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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW


THE
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REVIEW

VOLUME XIX. DECEMBER, 1871—MAY, 1872

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

REVIEW

VOLUME XIX. DECEMBER, 1871—MAY, 1872

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
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THE LAST TOURNAMENT.*

BY ALFRED TENNYSON,

POET LAUREATE.

DAGONET, the fool, whom Gawain in his moods
 Had made mock-knight of Arthur's Table Round,
 At Camelot, high above the yellowing woods,
 Danced like a wither'd leaf before the Hall.
 And toward him from the hall, with harp in hand,
 And from the crown thereof a carcanet
 Of ruby swaying to and fro, the prize
 Of Tristram in the jousts of yesterday,
 Came Tristram, saying, 'Why skip ye so, Sir Fool?'

For Arthur and Sir Lancelot riding once
 Far down beneath a winding wall of rock
 Heard a child wail. A stump of oak half-dead,
 From roots like some black coil of carven snakes
 Clutch'd at the crag, and started thro' mid air

* This poem forms one of the "Idylls of the King." Its place is between "Pelleas" and "Guinevere."

Bearing an eagle's nest : and thro' the tree
 Rush'd ever a rainy wind, and thro' the wind
 Pierced ever a child's cry : and crag and tree
 Sealing, Sir Lancelot from the perilous nest,
 This ruby necklace thrice around her neck,
 And all unscarr'd from beak or talon, brought
 A maiden babe ; which Arthur pitying took,
 Then gave it to his Queen to rear : the Queen
 But coldly acquiescing, in her white arms
 Received, and after loved it tenderly,
 And named it Nestling ; so forgot herself
 A moment, and her cares ; till that young life
 Being smitten in mid heaven with mortal cold
 Past from her ; and in time the carcanet
 Vext her with plaintive memories of the child :
 So she, delivering it to Arthur, said,
 ' Take thou the jewels of this dead innocence,
 And make them, an thou wilt, a tourney-prize.'

To whom the King, ' Peace to thine eagle-borne
 Dead nestling, and this honour after death,
 Following thy will ! but, O my Queen, I muse
 Why ye not wear on arm, or neck, or zone
 Those diamonds that I rescued from the tarn,
 And Lancelot won, methought, for thee to wear.'

' Would rather ye had let them fall,' she cried,
 ' Plunge and be lost—ill-fated as they were,
 A bitterness to me !—ye look amazed,
 Not knowing they were lost as soon as given—
 Slid from my hands, when I was leaning out
 Above the river—that unhappy child
 Past in her barge : but rosier luck will go
 With these rich jewels, seeing that they came
 Not from the skeleton of a brother-slayer,
 But the sweet body of a maiden babe.
 Perchance—who knows?—the purest of thy knights
 May win them for the purest of my maids.'

THE LAST TOURNAMENT.

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She ended, and the cry of a great jousts
With trumpet-blowings ran on all the ways
From Camelot in among the faded fields
To furthest towers ; and everywhere the knights
Arm'd for a day of glory before the King.

But on the hither side of that loud morn
Into the hall stagger'd, his visage ribb'd
From ear to ear with dogwhip-weals, his nose
Bridge-broken, one eye out, and one hand off,
And one with shatter'd fingers dangling lame,
A churl, to whom indignantly the King,
'My churl, for whom Christ died, what evil beast
Hath drawn his claws athwart thy face? or fiend?
Man was it who marr'd heaven's image in thee thus?'

Then, sputtering thro' the hedge of splinter'd teeth,
Yet strangers to the tongue, and with blunt stump
Pitch-blacken'd sawing the air, said the maim'd churl,
'He took them and he drave them to his tower—
Some hold he was a table-knight of thine—
A hundred goodly ones—the Red Knight, he—
Lord, I was tending swine, and the Red Knight
Brake in upon me and drave them to his tower ;
And when I call'd upon thy name as one
That doest right by gentle and by churl,
Maim'd me and maul'd, and would outright have slain,
Save that he sware me to a message, saying—
"Tell thou the King and all his liars, that I
Have founded my Round Table in the North,
And whatsoever his own knights have sworn
My knights have sworn the counter to it—and say
My tower is full of harlots, like his court,
But mine are worthier, seeing they profess
To be none other than themselves—and say
My knights are all adulterers like his own,
But mine are truer, seeing they profess
To be none other ; and say his hour is come,

The heathen are upon him, his long lance
Broken, and his Excalibur a straw." "

Then Arthur turn'd to Kay the seneschal,
'Take thou my churl, and tend him curiously
Like a king's heir, till all his hurts be whole.
The heathen—but that ever-climbing wave,
Hurl'd back again so often in empty foam,
Hath lain for years at rest—and renegades,
Thieves, bandits, leavings of confusion, whom
The wholesome realm is purged of otherwhere,—
Friends, thro' your manhood and your fealty,—now
Make their last head like Satan in the North.
My younger knights, new-made, in whom your flower
Waits to be solid fruit of golden deeds,
Move with me toward their quelling, which achieved,
The loneliest ways are safe from shore to shore.
But thou, Sir Lancelot, sitting in my place
Enchair'd to-morrow, arbitrate the field ;
For wherefore shouldst thou care to mingle with it,
Only to yield my Queen her own again ?
Speak, Lancelot, thou art silent : is it well ?'

Thereto Sir Lancelot answer'd, ' It is well :
Yet better if the King abide, and leave
The leading of his younger knights to me.
Else, for the King has will'd it, it is well.'

Then Arthur rose and Lancelot follow'd him,
And while they stood without the doors, the King
Turn'd to him saying, 'Is it then so well ?
Or mine the blame that oft I seem as he
Of whom was written, " a sound is in his ears "—
The foot that loiters, bidden go,—the glance
That only seems half-loyal to command,—
A manner somewhat fall'n from reverence—
Or have I dream'd the bearing of our knights
Tells of a manhood ever less and lower ?
Or whence the fear lest this my realm, uprear'd,

By noble deeds at one with noble vows,
From flat confusion and brute violences,
Reel back into the beast, and be no more ?'

He spoke, and taking all his younger knights,
Down the slope city rode, and sharply turn'd
North by the gate. In her high bower the Queen,
Working a tapestry, lifted up her head,
Watch'd her lord pass, and knew not that she sigh'd.
Then ran across her memory the strange rhyme
Of bygone Merlin, "Where is he who knows ?
From the great deep to the great deep he goes."

But when the morning of a tournament,
By these in earnest those in mockery call'd
The Tournament of the Dead Innocence,
Brake with a wet wind blowing, Lancelot,
Round whose sick head all night, like birds of prey,
The words of Arthur flying shriek'd, arose,
And down a streetway hung with folds of pure
White samite, and by fountains running wine,
Where children sat in white with cups of gold,
Moved to the lists, and there, with slow sad steps
Ascending, fill'd his double-dragon'd chair.

He glanced and saw the stately galleries,
Dame, damsel, each thro' worship of their Queen
White-robed in honour of the stainless child,
And some with scatter'd jewels, like a bank
Of maiden snow mingled with sparks of fire.
He look'd but once, and vail'd his eyes again.

The sudden trumpet sounded as in a dream
To ears but half-awaked, then one low roll
Of Autumn thunder, and the jousts began :
And ever the wind blew, and yellowing leaf
And gloom and gleam, and shower and shorn plume
Went down it. Sighing weariedly, as one
Who sits and gazes on a faded fire,

When all the goodlier guests are past away,
 Sat their great umpire, looking o'er the lists.
 He saw the laws that ruled the tournament
 Broken, but spake not; once, a knight cast down
 Before his throne of arbitration cursed
 The dead babe and the follies of the King;
 And once the laces of a helmet crack'd,
 And show'd him, like a vermin in its hole,
 Modred, a narrow face: anon he heard
 The voice that billow'd round the barriers roar
 An ocean-sounding welcome to one knight,
 But newly-enter'd, taller than the rest,
 And armour'd all in forest green, whereon
 There tript a hundred tiny silver deer,
 And wearing but a holly-spray for crest,
 With ever-scattering berries, and on shield
 A spear, a harp, a bugle—Tristram—late
 From overseas in Brittany return'd,
 And marriage with a princess of that realm,
 Isolt the White—Sir Tristram of the Woods—
 Whom Lancelot knew, had held sometime with pain
 His own against him, and now yearn'd to shake
 The burthen off his heart in one full shock
 With Tristram ev'n to death: his strong hands gript
 And dinted the gilt dragons right and left,
 Until he groan'd for wrath—so many of those,
 That ware their ladies' colours on the casque,
 Drew from before Sir Tristram to the bounds,
 And there with gibes and flickering mockeries
 Stood, while he mutter'd, 'Craven crests! O shame!
 What faith have these in whom they swear to love?
 The glory of our Round Table is no more.'

So Tristram won, and Lancelot gave, the gems,
 Not speaking other word than 'Hast thou won?
 Art thou the purest, brother? See, the hand
 Wherewith thou takest this, is red!' to whom
 Tristram, half plagued by Lancelot's languorous mood,
 Made answer, 'Ay, but wherefore toss me this

Like a dry bone cast to some hungry hound ?
Let be thy fair Queen's fantasy. Strength of heart
And might of limb, but mainly use and skill,
Are winners in this pastime of our King.
My hand—belike the lance hath dript upon it—
No blood of mine, I trow ; but O chief knight,
Right arm of Arthur in the battlefield,
Great brother, thou nor I have made the world ;
Be happy in thy fair Queen as I in mine.'

And Tristram round the gallery made his horse
Caracole ; then bow'd his homage, bluntly saying,
' Fair damsels, each to him who worships each
Sole Queen of Beauty and of love, behold
This day my Queen of Beauty is not here.'
And most of these were mute, some anger'd, one
Murmuring ' All courtesy is dead,' and one,
' The glory of our Round Table is no more.'

Then fell thick rain, plume droopt and mantle along,
And pettish cries awoke, and the wan day
Went glooming down in wet and weariness :
But under her black brows a swarthy dame
Laugh'd shrilly, crying ' Praise the patient saints,
Our one white day of Innocence hath past,
Tho' somewhat draggled at the skirt. So be it.
The snowdrop only, flowering thro' the year,
Would make the world as blank as wintertide.
Come—let us comfort their sad eyes, our Queen's
And Lancelot's, at this night's solemnity
With all the kindlier colours of the field.'

So dame and damsel glitter'd at the feast
Variously gay : for he that tells the tale
Liken'd them, saying as when an hour of cold
Falls on the mountain in midsummer snows,
And all the purple slopes of mountain flowers
Pass under white, till the warm hour returns

With veer of wind, and all are flowers again ;
 So dame and damsel cast the simple white,
 And glowing in all colours, the live grass,
 Rose-campion, bluebell, kingcup, poppy, glanced
 About the revels, and with mirth so loud
 Beyond all use, that, half-amazed, the Queen,
 And wroth at Tristram and the lawless jousts,
 Brake up their sports, then slowly to her bower
 Parted, and in her bosom pain was lord.

And little Dagonet on the morrow morn,
 High over all the yellowing Autumn-tide,
 Danced like a wither'd leaf before the hall.
 Then Tristram saying, ' Why skip ye so, Sir Fool ?'
 Wheel'd round on either heel, Dagonet replied,
 ' Belike for lack of wiser company ;
 Or being fool, and seeing too much wit
 Makes the world rotten, why, belike I skip
 To know myself the wisest knight of all.'
 ' Ay, fool,' said Tristram, ' but 'tis eating dry
 To dance without a catch, a roundelay
 To dance to.' Then he twangled on his harp,
 And while he twangled little Dagonet stood,
 Quiet as any water-sodden log
 Stay'd in the wandering warble of a brook ;
 But when the twangling ended, skipt again ;
 Then being ask'd, ' Why skipt ye not, Sir Fool ?'
 Made answer, ' I had liefer twenty years
 Skip to the broken music of my brains
 Than any broken music ye can make.'
 Then Tristram, waiting for the quip to come,
 ' Good now, what music have I broken, fool ?'
 And little Dagonet, skipping, ' Arthur, the king's ;
 For when thou playest that air with Queen Isolt,
 Thou makest broken music with thy bride,
 Her daintier namesake down in Brittany—
 And so thou breakest Arthur's music too.'
 ' Save for that broken music in thy brains,
 Sir Fool,' said Tristram, ' I would break thy head.'

Fool, I came late, the heathen wars were o'er,
The life had flown, we sware but by the shell—
I am but a fool to reason with a fool—
Come, thou art crabb'd and sour : but lean me down,
Sir Dagonet, one of thy long asses' ears,
And harken if my music be not true.

“ Free love—free field—we love but while we may :
The woods are hush'd, their music is no more :
The leaf is dead, the yearning past away :
New leaf, new life—the days of frost are o'er :
New life, new love to suit the newer day :
New loves are sweet as those that went before :
Free love,—free field—we love but while we may.”

‘ Ye might have moved slow-measure to my tune,
Not stood stockstill. I made it in the woods,
And heard it ring as true as tested gold.’

But Dagonet with one foot poisèd in his hand,
‘ Friend, did ye mark that fountain yesterday
Made to run wine ?—but this had run itself
All out like a long life to a sour end—
And them that round it sat with golden cups
To hand the wine to whomsoever came—
The twelve small damosels white as Innocence,
In honour of poor Innocence the babe,
Who left the gems which Innocence the Queen
Lent to the King, and Innocence the King
Gave for a prize—and one of those white slips
Handed her cup and piped, the pretty one,
“ Drink, drink, Sir Fool,” and thereupon I drank,
Spat—pish—the cup was gold, the draught was mud.’

And Tristram, ‘ Was it muddier than thy gibes ?
Is all the laughter gone dead out of thee ?—
Not marking how the knighthood mock thee, fool—
“ Fear God : honour the king—his one true knight—
Sole follower of the vows ”—for here be they

Who knew thee swine enow before I came,
 Smuttier than blasted grain : but when the King
 Had made thee fool, thy vanity so shot up
 It frightened all free fool from out thy heart ;
 Which left thee less than fool, and less than swine,
 A naked aught—yet swine I hold thee still,
 For I have flung thee pearls and find thee swine.'

And little Dagonet mincing with his feet,
 ' Knight, an ye fling those rubies round my neck
 In lieu of hers, I'll hold thou hast some touch
 Of music, since I care not for thy pearls.
 Swine ? I have wallow'd, I have wash'd—the world
 Is flesh and shadow—I have had my day.
 The dirty nurse, Experience, in her kind
 Hath foul'd me—an I wallow'd, then I wash'd—
 I have had my day and my philosophies—
 And thank the Lord I am King Arthur's fool.
 Swine, say ye ? swine, goats, asses, rams and geese
 Troop'd round a Paynim harper once, who thrumm'd
 On such a wire as musically as thou
 Some such fine song—but never a king's fool.'

And Tristram, ' Then were swine, goats, asses, geese
 The wiser fools, seeing thy Paynim bard
 Had such a mastery of his mystery
 That he could harp his wife up out of Hell.'

Then Dagonet, turning on the ball of his foot,
 ' And whither harp'st thou thine ? down ! and thyself
 Down ! and two more : a helpful harper thou,
 That harpest downward ! Dost thou know the star
 We call the harp of Arthur up in heaven ?'

And Tristram, ' Ay, Sir Fool, for when our King
 Was victor wellnigh day by day, the knights,
 Glorifying in each new glory, set his name
 High on all hills, and in the signs of heaven.'

THE LAST TOURNAMENT.

11

And Dagonet answer'd, 'Ay, and when the land
Was freed, and the Queen false, ye set yourself
To babble about him, all to show your wit—
And whether he were king by courtesy,
Or king by right—and so went harping down
The black king's highway, got so far, and grew
So witty that ye play'd at ducks and drakes
With Arthur's vows on the great lake of fire.
Tuwahoo! do ye see it? do ye see the star?'

'Nay, fool,' said Tristram, 'not in open day.'
And Dagonet, 'Nay, nor will: I see it and hear.
It makes a silent music up in heaven,
And I, and Arthur and the angels hear,
And then we skip.' 'Lo, fool,' he said, 'ye talk
Fool's treason: is the king thy brother fool?'
Then little Dagonet clapt his hands and shrill'd,
'Ay, ay, my brother fool, the king of fools!
Conceits himself as God that he can make
Figs out of thistles, silk from bristles, milk
From burning spurge, honey from hornet-combs,
And men from beasts—Long live the king of fools!'

And down the city Dagonet danced away.
But thro' the slowly-mellowing avenues
And solitary passes of the wood
Rode Tristram toward Lyonesse and the west.
Before him fled the face of Queen Isolt
With ruby-circled neck, but evermore
Past, as a rustle or twitter in the wood
Made dull his inner, keen his outer eye
For all that walk'd, or crept, or perched, or flew.
Anon the face, as, when a gust hath blown,
Unruffling waters re-collect the shape
Of one that in them sees himself, return'd;
But at the slot or fewmets of a deer,
Or ev'n a fall'n feather, vanish'd again.

So on for all that day from lawn to lawn
Thro' many a league-long bower he rode. At length

A lodge of intertwisted beechen-boughs
 Furze-cramm'd, and bracken-rooft, the which himself
 Built for a summer day with Queen Isolt
 Against a shower, dark in the golden grove
 Appearing, sent his fancy back to where
 She lived a moon in that low lodge with him :
 Till Mark her lord had past, the Cornish king,
 With six or seven, when Tristram was away,
 And snatch'd her thence ; yet dreading worse than shame
 Her warrior Tristram, spake not any word,
 But bode his hour, devising wretchedness.

And now that desert lodge to Tristram lookt
 So sweet, that halting, in he past, and sank
 Down on a drift of foliage random-blown ;
 But could not rest for musing how to smooth
 And sleek his marriage over to the Queen.
 Perchance in lone Tintagil far from all
 The tonguesters of the court she had not heard.
 But then what folly had sent him overseas
 After she left him lonely here ? a name ?
 Was it the name of one in Brittany,
 Isolt, the daughter of the King ? ' Isolt
 Of the white hands ' they call'd her : the sweet name
 Allured him first, and then the maid herself,
 Who served him well with those white hands of hers,
 And loved him well, until himself had thought
 He loved her also, wedded easily,
 But left her all as easily, and return'd.
 The black-blue Irish hair and Irish eyes
 Had drawn him home—what marvel ? then he laid
 His brows upon the drifted leaf and dream'd.

He seem'd to pace the strand of Brittany
 Between Isolt of Britain and his bride,
 And show'd them both the ruby-chain, and both
 Began to struggle for it, till his Queen
 Graspt it so hard, that all her hand was red.
 Then cried the Breton, ' Look, her hand is red !

These be no rubies, this is frozen blood,
And melts within her hand—her hand is hot
With ill desires, but this I gave thee, look,
Is all as cool and white as any flower.'
Follow'd a rush of eagle's wings, and then
A whimpering of the spirit of the child,
Because the twain had spoil'd her carcanet.

He dream'd ; but Arthur with a hundred spears
Rode far, till o'er the illimitable reed,
And many a glancing splash and sallowy isle,
The wide-wing'd sunset of the misty marsh
Glared on a huge machicolated tower
That stood with open doors, whereout was roll'd
A roar of riot, as from men secure
Amid their marshes, ruffians at their ease
Among their harlot-brides, an evil song.
'Lo there,' said one of Arthur's youth, for there,
High on a grim dead tree before the tower,
A goodly brother of The Table Round
Swung by the neck : and on the boughs a shield
Showing a shower of blood in a field noir,
And therebeside a horn, inflamed the knights
At that dishonour done the gilded spur,
Till each would clash the shield, and blow the horn.
But Arthur waved them back : alone he rode.
Then at the dry harsh roar of the great horn,
That sent the face of all the marsh aloft
An ever upward-rushing storm and cloud
Of shriek and plume, the Red Knight heard, and all,
Even to tipmost lance and topmost helm,
In blood-red armour sallying, howl'd to the King,
'The teeth of Hell flay bare and gnash thee flat!—
Lo ! art thou not that eunuch-hearted King
Who fain had clipt free manhood from the world—
The woman-worshipper ? Yea, God's curse, and I !
Slain was the brother of my paramour
By a knight of thine, and I that heard her whine
And snivel, being eunuch-hearted too,

Sware by the scorpion-worm that twists in hell,
 And stings itself to everlasting death,
 To hang whatever knight of thine I fought
 And tumbled. Art thou King?—Look to thy life!’

He ended: Arthur knew the voice; the face
 Wellnigh was helmet-hidden, and the name
 Went wandering somewhere darkling in his mind.
 And Arthur deign’d not use of word or sword,
 But let the drunkard, as he stretch’d from horse
 To strike him, overbalancing his bulk,
 Down from the causeway heavily to the swamp
 Fall, as the crest of some slow-arching wave,
 Heard in dead night along that table-shore,
 Drops flat, and after the great waters break
 Whitening for half a league, and thin themselves,
 Far over sands marbled with moon and cloud,
 From less and less to nothing; thus he fell
 Head-heavy, while the knights, who watch’d him, roar’d
 And shouted and leapt down upon the fall’n;
 There trampled out his face from being known,
 And sank his head in mire, and slimed themselves:
 Nor heard the King for their own cries, but sprang
 Thro’ open doors, and swording right and left
 Men, women, on their sodden faces, hurl’d
 The tables over and the wines, and slew
 Till all the rafters rang with woman-yells,
 And all the pavement stream’d with massacre:
 Then, yell with yell echoing, they fired the tower,
 Which half that autumn night, like the live North,
 Red-pulsing up thro’ Alioth and Alcor,
 Made all above it, and a hundred meres
 About it, as the water Moab saw
 Come round by the East, and out beyond them flush’d
 The long low dune, and lazy-plunging sea.

So all the ways were safe from shore to shore,
 But in the heart of Arthur pain was lord.

Then out of Tristram waking, the red dream
 Fled with a shout, and that low lodge return'd,
 Mid-forest, and the wind among the boughs.
 He whistled his good warhorse left to graze
 Among the forest greens, vaulted upon him,
 And rode beneath an ever-showering leaf,
 Till one lone woman, weeping near a cross,
 Stay'd him, 'Why weep ye?' 'Lord,' she said, 'my man
 Hath left me or is dead;' whereon he thought—
 'What, an she hate me now? I would not this.
 What, an she love me still? I would not that.
 I know not what I would'—but said to her,—
 'Yet weep not thou, lest, if thy mate return,
 He find thy favour changed and love thee not'—
 Then pressing day by day thro' Lyonesse
 Last in a roky hollow, belling, heard
 The hounds of Mark, and felt the goodly hounds
 Yelp at his heart, but turning, past and gain'd
 Tintagil, half in sea, and high on land,
 A crown of towers.

Down in a casement sat,
 A low sea-sunset glorying round her hair
 And glossy-throated grace, Isolt the Queen.
 And when she heard the feet of Tristram grind
 The spiring stone that scaled about her tower,
 Flush'd, started, met him at the doors, and there
 Belted his body with her white embrace
 Crying aloud 'Not Mark—not Mark, my soul!
 The footstep flutter'd me at first: not he:
 Catlike thro' his own castle steals my Mark,
 But warrior-wise thou stridest through his halls
 Who hates thee, as I him—ev'n to the death.
 My soul, I felt my hatred for my Mark
 Quicken within me, and knew that thou wert nigh.'
 To whom Sir Tristram smiling, 'I am here.
 Let be thy Mark, seeing he is not thine.'

And drawing somewhat backward she replied,
 ' Can he be wrong'd who is not ev'n his own,
 But save for dread of thee had beaten me,
 Scratch'd, bitten, blinded, marr'd me somehow—Mark?
 What rights are his that dare not strike for them?
 Not lift a hand—not, tho' he found me thus!
 But hearken, have ye met him? hence he went
 To-day for three days' hunting—as he said—
 And so returns belike within an hour.
 Mark's way, my soul!—but eat not thou with him,
 Because he hates thee even more than fears;
 Nor drink: and when thou passest any wood
 Close visor, lest an arrow from the bush
 Should leave me all alone with Mark and hell.
 My God, the measure of my hate for Mark,
 Is as the measure of my love for thee.'

So, pluck'd one way by hate and one by love,
 Drain'd of her force, again she sat, and spake
 To Tristram, as he knelt before her, saying,
 ' O hunter, and O blower of the horn,
 Harper, and thou hast been a rover too,
 For, ere I mated with my shambling king,
 Ye twain had fallen out about the bride
 Of one—his name is out of me—the prize,
 If prize she were—(what marvel—she could see)—
 Thine, friend; and ever since my craven seeks
 To wreck thee villainously: but, O Sir Knight,
 What dame or damsel have ye kneeled to last?'

And Tristram, ' Last to my Queen Paramount,
 Here now to my Queen Paramount of love,
 And loveliness, ay, lovelier than when first
 Her light feet fell on our rough Lyonesse,
 Sailing from Ireland.'

Softly laugh'd Isolt,
 ' Flatter me not, for hath not our great Queen

My dole of beauty trebled ?' and he said
 ' Her beauty is her beauty, and thine thine,
 And thine is more to me—soft, gracious, kind—
 Save when thy Mark is kindled on thy lips
 Most gracious ; but she, haughty, ev'n to him,
 Lancelot ; for I have seen him wan enow
 To make one doubt if ever the great Queen
 Have yielded him her love.'

To whom Isolt,
 ' Ah then, false hunter and false harper, thou
 Who brakest thro' the scruple of my bond,
 Calling me thy white hind, and saying to me
 That Guinevere had sinn'd against the highest,
 And I—misyoked with such a want of man—
 That I could hardly sin against the lowest.'

He answer'd, ' O my soul, be comforted !
 If this be sweet, to sin in leading strings,
 If here be comfort, and if ours be sin,
 Crown'd warrant had we for the crowning sin
 That made us happy : but how ye greet me—fear
 And fault and doubt—no word of that fond tale—
 Thy deep heart-yearnings, thy sweet memories
 Of Tristram in that year he was away.'

And, saddening on the sudden, spake Isolt,
 ' I had forgotten all in my strong joy
 To see thee—yearnings ?—ay ! for, hour by hour,
 Here in the never-ended afternoon,
 O sweeter than all memories of thee,
 Deeper than any yearnings after thee
 Seem'd those far-rolling, westward-smiling seas,
 Watch'd from this tower. Isolt of Britain dash'd
 Before Isolt of Brittany on the strand,
 Would that have chill'd her bride-kiss ? Wedded her ?
 Fought in her father's battles ? wounded there ?
 The King was all fulfill'd with gratefulness,
 And she, my namesake of the hands, that heal'd

Thy hurt and heart with unguent and caress—
 Well—can I wish her any huger wrong
 Than having known thee? her too hast thou left
 To pine and waste in those sweet memories.
 O were I not my Mark's, by whom all men
 Are noble, I should hate thee more than love.'

And Tristram, fondling her light hands, replied,
 'Grace, Queen, for being loved: she loved me well.
 Did I love her? the name at least I loved.
 Isolt?—I fought his battles, for Isolt!
 The night was dark; the true star set. Isolt!
 The name was ruler of the dark——Isolt?
 Care not for her! patient, and prayerful, meek,
 Pale-blooded, she will yield herself to God.'

And Isolt answer'd, 'Yea, and why not I?
 Mine is the larger need, who am not meek,
 Pale-blooded, prayerful. Let me tell thee now.
 Here one black, mute midsummer night I sat,
 Lonely, but musing on thee, wondering where,
 Murmuring a light song I had heard thee sing,
 And once or twice I spake thy name aloud.
 Then flash'd a levin-brand; and near me stood,
 In fuming sulphur blue and green, a fiend—
 Mark's way to steal behind one in the dark—
 For there was Mark: "He has wedded her," he said,
 Not said, but hiss'd it: then this crown of towers
 So shook to such a roar of all the sky,
 That here in utter dark I swoon'd away,
 And woke again in utter dark, and cried,
 "I will flee hence and give myself to God"—
 And thou wert lying in thy new leman's arms.'

Then Tristram, ever dallying with her hand,
 'May God be with thee, sweet, when old and gray,
 And past desire!' a saying that anger'd her.
 "May God be with thee, sweet, when thou art old,
 And sweet no more to me!" I need Him now.

For when had Lancelot utter'd ought so gross
 Ev'n to the swineherd's malkin in the mast?
 The greater man, the greater courtesy.
 But thou, thro' ever harrying thy wild beasts—
 Save that to touch a harp, tilt with a lance
 Becomes thee well—art grown wild beast thyself.
 How darest thou, if lover, push me even
 In fancy from thy side, and set me far
 In the gray distance, half a life away,
 Her to be loved no more? Unsay it, unswear!
 Flatter me rather, seeing me so weak,
 Broken with Mark and hate and solitude,
 Thy marriage and mine own, that I should suck
 Lies like sweet wines: lie to me: I believe.
 Will ye not lie? not swear, as there ye kneel,
 And solemnly as when ye sware to him,
 The man of men, our King—My God, the power
 Was once in vows when men believed the King!
 They lied not then, who sware, and thro' their vows
 The King prevailing made his realm:—I say,
 Swear to me thou wilt love me ev'n when old,
 Gray-hair'd, and past desire, and in despair.'

Then Tristram, pacing moodily up and down,
 'Vows! did ye keep the vow ye made to Mark
 More than I mine? Lied, say ye? Nay, but learnt,
 The vow that binds too strictly snaps itself—
 My knighthood taught me this—ay, being snapt—
 We run more counter to the soul thereof
 Than had we never sworn. I swear no more.
 I swore to the great King, and am forsworn.
 For once—ev'n to the height—I honour'd him.
 "Man, is he man at all?" methought, when first
 I rode from our rough Lyonesse, and beheld
 That victor of the Pagan throned in hall—
 His hair, a sun that ray'd from off a brow
 Like hillsnow high in heaven, the steel-blue eyes,
 The golden beard that clothed his lips with light—
 Moreover, that weird legend of his birth,

With Merlin's mystic babble about his end
 Amazed me; then, his foot was on a stool
 Shaped as a dragon; he seem'd to me no man,
 But Michaël trampling Satan; so I sware,
 Being amazed: but this went by—the vows!
 O ay—the wholesome madness of an hour—
 They served their use, their time; for every knight
 Believed himself a greater than himself,
 And every follower eyed him as a God;
 Till he, being lifted up beyond himself,
 Did mightier deeds than otherwise he had done,
 And so the realm was made; but then their vows—
 First mainly thro' that sullyng of our Queen—
 Began to gall the knighthood, asking whence
 Had Arthur right to bind them to himself?
 Dropt down from heaven? wash'd up from out the deep?
 They fail'd to trace him thro' the flesh and blood
 Of our old Kings: whence then? a doubtful lord
 To bind them by inviolable vows,
 Which flesh and blood perforce would violate:
 For feel this arm of mine—the tide within
 Red with free chase and heather-scented air,
 Pulsing full man; can Arthur make me pure
 As any maiden child? lock up my tongue
 From uttering freely what I freely hear?
 Bind me to one? The great world laughs at it.
 And worldling of the world am I, and know
 The ptarmigan that whitens ere his hour
 Woos his own end; we are not angels here
 Nor shall be: vows—I am woodman of the woods,
 And hear the garnet-headed yaffingale
 Mock them: my soul, we love but while we may;
 And therefore is my love so large for thee,
 Seeing it is not bounded save by love.'

Here ending, he moved toward her, and she said,
 'Good: an I turn'd away my love for thee
 To some one thrice as courteous as thyself—
 For courtesy wins woman all as well

As valour may, but he that closes both
 Is perfect, he is Lancelot—taller indeed,
 Rosier, and comelier, thou—but say I loved
 This knightliest of all knights, and cast thee back
 Thine own small saw, “ We love but while we may,”
 Well then, what answer ?’

He that while she spake,
 Mindful of what he brought to adorn her with,
 The jewels, had let one finger lightly touch
 The warm white apple of her throat, replied,
 ‘ Press this a little closer, sweet, until—
 Come, I am hunger’d and half-anger’d—meat,
 Wine, wine—and I will love thee to the death,
 And out beyond into the dream to come.’

So then, when both were brought to full accord,
 She rose, and set before him all he will’d ;
 And after these had comforted the blood
 With meats and wines, and satiated their hearts—
 Now talking of their woodland paradise,
 The deer, the dews, the fern, the founts, the lawns ;
 Now mocking at the much ungainliness,
 And craven shifts, and long crane legs of Mark—
 Then Tristram laughing caught the harp, and sang :

‘ Ay, ay, O ay—the winds that bend the brier !
 A star in heaven, a star within the mere !
 Ay, ay, O ay—a star was my desire,
 And one was far apart, and one was near :
 Ay, ay, O ay—the winds that bow the grass !
 And one was water and one star was fire,
 And one will ever shine and one will pass.
 Ay, ay, O ay—the winds that move the merc.’


Then in the light’s last glimmer Tristram show’d
 And swung the ruby carcanet. She cried,
 ‘ The collar of some order, which our King
 Hath newly founded, all for thee, my soul,

For thee, to yield thee grace beyond thy peers.'

'Not so, my Queen,' he said, 'but the red fruit
Grown on a magic oak-tree in mid-heaven
And won by Tristram as a tourney-prize,
And hither brought by Tristram, for his last
Love-offering and peace-offering unto thee.'

He rose, he turn'd, and flinging round her neck,
Claspt it; but while he bow'd himself to lay
Warm kisses in the hollow of her throat,
Out of the dark, just as the lips had touch'd,
Behind him rose a shadow and a shriek—
'Mark's way,' said Mark, and clove him thro' the brain.

That night came Arthur home, and while he climb'd,
All in a death-dumb autumn-dripping gloom,
The stairway to the hall, and look'd and saw
The great Queen's bower was dark,—about his feet
A voice clung sobbing till he question'd it,
'What art thou?' and the voice about his feet
Sent up an answer, sobbing, 'I am thy fool,
And I shall never make thee smile again.'



YEAST.

IT has been known, from time immemorial, that the sweet liquids which may be obtained by expressing the juices of the fruits and stems of various plants, or by steeping malted barley in hot water, or by mixing honey with water—are liable to undergo a series of very singular changes, if freely exposed to the air and left to themselves, in warm weather. However clear and pellucid the liquid may have been, when first prepared, however carefully it may have been freed from even the finest visible impurities, by straining and filtration, it will not remain clear. After a time it will become cloudy and turbid; little bubbles will be seen rising to the surface, and their abundance will increase until the liquid hisses as if it were simmering on the fire. By degrees, some of the solid particles which produce the turbidity of the liquid collect at its surface into a scum, which is blown up by the emerging air-bubbles into a thick, foamy froth. Another moiety sinks to the bottom, and accumulates as a muddy sediment, or “lees.”

When this action has continued for a certain time, with more or less violence, it gradually moderates. The evolution of bubbles slackens, and finally comes to an end; scum and lees alike settle at the bottom, and the fluid is once more clear and transparent. But it has acquired properties of which no trace existed in the original

liquid. Instead of being a mere sweet fluid, mainly composed of sugar and water, the sugar has more or less completely disappeared, and it has acquired that peculiar smell and taste which we call "spirituous." Instead of being devoid of any obvious effect upon the animal economy, it has become possessed of a very wonderful influence on the nervous system; so that in small doses it exhilarates, while in larger, it stupefies, and may even destroy life.

Moreover, if the original fluid is put into a still, and heated for a while, the first and last product of its distillation is simple water; while, when the altered fluid is subjected to the same process, the matter which is first condensed in the receiver is found to be a clear, volatile substance, which is lighter than water, has a pungent taste and smell, possesses the intoxicating powers of the fluid in an eminent degree, and takes fire the moment it is brought in contact with a flame. The alchemists called this volatile liquid, which they obtained from wine, "spirits of wine," just as they called hydrochloric acid "spirits of salt," and as we, to this day, call refined turpentine "spirits of turpentine." As the "spiritus," or breath, of a man was thought to be the most refined and subtle part of him, the intelligent essence of man was also conceived as a sort of breath, or spirit; and, by analogy, the most refined essence of any thing was called its "spirit." And then it has come about that we use the same word for the soul of man and for a glass of gin.

At the present day, however, we even more commonly use another name for this peculiar liquid—namely, "alcohol," and its origin is not less singular. The Dutch physician, Van Helmont, lived in the latter part of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century—in the transition period between alchemy and chemistry—and was rather more alchemist than chemist. Appended to his "Opera Omnia," published in 1707, there is a very needful "Clavis ad obscuriorum sensum referandum," in which the following passage occurs:—

"ALCOHOL.—Chymicis est liquor aut pulvis summè subtilisatus, vocabulo Orientalibus quoque, cum primis Habessinibus, familiari, quibus *cohól* speciatum pulverem impalpabilem ex antimonio pro oculis tingendis denotat. . . . Hodie autem, ob analogiam quavis pulvis tenerior, ut pulvis oculorum caneri summè subtilisatus *alcohol* audit, haud aliter ac spiritus rectificatissimi *alcolisati* dicuntur."

Robert Boyle similarly speaks of a fine powder as "alcohol;" and so late as the middle of the last century the English lexicographer, Nathan Bailey, defines "alcohol" as "the pure substance of anything separated from the more gross, a very fine and impalpable powder, or a very pure, well-rectified spirit." But, by the time of the publication of Lavoisier's "Traité Élémentaire de Chimie," in 1789, the

term "alcohol," "alkohol," or "alkool" (for it is spelt in all three ways), which Van Helmont had applied primarily to a fine powder, and only secondarily to spirits of wine, had lost its primary meaning altogether; and, from the end of the last century until now, it has, I believe, been used exclusively as the denotation of spirits of wine, and bodies chemically allied to that substance.

The process which gives rise to alcohol in a saccharine fluid is known to us as "fermentation," a term based upon the apparent boiling up or "effervescence" of the fermenting liquid, and of Latin origin.

Our Teutonic cousins call the same process "gähren," "gäsen," "göschchen," and "gischen;" but, oddly enough, we do not seem to have retained their verb or substantive denoting the action itself, though we do use names identical with, or plainly derived from, theirs for the scum and lees. These are called, in Low German, "gäscht" and "gischt;" in Anglo-Saxon, "gest," "gist," and "yst," whence our "yeast." Again, in Low German and in Anglo-Saxon, there is another name for yeast, having the form "barm," or "beorm;" and in the midland counties "barm" is the name by which yeast is still best known. In High German, there is a third name for yeast, "hefe," which is not represented in English, so far as I know.

All these words are said by philologers to be derived from roots expressive of the intestine motion of a fermenting substance. Thus "hefe" is derived from "heben," to raise; "barm" from "beren" or "bären," to bear up; "yeast," "yst" and "gist," have all to do with seething and foam, with "yeasty waves," and "gusty" breezes.

The same reference to the swelling up of the fermenting substance is seen in the Gallo-Latin terms "levure" and "leaven."

It is highly creditable to the ingenuity of our ancestors, that the peculiar property of fermented liquids, in virtue of which they "make glad the heart of man," seems to have been known in the remotest periods of which we have any record. All savages take to alcoholic fluids as if they were to the manner born. Our Vedic forefathers intoxicated themselves with the juice of the "soma;" Noah, by a not unnatural reaction against a superfluity of water, appears to have taken the earliest practicable opportunity of qualifying that which he was obliged to drink; and the ghosts of the ancient Egyptians were solaced by pictures of banquets in which the wine-cup passes round, graven on the walls of their tombs. A knowledge of the process of fermentation, therefore, was in all probability possessed by the prehistoric populations of the globe; and it must have become a matter of great interest even to primæval wine-bibbers to study the methods by which fermented liquids could be surely

manufactured. No doubt, therefore, it was soon discovered that the most certain, as well as the most expeditious, way of making a sweet juice ferment was to add to it a little of the scum, or lees, of another fermenting juice. And it can hardly be questioned that this singular excitation of fermentation in one fluid, by a sort of infection, or inoculation, of a little ferment taken from some other fluid, together with the strange swelling, foaming, and hissing of the fermented substance, must have always attracted attention from the more thoughtful. Nevertheless, the commencement of the scientific analysis of the phenomena dates from a period not earlier than the first half of the seventeenth century.

At this time, Van Helmont made a first step, by pointing out that the peculiar hissing and bubbling of a fermented liquid is due, not to the evolution of common air (which he, as the inventor of the term "gas," calls "gas ventosum"), but to that of a peculiar kind of air such as is occasionally met with in caves, mines, and wells, and which he calls "gas sylvestre."

But a century elapsed before the nature of this "gas sylvestre," or, as it was afterwards called, "fixed air," was clearly determined, and it was found to be identical with that deadly "choke damp" by which the lives of those who descend into old wells, or mines, or brewers' vats, are sometimes suddenly ended; and with the poisonous aeriform fluid which is produced by the combustion of charcoal, and now goes by the name of carbonic acid gas.

During the same time it gradually became clear that the presence of sugar was essential to the production of alcohol and the evolution of carbonic acid gas, which are the two great and conspicuous products of fermentation. And finally, in 1787, the Italian chemist, Fabroni, made the capital discovery that the yeast ferment, the presence of which is necessary to fermentation, is what he termed a "vegeto-animal" substance—or is a body which gives off ammoniacal salts when it is burned, and is, in other ways, similar to the gluten of plants and the albumen and casein of animals.

These discoveries prepared the way for the illustrious Frenchman, Lavoisier, who first approached the problem of fermentation with a complete conception of the nature of the work to be done. The words in which he expresses this conception, in the treatise on elementary chemistry, to which reference has already been made, mark the year 1789 as the commencement of a revolution of not less moment in the world of science than that which simultaneously burst over the political world, and soon engulfed Lavoisier himself in one of its mad eddies.

"We may lay it down as an incontestable axiom that, in all the operations of art and nature, nothing is created; an equal quantity of matter

exists both before and after the experiment : the quality and quantity of the elements remain precisely the same, and nothing takes place beyond changes and modifications in the combinations of these elements. Upon this principle, the whole art of performing chemical experiments depends ; we must always suppose an exact equality between the elements of the body examined and those of the product of its analyses.

“ Hence, since from must of grapes we procure alcohol and carbonic acid, I have an undoubted right to suppose that must consists of carbonic acid and alcohol. From these premisses we have two modes of ascertaining what passes during vinous fermentation : either by determining the nature of, and the elements which compose, the fermentable substances ; or by accurately examining the products resulting from fermentation ; and it is evident that the knowledge of either of these must lead to accurate conclusions concerning the nature and composition of the other. From these considerations, it became necessary accurately to determine the constituent elements of the fermentable substances ; and, for this purpose, I did not make use of the compound juices of fruits, the rigorous analysis of which is perhaps impossible, but made choice of sugar, which is easily analysed and the nature of which I have already explained. This substance is a true vegetable oxyd, with two bases, composed of hydrogen and carbon, brought to the state of an oxyd by means of a certain proportion of oxygen ; and these three elements are combined in such a way that a very slight force is sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of their connection.”

After giving the details of his analysis of sugar and of the products of fermentation Lavoisier continues :—

“ The effect of the vinous fermentation upon sugar is thus reduced to the mere separation of its elements into two portions ; one part is oxygenated at the expense of the other, so as to form carbonic acid ; while the other part, being disoxygenated in favour of the latter, is converted into the combustible substance called alcohol ; therefore, if it were possible to re-unite alcohol and carbonic acid together, we ought to form sugar.”*

Thus Lavoisier thought he had demonstrated that the carbonic acid and the alcohol which are produced by the process of fermentation, are equal in weight to the sugar which disappears ; but the application of the more refined methods of modern chemistry to the investigation of the products of fermentation by Pasteur, in 1860, proved that this is not exactly true, and that there is a deficit of from 5 to 7 per cent. of the sugar which is not covered by the alcohol and carbonic acid evolved. The greater part of this deficit is accounted for by the discovery of two substances, glycerine and succinic acid, of the existence of which Lavoisier was unaware, in the fermented liquid. But about $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. still remains to be made good. According to Pasteur, it has been appropriated by the yeast, but the fact that such appropriation takes place cannot be said to be actually proved.

However this may be, there can be no doubt that the constituent

* “Elements of Chemistry.” By M. Lavoisier. Translated by Robert Kerr. Second edition : 1793 (pp. 186—196).

elements of fully 98 per cent. of the sugar which has vanished during fermentation have simply undergone rearrangement; like the soldiers of a brigade, who at the word of command divide themselves into the independent regiments to which they belong. The brigade is sugar, the regiments are carbonic acid, succinic acid, alcohol, and glycerine.

From the time of Fabroni, onwards, it has been admitted that the agent by which this surprising rearrangement of the particles of the sugar is effected is the yeast. But the first thoroughly conclusive evidence of the necessity of yeast for the fermentation of sugar was furnished by Appert, whose method of preserving perishable articles of food excited so much attention in France at the beginning of this century. Gay-Lussac, in his "Mémoire sur la Fermentation,"* alludes to Appert's method of preserving beer-wort unfermented for an indefinite time, by simply boiling the wort and closing the vessel in which the boiling fluid is contained, in such a way as thoroughly to exclude air; and he shows that, if a little yeast be introduced into such wort, after it has cooled, the wort at once begins to ferment, even though every precaution be taken to exclude air. And this statement has since received full confirmation from Pasteur.

On the other hand, Schwann, Schroeder and Dusch, and Pasteur, have amply proved that air may be allowed to have free access to beer-wort, without exciting fermentation, if only efficient precautions are taken to prevent the entry of particles of yeast along with the air.

Thus, the truth that the fermentation of a simple solution of sugar in water depends upon the presence of yeast, rests upon an unassailable foundation; and the inquiry into the exact nature of the substance which possesses such a wonderful chemical influence becomes profoundly interesting.

The first step towards the solution of this problem was made two centuries ago by the patient and painstaking Dutch naturalist, Leeuwenhoek, who in the year 1680 wrote thus:—

"Sæpissime examinavi fermentum cerevisiæ, semperque hoc ex globulis per materiam pellucidam fluitantibus, quam cerevisiam esse censui, constare observavi: vidi etiam evidentissime, unumquemque hujus fermenti globulum denuo ex sex distinctis globulis constare, accurate eidem quantitate et formæ, cui globulis sanguinis nostri, respondentibus.

"Verum talis mihi de horum origine et formatione conceptus formabam; globulis nempe ex quibus farina Tritici Hordei, Avenæ, Fagotritici, se constat aquæ calore dissolvi et aquæ commisceri; hac vero aqua, quam cerevisiam vocare licet, refrigerante, multos ex minimis particulis in cerevisia coadunari, et hoc pacto efficere particulam sive globulum, quæ sexta pars est globuli fæcis, et iterum sex ex hisce globulis conjungi."†

* "Annales de Chimie," 1810.

† Leeuwenhoek, "Arcana Naturæ Detecta." Ed. Nov., 1721.

