


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
IN CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS

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COLLEGE LIFE
ITS CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS



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COLLEGE LIFE

ITS CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS

A SELECTION OF ESSAYS FOR USE IN
COLLEGE WRITING COURSES

ARRANGED AND EDITED BY

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PREFACE

In this volume, intended primarily for use in English composition classes, the selections have been chosen chiefly from the writings of college presidents and other educators with a view to covering some of the more important questions and problems of the student's personal relation to the various aspects of college life—intellectual, athletic, and social. Such material has for the English composition course a twofold value.

In the first place, material of this kind enables the student to receive at the beginning of his college career help in understanding the college and his relation to it. The student is generally seriously lacking in proper knowledge of the fundamental ideas involved in the college course he has entered upon—the ideas which are in fact necessary to insure success. He rarely has any conception of what the term liberal education means, or what combination of studies such an education demands; neither does he know the intellectual ideas that should dominate him as he pursues these studies; and he fails also in the utilization to the utmost of the incidental advantages which college life offers in its play and its social aspects. The English composition course seems a logical place in which to give students that understanding of the educational and social interests of the college necessary to enable them to become good "college citizens."

A glance at the groupings in the table of contents shows the extent to which this volume attempts to cover the field of college life. About half of the material bears upon the college curriculum. The first group treats of the general function of the college in education; the second presents the two great branches of education, namely, science and art, and their contrasted claims; the third takes up the individual student's selection of

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his program of study; and the next group presents some ideals of intellectual work. The remainder of the book deals with the student interests outside of the curriculum, such as general reading, recreation and athletics, college spirit, college morals, student government, etc.

The second value that this material has for the course in English composition is that it enables the instructor to make the course incite to thinking and to intellectual expansion. In the composition course it seems wise to emphasize ideas, rather than literary models or set exercises, by allowing the student to encounter fresh and stimulating thoughts, which one may adopt and apply to one's own experience, or which one may combat or modify in accordance with individual conviction. To throw the emphasis upon formal matters is unwise and is an illustration of what Huxley has described as making the student practice the use of knife, fork, and spoon without giving him a particle of meat. But if the student is provided before he writes with the materials of thought in the form of some reading which, firmly thought out and clearly expressed, stimulates to thinking, the ways and means of clear expression assume new significance to him. The field of college life offers many inviting subjects for writing and oral discussion which are well within the comprehension and experience of the student.

The selections in this book are therefore intended as a body of stimulating material. Though suggestiveness in point of ideas has been the main criterion of choice, these selections will serve well also as models of clear, direct, and incisive modern English. The selections have not been brought together for the purpose of representing the different types of discourse, but simply to set the student to the general task of correct and effective writing. It so happens, however, that these selections will readily serve as a basis for the expository and argumentative writing which, in most colleges, is the fundamental part of the first-year course in writing. The material in this book will be

found suited either for the work of a semester or of a whole session.

The question of the method to be used in handling this material is one for each individual instructor to solve, and no attempt has been made by the editor to indicate an elaborate plan for using it. The underlying principles in his mind are first, the reading of the essays; second, the discussion of their leading thoughts; and third, the writing by the student on topics suggested by this reading and discussion. The free discussion is important because it produces an atmosphere of interested and clear thinking which aids greatly the writing of compositions. The topics for discussion and practice in writing given in connection with the selections are merely suggestive and should be freely modified as the needs of particular classes may dictate. One point, however, seems essential to success in this method. It is that in assigning exercises for writing the student should be given some *one point* to explain and illustrate or to criticise rather than a whole article to summarize and condense. The first is a stimulating and essentially original task, the second a dull and deadening one; the first demands thought, the second prohibits it. The more definitely the topic can be narrowed to a precise focus, the more suggestive it will prove to the thoughtful student and tend to become one upon which he can enlarge to the limits of his intellectual resources.

Although due acknowledgments for permission to reprint the articles brought together in this book are scattered through its pages, it is pleasure here to record in a general way grateful appreciation of these generous permissions, and an obligation equally to the authors who have consented to this use of their writings and to the publishers who have graciously dismissed copyright restrictions.

M. G. F.

Davidson College, Davidson, N. C.
September, 1914.

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INTRODUCTION

This book is intended to help the student in his work in English composition in two ways. In the first place, he may acquire from reading these selections a generous number of fresh and stimulating ideas on subjects of importance to the college man, and these ideas, adapted or applied to one's own experience, or combated and modified in accordance with individual conviction, may be utilized as material for compositions and oral discussions. In the second place, he may, by analysis of methods, become master of some of the fundamental procedures of good writing. As it is natural for the student to ask how he may go about obtaining these benefits, these two purposes—reading for ideas and analyzing for methods of writing—will be discussed in turn more fully.

HOW TO READ FOR IDEAS¹

In order to acquire from these selections ideas for use in composition writing, it is necessary to read with two qualities of mind—alertness and sympathy. Alertness is nothing but being awake and interested in what is read. The mind must be at work behind the eye that follows the print of the pages. Furthermore, alertness is essentially an attitude of interrogation and judgment. That is, the student must put the ideas presented to him upon trial for their soundness and worth; he must uncover their merits and defects and pass judgment upon their general value. Many writers have emphasized the importance of such reading. Says Bacon in his essay, *Of Studies*, "Read not to . . . believe and take for granted, . . . but to weigh and consider." "Every book," says Lowell in his essay, *Books and Libraries*, "we read may be a round in the ever lengthening

¹ On this subject see also Bryce's *Hints on Reading*, pages 330-336 of this book.

ladder by which we climb to knowledge, and to that temperance and serenity of mind which, as it is the ripest fruit of wisdom, is also the sweetest. But this can only be if we read such books as make us think, and read them in such a way as helps them to do so, that is, by endeavoring to judge them, and thus make them an exercise rather than a relaxation of mind. Desultory reading, except as conscious pastime, hebetates the brain and slackens the bow string of Will." It is largely this interrogative mood that makes the difference between the idle absorber of print and the thinker.

The result of this testing of ideas for soundness and worth will sometimes be agreement, sometimes disagreement. There is a common idea that acceptance is a far more easy and less aggressive act than rejection. The contrary, however, is probably true. To belief in the ease of acceptance is due the fact that so much acceptance, as for instance, of religious and political doctrines, is only nominal and not intelligent enough or critical enough to be genuine. Again, it is often declared that any one can find fault, but the recognition of merit is admitted to require insight. If this be true in other fields, it must also be true in regard to reading. Rejection, therefore, is no more aggressive or positive than acceptance; and if one of these calls for a more critical attitude and more mental energy, it is probably acceptance.

Frequently the most profitable reading is that which irritates, that with which we disagree. But such reading must be done, not with scorn and aloofness, but with sympathy. The sympathetic mind desires to ascertain exactly what the writer thinks and why, even though his ideas may be contrary to what one can accept. Carlyle has called our attention to the importance of this quality of sympathy in the following passage: "We have not read an author till we have seen his object, whatever it may be, as he saw it. Is it a matter of reasoning, and has he reasoned stupidly and falsely? We should understand the circumstances which, to his mind, made it seem true, or persuaded him to write it."

The result of reading done with alertness of mind and sym-

pathy should be stimulation of the mental energies. It is such reading as this that Emerson meant to describe by the phrase, "creative reading" when in his *American Scholar Address* he said, "One must be an inventor to read well. As the proverb says, 'He that would bring home the wealth of the Indies must carry out the wealth of the Indies.' There is then creative reading as well as creative writing. When the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly significant, and the sense of our author is broad as the world." Emerson simply means that thoughtful men cannot sit over the printed page which exhibits the workings of a powerful mind without being excited, moved, and made to feel that they can and will do something in the expression of their thoughts. This same attitude is presented in the saying, "A German professor never reads a book except with the design of writing another." It is this stimulation to thought and to expression of thought that these selections are intended to give.

As an essential part of the student's profit from this reading, there should be the expression of thought. Thought without expression is, as every one knows, very indefinite and it is only when we think our thoughts out into words that we seem really to have thoughts. Furthermore, this clarifying of our own minds by attempts at expression provides us with surer ground on which to build new thoughts. Thus every time we try to express ourselves faithfully, we make the outlines of our own lives more distinct and create further opportunities for new activities. This relation of thought and expression is well set forth in the words of Channing from his *Remarks on National Literature*: "We doubt whether a man ever brings his faculties to bear with their whole force on a subject until he writes upon it for the instruction and gratification of others. To place it clearly before others, he feels the necessity of viewing it more vividly himself. By attempting to seize his thoughts, and fix them in an enduring form, he finds them vague and unsatisfactory to a degree which he did not suspect, and toils for a precision and

harmony of views of which he had never before felt the need. He places his subject in new lights,—submits it to a searching analysis, compares and connects it with his various knowledge, seeks for it new illustrations and analogies, weighs objections, and through these processes often arrives at higher truths than he at first aimed to illustrate. . . . The laborious distribution of a great subject, so as to assign to each part or topic its just position and due proportion, is singularly fitted to give compass and persevering force of thought.”

HOW TO ANALYZE FOR METHODS OF WRITING

One of the best ways of acquiring skill in composition is to go, as it were, into the workshop of successful writers, and see how they use their tools, and then try to use these tools as best we can. This might be called the method of analysis and imitation. On the side of analysis, we watch how the work has been done in order to see the processes, in sentence, paragraph, and longer work, by which the writer has digested his material, shaped it for eye of the reader, presented it to the best advantage, and said what he had to say in direct and incisive style. Thus the student comes to possession of a valuable set of procedures to help him in the expression of his own ideas. On the side of imitation, we do not try as Stevenson did in his famous method of learning to write,¹ to imitate the thing itself, but simply to apply observed principles to our own writing. This is not mere slavish copying. It is learning the difficult art of writing from many masters in turn, absorbing the processes of each of them, assimilating their methods, and at last finding out how to be one's self. It is true of this method of imitation that “The only way not to copy anybody is to study everybody. There is safety in numbers so far as originality is concerned.”

To assist in this rhetorical study the following suggestive scheme for the examination of a selection is given.

¹ See the essay “College Memories” in Stevenson's *Memories and Portraits*. Also, on this subject of the necessity of imitation as a means of learning to write, see Brander Matthews' *The Duty of Imitation*, Outlook, Vol. 97, page 77 (January 14, 1911).

PLAN FOR THE RHETORICAL STUDY OF SELECTIONS

ORGANIZATION

The ideal of any well written composition has been aptly expressed by Pater in his *Essay on Style* as "that architectural conception of the work which perceives the end in the beginning and never loses sight of it, and in every part is conscious of all the rest, till the last sentence does but, with undiminished vigor, unfold and justify the first." Pater means that every good composition must have its material carefully systematized and organized and all its parts skilfully adjusted to each other and the whole. In other words, a composition is not a haphazard collection of miscellaneous ideas or observations, but an orderly presentation of thoughts, each of which is related to all of the others in a reasonable and necessary way, and all combining to make the meaning of the larger whole complete and satisfying.

Focus.—From what has been just said about organization, it is evident that the first step toward good composition is to have a main idea upon which to focus all the subordinate ideas. This main idea will determine the selection of material, compelling the rejection of material that does not help in the development of the main thought.

State the substance of the selection under study in a short concise sentence. Has the writer introduced material at any point that does bear directly upon this main point, the presence of which tends to confuse the reader? Are any important matters bearing upon the subject omitted? Does the writer seem to have stopped halfway in developing any part of his discussion?

The Beginning.—The beginning is one of the most important parts of a composition. The older writers made use of formal introductions, but modern writers follow the fixed rule: Begin promptly, even if you have to plunge abruptly into your subject.

A good beginning catches the attention of the reader at once, and directs it as soon as possible toward the writer's end.

Does the selection open with a formal introduction? Is there need of such an introduction? If the introduction is considerably reduced, consider whether the selection begins too abruptly. Do the first paragraphs state the main thought of the selection? Do they indicate the sub-divisions which this main idea includes?

Order of Topics.—The main thought of a composition being generally too extended to be discussed all at once, it is divided by the writer into such parts as he can most clearly build up one by one into a connected whole. The question of order of presentation becomes then very important. The precise order of these parts in any given composition depends upon the subject and the conditions under which it is treated, but method of some kind there must be.

Carefully determine the main points of the selection being studied, and write them consecutively so that they will constitute an outline of the selection. Is the order the best for clearness and logic?

Obvious Structure.—Not only must the topics of the composition be arranged in good order, but indication should be given the reader whenever one topic is finished and another taken up. One way of doing this is to shape every division of a composition so that the end of it will suggest what is to follow. Under this method, explicit indication of transition is not necessary. But as this plan is sometimes impossible or undesirable, transition from one part to another is made by means of some word, or phrase, or sentence of backward reference placed at or near the beginning of the new part.

Find the important transitional and summarizing passages in the selection. Has the framework of the selection been made too evident?

Proportion and Emphasis.—As not all of the minor divisions of a composition bear with the same degree of directness or importance upon the complete development of the whole composition, it is necessary for the writer in order to have his composition a finished and symmetrical structure, with no part given undue emphasis or prominence, and no part slighted, to make clear those ideas which are relatively more important. This can be done either by devoting extra space to the topics to be emphasized, or by putting them in the conspicuous positions of the composition,—the beginning and the end.

Is the material of the selection well proportioned? What topic received the fullest treatment? Determine if possible the reason.

The End.—The end is as important as the beginning. Like the beginning, it should not be extended and formal. It may be of any one of many types. A very useful form is that which summarizes and enforces the main thought. The one unpardonable defect in a conclusion is to blur or weaken what precedes.

What is the nature of the conclusion of the selection under study? How effective is it? Could you suggest a better one?

DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION

Passing to the smaller features of a composition, we find that the governing principles are in the main the same that apply to the composition as a whole and to the larger features. Here, too, the most important matter is arrangement and organization.

The Paragraph.—Obvious structure necessarily involves careful paragraphing. In following the course of thought the mind wearies, and it is important that there should be halting places—points indicated where the reader may feel that a certain stage of the development of the thought has been completed, and where he may take breath, so to speak, before passing on to another. Hence paragraphing is an important element in

successful composition. The paragraph divisions should not be arbitrary nor accidental, but should correspond to some natural and logical grouping of thought. Each paragraph should contain only such material as is logically justifiable as a unit by itself. The fundamental principle of the inner structure of the paragraph is therefore unity. It must have one central thought to which all the ideas making up the development of the paragraph shall be properly subordinated. The question of long or short paragraphs must be determined largely by the capacity of the reader. If he lacks the power of grasping large and complicated wholes, the tendency of the paragraphs should be toward shortness; if, on the other hand, the reader has this power, the paragraphs may with advantage be much longer, for such a reader would probably find short paragraphs jerky, confusing, and ineffective. Between the parts of a paragraph there should be a flow of thought; in other words, connection. This is accomplished sometimes by means of link-words between the sentences of the paragraph, but often the relation of the ideas themselves is clear enough without explicit expression, particularly if they follow in the right order, and when this is the case connecting links are unnecessary. The end of the paragraph is important as a place for bringing home the central idea of the paragraph.

How many main points in this selection? Does the paragraphing correspond to these main topics; that is, is there an equal number of paragraphs and main topics? Give reasons for any disparity you may find in this matter. Test some of the paragraphs for unity by seeing whether the gist of the paragraph can be given in a brief sentence. Has the writer himself formulated the leading ideas of his paragraphs in topic-sentences appearing in the paragraphs? Make outlines of a few paragraphs to determine whether the various details mentioned are arranged upon a preconceived plan or left to haphazard. Point out the words in the various sentences of the paragraph that

connect with what is before or after. Are the paragraphs closely related and how are they bound together?

The Sentence.—Success in sentence making requires the endeavor to do three things:—(1) to make the sentence clear in itself; (2) to make it strong in relation to its neighbors in the paragraph; and (3) to give variety of cadence to the series of sentences making up the paragraph. However long or complex the sentence may be, it should embody but one central thought. There may be, of course, coördinate and subordinate ideas, but there must be sufficient attraction between these for them to be taken together as one complete thought. A common cause of poor sentences is the writer's failure to indicate the proper subordination of the related ideas. Generally this arises from the overuse of coördinating conjunctions and the consequent frequency of the compound type of sentence. By taking advantage of the plentiful supply of devices in English for indicating various shades of relationship between ideas, the writer should convert these improper compound sentences into complex sentences that really represent the relationship of the thoughts grouped together and which therefore makes a stronger impression of unity. Some words carry more of the thought of the sentence than others. Clearness requires that the writer make these words stand out so that the reader cannot miss them. The beginning of the sentence is a place of emphasis and should be occupied by an important idea. But the conclusion is an even more emphatic position, because the close of the sentence is the point where the reader grasps the meaning of what he reads completely. The peculiar structure of the periodic sentence which holds the thought in abeyance until the close of the sentence makes this type of sentence distribute its emphasis better than the loose type. The two characteristics of balanced sentences—parallel structure and antithesis or contrast—give a type of sentence which is likely to have a well-woven coherence of parts.

Every sentence serves a double purpose; it has a meaning of its own, and it helps to make clearer the meaning of some other

sentence. Each sentence, therefore, must be considered in its relation to other sentences. By means of relation of words and other devices of connection, it must be adjusted to its neighbors. Sentences must be considered in connection with surrounding sentences for the sake not only of clearness, but also of variety. In the best writers is to be found a constant variation in sentence structure which secures the important aid of novelty. The reader's attention is roused at every turn by some new arrangement of clause, different length or complexity of sentence, change in the places of stress, and the like. A brief, simple, direct sentence will be followed by a slightly more complex one, and this by another in which involution of subordinated clauses is carried to a considerable degree. It is important to note that when this variety is at its best, it is not a mere haphazard avoidance of monotony but a variety in unity. To the untrained writer sentences are likely to seem hard, crystallized affairs so that once a thought has taken form in words, it seems practically impossible to change it. The experienced writer, however, knows that a sentence is easier to twist and turn than a rubber band. He can change its shape, twist it about, divide it, join it with another, do what he will with it. To be infinitely various is one of the secrets of effective style so far as the sentences are concerned.

Does the writer tend to use very short sentences, very long ones, or those of moderate length? Are his sentences loose or periodic? Do many sentences show the use of parallelism? Does he give his sentences good emphasis? Does he seem to seek variety in his sentences? Is there a rhythm or cadence to the sentences in any part?

Vocabulary.—Words are the ultimate elements of speech. So important is careful study of them that style has been defined as consisting of right words in the right place, and this definition is correct if taken with its implications. No one can write effectively unless his vocabulary possesses three fundamental characteristics: (1) exactness, (2) suggestiveness, and (3) pro-

priety. The exact word is the word which expresses with precision the writer's meaning. Most often the exact word is the specific word, that is, the word that is narrow in its range. The specific word has a double advantage: it forces the writer to realize exactly what his idea is and so to avoid vagueness from careless thinking; it presents the idea more effectively to the reader by stirring him to think in concrete images rather than in abstractions. Suggestiveness in diction is the power to stir the imagination. As has just been pointed out, this is a quality which specific words possess. It is also possessed by familiar words on account of their greater connotative value. Figures of speech are often serviceable and vital means of giving suggestiveness to one's writing, provided they are not lugged in for the sake of mere adornment. Propriety is concerned with good form in words. Much has been written about various violations of propriety, such as provincialisms, colloquialisms, slang, neologisms, "fine writing," poetic diction, and the like, but most questions that arise under this head will be rendered easy of solution if we remember the basis of the fundamental law of usage in language. Language is a social product. Correctness in language is not like keeping the moral law or the laws of the state, but like dressing properly or behaving properly. Violations of usage in language are like violations of other social usages—in the main offenses against custom and good taste.

A person's choice of words is also, as in the case of other social usages, taken as an index to character and to mentality. It therefore behooves one to select his words with care, and to establish for himself a good usage, free from faulty grammar and an excessively local or slang diction. Furthermore, words and expressions that are perfectly fit for one occasion and purpose may be in bad taste for others. "A man of taste and ability will modify his use of language to meet the special requirements of the task proposed. He will have learned by study to distinguish between different tones and values in the instrument of speech, and will have acquired by exercise the power of touching the mighty organ of expression to various

issues."¹ One should therefore see to it that his phrasing is suited to the subject matter and to the reader.²

What kind of vocabulary does the writer use—an accurate and scientific one, or a suggestive and personal one? Is he fond of unusual and unfamiliar words? Are all these words in good use? Is he apparently desirous to avoid stereotyped words and phrases? Are figures of speech common? When used, are they mainly ornamental or do they clarify the thought?

¹ Symonds, J. A., *Essays, Speculative and Suggestive*, Vol. I, p. 267.

² The student is advised to read on this matter of vocabulary, Palmer, G. H., *Self-Cultivation in English*.

COLLEGE LIFE
ITS CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS

PURPOSE OF THE COLLEGE

WHAT IS A COLLEGE FOR? ¹

WOODROW WILSON

[Woodrow Wilson (1856—) was, before becoming President of the United States in 1913, a prominent educator. He had held professorships in history and politics at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan and Princeton, and from 1907 to 1912 was president of Princeton. The selection here given, although a part of what was published originally as a magazine article, gives substantially the same ideas regarding the aims of the college which were expressed toward the close of his career as a college president in several notable addresses on various academic occasions.]

It may seem singular that at this time of day and in this confident century it should be necessary to ask, What is a college for? But it has become necessary. I take it for granted that there are few real doubts concerning the question in the minds of those who look at the college from the inside and have made themselves responsible for the realization of its serious purposes; but there are many divergent opinions held concerning it by those who, standing on the outside, have pondered the uses of the college in the life of the country; and their many varieties of opinion may very well have created a confusion of counsel in the public mind.

They are, of course, entirely entitled to their independent opinions and have a right to expect that full consideration will be given what they say by those who are in fact responsible. The college is for the use of the nation, not for the satisfaction of those who administer it or for the carrying out of their private views. They may speak as experts and with a very intimate knowledge, but they also speak as servants of the country and

¹ Reprinted by permission of the author and of the publishers from *Scribner's Magazine*, Vol. 46, page 570 (November, 1909).

must be challenged to give reasons for the convictions they entertain. Controversy, it may be, is not profitable in such matters, because it is so easy, in the face of opposition, to become a partisan of one's own views and exaggerate them in seeking to vindicate and establish them; but an explicit profession of faith cannot fail to clear the air, and to assist the thinking both of those who are responsible and of those who only look on and seek to make serviceable comment.

Why, then, should a man send his son to college when school is finished; or why should he advise any youngster in whom he is interested to go to college? What does he expect and desire him to get there? The question might be carried back and asked with regard to the higher schools also to which lads resort for preparation for college. What are they meant to get there? But it will suffice to center the question on the college. What should a lad go to college for,—for work, for the realization of a definite aim, for discipline and a severe training of his faculties, or for relaxation, for the release and exercise of his social powers, for the broadening effects of life in a sort of miniature world in which study is only one among many interests? That is not the only alternative suggested by recent discussions. They also suggest a sharp alternative with regard to the character of the study the college student should undertake. Should he seek at college a general discipline of his faculties, a general awakening to the issues and interests of the modern world, or should he, rather, seek specially and definitely to prepare himself for the work he expects to do after he leaves college, for his support and advancement in the world? The two alternatives are very different. The one asks whether the lad does not get as good a preparation for modern life by being manager of a football team with a complicated program of inter-collegiate games and trips away from home as by becoming proficient in mathematics or in history and mastering the abstract tasks of the mind; the other asks whether he is not better prepared by being given the special skill and training of a particular calling or profession, an immediate drill in the work he is to do after he graduates, than by being made a master of his own mind

in the more general fields of knowledge to which his subsequent calling will be related, in all probability, only as every undertaking is related to the general thought and experience of the world.

“Learning” is not involved. No one has ever dreamed of imparting learning to undergraduates. It cannot be done in four years. To become a man of learning is the enterprise of a lifetime. The issue does not rise to that high ground. The question is merely this: do we wish college to be, first of all and chiefly, a place of mental discipline or only a school of general experience; and, if we wish it to be a place of mental discipline, of what sort do we wish the discipline to be,—a general awakening and release of the faculties, or a preliminary initiation into the drill of a particular vocation?

These are questions which go to the root of the matter. They admit of no simple and confident answer. Their roots spring out of life and all its varied sources. To reply to them, therefore, involves an examination of modern life and an assessment of the part an educated man ought to play in it,—an analysis which no man may attempt with perfect self-confidence. The life of our day is a very complex thing which no man can pretend to comprehend in its entirety.

But some things are obvious enough concerning it. There is an uncommon challenge to effort in the modern world, and all the achievements to which it challenges are uncommonly difficult. Individuals are yoked together in modern enterprise by a harness which is both new and inelastic. The man who understands only some single process, some single piece of work which he has been set to do, will never do anything else, and is apt to be deprived at almost any moment of the opportunity to do even that, because processes change, industry undergoes instant revolutions. New inventions, fresh discoveries, alterations in the markets of the world throw accustomed methods and the men who are accustomed to them out of date and use without pause or pity. The man of special skill may be changed into an unskilled laborer overnight. Moreover, it is a day in which no enterprise stands alone or independent, but is related

to every other and feels changes in all parts of the globe. The men with mere skill, with mere technical knowledge, will be mere servants perpetually, and may at any time become useless servants, their skill gone out of use and fashion. The particular thing they do may become unnecessary or may be so changed that they cannot comprehend or adjust themselves to the change.

These, then, are the things the modern world must have in its trained men, and I do not know where else it is to get them if not from its educated men and the occasional self-developed genius of an exceptional man here and there. It needs, at the top, not a few, but many men with the power to organize and guide. The college is meant to stimulate in a considerable number of men what would be stimulated in only a few if we were to depend entirely upon nature and circumstance. Below the ranks of generalship and guidance, the modern world needs for the execution of its varied and difficult business a very much larger number of men with great capacity and readiness for the rapid and concentrated exertion of a whole series of faculties: planning faculties as well as technical skill, the ability to handle men as well as to handle tools and correct processes, faculties of adjustment and adaptation as well as of precise execution,—men of resource as well as knowledge. These are the athletes, the athletes of faculty, of which our generation most stands in need. All through its ranks, besides, it needs masterful men who can acquire a working knowledge of many things readily, quickly, intelligently, and with exactness,—things they had not foreseen or prepared themselves for beforehand, and for which they could not have prepared themselves beforehand. Quick apprehension, quick comprehension, quick action are what modern life puts a premium upon,—a readiness to turn this way or that and not lose force or momentum.

To me, then, the question seems to be, Shall the lad who goes to college go there for the purpose of getting ready to be a servant merely, a servant who will be nobody and who may become useless, or shall he go there for the purpose of getting ready to be a master adventurer in the field of modern opportunity?

We must expect hewers of wood and drawers of water to come out of the colleges in their due proportion, of course, but I take it for granted that even the least gifted of them did not go to college with the ambition to be nothing more. And yet one has hardly made the statement before he begins to doubt whether he can safely take anything for granted. Part of the very question we are discussing is the ambition with which young men now go to college. It is a day when a college course has become fashionable,—but not for the purpose of learning, not for the purpose of obtaining a definite preparation for anything,—no such purpose could become *fashionable*. The clientage of our colleges has greatly changed since the time when most of the young men who resorted to them did so with a view to entering one or other of the learned professions. Young men who expect to go into business of one kind or another now outnumber among our undergraduates those who expect to make some sort of learning the basis of their work throughout life; and I dare say that they generally go to college without having made any very definite analysis of their aim and purpose in going. Their parents seem to have made as little.

The enormous increase of wealth in the country in recent years, too, has had its effect upon the colleges,—not in the way that might have been expected,—not, as yet, by changing the standard of life to any very noticeable extent or introducing luxury and extravagance and vicious indulgence. College undergraduates have usually the freshness of youth about them, out of which there springs a wholesome simplicity, and it is not easy to spoil them or to destroy their natural democracy. They make a life of their own and insist upon the maintenance of its standards. But the increase of wealth has brought into the colleges, in rapidly augmenting numbers, the sons of very rich men, and lads who expect to inherit wealth are not as easily stimulated to effort, are not as apt to form definite and serious purposes, as those who know that they must whet their wits for the struggle of life.

There was a time when the mere possession of wealth conferred distinction; and when wealth confers distinction it is apt

to breed a sort of consciousness of opportunity and responsibility in those who possess it and incline them to seek serious achievement. But that time is long past in America. Wealth is common. And, by the same token, the position of the lad who is to inherit it is a peculiarly disadvantageous one, if the standard of success is to rise above mediocrity. Wealth removes the necessity for effort, and yet effort is necessary for the attainment of distinction, and very great effort at that, in the modern world, as I have already pointed out. It would look as if the ordinary lad with expectations were foredoomed to obscurity; for the ordinary lad will not exert himself unless he must.

We live in an age in which no achievement is to be cheaply had. All the cheap achievements, open to amateurs, are exhausted and have become commonplace. Adventure, for example, is no longer extraordinary: which is another way of saying that it is commonplace. Any amateur may seek and find adventure; but it has been sought and had in all its kinds. Restless men, idle men, chivalrous men, men drawn on by mere curiosity and men drawn on by love of the knowledge that lies outside books and laboratories, have crossed the whole face of the habitable globe in search of it, ferreting it out in corners even, following its bypaths and beating its coverts, and it is nowhere any longer a novelty or distinction to have discovered and enjoyed it. The whole round of pleasure, moreover, has been exhausted time out of mind, and most of it discredited as not pleasure after all, but just an expensive counterfeit; so that many rich people have been driven to devote themselves to expense regardless of pleasure. No new pleasure, I am credibly informed, has been invented within the memory of man. For every genuine thrill and satisfaction, therefore, we are apparently, in this sophisticated world, shut in to work, to modifying and quickening the life of the age. If college be one of the highways to life and achievement, it must be one of the highways to work.

The man who comes out of college into the modern world must, therefore, have got out of it, if he has not wasted four vitally significant years of his life, a quickening and a training

which will make him in some degree a master among men. If he has got less, college was not worth his while. To have made it worth his while he must have got such a preparation and development of his faculties as will give him movement as well as mere mechanical efficiency in affairs complex, difficult, and subject to change. The word efficiency has in our day the power to think at the center of it, the power of independent movement and initiative. It is not merely the suitability to be a good tool, it is the power to wield tools, and among the tools are men and circumstances and changing processes of industry, changing phases of life itself. There should be technical schools a great many and the technical schools of America should be among the best in the world. The men they train are indispensable. The modern world needs more tools than managers, more workmen than master workmen. But even the technical schools must have some thought of mastery and adaptability in their processes; and the colleges, which are not technical schools, should think of that chiefly. We must distinguish what the college is for, without disparaging any other school, of any other kind. It is for the training of the men who are to rise above the ranks.

That is what a college is for. What it does, what it requires of its undergraduates and of its teachers, should be adjusted to that conception. The very statement of the object, which must be plain to all who make any distinction at all between a college and a technical school, makes it evident that the college must subject its men to a general intellectual training which will be narrowed to no one point of view, to no one vocation or calling. It must release and quicken as many faculties of the mind as possible,—and not only release and quicken them but discipline and strengthen them also by putting them to the test of systematic labor. Work, definite, exacting, long continued, but not narrow or petty or merely rule of thumb, must be its law of life for those who would pass its gates and go out with its authentication.

By a general training I do not mean vague spaces of study, miscellaneous fields of reading, a varied smattering of a score

of subjects and the thorough digestion of none. The field of modern knowledge is extremely wide and varied. After a certain number of really fundamental subjects have been studied in the schools, the college undergraduate must be offered a choice of the route he will travel in carrying his studies further. He cannot be shown the whole body of knowledge within a single curriculum. There is no longer any single highway of learning. The roads that traverse its vast and crowded spaces are not even parallel, and four years is too short a time in which to search them all out. But there is a general program still possible by which the college student can be made acquainted with the field of modern learning by sample, by which he can be subjected to the several kinds of mental discipline,—in philosophy, in some one of the great sciences, in some one of the great languages which carry the thought of the world, in history and in politics, which is its framework,—which will give him valid naturalization as a citizen of the world of thought, the world of educated men,—and no smatterer merely, able barely to spell its constitution out, but a man who has really comprehended and made use of its chief intellectual processes and is ready to lay his mind alongside its tasks with some confidence that he can master them and can understand why and how they are to be performed. This is the general training which should be characteristic of the college, and the men who undergo it ought to be made to undergo it with deep seriousness and diligent labor; not as soft amateurs with whom learning and its thorough tasks are side interests merely, but as those who approach life with the intention of becoming professionals in its fields of achievement.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. From your acquaintance with mature persons, what estimates of the value of college training have you heard? What criticisms of the efficiency of college training have come under your notice?
2. From your experience with your fellow-students and your general knowledge, enumerate some of the motives that lead students to go to college. Which of these should be regarded as proper motives

and which as improper? 3. Question yourself searchingly in respect to your own motives. Why did you come to college? Have you a clear idea of what you are seeking here? Will the motive bear scrutiny? 4. Specify what you think the college should do for the student in training him for work, for play, and for social living. 5. Does your experience in college life attest the truth of the writer's statement in regard to the undue importance attached to the "side shows," as he calls student diversions? What do you think is the place and value of this phase of college life? Do these matters seem to have in your institution an injurious effect upon scholarship? 6. With the aid of a large dictionary, find the history of the word "college," and trace the steps by which the term, originally belonging to Roman law, has been transferred to educational usage. 7. Distinguish between the college and the university; between the college and the technical school. 8. Is a college training more necessary at the present time for success in professions such as the ministry, teaching, law, medicine, scientific investigations, and in engineering than in the past? If so, why?

KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO LEARNING ¹

JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL NEWMAN

[John Henry, Cardinal Newman (1801-1890), was a distinguished English theologian and writer. For a time he was identified with the so-called Oxford Movement in the Church of England, but after severe self-scrutiny he turned to the Church of Rome as a refuge from the religious unrest of his age. Possessed of one of the most keen and subtle intellects of his age, Newman was also master of an English style of marvelous beauty and power. This selection is one of a series of addresses given before the University of Dublin and addressed primarily to Catholic educators.]

I

It were well if the English, like the Greek language, possessed some definite word to express, simply and generally, intellectual proficiency or perfection, such as "health," as used with reference to the animal frame, and "virtue," with reference to our moral nature. I am not able to find such a

¹ Reprinted from *Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated*, 1854.

term;—talent, ability, genius, belong distinctly to the raw material, which is the subject-matter, not to that excellence which is the result of exercise and training. When we turn, indeed, to the particular kinds of intellectual perfection, words are forthcoming for our purpose, as, for instance, judgment, taste, and skill; yet even these belong, for the most part, to powers or habits bearing upon practice or upon art, and not to any perfect condition of the intellect, considered in itself. Wisdom, again, is certainly a more comprehensive word than any other, but it has a direct relation to conduct, and to human life. Knowledge, indeed, and Science express purely intellectual ideas, but still not a state or quality of the intellect; for knowledge, in its ordinary sense, is but one of its circumstances, denoting a possession or a habit; and science has been appropriated to the subject-matter of the intellect, instead of belonging in English, as it ought to do, to the intellect itself. The consequence is that, on an occasion like this, many words are necessary, in order, first, to bring out and convey what surely is no difficult idea in itself,—that of the cultivation of the intellect as an end; next, in order to recommend what surely is no unreasonable object; and lastly, to describe and make the mind realize the particular perfection in which that object consists. Every one knows practically what are the constituents of health or of virtue; and every one recognizes health and virtue as ends to be pursued; it is otherwise with intellectual excellence, and this must be my excuse, if I seem to any one to be bestowing a good deal of labor on a preliminary matter.

In default of a recognized term, I have called the perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind, or illumination; terms which are not uncommonly given to it by writers of this day; but, whatever name we bestow on it, it is, I believe, as a matter of history, the business of a University¹ to make this intellectual culture its direct scope, or to employ itself in the education of the intellect,—just as the work of a Hospital lies in healing

¹ In England, the terms *university* and *college* are not differentiated in meaning as in the United States. Newman's use of the word *university* may be regarded as equivalent to the American use of *college*.

the sick or wounded, of a Riding or Fencing School, or of a Gymnasium, in exercising the limbs, of an Almshouse, in aiding and solacing the old, of an Orphanage, in protecting innocence, of a Penitentiary, in restoring the guilty. I say, a University, taken in its bare idea, and before we view it as an instrument of the Church, has this object and this mission; it contemplates neither moral impression nor mechanical production; it professes to exercise the mind neither in art nor in duty; its function is intellectual culture, here it may leave its scholars, and it has done its work when it has done as much as this. It educates the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it.

II

This, I said in my foregoing Discourse, was the object of a University, viewed in itself, and apart from the Catholic Church, or from the State, or from any other power which may use it; and I illustrated this in various ways. I said that the intellect must have an excellence of its own, for there was nothing which had not its specific good; that the word "educate" would not be used of intellectual culture, as it is used, had not the intellect had an end of its own; that, had it not such an end, there would be no meaning in calling certain intellectual exercises "liberal," in contrast with "useful," as is commonly done; that the very notion of a philosophical temper implied it, for it threw us back upon research and system as ends in themselves, distinct from effects and works of any kind; that a philosophical scheme of knowledge, or system of sciences, could not, from the nature of the case, issue in any one definite art or pursuit, as its end; and that, on the other hand, the discovery and contemplation of truth, to which research and systematizing led, were surely sufficient ends, though nothing beyond them were added, and that they had ever been accounted sufficient by mankind.

Here then I take up the subject; and, having determined that the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct and suffi-

cient in itself, and that, so far as words go, it is an enlargement or illumination, I proceed to inquire what this mental breadth, or power, or light, or philosophy consists in. A Hospital heals a broken limb or cures a fever: what does an Institution effect, which professes the health, not of the body, not of the soul, but of the intellect? What is this good, which in former times, as well as our own, has been found worth the notice, the appropriation, of the Catholic Church?

I have then to investigate, in the Discourses which follow,¹ those qualities and characteristics of the intellect in which its cultivation issues or rather consists; and, with a view of assisting myself in this undertaking, I shall recur to certain questions which have already been touched upon. These questions are three: viz., the relation of intellectual culture, first, to *mere* knowledge; secondly, to *professional* knowledge; and thirdly, to *religious* knowledge. In other words, are *acquirements* and *attainments* the scope of a University Education? or *expertness in particular arts and pursuits*? or *moral and religious proficiency*? or something besides these three? These questions I shall examine in succession, with the purpose I have mentioned; and I hope to be excused, if, in this anxious undertaking, I am led to repeat what, either in these Discourses or elsewhere, I have already put upon paper. And first, of *Mere Knowledge*, or Learning, and its connection with intellectual illumination or Philosophy.

III

I suppose the *prima-facie* view which the public at large would take of a University, considering it as a place of Education, is nothing more or less than a place for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many subjects. Memory is one of the first developed of the mental facilities; a boy's business when he goes to school is to learn, that is, to store up things in his memory. For many years his intellect is little more

¹If the student is interested in reading further in these discussions, he will find them in *The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated* in the discourses subsequent to the one here reprinted.

than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them; he welcomes them as fast as they come to him; he lives on what is without; he has his eyes ever about him; he has a lively susceptibility of impressions; he imbibes information of every kind; and little does he make his own in a true sense of the word, living rather upon his neighbors all around him. He has opinions, religious, political, and literary, and, for a boy, is very positive in them and sure about them; but he gets them from his school-fellows, or his masters, or his parents, as the case may be. Such as he is in his other relations, such also is he in his school exercises; his mind is observant, sharp, ready, retentive; he is almost passive in the acquisition of knowledge. I say this in no disparagement of the idea of a clever boy. Geography, chronology, history, language, natural history, he heaps up the matter of these studies as treasures for a future day. It is the seven years of plenty with him: he gathers in by handfuls, like the Egyptians, without counting; and though, as time goes on, there is exercise for his argumentative powers in the Elements of Mathematics, and for his taste in the Poets and Orators, still, while at school, or at least, till quite the last years of his time, he acquires, and little more; and when he is leaving for the University he is mainly the creature of foreign influences and circumstances, and made up of accidents, homogeneous or not, as the case may be. Moreover, the moral habits, which are a boy's praise, encourage and assist this result; that is, diligence, assiduity, regularity, dispatch, persevering application; for these are the direct conditions of acquisition, and naturally lead to it. Acquirements, again, are emphatically producible, and at a moment; they are a something to show, both for master and scholar; an audience, even though ignorant themselves of the subjects of an examination, can comprehend when questions are answered and when they are not. Here again is a reason why mental culture is in the minds of men identified with the acquisition of knowledge.

The same notion possesses the public mind, when it passes on from the thought of a school to that of a University: and

with the best of reasons so far as this, that there is no true culture without acquirements, and that philosophy presupposes knowledge. It requires a great deal of reading, or a wide range of information, to warrant us in putting forth our opinions on any serious subject; and without such learning the most original mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion. There are indeed persons who profess a different view of the matter, and even act upon it. Every now and then you will find a person of vigorous or fertile mind, who relies upon his own resources, despises all former authors, and gives the world, with the utmost fearlessness, his views upon religion, or history, or any other popular subject. And his works may sell for a while; he may get a name in his day; but this will be all. His readers are sure to find on the long run that his doctrines are mere theories, and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff instead of bread, and then his popularity drops as suddenly as it rose.

Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of expansion of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be denied; it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first principle; however, the very truth of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion that it is the whole of the matter. A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and what seems to put the matter beyond dispute is the fact of the great number of studies which are pursued in a University by its very profession. Lectures are given on every kind of subject; examinations are held; prizes awarded. There are moral, metaphysical, physical Professors; Professors of languages, of history, of mathematics, of experimental science. Lists of questions are published, wonderful for their range and depth, variety and difficulty; treatises are written, which carry upon their very face the evidence of extensive reading or multifarious information; what then is wanting for mental culture to a person of large reading and scientific attainments? what is grasp of mind but acquirement? where shall philosophical

repose be found, but in the consciousness and enjoyment of large intellectual possessions?

And yet this notion is, I conceive, a mistake, and my present business is to show that it is one, and that the end of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or knowledge considered in its matter; and I shall best attain my object, by actually setting down some cases, which will be generally granted to be instances of the process of enlightenment or enlargement of mind, and others which are not, and thus, by the comparison, you will be able to judge for yourselves, Gentlemen, whether Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is not rather something beyond it.

IV

For instance, let a person, whose experience has hitherto been confined to the more calm and unpretending scenery of these islands, whether here or in England, go for the first time into parts where physical nature puts on her wilder and more awful forms, whether at home or abroad, as into mountainous districts; or let one, who has ever lived in a quiet village, go for the first time to a great metropolis,—then I suppose he will have a sensation which perhaps he never had before. He has a feeling not in addition or increase of former feelings, but of something different in its nature. He will perhaps be borne forward, and find for a time that he has lost his bearings. He has made a certain progress, and he has a consciousness of mental enlargement; he does not stand where he did, he has a new center, and a range of thoughts to which he was before a stranger.

Again, the view of the heavens which the telescope opens upon us, if allowed to fill and possess the mind, may almost whirl it round and make it dizzy. It brings in a flood of ideas, and is rightly called an intellectual enlargement, whatever is meant by the term.

And so again, the sight of beasts of prey and other foreign animals, their strangeness, the originality (if I may use the

term) of their forms and gestures and habits and their variety and independence of each other, throw us out of ourselves into another creation, and as if under another Creator, if I may so express the temptation which may come on the mind. We seem to have new faculties, or a new exercise for our faculties, by this addition to our knowledge; like a prisoner, who, having been accustomed to wear manacles or fetters, suddenly finds his arms and legs free.

Hence Physical Science generally, in all its departments, as bringing before us the exuberant riches and resources, yet the orderly course, of the Universe, elevates and excites the student, and at first, I may say, almost takes away his breath, while in time it exercises a tranquillizing influence upon him.

Again, the study of history is said to enlarge and enlighten the mind, and why? because, as I conceive, it gives it a power of judging of passing events, and of all events, and a conscious superiority over them, which before it did not possess.

And in like manner, what is called seeing the world, entering into active life, going into society, traveling, gaining acquaintance with the various classes of the community, coming into contact with the principles and modes of thought of various parties, interests, and races, their views, aims, habits, and manners, their religious creeds and forms of worship,—gaining experience how various yet how alike men are, how low-minded, how bad, how opposed, yet how confident in their opinions; all this exerts a perceptible influence upon the mind, which it is impossible to mistake, be it good or be it bad, and is popularly called its enlargement.

And then again, the first time the mind comes across the arguments and speculations of unbelievers, and feels what a novel light they cast upon what it has hitherto accounted sacred; and still more, if it gives in to them and embraces them, and throws off as so much prejudice what it has hitherto held, and, as if waking from a dream, begins to realize to its imagination that there is now no such thing as law and the transgression of law, that sin is a phantom, and punishment a bugbear, that it is free to sin, free to enjoy the world and the flesh; and still fur-

ther, when it does enjoy them, and reflects that it may think and hold just what it will, that "the world is all before it where to choose," and what system to build up as its own private persuasion; when this torrent of willful thoughts rushes over and inundates it, who will deny that the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or what the mind takes for knowledge, has made it one of the gods, with a sense of expansion and elevation,—an intoxication in reality, still, so far as the subjective state of the mind goes, an illumination? Hence the fanaticism of individuals or nations, who suddenly cast off their Maker. Their eyes are opened; and, like the judgment-stricken king in the Tragedy,¹ they see two suns, and a magic universe, out of which they look back upon their former state of faith and innocence with a sort of contempt and indignation, as if they were then but fools, and the dupes of imposture.

On the other hand, Religion has its own enlargement, and an enlargement, not of tumult, but of peace. It is often remarked of uneducated persons, who have hitherto thought little of the unseen world, that, on their turning to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts, reforming their conduct, and meditating on death and judgment, heaven and hell, they seem to become, in point of intellect, different beings from what they were. Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than another. But now every event has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object, and an awful moral.

V

Now from these instances, to which many more might be added, it is plain, first, that the communication of knowledge certainly is either a condition or the means of that sense of en-

¹ The *Bacchæ* of Euripides. Pentheus, King of Thebes, having defied Dionysus, is smitten with madness.

largement or enlightenment, of which at this day we hear so much in certain quarters: this cannot be denied; but next, it is equally plain, that such communication is not the whole of the process. The enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding *then*, when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not the mere addition to our knowledge that is the illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that mental center, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitates. And therefore a truly great intellect, and recognized to be such by the common opinion of mankind, such as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas,¹ or of Newton, or of Goethe (I purposely take instances within and without the Catholic pale, when I would speak of the intellect as such), is one which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole, and no center. It possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement, but as philosophy.

Accordingly, when this analytical, distributive, harmonizing process is away, the mind experiences no enlargement, and is not reckoned as enlightened or comprehensive, whatever it

¹ Thomas Aquinas, the famous theologian of the thirteenth century.

may add to its knowledge. For instance, a great memory, as I have already said, does not make a philosopher, any more than a dictionary can be called a grammar. There are men who embrace in their minds a vast multitude of ideas, but with little sensibility about their real relations towards each other. These may be antiquarians, annalists, naturalists; they may be learned in the law; they may be versed in statistics; they are most useful in their own place; I should shrink from speaking disrespectfully of them; still, there is nothing in such attainments to guarantee the absence of narrowness of mind. If they are nothing more than well-read men, or men of information, they have not what specially deserves the name of culture of mind, or fulfills the type of Liberal Education.

In like manner, we sometimes fall in with persons who have seen much of the world, and of the men who, in their day, have played a conspicuous part in it, but who generalize nothing, and have no observation, in the true sense of the word. They abound in information in detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things; and, having lived under the influence of no very clear or settled principles, religious or political, they speak of everyone and everything, only as so many phenomena, which are complete in themselves, and lead to nothing, not discussing them, or teaching any truth, or instructing the hearer, but simply talking. No one would say that these persons, well informed as they are, had attained to any great culture of intellect or to philosophy.

The case is the same still more strikingly where the persons in question are beyond dispute men of inferior powers and deficient education. Perhaps they have been much in foreign countries, and they receive, in a passive, otiose, unfruitful way, the various facts which are forced upon them there. Seafaring men, for example, range from one end of the earth to the other; but the multiplicity of external objects which they have encountered forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon their imagination; they see the tapestry of human life, as it were on the wrong side, and it tells no

story. They sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in Europe, now in Asia; they see visions of great cities and wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid the islands of the South; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar,¹ or on the Andes; and nothing which meets them carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. Nothing has a drift or relation; nothing has a history or a promise. Everything stands by itself, and comes and goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was. Perhaps you are near such a man on a particular occasion, and expect him to be shocked or perplexed at something which occurs; but one thing is much the same to him as another, or, if he is perplexed, it is at not knowing what to say, whether it is right to admire, or to ridicule, or to disapprove, while conscious that some expression of opinion is expected from him; for in fact he has no standard of judgment at all, and no landmarks to guide him to a conclusion. Such is mere acquisition, and, I repeat, no one would dream of calling it philosophy.

VI

Instances, such as these, confirm, by the contrast, the conclusion I have already drawn from those which preceded them. That only is true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of Universal Knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this real illumination, the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes everything in some sort lead to everything else; it would communicate the image

¹ A shaft near Alexandria which has a traditional association with Pompey.

of the whole to every separate portion, till that whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, everywhere pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning. Just as our bodily organs, when mentioned, recall their function in the body, as the word "creation" suggests the Creator, and "subjects" a sovereign, so, in the mind of the Philosopher, as we are abstractedly conceiving of him, the elements of the physical and moral world, sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinions, individualities, are all viewed as one, with correlative functions, and as gradually by successive combinations converging, one and all, to the true center.

To have even a portion of this illuminative reason and true philosophy is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect; it puts the mind above the influences of chance and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, unsettlement, and superstition, which is the lot of the many. Men whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond if it happens to fail them. They are ever in alarm or in transport. Those on the other hand who have no object or principle whatever to hold by, lose their way every step they take. They are thrown out, and do not know what to think or say, at every fresh juncture; they have no view of persons, or occurrences, or facts, which come suddenly upon them, and they hang upon the opinion of others, for want of internal resources. But the intellect, which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which knows, and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leaven the dense mass of facts and events with the elastic force of reason, such an intellect cannot be partial, cannot be exclusive, cannot be impetuous, cannot be at a loss, cannot but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it discerns the end in every beginning, the origin in every end, the law in every interruption, the limit in each delay; because it ever knows where it stands, and how its path lies from one point to an-

other. It is the *τετραγωνος*¹ of the Peripatetic, and as the "nil admirari"² of the Stoic,—

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.³

There are men who, when in difficulties, originate at the moment vast ideas of dazzling projects; who, under the influence of excitement, are able to cast a light, almost as if from inspiration, on a subject or course of action which comes before them; who have a sudden presence of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion, and an undaunted magnanimous bearing, and an energy and keenness which is but made intense by opposition. This is genius, this is heroism; it is the exhibition of a natural gift, which no culture can teach, at which no Institution can aim; here, on the contrary, we are concerned, not with mere nature, but with training and teaching. That perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education, and its *beau ideal*, to be imparted to individuals in their respective measures, is the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind can embrace them, each in its place, and with its own characteristics upon it. It is almost prophetic from its knowledge of history; it is almost heart-searching from its knowledge of human nature; it has almost supernatural charity from its freedom from littleness and prejudice; it has almost the repose of faith, because nothing can startle it; it has almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of the spheres.

VII

And now, if I may take for granted that the true and adequate end of intellectual training and of a University is

¹ Four-square.

² To be moved by nothing.

³ Happy is he who has come to know the sequences of things, and is thus above all fear, and the dread march of fate, and the roar of greedy Acheron.

not Learning or Acquirement, but rather is Thought or Reason exercised upon Knowledge, or what may be called Philosophy, I shall be in a position to explain the various mistakes which at the present day beset the subject of University Education.

I say then, if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend; we cannot gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by means of them. It matters not whether our field of operation be wide or limited; in every case, to command it is to mount above it. Who has not felt the irritation of mind and impatience created by a deep, rich country, visited for the first time, with winding lanes, and high hedges, and green steps, and tangled woods, and every thing smiling indeed, but in a maze? The same feeling comes upon us in a strange city, when we have no map of its streets. Hence you hear of practised travelers, when they first come into a place, mounting some high hill or church tower, by way of reconnoitering its neighborhood. In like manner, you must be above your knowledge, not under it, or it will oppress you; and the more you have of it, the greater will be the load. The learning of a Salmasius or a Burman,¹ unless you are its master, will be your tyrant. "Imperat aut servit;"² if you can wield it with a strong arm, it is a great weapon; otherwise,

Vis consili expers
Mole ruit sua.³

You will be overwhelmed, like Tarpeia, by the heavy wealth which you have exacted from tributary generations.

Instances abound; there are authors who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible in their literary resources. They measure knowledge by bulk, as it lies in the rude block, without symmetry, without design. How many commentators are there on the Classics, how many on Holy Scripture, from

¹ Salmasius (1588-1653), a Dutch scholar; Burman (1668-1741), a Dutch theologian.

² It rules or it serves.

³ Brute force without intelligence falls of its own weight.

whom we rise up, wondering at the learning which has passed before us, and wondering why it passed! How many writers are there of Ecclesiastical History, such as Mosheim or Du Pin, who, breaking up their subject into details, destroy its life, and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about the parts! The Sermons, again, of the English Divines in the seventeenth century, how often are they mere repertoires of miscellaneous and officious learning! Of course Catholics also may read without thinking; and in their case, equally as with Protestants, it holds good, that such knowledge is unworthy of the name, knowledge which they have not thought through, and thought out. Such readers are only possessed by their knowledge, not possessed of it; nay, in matter of fact they are often even carried away by it, without any volition of their own. Recollect, the Memory can tyrannize, as well as the Imagination. Derangement, I believe, has been considered as a loss of control over the sequence of ideas. The mind, once set in motion, is henceforth deprived of the power of initiation, and becomes the victim of a train of associations, one thought suggesting another, in the way of cause and effect, as if by a mechanical process, or some physical necessity. No one, who has had experience of men of studious habits, but must recognize the existence of a parallel phenomenon in the case of those who have over-stimulated the Memory. In such persons Reason acts almost as feebly and as impotently as in the madman; once fairly started on any subject whatever, they have no power of self-control; they passively endure the succession of impulses which are evolved out of the original exciting cause; they are passed on from one idea to another and go steadily forward, plodding along one line of thought in spite of the amplest concessions of the hearer, or wandering from it in endless digression in spite of his remonstrances. Now, if, as is very certain, no one would envy the madman the glow and originality of his conceptions, why must we extol the cultivation of that intellect, which is the prey, not indeed of barren fancies but of barren facts, of random intrusions from without, though not of morbid imaginations from within?

And in thus speaking, I am not denying that a strong and ready memory is in itself a real treasure; I am not disparaging a well-stored mind, though it be nothing besides, provided it be sober, any more than I would despise a bookseller's shop:—it is of great value to others, even when not so to the owner. Nor am I banishing—far from it—the possessors of deep and multifarious learning from my ideal University; they adorn it in the eyes of men; I do but say that they constitute no type of the results at which it aims; that it is no great gain to the intellect to have enlarged the memory at the expense of faculties which are indisputably higher.

VIII

Nor indeed am I supposing that there is any great danger, at least in this day, of over-education; the danger is on the other side. I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years,—not to load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to force upon him so much that he has rejected all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study is not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement, which it is not; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance on eloquent lecturers, and membership with scientific institutions, and the sight of the experiments of a platform and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress. All things now are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it; and this, forsooth, is the wonder of the age. What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do with mind; it is to act mechanically, and the population is to be passively, almost unconsciously

enlightened, by the mere multiplication and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the school boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college, or the mechanic in the town, or the politician in the senate, all have been the victims in one way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions. Wise men have lifted up their voices in vain; and at length, lest their own institutions should be outshone and should disappear in the folly of the hour, they have been obliged, as far as they could with a good conscience, to humor a spirit which they could not withstand, and make temporizing concessions at which they could not but inwardly smile.

It must not be supposed that, because I so speak, therefore I have some sort of fear of the education of the people: on the contrary, the more education they have, the better, so that it is really education. Nor am I an enemy to the cheap publication of scientific and literary works, which is now in vogue: on the contrary, I consider it a great advantage, convenience, and gain; that is, to those to whom education has given a capacity for using them. Further, I consider such innocent recreations as science and literature are able to furnish will be a very fit occupation of the thoughts and the leisure of young persons, and may be made the means of keeping them from bad employments and bad companions. Moreover, as to that superficial acquaintance with chemistry, and geology, and astronomy, and political economy, and modern history, and biography, and other branches of knowledge, which periodical literature and occasional lectures and scientific institutions diffuse through the community, I think it a graceful accomplishment, and a suitable, nay, in this day a necessary accomplishment, in the case of educated men. Nor, lastly, am I disparaging or discouraging the thorough acquisition of any one of these studies, or denying that, as far as it goes, such thorough acquisition is a real education of the mind. All I say is, call things by their right names, and do not confuse together ideas which are essentially different. A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many are not the same thing; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory

for detail is not a philosophical or comprehensive view. Recreations are not education; accomplishments are not education. Do not say, the people must be educated, when, after all, you only mean, amused, refreshed, soothed, put into good spirits and good humor, or kept from vicious excesses. I do not say that such amusements, such occupations of mind, are not a great gain; but they are not education. You may as well call drawing and fencing education, as a general knowledge of botany or conchology. Stuffing birds or playing string instruments is an elegant pastime, and a resource to the idle, but it is not education; it does not form or cultivate the intellect. Education is a high word; it is the preparation for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge in proportion to that preparation. We require intellectual eyes to know withal, as bodily eyes for sight. We need both objects and organs intellectual; we cannot gain them without setting about it; we cannot gain them in our sleep, or by haphazard. The best telescope does not dispense with eyes; the printing press or the lecture room will assist us greatly, but we must be true to ourselves, we must be parties in the work. A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill.

IX

I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years, and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect,—mind, I do not say which is *morally* the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief,—but if I must determine which of the

two courses was the more successful in training, molding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun. And, paradox as this may seem, still if results be the test of systems, the influence of the public schools and colleges of England, in the course of the last century, at least will bear out one side of the contrast as I have drawn it. What would come, on the other hand, of the ideal systems of education which have fascinated the imagination of this age, could they ever take effect, and whether they would not produce a generation frivolous, narrow-minded and resourceless, intellectually considered, is a fair subject for debate; but so far is certain, that the Universities and scholastic establishments to which I refer, and which did little more than bring together first boys and then youths in large numbers, these institutions, with miserable deformities on the side of morals, with a hollow profession of Christianity, and a heathen code of ethics;—I say, at least they can boast of a succession of heroes and statesmen, of literary men and philosophers, of men conspicuous for great natural virtues, for habits of business, for knowledge of life, for practical judgment, for cultivated tastes, for accomplishments, who have made England what it is,—able to subdue the earth, able to domineer over Catholics.

How is this to be explained? I suppose as follows: When a multitude of young men, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant, as young men are, come together and freely mix with each other, they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day. An infant has to learn the meaning of the information which its senses convey to it, and this seems to be its employment. It fancies all that

the eye presents to it to be close to it, till it actually learns the contrary, and thus by practice does it ascertain the relations and uses of those first elements of knowledge which are necessary for its animal existence. A parallel teaching is necessary for our social being, and is secured by a large school or a college; and this effect may be fairly called in its own department an enlargement of mind. It is seeing the world on a small field with little trouble; for the pupils or students come from very different places, and with widely different notions, and there is much to generalize, much to adjust, much to eliminate, there are inter-relations to be defined, and conventional rules to be established, in the process, by which the whole assemblage is molded together, and gains one tone and one character.

Let it be clearly understood, I repeat it, that I am not taking into account moral or religious considerations; I am but saying that that youthful community will constitute a whole, it will embody a specific idea, it will represent a doctrine, it will administer a code of conduct, and it will furnish principles of thought and action. It will give birth to a living teaching, which in course of time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a *genius loci*,¹ as it is sometimes called; which haunts the home where it has been born, and which imbues and forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow. . Thus it is that, independent of direct instruction on the part of Superiors, there is a sort of self-education in the academic institutions of Protestant England; a characteristic tone of thought, a recognized standard of judgment is found in them, which, as developed in the individual who is submitted to it, becomes a twofold source of strength to him, both from the distinct stamp it impresses on his mind, and from the bond of union which it creates between him and others,—effects which are shared by the authorities of the place, for they themselves have been educated in it, and at all times are exposed to the influence of its ethical atmosphere. Here then is a real teaching, whatever be its standards and principles, true or false; and it at

¹ Spirit of the place.

least tends towards cultivation of the intellect, it at least recognizes that knowledge is something more than a sort of passive reception of scraps and details; it is a something, and it does a something, which never will issue from the most strenuous efforts of a set of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions which they dare profess, and with no common principles, who are teaching or questioning a set of youths who do not know them, and do not know each other, on a large number of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philosophy, three times a week, or three times a year, or once in three years, in chill lecture-rooms or on a pompous anniversary.

X

Nay, self-education in any shape, in the most restricted sense, is preferable to a system of teaching which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind. Shut your College gates against the votary of knowledge, throw him back upon the searchings and the efforts of his own mind; he will gain by being spared an entrance into your Babel. Few indeed there are who can dispense with the stimulus and support of instructors, or will do any thing at all, if left to themselves. And fewer still (though such great minds are to be found) who will not, from such unassisted attempts, contract a self-reliance and a self-esteem, which are not only moral evils, but serious hindrances to the attainment of truth. And next to none, perhaps, or none, who will not be reminded from time to time of the disadvantage under which they lie, by their imperfect grounding, by the breaks, deficiencies, and irregularities of their knowledge, by the eccentricity of opinion and the confusion of principle which they exhibit. They will be too often ignorant of what every one knows and takes for granted, of that multitude of small truths which fall upon the mind like dust, impalpable and ever accumulating; they may be unable to converse, they may argue perversely, they may pride themselves on their worst paradoxes or their grossest truisms,

they may be full of their own mode of viewing things, unwilling to be put out of their way, slow to enter into the minds of others;—but, with these and whatever other liabilities upon their heads, they are likely to have more thought, more mind, more philosophy, more true enlargement, than those earnest but ill-used persons, who are forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too much on their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour premise and conclusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who hold whole sciences on faith, and commit demonstrations to memory, and who too often, as might be expected, when their period of education is passed, throw up all they have learned in disgust, having gained nothing really by their anxious labors, except perhaps the habit of application.

Yet such is the better specimen of the fruit of that ambitious system which has of late years been making way among us: for its result on ordinary minds, and on the common run of students, is less satisfactory still; they leave their place of education simply dissipated and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they have never really mastered, and so shallow as not even to know their shallowness. How much better, I say, is it for the active and thoughtful intellect, where such is to be found, to eschew the College and the University altogether, than to submit to a drudgery so ignoble, a mockery so contumelious! How much more profitable for the independent mind, after the mere rudiments of education, to range through a library at random, taking down books as they meet him, and pursuing the trains of thought which his mother wit suggests! How much healthier to wander into the fields, and there with the exiled Prince¹ to find “tongues in the trees, books in the running brooks!” How much more genuine an education is that of the poor boy in the Poem²—a Poem, whether in conception or in execution, one of the most touching in our language—who, not in the wide world, but ranging

¹ Duke Ferdinand in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*.

² Crabbe's *Tales of the Hall*.

day by day around his widowed mother's home, "a dexterous gleaner" in a narrow field, and with only such slender outfit

as the village school and books a few
Supplied,

contrived from the beach, and the quay, and the fisher's boat, and the inn's fireside, and the tradesman's shop, and the shepherd's walk, and the smuggler's hut, and the mossy moor, and the screaming gulls, and the restless waves, to fashion for himself a philosophy and a poetry of his own!

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Explain the special sense in which Newman uses the word "philosophy" in connection with his definition of a university. 2. Take issue with, or defend, Newman's position regarding the difference in the methods and aims of the school and the university. 3. Explain by a series of examples of your own choosing what Newman means by "enlargement of mind" as the object of university training. 4. What is the distinction which Newman makes between liberal knowledge and information? Does he mean that liberal knowledge is to be without information? 5. Do the mistakes that Newman points out as besetting education in his day apply to the present time? 6. Does Newman believe that the student who will not study benefits by his stay at college? What is your position in the matter? 7. Discuss the soundness of Newman's view that private study may be more profitable than work done under teachers. Apply to the correspondence courses of the present time. 8. In study, how large a part should memory play?

THE AIM OF THE LIBERAL COLLEGE¹

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN

[Alexander Meiklejohn (1872—) was for several years professor of philosophy in Brown University. In 1912, he became president of Amherst College. The selection here printed was his inaugural address delivered upon the occasion of his induction into that office. It has become generally recognized as one of the classic statements of the claims of liberal learning.]

In the discussions concerning college education there is one voice which is all too seldom raised and all too often disre-

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garded. It is the voice of the teacher and the scholar, of the member of the college faculty. It is my purpose to devote this address to a consideration of the ideals of the teacher, of the problems of instruction as they present themselves to the men who are giving the instruction. And I do this not because I believe that just now the teachers are wiser than others who are dealing with the same questions, but rather as an expression of a definite conviction with regard to the place of the teacher in our educational scheme. It is, I believe, the function of the teacher to stand before his pupils and before the community at large as the intellectual leader of his time. If he is not able to take this leadership, he is not worthy of his calling. If the leadership is taken from him and given to others, then the very foundations of the scheme of instruction are shaken. He who in matters of teaching must be led by others is not the one to lead the imitative undergraduate, not the one to inspire the confidence and loyalty and discipleship on which all true teaching depends. If there are others who can do these things better than the college teacher of to-day, then we must bring them within the college walls. But if the teacher is to be deemed worthy of his task, then he must be recognized as the teacher of us all, and we must listen to his words as he speaks of the matters entrusted to his charge.

In the consideration of the educational creed of the teacher I will try to give, first, a brief statement of his belief; second, a defense of it against other views of the function of the college; third, an interpretation of its meaning and significance; fourth, a criticism of what seem to me misunderstandings of their own meaning prevalent among the teachers of our day; and, finally, a suggestion of certain changes in policy which must follow if the belief of the teacher is clearly understood and applied in our educational procedure.

I

First, then, What do our teachers believe to be the aim of college instruction? Wherever their opinions and convictions

find expression, there is one contention which is always in the foreground, namely, that to be liberal, a college must be essentially intellectual. It is a place, the teachers tell us, in which a boy, forgetting all things else, may set forth on the enterprise of learning. It is a time when a young man may come to awareness of the thinking of his people, may perceive what knowledge is and has been and is to be. Whatever light-hearted undergraduates may say, whatever the opinions of solicitous parents, of ambitious friends, of employers in search of workmen, of leaders in church or state or business,—whatever may be the beliefs and desires and demands of outsiders,—the teacher within the college, knowing his mission as no one else can know it, proclaims that mission to be the leading of his pupil into the life intellectual. The college is primarily not a place of the body, nor of the feelings, nor even of the will; it is, first of all, a place of the mind.

II

Against this intellectual interpretation of the college our teachers find two sets of hostile forces constantly at work. Outside the walls there are the practical demands of a busy commercial and social scheme; within the college there are the trivial and sentimental and irrational misunderstandings of its own friends. Upon each of these our college teachers are wont to descend as Samson upon the Philistines, and when they have had their will, there is little left for another to accomplish.

As against the immediate practical demands from without, the issue is clear and decisive. College teachers know that the world must have trained workmen, skilled operatives, clever buyers and sellers, efficient directors, resourceful manufacturers, able lawyers, ministers, physicians, and teachers. But it is equally true that in order to do its own work, the liberal college must leave the special and technical training for these trades and professions to be done in other schools and by other methods. In a word, the liberal college does not

pretend to give all the kinds of teaching which a young man of college age may profitably receive; it does not even claim to give all the kinds of intellectual training which are worth giving. It is committed to intellectual training of the liberal type, whatever that may mean, and to that mission it must be faithful. One may safely say, then, on behalf of our college teachers, that their instruction is intended to be radically different from that given in the technical school or even in the professional school. Both these institutions are practical in a sense which the college, as an intellectual institution, is not. In the technical school the pupil is taught how to do some of the mechanical operations which contribute to human welfare. He is trained to print, to weave, to farm, to build; and for the most part he is trained to do these things by practice rather than by theory. His possession when he leaves the school is not a stock of ideas, of scientific principles, but a measure of skill, a collection of rules of thumb. His primary function as a tradesman is not to understand but to do, and in doing what is needed he is following directions which have first been thought out by others and are now practised by him. The technical school intends to furnish training which, in the sense in which we use the term, is not intellectual but practical.

In a corresponding way the work of the professional school differs from that of the liberal college. In the teaching of engineering, medicine, or law we are or may be beyond the realm of mere skill and within the realm of ideas and principles. But the selection and the relating of these ideas is dominated by an immediate practical interest which cuts them off from the intellectual point of view of the scholar. If an undergraduate should take away from his studies of chemistry, biology and psychology only those parts which have immediate practical application in the field of medicine, the college teachers would feel that they had failed to give to the boy the kind of instruction demanded of a college. It is not their purpose to furnish applied knowledge in this sense. They are not willing to cut up their sciences into segments and to allow the student to select those segments which may be of service

in the practice of an art or a profession. In one way or another the teacher feels a kinship with the scientist and the scholar which forbids him to submit to this domination of his instruction by the demands of an immediate practical interest. Whatever it may mean, he intends to hold the intellectual point of view and to keep his students with him if he can. In response, then, to demands for technical and professional training our college teachers tell us that such training may be obtained in other schools; it is not to be had in a college of liberal culture.

In the conflict with the forces within the college our teachers find themselves fighting essentially the same battle as against the foes without. In a hundred different ways the friends of the college, students, graduates, trustees, and even colleagues, seem to them so to misunderstand its mission as to minimize or to falsify its intellectual ideals. The college is a good place for making friends; it gives excellent experience in getting on with men; it has exceptional advantages as an athletic club; it is a relatively safe place for a boy when he first leaves home; on the whole it may improve a student's manners; it gives acquaintance with lofty ideals of character, preaches the doctrine of social service, exalts the virtues and duties of citizenship. All these conceptions seem to the teacher to hide or to obscure the fact that the college is fundamentally a place of the mind, a time for thinking, an opportunity for knowing. And perhaps in proportion to their own loftiness of purpose and motive they are the more dangerous as tending all the more powerfully to replace or to nullify the underlying principle upon which they all depend. Here again when misconception clears away, one can have no doubt that the battle of the teacher is a righteous one. It is well that a boy should have four good years of athletic sport, playing his own game and watching the games of his fellows; it is well that his manners should be improved; it is worth while to make good friends; it is very desirable to develop the power of understanding and working with other men; it is surely good to grow in strength and purity of character, in devotion to the interests of society, in readiness to meet the obligations and

opportunities of citizenship. If any one of these be lacking from the fruits of a college course we may well complain of the harvest. And yet is it not true that by sheer pressure of these, by the driving and pulling of the social forces within and without the college, the mind of the student is constantly torn from its chief concern? Do not our social and practical interests distract our boys from the intellectual achievements which should dominate their imagination and command their zeal? I believe that one may take it as the deliberate judgment of the teachers of our colleges to-day that the function of the college is constantly misunderstood, and that it is subjected to demands which, however friendly in intent, are yet destructive of its intellectual efficiency and success.

III

But now that the contention of the teacher has been stated and reaffirmed against objections, it is time to ask, What does it mean? And how can it be justified? By what right does a company of scholars invite young men to spend with them four years of discipleship? Do they, in their insistence upon the intellectual quality of their ideal, intend to give an education which is avowedly unpractical? If so, how shall they justify their invitation, which may perhaps divert young men from other interests and other companionships which are valuable to themselves and to their fellows? In a word, what is the underlying motive of the teacher, what is there in the intellectual interests and activities which seems to him to warrant their domination over the training and instruction of young men during the college years?

It is no fair answer to this question to summon us to faith in intellectual ideals, to demand of us that we live the life of the mind with confidence in the virtues of intelligence, that we love knowledge and because of our passion follow after it. Most of us are already eager to accept intellectual ideals, but our very devotion to them forbids that we accept them blindly. I have often been struck by the inner contradictoriness of the

demand that we have faith in intelligence. It seems to mean, as it is so commonly made to mean, that we must unintelligently follow intelligence, that we must ignorantly pursue knowledge, that we must question everything except the business of asking questions, that we think about everything except the use of thinking itself. As Mr. F. H. Bradley would say, the dictum, "Have faith in intelligence," is so true that it constantly threatens to become false. Our very conviction of its truth compels us to scrutinize and test it to the end.

How then shall we justify the faith of the teacher? What reason can we give for our exaltation of intellectual training and activity? To this question two answers are possible. First, knowledge and thinking are good in themselves. Secondly, they help us in the attainment of other values in life which without them would be impossible. Both these answers may be given and are given by college teachers. Within them must be found whatever can be said by way of explanation and justification of the work of the liberal college.

The first answer receives just now far less of recognition than it can rightly claim. When the man of the world is told that a boy is to be trained in thinking just because of the joys and satisfactions of thinking itself, just in order that he may go on thinking as long as he lives, the man of the world has been heard to scoff and to ridicule the idle dreaming of scholarly men. But if thinking is not a good thing in itself, if intellectual activity is not worth while for its own sake, will the man of the world tell us what is? There are those among us who find so much satisfaction in the countless trivial and vulgar amusements of a crude people that they have no time for the joys of the mind. There are those who are so closely shut up within a little round of petty pleasures that they have never dreamed of the fun of reading and conversing and investigating and reflecting. And of these one can only say that the difference is one of taste, and that their tastes seem to be relatively dull and stupid. Surely it is one function of the liberal college to save boys from that stupidity, to give them an appetite for the pleasures of thinking, to make them sensitive to the joys of appreciation and under-

standing, to show them how sweet and captivating and wholesome are the games of the mind. At the time when the play element is still dominant it is worth while to acquaint boys with the sport of facing and solving problems. Apart from some of the experiences of friendship and sympathy I doubt if there are any human interests so permanently satisfying, so fine and splendid in themselves, as are those of intellectual activity. To give our boys that zest, that delight in things intellectual, to give them an appreciation of a kind of life which is well worth living, to make them men of intellectual culture—that certainly is one part of the work of any liberal college.

On the other hand, the creation of culture as so defined can never constitute the full achievement of the college. It is essential to awaken the impulses of inquiry, of experiment, of investigation, of reflection, the instinctive cravings of the mind. But no liberal college can be content with this. The impulse to thinking must be questioned and rationalized as must every other instinctive response. It is well to think, but what shall we think about? Are there any lines of investigation and reflection more valuable than others, and if so, how is their value to be tested? Or again, if the impulse for thinking comes into conflict with other desires and cravings, how is the opposition to be solved? It has sometimes been suggested that our man of intellectual culture may be found like Nero fiddling with words while all the world about him is aflame. And the point of the suggestion is not that fiddling is a bad and worthless pastime, but rather that it is inopportune on such an occasion, that the man who does it is out of touch with his situation, that his fiddling does not fit his facts. In a word, men know with regard to thinking, as with regard to every other content of human experience, that it cannot be valued merely in terms of itself. It must be measured in terms of its relation to other contents and to human experience as a whole. Thinking is good in itself,—but what does it cost of other things, what does it bring of other values? Place it amid all the varied contents of our individual and social experience, measure it in terms of what it implies, fix it by means of its relations, and then you will know its worth

not simply in itself but in that deeper sense which comes when human desires are rationalized and human lives are known in their entirety, as well as they can be known by those who are engaged in living them.

In this consideration we find the second answer of the teacher to the demand for justification of the work of the college. Knowledge is good, he tells us, not only in itself, but in its enrichment and enhancement of the other values of our experience. In the deepest and fullest sense of the words, knowledge pays. This statement rests upon the classification of human actions into two groups, those of the instinctive type and those of the intellectual type. By far the greater part of our human acts are carried on without any clear idea of what we are going to do or how we are going to do it. For the most part our responses to our situations are the immediate responses of feeling, of perception, of custom, of tradition. But slowly and painfully, as the mind has developed, action after action has been translated from the feeling to the ideational type; in wider and wider fields men have become aware of their own modes of action, more and more they have come to understanding, to knowledge of themselves and of their needs. And the principle underlying all our educational procedure is that, on the whole, actions become more successful as they pass from the sphere of feeling to that of understanding. Our educational belief is that in the long run if men know what they are going to do and how they are going to do it, and what is the nature of the situation with which they are dealing, their response to that situation will be better adjusted and more beneficial than are the responses of the feeling type in like situations.

It is all too obvious that there are limits to the validity of this principle. If men are to investigate, to consider, to decide, then action must be delayed and we must pay the penalty of waiting. If men are to endeavor to understand and know their situations, then we must be prepared to see them make mistakes in their thinking, lose their certainty of touch, wander off into pitfalls and illusions and fallacies of thought, and in

consequence secure for the time results far lower in value than those of the instinctive response which they seek to replace. The delays and mistakes and uncertainties of our thinking are a heavy price to pay, but it is the conviction of the teacher that the price is as nothing when compared with the goods which it buys. You may point out to him the loss when old methods of procedure give way before the criticism of understanding, you may remind him of the pain and suffering when old habits of thought and action are replaced, you may reprove him for all the blunders of the past; but in spite of it all he knows and you know that in human lives taken separately and in human life as a whole men's greatest lack is the lack of understanding, their greatest hope to know themselves and the world in which they live.

Within the limits of this general educational principle the place of the liberal college may easily be fixed. In the technical school pupils are prepared for a specific work and are kept for the most part on the plane of perpetual action, doing work which others understand. In the professional school, students are properly within the realm of ideas and principles, but they are still limited to a specific human interest with which alone their understanding is concerned. But the college is called liberal as against both of these because the instruction is dominated by no special interest, is limited to no single task, but is intended to take human activity as a whole, to understand human endeavors not in their isolation but in their relations to one another and to the total experience which we call the life of our people. And just as we believe that the building of ships has become more successful as men have come to a knowledge of the principles involved in their construction; just as the practice of medicine has become more successful as we have come to a knowledge of the human body, of the conditions within it and the influences without;—just so the teacher in the liberal college believes that life as a total enterprise, life as it presents itself to each one of us in his career as an individual, —human living,—will be more successful in so far as men come to understand it and to know it as they attempt to carry it

on. To give boys an intellectual grasp on human experience—this it seems to me is the teacher's conception of the chief function of the liberal college.

May I call attention to the fact that this second answer of the teacher defines the aim of the college as avowedly and frankly practical. Knowledge is to be sought chiefly for the sake of its contribution to the other activities of human living. But on the other hand, it is as definitely declared that in method the college is fully and unreservedly intellectual. If we can see that these two demands are not in conflict but that they stand together in the harmonious relation of means and ends of instrument and achievement, of method and result, we may escape many a needless conflict and keep our educational policy in singleness of aim and action. To do this we must show that the college is intellectual, not as opposed to practical interests and purposes, but as opposed to unpractical and unwise methods of work. The issue is not between practical and intellectual aims but between the immediate and the remote aim, between the hasty and the measured procedure, between the demand for results at once and the willingness to wait for the best results. The intellectual road to success is longer and more roundabout than any other, but they who are strong and willing for the climbing are brought to higher levels of achievement than they could possibly have attained had they gone straight forward in the pathway of quick returns. If this were not true the liberal college would have no proper place in our life at all. In so far as it is true, the college has a right to claim the best of our young men to give them its preparation for the living they are to do.

IV

But now that we have attempted to interpret the intellectual mission of the college, it may be fair to ask, "Are the teachers and scholars of our day always faithful to that mission? Do their statements and their practice always ring in accord with the principle which has been stated?" It seems

to me that at two points they are constantly off the key, constantly at variance with the reasons by which alone their teaching can be justified.

In the first place, it often appears as if our teachers and scholars were deliberately in league to mystify and befog the popular mind regarding this practical value of intellectual work. They seem not to wish too much said about the results and benefits. Their desire is to keep aloft the intellectual banner, to proclaim the intellectual gospel, to demand of student and public alike adherence to the faith. And in general when they are questioned as to results they give little satisfaction except to those who are already pledged to unwavering confidence in their *ipse dixits*. And largely as a result of this attitude the American people seem to me to have little understanding of the intellectual work of the college. Our citizens and patrons can see the value of games and physical exercises; they readily perceive the importance of the social give and take of a college democracy; they can appreciate the value of studies which prepare a young man for his profession and so anticipate or replace the professional school; they can even believe that if a boy is kept at some sort of thinking for four years his mind may become more acute, more systematic, more accurate, and hence more useful than it was before. But as for the content of a college course as for the value of knowledge, what a boy gains by knowing Greek or economics, philosophy or literature, history or biology, except as they are regarded as having professional usefulness, I think our friends are in the dark and are likely to remain so until we turn on the light. When our teachers say, as they sometimes do say, that the effect of knowledge upon the character and life of the student must always be for the college an accident, a circumstance which has no essential connection with its real aim or function, then it seems to me that our educational policy is wholly out of joint. If there be no essential connection between instruction and life, then there is no reason for giving instruction except in so far as it is pleasant in itself, and we have no educational policy at all. As against this hesitancy, this absence of a conviction,

we men of the college should declare in clear and unmistakable terms our creed—the creed that knowledge is justified by its results. We should say to our people so plainly that they cannot misunderstand, “Give us your boys, give us the means we need, and we will so train and inform the minds of those boys that their own lives and the lives of the men about them shall be more successful than they could be without our training. Give us our chance and we will show your boys what human living is, for we are convinced that they can live better in knowledge than they can in ignorance.”

There is a second wandering from the faith which is so common among investigators that it may fairly be called the “fallacy of the scholar.” It is the belief that all knowledge is so good that all parts of knowledge are equally good. Ask many of our scholars and teachers what subjects a boy should study in order that he may gain insight for human living, and they will say, “It makes no difference in what department of knowledge he studies; let him go into Sanscrit or bacteriology, into mathematics or history; if only he goes where men are actually dealing with intellectual problems, and if only he learns how to deal with problems himself, the aim of education is achieved, he has entered into intellectual activity.” This point of view, running through all the varieties of the elective system, seems to me hopelessly at variance with any sound educational doctrine. It represents the scholar of the day at his worst both as a thinker and as a teacher. In so far as it dominates a group of college teachers it seems to me to render them unfit to determine and to administer a college curriculum. It is an announcement that they have no guiding principles in their educational practice, no principles of selection in their arrangement of studies, no genuine grasp on the relationship between knowledge and life. It is the concerted statement of a group of men each of whom is lost within the limits of his own special studies, and who as a group seem not to realize the organic relationships between them nor the common task which should bind them together.

In bringing this second criticism against our scholars I am not urging that the principle of election of college studies should

be entirely discontinued. But I should like to inquire by what right and within what limits it is justified. The most familiar argument in its favor is that if a student is allowed to choose along the lines of his own intellectual or professional interest he will have enthusiasm, the eagerness which comes with the following of one's own bent. Now just so far as this result is achieved, just so far as the quality of scholarship is improved, the procedure is good and we may follow it if we do not thereby lose other results more valuable than our gain. But if the special interest comes into conflict with more fundamental ones, if what the student prefers is opposed to what he ought to prefer, then we of the college cannot leave the choice with him. We must say to him frankly, "If you do not care for liberal training you had better go elsewhere; we have a special and definite task assigned us which demands that we keep free from the domination of special or professional pursuits. So long as we are faithful to that task we cannot give you what you ask."

In my opinion, however, the fundamental motive of the elective system is not the one which has been mentioned. In the last resort our teachers allow students to choose their own studies not in order to appeal to intellectual or to professional interest, but because they themselves have no choice of their own in which they believe with sufficient intensity to impose it upon their pupils. And this lack of a dominating educational policy is in turn an expression of an intellectual attitude, a point of view, which marks the scholars of our time. In a word, it seems to me that our willingness to allow students to wander about in the college curriculum is one of the most characteristic expressions of a certain intellectual agnosticism, a kind of intellectual bankruptcy, into which, in spite of all our wealth of information, the spirit of the time has fallen. Let me explain my meaning.

The old classical curriculum was founded by men who had a theory of the world and of human life. They had taken all the available content of human knowledge and had wrought it together into a coherent whole. What they knew was, as judged by our standards, very little in amount. But upon that little

content they had expended all the infinite pains of understanding and interpretation. They had taken the separate judgments of science, philosophy, history, and the arts, and had so welded them together, so established their relationships with one another, so freed them from contradictions and ambiguities that, so far as might be in their day and generation, human life as a whole and the world about us were known, were understood, were rationalized. They had a knowledge of human experience by which they could live and which they could teach to others engaged in the activities of living.

But with the invention of methods of scientific investigation and discovery there came pouring into the mind of Europe great masses of intellectual material,—astronomy, physics, chemistry. This content for a time it could not understand, could not relate to what it already knew. The old boundary lines did not enclose the new fields, the old explanations and interpretations would not fit the new facts. Knowledge had not grown, it had simply been enlarged, and the two masses of content, the old and the new, stood facing each other with no common ground of understanding. Here was the intellectual task of the great leaders of the early modern thought of Europe: to re-establish the unity of knowledge, to discover the relationships between these apparently hostile bodies of judgments, to know the world again, but with all the added richness of the new insights and the new information. This was the work of Leibnitz and Spinoza, of Kant and Hegel, and those who labored with them. And in a very considerable measure the task had been accomplished, order had been restored. But again with the inrush of the newer discoveries, first in the field of biology and then later in the world of human relationships, the difficulties have returned, multiplied a thousand fold. Every day sees a new field of facts opened up, a new method of investigation invented, a new department of knowledge established. And in the rush of it all these new sciences come merely as additions, not to be understood but simply numbered, not to be interpreted but simply listed in the great collection of separate fields of knowledge. If you will examine the work of any scientist within one of these

fields you will find him ordering, systematizing, reducing to principles, in a word, knowing every fact in terms of its relation to every other fact and to the whole field within which it falls. But at the same time these separate sciences, these separate groups of judgment, are left standing side by side with no intelligible connections, no establishment of relationships, no interpretation in the sense in which we insist upon it with each of the fields taken by itself. Is it not the characteristic statement of a scholar of our time to say, "I do not know what may be the ultimate significance of these facts and these principles; all that I know is that if you will follow my methods within my field you will find the facts coming into order, the principles coming into simple and coherent arrangement. With any problems apart from this order and this arrangement I have intellectually no concern."

It has become an axiom with us that the genuine student labors within his own field. And if the student ventures forth to examine the relations of his field to the surrounding country he very easily becomes a popularizer, a *litterateur*, a speculator, and worst of all, unscientific. Now I do not object to a man's minding his own intellectual business if he chooses to do so, but when a man minds his own business because he does not know any other business, because he has no knowledge whatever of the relationships which justify his business and make it worth while, then I think one may say that though such a man minds his own affairs he does not know them, he does not understand them. Such a man, from the point of view of the demands of a liberal education, differs in no essential respect from the tradesman who does not understand his trade or the professional man who merely practices his profession. Just as truly as they, he is shut up within a special interest; just as truly as they, he is making no intellectual attempt to understand his experience in its unity. And the pity of it is that more and more the chairs in our colleges are occupied by men who have only this special interest, this specialized information, and it is through them that we attempt to give our boys a liberal education, which the teachers themselves have not achieved,

I should not like to be misunderstood in making this railing accusation against our teachers and our time. If I say that our knowledge is at present a collection of scattered observations about the world rather than an understanding of it, fairness compels the admission that the failure is due to the inherent difficulties of the situation and to the novelty of the problems presented. If I cry out against the agnosticism of our people it is not as one who has escaped from it, nor as one who would point the way back to the older synthesis, but simply as one who believes that the time has come for a reconstruction, for a new synthesis. We have had time enough now to get some notion of our bearings, shocks enough to get over our nervousness and discomfiture when a new one comes along. It is the opportunity and the obligation of this generation to think through the content of our knowing once again, to understand it, so far as we can. And in such a battle as this, surely it is the part of the college to take the lead. Here is the mission of the college teacher as of no other member of our common life. Surely he should stand before his pupils and before all of us as a man who has achieved some understanding of this human situation of ours, but more than that, as one who is eager for the conflict with the powers of darkness and who can lead his pupils in enthusiastic devotion to the common cause of enlightenment.

V

And now, finally, after these attacks upon the policies which other men have derived from their love of knowledge, may I suggest two matters of policy which seem to me to follow from the definition of education which we have taken. The first concerns the content of the college course; the second has to do with the method of its presentation to the undergraduate.

We have said that the system of free election is natural for those to whom knowledge is simply a number of separate departments. It is equally true that just in so far as knowledge attains unity, just so far as the relations of the various departments are perceived, freedom of election by the student must be limited.

For it at once appears that on the one side there are vast ranges of information which have virtually no significance for the purposes of a liberal education, while on the other hand there are certain elements so fundamental and vital that without any one of them a liberal education is impossible.

I should like to indicate certain parts of human knowledge which seem to me so essential that no principle of election should ever be allowed to drive them out of the course of any college student.

First, a student should become acquainted with the fundamental motives and purposes and beliefs which, clearly, or unclearly recognized, underlie all human experience and bind it together. He must perceive the moral strivings, the intellectual endeavors, the esthetic experiences of his race, and closely linked with these, determining and determined by them, the beliefs about the world which have appeared in our systems of religion. To investigate this field, to bring it to such clearness of formulation as may be possible, is the task of philosophy—an essential element in any liberal education. Secondly, as in human living, our motives, purposes, and beliefs have found expression in institutions,—those concerted modes of procedure by which we work together,—a student should be made acquainted with these. He should see and appreciate what is intended, what accomplished, and what left undone by such institutions as property, the courts, the family, the church, the mill. To know these as contributing and failing to contribute to human welfare is the work of our social or humanistic sciences, into which a boy must go on his way through the liberal college. Thirdly, in order to understand the motives and the institutions of human life one must know the conditions which surround it, the stage on which the game is played. To give this information is the business of astronomy, geology, physics, chemistry, biology and the other descriptive sciences. These a boy must know, so far as they are significant and relevant to his purpose. Fourthly, as all three of these factors, the motives, the institutions, the natural processes have sprung from the past and have come to be what they are by change upon change in the process of time,

the student of human life must try to learn the sequence of events from which the present has come. The development of human thought and attitude, the development of human institutions, the development of the world and of the beings about us—all these must be known, as throwing light upon present problems, present instrumentalities, present opportunities in the life of human endeavor. And in addition to these four studies which render human experience in terms of abstract ideas, a liberal education must take account of those concrete representations of life which are given in the arts, and especially in the art of literature. It is well that a boy should be acquainted with his world not simply as expressed by the principles of knowledge but also as depicted by the artist with all the vividness and definiteness which are possible in the portrayal of individual beings in individual relationships. These five elements, then, a young man must take from a college of liberal training, the contributions of philosophy, of humanistic science, of natural science, of history, and of literature. So far as knowledge is concerned, these at least he should have, welded together in some kind of interpretation of his own experience and of the world in which he lives.

My second suggestion is that our college curriculum should be so arranged and our instruction so devised that its vital connection with the living of men should be obvious even to an undergraduate. A little while ago I heard one of the most prominent citizens of this country speaking of his college days, and he said, "I remember so vividly those few occasions on which the professor would put aside the books and talk like a real man about real things." Oh, the bitterness of those words to the teacher! Our books are not dealing with the real things, and for the most part we are not real men either, but just old fogies and bookworms. And to be perfectly frank about the whole matter, I believe that in large measure our pupils are indifferent to their studies simply because they do not see that these are important.

Now if we really have a vital course of study to present I believe that this difficulty can in large measure be overcome.

It is possible to make a freshman realize the need of translating his experience from the forms of feeling to those of ideas. He can and he ought to be shown that now, his days of mere tutelage being over, it is time for him to face the problems of his people, to begin to think about those problems for himself, to learn what other men have learned and thought before him; in a word, to get himself ready to take his place among those who are responsible for the guidance of our common life by ideas and principles and purposes. If this could be done, I think we should get from the reality-loving American boy something like an intellectual enthusiasm, something of the spirit that comes when he plays a game that seems to him really worth playing. But I do not believe that this result can be achieved without a radical reversal of the arrangement of the college curriculum. I should like to see every freshman at once plunged into the problems of philosophy, into the difficulties and perplexities about our institutions, into the scientific accounts of the world especially as they bear on human life, into the portrayals of human experience which are given by the masters of literature. If this were done by proper teaching, it seems to me the boy's college course would at once take on significance for him; he would understand what he is about; and though he would be a sadly puzzled boy at the end of the first year, he would still have before him three good years of study, of investigation, of reflection, and of discipleship, in which to achieve, so far as may be, the task to which he has been set. Let him once feel the problems of the present, and his historical studies will become significant; let him know what other men have discovered and thought about his problems, and he will be ready to deal with them himself. But in any case, the whole college course will be unified and dominated by a single interest, a single purpose,—that of so understanding human life as to be ready and equipped for the practice of it. And this would mean for the college, not another seeking of the way of quick returns, but rather an escape from aimless wanderings in the mere by-paths of knowledge, a resolute climbing on the high road to a unified grasp upon human experience.

I have taken so much of your time this morning that an apology seems due for the things I have omitted to mention. I have said nothing of the organization of the college, nothing of the social life of the students, nothing of the relations with the alumni, nothing of the needs and qualifications of the teachers, and even within the consideration of the course of study, nothing of the value of specialization or of the disciplinary subjects or of the training in language and expression. And I have put these aside deliberately, for the sake of a cause which is greater than any of them—a cause which lies at the very heart of the liberal college. It is the cause of making clear to the American people the mission of the teacher, of convincing them of the value of knowledge: not the specialized knowledge which contributes to immediate practical aims, but the unified understanding which is Insight.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Take issue with, or defend, the view that the teacher is the one best qualified to give opinion on matters of educational practice.
2. Explain the difference between a liberal college and a technical or a professional school. Illustrate by well-known institutions.
3. Show how the student activities of college life may contribute to the training which is the object of the college.
4. "Apart from some of the experiences of friendship and sympathy I doubt if there are any human interests as permanently satisfying, so fine and splendid in themselves, as are those of intellectual activity" (page 39). Discuss friendship, sympathy, and intellectual activity as the three great human experiences. Should any others be added to them?
5. Compare the views on specialization expressed in this selection with those expressed in the selection, *Specialization*, page 145.
6. How satisfactory is the statement of the five "elements" (page 49) which the student of the liberal college should have as the constituents of his course?
7. Select some study which you think should have reality for you but which you have found to lack this quality in your experience with it. Indicate what your difficulties have been.

THE NEW DEFINITION OF THE CULTIVATED MAN ¹

CHARLES WILLIAM ELIOT

[Charles William Eliot (1834—) has been one of the foremost figures in American education for a great many years. During the larger part of his career as an educator, he was president of Harvard College, retiring in 1909 as president emeritus. He has written widely on educational topics, and has exerted a powerful influence in the shaping of the tendencies of American education of the present. This selection was delivered originally as a presidential address before the National Education Association.]

To produce the cultivated man, or at least the man capable of becoming cultivated in after-life, has long been supposed to be one of the fundamental objects of systematic and thorough education. The ideal of general cultivation has been one of the standards in education. It is often asked: Will the education which a given institution is supplying 'produce the cultivated man? Or, Can cultivation be the result of a given course of study? In such questions there is an implication that the education which does not produce the cultivated man is a failure, or has been misconceived, or misdirected. Now, if cultivation were an unchanging ideal, the steady use of the conception as a permanent test of educational processes might be justified; but if the cultivated man of to-day is, or ought to be, a distinctly different creature from the cultivated man of a century ago, the ideal of cultivation cannot be appealed to as a standard without preliminary explanations and interpretations. It is the object of this paper to show that the idea of cultivation in the highly trained human being has undergone substantial changes during the nineteenth century.

I ought to say at once that I propose to use the term "cultivated man" in only its good sense—in Emerson's sense. In this paper, he is not to be a weak, critical, fastidious creature,

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vain of a little exclusive information or of an uncommon knack in Latin verse or mathematical logic; he is to be a man of quick perceptions, broad sympathies, and wide affinities; responsive, but independent; self-reliant, but deferential; loving truth and candor, but also moderation and proportion; courageous, but gentle; not finished, but perfecting. All authorities agree that true culture is not exclusive, sectarian, or partisan, but the very opposite; that it is not to be attained in solitude, but in society; and that the best atmosphere for culture is that of a school, university, academy, or church, where many pursue together the ideals of truth, righteousness, and love.

Here someone may think: This process of cultivation is evidently a long, slow, artificial process; I prefer the genius, the man of native power or skill, the man whose judgment is sound and influence strong, though he cannot read or write—the born inventor, orator, or poet. So do we all. Men have always revered prodigious inborn gifts, and always will. Indeed, barbarous men always say of the possessors of such gifts: These are not men, they are gods. But we teachers, who carry on a system of popular education which is by far the most complex and valuable invention of the nineteenth century, know that we have to do, not with the highly gifted units, but with the millions who are more or less capable of being cultivated by the long, patient, artificial training called education. For us and our system the genius is no standard, but the cultivated man is. To his stature we and many of our pupils may in time attain.

There are two principal differences between the present ideal of cultivation and that which prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. All thinkers agree that the horizon of the human intellect has widened wonderfully during the past hundred years, and that the scientific method of inquiry, which was known to but very few when the nineteenth century began, has been the means of that widening. This method has become indispensable in all fields of inquiry, including psychology, philanthropy, and religion; and therefore intimate acquaintance with it has become an indispensable element in culture. As

Matthew Arnold pointed out more than a generation ago, educated mankind is governed by two passions—one the passion for pure knowledge, the other the passion for being of service or doing good. Now, the passion for pure knowledge is to be gratified only through the scientific method of inquiry. In Arnold's phrases, the first step for every aspirant to culture is to endeavor to see things as they are or "to learn, in short, the will of God." The second step is to make that will prevail, each in his own sphere of action and influence. This recognition of science as pure knowledge, and of the scientific method as the universal method of inquiry, is the great addition made by the nineteenth century to the idea of culture. I need not say that within that century what we call science, pure and applied, has transformed the world as the scene of the human drama; and that it is this transformation which has compelled the recognition of natural science as a fundamental necessity in liberal education. The most convinced exponents and advocates of humanism now recognize that science is the "paramount force of the modern as distinguished from the antique and the medieval spirit,"¹ and that "an interpenetration of humanism with science and of science with humanism is the condition of the highest culture."

A second modification of the earlier idea of cultivation was advocated by Ralph Waldo Emerson more than two generations ago. He taught that the acquisition of some form of manual skill and the practice of some form of manual labor were essential elements of culture. This idea has more and more become accepted in the systematic education of youth; and if we include athletic sports among the desirable forms of manual skill and labor, we may say that during the last thirty years this element of excellence of body in the ideal of education has had a rapid, even an exaggerated, development. The idea of some sort of bodily excellence was, to be sure, not absent in the old conception of the cultivated man. The gentleman could ride well, dance gracefully, and fence with skill. But the modern conception of bodily skill as an element in cultivation

¹ John Addington Symonds, *Culture*.

is more comprehensive, and includes that habitual contact with the external world which Emerson deemed essential to real culture. We have lately become convinced that accurate work with carpenters' tools, or lathe, or hammer and anvil, or violin, or piano, or pencil, or crayon, or camel's-hair brush, trains well the same nerves and ganglia with which we do what is ordinarily called thinking. We have also become convinced that some intimate, sympathetic acquaintance with the natural objects of the earth and sky adds greatly to the happiness of life, and that this acquaintance should be begun in childhood and be developed all through adolescence and maturity. A brook, a hedgerow, or a garden is an inexhaustible teacher of wonder, reverence, and love. The scientists insist to-day on nature study for children; but we teachers ought long ago to have learned from the poets the value of this element in education. They are the best advocates of nature study. If any here are not convinced of its worth, let them go to Theocritus, Virgil, Wordsworth, Tennyson, or Lowell for the needed demonstration. Let them observe, too, that a great need of modern industrial society is intellectual pleasures, or pleasures which, like music, combine delightful sensations with the gratifications of observation, association, memory, and sympathy. The idea of culture has always included a quick and wide sympathy with men; it should hereafter include sympathy with nature, and particularly with its living forms, a sympathy based on some accurate observation of nature. The bookworm, the monk, the isolated student, has never been the type of the cultivated man. Society has seemed the natural setting for the cultivated person, man or woman; but the present conception of real culture contains not only a large development of this social element, but also an extension of interest and reverence to the animate creation and to those immense forces that set the earthly stage for man and all related beings.

Let us now proceed to examine some of the changes in the idea of culture, or in the available means of culture, which the last hundred years have brought about.

I

The moral sense of the modern world makes character a more important element than it used to be in the ideal of a cultivated man. Now, character is formed, as Goethe said, in the "stream of the world"—not in stillness or isolation, but in the quick-flowing tides of the busy world, the world of nature and the world of mankind. At the end of the nineteenth century the world was wonderfully different from the world at the beginning of that eventful period; and, moreover, men's means of making acquaintance with the world were vastly ampler than they were a hundred years earlier. To the old idea of culture some knowledge of history was indispensable. Now, history is a representation of the stream of the world, or of some little portion of that stream, one hundred, five hundred, two thousand years ago. Acquaintance with some part of the present stream ought to be more formative of character, and more instructive as regards external nature and the nature of man, than any partial survey of the stream that was flowing centuries ago. We have, then, through the present means of reporting the stream of the world from day to day, material for culture such as no preceding generation of men has possessed. The cultivated man or woman must use the means which steam and electricity have provided for reporting the play of physical forces and of human volitions which make the world of to-day; for the world of to-day supplies in its immense variety a picture of all stages of human progress, from the stone age, through savagery, barbarism, and medievalism, to what we now call civilization. The rising generation should think hard, and feel keenly, just where the men and women who constitute the actual human world are thinking and feeling most to-day. The panorama of to-day's events is not an accurate or complete picture, for history will supply posterity with much evidence which is hidden from the eyes of contemporaries; but it is nevertheless an invaluable and a new means of developing good judgment, good feeling, and the passion for social service; or, in other words, of securing cultivation. But someone will say:

The stream of the world is foul. True in part. The stream is, what it has been, a mixture of foulness and purity, of meanness and majesty; but it has nourished individual virtue and race civilization. Literature and history are a similar mixture, and yet are the traditional means of culture. Are not the Greek tragedies means of culture? Yet they are all full of incest, murder, and human sacrifices to lustful and revengeful gods.

