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SUMMA THEOLOGICA
PARS PRIMA

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COMPENDIUM
OF THE
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
PARS PRIMA

BY
BERARDUS BONJOANNES

A. D. 1560

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

REVISED BY
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WITH INTRODUCTION AND AN APPENDIX EXPLANATORY OF
SCHOLASTIC TERMS

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

IT has become customary in our times to depreciate the philosophy of Aristotle, which had served during so many generations as an adequate vehicle of thought for philosophers and theologians of every school. This universal mind-language of the civilized world was virtually discarded, and lost, among other things, that fixed standard of expression without which mutual understanding is impossible,—a loss to which may be at least partially attributed the amazing misrepresentations of Catholic doctrine which confront the reader in almost every non-Catholic work of the day (and in some also which ought to be Catholic), when they treat of religion either directly or indirectly.

Of the so-called Scholastic Philosophy a contemporary writer¹ says it was “professedly the philosophy of common-sense and common language which, by reason of its child-like directness and simplicity, departed as little as possible from the fundamental conceptions common to all philosophies,” adding, that owing to its being likewise “coherent, systematic, and well worked out, the Aristotelian philosophy will perhaps always take precedence as an educational instrument,” as indicated by the number of revivals and reactions which have taken place in its favour.

¹ G. Tyrrell, S.J., *Uses of Scholasticism*.

Whatever may be the deficiencies of this venerable philosophy, it may surely compare favourably with modern sectarian systems (almost as numerous as the religious sects with which they have been contemporaneous) and what a still more recent exponent of philosophy¹ calls "their muddled conclusions," while its acceptance by the Church, as the mind-language best suited to the expression of religious dogma, should induce seekers for truth to make themselves so far acquainted with it as to understand, at least, what the Christian Church really believes and teaches, before rejecting it as inconsistent with modern science or their own spiritual needs.

As it is chiefly to facilitate such an understanding that this work has been undertaken, it has been the translator's aim to render it into plain English, avoiding as far as possible technical words and expressions, without attempting to modernize the more or less archaic simplicity of the original style.

A. J. M.

Fiesole, 1905.

¹ Prof. Santayana, *Poetry and Religion*.

INTRODUCTION

[“Our strength, in this world, is to be the subjects of reason, and our liberty, to be the captives of truth.”—NEWMAN.]

ALTHOUGH scientific knowledge is held in great honour by men of modern times, they seem to attach little value to metaphysical truth, and even to affect indifference for it. The old saying, “Let the love of pure truth lead thee to read,” is neglected with regard to rational philosophy ; while novelty of thought and strangeness of views are preferred to sound judgment and accurate reasoning in the various theories, advanced by modern writers, concerning the system of the universe and the last destinies of man.

It cannot be denied that knowledge of the material world has developed to such an extent, that what would have seemed impossible, or been even inconceivable to past generations, is now commonly admitted as certain by all sane persons. [But scientific knowledge does not suffice for a soul eager for the acquisition of truth. Such cannot rest satisfied until the superior operation of the mind, grasping universal theories, is found to agree with the inferior order of fact and experiment, the knowledge of which has been derived through the senses.]

There is probably not a man of any intellectual culture who has not more or less consciously asked

the question : Why, since truth can be obtained in the natural departments of learning, it cannot be reached, at least with a sufficient degree of certitude, in a higher and more important sphere? Is man to grope his way among the vague and contradictory systems of modern thinkers to make sure of the existence of God, of the immortality of the soul, of the sanction of the moral law, etc. ? Man cannot be indifferent to religion as the means of attaining eternal happiness ; he must accept or reject it on the strength of his own reason, *i. e.* he must consider whether the form in which religion has been presented to him be in accordance with historical facts, and with the immutable principles of knowledge.

This is what the apostle means by "reasonable homage"—for it would be both impious and absurd to question the particular tenets of a religious belief which is assumed to have been revealed by God Himself.

The facts upon which revealed doctrine is made to rest may be more or less thoroughly apprehended by each individual in proportion to his mental capacity and learning, yet they must be sufficiently demonstrable and convincing in themselves to leave no prudent motive for doubt. "Lord, if what we believe is false, it is by Thee we are deceived, for these things are confirmed to us by signs which can be Thy work alone."¹

As regards dogma and mysteries, though inaccessible to reason in their intimate bearing, they cannot run counter to an acknowledged and evident truth of the

¹ Richard of St. Victor, *De Trin.*

natural order ; but rather strengthen and perfect the same by raising it to a higher and Divine order—
 “Since grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should subserve faith, even as natural inclination should assist charity.”¹

Philosophical truth lends an efficient, and, it may be said, a necessary assistance in both cases. Historical criticism itself, which deals with facts and events belonging to past generations, cannot be carried on by arbitrary rules or merely subjective methods, but rather on well-proved principles whose objective evidence is a sufficient guarantee for the conclusions arrived at by their guidance.

The fact of Revelation, in its complex features, and the existence of a divinely-appointed organ of the same, being duly sifted and ascertained by means of sound criticism, it remains for the human mind to accomplish the still higher and hardly less important task of expounding the contents of Revelation in a scientific manner ; arguing from supernatural principles to further conclusions of the same kind, and refuting arguments which run counter to articles of faith. “Embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayer.”²

〔Such is the task of Theology, which evidently requires the concurrent assistance of rational philosophy, viz. of those speculative truths which the human mind has neither created nor invented, but only acknowledged and assented to in force of their objective evidence.〕

¹ *Sum. Theol.*

² *Ad Titum*, I. 9.

Theologus ergo philosophus, says an old adage. It means that philosophy stands between the natural order of facts and notions, which are perceived by human faculties, and the supernatural order of religious doctrines which claim our assent, as a sort of necessary link; and while it enables man to conceive the immense variety of natural phenomena under the general aspect of the laws which confer order and beauty upon their apparent chaos, it helps him likewise to reach the threshold of Heaven, and to look into the regions of eternal light. [It is therefore highly desirable for humanity that a method of reasoning should be pointed out, and proved good for all ages, by which experimental truth, so acceptable to the modern world, may be shown to agree with philosophical doctrine equally sound and objectively certain.] But does such a philosophy exist, or does it still require to be elaborated? Leaving aside for the present the relations between Scholastic Philosophy and the other branches of learning already alluded to, we venture to assert that, [in the department of Theology, the student of St. Thomas will find proof that such a philosophy does really exist, as it has always existed in civilized society.]

Persons of intelligence and good faith who endorse the maxim prefixed to this Introduction will surely find in the great work of St. Thomas of Aquin, of a small but important part of which the following pages are an epitome, that [the philosophical system adopted by St. Thomas serves as a support to Revelation without in the least doing violence to the natural process of

human thought ; nay, that he argues from it, in a clear and forcible manner, to uphold the tenets of religion.]

The *Summa Theologica* does not deal with the historical facts upon which Revelation rests ; but supposes them to be known and placed beyond doubt by the general conversion of the civilized world to Christianity ; it confines itself to the exposition of Catholic doctrine in accordance with the results of speculative reasoning and the fundamental principles of all sciences.

[It may be truly said, in the language of Holy Scripture, that it is a gigantic structure raised by the combined spirit of science and wisdom ;—the latter denoting a superior and more perfect knowledge, “ filled with the Spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding, and all knowledge.”]

The so-called Scholastic Philosophy, to which Theology owes being treated in a scientific manner, is by no means a peculiar or subjective view of the universe, held up to the admiration or reprobation of the learned class,—like certain modern French or German systems,—but is, at least in its capital points, [a clear and reasoned exposition of those truths which may be said to form the staple commodity of human reason, since they are derived from the perception of objects such as they present themselves to the sensitive faculties of man in all ages and in every condition of life.] It may be objected that such observation is not complete nor exhaustive, but it cannot be said to be false without undermining the natural foundations of all human knowledge.

A philosopher cannot be supposed to know all things particularly, nor to know them in quite a different manner from the vulgar; he only possesses a clearer view of those universal truths which must lead man to acquire specific knowledge by a closer and more thorough observation aided by instruments. Hence Philosophy does not interfere with particular theories concerning the various branches of modern science, although it embraces them all in virtue of the universal principles which it lays down and explains.

It would be a prejudice, and a most dangerous one, to suppose with Descartes, or any other famous innovator, that it is necessary to rebuild the philosophical edifice on entirely new grounds; or that a philosopher ought to keep apart from his fellow-men in exploring the high regions of thought. St. Thomas proceeded on quite different lines. He takes up Philosophy in aid of Theology without caring about its origin, whether Pagan or Christian; but accepts it as the natural result of right reason, embodied in the works of wise men of all ages. He quotes Aristotle, and makes use of his formulas then current in the Schools; hence the name of Scholastic Philosophy attached to his system; but far from endorsing all his maxims and opinions, he sometimes confutes and explodes them.

It is not therefore matter of surprise that the writings of St. Thomas are still held up to Catholic students as the exemplar of theological science. It is only in the study of principles that true philosophy is found, and for these we must look to scholastic

teaching. Hegel and Spencer can never take the place of Aristotle and St. Thomas. It is only in the works of the latter that the truths and principles are found by means of which modern sophistries may be successfully refuted.

The children of the Church ought, therefore, to be enabled to meet modern modes of intellectual warfare against revealed Truth, by being well grounded in the reasons for the faith they profess; nor can they better prepare themselves for such a task than by studying the works of this gigantic intellect, which has left a stamp of genius on the Catholic world which time will never obliterate. Here they will find all revealed doctrines effectively co-ordinated; may note the points at which one touches another and see their harmonious relation as a whole. Here they may learn to reconcile scientific truth with the teachings of Revelation, and this study will mould the mind to a habit of sound and sober reasoning with which to undertake historical researches and cultivate the subordinate departments of knowledge.

It is no exaggeration to say, with an American writer of the day, that the study of St. Thomas, so urgently recommended by the late Holy Father in his encyclical *Æterni Patris*, would create a new spirit and infuse new life into educated Catholics. The Catholic Church does not discourage scientific studies, provided they be kept within reasonable bounds; while in past ages theological controversy was invariably carried on under the patronage of the Church. The few instances to the contrary have been

due to particular circumstances of persons and places ; and even then, as in the case of Galileo, the opposition was raised, not so much in defence of Revelation as of Science, as it was erroneously considered in those times.

Enough has been said to point out the scope of the present translation of Bonjoanne's *Compendium of the Summa Theologica*, Part I. This Compendium, written in the sixteenth century, has several advantages over later ones ; the subject matter being so condensed as to exhibit the connection of doctrine forcibly and clearly, divested of the "Objections" and other peculiarities of form which might divert the modern reader from the main point. It is a book suitable either for meditation, or for spiritual reading of a more substantial and efficient character than is to be found in many of our modern books of devotion.

An appendix has been added containing a few notes for the benefit of such as may be unacquainted with the terms of Scholastic Philosophy.

Fiesole, 1905.

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COMPENDIUM
OF THE
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PARS PRIMA

CHAPTER I

OF SACRED DOCTRINE: ITS NATURE AND EXTENT

IT is necessary for the salvation of man that, besides the natural sciences, there should exist some doctrine received by revelation; for many things are made known by revelation which transcend reason. Moreover, that which is discoverable about God by human reason could be known only to a few, and that after much time, and not without a large admixture of error. It was good, therefore, for man to be taught by means of a doctrine divinely revealed; for salvation, which is in God, depends upon a knowledge of the truth.

This doctrine is a science proceeding from principles made known by the light of a higher science, as music proceeds from principles explained by arithmetic. For Sacred Doctrine proceeds from principles made known

by the light of a higher knowledge, namely, the Divine Knowledge, and in it certain particulars are treated of, both as an example of life and in order that we may know clearly by what instrumentality this revelation is made.

Sacred Doctrine takes account of all things only in so far as they belong to the formal order of Divine revelation. This science is one, neither wholly practical nor wholly speculative; but being of a higher order it includes both, yet remains one, as God knows both Himself and what He does with the same knowledge. It is, however, more speculative than practical, for it treats more of Divine things than of human actions, being concerned with the latter only in so far as they are intended to lead man to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists.

And this science is higher in dignity than other speculative sciences, for these derive their certainty from human reason, which may err, while Sacred Doctrine, owing to the light of Divine Knowledge, can never be deceived; moreover, they consider only things which are below reason, while she treats principally of such as transcend reason. Sacred Doctrine is also higher in dignity than other practical sciences, for, among such, that science is accounted the more honourable which is not subordinated to a further end, as military science is to civil; but the end of this doctrine, in as far as it is practical, is eternal beatitude, to which all other ends of the practical sciences are subordinate.

And since it treats most properly of God as the

First Cause, it is wisdom in the highest sense ; for he is accounted wise in any department of knowledge who studies the highest cause in that department. Seeing, therefore, that Sacred Doctrine determines concerning God, not only as He may be known by creatures, but also as He is known by Himself alone, and by others through revelation, it is properly called wisdom in the highest sense ; and God is the subject of it, for all things are considered with reference to Him, all things being related to Him either as their beginning or their end.

Sacred Doctrine does not employ argument to prove its principles, which are articles of faith, but proceeds from them to demonstrate something else, as the Apostle argues from the resurrection of Christ to that of others. The inferior sciences, indeed, do not prove their first principles or argue with those who deny them, but leave them to be proved by a higher science, while metaphysics, which is the highest among them, only disputes with those who deny its first principles if the adversary grant something ; if he grant nothing it cannot argue with him, but can still solve his objections. In like manner, Sacred Doctrine, having no superior, disputes with those who deny its principles provided the adversary grant something, and proceeds to argue from one article of faith against those who impugn others, as in the case of heretics. If, however, the adversary believe none of those things which are revealed, it is no longer possible to prove the articles of faith by reason, but only to solve objections brought against a faith which is rooted in infallible

truth. For as it is impossible that what is contrary to truth can be proved to be true, the arguments brought against faith can be answered.

It benefits Sacred Doctrine to express things Spiritual and Divine by the use of corporal metaphors, for God provides for every creature according to its nature, and men are led naturally by means of things sensible to knowledge which is purely intellectual. Moreover, the Sacred Scriptures are for the instruction of all men, and the uncultured apprehend intellectual things more easily under corporal similitudes.

And this Doctrine has several meanings under one letter. There is the literal, which is also called the historical sense, and the spiritual, when the things expressed in the words mean something else. The spiritual sense is threefold; for as the Old Law is the sign of the New, and the New Law is the figure of future glory, there follows from this the allegorical sense. The things which are done in Christ, and are the figure of what we ought to do, make the moral sense. As they signify what makes up eternal glory, they give the anagogical sense. Since God is the author of this Doctrine, and He comprehends all things in His mind at once, it is most fitting that the one literal sense should contain many meanings.

CHAPTER II

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

THAT God exists is in itself a self-evident truth ; but it is not so to us who do not see the Essence of God ; and it requires to be proved by those things which are more known as regards ourselves and less known in their nature, that is, by effects. Although we know God in a general way, we do not therefore know Him absolutely. It is possible to demonstrate the Existence of God by effects, which are more known to us than their cause, for effects being granted, a pre-existing cause there must be ; and we call this *demonstratio quia*, not *propter quid*,¹ for not even by effects do we know the Essence of God.

The Existence of God may be shown by five proofs. The First is drawn from the principle of motion. It is evident to our senses that motion exists. Whatever is moved must be moved by some external agent. Nothing is moved unless it is in potentiality (*in potentia*)² to its term of motion. Motion is made accordingly as things are changed from the potential to the actual, and this requires some actual agent to move them from the potential state. Since it cannot be that anything should be both potential and actual as regards the same order, it follows that the mover and

¹ See Appendix A.

² See Appendix B.

the moved cannot be identical. Thus, not to go on indefinitely, we must come at last to a First Cause immovable of motion ; and there we find God.

The Second Proof consists in the order of Efficient Causes in sensible objects. Nothing can be its own efficient cause, for then it would exist before itself. In every order of being the first is the cause of the intermediate, and this latter the cause of the ultimate ; so that if the cause be removed the effect ceases to be, and if the first is gone there can be neither the intermediate nor the ultimate. Hence, not to proceed indefinitely, there must be a First Efficient Cause ; and there too we find God.

The Third Proof is taken from possible and necessary things. Some things may be or not be ; they are possible, as they are subject to generation and decomposition ; but everything could not be always thus, for what is not necessary at some time is not. If, therefore, all things may possibly not be, at some time there must have been nothing ; and if this be true even now, there would be nothing, for what is not can only exist by that which is. All things, therefore, are not mere possibilities in their origin ; there must exist some necessary thing. But whatever is necessary, either has cause for its necessity or it has not ; and, not to proceed indefinitely, as regards necessary things with a cause for their being necessary, we are obliged to postulate something necessary in itself with no cause for its necessity, but itself the cause to other things of their necessity ; and this is God.

The Fourth Proof proceeds from our finding some

things better than others. A thing is said to be more or less as it approaches to that which is called most. There exists, therefore, something which is best and truest, the source to things of all goodness and truth, and of all their other perfections ; and this we call God.

The Fifth Proof is drawn from the idea of government. Some things are without understanding, yet they work for an end, because often or always they work in the same way to obtain the best end ; hence it is evident that they attain the end not by chance, but by intention ; and since they must act towards the end not by their own but by some one's knowledge, they reach the end because they are directed by an Intelligent Being. There must, therefore, be such an Intelligent Being Who directs all natural things to their end ; and Him we call God.

CHAPTER III

THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD

GOD is not corporeal ; first, because movement is not possible to a body except by an external agent—God is the First Cause of motion, Himself being immovable, as was shown above ; secondly, a body is a potentiality (*in potentia*) because, as it is continuous, it is divisible indefinitely, whereas God is a Being in Act and Pure Act ; thirdly, God is the noblest of all Beings in Act, and, therefore, cannot be corporeal, a body being either living or not living, and a living body is nobler than a not living body ; but a living body does not live as such, otherwise every body would live, and so it must live by another, which is the soul. That which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is, therefore, impossible that God should be corporeal.

God is not composed of matter and form. Matter is of itself a potentiality. God is True Actuality, having no potentiality. Further, every created being is good and perfect by virtue of its form and by participation, as matter participates form ;¹ but as God is the first and highest Good, He is not Good by participation, but by His own Essence ; therefore He is not composite. It is clear also, from His being the First Efficient Cause,

¹ See Appendix C.

and, therefore, the First Cause and acting of Himself, and Form by His own Essence, why He is not composed of matter and form. God is identified with His Essence or Nature, whereas in single forms which are their own individuality the subject is the same as the nature; and, therefore, God is His own Deity and His own Life, and all else that can be predicated of Him. In things composed of matter and form nature differs from the subject, because the nature or essence comprehends in itself only what falls under the definition of Species, and so it does not comprehend the individualizing matter, and thereby it is distinguished from the subject. So God is not only His own Essence, but His own Existence; for whatever is in anything besides its essence must be caused either by the essence or by some external agent; but it cannot be by the essence alone, for to be its own cause of being is beyond any being. If this is caused by an external agent, it must be as regards anything that has existence and essence distinct, that it should have a cause other than itself; but with God that cannot be, for He is, we have seen, the First Efficient Cause. Further, existence when distinct from essence is related to it as act to potentiality; but God is Pure Act with no potentiality, and, therefore, He is identified with His Essence; this is evident likewise from the fact that He is the First Being, and, therefore, must Be. If His Existence and Essence were not the same, He would Be by participation, and thus He would not be the First Being; which is absurd to say of God.

→ Neither is God, properly speaking, in any genus.

Species is made of genus and difference ; and that from which difference comes stands towards that which makes the genus as the actual to the potential (thus the rational may be compared to the sensitive, as the actual to the potential, and so on) ; but since in God the potential cannot be added to His Actuality, it cannot be that He should be as a species in a genus. Moreover, if God were in a genus, it must be that of Being, for genus signifies the essence of a thing, as when we predicate of a thing that it is such ; but Being cannot be a genus, as Aristotle says, because every genus has differences external to its essence, whereas no difference can be external to simple being. Therefore, God is not in a genus, for outside of Being there is only not-Being, which cannot be the difference among beings. Besides, all the members of one genus have those things in common which constitute the genus in its essence (of which it may be predicated that it is such), but they differ in their being ; thus the being of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor is the being of one man the same as another's. There is a necessary difference, therefore, between being (or existence) and essence in things which are in a genus ; whereas the contrary has been proved in God, and, therefore, He is not in a genus. Neither does He belong to a genus by reduction ¹ to first principles, for whatever belongs to a genus by reduction does not extend beyond it ; whereas God is the First Principle of all Being, and hence He cannot be contained as the first principle in any particular genus.

¹ See Appendix D.

Nor can there be any accident in God. The subject is to the accident as the potential is to the actual, and God being Pure Actuality, the potential has no place in Him. Then, as God is His own Existence, there can be nothing added to His Nature ; just as heat has only heat, although a thing which is hot may have something external added to the heat, such as whiteness. Thirdly, whatever exists of itself is prior to that which is accidental. Hence, as God is the First Being, there cannot be in Him anything accidental.

God is, therefore, wholly Simple, for in Him there is no composition nor quantitative parts, neither is His Nature distinct from His Subject. He is wholly Simple likewise because what is composite comes after its component parts, and depends upon them ; whereas God is the First Being. Moreover, a thing composite has a cause for its unity ; but God has no cause, being Himself the First Efficient Cause. Also, in everything which is composite there is potentiality and actuality, which have no place in God. Finally, everything which is composite is a whole separate from its parts, whether like or unlike, which can in no way be said of God, Who is His own Form, or rather His own Being, and, therefore, is wholly Simple.

Neither does God enter into the composition of any other things, as some have erroneously thought and said that He was the soul of the first heavens, or the formal principle of all things, or primal matter (*materia prima*), for God is the First Efficient Cause, and such cause is numerically distinct from the form of the effect, and can only agree with it in species, as in the

case of man generating a man. Matter does not agree with its efficient cause either numerically or specifically, for it is *in potentia*, and the latter is *in actu*. God, as the First Cause, is the highest, and acts by His own power ; and so He is not a part of anything else. Nor can any part of a composite thing be the absolute first among beings, as God is ; not matter nor form, which are the principles of anything composite ; for matter, which is potentiality, is simply posterior to actuality, and form, which is part likewise, is participated form which comes after that which is Form by Essence. Therefore God does not enter into composition at all.

CHAPTER IV

OF THE PERFECTION OF GOD

THE ancient philosophers did not attribute that which is best and highest to the First Principle, because they considered only the imperfect material principle. God is Perfect, because He is the First Efficient Principle, supreme in Actuality, and, therefore, supremely Perfect. In Him are the perfections of all things, for whatever perfection exists in the effect must be found in the efficient cause, and thus they exist in God in a more eminent manner than is the case in creatures. For God is His own very Existence of Himself, and hence it must be that He contains all perfection of being, for perfection is identified with being. The creature is like to God, because God is the Efficient Cause of all, and every agent does a work like to itself in proportion to its actuality. If an agent is one in species with its effect, there is likeness between them in species, as man generates a man; and if they are not in one species, there is likeness, but not in species, as those things which are generated by the sun's heat are like to the sun in some degree, but they do not receive the form of the sun in specific likeness, but only in generic likeness. If there is an Agent

outside of Genus, the effect has a more remote likeness to it ; for the likeness is not based either on genus or species, but only on analogy, inasmuch as both have being. In this way creatures are like to God, the First Natural Principle of all.

CHAPTER V

OF GOOD IN GENERAL

GOODNESS and Being are the same in substance but different according to our mode of conception; for Goodness implies the notion of desirability, whereas Being is necessarily not bound up with anything of that kind. Nevertheless, as everything is good and perfect according to its actuality, a thing is good in proportion to its measure of being, which is actuality, and hence Goodness and Being are substantially the same. Being, however, is prior to Goodness in our conception of them, because a thing is knowable accordingly as it is actual; and, therefore, since Being is the proper object of the intellect, it falls under knowledge, and is thus prior to Goodness.

Every being, as such, is good, for being is actuality, which is a perfection, and this again is desirable and good in our idea of it, and hence everything is good; and good is a final cause because it is desirable. What is desirable is a final cause for the reason because that which is first in the cause itself comes last in the thing which is caused; thus fire gives heat before it produces the nature of fire in its effect, although heat in the fire produces the substantial form.¹ Hence in the process of causation we find, first, good, and the end which moves the efficient cause; secondly, the act of the efficient

¹ See Appendix E.

cause to the form ; thirdly, there comes the form ; and hence the contrary must be the case in the effect caused ; for first is the form which makes it a being ; secondly, the effective power which makes it perfect in being, because each thing is perfect accordingly as it can produce its likeness ; thirdly, comes the idea of goodness which makes a thing perfect.

The idea of Good is expressed in Mode, Species, and Order. The form makes everything what it is, and this presupposes antecedent and consequent principles, as, for instance, determination to one form or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient ; and this is signified by mode ; hence it is said that measure fixes the mode. The species is signified in the form because each thing is constituted in a species by the form, and tendency to the end or to action follows from the form. Further, each thing acts so far as it is in actuality and tends to that which belongs to it according to its form ; and this belongs to order. Hence the idea of Good implying perfection consists in mode, species, and order.¹ So Good is properly divided into the useful, the just and the delectable. That which is desirable and terminates the movement of desire as the means whereby it tends to something else, is called useful ; that which is desired as an end so as to entirely terminate desire and is desired for its own sake, is called just ; and that which, being desired for its own sake, terminates desire by rest in the desired thing, is called delectable. Good is thus properly divided into these three.

¹ See Appendix F.

CHAPTER VI

THE GOODNESS OF GOD

GOD is the Supreme Good. He is the Efficient Cause of all things, whence all derive their being, and have a desire for Him in order to participate in His likeness, for likeness to the agent is the perfection proper to each thing. Wherefore, if His very likeness is an object of desire, much more is God Himself to be desired. Hence He is not only Good, but He is simply Goodness itself. Good, therefore, belongs to Him as the Source of all perfections, and as the First Cause, not as the agent of like nature with the effect, but as One not belonging to the same order as the effect, either according to species or genus ; in a superexcellent way the First Cause of all things, not of the same kind, but outside of genus, and the principle of existing creatures ; whence He is called the Supreme Good.

God only is Good by His Essence. The rule of goodness is that of the degree of perfection which is possessed, and perfection is threefold ; as, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in the existence which is given by its substantial form ; its second perfection is found in the accidents added to it for its perfect action, such as heat, dryness, lightness, and so on ; its third perfection, that it remains in its own place.¹

¹ See Appendix G.

Such perfections as these belong to no creature by its own essence, but in that way to God only, whose Essence is His Existence, and in whom there is nothing accidental. For such things as are said to be accidental in others belong to Him essentially, as, for example, to be powerful and wise. Nor is He related to an end, for He is Himself the Last End of all things. Hence God alone has all perfections by His Essence ; and so He only is essentially Good. Each thing is called good by the Divine Goodness ; from the Exemplar, the First Efficient Cause and the Final End of all goodness. Each thing is good formally by its likeness to Him. This goodness is one, and it is also multiform.

CHAPTER VII

THE INFINITY OF GOD

GOD is Infinite because His Immensity is not bounded by matter.¹ The Divine Being is not contained in anything, but He is His own Self-Existence,² and hence He is Infinite and Perfect. There is nothing absolutely infinite but God, although relatively it may be so. With regard to infinity as applied to matter, it is evident that everything in existence must have some form; thus its matter is determined by form and cannot be infinite, properly speaking; but in so far as matter remains in potentiality to an infinitude of forms, it is accounted relatively infinite. If we speak of infinity as applied to form, it is evident that those forms which are actually united to matter are finite; but the created forms independent of matter, as the opinion is regarding the angels, these would be relatively infinite, as not limited by matter; but, however, because they are not self-existent and their existence is limited by a determinate nature, they cannot be, properly speaking, infinite; and, therefore, God alone is absolutely Infinite.

¹ This metaphysical argument connected with the scholastic *matter and form* has no relation to modern theories of *matter* in physical science.

² *Ipse est suum esse subsistens*. The great scholastic philosophical formula concerning God's existence; also *Actus Purus*.

No natural body can be infinite in magnitude, because every natural body has a determinate substantial form to which belong fixed accidents ; hence a body has a determinate quantity of more or less, which makes it impossible for it to be infinite. The same is evident if we consider motion. Every body has some movement, whereas an infinite body could have none ; neither straight, for nothing can so move except outside its own place, which could not exist at all were it infinite ; nor circular, because such a movement requires that one part be transferred to the place hitherto occupied by another part, and this could not be in an infinite circular body, for the lines radiating from the centre become more distant from each other as they are more and more drawn out ; if, therefore, a body were infinite, such lines would become infinitely distant from each other, and one could never get near the other. The same is evident with regard to a mathematical body, the actual existence of which must be imagined under some form ; and because the form of quantity, as such, is shape, it must have some shape and be therefore finite, for shape is that which is within limits.

It is likewise impossible for an infinite multitude to exist. A multitude exists according to some kind of multitude, and kind exists according to the species of numbers ;¹ and no species of number is infinite, for number is multitude measured by one. Hence an infinite multitude cannot be, either directly or accidentally. There can be, however, an infinite multitude

¹ See Appendix H.

in potentiality, because increase of multitude follows upon division of multitude, and the more a thing is divided the greater will be the result in number. The infinity of being is thus found in potentiality, by the division of that which is continuous ; and a like idea of infinity is also found in the addition of multitude.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS

GOD is present in all things, not as part of their essence, or as an accident, but as the agent is present in what he does, for an agent must be united with, and by his power be joined to, what he does ; and hence God, as Universal Cause, is present to all things, not only when they begin to be, but as long as they exist. As light, which is caused in the air by the sun, remains so long as the air is illuminated, so God exists perpetually in all things as their Creator.

God is said to be in every place by His Power, not as a body fills place, excluding every other by the fact of its being there, for, rather, God may be said to fill place, inasmuch as He gives to all things in place that which makes them to be in place. Thus God is present effectively in all created things, but objectively in the rational creature which knows and loves Him by act or habit ; in such a manner is God present by grace in the saints.

Thus, therefore, He is present in all things by power, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him ; and He is in all things by His Presence, as all things are bare and open to His eyes ; and He is in all things by His Essence, inasmuch as He is in all as the Cause of Being. Moreover, that is properly said to be

everywhere which is necessarily present in any given place, which is proper to God ; for however many places there might be, from their very existence it would follow that God must be in them all, for nothing can exist but by Him. Thus it belongs to God to be everywhere first and of Himself; and it belongs to Him alone that, however many places there might be, in each of them He must be present, not by division of parts, but wholly as He is in Himself.

CHAPTER IX

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD

THAT God is absolutely unchangeable is proved from His being the Pure Act, with no admixture of any potentiality. For the potential, strictly speaking, comes after the actual,¹ and everything subject to change is in some degree in a state of potentiality, and capable of receiving more. Further, whatever is moved partly remains as it was, and partly goes on further, as when a thing changes from white to black, it remains in substance as it was; and hence in every change there is something which is composite; but this cannot be in God, Who is absolutely Simple. Lastly, everything moved acquires something, and attains to that which it had not; whereas God, Who is Infinite, comprehends in Himself the entire plenitude of all perfections in all beings, and cannot acquire anything more, or attain to that which He has not. He is, therefore, absolutely unchangeable. Hence, even among the ancient philosophers, truth compelled some to postulate a First Immovable Principle of all. It belongs, therefore, to God alone to be unchangeable of Himself. The creature is unchangeable through the Creator's power, in whose hand is its existence and non-existence, for its creation and preservation

¹ See Appendix I.

depend upon the absolute Will of God. In every creature change is possible : in corruptible bodies according to their substance, and in celestial bodies according to place only, because matter's potentiality is completed by form ; hence the latter are not subject to change according to their substance, but only according to place.¹ In the subsistent forms of the angels, who are not in potentiality to non-existence, there is a two-fold changeableness : that by which they are in potentiality to their final end, thus being subject to change as regards choice of evil instead of good ; the other, according to place, whereby they can by their finite power reach to some other place. As God, therefore, is not changeable by any of these modes, He alone is absolutely unchangeable.

¹ See Appendix J.

CHAPTER X

THE ETERNITY OF GOD

ETERNITY is well defined by Boëthius, *interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio*, the perfect and simultaneous possession of interminable life. We know what is simple by that which is composite; for we know first what is composite, through which we attain to the notion of simplicity. Accordingly, Eternity becomes known to us in a twofold manner: first, as that which belongs to Eternity is interminable, without beginning or end; the term can be applied to both. Secondly, this Eternity is without succession, it exists all at once. Thus it exists always according to one and the same mode, and the idea of *before* or *after* has no place in it at all. God is Eternal because He is Unchangeable; thus Immutability belongs to Eternity, as movement belongs to time.

God is not only Eternal; He is His own Eternity; for His Duration is His Existence; as His Essence is His Existence, so is His Eternity. And God alone is Eternal, for He alone is Unchangeable. Other things share in Eternity in much the same way as they share from Him, in their own degree, of durability, as things corruptible have a long life, and thus Scripture speaks of the "eternal hills." With some things, as the elements, this participation is held by the whole, and not according to the parts; others, like the

angels and the Blessed, participate, in a strict sense, by the substantial incorruptibility of their individual act; their happiness is in the Word, and their thoughts are not changeable. Eternity differs from Age (*Ævum*) and from Time. Eternity is without succession, which cannot be said of Time; because the very notion of Time means *before* and *after*. Age differs from Time, for as Eternity is the measure of permanent existence, and is without *before* and *after*, nor can be in a way comparable to such a notion; indeed, as a thing recedes from permanence of existence it recedes from Eternity, so also Age is without before or after in itself, but may possibly be joined to them accidentally, hence its measure is that of the heavenly bodies, the existence of which is unchangeable, although this may be joined to change as regards place. The angels have a changeless existence, with liability to change as regards election, so far as pertains to their nature, thus being mutable as regards intelligence, affection, and place, and their measure of existence is Age. But corruptible things that recede so far from permanence of existence as to be subject to change, or whose existence consists in change, like all movement, are measured by Time.

