have the advantage in point of profit. If it be said, that it exalts the mind to a very high extasy of joy: It may be answered, that no joy is warrantable but what proceeds from virtuous and justifiable reflections. And then, even their good luck runs them into such extravagancies, that when a man is given up to play, I give him over for lost and ruined.

*Ul.* This I can never come into; because I have known many live this way, who had no other method of supporting themselves.

*Hare.* Perhaps so; but then I warrant you, it was long after their original stock was sunk. For I used to think, that play serves a man of fortune, as ivy does a good wall; when it has once taken firm root in him, it never leaves him till it brings him  
G into

into a ruinous condition; but then it will prop him so, that he shan't tumble quite to the ground. Thus when a Gentleman is thoroughly attached to gaming, he'll be ruined by it; but then it will keep him from starving. Because, by being acquainted with the gamester's haunts, it gives him an opportunity, by cringing to every one, and flattering the winners, to recommend himself to a sorry maintenance. Believe me, Sir, the love of play is one of the greatest misfortunes that can befall a man, and it seems to me to be a pestilence of so contagious a nature, as to threaten the whole species. For we see very considerable parties so intirely devoted to this infatuation, as professedly to renounce for it all honourable employments, by which they might do their country service, and some particulars so bewitched by it, as to neglect all thoughts of honour, health, and credit; all concerns for friends, children, wife, nay even for themselves, till at last, by making away every thing that belonged to them, they are reduced to so scandalous a state of poverty, that they fly from the presence of a man with greater precipitation than we hares do from the sight of a dog; especially if he chance to be an old acquaintance,

acquaintance, that knew him in the days of his extravagance. And what yet aggravates the misery, they have still a hankering after the delusion that ruined them, and are perpetually casting about to come at some small trifle to venture, in order to fetch back (as they call it) the rest; for which they are content to deprive themselves even of necessaries. That, I think, *Ulysses*, a strong instance, how fallacious at least men's pleasures may prove to them.

*Ul.* The inference is only from a particular; besides, I know no obligation that a Man's nature lays upon him, to determine him to this folly. Nor have you named any evils of this kind which a little prudence might not prevent or remedy.

*Hare.* True: But with what difficulty, in so corrupt and debauched a state of mankind? So that I can never persuade myself to exchange a being free from care, for one that is ever embarrassed; where I must have the mortification to see what Nature gave in common to all, only in the possession of those that are mightier than myself; to whom I must be a slave, forsooth, to get a niggardly allowance of what she scattered with a liberal hand. And to complete all, where

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my seeming pleasures are sure to prove real misfortunes.

*Ul.* How impertinent is so much obstinacy in so contemptible an animal? who knows so little of himself, as not to be sure what sex he is of.

*Hare.* It is truer that you, who must seem to be ignorant of nothing, don't know it. For our own parts, we are satisfied with our knowledge upon that head.

*Ul.* Thou art so great a coward that every thing affrights thee: Thy whole trust is in thy feet, and they betray thee to whole species of animals, that are in combination to pursue thee.

*Hare.* What is that to me as an individual, if our whole species be liable to the same?

*Ul.* Then your lives are so precarious, that every slight injury puts an end to them.

*Hare.* I beg of you no more; nor endeavour to shew me the want of that knowledge which, if I had, would render me the most unhappy creature in the world: So pray make your offer where it may be more welcome, which I assure you will find no acceptance here. In the mean time, as I always follow the impulse of Nature, I must  
obey

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obey her summons to the delicious pasturage of the inviting verdure upon yonder rising grounds.

*Ul.* I must tell thee, Hare, thou puttest me strongly in mind of a scoundrel, who being cast into prison for his debts, and finding himself without any trouble supported by the goal maintenance, made interest with his creditors, not to drag him from a place so agreeable to his indolence. What could this be owing to but the most abject baseness of mind? Or who would not prefer a life of liberty, with all its inconveniency, to the greatest affluence in a coop? For a manly prudence is never so properly exercised as in providing against the accidents to which Nature subjects us. So that in thy state of manhood, I collect thou must have been both a mean and unreasonable creature, not to be able to confront the troubles which the World and Fortune throw in our way; and consequently, lovest the thoughtlessness of a Brute, better than the active wisdom of a Man. So I leave thee to enjoy it, rather than force thee, contrary to thy inclinations, to a change that would prove a scandal to our species; as every one is, that is base enough to think like thee.

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*Hare.* I could easily answer all this founding harangue. But as we are by Nature restrained from exceeding her demands, so are we necessitated to satisfy her cravings, when proper food is provided for us. And as that beautiful herbage has struck my eye, from the hill that rises there over-against us, and I find myself hungry, I must beg to take my leave.

*Exit Hare.*



CIRCE.






# C I R C E.

Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

## DIALOGUE IV.

Ulysses, Circe, and the Goat.

*Ulysses.*  Always thought, illustrious Queen, that *Man differs much from Man*, as our *Greek* proverb has it, but could not have suspected the difference to be so wide, if I had not disputed with the Hare you presented me to; or to speak more properly, with him whom you changed into that shape.

G 4

*Circe.*

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*Circe.* Why? Pray has he a mind to be changed back again?

*Ul.* The farthest from it in the world: He received my proposal with greater detestation than any of the rest.

*Circe.* I hope you are now convinced, how vain your sorrow was, that I had thus transformed your friends.

*Ul.* No, I assure you, I lament them more than ever; being more confirmed in my notion, as it is evident to me, that this wretch's cowardice and pusillanimity hinders him from discerning the truth. Would you believe it! that he was naturally of so base a spirit, and so averse to any little trouble, that he rather chose to live in the most abject slavery, void of care, than to enjoy the most honourable post, attended with the business that is inseparable from it?

*Circe.* Who told you so much of him?

*Ul.* Himself; by preferring the life of a beast, merely because men seemed to him to be subject to some trouble. Though at the same time he could not help owning, that he was under so strong a bias from Nature, and so powerfully necessitated by her influence, that he was not master of his own actions. For finding himself in the midst  
of

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of our dispute disposed to eat, and seeing I know not what herb, which he said was proper for him, he left me abruptly, quite unanswered, and solely against his will; declaring that he must obey the call of Nature which directed him to it. And yet to prove to you how mean a wretch he must have been, he chooses to continue in the state of slavery, rather than to be restored to manhood, and the government of these tyrannick passions. Though he could not but have heard of the many noble examples of our illustrious countrymen, so celebrated by Fame, for having freely sacrificed their lives, rather than lye under any slavery or constraint, and yet have never esteemed it a disgrace to have struggled with Fortune and the World.

*Circe.* What you call force or slavery is to him neither the one nor the other.

*Ul.* How so?

*Circe.* Because his nature requires it. When a stone descends towards the center, does it act under any force?

*Ul.* I should answer that I thought not.

*Circe.* And yet it can't act otherwise.

*Ul.* True: But as it's nature required it; the motion by which it proceeds in that direction,

rection, arising from an intrinsic power and an internal principle, does it no violence; because all violence is what is suffered from some exterior power, which can by no means be said to happen to the stone, in the motion you describe; so that though it cannot but act as it does, it cannot be said to suffer any violence.

*Circe.* However it is true, that it is attracted towards the center by the force of it's own gravity.

*Ul.* Not by the force, but by the nature of it's own gravity; it being natural to it to gravitate, which if it did not, it would not be a stone.

*Circe.* This is just the case with the propensions of mere animals, under the influence of their proper nature, which can't be called force, as it acts always for the best for them, and what most effectually tends to their preservation and perfection.

*Ul.* But would it not be better to be above the reach of this influence, and be able to act absolutely free?

*Circe.* Quite the reverse; because having no understanding, which is the result of reasoning, they would be perpetually (unless thus controlled) led into mistakes, which, as matters now stand with them, seldom or never happens.

*Ul.* What

*Ul.* What proof have you of this?

*Circe.* Experience; for though there be a sample of every species within the narrow compass of this little island, which consequently must fall under my daily notice, I can't charge my memory with having ever observed any of them disorder'd, from either an undue quantity, or an improper kind of food. Whence, though a shorter term of life falls to their share, yet they get to the end of it healthy and vigorous, which is more than you dare boast of.

*Ul.* If they are subject to none of these disorders, how comes it about that their life is shorter than ours?

*Circe.* From their constitution; which is not so well mixed as your's. The radical moisture, which is the support and food of life, being more impregnated with water, and participating less of the nature of air; so that it is more easily disposed to corrupt. I mean in general, though there are instances of animals, such as the elephant and the stag, that are much longer lived than you.

*Ul.* And are you seriously of opinion, that it is better to be a Beast than a Man?

*Circe.* I never said so much, nor have you any reason for drawing the inference. If  
so,

so, pray why don't I change myself into one? But if I must take the same side of the question with you, conversation drops of course. Let it suffice, that you have full commission to make your offer to any that will accept of it, and if you are resolved not to be too soon discouraged, who knows but you may find some one that will at length close with it?

*Ul.* I am resolved then, it being a reflection upon a man to have desisted cowardly from a brave enterprize.

*Circe.* If so, then call to the Goat that browzes there, who, as I remember, was a *Greek*.

*Ul.* Attend, you Goat, for *Circe* tells me that thou art a *Greek*.

*Goat.* I was so, when I was a Man, my name *Cleomenes* of *Corinth*: But I am no longer so; and what's more, will ne'er be so again.

*Ul.* What, ashamed of your country! *Corinthian*?

*Goat.* How can that be, when there is not upon earth a more honourable city?

*Ul.* What is it then that you are so resolutely bent against?

*Goat.*

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*Goat.* Against returning to manhood. This is the only fear that remains with me; so much more happy am I in my present than in my former state.

*Ul.* I was just going to make you an inestimable offer, of no less than that of restoring you to your former figure, of extricating you from this state of slavery, and of being your convoy to your native country.

*Goat.* I am obliged to you for any good intention; but I fear, that in this case the fact would prove the reverse of the promise.

*Ul.* How is it possible, good *Cleomenes*, when I have often heard our *Grecian* sages defend this proposition, “ that Man is the “ most noble and most perfect animal; or “ rather, in some measure the end and lord “ of all the rest?”

*Goat.* And they spoke like Sages; for a wise man should think well of what is his own; and an honest man should speak as things appear to him.

*Ul.* But what is this mighty happiness you enjoy, which humanity would so much abridge?

*Goat.* If I should describe it to you, I know you by your nature so difficult to be pleased, and so insatiable when you are so,  
that

that perhaps you would despise it; and be no more satisfied with it, than with the good things of this life, or the expectations of the next. But I will submit to you a few of those evils which we are absolved from; evils of so malignant a nature, that if you judge without prejudice, you must envy us, as much as you fancy, we ought to envy you.

*Ul.* Come on then, as many of them as you please.

*Goat.* Manifold are the miseries, and various are the evils, to which mankind is exposed, which would induce one to prefer any condition that sets us free from them. But it were impracticable to reduce them within the scanty measure of time that is allowed me to treat of them. For, to own the truth, having dined very plentifully, I find Nature, which above all things takes care of my health, prompting me strongly to repose myself, and take a sound sleep, within the cool recess of that shady grove.

*Ul.* However, let me intreat the favour of hearing some of the chief of these dreadful evils that attend us.

*Goat.* With all my heart. Know first then, *Ulysses*, that human nature is surround-  
ed



ed with unnumbred miseries; whereof there are four that feem to be the principal; each of which, if my memory fails me not, would move me to prefer to it the life of the most despicable reptile upon earth.

*Ul.* Name them?

*Goat.* The insecurity of the present good, the apprehension of future evils, the jealousy of those with whom you are obliged to live, and fourthly the dread of the laws.

*Ul.* Oh! you think of too many bad things.

*Goat.* The point is how to think on fewer. But to begin, Pray what moral security can a man have, that he shall peaceably, even for one hour, possess his present enjoyments, I speak of common advantages? Now these are primarily in the hands of Fortune, and how slippery a tenure that is, one need not say. They are in a secondary manner in the disposal of Princes, who acknowledge no other law but their own will, and how irregular a thing human will is, you know better than I.

*Ul.* This is true; but a wise man will take care, not to be obnoxious to the caprice of the one or the other.

*Goat.* If

*Goat.* If we consider property, who is he that can depend upon the possession of it for one poor day? For since the distribution into *meum* and *tuum* obtained in the world, each man's avarice is so whetted, that it is ever on the watch, by ways licit or illicit, to acquire riches, no matter at whose expence.

*Ul.* I am thoroughly convinced that men lay more snares for one another, than they do against any of you.

*Goat.* To what an extremity the fear of having these riches extorted from them, by the violence of Princes, may drive men, let it suffice, that I have known some quite disclaim all use of them, and by an affected poverty, and real misery, keep them buried, so that they were of no more use to the owner than to an indifferent person: All the advantage he reaped from them, was the knowledge where they were hid, and the pleasure of watching them.

*Ul.* I bar all declaiming against avarice, which is so monstrous a vice, that it divests men of all natural affection, even towards themselves.

*Goat.* Of the apprehensions from thieves, servants, workmen, and especially of your wife (if she happens to be somewhat younger than

than yourself) all that I shall say is, that let it be more or less it has no place in our estimate of things. We acknowledge no such Deity as Fortune, and as we have no property, it is impossible there should be any one dishonest amongst us. Much less, being all upon a par, can we have any fear of being robbed by one of superior power, which might prompt us to hide what we value.

*Ul.* I am persuaded that these things give many sour reflections, but I am as much persuaded, that he who has his passions in due subjection will steer clear of much the major part of them.

*Goat.* How can those be held in due subjection, whose nature it is to be in a constant rebellion?

*Ul.* There never was yet a complete victory obtained without immense toils.

*Goat.* A very sounding period truly! But to our second point, I would fain know what animal is at all solicitous about things not present, except it be man alone.

*Ul.* What things not present?

*Goat.* Why, if the sky be a little overcast you are frighten'd out of your wits for your harvests. If you hear the thunder grumble, or see a flash or two of lightning,

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then

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then is the time for superstition to begin her pranks: One flies to the temples and wearsies the Gods; a second takes sanctuary underground, because, forsooth, somebody has told him, that “the lightning never pierces the earth above five foot deep;” a third fool clothes himself with sealskin\*, because some old woman has assured him, that “that sea-monster was never known to be thunderstruck.”

*Ul.* Well, but how many can you charge with such folly?

*Goat.* Every one; those who have it not one way have it another. How many could I name to you, that out of the mere dread of being sick are never well, who so far from indulging in the liberty that health allows, never dare transgress, either in the quantity, or kind, prescribed by their Physician: And then the least alteration of weather, either to hotter or colder, gives such a turn to their blood and spirits that they find themselves really out of order.

*Ul.* We must own, that there are some vapourish people, that are easily put out of order.

\* *Augustum cerèè illa pelle pro ἀνολγοκάλω Fulminis usum, a Suetonio in ejus vita refertur.*

*Goat.*

*Goat.* And I have observed, that of those who are more hardy and despise these little notices, few are very long lived; and those that linger on, generally speaking, so wear out, and impoverish their constitutions, that when youth deserts them, a thousand complaints succeed in it's place. And then, upon reflection on some of the follies of their younger days, they fancy themselves never free from having some hint or *mind*ing of them.

*Ul.* Is it not so with you?

*Goat.* No, because we live by one simple rule, chalked out by Nature for us. Add to this the disheartning suspicions of being deserted in sickness, the fear of being put into a wrong method, and the jealousy of having your affairs mismanaged. Now this can never happen to one of us, who have no wants but what we can supply ourselves, and no concerns as we have no property.

*Ul.* And yet I have known some of you, who are so well equip'd, so well set out of hand, very miserable from the point of a thorn, which you could never have picked out without the assistance of one of us.

*Goat.* But the cases are so very rare that they are of no account. Then as to your

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fear of death, what description can exaggerate it?

*Ul.* Well, and are not you affected by the fear of death too?

*Goat.* Not before it comes upon us; not till the pains are actually upon us. Whereas the very thoughts of it, or even the foreknowledge when it shall happen, throws you into such horrors, that some of you have with your own hands opened a way to death, merely to get rid of the fear of dying. Ha! ha! ha! Let us now consider the anxious cares that haunt you, concerning things future and at a distance. And how unhappy must be their state, that are not only concerned for things necessary to their daily subsistence, but for what is at the distance of a year or two, so that the care to prevent misfortunes fills up all the intervening space, from the apprehension till their arrival.

*Ul.* And I dare affirm that some of you labour under cares of the same sort.

*Goat.* Name one?

*Ul.* The ant, who in summer lays up a magazine to last her through the winter.

*Goat.* I grant the fact, but deny the motive. It is not out of any apprehension of a failure or dearth, as when you provide against

gainst the future; but as she never stirs from underground, being not able to endure the winter's cold, she lays up what she has occasion for, within her reach, in the place of her residence. To this she is directed by Nature, not by any *presention* that she shall want what is not at that time of the year to be had above-ground. For how is it possible that they should know when things are in season, who know not the seasons themselves? nay, we know nothing of time, or any of it's parts.

*Ul.* No! how comes it then that so many of you can so exactly make off and return at stated seasons, as your birds of passage, the swallow and the field-fare; and that some can so regularly take to their winter quarters in caverns, as the serpent and the badger?

*Goat.* This does not prove that they have any idea of the seasons themselves, abstractedly consider'd; but that they are sensibly affected by physical movements. Nay, farther, we know not only nothing of time, but nothing of the motion of the heavenly bodies\*, which

\* *Pythagoras* asserted, that "Time was the sphere of the last Heaven, which contains all things;" to signify that all things are wrapt up and included in time; and that the motion of the Universe is the measure of time, which begun with this visible world, and can only end with it.

are it's subject. All that we perceive are the sensible differences caused by them; sometimes by heat, sometimes by cold; at one season by winds, and at another by rains. And in these we are so very sagacious, that the whole doctrine of your Auguries and Auspices is founded in observations upon some of us. Now how is this to be accounted for? Why as we have not our heads filled, like yours, with a thousand whims and extravagancies, our attention being free, we are at leisure to discern the most minute alterations,

*Ul.* So that you think it a misfortune to be sensible how time passes.

*Goat.* A very great one; because as that, or rather the motion of the celestial bodies which gives it a being, is the cause of all the changes in bodies, it must have an effect upon your own. Now you that can calculate this will always be picturing to yourselves death in an advancing posture: This makes you gravely count the solemn hours one by one; that again gives the alarm to every suspicion concerning futurity, which can never happen to us who live free, a rent-charge upon Nature. If what has been said of the fear of death be not sufficient to expose your vanity, to convince you of it let



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us a little consider your cares for what shall happen after it.

*Ul.* A very laudable concern too; to leave our affairs in such a condition that our children, who are a part of us, may pass through life with fewer troubles than we have done.

*Goat.* Well, as long as you can plead any use in it I forgive you; but what say you of being solicitous about things for which you cannot so much as plead the least shadow of utility?

*Ul.* What do you allude to?

*Goat.* To your solicitude about the performance of your funeral ceremonies; for which, as if the earth were not the common parent of us all, and that every child had not a right to return to our mother, you make an expensive bargain with your Priests; and those that cannot pay the burial fees, why let them escape being devoured by the dogs how they can.

*Ul.* I beg you to drop the subject; for after you have said all you can on it, it will only appear that the community has indulged some advantages to certain societies, but it can never furnish you with any reflections upon the species.

