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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

—————
JULY 13, 1951
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UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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COMMUNIST TACTICS AMONG VETERANS' GROUPS
(Testimony of John T. Pace)

FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, James B. Frazier, Jr. (appearance as noted in transcript), Harold H. Velde, Bernard W. Kearney, Donald L. Jackson.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Donald T. Appell, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order.

Let the record disclose that there are present the following members of the committee: Messrs. Walter, Doyle, Velde, Kearney, Jackson, and Wood.

Who are you going to call, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. There is one witness here today whose appearance from force of circumstances has been continued several times during the Hollywood and the Baltimore hearings, and I would like to interrupt the Baltimore hearings to call him now. It is Mr. John T. Pace.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Pace, will you stand and be sworn, please. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PACE. I do.

Mr. WOOD. Have a seat.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. PACE

(NOTE.—Mr. Pace was presented with a transcript of his testimony taken in executive session by the Committee on Un-American Activities on August 23, 1949, and, after identifying it as his testimony, he was asked the following question by the chairman:)

Mr. WOOD. Is it the testimony that you gave, substantially as you gave it, or are there any corrections that you want to make in it now?

Mr. PACE. Well, I would appreciate the opportunity of rephrasing a couple of paragraphs in it, and adding a little bit to it, inasmuch as before I was just picked out of the clear sky.

(NOTE.—The testimony of John T. Pace and Joseph Zack Kornfeder heretofore taken was directed to be incorporated in and made a part of this hearing and is as follows:)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. PACE AND JOSEPH ZACK KORNFEDER, ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1949, BEFORE THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, IN EXECUTIVE SESSION

The special subcommittee of one met, pursuant to call, in room 226 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C., on August 23, 1949, at 10:30 a. m., Hon. John S. Wood (chairman), presiding.

Committee member present: Representative John S. Wood.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; and Benjamin Mandel, [then] director of research.

Mr. WOOD. A special subcommittee of one is sitting this morning to hear testimony concerning Communist tactics among veterans' groups. The record will disclose that this is a subcommittee of one, consisting of the chairman.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, the witness this morning is Mr. John T. Pace, of Tennessee.

Mr. WOOD. Do you solemnly swear that evidence and testimony which you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PACE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. PACE

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that Mr. Tavenner, the counsel, and I have other commitments today, I request that Mr. Mandel, director of research, conduct the examination of the witness.

Mr. WOOD. It is so ordered.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Pace, will you give us your address?

Mr. PACE. Centerville, Tenn., Route 1.

Mr. MANDEL. When and where were you born?

Mr. PACE. Hickman, Ky.

Mr. MANDEL. When?

Mr. PACE. November 12, 1897.

Mr. MANDEL. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. I have been.

Mr. MANDEL. When did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. Approximately in the spring of 1931—or sometime in the winter of 1930 or 1931.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us what official positions you held in the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. Well, at first I was unit organizer of the Lincoln Park unit of the Michigan district of the Ford section. Then I was assigned to unemployed council work—chairman of the unemployed council in Lincoln Park. A short time after, I attended the workers' school.

Mr. MANDEL. In what city?

Mr. PACE. At the workers' camp in Farmington, Mich., and I was made a member of section 7 of the Communist Party known as the Ford section. Then I became a member of the district committee.

Mr. MANDEL. Of what organization?

Mr. PACE. Of district 7 of the Communist Party in Michigan. Later on I was made a member of the district bureau, and in 1932 I was made the organizer of the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League of Michigan.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League?

Mr. PACE. It was the veterans' organization, organized and controlled by the Communist Party.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the unemployed council?

Mr. PACE. The unemployed council was the organization of unemployed, organized and controlled by the Communist Party. I was State organizer of the unemployed council in the State of Michigan.

Mr. MANDEL. Were you at one time active in the "bonus march" of 1932?

Mr. PACE. I was.

Mr. MANDEL. When did you leave the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. In the early part of 1935, officially. I had ceased activities in late 1934 and made the public announcement in 1935 through the Detroit News.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show that the Daily Worker of May 7, 1936, page 3, carries a notice of expulsion of John Pace from the Communist Party. Mr. Pace, sometimes referred to as George Pace, is also mentioned as a leader of the left-wing contingent, as a leader of the bonus march, in the Daily Worker of June 6, June 18, June 22, and July 4, 1932. The Washington Post of July 31, 1932, page 3, shows John T. Pace as one of the leaders of the bonus march. A book by John Henry Bartlett, entitled "The Bonus March and the New Deal," shows John Pace addressing left-wingers on page 40.

Mr. Pace, the committee is interested principally in your activities in connection with the bonus march of 1932. Is it your opinion that this question is of current importance?

Mr. PACE. Well, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you explain?

Mr. PACE. Well, because of the magnitude of this bonus march and the attitude as created by the public toward the bonus march, it was brought about that many mistakes were made by both the leadership of the bonus march and the Government—both on the national and local scale—and a résumé of the whole procedure would be educational in the future handling of any similar situations.

Mr. MANDEL. Do you believe that your activities in the bonus march fitted in with the policies of the party in connection with the movement among the unemployed?

Mr. PACE. Well, the policies which I had to carry out as a party member in the bonus march were identical with the policies pursued by the party in all other mass undertakings.

Mr. MANDEL. Prior to the bonus march, what activities did you carry out among the unemployed?

Mr. PACE. Well, I organized the "hunger march" to Lansing.

Mr. MANDEL. About when was that?

Mr. PACE. That was in 1931, I was sent to Ann Arbor, Mich., and organized a strike of the WPA relief workers in Ann Arbor and

was busy most of the time in organizing unemployed councils throughout the Detroit area and organized demonstrations at the various relief stations throughout Detroit.

Mr. MANDEL. Then you consider the bonus march as being supplemental to that movement?

Mr. PACE. That is right—the party activities in the bonus marches. The hunger marches to a certain degree laid the basis for the bonus march.

Mr. MANDEL. At this point, I would like to introduce another witness, Mr. Joseph Zack Kornfeder. Mr. Kornfeder, you have been previously sworn?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. PACE AND JOSEPH ZACK KORNFEDER

Mr. MANDEL. Were you a member of the central committee of the Communist Party at the time of the bonus march and previous thereto?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was a member of the central committee of the Communist Party at the time of the bonus march. I was a member of the New York district committee of the Communist Party and participated in meetings of the central committee of the party.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Kornfeder, could you give us a background from the standpoint of the central committee of the Communist Party that would indicate the aims and purposes of the party in the bonus march?

Mr. KORNFEDER. The Communist Party at that time concentrated its entire effort to take advantage of the depression then existing in the United States and for that purpose had organized a special front known as the unemployed councils. Supplementary to that effort of taking advantage of the depression, they had also organized a special front to operate among the veterans. This front was then known as the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League.

The Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League, early in its existence, had raised the issue of the payment of the bonus due the ex-servicemen and needled the regular veterans' organizations through propaganda and otherwise, to get them on their side of this issue of the bonus in order to extend their influence among the veterans.

Mr. MANDEL. It would seem that the first contingent of veterans started out from Oregon sometime in the middle of May 1932. Would you say that this group was Communist inspired?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, this group may have been affected by Communist agitation, but it was certainly not led by Communists. This group was a spontaneous manifestation of the desire of the veterans to obtain payment of the bonus right then and there.

Mr. MANDEL. As other contingents began to participate, what position did the party find itself in?

Mr. KORNFEDER. The spontaneous outburst of the bonus march created a crisis in the central committee of the Communist Party, because the party, although working for the creation of such a movement, had, as it were, missed the boat in getting it started; so it started by itself and the problem then arose as to what could be done to get hold of this runaway movement and catch up with it.

Mr. MANDEL. Were any members of the central committee of the party assigned specifically to supervise the policy of this movement at that time?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. Yes, there was one assigned to supervise and direct the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League and its policies—William W. Weinstone.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us who William W. Weinstone was?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. William W. Weinstone was then a leading member of the central committee of the Communist Party and a former representative of the Communist Party of the United States to the executive committee of the Communist International in Moscow.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show that the Voice of Labor for June 2, 1922, page 4, shows William W. Weinstone as a member of the central executive committee of the Workers' Party of America, predecessor of the Communist Party, U.S.A.; the International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr) for August 1, 1928, page 750, shows William W. Weinstone as a member of the program commission of the Communist International. The same publication for November 21, 1928, page 1547, shows him as a member of the international control commission of the Communist International. The Communist, official theoretical organ of the Communist Party, U.S.A., for November 1931, page 960, shows Mr. Weinstone as a member of the secretariat of the Communist Party, U. S. A.

Was anyone else assigned to this work to assist Mr. Weinstone?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. Yes. Weinstone operated in the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League through Levin.

Mr. MANDEL. Emanuel Levin?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. That is right; and Stember.

Mr. MANDEL. Is that Samuel Stember?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. And who assisted Weinstone? Was any member of the central executive committee assigned to assist Weinstone?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. Well, Weinstone was to work under the direction of the political bureau of the central committee and specifically under the direction of the then representative of the Communist International known by various names—one whose name is Alpi.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show that Mario Alpi, also known as Fred Brown and Mario Mariani, was a representative to this country of the Communist International during the period of the early thirties. Have you ever heard of the name of Israel Amter, and what would be his connection with this movement?

Mr. KORNFEDEK. Israel Amter was then a member of the central committee of the Communist Party charged with supervising activities among the unemployed, which was to be carried out through the unemployed councils. Inasmuch as the unemployed councils were a part of the whole movement among the unemployed, they were made to back the bonus-march activities of the party and participate in it.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show that Israel Amter has been identified by Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, U. S. A., on September 5, 1939, before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, as a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A. Before a House Committee Investigating Un-American Activities in November and December 1930, Israel Amter identified himself as a member of the political committee of the Communist Party and district organizer for New York. The proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Interna-

tional held June 17 to July 8, 1924, show Israel Amter as a delegate. The book, *I Confess*, by Benjamin Gitlow, former member of the central executive committee of the Communist Party, shows Israel Amter as a fellow member of the central committee and as party representative in Moscow. See pages 133, 152, 155, and 231. The record will further show that on March 6, 1930, a hunger march was held, supported by the unemployed councils and the Communist party throughout the country. The *Daily Worker* of February 3, 1932, page 1, carries a headline, "Into the streets tomorrow against hunger war."

Now Mr. Pace, you have heard Mr. Kornfeder's sketch of the background of this movement, would you say that it was influenced at all by the various marches on Washington, organized by the Communists?

Mr. PACE. Well, I think all of the Communist activities among the unemployed and these local marches to State governments and the larger marches to the National Capitol, had planted the idea of these marches in the minds of millions of people.

Mr. MANDEL. Did the Communists in some cases occupy State capitols?

Mr. PACE. Well, I remember in one instance where the hunger marchers to Lansing, Mich., slept on the capitol grounds.

Mr. MANDEL. Now, Mr. Pace, will you describe in detail the beginning and the organization of the Communist contingent of the bonus march as it operated from Michigan?

Mr. PACE. Well, a few months prior to the bonus march, we organized the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League.

Mr. MANDEL. About what month did you say that was?

Mr. PACE. I would say that it was around the first part of the year 1932. And in the general slogans connecting up the slogans on unemployment insurance, and so forth, the slogan was also developed demanding an immediate cash payment of the bonus in the early months of the year the main slogans were to hold mass meetings and local demonstrations and send telegrams to your Congressmen and Senators demanding immediate cash payment of the bonus. I believe it was the latter part of April or the first of May that we began to raise the question of a march to Washington.

