The Concept Purpose

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A PHILOSOPHICAL THESIS

by the

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUND

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CHAPTER I

PURPOSE AND THE VOLITIONAL ACTIVITY

In the unity of consciousness, we find the intellectual side of life and the volitional side of life very closely bound up together. We never find in experience either the intellectual or the volitional elements independent and alone. In psychology we find neuroses and psychoses inevitably linked together; and if we examine ideas, and try to determine their nature, we again find the intellectual and the volitional closely intertwined. Both are united in a single consciousness. According to the philosophy of Locke, ideas are the objects of thought. Locke's definitions of "Idea" are as follows: An idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks" . . . "whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Ideas are the material with which the mind works. They are obtained wholly from experience. They come into the mind as the results, the effects, produced through the means of sensation. These ideas, coming from and given through sensation, are again the objects of the operations of the Mind, which, as an independent and active agent, unites and combines

these ideas from sensation, and hence there comes to be a second class of ideas—the ideas from Reflection. Knowledge arises from both these sources, which together form experience. Hence all our knowledge is about ideas, and ideas only are known by the mind.

But this position, inasmuch as it does not cover all the facts, is unsatisfactory. In that reflection is an active process of the mind, acting upon the ideas of perception and producing other ideas; the ideas show evidences of an activity of the mind which has not yet been taken into consideration. The activity of the mind is a fundamental thought with Kant. The problem between Nominalism and Conceptualism does not exist for him. The mind cannot think perceptions directly, immediately. No sooner are percepts received than they are classed under concepts, and must be thought through concepts. But the mind can think concepts directly, without the intervention of any further idea. The reason transforms and synthesizes ideas, in accordance with the forms and categories, because it is the very nature and constitution of the mind to do this very thing. An *à priori* philosophy goes beyond the given, and transcends experience.

There is no possibility of an idea that is purely intellectual, and has no other aspect. Every idea is as much a volitional process, or rather gives evidence of a distinct volitional activity, as it is an intellectual datum. As the volitional character and the intellectual character are both to be found displayed in ideas, we know them to be purposive, *id est,* they express or give evidence of a purpose. This is embodied in, or expressed by, the idea and is a principle characteristic of

an idea. It is in the ideas we find evidences of purposes which have been acting upon them or through them, altering their character, making of diverse ideas homogeneous units, and giving them the character of purposive ideas. Purposes are not the product of ideas, neither are ideas the product of purposes. But the sources of the purposes must be sought not in precepts or concepts, but by reference to the Will.

This attitude is opposed to that of Royce, when he says, "Ideas first voluntarily bind themselves to a given task—the internal purpose is selective—the idea learns to develop its internal meaning so as to assign to itself a specific purpose—the idea selects its object —the idea is selective. It seeks its own. It attends as itself has chosen. It desires in its own way—the idea's own conscious purpose or will,"[1] *et al.* This seems to mean that each idea possesses all the characteristics and powers of a complete and separate human mind, possessing the ability to choose, will, plan and execute. Such ideas are hypostasized.

"The will is a kind of causality *belonging to living beings,* in so far as they are rational," says Kant.[2] If a will acted without regard to an intellect, it would be blind. But in all our experience, we can never find evidence of a blind, an abstract will. "Tendency is only the empty form of the will . . . and as every empty form is only an abstraction, volition is existential or actual only in its relation to the representation of a present or future state. No one can really will purely and simply, without willing this or

[1] Royce: The World and the Individual.

[2] Kant: Practical Reason.

that. A will that does not will something is nothing. It is only by the determination of its content that the will acquires the possibility of existence, and this content is representation. Thus, then, there is no will without representation, as Aristotle had said before: ὀρεκτικόν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας (De An. III, 30). "[1] What we know is always and only an intelligent will, acting purposively. It is not independent of all influence. It can be trained and developed, or it can be debased and weakened. It increases in power by its activity, and decreases by failure to exert its power. It can be guided by ideas—that is, by whatever ideas it itself chooses, first to attend to and admit into consideration, then to permit to exert an influence upon its own autonomy, its own self-determination, and thus ideas do in a sense determine the will. The voluntary course of action pursued by one man differs from that of another as greatly as the ideas of one man differ from those of another. But yet, while the intellect and the will may influence each other, and may be very closely united in a single consciousness, it is the will that determines the course of action. One is able to select by an act of will upon what he will fix his attention, what ideas he will entertain. "We do not indeed say, our will causes our ideas," though it selects among them, "but we do say, our ideas now (imperfectly) embody our will."[2] The will gives the character of purposiveness, the ability to reveal the purposes which they embody. The purpose as thus revealed, *is not itself active* and causal. It defines or determines; but for

[1] Hartmann: Philosophie des Unbewussten.

[2] Royce: The World and the Individual.

the explanation, it is necessary to refer to the will itself as the cause.

The philosophy of Fichte may be very far from a complete and all-embracing system of metaphysics, and especially in the more minute ramifications of the deduction, may be far from finding its verification in experience. But the "Wissenschaftslehre" may be considered as an analysis of consciousness with respect to the point of departure which Fichte adopts. In searching for the first fundamental principle, recourse must be had at once to experience. In every perception, there are present both intelligence and its object. There can be no subject without an object, nor an object without a subject. The empirical basis must be assumed, taken for granted, posited, in order that there may be any starting-place at all. This, then, being given and granted, abstraction leads us from the empirical facts of consciousness to that which cannot be an object of thought in experience, but which is the very ground of the possibility of thought. From a proposition universally true of consciousness, we are led to that in which the relation between the terms and the terms themselves exists, and which is conscious of them, the Ego, which really exists, and which is present in every possible fact of consciousness, as the unifying and relating principle. Above all things, this Ego is *active;* for to relate is an activity, and thinking is active and free.

In his life, Fichte had had abundant opportunity to test the power of his will, and he had come to rely upon it to such an extent, that he made it the supreme principle, to which all else should be subordinated. He

has emphasized this aspect of consciousness, that the will is causal.

In order to discover wherein willing lies, we must ask each one to examine and analyze his own conscious experience. No definitions will make the activities of the will plainer, for they are common to all consciousnesses. Yet they cannot be found as pure activities, but in their very nature as voluntary, distinguished from involuntary reflexes, are always found in relation to ideas. Willing is found in acting and doing, entering the whole mental life in a far from simple manner. " The point to which the will is applied is always an idea."[1] We discover this activity in our use of ideas, or in our realization of ideas in their final fulfilment, or satisfaction by union with their " other."

" What we will is dependent upon what we think."[2] The point of focus for willing is the idea. We can conceive of no willing without some form of ideation present, and these ideas must be presented in consciousness, through perception, experience. "And what we think is subordinated to a comprehensive and steadfast will."[3] Munsterberg's position,[4] that there is a priority of the idea to the volitional activity, would seem to be true, if we illustrate it in this manner: Prenatal movement is not volitional, but instinctive. At birth, the sense-impressions of light, etc., rapidly give rise to many percepts, which are almost at once combined into concepts. Because of the ideas thus arising, there is,

[1] James : Psychology, B. C., Chapter XXIII.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ladd : Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, Chapter XVII.