Thus Leeuwenhoek discovered that yeast consists of globules floating in a fluid; but he thought that they were merely the starchy particles of the grain from which the wort was made, re-arranged. He discovered the fact that yeast has a definite structure, but not the meaning of the fact. A century and a half elapsed, and the investigation of yeast was recommenced almost simultaneously by Cagniard de la Tour in France, and by Schwann and Kützing in Germany. The French observer was the first to publish his results; and the subject received at his hands and at those of his colleague, the botanist Turpin, full and satisfactory investigation.

The main conclusions at which they arrived are these:—The globular, or oval, corpuscles which float so thickly in the yeast as to make it muddy, though the largest are not more than one-two-thousandth of an inch in diameter, and the smallest may measure less than one-seven-thousandth of an inch, are living organisms. They multiply with great rapidity, by giving off minute buds, which soon attain the size of their parent, and then either become detached or remain united, forming the compound globules of which Leeuwenhoek speaks, though the constancy of their arrangement in sixes existed only in the worthy Dutchman's imagination.

It was very soon made out that these yeast organisms, to which Turpin gave the name of *Torula cerevisia*, were more nearly allied to the lower Fungi than to anything else. Indeed Turpin, and subsequently Berkeley and Hoffmann, believed that they had traced the development of the *Torula* into the well-known and very common mould—the *Penicillium glaucum*. Other observers have not succeeded in verifying these statements; and my own observations lead me to believe, that while the connection between *Torula* and the moulds is a very close one, it is of a different nature from that which has been supposed. I have never been able to trace the development of *Torula* into a true mould; but it is quite easy to prove that species of true mould, such as *Penicillium*, when sown in an appropriate nidus, such as a solution of tartrate of ammonia and yeast-ash, in water, with or without sugar, give rise to *Torula*, similar in all respects to *T. cerevisia*, except that they are, on the average, smaller. Moreover, Bail has observed the development of a *Torula* larger than *T. cerevisia*, from a *Mucor*, a mould allied to *Penicillium*.

It follows, therefore, that the *Torula*, or organisms of yeast, are veritable plants; and conclusive experiments have proved that the power which causes the rearrangement of the molecules of the sugar is intimately connected with the life and growth of the plant. In fact, whatever arrests the vital activity of the plant also prevents it from exciting fermentation.

Such being the facts with regard to the nature of yeast, and of the changes which it effects on sugar, how are they to be accounted

for? Before modern chemistry had come into existence, Stahl, stumbling with the stride of genius, upon the conception which lies at the bottom of all modern views of the process, put forward the notion that the ferment, being in a state of internal motion, communicated that motion to the sugar, and thus caused its resolution into new substances. And Lavoisier, as we have seen, adopts substantially the same view. But Fabroni, full of the then novel conception of acids and bases and double decompositions, propounded the hypothesis that sugar is an oxide with two bases and the ferment a carbonate with two bases; that the carbon of the ferment unites with the oxygen of the sugar, and gives rise to carbonic acid; while the sugar, uniting with the nitrogen of the ferment, produces a new substance analogous to opium. This is decomposed by distillation, and gives rise to alcohol. Next, in 1803, Thénard propounded a hypothesis which partakes somewhat of the nature of both Stahl's and Fabroni's views. "I do not believe with Lavoisier," he says, "that all the carbonic acid formed proceeds from the sugar. How, in that case, could we conceive the action of the ferment on it? I think that the first portions of the acid are due to a combination of the carbon of the ferment with the oxygen of the sugar, and that it is by carrying off a portion of oxygen from the last that the ferment causes the fermentation to commence—the equilibrium between the principles of the sugar being disturbed, they combine afresh to form carbonic acid and alcohol."

The three views here before us may be familiarly exemplified by supposing the sugar to be a card-house. According to Stahl, the ferment is somebody who knocks the table, and shakes the card-house down; according to Fabroni, the ferment takes out some cards, but puts others in their places; according to Thénard, the ferment simply takes a card out of the bottom story, the result of which is that all the others fall.

As chemistry advanced, facts came to light which put a new face upon Stahl's hypothesis, and gave it a safer foundation than it previously possessed. The general nature of these phenomena may be thus stated:—A body, A, without giving to or taking from another body, B, any material particles, causes B to decompose into other substances, C, D, E, the sum of the weights of which is equal to the weight of B, which decomposes.

Thus, bitter almonds contain two substances, amygdalin and synaptase, which can be extracted, in a separate state, from the bitter almonds. The amygdalin thus obtained, if dissolved in water, undergoes no change; but if a little synaptase is added to the solution, the amygdalin splits up into bitter almond oil, prussic acid, and a kind of sugar.

A short time after Cagniard de la Tour discovered the yeast plant,

Liebig, struck with the similarity between this and other such processes and the fermentation of sugar, put forward the hypothesis that yeast contains a substance which acts upon sugar, as synaptase acts upon amygdalin; and as the synaptase is certainly neither organized nor alive, but a mere chemical substance, Liebig treated Cagniard de la Tour's discovery with no small contempt, and, from that time to the present, has steadily repudiated the notion that the decomposition of the sugar is in any sense the result of the vital activity of the *Torula*. But, though the notion that the *Torula* is a creature which eats sugar and excretes carbonic acid and alcohol, which is not unjustly ridiculed in the most surprising paper that ever made its appearance in a grave scientific journal,* may be untenable, the fact that the *Torulæ* are alive, and that yeast does not excite fermentation unless it contains living *Torulæ*, stands fast. Moreover, of late years, the essential participation of living organisms in fermentation other than the alcoholic, has been clearly made out by Pasteur and other chemists.

However, it may be asked is there any necessary opposition between the so-called "vital" and the strictly physico-chemical views of fermentation? It is quite possible that the living *Torula* may excite fermentation in sugar, because it constantly produces, as an essential part of its vital manifestations, some substance which acts upon the sugar, just as the synaptase acts upon the amygdalin. Or it may be, that, without the formation of any such special substance, the physical condition of the living tissue of the yeast plant is sufficient to effect that small disturbance of the equilibrium of the particles of the sugar, which Lavoisier thought sufficient to effect its decomposition.

Platinum in a very fine state of division—known as platinum black, or *noir de platine*—has the very singular property of causing alcohol to change into acetic acid with great rapidity. The vinegar plant, which is closely allied to the yeast plant, has a similar effect upon dilute alcohol, causing it to absorb the oxygen of the air, and become converted into vinegar; and Liebig's eminent opponent, Pasteur, who has done so much for the theory and the practice of vinegar-making, himself suggests that in this case—

* "Das enträthselte Geheimniss der Geistigen Gährung (Vorläufige briefliche Mittheilung)" is the title of an anonymous contribution to Wöhler and Liebig's "Annalen der Pharmacie" for 1839, in which a somewhat Rabelaisian imaginary description of the organization of the "yeast animals" and of the manner in which their functions are performed, is given with a circumstantiality worthy of the author of Gulliver's Travels. As a specimen of the writer's humour, his account of what happens when fermentation comes to an end may suffice. "Sobald nämlich die Thiere keinen Zucker mehr vorfinden, so fressen sie sich gegenseitig selbst auf, was durch eine eigne Manipulation geschieht; alles wird verdaut bis auf die Eier, welche unverändert durch den Darmkanal hingehen; man hat zuletzt wieder gährungs-fähige Hefe, nämlich den Saamen der Thiere, der übrig bleibt."

“ La cause du phénomène physique qui accompagne la vie de la plante réside dans un état physique propre, analogue à celui du noir de platine. Mais il est essentiel de remarquer que cet état physique de la plante est étroitement lié avec la vie de cette plante.”*

Now if the vinegar plant gives rise to the oxidation of alcohol, on account of its merely physical constitution, it is at any rate possible that the physical constitution of the yeast plant may exert a decomposing influence on sugar.

But, without presuming to discuss a question which leads us into the very arcana of chemistry, the present state of speculation upon the *modus operandi* of the yeast plant in producing fermentation is represented, on the one hand, by the Stahlian doctrine, supported by Liebig, according to which the atoms of the sugar are shaken into new combinations, either directly by the *Torula*, or indirectly, by some substance formed by them; and, on the other hand, by the Thénardian doctrine, supported by Pasteur, according to which the yeast plant assimilates part of the sugar, and, in so doing, disturbs the rest, and determines its resolution into the products of fermentation. Perhaps the two views are not so much opposed as they seem at first sight to be.

But the interest which attaches to the influence of the yeast plants upon the medium in which they live and grow does not arise solely from its bearing upon the theory of fermentation. So long ago as 1838, Turpin compared the *Torula* to the ultimate elements of the tissues of animals and plants—“ Les organes élémentaires de leurs tissus, comparables aux petits végétaux des levures ordinaires, sont aussi les décomposeurs des substances qui les environnent.”

Almost at the same time, and, probably, equally guided by his study of yeast, Schwann was engaged in those remarkable investigations into the form and development of the ultimate structural elements of the tissues of animals, which led him to recognise their fundamental identity with the ultimate structural elements of vegetable organisms.

The yeast plant is a mere sac, or “cell,” containing a semifluid matter, and Schwann’s microscopic analysis resolved all living organisms, in the long run, into an aggregation of such sacs or cells, variously modified; and tended to show, that all, whatever their ultimate complication, begin their existence in the condition of such simple cells.

In his famous “*Mikroskopische Untersuchungen*” Schwann speaks of *Torula* as a “cell,” and in a remarkable note to the passage in which he refers to the yeast plant, Schwann says:—

“ I have been unable to avoid mentioning fermentation, because it is the

* “*Etudes sur les Mycodermes*,” *Comptes-Rendus*, liv., 1862.

most fully and exactly known operation of cells, and represents, in the simplest fashion, the process which is repeated by every cell of the living body."

In other words, Schwann conceives that every cell of the living body exerts an influence on the matter which surrounds and permeates it, analogous to that which a *Torula* exerts on the saccharine solution by which it is bathed. A wonderfully suggestive thought, opening up views of the nature of the chemical processes of the living body, which have hardly yet received all the development of which they are capable.

Kant defined the special peculiarity of the living body to be that the parts exist for the sake of the whole and the whole for the sake of the parts. But when Turpin and Schwann resolved the living body into an aggregation of quasi-independent cells, each like a *Torula*, leading its own life and having its own laws of growth and development, the aggregation being dominated and kept working towards a definite end only by certain harmony among these units, or by the superaddition of a controlling apparatus, such as a nervous system, this conception ceased to be tenable. The cell lives for its own sake, as well as for the sake of the whole organism; and the cells, which float in the blood, live at its expense, and profoundly modify it, are almost as much independent organisms as the *Torulæ* which float in beer-wort.

Schwann burdened his enunciation of the "cell theory" with two false suppositions; the one, that the structures he called "nucleus" and "cell-wall" are essential to a cell; the other, that cells are usually formed independently of other cells; but, in 1839, it was a vast and clear gain to arrive at the conception, that the vital functions of all the higher animals and plants are the resultant of the forces inherent in the innumerable minute cells of which they are composed, and that each of them is, itself, an equivalent of one of the lowest and simplest of independent living beings—the *Torula*.

From purely morphological investigations, Turpin and Schwann, as we have seen, arrived at the notion of the fundamental unity of structure of living beings. And, before long, the researches of the chemists gradually led up to the conception of the fundamental unity of their composition.

So far back as 1803, Thénard pointed out, in most distinct terms, the important fact that yeast contains a nitrogenous "animal" substance; and that such substance is contained in all ferments. Before him, Fabroni and Fourcroy speak of the "vegeto-animal" matter of yeast. In 1844 Mulder endeavoured to demonstrate that a peculiar substance, which he called "protein," was essentially characteristic of living matter.

In 1846, Payen writes:—

“Enfin, une loi sans exception me semble apparaître dans les faits nombreux que j'ai observés et conduire à envisager sous un nouveau jour la vie végétale; si je ne m'abuse, tout ce que dans les tissus végétaux la vue directe ou amplifiée nous permet de discerner sous la forme de cellules et de vaisseaux, ne représente autre chose que les enveloppes protectrices, les réservoirs et les conduits, à l'aide desquels les corps animés qui les secrètent et les façonnent, se logent, puisent et charrient leurs aliments, déposent et isolent les matières excrétées.”

And again—

“Afin de compléter aujourd'hui l'énoncé du fait général, je rappellerai que les corps, donc des fonctions accomplies dans les tissus des plantes, sont formés des éléments qui constituent, en proportion peu variable, les organismes animaux; qu'ainsi l'on est conduit à reconnaître une immense unité de composition élémentaire dans tous les corps vivants de la nature.”*

In the year (1846) in which these remarkable passages were published, the eminent German botanist, Von Mohl, invented the word “protoplasm,” as a name for one portion of those nitrogenous contents of the cells of living plants, the close chemical resemblance of which to the essential constituents of living animals is so strongly indicated by Payen. And through the twenty-five years that have passed, since the matter of life was first called protoplasm, a host of investigators, among whom Cohn, Max Schulze, and Kühn, must be named as leaders, have accumulated evidence, morphological, physiological, and chemical, in favour of that “immense unité de composition élémentaire dans tous les corps vivants de la nature,” into which Payen had, so early, a clear insight.

As far back as 1850, Cohn wrote, apparently without any knowledge of what Payen had said before him:—

“The protoplasm of the botanist, and the contractile substance and sarcode of the zoologist must be, if not identical, yet in a high degree analogous substances. Hence, from this point of view, the difference between animals and plants consists in this, that, in the latter, the contractile substance, as a primordial utricle is inclosed within an inert cellulose membrane, which permits it only to exhibit an internal motion, expressed by the phenomena of rotation and circulation, while in the former it is not so inclosed. The protoplasm in the form of the primordial utricle is, as it were, the animal element in the plant, but which is imprisoned and only becomes free in the animal; or, to strip off the metaphor which obscures the simple thought, the energy of organic vitality which is manifested in movement is especially exhibited by a nitrogenous contractile substance, which in plants is limited and fettered by an inert membrane, in animals not so.”†

In 1868, thinking that an untechnical statement of the views current among the leaders of biological science, might be interesting to the general public, I gave a lecture embodying them in Edinburgh. Those who have not made the mistake of attempting to

* “Mem. sur les Développements des Végétaux,” &c.—“Mem. Présentées,” ix. 1846.
† Cohn, “Ueber Protococcus pluvialis,” in the “Nova Acta” for 1850.

approach biology, either by the high *à priori* road of mere philosophical speculation, or by the mere low *à posteriori* lane offered by the tube of a microscope, but have taken the trouble to become acquainted with well ascertained facts and with their history, will not need to be told that in what I had to say "as regards protoplasm" in my lecture "On the Physical Basis of Life," there was nothing new; and, as I hope, nothing that the present state of knowledge does not justify us in believing to be true. Under these circumstances, my surprise may be imagined, when I found, that the mere statement of facts and of views, long familiar to me as part of the common scientific property of continental workers, raised a sort of storm in this country, not only by exciting the wrath of unscientific persons whose pet prejudices they seemed to touch, but by giving rise to quite superfluous explosions on the part of some who should have been better informed.

Dr. Stirling, for example, made my essay the subject of a special critical lecture,* which I have read with much interest, though, I confess, the meaning of much of it remains as dark to me as does the "Secret of Hegel" after Dr. Stirling's elaborate revelation of it. Dr. Stirling's method of dealing with the subject is peculiar. "Protoplasm" is a question of history, so far as it is a name; of fact, so far as it is a thing. Dr. Stirling has not taken the trouble to refer to the original authorities for his history, which is consequently a travesty; and, still less, has he concerned himself with looking at the facts, but contents himself with taking them also at second-hand. A most amusing example of this fashion of dealing with scientific statements is furnished by Dr. Stirling's remarks upon my account of the protoplasm of the nettle hair. That account was drawn up from careful and often-repeated observation of the facts. Dr. Stirling thinks he is offering a valid criticism, when he says that my valued friend Professor Stricker gives a somewhat different statement about protoplasm. But why in the world did not this distinguished Hegelian look at a nettle hair for himself, before venturing to speak about the matter at all? Why trouble himself about what either Stricker or I say, when any tyro can see the facts for himself, if he is provided with those not rare articles, a nettle and a microscope? But I suppose this would have been "*Aufklärung*"—a recurrence to the base common-sense philosophy of the eighteenth century, which liked to see before it believed, and to understand before it criticised. Dr. Stirling winds up his paper with the following paragraph:—

"In short, the whole position of Mr. Huxley, (1) that all organisms consist alike of the same life-matter, (2) which life-matter is, for its part,

* Subsequently published under the title of "As Regards Protoplasm."

due only to chemistry, must be pronounced untenable—nor less untenable (3) the materialism he would found on it."

The paragraph contains three distinct assertions concerning my views, and just the same number of utter misrepresentations of them. That which I have numbered (1) turns on the ambiguity of the word "same," for a discussion of which I would refer Dr. Stirling to a great hero of "*Aufklärung*," Archbishop Whately; statement number (2) is, in my judgment, absurd; and certainly I have never said anything resembling it; while, as to number (3), one great object of my essay was to show that what is called "materialism" has no sound philosophical basis!

As we have seen, the study of yeast has led investigators face to face with problems of immense interest in pure chemistry, and in animal and vegetable morphology. Its physiology is not less rich in subjects for inquiry. Take, for example, the singular fact that yeast will increase indefinitely when grown in the dark, in water containing only tartrate of ammonia, a small percentage of mineral salts, and sugar. Out of these materials the *Torulæ* will manufacture nitrogenous protoplasm, cellulose, and fatty matters, in any quantity, although they are wholly deprived of those rays of the sun, the influence of which is essential to the growth of ordinary plants. There has been a great deal of speculation lately, as to how the living organisms buried beneath two or three thousand fathoms of water, and therefore in all probability almost deprived of light, live. If any of them possess the same powers as yeast (and the same capacity for living without light is exhibited by some other fungi) there would seem to be no difficulty about the matter.

Of the pathological bearings of the study of yeast, and other such organisms, I have spoken elsewhere. It is certain that, in some animals, devastating epidemics are caused by fungi of low order—similar to those of which *Torula* is a sort of offshoot. It is certain that such diseases are propagated by contagion and infection, in just the same way as ordinary contagious and infectious diseases are propagated. Of course, it does not follow from this, that all contagious and infectious diseases are caused by organisms of as definite and independent a character as the *Torula*; but, I think, it does follow that it is prudent and wise to satisfy oneself in each particular case, that the "germ theory" cannot and will not explain the facts, before having recourse to hypotheses which have no equal support from analogy.

T. H. HUXLEY.



GEORGE MAC DONALD.

Works of Fancy and Imagination. By GEORGE
MACDONALD. Ten Pocket Volumes. London:
Strahan & Co.

ON all or most of the different currents of religious tendency which in our own day appear to have put out for the same unfathomable sea, some, if not sufficient, criticism has been expended. Without having read and heard everything it is impossible to affirm that no criticism has yet addressed itself to the task of mapping out these currents all in one view; trying to define common sources, if any; and also to predict certain or probable points of confluence. However, thoughtful minds must somewhere, and perhaps in many places, have at least contemplated such a survey; and those who have made some little way in it, but are hindered by want of leisure, would willingly, we presume, see the work taken up by hands and heads less heavily impawned. Some of these currents float down to us, as they pass, wrecks, broken salvage, and still more painful things; in all of them there is golden sand, and in some much more than that. None is more obvious or more fertile than that which may be roughly called the current of the Humanization of the Divine. On this current have been borne to us products as strangely diverse as the heavy models, plans, and sections of Auguste Comte, who proposed to do everything "sans Dieu," and—these flowers from the garden of "a God-intoxicated" man.

These flowers—none without some beauty, and many of them

exquisite in chiselling, freshness, and odour, though often wanting in colour and firmness of grouping—are “Works of Fancy and Imagination, by George MacDonald,” collected into ten volumes, and enclosed in a case with a gilt design upon the face. The distinction between fancy and imagination cannot be made final and decisive—the latter being the same power as the former, “leased by a stronger tenure to a higher and more impassioned service;” but the *working* difference between the two is well indicated by the design in question, and a pretty plain line of classification may be drawn between the writings themselves.

The order in which the works are arranged is partly chronological, and it may not be unadvisable to begin by giving a short account of them.

First, we have “Within and Without,” dating, as we see by the dedicatory sonnet to the poet’s wife, from 1855. From the title of this, the words “A Dramatic Poem,” (which belonged to the first publication) have been withdrawn.

Next comes “A Hidden Life.” We can find nothing in the subsequent writings of Mr. MacDonald, of which the substance (by which we mean more than the germ) is not to be grasped in these two poems. Perhaps this may result in some degree from the treatment to which the author has since subjected them; but that is a question beyond the information at our command just now.

In the second volume we have “The Disciple,” “The Gospel Women,” and the “Sonnets Concerning Jesus;” of which the two latter may be taken as studies following upon the point of view supposed to be caught at the last “departure” in the record of spiritual history indicated in the first. Here, also, we have the fine poem “Light,” inscribed to the late A. J. Scott.

In the third volume are “Violin Songs,” “Roadside Poems,” “Poems for Children,” &c. The “Violin Songs” include the “Songs of the Seasons,” which are familiar to Mr. MacDonald’s admirers—an odious word, for which perhaps we might substitute friends of the book-shelf, till his exquisite instinct finds some happier periphrase. The “Roadside Poems” include “The Child-Mother.”

In the next volume come “Parables, Ballads, and Songs.” The parables include “Death and Birth,” “The Sangreal,” and “Somnium Mystici;” but apparently the chronological order is here broken, for we remember in the volume of miscellanies, published by Longmans many years ago, some poems (“Light,” for example) for which we must look elsewhere. As in the first volume we have the substance of all Mr. MacDonald’s teaching, so we have in “Somnium Mystici” the most concentrated exhibition of its central ideas.

Now we arrive at the works of “Fancy and Imagination” which

are not definitely poetic in form. Volumes v. and vi. contain the "faery romance" of "Phantastes;" in volume vii. is "The Portent," Mr. MacDonald's well-known story of "Inner Vision, or Second Sight."

The remaining three volumes contain various poetic parables told in prose; many of them fit for children, and all of them childlike in spirit, though their whole scope and meaning are far beyond the range not only of children, but of all persons except those of considerable experience and observation of life, united with respectable culture (high of its kind), and some natural apprehensiveness of truth put into symbols. The "Light Princess" is included in these three volumes.

We do not know that the amount and quality of the alterations made in these very varied writings since their first publication are any great concern of the reader, who, it may be said, is bound in honour to take them from the author as *he* wishes them to be taken, and not inquire too curiously. But we hope few of them have been altered as much as "Death and Birth," in which we miss some most pregnant lines, and some not less pregnant side-notes. Of the latter one word. "The resentment of genius at the thumbscrew of worldly talent," struck us as particularly good. And where is the passage out of which the line,

"Kiss me, God, with thy cold kiss!"

stands up in our memory, with its marginal quotation, "I dreamt that Allah kissed me, and his kiss was cold?" We cannot remember accurately enough to guess at reasons for such as these and other modifications; nor is this kind of criticism usually very fertile. Sometimes, no doubt, it proves otherwise; as, for example, in Julius Hare's powerful and convincing condemnation of the wretched changes Wordsworth introduced into the last verse of the "Laodamia;" but though Mr. MacDonald's mind has had, like other people's, a history, it shows no traces of having anywhere returned upon itself, or undergone a chill. If the spiritual ideas which rule in his mind have by any recent touches in these poems been more firmly outlined or more stringently drawn into the form of a personal *confessio fidei*,—this was to be expected, and it would be only something more of that of which for ends of pure art, there was always something too much in the poet.

We are making no complaint whatever; and are, on the contrary, anxious to empty our mind and the reader's of all personal predilections and mere theories. In estimating the work of another it is first one's duty to see that one's own tastes for this that or the other do not warp the judgment: otherwise, it is as if one condemned this

melody because he did not like the *timbre* of the violin on which it was played, and admired *that* because it was played upon the flute, an instrument of which the *timbre* pleased him. Many people do, in fact, judge music in some such way; and still more, books. That a thing suits some mood or need of their own or embodies some fact of their personal history is the secret reason of perhaps most of the literary likings of "general readers." To make some stand against these partialities is the greatest practical use of criticism; but critics, too, must go wildly wrong unless they remember that their canons are partly *ex post facto*, and that if a new product yields delight it vindicates itself and is entitled to insist on a modification of the canon. In fact, the critic is in the position of the grammarian, to whom the bad forms of yesterday may to-morrow become allowed and effective phraseology. But in each case there is a supreme logic which may not be violated with impunity. If in any particular a writer whose work is otherwise so exquisite as Mr. MacDonald's should disregard that supreme logic, the effect would be all the more inharmonious. But let us not anticipate.

Certain qualities of Mr. MacDonald's writings lie so immediately upon the surface, that it can scarcely be said that you notice them. Upon reflection, you *recall* them; but it would hardly strike you to say that he is singularly pure, elevated, and tender, or that he wrote beautiful English. Yet, of course, all this is true; and the transparency or lucidity of his style appears to be closely connected with, perhaps, the first peculiarity that an attentive reader can be said to notice. It reminds you of running water; and so, also, does the course of the author's thought. And yet the running water is not the right analogue, nor is the gushing water. "The cistern contains, the fountain overflows," said Blake; but it is not in that sense that Mr. MacDonald's manner reminds you of water. There is an abundant supply, and so far the comparison holds good. But we sometimes feel a little weary of this incessant out-flow or up-flow (if the physicist will permit the latter word), without any apparent *will* in it; and thus the very utmost spontaneity ends by having an air of arbitrariness. The late Sarah Williams (Sadie) has a remark expressly to the point here, and it is a true one. In the design upon the front of the case which enshrines these volumes, the first letter of the word *Imagination* shows a pair of wings mounting towards a star. But if there were such a thing as a balloon or kite to the empyrean—the reader will smile, and so do we—that would more truly represent Mr. MacDonald's genius—*on the whole*. We miss the beating of the wings. It is exceedingly difficult to make this plain, but we believe most readers have already felt it for themselves, and will need no explanation. Nor is the case met by what

we took to be Mr. MacDonald's own doctrine of the Imagination, as expounded by him in an article in the *British Quarterly Review*, which nobody could help at once assigning to its true authorship. The imagination may act ever so spontaneously, but there is a spontaneity of action as well as a spontaneity of receptivity; and the genius of Mr. MacDonald seems so very often as if it merely reflected what came to it, instead of going forth to seek, and gather, and bind, that at last the sense of a personality behind the work almost slips away. The watchful reader will notice how often, how very often, the poet starts from a *datum* of scene or incident—a *datum* in the strict sense. You notice it not only, for instance, in the "Violin Songs," but even in "The Disciple," where the author is before us in person, and recounting a personal struggle. His own very states of mind come before us as *data*, and nothing more.

We are referring to this point because it is related to a curious question which arises between Mr. MacDonald's prose and his poetry, and to the question generally of his ordination. When we come to look at his prose writings, there is a change—

"A fuller light illumined all,
A breeze through all the garden swept,
A sudden hubbub shook the hall,
And sixty feet the fountain leapt."

No, the "light" is not "fuller," it is of necessity more broken; but there is more movement in the air, and this is one reason why loving students of his writings, and good judges too, have set down his prose narratives of real life as his best work. The author's genius is, in *them*, obviously seeking, gathering, and binding, and the impression of power is proportionately stronger. In the stories of phantasy—notably in "Phantastes" itself—we receive, as in the poetry, a sort of impression that the author's genius is something that only lies or sits and watches a mirror and occasionally longs; and the procession of "sights," to use Macbeth's word, looks too often as if it "couldn't help it." And the farther we get from the sphere of pure poetry, the more does this impression about the product before us weaken. Nevertheless do we adhere to the opinion that Mr. MacDonald is truly and primarily a poet. It is in his poems that we find what perfect work he has done, and in them that we have opened to us the highest and sweetest sources of pleasure. There is a great deal *more* in "Robert Falconer" than there is in the "Somnium Mystici," "The Child Mother," "The Grace of Grace," or "Light;" but the latter have the unlimited and yet concentrated value that belong to all poetry, and indeed, to all works of high art: in which, by the exclusion

of what may be called the infirmities of the topic, and the (more or less successful) effort after perfect harmony of form and idea, the infinite is as abundantly suggested to the mind as it possibly can be by any human work. We would give a good deal of fine prose for this little song from "Phantastes":—

"Alas, how easily things go wrong!
A sigh too much, or a kiss too long!
And there follows a mist and a weeping rain,
And life is never the same again.

"Alas, how hardly things go right!
'Tis hard to watch in a summer night,
For the sigh will come, and the kiss will stay,
And the summer night is a winter day."

Yet much of Mr. MacDonald's prose is of the very highest excellence, considered as to both content and form.

Of his prose writings we are, on the whole, inclined to say that "The Portent" is the best. Not the one to which we should the most frequently turn, not the most poetic, or the most fertile; but the work which most completely fulfils its own natural conditions. At the close the quasi-preternatural becomes a little too suddenly the merely natural, and there is even another and more serious fault. The tale wants what we will call *padding*. It is not alone "The Portent," it is a hurry of portents, and the magic-lantern slides come in too closely upon one another. It is, however, the first work of the author's which suggests the word masterly; and why, in the dedication to "Duncan McColl, Esq., R.N., of Huntly," he should go out of his way to explain that it claims a place out of the category of "sensation novels," it would puzzle our old friend the Philadelphia lawyer to say. It is a very thrilling piece of work, with a true unity of its own, and, thank Heaven! no moral.

In passing we may note what this particular story discloses in much force—namely, the clearness with which Mr. MacDonald always conceives of relative place, and his strong grasp of mechanical conditions. His landscapes are the most clear and defined we know, in regard to the subject-matter of what cranioscopists call "the organ of locality;" and as his photograph is public property we suppose they may crow (especially in America) over the coincidence of the frontal development with the fact. They will probably add that in all his writings there is the traveller's instinct clearly visible. They will also perhaps look to see if they find his Constructiveness so large as to diminish the apparent size of his Ideality! The mechanical tendency is so obvious in the printed works that one of the first questions the present writer ever asked of a common acquaintance

was whether Mr. MacDonald was fond of carpentry! It has been with the greatest surprise that we have seen some of his landscapes described as "hazy." Anything but that. There is sometimes a haze *over* the landscape, and the detail is a little excessive; but all is as clear as a map-model.

Next to "The Portent" we place "The Light Princess," and perhaps "The Carasoy" —always speaking with the same reservation, and exclusively with regard to the collection now before us. In "The Light Princess" we find the work honestly done to order—the "order," that is, of the ruling conception—and only one thing in excess—the bad and inartistic pun upon the word "aspirate." In this delightful story, too, we have no "moral" intrusions, and we *have* some of the humorous padding which such works of phantasy imperatively need—except in rare cases. Yet, are there *any* exceptions? Would not even Fouqué's "Undine" have gained by touches of humour in relation to the water-maiden's "uncle" and the rather hardly-used Bertha? At all events, Mr. MacDonald never was in a more gracious mood than when he wrote "The Light Princess."

In richness and variety of conception "Phantastes," which received a warm word—perhaps many warm words—from Dickens, takes so high a place in the collection, that we hardly know what should rank before it. The symbols are easily read by an apprehensive mind; and how rapidly and easily they succeed, and "hang on," and interweave in this wonderful story of the man who went out to seek his ideal, and ended by being glad at having lost his shadow! Yet "Phantastes," rich in beauty and meaning, has grave faults. The machinery, so to call it, works with a little of the hardness and coldness of a young imagination; the symbols have not nested long enough to get warm and full-feathered; they are just a little callow. Then, again, we feel the want of a little more padding. There are one or two delicious bits of humour—that about the wooden men, for example—but not enough of them. The only way of making a tale of this kind go smoothly is to let superfluous matters—matters quite extraneous to the design, and yet honestly co-ordinated with the rest—slip or glide in, and act as buffers here and there. The thing as it stands wants flesh, or unction, except towards the close, where there is too much of the latter in another sense. The intellectual ground-plan shows too plainly through the symbols; and here, just where we want haze, we do not get it, but, on the contrary, everything fits into every other with the nicety, and the hardness, of mosaic work. There is another fault: towards the close the framework is over-weighted, and we almost fancy some leaves of "The Pilgrim's Progress" have got slipped in by mistake. Not that

there is anything which did not lie within the scope and prime conception of the work, but that the gradations are abrupt, and the morality far too obtrusive. Great part of pp. 168 and 169 is so bad—so *very* bad—that the reader, after so much delight, scarcely knows how to forgive this rude breaking of the spell. But in spite of his exquisite sensibility, there is some lack of the instinct of gradation in Mr. MacDonald's mind, though it is not easy to define where it is. We feel it when the little fairy of the dead rose-leaves leaps on to the floor at the opening. This is a *Contes des Fées* touch, thoroughly French. Then the stepping from the bed-chamber into Arcadia is damaged by too much detail—that about the ivy-leaves, for example. Neither can we relish a Greek name for a knight in fairy-land, and the “chamber of *Sir Anodos*” jars. The narrator had better have gone without a name: the significance of this does not reward us for its incongruity. The phrase “*church of darkness*,” too, later on, strikes an utterly incongruous note. We are quite certain of the justness of these criticisms, and they might be extended. The puzzle is that a writer of such a fine tactile truthfulness (if the phrase may be lawfully coined) should make such mistakes. It does not meet the case to reply that there are spots in the sun; for these blots do not look like the necessary consequences of temperament or natural habit; but like, so to speak, exotic faults. We presume it is the result of the author's early training, and of a bent contracted in his pulpit experience and the approaches to it. At all events, he sometimes rips up his allegory before your very eyes in a most irritating manner. “*The Sangreal*” is a poem of much beauty, but the purely explanatory verse, beginning, “For he sought no more the best,” is a blot which vexes a sensitive reader. If the parable was obscure, it ought to have been made plain with light from the inside, not with light thrown upon it. This reminds us to say the poem entitled “*Light*” has suffered from a similar cause. A thousand pities! for it is one of the finest of the author's poems: we have often been tempted to call it the very finest. It is free from any suspicion of morbidity, and if the singer's hand had been a little firmer on the strings, if there had been more grasp in it, it would have been sublime. Inevitably it reminds you of Wordsworth's Ode—the Ode—and the author may yet make it equal to that. It is too long: it should leave off a good deal sooner, and everything that is not purely lyrical should be ruthlessly cut away from it. The shade of “*A. J. Scott*” would gladly sanction such a treatment of the poem, and we would joyfully see it take its place in English poetry as the flawless and undisputed peer of its immortal companion.

“*Within and Without*,” an early poem, is, as a whole, not satis-

factory; but some of the poetry which is incidental to the scenes of which it is composed will not be let die. Already the sonnet—

“And weep not, though the beautiful decay,”
the verses—

“Love me, beloved, and let me lie,”

and, above all, “Little White Lily,” are classical; at least they have been classical in our thoughts ever since we saw the poem, though but for a few minutes, at its first appearance. Generally speaking, however, the workmanship is here not equal to the “good intentions” of the poet. All Mr. MacDonald’s usual moral and spiritual subtlety and tendencies are there, and the story is full of the most lovely light. It is fine to see the characteristic manner in which Mr. MacDonald has made Julian’s brother-monk and friend, who at first could not enter into Julian’s spiritual longings and questionings, come face to face with the same needs by his own act in helping Julian to escape. As fine, too, in the fifth part, which is a vision, is the passage in which Julian is shown by the angel his ideal woman, perfect, naked, celestial, far above him, and is told that she can clothe herself and come down. But will he choose between her and his earthly wife, stained, a wanderer, and more or less untrue, as he believes? In a pang of love, he chooses the woman who has shared his toils and lain in his bosom, earth-stained though she may be. Upon this, the ideal lady clothes herself, and lo, it is his wife! More pathetic, however, because more natural, is the passage in which the little child, Lily, cannot see anything in the poetry her father finds beautiful:—

[He looks up, and sees that the child has taken the book to her corner. She peeps into it; then holds it to her ear; then rubs her hands over it; then puts her tongue on it.

Julian (bursting into tears). Father, I am thy child. Forgive me this! Thy poetry is hard to read.”

But Julian is a little preachy, and though in a man who had been through such struggles, “the angel grace of unconsciousness” was impossible, one would have liked a little less of the opposite “grace.” The hero is too business-like. When he stabs the villain (in fair fight) he observes, “If men will be devils, they are better in hell;” and then we have, “wipes his dagger on the coat of the dead man.” The remark was a true one, but we feel that the speaker is rather too sententious for such a crisis. It is not given to all men to “temper” homicide “with epigram” and forethought in this cool style. There is one more criticism. Julian tells his dear lady—not without cause, but, seemingly speaking a little *de*

haut en bas—that he is afraid her heart will not hold all the love with which he desires to fill it. But in spite of this the reader finds it difficult to understand how a couple, really loving each other, and of fine instincts, could get as far apart as Julian and Lilia do in their London home. We feel that something *must* have happened to crack the ice. A joke would have done it, only we cannot conceive Julian joking. But there was the little girl. Did *she* never do anything to precipitate a thaw—never make droll speeches or ever fall down a stair or two? It was a hard case, certainly.

The beauty of the poem entitled "A Hidden Life," pleads hard for a high place for it, and a high place it must hold. It is a story of a Scotch peasant lad, who in the intervals of labour on his father's farm, studied at college; but who, before he went to the city, had a seed of beautiful thought and impulse cast into his bosom by a casual meeting with a lovely lady on horseback. This poem has been altered, and is in one respect the better for the alteration. Was there not at first a song in it beginning "Greet na', mither?" At all events it appears to us more healthy and breezy than it was before; but the letter which the dying youth dates from the churchyard to the unknown beauty is far too long, and far too hortatory; it breaks the idyllic sweetness and simplicity of the poem. The passages in which the transfiguration of common things is brought about in the lad's mind by the fleeting vision of the girl are extremely fine. Here, as in other places (especially in the "Somnium Mystici"), if the reader will keep his eyes wide open, he will be able to gather up for use some of the recurring ideas of Mr. MacDonald's mind. The following noble lines might, like others in this poem, be slipped in between some of Wordsworth's very best, and in no way break the spell of the elder poet's work:—

"All crowds are made
Of individuals; and their grief, and pain,
And thirst, and hunger, all are of the one,
Not of the many: the true saving power
Enters the individual door, and thence
Issues again in thousand influences
Besieging other doors. You cannot throw
A mass of good into the general midst,
Whereof each man can seize his private share."

What is more, all this is finely true, and yet it reminds us to say what may as well be said at once, now that we are approaching the point for some sort of précis of the poet's characteristics. One of his leading suggestions is that, God being once known for what he is, trust must be complete or it is unworthy, and, in fact, illogical. This is true; but we should like to see the doctrine of trust stated by some

one in definite language. At times it takes a shape in Mr. MacDonald's writings which would logically exclude any policy or conduct of life.* It is more than merely interesting to compare parallel ethical and spiritual touches or *dicta* in writers who so differ in their postulates. Of course there is one transcendental *tradition* to which both are affiliated. Which of them is logically faithful to it? If Mr. Emerson can consistently get all he teaches out of his own postulates, in what position are Mr. MacDonald's? And *can* the latter make the Semitic and the Transcendental traditions run on in one homogeneous current? Meanwhile, of all living writers Mr. Emerson and Mr. MacDonald are the most untiring preachers of the truth

"If my bark sink 'tis to another sea;"

and so far all is consistent. We shall have to refer again to the former.

Of the poems in detail we will only add a word or two here. "The Child Mother" is perfect, and to use a hackneyed formula, Wordsworth would have been proud of it. In the "Somnium Mystici," too, we can see no fault. The author's handling of the *terza rima* we like, and the soundless movement of the verse is perfectly adjusted to the solemn, silent, *beyond-world* conception of the poem.

It is an old dispute whether a poet of secondary merit in a high order is to rank before or after a first-class poet of a lower order. Mr. Browning and the best authorities decide that he must rank *before*, and we think so too. Mr. MacDonald will acquiesce, if we read aright what the little rose-leaf fairy says in "Phantastes,"—that size is accidental, form essential. At all events the order to which Mr. MacDonald belongs is at once determined by the spaciousness and large, free atmosphere of his best work. This decisively stamps him as of the high (lyrical) brotherhood, and removes him out of the category of provincial classifications;—whether much or little of his poetry lives, and granting that some of it wants space and air, his *genius* is free, spacious, and luminous. His writings are too nearly uniform in mood, however—he is too much the poet of longing and listening; but that is what fixes his secondary classification. Now the "lyrical cry" is never *ferce* in him, as it is in Shelley; he never aspires to grasp or possess; his longing is a longing to be possessed or fulfilled of what he longs for. Shelley seems to say, with anguish, "Hélas, l'infini a disparu et j'avais tant de choses à lui dire!" If he addressed that Celestial Woman of Mr. MacDonald's poem, it might be with, "O femme que j'aurais aimée!"† But Mr. MacDonald, more receptive and passive, has actually waited, listened

* See page 317, vol. i., "A Hidden Life," for a conclusive illustration.

† Both these quotations come from Michelet's "L'Amour."

and heard, saw and loved, and his mind hovers—floats, we might almost say—with conscious certainty in the near atmosphere of the thing he desires. We are not at all comparing what Mr. MacDonald has produced with Shelley's writings or with what we can see by the "Cenci" and the dramatic fragments he was on the verge of producing. Still less, on the other hand, are we measuring Mr. MacDonald's total poetic capacity by what he has done—we merely use these things for a moment, and then throw them aside.

The more obvious qualities of his work it is not necessary to dwell upon; and intermediate qualities have been suggested in what goes before. But when we come to what he himself would desire should be presented as the central idea of his writings, we shall not be at all sure-footed; for we cannot follow him. In Mr. Emerson's essay on "Nature," we find certain groups of conceptions familiar to the pure poetic vision. But in Mr. MacDonald we are to find these conceptions fused down into another. Or, to change the figure, we are to find them modulated into a new dominant. What we are about to quote will remind the attentive reader of a striking passage in "Robert Falconer;" but these lines are from the "Disciple;" and they are sufficient for our purpose:—

*"Lord Jesus Christ, I know not how,
With this blue air, blue sea,
This yellow sand, this grassy brow,
All isolating me,*

*"My words to thy heart should draw near,
My thoughts be heard by thee;
But he who made the ear, must hear,
Who made the eye, must see."*

*"Thou mad'st the hand with which I write,
That sun descending slow,"*

and so forth. Now, the theme of this poem is lifted up to a higher plane, and there repeated, in the "Somnium Mystici." The soul, laid asleep in the beyond-world, awakes to be educated for the new life, and its training, beginning with the snowdrop, and passing through pure human love, and perfect glorified love, prepares it for the "coming of the Son of Man," in whom all beauty and all love are to be seen consummated. But, whether by accident or design, the language in this dream is artistically perfect; that is to say, it is the language of universal poetry; for the phrase "Son of Man" and the word "Lord" belong to the poetic vocabulary as such, and though they may carry an infinite mystic value, and even imply an antecedent judgment upon the total *deposits* of life and history, they invoke no judgment upon historical facts in series. But in the other poem the language carries with it the absolute identifica-

tion of the historic with the mystic Son of Man*—a thing which is both poetically and logically impossible. The two things are not in *pari materiâ*. The Image of the historic Son of Man and Son of God does in the mind of any individual believer *coincide* with the mystic Son of Man and Son of God; but still no amount of historic proof, taken in series, as all such proof must be taken, can stand upon the same plane with assurance of vision or assurance of demonstration. The reader must steadily bear in mind the difference between judging of historic events in series, which is a matter of more or less certain belief, and judging a total historic deposit. Mr. MacDonald uses more than once the narrative of the woman taken in adultery—as the author of “*Ecce Homo*” does, though acknowledging its doubtfulness. The evidence about that story is pretty equally balanced, the scale, we believe, dipping somewhat against it. Now, suppose for one moment that that story supplied a trait in the worshipped image of the Man-God, which nothing else could supply; and it is at once seen that the historic Image and the mystic Image cannot be treated as absolutely the same. The human mind may receive the first verses of the Gospel attributed to John as representing some transcendent truths, of which it may some day know more; and A or B may assuredly believe that, taking things in series, he finds some resolution of the mystery in the historic Christ. But that does not prevent a shock to the mind when it finds the “*descending sun*” spoken of as *seen by the soul* to have been made by a particular child of Abraham. In one of Mr. MacDonald’s stories there is a quaint little girl, who, when told that God made the tree in Cheapside, says, disappointedly, that she would rather a man had made it. Now, we are utterly, hopelessly unable to understand that—we cannot put a glimmer of sense into it. And this is the conclusion. It seems to us that *this* humanization of the Divine must logically end in the peculiar pantheism of Mr. Emerson, in which the Divine comes to consciousness only in the Human. We can see no other terminus. It is plain that a whole school of religious thought do, or think they do, see another, and in Mr. MacDonald there is the most intense faith that he does—and that faith is the sun of his whole world of thought. But we cannot follow all this, so we cannot expound it. The reader will, however, go to Mr. MacDonald him-

* Though Spinoza was speaking of what is “*necessary to salvation*,” some readers may be helped to apprehend the present question by these words of his:—“*Dico ad salutem non esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere, sed de eterno illo filio Dei, hoc est, Dei eternâ sapientiâ, quæ sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humanâ et omnium maximè in Christo Jesu manifestavit, longè aliter sentiendum.*” Compare with careful scrutiny, “*Death and Birth*,” pp. 48, 49, 50; and “*Within and Without*,” pp. 227, 228.

self, not trusting wholly to a single word of ours. He will not find a solution of the difficulty we have put—for the impossible is unfindable—but he will find more treasure than he can carry, and yet it will not fatigue him.

Our reference to Mr. Emerson reminds us of a pleasant coincidence between him and Mr. MacDonald. In "Phantastes" we have this lovely song :—

"Do not vex thy violet
Perfume to afford ;
Else no odour thou wilt get
From its little hoard.

"In thy lady's gracious eyes
Look not thou too long ;
Else from them the glory flies,
And thou dost her wrong.

"Come not thou too near the maid,
Clasp her not too wild ;
Else the splendour is allayed,
And thy heart beguiled."

Against this, set the following verse from one of Mr. Emerson's poems :—

"Leave all for love !
Yet, hear me yet,
One thing more thy heart behoved,
One pulse more of firm endeavour—
Keep thee to-day, to-morrow, for ever,
Free as an Arab
Of thy Beloved !"

We cannot just now find the passage in Mr. Emerson in which we are told, as in "Light," and almost in the same words, that there is nothing which light cannot make beautiful—(which is quite untrue, by the way)—but it is only one more of numerous parallels to which reference might be made. More striking still are the parallels between the two writers as to what the American calls "the influx," or "communications of the Deity" during sleep—a favourite topic of Mr. MacDonald's. See the last verse of "The Wakeful Sleeper." All literature is crowded with such correspondences.