*Goat.* What I have been mentioning is bad enough, but the worst and the most slavish fear that I have to accuse you of, is the fear that one lyes under of another. Now from this we are absolutely free: There is no animal naturally an enemy to one of the same species, though he may be so accidentally, as through love, hunger, jealousy, or the like, and very rarely this way neither.

*Ul.* And I dare assert the same thing; that neither are we by Nature enemies one to another.

*Goat.* Yet insatiable appetite easily becomes second nature. For as not one of you is content with what would suffice Nature, your study is how to dispossess each other of what he has; whence springs that torrent of evils that rage amongst you, wars, desolations, massacres, treasons, thefts, and as the height and perfection of all wickedness, the practice of giving poison one to another, a crime that we cannot think of without horror.

*Ul.* And yet he that will may escape most of these.

*Goat.* As how?

*Ul.* By being contented with a little, and living to one's self separate from the world.

*Goat.*

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*Goat.* To the first of these, for ought I know, you may bring yourselves; but for the second I defy ye; because you stand in need of so many things, that it is impossible any one man should be sufficient to provide them for himself. And depend upon it, that this is the true account of the rise and foundation of all cities, that by living together you may be able to assist each other: And because one man may have more of something than is necessary, and less of another than he wants, you have found out a very proper means to carry on a traffic by the invention of money. But let me tell you one thing, that if, by means of it, you furnish yourselves with all you desire, the very desire of it will grow so strong upon you, that it is a doubt at the foot of the account, if it does you more harm or good. For as every body is contriving to make it his own, this so much disposes you to quarrel, that it is impossible for you to have any dealings, even for a single hour, without being suspicious of each other.

*Ul.* I shall not pretend to deny, that the distinction of things into property must occasion many troubles and broils, which I will farther grant, you are excused from, who enjoy

enjoy every thing in common. But then the mutual ties of friendship, which we alone can boast of, give us sufficiently the advantage of you: Friendship, that best of all the world's good things, by which we communicate not only a share of all outward blessings, but a part of our cares too.

*Goat.* And will any man pretend to deny that there is not such a thing as friendship subsisting amongst us, when it is found flourishing not only among those of the same but of a different species? As for example, the friendship is very remarkable between the turtle and the parrot, the peacock and the pigeon, the stag and the buck, and the like.

*Ul.* This I can never admit; because friendship must be founded on truth and virtue, and I cannot allow you to have any notion of either: So that those combinations that appear amongst you, directed to some selfish end, are rather compacts and conspiracies than friendships; what you call so, are rather natural inclinations, whereas what we honour with that title must be founded upon approbation and choice, which cannot be your case.

*Goat.* If you won't allow us any friendship, I hope you won't allow us any flattery  
neither,

neither, which does as much mischief as ever the other did good!

*Ul.* And yet whoever makes use of his reason, cannot have the one imposed upon him for the other.

*Goat.* But the flatterer appears so like the friend, that I fancy your reason will often be puzzled to find out the difference. Take notice that flattery addresses itself to your self-love, which will prejudice the strongest judgment.

*Ul.* I grant it; and as the desire of praise is of the party, these will make a formidable alliance: Both propose the same end, to please you; the flatterer in the sunshine of your fortune, and the friend stands by you in the time of need. Though I grant you, that it is a melancholy case to be driven to this proof, yet he who coolly considers, will long before make the distinction.

*Goat.* If it be so easy, pray shew us a little how?

*Ul.* There are many characteristicks, but the principal seem to be, that the flatterer resigns himself intirely to your manners, does as you do, changes his method with yours; is in love with every thing you admire, and is shocked with every thing you dislike: whereas

whereas the friend is steady, pursues his own honest purposes, and will drop you when you drop your integrity. The flatterer then is like the shadow that always follows the body, and does what it does; whilst the friend is like the light that shines on every object but preserves it's own purity. The flatterer commends every thing you do, the friend only when you deserve commendation: The flatterer exaggerates every virtue, and diminishes every vice, but the friend holds a true mirror, that shews you both in their just dimensions.

*Goat.* Proceed we to our last reason why we would not accept of your offer, which was out of a dread of your penal laws.

*Ul.* And is it a reflection upon us, that we are governed by laws?

*Goat.* No; but the necessity of them is a standing proof both of the weakness and wickedness of your nature; for what greater demonstration of depraved appetites and dissolute inclinations; discarding the remonstrances of reason, and forcing you to take shelter under a standing body of numerous laws, to compel you to keep within the lines of duty?

*Ul.* Let that be the wicked man's concern; but who does his duty out of a love  
to

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to virtue, need neither fear, nor even know the laws.

*Goat.* And pray how many of these tractable virtuous Gentlemen are to be found among you? I presume one might cast up the number of them, without going deep into Multiplication. Nay, were you such gentle manageable creatures, yet always to have your senses ridden with so heavy a bit, must be disagreeable enough.

*Ul.* But what grows into a habit ceases to be a fatigue.

*Goat.* How laborious must the first conquest be when it is the nature of your appetites to be desirous of a thing, in proportion to it's being illicit? But we have no wish repugnant to our nature, take our full enjoyment, not only where, but when we please, without having any remorse from fear, or check from shame.

*Ul.* A glorious privilege truly! not only to be exempt from the restraint of laws, but the rules of decency.

*Goat.* I can be very easy under any reflections upon a subject of which I profess to have no idea. I hope you will take this for a plain answer, that the liberty I now enjoy, is more endeared to me by comparing it  
with

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with the slavery that I know you to be under. And what aggravates it is, to think that you brought most of it upon yourselves through folly or ambition; I say, that you have in many points tied up your hands where Nature left you free; so that I declare, that I will not only not turn man again, but I do here renounce all dealings, all intercourse with the species. For even the very cattle in your service are involved in your quarrels: The beast that commits the trespass must suffer in his own hide, because of your fantastical distribution of what Nature made common. But those that entered into so ridiculous a compact I think much more worthy of the stripes, it being that alone to which you ought to ascribe all the frauds, contentions, and animosities that each day breeds among you; which hinder you from conversing with each other, as we do, without the fear of losing the present good, or incurring some future evil. So that I wish you all the felicity to be met with, in a state abounding with miseries; whilst I pass the little remainder of life, at least without the fear of death, and that can only be done by continuing as I am. *Exit.*





C I R C E.


Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

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DIALOGUE V.

Ulysses, Circe, and the Hind.

Ulysses.  IS said, dear *Circe*, that truth begets hatred; but surely to a noble mind nothing can be so odious as falshood; and nothing renders a person so abhorred as a discovery that his tongue holds no commerce with his heart. So that I am determined

determined to disburthen my breast sincerely, though I hazard your favour by it.

*Circe.* Let not the wise *Ulysses* think me capable of being offended at the truth, which is always welcome to those that are able to bear it: So speak your thoughts securely.

*Ul.* Why then I must own, I labour under some suspicions, that you have not granted to these creatures so free a use of their understandings as of their tongues. If not, I must complain that I think myself abused. If otherwise, how is it to be conceived that they should be unanimous in so monstrous a proposition, That it is better to be a Beast than a Man?

*Circe.* Were the case as you state it, you would have reason to charge me with a breach of promise, which is ever the effect of a weak head or a bad heart. And yet I affirm to you, that when you disputed with them they had the same exercise of their intellectual faculties as when they were men.

*Ul.* Prodigious! that they should not be able to discern so broad a mark, when I so plainly pointed it out to them.

*Circe.* Who knows (which is nothing incredible) but they find some enjoyments, some pleasures, unthought of by us? But

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come on; boldly pursue your enterprize, all may not prove so obstinate. And be assured, that as all the animals you see have been men, what shape soever they may bear, none of them will offer you any violence. *Exit Circe.*

*Ul.* It was a common saying with our wise men of *Greece*, that “\*those whose judgment was sufficient to conduct them through life with decency and honour were justly to be esteemed in the highest rank among mortals; that those who had not sense enough to govern themselves for their own preservation, yet had enough to be advised by persons wiser than themselves, were to be placed in the second form; but those that neither had enough to direct themselves, nor to listen to those who had, were scarce worthy to be reckoned a part of human nature.” Those whom I have been discoursing with, as I take it, are of this latter sort, so that one is not to be surprized at the

\* This is almost a translation of the beginning of *M. Minutius's* harangue to the soldiers. *Livy. Dec. III. Lib. II. Saepe audiivi, milites, eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit: secundum eum qui bene monenti obediatur. Qui nec ipse consulere nec alii parere scit, eum extremi ingenii esse.* By which he alludes to those verses of *Hesiod,*

Ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακίῳ, &c.

I

estimate

estimate they make of things. But as I may flatter myself that I can judge somewhat better, and am convinced how much it is the duty of man to be assistant to a distressed brother, think myself obliged to persevere till I find some worthy of the gift I have to offer. But see, what a noble herd of stags is here! I must try if there be any of my countrymen among them. Tell me, ye stags, if Heaven has ought in store to oblige you with, if there be any *Grecian* of your herd \*?

*Hind.* Oh! ye blessed Powers, and do I once more hear the sound of human accents? And have I myself recovered the use of speech too?

*Ul. aside.* Who knows but I may have less reason to suspect *Circe* here? - This opens well, by thanking the Gods for the use of speech.

*Hind.* Are you of *Greece* pray, who put the question?

*Ul.* I am, my name *Ulysses*.

*Hind.* I also was of *Greece*, but of a different sex: I was a woman before *Circe* changed me into a Hind.

\* The Ancients looked upon themselves as much obliged when adjured by things sacred, as if they themselves had sworn by them. *Life of King David.* Vol. I.

*Ul. aside.*

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*Ul. aside.* Nay, if I have to do with a Woman, who, they say, always takes the wrong side of the question, we are not likely to gain much ground. However, it will be some satisfaction to have tried both sexes.

*Hind.* Why then does *Ulysses* give himself the trouble of wandering up and down the island in quest of his countrymen? And tell me, I adjure you by the same vows you made use of, How does it come to pass that I have the privilege of speaking with you, which I never enjoy'd since my transmutation?

*Ul.* If you esteem it a privilege, you may thank me for it, who by dint of intreaties, out of the love I bear my countrymen, have obtained, first, that each shall have the power of speech; after that, the blessing of being restored to their former shape; and to crown all, of being safely reconveyed to *Greece*. And as you are one, will you accept of the offer? Speak your mind freely, and I must add quickly too; for when you Ladies revolve a thing too long in your minds, either out of hurry or diffidence, you quite lose yourselves: So that your most celebrated repartees have been the most off-hand.

*Hind.* No.—I think you could not desire an answer shorter or quicker.

*Ul.* I cannot say it is the wisest I ever heard, but I can safely say I never heard a shorter.

*Hind.* Why not the wisest?

*Ul.* Only because there is no sense in it.

*Hind.* You ought to take it for granted that I have my reasons when I say no.

*Ul.* That may be, but perhaps I may be better satisfied when I hear some of them.

*Hind.* Well then, don't you think I had some for not consenting to be restored, since you hear that I was a Woman?

*Ul.* I can't see any; since you must consider, that you would have been changed into a rational creature, for which you seemed to express the highest esteem, when you so devoutly thanked the Gods, upon the recovery of speech, which is inseparable from rationality.

*Hind.* My objection was not against becoming a Rational Creature, but against becoming a Woman. For Women are held in such contempt among you, that some of the \* Philosophers have had the confidence to assert

\* It must be owned, that in almost all ages some learned men have found leisure enough to start such questions. Thus those

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assert that we are of another species. Others have stiled us imperfect Men, and so have proceeded to philosophize upon the hypothesis of imperfection. But a little attention to their own births would have been sufficient to expose such extravagant notions.

*Ul.* Hey! dey! Why how came you by so much philosophy?

*Hind.* You will be less surprized, when I tell you, that my husband was a professor of the first credit, with whom it was impossible to converse so much, without picking up a good deal of what is so easily learned.

*Ul.* I can tell you one thing which I perceive he could never teach you.

*Hind.* Pray what was that?

*Ul.* To overcome the itch of prattling, which is still so strong upon you, that though you could coolly reject the offer, you could not forbear being transported when you found the use of your tongue.

those ancient sages the *Gymnosophists*, and thus among the *Indians*, the modern *Bonzi*, we are told, appear so much like ideots, when most abstracted, that it is not easy to distinguish the apparent from the real Philosopher. There was a book in the sixteenth Century upon this subject, *An Mulieres sint Homines*, which was answered by one *Simon Gediccus*, a *Lutheran* Divine of consummate gravity; whereas it deserved to be put in no other light but what the *Frenchman* sets it, by translating the Thesis, *Si les Femmes soient des Hommes*.

*Hind.* What I have to alledge then in justification of my refusal is, that you men treat us as your slaves, or at least as your servants, not as you ought, like your equals or companions. A thing so immoral, so monstrous, that I defy you to produce a parallel to it in Nature. Cast your eyes round the Animal World, and shew me where the Female is not the partner, not the slave to the Male; sharer of his pleasures, and fellow-sufferer in his troubles? Man is the single exception. I say Man, who from being a Lord, degenerates into a Tyrant, and as he finds himself superior to us in strength and courage, is generous enough to take advantage of it.

*Ul.* What makes you declaim thus furiously?

*Hind.* I tell you once more, because you use us as your servants.

*Ul.* Not as our servants, dear Hind; as our companions if you will.

*Hind.* D'ye call those companions, where the one always commands, and the other always obeys? But what aggravates our unhappiness is, that we purchase this bondage, or service, (call it what you will) with our own money. For, according to your righteous laws, when once one of us chooses to  
 associate



affociate herself (to use your soft phrase) with one of you, her fortune must be thrown into your lap; and she that has none, is sure to be treated as a slave for life, or else her only deliverance from it, is by being shut up in some honourable prison, to become a Priestess to *Pallas* or *Diana*, or some such self-denying Goddess, but must never think to taste of any worldly pleasures more.

*Ul.* And yet this delivery of the portion into the Husband's hands is evidently calculated for your advantage.

*Hind.* A very particular sort of advantage is that! Because, whereas others pay the person that serves them, we pay him whom we serve. But I desire to know how this custom was introduced for our good?

*Ul.* Because, when men observed your unaptness for business from irresolution or unsteadiness, it was adjudged that the safest method to preserve your fortunes, was to have them consigned to your Husbands, not as Masters of them, but as Attorneys for them, to secure them to you in bar of accidents. Accordingly you find upon their decease they revert to you: So that what you suppose is diametrically opposite to the true state of the case, and is evidently injurious to the Husband.

band. Whereas the fairest way had been for the Husband to be obliged to deposite into some third hand just as much as he receives with his wife; and then if there should be any defect, the loss should be in common to both. This would at least have one good effect, that it would turn your thoughts towards improving the principal, which is not so often done, because it is looked upon to be the Husband's business to get abroad, and the Wife's to spend it at home. And yet in your widowhood you are indemnified, and all deficiencies are made good out of the man's effects.

*Hind.* But we that stay at home have a greater share in the getting part than you that ramble abroad. For you never saw a vast fortune raised where there was not a Woman as notable to keep, as the Man was industrious to get.

*Ul.* I believe it; and always thought you had a better turn for saving money than Men; for it is \* *timorousness* and *pusillanimity* that puts people upon hoarding. But

\* *Quoniam hunc sexum custodiae & diligentiae assignaverat, idcirco timidiores reddidit quam virilem. Nam metus plurimum excipit ad diligentiam custodiendi.*

*Columella, Proem. XII. De Re Rustica.*

then these very qualifications prove you to be much more fit to receive than to give command; this minute care and exactness being only to be exercised in little matters. Hence the highest encomium that a Woman can merit is, they say, that she is very governable.

*Hind.* They say! that is, you say; and it makes for your purpose to have that notion generally prevail. But ask us, or ask experience, and you will find us as fit to govern, nay preside, in affairs of the highest importance. Consider the kingdom of the *Amazons*, how long was that preserved without their being indebted to any of you, either in Politicks or in War? To relate how the bounds of the *Babylonish* empire was extended by *Semiramis*, or the *Scythian* by *Tomyris*, were to transcribe your histories, which abound with their exploits.

*Ul.* And how many more such can you name? I fancy you may count them all upon the fingers of one hand.

*Hind.* For which we may thank you; who never give us an opportunity of exercising these faculties, but keep us immured within your own houses, employed in all the low offices that the care of a family brings  
with

with it; for which our sole reward is, to hear you\* say magisterially, that a Woman's fame and her employment should begin and end within the compass of her *own walls*. And yet even in this little way you may observe such an exactness, that the houses where there are no Women, in comparison of those where they are, put one a good deal more in mind of a den than a paradise; which some of you have had the honesty to own. As to the propriety and neatness relating to your own persons, all that I shall say is, that I don't think it difficult to distinguish which is the old Batchelor.

*Ul.* I grant, that you have your merit in these kind of things.

*Hind.* And we should distinguish ourselves as much in things of an higher Nature, if we were permitted to be concerned in them.

*Ul.* I beg you not to go too far, lest you should put me in mind of the Shoemaker, who, when they were criticising upon a statue, asserted that the shoe was cut wrong at the instep, and proved his point; upon which the fellow growing vain was for finding

\* He means *Thucydides*, who says, Καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ νομα τῆς ἀθανάτης γυναικὸς δεῖν καὶ ἀλάττειν ὅτι εἶναι καὶ ἀνείδοζον.

fault in another place; but a stander by pulling him by the sleeve, told him, " Friend, " don't go higher than the instep, for all " above that is beyond your province."

*Hind.* I am glad you will allow us any thing; for, generally speaking, your worst word is too good for us.

*Ul.* How can that be, when we always honour you, and give you the preference.

*Hind.* Never, in things of any consequence; but perhaps as far as giving the upper hand at table, and a few soft appellations merely for your own sakes, whilst we have any beauty left to engage you. When that is fled, Heaven knows your behaviour towards us, both in words and deeds.

*Ul.* This is the height of ingratitude.

*Hind.* As for facts which are less generally known I shall say nothing of them; but your words are too notorious to be dissembled. Is it not a saying with you, common even to be a proverb, that " in Marriage there are but " two happy days; the first when the wife " is led in, the second when she is carried " out?"

*Ul.* These are little freedoms of language that men of wit will indulge themselves in, when they meet, to divert the cares of life:

But

But I think their practice shews that they don't express their real sentiments, there being so very few that do not some time or other venture upon matrimony; and those that never do, are looked upon as odd creatures at best, and seldom escape censure.

*Hind.* And yet you can all be ready enough to say, "the Man that takes one Wife should bear the figure of Patience on his crest, but he that takes a second that of Folly."

*Ul.* The moral is, that second marriages, especially where there are children, are seldom very happy; as they want that strong cement of love that joined them in the first instance. Nor do I really think patience in the case so usefess a virtue, as it is so liable to be exercised by some of you; which made a man of wit say, that "he never saw a bride going to her husband's house, but he always pictured her in his mind, carrying one hand stretched out, and in it a lighted torch, as who should say, that she was going to set on fire the family she was going into."

*Hind.* Nay never be ashamed to give us the sequel: "And the other held behind, with a hook in it, with which she had  
" been

“ been robbing the family from which she  
“ came out.”