[4] Grundzüge der Psychologie.

first, reflexive movement, to answer the stimuli, but soon there is also, on the basis of ideas thus obtained the development of volitional activity; and movement is excited not only as a reflex, but also as the effect of desire, of definite volition. The will is already at work almost as soon as there are ideas, and then purposes are formed and executed. And Berkeley says, "A Spirit (Mind) is one simple, undivided, active being . . . as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the Will." "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as often as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of Volition, we only amuse ourselves with words." "The ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will."[1] But I can open my eyes to receive them or not, as I choose. I can appropriate or exclude the ideas from sensation. And this fact, in experience gives evidence of the volitional activity.

The will, then, is causal, and can initiate a new causal series. Whether we look for the cause in a boat or a book, we return to a primary volitional element. The lumber is sawn and bent by the strength of a man whose every move is determined by his causal will, or

[1] Berkeley: Principles, §§ 27, 28, and 29.

the argument of the book follows a course which has been previously determined upon by a will. The purpose involved in either case is the result of the action of the will choosing among the various ideas. The will has thus formulated and embodied a purpose, and has unified the ideas in this purpose and made them serve the end which it has chosen as its goal. It is by our own volition that we express our ideas in acts, and we say, "I act, or I will. I am determined only by the ideas which I have often before chosen as my guides. I am responsible for my actions."[1] Thus the Ego, as an originating activity, is a cause, an initiating or first cause, of which the effects are both mental and physical. I choose, and there results in the world a new causal series which changes not only the course of my own life, but the whole course of the world subsequently. When a crime is committed, not only does each one demand, "Who did this?" but society at large requires an answer, and places the responsibility upon the criminal. It is the result of an act of will, and an act implies an agent. The civil law holds the criminal, and judges him as alone responsible for the act which has altered the smooth-flowing course of the river, and detrimentally changed the facts and originated a new causal series. The historical variations from this rule are to be accounted for on the same basis. That the Greeks solemnly tried and condemned to exile the knife with which a murder was committed was due to the fact that the Greeks had a strong tendency to personify inanimate objects; and as persons they were responsible agents.

[1] Ladd : Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, Chapter XVII.

It is immediately in the causal activity of the will that we define our examples of purpose first displayed. Whenever we define a problem or isolate any question for the purpose of inquiry, when we judge of what is necessary for the solution of any problem, we immediately find that it is through the use of the concept purpose as a determining factor. In all our thinking we find it manifested. We can control our course of thinking. We select our ideas. With every conscious movement we have interposed between the desire to move and the idea, and the movement accomplished, an act of willing which is unique.

As our percepts become in time generalized under concepts, so on the basis of our ideas, voluntarily chosen, we erect what we call ideals. These ideals we set before our minds as goals. They are to be realized, and this calls for conscious, voluntary action. In this way the will places before the mind an ideal which is yet to be fulfilled, and it purposes a fulfilment in the end, the reality. Hence we may define an ideal as the expression of a purpose as presented before the mind, and a real thing is the concrete result, fulfilment, satisfaction, embodiment of the ideal in the outer world. It depends on the character of the ideal whether the object is a partial and incomplete or a whole and complete realization of the ideal. Both the ideal and the real give evidence of the presence of both elements of the mind —the intellectual and the volitional. But while it is true that the mind can be the source of many new causal series, it is also true that free will is not exercised at the expense of the laws of nature, and cannot change the essential conditions of the actual combina-

tion; it only shows itself in the very sphere of these conditions. It uses the limits set to its activity by the laws and the constitution of nature as the steps, the means by which it works its own effects. To go against these is ruin. Fire may warm or it may destroy. Men can use fire in their mechanical arts, but they cannot stay the burning of a forest.

In the highest forms of volition we notice, first, a choice of ends and the fixing of one before the mind, with more or less clearness and persistence. Then the desire for its accomplishment must oust and defeat other conflicting desires. The selection of the means to be used in the accomplishment of the end requires their deliberation, and a comparative weighing of values. Choice of ideas, of means, is itself of a voluntary character. Then deliberation is cut short by the "fiat of the will," and the choice is made. The executive volition, the will to act, leads directly to the carrying out of the purpose. The fact that I have decided, that I have chosen, is an ultimate fact of experience.

After this the execution may be more or less automatic and involuntary. But even so, it must at least be referred to previous will-acts. A man may dress automatically, but the child has difficulty in learning how to dress. The pianist has learned through many separate acts of the will how to control his fingers. His accustomed control shows a high form of developed will-activity. This is not automatic and involuntary in its origin, at least. The resistance of the fingers is brought under the will-control so thoroughly that the action of the will is directly carried into execution, without the need of overcoming an inhibition or a physical

stiffness, and so the response, because it is easier, is *called* automatic. Again, "the case of the old curate, who had become insane and who used to recite with the utmost eloquence the exordium of Father Bribaine" in a most impressive manner, although he was insane even to entire imbecility, is still an example of purpose, although it is not to be referred to present, but to past acts or habits of willing. The conscious and purposive action by volition was there once, although now only the effect may remain.

All volitions and choices are more or less purposeful actions. A purpose embraces both means and end. A purpose cannot exist apart from or independent of a will, to which it may be referred as an effect to a cause. Its chief characteristic is that the will is fixed steadily upon the end as the plan is executed, and controls every step of the progression. The degree of success is dependent upon the degree of this fixity. When applied to an ideal of life or character, which appears unitary owing to conscious planning, then a man is called "far-sighted." It is "the man of one idea," who centres his life in one purpose, that gains the highest degree of volitional power. In the construction of ideals we may set before ourselves ideals that not only have never been realized, but which may never be attainable.

"The will is the source, the origin of ideals, and also of their realization."[1] In the pursuit of such ideals, there is an interesting inhibitive volition that is no less a result of purposiveness than is activity, and that is, the suppression of all that may tend to interfere with

[1] Dewey: Psychology, Chapter XVIII.

the execution of the purpose and the attainment of the ideal end. This is the development of the will—in self-control, the checking of the causal activity of the will, by the very *act* of the will itself, by which the power to will is increased, and the ability to maintain the ideal before the mind by voluntary activity is strengthened. The only really efficacious cause that we can know is our own volitional activity. The only purposes that are immediately perceptible to us, are our own purposes, formed ideally at first in our minds, and later actively carried into effect. We know the active force of our own wills. We know the ideal, the end, or the plan according to which we act, and that the formation of the plan is our own act. This much is given us in our own immediate experience—and no more.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION

I SIT in the window, looking out over the Sound. I have seen and sailed many boats, and I desire to have a boat, and to join the fleet yonder. I get a piece of paper and a pencil, and I lay down the lines of a vessel, and make specifications for the lumber. Then I send for the materials with which to work. Putting aside all other work and pleasure, I put into effect the plan I have conceived and laid out on paper. I have chosen the end—the boat, now an ideal, but soon to be a real thing—and I have selected the means for its fulfilment. In my work I find that many of the means that I have selected must be abandoned and new devices substituted; yet the end I keep steadfastly before my mind. Gradually the work nears completion. The effect of days of labor is to be seen. The finishing touches assume an exaggerated magnitude. And at last she is finished and launched, and the desire and the ideas, previously gained from experience, upon the basis of which the will acted in forming first the plan in the mind and on paper, and later carried them into effect, are satisfied, and there is a completed purpose, which in its fulfilment is a Reality.

