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CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING A WARRE

WITH SPAINE.

1629.

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
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
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


Considerations
TOVCHING A
WARRE WITH
SPAIN E.

Written by the Right Honourable
Francis Lo. Verulam,
VI. ST. ALBAN.



Printed 1629.



Considerations TOUCHING A WARRE WITH SPAINE.

YOur Maiestie hath an Imperiall name; It was a *Charles* that brought the Empire first into France; A *Charles* that brought it first into Spaine; Why should not Great Brittain have his turne? But to lay aside all that may seeme to haue a shew of fumes and fancies, and to speake solids: A warre with Spaine (that the King shall enter into it) is a mightie worke; It requireth strong materials and active motions; He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according to knowledge: But neuerthelesse, Spaine is no such Giant, and he that thinketh Spaine to be some great overmatch for this Estate, assisted as it is and may be, is no good Mint-man, but takes greatnesse of Kingdomes according to their bulke and currencie, and not after their intrinsique value.

Although therefore I had wholly sequestred my thoughts from ciuill affaires, yet because it is a new case, and concerneth my Countrey infinitely; I obtained of my selfe to set downe, out of long continued experience in businesse of estate, and

much conuersation in bookes of policie and historie, what I thought pertinent to this businesse, and in all humblenesse to present it to your Maiestie; hoping, that at least you will discern the strength of my affection, through the weaknesse of my abilities: For the Spaniards haue a good prouerbe, *Desnariosi Empre con la Calentura*; There is no heat of affection, but it is ioyned with some idlenesse of braine.

To warre are required a iust quarrell, sufficient forces and prouisions, and a prudent choyce of the designes. So then I will first iustifie the quarrell; secondly, ballance the forces; and lastly, propound varietie of designes for choyce: For that were not fit for a writing of this nature, neither is it a Subject within the leuell of my iudgement, I being in effect a stranger to the present occurrences.

Warres (I speake not of ambitious predatorie warres) are suits of appeales to the Tribunall of Gods Iustice, when there are no Superiours on earth to determine the cause, and they are as ciuill pleas, either plaints or defences.

There are therefore three iust grounds of warre with Spaine; One vpon plaint, two vpon defence; *Salomon* saith, A cord of three is not easily broken, but especially when euerie of the lines wil hold by it selfe; They are these; The Recouerie of the Palatinate, A iust feare of the Subuersion of our Church and Religion; For in the handling of these two last grounds of Warre, I shall make it plaine, that warres preuentive vpon iust feares, are true defensives, as well as vpon actuall inuasions. And
again,

again, that Warres defensiu for Religion (I speake not of Rebellions) are most iust, though offensive Warres for Religion, are seldome to be approued or neuer, except they haue some mixture of Ciuill Titles. But all that I shall say in this whole argument, will bee but like bottomes of threed close wound vp, which with a good needle, perhaps may be flourished into large workes.

For the asserting of the Iustice of the quarrell, for the recouerie of the Palatinate, I shall not goe so high, as to discusse the right of the warre of Bohemia, which if it be freed from doubt on our part, then there is no colour nor shadow, why the Palatinate should be retained, the rauishing whereof was a meere excursion of the first wrong, and a superiniustice. But I doe not take my selte to bee so perfect in the customes, Records, transactions, and priuileges of that Kingdome of Bohemia, as to be fit to handle that part; and I will not offer at that I cannot master: Yet this I will say in passage positiuely and resolutely, That it is impossible and repugnant in it selte, that an electiue Monarchie should be so free and absolute as an hereditarie, no more than it is possible for a Father to haue so full power and interest in an adoptiue Sonne, as in a naturall, *Qui naturalis obligatio forcior ciuili.* And againe, that receiued Maxime is almost vnshaken and infallible, *Nil magis natura consentaneum est quam ut eisdem modis res dissoluantur quibus constituuntur;* So that if the part of the People or Estate be somewhat in the election, you cannot make them nulles or cyphers in the prouision or translation;

and if it bee said, that this is a dangerous opinion for the Pope, Emperour, and all electiue Kings; it is true, it is a dangerous opinion, and ought to be a dangerous opinion to such personall Popes, Emperours, or electiue Kings, as shall transcend their limits, and become tyrannicall.

But it is a safe and sound opinion for their Seas, Empires and kingdomes, and for themselues also, if they be wise; *Plenitudo potestatis est plenitudo tempestatis*: but the chiefe cause why I doe not search into this point, is, because I need it not. And in handling the right of a Warre, I am not willing to intermix matters doubtfull, with that which is out of doubt: For as in capitall causes, wherein but one mans life is in question, *in fauorem vite*, the euidence ought to be cleare, so much more in the Iudgement of a Warre which is capitall to thousands: I suppose therefore, the worst that the offensive Warre vpon Bohemia hath bene vniust, and then make the case, which is no sooner made than resolued; if it be made, not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously: It is this in these, An offensive War is made, which is vniust to the Aggressor, the prosecution and race of the Warre carrieth the Defendant to assault and inuade the ancient and indubitate patrimonie of the first Aggressor, which is now turned Defendant, shall he sit downe, and not put himselfe in defence, or if hee be disposed, shall he not make a Warre for the Recovery? No man is so poore of Iudgement, as will affirme it. The Castle of Cadmus was taken, and the Citie of Thebes it selfe inuested by *Phebidas* the Lacedemonian, insidiouly
and

and in violation of league: the proceſſe of this action drew on a reſurpriſe of the Caſtle by the Athebians, a Recouery of the Towne, and a Current of the Warre euen vnto the walls of Sparta; I demand, was the defence of the Citie of Sparta, and the expulſion of the Thebians out of the ancient Laconion Territories vniuſt? The ſtaruing of that part of the Dutchie of Millaine, which lieth vpon the Riuer of Adda, by the Venetians, vpon contract with the French, was an ambitious and vniuſt purchaſe. This wheele ſet on going, did power a Warre vpon the Venetians, with ſuch a tempeſt, as Padona and Triuigi were taken from them, and all their Dominions vpon the Continent of Italy abandoned, and they confined within the ſalt waters: will any man ſay that the memorable recouery and defence of Padona, (when the Gentlemen of Venice vnued to the Wars) out of the loue of their Country, became braue and martiall the firſt day; and ſo likewise the redemption of Triuigi, and the reſt of their Dominions, was matter of ſcruple, whether iuſt or no, becauſe it had force from a quarrell ill begun. The Warres of the Duke of Urbine, Nephew to Pope *Iuly* the ſecond, when he made himſelfe head of the Spaniſh Mutiniers, was as vniuſt, as vniuſt might be, a ſupport of deſperate Rebels, and inuaſion of Saint *Peters* patrimony, and what you will. The race of this Warre fell vpon the loſſe of Urbine it ſelfe (which was the Dukes vndoubted right) yet in this caſe not penitentiary, though he had enioyned him neuer ſo ſtrait penance to expiate his firſt offence, would haue counſelled him to haue giuen over the
pursuit.

pursuit of his right for Urbine; which after he obtained prosperously, and hath transmitted to his family, yet vntill this day.

Nothing more vniust than the inuasion of the Spanish *Armado* in 83. vpon our Seas (for our Land was holy land to them, they might not touch it) shall I say therefore, that the Defence of Lybone or Cales afterward was vniust. There be thousands of examples, *vitor in re non dubia exemplis non necessariis*: The reasons are plaine, Warres are vindict, Reuenges reparations; but reuenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And therefore, when a voluntary offensive Warre, by the designe or fortune of the Warre, is turned into a necessary defensive; the Scene of the Tragedie is changed, and it is a new Act to begin: For though the particular actions of Warres are complicate in fact, yet they are separate and distinct in right, like to crosse suits in Ciuill pleas, which are sometimes both iust, but this is so cleare, as needeth not further to be insisted vpon. And yet if in things so cleare, it were fit to speake of more or lesse cleare, in our present cause, it is the more cleare on our part, because the possession of Bohemia is settled with the Emperour; for though it be true, that *non datur compensatio iniuriarum*; yet were there somewhat more colour to detaine the Palatinate; as in the nature of a recouery in value or compensation if Bohemia had beene lost, or were still the Stage of the Warre. Of this therefore I speake no more. As for the title of proscription or forfeiture wherein the Emperour vpon the matter hath beene

Iudge

Judge and Party, and hath iustified himselfe. God forbid but that it should well endure an appeal to a War, for certainly the Court of Heauen (I take it) is as well a Chancery to saue and debar forfeitures, as a Court of common Law to decide rights, and there would be worke enough in Germany, Italy, and other parts, if imperiall forfeitures should goe for good titles.