*Ul.* I cannot say, that these things have not been said by men of character, and perhaps they have had their provocations too. Neither will I deny how injuriously you have been accused by some of us, men of debauched lives, or not of a capacity to consider your worth, or how much we are forced to be obliged to you. All which I am proud to allow, or should think myself unworthy the name of a Man. If Nature has given us in some things the advantage, so much the better for us: If you had been furnished with stronger faculties of body or mind, you had been less fit for the part Nature intended you should act, in subserviency to us. And when you behave properly in that post, we think ourselves not less obliged to you than to Nature herself for ordering it so. You are not therefore to take notice of every scurrilous saying, which fools are ever ready to throw out, since we can quote you as many good things justly pronounced in your favour, such as that “ It is you alone that make life  
“ preferable to death: That you are our  
“ crown;” according to that renowned *Egyptian* King, who after having shewn his im-  
mense

menſe treasure to a Royal Brother, told him, “ he had yet a jewel to produce, of more  
“ value than all the reſt,” and then preſented  
him to his Queen.

*Hind.* I aſk, How is it then that we are  
uſed ſo ill by you ?

*Ul.* And I aſk, How do you mean ?

*Hind.* I aſwer again, in treating us as  
ſervants, not as companions. Tell me then  
fairly, How came it to paſs that you ſhould,  
by preſcription, range out to the full extent  
of your Will, whiſt we are tied up by the  
ſhort bridle of Honour ? Is it that none but  
we can offend againſt Honour ? You indulge  
every deſire, and yet we muſt not be allowed  
the leaſt ſlip, though we have ſtronger temp-  
tations to it; not from a more furious or  
more ungovernable will, but from your vile  
importunity and irrefiſtible aſſiduity : And if  
you at length ſucceed in robbing a poor Lady  
of her honour, you are the firſt to repay her  
with a thouſand reproaches.

*Ul.* If it be ſo ineſtimable a jewel let  
them lock it up ſafer then.

*Hind.* How is that poſſible, when every  
fellow has a key to it ? So that if we are  
drawn aſide, as the fault is yours, ſo ſhould  
the ſhame be alſo. Eſpecially as you arro-  
gate



gate to yourselves a superior degree of understanding.

*Ul.* And yet if you would attend to the reason of this practice, you would not condemn it: But the error arises from your confounding cases, and putting yourselves, as brutes, upon the same foot with us. Now I demand, Is it right that the riches which a man has gained by his industry, or that the honours which have been the reward of his virtue, should descend to one wholly a stranger to his blood?

*Hind.* No, certainly.

*Ul.* But this must be the case, if Women were to give a loose to unlawful desires. Now this, I say, can never happen to Brutes, who have no property to leave to their offspring, and have no concern about them, after they are able to shift for themselves.

*Hind.* Since we have fallen upon the subject of Children, I desire to know how that justice and equity, the want of which we have complained of, is observed by you in regard to them? For it is well known, that you cast the whole care and burthen of their infancy upon us, contrary to the usage of all other animals in the world.

*Ul.* And

*Ul.* And pray, don't you as dextrously shift off this incumbrance, by putting them out to nurse? which I believe is as little practised among any other animals in the world.

*Hind.* Who is the occasion of this but yourselves? who, during their infancy, won't bear the least noise, won't give yourselves the least trouble or concern about them. But as soon as they are grown up, things take a quite different turn. Then you enter as it were into a combination together, to despise and set us at nought. Nor is this expressed in words alone, but in very deed: They are called your sons, take your name, and count themselves only of your family, without taking any farther notice of us.

*Ul.* Nor is this founded but on the most reasonable considerations.

*Hind.* I suppose the reason is grounded in this case, as in all the rest, upon your power; which can always make reason take what shape it pleases.

*Ul.* The reason that I intended to give was, because they derive their sensitive soul and essence of humanity from us, and us alone.

*Hind.* Are we then mere cyphers in the case?

*Ul.* You

*Ul.* You must know, the female can of herself produce nothing of a higher nature than the vegetative quality, which we enjoy in common with the plants. This, I say, is the highest perfection that she can unassisted reach. Hence you see, as Nature never acts in vain, she has not distinguished plants and trees into different sexes. If there are some exceptions, as for example, in the corneile tree, where you will find the female fruitful, and the male barren; as there can be no contact in the case, and the thing produced is of no higher a nature than the vegetative; for this, as I said before, the female is alone and of herself sufficient. This I illustrate by a familiar instance, suppose, of the hen, which of herself solely and properly can produce an egg, that has evidently the vegetative soul or nature in it, because it grows to a certain determinate size: But yet this egg, as it is unimpregnated, will ever remain unfruitful. So Physicians assure us, that you yourselves have often false conceptions, which they call *Mola*. Now this, it is plain, must be endued with the vegetative power, because it increases to a stated magnitude, but has no sensitive quality, because the other sex was wholly unconcerned in the production: So

K

that

that as our sons derive from us alone, the very animal essence and sensitive soul, they may well, as you observe, be called our sons. Hence, when they arrive at any degree of maturity, you are, by universal consent, absolved from farther care, which still remains a duty upon us.

*Hind.* What returns are we entitled to, for all our pains and care?

*Ul.* To be ever honoured, and if occasion requires, upon the decease of the father, to be always supported: Which is never refused but by wretches below the name and dignity of Men. And in truth, Nature is herself your security, who seems to have impressed stronger affections towards the mother than the father.

*Hind.* If you come to a comparison, we can give you such instances of our love towards our children and husbands, as would quite disgrace yours. What think you of those who, upon receiving the news of the loss of their children, have dropped down instantly dead? Of others, who upon seeing their husband's expire, have immediately dispatched themselves; as thinking it not proper to live without a husband, nor honourable to be joined to more than one?

*Ul.* These

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*Ul.* These are glaring acts, that seem at first sight to carry a great deal of merit with them, and to claim applause, as proceeding from violence of love, or greatness of soul: Whereas in truth they arise from madness or cowardise; as distrusting that they could not survive their loss. But if Nature, who always acts for the best, had found that it were better that the Man and his Wife should drop together, she would undoubtedly have contrived that it should always be so.

But our discourse begins to be tedious, so I must put the question once more, Will you resume your former nature, and return with me to *Greece*?

*Hind.* By no means; and I thought I had given you sufficient reasons why, too.

*Ul.* If I had thought them so, I should not have troubled you with the question again.

*Hind.* What I have to add, can be no argument to you, though they are to me, that by being a Hind, I am every way upon a par with our males, I go and come as free as they: I bring my young ones into the world with less \* danger, and breed them

\* *Inter omnia Anamalia Mulier in partu maxime vexatur.*  
*Aristot. 7. L. 9. Hist. Anim.*

up in it, with less trouble than the best Lady of them all.

*Ul.* Not that I suppose the happy minute you boast of is free from pain, or that you require no care after it.

*Hind.* But you must consider our strength, and that we naturally are directed to a certain herb, called *ara* \*, the use of which immediately restores us to our health.

*Ul.* Is it possible that you have no concerns as we have about the education of your young ones?

*Hind.* Very few, I assure you, in comparison of what you suffer. Because as they have fewer wants, they must give us less trouble; and that too is so overcome by instinctive affection that it is scarce perceptible. Whereas you that are without that advantage feel it's full weight: So that not to give you the fatigue of persuading me any longer, I declare that I live much more contented as I am. But not to discourage you, I freely own that, were I to change my shape, I

\* What the Author calls *Ara*, is probably an abbreviation of *Aristolochia*, so called because ἀρίστα βενθῆ τὰς λοχίαις, called hartwort, or birthwort, and is the same that *Cicero* calls *seselis*.

*Cicero Lib. Secund. De Natura Deorum, Cervæ paulo ante partum perpurgant se quadam herbula quæ seselis dicitur.*

would

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would rather be a human than any other creature ; as you may conclude, by our frequenting your roads more than the haunts of wild beasts. So I wish you happy in your voyage, and I will myself endeavour to be as much so as I can, for the remainder of life in these woods. And since I have recovered the use of speech, without being obliged to be a Woman again, I shall envy neither Gods nor Men.

*Ul.* I would not have you so obstinate, dear Hind, in your opinion, because you ought to think us better judges in the case than you are ; especially as we are quite disinterested, and only recommend this to you, wholly for your own good.

*Hind.* That, I remember, was the old cant, when you had a mind to persuade us to any thing ; and yet your chief regard was ever to yourselves.

*Ul.* Besides you ought to remember, that *Circe* restored you to the use of speech, for no other end but that you might be able to declare your mind to me, in relation to the proposal which was, by agreement, to be granted to those only that should desire it ; So that if you still continue a Hind, I am

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afraid you will lose the privilege of talking, which you seem so much to enjoy.

*Hind.* If I could suspect that, I must own it would stagger my resolution.

*Ul.* How can you doubt of it? Do any of your species ever speak?

*Hind.* Well——then e'en let it go—— For as I am to converse only with Deer, and we have so many other ways of explaining our meanings and wants, (which are so few that they give us but little trouble) let who will close with your offer, for my part, I refuse, point blank.

*Exit Hind.*



CIRCE.





# C I R C E,


Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

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## DIALOGUE VI,

*Ulysses and the Lion.*

*Ulysses.*  Know not what should be the cause, that Nature (which is always in the right) should make a greater difference between the sexes in the human than in any other species. In the nation of the Birds, the difference in courage is very inconsiderable, if at all discernible:

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The fatigue with them, either in hatching or educating their young, is pretty equally divided. The same is observable among the terrestrial and aquatick animals, the bodily strength as well as courage in both male and female being pretty near alike. But in rational creatures, the female has both these, if at all, in so low a degree that they are hardly cognizable: So that they ought rather to blame Nature, for having formed them fitter to be our servants than companions, than us for using them as such; for this treatment is more owing to their mean, than to our haughty temper. If they were as strong and bold, we should not try to force them to submit in this manner, nor could we if we would. But out of a distrust of their own conduct, or natural timorousness, they court our government, and voluntarily sue for the yoke: So that I can't so heartily wonder, that the Hind should refuse to become a Woman again. For in her present state she enjoys her liberty, the choicest of all blessings, and by the change would be put into a state of slavery, the forest affliction to any ingenuous mind. Let us look out then for one to whom our offer would prove a benefit indeed, and not as to her a real injury: Who knows but  
such

such a one may be met with in this troop of Lions here advancing towards us. But ha! what am I doing! If I should offend them, I know the consequence must prove fatal; if not I am secure, unless they should be a little hungry, or so. Now, though the Goddess gave me her word of honour, that no inhabitant of this island should harm me, yet cannot I overcome the horror with which I am struck at this dreadful assembly. However, in confidence of her love, as well as her honour, I will take the courage to accost them gently. Lions, so may happiness attend you in your present state, and be increased at every change, tell me graciously, I adjure you, if there be any of you who before his transformation was a *Greek*? If there be any such that is desirous of resuming his former shape (as who that considers does not?) and of revisiting his natal soil, let him know, that the bounty of the Gods has thrown a Man in his way who is empower'd by mighty love to effect both.

*Lion.* I was a *Greek*, as I perceive thou art, if the language that thou usest be thy mother tongue.

*Ul.* I am thy countryman. *Ulysses*, if such a name has ever reached thy ears.

*Lion,*

*Lion.* Infinite times, not in *Greece* alone, but in my most distant voyages. But say, have you deserted your trade, the glorious art of war, that render'd you so famous through the world? Or was you directed hither, like myself, by your better fortune?

*Ul.* I can't say by my better fortune, but it was owing to a desire of seeing the most distant parts: For when our wars were happily concluded, and *Greece* had subdued the nations that were her foes, I thought there remained no other way to extend my glory, but by sailing about the world.

*Lion.* And fair *Penelope*, — your wife, — that bright example of conjugal chastity, — I hope she's well.

*Ul.* She is, and the strong desire I feel of seeing her, and the rest of our *Grecian* friends, has urged me to prevail with *Circe*, (though her love to me be nothing inferior to *Penelope's*) to grant me licence to depart, and to take as many countrymen as desired to be changed back again into Men, to be companions of my voyage.

*Lion.* Though it often happens, that the person who means you well, officiously disoblige you, yet you ought to take it kindly, as considering more the goodness of his intention

tion than of his judgment; Because you must commend the motive, how much soever you blame the exercise of it. So I thank you for your good disposition towards me, though the offer that seems to you, I question not, agreeable and advantageous, I am sure would prove to me quite the reverse.

*Ul.* That is as much as to say, that it is better to continue a Beast than to be a Man.

*Lion.* Oh! beyond all controversy. To prove the truth of which, I refer you to the best authority, to one of the wise men of Greece, who used to say, that “could we freely inspect the inside of Man, we should find him a receptacle, or a magazine built by Nature, to treasure up her choicest evils in.”

*Ul.* This Man would have been wiser as well as juster, if he had taken the blame off of Nature, and laid it upon his own back; upon his own depraved appetite, which I suppose he had gratified at the expence of his constitution.

*Lion.* I am not now speaking of bodily evils, but of those of the mind, which are more malignant and more difficult to be cured.

*Ul.* No body should be too positive; because as the body is the vehicle that carries the

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the soul, if it be weak or out of order, she must be obstructed in her operations, which can be no small misfortune.

*Lion.* I did not deny that the indisposition of the body does impede the operations of the mind; but I asserted, that the diseases of the mind hurt the man more than those of the body. Which seems to be a clear proposition, as the mind is the better and nobler part.

*Ul.* I grant it, but nevertheless, if the mind cannot perform her functions without the body, the disorders of each must be equally bad.

*Lion.* I say those of the mind are more dangerous; because as for those of the body, a man perceives them upon him, either by his complexion, his pulse, a general faintness, or a thousand other ways, and as soon as they are discovered, every one applies for a cure. But disorders of the mind so far deceive us, that we do not only not wish to have them removed, but enjoy them, and entertain them as real blessings; hence they frequently are attended by that long train of ills, the loss of our country, friends, children, property, honours. Whereas the worst that bodily diseases can tend to, is death, which is waiting  
for

for us in a thousand shapes. To proceed, if those distempers of the body are justly esteemed the worst, that take away the senses or understanding, as the lethargy, phrenzy, falling-sickness, and the like, those of the mind all do as much, therefore they are to be reckoned worse.

*Ul.* I allow your argument to be conclusive.

*Lion.* You know that to be sometimes sick, Physicians tell us, is never the worse for us, as it is natural. But then the illness must not be of such a sort as not to let us understand whether we are sick or no. For to know that we are not well, and to desire help is itself a good sign in the patient. Now this can never be in distempers of the mind, for he that labours under them cannot form a right judgment: That itself being the seat of the distemper. And he that is ill, must first know that he is so, before he can either find, or seek a cure.

*Ul.* And yet the same thing may be said of drunkenness, whilst the fumes of the wine are in a state of action, they obstruct the avenues to that recess; where the internal senses perform their operations, so that the person thus disorder'd is not conscious of his condition,

condition, which leads him into unnumber'd mistakes, whilst he seems acting gravely for the best.

*Lion.* Very well; and what is drunkenness but a short madness? In this case the organs more immediately concerned in the act of judging are spoiled for a time, in the former, for ever. To prove farther, that these disorders are worse than those of the body, you never knew a person that called a fever a state of health, the ptisick a sign of sound lungs, or that ever brought his having the gout as a proof of the goodness of his joints. And yet you hear people every day call anger, valour; lust, love; envy, emulation; and timorousness, industry: Hence the former always caress the Physician, whilst the latter always hate the Monitor.

*Ul.* What mischief does this confusion of names cause in the world? When scandalous Vices strut in Virtue's robes, and honourable appellations are bestowed on crimes that call aloud for chastisement?

*Lion.* Add to this, that he who labours under any infirmity of body, usually takes to his bed, where, during the cure, he finds some rest, though never so imperfect; and if to shift the pain a little he tumbles and tosses  
from



from side to side, he has a friend at hand to cover him when he wants it, and to entreat him to be as still as he can. But he that has his mind disorder'd, finds no quiet, knows no repose in himself, nor is there any friend to administer it to him; but is in a continued perturbation: So that as that tempest is worse to the mariner which hinders him from making the port, than that which hindered him from setting out to sail; thus the diseases of the mind, which hinder it from seizing the haven of reason, and keep it tossed up and down in a boisterous sea, are more mischievous than those of the body; which, though they may hinder the operations of reason, yet do not quite destroy it. To close the argument, be pleased to consider, that they who are afflicted with bodily pains only suffer it, whereas those that are disorder'd in mind, are the people that do mischief to others.

*Ul.* Take care that you don't indulge your suspicions too far; because the authors of mischief are commonly too private to have any witness to what they do.

*Lion.* Examine a little into all the quarrels and calamities that have plagued the world, and you will trace them up to those  
poisonous

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poisonous sources, to ambition, envy, avarice, resentment, or some such other disease of the mind of man; which not only deprive it of the use of reason, but render it so turbulent as to let it know no rest itself, or to suffer it in any body else. Nay, one of these boisterous spirits is sufficient, if he be of any rank or quality, to destroy the peace of a whole community.

*Ul.* Well, granting that the diseases of the mind, according to your supposition, are more mischievous than those of the body, Are none of you subject to any of these maladies?

*Lion.* I answer no.

*Ul.* I hope you have considered the point enough to inform yourself rightly, else I should conclude, that where there is no reason to moderate the passions, they must be very unruly.

*Lion.* If we have not the use of reason, (which I grant may be sufficient to controul the passions in some degree, though not altogether) you must take with you also, that we have not so much natural perverseness, with which your reason strikes in, so as to heighten the disorders of the appetites; whereas ours are less unruly, merely for want of seeing

seeing things in the manner that you do. For instance, what room can there be for ambition where all are equally great, and where no slight or contempt can be passed on any one? We acknowledge no head over us, nor are there any degrees of honour amongst us: Which are such alluring baits to you, that Right and Wrong lose all distinction in the eye of him that is in pursuit of them. Nay some have been so hardy as openly to avow, that if ever Justice is to be dispensed with, it should only be when Empire is the object\*. Envy can never have place among those of the same species, because they are all equal; nor amongst those of different kinds, because as they know nothing one of another, they must be ignorant of each other's happiness. Neither can there be avarice, where there is no distinction of property. The same reasons hold good as to all other vices that render human life so wretched. Which made a wise man say, that "the sole superiority Man could reasonably boast of, was a pre-eminence in misery."

\* *Cæsar* used frequently a verse of *Euripides*, which expressed the image of his soul, "that if Right and Justice were to be violated, they were to be violated for the sake of reigning."

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*Ul.* Very well; but supposing that more evils attend us than you, there are also some good things in which we as much excel you.

*Lion.* Name them?

*Ul.* The virtues.

*Lion.* Why then I dare assert, that there is not one of these to be found amongst you that does not shine more conspicuous and perfect amongst us.

*Ul.* You must prove as well as assert.

*Lion.* I desire nothing more. Let us begin with Fortitude, by which, *Ulysses* has acquired the glory to be stiled “the spoiler\* of cities, and the subduer of nations.” And yet there was not one of those splendid actions, in which you disdained to have recourse to fraud and trick; thus dignifying a scandalous vice, with the specious names of stratagem and conduct.

*Ul.* Ha! is this to affront me, *Lion*?

*Lion.* Though my words were directed to you alone, I intended the application should be general: So I hope you will pardon me, as I had no design to affront you: But I know it is an universal maxim with you, that it is honourable to overcome in war, let the

\* These are titles given by *Homer* to *Ulysses*, as *αἰολότροπος*.  
*Domitor Trojæ.* — *Hor.* Lib. I. Ep. II.

means be what they will; which notion never yet could get footing with us. Accordingly you see all the wars we wage, either amongst ourselves, or against you, are carried on without the least plot or craft: Each confiding in his proper strength, out of the greatness and firmness of his heart, revenges the injury that has been offered him, without being accountable to any laws for doing it, or liable to any disgrace for refusing it.

