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CONSIDERATIONS

ON

The Re-establishment

OF

AN EFFECTIVE

BALANCE OF POWER.

BY

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PREFACE.



ALTHOUGH a short interval only has elapsed since the following performance was laid before the public, this period has been distinguished by a rapid succession of events of the highest political importance. These most memorable and most interesting events are, in truth, the natural and necessary consequences of the general and comprehensive plan of hostility, which the allied powers have so wisely and so steadily pursued. The practicability of this general system of cordial and unanimous co-operation was long denied : corruption, jealousy, imbecility, financial derangement, national supineness, in short every element of disunion existed, it was believed, in such force, as to render a zealous combination of the continental powers against France almost equally hopeless and visionary. The eventful history of the campaign, since the rupture of the armistice, furnishes a perfect refutation of this error.

The spirit of the times, and the new and characteristic features of the war, were too much overlooked by those

who entertained these desponding views. They considered the war with reference only to the governments of the respective nations engaged in hostilities: and making no allowance for the animating incitements of patriotism, regarded the conflicting armies merely as the military instruments by which these governments opposed each other's designs. Their calculations were founded upon ordinary data, and they looked forward to ordinary results. The numbers, the discipline, the brilliant remains of the high military reputation of the French armies, were contrasted with the numerical strength, the efficiency, and the military character of those of the Allies; and the result of the computation was given in favor of the former. It was not perceived, or not remembered, that since the reverses experienced by the French arms in Russia, there was no longer a marked inferiority in the efficiency of the troops of the Allies; and that, in addition to the advantages of an expanding military reputation, they had also the inestimable benefit of an enthusiastic impulse communicated to their valor by sentiments of patriotic devotion, and feelings of abhorrence for foreign oppression. It was not perceived, too, that an inversion in the order of things had, to a certain extent, taken place among the continental states, and that the people, instead of acting in blind subservience to the public authorities, began to exercise a beneficial reaction, by which a larger portion of energy was communicated to both, and by which the interests of both were more effectually secured. The impulse I allude to, was free from all wild revolutionary enthusiasm. Governed by a rational sense of the blessings of national independence, but excited to a lofty pitch of generous ardor by the remembrance of past oppressions; and by the apprehension of similar evils, this impulse successfully guided towards their legitimate end the military and political energies of the

Allies. In short, the true and genuine cause of the decline of French power, and of the advancement of the ascendancy of the Allies, is to be discovered in the liberal measure of national and patriotic spirit, by which the voluntary exertions of the people, the decisions of their respective rulers, and the efforts of the champions of independence in the field, have been animated and directed.

This great and important change has too little engaged the attention of a very numerous, perhaps the most numerous, class of speculative political reasoners. They forget that even oppression has its limits. It did not occur to them that though ignorance and slavery may subsist together, abject bondage and diffused intelligence form too discordant an alliance to remain long in a state of union. To impose the galling chains of universal subjection upon enlightened Europe, was an enterprize which folly and madness alone could suggest. The scheme could only succeed under every possible modification of well-organized tyranny, while it extended to a certain point; beyond these limits the machinery becomes too complex: the engine no longer works with effect, but becomes gradually clogged, until the main and original spring, which should give life and vigor to the whole, is first impeded, and subsequently arrested in its action. Against the resources and efforts of ordinary governments, the military energies of a state, so naturally, artificially, and extraordinarily powerful as France, might prevail even to an alarming extent; but when a course of successful tyranny is felt to be universally subversive of all human happiness, the spirit of resistance is awakened; the nation and the government have no longer a distinct and separate interest; the ordinances of the latter are anticipated by the voluntary oblations of the former, and from their united skill and labor, the pillar

of state is erected upon foundations that may safely resist the most impetuous assaults.

Such, then, has been the erroneous scheme of universal conquest which France has vainly attempted to pursue. While acted upon to such an extent only as to provoke and contend against the ordinary forces, at the disposal of most of the continental states, she was, from the superior military organization of her armies, from the martial genius of her troops, from the more splendid rewards she conferred on military merit, and from many other obvious causes, to a certain degree successful. But, from the moment the necessity of resistance was *nationally* felt—from the moment war was conducted by her enemies upon principles of *national* hostility—from the moment the interests and efforts of the government and of the people were identified against her—from that moment her career of conquest was checked. Against the armies of a sovereign prince, France might contend with many chances of success;—against the national resistance of an energetic and powerful state she must inevitably fail.

It is stated in the following little work, that, in order to prosecute hostilities with success, the principle of the war should be so far simplified, as to embrace all the distinct interests of the several belligerents in one grand comprehensive scheme, which, in realizing the legitimate end for which the patriotic armies of the Allies had taken the field, should, at the same time, effectually accomplish as parts of the same whole, the different objects for which each state felt itself compelled to engage in hostilities. Upon this very principle the Allies *have* acted. The minor being involved in the greater interest, a multiplicity of causes of mutual distraction and division have been kept entirely out of view, and removed to such a distance, that the sphere

of their influence could not extend to the main point, to which all the efforts of the Allies were directed. What have been the beneficial consequences of this enlarged, sound, and truly politic plan of hostility? These: the different objects for which each state felt itself compelled to engage in hostilities, have been effectually accomplished as parts of the same whole; and, if wisdom continue to guide the future efforts of the Allies, they will also, with unerring certainty, effectually provide for the undisturbed enjoyment of their future independence.

When is Russia likely to be again invaded? Within the annals of the Buonapartian dynasty? No! The menace that, if Russia would not yield to the dictation of France, she might perhaps be taught a lesson of submission by the destruction of a second capital, is now to be remembered and mentioned only to cover with shame the insolent, vaunting, vain-glorious, enemy, from whom it proceeded: an enemy baffled, defeated, driven, and chased, from one extremity of Europe to the other, by a foe whom he presumed to despise—by a foe to whom he has since been compelled to yield—and to whom he may yet be constrained to crouch for mercy.

Prussia has recovered her regal patrimony. Magnanimous as the Russian Emperor has been, he has still scope left for the exercise, towards this unhappy monarch, of imperial generosity. The acquisitions on the side of Prussia obtained at the peace of Tilsit, should be restored; the value of the cession would be a hundred fold repaid by the political advantages that would arise from founding an alliance between Russia and Prussia upon the basis of liberality and justice, and by the lustre such a sacrifice, or rather such a restoration, would shed on the elevated character of the monarch, capable of exercising such disinterested virtue. It would augment the indirect ascendancy

of the Emperor Alexander in Germany, and enable him the more efficaciously to defend his own frontiers by the barrier of German independence.

Whatever may have been the former errors of the Prussian government, she has cruelly expiated them. Her sacrifices have been numerous;—her humiliation degrading. She now raises her head anew among the continental nations, as a great and independent state. Her second political birth, as it may be termed, portends nothing favorable to a successful development of the future ambitious views of France. The greater the independence of Prussia, the less assailable will be the independence of Germany, either by direct conquest or indirect invasion by a system of alliance. Prussia has still much to re-establish; but she will have the means of political redintegration at her disposal; and for this she is indebted to that general system of unanimous and effective co-operation with the powers allied against France, in which she has herself taken a part so noble, so spirited, and so decisive.

It was further stated, in the following little performance, that among other effects to be expected from a successful prosecution of the war by the Allies, the successive defection of all the German states, who were parties to the confederation of the Rhine, might be calculated upon with every sanguine hope of its occurrence. This expectation has been realized so fully, that there remains not a single German state in alliance with France—not one that has not converted its defection into direct hostility against that power. Murat's secession was also hinted at: he is now at war with France.

The probability of such great and decisive changes, the natural effects of an energetic and wisely-concerted plan of hostility, rested upon the common and rational conviction, that, in the political, as in the physical world, powerful

causes must necessarily produce corresponding results. The vague predictions of a wild spirit of prophecy depend upon accident alone for their fulfilment. Without the intervention of accident, their accomplishment fails, and the presumptuous prophet is justly exposed to the reproach of blindness, instead of receiving credit for a piercing glance into futurity. Our anticipations of the future must be calculated upon the data of past experience. There are **no** other means of obtaining the slightest glimpse of probable events which are yet to transpire. It requires no peculiar sagacity to perceive that the age is too enlightened, that the nations of Europe are too far advanced in civilization, to hold out to the ambition of any tyrant, though his power should be unprecedentedly great, a prospect of universal dominion. It requires no gift of foresight to discover, that a government founded on the extinction of every cardinal principle of honor and of virtue,—a government that encouraged the energy of crime, and discountenanced the exercise of rectitude,—a government established on the demoralisation of society,—on the public violation of truth, and faith, and justice,—on violence and inhumanity,—on the reduction of the human mind to a state of comparative ignorance and barbarism,—must naturally contain within itself a morbid principle, that would ultimately weaken, and possibly expose it to annihilation.

Besides the general motives to resistance so amply supplied by the insolent, capricious, and tyrannical oppression of the French, it could not fail to be perceived that the existence of such a government, unless deprived of all political preponderance, could never be compatible with the independence of the other continental states. Between France, therefore, and all the other European nations, there existed the highest degree of political, moral, and popular

discordance. The necessity for its termination was deeply and universally felt. It was this feeling, this conviction, that laid the basis of that union which has produced such wonderful effects. Erroneous, indeed, have been the notions of those politicians who regarded it as a mere common international coalition, of which the frame would be found too slender, too delicate, to resist the shock of conflicting jealousies. All sentiments of this nature have been long smothered in one general feeling of aggravated indignation at the criminal, ambitious, and subversive policy of France, and in a firm, unshaken resolution effectually to resist it.

In the beginning of July, when the following production was published, it was suggested that the allies, in the event of a recommencement of hostilities, should declare, "*that the extension of the boundaries of the French empire, beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees, is incompatible with the liberties of Europe.*" The proposition was deemed equally extravagant and impracticable. The progress of the contest has shown the contrary. Now, instead of reducing the territorial limits of France within these boundaries, the question under discussion is, how far towards these restricted boundaries the new limits of the French territory shall be permitted to extend, and whether they shall not be completely circumscribed within the line to which the old monarchy was confined! How far a limitation or extension of dominion may be ultimately settled by arms or by negotiation, it is impossible to predetermine, even conjecturally, without a knowledge of the various feelings and views of the negotiators, and the military resources of the belligerents. But no one can doubt that the allies, who have already accomplished so much, have yet much within their power to accomplish, if their military efforts and political views continue to be made subservient to each

other, and jointly conducive to the main object of the war; viz. the reduction of the power of France within such limits as shall effectually prevent her from disturbing at will the repose of the other continental states.

