


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The colonies, and their
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
THE COLONIES,
AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE MOTHER COUNTRY,
WITH A
STATISTICAL LIST
OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1886
APPENDED.

AN ADDRESS
DELIVERED BY
WALTER CHAMBERLAIN
PRESIDENT,

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE INSTITUTE,
ON TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1st, 1887.

BIRMINGHAM :
J. L. ALLDAY, SUCCESSOR TO T. H. LAKINS, PRINTER, EDMUND STREET.

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ADDRESS

DELIVERED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE,
ON TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1st, 1887,

BY

WALTER CHAMBERLAIN,

PRESIDENT.



ONE of the fathers of the Church, St. Chrysostom, an excellent man in his day no doubt, but I fear somewhat of a misogynist, has I have read, described woman somewhere in his writings as "A necessary evil, a natural temptation, a desirable calamity, a domestic peril, a deadly fascination, and a painted ill."

Substitute the word "colonies" for the word "woman," and you have a very fair statement of the feeling with which very many educated Englishmen still regard the colonies. They would rather be without them, and yet they would not give them up if they could. They may be "necessary evils," but they are also "desirable calamities."

I hope in the course of the present address to be able to show good reasons why we should consider our colonies generally speaking as very "desirable calamities" indeed, and calamities which we should do our best to retain, and whose connection with the Empire we should endeavour to strengthen and consolidate by all the means in our power. Look for a moment at the state of Europe to-day. The great military nations face one another armed to the teeth, it is with them now as it has even been in history:—

" . . . The good old rule
" Sufficeth them, the simple plan,
" That they should take who have the power,
" And they should keep who can."

If we wish to retain our own with certainty, and not subject only to the forbearance or goodwill of others, we must look to material as well as to moral power. We may be just and good, we must also be great and strong.

Now Professor SEELEY in his admirable work, "The Expansion of England," which I strongly commend to your notice, points out that England's rank amongst nations is dependant on the retention, in some form or another, of her connection with the colonies, without them she may manage to hold a place in Europe, barely equal to Germany or France, but in any dispute, where might is right, she must some day succumb to the United States, to Russia, and probably in the more distant future to China, and to her own late Australian possessions.

With them, firmly bound up with her by ties of interest and affection, she must rank, certainly not last among the four (admitting China) Great States of the future, here in another form we have St. Chrysostom's "natural temptation."

Bigness, as Professor SEELEY says, may not be greatness, and we may hold the first rank morally and intellectually, though materially but a second or third rate Power, but as neither greatness nor moral and intellectual excellence are incompatible with bigness, and as that alone can enable us to protect our own with certainty, I do not see why we should not endeavour to retain the colonies as a whole, alike by the continued assertion of our authority over the Crown Colonies and India, and by a closer combination with the self-governing ones.

Nor must we forget that our colonial Empire once lost can never be replaced.

Through the folly and obstinacy of our rulers and the political ignorance of the people we lost our first colonies and the United States, though still bound closer to us by ties of blood and language than any other country, is nevertheless a separate and sometimes a hostile nation.

I know that there are many who believe that this separation must have happened in any event, but even if it was so, it would have been much better that it should have happened by mutual consent and in a friendly spirit, as well might have been, had the wishes and feelings of the Americans been better understood by the English people or their rulers, and it is for more consideration of colonial questions that I am about to contend generally to-night.

For myself I believe that the United States might have continued to this day in full political union with ourselves, had the rulers of past years been better advised, and given to colonial topics one tenth of the consideration they gave to the false and bewildering chaos of European politics.

That colonial Empire, however, was lost to us, and our fathers with indomitable energy, and through great sacrifices of blood and treasure, proceeded successfully to build up another—already far greater in area and population than the one they lost—they and we, have repaired their mistake ; we cannot repair a second and similar error. There are practically no more lands to discover and settle, nor with few exceptions do other nations now hold colonies worth winning from them.

Other nations, as Professor SEELEY points out, have held great colonial possessions, and not knowing how to keep them have lost them. Greater Spain, Greater Portugal, Greater Holland, and Greater France have passed away and for ever ; Greater Britain alone remains. Spain, Portugal, and Holland have fallen back once and for all in the rank of nations. France, for all her energy and patriotism, must soon play second to the United States, to Russia, and perhaps to Germany.

It rests with this generation or the next to say, where in the future our own country shall rank amongst nations.

Now you sometimes hear it said, chiefly for political purposes, that Great Britain is already losing her colonies, shrinking her boundaries, and so forth, it may therefore be of some interest at the outset of an address on the colonies to enquire how the case really stands.

Let us see what shrinkages and what expansions have occurred in recent times, that is to say, since the close in 1815 of the great colonial and Napoleonic wars.

Our colonial Empire as now existing has been slowly built up, the first and mainly tropical part of it, before and during the wars with Napoleon, and this portion was finally secured to Great Britain after the peace of 1815, that is, since that date, it has not again been seriously liable to external attacks, before that time, during the long periods of war, which, with short intervals of rest, convulsed Europe since the days of Cromwell, such colonies as we took by conquest or settlement were liable to change hands frequently—

Portuguese, Dutch, Spaniards, French and English being successively engaged in the effort to acquire colonies, and with varying success, until in the long run, thanks to her vast naval superiority, England came out after Waterloo in 1815 the greatest gainer, with an already large and varied assortment of colonies, Canada, the Cape Colony, the West Indies, huge possessions in the East Indies, fortresses in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

From that time and until a very few years before the commencement of the present reign, or for nearly twenty years, very little was done in the way of additions to the Empire, Botany Bay, in New South Wales, and two or three points in Tasmania had been utilised as convict settlements, but they had made little progress as colonies. Then with the increase of wealth, the revival of trade and general prosperity, and leisure at home, due to the long peace, men's minds turned once more to possessions abroad. The "deadly fascination" of St. Chrysostom, and within a few years all the rest of the great colonies in Australia were settled and fairly started on the road to prosperity, the older colonies received a great impulse, and constitutional government was, after a short struggle, granted to those colonies which now possess it, to Canada in 1840, to New Zealand in 1854, to the Australian Colonies in 1856, and finally complete responsibility to the Cape in 1872.

Later on again, and right down to the present time, the annexations, additions, and what may be called "rounding off" of territory, continues, Fiji in 1874, Cyprus in 1878, one-third of New Guinea in 1884, the Naval Station of Port Hamilton on the Corean Coast, and the huge area of Bechuana Land in South Africa, with other minor additions, in 1885, Upper Burmah at the beginning of last year, and finally the island of Sokotra towards the close of the year, and, I believe, a small block of territory on the East Coast of Africa, near the Equator, either annexed or protected under an arrangement with the Germans, who have grabbed a much larger piece to the south.

In all, omitting the two last-named countries, and Burmah, itself a country as large as France, and which is annexed to India, some 280,000 square miles of territory, or considerably more than double the area of our own Islands, and more annexations, protest as we will, are looming in the near future.

In this respect we seem to go on as the man pictured in *Punch* as smoking in a railway carriage :—

“You oughtn't to smoke, Sir, (says the Guard),

“So my friends say.

“But you mustn't smoke, Sir,

“So my doctor says.

“But you shan't smoke,

“So my wife says.”

You oughtn't to annex, say the Tories. You mustn't annex, say the Whigs. You shan't annex, say the Radicals. But we go on annexing all the same.

Now against these enormous additions to our territories, what have we lost or given up since 1815?

So far as I am aware, only the island of New Caledonia, taken possession of by Captain Cook but never occupied, and in 1853 unfortunately annexed by France with our assent, the Ionian Islands ceded to the then new Kingdom of Greece, and the Orange River and Transvaal Territories in South Africa, each hastily annexed by one ministry and restored to independence by another on further consideration.

Of the four retrocessions, the only one that probably any sensible Englishman would regret is New Caledonia, and that, not on account of any intrinsic value of its own, but because it introduces a rival power to Australian waters, and has, as a French convict establishment, caused some annoyance to our Australian brethren, if however, this annoyance should grow in the future to any serious extent, there can be no doubt but that a federated Australia will know how to deal with it.