*Ul.* But how do you prove that this does not proceed rather from anger than valour?

*Lion.* By the manner in which the combat is performed; where each, scorning to yield, persists to the last gasp, without fear of pain, or dread of death; preserving our heart still unconquered: As is evident from our never submitting to have recourse, in order to move pity, to vile prayers, or any suppliant dishonest gestures. And when we are conquered (as there can be but one victor) the overthrow is never completed but in our death. To proceed, you shall never see a Lion base enough to serve a Lion, or a Stag own a Stag to be his master. And yet you see one Man servant to another, without seeming sensible that it is a proof both of his cowardice and of his baseness. How can

this be accounted for, but that our courage is in it's nature invincible? This is still more evident, from that generous disdain of all refreshments, when we fall into your hands, choosing to suffer any thing rather than to associate with you; bravely preferring death to servitude. So that the only means you have of getting one of us to live tame amongst you is, by stealing a Lion's whelp, who, through your false careffes, may be won to be beholden to you: Having with his liberty, lost that noble roughness of manners, and immense strength of limbs, to which he was born. Besides, Nature could never intend to bestow so much courage upon you as upon us, because you would not have so much occasion to exercise that virtue, which therefore is not confined with us to one sex, our females being as able to repel all injuries done to themselves, or young, as ourselves. The Hind and Mare, you see, equal the Stag and Horse in strength and swiftness; whereas whilst you undergo the toils of war, or dangers of the sea, for the good of your Country, your wives have no other business assigned them, but to exercise their inventive faculties at the fire-side. So far therefore are you from possessing more valour than we,  
that

that I deny that you have any thing of it at all. What with you is called Courage is no more than cowardice, conducted with discretion; for I will maintain, that you expose yourselves to no danger, nor run into any inconveniency, unless it be to avoid a greater: Which, in my opinion, should denominate an adventurer rather a Coward than a Hero. It would ill become you therefore; to lament that Nature has not better armed your bodies with claws, fangs, or horns, since you yourselves take pains to debase or disarm your minds.

*Ul.* “ He that disputes without an opponent, *they say*, easily gets the better of the “ argument:” So that till you are contradicted, it is no wonder that you should conclude, that wild beasts are more valiant than men. But I am so far from submitting to your opinion, that I will uphold it, that there can be no valour but amongst men. Now to convince you what I say is the pure sincere truth, you must know that Fortitude is the mediocrity between Rashness and Fear, determined by Reason, concerning an object just and honourable. Is it possible then, according to this account, that there should be such a thing as valour among you? who have

first no judgment to find this mean between the two extremes, whence you are sometimes too confident, and at others too timorous? Secondly, you are not qualified to consider the nature of what is just and honourable (which can alone justify one in encountering dangers) but your resentments only serve to please or revenge yourselves. This is so wide of the virtue that is the subject of our discourse, that whoever exposes himself to dangers, either out of anger, pleasure, or ignorance, may be allowed to have as much of the Fool as you please, but has not a spark of the true Hero. Which arises from a defect, in not having adjusted the boundaries of what is to be feared, and what ought to be despised.

*Lion.* Surely you allow us very little, if you won't allow us to know that every thing which deserves to be feared is an evil.

*Ul.* Evils, as such, are the objects of fear; but then they are not all equally so; there being some evils, of which he that has no dread, inclines a good deal more to the Idiot than the Hero: Such, as for example, are disgrace, poverty, sickness, and the like. But when the motive is just and honourable, all dangers, let them appear in what horrid shapes



shapes they will, vanish before the truly brave man. Thus the valiant man shrinks not at the apprehensions of death, although the most ghastly of all evils, as it is the end of life; not therefore that all kinds of death are to be despised; and the bravest man ought not to be ashamed of being startled at natural death, shipwrecks, or the like. We allow him therefore the title of valiant, who shrinks not at death where the motive is honourable, whether it be in defence of his own personal Honour, or of his Country. Which last is esteemed so glorious a fate, that the voice of nations conspire to dignify the brave Man, that falls in his Country's service, with particular funeral Honours.

*Lion.* If the contempt of death be so highly valuable in your account, Where is this to be met with so pure and unmixed as in our wars? where we neither consider it, nor any of it's frightful attendants.

*Ul.* But then this fearlessness in you is owing to self-preservation, interest, or revenge, not to the laudable motives of what is just and honourable. Thus those amongst us, who to get rid of some excruciating passion, or to avoid the disgrace of poverty, (evils that come upon us not through any default of our

own) take sanctuary in death, are by no means held worthy of the glorious appellation of being brave, but are deservedly branded with the infamy of being fots and cowards.

*Lion.* As to dangers, it is evident that we must be insensible; because we never so much as think of them.

*Ul.* This may denominate you bold, but not valiant. For there are things which a brave man may, with safety to his character, justly shrink at: Such as are the things that human nature was never constituted to encounter or support, as earthquakes, blasts from heaven, and the like. And yet even in these cases He will, agreeably to his character, be less affected than others: But as he that trembles at every incident is a base Wretch, so he that indiscriminately regards nothing is a rash Fool. It is in the middle of these two extremes (for vices are but extremes, erring in defect or redundancy) that this noble virtue Fortitude consists; which whoever possesses, will never expose himself to perils without a cause. For as life is more valuable than any thing else, it would be the height of folly to expose it for a trifle; especially as this can only happen to the brave and noble minded, who are worthy

thy to enjoy it longer, if it were only for the sake of others. So that we refuse this title to those who, for hire, expose themselves to the dangers of war, when neither their own Honour, nor the service of their own Country, required it of them. Neither do we bestow it on Fops, who through an immoderate desire of pleasures, nor no Misers, who through an extravagant lust after riches, are ready to risque their lives in pursuit of them. These are not brave fellows, but luxurious coxcombs, and avaricious wretches. Thus those that run into difficulties, through passion or ignorance, are called furious and rash; but we never confer the honour of being valiant, unless on those that dare to despise death, when Glory is the prize to be obtained, and Dishonour the evil to be avoided. Which, as I said before, can never happen to you, who are not capable of forming a judgment upon the matter.

*Lion.* But don't you, that are so cautious how you bestow this honourable name, dignify those with it, who through compulsion of the laws, maintain some dangerous post, which entitles them to some high rank in the government?

*Ul.* Yes,

*Ul.* Yes, in a restrained sense; but we don't allow them to reach the perfection of the virtue we have been describing, though they come very near it. For he that is truly brave performs the duties of the character, and acts, primarily and principally, out of a love to virtue, let the consequences be what they will. Whereas those that act out of any restraint, or with a view to any reward, have a little too much of selfishness in the case.

*Lion.* Do you confer that honour on those that excel in the art and operations of war?

*Ul.* Yes; but those are improperly termed valiant, and their bravery is of a lower rank, because their merit is founded in an art, and a mechanical habit of offending others with impunity to one's self, not on election, guided by right reason, which constitutes the virtue. For granting this excellency it's full merit, it is certain that it inclines more towards the apprehensive and timorous. Whereas he that exceeds in the daring part, will do less violence to Fortitude, as there is less merit in abstaining from acting wrongly, than in suffering honourably. But if the brave man suffers, he finds his reward in it, by having obtained the glorious end proposed,  
with

with the applause of his own gallant mind, which is ever free from fear.

*Lion.* To speak the truth, *Ulysses*, your acts of Fortitude, as you call them, seem to me to stand in need of so many requisites and circumstances, that I am apt to think they very seldom are to be found. And even after that, they must receive a sanction from the general vogue of the world, and by what fallacious arts that is gained, by you eloquent men, I need not say. However, I don't think myself obliged to believe every thing that I cannot answer: So I am of opinion still, that there is more true Fortitude to be met with amongst us than amongst you. It's acts with us are more simple, and less embarrassed with difficulties: And as I am resolved to remain a Lion, why, I will hear no more arguments against it. So thanking you for your good intentions, I must take my leave, and join my valiant brethren of the troop. *Exit Lion.*

*Ul.* How poor a degree of understanding must this wretch have had, not to be sensible of any operations, but what arise wholly from the body! So that he called those acts of Fortitude, which are in reality mere inclinations and natural movements, without election,

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election, or any other act of the understanding. But let him continue a beast, without that reason of which he is so unworthy, whilst we proceed to find out some that are capable of carrying their thoughts higher than the corporeal part, and the impulse of mere matter.

*Exit Ulysses.*



CIRCE.




# C I R C E.

Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

## DIALOGUE VII.

*Ulysses, Circe, and the Horse.*

*Circe.*  HAT makes *Ulysses* in this solitary grove, and in this pensive posture?

*Ul.* The beauties of the scene, and coolness of the shade, first tempted me in, and I have since been detained by falling into a reverie upon this most serious subject, How few there are that either know,

or

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or are desirous of knowing, what is their better and more noble part. And yet this is so necessary a piece of wisdom, to every one that proposes to attain the end and perfection of his nature, (which all must desire) that without this be first established, the other is utterly impracticable; for which reason our wise ancestors have taken care, in the most venerable edifices of *Greece*, to have this motto inscribed in capitals, KNOW THY SELF\*.

*Circe.* Whence do you collect, that there are so few who attend to this consideration?

*Ul.* From their actions; for, as you know, Man is compounded of two natures, the one corporeal and earthy, the other immaterial and heavenly: By the former he is like the brutes, and by the latter related to those divine substances that keep the spheres in motion: This therefore, as the most valuable, ought to be most prized; instead of which their whole care is laid out upon the body, to sooth, adorn, satisfy, and preserve it as long as it is possible.

\* This precept, KNOW THY SELF, was inscribed on the temple of *Apollo* at *Delphos*. Vide *Plutarch's* Oration to *Apollonius*.

*Circe.*



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*Circe.* I thought I had heard you say, that in *Greece* there were great numbers that gave themselves up wholly to the study of the arts and sciences, that they might cultivate what you call their better part.

*Ul.* It is very true, but these numbers, I am afraid, will be found very inconsiderable, in comparison of the mass and bulk of mankind, that are wholly attentive to the welfare and pleasures of the body. And even of these wise men the major part, I fear, study virtue for the sake of the body, as thinking it's happiness cannot be so well procured and carried on without it. But I will venture to affirm, that who pursue not virtue for it's own sake and value, but because they make some advantage of it, are very unworthy of the name of wise. For the chief desire of the soul being to know truth, and the reason of things, in which it acquiesces as in it's proper end, those that are conscious of no such principle as the soul, must of course lay out their whole thoughts how to gratify the body: Which I hold to be the source of all the misery and unhappiness that attend human life.

*Circe.* Oh! my *Ulysses*, I flattered myself that the little time allowed me to enjoy your company,

company, would have passed smiling off, amidst an unbounded variety of pleasures on every side, springing up new and fresh, in this seat of all that is delightful; where the perpetual spring, so much the boast of happy mortals in the golden age, is actually flourishing, as in the most celebrated pieces of your best poets, before discord and enmity had being in the world; where a rich collection of animals, without controul, harmless, and secure, either rove over the verdant glades, or stroll through the cool recesses of this rising wood. I thought these entertainments would have incited you to partake of them. Instead of which, insensible of the joys that court you in every shape, I find you now musing upon a bare flint, beneath some spreading tree, or quite lost in thought upon some rock that overlooks the shore: This is not the chearful return I promised myself from your sprightly conversation, heightened by the joys I shew you, and provoked by the love I professed for you. It can therefore be no common grief that ranckles in your heart, and lets you feel no ease.

*Ul.* Thou art thyself, my little Syren, the readiest proof that I could bring, that there

are people, whose thoughts are so wholly engrossed by sensual delights, that they have no relish left for the pleasures that arise from a contemplation on the secrets of allwise Nature. First weighing down to earth, and then clenching there, that active principle which else would soar above the skies, to converse with immortal substances, amidst pure extasies of delights, which the gross affections of sense can bear no proportion to. And here I declare, that could I recover but four of those whom thou hast transformed, to present them to our wise men of Greece, I should be so overpaid by the glory and honour of the action (though a frail and slippery reward, yet as it is reckoned amongst the goods of the mind) I should, I say, find greater pleasure in it than in all the sensual delights, which either this or any other situation could afford me.

*Circe.* If these wise men are such great rarities, your glory would be confined to a narrow compass, and your fame must soar within a little sphere, since so great a majority, according to your own calculation, would be insensible of your merit, as they are ignorant how much man excels the rest of the animal world.

*Ul.* I should not esteem it so; since to be praised by one man of an established character, would weigh more with me than the casual applauses of an ignorant multitude.

*Circe.* How then do you account for it, that you cannot carry your point? and that you can find not one that will accept of your offer?

*Ul.* Because, as I said, all that I have yet met with, are of the sort I have been describing, that never knew or considered the true dignity of their nature, but were wholly attentive to the corporeal part and its gratifications: And finding that part of which they were altogether observant, better accommodated and less disturbed in their present state, having no thought that soared so high as to consider their divine part, they must of necessity desire to remain as they are.

*Circe.* If there are so few that are conscious of having this Divinity within, it is no wonder that they have hitherto escaped you. But if you are inflexibly determined to pursue your enterprize, such is the variety in the humours and caprice of men, that you may very well hope yet, to find one of your opinion. In the mean time, as I frankly confess, that I feel none of those extasies, in  
I the

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the refined way you have been talking of, I shall, as usual, take a turn in this winding valley. *Exit.*

*Ul.* Whilst I am resolved to try on, 'till I find some one wise enough to know the dignity of Man, and what constitutes him so perfect a being; for to know one's self is the first fruit that Wisdom bears. It being a greater satisfaction to confer a favour on one man of sense, than to scatter a thousand on as many fools. But what a stately Horse is here! oh! the beauteous beast. Sure Nature, next to man, takes delight in lavishing her skill on this animal. I own, I feel myself already so prejudiced in his favour, that methinks I wish I may find him a *Greek*. So tell me, gentle Horse, what thou wast before thy change.

*Horse.* I was a *Greek*; but why?

*Ul.* To let thee know that it is in my power to make a *Greek* of thee again; to release thee from this enchantment, to restore thee to thy country, and to the liberty of ranging through the world.

*Horse.* This bargain will require more than two words; because just the same abhorrence that I felt in my state of manhood, at the thoughts of being turned into a brute

M 2 animal,

animal, I perceive now, upon your proposal for my being changed from a Horse back into a Man.

*Ul.* I must beg your reason for it; because I must own your proposition, simply considered, appears shocking to human understanding.

*Horse.* My reason is, because as I am, I find fewer things to hinder me from enjoying my ease, and from attaining that perfection and end which is agreeable to my kind and nature; whereas when I was a man, I came very short of doing the duties of a man.

*Ul.* Sure you forget that you of all animals are most obliged to our assistance, and can make the worst shift without our care.

*Horse.* How true that may be of those who when young, through your artful caresses, might have been deluded out of the generous wildness natural to them I care not; but am certain, it is no argument to me, who never knew what restraint was, but live as you perceive free, and range at my will, without suspicion or fear.

*Ul.* Have you any thing better to offer, why you refuse?

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*Horse.* I think this sufficient, that we are less hindered than you, in acting agreeably to our nature.

*Ul.* I should be glad to hear how, for as yet I protest I don't see it.

*Horse.* With all my heart. Why you must know then, there are \* *two* principal springs of action, that hinder both you and us from doing what is suitable to our respective natures. The first is, the fear of what is disagreeable, and may prove injurious; the other the desire of what is delectable, and may prove beneficial. Now these two frequently are a drawback upon us both, in the performance of our duty; by laying a bias in you upon the will, in us upon the appetite, (our origin and source of action.) diverting it under the idea of fear of what is hurtful, or attracting it under the notion of what is desirable.

*Ul.* This wants to be a little explained.

*Horse.* Have a little patience, and it shall be done to your hands. The first of these impediments, which is fear, robs us of that fortitude which prompts us through dangers to pursue what we ought, the other of our

\* *Epietetus* makes the whole of wisdom to consist in these two things, ἀνίχαι καὶ ἀπέχαι, i. e. *to bear and to forbear.*

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temperance, which restrains us from pursuing what we ought not. Now these two obstacles are lighter in our way than yours, because our fortitude and temperance are stronger. By the former we keep down that part of our appetite, which you call the irascible passions, so as neither to be too timorous, or too confident: By the latter we suppress the passions of pleasure, so as neither to be hurried too violently to what delights, nor to be too soon daunted at what hurts. Thus by having the passions of each kind more moderate, we meet with fewer distractions in performing the operations agreeable to our nature.

*Ul.* I should have a very high opinion of your skill; if you could prove these virtues to be found in greater perfection in you than in us.

*Horse.* As to Fortitude, the whole stream of your writers runs in our favour. I shall not insist upon your poets who, as their chief aim is to give pleasure to their readers, may be allowed sometimes to \* *say the thing that is not*; but your historians, whose profession it is solely to regard the truth. Now when

\* This is a strict translation in *Gulliver's Voyages of, Dire quella che non è, in Gelli.*



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one of these intends to raise the idea of his hero's valour, he compares him to some such beast, as a furious lion or a sturdy bull \*. But how would it sound, in speaking of one of us, if they should say, that he was valiant nay even as a man. This therefore, I hope, gives it clearly for us.

*Ul.* You confound bodily strength with fortitude.

*Afide.* This, I find already, was one of those that was never conscious of any pleasures but those of the body.

*Horse.* And whence does strength of body proceed but from strength of mind?

*Ul.* From a mind rightly qualified to exert it, I grant it does.

*Horse.* And where will you find this qualification to so high a degree as in us, who have the mind less disturbed, as it is agitated by fewer passions?

*Ul.* What passions can you name in us, not to be met with as well in yourselves?

*Horse.* I answer, all those that relate to things absent or future. We regard nothing but what is present, without being so sharp-

\* *Ægyptii sacerdotes cum fortem & temperatum significare vellent Taurum integræ valetudinis pingunt, ait Orus.*

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fought as to torment ourselves concerning what has not yet a being.

*Ul.* Nor do we.

*Horse.* I assert that you do, both by fear and hope; fear of what displeases, and hope of what invites; which actually affects you with joy or sorrow, and holds the mind in such a state of distraction or suspense, so as to render it unfit to perform it's functions duly. Now from these passions flow all the rest.

Proceed we now to our Temperance, which secures us from those other impediments to our duty, which arise from pleasurable objects. And who so hardy as to deny us the preference in this virtue? I mean as it relates both to joy or sorrow.

*Ul.* This I must beg leave to do, as long as I find you more governed by the senses than we are.

*Horse.* And yet our practice shall confute you, and experience be the demonstration.

*Ul.* With all my heart. I desire no better proof.