Thus much for the first ground of Warre with Spaine, being in the nature of a plaint for the Recouery of the Palatinate, omitting that here which might be the seed of a larger discourse, and is verified by a number of examples, which is, that whatsoever is gained by an abusive treaty, ought to be restored *in integrum*. As we see the daily experience of this in Ciuill Pleas, (for the images of great things are best seene contracted into small glasses) we see (I say) that all pretorian Courts, if any of the parties be entertained or laid asleepe, vnder pretence of an Arbitriment or accord, and that the other party during that time, doth cautelously get the start and aduantage at common Law, though it be to iudgement and execution ; Yet the Pretorian Court will set backe all things *in statu quo prius*, no respect had to such euiction or dispossession. Lastly, let there be no mistaking, as if when I speake of a Warre for the recouery of the Palatinate, I meant, that it must be *in linea recta*, vpon that place ; for looke in *ius feiale*, and all examples, and it will be found to be without scruple, that after a legation *ad res repetendas*, and a refusall, and a denuntiation or indiction of a Warre, the Warre is no more

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confined

confined to the place of the quarrell, but is left at large, and to choice (as the particular conducting: designes) as opportunities and aduantages shall inuite.

To proceed therefore to the second ground of a Warre with Spaine; we haue set it downe to be a iust feare of the subuersion of our ciuill estate: So then the Warre is not for the Palatinate onely, but for England, Scotland, Ireland, our King, our Prince, our Nation, and all that we haue; wherein two things are to be proued, the one that a iust feare (without an actuall inuasion or offence) is a sufficient ground of a Warre, and in the nature of a true defensiuē; the other that we haue towards Spaine cause of iust feare, I say iust feare, for as the Ciuilians doe well define that the legall feare is *iustus metus qui cadit in constantem virum*, in priuate causes, so there is *iustus metus qui cadit in constantem Senatum in causa publica*, not out of vmbages, light iealousnesse, apprehensions a farre off, but out of cleare foresight of imminent danger.

Concerning the former proposition, it is good to heare what time saith.

Thucydides in his inducement to his story of the great Warre of Peloponnesus, sets downe in plaine rearmes, that the true cause of that Warre, was the ouer-growing greatnesse of the Athenians, and the feare that the Lacedemonians stood in thereby, and doth not doubt to call it, A necessity imposed vpon the Lacedemonians of a Warre, which are the very words of a meere Defensiuē, adding, that the other causes were but specious and popular; *Verissi-*

nam quidem, sed minime sermone celebratam arbitror extitisse belli causam, Athenienses magnos effectus, & Lacedemoniis formidolosos necessitatem illis imposuisse bellandi, quæ autem propalam ferebantur utrinque causæ istæ fuerunt, &c. The truest cause of this Warre, though least voyced, I conceiue to haue beene this; that the Athenians being growne great, to the terrour of the Lacedemonians, did impose vpon them the necessity of a Warre. But the causes that went abroad in speeches were these.

Sulpitius Galba, Consull, when he perswaded the Romans to a preuentive Warre, with the later *Philip* King of Macedon, in regard of the great preparations which *Philip* had then on foot, and his designs to ruine some of the Confederates of the Romans, confidently saith, that they who tooke that for an offensive Warre, vnderstood not the state of the question: *Ignorare videmini mihi (Quirites) non utrum bellum an pacem habeatis vos Consuli, neque enim liberum id vobis permittet Philippus, qui terra marique ingens bellum molitur, sed utram in Macedoniam legiones transportetis, an hostem in Italiam accipiatis*; You seeme to me (you Romans) not to vnderstand, that the consultation is before not, whether you shall haue War or Peace, for *Philip* will take order you shall bee no choosers, who prepareth a mighty Warre both by Land and Sea; but whether you shall transport the Warre into Macedon, or receive it into Italy.

Antiochus when he incited *Prusias* King of Bithinia (at that time in league with the Romans) to ioyne with him in Warre against them, setteth be-

fore him a iust feare of the ouerspreading greatnesse of the Romans, comparing it to a fire that continually tooke and spread from Kingdome to Kingdome; *Venire Romanos ad omnia Regna tollenda, ut nullum vsquam orbis terrarum nisi Romanum imperium esset, Philippum & Nabin expugnatos, se tertium peti, ut quisque proximus ab oppresso sit per omnes vclut continens incendium peruasurum*; that the Romans came to pull downe all Kingdomes, and to make the State of Rome an vniuersall Monarchie, that *Philip* and *Nabis* were already ruinated, & now was his turne to be assailed: so that as euery State lay next to the other that was oppressed, so the fire perpetually grazed, wherein it is well to be noted, that towards ambitious States which are noted to aspire to great Monarchies, and to seeke vpon all occasions to enlarge their dominions, *Crescunt argumenta iusti mei*: All particular feares doe grow and multiply out of the contemplation of the generall courses and practices of such States, therefore in deliberations of warre against the Turke, it hath beene often with great iudgment maintained, that Christian Princes and States haue alwayes a sufficient ground of inuasiue warre against the enimie, not for the cause of religion but vpon a iust feare, for as much as it is a fundamentall law in the Turkish Empire that they may (without any other prouocation) make warre vpon Christendome, for the propagation of their law, so that there lieth vpon the Christians a perpetuall feare of a Warre, (hanging ouer their heads) from them: and therefore they may at all times (as they thinke good) be vpon the prevention.

Demosthenes

Demosthenes exposeth to scorne Warres which are not preuentive, comparing those that make them, to countrey fellowes in a Fence Schoole, that neuer ward till the blow be past, *ut barbari pugiles dimicare solent, ita vos bellum geritis cum Philippo, ex his enim is qui ictus est, ictui semper inheret, quod si eum alibi verberes illo manus transfert, ictum autem propellere aut prospicere neque scit neque vult*: As countrey fellowes vse to doe when they play at Wasters, such a kinde of warre doe you (Athenians) make with *Philip*, for with them he that gets a blow, streight falleth to ward when the blow is past, and if you strike him in another place, thither goes his hand likewise: but to put by, or foresee a blow, they neither haue the skill, nor the will.

Clinias the Candian (in *Plato*) speaks desperately and wildely, as if there were no such thing as peace betweene Nations, but that euery Nation expects but his aduantage to Warre vpon another.

But yet in that excesse of speech there is thus much that may haue a ciuill construction, namely, that euery state ought to stand vpon his guard, and rather preuent than be preuened. His words are, *Quam rem fere vocant pacem, nudum & inane nomen est, reuera autem omnibus aduersus omnes Civitates bellum sempiternum perdurat*: That which men for the most part call peace, is but a naked and empty name; but the truth is, that there is euer betweene all Estates a secret Warre. I know well this speech is the obiection and not the decision, and that it is after refused; but yet (as I said before) it beares thus much of truth, that if that generall maligni-

ty and predisposition to warre (which hee vnruly figureth to be in all nations) be produced and extended to a iust feare of being oppressed, then it is no more a true peace, but a name of peace.

As for the opinion of *Iphicrates* the Athenian, it demands not so much towards a Warre, as a iust feare, but rather commeth neare the opinion of *Clinias*, as if there were euer amongst Nations a brooding of a warre, and there is no sure league, but impuissance to doe hurt : for hee in the treaty of peace with the Lacedemonians, speaketh plaine language, telling them, there could be no true and secure peace, except the Lacedemonians yeelding to those things, which being granted, it would bee no longer in their power to hurt the Athenians, though they would.