When therefore we hear wild talk about abandoning our colonies and so forth, we may do well to remember that such things have been said from time to time during the last fifty years, but nevertheless, the facts so far have been all the other way, and even to the present day, the Empire so far from diminishing continues to swell at a most portentous rate.

Now understand me, I am far from saying that these annexations were necessarily wrong, probably in the most recent cases they have been forced on those in authority and who were responsible, by circumstances, and much against their will. Our Colonial Office from sheer mental slothfulness, if from no better reason, has long done its utmost to discourage annexations, and in this has been well backed up by the Radical party in the country, but we cannot lay down hard and fast rules in such matters, nor adhere through thick and thin to the absolute integrity of every principle

we may wish to see carried out in Imperial concerns, we have sometimes to suffer from and make the best of past actions.

To quote the old simile of a stone thrown into a pool, the ripples extend and widen long after the stone has sunk and the splash subsided.

But, on the other hand, I most emphatically protest against the doctrine that retrocession is, under any circumstance, inadmissible, and that territory once annexed must be for ever held, that the prestige, and perhaps the very existence of the Empire, is to be staked if necessary, on the retention of every wretched settlement or island we may now, or in the future, hold in any part of the world. There are many places which I think we should consider as held only on the condition that they continue to serve the particular purpose for which they were taken, and from which therefore we might at some time recede, with positive advantage to ourselves and without injustice to others.

We come now to the consideration of what is our colonial Empire, what are its component parts, and their respective areas, populations, trade, climates, and system of government.

To treat this part of my subject fully would, of course, require a separate work on each colony—many of which works by-the-by are already in existence. For my present purpose it may be sufficient, I think, to give a summary as in the accompanying list, which embraces a concise statement on all the above matters.

In this list I have had to include the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, as also India and Burmah, but I do not propose further to refer to these to-night, as India alone offers more than sufficient matter for a separate address.

I may, however, point out that the government business of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man still passes through the Home Office, as these islands have always been considered as integral parts, not only of the Empire at large, but specially of the United Kingdom, although they have peculiar laws and administrative arrangements of their own.

Whilst India, because of its vastness and the peculiarly difficult and delicate considerations which are for ever cropping up in its government, is treated as an Empire, in itself an "imperium in imperio," and is, consequently, administered by a special Office (the India Office), presided over by a Secretary of State, always of

Cabinet rank, and who is assisted by a Council, composed of ex Anglo-Indian magnates.

The fortified position of Aden, at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the tiny island of Perim, together with the whole of Burmah are annexed to India for purposes of administration, and are therefore also subject to the India Office.

So far as I can discover, the list with which I have furnished you, is complete up to the end of last year—with the exception of Sokotra—though it has been a by no means simple task to compile it, as our claims here and there about the world are in some cases of so vague a character that, as we know in recent disputes with Portugal and Germany, it has greatly exercised the Colonial Office itself to define them; at any rate, this list is more complete than any I have met with. Those given in almanacs contain many errors of omission and commission, whilst that published by the Colonial Office leaves out certain of our minor possessions and Protectorates.

But we have also, in addition to our actual and acknowledged territories, a multitude of treaty rights in connection with the soil of independent nations or Potentates, giving us settlement rights or, so to speak, pre-emptory claims, or debarring other nations, as well as ourselves, from seizing the lands in question.

Of the first class are our settlements in China—at Canton, Shanghai, and elsewhere, where Englishmen congregate on reserves under consular jurisdiction.

Of the second class was our late treaty signed in 1876 with the Sultan of Keshin, in Arabia, who claimed suzerainty over, and collected tribute from, the large island of Sokotra, at the mouth of the Red Sea, by which he agreed never to cede it to, or allow settlement of it by, any other Power without our consent, and further allowed our Political Agent at Aden to make an annual visit. This treaty is now apparently abrogated.

Of the third class are our treaties with France, Germany, and other Powers, as regards the Samoan Islands, the New Hebrides, the Sandwich Islands, and other groups in the South Pacific.

Let me now give you a few rough figures to illustrate the areas and populations of our colonial possessions. Roughly speaking, Greater Britain, or, as Froude calls it, "Oceana," already comprises about one-seventh of the world's dry land, and includes, as subjects of one monarch, more than one-fourth of the human race. In other words, about eight million square miles of territory, and

about two hundred and fifty million subjects—and these figures are exclusive of the five hundred thousand square miles of territory and fifty million inhabitants comprised in the Feudatory and so-called Independent States of India, and also of merely protected areas elsewhere.

To put it again in another way, Greater Britain about equals Russia, with all its vast Asiatic possessions, is nearly three times the size of the United States, fourteen times the size of France, with all her colonial possessions, and nearly forty times as large as Germany, which has (or had until the other day) practically no colonies.

These are huge figures and, if of no other value, may at least serve to show the greatness and importance of the subject we are now considering, as it is obvious that, whether for good or for evil, the retention or abandonment of this huge, and in population, rapidly increasing connection, must seriously affect the future fortunes of the United Kingdom; a country which holds sixty-five square miles of extra territory for every one contained within its own area, and to whose Government six persons own allegiance outside for every one within, cannot afford for ever to treat with indifference the subject of its colonial relations.

Let us now consider a rough classification of the colonies. If you refer to the list, or possess any general knowledge of the colonies, you will at once perceive that they cannot be all classed under one head. They may be classified according to the reasons for which their retention may be urged, and these are very various according to their climates, their populations, that is whether mainly native or European, or their form of government.

This last classification must be of itself valueless were it not that in the main, and for obvious reasons, it follows roughly the natural conditions of climate and race, as well as the special purpose, if any, for which the colony was originally taken.

Thus, on reference to the list, you will perceive that I have divided the methods of government under three heads—"Crown," "Partly Elective," and "Responsible."

Both those which I have called "Crown," and those I have entered as "Partly Elective," although they comprise almost as many variations in the details of their governments as there are colonies to be governed, come under the popular if not official designation of "Crown Colonies," because in all alike the Crown

possesses an effective veto on legislation; but in those which I have specially denominated "Crown Colonies," the Government is either purely official as in Gibraltar, Heligoland, Labuan, the Gold Coast, &c., or tempered very slightly by the admission to the Legislative Council of a few unofficial members of the community, who are nominated by the Crown, and whose powers for good or evil are practically limited to placing their opinion of particular measures on record, as they can always be outvoted by officials, are not usually even allowed to initiate legislation, and unless their opinions are agreeable to the Governor are frequently severely snubbed for expressing them.

Examples of this style of government may be found in Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Trinidad, the Fiji Islands, and others.

Examples of what I have termed "Partly Elective" government may be found in Jamaica, British Guiana, the Leeward Islands, Malta, Natal, and Western Australia, where the majority of the Legislative Council is composed of non-official members, elected under a more or less restricted property franchise, but the Governor still possesses an absolute veto; or in Barbadoes, the Bahamas, or the Bermudas, where there is a double Legislature, the first Chamber being mainly or purely official; the second, elective, on anything but a popular basis and its legislative powers as usual entirely subject to the Governor's veto.

The two oddest forms of government exist in the small Atlantic islands of Ascension and Tristan d'Acunha, both seized whilst we kept Napoleon at St. Helena, for the better security of our prisoner.

The former is under the Admiralty, by whom the island is rated in the Navy List as Tender to H. M.'s S. "Flora." This island ship, which is always in commission, is commanded by a Post Captain, and subjected to Man-of-War discipline, and all lights ordered out at ten p.m. A precious example of adherence to old form, which is said to cost us £40,000 a year.

Tristan d'Acunha,* according to the "Colonial Office List" is for the present under the moral rule of the oldest inhabitant, and his

* *Tristan d'Acunha*.—H.M.S. "Thalia" called here with relief stores, August 5th, 1886. Pop. 97—Males, 23; Females, 44; Children, 30 (under ten).