Mr. MANDEL. Who raised the question, as far as you remember?

Mr. PACE. The *Daily Worker*, which was a guide to party activities throughout the various sections of the country.

Mr. MANDEL. Was the matter discussed at all in the district committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. At a district plenum held sometime in the early part of May they had on the agenda at that time the question of the veterans, at which meeting the question was then seriously discussed as to the possibility of a bonus march to Washington and from that time on the program centered on a march to Washington.

Mr. MANDEL. Now, will you describe in detail what took place thereafter?

Mr. PACE. Well, as the news began to come in that there was a movement on foot of veterans going to Washington, many schemes were tried to prevent the veterans from going to Washington, particularly in Detroit—the Wayne County council of the American Legion sponsored a parade of veterans. The plan of this parade was to parade

by city hall where they would be welcomed and addressed by the then mayor, Frank Murphy, then proceed to the Veterans Building, where a mass meeting would be held. The party immediately called a party fraction where they discussed plans of taking over this parade. I was assigned to the task with Leonard Woods, a Negro veteran, and Walter Eicker. We immediately got out a leaflet, and took our party-member veterans with members of the unemployed council, and distributed ourselves among this parade with this leaflet. We gave each participant in the parade a leaflet and we adopted the party slogans such as "We demand the cash payment of the bonus," "We demand unemployment insurance," "We demand transportation to Washington," and so forth.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the main slogan?

Mr. PACE. "We demand the immediate cash payment of the bonus."

Mr. MANDEL. Was there special emphasis on the march to Washington?

Mr. PACE. Yes. That was one of the demands. So the anxiety of the men to go to Washington and the economic pressure that was placed upon them was such that our slogans had an immediate effect, and because of our influence in this march the parade was not stopped at city hall and the auditorium was closed at the Veterans Building, so when the commander of the parade spoke to the veterans and told them that they had done a good job, that this was the kind of action that would get the bonus and he himself adjourned the meeting, I then took the steps and made an appeal to the veterans to march to Washington. But prior to this time I had established a headquarters across the street from the Veterans Building under the name of the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League and had registration cards prepared to register all veterans who wanted to march to Washington. So we took over the meeting immediately and went across the street and set up a desk, and girls of the Young Communist League were assigned to register all veterans who wished to march to Washington. We didn't ask them for any discharge papers or identification.

Mr. MANDEL. How many persons took part in the Legion parade, approximately?

Mr. PACE. I would say around 300 or 400.

Mr. MANDEL. How many Communists took part?

Mr. PACE. I would say possibly 8 or 10.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed with what happened.

Mr. PACE. So, in the meantime we were making arrangements for a mass meeting in the Cass Technical High School.

Mr. MANDEL. Do you have the date of that meeting?

Mr. PACE. No; I don't have the exact date; but it was around the 27th or 28th of May.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show that the Daily Worker of May 27, 1932, page 1, describes a meeting of veterans in the Cass Technical High School in Detroit held on May 23, 1932. Will you proceed.

Mr. PACE. Thousands of leaflets were distributed announcing this meeting, and approximately 1,500 came to the meeting, where speeches were made on behalf of a march to Washington by me and Judge Edward Jeffries. A bonus-march committee was elected at that time and I was elected the contingent commander.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you say that the party group ran this meeting?

Mr. PACE. It certainly did.

Mr. MANDEL. Did they select the committee and officers?

Mr. PACE. Well, the party has a method of appearing to elect committees by offering proposals from the party and that is the manner in which we elected this committee. In other words, I picked the committee and made the proposal to the membership and they voted for it.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you get any instructions from the district committee of the party on whom to select?

Mr. PACE. No; that was in the party fraction's hands, but they were appointed by the district committee, which consisted of myself, Eicker, and Woods.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, the party fraction ran the entire meeting?

Mr. PACE. That is right—where immediate plans were set for the march to Washington to start the following morning.

Mr. MANDEL. After the meeting, did you report what happened to the office of the Communist Party in Detroit?

Mr. PACE. I reported the action to Rudolph Baker, the district organizer of the Communist Party of Michigan.

Mr. MANDEL. What happened next?

Mr. PACE. Well, on June 1, the morning of June 1, the call was sent out to meet at the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League headquarters.

Mr. MANDEL. Do you remember the address of the headquarters?

Mr. PACE. I do not remember the number, but it was on Jefferson Avenue East, opposite the Veterans Building in Detroit.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed?

Mr. PACE. We expected over 1,000 veterans, and there was a terrific downpour of rain all morning. About 450 veterans showed up for this parade. We immediately divided them into contingents and placed a member of the party fraction in charge of each contingent, together with two nonparty members who showed militancy and ability in leadership, and proceeded to march to city hall, where streetcars were commandeered and rode to the city limits, about a mile from the railroad yards. There we were told by the Pennsylvania Railroad police force and the Detroit police force that no transportation was available. After a pep meeting, we proceeded to march to the railroad yards and upon our arrival found a freight train of gondolas ready to transport us out of Michigan.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Pace, who said that the group should commandeer the streetcars? Was that in line with Communist Party policies and tactics?

Mr. PACE. Well, any other method would have been out of line with Communist Party tactics. The party tried to instill in the minds of the workers that all these things were the result of the labor of the workers and that they had a right to commandeer them and take them.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you make speeches along the line in conformity with the party's policy?

Mr. PACE. I did.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the tenor of such speeches?

Mr. PACE. Well, I was instructed to act as a veteran, not as a party member. I was just to act as a veteran and leave the high political slogans out for the time being. The party realized that these veterans were members of the American Legion and other veteran organizations and that they were very sensitive to unpatriotic remarks. Therefore,

we were to use softer phrases—and my story to the veterans was that the Government had all kinds of money to spend on the repair, upkeep, and expenses of these railroad companies during the war, but we, the veterans who fought for the preservation of these things, were not allowed to ride on them by permission, so, therefore, our only alternative was to ride them without permission.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, the party policy was to encourage violation of law?

Mr. PACE. That is right. The party instruction was to support the demands of veterans in all of their struggles and specifically where their actions were self-initiated in defiance of the law. I might add here that in support of this movement, the party machine got into action to mobilize the organizations of its own, such as the International Workers' Order, the International Labor Defense, the Workers' International Relief, and the Young Communist League, to support the bonus marchers in such things as housing and legal assistance in all the cities throughout the march.

Mr. MANDEL. Did some of these organizations provide funds?

Mr. PACE. These organizations participated in a sort of tag day—providing canisters and marching along the street collecting funds.

Mr. MANDEL. Did they provide food?

Mr. PACE. When we arrived in Toledo, the Workers' International Relief had sleeping quarters provided for the marchers—also supper was prepared for the bonus marchers.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed with the developments of the march?

Mr. PACE. Well the party, in line with its general plan, had organized a mass meeting in Toledo, which the bonus marchers attended that evening and a delegate was sent to the mayor and the railroad officials demanding transportation out of Toledo.

Mr. MANDEL. Was the party interested primarily in the bonus issue when it arrived in a city like Toledo, or did it attempt to capitalize the situation in any way?

Mr. PACE. Well, it attempted to capitalize the situation by conforming to its general policy of creating as much drama as could possibly be created in order to focus the eyes of as many people upon the magnitude of this march as could be done.

Mr. MANDEL. What do you mean by dramatize?

Mr. PACE. Well, by having parades, meetings, placards, slogans—making lots of noise.

Mr. MANDEL. What would they accomplish in towns on the way by such tactics?

Mr. PACE. They accomplished their main purpose of attracting attention of the great masses of people.

Mr. MANDEL. Did they get additional contingents that way?

Mr. PACE. Yes, I would say they did. For instance, Toledo reported about 100 marchers ready to join the delegation, but by the time we left, it had swelled to 200.

Mr. MANDEL. Did they raise money this way?

Mr. PACE. The Workers' International Relief, unemployed councils, and the Young Communist League were busy with the canisters at all meetings, parades, and so forth, collecting funds.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed with your account?

Mr. PACE. Our delegations were again told that no transportation could be provided, so on the following morning we began to

march toward the railroad yards and upon arrival found a train waiting to take us farther.

Upon arrival in Cleveland, we again found that sleeping quarters had been provided, and food, by the Workers' International Relief and they had also secured a truck and had gathered a truckload of food, sandwiches, and so forth, to accompany the bonus marchers to Washington, with the sign "Workers' International Relief" on the truck and there we were joined by another party fraction of the Cleveland district and were instructed to contact the district organizer of the Ohio district. So again, the same procedure was followed; the delegations went to the mayor of Cleveland and to the railroad officials for transportation and were refused—so we proceeded to march to the railroad yards, after we had been joined by the Toledo and Cleveland delegations, which numbered at that time around 900, and there we found a different situation. We found the determination on the part of the officials of the railroad company to refuse to furnish transportation any further, and the prayer we had had all along we felt then had begun to be answered. The going had been a little too easy to suit the leadership, which was the Communist leadership, so quite a stay developed there.

We were determined to fight it out and the officers in charge were determined we wouldn't get any further. We held meetings and had speakers and had parades, and the party organized meetings throughout Cleveland and various districts, demanding that the mayor and the railroad company get us transportation, and in a last meeting on the grounds of the railroad yards, we elected a committee of 25 to contact the officials of the railroad company. Well, at 11 o'clock that night they said for me to come up and see them. So we demanded a committee of 25. After an hour's discussion we were still informed that all the trains had been rerouted, and that no train would be coming through the yards, and that they didn't intend to furnish transportation. Then on the morning—I believe it was the morning—of the 4th, June 4, I received a call to the party office and was told to get in touch with Emanuel Levin in Washington for instructions. Prior to this, we had organized groups to take over switches, engines, in the yards and a group of 75 took over the roundhouse. While I was at party headquarters in Cleveland, the police had succeeded in taking these committees off the trains and out of the roundhouse and had taken them over again.

When I came back and found this situation, I immediately called a meeting and we went into the yards and took the engines back from the police and ran the police out of the roundhouse—we took full possession of the yards.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you say that this policy of taking over private property was conscious or just accidental?¹

Mr. PACE. Well, on our part it was conscious. It was something we had sort of been praying for as a preliminary training to the masses on how to do these things and to build in their minds a hatred for private-owned property and Government control. So that created a situation where the officials had to provide transportation or else they would be confronted with a pretty bad situation in Cleveland. They decided

¹ See p. 1946, for enlargement upon answer to this question.

to drive us out of Cleveland and that evening they came down and took over the engines and took over the railroad yards, set up machine guns on the tracks under floodlight in the roundhouse, and began to give us pretty strict orders. This compelled them to use the entire police force of Cleveland, with the result, according to the papers the following morning, that many business places in Cleveland were robbed and much dissatisfaction arose among the citizenry or populace of Cleveland, which made us very gleeful.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show that on May 17, 1932, the Daily Worker carried a call for the national committee of the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League for a march on Washington to report there on June 8, 1932. Will you proceed?

Mr. PACE. It was; at least we took it to be more or less evident, that they were trying to keep our contingent from reaching Washington by that date because we seemed to be the only really organized group that was going to get into Washington as one piece, and of course we were just as determined to try to get there by that date, although we were much more satisfied to develop these struggles in the line of march than we were to make the demonstration in Washington on the 8th—they were more important to us. Because of the numerous mass meetings and parades and because of the publicity received by this action on the part of the officials of Cleveland and the railroad company that night in the yards, by depriving the citizens of Cleveland of any protection whatsoever, bringing tens of thousands of citizens to the scene, was exactly what the party wanted, to dramatize the whole situation. We then decided that we had obtained our purpose and proceeded to march out of Cleveland inasmuch as the trains had all been rerouted and there was no possibility of getting a ride.