II

A cultivated man should express himself by tongue or pen with some accuracy and elegance; therefore linguistic training has had great importance in the idea of cultivation. The conditions of the educated world have, however, changed so profoundly since the revival of learning in Italy that our inherited ideas concerning training in language and literature have required large modifications. In the year 1400 it might have been said with truth that there was but one language of scholars, the Latin, and but two great literatures, the Hebrew and the Greek. Since that time, however, other great literatures have arisen, the Italian, Spanish, French, German, and above all the English, which has become incomparably the most extensive and various and the noblest of literatures. Under these circumstances it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of any particular literature is indispensable to culture. Yet we cannot but feel that the cultivated man ought to possess a considerable acquaintance with the literature of some great language, and the power to use the native language in a pure and interesting way. Thus, we are not sure that Robert Burns could be properly described as a cultivated man, moving poet though he was. We do not think of Abraham Lincoln as a cultivated man, master of English speech and writing though he was. These men do not correspond to the type represented by the word "cultivated," but belong in the class of geniuses. When we ask ourselves why a knowledge of literature seems indispensable to the ordinary idea of cultivation, we find no answer except this, that in literature are portrayed all human passions, desires,

and aspirations, and that acquaintance with these human feelings, and with the means of portraying them, seems to us essential to culture. These human qualities and powers are also the commonest ground of interesting human intercourse, and therefore literary knowledge exalts the quality and enhances the enjoyment of human intercourse. It is in conversation that cultivation tells as much as anywhere, and this rapid exchange of thoughts is by far the commonest manifestation of its power. Combine the knowledge of literature with knowledge of the "stream of the world," and you have united two large sources of the influence of the cultivated person. The linguistic and literary element in cultivation therefore abides, but has become vastly broader than formerly; so broad, indeed, that selection among its various fields is forced upon every educated youth.

III

The next great element in cultivation to which I ask your attention is acquaintance with some part of the store of knowledge which humanity in its progress from barbarism has acquired and laid up. This is the prodigious store of recorded, rationalized, and systematized discoveries, experiences, and ideas. This is the store which we teachers try to pass on to the rising generation. The capacity to assimilate this store and improve it in each successive generation is the distinction of the human race over other animals. It is too vast for any man to master, though he had a hundred lives instead of one; and its growth in the nineteenth century was greater than in all the thirty preceding centuries put together. In the eighteenth century a diligent student, with quick powers of apprehension and strong memory, need not have despaired of mastering a large fraction of this store of knowledge. Long before the end of the nineteenth century such a task had become impossible. Culture, therefore, can no longer imply a knowledge of everything—not even a little knowledge of everything. It must be content with general knowledge of some things, and a real mastery of some small portion of the human store. Here is a profound modification of

the idea of cultivation which the nineteenth century has brought about. What portion or portions of the infinite human store are most proper to the cultivated man? The answer must be: Those which enable him, with his individual personal qualities, to deal best and sympathize most with nature and with other human beings. It is here that the passion for service must fuse with the passion for knowledge. It is natural to imagine that the young man who has acquainted himself with economics, the science of government, sociology, and the history of civilization in its motives, objects, and methods, has a better chance of fusing the passion for knowledge with the passion for doing good than the man whose passion for pure knowledge leads him to the study of chemical or physical phenomena, or of the habits and climatic distribution of plants or animals. Yet, so intricate are the relations of human beings to the animate and inanimate creation that it is impossible to foresee with what realms of nature intense human interest may prove to be identified. Thus the generation now on the stage has suddenly learned that some of the most sensitive and exquisite human interests, such as health or disease and life or death for those we love, are bound up with the life-histories of parasites on the blood corpuscles or of certain varieties of mosquitos and ticks. When the spectra of the sun, stars, and other lights began to be studied, there was not the slightest anticipation that a cure for one of the most horrible diseases to which mankind is liable might be found in the X-rays. While, then, we can still see that certain subjects afford more obvious or frequent access to means of doing good and to fortunate intercourse with our fellows than other subjects, we have learned from nineteenth-century experience that there is no field of real knowledge which may not suddenly prove contributory in a high degree to human happiness and the progress of civilization, and therefore acceptable as a worthy element in the truest culture.

IV

The only other element in cultivation which time will permit me to treat is the training of the constructive imagina-

tion. The imagination is the greatest of human powers, no matter in what field it works—in art or literature, in mechanical invention, in science, government, commerce, or religion; and the training of the imagination is, therefore, far the most important part of education. I use the term “constructive imagination” because that implies the creation or building of a new thing. The sculptor, for example, imagines or conceives the perfect form of a child ten years of age. He has never seen such a thing, for a child perfect in form is never produced; he has only seen in different children the elements of perfection, here one element and there another. In his imagination he combines these elements of the perfect form, which he has only seen separated, and from this picture in his mind he carves the stone, and in the execution invariably loses his ideal—that is, falls short of it, or fails to express it. Sir Joshua Reynolds points out that the painter can picture only what he has somewhere seen; but that the more he has seen and noted, the surer he is to be original in his painting, because his imaginary combinations will be original. Constructive imagination is the great power of the poet as well as of the artist; and the nineteenth century has convinced us that it is also the great power of the man of science, the investigator, and the natural philosopher. What gives every great naturalist or physicist his epoch-making results is precisely the imaginative power by which he deduces from masses of fact the guiding hypothesis or principle.

The educated world needs to recognize the new varieties of constructive imagination. Dante gave painful years to picturing on many pages of his immortal comedy of hell, purgatory, and paradise the most horrible monsters and tortures, and the most loathsome and noisome abominations that his fervid imagination could concoct out of his own bitter experiences and the manners and customs of his cruel times. Sir Charles Lyell spent many laborious years in searching for and putting together the scattered evidences that the geological processes by which the crust of the earth has been made ready for the use of man have been, in the main, not catastrophic, but gradual and gentle; and that the forces which have been in action

through past ages are, for the most part, similar to those we may see to-day eroding hills, cutting cañons, making placers, marshes, and meadows, and forming prairie and ocean floors. He first imagined, and then demonstrated, that the geologic agencies are not explosive and cataclysmal, but steady and patient. These two kinds of imagination—Dante's and Lyell's—are not comparable, but both are manifestations of great human power. Zola in *La Bête humaine* contrives that ten persons, all connected with the railroad from Paris to Havre, shall be either murderers, or murdered, or both, within eighteen months; and he adds two railroad slaughters criminally procured. The conditions of time and place are ingeniously imagined, and no detail is omitted which can heighten the effect of the homicidal fiction. Contrast this kind of constructive imagination with the kind which conceived the great wells sunk in the solid rock below Niagara that contain the turbines, that drive the dynamos, that generate the electric force that turns thousands of wheels and lights thousands of lamps over hundreds of square miles of adjoining territory; or with the kind which conceives the sending of human thoughts across three thousand miles of stormy sea instantaneously on nothing more substantial than ethereal waves. There is no crime, cruelty, or lust about these last two sorts of imagining. No lurid fire of hell or human passion illumines their scenes. They are calm, accurate, just, and responsible; and nothing but beneficence and increased human well-being results from them. There is going to be room in the hearts of twentieth-century men for a high admiration of these kinds of imagination, as well as for that of the poet, artist, or dramatist.

Another kind of imagination deserves a moment's consideration—the receptive imagination which entertains and holds fast the visions genius creates or the analogies of nature suggest. A young woman is absorbed for hours in conning the squalid scenes and situations through which Thackeray portrays the malign motives and unclean soul of Becky Sharp. Another young woman watches for days the pairing, nesting, brooding, and foraging of two robins that have established home and

family in the notch of a maple near her window. She notes the unselfish labors of the father and mother for each other and for their little ones, and weaves into the simple drama all sorts of protective instincts and human affections. Here are two employments for the receptive imagination. Shall systematic education compel the first, but make no room for the second? The increasing attention to nature study suggests the hope that the imaginative study of human ills and woes is not to be allowed to exclude the imaginative study of nature, and that both studies may count toward culture.

It is one lesson of the nineteenth century, then, that in every field of human knowledge the constructive imagination finds play—in literature, in history, in theology, in anthropology, and in the whole field of physical and biological research. That great century has taught us that, on the whole, the scientific imagination is quite as productive for human service as the literary or poetic imagination. The imagination of Darwin or Pasteur, for example, is as high and productive a form of imagination as that of Dante, or Goethe, or even Shakespeare, if we regard the human uses which result from the exercise of imaginative powers, and mean by human uses not merely meat and drink, clothes and shelter, but also the satisfaction of mental and spiritual needs. We must, therefore, allow in our contemplation of the cultivated man a large expansion of the fields in which the cultivated imagination may be exercised. We must extend our training of the imagination beyond literature and the fine arts, to history, philosophy, science, government, and sociology. We must recognize the prodigious variety of fruits of the imagination that the nineteenth century has given to our race.

It results from this brief survey that the elements and means of cultivation are much more numerous than they used to be; so that it is not wise to say of any one acquisition or faculty: With it cultivation becomes possible; without it, impossible. The one acquisition or faculty may be immense, and yet cultivation may not have been attained. Thus, it is obvious that a man may have a wide acquaintance with music, and possess

great musical skill and that wonderful imaginative power which conceives delicious melodies and harmonies for the delight of mankind through centuries, and yet not be a cultivated man in the ordinary acceptation of the words. We have met artists who were rude and uncouth, yet possessed a high degree of technical skill and strong powers of imagination. We have seen philanthropists and statesmen whose minds have played on great causes and great affairs, and yet who lacked a correct use of their native language, and had no historical perspective or background of historical knowledge. On the other hand, is there any single acquisition or faculty which is essential to culture, except, indeed, a reasonably accurate and refined use of the mother-tongue? Again, though we can discern in different individuals different elements of the perfect type of cultivated man, we seldom find combined in any human being all the elements of the type. Here, as in painting or sculpture, we make up our ideal from traits picked out from many imperfect individuals and put together. We must not, therefore, expect systematic education to produce multitudes of highly cultivated and symmetrically developed persons; the multitudinous product will always be imperfect, just as there are no perfect trees, animals, flowers, or crystals.

It has been my object this evening to point out that our conception of the type of cultivated man has been greatly enlarged, and on the whole exalted, by observation of the experiences of mankind during the last hundred years. Let us as teachers accept no single element or kind of culture as the one essential; let us remember that the best fruits of real culture are an open mind, broad sympathies, and respect for all the diverse achievements of the human intellect at whatever stage of development they may actually be—the stage of fresh discovery, or bold exploration, or complete conquest. Let us remember that the moral elements of the new education are individual choice of studies and career among a great, new variety of studies and careers, early responsibility accompanying this freedom of choice, love of truth now that truth may be directly sought through rational inquiry, and an omnipresent sense of social

obligation. These moral elements are so strong that the new forms of culture are likely to prove themselves quite as productive of morality, high-mindedness, and idealism as the old.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What impression seems to prevail among the people you have been thrown with in regard to the meaning of the phrases "culture" and "cultivated man"? Compare with the definition given in the selection of a truly cultivated man. 2. What two ideas have modified our ideals of culture? Which of these might be said to have been the most influential? 3. What are the essentials of true culture as indicated in this selection? How far can you agree with the writer? 4. In connection with what is said in this selection about the constructive imagination, discuss the following statement, "Nowhere is there more demand for imagination than in the formulation of a scientific hypothesis: the world, as science has constructed it, is the product of that faculty no less than a novel, a play, or an epic poem." 5. Taking into consideration the views in regard to education expressed in this and the three preceding selections, formulate for yourself a view of the distinctive function of a college education. Is it, for example, (1) acquisition of knowledge, (2) development of mental powers, (3) development of character, (4) supplying the ideal element to life, (5) development of culture, (6) social efficiency, (7) training for business, or something more fundamental than these?

THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM

ON SCIENCE AND ART IN RELATION TO EDUCATION¹

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY

[Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) was one of the great English scientists of the nineteenth century. As scientist, he made valuable contributions to scientific knowledge, and by his championing of Darwinism, did much to gain widespread acceptance for the evolutionary theory. Huxley also did much towards forwarding the cause of education. Not only was he interested in improving the existing methods of education in the sciences, but also in the larger problems of education as a national concern. The selection here given is an extract from an address delivered in 1882 at a meeting of the Liverpool Association.]

I know quite well that launching myself into this discussion [of what the principal subjects of education ought to be] is a very dangerous operation; that it is a very large subject, and one which is difficult to deal with, however much I may trespass upon your patience in the time allotted to me. But the discussion is so fundamental, it is so completely impossible to make up one's mind on these matters until one has settled the question, that I will even venture to make the experiment. A great lawyer-statesman and philosopher of a former age—I mean Francis Bacon—said that truth came out of error much more rapidly than it came out of confusion. There is a wonderful truth in that saying. Next to being right in this world, the best of all things is to be clearly and definitely wrong, because you will come out somewhere. If you go buzzing about between right and wrong, vibrating and fluctuating, you come out nowhere; but if you are absolutely and thoroughly and persistently wrong, you must, some of these days, have the extreme good

¹ Reprinted from *Science and Education*, Volume III of Huxley's *Collected Essays*, D. Appleton & Co.

fortune of knocking your head against a fact, and that sets you all straight again. So I will not trouble myself as to whether I may be right or wrong in what I am about to say, but at any rate I hope to be clear and definite; and then you will be able to judge for yourselves whether, in following out the train of thought I have to introduce, you knock your heads against facts or not.

I take it that the whole object of education is, in the first place, to train the faculties of the young in such a manner as to give their possessors the best chance of being happy and useful in their generation; and, in the second place, to furnish them with the most important portions of that immense capitalized experience of the human race which we call knowledge of various kinds. I am using the term knowledge in its widest possible sense; and the question is, what subjects to select by training and discipline, in which the object I have just defined may be best attained.

I must call your attention further to this fact, that all the subjects of our thoughts—all feelings and propositions (leaving aside our sensations as the mere materials and occasions of thinking and feeling), all our mental furniture—may be classified under one of two heads—as either within the province of the intellect, something that can be put into propositions and affirmed or denied; or as within the province of feeling, or that which, before the name was defiled, was called the esthetic side of our nature, and which can neither be proved nor disproved, but only felt and known.

According to the classification which I have put before you, then, the subjects of all knowledge are divisible into the two groups, matters of science and matters of art; for all things with which the reasoning faculty alone is occupied come under the province of science; and in the broadest sense, and not in the narrow and technical sense in which we are now accustomed to use the word art, all things feelable, all things which stir our emotions, come under the term of art, in the sense of the subject-matter of the esthetic faculty. So that we are shut up to this—that the business of education is, in the first place, to provide the

young with the means and the habit of observation; and, secondly, to supply the subject-matter of knowledge either in the shape of science or of art, or of both combined.

Now, it is a very remarkable fact—but it is true of most things in this world—that there is hardly anything one-sided, or of one nature; and it is not immediately obvious what of the things that interest us may be regarded as pure science, and what may be regarded as pure art. It may be that there are some peculiarly constituted persons who, before they have advanced far into the depths of geometry, find artistic beauty about it; but, taking the generality of mankind, I think it may be said that, when they begin to learn mathematics, their whole souls are absorbed in tracing the connection between the premises and the conclusion, and that to them geometry is pure science. So I think it may be said that mechanics and osteology are pure science. On the other hand, melody in music is pure art. You cannot reason about it; there is no proposition involved in it. So, again, in the pictorial art, an arabesque, or a “harmony in gray,” touches none but the esthetic faculty. But a great mathematician, and even many persons who are not great mathematicians, will tell you that they derive immense pleasure from geometrical reasonings. Everybody knows mathematicians speak of solutions and problems as “elegant,” and they tell you that a certain mass of mystic symbols is “beautiful, quite lovely.” Well, you do not see it. They do see it, because the intellectual process, the process of comprehending the reasons symbolized by these figures and these signs, confers upon them a sort of pleasure, such as an artist has in visual symmetry. Take a science of which I may speak with more confidence, and which is the most attractive of those I am concerned with. It is what we call morphology, which consists in tracing out the unity in variety of the infinitely diversified structures of animals and plants. I cannot give you any example of a thorough esthetic pleasure more intensely real than a pleasure of this kind—the pleasure which arises in one’s mind when a whole mass of different structures run into one harmony as the expression of a central law. That is where the province

of art overlays and embraces the province of intellect. And, if I may venture to express an opinion on such a subject, the great majority of forms of art are not in the sense what I just now defined them to be—pure art; but they derive much of their quality from simultaneous and even unconscious excitement of the intellect.

When I was a boy, I was very fond of music, and I am so now; and it so happened that I had the opportunity of hearing much good music. Among other things, I had abundant opportunities of hearing that great old master, Sebastian Bach. I remember perfectly well—though I knew nothing about music then, and, I may add, know nothing whatever about it now—the intense satisfaction and delight which I had in listening, by the hour together, to Bach's fugues. It is a pleasure which remains with me, I am glad to think; but, of late years, I have tried to find out the why and wherefore, and it has often occurred to me that the pleasure derived from musical compositions of this kind is essentially of the same nature as that which is derived from pursuits which are commonly regarded as purely intellectual. I mean, that the source of pleasure is exactly the same as in most of my problems in morphology—that you have the theme in one of the old master's works followed out in all its endless variations, always appearing and always reminding you of unity in variety. So in painting; what is called "truth to nature" is the intellectual element coming in, and truth to nature depends entirely upon the intellectual culture of the person to whom art is addressed. If you are in Australia, you may get credit for being a good artist—I mean among the natives—if you can draw a kangaroo after a fashion. But, among men of higher civilization, the intellectual knowledge we possess brings its criticism into our appreciation of works of art, and we are obliged to satisfy it, as well as the mere sense of beauty in color and in outline. And so, the higher the culture and information of those whom art addresses, the more exact and precise must be what we call its "truth to nature."

If we turn to literature, the same thing is true, and you

find works of literature which may be said to be pure art. A little song of Shakespeare or of Goethe is pure art; it is exquisitely beautiful, although its intellectual content may be nothing. A series of pictures is made to pass before your mind by the meaning of words, and the effect is a melody of ideas. Nevertheless, the great mass of the literature we esteem is valued, not merely because of having artistic form, but because of its intellectual content; and the value is the higher the more precise, distinct, and true is that intellectual content. And, if you will let me for a moment speak of the very highest forms of literature, do we not regard them as highest simply because the more we know the truer they seem, and the more competent we are to appreciate beauty the more beautiful they are? No man ever understands Shakespeare until he is old, though the youngest may admire him, the reason being that he satisfies the artistic instinct of the youngest and harmonizes with the ripest and richest experience of the oldest.

I have said this much to draw your attention to what, in my mind, lies at the root of all this matter, and at the understanding of one another by the men of science on the one hand, and the men of literature, and history, and art, on the other. It is not a question whether one order of study or another should predominate. It is a question of what topics of education you shall select which will combine all the needful elements in such due proportion as to give the greatest amount of food, support, and encouragement to those faculties which enable us to appreciate truth, and to profit by those sources of innocent happiness which are open to us, and, at the same time, to avoid that which is bad, and coarse, and ugly, and keep clear of the multitude of pitfalls and dangers which beset those who break through the natural or moral laws.

I address myself, in this spirit, to the consideration of the question of the value of purely literary education. Is it good and sufficient, or is it insufficient and bad? Well, here I venture to say that there are literary educations and literary educations. If I am to understand by that term the education

that was current in the great majority of middle-class schools, and upper schools too, in this country when I was a boy, and which consisted absolutely and almost entirely in keeping boys for eight or ten years at learning the rules of Latin and Greek grammar, construing certain Latin and Greek authors, and possibly making verses which, had they been English verses, would have been condemned as abominable doggerel,—if that is what you mean by liberal education, then I say it is scandalously insufficient and almost worthless. My reason for saying so is not from the point of view of science at all, but from the point of view of literature. I say the thing professes to be literary education that is not a literary education at all. It was not literature at all that was taught, but science in a very bad form. It is quite obvious that grammar is science and not literature. The analysis of a text by the help of the rules of grammar is just as much a scientific operation as the analysis of a chemical compound by the help of the rules of chemical analysis. There is nothing that appeals to the esthetic faculty in that operation; and I ask multitudes of men of my own age, who went through this process, whether they ever had a conception of art or literature until they obtained it for themselves after leaving school? Then you may say, “If that is so, if the education was scientific, why cannot you be satisfied with it?” I say, because although it is a scientific training, it is of the most inadequate and inappropriate kind. If there is any good at all in scientific education it is that men should be trained, as I said before, to know things for themselves at first hand, and that they should understand every step of the reason of that which they do.

I desire to speak with the utmost respect of that science—philology—of which grammar is a part and parcel; yet everybody knows that grammar, as it is usually learned at school, affords no scientific training. It is taught just as you would teach the rules of chess or drafts. On the other hand, if I am to understand by a literary education the study of the literatures of either ancient or modern nations—but especially those of antiquity, and especially that of ancient Greece;

if this literature is studied, not merely from the point of view of philological science, and its practical application to the interpretation of texts, but as an exemplification of and commentary upon the principles of art; if you look upon the literature of a people as a chapter in the development of the human mind, if you work out this in a broad spirit, and with such collateral references to morals and politics, and physical geography, and the like as are needful to make you comprehend what the meaning of ancient literature and civilization is,—then, assuredly, it affords a splendid and noble education. But I still think it is susceptible of improvement, and that no man will ever comprehend the real secret of the difference between the ancient world and our present time unless he has learned to see the difference which the late development of physical science has made between the thought of this day and the thought of that, and he will never see that difference unless he has some practical insight into some branches of physical science; and you must remember that a literary education such as that which I have just referred to is out of the reach of those whose school life is cut short at sixteen or seventeen.

But, you will say, all this is fault-finding; let us hear what you have in the way of positive suggestion. Then I am bound to tell you that, if I could make a clean sweep of everything—I am very glad I cannot because I might, and probably should, make mistakes,—but if I could make a clean sweep of everything and start afresh, I should, in the first place, secure that training of the young in reading and writing, and in the habit of attention and observation, both to that which is told them, and that which they see, which everybody agrees to. But, in addition to that, I should make it absolutely necessary for everybody, for a longer or shorter period, to learn to draw. Now, you may say, there are some people who cannot draw, however much they may be taught. I deny that *in toto*, because I never yet met with anybody who could not learn to write. Writing is a form of drawing; therefore if you give the same attention and trouble to drawing as you do to writing, depend upon it, there is nobody

who cannot be made to draw, more or less well. Do not misapprehend me. I do not say for one moment you would make an artistic draftsman. Artists are not made; they grow. You may improve the natural faculty in that direction, but you cannot make it; but you can teach simple drawing, and you will find it an implement of learning of extreme value. I do not think its value can be exaggerated, because it gives you the means of training the young in attention and accuracy, which are the two things in which all mankind are more deficient than in any other mental quality whatever. The whole of my life has been spent in trying to give my proper attention to things and to be accurate, and I have not succeeded as well as I could wish; and other people, I am afraid, are not much more fortunate. You cannot begin this habit too early, and I consider there is nothing of so great a value as the habit of drawing to secure those two desirable ends.

Then we come to the subject-matter, whether scientific or esthetic, of education, and I should naturally have no question at all about teaching the elements of physical science of the kind I have sketched, in a practical manner; but among scientific topics, using the word scientific in the broadest sense, I would also include the elements of the theory of morals and of that of political and social life, which, strangely enough, it never seems to occur to anybody to teach a child. I would have the history of our own country, and of all the influences which have been brought to bear upon it, with incidental geography, not as a mere chronicle of reigns and battles, but as a chapter in the development of the race, and the history of civilization.

Then with respect to esthetic knowledge and discipline, we have happily in the English language one of the most magnificent storehouses of artistic beauty and of models of literary excellence which exists in the world at the present time. I have said before, and I repeat it here, that if a man cannot get literary culture of the highest kind out of his Bible, and Chaucer, and Shakespeare, and Milton, and Hobbes, and Bishop Berkeley, to mention only a few of our illustrious writers—I say, if he cannot

get it out of those writers, he cannot get it out of anything; and I would assuredly devote a very large portion of the time of every English child to the careful study of the models of English writing of such varied and wonderful kind as we possess, and, what is still more important and still more neglected, the habit of using that language with precision, with force, and with art. I fancy we are almost the only nation in the world who seem to think that composition comes by nature. The French attend to their own language, the Germans study theirs; but Englishmen do not seem to think it is worth their while. Nor would I fail to include, in the course of study I am sketching, translations of all the best works of antiquity, or of the modern world. It is a very desirable thing to read Homer in Greek; but if you don't happen to know Greek, the next best thing we can do is to read as good a translation of it as we have recently been furnished with in prose. You won't get all you would get from the original, but you may get a great deal; and to refuse to know this great deal because you cannot get all, seems to be as sensible as for a hungry man to refuse bread because he cannot get partridge. Finally, I would add instruction in either music or painting, or if the child should be so unhappy, as sometimes happens, as to have no faculty for either of those, and no possibility of doing anything in any artistic sense with them, then I would see what could be done with literature alone; but I would provide, in the fullest sense, for the development of the esthetic side of the mind. -In my judgment, those are all the essentials of education for an English child. With that outfit, such as it might be made in the time given to education which is within the reach of nine-tenths of the population—with that outfit, an Englishman, within the limits of English life, is fitted to go anywhere, to occupy the highest positions, to fill the highest offices of the State, and to become distinguished in practical pursuits, in science, or in art. For, if he have the opportunity to learn all those things, and have his mind disciplined in the various directions the teaching of those topics would have necessitated, then, assuredly, he will be able to pick up, on his road through life, all the rest of the intellectual baggage he wants.

If the educational time at our disposition were sufficient there are one or two things I would add to those I have just now called the essentials; and perhaps you will be surprised to hear, though I hope you will not, that I should add, not more science, but one, or, if possible, two languages. The knowledge of some other language than one's own is, in fact, of singular intellectual value. Many of the faults and mistakes of the ancient philosophers are traceable to the fact that they knew no language but their own, and were often led into confusing the symbol with the thought which it embodied. I think it is Locke who says that one-half of the mistakes of philosophers have arisen from questions about words; and one of the safest ways of delivering yourself from the bondage of words is to know how ideas look in words to which you are not accustomed. That is one reason for the study of language; another reason is that it opens new fields in art and in science. Another is the practical value of such knowledge; and yet another is this, that if your languages are properly chosen, from the time of learning the additional languages you will know your own language better than ever you did. So, I say, if the time given to education permits, add Latin and German. Latin, because it is the key to nearly one-half of English and to all the Romance languages; and German, because it is the key to almost all the remainder of English, and helps you to understand a race from whom most of us have sprung, and who have a character and a literature of a fateful force in the history of the world, such as probably has been allotted to those of no other people, except the Jews, the Greeks, and ourselves. Beyond these, the essential and the eminently desirable elements of all education, let each man take up his special line—the historian devote himself to his history, the man of science to his science, the man of letters to his culture of that kind, and the artist to his special pursuit.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Comment on the adequacy of Huxley's statement of the object of education on page 67. 2. Discuss the basis of his distinction between science and art. 3. Although such a broad distinction may

have its value as a rough and ready classification, yet is it altogether true? Consider whether the popular conception of the scientist as a man with great command of his intellect and the artist with great command of his imagination and feeling is not very much at variance with the teaching of modern psychology that the faculties of emotion, reason, imagination are present together in every act of thought. Does not the scientist have much need for imagination in the construction of his hypotheses? Does not the artist need intellect in the structural side of his works? 4. Attempt a classification of the studies offered in your college according to Huxley's distinction between science and art. 5. Take issue with, or defend, Huxley's statement of the principal subjects of education. Compare his ideas with those of Meiklejohn in *The Aims of the Liberal College*, page 49.

SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION ¹

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY

[For biographical note about the author see page 66. This selection is a portion of an address delivered before the Liverpool Philomathic Society in 1869.]

At other times, and in other places, I have endeavored to state the higher and more abstract arguments, by which the study of physical science may be shown to be indispensable to the complete training of the human mind; but I do not wish it to be supposed that, because I happen to be devoted to more or less abstract and "unpractical" pursuits, I am insensible to the weight which ought to be attached to that which has been said to be the English conception of Paradise—namely, "getting on." I look upon it, that "getting on" is a very important matter indeed. I do not mean merely for the sake of the coarse and tangible results of success, but because humanity is so constituted that a vast number of us would never be impelled to those stretches of exertion which make us wiser and more capable men, if it were not for the absolute necessity of putting on our faculties all the strain

¹ Reprinted from *Science and Education*, Volume III of Huxley's Collected Essays, D. Appleton & Co.

they will bear, for the purpose of "getting on" in the most practical sense.

Now the value of a knowledge of physical science as a means of getting on is indubitable. There are hardly any of our trades, except the merely huckstering ones, in which some knowledge of science may not be directly profitable to the pursuer of that occupation. As industry attains higher stages of its development, as its processes become more complicated and refined, and competition more keen, the sciences are dragged in, one by one, to take their share in the fray; and he who can best avail himself of their help is the man who will come out uppermost in that struggle for existence, which goes on as fiercely beneath the smooth surface of modern society as among the wild inhabitants of the woods.

But in addition to the bearing of science on ordinary practical life, let me direct your attention to its immense influence on several of the professions. I ask anyone who has adopted the calling of an engineer, how much time he lost when he left school, because he had to devote himself to pursuits which were absolutely novel and strange, and of which he had not obtained the remotest conception from his instructors? He had to familiarize himself with ideas of the course and powers of Nature, to which his attention had never been directed during his school-life, and to learn, for the first time, what a world of facts lies outside and beyond the world of words. I appeal to those who know what engineering is to say how far I am right in respect to that profession; but with regard to another, of no less importance, I shall venture to speak of my own knowledge. There is no one of us who may not at any moment be thrown, bound hand and foot by physical incapacity, into the hands of a medical practitioner. The chances of life and death for all and each of us may, at any moment, depend on the skill with which that practitioner is able to make out what is wrong in our bodily frames, and on his ability to apply the proper remedy to the defect.

The necessities of modern life are such, and the class from which the medical profession is chiefly recruited is so situ-

ated, that few medical men can hope to spend more than three or four, or it may be five, years in the pursuit of those studies which are immediately germane to physic. How is that all too brief period spent at present? I speak as an old examiner, having served some eleven or twelve years in that capacity in the University of London, and therefore having a practical acquaintance with the subject; but I might fortify myself by the authority of the President of the College of Surgeons, Mr. Quain, whom I heard the other day in an admirable address (the Hunterian Oration) deal fully and wisely with this very topic.

A young man commencing the study of medicine is at once required to endeavor to make an acquaintance with a number of sciences, such as Physics, as Chemistry, as Botany, as Physiology, which are absolutely and entirely strange to him, however excellent his so-called education at school may have been. Not only is he devoid of all apprehension of scientific conceptions, not only does he fail to attach any meaning to the words "matter," "force," or "law" in their scientific sense, but, worse still, he has no notion of what it is to come into contact with Nature, or to lay his mind alongside of a physical fact, and try to conquer it, in the way our great naval hero told his captains to master their enemies. His whole mind has been given to books, and I am hardly exaggerating if I say that they are more real to him than Nature. He imagines that all knowledge can be got out of books, and rests upon the authority of some master or other; nor does he entertain any misgiving that the method of learning which led to proficiency in the rules of grammar will suffice to lead him to a mastery of the laws of Nature. The youngster, thus unprepared for serious study, is turned loose among his medical studies, with the result, in nine cases out of ten, that the first year of his curriculum is spent in learning how to learn. Indeed, he is lucky if, at the end of the first year, by the exertions of his teachers and his own industry, he has acquired even that art of arts. After which there remain not more than three, or perhaps four, years for the profitable study of such vast

sciences as Anatomy, Physiology, Therapeutics, Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics, and the like, upon his knowledge or ignorance of which it depends whether the practitioner shall diminish, or increase, the bills of mortality. Now what is it but the preposterous condition of ordinary school education which prevents a young man of seventeen, destined for the practice of medicine, from being fully prepared for the study of Nature; and from coming to the medical school equipped with that preliminary knowledge of the principles of Physics, of Chemistry and of Biology, upon which he has now to waste one of the precious years, every moment of which ought to be given to those studies which bear directly upon the knowledge of his profession?

There is another profession, to the members of which, I think, a certain preliminary knowledge of physical science might be quite as valuable as to the medical man. The practitioner of medicine sets before himself the noble object of taking care of man's bodily welfare; but the members of this other profession undertake to "minister to minds diseased," and, so far as may be, to diminish sin and soften sorrow. Like the medical profession, the clerical, of which I now speak, rests its power to heal upon its knowledge of the order of the universe—upon certain theories of man's relation to that which lies outside him. It is not my business to express any opinion about these theories. I merely wish to point out that, like all other theories, they are professedly based upon matters of fact. Thus the clerical profession has to deal with the facts of Nature from a certain point of view; and hence it comes into contact with that of the man of science, who has to treat the same facts from another point of view. You know how often that contact is to be described as collision, or violent friction; and how great the heat, how little the light, which commonly results from it.

In the interests of fair play, to say nothing of those of mankind, I ask, Why do not the clergy as a body acquire, as a part of their preliminary education, some such tincture of physical science as will put them in a position to understand

the difficulties in the way of accepting their theories, which are forced upon the mind of every thoughtful and intelligent man, who has taken the trouble to instruct himself in the elements of natural knowledge? . . .

I hope you will consider that the arguments I have now stated, even if there were no better ones, constitute a sufficient apology for urging the introduction of science into schools. The next question to which I have to address myself is, What sciences ought to be thus taught? And this is one of the most important of questions, because my side (I am afraid I am a terribly candid friend) sometimes spoils its cause by going in for too much. There are other forms of culture beside physical science; and I should be profoundly sorry to see the fact forgotten, or even to observe a tendency to starve, or cripple, literary, or esthetic, culture for the sake of science. Such a narrow view of the nature of education has nothing to do with my firm conviction that a complete and thorough scientific culture ought to be introduced into all schools. By this, however, I do not mean that every schoolboy should be taught everything in science. That would be a very absurd thing to conceive, and a very mischievous thing to attempt. What I mean is, that no boy or girl should leave school without possessing a grasp of the general character of science, and without having been disciplined, more or less, in the methods of *all* sciences; so that, when turned into the world to make their own way, they shall be prepared to face scientific problems, not by knowing at once the conditions of every problem, or by being able at once to solve it; but by being familiar with the general current of scientific thought, and by being able to apply the methods of science in the proper way, when they have acquainted themselves with the conditions of the special problem.

That is what I understand by scientific education. To furnish a boy with such an education, it is by no means necessary that he should devote his whole school existence to physical science: in fact, no one would lament so one-sided a proceeding more than I. Nay more, it is not necessary for him to give up more than a moderate share of his time to such studies, if they

be properly selected and arranged, and if he be trained in them in a fitting manner.

I conceive the proper course to be somewhat as follows. To begin with, let every child be instructed in those general views of the phenomena of Nature for which we have no exact English name. The nearest approximation to a name for what I mean, which we possess, is "physical geography." The Germans have a better, "Erdkunde" ("earth knowledge" or "geology" in its etymological sense), that is to say, a general knowledge of the earth, and what is on it, in it, and about it. If anyone who has had experience of the ways of young children will call to mind their questions, he will find that so far as they can be put into any scientific category, they come under this head of "Erdkunde." The child asks, "What is the moon, and why does it shine?" "What is this water, and where does it run?" "What is the wind?" "What makes this wave in the sea?" "Where does this animal live, and what is the use of that plant?" And if not snubbed and stunted by being told not to ask foolish questions, there is no limit to the intellectual craving of a young child; nor any bounds to the slow, but solid, accretion of knowledge and development of the thinking faculty in this way. To all such questions, answers which are necessarily incomplete, though true as far as they go, may be given by any teacher whose ideas represent real knowledge and not mere book learning; and a panoramic view of Nature, accompanied by a strong infusion of the scientific habit of mind, may thus be placed within the reach of every child of nine or ten.

After this preliminary opening of the eyes to the great spectacle of the daily progress of Nature, as the reasoning faculties of the child grow, and he becomes familiar with the use of the tools of knowledge—reading, writing, and elementary mathematics—he should pass on to what is, in the more strict sense, physical science. Now there are two kinds of physical science: the one regards form and the relation of forms to one another; the other deals with causes and effects. In many of what we term sciences, these two kinds are mixed up together; but systematic botany is a pure example of the former kind, and physics

of the latter kind, of science. Every educational advantage which training in physical science can give is obtainable from the proper study of these two; and I should be contented, for the present, if they, added to our "Erdkunde," furnished the whole of the scientific curriculum of school. Indeed, I conceive it would be one of the greatest boons which could be conferred upon England, if henceforward every child in the country were instructed in the general knowledge of the things about it, in the elements of physics, and of botany. But I should be still better pleased if there could be added somewhat of chemistry, and an elementary acquaintance with human physiology.

So far as school education is concerned, I want to go no further just now; and I believe that such instruction would make an excellent introduction to that preparatory scientific training which, as I have indicated, is so essential for the successful pursuit of our most important professions. But this modicum of instruction must be so given as to insure real knowledge and practical discipline. If scientific education is to be dealt with as mere bookwork, it will be better not to attempt it, but to stick to the Latin Grammar which makes no pretense to be anything but bookwork.

If the great benefits of scientific training are sought, it is essential that such training should be real: that is to say, that the mind of the scholar should be brought into direct relation with fact, that he should not merely be told a thing, but made to see by the use of his own intellect and ability that the thing is so and not otherwise. The great peculiarity of scientific training, that in virtue of which it cannot be replaced by any other discipline whatsoever, is this bringing of the mind directly into contact with fact, and practising the intellect in the completest form of induction; that is to say, in drawing conclusions from particular facts made known by immediate observation of Nature.

The other studies which enter into ordinary education do not discipline the mind in this way. Mathematical training is almost purely deductive. The mathematician starts with a few simple propositions, the proof of which is so obvious that they

are called self-evident, and the rest of his work consists of subtle deductions from them. The teaching of languages, at any rate as ordinarily practised, is of the same general nature,—authority and tradition furnish the data, and the mental operations of the scholar are deductive.

Again: if history be the subject of study, the facts are still taken upon the evidence of tradition and authority. You cannot make a boy see the battle of Thermopylæ for himself, or know, of his own knowledge, that Cromwell once ruled England. There is no getting into direct contact with natural fact by this road; there is no dispensing with authority, but rather a resting upon it.

In all these respects, science differs from other educational discipline, and prepares the scholar for common life. What have we to do in every-day life? Most of the business which demands our attention is matter of fact, which needs, in the first place, to be accurately observed or apprehended; in the second, to be interpreted by inductive and deductive reasonings, which are altogether similar in their nature to those employed in science. In the one case, as in the other, whatever is taken for granted is so taken at one's own peril; fact and reason are the ultimate arbiters, and patience and honesty are the great helpers out of difficulty.

But if scientific training is to yield its most eminent results, it must, I repeat, be made practical. That is to say, in explaining to a child the general phenomena of Nature you must, as far as possible, give reality to your teaching by object-lessons; in teaching him botany, he must handle the plants and dissect the flowers for himself; in teaching him physics and chemistry, you must not be solicitous to fill him with information, but you must be careful that what he learns he knows of his own knowledge. Don't be satisfied with telling him that a magnet attracts iron. Let him see that it does; let him feel the pull of the one upon the other for himself. And, especially, tell him that it is his duty to doubt until he is compelled, by the absolute authority of Nature, to believe that which is written in books. Pursue this discipline care-

fully and conscientiously, and you may make sure that, however scanty may be the measure of information which you have poured into the boy's mind, you have created an intellectual habit of priceless value in practical life.

One is constantly asked, When should this scientific education be commenced? I should say with the dawn of intelligence. As I have already said, a child seeks for information about matters of physical science as soon as it begins to talk. The first teaching it wants is an object-lesson of one sort or another; and as soon as it is fit for systematic instruction of any kind, it is fit for a modicum of science.

People talk of the difficulty of teaching young children such matters, and in the same breath insist upon their learning their Catechism, which contains propositions far harder to comprehend than anything in the educational course I have proposed. Again: I am incessantly told that we, who advocate the introduction of science in schools, make no allowance for the stupidity of the average boy or girl; but, in my belief, that stupidity, in nine cases out of ten, "*fit, non nascitur*,"¹ and is developed by a long process of parental and pedagogic repression of the natural intellectual appetites, accompanied by a persistent attempt to create artificial ones for food which is not only tasteless, but essentially indigestible.

Those who urge the difficulty of instructing young people in science are apt to forget another very important condition of success—important in all kinds of teaching, but most essential, I am disposed to think, when the scholars are very young. This condition is, that the teacher should himself really and practically know his subject. If he does, he will be able to speak of it in the easy language, and with the completeness of conviction, with which he talks of any ordinary every-day matter. If he does not, he will be afraid to wander beyond the limits of the technical phraseology which he has got up; and a dead dogmatism, which oppresses, or raises opposition, will take the place of the lively confidence, born

¹Made, not born.

of personal conviction, which cheers and encourages the eminently sympathetic mind of childhood.

I have already hinted that such scientific training as we seek for may be given without making any extravagant claim upon the time now devoted to education. We ask only for "a most favored nation" clause in our treaty with the schoolmaster; we demand no more than that science shall have as much time given to it as any other single subject—say four hours a week in each class of an ordinary school.

For the present, I think men of science would be well content with such an arrangement as this; but speaking for myself, I do not pretend to believe that such an arrangement can be, or will be, permanent. In these times the educational tree seems to me to have its roots in the air, its leaves and flowers in the ground; and, I confess, I should very much like to turn it upside down, so that its roots might be solidly imbedded among the facts of Nature, and draw thence a sound nutriment for the foliage and fruit of literature and of art. No educational system can have a claim to permanence, unless it recognizes the truth that education has two great ends to which everything else must be subordinated. The one of these is to increase knowledge; the other is to develop the love of right and the hatred of wrong.

With wisdom and uprightness a nation can make its way worthily, and beauty will follow in the footsteps of the two, even if she be not especially invited; while there is perhaps no sight in the whole world more saddening and revolting than is offered by men sunk in ignorance of everything but what other men have written; seemingly devoid of moral belief or guidance; but with the sense of beauty so keen, and the power of expression so cultivated, that their sensual caterwauling may be almost mistaken for the music of the spheres.

At present, education is almost entirely devoted to the cultivation of the power of expression, and of the sense of literary beauty. The matter of having anything to say, beyond a hash of other people's opinions, or of possessing any criterion of beauty, so that we may distinguish between the

Godlike and the devilish, is left aside as of no moment. I think I do not err in saying that if science were made a foundation of education, instead of being, at most, stuck on as cornice to the edifice, this state of things could not exist.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

As this selection and the one that follows are intended to be studied together as discussion of the value of scientific studies, topics for discussion covering both selections are given on page 94.

THE CULTURAL VALUE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE ¹

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY

[For note about the author see page 66. The selection here given is the latter part on the address entitled *On the Advisableness of Improving Natural Knowledge*, delivered in 1866, in St. Martin's Hall, London.]

But spinning jenny and steam pump are, after all, but toys, possessing an accidental value; and natural knowledge creates multitudes of more subtle contrivances, the praises of which do not happen to be sung because they are not directly convertible into instruments for creating wealth. When I contemplate natural knowledge squandering such gifts among men, the only appropriate comparison I can find for her is to liken her to such a peasant woman as one sees in the Alps, striding ever upward, heavily burdened, and with mind bent only on her home; but yet without effort and without thought knitting for her children. Now stockings are good and comfortable things, and the children will undoubtedly be much the better for them; but surely it would be short-sighted, to say the least of it, to depreciate this toiling mother as a mere stocking-machine—a mere provider of physical comforts.

However, there are blind leaders of the blind, and not a few of them, who take this view of natural knowledge, and

¹ Reprinted from *Science and Education*, Volume III of Huxley's Collected Essays, D. Appleton & Co.

can see nothing in the bountiful mother of humanity but a sort of comfort-grinding machine. According to them, the improvement of natural knowledge always has been, and always must be, synonymous with no more than the improvement of the material resources, and the increase of the gratifications of men.

Natural knowledge is, in their eyes, no real mother of mankind, bringing them up with kindness, and, if need be, with sternness, in the way they should go, and instructing them in all things needful for their welfare; but a sort of fairy god-mother, ready to furnish her pets with shoes of swiftness, swords of sharpness, and omnipotent Aladdin's lamps, so that they may have telegraphs to Saturn, and see the other side of the moon, and thank God they are better than their benighted ancestors.

If this talk were true, I, for one, should not greatly care to toil in the service of natural knowledge. I think I would just as soon be quietly chipping my own flint axe, after the manner of my forefathers a few thousand years back, as be troubled with the endless malady of thought which now infests us all, for such reward. But I venture to say that such views are contrary alike to reason and to fact. Those who discourse in such fashion seem to me to be so intent upon trying to see what is above Nature, or what is behind her, that they are blind to what stares them in the face in her.

I should not venture to speak thus strongly if my justification were not to be found in the simplest and most obvious facts,—if it needed more than an appeal to the most notorious truths to justify my assertion, that the improvement of natural knowledge, whatever direction it has taken, and however low the aims of those who may have commenced it—has not only conferred practical benefits on men, but, in so doing, has effected a revolution in their conceptions of the universe and of themselves, and has profoundly altered their modes of thinking and their views of right and wrong. I say that natural knowledge, seeking to satisfy natural wants, has found the ideas which can alone still spiritual cravings.

I say that natural knowledge, in desiring to ascertain the laws of comfort, has been driven to discover those of conduct, and to lay the foundations of a new morality.

Let us take these points separately; and first, what great ideas has natural knowledge introduced into men's minds?

I cannot but think that the foundations of all natural knowledge were laid when the reason of man first came face to face with the facts of Nature; when the savage first learned that the fingers of one hand are fewer than those of both; that it is shorter to cross a stream than to head it; that a stone stops where it is unless it be moved, and that it drops from the hand which lets it go; that light and heat come and go with the sun; that sticks burn away in a fire; that plants and animals grow and die; that if he struck his fellow savage a blow he would make him angry, and perhaps get a blow in return, while if he offered him a fruit he would please him, and perhaps receive a fish in exchange. When men had acquired this much knowledge, the outlines, rude though they were, of mathematics, of physics, of chemistry, of biology, of moral, economical, and political science, were sketched. Nor did the germ of religion fail when science began to bud. Listen to words which, though new, are yet three thousand years old:—

“ . . . When in heaven the stars about the moon
 Look beautiful, when all the winds are laid,
 And every height comes out, and jutting peak
 And valley, and the immeasurable heavens
 Break open to their highest, and all the stars
 Shine, and the shepherd gladdens in his heart.”¹

If the half savage Greek could share our feelings thus far, it is irrational to doubt that he went further, to find as we do, that upon that brief gladness there follows a certain sorrow,—the little light of awakened human intelligence shines so mere a spark amidst the abyss of the unknown and unknowable; seems so insufficient to do more than illuminate the imperfections that cannot be remedied, the aspirations that cannot be realized, of man's own nature. But in this sadness, this

¹ Need it be said that this is Tennyson's English for Homer's Greek? [Author's note.]

consciousness of the limitation of man, this sense of an open secret which he cannot penetrate, lies the essence of all religion; and the attempt to embody it in the forms furnished by the intellect is the origin of the higher theologies.

Thus it seems impossible to imagine but that the foundations of all knowledge—secular or sacred—were laid when intelligence dawned, though the superstructure remained for long ages so slight and feeble as to be compatible with the existence of almost any general view respecting the mode of governance of the universe. No doubt, from the first, there were certain phenomena which, to the rudest mind, presented a constancy of occurrence, and suggested that a fixed order ruled, at any rate, among them. I doubt if the grossest of Fetish worshipers ever imagined that a stone must have a god within it to make it fall, or that a fruit had a god within it to make it taste sweet. With regard to such matters as these, it is hardly questionable that mankind from the first took strictly positive and scientific views.

But, with respect to all the less familiar occurrences which present themselves, uncultured man, no doubt, has always taken himself as the standard of comparison, as the center and measure of the world; nor could he well avoid doing so. And finding that his apparently uncaused will has a powerful effect in giving rise to many occurrences, he naturally enough ascribed other and greater events to other and greater volitions, and came to look upon the world and all that therein is as the product of the volitions of persons like himself, but stronger, and capable of being appeased or angered, as he himself might be soothed or irritated. Through such conceptions of the plan and working of the universe all mankind have passed, or are passing. And we may now consider what has been the effect of the improvement of natural knowledge on the views of men who have reached this stage, and who have begun to cultivate natural knowledge with no desire but that of "increasing God's honor and bettering man's estate."

For example, what could seem wiser, from a mere material point of view, more innocent, from a theological one, to an

ancient people, than that they should learn the exact succession of the seasons, as warnings for their husbandmen; or the position of the stars, as guides to their rude navigators? But what has grown out of this search for natural knowledge of so merely useful a character? You all know the reply. Astronomy,—which of all sciences has filled men's minds with general ideas of a character most foreign to their daily experience, and has, more than any other, rendered it impossible for them to accept the beliefs of their fathers. Astronomy,—which tells them that this so vast and seemingly solid earth is but an atom among atoms, whirling, no man knows whither, through illimitable space; which demonstrates that what we call the peaceful heaven above us, is but that space, filled by an infinitely subtle matter whose particles are seething and surging, like the waves of an angry sea; which opens up to us infinite regions where nothing is known, or ever seems to have been known, but matter and force, operating according to rigid rules; which leads us to contemplate phenomena the very nature of which demonstrates that they must have had a beginning, and that they must have an end, but the very nature of which also proves that the beginning was, to our conceptions of time, infinitely remote, and that the end is as immeasurably distant.

But it is not alone those who pursue astronomy who ask for bread and receive ideas. What more harmless than the attempt to lift and distribute water by pumping it; what more absolutely and grossly utilitarian? Yet out of pumps grow the discussions about Nature's abhorrence of a vacuum; and then it was discovered that Nature does not abhor a vacuum, but that air has weight; and that notion paved the way for the doctrine that all matter has weight, and that the force which produces weight is co-extensive with the universe,—in short, to the theory of universal gravitation and endless force. While learning how to handle gases led to the discovery of oxygen, and to modern chemistry, and to the notion of the indestructibility of matter.

Again, what simpler, or more absolutely practical, than

the attempt to keep the axle of a wheel from heating when the wheel turns around very fast? How useful for carters and gig drivers to know something about this; and how good were it, if any ingenious person would find out the cause of such phenomena, and thence educe a general remedy for them. Such an ingenious person was Count Rumford; and he and his successors have landed us in the theory of the persistence, or indestructibility, of force. And in the infinitely minute, as in the infinitely great, the seekers after natural knowledge of the kinds called physical and chemical, have everywhere found a definite order and succession of events which seem never to be infringed.

And how has it fared with "Physick" and Anatomy? Have the anatomist, the physiologist, or the physician, whose business it has been to devote themselves assiduously to that eminently practical and direct end, the alleviation of the sufferings of mankind,—have they been able to confine their vision more absolutely to the strictly useful? I fear they are the worst offenders of all. For if the astronomer has set before us the infinite magnitude of space, and the practical eternity of the duration of the universe; if the physical and chemical philosophers have demonstrated the infinite minuteness of its constituent parts, and the practical eternity of matter and of force; and if both have alike proclaimed the universality of a definite and predicable order and succession of events, the workers in biology have not only accepted all these, but have added more startling theses of their own. For, as the astronomers discover in the earth no center of the universe, but an eccentric speck, so the naturalists find man to be no center of the living world, but one amidst endless modifications of life; and as the astronomer observes the mark of practically endless time set upon the arrangements of the solar system, so the student of life finds the records of ancient forms of existence peopling the world for ages, which, in relation to human experience, are infinite.

Furthermore, the physiologist finds life to be as dependent for its manifestation on particular molecular arrangements

as any physical or chemical phenomenon; and wherever he extends his researches, fixed order and unchanging causation reveal themselves, as plainly as in the rest of Nature.

Nor can I find that any other fate has awaited the germ of Religion. Arising, like all other kinds of knowledge, out of the action and interaction of man's mind, with that which is not man's mind, it has taken the intellectual coverings of Fetishism or Polytheism; of Theism or Atheism; of Superstition or Rationalism. With these, and their relative merits and demerits, I have nothing to do; but this it is needful for my purpose to say, that if the religion of the present differs from that of the past, it is because the theology of the present has become more scientific than that of the past; because it has not only renounced idols of wood and idols of stone, but begins to see the necessity of breaking in pieces the idols built up of books and traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs; and of cherishing the noblest and most human of man's emotions, by worship "for the most part of the silent sort" at the altar of the Unknown.

Such are a few of the new conceptions implanted in our minds by the improvement of natural knowledge. Men have acquired the ideas of the practically infinite extent of the universe and of its practical eternity; they are familiar with the conception that our earth is but an infinitesimal fragment of that part of the universe which can be seen; and that, nevertheless, its duration is, as compared with our standards of time, infinite. They have further acquired the idea that man is but one of innumerable forms of life now existing on the globe, and that the present existences are but the last of an immeasurable series of predecessors. Moreover, every step they have made in natural knowledge has tended to extend and rivet in their minds the conception of a definite order of the universe—which is embodied in what are called, by an unhappy metaphor, the laws of Nature—and to narrow the range and loosen the force of men's belief in spontaneity, or in changes other than such as arise out of that definite order itself.

Whether these ideas are well or ill founded is not the question. No one can deny that they exist, and have been the inevitable outgrowth of the improvement of natural knowledge. And if so, it cannot be doubted that they are changing the form of men's most cherished and most important convictions.

And as regards the second point—the extent to which the improvement of natural knowledge has remodeled and altered what may be termed the intellectual ethics of men,—what are among the moral convictions most fondly held by barbarous and semi-barbarous people.

They are the convictions that authority is the soundest basis of belief; that merit attaches to a readiness to believe; that the doubting disposition is a bad one, and skepticism a sin; that when good authority has pronounced what is to be believed, and faith has accepted it, reason has no further duty. There are many excellent persons who yet hold by these principles, and it is not my present business, or intention, to discuss their views. All I wish to bring clearly before your minds is the unquestionable fact that the improvement of natural knowledge is effected by methods which directly give the lie to all these convictions, and assume the exact reverse of each to be true.

The improver of natural knowledge absolutely refuses to acknowledge authority, as such. For him, skepticism is the highest of duties; blind faith the one unpardonable sin. And it cannot be otherwise, for every great advance in natural knowledge has involved the absolute rejection of authority, the cherishing of the keenest skepticism, the annihilation of the spirit of blind faith; and the most ardent votary of science holds his firmest convictions, not because the men he most venerates hold them; not because their verity is testified by portents and wonders, but because his experience teaches him that whenever he chooses to bring these convictions into contact with their primary source, Nature—whenever he thinks fit to test them by appealing to experiment and to observation—Nature will confirm them. The man of science has learned to believe in justification, not by faith, but by verification.

Thus, without for a moment pretending to despise the practical results of the improvement of natural knowledge, and its beneficial influence on material civilization, it must, I think, be admitted that the great ideas, some of which I have indicated, and the ethical spirit which I have endeavored to sketch, in the few moments which remained at my disposal, constitute the real and permanent significance of natural knowledge.

If these ideas be destined, as I believe they are, to be more and more firmly established as the world grows older; if that spirit be fated, as I believe it is, to extend itself into all departments of human thought, and to become co-extensive with the range of knowledge; if, as our race approaches its maturity, it discovers, as I believe it will, that there is but one kind of knowledge and but one method of acquiring it; then we, who are still children, may justly feel it our highest duty to recognize the advisableness of improving natural knowledge, and so to aid ourselves and our successors in our course towards the noble goal which lies before mankind.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

Note. These topics relate to both of the preceding selections.

1. What are the practical and cultural aspects of the study of the sciences?
2. Show the advantages over the older method of book study that the laboratory method of teaching science has.
3. Discriminate clearly between the inductive and deductive processes of reasoning.
4. Are any sciences deductive in method?
5. Discuss the value of one or more particular sciences.
6. How far is Huxley correct in his position as given on page 80 in regard to the general purpose of science instruction? Apply his view to the science instruction of the liberal college.

LITERATURE AND SCIENCE¹

MATTHEW ARNOLD

[Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) is well known as an English poet of the Victorian period, but more particularly as a critic of literature and society. The following essay shows him as a great apostle of literary culture and champion of classical education in a scientific and materialistic age. *Literature and Science* was originally an address delivered several times during a visit to the United States in 1883-1884.]

Practical people talk with a smile of Plato and of his absolute ideas; and it is impossible to deny that Plato's ideas do often seem unpractical and impracticable, and especially when one views them in connection with the life of a great work-a-day world like the United States. The necessary staple of the life of such a world Plato regards with disdain; handicraft and trade and the working professions he regards with disdain; but what becomes of the life of an industrial modern community if you take handicraft and trade and the working professions out of it? The base mechanic arts and handicrafts, says Plato, bring about a natural weakness in the principle of excellence in a man, so that he cannot govern the ignoble growths in him, but nurses them, and cannot understand fostering any other. Those who exercise such arts and trades, as they have their bodies, he says, marred by their vulgar businesses, so they have their souls, too, bowed and broken by them. And if one of these uncomely people has a mind to seek self-culture and philosophy, Plato compares him to a bald little tinker, who has scraped together money, and has got his release from service, and has had a bath, and bought a new coat, and is rigged out like a bridegroom about to marry the daughter of his master who has fallen into poor and helpless estate.

Nor do the working professions fare any better than trade at the hands of Plato. He draws for us an inimitable picture of the working lawyer, and of his life of bondage; he shows

¹ Reprinted from *Discourses in America*, The Macmillan Company.

how this bondage from his youth up has stunted and warped him, and made him small and crooked of soul, encompassing him with difficulties which he is not man enough to rely on justice and truth as means to encounter, but has recourse, for help out of them, to falsehood and wrong. And so, says Plato, this poor creature is bent and broken, and grows up from boy to man without a particle of soundness in him, although exceedingly smart and clever in his own esteem.

One cannot refuse to admire the artist who draws these pictures. But we say to ourselves that his ideas show the influence of a primitive and obsolete order of things, when the warrior caste and the priestly caste were alone in honor, and the humble work of the world was done by slaves. We have now changed all that; the modern majority consists in work, as Emerson declares; and in work, we may add, principally of such plain and dusty kind as the work of cultivators of the ground, handicraftsmen, men of trade and business, men of the working professions. Above all is this true in a great industrious community such as that of the United States.

Now education, many people go on to say, is still mainly governed by the ideas of men like Plato, who lived when the warrior caste and the priestly or philosophical class were alone in honor, and the really useful part of the community were slaves. It is an education fitted for persons of leisure in such a community. This education passed from Greece and Rome to the feudal communities of Europe, where also the warrior caste and the priestly caste were alone held in honor, and where the really useful and working part of the community, though not nominally slaves as in the pagan world, were practically not much better off than slaves, and not more seriously regarded. And how absurd it is, people end by saying, to inflict this education upon an industrious modern community, where very few indeed are persons of leisure, and the mass to be considered has not leisure, but is bound, for its own great good, and for the great good of the world at large, to plain labor and to industrial pursuits, and the education in question tends

necessarily to make men dissatisfied with these pursuits and unfitted for them!

That is what is said. So far I must defend Plato, as to plead that his view of education and studies is in the general, as it seems to me, sound enough, and fitted for all sorts and conditions of men, whatever their pursuits may be. "An intelligent man," says Plato, "will prize those studies which result in his soul getting soberness, righteousness, and wisdom, and will less value the others." I cannot consider *that* a bad description of the aim of education, and of the motives which should govern us in the choice of studies, whether we are preparing ourselves for a hereditary seat in the English House of Lords or for the pork trade in Chicago.

Still I admit that Plato's world was not ours, that his scorn of trade and handicraft is fantastic, that he had no conception of a great industrial community such as that of the United States, and that such a community must and will shape its education to suit its own needs. If the usual education handed down to it from the past does not suit it, it will certainly before long drop this and try another. The usual education in the past has been mainly literary. The question is whether the studies which were long supposed to be the best for all of us are practically the best now; whether others are not better. The tyranny of the past, many think, weighs on us injuriously in the predominance given to letters in education. The question is raised whether, to meet the needs of our modern life, the predominance ought not now to pass from letters to science; and naturally the question is nowhere raised with more energy than here in the United States. The design of abasing what is called "mere literary instruction and education," and of exalting what is called "sound, extensive, and practical scientific knowledge," is, in this intensely modern world of the United States, even more perhaps than in Europe, a very popular design, and makes great and rapid progress.

I am going to ask whether the present movement for ousting letters from their old predominance in education, and for transferring the predominance in education to the natural sciences,

whether this brisk and flourishing movement ought to prevail, and whether it is likely that in the end it really will prevail. An objection may be raised which I will anticipate. My own studies have been almost wholly in letters, and my visits to the field of the natural sciences have been very slight and inadequate, although those sciences have always strongly moved my curiosity. A man of letters, it will perhaps be said, is not competent to discuss the comparative merits of letters and natural science as means of education. To this objection I reply, first of all, that his incompetence, if he attempts the discussion but is really incompetent for it, will be abundantly visible; nobody will be taken in; he will have plenty of sharp observers and critics to save mankind from that danger. But the line I am going to follow is, as you will soon discover, so extremely simple, that perhaps it may be followed without failure even by one who for a more ambitious line of discussion would be quite incompetent.

Some of you may possibly remember a phrase of mine which has been the object of a good deal of comment; an observation to the effect that in our culture, the aim being *to know ourselves and the world*, we have, as the means to this end, *to know the best which has been thought and said in the world*.¹ A man of science, who is also an excellent writer and the very prince of debaters, Professor Huxley, in a discourse at the opening of Sir Josiah Mason's college at Birmingham, laying hold of this phrase, expanded it by quoting some more words of mine, which are these: "The civilized world is to be regarded as now being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result; and whose members have for their proper outfit a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special local and temporary advantages being put out of account that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme."

¹For a fuller statement of Arnold's views on culture, see the essay "Sweetness and Light" in *Culture and Anarchy*.

Now on my phrase, thus enlarged, Professor Huxley remarks that when I speak of the above-mentioned knowledge as enabling us to know ourselves and the world, I assert *literature* to contain the materials which suffice for thus making us know ourselves and the world. But it is not by any means clear, says he, that after having learnt all which ancient and modern literatures have to tell us, we have laid a sufficiently broad and deep foundation for that criticism of life, that knowledge of ourselves and the world, which constitutes culture. On the contrary, Professor Huxley declares that he finds himself "wholly unable to admit that either nations or individuals will really advance, if their outfit draws nothing from the stores of physical science. An army without weapons of precision, and with no particular base of operations, might more hopefully enter upon a campaign on the Rhine, than a man, devoid of a knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, upon a criticism of life."

This shows how needful it is for those who are to discuss any matter together to have a common understanding as to the sense of the terms they employ,—how needful, and how difficult. What Professor Huxley says implies just the reproach which is so often brought against the study of *belles lettres*, as they are called: that the study is an elegant one, but slight and ineffectual; a smattering of Greek and Latin and other ornamental things, of little use for anyone whose object is to get at truth, and to be a practical man. So, too, M. Renan talks of the "superficial humanism" of a school-course which treats us as if we were all going to be poets, writers, preachers, orators, and he opposes this humanism to positive science, or the critical search after truth. And there is always a tendency in those who are remonstrating against the predominance of letters in education, to understand by letters *belles lettres*, and by *belles lettres* a superficial humanism, the opposite of science or true knowledge.

But when we talk of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, for instance, which is the knowledge people have called the humanities, I for my part mean a knowledge which is something more than a superficial humanism, mainly decorative. "I call

all teaching *scientific*," says Wolf, the critic of Homer, "which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources. For example: a knowledge of classical antiquity is scientific when the remains of classical antiquity are correctly studied in the original languages." There can be no doubt that Wolf is perfectly right; that all learning is scientific which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources, and that a genuine humanism is scientific.

When I speak of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, therefore, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, I mean more than a knowledge of so much vocabulary, so much grammar, so many portions of authors in the Greek and Latin languages, I mean knowing the Greeks and Romans, and their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world; what we get from them, and what is its value. That, at least, is the ideal; and when we talk of endeavoring to know Greek and Roman antiquity, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, we mean endeavoring so to know them as to satisfy this ideal, however much we may still fall short of it.

The same also as to knowing our own and other modern nations, with the like aim of getting to understand ourselves and the world. To know the best that has been thought and said by the modern nations is to know, says Professor Huxley, "only what modern *literatures* have to tell us; it is the criticism of life contained in modern literature." And yet "the distinctive character of our times," he urges, "lies in the vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge." And how, therefore, can a man, devoid of knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, enter hopefully upon a criticism of modern life?

Let us, I say, be agreed about the meaning of the terms we are using. I talk of knowing the best which has been thought and uttered in the world; Professor Huxley says this means knowing *literature*. Literature is a large word; it may mean everything written with letters or printed in a book. Euclid's *Elements* and Newton's *Principia* are thus literature. All knowledge that reaches us through books is literature. But by litera-

ture Professor Huxley means *belles lettres*. He means to make me say that knowing the best which has been thought and said by the modern nations is knowing their *belles lettres* and no more. And this is no sufficient equipment, he argues, for a criticism of modern life. But as I do not mean, by knowing ancient Rome, knowing merely more or less of Latin *belles lettres*, and taking no account of Rome's military, and political, and legal, and administrative work in the world; and as, by knowing ancient Greece, I understand knowing her as the giver of Greek art, and the guide to a free and right use of reason and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics and physics and astronomy and biology,—I understand knowing her as all this, and not merely knowing certain Greek poems, and histories, and treatises, and speeches,—so as to the knowledge of modern nations also. By knowing modern nations, I mean not merely knowing their *belles lettres*, but knowing also what has been done by such men as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Darwin. "Our ancestors learned," says Professor Huxley, "that the earth is the center of the visible universe, and that man is the cynosure of things terrestrial; and more especially was it inculcated that the course of nature had no fixed order, but that it could be, and constantly was, altered." But for us now, continues Professor Huxley, "the notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is not the chief body in the material universe, and that the world is not subordinated to man's use. It is even more certain that nature is the expression of a definite order, with which nothing interferes." "And yet," he cries, "the purely classical education advocated by the representatives of the humanists in our day gives no inkling of all this!"

In due place and time I will just touch upon that vexed question of classical education; but at present the question is as to what is meant by knowing the best which modern nations have thought and said. It is not knowing their *belles lettres* merely which is meant. To know Italian *belles lettres* is not to know Italy, and to know English *belles lettres* is not to know England.

Into knowing Italy and England there comes a great deal more, Galileo and Newton among it. The reproach of being a superficial humanism, a tincture of *belles lettres*, may attach rightly enough to some other disciplines; but to the particular discipline recommended when I proposed knowing the best that has been thought and said in the world, it does not apply. In that best I certainly include what in modern times has been thought and said by the great observers and knowers of nature.

There is, therefore, really no question between Professor Huxley and me as to whether knowing the great results of the modern scientific study of nature is not required as a part of our culture, as well as knowing the products of literature and art. But to follow the processes by which those results are reached, ought, say the friends of physical science, to be made the staple of education for the bulk of mankind. And here there does arise a question between those whom Professor Huxley calls with playful sarcasm "the Levites of culture," and those whom the poor humanist is sometimes apt to regard as its Nebuchadnezzars.

The great results of the scientific investigation of nature we are agreed upon knowing, but how much of our study are we bound to give to the processes by which those results are reached? The results have their visible bearing on human life. But all the processes, too, all the items of fact, by which those results are reached and established, are interesting. All knowledge is interesting to a wise man, and the knowledge of nature is interesting to all men. It is very interesting to know that, from the albuminous white of the egg, the chick in the egg gets the materials for its flesh, bones, blood, and feathers; while, from the fatty yolk of the egg, it gets the heat and energy which enable it at length to break its shell and begin the world. It is less interesting, perhaps, but still it is interesting, to know that when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water. Moreover, it is quite true that the habit of dealing with facts, which is given by the study of nature, is, as the friends of physical science praise it for being, an excellent discipline. The appeal, in the study of nature, is constantly to observation and

experiment; not only is it said that the thing is so, but we can be made to see that it is so. Not only does a man tell us that when a taper burns the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, as a man may tell us, if he likes, that Charon is punting his ferry-boat on the river Styx, or that Victor Hugo is a sublime poet, or Mr. Gladstone the most admirable of statesmen; but we are made to see that the conversion into carbonic acid and water does actually happen. This reality of natural knowledge it is, which makes the friends of physical science contrast it, as a knowledge of things, with the humanist's knowledge, which is, say they, a knowledge of words. And hence Professor Huxley is moved to lay it down that, "for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education." And a certain President of the Section for Mechanical Science in the British Association is, in Scripture phrase, "very bold," and declares that if a man, in his mental training, "has substituted literature and history for natural science, he has chosen the less useful alternative." But whether we go these lengths or not, we must all admit that in natural science the habit gained of dealing with facts is a most valuable discipline, and that every one should have some experience of it.

More than this, however, is demanded by the reformers. It is proposed to make the training in natural science the main part of education, for the great majority of mankind at any rate. And here, I confess, I part company with the friends of physical science, with whom up to this point I have been agreeing. In differing from them, however, I wish to proceed with the utmost caution and diffidence. The smallness of my own acquaintance with the disciplines of natural science is ever before my mind, and I am fearful of doing these disciplines an injustice. The ability and pugnacity of the partisans of natural science make them formidable persons to contradict. The tone of tentative inquiry, which befits a being of dim faculties and bounded knowledge, is the tone I would wish to take and not to depart from. At present it seems to me, that those who are for giving to natural knowledge, as they call it, the chief place in the education

of the majority of mankind, leave one important thing out of their account: the constitution of human nature. But I put this forward on the strength of some facts not at all recondite, very far from it; facts capable of being stated in the simplest possible fashion, and to which, if I so state them, the man of science will, I am sure, be willing to allow their due weight.

Deny the facts altogether, I think, he hardly can. He can hardly deny, that when we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners,—he can hardly deny that this scheme, though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true representation of the matter. Human nature is built up by these powers; we have the need for them all. When we have rightly met and adjusted the claims of them all, we shall then be in a fair way for getting soberness and righteousness, with wisdom. This is evident enough, and the friends of physical science would admit it.

But perhaps they may not have sufficiently observed another thing: namely, that the several powers just mentioned are not isolated, but there is, in the generality of mankind, a perpetual tendency to relate them one to another in divers ways. With one such way of relating them I am particularly concerned now. Following our instinct for intellect and knowledge, we acquire pieces of knowledge; and presently, in the generality of men, there arises the desire to relate these pieces of knowledge to our sense for conduct, to our sense for beauty,—and there is weariness and dissatisfaction if the desire is balked. Now in this desire lies, I think, the strength of that hold which letters have upon us.

All knowledge is, as I said just now, interesting; and even items of knowledge which from the nature of the case cannot well be related, but must stand isolated in our thoughts, have their interest. Even lists of exceptions have their interest. If we are studying Greek accents, it is interesting to know that *pais* and *pas*, and some other monosyllables of the same form

of declension, do not take the circumflex upon the last syllable of the genitive plural, but vary, in this respect, from the common rule. If we are studying physiology, it is interesting to know that the pulmonary artery carries dark blood and the pulmonary vein carries bright blood, departing in this respect from the common rule for the division of labor between the veins and the arteries. But every one knows how we seek naturally to combine the pieces of our knowledge together, to bring them under general rules, to relate them to principles; and how unsatisfactory and tiresome it would be to go on forever learning lists of exceptions, or accumulating items of fact which must stand isolated.

Well, that same need of relating our knowledge, which operates here within the sphere of our knowledge itself, we shall find operating, also, outside that sphere. We experience, as we go on learning and knowing,—the vast majority of us experience,—the need of relating what we have learned and known to the sense which we have in us for conduct, to the sense which we have in us for beauty.

A certain Greek prophetess of Mantinea in Arcadia, Diotima by name, once explained to the philosopher Socrates that love, and impulse, and bent of all kinds, is, in fact, nothing else but the desire in men that good should forever be present to them. This desire for good, Diotima assured Socrates, is our fundamental desire, of which fundamental desire every impulse in us is only some one particular form. And therefore this fundamental desire it is, I suppose,—this desire in men that good should be forever present to them,—which acts in us when we feel the impulse for relating our knowledge to our sense for conduct and to our sense for beauty. At any rate, with men in general the instinct exists. Such is human nature. And the instinct, it will be admitted, is innocent, and human nature is preserved by our following the lead of its innocent instincts. Therefore, in seeking to gratify this instinct in question, we are following the instinct of self-preservation in humanity.

But, no doubt, some kinds of knowledge cannot be made

to directly serve the instinct in question, cannot be directly related to the sense for beauty, to the sense for conduct. These are instrument-knowledges; they lead on to other knowledges, which can. A man who passes his life in instrument-knowledges is a specialist. They may be invaluable as instruments to something beyond, for those who have the gift thus to employ them; and they may be disciplines in themselves wherein it is useful for every one to have some schooling. But it is inconceivable that the generality of men should pass all their mental life with Greek accents or with formal logic. My friend Professor Sylvester, who is one of the first mathematicians in the world, holds transcendental doctrines as to the virtue of mathematics, but those doctrines are not for common men. In the very Senate House and heart of our English Cambridge I once ventured, though not without an apology for my profaneness, to hazard the opinion that for the majority of mankind a little of mathematics, even, goes a long way. Of course this is quite consistent with their being of immense importance as an instrument to something else; but it is the few who have the aptitude for thus using them, not the bulk of mankind.

The natural sciences do not, however, stand on the same footing with these instrument-knowledges. Experience shows us that the generality of men will find more interest in learning that, when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, or in learning the explanation of the phenomenon of dew, or in learning how the circulation of the blood is carried on, than they find in learning that the genitive plural of *pais* and *pas* does not take the circumflex on the termination. And one piece of natural knowledge is added to another, and others are added to that, and at last we come to propositions so interesting as Mr. Darwin's famous proposition that "our ancestor was a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits." Or we come to propositions of such reach and magnitude as those which Professor Huxley delivers, when he says that the notions of our forefathers about the beginning and the end of the world

were all wrong, and that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes.

Interesting, indeed, these results of science are, important they are, and we should all of us be acquainted with them. But what I now wish you to mark is, that we are still, when they are propounded to us and we receive them, we are still in the sphere of intellect and knowledge. And for the generality of men there will be found, I say, to arise, when they have duly taken in the proposition that their ancestor was "a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits," there will be found to arise an invincible desire to relate this proposition to the sense in us for conduct, and to the sense in us for beauty. But this the men of science will not do for us, and will hardly even profess to do. They will give us other pieces of knowledge, other facts, about other animals and their ancestors, or about plants, or about stones, or about stars; and they may finally bring us to those great "general conceptions of the universe, which are forced upon us all," says Professor Huxley, "by the progress of physical science." But still it will be *knowledge* only which they give us; knowledge not put for us into relation with our sense for conduct, our sense for beauty, and touched with emotion by being so put; not thus put for us, and therefore, to the majority of mankind, after a certain while, unsatisfying, wearying.

Not to the born naturalist, I admit. But what do we mean by a born naturalist? We mean a man in whom the zeal for observing nature is so uncommonly strong and eminent, that it marks him off from the bulk of mankind. Such a man will pass his life happily in collecting natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and will ask for nothing, or hardly anything, more. I have heard it said that the sagacious and admirable naturalist whom we lost not very long ago, Mr. Darwin, once owned to a friend that for his part he did not experience the necessity for two things which most men find so necessary to them,—religion and poetry; science and the domestic affections, he thought, were enough. To a born naturalist, I can well understand that

this should seem so. So absorbing is his occupation with nature, so strong his love for his occupation, that he goes on acquiring natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and has little time or inclination for thinking about getting it related to the desire in man for conduct, the desire in man for beauty. He relates it to them for himself as he goes along, so far as he feels the need; and he draws from the domestic affections all the additional solace necessary. But then Darwins are extremely rare. Another great and admirable master of natural knowledge, Faraday, was a Sandemanian. That is to say, he related his knowledge to his instinct for conduct and to his instinct for beauty, by the aid of that respectable Scottish sectary, Robert Sandeman. And so strong, in general, is the demand of religion and poetry to have their share in a man, to associate themselves with his knowing, and to relieve and rejoice it, that, probably, for one man among us with the disposition to do as Darwin did in this respect, there are at least fifty with the disposition to do as Faraday.

Education lays hold upon us, in fact, by satisfying this demand. Professor Huxley holds up to scorn medieval education, with its neglect of the knowledge of nature, its poverty even of literary studies, its formal logic devoted to "showing how and why that which the Church said was true must be true." But the great medieval universities were not brought into being, we may be sure, by the zeal for giving a jejune and contemptible education. Kings have been their nursing fathers, and queens have been their nursing mothers, but not for this. The medieval universities came into being, because the supposed knowledge, delivered by Scripture and the Church, so deeply engaged men's hearts, by so simply, easily, and powerfully relating itself to their desire for conduct, their desire for beauty. All other knowledge was dominated by this supposed knowledge and was subordinated to it, because of the surpassing strength of the hold which it gained upon the affections of men, by allying itself profoundly with their sense for conduct, their sense for beauty.

But now, says Professor Huxley, conceptions of the universe

fatal to the notions held by our forefathers have been forced upon us by physical science. Grant to him that they are thus fatal, that the new conceptions must and will soon become current everywhere, and that every one will finally perceive them to be fatal to the beliefs of our forefathers. The need of humane letters, as they are truly called, because they serve the paramount desire in men that good should be forever present to them,—the need of humane letters, to establish a relation between the new conceptions, and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for conduct, is only the more visible. The Middle Age could do without humane letters, as it could do without the study of nature, because its supposed knowledge was made to engage its emotions so powerfully. Grant that the supposed knowledge disappears, its power of being made to engage the emotions will of course disappear along with it,—but the emotions themselves, and their claim to be engaged and satisfied, will remain. Now if we find by experience that humane letters have an undeniable power of engaging the emotions, the importance of humane letters in a man's training becomes not less, but greater, in proportion to the success of modern science in extirpating what it calls "medieval thinking."

Have humane letters, then, have poetry and eloquence, the power here attributed to them of engaging the emotions, and do they exercise it? And if they have it and exercise it, *how* do they exercise it, so as to exert an influence upon man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty? Finally, even if they both can and do exert an influence upon the senses in question, how are they to relate to them the results,—the modern results,—of natural science? All these questions may be asked. First, have poetry and eloquence the power of calling out the emotions? The appeal is to experience. Experience shows that for the vast majority of men, for mankind in general, they have the power. Next, do they exercise it? They do. But then, *how* do they exercise it so as to affect man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty? And this is perhaps a case for applying the Preacher's words: "Though a man labor to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea, farther, though a wise man think to

know it, yet shall he not be able to find it.”¹ Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say, “Patience is a virtue,” and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with Homer,

τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν—²

“for an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men”? Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with the philosopher Spinoza, *Felicitas in eo consistit quo homo suum esse conservare potest*—“Man’s happiness consists in his being able to preserve his own essence,” and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with the Gospel, “What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, forfeit himself?” How does this difference of effect arise? I cannot tell, and I am not much concerned to know; the important thing is that it does arise, and that we can profit by it. But how, finally, are poetry and eloquence to exercise the power of relating the modern results of natural science to man’s instinct for conduct, his instinct for beauty? And here again I answer that I do not know *how* they will exercise it, but that they can and will exercise it I am sure. I do not mean that modern philosophical poets and modern philosophical moralists are to come and relate for us, in express terms, the results of modern scientific research to our instinct for conduct, our instinct for beauty. But I mean that we shall find, as a matter of experience, if we know the best that has been thought and uttered in the world, we shall find that the art and poetry and eloquence of men who lived, perhaps, long ago, who had the most limited natural knowledge, who had the most erroneous conceptions about many important matters, we shall find that this art, and poetry, and eloquence, have in fact not only the power of refreshing and delighting us, they have also the power—such is the strength and worth, in essentials, of their authors’ criticism of life,—they have a fortifying, and elevating, and quickening, and suggestive power, capable of wonderfully helping us to relate the results of modern

¹ *Ecclesiastes*, viii. 17. [Author’s note.]

² *Iliad*, xxiv. 49. [Author’s note.]

science to our need for conduct, our need for beauty. Homer's conceptions of the physical universe were, I imagine, grotesque; but really, under the shock of hearing from modern science that "the world is not subordinated to man's use, and that man is not the cynosure of things terrestrial," I could, for my own part, desire no better comfort than Homer's line which I quoted just now,

τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν—

"for an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men"!

And the more that men's minds are cleared, the more that the results of science are frankly accepted, the more that poetry and eloquence come to be received and studied as what in truth they really are,—the criticism of life by gifted men, alive and active with extraordinary power at an unusual number of points;—so much the more will the value of humane letters, and of art also, which is an utterance having a like kind of power with theirs, be felt and acknowledged, and their place in education be secured.

Let us therefore, all of us, avoid indeed as much as possible any invidious comparison between the merits of humane letters, as means of education, and the merits of the natural sciences. But when some President of a Section for Mechanical Science insists on making the comparison, and tells us that "he who in his training has substituted literature and history for natural science has chosen the less useful alternative," let us make answer to him that the student of humane letters only, will, at least, know also the great general conceptions brought in by modern physical science; for science, as Professor Huxley says, forces them upon us all. But the student of the natural sciences only, will, by our very hypothesis, know nothing of humane letters; not to mention that in setting himself to be perpetually accumulating natural knowledge, he sets himself to do what only specialists have in general the gift for doing genially. And so he will probably be unsatisfied, or at any rate incomplete, and even more incomplete than the student of humane letters only.

I once mentioned in a school report, how a young man in one of our English training colleges having to paraphrase the passage in *Macbeth* beginning,

Can'st thou not minister to a mind diseased?

turned this line into, "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" And I remarked what a curious state of things it would be, if every pupil of our national schools knew, let us say, that the moon is two thousand one hundred and sixty miles in diameter, and thought at the same time that a good paraphrase for

Can'st thou not minister to a mind diseased?

was, "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" If one is driven to choose, I think I would rather have a young person ignorant about the moon's diameter, but aware that "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" is bad, than a young person whose education had been such as to manage things the other way.

Or to go higher than the pupils of our national schools. I have in my mind's eye a member of our British Parliament who comes to travel here in America, who afterwards relates his travels, and who shows a really masterly knowledge of the geology of this great country and of its mining capabilities, but who ends by gravely suggesting that the United States should borrow a prince from our Royal Family, and should make him their king, and should create a House of Lords of great landed proprietors after the pattern of ours; and then America, he thinks, would have her future happily and perfectly secured. Surely, in this case, the President of the Section for Mechanical Science would himself hardly say that our member of Parliament, by concentrating himself upon geology and mineralogy, and so on, and not attending to literature and history, had "chosen the more useful alternative."

If then there is to be separation and option between humane letters on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other, the great majority of mankind, all who have not exceptional and overpowering aptitudes for the study of nature, would do

well, I cannot but think, to choose to be educated in humane letters rather than in the natural sciences. Letters will call out their being at more points, will make them live more.

I said that before I ended I would just touch on the question of classical education, and I will keep my word. Even if literature is to retain a large place in our education, yet Latin and Greek, say the friends of progress, will certainly have to go. Greek is the grand offender in the eyes of these gentlemen. The attackers of the established course of study think that against Greek, at any rate, they have irresistible arguments. Literature may perhaps be needed in education, they say; but why on earth should it be Greek literature? Why not French or German? Nay, "has not an Englishman models in his own literature of every kind of excellence?" As before, it is not on any weak pleadings of my own that I rely for convincing the gainsayers; it is on the constitution of human nature itself, and on the instinct of self-preservation in humanity. The instinct for beauty is set in human nature, as surely as the instinct for knowledge is set there, or the instinct for conduct. If the instinct for beauty is served by Greek literature and art as it is served by no other literature and art, we may trust to the instinct of self-preservation in humanity for keeping Greek as part of our culture. We may trust to it for even making the study of Greek more prevalent than it is now. Greek will come, I hope, some day to be studied more rationally than at present; but it will be increasingly studied as men increasingly feel the need in them for beauty, and how powerfully Greek art and Greek literature can serve this need. Women will again study Greek, as Lady Jane Grey did; I believe that in that chain of forts, with which the fair host of the Amazons are now engirdling our English universities, I find that here in America, in colleges like Smith College in Massachusetts, and Vassar College in the State of New York, and in the happy families of the mixed universities out West, they are studying it already.

Defuit una mihi symmetria prisca,—"The antique symmetry was the one thing wanting to me," said Leonardo da

Vinci; and he was an Italian. I will not presume to speak for the Americans, but I am sure that, in the Englishman, the want of this admirable symmetry of the Greeks is a thousand times more great and crying than in any Italian. The results of the want show themselves most glaringly, perhaps, in our architecture, but they show themselves, also, in all our art. *Fit details strictly combined, in view of a large general result nobly conceived*; that is just the beautiful *symmetria prisca* of the Greeks, and it is just where we English fail, where all our art fails. Striking ideas we have, and well-executed details we have; but that high symmetry which, with satisfying and delightful effect, combines them, we seldom or never have. The glorious beauty of the Acropolis at Athens did not come from single fine things stuck about on that hill, a statue here, a gateway there,—no, it arose from all things being perfectly combined for a supreme total effect. What must not an Englishman feel about our deficiencies in this respect, as the sense for beauty, whereof this symmetry is an essential element, awakens and strengthens within him! what will not one day be his respect and desire for Greece and its *symmetria prisca*, when the scales drop from his eyes as he walks the London streets, and he sees such a lesson in meanness as the Strand, for instance, in its true deformity! But here we are coming to our friend Mr. Ruskin's province, and I will not intrude upon it, for he is its very sufficient guardian.

And so we at last find, it seems, we find flowing in favor of the humanities the natural and necessary stream of things, which seemed against them when we started. The "hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits," this good fellow carried hidden in his nature, apparently, something destined to develop into a necessity for humane letters. Nay, more; we seem finally to be even led to the further conclusion that our hairy ancestor carried in his nature, also, a necessity for Greek.

And therefore, to say the truth, I cannot really think that humane letters are in much actual danger of being thrust out from their leading place in education, in spite of the array of

authorities against them at this moment. So long as human nature is what it is, their attractions will remain irresistible. As with Greek so with letters generally: they will some day come, we may hope, to be studied more rationally, but they will not lose their place. What will happen will rather be that there will be crowded into education other matters besides, far too many; there will be, perhaps, a period of unsettlement and confusion and false tendency; but letters will not in the end lose their leading place. If they lose it for a time, they will get it back again. We shall be brought back to them by our wants and aspirations. And a poor humanist may possess his soul in patience, neither strive nor cry, admit the energy and brilliancy of the partisans of physical science, and their present favor with the public, to be far greater than his own, and still have a happy faith that the nature of things works silently on behalf of the studies which he loves, and that, while we shall all have to acquaint ourselves with the great results reached by modern science, and to give ourselves as much training in its disciplines as we can conveniently carry, yet the majority of men will always require humane letters; and so much the more, as they have the more and the greater results of science to relate to the need in man for conduct, and to the need in him for beauty.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Explain clearly what Arnold thinks is the value of the study of literature. 2. Discuss how far belief in the special efficacy of science or of literature in education may be a matter of temperament. Possibly Arnold and Huxley might be used as typical cases. 3. Set forth Arnold's definition of culture. See his essay, "Sweetness and Light," in *Culture and Anarchy* for further elaboration of this rather famous definition. 4. How well has Arnold succeeded in uniting literature and science by his statement, "all learning is scientific which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources" (page 100)? 5. How far may Arnold's definition of literature as "all knowledge that reaches us through books" be accepted? 6. Endeavor to explain in simple fashion what is the meaning of each

of the four powers which Arnold indicates as going into the building up of human life. 7. Set forth Arnold's grounds for his staunch belief in the classical literatures. If his position does not appeal to you, give your criticism of it.

THE FUNCTION OF ART¹

JOHN CAIRD

[John Caird (1820-1898) was a distinguished Scotch divine and philosopher. From 1873 to the close of his life he was vice-chancellor and principal of the University of Glasgow. It was his custom to deliver at the opening of each session of the University an address on some subject connected with the studies of the University, or on the work of some great author—philosopher or theologian, scientific or literary man—who might be regarded as representative of one of these studies. The selection here given is a portion of one of these addresses, entitled *The Study of Art.*]

It would seem at first sight that an inquiry into the uses of art involves a contradiction in terms. What we seek in a work of art is not instruction or information, not material or other advantages, but simply pleasure or enjoyment. Music, painting, poetry, and the other fine arts, whatever they do for the embellishment or decoration of human life, obviously contribute nothing to the supply of its practical necessities. They may form the luxury of idleness or the innocent pastime of our hours of leisure, but in themselves they have no moral purpose or practical utility; and whenever pleasure clashes with profit, they may even become noxious—diverting, as they do, time and thought from the serious work or sterner tasks of life.

Moreover, the view of the function of art that relegates it to the province of the ornamental as distinguished from the useful, seems to be sanctioned not merely by popular thought, but also by philosophic theory. Among those who speculate on the subject the accepted theory seems to be that which is embodied in the phrase, "Art for art's sake," meaning by

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that, that art is to be prosecuted for itself, and not for any ulterior end. The end of a work of art is not to point a moral or to convey a lesson in science or philosophy, or even to soften the manners and refine the habits of society; but to be, in and for itself, a source of delight. It appeals to what has been called the "play impulse" in human nature, to the spontaneous enjoyment of activities which men put forth, not for the wages they are to earn or the benefits they are to procure thereby, but simply because they find in the free play of their energies an immediate satisfaction and joy. When the sympathetic observer stands in rapt admiration before some great masterpiece of painting or sculpture, or when ear and soul yield themselves up to the charm of the great composer's art in song, cantata, opera, oratorio, and vague, undefined emotions, passionate or pathetic, are awakened within the breast, no thought of ulterior use or profit crosses the mind. Its experience is that of absorption in present, immediate enjoyment. And, on the other hand, if we think of the attitude of the artist's mind in producing, equally foreign to it is the aim at anything beyond the work itself. He paints or sings or writes simply because the creative impulse is upon him, and he cannot choose but give it vent; because a dream of beauty has taken possession of his soul, and it is joy or rapture to him to express it.

But while this view of the essentially non-utilitarian character of art may be freely conceded, there is nothing inconsistent with the concession in claiming for works of art a higher function than that of recreation or amusement, or in the assertion that they contribute in no slight or inappreciable measure to the formation of character and the intellectual and moral education of the community. In making this claim, however, it must be admitted that, in one point of view, the principle of "art for art's sake" is profoundly true. The educative function of art is, at best, an indirect one. Whatever intellectual enlightenment or moral elevation is to be gained from works of imagination, to communicate such benefits cannot be the conscious aim of the artist; nor is the merit of his work to be estimated by its didactic excellencies. Bad or indifferent

painting or poetry is no more redeemed from artistic inferiority by the moral or religious aim of the author than ill-dressed food or ill-made clothes by the respectability or piety of the cook or tailor. And, on the other hand, a poem or picture may have many of the highest qualities of art, though the subject may be coarse or voluptuous, or the treatment such as to offend our moral susceptibilities.

The poetry of Shelley and Byron contains much which, from a religious or moral point of view, cannot escape censure, while the literary form is of the highest artistic merit. The works of Dr. Watts and Mr. Tupper are full of pious teaching and unexceptional moralizing, yet, regarded as poetry, both are execrable. The deepest truth, in short, the noblest moral lessons may be conveyed in a form of art, but it is as unconsciously, with as little of a didactic aim, as are the lessons which Nature herself is ever teaching. The teachings of rock and stream and sea, the moralities addressed to us by stars and flowers, by autumn woods and mountain solitudes, do not reach us in the form of argumentative disquisitions, but of feelings and emanations which win their way insensibly into the soul. There are better sermons in stones and in the running brooks than human pen ever indited, but the lessons which these unconsecrated preachers address to us are innocent of logic or formal admonition.

Oh, to what uses shall we put
 The wild-weed flower that simply blows
 And is there any moral shut
 Within the bosom of the rose?
 But any man who walks the mead
 In bud or blade or bloom may find,
 According as his humors lead,
 A meaning suited to his mind;
 And liberal applications lie
 In Art, like Nature, dearest friend,
 So 'twere to cramp its use if I
 Should hook it to some useful end.

And the reason for what has now been said is obvious. It arises from the very nature of art as distinguished from sci-

ence. Works of imagination and works of instruction may treat of common subjects. The painter may depict, the poet sing, of the same scenes, persons, events, objects, whereof the naturalist, the historian, the philosopher discourses. But the aspects in which the two sorts of observers contemplate the common objects are essentially different; nor is it possible to combine in the same work an artistic and a scientific view of a subject, without sacrificing the peculiar excellence of both. In proportion to its merits as a work of science it will be bad as a work of art, and the very qualities which make it good art will make it bad science. The same tract of country, to take a palpable illustration, may be represented in landscape painting and in a map. But the painter who tried to embody in his work the precise and definite information of the map, would make it a wretchedly bad picture, and the geographer would spoil his map, if he tried to introduce the artistic effects of light and shade into his delineation of the boundaries of countries and of mountains, rivers, and streams. An anatomical drawing or model and a figure in sculpture deal both with the human frame; but if the sculptor is moved by the desire to display his anatomical knowledge, the ineffable grace and beauty we demand in a work of art vanishes, and what we get is neither science nor art, but only artistic pedantry. Or, to take but one other example, the conflicting and essentially inconsistent aims of science and art are exemplified in so-called didactic poems and novels with a purpose. A novel, say, may be written to illustrate some theory of life or to expose some social or political abuse—the evils of intemperance, the bad effects of the land or marriage laws, or what not. But what will be the inevitable result? The writer may be in the structure of his mind either mainly artist or mainly theorist. If the art-instinct predominates, there will be a constant temptation to sacrifice the didactic purpose to the exigencies of artistic treatment. Whenever the effective development of the plot would be marred by a too copious introduction of facts or a strict adherence to theory, the art impulse triumphs and fact or theory are ruthlessly sacrificed. If, on the contrary, the writer

is too conscientiously bent on the communication of information or the advocacy of a doctrine to care punctiliously for artistic effect, the result is a nondescript performance which gives neither information nor delight.

Though, however, it is not the direct function of art to teach, yet it does teach. Without direct scientific or ethical aim, works of imagination are not only the means of purest enjoyment, but they convey to us an order of ideas of an altogether peculiar kind, reveal to us in nature and in human life much which it lies beyond the province of science or philosophy to disclose, and exert over the moral nature an elevating and ennobling influence, in some respects the more potent that it is not their direct purpose to produce it.

What then, let me ask, is the sort of teaching which it is the unconscious vocation of art to communicate, what is the peculiar class of ideas of which works of imagination, in distinction from all other productions of human thought, are the vehicles? The answer to this question may be summarily given by saying that it is the office of art to idealize nature and life, or to present their facts and phenomena in their ideal aspect.

Does this answer mean that human art can improve on nature as God made it, or on human life as Providence has ordered it? Can the loftiest genius invent a fairer world, can the most soaring imagination conceive, or the resources of art depict, forms more lovely, lights more dazzling, harmonies of tone and color more subtle and various than those which we have but to open our eyes to behold? Bring before your minds, for example, any one of nature's ever-changing aspects, and say if the attempt faithfully to render it would not be employment sufficient for the rarest skill of the most ambitious limner who ever handled brush and palette? Light softly tinting the mountain edge at morning, or flooding meadow and woodland and stream with the golden rain of noontide, or flinging abroad with munificence of departing greatness its treasures of purple and vermilion and gold, ere it passes away with infinite gradations of fading splendor beneath the western

horizon; the sea rippling up with gentle, scarce perceptible insinuation over the long reaches of the pebbly shore, or rushing with wild impetuosity and hoarse clang of assault on the cliffs of an iron-bound coast; a mountain lake "in the light of the rising moon and of the first stars twinkling against the dusky silverness of twilight":—what, it may be said, has human art to do with its own inventions when, in myriads of such scenes and aspects, with inexhaustible wealth of loveliness, nature awaits, yet baffles man's utmost skill to copy her? Nay, before he presumes to draw on the resources of his own imagination, let the artist take the commonest natural objects, the merest patch of earth or sea or sky—a pool, a spray of hawthorn, a clump of heather, a cloud floating on the summer sky—and say, whether, after his most patient and protracted toil, he has succeeded in reproducing an exhaustive representation of what is before his eyes?

To this the answer is that, even if it were true that the artist has no other function than to record what he sees in nature, it is not every eye that can see what he sees. Nature reflects herself in the mirror of man's mind, but the mirror in most cases is opaque or dim, sometimes distorted and fractured, and the reflection takes its character from the medium by which it is produced. For the scientific man the outward facts, confused, accidental, unordered, which are all that the ordinary observer perceives, become luminous with the presence of hidden laws and relations. For the artistic or poetic observer, for the mind that is in sympathy with the soul of things—sensuous forms, colors, motions, are alive with the spirit of beauty, transfigured with the hidden glow and splendor of a light that other eyes see not—a light that never was on land or sea. And it is his high vocation, not merely to copy, to tickle our imitative susceptibilities by a matter-of-fact imitation of what we saw before, but through the language of imagination to interpret nature, and make us look upon her face "with larger, other eyes than ours."

But we may go further than this, and boldly say that there is a sense in which art does "improve in nature." All art

that is worthy of the name is creative, calls into existence something more than the bare facts which the outward world offers to the senses. These are the materials on which it works, but it does not leave them unchanged. It takes them up, pours them, so to speak, into the crucible of imagination, flings aside the mere dross of accident, fuses them anew in the fire of thought and feeling, shapes and molds them into conformity with its own ideals, and, lo! from its creative hand, forms which eye hath not seen, embodied visions of a land that is very far off, and of which only in our most exalted moments we catch a glimpse, start into life and beauty.

That there is nothing presumptuous in thus claiming for the imaginative arts the power to add something to nature, we may see by reflecting on what takes place even in the domain of what are called the industrial arts. Every piece of mechanism has in it something more and higher than nature contains. Watches, locomotives, power-looms, steam engines, are not mere natural products. They derive their materials from nature, they take advantage of natural forces and laws, but in their production a new, commanding, selecting, transforming element comes into play, compelling nature's raw materials into new combinations, itself the supreme force amidst nature's forces, to wit, the element of thought, the idea or conception of the inventor. And in like manner in that which we call by eminence the realm of art, *i.e.*, everything is based on nature and must, in a sense, be true to her; but that which constitutes the most precious element in the great work of art, that which arrests and holds the appreciative mind, is not nature slavishly copied, literally, mechanically reproduced, but the idea, the inspiring thought, the soul of the artist speaking to our soul and causing nature to shine for us with a supernatural significance and glory.

It is of course true that there is a kind of art which possesses nothing of this ideal element; and that, as there are un-inspired day-laborers in art who can, at most, by technical skill produce mechanical copies of common facts and incidents, so there are innumerable patrons of art of the same

order, in whose eyes vulgar imitation is the highest or only criterion of merit. But the highest praise which such productions deserve is that, at most, of clever mimetic legerdemain. They come no nearer to true art than the feats of the ventriloquist to eloquence, or the representations of political and other celebrities in Madame Tussaud's gallery¹ to sculpture.

Who amongst us cannot recall hundreds of exact, speaking likenesses of nobodies, prosaically accurate as the armchairs on which they sit, or the official robes with which they are bedecked—portraits of which the best that can be said is that the subject and the limner were worthy of each other? And to see what true art can do, compare the wooden fidelity of such productions with the relation which a characteristic portrait of a man, worthy of a great painter's powers, bears to the actual fleshly form and features of the subject. Here you have no reproduction of facts as you could measure them by rule and compass. A thousand irrelevant details that would only mislead and distract are left out. What is most significant of the soul and spirit is disengaged from what is purely arbitrary. What belongs to the inner essence of the man is so grasped and rendered that all that meets the eye—look, attitude, action, expression—is instinct with meaning, and everything else is subordinated to that in which the man was most himself, and which made him the special individuality he was. Of a work which thus fulfills the conditions of true art it may be said that in it the subject stands revealed to us more clearly than in his actual presence the common eye could discern him. Its power to evoke reality is like that which our greatest poet ascribes to memory recalling the image of a dear face and form we see no more:

The idea of her life shall sweetly creep
 Into his study of imagination;
 And every lovely organ of her life
 Shall come appareled in more precious habit,
 More moving delicate and full of life,
 Into the eye and prospect of his soul
 Than when she lived indeed.

¹ A well-known gallery in London, devoted to the exhibition of waxworks.

And this leads me to add, lastly, that it is the function of art to idealize not only nature but human life; and it is by the highest of all arts, poetry, and that which differs from poetry only in form, prose fiction, that this function can best be fulfilled. What a characteristic portrait is to an individual a great epic poem may be said to be to the life of a nation or the spirit of an age. A great dramatic poem or work of prose fiction, by the selection of its characters, actions, events, by the elimination of what is accidental and irrelevant to the main design or motive, by the evolution of the plot and the gradual and natural movement towards the dénouement, compresses into brief compass an ideal of the moral life of man which no literal record of facts could convey. Here, too, realism is not art, or at best only an inferior kind of art, and it is only by the presence of the ideal element that the profoundest truth can be obtained.

No writer can reproduce the whole of human existence or more than a very limited part of it within the brief compass of a drama or story. To give us a representation of life, all that a writer can do is either to copy a small bit of it with minute and painstaking fidelity, to tear out a leaf or two from the book of human life, so that we shall have it line for line and letter for letter—and this is the method of realistic fiction; or, instead of a fac-simile of a portion of human experience, he may try to make his work a representation on a small scale of what he conceives to be its significance as a whole, or at least of the hidden moral meaning of some phase or section of it. From the innumerable phenomena in their confusion and complexity of aspect as they appear to the ordinary observer, he can pick out a limited number of characters and incidents, giving relief to some, throwing others into the shade or rejecting them as mere surplusage, and group, arrange, order what is left, so as to convey to the reader some idea of the unity, the harmony, the moral significance of the whole. And this obviously is a task which, though it admits of infinite varieties of excellence, implies, in order to its worthy fulfilment, powers of the very highest order, a mind that is not merely observant

but creative or poetic,—a capacity, in other words, not simply of reflecting what lies on the surface, but of seeing under it and getting at the heart of life's mystery—a capacity of taking up the scattered materials of experience and fusing them in the fire of imagination into a new organic whole, every element in which is full of significance.