Cause of disproportion in sexes—17 men just drowned during a storm.

About 500 cattle on the island, and an average of 10 sheep and a flock of geese to each family. At "Thalia's" arrival, Islanders had been without tea, coffee, tobacco, rice, or flour, for several months. The relief was sent in response to the Chaplain's solicitations, he having come home for the purpose. The Islanders seemed willing to emigrate *en masse* if the Government would find them suitable homes elsewhere.

temporary subjects—for it is hardly in the nature of things that such a Governor should reign long—are reported well satisfied with this patriarchal arrangement.

Both Natal and West Australia in one or another of these efforts to shirk responsibility, and save itself from trouble, which, is, or used to be, characteristic of the Colonial Office, have been offered full Constitutional Government, but politely refused for very good reasons.

Natal, because of the difficulty and expense of ruling its overwhelming native population, and protecting its borders. West Australia, because the offer was very properly restricted to a large territory around the settlement of Swan River, where alone anything like population exists. The West Australians did not like this limitation, and argued very shrewdly that they had better wait awhile until they could improve on the terms; and they are probably right as the waiting game in a growing community is the winning one.

With these two exceptions, and those of two or three fortresses and naval stations, all Crown Colonies are situated in the tropics and conversely, all tropical colonies are governed by the Crown, for the good and sufficient reasons that the total population is either too sparse to admit of responsible government or the native races and interests are too important to make it just that their destinies should be confided to the charge of the small number of semi-resident Whites who carry on commercial pursuits in tropical lands; nor would it be safe now, or probably at any future time to which we can look forward, to entrust the natives altogether with their own government, that would be sure to result in the most serious race and tribal complications, and might probably have to be followed by a re-conquest on our part, or withdrawal and a subsequent seizure by some other power.

On the other hand, and with the previously mentioned exceptions, all the colonies with temperate climates possess full responsible government, and all colonies, without exception, possessed of responsible government are mainly situated in temperate or cold regions, since in all of these the white races have made permanent homes and are rapidly developing into nations.

You will see, therefore, that all our colonial Possessions fall naturally under three grand divisions.

The First Division, comprising the whole of the Crown Colonies and Possessions, that are either tropical, and mainly inhabited by

native races, or with populations too small for any other form of government, or held as naval stations. }

These colonies, omitting Protectorates and odd islands, are administered under twenty-six separate governments, and include, roughly speaking, 160,000 square miles of territory, with a population of six and a quarter millions. With few exceptions, they have all been acquired by war with European nations, or diplomacy, generally due to war.

The Second Division, comprising all those colonies which, owing to climate and the presence of a permanent and increasing European population, have either received or must eventually receive responsible government.

They are eleven in number, contain about seven million square miles of territory, and about nine and a half millions of population. The bulk of these have been acquired by comparatively peaceable settlement.

The Third Division, comprising British India, with its Feudatory States, and Burmah, embraces about one and a half millions of square miles, and 256 millions of population.

Let us now consider the First Division—Crown Colonies and Possessions.

Some of these need not detain us long. For instance, the detached Coral Islands, in the Pacific Ocean, and some at least of the islands attached to Mauritius are, so far as I can judge, perfectly valueless, and seem to have been annexed by over zealous naval commanders, and subsequently tacitly "allowed" by the Colonial Office, on the general principle that induced the Knight in "Little Alice" to carry about with him a mouse trap, namely, that it might come in useful some day.

After these, there is a second batch of "Claims" and "Protectorates" perfectly useless in themselves and held by us, solely to prevent any other nation taking them, and using them against our shipping or neighbouring colonies, or to prevent troubles with their native inhabitants.

Of the latter, the Maldives and Laccadives, attached to Ceylon, and the Nicobars, to India, are examples.

Of the former, to keep off other nations, the Tristan d'Acunha group, seized when Napoleon was confined at St. Helena, and St. Paul and Amsterdam Islands, on the route from the Cape to

Australia, are instances, as also the numerous islands about New Zealand, together with Perim, Sokotra, and other islands at the mouth of the Red Sea, on the route to India.

The story of the seizure of Perim, in 1855, though, I believe, often told and well known, is always interesting and amusing.

A French admiral was sent out expressly to take possession of Perim, hitherto unnoticed by the English. He called at Aden, where the English Resident, being very curious as to the object of his visit, invited him to dinner, plied him with good wine and many questions. Learning by these means that he meant to sail again at daybreak northwards the Englishman suspected Perim as his object, and in order to obtain an excuse for leaving the table without exciting the suspicions of his guest, he was seized suddenly with a violent fit of coughing, which compelled him to leave the room. Directly he was outside, he sent for the commander of the only ship in the harbour under his orders, and directed him to sail immediately for Perim, there to plant the British flag and put some seamen ashore. The French admiral presently retired to his ship, and sailed next morning, only to arrive at Perim and find the English already in possession. He returned to his station a sadder and a wiser man.

A third group may be formed for the present out of the Protectorates at the Straits Settlements on the West African coast, in South Africa, and also over New Guinea, all established in the interests of the colonies on which they border, but not otherwise concerning the Empire as a whole.

Fourthly, we have a group of Naval Stations, most important as bases of supply and harbours for the Navy and Mercantile Marine, and without which in these days of heavy coal consumption and costly ships, it would be impossible for the Navy adequately to perform its duties.

Such are Heligoland in the North Sea, Gibraltar and Malta in the Mediterranean, Bermuda in the North Atlantic, St. Helena and Ascension in the South Atlantic, Port Hamilton (since abandoned) off Corea, whence it was intended that our ships should watch the Russian North Pacific squadron, and the Falkland Islands, near Cape Horn, which were occupied, I am informed by the Colonial Office, mainly to protect the whale fishery in those seas.

Such Stations as these, commanding the principal trade routes of the world, are simply invaluable to an Oceanic Power, and I

think we should grudge no necessary expense in order to maintain and render them impregnable; they should be regarded as part and parcel of our fleets rather than as colonies, and held almost without reference to cost as we hold an ironclad or a fort on the Thames or at Portsmouth. This subject of the defence of our Naval and Coaling Stations has lately been referred to in the House of Commons by an eminent politician. Now I do not think that I should often be disposed to differ from Lord Randolph Churchill when that gentleman was advocating economy. I am not in love with taxation in general, nor the Income Tax in particular, and I devoutly believe that the Army and Navy Estimates may be greatly cut down (especially the former) without endangering the country; but I would myself rather commence with almost any other item than this one. That, however, is a matter of opinion, and one which I cannot stay to argue to night.

Fifthly, we can separate from the others a number of colonies which either combine the advantages of a flourishing trade with those of a Naval Station, or are valuable for their trade alone, but none of which are worth notice as producing anything themselves.

Such are Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea, Singapore at the extreme end of the Malay Peninsula, Hong Kong off China, and Sierra Leone on the West Coast of Africa; the first three of these do an immense trade, the last—Sierra Leone—a small trade, thus adding enormously to the importance they possess as Naval Stations.

The rest of the Straits Settlements and the other West African Colonies, together with the newly-formed North Borneo and National African Companies are examples of trading settlements only, valuable as an indirect source of wealth while their trade exists, useless and better abandoned if it should cease.

With regard to the North Borneo and National African Companies I may add a word or two.

Both of these Companies exercise their authority over the territories within their jurisdiction under somewhat similar conditions to those enjoyed by the old East India Company. The Council or Board of Direction has general power to elect or remove the Governor or other officials, and to maintain an armed force for defensive purposes, and to insure order within the Company's jurisdiction, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies.

They hope no doubt some day to become producers, but at present they cannot be considered other than as traders only, neither can their territories, strictly speaking, be classed as colonies at all, as they are not officially recognised as such; but since, by the grant of Royal Charters or Protectorates over them and theirs, the Colonial Office has become more or less responsible for their doings, they cannot well be omitted from a general review of the colonies.