Although the Allies have issued a declaration, which has been much commended for the moderation of its tone and the wisdom of its views, yet, it cannot be denied, that it was rather precipitately promulgated. They found they had been too generous, and felt themselves obliged to act in some measure in opposition to their own professions. They perceived, that if the territorial dominions of France were permitted to remain larger in extent than under any of her ancient kings, the resources of that country, and the warlike character of its ambitious chief, would soon supply motives and materials for speedily involving Europe again in sanguinary warfare. These original professions of moderation appear to have since produced some degree of embarrassment. If, on passing into the French territory, they had issued a declaration, by the terms of which they were fully determined as nearly as practicable to abide, they would perhaps have been more generally supported by all the moderate party in France; and they would have had all the advantage of leaving nothing in their views ambiguous and uncertain, and of reducing to a very small class of individuals, those persons in France who might be inclined to call in question their real intentions.

It would seem that the course which the allies have now to pursue is sufficiently obvious; viz. to reduce France to her old monarchical limits, leaving the sovereign power either in the hands of the present ruler, or in those of a Bourbon, if the French themselves desire it. Though every friend to the future tranquillity of the world must naturally desire the latter, it would hardly be right to attempt to accomplish it by force. Would there, however,

be an indiscretion in recommending to the people of France the restoration of the Bourbons, as the best means of consolidating and perpetuating that peace, for which the greater part of that nation has long anxiously sighed? If the allies should declare their willingness to treat with the sovereign power in France, when reduced within the frontier of 1789, and should at the same time frankly avow their preference to treat with a Bourbon, leaving it to the people of France to express their wishes in favor of a similar preference, would not such a declaration possess the two-fold advantage of presenting a distinct *projet* for negotiation, without an interference which might challenge resistance as a point of national honor? If the more distinguished members of the House of Bourbon shewed themselves to their long abandoned countrymen with the allies in the field, and if the latter, disclaiming all compulsion, presented them as the restorers of national happiness and peace, would not a fair occasion be thus given to ascertain the temper of the public mind in France, and a clue be furnished for the ultimate operations of the combined powers? The experiment is too promising to be left untried. Its result may be of the last importance to the future tranquillity, not of Europe alone, but of the world, and to the progressive civilization of mankind, which the actual government in France is calculated to impede. Its result may be highly conducive to religion, to public and private morals, and to national faith and honor. A Bourbon, disciplined in the severe school of adversity, may, sooner than any other sovereign, heal the wounds which France has repeatedly given and received in her long and infuriated conflicts with those mighty states, with which, under a monarch of wise and moderate councils, she might have enjoyed a long and flourishing period of happiness and repose.

If the course of events should unavoidably oblige the allies to treat with Buonaparte, the main point then to be accomplished is to reduce his power within the utmost practicable limits. Perhaps it might be advisable, if the fears, or the interests, or the vanity, of the French, should favor the perpetuation of his usurped authority, not to leave within his grasp those ample means for future hostility, which the resources of so large a portion of territory as old France comprised, would supply to his ambition. If the French are determined to retain a restless, remorseless conqueror on the throne, let it be the policy of the other states not to leave him the means of rekindling the flames of war, whenever the thirst of conquest may induce him to break the bonds of peace. Without this precaution, the term of general repose will soon expire, and war, with all its horrors, will again extend its sphere of miseries, havoc, and desolation. The spirit of rapid conquest would yield to the deeper policy of slow, cautious, insidious subjugation. If the subversion of the French government could be effected, no exertions should be remitted for its accomplishment. If events make it impossible to avoid treating with Buonaparte, his power should, if practicable, be reduced to such limits as would render his ambition uninjurious to the other continental states: but the most effectual means of giving to the world a permanent and honorable peace, consists in the restoration of the Bourbons. If the allies un-animously wish it, and the people of France desire it, its accomplishment cannot be doubtful.

London, March 1, 1814.

THE
RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF AN EFFECTIVE
BALANCE OF POWER
§c. §c.

CONSIDERATIONS, &c.

THE difficulties of this question appear to be equally overlooked by the zealous lovers of peace, and the strenuous advocates for war. The former precipitately conclude, that the immediate termination of hostilities would usher in a long and happy period of national repose; the latter confidently foresee in it only a short suspension of the many calamities of war, and a certain, early, and hazardous revival of all the evils of the conflict. The sentiments of both may, doubtless, be influenced and determined by the most humane considerations. Both may have equally at heart the best interests of their country, and the general welfare of mankind; but each may take an erroneous view of the surest means for their promotion. To the first, an early peace, even with the chance of interruption, may appear infinitely desirable; the last may as decidedly prefer a course of vigorous hostility, with the ultimate chance of a peace less exposed to the probability of disturbance. The opinions of the former may be biassed more by philanthropy, than by reason; while those of the latter may be guided less by sound judgment, than by apprehension.

A few temperate remarks on some of the bearings of this important question, may tend to guard the mind against the prepossessions and prejudices into which it may inadvertently be seduced, by implicitly yielding either to the feelings of humanity, or the suggestions of fear. To attempt minutely to estimate all the various considerations which immediately or remotely affect the solution of the problem, is a task, which I by no means presume to undertake. There are, however, some important points of view under which it may be contemplated, and which, however obvious they may be to the patient and enlightened inquirer, may have escaped the attention

of that numerous class of persons, who express, with equal confidence, the most opposite opinions on the subject. Such unqualified decisions on this complex international question cannot safely be pronounced; and whether our predilection be of a hostile, or pacific character, we ought at least to be prepared to show, that it has not been hastily adopted. These precipitate conclusions appear to be drawn from too limited and partial a view of the great interests at stake in the present contest. If Great Britain and France were the only belligerents, the adjustment of their respective pretensions might, after so many years of war, be submitted to the experiment of negotiation. But the important relations subsisting between England and several of the continental powers, ought necessarily to give to all negotiation a general, as well as an exclusive, interest. The difficulty, therefore, of ascertaining the most proper period for making or entertaining a pacific overture, must depend on the compatibility of the exclusive with the general interest. Might not a system of hostility be pursued upon the principle of rendering these interests, to all essential purposes at least, perfectly coincident? The ends to which the exertions of each separate power are directed, might surely be prosecuted, not merely without injury to the general cause, but with advantages eminently conducive to its success.

The objects, for which the great belligerents have been contending, ostensibly vary in their aspect, but are all substantially the same: they all centre in the re-establishment of their commercial and political independence.

The main point, for which Russia unsheathed the sword, is the subversion of the Continental System.

Prussia, in addition to this object, is influenced by the hope of being enabled to resume, among the Continental States, her former rank and dignity as a military power.

Portugal employs her energies to secure the liberty which has been restored to her by the valour of the British arms.

Spain aims at the ultimate expulsion of the common invader; but, in her efforts for its accomplishment, develops more of slow steady perseverance, than of vigor and activity suited to the exigency of the enterprise; and, by a singular departure from the lofty generosity of her national character, manifests, in the reluctance of her

co-operation, a jealousy, most injurious to herself, of those splendid feats of arms, by which her ally has saved her from the perils of subjugation.

In the prosperous issue of the contest, Great Britain is, perhaps, more deeply interested than all the Continental States. Besides the re-opening of her ancient channels of free commerce with the world, it is peculiarly incumbent on her to guard, with sleepless vigilance, against every encroachment upon her maritime rights, the unimpaired maintenance of which is vitally essential to her national dignity and power and independence. National rivalry, clashing political and commercial interests, incompatibility of the despotic spirit of the French with the free principles of the British Government, together with the unsubdued and unmitigated personal hostility of the French Ruler towards England, present very strong reasons for concluding, that France, abortive as every such attempt cannot fail to prove, will nevertheless long continue either openly to assail her national independence, or secretly to organize her vast resources for effecting its destruction. Security, not for the preservation of her national existence, (which rests safely enough on the basis of her patriotic spirit and her intrinsic strength), but against a capricious and harassing renewal of hostilities on the part of France, for the purpose of undermining the stability and greatness of the British Empire, must evidently be the principal end of the war; so far, at least, as Great Britain has a separate interest in its prosecution.

Such are the objects for which the various belligerents have had recourse to arms, and in the attainment of which each has an interest exclusively its own.

These views naturally give rise to the question, whether or not the principle of the war might not have been so far simplified as to embrace all these distinct interests in one grand comprehensive scheme, which, in realizing the legitimate end for which so many patriotic armies have taken the field, should, at the same time, effectually accomplish, as parts of the same whole, the different objects for which each State felt itself compelled to engage in hostilities?

In answer to this inquiry, it may be observed, that military operations are merely instrumental to the achievement of political

designs. Unity of political design ought, therefore, naturally to lead to unity of military operation; and, under ordinary circumstances, this simple adaptation of the means to the end might reasonably be supposed to promise the ordinary chances of success. But this chance of success must be diminished in proportion to the degree in which discordant political views affect the unity of the military combination. Though conducted on a large scale, its operations can, in this case, produce only an inadequate result: the political and military leaders must be animated by the same spirit, and their movements guided by systematic direction; otherwise, a large and well-disciplined allied army may prove inferior to a smaller force, under a skilful commander, possessing sufficient address to blend all varying sentiments into one feeling of martial ardor, and to combine his political and military efforts for the single accomplishment of the same point.

If it were practicable to array against France the whole of the military resources of her adversaries, and to communicate to all the forces brought into the field one general sentiment, which should actuate the whole, as if they constituted an army fighting under the banners of the same sovereign, would not, to every person capable of forming a comparative estimate of the respective advantages of the combatants, the issue of the conflict still appear to be involved in anxious doubt? If then such fears are well founded, when the whole strength of the allied force has the benefit of the most perfect and intimate union—when the political and the military objects are in the minutest points coincident—and when the co-operation is so complete as to be undisturbed by any jealous or selfish consideration, can it possibly be expected, that, without this strict bond of union, a continental war can be successfully conducted to a general issue? Hence it may, without any hazardous assumption, be inferred, that every exclusively national object should be sacrificed to the general interest; since, without this temporary suspension of all subordinate views, perfect military co-operation, upon which every hope of ultimate success must be founded, must soon be weakened and disorganized.

It may, perhaps, be asked, are these objects, which have been exhibited under the complexion of points of exclusive or subordinate interest, and which have in reality been of themselves con-

sidered as affording to each belligerent a justifiable ground of war, to be passed over as unimportant, and to be wholly sacrificed? Certainly not: they are only to be suspended, till all these minor interests be secured by the accomplishment of the great end, for which the scabbard has been thrown aside. But what is, or ought to be, the main object of this general union? Security for the absolute political independence of each state. How is this to be effected? It is certainly not a task of easy execution; but yet it is not impracticable; and unless it be realized, short will be the interval of repose, of which the nations of Europe can hereafter, in the midst of their fondest anticipation of continued peace, indulge the expectation of enjoyment.