It is true that realism often implies no common gifts. It needs powers of observation and graphic delineation, such as few possess, to produce a vivid picture of even the superficial aspects of life. It is no despicable talent which enables a man to catch up and arrest the evanescent, fugitive play of light and shade on the surface of society, to reflect in fixed colors the light flow and ripple of its follies, its vanities, its absurdities, or to portray without exaggeration its vulgarity, its meanness, its baseness. Yet with all the talent displayed in popular realistic fiction of the last and present centuries, it may be questioned whether the result even at the best is one to which the honor of true art can be ascribed. Truthfulness and reality are great qualities in an artist, but the realism that copies the surface only is often more untrue to nature than the wildest vagaries of fancy. Verisimilitude that is faithful only to the outside is not seldom as deceptive as downright falsehood. The life of clubs and drawing-rooms, of gossip, flirtation, and match-making, of dining and dressing, of flippant talk and conventional manners—this, even among those whom it purports to represent, is not the true life of men and women, even the meanest of them. If it were, so far from laboriously recording, it were better for us in shame and sorrow to ignore and forget it. And the same is true of the realistic novel of low life. The literalism, however clever, is surely unprofitable, which invites us to occupy time and thought with minute and wearisome details of the dress, the surroundings, the food, the manner of speech, of the dwellers in London back lanes and hovels—with the slang of costermongers and the chaff of omnibus-drivers, with inventories of the furniture of the tap-room or of the articles on the shelves of the pawnbroker's shop.

In contrast with this crude realism, it is the function of the

true artist so to represent life as to enable us to penetrate beneath its superficial aspects, and to perceive the grandeur that is hid under its apparent meanness, the good that lies at the basis of its seeming evil. Life is not really for any of us the poor, bare, barren thing it often seems. A treasure of beauty and joy of which we often wot not lies scattered about our daily path. Its dullness, its monotony and lack of interest, arise only from ignorance of the deeper forces that are at work underneath it. Its hardness and unloveliness are but the veil of a strange beauty which is ever ready to be revealed. It needs but the insight of the master-mind to see, and the touch of the master-hand to disclose, the wonder and greatness that are often latent in its homeliest details—all the passion and the power, the pathos and tenderness, the often more than tragic interest with which our common life is replete. Materials for art, subjects for song or story, if he can but detect and disentangle them, lie ready to the true artist's hand. Under a thousand varieties of forms and circumstance the essential greatness, the boundless possibilities of man's nature, the obstacles which resist and the strength of will which makes him master of his destiny, the struggle of duty with necessity, the collisions and conflicts, the play and strife of the great normal passions by which character and happiness are made or marred, the unsounded depths of sorrow and joy which human hearts contain, the golden threads of love and charity and truth and tenderness that are woven into every human life, and the sweet wonders of the common earth and skies which encompass it—these things constitute the materials which make human life an inexhaustible field for the sympathetic insight and inventive power of art.

So long as man's life is what it is, the strange story of "a being breathing thoughtful breath, a traveler 'twixt life and death," so long as, in innumerable ever-varied aspects, the moral elements of love and sorrow and hope and disappointment, of short-lived raptures and enduring cares, of temptations issuing in the strength of conquest or the weakness of discomfiture—the wondrous medley of greatness and littleness,

of things mundane and things celestial, of contrasts that move, now our laughter at their incongruity, now our terror at their awfulness—in one word, the strange swift course run out beneath the silent heavens, with the shadow of the awful future creeping ever more near till we are lost in its impenetrable mystery—so long as life contains such elements, the mind that can strip away the mask of accident that conceals them and by the power of genius vividly reflect them, will find in it scope for the grandest efforts of imagination, and such minds will be numbered among the wisest teachers of mankind.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What are some of the misconceptions in regard to the function of art that commonly prevail?
2. How would you distinguish between the fine arts and the useful or industrial arts? Give examples of each kind.
3. How universal is the appeal of art? Does appreciation of art go hand in hand with luxury? Does advancing civilization inevitably bring ugliness with it?
4. Discuss to what extent education in art is possible.
5. What benefits result from the study of art?
6. What is the relation of art to morality?
7. What is the relation of art to science?
8. What is the relation of art to religion?
9. What effect has art upon social development?
10. What is the service which useful art renders to the community, and how does this differ from the service rendered by fine art?

CHOICE OF COURSES

THE COLLEGE OF DISCIPLINE AND THE COLLEGE OF FREEDOM¹

HENRY SMITH PRITCHETT

[Henry Smith Pritchett (1857—) first fitted himself for astronomical work. After holding several prominent appointments in this field, he became president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since 1906, he has been president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. As the work of this foundation is much broader than the pensioning system for college professors with which most persons associate it, Dr. Pritchett has familiarized himself in an authoritative way regarding many of the problems of American education.]

All schools of general culture which, like the American college, have looked both to the development of character and to the training of the mind, have been evolved under the influence of two distinct educational ideals—one the ideal of discipline, the other that of freedom.

The first conception is the older. Men learned early in the history of civilization that every human being born into this world must first learn and obey, if later he is to command; must first control himself, if later he is to lead others. The conception of discipline as a means to education is universal; it has existed since schools began; it will always exist, because it is rooted in our universal human experience.

The ideal of freedom was a later development of educational experience. Long after men were familiar with the educational value of discipline, they came to realize that in the education

¹ Reprinted from *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 102, page 603 (November, 1908), by permission of the author and of the publishers. The selection as here presented is abridged by the omission of a few paragraphs at the beginning.

of men, as in the development of nations, the highest type of character, like the finest order of citizenship, is developed under conditions of freedom; that the virtue which blossoms under the clear sky has a finer fragrance than that which develops in the cloister; that the finest efforts of education, like the ripest fruits of civilization, are to be sought where the realization of human freedom is most perfect.

For two thousand years, from the schools of Athens and Rome to those of Berlin and Boston, schools which seek to deal with the general training of youth have differentiated in accordance with their adherence to one or another of these fundamental ideals, or in accordance with their effort to combine the two. The differences which exist to-day among the stronger American colleges as to what the college ought to do, as well as the reasons which are advanced for a separation of the college from the high school on one side and from the university on the other, rest on the relative weight which is attached to the educational ideal of discipline or the educational ideal of freedom. And the place which the college is ultimately to have will be fixed by the decision whether it is to represent squarely the ideal of discipline, the ideal of freedom, or both.

It is also to be remembered that each of these educational ideals has its relations to the development both of character and of intellect, and each may be interpreted differently according as one views it from the standpoint of the individual, or from the standpoint of the social order in which he moves. Personal discipline and social discipline, individual freedom and the freedom which can be had only by social organization, are all involved in the scheme of general education, but it is rare to have all of these phases simultaneously under the view of the same eyes. Specializing in education began at the beginning in the very conceptions of the fundamental processes by which education was to be effected.

In actual practice, American colleges represent to-day all the combinations and the compromises of these two conceptions. At one extreme are colleges organized to prescribe fixed lines of conduct and specified courses of study; at the other

are colleges so planned as to spread out before the eyes of the eighteen-year-old boy an almost endless variety of sports and of studies from which he may choose at will. In the first group, the idea of discipline is paramount, with the emphasis on the interests of organized society; in the second, the ideal of freedom is dominant, and the interests and development of the individual direct the line of vision.

There are perhaps no better illustrations of the consistent working out of the ideals of discipline and freedom than the two great colleges, West Point and Harvard, for each of which I have an unusual admiration and a sincere affection (having sent a boy through each). They represent more consistently than most colleges distinct educational policies, and for this reason, as well as for their nation wide influence, they furnish unusual lessons for the guidance of other colleges. The one is a college of discipline by virtue of a policy largely fixed by the traditions of army service; the other a college of freedom—a response in large measure to the leadership of a great man.

In the one are assembled some four hundred and fifty boys; in the other, some two thousand three hundred. The two groups of students enter their respective institutions at practically the same age, and are widely representative of alert American youth. The student in the one case becomes part of an organization whose ideal is discipline; the other enters a régime whose watchword is individual freedom. In the one, the boy of eighteen is ordered to comply with a rigid régime which for four years undertakes to arrange for each day, and almost for each hour, his work and his play, and the amount of money he may spend; in the second, he is invited to choose from a numerous list of studies and of sports as he will.

The strict discipline of the one, no less than the perfect freedom of the other, is, of course, tempered by the cross currents which run in all human affairs. The West Point plebe soon discovers that the austere economy of cadet life is mitigated by an underground arrangement through which New York tradesmen extend a practically unlimited credit, to be harvested on the far distant graduation day—a process

which makes the problem of how to live on your income not materially different at the two colleges.

On the other hand, the Harvard freshman who, with the aid of an anxious parent, undertakes to select five courses from an apparently inexhaustible supply, finds his freedom seriously limited at the outset by a certain evident tendency on the part of teachers and students to crowd the most desirable courses in the hours between nine and one. Moreover, if the boy has athletic tastes, he is likely to get a warning from the coach to avoid afternoon classes and laboratory exercises, a consideration which may limit the freedom of choice in a surprising manner, and sometimes turns the honest freshman from a course in elementary chemistry to one in the history of the fine arts.

The West Point cadet, once entered upon his work, finds his studies absolutely determined for him. Whether he will or not, he must take an assigned measure of mathematics, science, modern languages, drawing, history, and dancing (this last is a good required study in any college). He becomes a member of a section of perhaps ten. The assigned lesson will cover each day certain pages of a text-book. At the call of the instructor, he must rise, put his heels together, begin with the formula, "I am required to recite, etc."; and is most successful when he repeats the exact language of the text-book which is his guide. He must be ready every day, and his standing in comparison with every other man in his class is posted at the end of each week, made out to the fractional part of a per cent. The hours for work and play are fixed, and he may not go beyond the limits of the West Point reservation. Through the whole four-year course runs consistently the ideal of personal discipline.

His courses once chosen, the Harvard freshman finds himself one of a group of twenty or five hundred, according to the subject. If he occupies his place with fair regularity, he may work earnestly or very little. There is no day-by-day demand upon him such as the West Point cadet must expect. With occasional tests during the term—generally not difficult—and

an examination at the end, which a mark of sixty per cent will pass, the subject is credited to him as a completed study. Meanwhile the opportunities for reading, for individual study, for fellowship, and for amusement, are unlimited. Individual freedom is the keynote of his college life.

Both of these colleges are noble agencies for the education of men; both have sent into our national life graduates who have done honor alike to their institutions and to their country. The remembrance of this fact ought to help towards educational liberality. It serves to remind us that, after all, we have no specifics in education; that men come into a larger usefulness, and into a finer intellectual and spiritual life, by many paths. Discipline and freedom both play their parts in the evolution of the best human character, and we may therefore not wonder that institutions varying so widely in ideals and in methods have alike achieved a high measure of success, and have won a place of singular honor and regard in the nation's estimate.

Colleges, like all human organisms designed for moral and spiritual training, stand between the tendency to take the color of their environment, both good and bad, and the conscious duty to stand against certain tendencies of the society in which they exist. This is only another way of saying that colleges have a duty both to society and to the individual student and teacher. In the college of discipline, the tendency is to emphasize the duty to society as represented by the organization, at the expense of the individual; in the college of freedom, the tendency is to emphasize the rights of the individual at the expense of the social organization. The one view loses sight of the fact that discipline, to be effective, must in the long run be self-discipline; the other tends to overlook the truth that, in civilization, freedom for the individual is a function of the observance of social restraints. As a result, both the college of discipline and the college of freedom are peculiarly exposed to the prevailing American tendency to superficiality, but for exactly opposite reasons: the first on account of the multiplicity of standards, and the latter on account of the lack of definite standards.

In the college of discipline, the standards tend to become so numerous that the process of living up to them becomes disciplinary rather than educational. This arises out of the qualities of human nature. Once give to a group of men the power to select the things which other men ought to do or ought to learn, and the difficulties of moderation are great. In government, over-legislation, and in education, an overcrowded curriculum, is the almost universal result.

In nearly all schools with prescribed courses there has gone on for years a process of adding to the list of studies until the student is asked to absorb more in four years than he can possibly digest in that time. This régime is intensified at West Point by two facts peculiar to its organization—the low entrance requirements, and the lack of instructors who are masters of their subjects, able not only to hear recitations, but to impart intellectual enthusiasm.

If the currents which run toward superficiality in the college of discipline are sometimes strong, it is certain that those which flow in this direction in the college of freedom are sometimes even swifter.

The fundamental objection to a régime of complete freedom for eighteen-year-old boys, independent of some test of their capacity to use it, lies to my thinking in the lack of standards which under these conditions prevail among students, and the exaggerated tendencies toward superficiality which are thereby not only invited, but practically assured. Two features of the college to-day are specially significant of the practical outcome of these tendencies in the undergraduate college under the conditions of free election. These are the decadence of scholarly ideals, and the growth of secondary agencies for getting boys through college with a minimum of study.

If the college is to serve as a means for the general education of men, it is of course unlikely that any large percentage of college youths should turn out to be scholars. But so long as the college stands primarily for scholarly ideals, the conditions in it should be such that the ninety per cent who are not scholars should respect and admire the ten per cent who are. Such

a condition holds at Oxford and Cambridge. To say that it does not exist in our larger American colleges is to put the case mildly. The captain of the football team has more honor in the college community than any scholar may hope for. It is a serious indictment of the standards of any organization when the conditions within it are such that success in the things for which the organization stands no longer appeal effectively to the imaginations of those in it.

The old-time conception of culture was narrow. It has rightly given way before the enlarging intelligence of mankind. Nevertheless it did furnish standards by which not only teachers and scholars were able to orient themselves with respect to intellectual ideals, but society as well. Is not the time perhaps ripe for a broader and truer definition of culture in education?

So few standards are to-day left in the college which gives itself completely to the régime of individual freedom that the world has but scant data to judge of its educational efficiency. The minimum intellectual equipment which a college education ought to furnish to a youth should enable him to do two things: first, to turn his mind fully and efficiently to the solution of a given problem. In the second place, it should give him the analytic point of view, the ability to discriminate. Whether, judged on this basis, our colleges show to-day a fair coefficient of educational efficiency, I do not undertake to say, but I should like to see some estimate of it attempted.

The by-products of an organization are sometimes the most distinctive tests of its efficiency. There is, to my thinking, no more striking evidences of the tendency to superficiality which have developed in our larger colleges than the agencies which have grown up about them for getting boys into college, and for passing them through it with the minimum amount of work. By the more successful and profitable coaching agencies, this process has been reduced to an art. Such parasites weaken the character-making and the scholarly side of college life, and have to the legitimate work of a college much the same relation that a lobby has to a legislative body.

It is a delicate thing to determine how much freedom is good for an individual or a nation. We must also admit that freedom means the right to be weak as well as the right to be strong; the ability to be foolish as well as wise. In education, as in government, moderation becomes difficult once a group of men undertakes to set bounds to freedom. There is probably no attribute of the Almighty which men find so difficult to understand, or to imitate, as the ability to let things alone, the power not to interfere.

And yet it is perfectly clear that some individuals, and some nations, have had more freedom than they knew what to do with, and such individuals and such nations have generally ended by becoming not only less efficient, but less free. I have not been able to persuade myself that the eighteen-year-old American boy has yet demonstrated his fitness for so large a measure of freedom as is involved in the free elective system. Groups of boys whom I have studied under such conditions have generally recalled Wordsworth's phrase:—

Some souls (for such there needs must be)
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty.

The special function of the college seems to me to be, not to hold up exclusively the ideal of discipline or of freedom, but to serve as a transition school in which the boy grows out of one into the other. This conception of the college seems to me justified on the grounds of individual rights, social interest, and the efficiency of educational organization.

The process of transition from the tutelage of the boy to the freedom of the man is one of the difficult questions of civilized life. No method of solving it is perfect, or is adapted to every boy. German boys go from the strict régime of the gymnasium to the freedom of the university. They are older than the boys who enter American colleges, and are far better educated than they. The cost of the process is reflected in the saying current in the universities, that one-third of the students fail, one-third go to the devil, but the remaining third govern Europe. It seems clear that, under any system

which makes the transition from discipline to freedom abrupt, many are taken. The special function of the college would seem to make the transition less expensive. Otherwise there seems little reason for departing from the German plan of a strong secondary school leading directly to the university.

It seems clear that a college must take account of its duty to the social order in which it exists, as well as to the individual. It is not enough for the college to reflect indiscriminately the strength and the weakness of the nation. It must stand against the current of superficiality and commercialism which are our national weaknesses. It is difficult to see how this duty to society is to be carried out by the college unless there be admitted some relation between the amount of freedom accorded to a boy and his ability to use it.

Until very recently, the college was at the top of our educational fabric. It had no direct relation to professional education. So long as this was true, the changes in our standards operated simply to raise the college standards. So long as there was nothing beyond it, this went on without much questioning. For the future, the college is to be a part of a general system of education; and the university, with its professional schools and its schools of research, is to rest upon it. In no other form of educational organization is the college likely permanently to survive.

If the college is to be a school of free choice, it can scarcely take its students earlier than the present age, eighteen and a half. This brings the youth too late to the university. The picture of the university resting on a four-year college, which in turn rests on a four-year high school, reminds one forcibly of Chicago in the early days when the houses were boosted up on posts. The arrangement fitted a passing phase of municipal growth.

The pressure of economic, no less than educational, influences will demand a solution of American educational organization more efficient, better proportioned, and less wasteful of time, than that involved in a régime which delivers men to the university at the age of twenty-three.

In the reorganization which will sooner or later come, the college years seem to me likely to be those between sixteen and twenty, rather than those between eighteen and twenty-two. Under such an arrangement the college will take account both of discipline and of freedom. Its professors will be, first of all, teachers, and its function will be to lead boys out of the rule of the school into the freedom of the university; out of the tutelage of boyhood into the liberty of men. If the college does not fill this function, it will in the end be squeezed out between the reorganized secondary school and the fully developed university.

Meantime we may well be grateful both for the college of discipline and for the college of freedom. These are great words, and each stands for an idea in education which we cannot afford to forget. Perhaps it might be well to inscribe over the gate of the college of discipline and that of the college of freedom the sentence which surmounts the Worcester Courts: "In Obedience to the Law is Liberty"—in the first case the emphasis to be laid on one part of the sentence, and in the other case on another part.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Give arguments in favor of and against the college of freedom.
2. Give arguments in favor of and against the college of discipline.
3. Discuss your own institution with reference to this classification of colleges, showing toward which type it inclines.

ELECTIVES ¹

JAMES HULME CANFIELD

[James Hulme Canfield (1847-1909) was an American educator of long experience. He was chancellor of the University of Nebraska 1891-5, and President of Ohio State University 1895-9. From 1899 to his death, he was librarian of Columbia University.]

At the opening of your junior year, in many institutions even before that year, you will find that you may make choice of one or more subjects in place of those appearing in the regular curriculum; that you may "elect" which one or more subjects you will consider. In some colleges the courses are fixed, or "required," throughout the first two years, with some freedom of movement in the junior year, and more in the senior year. In others a student is permitted, even in his freshman year, to choose one of three sciences; in his sophomore year, to make certain selections in the general division of history and political science, or within the lines of the division of English; while his last two years become quite free. Sometimes this is expressed as a choice of so many "hours' work" in any division, department, or school of the university; generally about two-thirds of the total number of hours required. Many institutions demand that one of the courses selected shall be known as a major course, to which possibly two-thirds of the entire schedule time shall be given, the remaining time to be spent upon a minor, which shall be cognate to the major: as, an English history major with contemporaneous continental history as a minor; or Latin as a major with Romance languages as a minor. Generally, certain degrees can be obtained only by meeting certain fixed requirements on definite lines; this demand satisfied, the student may turn freely in any other direction. If the student has determined what his professional work is to be, some institutions permit him to elect a part of

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that work in place of part or all of the usual studies of his last college year, a plan which counts the same work toward each of two degrees, and shortens the aggregate time usually required for both the college work and that of the professional school.

All this has come about slowly, with no little opposition, and with many honest differences of opinion, and has happened (for its advance has been rather casual than regular) because a greater range and keenness of intellectual vision has discovered that there are a large number of studies having great educational value and power which are outside the accepted curriculum; and that the number of these subjects is too large to be definitely included in any fixed curriculum. Admitting that all are desirable and valuable, though perhaps not equally valuable, there is but one logical issue: to permit the largest possible freedom of choice. Electives have not been established, therefore, to create an easy road to a degree; they are not intended to be regarded as a collection of soft snaps; it is not expected that they will become the refuge of every weak and timid man, the sauntering ground for every educational loafer, the safe harbor for every shirk; nor is this true of them—much that is said to the contrary notwithstanding. The elective system has been misused and abused by both faculty and students, beyond question. It has been the means of relieving the student of much that has been distasteful to him, and for that very reason all the more salutary; and, undoubtedly, some weak or mercenary instructors have used the system to bolster up their failing fortunes. Numbers of students and officers considered, it is doubtful whether there has been more abuse by one than by the other. But this misuse really proves nothing as to the merits of the system; it simply bears upon the character, or want of character, of those who use the system to further their own private ends. In the hands of the ignorant or vicious, dynamite is exceedingly dangerous; but we have no serious thought of abandoning its use.

There are two ways of using electives, either being desirable and helpful. Choice may be made of those subjects which

will broaden the otherwise necessarily restricted course, or of those which will intensify some portion of it. As illustrations of each, you may substitute three one-term studies for the last year of Latin, or you may take (practically) five years of Latin instead of four. Which of these courses you will pursue will depend very much upon the nature of your graduate work or of your work after graduation, upon your natural or acquired liking for a given subject, or upon the strength or attractiveness of some given instructor. As a fact, it is probable that the choice of studies is quite evenly divided between intensive and extensive work. From an educational standpoint, it is still doubtful which is the more desirable, or whether there is a psychologic choice between the two. It is probable that the wisdom of the choice is determined by several factors, in which the personal factor plays an important part.

If your choice is for intensive work, your course is comparatively plain. The department within which the subject falls necessarily determines the exact form of the work, and you are very completely under its guidance and practically dependent upon it for both opportunity and method. It were almost useless to advise you, since you are bound to follow the lines which the department lays down. The only caution which may be given is to be sure not to substitute quantity for quality, not to fancy that you are doing well because you are doing much, and to avoid work offered by some shrewd and unscrupulous instructor—occasionally there is such a one, it must be confessed with shame—with the intention of advancing his own personal reputation or departmental interests rather than of contributing to the cause of sound education and advanced learning. Fortunately, that quick insight, that instinct so surely developed in an earnest student, is a great protection; and students often detect a sham, and scent selfishness or fraud or incompetency, much sooner than those more directly responsible for the management of the institution. Unfortunately their own indolence or selfishness sometimes prompts them to profit by the weakness or shortsightedness of others; but they are generally very frank among themselves,

and you will be rarely misled by the prevailing sentiment of the student body, or by any considerable portion of it, with regard to the actual value of the work of any given instructor. Only be thoroughly honest with yourself, and do not consent to thwart the very purpose of your becoming a collegian. In this, as in all other educational deceit, you really harm only yourself in the end. You have had given you time, opportunity, and all the materials with which to build a house. You may slight the work if you will, you may use seconds and commons instead of clear lumber, you may put mill finish in place of hand dressing, you may cover defects with paint and putty, and you may succeed in putting up a building which will be favorably received on a final examination, and for which a diploma of merit may be awarded you. But you yourself must live in that house, and the longer you live in it the more will every defect become apparent, the greater will be your discomfort because of every dishonesty connected with its erection, and the more complete will be your humiliation and shame. Never use the elective system, then, in other than a most honest and faithful effort to strengthen your educational work and to enlarge your educational opportunities.

If you decide to broaden your course, you are in less danger in the direction just indicated, because you will work in several departments; and as a class the members of our college faculties are peculiarly honorable, competent, unselfish, and worthy. Indeed, it is very doubtful whether any other profession can show a greater aggregate or a higher average of integrity in both character and work. You will always find this definite advantage in all elective work: it is generally on lines of especial interest to the instructors as well as to the students, which fact naturally creates more than usual enthusiasm in both; and under these conditions the pace is rapid, the sense of fatigue is less, and there is a delight and satisfaction to be found only in that effort which is entirely voluntary and free, known only to those who are running a race absolutely of their own choosing. It is this which has caused many a student to feel and assert that he accomplished more, that his work

was "more to the purpose," during his first term of electives than during any whole year of earlier work. There is much exaggeration in this statement, and a student making it does not realize or else forgets that the success of his first term of electives is largely if not wholly conditioned upon and made possible by his earlier fixed work, with its strict discipline and sound training; yet there is much truth in the statement also. You should never forget, however, that in education as in civil life, perfect liberty is conditioned upon law, not upon license; indeed, with license liberty dies. Education ceases to be possible when intellectual vagabondage begins. In broadening your course, therefore, you are not to run hither and yon, getting here a little and there less, moving without definite purpose and stopping by chance, never correlating your work, and securing an indigestible *pot-pourri* of all sorts of departmental odds and ends and leavings. It is all very well to dine *à la carte*, and any sensible man prefers it to a *table d'hôte*; but if you mix cranberries and cream, and insist on putting sugar in your cup-consommé, you will simply make a decided mess of what might otherwise have been an attractive and palatable menu.

Let me give you a few illustrations of wisely chosen electives, with selections made with a view of broadening and enriching your course. You may not be able to find at the college of your choice the electives which are named here; but the themes will be at least suggestive for collateral reading, if you are so unfortunate as to fail of direct instruction therein.

Let us suppose that you have had a half year's work in the elements of political economy, and have become sufficiently interested to desire to extend that work. It ought to be possible for you to get a course in practical problems in economics—a rapid review of such themes as money, the tariff, railways, immigration. To this may be added work upon the history of industrial society; or the industrial and financial history of this country; or a more specific study of public finance and taxation, or of private financiering—such as credit and banking. Many institutions are now offering courses in trade and com-

merce and in commercial geography, all of especial interest and value to Americans just now.

Or suppose history to have become something more than a collection of the dry bones of dates and disconnected events. Then you may take a dip into the political and constitutional history of England, or the era of the Protestant reformation, or the stirring days of the French Revolution, or the political history of our own country, or the history of European colonies—again a subject of most immediate and profound interest to us all. A half year, or even two hours a week for a half year, given to one or more of these themes, would go far toward making you a wise man and an intelligent and helpful citizen.

Possibly philosophy or psychology prove interesting. You may follow the elementary work with the history of ancient and medieval and modern philosophic thought; or with a course in ethics; or with a half year of logic; or you may even go into the laboratory, and try some work in experimental psychology, without which it is exceedingly difficult to get any very clear idea of the modern standpoint.

General literature may be followed by special work on Shakespeare and the English drama, or on poetry or the novel. Greek may bring you to a study of ancient art; Latin, to that of inscriptions or antiquities. Rhetoric and English naturally lead to exercises in rapid writing, in brief-making and debating and public speaking, in criticism, and in translation.

With every such advance you reach higher ground, you breathe and move more freely, your horizon is constantly expanding, you are larger in intellectual frame, your work is less mechanical, you come into more distinct and positive enjoyment of opportunity, hours which perhaps have dragged heavily in the past now disappear all too rapidly, growth has really begun, and you are experiencing the pure joy of living.

I have left for my last word on electives that which is really the best word: this, that after all the greatest advantage in the elective system is that you have an opportunity to choose your instructor—a most blessed privilege, which you ought

never willingly to neglect or forego. Always remember Mr. Emerson's words, "It is little matter what you learn, the question is with whom you learn." What you most need as a student is not information, but teachers to whom you will be "profoundly and eternally indebted." Even under most wise administration it is simply impossible to secure a faculty made up entirely of men with distinct force of character, earnestness of life, constant industry, unfailing thoughtfulness and consideration, unflagging interest in each student, and with a high degree of teaching power. Really, there are not enough of such men to "go around," and the impossible can no more be achieved in education than in any other walk of life. Hence, there will always be in every faculty men who are indolent and selfish and given over to eye-service or lip-service only, and indifferent, even if not downright dishonest. All of which simply means that, though quite up to the average of other classes and callings—probably even somewhat superior to these—college professors are human, sometimes intensely human, not infrequently even disagreeably human. But it is generally true that every faculty possesses at least a few men who are vigorous, and full of fire and movement, men who have snap and go in them, men who can command the attention and respect of every man in the class room, who inspire and quicken into new life, and who hold till their last hour the warm interest and affectionate regard of all so fortunate as to sit under their instruction. The elective system enables you surely to get a taste of such a man, to move in his atmosphere for a little while at least, to feel the effect of his electric currents, to know the thrill and uplift which come from daily association with such a character. It does not matter much what he teaches—elect it, in order that you may be able to elect him; and you will never regret your choice. Men are more valuable than subjects, and inspiration is far above information.

The very best feature of the elective system, then, is that you may consciously and intelligently choose the instruction and companionship of such a man.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Discuss arguments in favor of the elective system, such as extent of modern learning, adaptation to individual needs, encouragement to hard work, etc. 2. Discuss arguments against, such as various forms of abuse, lack of unity, encouragement to laziness, etc. 3. Does the elective system seem generally successful? 4. Discuss the need of enlightened election and methods of facilitating this. 5. Draw up and discuss a typical first-year curriculum. 6. How far is it desirable in the first year of college to have a fresh start in method and content in the studies pursued?

SPECIALIZATION ¹

GEORGE HERBERT PALMER

[George Herbert Palmer (1842—) was for many years a professor in the department of philosophy in Howard University. In 1913, he became professor emeritus. His writings cover a considerable range, including especially a notable translation of *The Odyssey*, a monumental edition of the poems of George Herbert, many stimulating essays in the field of ethics, and a striking biography of his wife, Mrs. Alice Freeman Palmer. This address was delivered at the Convocation of the University of Chicago, June, 1908.]

This morning, I sat down to breakfast with about a hundred of you who had entered on the attainment of the highest degree which this University offers. You were advanced specialists. You had each chosen some single line of endeavor. But, as I sat there, I recalled that you were not the only specialists of this University. Before me this afternoon I see candidates in medicine, men and women who have taken for their specialty the warfare with pain and disease. They have said, "All that I can ever know, I will bring to bear on this urgent problem." Here also are the lawyers, impassioned for justice, for the quelling of human strife. That is their specialty. They too restrict themselves to a single point of view. Beside them sit the scientific men, who looking over the vast expanse of nature say, "The physical aspects of this marvelous machine it will

¹ Reprinted from the *University Record*, Volume 13, page 1 (July, 1908), by permission of the author and of the publishers.

be my duty to trace." And why should I stop here? Throughout your undergraduate department, as we all know, run dominant interests. I should be ashamed of a young man who had not found here some such compulsive interest; for it is only when an interest compels that we can say that our education has begun. So long as we are simply learning that which is set before us, taking the routine mass of subjects, we may be students, but we are not scholars. No, it is when with a free heart we give ourselves to a subject and say, "Take of me all you demand—rather this I would do than anything else, for this expresses my personal desires"—then it is that a quickening education begins. But this is specialization. We might think of the University of Chicago, then, as a great specializing machine.

But why have you set yourself this task of specialization? Because the world needs leaders and you have chosen yourself to be one of those leaders. Are you aware how exceptional is your condition? The last census shows that only a little over one per cent of our population is in our colleges. You are of that one per cent, and you are here in order that you may enlighten the other ninety-nine per cent. If through ignorance you fail, you will cause others to fail and you had better never have come to this University. To some sort of leadership you have dedicated yourself, and to this aim you should be true. But do not at times doubts cross your mind? Have you not occasionally asked yourself whether you can attain such leadership and make the most of your life—the only one that will be intrusted to you—by shutting yourself up to a specialty? Multitudes of interesting things are calling; shall you turn away from them and follow a single line? It will be worth while to-day to consider these fundamental questions and inquire how far we are justified in specializing, what dangers there are in it, and in what degree those dangers can be avoided.

Let me say, then, at the start, that I regard specialization as absolutely essential to scholarship. There is no scholarship without it, for it is involved in the very process of knowing.

When I look at this desk I am specializing; that is, I am detaching this piece of furniture from all else in the room. I am limiting myself, and I cannot see without it. I can gaze without specialization, but I cannot see without specialization. If I am to know anything by sight, that knowledge must come through the limitation of sight. I seize this object and cast away all others, and thus I fix my attention. Or if I am really carefully to observe, I even put my eye on a single point of the desk. There is no other way. Clear knowledge becomes possible only through precise observation. Now specialization is nothing but this necessary limitation of attention; and you, as specialists, are merely carrying out on a large scale what every one of us must practice in some degree whenever we know. You employ the process persistently, and for the sake of science are willing to hold yourselves steadily to a single line of observation. And you cannot do otherwise. The principles involved in the specialization of the senses run throughout the sciences. If we would know, we must hold the attention long on a given subject.

But there is an unfortunate side to specialization. It obliges us to discard other important interests. To discard merely unimportant ones is easy. But every evening when I sit down to devote myself to my ethics I am aware that there are persons starving in Boston who might be saved if I should drop my work and go to them. Yet I sit calmly there and say, "Let them starve; I am going to study ethics." I don't see how I could be a suitable professor of ethics unless I were willing thus to limit myself. That is the hard part, as I understand it, of specialization—the cutting off of things that are worth while. I am sure you have already found it out. Many of you have come up here from places of narrow opportunity and you perceive the abundance that is here. Remembering how you have longed to obtain the opportunities here offered, you will be tempted to scatter yourself over a big field, and to pick up a little here and a little there. At the end of the year you will have nothing, if you do that. The only possibility of gain is to choose your field and say, "I devote serious time to this

field; I am a specialist and I propose to live like one." The great Goethe admirably announces the principle: "Wer grosses will muss sich beschränken können."¹ You must accept limitations if you will go on to greatness; for, as we have seen, in limitation the very process of knowledge is rooted.

Furthermore, not only is specialization forced upon us by the nature of knowledge, but without it our powers cannot receive appropriate discipline. It is difficult business to fashion a sound observer. Each province of science has its special modes of observation, its own modes of reasoning even. So long as we are unfamiliar with these and obliged to hold ourselves steadily to them by conscious control, our work is poor. It is slow, inaccurate, and exhausting. Only when we have trained ourselves to such aptitudes that within that field our observations and reasonings are instinctive do we become swift, sure, and unfatigued in research. To train your powers, then, you must begin to specialize early and hold yourselves steadily within your chosen field. I am sure as you look over the names of those who have accomplished much, you have been surprised at the number who became early specialists. Take my own department: Berkeley writes his great work when he is twenty-five; Hume publishes his masterpiece at twenty-seven. Or again, Keats had brought all his wonderful results to accomplishment and died at twenty-four, Shelley at thirty; Marlowe, the greatest loss English letters ever met, at twenty-seven. It is just the same in other fields; Alexander died at thirty-six, Jesus at thirty-three. Yes, let us look nearer home; the most forcible leader American education has ever had became president of Harvard University at thirty-five; President Hyde of Bowdoin took his position at twenty-seven; my own wife, Alice Freeman, was president of Wellesley at twenty-six. These are early specialists; and because they specialized early they acquired an aptitude, a smoothness of work, a precision of insight, and width of power that could not have been theirs had they begun later. I would not deny that there have been geniuses who seemed to begin late: Kant was such;

¹ Freely translated the passage means, He who would have greatness must limit himself.

Locke was such. You will recall many within your own fields. But I think when you search the career of those who come to power in comparatively late years, you will find that after all there has been a long train of covert specialization running through their lives. They may not have definitely named their field to themselves, or produced work within that field in early years, but everything had been converging toward that issue. I believe, therefore, you ought to respect your specialty because only through it can your powers be brought to their highest accuracy and service.

One more justification of specialization I will briefly mention, that it is necessary for the organization of society. No motive is good for much until it is socialized. If specialization only developed our individual selves, we could hardly justify it; but it is the means of progress for society. The field of knowledge is vast, no man can master it, and its immensity was never so fully understood as to-day. The only way the whole province can be conquered and brought under subjection to human needs is by parting it out, one man being content to till his little corner while his neighbor is engaged on something widely different. We must part out the field of knowledge and specialize on our allotted work in order that there may be entirety in science. If we seek to have entirety in ourselves, science will be fragmentary and feeble. That division of labor which has proved efficient everywhere else is no less needful in science.

But I suppose it is hardly necessary to justify specialization to this audience. You have staked heavily on it; most of you have put yourselves to serious inconvenience, many of you have heavily mortgaged your future, in order to come here and devote yourselves to some single interest. I might confidently go through this room asking each one of you what is your subject? And you would proudly reply, My subject is this, My subject is this, My subject is this. I think you would feel ashamed if you had not thus specialized. I see no occasion, therefore, to elaborate what I have said. As I understand it, the three roots of specialization are these: it is grounded in the very nature of the knowing process; it is

grounded in the needs of ourselves as individuals, in order that we may attain our maximum efficiency; it is grounded in the needs of society, because only so can society reach that fullness of knowledge from which it is richly fed.

But after all, the beliefs which are accepted as matters of course in this room are largely denounced outside it. We must acknowledge that our confidence in specialization encounters many doubts in the community. Would it not be well, then, for us to try to place ourselves where that community stands and ask the general public to tell us why it doubts us, what there is in our specialized attitude which it thinks defective, what are the complaints which it is disposed to bring against us? I will try to take the position of devil's advocate and plead the cause of the objector to specialization.

Specialization, it is said, leads to ignorance; indeed it rather aims at ignorance than knowledge. When I attend to this desk, it is true I secure a bit of knowledge, but how small is that bit in comparison to all the things in this room which I might know about. It is but a fraction. Yet I have condemned all other things in the room to ignorance, reserving only this one little object for knowledge. Now that is what we are all of us doing on a great scale; by specializing, by limiting our attention, we cut off what we do not attend to. It is often assumed that attention is mainly a positive affair and occupied with what we are to know. But that is a very small portion of it; really its important part is the negative, the removal of what we do not wish to observe. We cut ourselves off from the great mass of knowledge which is offered. Is it not then true that every specialist has disciplined himself to be an ignoramus? He has drawn a fence around a little portion of the universe and said, "Within that fence I know something." "Yes," the public replies, "but you don't know anything outside." And isn't the public right? When we step forward and claim to be learned men, isn't the public justified in saying, "I know a great deal more than you do; I know a thousand things and you know only one. You say you know that one through and through, and of course I don't know my thousand

things through and through. But it is not necessary. I perceive their relations; I can handle them; I can use them in practice; can you?" "Well, no," we have to say, "we specialists are a little fumbling when we try to take hold of the world. We are not altogether skillful in action, just because we are such specialists." You have been devoting yourselves to some one point—I am afraid many of you are going to have sad experience of it—you have been learning to know something nobody else on earth does know, and then you go forth to seek a position. But the world may have no use for you; there are only two or three positions of that sort in the country, and those may happen to be filled. Just because you are such an elaborate scholar you cannot earn your daily bread. You have cut yourself off from everything but that one sort of learning, and that doesn't happen to be wanted. Therefore you are not wanted. Such is the too frequent condition of the specialist. The thousand things he doesn't know; it is only the one thing he does know. And because he is so ignorant, he is helpless.

Turning then to our second justification of specialization, the case seems equally bad. I said that specialization was needed for the training of our powers. The training of them all? No, not that; but the training of only certain ones among them. The others hang slack. In those regions of ourselves we count for little. We are men of weight only within the range of those powers that we have trained; and what a large slice of us lies outside these! Accordingly the general public declares that there is nothing so bad as the bad judgment of a specialist. Few practical situations exactly coincide with his specialty, and outside his specialty his judgment is worse than that of the novice. He has been training himself in reference to something precise, and the moment he ventures beyond that, the very exactitude of his discipline limits his worth. The man who has not been a specialist, who has dabbled in all things, and has acquired a rough and ready common-sense, that man's judgment is worth something in a good many different fields, but the judgment of the specialist is painfully poor beyond his own field. You remember how, in the comic

opera, the practice is satirized of appointing a person who has never been at sea to take charge of the navy of a great country. But that is the only sensible course to pursue. Put a specialist there, and the navy will be wretchedly organized, because the administration of the navy requires something more than seamanship specialization. It is necessary to co-ordinate seamanship with many other considerations, and the man trained in the specialty of seamanship is little likely to have that ability. Therefore ordinarily we use our experts best by putting them under the control of those who are not experts. Common-sense has the last word. The co-ordinating power which has not been disciplined in single lines is what ultimately takes the direction of affairs. We need the specialist within his little field; shut him up there, and he is valuable enough; but don't let him escape. That seems to be the view of the public. They keep the specialist confined because they utterly distrust his judgment when he extends himself abroad.

And when we look at the third of our grounds for justification, social need, the public declares that the specialists are intolerably presumptuous. Knowing their own subject, they imagine they can dictate to anybody and do not understand how limited is their importance. Again and again it happens that because a man does know some one thing pretty well he sets himself up as a great man in general. My own province suffers in this respect more than most; for as soon as a man acquires considerable skill in chemistry or biology, he is apt to issue a pronunciamento on philosophy. But philosophy does not suffer alone. Everywhere the friends of the great specialist are telling him he has proved himself a mighty man, quite competent to sit in judgment on the universe; and he, forgetting that the universe and the particular subject he knows something about are two different things, really imagines that his ignorant opinions deserve consideration.

Now I suppose we must acknowledge that in all this blasphemy against our calling, there is a good deal of truth. These certainly are dangers which all of us specialists incur. I agree that they are inevitable dangers. Do not, however, on account

of them abandon specialization and seek to acquire a mass of miscellaneous information. Bacon said, "I take all knowledge for my province." If you say it, you will become not Bacons but fools. No, that is the broad road to ignorance. But laying these profound dangers of specialization well to heart, assured that they beset us all, let us search for remedial measures. Let us ask how such dangers may be reduced to a minimum. Is there a certain way in which we may engage in the specialist's research and still save ourselves from some of the evils I have here depicted? I think there is. To find it we will follow the same three avenues which have been leading us thus far.

In regard to the first, the limitation of attention, I understand that, after all, our specialty cannot fill our entire life. We do sometimes sit down to dinner; we occasionally talk with a friend; we now and then take a journey; we permit ourselves from time to time to read some other book than one which refers to our subject. That is, I take it, if we are fully alive to the great danger that in specializing we are cutting off a large part of the universe, we shall be wise in gathering eagerly whatever additional knowledge we may, outside our specialty. And I must say that the larger number of eminent specialists whom I have happened to know have been men pretty rich in knowledge outside their specialties. They were men who well apprehended the extreme danger of their ordinary modes of pursuit and who greedily grasped, therefore, at every bit of knowledge they could obtain which lay beyond their province. They appropriated all the wisdom they could; and merely because it did not exactly fit in with their specialty, they did not turn it away. I do not know how far it is wise to go in this effort to repair the one-sidedness in which most of us are compelled to live. A rather extreme case was once brought to my attention. There was a student at Harvard who had been a high scholar with me, and I found that he was also so specializing in the classics that when he graduated he took classical honors. Some years later I learned that he was one of the highest scholars in the Medical School. Meeting him a few years after he had entered his profession, I asked, "How

did it happen that you changed your mind so markedly? You devoted yourself to classics and philosophy in college. What made you finally decide to become a physician?" "Finally decide!" said he, "Why, from childhood up I never intended to be anything else." "But," I persisted, "I cannot be mistaken in recalling that you devoted yourself in college to classics and philosophy." "Yes," he said, "I did, because I knew I should never have another chance at those subjects. I was going to give the rest of my life to medicine, so I took those years for classics and philosophy." I asked, "Wasn't that a great mistake; haven't you now found out your blunder?" "Oh, no," said he, "I am a much better physician on that account; I could not have done half so well if I hadn't had all that training in philosophy and classics." Now I cannot advise such a course for everybody. It takes a big man to do that. If you are big enough, it is worth while laying a very large foundation; but considering the size on which most of us are planned, it is wiser to begin early and specialize from the very start. Other cases of a similar sort I recall, where a man saw that there was plenty of him and thought he could afford to build out some side of his being which he was not going to use directly in his profession and believed he might trust his energy to bring up the other sides later.

Well, then, this is one mode of making up for the defects of specialization: We may pick up knowledge outside our subject. But it is an imperfect mode; you never can put away your limitations altogether. You can do a great deal. Use your odd quarter-hours wisely and don't merely play at such times, understanding that these are precious seasons for acquiring the knowledge which lies beyond your province. Then every time you talk with anybody, lead him neatly to what he knows best, keeping an attentive ear, being a first-class listener, and seeking to get beyond yourself. By doing so you will undoubtedly much enlarge the narrow bounds to which you have pledged yourself. Yet this policy will not be enough. It will require to be supplemented by something more. Therefore I should say in the second place, that in disciplining our

powers we must be careful to conceive our specialty broadly enough. There lies our chief danger. There are two types of specialist. There is the man who regards his specialty as a door into which he goes and by which he shuts the world out, hiding himself with his own little interests. That is the petty, poor specialist, the specialist who never becomes a man of power, however much he may be a man of learning. But there is an entirely different sort of specialist from that; it is the man who regards his specialty as a window out of which he may peer upon all the world. His specialty is merely a point of view from which everything may be regarded. Consequently without departing from our specialty each of us may escape narrowness. Instead of running over all the earth and looking at it from a multitude of different points of view, the wise specialist chooses some point of view and says: "I will examine the universe as it is related to this." Everything therefore has a meaning for him, everything contributes something to his specialty. Narrowing himself while he is getting his powers disciplined, as those powers become trained he slacks them off and gives them wider range; for he knows very well that while the world is cut up into little parcels it never can be viewed rightly. It will always be distorted. For, after all, things are what they are through their relations, and if you snap those relations you never truly conceive anything. Accordingly, as soon as you have got your specialty, you want to begin to co-ordinate that specialty with everything else. Probably at first you fixed your attention on some single problem within a given field, but I dare say by this time you have discovered that you cannot master that problem without knowing the rest of the field also. Yet after you have gone on to know the rest of the field, that is, have made yourself a fair master of that science, you will discover that that science depends on other sciences. Never was there an age of the world in which this interlocking of the sciences was so clearly perceived as in our day. Formerly it seemed possible to isolate a particular topic and know something of it, but in our evolutionary time we know nothing of that kind is

possible. Each thing is an epitome of the universe. Have you been training your eye to see a world in a grain of sand? Can you look through your specialty out upon the total universe and say: "I am a specialist merely because I don't want to be a narrow man. My specialty is my telescope. Everything belongs to my province. I cannot, it is true, turn to it all at once. Being a feeble person I must advance from point to point, accepting limitations; but just as fast as I can, having mastered those limitations, I shall cast them aside and press on into ever broader regions."

But I said specialization was fundamentally justified through the organization of society because by its division of toil we contribute our share to the total of human knowledge; and yet the popular objector declares that we are presumptuous, and because we have mastered our own specialty are apt to assume ourselves capable of pronouncing judgment over the whole field. Undoubtedly there is this danger; but such a result is not inevitable. The danger is one which we are perfectly capable of setting aside. The temper of our mind is all important, and it is entirely within our control. What is the use of our going forth presumptuous persons? We certainly shall be unserviceable if we are persons of that type. That is not the type of Charles Darwin in biology, of William James in psychology, of Horace Howard Furness in Shakespeare criticism, of Albert Michelson in physics. These are men as remarkable for modesty and simplicity as for scholarly insight. The true characteristic of a learned specialist is humility. What we want to be training ourselves in is respect for other people. Our work would be of very little use if there were not somebody at our side who cared nothing for that work of ours and cared immensely for his own. It is our business to respect that other man, whether he respects us or not. We must learn therefore to look upon every specialist as a fellow-worker. Without him we cannot be perfect. Let us make ourselves as large as possible in order that we may contribute our little something to that to which all others are contributing. It is this co-operative spirit which it should be yours

to acquire. And it seems to me that you are under peculiarly fortunate circumstances for acquiring it. What strikes me as fatal is to have a group of young specialists taken and trained by themselves, detachedly, shut off from others. Nothing of that sort occurs here. Every day you have been rubbing shoulders with persons who have other interests than yours. When you walk to dinner, you fall in with a comrade who has been spending his day over something widely unlike that which has concerned you. Possibly you have been able to lead him to talk about it; possibly you have gained an insight into what he was seeking, and seen how his work largely supplements your own. If you have had proper respect for him and proper humility in regard to yourself, this great society of specialists has filled out your work for you day after day; and in that sense of co-operation, of losing yourselves in the common service of scientific mankind, you have found the veritable glory of these happy years.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What are the ends to be accomplished by specialization?
2. Elaborate the distinction between a "scholar" and a "student" suggested in the first paragraph.
3. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of specialization.
4. Explain the idea set forth in this selection regarding the broadening power of a specialty. Illustrate, if possible, by cases which have come under your observation.

INTELLECTUAL IDEALS

SELF-RELIANCE ¹

RALPH WALDO EMERSON

[Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) was the great American essayist and lecturer. Few writers have a more salutary effect upon their readers than Emerson. Some one has said, "I know of no author better fitted to nerve the young mind to truth and nobility than Emerson." One of the stimulating ideas that runs through his writings is "the infinitude of the private man"—a thought which this essay particularly bears upon. Probably no writer has surpassed him in power to express thought in few words. While his paragraphs and his essays are not to be studied as models of structure, his sentences are marvelously condensed, dignified, strong, and eloquent. In the well-known phrase of Ben Jonson, "his words are rammed with thought." The essay, "Self-Reliance," was first published in the *Essays, First Series*. Part of it was taken from a lecture on "Individualism," other passages from lectures on "Genius," "Duty," etc., in a course delivered in 1838-9.]

I read the other day some verses written by an eminent painter which were original and not conventional. Always the soul hears an admonition in such lines, let the subject be what it may. The sentiment they instill is of more value than any thought they may contain. To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men,—that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for always the inmost becomes the outmost—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato and Milton is that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men, but

¹ From *Essays, First Series*. The second half of the essay has here been omitted.

what they thought. A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the luster of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet he dismisses without notice his thought, because it is his. In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain alienated majesty. Great works of art have no more affecting lesson for us than this. They teach us to abide by our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflexibility then most when the whole cry of voices is on the other side. Else to-morrow a stranger will say with masterly good sense precisely what we have thought and felt all the time, and we shall be forced to take with shame our own opinion from another.

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better or worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. Not for nothing one face, one character, one fact, makes much impression on him, and another none. It is not without pre-established harmony, this sculpture in the memory. The eye was placed where one ray should fall, that it might testify of that particular ray. Bravely let him speak the utmost syllable of his confession. We but half express ourselves, and are ashamed of that divine idea which none of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. It needs a divine man to exhibit anything divine. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give him no peace. It is a deliverance which does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope.

Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string. Accept the place the divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves childlike to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the Eternal was stirring at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same transcendent destiny; and not pinched in a corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but redeemers and benefactors, pious aspirants to be noble clay under the Almighty effort let us advance on Chaos and the Dark.

What pretty oracles nature yields us on this text in the face and behavior of children, babes, and even brutes. That divided and rebel mind, that distrust of a sentiment because our arithmetic has computed the strength and means opposed to our purpose, these have not. Their mind being whole, their eye is as yet unconquered, and when we look in their faces, we are disconcerted. Infancy conforms to nobody; all conform to it; so that one babe commonly makes four or five out of the adults who prattle and play to it. So God has armed youth and puberty and manhood no less with its own piquancy and charm, and made it enviable and gracious and its claims not to be put by, if it will stand by itself. Do not think the youth has no force, because he cannot speak to you and me. Hark! in the next room who spoke so clear and emphatic? Good Heaven! it is he! it is that very lump of bashfulness and phlegm which for weeks has done nothing but eat when you were by, and now rolls out these words like bell-strokes. It seems he knows how to speak to his contemporaries. Bashful or bold then, he will know how to make us seniors very unnecessary.

The nonchalance of boys who are sure of a dinner, and would disdain as much as a lord to do or say aught to conciliate one, is the healthy attitude of human nature. How is a boy the master of society!—independent, irresponsible, looking out from his corner on such people and facts as pass

by, he tries and sentences them on their merits, in the swift, summary way of boys, as good, bad, interesting, silly, eloquent, troublesome. He cumpers himself never about consequences, about interests; he gives an independent, genuine verdict. You must court him; he does not court you. But the man is as it were clapped into jail by his consciousness. As soon as he has once acted or spoken with *éclat* he is a committed person, watched by the sympathy or the hatred of hundreds, whose affections must now enter into his account. There is no *Lethe* for this. Ah, that he could pass again into his neutral, godlike independence! Who can thus lose all pledge and, having observed, observe again from the same unaffected, unbiased, unbribable, unaffrighted innocence, must always be formidable, must always engage the poet's and the man's regards. Of such an immortal youth the force would be felt. He would utter opinions on all passing affairs, which being seen to be not private but necessary, would sink like darts into the ear of men and put them in fear.

These are the voices which we hear in solitude, but they grow faint and inaudible as we enter into the world. Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.

Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness. Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of our own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world. I remember an answer which when quite young I was prompted to make to a valued adviser who was wont to importune me with the dear old doctrines of the church. On my saying, What have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly from within? my friend suggested,

—"But these impulses may be from below, not from above." I replied, "They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the devil's child, I will live then from the devil." No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution; the only wrong what is against it. A man is to carry himself in the presence of all opposition as if everything were titular and ephemeral but he. I am ashamed to think how easily we capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions. Every decent and well-spoken individual affects and sways me more than is right. I ought to go upright and vital, and speak the rude truth in all ways. If malice and vanity wear the coat of philanthropy, shall that pass? If an angry bigot assumes this bountiful cause of Abolition, and comes to me with his last news from Barbadoes, why should I not say to him, "Go love thy infant; love thy wood-chopper; be good-natured and modest; have that grace; and never varnish your hard, uncharitable ambition with this incredible tenderness for black folk a thousand miles off. Thy love afar is spite at home." Rough and graceless would be such greeting, but truth is handsomer than the affectation of love. Your goodness must have some edge to it,—else it is none. The doctrine of hatred must be preached, as the counteraction of the doctrine of love, when that pules and whines. I shun father and mother and wife and brother when my genius calls me. I would write on the lintels of the door-post, *Whim*. I hope it is somewhat better than whim at last, but we cannot spend the day in explanation. Expect me not to show cause why I seek or why I exclude company. Then, again, do not tell me, as a good man did to-day, of my obligation to put all poor men in good situations. Are they *my* poor? I tell thee, thou foolish philanthropist, that I grudge the dollar, the dime, the cent I give to such men as do not belong to me and to whom I do not belong. There is a class of persons to whom by all spiritual affinity I am bought and sold; for them I will go to prison if need be; but your miscellaneous popular charities;

the education at college of fools; the building of meeting-houses to the vain end to which many now stand; alms to sots, and the thousandfold Relief Societies;—though I confess with shame I sometimes succumb and give the dollar, it is a wicked dollar, which by-and-by I shall have the manhood to withhold.

Virtues are, in the popular estimate, rather the exception than the rule. There is the man *and* his virtues. Men do what is called a good action, as some piece of courage or charity, much as they would pay a fine in expiation of daily non-appearance on parade. Their works are done as an apology or extenuation of their living in the world,—as invalids and the insane pay a high board. Their virtues are penances. I do not wish to expiate, but to live. My life is not an apology, but a life. It is for itself and not for a spectacle. I much prefer that it should be of a lower strain, so it be genuine and equal, than that it should be glittering and unsteady. I wish it to be sound and sweet, and not to need diet and bleeding. My life should be unique; it should be an alms, a battle, a conquest, a medicine. I ask primary evidence that you are a man, and refuse this appeal from the man to his actions. I know that for myself it makes no difference whether I do or forbear those actions which are reckoned excellent. I cannot consent to pay for a privilege where I have intrinsic right. Few and mean as my gifts may be, I actually am, and do not need for my own assurance or the assurance of my fellows any secondary testimony.

What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think. This rule, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the whole distinction between greatness and meanness. It is the harder because you will always find those who think they know what is your duty better than you know it. It is easy in the world to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude.

The objection to conforming to usages that have become dead to you is that it scatters your force. It loses your time and blurs the impression of your character. If you main-

tain a dead church, contribute to a dead Bible Society, vote with a great party either for the Government or against it, spread your table like base housekeepers,—under all these screens I have difficulty to detect the precise man you are. And of course so much force is withdrawn from your proper life. But do your thing, and I shall know you. Do your work, and you shall reinforce yourself. A man must consider what a blindman's-buff is this game of conformity. If I know your sect I anticipate your argument. I hear a preacher announce for his text and topic the expediency of one of the institutions of his church. Do I not know beforehand that not possibly can he say a new and spontaneous word? Do I not know that with all this ostentation of examining the grounds of the institution he will do no such thing? Do I not know that he is pledged to himself not to look but at one side, the permitted side, not as a man, but as a parish minister? He is a retained attorney, and these airs of the bench are the emptiest affectation. Well, most men have bound their eyes with one or another handkerchief, and attached themselves to some one of these communities of opinion. This conformity makes them not false in a few particulars, authors of a few lies, but false in all particulars. Their every truth is not quite true. Their two is not the real two, their four not the real four: so that every word they say chagrins us and we know not where to begin to set them right. Meantime nature is not slow to equip us in the prison-uniform of the party to which we adhere. We come to wear one cut of face and figure, and acquire by degrees the gentlest asinine expression. There is a mortifying experience in particular, which does not fail to wreak itself also in the general history; I mean "the foolish face of praise," the forced smile which we put on in company where we do not feel at ease, in answer to conversation which does not interest us. The muscles, not spontaneously moved but moved by a low usurping willfulness, grow tight about the outline of the face, and make the most disagreeable sensation; a sensation of rebuke and warning which no brave young man will suffer twice.

For non-conformity the world whips you with its displeasure. And therefore a man must know how to estimate a sour face. The bystanders look askance on him in the public street or in the friend's parlor. If this aversation had its origin in contempt and resistance like his own, he might well go home with a sad countenance; but the sour faces of the multitude, like their sweet faces, have no deep cause,—disguise no god, but are put on and off as the wind blows and a newspaper directs. Yet is the discontent of the multitude more formidable than that of the senate and the college. It is easy enough for a firm man who knows the world to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. Their rage is decorous and prudent, for they are timid, as being very vulnerable themselves. But when to their feminine rage the indignation of the people is added, when the ignorant and the poor are aroused, when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment.

The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a reverence for our past act or word because the eyes of others have no other date for computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath to disappoint them.

But why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag about this monstrous corpse of your memory, lest you contradict somewhat you have stated in this or that public place? Suppose you should contradict yourself; what then? It seems to be a rule of wisdom never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure memory, but to bring the past for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day. Trust your emotion. In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity, yet when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and color. Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee.

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With con-

sistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Out upon your guarded lips! Sew them up with packthread, do. Else if you would be a man speak what you think to-day in words as hard as cannon balls, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day. Ah, then, exclaim the aged ladies, you shall be sure to be misunderstood! Misunderstood! It is a right fool's word. Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.

I suppose no man can violate his nature. All the sallies of his will are rounded in by the law of his being, as the inequalities of Andes and Himmaleh are significant in the curve of the sphere. Nor does it matter how you gauge and try him. A character is like an acrostic or Alexandrian stanza;—read it forward, backward, or across, it still spells the same thing. In this pleasing contrite wood-life which God allows me, let me record day by day my honest thought without prospect or retrospect, and, I cannot doubt, it will be found symmetrical, though I mean it not and see it not. My book should smell of pines and resound with the hum of insects. The swallow over my window should interweave that thread or straw he carries in his bill into my web also. We pass for what we are. Character teaches above our wills. Men imagine that they communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment.

Fear never but you shall be consistent in whatever variety of actions, so they be each honest and natural in their hour. For of one will, the actions will be harmonious, however unlike they seem. These varieties are lost sight of when seen at a little distance, at a little height of thought. One tendency unites them all. The voyage of the best ship is a zigzag line of a hundred tacks. This is only microscopic criticism. See the line from a sufficient distance, and it straightens itself to

the average tendency. Your genuine action will explain itself and will explain your other genuine actions. Your conformity explains nothing. Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify you now. Greatness always appeals to the future. If I can be great enough now to do right and scorn eyes, I must have done so much right before as to defend me now. Be it how it will, do right now. Always scorn appearances and you always may. The force of character is cumulative. All the foregone days of virtue work their health into this. What makes the majesty of the heroes of the senate and the field, which so fills the imagination? The consciousness of a train of great days and victories behind. There they all stand and shed a united light on the advancing actor. He is attended as by a visible escort of angels to every man's eye. That is it which throws thunder into Chatham's voice, and dignity into Washington's port, and America into Adams's eye. Honor is venerable to us because it is no ephemeris. It is always ancient virtue. We worship it to-day because it is not of to-day. We love it and pay it homage because it is not a trap for our love and homage, but is self-dependent, self-derived, and therefore of an old immaculate pedigree, even if shown in a young person.

I hope in these days we have heard the last of conformity and consistency. Let the words be gazetted and ridiculous henceforward. Instead of the gong for dinner, let us hear a whistle from the Spartan fife. Let us bow and apologize never more. A great man is coming to eat at my house. I do not wish to please him; I wish that he should wish to please me. I will stand here for humanity, and though I would make it kind, I would make it true. Let us affront and reprimand the smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl in the face of custom and trade and office, the fact which is the upshot of all history, that there is a great responsible Thinker and Actor moving wherever moves a man; that a true man belongs to no other time or place, but is the center of things. Where he is, there is nature. He measures you and all men and all events. You are constrained to accept his standard. Ordinarily, everybody in society reminds us of somewhat else, or

of some other person. Character, reality, reminds you of nothing else; it takes place of the whole creation. The man must be so much that he must make all circumstances indifferent—put all means into the shade. This all great men are and do. Every true man is a cause, a country, and an age; requires infinite spaces and numbers and time fully to accomplish his thought;—and posterity seem to follow his steps as a procession. A man Cæsar is born, and for ages after we have a Roman Empire. Christ is born, and millions of minds so grow and cleave to his genius that he is confounded with virtue and the possible of man. An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man; as, the Reformation, of Luther; Quakerism, of Fox; Methodism, of Wesley; Abolition, of Clarkson. Scipio, Milton called “the height of Rome;” and all history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons.

Let a man then know his worth, and keep things under his feet. Let him not peep or steal, or skulk up and down with the air of a charity-boy, a bastard, or an interloper in the world which exists for him. But the man in the street, finding no worth in himself which corresponds to the force which built a tower or sculptured a marble god, feels poor when he looks on these. To him a palace, a statue, or a costly book has an alien and forbidding air, much like a gay equipage, and seems to say like that, “Who are you, sir?” Yet they all are his, suitors for his notice, petitioners to his faculties that they will come out and take possession. The picture waits for my verdict; it is not to command me, but I am to settle its claim to praise. That popular fable of the sot who was picked up dead drunk in the street, carried to the duke’s house, washed and dressed and laid in the duke’s bed, and, on his waking, treated with all obsequious ceremony like the duke, and assured that he had been insane—owes its popularity to the fact that it symbolizes so well the state of man, who is in the world a sort of sot, but now and then wakes up, exercises his reason and finds himself a true prince.

Our reading is mendicant and sycophantic. In history our imagination makes fools of us, plays us false. Kingdom and

lordship, power and estate, are a gaudier vocabulary than private John and Edward in a small house and common day's work: but the things of life are the same to both: the sum total of both is the same. Why all this deference to Alfred and Scanderbeg and Gustavus? Suppose they were virtuous; did they wear out virtue? As great a stake depends on your private act to-day as followed their public and renowned steps. When private men shall act with original views, the luster will be transferred from the actions of kings to those of gentlemen.

The world has indeed been instructed by its kings, who have so magnetized the eyes of nations. It has been taught by this colossal symbol the mutual reverence that is due from man to man. The joyful loyalty with which men have everywhere suffered the king, the noble, or the great proprietor to walk among them by a law of his own, make his own scale of men and things and reverse theirs, pay for benefits not with money but with honor, and represent the Law in his person, was the hieroglyphic by which they obscurely signified their consciousness of their own right and comeliness, the right of every man.

The magnetism which all original action exerts is explained when we inquire the reason of self-trust. Who is the Trustee? What is the aboriginal Self, on which a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the nature and power of that science-baffling star, without parallax, without calculable elements, which shoots a ray of beauty even into trivial and impure actions, if the least mark of independence appear? The inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, the essence of virtue, and the essence of life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this primary wisdom as Intuition, while all later teachings are tuitions. In that deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all things find their common origin. For the sense of being which in calm hours rises, we know not how, in the soul, is not diverse from things, from space, from light, from time, from man, but one with them and proceedeth obviously from the same source whence their life and being also proceedeth.

We first share the life by which things exist and afterward see them as appearances in nature and forget that we have shared their cause. Here is the fountain of action and the fountain of thought. Here are the lungs of that inspiration which giveth man wisdom, of that inspiration of man which cannot be denied without impiety and atheism. We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us organs of its activity and receivers of its truth. When we discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams. If we ask whence this comes, if we seek to pry into the soul that causes—all metaphysics, all philosophy is at fault. Its presence or its absence is all we can affirm. Every man discerns between the voluntary acts of his mind and his involuntary perceptions. And to his involuntary perceptions he knows a perfect respect is due. He may err in the expression of them, but he knows that these things are so, like day and night, not to be disputed. All my willful actions and acquisitions are but roving;—the most trivial reverie, the faintest native emotion, are domestic and divine. Thoughtless people contradict as readily the statement of perceptions as of opinions, or rather much more readily; for they do not distinguish between perception and notion. They fancy that I choose to see this or that thing. But perception is not whimsical, but fatal. If I see a trait, my children will see it after me, and in course of time all mankind,—although it may chance that no one has seen it before me. For my perception of it is as much a fact as the sun.

The relations of the soul to the divine spirit are so pure that it is profane to seek to interpose helps. It must be that when God speaketh he should communicate, not one thing, but all things; should fill the world with his voice; should scatter forth light, nature, time, souls, from the center of the present thought; and new date and new create the whole. Whenever a mind is simple and receives a divine wisdom, then old things pass away,—means, teachers, texts, temples fall; it lives now, and absorbs past and future into the present hour. All things are made sacred by relation to it,—one thing

as much as another. All things are dissolved to their center by their cause, and in the universal miracle petty and particular miracles disappear. This is and must be. If therefore a man claims to know and speak of God and carries you backward to the phraseology of some old moldered nation in another country, in another world, believe him not. Is the acorn better than the oak which is its fullness and completion? Is the parent better than the child into whom he has cast his ripened being? Whence then this worship of the past? The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and majesty of the soul. Time and space are but physiological colors which the eye maketh, but the soul is light; where it is, is day; where it was, is night; and history is an impertinence and an injury if it be any thing more than a cheerful apologue or parable of my being and becoming.

Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say "I think," "I am," but quotes some saint or sage. He is ashamed before the blade of grass or the blowing rose. These roses under my window make no reference to former roses or to better ones; they are for what they are; they exist with God to-day. There is no time to them. There is simply the rose; it is perfect in every moment of its existence. Before a leaf-bud has burst, its whole life acts; in the full-blown flower there is no more; in the leafless root there is no less. Its nature is satisfied and it satisfies nature in all moments alike. There is no time to it. But man postpones or remembers; he does not live in the present, but with reverted eye laments the past, or, heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future. He cannot be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the present, above time.

This should be plain enough. Yet see what strong intellects dare not yet hear God himself unless he speak the phraseology of I know not what David, or Jeremiah, or Paul. We shall not always set so great a price on a few texts, on a few lives. We are like children who repeat by rote the sentences of grandames and tutors, and, as they grow older, of the men

of talents and character they chance to see,—painfully recollecting the exact words they spoke; afterward, when they come into the point of view which those had who uttered these sayings, they understand them and are willing to let the words go; for at any time they can use words as good when occasion comes. So was it with us, so will it be, if we proceed. If we live truly, we shall see truly. It is as easy for the strong man to be strong, as it is for the weak to be weak. When we have new perception, we shall gladly disburden the memory of its hoarded treasures as old rubbish. When a man lives with God, his voice shall be as sweet as the murmur of the brook and the rustle of the corn.

And now at last the highest truth on this subject remains unsaid; probably cannot be said; for all that we say is the far off remembering of the intuition: That thought, by what I can now nearest approach to say it, is this: When good is near you, when you have life in yourself,—it is not by any known or appointed way; you shall not discern the foot-prints of any other; you shall not see the face of man; you shall not hear any name;—the way, the thought, the good, shall be wholly strange and new. It shall exclude all other being. You take the way from man, not to man. All persons that ever existed are its fugitive ministers. There shall be no fear in it. Fear and hope are alike beneath it. It asks nothing. There is somewhat low even in hope. We are then in vision. There is nothing that can be called gratitude, nor properly joy. The soul is raised over passion. It seeth identity and eternal causation. It is a perceiving that Truth and Right are. Hence it becomes a Tranquillity out of the knowing that all things go well. Vast spaces of nature; the Atlantic Ocean, the South Sea; vast intervals of time, years, centuries, are of no account. This which I think and feel underlay that former state of life and circumstances, as it does underlie my present and will always all circumstances, and what is called life and what is called death.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Show why a certain degree of independence, and even a touch of originality, is essential to a student's intellectual advancement.
2. Discuss the student's attitude toward the authorities he studies. Shall it be docile and passive, or critical and independent? Consider, in this connection, the following quotation: "How docile young people are, after all, in intellectual matters! They lack the courage to resent neglect in the class, to acknowledge that they do not understand, and to ask questions; they lose their initiative and even independent power to think, when in the presence of teachers; and they ignore their own experience in favor of print. They are so bent on satisfying others that they suppress their inner promptings. In doing this they seem to confuse moral with intellectual qualities, acting as though the sacrifice of self in study was equally virtuous with its sacrifice in a moral way" (McMurray, *How to Study*, page 262).
3. Why is individuality so difficult to preserve and develop?
4. Show how over-conformity injures a man.
5. Contrast the laboratory method with the text-book method in forming the open interrogative mind.
6. Should the college curriculum give more place to the forming sciences—bacteriology, psychology, economics, sociology—than to the well-settled sciences? If so, why?
7. Point out some customs of college life to which a student should not conform.
8. What would be Emerson's position on the question of supporting a man for President just because he was the candidate of your political party? Should you agree with him in his position?
9. Does Emerson's definition of genius express your idea? Compare it with the following: "Genius is mainly an affair of energy" (Matthew Arnold); "Genius is nothing but a great capacity for patience" (Buffon); "Genius is nothing but labor and diligence" (Hogarth); "Genius is the power of carrying the feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood" (Coleridge).
10. "An institution is but the lengthened shadow of one man" (page 168). Give illustrations.
11. Select from this essay some apothegm such as "A foolish consistency of the hobgoblin of little minds," and show whether it squares with your own observation.

THE MIND OF THE UNDERGRADUATE¹

GEORGE PIERCE BAKER

[George Pierce Baker (1866—) is professor of dramatic art in Harvard University. Before becoming interested in the teaching of play writing, Professor Baker was a pioneer in the teaching of argumentation in colleges. In connection with the severe demands of argumentative composition, he had ample opportunity to form an opinion regarding the mental caliber of students. This opinion he gives in the following selection, which was originally a paper read before the Schoolmasters' Association of New York and vicinity.]

I wish to state certain conditions which I find in the minds of Harvard undergraduates as some one hundred and fifty of them come before me, year after year, in the various courses on argumentation and public address which it is my fortune to have in charge. Whenever I consider the states of mind which confront me in these courses, certain queries and problems instantly arise. Understand, please, that what I am saying this morning I am not saying about the brilliant undergraduate, nor about the dull undergraduate. I am talking about the rank and file of the undergraduate body as it comes before me. I am talking, too, about youths who are not Sophomores, but Juniors and Seniors, and sometimes even Graduate Students; that is, the maturer of our college men. It is becoming clear to our undergraduate that he had better keep out of the debating, certainly out of the higher forms of debating work, until he, or somebody else, recognizes that he is somewhat matured.

As I work, year by year, with these youths, there is a sentence which keeps recurring to me with renewed significance. It is: "Now and then be idle; sit and think." Unless you have recently been reading in the eighteenth-century literature, I doubt if you will associate that with the right person. It doesn't sound like the meteoric career and the varied activities of Richard Brinsley Sheridan; but he is the man who wrote it. I should like to see that verse written large somewhere upon the walls of Harvard College, because as I work with these undergraduates I am more and more surprised to find, not that

¹ Reprinted from *The Educational Review*, Volume 30, page 189 (September, 1905), by permission of the author and of the publishers.

they do not know how to think accurately, cogently (I suppose they would not be in classes in argumentation if they knew how to think well), but that many of them have no real interest in knowing how to think well. Many of them mean to enter the Law School and therefore wish training in debate. Many suspect that some day they will have to speak often in public and wish the requisite training. Far too many of both groups desire the end but care nothing for the means, the process by which it may best be attained. It is only by forcing, coaxing, that one can develop in these youths any interest in thinking for thinking's own sake, can make them appreciate the fact that there is a delicate pleasure in the process of thinking. I meet often the type—which you must all know perfectly well, only he is a little more mature with me and therefore, I suppose, a little less pliable—who sits in front of you with an amiably receptive expression, who smiles gently at all your neat turns of phrase, who gives you a feeling that, on the whole, your lecture is really well fitted to the needs of the class, and then comes to the desk to ask you just one question which shows his mind has not taken in one important idea from the entire hour. Not only that; sometimes, and here is where his real genius comes in, he shows you that (despite his receptive appearance throughout your lectures) he has not taken in anything new for two or three weeks. It sometimes seems to me that the undergraduate of this type approaches more nearly to the delicious state of Nirvana than anybody outside of the East, perhaps than anybody in the East: his mind is not somewhere else, but simply nowhere; it is taking an absolute rest. What makes this Buddhist of the West especially difficult to deal with is that he is not boorish or inconsiderate toward the instructor, but usually quite the opposite. Clad in intellectual oilskins, he is almost blithesome in his absolute imperviousness to the ideas for which he is supposed to be taking the course.

There is another closely related group, those who, when choosing a question for a forensic or debate, instantly balk when I say: "I think we have had enough of the Panama Canal, the control of Manchuria, and the Merger Case; let us

try something now that will really test you, let us try a question of college life." They don't want it at all, and they don't take it unless I insist. I have been asked just once in three years to approve a question on a college matter. When asked, I was quite overwhelmed and immensely encouraged. That is to say, then, if I suggest to the undergraduate that he take this question, which is of vital moment to us at Harvard at the present day: Is the new plan for assigning rooms in the Yard likely to draw the representative men to the Yard? that is, Are we likely to succeed in endeavoring to get back in the Yard the representative men and the larger body of students? he does not take it unless I force him. In that case, he works over it for a while and finally comes to tell me that he is very sorry but he must change the question: there is no evidence at all to be found on it, he says. When I suggest that I have supposed his mind is his own kingdom, and that he, surely, can discuss the question inasmuch as he applied for a room under this plan and is by choice, supposedly, living inside rather than outside the Yard, he says: "Well, you know there is nothing written upon this subject at all; I've got to spin it all out of my own head! I can't do that." That happens over and over again. A year or two ago we were discussing the question: Shall we enforce training in the gymnasium for the Freshmen? When I talked with Juniors and Seniors who certainly had all been Freshmen, some of them Freshmen who had carefully and conscientiously done work in the gymnasium, urging them to take that question, they at first said they knew absolutely nothing about it. They could tell me how they had exercised, when they had exercised, but as for getting their experience into any relationship with undergraduate life in general, or looking at the question from the point of view of another undergraduate, that seemed to them quite impossible. This means that among undergraduates there is a curious lack of correct information about current topics in college life, and particularly about the relation of undergraduate life to the larger interests of the University. Often a student comes to me in an intense state of enthusiasm over some scheme regarding a college organiza-

tion: after listening to it, I point out that it seems admirable, but that four years before we tried identically that scheme—which failed dismally, for reasons which still hold good. He had never heard of all this, though any investigation of the history of his organization would have given him the information. He has simply developed his own scheme for the immediate moment, with no look backward and no thought forward.

Recently I asked some of my students to note simply in three hundred words, exactly why the writer was rooming inside or outside the Yard, that I might see whether the class could put the matter clearly in that compass. The exercise was very well done indeed. Then I said: "Now suppose you are writing to a friend whom you wish to induce to room with you either inside or outside the Yard. Take some real person whose peculiarities and habits you know well. So present your reasons that they shall have persuasive value for that individual just because he is himself and not another person." Result: a dire failure. Most of those exercises were simply repetitions of letter number one. A few were very gentle attempts at the art of persuasion. The majority gave a reader no suggestion of the personality addressed. These illustrations show, it seems to me, not only no pleasure at all in thinking as thinking, but almost an unwillingness to think. When I point out to such students that some clear statement of their ideas is all very well, but that I don't see why I should accept their views since other unanswered ideas occur to me, they too often seem to regard me as a little contrary, a little misinformed, uninformed perhaps—very rarely with a suspicion that I may be a little more informed. After all, the state of mind of the undergraduate beginning this matter of argumentation always reminds me of those lines on old Daniel Hanks down on Cape Cod.

"Some fellows reckon, more or less,
 Before they speak their mind,
 And sometimes calculate or guess,
 But they ain't Daniel's kind.
 Says I: 'How do you know you're right?'
 'How do I know?' says he;
 'Well now, I vum, I know by gum
 I'm right, because I be.'"

When I ask these students to look at the ideas, if possible, from the other person's side, not that they must necessarily go over to the other man's position, but just to see if they can imagine what the other man might think on the subject, they can't do it. Only after long training can they see the idea in more than one way. Yet in the whole field of persuasion certainly one of the great demands upon public speakers is so to present an idea that it shall seem true to the other person, not simply because of the truth of the idea, but because of the method of presentation. How can they do that, if they can't begin to imagine what the other man is likely to think about any particular subject?

This lack of co-operation between the imagination and thought is illustrated over and over again in our undergraduate life. At the preliminary Boylston Prize speaking, which we have in Cambridge every spring, it has often been difficult to distinguish between selections from George William Curtis, Demosthenes, and Mr. Bryan. One listens four hours to thirty or forty young men doing admirably just this: reading, rather than speaking, their selections so that the meaning is perfectly clear, but so that neither the special qualities of the style nor the special conditions for which the speech was prepared are equally clear. The result is that these men's speeches are almost exactly alike. When perhaps you suggest to one of the young men the desirability of recalling that when George William Curtis delivered his address in New York on "The Puritan Principle: Liberty under the Law," excitement over the Hayes-Tilden controversy was at fever heat and that Mr. Curtis, fitting his speech to the needs of the occasion, poured oil on the troubled waters, the student looks at you puzzled. He has learned his lines. He delivers them in his own way. What more can you ask? The few to whom this criticism does not apply so stand out from their competitors that they are sure to appear in the list of those chosen for the final contest.

These conditions have some interesting results in undergraduate life. I do not know how much you may have read the undergraduate editorial. It is not to be recommended unless you

have plenty of time. I have read a great many and they almost all fall into one of two classes. They are either wonderfully non-committal, balanced so delicately that the editor can fall either way with rapidity as college sentiment moves one way or the other; or else are a skillful clouding of a very slight idea in a mist of words. Once in a while a man comes forward who has the editorial instinct. Giving himself some trouble, he writes editorials that say something, either summarizing existing conditions so that you are thoroughly informed, or summarizing and commenting at the same time. Very rarely, some of these men write an editorial which states an opinion, and maintains it clearly, perhaps leading off in a movement. Is it too much to ask sometimes for the last kind of editorial? It might be if I did not know most of these editors to be personally intelligent, alert and responsive, assiduous in gathering news, alive to the changes of undergraduate life. Yet when it comes to a significant editorial statement from them you look almost in vain. These men seem to have no interest in relating the particular phenomena of the movement to what has gone before or to the conditions that are likely to come. So, too, it is with the undergraduate applying, under the new plan, for a room in the Yard. He has a paper to sign which states the new plan. He reads, signs, and that is the end of the work for him. Consideration of the new policy as likely to lead to different conditions in undergraduate life, as likely to make the undergraduate life of his successor somewhat different from his own, any consideration perhaps whether his own college life has been pleasanter because he has roomed where he has—there is little of that kind of thinking in the college papers. It is done, if at all, by a few thoughtful men,—who are not always, in their college days, the most prominent men.

There is another curious manifestation of this neglect of thinking. One great difficulty which I find in my teaching is the restless activity of the undergraduate. Some of the best men, who really might do admirable work in their courses and win distinction in their undergraduate career, don't get these results simply because they are like a student of mine in recent years,

always so busy with the other thing that the immediate piece of work never was done properly. That is the most common difficulty in undergraduate work; of course we know the excuse for it. It is, that these are young people. They are; but they are getting older, and I take it that, in so far as age means judgment, discretion, we are here in these colleges largely to assist in making these youths somewhat older. I see no reason why they should not begin this training early in their college career. Instead they plunge into every kind of activity. When I meet an undergraduate who is able to say: "These things I will do, and these things I will put aside," I know that man is going to rise. I have seen him rise, year after year, and college generation after college generation. The past students whom I take most pride in are those who were beginning to be able to make this thoughtful choice even in their college days. The majority of undergraduates cannot do it at all. They think themselves vitally interested in a special subject they are studying, and get small results in it. Certainly some of them say often enough there is no subject in which they are so much interested as debating and the practice of public address, and that they mean to do the very best possible work, yet they prove ineffective in the courses. One student, for instance, says: "I am taking the history of economics in order that my work may be better in this debating." I put him on an early debate and his contribution is the thinnest imaginable. Nor has he in the least meant to deceive me. Not at all. Investigating, I find he is president of one club, secretary of another; belongs to ten different organizations, and has accepted an office in every one. He has so many things to do that he cannot possibly do any of them well. Even while he is taking a course in debating he belongs to his own class debating club, which debates weekly and depends for its interest upon the activity of four or five men. He is one of the officers of the Debating Union which embraces all the undergraduate debating clubs. He is full of schemes for the improvement of Harvard debating. Here, then, is a man of A capacity, who is able to obtain a grade of B, if he simply does nothing but follow his own natural bent, who

barely gets his B, because he comes to me with poorly prepared debates, over which he grieves greatly two hours after the fiasco is passed. Has not lack of thought something to do with that? How can the undergraduate who thinks about the possibilities of his undergraduate career, realizing what his chances are, fail to see that to behave in this way is to lose just the special chances for which he would once have told you he was coming to college? I don't care, in the least, whether he settles down upon his philosophical club, his musical organization, debating or something else, if he will only settle down, concentrating upon something; then we shall be able to get results from him. This mental dissipation, this American hustle, which keeps interested in everything with small, because scattered, results, is a very unsatisfactory feature of the undergraduate world of to-day.

I do not contend for a moment that some of the undergraduates in the colleges I know do not understand thoroughly how to fulfill the first half of Richard Brinsley Sheridan's sentence: "Now and then be idle." But to sit apart and think is the troublesome operation. Watch them in their reading; watch them attending the theaters; you will find them reading mainly the books of ephemeral popularity, books they can skim, and attending musical burlesque, melodrama, vaudeville. Negation of thought is a science with this group. You face an interesting social question. We are developing curious citizens, unless we can, in some way, arouse these men to more responsibility. Now, it is quite fair to say, of course, that the awakening comes in many cases as graduate students and in the graduate school of life. I think it is perhaps a question with all of us teachers whether that is not a slightly late awakening. I never can fully share in the joy of the friends of a young man who has wasted most of his college time, when they say: "He is working hard, I assure you, in the Law School," as if somehow that were a satisfactory solution for everything. Does that recovery fully offset all the wasted opportunities of his college life?

There is another way in which this unwillingness to think works out. The growth of the tutorial system in this country

is both interesting and a little alarming. A father said to me, recently: "How is it that when I went to —— school (a preparatory school), it was not at all necessary that I should have a tutor every summer in order to get into Harvard College, nor necessary for my friends either? But my boy has to have a tutor. He is as bright as I was, and the other boys are bright—yet they all have tutors. What is the matter?" Of course we know what the fathers want to do—they want to hold you and me responsible. But first of all the boy is responsible; he wants to get his results as far as possible without thinking; at least he wishes somebody else to stand over him to see that he does. As a result we have this curious development at our colleges—the tutor who drags his young men along until he drags them through. The ethics of this custom need not be discussed here, but surely it is self-evident that such tutelage cannot be desirable.

Nor do I believe that this general attitude of mind among undergraduates is temporary. When I have sometimes spoken about these matters to graduates, of course they have said: "You must not take the situation too seriously. Boys will be boys. We have had numerous curious phases of undergraduate life. You must remember, when you were in college, what was known as 'Harvard indifference.' It was a peculiar kind of pose that held the stage for a time. That is true; it was temporary. It was a pose, something superimposed. We did it; we knew all the time we were doing it, and we had a good deal of fun out of it. But, watching this lack of pleasure in thinking, I don't think it is superimposed but exceedingly basal. No choice whatever is involved in it. It is the state of mind in which these youths come to college. Often a student says: "That was an interesting principle you explained at the last lecture and I should like to carry it out in my work." "Why don't you? If it is good for anything, it is applicable for you." He answers: "I tried to carry it out the other day, but somehow I couldn't see how it fits into my work." Surely if he can't learn in his college days to make the application of general principles to his own needs, if you must stand over him,

explaining, coaxing, aiding, he will have an odd time with the outside world where task-masters are more plentiful than teachers—or tutors. If this were the state of one, two, or ten undergraduates, it would not be important; but when there is a large group, and I believe an increasing group, of this sort, it is time to ask the source of this weakness. I am clear in my own mind that back of the responsibility of the boy lies the responsibility of the college, school, and home.

It is rather hard on a boy to plunge him into such a maze of possibilities as the Harvard elective pamphlet. I have sometimes wondered that the Freshman bears everything as bravely as he does. Of course he wants to take everything, all the higher mathematics courses before he has completed the initial courses, the most advanced Latin courses before he has finished Cæsar, all the courses in Anglo-Saxon before he has even a rudimentary knowledge of English Literature. Although he is not permitted to do this, it is one of the weaknesses of the Elective System—everything that is wrong has its weaknesses—that it seems to suggest variety and not solidity as of first importance in education, so that youth deduces as a corollary that variety is not only the spice of college life but the great essential. That may in part lead to the dissipation of energies of which I have spoken—wasteful, dangerous. The big lecture courses are enervating for the student. They are, for the teacher, the toughest problem he has to face. Given three or four hundred young men so crowded into a room where the temperature is so high that the air grows close before the hour is half over; given a subject necessarily a little hard to grasp; given an instructor who speaks in a voice not audible for all, or with a dry, uninteresting manner, and such conditions are a forcing house for that look of apparent attention which really marks vacuity of mind.

But would so many develop so rapidly this indifference to thinking if other causes had not prepared the way, before college days? I sometimes wonder, and that is one reason I am here this morning, whether it is possible that the colleges have set such rigid standards for the various entrance examinations that the schools must give all their time to cram-

ming the boys for them, and cannot teach them to see the relation or bearing of one subject upon another. If, instead, the boy came up to college with fewer facts, but an interest in thinking for its own sake, respect for learning and literature, and some responsibility in citizenship, would not the gain be great? The schools now send him up with his mind like a desk with pigeon-holes, some of them perhaps a trifle dusty, but undoubtedly with contents, yet not as a human being who has a relation to learning, literature, and the facts of existence, and who is able and eager to make for himself applications of the ideas he has learned. Whatever may be the cause, I believe that our secondary education at present spends too much time on facts as facts, far too little on creating an attitude of mind toward life and learning. Surely when one sees large numbers of our boys and girls alike rushing nervously from activity to activity; unable or unwilling to think quietly about the ideas taught them, or what they see about them, avid of ephemeral but strong sensation and superficial information, all is not well. One may spoil a child's mind even as one may spoil a child's digestion. The appetite for food and the appetite for information are much alike in the normal child. Each is insistent, will be fed, and takes what is given as it is given. The normal child has its keen interests and will absorb anything which bears on them. If he is interested in birds, you will find him in his enthusiasm reading the Latin names or scientific descriptions of them long before he can properly pronounce the Latin or understand the long technical terms. But in other subjects his interest may be only languid. It is dangerously easy to let this languor, which means ultimate superficiality, pass over even into what was once a subject so absorbing that it, at least, meant thoroughness. Some of our present-day so-called aids to study—certain conditions permitted, or at least not counteracted, in secondary schools, such as the rapid increase in tutoring to piece out the school work—are insidious.

Of course one must admit that in any case the secondary school is between the upper millstone of the rigid and severe

college requirements and the nether millstone of the irresponsible home. It is amusing to hear occasional lamentation that to-day we Americans do not read with enjoyment the contemplative poetry of the eighteenth century—"The Pleasure of Hope," "The Pleasures of Memory," etc. What has the American, who cannot utter the word *hustle* without affectionate stress upon its syllables as a word created by his people to describe a quality which they assume to be an American monopoly, to do with such poetry? Much to-day in American business life and, consequently, in its social life is but superficiality and sham concealed in a dust-storm of innumerable activities. Business and social responsibilities make it impossible for many parents, we are told, to train their children, and they are left to the schools, tutors, and themselves. Moreover, all this *hustle* is self-conscious, childlike. It thrives on living in the eye of the public, it is satisfied only with constant, evident results of its activity which the public will surely acclaim. Consequently we are only beginning to value properly the life of the scholar. Not long ago an American, after some years of study abroad, returned with his family to one of our cities most priding itself on its "culture." He tried to devote himself to historical research preparatory to a book, and yet to see something of society. After a winter he told me he was going abroad again. He and his family were tired of the insistent: "What are you doing? Oh, writing! A history? Really! When will it be out?" The combination of restrained incredulity that a man financially able to do what he pleased with his life should devote it to scholarship, and of demand for the instant results from his work, was too much for him.

I believe, then, that the causes for this heedlessness in undergraduates lie back of college and school, in the home, in the very nature of maturer American life of to-day. Whether we can get at the conditions in the home, or not, we certainly can in the school and college. But first we must recognize the condition and our present failure to grapple with it. Grant all the force exerted by the upper and nether millstones, is the secondary school resisting as stoutly as it might? That is

worthy of serious consideration. Is there not danger that, in much of the higher education, we teachers are like the builders fitting marble plates to stucco walls or him who makes bricks without straw?

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Give from your own experience instances to show the deficiencies of college students as thinkers.
2. Show the importance of the cultivation of the power to think by commenting on this saying, "Knowledge represents the storehouse; thinking is the engine that fills it."
3. Discuss, "Thinking and study are intimately related. All studying represents, or should represent, thinking; but thinking may not represent studying."
4. What studies of the college curriculum tend by their inherent character to develop the power of thinking?
5. Discuss the choice of debate questions in your institution. Are they of the kind to compel students to do first-hand thinking?
6. Criticise the editorials in your college paper or magazine. Suggest subjects that your college publications might take up with advantage; possibly write a model editorial yourself.
7. Other reasons, than those given by Professor Baker, for the decline in the ability to think among college students may be the prevalence of the lecture system of instruction, the increasing luxuriousness of college life, the predominating interest in athletics, the presence of many students in our colleges who do not look forward to the learned professions, but to commercial and industrial careers, etc. Discuss the effects of all, or some of these causes. Perhaps you can suggest other causes.
7. Describe the sort of use of the college library that may make it injurious to a student's powers of thought, and by way of contrast show how the library may properly be used.

COMPETITION IN COLLEGE ¹

ABBOTT LAWRENCE LOWELL

[Abbott Lawrence Lowell (1856—) has been since 1909 president of Harvard University. He has distinguished himself as a student of the science of government, his books in this field, as for instance his *The Government of England*, being regarded as authorities.]

It is safe to say that no member of a faculty is satisfied with the respect in which scholarship is held by the great

¹ Reprinted by permission of the author and of the editor from *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 103, page 822 (June, 1909).

body of college students to-day. Every one complains in his heart, although in public he is apt to declare that the conditions in his own college are better than they are elsewhere. In fact, we know little enough about the state of affairs in our own institutions, and are quite in the dark when we presume to draw comparisons with other places. This is a case where measuring ourselves by ourselves, and comparing ourselves among ourselves, is not wise. In spite of divergences in detail, the problem is essentially the same everywhere, and any college that helps to solve it will confer a benefit upon the whole country. Nor is it enough if we are better than our fathers were, if the average amount of study in college is greater, and the minimum much greater, than it was. In the community at large the general activity has increased prodigiously; even elegant indolence is by no means so fashionable as it used to be. Our colleges ought, in a movement of this kind, to set the pace, not follow it; and they must not rest satisfied until they create among their students a high standard of achievement.

When the elective system was first introduced, its advocates believed that it would have a powerful selective influence, by offering to each student ampler opportunity for self-development in the branches of learning that he might prefer. The opponents of the system did not deny this, but complained that the undergraduate was not capable of judging what was best for him, and that to follow his own bent would lead to a one-sided development. In the plans of men, the indirect, and therefore unforeseen, consequences are often more important than those which form the subject of discussion. The elective system—which has to a greater or less extent penetrated almost all our colleges—did, indeed, furnish an opportunity for self-development; but at the same time it weakened the stimulus to exertion. It was based upon the assumption that opportunity alone is enough, that a man will put forth his utmost powers if he can do so in a congenial field. Yet this is by no means true, even in the case of the highest genius. Many a man of talent has worked only from the stress of pov-

erty, groaning all the time at his hard fate. Shakespeare himself did much of his writing under the pressure of finishing plays for the stage; and the difficulty of keeping artists and literary men up to time is notorious,—a difficulty not wholly due to the fitful inspiration of the muse.

If opportunity alone were enough, hereditary wealth, which vastly enlarges opportunity, ought to increase intellectual productiveness. There ought to be no place “where wealth accumulates and men decay.” But there is too much truth in the common belief that abundant means usually lessens the output of creative work; and even Shakespeare, when rich enough to retire as a country gentleman, wrote no more. The mere opportunity for self-development, and for the free exercise of one’s faculties, the mere desire for self-expression, are not enough with most men to bring out all their latent powers. This is because in civilized life we are seeking to foster an activity far above the normal; we are striving to evoke a mental energy much greater than that required for a bare subsistence, and unless education can effect this it is a failure. In addition to opportunity, there must be a stimulus of some kind.

Under the old rigid curriculum the stimulus was supplied in part by competition. Since all the students were following the same course they were naturally ranked by their marks, and there was no little emulation among the more ambitious ones. Rivalry, with its component elements, the desire to win and the still stronger desire not to be beaten, is a pervasive sentiment in human nature, often most prominent when the object itself is least worth striving for. It is constantly shown in trivial things, from the school-boy who quickens his pace when a stranger walks faster than he, to the countryman who hates to have his horse passed on the road. The intensity of the emulation depends, in fact, far less upon the value of the end to be attained, than upon the ease with which the chances of the contestants are compared; provided, of course, they are nearly enough matched to make the result uncertain. **A race** where the participants run side by side on the same

track is obviously more exciting than one in which they start at considerable intervals, or run over different roads out of sight of one another. That is the chief reason why an athletic contest, or a physical struggle of any kind, is more interesting than almost any other competition. The sport is visible, its progress can be easily watched, and the varying chances of the players are readily compared. The world does not really believe that athletic success is the most desirable form of achievement on earth, and yet men tend to transfer a part of their emotions from the contest itself to its results. Thirty thousand people cannot go to a football game, and become greatly excited over it, without being convinced that the victory is in itself a highly important matter. Thus competition provokes rivalry, intense rivalry gives rise to a keen interest, and this in turn enhances the apparent value of the object for which the contest is waged. It is one of many instances where a state of mind is produced by stimulating the secondary emotions to which it naturally gives birth.

But the free elective system in college has reduced the spirit of competition in scholarship to a minimum. Perhaps no two men are taking precisely the same series of courses, and hence their achievements are incommensurate. Like the Caucus Race in *Alice in Wonderland*, every one begins and ends where he pleases, save that he must take at least a certain number of courses; and, as on that famous occasion, little interest is taken in the distribution of prizes. But it is the fashion to say that young men of college age ought not to work for prizes, or rank. This, we are told, is a low motive; and a man ought to study for the knowledge, the training, and the culture he acquires. In short, he ought not to need the spur of competition, or any other external stimulus, because it ought to be enough for him that his future welfare is in his own hands, and his own best interests ought to guide him in the way he should go. But such an assumption leads to a rather startling conclusion; for if the ordinary undergraduate can be trusted to act most wisely of his own accord, if his natural impulses are correct, then his attitude

toward his studies is what it should be. If he has less respect for scholarship than one might wish, nevertheless under this assumption he is right, while we who disagree with him must be wrong.

It may be that the need of competition or other stimulus to exertion among undergraduates depends upon the position which the college occupies in the general scheme of education, and upon the intricate functions of play and work in building up the faculties of mind and body. If so, it may be worth while to consider these questions briefly.

Of late years we have been taught much about the value of play in the development both of animals and of man; and for that purpose the word is commonly used to denote those acts which are performed for mere pleasure without any other serious motive.¹ Now I am perfectly aware of the iniquity of employing a technical term in an unusual sense; and yet on this occasion I propose, contrary to usage, to define play as any action of which the physiological object is a development of the powers of the actor, as distinguished from the accomplishment of a result in itself useful, or the acquisition of the means for reaching such a result. This seems a more apt definition in connection with education, because thereby attention is fixed on the physiological and educational object, not on the personal motive of the actor. To illustrate what is meant, let us look at the case of the over-studious boy, who is compelled to coast or ride when he does not want to do so, and does not enjoy it. We say that he is obliged to play, but that is a contradiction in terms if play means only things done for pleasure. Again, if pleasure is the criterion, and a student takes, because he enjoys it, an additional course beyond the number required by the curriculum, it must be classed for him as play; while for the student next him, who is taking only the prescribed number of courses, it is not play. If, on the other hand, he is a member of an athletic team, not for the mere fun of it, but because he thinks it good for him, or be-

¹ For example, Karl Groos's *The Play of Man*, translated by Elizabeth L. Baldwin, page 5. [Author's note.]

cause he hopes that he can help his college to win the game, then again it is not play; and as we shall see hereafter, a large part of the physical sports of youth are in fact pursued from motives other than mere pleasure.

A pursuit, then, which is followed, whether voluntarily or by compulsion, because it tends to develop the mind or body, is play; while one that is followed for the sake of gain, or because it supplies the manual skill or technical knowledge needed to earn bread, is not play. The application of the definition to studies is clearly shown in the varying relations between general education and professional training. In American schools for engineers it has been common to intersperse a certain amount of general education among the technical courses. But in the schools of divinity, law, and medicine it has been the tradition to confine the teaching to strictly professional matters. Conversely, the American college of the older type was devoted entirely to studies that were deemed to be of general educational value, without having any direct professional bearing. So far as this object has been retained, and for the most part it still holds its ground, the college may be regarded as the last period of play. Do not misunderstand me. By play I do not mean anything trivial, unessential, or even necessarily pleasurable. I refer to pursuits which develop the mental, physical, and moral powers, as distinguished from the acquisition of directly profitable attainments. While anyone may quarrel with this use of the word "play," the thing itself is intensely serious. It is the chief occupation of the most formative part of life, and should therefore be taken in a spirit of earnest determination.

For class-room purposes this is, no doubt, the well-worn distinction between liberal or cultural studies on one side, and professional or vocational ones on the other; but it is wider, inasmuch as it includes outdoor sports, and that is the reason I use it. The object, for example, of athletics in college is physical development, yet if a member of a baseball nine were paid for his services, or if he joined it in order to fit himself to become a professional hereafter, for him it would not be play. Now, I believe that there is a close analogy between outdoor sports and

those indoor studies which are pursued for intellectual development, especially in regard to the question of stimulus by competition.

According to the usual definition of play, as an action in itself pleasurable and pursued from that motive alone, any other stimulus is obviously unnecessary. But after early infancy that is not quite true of what we commonly understand by play. With very young children mere delight in exercising nascent faculties may be enough to provoke all the activity needed to develop those faculties, but that condition is soon outgrown. With most animals, indeed, the struggle for existence begins so early that the development by play covers only a brief time of rapid growth in which pleasure may be a sufficient incentive. Man, however, goes through a long period of adolescence before he is self-supporting, and with the progress of civilization it seems destined to become longer and longer, at least for pursuits that require intellectual labor. During a very small part of this period can we trust to the propelling force of enjoyment alone, even for the training of the physical powers. The mere pleasure of exercise soon ceases to suffice, because muscular strength and nervous and moral force can be brought to a high point only by strenuous exertion that surpass the bounds of strict physical enjoyment. To make the most of himself the boy must be induced to put forth an uncomfortable effort, and for this he must have an external stimulus of some kind. No one who knows much about intercollegiate football believes that most of the men are on the team chiefly because the game itself is pleasurable; and, in fact, other motives than immediate pleasure enter largely into all violent competitive sports after an early period of childhood. It is safe to assert that if young people took part in games only so far as they enjoyed the exercise, without being affected by ambition or the opinion of their fellows, a large portion of the more strenuous sports, and therewith much valuable training, physical and moral, would be lost.

The stimulus needed is usually found in competition; and, in fact, the object of throwing a boy into contact with others of his own age is, not only to train his social instincts, but also to

bring him into rivalry with his mates, to make him play with them games which test his powers, and stimulate him to use them to the full. Within the range of their immediate interests, young people are good practical psychologists, from whom we have still much to learn by studying the way they organize their sports to provoke exertion or select superior capacity; and it may be observed that competition in sport becomes more intense as maturity is approached. No doubt competition is often carried too far, until it has the effect of eliminating from the arena all but a few champions of preëminent qualities. In his *Social Life in Greece*, Professor Mahaffy pointed out the advantage to the community of the field sports of Sparta, in which every one of ordinary strength could engage, as compared with the gymnastic games of Athens, where only remarkable athletes took part and the rest of the young men looked on. Athletic sports in our colleges involve the same danger, by tending to accentuate the selective principle at the expense of the physical improvement of the whole body of students. But the fact that competition may be carried further than is wise does not prove that it is not valuable as a stimulus, that it is not indeed the main factor in the physical development of youth.