We proceeded to march to a ball park some 6 or 8 miles out, where we were fed from the truck of the Workers' International Relief, and slept and rested until the following afternoon. Due to the experiences of the Cleveland situation, the whole attitude of the railroad officials and local city officials had been changed and we were provided transportation from there on to Washington without any difficulty. In many cities, food and hot coffee were provided—but this was given us on the outskirts of the city.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you contact party headquarters in Washington when you arrived in Washington?

Mr. PACE. I contacted Emanuel Levin—which were my instructions upon arrival—who was in charge of National Professional Bonus March Committee assigned by the party.

Mr. MANDEL. Was there a headquarters for the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League in Washington?

Mr. PACE. I don't know about a headquarters for the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League. It was a joint headquarters of the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League and the National Professional Bonus March Committee at 905 I Street NW.

Mr. MANDEL. Could you summarize what were your general party instructions in connection with the bonus march and the instructions given to the other contingents?

Mr. PACE. Well, the party line was laid down in the Daily Worker. Of course the instructions, by virtue of the mechanism of the party, would be sent to all districts, as it would be sent to the Michigan district, and the tactics to be used would be the same in all parts of the

country. I might add here that where the party had sufficient organizational strength, these tactics were carried out.

Mr. MANDEL. The record will show instructions for bonus march contingents in the Daily Worker of June 3, 1932, page 3. The Daily Worker of June 8, 1932, announced that "The Workers Ex-Servicemen's League are resorting to mass action." Will you describe for us the developments that took place in Washington and the party's policy?

Mr. PACE. The first thing, we contacted Levin at the National Professional Bonus March Committee's headquarters where a party fraction was called to develop a strategy for our work in Washington and to decide upon the right tactics to carry them out.

Mr. MANDEL. Who addressed this meeting?

Mr. PACE. Emanuel Levin. This party fraction was composed of party members from Chicago, headed by a Negro by the name of Gardner, leading local party member from New York, and myself, Woods, and Eicker from Michigan. Quite a discussion developed as to whether we would distribute our contingent among the already established camps or whether we would settle in one camp of our own. After this discussion, we concluded that we should settle in a camp to ourselves in order to create a basis for operations. We had learned that a part of our contingent had already been sent to Camp Anacostia and about 100 had been billeted in Camp Bartlett. I immediately contacted Camp Bartlett and registered there as a bonus marcher.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you say that the Communist-controlled contingent was strictly limited to veterans?

Mr. PACE. I believe that it would run at least 90 percent veterans. There is no question but that there were some in there who were not veterans because we registered everyone who came in and said he was a veteran.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed?

Mr. PACE. Upon my contact with Camp Bartlett, I found a situation there that was depressing to the number of veterans billeted in that camp. It seems that one leader of the camp had become deposed and a Major French was the provost marshal of the camp. It also seemed that a major part of the food was given to Anacostia and that the cooking in the camp wasn't satisfactory. In other words, there was quite a confusion and dissatisfaction in camp. I immediately sensed that and called a meeting of my contingent, dividing them into groups and giving instructions, and told them how to penetrate other contingents in the camp to organize a mass meeting that evening in the camp.

I proceeded then back to headquarters in Washington, where I reported the conditions and was instructed by Levin to go back to this meeting and raise the question of a march of all the veterans in Camp Bartlett to Washington.

In the meantime, I went out and looked for a place to billet and found very suitable buildings at Thirteenth and B Streets SW. In the meantime, my contingent, through its committees, had been busy agitating for this meeting. When I arrived just before time to start the meeting, I found that all of the contingent in the camp had gathered for this meeting. I appealed to these men to march on to Washington, D. C., telling them that I had secured headquarters and a place to stay and that it was foolish to travel hundreds and thousands of miles and be stopped 8 or 10 miles from Washington.

Mr. MANDEL. These buildings that you spoke of—what kind of buildings were they?

Mr. PACE. They seemed to be former apartment buildings which had been condemned to be removed for the Federal program in this area.

Mr. MANDEL. Who owned the buildings?

Mr. PACE. I don't know whether they were Federal or local.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed.

Mr. PACE. I also found a very bad situation of the police rule in the camp. They had a big, tall Texas guy as sheriff, with a number of deputies, who was conducting a most ruthless campaign against any friend of the veterans in the camp whatsoever. The top leadership of the Michigan contingent were in jail when I arrived in the camp. I went to the jail, upon receiving this information, and informed these leaders whom I had put in charge of this contingent that they didn't have any set ordinances in Camp Bartlett, they didn't have any right to appoint a sheriff, deputies, and so forth, and that we refused to recognize them. I told my men to tell this sheriff to "Go to hell," and come on with me, which they did.

The following morning, after the meeting that evening, we took our blankets and our mess kits that had been issued to us in the camp and proceeded to march to Washington. Major French and two District of Columbia policemen stepped in the gateway and told us that we could not go to Washington. Of course, we knew that 3 people couldn't stop 700 or 800, so we just pushed them out of the way and proceeded to march to Thirteenth and B Streets SW. As soon as we occupied the grounds, or shortly thereafter, we were visited by the District of Columbia Police Commissioner, General Glassford. He immediately became very fraternal with us. We were busy building furnaces to cook on, cleaned out the apartment, took shower baths, and he furnished us with the necessary straw ticks, straw, and cooking utensils, and food for the first real supper that we had had since we left; and we were quite disturbed by the fact that the men began to think quite a bit of General Glassford, which didn't do our cause any too much good. And we found it rather difficult to carry on a smear campaign against a man who was giving them everything they asked for. On the other hand, the other section of our contingent that was directed to Camp Anacostia, where they were treated rather roughly, searched, and forced to stand under guard all night, had a completely different attitude. They had no way of knowing how to contact the other contingent until it had appeared in the newspapers that we had established headquarters at Thirteenth and B Streets SW. Then they began to evacuate the camp in pairs and small groups, and so forth, until all of them had come into our contingent. After 2 or 3 days of this treatment, they proved to be the most militant element in our camp and were very anxious for some kind of a program to go back and carry out in the Anacostia camp.

Mr. MANDEL. Let the record show that the Daily Worker of June 21, 1932, page 1, describes veteran seizure of Government buildings. The Daily Worker of June 22, 1932, page 3, mentioned Pace as "elected corps commander of the seized building area." The Daily Worker of July 4, 1932, page 1, carries the headline "Vets Cheer George Pace at Capitol."

Will you continue, Mr. Pace?

Mr. PACE. After a meeting with the top party fraction, headed by Levin, the methods and tactics of operation from the base at Thirteenth and B Streets SW., were decided, which called for the dividing of the contingent into various groups, with a chairman of each group, for the purpose of penetrating the other camps and working within those camps such as distributing leaflets put out by the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League and the central rank-and-file committee and to spread propaganda among the veterans in those camps by word of mouth, in line with the general party program to carry on a smear campaign against the "sell-out and double-cross policy" of the leaders of these various camps.

Mr. MANDEL. Which leaders, particularly, did they attack?

Mr. PACE. Well, of course, the principal target was Walter W. Waters. Others were Doake Carter, Harold Foulkrod, George Alman, and the commanders of other contingents, of whom I don't remember their names. Also Roy S. Robertson.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the purpose of attacking these leaders?

Mr. PACE. The purpose was to discredit them in the eyes of their followers in order to create confusion and eventually a split in the ranks of the followers, which would give our forces a wedge whereby they would eventually recapture the leadership of that contingent.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the line of attack against these leaders?

Mr. PACE. The line of attack would be the sell-out to the enemies of the bonus march—a do-nothing policy—demoralizing slogans—we accused them of having no program.

Mr. MANDEL. How were the Communist groups organized in the various contingents?

Mr. PACE. These small committees were sent into each camp, whose purpose it was to rally around themselves other militant veterans in these camps to form a camp rank-and-file committee, who would select one of their members as a member of the central rank-and-file committee in order to have a coordinated program outlined and elected from the central rank-and-file committee.

Mr. MANDEL. Was that central rank-and-file committee Communist controlled?

Mr. PACE. It was controlled completely by the Communist fraction in the central rank-and-file committee, myself being chairman of the Communist fraction in the rank-and-file committee. Through this type or organization we had been able to get a contact with the various camps which could be utilized to draw them into our street mass meetings and parades.

Mr. MANDEL. How was it that the forces opposed to Communists were not effective in counteracting your efforts?

Mr. PACE. Well, I would say that it was mostly due to the confusion and the difference that existed among these forces. One contributing factor was that in spite of the tactical finesse used by General Glassford, which proved very effective in the handling of the bonus march as a whole, I believe that one grave blunder was made and that was as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Department he allowed himself to be officially connected with the bonus expeditionary forces by serving as secretary and treasurer, which placed him in the position of being an officer and responsible to the bonus expeditionary forces. At the same time, due to his official capacity as head of the Police Department, he was responsible for the operation of the Police

Department in maintaining law and order. Another contributing factor was the inability of the Government to handle the situation properly, also the discord that existed among the various agencies which caused considerable vacillation. For instance, one day they would make a decision that the veterans would have to leave or they would make a decision that a certain locality could not be occupied, and the next day they would rescind that decision. They had no unified policy in dealing with the veterans, which seemed in my opinion a complete lack of understanding of the situation.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you describe the difference between the approach of the typical leader of the bonus march as compared with that of the Communist wing?

Mr. PACE. The differences between the approach of the leaders of the main army of the BEF and that of the left-wing group could be attributed to the differences in the purposes of the two groups. The purpose of the main group of the BEF, under the leadership of Waters, was to petition Congress for the immediate cash payment of the bonus and to send letters and telegrams to Congressman and to the White House, according to the established law; where that of the left-wing movement was to use these grievances—the general economic situation—this demand for the bonus, to build a revolutionary force and to gain followers for the cause of the revolution.

Mr. MANDEL. Well, that is very general. Could you be more specific as to their purpose? What was the attitude which they wished to inspire toward the Government?

Mr. PACE. Well, for instance, we were holding mass meetings practically every evening on Pennsylvania Avenue where derogatory speeches were made against the Government, against Hoover, against Glassford, and against all of the governmental agencies. These speeches would develop to a higher political level by connecting them with the general demands for unemployment insurance, Negro rights, and so forth.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the attitude of Waters and his fellow leaders toward the Government on this question?

Mr. PACE. Well, my conception of that is that Waters tried in every way to do everything in a legal manner. He used all the means that he could, and stay within good standing with his men, to cooperate fully with the agencies of the Government.

Mr. MANDEL. Did he look upon the Government as representing him and his associates?

Mr. PACE. Well, Waters was critical of the inability of several Congressmen and Senators to see the plight that the veterans were in and see the necessity for making the payment at that time, but the criticism was directed in a legitimate way.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you consider him as a loyal American?

Mr. PACE. I believe he was.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the attitude of the Communists toward the Government in this situation?

Mr. PACE. Of course, the Communist attitude toward the Government was just the same as it is in all other situations. They charged that the Government was an agent of business—the Government was handing out all kinds of doles to industry and banks—not doing anything for the veteran and the unemployed. They continuously car-

ried on a smear campaign against the Government or any agency of the Government.

MR. MANDEL. Was their attitude to discredit the Government of the United States?

MR. PACE. Well, yes. All of these economic demands were used to attract the attention of the veterans and connect them with a condemnation of the Government for the purpose of turning the veterans against the Government as preliminary steps.