And to say truth, if one marke it well, this was in all memory the maine peece of wisdome in strong and prudent Counsels, to be in perpetuall watch, that the States about them, should neither by approach, nor by increase of Dominion, nor by ruining confederates, nor by blocking of trade, nor by any the like meanes, haue it in their power to hurt or annoy the States they serue ; and whensoever any such cause did but appeare, straight-ways to buy it out with a Warre, and neuer to take vp peace at credit, and vpon interest. It is so memorable, as its yet fresh, as if it were done yesterday, how that Triumvirate of Kings, *Henry* the eight of England, *Francis* the first of France, and *Charles* the fifth Emperour, and King of Spaine, were in their times so prouident, as scarce a palme of ground could bee
gotten

gotten by either of the three, but that the other two would be sure to doe their best to set the ballance of Europe vpright againe. And the like diligence was vsed in the age before by that league (wherewith *Guicciardine* beginneth his story, and maketh it as it were the Calender of the good dayes of Italy, which was contracted betweene *Ferdinando* King of Naples, *Lorenço* of Medici, Potentate of Florence, and *Lodouico Sforça* D. of Milan, desined chiefly against the growing power of the Venetians; but yet so as the confederates had a perpetuall eye one vpon another, that none of them should ouertop. To conclude therefore howsoeuer some Schoolemen (otherwise reuerend men) yet fitter to guide penknives than swords) seeme precisely to stand vpon it, that euery offensive Warre must be *ultio* a reuenge, that presupposeth a precedent assault or iniury, yet neither doe they descend to this point (which we now handled) of a iust feare, neither are they of authority to iudge this question against all the Presidents of time, for certainly as long as men are men (the sons of the Poets allude of *Promethæus*, not of *Epimethæus*) and as long as reason is reason, a iust feare will be a iust cause of a preuentiuè Warre; but especially if it be part of the cause, that there be a Nation that is manifestly detested to aspire to Monarchie and new acquets, then other States assuredly cannot be iustly accused for not staying for the first blow; or for not accepting *Poliphemus* courtesie, to be last that shall be eaten vp.

Nay I obserue further, that in that passage of *Plato*
which

which I cited before, and euen in the tenet of that person that beareth the resolving part, and not the objecting, a iust feare is iustified for a cause of an invasive warre, though the same feare proceed not from the fault of the forraine state to be assayed, for it is there insinuated that if a state out of the distemper of their owne body, doe feare sedition and intestine troubles to breake out amongst themselues, they may discharge their owne ill humours vpon a forren warre for a cure, and this kind of cure was tendered by *Jasper Coligni* Admirall of France to *Charles* the ninth the French King, when by a viue and forcible perswasion, he mooued him to make a warre vpon Flaunders, for the better extinguishment of the ciuill warres of France; but neither was that counsell prosperous neither will I maintaine that proposition, for I will neuer set Politiques against Ethickes, especially for that true Ethiks are but as a handmaid to Diuinity and Religion: surely *S. Thomas* who had the largest heart of the schoole Diuines, bendeth chiefly his stile against depraued passions which raigne in making wars, out of *S. Augustine*, *Nocendi cupiditas, vlciscendicrudelitas, implacatus & implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi & si quae sunt similia, haec sunt quae in bellis iure culpantur*: And the same Saint *Thomas* in his owne text defining of the iust causes of a Warre, doth leaue it vpon very generall tearmes, *Requiritur ad bellum causa iusta, vt scilicet illi qui impugnantur propter aliquam culpam impugnationem mereantur*, For *impugnatio culpae*, is a farre more generall word, than *ultiominuria*.

And thus much for the first proposition of the second ground of a warre with Spaine, namely that a iust feare is a iust cause of a warre, and that a preventive warre is a true defensiuē. The second or minor proposition was this, that this Kingdome hath cause of a iust feare of ouerthrow from Spaine, wherein it is true that feares are euer seen in dimmer lights, than facts; and on that other side, feares vse many times to bee represented in such an imaginary fashion, as they rather dazell mens eies, than open them; and therefore I will speake in that manner which the subiect requires, that is prob bly, and moderatly, and briefly; neither will I deduce these feares to the present occurrents: but poynt only at generall grounds leauing the rest to more secret counsell.

It is nothing that the Crowne of Spaine hath inlarged the bounds thereof within this laste six-score yeares; much more than the Ottomans, I speak not of matches or vnions, but of armes, occupations, inuasions. Granado, Naples, Milan, Portugal, the East and West Indies; all these are actual additions to that crowne, and in possession: they haue a great minde to French Britaine, the lower part of Pickardi and Piemont; but they haue let fall their bit, they haue at this day such a houering possession of the Valtoline, as an Hobby hath ouer a Larke: And the Palatinate is in their talents, so as nothing is more manifest than that this Nation of Spaine runnes a race still of Empire, when all other States of Christendome stand (in effect) at a stay.

Looke then a little further into the titles where-

by they haue acquired, and doe now hold these new portions of their Crowne, and you will finde them of so many varieties and such natures (to speake with due respect) as may appeare to be easily mined, and such as can hardly at any time be wanting, and therefore so many new conquests and purchases, so many strokes of the Larum bell of feare and awaking to other Nations, and the facility of the titles which hand overhead haue serued their turne, doth ring the peale so much the sharper and the lowder.

Shall wee discend from their generall disposition to enlarge their dominions, to their particular dispositions and eye of appetite which they haue had towards vs, they haue now sought twice to impatronise themselves of this Kingdome of England, once by mariage with *Queene Mary*, and the second time by conquest in 83. when their forces by Sea and Land, were not inferiour to those they haue now; and at that time in 83. the Counsell and designe of Spaine, was by many aduertisements reuealed and laid open, to bee that they found the warre vpon the Low-Countries, so churlish and longsome, as they grew then to a resolution, that as long as England stood in state to succour those Countries, they should but consume themselves in an endlesse warre, and therefore there was no other way, but to assaile and depresse England, which was a backe of Steele to the Flemmings; and who can warrant (I pray) that the same counsell and designe will not returne againe? so as we are in a strange dilemma of danger: for if we suffer the
Flemmings

Flemmings to be ruinated, they are our outworkes, and we shall remaine naked and dismantled ; if we succour them strongly (as is fit) and set them vpon their feet, and doe not withall weaken Spaine, we hazzard to change the Scene of the warre, and to turne it vpon Ireland or England, like vnto Rheumes and defluctions, which if you apply a strong repercussive to the place affected, and do not take away the cause of the disease, will shift and fall streightwayes to another ioynt or place. They haue also twice inuaded Ireland, once vnder the Popes banner, when they were defeated by *Gray*, and after in their owne name, when they were defeated by *Mountioy* ; so as let this suffice for a taste of their disposition towards vs : but it will be said this is an Almanacke for the old yeare : since 88. all hath beene well, Spaine hath not assailed th s Kingdome, howsoeuer by two seuerall inuasions from vs mightily prouoked: It is true, but then consider, that immediately after they were imbroyled for a geat time in the protection of the league of France whereby they had their hands full ; after being brought extreme low by their vast and continuall imbracements, they were enforced to bee quiet, that they might take breath, and doe reparations vpon their former wastes : but now of late things seeme to come on apace to their former estate, Nay with farre greater disaduantage to vs, for now that they haue almost continued, and (as it were) arched their dominions, from Milan by the Valtoline and Palatinate to the Low Countries; we see how they thirst and pant after the vtter

ruine of those States, having in contempt almost the Germane Nation, and doubting little opposition except it come from England, whereby wee must either suffer the Dutch to be ruined, to our owne manifest prejudice, or put it vpon the hazard I speake of before, that Spaine will cast at the fairest. Neither is the point of internall danger which groweth vpon vs to be forgotten; this that the party of the Papists in England are become more knotted, both in dependance towards Spaine, and amongst themselves then they haue beene, wherein againe comes to be remembred the cause of 88. for then also it appeared by diuers secret letters, that the designe of Spain was for some yeares before the inuasion attempted to prepare a party in this Kingdome, to adhere to the foraine at his comming : and they bragged that they doubted not but to abuse and lay asleepe the Queene and Counsell of England, as to haue any feare of the party of Papists here, for that they know (they said) the State would but cast the eye, and looke about to see whether there were any eminent head of that party, vnder whom it might vnite it selfe ; and finding none worth the thinking on, the State would rest secure, and take no apprehension, whereas they meant (they said) to take course to deale with the people, and particulars by reconcilements, and confessions, and secret promises, and cared not for any head of party ; and this was the true reason why after that the Seminaries began to blossome, and to make missions into England, which was about the three and twentieth of Queen *Elizabeth*. at what time also was the

the first suspicion of the Spanish inuasion, then and not before, grew the sharpe and seuerer lawes to be made against the Papists, and therefore the Papists may doe well to change their thanks; and whereas they thanke Spaine for their fauours, to thanke them for their perils and miseries, if they should fall vpon them, for that, nothing euer made their case so ill, as the doubt of the greatnesse of Spaine; which adding reason of State, and matter of conscience and religion, doth whet the Lawes against them; and this cause also seemeth (in some sort) to returne againe at this time; except the clemency of his Maiestie and the State do superabound: as for my part I wish it should, and that the proceedings towards them, may rather tend to security and prouidence, and point of State, then to persecuti- on for religion.

