

**CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS**

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETIETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 6 AND 7, MAY 10, JUNE 15, AND NOVEMBER 15, 1967

(INCLUDING INDEX)

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules of its proceedings.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 90TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninetieth Congress * * *

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RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(r) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

18. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

27. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

* * * * *

SYNOPSIS

On March 8, 1967, the committee determined to hold hearings on the "activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments * * * with particular reference to the conduct of espionage and other intelligence gathering activities * * *." The hearings were also to encompass techniques employed by Communist agents in their efforts to recruit the assistance of U.S. citizens in their espionage and intelligence gathering activities. The legislative purpose of the hearings was "to provide factual information to aid the Congress in the enactment of any necessary remedial legislation * * *."

Pursuant to this resolution, the chairman appointed the Hon. William M. Tuck (D-Va.) chairman of a subcommittee to conduct these hearings and named himself, Hon. John C. Culver (D-Iowa), Hon. Richard L. Roudebush (R-Ind.), and Hon. Albert W. Watson (R-S.C.) as associate members.

The subcommittee held hearings in Washington, D.C., on April 6 and 7, May 10, June 15, and November 15, 1967. It received the testimony of four witnesses in the course of these hearings.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR.

(APRIL 6 AND 7, 1967)

Mr. John Huminik, Jr., 31, after being sworn, gave his birthplace as Washington, D.C. Mr. Huminik received his early education in the District of Columbia. He subsequently attended various technical institutes and military schools, as well as completing many correspondence courses from which he received diplomas and certificates in machine design, metallurgy, industrial metallurgy, aircraft structural maintenance, and aircraft materials.

Mr. Huminik is a scientist and businessman by profession. He has been associated with the defense industry in and around Washington, D.C., in the capacity of engineer, scientist, and corporation officer. He is presently a consultant on metallurgical and welding technology, as well as chairman of the board of Chemprox Corporation, a small chemical manufacturing company.

The witness has written a technical text dealing with "rocket reentry coatings and high temperature materials," entitled *High Temperature Inorganic Coatings*, related to space and rocketry programs, plus innumerable technical papers. Mr. Huminik has also been a member of several technical societies, including: American Ordnance Association, American Society for Metals, American Welding Society, and the Inter-American Relations Committee of the American Society for Metals.

Mr. Huminik served as chairman of the Washington chapter of the American Society for Metals (1965-66) and of the American Welding Society (1961-62), was awarded the Welding Society's meritorious cer-

tificate in 1963, and was listed in *Who's Who in Commerce and Industry* (13th edition).

In the past, Mr. Huminik has held positions with a number of companies in the Washington, D.C., area, such as: head of metallurgical group, Melpar, Inc.; vice president and senior scientist, Value Engineering Company; and manager, Materials Engineering Department, Fairchild Hiller Corporation.

Mr. Huminik was honorably discharged from the Military Reserves after 12 years of both active and reserve duty. Attached to the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, he received a commission in the Chemical Corps Reserve and commanded the 312th Chemical Company and the 419th Chemical Biological and Radiological Center. He also completed a 2-year Chemical Officer Career Course.

In 1961, Mr. Huminik became a voluntary, unpaid operative working under the guidance of the FBI against Soviet diplomats who were conducting espionage operations out of the Soviet Embassy and consulate in Washington.

The witness told the subcommittee of his happenstance meeting with Aleksandr Izvekov, a Russian diplomat, who gave the witness and his visiting relatives a personal tour of the Soviet Embassy. Later, an associate of Izvekov, Dr. Sergei Stupar, applied for membership in the American Society for Metals (of which Mr. Huminik was secretary).

The witness, of Russian ancestry, suspected the two Soviet diplomats of trying to utilize their new-found friendship with him as a means of gleaning highly technical data in the field of metallurgy and, at an early point in his contacts with the Russians, sought the advice of the FBI. He agreed to work hand in hand with the Bureau to uncover the clandestine espionage activities of a highly trained Soviet spy ring.

Dr. Stupar was admitted to membership in the American Society for Metals, a large society representing 20 countries with a 35,000 membership in this country, and told Mr. Huminik that he was a "scientist and not interested in politics."

Through his acquaintance with Dr. Stupar, the witness was introduced to Anatole Kuznetsov, a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, and Vladimir Boutenko, the assistant commercial consular, who also received membership in the American Society for Metals. Boutenko was extremely interested in the society and "took copious notes" and "made contact with as many ASM members as he could" at its meetings, according to the witness.

Vladimir Boutenko offered the witness a "trade agreement" with Chemprox Corporation (Mr. Huminik's company) and stated that if he "cooperated with the diplomats they would get * * * [him] some nice trade agreements with the Soviet Union."

Boutenko gave the witness several gifts in the process of their relationship: diaries, perfume, address books, chemical catalogs, calendars, and vodka.

Another third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Vladimir Zorov, attended a meeting of the American Society for Metals with Boutenko. The witness told the subcommittee that Zorov stated to him: "Mr. Huminik, we would be glad to pay very good prices for any information that you could give to our government." Zorov, however, added a solemn warning: "We take care of our friends and we also take care of our enemies."

The witness surmised that both the civilian (KGB) and military (GRU) intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union were represented in the operation through the various Soviet officials with whom he made contact. He said the two Soviet intelligence organizations appeared to be vying with each other for his services and, thereby, the classified information they hoped to obtain through him.

Mr. Huminik told of still another contact with Soviet intelligence, in the person of Aleksy R. Malinin, the assistant commercial consular at the Soviet consulate at that time. Malinin, declared *persona non grata* by this country in 1966, posed as a welding expert and was involved with U.S. Air Force Sergeant Herbert W. Boeckenhaupt in still another espionage operation, not related to Huminik's. (Boeckenhaupt was later convicted of conspiring with Aleksy Malinin to steal U.S. codes and communications data.) Huminik's meeting with Malinin was happenstance and took place at an American Welding Society meeting in 1964.

Another of the witness' many contacts was Valentin Revin, who was the assistant scientific consular of the Soviet Embassy and a successor to Dr. Stupar. Mr. Huminik stated that Revin, a very intelligent, alert, well-spoken, and thoroughly Westernized Soviet official, was very close to himself in mannerisms, temperament, and even age, build, and stature. The witness proposed that through Revin, the Embassy was attempting to "match an intelligence agent" with the person to be exploited.

Revin gave Mr. Huminik several gifts, including a \$180 Omega wristwatch and more vodka.

The witness gave his personal views as to why the Soviets would choose him as a "target," stating his Russian ancestry, his being an officer in the American Society for Metals, his personal accessibility, his access to Government officials and reports, and his extensive research into and knowledge of "reentry coatings" on satellites and rockets, all of which, combined, made him a very desirable subject to cultivate for critical intelligence information.

After stating that all the Soviet agents he had had contact with had either left this country or been declared *persona non grata*, he noted that his "assessment period" by the Soviets had taken a full 4 years "before they really got down to business." During this 4-year period the Soviets attempted various means of gaining control over the witness: (1) By telling him that they had located relatives of his in Russia (Georgia); (2) by obtaining from him handwritten reports bearing his signature which presumably could be used later for blackmail purposes; (3) by having him perform minor intelligence-type assignments.

In 1964 Boutenko asked the witness to obtain all information necessary to become "employed in the United States Government." The agent wanted not only Government Form 57, but all other documents and information pertinent to application for Government employment. The witness deduced that armed with the proper information the Soviets might conceivably attempt to place one or more of their people in U.S. Government jobs.

The Soviet agents also requested Huminik to obtain copies of all papers necessary to establish a corporation in the U.S. and asked if he would be willing to employ a Soviet in his chemical firm, both of

which, of course, would facilitate their establishing cover for "illegals."

Dr. Stupar made a direct approach to the witness asking for data on industrial machines, chemicals, blueprints, and other technical subjects. The industrial equipment was unidentifiable in the public hearing and, while not Government restricted, would not be sold to a foreign power. At this point the Soviet agents were prepared to have the witness commit a felony by either stealing the device or making a scale drawing of it. The chemicals the Soviets wanted were used in manufacturing a high-grade steel and were unavailable in Russia or her satellites. For reasons of national security the witness could not identify the rocketry materials the Soviet agents were interested in obtaining. The witness was told that his cooperation in obtaining the items desired would merit him a forged passport, escape route, and an excellent job in Russia should the FBI become aware of his activities. If all went well, he would be rewarded with trade agreements and money.

Mr. Huminik stated to the subcommittee that his contact with the Soviet agents turned to a full-scale clandestine operation on March 22, 1965, when Valentin Revin first met with the witness at his home on that date. Revin incorporated in the operation the use of danger signals, alternate plans, and a system of "dead drops" (places of concealment where objects can be deposited and later picked up by another person), escape plans and "live passes" (objects or information passed directly from one person to another). Various means of contacts were all prearranged in successive meetings with Revin.

The witness gave several elaborate examples of "dead drops" and "live passes" that actually had taken place between him and Revin.

Mr. Huminik told of the special camera the Soviet agents gave him \$300 cash to purchase. The camera was designed especially to photograph documents and was outfitted with a closeup lens. He was also instructed to buy a special brand of high-speed film for use in photographing documents with ordinary light.

The Soviet agents provided the witness with additional money to buy a tape recorder and instructed him to recapitulate entire conversations which he held with various scientists and defense officials known to him in the Pentagon.

Mr. Huminik revealed that over the 5½ years he worked under FBI guidance, he made approximately 75 personal contacts with Soviet agents. The Soviets, he declared, were primarily interested in scientific and engineering reports. The witness conjectured that the reason for the demand for this information was an apparent Soviet lack of the superior technology that is abundant in this country. He added:

They don't need to know troop movements and things like this as the espionage people did during World War II. They want technology, new weapons, faster airplanes, rockets, things like this. They wanted proprietary industrial processes * * *. They wanted details * * *.

They also wanted machines, rocket propellants, things on the Surveyor Moon Program, information concerning weapons, and "background information on scientists, specific scientists, and they wanted proprietary chemicals also."

In a warning to the American people, Mr. Huminik said:

My personal lesson indicates to me that there is danger to the small businessman, the scientist, and the engineer. The Soviets want technology more than anything else, and it is their plan to get it from technical people. * * *

The witness offered a special word of caution to technical people of Slavic descent whom the Soviets feel will be more susceptible to their approach.

Mr. Huminik then stated:

They will use money, promises of business, and many other ploys to entice Americans to work for them. They often strive to achieve such a firm grip on an individual that he would be afraid to go to the FBI * * *

The Soviets proved to me that they will penetrate our country as far as possible and by any means. * * *

In his statement, the witness added, "The Soviet Union has not changed its policy regarding espionage in this country for at least the last 20 years * * *."

Mr. Huminik read from two articles which had been printed in *Izvestia*, official newspaper of the Soviet Government, which made derogatory allegations about him and said that American press accounts of espionage by Soviet Embassy officials were merely "anti-Soviet slander campaigns."

At the close of his testimony, Mr. Huminik indicated his personal agreement with earlier statements of the FBI to the effect that 80 to 85 percent of the Soviet diplomats are engaged in intelligence and espionage operations.

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD I. EPSTEIN

(MAY 10, 1967)

Leonard I. Epstein, 40, of Paramus, N.J., was sworn in and gave his birthplace as New York City. Mr. Epstein is vice president and sales engineer of Trans-American Machinery and Equipment Corporation, a firm engaged in the purchasing, rebuilding, and resale of surplus machinery and machine tools.

Mr. Epstein is a graduate engineer of Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio. After college graduation he went into the armed services and after discharge from the Army worked for Chance Vought Aircraft in Stratford, Conn.; Stone and Webster Engineering in Baton Rouge, La.; Fluor Corporation in Houston, Tex.; and the Red River Arsenal, U.S. Army Arsenal at Texarkana, Tex.

Upon leaving the Red River Arsenal, Mr. Epstein attended school under the G.I. bill at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, N.J. After completing his studies at Stevens Institute he was employed with the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories at Bayonne, N.J.

Mr. Epstein entered the machinery business 14 years ago after leaving the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories and was employed by S and S Machinery, Johnson Machinery, and Jem Machinery. He formed his own corporation in 1956 and went into business with Mr. George Yohrling. His business, Trans-American Machinery and Equipment Corporation, is located at 27 East 23d Street, Paterson, N.J.

Leonard Epstein is a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, as well as a past member of both the Society of Automotive Engineers and the American Society for Metals. He is a vice president of the Case Alumni Association, New York chapter, and is a past commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States in his hometown.

Mr. Epstein told the subcommittee that his partner, George Yohrling, was, as himself, involved in all the details of the various contacts

made with a Russian United Nations employee. He then gave the subcommittee a brief background of his partner:

Mr. Yohrling is 49 years old. * * * He has been in the machinery business * * * approximately 30 years. He is * * * an ex-tool and die maker that got into rebuilding and finally into machinery purchases.

He is also a former U.S. paratrooper, and he holds a Silver Star for gallantry. * * *

Mr. Epstein related the nature of his business as buying and selling machine tools for rebuilding and retrofitting. Machines, primarily purchased from Government and private surplus sales, are updated and resold for a profit.

The witness said that his half-million-dollar-a-year business usually made machine tool and other equipment purchases on a bid basis, with sale going to the highest competitive bidder.

Mr. Epstein, in his testimony, said that equipment can be purchased from the Atomic Energy Commission, from the Navy Department, and other military departments. The material is usually "screened" and is demilitarized by the buyer or seller prior to resale.

While there is evidently no restriction of resale, the witness added, there are definite restrictions "as to what you can ship overseas and to what nations."

Saying that U.S. machine tool and other equipment is at least 20 to 40 years ahead of the rest of the world, Mr. Epstein spoke briefly of his recent trip to a machine tool show in Chicago where the Soviet Union exhibited a piece of equipment that manufacturers in the U.S. stopped making 40 years ago. He added that American equipment such as the type bought and sold by his firm "is of very definite interest to foreign countries, whether friendly or unfriendly."

The witness was asked if he ever knew a person named Vadim Isakov. He told the subcommittee that Isakov was a Russian employee of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), in the position of procurement officer. (Isakov came to the U.S. in 1962.)

Mr. Epstein first met Isakov through a neighbor who was selling hospital and laboratory equipment to UNICEF. Isakov had asked Mr. Epstein's neighbor for the name of someone who handled technological equipment.

Vadim Isakov called the witness and said he was interested in obtaining technological equipment for underdeveloped countries. On July 15, 1965, Mr. Epstein and Mr. Yohrling made an appointment with Isakov at the United Nations building in New York City.

At the first meeting, the procurement officer wanted to buy laboratory supplies. The witness and his partner told Isakov that they did not handle this type of equipment and instead offered him an entire surplus plant for the manufacture of watch parts. The Russian did not seem interested, but stated that he would like to visit Mr. Epstein's plant in Paterson, N.J.

On his first visit to the plant, Isakov was very interested in a surplus missile computer and asked for the nomenclature of the model. Additionally, Isakov produced a list from which he proceeded to read the descriptions of four items which he noted could be sold to a "customer" of his in Europe. The items included: (1) an underwater robot made by Vare Industries, which is designed to explore the bottom of the ocean. Cost, over \$300,000; (2) an accelerometer made by American

Bosch Arma Corporation or similar company. The accelerometer is an intricate device which measures the pull of gravity on any vehicle such as a missile or space-orbiting device. The device costs about \$6,000; (3) a miniature computer [valued at \$45,000] manufactured by Sperry Gyroscope. The computer was to be small and compact enough to be carried on board a missile or rocket (upon subsequent investigation, the witness found that Sperry Gyroscope never manufactured any such device), and finally (4) a quantity of titanium pressure vessels. Mr. Epstein called a well-known manufacturer of pressure vessels and asked about a 9000 p.s.i. vessel. When told that the company would be happy to sell the vessels in steel, Isakov stated, "No, no. It must be light, it is going to go up."

Isakov stated that upon delivery of these items the witness and his partner would be paid in cash. Furthermore, the high cost of the items did not seem to bother the Russian at all.

After the first plant meeting with Isakov, Mr. Epstein, now suspicious, contacted a neighbor who was an FBI employee, and related the entire story to him. The following week FBI agents instructed Mr. Epstein and his partner to "lead the man on" and "find out what he wanted."

Between the second and third meeting with Isakov, the Russian had taken a trip out of the country. Upon his return, he called Mr. Epstein and stated that the miniature computer he wanted was not manufactured by Sperry Gyroscope but was instead a "Red Man" minicomputer made by IBM. Likewise, he was well armed with many of the technical requirements concerning the four items which he lacked on his first visit.

In October of 1965, Isakov began to push for delivery on the accelerometers. The witness surmised that the urgency had something to do with the fact that the Soviets had smashed three vehicles onto the surface of the moon.

That same month the U.S. Government began putting various types of missile sites up for sale. Isakov had received previous information regarding the sales and was most interested in obtaining a brochure on the sites.

The witness told the subcommittee how he "stalled" Isakov for "quite some time" on the purchase of the accelerometers, by telling the Russian that the company had run out of stock and had to go completely through the manufacturing process which, because of the delicate nature of the instrument, would take from 60 to 90 days.

Mr. Epstein recounted the incident which led to his discovery, "quite by accident," that the accelerometers were indeed classified. The witness had walked into a surplus electronics store and simply asked if they had the device in stock. After finding two of the instruments on a shelf in the back of the store, the witness asked the clerk to call the manufacturer and check the characteristics. The clerk called in the presence of the witness. The company was shocked that the store had obtained the devices and immediately sent an armed guard to retrieve them.

The Russian became quite anxious to obtain an accelerometer and set up a clandestine meeting at a shopping center for the transaction. The witness called the FBI and was told to simply avoid the meeting with Isakov. Mr. Epstein explained his missing the contact to Isakov

with the pretext that he had been out of town on business and that they had not yet received shipment of the device as scheduled.

At this point in the relationship, the Russian would no longer come to the New Jersey plant for meetings, believing he would become too well known to the plant employees. A second meeting was set up at a restaurant near the plant, at which Isakov attempted to have the witness ship the device overseas for him. When Mr. Epstein refused, the Russian said that it did not matter, as he would "get it out in a diplomatic pouch." The witness asked the UNICEF procurement officer how he was going to get the underwater robot out of the country. The answer was the same, "under diplomatic pouch," although, in his position, he had no diplomatic standing.

One of the final meetings the witness had with the Russian had to do with an item that was included in the sealed-bid package on the missile sites which were offered for sale and took place on December 4, 1965. Isakov requested Mr. Epstein to purchase a device from the missile site called a Sylphon bellows. The item was described as a flexible connector used to fuel missiles just prior to launching. The witness attributed the impetus of the Russian's desire to purchase this particular device to probable difficulty with Soviet missile fueling techniques. The Sylphon bellows, like the other items, was never delivered to Isakov.

The witness told the subcommittee that he had had 20 different contacts with the UNICEF procurement officer—10 in person and 10 by telephone—from July 1965 to December of that same year.

On January 12, 1966, a newspaper broke the story of the clandestine operation being conducted by Isakov out of the U.N. and brought an end to the case. Two weeks later, on January 22, Vadim Isakov resigned his post after a State Department protest which stated he was involved in activities not in keeping with his U.N. position.

In his closing statements to the subcommittee, Mr. Epstein told of the apparent critical need which exists in the Soviet Union for U.S. advanced technology. He stated his objections to our giving up our advances for the sake of a few dollars' profit. Here the witness stressed that he was not talking about military secrets, but rather our technological secrets.

Mr. Epstein was of the opinion that the proposed opening of additional Soviet consulates in this country would create further problems for the U.S. with reference to technological espionage. He also saw the need for tighter controls on classified or advanced surplus material sales by the armed services in screening certain items destined for disposition on the open market.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK JOHN MRKVA
(JUNE 15, 1967)

The witness for the day was Mr. Frank John Mrkva, 39, chief of the Field Service Branch, Domestic Operations, Passport Office of the U.S. Department of State. Mr. Mrkva was born in Beaver Falls, Pa., and currently resides in Lanham, Md.

Mr. Mrkva attended high school in Beaver Falls, Pa., graduating in 1947. He graduated from Garfield Business Institute in Beaver Falls in 1949 and was subsequently employed with the Babcock and

Wilcox Tube Company in Beaver Falls; the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company of Aliquippa, Pa.; and for Michael Baker, Jr., a land surveyor and consulting engineer in Rochester, Pa. He was also employed with Wilco Builders, working on the Ohio Turnpike.

Mr. Mrkva entered the U.S. Army in December of 1950 with the 809th Engineering Battalion, served in Korea, and was discharged in 1952. He also served 5 years in the Inactive Reserves. He is a member of the American Legion and the World War II Vets of West Mayfield, Pa. He is married and the father of three children.

Upon being hired at the Department of State in 1955, Mr. Mrkva began his duties as research clerk. In time he was promoted to control clerk and, later, time and attendance clerk, visa courier, and general services officer. It was while he was working as visa courier in the Diplomatic Section of the Passport Office that he came into contact with Zdenek Pisk of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington. Pisk served as third secretary and later as second secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy during the years 1961-63.

The witness first met Mr. Pisk in 1961 when he had occasion to call at the Czechoslovakian Embassy at regular intervals in connection with his normal duties as visa courier. Pisk invited the witness to attend a social reception at the Embassy and later began meeting him for dinner on a social basis. The witness explained to the subcommittee that his parents were from Czechoslovakia and that he had a natural interest in talking to someone about conditions in the Czechoslovak nation. The witness said that he spoke enough of the language to "get by" and that he enjoyed the occasional social sojourns in the company of Pisk, who, as the witness noted, was a very personable and cordial companion.

From his initial contact with Pisk, Mr. Mrkva worked closely with his State Department superiors in the Passport Office and with the FBI.

The rapport between Mr. Pisk and the witness eventually developed into an intimate social relationship. The two men had dinner at a restaurant in the Georgetown section of Washington on May 25, 1962, at which time the Czech Embassy secretary stated his interest in the operation of the passport division at the State Department. He inquired about the methods of processing passports and the type of equipment used at the Passport Office. He appeared very interested in the fact that the State Department had streamlined its Passport Office operation through modernized forms and machines. The information discussed, although unclassified in nature, was not available to Czech intelligence other than through a person such as Frank Mrkva.

On June 17, 1962, Pisk and the witness drove to Mayo Beach for an outing. No State Department business was discussed. However, on September 6, 1962, the two again met at the same Georgetown restaurant, and the Czech official once again pressed the witness for information on the equipment in the Passport Office and asked Mr. Mrkva to get any form samples for him that were unclassified.

Mr. Mrkva, after clearing the matter with his superiors, wrote a detailed report on passport processing which he passed to Mr. Pisk at Haines Point one Saturday morning shortly after the June meeting. After this meeting, the two had five additional meetings at various

restaurants in Maryland. The meetings were arranged so that the witness would drive to the rear of a bank at an intersection in Maryland and wait. Pisk would, after checking the area, join Mr. Mrkva in his car, and the two would drive to a nearby restaurant. The witness noted that Pisk was never observed arriving for the pickup at the bank in an automobile. The Czech official was always punctual and cautioned the witness "not to talk in the car." During the last series of meetings with Pisk, Mr. Mrkva told the subcommittee, further information concerning the U.S. system of processing passports was discussed, plus a continuing debriefing of his background by Pisk.

At this point in the hearing, Mr. Watson queried the witness as to State Department policy regarding private social contacts with employees of Communist embassies. Mr. Mrkva replied that the contacts were not prohibited, but that the Department wanted to be made aware of such contacts.

The witness declined to comment on the preferability of a State Department ban on personal social contracts with Communist embassy employees. However, the witness saw nothing wrong in this type of contact as long as it was reported to superiors.

Mr. Tuck noted that but for these private social contacts there would be no way for the Government to engage in a form of counter-espionage. Mr. Watson observed that the U.S. always seemed to "end up on the short end of the stick" in these types of meetings, mainly because the Communists are "well trained in espionage" and Americans are so "friendly and kind and longsuffering," and "have faith in everybody."

Mr. Mrkva told the subcommittee that he received an envelope containing \$100 from Pisk just before the Czech secretary left the country. He also received as gifts: a bottle of Czech brandy, a glass vase, an ash tray, and several other small items.

Pisk's time in the United States was growing short, and at a meeting prior to his departure on May 8, 1963, Pisk told Mr. Mrkva that the both of them would "mutually benefit," "financially," if Mrkva were to continue meeting with a soon-to-arrive "friend" of Pisk's. At this meeting on March 27, 1963—the witness' last with Zdenek Pisk—Mr. Mrkva was told that the "friend" was a "professional" who would contact him as soon as he was established at the Czechoslovakian Embassy and who would give the recognition signal: "I bring greetings from Zdenek."

On December 20, 1963, Mr. Mrkva and his wife had just returned from shopping. As they parked in front of their home they noticed a man standing at their door talking to their daughter. As the Mrkvys approached, the man brushed aside Mrs. Mrkva and shook hands with the witness, saying, "I bring greetings from Zdenek." The witness knew immediately that the man was Pisk's replacement.

The new arrival was a very businesslike attaché of the Czech Embassy, whose name was Jiri Opatrny and who served in this capacity from 1963 to 1966, when he was declared *persona non grata* by the State Department.

Opatrny handed the witness an envelope containing a \$100 bill and an ash tray of Czechoslovakian manufacture. The witness described Opatrny as 30, aggressive, nervous, a heavy drinker and all business; as opposed to Pisk who was mild and friendly.

Opatrny attempted during their next meeting to indoctrinate the witness to the Communist philosophy. However, Mr. Mrkva stated that his only interest was monetary, which conformed with his statements to Pisk on this matter. At this statement Opatrny seemed relieved.

The many meetings with Opatrny in future months were more of a clandestine nature. True to widespread espionage tactics, danger signals were incorporated into their meetings: If the witness suspected he was being watched or followed, he was to go to a predesignated place and mark a spot on the wall with a red "X," which would be later observed by Opatrny and mean the meeting was canceled. If Mr. Mrkva had a classified document to pass to the Czech agent, he was instructed to send a post card to the Embassy with a short "Thank you" message and sign the card "Charles."

The meetings were preceded by an elaborate system of interceptions, observations, and precautionary maneuvers designed to confuse any attempt by U.S. counterespionage agents to follow either of the two men. The witness said that Opatrny knew the route of his (Mrkva's) car pool and would intercept him either going to or coming from work by standing at an intersection, which in turn was a signal to drive to another interception point.

When meetings were aborted for any reason, four alternate plans would be put into effect. In face-to-face interceptions, if either man suspected he was either being watched or followed, he would transfer a newspaper he was carrying from under his right arm to his left, or would take out a handkerchief as they approached and wipe his brow. These signals indicated that contact should be avoided. Another method was described as a system of phone booths and telephone books. Mr. Mrkva would, to signify cancellation of a meeting, travel to a pre-arranged telephone booth and draw a circle around the first name in the "M" section. Sometime later, Opatrny would stop by the booth, check the book, and know that the next meeting had been called off.

The Honorable Edwin E. Willis, chairman of the full committee, at this point in the testimony, commended Mr. Mrkva for his excellent contribution to his country and to the committee. Mr. Willis stated, "I wish we had more Americans like you." Mr. Mrkva replied by saying that he, as an untrained person in counterintelligence, found the assignment a difficult one and that throughout the several years of contacts with the Czech officials he counted heavily on the advice and counsel of Mr. Robert Johnson, his superior officer in the State Department who, Mrkva stated, spent many hours with him on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in preparation for his next meeting with the Czech espionage agent. Mr. Mrkva also noted for the record that throughout the years of contact his wife was unaware of the dangerous double life he was leading.

Mr. Mrkva told the subcommittee about the idiosyncracies of the agent, Opatrny, who, he said, was extremely punctual (he suggested they synchronize their watches on radio time before a meeting.) and very cautious. The witness said that Opatrny always set up a meeting in a large open area where he could easily observe if they were being followed. In other cases he was instructed to meet at an observation point, leave without speaking to the agent, and drive around in a residential neighborhood for a half hour, then return to the observation point. The witness surmised that in this fashion the agent could

observe if he (Mrkva) was being followed. Mr. Mrkva noted that he had 37 meetings with Opatrny and 11 with Pisk for a total of 48 meetings with the Czech agents. He mentioned that Opatrny became impatient with the fact that he was not getting any classified information and encouraged the witness to cultivate friendships with other employees in various sections of the State Department in order to elicit confidential information from them. The agent asked extensive questions into the backgrounds of the members of Mrkva's car pool and especially wanted to know which employees had obvious weaknesses, such as excessive drinking habits.

Mr. Mrkva stated that, on one occasion, Opatrny had given him an obvious test to determine if he was working with counterintelligence in their meetings. The assignment, for which Opatrny would pay him \$100, was to drive to a secluded dead drop at the base of a road sign, place a cigarette packet into the drop and retrieve a cigarette pack (which Mrkva suspected might contain microfilm or microdot), and bring it back to Opatrny. The witness had debated with himself over whether to divert the pack to the FBI, but decided that the mission had all the earmarks of a test and that it would be best to carry out the assignment, which he did. A second test, the witness thought, came about when Opatrny gave the witness money to buy a small walkie-talkie set and instructed him to carry it into the State Department, leaving it in the "transmit" position. The witness stated that the walkie-talkie malfunctioned in some fashion and the batteries burned out. Opatrny had hoped to check out State Department security practices in this manner, according to the witness.

It was May 29, 1965, when Opatrny told the witness of his plan to implant a listening device in the office of the chief of the Office of Eastern European Affairs at the State Department. Opatrny instructed Mrkva to obtain floor plans of the Eastern Europe division of the State Department. The two of them carefully went over the floor plan of the office which was eventually selected to be "bugged" and bantered about various concealed spots where the device would be hidden from sight, but would pick up conversations in the room. Government furniture catalogues were obtained for Opatrny by Mrkva, and a bookcase was chosen as the most suitable place to install the listening device. Mrkva, at Opatrny's order, obtained a sample piece of wood from such a bookcase in the State Department.

One year later, Opatrny gave Mr. Mrkva a transmitting microphone that could be placed under the front bottom lip of a bookcase, out of sight, but in a position to receive and transmit every sound in the office of the chief of the Eastern Europe division. The witness described the device as being about $\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick and about 12 inches long, or roughly the size of a ruler and capable of being operated by remote control from a substantial distance away. A photograph of the bugging instrument was placed in the record of the hearings as an exhibit.

If Mr. Mrkva's efforts in installing the device were successful, he was instructed to call the Communist agent and tell him that he "had made an excellent purchase." If unsuccessful he was to call and say he had "a bad headache." Likewise, if installation was unsuccessful, the witness was to drive to a predesignated theater and return the device to Opatrny in an alley next to the theater. If successful, he was to meet Opatrny a week later and receive \$1,000 in \$20 bills.

The witness told the subcommittee that he received \$100 for expenses prior to the installation.

On the designated date in 1966, Mr. Mrkva transported the bugging device into the State Department and immediately handed it over to waiting FBI agents. The FBI agents, the witness related, transported the device to another section of the building and left it to transmit for approximately 20 minutes before removing it.

The witness met with Opatrny sometime later and the two argued violently over the proposed payment for successful installation of the transmitter. Opatrny contended that the device was inoperative. The witness feigned surprise and demanded payment for the installation. At last the Czech official paid the witness \$500 and promised an additional \$1,000 if and when the device was retrieved and delivered to him. Shortly thereafter the operation was exposed and publicized.

Throughout his contacts with the two Czechoslovakian officials, Mr. Mrkva received a total of \$3,440, the bulk of which came from Jiri Opatrny and all of which was turned over to the FBI. The witness disclosed that he was asked to sign a receipt for the cash received from Opatrny, but he always signed with the alias "Zobek."

Jiri Opatrny was declared *persona non grata* by the Department of State in July 1966 and was given a time limit in which to gather his belongings and leave the country.

In a closing statement to the subcommittee, Mr. Mrkva said that he believed "the American public should be made aware of the activities of some of these Communist agents, who are now serving in this country, under the guise of diplomats." The witness saw how easily American citizens could be duped into furnishing information to these foreign agents "which in many cases could be very detrimental to the security of the United States." The witness was convinced that Communist agents—

are on the prowl here * * * in Washington, and elsewhere in this country, keeping prearranged rendezvous, setting up arrangements for future meetings, familiarizing themselves with select areas that they plan to use for meeting places, and as drops, and it should be a matter of concern to all of us.

The witness concluded with these somber words: "When you start seeing them, and start meeting them practically in your own backyard, as it was in my case, it kind of jolts your complacency."

At the end of the testimony, subcommittee chairman, the Honorable Mr. Tuck, placed a translation of an article which appeared in the May 5, 1967, publication of *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet Government, entitled "The Painters." The article attempts to create the impression that in holding the current series of espionage hearings the Committee on Un-American Activities has been acting at the instigation of the FBI and the CIA and that it has been receiving the testimony of witnesses who have not been telling the truth. The article goes on to falsely accuse various Americans of committing espionage against the Soviet Union.

TESTIMONY OF NATALIE ANNA BIENSTOCK
(NOVEMBER 15, 1967)

Miss Natalie Anna Bienstock, 31, a native of Prague, Czechoslovakia, came to the U.S.A. with her parents when she was 3 years old

and became a citizen of the U.S. through derivation in 1945. Miss Bienstock's parents were both Russian born and settled in Boulder, Colo., upon arrival in America.

The witness attended grammar schools in New York City, Boulder, and Washington, D.C. She graduated from Bronx High School of Science in 1954, and from City College of New York in 1958 with a B.A. The witness accomplished her post graduate work at Columbia University, Teachers College in New York, and received her master's degree from Cornell University in 1964.

The witness noted her ability to speak both Russian and French in addition to English.

She worked part time during college as a department store sales clerk, camp counselor, and tour guide escort. Miss Bienstock also did typing and proofreading of Russian grammar texts. During the years 1958 through 1962 she was a Russian interpreter on an assignment basis for Hurok Attractions, Inc., a company which books cultural exchange programs in this country.

Miss Bienstock also did occasional free-lance translation of Russian literary works for various publishing houses and NBC television during the years 1962 to 1967.

From 1958 to 1962 the witness traveled to Canada, France, the Netherlands, Soviet Union, and Mexico. Most of the trips were taken as a tourist, but some were under the auspices of Hurok, where she was chiefly a "coordinator" for ballet troupes.

In 1961, she met a "character dancer" for the Leningrad Ballet whose name was Constantine Rassadin. Some months later, after much correspondence, she made a trip to Moscow and Leningrad, U.S.S.R., to visit Rassadin, spending 10 or 12 days in each city. She returned to Moscow to extend her visa, in hopes of spending more time with Rassadin. She checked into the Ukraine Hotel in Moscow and gave her passport to Intourist, requesting the extension. Later she received a call from Intourist. She supposed that the passport bureau had granted an extension of her visa. Instead, she was directed to a small adjoining room where a young man introduced himself as Viktor Sorin and stated plainly that he was an agent of the KGB (Soviet Committee of State Security), the Soviet intelligence agency.

Sorin was very pleasant, according to the witness, and said "that he was not going to pull any of my nails out, because times have changed, and he just wanted to talk to me."

The KGB man indicated to Miss Bienstock that she had been followed during the entire trip to Leningrad and Moscow and that the KGB had a complete dossier on her entire family.

Sorin stated that Soviet members of cultural exchange groups to America had to be protected because American agents were "trying to recruit them while they were abroad." Despite her repeated denials, the KGB agent insisted that the witness must be an American agent to have worked with the Hurok staff for so long. Nevertheless, he told her that he thought she would be an ideal person to take care of these Soviet performers while they were in the U.S.

Agent Sorin appeared to have limitless knowledge concerning the lineage and background of the witness. (She estimated that 90% of her relatives were either executed or died from other causes in Soviet concentration camps.) This first interrogation in the Ukraine

Hotel lasted for 6 or 7 hours, after which the agent advised the witness to think about their "conversation." Her passport, which was lying on the desk during her interrogation, was not returned to her.

After returning to her room in the hotel, the KGB agent kept the pressure on the witness by making a number of nuisance calls. The following day, the 9th of March 1962, she was subjected to a second 7-hour session of interrogation.

She was instructed to go to another room in the Ukraine Hotel where Viktor Sorin was again waiting for her. He reiterated many of the facts known by the KGB regarding her personal and private life that had been disclosed to her the previous day. He continued to play on her emotions through various tactics and plyed her with vodka as well.

She was, in this manner, induced to sign a statement which declared that she was, or would become, an agent for the KGB and report the names of American agents in the U.S. who attempted to contact anyone in the Russian cultural exchange groups. She was also told to report any suspicious actions by the Russian members of the groups, those who might appear disloyal to Russia. She was "recruited" into Moscow's employ through coercion by fear.

Miss Bienstock was given two code names and was instructed to contact a Soviet citizen, *Leo Sorokin*, via secret writing at 680 Park Avenue, N.Y.C., then the Soviet United Nations mission address in New York. She was provided with chemically treated paper and was schooled in secret writing for sending messages to her contact—*Sorokin*—in the U.S.

(One *Alexander Sorokin* was formerly an attaché at the Russian Embassy in Mexico and was a member of the Soviet U.N. mission in this country from 1960 through August 1963. No *Leo Sorokin* was listed at that address at that time.)

As soon as Miss Bienstock agreed to act as an informant for the KGB, her passport was returned to her.

Upon arrival back in America, the witness, per instructions by Sorin, attempted to meet "an unspecified agent" 2 weeks later in the Bronx section of New York City. She kept the appointment, but did not make contact. She had been previously instructed to return to the same location 2 weeks later if for any reason the first meeting was aborted. She did not keep the second appointment.

Miss Bienstock received a letter from Sorokin after missing the second meeting. He asked her for the names of any American agents who had been in touch with Russians (at the Hurok Agency). She gave the agent the names of American agents who had been in touch with her—but did not have information concerning contacts between U.S. agents and Russian nationals.

In repeated letters from Sorokin, the witness was told to get more names. She sent back—in the same secret fashion—the names of everyone on the Hurok Agency staff.

Over a period of 11 months, Miss Bienstock sent a total of approximately seven secret letters to her contact. The letters, for the most part, reiterated the same set of names.

Sorokin, in return, would express his displeasure with the information and demand additional names, as well as those of disloyal Russians. The witness stated that it was her intent to give the contact as little information as possible.

Miss Bienstock never received any remuneration from the KGB and finally ceased all correspondence and broke with the KGB in February 1963.

The witness testified that she did not contact authorities in the FBI until fully a year and a half later. During this period, she imagined that disclosure of her activities would have brought about her deportation from the U.S.

In her closing statement, the witness spoke of her own immaturity in allowing the KGB to coerce her into any dealing with them at all. She said that she had never been exposed to the "bad side" of the Russians and, despite warnings from her mother, placed herself in a precarious position of which the Soviet secret police were quick to take advantage.

In conclusion, the witness agreed that the Soviets would take advantage of every opportunity to try to recruit and enlist American citizens in espionage activities against their own country.

CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in Room 429, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of Virginia, chairman; Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana, chairman of the full committee; John C. Culver, of Iowa; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck, Willis, Culver, Roudebush, and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator.

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will please come to order.

The committee is now in session. Under the rules of the committee, no taking of pictures will be permitted.

We have a quorum present.

This subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities is convened to hold hearings pursuant to a resolution unanimously adopted by the full committee on March 8, 1967. That resolution reads as follows:

BE IT RESOLVED, That hearings by the Committee on Un-American Activities or a subcommittee thereof, be held in Washington, D.C., or at such other place or places as the Chairman may determine, on such date or dates as the Chairman may designate, relating to the extent, character, and objectives of activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments or organizations affecting the internal security of the United States, with particular reference to the conduct of espionage and other intelligence gathering activities, and techniques employed for recruitment of citizens of the United States in aid thereof; the legislative purpose being to provide factual information to aid the Congress in the enactment of any necessary remedial legislation pursuant to the mandate to the Committee by House Resolution 7 of January 10, 1967, and Public Law 601 of the 79th Congress.

Over the past 37 years, the House of Representatives, determining that the Communist world movement poses a serious threat to the security of our Nation and our treasured way of life, has appointed committees to investigate Communist activities and to report their findings to the House.

It has done this so that the House would be at all times informed about the nature and extent of threats to the security of our Nation and in a position to take appropriate and effective action to protect our country from those who would undermine and subvert it in the interests of a foreign power.

The Congress of the United States has found, formally and officially, that there is a worldwide, revolutionary Communist movement which, to quote the Internal Security Act, has the aim of establishing a global totalitarian dictatorship by means of "treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary * * *."

Testifying before a House Appropriations Subcommittee last year, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated:

As a result of several decades of development, the coordinated espionage attack against this country by the intelligence services of the Communist bloc has now reached an intensity which makes it the most massive offensive of its kind ever mounted.

He also testified that—

the great bulk of the representatives of the Soviet bloc who are stationed in this country have some type of intelligence assignment and the number of these official representatives has increased substantially over the years.

Communist-bloc agents, Mr. Hoover said, are searching out information on every phase of our national life—to assist them in undermining the United States by propaganda or subversion.

At the same time, they are particularly interested in acquiring "scientific, technological, military, and industrial data which will strengthen the Soviet bloc."

Revelations concerning Communist espionage before this committee years ago—particularly those of Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley—shocked numerous Americans and served to alert them fully, for the first time in many cases, to a realization of the nature and aims of communism.

What they revealed, basically, was that some Americans, including quite a number in Government service, had sold out their country and given themselves so completely to an alien, totalitarian ideology that they would act as spies against their country for it.

To a great extent, these people had been recruited into Soviet spy rings from the ranks of the Communist Party.

Communist tactics are always changing, however—and always to serve Communist interests better.

Last year, Wladyslaw Tykocinski testified before this committee that in 1952 Moscow had issued a directive that native Communist party members, except in most unusual circumstances, were not to be used for espionage purposes. Revelations about the utilization of Communist parties as recruiting grounds for Soviet spies had hurt these parties everywhere—not only in the United States.

Tykocinski had been a Polish Communist diplomat for 20 years. For six of those years, his diplomatic position had been nothing but a cover for his operations as an agent of Communist Poland's military intelligence service.

This hearing today—and others which will follow it—are being held to develop information for the Congress on current Communist-bloc intelligence operations: who their agents are, what kind of information

they are seeking, who they are approaching for that information, and the techniques of their approach.

I will now read for the record the order of appointment of the subcommittee conducting this hearing:

APRIL 4, 1967.

To: Mr. FRANCIS J. MCNAMARA,
Director, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, consisting of Honorable William M. Tuck, as Chairman, and myself, Honorable John C. Culver, Honorable Richard L. Roudebush and Honorable Albert W. Watson as associate members, to conduct hearings in Washington, D.C., commencing on or about Thursday, April 6, 1967, and/or at such other times thereafter and places as said subcommittee shall determine, as contemplated by the resolution adopted by the Committee on the 8th day of March, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning the extent, character, and objectives of activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments or organizations affecting the internal security of the United States, and other matters under investigation by the Committee.

Please make this action a matter of Committee record.

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me.

Given under my hand this 4th day of April, 1967.