Of late years, it has not been the fashion to encourage this form of colonization, but, nevertheless, there is much to be said in its favour, and not a few of our possessions in the past and present had a similar origin, notably some of the United States, the Hudson Bay Territory in Canada, the West African Settlements, the Straits Settlement, and India itself.

Sixthly and lastly of the First Division, we come to the important group which are distinguished as producers; they include Ceylon, Mauritius, all our West Indian possessions, embracing some five and twenty chief islands, with the two colonies of British Honduras and Guiana, on the mainland, and the Fiji group.

They are all situated in the tropics, and in annexing them we have incurred special responsibilities, which I think we must all recognise, and which involve, in my judgment, in order that these responsibilities may be adequately discharged, that we should retain possession and continue to administer them, at least as far into the future as we need trouble ourselves about.

These responsibilities are two-fold—First, to the native population; Second, to the English or Creole settlers.

Ceylon, by far the most important of the lot, contains a population of about 2,800,000—roughly, three millions—the vast majority of whom are Cinghalese and Tamils, the latter originally from Southern India; there are, in addition, a considerable number of Moormen or Mahommedans, the descendants of Arabs, who have made their homes in the island for centuries past, some remnants of the aboriginal inhabitants, and a few thousand white settlers.

In Mauritius, with a population of about 360,000, about two-thirds are Negroes and imported Tamils from India, many of whom are now permanently resident; the remaining one-third consist of Creoles, the pure blooded descendants of the early French settlers, and a small number of Europeans.

In the West Indies, which includes the Bahamas, Jamaica, the Leeward and Windward Islands, Trinidad, British Guiana, and British Honduras, the population is roughly one and a half millions, almost entirely negroes or mulattoes, the bulk of whom speak English as their only language.

In Fiji, out of a total population of some 108,000, only about 3,000 are whites, the rest are Fijians or Tongans, conquerors in the old savage days from the neighbouring Tongan Islands.

And in all these colonies there are of course numerous half-castes.

Now, whether rightly or wrongly, we have annexed all these places and have administered them, except Fiji, for periods varying from seventy to over two hundred years, we have introduced our ways of government, our justice, and to some extent our civilization, and, as regards the negro population of the West Indies, our language and religion: we have overthrown the old native government, where such existed, and broken in on many of the old customs; we have governed them of late years at least, on the whole, wisely and well, but we have rendered them unfit to govern themselves on the old lines, if they ever had any; and we have not been able, we can hardly be said to have tried, to render them fit to govern themselves in the newer ways; if, therefore, we gave them up now, we should leave them a prey to social disorder and misrule among themselves, or easy victims to the next comer. If that comer was another civilized nation, France or Germany for instance, they might not suffer by the change in the long run, but they assuredly would for a time, and, when things settled once more, they would find themselves at least no better off than under our rule, therefore, and for their own good, we are, I conceive, morally bound to hold them as part of the Empire.

But besides the native population, we must not forget our own countrymen—planters, merchants, investors, and others, who have spent many of the best years of their lives in opening out estates, or building up businesses, or have invested large sums of money in one or another of these colonies. Lands have been bought and houses built, and numerous works carried out by these our fellow-subjects, under Crown grants, or with direct Crown sanction and encouragement, given expressly to assist the development of the colony, and it would be a distinct breach of faith and a cruel desertion on our part were we to leave this energetic—if small minority, which is so indispensable to the commercial prosperity of

every tropical colony—to struggle for its rights, perhaps even the liberties and lives of the individuals, with native rulers or new conquerers, or to clear out at a ruinous sacrifice of its possessions.

In addition to these moral reasons, and the political one that we should probably suffer seriously in prestige by retiring from such important colonies, and so involve ourselves in further troubles, we must not forget that nearly all of them—except the recently annexed Fiji group (and even Fiji pays its way)—are a source of considerable indirect gain.

It is true that neither they nor any other British colony pay anything directly to the British exchequer as tribute, except for a *quid pro quò* in the way of military or naval protection, but they all do a more or less appreciable trade with this country, amounting in the aggregate, for those I have included under Group VI., to nearly five millions per annum, that is, goods handled or made in this country (and in either case providing a wages fund for our artizans and labourers, as well as employing a large number of English ships and seamen), to the value of nearly five millions, are annually exported to these Crown Colonies; unless, therefore, for very stringent moral or political reasons—both of which I have endeavoured to show point the other way—we should certainly be wrong to do so ill a turn to our own overgrown population, as to willfully give up all or any portion of this trade.

With this sixth group of possessions the first great division of our colonies closes.

Now in considering the important question of the material strength added to the Empire by its various parts, or their consolidation or federation into a world-wide Empire or Commonwealth, we must keep the distinction between this and the second division clear in our minds and treat of them separately.

In one sense, most of the Crown Colonies can never become a sure or permanent addition to the strength of the Empire, there is no probability that at any time within our view the mass of their inhabitants can be so intimately associated with the Anglo-Saxon race as to enable us to treat them as absolutely with us and of us, and to cease to maintain the extra military and naval establishments necessary to cope with an outbreak of rebellion. Cinghalese, Tamils, Fijians, Negroes, and even most Half-castes, living as they do under vastly different conditions of climate, speaking different languages, and inheriting other traditions and peculiarities of colour

and ways of thought, can never so entirely imbibe Anglo-Saxon feelings and prejudices as to unite with them as Canadians or Australians might do.

We may educate them to govern themselves or nearly so, we may give them, if we choose, responsible government, we may induce them by wise and kindly rule to look upon us as good friends and well-wishers, but we can never be more to them than foreigners, nor ever induce in them that mighty bond of union which springs alone, from blood relationship, from the community of race and colour, of national feeling and pride in common ancestors and inherited traditions, they may be contented and loyal to a certain point, most of them are so now, they may as in the case of the great negro population of the West Indies, possess no national traditions of their own, no real national feeling, have learnt all that they know from us, even speak our language as their own, but the insuperable barrier of race and colour will for ever prevent an absolutely trustworthy and complete union.

Therefore in resolving, as I hope we shall do, to maintain these colonies (some of them always, nearly all of them, under existing circumstances, for the present), we must resolve also to do it, *vi et armis*, by force if need be, against themselves and against all comers, and to that end we must be prepared to back our authority, if necessary, by material as well as moral means.

But although I maintain they cannot be regarded as ever likely to become a trustworthy and permanent addition to the strength of the Empire in other and more limited ways, they do add considerably to our resources, and, under wise government, they may yet do so much more.

Firstly, as I have said, they add to our resources by the trade they do with us.

Secondly, under certain contingencies, they may be useful as recruiting grounds for soldiers.

India is by far the best example of both kinds of usefulness, as it may also, at any moment, become the most striking instance of a possession which is a source of weakness instead of strength; with India, however, I am not to-night concerned.

But from the other Crown Colonies also, as I have shewn, we receive an indirect benefit in the way of trade, and this trade not only adds to our wealth but it enables us to maintain a larger population in these islands than they could otherwise support, and it is

obvious that, other things being equal, a country with a population of thirty-six millions, such as Great Britain and Ireland, is a more powerful state than one with a population of four millions, such as Holland.

There is also a small advantage derived from the constant stream of British colonists returning home to spend in the mother country the wealth they have earned in its colonies, in this minor point the tropical colonies are proportionately more valuable than those in temperate climates, as from the former, the Anglo-Saxons must not only return home themselves from time to time if they wish to preserve their health, but they must also send home their children to be educated and reared, and remit money on their account.

As regards the absolute physical strength of the State, reckoned by its fighting power, in men and money they also as I have said assist, not only by enabling Great Britain itself to maintain a larger population, but they may be also be made available, to what extent we shall never realise until a real necessity arises, as recruiting grounds, at least so far as to neutralise the drain they cause in this direction in times of comparative peace, and although it is open to dispute whether an Indian or negro regiment may be good for much if placed in line against Europeans, they are good as against one another, or against other less highly-disciplined races, and the system which we already to some extent adopt of garrisoning one province or country from another, is capable of a much greater extension if it should ever be necessary to use for action elsewhere the services of every available British soldier.

