CONTEMPORARY
EAST
EUROPEAN
PHILOSOPHY

Edward D'Angelo
David H. DeGrood
Dale Riepe
Editors

Vol. IV

CONTEMPORARY
EAST
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Preface

The contributors to this fourth volume are Agnes Heller who was born in 1929, later becoming a disciple of Georg Lukács. She is now Chief Research Fellow in the Sociological Research Group of the Hungarian Academy. Her main works are Chernyshevsky's Ethics (1956); The Dissolution of Moral Norms (1957); The Sociology of Morality, or the Morality of Sociology (1963); Social Role and Prejudice (1964); The Ethics of Aristotle (1965); Renaissance Man (1968); Value and History (1969); From Intention to Consequences (1969); and Everyday Life (1970). Robert Steigerwald was born in 1925 of a working class family. He became Doctor of Philosophy, later working as an editor for radio, newspapers, and journals. Also, he was a political organizer for the SPD and later for the KPD, subsequently a political prisoner for five years. He is presently Chairman of the Arbeiterbildungszuneinschaften of the BRD, and is associate editor of the periodical Marxistische Blätter, also writing Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg (1969). Dr. Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924. He received his degree in Philosophy from Charles University, Prague. He has been Associate Professor of the Philosophical Faculty, and since 1961 has been a scientific worker of the Institute for Information Theory and Automation. In 1968 he was appointed Director of the Institute for Theory and Methodology of Science, as well as Full Professor at Charles University. Dr. Zádor Tordai, born in 1924, is a scientific researcher in the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His main research fields are in the philosophy of history and social theory. Books he has written include, Existence et réalité (1967) and Myth and Reality of Alienation (1970). Dr. Henri Wald was born in Romania in 1920. He is a member of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences and Director of Research of the Institute of Philosophy. His principal publications include: La philosophie du désespoir (1957); Introduction à la logique dialectique (1959); La structure

logique de la pensée (1962); Éléments d'epistémologie générale (1967); and Réalité et langage (1968).

The contributors' essays comprise the remaining articles of the fourth chapter and the first essay of the final chapter, V. The final index and corrigenda will appear in the last volume of this series, VI.

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Henri Wald

"Mass-Media and Creative Thinking"

The permanent necessary conditions of thinking
have not only been brains and a social environment,
but also material, physical, sensuous and recurrent
elements, without which human moods cannot become
thought. Sensations, perceptions, representations,
as well as emotions, sentiments, passions, become
"symbols" ("signifieds"), only when they are connected
with "signs" (signifiants"). The main natural signs
of human symbols have always been, and still are,
images and sounds. That is why the primary senses
of man we aim at regarding thought's genesis and
progress are sight and hearing, looking and listening.
Smell, taste, and touch are too immediately linked to
the functions of the biological organism to enable a
detachment by man from nature, to enable an embarking
upon the infinite evolution of culture. Nevertheless
sight is able to retain images reflected by bodies
and colors, thus paving the way for the process of
abstraction and generalization, which is the starting
point of the history of culture. One's memory forgets
bodies first, then colors, and finally images.
Representations and feelings become symbols only
after memory has also forgotten images, retaining
only the reflection of the general, recurring
features of things. Since it is an abstraction, the
symbol can only be formed after memory has been
detached from the concrete. In fact, this is the
creative function of forgetfulness.

Though they refer to reality, symbols are ideas
and not things, spiritual not material, temporal not
spatial, intelligible not sensuous. A symbol reflects
the general and the recurrent, reality providing the
content, viz. the _image_ and the _sound_. Reality is
both the means of signifying and its goal.

One can speak of _man_ the moment anthropoids began
using _parts_ of nature as tools to subdue the _rest of_
nature. For this very reason, the symbol is not part
of reality. It was born out of man's revolt against
reality, out of the doubt and discontent nature brought
him. Aiming at the future and essential, the symbol
(the signified) permanently outdistances reality. By
means of the signified man submits to laws to enable
himself to subdue events. Man's destiny is to con-
struct symbols. His most human act is the distinction
between phenomenon and essence. In the final analysis,
culture's whole history is to be found in matching
the gap between phenomenon and essence by widening the
distance between sign and symbol. The power man has
over nature is directly proportional to the cultural
field situated between signs and symbols. The distance
achieved between phenomenon and essence of today's
space rocket culture is incomparably greater than that
covered by the manipulators of uncut stone. The
distance between sign and symbol of uncut stone can
be instantly covered, while in the context of the
space rocket culture, it is much more difficult to
pass from the perceived to the known, from "perception"
to "understanding".

The limits of human resourcefulness are historical,
not logical, because of this field's extensibility.
The less dependent the symbol is upon the sign, the
greater the extensibility of the cultural field becomes,

the cognitive leap from the sensuous reflection of the phenomenon to the rational reflection of essence being completed in transcending images by means of vocal sounds.

Speech is the least corporeal sign. The sonorous substance of speech is almost immaterial. Speech occurs in time to a greater extent than in space, enriching our inner life more profoundly than our outer life. In this interior monologue, when even sonority disappears, speech is to be identified with consciousness itself. Thus speech is the main instrument in the construction of symbols.

Being made up of the most "spiritual" matter, the verbal sign most appropriately designates symbols; it is further and further removed from the phenomenon, but ever closer to essence. Speech is therefore the fundamental signifier. While sight is linked more to practical operations, hearing attaches to more theoretical ones. Man's actual knowledge of the world began the moment he succeeded in referring to an object by naming it, rather than pointing to it. By listening to their own speech, man can think of that which cannot be seen: the essential and the future. With the help of speech, man frees himself from the concrete, allowing his thought an ever more intensive, creative activity. That which divides the sonorous signals between animals from man's verbal communication is the potentiality of man's unlimited enrichment of the symbol.

Hearing is therfore man's most important sense. Sight has been and still is its subordinate. From the very beginning writing has been a transcription of speech to a greater extent than as a description of nature.

The creative activity of thinking is threatened, whenever the visual is considered to be of greater importance than the auditive; escaping from the supervision of the auditive, the visual tends to degrade ideas into images, and, little by little, to annul the critical distance between sign and symbol. This is the beginning of the hypertrophying of the outer life, to the detriment of the inner life, of production to the detriment of creation, of material needs at the cost of spiritual ones, of experience against reason, the present against the future.

Thus the world loses its dimension of <u>depth</u>, which asks to be <u>thought over</u>, remaining a mere <u>surface</u> dimension asking only to be <u>looked at</u>. From the philosophical point of view Neo-Positivism and Structuralism mark the beginning and end of this epoch.

Mass-media cultural communication has created mass-culture, the symbol being brought back to the sign, cultural signification tending to become natural signalization once more. "Mass culture," Edgar Morin writes, "is the product of a dialogue between production and consumption. Yet this dialogue is not mutual. . . . The consumer, the spectator, responds only by <u>Pavlovian</u> signals: yes and no, success or failure. The consumer never speaks. He listens, sees or refuses to listen or to see."[1]

After having found that the "great common unifying theme is that of private life, of the empirical present, of phenomenal reality",[2] Edgar Morin states: "The camera, the microphone, which catch and transmit whatever is instantaneous, are the predestined instruments of a culture adhering

to immediate reality."[3] The products of mass culture
are meant to intensify emotional life and not to
stimulate creative thinking. We are supposed to deal
with "creations worked out not for meditative silence,
but for man's adherence to the great rhythm, frantic
and exteriorized, of the spirit of the age."[4]
     Speaking of today's audio-visual mass-culture,
the typographical culture of past centuries, and the
oral cultures of primal history, Morin states: "The
printed work is an abstract sign: the printed picture
is motionless; whereas film, television, and radio
directly render life in its real movement."[5] And
later, he adds, "man is replaced by what we call
'public', 'audience', 'spectators'."[6]
     While oral culture brings about a total and
undifferentiated world view (pragmatic, emotional,
and rational simultaneously), and script culture
generates an analytical and a specialized world
outlook, predominantly rational; the audio-visual
mass-culture results again in a total, synchronic,
and kaleidoscopic Weltanschauung. The only difference
this makes is that the electronic means of information,
in contrast to what Rousseau hoped and Marshall
McLuhan thinks, will by no means bring us back to
nature; but will lead us to an ever higher degree of
culture. McLuhan looks upon the great culture of
alphabetic writing as an unfortunate break into oral
culture. Man, he asserts in Understanding Media, can
look back now and clearly see that the two or three
millennia of more or less developed mechanization
have been only an intermezzo between two great periods
of organic culture. It is as though the dogmatization
of symbols were due to their being ever further removed
from signs (signifiants), as if the de-dogmatization of

symbols could be carried out only by annulling this
distance, annihilating the distance between sensuousness
and reason.

McLuhan suggests in <u>Mutations</u> that, education
will be focussed in the future on developing and
refining sensitivity of perception to a greater
extent than on "brain-stuffing". Further it is
said that this will not be a loss to the intellect.

First and foremost, man's humanity expresses
itself by its capacity of examining the sensuous
presence in order to signify intelligible absence:
the absent cause of a present effect, or the absent
effect of a present cause. In such a way both Myth
and Theory came into being. The destruction of the
distance between sign and symbol would lead human·
thinking back to a pre-mythic epoch. The Westerners
have already started replacing myths: "What is
characteristic of the Occidental is its setting both
within epic and genetic time (the beginnings of
civilization) and within historic, realistic, and
recent time (the end of the 19th century)."[7]
Shortly, the Occidental will become only a condi-
tioned reflex or an elementary feed-back within
the huge cultural field, covering the distance
between sign and symbol. Already nowadays, "there
are no longer any mythological flights, as we find
in the religions and epics; there is only a glide
along the earth's surface."[8] "Gods are turned into
film stars, the future reduces to the week end,
essence is replaced by structure, and explanation by
description. No doubt, we shall have to protect
this necessary evolution from the danger of confusion-
making between the real and the spectacular, and also

from the danger of sacrifice-making to the immediate
and concrete, thus taking away thought's aspiration
for the universal."9
          Though regretting the disasters brought about
by alphabetism and welcoming the benefice of world
re-tribalization, McLuhan himself is not hostile to
the contemporary trend of also exploring the human
self's inner world. Since written and printed
languages isolated man and snatched him from the
security of the group, without either warning or
preparation, McLuhan has voiced his satisfaction
that the coming of the electronic era brought to-
gether all of humanity into one planetary tribe.
In his opinion, however, the most serious drawback
of alphabetic writing is the exacerbation of sight
to the detriment of the other senses. He continues
by insisting that peoples having no written language
found it unnecessary to develop one sense more than
another; they lived harmoniously in their total
perceptions, while civilized man preferred promoting
visual perception only. McLuhan predicts that the
predominance of outer life in the future's society
will not preclude the investigation of the self:
The Electric Age with its multiplicity of communica-
tions, while extending man's nervous system beyond
his body, at the same time creates a new desire for
exploring the inner self.
          How does one penetrate into the inner life?
There is only one way, an interior monologue. And
the interior monologue is nothing else but written
language converted into solitary meditation. The
interior monologue is reading without a text. In
contrast with McLuhan, I think that alphabetic
writing is auditory to a greater extent than visual,

as when reading we convert the auditory into interior
speech. MuLuhan observes only the negative effects
of the fact that writing (and primarily alphabetic
writing) concentrated the whole Western culture upon
Reason, by means of linearization, sequentialization,
and standardization. The logocentrism of European
culture is remediable, but man's capacity of abstrac-
tion and generalization, of analysis and synthesis,
of lifting to an ever greater extent the symbol from
its domination by the sign, has been the tremendous
treasure transmitted by the practice of alphabetic
writing.