/s/ Edwin E. Willis
EDWIN E. WILLIS,
Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Are you ready to proceed, Counsel?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Will the witness Mr. John Huminik, Jr., step forward, please.

Be seated.

Mr. Chairman, will you swear the witness.

Mr. TUCK. Will the witness please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HUMINIK. I do.

Mr. TUCK. Take the witness chair.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Huminik, will you please state your full name for the record?

Mr. HUMINIK. John Huminik, Jr.

Mr. SMITH. What is your date and place of birth?

Mr. HUMINIK. I was born in Washington, D.C., on 25 June 1935.

Mr. SMITH. What is your current address?

Mr. HUMINIK. 5906 John Adams Drive, Camp Springs, Maryland.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Huminik, you are here today in response to a subpoena served on you by Committee Investigator Ray McConnon on 16 February 1967; isn't that correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Now, Mr. Huminik, before we get into the reasons for your being here, I would like to establish briefly for the committee members some of your background.

For instance, would you briefly summarize your educational background for us?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I attended elementary and high school in Washington. I graduated from Anacostia High School in Washington in

June of 1953. Subsequently, I attended several schools and studied metallurgy and welding engineering, both civilian and military courses. I have the courses listed here if you care that I read them.

Mr. SMITH. All right.

Mr. HUMINIK. I graduated from the Columbia Technical Institute in 1957. The Metals Engineering Institute, a diploma in metallurgy in 1958. International correspondence schools, diploma in industrial metallurgy in 1956. U.S. Air Force Metals Processing School, Chanute Air Force Base, in 1954; I graduated number one in the class.

U.S. Air University extension courses, I have 84 credit hours.

U.S. Naval Aircraft Structural Maintenance in Aircraft Materials correspondence courses in 1954.

Then I took numerous courses from the American Society for Metals and I took U.S. Army extension courses in 16 subjects related to chemical, biological, and radiological defense and a 2-year U.S. Army Chemical Officer Career Course at Fort Myer, Virginia.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Huminik.

Would you now relate briefly for the committee your occupational background?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I am a scientist and a businessman, and I have been employed in and around the city of Washington in the defense industry in the capacity of engineering scientist and corporate officer.

I presently am a consultant in welding and metallurgical technology.

In addition, I am a board chairman of Chemprox Corporation, a small chemical manufacturing corporation.

I have also published a technical book and 15 technical papers. I have the book here if you would care to examine it.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HUMINIK. Also, I would like to point out I was chairman of two technical societies here. The American Society for Metals, I was chairman in 1965 and 1966; and in 1961 and 1962, I was chairman of the American Welding Society here in Washington.

The companies that I have worked with, specifically I have worked for Melpar, Incorporated. I was head of the metallurgical engineering group from July 1954 until August of 1959, and then I went back there between September 1965 and 1966.

At Chemprox Corporation I was president and chief scientist from March 1963 to September 1965.

At Value Engineering Company in Alexandria, Virginia, I was vice president and senior scientist between August 1959 and April 1963.

Finally, I was at Fairchild Hiller Corporation as manager of the Materials Engineering Department between July 1966 and January 1967.

I might also add, I am married and the father of four children.

Mr. SMITH. Would you be good enough to tell us something of the book and the papers that you wrote which you have just mentioned?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. The book is about rocket reentry coatings and high temperature materials that relate to the space and rocketry programs.

Some of the papers that I have written deal with subjects like microwave measurement of dielectric properties and high temperature and environments, highly technical papers, and papers also on welding of very rare materials.

Mr. SMITH. Would you give us the title of your book?

Mr. HUMINIK. The title is *High Temperature Inorganic Coatings*, published by the Reinhold Publishing Company.

Mr. SMITH. I would imagine, with that impressive background you have just given us, that you are most likely affiliated with some of the professional groups on a national basis?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I have been connected with several organizations. I was, as I said before, the chairman of the American Society for Metals, which in Washington has 400 members in Government and industry.

I was also chairman of the American Welding Society, which has approximately 100 engineers and scientists in that organization. Currently, I am on the Inter-American Relations Committee of the American Society for Metals. This is a national organization trying to work with Central and South American countries to promote exchange of metallurgical knowledge.

I have also belonged to the American Ordnance Association and I received one award specifically for welding, which was the meritorious certificate from the American Welding Society in 1963. And I am listed in *Who's Who in Commerce and Industry*, the 13th edition, and the latest edition in *Who's Who in the South and Southwest*.

Mr. SMITH. Have you had any military experience?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, I have been associated with the Reserves for 12 years. I served also actively for 7 months at Chanute Air Force Base when I attended the Metal Processing Specialist Schools. I served first as an enlisted man in the Air National Guard, obtaining the rank of staff sergeant. Then I applied for a commission and received a commission in September of 1960 in the Army Chemical Corps Reserves.

I subsequently commanded the 312th Chemical Company and the 419th Chemical Biological and Radiological Center, which was located near Andrews Air Force Base.

Mr. SMITH. Are you still active in the military?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; I was discharged in December of 1966, honorably.

Mr. SMITH. Honorable discharge?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Now, Mr. Huminik, some months ago, in September 1966 to be exact, you became the subject of a rather startling news story involving Soviet diplomats in Washington carrying on espionage operations out of the Russian Embassy and consulate; is that correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct. I became involved in the operation to thwart the Soviet agents and I worked under the guidance of the FBI.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Huminik, I wonder at this point if you might not relate to the committee in your own words and in general terms just what this story involved, what part you played in it, and just how it all started.

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. It all started actually back in probably 1960, when I took a tour of the Soviet Embassy with some out-of-town relatives and met a Russian diplomat there who gave us the tour. His name was Aleksandr Izvekov.

Later, an associate of his, Dr. Sergei Stupar, who is a scientific counselor, applied for membership in the American Society for Metals. At that time, I was secretary of that society, and he was admitted to membership and brought with him Mr. Izvekoy who had given me the tour previously, and they struck up a conversation.

Immediately I contacted the FBI because I suspected that they were going to go further because they knew that I was of Russian ancestry, my father having been born in Russia and coming over at the age of two.

They proceeded to evaluate me and to discuss broad subjects of my background and my occupation over a period of years, and then asking me for simple reports that were difficult to obtain, but unclassified, until finally it proceeded to a full-scale clandestine operation, with dead drops and everything else. And the operation became deeply involved until September 1, 1966, when Valentin Revin, the assistant to the scientific counselor, was declared persona non grata by the State Department.

MR. SMITH. Now you have mentioned several Soviet consulate and Embassy personnel whom you came in contact with during this operation.

I wonder if you would comment on each of these, giving names and titles, if you know them.

MR. HUMPHREYS. Yes. The first is Aleksandr N. Izvekoy, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

As I mentioned before, he gave me the tour of the Embassy. He identified himself as an economic engineer and he was not a member of these technical societies, but he accompanied another Soviet. He appeared more to be a bodyguard or watchdog over Dr. Stupar. He was of military bearing, and for this reason I think that he is part of the GRU.

Now I might explain two terms that I will use. The GRU is the military intelligence arm of the Soviet Government, and the KGB is the Committee on State Security, which is their civilian intelligence agency. They are not relatable to our FBI or CIA; they function differently.

I had a number of contacts with him, all technical meetings.

Another Soviet was Dr. Sergei N. Stupar. He was the scientific counselor and head of the Scientific Division of the Embassy. He is now back in the Soviet Union and, according to *Izvestia*, he is a senior scientific staff member of the Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy in Dnepropetrovsk.

My understanding of his job now is that he is the principal Soviet who reviews the metallurgical things that are probably brought into the Soviet Union by spies; in other words, in the field of metallurgy he is their top expert.

He first attended an ASM meeting, American Society for Metals, in May 1961, and became a member. He gave a lecture, in fact, to our society in January of 1962, where he talked about Soviet metallurgy.

I would like to point out now a couple of items that he gave to me. He gave me such things as a metallurgical handbook that was translated into English and things like calendars, Soviet calendars, which have very nice pictures.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt? I just wanted to inquire as to how a citizen of the Soviet Union would qualify as a member of the American Society for Metallurgy?

Mr. HUMINIK. The society is an open society and it is a society devoted to metals and metallurgy. He was a Ph.D. metallurgist.

Mr. WATSON. And it is not restricted to American citizens?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right. We have members from other countries. We inquired at the State Department about whether he should be admitted, and they told us we could do what we wanted.

We had many committee meetings on the subject before it was decided to allow him to come in. At this time, no one knew he was anything but a scientist.

Mr. WATSON. And there are other foreign national members of this society?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. So there are no restrictions so far as your society regulations and bylaws and policies are concerned, so far as a foreign national being a member of it?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, sir. I would say there are at least 20 countries represented in the society; it is a large society with 35,000 members throughout the country.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to this Soviet national, you only knew him as a scientist and not in any other capacity?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is how the society treated him, as a scientist?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

Mr. TUCK. Do you wish to file those booklets?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; I just wish to show them. I do not wish to file any of these. They are available at any time for anybody to inspect, even days other than this hearing.

Back to Dr. Sergei Stupar, whom I was discussing. He attended meetings of the ASM between May 1961 until September of 1964. He told me he was a scientist and not interested in politics.

He appeared later to be the boss of another Soviet, Valentin Revin, who was thrown out *persona non grata* and I believe him to be a member of the KGB, which is the civilian intelligence agency. He was the prime mover in the evaluation of myself for recruitment into the Soviet spy apparatus. He showed interest in my Reserve activities, and we had a number of contacts.

The next Soviet I would like to discuss would be Anatole Kuznetsov, who is a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy. I had only limited contact, perhaps one or two meetings; I don't recall. He impressed me as being a very intelligent and sharp Soviet diplomat.

He seemed to be the big boss because Dr. Stupar, who accompanied him on one meeting, was terrified every time he spoke. In other words, Dr. Stupar, who was the scientific counselor on a much higher level in the diplomatic status of the Embassy, if he said anything out of line, Anatole Kuznetsov was quick to correct him. And he might have been the top KGB man in the Embassy; I don't know.

I think that this illustrates the fact that the title at the Embassy does not necessarily show the rank of the man in an intelligence organization.

The next man I would like to talk about is Vladimir Boutenko. He was the assistant commercial consular, and he operated out of the Soviet consulate, which is not far from the Embassy here.

He appeared to be a military intelligence or GRU member. He attended ASM meetings and did in fact apply for membership and received membership, the same as Dr. Stupar. They presumably were from two different intelligence agencies, but both became members of this society. He took copious notes at all of our meetings and he made contact with as many ASM members as he could.

He did not appear as polished as Dr. Stupar and he made a total of 18 contacts with me over a period from March 9, 1964, until 10 January 1966, including two visits to my home with his wife.

On one of these occasions, he took a photo of my family, presumably to see if my wife was connected with counterintelligence. In other words, they have the feeling that families can be put together for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. So they check every angle.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Chairman.

Is your wife also of Russian nationality?

Mr. HUMINIK. No.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. She is not?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right.

Vladimir Boutenko stated that he would play a key role in a trade agreement he would make with my small chemical company, Chempro Corporation, a very small company which I founded. He was presumably instrumental in leading me along saying that if I cooperated with the diplomats they would get me some nice trade agreements with the Soviet Union. They said this would push my little company over the top and make it profitable, and everything else. This was the ploy that they used.

At one time, Boutenko had the audacity to ask me to meet his boss out of the country because his boss was not welcome in this country or could not come into this country, so they could discuss the kind of relationship under which I could get such trade agreements.

This proposed meeting was presumably to start off an espionage operation.

Mr. SMITH. Could he tell you why his boss could not come into this country?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, he did not tell me why.

He disappeared after Valentin Revin—and this is a little bit complicated to state now—but Valentin Revin, the spy who was thrown out of the country, was told by me that Boutenko was trying to get me out of the country to meet with his boss, so Revin, being from the other intelligence agency, cut Boutenko off.

In other words, the two agencies presumably were competing for my services.

I would like to show you some other items I got from Boutenko. He gave my wife on one of his visits a perfume called Midnight in Moscow.

Also, he gave me a diary, several diaries, which they like you to keep, I think, so that if they want to steal them later they can see what you were writing about. Also, an address book which also can be taken, phone numbers. In other words, they are always suspicious as to whether you are working for the U.S. Many of these things have double edges to them.

He also gave me a catalog of the chemicals that the Soviets wish to export. Now this catalog came out of the consulate. Since I was interested in chemicals he gave me a used catalog. Usually they gave you new things; presumably this time they didn't have a new catalog.

He also gave me several calendars, here are several more. The pictures are quite magnificent if the committee might want to inspect these. They try to give a peaceful appearance. They give very high quality care to the photography that is in these calendars.

Mr. WATSON. I notice that the perfume appears to have been used. Has your wife used it?

Mr. HUMINIK. I don't think she has used it. I think it has evaporated. I have been trying to save it.

Also, I have a bottle of vodka; I received several of these. As you know, they cannot be imported into the United States so the only way you get it is if a Soviet diplomat gives it to you. There is a bottle for exhibit.

Mr. SMITH. I see you have not opened it.

Mr. HUMINIK. No, it is not opened.

The next Soviet I would like to talk about is Vladimir Zorov. He was third secretary of the Soviet Embassy and he attended an ASM meeting on 9 March 1964 with Vladimir Boutenko.

He appeared to be the watchdog over Boutenko and he is a cruel, coldblooded type. He made a pitch to me in these words: He said, "Mr. Huminik, we would be glad to pay very good prices for any information that you could give to our government."

This is the first meeting I had with him and this was in the Hot Shoppe on the 14th Street Bridge here in Washington. He intimated to me that, "We take care of our friends and we also take care of our enemies."

He was a man used for the direct approach, a type of one-shot deal just to see what would happen, I would say.

Mr. SMITH. Did you understand what he meant by "take care of our enemies"?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think he implied that if you crossed the Soviet Union while you are working with them it would not be very healthy.

He came to my house with Mr. Boutenko on 20 March 1964 and had dinner at my house and discussed many things. This is part of their evaluation period. Later, Boutenko came along with his wife.

Mr. SMITH. Which one of these two groups do you think he was a member of?

Mr. HUMINIK. It is hard to say, but he probably was a GRU man. Just by his military bearing, I surmised this. I have no way of knowing, of course; these are just guesses from my knowledge of the Soviet operation.

Mr. SMITH. He did not exhibit any military training?

Mr. HUMINIK. No. They operate as civilians and say they don't have any military training, but you know from general conversation they know something about the military.

Aleksy R. Malinin, also assistant commercial consular at the Soviet consulate. He did not figure in the operation, but I met him at an American Welding Society meeting in Virginia on March 18, 1964. I had five meetings or contacts with him—had dinner beside him at one of these meetings. He told me he was an expert in welding and that he had been in England selling welding equipment to the British.

Now Aleksy Malinin was declared *persona non grata* in November 1966. He was involved with Sergeant Boeckenhaupt. This was covered in the newspapers. Boeckenhaupt was accused of conspiring to steal U.S. codes and communications data and he has been indicted. I think the trial has not been held yet.

I also note that there was a William Mulvena from England who was arrested by Scotland Yard as being the go-between, in other words, presumably he contacted Malinin in England, who was here at the consulate as an assistant commercial consular.

Mr. SMITH. This is an assumption on your part?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; just what I read from the newspapers. But I did know Aleksy Malinin, and he was declared *persona non grata* in November 1966.

Now the other Soviet I wish to talk about was Valentin Revin, who was the assistant scientific consular of the Soviet Embassy.

I had more contact with him of an intimate nature than any of the others; age 34, born in Moscow. He has a 3-year-old daughter, and his wife is a radio chemist. He attended the University of California at Berkeley as an exchange student and he studied nuclear physics there. He served as a guide at the Russian exhibition in the summer of 1959 in New York City. He is most likely a KGB or Committee on State Security member.

He was Dr. Stupar's successor. He took over after Stupar left. He is very intelligent, sharp, cautious, quick, observant. He spoke English as well as I do, very slight accent; it would be hard to determine that he had an accent, even.

He has a thorough knowledge of the metropolitan Washington area, maybe better than I do. I have a feeling that they have a course, it is probably called the City of Washington back in Moscow, before they come here. He knows every street. He knew how to dress in Western attire. This is a thing that the Soviets were accused of not doing in their earlier espionage days. He looked like a college student. You would say he was a college student if you saw him on the street. Well read in intelligence customs, familiar with techniques and equipment, in general a well-trained intelligence officer.

I proposed the theory to the FBI that he and I were biologically matched; in other words, that he and I were about the same build, same temperament, both wear eyeglasses, same temper. This is, in my opinion, the way to match an intelligence agent who is trying to subvert someone.

Mr. SMITH. Do you feel there was any effort on the Soviet Embassy's part to match you up with him?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think definitely. I think that is right.

I would like to show you a wristwatch that he gave me as a gift, it is worth about \$180; it is an Omega wristwatch. He gave me a box that is an expensive wooden box, with a very fancy picture on it, that came from Dr. Stupar, he said. And later he wanted to get this back from me because he said that it is easily recognized as being a Russian product and he didn't want it to be around, you could not get it in this country.

I told him I didn't go for this Indian-giving and I was not going to give it back to him, so I didn't. He gave me also a wallet, which I don't have any more, and he gave me vodka.

Mr. SMITH. Now would you explain to the committee your personal views as to why the Soviets chose you as a target?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, I think there are several reasons. One, that I was of Russian descent, my father coming here in 1913 at the age of 2, and I was friendly. And being an officer of the society, they could get to me easily without any notice being taken of this. I was very accessible through ASM; they could come and visit me every month openly.

I had access to Government officials and to reports; I was doing Government research. I was vice president of an engineering company at that time which was doing work in rocketry which they were very interested in.

I was a member of the Army Reserve and I was an expert in chemical and biological warfare, and they were very interested in the fact that I had published a technical book dealing with reentry coatings for satellites and rockets, a subject they were very interested in.

Mr. SMITH. Do you feel they made any kind of an inquiry or investigation of your background?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, I think they probably did this all along. They were asking me many personal questions—my hobbies, what I did, where I went, everything.

Mr. TUCK. Are they in the country now?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; they have either left or been thrown out, to my knowledge.

Mr. SMITH. How long did the Soviets develop an assessment of you before they really got down to business?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think between the spring of 1961 and March 2, 1965, which was a 4-year period where they assessed me and asked for simple reports and asked for things that were not highly classified. It was a 4-year period.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think this assessment period of 4 years unusual or an exception in your case?

Mr. HUMINIK. I don't know. I think they are going to take their time. I think they have been burnt before and they are going to be very careful about whom they pull into a spy operation.

Mr. SMITH. Would you describe some of the ways or the means by which they accomplished their assessment and development of you as an agent?

Mr. HUMINIK. They obtained all my biographical data, where I worked and schooling. They had photos of me from magazine articles. They had photos of my family. They tried to develop a personal friendship where we talked about everything. We went to lunch and to dinner. And they gave me vodka and these other items that you see here.

I gave a lecture at the Catholic University on high temperature coatings for rockets, and Dr. Stupar attended at least one of these lectures and appeared to be very interested in this topic.

They doublechecked me. They would ask me one question, and 2 years later they would repeat the same question to see if the answer was the same.

They had, obviously, an elaborate dossier.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, they were testing you?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; that is right. They tested me by asking me to obtain documents and reports and other things from the U.S. Gov-

ernment and they also promised trade agreements. They later offered money, and actually gave me money, and more or less promised a willingness to help—they promised an escape route out of this country if I was to be caught by the FBI while I worked for them.

They attempted at one time to control me by saying that I had relatives in Russia. Dr. Stupar at the Purple Tree cocktail lounge here in Washington one night said, "We found relatives of yours in the Georgian part of Russia."

I said, "Get off of that," that "I don't have any relatives that mean anything to me, anyway, and just forget it."

"If this is all you came to talk about, then we are going to sever our friendship right here," I told him.

They asked me for handwritten reports which had my signature on them, which they could presumably use for blackmail.

Mr. SMITH. Did they request your signature to any receipts?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, they did not.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for telling all of this detail regarding the testing and development period. It gives us a clear picture as to the lengths to which they went to develop you towards that service.

Now I wonder, were there times when they went beyond this assessment?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; there were times when they asked me for what I considered important information. Vladimir Boutenko, on the 23d of June 1964, riding in my automobile, asked me to obtain for him the forms necessary to become employed in the United States Government.

I asked him did he want a Government job, and he said, "No," but his boss was interested in this and he wanted all the data necessary—

Mr. SMITH. Who was his boss?

Mr. HUMINIK. His boss was the unnamed man that I was to meet out of the country, some intelligence official. He said he wanted the forms necessary, including birth certificate, driver's license, anything that would be required if you applied for a Government job.

In other words, not only the Form 57 but he wanted to know about the background data that you would also have to show to get a Government job. Presumably, this would be to bring an illegal Soviet in and set up the papers to get a Government job. This is what it implied to me.

Mr. SMITH. It seems the implication is clear as to why they desired these types of forms.

Mr. HUMINIK. The next thing that was asked also by Boutenko was papers necessary to establish a corporation in the U.S. He asked, "How does a U.S. corporation work? What are all the details of starting a corporation, operating, and everything?"

Dr. Stupar had at one time asked me if it was possible to bring a Soviet in and let him be employed in my corporation, if they paid the bills; in other words, provide the front for an illegal Soviet in a U.S. corporation.

They wanted to stay within the law if they established such a corporation, so they wanted to have all the data, everything necessary.

Mr. SMITH. Did they ever make a direct approach to you on the employment of an individual in the corporation?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; they asked if I would consent to it and whether this could be done and everything else.

Mr. SMITH. So you did not employ anybody that they sent to you?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct.

Then Dr. Stupar asked me for some data on industrial machines, on chemicals, on blueprints and other technical subjects.

Mr. SMITH. Is there any indication as to who would pay this bill that he was talking about?

Mr. HUMINIK. The Soviet Government would pay the bill.

Mr. SMITH. The Embassy here in Washington?

Mr. HUMINIK. Presumably; these people were diplomats and they came from the Embassy on 16th Street just a few miles from here, so I assume it comes out of the safe right there.

Mr. SMITH. Proceed.

Mr. HUMINIK. I think that is all I have on the examples.

Mr. SMITH. We can see from this, then, that some of their development of you served a twofold purpose; they tested your ability to perform on their behalf while, at the same time, obtaining materials they wanted without their having to show their own hand; is that correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct. I think that they were evaluating me as a prospective Soviet agent and they asked for simple things. They went through a development phase to see if I would really work for them, could I do them any good.

Mr. SMITH. Did you obtain these forms?

Mr. HUMINIK. Things that were obtained were cleared by the U.S. Government; things that passed to them were possibly altered or changed or reduced in some way. This is all classified.

Mr. SMITH. Can you tell us more about the chemicals that you mentioned a while ago, as well as the machine and the blueprints they wanted?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, the machine was a piece of industrial equipment which I cannot identify and it was not available to the Soviet Government. They, at one time, asked me to see if I could buy one for them and I said I would try.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, it was restricted sale or proprietary?

Mr. HUMINIK. It was not Government restricted, but the company would never sell them one if they knew it, that is for sure. When I told them they could not get such a machine, I told them there was one in Baltimore. They implied why not steal it or go over there and make drawings.

They were prepared for me to commit a felony on their behalf.

Mr. SMITH. Did they ever actually ask you to do that?

Mr. HUMINIK. They implied it. They implied very strongly, "Why don't you get it any way you can, and we will be very generous with our payment."

Mr. SMITH. Can you tell us what the machine was used for?

Mr. HUMINIK. It was for applying a certain type of constructional material. It is a new type of machine, and I cannot really say any more about it.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. HUMINIK. The chemicals he asked for were metallurgical types used in steelmaking. Again, I cannot identify what these are. They are used to make a high-grade steel and they are not, as far as I know, available in Russia, and they could not, again, have purchased these directly if they had gone to the company that I obtained them from.

Mr. SMITH. Would these chemicals that they had asked for be connected with rocketry by any chance?

Mr. HUMINIK. Not those particular ones. They were, however, interested in rocketry materials, very definitely.

Mr. SMITH. What, particularly, in rocketry?

Mr. HUMINIK. I cannot say.

Mr. SMITH. Is that for security reasons?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is for security reasons, yes; national security reasons.

Mr. SMITH. Before we leave this development and assessment phase of the operation, could you explain what means of control the Soviets were trying to establish over you?

Mr. HUMINIK. We had, of course, a feeble attempt by Dr. Stupar to tell me I had relatives in Russia; they had handwritten reports of mine; they had the family photos. They had requested me to perform an operation getting documents, so this is another form of control.

They promised me forged passports to get out of the country should I get caught by the FBI. They promised trade agreements and they also gave me money.

Mr. SMITH. Did they promise you any employment or any professional position if you had to leave the country?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. They said that a person with my talents in many fields would be very well taken care of in Russia and that I would have everything I needed.

Mr. SMITH. Then you felt all along that this gathering of these materials was to put you in a position of being controlled?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. By the Soviets?

Mr. HUMINIK. By the Soviets; that is right. But, of course, I would like to point out again, all along I was working with the FBI. They were not aware of this, naturally, and I was able to report all of these things to the FBI as it went along.

Mr. SMITH. You have indicated that they tested and developed you something like 4 years as a potential agent.

At what point do you feel that they considered this to be a full-scale clandestine intelligence operation?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think March 22, 1965—now, this is just a very recent time, it is about 22 months ago, I think—Valentin Revin telephoned me at home and told me that he brought greetings from Moscow from Dr. Stupar who had returned to the Soviet Union and that he would like to meet with me for lunch the next day.

That was the beginning of the clandestine part of the operation.

Mr. SMITH. You feel they had made their decision?

Mr. HUMINIK. Oh, yes.

Mr. SMITH. That they could use you?

Mr. HUMINIK. Very definitely.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Smith, would you suspend for just a few minutes.

(Brief recess.)

Mr. TUCK. We have a quorum call, and the committee will take a recess until 12:45.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Tuesday, April 6, 1967, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967

(The subcommittee reconvened at 1 p.m., Hon. William M. Tuck, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.)

Subcommittee members present at the time of reconvening: Representatives Tuck, Culver, and Roudebush.)

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will please come to order.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR.—Resumed

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Huminik, at the time of recess you were telling us, or describing for us, at what point you believed the Soviet operation became a full-fledged clandestine intelligence operation. Can you tell the committee what else there was about the way Valentin Revin operated that made you feel that the Soviet assessment and development period was concluded?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think the fact that he incorporated a number of things into this operation that were new, at least to me, indicated that this thing was going to get very deep. For instance, he incorporated danger signals and alternate plans in case we could not meet and he used a system of dead drops. This is when you put material into hiding places when no one is there and later someone will pick it up. He also used a system of live passes where you give classified information to a person, in person, rather than using a dead drop.

He also talked about an escape plan and using telephone books for codes and using forged passports to get out of the United States and furnishing money and buying a Zeiss camera to photograph documents. This indicates to me that he is a full-fledged intelligence agent.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, he exhibited all the classic characteristics of a well-trained intelligence agent?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, sir. This is the reason that I felt when Valentin Revin started that the other Soviets had given him the green light and had more or less accepted me into their operation.

Mr. SMITH. Now, Mr. Huminik, I wonder if we might not go into detail now on the manner in which Revin operated with you, taking those things you have just related one by one. First his method of contact with you, please elaborate a little more on that.

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, we would either use the telephone—this is near the beginning. Later we didn't even use the telephone because they were distrustful of telephones because they claimed they could be bugged and tapped. Later we arranged to meet at our next meeting, during the existing meeting. In other words, we arranged our meetings in advance. We had meetings at varied places—drug stores, a motel lobby, in front of a movie house, in front of a restaurant, parking lot, street corners, gas stations, anywhere.

Mr. SMITH. What transportation was used? Did the Soviets furnish transportation?

Mr. HUMINIK. No. They had diplomatic tags on their cars so they don't like to use theirs; they used my car. When we were in my car the radio was played very loudly so it would drown out any microphone pickups. In other words, the sound bouncing around in the car would be garbled so that nothing could be recorded. They never trusted a car for sensitive discussions. This is just automatic with them, "turn the radio on."

Mr. SMITH. Were these places of meeting widely dispersed?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I will give you some examples of some of the restaurants we had lunch or dinner at, and these also served as meetings where I got instructions in espionage:

The China Inn which is in the Shirlington Shopping Center in Arlington, Virginia.

Blair Mansion Inn which is in Silver Spring, Maryland.

The Steak House on Indianhead Highway in Fort Washington, Maryland.

The Wagon Inn in Lanham, Maryland.

Normandy Farms in Potomac, Maryland.

Mosby Restaurant in Fairfax, Virginia.

That gives you an idea.

Mr. SMITH. Did they change locations frequently?

Mr. HUMINIK. Oh, yes. Sometimes we met in front of one place and would go to another because they were suspicious.

Mr. SMITH. Did they ever meet at the same place twice?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think over a period of years we hit some of the same places twice.

Mr. SMITH. I think this brings us now to the next point, and that is the use of these danger signals. Could you describe those for us?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. We had some visual danger signals, which was the mere adjusting of the necktie if we were walking towards each other. If one of us did that, then the meeting was broken off and we used some alternate date. He was to speak first, not me, when we made contact. If I spoke first, it might be bad, there might be someone around and Revin wanted to talk first.

Mr. SMITH. Was there ever any occasion in which Revin felt it was not the proper time to meet?

Mr. HUMINIK. We had a couple of drops or passes that were unusual. One was at the Normandy Farms Restaurant. He aborted a meeting, but later as I was driving home he picked me up—in other words, he overtook my car and passed me and I followed him and we had a meeting in another place.

Mr. SMITH. How was that made now, this passing you? What kind of signals did he use to let you know?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, he blinked his headlights.

Mr. SMITH. A certain number of times?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, just blinked them once. In other words, I knew his car and in fact I saw him hiding. And after I passed him he took off at high speed behind me in a no-passing zone.

Mr. SMITH. How did he effect the contact then?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, he had me follow him and then he stopped in a residential area and we both got out of the car and I gave him the material.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Now you mentioned these danger signals employed when you were in visual contact. Were there other signals employed to denote danger when you were not in visual contact?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. Each of us had a mailbox assigned to us. This would be a public mailbox on a street corner, red and blue type you use every day. We were to use chewing gum to be placed on the line where the red and blue come together. He had a mailbox on 14th Street near the Carter Barron Theater, and I had one near my home. If I saw

some danger like the FBI closing in, I was to put a piece of chewing gum on his mailbox and we were to meet the next Wednesday or next Saturday in a prearranged place. Also, it was reversed. If he saw a danger, then he was to put it on my mailbox because I saw it every day and then I was to make the meeting with him.

Mr. SMITH. How often were they checked?

Mr. HUMINIK. These boxes were supposed to be checked every day. In other words, Revin was supposed to look at his every day, and I was to look at mine every day.

Mr. SMITH. I believe this would be an appropriate time for you to describe to the committee the use of these dead drops that you mentioned a while ago.

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. A dead drop is where you do not make personal contact. I think in this case I might first describe that the places we had the dead drops would be like the base of a tree, a sign post, a dump area where you had a "No Dumping" sign, or a wooded area. Now what Revin wanted me to do was to photograph material, classified documents, et cetera; put the film in a beer can or a cola can; take it to the predesignated spot at the predesignated time and place it there. Then I was to go to a telephone booth and mark a specific page on the telephone book with a number ending in three zeros, for example. Revin would then check the booth and he would know that the drop was "loaded."

Revin would then himself, or have one of his associates, "unload" the drop. Then he would mark the book in the phone booth with numbers that would tell me that he had "unloaded" the drop. Now the way this worked, for instance, if the drop was at 11 o'clock at night, I would go to the area, place the can with the film in the predesignated spot, and cover it with leaves. A half hour later or 15 minutes later, I would go into a specific phone booth, maybe miles away, and put the numbers on a certain page. Then I would go home.

Revin would go check the book and he would see that the numbers were on the page. He would then unload the drop. Then he would drive all the way across town to the booth that was assigned to me and mark another number on a specific page, which told me the next morning that the film had been picked up. If the numbers were not on my phone book, then I was to go back and get the material because this meant he could not get it for some reason. So it is very elaborate; it protected him from being directly involved with me. If he saw something suspicious in these areas, he could leave the material there, making it very difficult for the FBI to apprehend him in the act of getting the film, because they were always deserted areas. You could see clearly that there was no one there.

Mr. SMITH. What was the purpose of the half-hour wait between the drop and the time you marked the phone book?

Mr. HUMINIK. It just took that long for me to travel between the places. We operated all over the whole city. In other words, I possibly would have had to drive across town to mark a phone book.

Mr. SMITH. Could you tell me how these live or personal passes of information were made between you and Valentin Revin?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think the easiest way again is to describe a couple of examples. One was at the Riggs Plaza shopping center in Northeast Washington. I went on December 2, 1965, to a phone booth and pre-

tended like I was making a phone call. I then went back to my car and waited. Valentin Revin drives up in his car, goes into the phone booth, and pretends like he makes a call. He gets into his car, and I follow. He leads me on a chase for maybe 40 minutes through the city, going all over the city, I don't even remember. We were driving so fast we both should have gotten tickets; it is a wonder the police didn't catch us. He wanted to go fast because nobody could follow. If you go fast, you can usually tell if somebody is following.

We finally ended up in Silver Spring near the Sligo Creek Parkway. We pulled up to another stop sign, and a Volkswagen starts up about a block away—another Soviet vehicle. Then we go down along a 3- or 4-mile road that has no access roads. The Volkswagen goes 10 miles an hour, and we go 60. Pretty soon we leave the Volkswagen, which blocks up the road so if the FBI were following they could not get by. Where the stop sign is he opened his hood as though he were having car trouble, I walk up and throw the stuff in his front seat, and that was it.

Mr. SMITH. In your opinion did they have any arranged signals between these two cars?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; they blinked the lights. It was all prearranged. They work in pairs frequently; it is not a lonely operation for Soviet spies.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think that was made by shortwave radio or signal of some kind or blinking of lights?

Mr. HUMINIK. It was blinking of lights in this case.

Mr. SMITH. He always stayed in sight then, the one that dropped behind?

Mr. HUMINIK. He did in this case; yes.

Another example of a live pass would be on February 10, 1966, just a little more than a year ago, I went to a People's Drug Store in Alexandria, Virginia, and waited at the magazine rack until Valentin Revin came in. I was to wait for 1 minute after he left. In other words, while I was there, he came in and made a little purchase. I waited 60 seconds and then I was to walk a prearranged four-block pattern, and he was to meet me along the way, and then I was to give him the film. So I walk a block or two and then I see him looking in a store window, he is looking behind me. After I pass him, we walk in shadows and I give him the film. Then we walk away in different directions.

Later, on March 31, 1966, at the Normandy Farms where I was to go in at 11:30 at night, go into the bar and wait 20 minutes and then come out to the parking lot. He was to be walking up from the parking lot towards the restaurant, and as we passed I was supposed to hand him the material. He was scared that night, he told me later, because there was too much light in the parking lot. There was an electrical repair truck that looked suspicious, and there was a D.C. Transit bus parked next to my car.

So I waited 10 minutes past the designated time. He didn't come so I started driving home. When I got to an intersection about a mile down the road, I saw him in a gas station pretending like he was making a phone call, but I didn't acknowledge that I saw him and just kept on going. I saw him jump into his car and take off at high speed and pass me and blink his lights and more or less signal me to follow. I followed for 10 or 15 minutes, and he led me through various roads

I was not familiar with. This would be about midnight now, and in a residential area I gave him the material.

Mr. SMITH. Would you enlighten the committee in regard to the system of alternate plans that were employed in this operation that you mentioned a little earlier? I would like you to go into some detail about each one of the alternate type of plans.

Mr. HUMINIK. I think in the aspect of meetings, alternate dates were always selected. If we could not make a meeting or if we had to call it off for any reason, we were to have two or more alternate dates. Now frequently he would remind me not to wait more than 5 or 10 minutes. In other words, if he didn't show up in 5 or 10 minutes, I was to call the meeting off.

Now on dead drops, we would have alternate dates with alternate phone booths and alternate places, alternate bushes or trees or what-have-you, which would be used and we would set up dates. In other words, if I used a drop on this date, I was to use the one over in Fort Washington; if it was another date, it would be the one in Clinton, Maryland. These were all rural areas, the dead drops were done in relatively uninhabited areas.

Mr. SMITH. What were the alternate plans for the live passes?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, we always had an alternate date 1 week to 10 days later if that didn't work out. Of course that was early—in other words, we went to live passes and afterward we changed to dead drops. I don't know what we would have had next. I think that the live passes were relatively simple.

Mr. SMITH. For clarification of the record would you explain a little more about the chewing gum method and the telephone book method, describe those a little bit more?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. The chewing gum method was a danger signal, where I placed chewing gum on a mailbox which would be his mailbox—we call it "his" and the other was "mine." "His" mailbox was near his house and "mine" is near mine. If I was in danger for any reason, like the FBI was closing in on me, I was to put chewing gum on his mailbox and he and I were to meet the next Wednesday or the next Saturday, whichever came first, in a place in Lanham, Maryland, which was another drugstore, and I was to tell him about the problem. Now if he had a problem or he saw a danger, then he was to mark my mailbox and we would meet the next Wednesday or the next Saturday and discuss it.

Mr. SMITH. Was this chewing gum placed in such a way that it was visible to anyone?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. It was placed right on the side of the mailbox between the red and the blue paint so a kid could have put it there. No one would really be able to explain why it was there, but we knew what it was for.

Mr. SMITH. Now what were the details of the telephone system used?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I assume you are referring to the codes in the telephone books.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HUMINIK. The details of this were that when I made a dead drop I was to then go to a telephone book in a predetermined booth which is on a street corner and mark on a specific page, let's say page 100 of the yellow pages, at the bottom I would write a phone number, any phone number that ended with three zeros; on another day it

would have ended in three twos. If I had more than one container of film, I was to put an X through the number or a line through it. We had different materials. When he picked up the material, he would put in a telephone number ending with three numbers in another telephone booth, maybe within a mile of my house. That told me he had retrieved the film.

Mr. SMITH. Can you describe for us the alternate plan for this telephone system?

Mr. HUMINIK. The alternate plan is just other telephone booths. In other words, if it didn't work, we would have another booth.

Now one night, specifically the night that Revin got photographed by the FBI in one of these phone booths—this was in the newspaper on December 3, 1966, I believe—if I was not able to use that drop I was to put an X through the number on that night and go to another alternate drop that very night. In other words, he was determined to get that material that night even if I had to stay up until dawn. This was already very late. So we had two alternates on the same night on opposite sides of the city.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned an escape route earlier. Would you enlighten us on that, please?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I had told Valentin Revin that this was very dangerous business and I didn't like being associated with a Soviet diplomat; that I could get caught and sent to prison and perhaps worse. I kept reminding him about famous cases like the Rosenbergs. When Colonel Whalen was arrested, I reminded him of that case. So he promised to get me an escape route.

He said, "We are going to make two passports, an American passport and, since you have been down to the Dominican Republic, a Dominican Republic passport." Presumably the way it would work, should they decide it is too dangerous and I have to get out, I would go, for example—this is a supposition now because we never ran through the plan—from Washington to say Canada, fly from Canada down to the Dominican Republic, presumably to be picked up by submarine or some other method to escape from this hemisphere to Russia.

Mr. SMITH. Did they have any other plan if this one failed?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, I don't think so. I think the plan was to get out of the country. They said the big problem was getting out of the United States because the customs and immigration operation is so strict that it is hard to get out of the United States.

Mr. SMITH. By any chance, did you go to the Dominican Republic?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, I went to the Dominican Republic three times.

Mr. SMITH. Why were you there?

Mr. HUMINIK. I was there on business basically. I was caught in the revolution in April of 1965, the Dominican revolution, and I was there before the troops landed. I was there 2 days before the revolution started and then I was there 5 days during the fighting and I was aboard naval vessels for another few days.

Mr. SMITH. For what purpose were you there?

Mr. HUMINIK. I was there on business for my chemical company.

Mr. SMITH. To sell chemicals?

Mr. HUMINIK. We were trying to get a trade arrangement started with the Dominican Republic.

Mr. SMITH. Were the Soviets aware of this?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, they were not aware that I was going down there and they were upset when I came back because I hadn't told them. They read my name in the papers as being down there and they accused me of working for the CIA and grilled me extensively over several meetings. They wanted to see my passport and everything else; they thought I had a diplomatic passport. They were very nervous about it.

Mr. SMITH. Did you show them the passport?

Mr. HUMINIK. I had it one time and threw it out on the table while we were eating. Revin was embarrassed and showed me his. He gleaned it for a half hour looking at each of the stamps and other markings. Later he asked would I go down and get a Dominican passport made with Dominican film and a Dominican photographer. This was in 1966.

Mr. SMITH. This was to be forged?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; a forged Dominican passport and a forged U.S. passport. I delivered photos for each.

Mr. SMITH. Did they furnish you with the passports?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; the case was broken a month before I got these. The State Department broke it up for reasons I don't know.

Mr. SMITH. You described a while ago they indicated they rewarded those who worked for them and took care of those who were their enemies. Did they promise you any suitable employment if you had to leave our country suddenly?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I think I mentioned this morning that they said, with my talents in various fields, such as chemistry and metallurgy and other fields, there would be no problem in getting a suitable position in Russia and that they would take care of everything, that I had no problem.

Mr. SMITH. Did they furnish you any equipment other than what you have shown us here?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. They furnished me with money to buy a camera which I have here to show you. This camera cost nearly \$300 and is used to photograph documents. With that and a tripod, which I have here, and closeup lenses and a shutter release you were able to set up the camera and hold it over a document—I will demonstrate this very quickly. You put your shutter release on and your closeup lens and you can put it over a document and focus, using the light from regular table lamps, and you can photograph documents. When I passed films sometimes it would be six or seven rolls at a time, 36 shots on each roll.

Mr. SMITH. You stated they furnished you money to buy the camera?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did they specify the kind of camera?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. They told me what kind of camera to buy, what kind of settings to use, what film to buy, everything. Complete instructions.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, almost a course in photography?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. Revin said, "You are an engineer, we don't have to talk to you about how to run it, you can figure it out yourself." But presumably if you didn't know, they would give you a course

in person. Then they would criticize the photography and tell me what was wrong with it. For instance, I didn't buy the tripod, I wanted to appear amateurish. He said, "You need a tripod." I said, "Oh, a tripod?" Then I went and bought a tripod, and that still shook a little bit, and then he said, "Buy a cable release." So I kept doing this; I didn't want to appear too expert even though I know a good deal about photography.

Mr. SMITH. Did they give you money to buy other equipment?

Mr. HUMINIK. They gave me money to buy a tape recorder. This was to record summaries of my conversations with key scientists. For example, I was to go into the Pentagon and talk with officials, get information and put it on the recorder, and then pass it to them. They wanted information on opinions and statements and discussions with defense officials.

Mr. SMITH. Did they suggest or instruct you to go into the Pentagon for this purpose of discussions?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. They knew I knew officials in the new sciences and they wanted me to start putting the conversations on tape, as well as continuing to photograph documents, that is, put audio tape recordings together and give them even more information.