*Horse.* Now Temperance, as we have said, relates both to joy and sorrow. But because it is much more difficult to abstain from pleasures, than to behave decently under

der afflictions, I shall consider the first branch of it, and begin with the most powerful propension to love. Now what animal in the world is guilty of such ridiculous madness upon this score, as you every day give proofs of? Cast your eyes through Nature, and tell me, if after pregnancy\* there be not an universal truce? Besides, we never recede the least title from our dignity, or ever degrade ourselves, to make a compliment of our superiority to our females, like you, who take a pride in professing yourselves their slaves. How many of you, out of a wanton indulgence to this passion, have divested yourselves of all regard to your distressed families, (which we abhor) to your honour, your dignity, and fixed upon yourselves an everlasting disgrace, and sometimes the very extremity of poverty? As for your authors, who publish their infamy in prose or rhyme, and your wretches who have from this motive procured to themselves an untimely end, it would be tedious, as well as needless to touch upon them, as instances of such every where abound. All that I shall say is, that having once persuaded yourselves

\* This also is translated by Captain *Guliver*.

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that beauty is *something divine*\* (a love and desire of which is always commendable) from hence springs the fallacy; for you dress up that phantastical grace, which is the result of due proportions, and well mixed colours, in all the attributes of heavenly beauty discoverable in the Supreme Being, and so you confound your human passion with the desire of that excellency which is the perfection of the human soul. I call it your human passion, because it neither rages so incessantly or furiously in any other kind, but only at stated times, for the preservation of the species.

*Ul.* As if we had not seen you guilty of a thousand freaks from the same motive.

*Horse.* The worst that I dare say you ever saw, is some quarrels arising from jealousy, which is inseparable from the passion. But this I choose to pass by, lest it should offend you, considering what horrid and shocking scenes it now and then introduces amongst you. Read your histories, and you will find how many plots, conspiracies, treasons, murders by sword, (and what is worse) by poison, have alarmed the world from that single

\* *Isocrates*, in his panegyric upon *Helen*, speaking in praise of Beauty, says, that "It is a thing of a divine nature."

cause.

cauſe. So now I think it high time to leave this firſt branch of Temperance, to conſider it as far as it concerns your food, in which I dare ſay, you will find yourſelves excelled by every beaſt ſavage or domeſtick: Amongſt them you will find none that exceeds the demands of Nature, or the kinds that ſhe allots them; be it ſeed, herb, fleſh, or fruit. Whereas you, not content with any one ſort of food, ranſack the world for variety, and after that call in the help of art, to make it what it never was intended to be, by which you are eaſily drawn in to indulge to ſuch a degree, as either to procure you a ſhort life, or a tedious decrepit old age. As for Drunkenneſs, as it robs you of all the boaſted ſuperiority of reaſon, I ſhall ſpare your ſhame, as you have been ſo ſevere upon yourſelves as to allow, that he who commits a crime through this vice, is worthy of double puniſhment; the firſt according to the quantity of the fault, the ſecond for having ſuffered himſelf to be deprived of his underſtanding, which ſhould have guarded him againſt it. I hope by this time you are convinced that we are more temperate than you, and that we are obliged to Nature for it, in giving us more of that virtue that is able to remove  
thoſe

those obstacles that hinder us from acting agreeably to Nature.

*Ul.* I shall not deny, that who observes particular operations simply, without respect to any proposed end, will be apt to conclude, that you are more temperate than men, and yet I will undertake to demonstrate, that nothing can be falser than such a conclusion. For you must know, that Temperance is an elective habit, acquired upon a wise choice, of which whosoever is possessed, he will not behave himself indecently under afflictions, or immoderately in pleasures: Though afflictions are not so much it's object as pleasures, nor all pleasures alike: Those of the Mind, such as a desire of honour, those of the Understanding, such as arise from intense study, and the like, fall not under it's consideration: Nor all the entertainments of the Senses neither; He can never be called an intemperate Man, that indulges to never so great a height in admiring pictures, statues, and other objects of sight; much less He that amuses himself with musick, vocal or instrumental: Nor can the pleasures of the smell fall under it's notice, unless from the ideas they raise; as the dog enjoys the scent of the hare, in hopes of eating him,

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him. So that there remains but two of the senses, the touch and taste, for this virtue to exercise itself about: Or more strictly, only the touch, the taste being rather a branch of that sense than a distinct one; as that monster\* of a voluptuary, who so far abandoned himself to the pleasures of wine, wished that the Gods had bestowed on him a length of neck equal to the crane's, that he might enjoy the flavour of the draught longer, and improved too through such a tube.

*Horfe.* What would you infer from thence?

*Ul.* Have a little patience and you shall hear. Why you must know that man has the instruments, or organs, of the sense of feeling in greater perfection than any other animal.

*Horfe.* How do you make that appear?

*Ul.* You shall see. All organs and instruments by which sensation is performed, must be wholly free and void of their objects; for it is absurd to say, that any thing can receive what it had before. Thus, for instance, the eye must not be tinged with any particular colour, nor the palate be possessed of any one original taste; for then we should

\* *Philoxenus. Arist. Ethic. Lib. III. cap. 10.*

see as through a discoloured glass, or have a predominant taste, as people complain that every thing seems bitter, in your bilious fevers.

*Horse.* This is very true ; but I don't see how it makes for your purpose.

*Ul.* Now this can never be the case with the organs of feeling, which are either nerves, flesh, or skin ; and as the objects of these are the primary qualities, such as hot, dry, cold, or moist, (answering to the four elements) it is impossible the instruments should be wholly free from these qualities.

*Horse.* How can these faculties then receive these objects, if they have them already ?

*Ul.* Why they do only perceive the excess or defect of what is in themselves, *i. e.* discern what is more hot, dry, cold, or moist than themselves. Hence those that have these organs in the best temper, must be sensible of the more minute difference, and that must be Man, who has his constitution better mixed, as all agree, than any other animal. From whence it follows, as we have that sense more exquisite, we must perceive higher pleasures from it than other animals can do. And as our pleasures are more exalted,



Ulyſſes, Circe, *and the Horſe.* 175

alted, it is no wonder if our deſires of them are leſs moderate; though I am far from granting that too.

*Horſe.* But will you, againſt daily experience, deny, that we do not ſuffer ourſelves to be drawn aſide by theſe pleaſures as much as you?

*Ul.* I am ready to allow, that you abſtain eaſier from pleaſures, and ſuffer leſs from afflictions, but deny either to be the effect of Temperance.

*Horſe.* But why?

*Ul.* Becauſe, as I ſaid, Temperance is an elective habit, choſen upon a chain of right deductions. Now how can you be ſaid to have the Virtue, who have not the Reason upon which it is founded? Nor know how to fix the mediocrity in which it conſiſts, and whoſe bounds cannot be tranſgreſſed with ſafety to the preſervation of the ſpecies. For Nature has affixed certain pleaſures to invite us, as well to take care of the individual as of the kind. But you can never be ſaid, like us, to have a freedom of choice, who are directed by Nature in all your actions.

*Horſe.* Whence then ariſe thoſe effects of Temperance, which, I hope, you will not deny to be found in us?

*Ul.* From

*Ul.* From an Instinct that Nature has implanted in you, as being conscious how imperfect your intelligence is, and how ill qualified you are to judge what would tend best to your preservation; and therefore she gave you a standard rule, that you should not exceed in any thing that might hasten your dissolution. The same care has provided, that as you are destitute of reason to moderate the passions, you should not be so strongly affected by them, as to let them be injurious to life. But still this is not Temperance, which upon choice desires, and rejects in a proper time and manner.

*Horse.* If the same end be obtained, what is it to us whether it be by Nature or Temperance?

*Ul.* However it cannot follow, that it is better to be forced to a certain determinate point, than to move towards it freely, and upon choice. So return, return then, gentle Horse; be as thou wast, a Man, and let thy Country bless thy fight with mine.

*Horse.* That is more than I can agree to; for though I may not be able to support my notions so well as you, it will by no means follow, that I don't perceive advantage enough

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nough in my present state, not to resolve to continue in it.

Ul. Nay, if you are so invincibly obstinate, I should recommend the same thing to you: For certainly he is unworthy of any better state, that gives himself up so implicitly to the guidance of Sense, as to be blind to the light of Reason.



N

CIRCE.



## C I R C E.


Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

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## DIALOGUE VIII.

*Ulysses and the Dog.*

*Ulysses.*  F Nature, (as our *Grecian* Sages tell us) wills that every creature should attain it's end and perfection, why did she, at the same time, give our Senses power to drag down to Earth our Thoughts; and to keep the Soul intent upon gross objects, (which I dare say was the case of

of our Horse) till the much greater number of us degenerate into something approaching very near to the nature of beasts? Now these, as they have their ultimate end upon Earth, have their eyes turned down towards it; whereas Man has his face erect to Heaven, to remind him that his thoughts ought to be directed thither, to contemplate the nature of spiritual Beings, which will raise him to a more exalted kind of happiness than falls to the share of mere Humanity.

*Afide.* But what can this poor Dog mean by coming up to me in this familiar manner? See how he stops! Surely this is in obedience to his Nature, which is fond of Man, and the sight of one in this place is a great rarity.

I believe, nay, I may say, I know (for it was Experience taught it me) that she gave us more senses than are absolutely necessary, for our more comfortable support, and for the more exact information of our understanding. But then why, I ask, are these Senses permitted, because their objects are there, to weigh down to Earth our better part, which else would naturally be soaring up to Heaven?

*Aside.* But see how this Dog seems to look with pleasure on me! And by his gestures one would think that he understood every word I have been saying.

I say this permission could be granted for no other purpose, but that the consideration of the disparity and disagreement between the parts of which we are composed, should excite in us a greater care and circumspection. This gives our virtue a better opportunity to exert itself; for difficulties not only prove, but serve to strengthen and perfect it too.

*Aside.* This Dog grows so fond, that I must speak to him. So, come here poor beast. How loving and faithful is this creature to Man!

*Dog.* Tell me, gentle Cavalier, if you are of *Ithaca* in *Greece*, as your accents seem to declare you?

*Ul.* I am a *Greek*, and *Ithaca*, as thou sayest, is my Country.

*Dog.* I guessed so by your dialect, which every province has peculiar to itself. This made me stop, overjoyed to meet a Countryman; but pity soon succeeded when I saw you could not obtain the same happiness that is conferred upon myself.

*Ul.* What

*Ul.* What happinefs?

*Dog.* Of being transformed by *Circe* like myfelf into fome beaft.

*Ul.* D'ye call it happinefs to be changed from a Man into a Brute?

*Dog.* I do indeed, as I will anfwer for it you would too, if you could have obtained the fame benefit. If this does not of itfelf feem clear, have a little patience and I will prove it to you.

*Ul.* With all my heart; for I have been ufing my intereft with *Circe*, to get you all turned back into Men, to redeem you from fo much wretchednefs.

*Dog.* Firft, if you have no objection, may I crave your name.

*Ul.* *Ulyffes*; my firft employment was ftudy, and after that I took to arms.

*Dog.* I fhall with the greater pleafure converse with you, as your time has been employed in the two moft honourable profefions in the world. My name was *Cleanthes*, and I too followed my ftudies for a certain time, but being eafy in my fortune, I quitted them, if not wholly, at leaft in part, as people in fuch circumftances ufually do, to enjoy myfelf more at leifure, till arriving at this ifland I was chang'd as you fee me; from which day I date my happinefs. N 3 *Ul.*

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Ul. I expect, or rather demand, that you should point out wherein this superior happiness consists?

Dog. If you please; I shall begin with the Virtues, because in them you place your so much boasted superiority; in Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, and the like. But first resolve me one question; Which soil do you think deserves the preference, the country of the \* *Cyclops* [*Sicily*], which, they tell us, untill'd, and uncultivated, furnishes it's inhabitants with a luxuriant crop of every kind of grain and fruit, or yours of † *Ithaca*, mountainous and barren, which with all your pains and care rewards you with a poor return, hardly sufficient for the goats it's natives? Answer me this, I say, all national prejudice apart.

\* Mr. Pope's *Hom. Odyss.* IX. 133. Of the Land of the Cyclops,

*The Soil untill'd a ready Harvest yields,  
With Wheat and Barley wave the golden fields,  
Spontaneous Wines from weighty clusters pour,  
And Jove descends in each prolific show'r.*

*Ille M. Cato sapiens cellam penariam Reipublicæ, nutricem plebis Romanæ Siciliam nominavit. Cicero in Verr. C. 2. 2.*

† *Hom. Lib. Odyss.* 4. v. 823.

*Horrid with cliffs, our meagre Land allows  
Thin Herbage for the mountain Goat to brouze.*

Ul. Not-



*Ul.* Notwithstanding my strong partiality to my country, I must own, that the soil you have so well described, claims to be preferred.

*Dog.* The same merit will hold good in Souls: Those are best that reach an excellency with the greatest ease.

*Ul.* This I also readily allow.

*Dog.* Then you confess that the souls of Brutes, which without care or study are of themselves productive of the Virtues, are better, and more noble than yours, which know nothing that is not taught them.

*Ul.* What virtues are Beasts so adorned with, from their own proper nature?

*Dog.* Much greater than what Men are adorned with, with all their art. And that our disquisition may be the more unexceptionable, let us begin with the first and chief of all.

*Ul.* Which do you mean?

*Dog.* I mean Prudence. Without which no virtue can possibly exist. For as virtue is the mediocrity between two extremes determined by right reason, it must follow that there can be no virtue without Prudence. For the middle point, called Virtue, is not an arithmetical medium, consisting in an equidistance of it's two extremes; such as,

for example, in continued quantities is the center of the circle, from whence draw as many lines as you please to the circumference they will be all equal, or in a discrete quantity, such as six in the numbers two and ten, which is just equally removed from each; But it is a geometrical medium, which is distant from it's extremes by a similar, a rational proportion, such as, for example, is six between nine and four, which contains four one time and half, and is contained as often in the number nine; and it is therefore called the middle between the one and the other by a rational proportion. So then the middle point, in which the virtue consists, being not placed in an equal distance from the extremes, like an arithmetical medium, it is plain that some virtue must determine it in a rational proportion of extremes, after the manner of a geometrical medium, and that virtue must be prudence. So that there can be no virtue without prudence, and therefore it is with good reason esteemed the rule and foundation of all the rest, and this, I say, is to be found better in us than amongst you.

*Ul.* What proof do you bring of that?

*Dog.* Reason; for I hope you will allow that habits are to be judged of by actions.

*Ul.*

*Ul.* True.

*Dog.* Then you muſt alſo grant, that we are more prudent than you, there being more of that to be diſcovered in our actions than yours. And that this is alſo true you will prove to yourſelves by a fair induction, by a diligent attendance upon the operations of any one ſpecies amongſt us. Let us begin with the leaſt, I mean the inſects; and here you will ſee the Ant ſo provident as to lay up in harveſt, a ſtock to carry her through the winter. The Spider with great craft hangs out her nets, to catch the prey that is her ſupport; whilſt the Waſp, with many other ſort of flies, take ſhelter under ground from the ſeverity of the cold. As for the Bees, I ſhall not trouble you with a detail of their actions, their wiſe government, and exact adminiſtration of it; ſo many authors having ſpent a great part of their lives in ſtudying their manners and policy. Next, let us go to the Birds; and here you will find them all changing their reſidence, till they find one agreeable to their conſtitutions, and thoſe of them that are conſcious they are bad nurſes, leave their eggs, and afterwards their young ones to be educated (as for example, the Cuckow) by others. The Eagle, when he  
ſuſpects

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suspects the \* legitimacy of his children, convinces himself by turning their faces full against the sun. The Cranes put themselves under the government of one, who when the rest sleep, stands aloof watchful with a stone in his claws, which he drops and rouses them upon any alarm of an invasion. The † Partridge, to defend her little brood from the fowler, exposes herself till they make their escape, and after that she makes her own. The Swallow when she cannot come at clay to make a cement with straws to build her nest, dips herself first in water and then rolls herself in the dust, till she gathers a mortar much like yours. In breeding up her little ones, how wisely does she employ her care, to make an equal distribution of the food amongst them, as well as to preserve a neatness in the nest: When the Magpye finds her eggs are discovered, her next care is to remove them by two at a time; which she does by sticking them with a viscous matter, with which she is supplied from herself, each

\* *Desumitur ex nono Lucani Lib.*

*Utque Jovis volucer, calido dum protulit ovo*

*Implumes natos, solis convertit ad ortus*

*Qui potuere pati radios, & lumine recto*

*Sustinuere Diem, cæli servantur in usus*

*Qui Phæbo cessere, jacent.*

† *Le Pernici, the red leg'd Partridges.*

at

at the end of a twig, under which ſhe thruſts her neck, and bringing them to an equal balance, carries them off. There is another ſort of Partridge \*, of which the hen is obliged with great privacy to hide her eggs from the cock-bird, who is ſo very amorous, that not brooking her abſence, would elſe deſtroy them. The ſagacity of ſome quadrupeds, particularly of the Camel and Elephant, is too notorious to be inſiſted on. The Stag, when he is grown unweildy through fatneſs, as knowing himſelf to be unfit to ſtand a chace, withdraws to ſome private ſtation; and does the ſame again when he caſts his horns, as being in both theſe circumſtances unable to defend himſelf. Nor does the Hind diſcover leſs prudence, in chooſing to bring forth near ſome path beaten by human footſteps, as moſt likely to be free from the haunts of wild beaſts, thinking it ſafer to be expoſed to the mercy of men: And when her young ones are grown pretty ſtrong, ſhe is obſerved to lead them to ſome ſteep place to teach them to leap. The Bear, that ſhe might teach her cubs to climb trees, frightens them herſelf, that they might learn that way to defend themſelves. I ſhall paſs over the prudence of the Horſe, and thoſe of our

\* *Le Starne.*

own species, as being a subject too familiar to you, and that of the reptiles, particularly of the Serpent, as too obvious, it being born symbolically in the hand of Prudence herself. Nor shall I detain you with stories of the ingenuity visible in fish, both in defending themselves or making their escape: This species by raising a mud in the water with it's gills; *that* by emitting a dark liquor like ink. Nay you yourselves have sufficiently confessed how ingenious they are, by borrowing from them the art of building those vessels by which the commerce of the world is carried on. Your oars are but an imitation of the make of the feet of the Nautilus; your sails of his wings, which he stretches to the windward, and so rides top gallant over the waves. So that I hope you will subscribe to this plain proposition, that we possess a superior degree of prudence; and consequently, that the state, for which Nature has done so much, claims the preference. As the luxuriant soil of the \* land of the *Cyclops*, that produces her fruits of herself, is of more value than your country *Ithaca*, which without great care would bring forth none.

\* *Diodorus Siculus* tells us, Lib. V. chap. 1<sup>st</sup>. that the *Leontine* plains, and many other parts of *Sicily*, bear wild wheat to this day.

*Ul.* I expected at your first setting out, *Cleanthes*, to have found you a master of all moral knowledge, but was soon undeceived, when I saw that you did not so much as know what strictly Prudence is; and for want of a distinct idea of it, I observed you frequently confounded it with art.

*Dog.* I asserted that Prudence is, that knowledge by which we conduct our actions, and dispose them to the best advantage. This I hope you won't deny.

*Ul.* No, but I shall deny it to be all. For he does not deserve the name of prudent, who is so only in one thing; suppose in the preservation of his health, or in the skill of managing his weapon: He alone is worthy of it who is so in every thing relating to a quiet and happy life. And therefore this virtue cannot exist among you, as I prove thus; Prudence is a virtue subsisting in the part of the understanding, called practical, because it has actions for it's object, and universals for it's principles, which by reasoning she applies to particulars. Now this you cannot do, because you are not endued with this faculty.

*Dog.* But how will you prove that this power may not be the result of Sense, and not of Reason?