Without abstractions culture would have remained
close to nature, and throughout the centuries man
would have stayed an animal, possibly cleverer than
others, but not a creator. For creation springs out
of the tension developed between individualizing
sensibility and generalizing reason. By means of its
written language, society rationalizes individual
sensibility, while individuality sensitizes social
reason. Originality comes out of the short-circuit
made between the individual and the social, between
sensibility and reason, between experience and theory.
Written language expresses not only the logical forms
which help to organize a common reflection of the
object's nature, but also the infralogical forms that
help to keep manifest the original attitude of the
subject. Without his alphabetic writing man would
not have succeeded in sufficiently widening the
distance between symbol and sign, which enables him
to establish his rule over nature.

Man's ultimate superiority to all other beings
consists in his freedom of combining an infitite number
of monemes and syntagms, having at his disposal a

finite number of phonemes and grammatical rules. Man
is a creative being, not merely a reflex of social
intercourse. The means of communication are not only
instruments of information transfer, but also direct
participants in the very structuring of information.
By the aid of the means of communication, man achieves
an increasing freedom of invention. How man thinks
depends on the social means of communication, but
what he thinks comes from his original individuality.
The form and "formal contents" of the means of
communication are the products of society, but the
new ideas are products of individuals. McLuhan is
probably right when he distinguishes between
utterance which records and engages, and printed
alphabetic writing which fragmentizes and neutralizes;
man, however, employs these forms of communication
in order to grasp the very dialectics of reality.
Moreover, the formal contents reflect the most
general features of the real: part and whole, individual
and general.

"Yet the value of reflection depends upon the
quality of the mirror", Chauchard maintains. "This
is what accounts for the relatively simple character
of medullary reflexes, predictable automatisms. If,
on the contrary, the reflection takes place within
complex human brains, whose interior entails infinite
possibilities of unpredictable structurings, it
becomes interiority, spontaneity, freedom."[10] The
inventiveness of the human mind is permanent, since
man has become the only self-conscious being, capable
of doubting, refusing, designing. Chauchard observes,
"it is only when the child starts saying I that man
gets completely differentiated from the ape; in fact,
the verbal 'I' appears as the best means of realizing

the latent cerebral attitude of reflection."[11] In the
past the mass were producers and the elite were con-
sumers; in the future, when machines produce and men
consume, the mass will consume and an ever numerous
elite will create. For our present period, modern
engineering frees men from the domination of their
material needs, but at the same time their spiritual
needs become ever more superficial and standardized.
The critical spirit is in danger. The very power of
creation is thus menaced.

The great claims of the future will no longer
be economic, but cultural: freedom of creation, right
to originality, struggle for the promotion of the new.
Spiritual necessities will be brought to the fore-
front of human activity. The time will come when
the thinkers who transformed the world will be again
called to contemplate it. . . .

We must prepare ourselves for a society where
the spectacular will be less photography of given
data, and more an outline of a new project.

In spite of all the gloomy prognostications
about the dissolution of the self (M. Foucault),
about re-tribalization (McLuhan), about the Niagara
of increasing entropy (N. Wiener); I remain convinced
that men are able to move towards a society capable
of developing an ever greater number of creative
individuals.

Thinking is the activity that enables man to
structure his practical and emotional inventions
into ideas and to combine these ideas; at the same
time, society provides him with the main instrument
of building up ideas: language. Without this man
would never have succeeded in postponing his present
reactions, in planning them, thus detaching himself

from the immediate. Thinking appeared the very moment
that man succeeded, on the one hand, in employing one
thing in order to make another thing, and, on the
other hand, in utilizing one thing in order to signify
another thing. This is the way the means of production
and of communication appeared. In this manner, it
became possible for the future (still absent) to take
part in carrying out present work. Again, this is
the way the distance began to widen between sign and
symbol. Moving away from the phenomenon and approaching
the essence became possible when man discovered that
he could use phenomena in order to signify essences,
that phenomena were not only consumers' goods, but
also means of production and communication.

The fundamental opposition between society and
nature maintains permanently the negating force of
thought. By means of the improvement of tools,
language, and inter-individual relationships, men
no longer adapt themselves to nature, but adapt
nature to themselves. The unity between man and
nature makes the objectivity of knowledge possible,
yet knowledge starts from the opposition between
man and nature.

The increasing entropy of nature has only one
serious antagonist: the non-entropy of human thinking.
Man's thought opposes the ruinous tendencies of nature,
designing new forms of material organization. Thinking
is an act of revolt. Thinking is a denial. By
reflecting on essence, man refuses to remain at the
stage of sensuous mirroring of phenomena; he builds
ever higher abstractions, refusing to submit to the
concrete, looking ever more deeply into the future,
refusing to live in the present. Thinking refuses
to stop at acquired knowledge and past achievements.

In terms of its essence and origin, thinking is
a polemical act, heretical, negating, creative. This
is also why thinking is not an absolute denial, only
a relative one. When negative, thinking is in fact
affirmative. Without positivity, negative thought
would degenerate into negativism. Thinking cannot
consider nothingness, only transcendence. The
non-existence of thought is possible, but thinking of
non-existence is impossible. Thinking expresses man's
permanent disagreement with his surrounding environ-
ment; practice is only the positive outcome of this
discontent.

Society is nevertheless the only medium that
makes thinking possible, as it is the only medium
where human individuality can appear and evolve.
Thinking is not possible outside society, yet it is
not society that thinks, but the individual man.
Ideas are not formed in the social field which is
to be found "between" men, but only in the individual
field which is to be found between each man's sensibil-
ity and reason. Determinism in nature and society is
turned into individual freedom of creation through
the tension between sensibility and reason. Through
reason society comes to be expressed in each individual,
and through his sensibility the individual, developing
his personality, contributes to the whole society's
progress. The wider the distance between sensibility
and reason the greater the relative independence of
the individual from nature and from the collectivity
in which he lives. The shorter the distance between
sensibility and reason the tighter are the relations
with his natural and social milieux, and the poorer
his contribution to progress.

Human personality is the outcome of the dialectical

contradiction between society and individuality, between
sensibility and reason, between determinism and freedom.
Society advances by means of the development of its
individuals. While the social was dominant, society
could not transcend the stage of gregariousness. That
society is superior to another which succeeds in
ensuring a greater amount of freedom to its individuals.
The appearance of human individuality is the highest
achievement in the evolution of society.

Men are not samples of the species: they are
uniques of a collection. The supreme aim of society
should be the development of the human personality.
Gregariousness prevents the development of those
qualities by which men are distinguishable among one
another, by which they are successful in discovering
what is not yet known, in designing what is yet non-
existent; gregariousness prevents doubt, controversy,
phantasy. Without personalities nothing new can
appear. Nature does not exert an influence on our
lives directly, but rather through the agency of
society; at the same time, society reaches conscious-
ness of the direction of its progress via individual
consciousness. Individual consciousness is the
expression of social consciousness, and it is the
only thing capable of enriching it.

From language thought receives logical forms
from society. Just as the temporary stability of
things does not prevent the permanent movement of
things, social forms of thinking do not annihilate
the individual activity of thinking. There is always
an element of relative stability in whatever is in
movement. Furthermore, the moment of thought of the
individual becomes possible because of the social
stability of logical forms; otherwise, after the Fall

of Babel, how could individual thinking have reflected
and preserved the common and communicable properties
of things without the social stability of its logical
forms? The individual's thought transforms incommuni-
cable emotions into ideas communicable to all of
society. Thought always searches for the invariant in
the continuous variation of things. By means of these
logical forms of language, thinking discovers the
identical and socially necessary in things. Since
they are formed in and by society, these logical
structures naturally have a history of their own.
Yet because they reflect reality in their cognitive
content, they gradually become universally human.
How men think depends on society, but what they think
depends as well on themselves. Their freedom grows
as they improve the means of production and communi-
cation. In the tribal epoch, rudimentary tools and
oral speech was connected with thinking and acting
in a mytho-magical way; whereas alphabetic writing
and mechanical instruments allowed men to construct
their own thoughts, to determine their own aims.
For thinking minds language has an enormous
heuristic value. Cliches, commonplaces, and trite
expressions reflect others' thinking and a lack of
personal thinking. Certainly, truths known for a
long time do not become errors, they become banalities.
A truth which is a banality becomes less and less
informative. Platitude is the natural end of any
paradoxical truth. While platitude is a victory of
natural entropy, paradox is a success of human non-
entropy.
     The paradox, however, flashes only through those
minds capable of transcending the usual distance
between knowledge's two poles: sensibility and reason.

It is _affirming_ that the earth moves round the sun,
though one _sees_ that it is the sun that moves round
the earth. Language itself sprang forth in the form
of paradox, in the very moment it signified an ideal
by means of a material sign, a "metaphysical" signi-
fication from a "physical" sign. Paradox is sur-
prising; it exhibits an idea which contradicts
common sense, or good sense.

The appearance of new ideas becomes threatened,
if society forces reason to come back to sensibility,
keeping the symbol close to the sign, reducing the
world to its sensuous dimension. A world without
explainable depth is limited to describable surface.
At this juncture, thinking is left only with an
organizational mission, putting order into the flux
of appearances. A world devoid of essences is one
where thought is reduced to the manipulation of
systems of signs. The very moment the objective
existence of essences is contested thinking atrophies.
Signs can also be combined by animals and automatic
machines. One may in the end reach the conclusion
that machine-thought is preferable to the human, since
it is never bothered by the anxious moment when
emotions become ideas. This view maintains that man
should give up the illusion that he is qualitatively
different from other systems of organization in
nature. Man is conceived as nothing else than a
system which sends forth and picks up messages via
various signals.

But signification by language and signalling
are altogether different. In the structure of the
signal, the signified (the symbol) cannot get
detached from the sign, and thereby thinking, as the
capacity of abstraction and generalization, is

impossible. The signal is always the same, always
linked to an immediate circumstance, always univocal;
another signal as an answer is never expected.
Signalization is incompatible with questioning.
The reduction of signification to signalization
would mean the dehumanization of man. From being
the only animal that commands nature, man would
again become one among the many beings commanded
by nature. The tendency of technocratic society
to reconvert thoughts into pragmatic and affective
reactions, making performances replace books and
even pictographs replace letters, represents a
real danger today.

The object takes revenge upon the subject. After
Neo-Positivism called the subject to absorb the object,
Structuralism now calls the object to absorb the
subject. Subjectivism is turned into objectivism,
abstractism into concretism, and utopian humanism
into "scientific" anti-humanism. What should
disappear, however, is not humanism, but its
utopian character.

Socialism means scientific humanism. It means
unity and not uniformity. Socialism signifies culture
for all--at the same time culture for every one.
Liquidating social differences-- between classes,
between nationalities, between manual and intellectual
work, between town and village--socialism means the
development of individual differences, the free
development of each and every man. By improving
the means of production and communication, as well
as individual relationships, socialism ensures all
men the same opportunity for developing their own
personalities. Compared to achievements so far, the
socialist order will be a society with a greater amount

of thinking performed by a <u>greater number</u> of men,
having become capable of mentally covering an
increasing distance between the "perceived" and
what can only be "understood".