But to conclude, these things briefly touched may serue as in a subiect coniecturall, & future, for to represent how iust cause of feare this Kingdome may haue towards Spaine, omitting (as I said before) all present and more secret occurrents.

The third ground of a warre with Spaine I haue set downe to be a iust feare of the subuersion of our Church and Religion, which needeth little speech, for if this war bee a defensiuē (as I haue proued it to be) no man will doubt that a defensiuē warre against a forreiner for religion is lawfull, of an offensiuē war there is no dispute, and yet in that instance of the warre for the holy Land and Sepulcher, I doe wonder sometimes, that the schoole men want words to defend that which *S. Bernard* wanted

words to commend, but I, that in this little extract of a treatise, doe omit things necessary, am not to handle things vnnecessary, no man I say, will doubt, but if the Pope, or King of Spaine, would demand of vs to forsake our Religion vpon paine of a warre, it were as vniust a demand as the Persians made to the Græcians of land and water, or the Ammonites to the Israelites of their right eyes, and we see all the Heathen did stile their defensiu war *pro Aris & focis*, placing their Altars before their Hearthes, so that it is in vaine of this to speake further, only this is true that the feare of the subversion of our Religion from Spaine, is the more iust for that all other Catholique Princes and States, content and containe themselves to maintaine their Religion within their owne Dominions, and medle not with the subiects of other States, whereas the practice of Spaine hath beene both in *Charles* the fifth's time in Germany and in the time of the league in France by warre, and now with vs by conditions of treaty to intermedle with forraine States, and to declare themselves protectors generall of the partie of Catholiques through the world, as if the crowne of Spaine had a title of this, that they would plant the Popes law by armes, as the Ottomans doe the law of *Mahomet*. Thus much concerning the first maine point of iustifying the quarrell, if the King shall enter into a war, for this that I haue said, and all that followeth to be said, is but to shew what he may doe. The second maine part of that I haue propounded to
 speake

speake of is the ballance of forces betweene Spaine
 and vs, and this also tendeth to no more but what
 the King may doe, for what he may doe is of two
 kinds, what he may doe as iust, and what he may
 doe as possible : of the one I haue already spoken,
 of the other I am now to speake : I said Spaine was
 no such Giant, and yet if he were a Giant, it will be
 but as it was betweene *Dauid* and *Goliath*, for God is
 on our side. But to leaue all arguments that are super-
 naturall, and to speake in an humane and politique
 sense, I am led to thinke that Spaine is no ouer-
 match for England, by that which leadeth all men,
 that is, experience and reason, and with experience
 I will begin, for there all reason beginneth. Is it for-
 tune shall we thinke that in all actions of warre or
 Armes great and small, which haue happened
 these many yeares, euer since Spaine and England
 haue had anything to debate one with the other,
 the English vpon all incounters haue perpetually
 come off with honour and with the better ? It is
 not fortune sure, shee is not so constant ; There is
 somewhat in the Nations and naturall courage of
 the people, or some such thing. I will make a
 briefe list of the particulars themselves, in an hi-
 storicall truth no wayes strowted nor made greater
 by language. This were a fit speech, you will
 say, for a Generall in the head of an army when
 they are going to battell, yes, and it is no lesse
 fit speech to be spoken in the head of a Counsell
 vpon a deliberation of an entrance into a warre :
 neither speake I this to disparage the Spanish na-
 tion whom I take to bee of the best souldiers in
 Europe.

Europe. But that sorteth to our honour, if wee still haue had the better hand. In the yeere 1578. was that famous Lammas day which buried the reputation of *Don Iohn de Austria*, himselve not suruiuing long after *Don Iohn* being superiour in forces assisted by the Prince of Parma, *Mondragon*, *Mansell*, and other the best commanders of Spaine confident of victory charged the army of the States neere Rimenant, brauely and furiously at the first, but after fight maintained by the space of a whole day, was repulsed, and forced to a retrait, with great slaughter of his men, and the course of his further enterprizes, wholly arrested, and this chiefly by the prowesse and vertue of the English and Scottish troubles, vnder the conduct of Sir *Iohn Norris*, and Sir *Robert Steward* Colonels, which troupes came to the Army but the day before, harassed with a long and wearisome march, and as it is left for a memorable circumstance in all stories, the Souldiers being more sensible of a litle heat of the Sunne, then of any cold feare of treaty, cast away their armour and garments from them, and fought in their shirts, and as it was generally conceiued, had it not beene that the Count of Bosse was slacke in charging the Spaniards vpon their retraits, this fight had sorted to an absolute defeat; but it was enough to chastise *Don Iohn* for his insidious treaty of peace, wherewith he had abused the States at his first comming, and the fortune of the day, besides the testimony of all stories, may bee ascribed to the seruice of the English and Scottish, by comparison of this charge neare Rime-

nant,

nant, where the English and Scottish in great numbers came in action with the like charge given by *Don Iohn* halfe a yeare before at *Guylours*, where the successe was contrary, there being at that time in the Army but a handfull of English and Scottish, and put in disarray by the horsemen of their owne fellows.

The first dart of Warre which was thrown from Spaine or Rome vpon the Realme of Ireland, was in the yeare 1580. for the designe of *Stuckley* blew ouer into Africke, and the attempt of *Sanders* and *Fitz Morris* had a spice of madnesse. In that yeere Ireland was inuaded by Spanish and Italian forces, vnder the Popes banner and the conduct of *S. Iosepho*, to the number of 700. or better, which landed at *Smerwicke* in *Kerey*. A poore number it was to conquer Ireland to the Popes vse (for their designe was no lesse) but withall they brought armes for 5000. men aboue their owne company, intending to arme so many of the Rebels of Ireland; and their purpose was to fortifie in some strong place of the wilde and desolate Country, and that to nestle till greater succours came, they being hastened vpon this enterprise vpon a speciall reason of State not proper to the enterprise it selfe, which was by the inuasion of Ireland and the noise thereof to trouble the Councell of England, and to make a diuersion of certain aids that were then preparing from hence for the Low Countries. They chose a place where they erected a Fort which they called the Fort del Or, and from thence they bolted like beasts of the Forest sometimes into the Woods and Fastnesses,

and sometimes backe againe to their den. Soone after siege was laid to the Fort by the Lord *Gray*, then Deputy, with a smaller number than those were within the Fort, venturously indeed, but haste was made to attach them before the Rebels came in to them. After the siege of 4. dayes only with two or three sallies, with losse on that part, they that should haue made good the Fort for some moneths, till new succours came from Spaine, or at least from the Rebels of Ireland, yeelded vp themselves without conditions at the end of those foure dayes; and for that there were not in the English Army enow to keepe euery man a Prisoner; and for that also the Deputy expected instantly to be assailed by the Rebels, and againe there was no Barke to throw them into and send them away by Sea, they were all put to the sword; with which Queene *Elizabeth* was afterwards much displeas'd.

In the yeere 1582. was that memorable retrait of Gaunt, then the which there hath not beene an exploit of warre more celebrated, for in the true iudgement of men of warre, honourable Retraits are no wayes inferiour to braue Charges, as hauing lesse of Fortune, more of Discipline, and as much of valour. There were to the number of 300 horse and many thousand foot English commanded by Sir *John Norris*: charged vpon an aduantage taken by the Prince of Parma comming vpon them with 7000. horse, besides that the whole Army of the Spaniards was ready to march on. Neuertheless Sir *John Norris* maintained a retrait without disarray by the space of some miles, part of the way champion vnto
the:

the city of Gaunt, with lesse losse of men than the Enemy. The D. of Anioy and the Prince of Orenge beholding this noble action from the wals of Gaunt as in a Theatre with great admiration.