Mr. SMITH. Did they instruct you how you were to carry this into the Pentagon?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; they told me what kind of recorder to buy and what speed to set it at. It was not necessarily to take the recorder into the Pentagon, but at least to go in and talk to the people and then go back home and talk into the recorder about the discussion. They didn't require that I obtain a specific conversation right on the recording; they wanted the information. They didn't care about the man's voice.

Mr. SMITH. Did they give you any indication as to what kind of information they wanted you to discuss with these people?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, they did, but this information is classified.

Mr. SMITH. How many contacts did you have with Mr. Revin?

Mr. HUMINIK. At least 20 personal contacts, not counting telephone-type contacts, over a period of some 19 months.

Mr. SMITH. And ending when?

Mr. HUMINIK. When he was thrown out of the country *persona non grata* in the fall of 1966. That is approximately 8 months ago.

Mr. SMITH. What were your total contacts with the Soviets if you can remember?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think 65 or 75 personal contacts.

Mr. SMITH. Over what period of time?

Mr. HUMINIK. Five and a half years approximately, 1961 to 1966.

Mr. SMITH. Could you tell us at this point, Mr. Huminik, what types of information and assistance the Soviets were requesting of you?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. They basically wanted scientific and engineering reports. They consider, I think, that their technology is not up to what ours is, and I think this is what they really want. They don't need to know troop movements and things like this as the espionage people did during World War II. They want technology, new weapons, faster airplanes, rockets, things like this. They wanted proprietary industrial processes such as the oxygen steel process as installed in

this country. They wanted details—what size pipe is used, the pressures, the operational details, so they could duplicate.

They wanted this machine for applying constructional materials. They wanted records of classified technical meetings. There were several classified technical meetings or conferences during this period, and they asked me to go and get the proceedings or to order the proceedings later and to pass it on to them.

They wanted certain things on the Surveyor Moon Program. They were very interested in this and they had a high priority on it. They were saying in the public media they were not in any race to the moon, yet they were interested in the Surveyor Moon Program.

Mr. SMITH. These were defense contract meetings or defense proceedings they asked you to attend?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And secure classified information?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; weapons and other subjects. They also wanted background information on scientists, specific scientists, and they wanted proprietary chemicals also.

Mr. SMITH. And it would seem to indicate that they had a shortage in this type of materials?

Mr. HUMINIK. Definitely. I would say they would not be asking for it unless they wanted it for some specific reason and they must not have had it.

Mr. SMITH. Do you feel that the Soviets are or were lacking information on all of these areas in which they requested you to get the information for them?

Mr. HUMINIK. I can only guess. I would say, as I mentioned earlier, that they probably were lacking in it otherwise they would not be asking. It just seems to me that they would not take all these risks and go through these elaborate procedures and pay money to get the things they didn't need. I think somebody had deduced they needed this, and that is why I was to get it.

Mr. SMITH. Were they pleased with the results that you produced for them?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, this is questionable. We don't really know, but we gave them incomplete reports frequently. For instance, if there was a series of five reports, we left out the most valuable one so without it, it does not mean anything. We would have handwritten reports that were incomplete, and I would promise them more later. I would string them along.

Mr. SMITH. This information was all cleared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the agencies involved?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; the Government cleared all items passed to the Soviets.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Mr. HUMINIK. Some of these items were altered; I altered some and the Government altered some.

Mr. SMITH. How much of this information that they requested you to produce did you actually produce? In other words, was it in volume or limited?

Mr. HUMINIK. We produced a lot of information for them, but it was not necessarily what they asked for. In other words, I would give them a lot of things that they would say are just interesting,

not really valuable. In other words, I was giving them something so they would see I was working for them. They would see a lot of film with a lot of pages or a lot of documents, but it was merely interesting.

Mr. SMITH. They knew you had access to this type of information?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, this type of information to keep it going, and certainly the Government wanted to keep it going for the purpose of learning how the Soviets operated. You have to be giving them something of some value to keep it going, you have to weigh this. Is it good to keep it going or is it better to cut it off? So all this was weighed carefully through the whole operation.

Mr. SMITH. By my count, you came into contact with six or seven Soviet Embassy and consulate personnel who were engaged in espionage in this country, or at least performing some intelligence function. In earlier statements you said that you believed some to have been members of the GRU and others to have been members of the KGB. This would denote to me that there was some infighting going on between these two organizations in regard to your services. Would you care to clarify this for the committee and tell us why you feel that was the case?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, this is again speculation on my part, but I would say that Izvekov, Boutenko, and Zorov were members of the GRU and Stupar, Kuznetsov, and Revin were members of the KGB. By the operation as it was going on, I could tell that one sometimes did not know what the other was doing. This showed they were disconnected—the fact that Boutenko, the assistant commercial consular, was working on me for one subject and Revin on another. When I told Revin about Boutenko's pursuing me, he was very surprised and he contacted Boutenko and cut him off; in other words, I didn't see him any more. So there definitely were two intelligence agencies working on me at the same time.

Mr. SMITH. Which one in your opinion won out?

Mr. HUMINIK. The KGB which is the larger of the two.

Mr. SMITH. Why do you arrive at that conclusion?

Mr. HUMINIK. Because I think Revin worked for the KGB and since he was the one I was working with last and the only one, it indicated that the KGB was it.

Mr. SMITH. In your feeling in that respect, was there any connection between the military objectives and the KGB going beyond these objectives? Would that make you arrive at that conclusion?

Mr. HUMINIK. Not really. It is a hard question to answer because some of this is speculation—I can feel it, you know, because I was in it and I can't necessarily find proof that these people worked for different agencies.

Mr. SMITH. The information they requested of you did go beyond what would be the normal military objective?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. It was very broad so you could not say that this group was just military; no, not at all. They were both interested. Military technology is technology that can be applied to any kind of industry.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. You were involved in this operation almost 5 years in almost constant contact with Soviet intelligence personnel. Would you care to comment on what you believe we as Americans can learn from this operation?

Mr. HUMNIK. I have come here today at the request of this committee and have tried to relate accurately my experience with the Soviet diplomats and consular officials during more than 5 years. This experience came to an end only 8 months ago—and I would hope indicates to this committee that the Soviet Union intends to continue their espionage activities in this country. It is obvious to me that the Soviet Union is using its embassy and consulate, located only a few miles from here, to conduct extensive espionage activities. I am sure that this is not news to this committee. J. Edgar Hoover, the eminent Director of the FBI, has testified many times to this effect.

My personal lesson indicates to me that there is danger to the small businessman, the scientist, and the engineer. The Soviets want technology more than anything else, and it is their plan to get it from technical people. In addition, they seek out technical people of Slavic descent—in other words, people that came from Czechoslovakia, Russia, Poland, or any of the countries that are now the Iron Curtain countries—because they feel they can blackmail them, or they will be more receptive or susceptible to their requests. They will use money, promises of business, and many other ploys to entice Americans to work for them. They often strive to achieve such a firm grip on an individual that he would be afraid to go to the FBI for fear of what he already might have given them unwittingly. In my case, I went to the FBI immediately, but there are probably people who unknowingly get involved and then are afraid to go to the FBI and in some way continue to work for them. Some of these people, of course, are caught.

The Soviets proved to me that they will penetrate our country as far as possible and by any means. They wanted data necessary to become employed in the U.S. Government—and they wanted to know how to start a corporation, presumably to operate an illegal apparatus in this country.

The lesson I learned is deeper than I can put into words before this committee. Espionage is a complex business and sometimes hard to detect—but it is there, and I am sure that the Soviet Union will not slow down because I am speaking here today. They will continue with their efforts in spite of the FBI. The FBI is the guardian of this land, and through its vigil we are guaranteed a good measure of protection. The job they do is legend and known by almost every school boy. As citizens we have to give the FBI maximum support. They should be informed any time anything suspicious is around. I think diplomatic license plates in residential areas should be reported more frequently.

Further, I want it to be known today that I came here as a citizen—a plain American citizen; that I am not a representative of any group, I am not here as a Democrat or as a Republican. And I want it known that I have the highest respect for this committee which often times alone is battling elements that affect the internal security of America. This committee will always have my support and help, if it is requested.

I think that we could say that the country at large should become more aware of the problems and that they should look closely at their elected officials, the ones that in some cases are naive to the problems that the Soviets are causing us and they should learn what the Soviet Union is trying to do here. And suitable legislation should be passed if it is inadequate now, I just don't know about that. The Soviets are

doing nothing to reduce the cold war. Their espionage, terrorism, and blackmail operations are, if anything, more intense and more sophisticated than ever before.

The Soviet Union has not changed its policy regarding espionage in this country for at least the last 20 years, and there is not a single indication to me or any other informed American that a different Soviet Union exists in 1967.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to ask you one more question in this respect. Did you gain any indication from your contacts with these Soviet officials, by the fact that they had asked you for certain personnel forms and how background investigations are conducted, as to whether or not they have been successful in planting anyone within our Government?

Mr. HUMINIK. Not to my knowledge. Of course, when we run an operation like this they don't tell me what else they are doing, but I think that evidently they are interested in planting people in the Government, so this shows that security checks have to be conducted carefully.

Mr. SMITH. When they were asking you how to create an organization or corporation in this country, did you get any impression that they had such corporations in this country?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, I didn't get any impression to that effect.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank you, Mr. Huminik, for what you have done here today, for the information you have brought to us. On behalf of myself and the director and the investigative staff I think you have done a splendid job. I think your parents can be very proud of you for the patriotic job that you have done for this country.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. McCONNON. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Just one more question, please. Can you tell us whether or not the Soviets have taken any action against you since the disclosure of this case to the public press?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I can say that the Soviets have written two articles in *Izvestia* that make strong reference to me and I have brought copies of these translated from the Russian. I would like to read from these two articles what they say about me in Moscow. I have copies here for the record.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, Mr. Chairman.

(Documents marked "Huminik Exhibits Nos. 1-A and 1-B," respectively. For full text of these articles see pp. 612-615.)

(At this point Mr. Willis entered the hearing room.)

Mr. HUMINIK. I would like to read first on October 30, 1966, from *Izvestia* portions of an article. Now the title of this article was "Made in the FBI" and it was written by V. Mazhorov. I will just read sections. I will try to describe what they are talking about first. They are talking about a steel door with somebody behind it late at night making plans to corrupt their diplomats and to make false charges. Then they go on and say:

Perhaps we have taken some liberties in describing the procedure of preparing anti-Soviet slander campaigns in the US; but, there is no doubt at all that such campaigns are planned well in advance in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At certain regular intervals the special services of the United States unleash noisy anti-Soviet witches sabbaths, attempting to pollute the consciousness of the average Ameri-

can with the poison of distrust toward Soviet people. The press is also enlisted to help in these dirty provocations.

Recently the American newspaper "Washington Post," which considers itself to be a solid press organ, published some sensational "revelations." It printed the photograph of an official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington speaking over the telephone at a pay station. Why does he use a pay telephone? He is a spy! Thus, without even blushing in shame, did the "Washington Post" present the FBI's current clumsy absurdity to its readers. Once you have a "spy," you need an "agent." In this respect, too, there were no great difficulties. The same newspaper informs Americans of the existence of a certain John Huminik—a "scientist and metallurgist," who for a number of years, while hiding behind his activities in the "Chemprox Corporation" has been rendering special services to his bosses in the FBI.

Huminik first visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1961 in the guise of "Secretary of the Washington Section of the Society for Metals," who was ready to cooperate with Soviet representatives in the field of Soviet-American trade relations and scientific and technical exchanges. Naturally such a proposal was met without prejudice and it became easy for Huminik to enter into ordinary, generally accepted contacts with Embassy personnel. From that moment on, the Washington paper states with sensational emphasis, "Huminik acted constantly under the guidance of the FBI." On FBI instructions and without his Soviet acquaintances being aware of it Huminik imparted a "conspiratorial" and "secret" character to his meetings with them. For many months the FBI accumulated "comprising" materials concerning these meetings. As a result one of the Embassy officials who used to meet with Huminik was defamed and declared persona non grata. But that is not all. A noisy campaign to discredit other Soviet representatives was unleashed in the American press. And the prime prosecutor of this campaign was none other than Huminik.

This 'scientist' did not want for resourcefulness. Thus, one of the Soviet specialists, after having had dinner with the provocateur Huminik, found among various prospectuses of the Chemprox Corporation Huminik had given him a document bearing a "Secret" stamp. The document contains instructions on chemical and bacteriological weapons and the tactics of their use by the Army of the USA.

Then they list some diseases. I will skip through some of this because it gets too lengthy. It says:

The war in Vietnam provides convincing confirmation of the fact that the American militarists faithfully follow the instructions worked out for them.

In other words, they are saying we use germ warfare in Vietnam because that is what they are talking about here:

Here would really be something for the "Washington Post" to tell its readers! [referring to the germ warfare] But—that would be too much, the paper prefers to feed on the forgeries of the FBI.

After this was printed I called Tass, the Russian news agency, and I said, "It was an interesting article you people published and I would like to hear more and get a little more detail." They got all upset and hung up on me.

They published another article on November 5. This is a week after I talked to Tass.

Mr. SMITH. Would you give the dates of these?

Mr. HUMINIK. The first article was October 30, and I would assume it would be probably November 1 that I called Tass. I don't have that date.

Mr. SMITH. What year?

Mr. HUMINIK. Excuse me; 1966. That was after the case broke.

On November 5, 1966, *Izvestia* put out another article, and I might add both of these were on the front pages of *Izvestia*. It was called "Facelifting." Here it is.

The US press lost no time in reacting to *Izvestiya's* article concerning the improper activities of certain American "scientists."

Then they were referring to the article entitled "Made in the FBI" that I referred to—

The FBI agents with scientific titles and degrees who were named by this newspaper were "interviewed," and the provocateurs took the position: "I am not I, and this horse is not mine." In trying to shield these unmasked accomplices of the secret police the United Press International correspondent makes an effort to evade the issue, offering his readers a hackneyed formula: *Izvestiya*, he says, wants to cast aspersions upon the reputations of these most respected persons.

Then they talked to Dr. Stupar, who was at the Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy, and he gave them some other things on me and other people. Then we go on and it says:

Certain press organs of the US try with no lesser effort to prove the respectability of that rascal Huminik. Here again are the facts we gathered in conversations with many Soviet specialists who had met with Huminik, the President of the "Chemprox" Company, at different times. He first approached Soviet people in the humble role of a dealer in laundry powder. Things did not go too well, as far as sales of soap foam were concerned. Huminik decided to deal in merchandise of a different kind. In meeting with any Soviet citizen, Huminik offered him the secrets of other firms, supposedly received by him from some of his friends. He tried to slip some reports of the "Melpar" firm about component materials to one of the Soviet specialists. In another instance, speaking with the undue familiarity of a vulgar person, Huminik tried to interest a Soviet specialist in his rales about the dirty details of the lives of some of his acquaintances. Huminik's relationship with Soviet people does not jell and he risks all in an open act of provocation—he slips some instructions concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons to his Soviet acquaintance together with a number of other prospectuses of the firm. We have already told our readers about this fact. On October 31st Huminik phoned the TASS office in Washington and stated that he had been "slandered." We visited the Soviet specialist with respect to whom this provocation had been committed. He showed us this document, too. We saw the heavy stamp "Secret" on the papers, "Secret" at the top of each page and at the bottom, so that there be no doubt. We glanced at the long enumeration of gases, poisonous substances, both chemical and bacteriological, which are intended for purposes of annihilating people, crops and cattle. In parentheses the authors of the document remind the reader once again: this here component of the poisonous substance belongs to the secret category, that one is merely confidential. Behind this document one can see the dirty figures, far more sinister than Huminik, who poison all around them in a calculating and conscious manner, rejecting everything that is known as elementary morality.

The last paragraph:

Is not the reason for these American attempts to wash the dirt off the bearers of "decency" of the Huminik type to be found in the fact that behind them stand men who bear a much greater responsibility for the resumption of the Cold War?

Some of the English is not exactly right, but I read it as it was written, and that shows you what they think.

MR. SMITH. That appears to be an effort to whitewash the fact that they were caught.

MR. HUMINIK. Yes. They gave me money and a camera, and it went on for many years. I understand on Radio Free Europe they talk about these things, they alert some of the Russian people. Russian officials are giving their people these explanations. This is what they are telling their people about their diplomats.

MR. SMITH. Have you any other indication to strike back at you?

MR. HUMINIK. I had phone calls, but I would not say they came from Soviets. But I don't take any of these seriously.

MR. SMITH. That is all the questions I have.

MR. TUCK. Mr. Huminik, I want to commend you on behalf of the committee. We appreciate your coming in today. I suppose that

some of the members of the committee might wish to ask you a few questions and if by any chance you think they might elicit a response that would cause you to reveal classified information, of course, we expect you to refrain from doing so.

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, sir.

Mr. TUCK. One thing that interested me, in the early part of your testimony as I understood it, you said that Russians and others were invited to full membership into the American technical and scientific societies. I suppose they discuss science in addition to being just a social meeting; is that right?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right. We have technical speakers talk about some late technology that people are generally interested in. In other words, it is a technical program; we come to hear a speaker on some area of science or technology. So they not only meet people socially, but they also learn new things on technology. These are unclassified meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago that these articles brushed over or glossed over the fact that you had been given money and cameras. I was not in when you brought that out, but let me ask you this: Without going into detail, it is my understanding that you did not keep that money, but passed it on to some third party: is that correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. The money I received from the Soviets went to the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to be sure about that.

Mr. HUMINIK. I was not an employee of the FBI: I did this as a voluntary thing.

Mr. TUCK. Any other questions?

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Yes.

I would like to ask, did you have any cases on your dead drop or the sign drop where the sign had been obliterated or the chewing gum so you had to use alternate pickups?

Mr. HUMINIK. No. I think we had to pass up some dates and use alternate dates. On one occasion I planted the material intentionally in the wrong spot. For instance, there were two "No Dumping" signs, one was covered with a briar patch and the other was in the open. He wanted me to use the open one, but I used the other so he would get scratched up.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Were you instructed to do so?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; I ran many aspects of the operation as I saw fit. When you are on the front line, you have to use your wits and you just inform the FBI what happens.

Mr. WATSON. Pursuing the question a little further that the chairman asked you a moment ago about the apparent availability of membership for people of any nationality, at least in the American Society for Metallurgy, do you know whether or not that is a common practice in other professional or scientific societies or associations, to open their membership to anyone of any particular nationality?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think that most technical societies admit people from other countries, yes, but the meetings are supposed to be unclassified.

Mr. WATSON. They are supposed to be unclassified?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, and they are unclassified. If they are classified, they will have special applications and security clearances to go with

it. These meetings are open subjects, we could say, but they are still very meaty, they get down to the point.

Mr. WATSON. Then from your response I understand you do have some meetings of your society where classified material was discussed.

Mr. HUMINIK. Not in this particular society; I am speaking broadly. I know of many societies that the Soviets attend meetings of and some of them like the American Ordnance Association would have classified meetings. For instance, they go to the Naval Research Laboratory and have a closed meeting. Well, the Soviets could not go to that.

Mr. WATSON. Well, I should think in your particular society that your membership would be trying to discuss and get the benefit of the other members for any advanced developments in the particular field of metallurgy; is that not correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct. I see your point. I think many of our members opposed having the Russians in there and some didn't. The Government said, well, this is just a personal note, that one good thing about having Soviet diplomats there is, for those hours, we know where they are.

Mr. WATSON. Yes; but at the same time you are giving them information.

Mr. HUMINIK. They are getting some information.

Mr. WATSON. Free information and making it readily accessible to them.

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right.

Mr. WATSON. I note that, in your recommendations as to what we might do, you said we could more carefully guard those in the technical field, but yet those in the technical field apparently open their doors to anyone.

Mr. HUMINIK. I think in general the scientists and engineers are more naive about this. At these meetings certain scientists and engineers would not talk to the Soviets because of their feelings, but some would. I think perhaps legislation should be considered about how broadly an Iron Curtain country can operate in a technical community because they want technology, that is what they want. The atomic bomb material that they wanted was technological, also. They can get more of this, and it makes it better for them for their weapon development. They save money and time.

Mr. WATSON. I do not want to play on words here. You say that most of your technical discussions were of an unclassified nature, but I should think that your membership would try to impress the others of their advance discovery or perhaps development in this particular field. You would not just sit there and rehash things that were well known or at least would be known to a man of my limited knowledge of metallurgy?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think that you are correct except when a scientist in a public meeting like that gives some information it is not specific enough. See, the Soviets over and over pointed out, "We don't want to know the fact you built the rocket, we want the whole blueprint." In other words, general statements on new things were of no value except the fact that they knew about a new thing. Then they could pursue another method to get the details.

Mr. WATSON. Based on your experience, you would recommend that these professional societies, especially the technical societies, be

more guarded in opening their membership to anyone of any particular nationality?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, I think this is my feeling. I think we should be more guarded.

Mr. WATSON. So that we might understand whether or not the interpretation of this material that you gave to the Soviet agents was made in this country or whether it was transmitted to the Soviet Union for further interpretation, what was the lapse of time between your delivery of these particular materials and the Soviets' response as to whether or not it made sense or whether or not you were giving them worthwhile information?

Do you understand the question?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, I understand the question.

They would respond at the next meeting which would be, say, 2 weeks or a week later. My feeling is that they developed a film, when we talk about a film, because this is the bulk of the stuff that was passed—they developed it here in the Embassy and or consulate and then interpreted it here and then forwarded it to Moscow, you know, maybe weeks later. I think they made the initial interpretation here.

Mr. WATSON. So there is no doubt in your mind as to all of the responsibility, officials knowing about this operation, and it was not just an operation between you and these five or six you have named?

Mr. HUMINIK. No. I am sure the Ambassador and everybody in there knows what is going on.

Mr. WATSON. I believe all of the agents involved with you are no longer in this country; is that correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. To my knowledge, they are not in this country: that is correct.

Mr. WATSON. Now, as I recall, you said Dr. Stupar was your first technical man and he was succeeded by Boutenko.

Mr. HUMINIK. Dr. Stupar and Mr. Boutenko were working at the same period of time. Sometimes I would be working with two different Soviets. First it was Izvekov and Stupar. Then when Revin took over in late 1964 it was Revin and Boutenko operating separately and then just Revin.

Mr. WATSON. The point I am trying to make is that, so far as your best judgment is concerned, this espionage was not confined to these five or six, but anyone coming into the Embassy would likewise pick up where his predecessor may have left off.

Mr. HUMINIK. The FBI has publicly stated that 80 or 85 percent of the Soviet diplomats are engaged in intelligence and espionage operations, and from my limited knowledge I would say that this is correct.

Mr. WATSON. In your associations with these people over the period of 5 years, did they ever encourage you to recruit or to get to other people to assist in this espionage operation?

Mr. HUMINIK. They wanted to know about other scientists and the ones they could blackmail or that would be partial to them. I think they were getting at this. This is the phase we were entering with the recorder.

Mr. WATSON. Did you ever give them any names or recommendations as to others who might be enlisted in such an operation?

Mr. HUMINIK. This information is classified in a way, but I did not give them any recommendations to enlist anybody else. We talked about other scientists, but this is classified.

Mr. WATSON. I believe you touched upon this earlier, but did they have any particular group so far as age, economic status, or what-have-you, that they attempted primarily to recruit into the espionage operation?

Mr. HUMINIK. Well, I would say that they want to pick people that can get them something. In other words, I see they had an Air Force sergeant; they had an Army colonel; they had me, a scientist. I would say they would not recruit cab drivers, just to pick another group, because the man would not have access to anything. They wanted people that had access to military or technological information.

Mr. WATSON. I don't know, cab drivers might know more secrets than you know.

(At this point Mr. Culver left the hearing room.)

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Huminik, would you be willing to return for any further questioning at some time?

Mr. HUMINIK. I am under subpoena, so any time.

Mr. SMITH. Just one question.

Mr. WATSON. I might say at this time, I do not want to prolong it, but I do have several other questions that I would like to propound to the witness this afternoon or tomorrow or later on.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you fix a time to return?

Mr. TUCK. Return this afternoon. Suppose we adjourn here at say a quarter to 3.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what the situation is.

Mr. SMITH. May I make one clarification on the record?

Mr. TUCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. In clarification of the record, Mr. Revin came into the picture on March 22, 1965; isn't that right?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. I think I had said 1964 erroneously.

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will stand in recess until a quarter to 3.

(Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the subcommittee recessed and reconvened at 3:05 p.m.)

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., Thursday, April 6, 1967, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, April 7, 1967.)

CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS

FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 1967

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in Room 429, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of Virginia, chairman; John C. Culver, of Iowa; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck, Roudebush, and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator.

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will please come to order.

Let the record show that for purposes of continuing the testimony at this particular hearing, the Chair has established a new subcommittee composed of myself as chairman; the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Roudebush; the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Watson; and the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Culver. Mr. Roudebush and Mr. Watson and I are present.

That constitutes a quorum of the subcommittee as it exists. I understood that the gentleman from South Carolina had a number of questions he wished to expound to the witness.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HUMINIK, JR.—Resumed

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Huminik, yesterday you were discussing in some detail the various systems of dead drops and live drops that you practiced with these Soviet agencies. Unfortunately I was not in the hearing room during your entire testimony.

Since I think this is extremely important, I wonder if you would tell the subcommittee in some detail the system of telephonic and other communications that you had with the Soviet agents.

Mr. HUMINIK. I think if we confine it first to the system of live passes, there was a prearranged system of me giving the Soviet infor-

mation that he had asked for, either in the form of film, pictures that I had taken with this camera which they had provided money for—

Mr. WATSON. Could you tell the committee about how many rolls of film you passed to the various Soviet agents?

Mr. HUMINIK. I would guess, and this is a guess, approximately 30 or 40 rolls of film were passed to Valentin Revin and each roll would have 36 pictures on it, so it was a goodly number of pictures.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you. You may continue.

Mr. HUMINIK. The live pass was always prearranged. I can give you an example again, if you like, of one of the most dramatic ones which is a time that I went to the Riggs Plaza shopping center—I don't recall the date now—we have it in the record.

I went at approximately 9 o'clock at night to the Riggs Plaza shopping center in Northeast Washington, went to a telephone booth, pretended like I was making a telephone call, went back to my car and waited while the Russian came up, pretended to make a telephone call, and got into his car.

He then proceeded to drive through Washington at a fairly high speed, with me following him. This was all prearranged. Then on Sligo Creek Parkway he stopped, blinked his brights. Another Soviet vehicle about a block away proceeded to come in behind me.

We went at a high speed down a road approximately 3 miles long. The Volkswagen behind me going very slow and Valentin Revin going fast so the Volkswagen blocked the road so if FBI agents were following, they could not be present when I gave him the documents.

He stopped at this road, raised the hood of his car pretending he had trouble with his automobile, and the information was passed. That was a live pass.

In Alexandria we met at a Peoples Drug Store. We more or less looked at each other to acknowledge we were there on time.

He walked out. I followed him 1 minute later. I walked a prearranged route around four blocks of the city of Alexandria and he met me along the way, and as we walked through shadows I handed him a little package of film. That would be the live passes.

The dead drops, which was using a system of telephone booths, were done without personal contact. I will describe how this is done.

On a prearranged date, and we again had alternate dates if those dates were not suitable for any reason. In other words, if I saw it was dangerous to leave material or if there were people around, I could abort that date and either use another day or later that night, if we had arranged for a later drop.

The way this is done, I photographed the documents with film, put rolls of film undeveloped into beer cans or cola cans, placed these cans at a predesignated point, which could be a lamppost, a tree, a signpost, direction post, any telephone booth, at the predesignated time, then I was to go back and retrieve the material and then use still another alternate date at another alternate drop.

Mr. WATSON. These appear to be rather intricate and foolproof for various drops. Who formulated those drops? Did you or the Soviet agents?

Mr. HUMINIK. The Soviet agents provided me all the training to conduct myself during these drops. In other words, they gave me complete instructions, drew maps for me, which the FBI now has, and described completely how to do it.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, they convinced you they were quite well versed in the various procedures for these intricate drops, both the live and the dead drops?

Mr. HUMINIK. There is no question in my mind but that they were trained and skilled intelligence agents.

Mr. WATSON. Who advised you of the drop plans?

Mr. HUMINIK. Valentin Revin was the only Soviet agent working with me during the last 19 months of this operation. He told me how to make the drops and where to make them and gave me information and instructions on how to photograph documents.

Mr. WATSON. When were those instructions given and under what circumstances?

Mr. HUMINIK. They were given during personal meetings I had with Valentin Revin at restaurants or in the automobile or walking down the street, prearranged meetings we had.

Mr. WATSON. I believe you testified earlier there had been some 65 contacts that you personally had made with various Soviet agencies?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, sir, more than 65 contacts.

Mr. WATSON. Other than these various drops, did you ever on any occasion take a Soviet agent to any Government establishment?

Mr. HUMINIK. There was only one occasion where Soviets came. I did not take them there, but they came to a meeting of the American Society for Metals which was held at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory in Silver Spring.

This is a defense research and engineering establishment operated by the Navy. They were very surprised that they were even permitted in the gates. It was a social meeting. It was more or less a party to kick off the meeting year.

This is the only meeting that we do not have a technical speaker at. It is a good fellowship type of thing where they have food and beer to encourage memberships throughout the year, more or less, and it was held on the grounds of the Naval Ordnance Lab. But the Soviet agents had no access to any areas where any work was going on.

This was in a social facility that was provided on the station.

Mr. WATSON. So far as you know, they were admitted to the grounds of that facility without question simply because of their membership in this American Society of Metallurgy.

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct. It is called the American Society for Metals. It is a society of metallurgists but it is just called the Society for Metals.

Mr. WATSON. Actually it would be more accurate to call it the International Society for Metals, in view of the fact that you have some 24 various nationalities who are members of that society.

Mr. HUMINIK. This might be correct; yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. We don't want to get into the exact amount of money which you were paid by the Soviet agents in payment for your cooperation in supplying this data, but could you give us in generalities as to what amount you received—whether it was substantial, slight, or what?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think I received substantial money. It was more than \$5,000 and it was all in cash and paid to me in large bundles of cash. This money was turned over to the FBI.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, every dollar that you received for your espionage activity with the Soviet agents was turned over to the FBI?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct. For instance, when the Soviets asked me to buy this camera which cost, with attachments, nearly \$300, the FBI would give me the money back, after they had inspected it and recorded serial numbers and whatever they needed, to purchase the camera.

Mr. WATSON. Were you ever paid by the FBI for your services?

Mr. HUMINIK. I received a small amount of expense money, which was insufficient to cover the expenses. I received no salary from any Government agency for this work.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, your role in this was as a citizen interested in his Government rather than the matter of pay from the FBI or any governmental agency?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right. The FBI told me that I was acting as a citizen only and if I got into any trouble because of this, it was my problem and not theirs and I had to take the risks if I wanted to conduct this operation.

Mr. WATSON. May I ask you parenthetically now, in view of your service to your country, have you ever been commended by any governmental agency, the Department of Justice, for your role over the 4 or 5 years you worked with them?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, I never received any commendation or letter or any acknowledgement for this work.

Mr. WATSON. I see you still have the camera.

Mr. HUMINIK. The Government says since the camera and watch were more or less gifts from the Soviet Government I could keep them, including the vodka and everything else that the Soviets provided. I volunteered to give it to the Government if they wanted it, but they said they had no use for it.

Mr. WATSON. While the camera was a gift to you personally, it was given you for the purpose of photographing various documents?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. And transmitting them to the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; and the watch was given to me to make sure I got to the meetings on time, the Soviets told me.

Mr. WATSON. Do you know of any other American citizen who ever met with you or with the Soviet agents with whom you were dealing over this period of 4 or 5 years?

Mr. HUMINIK. There were no other citizens in particular. The Soviets did meet other Americans at these meetings. When they went to any technical meetings they met 20 or 30 engineers, but they had no contact that I knew of outside of the technical meetings.

Mr. WATSON. Did you ever notice these Soviet agents at these technical society meetings conversing at length with any other member of this society?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. At length?

Mr. HUMINIK. When we say "at length," are we talking about discussions that last 20 minutes?

Mr. WATSON. In that connection do you know one Harry Barnett or Burnett?¹

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, I do.

¹ Correct spelling "Burnett."

Mr. WATSON. There was an article appearing in the November 5 issue of *Izvestia* which stated that one "Harry Barnett" was chairman of the Washington section of the American Society for Metals and deputy department chief of the National Bureau of Standards.

Is that correct?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. The English in those articles is not quite right. It is American Society for Metals and he is assistant to the division chief of the Metallurgy Division of the Bureau of Standards, but essentially it is correct; yes.

Mr. WATSON. Do you know whether or not Burnett ever had any dealings with the Soviet agents?

Mr. HUMINIK. His only relationship as far as I know was during the meetings. When they came to the American Society for Metals meetings he talked to them, and he did visit Russia on one occasion as a tourist.

Mr. WATSON. Did any of these Soviet agents ever discuss the possibility that Burnett might be of assistance to you in your espionage activity?

Mr. HUMINIK. Never. They never discussed anyone else to be assistants to me. In other words, I was to be a lone operator.

Mr. WATSON. Did you ever discuss with Burnett yourself any aspects of Soviet technology?

Mr. HUMINIK. No.

Mr. WATSON. This article further alleges that Harry Burnett attempted to get one Dr. Stupar of the Soviet Embassy to cooperate with him for American intelligence. Did you ever have any discussion with Burnett with reference to that allegation?

Mr. HUMINIK. I talked to him after the article was printed, and he said it was preposterous and he didn't know what they were talking about.

Mr. WATSON. This article further alleges that Burnett made a trip to the Soviet Union with his wife, Elizabeth, in 1963.

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct.

Mr. WATSON. Did you ever have any discussion with him in reference to that trip, the purpose of it, and what he did while on that trip to the Soviet Union?

Mr. HUMINIK. I only discussed this with him many years after the trip. In other words, recently, after my case was broken and I read that article in *Izvestia*, I asked him about the trip. I knew before he had gone but I never discussed it with him, but he said he went as a tourist.

Mr. WATSON. This article attempts to discredit you—as naturally it would be expected to—so in an effort to give you an opportunity to vindicate yourself, I wonder whether or not you can explain this statement appearing in the article that you first approached the Soviet people in the humble role of "a dealer in laundry powder."

Mr. HUMINIK. I think that they have neglected to consider one part. They first came to the American Society for Metals in 1961. At that time I was working as vice president at Value Engineering Company. We were engaged in rocketry. We had nothing to do with any detergents.

It was not until April of 1963 that I came into the chemicals business, and they promised a trade agreement in that relationship. We will

note they said I first approached them in that field and this was 3 years after they were already attending the meetings, so the dates don't even nest together.

Mr. WATSON. At any time, did any of these Soviet agents appeal to you to get more detailed information, alleging that they could get better or more sophisticated information from other sources? The purpose of that question is to see whether or not they ever indicated to you that some other American or Americans were involved in espionage.

Mr. HUMINIK. No, they thought I was very good for them. They were always praising me on all of the topics that I had knowledge in. During the early evaluation periods, they were asking me questions on many technological subjects which I would answer.

They never talked about anybody else, or implied that there was anybody else.

Mr. WATSON. There was another article appearing, an earlier one, October 30 in *Izvestia*, concerning your operation with these Soviet agents of the Embassy and the consulate. And in this article the writer alleges that this whole operation was designed "to compromise Soviet citizens coming to the U.S. under the provisions of the Cultural Exchange Program."

Are you aware of any activities or any material change in the attitude of the United States toward treatment of Soviets coming to the U.S. under the cultural exchange program?

Mr. HUMINIK. As far as I know there were no discussions on cultural exchange. None of the people I dealt with were here as a cultural exchange student except the fact that Valentin Revin himself was an exchange student at Berkeley studying nuclear physics.

He was later, as you know, expelled as a spy, so if anybody is misusing the cultural exchange system, it is Valentin Revin himself.

Mr. WATSON. It was the Soviet agent and not you?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. There was no involvement with any cultural exchange program during the whole activity.

Mr. WATSON. This article of October 30 further alleges that your venture with them was a cooperative one in which you sought scientific and technical exchanges with them.

Did you ever receive any scientific or technical information from the Soviets with whom you dealt?

Mr. HUMINIK. They never gave me anything in the way of scientific or technical information except how to run this camera and how to make dead drops and to do things to pass information to them. In other words, they didn't give me anything. They didn't give me the time of day.

Mr. WATSON. So your whole operation was the gathering of information from American sources and supplying it to them?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct; to them. On one occasion I was preparing another book on welding of rare metals and I asked them to get me information, open literature information in the Soviet Union.

This was very early in my relationship. They said, "Yes, we will provide it," and they never provided the first sentence. That was the only time this was ever mentioned.

Mr. WATSON. It would be quite early, in the early stages of such an association, that they would pretend that it be a cultural or scientific exchange?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes, because Dr. Stupar told me, "We are not interested in politics. We are only interested in science and engineering."

Mr. WATSON. You said earlier they were primarily interested in scientific and technical data?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes. But they wanted classified information.

Mr. WATSON. So far as this article alleging this was a technical exchange between you and the Soviet agents, that is totally false?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct.

Mr. WATSON. This article further states that the Soviet Ambassador lodged an official protest with the Department of State here in Washington relative to Harry Burnett, to whom we alluded earlier, and his attempt to get Dr. Stupar to collaborate with him for purposes of American intelligence.

Do you know whether or not such a protest was made by the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. HUMINIK. I have no knowledge of that at all.

Mr. WATSON. At the time you were contacted, or at least began your association with these Soviet agents, you were not a Government employee; were you?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct; I have never been a Government employee except if you consider the Army Reserves as a Government employee. That is the only relationship I have had with the Government.

Mr. WATSON. In your Army Reserve capacity, I believe you were in the Ordnance Corps.

Mr. HUMINIK. No, Chemical Corps.

Mr. WATSON. Earlier cases of espionage, and so forth, have had Government employees involved. But I think the fact that they worked with you would be indicative that they are not only interested in getting Government employees, but civilian employees who have a particular background or professional experience that might be helpful to them. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. HUMINIK. That would be fair; yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. You have already had two articles in *Izvestia*—and I believe you said they appeared on the front page—maligning you and attempting to discredit you.

Do you anticipate further articles of such nature as a result of your testimony before this committee?

Mr. HUMINIK. Knowing how they dislike me so at this time, I would assume as a result of this testimony they might write another article.

Also in preparing—I have been preparing a book on my experience and I suspect they will write articles on that after it is out.

Mr. WATSON. Recently the Senate approved a treaty whereby we can establish additional consulates in this country. On the basis of your experience with the Soviet agencies both in the Embassy and in the present consulate, what would be your opinion as to whether or not the practices that have been followed in the past would no doubt be applied to any future consulates which may be established?

Mr. HUMINIK. As I said in my earlier testimony, it is well known to our Government that 80 or 90 percent of the Soviet nationals that are in this country are engaged in some type of intelligence operation. And my opinion is, by having additional consulates in other cities, you start a new zone of operation for each of these Soviet diplomats

that will be there because the new consulate treaty provides the consulate officials now have diplomatic immunity, which is one thing they never had before.

When you consider the Soviets are held within a 25-mile radius of Washington, this opens up a new zone. For instance, if a Soviet leaves Washington, he has to file, with the State Department, his itinerary. Now, if he establishes a consulate in Chicago or Gary, Indiana, or San Francisco, where there is an industrial complex, he can operate completely within the complex.

If there are Slavic people there, he has a good chance of subverting or threatening or blackmailing them.

Mr. WATSON. While I realize you would have no direct knowledge with which to answer this next question, I think in view of your experience it might be helpful to get your opinion.

Inasmuch as the Soviet agencies worked with you on this espionage operation, would it be fair to conclude that they have so attempted or either have worked with others in a similar capacity and may even be doing so at this time?

Mr. HUMINIK. I have some knowledge of this from just reading the newspapers and other hearing reports. They do and have worked with other Americans, some of these actually being traitors to the United States.

The Colonel Whalen case was just unearthed and he got 15 years for his activities with the Soviets, and this case of Sergeant Boeckenhaupt in November of 1966 indicates that the Soviet diplomats are working with other people.

Mr. WATSON. Based on your experience, you would conclude that the Soviet Embassy, as well as the consulate, is well staffed with members versed in the most intricate and sophisticated procedures of espionage and well trained in that particular operation?

Mr. HUMINIK. There is no question about it. They are well versed in it and this is their prime interest.

Mr. WATSON. Unless American citizens, particularly those young people and those in the scientific and technical areas, are extremely careful and cautious, then they could be implicated in such a procedure or operation as you were?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is right, and some of them may be trapped and embarrassed in such a way that they don't go to the FBI and they become entwined in an operation which is very illegal and harms the interests of this country.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I believe those are all the questions I have except I would like to thank Mr. Huminik. I think it has taken a great deal of courage on his part to participate in this operation. And while you have not been commended by any governmental agency heretofore, I, as an individual Member of Congress, certainly want to commend you and I feel that you have done your country a real service in coming before this committee and cooperating with the FBI in trying to find a modus operandi of the Soviet agents in this country.

Mr. HUMINIK. Thank you.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Huminik, yesterday morning your testimony mentioned a project I am very close to, the Surveyor program in our space program. Could you amplify on that a bit, the interest they have expressed in Surveyor and what personal knowledge you have of this particular project?

Mr. HUMINIK. The Surveyor program, our space shot to explore the surfaces of the moon, the first launching of it—I don't recall the date now—I believe it was in 1966—at the time this launching was scheduled, and it was in the newspaper that it was going to be launched, Valentin Revin told me when we were in the Hospitality House restaurant in Alexandria, Virginia, that he was highly interested in the Surveyor moon probe and his government wanted me to have this as my top priority. We were just a week from the launch. He wanted me to find specific data. I cannot relate to you what this classified data was now.

Many people say the Surveyor moon program is unclassified and is published, but there are more things going on in the satellite than the public necessarily knows.

There was classified information that even the subject of the classification can't be revealed that he wanted. He knew what was classified and what he needed and he wanted me to get it and put it in a drop on a certain date, and that is all he wanted on that date.

He didn't get anything from that. We blew that drop, we aborted it, we did not make that drop, and he got nothing on the classified aspect of the Surveyor program and he was very disappointed.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Did you have any personal knowledge of the Surveyor program?

Mr. HUMINIK. I have knowledge on many of these programs because I have worked broadly in all of the scientific space and rocketry programs and I have some knowledge, yes, but this knowledge is of unclassified aspects.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. You also mentioned that at one time during your conversation with one of the Soviet agents that they threatened relatives of yours who still lived in Russia. Have you had any indication or any word that any of these relatives have been molested in any way?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; so far as I know there are no relatives in Russia that I know of. My father came over in 1913 and he lived in Gary, Indiana, your State. And they had no contact except some mail contact when he was very young with uncles and aunts that are there, but as far as they know they would be all deceased or they would be over 100 years old.