Therefore, though taken as a whole, and from a direct military point of view, the Crown Colonies are no doubt rather a cause of weakness than of strength to the other parts of the Empire, yet in other ways they contribute materially to the prosperity of the whole, and since the danger of rebellion may be reduced to a minimum by good government and a sufficient reserve of force, there is little to urge against the most part of them, except their liability to attack from external foes.

No doubt in the event of war with another naval Power, the defence of our tropical colonies would prove, at least for a time, a source of much anxiety to the authorities, and some of them might even be taken, their fate, however, would ultimately depend on the general issue of the war, if we were successful, they would, if not previously recovered, be demanded back, and of course returned.

If we were defeated, some of them would likely enough be torn from us by the treaty of peace, whether they had been previously seized or not.

On the whole I think it is pretty sure that, besides the moral reasons for retaining them, the indirect advantages accruing to us from tropical colonies are much greater than the more obvious direct disadvantages, and there are few of our neighbours, therefore, in Europe who would not gladly relieve us of them; but the case for the retention of each rests on its own circumstances alone, and in some instances, if strong to-day may be entirely demolished to-morrow.

Any way these colonies fairly represent to us the "desirable calamity" and the "domestic peril," and to other nations the "deadly fascination" of St. Chrysostom's woman.

We have now to consider the second division of our colonies, comprising the great self-governing communities of our own race to which reference is intended nineteen times out of twenty when the colonies are mentioned in ordinary writings or conversation.

They are nine in number—Canada, Newfoundland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, New Zealand, and Cape Colony; or if we include West Australia and Natal, which must some day occupy similar positions, eleven in all.

According to Sir W. W. LAWSON, in his inaugural address to the Statistical Society in 1885, the area of these colonies within the temperate zone, and, therefore, suitable as a permanent home for our race, is equal to three-fourths of the total area of all the British colonies and India. I make the amount myself somewhat less. Deducting the tropical portions of Australia, the figures are roughly as 5,750,000 to 9,084,000 square miles, or say two-thirds.

As illustrating their unique importance I may point out to you that no other country possesses any similar colonies whatever, nor, in fact, any outside territory of the least account within the temperate zones; nor, thanks to our pre-occupation of all such inhabitable or available lands, can they hope now ever to obtain any except through our weakness.

Notwithstanding considerable differences that exist between them as regards their internal conditions and possible futures, they all agree on many important points in their relations to the mother country. All of them, though in varying degrees, are bound to us by

common ties of race, religion, language, institutions, and inherited traditions, all of them possess or will possess responsible government, and are to all intents and purposes independent. Lastly, all of them possess a remarkably good opinion of themselves, and I must confess, seem to me a little too fond at times of the amusement called, in America, "Twisting the Lion's tail;" that is, trying how much they can get out of us by trading on the well known weakness of the Colonial Office to lead a peaceable life.

Most of them possess great areas of unoccupied land, and all are capable of sustaining an enormously larger population than that which now inhabits them; and lastly, all are likely in the future, with the help of local federation, to develop into great commonwealths.

It must, therefore, be obvious at once that such colonies as these stand on a very different footing in relation to the question of a united or federated British Empire or Realm than do the Crown Colonies.

From whatever point of view we regard them, whether as sources of wealth by the trade they do with us, as sources of military strength by the assistance they can and seem willing to bring to us, if called upon, or as territories whither our own ever increasing population may emigrate without ceasing to be our fellow subjects; even now in their infancy, it would be difficult to over estimate the importance to us of retaining the connection; it is impossible to do so, if we regard also the future—fifty years hence say—when either Australia or Canada may number a population half as large as our own.

As regards the Cape, there is no doubt, much to be urged on the other side, and an intimate political union with Canada might have its drawbacks, but in the case of Australia or New Zealand, I can see absolutely no objections. They profit from the connection now as much or more than we do, but with their vast capabilities of expansion, a United Australia, or a United Canada, must ultimately by sheer weight of numbers surpass in material power this small land of ours, even as the United States are doing; and bearing this in mind, it behoves us if we wish well for the future greatness of our country, that we should leave no stone unturned to make with them an honourable and lasting union.

They can, it is true, leave us when they choose, and as they grow more and more confident in their own power and resources,

they may choose to do so ; in that case, let it at least be our care, that they leave us only with good wishes on both sides, and not with high words and bad blood. But whether for the purpose of retaining the political connection, and strengthening it, or at least of avoiding an other than friendly separation, it is equally important that the people of this country should seek to understand the question in order that they may act with judgment and forethought rather than from ignorance and impatience, and to that end it were much to be wished that more time was given in every school in Great Britain to teaching the history, geography, and social conditions of our great self-governing colonies.

Now, at the present time, the European population of Canada is over four and a half millions, of Australia and New Zealand about three and a half millions, and of Cape Colony and Natal under half million—in all, say eight and a half millions of European descent. These are not all, of course, of our own race.

In Canada, there is a large French population, and at the Cape there are more Europeans of Dutch than of British parentage, but the proportion of these British subjects of foreign descent diminishes every year, as compared with those of British origin, and for the moment we need not stop to consider this point.

The main fact is that there are to day in the self-governing communities beyond the seas eight and a half millions of British European subjects, mostly Anglo-Saxons of the same ancestry and speaking the same language as ourselves. Such a population, already nearly a fourth of our own, welded with ourselves in an offensive and defensive alliance against external enemies would bring to the whole no mean accession of strength, and would, as it in fact already does to a great extent, add largely to the importance and stability of the Empire.

But all these Colonies are capable of maintaining a much larger population than they now do. - Were Canada or Australia peopled in proportion to inhabitable areas, as our own islands are, they would each of them number their inhabitants by tens of millions ; no doubt such an ultimate expansion is far off yet, but in the meantime a vast increase is merely a question of years.

Professor SEELEY has calculated that in less than half a century the Englishmen beyond the seas will equal in number the Englishmen at home, and that the total will not fall short of one hundred millions ; that is, supposing that our own population continues to

increase as it has done of late years, and temporary depression and bad trade notwithstanding, seems likely to do, provided the union with the colonies be maintained; but whether our own population increases or remains stationary, that of the colonies must go on, all the faster by emigration if ours overflows, and by the end of another century, no long time in the history of a nation, may not unlikely exceed one hundred and fifty millions.

The United States, starting with a population of about two millions at the Declaration of Independence, in a hundred years has increased by fifty millions, or in the proportion of twenty-five to one.

The remnant of our colonial Empire in the temperate zone, at the time of the severance of the United States could not have contained 120,000 souls of European descent, mostly French, add to these another 120,000 as the white population of the Cape, when it was taken, say 240,000 in all, and this small number has swelled in the some period of one hundred years, in the old and new colonies, by natural means and by emigration, to the present number of eight and a half millions, or in the proportion of thirty-five to one.

Our colonies may well, therefore, in another century, with the greatly improved means of communication, and the greater value set on human life, increase from eight and a half to one hundred and fifty millions, or as eighteen or nineteen to one, but confining our calculations only to the next half century, we may fairly assume with Professor SEELEY that one hundred millions of British speaking subjects at home and abroad will be under the mark if the political connection continues.

One hundred millions of British subjects in the year of our Lord 1936 (some here present may live to see the day), only think what that means, what vast possibilities of good to the human race it suggests! By the same period there should be something like one hundred and fifty millions in the United States, a kindred race speaking the same language, possessing the same literature, and governed by the same general ideas as ourselves.

The agreement of the two great Anglo-Saxon States would mean the peace of the world, there would be, and there could be no other nation that could afford to break that peace in defiance of their mandate.

If wars are ever to cease from the land, it can only be through the existence of great commercial States, all powerful to strike if

need be, but pledged to peace by all their interests and all their feelings; States such as Germany in Central Europe, already a great make-weight for peace (temporary war scares notwithstanding), or the United States on the American Continent, or let us hope in the future a British Empire.