In the yeere 1585. followed the prosperous Expedition of *Drake* and *Carlile* into the West Indies. In which I set aside the taking of S. Iago and S. Domingo in Hispaniola, as surprisēs rather than encounters. But that of Carthagenā where the Spaniards had warning of our cōming, & had put themselves in their full strength, was one of the hottest seruices & dangerous assaults hath beene knowne, for the accessse to the Towne was only by a necke of, betweene the Sea on the one part, and the Harbour water or minor sea on the other, fortified cleane ouer a strong Rampier and Barricado, so as vpon the ascent of our men they had both great Ordnance and small shot that thundred and showered vpon them from the Rampire in front, and from the Gallies that lay at Sea in flanke, and yet they forced the passage, and wan the Towne, being likewise very well manned. As for the Expedition of Sir *Francis Drake* in the yeere 1587. for the destroying of the Spanish shipping and prouision vpon their owne Coast, as I cannot say that there interuened in that Enterprise any sharpe fight or encounter, so neuerthelessse it did straightly discover, either that Spaine is very weake at home, or very slow to moue, when they suffered a small Fleet of English to make an hostile Inuasion or IncurSION vpon their Hauens and Roades from Cadiz to Cape Sacre, and thence to Cascous, and to fire, sinke, and

carry away at the least 10000. tonne of their greater shipping, besides 50. or 60. of their smaller vessels, and that in the sight and vnder the fauour of their Forts, and almost vnder the eye of their great Admirall, the best Commander of Spaine by sea, the Marquis de Sant Cruce, without euer being disputed with by any fight of importance. I remember *Drake* in the vaunting stile of a Souldier would call this Enterprise the cingeing of the King of Spaines beard. The Enterprise of 88. deserueth to be stood vpon a little more fully, being a miracle of time. There arriued from Spaine in the yeere 1588. the greatest Nauy that euer swam vpon the Seas, for though there haue beene farre greater Fleets for number, yet the bulke and building of the Ships, with the furniture of great Ordnance & prouisions, neuer the like. The designe was to make not an inuasion onely, but an vtter conquest of this Kingdome. The number of Vessels were 130. whereof Galliaffes and Gallions 72 goodly Ships like floating Towers or Castles manned with 30000. Souldiers and Mariners. This Nauy was the preparation of siue whole yeeres at the least : it bare it selfe also vpon diuine assistance, for it receiued speciall blessing from Pope *Zistus*, and was assigned as an Apostolicall mission for the reducement of this Kingdome to the obedience of the See of Rome. And in further token of this holy warfare, there were amongst the rest of these Ships twelue called by the names of the twelue Apostles. But it was truly conceiued that this Kingdome of England could neuer be ouerwhelmed except the Land waters came in

to the Sea tides. Therefore was there also in readinesse in Flanders a mighty Army of Land Forces, to the number of 50000. veterane Souldiers vnder the conduct of the Duke of Parma, the best Commander next the French King the fourth of his time. These were designed to ioyne with forces at Sea, there being prepared a number of flat bottome Boats to transport the Land Forces vnder the wing and protection of the great Nauy, for they made no other account but that the Nauy should be absolutely Master of the Seas. Against these Forces there were prepared on our part to the number of neere 100 ships, not so great of bulke indeed, but of a more nimble motion and more seruiceable, besides a lesse Fleet of 30 ships for the custody of the Narrow Seas. There were also in readinesse at Land two armies, besides other forces, to the number of 10000 dispersed amongst the Coast Townes in the Southerne parts, the two armies were appointed, one of them consisting of 25000 horse and foot for the repulsing of the Enemy at their landing, and the other of 35000 for safeguard and attendance about the Court and the Queenes person. There were also other dormant musters of Souldiers thorowout all parts of the Realme, that were put in readinesse, but not drawne together. The two Armies were assigned to the leading of two Generals, noble Persons, but both of them rather Courtiers, and assured to the State, then Martiall men, yet loued and assisted with subordinate Commanders of great experience and valour. The fortune of the warre made this enterprise at first a play at Base: The Spanish Nauy

set forth out of the Groyne in May, and was dispersed and driuen backe by weather : Our Nauy set forth somewhat later out of Plimouth, and bare vp towards the Coast of Spaine to haue fought with the Spanish Nauy ; and partly vpon aduertisement that the Spaniards were gone back, and vpon some doubt also that they might passe by towards the Coast of England whilest wee were seeking them a farre off, returned likewise into Plimouth about the middle of Iuly. At that time came more constant aduertisement (though false) not only to the Lord Admirall, but to the Court, that the Spaniards could not possibly come forwards that yeere, whereupon our Nauy was vpon the point of disbanding, and many of our men gone ashore. At what very time the inuincible Armado (for so it was called in a Spanish ostentation thorowout Europe) was discovered vpon the Westerne Coast : It was a kinde of surprize, for that (as wee said) many of our men were gone on Land, and our ships ready to deparr. Neuertheless the Admirall with such ships only as could suddenly be put in readinesse, made forth towards them : insomuch as of 100 ships there came scarcee thirty to worke. Howbeit with them and such as came duty in wee set vpon them and gaue them the chase. But the Spaniards for want of courage (which they called Commission) declined the fight, casting themselues continually into Roundels (cheir strongest ships walling in the rest) and in that manner they made a flying march towards Callis. Our men by the space of fīue or six dayes followed them close, fought with them continually, made

great

great slaughter of their men, tooke two of their great ships, & gaue diuers other of their ships their deaths wounds, whereof soone after they sanke and perished, and in a word distressed them almost in the nature of a defeat, wee our selues in the meane time receiuing little or no hurt. Neere Callis the Spaniards anchored, expecting their Land forces, which came not. It was afterwards alleaged that the Duke of Parma did artificially delay his coming; but this was but an inuention and pretention giuen out by the Spaniards, partly vpon a Spanish enuy against the Duke being an Italan, and his son a Competitor to Portugall, but chiefly to saue the monstrous scorne and disreputation which they and their Nation receiued by the successe of that enterprise, therefore their colours and excuses forsooth were, that their Generall by Sea had a limited Commission, not to fight vntill the Land Forces were come in to them, and that the Duke of Parma had particular reaches and ends of his owne vnder hand to crosse the designe. But it was both a strange Commission, and a strange obedience to a Commission, for men in the midst of their own bloud, and being so furiously assailed, to hold their hands, contrary to the lawes of nature and necessarie. And as for the Duke of Parma, hee was reasonably well tempted to be true to that enterprise, by no lesse promises than to be made Feudatary or Beneficiary King of England vnder the Seignorie in the chiefe of the Pope & the protection of the King of Spaine. Besides it appeared that the Duke of Parma held his place long after in the fauour and trust of the King
of

of Spaine, by the great employments and seruices that he performed in France. And againe it is manifest that the Duke did his best to come downe and to put to Sea: the truth was, that the Spanish Nauy vpon these proofes of fight which they had with the English, finding how much hurt they receiued, and how little they did by reason of the actiuitie & low building of our ships, and skill of our Seamen, and being also commanded by a Generall of small courage and experience, and hauing lost at the first two of their brauest Commandars at Sea, *Petro de Valdez* and *Michael de Oquenda*, durst not put it to a battell at Sea, but set vp their rest wholly vpon the Land enterprise. On the other side the transporting of the Land forces failed in the very foundation, for whereas the Councell of Spaine made full account that their Nauy should be Master of the Sea, and therefore able to guard and protect the Vessels of transportation, when it fell out to the contrary, that the great Nauy was distressed and had enough to do to saue it selfe, and againe that the Hollanders impounded their Land forces with a braue Fleet of 30 Saile excellently well appointed; Things (I say) being in this case, it came to passe that the Duke of Parma must haue flowne if he would haue come into England, for he could get neither Barke nor Mariner to put to Sea: yet certaine it is that the Duke looked still for the comming backe of the Armada, euen at that time when they were wandring and making their perambulation vpon the Northern Seas. But to returne to the Armado which we left anchored at Callis; From thence (as Sir *Walter Rawleigh*