By an analysis of this illustration, which we may make to stand as typical of all our purposes, we may form a definition of what a Purpose is. There are

many parts, means, end, united in one, hence the whole is an organism, organum. The formation of a plan or purpose in the mind involves the action of the will. And then this plan, sustained by the will before the mind determines what future volitions are to be in order to carry out this plan. "Volition is regulated, harmonized impulse. It involves a double process: first, the various impulses must be coördinated with each other; secondly, they must all be brought into harmonious relations with an end, must be subordinated to one principle,"[1] and must form an organum. Consequently, there is a neccessary connection between each of the elements and all the others. This is not a *causal connection.* One means does not cause another, nor do any or all of the means cause the end. And certainly the end is not a cause of the means. It cannot be a "*causa sui*" to cause itself, and so self-explanatory. Even the ideal representation of the end does not cause either the means or the real end. Neither the plan nor the purpose is in any stage causal. It is not a "*causa finalis.*" A final *cause* is used to *explain.* Purpose is *not an explanatory concept.* It only *defines,* as is the case with the other philosophical concepts. It is the will-activity that initiates a new causal series. Here is the great confusion of Janet's "Finales Causes," that it does not distinguish between a Purpose and a final cause.

Again: Both in the ideal representation of a purpose before the consciousness, and in the concrete external realization afterwards attained, there is an identity between each means and the end. Thus the end

[1] Dewey: Psychology.

may be considered the sum of all the means which have been used to bring it about. "These means, however, are not intrinsically distinct from the end. They are only proximate ends; they are the end analyzed into its constituent factors. For example, the end of volition is the construction of a house. The means are the plans, the brick and mortar, the arrangement of these by the workmen, etc. It is evident that the end is not something intrinsically different from the means; it is the means taken as a harmoniously manifested whole. The means, on the other hand, are something more than precedents to an end. The first means, the plans, are only the end in its simplest, most elementary form, and the next means are an expansion of this, while the final means are identical with the end. "When we look at the act as a realized whole, we call it end; when we look at it in process of realization, partially made out, we call it *means*. But the action of the intellect is requisite to analyze the end, the whole, into its means, the component factors."[1] If any means were not identical with the end, it would be immediately dropped out of consciousness as useless.

As the means become realized, there is an accumulation of effects, a cumulative aspect. Time is required, first, to form the purpose in the mind and to select the means, then to carry out the purpose and bring it to a realization. The purpose must be worked out in time. From start to finish the purpose-forming process is carried on in this continuum. The whole is present continuously in consciousness. "Volition," which forms the purpose in accordance with the ideas present

[1] Dewey: Psychology, Chapter XVIII.

in consciousness, " is impulse consciously directed towards the attainment of a recognized end . . . which is felt as desirable."[1] Throughout the whole there is a feeling of the value of the end—that it was worth while to go through the labor and privations necessary to attain the end. " A volition or act of will involves, therefore, over and above the impulse, knowledge and feeling. There must be knowledge of the end of action. There must be knowledge of the relations of this end to the means by which it is to be attained; and this end must awaken a pleasurable or painful feeling in the mind. It must possess an interesting quality, or be felt to be in immediate subjective relation to the self. The impulses furnish the moving force by which the end whose quality is recognized, and whose necessity for the happiness of self is felt, is actually brought about. It is the energy which furnishes its actual accomplishment, directed along the channels laid down by the intellect for the satisfaction of feeling."[2] Even the feeling of curiosity may be an incentive to the mind to exert a purposive activity. In fact, the Feelings play a very great part in the formation and execution of purposes, and are in no wise to be left out of account. This is easily seen in the fine arts, where the æsthetic feelings play so important a part. Purpose, then, may be used in two senses—when it refers to a peculiar characteristic of an ideal which it is desired to put into execution, when it means " plan," plus the striving or desire to make the ideal real, or to a peculiar characteristic exhibited by and inherent in the real ac-

[1] Dewey : Psychology, Chapter XVIII.

[2] Ibid.

complishment of the ideal in the completed fact. Then the fact is said to be purposive. The boat gives evidence of purpose, *i.e.,* (as purpose refers to a consciousness), not only of the activity of physical causes, but also of the use of these physical causes (which might explain, but could not fully define, the existence of the boat), by an active mind.

In our definition, we have used a number of other concepts which are wrapped up and involved inextricably with the concept purpose. Among them, the most noticeable are these:

The Individual. The active agent, the planks, the tools, the various means employed, the end realized, the boat, are each and all individuals, and are as such to be defined.

The Continuum. The plan is formed in the continuum consciousness and executed in time and space continua.

Potentiality. The plan must be feasible, possible, else it would not be formed. If a device is found impossible, it is exchanged for a plan that can come within the concept of potentiality.

Chance. As we discuss this concept later, we merely mention it here.

CHAPTER III

THE PURPOSES OF MEN

We have now seen what sort of a thing purpose is in the immediate consciousness, in the Ego, in me. How can I extend the concept to a wider sphere? I have immediate experience of it in my own consciousness, and I reason from the causal will and my ideas, to the plan and its execution in the purpose, showing volitional activity. How do I know of others' purposes?

The only immediate object presented to us is ourselves,—our own minds, as they receive passively, or as they are active or efficacious. We know only a single individual. We cannot proceed as anatomists, and draw our conclusions from having dissected a great number of individuals from the species we are studying. But we can study only the one single individual, and from the conclusions thus derived, we must reason concerning other individuals of the same sort. We can do no more than "judge others by ourselves," and "*ab uno disce omnes.*" But this is sufficient. Although other men differ very greatly as being different individuals, not precisely like ourselves, yet we may and we must conclude from the likeness of qualities that we see to the likeness of qualities that are hidden. "Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects

which it produceth."[1] This process is an induction, based on analogical reasoning. We believe in the intelligence of our fellow-men, but that belief is so deep-seated in our own minds that it amounts to certitude. We are as certain here as we are of anything that is given us, either in sensation or reflection. Indeed, so far as I know, no man has ever questioned the intelligence of other men. The greatest doubters have held this belief very strongly, as is shown by the fact that they have published their books for the perusal of others. The method we have adopted for our procedure is justified on this ground, because in one sense it is the "only possible" way. In whatever we do, in whatever we think, there is always the "personal element." We can never work otherwise. There is always present the Subjective Ego, with all its peculiar characteristics, desires, choices, preferences; and it colors the whole work of every man. There is not a philosopher who has not put upon his work the stamp of his own character, mirrored his own face in it, and thereby missed the "necessarily and universally valid" philosophy that will serve as well for one man as for another. There has never been an independent and absolute system made by man. Whatever is universally valid finds its ground in the source to which the very nature and constitution of man himself must be referred. The reason why we make this induction —that other men have minds like our own—is because we see in their actions and words evidences of that same activity of the will, planning and executing, as we discover or experience in our own. Our experience of

[1] Berkeley: Principles, § 27.

other men leads us to see purpose "in their actions." These actions we refer to the causal activity of a purposive will like our own.