*Ul.* She

*Ul.* She passes a judgment both upon things past and to come; therefore it must know them; but sense, you will confess, knows only things present.

*Dog.* Pray do not the memory and the imagination comprehend things absent?

*Ul.* Yes; but then they pass no judgment on them, nor do they afterwards apply them to particulars.

*Dog.* But why may not we have by Nature the principles of Prudence in us, as well as you have those of Science?

*Ul.* Because they are such as must be acquired, either by discipline or by experience. You cannot have them by discipline, because you are not capable of considering universals; nor by experience, because you have not memory, which lays up that store of particulars with which when reason serves itself it becomes experience.

*Dog.* He that denies us to have any memory, sure is very little acquainted with us.

*Ul.* And yet I will maintain, that what you call Memory is nothing but Imagination.

*Dog.* Where is the difference, granting what you say, if Imagination serves the same purposes in us as Memory does in you?

*Ul.* It is very true that the Fancy preserves the images of things, which she has received  
from



from the Senses, as Memory does; but then the Memory preserves them more distinct, and ranges them in better order. Besides, it connects the idea of time with it; such as when it received such and such impressions, which mere Fancy cannot perform. "The Ass will not go by the ditch where he once fell in," says the proverb. But this is only because the imagination represents to him the fall indistinctly, and without any notion of the time when. So that as it does not appear to him in what part of time this happened, whether it was in the past, is in the present, or is to be in the future, his apprehension will not suffer him to risque a second tumble. So that it is certain, those species that have the Imagination in a higher degree of perfection, by which they perceive things more distinctly, will seem to have Memory: As you above all animals seem to retain some things, particularly the knowledge of your Masters. And where this power is less perfect, they will appear to have less of memory; as the flies, which when driven from a place, immediately seem to forget it, by returning instantly to settle upon it again. Therefore as Man alone, by the knowledge of the parts of time, can be

said

said to have Memory, he alone can be said to have Prudence: For without that it would be impossible to judge when it is proper to do a thing, and when not, in which Prudence consists.

*Dog.* If you will not allow us to have Prudence, What is that principle that directs us to do only what is agreeable to our Nature?

*Ul.* An instinct, a property implanted in you for your preservation, conducting you to what is your end. So that if you should, for example, ask those Ants that were born last spring, upon what motive they lay up their store, having not felt the rigour of any preceding winter, and consequently it could not be from prudence; their answer must be, because we see our parents do the same, or that they act by some natural impulse urging them to it.

*Dog.* But is not this the same thing in us which would be called Prudence in you?

*Ul.* No, it is rather quite a different thing; because Prudence is not a natural gift, but an habit, begun upon choice, and brought to perfection by repeated acts. That you may see this the clearer, you must know that in our mind, (I speak of the understanding  
and

and not of the Sense) are two powers, with the one we contemplate things unchangeable, necessary, and eternal. By necessary I mean, that have their beginning in such a manner, that it is impossible for them to be in any other manner. By the second we consider things contingent and variable, or such as may exist as well under one form as another. The first of these is called the speculative Intellect, the second is stiled Reason, Discourse, and the practical Understanding. But, because things necessary and unchangeable are of three sorts, that is, they are principles, or conclusions from them, or an aggregate of both; therefore in this speculative part, there are correspondent to them three habits, Intellect, Science, and Knowledge. By the first we take in Principles, the second Conclusions, and by the third both. And because things contingent are of two sorts (I speak now of moral not physical accidents) active and operative or executive; the active regards our own manners and moral operations, so as to render the Man good, by correcting his appetites, and conducting him to happiness: the executive relates to combinations external to him, and the wise administration of them. The first falls under the notice of Prudence,

O                    I                    which

which is nothing but an habitude of acting according to Reason, in things good or bad for us personally considered; the second falls under the cognizance of Art, which is the habit of acting wisely in things external, and constituted artificially. So that you see how other Animals cannot be said to have either Prudence or Art, as you are void of Reason, or, call it the practical Intellect, which is the ground they have to work upon. Nor is it strange that Nature, which never does any thing in vain, has given you neither the one nor the other. Having only yourselves to provide for, and your young ones a short time, till they can make a shift without you. You could have no occasion for Prudence or Art, as those have to whom the government of families and states are committed; and especially, as you want no supplies that Nature does not furnish you with.

*Dog.* Your eloquence, *Ulysses*, is so artful and at the same time so forcible, that who should incautiously listen to you, would be in danger of being drawn in to give his assent, as if nothing but truth dropt from those lips, though you grossly stumbled at the very threshold, as the saying is, of your discourse.

*Ul.* What is this mighty blunder you charge me with?

*Dog.* That in reckoning up the intellectual habits, you took no notice of Opinion, and yet what share that has in the acts of the Understanding one need not say.

*Ul.* The charge recoils upon yourself, for want of observing that I obviated it at the very threshold, as you call it, by declaring, that I confined myself to those contingencies that are within our own power, which are properly the objects of Prudence, and left out of the consideration such as depend on nature, that fall under the notice of Opinion, which is no wonder if it sometimes errs, as natural effects are so immense and various.

*Dog.* Why was this left out of the consideration?

*Ul.* As unworthy to be reckoned amongst those higher powers, or intellectual habits, because it brings no improvement to the Understanding. Thus a Man is not esteemed wise for having an opinion of a thing, but for knowing it. Besides, Opinion is liable to be deceived, which can never happen to the forementioned habits.

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*Dog.* Are you in earnest! not liable to be deceived?

*Ul.* The three first, which subsist in the mind or speculative intellect, as their objects are immutable, cannot be deceived. But, that must ever be true or false, which the Soul shall judge to be so with either of these. The like may be said of the two powers of the practical intellect; but with this difference, that with the first three she judges and pronounces true on her own part, and on the part of the things which she considers as they are immutable, and must for ever remain so: Whereas with the powers of the second kind, she only pronounces what is true as far as they are concerned, and not the objects themselves.

*Dog.* Will you be so hardy as to assert, that Prudence, or the Art that you have been speaking of, is not capable of being mistaken?

*Ul.* No; but this is not the fault of the faculties, which are good and true, but it proceeds from the part of the objects which are variable.

*Dog.* And yet this methinks may be answered; but I choose rather to return to our proposition, and demand of you again, if  
we

we have not Prudence, how comes it that there is such a rectitude in our operations, and that we make fewer mistakes than you? And if we are wholly void of Art, to what do you ascribe that surprizing skill, that shews itself in what we do for our own service, and especially for the service of our young?

*Ul.* To an Instinct, or a certain natural Prevalency implanted in you, according to your different species, for your preservation, wholly different from either Prudence or Art. And that this is so, be pleased to remember, that all animals of the same sort, observe exactly the same forms, as well in building as in every thing else. Whereas were these the effect of Art or Prudence, which always act upon choice, there must be a variety suitable to the circumstances of time and place, as you find in every thing we do.

*Dog.* You seem to me, *Ulysses*, to argue from mere differences of terms, which are arbitrarily affixed by you to things. So that what is stiled in you Prudence and Art, is in us no more than Instinct, or a natural Prevalency. But if ours be less liable to

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mistakes, I think it a proof that it is more eligible, and ourselves more perfect. So bidding adieu to our controversy I shall leave you to enjoy your present state, because you seem to think it best, and for the same reason I shall continue in my own.

*Exit Dog.*



CIRCE.





# C I R C E.

Translated from the *Ita'ian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

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## DIALOGUE IX.

*Ulysses and the Steer.*

*Ulysses.*



Find my self at present rightly qualified to subscribe to the proverb, that nothing is so equally distributed as the Understanding \* : since there

\* *Cartesius* takes these very words. *Dissertat. de Method.* P. 1. Dr. *Calamy* quotes them as a wise reflection of *Cartesius*. *Vide* his Sermons.

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is not one of these beasts with whom I have been discoursing, but is so satisfied with his own share of it, that he cannot bear to submit to the judgment of Man, who can reason strictly, and act freely. For, that the state of a brute is more desirable than ours, is so monstrous a proposition, that in their former shape they durst not be so hardy as to maintain it. It must then be owing to nothing else but the strong prejudice that every being has to itself, which may make it abhor a total change, lest it should risque a dissolution by it. And this jealousy is perhaps stronger in Man than in any other creature. I speak now of a thorough substantial change, not a little accidental alteration; for I fancy, we should meet with few old fellows, that would hesitate long whether they would be turned back to five and twenty; no sick man would have any scruples, whether he should change constitutions with the robust, or the beggar his purse with the wealthy. But to suffer an essential transmutation, so as to become quite another creature, is what few or none can bear to think of. This is the best account I can find for their obstinacy in rejecting my proposal. But what a beautiful young Steer do I see coming up, carelessly grazing

grazing towards me! How much fierceness is in his four look, and yet how gentle and tractable is his carriage! Surely we are much obliged to Nature for this beast, which seems calculated to do our drudgery both by his strength and temper. I will try if he was a *Greek*, which I shall easily do, for I observe he listens to every word I speak, as if he understood me. So, gentle Steer, I adjure thee by thy hopes tell me of what country thou wast before thy change?

*Steer.* Of the same that you were, if you speak your mother tongue.

*Ul.* Then I presume, you feel the same longing to return that I do.

*Steer.* Not I truly, I always thought that where one is happiest, that is our truest country. And as I would upon no account return to manhood again, so neither can I think of quitting scenes so delightful and a soil so fertile.

*Ul.* Do you feel then no compunction no tenderness for friends deserted, and relations left behind: No concern for those whom to part with, to some generous minds, has been esteemed worse than death?

*Steer.* For my part, if I had no other motive to determine me to continue as I am,  
this

this would be a very strong one, that by having my cares disengaged from those external concerns, they all or chiefly center in myself. Hence we live quietly and contentedly with one another, and each being supplied by Nature with every thing he wants, there can be no room for hatred, quarrels, envy, rapine, murders by sword or poison, with a thousand other calamities, with which your human life abounds, and which made a wise Man so justly call it, an ocean of miseries.

*Ul.* This outcry against us, methinks, comes with a very ill grace from those that are guilty of such gross enormities, whom it would become at least not to be censorious.

*Steer.* It must not be denied, that we also have our irregularities; perhaps by the appointment of Nature, which will not suffer any thing in this world to be without defect; but this we dare affirm, that you shall find but one vice raging in one species, as Surlinefs in the Bear, Fierceness in the Tiger, Ravenousness in the Wolf, and Gluttony in the Hog. Whereas each of these is to be met with in a very flourishing condition in Man alone.

*Ul.* What

*Ul.* What you ſay may be true of the ſpecies, but not of the individual; it being impoſſible that all vices can be in one, conſiſtent with his being, though all the virtues may dwell very peaceably in him, that is ſo happy as to acquire them.

*Steer.* Why ſo? as Nature has furniſhed him with a genius equal to every thing.

*Ul.* Becauſe the vices being contrary to each other, as Cowardice to Raſhneſs, Avarice to Prodigality, cannot meet together in the ſame perſon, though the virtues, which are aſſiſtant to each other, very well may.

*Steer.* And will any man dare to deny, that the virtues are not alſo to be found amongſt us?

*Ul.* Not ſo perfect; though there ſhould be one or more found in a whole ſpecies; whereas one man, I ſay, is capable of them all.

*Steer.* Our opinions ſeem hitherto to claſh extremely.

*Ul.* So, who ſhall be judge in the caſe?

*Steer.* I will name one, that is yourſelf, and will demonſtrate the point ſo clearly, that I ſhall freely ſubmit the deciſion to your ingenuity. To begin, I think your wiſe men

men agree, that \* *Justice* is an epitome and collection of all the virtues in one, as containing them all in itself, and giving law to the rest. It is she that dictates to the valiant, and restrains him from declining dangers when glory is the prize. It is by her the temperate man disdains to abandon himself so far to pleasures, as to have no regard to decency. What but this virtue keeps the civilized man from abhorring the thoughts of doing an injury? Nay it reduces all human actions, good and bad, to a proper regulation, and one standard rule. Not only such as are voluntarily entered into by consent of parties, as contracts, loans, mortgages, and the like; but such as men are driven to by revenge, or some unwarrantable habit, either secretly, as thefts, assassinations, poisonings, treasons, and false testimonies; or openly with a high hand, as robberies, assaults, disfigurements, murders, and the like outrages upon human nature.

*U.* It is true; and therefore Justice has alone been stiled the complete virtue†; for where-

as

\* *Theognis* says of Justice,

Ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλέγον ἅσ' ἀρετὰ ἔστιν.

† *Hierocles* says, that Justice is the most perfect of all Virtues, and that like the octave in musick, which contains all

as the rest have only a tendency to make the person possessed of it happy in himself, this has a more extensive influence, and considers the publick welfare.

*Steer.* This is the point then on which I shall rest my argument; if there be no such thing as pure sincere Justice among you, neither, by consequence, can there be any other real true virtue, as amongst us, and therefore our state is more desirable.

*Ul.* Your conclusion is very natural and easy, the only difficulty that remains is to prove it.

*Steer.* Will not the conclusion be established, upon a proof of the propositions that infer it?

*Ul.* That is a stroke of logic that I little expected.

*Steer.* I wonder why; since you know I was a *Greek*, and must be acquainted with it, in the course of our education.

*Ul.* I grant it, I allow it.

*Steer.* The major proposition of the two, I have already sufficiently proved, as you granted, that where there was no Justice

all the notes, it includes all the other virtues. So Mr. *Dacier* translates *διὰ πᾶσων ἀρεῶν περιεκτικῆς τῶν ἄλλων*; for which sense he says he is indebted to the learned Dr. *Salviati*.

there

there could be no Virtue, since you allow it to be the complete Virtue, as containing all the rest in itself.

*Ul.* With all my heart. Go on to your minor proposition.

*Steer.* This is as clear as the light, if the received maxim of your learned men be true, that every creature is known by it's actions. Which, if applied to men, will abundantly make out my assertion.

*Ul.* If men did all act in one uniform manner, I own there would be something in it.

*Steer.* But the actions of the majority are sufficient to justify an inference. Now, if there was such a thing as natural Justice among you, and Man lived according to a law written in his heart, what occasion would there be for such a voluminous collection of Statutes, to catch the Flies at least, though the heavier brutes break through them?

*Ul.* It must be confessed, that if each would follow the law that Nature dictates, of doing what in the same circumstances he would desire should be done to himself, there could be no want of any other rule, though, to say the truth, they seem to be interpretations and comments on the natural Law, and



as far as any of them deviate from the original they are faulty. For as in speculation there are some truths so evident that they need no proof, such as, that the same thing can be and not be at the same time, and other truths again spring from, and are founded on this: So in practical life, there are certain lights and natural principles self-evident, such as, you should not do what you would not have done to yourself; upon which all the superstructure of written Laws depend.

*Steer.* Now to me they seem rather calculated to interpret this natural Law according to your own sense, that it may be turned and twisted at your pleasure, 'till that appears to be right in words which is most unjust in fact. And I fancy your experience will agree with mine, that that Lawyer will always be esteemed the most able in his profession, who can best make the Law speak as he would have it.

*Ul.* I must caution you to confine yourself to the intention and spirit of the Laws, and not to the abuse of them; and then let us see if you will be able from thence to defend what you at first advanced, that there is no such thing as Justice to be found among men.

*Steer.*

*Steer.* You must know then, that Justice divides itself naturally into the distributive and the commutative. The first relates to rewards and punishments, in providing that the Good be properly rewarded, and the Bad duly corrected. The second provides for an equitable intercourse, and just commerce of things necessary to the benefit of mankind, establishing a fair method of dealing, by which alone peace can be preserved in civil life. Now if these two parts of Justice cannot be found among you, neither can the whole, which is never any thing else but the aggregate of it's parts.

*Ul.* But what proves that neither of these parts of Justice, according to your division, is to be found amongst us?

*Steer.* Your own experience, unless you suffer yourself to be quite blinded by prejudice. To begin with the first, what pretensions have you to an impartial equitable distribution of rewards and punishments, according to the merit of the parties, when one sees Virtue so often treated with contempt, or persecuted with malice?

*Ul.* One would hardly believe, that there could be any motive for doing violence to the Good and Innocent.

*Steer.*

*Steer.* I can tell you of one; that a good man is a standing reproach to a villain, who, by having such a comparison at hand, sees his own corrupt actions set in a stronger light. Cast your eyes upon what form of government you please in *Greece*, either that by one, by few, or by all, and I will answer for it, you will be furnished with variety of examples, where through interest, envy, or some other scandalous motive, the self-same action has been rewarded in one, and censured, or perhaps punished, in another; and so the reverse.

*Ul.* But granting all this; How does our want of justice prove that you abound with it? Or how does it appear that you have any?

*Steer.* From our actions, as far as our circumstances will admit. When did you ever see in our combats, the applause bestowed but on the conqueror, whilst disgrace always pursues the unworthy?

*Ul.* These may be well known truths among yourselves, for aught I know; so I shall not dispute them with you; but hasten to the second branch, and see how much commutative Justice is to be found among brutes.

## 210 DIALOGUE IX.

*Steer.* I can readily tell you ; just as much as is to be found among men, that is not one single grain of it: Only with this difference, that we, by having every thing in common, as having no occasion for this virtue, have never cultivated it: But you, where every thing is cantoned out into property, and cannot possibly subsist without it, have, through your insatiable avarice, and lust after riches, quite banished it from the world. So that in all your contracts and transactions, your sole care is to get, no matter by what means, or at whose expence. And he that succeeds best, by the vile arts of fraud and falshood, is sure to have his address in business highly applauded: Which seems to me to justify the practice.

*Ul.* Oh! fie; what justify dishonesty?

*Steer.* Why not, when it is the sure road with you to honour? How many wretches could I name (whose mean natural abilities would mark them out in low life for contempt) in such high esteem, merely from the advantages of fortune, as to have every folly extolled and each insipid sentence listened to with admiration? Nay your common proverbs, in every body's mouth, seem calculated to countenance and propagate the notions,  
base

base as they are, of the merit of riches, and the crime of being poor. And yet I fancy when these great men, that have had their thoughts so debased, and quite immersed in the desire of riches, come to part with this world, they can give no more account of it than if they had never been in it. Having neither examined their own nature, or observed the beauties that are every where displayed to them through the universe. For them the beauteous structure of the world was made in vain, and all things might as well have continued in the confusion of the first chaos: their eyes were so constantly turned down upon their darling treasure, as never to be cast up towards heaven, to contemplate the wonderful appearance of such immense orbs, rolling round them in perpetual harmony. And yet these are but the degrees and scale by which their thoughts should mount up to more amazing and more divine speculations. And what aggravates the case is, that even with such wretches the poor man is so despised, that his natural advantages are of no more account than the strength of a slave, or the venal beauty of a common prostitute.

## 212 DIALOGUE IX.

*Ul.* It will be of no service to the argument, to shew that there are irregularities in the actions of men, since I readily grant, they are so often drawn aside from their duty to do what in cool dispassionate thoughts they abhor. But then this is so far from proving that there is no such thing as Justice amongst us, that I could at the same time tire you with examples, of many that would scorn, upon any consideration, to violate the least of her sacred laws. Much less will those actions of yours demonstrate that you have justice among you, though some of them may appear under the form of it.

*Steer.* That's very hard, if it be true that every creature is to be judged of by it's actions.

*Ul.* Not in the least, because they are in you no more than certain habits, from propensions implanted in you by Nature; who being conscious, that she had not given you light sufficient to guide you to your happiness, supplied you with these unerring rules. But be ingenuous, do you really know strictly what Justice is?

