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CONTEMPORARY
EAST
EUROPEAN
PHILOSOPHY

Edward D'Angelo
David H. DeGroot
Dale Riepe
Editors

Vol. IV

the 1990s, the number of people with a disability has increased in the United States.

As a result of the increase in the number of people with a disability, the number of people with a disability who are employed has also increased. In 1990, 10.5 million people with a disability were employed in the United States. In 2000, 12.5 million people with a disability were employed in the United States. This increase in the number of people with a disability who are employed is due to a number of factors, including the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990.

The ADA is a landmark civil rights law that prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in all areas of public life, including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and private places that are open to the general public. The ADA also requires that people with disabilities be given the same opportunities as people without disabilities to participate in all aspects of society.

One of the ways in which the ADA has helped to increase the number of people with a disability who are employed is by requiring that employers provide reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities. Reasonable accommodations are changes or adjustments to the work environment that enable people with disabilities to perform the essential functions of their jobs.

Examples of reasonable accommodations include providing a person with a wheelchair with a ramp to enter a building, providing a person with a hearing impairment with a sign language interpreter, and providing a person with a visual impairment with a screen reader. These accommodations help to level the playing field for people with disabilities and enable them to compete for jobs on an equal basis with people without disabilities.

In addition to requiring reasonable accommodations, the ADA also prohibits employers from discriminating against people with disabilities in hiring, firing, and promotion. This means that employers cannot refuse to hire a person with a disability, fire a person with a disability, or promote a person with a disability based on their disability.

The ADA has been a major force in increasing the number of people with a disability who are employed in the United States. It has helped to create a more inclusive society in which people with disabilities are given the same opportunities as people without disabilities to participate in all aspects of society.

As a result of the ADA, the number of people with a disability who are employed has increased from 10.5 million in 1990 to 12.5 million in 2000.

This increase in the number of people with a disability who are employed is a testament to the power of the ADA. It shows that when people with disabilities are given the same opportunities as people without disabilities, they can succeed in the workforce and contribute to society in meaningful ways.

The ADA has also helped to change the way that people think about disability. It has helped to break down the barriers that have long existed between people with disabilities and people without disabilities. It has helped to create a more inclusive society in which people with disabilities are valued and respected for their contributions.

The ADA is a landmark civil rights law that has helped to create a more inclusive society in which people with disabilities are given the same opportunities as people without disabilities to participate in all aspects of society. It has helped to increase the number of people with a disability who are employed in the United States and has helped to change the way that people think about disability.

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Preface

The contributors to this fourth volume are Agnes Heller who was born in 1929, later becoming a disciple of Georg Lukács. She is now Chief Research Fellow in the Sociological Research Group of the Hungarian Academy. Her main works are Chernyshevsky's Ethics (1956); The Dissolution of Moral Norms (1957); The Sociology of Morality, or the Morality of Sociology (1963); Social Role and Prejudice (1964); The Ethics of Aristotle (1965); Renaissance Man (1968); Value and History (1969); From Intention to Consequences (1969); and Everyday Life (1970). Robert Steigerwald was born in 1925 of a working class family. He became Doctor of Philosophy, later working as an editor for radio, newspapers, and journals. Also, he was a political organizer for the SPD and later for the KPD, subsequently a political prisoner for five years. He is presently Chairman of the Arbeiterbildungszuneinschaften of the BRD, and is associate editor of the periodical Marxistische Blätter, also writing Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg (1969). Dr. Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924. He received his degree in Philosophy from Charles University, Prague. He has been Associate Professor of the Philosophical Faculty, and since 1961 has been a scientific worker of the Institute for Information Theory and Automation. In 1968 he was appointed Director of the Institute for Theory and Methodology of Science, as well as Full Professor at Charles University. Dr. Zádor Tordai, born in 1924, is a scientific researcher in the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His main research fields are in the philosophy of history and social theory. Books he has written include, Existence et réalité (1967) and Myth and Reality of Alienation (1970). Dr. Henri Wald was born in Romania in 1920. He is a member of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences and Director of Research of the Institute of Philosophy. His principal publications include: La philosophie du désespoir (1957); Introduction à la logique dialectique (1959); La structure



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logique de la pensée (1962); Éléments d'epistémologie générale (1967); and Réalité et langage (1968).

The contributors' essays comprise the remaining articles of the fourth chapter and the first essay of the final chapter, V. The final index and corrigenda will appear in the last volume of this series, VI.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volumes I-IV

Preface.....	pp. i-
Chapter I. Philosophy and Human Practice.....	pp. 4-60.
György Márkus, Marx's Earliest Epistemology.....	pp. 4-15.
Stéfan Anguélov, Reflection and Practice.....	pp. 16-28.
Mihailo Marković, Human Nature and Social Development.....	pp. 29-44.
Mihály Vajda, Nature, Society, and Praxis.....	pp. 45-60.
Chapter II. Marxism-Leninism.....	pp. 61-135.
Auguste Cornu, The Formation of Historical Materialism.....	pp. 61-83.
Nikolai Iribadjakov, The Meaning of History.....	pp. 90-107.
Milan Machovec, World Dialogues.....	pp. 108-121.
Howard L. Parsons, Lenin's Theory of Personality.....	pp. 122-135.
Chapter III. Epistemology, Ontology, and Logic....	pp. 136-243.
Dobrin Spassov, Refutation of Linguistic Philosophy.....	pp. 136-154.
Igor Hrušovský, Being and Structure.....	pp. 155-172.*

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting of the Board of Directors of the [Company Name] held on the 1st day of January, 1900.

[The text in this section is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a list of names and possibly titles, but the specific details cannot be discerned.]

Karel Berka, Toward a Materialistic Foundation of Logic.....	pp. 182-204.
George Brutian, Lenin and Logic.....	pp. 205-215.
Georg Lukács, The Ontological Foundations of Human Thought and Activity.....	pp. 216-230.
Bogusław Wolniewicz, Wittgensteinian Foundations of Non-Fregean Logic.....	pp. 231-243.
Chapter IV. Mass-Media, Technology, and Creativity.....	pp. 244-334.
Ion Banu, The Graphic Figure and the Philosophical Abstraction.....	pp. 244-259.
Henri Wald, Mass-Media and Creative Thinking.....	pp. 274-291.
Ladislav Tondl, The Janus Head of Technology.....	pp. 292-305.
Agnes Heller, The Individual and the Community....	pp. 306-320.
Zádor Tordai, Outline of a Marxist Theory of Alienation.....	pp. 321-334.
Chapter V. Social Philosophy.....	pp. 335-
Robert Steigerwald, Herbert Marcuse's Critical Theory.....	pp. 335-350.**

*
Corrigenda to vols. I & II, p. 177.

* *
Cumulative index to vols. I through IV, pp. 351-355.

Henri Wald

"Mass-Media and Creative Thinking"

The permanent necessary conditions of thinking have not only been brains and a social environment, but also material, physical, sensuous and recurrent elements, without which human moods cannot become thought. Sensations, perceptions, representations, as well as emotions, sentiments, passions, become "symbols" ("signifieds"), only when they are connected with "signs" (signifiants). The main natural signs of human symbols have always been, and still are, images and sounds. That is why the primary senses of man we aim at regarding thought's genesis and progress are sight and hearing, looking and listening. Smell, taste, and touch are too immediately linked to the functions of the biological organism to enable a detachment by man from nature, to enable an embarking upon the infinite evolution of culture. Nevertheless sight is able to retain images reflected by bodies and colors, thus paving the way for the process of abstraction and generalization, which is the starting point of the history of culture. One's memory forgets bodies first, then colors, and finally images. Representations and feelings become symbols only after memory has also forgotten images, retaining only the reflection of the general, recurring features of things. Since it is an abstraction, the symbol can only be formed after memory has been detached from the concrete. In fact, this is the creative function of forgetfulness.

Though they refer to reality, symbols are ideas and not things, spiritual not material, temporal not spatial, intelligible not sensuous. A symbol reflects the general and the recurrent, reality providing the content, viz. the image and the sound. Reality is both the means of signifying and its goal.

One can speak of man the moment anthropoids began using parts of nature as tools to subdue the rest of nature. For this very reason, the symbol is not part of reality. It was born out of man's revolt against reality, out of the doubt and discontent nature brought him. Aiming at the future and essential, the symbol (the signified) permanently outdistances reality. By means of the signified man submits to laws to enable himself to subdue events. Man's destiny is to construct symbols. His most human act is the distinction between phenomenon and essence. In the final analysis, culture's whole history is to be found in matching the gap between phenomenon and essence by widening the distance between sign and symbol. The power man has over nature is directly proportional to the cultural field situated between signs and symbols. The distance achieved between phenomenon and essence of today's space rocket culture is incomparably greater than that covered by the manipulators of uncut stone. The distance between sign and symbol of uncut stone can be instantly covered, while in the context of the space rocket culture, it is much more difficult to pass from the perceived to the known, from "perception" to "understanding".

The limits of human resourcefulness are historical, not logical, because of this field's extensibility. The less dependent the symbol is upon the sign, the greater the extensibility of the cultural field becomes,

Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is too light to transcribe accurately.

the cognitive leap from the sensuous reflection of the phenomenon to the rational reflection of essence being completed in transcending images by means of vocal sounds.

Speech is the least corporeal sign. The sonorous substance of speech is almost immaterial. Speech occurs in time to a greater extent than in space, enriching our inner life more profoundly than our outer life. In this interior monologue, when even sonority disappears, speech is to be identified with consciousness itself. Thus speech is the main instrument in the construction of symbols.

Being made up of the most "spiritual" matter, the verbal sign most appropriately designates symbols; it is further and further removed from the phenomenon, but ever closer to essence. Speech is therefore the fundamental signifier. While sight is linked more to practical operations, hearing attaches to more theoretical ones. Man's actual knowledge of the world began the moment he succeeded in referring to an object by naming it, rather than pointing to it. By listening to their own speech, man can think of that which cannot be seen: the essential and the future. With the help of speech, man frees himself from the concrete, allowing his thought an ever more intensive, creative activity. That which divides the sonorous signals between animals from man's verbal communication is the potentiality of man's unlimited enrichment of the symbol.

Hearing is therefore man's most important sense. Sight has been and still is its subordinate. From the very beginning writing has been a transcription of speech to a greater extent than as a description of nature.

The creative activity of thinking is threatened, whenever the visual is considered to be of greater importance than the auditive; escaping from the supervision of the auditive, the visual tends to degrade ideas into images, and, little by little, to annul the critical distance between sign and symbol. This is the beginning of the hypertrophying of the outer life, to the detriment of the inner life, of production to the detriment of creation, of material needs at the cost of spiritual ones, of experience against reason, the present against the future.

Thus the world loses its dimension of depth, which asks to be thought over, remaining a mere surface dimension asking only to be looked at. From the philosophical point of view Neo-Positivism and Structuralism mark the beginning and end of this epoch.

Mass-media cultural communication has created mass-culture, the symbol being brought back to the sign, cultural signification tending to become natural signalization once more. "Mass culture," Edgar Morin writes, "is the product of a dialogue between production and consumption. Yet this dialogue is not mutual. . . . The consumer, the spectator, responds only by Pavlovian signals: yes and no, success or failure. The consumer never speaks. He listens, sees or refuses to listen or to see."¹

After having found that the "great common unifying theme is that of private life, of the empirical present, of phenomenal reality",² Edgar Morin states: "The camera, the microphone, which catch and transmit whatever is instantaneous, are the predestined instruments of a culture adhering

to immediate reality."³ The products of mass culture are meant to intensify emotional life and not to stimulate creative thinking. We are supposed to deal with "creations worked out not for meditative silence, but for man's adherence to the great rhythm, frantic and exteriorized, of the spirit of the age."⁴

Speaking of today's audio-visual mass-culture, the typographical culture of past centuries, and the oral cultures of primal history, Morin states: "The printed work is an abstract sign: the printed picture is motionless; whereas film, television, and radio directly render life in its real movement."⁵ And later, he adds, "man is replaced by what we call 'public', 'audience', 'spectators'."⁶

While oral culture brings about a total and undifferentiated world view (pragmatic, emotional, and rational simultaneously), and script culture generates an analytical and a specialized world outlook, predominantly rational; the audio-visual mass-culture results again in a total, synchronic, and kaleidoscopic Weltanschauung. The only difference this makes is that the electronic means of information, in contrast to what Rousseau hoped and Marshall McLuhan thinks, will by no means bring us back to nature; but will lead us to an ever higher degree of culture. McLuhan looks upon the great culture of alphabetic writing as an unfortunate break into oral culture. Man, he asserts in Understanding Media, can look back now and clearly see that the two or three millennia of more or less developed mechanization have been only an intermezzo between two great periods of organic culture. It is as though the dogmatization of symbols were due to their being ever further removed from signs (signifiants), as if the de-dogmatization of

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. The text also mentions the need for regular audits to ensure the integrity of the financial data.

In the second section, the author details the various methods used for data collection and analysis. This includes the use of statistical software and manual calculations. The document highlights the challenges of handling large volumes of data and the importance of using appropriate sampling techniques.

The third part of the document focuses on the implementation of internal controls. It describes how these controls are designed to prevent errors and fraud. Key elements include the separation of duties, the use of standardized procedures, and the establishment of a strong internal audit function.

Finally, the document concludes with a summary of the findings and recommendations. It stresses the need for continuous improvement and the importance of staying up-to-date with the latest industry practices and regulations. The author also provides a list of references for further reading.

symbols could be carried out only by annulling this distance, annihilating the distance between sensuousness and reason.

McLuhan suggests in Mutations that, education will be focussed in the future on developing and refining sensitivity of perception to a greater extent than on "brain-stuffing". Further it is said that this will not be a loss to the intellect.