There is certainly no less need for an effective stimulus in scholarly than in physical training, but it is far more difficult to use, because we cannot at present rely on the same constant enthusiasm on the part of the young people themselves. In the professional schools this matter is in a satisfactory state to-day. Fifty years ago there appears to have been no little apathy about study in these schools, but they have now succeeded generally in convincing their students that excellence in the work of the school has great importance, both as an equipment for their coming career, and as an indication of future success. In some cases competition is indeed used with marked effect, but it is not indispensable, because the student has the powerful incentive of feeling that he has begun his life's work, in which his prospects depend on his diligence. The schools for engineers where general and technical subjects are taught side by side, bring into sharp contrast the strong professional motive and

the feebler desire for self-improvement. It is difficult there to make the ordinary student realize the value of a cultural course. He is apt to regard it as something foreign to his regular work; something very well in its way, but not essential to success in his future career. He labors without a groan on mathematics, which most college undergraduates shun like a pestilence, while he treats English literature or the history of his country lightly, as a pleasant enough accomplishment hardly worthy of strenuous effort.

At the other end of the educational ladder, also, in the preparatory school, competition, although highly useful, is not indispensable. The boy is subject to discipline, accustomed to obey, and much influenced by the precepts and wishes of his parents and teachers. If a good boy, he tries to do well, and being under constant supervision he tends to conform to the expectations of those about him. The serious difficulty begins in college, where he is plunged into a far wider liberty—a freedom that brings vast opportunities, intellectual and moral, by which he may rise, but which on the other hand he may abuse. The old schoolboy motives for hard study he has left behind; the professional ones are not yet in sight; and it is not easy to make him appreciate the seriousness of the education within his reach. To some extent he believes that it is good for him, and he intends to obtain a real advantage from it. In most cases he is not satisfied by getting through with the least possible exertion. He means to do reasonably well, but he has no idea of the benefit to be derived from striving for excellence. In short, he has a fair, but not a high standard.

Now, there is no grave difficulty in enforcing a fair amount of work; and of late years our colleges have wisely turned their attention to the matter, making the minimum requirements distinctly more severe than they were. We can, in fact, raise the minimum for a degree to any level that we may desire, provided we recognize frankly what that level implies. Suppose, for example, that the dullest tenth of the students who enter college ought not to graduate, no matter how faithfully they toil; then the line will be drawn at such a point that the dullest

man above that tenth can get through if he devotes to study as many hours as a young man of ordinary health can properly spend over his books. But, in that case, a brighter man will need less effort to reach the same result; and, as differences in natural ability are very great, a student who stands in capacity among the more talented half of his class can get through with very little work. On the other hand, we could so draw the line that only the brighter half of the class could graduate at all; and in that case we should have, like the German universities, a large mass of students who had no intention of taking a degree, but who could hardly be refused the privilege of living about the college as special students so long as they were well behaved.

We can, therefore, set the minimum where we please,—a minimum, however, in which the amount of work required is in inverse proportion to natural ability,—and we cannot by that process compel a clever student to be industrious. We can set a minimum of capacity, and establish a ratio between brains and labor, but we cannot thereby set up a high standard for men of ability. For that purpose we need something more than a minimum requirement, and this brings us to our really difficult problem, that of applying a stimulus.

College work may affect the fortunes of a lifetime more profoundly than the studies either of boyhood or of the professional school, but the ordinary student does not know it. The connection is too vague, too subtle, for him to see; it rests on intangible principles, the force of which he does not feel. It is in college, therefore, that an external stimulus is most needed; yet college is the very place where it is found the least. The result is that a fellow who ranks high in school, and works like a tiger when he studies his profession, is too often quite satisfied with mediocrity in college. The disintegration of the curriculum caused by the elective system in any of its common forms, the disdain of rank as a subject for ambition,—encouraged by students, by the public, and sometimes even by instructors,—and other forces that have crept in unawares, have brought us to a point where competition as a stimulus for scholarship has been well-nigh driven from the college. Again, I must ask

you not to misunderstand me when I speak of the elective system. No sane man would propose to restore anything resembling a fixed curriculum in any of our larger colleges. We must not go backward, we could not if we would; but neither must we believe that progress consists in standing still. We must go forward, and our path must be such that a choice of electives shall not lessen, among those capable of it, the stimulus to excellence.

Now, there is no reason to suppose that young men have by nature a stronger desire for physical than for intellectual power, or a greater admiration for it; yet, largely by the free use of competition, athletics, in the esteem both of undergraduates and of the community at large, has beaten scholarship out of sight. The world to-day has a far higher regard for Newton, Locke, and Molière than for Augustus the Strong; but in our colleges "the physically strong," as Carlyle called Augustus, would attract much more attention. I am not one of those who condemn athletic contests, for I do not think we can afford to diminish any spur to activity in college, but I am convinced that we ought to stimulate other forms of energy, and that we can get many a hint from athletic experience. The production of true scholars, or even of the scholarly tone of mind, is not the only object of the college. It aims to produce men well developed in all directions, and it has many agencies for doing so outside the class-room; but it cannot exist for these alone, and if it fails on the scholarly side it will be irrevocably doomed.

One hundred years ago the English universities awoke to behold the low state of scholarship among their students. It boots nothing to inquire how it compared with the worst that has ever existed here, but it was bad enough. They met it by a resort to frank competition. First in one subject, and then in another, they established a degree with honors awarded in several grades, and they succeeded in making the honors, not only a goal of ambition, but, what is more, an object of general respect. They have prizes, too, which are eagerly sought; and, in short, the stimulus to scholarship rests on an elaborate system of competition for prizes and honors. Of course, there are voices

raised against it, protesting that the muses ought to be wooed for worthier motives; but it is our province to make the most of men as they are, not to protest that they ought to have an innate love of learning. The problem of human nature, the question whether we could have made it better if we had presided at creation, is too large to discuss here.

The fact remains that the Oxford and Cambridge men are firmly persuaded that success at the bar, in public life, and in other fields is closely connected with high honors at graduation; and the contest for them is correspondingly keen. The prizes and honors are made widely known; they are remembered throughout a man's life, referred to even in brief notices of him,—much as his athletic feats are here,—and they certainly do help him powerfully to get a start in his career. The result is that, by the Isis and the Cam, there is probably more hard study done in subjects not of a professional character than in any other universities in the world. What defects the system may possess, its strength and its weakness in other directions need not detain us. The structure of English society, on which the old universities are built, is very different from ours; yet there are qualities in human nature that are common to all mankind, and without copying an institution we may, by observing it, discover the secret of its success. Although we do not follow, we may learn.

Competition as an effective stimulus to scholarship in our colleges suffers to-day from a widespread feeling among the students that the distinctions won are a test of industry rather than of superior intellectual power. This conviction finds its expression in the term "grind," which is applied with great impartiality to all high scholars, instead of being reserved, as it seems to me it was formerly, to a certain kind of laborious mediocrity. The general use of the word is certainly unjust, for statistics show that, as compared with other men, the high scholars win a far larger share of distinction in the professional schools and in after life. But the feeling contains a grain of truth. In our desire to insure from every student a fair amount of work, we are too apt to use tests that measure mere diligence,

with the result that high rank in college is no sure measure of real ability. This has been to a great extent avoided in England by distinct honor and pass examinations, the questions in the former being of such a nature that industry alone cannot, it is believed, attain the highest grade; and this is an important matter if high rank is to command admiration. It is surely possible to devise tests which will measure any qualities that we desire to emphasize; but do we not touch here upon one of many indications that we have lost the key to the true meaning of the college? The primary object of the professional schools is knowledge, a command of the tools of the trade, and a facility in handling them; while in college the primary object is intellectual power, and a knowledge of facts or principles is the material on which the mind can exercise its force, rather than an end in itself. If we could make the world believe that high rank is a proof of intellectual power, our task in instilling among undergraduates a desire to excel would be simple.

The difficulty in stimulating a scholarly ambition is enhanced by a new, and on the whole a higher, moral tone among college men. The philosophers of a century ago preached the harmony of interests both in politics and economics. They taught that, in seeking his own highest good, a man promoted that of all the world; and they looked forward to a millennium based on universal self-interest. With the waning of this creed, a more altruistic spirit has replaced the extreme individualism of our fathers, and, as usual, the new tendencies are particularly strong in the rising generation. In college, the upper classmen feel a responsibility for the welfare of the younger students, and look after them, to an extent that would have been regarded as extraordinary, if not indeed meddling, half a century ago.

The sense of mutual obligation, and with it the corporate spirit, has grown apace. A man no longer wants to feel that he is working for himself alone; he wants to labor for the organization of which he forms a part, because that seems to him a nobler motive. This is one reason for the halo that surrounds the athlete; while the scholar seems to be striving for nothing better than personal distinction. If he is seeking a pecuniary

scholarship, his aim, though needful, appears sordid; if not, it seems at best selfish, and therefore unworthy of the highest admiration. But the member of the football team, who risks his limbs in a glorious cause, whose courage and devotion are placed freely at the service of his alma mater, stands out as a hero worthy of all the praise that can be lavished upon him. Many a man, deaf to all other appeals, can be induced to make a creditable record in his studies on the ground that otherwise he cannot play upon a team, and that it is his duty to do something for the honor of his college. Such sentiments deserve respect, although to a serene philosopher they may seem a substitution of co-operative for personal selfishness. But they assuredly place an obstacle in the path of anyone who would try to raise the esteem for scholarly attainment. The undergraduate sees no way in which scholarship adds luster to his college, and this complicates the problem of making it admirable in his eyes.

We have seen that the sifting out of young men capable of scholarship is receiving to-day less attention than it deserves; and that this applies, not only to recruiting future leaders of thought, but also to prevailing upon every young man to develop the intellectual powers he may possess. We have seen also that, while the Graduate School can train scholars, it cannot create love of scholarship. That work must be done in undergraduate days. We have found reason to believe that during the whole period of training, mental and physical, which reaches its culmination in college, competition is not only a proper but an essential factor; and we have observed the results achieved at Oxford and Cambridge by its use. In this country, on the other hand, several causes, foremost among them the elective system, have almost banished competition in scholarship from our colleges; while the inadequate character of our tests, and the corporate nature of self-interest in these latter times, raise serious difficulties in making it effective.

Nevertheless I have faith that these obstacles can be overcome, and that we can raise intellectual achievement in college to its rightful place in public estimation. We are told that it

is idle to expect young men to do strenuous work before they feel the impending pressure of earning a livelihood; that they naturally love ease and self-indulgence, and can be aroused from lethargy only by discipline, or by contact with the hard facts of a struggle with the world. If I believed that, I would not be president of a college for a moment. It is not true. A normal young man longs for nothing so much as to devote himself to a cause that calls forth his enthusiasm, and the greater the sacrifice involved the more eagerly will he grasp it. If we were at war, and our students were told that two regiments were seeking recruits, one of which would be stationed at Fortress Monroe, well housed and fed, living in luxury, without risk of death or wounds, while the other would go to the front, be starved and harassed by fatiguing marches under a broiling sun, amid pestilence, with men falling from its ranks killed or suffering mutilation, not a single man would volunteer for the first regiment, but the second would be quickly filled. Who is it that makes football a dangerous and painful sport? Is it the faculty, or the players themselves?

A young man wants to test himself on every side, in strength, in quickness, in skill, in courage, in endurance; and he will go through much to prove his merit. He wants to test himself, provided he has faith that the test is true, and that the quality tried is one that makes for manliness; otherwise he will have none of it. Now, we have not convinced him that high scholarship is a manly thing worthy of his devotion, or that our examinations are faithful tests of intellectual power; and in so far as we have failed in this, we have come short of what we ought to do. Universities stand for the eternal worth of thought, for the preëminence of the prophet and the seer; but, instead of being thrilled by the eager search for truth, our classes too often sit listless on the bench. It is not because the lecturer is dull, but because the pupils do not prize the end enough to relish the drudgery required for skill in any great pursuit, or indeed in any sport. To make them see the greatness of that end, how fully it deserves the price that must be paid for it, how richly it rewards the man who may compete

for it, we must learn—and herein lies the secret—we must learn the precious art of touching their imagination.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Do the students of your college seem indifferent to study? If so, what do you regard as the chief causes? 2. Discuss the problem of encouraging scholarship, showing means that might be used. 3. What is the attitude among the students of your college in regard to high rank and college honors? 4. To what extent is success in life to be associated with winning honors at college? For a refutation of the fallacy that there is "no connection between examination grades and post-collegiate success," see the article by President Lowell, "College Rank and Distinction in Life," in *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 92, page 512. 5. What is the system of grading in vogue at your institution, and how satisfactory is it? 6. In estimating a student's grade upon a recitation how much weight should be given to all or any of the following factors?

"The main factors represented by grades intelligently given may be described by the six terms: time, effort, mental ability, memory, language sense and preparation. The relative importance of these factors varies widely with the nature of the subject, but all are involved in every intellectual pursuit. The order chosen is that of directness of control by the student.

"*Time*.—This includes both that in attendance on classes and that given to the subject outside of class hours. Irregularity of attendance on classes and deficiency of outside preparation would have their obvious results in this factor, irrespective of the reasons for such irregularity or deficiency.

"*Effort*.—This factor includes the practice of concentration in and out of class, largely a result of past habits; thoroughness of thought, which passes nothing until really grasped; and system, which insures sustained and continuous work as opposed to cramming at intervals.

"*Mental Ability*.—This is evidenced by the ease and accuracy with which new ideas are grasped. It is of course largely a natural endowment, developed, however, or allowed to deteriorate, slowly by its exercise or its disuse. This factor is most important in subjects of a strongly reasoning character.

"*Memory*.—By this term is meant the retaining of ideas rather than the memorizing of words or symbols; it is mainly a natural endowment but somewhat subject to cultivation by mental activity.

"*Language Sense*.—By this is meant the ability to understand and to use language with precision. It is probably to some degree a natural gift, but is also largely a result of early training and associations and an appreciation of its importance. The student who cannot express his own ideas clearly

usually receives only vague impressions from his oral or printed instruction. The language sense can be cultivated by sustained effort directed to that end.

"*Preparation.*—This includes general education along intellectual lines, to which appeal can be made for analogies and illustrations. It also means a proper command of the earlier part of the same subject and of other subjects directly used as foundational material and as tools; grades wisely given in these antecedent subjects indicate clearly the adequacy of this direct preparation. It is in this factor that the student who has habitually aimed at passing rather than grasping his curriculum encounters the natural consequences in his increasing difficulties.

"In conclusion it may be noted that time and effort are under immediate control; mental ability, memory and language sense are subject to slow cultivation; and preparation is beyond present control. Of course less than all the allotted time, or less than the student's best effort, or less than an average rating in factors, would necessitate correspondingly higher values for the other factors that an average grade might be earned." *Science*, N. S., Volume 39, page 358.

7. In giving credit for courses toward graduation, should quality as well as quantity of work be taken into account? That is, should a course completed by one student with a low grade be considered as representing less work accomplished than the same course completed by another student with high grade, and therefore be counted as less credit towards graduation? An advocate of this method of giving credit in courses puts the matter thus: "Now in the laboratory, work done is always computed as the product of two factors: a quantity factor and an intensity factor. Just as mechanical work is the product of force and distance, so mental work in college may be estimated as the product of amount and quality; that is, of the number of courses and the grades attained. This analogy, though not perfect, suggests a pertinent question. In determining the fitness of a candidate, why not count quality as a definite and considerable factor?" Foster, W. T., "The Gentleman's Grade," *Educational Review*, Vol. 33, page 386. See also Foster, W. T., "The College Curriculum." 8. Compare working for grades with more worthy incentives to good scholarship.

THE PROGRESSIVENESS OF THE SCIENCES ¹

JOHN CAIRD

[For note on author see page 116. This selection is one of the author's addresses to the students of the University of Glasgow, delivered November, 1875.]

Last session the topic on which I took leave to address you was "The Unity of the Sciences,"—the relation, that is, of the various departments of knowledge to each other as parts of one organic whole. It may be said to be the peculiar function of a University to teach *science*, or the universal element in human knowledge; and, again, University teaching has this as a further characteristic of it, that it visibly represents the systematic unity of the various departments of knowledge, not merely by the juxtaposition of their teachers in a common seat of learning, but by the subjection of the whole work of education carried on within its walls to a common idea or system. In short, what according to this view lends distinctive significance to the name University is, that it is an institution which teaches or professes to teach, what is universal in all departments of knowledge, and each separate department in its relation to universal knowledge.

It is to another characteristic of the sciences, which concerns us no less than their unity, that I purpose to-day, for a few minutes, to direct your attention—I mean, their *progressiveness*. The history of human knowledge is a history, on the whole, of a continuous and ever-accelerating progress. In some of its departments this characteristic may be more marked and capable of easier illustration than in others. External accidents, affecting the history of nations, may often have disturbed or arrested the onward movement, or, even for a time, seem to have altogether obliterated the accumulated results of the thought of the past. But on the whole the law is a constant one, which constitutes each succeeding age the in-

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heritor of the intellectual wealth of all preceding ages, and makes it its high vocation to hand on the heritage it has received, enriched by its own contributions, to that which comes after. In almost every department of knowledge the modern student begins where innumerable minds have been long at work, and with the results of the observation, the experience, the thought and speculation of the past to help him. If the field of knowledge were limited, this, indeed, would, in one point of view, be a discouraging thought; for we should in that case be only as gleaners coming in at the close of the day to gather up the few scanty ears that had been left, where other laborers had reaped the substantial fruits of the soil. But, so far from that, vast and varied as that body of knowledge which is the result of past research may seem to be, the human race may, without exaggeration, be said to have only entered on its labors, to have gathered in only the first fruits of a field which stretches away interminably before it.

Now it is this condition or characteristic of human knowledge which constitutes the inspiration and the ever-present stimulus of intellectual effort. Without its quickening influence, thought and research would lose half their charm. If we cannot assent to the paradoxical notion of some thinkers that the chief value of knowledge is not in the possession, but in the pursuit of it; if there are few who would indorse the well-known saying of Malebranche, "If I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might pursue it again"; yet this much may be conceded, that the known, the mastered and established facts of knowledge, derive a great part of their value from their relation to the unknown and the undiscovered. As we review the history of science, we are impressed by the fact that the greatest discoveries, however important in themselves as a contribution to human knowledge, have been incalculably more important, as stepping-stones to subsequent and still greater advances. And we in turn, in our day, feel in our intellectual labors the power of the future pressing on us. It is the new hopes that are ever arising in us in the search after truth; it is the stir

of unresting endeavor, the impossibility of stationariness or stagnation, the excitement of inquiry, the wonder and delight of new ideas, of the world of thought breaking upon us with the ever-unabated charm of novelty; it is the sense of ever-growing power, the ever-increasing amount of our intellectual possessions, and prophetic glimpses of richer, yet still unappropriated, treasures that lie beyond us; it is, in short, this atmosphere of progressiveness which lends a peculiar interest and attractiveness to the vocation of the student and the searcher after truth. To few, indeed, is it given to be great discoverers or original thinkers, to know, by experience, the delight of the mind on which some great result of thought or investigation—a new law of nature, or speculative principle, or conception of creative imagination in the realm of art—comes, now, perhaps, dimly foreshadowed, now shaping itself into dawning, deepening fullness and distinctness of outline, at length grasped with the firm sense of realized certainty of possession. But though this peculiar experience is that only of the few, we can all, at least at second hand, share in the stimulus which the thoughts and discoveries of the higher and more gifted minds afford; and the humblest laborer in the field of science may feel himself partaking in the common movement, and in the intellectual activity of his own mind responding to the unresting activity which pervades the world of thought.

The immediate duty, it is true, of the great majority of those whom I address is that, not of discoverers, but of learners. Whether in future years it shall be given to any of us to rise to the rank of original thinkers or investigators, for we must be content to belong, at best, to that of the receptive and transmitting order, to whom is allotted the humbler office of being the conductors or interpreters of thought to the common mind, in the meantime, at least, our work is to gain, by the aid of skillful teachers, some acquaintance in various directions with the extant body of knowledge, with the languages and literature of the past, with the facts and principles concerning the outward world of nature or the inner world of mind which have been found out and established. But even here,

in this our proper vocation of students and learners, we may and do get the benefit indirectly of that spirit of progressiveness which is the life of science. If not immediately acting on your own minds, it acts on you through your teachers. Though not directly controlling your own aims and inquiries, it is reflected upon you in the intellectual atmosphere in which you daily breathe, in the living power and influence which ever penetrates the instructions of a teacher who is abreast with his science and seeking by his own investigations to contribute to its progress. Universities, especially Universities constituted as our Scottish Universities are, are places where a body of men are, for the most part, withdrawn from all other work but that of study and thought—men to whom knowledge is a profession, with ample leisure for prolonged inquiry, each in his special department, and a command of the best appliances for private research. Such places ought to be, and I am happy to think that our Universities have generally been, centers of intellectual activity. Seldom, if ever, have their professors been content to be mere routine teachers of stock ideas or transmitters of accepted traditions; generally they have added to the function of communicating the other and her function of extending the bounds of knowledge. I need not recall the names of Scottish professors whose contributions to literature and science and philosophy have given an impulse to the thought of former times; nor is the ancient fame of this University in our own day likely to suffer for lack of productive activity on the part of its teachers.

Now, what for my present purpose I wish to say with reference to this fact is, that though the function of the original thinker and investigator and that of the teacher are distinct, yet the latter ever derives from the former a great access of power—a power which, in the most elementary work of the class-room, will be sure to tell. It is not merely that the daily presence of a man eminent in the department he teaches has an insensible influence on the minds of the students which *he* can never exert who works merely from hand to mouth, knowing little more of his science than he daily doles out to his pupils;

it is that the man who speaks from a full mind, with a complete mastery of his subject and a genuine enthusiasm for its advancement, whose own powers are kept at their highest tension by original and exhaustive inquiry, will infuse into the ordinary routine of instruction a spirit and life, a freshness and ardor, which a commonplace mind can never communicate. It is, in one word, that the teaching of such a mind will transmit to other minds that with which it is itself penetrated—the power of that progressive spirit which is the life of science.

But now, passing from these general considerations, is it in point of fact true, it may be asked, that progressiveness is the universal characteristic of human knowledge? Are there not departments of study in which the productions that approach nearest to perfection are to be found, not in the present, but in the past, so that nothing is left to succeeding ages but to endeavor to imitate those exquisite works of the genius of antiquity which they can never hope to excel? Are there not again, it may be asked, some subjects with respect to which experience proves that the mind of man can make little or no advancement beyond the point reached at a very early period by one or two master minds of ancient times; and others in which the period of greatest illumination for the human mind was more than eighteen centuries ago, nay, in which the very organ of knowledge has for ages been an unused faculty, and wisdom at this entrance quite shut out? If we look only to the domain of the physical sciences, we see that here modern times are at an immense distance in advance of ancient; and there are obvious reasons on which we may base the conviction that the progress of these sciences will be still greater and more rapid in the future. As the number of observers increases and, with that, the possibility of the subdivision, comparison, and correctness of observation; as methods of investigation improve, and the application of science to the mechanical arts leads to the construction of instruments more delicate and incalculably adding to the power of observation; and still more significantly, as province after province of science is reduced to a condition of generalization, to which mathematical processes of

reasoning can be applied; it is impossible that man's knowledge of the inexhaustible realm of nature should not go on in an ever-increasing ratio.

But, while from these and other causes, in the domain of Physical Science, each successive generation is surely destined to advance by rapid strides on the attainments of its predecessors; there are other departments of mental activity in which neither experience nor the reason of the thing, it may be said, leads us to look for the same progressiveness. Can we ascribe it to the same extent, or indeed at all, to Literature and Art, to Philosophy, to Theology? Is it to modern or ancient times that we look for the most perfect masterpieces of purely literary art? Has language ever afforded a medium of expression, at once so varied and so accurate, so subtle and refined, lending itself with such infinite flexibility to the most delicate distinctions of thought, and to the endlessly diversified tones of feeling and fancy, clothing with aptest forms the severe dialectic of philosophy, and the impassioned inspirations of epic or dramatic genius—has language ever afforded a more perfect instrument of thought than that which, though dead, yet speaks to us from the lips of the orators and poets, the historians and philosophers of ancient Greece? Not to speak of their historic value, or of the substantive excellence of their contents, when we wish to place before the students of our day models of finished and faultless excellence in form and expression, examples by which he can be trained in the principles that regulate the formation and structure of language, the precise and accurate use of words, the delicacies of styles, the simplicity, the terse conciseness, the measured rhythmical sweetness, the elevated grandeur, the sustained force and vivacity of which human speech is capable,—is it not the fact that we pass by all the treasures of modern literature, to put into his hands, and bid him spend laborious days and nights in mastering and appreciating, the works of the great writers of classical antiquity? And the same observation applies to some extent also to ancient art in general. Are not the remains of Greek sculpture and architecture the envy and the despair of modern artists? Is not much, at least, of modern

art only an endeavor to reproduce with laborious imitation the lines and forms of those works which were flung forth, with the spontaneous ease and exuberance of genius, from the creative spirit of Greek and Roman art?

If, again, we turn from Art to Philosophy, to some it would seem as if here too we have an exception to the alleged progressiveness of human knowledge. To outsiders at least, it will be said, it looks as if not much has ever come of metaphysical speculation. Is not the history of speculative thought, it may be asked, a record of endless motion without advancement? In each successive age do we not find the old divisions and controversies reproduced without apparently any nearer approach to definite results? Are not philosophers still disputing about the same questions on which Plato and Aristotle thought and reasoned? Idealism and empiricism, materialism and spiritualism, dogmatism and skepticism, utilitarianism and intuitionism—do not these various schools of thought find their advocates in modern times, each as eager and earnest, as thoroughly convinced of the absolute and exclusive truth of his own standpoint, as the representatives of the same schools in all past times? And if there be any one school that is, more than another, the fashion of our day, that can claim a wider consensus of opinion than others, is there not a strange irony in the fact that it is a school which makes it the business of philosophy to prove that philosophy is an impossibility, that the necessary limits of human thought preclude all knowledge of the supersensible, and that the attempt to grasp absolute truth is a delirium or a dream?

Now, however plausible such representations may sound to the popular ear, I think it would not be difficult to show that they are fallacious and superficial. Neither Art nor Philosophy, nor, I will add, Theology, constitutes any exception to that law of progress which conditions all human knowledge. That I may not trespass too far on your indulgence, I will leave over for the present what might be said on Art and on the still more delicate and perilous subject of Theology, and in the few minutes that remain to me, confining myself to only one of the above-

named departments, I shall try very briefly to show that the much maligned science of Philosophy can justly claim to be a progressive science.

The doubt or denial of this claim, whether tacit or avowed, is grounded, as I have just said, on the never-ending succession of opinions and systems issuing in no definite and universally established results, which seems to characterize the history of metaphysical speculation. Each new system purports to have reached the secret of the universe, and denounces all previous explanations as futile. Yet each in turn, after attracting more or less attention, meets the universal fate—succumbs to some newer, yet equally transient, attempt to construct a perfect philosophy. Where then, in this restless flux of opinion, can we discern any sign of definite progress? Amidst the diversity and conflict of systems, how shall a plain and unsophisticated inquirer determine which is true, or whether the pretensions of the last and newest system are better grounded than any of those which it claims to supersede?

Now, in the first place, I think it necessary to remark that a plain and unsophisticated observer is not, in this case, a competent judge. Whether Philosophy has progressed or not, whether beneath the appearance of incessant change there has been a silent and steady advance of thought, is a question which cannot be determined by outsiders. In no case, indeed, can science be adequately appreciated from without; but of all branches of science, Philosophy can least suffer its acquisitions to be tested by external criticism. In the case of the physical sciences or the mechanical arts, dealing as they do with sensible facts, or appealing to results bearing on the outward utilities of life, there is a possibility, up to a certain point, of progress being tested and recognized by the popular mind. But Philosophy has its peculiar domain in a region altogether remote from popular observation, in the region of thought, of ideas, of the ultimate and invisible principles of things. Its objects are not discerned by the senses, capable of being represented to the imagination, or realized by the natural shrewdness or ordinary good sense of the world. It

demands for its prosecution a power of abstraction, of generalization, of speculative insight, which is not given to all; and an intellectual self-restraint, and superiority to outward illusions, which few are capable of yielding to it. Strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leads to this kingdom, and few there be that find it. Yet, it would seem as if, even more than the other sciences, Philosophy is expected to make its results palpable to the ordinary and unscientific mind—to stand and be judged by that generalization of common ignorance which we designate "common sense." Common sense is never allowed to sit in judgment on mathematical investigations, on a process involving delicate experimental analysis, on the correctness of a medical diagnosis, on a question of comparative philology or ethnology. In these cases uninstructed shrewdness is not offended to find that the language of science is to it unintelligible, its methods and processes an utter blank. Yet ordinary intelligence is somehow supposed to be quite adequate to the work of estimating the methods and results of a science, the most recondite of all; takes upon it to flout at what it calls the jargon of metaphysics, and is credited with wisdom in treating the results of speculative research as empty words.

Again, it is to be remarked that, owing to the remoteness of philosophy from ordinary thought, there is another difficulty with which it has to contend, and a further hindrance to the recognition of its substantial results. Here, more than elsewhere, science is subjected to the presence of impostors, while here it is less easy than elsewhere to detect and expose them. There are many who give themselves the air of metaphysicians and psychologists with whom philosophy has nothing to do, yet the discredit of whose crudenesses and absurdities, in the general judgment, philosophy is often made to bear. All sciences, indeed, are more or less exposed to the intrusion of pretenders and charlatans; and in science, no more than in any other sphere of human activity, is it possible to prevent, occasionally, an element of nonsense from creeping in. But this is an evil which, from the nature of the thing, is more common in philosophy than anywhere else. For, though its

province is in one sense remote, in another it is near and familiar. Though not many can grasp it, all, or almost all, can talk about it. It deals with mind, with ideas, with the principles and processes of thought; and everybody has in his possession, at least implicitly, the subject matter with which it concerns itself: everybody has, or thinks he has, a mind and ideas. And so, mistaking the familiar for the intelligible, without science, culture, or discipline, multitudes who are shut out by conscious ignorance from other sciences, have thought themselves entitled to rush into this field. The literature of philosophy is thus exceptionally beset by extravagances and vagaries, by crude observations, ill-sifted notions, and baseless theories—in short, by the element of nonsense. From which it arises that people who have no liking for the subject, or who have caught up a prejudice against it, find ready to their hands a thousand illustrations of the uselessness and unprofitableness of metaphysics. But surely, if we would estimate the true value and solid results of philosophy, we should begin by brushing off this foreign and parasitical element. If controversies about the squaring of the circle or the perpetual motion are not to be set down to the discredit of mathematical or mechanical science; if the pseudo-science of Astrology or the dreams of alchemists and Rosicrucians are not suffered to abate our respect for the sober investigations of Astronomy or Chemistry, why should a like careful discrimination not be made when we come to consider what is or is not included in that body of truth for which philosophy is responsible? The history of philosophy is indeed rife with conflicts and controversies; but the senseless quarrels of camp followers and hangers-on have no bearing on the great controversies of nations, nor even on the issue of a single campaign.

But though it is impossible outside of philosophy to demonstrate its reality and its progress—though, in other words, it is only a knowledge of philosophy that can qualify us for appreciating its progressive character; yet, waiving for the present other points, there is one general consideration with respect to the history of this science which, even without this

deeper knowledge, may help us to see how there may be real progress here despite that appearance of fluctuation, that absence of settled results, to which I have referred. And that consideration is simply this, that the highest kind of progress is not progress by addition or accumulation, but progress by *development*, and development implies the perpetual transmutation of the past. There is one kind of progress which consists simply of addition of the same to the same, or of the external accumulation of materials. But increase by addition, even though it be ordered or regulated addition, is not the highest kind of advancement. Pile heap on heap of inorganic matter, and you have a result in which nothing is changed; the lowest stratum of the pile remains to the last what it was at the first, and you keep all you ever had in solid permanence. Add stone to stone or brick to brick, till the house you have built stands complete from foundation to coping; and here, though in order and system there may be a shadow of something higher than mere quantity, there is still only addition without progress. You have here also what the superficial mind covets as the sign of value in its possessions—permanent results, solid and stable reality. Every stone you place there remains to the last cut, hewn, shaped, in all its hard external actuality, what it was at the first: and the whole edifice, in its definite outward completeness stands, it may be, for ages, a permanent possession of the world.

But when you turn from inorganic accumulation or addition of quantities to organic growth, the kind of progress you get is altogether different. Here you never for a single day or hour keep firm possession of what you once had. Here there is never-resting mutation. What you now have is no sooner reached than it begins to slip away from your grasp. One form of existence comes into being only to be abolished and obliterated by that which succeeds it. Seed or germ, peeping bud, rising stem, leaf and blossom, flower and fruit, are things that do not continue side by side as part of a permanent store, but each owes its present existence to the annulling of that which was before. You cannot possess at one and the same

time the tender grace of the vernal woods and the rich profusion of color and blossom of the later growth of summer. If you are ever to gather in the fruit, you must be content that the gay blossoms should shrivel up and drop away. Yet though, in organic development you cannot retain the past, it is not destroyed or annihilated. In a deeper way than by actual matter-of-fact presence and preservation, it continues. Each present phase of the living organism has in it the vital result of all that it has been. The past is gone, but the organism could not have become what it is without the past. Every bygone moment of its existence still lives in it, and indeed as it was, but absorbed, transformed, worked up into the essence of its new and higher being. And when the perfection of the organism is reached, the unity of the perfectly developed life is one which gathers up into itself, not by juxtaposition or summation, but in a much subtler way, the concentrated results of all its bygone history. And by how much life is nobler than dead matter, by so much are the results and fruits of life the manifestation of a nobler kind of progress than the accumulation of things which are at once permanent and lifeless, and permanent *because* they are lifeless.

Now, the claim of philosophy—a claim asserted by its greatest modern representatives—is that the history of speculative thought, like the whole history of man of which it is the highest form and expression, is not an accidental succession of opinions, but a development—the evolution through definite stages of an ever-growing organic life. Philosophy does not advance by mere empirical addition of fact to fact, and opinion to opinion; its history is that of a process, a systematic development, each step of which, though true, is not the absolute truth, and therefore yields to and is taken up into another and higher in the dialectic movement of the thought of the world. And, as in the process of physical life, each successive phase and form, though it seems to be the subversion, is only the deeper realization of that which preceded it. The first step, like the germ contains ideally and implicitly the whole subsequent development; and the last, in the fullness and riches of its life,

absorbs and explains, is in itself the truth and realization of all that seems to have passed away.

The attempts, for instance, at the first awakening of speculative thought in Greek philosophy, to explain the world by such notions as Being, Becoming, the One, the Many, etc., might seem to have lost any other than a historic or antiquarian interest. But even the ripest and most advanced philosophy of modern times has not refuted or falsified these notions of its earliest infancy. For the categories which seemed to these early thinkers the ultimate principles of things, do actually enter into the system of the world, and must enter into any rational explanation of it which our latest thought can give. They are the notions with which every philosophy must begin, and they are only false when we stop short at such abstractions, instead of regarding them as only the first faint notes of that rhythmical harmony of thought into which they have long been taken up. And even in these first beginnings of speculation we already see the process at work by which one philosophy, while seeming to be subverted, yet really passes into and yields up its life to another. "All is Being," is the formula which expresses one and perhaps the earliest definite attempt to read the secret of the universe. "Change, division, multiplicity, are but surface appearance and illusion. There must be one permanent principle or ground of things, and all other experiences that seem to be are but phantoms." "All is Becoming," was the seemingly contradictory explanation of another and later school. "Nothing in the universe continues for two successive moments, but restless movement, mutation, fleetingness, an eternal alternation of birth and decay, life and death,—*that* alone is. The permanent is the illusory—what is, only seems to be; the real principle of things is to be found not in the idea of Being, but of Becoming." And both explanations were true; both principles needed to rise, and have their day, and play themselves out to the fullest, before thought, obeying its own inward impulse, rose to a higher principle which at once superseded and embraced them—a principle which includes both change and permanence, unity

and difference; which sees not the one only, or the many only, not the particular, the manifold, apart from the universal, nor the universal apart from the particular, but a universal which is *in* the particular, a world which is neither in abstraction, but both ever coincident, ever blended, ever reciprocally interpenetrated in the concrete unity of thought and life.

And so, in like manner, at another and far distant time, when a deeper problem arose for solution, the problem of matter and mind, of the world without, and its relation to the world within, it would be easy to show how, beginning with the hard opposition of the two, speculation first playing with metaphorical solutions, such as that of a mental tablet on which impressions are inscribed from without, sought on the one hand the explanation of materialism; on the other, by necessary reaction, that of false or subjective idealism, till the truth in both was taken up, and the error eliminated in a deeper philosophy, which says, "Both are true, but neither in abstraction from the other. Neither materialism in itself, nor idealism in itself, neither bare objectivity, nor bare subjectivity; but the secret is to be found in that deeper concrete unity in which they are both lost and found again—the unity of self-conscious thought."

Thus, not to weary you with further illustration, what has been said may, at least in some faint measure, suggest to you a view which removes from the history of philosophy that aspect of chaos and perpetual contradiction issuing in no progressive knowledge which has been so often urged against it. There is much, as I have already said, in the history of speculative thought just as in the outward life of man, that belongs to the accidental and irrational—errors, vagaries, paradoxes, assuming the name and the guise of philosophy. But just as the student of the constitutional history of England can trace, amidst all the complexity and contingency of outward and passing events, through successive times and dynasties, underneath the waywardness of individual passion and the struggle for ascendancy of classes and orders,—the silent, steady devel-

opment of that system of ordered freedom which we name the Constitution of England; so, in the light of the principle I have attempted to set forth, looking back on the course which human thought has traveled, we shall be at no loss to discern beneath the surface changes of opinions, unaffected by the abnormal displays of individual folly and unreason, the traces of a continuous, onward movement of mind. It is one thought, one mind, and spirit which has lived and thought through the ages. The intellectual life of the world is the intellectual life of the individual mind writ large. It is not dwarfed in perpetual childhood. It has grown from less to more; and the rich content of its present thought is no chance-medley of opinions, but the legitimate and logical outcome of all the thought of the past.

And now let me ask in conclusion, is there not, in the idea I have imperfectly presented to you, that which should have a stimulating and ennobling influence on us in our vocation of students? Should it not help to lift us above ourselves, our petty individual aims, our narrow and selfish desires, to feel that we are sharers in a life which is infinitely larger and greater than our own—the ever-advancing intellectual life of man. The pursuit of knowledge is at once a humbling and ennobling work—humbling, because it is so little we individually can accomplish within the narrow limits of our brief and passing life; but ennobling, because no earnest seeker after truth, but, by the very nature and law of his vocation, enters into communion with the great intellectual fellowship of all time; and if he will but open his mind to the genius and spirit of his calling, may feel himself inspired with the purest and noblest aims that have ever animated the spirit of humanity. Little indeed is it that we, even the most richly dowered with the gifts of intellect, can do to advance the cause of truth. Slender at the best is the contribution we can make to the intellectual wealth of the world. But, slight though it be, it is surely something to think that it is taken up into and becomes an integral part of a life which neither space nor time can measure. Far above the agitation and strife of man's petty passions,

far above the individual cares and interests that seem for the moment so important, never hasting, never resting, onward through the ages, the life of thought and knowledge advances to its goal. What its course has been in the past is only an augury of the yet more splendid future that awaits it. Science, advancing to richer discoveries, and a more comprehensive grasp of the order and system of nature; philosophy, shedding new and fuller light on the deeper problems of thought; art, enriching the world with new and fairer creations; and the many-sided intelligence of man, freed from the idols and prejudices that still encumber it, unfolding new capabilities of insight, and a new consciousness of power and freedom—if something like this is the intellectual destiny that lies before our race, is there not in the contemplation of it that which may inspire us with a high and ennobling sense of our work here, and of the ends to which such institutions as this are devoted? To work here in order to gain the knowledge that will qualify you to earn your bread is no dishonorable motive. To study for honors, to be inspired by the love of fame and reputation, if it be the reputation of acquirements that are in themselves good and noble, is no unworthy aim. But there is an intellectual virtue that is higher and purer than these, without some touch of which you can be no true student. For, as the highest patriotism is that of the man who thinks not of honor or rewards, but so loves his country that he is content to be forgotten, to lose himself altogether in the larger, dearer life for which he lives; so he only rises to the true nobility of the student's calling who catches some sympathetic spark of that pure intellectual love, that love of knowledge for its own sake, which lifts him out of self into fellowship with those in all the ages whose life has been, and will be, the eternal life of thought.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What is the writer's point about the value of the element of progressiveness in knowledge? 2. Distinguish between the two kinds of progress described, and illustrate each. 3. Why does the

popular mind appreciate the progressiveness of the physical sciences and the mechanical arts but fail to discover it in other fields like philosophy and art? 4. Take some field with which you are familiar and illustrate the point that the greatest discoveries have had their chief value as stepping-stones to greater advances. 5. Applying this idea of progressiveness in knowledge to the field of literature, what can be said in defense of, or in opposition to, our reverence of the achievements of the past?

THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRACY ON THOUGHT¹

JAMES BRYCE

[James Bryce (1838—) is a distinguished English jurist, historian, and statesman. From 1907 to 1913 he was British ambassador at Washington. Though prominent in many fields, Mr. Bryce is better known as a writer, and especially as the author of *The American Commonwealth*, the material for which was collected during visits to the United States in 1870, 1881, and 1883. It is probably the best account ever written of the political institutions of the United States, considered in their relation to the history, the character, and the habits of the American people. This selection is one of the chapters of this book.]

Two opposite theories regarding the influence of democratic institutions on intellectual activity have found currency. One theory extols them because they stimulate the mind of a people, not only sharpening men's wits by continual struggle and unrest, but giving to each citizen a sense of his own powers and duties in the world, which spurs him on to exertions in ever-widening fields. This theory is commonly applied to Athens and other democracies of the ancient world, as contrasted with Sparta and the oligarchic cities, whose intellectual production was scanty or altogether wanting. It compares the Rome of Cicero, Lucretius, and Catullus, and the Augustan age, whose great figures were born under the Republic, with the vaster but comparatively sterile Roman world of Marcus Aurelius or Constantine, when freedom had long since vanished. It notes the outburst of

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literary and artistic splendor that fell in the later age of the republics of medieval Italy, and dwells with especial pleasure on the achievements of Florence, the longest-lived and the most glorious of the free commonwealths of Italy.

According to the other theory, Democracy is the child of ignorance, the parent of dullness and conceit. The opinion of the greatest number being the universal standard, everything is reduced to the level of vulgar minds. Originality is stunted, variety disappears, no man thinks for himself, or, if he does, fears to express what he thinks. A drear pall of monotony covers the sky.

"Thy hand, great Anarch, lets the curtain fall
And universal darkness buries all."

This doctrine seems to date from the appearance of De Tocqueville's book,¹ though his professed disciples have pushed it much further than his words warrant. It is really an *a priori* doctrine, drawn from imagining what the consequences of a complete equality of material conditions and political powers ought to be. But it claims to rest upon the observed phenomena of the United States, which, thirty years ago, were still the only great modern democracy; and it was with reference to the United States that it was enunciated by Mr. Robert Lowe in one of those speeches of 1866 which so greatly impressed his contemporaries.

Both these theories will be found on examination to be baseless. Both, so far as they are *a priori* theories, are fanciful; both, in so far as they purport to rest upon the facts of history, err by regarding one set of facts only, and ignoring a great number of concomitant conditions which have probably more to do with the result than the few conditions which have been arbitrarily taken to be sufficient causes. None of the Greek republics was a democracy in the modern sense, for all rested upon slavery; nor, indeed, can the name be applied, except at passing moments, to the Italian cities. Many circumstances besides their popular government combined to place the imperishable crown of literary and artistic glory upon the brows of the city of the Violet and

¹ *Democracy in America*, by this French statesman and political writer.

the city of the Lily. So also the view that a democratic land is necessarily a land of barren monotony, while unsound even as a deduction from general principles, is still more unsound in its assumption of certain phenomena as true of America, and in the face it puts on the phenomena it has assumed. The theorists who have propounded it give us, like Daniel, the dream as well as their interpretation of it. But the dream is one of their own inventing; and such as it is, it is wrongly interpreted.

Few mistakes are more common than that of exaggerating the influence of forms of government. As there are historians and politicians who, when they come across a trait of national character for which no obvious explanation presents itself, set it down to "race," so there are writers and speakers who, too indolent to examine the whole facts of the case, or too ill-trained to feel the need of such examination, pounce upon the political institutions of a country as the easiest way to account for its social and intellectual, perhaps even for its moral and religious peculiarities. Few problems are in reality more complex than the relation between the political and the intellectual life of a country; few things more difficult to distinguish than the influences respectively attributable to an equality of political rights and powers on the one hand, an equality of material and social conditions on the other. It is commonly assumed that Democracy and Equality go hand in hand, but as one may have popular government along with enormous differences of wealth and dissimilarities in social usage, so also one may have social equality under a despot. Doubtless, when social and political equality go hand in hand they intensify one another; but when inequality of material conditions becomes marked, social life changes, and as social phenomena become more complex their analysis becomes more difficult.

Reverting to the two theories from which we set out, it may be said that the United States furnish little support to either. American democracy has certainly produced no age of Pericles. Neither has it dwarfed literature and led a wretched people, so dull as not even to realize their dullness, into a barren plain of featureless mediocrity. To ascribe the deficiencies, such as they

are, of art and culture in America, solely or even mainly to her form of government, is not less absurd than to ascribe, as many Americans of what I may call the trumpeting school do, her marvelous material progress to the same cause. It is not Democracy that has paid off a gigantic debt and raised Chicago out of a swamp. Neither is it Democracy that has denied her philosophers like Burke and poets like Wordsworth.

Most writers who have dealt with these matters have not only laid more upon the shoulders of democratic government than it ought to bear, but have preferred abstract speculations to the humbler task of ascertaining and weighing the facts. They have spun ingenious theories about democracy as the source of this or that, or whatever it pleased them to assume; they have not tried to determine by a wide induction what specific results appear in countries which, differing in other respects, agree in being democratically governed. If I do not follow these time-honored precedents, it is not because the process is difficult, but because it is unprofitable. These speculations have perhaps had their use in suggesting to us what phenomena we ought to look for in democratic countries; but if any positive results are to be reached, they must be reached by carefully verifying the intellectual phenomena of more than one country, and establishing an unmistakable relation between them and the political institutions under which they prevail.

If some one, starting from the current conception of democracy, were to say that in a democratic nation we should find a disposition to bold and unbridled speculations, sparing neither theology nor morals, a total absence of rule, tradition, and precedent, each man thinking and writing as responsible to no criticism, "every poet his own Aristotle," a taste for strong effects and garish colors, valuing force rather than fineness, grandeur rather than beauty, a vigorous, hasty, impetuous style of speaking and writing, a grandiose, and perhaps sensational art: he would say what would be quite as natural and reasonable *a priori* as most of the pictures given us of democratic societies. Yet many of the suggested features would be the opposite of those which America presents.

Every such picture must be fanciful. He who starts from so simple and (so to speak) bare a conception as that of equal civil rights and equal political powers vested in every member of the community cannot but have recourse to his fancy in trying to body forth the results of this principle. Let anyone study the portrait of the democratic man and democratic city which the first and greatest of all the hostile critics of democracy has left us,¹ and compare it with the very different descriptions of life and culture under a popular government in which European speculation has disorted itself since De Tocqueville's time. He will find each theory plausible in the abstract, and each equally unlike the facts which contemporary America sets before us.

Let us then bid farewell to fancy and endeavor to discover what are now the salient intellectual features of the mass of the native population in the United States.

As there is much difference of opinion regarding them, I present with diffidence the following list:—

1. A desire to be abreast of the best thought and work of the world everywhere, to have every form of literature and art adequately represented, and excellent of its kind, so that America shall be felt to hold her own among the nations.

2. A fondness for bold and striking effects, a preference for large generalizations and theories which have an air of completeness.

3. An absence among the multitude of refined taste, and disposition to be attracted rather by general brilliance than by delicacy of workmanship; a want of mellowness and inadequate perception of the difference between first-rate work in a quiet style and mere flatness.

4. Little respect for canons or traditions, accompanied by the notion that new conditions must of necessity produce new ideas.

5. An undervaluing of special knowledge or experience, except perhaps in the sphere of applied science and commerce, an

¹ Plato indeed indulges his fancy so far as to describe the very mules and asses of a democracy as prancing along the roads, scarcely deigning to bear their burdens. The passion for unrestrained license, for novelty, for variety, is to him the note of democracy, whereas monotony and even obstinate conservatism are the faults which the latest European critics bid us expect. [Author's note.]

idea that an able man can do one thing pretty much as well as another, as Dr. Johnson thought that if he had taken to politics he would have been as distinguished therein as he was in poetry.

6. An admiration for literary or scientific eminence, an enthusiasm for anything that can be called genius, with an over-readiness to discover it.

7. A love of intellectual novelties.

8. An intellectual impatience, and desire for quick and patent results.

9. An over-valuing of the judgments of the multitude; a disposition to judge by "success" work which has not been produced for the sake of success.

10. A tendency to mistake bigness for greatness.

Contrariwise, if we regard not the people generally but the most cultivated class, we shall find, together with some of the above-mentioned qualities, others which indicate a reaction against the popular tendencies. This class has a strong relish for subtlety of thought and highly finished art, whether in literature or painting. It is so much afraid of crudity and vagueness as to be prone to devote itself to minute and careful study of subjects unattractive to the masses.

Of these characteristics of the people at large some may at first sight seem inconsistent with others, as for instance the admiration for intellectual gifts with the under-valuing of special knowledge; nevertheless it could be shown that both are discoverable in Americans as compared with Englishmen. The former admire intelligence more than the latter do; but they defer less to special competence. However, assuming for the moment that there is something true in these suggestions, which it would take too long to attempt to establish one by one, be it observed that very few of them can be directly connected with democratic government. Even these few might take a different form in a differently situated democracy. The seventh and eighth seem due to the general intelligence and education of the people, while the remainder, though not wholly uninfluenced by the habits which popular government tends to breed, must be

mainly ascribed to the vast size of the country, the vast numbers and homogeneity of its native white population, the prevalence of social equality, a busy industrialism, a restless changefulness of occupation, and the absence of a leisured class dominant in matters of taste—conditions that have little or nothing to do with political institutions. The prevalence of evangelical Protestantism has been quite as important a factor in the intellectual life of the nation as its form of government.

Some one may say—I wish to state the view fairly though I do not entirely agree with it—that assuming the foregoing analysis to be correct, the influence of democracy, apart from its tendency to secure an ample provision of education, is discernible in two points. It produces self-confidence and self-complacency, national and personal, with the result both of stimulating a certain amount of thought and of preventing the thought that is so produced from being subjected to proper tests. Ambition and self-esteem will call out what might have lain dormant, but they will hinder a nation as well as a man from duly judging its own work, and in so far will retard its progress. Those who are naturally led to trust and obey common sense and the numerical majority in matters of state, over-value the judgment of the majority in other matters. Now the judgment of the masses is a poor standard for the thinker or the artist to set before him. It may narrow his view and debase his style. He fears to tread in new paths or express unpopular opinions; or if he despises the multitude he may take refuge in an acrid cynicism. Where the masses rule, a writer cannot but think of the masses, and as they do not appreciate refinements he will eschew these, making himself at all hazards intelligible to the common mind, and seeking to attract by broad, perhaps coarsely broad, effects, the hasty reader, who at the circulating libraries passes by Walter Scott or Thackeray to fasten on the latest sketch of fashionable life or mysterious crime.

I do not deny that there is some force in this way of putting the case. Democracy tends to produce a superficially active public and perhaps also a jubilant and self-confident public. But it is quite possible to have a democratic people which shall

be neither fond of letters nor disposed to trust its own judgment and taste in judging them. Much will depend on the other features of the situation. In the United States the cultivated public increases rapidly, and the very reaction which goes on within it against the defects of the multitude becomes an important factor. All things considered, I doubt whether democracy tends to discourage originality, subtlety, refinement, in thought and in expression, whether literary or artistic. I doubt if there be any solid ground for expecting monotony or vulgarity under one form of government more than another. The causes lie deeper. Art and literature have before now been base and vulgar under absolute monarchies and under oligarchies. One of the most polished and aristocratic societies in Europe has for two centuries been that of Vienna; yet what society could have been intellectually duller or less productive? Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the habits of popular government which open a career to talent in public life, open it in literature also. No man need lean on a faction or propitiate a coterie. A pure clear voice with an unwonted message may at first fail to make itself heard over the din of competitors for popular favor; but once heard, it and its message will probably be judged on their own merits.

Passing away from this question as to the supposed narcotic power of democracy, the further question may be asked, what is the distinctive note of democratic thought and art as they actually appear in the United States? What is the peculiar quality or flavor which springs from this political element in their condition? I cannot tell. I find no such note. I have searched for it, and, as the Americans say, it is hard work looking for what is not there. Some Europeans and many Americans profess to have found it, and will tell you that this or that peculiarity of American literature is due to democracy. No doubt, if you take individual writers, you may discover in several of them something, though not always the same thing, which savors of democratic feeling and tinges their way of regarding human life. But that is not enough. What must be shown is a general quality running through the majority of these writers—a

quality which is at once recognized as racy of the soil, and which can be traced back to the democratic element which the soil undoubtedly contains. No such quality seems to have been shown. That there is a distinctive note in many—not, perhaps, in all—of the best American books may be admitted. It may be caught by ears not the most delicate. But is this note the voice of democracy? Is it even the voice of democracy and equality combined? There is a difference, slight yet perceptible, in the part which both sentiment and humor play in American books, when we compare them with English books of equivalent strength. The humor has a vein of oddity, and the contrast between the soft copiousness of the sentiment and the rigid lines of lingering Puritanism which it suffuses, is rarely met with in England. Perhaps there is less repose in the American style; there is certainly a curious unrestfulness in the effort, less common in English writers, to bend metaphors to unwonted uses. But are these differences, with others I might mention—and, after all, they are slight—due to any cause connected with politics? Are they not rather due to a mixed and curiously intertwined variety of other causes which have molded the American mind during the last two centuries? American imagination has produced nothing more conspicuously original than the romances of Hawthorne. If anyone says that he finds something in them which he remembers in no previous English writer, we know what is meant and probably agree. But can it be said that there is anything distinctively American in Hawthorne, that is to say, that his specific quality is of a kind which reappears in other American writers? Few will affirm this. The most peculiar, and therefore I suppose the most characteristically American school of thought, has been what used to be called the Concord or Transcendental school of forty years ago; among the writings produced by which those of Emerson are best known in Europe. Were the authors of that school distinctively democratic either in the color of their thought, or in its direction, or in the style which expresses it? And if so, can the same democratic tinge be discerned in the authors of to-day? I doubt it: but such matters do not admit of proof or

disproof. One must leave them to the literary feeling of the reader.

A very distinguished American man of letters once said to me that he hated nothing so much as to hear people talk about American literature. He meant, I think, that those who did so were puzzling themselves unnecessarily to find something which belonged to a new country, and a democratic country, and were forgetting or ignoring the natural relation of works of imagination and thought produced in America to books written by men of the same race in the Old World before and since 1776.

So far, then, as regards American literature generally, I do not believe that there is in it anything specifically democratic. Nor if we look at the various departments of speculative thought, such as metaphysics and theology, or at those which approach nearer to the exact sciences, such as economics and jurisprudence, shall we find that the character and substance of the doctrines propounded bear marked traces of a democratic influence. Why should we be surprised at this, seeing that the influence of a form of government is only one among many influences, even where a nation stands alone, and creates a literature distinctively local? But can books written in the United States be deemed to constitute a literature locally American in the same sense as the literatures of France and Germany, of Italy and Russia, belong to those countries? For the purposes of thought and art the United States is a part of England, and England is a part of America. Many English books are more widely read and strike deeper to the heart in America than in England. Some American books have a like fortune in England. Differences there are, but differences how trivial compared with the resemblances in temper, in feeling, in susceptibility to certain forms of moral and physical beauty, in the general view of life and nature, in the disposition to revere and be swayed by the same matchless models of that elder literature which both branches of the English race can equally claim. American literature does not to-day differ more from English literature than the Scottish writers of eighty or a hundred years ago—Burns, Scott, Adam Smith, Reid, Hume, Robertson—differed from

their English contemporaries. There was a fondness for abstractions and generalizations in the Scottish prose writers; there was in the Scottish poets a bloom and fragrance of mountain heather which gave to their work a charm of freshness and singularity, like that which a faint touch of local accent gives to the tongue of an orator. But they were English as well as Scottish writers: they belong to English literature and make part of its glory to the world beyond. So Fenimore Cooper, Hawthorne, Emerson, Longfellow, and those on whom their mantle has fallen, belong to England as well as to America; and English writers, as they more and more realize the vastness of the American public they address, will more and more feel themselves to be American as well as English, and will often find in America not only a larger but a more responsive audience.

We have been here concerned not to discuss the merits and estimate the place of American thinkers and writers, but only to examine the relation in which they stand to their political and social environment. That relation, however, sets before us one more question. The English-speaking population of the United States is one-third larger than that of the United Kingdom. It is a more educated population, in which a greater number of persons come under the influence of books and might therefore be stirred up to intellectual production. Why then does it not make more important contributions to the common literary wealth of the race? Is there a want of creative power? and if so, to what is the want due?

. This is a question frequently propounded. I propose to consider it in the chapter which follows.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

As this and the following selection make practically one continuous discussion, questions and topics for both will be found on page 244).

CREATIVE INTELLECTUAL POWER ¹

JAMES BRYCE

[For notes in regard to the author, see introduction to preceding selection. The present selection is one of the chapters of *The American Commonwealth*.]

There is a street in Florence on each side of which stand statues of the famous Florentines of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,—Dante, Giotto, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Ghiberti, Machiavelli, Michael Angelo, and others scarcely less illustrious, all natives of the little city which in their days had never a population of more than sixty thousand souls.² No one can walk between these rows of world-famous figures, matched by no other city of the modern world, without asking himself what cause determined so much of the highest genius to this one spot; why in Italy herself populous Milan and Naples and Venice have no such list to show; why the succession of greatness stopped with the beginning of the sixteenth century and has never been resumed? Questions substantially the same constantly rise to the mind in reading the history of other countries. Why did England produce no first-rate poet in the two stirring centuries between Chaucer and Shakespeare, and again in the century and a half between Milton's birth and Wordsworth's? Why have epochs of comparative sterility more than once fallen upon Germany and France? and why has music sometimes reached its highest pitch of excellence at moments when the other arts were languishing? Why does the scepter of intellectual and artistic leadership pass now to one great nation, now to another, inconstant and unpredictable as are the shifting winds?

These questions touch the deepest and most complex problems of history; and neither historian nor physiologist has yet been able to throw any real light upon them. Even the commonplace remark that times of effort and struggle tend to

¹ Reprinted by permission from *The American Commonwealth*, Volume II, The Macmillan Co.

² Petrarch saw the light in Arezzo, but his family was Florentine, and it was by a mere accident that he was born away from his own city. [Author's note.]

develop an unusually active intellectual movement and therewith to awaken or nourish rare geniuses, is not altogether true; for some of the geniuses have arisen at moments when there was no excitement to call them forth, and at other times seasons of storm and stress have raised up no one capable of directing the efforts or interpreting the feelings of his generation. One thing, however, is palpable: numbers have nothing to do with the matter. There is no average of a man of genius to so many thousands or millions of persons. Out of the sixty thousand of Florence there arise during two centuries more men of undying fame than out of huge London during the last three centuries. Even the stock of solid second-class ability does not necessarily increase with increasing numbers; while as to those rare combinations of gifts which produce poetry or philosophy of the first order, they are revealed no more frequently in a great European nation now than they were in a Semitic tribe or a tiny Greek city twenty-five or thirty centuries ago.

There is therefore no reason why the absence of brilliant genius among the sixty millions in the United States should excite any surprise; we might as well wonder that there is no Goethe, or Schiller or Kant or Hegel in the Germany of to-day, so much more populous and better educated than the Germany of their birth-time. It is not to be made a reproach against America that men like Tennyson or Darwin have not been born there. "The wind bloweth where it listeth;" the rarest gifts appear no one can tell why or how. In broad France a century ago no man was found able to spring upon the neck of the Revolution and turn it to his will. Fate brought her favorite from a wild Italian island, that had but just passed under the yoke of the nation to which it gave a master.

The question we have to ask as regards the United States is therefore not why it has given us few men of the highest and rarest distinction, but whether it has failed to produce its fair share of talents of the second rank, that is, of men capable of taking a lead in all the great branches of literary or artistic or scientific activity, men who instruct and delight their own

generation, though possibly future generations may not hold all of them in remembrance.

Have fewer men of this order adorned the roll of fame in the United States, during the century of their independence, than in England, or France, or Germany during the same period? Obviously this is the fact as regards art in all its branches; and also as regards physical and mathematical science. In literature the disparity is less evident, yet most candid Americans will agree with Englishmen that it is greater than those who know the education and intelligence of the younger people would have expected. I pass by oratory and statesmanship, because comparison is in these fields very difficult. The fact therefore being admitted, we have to endeavor to account for it.

If the matter were one of numerical averages, it would be pertinent to remark that of the sixty millions of people in the United States seven or eight millions are negroes, at present altogether below the stratum from which production can be expected; that of the whites there may be nearly two millions to whom English is a foreign language, and that several millions are recent immigrants from Europe. This diminishes the contrast between numbers and intellectual results. But numbers have so little to do with the question that the point deserves no more than a passing reference.

Those who have discussed the conditions of intellectual productivity have often remarked that epochs of stir and excitement are favorable, because they stimulate men's minds, setting new ideas afloat, and awakening new ambitions. It is also true that vigorous unremitting labor is, speaking generally, needed for the production of good work, and that one is therefore less entitled to expect it in an indolent time and from members of the luxurious classes. But it is not less true, though less frequently observed, that tranquillity and repose are necessary to men of the kind we are considering, and often helpful even to the highest geniuses, for the evolving of new thoughts and the creation of forms of finished and harmonious beauty. He who is to do such work must have time to meditate, and pause, and

meditate again. He must be able to set his creation aside, and return to it after days or weeks to look at it with fresh eyes. He must be neither distracted from his main purpose, nor hurried in effecting it. He must be able to concentrate the whole force of his reason or imagination on one subject, to abstract himself when needful from the flitting sights and many-voiced clamor of the outer world. Juvenal said this long ago about the poet; it also applies, though possibly in a lower degree, both to the artist and to the serious thinker, or delicate workman, in any field of literature, to the metaphysician, the theologian, the philosophic historian, the economist, the philologist, even the novelist and the statesman. I have heard men who had gone from a quiet life into politics complain that they found their thinking powers wither, and that while they became far more expert in getting up subjects and speaking forcibly and plausibly, they found it harder and harder to form sound general views and penetrate beneath the superficialities of the newspaper and the platform. Interrupted thought, trains of reflection or imaginative conceptions constantly broken by a variety of petty transient calls of business, claims of society, matters passing in the world to note and think of, not only tire the mind but destroy its chances of attaining just and deep views of life and nature, as a wind-ruffled pool ceases to reflect the rocks and woods around it. Mohammed falling into trances on the mountain above Mecca, Dante in the sylvan solitudes of Fonte Avelana, Cervantes and Bunyan in the enforced seclusion of a prison, Hegel so wrapt and lost in his speculations that, taking his manuscripts to the publisher in Jena on the day of the great battle, he was surprised to see French soldiers in the streets; these are types of the men and conditions which give birth to thoughts that occupy succeeding generations: and what is true of these greatest men is perhaps even more true of men of the next rank. Doubtless many great works have been produced among inauspicious surroundings, and even under severe pressure of time; but it will, I think, be almost invariably found that the producer had formed his ideas or conceived his creations in hours of comparative tranquillity, and had turned on

them the full stream of his powers to the exclusion of whatever could break or divert its force.

In Europe men call this a century of unrest. But the United States is more unrestful than Europe, more unrestful than any country we know of has yet been. Nearly every one is busy; those few who have not to earn their living and do not feel called to serve their countrymen, find themselves out of place, and have been wont either to make amusement into a business or to transfer themselves to the ease of France or Italy. The earning of one's living is not, indeed, incompatible with intellectually creative work, for many of those who have done such work best have done it in addition to their gainful occupation, or have earned their living by it. But in America it is unusually hard for anyone to withdraw his mind from the endless variety of external impressions and interests which daily life presents, and which impinge upon the mind, I will not say to vex it, but to keep it constantly vibrating to their touch. Life is that of the squirrel in his revolving cage, never still even when it does not seem to change. It becomes every day more and more so in England, and English literature and art show increasing marks of haste. In the United States the ceaseless stir and movement, the constant presence of newspapers, the eagerness which looks through every pair of eyes, even that active intelligence and sense of public duty, strongest in the best minds, which make a citizen feel that he ought to know what is passing in the wider world as well as in his own, all these render life more exciting to the average man than it is in Europe; but chase away from it the opportunities for repose and meditation which art and philosophy need, as growing plants need the coolness and darkness of night no less than the blaze of day. The type of mind which American conditions have evolved is quick, vigorous, practical, versatile; but it is unfavorable to the natural germination and slow ripening of large and luminous ideas; it wants the patience that will spend weeks or months on bringing details to an exquisite perfection. And accordingly we see that the most rich and finished literary work America has given us has proceeded from the older re-

gions of the country, where the pulsations of life are slower and steadier than in the West or in the great commercial cities. It is from New England that nearly all the best books of the last generation came; and that not solely because the English race has been purest there, and education most generally diffused, for the New Englanders who have gone West, though they have carried with them their moral standard and their bright intelligence, seem either to have left behind their gift for literary creation, or to care to employ it only in teaching and in journalism.

It may be objected to this view that some of the great literary ages, such as the Periclean age at Athens, the Medicean age at Florence, the age of Elizabeth in England, have been ages full of movement and excitement. But the unrestfulness which prevails in America is altogether different from the large variety of life, the flow of stimulating ideas and impressions which marked those ages. Life is not as interesting in America, except as regards commercial speculation, as it is in Europe; because society and the environment of man are too uniform. It is hurried and bustling; it is filled with a multitude of duties and occupations and transient impressions. In the ages I have referred to men had time enough for all there was to do, and the very scantiness of literature and rarity of news made that which was read and received tell more powerfully upon the imagination.

Nor is it only the distractions of American life that clog the wings of invention. The atmosphere is overfull of all that pertains to material progress. Americans themselves say, when excusing the comparative poverty of learning and science, that their chief occupation is at present the subjugation of their continent, that it is an occupation large enough to demand most of the energy and ambition of the nation, but that presently, when this work is done, the same energy and ambition will win similar triumphs in the fields of abstract thought, while the gifts which now make them the first nation in the world for practical inventions, will then assure to them a like place in scientific discovery. There is evidently much truth in this. The attractions of prac-

tical life are so great to men conscious of their own vigor, the development of the West and the vast operations of commerce and finance which have accompanied that development have absorbed so many strenuous talents, that the supply of ability available not only for pure science (apart from its applications) and for philosophical and historical studies, but even for statesmanship, has been proportionately reduced. But, besides this withdrawal of an unusually large part of the nation's force, the predominance of material and practical interests has turned men's thoughts and conversation into a channel unfavorable to the growth of the higher and more solid kinds of literature, perhaps still more unfavorable to art. Goethe said, *apropos* of the good work produced by such men as Ampère and Merimée at a very early age, "If a talent is to be speedily and happily developed the chief point is that a great deal of intellect and sound culture should be current in a nation." There is certainly a great deal of intellect current in the United States. But it is chiefly directed to business, that is, to railways, to finance, to commerce, to inventions, to manufactures (as well as to practical professions like law), things which play a relatively larger part than in Europe, as subjects of universal attention and discussion. There is abundance of sound culture, but it is so scattered about in divers places and among small groups which seldom meet one another, that no large cultured society has arisen similar to that of European capitals or to that which her universities have created for Germany. In Boston twenty years ago a host could have brought together round his table nine men as interesting and cultivated as Paris or London would have furnished. But a similar party of eighteen could not have been collected, nor perhaps even the nine, anywhere except in Boston. At present, culture is more diffused: there are many cities where men of high attainments and keen intellectual interests are found, and associate themselves in literary or scientific clubs. Societies for the study of particular authors are not uncommon among women. I remember to have been told of a Homer club and an Æschylus club, formed by the ladies of St. Louis, and of a Dante club in some Eastern city. Nevertheless a young talent gains

less than it would gain in Europe from the surroundings into which it is born. The atmosphere is not charged with ideas as in Germany, nor with critical *finesse* as in France. Stimulative it is, but the stimulus drives eager youth away from the groves of the Muses into the struggling throng of the marketplace.

It may be thought fanciful to add that in a new country one whole set of objects which appeal to the imagination are absent, —no castles gray with age; no solemn cathedrals whose altering styles of architecture carry the mind up or down the long stream of history from the eleventh to the seventeenth century; few spots or edifices consecrated by memories of famous men or deeds, and among these none of remote date. There is certainly no want of interest in those few spots: the warmth with which Americans cherish them puts to shame the indifference of the English Parliament to the historic and prehistoric sites and buildings of Britain. But not one American youth in a thousand comes under the spell of any such associations. In the city or State where he lives there is nothing to call him away from the present. All he sees is new, and has no glories to set before him save those of accumulated wealth and industry skillfully applied to severely practical ends.

Some one may say that if (as was observed in last chapter) English and American literature are practically one, there is no need to explain the fact that one part of a race undivided for literary purposes leaves the bulk of literary production to be done by the other part, seeing that it can enter freely into the labors of the latter and reckon them its own. To argue thus would be to push the doctrine of the unity of the two branches rather too far, for after all there is much in American conditions and life which needs its special literary and artistic interpretations; and the question would still confront us, why the transatlantic branch, nowise inferior in mental force, contributes less than its share to the common stock. Still it is certainly true that the existence of a great body of producers, in England of literature, as in France of pictures, diminishes the need for production in America. Or to put the same thing in another way,

if the Americans did not speak English they would evidently feel called on to create more high literature for themselves. Many books which America might produce are not produced because the men qualified to write them know that there are already English books on the same subject; and the higher such men's standard is, the more apt are they to overrate the advantages which English authors enjoy as compared with themselves. Many feelings and ideas which now find adequate expression through the English books which Americans read would then have to be expressed through American books, and their literature would be not only more individual, but more copious and energetic. If it lost in breadth, it would gain in freshness and independence. American authors conceive that even the non-recognition of international copyright has told for evil on their profession. Since the native writer has been undersold by reprints of English and French books, which, paying nothing to the European author, can be published at the cost of the paper and printing only, native authorship is discouraged, native talent diverted into other fields, while at the same time the intellectual standard of the public is lowered and its taste vulgarized. It might be thought that the profusion of cheap reprints would tend to quicken thought and diffuse the higher kinds of knowledge among the masses. But experience proves that by far the largest part of these reprints, and the part which is most extensively read, are novels, and among them many flimsy novels, which drive better books, including some of the vast American fiction, out of the market, and tend to Europeanize the American mind in the worst way. One may smile at the suggestion that the allegiance of the working classes to their democratic institutions will be seduced by descriptions of English duchesses;¹ yet it is probably true—eminent observers assure one of it—that the profusion of new frothy or highly spiced fiction offered at fivepence or tenpence a volume tends to spoil the popular palate for the enjoyment of more wholesome and nutritious food. And if it injures the higher literature by diminishing the demand, it may further

¹I have seen this argument advanced. [Author's note.]

injure it by creating an atmosphere unfavorable to the growth of pure and earnest native literary talent.

What then of the newspapers? The newspapers are too large a subject for this chapter, and their influence as organs of opinion has been already discussed. The vigor and brightness of many among them are surprising. Nothing escapes them: everything is set in the sharpest, clearest light. Their want of reticence and delicacy is regretfully admitted by all educated Americans—the editors, I think, included. The cause of this deficiency is probably to be found in the fact that, whereas the first European journals were written for the polite world of large cities, American journals were, early in their career, if not at its very beginning, written for the bulk of the people, and published in communities still so small that everybody's concerns were already pretty well known to everybody else. They had attained no high level of literary excellence when some forty years ago an enterprising man of unrefined taste created a new type of "live" newspaper, which made a rapid success by its smartness, copiousness, and variety, while addressing itself entirely to the multitude. Other papers were almost forced to shape themselves on the same lines, because the class which desired something more choice was still relatively small; and now the journals of the chief cities have become such vast commercial concerns that they still think first of the mass and are controlled by its tastes, which they have themselves done so much to create. There are cities where the more refined readers who dislike flippant personalities are counted by tens of thousands, but in such cities competition is now too severe to hold out much prospect of success to a paper which does not expect the support of hundreds of thousands. It is not, however, with the esthetic or moral view of the newspaper that we are here concerned, but with the effect on the national mind of the enormous ratio which the reading of newspapers bears to all other reading, a ratio higher than even in France or England. A famous Englishman, himself a powerful and fertile thinker, contrasted the value of the history of Thucydides with that of a single number of the *Times* newspaper, greatly to the advan-

tage of the latter. Others may conceive that a thoughtful study of Thucydides, or, not to go beyond our own tongue, of Bacon, Milton, Locke, or Burke, perhaps even of Gibbon, Grote, or Macaulay, will do more to give keenness to the eye and strength to the wings of the mind than a whole year's reading of the best daily newspaper. It is not merely that the matter is of more permanent and intrinsic worth, nor that the manner and style form the student's taste; it is not merely that in the newspaper we are in contact with persons like ourselves, in the other case with rare and splendid intellects. The whole attitude of the reader is different. His attention is loose, his mind unbraced, so that he does not stop to scrutinize an argument, and forgets even valuable facts as quickly as he has learned them. If he read Burke as he reads the newspaper, Burke would do him little good. And therefore the habit of mind produced by a diet largely composed of newspapers is adverse to solid thinking and dulling to the sense of beauty. Scorched and stony is the soil which newspaper reading has prepared to receive the seeds of genius.

Does the modern world really gain, so far as creative thought is concerned, by the profusion of cheap literature? It is a question one often asks in watching the passengers on an American railway. A boy walks up and down the car scattering newspapers and books in paper covers right and left as he goes. The newspapers are glanced at, though probably most people have read several of the day's papers already. The books are nearly all novels. They are not bad in tone, and sometimes they give incidentally a superficial knowledge of things outside the personal experience of the reader; while from their newspapers the passengers draw a stock of information far beyond that of a European peasant, or even of an average European artisan. Yet one feels that this constant succession of transient ideas, none of them impressively though many of them startlingly stated, all of them flitting swiftly past the mental sight as the trees flit past the eyes when one looks out of the car window, is no more favorable to the development of serious intellectual interests and creative intellectual power than is the limited knowledge of the European artisan.

Most of the reasons I have hazarded to account for a phenomenon surprising to one who recognizes the quantity of intellect current in America, and the diffusion, far more general than in any other country, of intellectual curiosity, are reasons valid in the Europe of to-day as compared with the Europe of last century, and still more true of the modern world as compared with the best periods of the ancient. Printing is by no means a pure gain to the creative faculties, whatever it may be to the acquisitive; even as a great ancient thinker seems to have thought that the invention of writing in Egypt had weakened the reflective powers of man. The question follows, Are these causes, supposing them to be true causes, likely to be more or less operative in the America of next century than they now are? Will America become more what Europe is now, or will she be even more American?

I have elsewhere thrown out some conjectures on this point. Meantime it is pertinent to ask what are the most recent developments of American thought and research, for this will help us to see whether the tide of productive endeavor is rising or falling.

The abundant and excellent work done in fiction need be mentioned only for the sake of calling attention to the interest it has, over and above its artistic merit, as a record of the local manners and usages and types of character in various parts of the Union—types which are fast disappearing. The Creoles of Louisiana, the negroes under slavery, with African tales still surviving in their memories, the rough but kindly backwoodsmen of Indiana forty years ago, the humors of the Mississippi steamboat and the adventurous life of the Far West, are all known to Europe through the tales of writers now living, as the Indians of eighty years ago became known through the romances of Fenimore Cooper. However, this is familiar ground to European readers, so I pass to work of a less generally attractive order.

Thirty years ago the standard of classical scholarship was low, and even the school commentaries on classical authors fell far short of those produced in Germany or England. Nowadays

both in classical and in Oriental philology admirably thorough and painstaking work is produced. I have heard high European authorities observe that there is an almost excessive anxiety among American scholars to master all that has been written, even by third-rate Germans, and that the desire they evince to overtake Germany in respect of knowledge betrays some among them into the German fault of neglecting merits of form and style. In the sciences of nature, especially in those of observation, remarkable advances have been made. Dr. Asa Gray, whom the eldest American university has lately lost, was one of the two or three greatest botanists of his age. Much excellent work has been done in geology and paleontology, particularly in exploring the Rocky Mountain regions. Both for the excellence of their instruments and the accuracy of their observations, the astronomers stand in the front rank; nor do they fall behind Europe in the theoretical part of this science. In some branches of physics and chemistry, such as spectrum analysis, American investigators have won like fame. Competent authorities award the highest praise to their recent contributions to biology and to medical science. In economics they seem to stand before either England or France, both as regards the extent to which the subject is studied in universities and as regards the number of eminent persons whom it occupies. In jurisprudence and law, American text-books are quite as good as those produced in England;¹ and one author, the late Mr. Justice Story, deserves, looking to the quantity as well as to the quality of his work, to be placed at the head of all who have handled these topics in the English tongue during the last sixty years. Political science has begun to be studied more energetically than in England, where, to be sure, it is scarcely studied at all; and every year sees treatises and articles of permanent value added to the scanty modern literature which our language possesses on this subject. Similarly there is great activity in the field of both secular and ecclesiastical history, though as the work done has largely taken the direction of inquiries into the early history of institutions,

¹ The number of legal journals and magazines in the United States is very much larger than in England, and the average level of workmanship in them seems to be higher. [Author's note.]

and has altogether been more in the nature of research than of treatises attractive to the general public, its quantity and its merits have not yet been duly appreciated even at home, much less in Europe. Indeed, it is remarkable how far from showy and sensational is the bulk of the work now done in America. It is mostly work of the German type, solid, careful, exact, not at all the sort of work which theorists about democracy would have looked for, since it appeals rather to the learned few than to the so-called general reader. One receives the impression that the class of intellectual workers, who until recently wanted institutions in which the highest and fullest training could be had, have now become sensible that their country, occupied in developing its resources and educating its ordinary citizens, had fallen behind Europe in learning and science, and that they are therefore the more eager to accumulate knowledge and spend their energy in minutely laborious special studies.¹

I may be reminded that neither in the departments above mentioned nor in statesmanship can one point to many brilliant personalities. The men whose names rise to the lips of a European are all advanced in life. Perhaps this is true of Europe also; perhaps the world has entered on an age of mediocrities. Some one lately said that there was now nobody in Paris, Berlin, or London under sixty years of age whom one would cross the street to look at. If this be so, it is not merely because length of years has given better chances of winning fame, for nearly all the men now famous in Europe had won fame before they were forty. There have been periods in history when striking figures were lacking, although great events seem to call for them. As regards America, if there be few persons of exceptional gifts, it is significant that the number of those who are engaged in scientific work, whether in the investigation of nature or in the moral, political, and historical sciences, is larger, relatively to the population of the country, than it was thirty years ago, the methods better, the work done more solid, the spirit more earnest and eager. Nothing more strikes a

¹ The extreme pains taken in America to provide every library with a classified catalogue directing readers to the books on each subject, seem to illustrate this tendency. [Author's note.]

stranger who visits the American universities than the ardor with which the younger generation has thrown itself into study, even kinds of study which will never win the applause of the multitude. There is more zeal and heartiness among these men, more freshness of mind, more love of learning for its own sake, more willingness to forego the chances of fame and wealth for the sake of adding to the stock of human knowledge, than is to be found to-day in Oxford or Cambridge, or in the universities of Scotland. One is reminded of the scholars of the Renaissance flinging themselves into the study of rediscovered philology, or of the German universities after the War of Liberation. And under the impressions formed in mingling with such men, one learns to agree with the conviction of the Americans that for a nation so abounding in fervid force there is reserved a fruitful career in science and letters, no less than in whatever makes material prosperity.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Is Bryce fair in his statement of the chief intellectual features of the mass of people in the United States?
2. Can these tendencies be observed in the students of your college?
3. Compare the notable intellectual achievements of the United States with those of some other modern nations. It may be well to narrow this topic to some particular field of intellectual endeavor, literature, science, etc.
4. Review some of the periods of great intellectual brilliancy in the world's history with a view to ascertaining the conditions that produced them.
5. What hindrances to creative intellectual work exist in the United States?
6. What are the advantages and the disadvantages of cheap literature?
7. Instance some cases, in other fields than this of intellectual endeavor, where the influence of the democratic system of government has been exaggerated.

ATHLETICS AND RECREATION

INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ¹

IRA NELSON HOLLIS

[Ira Nelson Hollis (1856—) is president of Worcester Polytechnic Institute. He is an authority in the field of naval construction, and was for many years professor of engineering in Harvard University. He has always been greatly interested in college athletics.]

One of the aspects of American life that must impress every foreigner visiting this country for the first time is the attention given to outdoor sports. Athletic meetings and sporting events are regularly reported in the daily newspapers with a wealth of detail exceeding any other single department of news. The rivalry among cities, clubs, and schools is so keen that our main interest outside of business hours seems to be in some form of physical contest. Organized outdoor sports are recent developments which have begun within the memory of men still young. They seem at first glance like a sudden reaction against former neglect of the body, but they are more logically a development of physical exercise into a newer and more artificial form, and under changed conditions.

Up to the close of the Civil War the need of physical training was not felt, and the stimulus to an outdoor life was supplied by the continual exploration of new country. All life was practically out of doors. Our people were scattered over a wide domain, and the centers of population were small. The great West to be explored and settled easily turned the thoughts

¹ Reprinted by permission of the author and the editor from *The Atlantic Monthly*, volume 90, page 534 (October, 1902).

of a young man to his rifle, and to the adventures to be found in the forest. Sport was a child's occupation by the side of the great game that he played.

Colleges suffered from the effect of this drain of men of strength and initiative, who were more likely to turn away from books to seek their careers in the opening up of new territory and in the business connected with developing natural resources. The improvement in physical appearance of college boys generally is often ascribed to the physical training which is now common; but it might with as good reason be ascribed to the large infusion of the stronger type. The pale student no longer holds a monopoly in education. He is still with us, surrounded by so many of his sturdy companions that he is no longer typical of college life. The disappearance of the backwoods and the growth of large centers of population have thus created the demand for an artificial outlet; and the games are the natural successors of the youthful activities of a pioneer period. For boys in a large city far removed from open country organized play is almost a necessity.

What a foreigner would observe of the intensity of sports is only one manifestation of the spirit which American people now put into everything. The commercial growth of the past twenty years is probably equal to that of all the preceding years since the discovery of the continent. The energies of the entire nation have been turned into channels of trade and pleasure, and we are passing through a period of surprise and readjustments calculated to upset the nerves of any people. Many arts are being revolutionized. A machine has no time in the United States to wear out, before it is superseded by something thought to be better, and we are constantly hearing of inventions that will wipe out entire industries. Our sudden leap into prominence as a commercial power has affected us like the discovery of a vast gold mine. The majority are engaged in the struggle for wealth, and most things are judged from a material standpoint. This condition was inevitable from the first, and it constitutes only a phase of American development which will pass away as the novelty wears off.

If in the craze for winning our sports exhibit the spirit and method of trade, it is because boys cannot escape from their environment into an atmosphere more ideal. The only place where we can hope to maintain the higher motive is in colleges and schools. There the young men are collectively under better control, and they are for a season removed from the competition of the outside world. Athletic sports have obtained a strong hold upon them, and the public is entirely familiar with the large number of games among students of different universities and colleges. Much has been said against the contests, and the opinion that they have been allowed to go too far is quite common. In discussing this subject, let us remember that boys and girls will carry to school the impulses and habits learned at home, and that society at large shares the responsibility for degraded sports. Youth is the natural time for play, and it is well to provide some wholesome method of working off superfluous animal spirits. Physical contests are probably the best; at any rate they are far ahead of billiards and horse-play. If, then, disagreeable extremes often spring from them, it does not follow that the ultimate result is not the best that could be attained in the present state of society.

While universities and colleges have become natural centers for athletic contests, scholarship has seemed to lose its proper perspective. The appearance of thirty thousand people to see a football game, and the disappearance of all students from their classrooms during an entire day, would have filled a professor of the old school with despair. He would have looked upon it much as the general public now regard a prize fight or a bull fight. Many professors hold this view to-day, and a very respectable vote could be obtained in most college faculties against the severer forms of intercollegiate contests. It is not intended to imply that teachers are opposed to outdoor sports; but rather to some of the practices that seem to follow in their train. There are evils, and for the good of American students they ought to be stated without reserve. At the same time the subject should be approached without prejudice, as the adequate

treatment of the physical side of college life is perhaps one of the most important questions now before educators.

The old idea of education was that a youth could obtain all the benefits of a college training from books. The value of a sound body was recognized in theory, but in practice no systematic method of obtaining it seemed to be thought necessary. A college simply represented study and books. Education, crystallized along conventional lines, was confined mainly to men entering the professions of law, medicine, and divinity. Now all this is changed. The modern college is obliged to take into account the demands of commerce, and the applications of science to the well-being of man. Many of the professions now require the higher education as a foundation, and the majority of subjects taught have been placed on college catalogues within a few years. The dominating note underlying courses of study for undergraduate students is, before all else, the production of enlightened citizens. Physical vigor has therefore acquired a practical significance which it never had before. It is fast becoming as much a man's duty to take proper care of his body as it is to cultivate his reason. Most colleges have been forced to provide the opportunity for some kind of physical training.

The systematic culture of the body began in this country in a very small way, but its growth has been most rapid. Gymnasiums, such as are now resorted to by many young people, fill a highly useful function. Unfortunately many colleges and universities lose a large part of the benefit accruing from them. Usually there is no recognition of the work done. Competent instructors are provided, and every opportunity is given to the students to benefit by their teaching, but everything is voluntary. Physical excellence does not in any way affect a student's standing or help him to get his degree. This is a serious handicap to a gymnasium, as the exercises indoors are at best extremely monotonous and dull. It is only natural that a young man should want credit in the shape of marks, as for a course of studies, when he has spent several hours a week during an entire year in manipulating weights for the good of his body.

Failing these or any other inducement in the gymnasium, he turns to outdoor sports, wherein success yields an immediate return in the applause of his classmates and friends. This is where college faculties have been slow to recognize their opportunities and duties.

Outdoor sports were for many years left to regulate themselves in the hands of students without experience of life to guide them, and often under the influence of irresponsible persons to whom college contests represented nothing more than the excitement to be found in a horse race or a professional baseball game. It was not sport for sport's sake, but sport for the sake of beating somebody by fair means, or by political intrigue. The inevitable result was an intolerable condition which had to come under the correction of faculties whether they liked to take the time from their lectures or not. Their interference was resented at first by students and athletic graduates, and mutual confidence was practically destroyed. The difficulty was how to improve the contests without entirely prohibiting them. The enthusiastic promoters of the sports were rarely good advisers, and for some years college professors worked alone on a most troublesome problem. The prevailing notion that they belonged to a class living in the clouds did not increase respect for their opinions even when governed by reason and sound sense. In consequence progress has been slow. The spirit of sport is certainly much better as the newness has worn off, but much remains to be done. The first step was to make rules for the guidance of students in their intercollegiate relations. Committees were necessary to that end, and as a rule representatives of the student body were called into consultation. In most colleges these committees have remained to regulate the sports and to safeguard them against bad practices in the future. The rules commonly in force are similar in spirit, if not in substance, throughout the college world. They are simply records of experience relating to past abuses, as they have invariably been framed to cure some evil or to promote fairness.

There are only three rules that require comment here. The

first and most difficult of administration is in the nature of a definition of professionalism. The intention of this rule is to disqualify from participation in college sports all men who have received a money benefit or its equivalent by reason of their previous connection with athletics. It would be foolish to treat this as a moral question, although it does affect the honor of a team. The distinction between an amateur and a professional is one purely in the interest of sport, because the latter has presumably made more or less of an occupation of athletics, and therefore outclasses the former. Hence the contest wherein professionals are set against amateurs is unequal if the facts are known; unfair, if the facts are concealed. In either case the result is bad. A spirit of retaliation, absolutely fatal to friendly contests, is introduced. The rule was made at a time when abuses were common, and some of its provisions now seem too sweeping. The technicalities that arise are often absurd, yet the distinction between the two kinds of players had to be drawn, and the line was not a clear one under the best of circumstances. On the whole, the rule has promoted honorable dealing between college boys, and its influence in the preparatory schools has been far reaching. It should not be modified in spirit except for very weighty reasons, although a greater latitude in its interpretation might be allowed to committees.

There is no doubt that college boys often dishonor themselves consciously or unconsciously by concealing facts in relation to their standing as amateurs. Even older men are sometimes willing to degrade sports by deception. A letter was received at Harvard several years ago, informing the Athletic Committee that the services of a well-known athlete could be secured as coach, if he could be paid a stated sum in such a way that no evidence could be found against his amateur standing. The most common lapses among students occur in the summer in connection with baseball. Some of the men undoubtedly play on hotel and summer resort nines for a substantial gain. They know that they are cheapening themselves, but the practice continues with the concealment of the actual facts. There are various methods of receiving financial benefit without violating

the letter of the athletic rules. One of these is exhibited in a letter, by no means unique, received last spring by a first-rate college ball player. A few extracts are given below:

“I write to ask if you know of a first-class pitcher that can be obtained for the summer, to pitch on the —— team of the —— —— League, a team that will be made up entirely of fast college players. Such a pitcher would be used most liberally here,—in fact, he could have almost anything he wanted, and he would be protected in the matter of privacy concerning any arrangement made. This is the best summer town on the coast, and clean baseball players will be taken into the best society here. Our players will come from ——, ——, ——, and other colleges. It is possible that you may know of one or two good men on the Harvard team who would like such an outing, which will cost them nothing from the time they leave home until they return there. If so, I shall consider it a great favor if you will write me about them. We must have a corking team this year and stand willing to plunge on a pitcher. The right man will find seventy-five monthly in his jeans, and he can wonder as much as he likes how it got there. Couldn't you be induced to visit some friends who will be provided for you down this way?”

Another rule requires all members of athletic teams to be genuine students of the college which they represent, and to be satisfactory in their studies. A student who is not promoted every year to a higher class, or is on probation for neglect of studies, is not allowed to play on any team. It does not follow from this that athletes as a class are good students. The eager desire to play acts as a spur to many otherwise dull men, and some of them have been thus goaded into mental activity. The games are powerful incentives to some boys, and can be depended upon to keep them straight. In this respect their advantage to mental and physical discipline cannot be denied. Statistics on the scholarship of athletes are not conclusive. Allowance is rarely made for the fact that young men in bad standing are carefully weeded out of the teams, and that therefore comparison with all other students is unfair. It does not stand to reason

that a student in intercollegiate athletics can do as much work as one who devotes all his time to study. The athletic season of football, for example, lasts six weeks in the fall, and, so far as classroom work is concerned, the time is practically thrown away. The members of the team attend lectures regularly, they are obliged to; but their minds are on signals and plays for the next game or practice. As a consequence, one-fifth of the year is lost, and the players have to do as much work in the remaining four-fifths as others do in the five-fifths. With average students it will not be done. The physical training which the football men have gone through cannot under favorable circumstances increase their efficiency enough to make good the difference. Then, as a rule, their participation in athletics has made them natural leaders in the social life of the college, and so they lose still more time. The only point that may be regarded as established by the records is that few students admitted to the teams are subsequently thrown off for poor scholarship. This proves that most athletes can usually do enough work to remain satisfactory in their studies. Of late years a good player has lost caste if he permits himself to be disqualified through any fault of his own.

The question of scholarship should not be approached in a narrow spirit. Do students gain anything in athletics that justifies the time taken from their studies? That is the vital consideration. While a definite and convincing answer cannot be given in all cases, it is safe to say that many do. It is a matter of common observation that athletes as a class have more initiative, and know better how to deal with men, than other students, especially when they first graduate. Whether they really hold their own in a long life is another matter. Much depends upon the individual.

A third rule relates to the procurement of good players from other colleges, by social or money inducements. To discourage this practice no ex-player of a college team is allowed to join the team of another college until after he has been enrolled for one entire year. This has removed one cause of complaint, but a real evil nevertheless remains. There is too much solicitation

of boys in the preparatory schools with a view to the strengthening of college teams. Agents are constantly on the lookout for good candidates. Let a boy exhibit any unusual ability as an athlete, and half a dozen colleges will be after him. Inducements are offered in the nature of social advantage or of sinecure positions, which carry with them substantial financial gains. Often good athletes or their friends set a value on their services, and solicit positions. An example of this is shown in the following extract from a letter lately received by the Athletic Committee at Harvard: -

“I should like to call your attention to Mr. —, who is thinking of entering college. We want to place him in some college where his athletic talents will be recognized and will be of use to him.”

Then follows a list of his achievements, with a request to know what the university can do for him. College teams should be made up of men who come to them naturally, and the secondary schoolboys should be freed from all forms of solicitation. They unsettle the judgment of both parents and boys. An extension of the one year rule to include all students from going into the intercollegiate games during their first year in college would be wholesome in its effects.

The three rules mentioned form in the main the backbone of college regulation of athletics. There are other rules intended mainly to keep the contests within bounds, and to promote so far as possible a friendly relation between contestants, but, unhappily, many things cannot be reached by rules. Student tradition and public opinion when rightly directed are of greater value than even regulation, if the players can be made to feel them. Various abuses creep in from an intense desire to win, and every year brings its crop of tricks. One of these is found in coaching a team from outside after the men have gone on the field to play. When eleven young men appear on the football field, it is commonly understood that they are going to win or lose on their merits, and not with the assistance of some one on the side lines. Outside coaching is in this sense entirely wrong, and yet it is often done secretly. In most cases the only

justification pleaded by those guilty of it is that the other side does the same,—just as a corrupt politician would justify buying votes,—and that we have to resort to this method to enable the good to triumph. As a matter of fact, trickery is usually resorted to, not because the other side actually does it, but because some one suspects that the other side is going to do it. In some cases he is wrong, in others he is right. The best that can be said for side line coaching in football, however, is that it belongs to that class of shady practices which lessen the interest in the game.

Intercollegiate athletics seem at times to suffer from a kind of insanity which bids fair to ruin them by destroying the interest of people who like to see fair play. There is no reason why games should not be made to build up character, and to teach patience, grit, and courage; but, unfortunately, winning in these days is put above everything else. This I believe to be a mere fad that we can live down in course of time, for deep in every young man's heart there is a love of fairness which permits him to be led into trickery only under the mistaken idea that it is justified as a last resort. No good business man in America can ever derive satisfaction over success achieved by sharp practice or dishonesty. This is the saving grace of the nation. The principal lessons that rules and tradition can teach are to play the games fairly without whining over the result, and to introduce no element prejudicial to the highest ideal of college life.

There are several claims for intercollegiate sports. First, that they establish the physical vigor necessary to enable the mind to do its most effective work; second, that they stimulate outdoor exercise all over the country; third, that they form an atmosphere of temperance and moderation in living, and thus restrain students from excesses; fourth, that they teach self-control and fairness; fifth, that they bring the graduates and undergraduates of different universities together in bonds of friendship; sixth, that college loyalty is promoted. Let us examine these claims somewhat more in detail.

At present all sports do serve as physical developers to a

number of college students, but not equally. Some are better suited to the purpose than others. A moderate game which does not try the powers to the utmost, and which can be entered by anyone, is undoubtedly beneficial. Others, which involve a tremendous strain on the system and elaborate preparation continued over long periods, are of doubtful benefit. It is the daily exercise extending over years that builds up the physical strength, and keeps a man up to his highest mental powers. Regular sleep and moderate eating are even more important than exercise. For this reason the military schools are vastly superior to the ordinary colleges in the physical setting up of boys. The teams need very little special training at West Point and Annapolis, for the cadets are always in training. They are kept busy during a four years' course in which the body receives as much daily attention as the mind. Every afternoon has its drill, usually out of doors, and every evening finds the cadet in bed by ten o'clock.

The sports most commonly found in colleges are football, baseball, track athletics, ice hockey, lacrosse, basket ball, hand ball, cricket, rowing, tennis, golf, fencing, and swimming. The first six usually end with graduation; the others may be continued through life as opportunity offers. Three of them, football, rowing, and track athletics, demand at times an exhausting strain, which may leave behind it a permanent weakness in some part of the body. Statistics would be difficult to obtain, and the statement should be made with due reservation; nevertheless, it stands to reason that no physical effort that leaves a man in a fainting condition can be of real benefit. All of us have seen men collapse in a boat, or after a hard foot race. It may be that this is generally due to poor preparation for the contest, and that better methods would remove all danger. Rowing and the track games are so improving and satisfactory to a large number of students that they could not be given up without serious loss. Some modification of the length of the course might make rowing less exhausting. Four miles does not seem any better than three miles in testing two crews, and it is usually the fourth mile that does all the damage.

Football stands in a class by itself. It attracts enormous crowds, and is more spectacular than anything else we have ever had in American colleges. This is considered by many to be one of the chief objections to it. In some respects it is superior to any other sport. The combinations, like those in war, are endless, and the same quality of mind is required to work them out. Then, while the element of the unexpected is not lacking, games are seldom won by a fluke. The best equipped team almost always wins. Yet, as at present played, it is doubtful if football ought to have a place on college grounds. The old idea of fun has long since passed away, and although the excitement of a great final contest still remains, the players cannot possibly enjoy the season of drudgery that leads up to it. I have heard students say that they cared little for the ordinary game. One young man told me that he loathed it, and that only the pressure of his friends, and an ambition to share in the glory of a winning team, carried him into it.

There is always the risk of serious injury to the participants. No season passes without many of them being in the doctor's hands for bruises, sprains, and broken or displaced bones. Frequently in the heavier games players have to be carried off the field sometimes unconscious. Often in stopping a play, the side on the defensive take chances with their own lives and with those of their opponents, justified only in certain professions like fire protection, life-saving, sea-faring, and railroading. Another aspect of the game is that foul play cannot well be detected by an umpire, and, worse still, it often pays.

It is a fact that modern life demands courage, and that football develops it; nevertheless it is foolish to risk life and limb in a game because it teaches physical courage. There are so many ways of learning courage, which is most often a matter of temperament, that we may well look around for some less dangerous method, unless the roughness of the game can be regulated out of it. This is by no means impossible. The steady improvement in spirit and the great reduction in the number of injuries promise much for the future. It is only fair to add that the advocates of the game seem to be fully

warranted in claiming that injuries indicate lack of skill, and that proper training teaches a boy how to take care of himself on the field. The attitude assumed by most colleges that the game has merits which entitle it to further trial is perhaps justifiable; at any rate, it is the most practical. There is a mistaken idea that football is peculiarly fitted to train men for military service, and there is absolutely no evidence to justify it. Quick decision, courage, and ready resource are often called out in a game as in a campaign; but there is much more demanded of a good soldier. The monotonous and regular performance of duty in the long delays between battles, and in the many years that happily intervene between wars, tests a man's moral fiber more than the charge across a bloody field. The bulk of a soldier's or of a sailor's work lies in the preparation for the thing he may be called upon to do, while the principal work of a team, and that for which they entered college, is neglected during the six weeks of the season. This is the proper point of view in considering the value of a training for war. As to the moral courage which is more frequently the badge of good citizenship than physical courage, that is about evenly distributed throughout the student body, with perhaps a slight advantage to the young man who is working hard for his education.

It is difficult to make a clear case for intercollegiate athletics as a stimulus to outdoor sports. We may be confusing cause and effect, and it may be the craving for an outdoor life which has stimulated college sport. Without doubt, the great intercollegiate games do appeal to the imagination of all small boys, and lead them away from mischief to baseball, football, and the track games. In this respect they are of unqualified good to every community. We see hundreds of boys at their games today where we saw only tens a generation ago.

One of the chief objections to intercollegiate games is that at present they require only a handful of specially qualified men on the big teams, with a very large number of unqualified men sitting on the bleachers to watch them. Now, it is the latter class that most need physical training and that waste much

of their time in college. With the present rage for victory at almost any cost, sports cease to be all round developers, and teams are necessarily made up by a weeding process which pays little attention to any who are not physically able to stand the strain of a hard season. The sports cannot, therefore, be considered in a thoroughly healthy condition. Intercollegiate games ought to be the result of a great deal of competition wholly within each university, where every student should be encouraged to go out on the field an hour every day.

No one can associate with the athletes of our large universities without being struck with their general temperance and moderation. They commonly talk more about their sports than their studies, and they are sometimes too demonstrative; but in the essential things that go to make men of good physique they establish the fashion at college. In this respect alone, outdoor sports and intercollegiate games offset much of the trouble they cause. The presence of a large number of young men who are in training and who keep themselves in good condition has a wholesome effect upon every entering class. The practical disappearance of hazing may be fairly credited to athletics as much as to faculty regulation. The upper class men would find it difficult to haze a possible candidate for a team. Another consideration is the atmosphere of democratic equality that prevails on the athletic field.

That college sports promote self-control and fairness is quite evident in spite of occasional lapses. There has been a steady improvement in the spirit of the college youth during the past twenty years. After all it is only by experience in the actual conduct of affairs, such as those relating to sports, that young men learn fairness. The majority of them go to college unformed, with experience only in what is proper in the home circle, but with no adequate notion of what is due to their fellow beings in the world at large. From this spring many of the errors into which they fall. A freshman often violates the spirit of ordinary courtesy and fairness in his sports, not because he is bad, but simply because he has never come into contact with other men in such a way as to show him what is really

square. The games exert a very wholesome influence in this respect. The cheerfulness with which the average student will suffer a penalty in a game, or will accept exclusion from a game, is proof that athletics teach self-control. When a young man says that he "did not make the team," that is the whole story. There is very little whining about unfairness in the selection of a team or about the one-sidedness of the coach and captain. It usually comes down to the statement, "I was not good enough to make it." This kind of education is unqualifiedly good. Team play which means that the individual must give way to the needs of the society in which he is placed is a valuable antidote to the spirit of the age,—individual success at almost any cost.