was wont prettily to say) they were suddenly driven away with squibs, for it was no more but a stratagem of fireboats manlesse and sent vpon them by the fauour of the wind in the night time, that did put them in such terrour as they cut their cables and left their anchors in the sea. After they houered many dayes about Graueling, and there againe were beaten in a great fight, at what time our second Fleet which kept the narrow Seas was come in and ioyned with our maine Fleet. Thereupon the Spaniards entring into further terrour, and finding also diuers of their ships euery day to sinke, lost all courage, & in stead of coming vp into the Thames mouth for London (as their desigine was) fled on towards the North to seeke their fortunes, being still chased by the English Nauy at the heeles, vntill wee were fain to giue them ouer for want of powder. The breath of Scotland the Spaniards could not endure, neither durst they as Innaders land in Ireland, but only enobled some of the coasts thereof with shipwracks, and so going northwards aloofe as long as they had any doubts of being pursued, at last when they were out of reach they turned and crossed the Ocean to Spaine, hauing lost fourescore of their ships and the greater part of their men. And this was the end of that Sea Giant, the inuincible Armado, which hauing not so much as fired a Cottage of ours at Land, nor taken a Cockboat of ours at Sea, wandered thorow the wildernesse, of the Northerne Seas, & according to the curse in the Scripture, came out against vs one way and fled before vs 7. wayes, seruing only to make good the iudgement of an Astrologer long before given, *Octogesimus octauus mirabilis annus*, or rather indeed to make good euen to the astonishment of all posteritie, the wonderfull iudgements

ments of God powred downe commonly vpon vast and proud aspirings.

In the yeere that followed, 1589, we gaue the Spaniards no breath, but turned challengers & inuaded the Mainie of Spaine : in which enterprife although we failed of our end, which was to settle *Don Antonio* in the Kingdome of Portugall, yet a man shall hardly meet with an action that doth better reueale the great secret of the power of Spaine, which well sought into will be found rather to consist in a veteran Army, such as vpon seuerall occasions and pretences they haue euer had on foot in one part or other of Christendome now by the space almost of six score yeeres, then in the strength of their seuerall dominions and prouinces : for what can be more strange or more to the disualuation of the power of the Spaniards vpon the Continent, then that with an Army of 11000. English land souldiers, and a Fleet of 26. ships of warre, besides some weake vessels for transportation, we should with the houre glasse of two moneths haue won one Towne of importance by Escalida, battered and assaulted another, ouerthrowne great forces in the field, & that vpon the disadvantage of a bridge strongly barricadoed, landed the Army in three seuerall places of his Kingdome, marched seuen dayes in the heart of his countries, lodged 3. nights in the Suburbs of his principall City, beaten his forces into the gates thereof, possessed two of his frontire forts, & after all this came off with small losse of men otherwise then by sicknesse. And it was verily thought, that had it not beene for foure great disfaouours of that voyage, that is to say, in the failing in sundry prouisions that were promised, especially of Cannons for battery, the vaine hopes of *Don Antonio* concerning the people of his

his country to come in to his aid, the disappointment of the Fleet that was directed to come vp the Riuer of Lisborne, and lastly the diseases which spread in the Army by reason of the heat of the season and of the souldiers misrule in diet, the enterprise had succeeded and Lisborne had beene carried. But howsoever it makes prooffe to the world that an inuasion of a few English vpon Spaine may haue iust hope of victory, or at least of a passport to depart safely.

In the yeere 1591. was that memorable fight of an English ship called the *Reuenge*, vnder the command of Sir *Richard Greenefield*, memorable I say beyond credit, & to the height of some heroicall fable. And though it was a defeat, yet it exceeded a victory, being like the Act of *Sampson* that killed more men at his death then he had done in the time of all his life. This ship for the space of 15 houres sate like a Stagge amongst Hounds at the bay, and was seiged and fought with in turne by 15 great ships of Spaine, part of a Nauy of 55 ships in all, the rest like Abettors looking on as farre off. And amongst the 15 ships that fought, the great *Saint Philip* was one, a ship of 1500 Tun, Prince of the 12 Sea Apostles, which was right glad when shee was shifted off from the *Reuenge*. This braue ship the *Reuenge* being manned only with 200 souldiers and mariners, wherof 80 lay sicke, yet neuerthelessse after a fight maintained (as was said) of 15 houres, and two ships of the enemy funke by her side, besides many more torne and battered, and great slaughter of men, neuer came to be entered, but was taken by composition, the enemies themselues hauing in admiration the vertue of the Commander, and the whole tragedy of that ship.

In the yeere 1596 was the second inuasion that wee

made vpon the maine territories of Spaine, prosperously atchieued by that worthy and famous Earle, *Robert* Earle of *Essex*, in consort with the noble Earle of *Nottingham*, that now li ueth, then Admirall. This journey was with lightning, for in the space of 14. houres the King of Spaines Nauy was destroyed, and the Town of *Cales* taken: the Nauy was no lesse than 59. tall Ships, besides 20. Gallies to attend them; the ships were straightwayes beaten and put to flight, with such terrour, as the Spaniards were their owne executioners, and fired them all with their owne hands: the Gallies by the benefit of the shores and shallowes, got away, the Towne was a faire, strong, well built, and rich Citie; famous in antiquity, and now most spoken of for this disaster: it was manned with 4000. souldiers on foot, and some 400. horses; it was sacked and burnt, though great clemency was vsed towards the inhabitants; but that which is no lesse strange than the sudden victory, is the great patience of the Spaniards, who though we stayed vpon the place diuers daye; yet neuer offered vs any play, no neuer put vs in suite by any action of reuenge, or reparation of any times after.

In the yeare 1600. was the battell at *Newport* in the *Low Countries*, where the armies of the *Arch-Duke*, and the *States*, tried it out by a iust battell.

This was the only battell that was fought in those Countries these many yeares, for battels in the *French* wars haue beene frequent. but in the wars of *Flanders* rare, as the nature of a defensive requireth. The forces of both Armies were not much unequal, that of the *States* exceeded somewhat in number, but that againe was recompenced in the qualitie of the souldiers, for those of the *Spanish* part were of the flower of all their forces.

forces. The Archduke was the assailant and the pre-
 uenter, and had the fruit of his diligence and celeritie,
 for he charged certaine Companies of Scottishmen, to
 the number of eight hundred, sent to make good a pas-
 sage, and thereby seuered from the body of the Army,
 and cut them all in peeces, for they like a braue Infan-
 terie, when they could make no honourable retrait, and
 would take no dishonourable flight, made good the
 place with their liues. This entrance of the battell did
 whet the courage of the Spaniards, though it dulled
 their swords, so as they came proudly on confidently
 to defeat the whole Army. The encounter of the maine
 battell which followed was a iust encounter, not haste-
 ning to a sudden rout, nor the fortune of the day resting
 vpon a few former ranks, but foughten out to the
 prooffe by seuerall squadrons, and not without varietie
 of successe; *Stat pedes densusque viro vir*; There fell
 out an error in the Dukes Army, by the ouerbastie
 meddly of some of their men with the enemies, which
 hindered the playing of their great Ordnance. But the
 end was, that the Spaniards were vtterly defeated, and
 5000 of their men in the fight & in the execution slaine
 and taken, amongst whom were many of the principall
 persons of their Army. The honour of the day was
 both by the enemy and the Dutch themselves ascribed
 much to the English, of whom Sir *Francis Vere* in a pri-
 uate Commentary which he wrote of that Seruice, lea-
 ueth testified, that of 1500 in number (for they were no
 more) 800 were slaine in the field, and (which is almost
 incredible in a day of victorie) of the rest two only came
 off vnhurt. Amongst the English Sir *Francis Vere* him-
 selfe had the principall honour of the seruice, vnto
 whom the Prince of Orange (as is said) did transmit

the direction of the Army for that day ; and in the next place Sir *Horace Vere* his brother that now liueth, who was the principall in the actiue part. The seruice also of Sir *Edward Cecil*, Sir *John Ogle*, and diuers other b aue Gentlemen was eminent.