I told the Russians if you want to shoot somebody there, go ahead, because I don't know anybody there. They were hoping I would be interested and would want to start corresponding there and then they would use this person for blackmail, but they could have produced anybody and said he was a relative.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I think several times they mentioned about certain strategic goods that they needed. Did they give you any insight into where their shortages occurred?

Mr. HUMINIK. They were interested in my book in high temperature coatings, reentry, coatings for space vehicles. They generally were desirous of all technological information, and my other readings indicated to me that the Soviet Union lacks a lot of basic technology, that they put their efforts into building one type of rocket and they neglect a lot of other areas that have to be developed, so they lack the broad technological base that we have in this country. Their plan is to prove as much of this technology, which saves them the dollars you expend for the research and time. In the atomic bomb, for instance, there were

three ways of refining the uranium. They wanted to know which it was the U.S. used so they did not have to pursue all three, which saved them time and money.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. You have related these compounds and I know you are familiar with them, but they did not mention specific chemicals or things of this type. It was technological information.

Mr. HUMINIK. They mentioned specific things. For instance they were interested in the oxygen process for making steel which is being installed in the steel plants in Gary, Indiana. At the time I talked about it, I think there were six or eight processes installed by the various steel companies.

They wanted all the details. They said since you have contacts and relatives that work in the steel industry, why don't you see what you can do and get us the type of information we want, the size of pipes, pressure, and so on.

They don't want to know it puts out so many tons a day. They want to know how they can duplicate the process in the Soviet Union so there were specific requests for things they wanted.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Again this was technical information?

Mr. HUMINIK. They wanted background information on scientists for blackmail purposes, and things like this.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I believe those are all the questions I had, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Huminik, I gather from your testimony that these men are very dexterous in their operation. Do you have any information as to whether or not when you were not in contact with them they kept you under surveillance?

Mr. HUMINIK. I think in some cases I was followed by them and I know of at least two occasions I observed them watching me. They acknowledged to me that they have ways of observing and checking on me.

So they run a fairly big operation, and I see them even today and in fact 2 days ago I saw some Soviets in my neighborhood and I report these facts to the FBI. In other words they are operating all through the city here.

Mr. TUCK. Mention has been made of the fact that you have not received any commendation from any governmental agency. The facts are, however, that these men were declared *persona non grata* as a result of your findings?

Mr. HUMINIK. That is correct.

Mr. TUCK. I commended you yesterday on behalf of the chairman and members of the committee. I want to reiterate today what I said yesterday and associate myself with the remarks made by my colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. May I ask one additional question which slipped my mind.

In carrying on Mr. Watson's line of questioning, at any time in your dealings with the Soviets, were there any other names mentioned? Was there any indication that they had other contacts here in Washington?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, they never mentioned specific names. I always had the feeling and genuine intimation that they had other things going on, that I was not the only person they were working with, but never anything specific.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. They never gave you any indication of the direction of these other interesting surveys that were being conducted?

Mr. HUMINIK. No; but I would say it was always technical information. The FBI released a statement that these Soviets were working in the scientific division in an Embassy-based spy ring in the Embassy. This was published by the State Department and the FBI, so our Government has knowledge which indicates scientific and technical espionage. Although to my knowledge I was the only person involved, there must have been others also.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I also want to join with Governor Tuck and Congressman Watson in expressing my thanks and appreciation and my commendation for your forthright statements and your appearance before this committee.

Mr. TUCK. Counsel has some questions.

Mr. SMITH. I have a matter I want to clarify. In connection with the live drops you mentioned a while ago, I believe you stated Sligo Creek was one of the areas and one of the drops occurred there which was about 12/2/65.

Mr. HUMINIK. That would be right.

Mr. SMITH. And Alexandria was another area of drop which occurred February 10, 1966.

Mr. HUMINIK. That would be approximately correct; yes.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, earlier we discussed this and the chairman expressed concern, and I share that concern, about the apparent ease with which these Soviet agents, especially those in the scientific field, can become a member of a professional society here in Washington. I know the agents with whom you dealt have either gone back to Russia voluntarily or have been declared persona non grata. Do you still attend the meetings of this society?

Mr. HUMINIK. Yes; I was chairman last year and I am ex officio and I still attend; that is correct.

Mr. WATSON. Are any Soviet nationals members of that society today?

Mr. HUMINIK. No, there are not any at this time.

Mr. WATSON. There are none at this time?

Mr. HUMINIK. No. I might add that this committee might inspect and find out if our scientific diplomats and attachés are allowed to attend Soviet technical societies. I would recommend if our diplomats in Russia and the other Iron Curtain countries cannot attend their meetings then we should forbid this from occurring here.

Mr. WATSON. You stated practically every meeting is of a technical nature and you had the one meeting out at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.

Mr. HUMINIK. That is true and that is generally true for all technical societies, and there are hundreds of them in the United States, and I know the Soviets attended four or five different ones here. I know this from personal knowledge.

Mr. WATSON. It would be our belief that our professional societies would be much more free in their discourse and discussion, and even if our officials were allowed to become members of any such professional society in the Soviet Union, about all they would get would be a cup of pink tea or something like that. I am sure they would be more guarded in their discussions of a technical nature than we would be in this country.

Mr. HUMINIK. My understanding is that if a Soviet citizen talks to an American in Russia, this Russian comes under great suspicion if he was not authorized to talk to an American, so I think you are right in that they are more guarded in what they are going to pass to any of our people.

Mr. WATSON. I am not a great believer in governmental edicts, and all of that, but I should be hopeful that you, in view of your experience here, would be encouraging your society and other similar societies to be more guarded so far as the matter of permitting Soviet nationals to become members of their society.

I would urge you to recommend that you and they be more guarded in that area.

Mr. HUMINIK. I think it is a good suggestion.

Mr. TUCK. We thank you very much.

If there is no further business to come before the committee at this time, we will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11 a.m., Friday, April 7, 1967, the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(Huminik Exhibits Nos. 1-A and 1-B referred to on p. 594, follow:)

HUMINIK EXHIBIT No. 1-A

[From *Izvestia*, Oct. 30, 1966.]

(Translated from Russian)

MADE IN THE FBI

An official of the secret agency sits behind a steel door, which bears the legend: "No access for unauthorized persons." He sits there from morning until late at night and prepares papers for his superiors. His pen fills sheet after sheet with plans, such as the following:

Project: Measures to be taken to uncover the subversive activities of Russian agents.----- (month), 196--.

Proposals: Scandalous revelations in the press—4; Soviet citizens to be declared persona non grata—2 (one from among the employees of the Soviet Trade Mission, the other preferably from among their diplomatic personnel);

Individual actions to compromise Soviet citizens coming to the US under the provisions of the Cultural Exchange Program—30; (to be developed by ----)."

When the document is finished it will be sent to higher officials through channels. It will acquire corrections, amendments and resolutions.

Perhaps we have taken some liberties in describing the procedure of preparing anti-Soviet slander campaigns in the US; but, there is no doubt at all that such campaigns are planned well in advance in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At certain regular intervals the special services of the United States unleash noisy anti-Soviet witches sabbaths, attempting to pollute the consciousness of the average American with the poison of distrust toward Soviet people. The press is also enlisted to help in these dirty provocations.

Recently the American newspaper "Washington Post," which considers itself to be a solid press organ, published some sensational "revelations." It printed the photograph of an official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington speaking over the telephone at a pay station. Why does he use a pay telephone? He is a spy! Thus, without even blushing in shame, did the "Washington Post" present the FBI's current clumsy absurdity to its readers. Once you have a "spy," you need an "agent." In this respect, too, there were no great difficulties. The same newspaper informs Americans of the existence of a certain John Huminik—a "scientist and metallurgist," who for a number of years, while hiding behind his activities in the "Chemprox Corporation" has been rendering special services to his bosses in the FBI.

Huminik first visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1961 in the guise of "Secretary of the Washington Section of the Society for Metals," who was ready to cooperate with Soviet representatives in the field of Soviet-American

trade relations and scientific and technical exchanges. Naturally such a proposal was met without prejudice and it became easy for Huminik to enter into ordinary, generally accepted contacts with Embassy personnel. From that moment on, the Washington paper states with sensational emphasis, "Huminik acted constantly under the guidance of the FBI." On FBI instructions and without his Soviet acquaintances being aware of it Huminik imparted a "conspiratorial" and "secret" character to his meetings with them. For many months the FBI accumulated "comprising" materials concerning these meetings. As a result one of the Embassy officials who used to meet with Huminik was defamed and declared persona non grata. But that is not all. A noisy campaign to discredit other Soviet representatives was unleashed in the American press. And the prime prosecutor of this campaign was none other than Huminik.

This 'scientist' did not want for resourcefulness. Thus, one of the Soviet specialists, after having had dinner with the provocateur Huminik, found among various prospectuses of the Chemprox Corporation Huminik had given him a document bearing a "Secret" stamp. The document contains instructions on chemical and bacteriological weapons and the tactics of their use by the Army of the USA. The instructions enumerated chemical and bacteriological components and their code designations. Among the secret bacteriological components were poisonous substances inducing brucellosis, fever, tularemia and other diseases. Among the chemical poisons were components for destroying crops of wheat, rye and rice, and components of a nerve gas known as "Sarene." The war in Vietnam provides convincing confirmation of the fact that the American militarists faithfully follow the instructions worked out for them. Here would really be something for the "Washington Post" to tell its readers! But—that would be too much, the paper prefers to feed on the forgeries of the FBI.

The following facts also illustrate the manner in which the masters of inducing psychoses fabricate their materials for sensational incidents, in which the "all-seeing eye" of the FBI is praised to the heavens.

Harry Barnett, Assistant Section Chief of the National Bureau of Standards, was unusually kind and courteous toward the Scientific and Technical Counselor of the USSR Embassy in Washington. In addition to questions relating to metallurgy Barnett tried to interest the Soviet worker in "secret" information as well, information far beyond the framework of competence of the "Chief of the Society for Metals," as he used to introduce himself. After determining that his readiness to supply such "information" was of no interest, Barnett revealed his true face, proposing no less than that the Soviet citizen "cooperate" with American intelligence. To prove his authority and his membership in the special agency Barnett produced Certificate No. 3848, issued by the Special Intelligence Group, which reports directly to the President. In doing so Barnett explained that his duties consisted in recruiting persons who are in a position to supply secret information to the Americans, and that he has been in this "business" since 1948. The American special agencies clearly overestimated the talents of the "metallurgist" Barnett. This affair ended by the Soviet Ambassador's lodging an official protest with the Department of State of the USA. Neither the State Department nor the American press, however, mentioned even one word concerning this gross provocation.

The American special agencies take a great interest in Soviet citizens who are temporarily abroad. They do not conceal their intention to dispose these Soviet people toward non-return to their homeland, or to obtain intelligence information from them.

Soviet scientists interning at Harvard University under the terms of the Program for Cultural Exchanges between the USSR and the USA will long remember the "hospitality" of one of the leaders of the "Russian Center" of that university—Professor Marshall Shulman. Acting as official host of the University for the reception of Soviet citizens, Shulman interpreted his duties of being a "guardian" to the young scientists in a somewhat peculiar manner, subjecting their mail and telegraph communications with their relatives and their scientific institutes in the USSR to his personal censorship.

Early in 1964 Shulman, together with Jerry Platt, another "Professor," a "specialist on Marxism," more precisely on anti-communism, participated directly in an attempt to persuade the Soviet intern A. not to return to his homeland. Being subjected to unceasing psychological processing, blackmail and threats on the part of Shulman and Platt, A. became gravely ill. Shulman and Platt placed him in the university's clinic and attempted in every possible way to prevent his getting in touch with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. At this so critical time for A. Shulman personally "corrected" A.'s letters to the Embassy requesting

immediate recall from Harvard. Only the resolute intervention of the Soviet Embassy made it possible for A. to return to his homeland safely.

In spite of this incident, so disgraceful for a man claiming the title of representative of American science, Shulman as heretofore contacts Soviet people and institutions in the guise of a man striving "to contribute to better understanding between the Soviet and American peoples." During this current year Shulman tried to get the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to grant him permission to visit the Soviet Union for a period of six months. Shulman asserted that his purpose was "to study the evolution of the approaches of the Soviet and the American sides to the problem of disarmament in the light of political and economic changes in the current international situation." Knowing Shulman's true personality, it was not difficult to guess at the true purpose of his visit. Shulman was refused. This did not, however, stop him. Shulman came to the Soviet Union just the same, as a tourist, and today he tries to accomplish his "program" under such cover.

One would like to tell the "evolution" researcher: your efforts are in vain, your true face is well known!

The Soviet press has already reported on the attempts of the American intelligence services to utilize scientific and technical exchanges for purposes of espionage against the Soviet Union. The CIA's well known Operation "Lincoln," which is a long term program, is primarily directed at obtaining espionage data from American scientists. Such espionage activities, it goes without saying, harm the development of exchanges between the USA and USSR in the fields of science and technology. They also degrade the dignity of those representatives of American science who permit themselves to become involved in the provocative "Work" of the CIA and the FBI. The inspired statements in the American press, which create a poisonous spy mania bear the imprint—"Made in the FBI."

V. MAZHOROV.

HUMINIK EXHIBIT No. 1-B

[From *Izvestia*, November 5, 1966.]

(Translated from Russian)

Replies.

FACELIFTING

The US press lost no time in reacting to *Izvestiya's* article concerning the improper activities of certain American "scientists" (see No. 257, the article entitled "Made in the FBI"). The FBI agents with scientific titles and degrees who were named by this newspaper were "interviewed," and the provocateurs took the position: "I am not I, and this horse is not mine." In trying to shield these unmasked accomplices of the secret police the United Press International correspondent makes an effort to evade the issue, offering his readers a hackneyed formula: *Izvestiya*, he says, wants to cast aspersions upon the reputations of these most respected persons.

Well, then, we could amplify their characteristics. We contacted the city of Dnepropetrovsk and talked to the Senior Scientific Staff Member of the Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy, S. N. Stupar. He related the following:

Yes, I was well acquainted with this Harry Barnett. From 1960 until 1964 I was the Scientific and Technical Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States. Barnett introduced himself to me as the Chairman of the Washington Section of the American Society for Metals and Deputy Department Chief of the National Bureau of Standards. About the middle of 1961 he telephoned me and asked me to give a talk about Soviet metallurgy at a meeting of the Society for Metals. I was happy to comply with his request. Had he not occupied some kind of official position in that Society, he could hardly have spoken and acted in its name. I can truly say that at first I liked the man, and we quickly became friends. He frequently invited me to have dinner with him. Both he and his wife Elizabeth impressed me and my wife as being nice and likable people. Barnett took a lively interest in my opinion on many political and scientific questions. I did not see anything unnatural in this. He spoke of the need for contacts between the scientists of our countries, he emphasized that such contacts lead to an improvement of mutual understanding. In a word, he spoke in a manner which impresses any Soviet man. He frequently talked to me of his desire to visit the Soviet Union so as to become acquainted with our achievements in metallurgy and asked me to help him organize such a trip. He wanted me to arrange for him to be invited by our scientific institutes. He even composed the draft of such an invitation. I have

the text somewhere among my papers. All of these requests and conversations appeared to me to be sincere, and as a specialist in metallurgy he also made a good impression. When he came to the Soviet Union together with his wife, during the summer of 1963, I tried to help him visit as many scientific institutes as possible.

Barnett, however, interpreted my predisposition towards him in his own way and decided that he could show me his true colors. In December of 1963 we got together to have dinner in a restaurant. Barnett suddenly proposed that I work for American intelligence. In doing so he stated that he spoke in the name of the Special Intelligence Group of the President of the US. Unabashedly he explained to me that the purpose of this group was to recruit Soviet scientists and showed me a document to prove his membership in this "group." Upon being sharply rebuffed by me, Barnett tried to scare me. For purposes of blackmail he showed me a pile of photographs taken, he asserted, by FBI personnel. They depicted some of the moments of our meetings. Losing his composure, Barnett threatened to inform "the proper authorities" about some materials supposedly compromising me. Evidently carried away, he declared that he knew absolutely all about me, even that the burglarizing of my apartment a short time earlier had been arranged by the FBI. So that I not have any doubts in this respect, he even enumerated some of the minor things which had been stolen on that occasion. Needless to say, I told this provocateur exactly what I thought of him, perhaps in not too diplomatic terms. His bosses, however, apparently did not have any great regard for his feelings, for even after this "important" conversation Barnett persistently continued to seek new meetings with me.

This is how matters stand, gentlemen of the "Washington Evening Star!" You wanted us to name names, well, we have named them. In vain do you attempt to present this provocateur in an academic cap as an "innocent lamb."

Certain press organs of the US try with no lesser effort to prove the respectability of that rascal Huminik. Here again are the facts we gathered in conversations with many Soviet specialists who had met with Huminik, the President of the "Chemprox" Company, at different times. He first approached Soviet people in the humble role of a dealer in laundry powder. Things did not go too well, as far as sales of soap foam were concerned. Huminik decided to deal in merchandise of a different kind. In meeting with any Soviet citizen, Huminik offered him the secrets of other firms, supposedly received by him from some of his friends. He tried to slip some reports of the "Melpar" firm about component materials to one of the Soviet specialists. In another instance, speaking with the undue familiarity of a vulgar person, Huminik tried to interest a Soviet specialist in his tales about the dirty details of the lives of some of his acquaintances. Huminik's relationship with Soviet people does not jell and he risks all in an open act of provocation—he slips some instructions concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons to his Soviet acquaintance together with a number of other prospectuses of the firm. We have already told our readers about this fact. On October 31st Huminik phoned the TASS office in Washington and stated that he had been "slandered." We visited the Soviet specialist with respect to whom this provocation had been committed. He showed us this document, too. We saw the heavy stamp "Secret" on the papers. "Secret" at the top of each page and at the bottom, so that there be no doubt. We glanced at the long enumeration of gases, poisonous substances, both chemical and bacteriological, which are intended for purposes of annihilating people, crops and cattle. In parentheses the authors of the document remind the reader once again: this here component of the poisonous substance belongs to the secret category, that one is merely confidential. Behind this document one can see the dirty figures, far more sinister than Huminik, who poison all around them in a calculating and conscious manner, rejecting everything that is known as elementary morality.

Is not the reason for these American attempts to wash the dirt off the bearers of "decency" of the Huminik type to be found in the fact that behind them stand men who bear a much greater responsibility for the resumption of the Cold War?

V. LYAKHOV



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1967

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.
PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in Room 429, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of Virginia, chairman; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator.

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will please come to order.

The hearing today is a continuation of a series of hearings initiated by the committee on April the 6th, pursuant to resolution adopted by the full committee on March 8, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning the current espionage and intelligence-gathering activities within the United States by Communist governments.

The chairman has appointed a new subcommittee for the purpose of receiving the testimony of today's witness.

I will read the order of appointment of the subcommittee as a part of the record:

May 5, 1967.

TO: Mr. FRANCIS J. McNAMARA,
Director, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities consisting of William M. Tuck, as Chairman, and Honorable Richard L. Roudebush and Honorable Albert W. Watson as associate members, to conduct hearings in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of receiving the testimony of Leonard I. Epstein, commencing on or about Wednesday, May 10, 1967, and/or at such other times thereafter as may be necessary, as contemplated by the resolution adopted by the Committee on the 8th day of March, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning the extent, character, and objectives of activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments or organizations affecting the in-

ternal security of the United States, and other matters under investigation by the Committee.

Please make this action a matter of Committee record.

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please **notify me**.

Given under my hand this 5th day of May, 1967.

/s/ Edwin E. Willis
EDWIN E. WILLIS,

Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. Smith, please call the witness.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Epstein, will you please come forward? Will you stand to be sworn, please, sir?

Mr. TUCK. Will you stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give to this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I do.

Mr. SMITH. Be seated.

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD I. EPSTEIN

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Epstein, for the record, would you give us your full name?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Leonard I. Epstein.

Mr. SMITH. Would you give us your home address?

Mr. EPSTEIN. 314 Spencer Place, Paramus, New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. And your date and place of birth?

Mr. EPSTEIN. July 11, 1926, New York City.

Mr. SMITH. What is your occupation, Mr. Epstein?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I am vice president of Trans-American Machinery and Equipment Corporation. I am sales engineer, machinery builder, and we buy and sell machine tools.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Epstein, you are here today in answer to a committee subpoena served upon you by Committee Investigator Ray McCommon, on 28 April 1967. Is that correct?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Prior to our getting into the reasons for your being here, Mr. Epstein, I should like to establish more of your background for the committee's benefit. First, could you briefly relate your educational background for us?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I am a graduate engineer of Case Institute of Technology, of Cleveland, Ohio, and I have done some graduate work at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken.

Mr. SMITH. Would you now relate your occupational background a little more?

Mr. EPSTEIN. After graduation, I went into the armed services, and upon discharge from the Army, I worked for Chance Vought Aircraft in Stratford, Connecticut; then Stone and Webster Engineering in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; the Fluor Corporation in Houston, Texas; then I worked for the Red River Arsenal, U.S. Army Arsenal at Texarkana, Texas.

I left the Red River Arsenal; went back to school under the G.I. bill at Stevens; and upon completion there at Stevens, I went to work for the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories at Bayonne, New Jersey.

When I left the Research Labs and went into the machinery business approximately 14 years ago, I worked for three firms in the

machinery business, S and S Machinery, Johnson Machinery, and Jem Machinery, up until approximately 1956, when I left those people and went out and formed my own corporation, my own company, for the sale of machinery and equipment. And I bought out a Mr. George Yohrling in 1956, approximately, a firm that he had at the time called K and Y Machinery Builders.

Mr. Yohrling had to leave subsequently because of ill health, and when he got well, in 1964, we got together again and formed Trans-American Machinery, and that is my present position. I am vice president of that corporation.

Mr. SMITH. What is the address of your firm or corporation?

Mr. EPSTEIN. It is 27 East 23d Street, Paterson, New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. And what is its official name or title?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Trans-American Machinery and Equipment Corporation.

Mr. SMITH. Are you now a member of any technical societies or other organizations?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir. At the present time, I am a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. I have in the past belonged to the Society of Automotive Engineers and the American Society for Metals.

I am also a vice president of Case Alumni Association, New York chapter. I am a past commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States in my hometown.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned a moment ago that you had performed some military service. Would you give us a rundown on that, please?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I was inducted into the Army in 1944, and received the infantry training, but after being sent overseas, I was put in the engineers, a heavy shop company, heavy machine shop company, and later on, on Okinawa, when there was a mass transfer, I was transferred to the Air Force Weather Service, from which I received an honorable discharge in 1947 as a member of a weather squadron operating radar equipment.

Mr. SMITH. I presume that you have a family.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have any children?

Mr. EPSTEIN. A boy and a girl.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned some moments ago your partner, Mr. George Yohrling. Is Mr. Yohrling here with you today?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir, he could not come. Somebody had to watch the store, so we left him back in Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Was Mr. Yohrling involved in any way in what we are about to discuss here today?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir; Mr. Yohrling and I both were cognizant of all the details that went on and the contacts that were made with this Russian agent.

Mr. SMITH. Could you give us a little information, background information on Mr. Yohrling?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Mr. Yohrling is 49 years old. He just had a birthday the other day. He has been in the machinery business a lot longer than I have, approximately 30 years. He is a tool and die maker, an ex-tool and die maker that got into rebuilding and finally into machinery purchases.

He is also a former U.S. paratrooper, and he holds a Silver Star for gallantry. And as far as I know, he was discharged from the Army with a physical disability type of discharge in 1945.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook, a member of the full committee, entered the hearing room.)

Mr. EPSTEIN. He lives in Boonton, New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have his street address?

Mr. EPSTEIN. It is 33 Lorraine Terrace, Boonton, New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Epstein. I believe that established the gentleman's identity sufficiently.

Could you now please tell the committee in some detail just what your company does and just what you are involved in?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, we buy and sell machine tools for rebuilding and retrofitting. We try to update machines, put on the latest numerical controls or automatic positioning devices.

We purchase machines, primarily from Government surplus sales and private plants where they feel the machines are outdated or they are looking to update their equipment. We take these pieces of equipment in, we usually rework them, what we call rebuild or retrofit, and then turn around and resell.

We sell across the country, a few pieces around the world, not too many. Our primary customers are in the United States, but we are not limited to the East Coast. We do sell quite a bit to California, occasional pieces to Canada.

Mr. SMITH. About what is the annual volume of your business?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, dollarwise?

Mr. SMITH. Approximately.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Dollarwise, about a half a million dollars a year.

Mr. SMITH. Do you make these purchases through sealed bids or open bidding, or just how?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, most of it is done through bidding. Whether it is a private firm or the Government, it is usually offered out, as a group or a lot, to interested parties. And so we have competition and we must bid against other people in the purchase of the equipment.

Mr. SMITH. Would any of this equipment that you buy be restricted or classified?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, that is a little difficult for me to say, because I don't know what constitutes the exact classification on it.

The equipment is put out by Atomic Energy, by the Navy Department, by private firms. Now we presume that the material has been screened. That is the terminology—that they screen it—so I really would not know if it is classified, to be perfectly honest, but I have seen submarines sold and I have seen Atomic Energy equipment sold, in which they mentioned that you must dismantle or you must in some way destroy the original intent or purpose of the object.

Now if that constitutes classification.

Mr. SMITH. I believe they call that cannibalization?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Demilitarizing. If you buy a still, you also must say that you are not going to use it for manufacturing alcoholic beverages.

Mr. SMITH. To your knowledge, have you ever purchased any equipment that you subsequently learned was classified or still classified? And you had to handle it as such?

Mr. EPSTEIN. We came fairly close, but to my knowledge, we never actually bought any classified material. It was either withdrawn at the last moment or something occurred to prevent us buying.

Mr. SMITH. Right. Would you say, Mr. Epstein, that it is possible for some of this material to get into the wrong hands, that is, into enemy hands?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I would say very definitely yes. There appears to be no restriction as to who can go in and buy the equipment, and the most that I have ever noticed was that there were certain clauses that said you could not ship it out of the country, but there was no restriction as to who could purchase this equipment, so I would say it was very possible it could get into the wrong hands.

Mr. SMITH. Is there any restriction on whom you can sell it to?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Within the United States, there is no restriction. There are definite restrictions as to what you can ship overseas and to what nations. They supposedly must be friendly countries to whom you can ship the equipment.

Mr. SMITH. Right. Would any of the machinery that you purchased be useful to foreign nations?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Oh, definitely. I would say that the equipment we have is probably anywhere from 20 to 40 years ahead of the rest of the world, with very few exceptions, and I have a pretty good example.

I just came back from a machine tool show in Chicago, in which there were two Russian machines exhibited for the first time, I believe, in the United States—two machines of Russian manufacture. And there was an American manufacturer of the similar machine at the show, and I asked him what he thought of this particular piece of equipment called a Bullard, and he said, "Well, it is a damned nice machine. We stopped making them like that 40 years ago."

So that was his opinion of the particular Russian machine, and I kind of bear that out, so I would say that our equipment is of very definite interest to foreign countries, whether friendly or unfriendly.

Mr. SMITH. Did you ever know a person named Vadim Isakov?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to reflect that Vadim Isakov came to this country in February 1962 as a Russian employee of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, in the position of procurement officer.

He resigned that post on 22 January 1966, due to a U.S. State Department protest, which stated that he was involved in activities not in keeping with his U.N. position.

Mr. Epstein, when did you come into contact with Mr. Isakov?

Mr. EPSTEIN. We met Mr. Isakov in July of 1965.

Mr. SMITH. Where did you meet him?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, we met him at the U.N. at his invitation. The story is a little unusual. I have a neighbor, lives on Spencer Place, who sells hospital and laboratory equipment to UNICEF.

Mr. SMITH. Who is the neighbor, please?

Mr. EPSTEIN. The gentleman's name is Army Stiefel or Steifel.

Mr. SMITH. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. EPSTEIN. S-t-i-e-f-e-l. It is Arndt, A-r-n-d-t.

Mr. Stiefel, who apparently knew Mr. Isakov in his position as procurement officer for the UNICEF, was asked by Mr. Isakov would

he know someone who could handle, that would have technological equipment, and Arndt gave him my name, and everything after that was Mr. Stiefel's fault.

We received a call from this party Isakov, and at first, I will be honest with you, I thought it was a joke by a competitor, so I called back the U.N. to ask if there was such a party as Vadim Isakov, and they said "yes," he was a procurement officer. And I told my partner, I said, "Well," I says, "Have you ever been to the U.N.?" And he said "no," and I said, "Well, this might be a good opportunity to see what the place looks like, in all the years it has been up."

So we made an appointment, Mr. Isakov asked us over, to come to the U.N. and see if we could help him in obtaining technological equipment for undeveloped countries. That was the way he put it, on the telephone.

So on the 15th of July we went over there, and he took us to lunch in the Delegate's Lounge there and proceeded to talk to us about the kind of equipment he wanted, and it was quite evident at this very first conversation that we did not really have the type of equipment he wanted.

He wanted laboratory supplies, what you might say small tools, hand tools, wrenches, pliers, equipment of that sort, which we don't handle. He was not looking for large machine tools. He was looking for small equipment. He was looking again, as I say, for laboratory equipment, which we don't normally handle.

And at this point, I was a little discouraged as far as any possibility of sales; so he took us around on a tour of the entire U.N. territory there, and when it was all over I felt that I was going to be finished with, but he says no, he would like to come out and see what we had to offer. So in the meantime, in order to stimulate some interest on his part, we had an entire surplus plant for making watch parts that had become surplus, and I said, "This would be a type of an item for an undeveloped nation, and they might be interested in obtaining it through UNICEF. It would be good for an economy of an undeveloped nation, for the manufacture of watch parts."

And I played that up, and he said well, he would like to come out and visit us. He made arrangements; he came out the 27th of July. This was the first time he came to our plant in Paterson, and we showed him through the entire plant.

Again, he did not seem to know anything about machine tools and he expressed no interest in the machine tools. But we did have at the time on the floor a surplus missile computer that we had purchased quite by accident in a Government sale, and, by accident, I will indicate that we bid \$71 on an item that cost the Government something on the order of \$10,000, and we were very surprised when we were awarded it.

So it was sitting on our floor. We did not have the vaguest notion of where to sell it or what to do, and as we walked by it, and I mentioned that this was a missile computer, he expressed quite a lot of interest.

He asked, could I give him the serial number, the model, and all the rest, and I said "yes," I would be glad to.

Again, as far as the machinery went, there was no interest on his part. We went back into our office and sat down, and he said well, as far as the UNICEF items, he could see that we did not really have

anything for him, but he had a customer in Europe for the following items, and he pulled out a list and proceeded to read off the four following items, and I will say this at this point, my eyebrows went up, because the first thing he asked for is an underwater robot.

Mr. SMITH. Will you explain what an underwater robot is?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, I did not know at the time what it was either, to be frank with you, but he pulled out a name. He said, there is an underwater robot being made in Jersey, by an outfit—

Mr. SMITH. That is in New Jersey?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right, by an outfit called Vare Industries. This is the interesting point. At this point, he knew what he wanted and he knew who wanted it and he knew where it was being made.

I did not lead him on at all. I was unaware that this underwater robot was even being built, and he pulled out, as I say, the list, and subsequently we got a picture of it.

I don't know if the committee gentlemen can see this, but this will give you an idea of what an underwater robot is.

Mr. SMITH. Would you say that was a classified item at that particular time?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, the item is made for the Bell Telephone Laboratories, to explore the bottom when they are laying a cable.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. EPSTEIN. It came into Government use subsequently, when Uncle Sam needed it to go searching for parts missing on the bottom of the ocean. The device is very complicated and very expensive. It runs over \$300,000 for this one item.

That was the first thing. And again, as I say, I was quite surprised, when he asked about it and knew who made it.

Mr. TUCK. Would you like to offer this as an exhibit into the record?

Mr. SMITH. May we have this as an exhibit?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Surely. It is quite all right.

Mr. SMITH. May I move to introduce this as an exhibit, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. TUCK. Unless there is objection, yes.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir, I obtained that, sir, from Vare Industries, the people who actually manufacture that.

Mr. SMITH. Note this as Epstein Exhibit Number 1.

(Document marked "Epstein Exhibit No. 1" and retained in committee files.)

Mr. EPSTEIN. The next thing he asked for was an accelerometer. And again, at that point, very honestly, I did not know what he was talking about, but he wanted an accelerometer manufactured by American Bosch Arma Corporation, by Minneapolis-Honeywell, or by an outfit known as Kearfott, which today is a division of General Precision Aerospace, in Little Falls, New Jersey. He seemed to know what he wanted. He gave us model numbers, again, on this device.

Now on the accelerometer; I have one here. I have an accelerometer that I obtained afterwards from a friend of mine, and this accelerometer is considered obsolete. It was also verified by Mr. Isakov, because when I offered it to him, and he did not instantaneously refuse it, but later on he came back and laughed and said, "That is a piece of junk."

But it is an accelerometer. The accelerometer that he wanted is a device so small, as you can see here; it is smaller than a cigarette pack-

age, if you gentlemen would care to see this. This device is really sophisticated.

Mr. SMITH. What does an accelerometer do? What is its purpose?

Mr. EPSTEIN. An accelerometer measures the pull of gravity on any vehicle, on a missile, on a space orbiting device; as it approaches the earth or the moon or anywhere else, the pull of gravity starts to accelerate the object, making the missile speed up, and this device here will measure that to very fine amounts, very, very close amounts.

It will detect a change in the gravitational pull in the acceleration of a body in feet per second or miles per hour. It will detect this very fast and very accurately. In fact, the whole trick in manufacture of this device, and what makes this a piece of junk, and that device worth \$3,000, is the sensitivity of that device; also, its ability to withstand heat and cold and tumbling and all types of motions.

The device is very sophisticated, as I said, and it is a very critical device when you are trying to make a soft landing on a planet.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, it signals the guidance equipment within the vehicle of these changes in gravitation.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right, and tells it to put on the brakes or speed up, slow down or go faster. It is a very critical device, because it will let you land hard or soft.

Mr. SMITH. May we have this as an exhibit?

Mr. EPSTEIN. All right.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. EPSTEIN. Excuse me.

Mr. SMITH. I want to introduce that as an exhibit.

Mr. EPSTEIN. May I ask if the exhibits are returnable, or are they kept—that is the only book I have of that type.

Mr. SMITH. This will be Epstein Exhibit Number 2.

(Document marked "Epstein Exhibit No. 2" and retained in committee files.)

Mr. SMITH. Proceed.

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is the accelerometer. The next item he asked us for was a miniature computer, he called it, and he said Sperry Gyroscope made it. And we subsequently investigated that and found out that they never made any such device, but he was talking about a miniature, lightweight, compact, on-board computer, and that was all we could gather; we never got anything further on that.

And then the last item he asked for were some titanium pressure vessels. Now this I was a little nonplussed at, because he gave me the requirements for this in atmospheres, which is a typical European connotation, and I had to translate it into pounds per square inch.

In other words, he wanted a bottle of some sort to hold the gas, and it turned out he wanted the bottle to hold the gas at 9,000 p.s.i., which is not very low pressure. It is a—

Mr. SMITH. That is pounds per square inch?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right, 9,000 pounds per square inch. It is a very high pressure, as pressure goes. Under those conditions, most thing, on board a ship or a missile, you are going to have to compress but if you want to carry a fuel supply or an oxygen supply, or something, on board a ship or a missile, you are going to have to compress the gas under this very high pressure.

Now we called up the manufacturer. Again the manufacturer for this device was in Jersey, an outfit called Walter Kidde. They make fire extinguishers.

You probably all are familiar with their fire extinguishers, and they also make pressure vessels, and when I called up and asked about a 9,000 p.s.i. pressure vessel, they said, "Sure, we will be glad to make them." They have them in steel. When he said "steel," Mr. Isakov said "No, no. It must be light, it is going to go up."

So I said, "What do you want?" And he said, "Titanium."

Walter Kidde said, "We can make them, but they are very expensive, and we prefer to sell you something in steel or aluminum, but not titanium," but they said they were available.

So that was the fourth item. That was the pressure vessel.

MR. SMITH. Did this seem strange to you, that a procurement officer of UNICEF or United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund would be interested in this type of thing?

MR. EPSTEIN. Yes; this struck us as quite unusual. He tried to pass it off that he was interested in making money. He had this customer in Europe and he saw the possibility of us making a lot of money and he could also make some money.

This was the way he put it.

MR. SMITH. Did he indicate that he wanted these items for UNICEF or for these people that you mentioned a while ago?

MR. EPSTEIN. He kept referring to his customer in Europe. He never said the Russian Government; he never said anything about Russia. He just kept talking about a customer in Europe and he definitely did not say it was for UNICEF. He did not pretend. At this point, he just had a customer in Europe, the way he put it.

MR. SMITH. Did you tell Isakov that you would be able to get these items for him, Mr. Epstein?

MR. EPSTEIN. Well, when he came in with these requirements, the day he came in, I picked up the telephone and I called Vare Industries there in south Jersey, and they said "yes," they made them for sale, and I asked the price.

I called up Walter Kidde, and the same story as I gave you; in other words, right there in front of the man, I indicated that the material was available. As far as the accelerometers go, I could not do anything instantaneously, but I definitely showed him that it was possible for us to obtain these items for him.

MR. ASHBROOK. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question at that point?

MR. WITNESS, he gave the indication that he held out the promise of large profits. Did he indicate in what amount or quantities he wanted any of these four or five items for which he said he had a customer to purchase them?

MR. EPSTEIN. Well, with the exception of the accelerometers, he only wanted one. No; the bottles, he wanted two each of the bottles. The accelerometers, he wanted a half dozen. The underwater robot, he only wanted one; the miniature computer, he only wanted one.

MR. ASHBROOK. With the exception of the underwater robot, most of these items were small enough that they could be taken out of the country in a person's clothing or baggage; couldn't they?

MR. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Did the topic of payment arise on your initial contact as to how he would pay you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir. We asked him that very question, well, how would we be paid, and he indicated, strictly cash.

Mr. SMITH. That is, U.S. dollars?

Mr. EPSTEIN. U.S. dollars, right on the line. He was not looking for any trade terms.

Mr. SMITH. Did the price of the items seem to set him back any at all?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No; I guess I was more surprised than he was when the underwater robot came in at \$300,000. It did not seem to faze him at all.

Mr. SMITH. Did you know whether or not any of these items were classified at the time?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No; I had a small suspicion that there was something about these accelerometers that might be, but that was just a suspicion. I had no indication.

Mr. SMITH. At what point did you contact the FBI in connection with this matter?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, the minute this gentleman left that day, I discussed the matter with my partner and I said, "These four items he wants are not for UNICEF, as we both understand, and, also, I don't like the looks of this thing. It looks very fishy," at that point, that this fellow was selling it to any friendly customer in Europe and also the fact that he did not know what he wanted, but yet he knew what they wanted, because he was reading from a list.

This got me immediately suspicious. And that evening I contacted my neighbor, the gentleman who lived next door at the time, who was an FBI man, and I told him just what happened, and he said, "All right, you will be hearing from us." And he apparently works in a division that he contacted, and then the following Monday morning, I believe it was a Monday morning, we were visited by FBI agents.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Could I ask one more question at that point? In the case of the accelerometer, you said that he brought it back to you and said it was a piece of junk. Therefore, you are gaining from that the impression that he was taking this equipment to someone else, who was looking at it, and he himself was not making a judgment on it?

Mr. EPSTEIN. In all cases, I would say that was true. In other words, if we gave him anything technical, if we threw up any technical road-block, he would say he would get an answer; and then he would come back at us with the answer, a week later, 2 weeks later, the next time we met him. Any time there was any doubt, in fact, any time there was just even a question, he would have to refer back to somebody. We never gave him this device. We only gave him a serial number and a model number, and he came back, always with the answer a week later.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you. That was it.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Or a month later.

Mr. SMITH. What opinion or instructions did the FBI give you at that time?

Mr. EPSTEIN. The FBI at this point told us to lead the man on, find out what he wanted. They told us that they knew this party had to surface, as they called it, at some point and they were glad he had surfaced to someone that informed them. So, as far as they were con-

cerned, we were just to continue negotiations with him and report on all movements and whereabouts and what this party wanted.

Mr. SMITH. And your bringing the FBI into the picture at this juncture was based on your suspicions of this man's activities as not being clearly within his UNICEF responsibilities?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right. That is the reason. The FBI seemed to be aware of this man's position, because when they walked into our office on Monday, they had a picture of him and they said, "Is this the party? Is this Vadim Isakov?"

And by golly, that was the party. They had a picture, a long distance telephoto of him.

Mr. SMITH. Before we go any further, I think we should make a note at this point. We have had testimony similar to yours in the past, where the person involved with Soviets or a member of one of the other satellite intelligence groups has counseled that the right time to contact the FBI is at the outset of the approach of these people.

Do you agree with this?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir. Because they can get you pretty involved pretty fast, I would say.

Mr. SMITH. Would you care to comment at this point on what might be done to more fully alert people in our own or in your own or allied businesses in regard to this type of approach or situation?

Mr. EPSTEIN. All I can really say is that the approach that they are going to use on you is one of monetary gain; and, apparently, they feel that all the American businessman or an American citizen is interested in is in what amounts in dollars for him.

Apparently they don't understand that some of us feel that this country is first and foremost, and the dollars be damned. But I would say that the peril is there. If a party is looking for monetary gain, these people will reach him, on a monetary basis.

So I strongly feel, as a patriotic American, that the thing to do is to contact the FBI. If the party's request is a legitimate one and the FBI clears it, well, then, you could go ahead. If not, then the necessary steps will be taken by the Government to thwart these activities.

Mr. SMITH. What was your next contact with Mr. Isakov? Or when, rather?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, he said right at that meeting, as we brought up certain problems in relation to the different items, he said he was going on vacation and he would not return until late September and, at the time, he would have more details for us.

Because don't forget, this was the first contact where he asked for these specific items, and we immediately threw up these roadblocks, what size, what shape, what tolerances, what limits do you want on the particular material?

So he called us on the 30th of September and said he was back in the country, he would like to come out and see us on the 2d of October; and he did come back to our plant on the 2d of October.

Mr. SMITH. What transpired at this meeting?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, at this meeting, now, he was pretty specific. He knew what he wanted in relationship to the accelerometer. He had another name for the computer, since we could not at this point—we told

him we could not find any such thing as a minicomputer, he came back at us with a different name, a "Red Man computer," manufactured by IBM.

He also seemed to know what he wanted in the pressure vessel as regards the volume, the size of it.

You see, when he first came, all he knew was that it had to withstand this 9,000 p.s.i., but he did not know how big. But now he had the answers to the questions and he also hinted again that there was a lot more business, there were a lot more items that his customer in Europe wanted.

Mr. SMITH. He kept dangling the volume of business before you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right.

He next came back on the 22d of October and he started to push the accelerometers; and if you will recall, at this time the Russians made about three hard landings on the moon in a row.

They smashed them up, one after another, and it seemed to us, and it may be strictly coincidence, every time they smashed one on the moon, he would come running in for that accelerometer.

This little gadget, that is, if it functions properly, would prevent a hard landing. So there was an awful lot of push on that.