Let us take our former illustration of the boat. But we shall find it necessary to turn it around, end for end. We see the boat-builder engaged over his work, selecting the proper tools, cutting, choosing and trimming the timbers, making fast the frames, forming the hull of a boat. We never for a moment imagine that here there is at work a blind necessity, or that the work is a result of accident. Here are effects giving evidence that all through the work there is running the characteristic of purposiveness, that the builder is realizing a purpose which he has in his mind, and that this purpose involves, as its ground, necessarily, a will and a mind. It is because of the element of Purpose that we can thus reason, and can thus affirm the intelligence of other men as an indisputably certain truth. We perform the same process of reasoning if, night after night, when the builder is gone home, we drop into the shop, and see the boat nearing completion, the purpose gradually reaching its fulfilment in reality. Although we do not see the workman or the performance of the work, we yet know that he who does this thing is an intelligent, willing, planning, purpose-forming man. The work, too, has all the characteristics of Purpose,—of any one of our own purposive acts. We see here the union of interdependent parts, working themselves out toward a completion in time, each means dependent on all the other means, the planking on the frames, and the frames on the backbone, and we see these means all adapted for and iden-

tical with the end. We see the necessary connection involved between the parts. We see the cumulative growth toward completion, the finished boat, and we feel the value of the end, that it will fulfil its function and realize the purpose. This gradual, regular, ordered growth indicates that it is the realization of an ideal, that back of it all lies the ideal, the plan, toward which the work is progressing. We can explain every step by means of mechanical laws, every movement by gravity, resistance, force, etc.; but all would be meaningless were it not that in the whole we saw the activity of a willing agent, *i.e.*, that the plan and the purpose which we see in the work were present before a consciousness. This alone gives a meaning to the work. We can explain (after a fashion) by the mechanical causes, but we need more. We need, in order to define, the concept of Purpose, and the presence thereby involved of a consciousness other than our own. To quote again from Berkeley: "From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and because actions, volitions, and because there are volitions, there must be a will. . . . But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit."[1] "We cannot know the existence of other spirits" (men). The motions of their bodies are perceptible. Their conscious life or personality is necessarily invisible. "We cannot know the existence of other spirits, otherwise than by their operations or the ideas by them excited in us." These "inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence the knowl-

[1] Berkeley: Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.

edge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of our ideas (or acts) by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs."[1] This is a pure inference. We have perception in our minds. We can infer that there are perceptions which are in other minds. We can infer minds, or minds plus perceptions, but never perceptions or experiences alone, apart from a mind. But having made the induction from what we can observe to what we must conclude to be the ground for our observations, we determine that other men can will and can purpose. And this conclusion gives interest and meaning to all their work.

To what an extent does the Concept of Purpose enter into the history of men and their actions? It gives content to history and lends interest to the lives of other men and to their deeds. It is the men of activity, of volitional energy, of strong purposiveness, who have moulded the lives of nations. And even in a much humbler sense, in the Drama, the concept Purpose is seen to be the one essential, the very point of focus. The history of dramatic activity shows that the energy has been greatest in the writing of plays just after times of struggle. France and Germany give the best examples. The life of the drama is in struggle, the clash of will against will, in the formation and execution of a Purpose that is all-absorbing. The interest of a drama lies in the plot.

[1] Berkeley: Principles, § 145.

PART II

THE COSMOLOGICAL APPLICATION

CHAPTER IV

ON METHOD

We have found Purpose manifested in our own personal and voluntary experience. We have also established its existence in other men. We shall now continue by descending the scale of life, seeking evidences of purposiveness in the lower orders. As we descend, we shall find the evidences of individual purposiveness gradually decreasing and the evidences for a mechanical explanation gradually increasing, until we find ourselves involved in the "riddle of the universe." We should, I thoroughly believe, remain entangled in this mesh, if we contented ourselves with this procedure alone—that is, the descent of the scale—and did not seek the evidences of purposiveness, as referring to and emanating from a higher source. We must also ascend again to a higher plane, even superior to the purposes of man, seeking the ground and source, the intelligent and willing mind, to which the purposes which we discover can and must be referred, if we are to escape from this "riddle of the universe," and have a philosophical system that is logical and explicable.

Our statements with regard to man's will regard it as free. If it were not, we could not look to man for the formation and execution of plans and the realization of ideals, but would be compelled to look elsewhere for a definition and an explanation of Purpose, or to

deny its existence altogether. But man, capable as he is, is not absolutely free to will and to perform whatever his imagination may conceive. He is not omnipotent. He is bound and conditioned in many ways. He cannot choose what ideas he is to receive through sensation and experience. He meets life as it comes to him, and must make the best of it. He must act in accordance with the laws of nature, which are set as bounds, against which he may struggle in vain, only to be overthrown at the last. But these same bounds he can use, and he does use them in carrying out his purposes. In his boat-building he works in accordance with the laws of gravity and resistance, with the mechanical laws, and with the natural properties of the materials with which he works. He acts beyond himself on nature and on bodies, and brings into the universe new and unending causal series. Things that would otherwise obey the laws of nature he turns into new courses. He hews down the trees and cuts them to his patterns, and works them into his boat, all compatible with the laws of gravity and mechanics, and yet in every instance predetermined by the mind. And yet he must always act under and in agreement with this higher law which is over him and limits him. So we have not begun at the top. We must go higher as well as deeper. We must determine what this other something is. For as we descend the scale we find that the purposiveness of the individuals which we may consider is steadily decreasing. There is less and less intelligence, less volitional activity, less self-determination, less purposiveness that is merely personal and to be referred to the individual in question—*id est,* internal.

ON METHOD

It is not now generally thought that there are such great gaps and leaps in nature as Descartes' paradox of animal machines and Kant's animal automata seem to imply. The beasts have not the capacity to reason and to execute plans that man has—the trees are not able to cope with the beasts, and a stone is unchanged by any growth, life or activity within it. Each is powerless before the activity of the higher order, and the stone is entirely under the dominion of laws and purposes which are wholly outside of its own individual self, and which must consequently be referred to something entirely other and different from itself. And at the same time there is, as we descend the scale, the steadily *increasing* evidences of something acting purposively, which supplies the evidences of purposes in a no less striking way than they appear in man's activity. Man has a will of his own, and can act independently of all else within the limits of his own possibilities. The stone has no self-determination. In man, purposes are *first* to be referred to his own free will. In the stone, the evidences of purposiveness are to be referred at once and directly to something else outside itself—to Nature, that wore it to a smooth pebble; to the *man,* who fitted it into the wall of the building; and in the end we shall find ourselves obliged to refer *both* the man and the stone, because they are both conditioned, limited, finite, to a higher and more powerful and intelligent purposive mind, to whom they are both materials and means.