First and foremost, man's humanity expresses itself by its capacity of examining the sensuous presence in order to signify intelligible absence: the absent cause of a present effect, or the absent effect of a present cause. In such a way both Myth and Theory came into being. The destruction of the distance between sign and symbol would lead human thinking back to a pre-mythic epoch. The Westerners have already started replacing myths: "What is characteristic of the Occidental is its setting both within epic and genetic time (the beginnings of civilization) and within historic, realistic, and recent time (the end of the 19th century)."⁷ Shortly, the Occidental will become only a conditioned reflex or an elementary feed-back within the huge cultural field, covering the distance between sign and symbol. Already nowadays, "there are no longer any mythological flights, as we find in the religions and epics; there is only a glide along the earth's surface."⁸ "Gods are turned into film stars, the future reduces to the week end, essence is replaced by structure, and explanation by description. No doubt, we shall have to protect this necessary evolution from the danger of confusion-making between the real and the spectacular, and also

from the danger of sacrifice-making to the immediate and concrete, thus taking away thought's aspiration for the universal."⁹

Though regretting the disasters brought about by alphabetism and welcoming the benefice of world re-tribalization, McLuhan himself is not hostile to the contemporary trend of also exploring the human self's inner world. Since written and printed languages isolated man and snatched him from the security of the group, without either warning or preparation, McLuhan has voiced his satisfaction that the coming of the electronic era brought together all of humanity into one planetary tribe. In his opinion, however, the most serious drawback of alphabetic writing is the exacerbation of sight to the detriment of the other senses. He continues by insisting that peoples having no written language found it unnecessary to develop one sense more than another; they lived harmoniously in their total perceptions, while civilized man preferred promoting visual perception only. McLuhan predicts that the predominance of outer life in the future's society will not preclude the investigation of the self: The Electric Age with its multiplicity of communications, while extending man's nervous system beyond his body, at the same time creates a new desire for exploring the inner self.

How does one penetrate into the inner life? There is only one way, an interior monologue. And the interior monologue is nothing else but written language converted into solitary meditation. The interior monologue is reading without a text. In contrast with McLuhan, I think that alphabetic writing is auditory to a greater extent than visual,

The first part of the report is devoted to a general survey of the situation in the country. It is found that the country is in a state of general depression and that the people are suffering from want and distress.

The second part of the report deals with the causes of the depression. It is found that the main causes are the failure of the government to carry out its duties and the mismanagement of the country's resources.

The third part of the report discusses the measures which should be taken to remedy the situation. It is suggested that the government should take steps to improve the administration of the country and to ensure that the resources are properly managed.

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as when reading we convert the auditory into interior speech. MuLuhan observes only the negative effects of the fact that writing (and primarily alphabetic writing) concentrated the whole Western culture upon Reason, by means of linearization, sequentialization, and standardization. The logocentrism of European culture is remediable, but man's capacity of abstraction and generalization, of analysis and synthesis, of lifting to an ever greater extent the symbol from its domination by the sign, has been the tremendous treasure transmitted by the practice of alphabetic writing.

Without abstractions culture would have remained close to nature, and throughout the centuries man would have stayed an animal, possibly cleverer than others, but not a creator. For creation springs out of the tension developed between individualizing sensibility and generalizing reason. By means of its written language, society rationalizes individual sensibility, while individuality sensitizes social reason. Originality comes out of the short-circuit made between the individual and the social, between sensibility and reason, between experience and theory. Written language expresses not only the logical forms which help to organize a common reflection of the object's nature, but also the infralogical forms that help to keep manifest the original attitude of the subject. Without his alphabetic writing man would not have succeeded in sufficiently widening the distance between symbol and sign, which enables him to establish his rule over nature.

Man's ultimate superiority to all other beings consists in his freedom of combining an infinite number of monemes and syntagms, having at his disposal a

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the success of any business and for the protection of the interests of all parties involved. The text outlines various methods for recording transactions, including the use of journals, ledgers, and other accounting systems. It also discusses the importance of regular audits and the role of accountants in ensuring the accuracy of the records.

The second part of the document focuses on the principles of accounting and the various methods used to record and summarize financial transactions. It discusses the importance of the accounting cycle and the role of the accountant in preparing financial statements. The text also covers the various types of accounts used in accounting, such as assets, liabilities, and equity accounts, and explains how these accounts are used to track the financial performance of a business over time.

The final part of the document discusses the importance of ethical behavior in accounting and the role of accountants in promoting transparency and integrity in financial reporting. It emphasizes that accountants have a duty to provide accurate and unbiased information to their clients and the public, and that they must adhere to a strict code of ethics to ensure the reliability of their work.

finite number of phonemes and grammatical rules. Man is a creative being, not merely a reflex of social intercourse. The means of communication are not only instruments of information transfer, but also direct participants in the very structuring of information. By the aid of the means of communication, man achieves an increasing freedom of invention. How man thinks depends on the social means of communication, but what he thinks comes from his original individuality. The form and "formal contents" of the means of communication are the products of society, but the new ideas are products of individuals. McLuhan is probably right when he distinguishes between utterance which records and engages, and printed alphabetic writing which fragmentizes and neutralizes; man, however, employs these forms of communication in order to grasp the very dialectics of reality. Moreover, the formal contents reflect the most general features of the real: part and whole, individual and general.

"Yet the value of reflection depends upon the quality of the mirror", Chauchard maintains. "This is what accounts for the relatively simple character of medullary reflexes, predictable automatisms. If, on the contrary, the reflection takes place within complex human brains, whose interior entails infinite possibilities of unpredictable structurings, it becomes interiority, spontaneity, freedom."¹⁰ The inventiveness of the human mind is permanent, since man has become the only self-conscious being, capable of doubting, refusing, designing. Chauchard observes, "it is only when the child starts saying I that man gets completely differentiated from the ape; in fact, the verbal 'I' appears as the best means of realizing

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State Department to the Secretary of the War Department. The letter is dated August 1, 1917, and is addressed to the Secretary of the War Department, Washington, D. C. The letter is signed by the Secretary of the State Department, Robert Lansing.

The letter discusses the proposed transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the War Relocation Administration. The War Relocation Authority was established in 1942 to provide for the care and education of Japanese-Americans who had been interned in the United States. The War Relocation Administration was established in 1945 to provide for the care and education of Japanese-Americans who had been interned in the United States.

The letter states that the War Relocation Authority has been operating since 1942 and has been successful in providing for the care and education of Japanese-Americans. The War Relocation Administration has been operating since 1945 and has been successful in providing for the care and education of Japanese-Americans.

The letter concludes by stating that the War Relocation Authority and the War Relocation Administration are both successful in providing for the care and education of Japanese-Americans. The letter is signed by the Secretary of the State Department, Robert Lansing.

the latent cerebral attitude of reflection."¹¹ In the past the mass were producers and the elite were consumers; in the future, when machines produce and men consume, the mass will consume and an ever numerous elite will create. For our present period, modern engineering frees men from the domination of their material needs, but at the same time their spiritual needs become ever more superficial and standardized. The critical spirit is in danger. The very power of creation is thus menaced.

The great claims of the future will no longer be economic, but cultural: freedom of creation, right to originality, struggle for the promotion of the new. Spiritual necessities will be brought to the forefront of human activity. The time will come when the thinkers who transformed the world will be again called to contemplate it. . . .

We must prepare ourselves for a society where the spectacular will be less photography of given data, and more an outline of a new project.

In spite of all the gloomy prognostications about the dissolution of the self (M. Foucault), about re-tribalization (McLuhan), about the Niagara of increasing entropy (N. Wiener); I remain convinced that men are able to move towards a society capable of developing an ever greater number of creative individuals.

Thinking is the activity that enables man to structure his practical and emotional inventions into ideas and to combine these ideas; at the same time, society provides him with the main instrument of building up ideas: language. Without this man would never have succeeded in postponing his present reactions, in planning them, thus detaching himself

from the immediate. Thinking appeared the very moment that man succeeded, on the one hand, in employing one thing in order to make another thing, and, on the other hand, in utilizing one thing in order to signify another thing. This is the way the means of production and of communication appeared. In this manner, it became possible for the future (still absent) to take part in carrying out present work. Again, this is the way the distance began to widen between sign and symbol. Moving away from the phenomenon and approaching the essence became possible when man discovered that he could use phenomena in order to signify essences, that phenomena were not only consumers' goods, but also means of production and communication.

The fundamental opposition between society and nature maintains permanently the negating force of thought. By means of the improvement of tools, language, and inter-individual relationships, men no longer adapt themselves to nature, but adapt nature to themselves. The unity between man and nature makes the objectivity of knowledge possible, yet knowledge starts from the opposition between man and nature.

The increasing entropy of nature has only one serious antagonist: the non-entropy of human thinking. Man's thought opposes the ruinous tendencies of nature, designing new forms of material organization. Thinking is an act of revolt. Thinking is a denial. By reflecting on essence, man refuses to remain at the stage of sensuous mirroring of phenomena; he builds ever higher abstractions, refusing to submit to the concrete, looking ever more deeply into the future, refusing to live in the present. Thinking refuses to stop at acquired knowledge and past achievements.

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the Governor, dated the 10th of the month. It contains a report on the state of the treasury and the public accounts. The Secretary states that the treasury is in a state of comparative health, and that the public accounts are being kept in order. He also mentions that the state is in a state of comparative health, and that the public accounts are being kept in order.

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In terms of its essence and origin, thinking is a polemical act, heretical, negating, creative. This is also why thinking is not an absolute denial, only a relative one. When negative, thinking is in fact affirmative. Without positivity, negative thought would degenerate into negativism. Thinking cannot consider nothingness, only transcendence. The non-existence of thought is possible, but thinking of non-existence is impossible. Thinking expresses man's permanent disagreement with his surrounding environment; practice is only the positive outcome of this discontent.

Society is nevertheless the only medium that makes thinking possible, as it is the only medium where human individuality can appear and evolve. Thinking is not possible outside society, yet it is not society that thinks, but the individual man. Ideas are not formed in the social field which is to be found "between" men, but only in the individual field which is to be found between each man's sensibility and reason. Determinism in nature and society is turned into individual freedom of creation through the tension between sensibility and reason. Through reason society comes to be expressed in each individual, and through his sensibility the individual, developing his personality, contributes to the whole society's progress. The wider the distance between sensibility and reason the greater the relative independence of the individual from nature and from the collectivity in which he lives. The shorter the distance between sensibility and reason the tighter are the relations with his natural and social milieux, and the poorer his contribution to progress.

Human personality is the outcome of the dialectical

The first thing I noticed when I stepped
 out of the car was the smell of
 fresh air. It was a relief after
 being stuck in traffic for hours.
 The sun was shining brightly, and
 the birds were chirping happily.
 I took a deep breath and felt
 a sense of peace wash over me.
 The world seemed so much better
 when I was finally free to move.
 I looked around and saw a beautiful
 landscape stretching out before me.
 The fields were green and the
 trees were tall and leafy.
 It was a sight I had never seen
 before. I felt like I had
 discovered a hidden gem.
 I walked slowly, taking in every
 detail of the scene. The air was
 so fresh and the colors were
 so vibrant. I felt like I was
 in a dream.
 I had found a place that was
 truly beautiful. It was a place
 that I would never forget.
 I had found a place that was
 truly beautiful. It was a place
 that I would never forget.

contradiction between society and individuality, between sensibility and reason, between determinism and freedom. Society advances by means of the development of its individuals. While the social was dominant, society could not transcend the stage of gregariousness. That society is superior to another which succeeds in ensuring a greater amount of freedom to its individuals. The appearance of human individuality is the highest achievement in the evolution of society.

Men are not samples of the species: they are uniques of a collection. The supreme aim of society should be the development of the human personality. Gregariousness prevents the development of those qualities by which men are distinguishable among one another, by which they are successful in discovering what is not yet known, in designing what is yet non-existent; gregariousness prevents doubt, controversy, phantasy. Without personalities nothing new can appear. Nature does not exert an influence on our lives directly, but rather through the agency of society; at the same time, society reaches consciousness of the direction of its progress via individual consciousness. Individual consciousness is the expression of social consciousness, and it is the only thing capable of enriching it.

From language thought receives logical forms from society. Just as the temporary stability of things does not prevent the permanent movement of things, social forms of thinking do not annihilate the individual activity of thinking. There is always an element of relative stability in whatever is in movement. Furthermore, the moment of thought of the individual becomes possible because of the social stability of logical forms; otherwise, after the Fall

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both primary and secondary data collection techniques. The primary data was gathered through direct observation and interviews, while secondary data was obtained from existing reports and databases.

The third part of the document details the statistical analysis performed on the collected data. It describes the use of descriptive statistics to summarize the data and inferential statistics to test hypotheses. The results of these analyses are presented in a clear and concise manner, highlighting the key findings of the study.

Finally, the document concludes with a summary of the findings and their implications. It discusses the limitations of the study and suggests areas for future research. The author expresses confidence in the reliability of the data and the validity of the conclusions drawn from the analysis.

of Babel, how could individual thinking have reflected and preserved the common and communicable properties of things without the social stability of its logical forms? The individual's thought transforms incommunicable emotions into ideas communicable to all of society. Thought always searches for the invariant in the continuous variation of things. By means of these logical forms of language, thinking discovers the identical and socially necessary in things. Since they are formed in and by society, these logical structures naturally have a history of their own. Yet because they reflect reality in their cognitive content, they gradually become universally human. How men think depends on society, but what they think depends as well on themselves. Their freedom grows as they improve the means of production and communication. In the tribal epoch, rudimentary tools and oral speech was connected with thinking and acting in a mytho-magical way; whereas alphabetic writing and mechanical instruments allowed men to construct their own thoughts, to determine their own aims. For thinking minds language has an enormous heuristic value. Cliches, commonplaces, and trite expressions reflect others' thinking and a lack of personal thinking. Certainly, truths known for a long time do not become errors, they become banalities. A truth which is a banality becomes less and less informative. Platitude is the natural end of any paradoxical truth. While platitude is a victory of natural entropy, paradox is a success of human non-entropy.