One feature of the games is particularly disagreeable to anyone not interested in either side. That is the organized cheering. The home team always has the advantage, if there is any, as their friends are most numerous represented on the seats, and are well prepared to assist them by shouting at critical moments. They always cheer the good plays of their own side, and often the mistakes of the opposing side. Nothing could be more discourteous or unfair to visitors, and yet it seems impossible to make students understand this. The call that is regularly issued, "Come out and help the team," carries with it the implication that they are willing to win by shouting and playing against a team that can only play. The amusing side of this is that students always complain of the organized attempt to rattle their own men when visiting other universities. There is no possible objection to the cheers that spring naturally to a young man's lips over a good play, and enthusiasm is a beautiful sight in a crowd of boys; but let the whole thing be natural and not pumped up.

The friendships and memories associated with one's college days become increasingly attractive as the years pass. A boy of fine temper and strong sympathy is always an influence, and there is no place where his true qualities may be discovered as they can be in a team. It is doubtful, however, if games between two teams ameliorate college courtesies in any great

degree. There is at present a prevailing atmosphere of suspicion, and colleges are too often set at odds with one another by a game. This extends to the graduates and sometimes even to the faculties, and it is shocking to hear what one university will say about another when there is a difference of opinion upon some eligibility question. The newspapers are full of it. As a matter of fact, one athletic dispute can destroy for years the good will of two otherwise friendly colleges. We see so many cases of it that we may be pardoned some skepticism on the promotion of intercollegiate friendship by intercollegiate games. When students and officers of one university point the finger of scorn at those of another, we may usually be sure that both are wrong, and that their games should be suppressed as common nuisances. We still have much to learn, and the effort to study the subject in conference of representatives from all universities is a movement in the right direction.

The loyalty of college men is without doubt quickened by regular return to the alma mater to see the chief games; but it is not unfair to charge it with being the shouting kind of loyalty which does not yield adequate return. The great gifts to the universities rarely come from men who have been athletes, and not seldom from men who have never been to college. In some institutions, athletic teams are encouraged and intercollegiate contests are deliberately promoted for advertising purposes. It is doubtful if the resulting gains are of solid advantage. The real value of the athletic system in stimulating loyalty and in fostering the growth of a college is not yet fully tested. It has been in effective operation less than a generation, and ex-members of teams have not had time to earn great wealth. Of the good will of the graduated athlete there is no possible doubt. He always holds his college in affectionate remembrance. He will work for it, and beg for it, but he would not claim to be alone in this.

One aspect of athletics which stands apart from the merits of the games is the large sum of money necessary to run them. At one university, for instance, the expenditure on the teams

was over fifty thousand dollars. This seems unduly large, but when we divide the total outlay for all teams by the number of boys who appeared upon the fields, the amount for each one does not appear so out of proportion. There were about two thousand men in rowing, baseball, football, track athletics, tennis, and many other minor sports, and the annual expense was about twenty-five dollars per student. Of course this does not represent the whole case, as most of the money was used to pay the expenses of the university football, baseball, track, and rowing teams on which only a small percentage of the students actually played. There are undoubtedly great wastefulness and extravagance where undergraduates are entrusted with the management of the finances. They have not had the experience to safeguard them against loss. A graduate treasurer, or manager, is an absolutely necessary part of the administration. Under the best of conditions, a large part of the income from the sale of tickets for the games goes into expenses that would have been thought wholly unnecessary twenty years ago. The training and equipment for a game are immeasurably more expensive than they were when a young man provided himself with a single garment to use in a boat race, and no trainer was thought of. Nowadays no player is expected to pay any part of the expense beyond what he would have to pay for his board under ordinary circumstances. Everything is provided by the management. This proceeds from two causes: first, the praiseworthy desire to give all students an equal chance for the teams, when otherwise the rich man would have the advantage of the poor one; second, the questionable desire to give every competitor recognition for his participation in athletics. The young man who makes a team usually looks upon himself as one deserving well of his university, just as a man who has fought for his country expects to hear of it. It is essentially the same spirit that creates a large pension appropriation. As a member of a second eleven once said, "I am working faithfully for the university, and I ought to have some recognition." He was arguing that he ought to be sent with the first eleven to a neighboring city, where he could enjoy a vacation

during term time. Not that any of the athletes are paid, but their relation to the management is precisely that of a citizen to the Treasury Department. The money seems to roll in freely, and the average boy does not realize the value of it. This is the real evil of gate money. No student should have his responsibility in money matters destroyed by the undermining and agreeable process of spending unlimited means easily obtained. The correction is found in the graduate treasurer, and in a committee responsible for the collection of money and for the sale of tickets. By holding team captains and undergraduate managers to rules laid down by a committee, and relieving them of all money that comes in, reckless expenditure is at least checked. At the same time, income and expenditure should be reduced by common agreement among colleges.

One of the largest items in the yearly budget is for training, which requires trainers, coaches, physicians, rubbers, and a special diet. The fundamental cause of the employment of doctors is that the men are undergoing preparation for extraordinary effort, and extraordinary risk. The heart has to be examined, and those who develop weakness rejected. Then, too, young men who are nearing the end of a season are said to be "on edge," when the nervous system is on the verge of a breakdown. The services of physicians are most necessary in football.

The trainer is usually a man who supervises the food and the general relation of the students to exercise, very much as a nurse looks after a patient, or as a mother tends a family of children. He is often, especially if good-tempered and straight, a very useful man. On the other hand, if suspicious and jealous of his reputation as a skillful manipulator of muscle, he is likely to set rival teams by the ears, and to exert his influence toward the worst kind of jockeying. He seldom possesses the ideals that should prevail in a college atmosphere. His introduction into sports springs probably from the difficulty of getting practical advice from the doctors. Their experience has usually been with sick men, and with the remedial methods necessary to

cure the sick. When confronted with the problem of taking care of well men, they seem to fail. There is no telling what a man's nerves will do under stress of emergency, and a good judgment of character is generally superior to a knowledge of anatomy. That there is much to be learned, however, is shown by the many disastrous failures of overtrained teams. The best training seems to be in a natural and regular life, with common sense applied to the choice of food, and great temperance in the use of alcohol and tobacco.

Another large item of expense is in traveling between colleges. A number of substitutes and advisers are often carried along, as, for instance, in a recent game requiring eleven men about sixty formed the squad whose traveling expenses were paid by the management. It is like moving a theater troupe. The engagements are made six months ahead, and scheduled games have to be played on the hour, regardless of expense.

How far intercollegiate sports have demonstrated their permanent value as part of a college education is still a matter of opinion. They must be judged in the end by their effect upon character. If they can be made to teach self-control and manliness to a large number of students without a sacrifice of the regular classroom work, they are worth keeping and assisting. The present evidence is, on the whole, favorable, although there is nothing to show that outdoor games wholly within the confines of each university would not accomplish as much. The intercollegiate feature is the main cause of the great publicity and of the numerous disputes.

There is no doubt of the false perspective which on account of this publicity athletics assume in the eyes of every schoolboy. A boy preparing for college once explained the situation to me. "I must learn baseball and football. It doesn't make any difference how poorly I pass the examinations, so long as I get through. That has nothing to do with my career in college. If I can play football I amount to something immediately after I get in. What is the good of the other things, if I don't amount to anything?" This theory of the case will not produce scholars or

enlightened citizens, and it is upon this issue that the case must be worked out.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What should be the true ideal of college athletics in college,—symmetry of development for the many or high muscular proficiency for the few? Which ideal seems to obtain at your institution?
2. Make a classification of the students of your college with reference to the manner of their interest in athletics.
3. What are the advantages and what the drawbacks of the intercollegiate feature of athletics? Would the true end of college athletics be better conserved by abolishing intercollegiate contests and stimulating intra-collegiate contests?
4. Show why it is important that college athletics especially should be kept on a high plane of ideals.
5. Should gymnasium work or other forms of exercise be compulsory? If so, should it be required of all students or only of certain classes?
6. Suggest games and sports other than those now commonly used in colleges which might be introduced as means to more general exercise, and show what advantages such games would offer.
6. Should credit towards graduation be given for such required exercise?
7. Of what nature should the faculty supervision of athletics be? Explain the system in vogue at your institution.
8. What distinction prevails at your college between an amateur and a professional athlete? Is the test a fair one? If not, suggest a better one.
9. Should there be a scholarship requirement for members of college athletic teams?
10. If such a requirement exists at your institution, is it satisfactory?
11. Is it desirable to prohibit Freshmen from playing on college teams?
12. Should college athletics be endowed, thereby doing away with gate money charges for games?

THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF MODERN ATHLETICS ¹

ARLO BATES

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Athletics in school and college have in recent years received so much attention that no one can deny the need of considering their influence in connection with modern education. The subject has been largely discussed, sometimes with enthusiastic admiration, and sometimes with condemnation no less ardent. How much effect this talk has had it is not easy to say. Public opinion is seldom affected directly by argument; and until any popular fashion has run its course words seem to do little in modifying it. The partisan is apt to speak with too much force, the opposition with too great rancor; so that both more often provoke than convince. Argument in favor of the unpopular view is especially ungrateful, and is apt to seem completely ineffectual. Yet the negative side should be presented. This generation prides itself upon being guided rather by reason than by impulse, and it cannot consistently refuse to consider even unpalatable objections.

At a time when the general voice so strongly indorses the present fashion of conducting athletics, I therefore venture to state some possible doubts in regard to the part which sport has come to take in the lives and training of young men. Although my views may not be agreed to, they may at least suggest some fresh thought upon a subject which should be examined with patient and dispassionate attention.

The physical is continually, and, of course, with obvious truth, called the basis of mental growth. One of the doubts which I venture to put forward is whether this fact has not been made to bear more weight than it can fairly support. Few quotations have been more hopelessly over-worked than "*Mens sana in corpore sano.*" The nourishment of the mind by the development of the body was one of the dreams of the idealists at Brook Farm; but Hawthorne drily comments that when the work of the day was finished, these cultivated men, instead of discussing philosophy and poetry, leaned idly on the sty and poked the pigs. That a diseased body will warp the mind is conspicuously shown by the violence of dyspeptic Carlyle, the pessimism of bed-ridden Heine, or the sentimentalism of consumptive Mrs. Browning; yet the intellectual results which

these and others of their kind accomplished, the good that they did to society, will easily endure comparison with the work of most athletes. The line beyond which physical development cannot well go without injury to intellectual growth is probably to be drawn much nearer simple ordinary freedom from ill health than most theorists are willing to allow. The effective intellectual workers of the world thus far certainly seem to have been of no more than ordinary physical endowments or training. It is at least doubtful if bodily culture can be made an end without stunting mental vigor; and in these days we are face to face with the possibility, if not with the certainty, that the physical is being advanced at the risk of injury to intellectual well-being.

The overworked phrase just quoted, "*Mens sana in corpore sano*," seems in modern practice to have come to be translated, somewhat inexactly: "A sound body necessarily makes a sound mind." Life would be greatly simplified if the understanding could be brought to perfection by training the body; but the method suggests that of the mad professor who proposed to teach students all languages by setting them to build a second tower of Babel. The sane mind responds normally and joyously to bodily health; but such is human weakness that it is too prone to go no farther, to satiate itself in the delight of physical content, and to sink into mental inanition which is entirely satisfied to do without intellectual advancement. The enjoyment of sport and of the excitement attending it has under present conditions not only to a large extent taken the place of mental recreation and mental exertion, but it has also so warped the minds of many of the rising generation as to render intellectual pleasure entirely unattractive. The college man of to-day, I believe, has often been turned away from literature and the inner life by a too great zeal for athletics. What is worse, the absorbing fascination of sport has, in some cases at least, seriously crippled even the appreciation of the delight of mental growth.

The constantly growing lack of the power of concentration and of intellectual manliness was the subject recently discussed

by a conference of leading teachers in Boston; and the Principal of the Cambridge High School did not hesitate, if the newspapers report him correctly, to attribute the difficulty in a large measure to athletics. The sentiment is one which I have heard privately expressed by a good many teachers. It is not often said publicly, probably for the reason given by the head of one of the best fitting-schools in New England. "To say anything against athletics in the present craze," he declared, "does no good, and would simply diminish my influence with the boys and their parents; so I hold my tongue."

How general is the sentiment I do not know; but I do know that it is the general experience at the Institute of Technology, with which I have the honor to be connected, that a boy's work suffers if he goes deeply into athletics. The practical, technical work of such an institution demands the first place in the interests of the student, and is not to be glossed over by cramming or forced effort. Such work is in a manner a fair, if a severe, test of the possibility of combining really serious mental discipline with any unusual degree of special physical training. Whatever may be true of an academic education—although I am not able to see why there should be any difference in the principle—a student in a technical school of high grade, in order to attain to success, must not only attend to his studies, but give to them the very first place in his interest. It is my belief, and my experience as far as this goes, that the work done by students deep in athletics, while it may be conscientious, is seldom of the best or the most lasting quality. Exceptions there may be, and I am aware with what vehemence the statement would be denied by the partisans of modern athletics; yet, on the whole, I am convinced that what I have advanced is substantially true.

An incident which happened to me a few years ago will perhaps make more clear what I have in mind. It is one of a number which might be given; but it chances to be particularly apposite. Coming from the West, I shared a section with a well-built, well-dressed young man, apparently between twenty-five and thirty. He had a wholesome, manly face, evident good breeding, and a personality at once attractive. In the middle

of the first forenoon, as we sat opposite, he said without preface: "I beg your pardon, but I should like to ask you a question." "Well?" I responded. "How shall I learn to like to read?" he asked, with a seriousness evidently real. Then, in answer to my look, which probably showed my surprise at such a question from a complete stranger, he added: "I saw your name on your bag. I never read any of your books, but I've seen them on my father's table, and I thought that you might help me."

He went on, in answer to my questions, to tell me his experience. He had been brought up in a cultivated family, and by a father fond of books. In fitting-school and in college he had gone deeply into sports, playing first on the 'varsity baseball nine and later on the eleven. The intoxication of physical exertion and the strong delight in athletic competition—that personal struggle which calls out the most subtle refinements of human vanity—took upon him that hold which they inevitably take upon a normal and manly boy. He stood well in his classes; indeed, he said, in naïve unconsciousness of the scale of relative values he was establishing, it would not have been fair to the team not to stand well in his classes. By little and little the old intellectual life to which he had been bred became cold and tame, and then slipped away from attention altogether. He said in substance:

"Of course, I thought nothing of it at the time; but looking back I see now that we really had nothing in mind but athletics. We talked of the games beforehand, estimated chances, discussed the teams we were to meet—all that sort of thing was necessarily part of it, you know. Then after the games we went over them point by point, and talked of the different men and the newspaper reports. I can see now that I wasn't really alive to anything but athletics all the time I was in college. I couldn't to-day pass an examination on any of the things I stood well in, but I could tell you the details of every game I played. After I graduated, I was sent to a country town to a factory my father owns, and there I'm learning the business. There's no society, and I made up my mind to do a lot of reading. I knew I could never be the sort of man I want to be, the sort of gentleman my father is, without the help of books. I've been at it a couple of years, and I've waded through a lot of first-class things. They only bore me. I really care only for the newspapers, and in those I always read the sporting news first. Then I take a book, and go to sleep over it, and hate myself."

I do not pretend that I have reproduced his words literally; but I am not far from this, because the matter made so strong an impression on me. I have told the incident somewhat at length, because I felt then and I feel now that the case was one typical of a large class. It is typical, too, not only of the effect upon students who are actually on the teams, but to a great extent of the whole college fraternity as far as they are interested in athletics as at present conducted. It shows how it is at least possible for absorption in sport to swallow up higher interests.

The notoriety attending any close connection with sports helps to foster this too great absorption in them, and it has an effect perhaps worse in tending to develop a vulgar appetite for cheap sensationalism. The newspaper gossip, the pictures, and the personal details about members of school and college teams, are about as unwholesome as anything which could come to lads in their student days, and the more so from the fact that these are entirely without relation to any intellectual merit or effect. "Notoriety," Kipling has said, "is a windy diet for a young colt"; and the image, if not overrefined, is shrewdly just. The boy who, as the phrase goes, has been "written up," who has seen his picture shining through a haze of sham glory and smudgy printing in the Sunday newspapers, may by innate manliness and native modesty escape unbearable conceit; but he cannot avoid coming to look with tolerance on the offensive personalities of modern journalism, and he would be rather more than human if he escaped without some distortion of standards.

The English have certainly less excess in this matter than the Americans. An Oxford man said to me last summer: "But, you know, in American colleges the whole feeling about sport is what we consider a professional one": and few would be inclined to deny, I think, that there is more moderation and a better sporting spirit among English than among American undergraduates. Yet the London "Spectator" has declared that the army is going to ruin because its officers are at school spoiled by "the prevalence of what may be called the playing-

fields fallacy," and that nothing can be improved so long as the English parent "puts skill in games far above general intelligence and culture as a qualification for a commission." The London "Times," in a leading article, says that before the public schools can be held qualified to train men to be good officers it must be shown "that the reproach of training boys to care for nothing but sport, and fostering in them no habits of industry, is a malicious libel." If there be any justice in such strictures on the other side of the water, what shall be said of our schools and colleges where athletics are carried so much farther?

The feature which most markedly distinguishes modern athletics from those of the days of our fathers, however, is not the present elaboration, the extravagance with which everything is done, not even the publicity; it is the part which by incitement and by support is taken by adults. The encouragement given to sports by men long out of college, men of affairs and so of standing in the world, is the most peculiar and characteristic of the influences which affect undergraduate athletics. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that this attitude of men of consideration toward college and school sports is at present the influence most effective upon student life, and certainly it is the most important of all outside forces. This seems to me to be the chief cause of whatever in the present condition of things is undesirable.

That the impulse and enthusiasm of youth should be restrained by the cooler judgment of age is perhaps an antiquated notion, but it is none the less a wise one. The inclinations which in boys are entirely natural and wholesome are often those which most need to be restrained and subdued, if a broad and sound development is to result. The natural tendency of the young toward physical enjoyment needs no spur. It should rather be tempered by the broader and deeper perception of those old enough to realize that, while sport must have a part in every well-balanced education, it very easily slips into excess, and consequently into evil.

The attention given to-day by adults to sports has thrown

things out of proportion. Students are likely from natural impulse to give to sport a sufficient emphasis; and the result of present conditions is that young folk inevitably, even if only half-consciously, come to overestimate the value of physical training in education. Sport is the one thing in college life which at the present time awakens enthusiasm outside, and it is impossible that this fact should be without effect. The thousands crowding to an intercollegiate game arouse every fiber in the young and responsive collegian and set him a-tingle with excitement. Nothing connected with the intellectual side of education is reinforced by outside interest in this way. The general public cares so little, for instance, for the intercollegiate debates as hardly to know which side wins. A debate is not an especially seductive form of recreation, but it is the one public event of rivalry between universities on intellectual grounds; and if any genuine interest in this side of college life existed in the people at large, some sign might be expected here. By actions, which are everywhere so much more effective than professions or protestations, the public, and the educated and cultivated portion of the public in particular, say to the undergraduate that athletics are of more consequence than anything else in a college career. It does not seem possible that under such a state of things the student's sense of values can escape distortion.

This distortion of values is fostered, moreover, by the character of modern sports. The claim that they develop pluck and produce a gain in self-control and responsiveness is undoubtedly well founded. No one could for an instant deny the worth of these things: the question at issue is whether they are not perhaps in this instance purchased at too high a price. There are times in every noble life when the cool calculation of chances is the most contemptible cowardice; but the man who is a hero differs from the man who is merely rash or foolhardy largely in virtue of his power to distinguish the real worth of a cause. The man who encounters great peril for trifles has always and properly been held to have but an ill-balanced mind.

In modern athletics the comparison between the gravity of

the risk and the value of the result is such as to warp the judgment. I have no intention of bringing up the question of the brutality of football, or the horrors of the dressing-rooms at a modern athletic meet. These things are known sufficiently, and the advocate of athletics is forced to accept them as necessary evils, but evils not great enough to counterbalance the good which he believes to result on the whole. In face of fact, however, no one can deny that the risks are possibly of the most grave. The New York papers last autumn published a list of some dozen fatal accidents on the inter-scholastic football field for the season; and whether this particular list be authentic or not, there have certainly been deaths enough from football accidents to give pause to those not either thoughtless or convinced that the end justifies the danger. For a youth to be trained to run this risk for mere sport is not likely to help him to a just perception of comparative worth; and so far as it influences his character, it would logically seem likely to make him rather rash than brave, rather foolhardy than heroic. He might be ready in the heroic moment; but the heroic moments are rare in ordinary life, and the opportunities for impetuosity and rash folly are numerous. This may seem somewhat extravagant, because the danger of fatal catastrophes on the athletic field is seldom realized; and it is generally held that the players do not believe in them or they would not play. Young and ardent lads will run any risk and enter upon any foolhardy enterprise, if they are sufficiently spurred on by the encouragement and applause of their elders; and, moreover, they do realize these things when outside of the actual excitement of play. The risks exist, and I have known more than one instance in which a man on a school or college team has felt himself to be by public opinion blackmailed into participation in a game which he regarded as dangerous to the last degree. Certainly, to be praised and lauded for running such risks as are admitted, when the stake is what it is, cannot help a youth to just appreciation of real and relative values.

Undergraduates are generally a pretty shrewd set. They are at the least conventional period of life, and they are very little

likely to be deceived by conventional professions. They may at first be imposed upon by the glib assurance that their elders encourage athletic contests from pure interest in the well-being of youth and a noble and self-sacrificing desire to promote their higher education; but they are too shrewd not to perceive the spirit in which the sports are witnessed, and to appreciate the exact quality of that zest. The student understands the men who are genuine in their support, and who are actuated in their generous aid to athletics by a real faith in them: no less does he realize perfectly that the tens of thousands of spectators who rush to a football game come together in the same mood in which they would crowd to a bull-fight. He comprehends that the multitude is assembled by the love of amusement.

The college serves as an agreeable background for personal preferences and exciting rivalries of talk or of bets. But the college on the field of sports touches nobody as an intellectual ideal: in that atmosphere it does not shine forth as an alma mater of mental nourishment or of higher aspirations. Every college student realizes this with the unwinking clearness which is characteristic of these unreverential days. He sometimes says plainly that the crowd do not care for the risks of the player, if they can have their fun; although, as a rule, this side of the matter, if it comes to his thought, seldom finds its way to his lips, lest he be suspected of flinching. He does not fail to believe the men who with so evident sincerity and zeal declare their belief that athletics are of high value in education; he respects their genuineness and shares their views. Neither does he fail to comprehend, however, that if college athletics depended for support upon interest in education they would come quickly to a starveling end. The support of the public, despite whatever eloquent speeches are made to the contrary, the undergraduate knows to depend absolutely upon the extent to which the public is entertained.

The leading educational institutions of the country are precisely those places where this spirit of excitement and amusement at any cost is most strongly felt. The indifference of people in general to intellectual concerns and their greed for

amusement are thus burned into boys at the most impressionable period of life, and that, too, under the sanction of the very universities of which the highest function should be that of nourishing the intellectual ideal.

The intellectual standards of any civilized land are obviously the measure of its permanent advance. They are established, not by the many, but by the few; and the few, the leaders of the higher thought, have a right to claim from a university its best support and coöperation. The university which simply fits men for utilitarian ends is false to its best uses; and still more is it unworthy if it instill or foster material or degraded views of life. The university has a duty to the nation which is not less than that which it owes to the individual student. Personally, I find it impossible not to feel that the prominence given at American universities and schools to athletics is a menace to their influence for good to the public or to students. The intellectual ideal may not have been abandoned or degraded; it most certainly has been obscured.

The effect upon the universities which has been brought about by modern athletics is more grave, because more far-reaching, than any immediate effect upon individuals. The well-being of the student is a serious matter, but it is, after all, of less real consequence than any vital deterioration in the character of institutions of learning. One cause cannot be entirely disentangled from another in considering the modifications which come about in complicated modern social conditions; but it is not impossible to distinguish at least the tendency of the present exaltation of sport. Social prominence in colleges to-day is so largely dependent upon physical prowess that whatever power scholarship should have in this direction has been much discredited. The institutions which are nominally the conservators of the intellectual ideals of the nation introduce students into a society where intellectual distinctions have sunk into a secondary place. Instead of being four years in an atmosphere of learning and of mind, the youth is during his college course constantly impressed through his surroundings with the idea that success is to be won rather by the body than

by the mind; that popularity is of more effect than culture; and that learning may be disregarded for more showy and ephemeral accomplishments.

This unfortunate condition of things is more firmly established by the class of students attracted to college by the fame of athletic victories. The day that a university receives a single student who has been brought there by its record in the field it weakens its intellectual standing; and to-day it is difficult not to feel that not only have our leading universities taken in many such men, but that they have deliberately counted upon this means of increasing their numbers. In so far as a college is not responsible for such students, it suffers a misfortune in their coming; in so far as the college, directly or indirectly, is responsible, it has been false to the principles on which institutions of learning are founded; it has been guilty of sacrificing to present and fallacious appearances of prosperity its real and lasting efficiency.

The grave matter of the moral effect of college athletics on individuals I touch upon with reluctance; and I have no hesitation in confessing that it is a point about which I neither feel clear nor qualified to speak conclusively. That, during training, men are kept from dissipation is insisted upon constantly, somewhat as if it were fair to assume that they would necessarily be dissolute if left to themselves. Physically they are perhaps as often injured by overtraining as under other circumstances they would be by vice; but it would be unfair not to recognize that the rectitude is good, no matter how it is promoted. To some extent, in individual cases, it is balanced by the excesses with which men "break training"; but, on the whole, the influence of self-restraint cannot but be beneficial. The fact that men in training are excused from drinking at clubs has introduced to some extent a decline in the old, silly and tyrannous habit of forcing by college opinion the acceptance of "treats," and doubtless has diminished the habit of drinking. What is of more importance, the prevalence of outdoor sport has done much to make the whole rising generation clean-minded.

These things are not to be passed over lightly; but they are, in the first place, advantages which need not be diminished if athletics were kept within proper bounds; and they are only remotely inspired by those ideas of moral responsibility which have in the past been universally regarded as the foundations of real ethical strength. The excesses in drinking, in gambling, and in general debauchery, which have accompanied intercollegiate games, have created a good deal of scandal. They are said to be less flagrant than formerly, but it is not likely that they will disappear so long as the occasion remains.

The influence upon character of becoming responsible to a trainer first, and to constituted authority only secondarily, certainly seems of doubtful merit; and of graver, because more insidious, effect is that of accepting support in athletic expenses to be repaid in public exhibitions. As a writer in "The College" puts it, when a man gets on a team "his classmates pay to make him so skillful that by and by they may pay to see him." A student who would resent with fine indignation any proposal that an association of his fellows should bear the cost of any intellectual training has apparently no scruples about allowing the same thing to be done when his bills are for physical development. The scandals which have arisen at the keeping of men in school or college simply to help on the teams are largely things of the past, since here, at least, public opinion has stimulated the somewhat sluggish college consciousness into a perception of advisability, if not of honor. The nearest that I have ever been able to come to a conclusion in this delicate question is that athletics properly conducted are advantageous to college morals, but that the present method of conducting them introduces evils which at best go far to counterbalance this good.

In all that I have said I have been trying to deal with things as they are, and I have consequently avoided touching upon what might or should be. It is not my place here to dwell upon the brighter side, because this has already been so strongly insisted upon that an article such as this is meant merely to

arouse thought of possible drawbacks. No sane man can shut his eyes to the substantial advantages which belong to the development of the physical side of youth; and certainly I have no desire, as I believe that I have no inclination, to underrate them. The whole question, as I have suggested, is that of deciding whether the obvious benefits are worth what is now paid for them, and of seeing whether what is really good is not possible without what seem to be unequivocal evils. Life is a sharp huckster, and exacts the price to the last farthing.

Too much attention has been paid to what is gained in modern athletics, and not enough to what is lost. The true benefactor of the universities to-day, and through them to the community at large, must be he who would use his influence to arouse and to foster intellectual ideals, who would set himself deliberately and effectively against the overvaluation of the physical, and do his part to recall the universities to their great office of correcting the materialistic tendencies of the age. Where is the country to look for the generating and nourishing of intellectual impulse if not to the educated classes? And how is this to come about if education means athletics first and mental good afterward?

Whatever be true of cultivated men to-day, to the general public the college has come to be so largely identified with sport as to represent ideals rather physical than scholarly. Even if unfounded, such an impression would be a misfortune from its influence in degrading popular standards. When public sympathy and interest have been brought to the point of appreciating and enjoying the intellectual side of college life and effort, athletics may be magnified with comparatively little danger of evil consequences. At present, enthusiasm for bodily training has so distorted and maimed the whole system of education that, at the obvious risk of offending and of seeming extravagant, I cannot refrain from closing with the deliberate expression of the conviction that athletics is in education to-day the most serious obstacle to the advancement of intellectual growth.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Discuss the fairness or unfairness of the writer's views on athletics. 2. As a reply to this article, point out some of the matters favorable to athletics that might be brought forward under the title, "The Positive Side of Athletics." 3. What are the evils that come from the great publicity given to college athletics? 4. Does your experience with athletics in high school or college confirm or contradict the writer's opinion that athletics injure general scholarship in our institutions of learning? 5. If the state of affairs is as described by the writer, what remedies may be suggested?

ATHLETICS AND THE COLLEGE¹

CHARLES ARTHUR STEWART

[Charles Arthur Stewart (1885—), lately professor of geology in the University of Idaho, graduated from Columbia University, where he took an active part in athletics. Thereafter he taught two years at Columbia and several more at Cornell. He has always taken an active interest in American college life, and the generalizations made in this article rest, therefore, upon a wide experience and upon a mass of carefully sifted facts.]

The abolition of all intercollegiate athletic contests involves the destruction of many phases of undergraduate life very dear to the college man. To mention the subject seriously is to brave the epithet "old fogey," and to hear the scornful laugh of those who believe that nothing can successfully assail the position of intercollegiate athletics as one of the most valuable features of college life. It is a fact, however, that many thoughtful men, occupying positions of influence in college administration, are at present contemplating with alarm abuses which have crept into this phase of undergraduate activity,—abuses which to them seem so serious and so deeply rooted as to justify the abolition of the whole system of intercollegiate contests.

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These abuses have nothing to do with the roughness of some of the games, or with the conflict between play and work; they have to do with the pernicious influence of athletics upon the moral life of the whole undergraduate body. Participation in college athletics may indeed teach control of temper, abstinence from dissipation, and willingness to subordinate one's self to the efficient working of an organization; but it also teaches trickery and deceit. Training for a college team in these days furnishes a Fagin-like drill in complex dishonesty which far overbalances any benefits. At least that is the belief of many careful observers,—and it is a belief which experience as a student and a teacher in three universities, and an intimate acquaintanceship with athletics in a score of others have convinced me to be well-founded.

In competition among gentlemen there is no place for the man who "stacks" the cards and signals his partner across the table; who deliberately miscalls the score at tennis, or who picks his ball out of a bad lie on the golf links. He is barred from reputable clubs, and is not welcomed in respectable society. Even the professional gambler respects fair play, and repudiates the "crooked game." Yet college men, so often the soul of honor in all their other activities, see no wrong in deliberately and slyly violating in football, baseball, and kindred sports any rule which may diminish their chances of victory. A few illustrations will make this clearer.

To weaken the opposing side by "putting out" its strongest players is a common practice in football. It may be done legitimately by concentrating the attack upon one man until exhaustion forces him to give way to a substitute; but in actual fact few strong players leave the game for this reason; they are more often temporarily disabled by a kick in the ribs, a knee thrust into the stomach, or a twist of the neck slyly given under cover of the play. Gleeful discussion of the success of such tactics can be heard among the players after many intercollegiate contests. The progress of every football game is interrupted by the referee's penalizing first one side, then the other for "holding,"—an unfair use of the hands and arms. Every such

penalty means that some one has cheated, whether involuntarily or with deliberation, yet the spectators make no comment, and in college circles the guilty players lose standing only in so far as the coach scolds them for being caught.

Not many years ago I was watching the football practice at a well-known eastern university. The coach was a graduate of the university, and a mature business man of good repute, and I had heard members of the faculty express satisfaction that the students were going to be in the hands of so reliable a man. I saw this coach drilling the linemen in an illegal play, the essence of which was to swing the fist violently into the opponent's face. After some minutes he vented his disgust with an awkward pupil in these words:—

“Not that way, not that way, you dub! You have got to be nifty to get away with that play.”

I see no objection to one man's using his fist upon another, provided that it be part of the game. I see every objection to teaching a boy to “be nifty and get away with it.”

In a basket-ball game it sometimes happens that a player gets the ball close to the basket. None of his opponents is between him and the goal, and there is no chance for anyone to get in front of him to block his throw in a legitimate way. The only defense is to rush at him from behind, and to shove him violently enough to spoil his aim. Such a play is a foul under the rules, but it is made time and again, because the well-trained player reasons thus:

“If I do not shove this man, he will almost certainly shoot a goal. If I do, he will not get the goal, and there is a chance that the referee will not see me; and even if I am caught, the penalty for the foul counts less for the other side than the goal which I am going to prevent.”

No account is taken of the fact that the man has won this favorable position by skill and quickness, and is entitled by the rules to what he can make of it. The same tactics are followed in regard to certain rules forbidding the blocking of opponents, for these rules are particularly hard to enforce. It is no uncommon thing to hear players explaining after a game that they

missed this or that play because they were blocked; and seldom is there any expression of resentment at the unfairness. It was forbidden by the rules, but the opponent "got away with it" and was entitled to the fruits.

The same principle is at the bottom of "cutting the bases" in baseball. A man knows when he has failed to touch a base, yet time after time we see a runner cut wide of a base, and his opponents protest in vain, because the umpire has not seen the play. Meanwhile the man who by violation of a rule has shortered the distance he has had to run, grins complacently because he "got away with it," and his college mates among the spectators applaud him as heartily as if he had scored by skill instead of trickery. In the few foregoing illustrations no reference is made to the faults committed in the heat of the contest. A man may lose his temper and break his opponent's nose, and still be honest; he may get over-anxious and start play before the signal, and yet not be a cheat; he cannot strengthen his playing by an assortment of intentional tricks that are expressly forbidden by the rules, and still be entitled to the respect of good sportsmen.

The question of the eligibility of men to represent their colleges in intercollegiate contests calls forth tactics similar to those in vogue in the actual conduct of the games. There is a rule providing that no man who has competed in athletics for money shall play on a college team, and every candidate is required to give a signed statement that he has not violated this rule. In spite of this requirement there are constantly charges and countercharges of professionalism made by one college against another. It appears that the college athlete does not think highly of the word of honor of his fellows. Every charge of professionalism is an accusation of lying against the man involved. The fact that the implied falsehood is ignored, and that attention is given only to investigating the man's amateur standing, shows clearly that prevarication in this matter is not considered a grievous fault.

As a matter of fact, every man who has lived among college athletes knows that many of them have at some time received

money, directly or indirectly, for athletic competition. Actual proof of professionalism in any one case is as difficult as proof of bribe-taking among aldermen. Payments are not made by check, and are often disguised in more or less clever ways. I know of one athlete who received a goodly sum for acting as watchman of a building. His duty was to sleep in the building every night. In the daytime he played baseball with a professional team. I know of another who played a game with a professional team,—for which he was not paid. But after the game the manager went to his room and said:

“I’ll bet you twenty dollars that you can’t jump over that suit-case.”

The bet was taken, and the jump was successfully made. Both of these men afterwards went to college and signed a statement that they had not “competed in athletics for money, directly or indirectly.” I believe that a large percentage of the men playing college baseball are guilty of dishonesty of this kind. The evil, of course, rests not in the playing for money, but in the cool denial of the fact.

Another eligibility rule in effect in most colleges is that no man shall compete in college athletics more than four years, yet I have learned of many cases in which men, after representing a small western college for a year or more, have entered a large eastern university and played under its colors for a full four years. To do this they had to deny their participation in athletics at the first school.

If practices like the above involved only the guilty players, they could be attributed to the “black sheep” sure to be found in every group of men, and would not be ground for the arraignment of college athletics in general. They are, however, known to the other players, and in some degree to the whole body of undergraduates, which becomes so imbued with the spirit of “anything to win” that it supports them, and is therefore equally guilty. At every big intercollegiate contest you will hear among the spectators denunciation of the “dirty play” of the visiting team, when similar play by members of the home team has passed uncondemned, or mayhap has been praised

in a gleeful, "Did you see Jack 'get' that fellow? He's a slick one."

Except at a few institutions of notoriously low standards, college men are of very much the same type, and, on the average, one college team is no better or no worse than another. Why then do undergraduates so seldom rise up and denounce the tactics of their own representatives, but so frequently demand the ruling-out of this or that player from a rival school?

At my own college we learned, one autumn, that our baseball captain had played as a professional all summer. Our concern was not in regard to his successor, now that he had made himself ineligible, but about the chance of the discovery of the conditions by the faculty. It happened in this case that the faculty did learn the truth and debar the man from further competition; but if they had not, the entire undergraduate body would have cheered that man madly at the baseball games the following spring, and would have rejoiced boastfully over the victories made possible by his deceit.

There is at large in the East at the present day a football coach who some years ago was involved in a notorious scandal concerning the eligibility of several members of a team under his charge. Many years ago his mastery of the details of football crookedness earned him the familiar sobriquet of "Mucker," but last year he acted as coach for one of the best-known colleges in the United States. His tactics are a by-word among men connected with athletic history, yet his retention is tolerated by alumni and undergraduates,—for he is a successful coach.

These last two cases do not involve a few men, they speak for the attitude of the great majority of the alumni of two large universities. In fact the stories told in the foregoing pages are not taken from the athletic history of obscure colleges of uncertain standing. Yale, Columbia, and Cornell figure in them, and I could give others involving Harvard, Princeton, Pennsylvania, and universities of equal prominence and solidity. My quarrel, however, is not with any specific colleges, or with specific instances of unsportsmanlike conduct; it is with the lax

moral spirit which rules college athletics everywhere; and the stories are only illustrations in point. To prove that these illustrations are indeed typical of conditions in general is difficult, but if you are skeptical, let your mind run back over the intercollegiate contests you have witnessed, or watch keenly those which you see next spring and autumn; note the number of fouls called, and the penalties inflicted for offenses such as I have mentioned,—offenses not chargeable to loss of temper but to deliberate breaking of rules,—and see the matter-of-course way in which the cheating is passed over by both players and spectators; recall the instances in which athletes have been declared ineligible after having competed part of a season, and yet have remained in good standing among their collegemates in spite of the fact that *they must have falsified to have competed at all*, and you will see that the college man does expect these things, and that fair play in college athletics and fair play between gentlemen out of college are two different things.

Count the number of officials required to supervise a football game, and read the special rules designed to let them watch the movements of every man; investigate the complex system which college athletic associations have instituted for deciding upon the eligibility of competitors who have already given their "word of honor" that their records are clear; read the stories of some of the disputes,—as full of affidavits and canceled checks as a New York State impeachment proceeding,—and then picture the analogue outside of college: two country clubs engaging in a team match at golf, each competitor required to show a signed statement outlining all of his past athletic history, and reiterating in half a dozen places his good standing in his club, and nevertheless being followed all through the match by a carefully selected official who keeps a cat-like watch on his every move. The absurdity of it will emphasize the true meaning of the everyday occurrences in college athletics.

In short, college men have in regard to their sports a standard of honor—if we may call it such—which permits practices not tolerated in any other walk of life. These men would not

cheat in their private games; as a class they are honorable and courageously truthful in all the other relationships of life; but in athletics they tolerate trickery and deceit, and rejoice in the victories gained thereby.

This is not merely a question of the conduct of college sports; it is a question concerning the moral training of future citizens. We are dealing on a small scale with that vicious philosophy of "get away with it," that has been at the root of dishonest "big business." Men, not content to make their fortunes in a lawful way, have contrived to circumvent interfering laws,—to violate them without paying the penalty, or so to violate that the penalty evoked will be small compared with the resulting gain. The heads of dishonest corporations and the participants in the profits of public graft are often men with a keen sense of honor in their personal relationships, strong supporters of philanthropies, and sincere worshipers in the churches, but they lack the complete moral sense necessary to enable them to apply one standard of right and wrong to all of their acts. In the same way college students are failing to carry their ideals upon the athletic field, and are allowing themselves to be governed in this one respect by a standard that is essentially immoral.

When we reflect upon the prominence given athletics by undergraduates, and consider the hero-worship accorded the successful athlete both in college and by the general public, the deep import of the matter becomes evident. The undergraduate loves to say that every college community is in a sense a toy world wherein the struggle for fame and influential position is waged in miniature,—the scene of a sham battle fought under the same conditions and with the same weapons as in the world at large, and fought as a preparation for that real battle. If this mock world is to train good citizens it should be so governed that honor and truth are first in popular esteem, and trickery and deceit are outlawed.

How to infuse into college athletics a spirit of fair play and truthfulness comparable to that ruling other undergraduate activities is a difficult problem, and some of the methods sug-

gested are based upon a superficial study of the conditions. The abolition of the professional coach, for instance, is not a solution of the question. We are told that when a man's livelihood is dependent upon the success of his coaching he will stoop to any tactics to insure victorious teams, and that if athletic coaches were chosen from alumni, moved solely by love for their college and having no financial interests involved in victory, there would be less of the "win-at-any-cost" spirit inculcated. It must be remembered, however, that all graduates are the product of the evil system that we are discussing. We have seen that the college man does not regard the tactics we have mentioned as wrong, or that if he does, he tolerates, even supports them. His policy is not likely to change on graduation. The desire to *win* is as keen among men who have gone through four years of intercollegiate athletics as is the desire to make a living. A careful comparison fails to show that colleges boasting of a "graduate coaching system" are at all superior in athletic ethics to those employing professionals. The practices prevailing in athletics at present may indeed have been first introduced by professional coaches; they flourish now, not because certain men teach them, but because undergraduates and faculties lack the logic to analyze them properly, or the courage to cope with them.

A most certain cure for the evils mentioned, and one often suggested by those college administrators who give thought to this subject, is the total abolition of intercollegiate athletics. Such a policy is yielding to an evil rather than overcoming it. If it be true that a keen desire to win will drive the modern college student into unfairness and cheating, there is some weak spot in his moral fiber, and it would seem to be the business of the college, not to remove the temptation, but to make the man conquer it. Sooner or later every one must choose between losing fairly and winning unfairly. A boy who is made to face this problem in college, and made to solve it rightly, is better equipped to repeat the victory in the larger issues of life. Any one who has spent four years of his life working for the popularity and renown of a successful college athlete, and who has

through it all resolutely refused to do anything but the fair and honest thing, is sure to come out of the experience very much a man.

I believe such a solution is possible. The conditions existing in college athletics to-day are the result of gradual and insidious growth. The rottenness prevails largely because the men do not realize that it is rotten. The sanction of general custom is given to practices which, viewed as isolated acts, are manifestly wrong, and the average college man accepts the conditions as he finds them simply because he has never stopped to analyze them. He lies about his eligibility and develops his dishonest tactics, not because he has deliberately chosen between honesty and dishonesty, but because it is the thing expected of him,—the thing that everybody does as a matter of course.

Faculties should undertake a vigorous campaign of education, designed to show these matters in their true light. Most college men are essentially honest, and the chief need is to make them realize the true significance of what they are doing in athletics under the present system. Arouse the boys to the facts; make them see that cheating in football is the same as cheating at cards or as stealing money; foster a college sentiment that says fairness first and victory second; and attach the same obloquy to lying about eligibility that is attached to any lying. Do this, and you have gone to the root of the evil, and laid the foundation for lasting reform. This basic campaign for moral acumen should, however, be reinforced by two supplementary measures. First, make no rules, either of play or of eligibility, which are not strictly just, and which cannot be entirely enforced; and secondly, subject all dishonesty to severe punishment.

The first measure is in accord with the belief that legislation which the majority of the people does not consider just, or which cannot be enforced, makes for disrespect of the law in general. Many of the rules in regard to eligibility for college athletic teams are neither fair nor enforceable, and should therefore be eliminated if we are to have respect paid to those

which are based on justice. The only condition which we have a right to impose in limiting the personnel of a college team is that all members shall be *bona fide* students in good standing, and not brought to the institution by special inducements offered because of athletic prowess. Because some colleges do violate this essential, a number of rules have been made which aim indirectly to prevent this violation,—rules which in themselves are unjust. The practice which obtains in larger colleges of recruiting athletes from smaller schools is guarded against by the rule forbidding a man who has transferred from one institution to another to compete in athletics until after a year's residence at the second school. This restriction works a real hardship by prohibiting from engaging in any sports men who are in actual fact members of the student body, but who have, for some good reason not connected with athletics, changed their choice of colleges; and the manifest injustice often makes evasion of the rule seem less reprehensible.

Particularly vicious is the custom of denying the right to engage in college athletics to all men who have previously competed for money, and adherence to it is monumental hypocrisy. There is hardly a poor country boy with fleetness of foot or skill of arm who has not at some time in his life received a cash prize for winning a race at a village picnic, or who has not played on a country-town baseball team for a share of the gate-receipts. Such an indiscretion, committed long before he enters college, debars him forever from athletic competition. Moreover, men who attend college primarily for intellectual purposes often find that playing professional baseball during the summer offers the easiest and most healthful method of solving their financial problems; yet they must not depend upon this one resource if they wish to play with their fellow-students during the academic year. Here again the unfairness of the rule makes evasion of it seem, not a wrong, but the only way to obtain justice.

To my mind there is no place in college athletics for the distinction between amateur and professional; that a man be a *bona fide* student of the institution he represents is all we have a

right to ask. Carried to its logical conclusion, the rule against professionalism is held in some countries to forbid any man who makes a living with his hands from calling himself an amateur athlete. A carpenter, for instance, cannot be an amateur oarsman. If there persists in colleges a vestige of this snobbery,—if we are not yet ready to abolish all distinction between amateur and professional,—we must at least so revise the present rule that it will work less hardship. A few colleges have been courageous enough to do this, and now permit summer baseball, but most institutions still persist in a pretense of strict enforcement of the amateur rule, knowing full well that it makes many students either lie or submit to an injustice. Most of them lie, and feel that the means is condoned if not justified by the end.

The second measure supplementary to education in right athletic ideals, is a firm stand by the faculties in all matters of athletic honor. All opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, undergraduates are influenced in their views of right and wrong by the general attitude of the faculty. Knowing that their teachers are interested in their moral welfare, they conclude, naturally enough, that anything these teachers do not oppose and punish is not so very wrong. This is well illustrated by a consideration of cheating in examinations. In those colleges in which the instructors are lax in the conduct of examinations, seeming to care little whether or not cheating is done, and punishing it when detected only by a reprimand and a mark of failure, there is always a feeling among the students that "cribbing" is a part of the game, and not a matter of honor. On the other hand, when every possible means is taken to prevent cheating, and when it is punished by expulsion, there is usually an undergraduate sentiment which puts the cribber in his proper place. I have seen in one college the whole student attitude upon cheating in examinations changed from indifference to stern disapproval by an improvement in the conduct of examinations on the part of the faculty. No change in the spirit of college athletics can be expected until faculties array themselves firmly on the right side, and refuse to tolerate dishonest practices. A few men expelled for lying about eligi-

bility, and a few teams disbanded because of unfair play, would arouse undergraduates with a wholesome jolt.

A forceful presentation of the facts of the situation with an appeal to the innate sense of honor of the undergraduates; such a revision of the rules as will retain only those based upon essential fairness; and a strict supervision by the faculty,—upon the success of these three measures rests the hope that college athletics may be purged of trickery and the spirit of “get away with it.” It will be a struggle of some duration, for it involves the remolding of the undergraduate point of view,—something akin to the making of public opinion, and not to be done in a day. I believe it can be done.

In fact there is some basis for asserting that conditions in the larger Eastern institutions have greatly improved during the past few years,—a contention which finds support in the lack of scandal and recrimination connected with the big football games of last autumn as compared with the days of the Cutts and Hinkey disputes. This improvement is not, however, fundamental. Disputes as to eligibility are prevented, not because the spirit of the undergraduates or of the coaches is above reproach, but because faculty committees maintain strict supervision over this matter, and allow no doubtful case to pass without investigation. More rigid enforcement of the rules has indeed made it harder to “get away with it,” but that there is still a desire to do so whenever possible, is shown by the continuous need for these very faculty committees, and by the ever-increasing mass of complex legislation designed to prevent or punish unfair play.

If an honorable spirit of sportmanship ruled college athletics, why need there be severe penalties threatened for coaching from the side-lines in football, and special precautions exercised by the officials to detect it? Should not merely forbidding it be sufficient? Why should it be necessary in basketball to provide that after four personal fouls a player must be removed from the game? I do not contend that every play, or even that the majority of plays, in intercollegiate games involves trickery, for I know that faculty supervision and vigilant umpiring have

greatly reduced the more obvious forms of cheating in the games between the larger eastern institutions. I do contend, however, that even this veneer of fairness is lacking in most colleges; that college athletics are still ruled by the spirit of "get away with it"; and that merely preventing the actual success of fraud is but a superficial reform. Men interested in the ethical aspects of college life should not rest until college men meet in sports as do other gentlemen,—relying upon officials merely to aid in the administration of the games, and trusting to their own integrity to prevent intentional unfairness, and to their collective sense of honor to deal summarily with the occasional intruder who may refuse to accept their own high code.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Does this arraignment impress you as being fair to college athletics as you know them? Give reasons for your opinion. 2. Discuss the effects of the win-at-any-cost spirit on the character of the student body of an institution. 3. What should be the true spirit of athletic contests? Consider how far the English ideal of play purely for the game's sake is applicable to American conditions. Would our national temperament permit such an idea to be widely accepted?

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF RECREATION¹

GEORGE JOHN ROMANES

[George John Romanes (1848-1894) was an eminent British biologist. His writings such as *Animal Intelligence*, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, and *Mental Evolution in Man*, are standard books in their fields.]

In all places of the civilized world, and in all classes of the civilized community, the struggle for existence is now more keen than ever it has been during the history of our race. Everywhere men, and women, and children are living at a pressure positively frightful to contemplate. Amid the swarm-

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ing bustle of our smoke-smothered towns, surrounded by their zone of poisoned trees, amid the whirling roar of machinery, the scorching blast of furnaces, and in the tallow-lighted blackness of our mines—everywhere, over all the length and breadth of this teeming land, men, and women, and children, in no metaphor, but in cruel truth, are struggling for life. Even our smiling landscapes support as the sons of their soil a new generation, to whom the freedom of gladness is a tradition of the past, and on whose brows is stamped, not only the print of honest work, but a new and saddening mark—the brand of sickening care. Or if we look to our universities and schools, to our professional men and men of business, we see this same fierce battle rage—ruined health and shattered hopes, tearful lives and early deaths being everywhere the bitter lot of millions who toil, and strive, and love, and bleed their young hearts' blood in sorrow. In such a world and at such a time, when more truly than ever it may be said that the whole creation groans in pain and travail, I do not know that for the purposes of health and happiness there is any subject which it is more desirable that persons of all classes should understand than the philosophical theory and the rational practice of recreation. For recreation is the great relief from the pressure of life—the breathing-space in the daily struggle for existence, without which no one of the combatants could long survive; and therefore it becomes of the first importance that the science and the philosophy of such relief should be generally known. No doubt it is true that people will always be compelled to take recreation and to profit by its use, whether or not they are acquainted with its science and its philosophy; but there can be equally little doubt that here, as elsewhere, an intelligent understanding of abstract principles as well as of practical applications will insure more use and less abuse of the thing which is thus intelligently understood.

With a view, then, of obtaining some such intelligent understanding of recreation, let us begin by clearly understanding what recreation means. First of all, the mere word, like many of our other English words that signify abstractions, condenses much philosophy within itself. For, as "creation" means a

forming, "re-creation" means a forming anew; and, as in etymological derivation, so in actual truth re-creation is nothing other than a re-novation of the vital energies; leisure time and appropriate employment serve to repair the organic machinery which has been impaired by the excess of work. The literal meaning of the word is therefore in itself instructive, as showing that what our forefathers saw in recreation was not so much play, pastime, or pleasantry, as the restoration of enfeebled powers of work. And I do not know that within the limits of one word they could have left us a legacy of thought more true in itself or more solemn in its admonition. Recreation is, *or ought to be*, not a pastime entered upon for the sake of the pleasure which it affords, but an act of duty undertaken for the sake of the subsequent power which it generates, and the subsequent profit which it insures. Therefore, expanding the philosophy which is thus condensed in our English word, we may define recreation as that which with the least expenditure of time renders the exhausted energies most fitted to resume their work. Such is my definition of recreation; yet I know that many things are called by this name which cannot possibly fall within this definition, and I doubt whether nine persons out of ten ever dreamed either of attaching such a meaning to the word, or of applying such a principle to the thing. Nevertheless, I also know that in whatever degree so-called recreation fails to be covered by this definition, in that degree does it fail, properly speaking, to be recreation at all. It may be amusement, fun, or even profitable employment; but it is not that particular thing which it is the object of this paper to consider. Therefore the definition which I have laid down may be taken as a practical test of recreation as genuine or spurious. If recreation is of a kind that renders a man less fitted for work than would some other kind of occupation, or if it consumes more time than would some other kind of occupation which would secure an equal amount of recuperation, then, in whatever degree this is so, in that degree must the quality of such recreation be pronounced impure.

So much, then, for the meaning of recreation. The next

point that I shall consider is the physiology of recreation. It may have struck some readers as a curious question, why some actions or pursuits should present what I may call a recreative character, and others not. For it is evident that this character is by no means determined by the relief from *labor* which these actions or pursuits secure. A week on the moors involves more genuine hard work than does a week in the mines, and a game of chess may require as much effort of thought as a problem in high mathematics. Moreover, the same action or pursuit may vary in its recreative quality with different individuals. Rowing, which is the favorite recreation of the undergraduate, is serious work to the bargeman; and we never find a gardener to resemble his master in showing a partiality to digging for digging's sake. If it is suggested that it is the need of bodily exercise which renders muscular activity beneficial to the one class and not to the other, I answer, no doubt it is so partly, but not wholly; for why is it that a man of science should find recreation in reading history, while an historian finds recreation in the pursuit of science? or why is it that a London tradesman should find a beneficial holiday in the country, while a country tradesman finds a no less beneficial holiday in London? The truth seems to me to be that the only principle which will serve to explain the recreative quality in all cases is what I may call the physiological necessity for frequent change of organic activity, and the consequent physiological value of variety in the kinds and seasons of such activity. In order to render this principle perfectly clear, it will be necessary for me very briefly to explain the physiology of nutrition.

When food is taken into the body it undergoes a variety of processes which are collectively called digestion and assimilation. Into the details of these processes I need not enter, it being enough for my present purpose to say that the total result of these processes is to strain off the nutritious constituents of the food, and pour them into the current of the blood. The blood circulates through nearly all the tissues of the body, being contained in a closed system of tubes. This system of tubes springs from the heart in the form of large, hollow trunks

which ramify into smaller and smaller tube-branches. These are all called arteries. The smaller arteries again ramify into a countless meshwork of so-called capillaries. Capillaries are also closed tubes, but differ from arteries in being immensely more numerous, more slender, and more tenuous in their walls. These capillaries pervade the body in such an intimate meshwork that a needle's point cannot be run into any part of the body where they occur without destroying the integrity of some of them, and so causing an outflow of blood.

As these capillaries ramify from the arteries, so do they again coalesce into larger tubes, and these into larger, and so on, until all this system of return tubing ends again in the heart in the form of large, hollow trunks. The tubes composing this system of return tubing are called the veins. Thus the whole blood-vascular system may be likened to two trees which are throughout joined together by their leaves, and also by cavities at the bottoms of their trunks—the heart. The branches of both trees being everywhere hollow, the contained fluid runs up the stem, and through smaller and smaller branches of the arterial tree, into the delicate vessels of the leaves, which may be taken to represent the capillaries. Passing through these into the twigs of the venous tree, the blood returns through larger and larger branches of this tree till it arrives at the trunk, and completes its circuit by again entering the trunk of the arterial tree through the cavities of the heart. Now the blood, in perpetually making this complete circuit of the body, performs three important functions: it serves to carry oxygen from the lungs to all the other parts of the body; it serves to supply all parts of the body with the nutritive material with which it is charged; and it serves to drain off from all the tissues of the body the effete products which they excrete, and to present these effete products to the organs whose function it is again to abstract them from the blood and expel them from the body. The two latter functions of the blood—those of nourishing and draining—I must consider more in detail. They are both performed in the capillaries, so that the object of the arteries and veins may be considered as merely that of conveying the blood

to and from the capillaries. Moreover, both functions are performed by transfusion through the delicate walls of the capillaries—the nutritive material in the blood being thus transfused into the surrounding tissues, and the waste product of these tissues being transfused into the blood. Thus, in the various vascular tissues there is always a double process going on: first, that of receiving nourishment from the blood, whereby they are being constantly built up into an efficient state for the performance of their various functions; and, secondly, that of discharging into the blood the effete materials which the performance of these functions entails. Now, when any tissue or organ is in a state of activity in the performance of its function, the activity which it manifests entails a process of disintegration, which is the reverse of the process of nutrition; that is to say, when a tissue or organ is doing its work, it is expending energy which it has previously derived in virtue of the process of nutrition. Work is therefore, so to speak, the using up of nutrition; so that if the income of energy due to nutrition is equal to the expenditure of energy due to work, the tissue or organ will remain stationary as regards its capacity for further work, while, if the work done is in excess of the nutrition supplied, the tissue or organ will soon be unable to continue its work; it will become, as we say, exhausted, cease to work, and remain passive until it is again slowly and gradually refreshed or built up by the process of nutrition. Therefore all the tissues and organs of the body require periods of rest to alternate with periods of activity; and what is true of each part of the body is likewise true of the body as a whole—sleep being nothing other than a time of general rest during which the process of nutrition is allowed to gain upon that of exhaustion. Thus we may have local exhaustion—as when the muscles of our arm are no longer able to hold out a heavy weight—or we may have general exhaustion, as in sleep; and we may have local restorations due to nutrition—as when our exhausted arm, after some interval of rest, is again able to sustain the weight—or we may have a general restoration due to nutrition, as in the effects of sleep.

I have now said enough about the physiology of nutrition

to render quite clear what I mean by recreation depending on the physiological necessity for a frequent change of organic activity. For although in the case of some organs—such as most of the secreting organs—activity is pretty constant, owing to the constant expenditure of energy being just about balanced by the constant income, in the case of nerves and muscles this is not so; during the times when these organs are in activity their expenditure of energy is so vastly greater than their income during the same times, that they can only do their work by drawing upon the stores of energy which have been laid up by them during the comparatively long periods of their previous rest. Now, recreation applies only to nerve and muscle; and what it amounts to is simply this—a change of organic activity, having for its object the affording of time for the nutrition of exhausted portions of the body. A part of the body having become exhausted by work done, and yet the whole of the body not being exhausted so far as to require sleep, recreation is the affording of local sleep to the exhausted part by transferring the scene of activity from it to some other part. Be it observed that a certain amount of activity is necessary for the life and health of all the organs of the body; so it would not do for the community of organs as a whole that, when any one set become exhausted by their own activity, all the others should share in their time of rest, as in general sleep. But, by transferring the state of activity from organs already exhausted by work to organs which are ready nourished to perform work, recreation may be termed, as I have said, local sleep.

Thus we see that, in a physiological no less than in a psychological sense, the term re-creation is a singularly happy one; for we see that, as a matter of fact, the whole physiology of recreation consists merely of a re-building up, re-forming, or re-creation of tissues which have become partly broken down by the exhausting effects of work. So that in this physiological sense recreation is partial sleep, while sleep is universal recreation. And now we see why it is that the one essential principle of all recreation must be that of variety of organic activity;

for variety of organic activity merely means the substitution of one set of organic activities for another, and consequently the successive affording of rest to bodily structures as they are successively exhausted. The undergraduate finds recreation in rowing because it gives his brain time to recover its exhausted energies, while the historian and the man of science find recreation in each other's labors because these labors require somewhat different faculties of mind for their pursuance.

Before concluding these general remarks on the physiology of recreation, I must say a few words with more special reference to the physiology of exercise. We do not require science to teach us that the most lucrative form of recreation for those whose labor is not of a bodily kind is muscular exercise. Why this should be so is sufficiently obvious. The movement of blood in the veins is due to two causes.

The act of drawing breath into the lungs, by dilating the closed cavity of the chest, serves also to draw venous blood into the heart. This cause of the onward movement of blood in the veins is what is called aspiration, and it occurs also in some of the larger veins of the limbs, which are so situated with reference to their supplying branches that movement of the limbs determines suction of the blood from the supplying branches to the veins. The second great cause of the venous flow is as follows: The larger veins are nearly all provided with valves which open to allow the blood to pass on toward the heart, but close against the blood if it endeavors to return back toward the capillaries. Now, the larger veins are imbedded in muscles, so that the effect of muscular contractions is to compress numberless veins now in one part and now in another part of their length; and, as each vein is thus compressed, its contained fluid is, of course, driven forward from valve to valve. Hence, as all the veins of the body end in the heart, the total effect of general muscular activity is greatly to increase the flow of venous blood into the heart. The heart is thus stimulated to greater activity in order to avoid being gorged with the unusual inflow of blood. So great is the increase of the heart's

activity that is required to meet this sudden demand on its powers of propulsion, that every one can feel in his own person how greatly muscular exercise increases the number of the heart's contractions. Now, the result of this increase of the heart's activity is, of course, to pump a correspondingly greater amount of blood into the arteries, and so to quicken the circulation all over the body. This, in turn, gives rise to a greater amount of tissue-change—oxygenation, nutrition, and drainage—which, together with the increased discharge of carbonic acid by the muscles during their time of increased activity, has the effect of unduly charging the blood with carbonic acid and other effete materials. This increased amount of carbonic acid in the blood stimulates the respiratory center in the spinal cord to increase the frequency of the respiratory movements, so that under the influence of violent and sustained exercise we become, as it is expressly said, "out of breath." The distress to which this condition may give rise is, however, chiefly due to the heart being unable to deliver blood into the arteries as quickly as it receives blood from the veins; the result being a more or less undue pressure of venous blood upon a heart already struggling to its utmost to pump on all the blood it can. Training, which is chiefly systematic exercise, by promoting a healthy concordant action between the heart and arteries, diminishes the resistance which the latter offer to an unusual flow of blood from the former, and therefore men in training, or men accustomed to bodily exercise, do not easily become distressed by sustained muscular exertion.

Now it is evident, without comment, how immense must be the benefit of muscular exercise. Not only does it allow time for the brains to rest when exhausted by mental work, but, by increasing the circulation all over the body, it promotes the threefold function of oxygenation, nutrition, and drainage. It thus refreshes the whole organism in all its parts; it increases by use the strength and endurance of the muscles; it maintains the heart and the lungs—or rather the whole of the circulatory and respiratory mechanisms—at the highest point of their natural efficiency; and, in general, next only to air and food,

muscular exercise is of all things most essential to the vitality of the organism.

So much, then, for the physiology of recreation; and, having said this much on the abstract principles of our subject, I shall devote the rest of my paper to a consideration of this subject in its more practical aspects.

The fundamental principle of all recreation consisting, as I have said, in the rest from local exhaustion which is secured by a change of organic activity, it is clear that practical advice with regard to recreation must differ widely according to the class, and even the individual, to which it is given. Thus it would be clearly absurd to recommend a literary man, already jaded with mental work, to adopt as his means of recreation some sedentary form of amusement; while it would be no less absurd to recommend a workingman, already fatigued with bodily toil, to regale himself with athletics. And, in lower degrees, the kind and amount of recreation which it would be wise to recommend must differ with different individuals in the same class of society, according to their age, sex, temperament, pursuits, and previous habits of life. But, although all matters of detail thus require to be adjusted to individual cases, there is one practical consideration which applies equally to all cases, and which must never be lost sight of if recreation of any kind is to produce its fullest measure of result. This consideration is the all-important part which is played in recreation by the emotions. It is, I am sure, impossible to over-estimate the value of the emotions in this connection—a prolonged flow of happy feelings doing more to brace up the system for work than any other influence operating for a similar length of time. The physiological reasons why this should be so are not apparent; for, although we know that the emotions have a very powerful influence in stimulating the nerves which act on the various secreting organs of the body, I do not think that this fact alone is sufficient to explain the high value of pleasurable emotions in refreshing the nervous system. There must be some further reason—probably to be sought for within the limits of the nervous system itself—why a flow of happy feelings serves to

re-create the nervous energies. But, be the reasons what they may, we must never neglect to remember the fact that the influence of all others most detrimental to recreation is the absence of agreeable emotions or the presence of painful ones. There is, for instance, comparatively little use in taking so-called constitutional exercise at stated times, if the mind during these times is emotionally colorless, or, still worse, aching with sorrow and care. If recreation is to be of good quality, it must before all things be of a kind to stimulate pleasurable feelings, and while it lasts it ought to engross the whole of our consciousness. Half-hearted action is quite as little remunerative here as elsewhere; and, if we desire to work well, no less in play than in work must we fulfill the saying, "What thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might."

Health may be taken as implying capacity for work, as well as to a large, though to a less absolute degree, the capacity for happiness; and, as duty means our obligation to promote the general happiness, it follows that in no connection is the voice of duty more urgent than it is in the advancement of all that is conducive to health. By maintaining our own health at the highest point of its natural efficiency, we are doing all that in us lies to secure for ourselves the prime condition for work—that is, the prime condition for benefiting the community to whatever extent our powers may be capable. And, similarly, by promoting the health of others, we are, in proportion to our success, securing to the community a certain amount of additional capacity for work on the part of its constituent members, as well as increasing the individual capacity for happiness on the part of all the members whom our efforts may reach. Therefore, I take it that if we regard this subject from an ethical point of view, it is clear that we have no duty to perform of a more grave and important kind than this—thoughtfully to study the conditions of health, earnestly to teach these conditions to others, and strenuously to make their observance a law to ourselves. Now, of these conditions one of the most important is suitable recreation. For this is the condition which extends to all classes of the community, and the observance of which is, as we have

seen, an imperative necessity to every individual who desires to possess a sound working mind in a sound working body. Hence I do not hesitate to say that one of our most weighty duties in life is to ascertain the kinds and degrees of recreation which are most suitable to ourselves or to others, and then with all our hearts to utilize the one, while with all our powers we encourage the other. Be it remembered that by recreation I mean only that which with the least expenditure of time renders the exhausted energies most fitted to resume their work; and be it also remembered that recreation is necessary not only for maintaining our powers of work so far as these are dependent on our vitality, but also for maintaining our happiness so far as this is dependent on our health. Remembering these things, I entertain no fear of contradiction when I conclude that, whether we look to the community as a whole, or restrict our view to our own individual selves, we have no duty to discharge of a more high and serious kind than this—rationally to understand and properly to apply the principles of all that in the full but only legitimate sense of the word we call recreation. Again, therefore, I say, if we know these things, happy are we if we do them. And if we desire to do them—if as rational and moral creatures we desire to obey the most solemn injunction that ever fell from human lips, “Work while it is day”—we must remember that the daylight of our life may be clouded by our folly or shortened by our sin; that the work which we may hope to do we shall be enabled to do only by hearkening to that Wisdom who holdeth in her right hand length of days, in her left hand riches and honor; and that at last, when all to us is dark with the darkness of an unknown night, such Wisdom will not have cried to us in vain, if she has taught us how to sow most plenteously a harvest of good things that our children’s children are to reap.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Do the conditions of contemporary life in regard to health and exercise seem to you to be better than described in the

opening paragraph of this article, which was written some years ago? 2. Distinguish between *amusements* and *recreations*. 3. Explain the physiological effects of muscular activity and show their hygienic value. 4. Compare in point of benefit moderate exercise with vigorous exercise. 5. May over-exercise have hurtful effects? 6. Consider from the point of permanent physical benefit the prominent forms of college athletics, football, baseball, rowing, etc. 7. Are such games as tennis and golf, which are not so prominent as forms of college athletics, more likely to confer permanent benefit physically, and therefore deserving of being encouraged by college authorities among students? 8. Why and to what extent is there a connection between mental efficiency and bodily vigor? 9. In the recreative life of your institution, is the athletic ideal of vigorous exercise or the hygienic ideal of sufficient moderate exercise for bodily and mental efficiency predominant?

GENERAL READING

THE CHOICE OF BOOKS¹

FREDERIC HARRISON

[Frederic Harrison (1831—) is a noted English lawyer and literary critic. This selection was originally delivered in 1878 before the London Institution for the Diffusion of Knowledge. Subsequently, it appeared with some of the writer's other discussions in the same field, in a volume entitled *The Choice of Books*.]

It is the fashion for those who have any connection with letters to expatiate on the infinite blessings of literature, and the miraculous achievements of the press: to extol, as a gift above price, the taste for study and the love of reading. Far be it from me to gainsay the inestimable value of good books, or to discourage any man from reading the best; but I often think that we forget that other side to this glorious view of literature—the misuse of books, the debilitating waste of brains in aimless, promiscuous, vapid reading, or even, it may be, in the poisonous inhalation of mere literary garbage and bad men's worst thoughts.

For what can a book be more than the man who wrote it? The brightest genius seldom puts the best of his own soul into his printed page; and some famous men have certainly put the worst of theirs. Yet are all men desirable companions, much less teachers, able to give us advice, even of those who get reputation and command a hearing? To put out of the question that writing which is positively bad, are we not, amidst the multiplicity of books and writers, in continual danger of

¹ Reprinted by permission from *The Choice of Books*, The Macmillan Company.

being drawn off by what is stimulating rather than solid, by curiosity after something accidentally notorious, by what has no intelligible thing to recommend it, except that it is new? Now, to stuff our minds with what is simply trivial, simply curious, or that which at best has but a low nutritive power, this is to close our minds to what is solid and enlarging and spiritually sustaining.

Whether our neglect of the great books comes from our not reading at all, or from an incorrigible habit of reading the little books, it ends in just the same thing. And that thing is ignorance of all the greater literature of the world. To neglect all the abiding parts of knowledge for the sake of the evanescent parts is really to know nothing worth knowing. It is in the end the same, whether we do not use our minds for serious study at all, or whether we exhaust them by an impotent voracity for desultory "information"—a thing as fruitful as whistling. Of the two evils I prefer the former. At least, in that case, the mind is healthy and open. It is not gorged and enfeebled by excess in that which cannot nourish, much less enlarge and beautify our nature.

But there is much more than this. Even to those who resolutely avoid the idleness of reading what is trivial, a difficulty is presented—a difficulty every day increasing by virtue even of our abundance of books. What are the subjects, what are the class of books we are to read, in what order, with what connection, to what ultimate use or object?

Even those who are resolved to read the better books are embarrassed by a field of choice practically boundless. The longest life, the greatest industry, joined to the most powerful memory, would not suffice to make us profit from a hundredth part of the world of books before us. If the great Newton said that he seemed to have been all his life gathering a few shells on the shore, while a boundless ocean of truth still lay beyond and unknown to him, how much more to each of us must the sea of literature be a pathless immensity beyond our powers of vision or of reach—an immensity in which industry itself is useless without judgment, method, discipline; where it is of

infinite importance what we can learn and remember, and of utterly no importance what we may have once looked at or heard of. Alas! the most of our reading leaves as little mark even in our own education as the foam that gathers round the keel of a passing boat!

For myself, I am inclined to think the most useful help to reading is to know what we should not read, what we can keep out from that small cleared spot in the overgrown jungle of "information," the corner which we can call our ordered patch of fruit-bearing knowledge. The incessant accumulation of fresh books must hinder any real knowledge of the old; for the multiplicity of volumes becomes a bar upon our use of any. In literature especially does it hold—that we cannot see the wood for the trees.

How shall we choose our books? Which are the best, the eternal, indispensable books? To all to whom reading is something more than a refined idleness these questions recur, bringing with them the sense of bewilderment; and a still, small voice within us is forever crying out for some guide across the Slough of Despond of an illimitable and ever-swelling literature. How many a man stands beside it, as uncertain of his pathway as the Pilgrim, when he who dreamed the immortal dream heard him "break out with a lamentable cry: saying, what shall I do?" And this, which comes home to all of us at times, presses hardest upon those who have lost the opportunity of systematic education, who have to educate themselves, or who seek to guide the education of their young people.

Systematic reading is but little in favor even among studious men; in a true sense it is hardly possible for women. A comprehensive course of home study, and a guide to books fit for the highest education of women, is yet a blank page remaining to be filled. Generations of men of culture have labored to organize a system of reading and materials appropriate for the methodical education of men in academic lines. Teaching equal in mental caliber to any that is open to men in universities, yet modified for the needs of those who must

study at home, remains in the dim pages of that melancholy volume entitled "*Libri valde desiderati.*"¹

I do not aspire to fill one of those blank pages; but I long to speak a word or two, as the Pilgrim did to Neighbor Pliable, upon the glories that await those who will pass through the narrow wicket-gate. On this, if one can find anything useful to say, it may be chiefly from the memory of the waste labor and pitiful stumbling in the dark which fill up so much of the travail that one is fain to call one's own education. We who have wandered in the wastes so long, and lost so much of our lives in our wandering, may at least offer warnings to younger wayfarers, as men who in thorny paths have borne the heat and burden of the day might give a clue to their journey to those who have yet a morning and a noon. As I look back and think of those cataracts of printed stuff which honest compositors set up, meaning, let us trust, no harm, and which at least found them in daily bread,—printed stuff which I and the rest of us, to our infinitely small profit, have consumed with our eyes, not even making an honest living of it, but much impairing our substance,—I could almost reckon the printing press as among the scourges of mankind. I am grown a wiser and a sadder man, importunate, like that Ancient Mariner, to tell each blithe wedding guest the tale of his shipwreck on the infinite sea of printers' ink, as one escaped by mercy and grace from the region where there is water, water, everywhere, and not a drop to drink.

A man of power, who has got more from books than most of his contemporaries, once said: "Form a habit of reading, do not mind what you read; the reading of better books will come when you have a habit of reading the inferior." We need not accept this *obiter dictum*² of Lord Sherbrooke. A habit of reading idly debilitates and corrupts the mind for all wholesome reading; the habit of reading wisely is one of the most difficult habits to acquire, needing strong resolution and infinite pains; and reading for mere reading's sake, in-

¹ Books greatly desired.

² Thing said in passing.

stead of for the sake of the good we gain from reading, is one of the worst and commonest and most unwholesome habits we have.

And so our inimitable humorist has made delightful fun of the solid books,—which no gentleman's library should be without,—the Humes, Gibbons, Adam Smiths, which, he says, are not books at all, and prefers some "kind-hearted play-book," or at times the "Town and County Magazine."

Poor Lamb has not a little to answer for, in the revived relish for garbage unearthed from old theatrical dung-heaps. Be it jest or earnest, I have little patience with the Eleatic philosophy of the frivolous. Why do we still suffer the traditional hypocrisy about the dignity of literature—literature, I mean, in the gross, which includes about equal parts of what is useful and what is useless? Why are books as books, writers as writers, readers as readers, meritorious, apart from any good in them, or anything that we can get from them? Why do we pride ourselves on our powers of absorbing print, as our grandfathers did on their gifts in imbibing port, when we know that there is a mode of absorbing print, which makes it impossible that we can ever learn anything good out of books?

Our stately Milton said in a passage which is one of the watchwords of the English race, "as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book." But has he not also said that he would "have a vigilant eye how Bookes demeane themselves, as well as men; and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors"? . . . Yes! they do kill the good book who deliver up their few and precious hours of reading to the trivial book; they make it dead for them; they do what lies in them to destroy "the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, imbalm'd and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life"; they "spill that season'd life of man preserv'd and stor'd up in Bookes." For in the wilderness of books most men, certainly all busy men, must strictly choose. If they saturate their minds with the idler books, the "good book," which Milton calls "an immortality rather than a lie," is dead to them: it is a book sealed up and buried.

It is most right that in the great republic of letters there should

be freedom of intercourse and a spirit of equality. Every reader who holds a book in his hand is free of the inmost minds of men past and present; their lives both within and without the pale of their uttered thoughts are unveiled to him; he needs no introduction to the greatest; he stands on no ceremony with them; he may, if he be so minded, scribble "doggerel" on his Shelley, or he may kick Lord Byron, if he please, into a corner. He hears Burke perorate, and Johnson dogmatize, and Scott tell his border tales, and Wordsworth muse on the hillside, without the leave of any man, or the payment of any toll. In the republic of letters there are no privileged orders or places reserved. Every man who has written a book, even the diligent Mr. Whitaker, is in one sense an author; "a book's a book although there's nothing in't"; and every man who can decipher a penny journal is in one sense a reader. And your "general reader," like the grave-digger in "Hamlet," is hail-fellow with all the mighty dead; he pats the skull of the jester; batters the cheek of lord, lady, or courtier; and uses "imperious Cæsar" to teach boys the Latin declensions.

But this notable equality of all writers—of all writers and of all readers—has a perilous side to it. It is apt to make us discriminate in the books we read, and somewhat contemptuous of the mighty men of the past. Men who are most observant as to the friends they make, or the conversation they share, are carelessness itself as to the books to whom they intrust themselves, and the printed language with which they saturate their minds. Yet can any friendship or society be more important to us than that of the books which form so large a part of our minds and even of our characters? Do we in real life take any pleasant fellow to our homes and chat with some agreeable rascal by our firesides, we who will take up any pleasant fellow's printed memoirs, we who delight in the agreeable rascal when he is cut up into pages and bound in calf? If any person giving to reading were honestly to keep a register of all the printed stuff that he or she consumes in a year—all the idle tales of which the very names and the story are forgotten in a week, the bookmaker's prattle about nothing at so much a

sheet, the fugitive trifling about silly things and empty people, the memoirs of the unmemorable, and lives of those who never really lived at all—of what a mountain of rubbish would be the catalogue! Exercise for the eye and the memory, as mechanical as if we set ourselves to learn the names, ages, and family histories of every one who lives in our own street, the flirtations of their maiden aunts, and the circumstances surrounding the birth of their grandmothers' first baby.

It is impossible to give any method to our reading till we get nerve enough to reject. The most exclusive and careful among us will (in literature) take boon companions out of the street, as easily as an idler in a tavern. "I came across such and such a book that I never heard mentioned," says one, "and found it curious, though entirely worthless." "I strayed on a volume by I know not whom, on a subject for which I never cared." And so on. There are curious and worthless creatures enough in any pot-house all day long; and there is incessant talk in omnibus, train, or street by we know not whom, about we care not what. Yet if a printer and a bookseller can be induced to make this gabble as immortal as print and publication can make it, then it straightway is literature, and in due time it becomes "curious."

I have no intention to moralize or to indulge in a homily against the reading of what is deliberately evil. There is not so much need for this now, and I am not discoursing on the whole duty of man. I take that part of our reading which by itself is no doubt harmless, entertaining, and even gently instructive. But of this enormous mass of literature how much deserves to be chosen out, to be preferred to all the great books of the world, to be set apart for those precious hours which are all that the most of us can give to solid reading? The vast proportion of books are books that we shall never be able to read. A serious percentage of books are not worth reading at all. The really vital books for us we also know to be a very trifling portion of the whole. And yet we act as if every book were as good as any other, as if it were merely a question of order which we take up first, as if any book were good enough for us, and as

if all were alike honorable, precious, and satisfying. Alas! books cannot be more than the men who write them; and as a fair proportion of the human race now write books, with motives and objects as various as human activity, books as books, are entitled *a priori*, until their value is proved, to the same attention and respect as houses, steam-engines, pictures, fiddles, bonnets, and other products of human industry.

In the shelves of those libraries which are our pride, libraries public or private, circulating or very stationary, are to be found those great books of the world *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*,¹ those books which are truly "the precious life-blood of a master-spirit." But the very familiarity which their mighty fame has bred in us makes us indifferent; we grow weary of what every one is supposed to have read; and we take down something which looks a little eccentric, some worthless book, on the mere ground that we never heard of it before. Thus the difficulties of literature are in their way as great as those of the world, the obstacles to finding the right friends are as great, the peril is as great of being lost in a Babel of voices and an ever-changing mass of beings.

Books are not wiser than men, the true books are not easier to find than the true men, the bad books or the vulgar books are not less obtrusive and not less ubiquitous than the bad or vulgar men are everywhere; the art of right reading is as long and difficult to learn as the art of right living. Those who are on good terms with the first author they meet, run as much risk as men who surrender their time to the first passer in the street; for to be open to every book is for the most part to gain as little as possible from any. A man aimlessly wandering about in a crowded city is of all men the most lonely; so he who takes up only the books that he "comes across" is pretty certain to meet but few that are worth knowing.

Now this danger is one to which we are specially exposed in this age. Our high-pressure life of emergencies, our whirling industrial organization or disorganization have brought us in this (as in most things) their peculiar difficulties and drawbacks.

¹ Floating here and there in the surging sea.

In almost everything vast opportunities and gigantic means of multiplying our products bring with them new perils and troubles which are often at first neglected. Our huge cities, where wealth is piled up and the requirements and appliances of life extended beyond the dreams of our forefathers, seem to breed in themselves new forms of squalor, disease, blights, or risks to life such as we are yet unable to master. So the enormous multiplicity of modern books is not altogether favorable to the knowing of the best. I listen with mixed satisfaction to the pæans that they chant over the works which issue from the press each day; how the books poured forth from Paternoster Row might in a few years be built into a pyramid that would fill the dome of St. Paul's. How in this mountain of literature am I to find the really useful book? How, when I have found it, and found its value, am I to get others to read it? How am I to keep my head clear in the torrent and din of works, all of which distract my attention, most of which promise me something, while so few fulfill that promise? The Nile is the source of the Egyptian's bread, and without it he perishes of hunger. But the Nile may be rather too liberal in his flood, and then the Egyptian runs imminent risk of drowning.

And thus there never was a time, at least during the last two hundred years, when the difficulties in the way of making an efficient use of books were greater than they are to-day, when the obstacles were more real between readers and the right books to read, when it was practically so troublesome to find out that which it is of vital importance to know; and that not by the dearth, but by the plethora of printed matter. For it comes to nearly the same thing whether we are actually debarred by physical impossibility from getting the right book into our hand, or whether we are choked off from the right book by the obtrusive crowd of the wrong books; so that it needs a strong character and a resolute system of reading to keep the head cool in the storm of literature around us. We read nowadays in the market-place—I would rather say in some large steam factory of letter-press, where damp sheets of new print whirl round us perpetually—if it be not rather some noisy book-fair where

literary showmen tempt us with performing dolls, and the gongs of rival booths are stunning our ears from morn till night.

Contrast with this pandemonium of Leipsic and Paternoster Row the sublime picture of our Milton in his early retirement at Horton, when, musing over his coming flight to the epic heaven, practising his pinions, as he tells Diodati, he consumed five years of solitude in reading the ancient writers—

“Et totum rapiunt me, mea vita, libri.”¹

Who now reads the ancient writers? Who systematically reads the great writers, be they ancient or modern, whom the consent of ages has marked out as classics: typical, immortal, peculiar teachers of our race? Alas! the “Paradise Lost” is lost again to us beneath an inundation of graceful academic verse, sugary stanzas of ladylike prettiness, and ceaseless explanations in more or less readable prose of what John Milton meant or did not mean, or what he saw or did not see, who married his great-aunt, and why Adam or Satan is like that, or unlike the other. We read a perfect library about the “Paradise Lost,” but the “Paradise Lost” itself we do not read.

I am not presumptuous enough to assert that the larger part of modern literature is not worth reading in itself, that the prose is not readable, entertaining, one may say highly instructive. Nor do I pretend that the verses which we read so zealously in place of Milton’s are not good verses. On the contrary, I think them sweetly conceived, as musical and as graceful as the verse of any age in our history. A great deal of our modern literature is such that it is exceedingly difficult to resist it, and it is undeniable that it gives us real information. It seems perhaps unreasonable to many to assert that a decent readable book which gives us actual instruction can be otherwise than a useful companion and a solid gain. Possibly many people are ready to cry out upon me as an obscurantist for venturing to doubt a genial confidence in all literature simply as such. But the question which weighs upon me with such really crushing

¹ And my book, my life, possess me utterly.

urgency is this: What are the books that in our little remnant of reading time it is most vital for us to know? For the true use of books is of such sacred value to us that to be simply entertained is to cease to be taught, elevated, inspired by books; merely to gather information of a chance kind is to close the mind to knowledge of the urgent kind.

Every book that we take up without a purpose is an opportunity lost of taking up a book with a purpose—every bit of stray information which we cram into our heads without any sense of its importance, is for the most part a bit of the most useful information driven out of our heads and choked off from our minds.

It is so certain that information, *i. e.*, the knowledge the stored thoughts and observations of mankind, is now grown to proportions so utterly incalculable and prodigious, that even the learned whose lives are given to study can but pick up some crumbs that fall from the table of truth. They delve and tend but a plot in that vast and teeming kingdom, while those whom active life leaves with but a few cramped hours of study can hardly come to know the very vastness of the field before them, or how infinitesimally small is the corner they can traverse at the best. We know all is not of equal value. We know that books differ in value as much as diamonds differ from the sand on the seashore, as much as our living friend differs from a dead rat. We know that much in the myriad-peopled world of books—very much in all kinds—is trivial, enervating, inane, even obnoxious. And thus, where we have infinite opportunities of wasting our efforts to no end, of fatiguing our minds without enriching them, of clogging the spirit without satisfying it, there, I cannot but think, the very infinity of opportunities is robbing us of the actual power of using them. And thus I come often, in my less hopeful moods, to watch the remorseless cataract of daily literature which thunders over the remnants of the past, as if it were a fresh impediment to the men of our day in the way of systematic knowledge and consistent powers of thought, as if it were destined one day to overwhelm the great inheritance of mankind in prose and verse.

I remember, when I was a very young man at college, that a youth, in no spirit of paradox, but out of plenary conviction, undertook to maintain before a body of serious students, the astounding proposition that the invention of printing had been one of the greatest misfortunes that had ever befallen mankind. He argued that exclusive reliance on printed matter had destroyed the higher method of oral teaching, the dissemination of thought by the spoken word to the attentive ear. He insisted that the information of a vast literary class looking to the making of books as a means of making money rather than as a social duty, had multiplied books for the sake of the writers rather than for the sake of the readers; that the reliance on books as a cheap and common resource had done much to weaken the powers of memory; that it destroyed the craving for a general culture of taste, and the need of artistic expression in all the surroundings of life. And he argued lastly that the sudden multiplication of all kinds of printed matter had been fatal to the orderly arrangement of thought, and had hindered a system of knowledge and a scheme of education.

I am far from sharing this immature view. Of course I hold the invention of printing to have been one of the most momentous facts in the whole history of man. Without it universal social progress, true democratic enlightenment, and the education of the people would have been impossible, or very slow, even if the cultured few, as is likely, could have advanced the knowledge of mankind without it. We place Gutemberg among the small list of the unique and special benefactors of mankind, in the sacred choir of those whose work transformed the conditions of life, whose work, once done, could never be repeated. And no doubt the things which our ardent friend regarded as so fatal a disturbance of society were all inevitable and necessary, part of the great revolution of mind through which men grew out of the mediæval incompleteness to a richer conception of life and of the world.

Yet there is a sense in which this boyish anathema against printing may become true to us by our own fault. We may create for ourselves these very evils. For the art of printing

has not been a gift wholly unmixed with evils; it must be used wisely if it is to be a boon to man at all; it entails on us heavy responsibilities, resolution to use it with judgment and self-control, and the will to resist its temptations and its perils. Indeed, we may easily so act that we may make it a clog on the progress of the human mind, a real curse and not a boon. The power of flying at will through space would probably extinguish civilization and society, for it would release us from the wholesome bondage of place and rest. The power of hearing every word that had ever been uttered on this planet would annihilate thought, as the power of knowing all recorded facts by the process of turning a handle would annihilate true science. Our human faculties and our mental forces are not enlarged simply by multiplying our materials of knowledge and our facilities for communication. Telephones, microphones, pantoscopes, steam-presses, and ubiquity-engines in general may, after all, leave the poor human brain panting and throbbing under the strain of its appliances, no bigger and no stronger than the brains of the men who heard Moses speak, and saw Aristotle and Archimedes pondering over a few worn rolls of crabbed manuscript. Until some new Gutemberg or Watt can invent a machine for magnifying the human mind, every fresh apparatus for multiplying its work is a fresh strain on the mind, a new realm for it to order and to rule.

And so, I say it most confidently, the first intellectual task of our age is rightly to order and make serviceable the vast realm of printed material which four centuries have swept across our path. To organize our knowledge, to systematize our reading, to save, out of the relentless cataract of ink, the immortal thoughts of the greatest—this is a necessity, unless the productive ingenuity of man is to lead us at last to a measureless and pathless chaos. To know anything that turns up is, in the infinity of knowledge, to know nothing. To read the first book we come across, in the wilderness of books, is to learn nothing. To turn over the pages of ten thousand volumes is to be practically indifferent to all that is good.

But this warns me that I am entering on a subject which

is far too big and solemn. It is plain that to organize our knowledge, even to systematize our reading, to make a working selection of books for general study, really implies a complete scheme of education. A scheme of education ultimately implies a system of philosophy, a view of man's duty and powers as a moral and social being—a religion. Before a problem so great as this, on which readers have such different ideas and wants, and differ so profoundly on the very premises from which we start, before such a problem as a general theory of education, I prefer to pause. I will keep silence even from good words. I have chosen my own part, and adopted my own teacher. But to ask men to adopt the education of Auguste Comte, is almost to ask them to adopt Positivism itself. Nor will I enlarge on the matter for thought, for foreboding, almost for despair, that is presented to us by the fact of our familiar literary ways and our recognized literary profession. That things infinitely trifling in themselves: men, events, societies, phenomena, in no way otherwise more valuable than the myriad other things which flit around us like the sparrows on the housetop, should be glorified, magnified, and perpetuated, set under a literary microscope and focussed in the blaze of a literary magic-lantern—not for what they are in themselves, but solely to amuse and excite the world by showing how it can be done—all this is to me so amazing, so heart-breaking, that I forbear now to treat it, as I cannot say all that I would.

The choice of books is really the choice of our education, of a moral and intellectual ideal, of the whole duty of man. But though I shrink from any so high a theme, a few words are needed to indicate my general point of view in the matter.

In the first place, when we speak about books, let us avoid the extravagance of expecting too much from books, the pedant's habit of extolling books as synonymous with education. Books are no more education than laws are virtue; and just as profligacy is easy within the strict limits of law, a boundless knowledge of books may be found with a narrow education. A man may be, as the poet saith, "deep vers'd in books, and shallow in himself." We need to know in order that we may feel rightly and act

wisely. The thirst after truth itself may be pushed to a degree where indulgence enfeebles our sympathies and unnerves us in action. Of all men perhaps the booklover needs most to be reminded that man's business here is to know for the sake of living; not to live for the sake of knowing. A healthy mode of reading would follow the lines of a sound education. And the first canon of a sound education is to make it the instrument to perfect the whole nature and character. Its aims are comprehensive, not special; they regard life as a whole, not mental curiosity; they have to give us, not so much materials, as capacities. So that, however moderate and limited the opportunity for education, in its way it should be always more or less symmetrical and balanced, appealing equally in turn to the three grand intellectual elements—imagination, memory, reflection: and so having something to give us in poetry, in history, in science, and in philosophy.

And thus our reading will be sadly one-sided, however voluminous it be, if it entirely close to us any of the great types and ideals which the creative instinct of man has produced, if it shut out from us either the ancient world, or other European poetry, as important almost as our own. When our reading, however deep, runs wholly into "pockets," and exhausts itself in the literature of one age, one country, one type, then we may be sure that it is tending to narrow or deform our minds. And the more it leads us into curious byways and nurtures us into indifference for the beaten highways of the world, the sooner we shall end, if we be not specialists and students by profession, in ceasing to treat our books as the companions and the solace of our lifetime, and in using them as the instruments of a refined sort of self-indulgence.

A wise education, and so judicious reading, should leave no great type of thought, no dominant phase of human nature, wholly a blank. Whether our reading be great or small, so far as it goes, it should be general. If our lives admit of but a short space for reading, all the more reason that, so far as may be, it should remind us of the vast expanse of human thought, and the wonderful variety of human nature.

To read, and yet so to read that we see nothing but a corner of literature, the loose fringe, or flats and wastes of letters, and by reading only deepen our natural belief that this island is the hub of the universe, and the nineteenth century the only age worth notice, all this is really to call in the aid of books to thicken and harden our untaught prejudices. Be it imagination, memory, or reflection that we address—that is, in poetry, history, science, or philosophy—our first duty is to aim at knowing something at least of the best, at getting some definite idea of the mighty realm whose outer rim we are permitted to approach.

But how are we to know the best; how are we to gain this definite idea of the vast world of letters? There are some who appear to suppose that the “best” are known only to experts in an esoteric way, who may reveal to inquirers what schoolboys and betting-men describe as “tips.” There are no “tips” in literature; the “best” authors are never dark horses; we need no “crammers” and “coaches” to thrust us into the presence of the great writers of all time. “Crammers” will only lead us wrong. It is a thing far easier and more common than many imagine, to discover the best. It needs no research, no learning, and is only misguided by recondite information. The world has long ago closed the great assize of letters, and judged the first places everywhere. In such a matter the judgment of the world, guided and informed by a long succession of accomplished critics, is almost unerring. When some Zoilus finds blemishes in Homer, and prefers, it may be, the work of some Apollonius of his own discovering, we only laugh. There may be doubts about the third and the fourth rank; but the first and the second are hardly open to discussion.

The gates which lead to the Elysian fields may slowly wheel back on their adamantine hinges to admit now and then some new and chosen modern. But the company of the masters of those who know, and in especial degree of the great poets, is a roll long closed and complete, and they who are of it hold ever peaceful converse together. Hence we may find it a useful maxim that, if our reading be utterly closed to the great poems

of the world, there is something amiss with our reading. If you find Milton, Dante, Calderon, Goethe, so much "Hebrew-Greek" to you; if your Homer and Virgil, your Molière and Scott, rest year after year undisturbed on their shelves beside your school trigonometry and your old college text-books; if you have never opened the "Cid," the "Nibelungen," "Crusoe," and "Don Quixote," since you were a boy, and are wont to leave the Bible and the Imitation¹ for some wet Sunday afternoon—know, friend, that your reading can do you little real good. Your mental digestion is ruined or sadly out of order.

No doubt, to thousands of intelligent educated men who call themselves readers, the reading through a Canto of "The Purgatorio," or a Book of the "Paradise Lost," is a task as irksome as it would be to decipher an ill-written manuscript in a language that is almost forgotten. But, although we are not to be always reading epics, and are chiefly in the mood for slighter things, to be absolutely unable to read Milton or Dante with enjoyment, is to be in a very bad way. Aristophanes, Theocritus, Boccaccio, Cervantes, Molière are often as light as the driven foam; but they are not light enough for the general reader. Their humor is too bright and lovely for the groundlings. They are, alas! "classics," somewhat apart from our everyday ways; they are not banal enough for us; and so for us they slumber "unknown in a long night," just because they are immortal poets, and are not scribblers of to-day.

When will men understand that the reading of great books is a faculty to be acquired, not a natural gift, at least not to those who are spoiled by our current education and habits of life? *Ceci tuera cela*,² the last great poet might have said of the first circulating library. An insatiable appetite for new novels makes it as hard to read a masterpiece as it seems to a Parisian boulevardier to live in a quiet country. Until a man can truly enjoy a draught of clear water bubbling from a mountain side, his taste is in an unwholesome state.

And so he who finds the Heliconian spring insipid should

¹ *The Imitation of Christ* by Thomas a Kempis.

² This will kill that.

look to the state of his nerves. Putting aside the iced air of the difficult mountain tops of epic, tragedy, or psalm, there are some simple pieces which may serve as an unerring test of a healthy or a vicious taste for imaginative work. If the "Cid," the "Vita Nuova," the "Canterbury Tales," Shakespeare's "Sonnets," and "Lycidas" pall on a man; if he care not for Malory's "Morte d'Arthur" and the "Red Cross Knight"; if he thinks "Crusoe" and the "Vicar" books for the young; if he thrill not with "The Ode to the West Wind," and "The Ode to a Grecian Urn"; if he have no stomach for "Christabel" or the lines written on "The Wye above Tintern Abbey," he should fall on his knees and pray for a cleaner and quieter spirit.

The intellectual system of most of us in these days needs "to purge and to live cleanly." Only by a course of treatment shall we bring our minds to feel at peace with the grand pure works of the world. Something we ought all to know of the masterpieces of antiquity, and of the other nations of Europe. To understand a great national poet, such as Dante, Calderon, Corneille, or Goethe, is to know other types of human civilization in ways which a library of histories does not sufficiently teach. The great masterpieces of the world are thus, quite apart from the charm and solace they give us, the master instruments of a solid education.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What is the character of the general reading done by the students of your college? 2. Discuss the possibility of finding time in a busy college life to read some of the great books. 3. What plea can be made for reading the current books? For a discussion of this phase of reading, which is a reply to Harrison's views, look up Balfour, A. J., *The Pleasures of Reading*. 4. What is to be said about general reading as a substitute for the curriculum?

SOME HINTS ON READING¹

JAMES BRYCE

[For note on author see page 219. This selection was originally an address to the students of Rutgers College, in October, 1911.]

It has been often said that books do for us to-day what universities did in earlier ages. The knowledge that could five centuries ago have been obtained only from the lips of a teacher, can now be gathered from the printed page. Nevertheless, since it is only the most active and most diligent and most discerning minds that can dispense with the help and guidance of teachers to show them what to read and how to read, universities and colleges are scarcely less useful if not quite as indispensable to-day as they were before the invention of printing. It is, therefore, not unfitting that in your college I should be asked to talk to you about books, the way to choose them, and the way to draw most profit from them. The very abundance of books in our days—a stupefying and terrifying abundance—has made it more important to know how to choose properly and judiciously among them if one is not to spend as much time in the mere choice as in the use. Here you have the help of your professors. But here you are only beginning the process of education which will go on during the rest of your life. By far the largest part of that process will, after you have left college, consist in your independent reading, so the sooner you form habits of choice and methods of use, the better.

The first piece of advice I will venture to give you is this: Read only the best books. There are plenty of them, far more than you will ever find time to read, and when they are to be had it is a pity to waste time on any others.

You may ask what I mean by the best books. Passing by for the moment those which in each of the great world-languages we call its classics, for to these we shall return presently, I mean

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by the best those from which you receive most, and can carry most away, in the form either of knowledge or of stimulation. When you want to learn something about a subject, do not fall upon the first book which you have heard named or which professes by its title to deal with that subject. Consult your teacher, or any well-read friend, or the librarian of the nearest public library. (One of the greatest services public libraries render is that they provide librarians usually competent, and I believe always willing, to advise those who apply to them.) Be content with nothing less than the very best you can get. Time will be saved in the end.

There is no waste more pitiable than that so often seen when some zealous student has, for want of guidance, spent weeks or months of toil trying to obtain from a second- or third-rate book what he might have found sooner and better in a first-rate one. So try to read only what is good. And by "good" you will not suppose me to mean what used to be called "improving books," books written in a sort of Sunday School spirit for the moral benefit of the reader. A book may be excellent in its ethical tone, and full of solid information, and yet be unprofitable, that is to say, dull, heavy, uninspiring, wearisome. Contrariwise, a book is good when it is bright and fresh, when it rouses and enlivens the mind, when it provides materials on which the mind can pleasurably work, when it leaves the reader not only knowing more but better able to use the knowledge he has received from it.

Seventy years ago people, or at least those who used then to be called the preceptors of youth, talked as if there lay a certain virtue in dry books, or at any rate a moral merit in the process of plodding through them. It was a dismal mistake, which inflicted upon youth many a dreary hour. The dull book is not better than the lively book. Other things being equal, it is worse, because it requires more expenditure of effort to master such of its contents as are worth remembering. If the edge of the tool is blunt, one must put forth more strength, and as there is never too much strength, none of it should be wasted. It may be asked, "But is not the mental discipline

wholesome?" Yes, effort crowned with victory is a fine thing, but since there is plenty of such discipline to be had from the better books why go to the worse books for it?

Sometimes it happens that what you want to learn cannot be had except from dry or even from dull treatises. Dryness and dullness are not the same thing, for the former quality may be due to the nature of the subject, but the latter is the fault of the author. Well, if there is no other book to be found, you must make the best of the dry and even of the dull. But first make quite sure that there are none better to be had, for though in many a subject the really satisfactory book has not yet been written, still in most subjects there is a large choice between the better and the worse.

Every book ought to be so composed as to be capable of being read with enjoyment by those who bring interest and capacity to it. One cannot be playfully various and graphically picturesque upon every kind of subject. Once, in a distant British colony, a friend of mine was asked by a person who knew that he came from the University of Oxford, "What do you think of Euclid?" My friend replied that Euclid's "Elements of Geometry"—if that was what the question referred to—was a valuable treatise, whose reputation had been established for many centuries. "Yes," said the questioner, "but what do you think of Euclid's style?" My friend answered that he had always thought more about the substance than about the style of Euclid, but would be glad to know his questioner's opinion. "Well," said the latter, "I consider it quite good style, but too systematic." Eloquence, variety, and wit are not the particular merits we look for in a scientific treatise, but however dry geometry or any other subject may appear, there is all the difference between a book which is well arranged and well expressed, a book which takes a grip of the mind and affords the pleasure of following out a line of logical thought, and a book which tumbles out facts and ideas in a confused and shapeless heap.

To you undergraduates life now seems a long vista with infinite possibilities. But, if you love learning, you will soon

find that life is altogether too short for reading half the good books from which you would like to cull knowledge. Let not an hour of it be wasted on third-rate or second-rate stuff if first-rate stuff can be had. Goethe once said of some one he knew, "He is a dull man. If he were a book, I would not read him." When you find that a book is poor, and does not give you even the bare facts you are in search of, waste no time upon it.

The immensity of the field of reading suggests another question. Ought a man to read widely, trying to keep abreast of the progress of knowledge and thought in the world at large, or is it better that he should confine himself to a very few subjects, and to proceed not discursively but upon some regular system?