Under the influence of Structuralism in general,
and especially of McLuhan, many contemporary researchers
do not consider European logocentrism to be the
highest model of culture, only one among the numerous
models possible. René Berger maintains that our
judgments speak less about reality and more about
those making them.[12] Exaggerating the part played
by communication in the constitution of information,
Berger cannot see the objectivity of the information
communicated. He observes that the transition from
alphabetic writing to reproductions in black and
white and then to reproductions in colors, accompanied
by oral speech, by cinema and television, is a
considerable enrichment of culture; but what he
overlooks is that there was a continuous growth of
abstractive and generalizing capacity of human
thinking from oral speech, by means of cave paintings
and totems to alphabetic writing. In contemporary
culture the deeper the intellectual symbol is the
more informative the corresponding audio-visual sign.
the modern artist communicates less what he has
seen, and more what he has learned. The conceptualized
character of European thinking is not only one of
The numerous possibilities in the organization of
knowledge, it is also the highest level reached yet
in the history of thought. Social emancipation
leads to higher individual freedom, and therefore
creates many more possibilities for knowledge.[13]

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Notes

1. Edgar Morin, L'Esprit du temps; Grasset, Paris, 1962, p. 56.
2. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
3. Ibid., p. 244.
4. Ibid., p. 249.
5. Ibid., p. 77.
6. Ibid., p. 78.
7. Ibid., p. 149.
8. Ibid., p. 144.
9. Jean Cazeneuve, "Communication de masse et mutations culturelles". In Cahiers intern. de sociologie, Janvier-Juin, 1969, p. 25.
10. Paul Chauchard, "Importance de la connaissance psychophysiologique du langage". In Dialectics, # 3-4, 1968, p. 239.
11. Ibid., p. 243.
12. Cf. René Berger, "Une Aventure de Pygmalion". In Diogène, # 68, 1969.
13. Wald's article has been edited and abridged for inclusion in this volume.

Ladislav Tondl

"The Janus Head of Technology"*

Every search to find a precise characteristic of the concept "technology" runs into many problems and difficulties, whose solutions depend upon the type and method of interpretation of this concept, as well as upon the objectives of various possible analyses, etc. There are, moreover, linguistic and semantic difficulties, which hinge on the ambiguous and imprecise meaning of this general concept; but further, various languages have no common conventions to pin down a similar interpretation of the term. In the German and Slavic languages, their word Technik involves subjective as well as objective aspects; in English the words technology and technique are likewise different in their grammatical usage, e.g. by the application of the predicate technical, and so on. However, I nevertheless find it practical not only to restrict the number of possible meanings of the word "technology", but also to attempt to establish the fundamental characteristics of this concept.

Technology in its general sense comprehends the totality created by man in the use of his conscious activity with concrete objects, activity by which he changes his relation to his objective environment.

Technology is therefore what man brings between him-
self as subject and the world as object, intending
to change certain properties of the world in such a
way that he can reach his objective. Technology
thereby has been closely tied up with man's practical,
object-conscious, human activity, presupposing
operational knowledge, suitable technique, etc.
In short, technology includes not only our changing
the appearances, properties, and relationships of
the objective world, but also includes the ways and
means of attaining these goals. This means that
technology in this sense is inseparable with all
those things bound together with techniques.

Sometimes we say that technology imitates
nature. This is correct since we think of men as
part of nature. The simplest and original tool
actually copied the movements of the human arm,
extending and multiplying the effects of its work
and power. This is already established conclusively
by the most primitive stone-tools.

In the evolution of technology the unity of two
aspects stands out clearly: On the one hand,
technology is founded on the human model, on forms
man discovered in the organic and inorganic realms,
realms which he imitates; and, on the other hand,
it has a second characteristic. The more "humanity"
man inserts into technology's objective world, the
more he withdraws himself from nature, and therefore
there results an "alienation" from nature. Also,
the more completely man imitates nature, the more
he withdraws the results of his activity from nature's
original model.

Technology always increases, in a certain respect,
the efficiency of human activity. We must, however,

interpret this statement broadly: The force of a
hand which holds a hatchet is harder than that of
a bare fist. Whether through the better application
of a particular human ability or through the con-
struction of a further source of energy (the power
of beasts of burden, the wind, water--energies man
places at his service by his control of certain
natural occurrences), technology not only raises
fantastic human possibilities, but also offers still
another dimension of possibilities. Here belong,
for example, technical instruments used to transmit
news reports, the processing of information, and so
forth.

The generalization is defective which regards
technology as a mere multiplication of the human
arm's power and abilities. Microscopes and tele-
scopes multiply the possibilities of sight, and
other instruments extend our other, human sense
organs. Speaking figuratively, one can say that
technology is an objectification of our senses.
Even this denotation, nevertheless, is too narrow,
because technical means also expand and deepen the
capacities of our intellect. That can be seen in
the modern techniques of automation and cybernetics.
The events of nature are also intensively modified by
the abilities brought out in man's intellect,
supplementing the dexterity of his arms, etc. The
concept of "technology," therefore, involves not
only controlling and organizing our metabolism, but
also involves processing energy changes and exchanging
information. If we classify these three kinds of
technology under the controlling and organizing
processes of men, by no account do we say that
these three aspects have occupied the same place in

the development of technology. The earliest stage
of technological evolution is the epoch of time in
which the materials which man used were his working
tools--which has led us to name various periods
after these same materials. The tremendous forces
of technology came into the foreground when man was
first able to control profound transformations, e.g.
the first heat-energy sources. The present
scientific-technical revolution is characterized
by the enormous increase in the process and equip-
ment in transmitting information, a revolution which
has begun to automate the processes of decision-
making. The present-day emphasis on these aspects
of technology does not diminish the role of the
material and the energy technologies (here one
deals with the problem of new materials, new
sources of energy and more effective systems for the
transformation of energy); it allows these questions
to appear in the light of new relationships. On
this account, we must always interpret the notion
of technology in historical context; the concept's
characteristic traits, their mutual relationships
and proportions, should not be understood as per-
manent, but rather as historically conditioned; and
thus capable of change.
    The traits of technology, such as those con-
trolled and organized processes of his metabolism
by man, as those of energy transformation, and
those of the exchange of information, rest
essentially upon the interpretation of technology
which comes from the basic fundamentals of cyber-
netics; that is, upon the concepts of control and
organization, in the sense of an object-conscious,
anti-entropic activity. By technology man strengthens

what Norbert Wiener designates as enclaves for a
growing organization, an island where entropy cannot
grow, where organization and its correlates are
established.

This gives the impression that the application
of this viewpoint must imply the application to the
highest degree of the features and aspects of
technology. In this connection we refer to the
fruitfulness of the principle that the anatomy of
man represents the key to the anatomy of the ape.
Since L. Couffignal maintains that cybernetics
"aims to guarantee its art and its efficiency of
action," then this characteristic entails the
difficulty of constantly advancing efficiency of
action as a permanent trait of every technology:*
Not only do the computers of modern civilization
but the stone implements of primitive man as well
represent a specific effort to secure efficiency of
action, although on different levels and in different
senses.

The marriage of technology with such concepts
as "control" and "organization", and with the
concept of "enclaves of a growing organization",
raises the question of what we have called the
"Janus head" of technology. Also, since, in the
domains of energy and information, perpetual
motion is not possible, the application of technology
leads directly, or more often indirectly, to an

* L. Couffignal above all emphasized the rational
  foundations of cybernetics, which he conceives as
  a "mode de penser", as "pattern", etc. Such an
  emphasis upon its rational foundation corresponds
  to the Cartesian tradition of "l'art de penser".

increase of entropy, both outside and even inside of
these enclaves. In other words, the application of
technology to various domains of social life, and
at the same time the collective solution of socially
significant crises, ushers in not only benefits, not
only the attainment of difficult goals, the realiza-
tion of new conceptions of civilization; but also
simultaneously with such benefits (or in contradiction
to them), an increase in unforeseen dangers, diffi-
culties, and problems.

The many heads (Januskopf) of technology means
that technology not only increases and multiplies
human capacities, not only enlarges the spectrum of
human possibilities, not only develops the creative
powers of man; but it also subdues these same creative
powers, and restricts and destroys them. Industriali-
zation has brought not only many blessings with it,
but also the pitfalls of the agglomeration of cities,
atmospheric pollution, and the destruction of nature,
man included. Modern mass communication brings with
it not only quick and basic sources of information,
and naturally new forms of entertainment, but also
the dangers of uniformity and regimentation, the
destruction of our creative powers, etc. The
abundance of rational information in the fields of
science and technology can dull our capacity and
sensitivity for information stemming from our own
experiences and emotions. Moreover, the order and
organization brought about by technological progress
in one sphere often leads to the neglect of another
field.

We can reduce, consequently, the concept of
technology to something subordinate to man, which
results from him, which has arisen from human qualities,

and to that which serves man's traits and needs. If
we consider technology from this viewpoint, we find
only positive factors: technology multiplies man's
muscle power, makes it possible to erect gigantic
structures, to explore interstellar space, and to
go down into the depths of the ocean. It makes
feasible the solution of problems regarded by former
generations as insoluble. Moreover, it will pave
the way for him to control atomic energy and to
travel interplanetarily, also allowing him to solve
a series of intellectual problems, problems such as
computer translations, cybernetic diagnoses, automa-
tion of the documentation of events, and perhaps also,
solutions to artistic problems in music, poetry, and
so on.

This picture of the relations between technology
and man indicates, however, only one face of technology
in its relation to man. It does not show the negative
side of these relations, the shadows and griefs. To
some it may appear that these negative and even some-
times threatening appearances, which the horror of
the mass murders in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the
dangers of the nuclear suicide of humanity have
represented, are the only attributes of today's
modern technology. The danger today of technology's
misuse is horribly, incomparably greater than ever
before. The many heads of technology, its light and
dark sides, are not the only accompanying phenomena
of its new heights, but are also to be seen against
the totality of the evolution of the relationships
between man and technology.

Concerning the negative symptoms of technology,
there is no one formula under which the various
aspects could be subsumed. Great differences of

historical and structural nature exist here. One could get the impression that these negative aspects can only crush the highest and most perfect stage of technology: Simple technical developments seem to us "obedient," "subordinate," and "harmless"; and only technical developments of absolute perfection, symbolized by Prager Golem or Capek's "robots", can be autonomous and danger laden. Such a feeling, however, is a simplification and also is supported by the false assumption that these negative aspects of technology would eventuate in the rising autonomy of technology. The actual difficulties and problems are in no case, however, the product of a greater autonomy of technology from man, but are mainly the result of a lack of respect for humanistic principles. Moreover, it is to be emphasized that these problems and difficulties are related to changes in the larger and smaller milieux of human activity, to the interaction of technology with the evolution of bodily, psychological, and intellectual human qualities, being the symptoms of the totality of present technical developments; and they are not necessarily the characteristic of the highest phases of the development of technology. Clearly however, technological progress deepens the social consequences and meaning of such problems.