Age is one; for, as the oneness of Time is derived from the unity of the first movement, which is the most simple, and the rule of measurement for all others, so one Age is the measure of all others, and the more it is simply the first the more simple it is, and the principle of the rest. But many ages are reckoned as so many centuries.

CHAPTER XI

THE DIVINE UNITY

ONE is convertible with Being, and adds nothing to it but the negation of division. Everything is either simple or compound ; what is simple is undivided and indivisible ; what is compound has no existence whilst its parts are divided, but only when they make and compose the compound ; hence the existence of anything consists in the absence of division, and it follows that a thing maintains its being accordingly as it preserves its unity.

One is opposed to many, but in different ways, for one, which is the beginning of numbers, is opposed to multitude as the measure is to the thing measured, because One represents the first measure, and number is multitude measured by one, while One, as it is interchangeable with Being, is opposed to multitude by way of privation of multitude, as the undivided is to the divided.

God is One, for that which causes a thing to be singular cannot be communicated to many ; and this belongs to God, for God Himself is His own Nature ; hence "God" and "this God" are the same. Wherefore there cannot be many gods, which is also evident from the fact that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfections of existence. If there were several gods,

something would belong to one and not to another, and so he in whom was privation of anything would not be simply perfect. The same is likewise proved by the unity of the world, for one is the cause of one, and things are better arranged by one than by many, and are brought into a uniform order. Thus God is pre-eminently One, because He is pre-eminently Being, inasmuch as He has not any existence restricted to any other nature, but He is Himself His own Existing Essence, entirely indeterminate and absolutely undivided in act and potentiality, for He is in every way Simple. Hence God is pre-eminently One.

CHAPTER XII

HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US

GOD, Who is the Pure Act, with no mixture of potentiality, is, in Himself, supremely knowable, for the measure of cognition is Actuality ; but because He so greatly exceeds our intellect He is not fully known by us ; His Essence, however, can be seen, for our Beatitude consists in that Vision ; were it otherwise, the desire implanted by nature would be futile if it could not attain to its First Cause, or would have to seek its Beatitude elsewhere than in the Vision of God.¹ The Blessed do, therefore, see the Essence of God, although they do not comprehend Him.

The created intellect does not see the Divine Essence through any similitude created on the part of the Vision itself, which must be in some manner united with the seer, for the Essence of God is His Existence, and cannot be represented by any created form. It is rather uncircumscribed, containing in itself in a supereminent manner whatever can be known to, or understood by, the created intellect, and it is therefore beyond the capacity of representation by any created likeness : for every form is contained in a

¹ There is some controversy as to what St. Thomas means by the "natural desire" to see God. It cannot be discussed here. See Ward's *Nature and Grace*.

definition, and hence to say that God is seen through a similitude is equal to saying that the Divine Essence is not seen at all. We must rather say that the visual power is raised to beholding God through the Divine Light of Glory, according to the words, "In Thy Light we shall see Light."

God, being incorporeal, is not seen by the bodily eye ; but those in the flesh after the resurrection will see Him in such a manner as not by any sense or faculty of the senses, but only by the intellect ; and in vision of the imagination will be a kind of likeness of God. Nor can the Divine Essence be seen through the natural power of any created intellect, because, as knowledge comes by mode, and the nature of the one that knows, and in such a manner that another superior faculty is required to attain to any object above nature, and God being His own essential Existence, can, therefore, only be seen by the created intellect through Grace. The created intellect is in need of some disposition of a supernatural order to see the Essence of God ; that Divine Essence is, indeed, the Form which determines our intellect ; hence it is necessary that by Divine Grace a power of intelligence should be added to nature, and this increase of intellectual strength is that illumination of the intellect of which we read (Apoc. xxi.), and it is said that the Glory of God shall enlighten the society of the Blessed who see God. God Himself shall be seen more perfectly by one than by another, accordingly as one shall participate in Glory and Light more than another, and he shall participate more who has more of charity, for where there

is more charity there is more desire, and desire makes him who desires in some manner apt and prepared for the reception of the object desired. Inasmuch, however, as God is capable of being known to infinity, He cannot be comprehended by the created intellect, although He is so in a certain sense, inasmuch as the Blessed see His Essence, and seeing they possess, and possessing they enjoy.

Although the Divine Essence is seen by the created intellect, everything in God is not seen, otherwise He would be fully understood, which, as we have seen, is impossible. The natural desire of the creature, however, will be satisfied by the understanding of *genus* and *species* with their causes, all of which will be seen in this same Essence, and the higher the intellect the more will be known. The perfection of the created intellect does not require the individual knowledge of things with all their details, nor do we naturally desire this : God alone, the Source and Principle of all Being, fully satisfies all.

Those who see God will not see anything else by its own likeness, but by the Divine Essence itself united to their intellect ; and they will see all things at once in God, and not successively, for as in this present life our intellect understands by many and various *species*, and it cannot by one act be filled with many *species*, as one body cannot be made of several different shapes at once, the intellect of the Blessed sees all things by the one Divine Essence and not by any likeness : and, therefore, it sees all things at once, and not successively. In this life no one can see the Divine Essence, because

whilst we are in the body we understand by the mode that is natural to us, and our soul in this life exists in corporeal matter ; whereas the Divine Essence cannot be known through the nature of corporeal things. The Vision of God by means of some created similitude is not the Vision of the Divine Essence Itself. If Moses and St. Paul, the one ruler of the Jews, the other of the Gentiles, are objected as having been raised above the course of nature to see the Divine Essence, it is explained that neither of them were at that moment subject to the senses. Likewise by natural reason we cannot know the Divine Essence ; but by things of sense we can learn that God exists, and that He is the Cause of all things, but in Himself He is nothing of those things of which He is the Cause, and which are removed from Him, not by way of His being deprived of anything, but because He far exceeds them all. We have by Grace a higher knowledge of Divine things than reason can give, for when the natural light of the intellect is strengthened by Divine Light, images more expressive of Divine realities are produced than any within reach of nature. This is evident from the prophetic visions ; also when voices or other sensible things are supernaturally produced in order to convey some experience of Divine things, as when the Holy Ghost, at Christ's baptism, appeared in the form of a dove, and the Father's voice was heard : " This is My Son," etc.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DIVINE NAMES

GOD can be named by us only from the analogy of creatures, not from what He is in Himself ; but we name Him as He is known to us through creation by way of excellence, and by way of negation, that is, in an affirmative and negative sense. In this life we do not know the Essence of God as He is, and because we know Him as imperfectly represented by creatures, all such names are imperfect and are inadequate to express the Divine Substance. So when we say " God is good " the meaning is not, God is the Cause of good, or God is not bad ; it means that what is called good in creatures pre-exists in God in a higher sense. For it does not follow that goodness is attributed to God because He is the Cause of goodness ; rather, conversely, because He is Himself good He diffuses goodness in creatures, as St. Augustine says: " Inasmuch as He is good, we are."

Some names are properly applied to God because of their meaning, and to Him first and more properly than to creatures, such as goodness, life, etc. These, indeed, are perfections existing in God in a more eminent manner¹ than in creatures, but in respect of

¹ *Eminentiori modo.* This expression embodies an important principle of the scholastic theology, applied consistently throughout.

their mode of signification they cannot be, strictly speaking, applied to God, because such a mode is on a level with creatures, and such perfections are understood by us as they exist in creatures, and are named by us as they are thus understood. Although the names attributed to God signify one, still they signify it in a multiform and diverse aspect, and are, therefore, not synonymous ; for perfections exist united and absolutely in God, whereas creatures can receive them only in a divided and multiform manner.

Nor are those terms which are applied to God and creatures used in the same sense, and the reason is because an effect which does not equal the force of the cause is a recipient of that, divided and manifold, which in the cause is simple and uniform. Thus in a man to be wise means something distinct from the essence of man. But neither are they used *equivocally*¹ (*i. e.* in a wholly different sense) of God and creatures, for were that so, nothing could be known or inferred from creatures about God, contrary to that shown above ; it is, therefore, by way of *analogy*, *i. e.* proportion, that the same terms are applied to God and to creatures, for there is a certain orderly relation of the creature to God, as He is the Principle and Cause in Whom pre-exist excellently all created perfections. This way stands between the two, pure equivocation and simple univocation ; forasmuch as in analogy there is not one idea only, as in the univocal order, nor that entire difference which marks the equivocal order, since there is signified in it diversity of proportion in relation to the unit.

¹ See Appendix K.

Names which are applied metaphorically to God are derived from creatures, and not from God, forasmuch as when they are spoken of God they only signify His likeness to certain creatures, as when we apply to God the name of "Lion" we signify that the strength of God shown in His works is like the lion's strength in its sphere of action ; while, on the contrary, what is signified by the name belongs first to God rather than to the creature, for perfections flow from God to creatures. When we consider the imposition of the name, however, we give it first to those we know first, to creatures.

Names also implying temporal relations to creatures are assigned to God, for although He is outside the order of the universe, all creatures being ordered to Him as their End, and not, conversely, He to them, they bear a relation to Him, while God has no relation to creatures, except as a notion, for God and creatures are not of the same order. Thus the names of "Lord," "Redeemer," and others like them, implying temporal relations, may be given to God.

The very name of "God" belongs to the Divine Nature as regards that to which it is given, but as regards that from which it is taken, it expresses effect or operation, being derived from the idea of universal Providence, for when we speak of God by this name we mean to express that He takes care of all. And as this name is used to signify the Divine Nature, which is not multiple, it cannot be communicated in reality, except only in the opinion of those who assert there are many gods ; yet still it is communicable, not in its full

meaning, but according to some kind of likeness, as those are called gods who participate in the Divine Likeness, while if it were a name that signified not the Nature but the Personality of God, such a name would be wholly incommunicable. And this name of "God" is not applied to God univocally nor equivocally, that is in quite the same or quite a different sense, but analogically, by participation, and according to nature and notion: for when we name God by participation, we mean by the name "God" anything that has the likeness of the true God; and when we call an idol god, we mean something that men think is God: thus the meaning of the name has various aspects, though one is contained in the rest, from which we infer that it is used analogically. The name "He is" or "I am" is most strictly applicable to God, for it signifies not form but His very Existence, and in God alone is His Essence His own very Existence, and everything else is denominated by its form; whilst it is evident that the Essence of God cannot be understood by us in this life as it is in itself, and hence everything that is understood in any explicit way falls short of God as He is in Himself. Hence the more extended and less determined names are the more suitably applied to Him Who is the Infinite ocean of substance and indetermined. Moreover, it is plain that because existence signifies the present, it is most properly said of God, Who knows neither past nor future. And further, because God in Himself is One and Simple, and we cannot see Him as He is, we understand Him according to different conceptions, for we cannot see Him as He is, but we

understand Him in various ways that correspond, as we know, to one and the same. Hence the notional plurality in our minds represents the predicate and subject in that guise ; nevertheless, unity is realized in the mind of composition.

CHAPTER XIV

THE KNOWLEDGE OF (IN) GOD


IN God there is perfect knowledge. The more immaterial a being is, the more intelligent it is. Unintelligent nature is limited by and immersed in matter ; but intelligent natures have a more extended sway, and are less contracted by matter ; and hence in proportion as forms are immaterial they approach, so to speak, to a kind of infinitude, and to a share of intellectual perfection. God, Who is absolutely immaterial, is intelligent to an infinitely perfect degree.

God knows Himself by Himself, because, being Pure Actuality, and having nothing potential, the power of knowing and the object known are in all respects the same in Him ; nor is He ever without intelligible species, as we are, when our mind is in a state of potentiality as regards understanding, for the Intelligible Species of the Divine Intellect are the Divine Intellect itself, and no other. Thus God understands Himself perfectly, for as actuality and intelligibility correspond to each other, and God is the Pure Act, free from matter and all that can be called potential, consequently He is intelligent perfectly, and knows Himself absolutely.

The Intelligence of God is His Substance. Were it otherwise the Divine Substance would have a relation

of potentiality to something else, for to understand is the perfection of the act of an intelligent being, and this in God cannot be ; and since in God there is no form which can be distinct from His Existence, it follows that His Intelligence is His Essence and His Existence : therefore in God the Intelligent Mind, that which is understood, the intelligible species, and He Who understands, are altogether One and the Same ; nor when we say the Intelligent God do we mean to place any multiplicity in His Substance.

Things other than Himself God knows, because He perfectly knows Himself, and all those things to which His Power extends, for since He is the First Cause of all things, the effects pre-existing in the Cause are in His Intelligence. He knows Himself in Himself, and others He knows not in others but in His own Substance ; for His Essence is a Species measured by God Himself, and not by others ; for He comprehends the species of all things. God's knowledge of Himself extends to all other things, because He contains all perfections, and it is evident that knowledge of what is imperfect is contained in the knowledge of what is perfect, as, for instance, knowledge of man contains that of animal. Since, then, every nature consists in some [created] participation of the Divine Perfections, God would not perfectly know Himself unless He knew every modification of existence, and how His perfections are shared by others, as contrarily has been shown above. Nor is His knowledge in any way discursive or successive, for God sees everything in One, that is, in Himself, and He sees effects in Himself as



their Cause, and hence His knowledge is not discursive. His knowledge is the Cause of all things, as the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of his work, joined to his will to carry out a determined effect. This knowledge in God as the Cause is called the Knowledge of Approbation.

“Moreover, God knows things that exist not, because whatever He or the creature might do, even of only possible things, yet, as such, so far He knows them. Things not actually in existence, but which have been or will be, God knows with the Knowledge of Vision, for all are before Him, and with a single glance He comprehends all time ; while things which are only possible, and neither are, nor were, nor will be, He knows by Knowledge of Simple Intelligence.

God knows evil also, for He Who knows anything perfectly must know also what may befall it. Unless God knew the evil that might befall any good thing, the good could not be perfectly known to Him ; and because evil is the privation of good, by the very fact that God knows good He knows also evil, as by light is known darkness.

And God likewise knows single things, for all the perfections of creatures exist in Him in a more eminent mode, and His knowledge, which is the Cause of all things, must extend as far as His Causality. And because the power of God extends not only to forms but to matter also, His knowledge must reach to the least details which receive their individuation from matter ; thus Cause may be able to contain the knowledge of all its effects, in general and in particular.

God knows infinity with the Knowledge of Vision, for He knows all that is within His power, and in that of creatures ; the thoughts and affections infinitely multiplied in rational creatures, and which last for ever, He knows all. This knowledge extends in relation to form, which is the principle of intelligence. Since, therefore, the Divine Essence, by which the Divine Intellect understands, is a Species adequate to comprehend all actual or possible beings, it follows that the knowledge of God extends infinitely, not only to things in general, but to each individual detail of everything, and that it extends infinitely to all distinctions and differences.

As God knows all, He sees even future contingent things, not only in their causes, but in their actuality and determination, which to us is only conjectural knowledge. God sees all at once by His Eternal Intuition, and not successively, and hence all things are certain in His Mind, contingencies being such in relation to their immediate causes.

God likewise knows propositions, not by composition and division, as is the way with us, but by His Essence He knows material things immaterially and compound things simply, which is not the case in our human mind, for we pass in a discursive manner from one subject to another, and in our mind one intelligible species does not represent anything but its own object. Since the Substance of God is immutable, His knowledge cannot change, for whatever is, or can be, He knows from eternity.

God has of Himself a speculative knowledge because

He is not operable,¹ but of created things, He has speculative and practical knowledge; the first as He knows all things speculatively, the second as regards things that belong to time. Evil also, though not operable to Him, falls under His knowledge, inasmuch as He permits, or prevents, or punishes it, just as we may say that disease comes under the practical knowledge of the physician to remove and cure.

¹ *Operabilis*. As this word requires a paraphrase for its full translation, it is retained in its literal sense in this place, and left to the context for explanation.

CHAPTER XV

OF IDEAS

IT is necessary to admit that there are ideas,¹ in the Divine Mind, that is to say, intelligible forms of things outside of the created objects themselves. An idea is a form apart from the thing, and it is the exemplar or principle by which the thing is known. For these two reasons ideas must be, for because things are not made by chance, the form must be the end of their production. As regards some natural beings, this form pre-exists, as when man generates man, and fire begets fire; as regards others, it pre-exists according to intellectual being in those that act by intelligence. Thus the model of a house pre-exists in the architect's mind, and is the idea of the house, for he aims at assimilating the house to the form in his mind. Since, therefore, the world is not the result of chance, but is created by God by the agency of intellect, there must be forms in the Divine Mind as the model of things created, and in this consists the idea.

Ideas in the Divine Mind are various. God has the idea of the order of the whole universe, which requires that He should have the idea of the parts as well as of the whole. This must not be esteemed to be inconsistent with the Simplicity of the Divine Nature,

¹ See Appendix L.

inasmuch as we have seen above there are not different species in His Mind, but one glance of His Divine Essence includes all things. God knows all things in every way they are knowable, not only in Himself as ideas, but also in reference to other creatures as exemplars, for every creature has its own species which participates after some manner in the likeness to the Divine Essence. Therefore, as God knows His own Essence as the great Exemplar of creatures, He knows His Essence also as the true and adequate Idea of creatures, and of all. Hence God apprehends various ideas appertaining to the variety of existences, and which are separate ideas in themselves. The idea as Exemplar or Model represents all that is done by God in time. The idea as Principle of Knowledge represents everything which can be or is known, according to both its speculative and practical conception.

CHAPTER XVI

OF TRUTH

TRUTH resides principally in the intellect, and secondarily in things accordingly as they are related to the intellect as to their principle. Truth is the object of the intellect, and stands to it as good does to the will, with this difference, that the good to which desire tends is in the thing desired; while truth, which is the end of the mind, is found in the intellect itself. Hence a true thing is so denominated from its relation to the intellect from which it depends, as a house is called true as it realizes the likeness in the architect's mind, and natural things are called true as they realize the likeness of the species in the Divine Mind.

Truth, strictly speaking, exists only in the created mind joining and dividing terms by reasoning, for everything is true according to the form of its own nature. Thus the intellect knows because it is made like to the objects known; and truth is the agreement of intellect and object, and therefore to know Truth is to know the agreement of knowledge with the thing known.] Thus not sense, nor intellect as a mere power, but [intellect judging a thing to be as it is apprehended to be, first knows and then pronounces a thing to be true.] Hence (the intellect knows truth by reason, that is, by composing and dividing; and

accordingly truth exists only so far as this method is carried out.)

[Truth and Being are convertible, because things are knowable so far as they have being. If good be convertible with being, as it is, so is truth. Good adds to being the notion of desirability, while truth has direct relation to the mind. While truth and being are convertible terms, the true is, strictly speaking, prior to good, for it is nearer to being regarded simply and directly, while good follows upon being considered as in some degree perfect and desirable.] For it is clear that knowledge precedes desire; and hence as the true is referred to the mind, and the good to desire, the idea of truth is prior to that of good. God is not only Truth, but the highest and first Truth.

[His Being is not only conformed to His Intellect, but It is His own very Act of Understanding, the measure and cause of all other being, and of every other intellect. Hence Truth is not only in God, but is His own very Existence, and the highest and primary Truth.]

[Truth as the standard of all other truths in creatures is in a sense one, and in a sense not one; for truth is first in the intellect, and afterwards in things as they have relation to the Divine Mind. Wherefore if we speak of truth in the intellect according to its own nature, we find many truths in the many created intellects, also in the many thoughts of one intellect. If we speak of truth in things, all are true by virtue of one primal Truth, to which each one is assimilated according to its being;] and however many essences or

forms there are, still there is but one Truth in the Divine Mind, which is the Rule of Truth in all things.

[Things being denominated as true by the truth of the intellect, no created truth can be eternal. And so, if no created intellect can be eternal, nor any created truth, whereas the Divine Intellect alone is eternal, Truth is eternal there alone, and immutable, for truth of the intellect consists in its conformity to its objects, and this can change on the part of the created intellect and on the part of its object.] (An intellect beyond the risk of change of any kind, and extending itself in its knowledge to everything, is in its Truth immutable. This is the prerogative of the Divine Intellect, and, therefore, Its Truth is immutable; but the truth of our intellect is mutable.)

CHAPTER XVII

OF FALSITY

FALSITY, strictly speaking, cannot be found in things which depend upon God, and which necessarily are conformed to His Divine Mind, as products of art agree with the mind of the artist. The falsity of a thing, therefore, consists, properly speaking, in its divergence from the intellect on which it depends, and also accidentally (*per accidens*) it consists in its divergence from the mind on which it does not depend; wherefore falsity cannot exist in relation to the Divine Mind, except, perhaps, we may admit in voluntary agents alone, in whose power it is to withdraw themselves from the order of the Divine Plan; and in this consists the evil of sin, and hence sins are called falsities and lies. In relation to our human mind, to which natural things are related accidentally, they may be called false by accident or notionally, as that may be called false which is signified or represented in false speech or idea, or by way of cause, inasmuch as they may be sources of falsehood. Things which in external attributes appear like other things are called false in relation to those things, as if it were said that vinegar is honey and tin silver.

Nor are the senses false as regards their proper object unless by accident, and in cases when through

indisposition of the organ the sensible form is not properly received—thus by defect of the tongue sweet may taste bitter. But there may be a false judgment even in senses rightly disposed as regards things beyond their natural sphere, or as regards something which is the object of more than one sense, accidentally, or in consequence of its being referred to something else.

Neither is there falsity in the essence of the intellect, for a natural thing does not fall short of its existence according to its form, though it may fail accidentally or in something that follows from it; and in like manner the faculty of knowledge does not fail in the knowledge of what informs it, but only accidentally, or as regards what ensues from it. Therefore the intellect is not deceived as regards the essence of a thing, though in the process of reasoning it may attribute to things whose nature it understands something which does not follow therefrom or is opposed thereto, for the intellect so judging conducts itself as sense does as regards things which are the object of more senses than one. True and False are contraries,¹ for falsity is to apprehend that to be which is not, or that not to be which is; and as truth assigns the acceptation adequate to the thing, so falsehood assigns an acceptation which is not adequate to it, and determines the subject.

¹ See Appendix M.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE LIFE OF GOD

THOSE things only are properly said to live which move themselves by some kind of motion, whether that known as imperfect action, that is, of a body existing in potentiality, or that known as motion generally or perfect actuality. In this latter sense understanding and feeling are called motion, for the difference between the living and the not living is taken from things manifestly living, such as animals, in which we say life begins, and define it as self-movement; while such as have no power of motion or action can only be called living metaphorically. Hence the term "life" is taken from something outwardly apparent, which is self-movement; but this is only a sign of the substance of the thing, to the nature of which belongs the power of self-movement or self-exertion. Thus to live is neither more nor less than to be of such nature, and life means only this; but the term is sometimes applied less strictly to signify those vital operations from which it is derived; hence, in the ethics of Aristotle, to live means principally to feel and understand.

Life is to be attributed to God in the highest degree; for what is possessed by Him is not determined to Him by anything else; for He is His own

very existing Mind, and therefore life pre-eminently belongs to Him. For beings live in proportion as they act of themselves, and are less moved by others ; but the Being of God is His Understanding and His Life ; whence it follows that He so lives as having no beginning of life. And because His Intellect, and its object, and the Act of Intelligence, are one and the same, all that can be Intellect and can be understood in God is His Divine Life. All things, indeed, are Life in God, because subject to and preserved by His power ; as those things are said to be in us which are in our power ; also because they exist in Him as ideas, which are not other than His Essence.

CHAPTER XIX

THE WILL OF GOD

As there is Intellect in God, it follows that there is also Will in Him. For as natural things have their being through form, to which they are so related that if they have it not they tend towards it, and if they have it they rest in it, so the intellectual nature either tends to or rests in the good it apprehends. This belongs to the will; where, therefore, we find intellect we find also will, as animal strength exists where there is sensation. Since, therefore, there is Intellect in God, and His Intellect is His own very Existence, so also is His Will.

And God wills others besides Himself. For we find in every perfect agent, not only an inclination towards its own good, either to gain it or rest in it, but an inclination to diffuse that good as much as possible to others; and from this action of the perfect agent producing an effect similar to itself, we learn what best befits the Divine Will. Thus God wills Himself as the End, and others to the end; it is, therefore, fitting that these should participate in the Divine Goodness, for although God's Goodness suffices to Himself, He nevertheless wills others by reason of His Goodness.

God wills something of absolute necessity, for He

has a necessary inclination towards His own Goodness as His proper object; in this way we also will our own beatitude. Other things, indeed, God wills that they may be ordered to His Goodness as their end; but what is willed for an end is not willed of necessity, unless it be such that the end could not be had without it, as life without food. Since, therefore, the Goodness of God can exist without anything else, and is in itself perfect, it follows that He does not will other things for Himself by absolute necessity, but only hypothetically. By hypothesis, however, what God wills He cannot not will, for His Will cannot change.

That the Will of God is the cause of things may be proved in three ways: first, because, in respect of every natural agent, the end and the means are predetermined by some intelligence, and, therefore, the agent by intelligence is prior to the natural agent; and God is the First Agent. Secondly, every natural agent has a determinate being, and one and the same mode of action, unless prevented; and since the Divine Being is Infinite, and contains in Itself every perfection, God's natural action would be infinite in producing being, which is impossible; therefore He acts according to the determination of His Will. Thirdly, effects proceed from the acting cause according as they pre-exist in it, and since the Being of God is His Intelligence, such effects must proceed according to the mode of His Intelligence and Will.

Nor is there any cause for His Will, for He understands all by one act in His Essence, and by one act He wills all in His Goodness; therefore, as in

God His understanding of the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effects, but the effects are understood by Him in the cause, so His willing the end is not the cause of His willing those things which are ordained to the end ; nevertheless He wills that the things which are for the end should be ordered to it.

And the Will of God is always fulfilled. Because, as nothing can fall away from the universal form, yet may do so from some particular form, so with causes proceeding from agents ; something may happen outside the order of a particular cause, but not outside that of the universal cause ; since, therefore, the Will of God is the universal Cause of all things, it must necessarily be always fulfilled. Thus the sinner who departs from the Divine Will, as far as it is in his power to do so, by sinning, falls into the order of the Divine Will when by the justice of God he is punished.

Further, the Will of God is immutable. For change could not occur except by a presupposed mutation, either with regard to His thoughts or to the dispositions of the substance of His Will ; but the Substance of God is equally immutable with His knowledge, therefore so also is His Will. Thus Scripture speaks according to our human ideas when it says : " I repent," etc., or when something is represented as being in the future according to particular causes which, according to the universal Cause, was nevertheless not in the future, as in Isaiah xxxviii. : " Take order with thy house," etc.

God does not, however, impose all that He wills by

a necessary will, but by His efficacious Will things are brought about as He wills they should be, some of necessity and some contingently, that there may be order in everything for the carrying out of the whole. Certain effects are fitted, therefore, to necessary causes which cannot fail, and others to contingent causes which are defectible, out of which contingent effects proceed.

Neither does God in any way will the evil of sin, although He wills accidentally the evil of natural defect and the evil of punishment because of some good attached to it. Thus, willing justice, He wills punishment, and willing to preserve the order of nature He wills that certain natural things should decay. But evil, as such, cannot attract any one's desire, natural, animal or intellectual.

And God has free Will in those things which He does not will of necessity. For He wills other things besides Himself, and that freely; and this Will, if considered in itself, is called His Will of Complacency. Metaphorically, also, the manifestation of the will by signs is called will.

The signs, commonly received, are: prohibition, precept, counsel, operation and permission; for that is called a sign by which we are accustomed to express our will. Thus permission and operation have respect to the present, prohibition and precept to the future, while counsel has reference to the superabundance of good.

CHAPTER XX

THE LOVE OF GOD

IN God there is Love ; for the motion of will tends of itself to good, and only accidentally to evil. Moreover, that which is of itself is prior to that which is by something else, and the general is prior to the particular ; hence love, which regards good in general, whether possessed or not possessed, is the first act of the will—presupposed as the root of all other movements of desire ; and since Will exists in God, there must be Love also.

God, therefore, loves all things inasmuch as they exist, for existence is good, and since His Will is the Cause of all things He wills them to be good. But love is not the same in God as it is in us ; for when God loves He infuses and creates goodness in things ; whereas we are moved to love by the good which we find in them.

God loves irrational creatures with a Love of Pleasure, inasmuch as He has subordinated them to the use of rational creatures ; for Himself He has no need of them and nothing accrues to Him from them.

Inasmuch as God loves all things by one single and simple act, that act is not said to be more or less intense on the part of Him Who loves ; but as regards the good which He wills to the loved, He loves some

more than others. And because His Will is the Cause of good in creatures, one is not better than another except as being more loved by God ; while God always loves the best, inasmuch as His Will is the Cause of their goodness.

CHAPTER XXI

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

THERE is no commutative justice in God, for no one gives to Him that it should be rendered to him again. There is distributive justice in Him, as the order of the universe shows ; for God gives to every creature according to its nature and dignity. Moral virtues which are related to the passions are only ascribed to God metaphorically ; for in Him there exists neither sensitive appetite nor passion ; but the moral virtues which belong to the works of God are properly attributed to Him, such as justice, magnificence and liberality. The Justice of God is also rightly called Truth, because it constitutes the order in things which agrees with the idea of His Wisdom ; for the Intellect of God is their rule and measure.

Above all, we must admit the effects of mercy in God ; not after the mode of passion, which has no existence in Him, but as by His own Goodness He removes misery and defect in others.

For God diffuses His perfections in divers ways. When He communicates them absolutely it belongs to goodness ; when He apportions them according as they are due to each one it belongs to justice ; inasmuch as such perfections are not given for His own benefit, but from gratuitous goodness, it pertains to

liberality ; while in so far as they supply for all defects it belongs to mercy.

Mercy and Justice are found, indeed, in all the works of God ; for the debt which arises from the Divine Justice is twofold ; first, that due to God Himself, according to which He does nothing but what befits His Wisdom and Goodness ; secondly, that due to the creature, according to which He disposes all things in suitable proportion.

Mercy is found in all Justice, inasmuch as the debt is reduced somewhat by the Divine Goodness ; for Mercy shines forth eminently when more is given than the proportion of things demands ; thus in damnation Mercy appears, not by the remission of all punishment, but by the punishment being less than is deserved ; while in justification Justice appears, because the fault is remitted on account of Love, which is, itself, mercifully infused.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

SINCE all the good which exists in created things is from God, the good of harmony (or order) is from God ; for goodness is found, not only in the substance of things, but also in the manner in which they are ordered to their end. For God being the Cause of all things by His Intellect, the idea of all things must pre-exist in Him ; and this idea of the order of things in relation to their end is, in God, called Providence. To this Providence all things are subject, not only in general but also in particular ; for all have their being from God, and are subject to the First Cause, nor can any effect take place beyond His intention.

With regard to this order, God provides for all things immediately, inasmuch as He has, in His Intellect, the conception of each one, even the smallest ; but as regards the execution, He provides through some medium, inasmuch as He governs the inferior through the superior ; and this not on account of any deficiency in Himself, but in order that He may communicate to others the dignity of causation.

In some things the Providence of God imposes necessity, but not in all. It belongs to Him to ordain all things to their end, and thus to the perfection of

the universe, which requires the existence of every gradation of being. Hence for some things God has prepared necessary causes, and for some contingent causes, according as He sees expedient for the perfection of the universe.

CHAPTER XXIII

PREDESTINATION

GOD predestinates man. As Eternal Life exceeds the power of human faculty, man is directed towards it, as an arrow sent by the archer, a course the idea of which pre-exists in God. And as His idea of the order of all things to their end is called Providence, as has been said above, so the perfect course of a rational creature is called Predestination, which is not revealed to us, nor is a security given which might encourage negligence. Regarded as the act of the Predestinator, this is a part of Providence and causes nothing in the predestined; while inasmuch as the idea is in the Mind of the Predestinator, and its execution belongs to the predestined, it is called Vocation and Magnification.

God reprobates any one who is permitted by Divine Providence to fail of the end of Eternal Life, while others, by the same Providence, are supported to attain it; and as Predestination includes the Will to confer grace and glory, so in like manner Reprobation includes the Will to permit some to fall into sin, and to incur punishment and reprobation for sin.

Predestination presupposes the election and love of God; but in Him Love precedes election, the contrary of which takes place in us; for we choose what we love on account of pre-existing goodness, whereas in

God it is otherwise, because His Will is the Cause of goodness.

Thus the entire effect of Predestination is due to the Goodness of God as its first reason and last end ; for there is no cause for it on our part, since whatever conduces in us to Eternal Life is the effect of Predestination. This does not, however, prevent a particular effect from having a cause, and one thing being the cause of another ; but that which comes after is the end of what precedes, the preceding being, so to speak, the subject of that which follows, as merit is the subject of reward.

Predestination is certain if it be referred to the intuition of the Divine Plan. For though the order of Providence is infallible, nevertheless some things happen contingently, according to the conditions of proximate causes ; and in like manner the order of Predestination is certain, although its effects happen contingently ; nor is free will taken away, as was explained above with reference to the Divine Knowledge and Will, which do not take away the contingent character of some things.

The number of the predestined is known to God, not only formally and in general but also materially¹ and individually, that is, not only by knowledge but by predetermination, as is the case with the universe which He has preordained in measure ; of which rational creatures are the chief because capable of attaining beatitude. It is otherwise with the number of the reprobate who are preordained by God to the

¹ See Appendix N.

good of the Elect. But the number of those who are to be saved is known to God alone.

Divine Predestination as regards its source, the act of the Predestinator, is not assisted by the prayers of the saints, but only as regards the effect, because Providence does not do away with second causes but provides the effect by their means, that thus the order of second causes may be subject to Providence. So with regard to the salvation of any one predestined by God; whatever promotes salvation in such a case falls under the order of Predestination, whether it be Prayer, or other good works, without which it would not be attained. Hence St. Peter says: "Labour the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Peter i. 10).

CHAPTER XXIV

THE BOOK OF LIFE

THE enumeration of the predestined is called the Book of Life; for as something may be written in a material book to assist the memory, the indefectible knowledge of God, by which He assigns Eternal Life to some one, is called the Book of Life, and regards, properly, the life of glory; for it is the knowledge in God of those who are elected to glory. Now that to which any one is chosen must have conditions belonging to an order superior to his nature; it must likewise be conceived as an end; and such is the life of glory, which exceeds the nature of man.