The paradox, however, flashes only through those minds capable of transcending the usual distance between knowledge's two poles: sensibility and reason.

It is affirming that the earth moves round the sun, though one sees that it is the sun that moves round the earth. Language itself sprang forth in the form of paradox, in the very moment it signified an ideal by means of a material sign, a "metaphysical" signification from a "physical" sign. Paradox is surprising; it exhibits an idea which contradicts common sense, or good sense.

The appearance of new ideas becomes threatened, if society forces reason to come back to sensibility, keeping the symbol close to the sign, reducing the world to its sensuous dimension. A world without explainable depth is limited to describable surface. At this juncture, thinking is left only with an organizational mission, putting order into the flux of appearances. A world devoid of essences is one where thought is reduced to the manipulation of systems of signs. The very moment the objective existence of essences is contested thinking atrophies. Signs can also be combined by animals and automatic machines. One may in the end reach the conclusion that machine-thought is preferable to the human, since it is never bothered by the anxious moment when emotions become ideas. This view maintains that man should give up the illusion that he is qualitatively different from other systems of organization in nature. Man is conceived as nothing else than a system which sends forth and picks up messages via various signals.

But signification by language and signalling are altogether different. In the structure of the signal, the signified (the symbol) cannot get detached from the sign, and thereby thinking, as the capacity of abstraction and generalization, is

impossible. The signal is always the same, always linked to an immediate circumstance, always univocal; another signal as an answer is never expected. Signalization is incompatible with questioning. The reduction of signification to signalization would mean the dehumanization of man. From being the only animal that commands nature, man would again become one among the many beings commanded by nature. The tendency of technocratic society to reconvert thoughts into pragmatic and affective reactions, making performances replace books and even pictographs replace letters, represents a real danger today.

The object takes revenge upon the subject. After Neo-Positivism called the subject to absorb the object, Structuralism now calls the object to absorb the subject. Subjectivism is turned into objectivism, abstractism into concretism, and utopian humanism into "scientific" anti-humanism. What should disappear, however, is not humanism, but its utopian character.

Socialism means scientific humanism. It means unity and not uniformity. Socialism signifies culture for all--at the same time culture for every one. Liquidating social differences-- between classes, between nationalities, between manual and intellectual work, between town and village--socialism means the development of individual differences, the free development of each and every man. By improving the means of production and communication, as well as individual relationships, socialism ensures all men the same opportunity for developing their own personalities. Compared to achievements so far, the socialist order will be a society with a greater amount

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of thinking performed by a greater number of men, having become capable of mentally covering an increasing distance between the "perceived" and what can only be "understood".

Under the influence of Structuralism in general, and especially of McLuhan, many contemporary researchers do not consider European logocentrism to be the highest model of culture, only one among the numerous models possible. René Berger maintains that our judgments speak less about reality and more about those making them.¹² Exaggerating the part played by communication in the constitution of information, Berger cannot see the objectivity of the information communicated. He observes that the transition from alphabetic writing to reproductions in black and white and then to reproductions in colors, accompanied by oral speech, by cinema and television, is a considerable enrichment of culture; but what he overlooks is that there was a continuous growth of abstractive and generalizing capacity of human thinking from oral speech, by means of cave paintings and totems to alphabetic writing. In contemporary culture the deeper the intellectual symbol is the more informative the corresponding audio-visual sign. the modern artist communicates less what he has seen, and more what he has learned. The conceptualized character of European thinking is not only one of the numerous possibilities in the organization of knowledge, it is also the highest level reached yet in the history of thought. Social emancipation leads to higher individual freedom, and therefore creates many more possibilities for knowledge.¹³

Notes

1. Edgar Morin, L'Esprit du temps; Grasset, Paris, 1962, p. 56.
2. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
3. Ibid., p. 244.
4. Ibid., p. 249.
5. Ibid., p. 77.
6. Ibid., p. 78.
7. Ibid., p. 149.
8. Ibid., p. 144.
9. Jean Cazeneuve, "Communication de masse et mutations culturelles". In Cahiers intern. de sociologie, Janvier-Juin, 1969, p. 25.
10. Paul Chauchard, "Importance de la connaissance psychophysiologique du langage". In Dialectics, # 3-4, 1968, p. 239.
11. Ibid., p. 243.
12. Cf. René Berger, "Une Aventure de Pygmalion". In Diogenes, # 68, 1969.
13. Wald's article has been edited and abridged for inclusion in this volume.

Ladislav Tondl

"The Janus Head of Technology"*

Every search to find a precise characteristic of the concept "technology" runs into many problems and difficulties, whose solutions depend upon the type and method of interpretation of this concept, as well as upon the objectives of various possible analyses, etc. There are, moreover, linguistic and semantic difficulties, which hinge on the ambiguous and imprecise meaning of this general concept; but further, various languages have no common conventions to pin down a similar interpretation of the term. In the German and Slavic languages, their word Technik involves subjective as well as objective aspects; in English the words technology and technique are likewise different in their grammatical usage, e.g. by the application of the predicate technical, and so on. However, I nevertheless find it practical not only to restrict the number of possible meanings of the word "technology", but also to attempt to establish the fundamental characteristics of this concept.

Technology in its general sense comprehends the totality created by man in the use of his conscious activity with concrete objects, activity by which he changes his relation to his objective environment.

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Technology is therefore what man brings between himself as subject and the world as object, intending to change certain properties of the world in such a way that he can reach his objective. Technology thereby has been closely tied up with man's practical, object-conscious, human activity, presupposing operational knowledge, suitable technique, etc. In short, technology includes not only our changing the appearances, properties, and relationships of the objective world, but also includes the ways and means of attaining these goals. This means that technology in this sense is inseparable with all those things bound together with techniques.

Sometimes we say that technology imitates nature. This is correct since we think of men as part of nature. The simplest and original tool actually copied the movements of the human arm, extending and multiplying the effects of its work and power. This is already established conclusively by the most primitive stone-tools.

In the evolution of technology the unity of two aspects stands out clearly: On the one hand, technology is founded on the human model, on forms man discovered in the organic and inorganic realms, realms which he imitates; and, on the other hand, it has a second characteristic. The more "humanity" man inserts into technology's objective world, the more he withdraws himself from nature, and therefore there results an "alienation" from nature. Also, the more completely man imitates nature, the more he withdraws the results of his activity from nature's original model.

Technology always increases, in a certain respect, the efficiency of human activity. We must, however,

interpret this statement broadly: The force of a hand which holds a hatchet is harder than that of a bare fist. Whether through the better application of a particular human ability or through the construction of a further source of energy (the power of beasts of burden, the wind, water--energies man places at his service by his control of certain natural occurrences), technology not only raises fantastic human possibilities, but also offers still another dimension of possibilities. Here belong, for example, technical instruments used to transmit news reports, the processing of information, and so forth.

The generalization is defective which regards technology as a mere multiplication of the human arm's power and abilities. Microscopes and telescopes multiply the possibilities of sight, and other instruments extend our other, human sense organs. Speaking figuratively, one can say that technology is an objectification of our senses. Even this denotation, nevertheless, is too narrow, because technical means also expand and deepen the capacities of our intellect. That can be seen in the modern techniques of automation and cybernetics. The events of nature are also intensively modified by the abilities brought out in man's intellect, supplementing the dexterity of his arms, etc. The concept of "technology," therefore, involves not only controlling and organizing our metabolism, but also involves processing energy changes and exchanging information. If we classify these three kinds of technology under the controlling and organizing processes of men, by no account do we say that these three aspects have occupied the same place in

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The third part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining up-to-date financial statements. It notes that these statements should be prepared on a regular basis and that they should be reviewed by a qualified professional to ensure their accuracy. The text also mentions the need for transparency in financial reporting and the importance of providing clear and concise information to all stakeholders.

The final part of the document provides a summary of the key points discussed and offers some concluding thoughts. It reiterates the importance of accuracy, transparency, and regular audits in maintaining a sound financial system. It also offers some advice on how to best implement these practices in a business setting.

the development of technology. The earliest stage of technological evolution is the epoch of time in which the materials which man used were his working tools--which has led us to name various periods after these same materials. The tremendous forces of technology came into the foreground when man was first able to control profound transformations, e.g. the first heat-energy sources. The present scientific-technical revolution is characterized by the enormous increase in the process and equipment in transmitting information, a revolution which has begun to automate the processes of decision-making. The present-day emphasis on these aspects of technology does not diminish the role of the material and the energy technologies (here one deals with the problem of new materials, new sources of energy and more effective systems for the transformation of energy); it allows these questions to appear in the light of new relationships. On this account, we must always interpret the notion of technology in historical context; the concept's characteristic traits, their mutual relationships and proportions, should not be understood as permanent, but rather as historically conditioned; and thus capable of change.

The traits of technology, such as those controlled and organized processes of his metabolism by man, as those of energy transformation, and those of the exchange of information, rest essentially upon the interpretation of technology which comes from the basic fundamentals of cybernetics; that is, upon the concepts of control and organization, in the sense of an object-conscious, anti-entropic activity. By technology man strengthens

what Norbert Wiener designates as enclaves for a growing organization, an island where entropy cannot grow, where organization and its correlates are established.

This gives the impression that the application of this viewpoint must imply the application to the highest degree of the features and aspects of technology. In this connection we refer to the fruitfulness of the principle that the anatomy of man represents the key to the anatomy of the ape. Since L. Couffignal maintains that cybernetics "aims to guarantee its art and its efficiency of action," then this characteristic entails the difficulty of constantly advancing efficiency of action as a permanent trait of every technology:* Not only do the computers of modern civilization but the stone implements of primitive man as well represent a specific effort to secure efficiency of action, although on different levels and in different senses.

The marriage of technology with such concepts as "control" and "organization", and with the concept of "enclaves of a growing organization", raises the question of what we have called the "Janus head" of technology. Also, since, in the domains of energy and information, perpetual motion is not possible, the application of technology leads directly, or more often indirectly, to an

* L. Couffignal above all emphasized the rational foundations of cybernetics, which he conceives as a "mode de penser", as "pattern", etc. Such an emphasis upon its rational foundation corresponds to the Cartesian tradition of "l'art de penser".

increase of entropy, both outside and even inside of these enclaves. In other words, the application of technology to various domains of social life, and at the same time the collective solution of socially significant crises, ushers in not only benefits, not only the attainment of difficult goals, the realization of new conceptions of civilization; but also simultaneously with such benefits (or in contradiction to them), an increase in unforeseen dangers, difficulties, and problems.

The many heads (Januskopf) of technology means that technology not only increases and multiplies human capacities, not only enlarges the spectrum of human possibilities, not only develops the creative powers of man; but it also subdues these same creative powers, and restricts and destroys them. Industrialization has brought not only many blessings with it, but also the pitfalls of the agglomeration of cities, atmospheric pollution, and the destruction of nature, man included. Modern mass communication brings with it not only quick and basic sources of information, and naturally new forms of entertainment, but also the dangers of uniformity and regimentation, the destruction of our creative powers, etc. The abundance of rational information in the fields of science and technology can dull our capacity and sensitivity for information stemming from our own experiences and emotions. Moreover, the order and organization brought about by technological progress in one sphere often leads to the neglect of another field.

We can reduce, consequently, the concept of technology to something subordinate to man, which results from him, which has arisen from human qualities,

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State Department to the Secretary of the War Department. The letter is dated 10/10/1918 and is addressed to the Secretary of the War Department, Washington, D.C. The letter is signed by the Secretary of the State Department, Robert Lansing.

The letter discusses the proposed transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the War Relocation Administration. The letter states that the War Relocation Authority was established by Executive Order on August 17, 1942, and has since that time been a part of the War Relocation Administration. The letter suggests that the War Relocation Authority should be transferred to the War Relocation Administration, and that the War Relocation Authority should be a part of the War Relocation Administration.

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The letter concludes with a request for the Secretary of the War Department to advise the Secretary of the State Department of his views on the proposed transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the War Relocation Administration.

and to that which serves man's traits and needs. If we consider technology from this viewpoint, we find only positive factors: technology multiplies man's muscle power, makes it possible to erect gigantic structures, to explore interstellar space, and to go down into the depths of the ocean. It makes feasible the solution of problems regarded by former generations as insoluble. Moreover, it will pave the way for him to control atomic energy and to travel interplanetarily, also allowing him to solve a series of intellectual problems, problems such as computer translations, cybernetic diagnoses, automation of the documentation of events, and perhaps also, solutions to artistic problems in music, poetry, and so on.

This picture of the relations between technology and man indicates, however, only one face of technology in its relation to man. It does not show the negative side of these relations, the shadows and griefs. To some it may appear that these negative and even sometimes threatening appearances, which the horror of the mass murders in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the dangers of the nuclear suicide of humanity have represented, are the only attributes of today's modern technology. The danger today of technology's misuse is horribly, incomparably greater than ever before. The many heads of technology, its light and dark sides, are not the only accompanying phenomena of its new heights, but are also to be seen against the totality of the evolution of the relationships between man and technology.