CHAPTER V

THE PURPOSES OF BEASTS

From the likeness of one man to others, we have argued by analogy from our own intelligence to intelligence in other men. It is only by analogy that we can pass from man to the beasts and argue for their intelligence. We must proceed by the same method —from effects to causes.

There is a close relationship between men and beasts. Consequently either both are automata or both are intelligent. The former is untenable on our previous ground. Is there any evidence for the latter?

There are so many actions in beasts, both domesticated and wild (the latter are the more certain study in this regard, because the domesticated beasts, by imitation or by imputation, often acquire the habits and almost the ideas of their masters), that are exactly like the actions of men, that it is quite necessary to assign them to the same sources. The tiger stalks the gazelle and pounces upon it unexpectedly. The hunter trails the tiger and slays it unsuspecting. The bear or the squirrel, when trapped, after recovering from frantic and futile attempts at escape, sits down to think over its situation, and, trying first one method and then another, at last learns the secret of the trap and regains its liberty. Having once learned this way of escape, it tries it first when again trapped. There is, too, a great

difference in various beasts in this regard. Some are stupid and slow of wit. Others are bright, and their cunning shows a greater degree of intelligence. The beast desires water or to cross a river, and goes about the fulfilment of its purpose as deliberately and with as great evidence of a well-formed plan as does a man. Monkeys learn to cross rivers by forming a living chain. When the red squirrels, which had lately migrated into the Eastern States from Canada, had propagated in great numbers, they began to drive the older inhabitants, the gray squirrels, from their homes. The gray squirrels, though larger, were unable to withstand the fierce little red squirrels, and found it necessary to migrate. They moved southwestward in large numbers, and reached the Mississippi River. Although they can swim fairly well, their strength was unequal to the great breadth of the river. As they were driven from behind, they were compelled to advance. Many met death by drowning, but often it was possible to see a squirrel dislodging a piece of wood from one shore, and either riding upon it or clinging to it, take his chances of reaching the other bank. The most remarkable thing of all is the fact that the squirrels *chose* their place of crossing, where the current was close to the eastern bank, and then swung over to the other shore; and they often selected a time when the wind was in the right direction to help them in their passage.

Those animal characteristics that are so deeply ingrained that they are called instincts, are greatly altered or quite lost by change of locality, climate or environment, because the beast learns that the previous methods are no longer useful, while other needs must be

met, and the readiness and adaptability which many animals show argues well for their intelligence. Who is there, who has domesticated various sorts of wild beasts, who does not say that they have intelligence, and form and execute plans? "It is those who know them best who have the firmest conviction on this point." [1]

To all appearance, the spider's web is as much a purpose of the spider as the web of the weaver. The squirrel makes his winter store, and man preserves his fruits. The beavers build houses and man builds homes. Do not the beasts foresee and display purposiveness as well as man? When they meet unusual or prohibitive conditions, do they not show great intelligence in circumventing them, in finding some new device never before tried, to bring about the same results, to fulfil the same purposes, or others even better adapted to new wants?

The beasts without doubt act in many instances with purpose, and display in their acts every evidence that their acts are voluntary, and result from volitions as their cause, and that the end for which they are working is *known* and perceived ideally, making their actions and the effects of their actions purposive.

But while a great part of these actions are clearly purposive, there are less data here to go by than in the case of men. The relative number of acts which display purpose is far less, while a new type of activity displays itself, which appears truly enough and undeniably in men, but is much more in evidence in the beasts —instinct. In this we cannot find the beast planning,

[1] Janet: Final Causes.

purposing, consciously and intelligently, but he is acting in a different sort of way—indubitably no less purposively; but now the purposes cannot so easily be referred to the conscious and voluntary activity of the beast himself. This is natural, for the degree of consciousness and volitional power, no less than difference in the matter of the reason, is marking the distinction between men and beasts by which the former hold their superior place in the universe. We can therefore refer the purposes which we may find in instinctive actions no longer to the consciousness of the individual beast—internal purposiveness—but must seek another ground, another consciousness, before which the purposes are, and by whose volitional activity they are, carried into effect.

But before examining this subject, instinct, let us look for a moment at the life of the flora. Here we have, so far as we are able to determine, none of the characteristics of the mind. There is life, but no consciousness, volitional activity and purposiveness. This seems to stop with the nervous system. We see some characteristics that appear like inner and consciously purposive and volitional actions—the long journey of a young sprout under a stone toward the light, the turning of a plant toward the sun, the unaccustomed and painful efforts of the cultivated plants to propagate at strange seasons when they have been thwarted in their first attempt—these look almost as if intended on the part of the plant. Yet it may be no more than that which is a common property of all life—the "will to live," or the working out of another will through and in them. We cannot determine any internal pur-

posiveness. And as we are able to discover in the ores, the stones, the water, the air, no life at all, we laugh to scorn those imaginative philosophers who have tried to establish the poetic doctrine of philozoism. If there is no consciousness in a rock, there is likewise no internal purposiveness, as a purpose must be present before a consciousness.

Two methods of explanation have stood opposite each other, mutually hostile—teleology and mechanism. The former, starting from man, reasons down, applying analogies from a higher order to a lower. The latter, beginning with matter, argues by analogies to higher orders, to living organisms, to rational beings even, and, using physical and mechanical explanations, even tries to reduce the volitional and reasoning mind to the condition of a brain acting by reflexes according to the laws of physics. Schopenhauer is strikingly at variance with his usual and more prominent system of idealism, by sudden reversions that make mind and brain identical terms.

We have shown purposiveness and volitional causation to exist in consciousness, but we have not excluded but rather included mechanical causation. In the inorganic sphere we have for the present excluded internal conscious volition. As we have brought the one down, gradually decreasing and disappearing, so as we go up by the other road we shall see the mechanical causation more and more overcome, overruled, superseded by volitional activity, which represents in a sense a higher force.

Are we to consider that physical laws and mechanical operations explain themselves, or are they to be

considered valid only as in reference to some ulterior ground? Do they exclude purposes in inorganic nature, or can we find that in the very order and constitution of the mechanical laws themselves there is purpose?

CHAPTER VI

PURPOSE IN INORGANIC NATURE

THERE are comparatively few things in nature that suggest in their structure direct evidences of purposiveness. It seems possible to explain most things sufficiently without reference to this concept. But we can never be sure that this is not due to our own shortsightedness, to our inability to judge from lack of sufficient data. "We find it impossible to limit anywhere the conception of final purpose in its application to the concrete facts of reality—anywhere, that is, in a logical and principled way. The ignorance of man, which is either partial or almost complete in every realm of inquiry, limits his ability to recognize the particular final purposes served by the concrete facts of his experience. The obscurity which hangs like an impenetrable cloud over the beginning and the concluding portions of the present system of things makes it impossible for him to demonstrate the final aim of the world's course. The scale of rising ideas that tower one above another until they lose themselves in the heights of the loftiest æsthetical and ethical ideals that lie one below another until imagination cannot longer conjecture the ultimate foundations of reality, is too vast for his intuition to discern surely or for his calculation to measure precisely. But wherever man's knowledge

does go, there does it find the presence indicated of formative principles due to ideal ends. In other words, the facts of purposiveness seem coëxtensive with the facts of knowledge. All things and all minds in their structure, development and relations, give token of ideal ends to our cognitive faculties. And without the significant influence of this category there is not a thing or transaction known that is really and satisfactorily known." [1] "In the construction of a great building or in the carrying out of a plan of campaign, the subordinates very generally work in accordance with a plan not revealed to them. Their whole activity is governed by the relation of means and ends; but they remain in ignorance, for the relation is not objectively revealed until the work converges toward completion. To one standing in the midst of the work, and especially in its raw beginnings, or to one studying the details singly and not in their relations, the end may well be missed altogether.