*Steer.* It is an uniform and constant will, that renders to every one what is due and fit for him. This is the usual definition, and I  
desire

desire to know if you have any exception to it?

*Ul.* I have not, if by will you mean a habit confirmed by repeated acts. For a person is not to be denominated just from one or a few acts, but from the whole or general tenour of them.

*Steer.* I understand so; having always esteemed powers not yet exerted into acts, to be so imperfect as not to deserve notice.

*Ul.* Your own account therefore demonstrates, that there can be no Justice found among you, because you cannot be said to have a will, which is the subject on which it is originally founded. Now the will being a rational faculty, is only to be found in rational creatures.

*Steer.* Why can it not be found in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with you?

*Ul.* Because the will is under the influence of the understanding, which influence constitutes the will, and justice is the regulation of it's operative part. Now this faculty does not only take cognizance of things [for that sense can do] but their relations also, by which it can assign what is proper to one and what to another, which is more than mere sense can do.

## 214 DIALOGUE IX.

*Steer.* If you won't allow it to be Justice, pray what is it that so restrains our appetite in what belongs to another, that our conduct is much less blameable that way than yours?

*Ul.* I have told you; it is a principle impressed on you by Nature, for your preservation, under which you act necessarily. And those operations that proceed from mere Nature, no more deserve praise or blame than the stone deserves to be condemned for tending towards the center, or the fire to be praised for it's aspiring quality. As to what you say of your acting freely (for I verily believe you seem to yourselves to have your appetite free) I answer, that granting as much as you desire, yet you cannot pretend, that you know perfectly and distinctly what you do; and consequently such actions can never be called good and perfect, of which the actor himself hath not a clear distinct knowledge.

*Steer.* These are refinements and subtleties invented by yourselves, to gratify your pride of being superior to your fellow creatures. But whoever shall judge by your actions, must conclude, that if you have any Justice among you, it is only in words, which cannot be said of us, who have not the art to  
 . I . . . . . express



express to another the contrary of what we feel within ourselves.

*Ul.* Let us discourse a little more distinctly upon this virtue, according to your definition, which is certainly a very just one, and it will set your mistake in a clearer light. For if Justice consists in rendering to all their due, she must render to the immortal Gods the adoration which is so much their right. And this either is a part of, or a distinct virtue so intimately joined and connected with Justice, that it is from thence by us called Religion\*. Now how is it possible that you can have this virtue, either entire or in part, who know nothing of the Gods, nor have any thoughts or belief of their existence? For having not the use of reason to weigh the properties of motion, and the nature of accidents, as they cannot subsist of themselves, but in another, you could never attain to the knowledge of a first mover, or an independent substance.

*Steer.* That is more than I know; this I am sure of, that there are amongst us who pay their reverence each morning to the rising sun, acknowledging him to be the great Minister of Nature. And amongst the birds,

\* From *religare*, to bind hard.

## 216 DIALOGUE IX.

as soon as he breaks out above our horizon, there are those that turn towards him, and salute him with a song. Nay, there are even plants that seem to adore him, by always unfolding their leaves, and turning their flowers towards him.

*Ul.* This proceeds not from any knowledge of him as a divine creature, but from the joy and comfort they perceive in his light and heat. And that they might enjoy the more of it, they look towards him, and so express the complacency they feel by some signs of joy. Let us proceed to the other branch of Justice, by which we return to our country and our parents what is due to them, called Piety. I shall not descant upon the duties to our country, though they are not less obligatory than those to our *natural Parents* \*, because you cannot be concluded under them; for by having no property, you can have no country or settled habitation. And then as to your parents, what tribute of service or gratitude are you capable of paying to those, whom you do not so much as

\* *Plato in Critone inquit, τιμιωτέραν μητρὸς καὶ πατρὸς. In majore honore Patriam habendam, quam Matrem & Patrem. Cicero Patriam antiquiorem Parentem, appellat in Lib. de Repub. & Epist. ad Atticum.*

know,

know, after you come to maturity enough to live without their care?

*Steer.* To obviate the charge, I produce to you the Stork\*, who, when his aged parents are disabled from flying, stirs not from the nest, but nurses and cherishes them with his blood, and as their feathers drop off, supplies them with his own, to defend their nakedness from the cold.

*Ul.* An argument from a single species will prove but little. And perhaps the stork does this more to serve himself than his father or mother: For being of a cold nature, and especially after one of his large meals of watry food, he thrusts himself in between them to partake of their warmth. There are besides some duties to superiors; to those whose virtues entitle them to our respect, which we call Obedience and Reverence: Pray what footsteps or signs of this are to be traced out among you?

*Steer.* As we are all equal, I see no room for this mighty difference; though in kinds

\* *Petronius Arbiter vocat Ciconiam Pietaticultricem. Et in nummis Hadriani Ciconia est expressa cum inscriptione, PIETAS AUGUSTA*

*Cassiodorus Var. Ep. 14. Lib. 2. ait Ciconias plumis suis Genitorum membra frigida reserere.*

that

that stand in need of a leader you find it very remarkable, as amongst the Cranes and Bees, who have a strong sense of loyalty to their respective Sovereigns.

*Ul.* If you would call it by it's right name, call it natural inclination. There is also a debt for favours received, termed Gratitude; What place has that among you?

*Steer.* You will find us not only grateful to one another, but so far as even to enter into your service, merely out of gratitude for our subsistence.

*Ul.* That is, you are very obsequious as long as you please, and when you are pleased to forget them, you return all favours received with your heels. I shall not trouble you with any questions concerning particular friendships (I mean not natural affections, which have nothing to do with justice) which have virtue for their foundation, and a free approbation of the mind for their support: Nor concerning the tenderness and caution with which we ought to carry ourselves toward those that are by Fortune placed below us, all which duties having a long deduction of arguments for their foundation, cannot be expected amongst you, where no reason is. So that I hope by this time you are convinced,

vinced, what unreasonable prejudices your ignorance had possessed you with against us.

*Steer.* Whether I am convinced or no, I find myself silenced, which I must impute to your greater skill and practice in managing an argument. But if these are prejudices, they are such as I fear I shall never be able to get rid of, as they grew up with me from experience, and sensitive knowledge, which I shall always think the most certain. Nevertheless I return you all the thanks due to good intentions, and so shall beg leave to retire, and continue as I am.



CIRCE.



## C I R C E.

Translated from the *Italian* of

JOHN BAPTIST GELLI, &c.

## DIALOGUE X.

*Ulysses and the Elephant.*

*Ulysses  
solus.*



AFTER all it is strange, that among so many *Greeks*, changed into such different animals in this island, I should not find even One that will accept of my offer. So that if the saying in such vogue with us in *Greece* were true, that what great numbers agree in cannot be false, one would  
from

Ulysses and the Elephant. 221

from hence be apt to conclude, that the state of animals void of reason was preferable to ours. But the observation, I fancy, holds good only in things relating to active life; for in things merely speculative, I should oppose to it that other general rule, *that we should think with the few, though we speak with the many*; whom I find always stigmatized with the character of unconstant, fickle, various; and whatsoever else denotes inconsiderate and obstinate. The only way then to reconcile these opposite aphorisms (for I have a tender regard for every proposition that is established upon long experience) is to say, that the first relates to practice, the second to theory. As, therefore, the knowledge of the dignity of human nature, and wherein consists it's superiority to animals without reason, is the object of theory, which alone examines truth, it is no wonder if the many fall into gross mistakes about it. I find then, I can hope for no success this way; so am resolved with my little crew, which *Circe* has already restored, and the bark now riding at anchor impatient for my return, to set sail immediately for *Ithaca*. For if it is not in my power to serve them, I ought to put it out of theirs to disserve me. A human

man

man creature amongst brutes must live, like them, according to imagination and sense : Whereas amongst rational creatures, a life regulated by the rules of art and prudence will lead me insensibly towards perfection : Or rather, by proceeding daily from one degree of it to another, I shall arrive at a state of happiness and contentment.

Come on then, let us to the shore, and let wisdom, as she always ought, begin at home. But stay! what creature of immense size do I see stalking along the strand. Surely, unless the distance deceives me, it must be an Elephant. How astonishing is the variety that Nature exercises in the production of animals! I am so taken with his presence, that I begin already to wish I may find him to have been a *Greek*. I will put the question to him, and if he answers my expectation, it will give me a real pleasure, to find my labour not altogether thrown away. Tell me, Elephant, (if, as I think, thou wast once a man) who thou wast before thy change?

*Elephant.* A *Greek*——of the renowned city of *Athens* — in which I for many years gave myself up to the study of philosophy. *Aglaophemus* was my name: But pray let me know



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know why you ask me? For this is agreeable to the character of a Philosopher, who is supposed to be always inquisitive into the cause of every appearance, and always desirous of satisfying his thirst after knowledge.

*Ul.* Thanks to the immortal Gods, that I have at length discovered a lover of truth, and one that is indeed worthy to be called a Man. Know then, *Aglaophemus*, that *Circe* has granted me the power of restoring to manhood every *Greek* transformed in this her island, but with this condition, that they themselves are desirous of it. Warmed with the desire of delivering my countrymen from such vile imprisonment, I have with great earnestness urged my privilege with every one that I met with; but have not been so happy as to light on one that would accept of my offer, or seemed at all sensible of the dignity of the human, or of the baseness of their present condition.

*Eleph.* But whence do you collect, that you shall find me more agreeable to your scheme? Or what pretensions have I above the rest, to be thus emphatically stiled a Man?

*Ul.* From your profession; which is desirous of knowing the truth, and is indefatigable

gale in it's researches after it. Whereas the others being either Farmers, Fishermen, Physicians, Lawyers, or Gentlemen, who always propose to themselves either profit or pleasure; and fancying that they find a higher enjoyment of sensual pleasures in their present state (though they may be greatly mistaken) it is no wonder if they are fond of continuing as they are. But a Philosopher, whose only aim is truth, must hold in low esteem all the pleasures of sense, that he might arrive at that happiness of mind that is his perfection. This is to act according to the human nature; and such acts constitute the man. Whilst he whose life is passed over in the gratifications of a beast, no more deserves the name of a man, than what is void of heat merits to be called fire, or that to be called light where nothing is visible.

*Eleph.* I must own myself to have been severely attached to truth! It was the love of this that first put me upon the study of philosophy, and after that moved me in quest of it to leave my native country, and travel through the world; till at length arriving at this shore, I was changed by *Circe* into what you see me; which state whether it be more eligible than yours I am not yet satisfied:

However I shall not take your word for it; but proceed in the method of the Philosophers, who though they won't embrace a proposition without the reasons for it, yet neither will they reject it, though it does not appear evident to them, unless it be contradictory to some known principle, and contains within itself some manifest absurdity. For he that will not believe any thing can be but what he understands, will not be very likely to improve himself. So that I shall very patiently listen to the reasons you have to offer, why it will be so great an advantage to me to be restored to manhood. And if I find them as convincing as you seem to imagine, I will instantly divest myself of my present shape, resume yours, and set sail with you in transport for *Greece*.

*Ul.* And I, in return, give you my word of honour, that if you shall prove to me, that yours is preferable, I will immediately entreat the Goddess to transform me into one of these beasts, and pass the rest of my days here with you. So much am I taken with your engaging discourse, and modest manner, so truly worthy of a follower of right reason.

*Eleph.* You engage for more than I shall insist on, though you should not prove your  
Q point.

point. For I well remember, that in my own transmutation, I underwent such a scene of fatigue and horror, that it is not a little advantage that should make me submit to another change myself, or desire one in you, though I must own to you, I am not quite satisfied that my condition is altered for the better. But propose your arguments for the great excellency of your own state, which urge you so strongly to persuade me to a change.

*Ul.* I shall; and in compliance to your education will proceed philosophically. You know then, that though in Nature there is an almost infinite variety of creatures, there is not one that does not act in a manner proper and peculiar to itself. This arises from that form which constitutes it's particular being. So that till it ceases to be it cannot cease thus to act.

*Eleph.* True, else Nature would have made something in vain; which is impossible.

*Ul.* You know also, that the nature and essence of agents is known by their operations. And that those are esteemed better, and more noble whose actions are so; it being not given to man to know causes but by their effects.

*Eleph.*

*Elepb.* True ; for to understand causes originally, and from thence to deduce their effects, seems to be reserved only to the first Origin and Cause of every thing.

*Ul.* From hence you will clearly infer, that the nature of man is more perfect than that of the beasts. For what do you take to be the distinguishing property of animals?

*Elepb.* I suppose sense ; because to live, to grow, and to propagate it's kind, it has in common with vegetables. So that it is sense alone that belongs to them as animals.

*Ul.* What do you understand by sense?

*Elepb.* The knowledge of the nature of things, by the assistance of the senses.

*Ul.* And in man what?

*Elepb.* I should say the same ; though I know that knowledge in man is called intellectual, and in brutes sensitive. For neither can you know any thing but by the senses.

*Ul.* It is neither true that it is the same thing ; nor that we can have no notion of any thing but by the senses. It being certain that the understanding can form within itself many things clearly intelligible, and make those again productive of others, without the interposition of sense. But then it

must be granted, that the prime source of these images is from the senses, and that we understand nothing but whose origin is deducible from thence. And so far only the proposition you advanced is true.

*Elepb.* These are whimsies and extravagancies that are of no real advantage to the mind, but rather serve to mislead and perplex it. Whereas we are humbly satisfied with knowing only things useful, necessary, or agreeable to us, and in these I don't suppose that our knowledge comes one jot short of yours.

*Ul.* It no more becomes you to be positive in these things, than it does a blind man upon the subject of colours.

*Elepb.* But I shall prove what I say to you. Tell me, pray is not the most certain knowledge the most perfect?

*Ul.* Yes.

*Elepb.* But the knowledge that comes by the senses is the most certain.

*Ul.* Who taught you this?

*Elepb.* Myself: For whilst I see that the leaves of the bay tree opposite to us are green, if the united voice of all the world should assert the contrary, I could not believe them.

*Ul.* And

*Ul.* And yet how could you be fure that you are not miftaken; or that they would not be in the right?

*Eleph.* How could I be more fure of it than by feeing it?

*Ul.* By being certain beyond all doubt, that your eye could not be deceived; and this you may be, by the affiftance of the understanding; fo that you are capable of being more fure of it than by the bare fenfe. And that this is fo, give me leave to afk you, do you fee the fun there? Well; and pray does it feem to move or not?

*Eleph.* It appears to me not to move.

*Ul.* What fize does it feem to be of? and of what colour?

*Eleph.* As to it's fize, I fancy it is near about fuch a body as you yourfelf would make, if caft into a fpherical figure. And it feems to be near of the fame colour with thefe oranges.

*Ul.* I defire no ftronger proof how much you may be miftaken, in any representation made by the fenfes, unaffifted by the understanding. For of three things of which you was entirely fatisfied, two of them are entirely falfe.

*Eleph.* Which two do you mean?

Q 3

*Ul.* That

*Ul.* That the sun is motionless, and no bigger than you describe it. As to the rapidity of it's motion, it is agreed, that no sensible swiftness, not that of the most impetuous arrow upon the wing, can bear any proportion to it. For notwithstanding it's immense distance, it is whirled by the motion of the highest heavens once every day round the earth\*. The space it runs through therefore daily, must as much exceed the circumference of the earth, which is held to be more than two and twenty thousand miles, as the sun's distance from the centre of the earth exceeds the earth's † semidiameter. And as to it's magnitude, it is by calculation about one hundred and sixty-five times bigger than the earth, which is well known to any body at all conversant in the mathematicks. Nor are we less certain of this, than you are that the bay leaves are green: In which you are not mistaken; but you have not the full proof that you are not, without the aid of reason.

*Elepb.* How so?

\* *That is according to the Ptolemaic System.*

† *Which at a medium between his greatest and least distance is, 81,000,000. of miles.*

*Ul.* Because



*Ul.* Because it is by that alone we distinguish what is the proper object of one sense, from what is common and perceptible by more. By this then it would be clear to you that you could not be deceived in the perception of the proper object, under the necessary circumstances of a due distance, a suitable medium, and the like: And at the same time, how liable we are to errors, when we pronounce from one sense, a judgment upon objects common to more. Thus under the requisite conditions, you could not err in your judgment upon the green leaves; colour being the proper object of the eye: But when you came to speak your sense of the magnitude and motion of the sun, you see how you blundered, and that for the reason I told you. So little cause have you therefore to boast of the knowledge conveyed by the senses, that without the assistance of the understanding, I will venture to affirm it to be the lowest.

*Eleph.* Pray are there then more ways of knowing?

*Ul.* The powers and faculties of perception are of three orders or degrees. The first is of those pure immaterial intelligences, who are supposed to preside over the

† *motions of the heavenly bodies.* The proper objects of which (as their own essence arises not from any corporeal form, and is not dependent upon any modification of matter) are those forms that are self-subsistent, and independent of matter. But if these take any cognizance of material forms, it must be by a reflexive act, from species within themselves, or by actual intuition on the || first Cause, which, as it produced all things, must contain them all in itself. The second power is the reverse of this; which, as it arises from a modification of body and organized matter, from which it is inseparable; it can have only material forms for its object, and those only as they are actually inherent in matter. And because matter is the principle \* of division and distribution into particulars, it follows, that this power can only take in particulars, and this is what we call sense. There is also a third power or faculty of perception, of a middle nature

† The *Pythagoreans* taught, that God assigned to the inferior Gods, the different spheres of the heavens. See more of this in *Plato's Timæus*.

‡ Πρῶτον αἰτίον.

\* This is according to the *Pythagoric* school, that the ἕλη being undeterminate as to any shape, is the cause of divisibility. So *Simplicius* calls ἕλην διαίρεισως αἰτίαν, the cause of distribution.

between

between these two, and that is the human understanding. Which being not the result of any material form, or dependent upon any structure of organs, but a pure power of the soul, has not for it's object material forms, as they either are in, or depend upon matter, but so as she may consider them in their proper nature. Hence, when she undertakes to examine them intimately, she not only abstracts and divests them of matter, but strips them of all the qualities attendant on it. So that our understanding is as much superior to sense, as it is inferior to those pure intelligences that I have been describing.

*Elepb.* How does that appear?

*Ul.* Because there is a greater certainty in it's knowledge. For as sense only takes cognizance of particulars, and of matter, which are in a constant motion and variation, it can have no absolute certainty of them. Because in strictness, even in the very article of judging, the scene has shifted and has undergone a change, and is not only altered, but very different from what it was when it was first taken into consideration. Whereas our understanding, by stripping things of their sensible qualities to their bare essence; by dividing it's parts, and comparing what is essential

fential and what is only adventitious to it, does acquire an indisputable knowledge of it.

*Eleph.* How could you get any true knowledge this way of such a creature, for example, as man, by considering him divested of matter, when he cannot exist without flesh and bones?

*Ul.* You must know, that matter may be considered either in a general respect of all things, or else in a particular respect to the individual. The matter common to all men is flesh, bones, and nerves; what is proper to this man, is this flesh, these bones, and those nerves. The particular is doomed to a perpetual change, and is ever drawing near to a dissolution. The understanding considers man as a rational creature, composed of flesh and bones, and mortal; in this universal way then He becomes unchangeable, and is therefore capable of being the object of certain knowledge.