Each alternative has its advantages, but considering how rapidly knowledge is extending itself in all directions, and how every branch of it is becoming specialized, we must recognize that the range of attainment possible three or even two centuries ago is now unattainable even by the most powerful and most industrious minds. To-day the choice lies between superficiality in a larger, and some approach to thoroughness in a smaller, number of topics. Between these alternatives there can be no doubt as to your choice. Every man ought to be thorough in at least one thing, ought to know what exactness and accuracy mean, ought to be capable by his mastery of some one topic of having an opinion that is genuinely his own. So my advice to you would be to direct your reading chiefly to a few subjects, in one at least of which you may hope to make yourself proficient, and as regards other subjects, to be content with doing what you can to follow the general march of knowledge. You will find it hard—indeed impossible—to follow that march in the physical sciences, unless you start with some special knowledge of one or more of them. Many of the branches into which they have been diverging are now so specialized that the ordinary reader can hardly comprehend the technical terms which modern treatises employ. But as respects travel and history and biography, and similarly as

respects economics, the so-called "sociological subjects," art, and literary criticism, it is possible for a man who husbands his time and spends little of it on newspapers or magazines, to find leisure for the really striking books that are published on some of these topics which lie outside his special tastes. Do not, however, attempt to cover even the striking books on all of such topics. You will only dissipate your forces. Now and then a book appears which everybody ought to read, no matter how far it lies out of his range of study. It may be a brilliant poem. It may be a treatise throwing new light on some current question of home or foreign politics, about which every citizen, because he is a citizen, ought to try to have an opinion. It may be the record of some startling discovery in the realms of archæology, for instance, or in some branch of natural science. But such books are rare; and in particular the epoch-making scientific discoveries are seldom known at the time when the world first hears of them to be really epoch-making.

Two questions may, however, have presented themselves to you. One is this: Are there not some indispensable books which every one is bound to read on pain of being deemed to be not an educated man? Certainly there are. Every language has its classics which those who speak the language ought to have read as a part of a liberal education. In our own tongue we have, say, a score of great authors—it would be easy to add another dozen, but I wish to be moderate and put the number as low as possible—of whose works every one of us is bound to have read enough to enable him to appreciate the author's peculiar quality. These of course you must read, though not necessarily all or nearly all they have written. Spenser, for instance, is an English classic, but even so voracious a reader as Macaulay admitted that few could be expected to persevere to the end of the "Faery Queene." Even smaller is the percentage of Dryden's works which a man may feel bound to read. Do not look for an opinion as to the percentage in the case of Robert Browning. The sooner you begin to read those who belong to this score, the better, for most of them are poets, and youth

is the season in which to learn to love poetry. If you do not care for it then, you will hardly do so later.

The other question is, What about fiction? I can just recall an austere time, more than sixty years ago, when in Britain not a few moralists and educators were disposed to ban novel-reading altogether to young people and to treat it even among their elders as an indulgence almost as dangerous as the use of cards, dice, and tobacco. Exceptions, however, were made even by the sternest of these authorities. I recollect that one of them gave this imprimatur to two stories by an estimable Scottish authoress—now long forgotten—named Miss Brunton. These tales were entitled "Discipline" and "Self-Control," and a perusal of them was well fitted to discourage the young reader from indulging any further his taste for imaginary literature. Permitted fiction being scanty, I did attack "Self-Control," and just got through it, but "Discipline" was too much for me. Fiction is far more read now; being abundant and cheaper since it comes in the form of magazines as well as in books. But we have no Dickens, no Thackeray, no Hawthorne, no George Eliot.

Need anything more be said about fiction than that we should deal with it just as we should with other kinds of literature? Read the best; that is to say, read that from which you can carry away something that enlarges the range of your knowledge and sets your mind working. A good story, be it a historical romance or a picture of contemporary social conditions, gives something that is worth remembering. It may be a striking type of character, or a view of life and the influences that mold life, presented in a dramatic form. Or perhaps the tale portrays the aspects of society and manners in some other country, or is made a vehicle for an analysis of the heart and for reflections that illuminate some of the dark corners of human nature. Whichever of them it be that a powerful piece of fiction gives, the result is something more powerful than mere transient amusement. Knowledge is increased. Thought is set in motion. New images rise before us. It is an enrichment of the mind to have erected within it a gallery of characters of history, to some of us possibly more real. In them we see the

universal traits of human nature and learn to know ourselves and those around us better, we comprehend the common temptations and aspirations, the mixture of motives, the way in which Fortune plays with men. We share the possession of this gallery with other educated men. It is a part of the common stock of the world's wealth.

The danger of becoming so fond of fiction as to care for no other sort of reading, a malady from which some men and more women are said to suffer, will threaten nobody who has formed the habit of reading the kind of fiction I am trying to describe; because he will enjoy no other kind. A boy or girl can usually read any sort of tale be it better or worse written. The story is enough for him. As he grows older and has read more and more of the best writers, his taste becomes more cultivated and exacting. While faults repel him more, merits attract him more, because he has become more capable of appreciation. At last a poor quality of fiction which is merely commonplace, handling threadbare themes in a hackneyed way, the sort of fiction into which no incentive or reflected thought has gone, comes to bore him. He can no longer read it, because it is too dull or too vapid.

Prose fiction in its higher forms cultivates the imagination almost as well as history does, but poetry does this better than either. The pleasures of the imagination are among the highest we can enjoy. Unless, therefore, any one of you is so unlucky as to find no delight in poetry, it will always form a part of your reading. Not much of the highest order has been appearing in these later days in any country, but there is such an abundance from former days that you will never want for plenty to read and no modern language possesses so much poetry of first-rate merit as does our own.

It seems a pity that the old practice of learning a good deal of poetry by heart should now be falling into disuse, for it stored the mind in the early years of life with fine thoughts in fine words and helped to form a taste for style, seeing that style can rise to greater heights of perfection in poetry than in any kind of prose. As to what to read in poetry, there is no need in

our day to warn any one against reading too much, and there is little to say about choice, for you will naturally be drawn first to the great and famous classics in our own and other tongues, and they will so form your taste that you will know how to choose among other verse writers. In particular do not omit those few great writers who have attained to a distinctive way of looking at the world as a whole (what the Germans call a *Weltanschauung*), those in whose minds and works human nature in all its varieties, human life in all its aspects, is mirrored. The author, or authors, of the Homeric poems is the earliest example: Goethe is one of the latest, and not all are poets, for Cervantes is among them.

A man who does not care for those whom the judgment of the world has approved, may conclude that the fault is with himself. But it is not always the greatest that give the most pleasure. Most of us have some two or three poets not classed in the first rank, perhaps writers whose fame has always been limited, to whom we frequently return because they express thoughts in a way which makes a special appeal to our own minds. Look out for these also, and cherish them when you have found them.

Though divers wise and learned men have drawn up lists of what they describe as the Best Hundred Books, it may be doubted whether such lists have any use beyond that of indicating the preferences of their eminent compilers and the use also of recalling to the notice of the modern public some remarkable works which it has nearly forgotten. The truth is that the excellence of a book is not absolute, *i. e.*, the same for all readers alike, but rather is relative to the knowledge and capacities and environment of the particular reader. Many a book of first-rate value to a person prepared by education and special talents to appreciate it is useless to others not so prepared. A more really interesting inquiry is, What are the books that have made most difference to the progress of the world? Such books are a part, and a significant part, of world-history, yet some of them would interest comparatively few readers to-day.

The question of how much time should be devoted to the

classics of other countries than our own is too large a one for me to enter on. Enough to say that whoever knows Latin or Greek or Italian or French or German or Spanish or Icelandic, will not need to be told that he ought to be just as anxious to know the master-pieces in those languages as those in his own. The ancient classics in particular give something which no modern literature supplies.

From considering *What to read*, let us go on to consider *How to read*. Here my advice to you would be, *Read with a purpose*. Bend your mind upon the book. Read it so as to get out of it the best it has to give you. You may accept this advice as applicable to what is read for information, but you may think it superfluous if the book is a story or other work read for amusement, because presumably no one will persevere with such a book unless it interests him. Yet even where the aim is amusement and the book a work of fiction one man may, if he read it in the right way, extract more benefit as well as more pleasure than another would do. If the story is worth reading it is so because it not only appeals to our curiosity, but also because it pleurably stirs our thought.

With other kinds of literature, with science or philosophy or history or economics, the worth of the book is to be measured by what you can carry away from it, and that depends mainly on the spirit in which you read. The book, as already observed, must have quality enough to stimulate thought, to give you what is called a mental reaction. But however good the quality, the reaction will not follow unless you address your mind to the subject. The purpose must be either to get something—whether facts or ideas—which you can add to your store of knowledge or else to receive a stimulus which will quicken your own powers of thinking and feeling. These two benefits usually go together. It is not the quantity of reading that counts, but the quantity and the intensity of thought that are evoked. Nothing is gained by skimming over hundreds of thousands of pages of print unless something remains from the process. So if after having honestly applied your intellect to a book you do not find anything you care to carry away, drop

it. Either it is not worth further effort, or it may be outside the range of your appreciation.

You will not, however, fancy that all books you may have to consult deserve careful study. If thoroughness is a virtue to be cultivated, still more is time a thing to be saved. The old maxim, "Whatever is worth doing is worth doing well," is less true than it seems, and has led many people into a lamentable waste of time. Many things are worth doing if you can do them passably well with a little time and effort, which are not worth doing thoroughly if so to do requires much time and effort.

Time is the measure of everything in life, and every kind of work ought to be adjusted to it. One of the commonest mistakes we all make is spending ourselves on things whose value is below the value of time they require. Many a book may be worth reading rapidly so as to extract from it the few important facts it contains, and yet be by no means worth a prolonged study. Economize time in reading as in everything else. The adage that Time is Money falls far short of the truth. Time is worth more than money because by its judicious employment more enjoyment can be secured than money can purchase.

One of the less fortunate results of the large amount of matter which the printing-press turns out in our time is the tendency it has bred to read everything hastily and unthinkingly. The man who glances through several newspapers in the morning and two or three magazines in the evening forms the habit of inattention, or, more correctly, half attention. He reads with no intention of remembering anything except what directly and urgently bears upon his own business, and when in the scanty leisure which business and the practice of reading newspapers and magazines leave him, he takes up a book, this habit of half attention prevents him from applying his mind to what he reads. Instead of stimulating thought, constant reading of this kind deadens it, and the quantity of reading and the quantity of thinking are apt to be in inverse ratio to one another. To say, "Don't read without thinking," might be deemed to be that useless thing, a Counsel of Perfection; but I may say "Beware of the Reading Habit." It is one of the curses of our

age. What is wanted to-day is less printing and less reading, but more thinking. Reading is easy, and thinking is hard work, but the one is useless without the other.

You may ask what is the best way of trying so to read books as to be able to retain the best they give us. If the book be one you wish to know with absolute thoroughness, as students at Oxford University were in my time expected to know Aristotle's *Ethics* and the history of Thucydides for our degree examination, you will find it a good plan to read over every day all that you read the day before. At first this is irksome, but it fixes things in your mind and is a saving in the long run. Everybody has his own devices for recording what he deems best in what he reads, but I can recommend that of making very short notes, or references, on the fly leaf (or leaves) at the end and beginning of a volume of the most important facts or views it contains, noting the page on which it occurs, so that one can refer promptly to the things which struck one at the time. Where a work is either of exceptional merit for its fertility in suggestion, or is specially rich in out-of-the-way facts, it may be worth while to bind in additional fly leaves. Should the book be not one's own but borrowed from a friend or a library, one must of course make the notes or references in a manuscript note-book, and in that case, since the treatise will not be at hand to refer to, it becomes necessary to make a somewhat fuller abstract of the facts it is desired to remember. The advantage of either method is that the process of compressing the fact or view into the fewest possible words helps to fix it in the memory. I remember cases in which eight or ten entries represented the total results of reading a book of four hundred octavo pages, yet those entries might serve to make some dark things clear.

The late Lord Acton, the most learned man I ever knew, was in the habit of copying out on slips of paper passages or sentences which he thought valuable from all the volumes he perused. He had hundreds of cardboard boxes filled with these slips, the boxes being labeled with the titles of their subjects; and he seemed to know how to lay his hand upon any extract he wanted. Few,

however, could hope to bring leisure and industry like his to the accumulation of such a mass of knowledge; and he spent so much time in the process of gathering the opinions of others that he had little left for using them or for giving the world the fruit of his own thoughts, often far better worth having than that which he had plucked from other orchards.

There are those who keep notebooks in which they enter the most remarkable facts or aphorisms or statements of doctrine and opinion which they encounter in the course of their reading. For persons fortunate enough to have formed methodical habits this may be a good plan.

Ought reading to be systematic? Should a man lay down a scheme and confine himself to one or more subjects in which he can become proficient rather than spread himself out in superficial sciolism over a large number?

For many of us Life answers this question by requiring attention to be devoted primarily to books which bear upon our occupation or are connected with it. For others again pronounced tastes point out certain lines of reading as those in which they will find most pleasure. Yet there is also a third class whom neither their avocations nor any marked personal preferences guide in any particular direction. My advice to these would be: If you have not got a definite taste, try to acquire one. Find some pursuit or line of study which you can relish, and give to it most of your spare time. It will be a constant spring of pleasure, an occupation in solitude, a distraction from worries, even a consolation in misfortune, to have something unconnected with one's daily work to which one can turn for change and refreshment of spirit. Some branch of natural history, or some one of the physical sciences, is perhaps the best for this purpose, but any branch of history or archaeology or art (including, as one of the very best, music) will serve. When one has such a pursuit or taste, it naturally becomes the central line which a man's reading follows. In advising a concentration of study upon some few topics, I do not suggest that you should cease to interest yourselves in the general movements of the world. Everyone ought to try to keep abreast of his

time, so far at least as not to be ignorant of the great advances that are being made. Of most of these you will not be able to know much, but the more you can know, the better, so long as you do not scatter and dissipate your efforts in such wise as to become a mere smatterer.

There is a maxim which, like the other venerable dictum already referred to, sounds good but has often done harm. (A book might be written with the title *Moral Maxims and the Mischief They Do.*) You all remember the lines:

A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep or taste not the Pierian spring.

With all respect to the poet, this is by no means true. A little learning is not dangerous so long as you know that it is little. Danger begins with thinking you know much more than you do. It is not knowledge, be it great or small, but the conceit of knowledge, that misleads men: and the best remedy against this is not ignorance, but the knowing some one thing really well. Thoroughness in one subject enables a man to recognize his scantiness of attainment in other subjects, not to add that to have learned any one thing well helps him in dealing with whatever else he touches, since he learns to discern more quickly what is essential, and to make sure that his knowledge, even if it remains elementary, is not merely superficial.

Do not be surprised if after advising you to read thoroughly I also advise you to learn to read swiftly. There is no inconsistency, for thoroughness depends not so much on the time spent on a piece of work as upon the intensity wherewith the mind is concentrated upon it. One man will read a book in half as many hours as another, and yet know more of what is in the book; and this because of his superior power of turning upon it the full stream of his mental energy. Only exceptional minds possess this gift in high measure, as did Macaulay, who read a book so swiftly that he seemed to turn the pages almost without pausing, taking in at one glance all that was in them.

and yet carrying away all that was worth remembering. But you can cultivate the gift by practice, and it deserves cultivating, for it means better results with less time spent.

The counsel of swift reading is, of course, applicable only to books which are read chiefly for their facts or their views, not to those whose merit lies largely in their style. It would be folly to gallop through Virgil or Keats or Charles Lamb or Heinrich Heine or Chateaubriand. Not in poetry only must one move deliberately, but also in reading fine and finished prose, where every word has its fitting place in the sentence, and its due effect in calling up subtle associations and in touching, however delicately, the spring of emotion.

Finally, let me suggest that you read with independence. There are various spirits in which a book may be approached. One must not be captious, hunting out mistakes or blemishes. But neither must one submissively assume that the author is always right. No author, however great, is exempt from error. True it is that modesty is always in order, and deference due to writers of established credit. We must take them as likely to be wiser than we are. Nevertheless, if you wish to profit by your reading, do not forget to scrutinize each argument as it is presented, each inference drawn, each maxim delivered, to see if it be justified by the facts. Sound criticism seeks rather to discover and appreciate merits than to note faults; but however ready we may be to admire, we must test our author as we go along, and make sure that the view we accept from him is formed not because he had given it but because he has convinced us that it is correct. As your forefathers said that perpetual vigilance is the price of freedom, so you may say that it is also the price of learning. In a free country every citizen is responsible for the formation of opinions, and must take them neither from newspapers nor from platform speeches. So in the domain of knowledge a man will lose half the benefit of his study if he reads in a passively receptive way, neglecting to apply his own judgment. Often he will not be able to test his author. Often when he differs from his author the author will be right, and he wrong in venturing to differ. Nevertheless, such error

is better than an indolent acquiescence which brings to bear no independent thought.

To say this is to repeat in different words the remark that the reading which counts is the reading which, in making a man think, stirs and exercises and polishes the edge of his mind. The end of study is not to possess knowledge as a man possesses the coins in his purse, but to make knowledge a part of ourselves, that is, to turn knowledge into thought, as the food we eat is turned into the life-giving and nerve-nourishing blood. It is to have a mind so stored and equipped that it shall be to each man, as to the imprisoned sage, his kingdom, of which no one can deprive him. When you have begun by forming the habit of thinking as you read, and exercising your own judgment freely, though modestly, you will find your footing grow firmer and surer as you advance, and will before long know for yourselves what to read and how to read. Life has few greater pleasures.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Indicate what you think are the qualities of books that wear in comparison with those of books that wear out.
2. Express an opinion on the doctrine of reading simply what you find interesting.
3. Give Bryce's opinion about a man's attempting to read widely among the modern books in order to keep abreast of progress, and express your own view.
4. "Now and then a book appears which everybody ought to read, no matter how far it lies out of his range of study" (page 326). Illustrate Bryce's contention by some book of the present or recent times, indicated why it should be widely read.
5. "In our own tongue we have, say, a score of great authors . . . of whose works every one of us is bound to have read enough to enable him to appreciate the author's peculiar quality" (page 326). Attempt the making of a list of this score of writers.
6. Point out some of the objections to the reading of fiction.
7. Mention some of the ways in which knowledge supplied by novels may be of value in addition to the immediate pleasure derived from reading them.
8. Suggest some of the ways for cultivating pace in reading, that is, the ability to read rapidly yet thoughtfully.
- 9.

If you have ever tried to follow in your reading a list of the "Best Hundred Books" or any selected library, how satisfactory was the attempt?

ON THE READING OF NEWSPAPERS¹

HENRY DAVID THOREAU

[Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862) was the eccentric American writer and naturalist. His ruling passions—his love for independence and simplicity and his love of nature—were perhaps most completely and naturally gratified when he spent more than two years in a little hut which he built on Walden pond, near Concord, tilling a small plot of ground, and depending for sustenance and enjoyment almost entirely upon his own resources. As he himself says, "I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach." He was not a misanthropist as some have thought. He simply preferred solitary communion with nature to human society. "The man I meet," he said, "is seldom so instructive as the silence he breaks." Thoreau was a man whose personal views and tenets were carried out to the point of eccentricity; but his life was blameless and he was loved and respected by all who knew him.]

I do not know but it is too much to read one newspaper a week. I have tried it recently, and for so long it seems to me that I have not dwelt in my native region. The sun, the clouds, the snows, the trees, say not so much to me. You cannot serve two masters. It requires more than a day's devotion to know and to possess the wealth of a day.

We may well be ashamed to tell what things we have read or heard in our day. I do not know why my news should be so trivial,—considering what one's dreams and expectations are, why the developments should be so paltry. The news we hear, for the most part, is not news to our genius. It is the stalest repetition. You are often tempted to ask why such stress is laid on a particular experience which you have had,—that, after twenty-five years, you should meet Hobbins, Registrar of Decds,

¹ Reprinted by permission from *Miscellanies*, in Thoreau's Collected Works, Houghton Mifflin & Co.

again on the sidewalk. Have you not budged an inch, then? Such is the daily news. Its facts appear to float in the atmosphere, insignificant as the sporules of fungi, and impinge on some neglected *thallus*, or surface of our minds, which affords a basis for them, and hence a parasitic growth. We should wash ourselves clean of such news. Of what consequence, though our planet explode, if there is no character involved in the explosion? In health we have not the least curiosity about such events. We do not live for idle amusement. I would not run round a corner to see the world blow up.

Not without a slight shudder at the danger, I often perceive how near I had come to admitting into my mind the details of some trivial affair,—the news of the street, and I am astonished to observe how willing men are to lumber their minds with such rubbish,—to permit idle rumors and incidents of the most insignificant kind to intrude on ground which should be sacred to thought. Shall the mind be a public arena, where the affairs of the street and the gossip of the tea table chiefly are discussed? Or shall it be a quarter of heaven itself,—an hypæthral temple, consecrated to the service of the gods? I find it so difficult to dispose of the few facts which to me are significant, that I hesitate to burden my attention with those which are insignificant, which only a divine mind could illustrate. Such is for the most part the news in newspapers and conversation. It is important to preserve the mind's chastity in this respect. Think of admitting the details of a single case of the criminal court into our thoughts, to stalk profanely through their very *sanctum sanctorum* for an hour, ay, for many hours! to make a very barroom of the mind's inmost apartment, as if for so long the dust of the street had occupied us,—the very street itself, with all its travel, its bustle and filth, had passed throughout thoughts' shrine! Would it not be an intellectual and moral suicide? When I have been compelled to sit spectator and auditor in a court room for some hours, and have seen my neighbors, who are not compelled, stealing in from time to time, and tip-toeing about with washed hands and faces, it has appeared to my mind's eye that, when they took off their hats, their ears

suddenly expanded into vast hoppers for sound, between which even their narrow heads were crowded. Like the vanes of windmills, they caught the broad but shallow stream of sound, which, after a few titillating gyrations in their coggy brains, passed out the other side. I wondered if, when they got home, they were as careful to wash their ears as before their hands and faces. It has seemed to me at such a time that the auditors and the witnesses, the jury and the counsel, the judge and the criminal at the bar,—if I may presume him guilty before he is convicted,—were all equally criminal, and a thunderbolt might be expected to descend and consume them altogether.

By all kinds of traps and signboards, threatening the extreme penalty of the divine law, exclude such trespassers from the only ground which can be sacred to you. It is so hard to forget what it is worse than useless to remember! If I am to be a thoroughfare, I prefer that it be of the mountain brooks, the Parnassian streams, and not the town sewers. There is inspiration, that gossip which comes to the ear of the attentive mind from the courts of heaven. There is the profane and stale revelation of the barroom and the police court. The same ear is fitted to receive both communications. Only the character of the hearer determines to which it shall be open, and to which closed. I believe that the mind can be permanently profaned by the habit of attending to trivial things, so that all our thoughts shall be tinged with triviality. Our very intellect shall be macadamized, as it were,—its foundation broken into fragments for the wheels of travel to roll over; and if you would know what will make the most durable pavement, surpassing rolled stones, spruce blocks, and asphaltum, you have only to look into some of our minds which have been subjected to this treatment so long.

If we have thus desecrated ourselves,—as who has not?—the remedy will be by wariness and devotion to reconsecrate ourselves, and make once more a fane of the mind. We should treat our minds, that is, ourselves, as innocent and ingenuous children, whose guardians we are, and be careful what objects and what subjects we thrust on their attention. Read not the Times. Read the Eternities. Conventionalities are at length

as bad as impurities. Even the facts of science may dust the mind by their dryness, unless they are in a sense effaced each morning, or rather rendered fertile by the dews of fresh and living truth. Knowledge does not come to us by details, but in flashes of light from heaven. Yes, every thought that passes through the mind helps to wear and tear it, and to deepen the ruts, which, as in the streets of Pompeii, evince how much it has been used. How many things there are concerning which we might well deliberate whether we had better know them,—had better let their peddling carts be driven, even at the slowest trot or walk, over that bridge of glorious span by which we trust to pass at last from the farthest brink of time to the nearest shore of eternity! Have we no culture, no refinement,—but skill only to live coarsely and serve the Devil?—to acquire a little worldly wealth, or fame, or liberty, and make a false show with it, as if we were all husk and shell, with no tender and living kernel to us? Shall our institutions be like those chestnut burs which contain abortive nuts, perfect only to prick the fingers?

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What features of the newspapers are objected to by Thoreau?
2. What can you say of the helpful influences of the newspaper? Of the hurtful influences?
3. Which of these influences seems to you strongest in the newspapers you are familiar with?
4. Give your impressions of the comparative worth of certain assigned newspapers both as purveyors of news and as molders of public opinion.
5. Give suggestions as to ways of reading the newspaper so as to reap benefit from this reading.
6. Consider newspaper English, and give some illustrations of its qualities.
7. Select some of Thoreau's aphoristic sayings, such as, "It is so hard to forget what it is worse than useless to remember," and give a full explanation of its meaning.

COLLEGE ORGANIZATIONS

VALUE OF THE COLLEGE FRATERNITY¹

ELBRIDGE COLBY

[Elbridge Colby (1891—) is an instructor in the English department of Columbia University. During his undergraduate career at Columbia he was active in many phases of college life. The official posts which he held in his fraternity were such as to take him a great deal to other Eastern colleges. His discussion of the fraternity is therefore of interest as representing the views of a recent graduate who has seen much of college and fraternity life.]

It is manifestly unfair that the American college fraternity should have been advertised throughout the country in its worst light—and only so. Such books as *Stover at Yale* and the more recent *The Ice Lens*, both of which have attained a wide notoriety among all persons interested in the college world, are essentially false as typical pictures of college life, and especially of the fraternity life for which they have been readily taken by an eager public. Yet it seems to be human nature to accept such things on faith. In this matter, people have grasped at the faintest suggestions of wrong-doing and held them up as representative conduct, just as the “yellow journalism” of the Rosenthal case and the “graft” exposures made the honest, hard-worked, underpaid body of the New York metropolitan police suffer scorching blasts of undeserved criticism. Thus Thoreau never read newspapers because he said that news was nothing more than gossip, and gossip is never representative. So, the fraternity has been the victim of a kind of yellow journalism—of a very pernicious kind, for the permanency and dignity of a published book over the passing news-sheet seemed to lend weight and authority to the arguments advanced.

¹ Reprinted from *The Educational Review*, Volume 46, page 157 (September, 1913), by permission of the author and of the publishers of the magazine.

In the first place, Yale College presents a poor example of the conditions of fraternity life, for there are, drawing from the personnel of the college, few real fraternities, as the word is used country-wide. These few restrict elections to no class and to no particular period of the year; they take men in for the whole remainder of the academic career and, demanding continued allegiance, do not allow their own prestige to be dimmed by the assumed importance of the "senior" elections. The Yale organizations, other than these, with their present form and meaning resulting from purely local conditions, and some of them entirely dissimilar from chapters which bear the same fraternity name in other colleges, are the senior "societies" and the junior "societies." The official regulation that Yale College men cannot live in fraternity houses makes a sharp distinction between Yale College "fraternities" and the fraternities at other colleges, a distinction evident in the unique character of the Yale chapter houses, called "Tombs." The fraternity situation is thus different at Yale than elsewhere; and it is unfortunate that the value and the influence of fraternities should be in this way misrepresented to a reading public who do not realize that what they discuss is peculiarly a Yale problem and that the same arguments do not apply at all, or at least not in the same way, at other colleges.

In Yale College, where none of the men live in the fraternity houses and where the fraternity membership roll is especially large, the fraternity has become largely an occasional thing, a sort of club for purely social purposes. On the other hand, this social side of the fraternity is but a small fraction of the part the fraternity plays at Columbia, at Dartmouth, at Lafayette, at Syracuse, at Pennsylvania, at Wesleyan, at Trinity, at Cornell—in fact at practically every college except Yale. Even at Yale, the specific college "society" is not the typical organization. And yet, it is this purely social side of fraternities that is flayed by criticism; it is the social side that is held up before horrified fathers, mothers, sisters, cousins, and aunts as a picture of the horribly profligate life led by the college boy away from home.

It would perhaps be best if we made ourselves perfectly clear from the start with respect to the two books above mentioned. *The Ice Lens* concerns itself with social life in the Sheffield Scientific School organizations which are of the customary fraternity type. Our objection to this book is that the impression it attempts to convey is untrue and that the charges it brings are unjust. It will be our purpose in this paper to show the value of the fraternity—the fraternity to be of this type—to show something of the good influences which the fraternity body aims to effect. Some fraternities may fall short of their ideals occasionally, but none lose sight of them. *The Ice Lens* emphasizes the evil and forgets the ideal toward which these bodies strive.

Stover at Yale concerns itself with the purely social environment created by the Yale academic societies. Our objection to this book is that its wide circulation has given to the American public an untrue view—the Yale College “societies” therein represented are not in any sense representative of fraternities. The aims of our American national college fraternities are far more serious and far loftier than those merely pleasurable ones which both of these volumes depict.

To group together a small number of men with fairly similar tastes and ideas, to unite them in view of a common ideal, to have them live together—this is the great educational advantage of the fraternity. Men must work together as well as play together before they can know and appreciate one another. It is necessary that people should realize from the start that there is a bigger and broader meaning to the fraternity influence than the sheer quest of pleasure upon which *The Ice Lens* dwells. They should realize that most of the American national college fraternities have worthy and high ideals up to which they strive to live, and that the real molding of character comes through the intimacies of continued companionship, not through the passing acquaintanceships of frivolous moments. The true comradeship—not merely the “good fellow” sort of a feeling, persisting only during an evening of jollity spent together—the

true comradeship is the bond which unites brother with brother in a real fraternity.

“Amici usque ad aras,”

they sing in the words of the old song: *Friends even to the altars of sacrifice.*

There are three dominant elements in the influence which a worthy fraternity exerts upon its members and these elements are, respectively, of a social, intellectual, and fraternal nature. We will discuss them in turn.

The exuberance, the ebullient spirits, the rash desires, the decided aversions, the lights and shadows of mingling timidity and boldness, the abandonment of enthusiasm, the sheer delight in living for its own sake, the sowing of “wild oats,” the emphasis on the pleasures rather than on the obligations of life, irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, even vice—these have been familiarly and frequently attributed to youth. The period of adolescence is a very important one, for it is then that our young men, in response to a healthy curiosity, come to know the world, come to a full cognizance of facts and the relations between facts, to an appreciation of the actuality and the ideality of life.

Wide experience is very valuable in character formation and the American college, with its mixture of types, forms a splendid crucible for the melting and tempering of the metals. In like wise, the fraternity, smaller, more compact, more intimate and more intense in the relations it fosters, is the ideal point of contact, the perfect spot for the study under correction, and not merely the slight observation, of our fellow men. Into the fraternity chapter—the one of the present writer, for example—there have come from far distant places young men who learn to understand, to appreciate, to sympathize with, to know, diverse types in one another; and who are, thereby, better fitted to go out and contact the diverse types of the world. They are learning new situations and are increasing their range of adaptability.

Some had come from quiet rural homes of up-state provinces to the north; some had come from the respectability and complacency of the old New England towns; others had come steeped in the vigorous progressivism of the west, even from California; and not a few, quick, alert, with the urban habit of mind, sons of honored Columbia alumni, had come out of the great metropolis. These men, bringing variant provincial ideals and curious home customs, are joined together for four years. They influence, instruct, enlighten, inspire, and observe one another, and in the process they learn *Life*.

A classmate of the present writer has said in a recent essay: "All the different traits of our nature must get their airing through friends. . . . We let ourselves out piecemeal, it seems—each friend calls out some particular trait in us, and it requires the whole chorus fitly to teach us what we are. . . . A man with a few friends is only half-developed; there are whole sides of his nature which are locked up and have never been expressed. He cannot unlock them himself, he cannot even discover them; friends alone can stimulate him and open them." According to this conception, a friendship is now seen to be valuable both subjectively and objectively, as a form of self-impression and as a form of self-expression. The membership in a fraternity prefaces the relations between friends and obviates the necessity of introductory stages. The advantage of the fraternity, both in the contact with a multiplicity of types and in the intensity of personal feelings, is that there is no time lost in progression from the initial acquaintance. Formalities can be immediately brushed aside and the direct personal influence can begin at once, and can be truer and less artificial from the start. The wearing of the same badge is a pledge and surety of a sincere mutual interest; it forms a valid introduction to the most delicate subject; it premises the ensuing discussion with an authorized and expected sympathy. This is one thing which the fraternity has to offer more than friendship, this is one difference between the relationship among fraternity brothers and that among those who are simply classmates, it is one contribution which the fraternity makes to the college world.

Then, too, the younger men can go beyond the limits of their class and meet the older on common ground and learn from them.

We live our truest lives with our friends, for in them we express ourselves and from them we add to ourselves. No man is sufficient unto himself; he must be assisted and supported by his friends and he must assist and support them. Thus, in the social relationship—and a state of society exists wherever two or three are gathered together—in the social relationship, we add to our knowledge of our fellows, to our consciousness and appreciation of the world and of ourselves. Dear old Doctor Johnson delighted in “the endearing elegance of feminine friendship” and the fraternity man of to-day must have his teas, his dances, his theater parties, his “ladies’ nights.” There is the nobler side of man’s nature which the gentler sex does much to develop. So, periodically, sisters and sweethearts, mothers and fiancées, raid our rooms and laugh at our interior decorations. They peep into the pantry and wonder how a room so small can hold food enough for so many hungry boys; they look out of our windows and watch the far lights twinkling across the river. There are, besides the fine feminine influences, strong masculine ones, emanating from man-and-man companionship. These are so commonly emphasized that we scarce need to rehearse the succession of platitudes. One thing in addition, however, the national fraternity gives. If the different universities have different characteristics, if they develop *types*, if there is a “Yale man,” a “Harvard man,” a “Columbia man,” and so forth, to go on visits from college to college, from chapter to chapter, and to stay for a short time at these places, living the life of the student—this is valuable educational experience. In the fraternity with strong “national spirit” such visits are frequent and, aside from the fact that the welcome accorded the visitor is intrinsically pleasing, these trips do much to broaden and enrich the character of the traveler, as well as to provide him with much specific information about Ithaca, Syracuse, and New Haven. Thus, on the social side of fraternity life, there are many serious parts to play; and the game is worth the candle.

Our classmate says, in another of his essays: "The sins and excesses of hot-blooded youth are a by-word; and youth would not seem to be youth without its carnality and extravagance. It is fortunate that youth is able to spend that extravagance partly in idealism." The fraternity, to the present writer, has stood for two things, for restraint and aspiration: it has provided idealism for his extravagance of spirit. Of course, from the very nature of things, he can know very little of other fraternities than his own. He does know, however, that many of them very commendably place careful restrictions on the conduct of men within The House, that very many of them prohibit drinking and gambling within The House, and that very many of them, through special committees of upper-classmen, watch, exhort, and actually assist those with poor standing in academic work. Earnest effort is made to direct the scattered enthusiasm of the underclassmen to proper ends and to prevent the youngsters from "drifting along" without serious purpose. Making allowances for a few exceptions—to err is human—we can safely deny with vigor the charges that the fraternity stands for little else than immorality, laziness, and vice. In reality, the fraternity as a social force is more largely used than abused.

Any persons who will trouble themselves to read over the pamphlet reports of the various committees to the Inter-Fraternity Conference which met last in New York at the University Club in November, 1912, may easily see that fraternities to-day have serious intent and honest purpose. From statistics there presented we learn that fraternities are examining themselves and their collegiate conditions in a critical spirit, that careful investigations are usually made of academic standings of all men in the chapters, that effective coöperation is frequently in evidence between the chapter hierarchy and the academic authorities. At many institutions averages are published to show the relative grades of fraternity and non-fraternity men and to compare the records of men in the various Greek-letter societies. It is splendid to note that many fraternities have faculty advisers and that definite steps are taken to guard

against scholastic failure. A dean recently sent a letter to a prominent upperclassman in each of the different chapters at his college, asking for coöperation "in seeing that the entering students . . . are impressed with the importance of making a good start in their academic work. It is a poor investment to initiate a student who is compelled to leave the university in February or June. . . . We feel that the older men in the fraternity can do a great deal to improve conditions." The present writer knows that at least one of these letters bore immediate fruit in causing the spurring on of a somewhat delinquent "Scholarship Committee." And so on, through all the questionnaire answers presented to the New York Inter-Fraternity Conference, we find the same story—consistent coöperation.

As regards conduct of the fraternity houses, there is practically no supervision by the college administration. Reasons given for this were lack of precedent and lack of occasion for interference, and the presence of voluntary and adequate alumni supervision. The answer returned by one college was: "We do not impress uniform house rules on the fraternities because I found that the rules they themselves had in force were sufficient." From the same pamphlet report, we learn that the old-time enmities have disappeared and that, at a great majority of the colleges, there are in existence inter-fraternity agreements or conferences of more or less importance. Though these agreements sometimes concern themselves merely with mutual assistance in telephone arrangements or in the purchase of such supplies as coal, or perhaps with formal "rushing agreements," the exchange from hostility to friendliness is obvious and noteworthy. There is always a strong sense of the necessity of maintaining the dignity of the fraternity in the eyes of other "Greeks;" and this feeling avails much in obviating disorderly conduct about the house. In fact, the whole tone of the few pamphlets issued by the 1912 Inter-Fraternity Conference, to which we have referred, would indicate that, though the investigations have shown matters to be very little amiss, there is still abroad a beneficial spirit of self-criticism.

Youth is the age of many awakenings. Before the rapidly unfolding panorama of personalities and events, amid a curious jumble of experiences, the member of the rising generation must win to a firm station of spirit. In his own mind heterogeneity and confusion, of ideas and ideals, must give place to consistence and order. In the colleges the fraternity stands for a coördination and a settling; it takes the young man "in four of the best years of his life" and helps him to understand, and to become what he seriously intends to be.

At the dinner table, in the afternoon after work is over, all that is needed is for some one to give the proper turn to the conversation and a spirited discussion will ensue in which all will be interested, and from which all will be instructed. "Anyone who has had anything to do with the formulation of critical theories"—anyone who has looked over the lives of the Goncourt brothers or of Maxime Ducamp, or the story of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood—anyone who has ever familiarized himself with the personnel and the talk of the evenings at the house of Charles Lamb—anyone who has read in the history of rationalism of the twice-a-week dinners given by the Baron d'Holbach where assembled Diderot, Rousseau, Helviteus, Raynal, and many another noted Frenchman, where went noted travelers passing through Paris, Hume, Beccaria, Franklin, and Priestly, to visit the charmed circle—anyone who has studied British radicalism and contemplated the prominent rôles played by such men as Horn Tooke, Thomas Holcroft, and the young Wordsworth, and the manner in which the ideas of these men hark back to simple dinner parties with Godwin—anyone who has known and thought of these things will know how greatly the talk of a few men, of a small group, of a brotherhood or even "the exchange of ideas of two or three friends will end in putting vague ideas into words and from words into action." In the history of art, of literature and of politics there are many records of enthusiastic friendships and warm discussions that have ended in great ideas. Many an informal evening has resulted in the organization and the expression of as many worthy ideas as a university lecture. This is the chief

intellectual stimulus of the fraternity, aside from the mere committee-work of assisting men poor in curricular work.

We speak now of the purely fraternal relationship.

It is more significant than these other matters of society and intellect. It is the essence of the fraternity, the brotherhood in the fullest sense of the word. The social side represents friendship; the intellectual, community of interest; the fraternal, love. The spirit of the fraternity is not of time or condition, of place or circumstance. Stevenson wrote to William Ernest Henly in 1881: "Times change, opinions vary to their opposites—and what can be more encouraging than to find the friend who was welcome at one age, still welcome at another?" The fraternal bond is this sort of sublimated friendship:—it is Platonic love in the sense in which Plato meant it, the love of one man for another. This is the ideal of fraternity; its expression is in the treatment of the brother.

Anatole France has remarked that "every creature in the world, however small, is at the center of the universe." The field, the scope, the world of each person is made up of his personal experiences; and friendship is but an experience. Our classmate essayist has admitted that "our friends must be pointed in the same direction in which we are going."

Circumstances of accidental association and separation may govern our friendships but not our loves. In the fraternity, an indissoluble tie always unites brother with brother; there is always a commonalty of opinion on certain of the deep and fundamental things of the spirit. Founded on a clear conception of the meaning and purpose of life, the fraternal bond premises every meeting, every renewal of acquaintance, with agreement on the intimate and personal motives and ideals. At the fraternity home, in the quiet of the study hour, before the evening fire, when we have eaten, talked, walked, slept with a man of our own age and with our own or like interests, when we have *lived* with him in high-light and shadow, only then can we appreciate, understand, love and serve our friend. We can help him as only he can help us. The bond of the fraternity is sufficient introduction for any heart-to-heart talk, for be-

stowal of advice or request for assistance. It means mutual criticism and mutual help. It means a similarity of inspiration and aspiration. It increases the opportunities for close intimacies. The brothers pattern their relationship after an ideal and they would each further the advancement of the other toward that ideal. Finally, the soul does not, as Maeterlinck would say, flower only on nights of storm. The persistent personal influence is always the strongest and best. Such persistent personal influence, in the light of high ideals, exists in the American college between fraternity members. It is decidedly unfair for those members to have to bear the distorted charges which are brought against a part, by people not cognizant of the whole, of the fraternity situation.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What are the advantages of fraternities as set forth in this selection? Can you give others? Which of these seem of the greatest weight in justifying the existence of such organizations?
2. What criticisms of fraternities have you read or heard? Give any that you yourself would make from your own experience.
3. What is the situation with reference to the fraternities of your institution? Are they an advantage or a disadvantage?
4. Which side is most responsible for friction, if it exists, the fraternity men or the non-fraternity men?
5. How do the fraternity men of your institution, taken as a whole, rank in scholarship with the other students?
6. Discuss what should be the relation of the older members of a fraternity to the younger ones. Consider in this connection the common practice of keeping underclassmen in a subordinate position regarding chapter affairs.
7. Should the college authorities ignore or utilize the fraternity?
8. How can evils connected with the present system of pledging new members at your institution be minimized or avoided?
9. What should be the relations of the fraternities to one another in an institution?
10. What should be the relation of the fraternities to the life of the nation? Have they any duties beyond their own membership? If so, what?

THE COLLEGE LITERARY SOCIETY

HENRY NELSON SNYDER

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One of the significant things in college education of the last twenty-five years has been the comparatively steady and general decline in the value of the literary society. Anyone who entered college (say) in the early eighties, could still hear the reverberating echoes of superlative efforts in college oratory and much talk of a golden age of literary society efficiency. Even yet, when the older alumni of Southern institutions come together at commencement, they sadly lament a something gone out of the platform exhibitions, and in reminiscent mood recall a time when college students "could speak," as they say. They visit their old societies and, in the very act of recounting former glories illustrate the oratorical qualities that made the other years so splendid in speaking achievement. One of them, whose name is still one to charm with in tradition, came to me much out of heart and dissatisfied with the debate of the Juniors and the speeches of the Seniors. In a tone that implied that the bottom had dropped out of all things, he said: "Your boys write better English, discuss more up-to-date subjects than we used to; but they simply can't *speak*." "What do you mean by that?" I inquired. "Why," continued he, "they don't know how to make gestures, they don't feel what they say, and they have no voices."

Here, then, was a student of the old school, by way of criticism of the new, asserting the aims and ideals of the literary society of former days, and at the same time suggesting an essential difference in present-day aims and ideals. Gesture, feeling, voice, these made the basis of the consummate product

of literary society work in the Southern College both before and immediately following the war. At their best, these elements brought a charm of stately attitudinizing, graceful action, moving and winning appeal to the emotions, and range and power of vocal expression; at their worst, affected extravagance, brazen and clanging rhetoric, and the sound and fury that signifieth nothing. This baser expression of college oratory has, unfrequently, I think, ruled in our conception of the general type of the older product of the college literary society, and has made it a mockery and byword. But it should be steadily kept in mind that the literary societies formerly aimed to develop the orator, and that the orator was the hero of the campus and the unfailing wonder of admiring audiences. And this supreme position of the orator and the fame he won were sufficient to furnish a vital atmosphere for the abounding life of that which produced him, the literary society.

However, changed conditions both without and within the college campus have been potent enough to take the orator from his lofty pedestal as a college hero and furnish other social and scholastic ideals, which have brought about his virtual undoing, and hence an almost fatal enfeebling of that within which he moved and had his being, the literary society. Great changes have come in the social ideals that appeal to young men of intellectual aspirations. Formerly the law and politics were the supreme fields that invited them, and these fields were the arena for the display of the power and influence of the orator. It should be remembered, too, that in no other part of the world did the mere speaker get so many glittering rewards, and no people were more sensitive to the charm of voice, emotional appeal, and graceful action than the people of the South. Every state, every district, every community, every crossroads and more than one man whom the people heard with eager gladness, and upon whom they were willing to confer honors and offices of trust for his much speaking. These outside influences naturally beat into the retirement of classic shades, to use an old-fashioned phrase, and furnished ideals potent enough to make the college literary society seem the most practical part of

the college course. Hence it flourished as the training ground of the rhetorical, declamatory debater and speaker, and he became in general estimation the consummate flower of college life. But a rather swift change has come in social ideals, and with it has grown more and more evident that the orator has had his day. Indeed, it does not require much insight to see that the orator as such has become pretty generally distrusted, and the demand is for plain, simple, straightforward utterance, unadorned with the older graces of diction and manner. In the new industrial revolution and economic adjustment men have busied themselves with what they are pleased to call practical affairs, and the law and politics have not wholly monopolized men of talent and ambition as they once did. These conditions, moreover, do not call for emotion and imagination as did the dramatic conditions of the older days. They ask of the speaker if he really has anything to say—information, instruction, and the dry, matter-of-fact details that concern the building of factories and the developing of mines. They are thus of such nature as to create a kind of suspicion, if not contempt, for the man of words, however fine the words may be.

These influences have been strongly reënfined by other influences within the campus, which have helped not only to diminish the power of the college speaker, but also to affect generally the place and work of the literary society. The first is to be found in the steady increase of academic requirements. More work and, I believe, a better kind of work is now demanded of students, so that they simply have not the time they once had to give to the literary society. The result is that men of the finer sort devote themselves almost wholly to meeting scholastic requirements, and the men of the other sort either express their activity in other ways or else are not strong enough to make the societies at all what they should be. The more deeply one looks into the amount of work which each department requires and expects of the rather immature students that come to us, the more one wonders that so many manage to survive and in some way accomplish it. It really at times seems all but a slaughter of the innocents. At any rate, under

the present system—and I do not say it is bad—literary society work must inevitably be a sort of addendum to the regular college course, and to give it anything like the time necessary to make it seem worth the doing is to rob where, if it be not a crime, it is at least to put in danger class standing. Men have neither the time nor the opportunity seriously to prepare themselves for their society duties. Hence it is not hard to understand why these societies become places for superficial fluency, for trivial mouthing under the name of speaking, for parliamentary quibbling, and cheap college politics. Such as this requires no preparation, and indeed may be taken as a kind of recreation. The faculty may make appeals, if they will, for a better sort of work, may point out the unusually important benefits of training the societies profess to offer; but with all departments crowding the students and devouring time, day in and day out, it is expecting too much of them that they should give such attention to the societies as that they should flourish with even a shadow of their former glory. These new academic requirements have been strong, I should say, in helping to bring about the inevitable decadence of the literary society.

But to the mere matter of requirements must also be added those modifications of college methods and ideals due to the introduction of scientific courses, with the demands of the laboratory, and the full elective courses inviting very early to specialization. These laboratory hours must be met. In laboratory hours would be included also library hours. They take the time that formally might have been given to preparation for speaking and debate. But even deeper than this: science and its methods have subtly yet surely affected student ideals, and there is no class of persons more easily subdued to the color of certain exaggerated notions. Science and the scientific method applied to all subjects is a practical, everyday thing dealing with facts. It is thus apt to substitute in the student's thinking the importance of the doer of things over the sayer of things, and arouse his interest in matters wholly remote from the subjects that usually concern the speaker and debater. Imagination, emotion, decorative rhetoric, high-sounding gen-

eralities are just the elements that the laboratory and library will have none of, and yet in them the active literary society worker is more than apt to luxuriate. So, then, it is not only a question of time that we have to deal with when we come to consider scientific studies and the scientific method in their effect upon the college literary society; it is a question of aims and ideals as well.

The introduction of elective courses has also had its share in furnishing influences unfavorable to an active interest in what the literary society stands for. Election leads necessarily to specialization, and to a narrowing, in the mind of the student, of what the college may mean. Now, whatever else may have characterized the old college, it stood for general culture; the new stands for special efficiency. The older type of student found his cultural life most active in the literary society; the new type of student thinks he finds his ambitions best satisfied in trying to know everything about a few things. The literary society is, therefore, apt to make only a feeble appeal to him on the side of general culture, even if he had time for it. If he thinks at all about the matter, he is likely to resist the natural tendency of the literary society to draw him away from his special line of work into broader and more general interests, interests that seem quite remote from what he has immediately in hand. There would be, for example, no inconsiderable number of students who would find it hard to get themselves concerned with the inveterate way most literary societies have of confining their topics of discussion almost wholly to political and social matters. Election, therefore, and the consequent narrowing of student interest and activity are influences which, to no small degree, limit and hamper the literary society, at least in comparison with what it formerly meant in college life.

In connection with these changes and modifications in the college courses affecting the literary societies, I think we should also consider the new type of college professor. The older type of college teacher was, in most cases, a man of general culture, and was almost always, if not himself skilled and gifted in the art of charming public utterance, at least in full sympathy with

it, both outside and inside the literary society. Indeed, formerly no college faculty was wanting in one or two men who perhaps really owed their positions not so much to their scholarships as to a winning charm of stately, classic oratory. Now, however, we have changed all that. The mere scholar has taken the place of the mere teacher with the adornments of scholarship. And I am not sure that we have wholly gained by the change. The new type of professor is inclined to be cabined, cribbed, and confined in the narrow house of his own department. In an unwavering devotion to a limited field he has found that the rewards of his profession come. Whatever his chair, therefore, he is likely to be a man of deep rather than broad knowledge and of a hard scientific method than the graces of social and intellectual culture. He has not only no charm of public address, but is openly willing to show a contempt for the whole business of public speaking. Now college students are keen and quick to get their notions of at least some things from their professors, especially if these professors happen to be strong men. The result is that the student does not care for that in which his professor shows not only inefficiency, but also a manifest contempt. So we have here another element working against anything like a general and hearty appreciation of the value and importance of the literary society. Indeed, it is positively hostile to it.

But these modifications of the college course and the new type of professor that has come with them have emphasized thorough and exact scholarship in a way hardly dreamed of under older conditions. We have come, therefore, to see the scholar, in the matter of college ideals, set high above the orator and debater. The plodding crammer at worst and brilliant student at best have taken the place, at least in the eye of the faculty, of the speaker who once walked, too frequently strutted, a veritable hero among his fellows. The truth is that the stress of college requirements, and the rewards that success in them bring, have so far appealed to men of talent that activity and a sort of efficiency in literary society work have been found to be characteristic of many who neglect the routine

of academic duties and demands. This has grown to be such an evil in some institutions that college honors have been taken from the hands of the literary societies in some cases, and in others a certain minimum of scholarship is demanded of all whom the societies choose to represent them on public occasions. This indicates a low ebb of society interest. A rather shiftless class of fellows are in the saddle, and institutions must protect themselves by refusing a semblance of approbation to them. But, however necessary this may be, such measures show in no uncertain way that the new conditions demand that a student shall be first of all a scholar and only secondarily a speaker. This is, of course, as it should be; still it is a sign of that low estate to which literary societies have fallen; and a further sign that the scholar is in the prime ideal of all the forces of college life.

This is from the standpoint of college faculties; but the student community has itself, in the last twenty years, set up its own visions of excellency and fame-bringing achievement, and these have aroused such a pitch of fervent student enthusiasm as none others have, not even the college orator in his palmiest days. The long jumper and the high kicker, the pitcher and the shortstop, the center rush and the quarterback have come to their day of radiant glory. These are the bright, particular stars in the college firmament, and other lights are lesser in comparison. The scholar and the orator both sink into the shadow of the commonplace in the presence of the shining figure of the hero of the athletic field. To him all bow, and for him all things exist. The outside public, through the newspapers, has brought college athletics into the glare and noise of a fierce sensationalism. I saw a rather striking notice in a newspaper just a little while ago. It ran this way: "A. college is ready for opening next week. Football Coach Smith is already on the grounds, and the president will be in Monday." No humor was intended by this notice. It merely indicated what phase of the college opening the public would be especially interested in. The interest of the students gathers about the same thing with all-absorbing, all-excluding intensity, and this

athletic interest becomes the most abiding memory after they leave college. Now when the younger alumni come together, it is not to talk of the powerful speaking of A., but of the marvelous pitching of B. and the extraordinary "run" of C. down the field for a touch-down. Athletics, then, is the most vital thing in college life under present conditions, and the athletic ideal looms larger before the student-mind than any other. He has before him, therefore, a vision of excellence other than intellectual and academic, as we understand that word. And so powerful is this influence that we may well ask what chance has the orator, or indeed even the scholar, in the atmosphere in which the athletic ideal thrives.

There is yet another thing which we shall have to reckon with in dealing with the literary society as it is, especially in comparison with what it has been, and that is a social matter. The time was when the society and its occasions represented the social activity of college life at its high tide. Their functions were the events of the year, looked forward to long before and talked of long after. The college shone in happy and radiant splendor at such times, and it seemed as if everything existed for, and led up to, such crowning occasions. Now, however, fraternity functions and the functions of other organizations more or less exclusive have come, if not to absorb social interest altogether, at least to divide it and so to dissipate it as to minimize the importance of the society occasions, and to reduce to mere formalities, to be put up with because they have been recurring for many years. The literary society is thus in danger of being shorn of its influence on even its social side.

Now, in considering the whole question of the literary society in both school and college we shall have to keep before us the influences which we have but briefly pointed out—changed social ideals impatient and distrustful of the mere orator, increased college requirements in respect to both work and time, the introduction of new methods of instruction and new aims of work, the changed type of college professor with his example and attitude toward what the literary society stands for, student ideals of scholarship and athletics, and fresh and more varied

social interests. With these before us, the first question to be asked is: Holding to the aims and methods that once ruled the societies, do we desire to make the effort to restore them as they were? The second question is: Recognizing the literary society as essential, or at least a valuable part of college life, do we desire to keep it, but modified to suit the changed conditions? In answer to the first question it is my opinion that the societies can never be restored to the position they once held in college life. The conditions already discussed are simply too strong for that. Indeed, we can well spare the college orator or debater of the older type, even if it were possible to keep him alive. It is true that now and then when we hear him he is interesting as a survival of old things. But he has had his day, and a glorious one it was, too, while it lasted. New times, however, call for other things, and new conditions force the college into line. It is with the second question, therefore, that we have to deal; a question which affirms that the college literary society is a good thing and ought to be preserved and directed toward bringing about the results of which it is capable under present conditions.

It is a wholesome sign to start with, that one can easily detect a reaction away from the disfavor into which the literary societies have fallen, in some quarters anyway, and a strong feeling gathering that they are really worth while. To train young men in simple, straightforward, natural, effective public speaking, to furnish a field for the practice of the rules governing deliberative bodies, to offer opportunity for a more or less extemporaneous discussion of current matters of sociology, politics, commerce, literature, and science, however crude the discussion may be, may lead to acquirements not to be despised in the preparation of men who are to take their places as citizens in a democracy like ours. Indeed, all will agree that it is absolutely indispensable that at least a few shall be so trained. If the college is to inform men in the larger matters of human interest, give the right perspective to their judgments, and train them to think clearly and sanely, it ought also to do all it can to get these things properly expressed in both written and spoken

utterance. Even the trained thinker and the man of wide and sure knowledge may be so far hampered in the mere matter of expression as to bungle his thinking and darken his knowledge. It is highly important, therefore, that we should cultivate and foster whatever tends to make reasoned thought and enlightened knowledge effective in the free air of a democracy in which there are so many voices that deafen the reason and eclipse the light. This is the utilitarian view of the possible use of the literary society, and leaves out of all consideration those mere graces of public speech that used to make them things greatly desired for the delight they gave.

But apart from this outlook into that practical life for which the college professes to be getting men ready, we should further see, in considering the mission and use of the literary society, the need of some one element that will unify, if possible, on an intellectual and strictly academic basis all the varied and manifold interests of college life. Now I should not underrate or belittle the very important use of football and baseball clubs in fusing the scattered interests of a college campus into one overwhelming sentiment that we describe in the rather indefinite phrase "college spirit." This is more than a mere sentimentality that finds expression in hideous yells and gives hoarse, husky answers in the class room after all games. Poor indeed is that college that has not this spirit, and I am almost willing to shut my eyes to the excesses of the noisy strenuosity of the athletic mood if it bring into the campus life a warm, vital sense of college unity and bind all the men together in a close bond of student fellowship. It is certain, too, that no other single influence can be quite so strong as athletics to bring this about, at least so long as college students are what they are. But I should earnestly desire to add to the unifying forces of the community life other interests which, if they be of a milder sort, are yet intellectual and academic. The college rests, as commonplace as it is to say it, fundamentally on things of the mind, and brawn should not absorb the enthusiasm of the students to the exclusion of brain. Now in the possibilities of the literary societies one can see the only means whereby a strong sense of

student unity may be established on a basis of intellectual effort and excellence.

The first step in this direction is to be taken in the effort to arouse and maintain a vital interest in these societies. We certainly must get over any cold and languid attitude toward them, and insist that they are not merely for the limited few who happen to have a taste for that sort of work just as there are those who have special aptitudes for chemistry or history or mathematics, but are for all students. If the notion is to become current that the literary society is to be for a small group of men with special aptitudes and uncommon skill in speaking of debate, we shall greatly narrow its aim and use. If it is to be no more than this, it is hardly worth the effort to keep it alive. Under such a conception it either languishes or else it becomes a limited literary club, in which a few chosen spirits may air their notions of things in general, and exploit themselves in public positions which have long since lost the distinction attaching to them. To arouse a general interest rests largely with the authorities of an institution. It is possible for a college faculty both collectively and individually so to express themselves with reference to their attitude to, and their estimate of, the value of society work as to awaken student appreciation and activity. One thing is certain, however; anything like a feeble support on the part of the authorities of an institution is, under present conditions, bound to react to the detriment of the societies.

But we should go even farther than giving a hearty general approbation to what the societies stand for and encouraging to the full, in a general way, what they are trying to do. It is my judgment that all students should be required to join one of the literary societies at least during one year of their college course. This at first may seem a hardship and a placing of undue emphasis upon their importance in college life. But when we consider both their absolute value and their possible social use in unifying the college community upon an intellectual basis, I believe it worth doing. To do this, moreover, is at once to show in a tangible way the high value set upon literary society work.

A student may elect this or that course of study, but he must elect the work of the society. Moreover, in this way, as I have already said, the entire student body may possibly be bound together in academic fellowship, and all departments meet upon a common ground. A unifying process, a thing greatly to be desired under present collegiate conditions, when the student community is broken into small groups, is thus going on.

Whether or not we thus commit the entire student body to membership in the literary societies, they are such important interests that there should be regular and frequent visitation on the part of the faculties. In this way, by suggestive addresses not only upon the special concerns of literary society work, but also upon general subjects of larger public interest, members of the faculty would be recognizing the students in their collective society relationships, and would be thus committing themselves to a share in those things the students are trying to do through the societies. But the faculty should do more than this. There ought to be in every college a standing faculty committee whose duty it should be to keep itself close to the societies, and without needless interference help in directing them to the best results and shaping their aims in accordance with the best ideals. It is little short of suicidal to leave so important an interest wholly to the management of rather immature young men. It is no wonder that at times they bungle the whole matter and bring the societies to such ignoble uses that we are willing to abolish them out and out as a waste of time and a mangling and perversion of opportunities.

If cheap political methods, drawn from practical politics with which young men in the South are all too familiar; if noisy mouthing and empty vaporizing under the name of speech-making; the absence of earnest, intelligent effort and serious preparation; the facile, fluent readiness to handle grave, important questions with a superficial flippancy, quibbling with fact and principle that train the dodger and the shallow causist—if these things all too frequently mark literary society work we have to blame, to no small degree, the let-alone policy of college faculties. We have been rather prone to believe that

the day of the literary society was past and that its real usefulness was at an end; that it was an ancient survival of an old formality clinging with some other old things to college life. We have been so busy reconstructing courses of study and readjusting methods of instruction that we have, perhaps, neglected one other important interest that needed reconstruction and a fresh adaption to meet changed conditions. This faculty committee, therefore, has a work to do in getting literary societies to a point where they can do the things of which they are really capable. And this work is worth doing; it lies along the line of general and special consultation, choice of themes, literary references, advice, suggestion, and direction in all that concerns literary society efficiency.

I believe, too, that each member of the faculty can also take his share in making the literary society seem worth while in yet another way. Each should see to it that at least now and then his department is in some way represented upon the floor of the society. Under present conditions, due to election and divided courses of study, it is possible for no inconsiderable body of students to know absolutely nothing of special departments outside the range of their own line of study. To this class of students the college is really narrowed to the small field in which they may be engaged. To offset this, it is possible for each professor to choose a capable man, and direct him to the treatment of certain phases of his own department susceptible to popular appeal. He would not only thus be opening his own specialty to the student body (in a small, imperfect way, to be sure), but he would also be helping to broaden their view of the larger work the college is trying to do. His service would, therefore, to be a twofold one, while at the same time he would be emphasizing his own interest in the work of the society.

In particular, the English department should be closely related to the work of the literary society. No course in English should be considered complete without offering special work in written speeches and debate, and reference should always be had to the practical application of the work to the purposes and needs of the societies. In this way the character of the speaking, writing

and debating could possibly be shaped in accordance with the best ideals, and relieved of the futile, inane, vicious rhetoric that characterizes so much the so-called "efforts" of college students. I believe, too, it would be possible for "credit" to be allowed by a department for work done in the societies under its direction and approval. Thus due and proper emphasis could be laid upon the importance of the work a student does for his society, and a higher quality of achievement could be reached.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Draw a contrast between the college literary society of the past and that of the present, with especial reference to your own college, indicating the causes of the change.
2. Discuss the condition of the literary societies at your institution. If they are not flourishing as they should, point out what seems to be the special cause of their decline in influence.
3. Show the benefits to be derived from joining a literary society.
4. Give your opinion as to whether college credit should be given for literary society work.
5. Discuss the suggestion in this article that every student should be required to join a literary society for at least one year of his college course (page 362). What effect would this requirement tend to have on the societies?

COLLEGE GOVERNMENT

THE COLLEGE OFFICER AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT¹

WILLIAM RAINEY HARPER

[William Rainey Harper (1856-1906) was at the time of his death president of the University of Chicago. As the first president of that institution, he manifested great initiative and aggressiveness, and rapidly put it among the leading American universities. Dr. Harper was also distinguished as a teacher and student of Hebrew. This address was delivered on the occasion of the inauguration of Professor Rush Rhees as president of Rochester University, October, 1900.]

The growth of interest shown in the field of higher education during thirty years or so has been as marked as the growth of the industrial world. The changes which have come about in connection with this growth, and in part a consequence of it, are greater than can be appreciated without a careful comparison, point by point, between the usage of to-day and that of a quarter-century ago. A multitude of agencies, all of which relate themselves to the thought of democracy, and which owe their life to the spirit of democracy, have exerted influence upon the minutest details of higher educational life and method. The changes, therefore, in the educational field are due to the same causes, and indeed are the same changes as those which have taken place in every kind of life about us.

Thirty years ago there were no universities nor large institu-

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tions. Harvard had 655 students; Yale, 664; Michigan, 432. The American university is something entirely new; and side by side with its development, important modifications in the method and aim of college work have come in. No one questions for a single moment the fact that these changes have in general served to advance the cause of education; and yet one will be slow to make the distinct announcement that in every detail these changes have proved to be a source of added strength. What I have in mind to speak of to-day, however, is the actual relationship which exists, or should exist, between the college student in his student life and the college professor. I use the word "college" rather than the word "university." In real university life the question of this relationship is one which has not yet received even the slightest consideration. I am myself persuaded that in the university as well as in the college the members of the faculty have large and definite responsibilities outside of those pertaining directly to the work of the lecture-room; but the opportunity this afternoon permits but few words at best, and these I shall restrict to the college life as distinguished from that of the university.

The college professor of to-day is not an officer of the state, but a fellow-student. The truth is he is not an officer at all, although, in view of the old traditions or with a new meaning for the word, the term may be employed. The higher institution of learning is not, as it once was, an institution empowered to try its students for civil or criminal offenses. University courts are a reminiscence of the Middle Ages. The college professor is neither a judge nor a member of a jury. He is not set to pass judgment on the conduct of the student, if that conduct should violate the state laws. The college community is one made up of older and younger students, all of whom have joined the community in order to make progress in intellectual life. If some of the members of the community for good reason violate its common sentiment, they should retire, and naturally it will be the older members of the community who, as fellow-students, will have the most to do with determining the particular spirit that shall be characteristic of the community.

In that incitement which those more advanced in the same kinds of work may furnish to those who follow, in the sympathy which binds together those who hold interests in common, in the ambition which leads a student to emulate and to out-distance fellow-students—in all these and in other ways the college professor will show himself as much a student as any other in the college; as intense a worker, as sympathetic a listener, as humble a learner as any member of the community. The only difference between the professor and the pupil is that the former has the advantage of maturity and experience. This advantage he shares unselfishly with his fellow-student, the pupil. Maybe the pupil is just beginning his work along these higher lines, while the professor has learned long since that, whatever progress he may have made, he is still only on the border lines of knowledge in his department. The college professor who has not the student spirit should not continue his college work, and, if he have the student spirit, then he is a fellow-student with all who have that spirit. The idea involved in arbitrary exercise of authority as an officer is utterly opposed to the student spirit. It is an attitude of mind with which the student spirit is entirely inconsistent; and so to-day, the true and efficient college instructor is only an older fellow-student in a guild made up of members all of whom, if they so deserve, retain their membership—are truly fellow-students. If he is more than this, he is not this; if he is less than this, he is nothing.

The college professor to-day is not an officer *in loco parentis*. It is an old and widely prevailing opinion which in opposition to this statement would make the college instructor parent for the time being of those with whom he is to associate. This idea is, of course, closely related to that which has just been mentioned. Parents who have occupied the first sixteen or eighteen years of the life of the prospective pupil in such a manner as to convince the pupil that parental discipline is something to be dreaded and to be avoided, something mischievous and productive of every evil, are only too glad to turn their sons and daughters over to the college, with the understanding that the college shall now assume parental authority. Such parents, in

transferring this dignified and far-reaching function, have transferred, in these cases, something that has long since been emptied of its dignity and its worth. If parental authority has been rightly exercised, the young man or the young woman at the age of eighteen ought to be free, within the limitations of conventional life, to do what seems proper, in so far as it does not conflict with the general sentiment of the particular community to which they have now given adherence. If the parental authority has not been exercised properly during those eighteen years, the young man or young woman will not be found ready to submit to artificial authority of an institutional character even for a moment.

No, the college instructor is not a parent, nor does he have the authority of a parent. Parents in these days are themselves wise enough to know that at the college age the time has come when the young man or the young woman will not brook objective or institutional authority. The influence of the parent has its basis in affection; and the professor, if he would exert a strong influence, must convince the student that he is serving the student's interests. The instructor is, therefore, an older brother in the student's family. Here again the advantage is only that which comes from age and experience. As in any given family there are those who stand more closely associated—brothers, for instance, in some cases stand in closer, in others a less close relationship—so the ideal community is a fraternity in which older and younger come together and influence each other in a different degree.

For my own part, I can conceive that the influence of the younger members of this fraternity is as great in many instances upon the older as is that of the older men upon the young. This influence will be very strong, and will be entirely different from any arbitrary exercise of authority. For the college community is a real democracy. All men, even in a democracy, are not equal although all deserve equal privileges. In the college community these have larger *influence*, who, by reason of age and wisdom and training, have larger *opportunity* to aid those who as yet have not attained to the same high level.

If the foregoing conceptions are in any measure correct, it follows that the closeness of the relationship which we are considering will depend upon the extent to which in any given case the pupil and the instructor have common interests; and those who have common interests, whether of an objective or a subjective character, will alone derive strong advantage from this relationship. It is just here that the principle of election plays its part. The opportunity to elect certain subjects for study is one which permits the pupil to assume the relation of fellowship with an instructor whose highest interests connect themselves with those subjects. A pupil cannot be a fellow-student with a professor, if pupil and professor do not have a fellow-feeling toward the subject studied. On the other hand, fellowship and friendship can hardly be avoided in the case of pupil and instructor whose hearts are drawn in the same direction, whose minds are led to deal continuously with the same thought, and whose lives are thus brought intimately together. Fellow studentship between instructor and pupil is therefore dependent upon the opportunity to elect; and if it has existed in earlier times without this opportunity, it has been, in many cases, an accident.

The principle of election, then, has made student-fellowship between officer and pupil possible; nay, more, it has made any other relationship impossible. But this, it may be said, does not apply to those subjects in the first year of college work which all students take in common; for example, Latin, English, mathematics. Here an important difference exists between the larger and the smaller college. In the latter the old régime still continues. The freshman and the sophomore do not think of student-fellowship with instructors. It is only when one has come to be a junior or a senior that he may, under ordinary circumstances, be said to enter into any kind of relationship with his instructors; and this is because in most instances in the smaller institutions all students must go to one man for work in Latin, to another for work in English, and to another for work in mathematics. Even though there be two or three, the student has no choice; because, there being but a single class

of a certain stage of advancement, some one instructor of the department takes the more advanced students, another those less advanced; and this arrangement leaves the student himself no choice. In the larger institutions it is possible—although it must be admitted the possibility is not often realized—to apply the principle of election to the instructor rather than to the subject of instruction. And here a new principle comes into operation. The pupil may select one or two or three, or even more, instructors who are offering the same course of instruction at the same time.

There is, indeed, much to be said in favor of the distribution of students in sections made up of those of equal intellectual strength, Section A including those who rank highest, the other sections also being organized on the basis of scholarship. There are advantages in this system; but there are advantages also in the system which will allow each student to select that one of the two or more instructors offering the same subject at the same time who shall seem to be a man between whom and the pupil a close personal relationship may exist. One instructor may prove to be sympathetic and helpful to pupils of a certain temperament and attitude of mind. This same instructor may utterly fail to be of assistance to another group of students equally strong; while a second instructor may succeed with the second group and fail with the first. Few men occupy the professorial chair in our colleges who can touch closely even a majority of the students in their classes. This is in many cases, as has been said, a matter of natural temperament. The nervous and vigorous instructor will accomplish most for students of one temperament, while students of another temperament will receive injury from his instruction. The sober, quiet, and unobtrusive personality of another instructor will, on the other hand, find response in the minds and hearts of students whom the first instructor could not touch.

From this point of view care should be taken that the instructors in a given department of study should be men or women of entirely different types, in order that, being thus different, they may bring themselves into relationship with different types

of pupils. In the liberty accorded the pupil to select the departments in which he will study, and in the liberty which he may enjoy to make choice between different instructors offering the same grade of work at the same time, there will be found the basis, and the only basis, for fellow-studentship and for fraternal comradeship; and these together constitute the ideal relationship that should exist between the instructor and his pupil.

I regret that the limit of time has not permitted me to enlarge upon the thought I have in mind. But now, in bearing greetings from the university which I have the honor to represent to our colleague who to-day assumes the responsibilities of this high office, it will not be inappropriate to make brief application of these propositions to him and to his office.

If the college instructor be a student, if he be a fellow-student, one of the members of a community of students, the president of the college must in a peculiar sense be such a student. There is no place in the college community for a man, whether he be pupil or instructor or president, who is not a student, who is not himself engaged in the search for truth, or for the best methods of propagating truth already known. I do not mean that he must be a formal teacher; for this there may not be good opportunity. But the college community cannot have as its most honored member one who is not a student in one or another of the great departments of life—one who has not the student mind, the student attitude of mind, the student sympathy, or the student ambition.

If the college community is a family of brothers, in which the instructor is an older member guiding as best he can those who have more recently entered the family, it follows that the president is the elder brother, the oldest of the family, that one in whom special responsibilities rest—responsibilities which shall be discharged only as they conserve the interests of the family, as they include the work and the growth of even the youngest member of the family. The relationship between him and the instructor is that of brothers closely related in age. His relationship to the pupils is that of a brother somewhat separated,

perhaps, in years, but, for that very reason, in whose heart there will be found greater care and tenderness for those who are the newcomers in the family. The president will be the most honored student of the student community. He is the oldest brother of the family, and as such his interests will be broader than those of any other student. Personally he may have made choice of some special subject, but officially he will feel the same interest in every department, and will labor with his fellow-students who represent the departments, for their upbuilding. Breadth of interest will be his strongest characteristic. As a member and a brother in the family, he will exercise the largest sympathy with the other members of the family, old and young. His personal relationship will be close; with each brother of the family who has occasion to rejoice he will rejoice; with each member of the family who has occasion to weep he will weep. As a true brother he will point out to each member of the family, young and old, what in his opinion is wrong; and he will make effort to suggest how improvement may be secured. He will exercise, if need be, that candor and that straightforward bluntness which a brother may exercise toward a brother. His attitude will not be that of a superior person endowed for the time being with superior power. The true college president is not a "boss"; he is a fellow-student and a brother.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Of the three types of relationship between faculty and students—paternalism, separation, comradeship—which is best and why?
2. From the student's point of view, make definite suggestions as to means of promoting closer social relations between instructors and students.
3. Discuss co-operation as a characteristic of college instruction.
4. Show whether the general character of the relations between students and faculty at your college is friendly, neutral, or hostile.

COLLEGE DISCIPLINE ¹

THOMAS ARKLE CLARK

[Thomas Arkle Clark (1862—) is dean of men in the University of Illinois. Before taking up the work of this position he was professor of rhetoric in the same institution for many years. As dean, he has shown himself one of those rare men in this office who by tact and sympathy with the student's point of view can exercise a powerful influence upon the characters of the young men of a large university. This selection was originally a paper presented before the Department of Higher Education of the National Educational Association at its meeting in July, 1910.]

The greatest handicap in my experience to successful college discipline is the excessive number of rules laid down by the colleges for the conduct of students. Too many college officers feel that when an evil exists, or an erroneous custom prevails, the only thing necessary is to pass a regulation against the evil, or the custom, and the matter is settled. The real fact is that generally the more rules an institution has, the more difficulty the college officers find in maintaining good discipline, and in keeping the young people within bounds.

It is safe to take for granted that young people of college age know in the main what is right and what is reasonable as to conduct, so that it is not necessary that every sin in the decalogue, or that every violation of the law under the statute, should be named in the college catalogue and the penalty for its violation attached. Rules often prevent individual action in specific cases. Every violation of good order should be taken up, looked into, and judged as if it were the only one of its sort. Rules often hamper such judgment. Many college rules are virtually a dead letter because they are difficult or impossible of execution, and the existence of such regulations can do nothing less than bring the whole system of college statutes into ridicule and disrepute. I believe, for illustration, that it would be a most excellent thing if college students did not visit saloons,

¹ A paper read before the Department of Higher Education of the National Educational Association, 1910. Reprinted from the *Proceedings* by permission of the author.

for I have known very few students who were not to a greater or less degree injured by such a practice. It seems to me, however, usually worse than useless, and in fact often harmful, for a college to make a rule prohibiting students from entering saloons, because it is so evidently a rule unlikely or impossible to be enforced.

More than this, the very existence of regulations will frequently incite students to insubordination that would not otherwise have been thought of. "I've just discovered," one freshman said to another, "that it's against the rules to smoke in the quadrangle. Now, I suppose it will make me sick, for I don't care much for smoking, but I couldn't let a thing like that go by without having a try at it." I am not arguing against regulations *per se*; some of course are necessary for the proper conduct of any business or institution, but the fewer the better, and then only those which are absolutely necessary.

The young person who enters college is on a different basis, and should receive different treatment, from the same person in the high school. He is more nearly an adult, and he should be treated as such. He is more independent, more upon his own responsibility, and so far as possible he should be left to manage his own conduct and his own affairs. The more he can be let alone the better. This last statement does not mean in any sense that no one should know what he is doing. Much of the trouble that occurs in college—nearly all that occurred in my own undergraduate days—comes from the fact that rules more or less arbitrary and often foolish are made in the belief that such legislation will in itself correct any tendency to wander which the undergraduate may evince. Seldom is any effort made to keep an eye upon the young student, and to forestall any dereliction into which he may fall. The best way to manage the student guilty of misconduct is to look after him so personally and so carefully that he may be brought to account just *before* he has been guilty of the act that would subject him to discipline. This last statement may seem like a paradox, or an Irish bull, but I am sure that the most skillful disciplinary work which I have ever done in the ten years during which I have been a

disciplinary officer has been connected with the things that never happened, because they were not allowed to.

Granted that the college has made few rules, and that there is some one who keeps himself pretty thoroughly conversant with what is going on, there will still be infractions of regulations, and the necessity on the part of college officers to exercise authority. Youth is still young and irresponsible, and is quite as likely to be guided by impulse as by judgment. In my own undergraduate days, twenty years ago, when a young fellow had been drunk, had danced in a college hall, had carried away the campus fence to add fuel to the bonfire in celebration of Hallowe'en, or had backed the cannon into the sluggish stream that flowed through the campus in order to show his disapproval of compulsory military drill—when he had done any of these things and was caught, he was brought before the entire faculty assembled in most serious session, and here he was tried. It is a harrowing experience, as some of us well know, and one not likely always to bring justice. A man may perhaps make a good teacher, or a good scientific investigator, without making a good judge. When an entire faculty deliberates on disciplinary matters there is likely to be too much talking, some wrangling, and uncertain conclusions. The responsibility is too widely scattered, and the student and good order are sure to suffer.

Disciplinary matters will be handled more satisfactorily to all concerned if put in charge of a small body composed of from three to five persons chosen because of their knowledge of student life and conditions, and because of their special fitness to give reasonable and sympathetic judgments on the cases that come before them. The members of such a committee should be young, or should have once been young, with the memory of that time still in mind. They should be broad-minded and above petty prejudices. They should still be interested in the things outside of books that interest normal, healthy young people—such as athletic sports and social pleasures. They should have backbone enough when an unpleasant thing has to be done, and ought to be done, to do it even though it hurts some students, and some fathers and mothers. Ordinarily I

should not consider it a calamity if neither women nor lawyers were on such a committee. Women are more often than men influenced by their prejudices or their emotions, and lawyers are likely to insist upon a "legal" conviction. Conditions are such that a man should often be allowed to go free who has really violated a college regulation, while another man who cannot be proved guilty of any actual dereliction may yet clearly be proved a detriment to the community, and should be sent away.

In institutions where both men and women are in attendance I believe it will often be found of advantage for a different committee to pass upon the cases of discipline of women from the one which considers the cases of men. Men and women are so different, especially young men and young women, in the crises which matters of discipline bring, that I believe they may very well be handled by people of somewhat different temperaments. Men, for instance, I have found will almost always tell the truth about their own escapades, being careful, of course, not to bring in any of their companions, but shielding themselves very little; while girls, under similar conditions, from sheer nervousness or terror, will often tell the most palpable untruths.

Whether or not such a committee should be given absolute and final power, or should report its findings to the faculty, or to some higher power for confirmation and final action, will depend upon local conditions. Whichever method is employed the findings of such a committee should virtually be final, or its power and influence will count for very little.

In such a disciplinary committee as I have discussed the general management should be in the hands of a chairman who should be a man of experience and judgment, well acquainted with students and student activities, and he should allow only such matters to come before the committee for trial as cannot be settled in some more amicable and satisfactory way. Cases requiring discipline may be reported to him either directly or through the proper college officer.

A disciplinary officer to be successful must have the confidence of both students and faculty. The faculty must feel that matters given into his hands will be dealt with squarely, and

without delay. No college instructor wishes to be humiliated by having matters of discipline which he reports either ignored or treated lightly. Neither should he feel that he is compromised if every student whom he reports for discipline is not found guilty. I have known college instructors who refused to report cases of alleged cribbing, because of the fact that a student previously reported had not been found guilty by the disciplinary committee. It was not justice they desired, but conviction. Many instructors are annoyed by what they consider unnecessary delay in disciplinary affairs. They do not realize that it takes time to assemble committees, to gather facts, and to come to conclusions which will do justice to everyone concerned.

No disciplinary officer will get on well unless he has a reputation for playing fair. If the college officer is willing to give the square deal, he will have gone a long way toward solving his official difficulties. He will sometimes have to listen to some long stories, he will perhaps have often to go a long way and suffer some inconvenience to discover necessary facts, but the college students whom I have known have for the most part been square, and have been willing to take without complaint or whimpering what was legitimately coming to them for their misdeeds, when it was shown to them that the college officer was inclined to do the fair thing.

I long ago learned that it will never do to reach a conclusion with regard to any matter under dispute without hearing both sides of the story. No matter how damaging or convincing the evidence may be, it is always best to hold one's judgment in abeyance until the accused party has been heard, and given a fair chance to defend himself.

Only a few days ago a woman called me up to settle a dispute with reference to an alleged agreement which she had had with a student. "Should not a student who has rented a room for a semester, and who leaves before that time, pay for the whole semester?" she asked. "Ordinarily, yes," I answered, "but I should like to talk to the student before answering." And when I did, I found that in reality the woman had violated her contract, but wanted still to hold the student to his,

It is never advisable to convict a man on circumstantial evidence, no matter how convincing it may appear to be. The committee of which I am chairman in my own institution have made it a rule to give the student the benefit of the doubt unless the case is clearly proved. We have never felt that we have lost by this method, for even though some guilty ones have escaped we have always been able to justify our actions, and to hold to our decisions.

This last point is a really important one. Whenever a disciplinary body gets a reputation for reversing its decisions, or changing its action at the first appeal, it loses force and influence. It is no light matter to send a man away from college; it may deprive the student of his chances of an education, and it is a disgrace and a sorrow to the family at home not easily borne. For that reason, such action should be taken deliberately, with a clear notion of what the facts are, and what the punishment means. Being once taken, unless new evidence is presented which alters the circumstances and presents new conditions, it should not be reversed. Any college disciplinary body will have to withstand tears and promises of reform, petitions and the onslaught of influential friends. If the decision was right, however, it should stand; if it was wrong, it should never have been made.

Whenever a disciplinary officer shows unusual consideration for the position or the connections of anyone under examination, he loses his grasp of the situation. A student should not be shown favors because he is some one's son, or because he is related to some one who has social position or influence. Everyone should be treated alike so far as his social position is concerned.

Personally I have found the greatest help in the solving of disciplinary difficulties in the students themselves. I should have far more trouble than I do were it not for the reliance which I have upon individual students, and student organizations, to help control situations. One of the main reasons why I have favored fraternities, and other social organizations among students, is because I have found them of the greatest help to

me in controlling and directing student activities, and in preventing dissipations and outbursts which might otherwise occur. One active student leader can help immensely to keep things under control.

One of the greatest difficulties of student discipline lies in the changing character of the student population. Every year, perhaps one third of the student community is new, and must become accustomed to the traditions and the regulations of the college. Whether this number consists of one hundred or one thousand, it should be some one's business to get acquainted with these freshmen, to know so far as possible who they are, where they come from, where they live, and what they are doing. If students have the feeling that some college officer knows what they are doing, and if the college officer goes far to make this feeling a reality, the problems of student discipline will be minimized. We are coming more and more to see, I believe, that though college students should be allowed so far as possible to think and act independently, they should be so situated that some one will know what they are doing; then, if trouble is brewing, some one will know where to look for it, and perhaps how to prevent it; if not, he will at least have a more intelligent idea of how it may be ended with the least friction on student and faculty.

If a man hopes to succeed as a disciplinary officer he must keep closely in touch and sympathy with student life and student activities. He must be willing to praise the virtuous, to commend the worthy as well as to pass judgment upon the derelict. The wider his acquaintance the better; the more fully he understands human nature the easier will be his task. He must often know a great many things which he does not tell, though he must not tell things which he does not know. He will not lose if he sometimes does the unexpected thing, and no matter how many years he may live he must always be young.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Upon what matters of personal conduct, if any, should the faculty place restrictions by regulations? 2. Describe the college student's attitude toward the regulations in existence at your institution. 3. Describe the system of administering discipline at your institution, and comment on how closely it approximates your ideal. 4. Point out how fraternities and other student organizations may help in college discipline. 5. Indicate what might be the helpfulness to the student of a disciplinary officer such as Dean Clark has described. 6. Show what should be the effect of a general democratic spirit among both students and faculty upon student attitude toward work, standards of scholarship, etc. 7. Suggest how the college authorities may secure better personal knowledge of students and student life, and deal more directly with individual needs.

STUDENT CO-OPERATION IN COLLEGE
GOVERNMENT¹

ETHELBERT DUDLEY WARFIELD

[Ethelbert Dudley Warfield (1861—) was from 1891-1914 president of Lafayette College. Before becoming president of this institution, he was at the head of Miami University for several years.]

Of all the problems which colleges have had to deal with, the most difficult have had to do with college life, not with college learning. The practical genius of the Anglo-Saxon people at the very dawn of their conscious life demanded that the learning of the school and the college should be a lamp to the feet of men. The learning of the cloister was well enough, but it was not the only, nor even the most important thing. It has been the pride of English schools and colleges that they have trained not merely scholars, but statesmen; that they have developed not merely men of letters, but men of affairs; that

¹ Reprinted from *The Educational Review*, Volume VIII, page 442 (December, 1894), by permission of the author and of the publishers of the magazine.

they have directed the progress of thought not more than the growth of colonies and the rule of kings. The college has existed for the state, it has sought to influence the standards of life within the state, it has realized that its graduates were to be not merely scholars, but citizens.

While it has sought to do this for the state, and has done it with conspicuous success, the college has found it difficult to assimilate the raw material constantly sent to its mills, and has at times failed in the practical management of its own temporary citizens—crude emigrants from many and often hostile homes, who have not yet reached the full standard of naturalization. During the Middle Ages so miscellaneous was the collection of students in all the great universities, and so rude were the best elements among them, that the difficulty of governing them became immense, and yet there was a thoroughgoing system, capable of the exertion of great repressive power, always in operation. Down to the Renaissance there were practically no students in the universities who were not in greater or less degree members of the clerical body. In one form or other they were under the domination, direct and personal, of "Mother Church," and their teachers were in every case their spiritual superiors. With the temporal power of penance, and the spiritual terrors of excommunication, in addition to the rules of various monastic orders, supported by the institution of the confessional, it would seem as though there existed a ready-made system of government adequate to all needs. But men are men, and human nature is the same in all ages. Youth is a period of vivacity and vitality. And under the conditions of life prevalent in the Middle Ages, rough and boisterous conduct, indulgence, and excess were not only natural, but were hardly deemed scandalous. The traditional warfare of town and gown not merely raged periodically, but the students were sure to take sides in the oft-recurring conflict between the organized forces of a powerful and centralized church to which they owed spiritual allegiance, and the too often disorganized impotence of a feudalized monarchy to whom they owed temporal allegiance. The result was not

merely disorder, but open conflict, leading to secessions of the universities from towns where they believed themselves to have been oppressed and mistreated. Thus Bologna migrated to Verona, Paris to Oxford, Oxford to Stamford, under the hard compulsion of a pitiless feudalism in conflict with a riotous student body. A brief extract from the chronicles of the reign of Henry III, translated from Walter Map, will give a striking picture of student life in the thirteenth century. "At that time the lord legate went to Oxford. The scholar clerks sent him an honorable present in the shape of meat and drink, before breakfast. After breakfast they went to his lodging to call and pay their respects. On their arrival an Italian porter with improper and untimely jesting, opened the gate a little and bawled out after the Roman manner, 'What do ye want?' whereto the clerks replied, 'To pay our respect to the lord legate.' For they felt sure that they would receive honor in return for honor. But the porter replied with taunts, and in wanton pride and abuse refused them all admittance. On seeing this the clerks made a rush and got in; the Romans wishing to keep them back struck them with their fists and sticks; while the contending parties were bandying blows and abuse, a poor Irish chaplain, who was standing at the kitchen door, happened to earnestly beg for something in God's name, as poor and hungry men will do. The master of the legate's cooks heard him, but paid no heed, and being annoyed with the poor man, threw in his face some hot water from the caldron in which rich meat was being cooked. At this wrong a clerk from the Welsh border cried out 'Shame! that we should put up with this,' and drawing a bow which he carried—for as the tumult increased some of the clerks had snatched up arms that came to their hands—he discharged an arrow which pierced the cook, whom the clerks satirically called 'Nabuzaradan,' which means Chief of the Cooks. When he fell dead, an uproar arose, at which the legate, overcome with amazement and excessive fright, which may befall even the most steadfast, took refuge in the church tower, having on his canonical hood, and had the doors closed behind him. When the approach

of darkness had put an end to the tumult, the legate laid aside his canonicals and mounted his best horse in haste; and under the guidance of those who were acquainted with the less known fords, with much danger crossed the river at the nearest point, that he might the more quickly fly to the protection of the king's wings."

It was out of such conditions as these, and the monastic ideals to which they gave birth, that the system of government common to English universities sprang up. The life of Oxford, in my own student days, was one of the best examples of the survival, not of the fittest, but of the most unfit. In my judgment it was a striking anachronism. We lived in beautiful old Gothic buildings, arranged in series of quadrangles, communicating with each other by narrow passages, some of which were closed by iron gateways, and shut in from the outside world by barred windows wherever the buildings formed the external front, or by high walls rendered unscalable by iron spikes and railings where the beautiful gardens extended beyond the walls, while the great entrance was closed by a massive gateway only to be entered by a little wicket between the hours of 9 P. M. and 8 A. M. Inside this walled and barred retreat, the most minute report of the conduct of the inmates was daily formulated and placed on file. He who was out after the hour of nine paid a fine proportionate to the hour of his return in order to be admitted. He who had a guest who left his college later than that hour paid a corresponding fine that his friend might be allowed to return to his own college. In every way the student felt that the college was *in loco parentis*, the parent which the college represented being of a peculiarly suspicious temperament, and well assured that no opportunity for misconduct would be missed by his *quasi* son. And yet within these colleges from time immemorial has existed a spiritual relationship as sweet and as strong as has ever existed between teacher and taught, between master and disciple, or between parent and son—existed, I have sometimes thought, not because of the restraint imposed upon the younger, but despite it—and all the while both

master and pupil have found their self-reliance, their independence, and their self-assertion limited and atrophied by the feeling that they lived beneath so parental a system that effort and anxiety for their own usefulness were unnecessary; while, on the other hand, a more aggressive class, not used to having others think and act for them, have constantly chafed under the restraints of a home that was made a prison and the harshness of a life that, in being made too easy, was made to antagonize the dogged determination of English blood to think and act for itself.

If we turn to the German universities, we are met by a great contrast. The student body, instead of being gathered into colleges under a strict and too careful regimen, are turned out into the world without any special care or attention. Here, as in the English universities, it is true that the authorities of the university have jurisdiction of public offenses committed by students, and that as the Vice Chancellor holds a court in England, so the Rector holds his court in Germany. But the German student goes and comes at his own sweet will. He keeps no chapels, his lecture attendance is a matter of form rather than of requirement, no inquiry is made into his manner of life unless he comes in conflict with the city officials. Then he is brought before the city courts only to plead his university privileges and to have his case referred to the university court. The outcome is that for a time he will be put into what is supposed to be solitary confinement, in a room, or rooms, set apart for that purpose, usually on the topmost floor of the university building. The spell of seclusion is easily broken by a small fee paid to his jailer, and the prisoner, if at all popular, will make merry with his friends during the greater part of the time that his confinement lasts, enjoying such eatables and drinkables as his friends may see fit to provide. Scarcely any more riotous scene is conceivable than an afternoon reception of a popular student in confinement.

What a contrast is presented by the careful nightly promenade of the Oxford proctor inquiring into the presence or absence of cap and gown on students out for perfectly legiti-

mate purposes, with the processions to and from opera, theater, and concert hall constantly to be seen in any German university town! And yet it is probable that the order in the one institution is neither better nor worse than in the other.

The fact appears to be that conduct is largely a matter of temperament, training, and temptation. The Oxford system has to contend with the more assertive British temperament, the more aggressive British training, and also itself, by exercising too great repression, throws constant temptation in the way of students. In importing the British system of education, our ancestors in many respects copied, not the English, but the Scotch, type.

Retaining the dormitory system, they did not retain the remnants of monastic order, and, while establishing a definite system of government, tendered necessary by the early age at which the students of a century ago began their college course, they rather embraced the spirit than copied the form of college rule. Its theory was still parental. It was almost universally required that one or more tutors should reside in every college building. But it usually stopped there. And, wherever the tutor was possessed of a liberal spirit and kept himself in close touch and sympathy with college life, the arrangement was usually successful. It was often found, however, that a tutor of poor judgment provoked more dissatisfaction and disorder than he prevented by his official authority. Yet the system of tutorial presence, if not supervision, in the dormitory is still popular. It exists in a great many colleges which have the dormitory system, and, by a large proportion of college officials, is regarded as desirable, if not essential. The most important purpose which these inmates of the college buildings served was that, by learning the drift of college sentiment, they often brought the governing body to recognize it. And in this is to be found the key to the best college government in our own country during the present century: a careful inquiry into college sentiment and the prompt correction of it when misled, or an equally prompt recognition of it when in the right. For, as the students have increased in

age, and as the self-consciousness of modern life has grown, the sober judgment of the great majority of students, influenced more and more by the various expressions of public opinion, especially that voiced by the press, has become more and more worthy of consideration. Youth, which is always sensitive, has become critical as well. And as new institutions, often of state foundation, with larger liberty, have grown up in close neighborhood with the older colleges sometimes based upon methods evolved from older American ideals, but deeply influenced by new conditions largely derived from the study of German universities, the older colleges have had to reckon with a spirit of independence, self-reliance, and push generated by these new student bodies, keenly alive to the freedom of life in cities and large towns. More and more the colleges have drifted into a condition of anarchy tempered by good feeling, and the student body has been free to do what it would, except for temporary and sometimes violent assertions of authority in the face of external acts of lawlessness.

This lawlessness, of which we have heard much in the past year, has largely been the result of old and evil traditions generated by the recklessness of boyhood under the restraints of the older methods—a recklessness which has not diminished in proportion as greater freedom has been secured. These traditions survive in those which separate class and class, in those which dishonor our young manhood, as well as violate good order, in hazing, in cane rushes, and similar performances; in the old antagonism of town and gown, and various other disorderly acts without excuse in any seat of learning, and especially in colleges which have no roots in the distant past, when these things were the unhappy attendants of an unrefined condition of life.

The problem before us is, how to develop a new theory of government which shall remove the temptations which periodically appear, and regulate, as simply, and as nearly automatically as possible, our college life. This problem involves a complete recasting of our views of what college life is and ought to be. It demands a recognition of the student as a free agent,

the complete abandonment of ideas drawn from feudalism and despotism, and the fundamental recognition of the facts (1) that students, when they enter college, assume certain definite obligations in the form of a simple contract; (2) that in the great majority of cases they are young men of earnest purpose, with a well-defined object in view; (3) and that, if given an opportunity to choose between right and wrong under natural conditions, they will almost inevitably choose the right. On the other hand, it must be recognized with equal clearness that the college is not a shop to which men may come and purchase what they wish in just the quantity they wish without reference to utility and a rational object. The college, as represented by its teaching body, is to lead; it is to direct men to truth; it is to provide a carefully-ordered and well-adjusted course, and all who enter the college must be guided and directed within certain well-defined limits to the ends which they themselves have chosen. And in the second place, it must be clearly recognized that the student body is immature, that its judgment is undeveloped, that it is subject to freaks and fancies, and must be protected against its own ill-considered judgments. As a corollary to these two propositions, it may be further said that, in the discipline of the college, it may well be recognized that it is important to develop a thoroughgoing habit of self-command and self-control as a part of the mental and moral discipline which intellectual training provides, and to this end nothing is more important than education in the forming of concrete judgments, and in making a rational choice between conflicting courses of conduct as presented by questions involving social and governmental action even on a small scale.

Thus societies and clubs often afford that training for public life which in the old New England town was received in the town meeting, and men learn in private affairs the art of executive management with which they afterward may serve the state, and so they may learn in college government the fundamental principles of co-operation and self-control in social and political relations which they will afterward need as citizens.

Certain of our colleges have already adopted a co-operative system by which the students have a definite and extensive part in college discipline. Others have only gone so far as to assign the regulation of such questions as examinations, which present peculiar temptations to some students, to the student body; and, thirdly, other institutions have regulated their dormitories by a so-called "house-system," whereby the inmates of each house are permitted to control the affairs of their dormitory, even to the extent of electing its inmates. The Amherst system is the best illustration of the first of these. Princeton and Cornell have satisfactorily made trial of the second, while the University of Chicago is the best known exponent of the third. There are, however, in none of them any peculiarities or complex conditions which need to be especially explained. Everything turns on the simple question as to whether student co-operation is desirable, and, if desirable, possible.

That student co-operation is desirable is now very generally admitted among younger members of faculties. It is practically universally conceded that from seventy-five to ninety per cent. of the students have the interest of the college quite as much at heart as the faculty or trustees. The intense self-consciousness of modern college life, paraded as it is before the public in the daily and weekly press, has given the average student a keen desire to promote the reputation of the institution to which he belongs. The great difficulty lies, first, in giving expression to this college sentiment, and, second, in eliminating the occasional acute activity of a few unruly spirits out of sympathy with the purpose for which colleges exist, and unfit to enjoy their privileges or to bear their responsibilities. The community, from whatever point of view we may look at it,—political, moral, or religious,—has always been the victim of such a class. The object of college discipline, viewed from the standpoint of such men, has come to be looked upon as one in which punishment is the principal thing, while the real object of college discipline is to protect the residue of the college family from the misconduct and the evil report engendered by

these few. Yet even to these men the college owes an obligation. The college cannot, any more than can the state, execute the highest penalties of the law upon men who merely throw themselves athwart the purposes of the state. The college ought occasionally to suppress men merely as public nuisances, a function once frequently exercised upon a higher plane by a bill of attainder. But the college, by also acting under contract, must be careful how it acts, especially in the absence of a well-proved concrete case. This care should be in direct proportion to the demand which it makes upon the students for a thorough recognition of the responsibility which they assume in their initial contract at matriculation. Give the seventy-five or more per cent. of students a voice in the determination of college conduct, teach them how to use that voice, encourage them to think that it is their reputation and the reputation of their college that is at stake, and, by an energetic public opinion, they will more effectively suppress the disorderly element than any law that can be applied can ever do. This will be an education which will give them a deeper interest, both as students and alumni in their *alma mater*, and will also be an important factor in their education as citizens.

How this can be accomplished is not an easy question to answer broadly, and yet specifically it should not be difficult. One thing must be well guarded—the ideals of government must be kept in the hands of the faculty, and such a representation must be secured for these ideals as will make them the standard toward which the whole system tends; and, in the second place, care must be taken to prevent what is not infrequent in college life, as it is common in public life, the possibility of the overweening influence in college councils of demagogues. In my own student days, I have known a student agitator, of shrewd and unscrupulous political capacity, to keep the whole college in hot water for weeks together over some fancied grievance which he was able from time to time to exaggerate into a general conspiracy against the welfare of his fellow-students. I shall not undertake to outline any

specific plan. So far as my own experience and inquiry have extended, I believe the Amherst plan to be the most successful thus far formulated. But Amherst has been fortunate in having to do with the descendants of a singularly earnest and law-abiding people. Other colleges must work upon less easily repressed and less homogeneous material, and yet I believe in this, as in all relations between student and faculty, that the fundamental principle is the same, and one that can be safely acted upon—the utmost mutual trust in the oneness of purpose of student and teacher, and the sincere confidence of each in the devotion of all to the institution to which they equally owe allegiance.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. A college dean has written of student self-government: "Student government implies the possession of mature judgment or control of reason more than most persons of college age possess. At that time of life all are more easily moved by impulse and immediate advantage. Experience alone teaches men to seek an ultimate effect in preference to a near-by advantage. The college life in this respect is a time of transition, often of revolution in attitude and action." What answer could be made to this position? 2. Show how student self-government may be a valuable means of training for the responsibilities of citizenship. 3. What should be the scope of student self-government? Should it, for instance, attempt to regulate personal habits of students? 4. Describe the machinery of student self-government as it prevails at your college. If it does not prevail, draw up a plan that you think would suit your conditions.

COMMUNITY LIFE OF THE COLLEGE

DORMITORY LIFE FOR COLLEGE MEN ¹

CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING

[Charles Franklin Thwing (1853—) has been for many years president of Western Reserve University and Adelbert College. He is a frequent contributor to magazines on educational topics. Among the more notable of his writings in this field are *History of Higher Education in America*, *Within College Walls*, *Universities of the World*, *The American College*.]

The word "dormitory," in its present meaning, is a new word in academic language; in its present meaning it stands for a building used by a college for housing students. Mullinger, the historian of Cambridge, uses the word in contrast with "study" in speaking of a student of his university of about the year 1550. The present meaning was formerly taken by the word "hostel," or "college" or "hall." The hostel of the English universities of three hundred years ago was a lodging house under the charge of a principal, where students resided at their own cost. This word was never transferred to America, but it has been transferred to India, Japan and China, and there is in quite as good usage as the blessed institution itself. The word "college" as applied to a building has been the favorite word in American academic usage. Williams College began in a building long known as West College. The brick row at Yale of eight buildings was composed of colleges, though "hall" was the term applied in the earlier time to the first. "Hall" is still used, and to it have been added "house" or "cottage" or "halls of residence," especially as applied to women's colleges. "Dor-

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mitory" has, within fifty years, come into good use. It can hardly be called a fitting word except for those who wish, in their earnestness or wit, to represent the college life as torpid.

The foundation of the older colleges was marked quite as much by the erection of a building for housing students as of one for holding lectures and recitations. In fact, one building usually served for all academic purposes. In the development of colleges, differentiation has occurred and buildings have been erected, designed for specific purposes. In the foundation of the newer colleges outside of New England, the custom of building dormitories has not been constant. In fact, most state universities have declined to accept special responsibility for the domestic interests of students. These men and women have been left, in no small degree, to shift for themselves. Funds given by the state or by the individual have been required for the erection of libraries, laboratories and other halls. The ordinary home has opened its doors to students, glad to avail itself of means of increasing income, and students have been not loath to accept.

The advantages of dormitory life are not hard to distinguish.