From this Book of Life nothing can, properly speaking, be effaced; nevertheless such as may be ordained to Eternal Life, not by Divine Predestination but only through temporary possession of grace, are said to be written in the Book of Life not absolutely but relatively. Such are said to be wiped out of the Book; not with reference to the knowledge in God, as though He had foreknown something which He afterwards did not know, but only in regard of the thing known, inasmuch as God knows that such a one is first ordained to Eternal Life and afterwards not so ordained, through having fallen from grace.

CHAPTER XXV

THE POWER OF GOD

POWER, in God, is not in any sense passive, but active in the highest degree. For anything suffers the action of another, inasmuch as itself is deficient and imperfect; but God is Pure Actuality, simple and perfect; hence it eminently belongs to Him to be the Origin, and not to be in any way the recipient.

The power of God is infinite, because His Being is infinite, and in no way limited; for such is His Essence: and the power of action in any agent is proportioned to the perfection of the form by which it acts. Hence God is universally acknowledged as Omnipotent; for His Divine Being contains in Itself the perfection of all being, nor is anything repugnant to It except what would imply being and not being simultaneously; and this not from defect in the Divine Power, but because such things cannot be conceived. It is better, therefore, to say, of such things, that they cannot be done than to say that God cannot do them, *e.g.* to cause that the past should not have been does not fall under the power of God, because it implies a contradiction of being and not being, and consequently fails of conception as possible.

Since the Divine Wisdom is not determined to one

order of things, God can do things other than He does. For His Goodness is an end so out of proportion to created things that it exceeds them infinitely, and from it the course of things may always flow differently. Hence God may do other things than those which He does, but He cannot do these better than they are done, if we speak of that goodness which pertains to the essence of things, as reason to the essence of man. It is otherwise, however, if we speak of a goodness outside the essence of things, as it is the good of man to be virtuous and wise; for in this sense God could make things better than those He has made. Absolutely speaking, therefore, whatever things God has made, He could make others better.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE DIVINE BEATITUDE

BEATITUDE is the perfect good of the intellectual nature, to which it pertains to know the sufficiency of the good it possesses and to have dominion over its own operations; and since this is eminently proper to God, so also is Beatitude; for those things which exist in creatures separately and by way of composition, pre-exist in Him in simplicity and unity.

This Beatitude is to be attributed to God and to the other Blessed according to the intellect, because it is the perfect good of the intellectual nature. Now the most perfect operation of such a nature is that according to which, in certain manner, it knows all; and since to be and to know is, in reality, the same thing in God, intellectual Beatitude is to be attributed to Him; so also to the Blessed, who are called so by assimilation to the Divine Beatitude.

If beatitude be considered on the part of its object, then God alone is Beatitude; for beatitude consists in possessing the knowledge of God; but if we consider the act of him who knows, beatitude is something created in the beatified creature. And whatever is desirable in any beatitude pre-exists eminently in that of God, which consists in a continuous and most certain

contemplation of Himself and of all others, and in the active government of the entire universe. For riches it has every kind of sufficiency, for power omnipotence, for dignity universal rule, for fame universal admiration.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

IN God there is Procession according to the mode of intelligible emanation, not according to that of infirm corporeal beings; but because God is above all, no similitude can be found even among spiritual substances for the full expression of things Divine. This Procession is not, therefore, according to local movement, nor according to the action of any cause in the exterior effect, but according to intelligible emanation, that, viz. of a Word, which is intelligible to the mind and remains in it.

And this Procession in God is really generation,¹ because inasmuch as it proceeds by the mode of intelligible action it is an operation of life, and united to its source; and being a conception of the intellect it is really a similitude existing in the same nature; for, in God, to be is the same as to understand. Therefore the Procession of the Word in God is called "Generation," and the Word proceeding is called "Son," while in us the word which proceeds by intelligible operation is not of the same nature with him from whom it proceeds; therefore it does not constitute a generation, properly and completely.

Besides this Procession of the Word in God there

¹ See Appendix O.

is also a Procession of Love. For as in us there is, besides the intelligible operation, a procession of love according to the action of the will, by which the loved is in the lover, so it is also in God, and this Procession cannot be called Generation. The procession which takes place according to similitude is really a generation ; for whatever generates must generate that which is like to itself ; but the procession which is according to will has the nature of an impulse towards something ; hence that which, in the Divinity, proceeds by way of Love does not proceed as generated or as Son, but rather as Breath or Spirit : a name whereby we designate the motion and impulse of life.

Nor is there any other Procession in the Divinity besides those of the Word and of Love ; for God is purely intellectual, and in such nature no action is possible except to understand and to will.

And since God understands and wills all by one simple act, there cannot be in Him Procession of the Word from the Word, or of Love from Love ; but there is One Word only, and One perfect Love ; and in this the perfection of His fecundity is made manifest.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE DIVINE RELATIONS

REAL Relations exist in the Divinity. For wherever anything proceeds from a principle of like nature, it is necessary that the thing proceeding and the source from which it proceeds should belong to the same order, and so bear real relationship the one to the other; and since, in the Divinity, Procession is in identity of Nature, Real Relations are to be accepted.

This Relationship which exists in God is, in reality, one and the same with His Essence, and differs only according to the conception of our intelligence; for whatever has accidental being in created things, when transferred to God, in our mind has substantial being. Nevertheless these Relations, in God, are really distinguished from each other; for the multiplicity of the Trinity is due to Relation only: therefore, if these Relations were not really distinct from each other, the Trinity would not be real, but only conceptual, which was the error of Sabellius. Because, however, there is in God the highest Unity and real Simplicity, this distinction does not exist according to the Divine Essence considered absolutely, but only relatively. Thus Boëthius says that in the Divinity, Substance contains Unity, while Relation multiplies in Trinity.

Nor are there other Relations in the Divine Essence

except those of Paternity, Filiation, Spiration and Procession ; for Relations, in God, are not consequent upon quantity or external action ; hence the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him. The Divine Relations are to be understood, therefore, according to actions within the Godhead, which are two : one according to the intellect, namely, the Procession of the Word, which is Generation, to which corresponds Paternity ; the other according to the Will, which is the Procession of Love. This has no name proper to it ; but the Relation of the Principle we call Spiration, and that of the Person Proceeding, Procession.

CHAPTER XXIX

OF PERSON

PERSON is the individual substance of rational nature ;¹ that is to say, it is found in a special manner in rational substances, particular and undivided ; and because substance is individuated by itself, and accidents by their subject, which is substance, undivided substances are called by the special name of Hypostases or First Substances. These are found in a special manner, particular and undivided, in rational beings who have dominion over their actions ; therefore these alone among substances have received this name of " Person," which is peculiar to the rational nature.

In the genus of rational substances, Person signifies that which is conveyed generally in regard to all kinds of substance by the three expressions : Subsistence, a thing of the natural order ;² and Hypostasis or Substance. And this term Person may be applied to God in a more excellent manner than to creatures ; for whatever belongs to perfection is to be attributed to Him, and personality signifies what is most perfect in all nature, subsistence in a rational nature.

Now although this word Person signifies usually the undivided substance of the rational nature, in the

¹ *Rationalis naturæ individua substantia.*

² *Res naturæ.*

Divinity there is no distinction except that which arises from Relation; which Relation is not that of accidents inherent in their subject, but is the Divine Essence Itself. It subsists, therefore, as the Divine Essence subsists; and as the Divinity is God, so the Divine Paternity is God the Father, Who is a Divine Person. Hence "Divine Person" signifies Relation in Subsistence, which is to be understood as Relation by mode of Substance.

CHAPTER XXX

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN THE DIVINITY

WE make use of the word "Trinity" in speaking of God, because Plurality of Persons is admitted; for there is a Plurality of Real Relations; and hence Plurality subsists in the Divine Nature. This Plurality does not, however, extend to more than Three, because the several Divine Persons are several Relations really subsisting but distinct from each other by relative opposition only; therefore, while opposite Relations belong to distinct Persons, those not opposite belong to the same. Thus Paternity and Filiation have respect to two different Persons, while the other two Relations, viz. Spiration and Procession, are not opposed to either of the foregoing, but only to each other, on which account they are not applicable to the same Person; therefore one (Procession) belongs to a distinct Person, while the other (Spiration) befits both the Father and the Son, Procession by way of Love belonging to the Holy Spirit.

And numerical terms signify, in the Divinity, that which they affirm,¹ only adding negation; because in the Divinity such terms are not received as number, which is a species of quantity, and are not applicable to

¹ See Appendix P.

God except metaphorically in common with other corporeal properties (such as length, breadth, etc.); hence they are to be received as Plurality in a transcendental sense. Multitude thus accepted stands to the many of which it is predicated, as one does to being, with which it is convertible; in which sense one adds nothing to the conception of existence, except the negation of division. Therefore, when we say *One* it signifies that thing undivided; as *one*, said of a man, signifies the undivided substance of man; and when we speak of many things, multitude, thus understood, signifies these things undivided as regards them singly; but number, which is quantitative species, expresses some accident superadded to the things, and so likewise does one, as it is the principle of numbers. Therefore numerical terms in the Divinity signify that which they affirm and add nothing except negation of division.

The term Person is common to the three Divine Persons, in a logical sense, not as denoting genus or species, but as vaguely signifying a common nature with a determinate mode of existence such as belongs to individuals, *i. e.* that it exists by itself apart from others. By the name of an individual so designated we signify the distinguishing determination; so by the name Socrates we mean his flesh and bones; but there is this difference, that by "a person" we mean human nature or an individual of such nature, with the mode of existence which belongs to individuals; but the word "person" does not properly signify individuality in a certain nature; it means, rather, the substance from

which such nature depends ; and this is common to the Three Divine Persons, for each of Them subsists in the Divine Nature distinct from the Others ; and in this sense the term Person is in a logical manner common to the Three Divine Persons.

CHAPTER XXXI

OF WHAT PERTAINS TO UNITY OR PLURALITY IN THE DIVINITY

WE use the word "Trinity" speaking of the Divinity, because Plurality of Persons is admitted ; and this term has been seen to signify one Essence of Three Persons, as though the Trinity were called, if one may so speak, a Unity of Three. Therefore we must beware of falling into the error of Arius, and avoid names expressive of diversity, division, disparity and so on, of which there exists nothing in the Trinity. We must avoid also, as in Sabellianism, words expressing the unique or singular, confusion and solitude ; for Hilary tells us that God is to be confessed as neither solitary nor diverse.

The word "other" may be used because it implies no distinction except that of personality ; hence we may properly say : The Son is other than the Father, because He is another Personality in the Divine Nature.

The word "alone" cannot be added substantively to Essential terms, in speaking of the Divinity, because it would follow that God was solitary ; but it may be used in a qualifying sense, as excluding the association of any other Personality ; as when we say God alone is Eternal, meaning that nothing is Eternal except God.

CHAPTER XXXII

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

IT is impossible to arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity by our natural understanding (*i. e.* by reasoning). By natural reason we may, indeed, know God through creation, as He is the Source of being to all things ; but this pertains to Unity of Essence, not to distinction of Persons ; and to endeavour to prove the latter by natural reason would be derogatory to the dignity of Faith, which deals with things invisible, or transcending the power of reason. If unbelievers scoff at our asserting what cannot be fully proved, it is sufficient to defend what Faith declares, as not being impossible ; but we speak wisdom among the perfect.

Abstract notions are to be admitted in the Divinity ; for it is necessary that not only Essential Names should be expressed both in the abstract and in the concrete, but Personal ones also. To this we are obliged, first, by unbelievers ; for as we confess the Father, Son and Holy Ghost to be One God and Three Persons, it is not enough to answer those who inquire how God can be One and also Three, by affirming that Deity and Essence are one, unless we have abstract terms to express the distinction of Persons also. And in the Divinity, Essence

corresponds to *what*, Person to *who*, and abstract notions to *how*.

It is necessary, secondly, because one Divine Person is found to be referred to two—*i. e.* the Person of the Father to those of the Son and Holy Ghost—by different Relations. For, if by the same Relation, it would follow that the Son and Holy Ghost were the same, and referred to the Father by the same Relation ; and since Relation only multiplies the Trinity in the Divinity, They would not constitute two Persons. It is necessary, therefore, that two Relations be understood in the Father, by which He is referred respectively to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, corresponding to the two Relations by which They are referred to the Father ; and since there is only one Person of the Father, it is needful to formulate Relations in themselves abstract, which are called Properties or Abstract Notions.

Some hold a contrary opinion about these notions without any danger of heresy, because they do not understand thereby anything contrary to faith ; but if any one were to hold the erroneous opinion that abstract notions lead to something contrary to faith, he would fall into heresy. For some things belong directly to the Faith, as being articles divinely handed down to us ;—such are, that God is One, and that the Son became Incarnate ;—concerning which a false opinion leads to heresy. But those things which lead to conclusions contrary to faith belong to the Faith indirectly ; as, for instance, the opinion that Samuel was not the son of Helcana, whence it would follow that Scripture contains something false. About such,

one may hold a false opinion without danger of heresy before it has been considered and determined that a conclusion contrary to faith follows therefrom; but after the decision of the Church, or such conclusion, it could not be held without heresy; hence many are now reputed heretics who formerly were not, on account of the recent decision of the Church; and the same may be said regarding abstract notions.

CHAPTER XXXIII

OF THE DIVINE PERSONS SEVERALLY, AND FIRST OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER

THE Father is called the Principle, because from Him the Son and Holy Spirit proceed ; for a principle is that from which something proceeds. "Principle" is a more general term than "Cause," which has been seen to imply diversity of substance and the dependence of one upon another ; for which reason the Latin Doctors do not use the word Cause, but Principle, which implies no such difference, but a distinction in the nature of order only.

Now paternity is that which distinguishes a father from all other, hence the name proper to God the Father is "Father" ; for that by which one Person is distinguished from others is His proper name.

And the Father is said to be First in the Divinity Personally rather than Essentially : for, in every order, that is called *first* in which in the entire conception is perfectly recognized, rather than that in which it is recognized relatively to something else. Thus Paternity is said to exist first in the Divinity, according as it signifies relation of Person to Person, rather than as expressing the relation of God to creatures. For in God the Father and God the Son we find that perfect conception of Paternity and

Filiation which, between God and creatures, exists only by participation and a certain similitude, but which approaches more nearly to the true conception in proportion to the perfection of the creature. Thus we find vestiges in the irrational creature ; likeness in the rational ; a further likeness by Grace in the adopted ; and by Glory in the Blessed. And as we recognize the name " lion " in the animal in which the entire conception of a lion is found, rather than in a brave man, so the name of Father is given in the Divinity, where there is Relation of Person to Person having the same nature, rather than to the relation which exists between creatures and God.

It is proper to the Father to be Unbegotten, because He is the Principle not from the Principle ; while, as there is no before or after in God, the Son is the Principle from the Principle. And since, in the creature, the first principle is manifested in one way by relation to that which is outside itself, and in another by relation to that which is not without, in like manner the Father is made known by Paternity and common Spiration in regard of the Persons proceeding from Him ; while that He is the Principle not from the Principle, because not from any other, belongs to His property of Ingenerability.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE PERSON OF THE SON

THE term "Word" is properly understood in the Divinity as a Personal name, not as an Essential one, and signifies Intellectual Conception.

The nature of this conception requires that it should proceed from something else, namely, from the knowledge of the one who conceives: therefore, in the Divinity, Word properly signifies somewhat proceeding from Another. As such it belongs to the order of Personal names, or those which distinguish the Divine Persons according to Origin; and since the Word proceeds by intellectual emanation, it is the proper name of the Son, and His Person. And since there is no accident in God, whatever exists in the Divine Nature is subsistent: hence the Son only is called the Word, and such Procession is termed Generation.

But in the name Word reference is contained also to creatures, for in knowing Himself God knows all things; and as by one act He knows Himself and everything else, so by His One Word He has expressed, not the Father only, but also creatures. And as God's knowledge of Himself is intellectual only, while His knowledge of creatures is both intellectual and operative, so with the Word of God; as regards

the Father It is expressive only, but in regard of creatures It is both expressive and operative. Hence we read in the Psalms : " He spoke and it was done," because the operative conception of the things which God does is contained in the Word.

CHAPTER XXXV

OF THE IMAGE

LIKENESS to the species or figure is not sufficient for the true conception of an image ; there must also be similarity of origin, that from one thing another may proceed similar to itself in species, or at least in the sign of the species ; and inasmuch as whatever relates to Procession and Origin in the Divinity is Personal, the term "Image" is Personal, and proper to the Son.

The Greek Doctors attribute it also to the Holy Spirit, but the Latins to the Son only, of Whom we read "that He is the Image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature" (Col. i. 15), and the "brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance" (Hebrews i. 3).

The Holy Spirit, indeed, by His Procession, receives the Nature of the Father equally with the Son, yet He is not said to be born ; and in like manner, although He receives the same Species as the Father He is not called His Image. For the Son proceeds as Word, to the conception of Whom there belongs a similitude of Species to the Principle from which He proceeds ; while the conception of Love does not involve that of similitude or birth as Son, but rather a going forth by some manner of impulsion ; hence Love is not said to

be born ; nevertheless the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is Divine Love, resembles the Father and the Son. The Son is called the Image of the Father because He is a perfect Image of the same Nature, while man is said to be "to the Image," which expresses some motion tending towards perfection.

CHAPTER XXXVI

OF THAT WHICH BELONGS TO THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST

“HOLY SPIRIT,” taken as a term, is the name used of a Divine Person, proceeding by Love; a mode of Procession which has no proper name; hence the Relations which it implies are unnamed also, but we express ourselves according to the custom of language and of Holy Scripture. And there appears to be a twofold suitability in doing so: first, from the very community of that which is called Holy Spirit, for the Father and the Son are likewise Spirit and Holy; and secondly, from the proper signification of the word, for spirit in corporeal things is seen to imply impulse and motion. It is, indeed, of the nature of love that it moves and impels the will of the lover to the loved; while holiness is a special attribute of things belonging to God; therefore, since a Divine Person proceeds by way of Love, where God is loved the Person proceeding is suitably called Holy Spirit.

And the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily from the Son, from Whom He would not otherwise be personally distinguished; for the Divine Persons are not distinguished from one another by anything Absolute, but only by opposing Relations of Origin, according as they are the Principle or from the Principle. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit had not this Relation of Origin

from the Son, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be Personally distinguished, and there would not be Trinity of Persons. Thus the Son proceeds by way of Intellect, as Word ; and the Holy Spirit by way of Will, as Love ; and Love proceeds necessarily from the Word, for we do not love anything except it be apprehended by the mind. It is clear, for these reasons, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Moreover, order requires it ; for we never find several proceeding from one without order, except in the case of things which are materially different ; in others there is always an order. Therefore, since the Son and the Holy Spirit both proceed from the Father, there must be some order, nor can any other be assigned than that of Nature ; for as one proceeds from the other, the Holy Spirit must proceed from the Son, none having ever been called the Son of the Holy Ghost.

Moreover, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son ; for that which distinguishes the Son from the Father is His Procession ; and as the word "through" denotes a medium deriving from its principle the faculty of producing, it may be said that the Father breathes the Holy Spirit through the Son. Thus the Father and the Son are One Principle (or Source) of the Holy Spirit, as they are One in everything except where distinguished from each other by relative opposition. In this they are not relatively opposed ; therefore, as the Father and the Son are One in virtue of the Unity signified by the name God, so they are One Source of the Holy Spirit in virtue of the Unity expressed by the word Principle.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, WHICH IS LOVE

“LOVE,” in the Divinity, is to be understood both Essentially and Personally ; for as Word is the name of the Son, so is Love that of the Holy Ghost ; according to the two Processions, of which one is by mode of Intellect, and the other by that of Will. For the latter, owing to the poverty of language, no proper names exist ; but as from the understanding faculty there proceeds something, namely, an intellectual conception of the thing known by the mind which knows, which is called a word, so likewise from the fact of something being loved there is formed an impression of the thing loved in the affection of the lover, in virtue of which the loved is in the lover. But no words are found expressive of the relation between the will and this impression of the object loved which is admitted to exist in the lover, or conversely, except love or affection. These properly express the inclination of the lover to the loved, and in this sense the word love is used Essentially ; but when we mean the inclination of that which proceeds by mode of love to its principle, and conversely, so that by Love is understood love proceeding, it denotes the Person of the Holy Ghost.

And Love being understood in the Divinity after

this twofold manner, Essentially and Notionally, the Father and the Son love Themselves according to the first sense, *i. e.* by their Essence, not by the Holy Ghost. In the second sense, to love is nothing else than to produce love by spiration, or to breathe love ; as to speak is to produce words, or to flower is to produce flowers. Thus as a tree is said to flower with flowers, so the Father is said to express Himself and creatures by His Word or Son ; and the Father and the Son to love by the Holy Ghost, *i. e.* Love Proceeding, both Themselves and us.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE HOLY GHOST AS GIFT

As it belongs to one Divine Person to be from another by Origin, as the Son is from the Father, so it also befits the Divinity to be a Gift or Given, and to be possessed by the rational creature ; not indeed by its own power, but as, by union with God, it is made partaker of the Divine Word and Love Proceeding, in order that it may freely know God and truly and rightly love Him. Thus the Holy Spirit is called a Gift because we have Him from Another, and He is so called according as He is given to us Personally : for a gift denotes properly that which is given without return ; and the conception of gratuitous giving is that of love which wishes good to another. Since, therefore, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, He has the nature of the First Gift, by which, according to Augustine, all gratuitous gifts are given and divided among the members of Christ. Thus as the Son is called an Image on account of His likeness to His Principle, so the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father as Love is properly called a Gift, although the Son is also given.

CHAPTER XXXIX

OF PERSON AS COMPARED WITH ESSENCE

ALTHOUGH Person and Essence are one and the same in the Divinity, yet the Divine Persons are really distinguished from each other, because Personality signifies a Relation subsisting in the Divine Nature ; which Relation, as compared with Essence, does not differ according to the thing itself, but only according to the conception. Compared with the opposite Relation, however, there is a real distinction in virtue of opposition ; so the Essence remains One while the Persons are multiplied.

Now we name things Divine according to the mode of things created, not according to Their proper mode, which is impossible to us. Thus as in sensible things the nature of certain species is individualized by matter, so that nature stands as form, and the individual as the subject of the form, so in Divine things as regards the mode of signifying Essence. This is signified as the Form of the Three Persons ; and as we say in creatures that a form belongs to the one whose form it is, so in the Divinity, in Whom multiplication of Persons does not multiply Essence, we say that One Essence belongs to Three Persons and that Three Persons belong to One Essence. And

since Essential Names indicate the Divine Essence, partly as substantives and partly as adjectives, the substantive is predicated of the Three Persons in the singular number only, not in the plural ; for a substantive indicates something by mode of substance, but an adjective by mode of accident inhering in the subject. Hence, in adjectives, we expect to find the singular or the plural number according to the subject , so we say Three are eternal or omnipotent, but, substantively, there is One Creator, One Omnipotent, etc.

And this word God, from its mode of signification, is used sometimes for Person, as when we say that God generates ; and sometimes for Essence when we say that God creates, for the predicate belongs to the subject according to the conception of the form signified, which is Deity.

Abstract terms cannot represent Persons ; for God and Deity have different modes of signification ; and it is necessary for the truth of a proposition to observe both the thing signified and the mode of signification ; and since it does not belong to the mode of signification of the Essence to supply Personal names, those proper to the Persons to be distinguished from Each Other cannot be attributed to the Essence. To do so would imply that what was distinct in Personality was distinct in Essence also.

But although Personal Names and notional adjectives cannot be predicated of the Divine Essence, substantives may, on account of the real identity of the Essence and the Persons. The Divine Essence,

indeed, is not only really the same as One, but as Three Persons; hence One and Two and Three Persons may be predicated of the Essence; and we may say the Essence of the Father is the Son, is the Holy Ghost: and as God properly represents the Divine Essence it is equally true to say that the Divine Essence is Three Persons, or that God is Three Persons.

It is, moreover, suitable for the manifestation of the Faith that Essential terms be appropriated to the Divine Persons; for although the Trinity cannot be demonstrated, it may nevertheless be discovered to us by means of things which are more known; and those things which relate to the Essence are more known than the Personal properties, since the former may be known by natural reason, but not so the latter. Thus the Divine Persons are manifested to us by Essential Attributes in a twofold manner: first, by that of likeness, as when things belonging to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds as Word by mode of Intellect; and secondly, by that of unlikeness, as when power is attributed to the Father; fathers with us being often infirm through age.

According to our mode of understanding, the Essential Attributes have been suitably assigned by theologians to the Three Divine Persons as follows: ¹ Eternity to the Father, Who is from none, Beauty to the Son as the Image of the Father, and Fruition to the Holy Ghost. Or, Unity to the Father, Equality to the Son, and Peace to the Holy Ghost, as the bond of connection.

¹ *i. e.* by appropriation.

Again, to the Father Power, to the Son Wisdom, to the Holy Spirit Goodness : while, if we consider God from the point of view of His works, to the Father is appropriated "from Whom," to the Son "by Whom," to the Holy Spirit "in Whom."

CHAPTER XL

OF PERSONS AS COMPARED WITH RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES

PROPERTIES are of the Persons and in the Persons. For as it is of the nature of form to be in that of which it is the form, it is necessary that the properties be in the Persons, as in some sense Their form ; and as we speak of the Divine Essence as in God which nevertheless is God, so also of the properties, which, being in the Persons, are also the Persons Themselves. Not that there exists in God composition of subject and accident, for whatever can belong to Him is His Essence ; and since in Him there is no composition of form and matter, the abstract and the concrete are the same ; as Deity and God ; thus Relation is really the same as Person.

And the Divine Persons are distinguished by Relation rather than by Origin ; for origin does not signify anything intrinsic, but stands in some sort as the way to or from the thing ; as does generation. And since, in the Divine Persons, Understanding is no other than Essence, in which All unite, it is necessary that They be distinguished One from Another by the Relations or properties which constitute the Hypostases or Persons, inasmuch as they *are* these very Persons subsisting.

Thus Paternity is the Father, and Filiation the Son. But it is contrary to the conception of origin that it should constitute Hypostasis or Person; for origin, understood actively, means a going forth from the person subsisting, and therefore presupposes it; and understood passively, as birth, it expresses the way to the person subsisting, but by no means constitutes the person. Hence the Divine Persons or Hypostases are distinguished, according to our mode of understanding, by Relation, not by Origin.

Abstraction may be made by the intellect in a two-fold manner: either the universal may be abstracted from the particular, as animal from man, or else form may be abstracted from matter. According to the first mode, that of the universal from the particular, when the properties are removed there remains in the Intellect, not the Hypostasis of the Father, which is, so to say, particular, but the Essence of the Three Divine Persons; as, abstraction made of rational differences in man, nothing remains except the universal term "animal." But according to the abstraction of form from matter, if those properties which are not Personal be removed, there remains the Intellect of the Persons; and if we remove from the Father that which makes Him Unbegotten, or which signifies Spiration, there remains the Hypostasis or Person of the Father; but if intellectual abstraction be made of the Personal properties, the Hypostasis will be taken away. Since, then, it is Relation which distinguishes and constitutes Hypostasis, it follows that if the Personal properties be removed the Hypostases cannot remain.

Since, therefore, in the Divinity, Relations distinguish and constitute Hypostases, it follows, that in Origin, passively understood, they precede, according to our intellectual conception, the properties of the Persons ; for origin, understood passively, is as the way to the Person constituted by the property. In like manner, if origin be considered as active, that which is not Personal is prior, according to our conception, to the Relations of the Persons originating. Thus the notional act of Spiration precedes the unnamed property common to the Father and the Son.

The Personal property of Paternity may, indeed, be considered in a twofold manner : first, as Relation, which presupposes a notional act ; for, as regards this mode, relation is founded upon act ; and secondly, as constituting the Person ; which requires that the relation be understood before the intellectual act, inasmuch as the person acting is pre-understood to the act.

CHAPTER XLI

OF PERSONS AS COMPARED WITH NOTIONAL ACTS

NOTIONAL Acts¹ are to be attributed to the Divine Persons because we find in them distinction of Origin, and by these acts the Order of Origin is suitably designated. But the conception of Origin in Divine things is twofold. As regards that of creatures proceeding from God, it is common to the Three Persons ; hence the actions attributed to God which refer to the procession of creatures pertain to the Essence. But we find another conception of Origin as regards the Procession of Person from Person ; and to this belong notional acts which indicate the Order of Origin and the relation of one Person to Another.

And inasmuch as there are two ways in which a thing may be called voluntary,—one by concomitance, the other causally,—we say that the Father begets the Son by the first, *i. e.* with concomitance of Will, inasmuch as by His Will He is God ; while, by the second, *i. e.* causally, He does not beget the Son, but produces creatures. And this, because will differs from nature in the causation of things ; for nature is determined to one thing, but will not so ; because will does not act by one form only, but by many, since there are many intellectual forms. Will is the source, therefore, of those

¹ See Appendix Q.

things which might be other than they are, but the Being of God is necessary, hence the Father begets His Son not by Will, but by Nature.

This necessity of Nature is not a defect, as death and such-like with us ; for there is no such necessity in God, and all things are created as He wills them to be ; but the Son born of God subsists such as God is. For the Son is not begotten from nothing, but from the Substance of the Father.

If He were produced from nothing He would stand in the relation of that which is made to the maker, and it would follow that He was created, and not a proper and true Son ; the contrary of which we read in 1 John v. 20 : "That we may be in His true Son." Therefore the Son is Begotten, not made ; and if those who are made by God from nothing are called sons, it is by assimilation to Him Who is the true Son, Begotten and by Nature, while others are called sons by adoption. Therefore the Son is of the Substance of the Father ; differently, however, from the sons of men, in whom part of the substance of the father who begets passes into that of the son who is begotten. For the Divine Nature is indivisible ; consequently God the Father, in generating, does not transfuse a part of His Nature, but communicates the whole ; and the only distinction which remains is that of Origin.

In consequence of the manner in which notional acts are admitted in the Divinity, we must admit also a faculty in respect of such acts ; for faculty signifies simply the principle of an act ; therefore, as we understand the Father to be the Principle of Generation,

and the Father and the Son of Spiration, we must attribute to the Father the faculty of Generation, and to Both that of Spiration. The faculty of generation, indeed, signifies, in any one, that in virtue of which he generates; hence in every generator we must admit a faculty of generating, and for spiration a faculty of breathing.

This faculty of generation does not, however, signify relation in God, because it refers principally to the Essence; and in any agent that is properly called faculty in virtue of which it acts. Now, whatever produces anything by its action produces that which is like to itself in respect of the form by which it acts; so a man generated is similar to the generator in that human nature by virtue of which the father could generate; but the Son of God is like to the Father, Who generates in Divine Nature, therefore the faculty of Generating which exists in the Father is the Divine Nature Itself; and it follows that the faculty of Generation signifies the Divine Nature absolutely, and Paternity only secondarily, by relation to what is generated; for the Father generates by virtue of the Divine Nature, which is common to the Father and to the Son.

And in the Divinity there is One Father only, One Son, and One Holy Spirit; for which four reasons may be assigned: first, because Relations, which, in the Divinity, are nothing else than Divine Persons, cannot be so multiplied that there should be several Paternities or Filiations; for the form of a species cannot be multiplied except according to quantity, which does not exist

in God. The second reason is evident from the mode of the Processions ; for God knows and wills all by one simple act, hence there can be only one Person proceeding by mode of the Word, that is the Son ; and one by that of Love, which is the Holy Ghost. The third reason is taken from the mode of Those proceeding ; for the Divine Persons proceed naturally, and nature is determined to one thing. The fourth reason appears from the perfection of the Divine Persons ; for the Son is perfect inasmuch as He contains in Himself the plenitude of Divine Filiation, which is One Son only. The same is to be said of the other Persons.

CHAPTER XLII

THE EQUALITY OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, AND THEIR SIMILARITY TO EACH OTHER

EQUALITY must be postulated of the Divinity, in Whom there exists nothing of more or less ; for unequal quantities are not one ; and as quantity, in the Divinity, means nothing else than Essence, without equality there could not be One Essence, so neither would there be Three Persons and One God.

Hence the Son is coeternal with the Father, Who does not generate Him by His Will, but by His Nature, which is Eternally Perfect. Nor is the Act by which the Son is produced successive, for this Generation is not material, neither has it the nature of motion ; but the Son was when the Father was ; and so of the Holy Ghost. With created agents it may happen that a thing is posterior to its principle because the power of nature to act is not always perfect, but comes by degrees ; as man has not always power to generate. It is also due to action that created things are not simultaneous with their principle ; for action is successive in creatures ; but it is not so in God.

And in the Divine Persons there is Order of Nature ; for there is always order where there is comparison

with some principle or single cause : but in the Divinity Principle bears relation to Origin, without priority. Thus Augustine calls that Order of Nature where one is from another, not where one precedes the other.

The Son participates perfectly in the Nature of the Father, in which there is no defect ; nor is there succession in generation, nor transmutation such as is found in creatures, which pass from the potential to the actual and reach equality by increase : therefore we say that the Son is equal in greatness to the Father, for the greatness of God is the perfection of His Nature; but the Father is considered as giving, and the Son as receiving.

And the Son is in the Father, and conversely, according to Essence, Relation and Origin, which Three are found in the Divinity. The Father is in the Son by His Essence, which He communicates without any transmutation of Himself ; from which it follows that the Essence of the Father being in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son, and conversely. Likewise, according to Relation, it follows that One of the relative opposites is in the Other.

With regard to Origin, it is evident that the Procession of the Word is not intelligible to anything without, but remains in the speaker, and that which is expressed by the Word remains in the Word ; for the going forth of the Son from the Father is according to the mode of Interior Procession, as a word which comes from the heart and remains in it.