If the reader is anxious to compare Mr. MacDonald with himself we can introduce him to a treat. Let him turn to the curious article on "The Imagination" in the *British Quarterly* for July, 1867, and compare with it chapter xiv. of "Phantastes." Anodos had "sung" his Ideal out of the alabaster in the cave, and then lost his new-born love by his own folly. After some troubles we find him in the Palace of Phantasy, seeking to recover his white lady, and set her upon a blank pedestal in one of the Chambers of Art. The following

passage will furnish a clue, if any should be needed, to this characteristic study of the action (?) of the imagination :—

“But the difficulty was to surprise the dancers. I had found that a premeditated attempt at surprise, though executed with the utmost care and rapidity, was of no avail. And, in my dream, it was effected by a sudden thought suddenly executed. I saw, therefore, that there was no plan of operation offering any probability of success but this; to allow my mind to be occupied with other thoughts, as I wandered around the great centre-hall; and so wait till the impulse to enter one of the others should happen to arise in me just at the moment when I was close to one of the crimson curtains.”

The episode of the little girl who was trying to have wings, in the twenty-third chapter of “Phantastes,” is too long to reproduce in this page; but it is one of the most charming things Mr. MacDonald has ever written. The swarms of wooden men—“myrmidons, myrmidons”—who kept trampling upon the dear little aspirant, the uselessness of cutting them in pieces, and the happy and effectual thought of setting them on their thick heads, heels uppermost, make up the finest piece of irony in all Mr. MacDonald’s writings, though there are not wanting touches similar in kind, visible enough to open-eyed readers.

We should very much like, if there were space, to exhibit some more of the passages in which Mr. MacDonald says or sings in his own dialect, things which others have said or sung in theirs. In the sweet poem entitled “Wild Flowers,” the notion of the flowers being hurt when they are torn up—an inevitable one which recurs in literature in many shapes—reminds you of a passage in a story of Tieck’s—we forget the title, but it is the tale in which the man who thinks he can hear the flowers shriek goes back to the beautiful beldame of the forest, and delves again into the earth. Far more interesting is the next case. In “Phantastes” (page 158, vol. v.) we find this: “Joys cannot unfold the deepest truths, although deepest truth must be deepest joy. Cometh white-robed Sorrow, stooping and wan, and flingeth wide the doors she must not enter.” To this there are many parallels in literature; but the best we know is William Blake’s proverb — “Joys impregnate, sorrows bring forth.” The metaphor is finer than Mr. MacDonald’s (it would have been unsuitable for his purpose), and is, indeed, one of the most profoundly beautiful ever produced.

The action of Mr. MacDonald’s imagination in seizing analogies in life and nature, making his thought quick with them, is, of course, the usual action of imaginative minds. There is only one final law in the matter. Unfortunately the usual phraseology about the “soul in nature,” the “life of nature,” the “interpretation of nature by spirit,” and so forth, is inaccurate and poor, and we cannot in short

space justify new and accurate language upon the subject—that task can be dispensed with for the present, for we all know part of the meaning of such phrases. In the centre of Mr. MacDonald's mind, when the "life of nature" comes to him for (what is called) interpretation by human analogies, there is a peculiar sense of the sadness of aimless effort, and a correspondingly vivid sense of the joy of effectiveness and fruition. Of all life, considered as a chain; of its actions and reactions; of life as an ascent of pulsations up to the Divine, he has an electrical consciousness; and it runs through all his writings. This gives his imagination a buoyancy which permits him to lay heavy burdens on light wings—but they float, and we are deeply impressed, though the brightness of the page is not for a moment dimmed. Look at this:—"The season went on, and the world, like a great flower afloat* in space, kept opening its thousand-fold blossom. Hail and sleet were things lost in the distance of the year—storming away in some far-off region of the north, unknown to the summer *generation*." Here the use of the word "generation"—totally unexpected by the reader—unfolds with a touch the panorama of history. Again:—"The birds . . . awoke to utter their own joy, and awake like joy in others of *God's children*." Here the words "of God's children," again totally unexpected, bring thus with them a burden of love and hope which yet does not weigh down the rest of the sentence. Once more:—"The birds grew silent, *because their history laid hold upon them*, compelling them to turn their words into deeds, and keep eggs warm and hunt for worms." Here the touch about "words" and "deeds" is not well managed, and carries with it a savour of "edification;" but the words in italics, "because their history laid hold upon them," show the hand of a master. In the hands of the greatest living novelist, George Eliot, the doctrine of

"That supreme, the irreversible past,"

becomes a gospel of despair for the individual soul. But in Mr. MacDonald's writings there is another "Supreme," and the happy use which he makes of "the past" in his narratives is one of the most striking of their distinctive peculiarities. If he would only not speak in the same way of truths of vision and truths of belief (however strong the belief, and though it have been historically or necessarily an antecedent to the possibility of the vision) the effect of his writings would be perfect. The incongruity in question appears always in proportion to the poetic receptivity of the producing mind. We do not feel it in reading Paley or Mansel; but we do in

* The idea of *floating* is one of the recurring ideas of Mr. MacDonald's mind. It seems to have run itself to a sportive climax in "The Light Princess." It is not impossible to make a psychologico-physiological guess at the reasons for all this.

Mr. Lynch's exquisitely beautiful "Sermons for my Curates," though not so much as we do in reading Mr. MacDonald. In the prayers added to those sermons the incongruity almost wholly disappears; and so it should in poetry, where the general key-note is universal. It does not arise in a writer like Watts. But in Mr. MacDonald the atmosphere of the work is so charged with the electricity of vision or faith, that when any matter of "evidence" slips in, we feel as if we had suddenly dropped from wings to wheels.

The question will not be shut out—How is it that, if Mr. MacDonald's genius is primarily poetic, it is not in poetry that he has, to use a common phrase, made his very strongest mark? There is a great deal to be said in all such cases; for his is by no means singular. What would the reader say to a discussion of all the reasons—some of them known to but very few—for thinking that the *differentia* of Mr. Ruskin's mind was primarily poetic, and that his right course would have been to go on writing verse? At all events, Mr. MacDonald has, himself, in "The Disciple," and elsewhere, taken the world so far into his confidence that it is safe to affirm that his case has been that of his own nested birds—his "history" has "laid hold upon him":—"When thou wast young thou girdedst thyself and walkedst whither thou wouldst; but when thou shalt be old [er] . . . another shall gird thee and carry thee whither thou wouldst not." There is nothing to complain of; and there is all eternity to write poetry in—though even there one's history may lay hold of one in some unforeseen way! But, putting together the numerous hints scattered about the poetry and prose of Mr. MacDonald, we have little difficulty in drawing still another conclusion—namely, that he has had much illness, of a kind which compelled passivity of body and even of mental mood. This would account in great part for the mirror-like quality of so much of his poetry, and for the too frequent lack of the accent of the beating wing. Something, however, must still be allowed to temperament, especially as the same peculiar passivity appears in poems which are understood to have been by Mr. MacDonald's deceased brother. But this is not all. We are again going no further than Mr. MacDonald's own confidences, more or less direct, carry us, when we refer to the immense influence which his early training in Scotland, and his subsequent history in England, must have had in giving his mind a twist towards direct edification. Look at the Roadside poems in this collection. The "Child-mother" is stimulating, if anything on earth ever was. Mr. Martineau has defined the spirit of religion to consist in "looking up and lifting up," and the very essence of it is in that sweet idyll, *but without a word to call attention to the fact that it is so*. Now, as Aunt Glegg said, "Very well, that's the Dodson

sperrit," by which we mean the true spirit of the muses. In the next in merit of these Roadside poems, namely, "The Wakeful Sleeper," we come a little closer to "edification;" but still the beauty of the story itself, and its boundless suggestion, are not blotted or limited; for the last two verses are as indefinite as either. "The Sheep and the Goat," again, is beautiful; but such words as "let priests say the thing they please," strike a false note. In others of the same series the poetry splits sheer upon the rock of edification or conventionality; and the same peculiarity which makes the reader sometimes say, "Here are imaginative *data*, but a want of imaginative action," exhibits itself in a too great tendency to "occasional" poetry.

We believe then that illness of a peculiar kind, prolonged training in differing, though continuous, schools of "edification," much susceptibility to social influences *expressed in quintessential forms*, and something of personal temperament, have, in the case of Mr. MacDonald, combined to this result:—We can see that he is primarily a poet; he sometimes reaches that perfection of poetic form which carries with it the infinite suggestion that may make a small poem more valuable than a big prose book, however good. Yet the superiority, in point of force and profusion, rests with his prose works; and, since we are not there so exacting in points of artistic form, we see less of his shortcomings than we do in his poetical writings. This may seem, to impatient people, a very complex verdict, but we have not the shadow of a doubt that it states, or at least contains, the truth upon the question at issue.

The prose writings generally of Mr. MacDonald, from "David Elginbrod" onwards, are not before us. It would have been better for variety of effect if they had been, for the *field* of comment in his more finely imaginative writings is not wide. Of his wide—and always genuine—culture, and of the varied apprehensiveness of his mind, we should speak more easily in dealing with his prose. It may be a hazardous thing to say, but he reminds us more of Mendelssohn than of any *writer*. We have already hinted that we take his genius to be, on the whole, the flower of certain spiritual tendencies of our time, and a very beautiful and fragrant flower it is. In the dainty little casket which shuts over these ten volumes there is more of a talismanic virtue than the reader will appropriate in a lifetime.

HENRY HOLBEACH.



THE SECULAR STUDIES OF THE CLERGY.

“ I hold every man to be a debtor to his profession ; from the which, as men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavour themselves by way of amends to be a help and ornament thereunto.”

BACON.—*Maxims of the Law.*

THE fact that theology ought, as a matter of course, to make a part of the mental training of clergymen is widely, though not universally, acknowledged ; but there are very many schemes, from the lists of divinity schools and examining chaplains to the more elaborate recommendations of formal treatises, to guide the young ecclesiastic in the selection of books.

No doubt, theological study in England is in a highly unsatisfactory condition, and can hardly be said even to exist. Not any serial, magazine, or journal devoted solely to this vast and interesting pursuit, whatever may have been its school, has succeeded in maintaining a footing. If not subsidized it has died ; if subsidized, it lingers on as a feeble exotic, incapable of vigorous continuance and propagation.

That which passes here for scientific theology at the present day is either minute textual criticism, or vague, pietistic declamation, both of them holding a certain position in the field of divinity, but a merely subordinate and ancillary one, no more to be confounded with the scope of the main subject than a dissertation on enclitics, or a panegyric of Homer, can be substituted for an intelligent grasp

of the moral, religious, political, and mental development of ancient Greece.

And the remarkable inexactness of thought and paucity of information as to the very terminology of divinity prevalent amongst the great mass of the educated public, clerical and lay; the current lack of knowledge as to its axioms, definitions, and postulates; nay, as to its broadest historical facts, might seem to make the discussion of the theological studies of the clergy a matter of much more pressing importance than that which I have adopted as my theme.

When a journal of such high position as the *Times* can air its own profound ignorance, and presume on that of the public so far as to define the well-known term "Jansenism" as meaning "attaching too little importance to the forms and ceremonies observed by the Church,"* it would surely seem to be time to speak up for theological study.

But in a matter of this kind common sense may be trusted to make its way in the long-run. We have learnt, by no means too quickly, that soldiers and lawyers both need some exact professional training before being permitted to lead troops and conduct suits; and we may be very certain that the same notion will at last obtain recognition in the case of religious teachers. I have thus no fear upon this head.

I confess, however, to a very strong, and, as it seems to me, well-founded apprehension about the future general training of the English clergy, which looks as though on the brink of graver perils than the existing ones.

What I mean is this. Up to the present day the great bulk of the Anglican clergy has been drawn from the Universities, and the tide of literates which flowed in a few years ago has for the time somewhat receded. And however little the average pass-man may have availed himself of his opportunities of culture, yet he must needs have been surrounded for several years of his life with an intellectual atmosphere, which cannot but influence his subsequent tastes and habits, and produce some, at least, of the effects of higher education.

Now, on the other hand, one danger has come, and another is near. The steady change, amounting to a practical revolution, which has affected our public schools and Universities, making athletics and physical training the main subject of study, while science and literature are relegated to the background, and pursued, it would seem, even by their few votaries, as a means of pecuniary gain or of official advancement, rather than from any true love of learning, makes it quite possible for a young man of our day to

* *Times*, October 5, 1871, p. 8, foot-note to first column.

attain the degree of Master of Arts with a more slender stock of knowledge, literary or scientific, than might fairly be looked for from a skilled artisan in the higher branches of manufacture.

And the approaching disestablishment of the Church of England, attended, as it is sure to be, with more or less sweeping disendowment, must act in another way towards a similar end. For the lowered value of the Church as a profession and means of livelihood, at the same time that the material wealth of the country increases so fast as to enlarge the gains of other callings indefinitely, must lead, in the ordinary course of events, to the diversion of a very large proportion of candidates for Holy Orders from the Universities to theological colleges, which will combine a shorter and more technical course of study with much lower expenses, and thus bring in upon us, almost unawares, that Seminary system which has wrought such untold mischief to the Churches of Continental Europe.

In these seminaries the divorce between the clerical and the lay mind is pursued as a definite aim, with most disastrous consequences. The young ecclesiastic is caught very early indeed, and sent to a special preparatory diocesan school, called a Little Seminary, and intended only for such as he, and is drafted thence to the Great Seminary, where he remains, as a rule, until ordination. He emerges thence and goes to his parish, incomparably more familiar with the technicalities of his profession and the contents of a certain limited range of text-books than his Anglican brother, but with no acquaintance whatever with secular politics, philosophy, science, literature, or the current of general thought, beyond the very small field he has been permitted to survey through the smoked and coloured glasses of his ecclesiastical superiors.

The result, in the great majority of cases, is that he is at once cut off from all possibility of sympathy with the educated men of his flock. He has not encountered the future landholder, lawyer, statesman, physician, merchant, official, journalist, in daily familiar intercourse at his place of education, and when suddenly cast out in the midst of a world of new faces and new ideas, his natural instinct is to shrink back from the unaccustomed glare to the idols of his cave, and to content himself with sincere but narrow denunciation of all secular forms of thought, and with repeating his seminary lessons to a more or less deferential audience of women, children, and peasants.

There is another side of this evil even more formidable. I mean that which exists in parts of Spain and South Italy, of Russia and Greece, to how large an extent I cannot say, but without doubt appreciably—to wit, the union of a profound acceptance of the supernatural side of Christianity with an equally profound contempt

for the individual Christian minister. It is commonly supposed by shallow thinkers that the erection of the clergy into a magical caste (which is one form of exaggerated sacerdotalism), must lead inevitably to gross priestly tyranny over the whole population which accepts the position. On the contrary, all evidence shows that the result is in such cases to limit the influence and functions of the clergy within the narrow bounds of strictly ceremonial acts. People resort to them exactly as they would go to a reputed wizard for a charm, but not for advice, not for consolation, not for example. They pay a medicine-man to propitiate, on their behalf, a formidable and possibly malignant fetish; they do not sit at the feet of a wise teacher to learn lessons of practical holiness. The Italian bandit, who has a regular confessor attached to his gang, and who devotes a fixed proportion of his booty to the altar of the Madonna; the Greek, who will stab a man without hesitation, but would shudder at the thought of touching cheese and butter after Sexagesima Sunday, illustrate this temper of mind, whose most noteworthy examples are found in superstitious criminals like Louis XI. and Henry III. of France. In such cases religion and morality are forcibly severed, and the clergy socially degraded by the very fact of their hyper-professional training, which gives them no point of contact with their parishioners outside of their official routine. There are causes at work in England which would always, no doubt, hold this condition of things in check; but I am convinced that any method of training which should aim at turning out a stereotyped pattern of clergyman, informed to the full, if you will, with the contents of certain books, but not educated at all in the sense of having his own natural faculties and idiosyncrasy drawn out or developed, would so far act in this direction as to destroy the wholesome, general influence which a respectable body of religious teachers ought fairly to exert on society. I may just point out that the peril would not be avoided by reducing the clergy to mere exponents of certain historical and ethical opinions, and rejecting the notion of their possessing any spiritual powers not equally enjoyed by the lay public; for that condition of things actually exists in Protestant Germany, where, as is well known, the Lutheran and Evangelical ministers have absolutely no social influence at all, whatever respect individuals amongst them may win by their learning, eloquence, or virtue. To discuss the causes of this remarkable fact would lead me too far from my subject, and I must content myself with barely indicating it.

However, there is one account of the matter which will in part explain the resemblance between the disesteem of the Prussian burgher and the Italian peasant for their religious teachers. It is,

that Christianity is a life, and not a mere bundle of dead opinions, and life is the most complex of ideas. It follows that the science of this life cannot be a very simple, uniform, and rudimentary branch of knowledge, although the main truths on which it is ultimately based may be few and plain enough, and almost instinctively acted on by countless persons, who could give but a confused explanation of their philosophical character.

Hence it follows that men who undertake the task of expounding this idea, of teaching the laws which govern this life, cannot safely content themselves with studying only one set of its conditions, however integral and essential they may be, since that would result in a one-sided and unequal development. In other words, no man can become a theologian by the perusal of theological works only, any more than a publicist can become a practical statesman by the study of a few books treating of abstract political systems. This law applies universally to Christian teachers, but more especially to Anglican clergymen, on account of their very peculiar and complicated social position; imposing on them, especially in country parishes, a multitude of duties and offices only indirectly connected with their ecclesiastical character, but intimately bound up with the civil life of their flocks. So far as I am aware, this half-priestly, half-secular position of the English parish priest has no existing parallel in Christendom, albeit a very clever copy of it was introduced by the Puritans into the New England villages, which faded out almost within living memory. Here, where it still flourishes in several thousands of places, it makes a mere bookworm, however learned and amiable, of exceedingly small efficacy as a pastor, and calls for a more practical and many-sided type of man to approach in any degree the ideal which it suggests. The occasions on which the clergyman appears in the capacity of teacher, whether in the pulpit or the schoolroom, are much fewer than those on which he has some other office to discharge on behalf of his parishioners; and even if it were possible, which I strenuously deny, for him to teach effectively from a stock of merely technical reading, it is altogether out of his power to acquit himself of his duties as a leading citizen—often the only leading citizen of his neighbourhood—without taking a very much wider range.

I forbear to enter into any discussion of the value of equable development to his own mind and happiness, the resources it provides in the absence of educated companionship, the broader and nobler views it enables him to take of questions of the day. All these advantages are equally true of every class and calling; but the text on which I desire to insist is that a wide and

varied course of secular reading is of quite as much importance and practical utility to a clergyman as any of his more strictly professional studies. If this fact were clearly recognised by the clergy at large, if it were acted on in our theological colleges, and by our bishops and their examining chaplains, it would be unnecessary for me to dilate upon it; but I can discover no evidence that such is the case. Take, for instance, the well-known lectures of the late Professor Blunt on the "Duties of the Parish Priest." They are painstaking, learned, shrewd, practical; but there is scarcely a hint in the three lectures specially devoted to the "Reading of the Parish Priest" to imply that non-theological studies are of much value. Of course this may very naturally have arisen from his addressing University men who had access to a wide and liberal education, and of whom it might be hoped that they would carry on in after life the literary tastes and habits they had presumably acquired in their collegiate career. I am afraid this was taking far too sanguine a view of the matter, for we know tolerably well what the acquirements of an ordinary pass-man are; but even if the Professor was right as regards his own audience, it is clear that a different canon would have to be laid down for literates.

What the actual facts are may, I think, be gathered from the following account given to me by one of the most learned and versatile of English clergymen. He was present at a curia meeting in his diocese a couple of years ago, which was attended by a large number of clerics, all, or nearly all, I believe, University men. They had a subject to discuss, and it so happened that it was "Clerical Reading." The first speaker observed that there was one book which clergymen should study, and it was enough. He need hardly say that he meant the Bible. A second, assenting in the main to this proposition, said that he could add another suggestion to his reverend brother's admirable one, namely, that they should read the hearts of their parishioners. A third gentleman got up to observe that he found the *Cornhill Magazine* and *Macmillan* very pleasant reading, and acceptable to the ladies of the parsonage; and after a few other equally valuable contributions to thought had been made, the president closed the discussion by observing that he had heard, though he did not know from actual perusal, that there was a great deal in a book called the "Summa" of Thomas Aquinas.

I do not mean to imply that the state of culture disclosed in this wise is the rule in all other English dioceses, though there are certainly some more backward than that wherein this took place, but I am afraid the standard is lamentably low everywhere. My own hap has taken me into a great many parsonages and a great

many curates' lodgings, and I always go instinctively to the books. As a broad general rule, having of course several conspicuous and some brilliant exceptions, the library consists of the volumes crudely picked up in undergraduate years, the text-books recommended by the particular lecturers or examining chaplains under whom the clergyman has proceeded to ordination, a stray novel or two, and a few sermons. And I remember still with some amusement the simple bewilderment expressed many years ago, when I was in my first curacy, by a clergyman holding a very high scholastic position (and therefore presumably of unusual culture) when he saw amongst my books some of the old French chroniclers, such as Froissart, Monstrelet, Comines, and Brantôme, and also some volumes of philology and folk-lore. It was not surprise at a raw deacon having books of the kind, but astonishment at the works themselves, and I could not help drawing my conclusions.

But we have to bear in mind that the Anglican clergy consists of about twenty thousand members, and in so large a number we must expect a considerable proportion of slender capacities and narrow cultivation. I rather marvel, considering the whole question, at the high average they maintain, and the favourable result they yield when compared with members of the other learned professions.

It must be remembered, when estimating the intellectual level of lawyers and physicians, that there are circumstances in their case which aid their development in special directions. The barrister, in the first place, is of necessity a worker in great cities, chiefly London itself. His occupations compel him to be constantly mixing with shrewd, practical men, against whom he has incessantly to be measuring his own wits in serious combat. And his ability in so doing, whether as pleader or chamber-lawyer, fixes, as a rule, and in the absence of powerful backing, his professional success and social position. His incentives are obvious, and he is paid in the long run by results. Hence the rising lawyer is very keen and shrewd in a special pursuit, and often displays admirable sagacity and acumen. But, as a rule, he is narrow, technical, incapable of broad philosophic or statesmanlike views of a question, and hide-bound by precedent, however absurd or inconsistent. And if this criticism be true of the average successful lawyer, we shall find the standard still further lowered if we add in the unsuccessful ones, who have failed from indolence, incapacity, and sometimes from sheer misfortune, to make any mark in their profession. Further, even then, to at all equalize the numbers of the two callings for the purpose of comparison, we should be obliged to count the solicitors and attorneys also, and when we have added all the really able men of business from amongst them to the minority of brief-holding bar-

risters, we should find the total, I am fully persuaded, far smaller than that of able and educated clergymen.

The same is true, though not in so very marked a degree, of medical men; for in their case also the lustre of the profession is derived from a small number of very eminent persons, behind whom is ranked a large body of safe, respectable, and fairly able practitioners, while in their rear again we find no inconsiderable number of doctors and surgeons who have got into a rut, and have neither mastered the medical science of a former day, nor attempted to keep pace with fresh discoveries. In one particular, however, medical men contrast most favourably with clergymen. I mean their support of several professional memoirs and journals, apart from their professional newspapers, whereas there is now no theological magazine of merit existing in England. The average doctor, therefore, knows the technicalities of his profession better than the average clergyman; and for the same reason as holds in the case of the lawyer, namely, that he is paid by results, so that his income and position depend wholly upon his technical skill and practical success, while, from the intangible nature of moral labours, it would be perfectly impossible to apply any such test to the work of a clergyman. We might tabulate with perfect ease the number of services held, sermons preached, pastoral visits made, and school lectures delivered by any parish priest, but we should not thereby obtain any more certain result than the display of a given quantity of physical activity, which might or might not have been attended with spiritual benefit to those amongst whom it was exercised.

With regard to the bodies of journalists and men of science, apart from the fact that their ranks are largely recruited from amongst the clergy, it is plain that their numbers are much too small to admit of comparison with a class amounting to twenty thousand. They are, of necessity, the picked men of a particular stamp, and yet the eminent examples amongst them both do not amount to fifty persons, all told. Add together, then, all the really able lawyers, physicians, journalists, and men of science, and, man for man, the English clergy will be able to produce persons of equal abilities and learning, while, I feel well assured, the ecclesiastical rank and file will more than bear comparison with the rest of what are somewhat playfully called the educated classes.

How is it, then, if this defence be at all based on fact, that the current of popular literature sets in the direction of intellectual depreciation of the clergy?

The reasons are various, but not numerous. First stands that which I have already implied, but not explicitly stated, that people compare a few of the most eminent men of other callings with the

whole body of the clergy, or more frequently with the clerical staff of their own parish.

Just so, when Mr. Spurgeon's star first arose on the homiletic horizon, the question was widely and repeatedly asked, why the Church of England could not produce such preachers as the Nonconformists. It never occurred to the querists to put the further inquiries as to whether Nonconformists themselves had any more Spurgeons than one, or whether the Church did not possess preachers as good, or better, albeit fundamentally different in style. A man who was an exception then, and who has remained an exception ever since, in spite of a host of imitators, was compared with average preachers of no particular power, and a hasty inference drawn forthwith. This error can be corrected only by comparing leader with leader, or private with private, which is too troublesome a task for ordinary critics.

The second reason for the charge of mental inferiority is due to the attitude assumed towards Christianity by a certain section of the students of physical science. Led by the character of their researches to a strong realization of the uniform and relentless working of natural laws, they turn with impatience from the supernatural, and, above all, the miraculous element of Christianity; and then, rushing with eminently unscientific boldness and haste to the decision of intricate logical, ethical, and spiritual problems to which they have never given steady thought, they deal out their excommunicating ban of stupidity and folly upon the clergy who hold by miracles, with as much genuine fanaticism and bigotry as their opponents can retaliate with the charge of unbelief and atheism. And in the present temper of society the scientific anathema is more shrill and ear-piercing than the clerical one, and is more readily echoed by the public press.

The third reason is analogous, but has to do with politics rather than with science, as the cry comes from those who look, and with some justice, on the clergy as a barrier in the way of very rapid and sweeping changes in the framework of English society.

But it is the fourth reason, which one scarcely ever hears of, save in an epigrammatic sneer, or a satirical essay, which has more to do with the matter than the three others put together.

It is that the clergy, mainly from causes quite outside their own control, are compelled to associate chiefly with women and children, and that the shamefully low standard of the education of Englishwomen makes their habitual society anything but a whetstone to the edge of the intellect. Hence the truth underlying Sydney Smith's classification of the sexes as three—men, women, and curates. This is not a matter depending on the question of clerical celibacy, for the

same peculiarity is noticeable amongst the French clergy, while the emphatic language of Mgr. Dupanloup on the one side, and of M. Sauvestre on the other, in his pamphlet "Sur les Genoux de l'Eglise," teaches us that Frenchwomen, albeit as a rule superior to our countrywomen in social tact, conversational power, and business abilities, are quite as ill off in all that regards the training of their higher mental faculties.

Now you will observe that this rule does not hold good of any of the other educated professions which I have been contrasting with the clergy. Lawyers deal exclusively, or nearly so, with men. Physicians have almost as much to do with men as with women. Journalists and physicists address themselves almost entirely to a male public, and therefore, even when the subjects which they treat are, so to speak, sexless, and the writer's power of dealing with them by no means exceptionally great, yet there is necessarily a masculine tone in their language, a masculine vigour in their ideas; while the clerical mind, on the other hand, is apt to be imperceptibly effeminized (quite as much to the injury of women as of any one else), and thus to excite a certain feeling of contempt, not always just, but closely analogous to the irritation which is sometimes aroused by the sight of able-bodied young men measuring out laces and ribbons behind a counter, at a time when the country is calling for stalwart arms to do very different work.

Now, so far as this sentiment involves loss of general influence, which it does to a considerable extent, it is an evil to be earnestly striven against by the clergy, on behalf of the cause intrusted to their care. The original difficulty must continue, for the sufficiently simple reason that the ordinary work of men calls them away daily to places whither the religious teacher cannot very readily nor wisely follow them—to the shop, the counting-house, the courts, the parade-ground, the market, the field; whereas women and children, being more home-keeping, are also more accessible throughout the day to a visitor. And when men return in the evening wearied after toil, the time is unfavourable for dealing with them. The practical result is, that the clergyman sees little of his male parishioners except in church on Sunday, the very day when his own special occupations prevent him from doing much visiting, and then he gets up into the pulpit to give counsel, comfort, instruction, as the case may be, to people touching whose needs, troubles, doubts, and the like, he is either entirely ignorant, or supplied with very imperfect and second-hand information. The effect is familiar:—

"An' I hallus coomed to 's choorch afoor moy Sally wur dead,
An' 'eerd un a bummin' awaäy loike a buzzard-clock ower my 'eäd,
An' I niver knaw'd whot a meän'd but I thowt a 'ad summut to saäy,
An' I thowt a said whot a owt to 'a said an' I coomed awaäy."

There is a partial remedy for this state of things, necessarily no more than partial, but certainly a measure of great and lasting improvement, which is, that the clergyman, debarred, or at least checked, from much personal contact with men, should bring his mind into contact with masculine intellects in his library. And as the men he desires to influence are not all clergymen like himself, it follows at once that secular books ought to form a very large part of his reading, since in this wise he can gain some insight into the temper of those with whom he has to deal; and by taking care to make this reading wide, and inclusive of much from which he profoundly dissents, he will materially enlarge his induction, and correct that narrowness and incapacity for seeing more than one side of a question, which are the bane of rural life everywhere, and not less of the country parson than of his agricultural neighbours.

A moment's reflection will make it plain that if a clergyman's male parishioners know and care very little about theological questions, and the clergyman himself knows or cares little about secular ones, there is not any point of contact through which any electric influence from his sermons can penetrate their minds. He will simply be talking an unknown tongue, and though decorum and habit may keep them in their seats, yet they might as well, so far as intellectual or spiritual profit is concerned, be listening to a Finnish bard reading the Kalewala in its original language. The first and most important part of a clergyman's secular studies, therefore, is that which familiarizes him with the topics which interest or affect his people.

The rural parson ought to acquaint himself with all the details of farming, even if there be no glebe to give him a personal feeling for the subject, because men will always naturally argue from the known to the unknown, and if ploughmen, shepherds, and field-labourers once discover that their clergyman does not know a crop of wheat from one of oats, nor a Southdown sheep from a Scotch one, their respect for his understanding will be seriously lowered, and they will more than doubt his knowledge in other particulars, because he is so ignorant of what to them is familiar and simple. And a yet graver difficulty than this lies behind—namely, that in his turn he will altogether fail to understand their needs, because he is unacquainted with all that makes the staple of their lives. The same rule applies even more forcibly to the clergy in manufacturing towns, because of the greater shrewdness and keener susceptibility of the skilled mechanic as compared with the agricultural labourer. It may seem the merest common-place to urge such obvious counsel, but as a fact, I know that much harm comes from habitually neglecting it, while those who would learn what additional weight is given to

religious teaching when coming from the lips of one who has proved himself a wise and helpful adviser in secular concerns, can do no better than study the memoirs of that true king of men, John Frederick Oberlin, pastor of the Ban de la Roche. And although his peculiar glory as the civilizer of a semi-barbarous district can rarely be attained by the clergy of a highly civilized country, no one will pretend that the state of our manufacturing and agricultural poor is such as to need no amelioration through the agency of Christian ministers.

After establishing this community of idea and sympathy, the next step of importance is to find a common method of expression ; or, in other words, to couch our teaching in a tongue understood of the people—to wit, plain, vigorous, racy, idiomatic English. Now, a knowledge of this tongue, in all its variety, flexibility, and beauty, does not come by nature any more than other studies of complex and extensive subjects. It is only in very recent times, indeed, that a glimmering of this truth has dawned on a few of the schoolmasters of England, and that they have begun to ask why the best years of many boys' lives should be devoted to obtaining an imperfect smattering of a very few authors of the factitious and second-hand age of Latin literature, while Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspeare, Marlowe, Herbert, Milton, Pope, and Goldsmith, the long range of essayists from Earle to De Quincey, the historians from Lord Berners' most delightful version of Froissart to Mr. Freeman's fresh portraiture of the Norman Conquest, are barely the shadows of names to the upper forms of our public schools. Sterne's saying is for once true: "They manage these things better in France." Whatever a French boy of the higher classes may leave unlearned, whatever grave defects may be observable in the training he receives, at any rate he is obliged to learn his own language thoroughly at school and college, and whether he can construe Virgil and Horace or not, he is at least familiar with Racine, Corneille, and Molière, and knows far more about the later history of his country, of the wonderful career of revolutionary and Napoleonic conquest, than the British lad of similar rank does of the counter efforts by which the tide was turned back—by which the glories and successes of Marengo, Rivoli, and Austerlitz were shadowed and blighted at Aboukir, Trafalgar, Talavera, Vittoria, and Waterloo.

So long as the English master at a school was looked on as practically on a level with the drill-sergeant or the steward, it was unlikely that boys should hold the subject he taught in very high esteem, and to this cause, amongst others, may be attributed that fatal obscurity, pomposity, and technicality of diction which have deformed and enfeebled English sermonizing for the last three

centuries. When one examines the writings of Anglican divines of the Stuart and Hanoverian periods—even such eminent orators as Lancelot Andrewes, Jeremy Taylor, and Robert South, with such lesser names as Tillotson, Jortin, and Sherlock—it is impossible to help wondering if they ever thought about the text which speaks of preaching the Gospel to the poor. To have done so seems throughout that period as rare an achievement as the others grouped in the same sentence—restoring sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, casting out devils, and raising the dead. The faults are generally three in number—first, lack of perspicuity, and a preference for long, involved, over-loaded sentences, as against simple, direct, and terse ones; secondly, the employment of a learned dialect, which, if not actually bristling with Greek and Latin quotations, was, and is, chiefly made up of imperfectly naturalized words of classical origin, most rare even in secular writers, save such exceptionally quaint ones as Burton and Sir Thomas Browne; and thirdly, the employment of an esoteric tongue even within this one, a hieratic hieroglyphic superadded to the demotic, by the use of technical expressions of scientific theology (couched, moreover, in a formal archaic style, intended as an imitation of the Authorized Version of the Bible) instead of those simpler equivalents which the uninstructed classes might hope to understand.

I confess that the moment I hear the now obsolescent word “brethren,” for example, in the pulpit, I at once expect a flood of Johnsonese instead of English; I anticipate the preacher’s use of a number of technical phrases, such as “justification,” “satisfaction,” “atonement,” “inspiration,” “neologian,” and the like, not one of which conveys the vaguest idea to an average artisan, small shop-keeper, or field-labourer, and I give up all hope of listening to a plain Gospel for plain people.

There is only one cure for this salient and general defect, and that is a wide study of English literature, that men may learn what are the real powers of their native tongue, and not suppose it incapable of expressing any necessary meaning unless it be transferred into a bastard Latin, interlarded with scraps of doubtful French.

One piece of advice which is often heard of late on this head is such sheer nonsense that it is well to put in a word of warning against it. We are told that the true remedy is to speak and write what our counsellors are pleased to call “Saxon English.” Now it very often happens that Teutonic words in our tongue, without having dropped entirely out of sight and use, are less generally employed and understood than Romance ones. I need not trouble you with many examples, but I think you will allow that an ordinary church-goer would know better what you meant by a “traveller,” or “doctor,”

or "sacrament," or an "anniversary," than by a "wayfarer," a "leech," a "housel," or a "year's mind."

The soundest rule is to take the most current words that may be found, and to use as little ornament of language as may be, leaving beauty to depend on simplicity of style and ornament of idea. We have two contemporary illustrations ready to hand of the worst possible English style, and what is not very far from the best. The former may be found in the sensational leaders of the *Daily Telegraph*, the latter in the speeches of Mr. Bright, which are admirably worth study, even by those who most dissent from his political views, by reason of their mingled plainness and dignity, their remarkable and sustained vigour, and their far from rare instances of peculiar felicity of diction.

Of course, such a rule involves, as I have implied, the habitual avoidance of set and technical phraseology in the pulpit, and thus the abandonment of a long-cherished tradition, so deeply rooted in many clerical minds, that they experience a shock and more than suspect irreverence when they hear religious things treated in the language and tone of ordinary life and conversation. And yet the habit of estimating the practical value of a sermon by the number of comminuted Scripture texts it may hold suspended in its turbid stream, and by the superficial resemblance it may thus present to the diction of the Pauline epistles (a resemblance no deeper nor truer than that of a school-boy's nonsense verses to the *Æneid*), not only produces unintelligibility, but very often arouses in the minds of shrewd reasoners a doubt whether discourses so far removed in style and expression from the language of the street and market, can have any real bearing on man's daily life outside the walls of churches, and whether the preacher has any vital belief in tenets which seem never to allow him in the pulpit to be the plain-spoken man he is all through the week on topics of worldly interest.

Such a mode of preaching, looking to technical phraseology alone, and not to clearness of idea or force of application, is purely mechanical and superstitious, and can only be ranked with the method of treatment employed by some Arab physicians, who write their prescription out on a piece of paper or parchment, and then washing the ink off in a cup of water, give the fluid to their patient to drink, in lieu of the healing drugs which they had perfunctorily set down in manuscript.

The root of this error is not to be sought in any special form of religious opinion, although certain schools are notably more prone to it than others. It arises from the widespread confusion between preaching and teaching. In strictness, the preacher is a herald sent out by authority to proclaim a new edict which it is necessary to

make widely public; and in this sense the Gospel can be preached only to persons hitherto ignorant of its existence. Once they have listened to the proclamation, and have in any measure signified their willingness to accept it, the office of the preacher is ended, and that of the teacher begins, to explain, amplify, and show the practical application of the new law—its bearing on the thoughts, words, and actions of those whom it affects.

Hence it is plain that in an ordinary congregation of a Christian place of worship preaching has no place, and therefore that the habit, ingrained amongst men of more sections than one, of perpetually digging at the foundations of belief, and never attempting to raise any structure upon them, is unwise and unpractical.

All that is necessary in a herald who has merely to deliver a message, written or verbal, is faithfulness in the discharge of his task, and intelligence enough to retain in his memory the name of the sender, the terms of the commission, and the name of the person to whom he is sent. And if such were the case with Christian ministers, it would be needless to exact higher qualifications from them than those of a postman or errand-boy.

But their task is a much more onerous and difficult one, as is fitly symbolized in Scripture by the figures of a steward intrusted with the management and disbursement of his master's property; of an ambassador sent to discuss the terms of peace and alliance with aliens, enemies, or rebels; of a teacher bound to watch over and further the development of his pupils from tender infancy to adult manhood.

Therefore their study of literature has a much wider scope, a much loftier goal, than that of mere fluency and clearness of expression, valuable as such qualities are in a teacher, for it has to deal with all the manifold and intricate ramifications of human life in every aspect. If theology be what she has been called—the queen of sciences—she can vindicate her right to the throne and crown only by proving that all other branches of human knowledge are her-born subjects; and she can give this proof only by showing the world that every one of them is actively pressed into her service, and that no domain of the intellect or practical energy of man is exempt from her supreme jurisdiction.

Nor can this be effected by taking for granted that it must happen as a matter of course. It can be achieved on no other terms than those of the teachers of theology recognising the co-ordination of all truths, their intimate union with one another, their gradual progress from primary and simple elements to vast and complex organisms, each of which, as it rises higher in the scale of importance, includes all the essential integers of that which is next below.

Ascending, therefore, from the lowest grades of intellectual thought, those which deal with the dead and abstract notions of form and number (wherefore Plato rightly placed mathematics at the foot of the ladder of learning), to the highest ones, which treat of the destinies of man, corporate and individual, social and spiritual, theology cannot afford to dispense with one step of the staircase—cannot attempt, any more than geometry can, to bridge over a single interval with any make-shift hypothesis.

I have already said that a mere bookworm does not make an effective teacher, and therefore I need hardly disclaim here the notion that the man of widest reading will also prove the most beneficial religious instructor, any more than he will necessarily be the shrewdest lawyer, the most far-sighted statesman, or the most successful physician. Nevertheless, theology is at once an inductive and a deductive science; it has its analytic as well as its synthetic side. It is inductive, and depends on observation and experiment, in all matters which touch its practical application to social or individual needs, in its faculty of constructing new tools to achieve new tasks, in its tentative essay of hypothesis in matters of speculative doctrine, until that tenet finally prevails which complements and harmonizes with the body of dogmatic belief already accepted. The moment a clergyman descends from the pulpit, where he has been engaged in the deductive task of teaching certain received doctrines, and that he has to deal with any scheme of local improvement, sanitary, educational, or social—the moment he attempts to influence the feelings and conduct of any one single person, then the necessity for induction makes itself at once apparent, and the utility of non-professional studies becomes visible in a hundred ways.

It is not so much encyclopædic reading, nor even the mastery of two or three important studies, as the cultivation of a habit of mind at once broad and accurate, clear-sighted, and yet imaginative, which is valuable. And though, as I have intimated, men of very inferior mental culture may often surpass others of far wider capacity and learning as useful and influential teachers, by reason of their profounder sympathy or keener realization of some particular truth; yet it is unquestionable that where culture is superadded to such natural faculty or spiritual power, the energies are largely developed and the gift of practical insight considerably quickened.

I shall now proceed to illustrate these remarks, by showing in brief fashion how certain secular studies have a direct bearing on the ordinary pastoral work of Christian teachers. And I may fitly preface my remarks with a sentence from Lord Bacon's *Essays*:—
“Histories make men wise; poets, witty; the mathematics, subtle;

natural philosophy, deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend."

I should prefer saying of logic that, when intelligently studied, it makes men able to diminish the area of contention, by teaching them to avoid exuberance of statement and fallacy of argument, and to substitute for them perspicuity and cogency. The world is not governed by logic, no doubt, but bad reasoning has a great deal to do with the generation of those evils which beset us on all sides. To know clearly what one intends to say, and then to say it forcibly, so as to bring conviction home to some, at least, of one's hearers, is of prime importance to the preacher, while the too general neglect of such qualities in a sermon gives much force to the grumbling comment of the old lawyer—"A whole week to get up the case, and no reply from the other side, and so little made of it, after all!" The fallacies in reasoning which swarm in the majority of pulpit discourses are simply repellent to all trained intellects, and they plunge untrained ones into a deeper gulf than before, almost below the penetrability of light. Thus I hold that after mathematics have been used to sharpen the edge of the intellect, logic ought to make an invariable part of its training, and as preparatory to more advanced studies, because it aids the judgment, and enables the student to ascertain how far he may trust the arguments in the books which he takes up.

Akin to this study, in some respects, is that of law. I do not mean such a technical pursuit of legal knowledge as would make the clergyman an amateur, and therefore a bungling lawyer, nor yet any sedulous attempt to master the heterogeneous, contradictory, and often most unwise mass of English statutes, but such an acquaintance with a clear and codified system, such as the Roman civil law, as will give some definite insight into the rules of evidence, the nature of contracts, and the rights of persons.

It cannot have escaped the attention of any who read the newspapers regularly, how often clergymen appear in the civil courts as defendants in some actions which show that, whatever their private benevolence might be, no distinct realization of the mutual duties of citizens had ever dawned on their minds.

I believe that a full two-thirds of the gossip retailed by clergymen to entertain their parishioners, and of the hasty charges often issuing in actions for libel, would be checked more effectually by understanding what is real evidence of a fact than by Christian self-restraint, which may often be swept away by an eager desire to expose some wrong-doing or to abate some local nuisance. A current habit of paternal government, and of taking the law into their own hands, often with undesirable results, would be materially checked in the

same way, and I need hardly point out how considerably increased would be the parson's weight and influence as an arbiter in disputes (an office constantly falling to his share) if his parishioners observed, as they soon would, that his findings were always substantially just, and based on some deeper principle than mere personal bias or than rule of thumb. To achieve so much no very profound study is requisite. A few leading principles of law are sufficient to prevent many grievous blunders, and to check many local feuds, which make practical Christianity impossible.

Legal training has a further advantage, in that it teaches a man to estimate the relative value of arguments on his own and on his opponent's side, which may be very different from their logical cogency, since a perfect syllogism may be an exceedingly weak plea; and thus assists the teacher to put his strong points clearly forward, and not to dilute and enfeeble them with floods of irrelevant matter. And it also warns him never to despise an adversary, nor to take anything for granted as a basis of pleading till he has verified his facts and quotations by personal inquiry.

So too with political economy. I suppose no one can be blind to the terrible evil of English pauperism; but I am afraid a majority of the English clergy, through their ignorance of political economy, are quite blind to the large share they have in maintaining and propagating that pauperism by their unwise and indiscriminate almsgiving, which is as far removed as possible from true charity. The same Apostle who wrote that famous panegyric of charity which has commended itself to the heart of all Christendom is also he who has laid down the stern rule, "He that would not work, neither should he eat." The fatal encouragement of sloth and dirt, of lying and theft, of ignorance and disease, from generation to generation, through clerical neglect of this Apostolic law, has done incalculable harm to the morality and progress of the country. And, on the other hand, Canon Girdlestone's example has taught us that a careful observance of the laws of political economy may enable a man to confer permanent benefits on his poorer neighbours, instead of merely giving them continual and useless sops; for he struck at the root of the local pauperism in an overcrowded rural district, by providing means for the transfer of labour to places where work was abundant and well paid, but men scarce.

And I am firmly convinced that if the religious teachers of England, as also the masters of the higher classes in our national schools, had taken pains to acquaint themselves with the laws of this science, and to popularize their knowledge, we should have had much less of the antagonism and mutual distrust of capital and labour, which have of late been ranged against one another as foes, to the great

loss of both, instead of being united as inseparable allies. Nor is this study of less importance to the clergy personally. It would save them from two of the commonest of all their social perils, improvident marriage and commercial ruin.

In a great commercial country like this, a monetary standard is, however unfortunately, of very wide and general application to all things, and amongst others to personal influence. Now a clergyman who is known to have embraced poverty voluntarily, and with the option of wealth before him, may be wondered at as eccentric, or be revered as devoted; but one who is very poor, and that with manifest unwillingness, who dwells with his belongings far within the confines of shabby gentility, and is notoriously crippled with debt, is almost invariably certain to wreck his social power for good. He cannot mix on terms of real equality with his wealthier neighbours, because his family is excluded from their society, even if he be tolerated himself; he is looked down on by those whose lower station enables them to live in comfort on the same income as his, because they have no appearances to keep up; and the poor, only too often, reflect the contempt of the rich. If the notion that one hundred pounds a year, though adequate for the modest requirements of many a gentleman, will not support a wife and a number of children in physical comfort, not to say in the position of gentry, could once be impressed on the clerical mind, it would be a lesson of unspeakable value. And I, for one, could wish that the several pauperizing, miscalled charitable, societies, which foster this state of things, were suppressed, and that in the true interest of the poorer clergy themselves.