In the yeere 1601 followed the battell of Kinsale in Ireland. By this Spanish Inuasion of Ireland (which was in September that yeere) a man may ghesse how long time Spaniards will liue in Irish ground, which is a matter of a quarter of a ycere, or foure moneths at the most, for they had all the aduantages in the world, and no man would haue thought considering the small forces imployed against them, that they could haue beene driuen out so soone : They had obtained without resistance in the end of September the Towne of Kinsale (a small Garrison of 150 English leauing the Towne vpon the Spaniards approach, & the Townesmen receiuing the Forraines as Friends. The number of Spaniards that put themselues into Kinsale was 2000 men, souldiers of old bands, vnder the command of *Don John d' Aquila*, a man of good valour. The Town was strong of it selfe, neither wanted there any industry to fortifie it on all parts, and make it tenable according to the skill and discipline of Spanish fortification. At that time the Rebels were proud, being encouraged vpon former successes ; for though the then Deputy, the Lord *Mountioy* and Sir *George Carew* President of Munster had performed diuers good seruices to their preiudice, yet the defeat they had giuen to the English at the blacke water not long before, and the Treaty (too much to their honour) with the Earle of Essex was yet fresh in their memory. The Deputy lost no time, but made haste to haue recouered the Towne before new succours

succours came, & fate downe before it in October, and laid siege to it by the space of 3. winter moneths or more, during which time some sallies were made by the Spaniards, but they were beaten in with losse. In Januarie came fresh succours from Spaine, to the number of 2000. more, vnder the conduct of *Alonzo D'Ocampo*, vpon the comforts of these succours *Tirone* and *Odoneale* drew vp their forces together, to the number of 7000. besides the Spanish regiments, and tooke the field, resolved to rescue the towne, and to giue the English battell.

So here was the case, an army of English of some 6000. wasted and tired with a long winters siege, enraged in the middest betweene an army of a greater number than themselues, fresh and in vigour, on the one side; and a towne strong in fortification, and strong in men, on the other side: but what was the event, this in few words: that after the Irish and Spanish forces had come on and shewed themselues in some brauery, they were content to giue the English the honour, as to charge them first; and when it came to the charge, there appeared no other difference betweenc the valour of the Irish Rebels, and the Spaniards, but that the one ranne away before they were charged, and the other straight after; and againe, the Spaniards that were in the towne, had so good memories of their losses, in their former sallies, as the confidence of an army which came for their deliuerance, could not draw them forth againe; to conclude, there succeeded an absolute victory, for the English with the slaughter of about 2000. of the enemy, the taking of nine ensignes, whereof six Spanish; the taking of the Spanish Generall, *D'Ocampo* prisoner, and this with
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the losse of so few of the English, as is scarce credible, being (as hath beene rather confidently, than credibly reported) but one man, the Cornet of Sir *Richard Greame*, though not a few hurt : there followed immediately after the defeat, a present yeelding vp of the towne by composition, and not only so, but an auoiding by expresse Article of treaty accorded of all other Spanish forces thorowout all Ireland, from the places and nests where they had settled themselues in greater strength, as in regard of the naturall scituation of the places, then that was of Kinsall) which were Castle-hauen, Baltimore, and Beere-hauen : Indeed they went away with sound of Trumper, for they did nothing but publish and trumpet all the reproaches they could deuise against the Irish Land and Nation, insomuch as *D' Aquila* said in open treaty, that when the deuill vpon the mount did shew Christ all the Kingdomes of the earth, and the glory of them, he did not doubt but the deuill left out Ireland, and kept it for himselfe.

I cease here, omitting not a few other proofes of the English valour and fortune, in these latter times ; as at the Suburbs of Paris, at the Raneline, at Drus in Britaine, at Ostend, and diuers others, partly because some of them haue not beene proper encounters betweene the Spaniards and the English, and partly because others of them haue not beene of that greatnesse, as to haue sorted in company with the particulars formerly recited. It is true that among all the late adventures, the voyage of Sir *Francis Drake*, and Sir *John Hawkins*, into the West Indies was infortunate, but yet in such sort, as it doth not breake or interrupt our prescription, to haue had the better of the Spaniards vpon all fights, for the disaster of that iourney was caused chiefly

chiefly by sicknes, as well might appeare by the deaths of both the Generals, *Sir Francis Drake* and *Sir John Hawkins* of the same sicknesse amongst the rest. The land enterprise of Panama was an ill measured and immature counsell, for it was grounded vpon a false account that the passages towards Panama were no better fortified then *Drake* had formerly left them, but yet it sorted not to any fight of importance, but to a retreat after the English had proued the strength of their first Fort, and had notice of the two other Forts beyond by which they were to haue marched. It is true that in the returne of the English Fleet they were set vpon by *Auellandea*, Admirall of 20 great ships Spanish, our Fleet being but 14, full of sicke men, deprived of their two Generals by Sea, and hauing no pretence but to journey homewards, and yet the Spaniards did but salute them about the Cape de las Corientes with some small offer of fight, and came off with losse; Although it was such a new thing for the Spaniards to receiue so little hurt vpon dealing with the English, as *Auellandea* made great brags of it, for no greater matter then the waiting vpon the English afarre off from Cape de las Corientes to Cape *Antonio*, which neuerthelesse in the language of a souldier & of a Spaniard he called a chase.

But before I proceed further it is good to meet with an obiection, which if it be not remoued, the conclusion of expeience from the time past to the time present will not be sound and perfect, for it will be said that in the former times (whereof we haue spoken) Spain was not so mighty as now it is, England on the other side was more aforehand in all matters of power; therefore let vs compare with indifferencie these disparities of times, and we shall plainly perceiue that they make for the aduantage of England at this present time. And

because we will lesse wander in generalities, wee will fix the comparisons to precise times, comparing the states of Spaine or England in the yeere 88. with this present yeere that now runneth. In handling this point I will not meddle with any personall comparisons of the Princes Counsellors and Commanders by sea or land, that were then or are now in both Kingdomes, Spaine and England, but onely rest vpon reall points, for the true ballancing of the state of the Forces and Affaires of both times: And yet these personall comparisons I omit not, but that I could evidently shew, that euen in these personall respects the ballance swayes on our side, but because I would say nothing that may saour of the spirit of flattery, or censure of the present gouernment.

First therefore it is certaine that Spaine hath not now a foot of ground in quiet possession more then it had in 88. As for the Valtoline and the Palatinate, it is a Maxime in state, that all countries of new acquest, till they be settled, are matters rather of burthen then of strength. On the other side, England hath Scotland vnited, and Ireland reduced to obedience and planted, which are mighty augmentations.

Secondly, in 88 the Kingdome of France, able to counterpoize Spaine it selfe, (much more in compunction) was torne with the party of the league which gaue law to their King, and depended vpon Spaine. Now France is vnited vnder a valiant young King generally obeyed, if he will himselfe, King of Nauarre as well as of France, and one that is no wayes taken prisoner, though he be tied in a double chaine of alliance with Spaine.

Thirdly, in 88 there sate in the Sea of Rome a fire thundring Frier that would set all at six and seuen, or at

six and five, if you allude to his name. And though he would haue after turned his teeth vpon Spaine, yet hee was taken order with before it came to that. Now there is ascended to the Papacie a personage that came in by a chaste election, no wayes obliged to the party of the Spaniard, a man bred in Ambassages & affaires of State, that hath much of the Prince, and nothing of the Frier, and one, that though he loue the chaire of the Papacy well, yet he loueth the carpet aboute the chaire that is in Italy, and the liberties thereof well likewise.

Fourthly, in 88 the King of Denmarke was a stranger to England, and rather inclined to Spaine; Now the King is incorporated to the bloud of England, and engaged in the quarrell of the Palatinate. Then also Venice, Sauoy, and the Princes and Cities of Germany, had but a dull feare of the greatnesse of Spaine, vpon a generall apprehension onely, of the spreading and ambitious designs of that Nation: now that feare is sharpened and pointed by the Spaniards late enterprises in the Valtoline and the Palatinate which come neerer them.