Equality of power belongs to the Son because He

participates fully in the Nature of the Father ; for we see, even in creatures, that power in action is in proportion to the perfection of anything. Hence the Father, in communicating His Essence, communicates also His Power and Wisdom.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

It befits the Divine Persons to be Sent, but not so as that the One Sent implies any inferiority to the Sender, or change of place (as if anything should begin to be where formerly it was not); it denotes, rather, a Procession of Origin from the Sender, and a kind of new mode of existence. Thus the Son, sent into the world by the Father, began to be in the world by assuming human nature, and yet was already in the world, as we read in the first chapter of St. John.

The words Mission and Gift are used of the Divinity only temporally; Generation and Spiration only eternally; while Procession or Outgoing is used both eternally and temporally. For the Son proceeds eternally as He is in God, and temporally, according to Visible Mission as He is also Man, or in man, by Invisible Mission.

The Divine Persons are also said to be *sent* as They exist in some one in a new manner, and *given*, according as They are received by any one as a Free Gift; for although God is in everything by Essence, Power and Presence, He exists nevertheless in some special manner in rational creatures. In them God is said to be, as that which is known is in him who knows, or as the loved is in the lover; for the creature

itself attains to God by knowing and loving Him through the Divine Operation ; so that God is said to dwell in us as in His temple. Therefore we say that the Divine Persons are Sent and Proceed temporally, after the mode of grace, which is given to make us pleasing to God, and which we have the power freely to enjoy.

But although the Father communicates Himself to creatures it does not belong to Him to be sent ; for Mission in the Divinity implies, by its nature, Procession from Another and Origin. It does not, therefore, belong to the Father, but only to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs both to dwell in us and to be from Another. Indwelling by grace belongs to the Father also, but as He is not from Another, so neither is He said to be Sent.

An Invisible Mission is made to all who participate in grace. For there are two things to be considered : the indwelling of grace and the renovation by grace. Thus the Divine Persons are sent, according to the capacity of those who, by grace, know and understand Them ; while, to the Blessed, this Invisible Mission is made the principle of their Beatitude. Afterwards, indeed, another mission may be made, not for the increase of grace, but according as some mystery is further revealed to them ; and this will continue until the Day of Judgment.

As it is natural to man to be led by the visible to the invisible, it was necessary that the invisible things of God should be manifested by those which are visible ; and as God manifested Himself, and the Eternal

Procession of the Divine Persons, in a manner, by certain indications, it was suitable that the Invisible Mission should also be manifested by some visible sign. Thus the Son was sent visibly in Unity of Person, as the Author of sanctification, and the Holy Spirit appeared visibly in certain creatures as a Sign of sanctification, which sign lasted as long as the occasion demanded.

The Divine Persons are said to be Sent according as They Proceed One from Another eternally, if by the Sender we understand the Principle of the Person sent ; but if we understand the Principle of the effect which forms the object of the Mission, the Divine Person sent is sent by the whole Trinity.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL BEINGS AND THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD

ALL things, of whatsoever kind, must be from God ; for He Who is in everything by His Essence is the Cause of whatever exists by participation ; and being is by participation in all except God, in Whom alone it exists by Essence ; therefore all things are caused by Him.

And God is His own subsistent Being, which can be but one, as has been proved above ; hence Plato says : “ Before all multitude it is necessary to postulate unity ” ; and Aristotle : “ That which is pre-eminently Being and True is the cause of all beings and of all truth. ” Therefore God being the Cause of all things, He is not only the Cause of their existence according to such and such accidental and substantial forms, but of all that pertains to their being, according to whatever mode they exist. Hence it is necessary to admit that even the *materia prima*—the first matter—has been created by the First Cause of beings.

God is also the Exemplary Cause of all things, like an artificer who conceives in his mind a determinate form which is to be carried out. For the determination of things must be reduced as its first principle to the Divine Wisdom, wherein are found the

conceptions of all things, which, although multiple in respect of created things in themselves, are nevertheless no other than the Essence of God in Himself.

God is also the End of all things, because He is the First and Perfect Agent, in Whom there exists no want to be supplied ; nor does He expect to acquire anything by His action, but only to communicate His perfection, which is His Goodness ; this is exemplified in every creature, for every perfection is a similitude of the Perfections of God.

CHAPTER XLV

THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

To create is to make from nothing ; for if we consider the emanation of all being from the First Principle, it is impossible to conceive of being as pre-existent as regards such emanation. Therefore creation from nothing is not only possible, but necessary ; for, if anything were presupposed, it would follow that something existed of which God was not the Cause ; whereas it has been already proved that there is nothing which He has not produced.

Something uncreated is admitted of such creation according to relation only ; for God, when He creates, produces things without movement or change, as Universal Cause, which does not occur with particular causes : and if we subtract motion from that which is active and passive, nothing remains except relation ; therefore creation, in the creature, is nothing but a certain relation to the Creator, as to the Principle of its being.

And because to be created is to be something made, and to be made is to bear relation to the essence of things, created things are, properly speaking, substances which may be simple or composite. Accidents are said to have being, not as though they existed by

themselves, but inasmuch as something coexists in regard of them ; thus they are spoken of as coexistent and concreated.

Creation is the act of God alone, for the most universal effects must be referred to the most Universal Cause, and Being is the most universal of all effects. To produce Being absolutely belongs, therefore, to God, and we must reject the opinion of the Master of the Sentences that God can communicate to creatures the power of creating, or create through their ministry, not by His own authority. This opinion cannot be maintained ; for the second or instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the superior cause unless it contribute something of its own, by way of disposition, towards the effect of the principal agent ; having no proper action, its action would be evidently useless. We may, indeed, say that an axe, which cuts the wood, produces a bench, which is nevertheless the effect of the principal agent ; but the subject matter of creation is that which is presupposed to everything else, namely, absolute Being, therefore nothing could act by way of disposition towards it or be instrumental in it. And since that which is created is not made out of anything presupposed, which could be disposed by the action of an instrumental agent, it is eminently improper to say of a body that it creates ; for bodies do not act except as they are influenced or moved, and suppose something pre-existing, which is contrary to the conception of creation.

Creation does not belong to any One of the Divine Persons alone, but is common to the whole Trinity ;

for to create is, properly speaking, to cause the being of things, and therefore pertains to God according to His Being, which is common to the whole Trinity. And the Procession of the Divine Persons is the Cause of creation ; for God works by Intellect and Love to something related. Thus we attribute¹ to the Father the Power manifested in creation ; to the Son the Wisdom by which He operates intellectually ; and to the Holy Ghost Goodness, to which belongs the government which conducts everything to its proper end.

A representation of the Trinity is found in all creatures by mode of vestige ; for every effect represents its cause ; but diversely—some representing only the causality of the cause and not its form (as smoke that of fire), which is called the representation of vestiges. Others represent the cause according to a similitude of form, as a statue of Mercury represents Mercury, which is the representation of the image. In rational creatures, in whom there is intellect and will, we find a representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as we find in them the word conceived and love proceeding, by means of which we understand the Processions of the Divine Persons ; while in every creature there is a representation of the Trinity by way of vestiges, for every creature has Being by which it subsists, Form by which it is determined in species, and Relation to something else. Substance represents Cause and Principle, and shows forth the Father, Who is not from Another. Form and species represent the

¹ *i. e.* by appropriation.

Word ; for Form, which is elaborated, involves the idea of art, while relation represents the Holy Ghost, Who is Love, inasmuch as the order which connects one thing with another is of the Will of the Creator.

Creation must not be confused with the works which nature does, for natural operations presuppose something ; and to be made, or created, belongs properly to substantive things only, as has been explained above. Hence the being of form is not created but con-created, while composition from pre-existing materials is proper to natural agents ; and thus a thing goes forth into actual existence.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE PRINCIPLE OF DURATION IN CREATED THINGS

NOTHING besides God has existed always. Things exist inasmuch as God wills they should be, and He wills nothing of necessity except Himself. Hence the world was when God willed it to be; nor do the reasons of Aristotle prove absolutely that the world existed always; rather, they contravene certain opinions of the ancients, which supposed the world to have begun in ways incompatible with truth.

The beginning of the world we hold, however, by faith only, for its recent origin cannot be demonstrated either from itself, or from its Cause, which is God. For God acts by Will, and His Will cannot be investigated by reason except with regard to things which He wills of absolute necessity. Those which concern creatures are certainly not such; but the Divine Will may be known by revelation, and this is its conclusion.

That, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," admits of a threefold explanation. It excludes, first, the error which denies that time had a beginning; and secondly, that which admits two principles, one good, the other evil; thus "in the beginning" is to be understood as in the Son, to Whom, in regard of Wisdom, the exemplary principle

is attributed. Thirdly, it excludes the error which holds corporeal beings to have been created by God through the medium of spiritual ones. For four creations are generally held to have been simultaneous : the Empyrean Heavens ;¹ Matter, understood by earth ; Time, and the Angelic Nature.

¹ This expression is connected with the system held in former ages.

CHAPTER XLVII

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL

THE variety and multitude of things is from the intention of God, the First Agent, Who produces them for the communication of His Goodness. This shines forth more eminently through the diversity of creation ; for it could not be fully represented by any single creature. Hence goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, is found in creatures multiple and divided, and is more perfectly represented by the universe than by any single creature.

And the Wisdom of God is the Cause of the inequality of things as of their differences. For we find in things a twofold distinction : one formal, inasmuch as they differ in species ; the other material, where they differ in individuality only—a material distinction which is for the sake of the formal.

The formal difference always requires inequality, because the forms of things are like numbers, in which species differ by addition or subtraction of unity ; therefore in natural things species are graduated, and one is found to be more perfect than another, the inequality of things having been made a law for the perfection of the universe.

And as all those things which God has made are ordered one to another and also to Himself, it follows of necessity that the world is one and belongs to One. Those who deny this unity are driven to ascribe it to chance.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR

WHAT evil is can be learned from the idea of good ; for evil consists in a certain absence of good. Now by *good* we are to understand whatever is desirable ; and as every creature desires its own being and perfection, we must admit that goodness belongs to being and to perfection of every nature ; consequently that there is no being, or form, or nature of evil.

As the perfection of the universe requires the inequality of things in order that every gradation of good may be filled up, some having corporeal and others incorporeal being, so it requires also that there should be those in which there is the possibility of failure from goodness ; whence it follows that some among them do fail—in which consists the idea of evil.

Evil is found in things under the form of corruption, which is a certain kind of evil, existing in good as its subject ; for the taking away of good implies evil. In a merely negative sense, however, the absence of good has not the character of evil ; otherwise things which are not after any mode would be evil ; or a thing would be bad because it had not the good of something else, *e.g.* man would be bad because he could not run like a deer. Evil consists, therefore, in a subtraction of good

by mode of deprivation ; as loss of sight constitutes blindness. The form is, however, one and the same as the subject of the privation ; that is to say, Being *in potentia*, whether it be, like *materia prima*, the subject of substantial forms and the opposite deprivations, or whether it be actual, absolutely, and *in potentia* only relatively ; as a transparent body which is the subject of darkness and light. It is evident, therefore, that the form in virtue of which anything is actual constitutes some perfection and some good ; therefore being, *in potentia*, is so far good, inasmuch as it bears relation to good ; for being *in potentia* is the same as good *in potentia*. It remains true, therefore, that the subject of evil is good.

Nor can evil entirely destroy good. Good exists in a threefold manner : first, as form or quality, which is liable to be entirely taken away by its opposite, as light by darkness ; secondly, as the subject, which is neither taken away nor diminished by evil ; thirdly, as the capacity of the subject for actuality, which may be diminished by evil but not wholly taken away.

This diminution is not to be understood of quantity ; it is the subtraction of certain forms and qualities by which, as internal dispositions, being is prepared for actuality. Thus the more such contrary dispositions are multiplied, the more the capacity for actuality is lessened ; but were they multiplied to infinity, the capacity would be infinitely lessened, yet the remaining root, which is the substance of the subject, would not be taken away. Thus it is with sin ; additions may be made by which the aptitude of the soul for grace is

evermore diminished ; yet this aptitude, which follows upon its nature, will not be taken away.

Evil, which is divided into penalty and guilt, may consist in the subtraction of form, or of some of its parts ; such as the loss of a member, which is penal and contrary to the will ; or it may consist in the withholding of operations which are due on the part of the will ; this has the nature of guilt, *i.e.* when any one fails of perfect action in that whereof he is master according to the will.

Guilt has more of the nature of evil than pain has, not only of sense, but of loss. For evil signifies properly that of guilt, not of punishment : first, because goodness consists in actuality ; and the goodness of a man consists in his making a good use of the things which he possesses, which things are used by the will. Thus a man is said to be good or bad according as his will is good or bad ; and such badness consists in the inordinate action of the will, while punishment consists in the privation of some of those things of which the will makes use. A second reason is, that God is the Author of the evil of punishment, but not of that of guilt ; and while the evil of punishment takes away some created good, the evil of guilt is opposed to the Uncreated Good, and so has more of the nature of evil than the former.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE CAUSE OF EVIL

SINCE evil is the deficiency of some good which a thing was created to possess, it has good for its cause ; for nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it has being, and being is good. This may be said of all causes, for we have seen that in material ones good is the subject of evil.

Evil, indeed, has not a formal cause, for it is the privation of form ; nor has it a final cause, for it is the privation of the order which is due to the end ; neither has it a cause by mode of agent, except accidentally, for the agent intends to introduce his own form, not to injure the opposite form. Thus evil is the deficiency of good, and has no cause except good.

Evil is twofold. One kind of evil belongs to action, through defect of the agent—this cannot be charged to God, in Whom there is no defect. The other is due to God, whether in things natural or voluntary ; for the order of the universe requires that there should be some who may, and, consequently, among these some who do fail, and so promote the good of the universe, as it were, by accident. This is the cause of the corruption of certain things. And since the order of justice requires that sin should be punished, God is the Author

of the evil of punishment, which is included in the idea of guilt.

But there is no supreme evil which is the cause of all other evils, as the Supreme Good is the Cause of all that is good : first, because the principle of all good is good by essence, while nothing can, by its essence, be evil ; secondly, there is no supreme, that is to say integral, evil which consumes all good, for if all good were taken away, even that evil would be taken away of which good is the subject ; thirdly, evil cannot be a principle, for it cannot be a cause except by accident.

The error of those who admitted two principles arose from their considering only particular causes, and not the Universal one, to which all things may be reduced as to a common principle of being, since they all agree in the participation of being.

CHAPTER L

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS

THAT the angels are incorporeal is proved from the perfection of the universe. This consists in assimilation to God, Who produces creatures by Intellect and Will; and since the act of understanding is not corporeal, one due to any bodily virtue, the perfection of the universe requires the existence of intellectual creatures, called by us Angels.

In this the ancients erred, not distinguishing between sense and intellect, for they esteemed every being to be corporeal, because body alone falls under the cognizance of the senses.

Nor are the angels composed of matter and form, as Avicbron taught that the matter of corporeal and spiritual things was the same: for if the same division of matter received both spiritual and corporeal forms, these forms would be the same, which is impossible; it remains, therefore, that one division of matter receives spiritual forms, and another corporeal ones. It does not befit matter, however, to be divided except as regards extension, which being removed, there remains only indivisible substance.

It is, moreover, evident that intellectual substances are not material, because everything operates according to the mode of its substance, and the act of under-

standing is an operation wholly immaterial. Hence, material things when present to our intellect are there in a more simple manner than in themselves. The angelic substances are, indeed, beyond our intellect, which cannot attain to comprehending them as they are : it can, nevertheless, do so after its own mode—that by which it apprehends composite things ; and thus it also apprehends God.

Angels differ from each other in species, because, not being composed of matter and form, it is impossible they should be of the same species. For things which belong to the same species and differ numerically have the same form, but differ in regard of matter ; while angels, not being composed of matter and form, it follows that no two can be of the same species. They are, moreover, by their nature incorruptible, for corruption takes place where form is separated from matter ; but the angels are subsistent forms, wholly immaterial ; therefore, they are not subject to corruption.

CHAPTER LI

THE RELATION OF ANGELS TO BODIES

ANGELS have not bodies united to them by nature, because, inasmuch as they are intellectual substances, remote from matter, it does not belong to them to be united to a body ; for the act of understanding is not corporeal or dependent upon corporeal power. In every department of being, where the imperfect is found, the perfect pre-exists, and since, in the order of intellectual substances, we find the human soul acquiring a knowledge of sensible things by means of bodily senses, some intellectual substances must exist, not united to body, which do not so acquire knowledge ; and these we call Angels.

These angels assume bodies, not by imaginary vision as some have held, but in order to be really visible, as we read in Scripture ; and such bodies, condensed out of air, represent their perfections for our benefit, who are to be their future companions in glory. In these bodies they do not, absolutely speaking, exercise any operation of life ; for the nature of vital operation consists in the possession of life as the potential principle of such action. They can, however, perform certain actions which do not depend upon the soul, such are motion, sleep, etc.

CHAPTER LII

THE RELATION OF ANGELS TO PLACE

ANGELS are said to be in place equivocally as compared with bodies ; for a body is in a place according to the contact of dimensional quantity, but an angel by the application of power. Hence an angel is not measured by place, nor has it a particular position.

Incorporeal substance, indeed, is said to contain rather than to be contained ; thus the soul is in the body as containing, not as contained. By the application of power, however, to any place, the angel may be said to be in some manner in that material place, though not contained in place. For an angel is not everywhere, but in one particular place, its power being finite ; while God is everywhere because His power is infinite ; and the universe, compared with His universal power, is as one single thing. After divers modes, therefore, it pertains to bodies, to angels and to God to be in place. For a body is measured by place and therefore circumscribed by it ; an angel is present not as circumscribed but as limited, *i. e.* being so in one place that it cannot be also in another ; and God as neither circumscribed nor limited, because He is everywhere.

Nor are two angels in one place at the same time, for there cannot be at once two total and immediate causes for the same effect. And this notwithstanding

the example adduced of several forces united in drawing a boat ; for these do not constitute singly a perfect motor, but several, singly insufficient, unite their powers to produce one motor, while the angel is in a place as containing it perfectly.

CHAPTER LIII

THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS

ANGELS can move locally, but in a different manner from bodies which are contained and measured by place, which, in consequence of their continuity, have a continuous motion. The angels being present is by contact of power, as containing place, not as measured by it. Their local motion consists simply of different contacts with different places, successive, and not simultaneous, because an angel cannot be in several places at once. Nor is it necessary that such contacts should be continuous; for the angel may either leave a material place successively, and thus the motion would be continuous; or leave the whole place at once and apply itself at once to the whole of another place; in which case the motion would not be continuous.

If the angel's motion be continuous it cannot move from one extreme to the other without passing through the middle, as Aristotle proves; but if the movement be not continuous the angel may pass without going through the middle. This is impossible to a body which is extended and contained in place; but the substance of the angels is not subject to place as being contained by it, nay, it is superior as containing it; hence they have power to apply themselves to place as they will, either with or without medium.

The movement of the angels is, however, necessarily in time, for where there are several movements there must be time, time being nothing else than before and after. If their motion be continuous, it is therefore in time continuously, and not so if the motion be not continuous ; for the motion of an angel may be according to either mode. This time, however, is not the same as that which measures the movement of the heavens, and constitutes the standard by which all corporeal things, mutable through the change of the heavens, are measured : for the motion of the angels does not depend upon that of the heavens.

CHAPTER LIV

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS

OF no creature can the action or intelligence be the substance; for as being is the actuality of substance, so action is the actuality of power; only Pure Actuality can be its own actuality, because the potential is repugnant to the actual. It is, therefore, proper to God alone that His Being is His Substance, and that to act and to understand are His very Being subsistent. This is contrary, indeed, to the nature of the angels, or their substance would not be distinguished from the Substance of God, nor the substance of one angel from that of another; neither would the angelic nature constitute a hierarchy of intelligences of various perfection, as results from the diversity of their participation in the Divine Intelligence. Neither is the intelligence of the angels the same as their being: for the genus of action is twofold: either immanent (*i. e.* intransitive), as to feel, to will and to understand; or transitive, as to saw or to burn.

Transitive actions cannot constitute the being of the agent, because being signifies something within the agent itself, while transitive action constitutes an actual efflux from the agent: neither can immanent actions do so, because they are either absolutely

infinite, as to will and to understand, or relatively so, as to feel, whereas the being of every creature is finite and determined to a certain genus and species to which it belongs. Only the Being of God is absolutely infinite and comprehends all; therefore in God alone is Intelligence, and also Being and Will.

Nor is power, or faculty, the essence of the angels or of any other creature; because faculties differ according to the diversity of their operation, and operation and being are diverse actions, the respective powers of which are substance and energy. Since, therefore, being and intelligence are not the same in the angels, it follows that neither is their essence the same as their intellectual faculty, nor is operation or faculty the essence of any creature.

Neither can we attribute to the angels an agent¹ and possible intellect except equivocally; for the possible intellect, which indicates something potential to be reduced to actuality, may be admitted in us who do not always understand; and the agent intellect is admitted as a certain faculty which makes material things intelligible; but there is no such necessity in the angels, who are never *in potentia* to those things which they understand by nature, their intelligible species being always actualized; for they understand from the first, and principally immaterial things.

In us there are some faculties, the operations of which are carried on by organs in parts of the body, as sight in the eyes and hearing in the ears, while others, such as to will and to understand, are not

¹ *Intellectus agens.*

exercised by means of organs, while the angels, who have not bodies naturally united to them, possess will and intellect only, as befits the order of the universe, which requires that the highest creatures should be purely intellectual, not only partially so, as we are.

CHAPTER LV

THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC UNDERSTANDING

THE essence of the angels being determined to genus and species, which implies a limited perfection, does not comprehend all within itself. This, indeed, belongs to the Divine Essence alone, which, being absolutely infinite, contains all in Itself; hence God alone knows all by His Essence. The intellect of the angels must, therefore, be completed by some species enabling them to understand things. But these species are not received from the things themselves; they form part of their own nature. For there is a distinction between corporeal and celestial substances, according to which the former are *in potentia* to their perfections, and acquire them successively; while the latter have these perfections created along with them. Thus in the inferior intellectual substances, *i. e.* in human souls, the faculties are not complete from the beginning, but developed successively, inasmuch as souls receive their intelligible species by means of external things; while the intellectual faculties of the angels are completed by intelligible species belonging to their nature, by means of which they understand whatever they naturally know. This is likewise evident from their mode of being. For human souls have their natural mode of existence in

the body and by the body in which their intellectual perfection is developed ; while the angels, subsisting in intelligible being and wholly incorporeal, receive their intellectual perfection by innate species, directly from the Author of Nature.

The higher these angels are in grade, by so much the more universal species do they understand, thus resembling God in intellectual perfection in proportion as they approach that mode by which He understands all by means of One, that is, His own Essence—an intellectual plenitude which is found in intelligent creatures after an inferior and less simple mode. For what God knows by one the inferior intellect knows by several ; and multiplied in proportion as the intellect is lower. This is evident likewise among ourselves : for some persons from weakness of intellect cannot seize truth unless it be explained by many particulars ; while others of stronger intellect understand many things by means of few.

CHAPTER LVI

THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ANGELS AS REGARDS IMMATERIAL THINGS

THE angels understand themselves by their own substance. For as transitive actions are separate from, and immanent ones are united to, the agent, those species which are always actualized are known by their possessors without any change being required. And since the angels are immaterial, of some subsistent form, and, as such, intelligible actually, it follows that they know themselves by means of their form, which is their substance.

Every angel likewise understands others ; for as God creates things, not only in physical being but also as they are intelligible in the minds of the angels, there exist in every angel certain conceptions by which they understand both material and spiritual things. The conception of their own species, at once natural and intellectual, impressed upon angels individually, enables them to understand themselves ; while the conceptions of other natures, whether spiritual or material, impressed according to intellectual being only, enable them to know creatures, both material and spiritual.

For things may be known in three ways : first, by the essence which exists in the knower ; as an angel

knows itself, or the eye sees the light : a mode of vision which bears a likeness to that Vision of God by His own Essence which surpasses the natural power of any created mind ; for God is incomprehensible. Secondly, a thing is known by its own similitude ; as we see a wall by species existing in the eye ; and thus the angels know God in virtue of their nature, which, as a simple intellectual essence, bears a certain likeness to the Divine Nature. Thirdly, some things are known, not by their own species, but by species received from others ; whence results some similitude to the thing known. In this way we see God in this present state, in visible things ; which, according to the Apostle, is to see Him in an enigma. The natural knowledge which the angels possess of God is midway between these three modes, but nearer to the last, inasmuch as the angelic nature, not being a perfect likeness of the Divine Essence, does not perfectly reflect It.

CHAPTER LVII

THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ANGELS AS REGARDS MATERIAL THINGS

ANGELS know material things as they are, by means of intelligible species existing in themselves. This is in harmony with the order of the universe, according to which the superior contains in a more eminent manner, with a sort of totality and simplicity, what is found in the inferior, multiple, partial, and deficient ; for whatever exists in anything is there after the mode of that in which it is. The angels' being is immaterial and nearer to God ; therefore, as God knows material things by His Essence, so the angels by their innate intelligible species.

And as they are ministering spirits they know particulars according to intellect and will, not in universal causes, which would not be a knowledge of particular things as they are individually. Therefore, as a man of diverse faculties knows universals by intellect, and particulars by sense, so the angels ; but inasmuch as they are superior, they know both by an efflux from God, by means of a single intellectual faculty. Thus the angelic intellect contains the things which belong to universal nature, and those also which are the principles of individuation, knowing by species divinely infused, not only what belongs to universal nature, but

also individualities of things, inasmuch as these all form multiplied representations of the one Simple Essence of God.

In like manner they know future events which proceed necessarily from their causes; as that to-morrow the sun will rise; and future things such as happen often, not with certainty but by conjecture; better, however, than men do, because they are more perfect, and have more universal penetration. But things which happen seldom as regards the sequence of cause and effect, such as casualties and accidents, are wholly unknown to them; while knowledge of the future in itself belongs to God alone, Who sees all present in His Eternity; a mode unknown to angels and to men.

The thoughts of hearts may be known by their effects not to angels only, but to men, by change of countenance and physical dispositions; but as they exist in themselves, in the intellect and the will, they are known to God only; for the will is subject to Him alone Who can operate in it as its First Principle and Final End.

Thus knowledge in the angels is twofold: first, natural knowledge, by mode of their essence and innate species. This does not enable them to discern the mystery of grace, for if they do not know those thoughts which depend upon the free will of others, much less can they discern what depends upon the sole Will of God. Secondly, there is the knowledge which makes them blessed; by which they see the Word, and things in the Word. This knowledge is of a different order, and by it they know mysteries—not all,

or equally, but as it may please God to reveal them, whether at the Creation, or afterwards, especially the mystery of the Incarnation. All these are shown to them in general at the commencement of their Beatitude; not at once in all their details, but by successive manifestations.

CHAPTER LVIII

THE MODE OF THE ANGELIC UNDERSTANDING

INTELLECT is said to be *in potentia* in two ways: one, before it possesses the habit of knowledge; the other, after the habit, but without actual consideration. According to the former, the angels are never *in potentia* in respect of natural knowledge, their mind being always complete through the species which form part of their nature. In things which pertain to Divine Revelation, however, there is nothing to prevent their being *in potentia*.

In the second manner they may be *in potentia* to things which they know by nature, since every object of their intelligence is not always present by actual consideration; that, however, which they see in the Word they possess always actually; for in this consists their Beatitude, which is always actual.

And in the Word they know everything simultaneously, because such knowledge is by means of one species, namely, the Divine Essence; and the object of a single operation is one, as there is one end of one motion. Therefore, what they know through the Word they know at once; and by natural knowledge they also know simultaneously whatever is represented by one species; but things which are known by diverse species they cannot know simultaneously.

As celestial bodies differ from terrestrial ones in having their perfections by nature, without movement or change, the angels possess by nature a complete and continual contemplation of truth without the discursive reasons indispensable to us. Hence the angels are called intellectual; and our souls are called rational.

If our intellect, indeed, saw from the beginning the force of a conclusion it would not need to understand discursively; nor if we knew always by direct apprehension of a subject what may be attributed to or subtracted from it, should we ever have to make use of composition and division; but because owing to the weakness of our intellect we cannot understand by a first apprehension, we reason, affirming and denying; a process of which the angels have no need, on account of their perfect intellectual light. Hence the angels do not understand by reasoning; nevertheless they understand the value of propositions and the reasoning of syllogisms.

Nor can there be fallacy in the angelic intellect, for the intellect is always true in its first operation. In us deception and fallacy supervene by accident; as when we reason about anything by means of some unsuitable composition, or mistake the definition of one thing for that of another. But this cannot happen with the angels, who do not make use of a process of reasoning, but know by a simple apprehension the definitions pertaining to each object. It is evident, moreover, that the essence of things may be a principle of knowledge in their regard as to what is naturally suitable or unsuitable to them, although not in those things which depend

upon the supernatural ordination of God. Therefore the good angels, who have a right will, when they judge of supernatural things,—saving the ordinance of God,—cannot err; but the demons who have fallen from Divine Wisdom through a perverse will are often deceived in supernatural things, though not in natural ones.

According to St. Augustine, there is a twofold knowledge in the angels: ¹ one *of the morning*, as it is called, which regards things in the Word; the other *of the evening*, as they know by their own nature; not through species taken from the things themselves, but by their own innate species; and although one is more perfect than the other, it need not exclude the other; for two operations may coexist in the same faculty, as the will desires at once the end, and the means to the end; or the intellect understands at the same time conditions and principles, by means of those same principles which enabled it to acquire the knowledge.

¹ *Vide* St. Augustine's interpretation of the evening and morning of Creation, Gen. i.

CHAPTER LIX

THE WILL OF THE ANGELS

ALL things incline towards good in their own way. Some are so by nature only, without understanding ; as plants and inanimate things, in which there is a natural bias ; some with a certain amount of cognizance, where they know a particular good ; as the senses know sweetness, colour, and so on ; the inclination which follows such recognition being called sensitive appetite. Others incline to good with a cognizance by which they know this same conception of goodness ; this is proper to the intellect, and is called Will ; and will is attributed to the angels because their intellect is cognizant of the universal conception of goodness.

This will is not the same as their essence, because it does not belong to the essence of anything to extend to that which is outside itself, whereas the will of the angels extends to willing an infinite good. In God only, as already explained, Essence and Will are the same ; for in Him all good is contained, nor does He Will anything outside Himself except by reason of His Goodness ; which is impossible with creatures. Moreover, it is only by the power of another that the intellect can possess that which is external to itself and be perfected by it. The will tends, indeed, thereto ; but to possess, and to tend towards something else

belong to different faculties ; hence in creatures essence and will are diverse.

Since there are three different kinds of agents, namely, natural things without choice, sensible things with choice but without liberty, and intellectual beings with choice and liberty, the angels, who possess a higher intelligence than men, possess free will in regard of that which they apprehend under the general conception of good, and free will also in judging.

Angels, having intellectual appetite only, have nothing of the concupiscible or the irascible passions. For faculties are distinguished by the formal nature of their object, and the object of the will is good, according to the general conception of goodness. Hence the intellectual appetite is not differentiated according to particular kinds of good, like the sensitive appetite, which does not exist in the angels ; and acts which are dependent upon such faculties are attributed to the angels only metaphorically. Thus love and joy belong to them, not as passions but as simple affections of the will ; and so of others.

CHAPTER LX

LOVE OR DILECTION IN THE ANGELS

NATURAL love exists in the angels, for to every nature there belongs an inclination which is called natural appetite or love. This inclination exists differently in different natures, according to the mode of their being. In intellectual natures it exists according to will ; in sensitive natures according to sensitive appetite ; and in natures without understanding only in a bias which belongs to the order of nature ; as explained above.

In the angels this natural love differs from elective love ; for the former regards the good which is desired as an end, and is called natural dilection ; while the latter is derived from the former and regards the good which is desired for the sake of the end. Thus both angels and men desire their own good and perfection, and choose some good by election.

Beings love each other by natural love where they agree in nature. In so far as they agree or differ from anything else it does not belong to natural love, which signifies only that tendency which is found in everything towards what is of the same nature with itself (as we see in inanimate things, *e.g.* fire, which has a natural disposition to communicate its form, which is

its good): so that in so far as the angels love what differs from themselves it is not by natural love.

Angels and all creatures love God more than themselves, because God is the Universal Good, and it is natural to everything, in so far as it belongs to anything else, to be more inclined to that to which it belongs than to itself. Thus a member will naturally expose itself for the preservation of the whole body; and as reason imitates nature, we see also in politics that a good citizen will expose himself to danger for the preservation of the city.

CHAPTER LXI

THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN NATURAL BEING

ANGELS and all beings other than God are made: He only is His own Being. All others exist by created participation; and that which is by participation is caused by that which is by essence. Moses, in his account of Creation, may have omitted all mention of the angels, lest the Israelites should fall into the idolatry to which they were inclined; but all intelligent beings, of whatever substance superior to corporeal nature, are, according to St. Augustine, comprehended under the title of Light or Heaven. Thus the angels are not eternal, but created by the Will of God, which, though one with His Essence, produces freely without necessity.

Holy men among the Greek Doctors have held that the angels were produced before the creation of the world; but the opinion of the Latins is more probable, namely, that they were created together with corporeal creatures; for they form part of the universe, and a portion is imperfect apart from the whole. Since, then, the angels bear relation to other creatures, and the works of God are perfect, it is probable that they were created at the same time as corporeal substances. It was suitable, moreover, that they should be created in the

Empyreal Heavens, as in the highest body ; not as though they were dependent upon corporeal substance according to their being or creation, but to manifest their relation to the lower universe over which they preside.

CHAPTER LXII

THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN GRACE AND GLORY

ANGELS were created in a state of natural Beatitude, having from the first possessed their natural perfections without the discursive movement required by us ; and they know God, by a natural knowledge, through the Divine Similitude which shines forth in their nature. Such contemplation is called by Aristotle, Beatitude ; but the ultimate Beatitude, which is supernatural and exceeds the angelic faculties, they did not possess originally ; for this does not belong to any nature, but is the end of nature.