The other peril I spoke of is closely connected with this. The incomes of English clergymen are fixed, and, as a rule, small, their expenses indefinitely elastic. Debarred, in most instances, from augmenting their income in any regular fashion, they catch eagerly at the prospectuses of bubble companies, and are incessantly the victims of organized City swindles. I gather from the very much larger number of such prospectuses that the post used to bring me when I lived in the country than since I have been a resident in London, that the rural clergy are regarded as the natural prey of these sharpers; so that even so much economical knowledge as is compressed into Wellington's maxim, "High interest means bad security," would save many a clerical household from heavy loss, or even from actual insolvency.

Next in order in my rapid survey, wherein I have not attempted to observe logical sequence, I would place the study of at least the elementary laws of the physical sciences. Not merely because of the inherent fascination of this pursuit, to which I can testify, nor yet only

in order to facilitate the harmonizing of science and revelation, but for a broader and simpler reason than either, namely, that we live in bodies and amidst a world that are incessantly and profoundly affected by these laws, the neglect or violation of which draws down inevitable punishment. We cannot, if we would, ignore our own physical nature, and by reason of the subtle reaction of body and mind upon one another, any attempt to do so has invariably ended in spiritual disasters, as we have been fully taught alike by the austere and sensual forms of Manichæism. To my own apprehension, the gradual development of the notion of cosmic order, of universal and harmonious law (or rather sequence), of the absolute necessity which lies upon man of conforming himself to this order under pain of swift and unerring chastisement for disobedience, forms an admirable preparation for realizing the analogous harmony of spiritual truths, their freedom from vagueness and oscillation, the direct and necessary peril which neglect or contempt of them involves; quite apart from the question as to whether moral guilt and responsibility are involved in rejecting them. I mean that the famous argument of Butler's "Analogy" seems to me to apply precisely here, as against the popular modern view that religious truth does not admit of being defined and formulized, but is purely a matter of indeterminate sentiment and affection, varying for each individual; while, as a corollary, there is either no such thing as religious error, or if there be abstractedly, it cannot ultimately influence the destiny of man. I would just point out that every advance in knowledge brings out more and more fully three leading facts; first, that all truths have a real and intimate connection with one another, so that it is impossible to study any one branch of knowledge (except, perhaps, mathematics) with thoroughness without bringing many others to bear upon it; secondly, that increased knowledge means increased accuracy and sense of order, not increased vagueness and uncertainty; thirdly, that moral innocence and rectitude of intention do not exempt any one from the inexorable action of natural law. Take an example. Suppose some epidemic be raging, such as cholera or typhus, which are fatally propagated by dirt, and by the presence of organic matter in wrong places, then the same peril awaits the sluttish housewife who suffers an open drain to remain under her window, and the laboriously cleanly one who scours her floor with seemingly clear water from a well into which sewage has freely, though invisibly, percolated. I do not see how an idea of benevolent Theism can be evolved which would not require, on the popular hypothesis, that the second of those housewives should escape the danger of the other; but we see that they both break the same law, though in quite different fashion, and must bear the consequences. I am,

therefore, unable to see what reason there exists in the analogy of nature for assuming that there are no spiritual laws, or, if there be, that they may be violated with impunity, provided no bad intentions, no deliberate evil, mingle with or induce that violation.

There is a further importance in physical science as a clerical study, which I have partly implied, but not worked out. I mean that it culminates in human physiology, and in familiarity with the laws of health and disease; a branch of knowledge whose rudiments at least are absolutely indispensable to the man who desires to be an efficient religious teacher. Because of the intimate relation of body and mind, to which I have already referred, because, moreover, of the very high prominence and dignity given to the body by Christian theology (on this head, as on so many others, remarkably in advance of even the loftiest systems of the further East), it is essential that the man who proposes to act on the soul must have some knowledge of its habitation. I do not wish to see a clergyman quacking himself and his parishioners with drugs or globules, instead of letting the physician see to such matters, but I mean that there are scores of matters coming directly under his cognizance as a guide in morals which must be dealt with first from the physical side, chief amongst which stand drunkenness and unchastity. No one who has not looked into these questions from a physiological point of view can realize how very much more they are effects than causes, symptoms than diseases.

He who knows what a Dorsetshire cottage or a Seven Dials lodging-house is, will marvel that any sense of human decency remains in their inmates; he who understands the chemistry of food, and the nature of the waste of tissue, will have little faith in mere licensing Acts as a check on intemperance, while the diet of the poor continues as it now is.

It is also to be noted that the system of visitation of the sick, which makes so large a part of English parochial work, forces questions of health and disease daily upon the observation of the clergy, and makes it not merely advantageous, but necessary for them to study biological laws, were it for no other end than checking the origin and spread of endemic or epidemic disorders. There is yet another matter under this head deserving of much attention. I mean the poverty of intelligence and activity, often due to poverty of blood, the result of underfeeding and other cognate evils which beset the children of the poor, and opposing formidable barriers to the task of their moral and religious education. Clergymen would do well to remember that we must make human beings out of material that seems a long way on the return journey to the grade of the anthropoid ape, before trying to Christianize them.

Many years ago, when I was a London curate, I went to beg for help to carry on a school conducted by Sisters of Mercy. I applied to a gentleman who was not very lavish of his money, nor particularly enamoured of my opinions; and he asked me, "What do you teach the children?" "We teach them to play," was my answer. "What ever do you mean?" said he. "Well," I replied, "when they come to us they are so cowed and spiritless with poverty, hunger, often with bad treatment, that they have no idea of amusing themselves. They sit huddled up, and scarcely move hand or foot, and their brains are as slow as their limbs. But we teach them to run about, and laugh, and sport with one another, instead of slinking asidè into corners apart. And we find that freshens their brains, too, after a little." "Oh," replied my questioner, "if that is the way you go to work, I will give you a subscription; but I thought you did nothing but teach the Catechism, and that sort of thing."

Nor is the use of physiology confined to dealing with broad social questions such as these. It is invaluable in treating single cases also. I mean that in my own experience, and I suppose in that of every other person who has had much to do with treating persons for spiritual troubles, the bodily condition goes for a great deal more than is commonly supposed. Without going into tedious detail, it is simply impossible to believe that any minister of religion acquainted with a few well-known medical facts would encourage the excitement of what is technically known as a Revival. The cries and convulsions, the trances and visions which are familiar symptoms on such occasions, can be artificially generated without the smallest religious effect. They do not belong to divinity, but to medicine; and, under their true scientific name of "theopathic hysteria," have no more to do with conversion and salvation than small-pox or measles have. When I reflect how much morbidity and doubt can be traced to dyspepsia, how much temporary moral weakness to nervous relaxation, I marvel at the neglect of physiology, and more than ever admire that anecdote of the good old Roman Catholic Bishop Milner, who lived and taught a theology conspicuously unlike the hysteric sentimentalism of a certain school of modern 'Verts. A lady came to him for spiritual counsel one day, and recounted at length some remarkable visions with which she said she had been favoured. "Oh, father!" exclaimed she, "aren't they lovely, aren't they heavenly? Isn't it a blessed thing to be so privileged?" "Very lovely, very heavenly," replied the old Bishop; "and as you say, my dear child, it is a blessed privilege; but don't you think you had better take a little blue pill?"

What I have been saying of physiology applies with perhaps even greater force to psychology. I do not speak of the higher meta-

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physical studies, interesting and valuable as they are to the Christian philosopher, and essential to the missionary who professes to attack the hoary systems of Vedantism and Buddhism, for there are many minds which have no taste for this pursuit, and on whom the speculations of Descartes and Malebranche, of Berkeley and Kant, of Schelling and Hegel, are simply thrown away. But if Voltaire could define medicine as the art of putting drugs of which we know very little into bodies of which we know nothing at all, I am afraid that a similar maxim would apply to the greater part of current religious teaching. A clear view of the mutual relation and interdependence of our mental faculties would very much facilitate the labours of instructors.

Here again I must not dilate, but I may just point out that if clergymen and schoolmasters could once realize that memory is only one, and not the most important of psychical powers, we should not find it placed, as we so often do, in a position of solitary supremacy, and mere learning by rote taken as the sum and proof of educational progress, while the judgment has been left entirely undeveloped and untrained. Here a physical analogy comes in aptly enough. It is not the quantity of food a man swallows, but what he digests, which goes to recruit and build up his frame.

In drawing, as I must now do, to the close of a cursory analysis of a subject vast enough to fill large volumes, I would fain recur to my earliest category, that of general literature, which errs on the side of vagueness, in order that I may show, by a few selected examples, how it may be practically utilized. And, first, I would take the literature of art, including under that head music and poetry, as well as painting and sculpture.

I do not refer to the obvious application of all these to ecclesiastical purposes, to hymnody, to the architecture and decoration of churches, to the stateliness and splendour of worship; but only to their secular aspect, as having an important bearing on the conduct of life. I mean that the sense of beauty, as a civilizing agent, is a valuable ally of higher things, and needs sedulous cultivation alike in teacher and taught. It cannot be denied by any accurate thinker that the love of ugliness for its own sake, in art or song, the admiration of the burlesque and deformed, the incessant contemplation of merely gross and material images, is exceedingly debasing to minds which indulge habitually in them. They lose, little by little, the power of appreciating what is high and noble, they seize merely on the grotesque aspect of things, and the difficulty of lifting their thoughts to the lofty and intangible heights of religion is enormously increased. No one can look into a common photograph or music shop, or go into a lower-class London theatre or music-hall without

having this popular love of coarseness and idiocy forced on his attention; no one can have to deal with an average English child of the uneducated classes without feeling himself pulled up incessantly by its singular lack of imagination—the extreme difficulty of enabling it to assimilate any non-materialistic idea. I may give, as a familiar illustration, one that has come under my own observation. It is well-nigh impossible to make an ordinary London child attach any notion whatever to the bold personification of nature in the *Benedicte*. A Red Indian, or a wild Bedouin, would have no more difficulty than a sensitive poet in realizing the meaning; but the London street-child cannot see anything in it. A more remarkable instance of the same kind was adduced some years ago by Miss Cobbe. She told two different audiences—one consisting of Irish children and young people of humble rank, and the other of English of the same station—the story of the French nuns in the Revolution going to the scaffold singing the *Te Deum*, and continuing the verses to the close with diminishing numbers as each head fell, till the abbess alone was left, who began to chant the *Gloria in Excelsis*, and ceased not till the knife cut it short. The comment in the first case was “What a glorious death to die!” in the second, “She told us about a lot of women having their heads cut off.” Now, it is plain that all the beauty and nobleness of the story were lost on the second audience from sheer lack of imaginative training, and therefore the teacher who would fain ennoble the minds of his pupils must endeavour to train himself in the highest school first. Good pictures, given away in cottages, are a source of daily pleasure to inmates whose life is too usually of a drab and murky tint, and they encourage cleanliness for the sake, first, of preserving them, and then of bringing the objects around into some sort of keeping. And good poetry gives some other subjects of thought and talk than petty local gossip or money calculations. I do not believe in culture by itself as a religion. Italian history teaches us how little art alone can do for a people; the base and sordid lives of Turner and Thorwaldsen show plainly enough that it does not necessarily regenerate individuals; while the rise of a school of poetry amongst ourselves quite lately, rich in form and colour, and vivid in expression, yet devoid of all true nobility, all lofty aim, and amply meriting Professor Huxley’s withering epithet of “sensual caterwauling,” serves as a warning of another kind. But within the limits I have indicated, it seems true that art-culture has a great moral value.

In this same category of art-culture, along with poetry, may fitly be placed fiction in all its higher branches, and with special reference to children, the world-old beast-fables and folk-lore, which four thousand

years have not made obsolete for delight or instruction. It is a most singular fact, that with the Gospel parables full in view, there is not one educated Christian preacher in a hundred who dares to tell a story in the pulpit, and that in simple language. Uneducated ones do it not infrequently, and cover a multitude of sins thereby. But men of cultivation seem oppressed with a fear of making themselves or their subject ridiculous.


There is, however, a remedy for this, and it lies in a branch of study seemingly antagonistic to that I have just discussed—I mean the careful perusal of the great humorists of literature. Wisdom, piety, learning, will not prevent a man from doing absurd and ludicrous things at times; but humour is a sure preservative. It consists mainly in a keen sense of the incongruities of things, and thus is the direct converse of wit, and it is the best of beacons to warn men off the quicksands of ridicule, because it shows the grotesque aspect of an action in its true light, in sharp contrast with the nobler side, and not as an object of admiration. There are men totally devoid of this sense of humour, and very few women possess it at all, though tact often serves as a useful substitute; and for such the study has of course no value; but a low degree of the faculty can be educated into greater vigour, just as an imperfect ear for music can be trained. Another most valuable property of humour is that it instils a habit of tolerance and good temper, just because it shows so very clearly the absurdity of getting into a rage with human folly, instead of taking it for granted, and making due allowance for it. The true humorist is no cynic, and he keeps his tomahawk for abuses which need to be killed, not laughed at. The objection of coarseness which undoubtedly lies against some of the greatest names in this department of literature, such as Rabelais, Swift, Fielding, and Smollett, though not applying to Montaigne or Jean Paul, nor yet to Thackeray or Artemus Ward, may appear to some to overbalance their utility. I do not hold with this opinion so far as teachers are concerned, albeit there is much weight in it with reference to the mass of the taught, though even in their case the open-speaking and the comparatively healthy animalism of the writers named are far less dangerous to the mind than the veiled pruriency of modern novels of the "Pelham" school on the one hand, or than the fetid cesspool lately dug for us by half-a-dozen nasty-minded women on the other, following in emulous rivalry the lead of "Guy Livingstone," and surpassing the forgotten erotics of Mrs. Aphra Behn. It is also true that humour, if allowed to dominate the whole character, is destructive of Christian enthusiasm and of all lofty notions of life and duty, as we may see in men like Sydney Smith, but I am pleading for it as a condiment, not as the staple food of the mind.

Finally, I hold with the advantage of a careful study of really good criticism, not of such shallow censors as Lord Jeffrey, but produced by keener and deeper observers; and it seems to me that its utility is materially increased by being extended beyond the limits of English. A French or a German critic looks at literature and society from such a very different stand-point from ours, that the perusal of his remarks is almost equal to foreign travel as a means of lifting us out of an insular groove, which is generally the highway to a local rut. And the particular gain which good criticism is to the mind is, that it accustoms it to the habit of distinguishing the value of authorities and the merits of style, so that it does for letters what law does for daily facts. It is a protection against mistaking verbiage for thought, redundancy of words for fulness of ideas, and also against slipshod carelessness and inflated bombast, both of them rocks on which many a teacher wrecks his usefulness, and raises a smile or a sneer where he had hoped to impress a lesson.

I have left great departments of study completely out of view in this survey, some because their utility is sufficiently obvious, and does not need to be urged upon attention; others, such as the whole of classical literature, from mere lack of time. But even so, the range I have indicated is sufficiently wide to prompt two questions: What probability is there that the average minister of religion will trouble himself to cover so large an area? Supposing any one does wish to do so, where can he find a school to learn in, seeing that no English University or training college attempts so much? To answer these questions fully would require too much space. I am fully aware that the ordinary clergyman now cares no more for reading than any other average citizen, but my programme looks to the future rather than to the past. Every year convinces me more fully that there is no "spiritual destitution" like that of intrusting a sloth or dunce with the supreme function of religious teaching, and I do not believe in piety as a substitute for learning in a clergyman any more than in personal robust health as making a skilful doctor; or rather, to be more precise, I do not believe in the piety of a man who thrusts himself into the most difficult of duties without taking the pains to prepare himself to the best of his ability. I am satisfied that a very marked and simultaneous raising of the educational standard required from candidates for Holy Orders would be a most salutary step, at once and in the future, and I should make the test proportionably severer for literates, just because they lacked the culture of a University, requiring of them great accuracy within a limited range of study as a set-off for the absence of width. And I should exact of all men about to be promoted to their first benefice, proof by examination that they had not wasted their time as curates, but were

better instructed than when they first entered Holy Orders. This would give an incentive now lacking, for as regards promotion in the Established Church, learning is no aid, from a union chaplaincy to an archbishopric, and therefore the marvel is that the clergy are even as well read as they prove to be. As to the school, all true education is that which a man gives himself. Masters, tutors, and professors, can do no more than lead him to the water; it depends on himself alone whether he will drink. Nor is it necessary to swill gallons and tuns. All that I have sketched out, and a great deal more, can be readily acquired by the simple rules of keeping to comparatively few books, but these the best of their kind, and thinking more than reading. There is one further objection. What, some men will ask, is the practical utility of all this study to a teacher who has to deal with stolid peasants or with poverty-dulled artisans? It may be good for those who have congregations of University men, of lawyers, of the literary class generally, but not for such. I reply with one historical fact. The counter-Reformation, which snatched half of Europe back from the hands of Protestantism, was mainly carried out by means of the schools set on foot by the Jesuits; and their unexampled success was due to the observance of one rule. According as a teacher showed more and more aptitude for his office, and proved it by the rapid progress of his pupils, he was promoted in the school by being set to hear a class junior to his former one, till the ablest tutor was found, and set to teach the rudiments of knowledge only, on the sound principle that when the art of learning has once been acquired, and a taste for reading instilled, the pupil may be safely left in great measure to his own exertions, but that no task is harder than that of arousing a hitherto sluggish and unawakened mind.

RICHARD FREDERICK LITTLEDALE.



THINGS NEEDFUL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING
CLASSES.

THE subject of the prospects of the working classes is a very large one; much too large and many-sided to be ranked—as it often is—as merely one of the many questions of the day. It is a great deal more than that, comprehending, as it does, within itself most of the questions of the day, however varied in themselves or remote from it those questions may at a first glance appear. Indeed, taken broadly—and it is worse than useless to approach a consideration of it in any but the broadest spirit—it is less a question of the day than the problem which the questions of the day seek to solve. It cannot be relegated to any one of the great spheres of thought or action under which questions of the day are usually classed. It enters into the domains of religion, morality, politics, physics, and psychology. They all bear upon it, while it belongs exclusively to none of them; and, though politicians claim it as lying chiefly within their province, it is perhaps not too much to say that it belongs to no one of those spheres more than to another. Certain it is, at any rate, that no one of them, or all but one of them, could deal with it effectually while ignoring the influence and operation of the others, or other. It is as important as it is large and varied; and it is, moreover, a subject the discussion of which should have an attraction for every one, even on the low ground—supposing no higher one prompted attention to it—of self-interest. The future of the working

classes means more than a strictly literal interpretation of the phrase would indicate—means the future of *all* classes, the future of civilized society. Though they may not be—as they are so often told they are—the entire salt and savour of the earth, and the sole props and support of the social system; though they may not be all this, they are, undoubtedly, the most important division of society, and their importance is daily waxing greater as it becomes more and more evident that they are realizing the commanding extent of their potential strength, and moulding it into practical shapes. That there will always be distinctively working classes may, we think, be taken for granted—taken, that is, as a law of nature—but that they will remain in the same position relatively to other classes that they occupy now is highly improbable. So far as they can be taken as foreshadowing the future, the “signs of the times” all seem to indicate that there will be material changes in the condition of the working classes, and a moment’s consideration must, we think, make it evident that this will involve changes in all other classes. And though the probabilities are in favour of the supposition that the coming changes will be for the better both for the working classes and society, that is not necessarily the case; therefore, as we have said, the subject of the prospects of the working classes concerns every one.

Before entering upon the direct consideration of these prospects, it is for the sake of clearness necessary that we should first glance at the existing condition of the working classes—the stand-point from whence the prospective outlook commences. There are some who hold that the present condition of the working classes is of a flourishing and satisfactory character, and that if it is not all that could be desired the fault lies with those classes themselves—with their drunkenness, animal indulgences, improvidence, and (self-removable) ignorance. Those of this opinion, however, are few in number, are all outside the working classes, and so far as our own experience enables us to speak, are either very simple people, or people who are *not* very simple; who have a case involving this view to make out, and who are greatly wronged if they are not capable of manipulating and dislocating facts to make them appear to suit their view. For all practical purposes of dealing with our subject, it may be taken as a substantial and demonstrable fact, that the condition of the working classes is—to them at any rate—of so hard and unsatisfactory a character as to, in a great measure, justify the bitter and, to a certain extent, dangerous discontent existing among them on the point. With nothing but their labour to depend upon, and the wages of labour so low as in a vast number of instances to make it a practical impossibility to do anything beyond provide in a coarse and limited

fashion for the material necessities of the passing day—with things in this state working men cannot be sure of constant employment—cannot when in work be sure that it will last, or know when the evil day may be drawing nigh. Thus a carking care is laid upon them, and prevents them from fully enjoying even the passing good of the times when they are in employ. Their homes are often distressingly unhealthy and comfortless, and at best are very scantily supplied with the health and comfort-giving appliances which are things of course in the homes of even the moderately rich. Either from the early age at which they have to go to work, or from the neglect of parents too ignorant to be able to understand the value of education, a majority of the working classes are unable to enter upon those pleasures of the mind which education opens up to all, and which do so much to soften or make us for a time forget the hardships of life; while others again, though having the necessary education, and a natural inclination for such pleasures, feel themselves deadened towards them, by reason of the sordid cares of poverty dulling their finer feelings, and the labour-tired body so jading and enervating the mind as to unfit it for the exertion of even a pleasurable pursuit. Supposing they linger long upon the stage of the world, after their capacity for labour has been so deteriorated by age that they are no longer able to find sale for it in a market in which there is an excess supply of a younger quality of the article, the generality of the working classes have no better prospect before them than the work-house, or some other more capricious, if less degrading form of dependence.

This, broadly put, is the condition of the mass of the working classes, and to its material hardships is added a sense of injustice suffered, which rankles all the deeper from being blind and impotent. They are certainly born unto trouble. To labour with but scant reward, to endure with but little prospect of relief, is their lot from the cradle to the grave, and to crown all, they are but too often told that their evil fate will go with them beyond the grave. While they read in The Book that it is the rich who will find it hard to enter the kingdom of heaven, they are assured by those who assume to speak with authority upon such matters that it is they, the poor, who are likely to be excluded from the heavenly paradise, as they have been from the earthly. At the annual meeting of the Scripture Readers' Society held at Sheffield about three years ago, the Archbishop of York stated "that out of a district with two thousand families, nine hundred and fourteen, or nearly one-half, entered themselves as going to no place of worship whatever." From which he drew this conclusion: "that one-half of them had been accustomed to live, and had settled down to live, in a state which

professed no hope hereafter, and confessed no God here." In the case of the Archbishop some allowance is probably due to the sermonesque rounding of a period, but his doctrine as to the meaning of non-attendance at places of worship is substantially the one that is preached to the working classes by Scripture readers and others—and it is a doctrine that does more than any other to keep the poor from places of worship. Uneducated though they may be, ignorant of theology as they mostly are, their common sense still tells them that to make church-going the be-all and end-all, as a test of religion, is to confound religion with the observance of one of its mere mechanical rites; to put a premium upon hypocrisy and cheap self-righteousness. In individual instances they see the strictest religion—in the church-going sense of the term—associated with an utter want of Christianity; and, scoffing at the narrow-mindedness that puts so supreme a meaning upon so (comparatively) secondary a thing, they come to think but very lightly of church-going altogether. That it would in some respects be better for the working classes if they attended places of worship in the same degree that other classes do, may be freely conceded. But to say of them because they do not, they have no hope hereafter, or even that they have no real religion, or true Christianity, is, upon the part of those indulging in such utterances, saying in periphrastic language that they know nothing whatever of the working classes. And there are members of those classes who do not hesitate to say that it is in the same way saying that such speakers themselves lack one of the grander essentials of Christianity—the charity that thinks no evil. Though there is much in their life that at times is almost enough to drive them to doubt the existence of a principle of eternal justice, they do firmly believe in it; believe that though it is often set aside here, it will be asserted hereafter. Such a belief is to them a hope. They *do* "profess hope hereafter"—the hope of a brighter, better, juster, more all-equal hereafter, by which they cannot but be gainers, as those who have not had their good things in this life will get them there. And it is well for society that the masses have this hope and belief. If they had not, if they *were* hopeless as regards the hereafter, were really persuaded that—

"Vain as the has-been is the great to-be,"

then would they not endure the present as patiently as they have done, and do. If they thought that all that they could know of good or evil was to be found in this world alone, can it be doubted that they would attempt to seize a larger share of the good things than now falls to their portion? and though they might be frustrated in

such an endeavour, they would destroy others, even if they were themselves destroyed in the effort. Of those who speak of the working classes in relation to religion, as the Archbishop of York did on the occasion to which we have referred, it may be safely and charitably said, "They know not what they say;" they cannot have realised the terrible significance of the idea of those who have so little to hope for here having no hope hereafter. If ever such a state of things does come to pass, a time will have arrived when there will be no highly-paid and narrow-thoughted prelates to moralise about it. In the essentials of Christianity—the feelings of brotherly and neighbourly love and kindness, and the virtue of patience—the working classes are not lacking. Their non-attendance at places of worship has not the grave meaning that even many of the more charitably inclined in other classes attach to it, and the reasons for it are simple and not far to seek. To many of the poor and uneducated, as well as to many of the rich and educated, the actualities of public worship are repellent rather than attractive. To minds that do not regard public worship as an essential of religion, but only an optional accessory, formalised services, however fine in their conception, become ineffective and meaningless by constant and mechanical repetition. Then sermons are, as a rule—for there are many noble exceptions—dull, and exhibit a sameness and mechanicality that cannot but remind *attentive and intelligent* hearers that the manufacture of sermons is as distinctively and commercially a trade as is the manufacture of three-volume novels. They are often delivered either with an evident lack of all earnestness, or with an earnestness that it is as palpable is directed solely to clerical mannerisms and oratorical effects; and in tone they are more sectarian than broadly or charitably Christian.

These things constitute the ground upon which many of the more thoughtful of the working classes justify themselves for not attending places of worship. Another reason often assigned is, that Sunday being the only day the working classes have entirely to themselves, they require it for rest, fresh air, and certain phases of social intercourse that the limited leisure of other days does not admit of their carrying out. But the reason most frequently given to Scripture readers, district visitors, ministers, and others who put working men to the question concerning their non-attendance at places of worship is, that they—the working men—have not clothes good enough to go in. "What a paltry, contemptible reason!" perhaps some reader exclaims. Indeed, what a no-reason, what an *excuse*; and with the ministers and Scripture readers they would doubtless make the obvious reply—"God does not look at clothes." But there is an equally obvious—to working men—answer to that—"Congregations

and the guardians of the temples do." Nowhere do the "poms and vanities of this wicked world" assert themselves more strongly than in "the house of God." Any moderately close observer who has given attention to the point must know that such is the case. Broad-cloth and silk shrink from fustian and print in the church, as much or more than they do in the theatre. It is generally those who attend worship well-dressed who are inclined to regard a working man's plea of want of good clothes as an evasive one, but they might easily see for themselves that the reason is a substantial one. Let them enter a strange place of worship dressed, as tens of thousands of working men would have to be, in a washed and worn suit of "working" moleskin, or cord, and note the result. Let them see whether any half-filled pew will be opened for them as it would be for a well-dressed stranger; let them observe the different expression of the glance cast upon them and a well-dressed stranger, and notice how they will be avoided as the congregation streams out at the close of the service. Let them do this, and they will be convinced that want of good clothes alone may be *the* reason for working men not attending places of worship. It would be no reason for a high-souled Christian omitting to fulfil what he conceived to be a duty. But, as we have pointed out, the working classes generally do not regard attendance at a place of worship as an essential; and it is not every man who is sufficiently high-souled to brave even a petty social martyrdom.

To some it may appear that we have dwelt at an unnecessary length upon this point of the existence of a religious feeling among the working classes, but though, at a first glance, the questions may seem distantly incidental, it has, in the connection in which we have been considering it, a really important bearing upon our subject. The statistics quoted by the Archbishop of York, though gathered from a single district of a single town, are, as regards the matter upon which they bear, largely representative of the condition of things among the working classes generally. The Archbishop's deduction from the figures is also largely representative, and showing, as it does, that the working classes are very much mis-known upon a point that cannot but have a material influence upon both their present and prospective ideas and actions, it was necessary to combat it, to show that in this case narrowness of view meant also falsity of view. If the working classes had no comforting belief here, no hope hereafter, the constitution of society would be very different from what it is, and the attempt to estimate the prospects of those classes would involve an altogether different set of circumstances and probabilities from those that now offer themselves for consideration.

To come back, however, to their social position. It is, as we have pointed out, hard, unsatisfactory, and, as they themselves hold, unjust. So much we may take as certain, and the next question that arises is: what are the causes of its being so? All parties—both those who suffer by it, and those who do not—seem to be agreed that it is not a necessary result of the natural order of things. All say that there is fault and blame in the matter, the differences of opinion being as to who and what are in fault or to blame. Political economy, which professes to deal with the subject without respect to persons, or to sentiment, as apart from, or trying to evade, the “inexorable logic” of facts, and which moreover claims to treat it scientifically, comprehensively, and *authoritatively*, — political economy says that it is the working classes themselves who are to blame. Though it has side issues, that in some slight degree modify its main conclusion, that conclusion is substantially that over-population is *the* cause of which the miserable condition of the working classes is the unavoidable effect; and that those classes being responsible for over-population, are the authors of their own degraded and suffering state. The gist of the case of political economy upon this point is very clearly summed up in a few sentences at the end of the tenth chapter of the first book of J. Stuart Mill’s work (page 100, people’s edition) where he says:—

“It is but rarely that improvements in the condition of the labouring classes do anything more than give a temporary margin, speedily filled up by an increase of their numbers; the use they commonly choose to make of any advantageous change in their circumstances, is to take it out in the form which, by augmenting the population, deprives the succeeding generation of the benefit. Unless, either by their general improvement in intellectual and moral culture, or at least by raising their habitual standard of comfortable living, they can be taught to make a better use of favourable circumstances, nothing permanent can be done for them; the most promising schemes end only in having a more numerous, but not a happier people.”

A strong array of statistics, arguments, and cases in point is brought forward to prove and demonstrate this proposition, and the conclusion is generally accepted as an ascertained and incontrovertible fact by those outside the working classes, and by a few inside them. But the great majority of the people do not accept the doctrines of political economy as an explanation of their condition. They do not say that over-population would not be a means of bringing distress upon the masses, but they do argue that it cannot be truly held to be the cause of their condition at the present time; that, practically, there has been no over-population; that, in one or another fully accessible place there is room enough, and food enough, and work enough for all who are born, or likely to be born, for generations to

come; that, with the abundant facilities for removing population that is surplus as regards one country to another which stands in need of, could support, and would contribute to, the general wealth of the world through the labour of imported population—that, with things in this state, the responsibility for the crowded condition of old countries, and the evils resulting from it, lies upon those who withhold while they could grant the appliances for emigration from those of the too many who have the desire but cannot command the means to emigrate. The large section who differ from the conclusion of the political economists further say, that primary causes of the existing misery among the working classes are a constitution of society unfair to those classes, and the proceedings of governments, the members of which, being taken exclusively from among “those who have,” legislate in their spirit and on their behalf, to the neglect and injury of “those who want.”

To roundly assert that the truth in the matter lies between these views would be to show both ignorance and arrogance, but it may be safely said that there is truth on both sides. It is true that “the standard of condition” of the working classes does lie ultimately with themselves, and is chiefly a question of their numbers; true, that, by recklessness upon this point, they may render nugatory the best possible legislation; true that *some of them* have been, and still are, reckless in the matter, taking out improvements in their condition in shapes that augment their numbers in a degree that tends to cause to be merely temporary improvements which might otherwise become permanent in themselves and the stepping-stone to others.

And, more than all, it is most painfully true that this country *is* over-populated in the sense that large numbers of her working classes are suffering the dire ills that result from over-population. All this, the teaching of political economy, is true, but it is equally true that there is local as well as general, relative as well as absolute over-population; that while, where absolute and general over-population is undoubtedly an evil, it may be, if rightly used, a good, when only local and relative; and that the relative and local kinds may be the result of unwise or unfair government, and remediable by just and justifiable governmental action. So much we take to be as fully, effectively, and operatively true as any of the axioms of political economy, for it should be remembered that the latter science is not—whatever its more ardent disciples may claim it to be—an exact science. In its calculations it has to deal with so many unknown quantities, that its deductions, however closely reasoned, are, after all, more in the nature of problems than demonstrations. Leaving, however, these comparative certainties, and coming to points which we suppose must be taken as debatable, since they are

much debated, we can only say that we *think* that those of the working classes are right in their view, who hold that the over-population of England is only relative and local, and more the fault of the legislature than of the people. That we manufacture much more, and employ a far greater number of hands now than we did twenty or five-and-twenty years ago, innumerable tables and returns conclusively testify; but, for all that, there can be no doubt in the mind of any unprejudiced person acquainted with the technicalities of the case (and this is, of course, to a great extent a technical matter), that our manufacturing operations have fallen off *relatively* during that time. It may be that neither France, Germany, Belgium, nor any of the other countries that now compete with us in supplying themselves and the world with manufactured goods, which a generation ago they and others obtained exclusively from England—it may be that none of our manufacturing rivals are singly our equal, but the sum of their operations must have materially altered proportions. Such gigantic establishments as those of Krupp of Essen, Govin of Paris, and the great iron-works at Creuzot, and those belonging to the Terre Noire Company, *must* tell a tale upon the markets. If England were now doing the same proportion of the whole manufacturing work of the world that she was twenty-five years ago, she would not with her present population be over-populated, or at any rate would not be over-populated in anything like the same degree that she now is. This should be remembered and taken into account in bringing the fact of the existing over-population to bear upon the subject of the recklessness of the poor in regard to it.

So far as any considerations upon this point influence their actions with respect to their marriages—which of course involve the question of the regulation of the *rate* of their increase—the present extent of the working classes must be weighed in connection with such notions as the working classes could fairly be expected to have from twenty to thirty years ago. At that period “foreign competition” in our leading manufactures had not been heard of, and had it not intervened at a later date, England would, as we have said, been able to have fully and remuneratively employed her present working-class population. It may of course be said that if there had been more work and greater prosperity for them, they would have “taken it out” in the form that would have increased their numbers to such a degree as would still have led—though perhaps a little later—to as disastrous a state of over-population as now exists. A good deal might also be said in reply to this were it worth while to say it, but we do not see that any practical good is to be got by discussing “what might have been, but is not.”

As late as the Exhibition of All Nations in 1851, it was England first, the rest nowhere in all the largest employment-giving branches of manufacture. Then she witted the world with noble workmanship—workmanship that was unapproached, and thought to be unapproachable. All the world admired, and the more energetic portions of it did something more—took to heart and profited by the lesson thus offered to them. From this point foreign competition began to be a reality, and gradually grew to be what it is, and to affect England as it has; to break down her position as a practical monopolist of the chief manufacturing industries. And from that time, too—and the importance and significance of this in the connection in which we speak of it should be well marked—the rate of increase of population in England began to come down, as may be seen by a comparison of the last with the preceding census. That during the years that have elapsed since that time the Legislature have, in reducing taxes upon commodities, materially benefited the working classes, and rendered the existence of the principal sufferers by over-population—the ill-paid and irregularly-employed members of the working classes—less hard than it would otherwise have been, those of the working classes who take note of or think upon political matters readily acknowledge. But at the same time they, as has already been incidentally mentioned, hold the Legislature responsible for the over-population, by reason of their having refused the means of emigration to those of the surplus and unemployed population who solicited it at their hands. They quite understand that a few ship-loads of unemployed workmen assisted to our colonies on the occasion which they take as their case in point* would not in itself have materially lessened the strain caused by over-population; it is upon what they believed (whether their belief is right or wrong need not be discussed here) to have been the spirit and motive of the refusal that they lay stress. They say, taking the tone of the parliamentary debate that took place upon the question as their justification, that the refusal was not based upon any doubt of the soundness of the principle, but upon the circumstance that Parliament is composed exclusively of those classes who have a material interest in perpetuating *any* state of things that has the effect of making labour cheap.

But whatever difference of opinion there may be as to whether the working classes themselves, or the character of our social and governmental constitution, is most to blame in the matter, there can be no doubt as to the main fact of the condition of the classes in

* The occasion on which a body of the workmen who had been thrown out of employment by the collapse of the Thames Shipbuilding trade, petitioned Government to assist them to emigrate.

question being of a painfully unsatisfactory nature—being, in short, such as we sketched it a little way back—such as imperatively calls for amendment and reform. And now comes the question of what are the prospects of the much-needed amendment being brought about. The prospective outlook, as we have already said, is, we think, favourable, and this is the general opinion among those who have given the subject careful consideration ; but still it should not be too hastily or certainly concluded that this view will, as a matter of course, be realised. It is an unpleasant thing to contemplate, even in idea ; but there are some “signs of the times” that point to the possibility of a labour *caste*, whose position will be harder and more degraded than that of the present working classes. The wholesale importation of Coolie and Chinese labour going on in some parts abroad is a thing to “give pause” to the thoughtful among the working classes ; while at home there are things which, though at a first glance wholly favourable to the working classes, will be found, if closely observed, to have a reflex action that *may* help to create such a future labour caste as we have supposed. The aim of the great majority of the best members of the working classes—the cleverest, most energetic, and persevering men—is to raise themselves *out* of those classes. Numbers of them succeed in this aim, become in a greater or lesser degree capitalists, or get into positions in which their interests are identified with those of capital rather than those of labour. Still larger numbers—numbers so large that they form a considerable section of the working classes—though they do not rise out of their class, become, in their endeavour to do so, comparatively rich men—have money in banks, and shares in co-operative and building societies, and are as watchful against and strongly opposed to anything that it is alleged will tend to interfere with “the sacredness of private property” or lessen dividends, as are any of the great capitalists, who are usually the only persons associated with the interests of capital, as antagonistic to the interests of labour. There are tens of thousands of working men who as shareholders derive money from labour-created profits, and on that ground have a certain interest in some kinds of labour being kept cheap. What is usually called co-operation has undoubtedly been of great benefit to the working classes, and is in all likelihood destined to benefit them to a yet greater extent ; but it has in it one of the elements of the possible danger of which we are speaking. It should be borne in mind that it is not in the true or best sense of the term co-operation, but only an extension of the joint-stock principle. There has been no attempt among the working classes at co-operation in production, upon any considerable scale, that even if started upon a purely co-operative basis, has not speedily become a mere joint-stock com-

pany of small shareholders who, if they worked in the concern themselves, also employed labourers who had no interest in it, and the profits from whose labour came to them (the shareholders). And it is a well-understood and ascertained fact that a non-shareholding workman working alongside of shareholding ones, has, to say the very least of it, no better a time of it than one engaged in the ordinary class of workshop. Another well-known fact in working-class circles is that no master is so hard as the working piece-master who has only day-workers under him, and in a general way it will be found that the lower down you go in the ranks of those who are above or partially above, and in authority over, labour, the greater is the disposition to grind the bones of labour to make their bread. Were there to arise a *general* dispute between labour and capital, it would be found that many of those who, to a superficial observer, would appear to be the natural vanguard of the army of labour would be discovered forming a rank and file under the great captains of capital. The *tendency* of this state of affairs is obvious. That the worst result that could flow from it will ensue is not probable, but the possibility is so far substantial that it could not be and should not be overlooked in a dispassionate consideration of the general subject of the prospects of the working classes.

To come now to the favourable, the hopeful view of these prospects. The things needful to the improvement of the condition of the working classes are a general and higher education, a friendly, open, non-aggressive federation of the labouring classes throughout the civilized world, and Christianity. These are, in my opinion, the three grand essentials, comprehending within themselves the many minor ones necessary to the desired end. To speak of Christianity as one of the wants in a matter that is generally held to be wholly political is, we know, to lay ourselves open to a charge of Utopianism, idealism, and so forth; and as the charge of being unpracticable is the most damaging that can be brought against a writer dealing with such a question as our present one, we hasten to explain. In all civilized communities there always has been, and it may be taken for granted that there always will be, a stronger and weaker race of men, the stronger, though fewer in numbers, rising above and ruling their weaker brethren. The form and name of the relations between ruler and rulers may alter, but the relation has always existed, and with the same relative result—the earth and the fulness thereof falling to the lot of the strong, the hardest toil and bitterest suffering to that of the weak. And so substantially it will continue to be, if we have not Christianity to make the strong men merciful, to bring them to love their neighbours as themselves, and to cease to act upon such principles as that self is the first law of nature, and the weak

must go to the wall. It may, of course, be said that we have Christianity, that we are a Christian country. But this is only nominally the case. Though we have undoubtedly many individual Christians among us, we are *not* a Christian nation, have not a general, living, fruitful Christianity. The Christianity which we speak of as being one of the things needful for the permanent and general improvement of the condition of the working classes is not that of mere creeds, rites, and Sunday church-going; not the formal Christianity which is adopted as an element of respectability, but the Christianity of Christ, of the Sermon on the Mount, a Christianity under which brotherly love would abound, and the spirit of which would be visible in the life of the week-day, work-day world, which would lead the rich to consider the poor, employers to be kind to, and thoughtful for, the employed, and the latter class to be just and honest to employers, not the mere eye-servants and time-servers that so many of them now are. This is the sort of Christianity that we want, and it is strictly practical to say that if we do not get it, whatever else may or can be done for the benefit of the working classes, will be less efficient without such Christianity than it would be in conjunction with it.

The hopefulness of the outlook in regard to the condition of the working classes lies, in our opinion, in the fact that progress is already being made in two of the three things that we have spoken of as needful, while there are not wanting some slight signs and tokens favourable to the idea of progression in the third—Christianity. The anxiety, the warmth, and even the intolerance of feeling that are being displayed in connection with the Christianity of creed-ism, Ritualism, vestment controversies, and the like, may, we think, be taken as indicating a tendency, a direction of mind, that may ultimately result in a more extended development of that truer, nobler Christianity of which, as we have said, there are many individual instances among us—a Christianity that would cause an unjust balance to be an abomination to the conscience of man as well as to the Lord, and the now prevailing worship of mammon to be recognised as the ignoble idolatry it is.

The once favourite ideas about men being educated above their stations, and working people being made discontented with their lot by education, are now happily exploded. The necessity for universality of education has been admitted upon all hands, and the machinery for securing it set in motion. How much—taken in its full sense as meaning higher intelligence, wider knowledge, and greater refinement—it is capable of doing and likely to do, need scarcely be pointed out. It will serve as a common ground to bring the various sections of the working classes closer together, and give

to the general body something of that coherence the lack of which is at present their greatest weakness. It will enable them to discern what are the functions of governments, what those of individuals; and to wisely and effectively use the political power which is already legally and potentially in their hands, though it now remains a dead letter by reason of the want of a higher and more general education among them. Moreover, it will be a powerful means to the second great end—international federation. Internationalisation is even now a great, though as yet but insufficiently recognised actuality. Steam, telegraphy, machinery, the spread of the mechanical arts, and general facility of intercommunication, have internationalised the productiveness of all civilized countries. The stronger men, the governing, and capital-possessing classes are—even where they are unconscious of the true meaning of the matter—profiting by this, and the working classes are beginning to see that if they, too, would share in the good of the general material result of such a state of things, there must be international federation among them. The thinking men among them see this on two chief grounds. Firstly, that unless there is, those of the dealers in labour who hold it to be simply a marketable commodity—and at present a very large number hold that opinion—will play off the working classes of one country against those of another. Secondly, that for the working classes of any one country who happen to be at present in a more advanced position than those of others, to push on altogether regardless of any interests but their own, will be to create a Nemesis for themselves. Without some friendly understanding among themselves—without a knowledge upon the part of the ill-paid labourers of one country that the better-paid labourers of another sympathise with them, and are anxious to see their condition brought up to the higher level—without this there will always be the danger of the worst-paid labourers being used as an instrument to drag down the best-paid ones. These are the views that induce some of the working classes to join the International, and many others to regard at least its central idea with higher favour. It may be that the International is but a blind struggling towards the desired thing—that the wire-pulling and wild political notions associated with it are reprehensible; but it at least shows that the thoughts of the working classes are falling in the direction of federation. It is true that the actual progress in the matter is but small, but that there has been progress let some of the proceedings in connection with the great Newcastle strike bear witness. That the present want of unity among the English working classes themselves may be used as a sarcastic comment upon the idea of a working class “federation of the world” we are well aware. But the idea has taken root, and is destined to

be more or less fruitful in results, as education gradually eradicates the weeds of ignorance which now retard its growth.

Of our grounds for looking hopefully towards a development of the higher and truer Christianity, we have already spoken. The force of many noble examples is at work. The desire to be "written as one who loves his fellow-man;" to write it of oneself in the golden lettering of Christian deeds, is spreading. A wider development of the veritable Christian life seems to us to be among the coming events that are casting their shadows before, and from it, should it come, the working classes have more to hope than from aught else. It too, like education, and even more than education, will tend to effect the realisation of the grand idea of friendly international federation. It will bring us infinitely nearer than we now are to a state of things in which

"Man to man the world o'er
Shall brothers be and a' that."

THOMAS WRIGHT.



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MYTHOLOGY.*

WHAT can be in our days the interest of mythology? What is it to us that Kronos was the son of Uranos and Gaia, and that he swallowed his children, Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Pluton, and Poseidon, as soon as they were born? What have we to do with the stories of Rhea, the wife of Uranos, who, in order to save her youngest son from being swallowed by his father, gave her husband a stone to swallow instead? And why should we be asked to admire the exploits of this youngest son, who, when he had grown up, made his father drink a draught, and thus helped to deliver the stone and his five brothers and sisters from their paternal prison? What shall we think if we read in the most admired of classic poets that these escaped prisoners became afterwards the great gods of Greece, gods believed in by Homer, worshipped by Sokrates, immortalised by Phidias? Why should we listen to such horrors as that Tantalos killed his own son, boiled him, and placed him before the gods to eat? or that the gods collected his limbs, threw them into a caldron, and thus restored Pelops to life, *minus*, however, his shoulder, which Demeter had eaten in a fit of absence, and which had therefore to be replaced by a shoulder made of ivory?

Can we imagine anything more silly, more savage, more senseless, anything more unworthy to engage our thoughts, even for a single moment? We may pity our children that, in order to know how to construe and understand the master-works of Homer and Virgil, they have to fill their memory with such idle tales; but we might justly

* A Lecture at the Royal Institution.

suppose that men who have serious work to do in this world, would banish such subjects for ever from their thoughts.

And yet, how strange, from the very childhood of philosophy, from the first faintly-whispered Why? to our own time of matured thought and fearless inquiry, mythology has been the ever-recurrent subject of anxious wonder and careful study. The ancient philosophers, who could pass by the petrified shells on mountain-tops and the fossil trees buried in their quarries without ever asking the question how they came to be there, or what they signified, were ever ready with doubts and surmises when they came to listen to ancient stories of their gods and heroes. And, more curious still, even modern philosophers cannot resist the attraction of these ancient problems. That stream of philosophic thought which, springing from Descartes (1596—1650), rolled on through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in two beds—the *idealistic*, marked by the names of Malebranche (1638—1715), Spinoza (1632—1677), and Leibnitz (1648—1716); and the *sensualistic*, marked by the names of Locke (1632—1704), David Hume (1711—1776), and Condillac (1715—1780), till the two arms united again in Kant (1724—1804), and the full stream was carried on by Schelling (1775—1854), and Hegel (1770—1831),—this stream of modern philosophic thought has ended where ancient philosophy began—in a Philosophy of Mythology, which, as you know, forms the most important part of Schelling's final system, of what he called himself his *Positive Philosophy*, given to the world after the death of that great thinker and poet in the year 1854.