Nor even if war was allowed to commence anywhere, need it seriously concern such a British Empire of the future, any more than a European war now affects the United States, which secure in its vast and evergrowing latent strength, can afford to dispense almost entirely with standing armies, and can spend on peaceable progress, to the incalculable advantage of its working population, the huge sums annually expended by European nations on armaments and means of mutual destruction.

Again, before war could be declared by the mother country, the allied colonies would have something to say in the matter, and being out of Europe, where in most instances the *casus belli* would be likely to originate, they would be much less influenced by the war fever, and much better able to view the matter calmly.

That is one way of regarding the value of the colonies to England, the additions, great at present, enormous in the future, which they can bring to our material resources, union already makes both them and us less liable to attack; in the future it may make us all but invulnerable by sheer weight of numbers, and in so doing may enable us to dispense with the greater portion of that huge burden of taxation to which we now submit in order to provide an artificial means of defence.

No doubt, as an Oceanic Empire, our naval armaments must always be considerable; but even these may be reduced rather than increased as the danger of attack diminishes, and their incidence when borne by one hundred or one hundred and fifty millions instead of by thirty-six millions will be comparatively light.

Another way in which the colonies under consideration have been of the greatest value to us in the past, and must continue to be more and more so in the future, is in the matter of trade; and this is a question which comes much nearer home to us of this generation, to us present here to-night, than does the other one of population; population, at least for a sufficient development, is a matter of the future: the trade with the colonies is already a subject of the greatest moment to us, and on its continuance much of our immediate as well of our future prosperity must depend.

Sir W. W. LAWSON, in his inaugural address to the Statistical Society already quoted, says :

“ Although the system of free trade opens the markets of the whole world to our colonies, nearly one-half of their trade, amounting to 199 millions a year, is carried on with the mother country, notwithstanding all the influences, of distance, convenience, suitability of products, and competition of commercial rivals operating to reduce it.”

Of this sum about eighty-eight millions was done by the colonies now under consideration, and of the eighty-eight millions over forty millions were exports from this country, that is British goods either manufactured or handled in Great Britain ; they include such various articles as woollen and cotton fabrics, engines and machinery, rails, wire, and general hardware, agricultural tools and implements, submarine cables, glass, earthenware, boots, saddlery, leather articles, chemicals, paper, books, guns, and so forth, through an infinite variety of manufactures ; and also horses, cattle and sheep, for breeding purposes, to a considerable value.

During the same year, 1884, our five best customers among foreign countries—the United States, France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland—took about eighty-one millions ; therefore, the three groups of constitutional colonies, with a European and native population of say nine and a half millions, take half as much as our five best foreign customers, with a total population of about one hundred and fifty millions, and as might be expected, the proportion in favour of the colonies increases year by year with great rapidity. The reason of this comparatively enormous demand, mainly from Canada and Australia, is obvious enough ; these communities are mostly of British descent, they have retained with their connection with the mother country their liking for English fashions and English goods of all kinds. No doubt the trade will not continue to increase in proportion to the population ; as the latter grows it will of course rely more on its own resources, open out more than hitherto the natural wealth of the land and inaugurate its own manufactures on an ever increasing scale ; but for the present at least, and so far as we can look forward, the demand for English goods from the colonies, provided the unity of the Empire is maintained, is likely to continue to increase, and our general prosperity from that source at least to be secure.

But suppose a severance from the Empire of these colonies, if it was an unfriendly one, the results must of course be disastrous, and for many years afterwards our trade with them must fall to a

minimum, whilst even a friendly severance by setting up distinct interests and breaking the sentimental bond that now leads British colonists to patronise British manufactures, and to come home annually in tens of thousands to spend a well earned holiday in the mother country, and to take back with them fresh notions in favor of British goods as well as frequently the goods themselves, must result in an immediate loss of trade and a greater loss in the future ; and what such a loss would mean here at home with our overgrown population depending so largely on outside trade for its daily bread, I need not stop to point out, it is sufficient to say that even such a severe depression of trade as we are now suffering from, would be as absolutely nothing in comparison with that which would result from the loss of our trade with Greater Britain.

This is the second and to us at this moment by far the most practical consideration in estimating the value of the colonies to England.

A third way in which we may regard them is as homes for our surplus population.

In 1815, scarcely two thousand persons emigrated from the United Kingdoms ; in 1882, over forty thousand thus left us to seek new homes.

Now, those who go to the United States or other foreign countries, are for the most part lost for ever to the nation that gave them birth ; they take themselves, their power of work, whether mental or physical, their daily wants—to be supplied by other producers—and their potential value as fathers and mothers of future citizens, to swell the numbers and increase the wealth of other and possibly hostile nations.

Those on the other hand who go to our colonies, remain subjects of the same Crown, and continue as before, only with added energy and usefulness to fulfil the duties of citizenship to the same State.

In this address I am not concerning myself with the value of Great Britain to the colonies ; that is their concern, but of course, on most points, the benefits cannot but be reciprocal, and I should imagine, in the matter of greater security to be derived from union, for many years to come very much in their favour.

From this point of view, as suggested in the "Handbook to the Colonies," the constitutional colonies may fairly be regarded as so many great estates, inherited by all the subjects of Her

Majesty, and which are always, so long as any unoccupied lands exist, available for free distribution, or at least at prairie values, among the poor, who can or will avail themselves of the chances they offer.

There are of course, "unemployed" in Canada and Australia, as there are in the United States, or at home; and there always will be, not only because many of those who emigrate have an invincible repugnance to work of any kind, but also and more largely because too many emigrants are adapted only to the life of large cities, and are clerks or traders instead of agriculturists and shepherds. That is an evil which cannot be eradicated, which can only be combatted by warnings and official discouragements, but it does not in the least affect the general value of colonies as affording a sure means of earning a livelihood to healthy and sober emigrants not afraid of work, and who can adapt themselves to a life on the land.

Now I have already pointed out that although the self-governing colonies can be classed under one head, on many counts besides their method of government, which is in fact only a result of the main points of race, climate, and capability of future progress, which they possess in common, yet that there are very notable differences in their circumstances, so to speak.

In only one group of the three is the population anything like homogeneous and practically free from race jealousies or native embarrassments, that group of course comprises the Australian colonies and New Zealand.

With the exception of a small and diminishing population of Maoris in New Zealand, and of "Black-fellows" in the northern parts of Australia, also fast dying out, and soon as well as the Maoris to be absolutely lost in the fast increasing white population; there are neither natives nor European communities, other than Anglo-Saxon, to complicate the problems of the future.

From one end to the other, east, west, north, and south, Australia and New Zealand are British, no other language is spoken, no other nation has founded, or can now found settlements in those fortunate lands, the Anglo-Saxon there is absolute master of the situation, and absorbs and assimilates with ease, as in the United States, emigrants from any other nation.

Australia, almost alone of the colonies, has cost us little or nothing in the process of colonization. "How much did dat hat

cost you?" said one nigger to another in Virginia. "Don't know, brudder, dar was no one in the shop, time I bought him." There was practically no one in Australia when we took possession.

Australia with a total area of nearly three million square miles, has almost indefinite capabilities of expansion, indeed Australians themselves are inclined to believe that their future may rival that of the United States; without going quite so far myself, I am prepared, nevertheless, to believe much that they claim for it.

New Zealand also with an unsurpassed climate, a most fertile soil, and an area nearly as large as Great Britain and Ireland, may well grow almost without effort into a strong homogeneous nation of many millions.

For these lands the future is fair and there is not a cloud on the horizon, they have but to wait a few years more to attain their majority among nations, and then secure in their invulnerability of latent strength and isolation, no harm can ever come to them except from within, and it is hardly conceivable that disputes should ever arise among them not capable of peaceful adjustment, they have all been settled at nearly the same time, under similar conditions, and by the same classes, and there is no approach to anything like the same social differences between one Australian colony and another, as lay at the root of the war between the North and South in the United States.