The angels required grace, therefore, that they might adhere to God ; for the will cannot act in that which is above its faculty unless it be assisted. Thus heat has the natural power of warming and generates heat in others, but it cannot produce flesh except by means of the nutritive soul ; and in like manner the angels could not be turned to final Beatitude without the help of grace.

Conversion to God, indeed, is of three kinds : first, there is the conversion of perfect love, which is that of the Blessed ; for which grace perfected is required ; secondly, that which merits Beatitude ; for which habitual grace, the principle of merit, is required ; and thirdly,

the conversion which is a preparation for the reception of grace. For this, habitual grace is not required, but the operation of God converting the soul to Himself; as we read in the Lamentations: "Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted."

Some say that the angels were not created in grace, but the contrary opinion is to be preferred. For Providence has brought all things into existence according to some kind of seminal nature, as we see in trees and animals; and grace which makes us pleasing to God stands, to Beatitude, as the seed in the order of Nature to its natural effect. This inclination of grace does not, however, impose necessity; it only inclines the creature so that it may freely tend to Beatitude according to its nature. Hence the angels were free to use grace or not to use it.

Beatitude is natural to God only; in all others it is not by nature, but is the ultimate end at which nature ought to arrive by means of its work; yet inasmuch as it transcends nature it must at the same time be looked for as the gift of another. Hence if the angels were created in grace they would attain Beatitude by means of it, while if they had not grace we must suppose them to have obtained Beatitude without merit, as we obtain grace; but this is contrary to the conception of Beatitude, which has the nature of a final end, and is the reward of virtue. Nor can we say that one and the same act of conversion to God is meritorious because of free will, and at the same time beatific fruition because it pertains to the end, because free will is not a sufficient cause of merit. For an act is not meritorious

except as informed by grace, and since it cannot be informed at once by imperfect grace, which is the cause of merit, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of fruition, it is impossible at once to enjoy and to merit the enjoyment. Hence it is better to admit that before obtaining Beatitude the angels had grace wherewith to merit it.

And inasmuch as the angels do not acquire their perfections discursively, but have them complete by nature, they must have merited Beatitude by their first act of charity ; for as they bear relation by nature to natural perfection, so by grace to glory ; which is attainable through a single act, informed by charity, not by angels only but also by men. Human nature, however, is not always destined to reach its ultimate perfection ; hence a longer way is given to us for the attainment of Beatitude.

The gifts of grace and the perfection of Beatitude accorded to the angels are in proportion to their natural gifts. This is evident from the order of the Divine Wisdom, which, having constituted gradations in the angelic nature, has ordained the highest natures to the greatest gifts and most perfect Beatitude. It is also evident that the angels have not different natures in opposition to each other, as we have in soul and body, by which they would be impeded in the exertion of their full power ; it is therefore according to reason that those who have superior natures should be most efficaciously converted to God. So also among men, those who turn to God with a stronger will receive the greater gifts of grace here, and of glory hereafter.

And natural knowledge and love remain in the angels, subordinated to the knowledge and love of the State of Glory ; nor does the imperfection of nature interfere with their Beatitude ; but underlies and is subordinated to it.

Nor can the Blessed Angels sin ; for they see the Essence of God, which is the Supreme Good ; and thus they stand in a different relation to God from those who see Him only under the general conception of good. And since it is impossible for any creature to will or desire apart from good, it is impossible that, seeing God, they should not desire in conformity to the Will of God ; hence the Blessed cannot sin. And since Beatitude consists in the Vision of God, the angels are moved towards it by God Himself ; as that which is movable is subject to the motive power.

For the creature cannot arrive at Beatitude by its own efforts, being removed from it by an infinite distance : it is therefore brought, through the predestination of God, to a determined degree beyond which it cannot pass ; for when the end has been reached there is no more merit or change. As regards the joy of the angels, however, in the salvation of those to whom they minister, it belongs to their accidental reward, and is capable of increase until the Day of Judgment.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS AS REGARDS GUILT

ANGELS and men, constituted in a state of nature, may sin ; and if any creature cannot sin it is due to the gift of grace, not to their nature ; for to sin is simply to decline from the rectitude of action which is incumbent, whether in things natural, artificial or moral. The Will of God only cannot decline because it is the rule of His Acts, and not ordered to a superior end ; and the will of every creature has rectitude of action in proportion as it is regulated by the Divine Will, to which the final end belongs. Thus, according to the conditions of nature, sin may exist in every creature.

It may exist, moreover, in the said creature after a twofold manner, viz. as cause, or by affection. According to the former, every sin may be found in the devils, because they incur the guilt of every sin which they induce men to commit ; but according to affection, they are liable to those sins only to which a spiritual nature can be attached, or which belong to such. These sins consist in the disorder of their affection to spiritual good, through not remaining subject to the rule of the superior. Hence the first sin of the angels can only be pride, which is crossed by the orders of a superior ; afterwards there may also be envy, inasmuch as they

are grieved by the good of men, or esteem the good of others as an impediment to their own.

The angels are said to have sinned through desiring to be like God ; which may be understood in two senses : either as a desire of equality, or of similitude. According to the former, the angels could not desire what they knew by nature to be impossible ; it is, moreover, contrary to the natural desire of self-preservation for any creature to wish to change its being. In the latter sense there are two kinds of assimilation to God : one is the end for which a thing is created ; therefore to desire such a likeness is good, provided it be in due order. But to desire likeness to God for which they were not created would be sinful, and in this sense the devil desired to be as God, coveting that which he could attain by his natural strength as the final end of his Beatitude, and averting his desire from the supernatural Beatitude which is by the grace of God. In other words, he desired to possess the Divine Similitude by his own power, not by the Divine assistance.

The devils are not bad in nature ; for every nature being ordered to some good, according to the common conception of goodness, theirs cannot tend to evil. The intellectual nature, indeed, bears relation to Universal Good, which it is capable of apprehending, and which is the object of will ; hence it is impossible that they could have an inherent inclination to evil : for although some evil may be joined by accident to a particular good,—as fire, although good by nature, may happen to destroy something,—no evil can be joined to the Universal Good.

Nor could the angels be bad by default of their own will, at the first moment of creation. Besides being contrary to the authority of Ezekiel,¹ "Thou wast in the delights of Paradise," it is impossible that they should have sinned in the first instant, because God, Who created them, is not a defective Cause, nor a Cause of sin. For an operation may be defective through its relation to the agent, as when a child, born lame through hereditary weakness, limps from the beginning; but this could not be the case with the angels, created directly by God, in Whom there is no defect.

According to the more probable opinion of the saints, the devils sinned immediately after the first moment of their creation; thus, if created in grace, as was said above, some angels obtained Beatitude by one meritorious act, while others placed an impediment by the use of their free will; should it be admitted, however, that they were not created in grace, or that they did not exercise free will at the first moment of their creation, there may have been some delay between their creation and fall.

As regards sin, we have to consider the proneness to sin and the motive for sinning. According to the opinion of St. Gregory, the first angel that fell was of superior grade, the motive being pride, which arises from excellence; for the sin of the angels cannot be ascribed to any proneness to evil, but to free will alone. It is also evident that the sin of the first angel was the cause of the fall of others, not as obliging, but as inducing them to sin, from Matt. xxv. 41: "Go, ye

¹ Chapter xxviii. 13.

cursed," etc., which shows that the other demons were subject to the supreme one ; and that, by the order of Divine Justice, those who have been guilty of yielding to temptation are subjected in punishment to the evil power which has conquered them.¹

Nor do the angels require time for deliberation, choice and consent, as we do. With them all this is the work of an instant ; for since they are moved by one single faculty, in whatever direction, there is nothing to keep them back.

The angels who remained steadfast were more in number than those who fell ; for sin is contrary to natural inclination, and nature obtains its effect always or generally ; and if such is not found to be the case with men it is because they are liable to follow the sensible goods, which are more known to them ; a reason which does not exist in the angels, whose nature is purely intellectual.

If the first angel who fell was one of inferior rank, they did not fall from all the Orders ; but the contrary opinion is the more probable, since men are held to be assumed into all the Orders, to repair the losses of the angelic hierarchy.

¹ 2 Peter ii. 19.

CHAPTER LXIV

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS

NATURAL knowledge differs from the knowledge which is by grace. The former remains in the demons, intact, along with their gifts, because, owing to the simplicity of their substance, nothing can be subtracted from their nature. But the knowledge which is by grace is twofold. One kind, which is purely speculative,—as the revelation of some Divine secret,—is not entirely taken away from them, but as much as is necessary is communicated to them by the angels or other means ; but of the other, which is affective and produces love to God, they are wholly deprived ; as they are also of charity, which belongs to the Gift of Wisdom.

The will of the demons is confirmed in evil, as that of the other angels is in good, the same operation having taken place in the angels as occurs in us by death, after which there remains no more possibility of meriting ; and because the angelic apprehension differs from ours in that it does not make use of discursive reasoning, it apprehends simply and adheres immoveably. Thus before adhesion they could freely choose the opposite, but not afterwards ; whereas in man the will is flexible in its nature, before election and therefore afterwards.

Fear, grief, joy and other passions of the sensitive appetite which are in the bodily organs do not exist in the demons ; nevertheless we must admit such to be in them as simple acts of the will, in which sense grief is nothing else than the struggle of the will against something which is, or is not. Thus the demons wish many things to be which are not, and not to be which are ; since they are deprived of the Beatitude which they naturally desire. They desire, also, that some should be lost who are saved, and their evil will is restrained in many ways ; which is grievous to them.

The place ¹ of the demons is twofold : in hell, absolutely ; and in the lower atmosphere until the Day of Judgment ; for the probation of mankind, and to give occasion for the ministry of the angels. This is ordered by the Divine Wisdom, which procures the good of inferiors through superiors. Thus, by the good angels we are led directly to good and restrained from evil, while we are guided indirectly by our contest with the bad angels.

And there are demons now in hell, tormenting the souls which they led into sin ; as there are good angels with the saints in heaven. Place does not alter their nature, but it affects them with sadness, because they know themselves to be in a place which is not agreeable to their will.

¹ *i. e.* their sphere of action—*vide supra*, Chapter lii.

CHAPTER LXV

THE CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES

EVERY corporeal creature is from God. For wherever unity is found in diversity, it must be referred to a single cause, because variety does not, by itself, unite things in one order. Since Being, therefore, is common to all things, however diverse, there must of necessity be some Principle of Being by which all things exist, whatever they are and according to whatever mode; and this Principle is God.

Corporeal creatures are created by God to manifest His Goodness, not by way of punishment; for every nature is good. Neither is the disposition of the universe accidental, but creatures all form parts of a whole, in which the parts exist for the sake of their utility and are ordered to the whole. The less noble are for the nobler, matter for form, single creatures for the universe, and the universe for God;—since it forms a representation of the Divine Goodness, by means of which rational creatures may, in a special manner, find their end in the love and knowledge of God.

The higher any cause is, the more it extends to variety in causation; but that which underlies things is always found to be more general than that which informs and individualizes them. Thus, Being is more general than life, and life than intelligence; and

the more general anything is found to be, the more directly it proceeds from the First Cause; for no second cause can produce anything unless something be presupposed to the thing produced, either created or uncreated.

It remains, therefore, as before said, that God alone can create, and that corporeal forms are not produced from ideas (as taught by Plato and Origen); or created by lower intelligences (as held by Avicenna)—but that in the first constitution of things they are directly from God. And since there can be no transmutation from the potential to the actual in simple creation, we must admit that, in respect of its proper cause, matter is subject at command to God only, and that the forms of bodies are from God.

CHAPTER LXVI

THE ORDER OF VARIETY IN CREATION

THE first matter was not created without form, or under one general form, but under distinct forms. For such being would have no actuality; so that matter without form would be equivalent to actual being without actuality.

If the opinion of the ancients is to be followed, the first matter was a body—perhaps fire or air—in which case to *make* would only mean to *alter*, and the actuality of being would not depend upon form only; for supervening upon form there are accidents. Therefore Augustine says that matter precedes form by the order of nature, not by time; in the same manner as the potential is before the actual, or a part before the whole.

Other saints understand the words “without form,” not as excluding all form, but only that finished beauty which bodies now present. Thus because light was wanting to diaphanous bodies they are described as “darkness on the face of the abyss,” and the earth covered with water was called “void,” because it could not be seen; “empty and unformed,” because the ornament of plants and herbs was wanting.

Nor is one formless matter common to all bodies ; for the matter of corruptible and incorruptible things is different. The matter of the celestial bodies, considered in itself, is *in potentia* to that form only which it has, and which so fully corresponds to the capacity of its nature as to leave it subject to no change except that of place. The contrary happens with regard to things composed out of the elements ; hence they can only be compared by analogy, according to the conception of potentiality.

If the Empyrean Heavens were created along with corporeal matter a suitable reason may be deduced from the future State of Glory. For in the future reward a double glory is expected—one spiritual, the other corporeal ; and the latter, not in the glorified human body only, but in a renovation of the whole world. Since, therefore, spiritual glory began from the commencement of the world in the Beatitude of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints, it was suitable that the principle of corporeal glory also should be inchoate in certain bodies, which should be from the beginning exempt from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous. This, it is expected, will be the condition of all corporeal bodies after the Resurrection ; hence the Heavens are called Empyrean on account of splendour, not of heat.

It is generally held that the first four creations were, the Angels, the Empyrean Heavens, corporeal Matter, and Time ; for Augustine holds that the angelic nature

and corporeal matter had precedence according to the order of nature only, not by duration. If, however, formless matter preceded formation, it must also have preceded motion and time; so time could not be reckoned among the first creations.

CHAPTER LXVII

THE WORK OF VARIETY CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

THE word "light" originally signified what makes manifest to the sense of sight, its use being afterwards extended to whatever makes manifest, according to any mode of knowledge. In the first sense it is applied metaphorically to spiritual things; but, taken according to the ordinary use of language, as extended to all manifestation, it is used in a strict sense.

Since light is in bodies, it cannot be itself a body,¹ or there would be two bodies in the same place; nor would it shine forth as it does, instantaneously, from east to west; for corporeal motion is not instantaneous. Moreover, were it a body, when the air is darkened by the absence of the sun it would be dissolved and take another form; which does not appear. And if any one should object that it is not dissolved, but carried round with the sun, how are we to explain that by the interposition of some opaque body round a candle the whole house may be darkened and yet the light will not accumulate round the candle?

Light is therefore an active quality consequent upon the substantial form of the sun; and the proof of this is that the effects of light differ according to the body which emits it.

¹ This is the old system.

Nor has the light only a subjective existence. For mental effects do not cause changes in external nature; while the sun's rays warm bodies. Neither is light the substantial form of the sun, for what is substantial form in one thing cannot be accidental form in another. Hence it is an active quality, consequent upon the sun.

The production of light is suitably assigned to the First Day; for, according to Augustine, the light of the angelic nature is to be here understood. According to others, light is first mentioned because it is a quality of the highest bodies, and by it the inferior communicate with the superior; also because all things are made manifest by light, nor can there be any day without it.

CHAPTER LXVIII

THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY

THE Firmament is said to have been made on the Second Day, according to its substance, in whatever manner this is to be understood, *i. e.* whether we regard the order of nature or that of time.

According to the opinion of Basil, approved by Augustine, we are to understand by Firmament, not the heaven of the stars, but that part of the atmosphere in which clouds are condensed ; which is called Firmament on account of the density of the air. These waters praise and glorify God, Who created them, as do all creatures ; and are naturally solid or crystalline,¹ if the Firmament be such ; or formed out of the elements, if it be understood as the dense region of the air. It is, indeed, impossible that aqueous vapour should ascend to the higher heavens ; for vapours do not even rise to the summit of some of the higher mountains. Moses, speaking in a homely manner to the people, made mention of water and earth, which were chiefly known to them, allowing the air to be understood when he spoke of darkness being on the face of the abyss ; which implies the existence of some transparent body on the face of the waters, the subject of darkness and light.

¹ See Appendix R.

Thus, whether we understand by Firmament, the heaven of the stars, or the atmosphere of the clouds, we may suitably say that it divides the waters from the waters, whether water be taken to signify unformed matter, or as a general term for all diaphanous bodies. For the heaven of the stars divides these lower bodies from the superior ones, while the clouds divide the upper portion of the air, in which rains are generated, from the lower, which comes in contact with water, and is comprehended under the name of waters.

And the word "Heaven" has in Scripture a threefold meaning. First, the proper and natural sense, according to which the Heavens constitute a sublime region, actually or potentially luminous, and by nature incorruptible: of such, three are commonly admitted. First, that which is called the Empyrean, which is wholly luminous; secondly, the Crystalline, which is wholly transparent; and thirdly, the Sidereal Heavens, partly transparent and partly actual light. These are again divided into eight spheres, viz. that of the fixed stars; and those of the seven planets, which are called the Seven Heavens.

In the second sense Heaven is used to denote some participation in the properties of the heavenly bodies; while the third sense is metaphorical. Thus the Blessed Trinity is sometimes called Heaven, on account of the sublimity and splendour of the Divinity. Thus, also, Satan said: "I will ascend unto Heaven," that is, to equality with God. The spiritual good which constitutes the reward of the saints is likewise sometimes called Heaven, on account of its eminence;

in which sense Augustine expounds the words "your reward is great in Heaven." Occasionally, also, three kinds of supernatural vision are called three heavens, viz. corporeal, imaginary and intellectual visions; as Augustine says regarding the rapture of Paul to the third heavens.

CHAPTER LXIX

THE WORKS OF THE THIRD DAY

IN all these Augustine does not admit an order of time, but only of origin and nature. Thus the creation of spiritual and corporeal nature without form was first signified under the title of Earth and Water ; not that this formless creation preceded formation in time, but only according to origin. Secondly, the formation of the superior bodies is intended by the words : “ Let the Firmament be made ” ; by which we understand the impression of celestial forms in formless matter ; in the third place, we have the impression of the terrestrial forms in formless matter, without any precedence of time, but of origin only.

Therefore, when it is said : “ Let the waters be gathered together and the dry land appear,” this signifies the impression of the substantial form of water by which such motion belonged to it ; and that of earth, according to which it became visible. According to other saints, we see in these works likewise an order of duration ; for they conceive unformed matter to have preceded formation by time. In this case formless matter must not be understood as being wholly without form, for already there was Heaven, Earth and Water ; but the formlessness of matter is to be taken for the absence of variety, beauty and finish. According to

these commentators, Scripture indicates three kinds of want of form : in the heavens, which are the superior, there was darkness, because from thence is the origin of light ; to the waters the name of abyss is given to indicate their inordinate immensity ; while the earth is described as formless and void, because it was covered with water.

Thus on the First Day the first bodies were formed ; on the Second Day, the waters, with the firmament ; on the Third Day, the earth, since it was uncovered and appeared dry. On this Day, also, the formlessness of the earth was taken away by the gathering together of the waters, and by the adornment of plants, which left it no longer void. These, according to Augustine, were only created causally ; according to others, they were produced in their species ; but the opinion of Augustine is founded upon Scripture : " In the day when God made heaven and earth and every seed of the field before it sprang in the earth," etc. It may also be proved by reason. For in the first Days God created causally, and afterwards rested from His works, which He nevertheless continued in another manner by the administration of the things which He had created, and by the work of propagation. Others consider that the first institution of species belongs to the work of the six Days, while the generation of like species, proceeding from the first, belongs to the work of administration ; to point out which Scripture says : " Let the earth bring forth the green herb and things producing seed," *i. e.* the species of plants perfectly produced, from which others proceed.

CHAPTER LXX

THE WORK OF THE FOURTH DAY

ON the Fourth Day luminaries were added by way of ornament. For first are placed those works of creation and variety which are intrinsic as parts of a whole ; while on this Day the heavens were adorned with luminaries which move in them. On the Fifth Day the elements were adorned with fishes and birds ; and on the Sixth Day the earth, with animals. And since creatures were made, either for themselves, or for other creatures, or for the universe, or for the glory of God, it was fitting with regard to the luminaries that a cause for their production should be mentioned, namely, that they were placed as signs ; lest, perhaps, man should be deceived into adoring them as gods, whereas they are only intended to give light, and to direct his actions by serving for the measurement of time, to take away weariness, to assist in the production of food, and by foretelling rains and fair weather, to aid the different occupations of life.

Although there seem to be differences of opinion among philosophers and theologians as to whether or not the heavenly luminaries are animated, in reality there is little difference ; for the heavenly bodies have no sort of soul united to them as form, but only as

motor. And since the operations of vegetable and animal life are not suitable to bodies which are incorruptible by nature, those of motion and understanding only can belong to the celestial motors. For desire follows sense, while intellect bears relation to both ; and since the operation of the intellect is not exercised by the body, it does not require the body, unless it be to receive phantasms by the senses. But as the operations of the sensitive soul do not become celestial bodies, they are not united to souls for the sake of intellectual operation, but for the sake of motion only. For this purpose it is not necessary that they be united as form ; it suffices for virtual contact that they be united as the motor to the thing moved. Thus Plato held that spiritual substances were united to the celestial bodies as motors to moveable.

CHAPTER LXXI

THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY

THE work of adornment corresponds to that of variety; and as the Fourth Day answers to the adornment of the heavens with luminaries, so the Fifth to the adornment of the elements (water and air). And the Word of God was present as the formative power in the first institution of the active principle in nature, which gives to the seed its power of reproduction; and to the celestial bodies power in regard of things which putrify.¹

¹ See Appendix S.

CHAPTER LXXII

THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY

ON the Sixth Day, which connotes the Third, the earth was adorned by the production of terrestrial animals;—potentially, according to Augustine; according to others, actually.

Various modes of living in plants which have a hidden and imperfect life are expressed by generation only, because no other act of life is found in them. The life of fishes, etc., is signified by creeping things; and that of the superior animals, by living soul; while the perfect life of man is not said to have been produced by the earth or the water, as that of other animals, but by God.

CHAPTER LXXIII

WHAT BELONGS TO THE SEVENTH DAY

THE perfection of the universe is fittingly ascribed to the Seventh Day ; for the perfection of things is twofold : first, there is the perfection of the substance, which arises from the integrity of the parts ; and secondly, that of the end or operation, *i. e.* whatever is arrived at by means of work.

The first of these perfections is the cause of the second ; for form is the principle of the operation and belongs to the first institution of things, which is ascribed to the Seventh Day ; while the second is reserved for the end of the world. Hence the perfection of Nature was completed on the Seventh Day ; that of Grace in the Incarnation of Christ ; and that of Glory, which consists in the perfect Beatitude of the saints, will be completed at the end of the world.

And God rested from creating anything new, since everything pre-existed either materially, or causally, or according to similitude. Nor did God rest only by ceasing from new creations, but in Himself ; for He is blessed in Himself, having no need of any other ; hence Scripture says : “ He rested from them.”

And since God ceased from creating new things on

the Seventh Day, He blessed that which He preserves by administration, and sanctified that Day; because in it all things rest; by which is to be understood the sanctification of all creatures. And He gave them the power of multiplying.

CHAPTER LXXIV

OF ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN GENERAL

IT is sufficient to enumerate six Days, in which number, variety, and adornment were to be completed. Thus on the First Day spiritual creatures were formed ; on the Second, the superior corporeal ones ; on the Third, the inferior corporeal ; or, according to others, three Days were given to variety, and three to adornment. And so the Divine perfections correspond to the perfections of these six numbers, viz. one to the formation of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to adornment.

Nor does the Author intend to contradict the opinion of Augustine that all these Days are but One Day, which presents things after a sevenfold manner ; for by day he understands the apprehension of the angelic mind ; so by the First Day the first work, by the Second Day the second work, and so on ; all that God produced in the order of nature being successively impressed on the minds of the angels, which can apprehend many things at once, principally in the Word, in Whom their knowledge is perfected ; and these are called days because light, which is the cause of day, belongs chiefly to spiritual things.

Others, indeed, see in these Days a succession of temporal days, and things created under their specific

forms. Thus there are several differences of interpretation, but Scripture makes use of suitable words for expressing the work of Six Days; and in various modes shows forth the Father as creating, the Son as the principle, and the Holy Ghost as complacency.

CHAPTER LXXV

OF MAN AS HE IS COMPOSED OF SPIRITUAL AND CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE; AND FIRST, AS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

THE soul being the first principle of life cannot be a body. Body may, indeed, be a principle of vital operation, as the heart in animals, but it is not the first; for if the body were the first principle of life all bodies would be living. Hence if a body be living, or a principle of life, inasmuch as it is such, and so actuated it must of necessity have received this from some principle which is called its actuality. Therefore the soul is the actuality of the body, as heat, which is the principle of warming, is not a body, but the actuality or quality of a body.

This soul is self-subsistent and incorporeal; for that which takes cognizance of all bodies can by no means have the nature of a body. For if it had, one body would hinder the knowledge of another, as we see in the case of a tongue, bitter through indisposition, which can taste nothing sweet, but everything appears bitter to it. Therefore if the intellectual principle had the nature of any body in particular it could not know all bodies; for every body has some determinate nature. In the same way it follows that, if the soul understood by means of any corporeal organ, the

determinate nature of such an organ would prevent the apprehension of all bodies ; as we see in the case of a liquid poured into a glass, which appears to be of the same colour as the glass. Therefore the intellect must have an operation of its own, to which the body does not contribute ; and as nothing can act by itself unless it be self-subsistent, it remains that the human soul is incorporeal and self-subsistent.

The sensitive soul, indeed, has no proper operation ; all its operations are in union with the body, nor do they take place without some bodily change : the understanding only requires no corporeal organ ; therefore the souls of the lower animals are not self-subsistent.

The soul, however, is not the man ; for that is man which performs the works of a man ; as anything is that which has the work proper to that thing. To feel, is not the work of the soul alone ; and since feeling is a human operation, not proper to the soul alone but only when it is joined to the body, it follows that the soul is not, properly speaking, the man, unless it be understood as in some sense as the principle ; as a city may be said to do what the ruler does.

Neither is the soul composed of matter and form ; because being itself the form of the body it must be either all form, or partly so. If the former, it is impossible that it should be compound, because what is *in potentia* is not form ; for form is actual ; if the latter, we should have to call one part soul, and the other the *first animated*.

The same may be proved from the fact that everything is received according to the nature of the

recipient ; and the intellectual soul knows, universally and immaterially, things absolute in their nature—as, for instance, a stone—not this or that stone ; whereas, if it were composed, the forms of things would be received individually, as is the case with the sensitive faculties.

Nor is the human soul corruptible, for no self-subsistent form is such, either in itself or by accident : having subsistence in itself it cannot be dissolved by accident ; for a thing can only be dissolved or generated according to the mode of its being.

Moreover, corruptible things have a being separable from their constituents ; but not so subsistent forms, since being cannot be separated from form. Hence a self-subsistent form cannot cease to be, even if it be allowed to be composed of matter and form ; for corruption is only found when there are contrary forces ; and celestial bodies are incorruptible because they contain no elements of contrariety.

In the intellectual soul, indeed, there can be no contrarieties, because it receives everything according to its own mode of being ; and since the knowledge of contraries is one, it is evident that the reasons of contraries are received by the intellect without contrariety ; therefore it is impossible that the soul should be corruptible. And we see an indication that this is so in the fact that everything has a natural desire to exist according to its own mode : thus the desire of a being capable of knowing follows upon the knowledge which it possesses ; and since the human intellect apprehends being absolutely and according to all

time, every intellectual being has a natural desire to exist always ; a desire which cannot be void. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible. The angels and the souls of men are of different species, and naturally unequal ; for subsistent forms do not multiply, and we must therefore admit that they differ in species. For separate forms are only one of a species ; as is evident in the form of whiteness, which, if it were separate, would be only one. And diversities of species have always concomitant natural diversities of greater or less perfection or imperfection ; for the differences which divide the same genus are contraries.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THE UNION OF SOUL AND BODY

THE intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the form of the human body ; for that which is the principle by which anything operates is the form of the thing to which the operation is attributed. It is also evident that where the body lives, there the soul is ; and this life is manifested in living beings in various degrees according to its different operations ; for by the soul we are nourished, feel and move. Therefore that by which we understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. For the nature of a thing is manifested by its operation, and understanding is the operation proper to man ; since it is by this that he transcends all other animals.

To the arguments of Averroës, who maintained that the soul was united to the body as motor, we reply, that by such a union man would not understand, but be understood by a soul capable of existing in a state of separation. Moreover, if the intellectual principle be not the form of the man, it must be extrinsic to his substance ; but the act of understanding is not transmitted ; it rests in him who understands.

It is likewise impossible that the intellect by which we understand should be the same in all ; for granting

the soul to be the man, it would follow that Socrates and Plato were identical, without any distinction except that of tunic and cloak ; besides, if there were one intellect for all, all men would have the same conception of the object understood ;—which things are absurd. There is not, therefore, one intellect for all.

Nor are there other souls in man differing in essence from the intellectual soul ; the nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual soul is one and the same. This may be seen by noting the differences of species and forms according to their degrees of perfection ; comparing animals with plants, and man with animals. Aristotle¹ compares different souls to figures, one of which contains the other, as a pentagon contains a quadrangle : thus the intellectual soul contains virtually all that belongs to the sensitive faculties of the lower animals and to the nutritive life of plants. Nor is Socrates a man by one soul and an animal by another ; as the surface which bears the figure of a pentagon is not one for the pentagon and another for the quadrangle.

Reason also tells us that the soul is one. For an animal would not be really one if it had several souls ; nor is anything absolutely one except in virtue of the one form by which it has being, and by which it both is, and is at the same time, one. The unity of the soul is apparent, also, from the fact that one mental operation, if it be intense, hinders another ; which could by no means occur unless the principle of action

¹ *On the Soul*, B. 2.

were essentially the same. Therefore the soul is one : it alone is the substantial form in man ; and contains virtually both the sensitive and nutritive faculties ; and by itself alone supplies whatever less perfect forms operate in others, viz. the sensitive soul in the lower animals, and the nutritive soul in plants. And the same holds good of all the more perfect forms in respect of the less perfect. Moreover, if any other form pre-existed, the soul would not give being absolutely, and so would not be a substantial form ; neither would generation depend absolutely upon its advent ; which is evidently false.

It is necessary that the body to which an intellectual soul is united should be mixed, *i. e.* composed of diverse elements perfectly reduced to harmony. For Nature does not fail to produce what is necessary, and the human soul being weak among intellectual beings, and not having infused knowledge like the angels, requires faculties of understanding and feeling which do not exist without bodily organs : therefore, as the intellectual soul possesses sensitive faculties in the highest perfection, it was necessary that this compound body should be brought into perfect harmony of constitution. Thus man, among all animals, has the finest sense of touch ; and those persons who have the finest touch have also the finest intelligence ; for, according to Aristotle,¹ soft flesh is well adapted to mind.

No accidental dispositions conduce towards the union of the intellectual soul with the body ; for matter *in potentia* bears relation to all actuality. Therefore

¹ *On the Soul*, B. 2.

what is first actualized must be understood as existing in matter. But first among actualities is being, since a thing must exist before it can be hot or cold; hence it is impossible that accidental dispositions should pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, as though the soul were united as motor to the body.

Nor can the soul be united to the body through the medium of any other body. For form, of itself, constitutes a thing in actual being; nor does it give being by means of any medium, because it is actuality by its essence. Those are in error, therefore, who hold some body to be the medium between the soul and the body in man: as Plato, who taught that the soul was united to the body as motor, so that media might be admitted to intervene.¹

And being united to the body as form, the soul must of necessity be entire in the whole body, and entire in every part; because a substantial form is the perfection, not merely of the whole, but of every part. Hence, when the soul has departed, we can no longer speak of a man, or of an animal, except equivocally; and the same may be said of a hand or an eye. The proof of this is that no part of the body can perform the work proper to it when the soul is gone; for that which retains the species, retains also the operation of the species. So the soul, according to the three-fold division of totality,² has no quantity, either in itself or accidentally, but is entire in the whole body

¹ See Appendix T.

² See Appendix U.

and entire in every part according to the totality of perfection and essence ; but not according to that of power ; for the soul is not in every part of the body according to all its faculties ; but as regards sight it is in the eye, hearing in the ear, and so on.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL

IT is impossible that the substance of the soul should be identical with its faculties, because its operation is not that of substance. Nor is substance of the soul operative power; for it belongs to God only that His operation is the same as His substance.

It is impossible, also, because, if the essence of the soul were its own immediate principle of operation, that which has a soul, and is therefore living, would have the operations of life always actuated; which is not the case. Moreover, to be thus actual, and at the same time *in potentia*, does not belong to the soul in so far as it is form, but in virtue of its faculties; hence the faculties are not the same as the essence of the soul.

We must, moreover, admit various faculties in the soul. For there are four grades of things. The lowest of these comprises the things which are below man. These attain to some particular good for which little motion is required, while man is capable of the universal and perfect good, namely, Beatitude. But because his nature is the lowest of those to which Beatitude belongs, he requires many and various operations and faculties in order to reach it. Angels

require fewer faculties, because their nature is more perfect ; while in God there exists no faculty or power whatever except His Essence. But the human soul is on the confines of the spiritual and corporeal nature ; hence the variety of the faculties with which it is provided.

These faculties are diversified by acts, and by the diversity of objects ; for faculty is ordered to action, and an act has reference to its object. Not that any diversity of object serves to diversify the faculties ; but the difference of the object is that to which the faculty in itself has regard.

And since the faculties are various, we must admit an order among them ; and order in multitude must proceed from one, as explained above. This order, indeed, is threefold : one, viz. that of nature, by which the more perfect precedes the less perfect. Another, according to that of generation and time, in which the reverse is the case, since the nutritive faculties are prior to the sensitive. While, according to a third, some of the sensitive powers are ordered to each other, viz. sight, hearing and smell (for the visible is prior to the natural, being common to superior and inferior bodies ; while sound which is heard in the air precedes that mixture of the elements upon which the sense of smell depends).

The subject of the organic faculties is compound, but not so with the non-organic, which are in the soul only. For some operations, such as to understand and to will, are exercised by the soul alone, without bodily organs ; these are in the soul as in their

subject. But to see, to hear, and to be nourished are operations of which the principles are in the body and the soul together, as their subject.