All of the above assertions concerning the "Janus head" of technology, both its "faces" in relation to man and the contradictory development of technology, are really a partial simplification of the problem. There are "many faces" here, many circumstances, whose meaning we still do not, in many cases, yet grasp fully and whose relationships to man we are not even in a position to judge. In

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this connection, it is necessary to point out that
we must judge every technological change in its
entirety and in its many-sidedness. Every techno-
logical innovation solves a certain problem and
reaches a specific objective. Simultaneously
however, and this holds for primitive tools as well
as for the most modern inventions, especially the
latter, it also exerts on man's physical and psychical
achievements, on his living and working environments,
an influence to one extent or another. If we consider
technology's "many faces", we should not forget that
these faces change historically; that something which,
in the beginning, appeared as a "smile" and which
inspired in us an unconditional value and seemed to
have positive worth, can frustrate the course of
further development and have unknown and unexpected
problems and difficulties. We have now witnessed,
for example, the profound difficulties of the
operations of technology upon man's physical life:
the effects of smoke, dust, noise, higher tempera-
ture, etc. It is very clear that the advances of
automation will bring before us with greater and
greater impact psychological, sociological,
aesthetic, and other problems. Many of these
problems have remained hidden to us, up to now.
It is possible that we will ponder the meaning of
other problems not quite correctly understood as
yet. And many problems shall be overestimated by
us. We also need not reconsider only the original
goal, which was made necessary by the original pro-
blems; we must take account also of future circum-
stances. This is not, of course, easy and simple;
it demands most of all a complete evaluation of
technological problems, seeing these things through

the eyes of psychologists, sociologists, physicists, aestheticians, and other technically trained people; and to balance all these mutual aspects, considering the priorities. We do not doubt, then, that technology's further evolution is thinkable only when those who have to make decisions upon this or that form in questions of technology, those who utilize technology, will aim in their conduct to realize the interests of humanity.


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
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
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
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
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
Agnes Heller

"The Individual and the Community"*

The question whether there is an actual contrast
or only an apparent one between individual and
community** cannot be unambiguously answered, since
it is too general. As a matter of fact, the answer
depends on what individual and what community is in
question.
    The relation of individual and society is one
of identity only when the highest social integration
itself is of a communal character. Clans and tribes
were the last integrations of this kind. The more
highly structurally differentiated and complicated
a given society is, the less likely it is a community
in the sense above. In the ancient city-states and
the earlier Medieval estates (under, i.e., conditions
of city-state democracy, and under what Marx called
"the democracy of a lack of freedom" in the Middle
Ages), one layer or class of the entire society

* Lecture delivered at the European Discourse, Vienna,
  1966. Abridged for inclusion in this volume.

** Heller uses the term "community" (with the sense
   of Gemeinschaft) to signify an organic, personal-
   istic set of relationships between men; and
   "society" (with the sense of Gesellschaft) is used
   for the totality of groups of men, relating to one
   another more anonymously and impersonally--Editor.

fulfilled the function of bringing about community.
Not even that was still possible after the rise of
the large, bourgeois nation-states. Social theories
in this period quickly reacted to this change. While
in More and Campanella's utopias the whole society
still functioned as a community, in the later
utopianism begun in the French Enlightenment, it
no longer did. These utopians from Morelly to
Fourier searched for the means of building up a
society from communities, seeking to reverse the
relation of the individual and the society as a
whole through these organic communities. Rousseau
in his Social Contract gave a detailed analysis of
the reason why the modern, unified organization of
the state could not be a community; in his New Heloise
he tried to offer a model of what a "small community"
of the new type ought to be. In our age of "industrial
societies" only this latter way of putting the question
seems reasonable. As we think about the future of
mankind, it is hardly imaginable that we could have a
total integration in the form of community.

The identification of the two relations, individual-
group and individual-community, is mistaken; since the
relationship between an individual and his group can be
quite accidental. For instance, from the point of view
of my individuality, it is accidental which form I am
registered in at school; as it is equally accidental
which district I reside in, what trade I am taught,
etc., to the extent that such factors become non-
accidental by my personality's affecting these
groups, such groups begin to turn into communities.
Therefore, every group is not equivalent to a
community, though they may become so.

The conception of the accidental, however, in so

far as belonging to communities is concerned, has
two contrasts. The first is when one belongs to a
given community out of <u>external necessity</u>, the other
when the necessity is internal, i.e. when there is a
free choice relative to one's individuality. The
former situation (external necessity) can be observed
in the case of city-states and the feudal estates.
These societies are not "pure societies" yet, meaning
that the process which Marx termed "forcing back
Nature's borders" is not yet completed in terms of
social structure. The communities of these societies
are "natural", in so far as they cannot harbor free
choice; further, the social place, the scope of
action of individual development, and his scale of
values, are determined by the individual's birth.
A young man born in the family of an early medieval
knight could at best choose whether to be a knight
or a priest, but could not decide to be a serf or a
commoner. Such possibilities to decide come only
when "natural" communities are in dissolution. Only
in "pure" class society, without estates, that is,
bourgeois society, is an end put to natural communities
on the level of primary social integrations. Only
bourgeois society can bring about man's "accidental"
relation to social integration, and hence to his
class. Parallel to that, only in this kind of
society can one move to <u>choose</u> his integration; i.e.,
it makes it possible for us <u>to be individuals not by
the aid of our community, but being individuals
already able to choose our community</u>. The nobleman
adopting a commoner's name in the French Revolution,
or the commoner identifying himself with the aims
and interests of the working-class movement, is the
result of this new possibility.

A social class is also not necessarily a community. This is so despite the fact that the members of a social class have essentially identical interests and functions, despite the fact that its norms and customs give its members a similar scope of action. Belonging to a class results in community when a member deliberately engages himself in his class, his choice being objectified by choosing to participate in its organizations and institutions.

Is the contrast between individual and community real or apparent? As long as communities were natural communities and one's birth gave a "necessary character" to the individual's communal existence, raising this question would have been senseless. Each individual grew into an individual within the community. He who lost his community lost the vital prerequisite of his activity; the heaviest punishment was to be cast out of the community.

Concrete conflicts could and did arise between individual and community in that time, for instance by "exclusion" from community in ostracism (either the retaliation to or the prevention of such a con- flict). This conflict could have two bases: (1) when the individual exceeded his companions in significance and popularity to such an extent that his existence threatened the comparatively peaceful functioning of the community's structure; (2) when the individual lifted his personal aims (personal success, growing rich, etc.) above the interests and aims óf the community, considering the community as a means of realizing his aims. And, in spite of the possibility of error and injustice, there was never a doubt that communal actions of this sort were justified. Thus, Socrates refused to flee from prison, feeling that

even the laws of his country condemning him to death
were binding upon him.

As natural communities begin to dissolve, an
increasingly prominent part is played by communities
set up by choice. The question becomes: can one
choose or form oneself a new community having, instead
of loose or less and less strict scales of values, a
really strict scale of values? From the stoa poikile
through Epicurus's garden to the disciples of Jesus,
we take note of such freely chosen, strong communities.
The form is similar in the case of the heretical
movements of the Middle Ages for which communal bonds
are stronger than those of the official Church.

The contrast of community-individual was brought
about only in the "pure society", bourgeois society,
in which man is accidentally related to his class. At
this juncture, man is a social being, though not
necessarily simultaneously a communal being.*

When we consider the historical development of
individuality, we never start out from the average of
the individuals of this age or that society. We set
ourselves to analyze the maximum possibility created
in a given period for the development of individuality.
Thus we take "representative individuals", those
exceptional individuals who completely fulfill their
potentiality in their context. The deeper the
alienation is in a given society and the more
radically normal human life gets separated from the
human essence, the more importance the consideration
above is. This is crucial when analyzing individuals

* It should not be inferred that the weakening of
  community meant that individuality gained a greater
  scope of action. The scope of action even in well-
  functioning, strictly controlled communities is varied.

of a capitalist society. Scholars studying bourgeois
individuality show two conflicting schemata. Either
they maintain that individuality as such was created
by bourgeois society (the liberal standpoint), while
any other society can only result in the "withdrawal"
of individuality; or they say that formal, bourgeois
equality, conformity, and manipulation, "cancelled"
the development of individuality (the romantic view),
frustrating individual initiative, as well as the
potentiality of really free individuals developing
themselves. If we inspect the facts both views have
an element of truth, though in different respects.
Bourgeois society really did develop individuality
to a great extent. This is observed best in the
Renaissance, historically the moment when the evolution
of this society began. Later, individuality continued
to acquire completely new properties, including
subjectivity and "inwardness", a fact seismologically
signalled by flourishing music and lyric poetry. At
the same time, bourgeois society was dissolving
natural community, it was establishing the possibility
for the individual to raise himself to any height, to
direct his own fate--an achievement symbolized by
Napoleon. But at the same time, and here what is true
in the romantic standpoint comes to the fore, bourgeois
society was the very society which, by subordinating
the individual to his class and subjecting him to the
laws of economics (as though they were laws of nature),
profoundly frustrated possibilities; dragging the free
individual into the slavery of alienation to such an
extent, that <u>de facto</u> he sank very much below the
level of individuals in previous epochs.
  This century has brought about an increased
prominence of the second tendency, the majority of

representative individuals today denying their own
world, and seeking new social perspectives for the
evolution of mankind.

Since the emergence of bourgeois society, the
fixed scale of values has been broken up. The task
of the individual is no longer just to apply a
scale of values in each of his concrete acts (though
this remains part of his task), but choosing values
to enable him to construct a concrete hierarchy of
his own against the backdrop of the more or less
relaxed limits. Thus the individual's choice greatly
increases. But it is to be remembered, that this is
the very society in which the interests, customs, and
simple rules of conduct of classes begin to function
definitely and unambiguously as values. Also, con-
formity spreads profoundly.

Bourgeois individuals often grow up and live
without any community. The majority of them, at
least for a time, consider it an ideal to live
without a community, idealizing this state as
"freedom". Their "emancipation" from the community
enables them to confess that the motive of their
action is their individual interests. Thus arise
individualism and the consciousness of it, in which
the "total interest", i.e. the progress of society,
is the spontaneous result of each person following
his individual interest. Now we have egoism, and
existence outside of community becomes a principle.

This does not mean that bourgeois society is
bereft of community. The bourgeois revolutionaries,
the plebians, were constantly forming such communities,
for example in the French Revolution. Later the
workers began forming their own independent communal
organizations. Their aim was the struggle against

exploitation. The worker gaining self-consciousness
forms a community in opposition to class existence,
and hopes to create a new order and a new scale of
values, in place of the older, existing one--all of
this representing what has been brought about by
the evolution of individuality of bourgeois society.
        But has the individual the opportunity always
to choose to participate in a community? Or can he
choose any kind of community? The first question
can be easily answered in the negative. One can
think of such artists as Schubert, Schumann, or the
old Beethoven. The emotional atmosphere of their
music bears the mark of the nostalgia they felt for
the undiscovered or lost community. We must add
that, whenever we inquire about this opportunity,
we have to do so <u>in relation to the given individual</u>.
However, to answer the second question, we have to
bring in the concept of "value".
        As a matter of fact, the second question is the
central question of our time. Bourgeois individualism
had fallen into decline by the middle of the last
century. The naive hope of the individual unfolding
freely without community, the individual interest
principle guiding him toward liberty, had become
more and more problematic. Despair has now taken
the place of self-confidence, along with a <u>fin de
siècle</u> loneliness. We reach the stage where bourgeois
society stopped developing individuality, even for its
representative individuals. Coincident to this
development, the working-class movement gained
increasing strength, and intellectuals who gave their
allegiance to the workers' movement found meaning for
their lives once again in their communities. <u>This was
not a "fear of freedom" but a search for freedom</u>. The

revolutionary movement reaches its height in the 20th century, leaving a profound impress upon the best representatives of the working class and the intelli-gentsia. The individual had aroused in him a strong desire to act in common community, and could fly higher "on the wings" of the community. Thus we arrive at a <u>desire for a new society in which man can once more become a person in community</u>.