An effectual balance of power must be re-established.

The basis of this equipoise of relative political strength must be laid in the reduction of the physical and political resources of France: the limits of her Empire must be circumscribed. They can never be permitted, with any prospect of security for the future repose of Europe, to form an outline of colossal power, which a restless spirit of aggrandizement is incessantly laboring to complete, but which will never be completed, while the weakness and folly and blindness of the continental nations supply the chief of this mighty Empire with materials for the daily nourishment of his insatiable ambition.

It may not be altogether useless to inquire, 1st. Whether the reduction of the menacing and overgrown power of France be practicable?

2d. What means may be rendered the most efficient for this purpose?

3d. Whether the actual state of Europe be favorable to its execution?

The prodigious aggrandizement of France by conquest in war, and by aggression in peace, has augmented her resources beyond those of any other continental power. In population, Russia may perhaps claim some superiority; but with reference to the vast extent of her territories, her numerous subjects are less available for military destination. In agricultural, commercial, and financial resources, the advantage is indisputably on the side of France. But the distance which separates the two Empires will probably

render it, at least for a considerable period, extremely difficult for either *singly* to interfere, with a controlling direction, in each other's domestic politics. In this case their means of mutual annoyance, unaided by alliance, will be insufficient for decisive warfare.

It is quite unnecessary to make a similar estimate of the disproportion in the resources of France, and those of any of the other Continental States. The inferiority of the latter will be denied by none.

If, therefore, there is no individual State that, with the most skilful employment of all its more limited means of hostility, can expect to make any serious impression upon the French Empire, it would be vain to indulge the hope, that a conflict, prosecuted singly, and under circumstances of material disparity, could lead to any other result than a confirmation, or perhaps an enlargement, of the very power, for the reduction of which it was expressly undertaken.—It is, then, but too evident, that, to compel France to return within just and reasonable limits, is an enterprise to which the greatest power on the Continent is unequal, unseconded by efficient co-operation.

But are we therefore to conclude, that France may, henceforth, triumphantly bid defiance to every attempt to reduce her power within such limits as may be compatible with the liberties of other States? If a single arm be too feeble to inflict a decisive blow, are there no means of invigorating it, that it may strike with more effect? Is it impossible to sharpen the weapon, so as to render it a more formidable instrument of attack? Gigantic force may easily overcome the strength of an ordinary combatant; but may, perhaps, as easily be subdued, when assailed by the united and equalized vigor of inferior opponents, animated to the fight by a high and noble sense of justice.—The only practicable mode of repressing the inordinate ambition of France is, to restrain it by the very means which she herself employs for its indulgence. Force, absolute force, superior to the collective military power of France, either in numbers or equipment, in skill or in valour, and enthusiastically animated by the justice of their cause, can alone be relied upon for the accomplishment of these salutary views. Upon this alone depends the practicability of opposing France with effect.

With reference to the second topic of inquiry, it may be remarked,

that the resources of the French Empire, upon an abstract and general calculation, can hardly be computed, including those derived from all her compulsory alliances, at much more than one-third of the whole resources of the European States.—At the first view, it would appear that this numerical and physical superiority alone would furnish the latter with abundant materials for resisting those ambitious projects, for the execution of which the repose of the world has so long been disturbed. The means of resistance, therefore, exist; and until the resources of France approach much nearer to an equality with the whole collective resources of the rest of Europe, it would be premature to despair of the ultimate liberation of the Continent from the despotic ascendancy of that formidable Empire. The skilful intrigues of the French Government have hitherto frustrated every attempt to embody a sufficient military force to counteract its views; and it remains to be seen, whether the fatal experience of past failures will have at length awakened the nations of Europe to a conviction of the necessity of acting with union, if they propose to act with effect. They undoubtedly possess the means of emancipating themselves from the capricious tyranny of French control; and if they do not avail themselves of them with equal promptitude and wisdom, the success which they may now purchase, at the price of unanimous exertion, will, hereafter, like the Sybilline books, be equally expensive and less complete.

If no doubt exist as to the practicability, by a grand comprehensive and united effort, of opposing to the numerous armies of France, armies equally numerous, and excited to military glory by higher hopes and a nobler cause, the main point to which the allies should direct all their attention, should be a perfect coincidence of military and political views: in the further prosecution of hostilities, their efforts should all terminate in one point. One object, in which all the States of Europe have, either immediately, or ultimately, the same general interest, should be inflexibly pursued by all. It should also possess a paramount importance, and should, in its realization, secure to each State, separately, the separate object which originally justified its determination to have recourse to war.

But how can various States in arms be induced to feel the same interest in prosecuting war for the achievement of the same end?

The smaller States having more to apprehend than those of the first rank, how can the latter be prevailed upon to make the same extraordinary exertions, under circumstances productive of less immediate alarm? But it should be remembered, that the cause for apprehension, though more remote in the case of the greater State, may ultimately prove equally menacing to each; and that if nations of secondary rank should now fall, from a want of support from those of the first class, the latter may be unable to prepare for their own defence, when their turn arrives to contend with the common foe, for the preservation of their national existence.

To this end, what general object can be proposed, but the limitation of the power of France—the reduction of the territories under her immediate dominion to that extent, which, without infringing upon her dignity as one of the first in rank among the nations and empires of the world, shall deprive her of the means of invading the independence of other States, and interrupting the happy reign of peace, at any moment that she may think favorable to her scheme of universal dominion? But it, perhaps, will be demanded, whether this has not been the sole object of all the wars that have been waged with France, during the last twenty years? Partly, and vaguely, it has, without doubt, been blended with the other views of various belligerents. *But never, in any one instance, has it been clearly and distinctly defined, and openly and manfully avowed, as the just and legitimate and sole object of hostile combination against France.* Hence a collision of motives and interests could not fail to produce those effects, which were naturally to be expected from an ill-cemented union; a change in the relative position of the belligerents, more or less favorable to the aggrandizement of France, both during the actual continuance of hostilities, and on the return of peace—a period, of which she sedulously avails herself to organize her new resources as materials for new aggressions.

A Congress of the different States of Europe, convened, not for peace, (except eventually), but for the solemn purpose of recovering and securing their national independence, would, in the present posture of European affairs, contribute, more perhaps than any other proceeding, to restore the lost equipoise of the continental powers. A declaratory act of such a convention would give

renewed validity to the force of international law. It would be the first effectual step towards the restoration of the balance of power, without which there can be no peace with any chance of duration. Occasional truces might possibly precede the utter extinction of the liberties of the Continent; but the peace that would follow, would be stripped of all the blessings that endear it to mankind. It would be a state of repose founded on a base and universal submission to despotic sway—a torpid existence, in which the best energies of the soul would slumber in perfect uselessness.

If a declaration to this effect were issued by a Congress of Potentates, assembled for the assertion, recovery, and defence of their sovereign rights, could it fail to produce the most beneficial result? If, at the same time, it abjured all views of conquest, all interference with the internal concerns of France, and even unequivocally expressed a desire to maintain relations of amity with that power, whenever the principles of her government, and the equitable reduction of her political preponderance, should afford a reasonable guarantee for their security, would not its justice and moderation be universally admitted, and would not this general admission materially aid the accomplishment of the end itself for which the declaration was promulgated?

Next to the assertion of their own independent sovereign rights, the precise extent of the limitation within which the power of France should be restricted, should occupy the fullest attention of this august assembly.

Difficult it would certainly be to reduce to the same standard the securities against future encroachments, which each State might deem expedient for its own immediate safety. But in determining the scale of offensive operations, it would be a capital error to suppose, that it should be adapted to measure, by anticipation, the obscured grandeur and degradation of the French Empire. Justice demands that her wealth, her dignity, her power, as a State of the first rank, should be duly regarded as the sanctified attributes of national independence.

But, to the support of this independence, it is not necessary that France should aggrandize her Empire by the incorporation of Holland and the Hanse Towns; that she should annex Switzerland and the greater part of Italy to her own possessions, and retain the

remainder of the latter territory, ostensibly under the character of an ally, but really under the vassalage of feudal subjection. Nor is it requisite that Spain and Portugal should be reduced to the condition of Imperial Provinces, or that the north-eastern boundaries of France should be protected against the inroads of her military neighbours by the Confederation of the Rhine. All these defences and precautions are not requisite for the consolidation of peace. Had her views been really pacific, all these alliances, incorporations, and unfinished conquests, would have formed no part of her policy: sufficiently great in herself, she would not have needed the aid either of such alliances, of a direct aggrandizement of her territory, or of prospective acquisitions, to secure to herself, and to the world, the inestimable benefits of a long and flourishing interval of repose.

The truth is, these confederative alliances and incorporations of territory were made with diametrically opposite views: not to preserve, but to violate peace; not to defend, but to enlarge indefinitely the boundaries of the French Empire.

At one period, France affected to be satisfied with the limits, which, it was imagined, Nature herself had assigned to her. The Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Ocean, were considered to be the outline of her proper territorial dimensions.—Even the ambitious views of several of the revolutionary governments did not, at least ostensibly, advance beyond these traces of national demarcation. They were, however, most fully developed after the erection of the limited consulate, and have since progressively acquired a more consistent shape and expansion under the consulate for life; and still more since the establishment of the foundations of a new dynasty. The schemes of ambition formerly projected by the numerous individuals, in whom was vested the simultaneous exercise of the sovereign power, were then frustrated by the secret jealousies and divisions of the heads of the government. In the defence of France against all external attacks, they were all equally zealous and united; but their views of conquest wanted that dangerous unity and simplicity of plan, under which they have been so successfully prosecuted, since the direction of the military energies of France has been usurped and exercised by one individual.

It has become more and more evident, that the periods of peace

and war are rendered equally subservient to the extension of the power of France. In the former, treaties, at least with minor States, have lost their obligation. Pretexts, either plausible, or absurd, have been unhesitatingly advanced to give a specious sanction to their violation. In the latter, success has seldom been long faithful to the standard of her adversaries, and has generally secured to her, at the termination of hostilities, an augmentation of resources for their early renewal.