Since, therefore, the soul is the only subject of the non-organic, and joint subject of the organic faculties, it is evident that these faculties flow from its essence as from their principle; for what is accidental is caused by the subject in so far as it is actual, and received by it in so far as it is *in potentia*. And substantial form differs from accidental form; for the former constitutes Being absolutely, and its subject is Being *in potentia*, only; while accidental form causes Being to be such as it is. Moreover, matter is for substantial form, while accidental form is for the composition of the subject.

And one faculty arises out of another, because according to the order of nature that which is nearer to the original is in some manner the cause of what is more remote. For the essence of the soul, as compared with its faculties, is the active and final principle, and is also the receptive principle, by itself alone, or conjointly with the body. And since action, or end, is more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect, it follows that those faculties of the soul which are first according to the order of nature and perfection, are the principle of others after the mode of end and active principle; because sense is for intellect and not conversely. But if the soul, as it is possessed of sensitive faculties, be considered as the subject, and in some sort the material, in respect of the intellect, principles are found related to others

after the mode of the receptive principle, and thus the more imperfect faculties come first ; as in the case of generation : for animal is generated in order before man.

Those faculties which exist in the soul alone as in their subject remain after the destruction of the body ; but such as belong to the soul and body conjointly do not remain actually, but only virtually ; as in their principle or root.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR

THE genus of souls is threefold, viz. vegetable, sensitive, and intellectual; for souls are distinguished according to the superiority of their operation over that of corporeal nature;—all corporeal nature being below the soul, and only united to it as instrument and material. Hence the vegetative soul operates in itself and by itself, although by means of certain elementary organs and qualities; the sensitive soul makes use of corporeal organs without the aid of such natural qualities, except in as far as they are necessary to the disposition of the organs; while the intellectual soul is independent of everything, and does not make use of corporeal organs at all.

And the genus of the faculties is distinguished according to their object: the object being more universal in proportion as the faculty is higher, while the faculties themselves are divided into five, viz. vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive, and those which regard local motion.

The modes of life are four: first, vegetative, as in plants; second, sensitive, without local motion, as in shells; third, perfect animal life, which has the power of local motion, because animals require many things to sustain life; and, finally, intellectual life in man.

The appetitive faculty does not constitute a separate grade of life, because where there is sense, there is also appetite.

We find three parts in the vegetative life; for a living body, as such, requires three operations, namely, to be nourished, to grow, and to generate. Of these faculties the highest is the generative, for the nutritive and augmentative have their effect within themselves; the generative, not in itself, but in another body, since nothing generates itself. In this it approaches the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has its operation in exterior things in a more excellent and more universal manner. And the nutritive faculty serves the augmentative, while both serve the generative.¹

There are also five senses, properly distinguished, not arising out of organs or media; for the organs are for the faculties and not *vice versa*. They exist, however, according to the diversity of exterior objects; for sense, being a passive faculty, is susceptible of alteration by external things, which things are of five species: therefore the senses are also five in number. Some, such as sight, are affected only spiritually; others both spiritually and physically.

The interior senses of sensitive nature are four in number, viz. general sense,² imagination, instinct, and memory. Since it is the office of the faculties to supply whatever is required for the life of the perfect animal, these faculties are the proximate principle of the operation of the soul, both with regard to things

¹ See Appendix W.

² *Ibid.*

present and to such as are absent. Were it otherwise, animals would not require them, the contrary of which appears; for animals are moved by apprehension, and since they not only apprehend, but also retain, different principles are required. Moreover, animals are moved, not only by exterior things, pleasing or displeasing to sense, but by the desire of commodities, or the fear of injury, belonging to a different order. Thus we see a sheep fly from a wolf as the natural enemy of its race; or birds gathering straws and other things suitable for making their nests, although there is nothing in these things attractive to sense. Hence we must admit a distinct interior sensitive faculty not perceptive of exterior sensations. There is also a general sense for the reception of sensible forms, and for retaining them in the imagination, as well as for apprehending intentions, which is called in us particular reason,—in animals instinct; and there is memory for preserving them.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTY

THE intellect is not the essence of the soul, but a faculty ; for in God only, Whose operation is His Being, can intellect be the same as essence. Therefore faculty stands to operation, as essence to being ; and understanding, in creatures, is a faculty of the being who understands.

Our intellect, indeed, is a passive power in respect of intelligible things, and at the first like a clean slate. For the human intellect is lowest in order of intelligence and furthest removed from the Intellect of God, as appears from the fact that at first it is only *in potentia* and afterwards is made actually intelligent.

The Divine Intellect stands towards universal being as the actuality of all, because all beings pre-exist therein as in their First Cause ; and since no created being can be actualized in respect of all being,—which would require it to be infinite,—every created intellect is related to the things which are intelligible to it as the potential to the actual. The potential, however, bears a twofold relation to the actual, because some things are always perfectly actuated ; others, such as matter, which is susceptible of generation and dissolution, are not so. Thus the angelic intellect is always perfectly actualized on account of its nearness to the

First Intellect, which is Pure Actuality; but ours is passive according to the third mode of passivity,¹ inasmuch as whatever is *in potentia* to anything either receives the same, or, not possessing it, remains subject to that thing.

It is necessary, moreover, to admit an *intellectus agens*, for nothing which is *in potentia* can be actualized except by some Being itself actual, and we have seen that our intellect is *in potentia* to intelligible things. Hence, according to Aristotle, it must be actualized by something which we call the "active intellect"; although it is not so according to Plato, who held the theory of "ideas," by participation with which he supposed both matter and souls to come into existence, the intelligible species being actualized by itself.

We see, also, that there must be some *intellectus agens* in the soul, because, although it participates in a higher intellect by which it is assisted, yet, owing to its discursive mode of understanding, and gradual conversion from the potential to the actual, it neither understands all things, nor perfectly. There must, therefore, be some virtue received from the Superior Intellect, inherent in the soul itself, by which things are made actually intelligible; as is the case with other perfect things. For besides causes which act universally there are infused virtues, proper to things, which are derived from the Superior Intellect, whereby the intellect of man is enabled to elucidate phantasms, elicit universal conditions from particular ones, and make things actually intelligible.

¹ See Appendix X.

But every action belongs to things in virtue of some principle formally inherent in them; therefore the power which is the principle of such action is something in the soul itself. And since the active intellect is something in the soul itself, it follows that it must be multiplied according to the plurality of souls; for the same power cannot belong to several subjects. While, if it were something separate, the intellect of all men would be one; which has been disproved above.

Memory also belongs to the intellectual part, if it be understood as the power of preserving species. Understood as the power of recalling the past, it belongs rather to the sensitive part; for the sensitive soul apprehends particulars.

Nor can there be any difference of faculties in the intellect except that of possible and acting. For there is a difference between the active faculty, which renders an object actual; and the passive faculty, which is moved by an object already existing. Thus the active faculty, compared with its object, is as actual being to being *in potentia*; and the passive faculty *vice versa*: because the faculty which receives and retains is not distinct from the intellect itself.

Nor is reason a faculty distinct from the intellect. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth; and to reason is to proceed from one intellection to another in order to arrive at the knowledge of intelligible truth. Thus the angels, who possess such knowledge perfectly, do not require to go through the process of reasoning, since they have by simple intelligence what man acquires discursively. Reasoning,

therefore, compared to understanding, is as movement to rest or acquiring to possessing ; which processes are the work of the same faculty, and differ only as the imperfect differs from the perfect.

Neither are the superior and inferior reason different faculties ; they are distinguished only by their operations and diversity of use ; for the medium and the end both belong to the faculty of reason. The act of reasoning, indeed, somewhat resembles that kind of motion in which the moveable passing through the medium is the same as that which arrives at the end ; and thus wisdom is attributed to the superior reason and knowledge to the inferior.

Nor is the speculative intellect, which regards only the apprehension of truth, a different faculty from the practical intelligence which directs the work ; they only differ as to their end. For that which is accidental to the conception of the object does not diversify the faculty ; and something is apprehended by the intellect, whether it be ordered to the work or not : hence all are apprehended by the same faculty.

Synderesis is not a faculty, but a natural habit, by which we are impelled to good and indisposed towards evil. For as speculative principles are implanted in us, so also are operative ones. Both are natural, not pertaining to any special faculty, but to a particular use of the intellect ; which in speculative things is called the faculty of understanding, and in practical things, synderesis.

Conscience, likewise, is an act, not a faculty. For the order of knowledge requires that somewhat be

said to testify and judge as to that which should be done, or left undone ; to deter or instigate ; to judge of right and wrong ; to accuse, or excuse, or to cause remorse. But inasmuch as the habit is the principle of the act, the name "conscience" is sometimes applied to the first natural habit of the mind, viz. synderesis ; for, by a common figure of speech, cause and effect are taken the one for the other.

CHAPTER LXXX

THE APPETITIVE FACULTY IN GENERAL

APPETITE is a particular faculty of the soul, inasmuch as it is found after a higher mode in forms possessed of understanding than in those which are unintelligent. For in the latter everything is determined to its own natural being alone ; while in the former it is determined, not only to its own being, but also to the being of others ; and intentionally.¹ Hence the soul is in a manner all things ; and since forms exist after a higher mode where there is intelligent being, it follows that, in such, inclination exists in a mode superior to mere natural inclination. This is called intellectual appetite, as opposed to natural appetite.

Moreover, the intellectual appetite is a different faculty from the sensitive appetite, because these faculties are distinguished according to the difference of actuations and motions ; and since apprehension by sense is different from apprehension by intellect, the faculties also are different. And motives must be proportioned to things which are moveable ; actuations to such as are passive.

¹ *i. e.* in the apprehension of the mind.

CHAPTER LXXXI

SENSUALITY

SENSUALITY is the name given to the sensitive appetite, for sensual motion signifies the motion of the sensitive appetite. And such motion implies the operation of the appetitive faculty, which is thus perfected; because, by the act of desire, it is inclined towards the thing desirable.

Now two faculties are to be distinguished in this appetite, viz. the irascible, and the concupiscible. For in natural things, which are subject to dissolution, it is necessary that there should be an inclination not only to pursue what is suitable, and fly from what is hurtful, but also to resist contraries, which place impediment in the way of suitable things, and introduce hurtful ones. Hence in the sensitive appetite, which follows upon the sensitive inclination, there are two faculties; by one of which—called concupiscible—the soul is inclined to pursue suitable and fly from hurtful things; while the other implies strenuous effort, by which it fights against obstacles; and is called irascible. These two faculties are not reducible to a single principle, for when the soul fights against obstacles it undertakes what is painful, contrary to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty; consequently they are different faculties.

Both are subject to the superior part ; but they obey reason in one manner, and will in another. For while, in the lower animals, appetite is moved according to the estimative faculty, because they have none higher, in man it is by the cognitive faculty, which, as particular reason, is made to be moved and directed according to the conclusions of universal reason.

The sensitive appetite is also subject to the will as regards execution. This depends upon the strength of the motive ; and since in every faculty the motive only moves in virtue of the first mover, the inferior appetite waits for the command of the will. But it does not always obey ; for the power of the will is consultative rather than despotic, hence the appetite sometimes contradicts it.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THE WILL

THERE are three kinds of necessity. One is that of constraint, which is wholly repugnant to the will; for violence is contrary to natural inclination. Another is that of Nature; and this accords with the will: for all desire Beatitude, which is the inherent end of the will, and stands towards it as first principles to the intellect. The third kind of necessity is that of supposition, where an end can only be reached in one way, such as the necessity of a ship for crossing the sea; this also accords with the will.

But the will does not choose everything by necessity; for good being the final end, those things only upon which it actually depends are willed of necessity. Thus the intellect apprehends first principles and those things which have a necessary connection with them,—such as demonstrable conclusions once they are known,—but not contingent conclusions, which may be denied without affecting the premises. And in like manner the will is not compelled to desire particular goods which have no necessary connection with Beatitude, since the latter can be attained without them.

The intellect considered in itself is, absolutely speaking, a higher faculty than the will, although

relatively the will is sometimes to be preferred. For the proper order of the faculties follows that of their relation to the object; and since the object of the intellect is this very conception of desirable good, it is simpler and more absolute than the desirable good which is the object of the will. Relatively, however, the will may be nobler; as when the desired object is superior to the soul itself, hence it is better to love God than to know Him. For the act of the intellect consists in that conception of the object which is in the intelligent mind; while the act of the will is directed to the object as it exists in itself. Thus the intellect moves the will by mode of end; for the end moves the efficient; and intellectual good, being the object of the will, moves it as the end; while the will moves the intellect by mode of agent, as that which alters moves the thing altered, or the impeller the impelled. And, in all regulated faculties, those which regard the particular end are subject to those which regard the universal end; excepting, however, the faculties which belong to the vegetative part, which are not subject to the will.

The will is not divided by the irascible and concupiscible faculties; because faculties which are ordered to good according to the general conception of it are not diversified by special differences. As with sight in relation to colour, the visual faculty is not multiplied according to the diversity of colours, so the will being related to good under a general conception is not diversified by the distinctions of the irascible and the concupiscible.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

FREE WILL

MAN has freedom of choice. For some things act without judgment, as a stone falls; others with judgment but without freedom, as the lower animals, which judge by instinct, not by collating; while man acts by judgment, with the power of choosing diversely by seeking out reasons. By this means, as regards contingent objects, the understanding finds a way to reach an opposite conclusion, and since particular works are contingent, man stands towards them free and undetermined.

This free will is a faculty, not a habit: for if it were a habit it would have to be a natural one, since man possesses free will by nature; the things to which we are inclined by nature, however, are not the objects of free will; hence it is contrary to reason to ascribe free will to a natural habit. Secondly, habits are the result of our passions, or of our good or bad acts; but free will stands indifferently to the choice of good or evil; hence it is not a habit; we conclude, therefore, that it is a faculty.

It is, moreover, an appetitive faculty, since election is its virtual act; for we can refuse one thing and choose the other, which is election, in which something is due to the understanding, *i. e.* counsel, while

acceptance belongs to the concurrence of the will. But because things which conduce to the end are conceived as good in virtue of being useful, Aristotle inclines to the opinion that election belongs chiefly to the will.¹

And this freedom of choice is one faculty with the will, not another; for as intellect, which is simple intelligence, stands to reason which is discursive, so the will which is the end stands to that freedom of choice which is the way to the end. Thus they are diverse acts of the same faculty.

¹ *Ethics*, No. 3.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

HOW THE SOUL UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS WHICH ARE BELOW ITSELF

WE must reject the opinion of the ancients, who held truth to be unattainable about corporeal things which are in a state of continual change ; also that of Plato, who admitted another genus of beings separate from matter and motion, viz. ideas, by means of which the soul was supposed to participate in sensible things, as though the intellect were to be referred to these, which would be immaterial and separate. This has been shown to be false, because it would exclude the cognizance of matter and motion, which form part of knowledge. It has been seen, moreover, to be absurd to seek the knowledge of things which are manifest to us, through others which cannot be their substance, inasmuch as they have a different mode of being ; therefore we must conclude that knowledge is according to the mode of the faculties of the being who knows.

Thus as whiteness exists in different modes on a wall and in the eye, so the species of bodies exist in the intellect according to the nature and mode of the intellect, viz. immaterially and intelligibly ;—for everything is received according to the capacity of the

recipient; the intellect, therefore, knows bodies certainly and universally.

The ancient philosophers, who held things known to be material and corporeal and to have a common nature with the soul, supposed them to exist in the soul in such manner as to be known directly by its essence; but this opinion is to be rejected, because it would require things known to be within the soul's nature, and to be forms of individual effects; for a thing is only known in so far as it is actual, not as it is *in potentia*. Moreover, if it were necessary for the thing known to be materially in the knower, why should things which subsist materially outside the soul be devoid of understanding? If the soul knows fire by means of fire, the fire which exists outside the soul should also know fire; which cannot be admitted. It remains, therefore, that material things, as known, exist in the knower immaterially; and the more immaterially an intelligence possesses the forms of things known, so much the more perfectly it knows them.

The soul cannot know by means of species naturally infused; for it is sometimes *in potentia* both according to sense and to intelligence, being actualized as regards sense by sensible acts, and as regards intelligence by training and experience. Neither does the soul forget everything by union with the body; for a natural operation is not entirely hindered by that which properly belongs to nature, as does the union of the soul with the body; nor is that forgotten which is naturally known.

The conception of sensible things requires that their forms should not subsist without matter; therefore Avicenna held that intelligible species flowed from the Ultimate Intelligence into our intellect, which thus became actualized and received intelligible forms. But this theory assigns no sufficient reason for the union of the soul with the body, for such union is not for the sake of the body, but for that of the soul; and if the intelligible species were received by the influence of some separate principle, not through the senses, the soul's union with the body would be useless. Nor can the senses be only an exciting cause; for if it were natural to the soul to understand by means of species flowing from the acting intellect, the result would be that, through natural tendency, the soul would turn to the intellect for the reception of sensible species when the corresponding sense was wanting: thus the blind might have a knowledge of colour: which is evidently false. Hence we conclude that the intelligible species by which the soul understands do not flow from separate forms.

It may, however, be said that the soul knows things in their eternal conception, if by that we mean causally, inasmuch as the natural light by which we know is a certain participation in the Divine light; but not in their eternal conception alone, for in this present state we require intelligible species taken from material things besides the Divine light; thus it is written: "The light of Thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord." With regard to objective knowledge, the soul does not in her present state know things in their

eternal conception. This belongs to the beatified soul which sees everything in God.

Neither is intellectual knowledge taken from sensible things according to the mode of defluxions in sense, as held by Democritus, who did not admit the difference between sense and intellect ; but the active intellect renders the images received from the senses intelligible by means of certain abstractions. Inasmuch, therefore, as these images are not sufficient to act upon the possible intellect, but require to be made intelligible by means of the active intellect, sensible knowledge cannot be assigned as the whole or perfect cause of intellectual knowledge ; it is rather the matter of the cause, than the cause itself.

The intellect, indeed, conjoined to a passible body, cannot understand without turning to phantasms, and since it does not itself make use of bodily organs, unless its action required the help of some other faculty which does make use of such organs, it would be in no way hindered by their injury ; the contrary of which we find to be the case, since through physical injuries, memory and imagination not only lose knowledge already acquired, but are prevented from acquiring new knowledge. Moreover, whoever tries to understand anything will experience that he forms for himself images or phantasms in which he seems to look at what he is endeavouring to understand, the reason being that the knowing faculty is proportioned to the things which are to be known.

Thus the judgment of the intellect is hindered when the senses are impaired ; for when the object and end

of the judgment is unknown the judgment itself cannot act; as we find to be the case when through the imperfection of a sense that particular which is the term of the judgment is not perceived. For the object of our intellect being sensible nature, it is impossible that the judgment of the intellect should be perfect when the senses are imperfect by which sensible things are known.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING

OUR intellect knows material things by abstracting from phantasms ;¹ but there are three degrees in the cognitive faculty. There is, first, the act of the corporeal organ, *i. e.* sense, which knows particulars ; secondly, the power which is neither the act of a bodily organ nor conjoined with corporeal matter, and such is the intellect of the angels, the object of which is form as it exists without matter ; and thirdly, there is the human intellect, which stands midway between the other two, which is the form of a body, although not the act of a bodily organ. Hence its proper object is to know form in matter, as it possesses an individual corporeal existence, but not as it exists in such and such (particular) matter, which latter is the object of sense. We must, therefore, admit that our intellect knows material things by abstracting from phantasms ; and that by means of material things so considered it becomes in some manner able to understand immaterial things. Thus intelligible species is that by which the soul knows ; for similitude is the form according to which the intellect understands, and because the intellect is reflected upon itself it knows, by means of this same reflection, both its own understanding and the species

¹ In the Imagination.

by which it understands. For the species are understood by the intellect in the second place ; that which it apprehends first is the object of which the intelligible species is the similitude. And since with regard to us sensitive knowledge is prior to that which is intellectual, so also with regard to us the knowledge of particulars is prior to that of universals. But as regards sense and intellect the more general knowledge precedes the less general ; hence he who knows anything indistinctly is *in potentia* to knowing the principle of distinction ; as he who knows genus is *in potentia* to knowing species. Thus a child might at first call all men fathers and afterwards learn to specify one.

And the intellect understands plurality by the mode of one at a time, not by many at once. God by His Essence knows all things at once, but we understand at once only those things which fall under one species, not others ; for as it is impossible for the same body to be coloured at once with different colours, so it is impossible for the intellect actually to understand diverse things at the same time.

The process of our intellect as it passes from the potential to the actual resembles generation, which is not perfect from the beginning. Thus because, in its first conception, the intellect does not perfectly seize the knowledge of things and their nature, it is constrained to affirm and deny, which is to reason ; while the Divine and the angelic intellects—perfect from the first because their nature is that of incorruptible things—know at once all we can arrive at by the process of

reasoning. With regard to the nature of things the intellect cannot err, except accidentally, when reasoning about things which are only related to the object. This is evident from the example of sense, which does not err regarding its proper object except accidentally, in the case of things which are the object of more than one sense, or through indisposition of the organ. This cannot happen with the intellect because it is not an organic faculty and is always related in the same manner to its proper object; therefore the intellect does not fail or err concerning the simple knowledge of its object.

And with regard to the object, we all understand the same thing; but as regards the understanding mind, one person understands better than another; for the souls of the best-disposed bodies understand best. Thus we have seen that, as the philosopher says, soft flesh is well adapted to mind; also that with regard to the inferior faculties some may happen to be wanting which are required by the intellect for its operation.

With regard to the indivisible, it may exist after three modes: first, there is that which is actually undivided although it might be divided; and this continuous indivisible is understood by us before its division into parts, as confused knowledge precedes that which is distinct; secondly, there is the indivisible according to species, such as man, lion, etc., which is also understood before its parts. But there is another indivisible, that, viz. which neither is nor can be divided,—as a point, and unity,—which is only known afterwards

by privation of the divisible. Thus we define a point as that which has no parts; and this because such indivisible has in it somewhat opposed to corporeal things, the nature of which is the direct and primary object of the intellect.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN THINGS MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL

OUR intellect cannot know individual material things primarily and directly, since its mode of understanding is by the abstraction of intelligible species from individual matter, and that which is abstracted from matter is universal. Hence the intellect apprehends universals directly, but particulars only indirectly, and as it were by some sort of reflection. And since the intellect abstracts species, it can only understand them by adverting to the phantasms in which it understands intelligible species. Thus the intellect knows individual sensible things through reflecting on these images and through sense.

The object of our intellect being such—*i. e.* the nature of material things,—it follows that we cannot have an actual knowledge of the infinite; because faculties are proportioned to their object, and in material things nothing actually infinite is found. For the infinite is that from which whatever quantity be deducted there remains always more to take away; hence it cannot be understood actually, but only potentially, inasmuch as our intellect is not subject to the limits of corporeal matter and so is an infinite faculty. Nor can we know the infinite by habit, because such knowledge is arrived

at by actual consideration, habit being formed by acts. Hence we should require to consider all the infinite, enumerating it according to the apprehension of succession, which is impossible.

Contingent things, as such, are known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect through reflection from sense; but where they involve something necessary and universal the intellect apprehends them directly. Therefore, if we consider the universal conceptions of things, all sciences belong to the necessary; but if we consider the things themselves, some knowledge belongs to the necessary and some to the contingent.

Future things are known by the intellect by mode of reflection, for things which are subject to time are individual; but inasmuch as such conceptions are universal the intellect can apprehend them directly.

For the future may be generally known in two manners: either as it is in itself, and so is known to God only, Who knows all things at once by an eternal intuition; or according as things exist in their causes, and thus they may be foreknown by us, provided they be in their causes necessarily—as astronomers know eclipses. If they are only contingently in their causes they may be known by conjecture, more or less certainly according as the causes are more or less disposed towards the effects.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE IN ITSELF

SINCE everything is knowable in as far as it is actual, but not as it is potential, our intellect, which is a simple faculty of the intelligible order, knows itself by its action, not by its essence. God, being Pure Actuality, knows by His Essence, not Himself only but all things: angels, whose essence, belonging to the genus of intellectual natures, is neither pure actuality nor complete in itself, know things other than themselves, not by their essence but by similitudes. While the human intellect, which ranks in the genus of intellectual natures as Being *in potentia* only (like *materia prima* in the genus of sensible things) is called "possible," because it has the faculty of understanding according as it is actualized through the conversion of material things. Hence the mind knows itself as far as it is actualized through species abstracted from sensible things, made intelligible by the light of the active intellect.

The habit which exists in the mind, and is something midway between pure faculty and pure actuality, is not known except by the act; for nothing is known except as it is actual, which "habit" is not. Hence the

knowledge of a habit comes first from the presence of the habit manifested by the act ; by which the intellect at once perceives that it has the habit. Secondly, the knowledge of a habit may come through studious investigation, as was said above of the mind.

That, however, which is first understood about the intellect is the fact of its understanding ; because intellect is, absolutely speaking, actualized through understanding ; while the last understood is its own operation, not tending to others, but remaining in itself.

This, as before said, is perceived by different grades of intellect according to different modes. In God Essence and Understanding are one ; in the angels essence is not the same as understanding, nevertheless they know both at once by one simple act ; but our intellect is neither our understanding, nor is its essence the immediate object of our understanding, but rather the nature of material things ; consequently the latter is the object first known. Thus the act, and by the act the intellect itself, becomes known, the perfection of which consists in this same faculty of understanding.

As natural appetite is the inclination consequent upon natural form, so is rational appetite the inclination consequent upon rational form ; hence Aristotle says¹ that the will is in the reason. For an inclination exists in anything according to the mode of that thing ; hence intelligent inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intellect intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. But if it be present

¹ *On the Soul*, B. 3.

intelligibly it follows that it must be understood ; therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect inasmuch as it perceives itself to will : and because it knows the nature of the act, it knows also the nature of the faculty.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF

IN our present state we cannot know separate immaterial substances as they are, either by the active or the possible intellect; for the natural intellect bears an essential relation to the nature of material things. Consequently it understands nothing except by turning to phantasms, and since separate substances are not the subject either of sense or imagination, but differ entirely in nature from material things, it follows that whatever abstractions our intellect may make from matter it can never, in its present state, arrive at anything like a conception of immaterial substances.

Thus God is not the first known to us; for if immaterial substances are not known, much less is God known; but material things are first known to us, because they are the natural object of our intellect. We arrive, however, at a certain knowledge of God through creatures, as the apostle says to the Romans: "The invisible things of God are known by those which are made."

CHAPTER LXXXIX

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATED SOULS

SINCE the soul, when separated from the body, has a different mode of being from that which it had united to the body, although its nature remains unchanged, it has also a different mode of understanding. For while still in the body the soul turned to phantasms, but separate from the body it turns to things which are simply intelligible, such as other separate substances ; and although this is contrary to its nature, that nature is not changed.

If any one should say, that it is better to understand directly than by turning to phantasms, and that souls ought to be so made, we reply that in every intellectual substance intellectual power exists through the influence of the Divine Light—one and simple in its first principle but divided and diversified in proportion as creatures are further removed from the Source. Thus God knows all things by His Essence ; the angels by more forms than God, but fewer and more universal forms than human souls ; and if the latter, not having the power of other separate substances, were to see in that universality, they would understand confusedly ; it is therefore better for the soul to be united to the body and to know by means of phantasms, having at the same time the power of existing in a separate state

with a different mode of understanding after separation ; the same mode, indeed, as that of other separate substances, for the mode of operation follows that of being.

The separated soul has, moreover, a perfect knowledge of other souls because it perfectly knows itself and other disembodied spirits ; while the angels, being of a higher nature, are known indefinitely and imperfectly. For it is common to all separate substances that they understand what is above or below themselves by the mode of their own substance and according to the degree of their intelligence ; therefore the mode of the disembodied soul, although strengthened by other intellectual beings, remains inferior to that of the angels, which is cognizant of natural things, though not of such as pertain to the State of Glory.

Thus the disembodied soul understands by species received, like the angels, from an influx of the Divine Light, but less perfectly, because it is a mode natural to the angels, by which they have a perfect knowledge of all natural things ; while souls, being of a lower nature, do not, by such species, receive a perfect knowledge of things, but understand, as it were, in general and confusedly, the more perfect mode of superior natures being imperfectly adapted to inferior ones.

And since, in our present state, the soul knows particulars indirectly, abstracting from phantasms by reflection, which it can no longer do when separated from the body, it remains that such souls know particulars directly by an influx of Divine Light. For as God, inasmuch as He is the Cause of universal and

individual principles, knows all things, whether universal or particular, by His Essence, so likewise immaterial substances may know particulars by means of species which bear some likeness by participation to that Divine Essence. But while the angels by the power of their intelligence know natural things, not only according to species but even to the individuals contained under the species, souls know only those particulars to which they have been in some way determined by preceding knowledge, affection, or natural habit ; or else by Divine ordination. Thus in disembodied souls knowledge remains actual, though not according to the same mode, for they know by the mode suitable to separate souls. There remains, also, the habit of knowledge, the subject of which is the intellect, which is incorruptible. Nor can the intelligible species be destroyed by contraries in the possible intellect, because there is nothing contrary to the act of understanding ; and chiefly as regards the simple act of intelligence ; but the disposition which exists in the sensitive faculty is wanting to the disembodied soul.

But local distance does not hinder knowledge, since the soul understands by the influx of species from the Divine Light, to which far and near are one. Hence the opinion that disembodied souls know particulars by abstracting from sensible things is to be rejected, such a position being impossible, since the abstraction is made by means of faculties and senses which are wanting to them.

The souls of the departed are naturally ignorant of

what goes on here, since they are separated from intercourse with us and united in intercourse with spiritual beings ; for although they know particulars by that which is in some manner determined through preceding knowledge and affection, or by Divine ordination, the life of the spirit is far removed from that of the flesh, and since corporeal and incorporeal being are diverse in kind, their mode of knowledge is different. With regard, however, to the souls of the Blessed there is a difference of opinion between Augustine and Gregory ; for the latter says that the souls of the saints know our concerns, because they are equal to the angels and behold the Glory of God ; and this he holds positively ; while Augustine maintains the opposite view. The Author, however, holds with Gregory, because the souls of the saints are equal to the angels, who, as Augustine allows, are not ignorant of what goes on among the living.

CHAPTER XC

THE PRODUCTION OF THE SOUL OF THE FIRST MAN

THE soul is not of the Substance of God, but is created. For the soul is *in potentia* and receives knowledge from things; it has, moreover, diverse faculties, both of which are repugnant to Divinity. For God is Pure Actuality, receives nothing from elsewhere, and is wholly simple.

Error on this subject arose from a belief that everything was corporeal, and that consequently God was the Principle of all bodies: to which the Manichæans added that light was in some manner Divine and the world-soul; not separate from bodies but the form of the body. Thus they failed to recognize the intellect as belonging to an order of spiritual substances; from which the error began.

Nor can the rational soul have been made except by creation, since it has being apart from pre-existing matter. It is therefore a substance, the property of which is being:—for it is not substance but accident when anything exists after a certain mode, as, *e. g.* whiteness, which causes something to be white. And since the soul is a subsistent form, not made of corporeal matter because not a body, neither is it made of spiritual matter; from which it would follow

that spiritual substances might be changed, one into another. We conclude, therefore, that the soul was made immediately by God ; not by transmutation, nor from the latent virtue of matter, but by creation ; for, as has been already seen, only God can create, since the first agent alone acts where nothing is presupposed. Moreover, the soul was created along with the body, although Origen erroneously believed all souls to have been created along with the angels. Augustine also says, though not positively, that the soul of the first man was produced along with the angels, and the body according to a causal conception : which may be tolerated provided the opinion be true which ascribed to the soul a nature complete in itself, not united to the body as form, but only as administering it. If the soul be united to the body as form,¹ it is impossible ; for the soul is part of human nature, and God instituted things in a perfect state which requires that a part be with its whole ; whereas the soul is not perfect except as united to the body.

The opinion of Augustine may also be maintained that the soul as part of the work of the Six Days took precedence according to a certain conception of genus, inasmuch as the soul shares in the intellectual nature of the angels :—it was, however, created along with the body.

¹ Now of faith (*Conc. Vienn.*).

CHAPTER XCI

THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY OF THE FIRST MAN

SINCE God is the absolute perfection wherein all things pre-exist in unity, He distributes perfection in all His works, giving to each creature according to its mode. Thus to the angels He communicates His perfection in the knowledge of all natural things by diverse forms ; a perfection which is received by man after an inferior mode ; for man has not the knowledge of all natural things ; nevertheless, being in a certain manner composed out of all things, he communicates by his intellectual soul with the angels, with the heavenly bodies in the harmony of his constitution, and with the elements in his substance. The body of man was produced immediately by God, to Whose power it belongs to create form without any natural precedent form : for although Himself immaterial, God produces matter by His creative power, which the angels cannot do ; for they cannot change the form of bodies except by means of some pre-existing seed. Hence the first man must have been made by God, because in the beginning there existed no other from which a like species could have originated by mode of generation. There may, however, have been some ministry of angels in connection with the formation of the body of

man, as there may be hereafter with regard to the Resurrection.

Moreover, God instituted man's body in the best dispositions with reference to the rational soul. For an artificer intends to bestow upon his work the best disposition, not absolutely, but relatively to the effect which he desires to produce ; and such is our body with regard to the soul, being its instrument for action.

Thus man excels the lower animals in the sense of touch and in sensitive power, although inferior to them in respect of some of the senses. His brain is large, to temper the warmth of the heart ; he stands upright, and has hands for self-defence instead of horns. And he has an erect stature because his senses are not intended only for the necessities of life as with the lower animals, but for the acquirement of knowledge ; and that he may freely carry out his works. Thus man's brain is not depressed but elevated, his head is towards heaven and his feet to earth that he may be better able to work with his hands, while his mouth, lips and tongue are soft, the better to fit him for speech. The production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture, which makes use of special terms with reference to man ; because other things have been made for him. Thus the plural number is used to indicate the Blessed Trinity, Who is said to have breathed on the face of Adam more than on any other part, because sense is chiefly expressed in the face ; hence the operation of the soul appears chiefly in the face.