Man has once again, however, turned away from the search for community, resulting undoubtedly from three historical factors. These are the cult of personality in Socialist countries, fascism, and group manipulation in the contemporary bourgeois world. It is to be emphasized that these three are entirely different phenomena.

At this point we introduce the concept "value". Objective values, i.e. values independent of men's overt valuations, are all those social conditions, products, actions, ideas, <u>which contribute to the development of the human essence at a given historical stage</u>.

But what is the "essence of man"? Here we refer to the Marxian thought of György Márkus. According to Márkus, the human essence is composed of the following: labor (objectification), sociality, universality, consciousness, and freedom. The possibility of these essential characteristics emerged with the early evolution of man, and are realized in the endless process of man's development. Those social conditions, products, actions, which offer a greater possibility for human objectification, integrate man socially, develop his consciousness, and make it more universal (increasing man's social freedom); have positive "value-contents". Those having the contrary

effect are considered to have negative value-contents,
even if the majority of the members of a given society
regard them as positive.

There are social conditions that develop one
value but counteract another, or those that develop
one value in its relation to mankind but counteract
its development in reaction to the individual. When
choosing a community, it is always the whole which
should be taken into account. The point to find out
is what predominates in the contradictory complex of
values.*

Does this mean that every community contributing
in various degrees to the unfolding of the human
essence uniformly aids in unfolding the capacities
of its individuals? Because a community relatively
unfolds general human values does not necessarily
imply that it develops individuality to the same
extent. We can mention the communities of the
Jacobins and their revolutionary terrorism, which
was necessary to develop the value-contents of the
community, but which (at the same time) morally ruined
many individuals who took part. In this case there
was a contradiction of values within the community,
making the unfolding of the individual problematical.
But there is still another reason. Such communities
organized with special historical aims emphasize
certain capabilities rather than others. Therefore
that type of individual whose bent is in this
direction is developed better, while those whose
disposition is against it develop unfavorably.

Thus the choice of a community can have two

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* To bring out the substance of values, according to our
hypothesis, is to unfold the potentialities of the
human essence.

rational motives: (1) the objective value-content
of the community, i.e. its possibilities of developing
the human essence, and (2) the degree to which it
enables a man to develop his individuality. The first
criterion, however, always has primacy over the
second. This primacy is not simply derived from the
category of "Ought" (Sollen); it follows from the very
essence of individuality.
    Human individuality is more than a mere "entity".
Everyone is a particular thing, but at the same time
a representative of the human race as well. One's
activity is both particular and belongs to the human
genus. Man acts, feels, questions, and solves, in
terms of his instincts and needs, both of which are
conditioned by society, both of which exist in
connection also with his ego. At the same time, he
acts as a member of the genus, since his feelings
and needs belong also to mankind. In his social
activity as a whole, man is always "moving" between
his particularity and his conscious universality.
Man becomes an individual by making a synthesis
within himself to the extent that he consciously
transforms the aims and ambitions of the race into
his own, "socializing" his particularity. The concept
of distance belongs to the essence of individuality,
i.e. a free attitude towards his integration. This
was the case as early as the era of "natural" communities,
especially in the instance of the well-developed
individual. The possibility of this stance has been
widened by the dissolution of such communities.
    If such a free attitude to a community belongs
to the essence of the individual, then the individual's
value-content primarily finds its expression in the
kind of community he chooses. Quod erat demonstrandum:

the primacy of the choice of the community on the
basis of its objective value-content from the point
of view of individuality. This conception answers
a question not yet raised. A basically negative*
community can <u>never</u> develop individuality, because
it does not develop value even in the individual.
Such a community cannot develop values, even if the
individual feels well in it, even if he thinks he
has found the right environment for developing him-
self. What manifests itself in a community of
negative value-content is never individuality; it
is a mere <u>particularity</u>.

        History demonstrated that in fascist communities.
The fascist community and its myths annihilated an
enormous achievement of human history, the relatively
free choice of community. Fascism created <u>the myth of</u>
<u>the natural community</u> in a world where <u>de facto</u> it had
not existed for centuries. Integration without
"distance" was necessarily accompanied by unrestricted
"indulgence" in emotion. The individual did not
become real in the fascist community; in fact, he
"split up" into a particularity wildly indulgent and
into a being tamely put on the level of the race,
absolutely subjecting itself to an "external" require-
ment of the so-called "race".

        If we look for another type of example in our
own century, it is to be found in Makarenko's
community, described in his book <u>Road to Life</u> (English
title).** What is described in this book is more than
a mere analysis of the non-recurring or accidental

* In its value-content.
** Makarenko's <u>Pedagogic Poem</u> (Russian title) was
    published in 1933-35--Editor.

features of a youth collective or of an educational
hostel. It is the model of a humanitarian-socialist
society, the model of the possibilites theoretically
present in socialism. We shall not give a detailed
analysis, since this was accomplished by Georg
Lukács. It is sufficient to enumerate the charac-
teristics of that community. Its first feature was
that it could be freely chosen. Joining or leaving
was a matter of free decision. Another characteristic
of it was that this community was oriented around its
goal. Communal existence is never a goal in itself,
nor is it a goal just to be educated, nor only
"not to be alone"--all these are results realized
if the whole society's aims are carried out, even
when the relation of the community to the society
has certain problems and conflicts.* Another
feature was the organization of moral standards of
the community in such a way that the community strictly
condemned acts resulting from particularity, which
undermined the total values of the collective. But
it did not denounce the individual responsible for
such a deed, giving him the possibility for a constant
rebirth. Moreover, it was set up to give the maximum
potential for the individual to form different individual
hierarchies of values, developing various kinds of
behavior within such a positive scale of moral values.
Finally, Makarenko's community was so diversified and
many-sided that everyone could realize his natural
capabilities.

   After this is it correct to speak of the contra-
diction of individual and community?

* The relation of Makarenko's community to Soviet society
  was always based on a unity full of conflict.

We have actually answered the question concerning
what a man should do, if a community exists with
positive-value content. He must choose that community,
if he wishes to develop his individuality to a high
degree. But what should he do if there are no
communities such as this in his society?
    The substance bearing these values is human
history itself, and this substance does not objectify
itself in community. Values are realized also in art,
science, production, etc. If both of these spheres
are absent, the individual can still choose positive
values. He can find them in the objectifications,
ideas, and norms of the <u>past</u>, selecting them in
opposition to his own age, accepting them as his
standard, hypostatizing them into the future. If
he is opposed to communities in his age, at least
theoretically, he chooses a community. <u>Without this
theoretical community individuals cannot obtain
positive value-content.</u>
    We suppose, but did not admit, that there were
ages which did not allow any possibility <u>whatever</u>
of forming communities of positive value-content.
We do not believe that such ages exist. In some
form or other, with greater or lesser scope of
action, it can exist; and every individual feels
the <u>need</u> of it. Man as a representative of the
human gens can only really know the world and himself
through the mirror of "others".
    There are ages in which such extraordinary
capabilities, mental, and moral efforts, are needed
for the formation of communities, and at the same
time for the development of individuality, that such
communities become possible only for certain
representative individuals. Such is the age of the

manipulated "mass society". Think of what we have
been told about it: it makes individual <u>decision</u>,
without which a community cannot be imagined, less
and less possible. Being transformed from a
"consequence" of subjects into a mere "object", the
manipulated group has ceased to function as a
community.

We have said that society <u>as a whole</u> can never
be a community. But how much opportunity one is
offered to form a community of positive value-content
depends on the <u>whole</u> society, including its economic
structure. <u>When we speak of the socialist perspective,</u>
<u>we hypostatize a society whose structure offers the</u>
<u>opportunity spoken of above to everybody</u>. And if the
question, "What is to be done <u>hic et nunc</u>?", arises,
the answer is that we have to organize or accept such
communities whose aim is the quest for or the
acceleration of the social processes resulting in
the birth or development of such a society.

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

Zádor Tordai

"Outline of a Marxist Theory of Alienation"*

The concept of alienation (<u>Entfremdung</u>) has
enjoyed a kind of vogue. It has been just as "chic"
to speak of alienation as it used to be to talk
about the Oedipus Complex or relativity in their
season. It has been a "maid-of-all-work." Happily,
like all vogues, this one was short-lived. It is now
on the wane, so that we can finally consider the
matter in a serious manner. But while we are now
able to lay down a more or less viable hypothesis,
we must first of all make a distinction. Any subject
of intended discussion should be at least approximately
defined: and the flood of modish garrulity has left
the issue somewhat confused. More than that, it has
obscured even the serious investigations, and those
especially which have led in recent years to signi-
ficant conclusions and have opened up many fruitful
lines of research.

If we concentrate on the relevant scholarly
literature, we see at once that several distinct
tendencies are present in them, and that a number
of approaches to the problem have found currency.
The tendencies can be reduced essentially to three.

The first group I shall call psychological.
It posits an inner estrangement (<u>Entzweiung</u>) of the
individual in the center of its concentration. But
since this approach cannot conceive, fathom, or
explain anything at all about its "overall developing",

* Translated by John C. Cullen.

i.e. the universalization of this inner split, and, therefore, can say nothing about the sociological dimensions of the problem; it seems to promise very little.

The second group would set up theories which see alienation as a discrepancy between man's existence and his nature. As a sub-group here we have those who hold that human nature is conceivable only at the level of the historico-social, and therefore set it in conflict with the individuality of existence. In this way the social arena is included, but the picture we end up with is a still-life. These theories cannot, in fact, explain the existence of the discrepancy, either in its present actuality or in its emergence. The adherents of this tendency appeal to the early writings of Marx, but they cannot make full use of the relevant texts in the later works.

The third approach is that which starts from the "end-point" of the pertinent Marxian research, and sees the basis and heart of the problem in the subject-object relationship and its transformation. Since I am convinced that this last approach can explain the widest field of phenomena, that it can penetrate most deeply into the discovery of causes, that, finally, it can give the simplest explanation; I consider it as scientifically the best. A further confirmation of this preference lies in the fact that it can incorporate all the results of the other two modes of explanation, while the converse is not the case.