*Eleph.* Well; and does not imagination do the same thing in us? For you must allow, that the pictures of things drawn on it are immaterial, which she can afterwards distribute into such divisions or combinations as she pleases.

*Ul.* It

*Ul.* It must be granted, that the imagination is so noble a faculty of the soul, that some have doubted if it be not the self-same thing in us that is called the understanding. And those that have not gone so far, have agreed at least, that the understanding is imperfect without it. But this does not prove it not to be much inferior, and in truth her servant, to wait upon her in all operations. And this order is observed in all Nature, that every power\* made for the service of another is less perfect. Thus in yourselves it is manifest, that the external senses of hearing, seeing, and so forth, are less noble than the common sensory that takes them in all. So fancy, that is assistant to discernment, is of less account than her mistress. In us it is still more evident, for though fancy receives the images of objects immaterially, it comprehends them with the adjuncts of time, place, and the like, which are essential to matter as such: And therefore it cannot strip it of these circumstances. But this is not the case with the human understanding, which can consider things without quantity, time, place, change, or the like properties of matter;

\* Τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰσθητώτερα τῶν ὑφ' αὐτά. Vide *Aristot. Ethic. Lib. I.*

though

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though it acquires this abstracted knowledge, not from the things themselves, but at second hand, from their images painted on the imagination. Now though fancy in you can compound or divide so far as from a horse and a man to form a centaur; or can figure to itself a man destitute of hands or feet, yet it cannot separate matter from form, or substance from it's accidents, or mix these, as our understanding can do. Because you take these in by one simple act of sensation in the same subject. Besides this imagination of yours can represent nothing to itself, but what you have seen either in the whole or in it's parts.

*Elepb.* This is what I shall never grant, it being evident, that many things are the subject of our thoughts, which we never could see. When a sheep flies from the wolf, is this from any aversion to his colour, or antipathy to his shape?

*Ul.* No.

*Elepb.* Why does she shun him then?

*Ul.* Because she thinks him her enemy.

*Elepb.* And yet she never saw such a thing as enmity. Which I think is full to our point.

*Ul.* It is very true, that you are endued with a certain power, which we call sagacity,

ty, that collects and draws from sensible objects, some intentions and properties that do not fall under the notice of the senses. Such as when a bird sees a straw, she supposes that it is proper to make her nest, and accordingly carries it off for that purpose. Or when a sheep seeing a wolf, takes him for an enemy, and so avoids him. Which actions cannot be imputed to the senses, because they come not under their cognizance. And this is the motive that prompts you to what you ought to seek or shun. Nevertheless it must be owned, that these intentions are very few in number, and only such as are necessary to your preservation, such as relate to things hateful, grievous, delightful, profitable, injurious, and the like, which are observable in our children, before they come to the use of their reason, nay even in ideots. But the judgment in man discovers properties in things, not only necessary to his being, but to his more comfortable being in the world. Nor does it do this by natural instinct, as your sheep, without any reflection, flies from the wolf, but acts by a chain of consequences, founded upon a comparison of one thing with another. This is called thought, and by some, particular reason, as it considers particular

culars in the same manner that the understanding does universals. Hence, when a man spies a wolf, though he judges him to be no friend, yet he does not, like the sheep, immediately and naturally spring from him; nay, if he sees him safe muzzled, he is so far from being shocked at his approach, that he will out of curiosity make up towards him. But if he sees him running furiously at him, lank with hunger, and open mouthed, he concludes that he means him no good, and so chooses to keep out of the way. This account, I think, gives us fairly the superiority.

*Eleph.* I must be so free with you as to own, that some things of what you have said appear clearly intelligible to me, and others again leave me quite in the dark.

*Ul.* The fault is in your nature, which cannot raise itself up to such truths. But embrace my offer, and be once more the most noble animal in the world, and you will understand it all.

*Eleph.* I should be obliged to you, if you would point out in what this super-excellency of manhood consists.

*Ul.* You must know then, there are two faculties that distinguish man from the whole animal



animal world, the Understanding and the Will.

*Elepb.* What mighty feats do these perform, to make them deserve to be fo much boasted of?

*Ul.* Knowledge is the object of the first, love and hatred of the second.

*Elepb.* As they are in us of sense and appetite.

*Ul.* Only with this difference, that in you they go no farther than preservation, but in us they extend to happiness. Let us begin regularly with the Understanding; for a thing must be known before it can be desired or disliked. Now this is not confined to particulars, like sense, which is her meanest attendant (and which by reason of the mutability of things, can never extract any fixed truth from them) but comprehends universals; by forming an idea of many individuals contained under the same species, in which many individuals equally agree. And this knowledge it acquires after this manner: The fancy presents to the Understanding the image or picture of one man, with all the circumstances that accompany him as such; in this place, at that time, under such a form. And because these conditions can only agree to this  
sole

sole individual, so far the Understanding has only knowledge of a particular. But if afterwards it reflects upon this image, and the species it belongs to, and then separates them from these circumstances, stripping it of all that related to it as a particular, and an individual, retaining only the human nature in it, it must form within itself an intellectual idea, productive of this universal knowledge, that human nature consists of a corporeal substance, mortal and rational, and this is what all mankind equally agree in.

*Eleph.* I don't yet see what advantage this universal knowledge, by the Understanding, has over our particular knowledge, by the senses.

*Ul.* I will tell you ; a demonstration that what you know is certainly so, and cannot be otherwise, which is more than mere sensitive cognizance can pretend to. Because he that should find this man, and so on a second, to be a rational creature, would have no proof that every man was so. Neither would he that should see that a dog is endued with sense, or if you please a horse, have any proof that all dogs, or all horses, have this quality. But he that knows that man is nothing else but a rational creature, knows that

every man is rational. And he that knows, that an animal is nothing but a body animated with a sensitive soul, must know that every dog and horse, by being animals, must be endued with sense. And what is more, he must be certain that what he knows, is, and must be infallibly so. Because he reasons from it's proper cause, as the being a man is the cause that every man is rational; and the being an animal is the occasion in a dog and a horse of their being sensible.

*Eleph.* Well, I must confess that I begin already to see, that your intellectual knowledge is more noble, because more certain, than our sensitive.

*Ul.* Nay farther, our Understanding need not, like your senses, take in the knowledge of things as they are complicated and intire, but can separate the qualities and properties which compose them. Thus, for example, when it sees a white object, it knows from itself what whiteness is; namely a colour streaming upon the organ of sight from the surface of some body. Whereas sense can never distinguish white from a white body, comprehending under one and the same act, the subject, with it's form and accidents: Because colour is not so much the object of

the organ as the thing coloured; as you may convince yourself, by considering that you pass not a judgment upon colours, but the thing coloured; and this every man, as well as you, does that follows only the information of sense.

*Eleph.* I grant that this knowledge is very clear and distinct.

*Ul.* Farther yet, our Understanding, in order to acquire a perfect knowledge of things, can compound or divide them, by way of affirmation or negation; which is above the sphere of sense. For by knowing that a substance receives and supports accidents, and that bodies sustain colours, which are accidents, it compounds these two natures, and collects that body is a substance; again by being satisfied that substance is what subsists of itself, but that colour must subsist in another, what does it do but divide and separate these two natures, by denying the one to be the other, which forms this proposition, that colour is not a substance? And so on, by the help of many of these affirmations and negations, it comes at many truths that never could have fallen under the notice of sense, and consequently, must escape you. For though you avoid what offends you, this is

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not by reasoning, in the way I have been describing, which is above your capacity; but from the impulse of appetite, which hurries you from it without any reflection.

*Eleph.* So far I understand also.

*Ul.* Nor is our Understanding bounded here; but by revolving and reviewing the several semblances and images of things deposited by the senses in the fancy, it extracts the knowledge of many things that could not fall under the notice, either of the external or internal senses. For it is thus that it acquires a clear conception of universal natures, of separate forms, and heavenly beings, nay as far as his nature will permit it, to reach even the knowledge of the Supreme Cause of all things. This is what imagination, sagacity, or the highest faculty you can boast of, never can pretend to.

*Eleph.* And in what manner do you know this Supreme Cause?

*Ul.* Not only in a negative manner, as some have taught, but by supposing an original Cause, and then denying it to be capable of any affections that imply defect, such as we see are the properties of matter in corporeal creatures. Such a one then is unproduced, incorruptible, unchangeable, not con-

tained in place, uncompounded, of unlimited duration, and the like. Nor have we an idea of him only by the means that others have asserted, by the way of super-excellence, such as that he excels in goodness, beauty, amiableness; all that in the universe is good, beautiful, and amiable. But man knows him by inspecting himself, by considering that the excellence of his own nature consists only in this, that he *can reason upon all things\**, either those below or superior to himself, and can in some measure assimilate himself to them, and become what he pleases. A farther discovery that he makes is, by examining his own imperfections, that his knowledge in respect of all things is only potential and not actual, and therefore he is ignorant at one time of what he may know at another, from hence he forms the idea of an Intelligence of a more exalted and perfect kind than his own, always actual, comprehending all things that either are or have been from all eternity, and not capable of any new information, as containing within himself the species of whatsoever either has been or can be in the world. This is the first Cause which,

\* The original is, *intendendo tutte le cose.*

by governing all things from the beginning in fuch wonderful order, must of neceffity be an intelligent Being, and for ever continue to be fo, after one uniform manner of intelligence.

*Elepb.* Oh! furprizing power of the human Understanding.

*Ul.* And it is the more fo, by being confcious that it does understand; which is above the reach of fenfe. For though the eye takes in the rays of light, and the ear is affected by founds, yet the eye fees not that it fees, nor does the ear hear that it does fo. For thefe powers being affixed to certain organs of the body, cannot reflect and reason upon themfelves. Whereas the Understanding being a power fpiritual and divine, may be turned in upon itfelf, and fo difcern both it's own faculties and their value, which is, let me tell you, it's peculiar privilege. Heaven itfelf, though of fuch purity and honour, is infenfible of it's own worth. And the fun, the firft minifter of Nature, and fource of light in heaven, feels not his own high ftation. But man, who is acquainted with his own excellency, and fuperiority over every other creature, whofe end he feems to be, (fince by knowing their refpective natures he

can employ them for his use) rejoices in himself, and feels a sincere contentment and self-complacency. And that he might be the better qualified for this, he is furnished with a faculty that treasures up his notions, called intellectual memory, which as much excels yours, as it's objects are more noble.

*Eleph.* This makes a farther discovery of your happiness.

*Ul.* Nay, what is more, Man has this property, that it is not in the power of his Understanding, to entertain a conceit so abstruse or sublime, which, by the help of language, he cannot freely communicate. For we don't understand a voice, like you, only as a sign and expression of some common passion, such as joy, grief, fear, and the like, but by the assistance of words, whose import we have agreed upon, we can describe it just in the manner we would have it explained. It is by this canal that instruction is conveyed, and ignorance in one man is banished by the skill of another. For though the more knowing cannot always from himself impress the very thought he would communicate to the scholar, yet by this means he can put him in a method to form it in his own mind. It was from ob-  
serving-



-serving this, that the old *Ægyptian* sages broke out into such extravagant raptures, as to call man the terrestrial God, the heavenly Animal, resident of the Gods, Lord of all below, Favorite of all above, and in a word, the Miracle of Nature.

*Eleph.* Without doubt, so much perfection will require very pompous expressions to do it justice.

*Ul.* But there is yet another faculty, and that not a tittle short of this in point of excellence, I mean the Will, by which we freely desire or avoid what is judged right or wrong by the Understanding: As you fly or pursue what Sense recommends or deters you from.

*Eleph.* Would not the appetite have been sufficient for this, without the addition of a new power?

*Ul.* It evidently would not; because appetite, under the influence of sense, could only desire or abhor what falls under the notice of sense. Whereas the virtues or vices which attract our love, or cause our aversion, could never come under the cognizance of sense. This then ennobles the man, by making him the free lord of all his actions; which arises from it's own freedom, not be-

ing determined by Nature more towards one extreme than the other. For though the object be good, it is no more constrained to the pursuit of it than of it's contrary. Whereas mere natural agents, being impelled towards their objects within a certain distance, must act as necessarily as the flame, which, within reach of combustible matter, cannot but set it on fire. But in us the Will, though what is good and amiable be proposed to it, and it be disposed in some degree rather to pursue it, yet it is free from all force, either to chuse or to reject it. Every other faculty in man, as an animal, owns it's subjection to this; for though each may be affected by it's object, without the consent of the Will, yet it must be so as always to be under it's government, whenever it pleases to exert itself. Thus, though the sight, when a visible object be presented to it, must be moved by it naturally, yet the Will can command it away, and turn it to some other; and so with the rest of the senses. And no object, nay no force on earth below, or heaven above, can constrain it to desire what it dislikes. The case is very different with the sensitive appetite; to which when an object is presented which it desires, the animal is hurried away necessarily

necessarily and naturally to it, without any choice : As every observer must confess.

*Elepb.* Well, but after all where is the great dignity that this confers on human nature ?

*Ul.* So great that it was this alone made the old sages pronounce him to be the miracle of Nature.

*Elepb.* Give me leave to ask why ?

*Ul.* Because every other creature being under stated laws, by which it must attain the very end which Nature has prescribed to it, and no other, it cannot supersede those directions : But man, by having his choice free, can obtain an end more or less worthy as he thinks fit, by letting himself down to creatures much below him, or by emulating those as much above. He that elevates himself no higher than the earth on which he grows, will become a mere vegetable ; and he that abandons himself to sensual pleasures will degenerate into a brute. Whilst he that looks with an eye of reason on the glories of the heavens, and contemplates the stupendous regularity of Nature, will change the earthly into a celestial creature ; but he that dares soar above the gross impediments of flesh, to converse with divine objects, will  
become

become little less than a God\*. Who therefore can look without astonishment on man, not only the most noble, and the sovereign over animals, but who has this peculiar privilege indulged him by Nature, that he may make himself what he will?

*Eleph.* How comes it to pass then, if the Will has what is good for it's object, and it be unbiaſſed in it's choice, that you prefer oftner what is it's contrary, and fly from virtue to follow vice?

*Ul.* The reason of this appearance is, the intimate and wonderfully strict attachment and combination it has with the senses, and from the necessity the Understanding (whose light the Will follows) is under, of taking it's information from them, who often shew him an apparent for a real good: So that the Will being diverted and misled by the one, which is imposed upon by the misrepresentations of the other, it must be granted, if it does not pursue evil, yet it does not sufficiently avoid it; nor does it exercise

\* The *Pythagoreans* propose the *Σείας ὁμοίωσις* to their scholars, as the great incitement to virtue.

*Hierocles*, in his commentaries on the Golden Verses, says, that they lead to the likeness with God, which is the aim of the *Pythagorean* Philosophy.

the sovereignty it ought over the sensitive appetite. So that in truth, all our errors proceed from the irrational part of our nature, which we have in common with you, and not from what constitutes us men.

*Eleph.* No more, no more, *Ulysses*, every moment of delay hinders me from the happiness I have already been too long deprived of. Let me instantly put off the Beast and resume the Man.

*Ulysses changes him.* Which I here grant unto thee, by the authority to me committed.

*Aglaophemus.* Oh! miraculous effect, oh! happy change; more happy from the experience I have had of both conditions. This breaks in upon me like a flood of light, upon a wretch long pent up in darkness; or like the pleasures that a prosperous change affords one inured to misery. How I pity the wretches who refused this offer, that they might wallow on in all the sordid delights of sense? Thanks to my benefactor, who by his wisdom pointed to me out the truth, and by his eloquence warmed me in the pursuit of it. The Gods alone can render you a suitable reward, for the favours you have conferred upon me; whilst I, in obedience  
to

to strong natural impulse, make them an humble offering of my thanks, tracing up the blessings that are bestowed upon me, to the sole original Cause of all things, from whence they are derived, especially this last, of knowing the imperfection of every other creature when compared with man. And because the only return I am capable of making is gratitude, let me indulge it, till it kindles into some rhapsody sacred to his praise. And do thou, *Ulysses*, whilst thy heart burns with the same zeal, give devout attention to this holy hymn, which I dare dictate to the world.

## I.

*S*ilence ye winds, ye whisp'ring trees  
 Attend; let list'ning motion cease,  
 Whilst the First Mover of the world's great  
 frame

*Inspires the song. Hail ever sacred name!*

*Father, Maker, Source of all*

*That great, or wise, or good we call,  
 Whether on earth, where foul corruption reigns,  
 Or else above, in blissful azure plains,  
 Where substances divine, in purer day,  
 Flourish unchang'd, unconscious of decay.*

II. 'Twas

II.

'Twas he that stretch'd the pendent earth,  
Self-poiz'd amidst the concave skies,  
He gives the gushing fountains birth,  
And bids the healthful torrent rise.  
'Twas he, whose bounty stor'd  
For man, imperial lord,  
With grim inhabitants the woods,  
And peopl'd all the genial floods:  
He first the soul enlighten'd from above,  
And taught the heart to glow with holy love:  
For him th'enlighten'd soul in rapture burns:  
To him the glowing heart his love returns.

III.

Ye spirits pure æthereal train,  
You that reside in mystick cells,  
In secret chambers of the brain,  
Where mem'ry and invention dwells,  
Pow'rs, virtues, potentates,  
That round the throne of Reason stand,  
Where free volition waits,  
Proud to receive her Queen's command,  
Sing the First Cause; ye pow'rs, divinities,  
Sing to your elder brothers of the skies;  
'Till

*'Till echoing heav'n shall catch the song di-  
vine,*

*And all the world in one grand chorus join.*

*Ul.* Let me trouble you but with this one question more; Were you not conscious of this knowledge of a First Cause in your brutal capacity?

*Agla.* No, but instantaneously with my change I felt this light springing up in the soul, as a property natural to it. Or rather I should express myself, that it seemed like a recovery in the memory of ideas it had been before acquainted with. But I have this advantage however from my experience, that by having a more perfect knowledge of the excellency of human nature, I draw this conclusion; that as man has been more beloved by the Supreme Cause, since he is more honoured than his fellow creatures, the end he ought to propose to himself, should be very different from that of other animals, who, by being without reason, must be without the knowledge of a first Cause.

*Ul.* Right; and to carry the thought yet higher, it cannot be but that if the knowledge of truth is the perfection of the human mind, and this cannot properly be said  
to



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to be acquired here, whilst we are in this mortal frame, struggling under many obstacles, which at best must soon end in death; it must follow, that when the soul is enlarged, and free from these impediments, this must be the subject of it's pursuit in some future state, unless we will suppose Nature to have acted in vain. And though man in this present life cannot, like other animals, attain the end of his nature, and acquire the sum of what he aims at, yet he may be said to enjoy it in some degree, whilst he keeps above the gross pleasures of sense, and lives in a manner agreeable to a rational creature.

*Agla.* Let us fly then, my *Ulysses*, from this accursed shore, where this false artful woman, with her vile sorcery, makes men live like beasts, not only in manners but in shape also. Let us, I say, quit this slavery to return to *Greece*, and to the full enjoyment of all the liberty of reason. Nor do thou dare trust thyself again with the sight of the foul enchantress, lest by some new illusion she prevail with thee to remain in this unhappy land.

*Ul.* Come


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
U. Come on then, it is my soul's desire.  
And see! how the propitious Gods, ever fa-  
vourable to those who strive to imitate them,  
have prevented our wishes, by sending a gale  
inviting to our voyage.



F I N I S

U. Come







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