We, in the meantime, had gotten a hold of Kearfott's accelerometer, and they told us the price on that little unit had gone up, so we passed this price increase, which was from \$3,000 to \$6,000, right on to Isakov, told him that now it would cost \$6,000; and it did not seem to bother him in the least. The fact that the price had gone up, that made no matter, but he sure wanted one in a hurry.

Mr. SMITH. Did anything else take place at the meeting, this last meeting, the 22d of October?

Mr. TUCK. What year was this, the 22d of October?

Mr. EPSTEIN. 1965.

Mr. SMITH. 1965?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right. No, the next thing, we had a meeting with him. He called us on the 29th, and we met him on the 3d of November and we met him on the 5th of November. He came to our plant, and while he was at the plant at that time, we had just received some missile site sales.

The Government at the time was selling the Atlas "E" missile sites and then they switched, they sold the Atlas "F," and they finally sold the Titan "I" missile sites, and he spotted this sealed-bid sale and he was quite interested.

We gave him one of these things. He requested, would we mind giving him one of these brochures on the Government sale.

Mr. SMITH. May we introduce that as an exhibit?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Surely.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, we request permission to introduce this as an exhibit.

Mr. TUCK. Unless there is objection, it will be offered as an exhibit.

Mr. SMITH. This will be Epstein Exhibit 3.

(Document marked "Epstein Exhibit No. 3" and retained in committee files.)

Mr. EPSTEIN. We just handed it to him, and he was quite interested. He did not say anything further. He took it with him.

Now at this point—

Mr. SMITH. Now that was the first run of missiles this country had; was it not? The Atlas?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. The big one?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That was our first hard-stand missile, hard site.

Mr. SMITH. Intercontinental missile?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right. And subsequently, they sold the "F's" and then the Titan "I's."

Mr. SMITH. How did you keep stalling Mr. Isakov in connection with this accelerometer?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, in a way, it was simple and, in a way, it was difficult, at least keeping the credibility. These things are quite difficult to manufacture, and we told Isakov that the company had plumb run out of them. They had sold all their inventory and they would have to pft through another manufacturing run and that would take 30 days or 60 days or 90 days to run them through the shops, which is a fairly plausible explanation because of the complexity of the manufacture of the device.

Mr. SMITH. Would you know whether or not the accelerometer, particularly, was on the Department of Commerce prohibited list of equipment to be sold a foreign nation?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, I would not know that, and the one at Kearfotts was apparently free for anybody's asking. I mean, it was not free. If you paid the price, you could buy it.

Mr. SMITH. What about the other two items that were involved in this?

Mr. EPSTEIN. The other two types of accelerometers, the one manufactured by Minneapolis-Honeywell and the one manufactured by American Bosch Arma were classified, and we found that out in a very strange way. Quite by accident. We actually almost purchased two American Bosch Arma accelerometers. They were gorgeous little things, in an almost silver container. I walked into a surplus electronics store and I asked them if he had any accelerometers, and he looked up and said, "Come in the back here," and there, sitting on the shelf, were these two gorgeous silvery gadgets, made by American Bosch Arma, accelerometers, labeled right on top of them, and just what this Russian had asked for.

So I asked the party there, I said, "Would you be good enough to check American Bosch Arma and see if this is the particular accelerometer with the following characteristics?" And I gave him the characteristics that were required.

He picked up the phone, called American Bosch Arma, and I heard the phone explode. Somebody on the other end said, "What in blazes are you doing with those accelerometers? They are classified! You are not supposed to have them!"

And he says, "We are sending a guard right over to pick them up." They were sending a plant security officer over to pick these things up.

It turned out he had purchased the thing in a lot, in other words, he had been invited to go in and bid on a whole room of surplus, and this is what happened.

Mr. SMITH. You mean from the Government?

Mr. EPSTEIN. From Arma. Arma was told to dispose of certain items.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. EPSTEIN. And these classified items had gotten into this lot, and quite by accident he had bought them.

Mr. SMITH. Do you suppose that these items had gotten into the lot by accident?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Or deliberately?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, I think by accident. Because, apparently, a lot more of them were made and destroyed and just these two happened to—

Mr. SMITH. Did Mr. Isakov's interest continue in all of these items that you mentioned a while ago, or did it boil down to these later items, the robot boat and the accelerometers?

Mr. EPSTEIN. It boiled down primarily to the accelerometer, and even the robot he sort of dropped.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Now that pretty much covers that contact.

Could you tell us what took place after this last discussion that you mentioned?

Mr. EPSTEIN. He now began to get very suspicious about meeting us at the plant. He did not want to meet us any longer at the plant. He said the employees were beginning to recognize him and he began to get into what we would call cloak-and-dagger or clandestine operations. He arranged for us to meet him at shopping centers; he met Mr. Yohrling and myself one day and talked with us only in the car. He asked us to drop him off at a spot; we could not take him anywhere. He began to get a little amusing in that sense.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, he was beginning to establish a clandestine operation, rather than an open commercial operation?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Very definitely, yes. And at this point, he was so anxious about setting up the delivery of an accelerometer that we actually set up an appointment. I said we had finally gotten one—this is about the middle of November—we had gotten an accelerometer, or we were about to get one, so we set up a meeting at a shopping center, and we have a large shopping center called Korvette's up there. And I was supposed to meet him in the early evening in a certain department and hand him the accelerometer, and he would hand me—and he patted his vest pocket very significantly—cash. He would hand me the \$6,000 cash. Now that was all set up.

Mr. SMITH. Did he indicate any interest in the Atlas missile equipment that you mentioned a while ago?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No. Later on. This was much later on.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. EPSTEIN. But this meeting that we had, or were supposed to have, I told the FBI, "Now what do I do?"

And they said, "Don't show. We will monitor the meeting." And, apparently, he did show up and he was quite disappointed that I did not show up at that meeting at Korvette's.

We gave him an excuse that I was out of town on business, I had forgotten, and again we gave him the delay that we had not received the accelerometer, actually, and we are sorry.

He was really pushing for that accelerometer and was willing to pass the cash at that time.

Mr. SMITH. Did the fact that he was so intensely interested in the accelerometer indicate to you that they were possibly having trouble with their outer space shots?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I really feel that that was quite evident, that they were having a lot of difficulty with this, trying to make this landing, that soft landing on the moon.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Now did you keep the appointment with him at this clandestine point meeting?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, no; the meeting at Korvette's, I never kept, but we did set up a meeting later on at—again he would not come to the plant, but I met him at a restaurant, the Crane House, which is around the corner from our plant. And at this meeting, over a few drinks, he started to discuss how was I going to cover up the purchase of this accelerometer. In other words, it was imminent that I was about to obtain the accelerometer, so what excuse could I use, and he proposed a number of peculiar covers, such as buying it in a phony name, telling them that I was going to use it for another purpose entirely.

He began to be worried about the security. He also brought up at this meeting would I be willing to ship it for him, the accelerometer.

Mr. SMITH. Did he indicate how it was to be shipped?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes—no, you mean as to whom—he did not give me any address to ship it to; no.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. EPSTEIN. But he did, when I flatly refused to ship the item, I flatly turned him down, so I said he would have to handle it, and he said, well, that would be no difficulty; he would get it out in a diplomatic pouch.

And this question you brought up before, Mr. Ashbrook, about how would you get out an item, I asked him how would he get out the underwater robot, and he said under diplomatic pouch.

Apparently, if they put the connotation "diplomatic pouch" on it, it does not matter if it is as big as an automobile, they can't stop it. The material will go out, with nobody from our Government or our country able to prevent its departure. I was quite surprised by that.

Mr. SMITH. That is true. There is no limitation on the size of the pouch under international law.

Did you have to stall him any further in connection with the accelerometer?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I was still going along with this stall. I requested the FBI to give me some directions as to what to do, and the only thing that kept coming back at me was that it was under consideration that they could let us, they would tell me what to do, but to just keep stalling him, ask him if he is interested in anything else.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have any further contacts with him?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes. He visited us on December 4, and apparently, as an outgrowth of this. This meeting on December 4 had to do with the missile site. They apparently had spotted something in the brochure that they wanted, because he came at me now and asked if I could obtain, not the entire site or not the missile itself, but a device called a Sylphon bellows. This is a flexible connector used to fuel the missile just prior to launch and, again, this was indicative of some troubles they must have been having, because this Sylphon bellows that was built for this for launching and fueling—in other words, the missile re-

mains on the pad entirely unfueled until the time is called for it to be launched, and just prior to launch it must be fueled by flexible connections.

You have probably all seen them down on the gantries, hanging off the gantries down at Cape Kennedy, all those hoses that drop away just before the missile is lifted off, and they must have been having difficulty, because he specifically wanted to buy flexible connectors, coupling, diaphragms, and these Sylphon bellows, from the missile sites, or if I could get them from any of these sites.

Mr. SMITH. Up to this point, can you give us an idea of how many contacts you have had with Isakov?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Oh, I have a list here of phone contacts and all he made at the office. We keep a record, our secretary keeps a record of that, and I would say over 20 contacts by phone and in person. Probably 10 contacts in person, and 10 by phone.

Before we made personal contact, he would usually call us. In fact, he did not want us to call him at the U.N. ever since that first meeting. After that, he said he would contact us.

"Don't call me, I will call you." That type of thing.

Mr. SMITH. Over what period of time did these contacts take place?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, I have brought you right up to December. In other words, from July of 1965 right up until December 1965. This one where he came and asked for the Sylphon bellows occurred on December 4.

Mr. SMITH. What was the purpose of the Sylphon bellows?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, as I mentioned, it is a flexible connector for a missile, for fueling it, for charging it prior to launch.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. TUCK. Did you ever deliver to him any of the technical equipment which he requested?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir. We never actually delivered a thing to him with the exception of that exhibit of the sealed bid. That was the only thing. And a bottle of whiskey. On December 30, he came in with a bottle of vodka, and I gave him a bottle of whiskey, and that was the only thing we ever passed. He brought in a bottle of Russian vodka with no tax stamp on it. It was quite interesting.

Mr. TUCK. What became of the cash? I understood you to say that he had some cash.

Mr. EPSTEIN. He had cash, but we never delivered an accelerometer; he never passed any cash to us.

Mr. SMITH. Did he establish any set of signals or anything like that for your meetings?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Well, as I say, they were always preceded by a phone call. They were always preceded by a phone call. They were always at some public spot, a shopping center, or at a restaurant.

Mr. SMITH. Did he have a specific time and all the other elements involved with that?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Oh, yes. If we were late for a meeting, he was quite perturbed. He was quite upset. One or two occasions, we were a half hour late for a meeting; he was quite upset about it.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, he became progressively clandestine in his operations?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right, and he wished us to become so, too. He seemed

to be fairly certain that any time we made an approach to an American manufacturer to buy one of these things that it would go on record.

It must be their economic policy over there in Russia that a record is kept of every technical purchase, which of course we don't do here in the United States.

Mr. SMITH. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Isakov as a UNICEF employee of the U.N. did not have diplomatic immunity and, theoretically, could not have access to the diplomatic pouch of his nation?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir, I really was not aware of that.

Mr. SMITH. He was a Russian national, employed by the U.N. but, as clearly demonstrated here, he was engaged in a clandestine operative operation or purchase of equipment in this country which was beyond his duties and responsibilities.

Did you have any further contacts with him after this last meeting that you mentioned?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No; after he gave us that bottle of vodka on December 30, we had no further contact with Mr. Isakov because a story broke in the newspapers, of which you people are aware, and on January 12 the newspaper article appeared, which, you might say, blew the whistle on his whole operation.

Mr. SMITH. May I go back just a moment?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Surely.

Mr. SMITH. In connection with the Sylphon bellows, were you able to obtain it for him?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Did he raise any question about that, your inability to obtain it for him?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No. We did not really have the opportunity or the time to get into that. That came very late in the meetings, so we never actually pursued it at all.

Mr. SMITH. Now when the matter broke in the newspaper, did that close his contacts with you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir, very definitely. We heard no further from Mr. Isakov.

Mr. SMITH. You have told us a most interesting story here that once again demonstrates the need for all Americans to be alert to this type of happening.

Would you, in view of your experience, tell us just what might be learned along these lines?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I will say this: I feel that they are behind us, in their technology. I don't know how many years behind, but they definitely need the advanced technology that we have, and I feel that selling them this type of equipment, giving it to them, or in any way dealing with them in this type of item, is just endangering our own future positions with the people.

I was very much upset on learning here, about a month ago—and you probably saw it in the newspaper—that General Dynamics was going to sell a submersible to the Russians—you probably saw it—for a million dollars.

I don't feel that this country should give up our advances just to make dollars. What we have, I think we should keep. I think that we should not make the task any easier for them at all.

I happen to feel that the increasing trade relations with them and the opening of consulates throughout the United States is just going to make it that much more difficult, and make that many more people susceptible to their approaches.

That is my own opinion. But I definitely feel that the job is going to get difficult, more difficult for the FBI. More people will be approached, strictly for this industrial espionage.

I am not talking about military secrets, I am just talking about technological secrets. The ones that we have, I don't feel we should share it with them, I don't feel we should sell it to them.

Let them go develop their own, especially when it comes to missiles or satellite vehicles.

Mr. SMITH. Upon disclosure of this in the press, this closed out the operation you had in connection with Mr. Isakov and closed out your contacts with the Bureau?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. The FBI at that time?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Mr. Chairman, that completes my questioning. Do you have any questions?

Mr. TUCK. I have one or two. I understood you to say that opening up of these additional consulates will have a deleterious effect upon the country, in your opinion. As I understand it, these people who work in the consulates would be granted diplomatic immunity.

I said those who are employed in these consulates in the country are granted diplomatic immunity; are they not?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir, they are. They would be.

Mr. EPSTEIN. I imagine so, sir.

Mr. SMITH. This is right.

Mr. TUCK. This Mr. Isakov, or whatever his name was, he was granted diplomatic immunity. It was impossible for us to prosecute or punish him in any way for his conduct. Is that right?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir; I believe Mr. Isakov could have been grabbed; I believe he could have been prosecuted.

Mr. SMITH. That is correct; he was an employee of the U.N.

Mr. TUCK. Of the United Nations.

Mr. SMITH. And as an employee of the U.N., he does not have, nor can he get, diplomatic immunity.

Mr. TUCK. Does not have. But ordinarily, those who are employed in consulates would have.

Mr. SMITH. In consulates, they would have.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Epstein, I am interested in the approach made by Mr. Isakov, and apparently it was quite open when you visited him at the U.N. Did you have any social contacts with him, or were all of your contacts of a business nature?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No; there were some social contacts of the type where we met at a restaurant, or in particular I mentioned the Crane House, and at the Garden State Plaza; we met at a Cambridge Inn, where we discussed family and some other things.

I never met his family socially, but let's put it this way, over a few drinks we discussed various things, and he tried to let me believe that he was interested in personal gain also in the sale of these items.

In other words, that it was strictly a business proposition with him and that he would pick up a certain commission on the sale of the items.

Mr. WATSON. I assume that you do not speak Russian, so naturally all of your conversations were carried on in English.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. What was the proficiency of Mr. Isakov so far as speaking English?

Mr. EPSTEIN. It was very good.

Mr. WATSON. Very good.

Mr. EPSTEIN. He was not a technical man. He did not know technology.

Mr. WATSON. I am speaking about general conversational English.

Mr. EPSTEIN. General conversational English, it was excellent.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, he could very well pass himself upon an innocent American as a fellow American, rather than a decidedly Russian individual?

Mr. EPSTEIN. With the exception of that name.

Mr. WATSON. Well, with the exception of the name. But if he wanted to change the name, you could not easily detect that he was of Russian extraction through his conversation?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Approximately what age was this man Isakov?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I would say he was about 40—38 or 40, somewhere in there. I believe at one time he mentioned he was 38 years old.

Mr. WATSON. Do you know his whereabouts now?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir.

Mr. WATSON. During your contacts with this individual, were any other parties involved, either Russian or Americans, other than you and your partner?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir. No one else.

Mr. WATSON. Did he ever mention the names of any other individuals?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir; he just always referred to his customer. That is all. And he never gave a specific name at all.

Mr. WATSON. And you never inquired specifically as to who his customer was?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir; we joked about it a couple of times, knowingly, we joked about it, but there was no—we did not want to upset him. We sort of played ball. That was what the FBI wanted us to do.

Mr. WATSON. Yes. And when you started meeting with him outside of the plant, you had already notified the FBI, and so you were going along with their instructions at that time?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, so far as you know, there would be no need for any of this technological equipment for the United Nations International Emergency Children's Fund?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir. Not of the type that he was looking to obtain.

Mr. WATSON. I believe initially, when you contacted him at the U.N., you stated that he inquired as to whether you had laboratory equipment?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right. That is what he wanted, or that was his procurement goal. That was what he was supposed to procure for UNICEF, was laboratory equipment.

Mr. WATSON. Ordinarily, I would assume laboratory equipment involves things other than tools as you mentioned a moment ago. Could he not have been inquiring of you as to whether or not you had equipment which might be used in laboratories for health purposes, in making research and such?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right. That would be what he would normally purchase.

Mr. WATSON. But, immediately, he went into the other fields and made these specific requests of you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Now I think it is quite alarming that you relate here that you found one of these accelerometers in a supposedly surplus commodity house. Is that it?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Now I assume that these can be bought by anyone?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right; anyone who walks in could buy them. In fact, if the party is not very knowing who runs the commodity house, he does not really know what he is selling. He only knows that he bought an item; and somebody is coming in and willing to buy it at a price.

Mr. WATSON. How long have you been in the business yourself?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I have been in the business 14 years, by myself.

Mr. WATSON. Fourteen years. And during the course of that experience, have you encountered some purchases where you bought some equipment which was even beyond your knowledge, technological knowledge?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir. We sometimes take what we call a flyer, a bid on something that we know nothing about and it just looks like it might be a good speculation, as we call it. But frankly, I am not in the electronic end of the surplus business.

It is all by itself. The electronic specialty boys would be much more aware of highly complex and maybe classified equipment than I am.

Mr. WATSON. I believe you stated that you were first put in contact with Mr. Isakov by a Mr. Stiefel, a neighbor of yours.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Do you, of your own knowledge, know how long Mr. Stiefel knew Mr. Isakov and how he made that acquaintance?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I don't know specifically. I only asked Army after the whole thing had broken open what his relations were with him. And, apparently, Mr. Stiefel's employer, which is a supply house, has had business dealings with UNICEF for a number of years. How many, I don't know.

Mr. WATSON. I understood that Mr. Stiefel was involved in pharmaceuticals and such as that.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Do you know whether or not, from conversations you have had with Mr. Stiefel, Mr. Isakov made similar inquiries, beyond the pharmaceutical end, of Mr. Stiefel?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir. Because apparently, the only inquiry he made of Mr. Stiefel was did he know somebody else. And the first thought, or Mr. Stiefel's first recommendation was our company, myself, and this was confirmed by the FBI, in the fact that they said they were wondering when this fellow was going to surface, and apparently

we were the first contact he made. We were the first surfacing of Mr. Isakov.

Mr. WATSON. Do you know whether or not he contacted other people engaged in a similar business as yours?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir, I don't know.

Mr. WATSON. Did he ever have any discussions with you concerning the possibility of obtaining or procuring this equipment from some other sources?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, he never went that way. Apparently, he was assigned to us and he stayed pretty much with us, which is what the FBI led me to believe was their method of operation.

Mr. TUCK. I am not familiar with the provisions of the Internal Security Act. Was his conduct such as to bring him in violation of any of the existing provisions of that law?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. TUCK. Do you know, Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir; if he was serving as an intelligence agent in procurement activities contrary to his U.N. assignment, he would be violating our laws.

Mr. TUCK. Then if he was not acting under the protection of the cloak of immunity, I don't understand why the Department of Justice did not pursue him.

Mr. SMITH. He could have been prosecuted.

Mr. EPSTEIN. That was the same question I asked, sir.

I don't know the answer to that one either.

Mr. WATSON. That led, Mr. Chairman, to the question I was going to ask you. Do you know whether or not the FBI ever made any attempt to arrest or apprehend this individual?

Mr. EPSTEIN. If they wished to apprehend him, that meeting at Korvette's where we were supposed to pass an accelerometer, a supposedly classified piece of equipment, to him in return for cash, there was the time.

Mr. WATSON. Did I understand from your testimony that you did not attend that meeting, but the FBI said they could cover it for you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. They would monitor it.

Mr. WATSON. Monitor it. Now am I to understand that, subsequently, you learned from the FBI that they did monitor, as you say, that engagement?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Did they find Mr. Isakov there?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. So far as you know they had no conversation or contact in any way with Mr. Isakov, other than to observe him at that point?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Epstein, I notice that you are a member of the American Society for Metals, among other organizations. I find that, Mr. Chairman, rather interesting because the first witness that we had on this subject was also a member of that particular society, and we discovered that, apparently, there, their ranges and membership is open to anyone of any national origin.

Do you know Mr. Huminik?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir. Sorry.

Mr. WATSON. The one who testified earlier?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir, I do not know the gentleman.

Mr. WATSON. What is the policy in reference to the American Society for Mechanical Engineers? Is their membership open to anyone of any national origin, namely, a Russian?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I am not that familiar, but I do believe it is restricted to American technical people. I don't believe it is a foreign—we have any foreign members, except if a party became a member here in the States and then moved out of the country.

But I don't believe we have—it is open to foreign membership as such.

Mr. WATSON. Do you know whether or not the Society of Automotive Engineers, of which you were a member, I believe, whether or not they have restricted membership as to Russian nationals?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir, I don't know that answer. I have never looked through the charter of any of the groups.

Mr. WATSON. I might state here that I think it would be helpful if you might check into that, because I know the chairman and the members of the committee were astounded to learn that a technical society, such as this, was apparently open to Russian nationals, and I am sure that in the course of your meetings you have very technical and sophisticated discussions, and it would appear to me that it is an open door for them to gather the very technical information that you say now they are primarily interested in.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir; I say that they probably can obtain it very easily by subscribing to some of our publications, which are open to anyone to purchase.

The only thing I feel is this: While you can't censor or in some way hold back this information, this publication, the very fact that we have them confined to two spots at the present time in the United States is restrictive on their ability to get around to these meetings.

The fact that they are confined to New York and Washington would make them quite limited in their ability to branch out, that if this other thing happens, with the consulates scattered all around the United States, then they have got this spreadout ability, which they don't have now.

Sure, they can attend the meeting in New York, of any of the societies, the Automotive Engineers or the Metals or ASME, but all they will hear is what is going on at that particular meeting. We are holding meetings all around the country at all times, and the mobility is limited for these Russian nationals now.

What it is going to be like under this consulate thing is another story.

Mr. WATSON. Well, I happen to agree with you in your feeling about the new consulates, but as I understand from your testimony, you said that they could attend the meetings of these technological societies now, in New York and in Washington.

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is right. They could do that.

Mr. WATSON. Well, I am sure that you discuss things other than social matters at these particular meetings; don't you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir. If it is a classified meeting, though, in which some classified material is supposed to be divulged, they will have a security check at the meeting. That, they will have. There have been a number of meetings of that type.

Mr. WATSON. Since your experiences with Mr. Isakov, I assume that you have discussed this matter with other members of your industry?

Mr. EPSTEIN. A number of them. Not too many, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Have any of them indicated to you that they have had similar contracts?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir.

Mr. WATSON. None of them indicated that?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No. There is only one party in the industry that we know of that actually did make a contact where he sold some diesel locomotive parts to a blind in Mexico, and the material ended up in Cuba. And to my knowledge, this party regrets the day he ever did it, because he was brought to justice, and they prosecuted him, and he did a stretch in jail.

That was the only party, and it was a party I knew personally. So I would say that anyone else in my industry who has ever had contacts with—of this nature certainly is not disclosing them, to my knowledge.

Mr. WATSON. I see. A final question or two, and I don't know whether it is directly related to the question under discussion or inquiry here. You stated that you had bought a missile computer for \$71, which had cost the Government approximately \$10,000 to construct it or purchase it.

Is that true?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is true.

Mr. WATSON. Have you disposed of that missile computer?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir; we sold it finally. Somebody came in and offered us a hundred dollars, and we took it. The party, I assure you, was going to dismantle it, tear it apart for electrical components, tubes, and wiring, and things of that sort. I am pretty certain that is about all they intended.

Mr. WATSON. Do you personally believe that the procedures for disposal of U.S. Government surplus commodities are rather loose and that there should be some tightening of these procedures so as to prevent, as you indicated here, accelerometers and other sophisticated technological equipment from getting into the hands of people that in turn it might be given or sold to the Communists?

Mr. EPSTEIN. That is a very difficult question to answer, Congressman. The problem is so vast, our Government has got this equipment from one end of the earth to the other, in quantities that are really unimaginable, and how you could have anything screened by intelligent people at all times, without some point along the line slipping up, is beyond me.

It really, the task is Herculean in scope. I believe the people who dispose of equipment are doing the best job they can, at the present time, with the manpower available. I will say this: I don't know if they have the technological people in the organization that could really say, "This you can sell, and that you can't sell." They do the best they can. They try to screen out any such mistakes such as occurred.

Mr. WATSON. Well, now, the contact you made, and you found an accelerometer there, that was so impressive in the silver container, and so forth, was that a large surplus operator, or what size would you consider it?

Mr. EPSTEIN. I guess in electronics he was considered fairly large.

Mr. WATSON. Well, would it not be reasonable to conclude that, if he had picked up this classified item, others have done the same thing?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir, I think so.

Mr. WATSON. And you believe, simply because of the enormity of the problem, that it would be useless for us to try to tighten down the sales procedures a little bit?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, I don't say it is useless. I say it would be possibly a good idea to maybe have an intelligence screening unit. I don't know if there is such a group, an evaluation or an intelligence screening group on all this. It could be done.

Right now, the only screening is done, I gather, if the Navy has a piece of equipment it wants to sell, it is offered around to the Army, to the Air Force, to the Department of Commerce, and they are supposed to screen it.

But I don't believe there is an overall intelligence screening unit in this picture at all.

Mr. WATSON. Well, would you not agree with me that there should be such a unit as that?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir, that might be of great value.

Mr. WATSON. You mentioned that you called Walter Kidde, and I assume some other companies, when Mr. Isakov was in your presence?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. And made inquiry about these particular items.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. And all of the companies said that they were available for sale to you?

Mr. EPSTEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Did they make inquiry as to the purpose for which you were going to use them, as to your prospective customer, or matters of that kind?

Mr. EPSTEIN. They did not ask who my prospective customer was. They only asked me what my intended use was in order to better perform the tasks that I wanted the item to do.

That was their only curiosity, was what was it intended to do. And, in fact, on one occasion, Kearfoot recommended I go out and buy a much cheaper accelerometer than the one they offered for sale. I could save a lot of money. That was the only question in their mind, was that they possibly could save me some money by buying a much less expensive accelerometer.

Mr. WATSON. Is there any restriction so far as companies or rejuvenators, as your company might be, as to who can buy these surplus items, sophisticated surplus items?

Mr. EPSTEIN. The only restriction seems to be that you cannot be employed by the U.S. Government and purchase any of these items. That seems to be the only restrictive clause in all of this. If you are an armed services employee, a member of any Government organization, you are not allowed to buy this equipment.

Mr. WATSON. Otherwise, if you have the money, you can buy it, if you find it the right one. But there is no clearance at all so far as who is buying it, or whether or not you are a security risk or for what purpose you are going to use it.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Right, correct. You bring to mind, Congressman, something that I clearly forgot. The classification on this, as to being restricted, only had to do with who put up the money for developing it.

If Uncle Sam laid out the money for the development of the device, it was automatically classified restricted. If it was developed by private industry, using their own funds, there was no restriction placed on the item.

That was something that came out. I meant to bring it up, in particular in the development of the accelerometer. I was very surprised to find that out.

Mr. WATSON. I believe that is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I only have one question, Mr. Chairman.

It seems that the evidence has been very completely elicited, and I would only add one point.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Epstein, at any time during the course of events when you were communicating with, and dealing with, so to speak, Mr. Isakov, or since the time that you have stopped dealing with Mr. Isakov, did any other Government agency than the FBI contact you, or a representative of any other Government agency?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. At no time?

Mr. EPSTEIN. No, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Commerce, Justice, no one?

Thank you.

Mr. TUCK. Thank you very much, Mr. Epstein, for your presence here and for the information which you have brought us. You have rendered a valuable service to your country.

Mr. EPSTEIN. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Epstein.

Mr. TUCK. Unless there is further business, the committee will recess until the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., Wednesday, May 10, 1967, the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1967

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities (appointed April 4, 1967) met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m. in Room 429, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of Virginia, chairman; Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana, chairman of the full committee; John C. Culver, of Iowa; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck, Roudebush, and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel; and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator.

Mr. TUCK. The subcommittee will come to order. A quorum is present.

The hearing today is a continuation of a series of hearings initiated by the committee on April 6, pursuant to a resolution adopted by the full committee on March 8, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning current espionage and intelligence-gathering activities within the United States by foreign governments.

Before calling the first witness this morning, I would like to state for the record that these hearings have apparently upset the Soviet Union to some extent.

On May 5, *Izvestia* published an article concerning them entitled "The Painters."¹ Generally this article tries to create the impression that in holding these hearings the committee has been acting at the instigation of the FBI and the CIA and that it has been receiving the testimony of witnesses who have not been telling the truth.

Going further in its attempt to discredit the committee and the hearings, the *Izvestia* article falsely accuses certain Americans of committing espionage against the Soviet Union.

The article has been translated by the Library of Congress at the committee's request, and copies of it were sent to all members by the

¹ See pp. 681-689.

staff director last week. If there is no objection, I would like to offer the translation of this article, along with a mechanical reproduction of the original, for inclusion in the hearing record.

The Chair hears no objection. It will be inserted in the record at the conclusion of the testimony of the witness the committee is about to hear.

The witness for the day is Mr. Frank John Mrkva, who is head of the Field Service Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Passport Office of the Department of State.

Will you come forward, please, Mr. Mrkva?

Will you stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MRKVA. I do.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mrkva is accompanied by Mr. Robert D. Johnson, deputy director of the Passport Office.

Mr. TUCK. I should have made that announcement. We are glad to have you, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. TUCK. Under the rules of the House of Representatives, there will be no further pictures or photographs while the witness is testifying.

Go ahead, Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK JOHN MRKVA, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT D. JOHNSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PASSPORT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Mrkva, would you please state your name for the record, your full name?

Mr. MRKVA. Frank John Mrkva.

Mr. SMITH. What is your date and place of birth?

Mr. MRKVA. April 22, 1928. I was born in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania.

Mr. SMITH. May we have your current address, please?

Mr. MRKVA. 5623 Gregory Drive, Lanham, Maryland.

Mr. SMITH. Where are you currently employed, Mr. Mrkva?

Mr. MRKVA. Currently employed with the Passport Office; that is, in the Department of State.

Mr. SMITH. And what position do you hold there?

Mr. MRKVA. My current position is that of chief of the Field Services Branch, within the Passport Office.

Mr. SMITH. All right. Now, Mr. Mrkva, would you please relate briefly for the committee your educational background?

Mr. MRKVA. Graduated from high school in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, in 1947. I am also a graduate of Garfield Business Institute, also of Beaver Falls.

Mr. SMITH. Right. In what year?

Mr. MRKVA. 1949, I believe.

Mr. SMITH. Would you please in like manner relate your occupational background for the committee?

Mr. MRKVA. Very briefly, I had worked prior to coming to the State Department in the Babcock and Wilcox Tube Company of Beaver Falls; the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company of Aliquippa, Penn-

sylvania; and for Michael Baker, Jr., who is a land surveyor consulting engineer in Rochester, Pennsylvania; Wilco Builders—that was on the Ohio Turnpike—as assistant demolitions man; and, ultimately, with the State Department, in 1955.

Mr. SMITH. You came to the Department of State in 1955?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Would you tell us now the various positions you have held within the State Department prior to the one you now hold as chief of the Field Services Branch?

Mr. MRKVA. Within the State Department itself, I started out as a research clerk, worked into a position of control clerk, and time and attendance clerk.

At the time I met Mr. Pisk I worked as visa courier in the Diplomatic Section of the Passport Office; later as general services officer; and in my current position as chief of the Field Services.

(At this point Mr. Pool, a member of the full committee, entered the hearing room.)

Mr. SMITH. Have you had any military service, Mr. Mrkva?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Would you please describe that for us?

Mr. MRKVA. I entered into the United States Army in December of 1950, served in Korea, and was discharged in 1952. I was with the 809th Engineering Battalion.

Mr. SMITH. How long were you in the Reserves? Are you still in the Reserves?

Mr. MRKVA. I had 5 years of Inactive Reserve.

Mr. SMITH. That is after you were discharged and returned to inactive service?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Are you a member of any veterans' organization?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; I belong to the American Legion, within the State Department, and I also belong to the World War II Vets of West Mayfield, Pennsylvania.

Mr. SMITH. What is your marital status, Mr. Mrkva?

Mr. MRKVA. I am married and have three children.

Mr. SMITH. You are here today in answer to a subpoena served upon you by this committee by Investigator Ray McConnon on June 8, 1967. Is that correct?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SMITH. I should like to ask you at this point, Mr. Mrkva, if you know, or have you known, two Czechoslovakians named Zdenek Pisk and Jiri Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir. I knew both these gentlemen at the time that I was performing the duties as a visa courier.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state for the record that Zdenek Pisk came to this country in 1961. He served as third secretary, later as second secretary of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington until 1963.

Jiri Opatrny served as an attaché of that Embassy from 1963 to 1966, when he was declared persona non grata by our State Department.

Now, Mr. Mrkva, could you tell us just how you came into contact with these two men, and for what purpose?

Mr. MRKVA. I came into contact with Zdenek Pisk in 1961 through '63. As I stated before, I met Mr. Pisk when I called at the Embassy in connection with my normal duties.

Mr. SMITH. In connection with your duties?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. When did you meet Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. I met him in December of 1963. This was quite a few months after Pisk left the country.

Mr. SMITH. Right. Your initial contact, then, was with Zdenek Pisk, and that was in the course of your normal duties at the Department of State?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Did your relationship or association with Mr. Pisk go beyond that stage? That is, did it go beyond routine business visits or duties?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, very definitely.

Mr. SMITH. Would you relate, please, to the committee just what did take place?

Mr. MRKVA. In addition to dealing with Mr. Pisk in connection with visa work, I had received an invitation to attend a Czech reception. This was a routine thing, actually. We had a very pleasant social discussion, and during the reception he suggested that we should get together at a later date and become a little more acquainted and perhaps have dinner together, and so forth.

Mr. SMITH. I assume that a part of your duties with the Department of State was to visit the Czechoslovakian Embassy on business, State Department passport business?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. This was usual, not only with the Czech Embassy, but with every embassy in Washington.

Mr. SMITH. Right. And it was during one of these visits that you were invited to attend a reception at the Embassy?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Was it a little strange to you that Pisk would invite you to the reception? Or was this usual?

Mr. MRKVA. This would be considered normal and natural.

Mr. SMITH. There wasn't anything out of the ordinary?

Mr. MRKVA. No, there was nothing out of line with this.

Mr. SMITH. Did he in fact invite you to dinner at a later date?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; in November of 1961, I believe it was. Here again, while I was at the Czech Embassy, Mr. Pisk suggested that we have dinner together, and he said he would like to talk to me about social things, you know, just to get together and get to know each other. He suggested we have dinner at the Old Europe restaurant.

Mr. SMITH. What was your reaction to all of his questioning and eliciting of background information on you?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, at our first dinner engagement at the Old Europe restaurant Dr. Pisk generated some interest in my background, where my folks came from, what type of work I did at the Passport Office. We got into a conversation about my folks.

He was very interested in my father's illness, or he appeared to be very interested in my father's illness, relatives in Czechoslovakia, and we talked generally about passport matters and processing of passports.

Mr. SMITH. These were nonclassified matters that would be of general topical conversation?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, that is correct, sir. He went quite a bit into my background, where I came from, where my folks came from, and—

Mr. SMITH. He did pinpoint this aspect of it, I assume.

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. What was your reaction to it? Did you have any thoughts on the subject? Was this peculiar to you?

Mr. MRKVA. This, the evening was really—it was a pleasant evening. There was nothing clandestine about it. I held nothing back.

Mr. SMITH. Did he seem to know that you had relatives in Czechoslovakia prior to his questioning on the subject?

Mr. MRKVA. No, I don't think—he didn't give that indication.

Mr. SMITH. Did he get names and addresses of these relatives from you?

Mr. MRKVA. No; we just talked generally, general areas of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, general conversation?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Were your superiors aware of this contact?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, indeed. Right from the beginning I kept Mr. Johnson and Miss Knight apprised of my activities at all times.

I would like to embellish here just a bit, if you will bear with me.

Mr. SMITH. Go right ahead.

Mr. MRKVA. When Miss Knight took over the Passport Office in 1955 as director, she had quite a reorganization of the entire office. As part of this reorganization, she emphasized the need for greater security and housekeeping and these types of activities.

This is about the point when I became acquainted with Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson at the time was chief of our Legal Division and also he was the security officer of the Passport Office itself.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Mr. MRKVA. In 1956, '57, Mr. Johnson and I worked very closely on internal security, details, housekeeping inspections, and so forth. And it was through him that I was made aware of some of the ramifications of security and what—I was sort of new in the Government at this time, but he taught me the ins and outs of security.

Mr. SMITH. And you were security conscious?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; that is what I was trying to bring out.

So actually, when I was invited to have dinner with Dr. Pisk, I thought this was a little bit unusual.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Counselor, may we interrupt at this point? I am going to honor your request, and I appreciate the reasoning behind it, in not going into the background so far as your relatives are concerned.

However, you stated earlier that this Dr. Pisk asked you about your relatives, a sick father, or something to that effect?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. It was in the course of conversation during dinner.

Mr. WATSON. The question that I have is, Did you relate to him the names of your relatives and their locations and their well-being?

Mr. MRKVA. Generally, yes. I didn't pinpoint addresses or anything. I did tell him a bit about—well, let us go back just a bit.

I used to like to practice my Czech at the Embassy. I could speak the Czech language, not fluently, but enough to get by on. He commented on this and asked about my parents, if they were in fact Czech, Czechoslovakian. And I said "yes," and we got into where they came from, and this type of questioning.

Mr. WATSON. Were you not aware of the fact that the revelation of such information to this agent of Czechoslovakia would subject you to most undue pressure?

Mr. MRKVA. I might add—

Mr. WATSON. Or were you that naive at the time?

Mr. MRKVA. At this point, sir, there was nothing clandestine about the operation. We were out for a social evening. We were out for dinner.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, you were aware of the fact that the feeling of the Czechoslovakian Government was not necessarily one of friendliness to the United States: weren't you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. And yet you voluntarily told this agent about your family and their location, and so forth, in Czechoslovakia?

Mr. MRKVA. I had nothing to hide.

Mr. WATSON. Well, I should think under the circumstances—

Mr. MRKVA. I didn't know he was an agent. As far as I knew—at the time, I believe, he was second secretary. I was as much interested in him as he was in me.

Mr. WATSON. I am not being argumentative. I appreciate your position. But, frankly, under the circumstances, I think it would be very unwise, and I would caution other people about that, because it would be difficult, indeed, to ascertain in view of earlier hearings that we have had, Mr. Counsel, as who is or is not an agent of either the Czechoslovakian or the Russian Embassies, so—

It is water over the dam now, but I don't believe I would voluntarily give information about my relatives over in Czechoslovakia, because I think it would subject you to most undue pressure in regard to matters such as this.

Mr. MRKVA. I was suspicious of the question, yes, but like I say, I didn't embellish on it.

We didn't go into detail. I merely acknowledged the fact that I had relatives there. Of course, I have no close connection with these people, so—

Mr. WATSON. But they are relatives, and I am sure you are concerned about their welfare.

Mr. MRKVA. Oh, yes.

Mr. WATSON. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. I just wanted to develop that point.

Mr. SMITH. At this point, Mr. Mrkva, could you describe Dr. Pisk to the committee, that is, his physical makeup, his mannerisms, and how he behaved himself?

Mr. MRKVA. He was somewhat stocky, of medium height. I would guess he was in his late 30's or early 40's. He was a very pleasant individual.

Mr. SMITH. Easy to meet, I assume.

Mr. MRKVA. Very pleasant, easy to talk to. I was completely at ease with him. He was a very mild-mannered, scholarly type. He was married, with no children.

Mr. SMITH. When was your next contact with Dr. Pisk?

Mr. MRKVA. After the initial reception and the first dinner meeting, I had no contact for approximately 5 months.

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.)

Mr. SMITH. Did you see him at any time subsequent to that?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; during this time I had continued to call at the Embassy, two, sometimes three, times a week—and I talked to him occasionally.

Mr. SMITH. Did he make any contact with you during those calls?

Mr. MRKVA. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, he took me within the Embassy to a different reception room, especially if I was waiting for an urgent or rush case. And at that time he would point out certain displays that they had at the Embassy, and we'd talk a bit about Czechoslovakia.

At times he furnished me with magazines. We talked about their free schools, free hospitalization, and, in general, it was almost a pleasant social get-together every time I called at the Embassy.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, he was talking about Czechoslovakia?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And describing to you the things that they had in Czechoslovakia, I assume.

Mr. MRKVA. Conditions. This was picking up what we talked about at our dinner engagement.

Mr. SMITH. You said that he took you to another room within the Embassy. Was this different from the room that you had been going to in the Embassy in connection with your business?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; generally when I had called at the Embassy, they had a few chairs right in the immediate entryway of the chancery, and this was a little more on the plush side. It was a little reception room they had off to the side that they used for, perhaps, distinguished visitors or guests.

Mr. SMITH. This is where you would wait for the results of your business. Is that correct?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. And usually I would get excellent treatment, and the visa would be at times issued on the spot, while I waited.

Mr. SMITH. I see. When was your next outside contact with Mr. Pisk?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe our next meeting was again at the Old Europe restaurant.

Mr. SMITH. Can you give us a date on that?

Mr. MRKVA. It was on May 25, 1962.

Mr. SMITH. 1962?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Now you say this was about 5 months after the first dinner engagement. Is that right?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Before you had this second meeting outside the Embassy?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. During your contacts at the Embassy, he did not raise business questions or any questions about getting you to serve them?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Just strictly business?

Mr. MRKVA. No; strictly business and strictly day-to-day conversation. He remarked at times how hot the weather was and suggested

we should get together and go to the beach sometimes. He was very affable and very friendly.

Mr. SMITH. To the best of your knowledge, was there any reason for this long delay between the first meeting outside of the Embassy and the second meeting that we have just mentioned?

Mr. MRKVA. To tell you the truth, I was a little surprised that he again extended an invitation for the second dinner meeting, and Mr. Johnson and I talked about it.

The Bureau, of course, was interested, and I can only speculate that they were perhaps checking into my background.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned the "Bureau." The FBI, I assume, is what you mean by the "Bureau."

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. When were they cut in on this operation?

Mr. MRKVA. Right at the beginning.