I do not mean to say that Schelling and Aristotle looked upon mythology in the same light, or that they found in it exactly the same problems; yet there is this common feature in all who have thought or written on mythology, that they look upon it as something which, whatever it may mean, does certainly not mean what it seems to mean; as something that requires an explanation, whether it be a system of religion, or a phase in the development of the human mind, or an inevitable catastrophe in the life of language. According to some, mythology is history changed into fable; according to others, fable changed into history. Some discover in it the precepts of moral philosophy enunciated in the poetical language of antiquity: others see in it a picture of the great forms and forces of nature, particularly the sun, the moon, and the stars, the changes of day and night, the succession of the seasons, the return of the years—all this reflected by the vivid imagination of ancient poets and sages. Epicharmos, for instance, the pupil of Pythagoras, declared that the gods of Greece were not what, from the poems of Homer, we might suppose them to be—personal beings, endowed with superhuman powers, though liable to many of the passions and frailties of human nature. He maintained that these gods were

really the Wind, the Water, the Earth, the Sun, the Fire, and the Stars. Not long after his time another philosopher, Empedokles, holding that the whole of nature consisted of a mixture and separation of the four elements, declared that Zeus was the element of Fire, Here the element of Air, Aidoneus or Pluton, the element of Earth, and Nestis the element of Water. In fact, whatever the freethinkers of Greece discovered successively as the first principles of Being and Thought, whether the air of Anaximenes, or the fire of Herakleitos, or the Nous or Mind of Anaxagoras, was readily identified with Zeus and the other divine persons of Olympian mythology. Metrodoros, the contemporary of Anaxagoras, went even further. While Anaxagoras would have been satisfied with looking upon Zeus as but another name of his Nous, the highest intellect, the mover, the disposer, the governor of all things, Metrodoros resolved not only the persons of Zeus, Here, and Athene, but likewise those of human kings and heroes—such as Agamemnon, Achilles, and Hektor—into various combinations and physical agencies, and treated the adventures ascribed to them as natural facts, hidden under a thin veil of allegory.

Sokrates, as is well known, looked upon such attempts at explaining all fables allegorically as too arduous and unprofitable; yet he, too, as well as Plato, pointed frequently to what they called the *hypónoia*, the under-current, if I may say so, or the under-meaning of ancient mythology.

Aristotle speaks more explicitly:—

“It has been handed down,” he says, “by early and very ancient people, and left to those who came after, in the form of myths, that these (the first principles of the world) are the gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. The rest has been added mythically, in order to persuade the many, and in order to be used in support of laws and other interests. Thus they say that the gods have a human form, and that they are like to some of the other living beings, and other things consequent on this, and similar to what has been said. If one separated out of these fables, and took only that first point, viz., that they believed the first essences to be gods, one would think that it had been divinely said, and that while every art and every philosophy was probably invented ever so many times and lost again, these opinions had, like fragments of them, been preserved until now. So far only is the opinion of our fathers, and that received from our first ancestors, clear to us.”

I have quoted the opinions of these Greek philosophers, to which many more might have been added, partly in order to show how many of the most distinguished minds of ancient Greece agreed in demanding an interpretation, whether physical or metaphysical, of Greek mythology, partly in order to satisfy those classical scholars, who, forgetful of their own classics, forgetful of their own Plato and Aristotle, seem to imagine that the idea of seeing in the gods and heroes of Greece anything beyond what they appear to be in the songs of Homer, was a mere fancy and invention of the students of Comparative Mythology.

There were, no doubt, Greeks, and eminent Greeks too, who took the legends of their gods and heroes in their literal sense. But what do these say of Homer and Hesiod? Xenophanes, the contemporary of Pythagoras, holds Homer and Hesiod responsible for the popular superstitions of Greece. In this he agrees with Herodotos, when he declares that these two poets made the theogony for the Greeks, and gave to the gods their names, and assigned to them their honours and their arts, and described their appearances. But he then continues in a very different strain from the pious historian.* “Homer,” he says,† “and Hesiod ascribed to the gods whatever is disgraceful and scandalous among men, yea, they declared that the gods had committed nearly all unlawful acts, such as theft, adultery, and fraud.” “Men seem to have created their gods, and to have given to them their own mind, voice, and figure. The Ethiopians made their gods black and flat-nosed; the Thracians red-haired and blue-eyed; just as oxen or lions, if they could but draw, would draw their gods like oxen and lions.” This was spoken about 500 B.C. Herakleitos, about 460 B.C., one of the boldest thinkers of ancient Greece, declared that Homer deserved to be ejected from public assemblies and flogged; and a story is told that Pythagoras (about 540 B.C.) saw the soul of Homer in Hades, hanging on a tree and surrounded by serpents, as a punishment for what he had said of the gods. And what can be stronger than the condemnation passed on Homer by Plato? I shall read an extract from the “Republic,” from the excellent translation lately published by Professor Jowett:—

“But what fault do you find with Homer and Hesiod, and the other great story-tellers of mankind?”

“A fault which is most serious,” I said: “the fault of telling a lie, and a bad lie.”

“But when is this fault committed?”

“Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods

* Her. ii. 53, οὔτοι δὲ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίην Ἑλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἰκωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμὰς τε καὶ τέχνας ἐπιδόντες, καὶ εἶδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.

† Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὀμηρὸς θ' Ἡσιόδος τε
 ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισι δνειδεα καὶ ψόγος ἰστίη.
 ὡς πλείστ' ἐφθέγγαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,
 κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

Sext. Emp. adv. Math., 1,289; ix. 193.

Ἄλλὰ βροτοὶ δοκίουσι θεοὺς γενεῆσθαι
 τὴν σφετέρην τ' αἰσθησὶν ἔχειν φωνὴν τε δῖμας τε.—
 Ἄλλ' εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἢε λέοντες
 ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἄπερ ἄνδρες,
 καὶ κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίησαν
 τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ κἀντοὶ δῖμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον,
 ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δὲ τε βουσὶν ὁμοῖα.

Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 601, c.

Ὡς φησὶν Ξενοφάνης· “Αἰθίοπες τε μέλανας σιμούς τε, Θρηῆκες τε πυρροὺς καὶ γλαυκοὺς.”—Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 711, B. Historia Philosophiæ, ed. Ritter et Praller, cap. iii.

and heroes—like the drawing of a limner which has not the shadow of a likeness to the truth.’

“ ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?’

“ ‘First of all,’ I said, ‘there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranos, and which was an immoral lie too—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranos did, and what Kronos did to him. The fact is that the doings of Kronos, and the sufferings which his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a very few might hear them in a mystery, and then let them sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; this would have the effect of very greatly reducing the number of the hearers.’

“ ‘Why, yes,’ said he, ‘these stories are certainly objectionable.’

“ ‘Yes, Adeimantos, they are stories not to be narrated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous, and that he may chastise his father when he does wrong in any manner that he likes, and in this will only be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods.’

“ ‘I quite agree with you,’ he said; ‘in my opinion those stories are *not fit to be repeated.*’

“ ‘Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonourable, should anything be said of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue. Far be it from us to tell them of the battles of the giants, and embroider them on garments; or of all the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relations. If they would only believe us, we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up. And these are the sort of fictions which the poets should be required to compose. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten—such tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal, and anything that he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore the tales which they first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.’ ”

To those who look upon mythology as an ancient form of religion, such freedom of language as is here used by Xenophanes and Plato, must seem startling. If the Iliad were really the Bible of the Greeks, as it has not unfrequently been called, such violent invectives would have been impossible. For let us bear in mind that Xenophanes, though he boldly denied the existence of all the mythological deities, and declared his belief in One God, neither in form nor in thought like unto mortals,* was not therefore considered a heretic. He never suffered for uttering his honest convictions: on the contrary, as far as we know, he was honoured by the people

* Εἰς θεὸς ἓν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος.
οὐτε ἕμᾶς θνητοῖσι ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα.

Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 601 c.

among whom he lived and taught. Nor was Plato ever punished on account of his unbelief, and though he, as well as his master, Sokrates, became obnoxious to the dominant party at Athens, this was due to political far more than to theological motives. At all events, Plato, the pupil, the friend, the apologist of Sokrates, was allowed to teach at Athens to the end of his life, and few men commanded greater respect in all ranks of Greek society. But, although mythology was not religion in our sense of the word, and although the Iliad certainly never enjoyed among Greeks the authority either of the Bible, or even of the Veda among the Brahmans, or the Zend Avesta among the Parsis, yet I would not deny altogether that in a certain sense the mythology of the Greeks belonged to their religion. We must only be on our guard, here as everywhere else, against the misleading influence of words. The word Religion has, like most words, had its history; it has grown and changed with each century, and it cannot therefore have meant with the Greeks and Brahmans what it means with us. Religions have sometimes been divided into *national* or *traditional*, as distinguished from *individual* or *statutable* religion. The former are, like languages, home-grown, autochthonic, without an historical beginning, generally without any recognized founder, or even an authorized code; the latter have been founded by historical persons, generally in antagonism to traditional systems, and they always rest on the authority of a written code. I do not consider this division as very useful for a scientific study of religion, because in many cases it is extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible, to draw a sharp line of demarcation, and to determine whether a given religion may be considered as the work of one man, or as the combined work of those who came before him, who lived with him, nay, even of those who came after him. For our present purpose, however, for showing at once the salient difference between what the Greeks and what we ourselves should mean by Religion, this division is very serviceable. The Greek religion was clearly a national and traditional religion, and, as such, it shared both the advantages and disadvantages of this form of religious belief; the Christian religion is an historical, and to a great extent, an individual religion, and it possesses the advantage of an authorized code and of a settled system of faith. Let it not be supposed, however, that between traditional and individual religions the advantages are all on one, the disadvantages on the other side. As long as the ancient immemorial religions of the different branches of the human race remained in their natural state, and were not pressed into the service of political parties or an ambitious priesthood, they allowed great freedom of thought and a healthy growth of real piety, and they were seldom disgraced by an intolerant or persecuting spirit. They were generally honestly believed, or, as we have just seen, honestly attacked,

and a high tone of intellectual morality was preserved, untainted by hypocrisy, equivocation, or unreasoning dogmatism. The marvellous development of philosophy in Greece, particularly in ancient Greece, was chiefly due, I believe, to the absence of an established religion and an influential priesthood; and it is impossible to overrate the blessing which the fresh, pure, invigorating, and elevating air of that ancient Greek philosophy has conferred on all ages, not excepting our own. I shudder at the thought of what the world would have been without Plato and Aristotle, and I tremble at the idea that the youth of the future should ever be deprived of the teaching and the example of these true prophets of the absolute freedom of thought. Unfortunately we know but little of the earliest fathers of Greek philosophy; we have but fragments, and those not always trustworthy, nor easily intelligible, of what they taught on the highest questions that can stir the heart of man. We have been accustomed to call the oracular sayings of men like Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, or Herakleitos, philosophy, but there was in them as much of religion as in the songs of Homer and Hesiod. Homer and Hesiod were great powers, but their poems were not the only feeders of the religious life of Greece. The stream of ancient wisdom and philosophy flowed parallel with the stream of legend and poetry; and both were meant to support the religious cravings of the soul. We have only to attend without prejudice to the utterances of these ancient prophets, such as Xenophanes and Herakleitos, in order to convince ourselves that these men spoke with authority to the people,* that they considered themselves the equals of Homer and Hesiod, nay, their betters, and in no way fettered by the popular legends about gods and goddesses. While modern religions assume in general a hostile attitude towards philosophy, ancient religions have either included philosophy as an integral part, or they have at least tolerated its growth in the very precincts of their temples.

After we have thus seen what limitations we must place on the meaning of the word religion, if we call mythology the religion of the ancient world, we may now advance another step.

We have glanced at the principal interpretations which have been proposed by the ancients themselves of the original purpose and meaning of mythology. But there is one question which none, either of the ancient or of the modern interpreters of mythology, has answered, or even asked, and on which, nevertheless, the whole problem of mythology seems to turn. If mythology is history

* Empedokles, Carmina, v. 411 ("Fragm. Philos. Græc.," vol. i. p. 12).

ὦ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὖν ὅτ' ἀληθείη παρὰ μύθοις
οὐς ἐγὼ ἐξερίω· μάλα δ' ἀργαλήη γε τίτυεται
ἀνδράσι καὶ οὐσζήλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὕμῃ.

changed into fable, why was it so changed? If it is fable represented as history, why were such fables invented? If it contains precepts of moral philosophy, whence their immoral disguise? If it is a picture of the great forms and forces of nature, the same question still returns, why were these forms and forces represented as heroes and heroines, as nymphs and shepherds, as gods and goddesses? It is easy enough to call the sun a god, or the dawn a goddess, after these predicates have once been framed. But how were these predicates formed? How did people come to know of gods and goddesses, heroes and nymphs, and what meaning did they originally connect with these terms? In fact, the real question which a philosophy of mythology has to answer is this. Is the whole of mythology an invention, the fanciful poetry of a Homer or Hesiod, or is it a growth? Or, to speak more definitely, Was mythology a mere accident, or was it inevitable? Was it only a false step, or was it a step that could not have been left out in the historical progress of the human mind?

The study of the history of language, which is only a part of the study of the history of thought, has enabled us to give a decisive answer to this question. Mythology is inevitable, it is natural, it is an inherent necessity of language, if we recognize in language the outward form and manifestation of thought: it is in fact the dark shadow which language throws on thought, and which can never disappear till language becomes altogether commensurate with thought, which it never will. Mythology, no doubt, breaks out more fiercely during the early periods of the history of human thought, but it never disappears altogether. Depend upon it, there is mythology now as there was in the time of Homer, only we do not perceive it, because we ourselves live in the very shadow of it, and because we all shrink from the full meridian light of truth. We are ready enough to see that if the ancients called their kings and heroes *Διογενεῖς*, sprung of Zeus, that expression, intended originally to convey the highest praise which man can bestow on man, was apt to lapse into mythology. We easily perceive how such a conception, compatible in its origin with the highest reverence for the gods, led almost inevitably to the growth of fables, which transferred to divine beings the incidents of human paternity and sonship. But we are not so ready to see that it is our fate, too, to move in allegories which illustrate things intellectual by visions exhibited to the fancy. In our religion, too, the conceptions of paternity and sonship have not always been free from all that is human, nor are we always aware that nearly every note that belongs to human paternity and sonship must be taken out of these terms, before they can be pronounced safe against mythological infection. Papal decisions on immaculate conception are of no avail against that mythology. The mind must become immaculate to rise superior

to itself: or it must close its eyes and shut its lips in the presence of the Divine.

If then we want to understand mythology, in the ordinary and restricted sense of the word, we must discover the larger circle of mental phenomena to which it belongs. Greek mythology is but a small segment of mythology; the religious mythologies of all the races of mankind are again but a small segment of mythology. Mythology, in the highest sense, is the power exercised by language on thought in every possible sphere of mental activity, and I do not hesitate to call the whole history of philosophy, from Thales down to Hegel, an uninterrupted battle against mythology, a constant protest of thought against language. This will require some explanation.

Ever since the time of Wilhelm von Humboldt, all who have seriously grappled with the highest problems of the Science of Language, have come to the conviction that thought and language are inseparable, that language is as impossible without thought as thought is without language; that they stand to each other like soul and body, like power and function, like substance and form. The objections which have been raised against this view arise generally from a mere misunderstanding. If we speak of language as the outward realization of thought, we do not mean language as deposited in a dictionary, or sketched in a grammar, we mean language as an act, language as being spoken, language as living and dying with every word that is uttered. We might perhaps call this speech, as distinguished from language.

Secondly, though if we speak of language, we mean chiefly phonetic articulate language, we do not exclude the less perfect symbols of thought, such as gestures, signs, or pictures. They, too, are language in a certain sense, and they must be included in language before we are justified in saying that discursive thought can be realized in language only. One instance will make this clear. We hold that we cannot think without language. But can we not count without language? We certainly can. We can form the conception of *three* without any spoken word, by simply holding up three fingers. In the same manner, the hand might stand for five, both hands for ten, hands and feet for twenty. This is how people who possessed no organs of speech would speak; this is how the deaf and dumb *do* speak. Three fingers are as good as three strokes, three strokes are as good as three clicks of the tongue, three clicks of the tongue are as good as the sound *three*, or *trois*, or *drei*, or *shalosh* in Hebrew, or *san* in Chinese. All these are signs, more or less perfect, but being signs, they fall under the category of language; and all we maintain is, that without some kind of sign, discursive thought is impossible, and that in that sense, language, or *λόγος*, is the only possible realization of human thought.

Another very common misunderstanding is this: people imagine

that, if it be impossible to think, except in language, language and thought must be one and the same thing. But a true philosophy of language leads to the very opposite result. Every philosopher would say that substance cannot exist without form, nor form without substance, but no philosopher would say that therefore it is impossible to distinguish between form and substance. In the same way, though we maintain that thought cannot exist without language nor language without thought, we do distinguish between thought and language, between the inward and the outward λόγος, between the substance and the form. Nay, we go a step beyond. We admit that language reacts on thought, and we see in this reaction, in this refraction of the rays of language, the real solution of the old riddle of mythology.

You will now see why these somewhat abstruse disquisitions were necessary for our more immediate purpose, and I can promise those who have hitherto followed me on this rather barren and rugged track, that they will now be able to rest, and command, from the point of view which we have reached, the whole panorama of the mythology of the human mind.

We saw just now that the names of numbers may most easily be replaced by signs. Numbers are simple analytical conceptions, and for that very reason they are not liable to mythology: name and conception being here commensurate, no misunderstanding is possible. But as soon as we leave this department of thought, mythology begins. I shall try by at least one example to show how mythology pervades, not only the sphere of religion or religious tradition, but infects more or less the whole realm of thought.

When man wished for the first time to grasp and express a distinction between the body, and something else within him distinct from the body, an easy name that suggested itself was *breath*. The breath seemed something immaterial and almost invisible, and it was clearly connected with the life that pervaded the body, for as soon as the breath ceased, the life of the body became extinct. Hence the Greek name ψυχή,* which originally meant breath, was

* The word ψυχή is clearly connected in Greek with ψύχω, which meant originally blowing, and was used either in the sense of cooling by blowing, or breathing by blowing. In the former acceptation it produced ψύχος, coldness; ψυχρός, cold; ψυχάω, I cool; in the latter ψυχή, breath, then life, then soul. So far the purely Greek growth of words derived from ψύχω is clear. But ψύχω itself is difficult. It seems to point to a root *spu*, meaning to blow out, to spit; Lat., *spuo*; Goth., *spcivan*; Greek, πτόω, supposed to stand for σπιύω. Hesychius mentions ψύττει = πτύει, ψυττόν = πτύελον. (Pott, Etym. Forsch., No. 355.) Curtius connects this root with Greek φν, in φῦσα, blowing, bellows, and with Latin *spirare* (i.e., *spoisare*). Stahl, who rejected the division of life and mind adopted by Bacon, and returned to the Aristotelian doctrine, falls back on to Plato's etymology of ψυχή as φουσίχη, from φύσειν ἔχειν or ὀχεῖν, Crat. 400 B. In a passage of his "Theoria Medica Vera" (Halae, 1708), pointed out to me by Dr. Rolleston, Stahl says:—"Invenio in lexico graeco antiquiore post alios, et Budæum imprimis, iterum iterumque reviso, nomenclaturam nimis quam fugitive allegatam: φουσίχη, poetica, pro

chosen to express at first the principle of life, as distinguished from the decaying body, afterwards the incorporeal, the immaterial, the undecaying, the immortal part of man—his soul, his mind, his Self. All this was very natural. When a person dies, we too say that he has given up the ghost, and ghost, too, meant originally spirit, and spirit meant breath.

The Greeks expressed the same idea by saying that the *ψυχή* had left the body,* had fled through the mouth, or even through a bleeding wound,† and had gone into Hades, which meant literally no more than the place of the Invisible (*Ἄϊδης*). That the breath had become invisible, was matter of fact; that it had gone to the house of Hades, was mythology springing spontaneously from the fertile soil of language.

The primitive mythology was by no means necessarily religious. In the very case which we have chosen, philosophical mythology sprang up by the side of religious mythology. The religious mythology consisted in speaking of the spirits of the departed as ghosts, as mere breath and air, as fluttering about the gates of Hades, or ferried across the Styx in the boat of Charon.‡

The philosophical mythology, however, that sprang from this name was much more important. We saw that *Psyche*, meaning originally the breathing of the body, was gradually used in the sense of vital breath, and as something independent of the body; and that at last, when it had assumed the meaning of the immortal part of man, it retained that character of something independent of the body, thus giving rise to the conception of a soul, not only as a being without a body, but in its very nature opposed to body. As soon as that opposition had been established in language and thought, philosophy began its work in order to explain how two such heterogeneous powers could act on each other—how the soul could influence the body, and how the body could determine the soul. Spiritualistic

ψυχή. Incidit animo suspicari, an non verum primum nomen animæ antiquissimis Græcis fuerit hoc *ψυχή*, quasi ἔχων τὸ φύειν, e cuius vocis pronunciatione deflectente, uti vere familiariter solet vocalium, inprimis sub accentibus, fugitiva enunciatione, sensum natum sit *ψυ-χή ψυχή*, denique ad faciliorem pronunciationem in locum *ψυχή*, *ψυχή*. Quam suspicionem fouere mihi videtur illud, quod vocabuli *ψυχή*, pro anima, nulla idonea analogia in lingua græca occurrat; nam quæ a *ψύχω* ducitur, cum verus huius et directus significatus notorie sit refrigero, indirectus autem magis, spiro, nihil certe hæc ad animam puto. (p. 44.)

* ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχή πάλιν ἰλθεῖν οὔτε λείσθη,
οὔδ' ἔλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἔρκος δδόντων.
Il. ix. 408.

† εἰ δ' ἔντερα χαλκὸς ἀφύσσειν
ἠρώσας· ψυχή δὲ κατ' οὐραμένην ὠτειλήν
ἴσσοι' ἐπειρομένη.
Il. xiv. 517.

‡ "Ter frustra compressa manu effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno."
Virg. Aen. ii. 792.

and materialistic systems of philosophy arose, and all this in order to remove a self-created difficulty, in order to join together again what language had severed, the living body and the living soul. The question whether there is a soul or spirit, whether there is in man something different from the mere body, is not at all affected by this mythological phraseology. We certainly can distinguish between body and soul, but as long as we keep within the limits of human knowledge, we have no right to speak of the living soul as of a breath, or to speak of spirits and ghosts as fluttering about like birds or fairies. The poet of the nineteenth century says;—

“The spirit does but mean the breath,
I know no more.”

And the same thought was expressed by Cicero two thousand years ago: “Whether the soul is air or fire, I do not know.” As men, we only know of embodied spirits, however ethereal their bodies may be conceived to be, but of spirits, separate from body, without form or frame, we know as little as we know of thought without language, or of the Dawn as a goddess, or of the Night as the mother of the Day.

Though breath, or spirit, or ghost are the most common names that were assigned through the metaphorical nature of language to the vital, and afterwards to the intellectual, principle in man, they were by no means the only possible names. We speak, for instance, of the *shades* of the departed, which meant originally their shadows. Those who first introduced this expression—and we find it in the most distant parts of the world—evidently took the shadow as the nearest approach to what they wished to express; something that should be incorporeal, yet closely connected with the body. The Greek *εἶδωλον*, too, is not much more than the shadow, while the Latin *manes* meant probably in the beginning no more than the Little Ones, the Small Folk.* But the curious part, as showing again the influence of language on thought, an influence more powerful even than the evidence of the senses, is this, that people who speak of the life or soul as the shadow of the body, have brought themselves to believe that a dead body casts no shadow, because the shadow has departed from it; that it is, in fact, a kind of Peter Schlemihl.†

Let us now return to mythology in the narrower sense of the word. One of the earliest objects that would strike and stir the mind of man and for which a sign or a name would soon be wanted, is surely the Sun. It is very hard for us to realise the feelings with which the first dwellers on the earth looked upon the sun, or fully to understand what they meant by a morning prayer or a morning sacrifice.

* *Im-manis*, originally not small, came to mean enormous or monstrous.—See Preller, “Römische Mythologie,” p. 72 *seq.*

† “Unkulunkulu; or the Tradition of Creation as existing among the Amazulu and other Tribes of South Africa.” By the Rev. J. Callaway, M.D. Natal, 1868. Part I., p. 91.

Perhaps there are few people here present who have watched a sunrise more than once or twice in their life; few people who have ever known the true meaning of a morning prayer, or a morning sacrifice. But think of man at the very dawn of time: forget for a moment, if you can, after having read the fascinating pages of Mr. Darwin, forget what man is supposed to have been before he was man; forget it, because it does not concern us here whether his bodily form and frame were developed once for all in the mind of his Creator, or gradually in the creation itself, which is, I suppose, from the first monad or protoplasm to the last of the primates, or man, the work of his mind; think of him only as man (and man means the thinker), with his mind yet lying fallow, though full of germs—germs of which I hold as strongly as ever no trace has ever, no trace will ever, be discovered anywhere but in man; think of the Sun awakening the eyes of man from sleep, and his mind from slumber. Was not the Sunrise to him the first wonder, the first beginning of all reflection, all thought, all philosophy? was it not to him the first revelation, the first beginning of all trust, of all religion? To us that wonder of wonders has ceased to exist, and few men now would even venture to speak of the sun as Sir John Herschel has spoken, calling him “the Almoner of the Almighty, the delegated dispenser to us of light and warmth, as well as the centre of attraction, and as such, the immediate source of all our comforts, and, indeed, of the very possibility of our existence on earth.”* Man is a creature of habit, and wherever we can watch him, we find that before a few generations have passed, he has lost the power of admiring what is regular, and that he can see signs and wonders only in what is irregular. Few nations only have preserved in their ancient poetry some remnants of the natural awe with which the earliest dwellers on the earth saw that brilliant being slowly rising from out the darkness of the night, raising itself by its own might higher and higher, till it stood triumphant on the arch of heaven, and then descended and sank down in its fiery glory into the dark abyss of the heaving and hissing sea. In the hymns of the Veda the poet still wonders whether the sun will rise again; he asks how he can climb the vault of heaven? why he does not fall back? why there is no dust on his path? And when the rays of the morning rouse him from sleep and call him back to new life; when he sees the sun, as he says, stretching out his golden arms to bless the world and rescue it from the terrors of darkness, he exclaims, “Arise, our life, our spirit has come back! the darkness is gone, the light approaches!”

For so prominent an object in the primeval picture-gallery of the human mind, a sign or a name must have been wanted at a very

* See J. Samuelson, “Views of the Deity, Traditional and Scientific,” p. 144 Williams and Norgate, 1871.

early period. But how was this to be achieved? As a mere sign, a circle would have been sufficient, such as we find in the hieroglyphics of Egypt, in the graphic system of China, or even in our own astronomical tables. If such a sign was fixed upon, we have a beginning of language in the widest sense of the word, for we have a sign for a conception made up of a large number of single sensuous impressions. With such definite signs mythology has little chance; yet the mere fact that the sun was represented as a circle would favour the idea that the sun was round; or, as ancient people, who had no adjective as yet for round or *rotundus*,* would say, that the sun was a wheel, a *rota*. If, on the contrary, the round sign reminded the people of an eye, then the sign of the sun would soon become the eye of heaven, and germs of mythology would spring up even from the barren soil of such hieroglyphic language.

But now suppose that a real name was wanted for the sun, how could that be achieved?

We know that all words are derived from roots, that these roots express general predicates, and that with few exceptions every name conveys a general predicate peculiar to the object that has to be named. How these roots came to be, is a question into which we need not enter at present. Their origin and growth form a problem of psychology rather than of philology, and each science must keep within its proper bounds. If a name was wanted for snow, the early framers of language singled out one of the general predicates of snow, its whiteness, its coldness, or its liquidity, and called the snow the white, the cold, or the liquid, by means of roots conveying the general idea of whiteness, coldness, or liquidity. Not only *Nix*, *nivis*, but *Niobe*† too, was a name of the snow, and meant the melting;

* "It has already been implied that the Aborigines of Tasmania had acquired very limited powers of abstraction or generalization. They possessed no words representing abstract ideas; for each variety of gum-tree and wattle-tree, &c., &c., they had a name, but they had no equivalent for the expression, 'a tree;' neither could they express abstract qualities, such as hard, soft, warm, cold, long, short, round, &c.; for 'hard' they would say 'like a stone;' for 'tall' they would say 'long legs,' &c.; for 'round' they said 'like a ball,' 'like the moon,' and so on, usually suiting the action to the word, and confirming, by some sign, the meaning to be understood."—Milligan, "Vocabulary of the Dialects of some of the Aboriginal Tribes of Tasmania." Hobart Town. 1866. p. 34.

† If Signor Ascoli blames me for deriving *Niobe* with other names for snow from the root *snu*, instead of from the root *snigh*, this can only be due to an oversight. I am responsible for the derivation of *Niobe* and for the admission of a secondary root *snju* or *nyju*, and so far I may be either right or wrong. But Signor Ascoli ought to have known that the derivation of Gothic *snair-s*, Old High-German *snéo*, or *sné*, gen. *snéwe-s*, Lithuanian *snéga-s*, Slav. *snjeg*, Hüb. *sneachd*, from the root *snu*, rests on the authority of Bopp ("Glossarium," 1847, s. v. *snu*; see also Grimm, "Deutsche Grammatik," ii., p. 700). He ought likewise to have known that in 1852 Professor Schweizer-Sidler, in his review of Bötticher's "Arica" (Kuhn's "Zeitschrift," i. 479) had pointed out that *snigh* may be considered as a secondary root by the side of *snu* and *sná*; (cf., *σμάω*: *σμήχω*; *ψάω*: *ψήχω*: *νάω*: *νήχω*). The real relation of *snu* to *sngh* had been explained as early as 1842 by Benfey, "Wurzellexicon," ii., p. 64.

the death of her beautiful children by the arrows of Apollon and Artemis represents the destruction of winter by the rays of the sun. If the sun itself was to be named, it might be called the brilliant, the awakener, the runner, the ruler, the father, the giver of warmth, of fertility, of life, the scorcher, the destroyer, the messenger of death, and many other names; but there was no possibility of naming it, except by laying hold of one of its characteristic features, and expressing that feature by means of one of the predicative roots. Let us trace the history of at least one of these names. Before the Aryan nations separated, before there was a Latin, a Greek, or a Sanskrit language, there existed a root *svar* or *śal*, which meant to beam, to glitter, to warm. It exists in Greek, *σέλας*, splendour; *σελήνη*, moon; in Anglo-Saxon, as *swélan*, to burn, to sweat; in modern German, *schwül*, oppressively hot. From it we have in Sanskrit the noun *svar*, meaning sometimes the sky, sometimes the sun; and exactly the same word has been preserved in Latin, as *sol*; in Gothic, as *sauil*; in Anglo-Saxon, as *sol*. A secondary form of *svar* is the Sanskrit *súrya* for *śár̥ya*, the sun, which is the same word as the Greek ἥλιος.

All these names were originally mere predicates; they meant bright, brilliant, warm. But as soon as the name *svar* or *súrya* was formed, it became, through the irresistible influence of language, the name, not only of a living, but of a male being. Every noun in Sanskrit must be either a masculine or a feminine (for the neuter gender was originally confined to the nominative case), and as *súryas* had been formed as a masculine, language stamped it once for all as the sign of a male being as much as if it had been the name of a warrior or a king. In other languages where the name for sun is a feminine, and the sun is accordingly conceived as a woman, as a queen, as the bride of the moon, the whole mythology of the love-making of the heavenly bodies is changed. You may say that all this shows, not so much the influence of language on thought, as of thought on language; and that the sexual character of all words reflects only the peculiarities of a child's mind, which can conceive of nothing except as living, as male or female. If a child hurts itself against a chair, it beats and scolds the chair. The chair is looked upon not as *it*, but as *he*; it is the naughty chair, quite as much as a boy is a naughty boy. There is some truth in this, but it only serves to confirm the right view of the influence of language on thought; for this tendency, though in its origin intentional, and therefore the result of thought, became

Signor Ascoli has certainly shown with greater minuteness than his predecessors that not only Zend *snizh* and Lithuanian *snéga-s*, but likewise Gothic *snair-s*, Greek *νίφει*, Latin *nix*, *niv-is*, and *ninguis*, may be derived from *snigh*; but if from *snigh*, a secondary development of the root *snu*, we can arrive at *νίφ-α*, and at *νίβ-α*, the other steps that lead on to Niobe will remain just the same.

soon a mere rule of tradition in language, and it then reacted on the mind with irresistible power. As soon, in fact, as *suryas* or *ἥλιος* appears as a masculine, we are in the very thick of mythology. We have not yet arrived at Helios as a god—that is a much later stage of thought, which we might describe almost in the words of Plato at the beginning of the seventh book of the “Republic,” “And after this, he will reason that the sun is he who gives the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold.” We have not yet advanced so far, but we have reached at least the first germs of a myth. In the Homeric hymn to Helios, Helios is not yet called an immortal, but only *ἐπιείκελος ἀθανάτοισι*, like unto immortals, yet he is called the child of Euryphaessa, the son of Hyperion, the grandson of Uranos and Gaea.* All this is mythology; it is ancient language going beyond its first intention. Nor is there much difficulty in interpreting this myth. Helios, the sun, is called the son of Hyperion, sometimes Hyperion himself. This name Hyperion is derived from the preposition *ὑπέρ*, the Latin *super*, which means above. It is derived by means of the suffix *ων*, which originally was not a patronymic, but simply expressed belonging to. So if Helios was called Hyperion, this simply meant he who dwells on high, and corresponds to Latin *Summanus* or *Superior*, or *Excelsior*. If, on the contrary, Helios is called Hyperionides, this, too, which meant originally no more than he who comes from, or belongs to those who dwell on high,† led to the myth that he was the descendant of Hyperion; so that in this case, as in the case of Zeus Kronion, the son really led to the conception of his father. Zeus Kronion meant originally no more than Zeus the eternal, the god of ages, the ancient of days; but *ίων* becoming usual as a patronymic suffix, Kronion was supposed to mean the son of Kronos. Kronos, the father, was created in order to account for the existence of the name Kronion. If Hyperion is called the son of Euryphaessa, the wide-shining, this requires no commentary; for even at present a poet might say that the sun is born of the wide-shining dawn. You see the spontaneous generation of mythology with every new name that is formed. As not only the sun, but also the moon and the dawn could be called dwellers on high, they, too, took the name of Hyperionis or Hyperionides; and hence Homer called Selene, the Moon, and Eos, the Dawn, sisters of Helios, and daughters of Hyperion and Euryphaessa, the Dawn

* At the end of the hymn the poet says:—

“χαῖρε, ἀναξ, πρόφρων δὲ βίον θυμηρεῖ ὑπαζε
 ἐκ οἴο δ’ ἀρξάμενος κλήσω μερόπων γένος ἀνδρῶν
 ἡμιθίων, ὃν ἔργα θεοὶ θυητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν.”

This would seem to imply that the poet looked upon Helios as a half-god, almost as a hero, who had once lived on earth.

† Corssen, “Ueber Steigerungsendungen,” Kuhn’s “Zeitschrift,” iii. p. 299.

doing service twice, both as mother, Euryphaessa, and as daughter, Eos. Nay, according to Homer, Euryphaessa, the Dawn, is not only the wife, but also the sister of Helios. All this is perfectly intelligible, if we watch the growth of language and mythology; but it leads, of course, to the most tragic catastrophes as soon as it is all taken in a literal sense.

Helios is called *ἀκάμας*, the never-tiring; *πανδερκής*, the all-seeing; *φαέθων*, the shining; and also *φοῖβος*, the brilliant. This last epithet *φοῖβος* has grown into an independent deity Phoebus, and it is particularly known as a name of Apollon, Phoibos Apollon; thus showing what is also known from other sources that in Apollo, too, we have one of the many mythic disguises of the sun. So far all is clear, because all the names which we have to deal with are intelligible, or, at all events, yield to the softest etymological pressure. But now if we hear the story of Phoibos Apollon falling in love with Daphne, and Daphne praying to her mother, the Earth, to save her from Phoibos; and if we read how either the Earth received her in her lap, and then a laurel tree sprang up where she had disappeared, or how she herself was changed into a laurel tree, what shall we think of this? It is a mere story, it might be said, and why should there be any meaning in it? My answer is, because people do not tell such stories of their gods and heroes, unless there is some sense in them. Besides, if Phoibos means the sun, why should not Daphne have a meaning, too? Before, therefore, we can decide whether the story of Phoibos and Daphne is a mere invention, we must try to find out what can have been the meaning of the word Daphne. In Greek it means a laurel,* and this would explain the purely Greek legend that Daphne was changed into a laurel tree. But who was Daphne? In order to answer this question, we must have recourse to etymology, or, in other words, we must examine the history of the word. Etymology, as you know, is no longer what it used to be; and though there may still be a classical scholar here and there who crosses himself at the idea of a Greek word being explained by a reference to Sanskrit, we naturally look to Sanskrit as the master-key to many a lock which no Greek key will open. Now Daphne, as I have shown, can be traced back to Sanskrit *Ahaná*, and *Ahaná* in Sanskrit means the dawn. As soon as we know this, everything becomes clear. The story of Phoibos and Daphne is no more than a description of what every one may see every day; first, the appearance of the Dawn in the eastern sky, then the rising of the Sun as if hurrying after his bride, then the gradual fading away of the bright Dawn at the touch of the fiery rays of the sun, and at last her death or disappearance in the lap of her mother, the Earth. All this seems to me as clear as daylight, and the only objection that

* See M. M.'s "Chips from a German Workshop" (2nd ed.), vol. ii, p. 95, note 45.

could be raised against this reading of the ancient myth would be, if it could be proved that *Ahaná* does not mean Dawn, and that Daphne cannot be traced back to *Ahaná*, or that *Helios* does not mean the Sun.

I know there is another objection, but it seems to me so groundless as hardly to deserve an answer. Why, it is asked, should the ancient nations have told these endless stories about the Sun and the Dawn, and why should they have preserved them in their mythology? We might as well ask why the ancient nations should have invented so many irregular verbs, and why they should have preserved them in their grammar. A fact does not cease to be a fact, because we cannot at once explain it. As far as our knowledge goes at present, we are justified in stating that the Aryan nations preserved not only their grammatical structure, and a large portion of their dictionary, from the time which preceded their separation, but that they likewise retained the names of some of their deities, some legends about their gods, some popular sayings and proverbs, and in these, it may be, the seeds of parables, as part of their common Aryan heirloom. Their mythological lore fills in fact a period in the history of Aryan thought, half-way between the period of language and the period of literature, and it is this discovery which gives to mythology its importance in the eyes of the student of the most ancient history and psychology of mankind.

And do not suppose that the Greeks, or the Hindús, or the Aryan nations in general were the only people who possessed such tales. Wherever we look, in every part of the world, among uncivilized as well as a civilized people, we find the same kind of stories, the same traditions, the same myths. The Finns, Lapps, and Esthonians do not seem a very poetical race, yet there is poetry even in their smoky tents, poetry surrounded with all the splendour of an arctic night, and fragrant with the perfume of moss and wild flowers. Here is one of their legends:—

“Wanna Issi had two servants, Koit and Ämmarik, and he gave them a torch which Koit should light every morning, and Ämmarik should extinguish in the evening. In order to reward their faithful services, Wanna Issi told them they might be man and wife, but they asked Wanna Issi that he would allow them to remain for ever bride and bridegroom. Wanna Issi assented, and henceforth Koit handed the torch every evening to Ämmarik, and Ämmarik took it and extinguished it. Only during four weeks in summer they remain together at midnight; Koit hands the dying torch to Ämmarik, but Ämmarik does not let it die, but lights it again with her breath. Then their hands are stretched out, and their lips meet, and the blush of the face of Ämmarik colours the midnight sky.”

This myth requires hardly any commentary; yet, as long as it is impossible to explain the names, Wanna Issi, Koit, and Ämmarik, it might be said that the story was but a love-story, invented by an idle Lapp, or Finn, or Esthonian. But what if Wanna Issi means,

in their own language, the Old Father, and if Koit means the Dawn? Can we then doubt any longer that Ämmarik must be the Gloaming, and that their meeting in the summer reflects those summer evenings when, particularly in the North, the torch of the sun seems never to die, and when the Gloaming is seen kissing the Dawn?

I wish I could tell you some more of these stories which have been gathered from all parts of the world, and which, though they may be pronounced childish and tedious by some critics, seem to me to glitter with the brightest dew of nature's own poetry, and to contain those very touches that make us feel akin, not only with Homer or Shakespeare, but even with Lapps, and Finns, and Kaffirs. But my time draws to an end.

If people cannot bring themselves to believe in solar and celestial myths among the Hindus and Greeks, let them study the folk-lore of the Semitic and Turanian races. I know there is, on the part of some of our most distinguished scholars, the same objection against comparing Aryan to Non-Aryan myths, as there is against any attempt to explain the features of Sanskrit or Greek by a reference to Finnish or Bask. In one sense that objection is well founded, for nothing would create greater confusion than to ignore the genealogical principle as the only safe one in a scientific classification of languages and of myths. We must first classify our myths and legends, as we classify our languages and dialects. We must first of all endeavour to explain what wants explanation in one member of a family by a reference to other members of the same family, before we allow ourselves to glance beyond. But there is in a comparative study of languages and myths not only a philological, but also a philosophical, and more particularly, a psychological interest, and though even in this more general study of mankind, the frontiers of language and race ought never to disappear, yet they can no longer be allowed to narrow or intercept our view. How much the student of Aryan mythology and ethnology may gain for his own progress by allowing himself a wider survey over the traditions and customs of the whole human race, is best known to those who have studied the works of Klemm, Waitz, Bastian, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Tylor, and Dr. Callaway. What is prehistoric in language among the Aryan nations, is frequently found as still historic among Turanian races. The same applies with regard to religions, myths, legends, and customs. Among Finns and Lapps, among Zulus and Maoris, among Khonds and Karens, we sometimes find the most startling analogies to Aryan traditions, and we certainly learn, again and again, this one important lesson, that as in language, so in mythology, there is nothing which had not originally a meaning, that every name of the gods and heroes had a beginning, a purpose, and a history. Jupiter was no more called Jupiter by accident, than the Polynesian *Maui*, the Samoyede

Num, or the Chinese *Tien*.* If we can discover the original meaning of these names, we have reached the first ground of their later growth. I do not say that we have solved the whole riddle of mythology if we can explain the first purpose of the mythological names, but I maintain that we have gained firm ground; I maintain that every true etymology gives us an historical fact, because the first giving of a name was an historical fact, and an historical fact of the greatest importance for the later development of ancient ideas. Think only of this one fact, which no one would now venture to doubt, that the supreme deity of the Greeks, the Romans, the Germans, is called by the same name as the supreme deity of the earliest Aryan settlers in India. Does not this one fact draw away the curtain from the dark ages of antiquity, and open before our eyes an horizon which we can hardly measure by years? The Greek *Zeus* is the same word as the Latin *Ju* in *Jupiter*, as the German *Tiu*; and all these were merely dialectic varieties of the Vedic *Dyaus*.† Now *dyaus* in Sanskrit is the name of the sky, if used as a feminine; if used as a masculine, as it is still in the Veda, it is the sky as a man or as a god—it is *Zeus*, the father of gods and men. You know, of course, that the whole language of ancient India is but a sister dialect of Greek, Latin, of German, Celtic, and Slavonic, and that if the Greek says *es-ti*, he is, if the Roman says *est*, the German *ist*, the Slave *jesté*, the Hindu said three thousand years ago, *as-ti*, he is. This *as-ti* is a compound of a root *as*, to be, and the pronoun *ti*. The root meant originally *to breathe*, and dwindled down after a time to the meaning of *to be*. All this must have happened before a single Greek or German reached the shores of Europe, and before a single Brahman descended into the plains of India. At that distant time we must place the gradual growth of language and ideas, of a language which we are still speaking, of ideas which we are still thinking, and at the same time only can we explain the framing of those names which were the first attempts at grasping supernatural powers, which became in time the names of the deities of the ancient world, the heroes of mythology, the chief actors in many a legend, nay, some of which have survived in the nursery tales of our own time.‡

My time, I see, is nearly over, but before I finish, I feel that I have a duty to perform from which I ought not to shrink. Some of those who have honoured me with their presence to-night may recollect that about a year ago a lecture was delivered in this very room by Professor Blackie, in which he tried to throw discredit on the scientific method of the interpretation of popular myths, or on what I call Comparative Mythology. Had he confined his remarks to the subject itself, I should have felt most grateful for his criticisms, little

* See M.M.'s "Lectures on the Science of Religion," p. 41, *seq.*

† See M.M.'s "Lectures on the Science of Language" (6th ed.), vol. ii., p. 468.

‡ See a most interesting essay, "Le Petit Poucet" (Tom Thumb), by Gaston Paris.

minding the manner in which they were conveyed—for a student of language knows what words are made of. Nor, had his personal reflections concerned myself alone, should I have felt called upon to reply to them thus publicly, for it has always seemed to me that unless we protest against unmerited praise, we have no right to protest against unmerited abuse. I believe I can appeal to all here present, that during the many years I have had the honour to lecture in this Institution, I have not once allowed myself to indulge in any personal remarks or to attack those who, being absent, cannot defend themselves. Even when I had to answer objections, or to refute false theories, I have always most carefully avoided mentioning the names of living writers. But as Professor Blackie has directed his random blows, not against myself, but against a friend of mine, Mr. Cox, the author of a work on Aryan Mythology, I feel that I must for once try to get angry, and return blow for blow. Professor Blackie speaks of Mr. Cox as if he had done nothing beyond repeating what I had said before. Nothing can be more unfair. My own work in Comparative Mythology has consisted chiefly in laying down some of the general principles of that science, and in the etymological interpretation of some of the ancient names of gods, goddesses, and heroes. In fact, I have made it a rule never to interpret or to compare the legends of India, Greece, Italy, or Germany, except in cases where it was possible, first of all, to show an identity or a similarity in the Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, or German names of the principal actors. Mr. Cox having convinced himself that the method which I have followed in mythology rests on sound and truly scientific principles, has adopted most, though by no means all, of my etymological interpretations. Professor Blackie, on the contrary, though he has never, as far as I know, paid much attention to the study of Comparative Philology, without which a study of Comparative Mythology is simply impossible, thunders forth the following sentence of condemnation:—"Even under the scientific guidance of a Bopp, a Pott, a Grimm, and a Müller, a sober man may sometimes, even in the full blaze of the new sun of comparative philology, allow himself to drink deep draughts, if not of *maundering madness*, at least of *manifest hallucination*." If such words are thrown at my head, I pick them up chiefly as etymological curiosities, and as striking illustrations of what Mr. Tylor calls "survivals in culture," showing how the most primitive implements of warfare, rude stones and unpolished flints, which an ethnologist would suppose to be confined to pre-historic races, to the red Indians of American or the wild Picts of Caledonia, turn up again most unexpectedly at the present day in the very centres of civilized life. All I can say is, that if, as a student of Comparative Mythology, I have been drinking deep draughts of maundering madness, I have been drinking in good company. In this respect Mr. Cox has

certainly given me far more credit than I deserve. I am but one out of many labourers in this rich field of scientific research, and he ought to have given far greater prominence to the labours of Grimm, Burnouf, Bopp, and before all, of my learned friend, Professor Kuhn.