"From the nature of the case, we must be largely in this position with regard to the purpose in nature. Our own brevity makes it hard to believe in purpose when it is slowly realized." [2] We find the purposes of nature inscrutable, and are unable to judge as we judge concerning the purpose manifested in the boat another builds, to which we have only an exterior relation. Just so a cat would regard a printing-press as a place well fitted for hunting and hiding, but nothing further. But if we consider purpose as a fact in nature, then we are enabled to bring our thought to a systematic com-

[1] Ladd: A Theory of Reality.

[2] Bowne: Theory of Thought and Knowledge.

pleteness, and our reasonings are not doomed to end in a deadlock. In this there is nothing that is "contrary to the laws of reason, logic or analogy." There is no reason why the law of cause and effect should not be found in every set of phenomena that comes under observation, from stones to our own mind. Even thinking and willing have some sort of a causal inter-connection. Why not find the opposite point of view true, too, that purposes are to be found everywhere, that nature is purposive? Why should a mechanical explanation try to rout a supposed enemy when, if we are in search of an explanation, we should entertain both guests under the same roof as friends? The mechanical explanation, carried to extreme, is absurd. It will deny the intelligence of other men, and of one's self, and end in complete speculative collapse. Mechanical causality ends by cancelling itself through the impossibility of thinking it in infinite regress, and leaves the insoluble problem that is found so clearly stated in Schopenhauer's "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Causality must originate in the first member of a causal series, and arises from the concept of the Individual, inasmuch as each individual is characterized by its *degree,* and differences of degree result in Causation. So, instead of there being no first cause, there are many first causes. And volitional causality is the one fundamental, basal causality both in men's minds and in the evolution of nature; and mechanical causality must be shown to be a form, an aspect, a manifestation of volitional causality, and must be thus understood, if our thinking is to be order and not chaos. Purpose cannot be excluded from mechanical causality "unless

it be shown that the mechanism cannot be viewed as founded in or directed by intelligence." [1]

On the other hand, teleological explanation, if carried to excess, is liable to abuse, and is at best impossible of sufficient proof in the present state of our knowledge. All we wish to attempt at present is to show that the constitution of things would lead us to the inference that there is, as the explanation and ground of the world, a mind which unites intellectual and volitional (purposive) activities in one intelligence.

It is not difficult to see the internal purposive nature of organic beings, for, as individuals, they exist for themselves, to fulfil their proper functions. Self-preservation is their first law of life. They may also have a value as related to other things, but this is not necessary to give them the characteristic of purposiveness. But in the case of inorganic beings, we cannot discover any interior purposiveness or volitional activity at all. Hence, we must look at them as they are related to other things. And we first look at them as related to living nature. Instead of studying single individual objects or species now, we must take nature as a whole, and treat it as an organism, organum. In other words, there is "the respective and reciprocal utility of one and the same being for each other, and of all for the whole being." And as an organism we may see evidences of purposiveness. First, let us see what indications there are for all external purposiveness. We need not here expect to find purposes present to the consciousnesses of the various things by which and in which the purposes are displayed in process of being realized, or already real-

[1] Bowne: Theory of Thought and Knowledge.

ized. Stones have no consciousness that we are able to determine. And this is why we have drawn the distinction between internal and external purposiveness. But we have defined purpose in our analysis of it as being "*present before a consciousness.*" This definition is still to hold good, and the sheer force of logic compels us to carry with the definition the implications involved in this definition of Purpose.

Therefore, the purposes of both inorganic and organic nature must be referred to a thinking and willing mind before the consciousness of which the purposiveness is present, and in whose plans the purposes are advancing toward a consummation, in reality at least, when the ideal shall become the real. It is in this way that the universe comes to have an external purposiveness.

We now find ourselves considerably at variance with the position of Kant,[1] who was so engrossed in tracing the internal purposiveness that he sacrificed too much the external purposes. Our position—the universe as an organum—shows internal and external purposes to be bound up inseparably together. Each unit of the great mass exists only as it depends on others, yes, even all the others, for its means of support. Each thing that we may mention depends upon every other thing of its own class, or beneath it; and the lower orders exist not only for themselves and as the support of the higher, but are often much benefited by the existence of the higher forms. The flora are food for the fauna, the fauna in their turn keep in restriction a too exuberant growth. The different varieties keep among themselves a wonderful balance, so that one sort of beast

[1] Kant: Critique of Judgment.

does not overrun and destroy all the others. And man improves the condition of both, as well as utilizing them.

We often find in this universe, which is arranged with all the symmetry of an ordered series, that there are accidents or variations that cannot be accounted for. But the application of purposes need not deny the existence of such. The observation of such exceptions seems very often to cast doubt on the whole. But a moment's consideration will show why, although some things in nature may at first sight appear to be fortuitous, the whole ultimately cannot be so, but is none the less the embodiment of purpose.

Indeed, how do we discover, determine the laws of nature?

The law with which men first concerned themselves was social law, which soon crystallized into a set form called civil law. How did this arise? Men observed the relations that existed among them, their respective rights and mutual privileges, and they generalized these into social rules, which grew as they were extended to a greater number into the civil law. So civil laws are the generalizations of the rights and experiences of many men. They represent the *average* of the men to whom they apply, not an impractical ideal nor a low standard that would induce revolt.

Do these laws apply to *every* case that comes under their ruling? No. There is many an exception. And so there is established the Court of Equity, to make right that for which the law was not framed, or for cases where the application of the law would be unjust and the reversal of it just. And so the civil law is a gen-

eralization, a norm, a standard, to which most men desire to conform, and which is formulated as a means by which the few may be compelled to conform.

Is it otherwise with physical or natural law? Let us take two instances:

According to the law of probability, if a coin is tossed into the air, whirling, the chance that it will come up heads is even with that of tails. The ratio is 1 : 1. If it is flipped up a hundred times, the chances are again even, and the probability is that it will come fifty times heads, and fifty times tails. If a thousand, the ratio is 500 : 500. Such is the law obtained by generalization. How does an experiment show it? There is an approximation to this generalization, this even percentage, but there is no necessity that there should be an exact conformity. Experiment might lay down certain limits outside of which it has never come and might never come. But there is always the chance that there will not be an exact conformity to law, even when running to the highest numbers. The most we can say is, that there is an approximation to the law. Here is a table showing an actual experiment:



Tossing a hundred times a day for ten days, a thousand tosses, gave heads the first time, then sank to three tails in excess of the average at the end of the day. At the end of the third day there were nine tails above the

average. Then began a steady rise in the number of heads, till at the end of the sixth day, there were ten more heads than tails. At the end of the tenth day there were two more heads than tails in the thousand throws.