I should like to outline this hypothesis into the rest of this paper, but first, an introductory

note. There has been a great deal of debate over the
Marxian texts concerning alienation. But unfortunately,
this debate has amounted to little more than a spinning
of wheels; since, up until now, there is, for example,
no Marxian philology, nor any scientifically complete
edition of his works. I do not care to go into the
question of the relationship between the early writings
and the later works, but I would like to offer a
reflection upon one argument in this debate, viz.
the appeal to <u>Capital</u>. This appeal simply cannot
stand scrutiny, since it is false,* that in <u>Capital</u>
there was no discussion of alienation. The proponents
of this argument fail to take into consideration that
Marx had conceived this work as a <u>Volksbuch</u>; that he
therefore deferred a whole series of questions for
later treatment (in vols. 2 & 3), and that he put
aside another set of philosophical problems entirely.
We must, therefore, make full use of his other
writings in this connection, above all, the works
preparatory to <u>Capital</u>. Only the results of such
an exhaustive study can provide us with the basis
for references to <u>Capital</u> that will be of value in
this issue. Such research is, for all practical
purposes, non-existent at present. But all the tenta-
tive advances in this direction have shown that Marx's
theories of alienation converge upon the subject-
object problem.
      The subject-object problem-complex can be traced
partly back to Hegel. And we find on just this point
a basic difference between the Hegelian and the Marxian
conceptions. As is well known, they both locate

* This is philologically demonstrable.

objectification (<u>Objektivation</u>) at the heart of the
problem. Hegel identifies alienation (<u>Entfremdung</u>)
and reification (<u>Verdinglichung</u>), while Marx sees a
fundamental distinction. For Marx, as we know,
objectification is a renunciation (<u>Entäusserung</u>)
as well as an appropriation (<u>Aneignung</u>) and an
incorporation (<u>Einverleibung</u>). Objectification
implies a becoming-for-us, and this is essential.
But alienation, accordingly, appears as a "distortion"
of objectification. We might express it this way:
the objectification fails to complete the circle.
We have a process in which the humanization which is
"put into" the object fails to be realized for the
individual. There is a question, therefore, of
the non-realization of concrete humanization (which
should have occurred in the form of re-subjectifica-
tion). Thus, alienation implies that objectification
remains outside the subject; it denotes a process
in which objectification "escaped from" the hands of
the human agent. What is more, the fugitive objecti-
fication sets itself over against the agent: an
opposition arises between them; and, finally, the
objectification which begins by opposing man ends
up as the master of the very human subject that
brought it into existence. The world of objecti-
fications gains the power of a determining force
over the subject and his acts. The world of objecti-
fications appears to have become the subject; while
man (the real subject) assumes the status of an
object. Thus, we are involved in a kind of reversal
of the subject-object relationship.
        However, since objectification can be treated as
the mediating factor in this process, the vehicle of
objectifications, i.e. the thing in its otherness,

appears to be the embodiment of an alien being,
and, therefore, as the embodiment, and hence the
cause, of alienation.*   In this way, reification,
which is one of the phenomena of alienation, now
appears partly as alienation itself and partly as
the cause of alienation. As a consequence, all
theories which remain at the level of mere fact
and do not probe further into the relationships
behind the facts, equate alienation and reification.
One superficial description goes even further astray
by looking for the cause of alienation in the
materiality of the object; and we find other such
superficial explanations gaining currency, such
as the one that converts the alienation-relationship
(which is brought into being by the mediating object)
into a relationship belonging to the thing. We
arrive in this way at an explanation which once
more fastens on a relationship that belongs to the
world of the merely phenomenal. An example of such
an explantion is the one that points to the property-
relation, to those relations of management over things.
This road leads directly to the identification of
alienation and exploitation. We can find a similar
conception even in the early writings of Marx. But
Marx kept digging deeper and soon forsook this view-
point. Thus, he came to discover that alienation is
a universal fact, one that belongs to society as a
whole, therefore of such a nature that even the

* Mediation works in two directions: that of alienation
proper, i.e. the slipping away (from the subject) of
the objectification; and that of the emergence of deter-
mination, hence the subordination of the subject.

proprietor "embodies" the exploiter in his own person.
    Moreover, alienation is not so totally societal
that it is found in all men, nor does it represent a
universal human phenomenon. It is the specific feature
of society as a whole, therefore as a totality. It
is the specific feature of the becoming of the whole,
and thus of the bond between the individual and the
whole. Society is the totality of men, and the
activity of the totality. Therefore, the activity
of society (which we call history) is nothing but the
result of all human activities, the structured
wholeness of them all. But now we see that the
human agents, who do not have control over the
totality that arises from their activities, nor
over the activity of the whole, do not determine it.
And, what's more, they cannot even recognize their
own activities within the totality. They see the
totality set over them; they see it as an alien
power, determining their existence and action. It
is the product of their actions, but it is a lord
over them. The final result of all this is that the
very activity which begets this product is perceived
as alien to them. Now, since it is precisely in these
activities that men actualize their own being, this
existence of theirs becomes an existence forced upon
them from without, experienced as alien.
    We might say that because of alienation human
existence appears in its totality as split in two.
There is one level, that of history, of society; and
another, that of individuality. Society and history
develop into a kind of objective self-sufficiency, and
are, therefore, apparently beyond explanation; or
rather, it looks as if no fully satisfactory explanation
can be given. But this means that the epistemological

problem is not the cause but the effect. Another
conclusion we can draw is that the problem of
alienation should be recognized as the very heart
of the philosophy of history and social philosophy.

The sounding of the depths of alienation is
thus the only possibility of making a truly synthetic
view feasible. Conversely, only a synthesis can
grasp the problem of alienation. This raises the
question of the synthesizing processes of <u>Praxis</u>.

The determinations discernible in man's social
existence are customarily represented as forces or
processes working in a linear direction. These are
explained in social life in terms of diachronous
causes and conditions. But such a theory is inadequate;
for all social determinations are based in reality
upon synchronous processes. All human activities are
properly and fundamentally determined by their incor-
poration into universal activity, i.e. the totality
of all the activities of men. We are dealing here
with totalization through which every activity is
assigned its definite "place" in social existence and
development. Every particular activity acquires its
real, objective meaning in this way. All activities
acquire their meaning (the basis of their social
significance) through the activities of other men
directed toward their objectification; through the
use to which the objectification is put; through
the secondary effects of the activity; and through
the role which this particular objectification plays
in the total system of objectifications. This process
of incorporation is universal and fundamental. (All
other forms of determination arise from this basic form.)

This means that all activities coalesce into a
"unity". But it is precisely the totality of all

activities which constructs this unity. Thus, we can
even assert that the constructed activities (in their
universality) are themselves determined by the unity
of the totality. In the case in which this unity of
activities stands over against the activities them-
selves as something alien, all these reflective
determinations necessarily appear as if they arose
from some alien source; and, at the same time, in
such a way as to turn the very activity which pro-
duced them into something alien. But this is always
the case if the particular activities are not them-
selves able to determine their position in the totality,
i.e. whenever the agent cannot choose his activities
for himself nor determine for himself the relationship
between his own activities and the activities of
others. In other words, in all situations in which
the totality of all men cannot control the totality
of their relations, in which, therefore, these
relations come into and remain in existence
spontaneously.
          Thus, we have penetrated into the basic ground.
The objective self-sufficiency of the totality arises
from the fact that human activities are divided up
spontaneously; that their division is a "natural
growth"; and therefore, that their resulting totality
can only exist as a "natural growth". But the basic
form of human activity is labor: it is the element
that maintains all the others. Therefore, we must
trace alienation back to the "natural growth" of
the division of labor. From this source arises the
objective self-sufficiency (Verselbständigung) of
the economy as a totality, the objective self-
sufficiency of the whole productive apparatus.

Now if this is truly the case, then we must con-
clude that the objective self-sufficiency of the
productive complex must be considered the central
problem. But all other social activities have a
similar character; therefore, they too are subjected
to spontaneous totalization.

The above-mentioned form of the division of
labor implies that all labor and the human activities
connected with it already have their pre-determined
place in the totality; consequently, the overall
regulative plan achieved through synchronous deter-
minations is based on a pre-existing "framework". The
individual finds himself in a ready-made situation,
and this situation is the vehicle of the determinations
that pertain to him. These determinations appear to
him as something "pre-ordained". (And this might
help explain the existence of the theory of linear
determinations.) But what is obscured by this situa-
tion is, first of all, the fact that the pre-existent
state of affairs is the product of human activities;
and secondly, that the system of pre-existing conditions
is maintained, renewed, and ultimately achieved through
the continuation of these activities. The result is
that man is locked up in a cosmic prison, but one which
he has built with his own hands.

The development of the modern productive complex
enables man, as we know, to gain mastery over nature, to
break out of his subjection to nature. But he has
achieved this success in such a way that at present
another form of human subjugation has simply taken
its place, viz. that of man to the apparatus of pro-
duction itself. Nevertheless, this is also the process
which has produced the human individual in his individuality.

The full richness of human abilities appears precisely
in and through this process. Thus the plenitude of
human possibilities arises from the same source as
the impossibility of their fully-rounded realization.
Therefore at the level of the individual, alienation
signifies the existence of a contradiction between
the potential plenitude of possibilities and the actual
one-sidedness of their realization.

      There is a further implication at this same level,
and it arises from the fact that man, the unique subject,
sees himself forced into the situation of an object.
The quasi-subjectivity of the totality means that man's
subjectivity can only be experienced as something
apart from himself, that is, alienated. Man feels
stripped of his own subjectivity (that very subjectivity
which he has constructed from his activities). He can
grasp his subjectivity only in the form of a negation.
His own proper subjectivity seems to him as somehow
lost. And he can demand it back for himself only by
renouncing his deprivation. But such a renunciation
can be realized only in Praxis (practice).

      If we wish to give an adequate explanation of the
processes of alienation, we can do it successfully only
if we take into consideration all the various concrete
mediations. And this is all the more necessary, since
we are dealing with the processes of totalization,
which are concretely actualized at mediated levels.

      We stated that the problem of alienation arises
because social existence takes on an independent
reality as a totality. Since this does not take
place in the abstract, but in social actuality, this
means that the concrete forms of existence of the
totality, along with their structure, are embodied
in an independent form. These concrete forms are the

elements which make up the structure of social
reality. Here we could, and properly should, .
engage in an analysis of all the social forms of
human existence, keeping in mind at the same time
the organization of their reciprocal relationships,
and thus, of their structuration. But we must
content ourselves here with a few hints, or more
precisely, examples.
     State, nation, class are all social realities,
precisely because they all represent aspects of
alienation, and do so under the most diverse
forms. We can assert with some assurance that
the concrete forms (of alienation) are always
those in which human activity is integrated into
partial totalities. These partial totalities
have independent existence only through the activities
which produce them, over against which they
establish their own independent reality. So, for
example, a social class is a species of alienation;
and the fact of class determination is a reality
precisely on this basis, and to this extent. Among
partial totalities, however, we are particularly
concerned with those which are themselves subordinated
as parts of a larger unity, and thus receive their
determination also from outside themselves. One
form of this determination is that which is realized
in a reciprocity of negation, i.e. in the relation
of reciprocity which defines the classes that are
constituted by negation. It is this reciprocal
negation which brings it about, that neither of the
opposed components is aware of its determination by
the other.
     When we turn to the state the case is somewhat
the same, at least to the extent that the state is an

element in the existence and conflict of classes.
However, the state is also an element in the total
social reality. In this sense, the state is always
simultaneously an expression and a form of the
objective, independent existence of the totality.
And this aspect of its objective independence sets
it over against all partial totalities at once
(including those which can be considered the ruling
classes).

The very existence of ideology is also an aspect
of alienation. Therefore, the question here concerns
the existence of ideology as a form of social thought;
but if this is the case, it follows that ideology can-
not be included under alienation by virtue of its
<u>content</u>. An ideology (e.g. religion) cannot be an
aspect of alienation simply because it expresses one
or another feature of human becoming; it is alienation
because it is a form of theoretical organization
which has an independent reality of its own over
against the human thinker. This entails the fact
that every ideology is an instance of alienation.