But while, with regard to etymology, Mr. Cox contents himself with reporting the results of other scholars, he stands quite independent in his own treatment of Comparative Mythology. Of this Professor Blackie seems to have no suspicion whatever. The plan which Mr. Cox follows is to collect the coincidences in the legends themselves, and to show how in different myths the same story with slight variations is told again and again of different gods and heroes. In this respect his work is entirely original and very useful; for although these coincidences may be explained in different ways, and do not afford proof of a common historical origin of the mythologies of India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, they are all the more interesting from a purely psychological point of view, and supply important material for further researches. Mr. Tylor has lately worked with great success in the same rich mine; extending the limits of mythological research far beyond the precincts of the Aryan world, and showing that there are solar myths wherever the sun shines. I differ from Mr. Cox on many points, as he differs from me. I shall certainly keep to my own method of never attempting an interpretation or a comparison, except where the ground has first been cleared of all uncertainty by etymological research, and where the names of different gods and heroes have been traced back to a common source; but I gratefully acknowledge the help which I have received from his researches, particularly as suggesting new clusters of myths that might be disentangled by etymological analysis.

But not only has Professor Blackie failed to perceive the real character of Mr. Cox's work, but he has actually charged him with holding opinions which both Mr. Cox and myself have repeatedly disavowed and most strenuously opposed. Again and again have we warned the students of Comparative Mythology that they must not expect to be able to explain everything. Again and again have we pointed out that there are irrational elements in mythology, and that we must be prepared to find grains of local history on which, as I said,* the sharpest tools of Comparative Mythology must bend or break. Again and again have we shown that historical persons†—

* "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. ii. p. 172:—"Here then we see that mythology does not always create its own heroes, but that it lays hold of real history, and coils itself round it so closely that it is difficult, nay, almost impossible, to separate the ivy from the oak, the lichen from the granite to which it clings. And here is a lesson which comparative mythologists ought not to neglect. They are naturally bent on explaining everything that can be explained; but they should bear in mind that there may be elements in every mythological riddle which resist etymological analysis, for the simple reason that their origin was not etymological, but historical."

† "Lectures on the Science of Language, vol. ii. p. 581.

not only Cyrus and Charlemagne, but Frederick Barbarossa and even Frederick the Great—have been drawn into the vortex of popular mythology. Yet these are the words of Professor Blackie: "The cool way in which Max Müller and his English disciple, Mr. Cox, assume that there are no human figures and historical characters in the whole gallery of heroes and demigods in the Greek mythology, is something very remarkable."

I readily admit that some of the etymologies which I have proposed of mythological names are open to criticism; and if, like other scholars, Professor Blackie had pointed out to me any cases where I might seem to him to have offended against Grimm's law or other phonetic rules, I should have felt most grateful; but if he tells me that the Greek Erinyes should not be derived from the Sanskrit *Saranyû*, but from the Greek verb *ἐπιτίθειν*, to be angry, he might as well derive *critic* from *to criticise*;* and if he maintains that a name may have two or three legitimate etymologies, I can only answer that we might as well say that a child could have two or three legitimate mothers.

I have most reluctantly entered upon these somewhat personal explanations, and I should not have done so if I alone had been concerned in Professor Blackie's onslaught. I hope, however, that I have avoided everything that could give just offence to Professor Blackie, even if he should be present here to-night. Though he abuses me as a German, and laughs at the instinctive aversion to external facts and the extravagant passion for self-evolved ideas as national failings of all Germans (I only wonder that the story of the camel and the inner consciousness did not come in), yet I know that for many years German poetry and German scholarship have had few more ardent admirers, and German scholars few more trusty friends, than Professor Blackie. Nationality, it seems to me, has as little to do with scholarship as with logic. On the contrary, in every nation he that will work hard and reason honestly may be sure to discover some grains of truth. National jealousies and animosities have no place in the republic of letters, which is, and I trust always will be, the true international republic of all friends of work, of order, and of truth.

MAX MÜLLER.

* Professor Blackie quotes Pausanias in support of this etymology. He says: "The account of Pausanias (viii. 25, 26), according to which the terrible impersonation of conscience, or the violated moral law, is derived from *ἐπιτίθειν*, an old Greek verb originally signifying to be angry, has sufficient probability, not to mention the obvious analogy of *Ἄραι*, another name sometimes given to the awful maids (*στυγαί*), from *ἀρά*, an imprecation." If Professor Blackie will refer to Pausanias, he will find that the Arcadians assigned a very different cause to the anger of Demeter, which is supposed to have led to the formation of her new name Erinyes. The story itself does not bear repeating in an English journal.



THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BAVARIA.

IN May of the present year an article appeared in the *Contemporary Review* on the crisis in the Catholic Church in Bavaria, which narrated the course of events up to the excommunication of Döllinger, about the middle of April. His disciple, Professor Dr. Friedrich, also ecclesiastical historian, was excommunicated at the same time. He has in course of publication an ecclesiastical history of Germany, of which two volumes have already appeared. The excommunication of both was solemnly announced to the people from the pulpit. The other professors of theology in Munich have all submitted, and they afterwards decidedly separated themselves from their excommunicated colleagues by a public declaration. In 1864, the professors of theology in Munich publicly separated from Professor Frohschammer and disclaimed his views, at the desire of the Archbishop of Munich. In this Döllinger concurred, indeed he headed the list of subscribers. He has now suffered the like fate from his own colleagues.

It is noteworthy, and is not without profound meaning, that both the ecclesiastical historians have steadfastly opposed the decrees of the Council, and have incurred the penalty of excommunication. Ecclesiastical history is a dangerous branch of knowledge for the Roman claims to infallibility and supernaturalism; for it decidedly reveals the fallibility of the popes, and exhibits them in their too

often coarse natures, and disperses the halo of the supernatural. Dogmatics, even biblical exegesis and positive ecclesiastical law, must be unconditionally at the service of the authorities of the Church, and may only contain what is ordained by them. Besides this, they must represent the Church and the Papacy in an ideal light, and not as they really are. But ecclesiastical history has only to report real facts to wield an annihilating criticism against the Roman papal power. If the Catholics would acquaint themselves with church history, and if the Papacy were not always represented to them in unhistorical and ideal glorification, but as it really has been and is, the power of the Pope would soon be at an end. The Jesuits and their followers, therefore, spare no pains to prevent church history from being taught, and when they cannot do this they falsify it. Meanwhile, however, even from the standpoint of church history, the Opposition is limited by bounds which prevent it from attaining to a real reform of the Church. For from the historical standpoint the eye is always turned towards the past, and some past state of things is looked upon as an ideal one, as alone right and desirable. This is a delusion; it is opposed to all historical development, hinders progress and leads to reaction. In order to effect a real reform, a higher leading idea is needed, not merely recurrence to the past, the eye must be cast forward upon present circumstances and needs, and not alone backwards; real progress must be aimed at, not only stand-still or retrogression. This latter seems to be the special aim of the "Old Catholic" movement.

So far as is known, Döllinger has not made any protest against his excommunication, nor appealed to any canonical court. He at once desisted from all ecclesiastical functions, although as provost of St. Cajetan, he is the chief court minister. He has so far therefore practically recognised the excommunication. The motives for this conduct are not precisely known. Some say that Döllinger gave up his ecclesiastical functions in the court church at the special desire of the King, others maintain that he did so to avoid public scandal. This last would betray some doubt as to the justice of his own cause. For he who is fully convinced of the right and necessity of opposition, will not be deterred from doing all he can to further his cause because others take offence at it. Otherwise how could any improvements be effected?

Professor Friedrich, court beneficiary of the same church of which Döllinger is provost, was disposed to continue his ecclesiastical functions in spite of the excommunication, and therefore addressed an inquiry to the King whether it would be permitted. He received no decisive answer, but, as the newspapers stated, his question was handed over to the minister of worship, from whom until the other

day no answer had been received. At any rate, Professor Friedrich has not performed divine service in the above-mentioned court church, that is, has not read mass. A different course was taken by Renftle, parish priest of Mehring, a village near Augsburg. Before Döllinger had done so, he publicly protested against the dogma from the pulpit, and was therefore deposed from his office and excommunicated by the Bishop of Augsburg. But as his congregation remained faithful to him, he continued to perform his ecclesiastical functions and his cure of souls as parish priest in spite of it. The Bavarian Government refused the Bishop of Augsburg the power to proceed by force against Renftle which he desired. Renftle therefore remains steadfastly at his post.

The followers of Döllinger, the "Old Catholics" as they are called, have not been wanting in activity, particularly by means of the press. But their efforts have been mainly directed towards gaining over the government to their cause, and inducing it to take measures against those who defy the laws of the State. Their endeavours to interest the people in the movement have been less zealous. Their main efforts were directed to getting as many signatures as possible from Catholics to an address to the King, who had fixed the meeting on which they had already agreed for the 10th of April. By degrees about 12,000 signatures were obtained. Meanwhile the acting committee so called, appointed by this assembly, had a vehement dispute with the Archbishop of Munich, who had issued a pastoral letter against the assembly. Professor Huber answered the Archbishop, vehemently denouncing his present conduct, which was in striking contrast with his conduct at the Council at Rome. This, however, was a quarrel, which in no way furthered the cause itself. Of more importance was a publication by Professor Friedrich, who had been present at Rome during the Council, Cardinal Hohenlohe having sent for him as a learned theological adjutant. His article in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* contains many characteristic notices and compromising statements about the Council, the conduct of the Roman Curia, and the pitiful part played by the bishops.

None of this, however, was of much moment, for no great energetic movement arose out of it. The people took no part in the opposition against the new dogma. Döllinger did indeed receive addresses from some universities and towns in support of his undertaking; but no church congregation was formed, because he had relinquished all ecclesiastical functions and expressly avoided influencing the course of events by any verbal or written declaration. Even when a great meeting of "Old Catholics" took place at Munich at Whitsuntide, and an attempt was made to work upon the public at

large, he did not appear at it, but left all that was to be done to some active but uninfluential followers. The speakers were Professor Michelis, from Braunsberg in East Prussia (late of Westphalia), and Professor Huber, of Munich. Michelis, not at all a clear-headed man, by no means liberal, but rather hyper-Catholic, spoke with his customary pathos, and did not fail to give utterance to telling liberal phrases which gained for him much applause. But his speech was full of contradiction and confusion. Sometimes he appeared to advocate a return to the earliest Christian Church, sometimes to think that it was only to avert the intended innovations and to remain as we are at present, so that the Catholic Church may not be turned into a priest's church. Just as if this had not been done long ago, and was not the very essence of Catholicism. Now he seemed to think that learning and the laity should alone have decided influence in the Church, then he declared that he fully believed in infallibility, only not in that of the Pope. He called upon the laity to stand up against the infallibility bishops and priests with the catechism in their hands, in which nothing is taught about Papal infallibility, forgetting that in the same catechism the Catholic Church is divided into a teaching and a listening Church, and that the whole duty of the latter—all the laity—is to receive definite dogmas from the teaching Church, that is, the hierarchy, with dutiful obedience.

Professor Huber made vehement attacks upon the Archbishop of Munich. But neither the character nor aim of "Old Catholicism" was any further developed by him, and the assembly broke up without essentially advancing the cause. Meanwhile the German bishop upon whom the "Old Catholics" had placed their greatest hopes had submitted, and proclaimed the Vatican decree. This was Bishop Hefele, of Rottenburg, in Württemberg, professor of ecclesiastical history at Tübingen, and author of a History of Councils, one of the most decided opponents of the Infallibility dogma at the Vatican Council. In the circular of 10th of April of this year, in which with some obscurity Professor Hefele announces his submission, to the clergy of his diocese, he says, in justification of it after his previous attitude of opposition: "The peace and unity of the Church is so great a good that great and heavy personal sacrifices may be made for it." According to this episcopal view, the peace of the Church is to be secured at any price, even at the price of truth and justice, and the Catholic nations, the Germans in particular, are to be sacrificed to every claim of Rome, every Jesuitical hierarchical tyranny, and are not in any way to be permitted to defend themselves, lest they disturb the peace of the Church. The Roman Curia, which has never troubled itself about the peace of the Church when its own lust of power was in question, can on such principles conveniently enforce

all manner of claims upon German bishops, since these bishops are always crying out "peace, peace!" even when the Curia carries on active warfare against law, the State, learning, and civilization.

It is just the same with the "unity of the Church." It is made an idol to which everything must be sacrificed, even our highest and holiest possessions truth, faithfulness to conviction, natural rights, and moral duties;—the consciences, the liberties, the dignity of men. It is not considered that this unity can no longer have any value if the highest good of humanity is to be sacrificed to it. During the middle ages more human lives were sacrificed to this phantom of unity than ever were devoured by the Moloch of Phœnicia or Carthage. How, then, can a German bishop speak merely of subjective personal sacrifices when it is proposed to sacrifice not only personal advantages, but truth and justice themselves?

It is but too clear what intellectual dimness and moral weakness this Roman hierarchical system may bring upon otherwise highly-cultivated and excellent men. A second example of this is offered by the docile submission of another eminent man in the Catholic Church in Germany—Haneberg, Abbot of the Benedictine Monastery of St. Boniface, at Munich. Haneberg is also professor of theology at the University, and is perhaps the most highly-esteemed and influential Catholic priest in Munich. Through an indiscretion, a private letter of his to his friend Bishop Hefe appeared in the newspapers, in which he announces his submission to the new dogma, and states his motives for it. He acknowledges that nothing was known of Papal infallibility in the early Church, and that so far he does not consider the making of this infallibility into a dogma to be justifiable. But he adds that he submits to the decree from regard to the Catholic people, whose pious sentiments he does not wish to disturb, and also from the necessity of ecclesiastical obedience. The Abbot silences his better knowledge and conscience with the following comfortable words: "Perhaps God will send us a remedy for the fundamental evil of the age in the increase of primatial power. God the Lord, who is with his Church, will accept the sacrifice of submission, and make it a germ of life. I cannot go on in this martyr-like frame of mind; I put an end to it by submission, in trust in God, who is with his Church." Certainly a remarkable motive for submission, and a peculiar kind of comfort! The Abbot appears entirely to have forgotten that it is a duty to bear witness to recognised truth, even in face of the arbitrariness and violence of the authorities. And it is in the Catholic Church that steadfast witnesses for the truth are specially applauded and honoured! It is very convenient to submit to error and arbitrary power, because God can bring good out of it, and will even "perhaps" make it an occasion for interference and reformation.

But we must not confound trust in God with moral weakness, nor make the former a cloak for the latter, and thus justify our own timidity and indolence. It might by the same reasoning be said that missions are needless, because God can spread the faith without them. And if we must not enter into a contest for our highest possessions lest the peace of pious souls should be disturbed, the Apostles, and Christ himself, must have been in the wrong in not leaving men in peace, and for bringing dissensions into the existing religion.

It is doubtless confidently to be hoped that the very reverse will be the result of this arrogant increase of Papal power, and that the final liberation of the people from it will be thereby effected; but in order to do this men must be found who think differently from Abbot Haneberg, and act differently too; men who do not hesitate to sacrifice their own peace for the sake of down-trodden truth, and to resist hierarchical tyranny; who will not shrink from subjecting themselves to the insults of a vulgar press, and submit rather to suffer ecclesiastical penalties than consent to falsehood and injustice. It is by means of such men that God works, not by means of those who pusillanimously agree to everything. It is through such men only that God can and will do anything against the Papacy. Even were He to reveal himself in a supernatural manner, and work miracles for the reform of the Catholic Church, they would not be acknowledged by the Pope and his servants; for those miracles only would be recognised as divine which were in favour of the Pope and his claims; those which testified against him would be at once pronounced delusions of the devil. Even if an angel came down from heaven he would accomplish nothing, unless he favoured the Papal claims. He would otherwise be declared by the Pope to be a son of darkness, would be branded as a teacher of error, banished or, if possible, burnt. There is but one means of salvation from Papal domination. Men of insight and character must make decided resistance, and seek to liberate the people by their teaching and example.

The submission of Hefele and Haneberg was, of course, unfavourable to the progress of the "Old Catholic" movement. The more so, as on the one hand the government did nothing for it, and on the other the bishops proceeded against it with great severity. The Archbishop of Munich in his pastoral letter declared that all who had signed the above-mentioned address had incurred excommunication. So also did the Archbishop of Bamberg, and the rest of the Bavarian and the Prussian bishops. With very few exceptions, the inferior clergy submitted to the Papal and episcopal commands. The parish priests, with their deans, openly published their allegiance to the new dogma, and separated from Dollinger's party. The

faithful were threatened with refusal of absolution, with excommunication, with the denial of every means of grace and Christian burial, if they joined the movement. There were a few isolated cases in which these penalties were incurred. Before long a declaration from the collective episcopate of Germany appeared. About the end of May an official address was issued to the clergy, and another to the faithful, signed by twenty-three bishops. In the address to the clergy, they were commended for their behaviour, and then instructions were given them as to the duty of faith in the new dogma, as to the right understanding and mode of treating it, which were to serve as guides in teaching it. But above all things it was enforced that it is the duty of every Catholic to submit to every dogma of the Vatican Council with inward faith and by outward confession, for this is required by the fundamental doctrine of the Catholic Church, when it has spoken by a General Council. Every Catholic who obstinately persists in opposing the decrees of the Vatican thereby incurs the guilt of heresy, subjects himself to the great ban of the Church, with all its ecclesiastical consequences, and is therefore excommunicated. The clergy therefore are continually to admonish the faithful not to suffer themselves to be seduced by those who place their own or any other opinions above the divinely appointed doctrinal authority of the Church.

“The opponents of the Church,” continues the pastoral letter, “seek to deceive, partly by reporting the words of the decrees of the Council in a mutilated form or incorrectly, partly by altering their meaning, by unduly amplifying them, or by false interpretations. It is wrong to draw inferences for public law, or the lives of Catholics, from such false or distorted interpretations of the Catholic doctrine.”

After this it is maintained that the Council has not conferred on the Pope any greater power than he before possessed, and especially no supreme power. It has not conferred on the Pope any personal infallibility, but only declared that infallibility is promised to him in a certain precisely defined and lofty exercise of his doctrinal office. It is said to be a calumny that the Catholic Church and her doctrines endanger rulers and States; for it is contradicted by the fact that it was the Church which first inculcated the duty of obedience to rulers and governments for God's sake, and conscientious obedience to the laws of the State. But the privilege of interference with the deepest matters of religion cannot be conceded to States. The right of States to self-defence and control, therefore, cannot include the privilege of forbidding the proclamation and defence of Catholic doctrines, or of determining who is a member of the Church and who not, or who is entitled to remain in the possession and enjoyment of ecclesiastical offices and incomes. This would be a despotism which would put an

end to all conscientiousness and liberty of teaching. Just so it is declared that it would be an injustice to permit the property of the Catholic Church to be at the disposal of governments.

The Pope and the bishops are the visible pillars of the Church, without whom it would cease to exist, and it is to this Church alone that the right of holding benefices and the enjoyment of their incomes is secured by constitution and contract. Finally, it is declared to be a groundless fear that it is intended to re-introduce the hierarchical system of the middle ages. The Church has neither the wish nor the power to resuscitate the state of things of former times in their previous form. Of all the bulls which the Opposition designates as dangerous to Christian States, the episcopate declares that one only is dogmatic (the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Pope Boniface VIII.) But this was adopted by a general council. The infallibility of general councils, therefore, and of the Church must be as dangerous to States as that of the Popes. Besides, it has been clearly shown by solemn acts of the Holy Chair in modern times, by the concordats and treaties entered into with the States of the nineteenth century, that the Pope has gone back to his strictly ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and has limited the ancient ecclesiastical immunities or principles to such an extent that they can nowhere present any obstacle to modern equality of rights; and there is no fact in recent times which gives any ground for the conclusion that the Holy See desires any other relations with States than those previously existing.

These are the main contents of this address to the clergy, and it must be confessed that it is not unskillfully drawn up to serve its purpose. First, the faithful are admonished as to the duty of blind obedience or unconditional subjection to the decrees of the bishops—that is, of the Church—and threatened with the terrors of the Church's malediction. Next, however, the revolting features of the new dogma are softened down as much as possible, and its danger to States denied. The bishops do not hesitate to deny the most patent facts, to employ all the artifices of concealment, and to make them a rule of conduct for the clergy. The conclusion is specially remarkable. They are barefaced enough to declare that the Pope has done nothing in modern times to indicate that he desired to put forth higher claims in relation to States, and appear entirely to have forgotten that in the *Encyclical* and the *Syllabus*, so called, of 1864, he expressly assumes the supreme authority in the world, places the laws of the Church above those of the State, and expressly declares the statement to be inimical to the Church, that the Popes in the middle ages overstepped their divinely-conferred authority. Besides this, the bishops themselves call the bull "*Unam Sanctam*" dogmatic, and therefore absolutely binding and in force to this day.

But in this very bull absolute supremacy over nations and rulers is decidedly claimed for the Pope, towards whom they are to maintain a subordinate and servile attitude.

The statement of the bishops that the hierarchy, or the Church, teaches the people obedience to governments, sounds like a jest, especially when their own conduct in Bavaria is considered, where they at once supersede the existing laws when obedience to them is unfavourable to their so-called ecclesiastical rights, or stands in their way. Thus, for example, the Archbishop of Bamberg petitioned the Bavarian Government to give the *Placet*, as it is called, to the promulgation of the new dogma. The Government refused, but the Archbishop had the dogma proclaimed nevertheless. The rest of the Bavarian bishops did not even ask for the *Placet*, but proclaimed the dogma in opposition to the existing laws without ceremony.

The address of the bishops to the faithful, published at the same time, tries to depreciate modern learning, and to bring it as much as possible into suspicion; the second part treats of the well-known distressed situation of the Pope. As it is characteristic, and plainly shows the incompatibility of learning, sound sense, and mental culture with the Roman hierarchical system, and therefore bears within it its own condemnation, we quote a portion of it verbatim:—

“In consequence of the decrees of the Vatican Council, many minds, especially in Germany, have been greatly excited. While the faithful Catholic people have everywhere cheerfully submitted to the decisions of the General Council, in those circles of society which lay claim to higher culture we find aversion to and alienation from its decrees, especially that of the infallible doctrinal office of the Pope. In the camp which is hostile to the Church a violent and widespread agitation has taken place, with the object of insulting it, of calumniating it, of bringing it into bondage, and even of annihilating it, if human powers could accomplish what the gates of hell have never been able to do. Whence comes this state of things? Learning in Germany has in recent times entered upon paths even in the theological sphere which are not compatible with the existence of the Catholic faith. This learned tendency, which has freed itself from the authority of the Church, and believes in nothing but its own infallibility, is incompatible with the Catholic faith. It is a falling away from the true spirit of the Church, since it does homage to a spirit of false liberty, which prefers personal views and opinions to faith in the Divine authority of the Church inspired by the Holy Ghost. In face of these facts, does it not seem providential that just in our times, when free theological science, as it is called, has raised its head so high, the dogma of the infallible doctrinal office of the chief shepherd and teacher of the Church should have been proclaimed, in direct contradiction to this false tendency in theology? What would not have been the lasting result of this free science, so called, in the sphere of Catholic theology, if the Council of the Vatican had not set up that touchstone of souls, upon which the proud darkness of science, which considers itself infallible, has been broken, and by which no less must be revealed that lamentable frivolity of our time, which, even within the sphere of the

supernatural, worships public opinion as the highest oracle, while it despises the doctrinal office of the Church ordained by God. The whole episcopate, all successors of the apostles, to whom our divine Saviour said: 'Behold I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world;' and, 'He that heareth you heareth me, and he that despiseth you despiseth me'—are one, according to the saying of Peter. They all stand upon this rock of the Church, from which no man can separate himself who seeks to belong to the flock of Jesus Christ.

"While, therefore, beloved in the Lord, in most intimate communion with the collective episcopate of the Catholic world, we unanimously declare our entire agreement with, and submission to, all and every decree of the Vatican Council, we at the same time decidedly protest against the statement that a new doctrine has been proclaimed which is not contained in the ancient traditions of the Church, or that by the doctrine of the infallible doctrinal office and official supremacy of the Pope any change is introduced into the relations of Church and State, which can in any way endanger the power of the State. At the same time we warn all members of the flocks intrusted to us by God of the dangers of the erroneous paths above mentioned, which separate from the communion of the holy Church. We most earnestly admonish all the faithful to abide sincerely and steadfastly in the faith of our holy mother, the Church, which, according to the word of the apostle, is a pillar and ground of the truth."

So far the first part of this pastoral letter. All the current phrases are heaped together to work upon the minds of the uneducated, who are admonished to blind obedience and apathetic subjection to the faith. It may be truly said that there are here as many misrepresentations of the truth as there are words. Even what is said of the cheerful willingness of the people to submit is absolutely untrue. There was not a trace of alacrity anywhere, although, according to custom, the uneducated masses behaved like an obedient flock. Even the bishops themselves confess that all who possess culture and judgment have declared against the dogma and refused to recognise it. Their opponents are reproached with insult, calumny, &c. But the bishops call it insult, when the disgraceful acts, the artifices, the falsifications, and fictions of the hierarchy, and especially of the popes, as revealed by history, are brought to the knowledge of the public. And they call the mystification and misrepresentation of history, and the maintenance of falsehood, divine truth, proclaimed under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

They say that learning gives itself out to be infallible. Again a complete untruth, and unworthy artifice. Learning has not acknowledged the Pope to be infallible, and has brought forward historical and reasonable proofs of his fallibility, which form evidence so complete that no reasonable man can doubt it. Because nothing can be adduced to contradict it, they try to weaken learned proofs and to bring them into suspicion by accusing the learned investigators of giving themselves out to be infallible, because they turn the results of learning, historical facts, and reasonable evidence to

good account. But no man lays claim to infallibility because he maintains that a truth which he has sought out stands firm and unassailable. Learning can aim at certain and trustworthy results without boasting of infallibility.

Those who, like the bishops, will not grant this must favour absolute scepticism, deny all trustworthiness to human knowledge, and hold everything to be uncertain and insecure. How the bishops can dare to assert that anything is certain is inconceivable. They saw off the bough on which they are sitting themselves. Besides, modern learning puts forward no claim to infallibility. It is well aware of the liability to error. It cherishes a wholesome relative scepticism, is always and unweariedly making fresh researches, and thus by degrees it achieves great and unassailable results. The bishops, who are very little or only scholastically educated, are not acquainted with the modern learning upon which they pass judgment, and speak as the blind may speak of colours. And when they go on to say that theology becomes uneclesiastical, and falls away from the spirit of the Catholic Church, that is, the hierarchy, because it seeks to become a free and therefore true science, and ceases to be false science and mere Papal court sophistry—they condemn this hierarchical Church themselves. It is clear that it cannot bear free investigation, and is only pleased when reason and learning are suppressed. And how naïve is their admiration that, in the face of the arrogant intellectual pride of learning, the Pope has providentially had himself proclaimed infallible, and has put forth his claims without troubling himself with learned researches! They do not see in their utter blindness that this Papal act is the greatest assumption which any man has ever permitted to himself in the history of the human race, the greatest outrage against God, against the intellect of man, and even against the Christian religion, which has ever been perpetrated.

The usual abuse of texts of Scripture is not, of course, wanting. The words of Christ are to be applied only to the bishops, not to simple believers. Christ is turned into an aristocrat, who is with the rulers of the Church only to the end of the world. He keeps aloof from the common people; they are referred to the subordinate ministry of the princes of the Church! Thus is the work of Christ distorted! so far have these bishops, who call themselves organs of the Holy Spirit, departed from the Spirit of Christ! And how do they distort historical truth? In this, however, they are true to ancient usage. The infallibility of the Pope is said to have always been the faith in the ancient Catholic Church! And yet the fathers of the first centuries knew nothing whatever about this most important fundamental dogma. Even in the fourteenth century the

European episcopate did not believe in Papal infallibility, and solemnly and decidedly proclaimed that they did not, in the decrees of the General Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle; in all of which the principle was acted upon that general councils only were the supreme organs of doctrinal authority, and that the Pope was subordinate to general councils, the collective episcopate.

These principles also prevailed in the Gallican Church up to recent times, without its ever being declared heretical, though the Pope has been certainly continually at enmity with it. Yet in face of these certain and well-known facts, the German bishops have had the audacity to assert, with contempt of all truth, that belief in Papal infallibility is ancient, universal, and has always existed! What will they achieve by it, especially in Germany, except that they will draw down upon themselves the ridicule and derision of all educated men who have any knowledge of history?

During this time also two Encyclicals have appeared from the Pope, one in May, the other in June, which, however, do not refer directly to the Church conflict in Bavaria and the rest of Germany. Both are devoted to a narrative of the reign of Pius IX., and to the distress of the situation in which he finds himself. The second is remarkable for a passage which plainly shows what importance the Pope still allows to the cardinals and bishops. He speaks of their advice of which he still avails himself, and says that "they illumine this seat of truth" (that is, the Roman chair) "by the splendour of their virtues and their unanimous submission." Of course they no longer take any independent part as teachers, or in the government of the Church. In this Encyclical the Pope speaks also of "rebellious teachers who are bound by numerous vows, but whom he now sees with bitterness going their own way without in the least concerning themselves about his voice or their own salvation; for they neglect to use the time God has given them for repentance, and rather call down the wrath of God upon themselves than try to appropriate the benefaction of the Redeemer." This plainly refers to the opposition, particularly at Munich; and the bitter feeling at Rome may be specially strong against Döllinger, as great hopes had been placed upon him, and he had been distinguished for his previous services by the dignity of a *cameriere secreto*.

About the middle of June an official document at length appeared on the part of the "Old Catholics." Döllinger, with about thirty colleagues, mostly from Munich, published a declaration in which some light is thrown on the standpoint, aims, and motives of the "Old Catholics." They say: 1. "True to the inviolable duty which is not disputed by Pope or bishops, of every Catholic Christian to keep firm hold of the faith, and to resist every innovation, even

if introduced by an angel from heaven, we persevere in rejecting the Vatican dogmas." Then follow further particulars; it is stated that the Vatican decree contains innovations concerning the Pope, and that the new dogmatic doctrine owes its origin to falsification, and its spread to compulsion; further that the whole Church, all the faithful are deprived of their rights, the force of tradition is entirely annulled, the Pope made into an unlimited ruler, subject to no further limits upon his arbitrary power than such as the Sultan of Turkey may have.

2. "We persevere," they continue, "in the firm conviction that the Vatican decrees constitute a serious danger for the Church and for society; that they are simply incompatible with present laws and institutions, and that, by accepting them, we should fall into insuperable difficulties with regard to our political duties and oaths."

The attempts of the bishops to conceal or deny this will be vain, and their endeavours to soften it down will have all the less weight because they are now entirely powerless and without rights in face of the Papal decrees and claims. Besides the attempts at explanation of the German bishops are quite at variance with the opinions of some others—with those of Archbishop Manning, of Westminster, for example, who recognises Papal infallibility in its fullest possible extent. The danger is all the greater, because the infallibility of the Pope, in spite of the disclaimers of the bishops, is a "personal" one.

Again, in the Syllabus so called, with its anathemas, which the bishops pass over in silence, may be seen what rights the Pope assumes in relation to States; and the solemn rejection by the Pope a few years ago of the Austrian constitution, as well as the publications of the Jesuits, plainly show how these rights are to be construed.

3. "We appeal," they continue, "to the involuntary testimony which the German bishops themselves have borne to the justice of our cause. If we openly and directly reject the new doctrine, that the Pope is the universal bishop and absolute ruler of every Christian in the sphere of morals, of all moral conduct therefore, the bishops show, by their uncertain and contradictory explanations in their pastoral letters, that they perfectly well recognise the novelty and repulsiveness of this doctrine, and that they are in reality ashamed of it. Not one of them can make up his mind to follow the example of Archbishop Manning and the Jesuits, and to leave the simple and natural sense of the Vatican decree alone. But they forget that the attempts at explanation and softening down in their pastoral letters, as applied to dogmas, put an end to all certainty and uniformity of doctrine, and must result in a general uncertainty in the faith. What would remain firm and trustworthy of the doctrinal decrees of the Church, ancient and modern, if the treatment which is applied to the latest pastoral letters were applied to the bull of Pope Boniface VIII., or to any of them—if their clear intention and obvious meaning were so knocked on the head, as is the case

here? We deplore such an abuse of the episcopal office. We deplore still more deeply that the same bishops have not hesitated, in a pastoral letter to the Catholic people, to answer the conscientious cry from their dioceses with insults to reason and learning."

4. "We reject," the declaration continues, "the threats of the bishops as unjustifiable, and their proceedings as not binding and invalid." Formerly it was the originators of new doctrines who were expelled from communion with the Church; it is the first time that men have been excommunicated for adhering to the ancient, unchangeable doctrines, and rejecting the new. An unjust excommunication disgraces not those who fall under it, but those who inflict it.

5. "We live in the hope," say the subscribers in conclusion, "that under higher guidance the conflict now begun may be the means of preparing for and effecting the long wished for and inevitable reforms both in the constitution and doctrines of the Church." They trust in the divine guide of the Church, and they behold in the future a picture of genuine ecclesiastical regeneration, a state of things in which the cultivated nations of the Catholic creed, without impairing their membership in the body of the Church universal, and free from the dread of unjustifiable ambition, may each develop its Church system as best suits its character and mission, and by the harmonious efforts of clergy and laity. And they look forward to a time when the world will rejoice in the leadership of a primate and episcopate, who, by active co-operation in a common life, have acquired the judgment and ability to regain and maintain for the Church the only position worthy of her, at the head of universal culture. It is remarked, in conclusion, that it is in this way alone that a re-union of the separated sections of Christendom can be effected.

These are the chief contents of the address of Döllinger and the thirty subscribers. It indicates a departure from Döllinger's previous standpoint. He formerly tried to gain over the Episcopate against the Papacy, and seems to have recognised the collective Episcopate as the essence of the Church. But since the Episcopate has now gone over to the Papacy, he turns against it too, severely censures its conduct, and now appears to recognise the essence of the Catholic Church in the laity and the learned theologians. Still he wishes to represent the true, ancient Catholic Church, and to retain the Primate and Episcopate, although at the conclusion of the address he appears to have national churches in view. How all this can be compatible is not clear; at all events, this is a different Catholic Church from that to which Döllinger has hitherto given his allegiance, and for which he has zealously laboured during a long

life. Of course the infallibility of the Church is to be maintained; but as the previous representatives of it, the Pope and Episcopate, although unanimous as to the decrees of the Council, are rejected, it is not easy to see where this infallibility is to reside, and who are to be its representatives. It appears as though the Catholic people and the theologians learned in history were to have the highest infallible authority, so far as both are representatives of tradition. Great stress is laid upon ancient, continuous, and uniform tradition; what has been always and everywhere believed must be pure and certain Christian truth—a principle which was certainly early laid down by Vincentius Lirinensis (in the fifth century), but which has never been acted upon in the formation or confirmation of dogmas. For dogmas have proceeded from a dialectic process, of which the people understand very little, because they relate to theological subtleties, for the comprehension of which special study is required. Even now the Arian, Nestorian, Monophysite, Monothelite and Pelagian dogmas are unintelligible to the Christian people, and in those earlier times they did not proceed from the collective Christian consciousness. This collective consciousness and tradition, therefore, cannot be held to be the essential Catholic principle which can be opposed to the Pope and the Episcopate, and yet remain Catholic in the traditional sense of the word. It is singular that so learned a theologian as Döllinger does not see this, and can fall into the illusion that after rejecting the animating principle of tradition, especially after rejecting the existing Pope and Episcopate, he can still be in possession of genuine Catholicism. In fact, by the division of Catholicism into ancient and modern, the dissolution of the previous Church is accomplished, and neither party can claim to be the Catholic Church in the former sense of the word. Material and form are separated as in the dissolution of an organism. Tradition, with all it contains, is the material part of the Catholic Church, while Pope and Episcopate are the animating principle. Old Catholicism retains only the material part, and rejects the animating principle, though it speaks of a Primate and Episcopate in its own sense. The Roman Church, on the contrary, retains indeed the previous principle of authority in the Pope and Episcopate, but by the new dogmas she has separated herself from the material part, from tradition, and has thereby fallen into dissolution and confusion.

Another great failing in Döllinger's declaration is that, although it assures us that he and his followers remain faithful to the ancient traditional faith, and will resist Papal and Episcopal innovations, it does not tell us what they understand by this old Catholicism, what belongs to it, and what not, to what former period of the Church they attach themselves, and where modern Catholicism begins. Whether, for example, the Council of Trent, with its nearly 500

anathemas against the Protestants, belongs to Döllinger's old Catholicism or not. This is all left in obscurity, and it seems as if he was not quite clear about it himself. Again, at the conclusion of the declaration, a Church reform is spoken of, by which the Catholic Church is to be brought into harmony with modern culture and learning; but notwithstanding all these fine words, we are not told wherein this reform is to consist. Indeed, the promise of a real reform in accordance with modern culture appears to me to be absolutely incompatible with the before expressed resolution to abide by the ancient traditional faith, and to reject every kind of innovation.

Although otherwise Döllinger and his followers have approached considerably nearer to Frohschammer's standpoint, they will not confess it, nor take the last decisive step towards a real reform of the Church by going back to the simple teaching of Christ. This does not appear to them to be "positive" enough—some decrees and additions of theologians and bishops must be added to it; it does not seem to them to be clear enough—some theological-hierarchical explanations are required; finally, it does not seem to them to be authoritative enough—it must receive the testimony of many subordinate authors and ecclesiastical authorities before it can be worthy of credence, as though they deserved more credit than Christ himself, and as though his simple teaching did not bear its verification upon the face of it without its needing witnesses or miracles any more than that $2 + 2 = 4$ require any further testimony in order to be believed. The address to the King was finally handed over with its signatures to the Ministry, accompanied by an urgent petition for protection against the bishops and their measures.

The Bavarian Ministry was placed in no little perplexity by all these movements and efforts. On the one hand the bishops proceeded with the publication and introduction of the dogma without troubling themselves about the legal Placet—that is, the law that all the proclamations of the Church must receive the assent of the Government. On the other hand, the "Old Catholics," as they were persecuted by the bishops about the new dogma which had no legal force, unremittingly urged energetic measures. But the ministers had not the means, and by reason of their own indecision scarcely the will, to interfere in the violation of the law which the bishops had permitted themselves.

At the beginning of June there appeared a series of articles in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, on the "Vatican Decrees and the Bavarian Laws." They plainly had an official origin, and investigated the means at the disposal of the Government for punishing the bishops for their disobedience and contempt of law. The result was to show that the Government had no means at its disposal, that those which formerly existed were no longer available, and that

modern legislation provided no other. Neither the royal Placet, which has still a legal existence, nor the *appellatio ab abusu*, nor the right to convene synods, could be availingly employed. If the Government employed these means the bishops would simply ignore their commands. By the use of the temporal means the Government would incur the danger of civil processes, and might be involved in a conflict with an uncertain issue. For, as an income cannot be at once withdrawn from a State official on account of errors in discipline, so it is with the bishops. There remained, therefore, until the necessary legislation is introduced, nothing to the Government but to refuse the disobedient bishops all support from the State in their ecclesiastical measures against the clergy, and to protect all those citizens of the State who did not receive the illegally proclaimed Vatican decree in their offices and incomes.

No fresh legislation, however, on this subject is to be expected in Bavaria at present, as not only in the Chamber of the "Reichsrath," but also in the Chamber of Representatives, the majority belongs to the clerical or Ultramontane party. Thus the Bavarian bishops practically are above the laws, since they may break them with impunity. They are more sovereign than the King, since they do not feel themselves bound by the laws which he must respect. And through these episcopal law-breakers the Pope is made supreme ruler in Bavaria, for the bishops are only his servants and tools.

The "Old Catholic" movement, with the exception of the above-mentioned congregation (at Mehring), has not made any considerable progress in Munich or elsewhere, and no congregations have been formed. It has been mostly confined to newspaper polemics and demonstrations. Thus, for instance, the procession of Corpus Christi (8th June), always celebrated with great pomp, this year excited very little interest. The King was not present, and very few officials, professors, or magistrates took part in it. Somewhat later an old Catholic professor of the University was refused the last communion and Christian burial, and the funeral service was performed by Professor Friedrich amidst the sympathy of a numerous concourse of people. The University service on the Sunday was entirely omitted, as the minister of St. Ludwig, a University church, refused to read the funeral service for this professor. When somewhat later a new rector, as usual every year, was to be elected for the University, the excommunicated Döllinger was elected by a large majority. The magistrate of Munich has taken a decided position against the new dogma, and endeavours to avert it, especially, as far as possible, to keep it out of the schools.

But that nothing more decisive has taken place is chiefly the fault of the leaders of this movement; it is owing to their lukewarmness, their indecision, their diplomatic artifices, and false method of

going to work. They address themselves too little to the people and appeal too much to the Government for help. They are prophets who seek before all things to be secured from personal injury so that they may act without danger. They are leaders without flocks, for whom the Government must first find churches before they find congregations, instead of their first forming congregations, and then asking recognition from the Government. It would at first have been possible for Döllinger to have gained over some of the people and even some of the clergy for the Opposition, if he had laboured decisively, openly, and personally for his cause. But his cool diplomatic bearing, his relinquishment of all ecclesiastical functions, his avoidance of appearing personally, made many timid and reserved, and the clergy could soon coolly calculate which side was the safest, and they found this to be the side of the Archbishop and the Pope. Only a small and decreasing number of the clergy have as yet joined Döllinger's Opposition, and not one of the clerical organs has taken his part, except the recently established *Rheinische Mercur*, which is mostly filled with theological squabbles.

Besides this, it must be noted as a fundamental failing in this "Old Catholicism," that while Döllinger, and mostly Friedrich also, avoid coming forward and working for their cause in public, the men who do appear are generally supposed not to believe what they maintain and defend, since they have long ago renounced the positive faith of the Church. Of course this circumstance is not calculated to inspire confidence nor to conduce to the formation of an "Old Catholic" congregation. Another and perhaps still more important reason why "Old Catholicism" has hitherto met with so little real sympathy is to be sought in the lukewarmness and indecision by which it is characterized. Those Catholics who really feel the need of a reform are not likely to be satisfied with an opposition to the most absolute Papacy, while all the rest is to remain as "Old Catholicism." By this course no account is taken of modern scientific research, nothing is done to advance civilization. And many Catholics say, in excuse of their apathy in this matter, "If in going over to Old Catholicism we are to accept all the rest with the sole exception of the dogma of infallibility, it is not worth while to encounter the excitement, and we no longer concern ourselves with this dogma." In fact, for him who believes in transubstantiation, who holds that the priest can by a word change the substance of a piece of bread into the substance of divinity and humanity, it can no longer be impossible to believe anything. After that feat of faith it may seem a mere trifle to believe that the Pope is infallible. In some declarations several "Old Catholics" have hinted that they intend going further with their reforms, but without saying wherein these reforms are to consist. This indicates that there are two separate

tendencies in "Old Catholicism," the more liberal of which does not as yet know what it wishes.

The "Old Catholics" place their greatest hopes upon a future really free general council, and to bring such an one about is the great end of their endeavours. Of course this council is to annul the dogma of infallibility—that is, to pronounce the Vatican Council not to have been free, and therefore not œcumenical. They do not conceal from themselves that there is very little prospect of the convocation of such a council, as neither the Pope nor the collective Episcopate will hear of it, and the Vatican Council has been solemnly recognised and affirmed to be general. But governments should compel the Pope and bishops to convene such a council. It is also to meet in Germany to secure the necessary liberty. Surely a curious illusion! Governments must take ecclesiastical affairs in hand, and regulate them according to the pleasure of the "Old Catholics." They are to usurp the position of the Pope, the bishops, and the Holy Spirit, and to guide and rule the Catholic Church in order that genuine Catholicism may regain the upper hand. This council, therefore, extorted from the Pope and bishops by temporal governments, for which it is prescribed beforehand that it is to annul the dogma of infallibility, will be called by the "Old Catholics" a genuine unfettered one, in opposition to the fettered Vatican Council presided over by the Pope! And this council assembled in Germany, which would certainly be attended by the Roman bishops only in very small numbers, is to be considered as truly œcumenical. The followers of Döllinger's "Old Catholicism" seriously proposed this task to governments not long ago in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*. It is inconceivable how men can give themselves up to such delusions. They also desire from governments, and especially from the Bavarian Ministry, a continual interference in ecclesiastical affairs in favour of the "Old Catholics." If governments were to accede to these proposals, we should soon have a positive ecclesiastical government worse than the ancient Byzantine; instead of that, in accordance with modern consciousness and the rights of private religious conviction, the State should more and more separate itself from the Church and grant universal religious liberty.

Besides, such a secular ecclesiastical government could only be introduced and maintained by absolute rulers, against whom the will and voice of the people is of no avail. It could not be carried out under constitutional rule, since the exercise of constitutional rights is always influenced by religious convictions, and the people would call their rulers to account for every interference in the sphere of religion. But the exchange of ecclesiastical for temporal absolutism in religious matters would be a bad one. Cases may perhaps occur where it must be said that the devil is only to be cast out by Baal-

zebug. We Bavarians especially do not want either a Roman or a royal Bavarian Catholicism, the latter of which, however, still seems to hover before the eyes of Provost von Döllinger as an ideal from former times.