MR. MANDEL. Was their attitude sincerely to try to secure relief?

MR. PACE. Well, the policy of the party is to use the immediate economic demands of the veterans in this situation. This whole program of organization was for the purpose of arousing the veterans to the support of more mass meetings, more parades, more demonstrations at the Capitol and White House and the picketing of the White House, and more direct action against the Government for the purpose of provoking a conflict between the marchers and the law-enforcing agencies of the District. We took advantage of the momentum of the campaign by intensifying the necessity of parades and meetings, and demanding participation in the regular meetings of the BEF army, such as the large demonstration that was called by Waters at the Capitol, where Waters and Foulkrod made reports upon their return from a meeting with Governor Roosevelt at the Democratic National Convention. At this time, immediately following their reports, I took the platform, without permission, and made an appeal to the veterans for continuous demonstrations daily at the Capitol, and denounced the sell-out policy of Waters and his aides to the veterans.

MR. MANDEL. You were then following the party line?

MR. PACE. That is right. Also a meeting was organized on the outskirts of Anacostia by the left-wing group as a means of spreading our propaganda and fomenting more direct action in the Waters camp, where his followers could hear our speeches and our program. On July 17, 1932, Congress adjourned, so the party immediately sensed the feeling that the last hope of the veteran to obtain his bonus immediately had been destroyed, so a representative of the central committee, Israel Amter, was sent from New York.

MR. MANDEL. Of the central committee of the Communist Party?

MR. PACE. Yes. He was sent from New York and immediately called a top party fraction meeting, when he demanded a more militant and more vigorous program.

MR. MANDEL. Will you describe as nearly as you remember what he said?

MR. PACE. He said that as long as Congress remained in session there were some hopes of the passage of the bonus bill, but now Congress has adjourned, those hopes have been destroyed. The veterans will be ready for more direct action and we must take the lead—that is, the Communists—we must take the lead and utilize this dissatisfaction among the veterans. We must come forward with a more militant program. He proposed a continuous picketing of the White House, the sending of delegates to President Hoover, and a bolder campaign of our committee inside other camps in order to arouse them to the support of our program. He also said that if we allow the veterans to get out of Washington without a fight we have lost our cause.

Mr. MANDEL. As far as you remember, where was this top fraction meeting held with Amter?

Mr. PACE. It was held at party headquarters on Seventh Street NW.

Mr. MANDEL. What happened as a result of this meeting with Amter?

Mr. PACE. Well, we went back into our rank-and-file committee headquarters at Thirteenth and B Streets SW and called a party fraction meeting of the party members inside the rank-and-file committee and presented them with this program and these instructions, with the result that we immediately began picketing the White House.

Mr. MANDEL. That same day?

Mr. PACE. Well, I don't know whether the same day or the next day; it wasn't long after. In the plans of picketing the White House we timed the picket at 5 minutes after 12 in order to have the great mass of Government employees coming out of their buildings for lunch right at the time the pickets arrived.

Mr. MANDEL. So that they could get into a clash with the police and put on this demonstration to dramatize the thing before thousands of Government workers and involve them in the demonstration?

Mr. PACE. That is right. For instance, one Government employee was kicked and arrested and put in a scout car because he walked over and picked up some fellow's hat and the cops thought he was a marcher, at which time he was arrested.

Mr. MANDEL. What effect did your activities in the Waters camp have?

Mr. PACE. Well, the slogans used and the demands put forward were in such a fashion as to appeal to the rank-and-file veterans, thereby causing confusion, and in the attempt of the various officers of the Waters camp to agree on what methods to be used to counteract these things, they were forced to resign and be replaced. This caused a lot of vacillation in the leadership, which resulted in a split from the Waters camp of the Oregon delegation and the Alman faction.

Mr. MANDEL. What happened as a result of this split?

Mr. PACE. Well, because of this, Waters came into the Oregon delegation and called for the election of a new commander of that area, which also included two or three smaller contingents. Alman, who had shown a tendency to develop a more militant attitude and a program more or less coinciding with the program of the Communists, came to our camp and invited me to come over there and speak at this election rally and I spoke on behalf of the election of Alman, which, according to Alman's own statement, resulted in his reelection as area commander. The Communists felt quite jubilant over the fact that they had brought about this much of a split in the Waters camp.

Mr. MANDEL. From that time on, did the Communist group cooperate with Alman?

Mr. PACE. Well, yes, to the extent that they began to support our mass meetings and when we had our parade and demonstration at the Capitol, where a meeting was held at the foot of the Library steps, Alman's contingent joined with us in that demonstration.

Mr. MANDEL. What were your plans in regard to the future use of Alman?

Mr. PACE. Well, we were using Alman to get control of the rank and file. It was the plan of the party to use Alman as the front for

gaining control of the entire bonus expeditionary forces. The rapid momentum with which the Communist Party, through its central rank-and-file committee, was gaining influence resulted in more militant and more direct action, which we hoped would bring us into sharper clashes with the Government and the law-enforcement agencies and which, in my opinion, resulted in the Government being placed in the position of having to call out the Army.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, you are of the opinion that the Government was becoming increasingly alarmed at the headway being made by the Communists?

Mr. PACE. That is right. I do not believe that the Government had any alternative because of the rapid pace being made. It is my candid opinion that had this thing gone another week, the Communists would have gained the leadership of the bonus expeditionary forces, thereby resulting in forcing the Government to take the action that they did take, at a time when the results would have been much more disastrous.

Mr. MANDEL. Are you acquainted, Mr. Pace, with the events that took place on July 29, 1932?

Mr. PACE. No; I was in jail at that time.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you learn from party leaders what happened?

Mr. PACE. No; the only discussion that I had came probably 2 or 3 weeks after that date, when I was called to New York City.

Mr. MANDEL. When were you released from jail?

Mr. PACE. That I don't remember.

Mr. MANDEL. How many days, approximately, were you in jail?

Mr. PACE. I would say 20 or 25 days—something like that.

Mr. MANDEL. What did you do after your release?

Mr. PACE. I was ordered to New York, where I attended a meeting of the top leadership of the Communist Party and a representative of the Comintern was also present—he was introduced to me as Alpi.

Mr. MANDEL. Can you tell us who else was at that meeting?

Mr. PACE. There was Earl Browder, Clarence Hathaway, William Weinstone, Emanuel Levin, Herbert Benjamin, Max Bedacht, a fellow by the name of Alpi, and a fellow by the name of Louis Sass.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you describe what happened at this meeting?

Mr. PACE. Well, there was quite a hot argument over the policies that had been pursued by the party in connection with the bonus march. The Communist Party of the United States was severely criticized by the representative of the Comintern. Alpi, for, as Alpi put it, the bonus march was like an alarm clock waking somebody up out of a dead sleep.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you try to recall, as nearly as possible, all that he said?

Mr. PACE. Well, he centered his attack on Weinstone. He told him that he slept while the masses rolled and called him a swivel-chair organizer. In fact, he called the whole party, approximately, a swivel-chair organization.

Mr. MANDEL. You have not pointed out so far what was Weinstone's official connection with the party forces in the bonus march?

Mr. PACE. According to the discussions that were carried on in this meeting, he was supposed to be the chief representative of the executive committee of the Communist Party on the question of veterans.

Mr. MANDEL. Operating from New York?

Mr. PACE. Operating from New York.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, he was chiefly responsible to the central committee for policy on this question?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you describe the course of the discussion?

Mr. PACE. Well, the discussion then centered around the future program and activities among the veterans. Browder asked Weinstone if he thought there could be another bonus march soon, and Weinstone gave him the opinion that there could be. He then asked Levin if he thought there could be another bonus march soon, and Levin told him there could be. Then he asked me if I thought there could be another bonus march soon, and I told him no, I didn't believe there could be another bonus march anyway soon. Browder then asked me what, in my opinion, could be done. I told him that by virtue of my popularity among the veterans at that time I could make a national tour and build up a national convention spearheaded between the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League and the central rank-and-file committee to be held in Cleveland at some time in the near future that would serve as an organization force and a stimulant for maybe a bonus march next year, at which point the Communist International Representative Alpi hammered his fist on the desk and said, "Correct." So Levin and I were instructed to carry out this program.

Mr. MANDEL. As approved by Alpi?

Mr. PACE. Yes, as approved by Alpi.

Mr. MANDEL. What specific steps were recommended?

Mr. PACE. Well, the steps to be pursued and the details of the program were left to Levin and me to work out; the only instructions were that it be not later than September. So we proceeded to call a party fraction meeting in the central rank-and-file committee and the Workers' Ex-Servicemen's League to discuss the step and dates necessary for the building of this convention. The date was set for the latter part of September 1932. Alpi ordered that the party machine be put into operation in every district that was to be covered for the purpose of holding mass meetings and giving support to my meetings on this tour.

Mr. MANDEL. At this point, let the record show an article entitled "Lessons of the Bonus March," statement of central committee of Communist Party, U. S. A., as published in the Communist for September 1932, pages 792 to 804.

During the bonus march, was there any effort on the part of the Communists to disaffect American troops?

Mr. PACE. In our meetings downtown, in walking around the town, we would come in contact with members of the Marine Corps and the Army and discuss with them the plight of the veterans—why we were there—and we would tell them that some day they might be in the same boat, and so forth, which resulted in too friendly relations of the marchers and the marines. When the marines were ordered to the Capitol during the demonstration there, because of this friendliness and fraternization, they didn't take any action.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Pace, as you look back upon the whole affair, do you have any specific recommendations or points that you would like

to emphasize that would be of future value if such a situation should again arise?²

Mr. PACE. Well, I believe that if such a situation or a similar situation would arise it would be advantageous for all of the people responsible to get together and discuss all the phases that led up to such a situation and discuss ways and means of handling the situation in order that everybody connected with it would have a distinct understanding of how the job should be done and that all action should be a united action in order to prevent vacillation, indecisiveness, and so forth. It should be people who understand the social and economic condition, people who should understand and know from past experience; and they should base their future judgment upon these experiences.

Mr. MANDEL. At the peak of the bonus march how many veterans were in Washington; would you say?

Mr. PACE. Well, I estimated between 15,000 and 20,000.

Mr. MANDEL. How many party members were there in this group at the peak?

Mr. PACE. Well, I don't believe there could have been over 100 party members.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, this activity among 15,000 veterans was handled by a group of about 100 party members?

Mr. PACE. That is right. The active party group, party fraction, that we knew were reliable party members would number no more than 25.

Mr. MANDEL. How many party members were in the Michigan contingent?

Mr. PACE. I would estimate about 10; there were 3 that were actively in charge.

Mr. MANDEL. Who defended you when you were arrested?

Mr. PACE. Irving Schwab and David Levinson.

Mr. MANDEL. Who were they?

Mr. PACE. They were attorneys for the International Labor Defense.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Kornfeder, you have heard the testimony of Mr. Pace and you were in contact with party headquarters during the entire period of the bonus march. Will you give us your estimate of the party's conduct in this situation and the lessons to be learned from the whole episode?

Mr. KORNFEDER. As I said before, the party was represented in this activity by William W. Weinstone. He had missed in taking the initiative in the actual direct organization of the bonus march and therefore was compelled after the movement had been initiated by others to catch up as far as possible with it.