One of the most apparent advantages lies in the tendency of this life to intensify academic atmosphere. The student is apart from his home. The building he occupies is made for the college; he lives with other students. With them he spends happy days and happier nights. The community is academic and of it he is an individual part. He "wears the gown" even if he does not, as the priest says in *Kim*, "follow the road." His talk, his fun, his tricks, his friendships, are all academic: he takes the academic bath. The worth of such absorption is great. At the altars of good fellowship and of opportunity, as well as at the shrine of scholarship, it is worth while to burn incense. Aloofness from common men's common concerns is, for a time, as good for a boy as at other times it is despicable and disastrous. The idols which men outside of the walls and the gates worship make no appeal to him. The value of unworldliness is pressed down hard upon his mind. The lawn, the quad, the hall, the campus, the yard, are holy ground. The

interpretation which memory makes of such academic conditions represents their value. What a storm of protestation occurs from the intimation of a college Board of Trustees of the tearing down of a dormitory. "Sacrilage" is the comment. Even the taking down of a college fence awakens national comment. Mr. Lowell once said that when a family leaves its ancestral home, the house should be burned down. A college dormitory is so sacred to the generations of students that it should stand forever.

A dormitory, moreover, fosters that thing or that being called college spirit. College spirit, all the college papers are ever declaring, the college lacks. College spirit, they lament, is not now what it once was. College spirit, they affirm, we must now have. "Go to, now," add these editors, "we will get college spirit." College spirit, what is it? This is the formula:—love of teacher and student for the college *plus* submission of the individual to the general academic good, *plus* appreciation by students of the highest ideals, *plus* songs and sports as expressing college devotion—those constitute college spirit. College spirit represents men living in close association. To make the fire of college spirit all the pieces of the kindling wood of the student life must lie close together. College spirits make college spirit.

Dormitory life, moreover, has the advantage of teaching students to get on with each other. It frees from cantankerousness. This ability of association, or of consociation, is of the highest worth. College men, when they fail, though, in fact, they seldom do fail, fail for one of two reasons. Either lack of moral fiber or inability to get on with their fellows. The second cause is far more common. No life represents so efficient a means for the removal in tendency to cantankerousness as the dormitory. Men must live under the same conditions. They must live together in time, as well as in space. These forces and methods cut out eccentricities, turn angularities into curves, make men reasonable. There is developed social taste, a social conscience, a social mind, a social heart and a social will. There is nourished a fine and noble democracy in the in-

dividual and a no less noble and fine individuality in the academic democracy.

In this same relation dormitory life has the advantage of formation of friendships—friendships which prove to be the most intimate and of life-long continuance. The memory of each man calls up such friendships. Let me, however, refer to one or two. I turn to a biography of Archbishop Tait and I find him writing of his going to Oxford. He says: "Arrived at Oxford, I took possession of my rooms in the top attics of Balliol, as completely a garret as could be imagined. I was at once introduced to George Moberly, Tutor of Balliol, whose favor had been bespoken for me. He asked me to breakfast with him next morning, which was Sunday. The party consisted of Herman Merivale—whom I had already begun to know—Manning—whom I never did know well—and Stephen Dennison."¹

He mentions the scholars of Balliol and his friends, among whom were Arthur Stanley, Jowett, Sir Stafford Northcote, Arthur Clough and Lord Coleridge, and he says that the men with whom he lived habitually acquired the name of "the family." I turn to the life of Tennyson. Everyone knows of "the Apostles." The friends among whom he lived were Lord Houghton, Archbishop Trench, Dean Alford and Hallam. Such friendships arise naturally in the common life of the dormitory.

I turn to the biography of Bishop Westcott and I read that among his contemporaries at Cambridge were C. B. Scott, late Headmaster of Westminster School; J. E. B. Mayor, Professor of Latin, formerly University Librarian; J. L. Davies, the well-known theologian, Vicar of Kirkby Lonsdale, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the King; D. J. Vaughan, Vicar of St. Martin's, Leicester, and Hon. Canon of Peterborough; A. Barry, Canon of Windsor, formerly Bishop of Sydney; Howson, late Dean of Chester, and Hon. E. H. Stanley, late Earl of Derby, formerly Secretary of State for the Colonies.²

I also wish to say that I look upon the dormitory as at once

¹ Davidson and Benham's *Life of Archibald Campbell Tait*, Vol. I, p. 39. (Author's note.)

² *Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott*, Vol. I, p. 37. (Author's note.)

the safest moral place and the strongest agency for forming character. I do not fail to recognize that grave dangers await college men, both within and without dormitory walls. We all know the nature of these perils. They are, comprehensively, the perils of appetite. But the dormitory represents a condition in which supervision can be exercised and always should be. The college stands as an official and personal guardian, but the dormitory offers, too, the means and the opportunity of forming the strongest character. Man comes closest to man. No haven of the home offers a snug harbor of moral refuge. Brother meets brother, and comes into brotherhood. No fugitive and cloistered man is to nurture a virtue or a man fugitive and cloistered. Each man teaches each man, forming, reforming, inspiring each and all. The floor of every dormitory room is a battlefield where men have fought our great personal moral issues, and in the field they, like Jacob, have prevailed.

Before I pass on to some of the objections to dormitory life, I wish to refer to one other advantage. It is found in the fact that the college memories of the graduate are most vivid of the personal and material relations of his dormitory home. No such memories does he hold remembering library or club table. His thought turns back to Hollis, to Main or to North. He has no such affection for recitation hall or for physics laboratory. When he returns to his twenty-fifth or fortieth anniversary, he seeks out the dormitory room and enters its doorway as a shrine.

I passed beside the reverend walls
 In which of old I wore the gown;
 I roved at random thro' the town,
 And saw the tumult of the halls;

And heard once more in College fanes
 The storm their high-built organs make,
 And thunder-music, rolling, shake
 The prophets blason'd on the panes;

And caught once more the distant shout.
 The measured pulse of racing oars
 Among the willows; paced the shores
 And many a bridge, and all about

The same gray flats again, and felt
The same, but not the same; and last
Up that long walk of limes I past
To see the rooms in which *he* dwelt.

Another name was on the door;
I lingered; all within was noise
Of songs, and clapping hands, and boys
That crash'd the glass, and beat the floor;

Where once we held debate, a band
Of youthful friends, on mind and art,
And labour, and the changing mart,
And all the framework of the land.¹

Yet there are disadvantages and difficulties in the dormitory life for college men.

These disadvantages arise from the necessary conditions and methods of fifteen or fifty or more men of the age of twenty years living together in one building. The disadvantages are the disadvantage of too great freedom, of too great individual independence. The freedom may be too great for the intellect: the peril of unwise methods of work or bad mental habits results. The freedom may be too great for the conscience: evil moral practices may follow. The freedom may be too great for the will: the peril of foolish practices may prevail. The freedom may be too great for the character: the peril of physical intellectual and moral debasement may become evident. Physical disorder, boisterousness, rowdyism is not uncommon. The interruption of a man's study by the invasion of a half dozen men, or the wasting of his evening with the slow-going caller, are necessary evils. The sense of individuality in property is ravaged. The application of "meum" and "teum" becomes mixed. Good-natured borrowing of books and of clothes is too much suffered.

The comprehensive difficulty of dormitory life lies in the lack of solitude. It is hard to find a chance to be alone. Some men do not wish to be alone; they are alone when they are alone. To change the remark of Newman, they are most alone when

¹Tennyson's *In Memoriam*.

most alone, but they ought to be alone, if not lonely. Other men wish to be alone. In loneliness they are like Newman, least alone. "If you have a mind, use it," said Walter Bagehot, "it is the most interesting thing." But those who like and those who dislike solitude should enter into the halls of silence. Thought, feeling, sentiment, are fed in great, quiet atmosphere. In noble solitudes rich characters and rich intellects are developed.

The chief element in a dormitory is its spirit, its life, its tone. This fine atmosphere depends first, on the students themselves; second, on the head of the house. The students should be organized into some society for promoting the common interest. The organization may have several officers, or may take on the form of a committee. Orderliness, fellowship, sympathy, helpfulness, are the key-notes of such a communistic process. Second, upon the head of the house quite as largely depends its worth. For there should be a head. The practice obtaining in some colleges of leaving the boys to themselves in a great dormitory is to be deprecated. The peril of disorder, of danger in case of fire, is great. This head should also be a heart, and both should be embodied in a college officer. The higher his official rank, the more influence has the head of the house, but beyond his official rank lies his personal character and bearing. He is in some places called a proctor. He is never to be regarded as a policeman or prison warden. He is here as a friend, guide and counsellor. His interest, care, oversight, should be close, but not too close. Jane Austin somewhere makes one of her characters say that "Oatmeal should be thin, thin, thin, but not too thin." The supervision of the dormitory officer should be close, but not too close—close enough to show friendship, wise, true, constant—but not so close as to give the impression of undue watchfulness which would free the student from the sense of personal responsibility. Such friendship is hard enough to secure. It represents the best type of character; it embodies genius for boys. Such a friend was Edward Bowen of Harrow. Of him it is said by one who knew him well: "If I attempted

to classify his interests, I should be inclined to say that he cared for things somewhat in the following order: boys, literature, games, history, walks, politics. . . . His friendship with his boys held the first place in his heart. . . . He gave his life to his boys."¹ But also it is said: "He had a great power of making older boys judge themselves, and offer an adequate punishment of an intellectual kind for their shortcomings. Throughout in all matters there was an appeal to the boy himself, to his best part, to his conscience. To train the conscience so that its discernment of right and wrong was clear, and the following of it was habitual, was his method. If there was no conscience, then still there was to be found something to appeal to. I have known him keep a very bad and weak boy straight for a while by an appeal to his honor as a gentleman, when it seemed that nothing could influence him."² Benson, writing of the schoolmaster, says, that he should be "easy, friendly, conversational." He also commends "courage, approbation, appreciation, a ready smile, an agreeable manner, a rebuke given in the form of a compliment, as most effective."³ These are the great qualities belonging to the head of a dormitory which help to transmute it into a condition and force, not simply for living, but for life.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Do you agree with the writer in his views upon the advantages and disadvantages of dormitory life? 2. Should a college endeavor to lodge all its students in dormitories? 3. Is it especially desirable that Freshmen should live in the dormitories if there is not room for all students? Is it desirable for Freshmen to be segregated to themselves in special buildings or halls? 4. Is the fraternity house an acceptable substitute for the dormitory? 5. Make a criticism of the dormitory life at your college, favorable or unfavorable as the case may be. 6. Express your opinion of the scheme of dormitory government suggested in this selection.

¹ Edward Bowen. *A Memoir*, page 25.

² *Ibid.*, page 255.

³ A. C. Benson's *School Master*, pages 26 and 30.

COLLEGE SPIRIT¹

DAVID STARR JORDAN

[David Starr Jordan (1851—) was the first president of Leland Stanford, Jr. University. In 1913 he retired from the active duties of this position with the title of chancellor. Dr. Jordan is also a distinguished zoologist. The selection here reprinted was originally delivered before the students of the University of Missouri.]

College spirit is the *esprit de corps* among college men, the feeling shared by all who have breathed the same college atmosphere. That each successful college must have a college atmosphere and that this atmosphere must find its expression in college spirit we are all agreed. We do not seem quite so sure as to the best form this spirit should take. Doubtless the atmosphere should be one of plain living and high thinking, with flashes of color from men of gifted personality; one of mutual help and forbearance, with the struggles and rewards of after-life showing more or less clearly in perspective. Doubtless the college spirit should be one of comradeship in worthy ambitions, of full-tempered jollity, with a strong undercurrent of something which is very like patriotism. Not "my college right or wrong," but "my college; when she is wrong, I will do everything to make her right. I believe in her. I glory in her good name. I wish her degree to be a mark of honor. I will sacrifice my convenience, my fun, my success even to save her good name from tarnish."

There is no better definition of the college spirit than that given in the old University of Greifswald nearly four hundred years ago. This was the phrase of Ulrich von Hutten, "Gemeingeist unter freien Geistern," "Comradeship among free spirits." "Free should the scholar be, free and brave"; for men whose minds are free should find harmony in action. The true college spirit is the working together of good men for good ends, for broad, fearless, helpful life, arising from sound impulses within.

¹ Reprinted from *The Voice of the Scholar* (1903) by permission of the author and of the publishers, Paul Elder and Company.

We breed college spirit by the development of college men of the broad, large, helpful, hopeful type. To this end we must do away with the dread of "the rod behind the mirror." We must make college work not a succession of pointless tasks, but every part of it must be made real, vital,—a part of life, "striking the heart of the youth in flame." We must offer as rewards not cheap toys and prizes, but incentives which are natural and enduring. For him who works, large room for work should be opened. The idlers should be taken to the edge of the campus and quietly dropped off. The privileges of the college belong to those who can use them. Co-working comes from working. Without habits of industry there can be no sound college spirit. Vices divide men. Virtue brings them together. With idleness banished from the campus, most of the other vices of academic life would soon disappear.

In this matter false notions are prevalent. I have heard college presidents, who have tried to promote industry, accused of "breaking up college spirit" as though idleness and trickery, in the topsy-turvy college world, had come to stand among the virtues. To make the college a place of serious work is to prepare the way for college spirit. It is clearing the ground for better crops. The true college spirit considers the good of the college, not the pleasure of the individual. To do one's level best for the college and for one's fellows, leaves no selfish residuum. It was a Princeton man who, when his leg was broken in the football field, rejoiced that it was not one of the first team that was hurt. This is a type of the Princeton spirit, and it arises from the football field to make its influence felt in other things. It is college spirit that leads the player to struggle like a bulldog in the game when a moment's weakening would mean defeat. It is college spirit of the same sort which leads the men to cheer the good play of their rivals. In little things as in big, it is the one who is most courteous to his rivals, most considerate among his equals, who will never let go when he ought to hold on.

There are other kinds of spirit abroad in college life and some of these the ignorant mistake for college spirit. I have heard

of spirits of mischief, of spirits that dance by night, of spirits of rye, and spirits that arise from a beer cask. There are some who think that spirits of such sorts are all that a college can produce, and that college spirit at the best is but another name for deviltry and dissipation. But the conviviality of the "beer-bust" or the champagne supper is but a spurious imitation of the good-fellowship of sane men.

After a great game of football in a large city, I passed, one evening, by the open door of a fashionable saloon. It was full of college boys, resplendent in the green and gray of their college celebrating on unsteady legs their team's great victory. With faces as red as the sweaters of their opponents they were singing maudlin college songs, full of patriotic liquor. They thought themselves possessed of college spirit. But the passers-by did not look on the scene in that light. It was clear to them that certain college men mistook drunkenness for manliness, and after the fashion of passers-by, they threw the whole blame on the college. The students of a college fix its reputation, and it may take years of honest effort to outgrow a single drunken escapade.

I once heard a graduate of the Boston Institute of Technology make this plea to a body of students of another institution: "Never carry your colors into a saloon. If you must disgrace yourself, do it in the name of someone else. When we visited a saloon in Boston," he said, "we always gave the Harvard yell." You may not care for your own disgrace, but do not make your college party to it. If you must visit saloons to express your feelings, do not take your college with you. If you must scream, give the other fellow's yell. Perhaps if you do this, some other fellow may whip the breath out of you. Be a martyr if it must be, but die rather than disgrace your college.

To form a college atmosphere, there should be free intercourse among the students. The professional schools of a university may be in a great city, but a college should be in a town so small that college interests overshadow all others. The college spirit burns dimly in a great city. A small town and a large campus represent the ideal condition, with a great city not too far away.

Higher education mostly begins when a boy goes away from home. You cannot get it on the street cars. In the German universities they recognize two classes of university men, real students and "spur-studenten," or railway-track students, those who live at home and come and go without becoming an actual part of the university. In a great city all students are likely to "spur-studenten." Unless men can get together, college spirit and college atmosphere are well-nigh impossible. The unrest in regard to the four years' college course in our great urban universities stands in evidence of this fact. The men want to get into professional work, because the college course lacks its best element, the force of comradeship.

If our college faculties had the academic courage and academic patriotism which our people have the right to demand of them, most of the evils of college life would speedily disappear. The worst training a young man can have is that of physical and intellectual idleness. Free education should be reserved for those who have the mind and the will to receive it. There is no education without effort. Those who do not want an education have no place in college. A firm insistence on the demands of scholarship would do away with rowdies and rowdyism.

It is not often the real scholar that leads in rushing and hazing. The class rush is a product of sheer rowdyism. It is the work of the college bullies. It is dangerous because it has no time limit, no rules, no training. When a man is hurt in its rough-and-tumble activity, the blame falls, and rightly so, on the college.

Of the same nature is hazing, with this difference that hazing is essentially the coward's part. It is half a dozen against one, and always involves infringement of the rights and liberties of free men. Such affairs are not indications of college spirit. They are not, like amateur athletics, in aid of the good name of the college. It does not enhance the reputation of one of our great universities that the papers are full of the hair-cutting scapes of her freshmen and sophomores. It adds nothing to the glory of another institution of honored name that her sophomores break up the freshmen dance by throwing skunks into

the ball-room. It is against the good name of any college that sophomore bullies carry away freshman class presidents or lock up the escorts of ladies at a junior ball. It is not to the credit of any institution that bogus programs and anonymous insults, inane or obscene, are circulated on its campus. Stealing ice-cream is very much like ordinary stealing, and rowdyism in all its forms makes the development of honest college spirit hopeless. Comradeship among free spirits,—what decent man cares to be the comrade of a bully?

It is a weakness of our state universities that their students sometimes mistake rowdyism for spirit and brutality for democracy. These institutions are thoroughly democratic, that is a matter of course, but we must not forget that democracy is not inconsistent with courtesy. Other things being equal, the better the manners, the better the man. The same spirit that leads to rowdyism in a state institution reappears as imbecility in some other kinds of colleges. There is little choice between the two. It is lack of inventive power that leads the midnight student to take the president's carriage to pieces, to put his cow into the bell-tower or to stack up the gates of the town in his back yard. It is imbecility that leads college men to assert their own independence by discourtesy to college women. It is imbecility that causes college boys to take up one after another a series of unpleasant fads, the fad of swiping signs, of stealing spoons, of running away with some one's bric-à-brac.

Another peculiarly disagreeable fad, caught from the street gamin, is seen or heard at some of our athletic games. The mob at a ball game tries to rattle the pitcher, to confuse the catcher, or to so crowd about that an opposing team has not only the local team to meet, but the whole student body as well. It is not genuine college spirit that has turned many a football game in the Middle West into something very much like a riot. The institution that permits this sort of thing consents to its own disgrace. It is upon the apathy of college faculties that the blame must finally rest. It is for such performances as these that aristocratic Harvard has invented the term of "mucker." Whatever else Harvard may be, she is "anti-

mucker" through and through. The movement toward athletic courtesy perhaps had its origin in Harvard, and I hope for the spread of its influence. When a Yale batter strikes a foul and returns to his base, he finds the Harvard catcher handing him his bat. That a man may play a strenuous game, the fiercest ever seen on the gridiron and yet keep the speech and manners of a gentleman, is one of the lessons Harvard may teach us, and we of the West cannot listen to any better lesson in college spirit.

Our student bodies as well as our college faculties have been too tolerant of petty trickery. This is shown in student elections, which would often give points to the most corrupt of city governments. The man of college spirit will vote for the best representative of the college. The vulgar college politician sees only the chance of combination. Many men will even prostitute their fraternity relations by making that association a mere means of political influence. President White used to call "college politics a pewter imitation of a pinchbeck original." I have never known a successful politician of the "win at any cost" sort who became a useful man in after-life. I have known some who have risen in politics—risen for a while until they have been found out. As grown men they have disgraced the state, just as, when boys, they brought their college into ill-repute. Cheating in examinations is of a piece with cheating in politics. A sound college spirit finds no place for such things.

The same evil spirit which at times controls student elections often works havoc with the usefulness of athletics. I believe thoroughly in college athletics. I have taken my part in them in college and out, and I know that other things being equal, the athletic man is worth more to the community than other kinds of men. But other things may not be equal. The athletic tramp should receive no academic welcome. The athletic parasite is no better than any other parasite. The man who is in college for athletics alone, disgraces the college, degrades athletics and shuts out a better man for his place on the team. In tolerating the presence of athletes who do not study, the college faculty becomes party to a fraud. Some of our greatest

institutions stand disgraced in the eyes of the college world, by reason of the methods employed to win football victories.

At the best, athletics is a by-play in the business of education, most useful, in their place, but most damaging if it breaks down academic standards. To relieve football men from all necessity of scholarship during the football period is to strike a blow at the dignity and honesty of the college. More than one institution is doing this at the present time. The college that does its duty to its students is the one in which the football tramp, the professional athlete, finds no place. Nothing I have seen in the University of Missouri had pleased me more than the firm stand it has taken for decency in athletics, and that too when the traditions of fraud, the impulse to win at any cost, were at their very strongest.

On the girls as well as on the boys falls the duty of maintaining college spirit. To create the sense of manly dignity is largely woman's work. To be drawn into college combinations and voted like lambs at the will of some shrewd manipulator has been too often women's experience in college politics. Young women, think for yourselves. Don't ask the politicians how the candidates stand. You can get better information from the registrar. Don't behave as if you needed a guardian. Don't carry your social affairs into the recitation rooms. Let society have its place and time, but do not mix these demands with those of study. If there are too many balls in college society and they last too long, have the courage to refuse to go, the courage to refuse to stay after it is time for sleep. If dances run on without time limit, as they do in some places, it is your duty to make your own limit, before the faculty awakes to its responsibility and lays down your duty for you. Do not be put into false positions. Young men value young women more when their society is not to be had too easily. I heard the other day these words uttered by a student, and they were words of wisdom: "When a girl's name is bandied about the campus, it is a hard proposition for her to live it down."

The future of co-education rests with the young women and with them alone. If they are worthy of their opportunity, as

the vast majority are, the caviling of provincial ignorance will not harm them. The reputation of the college is made by its students, women as well as men, and on the women rests a large responsibility for the growth of a healthy college spirit.

The process of "knocking" is opposed to the growth of college spirit. There is no use in complaining for complaint's sake. If you don't like things as they are, turn in and make them better, or go somewhere else. If the habit of faultfinding is deep-seated, learn your college song. Practice at nights upon your college yell. It will do you good. There is a great moral lesson in learning to shout in unison. To "root" in perfect time at the call of the yell-leader is a college education in itself. To keep in touch with men is the best antidote for cynicism.

Snobbishness is opposed to college spirit. It is not a fault of the West, where few students are reared on Mellin's food and finished on champagne. We have few young men who tread on velvet and take a college course by proxy. The Harvard man who keeps a groom for his horse, a groom for himself, and a groom for each of his studies, has few imitators in the West. In the strenuous rugged West, there is little room for the "Laodicean Club," the association of those who are neither hot nor cold, but altogether luke-warm.

But if we lack the perfect aristocrat, we have in the West our own cliques and divisions. The fraternity system at its best is an aid to scholarship, to manners and to character; at its worst, it is a basis for vulgar dissension. The influence of a fraternity depends on the men who are in it. If these are above the average in character and work, it is lucky for the average man to be chosen into it. If they are below the average in this regard, the average man loses by joining his fortunes with it. When fraternities are sources of disorganization, there is something wrong in them or in the institution.

The evil of dissipation exists in college outside of it. The average boy, or rather the boy a little below the average, believes that some degree of manliness inheres in getting drunk. Bismarck is reputed to have said that in the universities of Germany "one-third the students work themselves to death,

one-third drink themselves to death, and the other third govern Europe." Something like this takes place in America though the percentage of those who die of drink is less and the percentage of those who die of hard work is still lower. But too many of our college students have wrecked their lives even before they have realized the strength and the duties of manhood.

The finest piece of mechanism in all the universe is the brain of man. In this complex structure, with its millions of connecting cells, we can form images of the world about us, correct so far as they go. To retain these images, to compare them, to infer relations of cause and effect and to transfer thought into action is man's privilege. In proportion to the exactness of these operations is the soundness, the value of the man. The wise man protects his brain, and the mind, which is its manipulator, from all that would do harm. Vice is our name for self-inflicted injury, and every stimulant or narcotic—every drug that leaves its mark of weakness on the brain, is the beginning of vice. Vice means brain decay. "Death is a thing cleaner than vice," and in the long run it is more profitable. False ideas of manliness, false conceptions of good-fellowship, wreck many a young man of otherwise good intentions. The sinner is the man who cannot say *no*.

The young man's first duty is toward his after-self. So live that your after-self, the man you ought to be, may be possible and actual. Far away in the twenties, the thirties of our century, he is awaiting his time. His body, his brain, his soul are in your boyish hands to-day. He cannot help himself. Will you hand over to him a brain unspoiled by lust or dissipation, a mind trained to think and act, a nervous system true as a dial in its response to environment? Will you, college boy of the twentieth century, let him come in his time as a man among men? Or will you throw away his patrimony? Will you turn over to him a brain distorted, a mind diseased, a will untrained to action, a spinal cord grown through and through with the vile harvest we call "wild oats"? Will you let him come, taking your place, gaining through your experiences, your joys, building

on them as his own? Or will you wantonly fling it all away, careless that the man you might have been shall never be?

In all our colleges we are taught that the athlete must not break training rules. The pitcher who smokes a cigarette gives away the game. The punter who dances loses the goal, the sprinter who takes a convivial glass of beer breaks no record. His record breaks him. Some day we shall realize that the game of life is more strenuous than the game of football, more intricate than pitching curves, more difficult than punting. We should keep in trim for it. We must remember the training rules. The rules that win the football game are good also for success in business. Half the strength of young America is wasted in the dissipation of drinking or smoking. If we keep the training rules of life in literal honesty, we shall win a host of prizes that otherwise we should lose. Final success goes to the few, the very few, alas, who throughout life keep mind and soul and body clean.

“Gemeingeist unter freien Geistern,” the “comradeship of free souls,”—this is the meaning of true college spirit. Freedom of the soul means freedom of the mind, freedom of the brain. It is said in the litany that His “service is perfect freedom.” Ignorance holds men in bondage; so do selfishness, stupidity and vice. The service of God and of man is found in casting off these things. In freedom we find abundance of life. The scholar should be a man in the full life of the world. “The color of life is red,” and the scholar of to-day is no longer a dim-eyed monk with a grammarian’s cough. He is a worker in the rush of the century—a lover of nature and an artist in building the lives of men.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Discuss the meaning and value of college spirit.
2. What part do custom and conformity seem to play in determining what is or what is not a proper display of college spirit?
3. Enlarge on the point that students fix the reputation of a college by criticising certain practices among the students of your own college which tend to be injurious to its good name.
4. Discuss some of the ways of manifesting

ing college spirit other than in connection with athletics. 5. Point out some of the things in your institution that might be viewed as hindrances to the development of college spirit. 6. Discuss the advantages or disadvantages of the class rush. 7. Hazing or helpfulness,—which is the truer manifestation of college spirit? 8. Discuss courtesy in athletics. Is your institution impeccable in this matter?

HONOR IN STUDENT LIFE IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ¹

CHARLES ALPHONSO SMITH

[Charles Alphonso Smith (1864—) is the Edgar Allan Poe professor of English in the University of Virginia. In 1910-11 he lectured at the University of Berlin as Roosevelt exchange professor of American history and institutions. This selection was presented as a paper before the Department of Higher Education of the National Educational Association at the meeting in July, 1905.]

In the fourth book of his work on "The German Universities" Dr. Friedrich Paulsen analyzes student honor into three constituent elements: courage, independence, and truth-telling. This analysis, however, besides being purely abstract, looks more to the foundation of student honor than to the superstructure. The analysis given by Mr. Le Baron Russell Briggs, dean of the faculty of arts and sciences in Harvard University, is more concrete because it is based on the actual working out of honor ideals in college life. "Want of a fine sense of honor," says he,² "appears chiefly in athletic contests, in the authorship of written work, in excuses for neglect of study, in the relation of students to the rights of persons who are not students, and in questions of duty to all who are, or who are to be, nearest and dearest." These defects Mr. Briggs considers "a part of that lopsided immaturity which characterizes privileged youth."

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² See the excellent chapter on "College honor," in *School, College, and Character*, Houghton Mifflin & Co. [Author's note.]

Without attempting an adequate analysis of student honor, either of its excellences or of its defects, it may be said that the most popular error in regard to the subject is to view it wholly as a phase of ethics. Student honor is only partly a thing of the conscience. One of the most effective appeals that I ever heard made to a band of college hazers was based not so much on the view that hazing is wrong as that it is puerile and common. The students were told that society is coming more and more to regard hazing as belonging with slovenly speech, loud neckties, and even eating with the knife. The appeal was made with tact and sympathy, the students seeming to feel that their honor had been invoked because nothing was said about the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule. Student honor, as it exists in our colleges and universities to-day, is only in part, therefore, an ethical dictate; it is rather a curious blend of conscience and convention, of individualism on the one hand and compliance with the canons of good form on the other. Being essentially a communal sentiment, a *faculté d'ensemble*, it is peculiarly susceptible to the consensus of opinion prevailing in its own college and in the colleges that form its social or athletic environment. A college president writes: "I am almost coming to the conclusion that student honor is based entirely upon campus sentiment, and refuses to receive any other standard. . . . Convince one team that all the other college teams sign certain pledges as a matter of form, and they will consider themselves justified in doing the same."

Another misconception is to regard student honor as instinctive or intuitive, as having the simplicity of the great emotions and but little affinity with the analytic distinctions and reasoned processes of the intellect. Shakespeare's unanswered question of fancy may be asked with equal pertinency of student honor:

"Tell me where is fancy bred,
Or in the heart or in the head?"

Undoubtedly the impulses of student honor come chiefly from

the feelings, but the code of student honor frequently finds place for more subtle distinctions than ever vexed the brain of rabbi or scholiast. It recalls at times the phrase with which Charles Lamb characterized the comedy of the Restoration: he called it "the sanctuary and quiet Alsatia of hunted casuistry."

But when all is said, student honor remains an asset of incalculable moral, social, and civic worth. You may smile at it now and then; you will more often be thrilled by it. Its inconsistencies are apparent, but student life would be gross and sordid without it. No college discipline would be tolerable that did not strive with sympathy and patience to identify itself with the honor ideals of its students. No teacher would deserve the name that did not seek in the classroom and out of it to invest these ideals with ever increasing worth and dignity. Student honor needs above all else neither praise nor blame but recognition, enlightenment, and coöperation.

That it has not received the consideration that its importance merits is evidenced by the dearth of literature bearing on the subject. It is true that more attention is now given to the ethical aspects of education than ever before: the ethical note is more often and more clearly sounded; but student honor, though it is unquestionably the strategic point in student character, has received but scant notice from writers on educational themes. No thorough treatment of the subject has yet been attempted and no concerted action has been taken. If we believe in the primacy of character rather than in the primacy of mere intellect, we cannot afford to ignore the standards of honor and dishonor that students impose upon themselves and that effect more or less permanently their character in after-years. If this paper, therefore, does nothing else than call attention to an oversight and a need, it will at least justify its niche in the program.

While it is true that student honor is measured to-day chiefly by the student's deportment on examinations and on the athletic field, there was a time when the phrase connoted primarily the student's bearing toward the faculty and toward

the property-owners in the neighborhood of the college or university. In both these respects, however, there has been a significant change for the better. Organized rebellions against college authority are comparatively rare. They occur at times, and perhaps will occur throughout the century; but they are exceptional and marked by less violence and rowdiness than in earlier years. They arose out of conditions which are now obsolescent if not obsolete. Foremost among these were the petty restrictions imposed by faculties and enforced by a system of espionage and inquisitorial investigation that rarely failed to beget an insurrectionary feeling on the part of the students. In many cases students were not only not trusted, but their very presence at a college or university seemed the warrant of suspicion. They were expressly forbidden to do what only the most versatile ingenuity would ever have thought of doing. In the inhibitions launched against them no attempt was made to discriminate between the *malum prohibitum* and the *malum in se*. This is a distinction, however, that students never fail to make, and, be it said to their credit, their insistence on their natural rights, together with their consistent opposition to artificial and unnecessary restrictions, has had its share in bringing about the era of better things. "The history of the government of the students in American colleges," says Dr. Thwing, "is a history of increasing liberality and orderliness," of increasing orderliness because of increasing liberality.

There has been also a corresponding change in the attitude of college students toward those living in the college environment. Conflicts between gownsmen and townsmen are no longer a settled feature of college life. This consummation is to be ascribed in part to the growth of college towns and to the attendant blending of student life with a larger social and civic life. It has been brought about also by the greater attention now paid to the physical comfort of students in dormitories and lecture rooms, by the modernization of the curriculum, and by the wider introduction of the elective system. The adaptation of student to study, which it is the aim

of the elective system to effect, leaves little room for the restless leisure that used to vent itself on signboards and hen roosts. Congenial work and plenty of it will do more to harmonize a student to his surroundings than all the formal regulations or systems of espionage that the mind of man could devise.

But while there has been improvement in the respects noted, student standards have still their inconsistencies. The two nerve centers of student honor are now athletics and examinations. It would be hard to overrate the significance of athletics in modern college life. Time was when the commencement exercises furnished the chief point of contact between the collective life of the student body and the outside public. The point of intersection is now the intercollegiate game of football or baseball. Both games are characteristically American and have proved effective agencies for the discipline of manliness and the development of college spirit. The popularity of these games, however, and especially the unprecedented interest in football, have grown faster than the means devised to meet and control the abuses connected with them. Methods of safeguarding intercollegiate athletics are yet in an experimental stage. While I have perfect faith in the ultimate competency of student honor, reënforced by the American love of a square deal, to meet the exigencies presented, the duty of the hour is to educate public sentiment in and outside of our colleges so that it will despise the doctrine of victory at any price. This is the slogan that is responsible more than anything else for the lie signed to the examination paper as well as for the lying evasion of the aspiring athlete.

In intercollegiate athletics, as practiced in nearly all of our American colleges and universities, a student becomes ineligible who has received or is receiving compensation "direct or indirect" for his athletic services. This inhibition, it is true, strikes at the root of athletic commercialism; but there has grown up a code of casuistry in the interpretation of this clause that threatens to undermine the integrity of athletic ideals. The faculties of our colleges have here a rare oppor-

tunity and duty. It is a duty requiring tact, insight, courage, and unflinching fidelity to truth and honor. The slightest inconsistency or evasion on their part, the slightest concession to the lust of victory without merit, the slightest relaxation of vigilance or interest, even the complacent smile that sometimes accompanies the formal rebuke of victorious trickery may lower the whole standard of athletic honor. It must be remembered, too, that no institution can long maintain one standard of honor for the athletic field and another for the recitation room. Both student and public are quick to make their inferences, and these inferences, even if unfair, become in turn almost as prejudicial to the maintenance of student honor as are overt acts of dishonor.

I am convinced, however, that in many instances of supposed underhandedness in college athletics the case is one of perverted vision rather than of moral obliquity. We need constantly to remember that many things which to the faculty and to outsiders appear palpably dishonorable are not so regarded by the student, because he is in the grip of a collective athletic sentiment of which others know but little. He is in need of enlightenment rather than of censure. He is a reminder that athletic tactics have not been adequately interpreted to college students in simple terms of right and wrong. The strategy, for example, by which a pitcher leads a runner on the bases to overestimate his chances "to get away," is perfectly legitimate; but the strategy employed by the catcher who habitually pulls the ball down as he catches it, and thus leads the umpire to call a strike, is dishonest. The principle is perfectly clear: to practice deception on the umpire is to practice imposition on the opposing team. But how many students ever pause to make the distinction, and how often has it been made to them?

Mr. Briggs narrates the following case:¹ "A whole-souled and straightforward young athlete told me once, with smiling good humor, that a football player in his own college (who had everybody's respect) owed his success in the game to a knack of holding his opponent in such a manner as made his

¹ *School, College, and Character*, page 75. [Author's note.]

opponent seem to hold him." Does not the very frankness of the young man in making this disclosure to the dean show that he saw nothing dishonorable in it? His sense of honor was not involved because his intelligence had not been appealed to. So far from purposely affronting faculty sentiment, he was ignorant of it.

Another case in point is found in the most important declaration made by the well-known Conference on Intercollegiate Athletics held at Brown University, February 18, 1898. The declaration reads: "The practice of assisting young men through college in order that they may strengthen the athletic teams is degrading to amateur sport." This declaration, I repeat, is all-important; but it needs explanation to the prospective matriculate. It does not commend itself to his sense of fairness or of consistency. He is more likely to see in the offense inhibited, so far as it regards himself, not a *malum in se*, but only a *malum prohibitum*. He knows that the practice of assisting worthy young men through college that they may strengthen some musical organization, or serve as typesetters in the office of the college paper, is perfectly legitimate. "Why may not I," he asks, "pay in part for my education by my physical prowess, if my brother pays in part for his education by his musical talent?" The question is a natural one and should be answered before it is asked. Left unanswered, it tempts the student to evasion and duplicity.

One other illustration of the obscurity that should not exist in matters affecting student conduct relates not to athletics, but to examinations, an illustration that may serve also to introduce the subject of the honor system. In an article entitled "Student honor: a study in cheating,"¹ Mr. Earl Barnes writes as follows: "Not long since there was a flagrant case of cheating discovered in one of our large universities. An examination paper had been stolen from a printing office and several students had used it to secure superior standing. An attempt was made to arouse public sentiment in the institu-

¹ See the *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume 14, page 481 (1903-1904). [Author's note.]

tion; and the student body appointed a committee from its numbers which was to receive reports and try future offenders." While the matter was under discussion, three professors in different and representative departments asked their students to state in writing whether they would themselves, had they become cognizant of the theft, have reported it to the student committee, it being taken for granted that they would not report to the faculty. The majority of the students, men and women, said "No." The author concludes: "And so we must be patient with children, and university students, and with ourselves until we grow up to social manhood and womanhood."

The position of the author seems to me not well taken. Something ought to have been done, but all the world despises a tattler. Some of the students wrote: "I despise the spirit that actuates a talebearer. How can a person respect himself and be a talebearer?" Others said that "even the faculty professors would secretly despise them, and the public would consider them contemptible informers." Was there no other exit except through tattling? My own feeling is that a student who has witnessed the theft would, under the circumstances, have done his full duty had he gone to the ring-leaders and expressed to them his own sense of indignation and wrong, adding no threat of possible exposure. But if the student committee had been an established agency of the institution, and not called into being solely by this emergency,—in other words, if the honor system had prevailed in the institution,—reporting to the committee would not have been tattling, nor would it have been so regarded by the students themselves. If an institution uniformly ignores the student's sense of honor on examinations, is it to be expected that this same sense of honor can be confidently appealed to when an emergency arises, an emergency due to the almost inexcusable carelessness of a member of the faculty?

The honor system as it prevails in Southern colleges and universities to-day is itself an evolution. Inaugurated by

Thomas Jefferson in the founding of the University of Virginia in 1825,¹ it was not until 1842 that the system may be said to have culminated in the following resolution:

“Resolved. That in all future written examinations for distinction or other honors of the University, each candidate shall attach to the written answers presented by him on such examination a certificate in the following words: I, A. B., do hereby certify on honor that I have derived no assistance during the time of this examination from any source whatever, whether oral or written, or in print, in giving the above answers.”²

The pledge is now simplified into “I certify upon my honor that I have neither given nor received aid on this examination,” and is used in this form, or with unimportant modifications, in all Southern colleges and universities. The professor remains in the room during the examination to preserve quiet and to answer necessary questions, but there is no suggestion of espionage. The student is presumed to be a gentleman, and this trust in his honor is a powerful influence in making him honorable. It at least shields him against the subtle temptation to act on the principle that where there is no confidence, deceit is no crime. Violations of the written pledge are rare and are usually dealt with by the students themselves, sometimes by the faculty alone, not infrequently by both.

That the honor system prevails only to a limited extent outside of the South is no indication that student nature is essentially different in different sections. I have yet to hear of any college or university where the honor system, if faithfully tried, has proved a failure. “I have yet to meet a single

¹ It is possible that the honor system may have been in vogue in a few Southern colleges before 1825. The claim of precedence is often made for the South Carolina College. President Benjamin Sloan writes, however, as follows (May 27, 1905): “I am very sorry that I can find no record of the origin of the honor system in South Carolina College. It seems, though, that this principle was adopted at the birth of the college, for one of the by-laws published in 1804 states ‘that rewards and punishments shall be addressed to a sense of duty, and the principle of honor and shame.’ I can find no further documentary evidence of the adoption of the honor system by the Board of Trustees.” [Author’s note.]

² See *The Genesis of the Honor System*, by Professor William M. Thornton, an address (1904) privately printed. [Author’s note.]

man," says Mr. Briggs,¹ "who has lived under the honor system (as I have not) who does not give it, in spite, perhaps, of *a priori* scepticism, his absolute faith."

Mr. Briggs is not, however, a believer in the honor system for two reasons. "Theoretically," says he,² "though in a doubtful case I should always accept the word of a suspected student, I object to the honor system as nursing a false kind of sensitiveness that resents a kind of supervision which everybody must sooner or later accept, and as taking from the degree some part of its sanction." The same objections reappear in a letter recently received (June 3) from Mr. Jerome D. Greene of Harvard University, secretary to President Eliot: "The honor system, so-called, does not obtain at Harvard. With us all examinations are held under the supervision of a college officer, either an instructor in the course, or a proctor appointed and paid for such services. Such supervision is valued by honorable students as a guarantee of the good faith of an examination, —a guarantee which is absent from a diploma based on examinations which are not supervised. An honest student has no more objection to this method of vouching for the honesty of his examination than a bank official has to having his accounts audited."

It is not my purpose to take up the cudgels for the honor system, but to remove what seem to be the two prevalent misconceptions of the system as compared with the so-called system of supervision. In the first place, Mr. Greene's contention that the honest student has no objection to this method of vouching for the honesty of his examination may be conceded at once. No one would maintain that the students of an institution accustomed to no other system would resent the system of supervision. But how do the two systems prepare for life? If the one system prepares the student for "a kind of supervision which everybody must sooner or later accept," does not the other system prepare the student for a kind of personal accountability which, unfortunately, everybody does not sooner or later accept?

¹ *School, College, and Character*, page 83. [Author's note.]

² *Ibid.*, page 82. [Author's note.]

In the second place, is it true that a diploma based on examinations conducted under the honor system is less trustworthy than one based on supervised examinations? Granting that there is undetected cheating under both systems, is there more under the honor system? Having known only the honor system myself, let me cite, out of much available material, the testimony of three teachers who have tried both systems. "If any instructor," says Professor William H. Hulme,¹ of the College for Women, Western Reserve University, "even with the help of two or three assistant 'proctors,' supposes he can prevent cheating or cribbing in a room of fifty or more college boys by seating them in any possible order, he certainly does not understand human nature and he is entirely mistaken. An inquiry among a half-dozen of his best students will convince him that cheating goes on regularly right under his eyes. It is, in fact, the boast of many students in colleges where they are watched on examinations, that they cheat and crib at every opportunity, and they feel that they have a perfect right to do so because they are being watched and are therefore suspected."

Dr. G. Carl Huber, of the University of Michigan, writes as follows (May 18, 1905): "In view of the fact that the so-called honor system has been tried only in the department of medicine and surgery of the University of Michigan, President Angell has forwarded your communication to him, of recent date, to me for answer. I may state that some four years ago, largely through the instigation of our present graduating class, a set of resolutions were adopted by the class and approved by the faculty, according to which the class, and especially an appointed committee of the class, which also was approved by the faculty, were to have charge of all examinations, written quizzes, and all written exercises in which this class would participate during its stay in the University. The class adopted a very good set of resolutions and have been enthusiastic in carrying out the spirit and the letter of these resolutions. As concerns this one class, the honor system has

¹ See *The Western Reserve University Bulletin*, Volume VII, No. 3, page 123 (May, 1904). [Author's note.]

proven very satisfactory. It has elevated the tone of the class, and its conduct has been much more loyal through its entire stay at the University."

"The honor system," writes Dean H. B. Fine of Princeton University (May 25, 1905), "I may say has proved an unqualified success here in Princeton. It has banished cheating from our examinations, and before the system was introduced there was a great deal of cheating in the Princeton examinations. Once in a while, to be sure, a student so far forgets himself and his honor as to cheat, but he is pretty certain to be detected, and if so, his dismissal from college on the recommendation of the student honor committee follows almost as a matter of course."

In conclusion, there is no room for pessimism, for there was never a time when the relations existing between college faculties and college students were more frank and cordial than they are to-day. There was never a time when the personal influence of college professors was more potential for the direction and ennoblement of student life. If the honor ideals of the students find in their instructors prompt recognition, kindly enlightenment, and hearty coöperation, both students and instructors will be alike the beneficiaries.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Compare the advantages and the disadvantages of the honor system and show which you prefer to work under,—it or the opposed scheme.
2. If the honor system is in vogue in your institution, discuss whether it is successful.
3. Familiarize yourself with the *modus operandi* of the honor system at your own institution or some other, and describe its operation.
4. By means of further illustrations, show the difference between legitimate strategy and dishonesty in athletic contests.
5. Indicate other instances where a curious double standard prevails in college ethics. Is this something distinctive of college life or may the same thing be found obtaining in business and social life?
6. Argue for or against the view, sometimes current among students, that the honor system is a college-mode idea which will not prevail in after life where aids are allowed in professions and that therefore the student did not always consider him-

self culpable when receiving such aid in examinations. 7. Consider the relation of the honor system to the student practice of bluffing it out on recitation rather than telling the instructor he is unprepared for recitation when called upon to recite. 8. Should the honor system be extended to gambling, drunkenness, and like matters?

TRUTH OF INTERCOURSE¹

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON

[Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-1894), the Scotch novelist and essayist, was a most interesting character alike in his life and writings. He was intended for the engineering profession, but early developed symptoms of consumption, and his life became thenceforward one long struggle bravely borne against pain and disease. Under these circumstances he went back to his first love, literature. During his comparatively brief life, Stevenson wrote—besides a number of sketches, plays, and poems,—half a dozen long romantic novels, some short stories, and two or three volumes of personal and critical essays. His personal essays, of which the following selection is a representative, are charming confidential talks from one who, besides having a charming personality, possessed a mind steeped in great literature, and along with it all a lively fancy. In his writing Stevenson worked hard to perfect his style, with the result that he finally wrought out a clear, well modulated form of expression which is the admiration of critics and the joy of cultivated readers.]

Among sayings that have a currency in spite of being wholly false upon the face of them for the sake of a half-truth upon another subject which is accidentally combined with the error, one of the grossest and broadest conveys the monstrous proposition that it is easy to tell the truth and hard to tell a lie. I wish heartily it were. But the truth is one; it has first to be discovered, then justly and exactly uttered. Even with instruments specially contrived for such a purpose—with a foot rule, a level, or a theodolite—it is not easy to be exact; it is easier, alas! to be inexact. From those who mark the divisions on a scale to those who measure the boundaries of empires or the distance of the heavenly stars, it is by careful method and minute, unwearying attention that men rise even to material

¹ Reprinted from *Virginibus Puerisque* by permission of the publishers, Charles Scribner's Sons.

exactness or to sure knowledge even of external and constant things. But it is easier to draw the outline of a mountain than the changing appearance of a face; and truth in human relations is of this more intangible and dubious order: hard to seize, harder to communicate. Veracity to facts in a loose, colloquial sense—not to say that I have been in Malabar when as a matter of fact I was never out of England, not to say that I have read Cervantes in the original when as a matter of fact I know not one syllable of Spanish—this, indeed, is easy and to the same degree unimportant in itself. Lies of this sort, according to circumstances, may or may not be important; in a certain sense even they may or may not be false. The habitual liar may be a very honest fellow, and live truly with his wife and friends; while another man who never told a formal falsehood in his life may yet be himself one lie—heart and face, from top to bottom. This is the kind of lie which poisons intimacy. And, *vice versa*, veracity to sentiment, truth in a relation, truth to your own heart and your friends, never to feign or falsify emotion—that is the truth which makes love possible and mankind happy.

*L'art de bien dire*¹ is but a drawing-room accomplishment unless it be pressed into the service of the truth. The difficulty of literature is not to write, but to write what you mean; not to affect your reader, but to affect him precisely as you wish. This is commonly understood in the case of books or set orations; even in making your will, or writing an explicit letter, some difficulty is admitted by the world. But one thing you can never make Philistine natures understand; one thing, which yet lies on the surface, remains as unseizable to their wits as a high flight of metaphysics—namely, that the business of life is mainly carried on by means of this difficult art of literature, and according to a man's proficiency in that art shall be the freedom and the fullness of his intercourse with other men. Anybody, it is supposed, can say what he means; and, in spite of their notorious experience to the contrary, people so continue to suppose. Now, I simply open the last book I have been reading

¹The art of fine speaking.

—Mr. Leland's captivating "English Gipsies." "It is said," I find on page 7, "that those who can converse with Irish peasants in their own native tongue form far higher opinions of their appreciation of the beautiful, and of *the elements of humor and pathos in their hearts*, than do those who know their thoughts only through the medium of English. I know from my own observations that this is quite the case with the Indians of North America, and it is unquestionably so with the gipsy." In short, where a man has not a full possession of the language, the most important, because the most amiable, qualities of his nature have to lie buried and fallow; for the pleasure of comradeship, and the intellectual part of love, rest upon these very "elements of humor and pathos." Here is a man opulent in both, and for lack of a medium he can put none of it out to interest in the market of affection! But what is thus made plain to our apprehensions in the case of a foreign language is partially true even with the tongue we learned in childhood. Indeed, we all speak different dialects; one shall be copious and exact, another loose and meager; but the speech of the ideal talker shall correspond and fit upon the truth of fact—not clumsily, obscuring lineaments, like a mantle, but cleanly adhering, like an athlete's skin. And what is the result? That the one can open himself more clearly to his friends, and can enjoy more of what makes life truly valuable—intimacy with those he loves. An orator makes a false step; he employs some trivial, some absurd, some vulgar phrase; in the turn of a sentence he insults, by a side wind, those whom he is laboring to charm; in speaking to one sentiment he unconsciously ruffles another in parenthesis; and you are not surprised, for you know his task to be delicate and filled with perils. "O frivolous mind of man, light ignorance!" As if yourself, when you seek to explain some misunderstanding or excuse some apparent fault, speaking swiftly and addressing a mind still recently incensed, were not harnessing for a more perilous adventure; as if yourself required less tact and eloquence; as if an angry friend or a suspicious lover were not more easy to offend than a meeting of indifferent politicians! Nay,

and the orator treads in a beaten round; the matters he discusses have been discussed a thousand times before; language is ready-shaped to his purpose; he speaks out of a cut and dry vocabulary. But you—may it not be that your defense reposes on some subtlety of feeling, not so much as touched upon in Shakespeare, to express which, like a pioneer, you must venture forth into zones of thought still unsurveyed, and become yourself a literary innovator? For even in love there are unlovely humors; ambiguous acts, unpardonable words, may yet have sprung from a kind sentiment. If the injured one could read your heart, you may be sure that he would understand and pardon; but, alas! the heart cannot be shown—it has to be demonstrated in words. Do you think it is a hard thing to write poetry? Why, that is to write poetry, and of a high, if not the highest, order.

I should even more admire "the lifelong and heroic literary labors" of my fellow-men, patiently clearing up in words their loves and their contentions, and speaking their autobiography daily to their wives, were it not for a circumstance which lessens their difficulty and my admiration by equal parts, for life, though largely, is not entirely carried on by literature. We are subject to physical passions and contortions; the voice breaks and changes, and speaks by unconscious and winning inflections; we have legible countenances, like an open book; things that cannot be said look eloquently through the eyes; and the soul, not locked into the body as a dungeon, dwells ever on the threshold with appealing signals. Groans and tears, looks and gestures, a flush or a paleness, are often the most clear reporters of the heart, and speak more directly to the hearts of others. The message flies by these interpreters in the least space of time, and the misunderstanding is averted in the moment of its birth. To explain in words takes time and a just and patient hearing; and in the critical epochs of a close relation, patience and justice are not qualities on which we can rely. But the look or the gesture explains things in a breath; they tell their message without ambiguity; unlike speech, they cannot stumble, by the way, on a reproach or an illusion

that should steel your friend against the truth; and then they have a higher authority, for they are the direct expression of the heart, not yet transmitted through the unfaithful and sophisticating brain. Not long ago I wrote a letter to a friend which came near involving us in quarrel; but we met, and in personal talk I repeated the worst of what I had written, and added worse to that; and with the commentary of the body it seemed not unfriendly either to hear or say. Indeed, letters are in vain for the purposes of intimacy; an absence is a dead break in the relation; yet two who know each other fully and are bent on perpetuity in love, may so preserve the attitude of their affections that they may meet on the same terms as they had parted.

Pitiful is the case of the blind, who cannot read the face; pitiful that of the deaf, who cannot follow the changes of the voice. And there are others also to be pitied; for there are some of an inert, uneloquent nature, who have been denied all the symbols of communication, who have neither a lively play of facial expression, nor speaking gestures, nor a responsive voice, nor yet the gift of frank, explanatory speech: people truly made of clay, people tied for life into a bag which no one can undo. They are poorer than the gipsy, for their heart can speak no language under heaven. Such people we must learn slowly by the tenor of their acts, or through yea and nay communications; or we take them on trust on the strength of a general air, and now and again, when we see the spirit breaking through in a flash, correct or change our estimate. But these will be uphill intimacies, without charm or freedom, to the end; and freedom is the chief ingredient in confidence. Some minds, romantically dull, despise physical endowments. That is a doctrine for a misanthrope; to those who like their fellow-creatures it must always be meaningless; and, for my part, I can see few things more desirable, after the possession of such radical qualities as honor and humor and pathos, than to have a lively and not a stolid countenance; to have looks to correspond with every feeling; to be elegant and delightful in person, so that we shall please even in the intervals of active pleasing,

and may never discredit speech with uncouth manners or become unconsciously our own burlesques. But of all unfortunates there is one creature (for I will not call him man) conspicuous in misfortune. This is he who has forfeited his birthright of expression, who has cultivated artful intonations, who has taught his face tricks, like a pet monkey, and on every side perverted or cut off his means of communication with his fellow-men. The body is a house of many windows: there we all sit, showing ourselves and crying on the passers-by to come and love us. But this fellow has filled his windows with opaque glass, elegantly colored. His house may be admired for its design, the crowd may pause before the stained windows, but meanwhile the poor proprietor must lie languishing within, uncomforted, unchangeably alone.

Truth of intercourse is something more difficult than to refrain from open lies. It is possible to avoid falsehood and yet not tell the truth. It is not enough to answer formal questions. To reach the truth by *yea* and *nay* communications implies a questioner with a share of inspiration, such as is often found in mutual love. *Yea* and *nay* mean nothing; the meaning must have been related in the question. Many words are often necessary to convey a very simple statement; for in this sort of exercise we never hit the gold; the most that we can hope is by many arrows, more or less far off on different sides, to indicate, in the course of time, for what target we are aiming, and after an hour's talk, back and forward, to convey the purport of a single principle or a single thought. And yet while the curt, pithy speaker misses the point entirely, a wordy, prolegomenous babbler will often add three new offenses in the process of excusing one. It is really a most delicate affair. The world was made before the English language, and seemingly upon a different design. Suppose we held our converse not in words, but in music; those who have a bad ear would find themselves cut off from all near commerce, and no better than foreigners in this big world. But we do not consider how many have "a bad ear" for words, nor how often the most eloquent find nothing to reply. I hate questioners and

questions; there are so few that can be spoken to without a lie. "*Do you forgive me?*" Madam and sweetheart, so far as I have gone in life I have never yet been able to discover what forgiveness means. "*Is it still the same between us?*" Why, how can it be? It is eternally different; and yet you are still the friend of my heart. "*Do you understand me?*" God knows; I should think it highly improbable.

The cruelest lies are often told in silence. A man may have sat in a room for hours and not opened his teeth, and yet come out of that room a disloyal friend or a vile calumniator. And how many loves have perished because, from pride, or spite, or diffidence, or that unmanly shame which withholds a man from daring to betray emotion, a lover, at the critical point of the relation, has but hung his head and held his tongue? And, again, a lie may be told by a truth, or a truth conveyed through a lie. Truth to facts is not always truth to sentiment and part of the truth, as often happens in answer to a question, may be the foulest calumny. A fact may be an exception; but the feeling is the law, and it is that which you must neither garble nor belie. The whole tenor of a conversation is a part of the meaning of each separate statement; the beginning and the end define and travesty the intermediate conversation. You never speak to God; you address a fellow-man, full of his own tempers; and to tell truth, rightly understood, is not to state the true facts, but to convey a true impression; truth in spirit, not truth to letter, is the true veracity. To reconcile averted friends a Jesuitical discretion is often needful, not so much to gain a kind hearing as to communicate sober truth. Women have an ill name in this connection; yet they live in as true relations; the lie of a good woman is the true index of her heart.

"It takes," says Thoreau, in the noblest and most useful passage I remember to have read in any modern author,¹ "two to speak truth—one to speak and another to hear." He must be very little experienced, or have no great zeal for truth, who does not recognize the fact. A grain of anger or a grain of

¹ *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, Wednesday, page 283. [Author's note.]

suspicion produces strange acoustical effects, and makes the ear greedy to remark offense. Hence we find those who have once quarreled carry themselves distantly, and are ever ready to break the truce. To speak truth there must be moral equality or else no respect; and hence between parent and child intercourse is apt to degenerate into a verbal fencing bout, and misapprehensions to become ingrained. And there is another side to this, for the parent begins with an imperfect notion of the child's character, formed in early years or during the equinoctial gales of youth; to this he adheres, noting only the facts which suit with his preconception; and wherever a person fancies himself unjustly judged, he at once and finally gives up the effort to speak truth. With our chosen friends, on the other hand, and still more between lovers (for mutual understanding is love's essence), the truth is easily indicated by the one and aptly comprehended by the other. A hint taken, a look understood, conveys the gist of long and delicate explanations; and where the life is known even *yea* and *nay* become luminous. In the closest of all relations—that of a love well founded and equally shared—speech is half discarded, like a roundabout, infantile process or a ceremony of formal etiquette; and the two communicate directly by their presences, and with few looks and fewer words contrive to share their good and evil and uphold each other's hearts in joy. For love rests upon a physical basis; it is a familiarity of nature's making and apart from voluntary choice. Understanding has in some sort outrun knowledge, for the affection perhaps began with the acquaintance; and as it was not made like other relations, so it is not, like them, to be perturbed or clouded. Each knows more than can be uttered; each lives by faith, and believes by a natural compulsion; and between man and wife the language of the body is largely developed and grown strangely eloquent. The thought that prompted and was conveyed in a caress would only lose to be set down in words—ay, although Shakespeare himself should be the scribe.

Yet it is in these dear intimacies, beyond all others, that we must strive and do battle for the truth. Let but a doubt arise,

and alas! all the previous intimacy and confidence is but another charge against the person doubted. "*What a monstrous dishonesty is this if I have been deceived so long and so completely!*" Let but that thought gain entrance, and you plead before a deaf tribunal. Appeal to the past; why, that is your crime! Make all clear, convince the reason; alas! speciousness is but a proof against you. "*If you can abuse me now, the more likely that you have abused me from the first.*"

For a strong affection such moments are worth supporting, and they will end well; for your advocate is in your lover's heart, and speaks her own language; it is not you but she herself who can defend and clear you of the charge. But in slighter intimacies, and for a less stringent union? Indeed, is it worth while? We are all *incompris*, only more or less concerned for the mischance; all trying wrongly to do right; all fawning at each other's feet like dumb, neglected lap-dogs. Sometimes we catch an eye—this is our opportunity in the ages—and we wag our tail with a poor smile. "*Is that all?*" All? If you only knew! But how can they know? They do not love us; the more fools we to squander life on the indifferent.

But the morality of the thing, you will be glad to hear, is excellent; for it is only by trying to understand others that we can get our own hearts understood; and in matters of human feeling the clement judge is the most successful pleader.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Why is it difficult to obtain truth of intercourse? 2. Some one has said, "To speak the truth is to say what you think." Is this an adequate definition? If not, give a better or more complete one.
3. Name all the motives you can think of which lead people to falsehood in speech and in action. Are any of these motives as important as truthfulness?
4. Discuss the truth of Stevenson's statement on page 428: "The cruelest lies are often told in silence. A man may have sat for hours and not opened his teeth and yet come out of that room a disloyal friend and a vile calumniator." Illustrate your discussion by examples.
5. "A lie is the abandonment of the dignity of man," Kant, the German philosopher, has said. Show why this is so.
6. Apply Stevenson's view of the poverty of the resources of language to the work of the composition writer.

ON RESPONSIBILITY ¹

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN

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There is much loose and confused thinking about the nature of responsibility. Not only are there innumerable instances of persons holding positions of trust who are evading evident responsibilities, but also of those who would seek to justify themselves in such a course. The latter are like the figures in Nast's famous cartoon of the Tweed Ring, who are all standing in a circle, and each one pointing aside with his thumb to his neighbor as the responsible person. It is the old story of the other man. There are many circumstances in life where it is convenient to shift the responsibility upon some one else; and whenever one sets himself to defend a convenient course of action, he cannot always see straight and think clear. Even though he may succeed in convincing himself, nevertheless if in this process there is any element of self-deception, he is perilously near the danger line.

There are no fallacies so subtle as those which insinuate themselves into our reasonings at a time when our interests are involved. Therefore when we seek to free ourselves of the burden of responsibility in any situation, we must be peculiarly on guard, that we do not allow ourselves to become ensnared in the toils of those artificial distinctions and plausible explanations, which when stripped of their verbal dress appear in their nakedness as contemptible subterfuges.

One of these convenient ideas which serve as a kind of natural anæsthetic to conscience is the belief that any responsibility which is divided is thereby lessened. The director of a corporation may content himself with the comforting thought that where many are jointly responsible, his share of the common obligation after all cannot be regarded as very serious. And

¹ Reprinted from *Scribner's Magazine*, Volume 47, page 498 (April, 1910).

it is in this idea that a very fundamental error lies. For responsibility is by its nature something intensive and not extensive. It can be divided among many, but it is not thereby diminished in degree. On the other hand, when by the ordinary processes of arithmetical division one number is divided by another, the result is only a small part of the original amount. It is always a lessening process. But the idea of responsibility cannot be expressed in any such quantitative terms. Dividends can be divided into separate parts, but responsibility cannot. Responsibility can never be conceived in the light of a magnitude. It belongs to the class of things which, when divided, each part is equal to the whole.

Responsibility in this respect is like pleasure which, when shared, is not lessened, but the rather increased, as Bacon long ago pointed out. The same quality we find in the rewards of honor, or of fame it may be, which come to the many who have served in a common cause and rejoice in a common victory. Thus the glory of the whole is each one's share. It can be divided among many without loss. So, also, the appreciation of beauty in nature or in art shows no diminishing returns, although the number who experience the joy of it may be increased without limit. This, also, is the characteristic feature of responsibility. Parents share the responsibility of their child, but the complete responsibility and no half measure of it rests upon each. The director of a bank or an insurance company shares the responsibility of his position with his colleagues on the same board; but the shared responsibility is not a per capita portion, but the whole.

This is not a new doctrine; it comes to us with an immemorial sanction. But it seems to have been forgotten in recent years. "My share of the responsibility is but slight," is a common phrase which may be heard on all sides at the present day. If one would thus seek to minimize his sense of obligation as regards that which may be placed in his keeping as a trust, he should not forget that his share of responsibility is not a part, but the whole, undiminished and untransferable. He may have others associated with him, it is true, but his individual

responsibility cannot be shifted upon them. He must meet it in the full rigor of its demands, and regard himself as though alone in the discharge of his duties.

There is also the fallacy of the delegated responsibility. It is impossible for one at the head of large business interests, for instance, to give his personal attention to every minute detail. He finds himself naturally compelled to delegate much of the work of supervision and of administration to others who act in the capacity of his deputies. Otherwise the business of life would be impossible. This is indeed a commonplace of every-day business routine. But because some one else may assume the responsibility, he is not wholly relieved of it. He passes on the duty of actually performing some specific work, and yet the obligation still rests with him not to do the task, it is true, but at least to see that it is done. We cannot afford to ignore the customary judgment that the act of the agent is the act of the principal. We cannot take it for granted that the mere transfer of responsibility to another assures a satisfactory discharge of all the duties which it involves. We do not dare to shut our eyes to the fact as to whether such duties are fulfilled or not, on the ground that the responsibility now rests upon another and not upon ourselves. It is his responsibility, but it is also ours. A person who is at the head of a large business enterprise cannot be omnipresent or omniscient; but he is responsible for the kind of men who are his partners in responsibility, and also for the atmosphere which pervades his business, for the general morale of the service, for the discipline that is enforced, for the prevailing policy and method pursued, and for the spirit and tone which characterize all departments, however various they may be. Division of labor is not a dissipation of responsibility. He who is responsible for a particular task is relieved of that responsibility only when there is evidence that the given work has been done. The head of a corporation should devise certain methods by which such evidence can be regularly forthcoming, so that when any cog in any wheel may chance to slip, the fact may be at once apparent at the central seat of responsibility.

There is, of course, such a thing as a serial responsibility, as I would style it, that is, where a number of persons in turn assume the responsibility for a certain task, each contributing his share to its accomplishment, and then pass on the full responsibility to some other. This is illustrated in the sending of a registered package. Each one in the series does his part in the process of forwarding it, and receives a signed acknowledgment that another has relieved him of his particular duty and of all responsibility connected with it. The ordinary business of life, however, cannot always be so nicely adjusted. Responsibility appears more often in an indefinite and diffused form; in which many persons are involved, and no one at any time carries the full burden alone. There is no way of escaping responsibility of this kind as long as we remain within the area of its pervading power. We dare not hang about the outer edge of this region, hoping to reap the possible rewards, and yet think to evade all blame or loss in the event of untoward results. There are many who thus endeavor to hold their course along some such imaginary line, so that they may shrewdly keep within it to share the honor or dividends which may accrue, and yet be able to swerve to the other side of it whenever the area within may become the storm center of indignant protest and recrimination.

There is another fallacy which many fall into of securing freedom from responsibility by the assumption of a convenient ignorance. A candidate, for instance, may not choose to know the detail of method and of policy pursued by a campaign committee in charge of his interests. The members of the committee in turn deem it wise to have him kept in ignorance. It is generally understood that whatever happens, he is to know nothing about it. The comforting theory is that no responsibility can attach to a person concerning an act of which he is ignorant. This is doubtless true, provided he is not purposely ignorant. A person may not be held responsible for failure to see some obvious circumstance when his eyes are shut; but he is responsible for his eyes being shut when they ought to be open.

There are men who know that certain results could not possibly be accomplished without certain definite means being used; and yet consent weakly to profit by these results on the ground that they do not know explicitly the character of the means used to attain them. It is a lame excuse. We are responsible not only for that which we see and hear, but also for that which may be implied in the things seen and heard, and which we are compelled to recognize as the necessary consequence of them. It is not merely the actual situation in which we find ourselves, but also the logic of such situation that must be interpreted and judged by us as to the measure of our responsibility for them. It must be remembered that the very ground of our responsibility is the presupposition that we are in complete possession of our reason. How absurd therefore to narrow the range of responsibility by excluding the obvious inferences which the reason of any man of ordinary intelligence must surely recognize. If a campaign committee, for instance, expends large sums of money, it stands to reason that the one in whose interests it has been raised must know that revenues are not created by magic. Merely to choose not to know, is to ignore a definite responsibility and thereby assume an indefinite one. It is like signing a blank check to an unknown order for an unknown amount. The man who would rather not know what his friends are doing in his behalf should be held to strict account for his voluntary ignorance. No one can afford to have things done for him which he would scorn to do or be afraid to do himself.

There is also a very common feeling that any one can repudiate all responsibility in a given situation, if he will only declare forcibly and loudly enough that he does not regard himself as in the least responsible for the same. He may insist that he will wash his hands of the whole matter; but there are certain stains that cannot be thus removed. The hands may be washed; but they may not be made clean by the process. How often do men justify themselves when feebly yielding to the prevailing opinion of the many associated with them in some position of trust, by the ready excuse, that after all the majority must rule.

It is true that the majority must rule; but it is equally true that the minority must often fight. A mere verbal protest followed by a quiet acquiescence is not sufficient when honor or honesty is the issue. An uncompromising attitude of opposition may have to be maintained until the court of last appeal is reached; that court may be a board of directors, or the stockholders, or public opinion, or in the regular course of legal procedure even the Supreme Court of the United States itself. Responsibility often means a fight to the finish.

We are responsible for our silence, for our inertia, for our ignorance, for our indifference—in short for all those negative qualities which commonly constitute the “dummy” directors,—those inconsequent personages who would enjoy the honor and the perquisites of their office without allowing themselves to be unduly burdened with its duties and cares. The president of a corporation or a superintendent does not assume the responsibility vested in its board of directors; he merely represents that responsibility. And when they would implicitly assign all sense of their personal obligations to his keeping, they not only put themselves in a position to be easily fooled, but actually offer a ready temptation to such an one to fool them. They are thus doubly reprehensible; for the neglect of duty on the one hand and on the other for actually extending a virtual invitation for some one to use them as tools for unlawful ends. Not only the wreck of a business, but the wreck of a human being must be laid at their door who by a splendid capacity for negligence do thus expose another to the play of the most subtle temptations which can be conceived.

There is also the mistaken notion that we may escape certain responsibilities by simply not assuming them. There are some obligations, however, which we do not dare to refuse, and which indeed it is not possible to refuse. We have no choice in the matter. We cannot say in truth that we have no responsibility, for instance, for the general decency and good order of the community in which we live, merely because we have chosen to keep out of the village politics, and therefore, not being on the borough council or the board of health, it is none of our business

if the laws of nature, of man, or of God are violated. It must be remembered that responsibilities of such a kind are not assumed by definite choice, but belong to us whether we will or not. Certain responsibilities we do not choose; they rather choose us. If at times they seem to us vague and indefinite, it becomes our duty then to make them definite through some effort on our part. We are held to account not merely for doing the obvious duty that circumstance may urge upon us, but also for creating the circumstance which may give rise to a wholly new set of duties. We are not only responsible for lending our service to the cause which has a rightful claim upon us, but also we may be responsible for the establishing of a cause to serve.

There are those who imagine that in certain relations of life there can be devised some natural substitute for the sense of responsibility. It is possible, of course, to establish a set of automatic checks upon an employee's activities, of such a nature as to reduce his personal responsibility to a minimum. Any failure in the performance of his duties is at once mechanically discovered by the various systems of time clocks, bell punches, cash registers, and the like. This is very well in all cases where the labor is that of simple routine. Mechanical activity can be checked by a mechanical device. Not so, however, as regards those duties which demand a higher order of capacity—such as that of sound judgment, a fine sense of discrimination, and the power of resourceful initiative. In all such matters there can be no substitute for the responsible personality. Man is a responsible being because of this very element of free activity in his nature which no mechanical contrivance, however ingenious, can ever gauge. We are all so dependent upon the integrity, fidelity, and efficiency of man in the more complex relations of life that we must at times, and often the most critical, trust in him implicitly. We do not proceed far in any undertaking without being aware that we are holding another responsible, or that some one is holding us responsible for those inevitable duties which arise out of the relations of man to man the world over. If a man would escape all responsibility he must place

himself wholly outside of the relations of life; for life is responsibility. As we have seen, responsibility remains with us even though we may ask others to assume it; we share it with others, but our portion is the same; when we turn our backs upon it, we find it still facing us; we flee from it, and, however far it may be, we see it waiting for us at the journey's end.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What common fallacious ideas of responsibility does the writer set forth? 2. Show the importance of acquiring a high sense of responsibility in college. Consider in this connection the following paragraph from Briggs's "The Mistakes of College Life": "To many boys the beginning of college life is the first step into the world. Its dangers are much like those of other first steps in the world, yet with this difference: the college boy has the advantage of living where ideals are noble, and the disadvantage (if he is weak and immature) of living where he need not get heartily tired day after day in keeping long, inevitable hours of work. This disadvantage is indeed a privilege, but a privilege which like all privileges is bad unless accorded to a responsible being. To discipline one's self, to hold one's self responsible, is ever so much better than to be disciplined, to be held responsible by some one else; but it is a task for a man. Naturally enough, then, the mistakes and sins of college life are commonly rooted in boyish irresponsibility." 3. What special responsibilities rest upon the student? 4. Does the present generation need a deeper sense of personal responsibility in business and political life?

THE COLLEGE MAN IN THE WORLD'S WORK

WHEN A MAN COMES TO HIMSELF¹

WOODROW WILSON

[For note regarding the author, see page 1.]

It is a very wholesome and regenerating change which a man undergoes when he "comes to himself." It is not only after periods of recklessness or infatuation, when he has played the spendthrift or the fool, that a man comes to himself. He comes to himself after experiences of which he alone may be aware: when he has left off being wholly preoccupied with his own powers and interests and with every petty plan that centers in himself; when he has cleared his eyes to see the world as it is, and his own true place and function in it.

It is a process of disillusionment. The scales have fallen away. He sees himself soberly, and knows under what conditions his powers must act, as well as what his powers are. He has got rid of earlier prepossessions about the world of men and affairs, both those which were too favorable and those which were too unfavorable—both those of the nursery and those of a young man's reading. He has learned his own paces, or, at any rate, is in a fair way to learn them; has found his footing and the true nature of the "going" he must look for in the world; over what sorts of roads he must expect to make his running, and at what expenditure of effort; whither his goal lies, and what cheer he may expect by the way. It is a process of

¹ Reprinted from *The Century*, Volume 40, page 268 (June, 1901), by permission of the author and of the publishers of the magazine.

disillusionment, but it disheartens no soundly made man. It brings him into a light which guides instead of deceiving him; a light which does not make the way look cold to any man whose eyes are fit for use in the open, but which shines wholesomely, rather, upon the obvious path, like the honest rays of the frank sun, and makes traveling both safe and cheerful.

There is no fixed time in a man's life at which he comes to himself, and some men never come to themselves at all. It is a change reserved for the thoroughly sane and healthy, and for those who can detach themselves from tasks and drudgery long and often enough to get, at any rate once and again, view of the proportions of life and of the state and plot of its action. We speak often with amusement, sometimes with distaste and uneasiness, of men who "have no sense of humor," who take themselves too seriously, who are intense, self-absorbed, over-confident in matters of opinion, or else go plumed with conceit, proud of we cannot tell what, enjoying, appreciating, thinking of nothing so much as themselves. These are men who have not suffered that wholesome change. They have not come to themselves. If they be serious men, and real forces in the world, we may conclude that they have been too much and too long absorbed; that their tasks and responsibilities long ago rose about them like a flood, and have kept them swimming with sturdy stroke the years through, their eyes level with the troubled surface—no horizon in sight, no passing fleets, no comrades but those who struggled in the flood like themselves. If they be frivolous, light-headed, men without purpose or achievement, we may conjecture, if we do not know, that they were born so, or spoiled by fortune, or befuddled by self-indulgence. It is no great matter what we think of them.

It is enough to know that there are some laws which govern a man's awakening to know himself and the right part to play. A man *is* the part he plays among his fellows. He is not isolated; he cannot be. His life is made up of the relations he bears to others—is made or marred by those relations, guided by them, judged by them, expressed in them. There is nothing else upon which he can spend his spirit—nothing else that we can see.

It is by these he gets his spiritual growth; it is by these we see his character revealed, his purpose, and his gifts. Some play with a certain natural passion, an unstudied directness, without grace, without modulation, with no study of the masters or consciousness of the pervading spirit of the plot; others give all their thought to their costume and think only of the audiences; a few act as those who have mastered the secrets of a serious art, with deliberate subordination of themselves to the great end and motive of the play, spending themselves like good servants, indulging no wilfulness, obtruding no eccentricity, lending heart and tone and gesture to the perfect progress of the action. These have "found themselves," and have all the ease of a perfect adjustment.

Adjustment is exactly what a man gains when he comes to himself. Some men gain it late, some early; some get it all at once, as if by one distinct act of deliberate accommodation; others get it by degrees and quite imperceptibly. No doubt to most men it comes by the slow processes of experience—at each stage of life a little. A college man feels the first shock of it at graduation, when the boy's life has been lived out and the man's life suddenly begins. He has measured himself with boys; he knows their code and feels the spur of their ideals of achievement. But what the world expects of him he has yet to find out, and it works, when he has discovered it, a veritable revolution in his ways both of thought and of action. He finds a new sort of fitness demanded of him, executive, thoroughgoing, careful of details, full of drudgery and obedience to orders. Everybody is ahead of him. Just now he was a senior, at the top of a world he knew and reigned in, a finished product and pattern of good form. Of a sudden he is a novice again, as green as in his first school year, studying a thing that seems to have no rules—at sea amid cross-winds, and a bit seasick withal. Presently, if he be made of stuff that will shake into shape and fitness, he settles to his tasks and is comfortable. He has come to himself: understands what capacity is, and what it is meant for; sees that his training was not for ornament; or personal gratification, but to teach him how to use himself

and develop faculties worth using. Henceforth there is a zest in action, and he loves to see his strokes tell.

The same thing happens to the lad come from the farm into the city, a big and novel field, where crowds rush and jostle, and a rustic boy must stand puzzled for a little how to use his placid and unjaded strength. It happens, too, though in a deeper and more subtle way, to the man who marries for love, if the love be true and fit for foul weather. Mr. Bagehot used to say that a bachelor was "an amateur in life," and wit and wisdom are married in the jest. A man who lives only for himself has not begun to live—has yet to learn his use, and his real pleasure too, in the world. It is not necessary he should marry to find himself out, but it is necessary he should love. Men have come to themselves serving their mothers with an unselfish devotion, or their sisters, or a cause for whose sake they forsook ease and left off thinking of themselves. It is unselfish action, growing slowly into the high habit of devotion, and at last, it may be, into a sort of consecration, that teaches a man the wide meaning of his life, and makes of him a steady professional in living, if the motive be not necessity, but love. Necessity may make a mere drudge of a man, and no mere drudge ever made a professional of himself; that demands a higher spirit and a finer incentive than his.

Surely a man has come to himself only when he has found the best that is in him, and has satisfied his heart with the highest achievement he is fit for. It is only then that he knows of what he is capable and what his heart demands. And, assuredly, no thoughtful man ever came to the end of his life, and had time and a little space of calm from which to look back upon it, who did not know and acknowledge that it was what he had done unselfishly and for others, and nothing else, that satisfied him in the retrospect, and made him feel that he had played the man. That alone seems to him the real measure of himself, the real standard of his manhood. And so men grow by having responsibility laid upon them, the burden of other people's business. Their powers are put out at interest, and they get usury in kind. They are like men multiplied. Each counts

manifold. Men who live with an eye only upon what is their own are dwarfed beside them—seem fractions while they are integers. The trustworthiness of men trusted seems often to grow with the trust.

It is for this reason that men are in love with power and greatness: it affords them so pleasurable an expansion of faculty, so large a run for their minds, an exercise of spirit so various and refreshing; they have the freedom of so wide a tract of the world of affairs. But if they use power only for their own ends, if there be no unselfish service in it, if its object be only their personal aggrandizement, their love to see other men tools in their hands, they go out of the world small, disquieted, beggared, no enlargement of soul vouchsafed them, no usury of satisfaction. They have added nothing to themselves. Mental and physical powers alike grow by use, as every one knows; but labor for one's self alone is like exercise in a gymnasium. No healthy man can remain satisfied with it, or regard it as anything but a preparation for tasks in the open, amid the affairs of the world,—not sport, but business,—where there is no orderly apparatus, and every man must devise the means by which he is to make the most of himself. To make the most of himself means the multiplication of his activities, and he must turn away from himself for that. He looks about him, studies the face of business or of affairs, catches some intimation of their larger objects, is guided by the intimation, and presently finds himself part of the motive force of communities or of nations. It makes no difference how small a part, how insignificant, how unnoticed. When his powers begin to play outward, and he loves the task at hand not because it gains him a livelihood but because it makes him a life, he has come to himself.

Necessity is no mother to enthusiasm. Necessity carries a whip. Its method is compulsion, not love. It has no thought to make itself attractive; it is content to drive. Enthusiasm comes with the revelation of true and satisfying objects of devotion; and it is enthusiasm that sets the powers free. It is a sort of enlightenment. It shines straight upon ideals, and for those who see it the race and struggle are henceforth toward

these. An instance will point the meaning. One of the most distinguished and most justly honored of our great philanthropists spent the major part of his life absolutely absorbed in the making of money—so it seemed to those who did not know him. In fact, he had very early passed the stage at which he looked upon his business as a means of support or of material comfort. Business had become for him an intellectual pursuit, a study in enterprise and increment. The field of commerce lay before him like a chess-board; the moves interested him like the maneuvers of a game. More money was more power, a greater advantage in the game, the means of shaping men and events and markets to his own ends and uses. It was his will that set fleets afloat and determined the havens they were bound for; it was his foresight that brought goods to market at the right time; it was his suggestion that made the industry of unthinking men efficacious; his sagacity saw itself justified at home not only, but at the ends of the earth. And as the money poured in, his government and mastery increased, and his mind was the more satisfied. It is so that men make little kingdoms for themselves, and an international power undarkened by diplomacy, undirected by parliaments.

It is a mistake to suppose that the great captains of industry, the great organizers and directors of manufacture and commerce and monetary exchange, are engrossed in a vulgar pursuit of wealth. Too often they suffer the vulgarity of wealth to display itself in the idleness and ostentation of their wives and children, who “devote themselves,” it may be, “to expense regardless of pleasure”; but we ought not to misunderstand even that, or condemn it unjustly. The masters of industry are often too busy with their own sober and momentous calling to have time or spare thought enough to govern their own households. A king may be too faithful a statesman to be a watchful father. These men are not fascinated by the glitter of gold: the appetite for power has got hold upon them. They are in love with the exercise of their faculties upon a great scale; they are organizing and overseeing a great part of the life of the world. No wonder they are captivated. Business is more

interesting than pleasure, as Mr. Bagehot said, and when once the mind has caught its zest, there's no disengaging it. The world has reason to be grateful for the fact.

It was this fascination that had got hold upon the faculties of the man whom the world was afterward to know, not as a prince among merchants,—for the world forgets merchant princes,—but as a prince among benefactors; for beneficence breeds gratitude, gratitude admiration, admiration fame, and the world remembers its benefactors. Business, and business alone, interested him, or seemed to him worth while. The first time he was asked to subscribe money for a benevolent object he declined. Why *should* he subscribe? What affair would be set forward, what increase of efficiency would the money buy, what return would it bring in? Was good money to be simply given away, like water poured on a barren soil, to be sucked up and yield nothing? It was not until men who understood benevolence on its sensible, systematic, practical, and really helpful side explained it to him as an investment that his mind took hold of it and turned to it for satisfaction. He began to see that education was a thing of infinite usury; that money devoted to it would yield a singular increase, to which there was no calculable end, an increase in perpetuity,—increase of knowledge, and therefore of intelligence and efficiency, touching generation after generation with new impulses, adding to the sum total of the world's fitness for affairs,—an invisible but intensely real spiritual usury beyond reckoning, because compounded in an unknown ratio from age to age. Henceforward beneficence was as interesting to him as business—was, indeed, a sort of sublimated business in which money moved new forces in a commerce which no man could bind or limit.

He had come to himself—to the full realization of his powers, the true and clear perception of what it was his mind demanded for its satisfaction. His faculties were consciously stretched to their right measure, were at last exercised at their best. He felt the keen zest, not of success merely, but also of honor, and was raised to a sort of majesty among his fellow-men, who attended him in death like a dead sovereign. He had died dwarfed had he not broken the bonds of mere money-getting:

would never have known himself had he not learned how to spend it; and ambition itself could not have shown him a straighter road to fame.

This is the positive side of a man's discovery of the way in which his faculties are to be made to fit into the world's affairs and released for effort in a way that will bring real satisfaction. There is a negative side also. Men come to themselves by discovering their limitations no less than by discovering their deeper endowments and the mastery that will make them happy. It is the discovery of what they can *not* do, and ought not to attempt, that transforms reformers into statesmen; and great should be the joy of the world over every reformer who comes to himself. The spectacle is not rare; the method is not hidden. The practicability of every reform is determined absolutely and always by "the circumstances of the case," and only those who put themselves into the midst of affairs, either by action or by observation, can know what those circumstances are or perceive what they signify. No statesman dreams of doing whatever he pleases; he knows that it does not follow that because a point of morals or of policy is obvious to him it will be obvious to the nation, or even to his own friends; and it is the strength of a democratic polity that there are so many minds to be consulted and brought to agreement, and that nothing can be wisely done for which the thought, and a good deal more than the thought, of the country, its sentiment and its purpose, have not been prepared. Social reform is a matter of coöperation, and, if it be of a novel kind, requires an infinite deal of converting to bring the efficient majority to believe in it and support it. Without their agreement and support it is impossible.

It is this that the more imaginative and impatient reformers find out when they come to themselves, if that calming change ever comes to them. Oftentimes the most immediate and drastic means of bringing them to themselves is to elect them to legislative or executive office. That will reduce oversanguine persons to their simplest terms. Not because they find their fellow legislators or officials incapable of high purpose or in-

different to the betterment of the communities which they represent. Only cynics hold that to be the chief reason why we approach the millennium so slowly, and cynics are usually very ill-informed persons. Nor is it because under our modern democratic arrangements we so subdivide power and balance parts in government that no one man can tell for much or turn affairs to his will. One of the most instructive studies a politician could undertake would be a study of the infinite limitations laid upon the power of the Russian Czar, notwithstanding the despotic theory of the Russian constitution—limitations of social habit, of official prejudice, of race jealousies, of religious predilections, of administrative machinery even, and the inconvenience of being himself only one man, and that a very young one, oversensitive and touched with melancholy. He can do only what can be done with the Russian people. He can no more make them quick, enlightened, and of the modern world of the West than he can change their tastes in eating. He is simply the leader of Russians.

An English or American statesman is better off. He leads a thinking nation, not a race of peasants topped by a class of revolutionists and a caste of nobles and officials. He can explain new things to men able to understand, persuade men willing and accustomed to make independent and intelligent choices of their own. An English statesman has an even better opportunity to lead than an American statesman, because in England executive power and legislative initiative are both intrusted to the same grand committee, the ministry of the day. The ministers both propose what shall be made law and determine how it shall be enforced when enacted. And yet English reformers, like American, have found office a veritable cold-water bath for their ardor for change. Many a man who has made his place in affairs as the spokesman of those who see abuses and demand their reformation has passed from denunciation to calm and moderate advice when he got into Parliament, and has turned veritable conservative when made a minister of the crown. Mr. Bright was a notable example. Slow and careful men had looked upon him as little better than a revolu-

tionist so long as his voice rang free and imperious from the platforms of public meetings. They greatly feared the influence he should exercise in Parliament, and would have deemed the constitution itself unsafe could they have foreseen that he would some day be invited to take office and a hand of direction in affairs. But it turned out that there was nothing to fear. Mr. Bright lived to see almost every reform he had urged accepted and embodied in legislation; but he assisted at the process of their realization with greater and greater temperateness and wise deliberation as his part in affairs became more and more prominent and responsible, and was at the last as little like an agitator as any man that served the Queen.

It is not that such men lose courage when they find themselves charged with the actual direction of the affairs concerning which they have held and uttered such strong, unhesitating, drastic opinions. They have only learned discretion. For the first time they see in its entirety what it was that they were attempting. They are at last at close quarters with the world. Men of every interest and variety crowd about them; new impressions throng them; in the midst of affairs the former special objects of their zeal fall into new environments, a better and newer perspective; seem no longer susceptible to separate and radical change. The real nature of the complex stuff of life they were seeking to work in is revealed to them,—its intricate and delicate fiber, and the subtle, secret interrelationship of its parts,—and they work circumspectly, lest they should mar more than they mend. Moral enthusiasm is not, uninstructed and of itself, a suitable guide to practicable and lasting reformation; and if the reform sought be the reformation of others as well as of himself the reformer should look to it that he knows the true relation of his will to the wills of those he would change and guide. When he has discovered that relation he has come to himself: has discovered his real use and planning part in the general world of men; has come to the full command and satisfying employment of his faculties. Otherwise he is doomed to live forever in a fools' paradise, and can be said to have come to himself only on the supposition that he is a fool.

Every man—if I may adopt and paraphrase a passage from Dr. South—every man hath both an absolute and a relative capacity: an absolute in that he hath been endued with such a nature and such parts and faculties; and a relative in that he is part of the universal community of men, and so stands in such a relation to the whole. When we say that a man has come to himself, it is not of his absolute capacity that we are thinking, but of his relative. He has begun to realize that he is part of a whole, and to know *what* part, suitable for what service and achievement.

It was once fashionable—and that not a very long time ago—to speak of political society with a certain distaste, as a necessary evil, an irritating but inevitable restriction upon the “natural” sovereignty and entire self-government of the individual. That was the dream of the egotist. It was a theory in which men were seen to strut in the proud consciousness of their several and “absolute” capacities. It would be as instructive as it would be difficult to count the errors it has bred in political thinking. As a matter of fact, men have never dreamed of wishing to do without the “trammels” of organized society, for the very good reason that those trammels are in reality no trammels at all, but indispensable aids and spurs to the attainment of the highest and most enjoyable things man is capable of. Political society, the life of men in states, is an abiding natural relationship. It is neither a mere convenience nor a mere necessity. It is not a mere voluntary association, not a mere corporation. It is nothing deliberate or artificial, devised for a special purpose. It is in real truth the eternal and natural expression and embodiment of a form of life higher than that of the individual—that common life of mutual helpfulness, stimulation, and contest which gives leave and opportunity to the individual life, makes it possible, makes it full and complete.

It is in such a scene that man looks about to discover his own place and force. In the midst of men organized, infinitely cross-related, bound by ties of interest, hope, affection, subject to authorities, to opinion, to passion, to visions and desires which

no man can reckon, he casts eagerly about to find where he may enter in with the rest and be a man among his fellows. In making his place he finds, if he seek intelligently and with eyes that see, more than ease of spirit and scope for his mind. He finds himself—as if mists had cleared away about him and he knew at last his neighborhood among men and tasks.

What every man seeks is satisfaction. He deceives himself so long as he imagines it to lie in self-indulgence, so long as he deems himself the center and object of effort. His mind is spent in vain upon itself. Not in action itself, not in "pleasure," shall it find its desires satisfied, but in consciousness of right, of powers greatly and nobly spent. It comes to know itself in the motives which satisfy it, in the zest and power of rectitude. Christianity has liberated the world, not as a system of ethics, not as a philosophy of altruism, but by its revelations of the power of pure and unselfish love. Its vital principle is not its code, but its motive. Love, clear-sighted, loyal, personal, is its breath and immortality. Christ came, not to save himself, assuredly, but to save the world. His motive, his example, are every man's key to his own gifts and happiness. The ethical code he taught may no doubt be matched, here a piece and there a piece, out of other religions, other teachings and philosophies. Every thoughtful man born with a conscience must know a code of right and of pity to which he ought to conform; but without the motive of Christianity, without love, he may be the purest altruist and yet be as sad and as unsatisfied as Marcus Aurelius.

Christianity gave us, in the fullness of time, the perfect image of right living, the secret of social and of individual well-being; for the two are not separable, and the man who receives and verifies that secret in his own living has discovered not only the best and only way to serve the world, but also the one happy way to satisfy himself. Then, indeed, has he come to himself. Henceforth he knows what his powers mean, what spiritual air they breathe, what ardors of service clear them of lethargy, relieve them of all sense of effort, put them at their best. After this fretfulness passes away, experience mellows

and strengthens and makes more fit, and old age brings, not senility, not satiety, not regret, but higher hope and serene maturity.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Explain what the phrase "coming to himself" means. Give instances of historical figures or persons of your own acquaintance who have passed through such a development.
2. In what ways might college education tend to obviate the nondescript period of finding one's self in early manhood?
3. It is often said that one's life is a constant education. In connection with this discussion about adjustment to life's work, discuss what is the educational effect of one's life work?
4. How far is opportunity to be allowed to determine one's choice of his career? To what extent should one be guided by his ambition in this matter? How far by duties to others?
5. Do you agree or disagree with the writer's position in regard to the reason why men love power and greatness (page 443)?
6. What is the motive back of notable philanthropic gifts? Is the author right in his view of this matter?
7. When misfortune comes, what resources has the unselfish man which the selfish man does not possess?
7. Has the college man with a strong college spirit, or the public man who works for his city or state, a source of satisfaction which those without this spirit do not possess? What is its nature?
8. Is it possible to be overenthusiastic in reforms? Can you give any instances from your experience or reading, especially any that may show how the would-be reformer has had his ambition curbed by facing the practical problems in the way described in this selection?
9. How can one develop altruism in himself?
10. This discussion has dealt with the man after he begins his work in the world. Show how there is such a thing as a man finding himself in regard to his college career after a period of neglect of or indifference to his college duties.

THE CALL OF THE JOB¹

RICHARD CLARKE CABOT

[Richard Clarke Cabot (1868—) is a physician of Boston whose efficient devotion to good works is recorded in many useful ways in the fields of medicine and educational and philanthropic work. This selection, although a magazine article, is really a part of the author's book, *What Men Live By*, a stimulating discussion of the part that should be played in life by four elements—work, play, love, and worship.]

A camper starting into the woods on his annual vacation undertakes with enthusiasm the familiar task of carrying a Saranac boat upon a shoulder yoke. The pressure of the yoke on his shoulders feels as good as the grasp of an old friend's hand. The tautening of his muscles to the strain of carrying seems to gird up his loins and true up his whole frame. With the spring of the ground beneath him and the elastic rebound of the boat on its springy yoke, he seems to dance over the ground between two enlivening rhythms. It is pure fun.

In the course of half a mile or so, the carry begins to feel like work. The pleasant, snug fit of the yoke has become a very respectable burden, cheerfully borne for the sake of the object in view, but not pleasant. The satisfaction of the carry is now something anticipated, no longer grasped in the present. The job is well worth while, but it is no joke. It will feel good to reach the end and set the boat down.

Finally, if in about ten minutes more there is still no sight of the end, no blue sparkling glimmer of distant water low down among the trees, the work becomes drudgery. Will it ever end? Are we on the right trail at all? Is it worth while to go on?

Perhaps not, but to stop means painfully lowering the boat to the ground and later heaving it up again, which is the worst task of all—worse than going on as we are. So we hang to it, but now in scowling, stumbling, swearing misery, that edges always nearer to revolt.

¹ Reprinted from *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 112, page 599 (November, 1913), by permission of the author and of the editors of the magazine.

In varying proportions every one's life mingles the experiences of that carry. At its best and for a few, work becomes play, at least for blessed jewel-like moments. By the larger number it is seen not a joy but as a tolerable burden, borne for the sake of the children's education, the butter on the daily bread, the hope of promotion. Finally, for the submerged fraction of humanity who are forced to labor without choice and almost from childhood, life seems drudgery, borne simply because they cannot stop without still greater misery. They are committed to it, as to a prison, and they cannot get out.

It is not often, I believe, that a whole life is possessed by any one of these elements,—play, work, or drudgery. Work usually makes up the larger part of life, with play and drudgery sprinkled in. Some of us at most seasons, all of us at some seasons, find work a galling yoke to which we have to submit blindly or angrily for a time, but with revolt in our hearts. Yet I have rarely seen drudgery so overwhelming as to crush out altogether the play of humor and good fellowship during the day's toil as well as after it.

In play you have what you want. In work you know what you want and believe that you are serving or approaching it. In drudgery no desired object is in sight; blind forces push you on.

In all work and all education the worker should be in touch with the distant sources of interest, else he is being trained to slavery, not to self-government and self-respect.

Present good, future good, no good,—these possibilities are mingled in the crude ore which we ordinarily call work. Out of that we must smelt, if we can, the pure metal of a vocation fit for the spirit of man. The crude mass of "work" as it exists to-day in mines, stores, railroads, schoolrooms, studies, and ships, contains elements that should be abolished, elements that are hard, but no harder than we need to call out the best of us, and here and there a nugget of pure delight.

Defined in this way, work is always, I suppose, an acquired taste. For its rewards are not immediate, but come in foretastes and aftertastes. It involves postponement and waiting.

In the acquisition of wealth, economists rightly distinguish labor and waiting; but in another sense labor is always waiting. You work for your picture or your log-house because you want it, and because it cannot be had just for the asking. It awaits you in a future visible only to imagination. Into the further realization of that future you can penetrate only by work; meantime you must wait for your reward.

Further, this future is never perfectly certain. There is many a slip between the cup and the lip, and even when gross accidents are avoided, your goal,—your promotion, your home, the degree for which you have worked, usually do not turn out to be what you have pictured them. This variation you learn to expect, to discount, perhaps to enjoy, beforehand, if you are a trained worker, just because you have been trained in faith. For work is always justified by faith. Faith, holding the substance (not the details) of things unseen, keeps us at our tasks. We have faith that our efforts will some day reach their goal, and that this goal will be something like what we expected. But no literalism will serve us here. If we are willing to accept nothing but the very pattern of our first desires, we are forever disappointed in work and soon grow slack in it. In the more fortunate of us, the love of work includes a love of the unexpected, and finds a pleasant spice of adventure in the difference between what we work for and what we actually get.

Yet this working faith is not pure speculation. It includes a foretaste of the satisfaction to come. We plunge into it as we jump into a cold bath, not because the present sensations are altogether sweet, but because they are mingled with a dawning awareness of the glow to follow. We do our work happily because the future is alive in the present,—not like a ghost but like a leader.

Where do we get this capacity to incarnate the future and to feel it swelling within us as a present inspiration? The power to go in pursuit of the future with seven-leagued boots or magic carpets can hardly be acquired or even longed for until we have had some actual experience of its rewards. We seem, then, to

be caught in one of those circles which may turn out to be either vicious or virtuous. In the beginning something, or somebody, must magically entice us into doing a bit of work. Having done that bit, we can see the treasure of its results; these results will in turn spur us to redoubled efforts, and so once more to increased rewards. Given the initial miracle and we are soon established in the habit and in the enjoyment of work.

But there is a self-maintaining circularity in disease, idleness, and sloth, as well as in work, virtue, and health. Until we get the result of our work, we cannot feel the motive for exertion. Until we make the exertion (despite present pain and a barren outlook) we cannot taste the delightful result, or feel the spur to further effort. The wheel is at the dead point! Why should it ever move?

Probably some of us are moved at first by the leap of an elemental instinct in our muscles, which act before and beyond our conscious reason. Other people are tempted into labor by the irrational contagion of example. We want to be "in it" with the rest of our gang, or to win some one's approval. So we get past the dead point,—often a most alarming point to parents and teachers,—and once in motion, keep at it by the circular process just described.

Various auxiliary motives reinforce the ordinary energies of work. Here I will allude only to one—a queer pleasure in the mere stretch and strain of our muscles. If we are physically fresh and not worried, there is a grim exhilaration, a sort of frowning delight, in taking up a heavy load and feeling that our strength is adequate to it. It seems paradoxical to enjoy a discomfort, but the paradox is now getting familiar. For modern psychologists have satisfactorily bridged the chasm between pleasure and pain, so that we can now conceive what athletes and German poets have long felt, the delight in a complex of agreeable and disagreeable elements. In work we do not often get as far as the "selige Schmerzen" so familiar in German lyrics, but we welcome difficulties, risks, and physical strains because (if we can easily conquer them) they add a spice to life,—a spice of play in the midst of labor.

Work gets itself started, then, by the contagion of somebody else's activity or by an explosion of animal energies within us. After a few turns of the work-rest cycle we begin to get a foretaste of rewards. A flavor of enjoyment appears in the midst of strain. Habit then takes hold and carries us along until the taste for work is definitely acquired.

In the crude job as we get it there is much rubbish. For work is a very human product. It is no better than we have made it, and even when it is redeemed from brutal drudgery it is apt to be scarred and warped by our stupidities and our ineptitudes. Out of the rough-hewn masses in which work comes to us it is our business—it is civilization's business—to shape a vocation fit for man. We shall have to remake it again and again; meantime, before we reject what we now have, it is worth while to see what we want.

What (besides better hours, better wages, healthier conditions) are the points of a good job? Imagine a sensible man looking for a satisfactory work, a vocational adviser guiding novices toward the best available occupation, and a statesman trying to mold the industrial world somewhat nearer to the heart's desire,—what should they try for? Physical and financial standards determine what we get *out* of a job. But what shall we get *in* it? Much or little, I think, according to its fitness or unfitness for our personality,—a factor much neglected nowadays.

Among the points of a good job I shall name seven:—1. Difficulty and crudeness enough to call out our latent powers of mastery. 2. Variety and initiative balanced by monotony and supervision. 3. A boss. 4. A chance to achieve, to build something and to recognize what we have done. 5. A title and a place which is ours. 6. Connection with some institution, some firm, or some cause, which we can loyally serve. 7. Honorable and pleasant relations with our comrades in work.

Fulfil these conditions and work is one of the best things in life. Let me describe them more fully.

We want a chance to subdue. We want to encounter the raw

and crude. Before the commercial age, war, hunting, and agriculture gave us this foil. We want it still, and for the lack of it often find our work too soft.

Of course, we can easily get an over-dose of crude resistance. A good job should offer us a fair chance of our winning. We have no desire to be crushed without a struggle. But we are all the better pleased if the fish makes a good fight before he yields.

Not only in the wilderness, but wherever we deal with raw material, our hands meet adventures. Every bit of wood and stone, every stream and every season has its own tantalizing but fascinating individuality; and as long as we have health and courage, these novelties strike not as a frustration but as a challenge.

Even in half-tamed products, like leather or steel, there are, experts tell me, incalculable variations which keep us on the alert if we are still close enough to the elemental to feel its fascinating materiality. When a clerk sells drygoods over the counter, I suppose he has to nourish his frontiersman's spirit chiefly in foiling the wily bargain-hunter or trapping the incautious countryman. But I doubt if the work is as interesting as a carpenter's or a plumber's. It reeks so strong of civilization and the "finished product" that it often sends us back to the woods to seek in a "vacation" that touch with the elemental which should properly form part of daily work.

We want both monotony and variety. The monotony of work is perhaps the quality of which we complain most, and often justifiably. Yet monotony is really demanded by almost everyone. Even children cry for it, though in doses smaller than those which suit their elders. Your secretary does not like her work, if you put more than her regular portion of variety into it. She does not want to be constantly undertaking new tasks, adapting herself to new situations. She wants some regularity in her traveling, some plain stretches in which she can get up speed and feel quantity of accomplishment,—that is, she wants a reasonable amount of monotony. Change and novelty in work are apt to demand fresh thought, and reduce our speed.