If then, both in peace and in war, the system of France be unchangeably the same—if an incessant extension of dominion, both by direct annexations of territory, and by the subservient alliance of States, destined hereafter to be actually incorporated with France, be the code of policy by which all her movements are uniformly regulated, who will undertake to indicate the landmark to which this overwhelming flood will ultimately reach? Where shall the mound be erected to resist its further encroachments? Unless the torrent be checked, what fair and fertile regions will be devastated by the fury of its course! How many thousands and tens of thousands will yet be sacrificed to its unbridled rage! The cowardice or baseness of a great portion of the world, made resistance to the power of France almost equally hopeless; and while fear and servility sharpened the sword of the destroyer, folly and imbecility lent their aid to whet its edge for their own destruction. Surely the period is arrived, when the Continental States, taught by the political vicissitudes of many years of bitter experience, vicissitudes too, of which the causes would admit of an easy and natural explanation, will distinctly perceive the impending danger to which they are exposed, and which, if only apparently removed, will produce much more fatal consequences to them in after-times.

It may then be taken as an admitted point, that there is no alternative between the limitation of the power of France, and the alternate subversion of all the secondary States of the Continent, with, possibly, the ultimate ruin of those which still hold the first rank in the scale of national dignity and wealth and influence.

If a Congress of Sovereigns should be held, for the purpose of deliberating on the most effectual means of providing for the present and future security of their respective dominions, would it not,

in the first instance, appear to each illustrious member of it to be indispensably necessary, that a general alliance, offensive and defensive, should establish a basis for all their concurrent measures? Would it not also be attended with advantage, both to their cause, and to their proceedings, if this alliance should be held to be valid, for offensive operations, only until a fair and equitable reduction of the power of France shall be effected, whilst its validity, with regard to its defensive character, should remain permanently in force? By such a restriction upon the conditions of the alliance, the justice of the principles on which it was founded, would be rendered more obvious and palpable, and would aid the execution of the measures originating from it, by securing for it the benefit of the public sentiment in its favor. And what timidity, what despondency in their own resources, should prevent the allied powers from declaring, “*that the extension of the boundaries of the French Empire, beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees, is incompatible with the liberties of Europe?*” Intrepidity there would be in the declaration: but is the object to which it points of so extravagantly difficult a nature, as to be altogether impracticable? If the military force of the Continent, aided by the naval, military, and financial resources of this country, were embodied against France—if systematic unity of direction were skilfully given to this force—if, during their well-combined operations, every sentiment of national jealousy, every discrepant feeling of national interest, were allayed and suppressed—if a common impression of common danger communicated to the whole a single feeling of military ardor, animated by the cheering hope of preventing the independence of the world from being sacrificed at the shrine of sanguinary and lawless ambition—if the attainment of one general object, consecrated by the unqualified approbation of the moral and enlightened portion of mankind, constituted the sole point of union, for which the numerous ranks of the allies would be marshalled against the enemy; might not the emancipation of Europe be effectually achieved, by a combination founded upon such principles, and stimulated by every motive that can urge patriotic armies to the most zealous performance of their glorious task?

To this the cold political calculator will perhaps reply: your reasoning is conditional, and your conditions are inexecutable; your

superstructure is therefore without the requisite foundation, and the fine edifice of European liberty, which you propose to raise on so magnificent a scale, must remain a mere unsubstantial design. You expect to accomplish what experience has long since taught you to be impracticable; you expect to reduce, into one harmonious whole, those elements which are decreed to be eternally discordant; you expect to identify interests, which, while each State retains the least particle of independence, can never assume a similitude of character; you expect that Cabinets, which have long entertained against each other a secret hostility of sentiment, should at once suspend all enmity, and enter into one common league with all the warmth and enthusiasm of unsuspecting friendship; and that armies, differing from each other in language, in habits, in religion, in tactics, in military zeal, and under the command of leaders, all ambitious of glory, but envious of each other's fame, should co-operate with all that skilful regularity of progression, with which the motions of the most delicate and complex machinery may be adjusted by the ingenuity of the scientific artist. As in these expectations you have been more misled by the sanguineness of your hopes, than guided by the suggestions of sober investigation, you must prepare, if so visionary a project should ever be put in train for execution, having too, for its unattainable object, the compression of the boundaries of France within the Rhine and the Pyrenees, to submit to the disappointment to which such unqualified extravagance is sure to be exposed.

This broad counter-statement is, however, not wholly unanswerable. The reduction of the French Empire within limits which would hardly assign to it a much greater territorial extent, than that which was formerly subjected to the dominion of the Bourbons, would certainly not be an achievement of ordinary difficulty. But the cause of the allies would be materially benefited by this general concurrence in the grand object of hostility, notwithstanding its accomplishment might be placed beyond the sphere of their exertions. It is obvious, that where concurrence is desirable, there should be a common point in which this concurrence should have its centre. And why should not this point be fixed in the limitation of the territorial extent of France? It may ultimately be found to be impossible to circumscribe it within the reduced outline which

might be determined upon in a General Congress; but, if all agree in the absolute necessity of acting in concert for this most important end, though they may fail in obtaining a complete triumph, they may yet so far succeed as to effect such a reduction of the power of France, as may afford much better security against the future violation of their independence, and for the strict observance of the obligation of treaties, than can be expected from her, while her preponderance remains unbalanced by any effective political union among the European States. Failure in the full attainment of the object, for which hostilities might be thus prosecuted on so comprehensive a scale, does not necessarily involve its entire sacrifice. On the contrary, its partial accomplishment, leading to the most important consequences, is, perhaps, only to be effected by placing it distinctly in view, as a point which, though inaccessible, may yet be nearly approached.

An analogous reply may be made to the other objections. That perfect concord, that indissoluble union, that entire coincidence of political views, that systematic direction of combined military force, in undisturbed subservience to one main design, which would almost command success, it would certainly be unreasonable to anticipate. But is it not infinitely desirable, that, when States are to act in unison, the highest practicable effect should be given to the influence of all these motives and determinations? Is it unwise to provide, at the outset, as many safeguards as possible against that perverse tendency to disunion, which so frequently disconcerts "enterprises of great pith and moment;" and can this be done more effectually than by presenting to all one object of paramount interest, the prosecution of which may equalize all exertions, and suspend the prejudicial re-action of all exclusive and secondary views?

This completely harmonious co-operation, like the point to which its efforts are to be directed, may not be quite within the reach of those who are to guide its movements; but a much less imperfect combination against France may arise from the very exertions which may be made to give to it a perfection, of which it is only in a limited degree susceptible.

In this case, as well as in the projected limitation of the French territory, we must be contented with the greatest approximation

towards our object, if its distance shall have removed it beyond our grasp.

But this discordance imputed to the very elements of combination, seems to be calculated upon the ordinary data of ordinary coalitions. Notwithstanding the recent successes of the Russian arms, the power of France has seldom presented a more menacing aspect, with reference to the future independence of the Continental States, than it now assumes. If, after such prodigious sacrifices, as must have entailed certain ruin upon any other military power, she has still been able to contend with the greater part of the Continental States, how are we to form an estimate of her future resources, if she should bring the struggle to a close favorable to her still undeveloped ambition? How much then is hereafter to be apprehended from the abuse of her power? Is not this the strongest of all motives to give unprecedented vigor to any well-concerted coalition against her? Absolute, unconditional necessity may therefore disembarass such a combination from many of those jarring unassimilating principles, which, it may, perhaps, be too precipitately apprehended, would render it altogether inefficient.

It remains to be considered, in answer to the third question, how far the actual state of Europe may be favorable to the execution of such a confederate union.

The issue of the last campaign has in some degree altered the relative political importance of several of the Continental States. Russia, though she should withdraw her troops to the eastward of the Niemen, is almost entirely relieved from the apprehension of any new invasion. She can at least have none to fear for a considerable period. Her commercial system is therefore unfettered, and the result of the conflict, much as she has suffered from the devastations committed in her Empire, will ultimately produce an increase of national prosperity, and a corresponding increase of national power. This power will also be further augmented by the increased confidence which may be reposed in the efficiency of her armies, which, in fair and equal combat, have, on many occasions, snatched the laurel of victory from the brow of a haughty enemy, who had long been accustomed presumptuously to claim it, as the meed of his own unchecked triumphant course of conquest.

In commercial freedom, in military reputation, in political independence, Russia will have gained materially; and though her relative power will still be too limited, to permit her to assume a decided preponderance in the councils of the Continental Nations, yet, if discreetly used, her future influence over them may be exercised with more advantage to the cause of general independence, than at any period previous to the commencement of hostilities.

The relative political consequence of Austria has also been in some degree advanced by the events of the war; not, however, by any positive increase of national strength, but by the preservation of her resources nearly unimpaired, while those of France, for some time at least, have to a certain extent been diminished.

Even this slight change in the relative position of France and Austria is not so unimportant as to be altogether overlooked. In the same ratio, it has a tendency to diminish the dictatorial power of France, and to strengthen the sense of Austrian independence. In all the recent military operations of Austria, some indications of this independence are to be discerned; for it is to be observed, that she most strictly confined herself to the precise amount of auxiliary co-operation, which she had engaged by treaty to afford. And it is also to be remarked, that in the conduct of her share in the campaign, there appeared to be a deficiency of vigor in all the movements of her contingent, which can only be explained by referring it to her lukewarmness in the cause, which she was reluctantly compelled to support. What might be exacted, in conformity to the stipulations of treaty, was supplied; but she seemed to regard extraordinary energy and zeal in a bad cause as a supererogation of duty, of which she might conscientiously permit herself to decline the performance. Of this, too, the enemy seemed to be well aware, and upon more than one occasion, though policy might prevent him from making it a subject of open diplomatic remonstrance, it was glanced at in terms of mortified disappointment. That Austria, both during the victorious progress of the French armies, and through the whole period of their disastrous retreat, should have maintained a firm and consistent line of policy, co-operating with France only to a fixed and limited extent, showed not only that she was not reduced to a state of abject political humiliation, but that she was wisely determined to decline an identity of interests with

France. The growth of these seeds of national independence should be fostered with the utmost care; they may hereafter be destined to flourish in luxuriance, and may afford a sheltered repose to the victorious combatants in the sacred cause of civil liberty.

But what can Austria gain by wholly identifying her interests with those of France? Will she recover, by the adoption of this course of policy, her titular supremacy, with her ancient authority, in Germany? Will the territory wrested from her in Upper Austria and Salzburg be ultimately restored to her dominion? Will the cessions exacted from her in Polish Galicia be replaced under her sway? Will the Venetian possessions, originally ceded to her by the treaty of Campo Formio, be restored for the re-establishment of her maritime and commercial relations? Will the loyal Tyrol again constitute a boundary of her Empire? Will she regain the Illyrian Provinces?—No!—not a foot of land, of which she has been deprived, either by conquest or by treaty, will be recovered by drawing closer the bonds of union with France. By such an union she can only acquire the dangerous privilege of remaining a peaceful spectator of the overgrowing power of France, and of indirectly contributing to it, by abstaining from all exertions to prevent its increase.