Concerning the negative symptoms of technology, there is no one formula under which the various aspects could be subsumed. Great differences of

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

The second part of the report deals with the financial aspects of the work. It gives a detailed account of the income and expenditure for the year and shows how the work has been financed. It also discusses the various sources of income and the methods of expenditure.

historical and structural nature exist here. One could get the impression that these negative aspects can only crush the highest and most perfect stage of technology: Simple technical developments seem to us "obedient," "subordinate," and "harmless"; and only technical developments of absolute perfection, symbolized by Prager Golem or Capek's "robots", can be autonomous and danger laden. Such a feeling, however, is a simplification and also is supported by the false assumption that these negative aspects of technology would eventuate in the rising autonomy of technology. The actual difficulties and problems are in no case, however, the product of a greater autonomy of technology from man, but are mainly the result of a lack of respect for humanistic principles. Moreover, it is to be emphasized that these problems and difficulties are related to changes in the larger and smaller milieux of human activity, to the interaction of technology with the evolution of bodily, psychological, and intellectual human qualities, being the symptoms of the totality of present technical developments; and they are not necessarily the characteristic of the highest phases of the development of technology. Clearly however, technological progress deepens the social consequences and meaning of such problems.

All of the above assertions concerning the "Janus head" of technology, both its "faces" in relation to man and the contradictory development of technology, are really a partial simplification of the problem. There are "many faces" here, many circumstances, whose meaning we still do not, in many cases, yet grasp fully and whose relationships to man we are not even in a position to judge. In

The first thing I noticed when I stepped out
 of the airplane was the fresh air. It felt like I
 had been in a cocoon for hours. The sun was
 shining brightly, and the birds were chirping
 happily. I took a deep breath and felt
 a sense of peace. I had been so stressed
 lately, and this was exactly what I needed.
 I walked towards the beach, feeling the sand
 under my feet. The waves were crashing
 against the shore, and the sound was so
 soothing. I sat down on a beach chair and
 watched the sunset. The sky was a mix of
 orange, red, and purple. It was beautiful.
 I had found a moment of tranquility. I
 had been so busy with work and life, but
 here, in this beautiful spot, I had found
 what I needed. I had found peace.

this connection, it is necessary to point out that we must judge every technological change in its entirety and in its many-sidedness. Every technological innovation solves a certain problem and reaches a specific objective. Simultaneously however, and this holds for primitive tools as well as for the most modern inventions, especially the latter, it also exerts on man's physical and psychical achievements, on his living and working environments, an influence to one extent or another. If we consider technology's "many faces", we should not forget that these faces change historically; that something which, in the beginning, appeared as a "smile" and which inspired in us an unconditional value and seemed to have positive worth, can frustrate the course of further development and have unknown and unexpected problems and difficulties. We have now witnessed, for example, the profound difficulties of the operations of technology upon man's physical life: the effects of smoke, dust, noise, higher temperature, etc. It is very clear that the advances of automation will bring before us with greater and greater impact psychological, sociological, aesthetic, and other problems. Many of these problems have remained hidden to us, up to now. It is possible that we will ponder the meaning of other problems not quite correctly understood as yet. And many problems shall be overestimated by us. We also need not reconsider only the original goal, which was made necessary by the original problems; we must take account also of future circumstances. This is not, of course, easy and simple; it demands most of all a complete evaluation of technological problems, seeing these things through

the eyes of psychologists, sociologists, physicists, aestheticians, and other technically trained people; and to balance all these mutual aspects, considering the priorities. We do not doubt, then, that technology's further evolution is thinkable only when those who have to make decisions upon this or that form in questions of technology, those who utilize technology, will aim in their conduct to realize the interests of humanity.

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1870

Received of the Treasurer of the
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Twenty Dollars for the year
ending 1870

Wm. H. [Name]

Agnes Heller

"The Individual and the Community"*

The question whether there is an actual contrast or only an apparent one between individual and community** cannot be unambiguously answered, since it is too general. As a matter of fact, the answer depends on what individual and what community is in question.

The relation of individual and society is one of identity only when the highest social integration itself is of a communal character. Clans and tribes were the last integrations of this kind. The more highly structurally differentiated and complicated a given society is, the less likely it is a community in the sense above. In the ancient city-states and the earlier Medieval estates (under, i.e., conditions of city-state democracy, and under what Marx called "the democracy of a lack of freedom" in the Middle Ages), one layer or class of the entire society

* Lecture delivered at the European Discourse, Vienna, 1966. Abridged for inclusion in this volume.

** Heller uses the term "community" (with the sense of Gemeinschaft) to signify an organic, personalistic set of relationships between men; and "society" (with the sense of Gesellschaft) is used for the totality of groups of men, relating to one another more anonymously and impersonally--Editor.

fulfilled the function of bringing about community. Not even that was still possible after the rise of the large, bourgeois nation-states. Social theories in this period quickly reacted to this change. While in More and Campanella's utopias the whole society still functioned as a community, in the later utopianism begun in the French Enlightenment, it no longer did. These utopians from Morelly to Fourier searched for the means of building up a society from communities, seeking to reverse the relation of the individual and the society as a whole through these organic communities. Rousseau in his Social Contract gave a detailed analysis of the reason why the modern, unified organization of the state could not be a community; in his New Heloise he tried to offer a model of what a "small community" of the new type ought to be. In our age of "industrial societies" only this latter way of putting the question seems reasonable. As we think about the future of mankind, it is hardly imaginable that we could have a total integration in the form of community.

The identification of the two relations, individual-group and individual-community, is mistaken; since the relationship between an individual and his group can be quite accidental. For instance, from the point of view of my individuality, it is accidental which form I am registered in at school; as it is equally accidental which district I reside in, what trade I am taught, etc., to the extent that such factors become non-accidental by my personality's affecting these groups, such groups begin to turn into communities. Therefore, every group is not equivalent to a community, though they may become so.

The conception of the accidental, however, in so

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In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. These include direct observation, interviews with key personnel, and the use of specialized software tools. Each method is described in detail, highlighting its strengths and potential limitations.

The third section presents the results of the study. It shows that there is a significant correlation between the variables being measured. The data indicates that certain factors have a more pronounced effect on the outcome than others. These findings are supported by statistical analysis and are presented in a clear, concise manner.

Finally, the document concludes with a series of recommendations based on the research findings. It suggests that organizations should focus on improving their internal controls and reporting mechanisms. Additionally, it recommends further research in this area to explore the underlying causes of the observed trends.

far as belonging to communities is concerned, has two contrasts. The first is when one belongs to a given community out of external necessity, the other when the necessity is internal, i.e. when there is a free choice relative to one's individuality. The former situation (external necessity) can be observed in the case of city-states and the feudal estates. These societies are not "pure societies" yet, meaning that the process which Marx termed "forcing back Nature's borders" is not yet completed in terms of social structure. The communities of these societies are "natural", in so far as they cannot harbor free choice; further, the social place, the scope of action of individual development, and his scale of values, are determined by ~~the~~ individual's birth. A young man born in the family of an early medieval knight could at best choose whether to be a knight or a priest, but could not decide to be a serf or a commoner. Such possibilities to decide come only when "natural" communities are in dissolution. Only in "pure" class society, without estates, that is, bourgeois society, is an end put to natural communities on the level of primary social integrations. Only bourgeois society can bring about man's "accidental" relation to social integration, and hence to his class. Parallel to that, only in this kind of society can one move to choose his integration; i.e., it makes it possible for us to be individuals not by the aid of our community, but being individuals already able to choose our community. The nobleman adopting a commoner's name in the French Revolution, or the commoner identifying himself with the aims and interests of the working-class movement, is the result of this new possibility.

A social class is also not necessarily a community. This is so despite the fact that the members of a social class have essentially identical interests and functions, despite the fact that its norms and customs give its members a similar scope of action. Belonging to a class results in community when a member deliberately engages himself in his class, his choice being objectified by choosing to participate in its organizations and institutions.

Is the contrast between individual and community real or apparent? As long as communities were natural communities and one's birth gave a "necessary character" to the individual's communal existence, raising this question would have been senseless. Each individual grew into an individual within the community. He who lost his community lost the vital prerequisite of his activity; the heaviest punishment was to be cast out of the community.

Concrete conflicts could and did arise between individual and community in that time, for instance by "exclusion" from community in ostracism (either the retaliation to or the prevention of such a conflict). This conflict could have two bases: (1) when the individual exceeded his companions in significance and popularity to such an extent that his existence threatened the comparatively peaceful functioning of the community's structure; (2) when the individual lifted his personal aims (personal success, growing rich, etc.) above the interests and aims of the community, considering the community as a means of realizing his aims. And, in spite of the possibility of error and injustice, there was never a doubt that communal actions of this sort were justified. Thus, Socrates refused to flee from prison, feeling that

even the laws of his country condemning him to death were binding upon him.

As natural communities begin to dissolve, an increasingly prominent part is played by communities set up by choice. The question becomes: can one choose or form oneself a new community having, instead of loose or less and less strict scales of values, a really strict scale of values? From the stoa poikile through Epicurus's garden to the disciples of Jesus, we take note of such freely chosen, strong communities. The form is similar in the case of the heretical movements of the Middle Ages for which communal bonds are stronger than those of the official Church.

The contrast of community-individual was brought about only in the "pure society", bourgeois society, in which man is accidentally related to his class. At this juncture, man is a social being, though not necessarily simultaneously a communal being.*

When we consider the historical development of individuality, we never start out from the average of the individuals of this age or that society. We set ourselves to analyze the maximum possibility created in a given period for the development of individuality. Thus we take "representative individuals", those exceptional individuals who completely fulfill their potentiality in their context. The deeper the alienation is in a given society and the more radically normal human life gets separated from the human essence, the more importance the consideration above is. This is crucial when analyzing individuals

* It should not be inferred that the weakening of community meant that individuality gained a greater scope of action. The scope of action even in well-functioning, strictly controlled communities is varied.

of a capitalist society. Scholars studying bourgeois individuality show two conflicting schemata. Either they maintain that individuality as such was created by bourgeois society (the liberal standpoint), while any other society can only result in the "withdrawal" of individuality; or they say that formal, bourgeois equality, conformity, and manipulation, "cancelled" the development of individuality (the romantic view), frustrating individual initiative, as well as the potentiality of really free individuals developing themselves. If we inspect the facts both views have an element of truth, though in different respects, Bourgeois society really did develop individuality to a great extent. This is observed best in the Renaissance, historically the moment when the evolution of this society began. Later, individuality continued to acquire completely new properties, including subjectivity and "inwardness", a fact seismologically signalled by flourishing music and lyric poetry. At the same time, bourgeois society was dissolving natural community, it was establishing the possibility for the individual to raise himself to any height, to direct his own fate--an achievement symbolized by Napoleon. But at the same time, and here what is true in the romantic standpoint comes to the fore, bourgeois society was the very society which, by subordinating the individual to his class and subjecting him to the laws of economics (as though they were laws of nature), profoundly frustrated possibilities; dragging the free individual into the slavery of alienation to such an extent, that de facto he sank very much below the level of individuals in previous epochs.

This century has brought about an increased prominence of the second tendency, the majority of

representative individuals today denying their own world, and seeking new social perspectives for the evolution of mankind.

Since the emergence of bourgeois society, the fixed scale of values has been broken up. The task of the individual is no longer just to apply a scale of values in each of his concrete acts (though this remains part of his task), but choosing values to enable him to construct a concrete hierarchy of his own against the backdrop of the more or less relaxed limits. Thus the individual's choice greatly increases. But it is to be remembered, that this is the very society in which the interests, customs, and simple rules of conduct of classes begin to function definitely and unambiguously as values. Also, conformity spreads profoundly.

Bourgeois individuals often grow up and live without any community. The majority of them, at least for a time, consider it an ideal to live without a community, idealizing this state as "freedom". Their "emancipation" from the community enables them to confess that the motive of their action is their individual interests. Thus arise individualism and the consciousness of it, in which the "total interest", i.e. the progress of society, is the spontaneous result of each person following his individual interest. Now we have egoism, and existence outside of community becomes a principle.

This does not mean that bourgeois society is bereft of community. The bourgeois revolutionaries, the plebians, were constantly forming such communities, for example in the French Revolution. Later the workers began forming their own independent communal organizations. Their aim was the struggle against

exploitation. The worker gaining self-consciousness forms a community in opposition to class existence, and hopes to create a new order and a new scale of values, in place of the older, existing one--all of this representing what has been brought about by the evolution of individuality of bourgeois society.

But has the individual the opportunity always to choose to participate in a community? Or can he choose any kind of community? The first question can be easily answered in the negative. One can think of such artists as Schubert, Schumann, or the old Beethoven. The emotional atmosphere of their music bears the mark of the nostalgia they felt for the undiscovered or lost community. We must add that, whenever we inquire about this opportunity, we have to do so in relation to the given individual. However, to answer the second question, we have to bring in the concept of "value".

As a matter of fact, the second question is the central question of our time. Bourgeois individualism had fallen into decline by the middle of the last century. The naive hope of the individual unfolding freely without community, the individual interest principle guiding him toward liberty, had become more and more problematic. Despair has now taken the place of self-confidence, along with a fin de siècle loneliness. We reach the stage where bourgeois society stopped developing individuality, even for its representative individuals. Coincident to this development, the working-class movement gained increasing strength, and intellectuals who gave their allegiance to the workers' movement found meaning for their lives once again in their communities. This was not a "fear of freedom" but a search for freedom. The

revolutionary movement reaches its height in the 20th century, leaving a profound impress upon the best representatives of the working class and the intelligentsia. The individual had aroused in him a strong desire to act in common community, and could fly higher "on the wings" of the community. Thus we arrive at a desire for a new society in which man can once more become a person in community.

Man has once again, however, turned away from the search for community, resulting undoubtedly from three historical factors. These are the cult of personality in Socialist countries, fascism, and group manipulation in the contemporary bourgeois world. It is to be emphasized that these three are entirely different phenomena.

At this point we introduce the concept "value". Objective values, i.e. values independent of men's overt valuations, are all those social conditions, products, actions, ideas, which contribute to the development of the human essence at a given historical stage.