The curve that a cannon ball will take when fired at an angle of forty-five degrees, the curve of the parabola, has been figured out mathematically. But experiments show a great deal of variation from the line



mathematically determined. The ball may take a curve higher than the law requires, lower, or to either side, although the gun remains in exactly the same position and at the same angle.

This has also been tried on a small scale, where foreign influences could be guarded against, with the same results.

The same thing is true regarding a falling body. It deviates from the perpendicular, which the law of gravity requires, to some extent. Of course this is within limits. The falling body does not fall sideways, at an angle of ninety degrees. But the deviation is sufficient to cause a variation from the strict statement of the law of gravitation. These laws, based on generalizations, are primarily obtained by observations. The generalization laid down is a strict, hard and fast law.

When put to the test of experience, it is found that in almost every case there is exception to a slight degree, enough to admit other causes, new causal series, means, and diverse ultimate results. In fact, this is one way by which many modern philosophers introduce the concept purpose, basing it on Chance. Because there is chance there can enter purposive action, which goes to some degree contrary to the laws. But this view is based on the assumption that the laws are of themselves active and act blindly, mechanically, unguided, and that in the sphere where they are operative, there is no possibility of purposiveness. It is only by " getting in by a side door " that there is to be made a place for purpose.

But let us turn the picture another way. It is not because of these deviations, but *in spite of them,* that purposes are operative. The very fact that a generalization of observations can be made means that nature, on the whole, acts conformably to a certain definite direction. The laws are frequently broken or overcome. The growth of a tree overcomes gravitation, the wind moves a flying projectile from its path, and man is constantly using one force of nature to overcome another. The deviation from a strict conformity to law permits the entrance and activity of another kind of cause, *i. e.*, that arising from an outside source, of which the best example is the volitional causality.

The activity of man makes many exceptions to law. He wilfully goes contrary to the moral law, and makes an exception to law and a deviation in the course of events. He alters events in the physical world, thereby causing deviation or change in the obedience of things to physical laws, as when he erects a mound of stones.

The beavers obstruct the flow of the stream, and heap up a dam and a pile of water of great weight. The growing tree displaces or splits a rock. All these form exceptions to one or other of the physical laws. And yet the whole of nature advances in its course of evolution, fulfilling its purpose, tending toward the realization of its ideal. We here find one purpose overcoming the fulfillment of another, and yet the whole is carrying out a purpose which unites and blends all the others. Actions and reactions without end would never result in a purpose were there not a consciousness to which it must be referred.

Take two contiguous moments of time. Given the world as it was a moment ago, the last moment of the past. Suppose all to depend on chance. There is but one chance that at this present moment the world will be as it is now. There is but the one chance that it will continue from the first to the second moment. And these against a countless infinity of chances that it will be otherwise. And to be otherwise means what? There is but one chance that the world will continue the next moment. If it does, then that means what? That there are innumerable chances to one that the world will not exist the next moment, that it will vanish and disappear rather than continue, for to upset its laws and destroy its development and reverse its evolution means destruction. And there is every chance against one for this. But it is the chance that we have found to happen, from which we recognize the force of the consciousness and of the volition by which the evolution and realization of the purpose is maintained and advanced. We attribute an intelligence and choice to

that mind which sustains all nature in existence. The purposiveness that carries forward the evolution and growth of the world is the evidence of that great ideal which the world is ever tending to realize.

"Facts of the sort which the theory of evolution pursues cannot be known at all otherwise than in their relation to some teleological conception. The meaning of the entire series of facts, as actually arranged and viewed in the light of the ideal ends to be secured, is essential to the knowledge of the facts themselves." [1]

Let us return once more to our illustration from civil law. The laws alone are dead, inactive, inefficient. They have no power to purpose, although they exhibit in their construction purposiveness. They imply two things—a legislative as their source, and an executive as the power which makes them valid and active, which puts them in operation. These two things, or parts of the one thing, an administrative government, are shown by the very structure of the laws themselves. The laws of nature are generalizations arising from the observation of the relations that exist among the properties of the bodies of nature. These again witness in their very nature (first, the operation of the mind of man in forming these generalizations; then, if, apart from the mind of men, they have any validity, as we are forced to conclude that they have) the existence back of them, in and through them, of a purposive Being who is both legislating power and executive force, else the laws would be ineffective and no more than unexecuted plans that never see the light of reality.

Thus we conclude that the world is affected by an-

[1] Ladd: A Theory of Reality.

other series of causes other than merely mechanical. It has been under the guidance, both outside and inside of it, of a volitional and causal activity which has the power of forming and executing purposes. And that cause is intelligent, mental, volitional. And the will-causation controls and directs the mechanical causation. Thus all order implies and expresses purposiveness.

And even the mechanical laws themselves—are they independent, self-sufficient, self-acting machines whose whole ground and explanation is to be found in themselves? Or do they also give evidences of purpose, and another ulterior power behind them? Is it not a legitimate question to ask, whence come these mechanical laws? What is logic and logical necessity but the laws of thought, the way in which the mind thinks? Is the nature of the mind due to the mind itself—to its internal purposiveness; or is it due to an external purposiveness of which the minds of men form but one of the more important means—the purposiveness of nature, perhaps —to whom the mechanical laws and the conditions under which they act are also means? Do not law and order in the universe point to a purpose to be realized by these means, and this purposiveness, to a consciousness as its ground?

Schelling says: " The peculiarity of nature rests on the fact that, with all its mechanism, it is yet full of purpose." Indeed, our very use of the term " Mechanism " with reference to the laws of nature indicates that we have in our minds the machines which men make with purpose, and which are means by which we execute our purposes.

" The conception of mechanism cannot be held, even

its most meagre and outline form of statement, without implying the conception of final purpose. And the most elaborate and comprehensive form of the mechanical theory—the modern scientific and all-inclusive theory of evolution—does not at all dispense with, but rather enhances and applies in multiform ways, the ideas of teleology." "Mechanism means nothing less than this: a system of individual existences which act and react upon one another, according to forms and in obedience to laws that are necessary to the attainment of ideal ends. No such conception as a 'mechanism of nature' or a 'structure of the world' is tenable without the implicate of purposiveness. A critical metaphysics has therefore no need to effect a union, or apologetically to harmonize a seeming conflict between these two principles. The two *are* in union, essentially one and the same, both as noetical and as ontological principles. . . . To talk of conflict here is foolishness; to attempt reconciliation there is no need." [1]

[1] Ladd: A Theory of Reality.