From what has been said it follows that, because
an ideology, or a type of activity, or a partial
totality, or an organization, sets itself in opposition
to the existing forms of alienation; it cannot be
concluded that it is <u>by that very fact free of
alienation</u>. Each of them remains under the shadow
of alienation, and this points to a very important
conclusion, viz. that alienation cannot be broken
down with <u>one</u> blow, but only by a series of activities.
How are these activities constituted? First of all,
they have a dual character: they are directed against
alienation, and are at the same time subject to it.
In other words, alienation must be combatted with

instruments which are themselves aspects and forms
of alienation. Secondly, and this follows from the
first point, the struggle must be constantly renewed
if it is to overcome an alienation that is constantly
renewing itself and taking on continual variations.*
     In taking up this problem of the battle against
alienation, we must also insist that this struggle
take as its proper goal the subordination of the
totality under all of its elements. This is the
conception which Marx sets forth in his Grundrisse,
where he speaks of the necessity of subordinating
the productive complex under all its elements, and
in this program the "all" is of central importance;
however, it can be realized only if society takes on
a communal structure. And this, in turn, can only
come to actuality if it embraces the totality, and
precisely in the manner of those communities which
build up communal relationships between one another.
Thus if the same kind of relationships exist among
communities as exist among communities as exist
among the individuals within each community. But
this is simply impossible as an imposition from
above; it can be brought to fruition only through
the Praxis of everyone.
     This will be possible only if the world of
production is transformed. But the transformation
of production requires that man no longer be enclosed

* It is in this sense that we might interpret Marx's
insight which insists on the necessity of abolishing
all classes, and stands in stark opposition to every
absolutizing of a class, no matter what it might be.
And here we find one basis, among others, for a
contrast between Marx and Stalin.

<u>within</u> the productive process, but that he transcend it. The first suggestions of this "transcendence" are beginning to be realized through automation.

But whether the realization of such a perspective is utopian, or whether it can come to actuality in the real world, is a practical question. To treat of it today can only lead to speculation. To deal with it realistically, i.e. to take up the solution of this question in a practical way, is itself a question for human decisions.

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"Herbert Marcuse's 'Critical Theory'*

In their "Manifesto of the Communist Party",
Marx and Engels wrote: "The Communist revolution
is the most radical rupture with traditional pro-
perty relations; no wonder that its development
involves the most radical rupture with traditional
ideas."[1] These men focussed here upon the point
where historical continuity is shattered.

In principle, we have here the central point
enabling us to understand, not only Marcuse's
orientation, but an entire philosophical, ideological,
and political mode as well. This is the question of
a total break with the past, the question of an
immediate leap into a wonderful future, free of all
suffering. Marcuse asks at every stage of his
development: Does actual socialism offer such a total
break with the past? Is the socialist workers' move-
ment actually the power which completes this? He
answers this question in the negative. From this
perspective, directed against the workers' movement
and actual socialism, Marcuse arrives at a series
of opinions which in his voluminous lifework he
constantly approaches from new aspects, and which
he continually enlarges. One of the latest expressions
of this type of view, one which is quite influential
in our day, goes like this:[2] The inability of actual

* Translated by Robert M. Kunz. Article abridged for
  this volume.

socialism and the workers' movement to accomplish
this total break is connected with the fact that
Marxism is not sufficiently critical in relation
to the establishment, it is not negative enough,
it is not sufficiently utopian about the future
order, etc. Supposedly this is linked with Marx's
derivation, especially the Marxian dialectic's,
from Hegel, and with Marxism's incomplete materialism.
Both Marx and Hegel, allegedly, overlooked a most
essential problem, viz. all revolutions have their
own Thermidor. They reach a point where they revert
to their opposite; because there had been no libera-
tion, no revolution before the liberation, before
the revolution, oppression is re-established.
Supposedly, a readiness, evidently present in each
person, to submit oneself again, to allow oneself
to be oppressed all over again, was not destroyed.
To Marcuse, Marx had not explored the problem of
oppression with sufficient clarity; he failed to
extend his investigations of this problem directly
into the individual. It is asserted that we must
explore another form of dialectic, most of all
another kind of negation, another relationship to
the totality; conceptions other than those of Marx
and Lenin on the problematics of dialectical con-
tradiction must be elaborated.[3] Furthermore, we
must go beyond historical materialism to an analysis
of the instinctual structure of the individual. All
of Marcuse's work revolves around revisions of
historical materialism and its dialectic. It is a
constant variation of this theme.
      The philosophical and political development of
this revisionism has three clearly distinguishable
stages.[4] The first runs from 1928 to 1933.[5] In

this period, Marcuse starts from Heidegger and attempts a first revision of Marxism.

Marx had frequently asserted that men make their history themselves, but not under freely chosen conditions. Marcuse acknowledges the first half of this judgment, and ignores the second. That which speaks about man making history himself, he connects with Heidegger's anthropology; thereby, Marcuse throws out nature and society's objective laws. Since man constructs reality, he also brings its laws into operation as well. Man is a sort of secularized god. Those who assume, over against this conception, objective laws are said to misrepresent the products of his own activity. Thus materialsim is sacrificed to subjectivism. Dialectics becomes subjective Praxis. The fact that man can and does enter into a dialectical relationship with nature remains unexplained, and must remain so; finally, we have a theory here lacking a foundation.

At this point, we shall remark on an epistemological, basic question, one playing a decisive role not only in the young but also in the old Marcuse, as well as in the Frankfurt School, e.g. in Alfred Schmidt's works,[6] as in Sartre, and others. In principle, they all have the thesis that history is man's work, and vice versa. Man is therefore in history and can recognize in it his own products. But nature is external and inaccessible; at best we know nature through the mediations of our own activities. Knowledge of nature, accordingly, is relative to man's practice. As a result of our practice, there is a socio-historical dialectic. This dialectic is nothing else than the subjective activity of humanity. Since our mode of knowing corresponding to Praxis is dialectical, our

knowledge of nature is also dialectical. But whether
there is a dialectic of nature cannot be ascertained.
This latter is Engels' addition to Marxism, which
Lenin preserved and continued.

We then could ask: Since our knowledge of
nature is relative to human history, are there any
objective propositions about nature independent of
our will, consciousness, and practice? We must ask
next: How can there be even a relative knowledge
if there be no object known? The agnosticism here
must also doubt the possibility of historical
knowledge and practice. Our practice is based upon,
in the final analysis, a kind of metabolism between
us--as nature--and extra-human nature. If, however,
it is already conceded that our practice is dialectical,
it is, in the first place, given that the part of
nature which we already are is dialectical. From this,
then, unconsciously at least, also concede that
nature must be in principle dialectical, despite all
the distinctions which are naturally connected with
this. For how could our practical, dialectical
relationship to extra-human nature grow into the
desired results if human and extra-human nature
(from which, indeed, we derive genetically) had
totally different qualities?

Such an agnostic conception would be a most
radical denial of the extra-human, as well as of
our own activity, for what is that part of us which
is practically active? It is our bodily ego. For
the purposes of epistemology, this is already some-
thing external, an outer world in contrast to our
subjective consciousness. This outer world, further-
more, is known only through the contents of our
consciousness. Either one should be ready to cross

the Rubicon at the outset concerning the relationship between our subjective knowledge and our subjective practice, between the species-practice and species-history on the one hand, and extra-human nature on the other; then one, in principle, renounces the positing of agnostic barriers--_Or_, one finds himself within the classical epistemological paradox.* If the latter is one's position, then he cannot argue with us, for he must call into question not only our existence but also any existence outside of his consciousness.[7]

In this dialectic, negation is the total annihilation of everything worth negating. All bridges are broken, all the identity papers of the past are burned. As Marcuse indicates, revolution signifies not only a rejection of every reform, not only the "catastrophic" act, but also the nullification of history, a return to nature, à la left-wing Rousseauism; which we see negate the historical basis of the theory, and thus the theory itself. The dialectic of quantity and quality, of continuity and discontinuity disappears. The dialectics of Hegel and Marx are eradicated.

Such a revolution, moreover, is possible at any time. It requires no objective conditions, no revolutionary crisis. We have before us the foundation of a putschist theory of revolution. All that is needed is to generate revolutionary consciousness. How this can occur remains, in the meantime, unexplored.

During Marcuse's second stage (1933-1941), there is an attenuation of these basic theses. The foundations

* That is, the ego-centric predicament--Editor.

of this stage is the accession of the Nazis to power,
the emigration to the United States of the Frankfurt
School, participation in the anti-fascist struggle,
and therefore a loose alliance with the workers'
socialist movement. Marcuse now corrects his
Heideggerian position,[8] without a rejection of
the fundamental views of his first stage. Now,
after a period of vigorous struggle against the
heritage of bourgeois humanism, he changes course.
In his anti-fascist struggle he orients himself
towards this heritage, especially towards Hegel.[9]
       The deeper meaning of this is a subtle anti-
Marxism, for he interprets Marxism as a simple
corollary to Hegel. The other sources of Marxism,
social and intellectual, the revolutionary transfor-
mation Marxism presents, are neglected. Marcuse,
otherwise the opponent of continuity, sees only
continuity in Marx's relation to Hegel. Thus
Marxism's proper quality is denied. Marxism is
amputated from Marx. Such a Marxism was assimilable
into so-called critical theory, and certain parts of
its economics are incorporated into it, i.e. those
of political economy that deal with the domain of
circulation and distribution. The actual process of
production remains for all practical purposes unmentioned.
Only the chapter on the fetishism of goods remains from
the first volume of Capital,[10] and this is reduced to
Marx's early conception of alienation.
       Problems of the distribution and possession of
goods, not their production, move into the forefront
of this "critical theory". The Bakuninist "burning
of identity papers" does not apply to the process of
production, nor to property relations, nor to classes,
but only to the formal titles to property. Such a

theory sees the problem of revolutionary consciousness essentially in the possession or lack of ownership of goods, in the enlarged or restricted potentiality of them, exclusively in the poverty or wealth of social forces. Revolutionary consciousness thereby is derived from the sphere of circulation or distribution, not from the total system of social determinations. On this basis, the revolutionary role of the principal producer of capitalist wealth, the working class, can be denied.

In this second stage, Marcuse's critique of materialism centers on its lack of attending to the dialectic of quantity and quality, of continuity and discontinuity. This weakness comes from Kautsky and Bukharin's mechanical materialism. In reality, however, Marcuse does not protest against their mechanicism, but against their recognition of objective reality and its laws. For the purposes of this polemic against materialism, only the moment of the activity of the subject is taken out of Lenin's work.[11] As in Marcuse's first stage, the outcome here is political voluntarism, a dialectic of subjective practice only, and a subjectivist conception of socialism.

Within Cold War politics after the end of the Second World War, and due to the breakup of the anti-fascist alliance of the workers' movement and the bourgeois-democratic powers, we see the foundation of Marcuse's third stage of development.

Because of his negative attitude toward the movement of the working class and toward actual socialism, Marcuse asserts that the liberation movement stemming from Hegel, bourgeois humanism, and Marxism, failed. These were insufficiently negative

to capitalism, and were not utopian enough in their quest for freedom.