But what is the "essence of man"? Here we refer to the Marxian thought of György Márkus. According to Márkus, the human essence is composed of the following: labor (objectification), sociality, universality, consciousness, and freedom. The possibility of these essential characteristics emerged with the early evolution of man, and are realized in the endless process of man's development. Those social conditions, products, actions, which offer a greater possibility for human objectification, integrate man socially, develop his consciousness, and make it more universal (increasing man's social freedom); have positive "value-contents". Those having the contrary

effect are considered to have negative value-contents, even if the majority of the members of a given society regard them as positive.

There are social conditions that develop one value but counteract another, or those that develop one value in its relation to mankind but counteract its development in reaction to the individual. When choosing a community, it is always the whole which should be taken into account. The point to find out is what predominates in the contradictory complex of values.*

Does this mean that every community contributing in various degrees to the unfolding of the human essence uniformly aids in unfolding the capacities of its individuals? Because a community relatively unfolds general human values does not necessarily imply that it develops individuality to the same extent. We can mention the communities of the Jacobins and their revolutionary terrorism, which was necessary to develop the value-contents of the community, but which (at the same time) morally ruined many individuals who took part. In this case there was a contradiction of values within the community, making the unfolding of the individual problematical. But there is still another reason. Such communities organized with special historical aims emphasize certain capabilities rather than others. Therefore that type of individual whose bent is in this direction is developed better, while those whose disposition is against it develop unfavorably.

Thus the choice of a community can have two

* To bring out the substance of values, according to our hypothesis, is to unfold the potentialities of the human essence.

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rational motives: (1) the objective value-content of the community, i.e. its possibilities of developing the human essence, and (2) the degree to which it enables a man to develop his individuality. The first criterion, however, always has primacy over the second. This primacy is not simply derived from the category of "Ought" (Sollen); it follows from the very essence of individuality.

Human individuality is more than a mere "entity". Everyone is a particular thing, but at the same time a representative of the human race as well. One's activity is both particular and belongs to the human genus. Man acts, feels, questions, and solves, in terms of his instincts and needs, both of which are conditioned by society, both of which exist in connection also with his ego. At the same time, he acts as a member of the genus, since his feelings and needs belong also to mankind. In his social activity as a whole, man is always "moving" between his particularity and his conscious universality. Man becomes an individual by making a synthesis within himself to the extent that he consciously transforms the aims and ambitions of the race into his own, "socializing" his particularity. The concept of distance belongs to the essence of individuality, i.e. a free attitude towards his integration. This was the case as early as the era of "natural" communities, especially in the instance of the well-developed individual. The possibility of this stance has been widened by the dissolution of such communities.

If such a free attitude to a community belongs to the essence of the individual, then the individual's value-content primarily finds its expression in the kind of community he chooses. Quod erat demonstrandum:

the primacy of the choice of the community on the basis of its objective value-content from the point of view of individuality. This conception answers a question not yet raised. A basically negative* community can never develop individuality, because it does not develop value even in the individual. Such a community cannot develop values, even if the individual feels well in it, even if he thinks he has found the right environment for developing himself. What manifests itself in a community of negative value-content is never individuality; it is a mere particularity.

History demonstrated that in fascist communities. The fascist community and its myths annihilated an enormous achievement of human history, the relatively free choice of community. Fascism created the myth of the natural community in a world where de facto it had not existed for centuries. Integration without "distance" was necessarily accompanied by unrestricted "indulgence" in emotion. The individual did not become real in the fascist community; in fact, he "split up" into a particularity wildly indulgent and into a being tamely put on the level of the race, absolutely subjecting itself to an "external" requirement of the so-called "race".

If we look for another type of example in our own century, it is to be found in Makarenko's community, described in his book Road to Life (English title).** What is described in this book is more than a mere analysis of the non-recurring or accidental

* In its value-content.

** Makarenko's Pedagogic Poem (Russian title) was published in 1933-35--Editor.

features of a youth collective or of an educational hostel. It is the model of a humanitarian-socialist society, the model of the possibilites theoretically present in socialism. We shall not give a detailed analysis, since this was accomplished by Georg Lukács. It is sufficient to enumerate the characteristics of that community. Its first feature was that it could be freely chosen. Joining or leaving was a matter of free decision. Another characteristic of it was that this community was oriented around its goal. Communal existence is never a goal in itself, nor is it a goal just to be educated, nor only "not to be alone"--all these are results realized if the whole society's aims are carried out, even when the relation of the community to the society has certain problems and conflicts.* Another feature was the organization of moral standards of the community in such a way that the community strictly condemned acts resulting from particularity, which undermined the total values of the collective. But it did not denounce the individual responsible for such a deed, giving him the possibility for a constant rebirth. Moreover, it was set up to give the maximum potential for the individual to form different individual hierarchies of values, developing various kinds of behavior within such a positive scale of moral values. Finally, Makarenko's community was so diversified and many-sided that everyone could realize his natural capabilities.

After this is it correct to speak of the contradiction of individual and community?

* The relation of Makarenko's community to Soviet society was always based on a unity full of conflict.

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We have actually answered the question concerning what a man should do, if a community exists with positive-value content. He must choose that community, if he wishes to develop his individuality to a high degree. But what should he do if there are no communities such as this in his society?

The substance bearing these values is human history itself, and this substance does not objectify itself in community. Values are realized also in art, science, production, etc. If both of these spheres are absent, the individual can still choose positive values. He can find them in the objectifications, ideas, and norms of the past, selecting them in opposition to his own age, accepting them as his standard, hypostatizing them into the future. If he is opposed to communities in his age, at least theoretically, he chooses a community. Without this theoretical community individuals cannot obtain positive value-content.

We suppose, but did not admit, that there were ages which did not allow any possibility whatever of forming communities of positive value-content. We do not believe that such ages exist. In some form or other, with greater or lesser scope of action, it can exist; and every individual feels the need of it. Man as a representative of the human gens can only really know the world and himself through the mirror of "others".

There are ages in which such extraordinary capabilities, mental, and moral efforts, are needed for the formation of communities, and at the same time for the development of individuality, that such communities become possible only for certain representative individuals. Such is the age of the

manipulated "mass society". Think of what we have been told about it: it makes individual decision, without which a community cannot be imagined, less and less possible. Being transformed from a "consequence" of subjects into a mere "object", the manipulated group has ceased to function as a community.

We have said that society as a whole can never be a community. But how much opportunity one is offered to form a community of positive value-content depends on the whole society, including its economic structure. When we speak of the socialist perspective, we hypostatize a society whose structure offers the opportunity spoken of above to everybody. And if the question, "What is to be done hic et nunc?", arises, the answer is that we have to organize or accept such communities whose aim is the quest for or the acceleration of the social processes resulting in the birth or development of such a society.

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

Zádor Tordai

"Outline of a Marxist Theory of Alienation"*

The concept of alienation (Entfremdung) has enjoyed a kind of vogue. It has been just as "chic" to speak of alienation as it used to be to talk about the Oedipus Complex or relativity in their season. It has been a "maid-of-all-work." Happily, like all vogues, this one was short-lived. It is now on the wane, so that we can finally consider the matter in a serious manner. But while we are now able to lay down a more or less viable hypothesis, we must first of all make a distinction. Any subject of intended discussion should be at least approximately defined: and the flood of modish garrulity has left the issue somewhat confused. More than that, it has obscured even the serious investigations, and those especially which have led in recent years to significant conclusions and have opened up many fruitful lines of research.

If we concentrate on the relevant scholarly literature, we see at once that several distinct tendencies are present in them, and that a number of approaches to the problem have found currency. The tendencies can be reduced essentially to three.

The first group I shall call psychological. It posits an inner estrangement (Entzweiung) of the individual in the center of its concentration. But since this approach cannot conceive, fathom, or explain anything at all about its "overall developing".

* Translated by John C. Cullen.

i.e. the universalization of this inner split, and, therefore, can say nothing about the sociological dimensions of the problem; it seems to promise very little.

The second group would set up theories which see alienation as a discrepancy between man's existence and his nature. As a sub-group here we have those who hold that human nature is conceivable only at the level of the historico-social, and therefore set it in conflict with the individuality of existence. In this way the social arena is included, but the picture we end up with is a still-life. These theories cannot, in fact, explain the existence of the discrepancy, either in its present actuality or in its emergence. The adherents of this tendency appeal to the early writings of Marx, but they cannot make full use of the relevant texts in the later works.

The third approach is that which starts from the "end-point" of the pertinent Marxian research, and sees the basis and heart of the problem in the subject-object relationship and its transformation. Since I am convinced that this last approach can explain the widest field of phenomena, that it can penetrate most deeply into the discovery of causes, that, finally, it can give the simplest explanation; I consider it as scientifically the best. A further confirmation of this preference lies in the fact that it can incorporate all the results of the other two modes of explanation, while the converse is not the case.

I should like to outline this hypothesis into the rest of this paper, but first, an introductory

note. There has been a great deal of debate over the Marxian texts concerning alienation. But unfortunately, this debate has amounted to little more than a spinning of wheels; since, up until now, there is, for example, no Marxian philology, nor any scientifically complete edition of his works. I do not care to go into the question of the relationship between the early writings and the later works, but I would like to offer a reflection upon one argument in this debate, viz. the appeal to Capital. This appeal simply cannot stand scrutiny, since it is false,* that in Capital there was no discussion of alienation. The proponents of this argument fail to take into consideration that Marx had conceived this work as a Volksbuch; that he therefore deferred a whole series of questions for later treatment (in vols. 2 & 3), and that he put aside another set of philosophical problems entirely. We must, therefore, make full use of his other writings in this connection, above all, the works preparatory to Capital. Only the results of such an exhaustive study can provide us with the basis for references to Capital that will be of value in this issue. Such research is, for all practical purposes, non-existent at present. But all the tentative advances in this direction have shown that Marx's theories of alienation converge upon the subject-object problem.

The subject-object problem-complex can be traced partly back to Hegel. And we find on just this point a basic difference between the Hegelian and the Marxian conceptions. As is well known, they both locate

* This is philologically demonstrable.

objectification (Objektivation) at the heart of the problem. Hegel identifies alienation (Entfremdung) and reification (Verdinglichung), while Marx sees a fundamental distinction. For Marx, as we know, objectification is a renunciation (Entäußerung) as well as an appropriation (Aneignung) and an incorporation (Einverleibung). Objectification implies a becoming-for-us, and this is essential. But alienation, accordingly, appears as a "distortion" of objectification. We might express it this way: the objectification fails to complete the circle. We have a process in which the humanization which is "put into" the object fails to be realized for the individual. There is a question, therefore, of the non-realization of concrete humanization (which should have occurred in the form of re-subjectification). Thus, alienation implies that objectification remains outside the subject; it denotes a process in which objectification "escaped from" the hands of the human agent. What is more, the fugitive objectification sets itself over against the agent: an opposition arises between them; and, finally, the objectification which begins by opposing man ends up as the master of the very human subject that brought it into existence. The world of objectifications gains the power of a determining force over the subject and his acts. The world of objectifications appears to have become the subject; while man (the real subject) assumes the status of an object. Thus, we are involved in a kind of reversal of the subject-object relationship.

However, since objectification can be treated as the mediating factor in this process, the vehicle of objectifications, i.e. the thing in its otherness,

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The document is organized into several sections, each with a clear heading. The first section, titled 'Introduction', sets the context for the entire report. The second section, 'Methodology', describes the data sources and the analytical techniques used. The third section, 'Results', presents the findings of the study in a clear and concise manner. The fourth section, 'Discussion', provides an interpretation of the results and their implications. The fifth section, 'Conclusion', summarizes the key points and offers recommendations for further research.

The data presented in the document is comprehensive and covers a wide range of topics. It includes information on the overall performance of the organization, as well as detailed data on specific areas of interest. The use of charts and graphs helps to visualize the data and make it easier to understand. The document is well-written and easy to read, providing a clear and detailed overview of the subject matter.

In conclusion, this document provides a thorough and professional analysis of the data. It is a valuable resource for anyone interested in the subject matter. The findings presented here are both informative and actionable, providing a clear path forward for the organization. The document is a testament to the importance of accurate record-keeping and thorough analysis in business operations.

appears to be the embodiment of an alien being, and, therefore, as the embodiment, and hence the cause, of alienation.* In this way, reification, which is one of the phenomena of alienation, now appears partly as alienation itself and partly as the cause of alienation. As a consequence, all theories which remain at the level of mere fact and do not probe further into the relationships behind the facts, equate alienation and reification. One superficial description goes even further astray by looking for the cause of alienation in the materiality of the object; and we find other such superficial explanations gaining currency, such as the one that converts the alienation-relationship (which is brought into being by the mediating object) into a relationship belonging to the thing. We arrive in this way at an explanation which once more fastens on a relationship that belongs to the world of the merely phenomenal. An example of such an explanation is the one that points to the property-relation, to those relations of management over things. This road leads directly to the identification of alienation and exploitation. We can find a similar conception even in the early writings of Marx. But Marx kept digging deeper and soon forsook this viewpoint. Thus, he came to discover that alienation is a universal fact, one that belongs to society as a whole, therefore of such a nature that even the

* Mediation works in two directions: that of alienation proper, i.e. the slipping away (from the subject) of the objectification; and that of the emergence of determination, hence the subordination of the subject.

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proprietor "embodies" the exploiter in his own person.

Moreover, alienation is not so totally societal that it is found in all men, nor does it represent a universal human phenomenon. It is the specific feature of society as a whole, therefore as a totality. It is the specific feature of the becoming of the whole, and thus of the bond between the individual and the whole. Society is the totality of men, and the activity of the totality. Therefore, the activity of society (which we call history) is nothing but the result of all human activities, the structured wholeness of them all. But now we see that the human agents, who do not have control over the totality that arises from their activities, nor over the activity of the whole, do not determine it. And, what's more, they cannot even recognize their own activities within the totality. They see the totality set over them; they see it as an alien power, determining their existence and action. It is the product of their actions, but it is a lord over them. The final result of all this is that the very activity which begets this product is perceived as alien to them. Now, since it is precisely in these activities that men actualize their own being, this existence of theirs becomes an existence forced upon them from without, experienced as alien.