States in alliance can have no identity of interests, where there is no established ratio of relative political strength; where the power of the one remains stationary, while that of the other is hourly and rapidly progressive. Identity of views, and cordiality in alliance, imply an absence of jealousy and apprehension of each other's designs. In the existing connection between France and Austria, are there no feelings of this description to disturb its harmony? Can Austria be indifferent to the memory of her former losses? Can she forget that the Empire of Germany was once her own—that the King of Bavaria, once her secret, afterwards her declared enemy, has become a comparatively powerful sovereign, at the expense to Austria of sacrifices which she can never cease to regret—that in the east, the south, and the west, she has been stripped of some of the fairest portions of her dominions, by that very individual, who has since, by marriage, connected himself with the illustrious and ancient House of Hapsburgh, without conferring on it one single political benefit, or manifesting, by any one public or

private act, a sentiment of attachment to the dynasty, to which he has thus become allied?

What then can furnish to Austria a motive sufficiently powerful to assimilate her hopes, and fears, and views, with those of France? An alliance by marriage—formed, too, under circumstances calculated to aggravate the mortification of defeat? Surely not. It can hardly be forgotten that this connection, founded altogether on mere abstract grounds of policy, was originally proposed at a moment, when such an overture appeared more like the demand of a victorious chieftain, who claimed the hand of the fair Archduchess by right of conquest, than as an offer embellished with the softer graces to solicit her assent. Its success may therefore be regarded, not as a victory over the finer feelings, which it presumed to address, but as a new triumph over an humiliated Sovereign. But let Austria beware, lest an alliance, formed under such circumstances, may not furnish hereafter pretexts for interference in her affairs, and supply additional means for invading her independence!

If Austria, then, has so many motives for not identifying herself with France, the latter, with many reasons for viewing, with a jealous eye, the large resources which she still possesses, has every motive for assimilating the policy of the Court of Vienna to her own; not, however, with any view to the least reciprocal advantage, but in order to make it subservient to her designs. Was not this the main, if not the sole object of the marriage? It was at least only subordinate to the hope of establishing the direct succession of imperial power in France. This bond of union, therefore, instead of allaying, should awaken all the fears of Austria, lest it should prepare a chain of events, of which the last link may connect the Austrian dominions with those of France, as a dependent integral province of that Empire. To assimilate the views of the Cabinet of Vienna to those of the Thuilleries, but not to identify them, is manifestly the policy of Buonaparte; to resist both, should be that of the Emperor of Austria.

Bavaria, though enlarged in territory, and raised from an Electorate to a Kingdom, but degraded in character, and excluded from the class of independent States, has in part expiated those political sins, by the commission of which she basely purchased a trifling aggrandizement, at the price of her own liberty, and the dereliction

of the interests of the German Empire. Abjectly subservient to the views of France, her resources are no longer at her own disposal. Her armies, compelled to traverse strange and distant regions, and fighting to extend that despotism, which ultimately threatens her own extinction, have fallen, in thousands, by the sword of their adversaries, or have lamentably perished amidst the frozen rigors of the North. What avails it to Bavaria, if she has acquired the mountainous frontier of the Tyrol on the south, and has received an enlargement of territorial dimensions on the east and towards the west, if her independence be the stipulated value given for these acquisitions—if she must always be under arms to aid the designs of a conqueror, who, should success crown his ambitious enterprises, will, without scruple, dispose hereafter of the possessions of the House of Deux-Ponts, according to his own arbitrary will and pleasure?—Was it her jealousy of the Emperor Francis that misled her to prefer a French to a German interest? And was this jealousy to be traced to a frivolous discussion respecting the immediate dependence of certain equestrian orders upon the Emperor of Germany, or upon the Elector of Bavaria? If so, sadly has she taken revenge upon herself; and by siding with the enemies of the German Confederation, she has ceased to be an independent and powerful member of that Empire, the dignity and stability of which it should have been her noblest pride to have maintained.

The family on the new Bavarian throne is stated to be divided in political views, and the Crown Prince is represented to have manifested indications of greater spirit, and of more enlightened sentiments, than are to be discovered in the reigning Sovereign. This circumstance may, perhaps, be regarded, not as a mere individual difference of opinion, but as a sign of discordance in the government and in the state. The people themselves are among the least enlightened in Germany, and their ignorance, though undesirable in itself, may tend, however, to obstruct the progress of a community of interest with France. It is, therefore, not improbable, should circumstances arise favorable to the early emancipation of Germany, that Bavaria may take its just share, with other States, in a general effort to dis sever it from its present ignominious connection with the French Empire.

If such events should hereafter occur, why should not Wirtemberg also have her full participation in them? Her contiguity to France rendered it, perhaps, difficult for her to refuse, in the first instance, to accede to the Rhenish Confederation; and, indeed, an inclination to join it may have been communicated to her, by the tempting opportunity of emerging from a petty dukedom to royalty itself. This elevation, too, under the immediate protection of France, was the more seductive, as it armed the Duke with more influence over the public authorities in his dominions, with whom he was generally at variance. But notwithstanding this adventitious elevation of the State to the rank of a Kingdom, together with an acquisition of territorial resources, it cannot be doubted but the feelings, the habits, the prejudices, the predilections of the people, have, in the main, remained nearly the same. Necessity may still link them to the Confederation of the Rhine; but if the pressure of this necessity should be removed, a sense of German independence may re-acquire its proper elasticity: and Wirtemberg, rather than continue to wear the splendid trappings of dependent royalty, may prefer the assumption of a distinguished rank among the States of an emancipated Empire.

In Westphalia and Lower Saxony, the existence of great public discontent is notorious, and nothing but the presence of an imposing military force has prevented it from manifesting itself more frequently in overt acts of resistance. Dissatisfaction with the newly constituted authorities, and a grateful attachment to those which preceded them, furnish ample grounds for a well-placed reliance on the future patriotic exertions of the loyal inhabitants of these countries, should the aspect of public affairs encourage them to organize their efforts for the recovery of their ancient rights.

But the measure most eminently calculated to re-establish the foundations of an effective balance of power, and to secure the liberties of the Continent, is, in my decided opinion, the revival of the German Empire. The central position of Germany, the military character of its various States, the extent of its population, and of its resources of every kind, peculiarly qualify it for the assumption of a great and preponderating rank in the relative scale of national importance. If the restoration of this Empire were practicable, it should be re-established upon the principle of con-

solidating, and not of subdividing, its political power. The revival of the old cumbrous political and ecclesiastical subdivisions would be productive only of national weakness. The materials of which the Germanic body was formed, should be re-cast; and the new model, preserving the best features of its pre-existent shape, should exhibit its colossal strength, undeformed by every useless appendage. The actual political divisions of Germany might not be unfavorable to the execution of such a project for the consolidation of its power. With reference to its former state, the rights of sovereignty are now vested but in few sceptres. Many of the minor States have been melted down, and amalgamated with more substantial bodies, in the political crucible, in which the temper and character of their various properties have been examined and assayed. If there were not too much of innovation in the measure, this principle of a reduction of subdivisions of territorial authority might be extended with general advantage to the German nation. Distributed into a few large States, its increase in real power and strength would nearly follow the ratio of such reduction. If a common sense of independence, and a feeling of common interest, united them in one effective confederation, even without the investiture of supreme authority in an imperial chief, would not Germany, under such circumstances, possess the means of resisting the whole power of France? Or, might not, at all events, the deficient equiponderance of the former be then easily supplied by the ready aid of other powers, equally interested in repelling the encroachments of French ambition?

But why should not the imperial diadem be replaced on the head of the Emperor Francis? Would not the connection of the German States with Austria, and their dependence, to a certain extent, upon the Emperor, be, in every respect, more congenial to their interests and their feelings, than their present connection with France, and their present precarious dependence on the Ruler of that country? Should the Confederation of the Rhine continue to exist, and should Buonaparte, at a future time, in a fit of anger or spleen or revenge, think proper to wrest the ensigns of royal authority from any of the German Kings of his creation, would the poor menaced petty Sovereign be able to resist the mandate, which commanded him to deposit his crown at the feet of the arrogant

Monarch from whom it was received, and who, having assumed the power of bestowing it, might presume to exercise the power of re-demanding it, at his own good will and pleasure?

The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, the expulsion of the King of Westphalia, and a strict and cordial union of all the German Princes, including the Emperor of Austria, in his capacity of King of Bohemia, would certainly constitute a most important, perhaps an effectual step, towards the restoration of Germany to her just rank among the Continental States. But far more solid would be the security against future attempts to violate her independence, if this resumption of national dignity were shielded by the powerful sanction of Austria, re-invested with imperial splendor, and strengthened by a liberal accession of influence and of power. Without a main stream into which the smaller currents may glide, the latter would only run to waste; or, fertilizing the soil by diffusion, invite the plunder of the foe. United in one impetuous tide, its force might baffle every effort of the enemy to ascend it, and compel him to follow its course till it reach the boundaries of his own dominions.

Unless Germany revive under such auspices, how is the mischief of conflicting jealousies to be obviated? States nearly co-equal, acting in confederacy, will soon be dissatisfied with their presumed equality. This dissatisfaction may lay each more open to the poison of corruption. The desire of ascendancy may soon produce a competition for ascendancy, and the struggle may be made light to the party whom the enemy may wish to detach from the rest, and who may become disposed to be detached, on a promise of investiture with that superiority to which his pretensions aspire.

But this disturbance of every principle of union might be prevented by general concession to a Sovereign, whose dignity is too elevated, and whose power is too great, to encourage the most distant hope of successful competition. And whom could the Kings and Princes of Germany select, for this distinction, with brighter prospects of permanent benefit to the common cause, than those which would open to them on every side, by their unanimously choosing, for their august head, the illustrious individual, who, though deprived of the German imperial crown by the fortune of

war, may, in the present conjuncture, be almost intitled to assert a prescriptive claim to its immediate restoration?

To this scheme of union, under an imperial Sovereign, Bavaria would, without doubt, present most opposition. She would be a territorial loser by the project; for it is not to be imagined that Austria would re-assume her former imperial supremacy, and submit to the sacrifice of the Tyrol, and her valuable possessions in Germany. But whatever apparent losses Bavaria might sustain, from the restoration of provinces given to her as the price of her defection from the Germanic body, and to which she has no title upon the ground of conquest, she would re-acquire that security for her relative independence, which she has now lost. Can she, if the extravagant ambition of France should progressively realize its plans of universal subjugation, flatter herself, that she would be suffered quietly to transmit, in the usual order of hereditary succession, the crown which she has received as a bribe for her treason to the Empire? Reduced to her former size and shape, or at least aggrandized only by a few trifling incorporations of such petty States as, consistently with a more simple, but more efficient constitution of the renovated Empire, cannot well be permitted to resume their dwarfish, but embarrassing existence, Bavaria may soon, perhaps, become sensible of the strength she would derive from flourishing again as a main branch of the old but vigorous German stock, instead of adhering as an offensive fungous excrescence to the trunk of Gallic despotism. As a fair and just compensation for the sacrifices and exertions which Austria might thus be called upon to make, in executing the great and noble enterprise of restoring the German Empire, and securing its independence, she may surely be permitted to claim the full restitution of what was once her own, and what did not fall under the dominion of its present ruler by any direct right of arms. Bavaria should make a grace of a cession, for which she would be more than adequately repaid by the ample security it would purchase for the permanent safety of her dominions.