Fifthly and lastly, the Dutch (which is the Spaniards perpetually Duallist) hath now at this present five Ships to one, and the like proportion in treasure and wealth, to that they had in 88. neither is it possible (whatsoeuer is giuen out) that the Coffers of Spaine should now bee fuller than they were in 88. for at that time Spaine had no other wars saue those of the Low Countries, which was growne into an ordinary: now they haue had coupled with it, the extraordinary of the Valtoline and the Palatinate; and so I conclude my answer to the objection raised touching the difference of times, not entering into more secret passages of State, but keeping the Character of Stile whereof *Seneca* speaketh, *plus significat quam loquitur.*

Here I could passe ouer from matter of experience, were it not that I held it necessary to discouer a wonderfull erroneous obseruation that walketh about, and is commonly receiued contrary to all the true account of time and experience; It is, that the Spaniard where he once getteth in, will seldome or neuer bee got out againe: but nothing is lesse true than this: not long since they got footing at Brest, and some other parts in French Britainie, and after quitted them, they had Calais, Ardes, and Amieus, and rendred them, or were beaten out; they had since Verseilles, and fairely left it; they had the other day the Valtoline, and now haue put it in deposite; what they wil do with Ormus, which the Persian hath taken from them, we shall see; so that to speake trully of latter times, they haue rather poched and offered at a number of enterprises, than maintained any constantly, quite contrary to that idle tradition.

In more ancient times leauing their purchases in Africk, which they after their great Emperor *Charles* had clasped Germany almost in his fist, he was forced in the end to go from Icksparg, & as if it had bin in a Masque by Torch light, to quit euery foot in Germany round, that he had gotten, which I doubt not wil be the hereditary issue of this late purchase of the Palatinate; and so I conclude the ground that I haue to thinke that Spaine will be no ouermatch to Great Britaine, if his Maiestie shall enter into a warre out of experience, and the records of time.

For grounds of reason they are many; I will extract the principall, and open them briefly, and as it were in the bud. For situation, I passe it ouer, though it be no small point; England, Scotland, Ireland, and our good Confederates, the vnited Prouinces, lie all in a plump together, not accessible but by Sea, or at least by passing

of great Riuers, which are naturall fortifications ; as for the Dominions of Spaine, they are so scattered, as it yeeldeth great choice of assents of the war, & promisseth slow succours vnto such part as shall be attempted.

There be three maine parts of military puissance, (*viz.*) men, money, and confederates. For men, there are to be considered, valour, and number, of valour I speake not : take it from the witnesses that haue beene produced before, yet the old obseruation is vnttrue ; That the Spaniards valour lieth in the eye of the looker on, but the English valour lieth about the souldiers heart ; a valour of glory, and a valour of naturall courage are two things : but let that passe, and let vs speake of number. Spaine is a Nation thinne sowne of people, partly by reason of the sterility of the soile, and partly because their natiues are exhausted by so many employments, in such vast territories as they possesse, so that it hath beene counted a kinde of miracle to see 10. or 12000. native Spaniards in an Army ; and it is certaine (as we haue touched it a little before in passage) that the secret of the power of Spaine consisteth in a veterane Army, compounded of miscellany forces of all Nations, which for many yeares they haue had on foot vpon one occasion or other ; and if there should happen the misfortune of a battell, it would bee a long worke to draw on supplies. They tell a tale of a Spanish Ambassadour that was brought to see the treasure of *S. Marke* at Venice, and still hee looked downe to the ground, and being asked why hee looked downe, said, hee was looking to see whether their treasure had any root (so that if it were spent, it would grow againe) as his Masters had. But how soeuer it bee of their treasure, certainly their forces haue scarce any root, or at least such a root, as buddeth forth poorly

and slowly. It is true they haue the Wallons, who are tall Souldiers, but that is but a spot of ground ; but on the other side, there is not in the world againe such a spring and Seminary of braue military people, as in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the vnitied Prouinces, so as if wars should mowe them downe neuer so fast, yet they may be suddenly supplied and come vp againe.

For money, no doubt it is the principall part of the greatnesse of Spaine, for by that they maintaine their veterane army, and Spaine is the only State of Europe, that is a mony grower : but in this part of all others is most to be considered, the ticklish and brittle State of the greatnesse of Spaine. Their greatnesse consisteth in their treasure, their treasure in their Indies, and their Indies (if it be well weighed) are indeed but an accession to such as are Masters by Sea, so as this axeltree whereupon their greatnesse turneth, is soone cut in two, by any that shall be stronger than they by Sea : Herin therefore I refer me to the opinions of all men, enemies or whomsoever, whether that the Maritime forces of Great Britaine and the vnitied Prouinces be not able to beat the Spaniard at Sea ; for if that be so, the links of that chaine whereby they hold their greatnesse are dissolved. Now if it be said, that admit the case of Spaine to be such as we haue made it, yet we ought to descend into our owne case, which we shall finde perhaps not to be in state for treasure, to enter into a warre with Spaine ; To which I answer, I know no such thing, the mint beateth well, and the pulses of the peoples hearts beat well: But there is another point that taketh away quite this obiection : For whereas wars are generally cause of pouerty or consumption, on the contrary part, the speciall nature of this warre with Spaine (if it bee


made by Sea) is like to be a lucratiue and a restoratiue war, so that if we goe roundly on at the first, the war in continuance will finde it selfe: and therefore you must make a great difference betweene *Hercules* labours by land, and *Iasons* voyage by Sea for the Golden fleece.

For the Confederates, I will not take vpon mee the knowledge how the Princes States and Counsels in Europe at this day stand affected towards Spaine, for that trencheth into the secret occurrents of the present time, wherewith in all this treatise I haue forborne to meddle, but to speak of that which lieth open & in view: I see much matter of quarrell and ieaousie, but little of amity and trust towards Spaine, almost from all other estates: I see France is in competition with them for three noble portions of their Monarchie, Nauarre, Naples, and Millaine, and now freshly in difference with them about the Valtolne. I see once in 30. or 40. yeares commeth a Pope, that casteth his eie vpon the kingdom of Naples, to recouer it to the Church, as it was in the minds of *Iulius 2.* *Paulus 4.* and *Titus 5.* As for the great body of Germany, I see they haue greater reason to confederate themselues with the kings of France and Great Britaine, or Denmarke, for the libertie of the Germane nation, and for the expulsion of the Spanish and forren forces, then they had in the yeares 1552. & 1553. At which time they contracted a league with *Henry 2.* the French King, vpon the same articles, against *Charles 5.* who had impatronized himselfe of a great part of Germanie, through discord of the Germane Princes, which himselfe had sown and tomented, which league at that time did the deed, and draue out all the Spaniards out of that part of Germany, and reintegrated that nation in their ancient liberty and honour. For the West Indies though Spain hath had yet not much actual distur-

bance there, except it haue beene from England; yet neuerthelesse I see all Princes lay a kinde of claime vnto them, accounting the title of Spaine but as a Monopolie of those large Countries, wherein they haue in great parts, but an imaginary possession. For Affricke vpon the West, the Moores of Valentia expelled, and their Allies doe yet hang as a cloud or storme ouer Spaine. Gabor on the East, is like an anniuersary wind that riseth euery yeare once vpon the part of Austria. And Persia hath entered into hostility with Spaine, & giuen them the first blow by taking of Ormus. It is within euery mans obseruation also, that Venice doth thinke their State almost vnfixt, if the Spaniards hold the Valtoline, what Sauoy hath learned by fresh experience, that alliance with Spaine is no security against the ambition of Spaine, and that Bauaria hath likewise beene taught, that merits and seruice doe oblige the Spaniards but from day to day: neither doe I say for all this, but that Spain may rectifie much of this ill bloud, by their particular and cunning negociations: but yet there is in the body, and may breake out no man knowes when, into ill accidents; but at least it sheweth plainly, that which serueth for our purpose, that Spaine is much destitute of assured and confident Confederates. And here I will conclude this part, with a Speech of a Counsellour of State; He said to his Master the King of Spaine that now is vpon occasion: Sir I will tell your Maiestie thus much for your comfort; Your Maiestie hath but two enemies, whereof the one is all the world, and the other is your owne Ministers. And thus I end the second maine part I propounded to speake of, which was the ballancing of the forces betweene the Kings Maiestie, and the King of Spaine, if Wars must follow.







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