The new dogma cannot be successfully resisted, and Papal absolutism conquered, from the religious ecclesiastical standpoint, and without thorough simultaneous religious reform. But no such reform can be quickly effected nor carried out in our present circumstances, amidst the indifference of the educated, the blind faith of the uneducated, and the well-known controversial spirit of the theologians. But meanwhile the dogma may be introduced, and Roman absolutism confirmed, if it is not resisted and overcome in another way. In consideration of this, and because the new dogma has a great political significance inimical to Germany, a second Opposition party has been formed in Munich which takes its stand upon the purely political and national German standpoint. From this it has issued an address to the Government which rejects the new dogma, as well as every kind of ecclesiastical infallibility, not in order to maintain the true ancient Catholic faith, but to protect the sovereignty of the State against the Papal claims, and to secure the unity of the German nation from Papal despotism and Jesuitical intrigues. It is in this sense chiefly that Professor Frohschammer labours. In an article at the beginning of May in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, called "The Opposition to the Dogma of Infallibility," he explained the reasons why the Old Catholic movement as at present constituted cannot lead to any result. Its standpoint is the essentially Roman Catholic and hierarchical one, with the same principles of absolute authority and blind obedience to the faith as the opposite Papal party. Döllinger and his followers had no right to bring forward learned arguments against the decrees of authority, since from the Catholic standpoint this is to set learning above authority, to esteem the natural above the supernatural, &c. There is nothing left to them but either to submit to the decrees of the Pope and bishops, or to go further, to accept the standpoint of reason and learning, and to give up the principle of blind obedience. Since they will not do this, and always lay so much stress on the true and ancient Catholic faith, and oppose the dogma of infallibility not because it is unreasonable, but because it is new, there is no prospect of success, and so much the less, because they have no desire to free the people from ecclesiastical bondage, but rather to strengthen the fetters. They will not thereby be placed in a position to bear the withdrawal of the means of grace with which they are threatened by the Papal hierarchy, if they will not submit to the new dogma. So long, for instance, as the people hold confession and absolution from their confessors to be absolutely necessary to forgiveness of sins and

salvation, the Papal hierarchy will be able to compel them to obey any dogma that it pleases. The article says in conclusion: "If the present opposition movement in the Catholic Church should fail to effect anything for the religious needs of the present, from want of decision and consistency, this will not be the case with the political opposition, which will never sacrifice States and their sovereign rights to the Pope. It would perhaps have been better if the ecclesiastical Catholic and the political opposition had been distinct from the first, and if the State had not been appealed to to protect the true Catholic faith, but to protect itself, its rights, and its sovereignty. All will be able to unite in this political opposition, without distinction between liberal opinions and orthodox faith, without distinction of creeds. It must, for example, concern the Protestants as citizens of the State that the State should retain its sovereignty, and should always be in a position to protect all the creeds which are threatened by the Papacy. Even the Catholics who favour the Papacy must join in it, for they and their bishops are continually assuring us that the dogma of infallibility neither can, ought, nor will in any way endanger the rights of States, and they must be in earnest in saying so."

Frohschammer published two other articles in accordance with these views; one called "The German Nation and the Roman Papal Dominion" in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*; the other, "German Protestantism and the Dogma of Infallibility" in the *Berliner National Zeitung*. In the first it is shown that it is urgently necessary for the German nation to free itself from the Roman Papal dominion, and as much in the interests of intellectual and moral culture as in those of political unity and independence. It is plain from the history of the German nation, since the Reformation, that intellectual development is greatly hindered by the Roman Papal dominion, by the fact that nearly the whole of our splendid national literature has originated from Protestants, although the Catholic portion of the nation is as large as the Protestant. How great is the moral injury appears by the recent conduct of the German bishops, and especially by that of two such men as Bishop Hefele and Abbot Haneberg, who, in defiance of their better judgment and conviction, have publicly acknowledged the new dogma as absolute truth. The Professor adds:—

"Finally, the political danger consists mainly in this, that the Papacy will connect itself more than ever with France, in order to regain its lost worldly position, and it will therefore strive to organise a large Ultramontane party in Catholic Germany subject to the Pope as an ally."

The second of these articles is addressed to German Protestants, and seeks to show them that the new dogma, through its political significance, is fraught with danger to them also, since, in proportion

as Papal absolutism gains supremacy over a temporal government, the less competent it will be to give equal recognition to the other creeds, and to protect them in their legal rights.

In order to organize the "Old Catholic" movement, and to discuss and define its aims and character more fully, it was decided at a meeting at Heidelberg that an "Old Catholic" Congress should be held at Munich. This has now taken place, and was held from 22nd to 24th September. Upwards of two hundred persons took part in it, some from Munich itself, the rest mostly from various parts of Germany and Switzerland, especially from Bonn, Breslau, Heidelberg, Prague, Vienna, and other cities. A delegate also brought greetings from sympathizers in Hungary, and the Jansenist Archbishop of Utrecht sent a priest from Holland, by special invitation. Father Hyacinthe was present from France. A special committee projected a programme, which was submitted to the members of the Congress itself, to be discussed and determined upon.

Besides this, public meetings were held in the Crystal Palace, in which addresses were delivered to a more general public on the pending affairs of the Church. The most important of these speeches was perhaps that of Dr. Schulte, Professor of Canon Law in the University of Prague. Schulte was formerly a great representative of the Roman tendencies and of the Papacy, and especially a zealous defender of the Austrian Concordat of 1855. It was the dogma of Papal Infallibility which first made him doubtful about his former tendencies and course, and led him finally to the conclusion that the Roman and Jesuitical aims at absolute Papal autocracy are unjustifiable and pernicious. He is now one of the most zealous opponents of Papal Infallibility and absolute supremacy, and has employed his comprehensive knowledge of canon law in opposing it in several writings, in an energetic and trenchant style. Father Hyacinthe also gave an address in French, which was warmly approved. Döllinger, on the contrary, gave no address in the Crystal Palace, and did not generally appear in this public assembly.

The programme which, with some immaterial alterations, was resolved upon, agrees in essentials with the before-mentioned declaration of Döllinger and his followers of June. The members of the Congress declare that they intend to adhere to the ancient Catholic faith as attested by Scripture and tradition, also to the ancient Catholic worship. They consider themselves, therefore, to be members of the Catholic Church, with all their ecclesiastical and civil rights, in spite of the excommunication, which they hold to be groundless and arbitrary, and therefore invalid. They also adhere to the creed of the Council of Trent, as well as to the ancient constitution of the Church, with the "divinely-appointed hierarchy of bishops, priests,

and deacons." Finally, they declare themselves also to be in favour of the primacy of the Bishop of Rome, "as it was acknowledged to be based upon Scripture, by the fathers and councils in the ancient, undivided Christian Church."

They therefore expressly reject only "the dogmas proclaimed during the pontificate of Pius IX., in opposition to the doctrines of the Church and the principles which have been followed from the council of the apostles, especially the dogma of the infallible doctrinal office, and supreme, absolute, and direct jurisdiction of the Pope." The "Old Catholics," then, allow that "Old Catholicism" extends up to the pontificate of Pius IX., where New Catholicism begins. The term, therefore, has not much meaning, and they have now quite lately given it up, and call themselves simply "Catholics." In spite of this orthodox confession of faith, which rejects nothing but the Vatican decree of 18th July, the "Old Catholics" have been compelled to adopt a very hazardous course; for, since not only the Pope, but the collective Catholic episcopate, have decreed, accepted, and proclaimed the new dogma, it appears impossible to reject it, and yet to maintain that they are still true Catholics; for in so doing they deny the Catholic principle of authority, the fundamental principle of the Catholic Church. In order to get over this difficulty, the programme contains the following passage: "We assert that it is not only by the decree of the reigning Pope, and the concurrence expressed or implied of the bishops, who are bound by oath to unconditional obedience to the Pope, that dogmas can be defined, but only in accordance with Holy Scripture and the ancient traditions of the Church, as laid down by acknowledged fathers and councils. Even a council which was not like the Vatican, wanting in essential outward conditions of ecumenicity, but which by the general consent of its members effected a breach with the principles and past history of the Church, would not have the power to issue decrees which would be mentally binding on the members of the Church." It appears, therefore, to be acknowledged by the "Old Catholics" that even a general council is not infallible. But as they adhere to the infallibility of the Church, the question is where is the representative of it to be found. Tradition alone does not suffice; it must be vivified and expounded. This cannot be done by the general religious consciousness of the people, because the doctrinal system of the Church is too complicated and speculative to be understood and attested by them. There would remain, therefore, only the theologians, or more precisely only the Church historians, as supreme infallible authorities in the faith, as they only can say what has been always and everywhere believed from ancient times. But this cannot be Catholic, even if all theologians were agreed, since the Catholic system considers itself to possess

in the Pope and Episcopate a supernatural and to a certain extent inspired authority, while to learning is allotted only the subordinate part of a servant. But in the present instance, very few theologians have joined the "Old Catholic" Opposition; the great mass of the people is also on the side of the Pope, as well as the bishops, and all the clergy.

From the Catholic standpoint, therefore, to which the "Old Catholics" desire strictly to adhere, it must appear to be somewhat of a freak for this little "Old Catholic" Congress to assert that the Pope, all the bishops, the clergy, and people have fallen away from true Catholicism, and become heretics; but that, nevertheless, the true Catholic Church continues to exist with its infallibility; it consists of those assembled in our Congress!

Further, the programme expresses a desire that more part in the affairs of the Church shall again be accorded to the laity, which, of course, in accordance with the system, can only refer to external things. The programme expresses a hope of reunion with the Greek-Oriental and Russian Church, which certainly does not accord well with the belief of the "Old Catholics" that the primacy of the Bishop of Rome is based upon Holy Scripture and tradition, and is so far of divine appointment, which, as is well known, is denied by the orthodox Greek Church. Further, the expectation is expressed that by means of attempted reforms, learning, and the advance of Christian culture, an understanding will gradually be brought about with the other Christian creeds, especially with the Protestant Churches and the Episcopal Churches of England and America. We fear, however, that this expectation will be vain, since the "Old Catholic" Congress has expressly recognised as valid the creed of the Council of Trent, which contains so many anathemas against Protestantism.

This "Old Catholic" programme, so downright orthodox in the first part, and so dubious in the second, does not appear to us to be in any way adapted to become the basis of reform in the Church, or to have any kindling effect upon the people. He who acknowledges all that this programme prescribes may also accord his belief to Papal infallibility, or he may call down upon himself the absolute authority of the Church with its ecclesiastical measures, to which he otherwise unconditionally submits.

The orthodox first part is manifestly the work of Döllinger; the second and more liberal part appears to have been added by way of concession to those members who wished to go further; so that harmony might be maintained in the meeting. These concessions are illusory if they are in earnest with the first part. Döllinger himself expressed this, in fact, when it was discussed whether they should proceed to form "Old Catholic" congregations. Döllinger decidedly

gave his opinion against it, and warned the assembly against so dangerous a step. He remarked that by taking this course the assembly would be untrue to the first part of the programme, in which the members confess themselves to be within the Catholic Church, and claim all the rights of its members. The bishops must, therefore, be still recognised by them as legal ecclesiastical authorities, in spite of the pending penalties. By the formation of their own congregations they would soon appear merely as a sect; for the Roman Church would certainly continue to be considered Catholic, and two Catholic Churches are a contradiction. Nevertheless, when it came to the vote Döllinger was in the minority. The formation of "Old Catholic" congregations was resolved upon by a large majority. Afterwards, however, Döllinger appears to have gained the victory over the decision of the majority; for no separate congregations have been formed, although in a small church in Munich "Old Catholic" service is performed by Professor Friedrich.

Of more importance than this "Old Catholic" Congress are two declarations of the Bavarian Ministry, in which it fully expresses its opinion on the Church question, especially on the dogma of Papal infallibility, and indicates the position which it intends to take up in relation to it. The first of these declarations appeared at the end of August as an address from the Minister of Worship to the Archbishop of Munich-Freising; the other is a statement by the same minister in the Chamber of Deputies, in consequence of an interpellation on this subject. In both the minister enters fully into the subject. He shows in particular that this dogma must be considered as an innovation and as dangerous to the State by the Government; that the royal Placet for its publication is therefore refused, and that the bishops who have undertaken to publish it without the royal Placet have incurred the guilt of violating the laws of the State. The Government does not, however, wish to take measures to punish the Episcopal breakers of the law, in order not to afford opportunity for the coveted glory of martyrdom; but it will refuse all assistance to the bishops in introducing and spreading the new dogma, and will protect all Catholic citizens of the State, clergy or laymen, who refuse to acknowledge Papal infallibility in their offices and rights against ecclesiastical proceedings.

Full liberty is therefore accorded to Old Catholicism to spread itself if it has sufficient vitality. The struggle between State and Church in Bavaria and in Germany will now first really begin, since the Government has decidedly declared itself and taken up a position. The Ultramontane party is eager for the combat; it hopes to gain over the Catholic people for itself against the Government. Pope and bishops appear to be already consulting as to the measures to be taken.

A BAVARIAN CATHOLIC.



ON HIBERNICISMS IN PHILOSOPHY.

MISS EDGEWORTH, in her entertaining "Essay on Irish Bulls," observes that "it has never yet been decided what it is that constitutes a bull." It appears, however, from the context that the definition she means is not the definition of a bull, but the definition of that kind of bull which is supposed to be especially Irish. And in this contention I think she proves that the confusions of thought and language which constitute a bull can be produced abundantly from the writings of English poets, statesmen, and philosophers. I am happy to observe that no Scotch example has been produced by this ingenious and charming authoress. Nevertheless, candour obliges me to confess that quite lately I heard a Scotch young lady of my acquaintance (who, however, has some English blood) in answer to the question, "Do you remember Donald Ferguson?" make the following discriminating reply: "No; I recollect his face, but I don't recollect him by name." Probably this is pretty nearly a perfect specimen. Here is another which Miss Edgeworth tells us was particularly admired by Lord Orford: "I hate that woman," said a gentleman looking at one who had been his nurse; "I hate that woman, for she changed me at nurse." In the same essay we are told of an Irishman who accosted an acquaintance thus: "When first I saw you, I thought it was you; but now I see it's your brother;" and of a petition which was addressed to a lady in Ireland whom Miss Edge-

worth knew, which began, "That your poor petitioner is now lying dead in a ditch."

Now, I am disposed to think that Miss Edgeworth has done injustice to her country, when she disputes whether there is anything peculiar in Irish bulls. There is a neatness, completeness, and perspicuity of confusion in an Irish bull which is inimitable and unapproachable, and which constitutes at once its humour and its innocence. The bulls of other nations are comparatively clumsy; the confusions of thought which they involve are as complete, without being as apparent—having all the absurdity of the Irish bull without its fun. But the essence of a bull—the contradiction in terms, the assertion of something which is nevertheless denied in the very terms of the assertion, or conversely, the denial of something which is nevertheless asserted in the very terms of the denial—this is a kind of blunder in which our Irish friends have many successful rivals. Among these rivals none, as it seems to me, are more successful than philosophers, and especially metaphysicians. To the illustration of this—I fear somewhat irreverent proposition—this paper will be devoted.

Let me say, in the first place, that there are sayings which at first sight may appear to involve a bull, but which in reality do not. For example, Sir John Herschel, in one of his popular lectures on science, tells us that "light, although the cause of vision, is in itself invisible." This is no mere paradox invented to attract attention, and to fix it on the explanation which is to follow. It is, indeed, an apparent paradox, but only because the literal facts are not commonly apprehended. Light is a word which means several different things. First, and perhaps primarily, it signifies the sensation of vision. Secondly, it means the (once) unknown external cause of that sensation. The first of these two meanings is regarded by Locke (I think erroneously) as the proper meaning of the word. But the second is unquestionably the idea which is uppermost in the common understanding of the term. We talk of the light coming to us from one direction or another—from one body or another—meaning, of course, not our sensation of light (which cannot come to us from anywhere), but the agency, whatever it may be, which produces that sensation in us. But neither do these two meanings exhaust all that is now meant by light. In neither of these two meanings would there be any sense in saying that "light is in itself invisible." For if by light is meant the sensation, the saying would be nonsense; and if by light were meant the immediate cause of vision, or the precise agency which produces it, then the saying would be untrue. The thing which causes vision, or which, more correctly speaking, is the object of vision, is not only visible, but it is the only thing in the world which is

visible. Light, in this sense, is the thing and the one only thing which the human eye is made to see. But there is a third meaning in which Sir J. Herschel's assertion is strictly true. We now know what light is "in itself"—that is to say, we know the nature and constitution of it, not in terms of the sensation it gives to us, but in terms of a wholly different order of conception. First, we know that it is a motion; secondly, we know that it is a motion of a particular kind; and, thirdly, we know that it is that motion in a medium having peculiar properties. Provisionally, and for want of a better, this medium has been called the "luminiferous ether." And it is of light in this sense that Sir J. Herschel speaks when he says that it is invisible. It is now nearly seventy years since Dr. Thomas Young startled and amused the scientific world by announcing his belief that this luminiferous ether "pervades the substance of all material bodies with little or no resistance,—as freely perhaps as the wind passes through a grove of trees." But when this ether is not agitated, it is invisible. Nay, more—even when it is agitated, the movements of it are invisible, except when they come to us in a straight line, either directly from a luminous body, or indirectly by reflection from some other. In short, it may be said that the luminiferous ether is like a vast ocean, which is never seen except where its waves break in surf. When these facts are apprehended, we see at once that Herschel's assertion of the invisibility of light, so far from being a bull—that is, a confounding of ideas—is a clearing up of our conceptions. If there is any apparent confusion in that assertion, it is not due to any confusion of ideas, but, on the contrary, it is due to a nicety of discrimination which the weakness of ordinary language fails to indicate.

In contrast with this, which illustrates one of the great aims and objects of philosophy, let us look at some of the many cases in which language is abused to cover contradictory propositions, or to cheat the mind into a semblance of ideas when there are none.

To begin with—and to begin with a most distinguished countryman of my own, Sir William Hamilton—is not the very phrase, "the Unconditioned," in itself a bull? "The" is the definite article, and applicable only to things or ideas capable of definition. But nothing is capable of definition which has no conditions. The negation of conditions is the negation of existence, as alone conceivable by man. "The Unconditioned" is, therefore, simply nonsense—that is to say, a word pretending to have a meaning, but having none.

In saying this I hope I am not committing another blunder, which is very common—the blunder of denying the existence of some particular idea, which is nevertheless described and denoted by a name. We read often nowadays of such and such an idea being

“unthinkable.” If it be unthinkable, it had better also be considered as unspeakable. To speak of it, and then to deny its conceivability, is a bull. If the word or the phrase employed to express it, is a word or a phrase representing an idea, then it is absurd to deny the existence of that idea; and if the word or phrase represents no idea, then it is equally absurd to use it at all, and to make it the subject of either affirmation or denial.

But this case is carefully to be distinguished from another, with which it may easily be confounded. The necessities of language may compel us to place in momentary collocation, for the purpose of denial, two ideas which negative each other, and which thus make nonsense;—the very object of the collocation being to show that such is the result. For example: “We cannot conceive any boundary to Space.” Here, at first sight, it might appear as if we first speak of a conception, and then deny its conceivability. But this is not so. We have a distinct conception of a boundary, and a distinct conception of Space, and what we deny is that the idea of a boundary can be applied to the idea of Space, because the very conception of a boundary involves the conception of an outside as well as of an inside; and where there is an outside there must be space. Whatever, therefore, a boundary may be boundary of, it cannot be a boundary of Space.

Here, therefore, there is no confusion of thought, in first describing an attempted combination of ideas, and then denying that this attempted combination can be made successfully—that is, with sense.

But what are we to say of the second of the three great metaphysical discoveries which Mr. Mill has just extolled as the great triumphs of Bishop Berkeley’s philosophy, namely, the “non-existence of abstract ideas?”* It is not pretended that this phrase is in itself meaningless. It is not pretended that it involves an attempt to combine two ideas, the one of which excludes the other. On the contrary, the phrase is used over and over again, as having a definite meaning, which the mind can handle, examine, and analyse, by resolving it into the elements of which it is composed. But an idea cannot be proved to be non-existent by being proved to be composite. For, just as the most solid and stable forms of matter in physical nature are not elementary substances, but combinations of them, so many of the most real and serviceable conceptions of the mind are structures built out of the rudimentary elements of thought. The Irishman who complained that he had been changed at nurse is clear-headed, compared with the philosopher who takes up an abstract idea, examines it, describes it, and then denies its existence. And the absurdity of this blunder is made, if possible, more apparent, by the obvious impossibility of conducting

* The *Fortnightly Review*, November 1, 1871, “Berkeley’s Life and Writings.”

the argument against the existence of abstract ideas, without perpetually making use of them in the very terms of the argument itself. Abstract ideas are employed to give witness against themselves. They are summoned into the witness-box, examined, and urged to confess, like the poor Irishman, that "they lie dead in a ditch." Mr. Mill professes to "explain the psychological machinery by which *general names* do their work without the help of *general ideas*," which seems to me very like explaining how mere words, which are denied their appropriate meaning, "do the work" of ideas which are denied their appropriate name. How there could be any "help" in general ideas, if they don't exist, I can't conceive. And how general names can do any "work" in the operations of mind if they don't indicate general ideas, seems equally hard to understand. And how "general ideas" can be thus spoken of, and argued about at all, if no such conceptions can be formed, is the greatest wonder of all. For here we have got general names which do not mean general ideas, but nevertheless do the same "work;" and we have got general ideas which would be very "helpful" if they existed, but then they don't. The only solution of this puzzle would be, that the whole discussion is one like some others which Mr. Mill himself has elsewhere successfully exposed—a logomachy—in which words are used without any meaning whatever, and solemn affirmations and denials are made all about nothing at all. But Mr. Mill seeing the (at least) apparent puzzle, offers a solution which deprives us even of this escape. He says, "the solution of this, as of so many difficulties, lies in the connotation of general names," and he lays especial stress on the point, that these "general names" "are *not* (like a proper name) *mere words devoid of meaning*." "General names," then, are not mere words without any signification. They have a meaning, and yet they do not mean general ideas. What then do they mean?

Mr. Mill's explanation is that a general name "is a mark for the properties or some of the properties which belong to an indefinite number of individual objects, and with these properties it is associated in a peculiarly close and intimate manner." Well, to say that a word is "a mark" for an idea is equivalent I suppose to saying that it means the idea. It appears then, that these general names mean, or "connote," or are "a mark for," the properties, or some of the properties, which are common to many individuals. But what are properties? and especially what are common properties? Is not this essentially an abstract idea? Mr. Mill indeed asserts that every "class name" calls up the idea (image) of some individual as well as the special properties which it "marks." But he admits that in this idea the common properties of the class are made "artificially prominent;" and that all others may be unattended to, and thus "thrown into the

shade." And so, the whole argument comes, after all, to be not a denial of the existence of abstract ideas, but an account of their origin and a definition of their meaning. Of course, it may be perfectly good sense to argue that the vulgar understanding of a word is an erroneous one, and to put a better defined one in its stead. But even in this point of view, Mr. Mill's definition seems to cast no new light whatever on the common understanding of the term, which is in close accordance with the etymological meaning of "abstract." The idea of properties which are *drawn forth from* a group of others, more or less completely *separated from them*, and brought into such mental prominence as that all others are out of focus—cast into the shade and practically out of mind—this seems pretty much what everybody understands by an abstract idea. To analyse an idea and to trace its component parts is a legitimate operation. But to conceive it, describe it, define it, and then affirm it to be non-existent, is very like a bull.

There is another very similar process of metaphysical analysis which also passes readily into like confusions, and that is the process by which we trace the means through which particular ideas are arrived at. A brilliant example of the legitimate application of this process is the reasoning by which Bishop Berkeley has proved that the eye does not directly see that which we call distance, and that distance is an idea arrived at by the experience of other sensations, interpreting those of sight. The great opponent of the bishop, on this point, is the brush-turkey, which certainly sees distance the moment it is hatched, and without any experience at all. But still as men are not born so well-feathered as brush-turkeys, Berkeley's argument stands good for men—with just this important caution derived from the provoking bird—that the non-existence of intuitive perceptions is a particular and not a general truth. In Berkeley's argument, however, as applied to men and not to chicks, we have an example of accurate and careful reasoning.

An example not less remarkable of a false application of the same process is the further argument maintained by Mr. Mill that the sensations from which we derive our conceptions of matter do not really indicate anything, or justify us in concluding the existence of anything whatever except "potentialities of other sensations." And here we have, as it seems to me, another of those self-contradictions in which all metaphysical writings abound. After an elaborate argument to prove the non-existence of abstract ideas, we find Mr. Mill contending that an abstract idea—abstract up to the double-distilled essence of abstraction—is the only reality of which we have any assurance in the world. "A potentiality of sensation"—what is this idea? It is not a sensation; it is not even merely the recollection of a past sensation. It includes this indeed;

but it includes it along with a multitude of other things—along with all the mental conceptions which go to bind together the past with the present and the future, to assure us of the continuity of our own existence, and of the external agencies which act and react upon our organism. I deny, indeed, that our conception of matter can be boiled down into a “potentiality of sensation.” Something there is in the body which has escaped in the process of extraction. Some elements there are in the idea which are left out in the pretended abstract. But this is not my point now. My point is that Mr. Mill’s account of it is, first, an abstract—an abstract of a multitude of things; and secondly that it is a bad abstract—an abstract which involves a confusion of ideas, and the admission of one essential element of thought in the very attempt to deny or to expel it. I so far agree with Mr. Mill as to admit that the Potentiality of Sensation is an idea inseparable from our conception of matter. But Potentiality involves in its very root and essence the idea of a dormant power—of something having potency, and this is an idea which attaches primarily to the active cause, not to the passive subject of sensation. This phrase, invented by Mr. Mill, confounds two ideas which are entirely distinct, although the one is the correlative of the other. It confounds Susceptibility to Sensation with Potentiality to cause it. When I think of matter as a Potentiality of Sensation, I mean that I think of it as having the power to awake sensations in me. I do not think of it as having itself the capability of experiencing sensations. Mr. Mill is confounding the active agent with the passive subject. There is a well known story of a country Scotchman, who when he was asked by a dentist to open his mouth, replied with characteristic caution, “Naa, maybe ye’ll bite me.” This Scotchman, like Mr. Mill, was thinking of teeth as a Potentiality of Sensation, but he forgot, also like Mr. Mill, that the potentiality to cause that sensation lay in the man that had the mouth in a position to bite, and not in the man who had the finger in a position to be bitten. When will metaphysicians understand that a short phrase does not always mean a simple idea? When will they understand that they do not succeed in analysing thought by simply ignoring some essential part of it?

There are three great subjects on which, as it appears to me, philosophy has been largely vitiated by like confusions. One is the theory of Causation; another is the theory of Morals; and the last is the comparatively new one—the theory of Life.

We are told that we know nothing of causation, properly so called, and that what we mistake for it is merely “invariability of sequence.” To my mind every form in which this statement can be made—and there are many—involves a bull. That we have some idea of causation which is not mere invariability of sequence is involved in the very

argument or assertion which discriminates the two ideas, and then tries to confound them. We have the idea of "it must" over and above the idea of "it always does." Nay, we cannot even think of the invariability of sequence, without seeing in that invariability the working of a cause. In truth, there is no such thing as invariability, except as applicable to this abstract idea of causal connection. Particular sequences are not invariable. We do not attach the idea of invariability to any one sequence that we see, or hear, or feel, or touch, however uniform our experience of such sequence may be. Every such sequence we can conceive to be interrupted, broken, stopped. But there is one thing we cannot conceive, and that is, that this break or cessation should be itself uncaused. I am not speaking of how this idea arises, nor am I discussing whether it corresponds to an absolute universal truth. I am only saying that we have this idea, and that it is an idea different in kind from mere invariability of sequence, and cannot be resolved into it—unless, indeed, the phrase invariability of sequence be in itself understood as involving the idea of necessity.

It is because Mr. Mill rejects the idea of causation, and avoids the word, that he is driven to define our idea of matter as resolvable into a "potentiality of sensation." This is no necessary part of the philosophy which traces all our ideas to experience. Locke, who was the great apostle of that philosophy, describes matter as that which "causes," or "has power to produce" our sensations. And so does Mr. Mill when he speaks as a Logician* and not as a Metaphysician. This, so far as it goes, is a fair account of at least the skeleton or framework of our conceptions respecting matter, although I am very far from admitting that it is a complete account, or anything like a complete account, of all that enters into those conceptions. Every analysis of mind, like every analysis of matter, in order to be a true analysis, must account for all the elements to be found in the subject of examination. I do not think that Locke's analysis fulfils this condition: It appears to me that there are elements in our conception of matter—especially as that conception has been enriched by modern science—of which Locke's definition takes no account. But at least it does not commit the blunder of looking at one of these elements, and that one of the most prominent, of defining it, of examining it, and then deliberately rejecting it as non-existent.

The same objections apply, as it seems to me, to all attempts which have been made to reduce the idea of moral obligation to the fear of punishment, to utility, or to any other principle but itself. They all labour under the same insuperable fault of wilfully discarding an element of thought, which is nevertheless recognised in the very terms

* Mill's "Logic," Book I., c. iii., §§ 6, 7, 8.

of the argument by which it is explained away. How it comes, from what source derived—these may be more or less accessible subjects of speculation. But there it is;—differing in kind and in quality from all the supposed elements of its composition, and admitted so to differ in the very comparisons which are drawn between them. Torture it as you will, it cannot be made to confess that it has been changed at nurse.

In like manner the attempt in biological or physiological science to get rid of the idea of "life," or to reduce it to simpler terms, breaks down into similar confusions. Professor Huxley, in his ingenious and in many ways instructive essay on the "Physical Basis of Life," has tried to represent life as a mere name for the properties of a particular kind of matter called protoplasm, and says it is as absurd to set up these properties into a separate entity under the name of Life, as it would be to set up the properties of water as a separate conception under the name of "aquosity." But in the conduct of this argument Professor Huxley is compelled by the necessities of thought, reflected in the necessities of language, to contradict himself. If life be the property of protoplasm, and nothing else, it must be mere tautology to speak of "living protoplasm," and mere self-contradiction to speak of "dead protoplasm." And yet Professor Huxley uses both expressions over and over again—and must use them, if he wishes to distinguish between separate ideas, although it be in the very endeavour to confound them.

Professor Huxley complains that it is a frivolous objection to urge that "living protoplasm" can never be analysed, because the life of it is expelled in the very process of analysis. The conclusion defended evidently is, that we are safe in assuming the composition of dead and living protoplasm to be the same. Very well, be it so,—then so much the more evident it becomes that the life or the deadness of the protoplasm depends upon something entirely different from that physical composition which is alike in the living and in the dead.

Nor does it mend the matter to ascribe the difference between life and death to some undetectable difference in physical "conditions," as distinguished from physical composition. This is merely to hide our conception of one kind of difference which is clear, definite, and immense, under a word chosen because it suggests another kind of difference which is obscure, indefinite, and minute. We may call life a "condition," and deadness another condition, if we please. But this does not alter the fact that if the difference between life and deadness does depend on any physical difference, it is one undetectable, and belonging therefore, at best, to those "substrata of phenomena" which Professor Huxley in the same essay pronounces to be "imaginary."


I entirely agree with Professor Huxley's assertion that the language both of materialism and of spiritualism has only a relative truth. I believe the idealism which tries to expel our conception of matter to be as false as the materialism which tries to banish our conception of life or spirit. In this respect the language of the vulgar is infinitely more true and more subtle than the language of philosophers. I have spoken elsewhere of "the profound but conscious metaphysics of human speech."* And it has been all the more profound in proportion as it has been unconscious. Language is a self-registering index of the operations of mind. The conceptions of which it is a witness may be defined and traced, but are not to be explained away. All the truth that there is in the phraseology of materialism is reflected accurately in the ordinary use of language. When metaphysicians attempt to get behind that use, they generally do so only to "meddle and muddle." A man may speak of his brains as synonymous with his intellect, and nobody will derive an erroneous impression from language referring to a connection which is the most familiar of all facts, although its nature is incomprehensible. But this is a very different thing from attempting deliberately to confound connection with identity under the cover of some ambiguous word. The half-truth of materialistic phraseology ceases when that phraseology pretends to represent a whole-truth. Moreover, the fallacy which it then becomes is in the nature of nonsense. And this only is my point now. Nor is it surprising that when men try to explain away their own ideas, they should get into the atmosphere of bulls. When we try to get outside ourselves, our attitudes are not likely to be otherwise than ludicrous—as may be seen in the case of our canine friends when they take it into their heads to gyrate in energetic pursuit of their own tails.

The metaphysicians and physicists with whom I have been dealing seem to me to be one and all men who walk up to some idea—some old and familiar acquaintance of the mind—recognise it, peer into its face, and then accost it, as the Irishman accosted his acquaintance in Miss Edgeworth's story: "When I first saw you, I thought it was you, but now I see you are another."

ARGYLL.

INVERARY, November.

* "Reign of Law," Fifth Ed. p. 303



THE CHURCH OF THE FUTURE.

STATE Establishments may be made to rest upon the ground of right or of expediency. It is time that the controversy be narrowed as much as possible, if all hope of a compromise between contending parties is not to be for ever abandoned. These days, in which public opinion ripens rapidly, are not the days in which we can safely depend upon historical privileges or conservative traditions. The advocate of Disestablishment must dispossess his mind of political prejudices, to which his forefathers were strangers, whose secession never involved consciously any political issue, if he expects his adversary in turn to look at the question dispassionately, and not through the medium of traditional prepossessions.

There will be hope of agreement when both sides are content to argue the question as one of simple expediency. The supporter of Disestablishment must recognise the principle that what was morally right in the sight of the Almighty under the old dispensation, cannot be morally wrong at *any* time. And the advocate of a State Establishment must abandon *his* illogical inference, that what was politically right under a given set of circumstances, must be therefore politically right under every new development and phase of human thought *whatever*. It may be morally wrong, because morally degrading, to surround a grown-up man with the same defences against tempta-

tion which are demanded by the ignorance and inexperience of youth.

In examining the question how far it is impossible to unite Nonconformists with Churchmen in any compromise which shall be satisfactory to the conscience of both, we must determine whether either need be called upon to sacrifice any real principle, for the maintenance of which they separately exist.

I. The case of the Nonconformists shall be first considered. The able writer in the June number of this Journal, who defends the principle of Disestablishment, says—“To sacrifice themselves for an institution for the common good would be both patriotism and religion.” But if the care of religion on the part of the State be for the common good, or, in other words, if the Establishment be really a “social and religious benefit,” it is difficult to understand wherein lies the self-sacrifice, inasmuch as all religious denominations, so far as they are purely religious, with no political ingredients, cannot be supposed to exist for any other object. What is meant probably is this, that Nonconformists are unwilling to part with that amount of religious freedom which they now enjoy. But every system that aims at union must involve individual sacrifice. Such sacrifice is the payment which is due from each for the general good, and which, in another shape, comes back to him. Whether in the case of individuals or churches, laws are enacted for the protection, not the restraint, of freedom. Moreover, schism is essentially reproductive: the spirit of division is the spirit of sub-division. If none will conform to any system in which he finds *something* from which to dissent, then Nonconformity has no ultimate refuge but in *Individualism*. The liberty, which adhesion to the Establishment would require to be sacrificed, whether in regard to patronage, dependent upon the will of the Sovereign, or to those who have alienated property for endowments, is to be counterbalanced by the greater diffusion of religious instruction throughout the neglected deserts, unreached by the more wasteful and isolated action of a sect-torn Christianity. The *privilege* to be sacrificed is the right to defend some one-sided view of Christian teaching or discipline: the *benefit* which will be secured by such surrender is the recognition of national brotherhood, and the worship of a common Father. The original Nonconformists were seceders because of violence done to the religious conscience; but can the followers of Owen or Wesley urge this motive with any show of justice now? And if the true ground for continual secession be the restriction of freedom imposed by the Establishment, how is it that Nonconformists hold aloof from the Church in all our colonies, where the last remnant of Establishment has faded? “It would be as easy to restore the Heptarchy,” says Mr. Allon, “as to bring back the Wesleyan Church to the bosom of the Establishment.”

If this statement is intended to illustrate the objection to an Establishment, felt by men who were most unlikely to feel it, as soon as they could view it from a position outside of itself, the objection surely loses much of its force when we observe the like reluctance to return to the bosom of the Church in the various colonies of the British Empire. The true motive must be found, not in any peculiarity of an Establishment, but in the force of habit, which can reconcile men to the evils of schism, as soon as they have tasted the exciting pleasures of strife.

There can be no question that, on historic grounds, the objection to the principle of a State Church is an *after-thought*. Such objection cannot be made to rest upon moral grounds, discovered by reason or revelation, for in the only instance where God has seen fit to instruct us upon such a subject, He has enjoined the principle of an established religion. The rational ground upon which the objection can be made to rest, is that it exercises a prejudicial influence upon the interests of religion, *according to the views of the majority*. An Established Church can, in no true sense, be called a *national* Church, unless it expresses the views, and carries with it the sympathies of the nation. The Irish Church was not, except in name and mockery, a *national* Church, and its days have been numbered. In Scotland, the attempt to establish an Episcopal Church was to fight against the conscience of the nation; while in England a like failure attended the attempt to set up, on the part of the Puritans, a system built upon the Westminster Confession. But, on the other hand, the English Church, from the days of Elizabeth, has on the whole hitherto expressed the national conscience. If, by the rightful exercise of reason in the matters of religion, a large proportion of the nation has discerned, or thought that it has discerned so much error, some in one direction, some in another, as to justify secession, and, if it sees fit, to demand for such variegated secession, not only toleration, but a co-ordinate position with the Church from which it has seceded, then the dominant Church must do one of two things. It must either cease to be dominant, that is, to be the instrument of the State for the wider dissemination of religious truth, or it must *widen its basis*, and allow a greater divergence of religious opinion. The practical question is, need such divergence of opinion, being the necessary outcome of the exercise of private judgment, deprive the State of its most economical defence and the surest safeguard of its prosperity, the hitherto-trusted organ for the diffusion of religious ordinances, and the education of the religious conscience among all classes of the people?

The English nation, perhaps to the surprise of Nonconformists, has lately, by a most unmistakable popular vote, determined that national education shall not be entrusted to the fitful enthusiasm

of the voluntary principle. It has done more. It has determined in favour of a religious education; that the children shall be taught, if not by formularies, yet by *some* means, that there is a Divine law higher than man's law, and an inheritance beyond the present one of toil and trouble.

II. And when we come to settle the terms of the compromise, if compromise be possible, which shall reconcile Nonconformists to an Establishment, what sacrifice on the part of the Church will they expect? It may with safety be said that the demands made by their Puritan fathers have already been surrendered, partly, it must be owned, by their own determination and fortitude, and partly by the force of circumstances, and by the growth of public opinion. They will not, in fairness, require the surrender of Episcopal order, for they acknowledge the primitive, if not Apostolic precedent of Episcopacy, so long as they are not compelled to declare its Divine authority. To refuse to combine with their fellow-Christians, who do recognise such authority, so long as their own recognition of it were left voluntary, would be an act of intolerance. For if they regard a bishop as nothing more than a chief presbyter, does not the law of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism require ordination at the hand of presbyters? Again, Congregationalists do not ground their doctrine of the independence of Christian communities upon Apostolic command, but simply upon Apostolic precedent, and there would be no inconsistency in their submitting to any modification that was demanded by the scruples of others, or by the law of brotherly love and unity. The successors of those English Presbyterians of 1662, who profess to see in the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ the outgrowth of a later age, unknown to the Apostolic and primitive Creeds, would probably be content to conform to the Church, and eventually yield to a better mind, if the Creed of St. Athanasius was reserved as a weighty document containing the decision of a past age to be read at leisure, but not enforced as a test of communion.

Again, the freedom now enjoyed by non-established Congregationalists need not be sacrificed. At the present moment neither the individual member of a congregation, nor an individual Congregational church is at liberty to formulate its own doctrine, or to regulate its own worship, apart from some central authority called "the Congregational Union." And wherein lies the substantial difference between a controlling power vested in an assembly made up of nonconforming laymen and divines, and one vested in the synod or convocation of the Church, whose decisions, before they become binding, must receive the sanction of the lay members assembled in Parliament? The anomaly indeed may lie in the fact

that Parliament is a mixed body, but the anomaly is owing to the divisions and subdivisions of Christian professors, and would cease as soon as conditions of re-union were agreed upon. The very object now proposed is to destroy this anomaly, and to secure to the Christian Church that strength and solidarity which union alone can give. The freedom of a Church is destroyed whenever its regulations are rendered powerless by a controlling power, *external to itself*, but so long as the great majority of the nation is united, its representatives in Parliament legislate, in the name of God, for the religious as well as for the secular interests of the nation. The contrary principle, while it asserts the freedom of independent Churches, in reality limits the freedom of each individual member.

The more that men exercise the freedom of thought, the more certainly will they challenge the dogmas to which they have implicitly subscribed, and the more exacting the discipline is made, which is the characteristic of Nonconformity, the greater must be the tendency to fly off into never-ending sects. To preserve coherence of the particles, there must be both some pressure from without and some attraction between them from within. The pressure that proceeds from the national Parliament *need* not be more subversive of personal liberty than if it proceeded from a Church assembly, and the cohesive attraction would increase rather than be diminished by the very increase of numbers. And the danger of undue interference on the part of the State would be greatly lessened, as well as its disposition to interfere with the exercise of the Church's legislative functions in Convocation, if the laity were admitted to a participation in those functions. At present the Crown represents the lay element in the Church, and its supremacy in matters ecclesiastical is justifiable only on that hypothesis. The right to control the appointment of bishops rests upon the same hypothesis. The admission of the laity to Convocation and diocesan synods would reconcile the Crown to the cession of its rights, and induce it to retire within the more reasonable limits of an appellate jurisdiction. Similarly the recognition of the rights of the laity representing congregations by the appointment of parochial vestries, would remove all possibility of forcing upon the congregation novelties in ritual to which they objected. And even if it be true that union upon a wider basis would involve the loss of some degree of freedom, is there no gain to be put down to the credit of our common Christianity? The enthusiasm and spirituality which are now withdrawn from the Established Church, in order to sustain smaller organisations, would be left to animate her larger framework. One universal machinery, instead of separate and clashing ones, would make a parochial as opposed to a congregational pastorate, a reality, where it is too often

a name. The working classes, now alienated by our divisions, would bow before the authority of a great united power, while all the waste and necessary confusion arising from disconnected machinery would be obviated. The centuries before Constantine are often pointed to as a triumphant illustration of the working of the voluntary principle. But the fact is lost sight of that Christians were then united in one common phalanx, and the force of the Church was brought to bear upon the heathen world, as a compact whole. The world, in those days, bore the same witness to the Church which, in an earlier age, it had borne to its Divine Founder, that "it spoke with authority, and not as the scribes," and we know the result then. The State, too, has a direct interest of its own in calling in the aid of religious education, and she has a right to select whatever aid she thinks most suitable to her purpose. The supremacy of the Crown, as Walpole has remarked, rests on two sets of laws, negative and positive. By the one, the interference of a foreign power with the affairs of the country is provided against. By the other, the liberties of the clergy are protected and the religious instruction of the people secured; while by the action of such supremacy, the Church, purified at the Reformation, is preserved midway between the tyranny of sacerdotalism and the tyranny of fanaticism. And no fundamental laws of the Church Universal, nor any of the ordinances of Christ are outraged by such exercise of royal supremacy. The doctrine does not abandon the Church as the original source of ecclesiastical authority. According to Hooker, this doctrine is built upon the theory that all such authority rests ultimately upon the whole body of the Church, lay and clerical, and that of this body the Sovereign simply acts as its delegate, representing in that capacity the rights of the whole. But apart from such a theory, which loses its force as soon as the Church becomes disintegrated by independent sects, the State may take the best measures it can command for preventing large masses growing up in heathen ignorance. As the West Indian sugar planter (to take a stock example), or the Ceylon coffee-planter, or the monster vine-dresser of Australia may "establish" a teacher of religion upon his estate, so the State may be induced by temporal motives to do the same. It may do so without any conscience, with simply a regard to temporal results, *i.e.*, moral discipline and public safety. So far, it does not matter whether Constantine was actuated by policy, or the higher motives of Christian piety and philanthropy. The advocates of the voluntary system are, it may be observed, apt to compare the progress and influence of Christianity after the days of Constantine, unfavourably with its influence before him. Mr. Allon falls into the same fallacy. The fact is, that the establishment of the Christian religion, and the comparative deadness which suc-

ceeded it, were consequences flowing from the same event, viz., the rest given to the Church after its days of bitter persecution. The deadness, moreover, was only relative and apparent. There was no background of persecution to throw the graces of Christianity into strong relief, and during the "darker ages," as modern self-complacency is apt to nickname the period succeeding the State recognition of Christianity, it is certain that missionary zeal was more active and wrought greater triumphs than (scarcely excepting the last half-century) since the days of the Reformation. Such writers as Mr. Allon point to the comparative "spirituality" of Nonconformist bodies, in proof of the deteriorating influence of State connection. But if this "spirituality" be anything more valuable than the sober piety which characterises the best members of the Anglican Church, if it be not, in many cases, little more than Sunday excitement bearing little influence upon the every-day life of shop and office, sufficient allowance has not been made for the temptation which the Denominations unintentionally offer to pharisaical isolation. A Society may well be more exclusive than a Church. The Church of England is weighted with a dead mass of half-converted men, whom she dare not abandon to Satan. Her theory is *territorial*, not congregational, and her influences for silent good in the day school, in the visits of the parson at the cottage, and in his instruction at the season of Confirmation, to say nothing of the dying beds of large masses of the people who listen to his voice when they would listen to no other, are elements wholly imponderable, and make no show in the count. Besides, the pious members of the Church, whose religious consciousness has been quickened through her ministrations, are apt to be tempted away into more exclusive folds, which impose searching tests of membership. Dissent has an immense advantage in this contempt for material boundaries, and its consequent boast of the relative purity of its accredited members. This spiritual exclusiveness has a special attraction for the young. How far, however, this principle tends to affect the large mass lying *outside* the favoured circle, and to draw demoralising lines of demarcation, may be seen by a reference to the United States. Writers of a certain class are apt to appeal to the astonishing vitality of the American Churches. How far this vitality affects the masses, may be studied by the help of the following extract from a leading newspaper, published at New York:—

"Crimes against property lead to crimes against life, and these have become so common that they create no shudder. . . . The marriage tie is dissolved, and the family scattered upon the most frivolous pretences to gratify unlawful desires. . . . The real cause lies deeper, in the country's enormous prosperity and in the weakness of a sect-torn Christianity, that no longer dares to speak with the voice of authority. The multitude of

sects and their confusions and contradictions of Christian doctrine and duty have destroyed the national faith in every fixed principle of duty or morality."

Meanwhile, it is in the United States that Roman Catholicism is boasting of its most signal successes.

In England, the Established Church has acted as a check on these extravagances, and there exists at least, in her midst, one powerful representative of Christianity, which the uneducated classes have been taught traditionally to reverence, as a source of authority. The great drawback to Christian progress, as in India, according to the witness of Keshub Chunder Sen, is the sectarianism of Christianity, the same sinister power that has hampered the cause of the religious education of the poorer classes.