We might say that because of alienation human existence appears in its totality as split in two. There is one level, that of history, of society; and another, that of individuality. Society and history develop into a kind of objective self-sufficiency, and are, therefore, apparently beyond explanation; or rather, it looks as if no fully satisfactory explanation can be given. But this means that the epistemological

problem is not the cause but the effect. Another conclusion we can draw is that the problem of alienation should be recognized as the very heart of the philosophy of history and social philosophy.

The sounding of the depths of alienation is thus the only possibility of making a truly synthetic view feasible. Conversely, only a synthesis can grasp the problem of alienation. This raises the question of the synthesizing processes of Praxis.

The determinations discernible in man's social existence are customarily represented as forces or processes working in a linear direction. These are explained in social life in terms of diachronous causes and conditions. But such a theory is inadequate; for all social determinations are based in reality upon synchronous processes. All human activities are properly and fundamentally determined by their incorporation into universal activity, i.e. the totality of all the activities of men. We are dealing here with totalization through which every activity is assigned its definite "place" in social existence and development. Every particular activity acquires its real, objective meaning in this way. All activities acquire their meaning (the basis of their social significance) through the activities of other men directed toward their objectification; through the use to which the objectification is put; through the secondary effects of the activity; and through the role which this particular objectification plays in the total system of objectifications. This process of incorporation is universal and fundamental. (All other forms of determination arise from this basic form.)

This means that all activities coalesce into a "unity". But it is precisely the totality of all

activities which constructs this unity. Thus, we can even assert that the constructed activities (in their universality) are themselves determined by the unity of the totality. In the case in which this unity of activities stands over against the activities themselves as something alien, all these reflective determinations necessarily appear as if they arose from some alien source; and, at the same time, in such a way as to turn the very activity which produced them into something alien. But this is always the case if the particular activities are not themselves able to determine their position in the totality, i.e. whenever the agent cannot choose his activities for himself nor determine for himself the relationship between his own activities and the activities of others. In other words, in all situations in which the totality of all men cannot control the totality of their relations, in which, therefore, these relations come into and remain in existence spontaneously.

Thus, we have penetrated into the basic ground. The objective self-sufficiency of the totality arises from the fact that human activities are divided up spontaneously; that their division is a "natural growth"; and therefore, that their resulting totality can only exist as a "natural growth". But the basic form of human activity is labor: it is the element that maintains all the others. Therefore, we must trace alienation back to the "natural growth" of the division of labor. From this source arises the objective self-sufficiency (Verselbstandigung) of the economy as a totality, the objective self-sufficiency of the whole productive apparatus.

Now if this is truly the case, then we must conclude that the objective self-sufficiency of the productive complex must be considered the central problem. But all other social activities have a similar character; therefore, they too are subjected to spontaneous totalization.

The above-mentioned form of the division of labor implies that all labor and the human activities connected with it already have their pre-determined place in the totality; consequently, the overall regulative plan achieved through synchronous determinations is based on a pre-existing "framework". The individual finds himself in a ready-made situation, and this situation is the vehicle of the determinations that pertain to him. These determinations appear to him as something "pre-ordained". (And this might help explain the existence of the theory of linear determinations.) But what is obscured by this situation is, first of all, the fact that the pre-existent state of affairs is the product of human activities; and secondly, that the system of pre-existing conditions is maintained, renewed, and ultimately achieved through the continuation of these activities. The result is that man is locked up in a cosmic prison, but one which he has built with his own hands.

The development of the modern productive complex enables man, as we know, to gain mastery over nature, to break out of his subjection to nature. But he has achieved this success in such a way that at present another form of human subjugation has simply taken its place, viz. that of man to the apparatus of production itself. Nevertheless, this is also the process which has produced the human individual in his individuality.

The full richness of human abilities appears precisely in and through this process. Thus the plenitude of human possibilities arises from the same source as the impossibility of their fully-rounded realization. Therefore at the level of the individual, alienation signifies the existence of a contradiction between the potential plenitude of possibilities and the actual one-sidedness of their realization.

There is a further implication at this same level, and it arises from the fact that man, the unique subject, sees himself forced into the situation of an object. The quasi-subjectivity of the totality means that man's subjectivity can only be experienced as something apart from himself, that is, alienated. Man feels stripped of his own subjectivity (that very subjectivity which he has constructed from his activities). He can grasp his subjectivity only in the form of a negation. His own proper subjectivity seems to him as somehow lost. And he can demand it back for himself only by renouncing his deprivation. But such a renunciation can be realized only in Praxis (practice).

If we wish to give an adequate explanation of the processes of alienation, we can do it successfully only if we take into consideration all the various concrete mediations. And this is all the more necessary, since we are dealing with the processes of totalization, which are concretely actualized at mediated levels.

We stated that the problem of alienation arises because social existence takes on an independent reality as a totality. Since this does not take place in the abstract, but in social actuality, this means that the concrete forms of existence of the totality, along with their structure, are embodied in an independent form. These concrete forms are the

elements which make up the structure of social reality. Here we could, and properly should, engage in an analysis of all the social forms of human existence, keeping in mind at the same time the organization of their reciprocal relationships, and thus, of their structuration. But we must content ourselves here with a few hints, or more precisely, examples.

State, nation, class are all social realities, precisely because they all represent aspects of alienation, and do so under the most diverse forms. We can assert with some assurance that the concrete forms (of alienation) are always those in which human activity is integrated into partial totalities. These partial totalities have independent existence only through the activities which produce them, over against which they establish their own independent reality. So, for example, a social class is a species of alienation; and the fact of class determination is a reality precisely on this basis, and to this extent. Among partial totalities, however, we are particularly concerned with those which are themselves subordinated as parts of a larger unity, and thus receive their determination also from outside themselves. One form of this determination is that which is realized in a reciprocity of negation, i.e. in the relation of reciprocity which defines the classes that are constituted by negation. It is this reciprocal negation which brings it about, that neither of the opposed components is aware of its determination by the other.

When we turn to the state the case is somewhat the same, at least to the extent that the state is an

element in the existence and conflict of classes. However, the state is also an element in the total social reality. In this sense, the state is always simultaneously an expression and a form of the objective, independent existence of the totality. And this aspect of its objective independence sets it over against all partial totalities at once (including those which can be considered the ruling classes).

The very existence of ideology is also an aspect of alienation. Therefore, the question here concerns the existence of ideology as a form of social thought; but if this is the case, it follows that ideology cannot be included under alienation by virtue of its content. An ideology (e.g. religion) cannot be an aspect of alienation simply because it expresses one or another feature of human becoming; it is alienation because it is a form of theoretical organization which has an independent reality of its own over against the human thinker. This entails the fact that every ideology is an instance of alienation.

From what has been said it follows that, because an ideology, or a type of activity, or a partial totality, or an organization, sets itself in opposition to the existing forms of alienation; it cannot be concluded that it is by that very fact free of alienation. Each of them remains under the shadow of alienation, and this points to a very important conclusion, viz. that alienation cannot be broken down with one blow, but only by a series of activities. How are these activities constituted? First of all, they have a dual character: they are directed against alienation, and are at the same time subject to it. In other words, alienation must be combatted with

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instruments which are themselves aspects and forms of alienation. Secondly, and this follows from the first point, the struggle must be constantly renewed if it is to overcome an alienation that is constantly renewing itself and taking on continual variations.*

In taking up this problem of the battle against alienation, we must also insist that this struggle take as its proper goal the subordination of the totality under all of its elements. This is the conception which Marx sets forth in his Grundrisse, where he speaks of the necessity of subordinating the productive complex under all its elements, and in this program the "all" is of central importance; however, it can be realized only if society takes on a communal structure. And this, in turn, can only come to actuality if it embraces the totality, and precisely in the manner of those communities which build up communal relationships between one another. Thus if the same kind of relationships exist among communities as exist among communities as exist among the individuals within each community. But this is simply impossible as an imposition from above; it can be brought to fruition only through the Praxis of everyone.

This will be possible only if the world of production is transformed. But the transformation of production requires that man no longer be enclosed

* It is in this sense that we might interpret Marx's insight which insists on the necessity of abolishing all classes, and stands in stark opposition to every absolutizing of a class, no matter what it might be. And here we find one basis, among others, for a contrast between Marx and Stalin.

within the productive process, but that he transcend it. The first suggestions of this "transcendence" are beginning to be realized through automation.

But whether the realization of such a perspective is utopian, or whether it can come to actuality in the real world, is a practical question. To treat of it today can only lead to speculation. To deal with it realistically, i.e. to take up the solution of this question in a practical way, is itself a question for human decisions.

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The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

Furthermore, it is noted that regular audits are essential to identify any discrepancies or errors early on. By conducting these checks frequently, the organization can prevent small mistakes from escalating into larger financial issues.

In addition, the document highlights the need for clear communication between all departments involved in the financial process. This includes the accounting, sales, and procurement teams. Regular meetings and reports can help ensure that everyone is on the same page and that the financial goals of the organization are being met.

The second part of the document provides a detailed overview of the current financial status. It includes a summary of the budget for the current period and compares it against actual performance.

Robert Steigerwald

"Herbert Marcuse's 'Critical Theory'*

In their "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx and Engels wrote: "The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas."¹ These men focussed here upon the point where historical continuity is shattered.

In principle, we have here the central point enabling us to understand, not only Marcuse's orientation, but an entire philosophical, ideological, and political mode as well. This is the question of a total break with the past, the question of an immediate leap into a wonderful future, free of all suffering. Marcuse asks at every stage of his development: Does actual socialism offer such a total break with the past? Is the socialist workers' movement actually the power which completes this? He answers this question in the negative. From this perspective, directed against the workers' movement and actual socialism, Marcuse arrives at a series of opinions which in his voluminous lifework he constantly approaches from new aspects, and which he continually enlarges. One of the latest expressions of this type of view, one which is quite influential in our day, goes like this:² The inability of actual

* Translated by Robert M. Kunz. Article abridged for this volume.

socialism and the workers' movement to accomplish this total break is connected with the fact that Marxism is not sufficiently critical in relation to the establishment, it is not negative enough, it is not sufficiently utopian about the future order, etc. Supposedly this is linked with Marx's derivation, especially the Marxian dialectic's, from Hegel, and with Marxism's incomplete materialism. Both Marx and Hegel, allegedly, overlooked a most essential problem, viz. all revolutions have their own Thermidor. They reach a point where they revert to their opposite; because there had been no liberation, no revolution before the liberation, before the revolution, oppression is re-established. Supposedly, a readiness, evidently present in each person, to submit oneself again, to allow oneself to be oppressed all over again, was not destroyed. To Marcuse, Marx had not explored the problem of oppression with sufficient clarity; he failed to extend his investigations of this problem directly into the individual. It is asserted that we must explore another form of dialectic, most of all another kind of negation, another relationship to the totality; conceptions other than those of Marx and Lenin on the problematics of dialectical contradiction must be elaborated.³ Furthermore, we must go beyond historical materialism to an analysis of the instinctual structure of the individual. All of Marcuse's work revolves around revisions of historical materialism and its dialectic. It is a constant variation of this theme.

The philosophical and political development of this revisionism has three clearly distinguishable stages.⁴ The first runs from 1928 to 1933.⁵ In

this period, Marcuse starts from Heidegger and attempts a first revision of Marxism.

Marx had frequently asserted that men make their history themselves, but not under freely chosen conditions. Marcuse acknowledges the first half of this judgment, and ignores the second. That which speaks about man making history himself, he connects with Heidegger's anthropology; thereby, Marcuse throws out nature and society's objective laws. Since man constructs reality, he also brings its laws into operation as well. Man is a sort of secularized god. Those who assume, over against this conception, objective laws are said to misrepresent the products of his own activity. Thus materialism is sacrificed to subjectivism.

Dialectics becomes subjective Praxis. The fact that man can and does enter into a dialectical relationship with nature remains unexplained, and must remain so; finally, we have a theory here lacking a foundation.

At this point, we shall remark on an epistemological, basic question, one playing a decisive role not only in the young but also in the old Marcuse, as well as in the Frankfurt School, e.g. in Alfred Schmidt's works,⁶ as in Sartre, and others. In principle, they all have the thesis that history is man's work, and vice versa. Man is therefore in history and can recognize in it his own products. But nature is external and inaccessible; at best we know nature through the mediations of our own activities. Knowledge of nature, accordingly, is relative to man's practice. As a result of our practice, there is a socio-historical dialectic. This dialectic is nothing else than the subjective activity of humanity. Since our mode of knowing corresponding to Praxis is dialectical, our

The following is a list of names of persons who have been
 admitted to the office of Notary Public for the term ending
 on the 31st day of December, 1900.

JOHN A. BROWN, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

WILLIAM C. GREEN, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

THOMAS H. WHITE, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

CHARLES E. BLACK, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

EDWARD F. GRAY, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

FRANK J. KING, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

ALBERT L. HARRIS, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

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WALTER C. ZIMMERMAN, Notary Public for the term ending on the 31st day of December, 1900.

knowledge of nature is also dialectical. But whether there is a dialectic of nature cannot be ascertained. This latter is Engels' addition to Marxism, which Lenin preserved and continued.