The bonus march was the type of movement which, to a large extent, would naturally fit into the type of activity the party was then interested in; namely, the seizure of transportation facilities or high pressure to force the obtaining of such facilities. The opportunity of marching men across the country was a tremendous display of the crisis then existing. But because it had missed on the initiative it was able to take advantage of the situation only partly. For that reason it made an especially strong effort to recoup the initiative in Washington, D. C., itself. This was to be done, as Mr.

² See p. 1946 for enlargement upon the answer to this question.

Pace related, by setting up a separate camp and then doing everything possible to influence the other camps and take advantage of any differences in those camps, with the objective of thus getting complete control of the bonus expeditionary forces. If this objective had been fully successful, the aim was to dramatize on a grandiose scale events in Washington and parade them before the world. There is no doubt in my mind that if they had obtained complete organization control of the bonus expeditionary forces they would have done everything possible to turn the life of Washington, D. C., upside down, including attempts at storming the White House, in order to dramatize the crisis in the United States before the world.

Comintern headquarters was, of course, tremendously interested in the events occurring in the United States, especially in the bonus march, and when Weinstone, as Alpi, the Comintern representative, later said, was found to be slipping, he Weinstone, was blamed by Browder and other members of the political bureau of the Communist Party for missing the boat, a controversy developed inside the political bureau between Browder and Weinstone as to who was to blame. To settle that controversy, they both had to go to Moscow, and as a result of the decision made in Moscow, Weinstone was severely criticized and thereafter reduced in rank and position in the Communist Party.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Kornfeder, would you say that a study of the various phases of Communist activity in the bonus march is worthy of present study, and, if so, for what reason?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; I certainly think so, because in the event of any like situation, the Communist Party, which now has a much larger organization than then and operates through so many fronts, each of which is much larger than any of those existing then, plus their influence and control over a whole number of unions which then they did not have, if a similar situation were to occur, their ability to grab hold of any movement of this type and utilize it would create a condition of disorder and crisis way beyond the possibilities of 1932. I think they have learned a great lesson as to how to utilize veterans to spearhead a movement of unemployed and whether in the future there is such an issue as an unpaid bonus or not, they will certainly find it the wisest to put the much larger number of veterans into motion for their purposes in such a situation.

Mr. MANDEL. Let the record show that in a publication entitled "Veterans on the March," by Jack Douglas, published by Workers Library Publishers, a Communist publishing house, there is a photograph of Michigan and Ohio veterans in the Cleveland railroad yards executing a Communist salute, i. e., the clenched fist. In the same publication is a photograph of John Pace when he was arrested near the White House.

Mr. KORNFEDER. do you happen to know Jack Douglas?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; I do. Douglas, under a different name, was an undergraduate of the Lenin School in Moscow, and I notice from reading the volume that he wrote on the bonus march, that he embodied much of his training in the handling of the material and information available to him from the bonus march.

Mr. MANDEL. What do you think is the significance of the publication of this book?

Mr. KORNFEDER. The significance, in my opinion, is that it may serve as a manual to be used for the organization of similar activities in the future.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Kornfeder, have you any suggestions or recommendations in the event of a future recurrence of a similar situation?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I think the lessons that are, in my opinion, obvious from the events of the bonus march in 1932 are that the authorities in the various States and cities unintentionally helped the Communist Party by unnecessarily giving the party an opportunity to dramatize the march by all sorts of obstructions, impediments, controversies, etc.; that had the various local contingents been given transportation from their places of origin down to Washington, the drama that had been created by all these fights would not have been there because the country would not have been stirred up as it was by all these incidents as the dozens of columns marched through the country.

In Washington, D. C., the same erroneous policy, to a large extent, was pursued, which made it possible for the party to enhance its infiltration activities among the mass of the bonus expeditionary forces; and if instead of that, Congress had simply voted a sufficient amount to put all these men on relief, as it were, much of that drama in the Capitol would not have been. This is, of course, entirely aside of the question as to whether the bonus at that time should have been granted or not.

Mr. MANDEL. Is there anything else that you would like to add to your testimony regarding the matters which have been discussed here today?

(No response from the witnesses.)

Mr. WOOD. The committee wishes to express its appreciation to the witnesses for the testimony which they have given today. There being no further questions, the meeting will be adjourned.

(Whereupon the meeting was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

(NOTE.—After incorporation of the testimony of John T. Pace and Joseph Zack Kornfeder into the record of this hearing, the chairman invited the witness, Mr. John T. Pace, to proceed with such comment as he desired to make regarding his former testimony. The witness proceeded as follows:)

Mr. PACE. This paragraph on 784³ is just an error. The question was:

Would you say that this policy of taking over private property was conscious or just accidental?

I answered:

Well, on our part it was conscious. It was something we had sort of been praying for as a preliminary training to the masses on how to do these things and to build in their minds a hatred for private-owned property and Government control.

That is just a misstatement there. It would be a hatred for owners of private-owned property. That is just a correction.

Mr. TAVENNER. That change or addition should appear on page 784?

Mr. PACE. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. What is the other paragraph?

Mr. PACE. On page 793.⁴ This, I think, is important.

³ See p. 1934, this publication.

⁴ See pp. 1943-44, this publication.

Mr. WOOD. What page is that?

Mr. PACE. 793. The question was:

As you look back upon the whole affair, do you have any specific recommendations or points that you would like to emphasize that would be of future value if such a situation should again arise?

I was asked a question about specific recommendations or points to emphasize that would be of value if such a situation should arise in the future. I think the more proper response to that question would be that had the right people understood the determinations of the average veteran to march to Washington to urge the passage of immediate cash payment of the veterans bonus, and provide the proper leadership, the Communists would never have been able to establish a base of operations in Washington, and the resulting trouble would have been avoided. As the situation stood in the Michigan delegation, I as a Communist more or less controlled the policies and actions of the delegation. This I was able to do without revealing the fact that I was a member of the Communist Party and following the dictates of the party, because I was a veteran, personally interested in the payment of the bonus, and because the Michigan delegation liked the proper kind of leadership, I was able to use the Michigan delegation to carry out the Communist program in relation to the bonus march. (Representative James B. Frazier, Jr., entered the hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Are there any other explanations or elaborations that you desire to make of the testimony given by you in executive session?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir. As I stated before, I left the Communist Party in the early part of 1935. During the time I was active in the Communist Party, I learned that the party placed great emphasis on the need for the organization of the youth of America for the purpose of indoctrination, and that it behooved the Communist Party to infiltrate all organizations where there was a concentration of young people.

In 1946 and 1947 I was chairman of the Un-American Activities Committee of the Detroit District Association of the American Legion. In this connection I did some investigating of Communist activities in the colleges and universities in the State of Michigan, particularly Wayne University in Detroit.

The American Legion was interested in learning whether there were any Communist activities among the students at schools and universities and considered that inasmuch as there were a number of veterans attending the universities under the GI bill that these veterans would be a good source of information. Through a group of these veterans my committee learned that there was a chapter of the American Youth for Democracy chartered on the campus of Wayne University.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, at this point, for the benefit of the record, I would like to state that this committee, after considerable research and investigation, issued a pamphlet on April 17, 1947, dealing with the organization, the American Youth for Democracy.

In this report it was developed that a special convention of the Young Communist League was held at Manhattan Center, New York City, on October 15 and 16, 1943. Earl Browder, in addressing this convention, called for a broader eulogy among the young people's organizations to reach out and dissolve old and outlived barriers which have kept apart too many youth organizations.

The convention on October 16 dissolved the Young Communist League. The next day the same delegates met at Mecca Temple, New York City, and formed the American Youth for Democracy. At one time during its existence, the American Youth for Democracy claimed to have 160 chapters in colleges in 14 States. As a result of the work this witness will relate, the American Youth for Democracy was exposed as just another Communist organization, with the result that it folded up in February 1949.

As is the case when most Communist-front organizations are exposed, a new one is created. The Labor Youth League, which is nothing more nor less than a successor to the American Youth for Democracy, was formed at a conference held in Chicago, May 28 and 29, 1949. This latter organization was exposed by Matt Cvetic in his testimony before this committee. However, the Labor Youth League exists today as a Communist organization for the recruitment of youth into the Communist Party.

Now, Mr. Pace, with that just general explanation and introduction to the subject of the AYD, or the American Youth for Democracy, will you tell the committee what the result of your investigation was while you were holding the position to which you referred in the State of Michigan?

Mr. PACE. For the benefit of the committee and the public, could I state first what connection this has with the Communist activity among the veterans, why I was interested in the AYD. When I attended the party school—

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean the Communist Party school?

Mr. PACE. The Communist Party school; we were taught the role that the youth played in the Czarist army at the time of the revolution.

We were also taught that the primary interest of the Communist Party in the organization of the youth was for the purpose of organizing the youth and indoctrinating them with the Communist ideology and philosophy as potential members of our Armed Forces, and that they would be prepared to carry out acts of sabotage and espionage and acts of mutiny within our Armed Forces.

Therefore, I was interested, as the representative of the American Legion, in exposing this American Youth for Democracy as a recruiting ground for potential members of our Armed Forces to carry out the Communist program within our Armed Forces.

So, we did this work. We obtained the files, the membership lists, and found that there were 135 members of the American Youth for Democracy, evidently being led by a handful of Communists, because after our exposure a great majority of these people quit the American Youth for Democracy and refused to follow its leadership.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where was that organization established; at what place?

Mr. PACE. In Wayne University, Detroit, Mich.

Mr. WOOD. When was that?

Mr. PACE. In 1947.

Mr. WOOD. Was that after you had severed your relationship with the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. It was 12 years after.

Mr. WOOD. And had entered into the fight against communism?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir. I was chairman of the American Legion's committee on un-American activities. Those files I will mail to the committee upon my return home, and that membership list.

Upon getting this information, we took it to the Governor of Michigan, Governor Sigler at that time, and he became alarmed about it, and shortly after went on the radio exposing the American Youth for Democracy as a Communist organization.

That was followed shortly after by a radio address by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Hoover, and according to newspaper articles, why they were being banned from many colleges and universities throughout the United States. I think that that was the result of work of our committee at Wayne University.

Also, Michigan set up a committee, a city committee to investigate Communist activities. I believe that we cleaned them out of Michigan.

Mr. KEARNEY. You mean, out of the Michigan colleges.

Mr. PACE. Yes.

Mr. KEARNEY. You didn't clean them out of Michigan.

Mr. PACE. No, not Michigan. We broke their backbone.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are willing to send us the files that you have on the subject for the purpose of study and analysis by the staff of this committee?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

Mr. DOYLE. I think, Mr. Tavenner, he volunteered he would do that. before you asked him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

I would like to refer back to your statement of a few moments ago, when you elaborated upon your previous testimony, in which you said that had the right people understood the determinations of the average veteran to march to Washington to urge the passage of immediate cash payment of the veterans' bonus, and provide the proper leadership, the Communists would never have been able to establish a base of operations in Washington, and the resulting trouble would have been avoided.

Do I understand that what you are really saying there, in substance, is that the matter of educating the people on this subject of communism you consider to be of the utmost importance?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir.

In Detroit, this is an example of how the situation was handled. There was already a mass movement going on. The impulse was so strong for a march to Washington that it was unavoidable. The regular veterans' organizations, being patriotic organizations, were naturally opposed to such actions against the Government, and they were sincere and honest in attempting to avoid a march to Washington. So, they organized a parade in Detroit of various veterans' organizations for the immediate cash payment of the bonus. And so, we took our little group and got out a leaflet, went in and took over this parade of good patriotic American citizens, took the meeting away from them, raised the question of a march to Washington, which was greatly applauded, and because of this mistake in seeing this determination by the leadership, we were able to take it away from them and bring it to Washington and establish a base of operations down here.