Mr. SMITH. That is the first contact you had with Pisk outside the Embassy, or at the Embassy?

Mr. MRKVA. Outside the Embassy. As a matter of fact, I believe the invitation to the reception was—they were made aware of that.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. MRKVA. And, of course, they were certainly made aware of the first dinner engagement we had.

Mr. SMITH. During this second meeting, you began to speculate that maybe there was a little more to this than just friendship, or social?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, yes, especially at the second meeting. I was pretty well convinced myself.

Mr. SMITH. I see. What would lead you to this sort of speculation? Differences in position?

Mr. MRKVA. One would—it was unusual that a second secretary would want to be seen with, or offer dinner invitations to, a visa courier or, in fact, a messenger.

Mr. SMITH. Could you tell us in your own words, Mr. Mrkva, just what transpired between you and Mr. Pisk from this second meeting on?

Mr. MRKVA. Again we went to the Old Europe restaurant and we picked up—the conversation picked was much the same as it was before, his concern about my father's health.

My father, incidentally, had a couple of strokes and he was in pretty—he was in ill health.

Most of all, I think we talked about—we had common ground in that we talked about passports, methods of processing passports, and this type of conversation.

Mr. SMITH. His interest seemed to be in the operations of the Passport Office?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. In what respect? How you issued passports—

Mr. MRKVA. More in the paperhandling. We at the time had just streamlined our operation. We had introduced certain new equipment to help process some of the paper, the books, through the office, and he was very interested.

I think he commented that he was doing a paper for his own government, ways of improving their passport office, and he was very interested in what types of equipment we used, for example.

All this was, of course, not classified, so we talked about it for quite a bit. And——

Mr. SMITH. Did he make any suggestions of future meetings and future activities between you and his family?

Mr. MRKVA. I think he mentioned that it would be nice if we could get together and go to the beach sometime, some Sunday afternoon.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. In other words, he suggested a continuation of the social phase of it?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. When did you have, or did you have any other meetings with him, dinner engagements?

Mr. MRKVA. Let us see. We did have the outing at Mayo Beach.

He drove to our residence one Sunday afternoon. It was June 17, 1962, to be exact. We drove to the beach and we had an outing. We really didn't discuss anything about the office; he didn't question me with regard to anything about the job or anything. It was purely a social outing.

Mr. SMITH. Let us get the chronology straight now.

Your second dinner engagement was 25 May 1962, I believe you told us?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And now comes this Mayo Beach outing in June?

Mr. MRKVA. June 17, 1962.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, a little less than a month later?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Were there any other meetings?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; we had another meeting at the Old Europe restaurant in September, September 6, 1962.

Mr. SMITH. What transpired at this meeting?

Mr. MRKVA. We continued to talk about the Passport Office and his interest in some of the equipment. For example, we talked about the Frieden Flexowriter that we had introduced. We had talked about——

Mr. SMITH. Was this a classified item?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir.

And along with the Flexowriter we had a byproduct tape, one that was used to write the passport. We talked about snap-out forms that we used that were simultaneously typed as the tape was being punched. It is a little complex to explain, but he was very interested in this machine and other machines, like the cash registers that we used to apply the fee to the application, and certain other equipment.

Mr. SMITH. Did he ask you for anything during this visit?

Mr. MRKVA. He asked me to supply him with as much information as I could and I think cautioned me at this point. He said, "I don't want you to get into trouble, but I would be interested in getting as much information as I can on the processing of the paperwork." I agreed to do this.

Mr. SMITH. Did he ask you for actual samples of the papers that were used in your processing?

Mr. MRKVA. I think he asked—he asked for anything unclassified.

Mr. SMITH. Was this furnished to him?

Mr. MRKVA. Again after consulting with Mr. Johnson and the Bureau, and since there was nothing readily available at the time, I sat down and wrote in my own handwriting several pages of the steps and

what happened to the application when it initially arrived, how it was processed through the office, and named some of the machines and some of the companies that supplied us with certain paper stock, and so forth.

Mr. SMITH. Did you pass the data to him at the Embassy, or outside?

Mr. MRKVA. I never passed anything to him at the Embassy. We had made an arrangement where I was to meet him at Hains Point. This is when I wrote all the information down in longhand.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. MRKVA. And I met him at Hains Point on a Saturday morning. We talked briefly. I gave him the information, and that is about all there was to it.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give any reason why he wanted you to meet him at Hains Point rather than the Embassy?

Mr. MRKVA. I think he told me he was going to be fishing.

Mr. SMITH. Was he fishing when you arrived?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. As a matter of fact, he was decked out in his sports shirt, had his fishing tackle with him.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give any reason for choosing Hains Point, other than the one you just mentioned, fishing? Did he give any hint as to why that would raise any suspicions on your part?

Mr. MRKVA. Not really. We were getting into a little area here where it was out of the ordinary. I think that other than the fact that he was anxious to get, perhaps anxious to get, this information in connection with what he said he was doing a paper on.

Mr. SMITH. You did give him a handwritten statement of the processing in your office with regard to passports?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. At Hains Point?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. You transmitted it to him.

What other contacts did you have with Mr. Pisk? Outside contacts, that is.

Mr. MRKVA. I believe I had several other contacts with Mr. Pisk. I think we had five additional meetings, and these were at various locations, restaurants in Maryland, restaurants that were in the close proximity of where I lived at the time. There were—

Mr. SMITH. Were they restaurants, or taverns?

Mr. MRKVA. They were restaurants. When I would see Dr. Pisk at the Embassy, we would agree to meet near my place, near our home. This was generally at Route 1 and Queensbury Drive, and I would drive to this point.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook, a member of the full committee, entered the hearing room.)

Mr. MRKVA. There is a bank right at the intersection, and I would generally meet him about 7 or 7:30 in the evening. And from there we would go to one of the restaurants close by in the area.

Mr. SMITH. Was this in front of the bank, or where?

Mr. MRKVA. No; this was behind the bank.

Mr. SMITH. Behind the bank in a parking area?

Mr. MRKVA. In a parking area. It was dimly lit.

Could I break just a minute? I want to check a few dates, if you don't mind.

Mr. SMITH. Go ahead.

Mr. MRKVA. Here they are. All right.

Mr. SMITH. You stated that when you made this contact at the bank that we were speaking of a moment ago that you would go somewhere else. How would you go?

Mr. MRKVA. Generally I drove my car to the area, to the parking lot behind the bank. That seemed to be his favorite—it was a handy spot to meet him.

He would usually be waiting for me behind the bank in a dark corner, or he would just round the corner as I pulled in. We would drive to one of the restaurants in the near vicinity.

One of them was Jimmy Comber's Restaurant. This was on November 27, 1962. We had two meetings at the Calvert House Inn.

Mr. SMITH. Whose car would you use, his or yours?

Mr. MRKVA. I would always use my car.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, did you ever see his manner of transportation?

Mr. MRKVA. No. As a matter of fact, I never observed him arriving or leaving in, for example, an automobile. He always seemed to be in the area, waiting for me, or he would suddenly appear around the corner. I never had a chance to observe how he arrived at these meetings or how he departed.

Mr. SMITH. Was he on time, punctual, that is?

Mr. MRKVA. He was very punctual; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Was he cautious?

Mr. MRKVA. Extremely cautious. And, as a matter of fact, at this point he cautioned me that he preferred not to talk in the car. I think he may have suspected that the car was bugged. He preferred to talk outside the car. There was very little conversation in the car itself.

Mr. SMITH. Did he ever ask you a question as to whether or not the car was so-called bugged?

Mr. MRKVA. No. At this point, I think, he cautioned me. He said, "We shouldn't talk in the car."

Mr. SMITH. In other words, the association between you and Pisk was changing from one of strictly friendship to one of a semiclandestine arrangement, would you say?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Your suspicions became more firm, I assume at this time, that there was something more than social activity on his part.

Mr. MRKVA. Very definitely, yes. As our meetings progressed, although they were still on a friendly basis, he wasn't demanding. He didn't give the appearance of wanting classified information at this point, although towards the end of the last couple of meetings we had, of course, he brought this out in the open more. But at this point we generally talked about passports and the processing of passports.

In 1961 the Passport Office introduced a new series, a new type of passport. He was very interested in the new book and he asked many questions about the book itself.

Mr. SMITH. In order to get our chronology a little bit more accurate, could you give us specifically the places where these last five contacts took place?

Mr. MRKVA. Mainly in Riverdale, Maryland, specifically Jimmy Comber's Restaurant on—

Mr. SMITH. What date, please?

Mr. MRKVA. November 27, 1962. There were two at the Calvert House Inn, on December 13, 1962, and January 20, 1963. There was one at the Ledo Restaurant on March 6, 1963. Our last meeting was held at a Hot Shoppe in Hyattsville on March 27, 1963.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Counselor, to interrupt at this point, before we leave the social aspects of this, I am curious about this. Does the State Department have any regulations relative to private social contacts between the employees of the Department and employees of Communist Embassies in Washington?

Mr. MRKVA. At that time, I was not aware of any such regulations.

Mr. WATSON. Do they have some now, or are you aware of them?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe we did—there was a circular issued subsequent to this time.

Mr. WATSON. Prohibiting private social contacts with employees of Communist embassies?

Mr. MRKVA. Not necessarily prohibiting these contacts, but I believe the Department would like to be aware of such contacts.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, they are not prohibited, but the Department must be made aware of such contacts if they are made?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; I believe they requested this.

Mr. WATSON. Do you not agree personally that that appears to be the introduction to the later espionage activities, that all of these originate through private social contacts?

Mr. MRKVA. Absolutely.

Mr. WATSON. Would it not be advisable then, to obviate or preclude possible later slips, to prohibit the private social contacts?

Mr. MRKVA. I would prefer to let an expert answer that question, but if you want my opinion, this is a necessary thing with the Foreign Service. I mean, I imagine our Foreign Service people have a great deal of personal contact with the locals, wherever they are stationed. I imagine they have much the same interest, and generate an interest in talking to the citizens of this country.

Insofar as prohibiting it, no, I think it is necessary. But insofar as reporting it personally, I feel it should be reported. I think the Department is doing the right thing.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, various employees might differ in the gravity or the potential of gravity of such social contacts, and some might report it, and others might not. Do you not have that very real possibility?

Mr. MRKVA. There is a possibility; yes.

Mr. WATSON. And you feel that the private social contacts, although they lead to the apparent experience that you had and the experiences that others have had here, you still feel that there should be no prohibition against these private social contacts?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. But I feel that a—I strongly feel that they should be reported.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. TUCK. But for these private social contacts, there would be no other way by which you could engage in any form of counterespionage; would there?

Mr. MRKVA. Sir?

Mr. TUCK. I say, unless you have these social contacts, there would be no way of discovering what these foreign agents are doing?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct. And in my case I would like to inject in here that going back to the start that, personally, I did have a decided interest in talking to Pisk. For example, I was curious about conditions in Czechoslovakia from a personal standpoint.

My parents were from there. Before we got into this operation I was genuinely interested in what that guy had to say. I think it was very interesting to me.

Mr. WATSON. No doubt, it would be, Mr. Mrkva, but would you agree with me that you are a perfect natural for any potential espionage activity in view of your background? Do you not agree with that?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. And I agree with the Governor over here that it is necessary to have these private contacts in order to get counterintelligence. But the thing that disturbs me, Governor, is that we always seem to end up on the short end of the tail. They seem to be getting from us, and we get little from them.

They are well trained in espionage. They know how to shut up, but our people are so friendly and kind and long suffering, and we have faith in everybody. So we end up on the short end of the stick. That is my only concern here.

I am not directing this towards you, because—

Mr. MRKVA. That is very true, and I agree with you.

Mr. WATSON. I am sure you are doing a good job.

Excuse me, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. SMITH. In these restaurant meetings that we just mentioned, were they always preceded by a meeting at the parking lot behind the bank or some other area before you proceeded to the restaurant?

Mr. MRKVA. Generally, yes; we met behind the bank.

Mr. SMITH. Who made the choice of the restaurant?

Mr. MRKVA. He would generally make the choice. He always made the choice, in this case.

Mr. SMITH. And it was rarely the same one?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Each time?

Mr. MRKVA. He chose a different location.

Mr. SMITH. During these contacts, did Pisk levy any more requirements on you?

Mr. MRKVA. Generally, not anything other than the passports. We seemed to center around the passport itself, requests for additional information on the workflow.

He did ask for certain publications, like the State Department telephone directory, catalogues, and items of this nature.

Mr. SMITH. What type of catalogues were they?

Mr. MRKVA. Frieden catalogues.

Mr. SMITH. Business machine catalogues?

Mr. MRKVA. Business machine catalogues, generally, yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did you furnish these items to him?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, I did.

Mr. SMITH. I assume it had the concurrence of State Department and the Bureau?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; the material was examined by the Bureau before it was passed to him.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Did he make any reference to the handwritten document you had previously furnished them, or did it appear that he was following this procedure that you had set forth in the handwritten document?

Mr. MRKVA. No, he made very little reference to it after I passed it to him, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Did any money change hands at any of these contacts?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, just before he left the country, and after I passed on this information, the handwritten information, to him at one of our meetings, he was very sympathetic. He said, "Well, I know you don't make an awful lot of money and I certainly appreciate your taking the time to write this report for me."

I believe he gave me an envelope containing a hundred-dollar bill.

Mr. SMITH. Can you pinpoint the time that he gave you this?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, I believe I can.

I gave him the handwritten report at Hains Point—just a minute, please.

That was on Saturday, October 6, 1962.

Mr. SMITH. That was after these other meetings that we have been talking about?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. During that time?

Mr. MRKVA. And I think he passed the hundred-dollar bill to me in March of 1963.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give you anything else?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. As a matter of fact, he gave me a bottle of Czech brandy and he also gave me several gifts from time to time. One was this glass vase, and an ash tray.

Mr. SMITH. I assume that was Czechoslovakian production?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

And he also brought on several occasions Czech magazines, which he—I expressed an interest in, and he said my father would be interested in the magazines, Czech cigarettes, small items of this nature.

Mr. SMITH. What became of the money that he gave you?

Mr. MRKVA. The money was turned over to Mr. Johnson and to the Bureau, I should say, to the FBI.

Mr. SMITH. How much money did you receive in all in this operation?

Mr. MRKVA. A total of \$3,440.

Mr. SMITH. Now, where did the bulk of this come from?

Mr. MRKVA. The bulk of this money came from the—from Jiri Opatrny.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have to sign any receipts for this money that was given you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. With Mr. Opatrny, he did ask for a receipt.

When I was involved with Opatrny, at this point, the chips were down. We knew we weren't kidding each other like Pisk and I were. He did ask for a receipt. I was reluctant to sign my name, so we concocted an alias. We used the name "Zobek."

Mr. SMITH. I see. But it was in your handwriting?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Can you explain the procedure a little bit more of the receipt that they requested? What was the nature of it? What did it say, or can you remember?

Mr. MRKVA. Generally, when he asked for a receipt, I would in a notebook or on a piece of paper, I would write "received" and such and such a date, "\$100," and sign it merely "Zobek."

Mr. SMITH. From whom? Did it indicate from where it was being received?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir. It was a very simple receipt.

Mr. SMITH. I should say it was.

Did Pisk incorporate any other techniques into this operation, such as a contact plan or system of communication?

Mr. MRKVA. Not until at a later date, prior to his departure from the United States.

He told me that his friend was going to replace him very shortly. As a matter of fact, he told me that it would be beneficial for me to agree to meet him and to talk to him and that—

Mr. SMITH. Agree to meet Pisk or Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. To meet Opatrny when he came into this country.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Did he indicate it would be beneficial to you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, very definitely, that we would mutually benefit by this association.

Mr. SMITH. He didn't indicate how you would benefit?

Mr. MRKVA. Financially.

Mr. SMITH. You assumed it would be financially, then?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And that is what he meant?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. In retrospect, Mr. Mrkva, what do you believe Pisk's role to have been in the operation?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe his role in this was to make the initial contact with me and to develop and partially assess me.

We didn't really go into an operation; it was generally social. But he was leading into it gradually. I think he was doing a background check on me.

There was a degree of control, perhaps, since I passed over the handwritten information to him, and he more or less set the stage for Opatrny.

As a matter of fact, he told me at one point that Opatrny is a professional. He asked me to pay attention to what he had to say and I would learn a lot of things, and we would get into this thing full-swing, and it would be financially beneficial for both of us.

Mr. SMITH. Do you believe he was assessing your potentiality as an agent?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think he was a trained agent?

Mr. MRKVA. Perhaps not a full agent, but I feel he has had training along these lines.

Mr. SMITH. How was Jiri Opatrny brought into the operation?

Mr. MRKVA. Before Pisk left, I agreed to meet—I more or less indicated I would be agreeable to meeting, to setting a meeting with him. He didn't specify any date or time or place. He did establish a recognition signal.

He said that when he was established in Washington, he would come to me and say, "I bring greetings from Zdenek." That was the recognition signal.

Mr. SMITH. Your last meeting with Pisk—could you give us a time and date on that?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. When he mentioned Opatrny.

Mr. MRKVA. He left for Czechoslovakia on May 8, 1963.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have a meeting with him just prior to his leaving for Czechoslovakia?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Where was this meeting?

Mr. MRKVA. The last meeting we had was at the Hot Shoppe.

Mr. SMITH. And in what period of time?

Mr. MRKVA. In Hyattsville. Just a minute, sir. March 27, 1963.

Mr. SMITH. And this was at the Hot Shoppe where?

Mr. MRKVA. In Hyattsville, Maryland.

Mr. SMITH. In Hyattsville, Maryland. And at this place he told you that Opatrny would be coming to the States?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned a moment ago that he also made the statement that Opatrny was a professional?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did he indicate in what profession?

Mr. MRKVA. He really didn't come out and say that he was an espionage agent, in those words, but he did, by his references to—he urged me to meet with him and said that our relationship would be mutually beneficial.

Mr. SMITH. When did Jiri Opatrny initiate his contact with you? Upon his arrival?

Mr. MRKVA. Not until December 20, 1963.

Mr. SMITH. I believe you said that he arrived in this country in May of 1963. Is that right? Or was it at a later date?

Mr. MRKVA. Opatrny?

Mr. SMITH. Opatrny.

Mr. MRKVA. Pisk left in May. I believe I stated that Dr. Pisk left in May.

Mr. SMITH. Oh, Dr. Pisk left in May. You don't know exactly when Opatrny arrived?

Mr. MRKVA. No, I don't, but it was about 8 or 9 months after Pisk's departure that I met Opatrny.

Mr. SMITH. I see. But Opatrny has his first contact with you on 20 December 1963?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SMITH. In his first contact with you?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Would you describe that meeting for us?

Mr. MRKVA. As I recall, my wife and I were just returning from shopping. It was a few days before Christmas. We were loaded down with packages and we just pulled in front of the house. We noticed that there was somebody standing at the door, talking to our daughter.

We thought it was a salesman at first. And as we approached the door, he kind of brushed past my wife and came out and shook hands with me. He said, "I bring greetings from Zdenek." And I knew immediately who it was.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, "Zdenek," I believe, was Pisk's first name?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. And he brought you greetings from Pisk?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. And along with the greetings he had an envelope that contained another hundred-dollar bill and, I believe it was, the ash tray.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Now, did he set up any date for future contact, or did he discuss anything at this particular contact with you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; we talked briefly in front of the house and, as I recall, we sat in my car for just a moment. We did establish the fact that we would meet later.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned that he brushed past your wife. What were her thoughts about it?

Mr. MRKVA. She was extremely annoyed with his rudeness. As I walked into the house she remarked, "These salesmen are getting worse and worse every day."

Mr. SMITH. In other words, she thought he was a salesman?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Did she know of the operation that you were involved in?

Mr. MRKVA. No, she did not. As a matter of fact, when I went into the house, I had the ash tray. Of course, I put the money in my pocket. And I brought the ash tray in and I told her it was a friend of mine that had dropped this off as a Christmas present.

Mr. SMITH. I see. And she asked no further questions, I assume.

Mr. MRKVA. She was irritated with him.

Mr. SMITH. The changeover from Pisk to Opatrny, then, as you have described it to us, was a verbal arrangement. Is that correct?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. Just to repeat this, Pisk had set up this recognition signal, and—

Mr. SMITH. Gave you the gifts?

Mr. MRKVA. Gave me the gifts, and so forth. It was a verbal—

Mr. SMITH. Did he set up any future meetings at this first meeting you had with him?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, definitely. I don't believe I have the date, but it was somewhat later. I think I have the date elsewhere.

Mr. SMITH. What were your thoughts when he greeted you on this first meeting, bringing you greetings from Pisk? What were your thoughts in connection with whether or not they had accepted you?

Mr. MRKVA. I think Pisk had laid the groundwork for this meeting, of course. I think Jiri Opatrny had confidence that I had been cultivated and the track was open. We had a line of communication open.

Mr. SMITH. Did he appear to accept you without any further examination?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, the assessment of Pisk had been accepted as far as you were aware?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think they believed you to be fully recruited at this point?

Mr. MRKVA. No; I think Opatrny had some spadework to do. Not

initially. That came a little bit later with him. This was our first meeting, and—

Mr. SMITH. Would you give us a description of Opatrny? What did he look like? What were his manners, and so forth? How old was he?

Mr. MRKVA. He was about 30 to 35. He told me he was married and that his children were in Czechoslovakia. He was of medium build, somewhat stocky. He was a cocky individual, aggressive, demanding at times.

(At this point Mr. Willis entered the hearing room.)

Mr. MRKVA. Nervous. He drank quite heavily. He later told me, several years later, he had developed an ulcer.

Mr. SMITH. I see. How would you say he compared with Pisk?

Mr. MRKVA. Where Pisk was somewhat scholarly and calm, maybe a little bit slow and deliberate, Opatrny was a little—he seemed anxious to get on with it. He was nervous and he was more aggressive than Pisk. Pisk was mild and friendly, where Jiri Opatrny was all business.

Mr. SMITH. Did either of these two men attempt to indoctrinate you in communism?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. As a matter of fact, Opatrny did at our first meeting. The first meeting he tried to indoctrinate me into the Communist philosophy.

I made it clear to him that my only motivation at this point was the money and that I had no interest in his ideology and thinking. We made that clear right from the beginning.

Mr. SMITH. What was his reaction to that statement?

Mr. MRKVA. I think he seemed a little relieved.

Mr. SMITH. And what led you to that belief?

Mr. MRKVA. I think it seemed to tie in with perhaps Pisk's assessment of me. Pisk seemed to—except probing into the fact of my father's illness, for example, the mortgage, and so forth, on my house, I think he pretty well knew what course he was going to take with me.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. And he was satisfied or appeared to be satisfied with your explanation that you were interested in money?

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have any contact with Opatrny at the Czech Embassy?

Mr. MRKVA. No. All my contacts with Opatrny were made away from the Embassy. They were at prearranged meeting places.

Mr. SMITH. He set up the contacts for the future, I assume, at each meeting you had with him?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Would you describe the setup that he gave you, the plans for meetings, and so forth? Or did he give you any signals, plans, whatnot?

Mr. MRKVA. Generally, with Opatrny, we went into a different type of arrangement. Most of our meetings were held, for example, on a Friday evening. When we set up an appointment, it would be, for example, it would be "on next Friday at 7:30."

Now, if something went wrong and we couldn't make that meeting, we would move it up to the following Friday, same time, same place. And if that meeting—we had an alternative the third, same time, same place.

Mr. SMITH. What kind of a signal system did he give you to indicate when things were wrong or right?

Mr. MRKVA. When we met at these prearranged meeting places—for example, we had one in District Heights, Maryland, at a Hot Shoppe—we agreed, for example, if we met on a Friday, if something went wrong, if I suspected something was wrong and I couldn't make the meeting, we had a plan devised where I would go into the men's room in the Hot Shoppe, and I would take along a magic-marker, and in a specific area inside the men's room I would put an "X" on the wall. Apparently he would come through the previous Thursday evening and, if he noticed the "X," he would postpone the meeting until the following week.

Mr. SMITH. Was this "X" placed in any specific area within the men's room?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Any particular wall usually designated?

Mr. MRKVA. In this particular case, it was on a—right in the entry-way they had a section of wall, and I would put the "X" right on the wall to the right as you entered.

Mr. SMITH. Any particular color of the magic-pencil that you mentioned a moment ago?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe it was red.

Mr. SMITH. In these meetings at which you used these signals, you mentioned the "X" that you placed on the wall in red. Were there any other types of signals that you used or correspondence or anything, telephone calls, whatnot?

Mr. MRKVA. For example, if I had a classified document which I—he was always after me to pick up classified documents. If I had a classified document and I wanted to make contact with him, he instructed me to send a post card to the Embassy, and it would just be addressed to the Czechoslovakian Embassy, and I was to write on the card something like, "Thank you very much for the information that you supplied concerning the visa requirements," and I would sign the card "Charles." And this was an indication that he would meet me on the following day at a specified area agreed on.

Mr. SMITH. And was this specific area previously named, where you would meet?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, this was previously established.

Mr. SMITH. Previously arranged, it would be a specific point where you would meet?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct, and a specific time.

Mr. SMITH. Right. Were there any other signals used, other than the two you have mentioned?

Mr. MRKVA. If he in turn wanted to get in touch with me in a hurry, he asked me about the times that I left for work and the times I returned. He had a schedule of our car pool, and he would intercept me on my way to work or coming back home from work.

Mr. SMITH. How would he make the interception?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, for example, one evening as I was returning from work about 6:30, he met me in front of—two blocks away from our home. He would stand in an intersection where he knew I had to take this route to get home and, generally, I don't suspect he waited more than 15 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. How many were in your car pool?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe there were five of us at the time.

Mr. SMITH. And you used different cars on different days?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. The individuals'?

Mr. MRKVA. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. And you said that he met you a couple of blocks away from your house. I assume that you dismounted from the car at that point?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, in this case, I would drive my car to another location to meet the car pool, so he knew where I met the car pool and he knew the route I took to get to my residence.

Mr. SMITH. Did this indicate to you, or raise any question in your mind, that you were being watched?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. By these individuals?

Mr. MRKVA. I got that feeling; yes.

Mr. SMITH. They had your routine down pretty well, I assume.

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, they did.

Mr. SMITH. Your habits. Did you have any alternate plan set up between you?

Mr. MRKVA. Of course, there was always the second or third alternate. This was established, right at the beginning. If any of the alternate plans that we had set up, for example, we used to go about three of them, and we wouldn't go beyond the fourth alternate plan. If it went that far, he would intercept me on my way to or from work.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Can you describe these alternate plans that you had? What were the signals arranged? How were they arranged?

Mr. MRKVA. All right. For example, if at any time I had reason to believe I was being followed, we devised a plan, I would carry a newspaper, for example, under my left arm, and when he saw me he would immediately recognize this as perhaps a dangerous—something is wrong, to go to the next alternate. Or another occasion, I would, for example, wipe my brow with a handkerchief as I approached him. This would also be—

Mr. SMITH. Which would be the signal to him, not to make intercept, not to contact you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. McConnon tells me that you had a system of phone booths and telephone numbers as an alternate system, too. Can you describe that for us?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. We had, as I said before, we had this prearranged spot in Hyattsville: at the intersection of Route 1 and Queensbury Road, there is a telephone booth right on the corner. In this instance, if I couldn't make the meeting, assuming it was on a Friday, I would go into the telephone booth and turn the telephone book to the M's, for example, and I would draw a circle around the first name under the M's. And here again he would check the telephone booth on the previous Thursday, and that would indicate to him that we should postpone the meeting and pick it up the next week.

Mr. SMITH. Was there any place in the booth that you left the signal in the telephone book, did you say?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. For example, under the M's, I would turn the telephone book to the Maryland section, for example, to the "M" portion, and I would circle the first name that was under the M's.

Mr. SMITH. In the Maryland section?

Mr. MRKVA. In the Maryland section.

Mr. SMITH. And he knew that you would circle that first name?

Mr. MRKVA. If I couldn't make a meeting.

Mr. SMITH. That is how he knew. You had turned to that particular portion of the telephone book?

Mr. MRKVA. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. Was there any particular color of marking?

Mr. MRKVA. No; this was just with a pencil or a pen.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Counselor, may I interrupt at that point?

Where was this telephone booth?

Mr. MRKVA. It was across the street from the Citizen's National Bank of Maryland.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, you had established a definite telephone booth?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. WATSON. Now, as I understand, earlier you said that if you could not make a Friday meeting, then you would put an "X" in the restroom at some specific location. Now does that mean that Mr. Opatrny had to check both places?

Mr. MRKVA. No; we didn't hold our meetings in one—we weren't confined to one area. For example, generally we met once a month, maybe twice a month. We agreed, for example, like that next month we would meet at the Prince Georges Plaza. Before he went to the Prince Georges Plaza, we would use the telephone booth. The following month we agreed to meet in District Heights. Then we utilized the restroom of the Hot Shoppe to put the "X" on the prearranged spot, and so forth.

Mr. WATSON. And all plans for subsequent meetings were made at the previous meeting?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mrkva, I don't want to anticipate what might be called the climax of your testimony which you will reach, but I want for the record to ask one or two questions.

At this time, tell me, how long did you have these meetings and contacts with him? Roughly?

Mr. MRKVA. It was over 4 years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I understand, but again to make it plain for the record, it is obvious to me that while you were playing the part of the possible dupe, as I understand it, you were at all times reporting to your superiors, the State Department and/or the FBI. Is that correct?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you were permitting yourself to be played as a ruse by this man, but all along you saw through it and you were reporting these facts to the State Department and to your Government?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, it is too early to do it, we will do it at the close, but I wish we had more Americans like you, really.

Mr. MRKVA. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is very important information you are giving us; not only that, but it shows the length to which these operators, so-called people in the diplomatic corps, will go. We have had testimony along this line involving all sorts of espionage; for instance, by a man by the name of Huminik in April of this year, and he painted a story not unlike—on the contrary, quite like yours. We need very badly the loyalty of people like you particularly. As I understand, you are of foreign extraction. What is your extraction?

Mr. MRKVA. Both my parents are Czechoslovakian.

The CHAIRMAN. Czechoslovakian. And this, by the way, had to do with the Czech Embassy, so there, there is the point. Despite the lineage and your dedication, which is a noble thing, to your ancestors, that is one more point which brings out nobility of the performance that you gave this Government, and I congratulate you.

Mr. MRKVA. Thank you very much, sir. I would like to also state it was a difficult assignment. I am not an espionage agent. I have never had any training along these lines. And, as a matter of fact, during the course of the operation, I was still holding down my job as general services officer at the time and I had one man to confide in, really, who was very close to me, and that was Mr. Johnson. It was a difficult thing to keep inside and not to talk about it, and—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you for the record—he is here, you point to him, describe him.

Mr. MRKVA. Mr. Johnson was during the beginning of this, in 1960 or when the operation started, the general counsel of the Passport Office. He is at this time the deputy director.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I know of him, very well.

Mr. MRKVA. Mr. Johnson and I spent more time in that State Department on Saturdays and Sundays, I think every holiday, as a matter of fact. My wife was getting after me about, "When are we going to take our vacation?" or "Why can't we be like normal people and go to the beach over the Fourth of July holiday?"

The CHAIRMAN. I know the usual thing. I don't know whether it obtains in your case. That very frequently we have had witness after witness doing what you have done for your country, and that a man or the double agent, or whatever you want to call him, didn't have the comfort of being able to confer and advise and discuss with his wife. Did you have that problem?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir, my wife was completely unaware of this activity.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you could not—you went to Mr. Johnson, but not your wife, because it was too delicate a thing to do?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a common experience, and it is such a wonderful thing to see people who, because of their dedication to Americanism, will forego the comfort of homeside or fireside heart-to-heart discussions with even their wives and dear ones because of the perilous nature of what they are doing.

Mr. MRKVA. Thank you.

Mr. WATSON. Judge, will you yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Mr. WATSON. I might say this parenthetically, that that is one of the most remarkable things that has been brought out thus far in this

testimony, that you could carry on this clandestine arrangement for about 4 years and your wife not pick up anything about it, because my wife, I believe [laughter] would have at least been suspicious.

Mr. MRKVA. Well, I had an excellent ally with Mr. Johnson. Whenever my wife did get suspicious, as she had on many occasions, and on one occasion my daughter had observed me going into Jimmy Comber's Restaurant, and as I drove home my wife said, "Did you work hard this evening?" I said, "Yes, you know, it was kind of rough." And she said, "Well, what were you doing at Jimmy Comber's Restaurant?"

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. And your answer?

Mr. MRKVA. I said, "Well, we finished up early and decided to have dinner."

But Mr. Johnson used to provide me with most of my alibis.

Mr. WATSON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Mrkva, what other things were you able to note about Opatrny's manner of operation?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, generally, he was extremely punctual. And he requested that—prior to our meetings, that we synchronize our watches. He suggested we use radio time. He also set up meetings in a little different fashion than with Pisk. I noticed he always set up the meeting places in an area where he can observe large areas to see whether any of us were followed.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, he was very cautious?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; as a matter of fact, when I used to meet him at some of these meetings, I was not to recognize him. For example, when we met at the Prince Georges Shopping Center, we would meet in a designated area and we wouldn't recognize each other. We wouldn't talk, or anything, and I was merely to follow behind him, and until he more or less—was more or less satisfied that I wasn't being followed, and he would use several ways of doing this. I suspected that he had his countersurveillance, his people, countersurveillance meetings. He used to look in the store windows, look at the reflections in store windows, and we would always walk a couple of blocks away from the area, and when he felt it was safe, we would stop, and then we would go on from there.

(At this point Mr. Willis left the hearing room.)

Mr. SMITH. What position did he hold at the Embassy, or were you aware of it, his outward title?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe he was an attaché to the Embassy.

Mr. SMITH. Attaché. Do you know whether he was military attaché or cultural attaché or commercial attaché, or what?

Mr. MRKVA. I am not sure, sir, but whatever it was, it was a front. I am convinced of that.

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned how Opatrny set up countersurveillance possibilities for these meetings that we have been talking about. Could you give us a few examples to illustrate the point?

Mr. MRKVA. Getting back to Prince Georges County, we would always meet next to Murphy's Five & Ten, in a sort of a passageway there—towards the back of the building. There is a staircase that takes you down to the parking area behind the store, and from this vantage

point he could observe when I drove into the parking area. This is one of the—one of his techniques.

Another time, we used the restaurant across from the Plaza. He would stand on the sort of a balcony near the entrance to this building and he had an excellent—he could observe a large area there. He could see me coming and going.

On one occasion, we went into a very elaborate system. In this particular case, I was to drive to 42d and Queensbury Road, which is located in Hyattsville. On the corner there's a little grocery store, with a telephone booth on the outside. My instructions were to drive to this telephone booth, or to the store, park the car, get out and walk into the store, and purchase a package of cigarettes. In the meantime, as I followed his instructions, and did this, he was inside the telephone booth, observing me as I drove in, as I went into the store, and drove away from the area. After I left the area, my instructions were to drive into the residential area of Hyattsville and kind of wind around and kill about a half an hour's time, just driving and stopping, making U turns, at the same time looking into my rearview mirror to see if anybody was following me.

After a half an hour of this, I then drove behind the Prince Georges Plaza into the parking area, where again he was standing at the top of the steps, where he could observe any automobiles that perhaps—

Mr. SMITH. When you drove into these places, did he make immediate contact with you when you stopped your car?

Mr. MRKVA. No.

Mr. SMITH. He surveilled the situation before he ever contacted you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; as a matter of fact, he asked me to follow behind him, at a good 50 yards or so, until he was sure that he had a chance to—

Mr. SMITH. Until he was satisfied in his own mind?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Who would make the contact, or the recognition?

Mr. MRKVA. He would always make the recognition signal.

Mr. SMITH. If he did not make a recognition, you knew something was wrong?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Or he suspected something?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Were there any such occasions as that, when he did not recognize you?

Mr. MRKVA. No. We did have a very peculiar incident happened once in Hyattsville. We were behind Dick & Gary's Restaurant in Queenstown. We were in the parking lot behind the restaurant. It was a dark area, and we were having some conversation behind the restaurant when all of a sudden there was a tremendous flash. The outdoor theater is located right in the vicinity, and he commented something, "It looked like a flashbulb," and I said, "Well, we had better get the hell out of here," which we did, and drove up and down a couple of side streets until we were satisfied that it must have been something else.

Mr. TUCK. What method of transportation would this man use? Particularly did he use a diplomatic car?

Mr. MRKVA. I never saw whether Pisk or Opatrny arrived at these meeting places in an automobile. They were always, like I said before, they were always there prior to the meeting or they would suddenly appear around the corner. I never observed what method of transportation they used to get to these meetings or depart from the meeting areas. I think at one time I noticed he got on a bus after he left one of the meetings.

Mr. SMITH. How many meetings did you have with Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. I had a total of 37 meetings with Opatrny and I believe 11 with Pisk.

Mr. SMITH. For a total of—

Mr. MRKVA. Forty-eight meetings.

Mr. SMITH. Forty-eight meetings altogether over this period of time?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Now, obviously, the purpose of the meetings with Opatrny was to further the operation, develop it into a full-scale espionage case. Is that your opinion, too?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. This is correct.

Mr. SMITH. At what point do you feel they believed you were a fully recruited agent, working for them?

Mr. MRKVA. It wasn't too long after Opatrny took over the operation. I think when Opatrny picked up, where we—we started again following up on Dr. Pisk's requests. As a matter of fact, we initially started out with additional brochures about the equipment. He wanted a blank new series passport. He indicated that any classified information I can get my hands on would be worth something.

Mr. SMITH. Did he tell you to try to get information from any other area of the State Department, other than your own office?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. As a matter of fact, he encouraged me to cultivate friendships away from the Passport Office. This came later. Initially, of course, we weren't giving him anything, and he must have assumed that the Passport Office didn't have much; there were slim pickings in the Passport Office. So he encouraged me to make friendships elsewhere in the Department, and—

Mr. SMITH. Did he specify where, within the Department?

Mr. MRKVA. At first, no. I think he was a little upset after the first five or six meetings that we weren't giving him very much information, and he mentioned at one point that we were going off in too many directions. We were after a new series passport; we were trying to get any classified information, any place within the State Department. He encouraged me to engage in conversations with officials of the State Department, pick up any information I could, for example, the war in Vietnam, "What is the scuttlebutt?" he used to ask. He was very interested in the 1964 elections. What the consensus of opinion was about the elections.

He was very interested in the members of the car pool. He encouraged me to engage them in conversations, dealing with perhaps any classified information that they might have.

Mr. SMITH. These car pool members, I assume, worked in other areas of the building, the State Department?

Mr. MRKVA. All the members of the car pool at the time worked for the Passport Office, except one. The exception was a girl that worked in the Procurement Office of the State Department.

Mr. SMITH. Did he seem to know anything about your car pool members?

Mr. MRKVA. He asked me to identify them; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did you report any conversations or opinions to him as requested?

Mr. MRKVA. No. Well, I may have—we talked about the elections and what I thought. Who I thought would win the elections, but he seemed to get—at this point, well, this didn't get too far off the ground, really. He was dissatisfied with this type of information. I think he was anxious to get into a—he was trying to pinpoint me and to see where he could best utilize me. Here they had me more or less cultivated, and we weren't giving them any classified information. I imagine this was driving him crazy, because the best we were giving him were press releases. Some of them were marked "Not for dissemination until," such and such a date. We were giving him notifications of certain conferences that would be held and who was going to participate. This type of information.

Mr. SMITH. This was all under the supervision of Mr. Johnson and the FBI, what he was getting?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Did he ever seem to test you in any other way?

Mr. MRKVA. Getting back to the members of the car pool, he asked me to identify them. He also asked me to come up with names of individuals who I thought could be cultivated into this type of operation.

Mr. SMITH. Did you get the impression you were being used as a spotter?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir, definitely.

Mr. SMITH. And he might be interested in recruiting your car pool members? At least some of them?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; he asked for the names of individuals who had obvious weaknesses, perhaps, such as excessive drinking, and this type.

Mr. SMITH. He didn't want their reputation information?

Mr. MRKVA. What hobbies they had, what clubs they belonged to, and so forth.

Mr. SMITH. Did he test you in any other way to determine your loyalty? Any mission?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; we had a very interesting—there was one classic test that he put me through just before he gave them the device. It was on a Saturday morning, as I recall. We met in District Heights at a shopping center. We got into the car, and he asked me to drive down towards the Mayo Beach area. Just when we got to the Anne Arundel County line, he asked me to stop and suggested we go into a local tavern. As he didn't want to talk in the car, we went in, sat down, and had a conversation. He asked me if I would like to make a fast hundred dollars, and I, of course, agreed to this. The gimmick was that I was to take a plastic cigarette box, I think it was a Philip Morris box, and drive toward the Mayo Beach area until I got to the intersection of 468. That is the road to Shady Side.

As I approached this intersection, I was to drive just a short distance beyond this point, and he indicated a road sign, a reflector sign along the road. I was to pull alongside the sign and reach down to the base of the sign, and concealed under a rock was a similar type cigarette package. I was just to make the switch and drive back to the original spot and give him the box.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, you took one box and brought back one box?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. And gave this second box that you took from under the rock to him?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have any idea what it contained?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, at the time I really wasn't sure it was a test. I was warned that he would try to spring these surprise-type questions at me, or tests. As I drove down to the area, the box was sitting alongside me on the seat, and I popped open the top and looked at it. It had what appeared to be something wrapped in a wad of kleenex. I removed this, and there was a rubber band around the kleenex, and I took this apart and ultimately got down to a piece of paper that was Scotch taped. It was about an inch square, and I suspected that this could have been microfilm or microdot, and I said, "Well, what do I do now? Should I continue with this thing, or should I call the Bureau?" And I elected to—I made a decision, and decided to go through with the thing and not to stop and phone the Bureau for advice. As it turned out, I believe it was a test.

Mr. SMITH. Now at this point where he sent you on this mission, did he get out of the car and wait for you there, or was there another car anywhere?

Mr. MRKVA. No; he stayed in the tavern while I got out and drove down the road and came back. I met him at the same place.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, there is no indication that he followed you?

Mr. MRKVA. No, I don't believe he followed me, but I did observe a gentleman standing alongside the road—about a mile down—who was dressed in a business suit. You don't find very many of those out in that neck of the woods, so I suspected that this would have been one of his agents.

Mr. SMITH. He did not approach you, though?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir.

Mr. SMITH. In recognition?

Mr. MRKVA. No.

Mr. SMITH. Did he appear to be watching?

Mr. MRKVA. Opatrny, or—?

Mr. SMITH. No; the man that you saw.

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, he did appear to be watching traffic.

Mr. SMITH. How far away was he?

Mr. MRKVA. This was about a mile away from the intersection where I dropped him [Opatrny] off.

Mr. SMITH. Did he appear to have glasses, or field glasses?

Mr. MRKVA. No.

Mr. SMITH. He was watching the drop, I assume, this drop point that you were visiting?

Mr. MRKVA. No. There wasn't anybody at the drop point. However, the reflector sign was in a sort of a wooded area, and there were several houses in the nearby area.

Mr. SMITH. Nearby?