Nothing, perhaps, has indirectly contributed more to the aggrandizement of France, than the feeble efforts successively made by the German powers to oppose it. Subdivided and conflicting in-

terests prevented them from taking the field with that imposing attitude, of which their military resources and military character would have justified the assumption. In detail they fought—in detail they were subdued. The strength of the Empire was thus gradually wasted, while that of the enemy continually augmented. Disunion frustrated every attempt to act, either for offensive or defensive purposes, with all the energy of a vigorous collective effort. At the commencement of the revolutionary war, the amount of population was in favor of Germany; at the present period, France has decidedly a superiority. The whole military force of Germany, including all the troops which Austria and Prussia could possibly bring against the enemy, would now be numerically inferior to those which France can summon to battle. But this inferiority, however, is not so great as to furnish reasons only for despondency. If ardent patriotism imparted a national character to German hostilities—if the whole military force of a new Empire fought around the standard of national independence—if it were animated by a sacred feeling of honor and of duty—if in discipline, in enthusiasm, celerity of movement, and skilfulness of general operation, it could boast of equality with its adversaries; why should not its inferiority in physical strength be amply supplied by the efficient support of a bold peasantry, and by all the aid that can be derived from those for whom they have unfurled the standard of patriotic war, together with the stimulating excitement of a cause infinitely more just, than that in which their adversaries have embarked?

It should be recollected, that it was the weakness and the folly of Germany, that chiefly contributed to swell the despotism of France; but it should also not be forgotten, that Germany possesses, to a greater extent than any other nation, most substantial materials for erecting a solid mound against the destructive inundation of that power, whose early growth derived its principal nourishment from her imbecility. As an Empire, well consolidated, it may repel, and ultimately restrain, the encroachments of France; as a State, weakened by multifarious divisions of sovereignty, her opposition to them must evidently prove ineffectual. All German alliances with France cannot, in this case, fail to end in incorporations with that Empire. The progress from alliance to subserviency, and

from subserviency to incorporate identity, would probably be more rapid than is at present suspected. How then are these fatal consequences to be prevented, but by a perfect union of interest, and a perfect unity of co-operation? If these should still be found to be deficient, she must secure to herself effectual aid from contiguous and friendly powers, who, as their interests are identical, ought naturally to afford the demanded assistance with equal alacrity and zeal.

If Prussia be now enabled to assume an attitude of greater national independence, than at the period of her compulsory alliance with France, this advantageous change in her condition is to be ascribed to the effects produced by an explosion of patriotic feeling; which, though long nourished in secret, would, probably, not have burst forth, without the powerful protection of Russia. Without her aid, this patriot zeal might still have slumbered, and the indignation excited by the oppression of her late insidious ally, might still have been forcibly suppressed. The proposed admission of Prussia to negotiate with other powers, amounts indeed to a qualified acknowledgment of her independence, and may contribute to remove her apprehension of seeing the possessions of the House of Brandenburg transferred, by her former capricious and vindictive ally, to the dominion of his newly-created Prince of Neufchatel.

Besides the hope of resuming a dignified rank among the military powers of Europe, Prussia can hardly fail to be animated to better exertions by the painful remembrance of past errors—by the consciousness of having pursued an inglorious career, when the path of honor and of glory was open to her. She has a long list of political and military disgraces to expunge from the catalogue of her rational offences; and, had she not expiated her folly and her guilt by the sacrifices they have entailed upon her, she would still owe a deep atonement to the world for the many miseries, of which her crooked policy—her criminal inactivity—and her ill-timed and selfish hostilities, have been the lamentable cause. Her lost character is now to be redeemed—her lost independence now to be re-established. The narrow, partial, vacillating views, which formerly misguided her councils, must be dismissed—an enlightened, generous, comprehensive scale of policy should be the mea-

sure of her future efforts: and if the events of war shall give her an accession of national weight, it should, without the least reserve, be thrown into the general mass of resistance to the undermining and overwhelming power of France.

The rest of Germany has also experienced a change, from which benefit may hereafter be derived to the cause of the allies. Saxony, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Westphalia, have materially diminished their resources, by the active share they were compelled to take in the last destructive campaign. If, therefore, they should still preserve, either voluntarily, or from necessity, their connection with France, they must, for some time, be less effective auxiliaries than at an early stage of the war. The degree in which their ability to co-operate with France is weakened, ascertains, in some measure, the comparative advantage gained by the allies; especially when it is considered, that these States may hereafter be called upon to furnish recruits for those military operations, upon the issue of which depends the happiness or misery, the independence or the future subjugation, of the Continent.

To this actual loss of available resources for future hostilities may be joined the embarrassment, which the enemy must experience from the public spirit which has manifested itself in various parts of Germany, and which must evidently increase his difficulties in the proportion in which this spirit diffuses itself, and communicates a national feeling to the war. Though it has not yet produced any very decisive results, it may yet become powerfully instrumental to the emancipation of Germany, and, possibly, to a regeneration of that Empire. The simple conviction of its existence operates as a check upon, and contributes to prevent, that concentration of military force, by which the French have been so much accustomed to command success. It is always something gained to the common cause, that this spirit cannot be extinguished either by the utmost vigilance, or by the menaced and actual visitation of the severest punishments; and that occasions may present themselves, when it may discover itself in the rear of the enemy, embodied in too formidable a shape to be viewed without apprehension.

Even in Saxony, though degraded to the condition of a tributary ally, the patriotic spirit of resistance is yet unextinguished. It

sleeps, but will awake with the dawn of German independence. The conduct of the Government, it is true, seems to be at variance with the sentiments of the people; but this discordance of feeling is more apparent than real. Satisfactorily to explain the motives of the policy pursued by the King of Saxony would be difficult; it may, however, be presumed, that, in adopting it, he has been influenced either by his peculiar views of expediency, or his peculiar impressions of religion. As the latter are well known to be deeply tinctured with bigotry, he may possibly have regarded the career of Buonaparte as under the immediate guidance of an invisible hand; and this obscure sentiment may have lent its sophistical aid to those suggestions of state-expediency, which appeared to recommend the preservation of Saxony by an union with France, rather than to risk its conquest by opposition, at a time when the general state of affairs in Germany seemed unpropitious to a hostile course.

It would be difficult to form a conception of two individuals, whose characters are more distinctly dissimilar. The dictates of religion, and the influence of moral feeling, have imparted to the King of Saxony a mild, benevolent, and pacific disposition. In general and scientific knowledge, he holds a most conspicuously distinguished rank among the Sovereigns of the age. In many of the sciences his intelligence is equally minute and profound; and those who have devoted themselves exclusively to particular branches of them, have repeatedly expressed astonishment at the vast extent and variety of his information. The arts, commonly supposed to soften the manners of mankind, (to which general remark, however, the present Ruler of France is a striking exception,) have produced in him all their wonted benignity. The retirement and timidity of his character furnished additional precautions for the preservation of those beautiful shades of moral coloring, by which it was singularly distinguished. Is there then a point of similitude between this Sovereign and his ally? The contrast in the portraits I need not depict. The faithful historian of the times will delineate the latter with striking accuracy and truth. Ambition, deeply stained with blood, striding over the earth with desolating steps, and trampling upon the feebly defended rights of nations, will hereafter exhibit the distinctive features of the fierce warrior, whose path is tracked by flame and by the sword.

The union of Saxony and France is unconnected by any common interest. Is the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to the Saxon dominions, a sufficient bribe to secure to France the permanent alliance of this new German kingdom? Is it an adequate compensation for the loss of independence, the extinction of the liberty of the press, and the impoverishing sacrifices which war entails? Is all honest German feeling to be absorbed by a sentiment of French predilection; and are the descendants of those champions of liberty, whose boast it was never to have been subdued, to wear, under the mask of alliance, the galling chains of a foreign adventurer?

Happy, without doubt, would Saxony be, to abandon the wavering and fluctuating policy, by which she now endeavours to preserve her national existence; and should the current of success again set in favor of the allies, its rapidity and force in its passage through the Saxon dominions, would be increased by copious tributary streams in every direction. By a singular, yet not disadvantageous incongruity of conduct, the very motives of expediency, and the feelings of superstition, which may now influence the policy of the King of Saxony, may lead him to the adoption of a diametrically opposite decision. Expediency may then suggest the necessity of co-operating with the allies, and any marked reverse of fortune experienced by the presumptuous leader of the French armies, may induce this timid but venerable Prince to believe, that Buonaparte is no longer a favored instrument for the accomplishment of designs, into which it is not permitted to human foresight to penetrate.

With regard to the state of Poland, and of Denmark and Sweden, it may be sufficient, with reference to any change in their political relations, that may hereafter be favorable to the liberties of the Continent, to observe, that, in the present state of European affairs, the resources of these countries are less available to France, than at former periods of the war.

The farce of regeneration was exhibited in Poland, without producing any great public impression. Upon the plea of an observance of good faith towards Austria, Buonaparte felt it to be expedient to withhold from Galicia the benefit of this regeneration. A similar plea would also have secured to Saxony the greater part of the province of Mazovia, with the capital of Poland, strip-

ping the new kingdom of one of the fairest portions of its western divisions.

Twice Buonaparte held out to the Poles the seductive promise of national renovation, and upon both occasions the promise has been delusive. On the first, their limited exertions to serve him did not entitle them to the boon; on the second, the project was rendered effete, by the discomfiture and retreat of his numerous armies. Upon both, the sole object he wished to accomplish was, to procure the means of carrying on the war against Russia with the utmost vigor and effect. Had he succeeded, the kingdom of Poland might possibly have been restored; but stunted in shape, and possessing only the external form, without any of the essential attributes of royalty. To the caprice of some Marshal of the French Empire, the destinies of the new kingdom would have been confided, and the Sovereign, himself a slave to him who placed him on the throne, would employ his whole authority in virtually reducing Poland to the low condition of a tributary province of the French Empire—a military out-work, or commanding central position, whence Russia, Turkey, Austria, and Germany, might be assailed in front, in flank, or in the rear, whenever the hostile projects of France might be ripe for execution.