Mr. KEARNEY. When you say "We" who do you mean?

Mr. PACE. We Communists.

Mr. DOYLE. How many were in that group that you designate as "we"?

Mr. PACE. Well, there were—

Mr. DOYLE. And of what ages? Were they all adults?

Mr. PACE. Well, they were all adults in the march. They were not all adults that helped to take over this parade.

Mr. DOYLE. That is what I am asking. How many in that group that you refer to as "we took it over"?

Mr. PACE. Oh, probably 10. There weren't but three actually active who were doing the work. The rest were just the rank and filers, possibly 10.

Mr. TAVENNER. You described those matters fully in the course of your—you did describe them fully in the course of your testimony.

Mr. PACE. That is in here, that we used Young Communist League girls, and so forth, in helping prepare for the parade and making up the list, and clerical work.

Mr. TAVENNER. You see, the point that I am asking you now about that is the value of educating the people as to the plan of procedure by the Communist Party, and the dangers of communism.

Mr. PACE. The Communist Party teaches that we, the Communists, must be able at all times to take advantage of the weaknesses of our enemies, and that was one of the weaknesses that we were able to take advantage of. Had these people seen that there was a determination for them to march to Washington, then they stopped and would have prevented us from having the leadership, that would have prevented the establishing an operation base in Washington, which would have prevented all these mass meetings and demonstrations and pickets, and so forth.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Any questions, Mr. Walter?

Mr. WALTER. I have no questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. I didn't have the benefit of being a member of the committee who heard this testimony in executive session. I will try to avoid duplication, Mr. Chairman. I do feel, though, Mr. Pace, your reference to—unless it was gone into pretty thoroughly in the executive session when you previously testified—your statement just now that you were taught the place youth played in Russia, youth as a member of our Armed Forces in carrying out sabotage, and so forth, do I understand that the Communist Party, when you were a member of it up until 1935—is that correct?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. Had taught in this country that you, as a Communist leader, should undertake to get youth in this AYD and other Communist youth groups in order that they might later become members of the Armed Forces of America, and as members of the Armed Forces of America, carrying rifles and guns, be in a position to carry out the forceful revolution, forceful sabotage against the United States in case it was involved in armed conflict with Russia?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

Mr. DOYLE. Is that what you are telling me?

Mr. PACE. That was the program of the Communist Party.

Mr. DOYLE. As far as you know, is it still the program of the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. As far as I know, it is still the program of the Communist Party.

(At this point Representative Francis E. Walter left the hearing room.)

Mr. DOYLE. To your personal knowledge, were the members of this AYD, these 135 members, or any portion of them—were they actually so taught? Were they actually taught that in Michigan?

Mr. PACE. Well, I wasn't a member in Wayne University. I can't testify just what this specific group was taught, but I can say that that was the role of the Communists in the youth organization, to teach that. It was their duty.

Mr. DOYLE. In other words, you learned that, you were taught that in the Communist school; is that correct?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

Mr. DOYLE. Am I to understand that you, as an American citizen, swallowed that philosophy? Why did you agree to that sort of sabotage program?

Mr. PACE. Well, that's a long story.

Mr. DOYLE. I don't—

Mr. PACE. I can make it short.

Mr. DOYLE. Why would that sort of destruction to our Nation appeal to you, sir, as an adult American citizen?

Mr. PACE. Well, at that particular time, there was a situation that didn't exactly appeal to most people. I was in business in Detroit. I had worked pretty hard over a period of years building this business, and all of a sudden I lost it. I hadn't got a dime. We have read of accounts of people at that point losing all they had, jumping off of bridges and turning on the gas, and so forth. I didn't feel that I could solve the problem that way. I wanted to fight, and any organization that had the word "fight" in it, condemning this thing, I was in for.

Mr. DOYLE. I see.

Mr. PACE. And step by step I was given literature, elementary literature on the economic situation, and completely sold and agreed—all their economic slogans were fine—and then when I got into the party, why I was beginning to be fed literature on a higher political level, and became sold on the idea that this was the solution, this was the building of a classless society.

After the bonus march, I was, because of my American background and more or less clean background morally, pushed pretty hard, pretty fast. And when I was drawn into political discussions with the top leadership of the party in New York, a representative of the international, and when I saw the derogatory remarks by the representative of the international condemning the American party for going to sleep and letting this revolutionary situation develop, then I saw that there was no democracy in the Communist Party. It was strictly a dictatorship from Moscow, and I began then to disinherit these illusions and comb the cobwebs out of my mind. After a couple of more years I decided that it wasn't what I was looking for, and I quit.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask you this—

Mr. PACE. Could I continue?

Mr. DOYLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. PACE. Could I add one more thing? I realized then the damage I had done. So, I felt it my duty and obligation to do everything in my power and everything that I could to expose this false theory and

false philosophy and the purpose of the whole Lenin program to use the martyrs' program for the building of a political dictatorship before the American people.

Mr. DOYLE. Do you believe anything has transpired in the philosophy of the Communist Party in America since you were an active member thereof, so far as their youth program is concerned, which would have caused them to discontinue or stop educating, trying to train American boys and girls to be willing to join the Armed Forces, and as such members of the Armed Forces in time of conflict, if any came between the United States and Russia, be willing to commit sabotage and revolution? Has anything changed that philosophy that you know of?

Mr. PACE. I don't think so. The only changes they made, as these youth organizations are built and our Government agencies expose them to the public, they will disband them and form another one in the same shoe. But the philosophy and teaching, I don't think that will change.

Mr. DOYLE. How young do they try to get these members of youth organizations? How young are the American boys and girls?

Mr. PACE. A little past the walking age, a little bit. I would rather say, a little past the kindergarten age.

They had at that time an organization called the Young Pioneers of America, where they took the little tots and held parties for them, and they were in the second or third or fourth grades in school; they were just beginning to read, and they would give them little pamphlets with lots of pictures in them.

Mr. DOYLE. Were those youngsters in the Pioneer group, were they members—I mean, were they children of Communists themselves, or did they try to reach beyond the Communist families and get children of families whose parents were not yet Communists?

Mr. PACE. At that time the party organizational structure was very narrow. The young Pioneers was the baby organization of the Young Communist League, which were mostly party members' children. Of course, party members more or less forced their children to go to the Young Pioneers meetings and the Young Communist League meetings. But, as the party has broadened its influence and its movement in building broader mass bases, why they, of course, their aim and their attempt is to draw in any youth that they can get.

For instance, on this Wayne University we found that there were many children in that AYD; the parents didn't know they were in there.

Mr. DOYLE. Then, am I accurate in my conclusion that from your testimony, at least, these children, who were children of Communist parents in these Communist youth organizations, were, as far as you now know, still taught by their Communist parents and Communist leaders that part of their place in society is to, when they get into the Armed Forces, to be prepared to use their arms against their own buddies in the Armed Forces if they are in conflict with Soviet Russia; is that correct?

Mr. PACE. That is correct.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, now, do you mean to tell me that Soviet Russia, then, reaches down into our country, and that that sort of philosophy is definitely a matter of instruction and philosophy from Russia, from

Soviet Russia into America? Because that is conspiracy, that is traitorous action, isn't it?

Mr. PACE. I would say that those are the instructions, the philosophy, and the teachings of the executive committee of the Communist International. I wouldn't say Russia. Russia is a branch of the Communist International, the same as the party in the United States is, or Germany or France or any other country. But the Communist International is the head force of all Communist propaganda and activity and organizational instructions.

Mr. DOYLE. Where, as far as you know, did that international head up? Where does its leadership come from?

Mr. PACE. The international. The international executive committee is a committee composed of delegates of the various parties in the various countries in the world.

Mr. DOYLE. Is there any international—was there any international children's movement that you knew of, or youth movement?

Mr. PACE. The Young Communist League was affiliated to the Young Communist International.

Mr. DOYLE. Just one more question, Mr. Chairman. You remarked that the bonus march couldn't have been taken over by you and the other, I think you named 10—you said there were 10 in the group, and you narrowed that down to 3.

Mr. PACE. I said there were about 10 in the group, but there were only 3 that participated in policy and were the leadership of the fraction.

Mr. DOYLE. You said had there been the right and proper leadership you couldn't have taken that over in Michigan. Where did you expect that leadership to come from? You were dealing with a patriotic organization, weren't you?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

(Representative Francis E. Walter returned to the hearing room at this point.)

Mr. DOYLE. How could you take away the leadership of that problem from those groups? They were highly organized, weren't they?

Mr. PACE. But we didn't take over the organization as a unit. We took over the average veteran members of these organizations, members who were oppressed, out of a job, possibly most of them on the welfare.

As I said, had these various organizations gone out and provided the necessary leadership for this movement to Washington, we couldn't have broken in on it.

Mr. DOYLE. That condition, in those days, then, was a condition of special economic stress and strain, during the depression. In other words, the temporary economic conditions that then existed, in your judgment, were responsible for this formation of this march?

Mr. PACE. That is right. I think that had these veterans been more or less secure economically that they would have been willing to have waited until their World War certificates were due.

Mr. DOYLE. The temporary economic conditions that then existed, in your judgment, I suppose, made it, at least in your own case, possible for American businessmen such as you, who had been successful and lost everything, to find any appeal in this subversive Communist philosophy? In other words, that is your justification for your having become a member.

Mr. PACE. That is right. And, of course, there is another one.

At that time there had not been the public education as to what communism was. Nobody hardly ever saw an article about Russia, or what was going on, and there hadn't been any campaign, organized campaign at all, carried on against it, where now it is a different situation.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask you one more question, please? I just assume that you haven't had time to read the text of the law under which this committee is operating: or have you had the benefit of reading it? It is very short. You realize—may I call your attention to the fact that under the law under which this committee is functioning our duty is to investigate subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or domestically: also, however, we are charged with investigating all questions in relation to subversive and un-American propaganda that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

I direct your attention to that statement. Have you in mind any suggestion, recommendation, to this committee that we might consider in the field of remedial legislation dealing with subversive propaganda in our country as coming from other countries or which arise domestically: if so, what?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir. I have had some experience in testifying before the Immigration Service on denaturalization cases of Communist aliens.

I have found that the Government is spending a lot of money denaturalizing these people and ordering deportation proceedings to find that their respective countries refuse to accept the visas, and we still have them on our hands to operate as before.

Mr. DOYLE. You mean, they still stay here?

Mr. PACE. They still stay here. We haven't any law to dump them in the river.

Well, it is my candid opinion that if we had some form of legislation for the interment of Communist aliens who have been ordered deported, I don't believe that their respective countries would be so reluctant in granting a visa. So, therefore, if we had such legislation we might be able to get rid of a lot of them.

Mr. WALTER. You probably aren't up to date on the question of what to do where deported aliens cannot receive exit visas. There is such a law dealing adequately with that matter.

Mr. PACE. In what way do they deal with it?

Mr. WALTER. Well, it is a long story. I will be very happy to send you a copy of the law.

Mr. KEARNEY. May I ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania a question? Let's assume, as the witness states, that an alien is ordered deported, and the particular country refuses to accept him, what then?

Mr. WALTER. If he can't get an exit visa, then he is given an opportunity to depart voluntarily to any country he chooses. If he fails to do that, he can be held either at Ellis Island or some similar place: or, if in the judgment of the court he is not a dangerous alien, he can be released on bond.

Mr. KEARNEY. As was the case yesterday. I mean, only so far as so-called dangerous individuals are concerned.