The Dominion of Canada is not so happily situated in regard to its circumstances, either internal or external, as the Australias. Its total estimated area is greater—three and a half million against three million square miles—but a much larger part of this surface is probably unfitted for human occupation, and for four or five months of the year locked up by an arctic winter, whilst nearly all of its rivers and ports are closed to navigation during the winter months, and business operations more or less in abeyance.

But a far more serious difficulty that Canada may have to contend with in the future is that which arises from the separation of its population into two distinct races, speaking different languages, professing different forms of religion, and inheriting different ideas and traditions.

We need not take much account of the remnants of Indian tribes which must soon disappear before the white man, without embarrassing the future, not yet of the French half-castes, notwithstanding the recent rebellion. These half-castes, like the Indians,

are hunters and nomads, they possess no permanent national characteristics, and are merely a temporary phase of early colonization, to be soon swallowed up in the advancing tide of civilization.

But the French colonists, or Habitans as they are called, occupy altogether a different position, and so far from evincing any tendency to die out or become assimilated with the Anglo-Saxon population, they are every year in Lower Canada, that is, in the great province of Quebec, becoming more and more the dominant race, and supplanting those of British descent in every department of social life; a result partly due to their own sturdy qualities and large families, and partly to the restless energies of our own countrymen, which lead them to be always pushing out into the vast and newly opened lands of the interior, leaving the less enterprising and more contented Habitans to increase and multiply in the older portions of the colony.

These French Canadians, for the most part, have but one national sentiment. Unlike most colonists, they are not of their adopted country first, and their mother country second, or *vice versa*, they belong only to the country in which they live; they are Canadians pure and simple, and their motto is, "Canada for the Canadians," by which term they understand French Canadians, the descendants of the original settlers, and not of the British conquerors.

Their old-fashioned catholicism, fostered and absolutely controlled by their priests, their language and intense conservatism in manners and customs, keep them entirely out of sympathy with the rest of the world, as much with their original mother country, France, as with their step-mother, England.

In a certain limited sense, they are loyal to Great Britain and to the Dominion Government, but their loyalty is hardly of the sort that could be reckoned upon in times of trouble, and their race feelings and prejudices are always ready to blaze out, as in the recent instance of RIEL'S execution; when, as a community, they sided strongly with the twice unsuccessful rebel, for no other apparent reason than that he was a Catholic and half-bred French Canadian, and as in the steady way in which they ever give their support by vote or custom to the French Canadian candidate for office or the French Canadian merchant or shopkeeper.

In this distinction of races as well as in its contiguity to the overwhelming vitality of the United States lies the future danger

to the Dominion, and a special difficulty in forming between it and the rest of the Empire a close and enduring bond of union. Fortunately the greater enterprise of the Anglo-Saxons, and the rapidity with which they are spreading out over and occupying the vast interior, as well as their nearly complete control of the Eastern and Western sea boards, gives to them so great an advantage in the struggle for existence as to leave it hardly in doubt but that they must in the future control, even more than in the present, the destinies of Canada, and should the question of disintegration of the Dominion ever seriously arise, as it did between the Northern and Southern States of America, they will probably be both able and willing successfully to resist it; but the French Canadian difficulty in the meantime exists, and must be reckoned with as a potent factor in any attempts that may be made, now or hereafter, to federate or consolidate Greater Britain.

Lastly of the three groups of constitutional colonies we come to that which has most recently received responsible government, and which is in every respect alike the least important and the most troublesome.

The South African colonies have been a thorn in the side of the Colonial Office ever since 1820, and after a careful study of both sides of the question, and with the strongest feeling in favor of colonial enterprise, I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that it would have been far better for this country if we had never made a settlement in South Africa or had strictly confined it to a military occupation of Cape Town and the immediate neighbourhood, as we hold Gibraltar or Aden, as a post on the route to India, even though such an occupation would imply considerable fortification and constant readiness, that is, military expenditure.

At the present moment our South African colonies comprise, besides Cape Colony proper and its annexed districts, containing in all an area of some 240,000 square miles, or a country as large as Austro-Hungary, the Crown Colony of Natal, 21,000 square, and the protected area of Basuto Land, 10,000 square miles, and of Bechuana Land, the annexation of 1884, about 185,000 square miles; both the latter purely native territories, held solely in the interests, or at least on account of Cape Colony and Natal. Also the Zulu reserve for which we have made ourselves responsible.

The problem to be solved here is complicated to the last degree, not only by the presence in overwhelming numbers of a native race possessed of huge vitality, but by the strong Dutch Africander element in our own colonies, the existence of two independent Africander States—the Orange River Free State and the Transvaal—and of native countries, such as Pondo Land, over which we exercise a Protectorate only, and Zulu Land on our borders, as well as by the constant pressure southwards of apparently inexhaustible hordes from the interior, and as if these complications were not enough, we have recently had opened out the prospect of further disputes with European nations, in the confirmation of the Portugese claims to Delagoa Bay, of the German claims on the Southern, Western, and Eastern coasts, and of the French Protectorate over the great island of Madagascar, on the South eastern coast, a pretty kettle of fish indeed, and one which it will need all the resources of statesmanship to stew into harmony, if indeed success in the direction which we all desire is ever attained.

In the Cape Colony, the population of natives to Europeans is as three to one, or 1,240,000 to 340,000, and the population of colonists of Dutch descent to those of English, as two-and-a-half to one, or 240,000 to 100,000.

In the whole of South Africa, there are only about 120,000 of English descent against 360,000 of Dutch descent, and 2,500,000 natives.

In 1879, Mr. CHAMBERLAIN stated in the House of Commons that between 1871 and that year, South African wars had cost England £3,316,000, of which only £163,000 had been repaid, and the Zulu war involved us in a further five or six millions. Since then we have had the war with the Transvaal, and Colonel Sir Charles Warren's expedition in Bechuana Land.

In 1863, Mr. GLADSTONE, in a speech, also in the House of Commons, stated that he calculated, that Kafir, or native wars, had cost this country not less than twelve millions. In the meantime we are administering, at a great cost to ourselves, the countries of Basuto Land and Bechuana Land, and generally exercising an irresolute supervision over Zulu Land, as well as carrying on incessant and costly disputes with the Africander republics—and all this for a couple of colonies containing barely 120,000 of our own race, and importing goods from us to a less value than five millions, or about one-fifth of the value taken by our Australian colonies, which,

except in the matter of naval protection, cost, and have cost us, next to nothing. Things might not be so bad, if only our own Africander subjects, enjoying responsible government under British protection, were loyal; but by all accounts we receive from the Cape, this is far from being the case.

The French Canadians to whom I have before alluded, are, at least in ordinary times, contented and passively loyal, but a large part of the Dutch population at the Cape, seems to be in a chronic state of threatening rebellion, and regularly to oppose itself to any attempt on our part, either to promote Federation among South African States, or to draw closer the union with Great Britain.

There exists amongst them an "Africander League," which openly preaches the doctrine of Africa for the Africanders, which has recently insisted in carrying on the debates in the Cape Parliament in both languages, notwithstanding the patent inconvenience of such a course, and which would seem to be trying in all directions to exalt the Dutch colonist at the expense of the British.

Some part of our difficulties have arisen no doubt from the grant of responsible government in 1872, nor does it appear that at that time there was any sufficient demand for such an innovation, whilst the small proportion of European colonists to the native population, and the race differences existing between the former, all argued strongly against it, and in favor of the firm rule and single authority of a Crown Colony, but the Colonial Office was, I suppose, weary of much serving, and anxious, as usual, to evade responsibility, and shift the burden of deciding on a course of action amongst so many, and such divergent interests on to other shoulders. As a natural result of such weakness, the Colonial Office has found itself more worried and pressed than before, and learnt in the most practical way that a Constitutional Government may sometimes cause it more trouble than a Crown Administration.