Mr. MRKVA. Where I suspect they had somebody, perhaps, observing the operation from that vantage point.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. MRKVA. Another test was made prior to the installation of the device. Again he gave me some money to purchase a walkie-talkie set. This was again right at Christmas time, and what I was supposed to do was to leave one of the sets turned on as I entered the State Department. This was another interesting test that he had.

Mr. SMITH. We will cover this a little later.

Mr. MRKVA. All right.

Mr. SMITH. You said a moment ago, Mr. Mrkva, that Opatrny began to appear as though he was uncertain how to utilize you and your services. Would you explain this a little bit further? What led you to this?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, he got after me. Like I said before, we weren't giving him any classified information. He seemed to be very anxious to get into it. He called me down a couple of times. He said, "We are going off in too many directions. We are not ending up with anything."

He himself seemed to be in a hurry, and I think he was a bit frustrated at this point. He had a ticket to the State Department, or he thought he had a ticket to get into the State Department, but since we weren't coming up with any classified information for him, or something that he could really sink his teeth into, I think he was a bit frustrated.

Mr. WATSON. Excuse me again. I don't know whether it is going to be established later on or not, but the container that you picked up at the base of the highway sign—did you examine its contents? Are you going to develop that later, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Did you examine its contents?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. I didn't go into the entire package.

Mr. WATSON. You do not know what was in it?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir.

Mr. WATSON. So, very well, it is pure conjecture on your part about this being a test?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. WATSON. There could have been another involved, and you were going over for this dead-drop pickup information for Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; that is correct. It could have been, yes.

Mr. SMITH. Now in order that it might be straight—

Mr. MRKVA. On the way down, with the first box, I was curious to know what was inside the box. I did open this box, and I came to the part that had the one square inch of paper concealed in it, and all these wrappings, but however that was Scotch taped.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, as I understood you—

Mr. MRKVA. I couldn't open that one.

Mr. WATSON. AS I understood, you don't know whether that was microfilm or what-have-you. You did not know about it.

Mr. MRKVA. No; at the time I didn't know what it was.

Mr. WATSON. The curiosity didn't get the best of you coming back with the other container that you picked up at the base of the highway sign?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, I did—the first one was a Philip Morris box; the second one that I picked up was a Marlboro flip box. It was damp, it felt like it had been in the ground for several days. I opened up the top of that one and I shook out the same type of wadding, with a rubber band around it, but I didn't go any further than that, having made up my mind at this point to go along with it, and assuming it was a test. But insofar as what the thing contained, I don't know.

Mr. WATSON. You do not know, and you returned that to Mr. Opatrny at the tavern?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. Excuse me for interrupting, but I thought we should establish that.

Mr. MRKVA. I admitted to him at the following meeting—I told George that I did open the box and looked at it.

Mr. WATSON. Did he tell you he knew that you had opened it?

Mr. MRKVA. No, no, he didn't.

Mr. WATSON. If it had been a test, would it not be a logical assumption that he would have so wrapped it or arranged it as to be able to ascertain whether or not you had opened it and examined its contents?

Mr. MRKVA. I would suspect so, but I was extremely careful.

Mr. WATSON. In the absence of that, very well, we could conclude or conjecture the very opposite from yourself, and that is that there was some information of value and you were a party to picking up a dead drop and bringing it back to him.

Mr. MRKVA. True.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SMITH. How did Mr. Opatrny rectify his anxiety with respect to how to use you?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe that was about the time when he introduced the thought that we could conceivably install a listening device in the State Department building. He was very interested in the Eastern European Affairs area. He asked me to familiarize myself with the floor plan in this area.

Mr. SMITH. Now the Eastern European division, I believe you mentioned, what did that encompass, what countries would that cover? Would that cover Czechoslovakia and other countries?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; I believe most of the Iron Curtain countries are located on this floor.

After familiarizing myself with the floor itself and the location of the various offices, for example, the Soviet office and Czech office, he did narrow it down to Raymond Lisle's office. Mr. Lisle is the chief of the Eastern European division.

Mr. SMITH. Now when was this done? When did he make the contact with you for this purpose?

Mr. MRKVA. The 29th of May 1965.

Mr. SMITH. 1965?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. And I believe—

Mr. SMITH. Is this the first time that he brought up the matter of a device?

Mr. MRKVA. That's correct.

Mr. SMITH. The planting of a device?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. The very first time it was mentioned to you?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; like I said before, we had been stringing him along for a number of years at this point, and our meetings were not frequent at this point. We met perhaps once a month, and sometimes I would deliberately miss a meeting, though, and it would stretch out to sometimes once every 2 months. Prior to this time I believe he was completely frustrated as to how he could utilize my services, and this was the first time that he came up with the idea of installing a listening device.

Mr. SMITH. When he mentioned the possibility of planting such a device, did you give him any indication that you would be amenable to doing so?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, when he initially introduced the idea, he also stated that there would be—it would be worth a thousand dollars or perhaps more. I didn't jump at it right off the bat, but I told him I would like to think about it and perhaps let him know at the next meeting. This gave me an opportunity to go back and consult with Mr. Johnson and the FBI for directions.

Mr. SMITH. Now had he been back to Czechoslovakia in the interim period of time before he mentioned this device to you?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir, I don't believe so. Not at this point.

Mr. SMITH. Did you agree to go along, subsequently, with the idea?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. What transpired after you reached an agreement to go along?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, we got into—here again we started locating offices, especially Lisle's, in relation to the rest of the State Department building. In other words, we ascertained that his office did face the street, it wasn't in an inner court, for example.

Mr. SMITH. Did he explain to you why he wanted it to face the street, or the matter of inner court, as compared with facing the street?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, less interference with the transmission of the device.

Mr. SMITH. I see.

Mr. MRKVA. We measured the office. I took a rough measurement of Mr. Lisle's office. We pinpointed the location of furniture within his office, pictures on the wall, types of heating systems, and air ducts; we went into great detail on this.

Mr. SMITH. I was about to ask you, did he ask for specific detailed descriptions of the furniture and the air ducts, and so forth?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. As a matter of fact, I furnished him with a catalogue of the executive Class A type furniture that was in Lisle's office. I looked at the heating system and determined the manufacturer of certain component parts.

In Mr. Lisle's office, the radiator was located behind his chair, and from the control knob, I was able to get the manufacturer's name. I described the type of ventilation system.

Mr. TUCK. Let me interrupt just a minute, Mr. Counsel.

The chairman of the full committee has issued a directive reconstituting the composition of the committee composed of the gentleman from South Carolina, the gentleman from Indiana, and myself. Let the record so show.

Proceed.

Mr. SMITH. Did he ask for colors or chips from the furniture, or anything that would help him identify the coloring of the furniture?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. When we first started talking about the device, they were exploring places where we could install it. One of the thoughts he had was to drop the device behind the radiator, which was located right behind Mr. Lisle's chair.

(At this point Mr. Watson left the hearing room.)

Mr. MRKVA. I picked up a piece of plaster to show him what type of composition was used. His original thought was to conceal the device in a piece of plaster, open the door where the control knob was located, and drop this plaster behind the radiator. We also explored—we took measurements of Mr. Lisle's desk, thinking that perhaps we could conceal the device in the bottom portion of the desk—you know, where the center drawer is located on a desk.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. MRKVA. Well, there is a vacant spot towards the front of the desk. We took the measurements of that. We took the measurements of the bookcase and, as a matter of fact, we used a chip from one of Mr. Johnson's bookcases to show him the type of wood composition of the bookcase.

Mr. SMITH. Now, what type of testing did he desire, other than the descriptions of the furniture? Did he ask you to run any kind of test?

Mr. MRKVA. He was very interested in whether or not any of the security people ever stopped me in the building to search me, for example. I told him they didn't. He was interested in concealed cameras within the State Department building. He was extremely curious as to why they had all those antennas on top of the building and asked me to see if I could find out what they were used for.

I mentioned he previously asked me to buy this walkie-talkie set. This, again, was right before Christmas, and what I was supposed to do is to buy this particular model, turn the one unit "on" and go into the State Department building with it, and leave it on all day, assuming, perhaps, that they had devices that would pick up the transmission.

Mr. SMITH. That is, State would have devices that would pick up these emanations?

Mr. MRKVA. He was curious to see whether the State Department had a scanner, perhaps. As it turned out, nothing happened. The battery went dead, and that's about the extent of it.

Mr. SMITH. What other testing did he give you?

Mr. MRKVA. He had described the device to me. When we finally narrowed it down to the bookcase in Mr. Lisle's office, he was—we were checking out the dimensions underneath the lower panel of the bookcase. In order to make sure that the device would fit, he furnished me with a dummy of the device at one of our meetings at Silver Spring. There is an old abandoned woodshed that runs adjacent to the park in Silver Spring. He asked me to drive to this woodshed, where he jumped out of the car, and he picked up a base that he got some place——

Mr. SMITH. Base of what?

Mr. MRKVA. A base of a bookcase. The lower section.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. MRKVA. He brought this into the car with him and asked me to drive to a secluded area beyond the park. It was right near the park. We drove to this secluded area and parked. He gave me this dummy device and he said, "I want you to get the feel of it." So I did. The device had two sharp tacks on either end. I got the feel of it and installed it a couple of times.

Mr. SMITH. About what were the dimensions of the dummy device?

Mr. MRKVA. It was about the approximate size of a ruler. It was approximately a half inch to three-quarters inch thick, and about 12 inches long.

Mr. SMITH. This would be a facsimile of a base of——

Mr. MRKVA. The bookcase; yes.

Mr. SMITH. In Mr. Lisle's office?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Or in the type of furniture used by the State Department?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. Now after we finished playing with the installation, we drove away from the area. He took the bookcase base and, as we drove it around, he tore it apart and threw it out the car window into a wooded area.

Mr. SMITH. Asking you to practice attaching this, what were you to attach it to?

Mr. MRKVA. To the base itself.

Mr. SMITH. Of the bookcase that was there in the shed?

Mr. MRKVA. That he had pulled from the woodshed, yes.

Mr. SMITH. He was carrying this along in the car?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And you were practicing attaching the item of equipment?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Would it be hidden behind the base, or look like part of the base?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, if you can visualize a bookcase base as it was facing you. It stands, you know, it is on a pedestal or legs. You would reach underneath the front panel and merely squeeze the device into position.

Mr. SMITH. And to be discovered, somebody would have to get down and go behind that particular section?

Mr. MRKVA. The only way you can really see it is if you would remove the top sections, and—

Mr. SMITH. Down to the bottom or to the base.

Mr. MRKVA. And turn it upside down.

Mr. TUCK. Do you have a photograph of that device?

Mr. MRKVA. Pardon?

Mr. TUCK. Do you have a photograph of that device?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, I believe we have one here.

Mr. SMITH. I will introduce that in a moment, sir.

Did Opatrny ever furnish you with the real device?

Mr. MRKVA. Exactly 1 year to the day that he had introduced this idea to me.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, from the date he mentioned the thing to you, 1 year later?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. I believe it was to the day that Mr. McConnon and I determined that.

Mr. SMITH. What was the specific date, if you recall?

Mr. MRKVA. Pardon?

Mr. SMITH. What was the specific date that he furnished you the device?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe it was the 29th of May.

Mr. SMITH. What year?

Mr. MRKVA. 1966.

Mr. SMITH. 1966.

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Would you describe it for us, please? How he gave it to you, how he passed it to you?

Mr. MRKVA. We had a prior meeting. We had made prior arrangements, the previous meeting. We drove from the Prince Georges Plaza to the Baronet Theater in Bethesda. There is a passageway between the Baronet Theater and the post office, sort of a walkway.

Mr. SMITH. How wide?

Mr. MRKVA. Oh, it is approximately—about 4 feet, perhaps. He arranged to give me the device the following morning, in the men's room—here we go in the men's room again—in the Hot Shoppe, in Silver Spring. I was to take a prescribed route through Rock Creek Park to the State Department building, spend approximately 15—well, I believe 20, 25 minutes installing the device, and after which time, I would leave the State Department building and drive to a Drug Fair in downtown Washington. He furnished me with a telephone number, and I was to call him at this number.

If I had successfully installed the device, I was to tell him that I had made an excellent purchase, for example, and everything is fine. If I was unsuccessful in installing the device, I was to say something like, "I have a bad headache and I think I will knock off and go home for the rest of the day."

If I was unsuccessful in installing the device, I was to drive directly to the Baronet Theater and meet him in the passageway and return

the device to him. If my efforts were successful, I was to meet him a week later, on a Sunday morning, in this same passageway, and pick up my thousand dollars in \$20 bills.

Mr. SMITH. Did you actually get any pay? Did he give you any money in advance for this operation?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe he gave me a hundred dollars for expenses prior to this installation.

Mr. SMITH. But you were to be paid after the installation?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Did the device operate successfully?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes; I understand, I was told this subsequently, that the device—that the Bureau had left the device on for approximately 20 minutes.

When I entered the State Department building, I immediately turned over the device to the FBI, who were waiting there. I think I went back to my office and waited for approximately 20 minutes and then left the building and made my telephone call and went on home. I had no further contact, I don't believe, from Opatrny until a much later date.

However, the following week, the following Sunday, I went back to the passageway to pick up my money, and of course he wasn't there.

Mr. SMITH. What kind of a device was this that you mentioned?

Mr. MRKVA. I was told that it was a very sophisticated device. As a matter of fact, one of the most sophisticated devices they had unearthed. It was a remote-controlled device.

Mr. SMITH. A transmitter?

Mr. MRKVA. Transmitter type. That's about all I know about it.

Mr. SMITH. Right. This operation, this 20-minute operation of the device was under the supervision of the Bureau and you were not present during that operation?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes. It gets—the times here kind of run together at this point. But, like I said, I went back to the Baronet Theater to pick up my money the following Sunday, and he was not there. I believe I had four subsequent contacts with Opatrny after that. These were when he intercepted me en route home from work. Most of the four, these four meetings, we engaged in heated discussions. I appeared to be shocked that the device was not working. I was disgusted with him because he didn't have the money. I speculated that perhaps the device had been discovered and expressed my reluctance to go back to retrieve the device. We had several heated arguments. At one point, he suspected that perhaps I didn't install the device, and I told him, "Well, if you don't feel that I did, you go in and check."


Mr. SMITH. May I interrupt?

Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to introduce photographs of the device in question as Mrkva Exhibit No. 1.

Mr. TUCK. Unless there is objection, and the Chair hears none, it is so ordered.

(Photographs marked "Mrkva Exhibit No. 1" follow :)

MRKVA EXHIBIT No. 1



Mr. TUCK. Proceed.

Mr. SMITH. From what you have told us, I presume that Mr. Opatrny was very upset about the failure of the operation and was reluctant to pay you the money he had agreed to?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct; we got into a very heated discussion. As a matter of fact, I told him to just get the heck out of the area; that I wanted nothing further to do with him, and suggested that perhaps if we were to continue working together that he would have

to come up with \$1,500 cash before I would consider anything further.

Mr. SMITH. Did he ever produce any of the money in question?

Mr. MRKVA. At our last meeting he did come up with \$500 in cash and with a promise of an additional—I believe it was a thousand dollars after I retrieved the device.

Mr. SMITH. Did you ever collect the thousand dollars?

Mr. MRKVA. No. This was when the thing was publicized and exposed.

Mr. SMITH. How were you supposed to cover this sudden wealth?

Mr. MRKVA. Well, we had—for approximately 2 years he kept urging me to familiarize myself with the betting at the local race tracks. As a matter of fact, he gave me money to buy a pair of binoculars. He gave me a hundred dollars to spend at the track, which I turned in to the Bureau, and they furnished me with clean money. Incidentally, I lost that.

Mr. SMITH. Not the same amount, I assume?

Mr. MRKVA. That's the first and last time I went to play the horses.

Mr. SMITH. Were you lucky?

Mr. MRKVA. No; I lost every cent of it, plus a few dollars of my own.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Counsel, may I ask a question here?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Mrkva, what was the date that you received the \$500 payment? I don't believe you gave that for the record.

Mr. MRKVA. On July 6, 1966.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Was that your last contact with Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. One other question: Have you ever visited Czechoslovakia as a tourist?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir. I certainly would like to.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. You have never gone. I don't think you had better go right now.

But now one other question: You still continue with the Passport Division. What is your status—do you have to visit the Czechoslovakian Embassy at present?

Mr. MRKVA. No; I have a different position at this time, sir. I have nothing to do—

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. You don't have occasion to go over there now?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I say, you don't have occasion to go over there now?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir. Not in my present position.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Since you blew the whistle on these boys, have you had any occasion to visit the Czech Embassy?

Mr. MRKVA. No. Never have.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I just wondered about that. Thank you.

Mr. MRKVA. I have driven past there several times, but I haven't stopped.

Mr. TUCK. What was the method employed by which this man was declared persona non grata? Are you familiar with that?

Mr. MRKVA. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. TUCK. What were the procedures or the methods employed by which this man was declared persona non grata?

Mr. MRKVA. The way it was handled? Of course—I wouldn't know that. I understand that the Embassy was asked, or they asked for the Ambassador, and he was out, and one of their representatives came to the State Department, and he was asked that Jiri Opatrny be instructed

to leave the country. I believe at the time Opatrny was on vacation, and they did extend the time, they gave him an extra day or so, to return to Washington and leave the country.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, they set a time for him to leave the country?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir.

Mr. TUCK. Do you know whether or not the head of the Embassy, or whoever was responsible there for the activities, was ever rebuked or reproached by the State Department or did they have—

Mr. MRKVA. I was never informed of this, sir. I don't know.

Mr. SMITH. That is handled in another office?

Mr. MRKVA. That is right.

Mr. TUCK. It would seem to me that when you are dealing with a menace—

Mr. MRKVA. I went back to my former position as general service officer at the time, and I don't know how they handled the other end of it.

Mr. TUCK. Proceed. Excuse me.

Mr. SMITH. Was 6 July 1966 your last contact with Opatrny?

Mr. MRKVA. That is correct. I believe Opatrny was declared persona non grata and left the country on July 17, 1966.

Mr. SMITH. You were engaged in this operation for a total period of about 4 years and 7 months; was it not?

Mr. MRKVA. I believe that's correct.

Mr. SMITH. Quite a long time. I, too, Mr. Mrkva, would like to congratulate you on the fine performance that you gave for an untrained agent. You gave an excellent performance.

Mr. MRKVA. Well, I had some pretty good coaching from the sidelines.

Mr. SMITH. I imagine you taught the Czechoslovakians a few things.

That is all the questions I have.

Mr. TUCK. On behalf of the committee, I would like to join in those expressions. We deeply appreciate your cooperation and that of Mr. Johnson and of those who were associated with you in the development of this information which I hope will be of great value.

I would like to know whether or not you at this time have any statement of your own which you would like to make, elaborating in any way on your testimony or any other information that you may have about which you have not been questioned.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Mrkva makes his own statement, I would like to add this, and maybe you would want to comment.

At any time were you threatened physically by the Czech agents, and secondly, did they use the old ruse of saying that they would take it out on your relatives in Czechoslovakia should you doublecross them in any way? Did you ever have these points?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir; I was never physically threatened, although there were times when I had hoped he would make some effort towards this, along those lines. I was never threatened. I was never—he never brought up in subsequent conversation about the relatives, only that he was interested initially in them.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. I understand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.

Mr. TUCK. Yes, sir.

Do you have any statement you wish to make?

Mr. MRKVA. Yes, sir; it is very brief.

In reflecting on the activities, I have had a great deal of time to think about this, and I believe the American public should be made aware of the activities of some of these Communist agents, who are now serving in this country, under the guise of diplomats. I also believe the American public should know how easily and innocently they can be duped by these people into furnishing them information which in many cases could be very detrimental to the security of the United States.

I am convinced that even at this moment, Communist agents are on the prowl here, right here in Washington, and elsewhere in this country, keeping prearranged rendezvous, setting up arrangements for future meetings, familiarizing themselves with select areas that they plan to use for meeting places, and as drops, and it should be a matter of concern to all of us.

When you start seeing them, and start meeting them practically in your own backyard, as it was in my case, it kind of jolts your complacency.

I was very pleased to be here this afternoon and morning and have the opportunity to meet with the committee, and I hope the information I gave to you will be of some value to the committee.

Mr. TUCK. Thank you, sir. I certainly on my part share your anxiety and concern with reference to this matter, and we again thank you and Mr. Johnson for being here with us.

Mr. ROUDEBUSIL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate the thanks of the other members of the committee for your appearance, Mr. Mrkva.

In your closing statement you raise another question in my mind, and I know the hour is late, but you stated that you feel that there are other agents operating and other Government employees being contacted, and so forth and so on.

At any time, with all your dealing with the Czech agents, did they give you any indication that they had other people on the string, so to speak, or that there were other agents involved or other Government employees involved?

Mr. MRKVA. No.

Mr. ROUDEBUSIL. No names were mentioned or anything of that type?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir; they were very careful about this, but I suspect, I had the impression that there were.

Mr. ROUDEBUSIL. But no places or times or names or agencies were mentioned?

Mr. MRKVA. No, sir.

Mr. TUCK. The committee will now adjourn, to meet again upon the call of the chairman of the full committee.

(Members of the subcommittee present at time of recess: Representatives Tuck and Roudebush.)

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., Thursday, June 15, 1967, the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The article from *Izvestia* and the translation referred to by Mr. Tuck on p. 643 follow:)



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TRANSLATION (Russian)

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

[House Un-American Activities Committee]

[SOURCE: IZVESTIA, No. 105, of May 5, 1967, p.4]

THE PAINTERS

An international feuilleton

The Committee "on the investigation of un-American activities" which enjoys among the Americans the reputation of the organizer of "witch hunting" has apparently switched to the "preparation" for the fiftieth anniversary of the Country of the Soviets. It engaged with a swing and managed to get more than half a million dollars from the Federal Treasury. We remember other committees and commissions of the U.S.A. which had established themselves back in those days when the revolutionary proletariat of Russia declared: "We are going to build our own, new world!" Oh no, it won't work, you will not last even a year, the American Committees declared at that time, - we have evidence, the cards (obviously, military ones ["Cards" mean also "maps" in Russian, Translator]) tell us this, we do not want it and that's it.

Years passed, the anniversaries of the country that threw down the rule of capital, resounded in working glory and military triumphs. The faces of the American committees grew long with

disapproving amazement. To escape shame, they changed names and attire, but would not depart from their position. "If we cannot destroy it, we can smear you" - they maliciously whispered in the direction of towering structure of rising Socialism. Apparently, this is what the "freedom of the press", "free word" (radio stations which feel free to broadcast any kind of "canard", and, naturally, "free conscience" (of anti-Communist, anti-Soviet organizations, free from any moral responsibilities) are for. But their attire is rather transparent; behind them clearly appears the dark shadow of the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

One should think that it was not without their suggestion that the magazine "U.S. News and World Report" took part in the anti-Soviet races and set out on a propaganda ride on a much used mare of history, [old plug]. The magazine resolved to settle for nothing less than wiping out, in one stroke, the attractive power of Communist ideas and published an interview with the "ridiculous premier" - Kerenskii. He was ridiculous with his hysterical invocations even during the swiftly passed days of his government. From the moment of his "legendary" escape from his dear fatherland in a woman's dress, Kerenskii has been progressing as a clown of bourgeois propaganda. The stagnant maniacal idea would not leave the "premier". Threatening Communism with anathema, he predicts (for the nth time) its collapse in the very near future. The

"caretaker" of the Russian people sheds a tear: it is apparent that the Soviet people do not eat bread and do not wear pants. If he, Kerenskii, did not make two or three mistakes in his time, everything would have looked differently (How blind was humanity to turn away from such a giant of thought! Were it not for the editors of the American magazine, people would not know what they have lost!)

However, we diverted our attention from the main "hero" of our report, the one that heads the anti-Soviet crowd - the "House of Representatives Committee to investigate Un-American activities" which does not hesitate to use the services of daubers with less known names.

This year, in the United States Congress, those who are more perspicacious (there are 43 people of this kind) started talking: "Its time to abolish the Committee. For how many years have we worked for no purpose, have we spit against the wind?" Congressman W. Ryan (Democrat from New York) stated without beating about the bush: "The Committee to investigate Un-American Activities discredits the House of Representatives". Congressman Don Edwards (Democrat from the State of California) who supported him, tore the mask from the face of the Committee and pointed out that its main work consists in "violating Constitutional rights....and

conducting Congressional hearings which in essence are legislative court trials".

Why not listen to wise counsel? But 348 members of the House would not listen: "It is a jubilee year, the Soviet Union has been in existence for fifty years now, and many other things have come up. The Committee is needed. Lets not spare money for black color." So the Committee was given \$350,000.- for the new "hearings" and \$162,000.- for salaries of the staff.

The Committee got busy. After all, even American workers and American progressive society has been preparing for this Soviet celebration. One should not be late! Thus, vats with black color were supplied from the vaults of Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigations of the U.S.A. On the first vat there was an inscription: "The problem of spying activities in the U.S.A. of representatives of certain Communist Governments, including the technique of recruiting of U.S. citizens". Well, but who would smear? The Director of the Committee, Francis J. McNamara asserted that the "painter" would be available and that this "technical" detail was settled.

On April 7th, there appeared before the Committee in the capacity of the first "witness" a secret FBI informer, whom the readers of "Izvestia", going back to its issues of October 29, and November 4, 1966, can easily recognize as the "provoker" John

Huminik. Yes, he is the same "expert on soapy matters" [sic] who liked to wash dirty linens of his acquaintances, or plant, with provocative purposes, documents on Soviet citizens working in the U.S.A. Now, the exposed "painter" again "testifies" that Soviet citizens tried to get from him secret information. But there is no detergent powder, even of his own production, that can cleanse him of this dirt which he drew in handfuls and continues to draw from the falsehoods of the FBI.

Apparently, the "technique of recruiting U.S. citizens" as prepared in the rooms of the CIA disappoints the organizers of the "investigations", so that they are forced to resort to the services of such a dirty individual.

We are ready to help the leaders of the Committee to set up a complete team of "witnesses" who would be ready to engage in any dirty job. Of course, Mr. Francis McNamara knows them well, but perhaps he is preparing a "surprise" for the Congressmen who spent so much money on him. Thus, we are going to name the "painters".

The traitor, Vassilii Vassilievich Lukianov stayed in the US Zone of Germany till 1951, where, after the war, he kept company with the rabble from the "National Worker's Union" [Russian emigree political organization]. Sometimes he was rewarded when he succeeded in convincing some of his terrified countrymen

who would not return home, to cooperate with the western intelligence. In 1951, he moved to the U.S.A. and became a guide-
-translator for the Department of State. Lukianov is an eager and insolent provoker and will surely not disappoint Mr. Francis McNamara. As a translator, he was in touch with the visiting performing assemblies, and Soviet tourists, eagerly trying to tempt them the "American way of life".

Lukianov is afraid to go to the Soviet Union. But Diana Hayes [?] likes to visit us. She works with another "key" [agency?]. She persistently wants to make "friends" and wishes to enrich the Soviet Union with "any information". In 1963, she attempted, in New York, to hand over to Soviet citizens plans of new airplanes. She would come to your country as the owner of the "Anco Industrial Company". She obviously did not understand much about the business, but she saw its purpose in distributing, secretly or otherwise, the FBI questionnaires. In general, she fully qualifies to be a "witness".

Rolich or Rolikh, Alexander Ivanovich, confuses his occupations equally as his name. In one case, he presents himself as an interpreter for the "Columbia" Company, in another case as assistant professor of Slavistics at the University of Wisconsin in the City of Madison. In his provocative job, he gained the nickname of Don Juan (perhaps invented by himself). To all Soviet

women with whom he gets acquainted, he proposes his hand, his heart and - the American citizenship. He is also fit to be a "witness". But care should be taken that he does not get confused.

And here is a master of "behind the back" jobs. If necessary, he would also undertake a "wet" deed. We advise putting him on a special account. A bourgeois nationalist, Michael Mikhailovich Bon, being active during the war on the territory temporarily occupied by the Hitlerites, gave way to his malice in dealing with partisans and peaceful population, taking part in bloody executions. Saving himself from revenge, he went west. He is not a translator for the American tourist office "American Express". Serving the "reliability" of the Company, he attempted to persuade Soviet tourists not to return home. He would be particularly happy to wipe off his memory the village of Gorinchevo in the District of Khust, Transcarpathian Oblast (province), where he committed atrocities.

And there is another one with a Fascist past. He is Victor Alexeevich Bediay. Before the war, he was an active member of the "Russian-Fascist Union", in Warsaw. He is also regarded as a translator in the scientific Library of Congress. Obviously, [he is] a "scientist". He does not have to be taught to smear. He also has quite an experience in observing things not supposed

to be observed. He was already caught in the Soviet Union engaged in this occupation, when he came there as a member of the American delegation of [automobile] highway experts. For the second time, being in our country, he attended the "school" of military intelligence under the assistant Naval Attache in Moscow, Bebbitt.

Although the former administrator of the company "Hurok Attractions", Oscar Berlin, was also a provoker, he remained "faithful" to art. He stayed close to Soviet artists. In 1961, he attempted to "treat" to a nightly bohemian punch the artists of the Leningrad Academy Opera Theater and Ballet, who were performing as guests in the U.S.A., and, in 1962, he attempted to persuade an actress of the Ukrainian Dancing Ensemble, to betray her home country.

So why shouldn't he be a "witness"? In addition, Berlin has theatrically trained gestures and this fact could yield additional effect to his testimony.

Well, is this not enough for the first time? After all, we might unintentionally harm the Washington Committee and her appropriations might be cut. There is plenty of time till November. Many things can still be "investigated". We understand: the members of the Committee need "food". Yet we still cannot help making one more remark: It is a pity that high government officials let themselves mingle with that company of people who are to prepare an anti-Soviet frame-up according to police prescription.

V. Liakhov

Translated by
George Starosolaky
eg

МАЛЯРЫ

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ФЕЛЬТОН

КОМИССИЯ по расследованию антиамериканской деятельности, снискавшая у американцев славу организации выскочек-перелачных, позорно и неподготовленно к латентному объекту страны Советов. Включившая с размахом, тиражи из государственной казны более полумиллиона долларов. Мы помним и другие комитеты и комиссии США, что удержали себя еще в те дни, когда революционный пролетариат России провозгласил: «Мы над, мы новый мир построим!». Ан, вот — не вылетел, и годичка не протяжет, — зауряднейшие тогда американские комиссии, — у нас сведения, нам так карты (военные, конечно) говорят, не хотим мы, и basta.

Летели годы, гремели в трудовой славе и ратных подвигах юбилей страны, опору которой власть капитала. Вытеснялись в негодующем изумлении лица американских комиссий. И ни к одежде несли они, чтобы сразу избежать, но от своего отступиться не хотели. «Не свалим, так грязью обольем», — злобно шепели они в сторону устройства. Ведь не то существуют «свободная печать», «свободные голоасы» (радиостанции, сингапурские сабидомии заступить в зорю любую «куту») и, конечно, «свободная совесть» (антикоммунистические, антисоветские организации, свободная от каких-либо ограничений ответственность). Но слишком прозрачны оказались — за ними вставило не поступает черная тень Центрального разведывательного управления и Федерального бюро расследования.

Думается, не без их подсказки журнал «Юнайтед Стейтс ньюс энд Уорлд Репорт» принял участие в антисоветской скачке и аметлах на пропагандистскую дорожку на заезженной колее истории. Мужичья работа. Перичеркутны мещане как один, наком — перичеркутны притягательную силу коммунистической идеологии, опубликовав интервью с известным премьером — Керенским. Он бы смелеш со своими истеричными заявлениями даже в быстро променявшуюся тень своего правления. С момента «американского» побед в «дрюлого отечества» в мещаной юбке Керенский прогрессируя как пац буржуазной пропаганды. Застойная маньякальная мысль покладает «премьеря». Грозя коммунизму анафемой, он пределяет (в который раз уже) его гибель в самом недалеком будущем. «Радельте» русского народа пронзает слезу: оказываюся, ни являе не едят, ни штаны не носят советские люди. Не совершил он, Керенский, в свое время двух-трех ошибок, все выглядело бы иначе. (До чего же слепо было человечество, отвернувшись от такого гиганта мысли! Кабы не редакция американского журнала, не знали бы люди, что они потеряли).

Однако мы отвлекли внимание от главного героя нашего повествования, возглавляющего соим антисоветскую комиссию палаты представителей по расследованию антиамериканской деятельности, которая не гнушается услугами и «паучиному» мещане инытати.

В конгрессе Соединенных Штатов в этом году те, кто попорторирове (с опорой человека таких набралось), поговаривать начали: «Пора бы принять комиссию-то. Сколько лет зря маемся, против ветра плывем». Конгрессмен У. Райен (демокрот от штата Нью-Йорк) бы обидно заявил: «Комиссия по расследованию антиамериканской деятельности инициатирует палату представителей. Поддерживающий его конгрессмен Дюварад (демокрот от штата Калифорния) сдернул маску с лица комиссионца, что главное занятие ее сводится к «нарушению конституционных прав» и проведению законодательных слушаний, которые на самом деле являются

законодательными судебными процессами. Послушаться бы мудрого совета, но 348 человек палаты представителей американского конгресса ни в какой момент не выйдут из зала заседаний. Делать уже стоит Советский Союз, делаться и не одно я тому же. Нужна комиссия. Денег на черную краску не жалеть. И отваяла комиссия 350 тысяч долларов на проведение новых красноречивых да на содержание штата сотрунников 162 тысячи.

Заторопилась комиссия. Ведь и советскому правлению готовится в американизации трудящиеся, прогрессивная общественность США. Не опоздать бы и вот из подвалов Центрального разведывательного управления и Федерального бюро расследования США подали чашу черной краской. На первом заседании «Вопрос о шпионской работе в исторических правительствах, включая телную аеробия граждан США». Да, но мазать-то кому? Директор комиссии Френсис Дж. Макмамара успокоил, что, мол, «налары найдется, эта «тегилка» обработана. 7 апреля перед комиссией в качестве главного «свидетеля» выступил читатель «Известных», зарегирился в номере меран газеты за 29 октября и 4 ноября 1966 года, без труда узнают провокатора Джона Гуминика. Да, того самого «инициала» дел специалиста, который якобы ворочить белье своих знакомых, коммунисты советским цезах доукаются в США. Теперь разоблаченый и магар, опять «свидетельствует» что и магар, но советские граждане пытались получить секретную информацию. Но инкапир стиральным порошком, даже советского производства, не отмыться от той грязи, которую он пригоризовалы черная и продолжает еще черзуть из фальшивого ФБР.

Да, подводит организаторов «расследования» обработанная в стенах ЦРУ «тегилка аеробия граждан США», если приходится прибегать к услугам столь замызганного субъекта!

Мы готовы помочь руководителям комиссии составить целую команду «свидетелей», готовые встать за любую грязную работу. А, впрочем, господин Френсис Макмамара в сам из знает, но, Должно быть, готов и испорчить портарившихся на него членов конгресса. Итак, назывем «маляров».

Известный Лукьянов Василий Васильевич до 1951 года пребывал в американской зоне оккупации Германии, где полагаясь на помощь коммунистического советского так называемого «народного трудового союза». Иногда ему перелачно, когда удавалось склонить кого-либо из числа запуганных соплеменников-патриотов к сотрудничеству с запуганными разведками. В 1951 году он перебрался в США и становится гитлом — переводчиком старательней нагалям, он при «расследовании» не подведет, г-н Френсис Макмамара. Как переводчик, он крутится вокруг гастролирующих акасабей, советских туристов, тщетно пытаясь сообразить их «американским образом мышли».

ничего не смыслила, но понимала толк в том, что секретно, а что нет, подосылала анкету ФБР. В общем, в «свидетельстве» вполне годился!

Ромки, он же Ромик Александр Иванович. Путается в своих профессиях так же, как в фамилиях. В одном случае выдает себя за переводчика фирмы «Колумбия», в другом — за ассистента профессора славазиста в Висконсинском университете города Медисон. В пролетарском ремесе избрал себе анкету Дон Жуана («неужто сам долумася?»). Советским женщинам, с которыми ему удается познакомиться, предлагает всем подаря руку, сердце и... американское гражданство. Томе годится в «свидетель», только следать надо: не маляраты бы чего.

А этот вот — запяченых Дел мастер. Если надо, он и на микроскоп дело пойдеть. Советуем взять на особый учет. Буржуазный националист, Бил Маклая М. Маклаяном во время войны на временно оккупированной территории советской партизане и мирных жителей, принимая участие в кровавых расстрелах. Спасаясь от возмездия, подолзал на Запад. Сейчас переводчик американской туристской фирмы «Америк экспресс». Зайтись «исходности» фирмы, пытался склонить советских туристов в невозвращенчество. Особенно хотел бы вытравить из памяти село Горичево Хустского района Закарпатской области, где зареяствовал.

И еще один, с фашистским прошлым, Фелдй Виктор Алексеевич. До войны — активный член «русско-фашистского союза» в Варшаве. Тоже в переводчиках числится — в научной библиотеке конгресса США. «Ученый», стало быть. Его мазать не учено, и опыт юс-юс-юс-юс имеет по части разглашения того, что не положено. Его уже хатали за злостное занапятие в Советном Союзе, когда он приехал в составе американской делегации специалистов-автороджиров. В другой раз, находясь в нашей стране, он прошел «шпиону» военного разведывания и помощника военно-морского атташе США в Москве Бибичева.

Бышый администратор театральной компании «Юром» «Атришеи» Оскар Берлин хотя и был провокатором, но оставался «верным искусству». Он крутился вокруг советских артистов. В 1961 году он пытался «угостить» ночным богемным пушием артистов Ленинградского академического театра оперы и балета, находившихся в США на гастролях, а в мае 1962 года склоняя к измене Родине ополу их артисток украинского ансамбля танца.

Ну чем не «свидетель»? К тому же у Берлина обработана театральность жестов, а это при даче показаний может дать дополнительный эффект.

Но не хвать ли для первого раза? А, что чего доброго, иронично повествование уржует. До «Атришеи» прощало, можно многое еще «расследовать». Понимаем членам комиссии «несть-пить надо». Однако от одного дополнительного замечания не можем удержаться. Достойно сожаления, что в отношении по изготовлению антисоветской страны по полициским рецептам позволяют гнуть себя высокие правительственные органы.

В. ЛЯХОВ.



CONDUCT OF ESPIONAGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY AGENTS OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1967

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Richard L. Roudebush, of Indiana; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Tuck and Roudebush.

Staff members present: Chester D. Smith, general counsel, and B. Ray McConnon, Jr., investigator.

Mr. Tuck. The committee will come to order.

This is a continuation of the hearings begun earlier this year pursuant to a resolution adopted by the committee on March 8, 1967.

This resolution authorizes hearings on Communist espionage and intelligence operations and techniques used to induce U.S. citizens to collaborate with Communist intelligence operatives. I have here an appointment by the distinguished chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Willis, in which he appointed the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Roudebush; the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Watson; and myself as chairman, to serve as members of this subcommittee.

(The order of appointment of the subcommittee follows:)

NOVEMBER 13, 1967.

To: Mr. FRANCIS J. McNAMARA,
Director, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, consisting of Honorable William M. Tuck, as Chairman, and Honorable Richard L. Roudebush and Honorable Albert W. Watson as associate members, to conduct hearings in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of receiving the testimony of Natalie Bienstock, commencing on or about Wednesday, November 15, 1967, and/or at such other times thereafter as may be necessary, as contemplated by the resolution adopted by the Committee on the 8th day of March, 1967, authorizing hearings concerning the extent, character, and objectives of activities within the United States of agents of foreign Communist governments or organi-

zations affecting the internal security of the United States, and other matters under investigation by the Committee.

Please make this action a matter of Committee record.

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me.

Given under my hand this 13th day of November, 1967.

/s/ Edwin E. Willis
EDWIN E. WILLIS,

Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. TUCK. A quorum being present, we will now proceed. Will you call your witness?

I may say that we have a very important meeting of the House of Representatives at 11 o'clock, and we would like to expedite this hearing and the testimony as much as is practicable.

Counsel, call your witness.

Mr. SMITH. Will the witness come forward, please?

Mr. TUCK. Will you stand and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give to this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I do.

Mr. TUCK. Be seated.

TESTIMONY OF NATALIE ANNA BIENSTOCK, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, GERALD BERLIN

Mr. SMITH. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Natalie Anna Bienstock.

Mr. SMITH. You will have to speak directly into the mike, because the acoustics in here are very bad.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Natalie Anna Bienstock.

Mr. SMITH. Are you represented by counsel?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I am.

Mr. SMITH. Will counsel please identify himself?

Mr. BERLIN. Gerald Berlin, of Boston, 73 Tremont Street.

Mr. SMITH. What is your date and place of birth, Miss Bienstock?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on November 1, 1936.

Mr. SMITH. Are you now a citizen of this country?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I am.

Mr. SMITH. And when did you come to the United States?

Miss BIENSTOCK. We came here April 1, 1940.

Mr. SMITH. How old were you at that time?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Three.

Mr. SMITH. When and how did you derive your citizenship, please?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Through my parents, in 1945, at Boulder, Colorado, in June.

Mr. SMITH. Did your parents also become citizens of this country?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, they did.

Mr. SMITH. And where were they born?

Miss BIENSTOCK. My father was born in St. Petersburg, and my mother was born in Moscow, Russia, both.

Mr. SMITH. Although you were born in Czechoslovakia, your parents were both from Russia, and all of you came to this country in

1940, and all of you became citizens of this country in 1945. Is that correct?

Miss BIENSTOCK. That is right; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Miss Bienstock, you are here today in answer to a subpoena served upon you through the mail by the committee at 9 a.m., the 31st of October 1967. Is that correct?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Now, Miss Bienstock, would you please relate briefly your educational background for the committee?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I would like to look at my notes. I went to grade school in various parts of the country, grammar school, from 1942 to 1949, in New York City; Boulder, Colorado; and Washington, D. C.

From 1950 to 1954, I went to Bronx High [School of] Science in New York, from which I graduated.

From 1954 to 1958, I went to City College of New York, from which I graduated with a B.A. in 1958. In the summers of 1956 and 1957, I attended the Russian School at Middlebury College in Vermont.

I went to Columbia University for the spring semester of 1959, as a graduate student, and to Teachers College in the spring semester of 1960, where I got 12 education credits.

In 1962 to 1965, I was at Cornell, working for my master's degree and doctorate, and again in 1966 at Cornell, in the spring. And I got my master's from Cornell in 1964.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

In view of your background, do you possess ability in any languages?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I have.

Mr. SMITH. Russian?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Russian and French.

Mr. SMITH. French. Would you now, Miss Bienstock, relate your employment history for the committee?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes. Well, during college, I was a salesgirl in various stores in New York, department stores: one summer, when I was 16, in 1953, I went to a Quaker work camp in Richmond, Indiana, and one summer, in 1965, I was camp counselor in Poyntelle, Pennsylvania.

In 1957, during an intersession between semesters at City College, I was a guide escort to a Soviet delegation of physicists. They were attending a conference at NYU on nuclear physics—New York University.

Mr. SMITH. Who hired you for that?