CHAPTER VII

THE PURPOSE OF ORGANIC NATURE

In our former consideration of the beasts, we noticed only one set of phenomena, from which we concluded their intelligence and their internal purposiveness. It is now necessary to consider them as related to the rest of the universe, as parts of the organum and as revealing external purposiveness. The classifications of zoölogy are based not on the use of parts, but on the design, the purpose, of the beast. It is a division into types. The instincts of animals are not the result of imitation and experience. They appear not to be planned by the beast. They do not indicate consciousness of purposes. While modified by experience, they do not depend on it. The actions of the newly matured bee in seeking honey and returning to the hive; the adaptation of a moth to its new life, so unlike its life as a caterpillar, and her provision for food for the children she has never seen; the harvesting and storing of nuts by an old squirrel who had been born and raised in captivity and who had never experienced a winter out of doors until escape from confinement, all show these innate capacities which are so necessary to the preservation of the species. If these plans that are formed and purposes that are executed cannot be referred to the conscious activity of the beast, they must be referred to some other consciousness superior to the conditions and environments in which they are placed. They de-

pend on their instincts of preservation, perpetuation, and their coöperative instincts (beavers, ants, bees) for the accomplishment of their functions. In all instincts there is an adaptation of the beast to the satisfaction of its wants. It fulfils purposes which are imposed upon it from outside. It is conditioned. The beast is carrying out plans and fulfilling its functions in the world, and it must continue in that course. It cannot transcend its limits. Both upon insentient and sentient life there is imposed the mark of a purpose which is not of their own making, but which they are constrained to carry out. And even so with man, while he can use the lower laws and profit by mechanical causation, can chain the powers of water, steam and electricity and adapt them to his own designs and make them execute his own purposes, while—greatest of all—he can plan while many other intelligent and purposeful men come under his plan and often blindly execute his purposes, being thereby conditioned by his thought, yet he, too, is conditioned. He is within limits. There is a limit to his power of conception and volition, and a still closer limit to his ability to execute his purposes. He is not alone compelled to work in accordance with mechanical causation, and not against it; he is also conditioned by the purpose which is imposed upon the universe and upon him as its noblest representative, from a foreign source, and he must fulfil his function, his part, in bringing to a realization in fact, the purpose which is everywhere evident. Indeed, unless the universe were rationally, purposively, consciously, even "Divinely constituted, it could not be reasoned about." [1]

"But though there are some things which convince

[1] Frazer.

us human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to every one that these things which are called the works of nature are not produced by or dependent on the wills of men." [1]

The external world, as given to us in experience, is an ordered, necessarily connected series. We find the external world a purposive order, and consequently determine it to be consciously constituted.

"It is because there is an industry of nature, a geometry, and æsthetic of nature, that man is capable of industry, of geometry and æsthetic. Nature is all that we are, and all that we are we hold from nature. The creative genius which the artist feels in himself is to him the revelation and the symbol of the creative genius of nature." [2]

This leads us to the position that there is, above the physical laws of the world, a higher law, a mental causality, a conscious purpose, a spiritual and Divine guidance. The laws of nature, as being of a lower order, the lower of a pair of parallel horizontal lines, are altered, changed, affected, given validity and purposiveness by a higher law, which dominates it and overrules it, usually unnoticed, but sometimes in a manner unusual, as are those events which, not being easily explained, we call miraculous, or wonderful, or strange.

We see here a causal activity working from the upper line upon the lower,

a . . . . . .

↓

b . . . . . .

(and yet we cannot consider this more than a very superficial illustration).

[1] Berkeley, Principles, § 146. [2] Janet: Final Causes.

If the lower line indicates the series of events in the world, and the upper the conscious, volitional, thinking intelligence, to which we have referred the purposiveness that we have observed in the lower line, as to a cause or ground, we find this true in one sense.

Yet the illustration shows two lines which are everywhere equally distant, although infinitely prolonged. This is when our view is restricted to a very limited portion of the lines.

But purpose in the universe is not only an exterior purposiveness, due to a consciousness independent of the world and yet acting upon it, but also to an internal purposiveness due to a " Weltgheist," or to an immanent Consciousness. Let us use our illustration of the parallel lines again. If we view them from a distance, they seem to approach so closely together that they appear identical. (Or they may be considered as meeting in infinity, or as crossing, if we introduce other considerations not yet entertained, like a fourth dimension, for instance.) The first use of the lines illustrates the transcendence, the second the immanence of God. But here there is intended no contradiction. In distinction from the German philosophers, we do not consider transcendence and immanence as mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, there is no instance in the history of philosophy where one excludes the other. Descartes' " divinus concursus " and Leibnitz' " continued creation " both imply immanence. Spinoza's " Natura Naturans " and Hegel's " Idea and Nature " imply transcendence. All transcendence shows a relation between God and the world, and hence immanence, else the separation between God and the world, being com-

plete, would prevent the knowledge of either by the other. And all immanence shows a distinction, a duality, between God and the world, and hence transcendence, else the identity would result in a fixity, an unchangeableness, where there could be no cause and effect, no relative and absolute.

We may illustrate the union of transcendence and immanence by reference to the relation existing between a man's mind and his body. Our mind is not our body. To us, body, nerves, brain, are all objective. And again we can in self-consciousness objectify ourselves still more; ourselves as subjects are not ourselves as objects. The immaterial mind transcends the body.

Again, the mind is immanent in the body, because it is through the brain and nervous system that it acts and manifests itself. It is the life of the body, and displays itself in expression of face and in character, and pervades all the work which it accomplishes.

These two relations are logically distinct, but are actually one. The dead body differs from the living because the mind is not active in it. And we have no immediate and direct knowledge of a mind apart from a body, although it transcends the body in its self-conscious, self-identical and self-determined characteristics.

The union of the two parallel lines of our former illustration,



is to be discovered and found in the concrete expressions in reality of the concept purpose which, like the fourth

dimension, links the minds and the works of men in a reciprocal relation, and in the same manner unites God and the world. The supreme cause is at once apart from and within nature. The purposes of God are worked out both upon nature by external purposiveness and within nature by internal purposiveness, and it is frequently impossible to determine to which class the evidences of a purpose belong.

And besides, all the secondary purposes are being realized in the world; in this conception of the parallel lines, all are linked and united into one great, purposive whole. Nature is the working out and the evidence of a purpose of God of which it is the gradually developing realization.

"An 'ultimate' purpose of the world's being and course, as such, may well seem something unattainable and even inconceivable. The end to be attained cannot be regarded as the complete cessation of the process of its own attainment. The ultimate purpose of Nature cannot be a statical condition. The very idea of teleology is an incitement to strive on and live on; the idea itself perishes in its own completed realization. To be sure, individual men get tired and come to consider Nirvâna as the ultimate ideal; or they get pessimistic and regard the condition when the world shall be a burned-out coal as something devoutly to be wished. But the world itself is not tired; and the strictly 'ultimate' purpose is always beyond where man's hope and faith—not to say man's knowledge—can go. . . . This world is, fundamentally considered, known to man as a Will guided by immanent ideas; and among these guiding ideas are the ideal ends, already actually

secured and to be secured by the action of this Will." [1]

And thus man forms the conception of the Immanent God.

And so, as the transcendent God and the immanent God are one, the external purpose and the internal purpose of the world are united into One Purpose, which is the manifestation of the Will of God, expressing and realizing His Ideas, and the " ultimate purpose " of the universe is present before the Consciousness of God.

[1] Ladd : A Theory of Reality.

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