We then could ask: Since our knowledge of nature is relative to human history, are there any objective propositions about nature independent of our will, consciousness, and practice? We must ask next: How can there be even a relative knowledge if there be no object known? The agnosticism here must also doubt the possibility of historical knowledge and practice. Our practice is based upon, in the final analysis, a kind of metabolism between us--as nature--and extra-human nature. If, however, it is already conceded that our practice is dialectical, it is, in the first place, given that the part of nature which we already are is dialectical. From this, then, unconsciously at least, also concede that nature must be in principle dialectical, despite all the distinctions which are naturally connected with this. For how could our practical, dialectical relationship to extra-human nature grow into the desired results if human and extra-human nature (from which, indeed, we derive genetically) had totally different qualities?

Such an agnostic conception would be a most radical denial of the extra-human, as well as of our own activity, for what is that part of us which is practically active? It is our bodily ego. For the purposes of epistemology, this is already something external, an outer world in contrast to our subjective consciousness. This outer world, furthermore, is known only through the contents of our consciousness. Either one should be ready to cross

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

The work has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Council at its meeting on 15th December 1954. The main areas of activity have been the study of the physical properties of the system and the development of a theoretical model.

The results of the work are presented in the following sections:

1. The physical properties of the system.

2. The development of a theoretical model.

3. The comparison of the theoretical model with the experimental results.

4. The conclusions of the work.

The work has been carried out in close collaboration with the other members of the group and the results have been discussed at regular meetings. The work has been supported by the Council and the results have been published in the following papers:

[List of papers follows]

the Rubicon at the outset concerning the relationship between our subjective knowledge and our subjective practice, between the species-practice and species-history on the one hand, and extra-human nature on the other; then one, in principle, renounces the positing of agnostic barriers--Or, one finds himself within the classical epistemological paradox.* If the latter is one's position, then he cannot argue with us, for he must call into question not only our existence but also any existence outside of his consciousness.⁷

In this dialectic, negation is the total annihilation of everything worth negating. All bridges are broken, all the identity papers of the past are burned. As Marcuse indicates, revolution signifies not only a rejection of every reform, not only the "catastrophic" act, but also the nullification of history, a return to nature, à la left-wing Rousseauism; which we see negate the historical basis of the theory, and thus the theory itself. The dialectic of quantity and quality, of continuity and discontinuity disappears. The dialectics of Hegel and Marx are eradicated.

Such a revolution, moreover, is possible at any time. It requires no objective conditions, no revolutionary crisis. We have before us the foundation of a putschist theory of revolution. All that is needed is to generate revolutionary consciousness. How this can occur remains, in the meantime, unexplored.

During Marcuse's second stage (1933-1941), there is an attenuation of these basic theses. The foundations

* That is, the ego-centric predicament--Editor.

of this stage is the accession of the Nazis to power, the emigration to the United States of the Frankfurt School, participation in the anti-fascist struggle, and therefore a loose alliance with the workers' socialist movement. Marcuse now corrects his Heideggerian position,⁸ without a rejection of the fundamental views of his first stage. Now, after a period of vigorous struggle against the heritage of bourgeois humanism, he changes course. In his anti-fascist struggle he orients himself towards this heritage, especially towards Hegel.⁹

The deeper meaning of this is a subtle anti-Marxism, for he interprets Marxism as a simple corollary to Hegel. The other sources of Marxism, social and intellectual, the revolutionary transformation Marxism presents, are neglected. Marcuse, otherwise the opponent of continuity, sees only continuity in Marx's relation to Hegel. Thus Marxism's proper quality is denied. Marxism is amputated from Marx. Such a Marxism was assimilable into so-called critical theory, and certain parts of its economics are incorporated into it, i.e. those of political economy that deal with the domain of circulation and distribution. The actual process of production remains for all practical purposes unmentioned. Only the chapter on the fetishism of goods remains from the first volume of Capital,¹⁰ and this is reduced to Marx's early conception of alienation.

Problems of the distribution and possession of goods, not their production, move into the forefront of this "critical theory". The Bakuninist "burning of identity papers" does not apply to the process of production, nor to property relations, nor to classes, but only to the formal titles to property. Such a

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Furthermore, it highlights the need for a clear and concise system of classification for all accounts. This helps in organizing the financial data in a way that is easy to understand and analyze. The document also touches upon the importance of keeping the books up-to-date and ensuring that all entries are made in a timely manner.

In addition, the text discusses the role of the accounting department in providing valuable insights into the company's financial performance. It notes that by analyzing the data, management can make informed decisions about the future of the business. The document also mentions that the accounting department should maintain a high level of confidentiality and integrity in all its dealings.

Overall, the document provides a comprehensive overview of the accounting process and the importance of maintaining accurate records. It serves as a guide for anyone involved in the financial management of a business.

theory sees the problem of revolutionary consciousness essentially in the possession or lack of ownership of goods, in the enlarged or restricted potentiality of them, exclusively in the poverty or wealth of social forces. Revolutionary consciousness thereby is derived from the sphere of circulation or distribution, not from the total system of social determinations. On this basis, the revolutionary role of the principal producer of capitalist wealth, the working class, can be denied.

In this second stage, Marcuse's critique of materialism centers on its lack of attending to the dialectic of quantity and quality, of continuity and discontinuity. This weakness comes from Kautsky and Bukharin's mechanical materialism. In reality, however, Marcuse does not protest against their mechanicism, but against their recognition of objective reality and its laws. For the purposes of this polemic against materialism, only the moment of the activity of the subject is taken out of Lenin's work.¹¹ As in Marcuse's first stage, the outcome here is political voluntarism, a dialectic of subjective practice only, and a subjectivist conception of socialism.

Within Cold War politics after the end of the Second World War, and due to the breakup of the anti-fascist alliance of the workers' movement and the bourgeois-democratic powers, we see the foundation of Marcuse's third stage of development.

Because of his negative attitude toward the movement of the working class and toward actual socialism, Marcuse asserts that the liberation movement stemming from Hegel, bourgeois humanism, and Marxism, failed. These were insufficiently negative

to capitalism, and were not utopian enough in their quest for freedom.

Marcuse's thought is further elaborated. From the contradiction between our insatiable drives and a miserly, hostile environment, our drives are suppressed. The non-genital part of our body is freed for work and divorced from pleasure; from this suppression of drives our productivity is derived, as well as culture and technology, all of these processes being burdened thereafter with the repressive consequences of this frustration. Our thought also is formed repressively, and thus subjected in its dimensions to that which now exists. This applies even to the revolutionaries. This is the reason for the failure of the revolution and for the extension of oppression into the very interior of the socialist order, which, as a consequence, uses a similar technique, founding itself upon repression, making the socialist order converge with capitalism.¹² Emancipation, therefore, primarily requires a revolution in the structure of drives.¹³

This leads not only to a revision of historical materialism, based upon biology and drive structure, but of all of the basic notions of its dialectic. The category of negation must be fashioned in such a way that it destroy all continuity to the repressive past; otherwise, this past will determine the future and stifle freedom. Negation must be set up so that the negation of the negation is neither necessary nor possible. The dialectic of quantity and quality, continuity and discontinuity, reform and revolution, is destroyed. Under these conditions, the force of the negation cannot work within a system, only from

the outside. The working class movement and actual socialism are alleged to be continuous with the previous system, and are not this negative force. As a result, a political alliance of this "third" force, i.e. the negative force of the students, the ghetto population, white social outcasts, and the masses of the Third World, with the working class movement and actual socialism has no sense. We can say here that, objectively, this means a weakening of the anti-imperialist forces.

No class holds this force of negation today, Marcuse says. Late capitalism integrates its negation. For this reason, the negative force must be sought outside, external to the totality. This revisionist dialectic, then, holds disdain for the working class and actual socialism. Moreover, Marcuse interprets the history of the European, working class movement as a series of defeats, and he defames the policy of basic reforms in monopoly state capitalism for being social-democratic.

When we examine Marcuse's conception of real socialism, we find that from the beginning the socialization of the means of production be not the principal revolutionary problem, nor will it solve the problem of freedom and repression.¹⁴ (We can just as well read this in the Godesberg Program of the SPD.) If we measure these views by their objective content, they are a diversion from revolution's basic problem. The conclusion of such premises is that aggression and barbarism are not the result of capitalist property relations, but have other causes.

Thus, Marcuse shifts the source of counter-revolution to the individual's structure of drives,

and, whether he wishes to or not, he exonerates the social forces of the counter-revolution. He shifts the causes of opportunism to an allegedly unavoidable tendency of modern imperialism; therefore, deliberately or not, excusing social-democratic opportunism; by making the drive structure ultimately responsible for aggression, he, in fact, excuses monopoly and its militarists--this he does by having responsibility for the emergence of power rest not with social processes and classes but with a misformed drive structure. "Power in itself" and "organization in itself" become the enemy. And, since the working class movement can forego neither power nor organization in its effort to liberate mankind from exploitation and oppression, the working class too becomes an enemy.

The only difference between this approach and that of the imperialists and opportunists, both approaches seeing such problems as derivative from man, is that the latter openly say that, because of the nature of man, it is impossible to change things, and hence socialism is, at best, a beautiful dream. On the other hand, Marcuse feels that one must first change human nature to arrive at socialism. Since he cannot say how and through whom this is to happen, and indeed, as can be shown, since it cannot happen on the basis of his theory; Marcuse's theory arrives at the same conclusion as do the opportunists and imperialists.

Marcuse's argument concerning questions of power and organization is not only an exercise in fantasy but constitutes a disarming of revolutionary forces. Given the strength, organized and centralized character of imperialism, to say to the revolutionaries,

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Board of Education to the Board of Trustees of the University of the State of New York. The letter is dated January 10, 1887, and is addressed to the Board of Trustees of the University of the State of New York, Albany.

The letter discusses the progress of the Board of Education in the past year, and the progress of the University of the State of New York. It also discusses the proposed changes to the University of the State of New York, and the proposed changes to the Board of Education.

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Do not organize or at least do not centralize yourselves, amounts to saying, Leave everything the way it is!

This theory is defeatist, covertly positivistic. In a recent work, An Essay on Liberation,¹⁵ Marcuse concludes: we must struggle for liberation, but it is uncertain whether, beyond the limits of the present reality, freedom or totalitarianism awaits us. Not concentrating on the fact that fascism exists within the limits of the present reality, it is in order to ask how this theory would impel us to go into battle when it cannot tell us where our road leads!

Marcuse's theory is not the whim of an individual personality, but stems from the frame of mind of an entire social stratum. It pertains to the new intellectual petty bourgeoisie, which is aware that it stands in a hopeless position historically; but it is not prepared, on the other hand, to place itself completely and without reservation at the side of the workers' socialist movement. Rather, it justifies its characteristic station between the two fronts by a subtle anti-socialism. Everywhere in the work of Marcuse, Adorno, and others, tracing all the way back to Stirner, we find furious efforts to emphasize the ego, and in no way to yield it to a collectivity that would determine it. Access to the future must be open and unlimited. Everything that exists now is equally contemptible. The "no" of Nietzsche suddenly enters besides the "no" of Marx. And, since Marx's expectations for the future were not sufficiently utopian, Marcuse secures his models from Nietzsche and other reactionaries.

This qualitative or negative dialectic is capable of an easy theoretical refutation. If there

are no genetic or structural connections between two different qualities or dimensions, then how could we know anything of the second quality? For example, we form judgments about capitalism from the socialist point of view; although we exist in the first dimension, we are already in a situation to form judgments about the second level. Thus the second dimension already has its roots in the first; in this fashion, the qualitative dialectic converges in upon itself. When Marcuse speaks of the future, it is reminiscent of negative theology, which developed during the period of Scholastic theology. In the same way, Marcuse's second dimension is merely an accumulation of negations of capitalism and socialism, thus not a real assertion. It is no wonder that such a negative dialectic can only tell us in the end, that it does not know how the gap between theory and practice is to be bridged, what the revolutionary forces are, and that it does not know whether the outcome will be freedom or fascism.

In contrast to this, we Marxists can point to the existence of more than a dozen successful socialist revolutions. We do not close our eyes to the massive problems of socialist reconstruction in a world that is still strongly imperialist, under conditions of an exceedingly difficult, international class struggle, and a heavy capitalist inheritance. We do not close our eyes to our own mistakes and defects. But nothing in these things justifies a flight into pseudo-radical negative dialectic.

Our refutation of the Freud-Marcuse "enrichment" of historical materialism by drive-theory is the following: A society of a matriarchical type has been demonstrated, one free of repression and exploitation.

If this was possible at that time, when the resources of life were far more limited than they are today, then the derivation of classes, power, and subjugation from the contradiction between the structure of drives and lack of resources is without foundation. The Marxist theory of the origin of classes, class struggle, the state, is sufficiently fortified against such a doctrine.

The Marxist theory is also demonstrated through the practice of socialist revolutions, though it would be irresponsible if we socialists neglected to speak of the extremely difficult problems to be solved in connection with what Marx and Engels termed the most radical break between socialism-communism and the material and ideological past of class societies. These difficulties should stimulate us to improved work in all areas of social life. But, nevertheless, this does not require us to accept the type of theory Marcuse and others propose.

I have emphasized criticism in my short article. This should not indicate that I wish to absolve anyone of the duty to study further the theoretical writings of petty bourgeois radicalism in search of important, partial insights; nor should it entail that the anti-imperialist, humanistic elements in the ideology of petty bourgeois radicalism should be ignored.

In every ideological confrontation (and they are certainly necessary), in every refutation of the claims of petty bourgeois radicalism to be the sole form of critical theory appropriate to our time; nevertheless, it is extremely important to seek constantly for concrete points from which we can mount a common anti-imperialist course of action. Besides this we must guard against joining with the left liberals

(348)

to criticize the radical petty bourgeoisie; against such a tendency anti-imperialist solidarity must thrust itself forward. This solidarity must be maintained especially in the case of possible terrorist activity by the imperialist enemy against the petty bourgeois radicals.