Naturally, there is a limit to this. We want some variety, some independence in our work. But we can easily get too much. I have heard as many complaints and felt in myself as many objections against variety as against monotony. I have seen and felt as much discontent with "uncharted freedom" as with irksome restraint. Bewilderment, a sense of incompetence and of rudderless drifting, are never far off from any one of us in our work. There is in all of us something that likes to trot along in harness,—not too tight or galling, to be sure,—but still in guidance and with support. That makes us show our best paces.

Nor is there anything slavish or humiliating in this. It is simply the admission that we are not ready at every moment to be original, inventive, creative. We have found out the immense strain and cost of fresh thinking. We are certain that we were not born to be at it perpetually. We want some rest in our work, some relief from high tension. Monotony supplies that relief. Moreover the rhythmic and habitual elements in us (ancient labor-saving devices) demand their representation. To do something again and again as the trees, the birds, and our own hearts do, is a fundamental need which demands and receives satisfaction in work as well as in play.

For the tragedies and abominations, the slaveries and degradations of manual labor we cannot put all the blame on the large element of monotony and repetition which such labor often contains. We should revolt and destroy any work that was not somewhat monotonous. But the point is that work should offer to each worker as much variety and independence as he has originality and genius, no more and no less. Give us either more or less than our share and we are miserable. We can be crushed and overdriven by too much responsibility, as well as by too little. Our initiative, as well as our docility, can be overworked.

We want a boss, especially in heavy or monotonous labor. Most monotonous work is of the sort that is cut out and supplied ready to hand. This implies that some one else plans and directs it. In so far as we want monotony, therefore, we want to be

driven, though not overdriven, by a boss. If we are to do the pulling some one else should hold the reins. When I am digging my wife's garden beds I want her to specify where they shall go. We all want a master of some kind, and most of us want a master in human shape. The more manual our work is, the more we want him. Boatmen poling a scow through a creek need some one to steer and tell them which should push harder as they turn the bends of the stream. The steersman may be chosen by lot or each may steer in turn, but some boss we must have, for when we are poling we cannot well steer and we don't want the strain of trying fruitlessly to do both. This example is typical of the world's work. It demands to be bossed, and it is more efficient, even more original when it is bossed,—just enough!

Monotony, then, and bossing we need, but in our own quantity and also of our own kind. For there are different kinds (as well as different doses) and some are better than others. For example, to go to the same place of work every day is a monotony that simplifies life advantageously for most of us, but to teach the same subject over and over again is for most teachers an evil, though it may be just now a necessary evil.

We must try to distinguish. When we delight in thinking ourselves abused, or allow ourselves the luxury of grumbling, we often single out monotony as the target of our wrath. But we must not take all complaints (our own or other people's) at their face value. A coat is a misfit if it is too big or too small, or if it puckers in the wrong place. A job can be a misfit in twenty different ways and can be complained of in as many different tones. Let us be clear about this. If our discontent is as divine as it feels, it is not because all monotony is evil, but because our particular share and kind of monotony has proved to be a degrading waste of energy.

We want to see the product of our work. The bridge we planned, the house we built, the shoes we cobbled, help us to get before ourselves and so to realize more than a moment's worth of life and effort. The impermanence of each instant's thought, the transience of every flush of effort tends to make our lives

seem shadowy even to ourselves. Our memory is like a sieve through which most that we pick up runs back like sand. But in work we find refuge and stability, because in the accumulated product of many days' labor we can build up and present at last to our own sight the durable structure of what we meant to do. Then we can believe that our intentions, our hopes, our plans, our daily food and drink, have not passed through us for nothing, for we have funded their worth in some tangible achievement which outlasts them.

Further, such external proofs of our efficiency win us not only self-respect, but the recognition of others. We need something to show for ourselves, something to prove that our dreams are not impotent. Work gives us the means to prove it.

I want to acknowledge here my agreement in the charge often brought against modern factory labor,—namely that since no workman plans or finishes his product, no one can recognize his product, take pride in it or see its defects. Even when factory labor is well paid, its impersonal and wholesale merging of the man in the machine goes far to make it unfit for men and women.

We want a handle to our name. Everyone has a right to the distinction which titles of nobility are meant to give, but it is from our work that we should get them. The grocer, the trapper, the night-watchman, the cook, is a person fit to be recognized, both by his own timid self and by the rest of the world. In time the title of our job comes to stand for us, to enlarge our personality and to give us permanence. Thus it supplements the standing which is given us by our product. To "hold down a job" gives us a place in the world, something approaching the home for which in some form or other everyone longs. "Have you any place for me?" we ask with eagerness, for until we find "a place" we are tramps,—men without a country.

A man with a job has, at least in embryo, the kind of recognition which we all crave. He has won membership in a club that he wants to belong to and especially hates to be left out of. To be in it as a member in full standing gives a taste of self-respect and self-confidence.

We want congeniality in our fellow workmen. One of the few non-physical "points" which people have already learned to look for in selecting work, is the temper and character of the "boss." Men, and especially women, care almost as much about this as about the hours and wages of the jobs. Young physicians will work in a laboratory at starvation wages for the sake of being near a great teacher, even though he rarely notices them. The congeniality of fellow workmen is almost as important as the temper of the boss. Two unfriendly stenographers in a single room will often give up their work and take lower wages elsewhere in order to escape each other.

All this is so obvious to those who look for jobs that I wonder why so few employers have noticed it. The housewives who keep their servants, the manufacturers who avoid strikes, are not always those who pay the best wages and offer the best condition of work. The human facts—the personal relations of employer and employee—are often disregarded, but always at the employer's peril. The personal factor is as great as the economic in the industrial unrest of to-day. Are not even the "captains of industry" beginning to wake up to this fact?

Payment can be given a working man only for what some other man might have done,—because his pay is fixed by estimate of "what the work is worth," that is, what you can get other people to do it for. Hence you never pay anyone for what he individually does, but for what "a man like him," that fictitious being, that supposedly fair specimen of his type and trade, can be expected to do.

The man himself you cannot pay. Yet anyone who does his work well or gets satisfaction out of it, puts himself into it. Moreover he does things that he cannot be given credit for, finishes parts that no one else will notice. Even a mediocre amateur musician knows that the best parts of his playing, his personal tributes to the genius of the composer whom he plays, are heard by no one but himself and "the God of things as they are." There might be bitterness in the thought that in our work we get paid or praised only for what is not particularly

ours, while the work that we put our hearts into is not recognized or rewarded. But in the struggle for spiritual existence we adapt ourselves to the unappreciative features of our environment and learn to look elsewhere for recognition. We do not expect people to pay us for our best. We look to the approval of conscience, to the light of our ideal seen more clearly when our work is good, or to the judgment of God. Our terms differ more than our tendencies. The essential point is that for appreciation of our best work we look to a Judge more just and keen-sighted than our paymaster.

Nevertheless there is a spiritual value in being paid in hard cash. For though money is no measure of the individual value in work, it gives precious assurance of some value, some usefulness to people out of the worker's sight. Workers who do not need a money wage for the sake of anything that they can buy with it, still need it for its spiritual value. Doctors find this out when they try to get invalids or neurasthenics to work for the good of their health. Exercise done for exercise's sake, is of very little value, even to the body, for half its purpose is to stimulate the will, and most wills refuse to work at chest-weights and treadmills, however disguised. But our minds are still harder to fool with hygienic exercises done for the sake of keeping busy. To get any health or satisfaction out of work it must seem to the worker to be of some use. If he knows that the market for raffia baskets is *nil*, and that he is merely enticed into using his hands for the good of his muscles or of his soul, he soon gets a moral nausea at the whole attempt.

This is the flaw in ideals of studiousness and self-culture. It is not enough that the self-culture shall seem good to President A. Lawrence Lowell or to some kind neurologist. The college boy himself, the psychoneurotic herself must feel some zest along with the labor if it is to do them any good. And this zest comes because they believe that by this bit of work they are "getting somewhere," winning some standing among those whose approval they desire, serving something or somebody besides the hired teacher or trainer.

I once set a neurasthenic patient, formerly a stenographer,

to helping me with the clerical work in my office. She began to improve at once, because the rapid return of her former technical skill made her believe (after many months of idleness and gnawing worry about money) that some day she might get back to work. But what did her far more good was the check which I sent her at the end of her first week's work. She had not expected it, for she did not think her work good enough. But she knew me well enough to know that I had sworn off lying in all forms (even the most philanthropic and hygienic) and would not deceive her by pretending to value her work. The money was good for what it would buy, but it was even better because it proved to her the world's need for what she could do, and thus gave her a right to space and time upon the earth.

This is the spiritual value of pay. So far no one has thought of so convenient and convincing a way to wrap up and deliver at each citizen's door a parcel of courage for the future, and a morsel of self-respect which is food for the soul. But money is not the only means of paying people. The goods which money buys, the ends which it helps us to achieve are part of our reward, perhaps the most genuine part. But gratitude, service to others, and success to our aims are often thought of as the proper ends or rewards of work. Do we want them? Can we achieve them? Let us see.

Gratitude given or received is one of the best things in the world. We need far more of it and far better quality. Yet I have never read any satisfactory account of what it so gloriously means. Its value begins just where the value of pay ends. Thanks are personal, and attempt to fit an adequate reponse to the particular service performed. Pay is an impersonal coin which has been handed out to many before it reaches you, and will go to many others when it leaves you. It is your right and you are not grateful for it. But thanks are a free gift and enrich the giver. There is no nobler art than the art of expressing one's gratitude in fresh, unhackneyed, unexaggerated terms which answer devotion with fresh devotion, fancy with new fancy, clarity with sincerity. Artists who get their reward

only in money and in the stale plaudits of clapping hands are restless for something more individual. They want to be intimately understood and beautifully answered. For such gratitude they look to brother artists, to the few who really understand. There they find their best reward;—but even this leaves something wanting.

Why is it so notoriously difficult to accept thanks? Most things that I am thanked for I am not conscious of having done at all. Obviously the thanks are misdirected. Or, if I am conscious of having done what the thanker is grateful for, I am likewise conscious that I only handed on to a third person what had previously been given to me. I learned from Smith and then enlightened Jones. Smith is the man to thank. Or, again, one is thanked for simply carrying out a contract; but one could not honorably do less. Thanks for going along the usual and necessary road seem gratuitous and undeserved. Or, finally one receives gratitude for what one did with joy; that seems as queer as being thanked for eating one's dinner.

But suppose that the deed one is thanked for was not an act of passing along what came originally from another as you pass money in a street car. Suppose a man has really originated something, an invention, a poem, a statue. He hardly claims it as his, for he does not know where it came from. He did not "make it up." It sprang into his mind, given to him as much as if he had received it from a friend. He does not feel that he is the one to receive thanks. The thanks should pass through him, as the gift did, to some one else,—to his parents who gave him and taught him so much, to his race, his nation, his health, his friends, his opportunities. That is where it all came from; that is where thanks are due. But each of the influences is itself the recipient of countless other influences. Every fact in the universe depends on every other fact. Ultimately, then, not he but the universe must be thanked.

He deals with firms and employers, but he looks behind them, over their shoulders, and redirects their thanks elsewhere, ultimately, if he but knew it, to the World-Spirit. One may not remember that spirit. One often does not bother about

the world's work. Thinking exhausts some people and fatally confuses others. But if one thinks at all he runs up hard against the world plan and finds it the bulkiest object in sight.

The unsentimental male American is quick to reject the idea that he cares about *servi*ng anybody or anything. He may admit that he wants to "make good" in a fair and square way, according to the rules of the game. But "service" sounds too "stuck up" and Pharisaical for him.

Nevertheless I firmly believe that his derision is only a ruse to conceal his morbid bashfulness and oafish sensitiveness. For in point of fact service is one of the things that pretty much everybody wants,—however much he may disguise it and conceal it from himself. I have never seen any more unsentimental and raw-boned being than the American medical student; yet he is simply hankering for service. Medical teachers spread before him banquets of tempting "opportunities," rare "cases," "beautiful" specimens, easy chances to distinguish himself in research and to absorb his medical food in predigested mouthfuls. He often remains indifferent. But the moment you give him a place to work in a clinic, to serve as Dr. Blank's fourteenth assistant in a hospital where good work is done, he will jump at the chance. The work is much harder and more monotonous than his regular studies. Much of it is not teaching him medicine. He has to go on doing Fehling's test for sugar and trying knee jerks long after he has learned the trick. He has to measure stomach contents, to weigh patients, to bandage legs, and to write down names and addresses in monotonous routine day after day. Yet he loves the job. Despite all the drudgery, he learns far more medicine by holding down an actual job of this kind, than by lectures and classes. If you separate out the instructive portion of his day's work and present it to him without assigning him any regular position and duties, he does not like the work as well or learn so much.

Extraordinarily sound those students' instincts! The men are bored when we offer them more opportunities to do what is

easy and self-centered, but outside the current of reality. It is only when we give them hard, dry work like an assistantship in a clinic,—a place where they can accomplish something that has a real value in the actual world,—that they fall to with real appetite.

The sense of somebody's need is, I believe, the most powerful motive in the world, one that appeals to the largest number of people of every age, race, and kind. It wakes up the whole nature, the powers that learn as well as those that perform; it generates the vigor of interest that submerges selfishness and cowardice; it rouses the inventiveness and ingenuity that slumber so soundly in student's classrooms. For many of us, for more every time the world takes a step in the right direction, work which is service taps a great reservoir of power, sets free our caged and leashed energy.

I conclude then that pay, gratitude, and service as ends of work, have each a value, though not exactly of the sort one might expect. What about *success* as a reward of work?

Financial rewards are nowadays less advertised than the general prosperity which they express. Civic ideals are kept in the foreground, alike by "boosters," real-estate men, and chambers of commerce. According to these authorities business success means a flourishing city and a contented, healthy community. To help build up a fine city is what we are asked to do in case we take the investment offered us. A fine city is an efficiently managed, well-lighted community, with plenty of schools, parks, and churches. But stop a moment. What is the use of such a place?

When we have built and finished this perfect city, with its smooth-running government, its crime-freed, sanitary streets will be swept and garnished, all ready to begin—what? It is hard to hear any answer. Few are interested enough even to attempt one. For the interest of civic reform is mainly in the process,—far less in the result. Boys who built a boat or a play-house usually find that there is far more fun in the process of building than in using the finished product. So it is with the

reform of a slum or a municipal government. The best of it is in the reforming. We shall hardly stop to notice it when it is perfect. We shall take it for granted as we do the safe delivery of the letters which we post, and be off on another campaign. Our civic goals are like the scented rushes in "Wood and Water." The most beautiful ones, Alice found, were always those just beyond her reach. Perfect adaptation to environment, which seems to be what the sanitary and civic reformers aim at, would mean absolute stagnation,—attainment that buds no more. For what should stir us further?

"Well, anyway, to reform our city is the best thing in sight. It is certainly in the right direction." Ah, then we know what the right direction is! *That* is something far more significant than any single step in civic progress. If we know the true direction we can point beyond the civic models to something toward which they are on the road, and get our satisfaction all along its course.

The worship of "the right direction" is a fundamental motive in art and play as well as in work. Every noble game and work of art calls for others, incites to pilgrimages, reforms and nobler arts. Art is not meant to give us something final; everything in it is pointing ahead and gets its justification because it is "in the right direction." Everything in art, as in civics, gets the courage to exist and to push on because of its readiness to be corrected by experience to a truer version of its own purpose. Sincere people want the true, in their work as well as in their thinking. But the truth is an Infinite, and the will to approach it is an infinite intention. The fruit of this infinite intention would be our utter prostration of self before the vision, "Do with me as thou wilt." "Thy will not mine be done."

I cannot see the end of all this. I see reform after reform of character and of civilization, progress after progress in science and art, rising like mountain ranges, one behind the other. But there is no conceivable sense in all these upheavals if they are mere changes, mere uneasy shifts in the position of a dreaming world-spirit. To make sense they must be moving in a single direction.

It is obvious enough that all work is supposed to fulfill some one's plan—the worker's plan or his master's. It is good for something. But everyone of the goods we buy with our work is itself a means to something else, a coin with which to purchase something more. The goods we supply, the clothes, food, transportation, medicine, knowledge, inspiration which we give, are themselves means to something else, perhaps to comfort, health, education, courage. These again are means to better work, to civic perfection, to family happiness. But these once more are in themselves as worthless as fiat money or dolls stuffed with sawdust, unless there is absolute value behind them. Happiness, civic perfection, love, are sometimes named as the ultimate ends toward which the activities of busy men and women are means, but anybody who experiences any of these states and is not a Buddhist wallowing in vague bliss, finds that they incite us to new deeds. If they are not soporific drugs they are spurs to fresh action.

Taken literally, the ideals of utility and civic reform are like the old myth which explained the world's support as the broad back of an elephant. Who supports the elephant? He rests on a gigantic tortoise; and who supports the tortoise? No answer is audible in the business sections of our cities, in the schoolrooms or in the colleges. The church's answer is derided or ignored by a large fraction of us. But it is the right one; and we shall learn to listen to it or pay the penalty. Government does not rest ultimately on the consent of the governed, but on their conformity to the will of the World-Spirit who makes and unmakes civilizations.

Success in industry, in art, or in love is saved from bitterness and disappointment because we regard our achievements far more symbolically than we know, and rest far more than we are aware upon the backing of God.

Assuming that in everyone there is an infinite and restless desire to get into the life of the World,—to share any and all life that is hot and urgent or cool and clear,—we can tackle this infinite task in two ways:

By trying to understand the universe in the samples of it

which come into our ken and to draw from these bits a knowledge which typifies and represents the whole. That is science.

By trying to serve. Service is one of the ways by which a tiny insect like one of us can get a purchase on the whole universe. If he finds the job where he can be of use, he is hitched to the star of the world, and moves with it.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Illustrate from your own experience the author's difference between work and drudgery.
2. Has drudgery in itself any value?
3. Explain what is meant by overcoming the "dead point" in regard to work (page 455), and illustrate from your own experience.
4. Apply the discussion of the points of a good job to the work of the college student.
5. What are to be expected as the true rewards of work?
6. What is it that makes work valuable,—the effect on the man himself or what he acquires or achieves?
7. What part does work play in the development of one's character?
8. What is the highest form of work, and upon what principles is your conclusion reached?
9. Enumerate the most important sources of happiness. In doing so, guide yourself at least to some extent, by considering what things are possessed by the most contented and cheerful people of your acquaintance.

THE MORALS OF TRADE¹

HERBERT SPENCER

[Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was a distinguished English philosopher. His significance in the history of English thought lies in the fact that he was the philosopher of the great scientific movement of the second half of the nineteenth century. Spencer tried to effect a synthesis of all scientific knowledge and to express in a sweeping general formula the belief in progress which pervaded his age. Although as a system his synthetic philosophy, as it was called, is not likely to prove long-lived, yet it is extremely valuable as a source of suggestiveness and from the historic influence of many of its conceptions on the culture of the age.]

On all sides we have found the result of long personal experience to be the conviction that trade is essentially corrupt.

¹ From *Essays: Moral, Political and Æsthetic*.

In tones of disgust or discouragement, reprehension or derision, according to their several natures, men in business have one after another expressed or implied this belief. Omitting the highest mercantile classes, a few of the less common trades, and those exceptional cases where an entire command of the market has been obtained, the uniform testimony of competent judges is, that success is incompatible with strict integrity. To live in the commercial world it appears necessary to adopt its ethical code: neither exceeding nor falling short of it—neither being less honest nor more honest. Those who sink below its standard are expelled; while those who rise above it are either pulled down to it or ruined. As, in self-defense, the civilized man becomes savage among savages; so, it seems that in self-defense, the scrupulous trader is obliged to become as little scrupulous as his competitors. It has been said that the law of the animal creation is—"Eat and be eaten;" and of our trading community it may be similarly said that its law is—Cheat and be cheated. A system of keen competition, carried on, as it is, without adequate moral restraint, is very much a system of commercial cannibalism. Its alternatives are—Use the same weapons as your antagonists, or be conquered and devoured.

Of questions suggested by these facts one of the most obvious is—Are not the prejudices that have ever been entertained against trade and traders, thus fully justified? do not these meannesses and dishonesties, and the moral degradation they imply, warrant the disrespect shown to men in business? A prompt affirmative answer will probably be looked for; but we very much doubt whether it should be given. We are rather of opinion that these delinquencies are products of the average English character placed under special conditions. There is no good reason for assuming that the trading classes are intrinsically worse than other classes. Men taken at random from higher and lower ranks, would, most likely, if similarly circumstanced, do much the same. Indeed the mercantile world might readily recriminate. Is it a solicitor who comments on their misdoings? They may quickly silence him by referring to the

countless dark stains on the reputation of his fraternity. Is it a barrister? His frequent practice of putting in pleas which he knows are not valid; and his established habit of taking fees for work that he does not perform; make his criticism somewhat suicidal. Does the condemnation come through the press? The condemned may remind those who write of the fact that it is not quite honest to utter a positive verdict on a book merely glanced through, or to pen glowing eulogies on the mediocre work of a friend while slighting the good one of an enemy; and may further ask whether those who, at the dictation of an employer, write what they disbelieve, are not guilty of the serious offense of adulterating public opinion.

Moreover, traders might contend that many of their delinquencies are thrust on them by the injustice of their customers. They, and especially drapers, might point to the fact that the habitual demand for an abatement of price, is made in utter disregard of their reasonable profits; and that to protect themselves against attempts to gain by their loss, they are obliged to name prices greater than those they intend to take. They might also urge that the strait to which they are often brought by the non-payment of accounts due from their wealthier customers, is itself a cause of their malpractices: obliging them, as it does, to use all means, illegitimate as well as legitimate, for getting the wherewith to meet their engagements. In proof of the wrongs inflicted on them by the non-trading classes, they might instance the well-known cases of large shopkeepers in the West-end, who have been either ruined by the unpunctuality of their customers, or have been obliged periodically to stop payment, as the only way of getting their bills settled. And then, after proving that those without excuse show this disregard of other men's claims, traders might ask whether they, who have the excuse of having to contend with a merciless competition, are alone to be blamed if they display a like disregard in other forms.

Nay, even to the guardians of social rectitude—members of the legislature—they might use the *tu quoque* argument: asking whether bribery of a customer's servant is any worse

than bribery of an elector? or whether the gaining of suffrages by claptrap hustings-speeches, containing insincere professions adapted to the taste of the constituency, is not as bad as getting an order for goods by delusive representations respecting their quality? No; it seems probable that close inquiry would show few if any classes to be free from immoralities that are as great, *relatively to the temptations*, as those which we have been exposing. Of course they will not be so petty or so gross where the circumstances do not prompt pettiness or grossness; nor so constant and organized where the class-conditions have not tended to make them habitual. But, taken with these qualifications, we think that much might be said for the proposition that the trading classes, neither better nor worse intrinsically than other classes, are betrayed into their flagitious habits by external causes.

Another question, here naturally arising, is—"Are not these evils growing worse?" Many of the facts we have cited seem to imply that they are. And yet there are many other facts which point as distinctly the other way. In weighing the evidence, we must bear in mind that the much greater public attention at present paid to such matters is itself a source of error—is apt to generate the belief that evils now becoming recognized are evils that have recently arisen; when in truth they have merely been hitherto disregarded, or less regarded. It has been clearly thus with crime, with distress, with popular ignorance; and it is very probably thus with trading-dishonesties. As it is true of individual beings, that their height in the scale of creation may be measured by the degree of their self-consciousness; so, in a sense, it is true of societies. Advanced and highly-organized societies are distinguished from lower ones by the evolution of something that stands for a *social self-consciousness*—a consciousness in each citizen, of the state of the aggregate of citizens. Among ourselves there has, happily, been of late years a remarkable growth of this social self-consciousness; and we believe that to this is chiefly ascribable the impression that commercial malpractices are increasing.

Such facts as have come down to us respecting the trade

of past times, confirm this view. In his "Complete English Tradesman," Defoe mentions, among other maneuvers of retailers, the false lights which they introduced into their shops, for the purpose of giving delusive appearances to their goods. He comments of the "shop rhetorick," the "flux of falsehoods," which tradesmen habitually uttered to their customers; and quotes their defense as being that they could not live without lying. He says, too, that there was scarce a shopkeeper who had not a bag of spurious or debased coin, from which he gave change whenever he could; and that men, even the most honest, triumphed in their skill in getting rid of bad money. These facts show that the mercantile morals of that day were, at any rate, not better than ours; and if we call to mind the numerous Acts of Parliament passed in old times to prevent frauds of all kinds, we perceive the like implication. As much may, indeed, be safely inferred from the general state of society.

When, reign after reign, governments debased the coinage, the moral tone of the middle classes could scarcely have been higher than now. Among generations whose sympathy with the claims of fellow-creatures was so weak, that the slave-trade was not only thought justifiable, but the initiator of it was rewarded by permission to record the feat in his coat of arms, it is hardly possible that men respected the claims of their fellow-citizens more than at present. Times characterized by an administration of justice so inefficient that there were in London nests of criminals who defied the law, and on all highroads robbers who eluded it, cannot have been distinguished by just mercantile dealings. While, conversely, an age which, like ours, has seen so many equitable social changes thrust on the legislature by public opinion, is very unlikely to be an age in which the transactions between individuals have been growing more inequitable. Yet, on the other hand, it is undeniable that many of the dishonesties we have described are of modern origin. Not a few of them have become established during the last thirty years; and others are even now arising. How are the seeming contradictions to be reconciled?

We believe the reconciliation is not difficult. It lies in the fact that while the *great* and *direct* frauds have been diminishing, the *small* and *indirect* frauds have been increasing: alike in variety and in number. And this admission we take to be quite consistent with the opinion that the standard of commercial morals is higher than it was. For, if we omit, as excluded from the question, the penal restraints—religious and legal—and ask what is the ultimate moral restraint to the aggression of man on man, we find it to be—sympathy with the pain inflicted. Now the keenness of the sympathy, depending on the vividness with which this pain is realized, varies with the conditions of the case. It may be active enough to check misdeeds which will cause great suffering; and yet not be active enough to check misdeeds which will cause but slight annoyance. While sufficiently acute to prevent a man from doing that which will entail immediate injury on a given person, it may not be sufficiently acute to prevent him from doing that which will entail remote injuries on unknown persons. And we find the facts to agree with this deduction, that the moral restraint varies according to the clearness with which the evil consequences are conceived. Many a one who would shrink from picking a pocket does not scruple to adulterate his goods; and he who never dreams of passing base coin will yet be a party to joint-stock-bank deceptions. Hence, as we say, the multiplication of the more subtle and complex forms of fraud is consistent with a general progress in morality; provided it is accompanied with a decrease in the grosser forms of fraud.

But the question which most concerns us is, not whether the morals of trade are better or worse than they have been, but rather—why are they so bad? Why in this civilized state of ours is there so much that betrays the cunning selfishness of the savage? Why, after the careful inculcations of rectitude during education, comes there in after-life all this knavery? Why, in spite of all exhortations to which the commercial classes listen every Sunday, do they next morning recommence their evil deeds? What is this so potent agency which almost neutralizes the discipline of education, of law, of religion?

Various subsidiary causes that might be assigned must be passed over, that we may have space to deal with the chief cause. In an exhaustive statement, something would have to be said on the credulity of consumers, which leads them to believe in representations of impossible advantages; and something, too, on their greediness, which, ever prompting them to look for more than they ought to get, encourages the sellers to offer delusive bargains. The increased difficulty of living consequent on growing pressure of population, might perhaps come in as a part cause; and that greater cost of bringing up a family, which results from the higher standard of education, might be added. But all these are relatively insignificant. The great inciter of these trading malpractices is intense desire for wealth. And if we ask—Why this intense desire? the reply is—It results from the *indiscriminate respect paid to wealth*.

To be distinguished from the common herd—to be somebody—to make a name, a position—this is the universal ambition; and to accumulate riches is alike the surest and the easiest way of fulfilling this ambition. Very early in life all learn this. At school, the court paid to one whose parents have called in their carriage to see him, is conspicuous; while the poor boy, whose insufficient stock of clothes implies the small means of his family, soon has burnt into his memory the fact that poverty is contemptible. On entering the world, the lessons that may have been taught about the nobility of self-sacrifice, the reverence due to genius, the admirableness of high integrity, are quickly neutralized by experience: men's actions proving that these are not their standards of respect. It is soon perceived that while abundant outward marks of deference from fellow-citizens may almost certainly be gained by directing every energy to the accumulation of property, they are but rarely to be gained in any other way; and that even in the few cases where they are otherwise gained, they are not given with entire unreserve; but are commonly joined with a more or less manifest display of patronage. When, seeing this, the young man further sees that while the acquisition of property is quite possible with his mediocre endowments, the acquirement of

distinction by brilliant discoveries, or heroic acts, or high achievements in art, implies faculties and feelings which he does not possess; it is not difficult to understand why he devotes himself heart and soul to business.

We do not mean to say that men act on the consciously reasoned-out conclusions thus indicated; but we mean that these conclusions are the unconsciously-formed products of their daily experience. From early childhood, the sayings and doings of all around them have generated the idea that wealth and respectability are two sides of the same thing. This idea, growing with their growth, and strengthening with their strength, becomes at last almost what we may call an organic conviction. And this organic conviction it is which prompts the expenditure of all their energies in money-making. We contend that the chief stimulus is not the desire for the wealth itself; but for the applause and position which the wealth brings. And in this belief we find ourselves at one with various intelligent traders with whom we have talked on the matter.

It is incredible that men should make the sacrifices, mental and bodily, which they do, merely to get the material benefits which money purchases. Who would undertake an extra burden of business for the purpose of getting a cellar of choice wines for his own drinking? He who does it, does it that he may have choice wines to give his guests and gain their praises. What merchant would spend an additional hour at his office daily, merely that he might move into a larger house in a better quarter? In so far as health and comfort are concerned, he knows he will be a loser by the exchange; and would never be induced to make it, were it nor for the increased social consideration which the new house will bring him. Where is the man who would lie awake at nights devising means of increasing his income in the hope of being able to provide his wife with a carriage, were the use of the carriage the sole consideration? It is because of the *éclat* which the carriage will give, that he enters on these additional anxieties. So manifest, so trite, indeed, are these truths, that we should be ashamed of insisting on them, did not our argument require it.

For if the desire for that homage which wealth brings is the chief stimulus to these strivings after wealth, then is the giving of this homage (when given, as it is, with but little discrimination) the chief cause of the dishonesties into which these strivings betray mercantile men. When the shopkeeper, on the strength of a prosperous year and favorable prospects, has yielded to his wife's persuasions, and replaced the old furniture with new, at an outlay greater than his income covers—when, instead of the hoped-for increase, the next year brings a decrease in his returns—when he finds that his expenses are out-running his revenue; then does he fall under the strongest temptation to adopt some newly-introduced adulteration or other malpractice. When, having by display gained a certain recognition, the wholesale trader begins to give dinners appropriate only to those of ten times his income, with expensive other entertainments to match—when, having for a time carried on this style at a cost greater than he can afford, he finds that he cannot discontinue it without giving up his position: then is he most strongly prompted to enter into larger transactions; to trade beyond his means; to seek undue credit; to get into that ever-complicating series of misdeeds, which ends in disgraceful bankruptcy. And if these are the facts—the undeniable facts—then is it an unavoidable conclusion that the blind admiration which society gives to mere wealth, and the display of wealth, is the chief source of these multitudinous immoralities.

Yes, the evil is deeper than appears—draws its nutriment from far below the surface. This gigantic system of dishonesty branching out into every conceivable form of fraud, has roots that run underneath our whole social fabric, and, sending fibers into every house, suck up strength from our daily sayings and doings. In every dining-room a rootlet finds food when the conversation turns on So-and-so's successful speculations, his purchase of an estate, his probable worth—on this man's recent large legacy, and the other's advantageous match; for being thus talked about is one form of that tacit respect which men struggle for. Every drawing-room furnishes nourishment, in the admiration awarded to costliness—to silks that are "rich,"

that is, expensive; to dresses that contain an enormous quantity of material, that is, are expensive; to laces that are handmade, that is, expensive; to diamonds that are rare, that is, expensive; to china that is old, that is, expensive. And from scores of small remarks and minutiae of behavior, which, in all circles, hourly imply how completely the idea of respectability involves that of costly externals, there is drawn fresh pabulum.

We are all implicated. We all, whether with self-approbation or not, give expression to the established feeling. Even he who disapproves this feeling, finds himself unable to treat virtue in threadbare apparel with a cordiality as great as that which he would show to the same virtue endowed with prosperity. Scarcely a man is to be found who would not behave with more civility to a knave in broadcloth than to a knave in fustian. Though for the deference which they have shown to the vulgar rich, or the dishonestly successful, men afterwards compound with their consciences by privately venting their contempt; yet when they again come face to face with these imposing externals covering worthlessness, they do as before. And so long as imposing worthlessness gets the visible marks of respect, while the disrespect felt for it is hidden, it naturally flourishes.

Hence, then, is it that men persevere in these evil practices which all condemn. They can so purchase a homage, which if not genuine, is yet, so far as appearances go, as good as the best. To one whose wealth has been gained by a life of frauds, what matters it that his name is in all circles a synonym of roguery? Has he not been conspicuously honored by being twice elected mayor of his town? (we state a fact) and does not this, joined to the personal consideration shown him, outweigh in his estimation all that is said against him: of which he hears scarcely anything? When, not many years after the exposure of his inequitable dealing, a trader attains to the highest civic distinction which the kingdom has to offer; and that, too, through the instrumentality of those who best know his delinquency; is not the fact an encouragement to him, and to all others, to sacrifice rectitude to aggrandizement? If, after listening to a sermon that has by implication denounced the dishonesties

he has been guilty of, the rich ill-doer finds, on leaving church, that his neighbors cap to him; does not this tacit approval go far to neutralize the effect of all he has heard? The truth is, that with the great majority of men, the visible expression of social opinion is far the most efficient of incentives and restraints. Let any one who wishes to estimate the strength of this control propose to himself to walk through the streets in the dress of a dustman, or hawk vegetables from door to door. Let him feel, as he probably will, that he had rather do something morally wrong than commit such a breach of usage, and suffer the resulting derision. And he will then better estimate how powerful a curb to men is the open disapproval of their fellows; and how, conversely, the outward applause of their fellows is a stimulus surpassing all others in intensity: Fully realizing which facts, he will see that the immoralities of trade are in great part traceable to an immoral public opinion.

Let none infer, from what has been said, that the payment of respect to wealth rightly acquired and rightly used, is depre- cated. In its original meaning, and in due degree, the feeling which prompts such respect is good. Primarily, wealth is the sign of mental power; and this is always respectable. To have honestly-acquired property implies intelligence, energy, self-control; and these are worthy of the homage that is indirectly paid to them by admiring their results. Moreover, the good administration and increase of inherited property also requires its virtues; and therefore demands its share of approbation. And besides being applauded for their display of faculty, men who gain and increase wealth are to be applauded as public benefactors. For he who as manufacturer or merchant, has, without injustice to others, realized a fortune, is thereby proved to have discharged his functions better than those who have been less successful. By greater skill, better judgment, or more economy than his competitors, he has afforded the public greater advantages. His extra profits are but a share of the extra produce obtained by the same expenditure: the other share going to the consumers. And similarly, the landowner who, by judicious outlay, has increased the value (that is, the

productiveness) of his estate, has thereby added to the stock of national capital. By all means, then, let the right acquisition and proper use of wealth have their due share of admiration.

But that which we condemn as the chief cause of commercial dishonesty is the *indiscriminate* admiration of wealth—an admiration that has little or no reference to the character of the possessor. When, as very generally happens, the external signs are revered, where they signify no internal worthiness—nay, even where they cover internal unworthiness; then does the feeling become vicious. It is this idolatry which worships the symbol apart from the thing symbolized, that is the root of all these evils we have been exposing. So long as men pay homage to those social benefactors who have grown rich honestly, they give a wholesome stimulus to industry; but when they accord a share of their homage to those social malefactors who have grown rich dishonestly, then do they foster corruption—then do they become accomplices in all these frauds of commerce.

As for remedy, it manifestly follows that there is none save a purified public opinion. When that abhorrence which society now shows to direct theft is shown to theft of all degrees of indirectness, then will these mercantile vices disappear. When not only the trader who adulterates or gives short measure, but also the merchant who overtrades, the bank-director who countenances an exaggerated report, and the railway-director who repudiates his guarantee, come to be regarded as of the same genus as the pickpocket, and are treated with like disdain; then will the morals of trade become what they should be.

We have little hope, however, that any such higher tone of public opinion will shortly be reached. The present condition of things appears to be, in great measure, a necessary accompaniment of our present phase of progress. Throughout the civilized world, especially in England, and above all in America, social activity is almost wholly expended in material development. To subjugate Nature, and bring the powers of production and distribution to their highest perfection is the task of our age; and probably of many future ages. And as in times when national defense and conquest were the chief desiderata, mili-

tary achievement was honored above all other things; so now, when the chief desideratum is industrial growth, honor is most conspicuously given to that which generally indicates the aiding of industrial growth. The English nation at present displays what we may call the commercial diathesis; and the undue admiration for wealth appears to be its concomitant—a relation still more conspicuous in the worship of “the almighty dollar” by the Americans. And while the commercial diathesis, with its accompanying standard of distinction, continues, we fear the evils we have been delineating can be but partially cured. It seems hopeless to expect that men will distinguish between that wealth which represents personal superiority and benefits done to society, from that which does not. The symbols, the externals, have all the world through swayed the masses; and must long continue to do so. Even the cultivated, who are on their guard against the bias of associated ideas, and try to separate the real from the seeming, cannot escape the influence of current opinion. We must, therefore, content ourselves with looking for a slow amelioration.

Something, however, may even now be done by vigorous protest against adoration of mere success. And it is important that it should be done, considering how this vicious sentiment is being fostered. When we have one of our leading moralists preaching, with increasing vehemence, the doctrine of sanctification by force—when we are told that while a selfishness troubled with qualms of conscience is contemptible, a selfishness intense enough to trample down everything in the unscrupulous pursuit of its ends, is worthy of all admiration—when we find that if it be sufficiently great, power, no matter of what kind or how directed, is held up for our reverence; we may fear lest the prevalent applause of mere success, together with the commercial vices which it stimulates, should be increased rather than diminished. Not at all by this hero-worship grown into brute-worship, is society to be made better; but by exactly the opposite—by a stern criticism of the means through which success has been achieved; and by according honor to the higher and less selfish modes of activity.

And happily the signs of this more moral public opinion are already showing themselves. It is becoming a tacitly-received doctrine that the rich should not, as in by-gone times, spend their lives in personal gratification; but should devote them to the general welfare. Year by year is the improvement of the people occupying a larger share of the attention of the upper classes. Year by year are they voluntarily devoting more and more energy to furthering the material and mental progress of the masses. And those among them who do not join in the discharge of these high functions are beginning to be looked upon with more or less contempt by their own order. This latest and most hopeful fact in human history—this new and better chivalry—promises to evolve a higher standard of honor; and so to ameliorate many evils: among others those which we have detailed. When wealth obtained by illegitimate means inevitably brings nothing but disgrace—when to wealth rightly acquired is accorded only its due share of homage, while the greatest homage is given to those who consecrate their energies and their means to the noblest ends; then may we be sure that along with other accompanying benefits, the morals of trade will be greatly purified.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What is present day opinion of the morals of trade in comparison with that expressed in this article which was published in 1864? Do your observations justify this current opinion?
2. What does Spencer allege as the causes of the low morals of trade? Which of these are the most powerful now?
3. "The real question that confronts us when we seek to attain an understanding of the present attitude of the American people is not whether success is here taken to mean material prosperity, but whether material prosperity is not received by us as the final test of success and as the sole touchstone of a finished career." Give your opinion on this matter.
4. Contrast the ideals of trade as described by Spencer with those described by Wilson in *When a Man Finds Himself*.
5. Define business integrity. How is it related to veracity?
6. From your experience in your home community, find instances of success based upon integrity. Find also instances of failure due to lack of integrity.
7. Many people, especially at the

present time, argue as follows: "He is rich, therefore he must be dishonest." What fallacy is involved in this inference? 8. To what extent should an employee carry out the will of an employer who is swindling the public?

THE ROOTS OF HONOR¹

JOHN RUSKIN

[John Ruskin (1819-1900), art critic and social reformer, was one of the great quickening and invigorating forces of the nineteenth century. The selection here given shows him as social reformer and is from his book entitled *Unto this Last*, in regard to which Ruskin said in his preface, "I believe them to be the best—that is to say, the truest, rightest-worded, and most serviceable—things I have ever written." In this book he advocated the application of Christian principles to the organization of labor, and condemned the accepted political economy of the day as self-seeking and unsound. His idea of political economy was that it was not an abstract science, but a "system of conduct founded on the sciences, and impossible, except under certain conditions of moral culture." He accordingly devoted his main energies in the latter part of his life to arousing the upper classes to a sense of their duties toward the poor, and helping the lower classes to realize their opportunities. To this end he wrote, gave his money and labored with his hands. While there have been wide differences of opinion about his theories of art and his views of political economy and social reform, his entire singleness of aim and his preëminence as a writer of English prose are beyond dispute.]

Among the delusions which at different periods have possessed themselves of the minds of large masses of the human race, perhaps the most curious—certainly the least creditable—is the modern *soi-disant* science of political economy, based on the idea that an advantageous code of social action may be determined irrespectively of the influence of social affection.

Of course, as in the instances of alchemy, astrology, witchcraft, and other such popular creeds, political economy has a plausible idea at the root of it. "The social affections," says the economist, "are accidental and disturbing elements in human nature; but avarice and the desire of progress are constant

¹ Reprinted from *Unto this Last*.

elements. Let us eliminate the inconstants, and, considering the human being merely as a covetous machine, examine by what laws of labor, purchase, and sale, the greatest accumulative result in wealth is attainable. Those laws once determined, it will be for each individual afterwards to introduce as much of the disturbing affectionate elements as he chooses, and to determine for himself the result on the new conditions supposed."

This would be a perfectly logical and successful method of analysis, if the accidentals afterwards to be introduced were of the same nature as the powers first examined. Supposing a body in motion to be influenced by constant and inconstant forces, it is usually the simplest way of examining its course to trace it first under the persistent conditions, and afterwards introduce the causes of variation. But the disturbing elements in the social problem are not of the same nature as the constant ones; they alter the essence of the creature under examination the moment they are added; they operate, not mathematically, but chemically, introducing conditions which render all our previous knowledge unavailable. We made learned experiments upon pure nitrogen, and have convinced ourselves that it is a very manageable gas: but behold! the thing which we have practically to deal with is its chloride; and this, the moment we touch it on our established principles, sends us and our apparatus through the ceiling.

Observe, I neither impugn nor doubt the conclusions of the science, if its terms are accepted. I am simply uninterested in them, as I should be in those of a science of gymnastics which assumed that men had no skeletons. It might be shown, on that supposition, that it would be advantageous to roll the students up into pellets, flatten them into cakes, or stretch them into cables; and that when these results were effected, the reinsertion of the skeleton would be attended with various inconveniences to their constitution. The reasoning might be admirable, the conclusions true, and the science deficient only in applicability. Modern political economy stands on a precisely similar basis. Assuming, not that the human being has no skeleton, but that it is all skeleton, it finds an ossifiant

theory of progress on this negation of a soul; and having shown the utmost that may be made of bones, and constructed a number of interesting geometrical figures with death's-heads and humeri, successfully proves the inconvenience of the reappearance of a soul among these corpuscular structures. I do not deny the truth of this theory: I simply deny its applicability to the present phase of the world.

This inapplicability has been curiously manifested during the embarrassment caused by the late strikes of our workmen. Here occurs one of the simplest cases, in a pertinent and positive form, of the first vital problem which political economy has to deal with (the relation between employer and employed); and at a severe crisis, when lives in multitudes, and wealth in masses, are at stake, the political economists are helpless—practically mute; no demonstrable solution of the difficulty can be given by them, such as may convince or calm the opposing parties. Obstinately the masters take one view of the matter; obstinately the operatives another; and no political science can set them at one.

It would be strange if it could, it being not by "science" of any kind that men were ever intended to be set at one. Disputant after disputant vainly strives to show that the interests of the masters are, or are not, antagonistic to those of the men: none of the pleaders ever seeming to remember that it does not absolutely or always follow that the persons must be antagonistic because their interests are. If there is only a crust of bread in the house, and mother and children are starving, their interests are not the same. If the mother eats it, the children want it; if the children eat it, the mother must go hungry to her work. Yet it does not necessarily follow that there will be "antagonism" between them, and they will fight for the crust, and that the mother, being strongest, will get it, and eat it. Neither, in any other case, whatever the relations of the persons may be, can it be assumed for certain that, because their interests are diverse, they must necessarily regard each other with hostility, and use violence or cunning to obtain the advantage.

Even if this were so, and it were as just as it is convenient to consider men as actuated by no other moral influences than those which affect rats or swine, the logical conditions of the question are still indeterminable. It can never be shown generally either that the interests of master and laborer are alike, or that they are opposed; for, according to circumstances, they may be either. It is, indeed, always the interest of both that the work should be rightly done, and a just price obtained for it; but, in the division of profits, the gain of the one may or may not be the loss of the other. It is not the master's interest to pay wages so low as to leave the men sickly and depressed, nor the workman's interest to be paid high wages if the smallness of the master's profit hinders him from enlarging his business, or conducting it in a safe and liberal way. A stoker ought not to desire high pay if the company is too poor to keep the engine-wheels in repair.

And the varieties of circumstance which influence these reciprocal interests are so endless, that all endeavor to deduce rules of action from balance of expediency is in vain. And it is meant to be in vain. For no human actions ever were intended by the Maker of men to be guided by balances of expediency, but by balances of justice. He has therefore rendered all endeavors to determine expediency futile for evermore. No man ever knew, or can know, what will be the ultimate result to himself, or to others, of any given line of conduct. But every man may know, and most of us do know, what is a just and an unjust act. And all of us may know also, that the consequences of justice will be ultimately the best possible, both to others and ourselves, though we can neither say what *is* best, nor how it is likely to come to pass.

I have said balances of justice, meaning, in the term justice, to include affection,—such affection as one man *owes* to another. All right relations between master and operative, and all their best interests, ultimately depend on these.

We shall find the best and simplest illustration of the relations of master and operative in the position of domestic servants.

We will suppose that the master of a household desires only

to get as much work out of his servants as he can, at the rate of wages he gives. He never allows them to be idle; feeds them as poorly and lodges them as ill as they will endure, and in all things pushes his requirements to the exact point beyond which he cannot go without forcing the servant to leave him. In doing this, there is no violation on his part of what is commonly called "justice." He agrees with the domestic for his whole time and service, and takes them;—the limits of hardship in treatment being fixed by the practice of other masters in his neighborhood; that is to say, by the current rate of wages for domestic labor. If the servant can get a better place, he is free to take one, and the master can only tell what is the real market value of his labor, by requiring as much as he will give.

This is a politico-economical view of the case, according to the doctors of that science; who assert that by this procedure the greatest average of work will be obtained from the servant, and, therefore, the greatest benefit to the community, and through the community, by reversion, to the servant himself.

That, however, is not so. It would be so if the servant were an engine of which the motive power was steam, magnetism, gravitation, or any other agent of calculable force. But he being, on the contrary, an engine whose motive power is a Soul, the force of this very peculiar agent, as an unknown quantity, enters into all the political economist's equations, without his knowledge, and falsifies every one of their results. The largest quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay, or under pressure, or by help of any kind of fuel which may be supplied by the chaldron. It will be done only when the motive force, that is to say, the will or spirit of the creature, is brought to its greatest strength by its own proper fuel; namely, by the affections.

It may indeed happen, and does happen often, that if the master is a man of sense and energy, a large quantity of material work may be done under mechanical pressure, enforced by strong will and guided by wise method; also it may happen, and does happen often, that if the master is indolent and weak

(however good-natured), a very small quantity of work, and that bad, may be produced by the servant's undirected strength, and contemptuous gratitude. But the universal law of the matter is that, assuming any given quantity of energy and sense in master and servant, the greatest material result obtainable by them will be, not through antagonism to each other, but through affection for each other; and that if the master, instead of endeavoring to get as much work as possible from the servant, seeks rather to render his appointed and necessary work beneficial to him, and to forward his interests in all just and wholesome ways, the real amount of work ultimately done, or of good rendered, by the person so cared for, will indeed be the greatest possible.

Observe, I say, "of good rendered," for a servant's work is not necessarily or always the best thing he can give his master. But good of all kinds, whether in material service, in protective watchfulness of his master's interest and credit, or in joyful readiness to seize unexpected and irregular occasions of help.

Nor is this one whit less generally true because indulgence will be frequently abused, and kindness met with ingratitude. For the servant who, gently treated, is ungrateful, treated ungenerously, will be revengeful; and the man who is dishonest to a liberal master will be injurious to an unjust one.

In any case, and with any person, this unselfish treatment will produce the most effective return. Observe, I am here considering the affections wholly as a motive power; not at all as things in themselves desirable or noble, or in any other way abstractedly good. I look at them simply as an anomalous force, rendering every one of the ordinary political economist's calculations nugatory; while, even if he desired to introduce this new element into his estimates, he has no power of dealing with it; for the affections only become a true motive power when they ignore every other motive and condition of political economy. Treat the servant kindly, with the idea of turning his gratitude to account, and you will get, as you deserve, no gratitude, nor any value for your kindness; but treat him kindly without any economical purpose, and all economical purposes will

be answered; in this, as in all other matters, whosoever will save his life shall lose it, whoso loses it shall find it.¹

The next clearest and simplest example of relation between master and operative is that which exists between the commander of a regiment and his men.

Supposing the officer only desires to apply the rules of discipline so as, with least trouble to himself, to make the regiment most effective, he will not be able, by any rules, or administration of rules, on this selfish principle, to develop the full strength of his subordinates. If a man of sense and firmness, he may, as in the former instance, produce a better result than would be obtained by the irregular kindness of a weak officer; but let the sense and firmness be the same in both cases, and assuredly the officer who has the most direct personal relations with his men, the most care for their interests, and the most value for their lives, will develop their effective strength, through their affection for his own person, and trust in his character, to a degree wholly unattainable by other means. The law applies still more stringently as the numbers concerned are larger; a charge may often be successful, though the men dislike their officers; a battle has rarely been won, unless they loved their general.

¹ The difference between the two modes of treatment, and between their effective material results, may be seen very accurately by a comparison of the relations of Esther and Charlie in *Bleak House*, with those of Miss Brass and the Marchioness in *Master Humphrey's Clock*.

The essential value and truth of Dickens's writings have been unwisely lost sight of by many thoughtful persons, merely because he presents his truth with some color of caricature. Unwisely, because Dickens's caricature, though often gross, is never mistaken. Allowing for his manner of telling them, the things he tells us are always true. I wish that he could think it right to limit his brilliant exaggeration to works written only for public amusement; and when he takes up a subject of high national importance, such as that which he handled in *Hard Times*, that he would use severer and more accurate analysis. The usefulness of that work (to my mind, in several respects, the greatest he has written) is with many persons seriously diminished because Mr. Bounderby is a dramatic monster, instead of a characteristic example of a worldly master; and Stephen Blackpool a dramatic perfection, instead of a characteristic example of an honest workman. But let us not lose the use of Dickens's width and insight, because he chooses to speak in a circle of stage fire. He is entirely right in his main drift and purpose in every book he has written; and all of them, but especially *Hard Times*, should be studied with close and earnest care by persons interested in social questions. They will find much that is partial, and, because partial, apparently unjust; but if they examine all the evidence on the other side, which Dickens seems to overlook, it will appear, after all their trouble, that his view was the finally right one, grossly and sharply told. [Author's note.]

Passing from these simple examples to the more complicated relations existing between a manufacturer and his workmen, we are met first by certain curious difficulties, resulting, apparently, from a harder and colder state of moral elements. It is easy to imagine an enthusiastic affection existing among soldiers for the colonel. Not so easy to imagine an enthusiastic affection among cotton-spinners for the proprietor of the mill. A body of men associated for purposes of robbery (as a Highland clan in ancient times) shall be animated by perfect affection, and every member of it be ready to lay down his life for the life of his chief. But a band of men associated for purposes of legal production and accumulation is usually animated, it appears, by no such emotions, and none of them are in anywise willing to give his life for the life of his chief. Not only are we met by this apparent anomaly, in moral matters, but by others connected with it, in administration of system. For a servant or a soldier is engaged at a definite rate of wages, for a definite period; but a workman at a rate of wages variable according to the demand for labor, and with the risk of being at any time thrown out of his situation by chances of trade. Now, as, under these contingencies, no action of the affections can take place, but only an explosive action of *disaffections*, two points offer themselves for consideration in the matter.

The first—How far the rate of wages may be so regulated as not to vary with the demand for labor.

The second—How far is it possible that bodies of workmen may be engaged and maintained at such fixed rate of wages (whatever the state of trade may be), without enlarging or diminishing their number, so as to give them permanent interest in the establishment with which they are connected, like that of the domestic servants in an old family, or an *esprit de corps*, like that of the soldiers in a crack regiment.

The first question is, I say, how far it may be possible to fix the rate of wages irrespectively of the demand for labor.

Perhaps one of the most curious facts in the history of human error is the denial by the common political economist of the possibility of thus regulating wages; while, for all the important,

and much of the unimportant, labor on the earth, wages are already so regulated.

We do not sell our prime-ministership by Dutch auction; nor, on the decease of a bishop, whatever may be the general advantages of simony, do we (yet) offer his diocese to the clergyman who will take the episcopacy at the lowest contract. We (with exquisite sagacity of political economy!) do indeed sell commissions, but not openly, generalships: sick, we do not inquire for a physician who takes less than a guinea; litigious, we never think of reducing six-and-eightpence to four-and-sixpence; caught in a shower, we do not canvass the cabmen, to find one who values his driving at less than sixpence a mile.

It is true that in all these cases there is, and in every conceivable case there must be, ultimate reference to the presumed difficulty of the work, or number of candidates for the office. If it were thought that the labor necessary to make a good physician would be gone through by a sufficient number of students with the prospect of only half-guinea fees, public consent would soon withdraw the unnecessary half-guinea. In this ultimate sense, the price of labor is indeed always regulated by the demand for it; but so far as the practical and immediate administration of the matter is regarded, the best labor always has been, and is, as *all* labor ought to be, paid by an invariable standard.

“What!” the reader, perhaps, answers amazedly: “pay good and bad workmen alike?”

Certainly. The difference between one prelate’s sermons and his successor’s,—or between one physician’s opinions and another’s,—is far greater, as respects the qualities of mind involved, and far more important in result to you personally, than the difference between good and bad laying of bricks (though that is greater than most people suppose). Yet you pay with equal fee, contentedly, the good and bad workmen upon your soul, and the good and bad workmen upon your body; much more may you pay, contentedly, with equal fees, the good and bad workmen upon your house.

“Nay, but I choose my physician and (?) my clergyman,

thus indicating my sense of the quality of their work." By all means, also, choose your bricklayer; that is the proper reward of the good workman, to be "chosen." The natural and right system respecting all labor is, that it should be paid at a fixed rate, but the good workman employed, and the bad workman unemployed. The false, unnatural, and destructive system is when the bad workman is allowed to offer his work at half-price, and either take the place of the good, or force him by his competition to work for an inadequate sum.

This equality of wages, then, being the first object toward which we have to discover the directest available road; the second is, as above stated, that of maintaining constant numbers of workmen in employment, whatever may be the accidental demand for the article they produce.

I believe the sudden and extensive inequalities of demand which necessarily arise in the mercantile operations of an active nation, constitute the only essential difficulty which has to be overcome in a just organization of labor. The subject opens into too many branches to admit of being investigated in a paper of this kind; but the following general facts bearing on it may be noted.

The wages which enable any workman to live are necessarily higher, if his work is liable to intermission, than if it is assured and continuous; and however severe the struggle for work may become, the general law will always hold, that men must get more daily pay if, on the average, they can only calculate on work three days a week, than they would require if they were sure of work six days a week. Supposing that a man cannot live on less than a shilling a day, his seven shillings he must get, either for three days' violent work, or six days' deliberate work. The tendency of all modern mercantile operations is to throw both wages and trade into the form of a lottery, and to make the workman's pay depend on intermittent exertion, and the principal's profit on dexterously used chance.

In what partial degree, I repeat, this may be necessary, in consequence of the activities of modern trade, I do not here investigate; contenting myself with the fact, that in its fatalest

aspects it is assuredly unnecessary, and results merely from love of gambling on the part of the masters, and from ignorance and sensuality in the men. The masters cannot bear to let any opportunity of gain escape them, and frantically rush at every gap and breach in the walls of Fortune, raging to be rich, and affronting, with impatient covetousness, every risk of ruin; while the men prefer three days of violent labor, and three days of drunkenness, to six days of moderate work and wise rest. There is no way in which a principal, who really desires to help his workmen, may do it more effectually than by checking these disorderly habits both in himself and them; keeping his own business operations on a scale which will enable him to pursue them securely, not yielding to temptations of precarious gain; and, at the same time, leading his workmen into regular habits of labor and life, either by inducing them rather to take low wages in the form of a fixed salary, than high wages, subject to the chance of their being thrown out of work; or, if this be impossible, by discouraging the system of violent exertion for nominally high day wages, and leading the men to take lower pay for more regular labor.

In effecting any radical changes of this kind, doubtless there would be great inconvenience and loss incurred by all the originators of movement. That which can be done with perfect convenience and without loss, is not always the thing that most needs to be done, or which we are most imperatively required to do.

I have already alluded to the difference hitherto existing between regiments of men associated for purposes of violence, and for purposes of manufacture; in that the former appear capable of self-sacrifice—the latter, not; which singular fact is the real reason of the general lowness of estimate in which the profession of commerce is held, as compared with that of arms. Philosophically, it does not, at first sight, appear reasonable (many writers have endeavored to prove it unreasonable) that a peaceable and rational person, whose trade is buying and selling, should be held in less honor than an unpeaceable and often irrational person, whose trade is slaying. Nevertheless,

the consent of mankind has always, in spite of the philosophers, given precedence to the soldier.

And this is right.

For the soldier's trade, verily and essentially, is not slaying, but being slain. This, without well knowing its own meaning, the world honors it for. A bravo's trade is slaying; but the world has never respected bravos more than merchants: the reason it honors the soldier is, because he holds his life at the service of the State. Reckless he may be—fond of pleasure or of adventure—all kinds of bye-motives and mean impulses may have determined the choice of his profession, and may affect (to all appearance exclusively) his daily conduct in it; but our estimate of him is based on this ultimate fact—of which we are well assured—that, put him in a fortress breach, with all the pleasures of the world behind him, and only death and his duty in front of him, he will keep his face to the front; and he knows that this choice may be put to him at any moment, and has beforehand taken his part—virtually takes such part continually—does, in reality, die daily.

Not less is the respect we pay to the lawyer and physician, founded ultimately on their self-sacrifice. Whatever the learning or acuteness of a great lawyer, our chief respect for him depends on our belief that, set in a judge's seat, he will strive to judge justly, come of it what may. Could we suppose that he would take bribes, and use his acuteness and legal knowledge to give plausibility to iniquitous decisions, no degree of intellect would win for him our respect. Nothing will win it, short of our tacit conviction, that in all important acts of his life justice is first with him; his own interest, second.

In the case of a physician, the ground of the honor we render him is clearer still. Whatever his science, we should shrink from him in horror if we found him regard his patients merely as subjects to experiment upon; much more, if we found that, receiving bribes from persons interested in their deaths, he was using his best skill to give poison in the mask of medicine.

Finally, the principle holds with utmost clearness as it respects clergymen. No goodness of disposition will excuse want of

science in a physician or of shrewdness in an advocate; but a clergyman, even though his power of intellect be small, is respected on the presumed ground of his unselfishness and serviceableness.

Now there can be no question but that the tact, foresight, decision, and other mental powers, required for the successful management of a large mercantile concern, if not such as could be compared with those of a great lawyer, general, or divine, would at least match the general conditions of mind required in the subordinate officers of a ship, or of a regiment, or in the curate of a country parish. If, therefore, all the efficient members of the so-called liberal professions are still, somehow, in public estimate of honor, preferred before the head of a commercial firm, the reason must lie deeper than in the measurement of their several powers of mind.

And the essential reason for such preference will be found to lie in the fact that the merchant is presumed to act always selfishly. His work may be very necessary to the community; but the motive of it is understood to be wholly personal. The merchant's first object in all his dealings must be (the public believe) to get as much for himself, and leave as little to his neighbor (or customer) as possible. Enforcing this upon him, by political statute, as the necessary principle of his action; recommending it to him on all occasions, and themselves reciprocally adopting it; proclaiming vociferously, for law of the universe, that a buyer's function is to cheapen, and the seller's to cheat,—the public, nevertheless, involuntarily condemn the man of commerce for his compliance with their own statement, and stamp him forever as belonging to an inferior grade of human personality.

This they will find, eventually, they must give up doing. They must not cease to condemn selfishness; but they will have to discover a kind of commerce which is not exclusively selfish. Or, rather, they will have to discover that there never was, or can be, any other kind of commerce; that this which they have called commerce was not commerce at all, but cozening; and that a true merchant differs as much from a merchant according

to laws of modern political economy, as the hero of the "Excursion" from Autolycus. They will find that commerce is an occupation which gentlemen will every day see more need to engage in, rather than in the business of talking to men, or slaying them: that, in true commerce, as in true preaching, or true fighting, it is necessary to admit the idea of occasional voluntary loss;—that sixpences have to be lost, as well as lives, under a sense of duty; that the market may have its martyrdoms as well as the pulpit; and trade its heroisms, as well as war.

May have—in the final issue, must have—and only has not had yet, because men of heroic temper have always been misguided in their youth into other fields, not recognizing what is in our days, perhaps, the most important of all fields; so that, while many a zealous person loses his life in trying to teach the form of a gospel, very few will lose a hundred pounds in showing the practice of one.

The fact is, that people never have had clearly explained to them the true functions of a merchant with respect to other people. I should like the reader to be very clear about this.

Five great intellectual professions, relating to daily necessities of life, have hitherto existed—three exist necessarily, in every civilized nation:

The Soldier's profession is to *defend* it.

The Pastor's, to *teach* it.

The Physician's, to *keep it in health*.

The Lawyer's, to *enforce justice* in it.

The Merchant's, to *provide* for it.

And the duty of all these men is, on due occasion, to *die* for it.

"On due occasion," namely:

The Soldier, rather than leave his post in battle.

The Physician, rather than leave his post in plague.

The Pastor, rather than teach Falsehood.

The Lawyer, rather than countenance Injustice.

The Merchant—What is *his* "due occasion" of death?

It is the main question for the merchant, as for all of us. For, truly, the man who does not know when to die, does not know how to live.

Observe the merchant's function (or manufacturer's, for in the broad sense in which it is here used the word must be understood to include both) is to provide for the nation. It is no more his function to get profit for himself out of that provision than it is a clergyman's function to get his stipend. The stipend is a due and necessary adjunct, but not the object, of his life, if he be a true clergyman, any more than his fee (or *honorarium*) is the object of life to a true physician. Neither is his fee the object of life to a true merchant. All three, if true men, have a work to be done irrespective of fee—to be done even at any cost, or for quite the contrary of fee; the pastor's function being to teach, the physician's to heal, and the merchant's, as I have said, to provide. That is to say, he has to understand to their very root the qualities of the thing he deals in, and the means of obtaining or producing it; and he has to apply all his sagacity and energy to the producing or obtaining it in perfect state, and distributing it at the cheapest possible price where it is most needed.

And because the production or obtaining of any commodity involves necessarily the agency of many lives and hands, the merchant becomes in the course of his business the master and governor of large masses of men in a more direct, though less confessed way, than a military officer or pastor; so that on him falls, in great part, the responsibility for the kind of life they lead: and it becomes his duty, not only to be always considering how to produce what he sells in the purest and cheapest forms, but how to make the various employments involved in the production, or transference of it, most beneficial to the men employed.

And as into these two functions, requiring for their right exercise the highest intelligence, as well as patience, kindness, and tact, the merchant is bound to put all his energy, so for their just discharge he is bound, as soldier or physician is bound, to give up, if need be, his life, in such way as it may be demanded of him. Two main points he has in his providing function to maintain: first, his engagements (faithfulness to engagements being the real root of all possibilities in commerce); and, second-

ly, the perfectness and purity of the thing provided; so that, rather than fail in any engagement, or consent to any deterioration, adulteration, or unjust and exorbitant price of that which he provides, he is bound to meet fearlessly any form of distress, poverty, or labor, which may, through maintenance of these points, come upon him.

Again: in his office as governor of the men employed by him, the merchant or manufacturer is invested with a distinctly paternal authority and responsibility. In most cases, a youth entering a commercial establishment is withdrawn altogether from home influence; his master must become his father, else he has, for practical and constant help, no father at hand: in all cases the master's authority, together with the general tone and atmosphere of his business, and the character of the men with whom the youth is compelled in the course of it to associate, have more immediate and pressing weight than the home influence, and will usually neutralize it either for good or evil; so that the only means which the master has of doing justice to the men employed by him is to ask himself sternly whether he is dealing with such subordinate as he would with his own son, if compelled by circumstances to take such a position.

Supposing the captain of a frigate saw it right, or were by any chance obliged, to place his own son in the position of a common sailor; as he would then treat his son, he is bound always to treat every one of the men under him. So, also, supposing the master of a manufactory saw it right, or were by any chance obliged, to place his own son in the position of an ordinary workman; as he would then treat his son, he is bound always to treat every one of his men. This is the only effective, true, or practical *RULE* which can be given on this point of political economy.

And as the captain of a ship is bound to be the last man to leave his ship in case of wreck, and to share his last crust with the sailors in case of famine, so the manufacturer, in any commercial crisis or distress, is bound to take the suffering of it with his men, and even to take more of it for himself than he

allows his men to feel; as a father would in a famine, shipwreck, or battle, sacrifice himself for his son.

All which sounds very strange: the only real strangeness in the matter being, nevertheless, that it should so sound. For all this is true, and that not partially nor theoretically, but everlastingly and practically: all other doctrine than this respecting matters political being false in premises, absurd in deduction, and impossible in practice, consistently with any progressive state of national life; all the life which we now possess as a nation showing itself in the resolute denial and scorn, by a few strong minds and faithful hearts, of the economic principles taught to our multitudes, which principles, so far as accepted, lead straight to national destruction. Respecting the modes and forms of destruction to which they lead, and, on the other hand, respecting the farther practical working of true polity, I hope to reason further in a following paper.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. Has modern industry banished the personal relation between employer and employee?
2. What has been your observation in regard to the usual attitude on the part of the employee? Is it, How much wages can I get for how little work? What ought to be the true attitude?
3. What has the employee a right to expect from a good employer?
4. How can fair wages be determined?
5. What opportunity for usefulness does the position of employer offer?
6. What is the true ideal of professional honor?
7. What are the temptations of the different professions?
8. Is it possible to do business under modern condition and observe the golden rule?
9. Ought the same ideals of service to dominate in running a factory or a store or serving an employer which are expected of the minister or the physician or the teacher?
10. Is there any valid reason why willingness to serve for the sake of those served should be required only of members of the professions?

THE POLITICAL DUTIES OF THE CITIZEN¹

ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY

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In the early days of the republic it was expected that every citizen would devote a part of his time to political life. To the man who was desirous of amusement politics supplied an attractive game. To him who was anxious to do public service it furnished the best, and often the only available channel. To him who was ambitious for tangible success it offered the highest reward.

But as time has gone on this incidental or occasional practice of politics has become very difficult. A man cannot successfully go into public life in this indiscriminate way. We have grown older as a nation, and with increased age has come increased specialization of employment. In a boys' school everybody can spend an hour a day at baseball, and play it well enough for all practical purposes. Twenty years later a few of the graduates of that school will have gone into professional baseball, and will be giving all their time to it; the rest will not be playing it at all. The conditions which govern the practice of politics are different in many ways from what they were a hundred years ago. At that time public office furnished almost the only reward of ambition; now there are a great many other rewards, both commercial and professional. At that time the public-spirited man found no recognized channels of service except those that he followed by going into politics; now there are opportunities of service on relief boards,

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and school boards, and a thousand other kinds of boards, which have little or no connection with our political organization. At that time our communities were so small that each man was pretty well known to his neighbors, so that if he ran for office, they understood whom they were voting for; now he has to spend so much effort telling them about himself in order to stand any chance of getting nominated or elected that what was once an amusement for the intervals of his professional activity has become a most serious matter of business.

I still think that every American citizen ought to assume political responsibilities. But as I look at the matter, there are at least four different ways in which this can be done; and the obligations which go with these different ways of fulfilling civic duty are themselves widely different. One man may desire to go into politics as a most important part of the business of his life, with the hope of receiving elective offices and attaining a dominant position in the counsels of his party. Another may strive to influence the conduct of our public affairs indirectly, by his activity in behalf of civil service reform and other measures calculated to promote better government. A third may reserve his political activity for special emergencies, when some grave crisis, national or local, justifies him in an exceptional expenditure of time and strength. A fourth may content himself with that general influence on the conduct of political affairs which is exercised by every citizen who forms his moral judgment independently and expresses it fearlessly. One of these four modes of political influence each citizen should undertake to exercise; and, having undertaken it, he should adopt the methods and ideas necessary for serving the community in this chosen way. Of course they are not mutually exclusive. A man who has belonged to one of these classes may suddenly find himself transplanted into another, almost without his own knowledge. Some grave crisis may cause the people to select political leaders on account of proved business ability, or on account of the fearlessness which they have displayed in some emergency, rather than through the ordinary channels of party influence. But in a general way the four lines of activ-

ity that I have named are tolerably well distinguished from one another.

Let us take the duties of these different classes in order. First, what are the conditions that surround the man who thinks of going into politics as a profession?

To begin with, he must be prepared to take it as seriously as he would take any other profession he might choose. He must accept it as a continuous activity. He must have the necessary time for so doing. He must be willing to bear the disagreeable features incident to the work. People are not going to nominate and elect men without knowing for what they stand, and it takes time to show for what a candidate does stand. A great many people talk as though the only thing that a man needed to do in order to convince people of his character was to make them a speech. This is not true. Speeches do not attract as many votes as is commonly supposed, because the people shrewdly suspect that a man may not always be telling the truth. He may not be what he says he is. They want to vote for a person who feels as they feel; and unless a man has certain very peculiar qualities of personal magnetism, his speeches give very little impression about his real feelings. Through newspaper articles a man can reach the voters a little better than through speeches, because the constant reader of a newspaper keeps hearing the same thing day after day until it comes to dominate his thoughts and emotions. But even the most adroitly managed newspaper is a very uncertain means of getting votes. I suppose that the conduct of the *New York Journal* in the last campaign represented the maximum of effort in this line; and the effect of the *Journal* in getting votes for Mr. Hearst was on the whole a disappointment to those who had the matter in charge. Personal contact of man with man is what attracts votes and gets offices.

But no man in national politics, or even in state politics, can get into personal contact with more than a very small proportion of the voters whom he wishes to influence. Here is where the great importance of the party machinery comes in. The party is a sort of hierarchy, where each of the rank and file

is looked after by the local leader; and the local leaders in turn are influenced by leaders of higher grade, until you come to the great central committee which dominates the whole. This is, I think, a characteristic which all efficient American party organizations have in common. There are different ways of looking after men, which range all the way in merit from education to corruption. But the element of personal contact is present in every case where anything effective gets done. It is customary to talk as though these party machines furnished opportunities to the bad man only. I am inclined to think that they furnish equal opportunities to the good man, provided he is one who is ready to get acquainted with people and find out what they actually want: one who does not regard this sort of personal contact as a derogation to his dignity. Of course he will find corrupt men in the party councils, as he will in every other walk of life. He will find systems of ethics which are always crude, and standards of morals which are sometimes low. So he will in law or in medicine, or even in theology. A man who is squeamish about associates should not go into politics, any more than a man who is squeamish about dogmas should go into the Church, or than a man who is squeamish about bargaining should go into certain lines of business. But if his natural tastes fit him for political life, he will find himself morally about as well off here as he could be anywhere else. He will have a fair chance to fight for his convictions, and an opportunity to make all his powers tell most effectively. If a man can acquire weight in the councils of a political party it is an invaluable asset, not only for him personally, but for the cause of good government in general.

It is an asset which should not be lightly thrown away. The man who is in politics professionally has a right, and even a duty, to sacrifice much in order to preserve his influence with the party organization. Some people talk as though it were just as easy for a political leader to be independent as it is for the simple voter. They think that, with slight differences, what is good ethics for the voter is good ethics for the politician. With this judgment I cannot concur. The ordinary voter, by

making himself independent of party, compels the different parties to bid for his vote, and he does not forfeit any means of influence which he previously possessed. The utmost that he can lose will be the right to go to the caucus of the party that he has abandoned. But the politician who breaks with his party throws aside a power of reaching men and persuading them which control of party machinery gives, without acquiring any similar influence in the other party. In fact, any such defection on his part may lessen the strength of the better element in the organization opposed to him. It may be that the presence of a good man in the republican machine will strengthen the hands of the good men in the democratic machine, by compelling the democratic party leaders to adopt a higher standard of conduct than they would otherwise have done. It is not his chance of office alone, but his chance of influencing his associates and setting a mark for his opponents, that the politician throws aside when he deserts his party. Therefore, if a man's record shows that he has been honestly anxious to do public service, I am very slow to criticise him for standing by his organization through a good deal that is rather bad.

But if he is to retain his self-respect and the respect of his associates, the possibility of doing public good must be clearly the dominant motive. This is why certain classes of people have to keep out of politics as a business. Members of the civil service, for instance. A man who is employed by the people at a salary, for non-political work, will if he goes into politics always be under considerable suspicion as to his motives. Nor can a man safely make politics his occupation unless he has some independent means of support to fall back upon, if he has to break with his party. He has no right to put himself in a position where he may have to choose between starvation for his family or disservice to his country. I do not mean that every man who goes into politics ought to be independently rich (though the independently rich man does have certain very great advantages in leading a fight for clean politics); but that in default of wealth he ought to have had such training

in law or journalism, or some other profession which he can readily assume, as to give him a tangible alternative to fall back upon if political preferment may only be had at the sacrifice of his honor. Otherwise neither he nor those about him can be sure that the public motive is really the dominant one when he stands by the party. If he has not this advantage, and yet is anxious to do all the political service he can, he is far better off in our second group than in the first.

This second group consists of those who aim to promote good government, not by taking political office themselves, but by insuring the passage and enforcement of measures that will raise the general character of our politics as a whole. Any man who undertakes this has plenty of hard work before him; but he does not need to abandon his regular profession, nor to identify himself very closely with any one party. If he can suggest a law which seems likely to produce better government, he does not have to have party backing in order to get a hearing. Reform measures often find support in very surprising quarters. Many a politician who himself uses bad methods will encourage the passage, and even the enforcement, of laws to prevent the use of those methods in the future. The reason for this paradox is not hard to find. Almost every man who goes into politics is anxious to leave behind him as good a record as he can. As he gets higher and higher up, he sees that the things that he has used to help himself are regarded by many people as hurtful to the country. He does not feel strong enough to dispense with these means, while his opponents in the party or outside of it continue to use them, because it would cost him a continuance of his power. But he often believes that the passage of a general law which takes that means out of his hands and his opponents' alike will leave him a good chance to retain power and at the same time identify him and his party with an important measure of public service. I do not mean that all politicians will think or act in this way; but there will be enough of them who think and act in this way to give unexpected help to the advocate of clean politics.

The laws of this kind which we ought to have can be divided

into three classes: laws to prevent corruption, laws to fix responsibility, and laws to promote independent voting.

In the first class the best example is the civil service law. Many who read these words can remember a time when nearly the whole salary list of the government was regarded as the prey of spoilsmen in the game of politics. The efforts of disinterested men, of different parties, and some of them without definite party affiliations of any kind, made people see that this system was bad both for the efficiency of the public service and for the cleanness of political life as a whole. Another set of laws to take away the chance for corruption, not so old nor so well worked out as the civil service law but accepted in principle by most of our states, is exemplified by the secret ballot acts, which make it unsafe for a man to buy votes because he never can be quite sure that the goods will be delivered. There are other statutory means of preventing corruption, like laws providing for the publicity of campaign accounts, which have hardly passed beyond the experimental stage.

Of laws to fix responsibility, the best examples are seen in some of our newer city charters. Under the old system, where a mayor was surrounded by a board of aldermen which had large veto powers and large rights in sanctioning appointments to municipal office, no one could ever tell who was to blame for waste and inefficiency. The mayor could not give a good government if he tried, and therefore could not be held responsible if his government was bad. The aldermen considered themselves accountable only to their supporters and friends in their several districts; and if the interest of the whole community suffered, they disclaimed responsibility for the general result. By giving independent powers to one man, so that he could be praised for good work and blamed for bad work, it was found not that he abused his powers, but that he sought the credit which resulted from exercising them as well as he knew how. I do not mean that we have yet found the ideal form of city charter. A great deal of public spirit and disinterested service on the part of the citizens is requisite in order to run an American city under any charter, however good. But we have

in many places removed the worst features of a system that prevailed thirty years ago, which put a positive premium on corruption and prevented anybody, however good or disinterested, from rendering the service which he wanted to.

A law separating the time of local and national elections is a good example of the kind of measure which will promote independent voting. In municipal affairs, except perhaps in cities of the very largest size, there is not the same need of parties that there is in national affairs. Each citizen is interested to have the city's business well done; each citizen ought to know tolerably well the business capacity and character of men who are prominent enough to become candidates for municipal office. But if the municipal election is placed at the same time as the national election, the inevitable tendency is to make nominations a party matter and to let the man's vote for municipal candidates be a good deal influenced by his preferences on the national ticket. If the local election can be put at an entirely different time from the national one, the chance for an independent ticket is infinitely greater; and if in addition we can devise what is known as a direct primary law, in which every voter belonging to a given party shall have a fair and equal chance to say who shall be nominated, instead of being compelled to work through a system of caucuses which gives every advantage to the professional politician, we increase the probability of getting businesslike nominations from the parties themselves. The problem of direct primaries is not one which has been fully worked out; and I may perhaps be unduly prejudiced in favor of the reform because I happen to have seen especially good instances of its operation. But I do not know any field of effort which is more promising for a man who wants to do political service, and who has not the time or inclination to go into politics, than the development of the direct primary, or of some similar means which will give the average voter the best chance of expressing his views before the nomination.

It has been found much harder to separate state issues from national ones. The state is so large that people cannot

know a man's probable fitness to be governor as they can know his probable fitness to be mayor. But I believe that we ought to try to do for our states what we have done for our cities, by removing all artificial attempts to tie local and national issues together. This is why I favor direct election of United States senators by the people. It is not because we send specially bad men to Washington under the present system. It is not because of the effect of the present system on the character and composition of the senate. It is because of the effect of the present system on the character and composition of the state legislatures. A man is sent to the state capital to make some laws for the people of his state; and he finds that his first duty—in some sessions almost his only duty—is to elect a United States senator. A more direct means of preventing the elector from getting the kind of local laws which he wants could not possibly be devised. He is in a large number of cases compelled to vote either for a representative who will make the kind of laws he wants for the state but will send the wrong man to the United States Senate, or for one who will make the kind of laws he does not want for the state but will send the right man to the United States Senate. He generally chooses the latter; and that is one of the reasons why the politics of many of our states are so bad. People are not allowed to elect state officers on the basis of state issues.

It is hardly worth while to multiply instances of statutory changes which would promote cleaner politics. While we cannot make men good by Act of Congress or General Assembly, we can make it either a great deal easier or a great deal harder for a good man to do what he wants. The man who succeeds in making it easier does just as much public service and has just as honorable a political career as if he had himself taken office or been identified with the actual government of the country. And of equal importance with the work of the man who secures the passage of new laws of the right sort is that of the man who helps systematically toward the better enforcement and more intelligent administration of the laws which we have already. The work of a man like Judge Lindsey in the Juvenile Court of

Denver is in no sense political; but it would be hard to find any one in the whole country whose professional career has had more to do with the improvement of politics and of government than has Judge Lindsey through the effects, direct and indirect, of his Juvenile Court.

The duty of the third class that I have named—the men who feel that they can take up politics only in grave emergencies—requires very little comment. A nation, like an army, needs a strong reserve; and if a man cannot be in the front rank all the time, he does good work by accomplishing all he can when the reserves are called out. A man in such a position has this special advantage, that, not being bound by party affiliations, he is freer to make his choice, and to let people see that it is an unbiassed choice, in times when party lines have broken up. For leadership in a tremendous uprising of the whole people, it is sometimes an advantage not to have been habitually regarded as the representative of a particular party. And even when such a leader is turned out of office, as he is likely to be before very long, he can have the satisfaction of thinking that he has left behind him a larger sum of permanent results that his followers in the first flush of their disappointment are willing to see. No city which has become thoroughly reformed, even for a brief time, ever gets back to practices quite as bad as whose which it once had. The forces that overthrew Tweed in New York had a comparatively brief period of success; but no body of New York officeholders has ever again dared to do the things that Tweed and his friends did, or anything like them. The reformers who obtained control of many of our cities a year or two ago are inclined to be discouraged at the reaction which seems to be taking the fruits of victory out of their hands. But that reaction, at its worst, is not likely to carry people back to the point where they were when the reform movement started.

We are in perpetual danger of overestimating the power of a great moral uprising to change the face of our politics, and of being unduly disappointed because these impossible hopes do not turn out realities. It seems to most people as if a great

wave of public sentiment, which unites the good and even the indifferently good of all classes and parties, ought of itself to establish a permanent government too strong to be overthrown by politicians. It seems as though the public interests in favor of such a movement were so large, and the private interests opposed to it so small, that the contest between the two could be left to take care of itself. But we all know the comment of the man who, when he was told that God was stronger than the devil, objected that the devil made up for his inferior strength by his superior activity. We can hardly expect the leaders of a reform movement, who go into the work at the sacrifice of their regular business, to maintain year after year the continued activity which is characteristic of the successful politician. Still less can we expect it of their followers. A thousand details which an organized party machine would look after are left unheeded. Want of attention to these details alienates some supporters of the movement, and sets others at cross purposes. The underlying principles on which the reformers started remain as important as ever; but the mismanagement of the details distracts attention from these principles until people are willing to sacrifice some of them for the sake of having the government more smoothly run. "Will he not fail me in a great moral crisis?" asks the heroine in a recent story of her married sister, who is urging her to accept a match which seems somewhat advantageous. And the reply is, "I cannot say; but he has good manners at his meals. I do not think we have ever had a great moral crisis in our family; and you have to eat meals three times a day." There always will be some idealists in politics to whom the possibility of a great moral crisis is more important than the meals three times a day. These men are to be encouraged. We are never likely to have too many of them. But they will not generally get elected to office. Most of the time their work will be that of critics. Only in emergencies will they be called upon for constructive leadership; but what they can do then makes up for all their disappointments and failures at other times.

There is apt to be a misunderstanding, and a most unwise

misunderstanding, between the emergency worker and the man regularly connected with politics. The former regards the latter as hidebound. The latter regards the former as unpractical. But each is necessary in the fight for clean politics; and I may add that each is necessary for the usefulness of the other. A friend of mine said to me, not so very long ago: "I know President Roosevelt so well that I can tell him the truth; and I say to him, 'The trouble with you is that you are narrow-minded. You don't like the *New York Evening Post*. You don't see that the *Evening Post* is necessary to make people accept you as the less of two evils.'"

And now we come to our fourth group, which after all must be the largest influence in the politics of the country—the people who do not aspire to leadership, regular or even occasional, but whose votes and opinions and moral judgments make the country what it is. What obligation should be emphasized in their code of political ethics? What can they do for good public morals?

First, they can vote independently. The reasons which prevent the politician from always speaking his mind on a doubtful issue do not apply in the case of the ordinary citizen. He is bound by no set of obligations to the party with which he may have been associated. He has no highly organized influence, built up through a series of years, which he casts aside by breaking over party lines. I do not mean that the voter should try to defeat a party with whose aims he is in general sympathy, merely because of one man whom he dislikes or one measure which he disapproves. He must consider carefully the arguments which can be urged on both sides. But having taken those arguments into consideration, he ought to be guided by his reason and not by his inertia. Parties are likely to be so nearly even in numbers that many elections will be decided by two comparatively small groups of men: the corrupt and the intelligent. If the intelligent men stand by their party instead of voting independently, it will be more desirable for the party leaders to appeal to the corrupt vote by lowering the standards of their platforms and promises

than to appeal to the intelligent vote by raising the standard of those platforms and promises. But if the intelligent men are also independent, the chances are that it will be more necessary to bid for the intelligent vote than for the corrupt vote. The leaders will have every incentive to do better instead of doing worse. The man who, having sense enough, to find out what is right, does not take the trouble to do it, or does not have the courage to act on his convictions, is throwing away an influence which is absolutely necessary for the promotion of good politics.

But the American citizen has a yet broader duty than this. It is not enough to vote rightly on certain specific issues, or to enforce right ideas on certain specific questions of politics and morals. We must get our minds themselves into a judicial attitude. Under the American Constitution the people of our country are encouraged to judge of facts, to take charge of the enforcement of the law, and to select leaders of the kind that they admire. The final test of our ability as a nation rests on the power of our people to judge of evidence quietly; to accept the operations of law, even when it works to their own hurt; to get ideals of success of the kind that will preserve the nation instead of those which will destroy it. Every man who publishes a newspaper which appeals to the emotions rather than to the intelligence of its readers, and to a less extent every man who lightly believes the statements that he finds in such a newspaper, attacks our political life at a most vulnerable point. Every man, whether a member of the majority or of the minority, who regards the law as an enactment to promote one set of private institutions at the expense of another, or who coöperates in the passage and administration of laws in this spirit, makes himself responsible for the dangers of growing contempt of law. Every man who admires a public officer for success in serving himself rather than for success in serving others—who respects the man for getting the office rather than for deserving the office—shows himself to that extent unfit to be a member of a self-governing nation, and by influence and example diminishes the capacity of the nation as a whole for self-government. These are the fundamental points of political

ethics—these the fundamental issues in all questions of public morals.

For the great political question before us is not whether this or that party shall be kept in power, or whether one law or another shall be passed. The question is rather whether our present system of government shall stand. The history of the world shows that freedom is a very precarious possession, which a nation cannot continue to enjoy for many centuries unless it uses it with exceptional wisdom. If people will employ liberty as a means of substituting self-control for external control, they can continue to have it. If they try to make it a pretext for getting rid of all control except that which is furnished by their own desires and whims and wishes, it is taken away by force of circumstances. The Athenian democracy, when it was composed of men trained in the habits of self-command, furnished a magnificent instance of what freedom can do in government and in morals, in art and in literature. But the children and grandchildren of the men who made Athens great could not endure the discipline which their fathers voluntarily accepted. By defiance of the law and by the pursuit of individual selfishness they brought the state to its fall. The Roman freedom lasted longer than the Athenian, because the Romans had been trained in a sterner discipline, and had a respect for law which stood them in good stead for generations. But when freedom became a pretext for selfishness, Rome in its turn fell, first under the tyranny of the emperors, and later under the yoke of the barbarian.

I am no pessimist. I do not see anything which warrants the fear that we shall repeat in the near future the experience of Athens or Rome—unless it be the mistaken complacency of those optimists who think that we can repeat the mistakes of Athens and Rome without incurring the penalties. But the danger is great enough to make it worth while to impress upon every citizen the duty of inculcating respect for law, even when that law hurts him. It is the underlying spirit of philosophical selfishness which is the chief element of danger—the theory that if each man does what he really wants to do, things will

all go well. Every nation that has accepted this philosophy has begun to ride to its own destruction. I do not know what is the solution of the divorce problem. I wish I did. But I do know that the worst thing about divorce at present is that so many people regard marriage as a thing to be made and unmade for purely selfish reasons; and when this conception fully takes root, the days of a nation are numbered. I do not know what is the means of doing away with lynch law. I wish I did. But I do know that the most serious aspect of all the lynchings of which we hear, North or South, is the evidence of weakened authority of legal procedure, when brought face to face with the preconceptions and passions of the crowd. When any nation looks upon law as a thing which the individual may use when it suits him and evade or defy when it does not suit him, that nation is losing the main bulwarks of social order. To any man, whatever his position in the state, it has become the paramount political duty to defend the sacredness of law, not only against the active assaults which threaten to overthrow it, but against the more subtle and dangerous attacks of a selfish philosophy which works to undermine it. He must regard, and must persuade others to regard, liberty and the privileges which go with it as trusts to be used only in the public interest, and in behalf of the nation as a whole.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND PRACTICE IN WRITING

1. What do you understand to be your duty as a citizen with respect to government, local, state, and national?
2. "To be indifferent to the evils in the body politic is only one remove from being indifferent to the sins in one's own life." Discuss.
3. Why should much be expected of the college graduate in the political life of the nation?
4. How are you informing yourself of the public questions and problems of the day, local and general.
5. Name some of the urgent political and social questions that must be settled by legislation and concerning which you should be informed?
6. Select one of these questions and inform yourself upon it. Make an oral or written report about it.

APPENDICES

LIST OF ESSAY SUBJECTS

As a further aid in passing from the reading and discussion of the selections given in the body of this book to the writing of compositions in connection with them, the following list of essay subjects is included. It gives some titles which have been well handled in the past and which may prove available or may suggest other subjects. In assigning these subjects, the objects were to stimulate the student's thinking, to encourage his independent judgment, and occasionally to lead him away into a field of interesting research. As far as possible, application of a topic should be made to the student's personal experience or to the individual college.

Some instructors might prefer to have all the selections of a division of this book read before the composition writing is done. In this case, this list will afford a convenient means of finding subjects. Instructors who prefer to have the writing follow each selection will find that the groupings of subjects indicated by the Roman numerals will afford a ready guide to their connection with the selections, in a given division of the book. The last group of essay subjects under each division, however, is more general in character and does not relate to any specific selection.

PURPOSE OF THE COLLEGE

I. What I Hope to Get from College. Motives for Going to College. Recent Critics of Our Colleges. The Requisites for Success in College. The Average Man's Estimate of the Value of College Education. What is a College? What is a University?

II. Newman's Idea of Liberal Knowledge. Newman's Ideals and the Education of the Twentieth Century. Is Over-education Possible?

III. The Distinction between Cultural and Other Studies. The Liberal College distinguished from Professional and Technical Institutions. Ought the College Course to be Shortened? College before Business or Not? Should a Liberal Education Precede the Professional Course?

IV. Why our Ideals of Culture are Changing. Matthew Arnold's Ideal of Culture Compared with President Eliot's. Some Famous Definitions of Culture. Vocational Aspects of the College Curriculum. Should Manual Training be a Part of the College Curriculum?

V. Extent of College Education in the United States. Are there Too Many Colleges? Reasons for the Growth of My College. A Brief Account of the Development of the American College. State Universities, their Rise and Development. Social Conditions in the Early American Colleges. Service of the Early American College to the Nation.

THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM

I. Huxley's Distinction between Science and Art. A Classification of the Curriculum into Sciences and Arts. The Essential Subjects of Education,—What are They?

II. The Practical vs. the Cultural Value of Science. Advantages of Laboratory Work in Science. The Difference between Inductive and Deductive Sciences. The True Purpose of Scientific Education.

III. What can Literature do for Me? The Value of the Study of the Classical Literature. The Contribution of Greece to the Modern World.

IV. The True Office of Art. The Distinction between Fine Arts and Useful Arts. Should a Novel Teach Something?

V. The Curriculum of the Early American College. Are too Many Courses Offered by the Modern College?

CHOICE OF COURSES

I. Is my College a "College of Freedom" or a "College of Discipline"? Advantages and Disadvantages of the "College of Freedom."

II. The Elective System at my College. Principles that should Govern in the Choice of Electives. Should One Study only What interests Him? Studies Most Needed by a Lawyer (or other professional man).

III. The Dangers of Specialization. The Advantages of Specialization. Is Specialization begun too Early?

IV. My Course of Study. Should Woman's Education be the Same as Man's? The Value of the Study of Latin (or any other subject). Should the A.B. be the only Degree given by a College?

INTELLECTUAL IDEALS

I. Independence in One's Thinking. The Preservation of Individuality in College. Academic Freedom of Thought. Freedom of Speech in a Democracy.

II. College Students as Thinkers. Studies that Develop Thinking Power.

III. Attitude of the Students of my College toward Study. Can Scholarship be made as Attractive as Athletics? Should Students with High Class Standing be exempt from Examinations?

IV. What College Grades Represent. Credit for Quality—is it Practicable? Working for Grades,—Advantages and Disadvantages.

V. Some Pioneer Fields in Chemistry (or any other subject). The Lure of Knowledge. Future Achievements of Science.

VI. Intellectual Characteristics of Americans. Other American Characteristics. Notable Intellectual Achievements of the United States. Causes of Periods of Intellectual Brilliancy.

VII. My Theory of How to Study. The Value of Routine in Study. The Proper Amount of Study for a College Student. Concentration of Mind as a Key to Success in Study. Methods of Memory Training. How to Take Notes. Value of Instruction by Lectures. Evils of Examinations. Causes of Failure at College.

ATHLETICS AND RECREATION

I. Growth of Athletics in American Colleges. The True Purpose of Athletics. Unsettled Problems of Intercollegiate Athletics. Athletic Ideals at my College. Athletics and College Spirit. Is it Possible to be a True College Man without an Interest in Athletics? The Distinction between Amateur and Professional in Athletics. The Dangers of Professionalism. The Supervision of Athletics at my College. Are the Dangers of Football Exaggerated? Limitations of Gymnasium Exercise.

II. Athletics and Scholarship. Athletics as an Advertisement of the College. How to Turn Out a Winning Team. College Athletics and the Secondary School.

III. Athletic Courtesy. Fair Play in Athletic Contests. Evils of Intercollegiate Athletics for the Student Body. The English Ideal in Athletics Compared with the American.

IV. Exercise and Health. Dangers of Over-exercise. The Best Outdoor Exercise for a Business or Professional Man. The National Game of Baseball. Value of a Country Club to a Community. Dangers to Health in the Present Form of Civilization. Care of the Eyes. Is Smoking Injurious? The Value of an Open Air Gymnasium. American Hurry, its Danger. The Daily Care of the Body. Sunday Baseball for Workingmen. Dancing,—is it a Wholesome Amusement? The Value of Lawn Tennis (or any other game) as an Exercise. Should the Student Spend his Recreation Time in General Reading? The Advance of Preventive Medicine. The Student and Sunday Observance. Athletics for Women. Victories

and Defeats of the Past Season and the Lessons Therefrom. How to Take a Vacation.

GENERAL READING

I. What Books do College Students Read? How to Tell a Good Book from a Worthless One. Do College Students have Time for General Reading? The Value of the Personal Ownership of Books. Books I have Bought during the Past Year. A Professorship of Reading. A Book for an Idle Hour.

II. The Advantage Gained by the Student who Reads over the Student who does not. Some Famous Lists of Best Books. Value of Notes in Connection with One's Reading. Novels of the Past and Novels of the Present. The Value of Reading Fiction. The Student and Modern Books.

III. The Newspaper as It is and as It Should Be. How Much Time Should the Student give to Newspaper Reading? How to Read the Newspaper. Influence of the Press in America. Dangers of Magazine Reading. Opportunities of Journalism as a Profession.

IV. The Utilization of Mental Waste Products. The Vocabulary of the American Student. College Slang. The Art of Conversation.

COLLEGE ORGANIZATIONS

I. The History of College Fraternities. Is Secrecy Necessary to a Fraternity? Causes of the Extensive Development of Fraternities. Should Fraternities be Abolished at my College? Is Fraternity Life at my College too Expensive? A Criticism of Prevalent Practices of Rushing. Fraternity Initiations. The Relation of Fraternities to the College Administration.

II. Literary Societies of the Past and those of the Present. Are the Literary Societies in my College Effective? Benefits of Literary Society Membership. College Credit for Literary Society Work. Public Speaking of To-day.

III. Types of Student Societies at my College. The Y. M. C. A. in College Life. Phi Beta Kappa,—its Influence. The Value of Departmental Clubs. Famous Literary Clubs at English Universities.

COLLEGE GOVERNMENT

I. The Relation of the Student and the Faculty. The Relation of the Faculty and the Student. The College Professor of Fifty Years Ago. The New Type of College Professor.

II. The Attitude of the Students of my College toward College Regulations. Changes in Ideals of College Discipline since 1850. A Freshman's Responsibilities to College Discipline.

III. Reasons for Student Self-government. Student Self-government at my College. College Life as a Training for the Responsibilities of Citizenship.

COMMUNITY LIFE OF THE COLLEGE

I. Should all Students be Required to Live in the College Dormitories? Dormitory Life and College Spirit. The Choice of Friends in College. Social Life at my College compared with that at Other Colleges. The Furnishing of a Student's Room.

II. College Spirit,—an Attempt at a Definition. Proper and Improper Displays of College Spirit at my College. Class Organizations at my College. The Class Rush. College Politics at my College. College Spirit and Courtesy in Athletics. Hazing or Helpfulness as a Display of College Spirit. Class Animosity in College.

III. The Honor System Explained. The Honor System as it is at my College. Advantages (or disadvantages) of the Honor System. The Honor System and Business or Professional Life. How Far is a Student Responsible for the Conduct of Other Students? Inconsistencies of Student Character.

IV. The Distinction between Truth and Lying. The Complex Meaning of Truthfulness in Modern Life.

V. A Freshman's Responsibilities. Conscience in Student Life. College Freedom and Responsibility. The Value of Taking Things Seriously.

VI. Is the Spirit of Democracy Disappearing from my College? How to Make Friends at College. Notable College Friendships. Some Characteristics of my College Class. The Cost of Living at my College. Some Features of Social Life at my College. Good Breeding in the Class-room. Social Prejudice at my College. The Meaning of College Democracy. The Rights of the Individual Student. What Class Loyalty Means. The Difficulties of Settling Down at College.

THE COLLEGE MAN IN THE WORLD'S WORK

I. The Choice of a Vocation. Preparation for One's Life Work. Vocational Guidance in our Schools. Disillusionment,—is it an Evil? Is Service a Privilege, a Burden, or an Obligation? Subtle Forms of Selfishness in Student Life.

II. The College Student's Job. True Standards of Success in Life. True Standards of Success in College.

III. The Morals of Trade in the Twentieth Century. How Rich Ought a Man to be?

IV. The New Social Spirit. The Complaint of the Workingman.

Labor and Capital. The Social Discontent of the Times. Socialism, its Aims. American Sages. The Eight-hour Day. Needed Reforms in Industrial Methods. The Housing of the Poor. A Minimum Wage for Women Workers.

V. What my Country does for Me. What my Country has a Right to Expect of Me. Requisites of Good Citizenship. The Ballot and Duties of Citizenship. Dangers to our Free Institutions. Restrictive Qualifications for Suffrage. Educated Men and Politics. The Church and Politics. Has a Minister a Right to Seek Political Office? My College's Contribution to Politics (or the Church, Education, Medicine, etc.).

REFERENCE BOOKS

The list of reference books given below makes no pretension to being a complete bibliography to the problems of college life, but is simply a list of books, useful as aids in various ways in a course in this field, which the average college library will have, or can easily obtain. No account has been taken of the many important articles in this field which are to be found in the magazines, as these can easily be found through *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and Poole's *Index to Periodical Literature*. Much valuable material is also to be had from histories and books descriptive of individual colleges, from annual reports of college presidents and deans, and from published proceedings of educational associations.

- ADAMS. *The Health Master*
BAIRD, W. R. *American College Fraternities*
BENNETT, A. *How to Live on Twenty-four Hours a Day*
BIRDSEYE, C. F. *Individual Training in Our Colleges*
BIRDSEYE, C. F. *The Reorganization of Our Colleges*
BOONE, R. G. *Education in the United States*
BRIGGS, L. B. R. *Girls and Education*
BRIGGS, L. B. R. *Routine and Ideals*
BRIGGS, L. B. R. *School, College and Character*
BROWN, H. D. *Talks to Freshman Girls*
BUTLER, N. M. *The Meaning of Education*
CABOT, R. C. *What Men Live by*
CANFIELD, J. H. *The College Student and His Problems*
COOPER, C. S. *Why Go to College?*
CORBIN, J. *An American at Oxford*
CORBIN, J. *Which College for the Boy?*
CRAWFORD. *College Women of America*
DAVENPORT, E. *Education for Efficiency*
DEXTER. *History of Education in the United States*
ELIOT, C. W. *Educational Reforms*
ELIOT, C. W. *Education for Efficiency*
FITCH, A. P. *The College Course and Preparation for Life*
FLEXNER, A. *The American College*
FOSTER, W. T. *Administration of the College Curriculum*
GAYLEY, C. M. *Idols of Education*
GULICK, L. H. *Mind and Work*

- GULICK, L. H. *The Efficient Life*
HAMERTON, P. G. *The Intellectual Life*
HARPER, W. R. *Trend in Higher Education*
HARRISON, F. *The Choice of Books*
HERSEY, H. G. *To Girls*
HUXLEY, T. H. *Science and Education*
HYDE, W. D. *The College Man and the College Woman*
JAMES, WM. *Habit*
JAMES, WM. *Talks to Teachers*
JENKS, J. W. *Education for Citizenship*
JORDAN, D. S. *The Care and Culture of Men*
JORDAN, D. S. *The Voice of the Scholar*
KOOPMAN, H. L. *The Mastery of Books*
MCMURRY, F. M. *How to Study*
MONROE, P. (editor). *Cyclopedia of Education*
NEWMAN, J. H. *Idea of a University*
OSBORN, H. F. *Huxley and Education*
PALMER, G. H. *The Teacher*
PAULSEN, F. *German Universities*
RICHARDSON, C. F. *The Choice of Books*
SARGENT, D. A. *Physical Education*
SHELDON, H. D. *Student Life and Customs*
SLOSSON. *Great American Universities*
SMITH, C. A. *What Can Literature Do for Me?*
SPENCER, H. *Education*
THWING, C. F. *Education in the United States since the Civil War*
THWING, C. F. *History of Higher Education in America*
THWING, C. F. *The American College*
THWING, C. F. *The College Woman*
THWING, C. F. *Universities of the World*
WEST, A. F. *American Liberal Education*
WRIGHT, H. P. *From School to College*

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