Poland, therefore, would gain only a nominal independence, and would be exposed to all the evils incident to frequent warfare. With all the powers surrounding that country, France, under its present military government, would not be likely to remain long at peace. Her dependent connection with France would necessarily involve her in all hostilities in which she might be engaged, with the additional disadvantage of becoming, perhaps more often than any other State, the principal theatre of war. With such prospects, it is not probable that Poland will be very anxious to blend her interests inseparably with those of France, though tempted to do so by a delusive offer of independent sovereignty.

To a slackened co-operation arising from these apprehensions, should be added a feeling of disinclination towards France, which the generous conduct of the Emperor Alexander in Poland ought naturally to excite. This Monarch wisely preferred indulgent lenity to justifiable rigor, and the preference can hardly fail to produce a corresponding effect, of which Russia may hereafter feel

the benefit, should Poland again become the scene of military operations.

Of the course of policy which Denmark and Sweden may ultimately pursue, it is difficult to form a decisive judgment. The latter power, though bound by treaty to act against France, may be prepared for either alternative—to side ultimately with the successful party, and to join her weight to the preponderating scale. The Government of Denmark, by the failure of the late pacific overture, may be tempted to draw still closer the subsisting connection with France, partly from an aggravated feeling of dissatisfaction with this country, and partly to secure the integrity of her dominions against the pretensions of Sweden. Whatever may be the views, either immediate or remote, of each Government, they may be considered as having manifested, though in a different form, their hostility to France; Denmark, by the late overture to this country, and Sweden, by the engagements of an actual treaty. Though policy may, at this time, induce Denmark to coalesce with France, the coalition may yet be uncemented by national inclination, and therefore weak, in proportion to the absence of the latter feeling. In the case of Sweden, both policy and inclination may, at present, identify her cause with that of the allies; but should the arms of France prosper in the end, a supposed necessity may suggest to the Crown Prince the expediency of changing his views. It is, however, something gained to the general cause, to know that Denmark *was* disposed to take up arms against the common enemy, and that Sweden *is* under a specific obligation to take the field. Fortunate would it have been for both powers, if, under the late circumstances of the Continent, they had been guided by the paramount duty of suppressing their mutual jealousies and hostile designs; and, by zealous co-operation, upon the largest scale to which their respective resources were applicable, had boldly displayed their vigor, in contributing to re-assure the liberties of the Continent.

By such a decision, they might have best consulted their future safety, their immediate happiness, and their lasting honor.

Though the Italian States have undergone no change, in a marked degree unfavorable to the ambitious views of the French Government, yet, in the Roman Provinces, and in the kingdom of

Naples, circumstances have occurred, which tend, in some measure, to relax the intimacy of their connection with, and dependence on, France.

To the Pope, who, under trials of no ordinary difficulty, has manifested no ordinary firmness of character, some share of temporal power has been restored. It was the policy of Buonaparte, for the extension of his own power, to annihilate the temporal authority of the Pope. From this point he has been obliged, in part, to recede. The abandonment of any pretension is tantamount to an admission of his incapability of asserting it with effect; and every concession extorted by political necessity may, therefore, be regarded as a diminution of his power. To have yielded to the Pope at all, nearly implies, that the Pope could no longer be resisted. Out of this concession, events of great interest may hereafter arise. The Papal See has seldom been deficient in the ability requisite to avail itself of all chances favorable to the extension of its ecclesiastical influence. Temporal authority is an important instrument for the promotion of such views; and now the Pope is, to a certain extent, in possession of temporal power. Fallen, as the Church of Rome is, from her ancient dominion over the minds of men, she must naturally feel anxious to re-acquire some share of that lost ascendancy, to which so large a portion of the world submitted with reverential submission. Jealous of the revival of this ascendancy, it will infallibly be the object of Buonaparte to limit and control it, and to render it subservient to his own designs. Equally jealous of this control, it will naturally be the aim of every Pope to disengage himself, as much as possible, from the shackles of any temporal Sovereign. This collision will, probably, from the time the head of the Romish Church shall have a conscious feeling of returning influence, be constantly in operation. The prejudices of mankind will not only prevent the extinction of this influence, but voluntarily lend themselves to its extension.

Unless it be made to co-operate with the plan of universal dominion, which France is attempting gradually to realize, it may prove a most efficient and formidable check to the execution of such a project. Apprehensive as we have been of danger from Roman Catholicism, it would be a singular phenomenon, in the history of public events, if the revival of the liberties of the Conti-

ment were, in a material degree, aided by future opposition from the See of Rome to the aggrandizement of the temporal dominion of France. This speculation is, it is true, not unblended with extravagance; but events, less likely to have happened, are recorded in the page of history. Indeed, it is so far within the range of what is possible, that it might be exercised in contravention to the views of Buonaparte, though Cardinal Fesch himself were in possession of the Papal Chair. It is not, however, to be presumed, that this ecclesiastical power would be exclusively exerted for the general good; it is sufficient for the argument to assert, that its successful opposition to the temporal ambition of France would, in its consequences, be beneficial to the European commonwealth.

Of the Kingdom of Naples but little is at present known, and but little need be said. From many quarters it has been stated, that between Murat and his liege-lord much dissatisfaction prevails. It was represented to exist even before the last campaign, and it must necessarily have been increased by its disastrous issue, of which Murat was publicly accused to have been in part the cause. The share which Naples has recently taken in the war, with the exception of the military contingent, which formed a part of the grand army, was altogether of no importance. Almost as little has been heard of her hostile operations, as if she had ceased to exist. If this inactivity is not to be accounted for on the ground of the diversion of her whole military resources in aid of the continental war, it may give a slight coloring of truth to the above report.

This circumstance, however, is not alluded to as having any peculiar claim to credit. But if a judgment be formed, according to the obvious feelings of the human heart, of the relations subsisting between Murat and Buonaparte, can we suppose them to be in such a state of fixed unison, that nothing can disturb their harmonious vibration?—They are both successful revolutionary adventurers; they have both attained to the highest distinctions: the one a self-created Emperor; the other a King of his creation. The dependence of the latter is servile and complete; he holds his crown by a precarious tenure; it was taken from one King by conquest, confided to a second ruler by motives of family aggrandizement, and transferred to a third by considerations of policy. The feeling of personal attachment once thoroughly extinguished, that

of gratitude will be consigned to the same oblivion. Nothing will then remain between them but the mere bond of common policy. It will be the policy of Buonaparte, to keep Murat in perfect dependence upon himself, and arbitrarily to command the disposal of all the resources which Naples can supply; but, once fancying himself firmly seated on his throne, it will be equally the policy of Murat, if detached from Buonaparte by every other consideration, to shake off this painful subjection, and assume a rank among the independent Sovereigns of the world. Are all future alliances between Naples and Austria, or Spain and other powers, to be regarded as completely hopeless? Though not likely to happen at an early period, yet who will venture to assert that they never will, and never can take place? The presumption of the denial would, perhaps, exceed the boldness of the conjecture. If Buonaparte, under the influence of sentiments of augmented dissatisfaction, should manifest a determination to annex Naples to the Vice-Royalty of Italy, would Murat, his fellow-revolutionist, his companion in arms, readily yield to a dispossession of sovereign power? If the state of the Continent favored the retention of the sceptre in his own hands, might it not be secured to him by reciprocal aid, and might not a renovated continental alliance against France be materially strengthened by the accession of so large a portion of Italy to the general confederacy?—This, it must be owned, is speculation; and not, perhaps, of the most temperate character. But, at all events, it must be admitted to have some foundation in the presumed instability of an order of things, which appears to contain within itself too much of violence, too much disregard for the common feelings of mankind, and too many elements of discordancy, to promise itself a permanent existence.

The transactions in Spain and Portugal present many reasons for satisfaction. The territory of the latter is undefiled by the presence of the enemy; and Spain, at least before the armistice, might have indulged a confident hope of seeing every Frenchman, at the close of this campaign, expelled beyond the Pyrenees. Nor can this hope be extinguished, until peace with Russia shall enable Buonaparte to over-run the Peninsula with formidable detachments from his main army in the North.

The chances in favor of Spain, then, stand thus:

The allied forces in the Peninsula are numerous and highly effective, and they have the pre-eminent advantage of being led on to victory by a general, who, with reference to the means at his disposal, has indisputably accomplished more than any other military commander of the age. Science, skill, energy, intrepidity, foresight, self-possession—excellencies which we can hope to meet with only in part in the same individual—are all united, and in a very enlarged proportion, in forming and illustrating the heroic character of the great Captain, to whom the fate of the Peninsula has been confided. Nor will it have been confided in vain, if his genius has to encounter only such difficulties as to ordinary minds would appear insuperable.

The armistice may, possibly, but will not necessarily, lead to peace. The pretensions advanced by the various belligerents, during the discussions to which the armistice may give rise, will require to be supported by a warlike attitude; and the party whose preparations for contingent war are conducted on the largest scale, and promise, in the event of its revival, the most prosperous issue, will naturally negotiate with most success. Balancing the policy of converging all his efforts, and bringing up all his reinforcements to strengthen his armies in the North, Buonaparte may still for some time be deprived of the means of considerably augmenting the number of his troops in the Peninsula: and so long as the armistice shall continue without a certainty of its terminating in peace, it will operate, nearly as effectually as war itself, in the shape of a diversion in favor of Spain.

The incorporation of the Spanish with the British and Portuguese troops is also a circumstance not to be omitted in an enumeration of the immediate advantages of which Spain can, at this time, command the possession. It is of great importance, both as a clear indication of the subsidence of that detrimental jealousy, which has hitherto weakened the efforts of the Spaniards in the defence of their own country, and as an additional facility for recruiting the ranks thinned by the casualties of war. This mode of recruiting also is attended with a two-fold benefit: the Spanish recruit rapidly acquires the efficiency of the disciplined veteran at his side, and the bravery of the latter is stimulated by sympathy with the patriotic feelings of his Spanish comrade in arms. The mass of force

in the Peninsula opposed to the enemy will, therefore, not be, as heretofore, detached military bodies viewing each other's operations with jealousy or dissatisfaction ; but an amalgamated power, which will acquire, by length of union, fresh force and fresh consolidation.

In descanting on the affairs of Spain, it is impossible to allude to the jealousy which has manifested itself in that country, without deeply regretting, that national pride should, amidst the dangerous infirmities of national weakness, ever engender so hateful an offspring. Unhappily it presented itself, for a time, under the odious aspect of pride, envy, and ingratitude. Streams of British blood, poured forth in defence of Spanish independence, were long an unpropitiatory offering to Spanish jealousy. Years of strenuous, unsparing, heroic exertion, in a cause in which the interests of Spain were immediate, while those of Great Britain were only remote, have at length begun to correct that obscurity of vision, by which every thing generous and noble and great, on our part, was viewed through the distorting medium of jealous intuition.