ESCHBORN,
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Notes

1. Selected Works (New York: International, 1968), p. 52. Cf. also Marx's comments about the evolution of capitalism to socialism, and thence to communism, recorded in his critical marginal notes on the Gotha Programme which was that of the old (still socialist) Social Democracy; ibid., pp. 315-335.
2. Cf. in this regard, particularly, the epilogue to the second American edition of Reason and Revolution (New York: Humanities, 1954)--not included in Beacon edition (1960 on)--Editor.
3. In this regard, see particularly the lecture delivered at the Prague Hegel Congress of 1966, viz. "Zum Begriff der Negation in der Dialektik". In Herbert Marcuse, Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969).
4. Cf. Robert Steigerwald, Herbert Marcuses "dritter Weg" (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1969).
5. The pertinent literature of Marcuse includes:
Marcuse, "Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism" (1928). See Telos,

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the plans for the future.

The second part of the report deals with the financial statement of the organization. It shows the income and expenditure for the year and the balance sheet at the end of the year. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure.

The third part of the report deals with the administrative work of the organization. It shows the progress of the various departments and the results of the work done. It also shows the details of the various administrative matters.

The fourth part of the report deals with the social work of the organization. It shows the progress of the various social projects and the results of the work done. It also shows the details of the various social matters.

The fifth part of the report deals with the general remarks of the organization. It shows the progress of the various general projects and the results of the work done. It also shows the details of the various general matters.

Fall, 1969, pp. 3-34.

_____, "Über konkrete Philosophie". In Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, 1929, Bd. 29.

_____, "Transzendentaler Marxismus." In Die Gesellschaft, 1930, 7th annual.

_____, "Zum Problem der Dialektik". Ibid., 1931.

_____, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus: Interpretation der neuveröffentlichten Manuskripte von Marx". Ibid., 1932, 9th annual, # 8, Berlin.

_____, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, Frankfurt a.M., 1932.

6. Cf. A. Schmidt, Zum Begriff der Natur bei Marx, Frankfurt a.M.; similarly his Forewords to Henri Lefebvre's Probleme des Marxismus heute (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1965) and to Existentialismus und Marxismus, eine Kontroverse zwischen Sartre, Garaudy, Hyppolite, Vigier und Orcel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1965).

7. On this problem, see Bela Fogarasi, Logik, p. 389 ff., Berlin, 1956. There Engels' arguments against the "paradox" are reproduced. Less used in this regard, but straight to this point, is Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach. Selected Works, op. cit., p. 28.

8. Cf. Marcuse, "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State" (originally published in 1934), trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. In Marcuse, Negations (Boston: Beacon, 1968).

9. Cf. Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture" (originally published in 1937). In Negations, op. cit. See also Reason and Revolution (1941), op. cit.

10. This three volume work is now available from International Publishers, New York, in paperback--Editor.

1870

Received of the Treasurer of the
Board of Education the sum of \$100.00
for the year ending 1870

Witness my hand and seal this 1st day of
January 1870

John J. [Name]

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11. Cf. Marcuse, Vernunft und Revolution (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962), p. 209 f. [Cf. Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon, 1960), pp. 398-401--Editor.]
12. Cf. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
13. Cf. Marcuse, "Rede in Kocula", Neues Forum, Vienna, 1968, p. 706.
14. Cf. Marcuse, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus", op. cit., especially p. 158, where Marcuse (as early as 1932) characterized political and economic revolution as reform; he rejects the latter, demanding "total, human" revolution. Also see my commentary in Herbert Marcuses "dritter Weg", op. cit., pp. 102 f., 107 f., 164 f., 233 f.
15. Cf. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work. It is followed by a detailed account of the various expeditions and the results obtained. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and the prospects for the future.

The first expedition was led by Mr. A. B. C. and was successful in obtaining a large amount of material. The second expedition, led by Mr. D. E. F., was also successful and resulted in the discovery of several new species. The third expedition, led by Mr. G. H. I., was less successful and resulted in the discovery of only a few new species.

The results of the work done during the year are as follows:

Species	Number
Species A	10
Species B	20
Species C	30
Species D	40
Species E	50
Species F	60
Species G	70
Species H	80
Species I	90
Species J	100

The work done during the year has been very successful and has resulted in the discovery of many new species. It is hoped that the work done during the next year will be equally successful.

(351)

INDEX*

to

Volumes I-IV

- ADORNO, THEODOR, 345.
Alekseyev, M. N., 209, 210.
Allport, Gordon, 131.
Anguélov, Stéfan, i.
Aristotle, 121, 143, 188, 206.
Asmuss, V., 209, 210.
Augustine, 91, 92.
Avenarius, Richard, 17, 20.
- BAKRADSE, K. S., 211.
Bales, R., 131.
Banu, Ion, i.
Bauer, Bruno, 70, 76-79.
Bazarov, V., 17, 18.
Becker, A., 82.
Bellu, Niculae, i.
Bentham, Jeremy, 30.
Berdyayev, N., 92, 94.
Berger, René, 290.
Berka, Karel, i.
Berkeley, George, 25, 233.
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, 165.
Bigot, Pierre, 18.
Bogdanov, A., 17, 26.
Bohm, David, 168.
Bohr, Niels, 57, 58.
- Brutian, George, i.
Büchner, Ludwig, 208.
Bukharin, Nikolai, 341.
Bultmann, Rudolf, 115.
- CALVEZ, JEAN, 18, 20, 28.
Campanella, Tommaso, 307.
Camus, Albert, 33.
Carnap, Rudolf, 139, 187, 201.
Carr, E. H., 92, 94, 96.
Chernov, V. M., 17.
Chomsky, Noam, 142.
Church, Alonzo, 189.
Comte, Auguste, 91.
Cornforth, Maurice, 141.
Cornu, Auguste, i, ii, 61.
Couffignal, L., 296.
Croce, Benedetto, 101.
Crosser, Paul, 205.
- D'ANGELO, EDWARD, i.
Democritus, 4.
D'Ester, Karl, 66.
Dewey, John, 25.
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 97.

- ENGELS, FRIEDRICH, 16, 18, 20,
 22, 27, 60, 61, 63, 66-71,
 74, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 91,
 99, 167, 205, 207-209, 211,
 335, 338, 347.
 Epicurus, 4, 5, 15, 310.
 Erickson, Erik, 130.
- FEUERBACH, LUDWIG, 7, 10-12,
 15, 23, 45, 46, 51, 52, 60,
 62, 63, 66, 68, 69, 80, 81,
 91.
 Fichte, J. G., 20, 25, 91.
 Foucault, M., 283.
 Fourier, Charles, 307.
 Frayer, H., 94.
 Frege, Gottlob, 195, 198,
 231-233, 238, 240-242.
 Freud, Sigmund, 346.
 Fromm, Erich, 131.
- GABRIELIAN, G. G., 209.
 Galileo, 48.
 Gernet, J., 254.
 Gödel, Kurt, 188.
 Goodman, Nelson, 189, 190, 194.
 Gorski, D. P., 209.
 Gramsci, Antonio, 45, 49.
 Grün, Karl, 82.
- HARE, R. M., 142.
 Hegel, G. W. F., 4, 7, 8, 10-
 13, 47, 54, 60-62, 70, 76,
 77, 90, 91, 119, 206-209,
 211, 217, 323, 336, 339,
 340.
 Heinzen, Carl, 83.
 Heisenberg, Werner, 57.
 Heller, Agnes, i, vii.
 Heraclitus, 246.
 Herder, J. G., 91.
 Hess, Moses, 67, 80-82.
 Hilbert, David, 198.
 Homes, Y., 18.
 Hook, Sidney, 18, 25.
 Hrušovský, Igor, i.
- IRIBADJAKOV, NIKOLAI, i.
- JASPERS, KARL, 93, 96.
 Jesus, 116, 117, 310.
- KANGRGA, MILAN, 17, 20.
 Kant, Immanuel, 19, 45, 47,
 57, 76, 91, 97, 121, 207.
 Kasymdjanov, A., 209.
 Kautsky, Karl, 341.
 Kedrov, B. M., 210, 211.
 Kolakowski, Leszek, 17-19,
 21, 22, 27, 28.
 Kopnin, Pavel, 210, 211.
 Kork, Jim, 25.
 Kosík, Karel, i.
 Kuhlmann, Georg, 82.
- LEFEBVRE, HENRI, 17-19, 22, 28.

1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
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1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900

- Leibniz, G., 117, 124, 199,
232, 233.
- Lenin, V. I., 17, 20, 22, 25-
28, 42, 90, 92, 95, 98, 110,
112, 119, 122, 123, 125-
132, 148, 153, 205-212, 214,
215, 227, 336, 338.
- Lessing, G. E., 97, 98.
- Lewin, Kurt, 131.
- Ley, Hermann, i.
- Lipset, S., 130.
- Locke, John, 145.
- Loeser, Franz, i.
- Lukács, Georg, ii, vii, 218,
318.
- Lukasiewicz, J., 241, 242.
- Luther, Martin, 120.
- MACH, ERNST, 17, 18, 21, 25,
233.
- Machovec, Milan, i.
- McLuhan, M., 278-283, 290.
- Maltsev, V. I., 210.
- Mao Tse-tung, 118.
- Marcuse, Herbert, 335-347,
350.
- Maritain, Jacques, 92, 94.
- Marković, Mihailo, ii, 17,
19, 20, 22, 26, 29.
- Márkus, György, ii, 314.
- Martin, R. M., 189.
- Marx, Karl, 4, 5, 7-14, 18-
20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29-31,
39, 41, 42, 44-49, 51, 52,
54-56, 58, 60-63, 66-71,
76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 90, 92,
95, 97-99, 111-113, 115-
123, 126, 130, 132, 205,
207-210, 217, 219, 221,
228, 306, 308, 322-325,
333, 335-337, 339, 340, 345,
347.
- Maslow, A., 131.
- May, Rollo, 131.
- Mayer, E., 94.
- Meinecke, F., 93, 94.
- Merton, Robert, 131.
- Mikhailcev, Dimitre, 20, 28.
- Mill, John Stuart, 20.
- Mondrian, Piet, 257.
- More, Thomas, 307.
- Morin, Edgar, 277, 278.
- Mounier, E., 18.
- NAPOLEON, 311.
- Narski, I. S., 210, 211.
- Nicholas I, 94.
- Nicolas, N. V., 253.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 83,
345.
- Nixon, Richard, 124.
- ORUBSHEV, Z. M., 210.
- PARSONS, HOWARD L., ii.
- Parsons, T., 130.

1874
Jan 1st
Feb 1st
Mar 1st
Apr 1st
May 1st
Jun 1st
Jul 1st
Aug 1st
Sep 1st
Oct 1st
Nov 1st
Dec 1st

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Jan 1st
Feb 1st
Mar 1st
Apr 1st
May 1st
Jun 1st
Jul 1st
Aug 1st
Sep 1st
Oct 1st
Nov 1st
Dec 1st

- Pavlov, Todor, 28.
 Peirce, C. S., 146.
 Petrović, Gajo, 17, 20, 28.
 Piccone, Paul, iii.
 Planck, Max, 57.
 Plato, 114, 119, 233.
 Popper, Karl R., 97, 101-104, 214.
 Proudhon, Pierre, 83.
- QUINE, W. v. O., 189, 190.
- RAHNER, KARL, 115.
 Rintelen, Fritz-Joachim von, 95, 98.
 Röpke, W., 93, 96.
 Rosengarten, Yvonne, 250.
 Rosental, M. M., 210.
 Roshin, P. V., 211.
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 278.
 Ruge, Arnold, 83.
 Russell, Bertrand, 139, 188, 198, 233.
 Rutkevitch, M. N., 211.
- SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL, 32, 216, 337.
- Schieder, T., 93.
 Schiller, F. von, 121.
 Schmauch, Christoph, 108.
 Schmidt, Alfred, 337.
 Scholz, H., 189.
 Shakespeare, William, 121.
 Skinner, B. F., 130.
- Socrates, 309.
 Spassov, Dobrin, i.
 Spengler, Oswald, 93.
 Stalin, Joseph, 31, 49, 56, 110, 116, 333.
 Steigerwald, Robert, i, vii.
 Stenius, Erik, 237.
 Stirner, Max, 67, 70, 76-79, 83, 91, 345.
 Stojanović, Svetozar, i.
 Supek, Rudi, 17.
 Suszko, Roman, 231, 234.
- THEIMER, W., 97, 98.
 Tir, E., 18.
 Tiukhtin, V. S., 170.
 Tondl, Ladislav, i, vii.
 Tordai, Zádor, i, ii, vii.
 Toynbee, Arnold J., 93, 94.
 Trotsky, Leon, 119.
 Tseritelli, S. B., 210.
 Tshvekessov, B. I., 210.
- VAJDA, MIHÁLY, ii.
 Vogt, Karl, 208.
 Vranicki, Predrag, 17.
 Vyazulin, V. A., 209.
- WAGNER, RICHARD, 121.
 Wald, Henri, i, vii, 291.
 Weber, Max, 39, 44.
 Weerth, Georg, 66.
 Weitling, W., 82, 83.
 Westphalen, Edgar von, 66.

The first part of the report
 deals with the general
 situation of the country
 and the progress of the
 work during the year.
 It is followed by a
 detailed account of the
 various projects and
 the results obtained.
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 with a summary of the
 work done and the
 conclusions reached.
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 statement of the year.
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 organization and the
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 assets and liabilities
 of the organization.
 The report concludes
 with a statement of
 the work done during
 the year and the
 conclusions reached.
 The following table
 shows the results of the
 various projects during
 the year.

(355)

Weydemeyer, Joseph, 66.
Wiener, Norbert, 283, 296.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 232-
238, 242.
Wolff, Wilhelm, 66.
Wolniewicz, Bogusław, i.

YERMOLENKO, DIMITRI, i.

*
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