CHAPTER XCII

THE PRODUCTION OF WOMAN

IT is evident from a consideration of the mode of living things that woman properly formed part of the first creation, in aid of generation. For there are some things which have not the power of reproduction except through the agency of another species; and certain plants and animals which are generated spontaneously without seed. Others have the active and passive virtues combined; as plants, which are produced from seed. But it belongs to the perfect animal to have the generative power by mode of sex; active in the male and passive in the female; and because men have a nobler work to which their life is principally ordered, the sexes are only united in the time of generation. Since, therefore, man was ordained to a nobler work, namely, that of the intellect, it was fitting that there should be in him a distinction of these powers; and principally that he might love the woman who was produced from himself, and that they might be united in the work of generation. Thus after the production of the woman it is said immediately: "They were two in one flesh."

And it was fitting that in the original institution woman should be formed from man (which was not the case with the lower animals), first, in order to

preserve the dignity of the man, that he might be the principle of the entire species, as God is the Principle of the entire universe ; secondly, that he might the better love his wife, because knowing her to have been produced from himself, and that they might always remain companions ; thirdly, because they are not united for the purpose of generation only, like other animals, but for the sake of domestic life ; and fourthly, because we have herein a figure of the Church, which takes its origin from Christ ; as the apostle says to the Ephesians (Chapter v.).

Moreover, woman was made from the side of man to indicate social companionship ; not from his head, lest she should seem to be mistress over him, nor from his feet, lest she should appear to be his servant : we may add, also, that it signified the Church, which emanated from the side of Christ.

Woman was made immediately by God ; for since she was formed of other matter than that from which man is usually generated, she could have been made by God only ; but whether or not any ministry of angels intervened is unknown.

CHAPTER XCIII

THE END OR SCOPE OF THE CREATION OF MAN

THERE exists in man an imperfect image of God ; for the true conception of an image requires that it be taken from that of which it is the image. Hence an egg is not the image of another egg ; it is only like it ; but since there exists in man a certain likeness which is derived from God as Exemplar, he is said to be made to the image of God ;—not, however, according to any sort of equality ; for the Exemplar infinitely transcends the example. Hence man is an imperfect image of God.

And this image is proper to intellectual creatures ; for not every likeness which may find expression in another suffices for the conception of an image ; as though in virtue of genus only a worm were to be likened to a man, or as things may resemble each other by some common accident, such as whiteness. The likeness must be according to species or to some accident proper to species ; because resemblance is understood as relating to that which is most specific. Thus things resemble each other in the most general manner in virtue of their being ; others more specifically in virtue of life ; others in the most perfect manner, inasmuch as they know and understand.

Absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man ; according to that intellectual

nature in which the primary conception of the image consists ; relatively, however, the Divine image is found more in man, because man is from man as God is from God ; also the human soul is entire in the whole body and in every part of it, as God is present relatively to the whole world. Thus in some respects the image of God is specially found in man, although the true conception of the image belongs properly to the intellectual nature.

This image of God, which is found in all men, may be considered under three aspects : first, as a natural aptitude for loving and understanding God, which belongs to the nature of the mind and is common to all men ; secondly, as actual and habitual knowledge and imperfect love, which is the conformity of grace ; and thirdly, as that perfect love and knowledge which constitute the image of God in a State of Glory. The first is in all men, the second in the just, the third in the Blessed. And this image, in so far as it belongs to the intellectual nature, exists in the woman as much as in the man ; hence Scripture speaks of them in the plural ; nevertheless in other respects it is found more in the man because he is the principle.

The image of God in man is according to the Divine Nature and the Trinity of Persons, inasmuch as in God Three Persons exist in One Nature ; but great is the difference between this Trinity and the trinity which is found in us ; of which Augustine says : " The latter we see rather than believe, while of the former we believe what we do not see. " ¹

¹ *De Trinitate*, No. 15.

Moreover, this image exists in the mind according to the twofold procession of intellect and love ; in other parts it is only found by mode of vestige, which does not express the likeness of a species to its cause. For in the rational creature the Divine likeness is found in that in which it chiefly excels, namely, in the mind, and is to be understood first as represented by the act of the word and of love ; and secondarily, as a consequence as it exists in the habit and faculties of the mind. For the image is that in which the mind approaches to the nature of the Blessed Trinity, viz. in the procession of the word from the speaker, and in love as the bond of connection ; and so it exists chiefly in the act ; but inasmuch as faculties and habits are the principle of acts, it follows that the Divine image is to be understood also of the soul according to these faculties and habits, because in them the acts exist virtually.

CHAPTER XCIV

THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS THE INTELLECT

THE first man did not see the Essence of God. For an intellectual being who saw God by Essence would be placed as man is with regard to Beatitude, which compels the will: for all fly from suffering and desire Beatitude; thus if the first man had seen the Essence of God he could not have sinned. His knowledge was, therefore, midway between that of the Blessed and that which is proper to our present state; for the higher a creature is, the more clearly it sees God. Hence God is seen in a more eminent manner through intelligible effects than through sensible ones; and since, in a state of innocence, the inferior faculties were subject to the superior, so that the superior part was not impeded by the inferior (as in our present state), the first man was not prevented by exterior things from a clear and constant contemplation of intelligible effects; but perceived the splendour of primordial truth by a knowledge natural or gratuitous.

Nor did the first man see the angels in their essence, for even before the Fall, when soul and body were perfectly adapted to each other, he understood by turning to phantasms. This inability to apprehend

spiritual substances did not proceed from the weight of the body, as after the Fall, but from the fact that the object which is con-natural to man's intelligence has not the perfection of immaterial substances. His knowledge of such was, however, superior to ours, for his apprehension of intelligible things had a clearness and certitude which are wanting to us. Hence Gregory says that man, in a state of innocence, conversed with the angels. Since God instituted all things in a perfect state, not only as they existed in themselves but also as they were to be the principle of others, man, who was to be a principle, not only by physical generation but also in regard of instruction and government, for which knowledge is required, had from the first an infused knowledge of all things in which mankind was intended to receive instruction. And since he required, for the government of his own life and that of others, not only natural knowledge but also supernatural, concerning the things of faith, he possessed of the latter whatever was requisite for his state ; but things which exceeded his state or were unnecessary he did not know ; such as the thoughts of men, future contingencies, etc.

Man, in his original condition, could not be deceived ; for as truth is the good of the intellect, falsehood is its evil ; hence as long as man preserved his innocence it was impossible that he should accept a false statement as true, although there might be ignorance of a particular truth. For as long as the soul is subject to God so long the inferior part of man is subject to the superior ; and since the intellect is always true in regard of its proper object, in itself it is never deceived. Thus the

integrity of man's original state was incompatible with intellectual deception, and if the seduction of the woman was not already preceded by the act of sin there must, as St. Augustine says, have existed the internal sin of pride.

CHAPTER XCV

THE WILL OF OUR FIRST PARENTS IN REGARD OF GRACE AND JUSTICE

ALTHOUGH some are of opinion that the first man was not created in grace, but received it prior to the Fall, many holy Doctors hold the contrary. For our first parents were created in an upright state in which the body was subject to the soul, the inferior powers to reason, and reason to God, and if such subjection had been merely natural it would have continued after they sinned ; hence it was clearly due to the supernatural gift of grace. Thus Augustine says : "After the transgression of the Divine precept, grace being immediately withdrawn, they became ashamed of their nakedness, for in return for their own disobedience they felt the disobedience of the flesh."

And since in man's original state no evil was either present or imminent, nor any good wanting which the will could desire, our first parents were not subject to passions which have reference to evil (fear, grief, etc.), or to good not possessed but presently attainable (such as ardent desire) ; but only to such passions as may arise from the possession of present good, viz. joy and love ; or from some future good to be had in due time, such as desire, and hope, of a nature not distressing. There was this difference,

however: that inferior nature being wholly subject to reason, all the passions of the soul followed the judgment of reason, whereas with us the passions sometimes follow the judgment of reason, and sometimes anticipate or hinder it; because the sensitive appetite is not entirely subject.

In like manner the first man possessed all the virtues; for virtues are simply certain perfections, related to God, by which the inferior powers are disposed according to the government of reason. Since, therefore, the integrity of his original state required that man should have all things in due proportion, some virtues, such as charity and justice, which imply no imperfection, would exist in him absolutely and actually; while others, involving imperfection, though not such as to be inconsistent with a state of innocence, might exist actually and habitually. Such would be faith, which regards things not seen; and hope of things not possessed. Other virtues, of which the concomitant imperfections would have been repugnant to a state of innocence, might be present essentially though not according to the act, *e. g.* penance and mercy; man being so disposed that he would be sorry for sin if it existed, and relieve suffering if he saw it in another.

In regard of grace, the works of our first parents were more efficacious than ours, because, as no obstacle existed in human nature while innocence remained, grace was more abundant. So also if we consider the amount of work in itself; man, being endowed with greater strength, could perform greater works. If, however, we consider the proportional amount, we

are conscious of greater merit after the Fall, in consequence of man's weakness ; for a small work done with difficulty is more meritorious than a great one done without difficulty. Thus the widow is praised who threw the mites into the treasury.

CHAPTER XCVI

THE DOMINION WHICH BELONGED TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE

MAN in a state of innocence governed the lower animals, which were all subject to him, their disobedience being part of the punishment of sin. For as matter is for form, so the less perfect things give way, in use, to the more perfect; thus plants make use of earth, animals of plants, and man of plants and animals. On this account it is lawful to hunt¹ wild animals; for in so doing man appropriates that which belongs to him by nature. Moreover, it is evident that by the order of Divine Providence the inferior are governed by the superior; and man is made to the image of God. Finally, although the lower animals have some participation in the gift of prudence with regard to particular actions, man possesses universal prudence, from which depends all that pertains to activity; and since that which is by participation is subject to that which is by essence, and universal, the subjection of the animal creation is according to nature.

For there are four things to be considered in man, viz. reason, by which he is associated with the angels; the sensitive faculties, which he shares with the lower animals; natural functions, which he possesses in common with plants; and the body, which he shares

i.e. kill.

with inanimate things. Hence man does not rule over the angels but only over things which are less to the image of God than himself ; and the sensitive faculties are subject to his command, while the natural functions and the body are subject to him, not as commanding, but as using them.

Some disparity would always have existed among men in regard of age and sex ; and there might also have been some inequality of mind and body, since in virtue of free will some might make more progress than others. Neither was the human body exempt from the laws of Nature, but received help from food and the diverse dispositions of its environment ; so that some would naturally be larger than others, more beautiful or more robust ; yet not so as to imply defect of body or soul in those who were surpassed by others.

Nor would man in his original state have had despotic power over other men, as though the interest of the governed were secondary to that of the governor ; for such dominion is grievous ; and it is a hardship for one to be required to give up to another the good which is properly his own. Such sufferings are incompatible with a state of innocence, but authority would have existed, directed to the good of the governed, and to the general good ; for man is a social being, and social life cannot exist unless some preside over the good of the many. It is evident, also, that if one possessed superior justice or science, such gifts ought to be utilized for the benefit of others.

CHAPTER XCVII

MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE AS REGARDS THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

MAN in a state of innocence would have been immortal ; for death entered into the world by sin.

There are, however, three kinds of incorruptibility : first, where there is no matter, as with the angels ; or if there be matter, as in the Heavenly Bodies, it is susceptible of only one form. Secondly, incorruptibility may be due to the form itself ; when it possesses an inherent virtue which prevents the dissolution of that which would be otherwise corruptible, as will be the case in the State of Glory ; or, thirdly, it may be due to the efficient cause. Thus man in a state of innocence would have been an immortal man ; not that his body possessed any inherent power of incorruptibility, but because a supernatural gift was bestowed upon his soul in virtue of which the body would have been preserved from corruption as long as he remained subject to God.

For man's soul was made rational, and because the rational soul belongs to a higher order than corporeal matter, it was fitting that power should be given to it for the preservation of the body, beyond what was natural to corporeal matter.

But, after the Fall, although Adam recovered grace

and the power of meriting glory, he did not recover the virtue of immortality. That was reserved for Christ, Who should give us the Resurrection.

Nor would man in a state of innocence have been, properly speaking, passible, in the sense in which passibility implies a change of the natural disposition inflicted by something else; but as, in common language, it signifies change consequent upon understanding and feeling, he would have suffered in body and soul; for such suffering belongs to the perfection of our nature.

And since there was animal life, there existed also the necessity for food; while in the State of Glory there will be spiritual life not requiring food. For the human soul is both soul and spirit; that which man has in common with other animals and which is the principle of bodily life, is called soul, while spirit signifies that which is proper to himself, as an intellectual being. Therefore in man's original state the rational soul communicated to the body that which belonged to it as soul, and the body was called animal inasmuch as it received from the soul a life of which the natural operations were the use of food, generation, and growth. These belonged to man in his original state; but in his final state the soul will in some manner communicate to the body those things which belong to it as spirit, namely, immortality to both the good and the bad, and to the good, whose body will then be spiritual, impassibility and glory.

Moreover, the Tree of Life was, in a certain manner, a cause of immortality, but not absolutely so; for man

in his original state had two remedies for the conservation of his life against two causes of decay. The first cause consists in the waste of moisture, from which he was preserved by eating the fruit of other trees ; as we are now by food. The second cause of decay arises from the union of something extraneous with the pre-existent moisture by which the active virtue of species is gradually weakened, as wine is weakened by the addition of water until at last it becomes watery. Thus we see, among ourselves, that the active virtue is at first so strong that it produces growth and the power of increase ; later on it suffices to repair waste without increase, while in old age it is insufficient even for this ; thence follow decay and the final dissolution of the body. Against this defect man was preserved by the Tree of Life, which had the virtue of strengthening the species, and prevented decay by way of medicine. It did not, therefore, produce immortality absolutely, nor could it communicate a virtue by which the body would never decay, for its power was finite ; but it preserved the body for a time, after which man would either have been translated to a spiritual life, or have had recourse to it again.

CHAPTER XCVIII

THE CONSERVATION OF THE SPECIES BY MEANS OF GENERATION

IN a state of innocence multiplication would have taken place by generation; otherwise the sin of Adam, from which so much good has followed, would have been necessary. The same is proved by man's position, which, according to his nature, is halfway, so to speak, between corruptible and incorruptible things; for the soul is naturally incorruptible and the body naturally corruptible, and hence the intention of Nature is led diversely. With regard to corruptible things nothing is constant except species, therefore generation is ordered to its conservation; while incorruptible things are perpetuated, not according to species only, but individually. Hence generation belongs to man on the part of the body, which is by its nature corruptible, and also in regard of the incorruptible soul, because the multiplication of individuals one from another was intended by Nature, or rather by the Author of Nature, Who alone is the Creator of both soul and body.

And this generation would have taken place after the mode which is natural to all perfect animals, for what belongs to Nature is neither given nor taken away by sin. Thus Nature having provided organs

for this purpose, their exercise would not have been wanting, but generation would have followed upon an union of the active and passive principles without immoderate desire; for in that state the inferior powers were subject to reason; and generation would have taken place tranquilly, in due time.

CHAPTER XCIX

THE STATE OF CHILDREN AS REGARDS THE BODY

CHILDREN, in a state of innocence, would have possessed the power of motion suitable to their age ; for in natural things we ought to follow the teaching of Nature and in supernatural things the authority of Scripture.

Human infants are endowed with more brain than the young of other animals ; hence, owing to the greater amount of moisture, their nerves of motion possess less power for the movement of their members ; but in a state of innocence they would have had sufficient for the actions of childhood without any defect. And since nothing would have been wanting for the perfect fulfilment of all the requirements of Nature there would also have been a distinction between the sexes ; for, as diverse grades are required for the perfection of the universe, so the variety of men and women is required for the perfection of human society.

CHAPTER C

THE CONDITION OF CHILDREN AS REGARDS JUSTICE

EXCEPT through some default of Nature, incompatible with a state of innocence, children necessarily resemble their parents in accidents proper to the species, although not in such as are personal. Since, therefore, original justice, in which the first man was created, was an accident proper to his species,—not as though derived from the principle of species, but as a gift divinely bestowed upon human nature,—it would have been transmitted to his posterity; as original sin, which is opposed to this justice, is actually transmitted, and called a sin of Nature.

Children would not, however, have been confirmed in grace; inasmuch as children are not entitled to more perfection than their parents had when they were born: thus they would not have been confirmed in grace until they reached the beatific Vision of God, except through some special privilege, such as we attribute to the Blessed Virgin.

CHAPTER CI

OF THE STATE OF CHILDREN AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE

CHILDREN, in a state of innocence, would not have been perfect in knowledge ; since it is natural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses. Moreover, the body is united to the soul because it is necessary to its operation, and if the soul had knowledge from the beginning it would no longer require to make use of the sensitive faculties. Children, therefore, would have acquired knowledge gradually, though without difficulty, by means of instruction and investigation.

Nor could new-born infants have had the full use of reason ; because reason depends upon the organs of the sensitive faculties, which are imperfect in infancy through excess of moisture ; thus perfection would only have been reached with maturity ; they would, however, have possessed a fuller use of reason than now, in regard of things suitable to their age.

CHAPTER CII

OF MAN'S PLACE, WHICH WAS PARADISE

SOME understand Paradise materially, others spiritually, while Augustine admits of both acceptations. Thus it was a place situated in the region of the East ; the noblest place being assigned to the noblest part of the heavens ; for according to Aristotle the East is on the right of the heavens. Holy Doctors compare it to the orb of the moon, not as regards altitude, but in respect of its physical properties ; the air being always temperate, as in the Heavenly Bodies, which exist without contrarieties, among which bodies the moon is nearest to the earth.

And Paradise was suited for human habitation. Incorruptibility belonged to it ; not as belonging to the nature of the body, but through a virtue attached to the soul for its preservation ; and since the body is subject to dissolution both within and without, food was given for the conservation of moisture, and a temperate air for the prevention of exterior waste.

Man was placed in Paradise to keep it, and to work therein ; a work which would not have been laborious but pleasing, as an exercise of the natural faculties. Man would also have kept himself lest he should lose it ; and God worked in him and kept him lest he should be corrupted by evil. Man, however, was not made in

Paradise, in order that he might recognize his incorruptibility to be a gift of God, not due to Nature ; hence after his creation he was placed there for the term of his animal life, to be transferred finally to Heaven for the possession of a spiritual life.

But woman was made in Paradise ; not for her own dignity but on account of the dignity of the principle whence her body was taken ; and children would have been born in Paradise, where their parents had been already placed.

CHAPTER 'CIII

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL

THE opinion of certain philosophers who ascribe everything to chance is absurd; for we see that in most cases what is best nearly always happens, and this would not be the case unless natural things were directed by some providence to a good end, as the order of Nature demonstrates.

The same is also evident from a consideration of the Divine Goodness, which called things into being. For it belongs to the Best to produce that which is best, and to lead it to perfection; and the ultimate perfection of a thing is attained by the prosecution of the end, *i. e.* by right government. And the end of the government of the world must be a good external to the universe; for since the principle of things was external to the universe, the end, which corresponds with the beginning, must be so also. It is plain, moreover, that since universal good is the end of all things, such good cannot be anything less than the universe. For a particular end is found in some particular good, which is good by participation, but the universal end is that which is good in itself and by essence; hence the good which is the end of the whole universe must be something external to it.

The world, moreover, is governed by One; for since the world's government is essential good, such govern-

ment must be the best, and by the Best, *i. e.* by *One*. For every government tends to unity, and this unity is better attained by one than by several, because the cause of unity is in itself one ; nor are many ever the cause of one, except in as far as they are in some way united. The best government is therefore by one ; hence the philosopher says : “ Beings are never wrongly disposed, therefore there is one head.”

And since the effect of an action is to be measured by its end, and the end of the world's government is essential good, the effect may be considered in three ways. First, on the part of the end ; and thus it is assimilation to the highest good. Secondly, as to the means by which creatures are assimilated to God ; and in this regard we find, speaking generally, two effects of government, inasmuch as God is good, and the creature is good ; and, as being a cause of goodness to others, one creature moves another to goodness : hence there are two effects of government, *viz.* the conservation of creatures in good, and their movement towards good. Thirdly, the effects of government may be considered individually, and thus we find them to be innumerable, according to the diverse nature of things.

For all things are subject to the Divine Government, since it belongs to the same power to produce them, and to bring them to perfection ; and because God is the Universal Cause of being, and nothing exists which was not created by Him, so also nothing escapes His government.

The same appears evidently from a consideration of

the end ; for since the Goodness of God is the proper end of the government of the universe, nothing can exist which is not ordered thereto. Hence the opinion that particular and inferior things are not governed by God is absurd.

But two things are essential to government, viz. the plan and the execution of it, and with regard to the former God governs all things immediately ; for since He is Essential Goodness everything is to be attributed to Him in the most perfect manner, which demands that in all departments every particular be known to Him. For the best physician is he who takes account, not only of universals, but can enter into the smallest details ; hence we must admit that God's care extends to the least particulars.

As regards the execution, however, a government is better in proportion as it communicates greater perfection to the governed ; therefore God so governs as that some become causes in the government of others ; —as a master, who should make his scholars not only wise themselves, but teachers of others.

Thus it is impossible that anything should occur outside the order of the Universal Cause, and the Divine Government comprehends all beings ; nevertheless something may happen contrary to a particular cause, because some other cause, having a contingent effect, was not subject to it. So indigestion may take place in spite of the nutritive organs, through the accident of food having been too heavy ; and this is called evil, because it is contrary to the order of a particular good ; but if evil went wholly beyond the order of the Divine

Government it would cease to exist ; for evil is always grounded in good, and nothing is wholly bad.

Thus nothing reacts against the general order of Divine Government ; for all things tend to good, and nothing aims at evil in its operation, because the inclination of everything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but an impulse received from the First Mover, as an arrow from the archer. And thus everything which acts, comes as it were spontaneously to that which is divinely ordained. Hence God is said to "order all things sweetly."

CHAPTER CIV

THE EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT IN PARTICULAR

ALL things are preserved in being by God ; for preservation may be direct or indirect ;—direct, through support given by the preserver, or indirect, through the removal of causes of destruction. All things do not require the latter ; for some, as the angels and other heavenly bodies, are indestructible ; but all require direct preservation, because the effect of a cause requires to be maintained, as well as to be originated ; and as every creature is the effect of God, both as to form and being, all must be directly preserved by Him.

For every creature stands in relation to God, as the air to the sun which illuminates it. The sun is luminous by nature, the air by participation ; hence when the sun ceases to shine it is dark : so God is Being by His Essence, while the creature exists only by participation, and if God withdrew His governing power from created things their species would then and there cease to be. God nevertheless preserves some things indirectly by the medium of certain causes ; as water in the case of salt, which preserves meat from corruption. For there are many effects which depend primarily upon the First Cause, and secondarily upon intermediate causes, to the action of which their preservation

is to be the more attributed in proportion as such causes are higher and nearer to the First Cause. Hence the philosopher says¹ that the first mover is the cause of the continuity of generation, while to the second cause of motion, which is by the zodiac, is due the diversity which arises from generation and dissolution. Thus God sometimes preserves things in being by the medium of second causes.

Those who held that God could not annihilate anything, were in error, for God gives out of His free will, not from necessity; therefore, as He could at the beginning have not given, so He is free afterwards not to continue to give. But it is evident that, according to the order of Nature, nothing is annihilated. For things are either immaterial, and not *in potentia* to dissolution; or they are material, and so remain as matter, which is incorruptible;² while the miraculous is a manifestation of the Divine favour, and the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things rather than by their annihilation.

¹ *Metaphysics*, xii.

² In principle.

CHAPTER CV

THE MUTATION OF CREATURES BY GOD

GOD can move matter to form directly, because the passive power of being can be immediately actualized by the active power which holds it subject. Since matter, therefore, is subject to the Divine Power, inasmuch as it is created by God, much more can it be actualized by Him.

Thus God can move all bodies immediately, and it is an error to say that God cannot, by Himself alone, produce all the determinate effects which flow from any created cause whatever. For it is one and the same thing to impress form, to dispose to form, and to give motion according to form; and since God can impress form in matter immediately He can also move a body according to any species of motion.

In like manner God moves the created intellect, both by giving to it the power of understanding and by impressing intelligible species. For God is the First Intelligence, and the Cause of all intellectual power; consequently of all other intelligences, which He strengthens and elevates.

The will is also moved by God; but as its object. For the will is moved by every good, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously, because the object

of the will is universal good, and this is found in God only, not in particular creatures. Therefore the power of willing comes directly from God ; for universal good is the object, and to will is simply to be inclined to an object, while the inclination to universal good is from the First Mover, by Whom it is proportioned to the final end.

And God works in everything, yet so that each object has its proper operation. Otherwise the order of things would be destroyed, and God would be manifested as wanting in power to produce causes which would act in co-operation with Him, and the operative power of things would fail. He works also according to every species of cause. First, as End, inasmuch as every operation is for the attainment of some good, real or apparent, and nothing can appear such except as participating in some similitude to the highest good ; consequently God is the Cause of every operation as End. Secondly, as Agent ; for the first agent moves the second, so that all act in virtue of God Himself. Thirdly, as Form ; for God is Cause, not only as giving and applying the principles of actions, but as giving, preserving and applying forms which are the principles of actions. Thus God is the Universal Cause of the being of all things, and works intimately in them. Material causes are not admitted, for matter does not act, but is acted upon.

There is, moreover, a twofold order in things. One consists in dependence upon the First Cause, against which God cannot act, because to do so would be to

oppose His own foreknowledge ; which is impossible. The other consists in the dependence of things upon second causes ; and God can counteract these because such order is subject to Him, inasmuch as it proceeds according to the choice of His Will. For the superior cause is not subject to secondary causes, and since all are subject to God, He can institute other orders, either by producing the effects of second causes without them, or by producing other effects to which such causes do not extend.

Those things which are done by God beyond the known order of causes are called miracles, on account of the wonder they excite ; for they have an unknown cause manifested by the effect. But a wonder differs from a miracle inasmuch as that may be a wonder to one which is not so to another ; as an eclipse is a wonder to the peasant, but not to the astronomer ; whereas a miracle has a simple cause hidden from all. Therefore, one miracle is said to be greater than another, not in respect of the Divine Power, but in proportion as it exceeds the powers of Nature.

Things may exceed the power of Nature in three ways : first, according to the substance of the thing done ; as when the sun goes backwards, which constitutes the first class. Secondly, according to the matter in which it is done ; as raising the dead : for Nature can give life, but not to the dead ; and such are called miracles of the second class. Thirdly, according to the mode by which the miracle is done ; as when a fever is cured without the use of natural means,

or rain is condensed in the air ; for although these things exceed the power of Nature according to their mode and order, they may be produced gradually by natural means ; therefore such hold the lowest place in the order of miracles.

CHAPTER CVI

HOW ONE ANGEL MOVES ANOTHER

ONE angel can give light to another ; for to give light in intellectual things is to manifest truth ; and this may be done by the simple presentation of an object, and by bringing light to bear upon it. And one angel illuminates another by means of its intellectual power ; for as a less perfect body is strengthened by the neighbourhood of a more perfect one, so the inferior angel receives the increase of intellectual power through the influence of a superior one.

Moreover, the superior apprehends truth in a more universal manner, and communicates it under suitable distinctions, so as to be understood by the inferior ; even as teachers among us, by multiplying examples, convey to those of weaker capacity what they themselves understand under a single form.

But one angel cannot move the will of another, for the will can only be moved in two ways, viz. either directly by the object, or by means of the faculty. By the object it cannot be, for only the Universal Good moves the will sufficiently, *i. e.* God, Who is the Beatifying Object. An angel may, however, use persuasion, by pointing out some created good ordained in God. Neither does one angel move the will of another by means of the faculty, for God only

can change the will, Who has given the power of willing.

Neither do the inferior angels illuminate the superior ones, because one Order is related to another as cause to cause, the superiors being the illuminators and the inferiors the illuminated ; and if there be any deviation from the order of second causes it is for the sake of man's salvation, a reason which does not exist among the angels ; for the object of miraculous action is to promote the knowledge of God in man.

Superior angels enlighten the inferior ones about all whereof they have knowledge : for it is the nature of good to diffuse itself, and the more any creature participates in the Divine Goodness the more it diffuses its perfections. Nevertheless, the superior retains its superiority, and the more perfect knowledge which belongs to a higher order ; as a master understands various branches of knowledge more perfectly than the pupil who learns from him.

CHAPTER CVII

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS

THERE exists among the angels some manner of speech ; for to speak to another is simply to manifest to him the concepts of the mind. Thus the angels are said to speak when they direct their conceptions to others for the manifestation of their will. In like manner, when our mind turns to the actual consideration of what it possesses habitually, it is said to speak to itself ; for even the interior conception of the mind is called a word.

And the inferior angels can speak to the superior ; for although every illumination is speech, the converse does not hold ; thus the manifestation of things which depend upon the intelligent will is not illumination, but only speech, while something which is conveyed from God, Who is the Principle, through a superior angel to an inferior one, is illumination. But although this ordering of their mental conceptions one to another constitutes the speech of the angels, it is not thus that they speak to God, Who is the Creator, and principle of all truth and all will. For a person approaches another in a different manner if he desires to receive something, as a disciple comes to a master ; and the angels speak to God as consulting the Divine Will for

action, or as admiring His excellence, which surpasses all understanding.

Local distance forms no impediment to the speech of the angels, since this consists in an intellectual operation which is independent of time and place. For the angels do not understand by means of phantasms as we do, therefore distance of place and time do not affect them. But the speech of the angels to each other is not known to or understood by all ; for an angel may have occasion to direct its mental conception to one rather than to another ; and so it would be perceived correspondingly. For speech being related to the principle of created will, which is proper to each one, does not belong to the same order as illumination, which emanates from God, the primary source of truth and the principle common to all ; hence it is not necessary that these locutions should be common to all.

CHAPTER CVIII

THE DISPOSAL OF THE ANGELS INTO HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS

IF Hierarchy, which signifies sacred principality, be considered on the part of its Chief, all angels and rational creatures form one sole hierarchy, because there is one Head over all, namely, God ; but if it be considered on the part of the angels, there are three hierarchies.

For, with regard to any multitude governed, unity is understood to signify that the rule of the chief is received after a single mode ; but angels and men are governed by different modes ; the former by pure illuminations, the latter by sensible similitudes.

The angels likewise form different hierarchies, because the superior angels, illuminated by more universal conceptions which come directly from God, have a mode of understanding different from that of inferior ones ; therefore they form different hierarchies. Angels of the intermediate class are so illuminated that their conceptions, depending on universal created causes, are multiple and divided ; while the inferior ones derive theirs from individual objects, as these depend upon immediate causes. But those are in error who admit hierarchy in the Divinity, where there exists no Order except that of Nature only.

Every hierarchy must comprise different Orders, without which there would be a confused multitude. Hence diversity of order is essential to the idea of hierarchy. These Orders are to be considered as bearing reference to their respective actions and offices, but they may all be reduced to three ; for every perfect multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end ; as in a city we find three Orders of men, viz. the aristocracy, the middle class, and the populace.

Angels have all things in common, nevertheless one possesses more perfectly than another. Moreover, as far as our knowledge goes, there are many angels in each Order ; for owing to our very imperfect knowledge we can speak of their collective Orders only, which comprise many. A more perfect knowledge would enable us to distinguish their various offices ; for as every star has its order and use, so every angel.

The distinctions of Order, as these refer to their supernatural end, are, in the case of the angels, the gift of grace as the complement of nature. In men they are by grace alone ; for gifts of grace are not given to men in proportion to their natural gifts, while among the angels such gifts are proportioned to their natural capacity. Thus spiritual perfections, although common to all, abound more in the superior than in the inferior. For in every Order the same thing may be said to exist in one of three ways, viz. properly, when it is proportioned to the nature of the subject ; as reason is attributed to the man ; by excess, when the thing attributed is less than that to which it belongs, as that in respect of the sun, or the perfections of creatures

ascribed to God ; or by participation, when that which is attributed is not found fully, but only partially :—thus holy men are sometimes called gods. Hence Dionysius explains the names of the different Orders by reference to their spiritual perfections ; while Gregory chiefly regards their exterior ministry.

Thus angels bear the less and archangels the more important messages ; Virtues work miracles, Powers repel evil spirits, and Principalities direct good spirits.

The rank of the Hierarchies and Orders is likewise suitably distinguished inasmuch as the first Hierarchy is said to know the nature of things in God ; the second in universal created causes, and the third in causes as applied to particular effects. The first comprises the Thrones,—so exalted as to receive God in themselves and to apprehend conceptions in Him ; the Cherubim, who know Divine secrets in a super-eminent manner ; and the Seraphim, who excel in union with God.

The second Hierarchy is constituted for government ; thus universal rule over action is assigned to the Dominations ; over faculties to the Virtues, while the Powers keep order so that precepts may be fulfilled.

The third consists of the executive. These may possess incipient action, as leaders of others, like the Principalities, or they may be simply active, like the angels ; while the archangels are between the two.

The angelic Hierarchies will remain after the Day of Judgment as regards their distinctions of rank, which depend upon differences of nature and grace. For these cannot be taken away from them, since natural qualities are only lost by corruption, and degrees of

glory will always be in proportion to preceding merit. But their offices will only remain according to the requirements of the future Dispensation: thus they will cease in what concerns bringing others to their final end.

And some men will be assumed into the ranks of the angels; others into higher ranks, according to their gifts of grace and their own merits, not according to their natural gifts; and the society of men and angels will be one, inasmuch as the Beatitude of all consists in union with one God.

CHAPTER CIX

THE ORDERS OF THE EVIL ANGELS

SINCE the rank of the angels is determined by nature and grace, it follows that, as regards nature, the demons are still in their Orders ; for their natural gifts are not taken from them ; while as regards grace their state is twofold ; for there is the state of perfect grace, or Glory, in which they have never been ; and that of imperfect grace, in which they were once associated with the angels, and from which they have fallen.