At last, Spain begins to acknowledge, by a more intimate union with her defenders, that those who have abandoned their own peaceful homes, to fight her battles, and in which they have reaped unfading honor and renown, have some claim to the gratitude of a nation, which, without their aid, would long since have been in the military possession of the foe. Can it for a moment be doubted that the French would long since have spread themselves over the whole Peninsula, if their aggression had not been checked by the interposition of British aid? Quiet possession of Spain and Portugal they, perhaps, might not have obtained ; but every fortress in the Peninsula would have been theirs ; every capital of the ancient Kingdoms theirs ; and every port and harbour, from Biscay to Catalonia, entirely at their command.

Much, certainly, might have been accomplished by Spain, though left wholly to her own efforts ; but ultimately she must have fallen. Guerilla warfare may annihilate thousands, or tens of thousands ; but the decided numerical superiority of the enemy must sooner or later have brought all Guerilla movements to a state of perfect inactivity ; and the gradual, but complete subjugation of the country must have followed.

Spain, though the first European State in which war assumed, not simply a military, but a national, character, has still many sins of patriotic omission to expiate. Had her exertions corresponded to the paramount importance of the cause, in defence of which she entered the lists with her powerful adversary, armed as she was by Nature, armed as she was by the patriotic zeal and ardor of her proud and valiant sons, alone, without a particle of foreign aid, she ought to have vanquished her treacherous enemy, and expelled him from her soil. If, with such powerful means at her disposal, to have achieved little be disgraceful, what will be the measure of her ignominy, should her enemy still triumph, after all the splendid victories which have been gained in her cause, not by her own arms, but by her brave and generous defenders! What will be the depth of her shame, if her jealousy, her envy, her inactivity, by withholding that perfect and unconditional co-operation, which can alone meet the exigency of her affairs, should ultimately secure to her bitter enemy that triumph, in which he still hopes to exult! But more enlightened views may give rise to better anticipations; and time may have shown the wisdom of banishing from an alliance, which has saved Spain from destruction, those blind, narrow, injurious, and fatal feelings of jealousy, which have hitherto prevented that zealous, perfect, and unanimous co-operation, by which her national security might have been effectually re-established.

The number and efficiency of the allied armies—the consummate talents of their immortal chief—the diversion which even the armistice itself may continue to make in favor of Spain—the incorporation of the native soldier with the heroes who have bled to save his native land, and the consequent decline of that jealousy which has hitherto obstructed the attainment of complete success—these constitute the main and prominent advantages, of which Spain should decisively avail herself in the present campaign. To these should be added the general impression, that this campaign must be the last in the Peninsula.

It cannot be denied, that the critical period, in which the fate of Spain is to be decided, is at length arrived. The means of liberation are at hand. Should they be neglected or misused, indelible will be the stain affixed to the character of the Spaniards of the present day. Whether their posterity shall revere or execrate

it, depends on the spirit with which they shall execute the grand work of national redemption, or on the pusillanimity with which they may basely yield to a foreign yoke. To themselves, and to their children, they owe the great debt of national justice, which can be discharged only by effecting the deliverance of their country. This sacred duty is not to be performed by continuing, under the present circumstances of the Continent, the slow and doubtful process of gradual extermination. The vigor of the country should not be enfeebled by various and partial efforts; it should be collected and compressed, that it may burst on the enemy with resistless force. It should exhibit in its effects, not the violence of the transient storm, but the sweeping fury of the tempestuous hurricane. In atonement for his past comparative sloth, the Spaniard should awaken, and give the utmost activity to all the energies of his soul. One grand simultaneous effort, one general explosion of patriotic force, would annihilate the invader, or at least compel him to seek, in his own regions, protection from the avenging havoc of a wronged, insulted, and infuriated adversary. By such exertions alone can the general expectation be fulfilled, that the present campaign ought to be the last; but if the failure of such exertions, from the absence of vigor and enthusiasm and co-operation, should lead to a disastrous termination, the future conquest of the Peninsula can hardly be prevented. A sanguinary and protracted contest might ensue, but it would close with the extinction of the liberties of that fair portion of the European Continent.

From the very cursory view which has been taken of the state of the greater part of the Continent, it appears, that many of the changes which have taken place, in the condition of the respective powers, since the opening of the last campaign, are far from being unfavorable to the cause of the allies. Collectively, they present a mass of various materials, sufficiently substantial for laying the foundations of European independence. For the erection of this grand and beautiful edifice, nothing is wanting but the architectural skill requisite for the solid adjustment of its constituent parts. Rich and productive quarries every where abound, and zealous and laborious artisans flock from widely distant countries to be employed in its construction.

The crisis of subjection or of liberation is arrived. If this propitious moment be neglected, it may never present itself again; or, at least, many years of unavailing regret may elapse before its return. If France be suffered to re-invigorate her enfeebled arm, its future strength may far exceed its former power; and it may soon be raised, not to menace, but to crush, those whom it has lately attempted in vain to annihilate. France has bled most copiously; but if only a temporary debility should ensue—if her inordinate ambition—her political disease—should not have been radically cured by the severe regimen to which she has been compelled to submit—it will assuredly break forth again, and with a renovated and augmented violence, that will baffle every attempt to mitigate and subdue it. Unless the dangerous malady be healed, eternal reproaches will impugn the reputation of those, by whom a perfect cure ought now to be effected.

No one who has observed, even with the least attention, the conduct of the French Government, and the principles by which all its measures have been guided, can for a moment doubt, that it incessantly aims at universal dominion. New conquests are invariably made subservient to new conquests, and unless effectually checked, the system will remain in constant activity. The scheme of general subjugation will incessantly labor, sometimes with an accelerated, sometimes with a retarded, action. Sometimes it may be forced to retrograde, but will again dart forth with renewed velocity. The multifarious interests and passions which agitate mankind, will, probably in the end, render the full accomplishment of this project of universal conquest unattainable. But France may long flatter herself that it is by no means a chimerical dream of ideal power, and may long exert her vast energies, to the destruction of all public repose, to realize that boundless ideal sovereignty, to which she has the criminal presumption to aspire. The perturbed spirit of French ambition should not be laid and appeased by conciliation; it should be defied and driven back, like the spectre in Macbeth's banquet-scene, to its own legitimate abode.

It is not impossible, that many unforeseen events and chances may occur, by which the march of French ambition may be impeded—it may be checked by an explosion of national discontent—the hand of Death may suddenly arrest the conqueror's career—

vengeance may raise its arm against his life—disease may enfeeble the preternatural energy of his mind—the French Empire may be extended beyond the limits of an uniform municipal control, and the extremities may languish and wither, in consequence of their distance from the centre of Government—the unwieldy colossus may sink under its own weight.

But it is also to be recollected, that these chances and events may *not* occur. To place any fixed dependence on them, to make them a part of the basis of our hostile and political calculations, would argue a total absence of all statesman-like sagacity. The measures adopted by the allies should be founded upon very different data, from which chance need not be excluded; but among which it should not be permitted to enter as an element in the calculation. The object to be attained should be just and right; it should be precisely defined, and kept distinctly in view; and the means for its attainment should be such as, upon every reasonable and probable ground, are best calculated for the insurance of success. If powerful armies are to be vanquished, they are only to be subdued by armies rendered more powerful, if not by superior numbers, at least by efficiency and military zeal. If the adversary be formidable, from having communicated the same spirit and the same character to the multifarious troops under his command, uniformity of character and of spirit must be imparted to the allied forces, by which he is to be assailed. If unity and consistency of plan be inflexibly pursued by the enemy, it can only be frustrated by a persevering resistance, conducted with similar simplicity of operation. In this case, should success be the result, it will be secured without reliance on the uncertainties of chance, though the accidental intervention of this capricious agent may assist the execution of those measures, which have been adopted upon sound and rational principles.

Whatever may be the motives which determined the belligerents to agree to an armistice—whether they were mutually desirous of peace, or secretly hoped that their preparations during the interval might promise to each a decided advantage on a renewal of hostilities—the course to be pursued by the allies should admit of no variation. Peace, secured on the basis of an effective balance of power, should be the sole object either of immediate negociation,

or of eventual war: if such a peace cannot be concluded by diplomatic adjustment, it must be conquered by force of arms. None other can be permanent. The magnitude of Buonaparte's military preparations, at this moment, points clearly to the means by which his propositions will be supported; and if those of the allies should be unaided by an equally warlike attitude, either a precarious and unsubstantial pacification will ensue, or hostilities will recommence under circumstances most unpropitious to the cause of the allies.

At this crisis, every eye is fixed on the conduct of the Cabinet of Vienna. To its decision, consequences of unlimited importance are attached. The determination of Austria may prove decisive, not only of the fate of other nations, but ultimately of her own. The great work of continental deliverance from the yoke of France, so auspiciously begun and prosecuted by Alexander, might now be perfected by the seasonable and magnanimous intervention of the Emperor of Austria. By aiding the allies, he would secure the stability of his own power, and might recover both his lost dignities and his lost possessions. By his junction with France, he would infallibly seal his own ultimate ruin.

Should the armistice lead to negotiation, a general, and not a continental peace, should be its only object. The maritime powers, instead of manifesting a jealousy of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, should zealously uphold those principles to which her naval grandeur is chiefly to be ascribed. If these principles were abandoned, the Maritime States of the Continent would be unbenefited by the sacrifice; whilst their firm and unshaken assertion, by maintaining the naval superiority of Great Britain, enables her effectually to oppose and chastise the ambition of France, and to provide, by this just and equitable exercise of power, for the greater security and independence of the Continent. If the maritime greatness of this country had been extinguished in the course of the revolutionary war, would there at this time have been one free and independent state in Europe? Would not the whole have lain prostrate at the feet of France? The obvious answer to this question is alone sufficient to demonstrate the narrowness of that jealousy with which States, which, besides, are rather military than naval, view the maritime pre-eminence of England, notwithstand-

ing it is to that preponderance alone, that they are, in a great measure, indebted for the means of opposing a successful resistance to French aggression.

Equally animated by a desire to conclude a permanent and honorable peace, the allies cannot manifest too much promptitude to bring to a happy termination the countless miseries of this protracted war. But if it be closed, without that indispensable guarantee for the continuance of peace, which is to be found only in the re-establishment of an effective balance of power, the sanguinary conflict will be renewed with aggravated violence and fury, and afflicted Europe will bleed afresh at every pore.