Mr. DOYLE. I think I should be privileged to make this observation to the witness, because I can see that he, apparently, wasn't aware

of that law being in full force and effect; that we in Congress, Mr. Pace, recognize our colleague, Mr. Walter, who is a member of this committee that you are now appearing before, and who has just answered the question, as probably one of the best informed authorities in this whole country on immigration, the problems growing out of it, and he is chairman of the subcommittee of the Judiciary on Immigration. We are lucky to have him on this committee.

Now, may I ask this: Have you any other suggestion or recommendation as to remedial legislation? What about declaring the Communist Party illegal?

Mr. PACE. That's long past due. We are faced with all kinds of opposition when this question comes up, that why drive them underground, let them stay out in the open so we can see them and know who they are.

My experience in the organizational structure of the party is that the real backbone of the leadership has always been underground. They are never people who come out in the open. These people who come out in the open are the front for the party, the propagandists—their newspapers, or means of distributing propaganda. It is just the propaganda machinery to front for the real leadership, which is underground.

I think that any legislation that makes it more difficult for the party to operate is in line with the present situation.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, thinking in terms of the United States Constitution—and I haven't had the benefit of talking with you, as you know; I have never met you personally and discussed this subject with you, and I want the record to show it, because I don't know what the gentleman's answer to this question may be—isn't it true that under our system of government, such a law would only be justifiable in case membership in the Communist Party as now contained would amount to a conspiracy against our Government presently; in other words, a present threat? Or, am I in error in your thinking?

Mr. PACE. Has the Communist Party ever been put on trial? Has the Communist Party, as a party, ever been put on trial on conspiracy for the violent overthrow of the Government? Has that been upheld by the Supreme Court?

Mr. DOYLE. Well, I was wondering what the import of your answer might be in view of the Supreme Court of the United States decision, the majority opinion.

I will ask you this further question. Is that your answer, the only answer you have? I want you to do the thinking. I don't want to do the thinking.

Mr. PACE. Well, I can—

Mr. DOYLE. We want the benefit of your thinking, sir.

Mr. PACE. I could give a better answer if I knew whether that was so or not.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask you this, then? Do I understand the force, then, of your testimony to be this on this subject, that you believe that Communists in our country, as members of the Communist Party in our Nation, are by virtue thereof a present threat to the safety and security of our own Nation?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. Is that why you are willing to have a law passed making it illegal, an illegal party?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir. I think that the public, the people, should be informed, which they have now more or less, that the Communist Party is a party of conspiracy to overthrow the Government by force and violence. After knowing this they become members of the Communist Party, or stay members of the Communist Party, I think they are just as guilty as the top leaders in New York.

Mr. DOYLE. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman? I am a lawyer, Mr. Pace, by profession, when I practice it.

Mr. PACE. I am not.

Mr. DOYLE. And, naturally, as a lawyer, I want to be as much in defense of my United States Constitution as possible. In other words, we lawyers, as well as other citizens, but perhaps we lawyers more than others are anxious to defend the constitutional rights of every American citizen. You realize that, and I certainly want to, and always will.

You have talked about the young children being taught to look forward to joining the Armed Forces of the United States, and then to be prepared, if needs be, in substance, to shoot their buddies in the back with their American-furnished rifles; in other words, to make sabotage. What knowledge have you, if any, as to whether or not adult members of the Communist Party are, likewise, instructed and expected to act? In other words, are they taught forceful revolution the same as the children are taught sabotage if they get into the Armed Forces?

Mr. PACE. They are taught that it is impossible for the working class to gain the power of the state without forceful revolution. They are also taught that even after they have taken over the power of the state, they must continue to be on the alert and continue to be organized to prevent the former ruling element from capturing the power of the state; that without the control of the masses you must have the power of the state and the state machinery.

Mr. DOYLE. In connection with that, is international communism expected to help the Communist Party in America in acquiring control of the state machinery? In other words, is any foreign nation, or the Communist Party in any foreign nation, are they expected, or is it anticipated they will help in the American revolution?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

Mr. DOYLE. Well, does that include Soviet Russia?

Mr. PACE. Yes; Soviet Russia is a branch of the Communist International.

Mr. DOYLE. Is any other branch of the Communist International in any other nation expected to thus cooperate with the American Communists in overthrowing our Government if need be by force?

Mr. PACE. That is right.

Mr. DOYLE. What other nation harbors such Communists in the Communist International besides Soviet Russia?

Mr. PACE. What do you mean "harbors it"? Do you mean has the power that controls the state?

Mr. DOYLE. No. From what other foreign nation is such philosophy taught, and might we expect—from what other nation might the American Communists reasonably expect assistance in any forceful revolution against our Government?

Mr. PACE. It would be any nation where the Communist Party exists.

Mr. DOYLE. At that time?

Mr. PACE. Yes; whether open or underground.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Frazier.

Mr. FRAZIER. Mr. Pace, I notice that in August 1949 you said your address was Centerville, Tenn., route 1. How long did you live in Tennessee?

Mr. PACE. Since August 1947.

Mr. FRAZIER. Do you still reside there?

Mr. PACE. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. At Centerville?

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRAZIER. You were born, I believe, in Kentucky?

Mr. PACE. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. And then went to Michigan?

Mr. PACE. No. I went to Tennessee from there, went to high school in Tennessee, the same address, and then went to Michigan in 1923.

Mr. FRAZIER. And that was when you became associated with the Communist Party?

Mr. PACE. No, sir.

Mr. FRAZIER. When was that?

Mr. PACE. 1931.

Mr. FRAZIER. 1931?

Mr. PACE. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. After you went to Michigan?

Mr. PACE. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. You are still residing in Tennessee?

Mr. PACE. At present?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

Mr. PACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRAZIER. But you didn't come back to Tennessee until after you had renounced your allegiance to the Communist Party, and after you had been expelled, did you?

Mr. PACE. That is the party's—

Mr. FRAZIER. I notice you stated in here that you said they expelled you.

Mr. PACE. They expel everybody that quits.

Mr. FRAZIER. What business are you engaged in down there?

Mr. PACE. I am in the sewer contracting business at Centerville, the Lincoln Construction Co.

Mr. FRAZIER. All right. I was interested in that background, to see when you came to Tennessee.

Mr. PACE. My grandfather was a lieutenant in the Confederate Army in Tennessee, right where I live.

Mr. WOOD. For your information, the gentleman who was interrogating you is also from Tennessee.

Mr. DOYLE. You see, Mr. Pace, he is trying to get across to you that the climate and the atmosphere and the high level of citizenship in Tennessee would naturally contribute to your reformation.

Mr. PACE. It is one of the States in which they were able to establish a nice school.

Mr. WOOD. Any further questions?

Mr. FRAZIER. That is all.

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. I know you said you would send the information that you obtained concerning the AYD at Wayne University. Did you find out in that investigation that the AYD, which is the successor to the YCL, is established or was established at that time on other campuses of other colleges throughout the country?

Mr. PACE. Well, in these files that I am going to mail, it might be interesting to learn how they operate by saying that I have some leaflets that were printed for a student convention to be held at the University of Michigan, and there were other leaflets in this file that had been distributed at the University of Pennsylvania and the College of the City of New York, with a lot of similarity; that is, the same phraseology, the same paragraphs as the leaflet that was distributed for the University of Michigan meeting.

Mr. VELDE. When was that?

Mr. PACE. 1947; which shows that they had a national organization; that this was going on, and then by the reports of the various universities and colleges revoking the charters and banning them from activity on the campuses, after our exposure up there. They had a chapter at Wayne and a chapter at the University of Michigan, and they had a group at Michigan State College.

Mr. VELDE. Do you think the mere act of the university or college official banning the organization from the campus was successful in actually banning them from the campus; or, did they go underground to any extent, or do you have any knowledge of that?

Mr. PACE. Well, the good that comes out of exposure causes them to lose their membership in the AYD. The party knew that they could not get members to join the Young Communist League because of the Communist name. That is why they organized with a nice American name, American Youth for Democracy. Many of these kids who were in it didn't know what they were in. It serves to expose them, and gives these kids an opportunity to get out of it themselves. And then, when the faculty of the university bans it from the campus, then the kids know that it is an illegal outfit, has no right to be there.

Mr. VELDE. I will agree with you on that point.

Mr. PACE. That leaves them with their little handful of four or five. They are going to keep on hollering and haranguing, but they are not getting any place.

Mr. VELDE. Did you find that the AYD and the Communist Party were concentrating on youth in colleges and universities rather than other youths who did not go to college? Was there any particular concentration in colleges and universities?

Mr. PACE. There was a particular concentration, because it was a large concentration. You see, in one college or one university there would be more kids than they would find in probably a dozen other places.

Mr. VELDE. I want to congratulate you on your testimony. There have been a lot of ex-Communists who have come before this committee to testify, some of whom got out recently, some of whom are Johnny-come-latelies. However, you did get out of the party early in the game. I congratulate you for your intelligent understanding of the conspiracy in 1935, when you left them, and I think that you have made a great contribution to America by your fight against commu-

nism since that time, and I hope that you continue your efforts along that line.

Mr. PACE. I believe that the committee could put in just a little more effort in making a broader mass appeal for former party members to come in and contact the committee. I think that it one of our shortcomings. We have tried to form an organization of ex-Communists, thought that would be a door or a channel or avenue by which the former party members could come in and cooperate with the Government.

Mr. WOOD. In that connection, I might call your attention to the fact that the chairman of this committee has been on the radio recently.

Mr. PACE. I appreciate that.

Mr. WOOD. Right along that line.

Mr. PACE. I appreciate that. It has not been stressed too strongly. Mr. WOOD. I have been inviting former members of the Communist Party to come before this committee at any time they will.

Mr. PACE. Outside of the expert witnesses on Communist theories and philosophies, these rank-and-file members right down in the units are the most valuable ones.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney?

Mr. KEARNEY. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Jackson?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Pace, testimony that is as old as yours is, or your personal knowledge of it, would probably have to be discounted, but inasmuch as your testimony bears on a subject that has been pursued consistently and without deviation for over 100 years, I think it is just as fresh as if it had been given yesterday. In your opinion, can a member of the Communist Party be a loyal American citizen?

Mr. PACE. No, sir.

Mr. JACKSON. We hear a lot of talk about peace. I assume you are for peace.

Mr. PACE. Whenever you hear the Communist Party talking about one thing, you look for them to do something else.

Mr. JACKSON. You are for peace?

Mr. PACE. Certainly.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I think every member of this committee is for peace. What kind of a peace do you think we could get on Soviet terms? What do you think it would mean to the average individual in this country to negotiate a peace, in light of the consistent record of the Communist Party for aggression outside their own frontiers? What do you think would happen to the average American citizen?

Mr. PACE. I can say this: You will never get peace with the Communist-controlled countries over the table.

Mr. JACKSON. You think there would be any freedom of speech in a peace that was negotiated through the Soviet Union? Would there be any freedom to speak your own mind if we were placed in a position where we accepted the terms, or the terms were enforced upon us by the Soviet Union? Would you have any freedom of speech?

Mr. PACE. Well, if we agreed on terms put forward by Soviet Russia, we wouldn't have any freedom of anything, and we wouldn't have any Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. JACKSON. Of course, that probably is a fact that is well understood. But, I mean specifically, would you be able to speak your mind under a Soviet system?

Mr. PACE. No, sir.

Mr. JACKSON. Would you be able to gather freely; would you have the right of assemblage?

Mr. PACE. No, sir.

Mr. JACKSON. Would you have the right to worship any God you might see fit to worship?