Basuto Land, conquered for, and annexed to the Cape Colony, has by it, been repudiated and thrown back on the Colonial Office, and the incorporation of Bechuana Land with Cape Colony has also been declined, practical politicians out there, well understanding that it was equally useful for their purposes, and much cheaper, that England should administer and pay for these troublesome acquisitions.

Now when we come to consider fairly all these draw-backs we may well ask, of what value are such colonies to us? and frankly in this case I admit that I don't think they are at present at least of any value, on the contrary they are a distinct source of weakness, both military and financial, and if we could bring ourselves to treat the question simply as men of business, we might without the least hesitation, vote to let South Africa go, and retain only by force, if so advised by military experts, a few miles of territory around Cape Town as a station on the alternative route to India, and to prevent an enemy from establishing himself on such a point of vantage.

It is true that in so doing we should throw up absolutely any chance of recouping ourselves indirectly for the twenty millions odd already expended in fighting native battles for the colonists—Dutch and English; that we should leave the rest of South Africa a possible and very probable prey to the first great power, France or Germany, that chose to step into our shoes, who, commencing, as they would do, where we left off, would derive all the benefit of our profuse expenditure of blood and treasure; and after all, whether wisely or righteously spent or not, our money and lives have not been spent altogether in vain since the great native clans or chieftanships, which successively threatened the white man's supremacy, have one after another been broken up and reduced to submission, so that there is not at this moment in South Africa, since the suppression of the Zulu "fighting machine," a single chieftain or tribe powerful enough to threaten serious danger to the colonies.

But I would rather that we should write all this past expenditure off as a bad debt and wash our hands of the whole business, than continue to throw good money after bad, on the chance that South Africa may one day, under our management, become a powerful and united State in alliance with the rest of Greater Britain, did such a course seem permissible on other considerations; but I fear it is not so, and that here, as elsewhere, we have by the acts of those who preceded us, as well as by our own acts in recent times, incurred moral responsibilities which we cannot shirk, and that there is no honourable alternative before us but to go right on, making the best we can of a bad job, and endeavouring by a patient, wise and firm policy so to order matters as gradually to teach our Dutch subjects that their best interests lie in a firm union with the rest of the Empire, our native subjects that we can and will protect them in the peaceful possession of their lives and

liberties, and our troublesome Africander neighbours, that whilst we are willing to leave them "to stew in their own juices," we will not tolerate incursions on our borders or attacks on natives under our protection.

With South Africa this brief review of the colonies comes to a conclusion.

Let me now sum up what I conceive to be the leading points in connection with our colonial Empire :—

1. Our colonial Empire still increases vigorously, not only in population by natural means, but also in area by new annexations and Protectorates.
2. The present colonial question is comparatively modern and its urgency quite recent, since the bulk of our colonies date as such, only since the Peace of 1815 ; and by far the most important of them, always omitting India, practically since Her Majesty ascended the throne in 1837.
3. Owing to the vastness of the areas and populations concerned, the question is one of the greatest magnitude and importance.
4. Although our present colonial Empire is in effect the second this country has formed, it is also the last it can form, and if it be now taken from us or abandoned it cannot be replaced by a third.
5. Taken altogether, this colonial Empire, although a source of considerable direct cost, and some weakness and even danger in regard to certain of its components, nevertheless adds enormously to the general resources, and consequently to the material greatness of the British nation.
6. Whether we were justified in taking them or not, we cannot now part with the leading colonies without incurring much personal loss and consequent suffering among the working classes.
7. In some of the most important Crown Colonies, we have incurred moral responsibilities in connection with the natives, and to a less extent with the whites, which we cannot ignore.
8. This colonial Empire is composed of two quite distinct elements.
 - a India and the Crown Colonies, which are mainly tropical and inhabited by native races, and which can never be united with us in complete political equality ; but their association with ourselves must always ultimately depend on our material and intellectual superiority.

b The self-governing colonies, which are mainly situated in temperate climates, and inhabited by men of our own race, who may form an equal and complete political union with ourselves.

9.—The tendency of modern States, autocratic, constitutional, and democratic alike, is in the direction of union; accumulated strength from sheer bigness, a few huge States must soon between them rule the world. Our action in regard to our colonies will decide whether we shall be among the rulers or the ruled.

These are, I think, the leading facts which require to be kept clearly in view, whenever the colonial question is under consideration.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I have much to say with regard to the means that may be adopted to strengthen and consolidate the union—such as it is—between the various portions of the Empire—the means that have been suggested during the partly-sentimental, partly-practical movements of the last two or three years in favour of the colonial connection, but I have already run out my hour glass, and in your interests solely, and much against my own feelings, I am compelled to omit all this part of my subject.

I will only say now, that in the main I agree with the most recent suggestion put forward by Mr. FROUDE in “Oceana,” a suggestion, itself the natural outcome of the unsatisfactory results of the discussion of previous propositions, and that is, just to leave matters alone, to take no direct steps towards federation that are not distinctly asked for or cordially accepted by the constitutional colonies themselves, but—and the “but” is important—to do our best to maintain and develop friendly feelings in a variety of minor ways. To cultivate to the utmost the sentiment of blood relationship. To accustom ourselves to look upon these colonies (Div. II.) as really parts of one stem with ourselves, and not as fruit which must ripen and fall off. To promote an arrangement for mutual naval and military defence, and then to trust to time, education, habit, commerce, and sentiment to do the rest.

With regard to the first and third divisions, the Crown Colonies and India, since for the reasons I have given, I do not see that these can ever be admitted into a really equal union with the rest of the Empire or Commonwealth, and, in fact, it would be very undesirable that they should.

“Man is the nobler growth our realms supply,
And souls are ripened in our northern skies.”

An intimate association with Eastern or tropical races would conduce neither to our physical nor moral robustness. I can only suggest in their case that we should give them good government and good laws, and associate by degrees their leading men with our own officers in the task of administration, always retaining to ourselves the ultimate authority, and to that end maintaining in or near them, under Imperial control, a sufficient naval or military force. In short, CROMWELL'S advice to his troops before the battle of Dunbar should be our motto here :

“Put your faith in Providence and keep your powder dry.”

Believe me, this question of a closer union with our free colonies is one of the highest importance to us all—to ourselves in the future even more than to the colonists, and amongst ourselves, to the working classes in particular, their comforts, the very means of existence to many of them, are dependent on the continued stability of our colonial Empire. It is no class question, no question now of provision for younger sons, though younger sons may still obtain more than their share of official appointments; no party question; all of us now, whatever our political opinions, whatever our station in life, are more or less directly concerned in the maintenance of the unity and integrity of the Empire.


The only reason why the vast importance of the subject has not been hitherto more fully recognised and more generally taught has been, I suppose, the indistinctness due to distance, and the apparent complication and multiplicity of details.

It has been like a mass of clouds on the horizon, shapeless apparently and wanting definition, until the sunlight falls upon them, when they stand out in full relief, with all their upper outlines clear and distinct against the blue sky beyond, dissipating as they advance under the genial influence of the sun's rays, or deepening into storm-threatening masses if the light again fades off them.

We are, all of us, too apt to concentrate our attention on nearer and more distinct objects, or as Mr. SNIDER, of breechloader fame, once expressed himself to my father in regard to the cautious tendencies of business men, “too ready to place the cent so close to the eye that we cannot see the dollar in the distance.” A death at our own door is a more shocking event to most of us than an


earthquake in South America which swallows up ten thousand lives at one stroke.

On this great question let us try to realize the position of the colonies, their size and growing importance in the world. Let us study them on the spot, if we can, here at home, with maps and history, and statistical reports if not. Let us by all means manage our domestic affairs ourselves, and in our own ways, but do not let us forget that Greater Britain, of which they and we alike form part, and to which, affect what carelessness we may, we are all of us at times proud to belong.





BIRMINGHAM :

PRINTED BY J. L. ALLDAY, SUCCESSOR TO T. H. LAKINS, EDMUND STREET.









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