Miss BIENSTOCK. New York University did.

Mr. SMITH. And they paid you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. They paid me; right.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Go ahead.

Miss BIENSTOCK. In 1958, from June to September, I did typing on offsets, and proofreading of a Russian grammar book, called *Basic Russian*, by Rebecca Domar of Columbia University.

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.)

Miss BIENSTOCK. In 1958, from somewhere around October or November, perhaps later, through September 1962, I worked on an assignment basis for Hurok Attractions, Inc., as an interpreter—a Russian interpreter—coordinator, company manager's secretary. And I traveled with the Russian companies here on cultural exchange;

namely, Beryozka, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moiseyev, the Russian Festival, Sviatoslav Richter, the pianist, the Leningrad Ballet, and the Ukrainian Dance Company, and my duties were very varied, but I handled press interviews for them.

(At this point Mr. Watson left the hearing room.)

Miss BIENSTOCK. I was also a coordinator for KTLA television studios in Los Angeles, during video taping sessions of the Bolshoi Ballet, and I did general interpreting; assisted the stage manager; and helped to arrange transportation, hotel accommodations, and schedules. This was all on a freelance basis.

From October to January 1960, I did research for Botanical Garden in Sterling Forest for the City Investing Company in New York City.

In 1960 from June to September, I did work for Columbia University, and Ginn, G-i-n-n, I think it is Ginn and Company—it is a publishing house in Boston—where I typed another Russian grammar, by William Harkins and Galina Stillman of Columbia University.

In 1962 through 1965, and also the summers of 1963 and 1964, I was a teaching assistant in the Russian language department or, actually, the Modern Language Department of Cornell University, teaching Russian.

(At this point Mr. Watson returned to the hearing room.)

Miss BIENSTOCK. In 1965 from March to September, I worked for the Copylab Publishing Counsel in New York City, where I was the staff editor for the *Audubon Nature Encyclopedia*.

From October 1965 through January of 1966, I worked for McGraw-Hill Publishing Company in New York as a researcher, proofreader, editor, and layout worker for their Nature Library.

In 1967, September to the present, I teach in a private school in Boston, Massachusetts.

Then I have miscellaneous employments. I have translated various texts—scientific, literary, journalistic—from Russian into English and have done private tutoring in the Russian language.

My published translations are the collection called the *Great Soviet Short Stories*, edited by Franklin D. Reeve for Dell Publishing Company. I did three short stories in that book.

And for NBC television, I ghost translated “He Who Gets Slapped,” which is the name of the play by Leonid Andreyev, for “Play of the Week.”

And I also have had published in the *Odyssey Review* selected poems of Andrei Voznesensky and a short story. That is it.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Miss Bienstock, you mentioned moments ago that you did some traveling while employed by Hurok Attractions, Inc.

Would you tell us, please, the extent of this, and any other travel you have engaged in, the countries you visited and purposes of the travel in each case?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, when I was a child, we made several trips to Canada. I don't know the dates. My father used to go there, and I also; Hurok Attractions takes trips from the States to Canada, so on a number of occasions, I went with the Hurok Company to Canada, again, over the period from 1958 to 1962.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, at this point, was Hurok Attractions engaged in bringing Russian cultural exchange groups to this country?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, they did.

Mr. SMITH. Proceed.

Miss BIENSTOCK. And via this cultural exchange, he also does the contracts for Canada, so we went to Canada.

Mr. SMITH. Right.

Miss BIENSTOCK. But more specific travels, on the 24th of August through the 22d of September 1959, I went to Canada for Hurok and then I went on to Denmark and France as a tourist. And I met my mother in France and spent the summer there and then came back to the United States.

From the 26th of December 1959 through the 14th of January 1960, I was in the Netherlands, Soviet Union, and France.

You want the purpose of these trips?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Miss BIENSTOCK. I went to the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and France as a tourist, with a female friend, and we just went to sightsee over the vacation. And I visited some Russian people that I knew from working with Hurok, and I stopped in Paris to visit my family in France and then I went home.

From the 11th of July through the 2d of August 1961, I was in Mexico, purely as a tourist. Do you want me to elaborate?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, just capsule it.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Okay. Well, I went to Mexico; I had finished working for Hurok and I went to Mexico with the Moiseyev Dance Company, but not in any way as an employee for Hurok. I went with them because it facilitated my traveling cheaply—I went on the same chartered plane and I could stay at the hotel for theatrical rates—but that is the only reason I went with them.

I was in Mexico City only at that time, with small side trips to outlying villages.

From the 7th of February to the 18th of March 1962, I was in England, the Soviet Union, and France as a tourist. And I went to visit a male friend in Leningrad. That is why I went to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SMITH. Would you tell us, please, this man's name and something of his background and just how you came to know him?

Miss BIENSTOCK. His name is Constantine Rassadin, and he was a character dancer for the Leningrad Ballet, and I met him in 1961 in my work for Hurok. He was a dancer with the company with which I traveled.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

What were your duties with Hurok? As interpreter?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I was an interpreter and I assisted the company manager. I think the official title was "coordinator."

Mr. SMITH. Now, Miss Bienstock, that brings us to our purpose for inviting you here today. It was during this trip that you made to visit Mr. Rassadin in Leningrad that you came in contact with Soviet intelligence, specifically the KGB. Is that correct?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, it is.

Mr. SMITH. Had you had any previous contact with Soviet intelli-

gence or any other foreign intelligence operations on any of your earlier trips?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No; never before.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, before going any further, I should like to state that our reason for inviting Miss Beinstock here today is to illustrate once again how Soviet and satellite intelligence organizations attempt to recruit American citizens into their ranks for the purpose of carrying out illicit operations against this country.

In Miss Bienstock's case, we believe we can show a case of recruitment by coercion through fear.

Now, Miss Bienstock, I believe you stated that this last trip you mentioned began on 7 February 1962. Would you describe the initial phase of this trip?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I left this country on the 7th of February and I arrived in London on the 8th, in the morning. And from London, I believe it was a Soviet airplane I caught to Moscow, so I arrived in Moscow the 8th of February, where I was registered in the Hotel Ukraine by Intourist, who through an American travel agency here handle all the, you know, reservations; they do everything. And I spent about, as best I can remember, around 10 days in Moscow, sight-seeing, visiting kids that I had met while working for Hurok.

And then, my next itinerary was, next item on my itinerary was to go to Leningrad, and also I had about 10 or 12 days there, where I saw Rassadin and also visited other ballet dancers that I knew and sightsaw and went to concerts and theater, and everywhere, all over the city.

Mr. SMITH. Where did you stay in Leningrad?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I stayed at the Hotel Astoria. And after the 10 or so days, maybe longer, 12 days in Leningrad, I returned to Moscow, and my visa was expiring, I believe, on the 7th of March, and I had a 28-day visa for the Soviet Union and I wanted to extend it, because I wanted to see Rassadin some more.

But I had to go back to Moscow, again according to the itinerary, which I did, and there—do you want me to go on?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Miss BIENSTOCK. There I handed my visa in to the Intourist desk.

Mr. SMITH. At what hotel?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Again, the same hotel, the Ukraine. And I handed my visa to the Intourist desk and asked them for an extension, and that was all I heard. And I believe it was probably the day that I was supposed to leave, the 7th, I got a telephone call, ostensibly to go to the passport desk, but it was not the passport desk.

Mr. SMITH. Would you describe just how that telephone call came about?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I was in my room, and someone just called and said, "Would you come down to the Intourist desk?"—which is on the mezzanine, or whatever it is, in the Ukraine—which I did, and they said, would you then please go to some room that was off of there, and I thought it was a passport bureau, having to do with visas, but it was not.

Mr. SMITH. Well, whom did you meet in the room?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I met a young man, a medium young man, who very quickly introduced himself and said that his name was Viktor Sorin and that he was a member of the KGB.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have any prior knowledge of the KGB? Did you attach any significance to the fact that Mr. Sorin introduced himself as a member of that organization?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I knew what the KGB was. And the significance of the KGB, to me, is quite clear. It is the secret police and a repressive organ in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SMITH. Had your parents had any experience with the KGB?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes. My father—it was then not called the KGB, they changed their initials. But in the early part, after the revolution, he was imprisoned by what was then called CHEKA and finally exiled, in the twenties, but other relatives of mine also sat in prison. Some were able to leave the country; others were executed in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SMITH. Would you describe the room where this meeting took place with Sorin?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, it was a small, totally empty room, with a—I mean, there was just nothing in it. No pictures, no nothing in it. And a desk and two chairs, and then this man in it.

Mr. SMITH. Did Sorin give any reason at the outset as to why you would be confronted by the KGB when this was only a matter of a visa extension?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he said that they had heard a great deal about me in my work with Hurok and were taking this opportunity to meet me. You know, they wanted to see me, after having heard a lot about me.

My passport, in the meantime, he did not say anything about that at all. It was lying on the desk. That was the only item in the whole room.

Mr. SMITH. Did he compliment you for your work with Hurok?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, he said that he had heard a lot about me and that the Russian kids with whom I had worked, all these ballet people, and so forth, had liked me very much, and—

Mr. SMITH. Were you frightened by the approach of the KGB in this instance?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Pretty much terrified.

Mr. SMITH. Can you describe what took place in the way of a conversation?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he saw that I was frightened of him. I mean, really sort of paralyzed, and he smiled. He was rather pleasant and said that he was not going to pull any of my nails out, because times have changed, and he just wanted to talk to me.

And then, you know, he told me he knew about me, and then he began a whole—we talked about the ballet people and all the nice work I had done for them, and then we talked a little bit about, you know, “the ballet people tend to be rather brainless and they don’t know how to take care of themselves,” and did not I agree with this and did not I think the cultural exchange was a wonderful thing, and that it had to be protected at all costs.

At some point during this, again he referred to the fact that he knew all about my family, told me, making it perfectly clear that I had been followed through all of Leningrad and through Moscow, not only followed in Russia and kept very close tabs on, but that they had a complete dossier on my family abroad. They knew when every-

body had died and where they had died, abroad as well as in the country, and where we lived and when my father had passed away. They just knew absolutely everything there was to know about me. It was rather devastating.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, they had a complete dossier on you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I would say so; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give you any idea as to what these people had to be protected from?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he kept insisting that they were surrounded by American agents, or that American agents were trying to recruit them while they were abroad. He also at one point began to insist that I must be one, since I could not possibly have worked with them for so long without being an American agent.

And if I was not one, except that he kept insisting that I was and all of the Hurok staff had to be agents.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have any idea as to the point of his conversation?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No. I really was not thinking very much. He just kept badgering me with all this information.

Mr. SMITH. Was his demeanor causing you concern at that point?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he was not nasty, but he was extremely cool, and I felt rather helpless with him in this empty room.

Mr. SMITH. Were you becoming more disturbed as the conversation proceeded?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I would say yes, that I was. It was a very long, endless conversation.

Mr. SMITH. As a result of this, did you feel that he was beginning to have a hold on you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he had my passport to begin with, without which I could not get out of the country. He was also insisting that I was an American agent, and there was nothing I could do. I would deny it, and he would say, "You know that I know that you are."

It was pointless to talk to this man, because he was insistent about everything, although very cool and calm and quiet. I mean, I was sort of in his hands, and he made it clear that he knew it.

Mr. SMITH. Did the fact that he seemed to know all about your family and what had happened to them frighten you in any way?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, yes. First of all, my family history is an extremely unpleasant one in the Soviet Union. Most of them, I would say 90 percent of these people, were executed or died in concentration camps. I had not met any of them, but I had heard about them, and I certainly knew of my family abroad. It was—to find out that somebody, when you think you are a small private person, is so fascinated and so interested and knows everything about you, is terrible.

Mr. SMITH. A rather frightening experience?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did Sorin imply in any way, through his statements or actions, that you might come by a fate similar to that of some of your relatives?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, if not directly, I certainly myself felt that I was in his power, and I could not get out of the country without my passport. And he was self-assured and calm.

Mr. SMITH. What finally took place as a result of the discussion?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, this discussion went on for something like 6 or 7 hours. Also, and I had had—I had not had breakfast that morning, among other things, because I thought it was just a drop down to Intourist, so that I was very hungry, very tired, and thirsty.

He also at one point, when talking about Russian ballerinas being surrounded by Russian agents, mentioned an incident that took place with one of these ballerinas, that I had known about and had completely forgotten. I was taken completely aback, again, which he immediately picked up on.

Mr. SMITH. Did you have any impression that you were surveilled while in Russia?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Definitely. Well, I did not have an impression until I met this man. While I was there, I felt I was completely on my own, but it was very obvious that I had been watched and followed everywhere.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Did he know of your trip to Leningrad?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Oh, yes. It was, I think, in Leningrad in particular that they had kept tabs on me.

Mr. SMITH. Did he discuss the details of your trip sufficiently that you knew that he knew it?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes. He mentioned restaurants I had gone to and concerts I had gone to and people I had seen.

Mr. SMITH. Had he arrived at his point of discussion of why he had you there at this stage?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Not at all. No. He did not make any points, specifically at this first discussion. He simply said, when he finally dismissed me, that I should think about everything that he had said, about cultural exchange, about being an American agent, about my relatives. I guess, to think about the whole day.

He did not say what he wanted, and he let me go, without my passport.

Mr. SMITH. In retrospect, do you feel that Sorin was playing on your emotions with all of this conversation?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Oh, I think very cleverly so; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did he offer any proposition, or relate any incident that took place here in the country?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, this ballerina whom he mentioned, which put me in an extremely awkward position vis-a-vis him, because, although I had not been an agent, I had helped an American agent do something and I had forgotten about it. I knew nothing about it, had put it out of my mind. Do you want to know what this was?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Miss BIENSTOCK. It was in Chicago in 1961, when I was working with the Leningrad Ballet, and my second boss in command asked me to come to his hotel room, and there was another man there, who never identified himself.

I mean, I never saw any papers, and this man told me that it was a matter of life and death that a certain letter be conveyed to this girl, this ballerina, and it was terribly important, and she had to be alone when she received it, so that no one would see the reactions on her face. And they wanted me to facilitate getting this letter to her, and so we did it in New York City, where I was better aware of their schedules and knew when she would be alone, and he called me in

New York, the same man, and I arranged, I told him what room she was in, when she would be alone, and I assume that the letter was delivered to her. I don't know.

Mr. SMITH. Go ahead.

Miss BIENSTOCK. He asked me one more thing, this man. He asked me to watch her at the airport to see if she scratched her nose, which I guess was a signal, and I watched her, as best I could, because there were 200 of them milling around.

He called me again at midnight. I had not seen anything, and that was that. He said, "Please forget about it. Thank you very much."

And that was it, and I did, forget about it. I put it out of my mind, because I knew nothing of what it was about, but this man in Russia mentioned this ballerina's name to me and obviously knew exactly what had taken place, which again set me back, because in a sense, then, of course I had acted if not as an agent, I had helped an agent, so that he had me there. I mean, in a sense, I had been lying to him, except that I was not. I was not an agent, but in his eyes, of course, this was a complicity.

Mr. SMITH. Did this increase your fright?

Miss BIENSTOCK. The fact that he knew about it? Yes, absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. Was he insistent on the point that you were an agent of the United States Government?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he kept returning to it. If I was not CIA then I was FBI, and if I was not FBI I was CIA, and maybe I was both.

Mr. SMITH. Did he indulge in any self-criticism during your conference?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, we sort of both did, or rather, he indulged in self-criticism, I think, as a release of tension. He mentioned to me that he knew very well that the Russians send, when they send these cultural groups abroad, they send watchdogs to watch these Russian dancers, or whatever, and these people can be extremely unpleasant and make life extremely difficult for the dancers, as well as for the Americans, the Hurok staff that has to deal with them. And, you know, he mentioned that, was not that too bad that they, you know, were so awkward about this, and I jumped on this and said, "Yes, you know, it is true, terrible guys that you send," and sort of took an opportunity to then let off steam and berate these people, and I think, also, that I told him a few names of these particularly unpleasant Russians.

I don't know why he did it, but he did.

Mr. SMITH. Did Sorin accept your statement that you were not a U.S. agent?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he never said that he did. He just, you know, "Well, I know, I really know better" was his attitude "but we will let it ride."

Mr. SMITH. What transpired after the close of this incident about the ballerina?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I don't remember exactly in what order everything went, but this was again on the point that I obviously had been an agent. I think that in the first meeting we had here sort of covered everything that was discussed. I am not sure then in what order, but it was several hours later when he did let me out and said, "I want you to think about what we have been talking about."

Mr. SMITH. Had you taken any breaks, or eaten during this 8 to 10 hours of interrogation?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Not at this first meeting; no.

Mr. SMITH. He still had not stated what his purpose was?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Not at the first meeting; no.

Mr. SMITH. And he excused you, and—

Miss BIENSTOCK. Let me go.

Mr. SMITH. Told you to do what?

Miss BIENSTOCK. To think about all the things that we had talked about.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give you any idea why you were to think about those things?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I don't think specifically, except that he still had my passport; I was still in torment; I could not get out of the country. And then he kept calling me on the phone. I saw him the day after that for a second time, for another 7-hour session. And in the interim, he would call and he would not say anything; he would just say, "Hello," you know, "here I am, how are you?"

I guess I sort of knew all the time I was on his string, and he would just keep touch with me, but he did not really say what it was that he specifically wanted, this first time around.

Mr. SMITH. When were you summoned again by Sorin?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I believe it was the day after the first meeting, which should be sometime around the 9th of March. I am pretty certain.

Mr. SMITH. Of what year?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Of '62.

Mr. SMITH. And what was the date of the first meeting?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I think, as best I can remember, it must have been around the 7th of March.

Mr. SMITH. And 2 days later he called you again?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Right.

Mr. SMITH. Will you describe what took place at this second meeting?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, it was in a different room this time. It was in ostensibly a hotel suite in the same hotel, Ukraine, but it was also bare and sort of stark, with nothing in it except brown, you know, suite furniture.

Mr. SMITH. Did the fact of bareness of the rooms, and so forth, have any psychological effect on you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, it is very creepy and peculiar to be in a room that has no sign of human life before yours. I have never been in a room like that before, and also you can't hear anything in these rooms, and Russia is not noted for being soundproof, but it was very quiet in these rooms.

Mr. SMITH. Would you tell us what transpired at the second meeting?

Miss BIENSTOCK. On the second meeting, he again reiterated and reviewed all we had talked about, and without asking me, or, you know, he had a briefcase with him this time, and he took out a piece of paper—on which I don't remember if it was typed or handwritten, to tell you the truth—and he read it aloud to me, anyway, but I signed it, so I saw it, in which it stated that I would be an agent for the

KGB, or actually stated that I was an agent for the KGB. And he then proceeded to tell me that—he went through a whole thing about how it would make no harm to the United States, it would not be hurting this country and, actually, it was totally apolitical and it would do wonders for the cultural exchange, and that I would let the Soviet Government know which American agents or if there were American agents keeping tabs or having contact with Russians, to tell them all the Americans that surrounded the Russians, and, also, if I thought that there were some dubious Russian citizens that were, you know, a bad influence or an unreliable type, that I should tell them this.

But this took place, again, after several hours of rehashing all this old stuff. And in the meantime, finally he had ordered something to eat, and I must confess that not only did I eat, but I drank a lot of vodka, and I was also, again, quite hungry by the time he got to the food.

Mr. SMITH. How long had the session been going on before he ordered food?

Miss BIENSTOCK. About 3 or 4 hours. It was dark when I finally left. I came there in the afternoon, or before lunch—10:30, 11, something like this. But, so we had eaten, and during this meal he completely stopped all sort of business, it was just food and drink. And then immediately after this meal—and unfortunately I think I was quite high by this time—he brought out this paper, and I must say I signed it.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give the paper to you to read, or what—did you have any idea what was in the document?

Miss BIENSTOCK. He read it aloud to me and then gave it to me to sign. I mean, I did not sit there and read it myself. I saw it, so to speak, but I did not read it.

Mr. SMITH. Can you recall what some of the elements in the document were?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, it said that I was, or am, an agent. I, so and so, am an agent for the KGB, and I think it also mentioned that I would be known under two code names, I think they were in this paper. Do you want the code names?

Mr. SMITH. No. Did you sign the document?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I did sign the document; yes.

Mr. SMITH. You said earlier that Sorin had told you that what you were to do for them would be apolitical and of benefit to both the U.S. and Russia in regard to the cultural exchange program.

It would seem to me, however, that having you sign a document swearing to work for the KGB and assigning you a code name for that purpose they considered your future tasks as something more than simple or innocuous. Wouldn't you think so?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I guess so. Of course, they probably—I did not think about anything just then, but in retrospect, in thinking, well, thinking about it in retrospect, I imagine that, eventually, they were hoping that maybe they could use me for something more worthwhile than what they actually used me for.

Mr. SMITH. Why did you feel that it was necessary for you to sign the document?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I felt I had absolutely no choice; that if I did not sign the document, I would never get out of the Hotel Ukraine,

let alone the Soviet Union. I could not get my passport; you cannot leave the Soviet Union without an exit visa. It is impossible.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Did you believe the United States would render any help to you in the event—

Miss BIENSTOCK. Not in the Soviet Union.

Mr. SMITH.—You failed to return?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No, certainly not in Russia. I was born in Czechoslovakia, and in that sense, a foreigner. I felt I was completely alone there, and without my papers, even more alone. No, I did not think that anybody would help me, at all.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, you felt you were in a trap?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes. A closed door.

Mr. SMITH. What transpired after you signed this document?

Miss BIENSTOCK. After I signed the document, he then taught me how—well, he also said—and again I don't remember if it was written in the document, or if he told me this verbally only—that I would relay this information about American agents in touch with Soviet citizens here to a man in New York by the name of Leo Sorokin, who was at 680 Park Avenue, which was the United Nations mission.

And he then proceeded to teach me how I would relay these messages to this man.

Mr. SMITH. I see. Would you describe how this message writing was to take place?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he provided me with a packet of sort of, it looked like it had been used, an open packet of stationery, medium quality paper, decent quality, and he gave me another completely ordinary looking piece of paper, but it had been chemically treated, but you could not tell that it was. And the way one does it is, as you type out or you write out the dummy message, whatever it is, you know, the false message, I guess, double spaced, and then you put this on a hard surface, either glass or metal, face up. And on top of this, you put this thing which is called a carbon, but does not—you know, it looks like an ordinary sheet of paper, put this on top of this, and on top of that, you put another ordinary piece of paper, and you can see where you have written through these papers, and then with a pencil, not—you know, medium pencil, not too sharp a point, you print.

When you press hard, you print between the lines of this dummy message, and then you throw away, you know, the scrap paper and you put away the carbon, and then you can't see what has been written between the lines, and I think I forgot to mention there, but I said in the Justice Department statement, you then fix it by passing it over steam from a kettle, and then you send it.

And when you receive such a thing, you get a styptic pencil or silver nitrate—you can buy it in any drug store—and you take off a little piece and you dissolve it in a tablespoonful of hot water, and then you take cotton and you swab between the lines, in a not too bright light, and then the message comes out, in brown. You know, the message that has been written. That is how you do it.

Mr. SMITH. Now you were to use this paper in writing to your contact that he had given you in New York?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And did you receive communications from the contact in the same type of writing?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes. He wrote, I presume, in the same way, but I was instructed to develop it. I guess he wrote with the same kind of stuff.

Mr. SMITH. In secret writing?

Miss BIENSTOCK. In secret writing.

Mr. SMITH. How were these letters signed that you wrote?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I think I must have used one of the two code names.

Mr. SMITH. What were the two code names?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, one was a Russian one, and the name was Nadzehda.

Mr. SMITH. Would you spell that, please?

Miss BIENSTOCK. N-a-d-e-z-h-d-a. And the other was an American name, Andrew Courtney.

Mr. SMITH. How were these names chosen?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, Nadezhda, ironically enough, means "hope" in Russian. I don't know why he chose it. He chose it. Maybe he was being sarcastic. It is a common name, extremely common. And Andrew Courtney is just a name, myself, he asked me to choose a name that I would recognize and I would not expect to see. It is a name I pulled out of the past, somebody I knew and somebody I would not hear from again anyway, so just random choice.

Mr. SMITH. How much instruction did he give you in this communications method? How many hours?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I don't know. I don't remember, really, how long. He made me do it a couple of times. It is not very difficult.

Mr. SMITH. Was this all in the room that you previously described?

Miss BIENSTOCK. This was all in this same second room; yes.

Mr. SMITH. This was chemically treated paper that he gave you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I don't think that the stationery was. I am not sure. But the one sheet that you use when you write this, the sheet that makes the impression, I assume is, has to be, chemically treated; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Did he give you a supply of the paper?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No, he gave me just one sheet, maybe two, of this chemically treated stuff, but no, no great supply; no.

Mr. SMITH. In short, you were to become a spy, or an informant for the KGB, on Americans and on their own people as well?

To whom were you to send these messages that you were to write?

Miss BIENSTOCK. To this man in New York, by the name of Leo Sorokin, at 680 Park Avenue, which is the address, was the address of the Soviet mission there, U.N. mission.

Mr. SMITH. Did Sorin give you any further instructions beyond this?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, he did. He told me that he wanted me to meet an unspecified agent in the United States—well, do you want to know when? On the 27th of April 1962, at 10:15 p.m., I was supposed to go to 169th Street and Morris Avenue in the Bronx, and if I did not—this man was to identify me. I did not know who it was, and if this did not take place, I was supposed to go exactly 2 weeks later.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would like to introduce for the record the fact that an Alexander Sorokin, S-o-r-o-k-i-n, was formerly an attaché at the Russian Embassy in Mexico and that he came to the United States Soviet U.N. mission in 1960 and was in this country through August 23, 1963.

Mr. TUCK. Unless there is objection, and the Chair hears none, so ordered.

Mr. SMITH. Was this the extent of your last meeting with Sorin, when he had instructed you on secret writing?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes; it was dark when I left, and I never saw him again.

Mr. SMITH. How long had this last session lasted?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Seven, eight hours.

Mr. SMITH. Did he order food this time?

Miss BIENSTOCK. This is the second time; yes. Someplace, midstream, he ordered food and vodka.

Mr. SMITH. How did, or did he return your passport to you at this time?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes; at this time, he did.

Mr. SMITH. And you had no further contact with him, in person or by mail?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. SMITH. What did you do then?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, my airplane, which I think was Air France, did not leave Moscow until early on the 13th of March, so I had these 2 days, or what-have-you, left in the Soviet Union. And in the worst way, I did not want to be in Moscow, so I asked him if I could get an airline ticket and go to Leningrad, and he said, all right, you know, I could do that, and I did.

I spent the—I left, I guess this was the evening of the 9th. I left sometime on the 10th and I went to Leningrad, and left Leningrad on the 12th; and the 13th, very early in the morning, I left the country.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Did you return to Moscow?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I had to return to Moscow on the 12th.

Mr. SMITH. I see. When did you return to Moscow? You went to Leningrad over the weekend?

Miss BIENSTOCK. On the 10th.

Mr. SMITH. And you returned to Moscow on the 11th?

Miss BIENSTOCK. On the 12th.

Mr. SMITH. I see; the 12th. Do you believe that Rassadin had anything to do with your being approached by the KGB?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I honestly don't know. I really—it is possible, it is quite possible, but it is nothing that I could definitely swear to. I just don't know.

Mr. SMITH. Did anything significant occur on this second trip to Leningrad?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I felt terribly lonely and frightened, ashamed of myself, all kinds of feelings. I tried to tell him about it, and he simply, absolutely, just refused to listen. He said "I don't want to hear about it. Don't tell me about it, don't tell anybody about it." You know, just "No. I don't want to hear about it."

Mr. SMITH. Did he give you any reason why he did not want to hear about it?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No; he kept saying "no." You know, "My ears are closed, just shut up, I don't want to hear about it." And in a sense, this made it even worse, because it was like, well, it just made it much worse.

Mr. SMITH. Did you see Rassadin at any time after this second trip?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. SMITH. Now, Miss Bienstock, when you returned to the United States, did you follow through with Sorin's instructions to you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, unfortunately.

Mr. SMITH. Were you successful?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Successful in what?

Mr. SMITH. In transmission of names and communications with the contact in New York?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes; but I would like to add that I did not write first. I wrote in answer to a request.

Mr. SMITH. Did you attempt to make contact 2 weeks later as instructed by Sorin?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I did. I did not stay there as long as I was supposed to, which I think was 10 minutes, but I went up there, and there was nobody there. It was a completely empty street, so I quickly left and never went back again.

Mr. SMITH. Where was the meeting to take place?

Miss BIENSTOCK. It was in the Bronx, on 169th Street and Morris Avenue.

Mr. SMITH. In a building or on the street?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Out in the street.

Mr. SMITH. Was there any—did he give you any indications as to how you would recognize the contact?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No. I think that they were——

Mr. SMITH. Was he to recognize you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes; going to recognize me.

Mr. SMITH. Did you hear from Soviet intelligence in regard to this contact that you failed to make?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I did. I got a letter saying that they were sorry they had missed me. He did not say who it was that missed me. It was from this man, but he did not say it was him, and proceeded to ask me for the information, all the Americans connected with the Russians and the names of American agents who had been in touch with Russians or myself, and I gave him the names of American agents who were in touch with myself. I don't know about any agents in touch with Russians.

Mr. SMITH. Then it was Sorokin who was to meet you there.

Miss BIENSTOCK. They did not really ever——

Mr. SMITH. As far as you know.

Miss BIENSTOCK. They never specified. It could have been, it could have been someone else, but the man in Moscow never said it was going to be him, and Sorokin in his letters never said "I." He always used the plural "we." I don't know; it could be.

Mr. SMITH. Did you ever meet Sorokin in person?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Not to my knowledge, have I ever met him.

Mr. SMITH. You were residing in New York at this time?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes; uptown.

Mr. SMITH. Was Sorokin angry at the fact that you did not make the second contact 2 weeks after the first one?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I don't remember if he was specifically angry at that, but his letters became less and less pleasant with time, because they kept berating me for not giving them any information, and I really had no information to give them.

Mr. SMITH. Were his letters to you in this secret communications code?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, they were.

Mr. SMITH. And how did he sign them?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I don't really also exactly remember. I think that the dummy letters, you know, the dummy letters were signed "Andrew Courtney." I think this was the symbol or sign. I don't recall really that the secret writing were signed by anybody.

They were in secret writing. He may have signed them "Leo." But maybe not. I mean——

Mr. SMITH. How did you bring out the secret writing in the dummy letter?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, by this process of taking styptic pencil, silver nitrate, and dissolving it in hot water, a little bit, and then you swab in between the dummy lines; you know, the printed, whatever it is, message, you swab with cotton, in a dim light, and shortly thereafter, seconds, whatever, or minutes, this brown writing comes through; it is in brown, looks brown.

Mr. SMITH. Did Sorokin continue to correspond with you in spite of the fact you had not made this contact?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Could you tell us what you did furnish to him and why it was not to his satisfaction?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I could not help but keep repeating myself. I furnished him with the names of the Hurok staff as Americans who had, well, who were obviously with Russians, you know. I could not possibly say they were agents. They probably were not, and I don't know that they were. I also provided him with names which were also in the Hurok staff as public knowledge, the State Department, some of the State Department people who would be assigned to us, again, as cultural exchange people, public knowledge.

Do you want their names?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Miss BIENSTOCK. One man's name was Vladimir DeGrave, who was with the State Department, and Natalie Kushnir, also with the State Department, officially, openly.

Mr. SMITH. Were these people associated with the cultural exchange program?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I believe they were.

Mr. SMITH. Of the State Department?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes. I think so. And then I supplied them with the names of all the Hurok staff, which—George and Edward Perper, and Oscar Berlin, Simon Semenoff, and Martin Feinstein, and I can't think of who else worked for Hurok, but whoever worked for Hurok.

Mr. SMITH. Anyone who came in contact with you or the exchange personnel?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Who was in connection, right. People who traveled with us and worked with us.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Then, as I understand it, you were not actually furnishing him with any background information, but merely names of persons who came in contact with these Russian people?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Right. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. How many of these letters were written between you and Sorokin?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I don't remember exactly. I am pretty sure he wrote me more than I wrote him, but I would say that approximately seven, in total.

Mr. SMITH. Seven, total.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Approximately; yes.

Mr. SMITH. Over what period of time were they written?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, they were written from somewhere around April 1962 to somewhere—the last message could have been no later than February 1963.

Mr. SMITH. From where were they written?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I think most of them were written from New York City. It is quite possible that I sent, well, I severed from Ithaca, New York, with them. I probably sent a letter from Chicago, maybe Vancouver, B.C., and maybe Los Angeles.

Mr. SMITH. You were traveling with Hurok Attractions at that time, and you wrote these letters from wherever you were?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes; I worked one more job for Hurok with the Ukrainian Dance Company, and then I quit.

Mr. SMITH. Were there additional names furnished to Sorokin over those you have mentioned?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, there were. I have my notes here. Let's see. They kept asking me about disloyal Russians, and I don't know any disloyal Russians, offhand, so I repeated again the name of this ballerina. Do you want the name?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Miss BIENSTOCK. It is a long one, it is Natalie Slavachevskaya Banoukhina.

You know, I simply reiterated, you know, already, who. So that is one. I may have mentioned when I severed with them two Soviet exchange students at Cornell, who they certainly knew about anyway. Do you want their names?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Igor Tsybal and Anatoli Kasharov.

And I might have mentioned a Cornell student who again was publicly associated with them. Everybody knew about him, and I might have mentioned him. His name is Leon Kenman.

And I also gave them the names of some FBI and some CIA or Defense Department people that had contact with me and I think there were about three or four of them.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Did he accept this information as satisfactory?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, he accepted it, but he did not think it was very satisfactory. They kept pushing me to give more names, to tell them who was recruiting, among the Americans, and I just, you know,

I would not furnish him with this information, and in general, I wanted to furnish him with as little as possible.

Mr. SMITH. And you furnished nothing more than their names and affiliations?

Miss BIENSTOCK. That is right. Nothing else.

Mr. SMITH. From the fact that he was writing you these harsh letters, did you get the impression that he was pushing you into more and more espionage activity?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, maybe not espionage activity specifically, but he was obviously very irritated. I don't know what he wanted, whether he wanted background information. He was asking me for things that I did not want to give and did not know anyway.

Mr. SMITH. Did you ever receive any remuneration from the KGB?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Never.

Mr. SMITH. For your services?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. SMITH. Have you had any further contact with Russian intelligence or any other intelligence organization?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. SMITH. And when did you break off this relationship with Sorokin?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No later than February 1963.

Mr. TUCK. Did they pay you anything?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Pardon?

Mr. TUCK. Were you on the payroll of the organization?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. TUCK. Does the witness have with her any of the copies of the correspondence that she had with this man?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No, I don't. I destroyed it.

Mr. TUCK. Did you get expense money?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. SMITH. I believe you stated that you destroyed the letters that you received.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. What did you do with the chemically treated paper that they gave you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I destroyed it, too.

Mr. SMITH. Did you make this entire episode known to the proper American authorities?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I did, much later, in—when was it, 1964?

Mr. SMITH. Why did you not inform the FBI of your activities upon your return to the United States when you were out from under this coercive influence?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, frankly, I was very afraid that I would be deported if I did. I had signed a paper saying I was an agent and I had convinced myself that I was guilty and it was too late and that, if I told anybody about it, I would be put in jail or deported, and back to the Iron Curtain.

Mr. SMITH. You broke with the KGB in February 1963, but it was fully a year and a half later before you made your story known to the Bureau—the FBI.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Was that also due to fear?

Miss BIENSTOCK. That I made my story known to the Bureau?

Mr. SMITH. This year and a half lapse before you made the story known.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, since I never heard from them after I severed from them, I hoped, sort of in my own stupid way, that it would all go away and it would be forgotten. And I put it out of my mind and sort of put my head in the sand and, you know, hoped and prayed that it would have nothing to do with me ever again.

Mr. SMITH. Did any U.S. authorities contact you?

Miss BIENSTOCK. The FBI first contacted me.

Mr. SMITH. This is after you had broken with Sorokin?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And would you describe what took place?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, they came to Ithaca. I was at that time a student at Cornell and I had no idea that they had come about this, and they did not begin by asking questions about this at all, but they very quickly asked me if there was anything that I felt I wanted to tell them, and I sort of made up my mind right there that I would tell them, and so I think over a period of 2 days I made a very lengthy deposition to them about the whole matter.

Mr. SMITH. Did you get the impression they knew about your activities?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I was not sure. At first I had no idea that they did, but then when they asked me "do you have anything to say?" I felt that they were giving me a chance, you know, to say it myself and I was relieved to do so.

Mr. SMITH. Were you aware that your activities with the KGB made it obligatory for you to file with the Justice Department as an agent of a foreign government?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No, I did not know that.

Mr. SMITH. How did you learn of this?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, after speaking to the FBI, for that time, see, that was in the summer of 1964, I believe in September of 1964, I got a letter from the Justice Department, informing me that I had to register retroactively, which I did.

Mr. SMITH. Did you so register?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I did register.

Mr. SMITH. And that is a matter of record with the Department of Justice now?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Miss Bienstock, I have no further questions to ask of you, but I wonder, in view of your experience, if you have a statement to make?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, the only statement I could make is sort of a very personal one, about myself rather than anything else.

Mr. SMITH. All right.

Miss BIENSTOCK. I feel all of this has happened in my life, a long time ago, and I was then considerably younger, and still I feel—

Mr. SMITH. Would you speak up, please?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I was then considerably younger and still relatively immature. I was terribly frightened and felt completely lost and doomed. Never did I want to cooperate with the KGB and I wrote as little as I possibly could and tried in every way to make

these letters to them as innocuous to the United States and the people named in these letters as I could.

I believed then, as I do now, and hope now that I did no damage to this country, not to any persons. I sincerely regret my involvement with the KGB; and if I knew then what I know today, if I were able to think clearly and without panic then, I would have gone immediately to the FBI on my return from Moscow in 1962.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my interrogation.

Mr. TUCK. As the chairman of the subcommittee, I wish to commend this lady for the information which she has brought us. The House of Representatives is now in session, a very important session, which will require us to go to the floor in a few minutes.

I have no questions, but if any of the committee may have.

Mr. Roudebush.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Just one, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask Miss Bienstock did she ever withhold information from the Russians that she felt might have been of value to them?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, if I did withhold things, they were things of a personal nature. I did know some things about these kids and how they felt about things, but I did not feel it was their business to know this.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Then you did withhold information from the Russians?

Miss BIENSTOCK. In that sense, yes.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Since your meeting with the FBI in 1964, I believe that was the date, have you ever been contacted, knowingly been under surveillance by the Russians? Have you been subject to any intimidation by the Russians?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. That is all I have.

Mr. TUCK. The gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I will speak up. I don't think we need that mike.

I want to thank Miss Bienstock for her assistance here. I have one question. In view of the fact that I believe you stated that most of your family had either been executed or imprisoned by the Soviets, what prompted you to expose yourself in the first place to such a place as that? To get yourself into this situation?

Miss BIENSTOCK. My foolish and bad thinking. I guess because of working for Hurok and being so long among Soviets, and being with Hurok in a cultural exchange, and again not being born myself in the Soviet Union, and all of this was in the past, and everything was—well, there was the cultural exchange, and people were traveling and it was the thing to do, in that sense. I mean, it was all right to go.

I just did not think. My mother, of course, would never have set foot in the place and has always told me to be careful, but I just did not think that they would bother me. I had never seen their bad side before, personally, anyway.

Mr. WATSON. Well, it is obvious that you were some 5 or 6 years younger that you are now. You are quite young now. What was your age—and I don't want that to be an incriminating statement—at that time?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I was 25. Not so young.

Mr. WATSON. At that time. Well, frankly, you don't look older than that now, but anyway I can't quite understand; did you say it was Sorin or Sorokin that advised you to meet this agent on April the 27th?

Miss BIENSTOCK. The man in Moscow, Sorin, instructed me to meet this agent, so the instruction was from Moscow. But Sorokin wrote to me, saying that they had missed me at this meeting.

Mr. WATSON. And even a month and a half distant, I believe you said that you talked with Sorin at the Hotel Ukraine on March 7th or 9th, or both days.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. And he had apparently outlined the plan sufficiently in advance to advise you to meet someone a month and a half later, or almost 2 months, at 10:30 in the evening on April the 27th at a specific corner.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. He had it pretty well outlined for you, didn't he?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. And I was quite surprised. These people impress me as being masters of this game of espionage, and so forth. Did I understand you correctly that when he advised you about the code name and got you to sign this paper, admitting that you were a KGB agent, or what-have-you, that that was after you had had lunch and a session of drinking?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. Did I recall further that you said at the time you were rather high? Did you make that statement?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I did.

Mr. WATSON. And you mean to tell me even under those circumstances that such a man as Viktor Sorin, who apparently was a man well versed in this, with the secret police, that under those circumstances, he would ask you to sign a statement and give you instructions as to how to transmit secret codes?

Miss BIENSTOCK. He did.

Mr. WATSON. He did, under those circumstances?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. It is quite obvious that they would use any type person, or whether they were in their right minds or not in their right minds, but apparently you were sufficiently sober to retain the instructions that he gave you, and so forth.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. Now you said you gave the names of two FBI agents, or some FBI agents. Were they in touch with you through Hurok or in touch with the ballet companies, or what?

How did you know these agents?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Well, I began to meet FBI agents when I had that job for NYU with the Soviet physicists, and I would be debriefed after almost every trip I ever took with the Russians.

They would come and they would simply ask if any untoward things had happened, or if there was anything that, you know, was particularly interesting. Sometimes they would show me photographs of people not connected specifically with—well, not connected at all with the dance group, but you know, could I identify these people, did I know them.

Mr. WATSON. I can understand the fear under which you were operating, but, still, you had contact with FBI agents long before you ever reported your activities to the Justice Department or the FBI.

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I had contacts.

Mr. WATSON. To what extent did the members of the State Department who were directly involved in the cultural exchange program—and the names that you gave sounded very Russian to me—were they Russian natives?

Miss BIENSTOCK. I am not sure. I think that the girl was already born here. They were, I don't think they were actually constant State Department officials.

I think that they were interpreters. I don't know what it is called. I once passed such an examination myself for the State Department. They are people whom the State Department uses as interpreters, and I think as liaison. Now the elder man, Vladimir DeGrave, I assume, might have been born in Russia; yes.

Mr. WATSON. Did they have direct contacts with the Russian ballet companies?

Miss BIENSTOCK. They traveled with us and lived in the same hotels with us.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, they were with you most of the time?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. It was not just an intermittent contact, inquiring as to how the exchange program was going?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. WATSON. Or how the performance was going?

Miss BIENSTOCK. No.

Mr. WATSON. We certainly want to thank you again for the contribution you have made, and it is quite obvious, I think, from your experience that the Soviets are going to take advantage of every opportunity to try to recruit and enlist American citizens in the espionage activity.

That is a fair statement, isn't it, young lady?

Miss BIENSTOCK. Yes, I think it is.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. TUCK. Again I wish to thank the witness for her cooperation. The committee will adjourn, to meet again upon the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., Wednesday, November 15, 1967, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

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