Marcuse's thought is further elaborated. From the contradiction between our insatiable drives and a miserly, hostile environment, our drives are suppressed. The non-genital part of our body is freed for work and divorced from pleasure; from this suppression of drives our productivity is derived, as well as culture and technology, all of these processes being burdened thereafter with the repressive consequences of this frustration. Our thought also is formed repressively, and thus subjected in its dimensions to that which now exists. This applies even to the revolutionaries. This is the reason for the failure of the revolution and for the extension of oppression into the very interior of the socialist order, which, as a consequence, uses a similar technique, founding itself upon repression, making the socialist order converge with capitalism.[12] Emancipation, therefore, primarily requires a revolution in the structure of drives.[13]

This leads not only to a revision of historical materialism, based upon biology and drive structure, but of all of the basic notions of its dialectic. The category of negation must be fashioned in such a way that it destroy all continuity to the repressive past; otherwise, this past will determine the future and stifle freedom. Negation must be set up so that the negation of the negation is neither necessary nor possible. The dialectic of quantity and quality, continuity and discontinuity, reform and revolution, is destroyed. Under these conditions, the force of the negation <u>cannot work within a system</u>, only from

the outside. The working class movement and actual
socialism are alleged to be continuous with the
previous system, and are not this negative force.
As a result, a political alliance of this "third"
force, i.e. the negative force of the students, the
ghetto population, white social outcasts, and the
masses of the Third World, with the working class
movement and actual socialism has no sense. We
can say here that, objectively, this means a
weakening of the anti-imperialist forces.

No class holds this force of negation today,
Marcuse says. Late capitalism integrates its
negation. For this reason, the negative force must
be sought outside, external to the totality. This
revisionist dialectic, then, holds disdain for the
working class and actual socialism. Moreover,
Marcuse interprets the history of the European,
working class movement as a series of defeats, and
he defames the policy of basic reforms in monopoly
state capitalism for being social-democratic.

When we examine Marcuse's conception of real
socialism, we find that from the beginning the
socialization of the means of production be not
the principal revolutionary problem, nor will it
solve the problem of freedom and repression.[14] (We
can just as well read this in the Godesberg Program
of the SPD.) If we measure these views by their
objective content, they are a diversion from
revolution's basic problem. The conclusion of such
premises is that aggression and barbarism are not
the result of capitalist property relations, but
have other causes.

Thus, Marcuse shifts the source of counter-
revolution to the individual's structure of drives,

and, whether he wishes to or not, he exonerates the
social forces of the counter-revolution. He shifts
the causes of opportunism to an allegedly unavoidable
tendency of modern imperialism; therefore, deliberately
or not, excusing social-democratic opportunism; by
making the drive structure ultimately responsible for
aggression, he, in fact, excuses monopoly and its
militarists--this he does by having responsibility
for the emergence of power rest not with social
processes and classes but with a misformed drive
structure. "Power in itself" and "organization in
itself" become the enemy. And, since the working
class movement can forego neither power nor organi-
zation in its effort to liberate mankind from
exploitation and oppression, the working class too
becomes an enemy.

The only difference between this approach and
that of the imperialists and opportunists, both
approaches seeing such problems as derivative from
man, is that the latter openly say that, because
of the nature of man, it is impossible to change
things, and hence socialism is, at best, a beautiful
dream. On the other hand, Marcuse feels that one
must first change human nature to arrive at socialism.
Since he cannot say how and through whom this is to
happen, and indeed, as can be shown, since it cannot
happen on the basis of his theory; Marcuse's theory
arrives at the same conclusion as do the opportunists
and imperialists.

Marcuse's argument concerning questions of
power and organization is not only an exercise in
fantasy but constitutes a disarming of revolutionary
forces. Given the strength, organized and centralized
character of imperialism, to say to the revolutionaries,

Do not organize or at least do not centralize yourselves,
amounts to saying, Leave everything the way it is!

This theory is defeatist, covertly positivistic.
In a recent work, <u>An Essay on Liberation</u>,[15] Marcuse
concludes: we must struggle for liberation, but it
is uncertain whether, beyond the limits of the present
reality, freedom or totalitarianism awaits us. Not
concentrating on the fact that fascism exists <u>within</u>
the limits of the present reality, it is in order to
ask how this theory would impel us to go into battle
when it cannot tell us where our road leads!

Marcuse's theory is not the whim of an individual
personality, but stems from the frame of mind of an
entire social stratum. It pertains to the new
intellectual petty bourgeoisie, which is aware that
it stands in a hopeless position historically; but
it is not prepared, on the other hand, to place
itself completely and without reservation at the side
of the workers' socialist movement. Rather, it
justifies its characteristic station between the two
fronts by a subtle anti-socialism. Everywhere in
the work of Marcuse, Adorno, and others, tracing all
the way back to Stirner, we find furious efforts to
emphasize the ego, and in no way to yield it to a
collectivity that would determine it. Access to the
future must be open and unlimited. Everything that
exists now is equally contemptible. The "no" of
Nietzsche suddenly enters besides the "no" of Marx.
And, since Marx's expectations for the future were
not sufficiently utopian, Marcuse secures his models
from Nietzsche and other reactionaries.

This qualitative or negative dialectic is
capable of an easy theoretical refutation. If there

are no genetic or structural connections between two
different qualities or dimensions, then how could we
know anything of the second quality? For example,
we form judgments about capitalism from the socialist
point of view; although we exist in the first dimension,
we are already in a situation to form judgments about
the second level. Thus the second dimension already
has its roots in the first; in this fashion, the
qualitative dialectic converges in upon itself. When
Marcuse speaks of the future, it is reminiscent of
negative theology, which developed during the period
of Scholastic theology. In the same way, Marcuse's
second dimension is merely an accumulation of negations
of capitalism and socialism, thus not a real assertion.
It is no wonder that such a negative dialectic can only
tell us in the end, that it does not know how the gap
between theory and practice is to be bridged, what the
revolutionary forces are, and that it does not know
whether the outcome will be freedom or fascism.

        In contrast to this, we Marxists can point to
the existence of more than a dozen successful socialist
revolutions. We do no close our eyes to the massive
problems of socialist reconstruction in a world that is
still strongly imperialist, under conditions of an
exceedingly difficult, international class struggle,
and a heavy capitalist inheritance. We do not close
our eyes to our own mistakes and defects. But nothing
in these things justifies a flight into pseudo-radical
negative dialectic.

        Our refutation of the Freud-Marcuse "enrichment"
of historical materialism by drive-theory is the
following: A society of a matriarchical type has been
demonstrated, one free of repression and exploitation.

If this was possible at that time, when the resources
of life were far more limited than they are today,
then the derivation of classes, power, and subjugation
from the contradiction between the structure of drives
and lack of resources is without foundation. The
Marxist theory of the origin of classes, class struggle,
the state, is sufficiently fortified against such a
doctrine.
        The Marxist theory is also demonstrated through
the practice of socialist revolutions, though it
would be irresponsible if we socialists neglected to
speak of the extremely difficult problems to be
solved in connection with what Marx and Engels
termed the most radical break between socialism-
communism and the material and ideological past of
class societies. These difficulties should stimulate
us to improved work in all areas of social life. But,
nevertheless, this does not require us to accept the
type of theory Marcuse and others propose.
        I have emphasized criticism in my short article.
This should not indicate that I wish to absolve anyone
of the duty to study further the theoretical writings
of petty bourgeois radicalism in search of important,
partial insights; nor should it entail that the anti-
imperialist, humanistic elements in the ideology of
petty bourgeois radicalism should be ignored.
        In every ideological confrontation (and they are
certainly necessary), in every refutation of the
claims of petty bourgeois radicalism to be the sole
form of critical theory appropriate to our time;
nevertheless, it is extremely important to seek
constantly for concrete points from which we can mount
a common anti-imperialist course of action. Besides
this we must guard against joining with the left liberals

to criticize the radical petty bourgeoisie; against
such a tendency anti-imperialist solidarity must
thrust itself forward. This solidarity must be
maintained especially in the case of possible
terrorist activity by the imperialist enemy against
the petty bourgeois radicals.

ESCHBORN,
  BRD

Notes

1. Selected Works (New York: International, 1968),
p. 52. Cf. also Marx's comments about the evolution
of capitalism to socialism, and thence to communism,
recorded in his critical marginal notes on the Gotha
Programme which was that of the old (still socialist)
Social Democracy; ibid., pp. 315-335.
2. Cf. in this regard, particularly, the epilogue
to the second American edition of Reason and Revolution
(New York: Humanities, 1954)--not included in Beacon
edition (1960 on)--Editor.
3. In this regard, see particularly the lecture delivered
at the Prague Hegel Congress of 1966, viz. "Zum Begriff
der Negation in der Dialektik". In Herbert Marcuse,
Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969).
4. Cf. Robert Steigerwald, Herbert Marcuses "dritter Weg"
(Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1969).
5. The pertinent literature of Marcuse includes:
          Marcuse, "Contributions to a Phenomenology
      of Historical Materialism" (1928). See Telos,

(349)

Fall, 1969, pp. 3-34.
____, "Über konkrete Philosophie". In
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik,
1929, Bd. 29.
____, "Transzendentaler Marxismus." In
Die Gesellschaft, 1930, 7th annual.
____, "Zum Problem der Dialektik". Ibid., 1931.
____, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des
Historischen Materialismus: Interpretation der
neuveröffentlichten Manuskripte von Marx". Ibid.,
1932, 9th annual, # 8, Berlin.
____, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung
einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, Frankfurt
a.M., 1932.
6. Cf. A. Schmidt, Zum Begriff der Natur bei Marx,
Frankfurt a.M.; similarly his Forewords to Henri Lefebvre's
Probleme des Marxismus heute (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,
1965) and to Existentialismus und Marxismus, eine
Kontroverse zwischen Sartre, Garaudy, Hyppolite, Vigier
und Orcel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1965).
7. On this problem, see Bela Fogarasi, Logik, p. 389 ff.,
Berlin, 1956. There Engels' arguments against the
"paradox" are reproduced. Less used in this regard, but
straight to this point, is Marx's second thesis on
Feuerbach. Selected Works, op. cit., p. 28.
8. Cf. Marcuse, "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the
Totalitarian View of the State" (originally published in
1934), trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. In Marcuse, Negations
(Boston: Beacon, 1968).
9. Cf. Marcuse, " The Affirmative Character of Culture"
(originally published in 1937). In Negations, op. cit.
See also Reason and Revolution (1941), op. cit.
10. This three volume work is now available from
International Publishers, New York, in paperback--Editor.

11. Cf. Marcuse, <u>Vernunft und Revolution</u> (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962), p. 209 f. [Cf. <u>Reason and Revolution</u> (Boston: Beacon, 1960), pp. 398-401--Editor.]
12. Cf. Marcuse, <u>Soviet Marxism</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
13. Cf. Marcuse, "Rede in Kocula", <u>Neues Forum</u>, Vienna, 1968, p. 706.
14. Cf. Marcuse, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus", <u>op. cit.</u>, especially p. 158, where Marcuse (as early as 1932) characterized political and economic revolution as reform; he rejects the latter, demanding "total, human" revolution. Also see my commentary in <u>Herbert Marcuses "dritter Weg"</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 102 f., 107 f., 164 f., 233 f.
15. Cf. Marcuse, <u>An Essay on Liberation</u> (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

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KEEP CARD IN POCKET

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT
CARD BE KEPT IN POCKET