And there is prelacy among them ; for, since the Divine Wisdom leaves nothing without order, their actions are subordinated, and prelacy signifies that the action of inferiors is subject to that of superiors, as natural order signifies that the lower natures are ordered to the higher ones. And as particular faculties are governed by universal ones, so corporeal natures are governed by spiritual ones, which, being nearer to God and more perfect, have influence over others : therefore, as the demons are deprived of this perfection, it follows that the good angels have prelacy over them and govern them.

Neither can one demon illuminate another, because through perversity they are averted from God ; they can, however, intimate their thoughts to each other by mode of speech.

CHAPTER CX

THE CHARGE WHICH THE ANGELS EXERCISE OVER MATERIAL THINGS

SINCE particular faculties are governed by universal ones, angels have charge over material things. For it is evident that the power of a body is more limited than that of a spiritual substance; because corporeal forms are individuated, and exactly determined by matter, while spiritual forms are absolute and intelligible; hence, as the inferior angels, whose forms are less universal, are governed by the superior ones, so all material forms are governed by angels.

We must not conclude on this account, that one angel is fitted by nature to have charge of animals rather than of plants, for the lowest angel possesses higher and more universal faculties than any species of corporeal things; but the order established by Divine Wisdom assigns the administration of various things to various powers.

Neither does it follow that the angelic Orders are more in number than nine, for they are distinguished by their general offices only.

Nor are we to conclude that corporeal nature is subject to the angels directly, as regards transmutation of form; for whatever is composed of matter and form is developed, and, as such, produced from that

which is like itself. Hence formal transmutation is only effected by composite things, or by Him Who contains composition—that is to say, matter of form—in a more eminent manner, *i. e.* by God, Who alone creates, and to Whose command only matter is directly subject.

Nevertheless, matter is directly subject to spiritual substances as regards local motion; for an inferior nature attains its highest level by means of a superior one. Thus corporeal nature attains to local motion, which is motion of the most perfect kind, through this spiritual nature: accordingly we see that the soul moves the body first, and chiefly by way of local motion.

Neither can angels work miracles; for a miracle is something done contrary to the whole course of Nature. Therefore it does not suffice for the conception of a miracle that the thing done be contrary to a particular law of Nature, or else to throw a stone upwards would be a miracle. Thus, properly speaking, God alone works miracles, beyond the entire order of Nature; and whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power is according to the order of Nature; and if angels or saints are said to work miracles, it is either because they exercise some ministry in regard of them, or because God works the miracle at their desire.

CHAPTER CXI

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS UPON MEN

MEN receive the revelation of Divine things through the intermediary of the angels, for, according to the order of Nature, inferiors are subject to the action of superiors.

The mode of illumination in angels and in men is partly the same and partly different. For a superior angel divides its universal conception of truth to meet the capacity of an inferior, but the truth still remains simple and devoid of images ; while the human intellect, not being able to apprehend in this simplicity, requires the 'help of phantasms ; and in this way the illumination is different. But it is alike, inasmuch as the inferior is strengthened and enlightened by the superior. Angels have, however, no power to move the will interiorly ; for to alter the will belongs to Him alone Who gave it, namely, to God Almighty, Who, as the Universal Good, can turn the will objectively, while angels and men can only use persuasion.

Man's will may nevertheless be moved from without in another way, namely, by the passions which exist in the sensitive appetite, and which the angels have power to excite. For the will is affected by anger and concupiscence, although not to compulsion, since it is

always free either to consent to the passions or to resist them.

The imagination, also, may be affected by both good and bad angels ; for they can control corporeal matter to local motion, and by this means have power to produce in us imaginary visions through the medium of the bodily spirits and humours ; as is evident from the example of sleepers and madmen.

The angels can also affect the senses, by presenting an object, or by acting upon the physical organs.

CHAPTER CXII

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS

ANGELS are sent by God in ministry ; for that which begins to be where it was not, or by a mode in which it was not, is said to be sent. Applied to the Holy Ghost and to the Son, the term is used, not as though They began to be where They were not, but inasmuch as They exist after a new mode, by grace and the Incarnation : for a universal agent reaches everywhere, while a particular agent is so in one place as not to be in another. Thus an angel, about to do something in regard of corporeal creatures, applies its power anew to the object, and so begins to be where it was not ; and since the action proceeds from God, and is ordered to something else, it is called ministry.

According to the ordinary course, the inferior angels only are sent, although superior ones may be sometimes sent by Divine dispensation. As regards the Beatific Vision, all are present before God, for all see God immediately ; but only the angels of the first Hierarchy understand the mysteries contained in the Divine Essence, for the inferior are informed by the superior. In this sense, therefore, all are not said to assist, but the superior only, who are directly illuminated by God.

Nor are all the angels of the second Hierarchy said to be sent ; for to be sent is to exercise some ministry

towards corporeal creatures at the command of God. Hence only the executive angels are sent, while the administrative and other supreme Orders have other offices, as indicated by their names. Thus it appears that only five of the angelic Orders are sent in ministry.

CHAPTER CXIII

THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS AND THE ASSAULTS OF THE BAD

MAN requires to be kept by the angels, for in the Providence of God the moveable and variable are governed by the immoveable and invariable. Men, indeed, are variable, and liable to fall into many errors through the application of universal principles to particular cases; they require, therefore, to be regulated by the invariable, that they may be guided according to knowledge, and follow after truth and goodness. And individual men are guarded by individual angels, because such guardianship forms part of the Divine plan concerning mankind. For Providence acts in a different way towards man, and towards perishable creatures: for man is imperishable, not only as regards the species, which is common to the race, but in regard of the soul, which is the proper form of the individual. And because Divine Providence takes account chiefly of things which are durable, and of others as subordinated to them, It stands towards each individual man as towards an entire agent or species of perishable things. So, according to Gregory, different Orders of angels have charge of different genera of created things, and probably individual angels of the same Order have charge of different

species; hence it is reasonable to suppose that different angels are deputed as guardians to individual men.

These Guardians belong to the lowest Order of angels; for among the angelic offices the care of a single individual is the least, and the more universal charges are distributed in an ascending scale among the higher Orders; for an agent is higher in proportion as it acts more universally. All men have angel guardians; for the journey of life is beset with many dangers, both from within and from without. And since this benefit is common to the human race it is given from the hour of birth; for nature begins with birth; while the gifts of grace which are given to Christians commence with baptism. Nor does a guardian angel ever wholly leave its charge, for Divine Providence never abandons anything wholly. If, therefore, a man appears to be in some measure deserted by his guardian angel, because it does not prevent his being subject to certain tribulations, or falling into sin, this must be attributed to the order of the Divine judgments. Nor if an angel leave a place does its influence thereby cease.

Angels do not, however, grieve over the ills which befall their charges, for grief, properly speaking, implies something contrary to the will; which cannot be with the angels. We may say, indeed, that nothing which happens is contrary to the will of the angels or of the Blessed, because they adhere constantly to the Will of God. Therefore, when there is said to be conflict between the angels, it is not the result of a

discord of wills, but of the diversity of their gifts. For all desire to fulfil the Divine Will, which they consult accordingly ; and this, called forth by their various merits and offices, is termed a battle among the angels. In such a manner should be explained what is said to Daniel, in the person of the angel Gabriel, about the Prince of the Kingdom of Persia.

CHAPTER CXIV

THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS

THE demons fight against men through their own malice, and being envious of man's advancement they instigate him to sin ; but the order of the combat is from God, Whose Wisdom can utilize evil by overruling it for good. Hence the combat is due to their malice, while the order is from God Himself.

To tempt properly signifies to make experiment, so that something may be known about the person tempted. Temptations are therefore multiplied for the sake of the end, being sometimes permitted for the sake of the knowledge only, sometimes for an ulterior end, whether good or evil ; but to tempt in order to injure belongs to the devil only. Man tempts both for good and evil ; God for good only, in order that we may make progress.

The world and the flesh are also said to tempt materially and instrumentally ; because a man's character is known according as he follows after, or resists the concupiscence of the flesh, or by the manner in which he accepts the prosperity or adversity through which the devil takes occasion to tempt him.

Every sin proceeds indirectly from the temptation of the devil, inasmuch as Satan was the cause of the first sin, from which a proneness to sin has followed ;

but the devil is not directly the cause of every sin, because man possesses free will, and sensitive appetite which the will ought to restrain; therefore we must conclude that man can teach himself evil, but cannot merit a supernatural reward without the help of God, which is given to him through the ministry of the angels.

Miracles, properly so called, cannot be worked by the devil, because they exceed the order and virtue of all created nature; but if the term be used broadly for things which surpass our faculties and knowledge, they may do so; but such, though real phenomena, are not real miracles; for the devils can produce whatever effects are possible through the powers of Nature, by means of seeds which are found in the elements of the world, but nothing more.

According to some, a demon once vanquished ceases absolutely to tempt; but it is more probable that he ceases only for a time; as we read that the devil left Christ for a time. But it is evident that the devil must shrink from defeat on account of his pride; and the same may happen also through the mercy of God in consideration of our infirmity. That the devils sometimes return we see from Matt. xii. where it is said: "I will return to my house whence I went out."

CHAPTER CXV

THE ACTION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES

IT is evident to our senses that bodies are active, as Aristotle says ; and an active body acts according to its actuality on other bodies according as they are *in potentia*. But the opinion of Democritus is to be rejected, who taught that action is produced by the efflux of atoms from the acting body, and suffering, by their reception in the pores of the body acted upon ; from which it would follow that one body does not suffer the action of another as a whole ; also that the acting body would be diminished by the effect of its action.

The opinions of Avicbron and Plato are also to be rejected, who admitted only separate substantial forms, and reduced accidents to natural principles. They taught that corporeal agents act according to accidental forms, and dispose matter to substantial form, ascribing to an immaterial principle the perfection which is received by the advent of the substantial form. Hence they did not conclude that the corporeal principle is not active, but that it is not universally so.

And because terms are taken from perfections, and among bodies the living are the most perfect, the word "Nature"¹ has been derived from the principle of life.

¹ *Natus*—"born."

For living things are generated through a joint principle ; as the fruit of a tree, or a germ from the matrix—from which the word is taken. It is, moreover, manifest that the active and passive principles, which are the principles of generation, are the seeds from which living things are generated, and the origin of all natural motion. For, originally, these are seminal conceptions existing ideally in the Divine Word ; secondly, they exist in the elements of the world as in universal causes, where they have been produced from the beginning ; thirdly, they are in things produced through these universal causes, according to the succession of time ; as in this plant or that animal ; and after a fourth mode they are found in the seeds which are produced by these plants and animals : and these may be themselves compared to other particular effects, as the original universal causes to the first effects produced by them.

The celestial bodies, and principally the sun's light, are the cause of the motions which take place in the inferior bodies ; because multitude proceeds from unity and every moveable from the immoveable, but their action is received differently according to the constitution of bodies. Thus it is not directly the cause of human actions which depend upon intellect and will, but only indirectly ; otherwise there would be no difference between sense and intellect : for will and intellect are not acts of bodily organs susceptible of the action of the heavenly bodies. There is, however, some difference in this regard between the intellect and the will ; for the intellect receives of necessity

from the inferior apprehensive faculties, and is liable to be somewhat influenced by the passions, while the will remains always free. Hence physical impressions affect the will less than the intellect, though both are affected in so far as both receive what the bodily organs convey.

The demons, being intellectual substances, are in no way subject to the action of the celestial bodies.

CHAPTER CXVI

OF FATE

FATE is admitted in the sense that whatever happens here below is subject to Divine Providence ; ordained thereby, and, as it were, foretold. For whatever seems to occur accidentally, either in material or in human things, may be ascribed to some preordained cause, which is the Providence of God. But theologians do not, habitually, make use of this word, because fate was supposed to depend upon a disposition of the stars, which imposed a necessity upon sublunary things. This is evidently false, as has been already said ; neither is there any reason why a thing should not be accidental in relation to inferior causes, although intended by a superior cause.

Therefore fate, understood causally, stands for the Providence of God ; for it signifies the power of willing effects, or the Will of God : while considered as existing in secondary causes it means the disposition of these causes. In this sense it is, properly speaking, mutable, although as proceeding from Divine Providence, it is immutable.

It is a mistake, however, to conclude, as some do, that everything happens by necessity. The Egyptians were also mistaken in believing that sacrifices could alter fate ; which would be contrary to the immutability of the Divine foreknowledge.

Nor is everything subject to fate, because fate is itself subject to those things to which second causes are subject ; while things which are done immediately by God, such as creation, and the glorification of spiritual substances, are not subject to second causes, and therefore not subject to fate.

CHAPTER CXVII

OF WHAT BELONGS TO HUMAN ACTIONS

To teach is to be the cause of knowledge in the learner, by bringing him from potentiality into act ministerially, in the first place by giving him the light of the less universal propositions which are easily known by first principles, or sensible signs, or the like examples or their opposites, whereby he is led on to knowledge; secondly, by strengthening the intellect, not by any active power, but by giving the right method of principles to their conclusions; whereas probably of himself he could not exercise the power of comparison sufficiently to reach the conclusions. Hence it follows that the teacher's office is external, as in the same way a doctor cures disease by medicines.

Likewise men do not teach the angels, but only speak to them; for men are to angels, as the inferior angels are to the superior; and the inferior do not enlighten the superior, but manifest their thoughts by a sort of locution; and men act in the same way.

The soul cannot by its natural power make any change in corporeal matters; because it is only from God the First Cause, virtually containing the matter and form, and by an agent compounded of matter and form, that such a change can be made. The angels produce such change only by the application of some

corporeal agent : much less can the soul do so, when we speak of direct change ; but indirectly it can work a change in the body belonging to it, as appears in the apprehension of the soul as regards the sensitive appetite, in fear, and the like ; and also we see how the sensible life of the body is affected by the imagination, especially the eyes, where sense is prominent. Neither is a body subject to the separated soul by the force of the latter ; for as the soul is determined to vivify the body and move it, a dead member has no longer subjection as regards local motion. Apart from and above this natural power it may receive power from a Divine Source. The demons often pretend to be souls, for the purpose of deluding and deceiving men, as happened to Simon Magus.

CHAPTER CXVIII

THE PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL

THE sensitive soul, not being a simple or self-subsisting substance, does not exist by direct creation. Its being is like that of other corporeal forms without independent being, which are said to exist as other composite beings exist through them, and hence it is dependent on the *compositum*. As the generator is like the thing generated, the sensitive soul and other forms must be produced by corporeal agents making a change in the matter from potentiality to act by its corporeal power. The more powerful an agent is, the wider is the sphere of its action. Thus non-living [inorganic] bodies are lower in the natural order, and beget their likeness not mediately but immediately, as fire begets fire; whereas living bodies, with greater power, beget both immediately and mediately, in nutrition as regards the first way, when flesh begets flesh, and the second in the act of generation chiefly by the soul of the generator. As the sensitive soul is therefore not a self-subsisting, nor a self-operative being, it cannot be made such; but it is dependent on the *compositum* to which it belongs. The intellectual soul is otherwise produced; forasmuch as material force cannot produce an immaterial effect like intelligence, which is independent of the body. The intellect is produced by an external force, and is self-subsisting;

and hence it has independent existence by separate creation.

Rational souls were not created together at the beginning of the world, as some have thought ; for if it were so, the union of body and soul in man would be an accidental thing, and hence man would be man only accidentally, or the soul alone would be man. Neither was the soul created with the angels, for their mode of existence is different, as we see when we consider that if the soul's nature is to be in a body (as it is), to be without a body is unnatural, for the soul would not then enjoy its natural perfection. It does not become us to imagine that God should begin His work from imperfect things ; He has not made man without hand and foot, which are natural parts of man, and much less would He have made him without a body ; therefore He made the soul and body together. If it be said that it is not natural for a soul to be united to a body, we must ask for the reason why it was so united ; and if it be said that it was by His Will only, then this would appear irrational, as the soul would not require the body. Nor would there be any reason why, if souls were created at the beginning of the world, they should be confined to one body for so long a time. And further, the union of the soul to a body would then be a thing of chance, as two wills would be required, the will of the soul and the will of the generator. So if the union of the soul with the body were against its will, it would be violent and penal. Hence we must hold that souls are created when they are introduced into their bodies.

CHAPTER CXIX

THE PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY

MAN'S true nature includes the substance derived from nutriment, inasmuch as it is identified with flesh and bone ; and we must reject the opinion that man's true nature has only to do with the matter created at the beginning in the first man and derived from him to all others. Nutriment is a kind of stimulus to resist loss, as alloy is to the precious metals. Multiplication of bodies is therefore made by nutriment, which becomes part of human nature, as we see in the case of animals and plants. The opinion is to be rejected which teaches that the matter which is at first received by the soul belongs to human nature, and that because this was not sufficient other matter was added through the change of nutriment into the substance nourished to make up the necessary quantity, and hence that such matter belongs to human nature only secondarily. This opinion cannot stand ; because if the nutriment were not changed into the substance, generation would not take place according to individual likeness. Nutriment is not meant only for increase, but to restore, and thus it makes up for loss, and belongs to the one individual nature, as what is lost belonged to it also.

APPENDIX

A

Chapter II., p. 5.—“*Demonstratio quia*” and “*propter quid*.” The scholastics call that a *demonstratio quia* where a cause is only known through its effect, as opposed to the more perfect *propter quid*, where the effect is known through the cause;—thus he who knows fire understands smoke, while one who knew smoke only, would have a very imperfect notion of fire.

St. Thomas explains the difference, saying that the *demonstratio propter quid* is derived from what precedes the thing demonstrated not only in our mode of conceiving it but in itself, as being the cause of the same :—so we demonstrate that man is sociable by the consideration of his natural faculties, which could hardly be developed in a state of isolation ;—while in the *demonstratio quia*, the effect being often better known to us than its cause, we argue from the effect to know the cause. In this manner we demonstrate the existence of God from creation as being His effect. These two precepts are now distinguished by the terms analysis and synthesis ;—the former going from the particular to the universal, the latter *vice versa*.

B

Chapter II., p. 5.—“*Potentia*” and “*actus*.” These constitute two of the most transcendental notions of the human mind. *Potentia* is sometimes used to denote faculty or operative power, but in its strictly scholastic acceptation it denotes

some incomplete reality, which is fundamental to our conception of created being ; while *actus* signifies reality pure and simple, which admits of no further explanation. St. Thomas says that *potentia* and *actus* divide being, and any genus of beings whatever.

It is easy to conceive such potentiality in substance with regard to its accidental perfections ; but to understand the same potentiality with regard to the substance itself, as in the material world, or the distinction between essence and existence in spiritual substances, we must allow, with St. Thomas, of some kind of composition in every created being however simple ; God alone being altogether simple, and therefore inherently indestructible ; as he says : "Quod est in summo simpliciter est in summo entitatis."

C

Chapter III., p. 8.—*Matter* and *form*. These words are necessarily metaphorical, as are all which express metaphysical notions. Matter, according to the Latin root, signifies what is confused and chaotic. Form, on the contrary, signifies what is determinate and completely finished. Hence *forma* was used by the Latins as synonymous with beauty ; and these two words were transferred to express two essential constituents of corporeal as distinguished from spiritual substance. *Matter* in the scholastic sense stands, not for any corporeal substance, whether extended or not extended, but merely for the subject of generation and corruption, or being *in potentia* only. Aristotle illustrates the distinction between matter and form (the principle of determination) by the simile of the wax and the impression in a seal.

This twofold constitution of corporeal things becomes clear if we consider that there is a constant process at work in the physical world, by which substances are changed, not only with respect to their qualities or accidents, but also in their

substantial essence. Hence we distinguish between mere alteration and the change which takes place in generation and corruption : as oxygen and hydrogen when they combine to produce water acquire intrinsically new properties. Several theories have been framed to account for this double order of facts, which arrive at explaining them away ; while the scholastic theory, though somewhat obscure, is rigorously founded on facts. They say that in order to a change in the substance itself there must be some common subject or substratum, which remains the same in both terms,—that from which and to which the substance passes, otherwise there would be no change at all, but rather annihilation of what formerly existed and production of a new being. This common subject is called *matter*, to signify something which can assume various substantial determinations, under the influence of external agents, being intrinsically indifferent, or *in potentia* to all of them. This potentiality differs from mere possibility or conceivableness which exists only in the mind, and may be called a real as distinguished from a logical possibility ; for although matter does not actually so exist by itself, yet when *de facto* existing in a determinate manner, if it were not really distinct from its determination it would not be the subject of substantial transmutation.

The determination itself is called *form*, and this too cannot be conceived to exist by itself, as such, but together with its subject, so as to constitute along with it a complete corporeal substance. Thus what we first understand is the corporeal substance, from which we pass to consider its essential elements of matter and form, arguing from the above facts, which are the object of common experience.

D

Chapter III., p. 10.—*Genus by reduction* refers to the categories in which Aristotle classed the various notions of the human mind. Thus the primary conception of reality is

substance ; that, viz. which so exists as not to require to inhere in something-else ; the second is *accident*, or that which cannot naturally exist unless it inheres in substance (such as colour, shape, quantity, etc.), which form the two supreme genres under which all finite beings may be mentally arranged. Aristotle drops the further division of substance, adopted by Porphyry and subsequent philosophers, made by the addition of two differential notes, viz. material and spiritual, by which we obtain two supreme species, body and spirit. Adding to these two more differential notes, viz. animate and inanimate, we obtain two more species ; and so on. These differential notes are neither genus nor species, but are *reducible* to either, e. g. "rational" may be reduced to the species man or to the genus animal. In like manner we say that parts are reducible to the genus or species of the whole ; privations to the forms from which they are removed ; motion of whatever kind to the term which is reached by it. So local motion is reducible to the figure of space ; alteration to the quality, generation and corruption to the substance produced or destroyed.

E

Chapter V., p. 15.—“*Substantial form.*” Substance and accident.

Form has been explained above as the first determining principle of matter, by which it is specified and made into a corporeal substance. Matter, although so determined, retains its indifference in regard of all other forms by which it may be successively determined, under the influence of a proportionate agent, and under certain conditions of weight, volume, etc. Hence the scholastic theory of substantial mutation, also called generation and corruption, according as the newly-introduced form is more or less perfect than the previous one ; for in the material world, as the ancient philosophers saw,

nothing is generated without something being corrupted, and *vice versa*.

This substantial form is, together with matter, the proper subject of another, called accidental form, or simply accident (from the verb *accedere*, "to be added," not *accidit*, "it happens").

Although modern idealism would do away with any real difference between substance and accident, there must be some distinction which is not merely mental and subjective ; nor can quantity or extension be one and the same thing with their subject. According to the scholastics no creature is perfect of its own essence or substance, but must necessarily be completed by some accident. They further taught that science properly deals with substances, accidents being only the preliminary step to the knowledge of substance.

F

Chapter V., p. 16.—*Mode, species and order*. A creature's perfection depends upon something which precedes, accompanies and follows the essence. That which precedes and constitutes *mode*, is given by the exemplary and active causes ; then come the intrinsic constituents by which the thing is classed in some kind or *species* ; lastly follows the tendency and operation of the thing through which it is disposed and *ordered* relatively to the whole creation, *e. g.* a work of art presupposed : first, an artist with a plan conceived in his mind (exemplary cause) and skill sufficient to carry it out (active cause) ; secondly, that the thing itself be so arranged and proportioned in its parts as to represent the artist's idea ; thirdly, it must serve some purpose and conduce to the welfare of those for whom it was intended. This applies to the works of God in a higher and truer sense, for art is an imitation of nature ; and we have here a clue to the laws of beauty both

in nature and in art, as also of the deformity of certain things even in the natural world, when considered apart from the whole creation.

G

Chapter VI., p. 17.—“*Fire, rests in its own place.*” The saying is obsolete, but conveys a true meaning, for before the discovery of the law of gravity by Newton, the phenomenon was expressed by assigning different layers, which the ancients called spheres, to matter, solid, liquid and gaseous ; and fire, as being lighter and more subtle than air, was supposed to occupy the highest sphere. Hence the “four elements” (earth, water, air and fire), by which they understood, not four elementary substances, but four states of matter—a conception which seems to harmonize with the discoveries of the latest science.

H

Chapter VII., p. 20.—*Species of numbers.* According to St. Thomas, there is no multitude which cannot be reduced somehow to unity, and *number* is simply multitude thus reduced. In order to accomplish this, some common note must be assumed, generic, specific or transcendental (universal), which may afford us a measure applicable to each subject of the multitude, which we then come to consider as *one*. In this manner we obtain different unities, which constitute so many different numerical species, inasmuch as they differ from each other by the addition of the common note, viz. number, as things differ specifically by the addition of an essential note. If we consider things merely as distinguished from each other, they constitute only multitude, not number. Hence the dictum: “Man and horse are not two, but twice one.”

We may also observe, with St. Thomas, that *one* is not

properly a number, but the principle of numbers : "Unum non est numerus sed principium numeri."

The common note in material things is generally taken from quantity (dimension, weight, etc.). In spiritual substances it is taken from some spiritual property. Hence we have the so-called categorical number (*i. e.* the number which comes under the category of quantity) and the transcendental number, which does not belong to any particular category. The former (that of quantity) is reducible to accident ; the latter is identified with the substance itself.

I

Chapter IX., p. 24.—*The potential posterior to the actual.* This follows from the principle : "Nihil reducitur de potentia ad actum, nisi per aliquid quod sit in actu"—nothing which is *in potentia* can be reduced to actuality except by something which is already actual. Thus the so-called self-development of things from an embryonic state is only admitted by scholastic philosophy (endorsed by common-sense and experience), with the presupposition of pure actuality as the first cause of all potentiality.

J

Chapter IX., p. 25.—*Celestial bodies subject to change of place only.* The ancients supposed with Plato that celestial bodies, being perfect substances in a state of complete isolation, could undergo no change in their substance or accidental qualities, except extrinsically with regard to space. St. Thomas does not propose this as a statement philosophically demonstrated, but only accounts for the supposition by conclusions which, given the premises, would have been philosophically correct.

K

Chapter XIII., p. 35.—*Univoce, equivoce, analogice*—words denoting the modes in which a term may be applied to different subjects. *Univoce* when it is used in the same sense as “man,” applied to Peter, Paul, etc.; *equivoce* when used in an altogether different sense, as “bear” of the animal or the constellation; *analogice* when admitting different essences it implies some resemblance or relation—as we speak of “light” physical and intellectual; or the word “divine” may be applied to the grace of God and Dante’s poem. Equivocal terms are, properly speaking, mere play upon words—hence the puns in which the English language abounds. St. Thomas says all other *equivoca* may be reduced to *analogica*.

L

Chapter XV., p. 44.—*Ideas*. This word is used by St. Thomas in a restricted sense. Before modern philosophical systems had accustomed us to the use of the terms “subjective” and “objective,” it was generally admitted that our thoughts corresponded with the reality of the external world, and that *truth* consisted in such correspondence. And because thought is really the effect of the mind as well as of the exterior things which concur in its production, it is aptly called in English, “conception,”—in Latin, “verbum”: the word of the mind by which it asserts its adequacy to its external object. Starting from these conceptions as conformable to their exterior models, the mind is able to form thoughts of its own device, according to which alterations may be produced in the material world. These latter thoughts, presupposing the former as their necessary substratum, were properly and exclusively called *ideas* by the ancients, from the Greek word *ιδέα*, “appearance,” “vision”; and it is only to the modern

confusion of philosophical systems that the word has been transferred to signify indifferently that which is held or comprehended by the intellectual faculties. It is evident that human art can only deal with accidental changes. To God as supreme artist and architect may be applied the words of the Apostle: "I have laid the foundation and another builds thereon," viz. man, whose every work presupposes a subject wherein to produce a change.

M

Chapter XVII., p. 50.—*Contraries* and *contradictories* denote diverse forms of opposition which may find place in our conceptions and the things represented by them. *Contrariety* exists when things belonging to the same genus so differ as to exclude each other from the same subject, as truth and error, belonging to the genus knowledge, or black and white to that of colour; while *contradiction* exists between things opposed to each other as to be and not to be, e.g. somebody and nobody. Contrariety signifies a real strife or contention, but there can be no strife between what is and is not.

Two other kinds of opposition may be added, viz. privation and relation;—thus light and darkness are opposed as perfection to the privation thereof; father and son, inasmuch as they exclude each other in the same subject.

N

Chapter XXIII., p. 64.—*Formally* and *materially*. Formally, *i. e.* under a certain determination which does not descend to individuals, as if we said God had predestined 100 or 1000 persons, not precisely this or that person. These terms are here used in an accommodated sense derived from the material

world, where *form* denotes the specific constituent and *matter* the individuating principle ; regarded, along with the quantity arising from it, as singular and incommunicable.

O

Chapter XXVII., p. 71.—*Generation* is defined by Aristotle as “*Origo viventis a principio vivente conjuncto secundum similitudinem ejusdem naturæ*” ; which assumes the three conditions required by the Thomistic school, viz. first, that both generator and generated should be living ; secondly, that the latter should be produced from the substance of the former ; thirdly, that there must subsist between the two the utmost similarity of nature which is compatible with distinct individuality.

P

Chapter XXX., p. 77.—*Numerical terms in the Divinity*, etc. This signifies that the number three, as applied to the Divine Persons, must not be taken in a mathematical sense, as arising from the division of quantity, but in the metaphysical or transcendental sense, according to which it does not multiply the Essence or Nature, as it does in creatures. Thus when we say three men, the species as well as the person is multiplied ; yet the species is mentally considered as one, being the common note by which the multitude is reduced to unity. It is evident that the transcendental number adds nothing to things so numbered, but simply multiplies them by dividing their formal constituents. Hence if we said three Gods, the Divine Essence would be multiplied, but by saying three Persons only these are multiplied. Why the Divine Essence, being really the same with the Persons, is not also multiplied,

at least indirectly, is a mystery we are bound to believe, not to scrutinize; nevertheless St. Thomas goes a step further. In reply to the objection that "things which are equal to a third are equal to each other," he says, that in respect of that in which they are said to be One it is true, in other respects it is false. The Three Divine Persons are really identical with the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the implied relations add nothing to the Divine Substance, which is really distinguished therefrom; nevertheless, according to the manner in which the Divine Essence is conceived, they add to It a relation of opposition—hence we can conclude nothing with regard to Their identity. This is very different from the absurd answer given by some theologians, viz. that the axiom is true applied to creatures, but not so when applied to God—as if truth were not universal!

Q

Chapter XLI., p. 102.—*Notional Acts*. By the term "notions," applied to the Blessed Trinity, St. Thomas, in common with all theologians, means whatever helps us to understand the distinction of Persons in the Godhead; for although the mystery is unfathomable, we can and must explain the manner in which we acknowledge the plurality of Persons. Thus we admit in the Godhead *one* Essence or Nature, with *two* active powers and the Notional Acts corresponding to them, viz. Generation and Spiration; from whence result *four* relations, viz. paternity and filiation, spiration and procession; of which the first two are opposed to each other, while the last two, though also mutually opposed, are not so to the former: hence *Three* Persons, in accordance with the said relations which require three distinct subjects. To these Three Divine Persons are assigned nine notional names: to the First Person—Father, Principle, Unborn; to the Second—Son, Word, Born; to the Third—Holy Ghost, Love, Gift.

R

Chapter LXVIII., p. 170.—*Crystalline or water-like heaven*—so called on account of its transparency. The ancients, considering the earth as the centre of creation, apportioned all space around and above it, under the general term “Heaven,” to different classes of bodies. The lower or Sydereal Heaven, partly diaphanous and partly resplendent, contained the planets and fixed stars; above was the Crystalline Heaven, wholly diaphanous; and above all the Emyrean (from the Greek $\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$, “fire,”) where the Blessed were supposed to dwell with the angels in the glory of God. St. Thomas gives the opinions current in his time without vouching for their truth; but we must not suppose the ancients to have been so childish as to have intended by these spheres, continuous bodies encircling the earth; but rather different layers or strata into which different bodies were gathered according to their natural condition.

S

Chapter LXXI., p. 177.—*Power of celestial bodies in things that putrify*. An obsolete opinion according to which the celestial bodies were supposed to supply by their occult power for the absence of seeds in the apparent cases of spontaneous generation observed among the lower forms of life.

T

Chapter LXXVI., p. 190.—On the union of the soul with the body St. Thomas says (Art. 7): “Inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not being from the being of the body, but by its own being is immediately united to the body. Thus ‘form’ as *actus* is far removed from matter, which is being *in potentia* only.”

U

Chapter LXXVI., p. 190.—*A threefold totality.* A whole being, that which is divisible into parts, may be considered as threefold according to three modes of division, viz. first, that of quantitative parts, as a line or any body; secondly, logical and essential parts—as the thing defined is in the parts of the definition; or thirdly, the potential whole, which may be divided into virtual parts or faculties. These are called by St. Thomas “subjective parts,” as being the subjects in which some universal essence is existing.

W

Chapter LXXVIII., p. 197.—By *general or common-sense* the scholastics understood that internal organic faculty in which all the perceptions of the exterior senses are collected, united and compared. What in modern use is called common-sense, viz. the intellectual faculty as it is capable of understanding first principles and plain truths more or less clearly in all sane persons, was called by the ancients “intellect,” as distinguished from reason, which argues from principles to conclusions.

X

Chapter LXXIX., p. 200.—*Third mode of passivity or suffering.* A thing may be said to suffer or be passive in two senses. First, improperly and metaphysically, as the simple act of receiving; in which sense our intellect is passive in regard of the reception of the forms of knowledge from exterior objects, a mode of passivity which implies no loss or deterioration, but the reverse. Secondly, properly; in which sense passive or passivity (suffering) means the acquisition of

some quality connected with the loss or rejection of another. Hence if what is lost be suitable or agreeable to the nature of the subject, we have pain or "suffering," commonly so called. If, however, we consider the exchange without regard to its suitability or otherwise to the subject, we have, thirdly, suffering (or passivity) in its general and philosophical sense; in which a man "suffers" as well when he recovers as when he falls sick, when he rejoices as when he is sad.

THE END