Mr. PACE. No, sir.

Mr. JACKSON. In other words, you would have nothing that is in the Bill of Rights which is currently being used by the Communist Party—you would have none of those rights guaranteed you, would you?

Mr. PACE. No, sir; positively not.

Mr. JACKSON. You said that you felt that the outlawing of the Communist Party would lead to driving it underground. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Pace, that most of the subversive and sabotage activities of the Communist Party are underground now, and have been for many years?

Mr. PACE. I think I stated that. I didn't say that outlawing the Communist Party would drive it underground. The record will show that I said that that is the propaganda that is thrown out, the propaganda that is thrown at us by the left-wing influences, that why drive them underground, let them stay out in the open.

Mr. JACKSON. I misunderstood your answer.

Mr. PACE. The real leadership and the real espionage and sabotage is carried on by underground machinery, and always will be until after the revolution.

Mr. JACKSON. Would this be a fair statement of fact: It has become increasingly evident to me, through work on this committee and through listening to witnesses who appear, that actually there appear to be two branches of communism. There appears to be the rank-and-file community clubs, and so forth, who take the doctrines and know nothing about what is going on; whereas, on the other hand, there is the underground apparatus, such as the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss thing about which the average member knows nothing, but which functions with a fine line of communications, very closely knit and entirely apart from the thinking or from the activities of those people who are in community groups or in small community party cells.

Mr. PACE. It isn't just the rank and file; even the district organizers and the leaders in the various districts don't know what is going on in the Communist Party.

Mr. JACKSON. But there are two separate lines.

Mr. PACE. Well, I wouldn't say two separate groups. I would say it is the same group working in two separate directions, independent of one another.

Mr. KEARNEY. That former statement of yours that the district chairman or State chairman doesn't know what is going on either will be quite a revelation to several individuals who have been sitting in this room listening to the testimony of witnesses here on the stand for the past several weeks.

Mr. PACE. I can't help that. I know the organizational structure of the party, that you might have a district organizer, for instance, in the State of Michigan carrying on the propaganda and organizational work in the open. There may be two or three somewhere in that district that are carrying on work under the Comintern agent in New York that they don't even know is there.

MR. KEARNEY. That is what I was bringing to your attention, that several of these district leaders that have been in this very committee room for several weeks past; those are the individuals that you are now telling us don't even know what is going on themselves.

MR. PACE. I would say they don't know everything that is going on. They don't know all about this underground machinery. You see, the Comintern agent, or some specific real hardened and revolutionary experienced revolutionist has his trick working in the district, and the party organization in that district doesn't know anything about him.

MR. JACKSON. That is precisely the point I was trying to make, that the two are separated, except in the top echelons of command where the contact comes together.

MR. PACE. That is right.

MR. JACKSON. Where would you say the allegiance of the Communist Party member who is elected to public office belongs? Does it belong to the people he is elected to represent, or does it belong to the hierarchy of the Communist Party?

MR. PACE. I didn't get the first part of your question.

MR. JACKSON. The allegiance of a Communist Party member elected to public office, where is his allegiance owed; is it owed to Communist philosophy and Communist principles, or is it owed to the people he represents?

MR. PACE. His allegiance is owed to the Communist Party.

MR. JACKSON. To the Communist Party?

MR. PACE. The Communists are taught in the schools to try to get elected to public office for the purpose of exposing the functions of that branch of the state to the masses as a fake, as a part of the power of the state, and his duty is to carry on demonstrations and to dramatize certain situations which the party is interested in, by virtue of the use of his position in public office. It is only supposed to be used for that, not to cooperate or to help carry out the program of the state.

MR. JACKSON. During the period of time you were a member of the Communist Party, what would have been your actions if you observed an act of sabotage being committed by another member of the Communist Party? Would you have reported it?

MR. PACE. No.

MR. JACKSON. You think a Communist would report an act of sabotage or espionage which he observed taking place and being done by another member of the Communist Party?

MR. PACE. No. If he did, he would certainly be expelled. He would be lucky to get out with that.

MR. JACKSON. I have no further questions.

MR. WOOD. Any further questions, Mr. Counsel?

MR. TAVENNER. No, sir.

MR. WOOD. Mr. Pace, I was very much interested in your comment a while ago with respect to the immigration and naturalization laws, in which you suggested that we could probably accomplish a better result if we had some machinery for the confinement of people who have been, through the regular and orderly procedures of law, declared to be undesirable citizens and ordered deported, and then couldn't find a haven some place else, because the country of their origin wouldn't accept them. It was explained to you that we have certain laws now, the weakness of which, as I see it, is this: The existing

law leaves it in the hands of any Federal judge in the jurisdiction where that party may be to release him under bond at the discretion of the judge; otherwise he is kept in confinement.

As I see it, the weakness of it is that it so happens that it isn't very difficult for these people who have been ordered deported as undesirable citizens, the country of whose origin refuses to accept them, to get before some Federal judge that will allow them bail, where they can go right back out among the people of America and carry on their nefarious activities.

Do you agree with me that that power, that discretion of any judge to admit a man to bail who has been declared an undesirable citizen and ordered deported from this country—

Mr. PACE. I started to comment awhile ago, when he told me about the law. I saw right away that based upon how bad characters they were, you know, whether they could be let out on bail, or so forth, and that means the judgment of too many different people.

Mr. WOOD. Wouldn't, in your estimation, their character be sufficient, when they have been ordered deported?

Mr. PACE. It should be sufficient. But, as he explained the law, it is not that way. It is left in the power of some judge.

Mr. WALTER. Of course, the alternative is the creation of institutions that we have been criticized for erecting ever since Buchenwald, which I saw, and I don't think that the American people want that.

Mr. PACE. I think that if an alien Communist has been established, to the satisfaction of the immigration authorities, of carrying out work for the Communist Party, and to order his deportation, I think that that should end there. I think upon that basis they should be interned.

Mr. WOOD. I am going to agree with you on that, because I happen to know that we have many in this country—

Mr. WALTER. Two thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven as of June 1.

Mr. WOOD (continuing). Who have been judged by competent jurisdiction to be a menace to the security of the country, and when that has been done by competent jurisdiction, I don't feel there should be any discretion in anybody's hands to permit them to go back out and engage in their activities among the citizens of America.

Mr. PACE. Could I just—

Mr. WOOD. If we had such a law as that, they would find refuge, where they now cannot find it in some other country.

Mr. PACE. I would like to state one example in a case that I testified in last summer in New York against Nydia Barker, alias Dr. Luthy, who came over here as a young girl from Russia, carried out Communist activities all of her life, and finally married a quite wealthy man up in Michigan, graduated and received a degree from the University of Michigan, and was a professor of biochemistry in Stanford University.

I appeared against her in San Francisco. She was also being arraigned the following day for perjury, where she swore that she was born in this country, and her former school record showed that she was born in Russia.

Well, she was ordered deported and, as I understand it, a compromise was made to drop the perjury proceedings and let her automatically go to Palestine, where she is in a position to still carry

on her international conspiracy, because she is a trained Communist, educated.

Mr. WALTER. What would you have done with her?

Mr. PACE. I would have held her on the perjury charge and interned her. Certainly you could have put her in jail for that.

Mr. WALTER. Who would have taken care of her children?

Mr. PACE. As far as I know, she doesn't have any children. She has a husband who is crazy about her, who is worth plenty of money to take care of a lot of children, if she did have them.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that interning necessarily connotes Buchenwald.

Mr. WALTER. I say, it leads to that sort of thing.

Mr. JACKSON. I think certainly that anyone who is considered to be and is found to constitute a menace and a danger certainly should be subjected to surveillance, whether that be interning or anything else of the sort, and to have that number of people wandering around at large appears to me to be not in the best interests of the security of the United States, and I think that the gentleman would agree in that connection.

I personally, so far as I am concerned, would be in favor of fixing up very comfortable, a little Diomed Island, or something, with comfortable accommodations, and arrange for one Soviet speedboat run every week across. It is a very short distance, even put in docking facilities so they could be picked up.

Mr. KEARNEY. With no return ticket.

Mr. JACKSON. Obviously, if they favor the Soviet system, it appears to be poetic justice that they should be permitted to enjoy it.

Mr. WALTER. Suppose they couldn't get off the ship, as was the case of one man some time ago. He got to the gangplank, and the Russian soldiers said: "You are not coming off the ship." There are many cases of people who are riding back and forth right now.

Mr. JACKSON. We have been trying to get rid of Mr. Bridges for a long period of time. I can understand the reluctance of anybody to take him.

Mr. WOOD. The question that Mr. Walter is asking is rather analogous, I think, to a man who commits murder and is sentenced to be executed, and you can't find a man willing to execute him, so you are going to turn him loose and let him go out and kill somebody else. I think that is a fair analogy to make.

Mr. WALTER. Well, I wouldn't—

Mr. DOYLE. I am sure we are all mighty proud of the fact, nevertheless, that we are citizens of a nation that bends over backward, bends over vigorously to give the freedom and every right under the Bill of Rights to any citizen, and a maximum of—

Mr. KEARNEY. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOYLE. I don't want that observation to indicate, however—

Mr. KEARNEY. With the bending over that we have been doing for all these years, we have the bends.

Mr. WALTER. I would like to say for the benefit of you gentlemen, that if you know a solution, I would like to know what it is. Mr. Hobbs and I wrestled with this problem for 8 years, and what we have come up with and what is in the law now is the only solution that we could think of.

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Mr. WOOD. That would have a fair chance of passing the Congress.

Mr. WALTER. And, in addition to that, be constitutional.

Mr. WOOD. Well, in any event, I want to express to you, Mr. Pace, my personal appreciation, and I am sure I express the appreciation of the other members, not only for your presence but for the very valuable assistance you have given the American people over the past 15 years or better in undertaking to combat this menace. I hope that your presence here hasn't caused you any inconvenience from your present affairs.

If there are no further questions from either members of the committee or counsel, is there any reason why Mr. Pace shouldn't be excused from further attendance?

Mr. TAVENNER. No, sir.

Mr. PACE. Could I make one more statement?

Mr. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. PACE. I am proud, too, that we have a country where we can bend so far backward. I think the situation at present has to put us on the alert that we don't bend so far backward that we can't get back straight up again.

Also, on the question of this legislation, something is going to have to be done about members of the party, because at present, as I understand the law, before you can convict a person of conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence, you have got to prove that he personally, as an individual, has advocated the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. There are many who have never made that statement to anyone that can be brought in as a witness. There are not so many of us fellows running around. So, it is difficult to do anything with some of these people who are very dangerous but have not made those utterances that can be proven in court.

Mr. WOOD. Your views on that subject, of course, are very much appreciated by members of the committee. We are charged, among other things, with proposing remedial legislation to the Congress along such lines as that.

Mr. VELDE. I might make the belated observation here that we have been bending over backward to protect the rights of the Communist Party members, all of the rights that are guaranteed to them under the Constitution, and I thoroughly agree that we should do that. However, it appears to me that maybe we have been denying the protection to the great majority of our American people by so doing, because we know that the Communist Party is definitely trying to destroy those very things.

Mr. WOOD. You mean, the American people are entitled to some rights?

Mr. VELDE. That is right; the majority of the American people.

Mr. WOOD. Because of a roll call, the committee is going to have to stand in recess now until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. PACE. I would like to conclude by saying that when this committee was hanging in the balance, when there was mass sentiment for the abolishment of this committee, I made a lot of speeches for the continuity of this committee.

Mr. WOOD. Thank you.

(Thereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)