And the gain to set off against these enormous losses to the State is, we are told, the "freedom of independent churches." But wherein consists this freedom? Does it not mean freedom, on the part of any two or three persons, to form themselves into a society and to call it a church, and to delegate authority to "bind or loose" to one of their number, who shall become their minister? All, we are told, that is required, is "substantial agreement." The validity of the Sacraments may be denied and the necessity of Ordination, only let there be in opinion "substantial agreement." But such freedom is attended with this practical inconvenience. No sooner is the right of private judgment exercised than a laxer interpretation must be given to the very term "substantial," or relief will be claimed in fresh secessions, carrying with them still greater waste of power, money, machinery, and Christian union. The question, under such circumstances, cannot but force itself upon the thoughtful mind—is there no trace to be found in those records to whose authority we all alike profess to bow, of any organism prepared to receive and embody the spirit of Christianity, and such an organism as, according to all analogy in God's creation, shall possess within it the vital power of reproduction? For "as the Body without the Spirit is dead," so neither can the Spirit exist disembodied. We find recorded there, that "there is *one* Body" as "there is *one* Spirit." The Acts of the Apostles point out the gradual building up of this Body; the pastoral Epistles describe the co-existence of a threefold order of ordained ministers (the surviving apostles being one of them); while the history of the Primitive Church seems to stamp with the seal of perpetuity this threefold ministry, after their decease, which was handed down, without interruption, to the period of the Reformation. It is certainly difficult to conceive why the adoption of Episcopacy, sanctioned at least by the early Church, should be made a reasonable hindrance to the reunion of Protestant

Christianity. Nor is it conceivable that the disciples of Owen, Baxter, Wesley, or Robert Hall need to refuse the test of the Apostles' Creed, not to say the Creed of Nicæa, unless they desire Christianity to degenerate into a mere theory, or sentiment, or some devout but indistinct imagination, as in the case of the Society of Friends, whose contempt for material boundaries has consistently led them to the rejection of the Sacraments. On the other hand, for the sake of such reunion and all its practical and substantial blessings, will the Church, on its part, consent to regard all the decrees of councils in the light of interesting relics of bygone battles upon the doctrines *about* Christ, and be content henceforth to make the doctrines *of* Christ the essential basis of agreement?

In any such construction of the "Church of the Future," the pulpit must be left more free, and the preacher, not the Church, be held responsible for its utterances. *Devotion*, not *instruction*, must be made the main purpose of our "assembling together," after the example of Apostolic times, as sons and daughters met to worship the same common Father. *Ritual* must be pronounced to be no vehicle for conveying special doctrine, but an instrument for exciting the reverence and worship of the Almighty, "stirring up the dull mind of man." (Preface to Prayer-Book.) As one day shall be set apart, the weekly Easter, as a type of all days, and the minister, as the representative of all the people, so God's house must be solemnised and surrounded with whatever God has made beautiful in form or colour, and, by its associations, is calculated to lead our thoughts away from the din and clatter of a work-day world. Let the Church roll back the pages of her history through all the period of her hair-splitting discussions, not perhaps without their use, about the "Person" and "Substance" of Christ, through a dreary waste of Nestorianism and Apollinarianism and that period when salvation was made to depend upon the substitution of a vowel for a diphthong, right back to the Primitive and Apostolic Age, in which men were content simply to believe that Christ was the Son of God, that His Spirit should be with His Church to the end of the world, and that Church be "one with Him, as He is One with the Father."

In estimating the possibility of constructing such a "Church of the Future" (and the union with the State is chiefly valuable as a means to that end), the English Church will be asked to define the authority which she claims as an accredited keeper and interpreter of Holy Writ. The Church of Rome purports to have received an infallible authority to determine, by a short and easy method, all matters of controversy, as well as to develop all truths, the germs of which at least are found in the Scriptures. Although it may be doubted how far it can be wholesome to the human mind so to rid

itself of its rightful functions in the investigation of truth, it must be confessed that so convenient a method for settling disputes would be welcomed by all Christian men. The only difficulty is, that no proof has been forthcoming that such a method *has* ever been given by God to man. It is not a question of convenience, but a question of fact. The Anglican Church has never affected the awful claim of infallibility, and the Roman Church has never substantiated hers. The English Church requires that nothing need be believed as necessary to everlasting salvation but what has the warrant of Holy Scripture. In the interpretation, however, of Scripture, she lays a rational stress upon the testimony of the early Church, beginning from the time when its history was still dovetailed with that of the surviving Apostles, and ending with the last of its General Councils, according to the well-known principle of Vincentius, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." If this restraint upon individual licence of interpretation, regarded as a help towards not *absolute*, but proximate truth, be accepted as reasonable, the alienated wanderers from her fold are only asked to concede that which the early secessionists were ready to do. The threefold ministry, and the rite of confirmation, "after the example of the Apostles," would have to be regarded as at least unexceptionable portions of the Church's order and discipline, resting, if not upon Apostolic institutions, upon the legitimate exercise of her own authority. On the other hand, have our orthodox Dissenters faced the consequences to which their rejection of such authority brings them? Have they examined the tendency of modern religious thought? The rejection of that authority, which witnesses on behalf of Episcopal order and the rite of confirmation, involves the sacredness of the first day of the week and the very canonicity of the holy volume itself. For who is to determine the authority of the New Testament and the claim of the several writers to the awful attribute, never claimed on behalf of themselves, of Divine infallibility? Paul and Barnabas, uncle and nephew, have each left works behind them; who is to determine the invidious question, which of these two shall be regarded, for all time, as human and fallible, and which divine and infallible? Who shall say why three of the four Evangelists, the historian of the Acts, and St. James, the writer of one epistle, and St. Jude, of another, as well as the unknown writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews (not one of whom were amongst the original Apostles), to say nothing of St. Paul, who received a special commission, should become to the end of time dictators to the consciences and creed of Christians? Who shall determine such awful questions as these, if the silent witness of the Early Church, a witness so consentient as not to have required the arbitration of a General Council, is to be spurned, and

all authority on the part of the Church, claimed by virtue of Christ's promise, is to be rejected as worthless, or regarded as an act of encroachment upon personal liberty? In claiming this prerogative on behalf of the Church, as a nurse and mother, it is not pretended that her judgment, directed though it be, according to the promise of the Father, by the Holy Spirit, is free from human error. We see through a glass darkly, for that glass is human, though the light be divine. Truth is never absolutely reached, though it is approximated nearer and nearer as the right means are faithfully used, which have been placed within the reach of men's intuitive conscience and duly-exercised reason.

To men, yearning for freedom, surely this elasticity and comprehensiveness, consistently allowing for the play of private judgment, the outward discoveries of science, and the larger exercise of human reason, should be regarded not as a mark of senile weakness inseparable from human institutions, but as the glory of ever-growing light and power. In this respect a sect or society differs from a Church: if sects must exist, they should exist within, and not independently of the Church. Sects form little spheres, but spheres can only touch in one point, leaving large intervals outside. A *Church* should not only enfold them all in her ample circumference, but, at the same time, those large intervals of space which lie outside and between them. The Church, comprehensive in her folds, both in doctrine and work, admits, more largely than isolated sects, instead of "virtually refusing, all fresh teaching," whether of the living and indwelling Spirit, or of science and reason. Union with the State need not necessarily limit the Church's freedom, and indeed, with the exception of the latest judgments delivered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, every appeal has issued in the greater triumph of liberty. A Church cannot be so accused which finds within her fold a place for her ministers who incline to the views of Zwingle, and for those at the same time who are suspected, by their recognition of a "Real Presence," of a dangerous leaning to Rome. Such elasticity as is claimed for the Church of England is but the corollary of her abnegation of infallibility. The Church of England teaches "Baptismal Regeneration," but she does not compel, by any over-refinement of definition, her children to understand by that term more than that, as in natural birth, a child, without his consent, is born into the family to be educated for his earthly work, so in baptism, once more without his consent, he is born into a spiritual home, to be trained for a still higher inheritance. She teaches the doctrine of "Priestly Absolution," but where is it proved that she means by that phrase more than that, just as any private Christian may "declare" the forgiveness of sins to the penitent, her

ministers, as God's ambassadors, "declare and pronounce" absolution upon the same terms of penitence, so that the fearful may be specially comforted by the direct application of a general blessing to himself; and the spiritual leper, having shown himself to the priest, as the people's minister, may be received once more into the society of the clean? Canons and Articles are boundary fences, which the commissioned officers of the Church may not transgress. In the pulpit he may discuss with his people his own private views, so long as they do not go directly counter to the Church's standards, though he may fail to subscribe more than a general assent to her teaching. The Articles may bind him, but while he faithfully disavows the doctrine which each was intended to deprecate, he is not bound down by their outward letter, as if they claimed the same authority as Holy Scripture. He must preach the doctrine of the "Atonement," but he is not bound to accept the degrading notion of any commercial equivalent. So, again, he must recognise in his preaching that all canonical Scripture is Θεοπνευστος, but his judgment is not fettered by any private theories of verbal or mechanical inspiration. He must subscribe to the doctrine of a "Divine Presence" in the Eucharist, but he may object to the introduction into the discussion of all such philosophical terms as "objective" and "subjective" as savouring of that intellectual pride which would be wiser than what is written.

The prospect of comprehending the various bodies of Nonconformists may appear to be most visionary. Nonconformity, however, is continually filling its ranks by emigration, and that much more than by natural increase. It is seldom, too, that the attachment to dissent lasts longer than with the second or third generation, although elsewhere fresh defections are daily renewed. The tendency of the children is to return to the Church of their forefathers. But such defections as arise from principle would be cut off by the removal of the causes of offence. The return of any considerable number of the most thinking men to the Church, or the power of retaining them, would produce the same practical effect as the conversions or reversions of whole congregations. The purpose of this paper is to open the question whether less stringent terms of union are possible, which the Church may offer without sacrifice of her true principles. Such canons as the following, we believe, would involve no such sacrifice. No man shall be pronounced anathema, who reveres the Bible as emphatically the "Word of God" and the highest source of authority. The imposition of no dogma, or verbal definition of truth, shall be made a condition of membership. No dogma or canon of ecclesiastical synod shall be pronounced necessarily free from human error. The promise of Christ to be with his Church

shall be accepted as peculiarly fulfilled, when the undivided Church was permitted to meet in solemn councils. Their decrees, their creeds, and symbols shall be thought deserving of the utmost reverence, as the nearest approximation to unadulterated truth. Episcopacy shall be retained, as having the sanction of all the ages, from the death of the apostles. For were we to allow any analogy between a modern Congregational church and the churches founded by the apostles, no analogy can possibly be claimed between the churches of Galatia and Palestine, subject as they were to a common rule, and the endless incoherent sects of modern London or New York.

In any such church of the future, organised societies, like the Wesleyan, may be left to carry out their own special plans for evangelising the masses, as recognised brotherhoods. The practical advantages of reunited forces cannot be overrated. Concerted action would produce results, apart from the moral power of union, which desultory and fragmentary effort must fail to accomplish. The army of Christ cannot look for great victories, so long as its commanders never meet in council to arrange campaigns. The building, however beautiful may be its separate stones, so long as they are held together by the untempered mortar of party strife, will totter before the great hailstones of unbelief and sin. The saving of strength and resources, where they are now dissipated, would direct the Church's energies into moral deserts now left unreached. Enthusiasm would find her legitimate channels, while fanaticism would be controlled or corrected. Wholesale dissensions, the weakness and scandals of the Reformation, being removed, the English Church, once more national, not a rope of sand composed of disintegrated units held together by fluctuating *opinion*, but a corporate whole with a circulating life, the prophetic vine, whose branches not only draw their common life from Christ the Root, but realise an inter-dependent life among themselves, would prove the surest protest to the false pretensions of any other infallibility except the infallibility of truth and goodness. In other words, it is believed that she would show herself to be God's great instrument for the regeneration of society.

C. H. TASMANIA.



EVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR HUXLEY.

ON reading the criticism which Professor Huxley has done me the honour to make upon a little book (the "Genesis of Species") which I ventured to publish in the early part of this year, I felt that, as a subaltern in science, I was being severely reprimanded by my superior officer; that I might apprehend a sentence of degradation to the ranks, if not actual expulsion from the service. I found myself taxed, if not with positive desertion to an enemy with whom no truce is to be allowed, yet, at least, suspected of treasonable communication with a hostile army, and treacherous dalliance with ministers of Baal.

Now, recognising as I do that, in physical science, Professor Huxley is *indeed* my superior officer, having his just claims to respect and deference on the part of all men of science, I also feel that I am under special obligations to him, both many and deep, for knowledge imparted and for ready assistance kindly rendered. No wonder then that the expression of his vehement disapproval is painful to me.

It was not however without surprise that I learned that my one unpardonable sin—the one great offence disqualifying me for being "a loyal soldier of science"—was my attempt to show that there is no real antagonism between the Christian revelation and evolution!

My "Genesis of Species" was written with two main objects:—

My first object was to show that the Darwinian theory is un-

tenable, and that natural selection is not *the* origin of species. This was and is my conviction purely as a man of science, and I maintain it upon scientific grounds only.

My second object was to demonstrate that nothing even in Mr. Darwin's theory, as then put forth, and *à fortiori* in evolution generally, was necessarily antagonistic to Christianity.

Professor Huxley ignoring the arguments by which I supported my first point, fastens upon my second; and the gist of his criticism is an endeavour to show that Christianity and science are necessarily and irreconcilably divorced, and that the arguments I have advanced to the contrary are false and misleading.

Before replying to Professor Huxley's observations and misconceptions on this head, I may be excused for saying a few words as to my first point, namely, the scientific reasons which seem to oppose themselves to the reception of the Darwinian theory as originally propounded by its author; and here I claim to be acting, and to have acted, as "a loyal soldier of science" in stating the scientific facts which have impressed me with certain scientific convictions (on purely scientific grounds), in opposition to Mr. Darwin's views.

Professor Huxley does not so much dispute the truth of my conclusions as deny their distinctness from those at which Mr. Darwin himself has arrived, or indeed originally put forth, asserting that my book is but "an iteration of the fundamental principle of Darwinism."

I shall then shortly endeavour to show more distinctly wherein my view radically differs from that first propounded by Mr. Darwin, and still maintained, or at least not distinctly repudiated by him; though I believe that the admissions he has of late made amount to a virtual, but certainly not to an explicit, abandonment of his theory.

The Professor expresses his doubt as to the existence of an "absolute and pure Darwinian,"—a doubt which is certainly a surprise to me, as I had always understood him as guarding himself carefully against the identification of his own views with those of Mr. Darwin, and as allowing that it was one thing to hold the doctrine of evolution and another to accept the Darwinian hypothesis. In a lecture* delivered in 1868 at the Royal Institution, he observed, "I can testify, from personal experience, it is possible to have a complete faith in the general doctrine of evolution, and yet to hesitate in accepting the Nebular, or the Uniformitarian, or the Darwinian hypotheses in all their integrity and fulness."

It is plain then that at a recent period, Professor Huxley distinguished himself from thorough-going disciples of Mr. Darwin; implying by this distinction a recognition of the existence of such

* See "Proceedings of the Royal Institution," vol. v. p. 279.

disciples, pure Darwinians, like those of whom he now ignores the existence.

The very essence of Mr. Darwin's theory as to the "origin of species" was, the paramount action of the destructive powers of nature over any *direct* tendency to vary in any certain and definite line, whether such direct tendency resulted mainly from internal predisposing or external exciting causes.

The benefit of the individual in the struggle for life was announced as the one determining agent, fixing slight beneficial variations into enduring characters, and the evolution of species by such agency is justly and properly to be termed formation by "natural selection."

That in this I do not misrepresent Mr. Darwin is evident from his own words. He says:—

"If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down."* Also: "Every detail of structure in every living creature (making some little allowance for the direct action of physical conditions) may be viewed, either as having been of special use to some ancestral form, or as being now of special use to the descendants of this form—either directly, or indirectly, through the complex laws of growth;" and "if it could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been formed for the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could not have been produced by natural selection." †

Mr. Darwin could hardly have employed words by which more thoroughly to stake the whole of his theory on the non-existence or non-action of causes of any moment other than natural selection. For why should such a phenomenon "annihilate his theory?" Because the very essence of his theory, as originally put forth, is to recognise only the conservation of slight variations directly beneficial to the creature presenting them, by enabling it to obtain food, escape enemies, and propagate its kind.

Such being the case, my first object, as I have before said, was to show not only that "natural selection" is inadequate to the task assigned it, but that there is much *positive* evidence of the direct action both of external influences sufficient to dominate and overpower in certain instances the ordinary processes of "natural selection," and also of still more influential internal powers; moreover, that these latter powers are so efficient as to present themselves as probably the main determining agent in specific evolution, although I admitted that a certain subordinate action of natural selection plainly obtained.

The various arguments I advanced space does not allow me here to reproduce, but referring to my book, I may point out that therein I endeavoured to show:—

* "Origin of Species," p. 208.

† *Op. cit.* p. 220.

1. That no mere survival of the fittest accidental variations can account for the incipient stages of structures useful enough when once developed. Such, *e.g.*, as the whalebone of the whale's mouth, the larynx of the kangaroo, pedicellariæ and bird's head processes, and many other structures.

2. That the sexual colours of apes, the beauty of shell-fish, and the complex mechanisms by which fertilisation is effected in many orchids, are quite beyond the power of natural selection to develop.

3. That modes of formation, such as in the human eye and ear, in that they spring from simultaneous and concurrent modifications of distinct parts, have a remarkable significance.

4. That the independent origin of similar structures in very different animal forms should be noted,* and I adduced evidence to show that similar modifications are sometimes directly induced by obscure external conditions, as in the sudden acclimatization of English greyhounds in Mexico, and in the loss of the tail in certain butterflies of certain regions, and in the direct modification of young English oysters when transported to the shore of the Mediterranean. Moreover, it was shown that certain groups of organic forms exhibit a common tendency to remarkable developments of particular kinds, as is the case with birds of paradise.

5. That facts may be cited to support the theory of specific stability (different in degree in different species), and to demonstrate that reversion may take place *in spite of the most careful selection in breeding*. The value of the facts of sterility in hybrids was also considered.

6. That data bearing on the relation of species to time may be brought forward, apparently fatal to their origin by the action of natural selection.

7. That the significant and important facts of the deep-seated resemblances existing not only between different individual animals, but between different parts of one and the same individual, should be pondered over; these points being, as was shown, capable of reinforcement by others drawn from the abnormalities of monstrous births, and the symmetrical character of certain diseases.

From all these considerations, a cumulative argument seemed to me to arise conclusive against the theory that species have had their specific characters fixed solely by the action of "natural selection."

The hypothesis which I ventured to offer as my view of the evolu-

* Professor Huxley corrects me as to "a slip" I have made in laying too much stress on the amount of similarity existing between the eyes of vertebrates and cephalopods. After all, however, the resemblance is very great and striking. It is gratifying to me to find no more important error noted, even by such a master of the subject as Professor Huxley.

tionary process was and is, that just as all admit the universe to have been so ordered—or to so exist—that on the mixing of chemical substances under certain conditions new and perfectly definite species of minerals are suddenly evolved from potentiality to existence, and as by the juxtaposition of inorganic matters under certain influences* a new form of force—"vitality"—appears upon the scene—so also in animals, the concurrence of certain external exciting causes acts in such a manner on internal predisposing tendencies as to determine by a direct seminal modification the evolution of a new specific form. The action of "natural selection," I admitted, and admit, to be real and necessary, but I ascribe to it an altogether subordinate rôle.

This view may be true or false, but it is a very different one from that advocated by the author of the "Origin of Species," and I am at a loss to understand how Professor Huxley can consider it identical with Mr. Darwin's, more especially as (at p. 237) I have enumerated the points in which my theory coincides with Professor Owen's "Derivation," and differs from that of the author of the "Origin of Species." It seems to me strange that Professor Huxley should now assert the "very pith and marrow" of Darwinism to have been the affirmation that "species have been evolved by variation, aided by the subordinate action of natural selection,"—when he himself, in his "Lay Sermons" (p. 321), has enunciated simply that Mr. Darwin's hypothesis is the origin of species "by the process of natural selection," without one word of qualification; and five pages further on, has considered the possibility of the refutation of Mr. Darwin's view by the discovery of residual phenomena† not explicable by "natural selection"—just such phenomena as I have endeavoured to call attention to in my book.

I question whether Mr. Darwin even now *does* admit that "natural selection" has only a *subordinate* action. I do not recollect to have met with such a declaration, although I think that it should logically follow from the various admissions he has latterly made. If he does admit it, then a cause which is subordinate cannot be *the* determining agent. If he does not admit it, then there is a radical difference between my hypothesis and Mr. Darwin's.

Professor Huxley blames the Quarterly Reviewer's treatment of Mr. Darwin as "unjust and unbecoming," because he endeavours to show how Mr. Darwin has changed his ground without (in spite of

* Though Professor Huxley is disinclined as yet to admit that such evolution of living things takes place now, he none the less admits the principle, though he relegates such evolution to a remote epoch of the world's history. See "Address to the British Association, Liverpool, 1870," p. 17.

† His words are—"What if species should offer residual phenomena, here and there, not explicable by natural selection?"—*Lay Sermons*, p. 326.

his generally scrupulous candour) disavowing "natural selection" as *the* origin of species.

I confess that it seems to me that the reviewer was fully justified in so doing; for Mr. Darwin's reputation as a man of science stands so high, that it was plainly the reviewer's duty to endeavour to prevent the public attaching, in mere deference to Mr. Darwin's authority, a greater weight to his assertions than the evidence adduced warranted. The reviewer sought to do this by showing, by Mr. Darwin's own words, he had been compelled to admit that "abrupt strongly marked changes" may occur "neither beneficial nor injurious" to the creatures possessing them, produced "by unknown agencies" lying deep in "the *nature* of the organism." In other words, that Mr. Darwin has in fact,* though not in express words, abandoned his original theory of the "origin of species."

I am grateful, however, to Professor Huxley for having spoken of "injustice" in connection with Mr. Darwin. I am so because it affords me an opportunity for declaring myself more fully with respect to the distinction between Darwinism and Mr. Darwin.

In common, I am sure, with all those who have been privileged to know not only Mr. Darwin's works, but Mr. Darwin himself, I have ever entertained, and shall continue to entertain for that amiable gentleman and most accomplished naturalist the warmest sentiments of esteem and regard. Convinced as I am that he is actuated by a pure love of truth, admiring, nay, venerating him for his acute, his unwearied and widely-extended researches, it has been to me a most painful task to stand forth as his avowed and public opponent.

The struggle between my inclination to praise and to acquiesce, and my sense of duty which impelled me to dissent, led me to express myself very imperfectly, and I thank Professor Huxley for thus giving me occasion to acknowledge my regret that these sentiments should have led me to give such very inadequate expression to my dissent from, and reprobation of, Mr. Darwin's views, especially as manifested in their later developments.

As to the principles embodied in Mr. Darwin's "Origin of Species," the further study of them more and more brings home to me their unsatisfactoriness, as pointed out by me in my "Genesis of Species."

* Professor Huxley now tells us that Mr. Darwin is inclined to admit that varieties can "be perpetuated, or even intensified, when selective conditions are indifferent, or perhaps unfavourable" to their "existence." Surely, if species may be evolved in the teeth of all the opposition "natural selection" can offer, it is, to say the least, somewhat paradoxical to affirm that nevertheless natural selection is *their* cause. For all this Mr. Darwin has not, I believe, expressly said that the action of "natural selection" is only *subordinate*, though he implies that it is but co-ordinate. So that though he has virtually given up his original theory, his view does not yet coincide with mine, as far as I can gather from his words.

Indeed, "natural selection," as *the* agent for the determination of specific animal forms, is, I am convinced, utterly insufficient to the task assigned it; while the reasoning employed in the "Descent of Man" to support the hypothesis of our ape origin* seems to me, to say the least, unworthy of Mr. Darwin's earlier productions.

Professor Huxley attributes to the Quarterly Reviewer "peculiar notions of probability," because he affirms that if all animals below man *have* been evolved one from the other, then a close resemblance in man's body to any particular animal's does not increase that *a priori* probability as to his bodily evolution, which springs from the fact of his being "an animal at all." But surely if it was of the essence of an animal to be "evolved," so that to be an animal implied being a creature formed by evolution, then the fact of man being an animal would necessarily have a similar implication, and I fail to see what additional force that probability would obtain through any particular resemblance. On the other hand, if there is authority for believing that man's body was miraculously created, such particular resemblance would not render such a miracle one bit less credible; for there is no necessity, on the hypothesis of such miraculous creation, for more than even a specific difference between his body and that of some other animal.

Professor Huxley also speaks of the Quarterly Reviewer's making the admission as to the similarity of man's body to that of brutes "grudgingly." With regard to myself, no one is better aware than Professor Huxley how I have worked at the demonstration of the close resemblance between the bodily structures of men and apes.

Another objection is brought both against me and the Quarterly Reviewer by Professor Huxley. We are declared to make a "conspicuous exhibition" of the "absence of a sound philosophical basis," in that we agree in asserting that man differs more from an ape than does an ape from inorganic matter.

But surely this is the position every one must assume who believes that man is immortal, and has a moral responsibility to God. For it is manifest that such distinctions (*e.g.* growth, nutrition, locomotion, &c.) as exist between apes and minerals are as nothing compared with the transcendent distinction above referred to. If, then, in saying this we are in "philosophical error," we share that error with all those who assert the immortality of the soul, and a moral responsibility of each man to God such as no brute possesses. We can also claim as more or less on our side even one of the originators of the theory of "natural selection" itself, and his followers. For Mr.

* The much-ridiculed Lord Monboddo has been successfully redeemed from very unjust depreciation in an interesting article which has lately appeared. See the *Month* for November, 1871.

Wallace, if I understand him rightly, teaches us that for the evolution of man's body special spiritual agencies were required, which were not needed for the rest of the organic world. So that, according to this view, man is marked off from all the rest of nature by a very special distinction.

I will turn now to the main point of Professor Huxley's paper—namely, that in which he applies himself to controverting the second object aimed at in my "Genesis of Species." As I have before said, my second object was to demonstrate that there is no necessary antagonism between the Christian revelation and evolution.

In meeting me on this ground (to discuss what seems to have interested the Professor more than anything else in my book), he endeavours to create a prejudice against my arguments, and to narrow my base, by representing me as a mere advocate for specially Catholic doctrine.*

I altogether decline to allow the issue to be thus limited. I decline it because neither did I intend such limitation, nor do any words of mine justify such a construction of my purpose. I took up, and I take up, only the ground common to me and to all who hold the Christian religion as expressed in the Apostles' Creed, or who maintain the inspiration of Scripture. The better to make sure of my position I made use of an extreme case, knowing that if I could maintain *even that*, then all within that extreme term could not certainly be questioned. Purposely then I set out to show, and I did show, that even the strictest Ultramontane Catholics are perfectly free to hold the doctrine of evolution, thereby making evident that with regard to Christians in general there could not be a doubt as to *their* freedom in the matter. For this end I expressly selected just such persons as would commonly be supposed not to be those from whom (in Professor Huxley's words) "modern science was likely to receive a warm welcome," and amongst others the Spanish Jesuit, Father Suarez, precisely because, as Professor Huxley says, "the popular repute of that learned theologian and subtle casuist was not such as to make his works a likely place of refuge for liberality of thought."

My critic shows how he misapprehends my aim and intention when he speaks of "Mr. Mivart citing Father Suarez as his chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom enjoyed by Catholics." Had he been such a witness I should not for one moment have thought of citing him; it was precisely as one of the most rigid

* At p. 454, Professor Huxley gives the words "Catholic theology" with marks of quotation as if mine, though in fact they were not so. This typographical error does not misrepresent my substantial meaning, but it none the less tends to create a prejudice against my statements in the mind of the public.

theologians, and of "unspotted orthodoxy" (as Professor Huxley justly remarks), that I called him into court where he testifies so completely to my satisfaction.

The success of my mode of procedure is, I confess, gratifying to me. Not only was my argument "most interesting" to Professor Huxley, but he tells us his "astonishment reached its climax," and that he shall "look anxiously" for additional references "in the third edition of the 'Genesis of Species.'" Fortunately I have no need to keep the Professor waiting, but shall shortly proceed to give him these additional references at once.

Let it be borne in mind that in view of the popular conceptions current in England on the subject, my argument was that if even those who receive the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Jesuits, and who look to Rome for doctrinal decisions—if *even those* are free to accept evolution, then, *à fortiori*, other Christians, supposed to be comparatively untrammelled, need not hesitate as to the harmony and compatibility of Christianity and evolution.

Of all I said in my book on the subject I have nothing to retract; but I repeat yet more confidently than before that "evolution is without doubt consistent with the strictest Christian theology;" that "it is notorious that many distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted, and do accept, both ideas;" that "Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory;" and, finally, that "it is evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities distinctly assert *derivative* creation, and thus their teachings harmonize with all that modern science can possibly require."

The point I had to prove was that the assertion of the evolution of new species (whether by Mr. Darwin's "natural selection" or according to my hypothesis) was in no opposition to the Christian faith as to the creation of the organic world.

In order to prove this I had to consider the meaning of the word "creation," and I found that it might be taken in three senses, with only two of which, however, we had to do.

The first of these was direct creation out of nothing, of both matter and form conjoined—absolute creation such as must have taken place when the earliest definite kind of matter appeared.

The second was derivative or potential creation: the creation by God of forms not *as existing*, but *in potentia*, to be subsequently evolved into actual existence by the due concurrence and agency of the various powers of nature.

Searching for information on the subject, I found to my surprise that the regular teaching of theology adopted this view, which was maintained by a complete consensus of authorities. Of these I purposely chose but a few telling ones as types; and, amongst the

rest, Suarez, who without any doubt, and as I shall proceed to demonstrate more at length, is a thorough-going supporter of it.

Professor Huxley has quite misapprehended* my meaning, hence the disappointment he speaks of. What he did not find, I never said was to be found. What he actually did find is what everybody knew before, but is a matter totally different from and utterly irrelevant to the point I maintained.

My critic fails to distinguish between the question as to the *nature* of creation as an act, and that concerning the *fact* of creation.

Now, what my intention was is plainly shown by the words I used. I said: "Considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected *à priori* that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines *harmonising in any degree* with such very modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly the case." And so it is.

Of Suarez I said, he opposes those who maintain the absolute creation of substantial forms, and he distinctly asserts derivative (potential) creation. And this is true.

Although Professor Huxley has conveyed the impression that I adduced Suarez as a witness to evolution, I cannot think he intended so to do. He surely could not have imagined me so absurd as to maintain that ancient writers held that modern view; to attribute to them the holding of such a conception would be to represent them as nothing less than inspired. For certainly no notion of the kind could have been present, even in a dream, to the minds of such thinkers. In their eyes (as in the eyes of most till within the last century) scientific facts must have seemed to tell in the opposite direction.

All I maintained, and all that I thought any one could have supposed me to maintain, was that these writers asserted abstract *principles* such as can perfectly *harmonise* with the requirements of modern science, and have, as it were, provided for the reception of its most advanced speculations.

My words were: "The possibility of such phenomena, though *by no means actually foreseen*, has yet been *fully provided for* in the old philosophy centuries before Darwin." And that this is the case can be proved to demonstration. The *really* important matter, how-

* Not only this, but he has even mis-represented my words. He says (p. 445): "According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most orthodox authorities upon matters of Catholic doctrine agree in distinctly asserting 'derivative creation' or 'evolution'"—as if "derivative creation" and "evolution" were *the same thing*. Having thus made me enunciate what I never thought of, consequences are deduced which, of course, are not of my deducing. Derivative or potential creation such authorities do assert: evolution of species, however, was no more thought of in their days than the electric telegraph.

ever, is not what were my expressions, but *what is the fact* as to the compatibility of evolution with the strictest orthodoxy? We shall see how, by Professor Huxley's very fortunate misapprehension of my meaning, this truth will be brought out yet more clearly than before.

Far from maintaining that Suarez was a teacher of development or evolution, what I quoted him for was this:—

I. As an opponent of the theory of a perpetual, direct creation of organisms (which many held, and still hold).

II. To show that the principles of scholastic theology are such as *not to exclude* the theory of development, but, on the contrary, to favour it, even before it was known or broached.

What Professor Huxley quotes in his article amply *confirms my position*. For if there are innumerable substantial forms in the potentia of matter, which are evolved according to the proximate capacity of matter to receive such forms, it is evident that if the organisation of matter, through chemical or other causes, progresses by the ever-increasingly complex reactions between bodies and their environment, then it necessarily follows that new and higher substantial forms may be evolved, and consequently new and higher forms of life.

Such a principle, firmly established against opponents, becomes applicable to the evolution of new species, as soon as ever physical science shows good reason to regard the origin of species not as simultaneous but successive.

It may be objected that Suarez, in the passage referred to, only adverts to new individuals of known kinds in the ordinary course of nature. Professor Huxley says: "How the substantial forms of animals and plants primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to discover, he does not so much as allude in his 'Metaphysical Disputations.'" Most certainly, in his day, no one entertained the modern notion as to origin of species; and it was hardly to be expected that Suarez should say anything directly in point. That he should establish the needful principle was all we could reasonably demand or expect.

Nevertheless, in a remarkable manner, even Father Suarez does refer to the origination of certain kinds of animals, and admits their actual evolution by natural causes. These are partly exceptional forms such as hybrids, and partly such as were believed to originate by cosmical influences direct from the inorganic world, or through the agency of putrefaction.

In lib. ii., de Opere Sex Dierum, c. x., n. 12, speaking of such animals as the mule, leopard, lynx, &c., after stating the opinion that individuals of their kinds must have been created from the beginning, he says, "nihilominus contrarium censeo esse probabilius;" and he gives his

reason, "quia hujusmodi species animalium sufficienter continebantur potentialiter in illis individuis diversarum specierum ex quorum commixtione generantur; et ideo non fuit necessarium aliqua eorum individua ab auctore naturæ immediate produci." This in principle is absolutely all that can be required, for it reduces the matter simply to a question of fact. He asserts the principle that those kinds of animals which are potentially contained in nature need not be supposed to be directly and immediately created. In determining what kinds were or were not so contained, he followed the scientific notions of his time as he understood them. He would have written according to the exigences of science now.

But this matter is really unmistakable. For, so far was Suarez from teaching that all life requires direct creative action, that he speaks of certain creatures, "quæ per influentiam cælorum ex putrida materia terræ aut aqua generari solent." (Ibid., n. 10.)

It is also interesting to see that (in n. 11) he positively asserts the improbability and incredibility that certain kinds of animals now living were actually created at first at all: "Alias dicendum esset in omnibus speciebus quantumvis imperfectis aliqua individua in principio fuisse facta quia non est major ratio de quibusdam quam de aliis. Consequens est incredibile." He then instances certain insects, but as far as the principle of evolution in itself is concerned he might as well have selected crocodiles.

Moreover, with respect to certain vegetable productions, he says (ib. c. vi. n. 1), "an vero hujusmodi herbæ sint factæ hoc die tantum in potentia vel etiam in actu magis dubitari potest." Finally, even with regard to the production of animals altogether, he tells us that it was not a real creation (c. x. n. 3), "sed ex præjacente materia modo tamen proprio auctoris naturæ." It is strange that Professor Huxley should have overlooked these passages which so directly contradict his assertions.

Nevertheless these passages are not, let it be recollected, adduced to show that Suarez held the doctrine of evolution, or that he maintained as a fact that species were evolved, except in peculiar cases, or that he took St. Augustin's view as to the fact of creation; but to demonstrate that he distinctly admits principles compatible with evolution, and that even where he asserts direct and immediate divine action, yet that even there the exceptions he admits bring out still more clearly how completely I was justified in adducing him as a witness to the compatibility of evolution with the principles of the scholastic philosophy.

So much then for the teaching of Suarez as to the nature of the creative act and the admission of the evolution of even certain new organic forms by natural causes.

Let us turn now to a much more important subject.

Besides and in addition to this view it is a most remarkable circumstance that ideas should have been expressed of a distinctly evolutionary character by the highest theological authority, even as regards the *very fact of creation*, as an historical event.

Few things seem to me more striking than that such an anticipation, as it were, should have been enunciated by one of the greatest teachers the Church has ever known, a doctor, the authority of whose writings is not surpassed by that of any of the Fathers—I mean St. Augustin. As I said in my book, “it must be borne in mind that no one had disputed the generally received belief as to the small age of the world, or of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it.” Nevertheless, as I have shown, the teaching of St. Augustin was distinct with respect to the potential creation of animals and plants. That great source of western theology held that the whole creation spoken of in Genesis took place in one instant; that all created things were created at once, “*potentialiter atque causaliter*,” so that it accords with his teaching if we believe in the gradual development of species, the slow evolution, “*per temporum moras*,” into actual existence of what God created potentially in the beginning.

Now the greatest representatives of Catholic theology are unquestionably St. Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, and this being, as almost every one knows, the case, it is inconceivable how a teacher like Professor Huxley could write as he has done regarding the consequences of a divergence of Suarez from their expressed opinions.

If, as Suarez suggests, St. Thomas followed St. Augustin rather through deference than from identity of opinion, it would only bring out more strongly the paramount authority of the latter. But in fact Suarez was here mistaken, for we have St. Thomas’s own words as to the matter, where speaking of St. Augustin’s view, he tells us, “*et hæc opinio plus mihi placet*” (2 Sent. dis. 12, quaest. 1, a. 2).

Here it may be well to explain (as Professor Huxley seems quite to have misapprehended me), that when I spoke of the “wide reception” of Suarez and of his being “widely venerated” and of “unquestioned orthodoxy” I never thought of placing him on a level with St. Thomas and St. Augustin. Moreover, “wide veneration” and “orthodoxy,” by no means imply authority in the sense of binding consciences. Many Catholic teachers altogether reject the teaching of Suarez on certain points, though they none the less consider him an authority to be respectfully consulted, indeed, but by no means to be necessarily followed.

∴ Multitudes of teachers, all agreeing in matters of faith, yet belong

to very different theological schools, and the idea that any one of them can bind the others is simply laughable to those who know anything of the matter.

Professor Huxley seems to imagine in showing that Suarez (like most teachers of his day, Catholic or not, *e.g.* Tycho Brahe) adopts an extreme literalism of scripture interpretation, he has made a notable discovery. But (as before remarked) I referred to Suarez for principles of interpretation with regard to derivative creation, and his views as to the historical facts of Genesis are quite beside the question. St. Thomas explains the diversity of opinion among theologians in a way which exactly meets my purpose: "Quoad mundi principium, aliquid est quod ad substantiam fidei pertinet scilicet mundum incepisse creatum et hoc omnes sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine factus sit non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, in quantum in Scriptura traditur, ejus veritatem diversa expositione sancti salvantes diversa tradiderunt (2 Sent., dist. 12, q. 1., a. 2).

My critic also appears to think that because one side of a question is perfectly orthodox, that its contradictory cannot also be so. If he knew the A B C of Catholic doctrine, he would know that in *open questions* it is perfectly allowable to maintain either side.

Professor Huxley says, that Suarez in this question (as in other matters) is in opposition to St. Augustin. He is so; but other theologians of equal weight severely took him to task for his expressions on this subject, as I shall proceed to show, and there is not the slightest difficulty in bringing forward many theological authorities, both before and since the time of Suarez, who approve or positively affirm the position which St. Augustin took. Therefore, even if I had made the mistake which Professor Huxley supposes I had, it would not be of the slightest moment, and my thesis could repose as securely on the support of other theologians.

Thus I may mention St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Denis the Carthusian (1470), Cardinal Cajetan (1530), Melchior Canus (1560), Bannes (1580), Vincentius Contenson (1670), Macedo and Cardinal Noris (1673), Tonti (1714), Serry (1720), Berti (1740), and others down to the present day.

St. Bonaventure calls St. Augustin's exposition, "Multum rationalis et valde subtilis," and speaks of his method as a "via philosophica;" nay, he calls the contrary opinion "Minus rationalis quam alia" (Librum secund. Sent. Dist. xii. Quæst. ii. art. 1 conclusio).

St. Thomas, as I have shown, supports and approves St. Augustin, but he even admits ("Summ," par. i. quæs. lxxiii. art. 1 ad. 3) the possibility of new species himself. He says:—"Species etiam novæ

si quæ apparent, præextiterunt in quibusdam activis virtutibus sicut et animalia ex putrefactione generata producuntur ex virtutibus stellarum et elementorum quas a principio acceperunt, etiam si novæ species talium animalium producuntur."

Professor Huxley will hardly dispute the weight and significance, in this controversy, of the distinct adoption of St. Augustin's view by an eminent Roman Cardinal of the latter part of the seventeenth century.

Yet Cardinal Noris ("Vindiciæ Augus.," c. iv. § ix.; see Migne's "Patrologia Cursus Completus," tom. xlvii. p. 719) speaks in the following uncompromising words:—

"Hic etiam recentiorum querelæ, inno censuræ, quibus insignem Sancti Doctoris interpretationem in cap. i. Genescos excipiunt, refellendæ sunt. . . Augustinus, quod videbat sex priores dies queis Moyses mundum a Deo creatum scribit, si litteraliter accipiantur, gravissimis difficultatibus subjici, quas ipsemet in libris de Genesi ad litteram proponit, subtilem prorsus ac se dignam sententiam excogitavit, nempe dies illos intelligendos esse mystice, juxta cognitionem angelicam de rebus in Deo, et in proprio genere, et juxta ordinem rerum simul a Deo creatarum, dierum etiam ordinem in angelorum mente designavit. . . . Ex nostris scriptoribus Magister Emmanuel Cerda Lusitanus, publicus in Academia Conimbricensi theologiæ professor, in suis Quodlibetis theologicis, acerrime contra recentiorum impetum Magni Parentis sententiam propugnat, eorumque et in censurando audaciam, et in impugnando debilitatem ostendit; idem quoque præstitit Carolus Moreau, noster Bituricensis in vindiciis pacificis."

Speaking of Cornelius à Lapide, he adds:—

"Verum Augustino consentit Albertus, qui ob multiplicem ac mirabilem litteraturam Magni cognomento insignitus fuit, his plane verbis; sine præjudicio sententiæ melioris videtur Augustino consentiendum. Part I. Summæ q. 12, de quatuor comis. Addit Sanctus Thomas proxime laudatus: Hæc opinio (Augustini) PLUS MIHI PLACET. Itane Corneli sententia illa, quam Albertus Magnus ac Sanctus Thomas, Scholasticorum lumina ac columnæ, probant et sequuntur, hac ætate erronea evasit? Quænam illam Synodi, qui Romani præsules, quæ doctorum academiæ proscripterent? An quia tibi tuisque displicet erronea censenda est? Næ Sanctus Thomas, Albertus Magnus, Sanctus Bonaventura, et Ægidius Romanus inter accuratiores theologos minime recensendi sunt? Erunt ne illi de ultima theologorum plebe, Senatores vero Suarez, Molina et Martinon? Imo omnium nobilissimi illi sunt quibus et Suarez et Molina assurgant, Martinon vero nec eadem cum illis die nominetur."

Berti, who was Assistant-General of his order, who published his book at Rome, and belongs to a period more than half a century later than Cardinal Noris, proposes the following thesis ("De Theologicis Disciplinis," lib. xi. c. ii.):—

"Propositio I. Audaciæ potius et fidentia vitio, quam doctrinæ laude debent notari, qui maledico dente carpunt Augustianam de *simultanea creatione* sententiam.

"Propositio II. Augustini de simultanea creatione sententia non solum ab omni animadversione immunis est, *verum etiam probabilis et præpe certa.*"

And in n. 9 he says :—

“ Quare in distributione operum Dei omnia quidem spectant ad illos dies invisibiles in quibus creavit omnia simul, videlicet ad diversas cognitiones angelorum; sed plura, hoc est, quæ primum in rationibus seminalibus, deinde visibilibus facta sunt, si accipiantur secundum priorem conditionem, pertinent ad dies intelligibiles, et unico momento fuerunt et ipsa producta; si vero inspiciantur, ut in propria forma aspectabili constitutæ, istorum creatio perficitur in tempore, et post sex illos dies invisibiles; spectatque ad dies naturales in quibus Deus operatur *quotidie*, quidquid ex illis tanquam involucris primordialibus in tempore evolvitur. Sed legite S. Patrem Lit. v. de Gen. ad lit.”

But now, coming down to our own day, the same complete refutation of Professor Huxley's position is most easily effected.

Father Pianciani, a Jesuit, was president of the College of Philosophy in the Roman University. His work, “*Cosmogonia Naturale Comparata ad Genes.*,” was published at Rome in 1862, at the press of the “*Civiltà Catholica.*” Professor Huxley will hardly dispute as to his orthodoxy. This author, in his “*Historia Creationis Mosaicæ*” (published at Naples as long ago as 1851), p. 29, shows that the whole of the first chapter of Genesis must be read as a most sublime and magnificent poetical description. Concerning St. Augustin's special view, he tells us (p. 15), “*Ejus doctrina ad hæc capita revocatur:*”—

“ 1° Omnia simul a Deo fuisse producta: 2° Cum ipsa ita disponi queant, ut infimum gradum materia elementaris, supremum puri spiritus occupent, interjectos et medios tum mixta, seu chimica composita, tum corpora physice composita, ut saxa, tum præcipue corpora organica. Hinc quæ ad infimum, supremumque gradum spectant et si quæ alia sunt, quæ naturæ viribus neque nunc producuntur, plene et perfecte tunc fuisse producta; quæ vero interjectis gradibus continentur et nunc naturæ viribus producuntur, virtute duntaxat et seminaliter seu *causaliter*, tunc Dei imperio extitisse. Augustini opinio, *semper ab errore immunis habita* pluribus placuit theologis quos inter Alberto Magno. St. Thomas in Summa, p. 1, q. 74, a. 2—eam reveretur, et nec ipsi nec vulgari doctrinæ præjudicandum censet, p. 15, 16.”

No liberal-minded man can see with anything but regret how eagerly Professor Huxley endeavours to restrict within the narrowest limits the faith of the greater part of the Christian world, saying, “I, for one, shall feel bound to believe that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones which are sanctioned by authority,” &c.

But the attempt to represent that such literalism is binding on Catholics is simply preposterous. There is no need for the present Archbishop of Westminster to give any such permission as Professor Huxley speaks of (as to the six days), because such freedom existed long before His Grace occupied the see, and was accepted by his predecessor, Cardinal Wiseman. It would be restriction, not freedom, which could alone require him to make any declaration on the subject.

We might really suppose that at this day it would be superfluous to assert that Catholics are free and unembarrassed in their geology and palæontology. But that I may not seem to shirk a point on which the Professor lays such stress, namely, the "six days" of creation, I will say a few words as to the position of Catholics with regard to this matter.

Now, authorities showing the freedom of Catholics in this respect are so numerous, that it is only difficult to choose. In the first place we have St. Augustin and his many followers, also St. Hildegard, Bertier, Berchetti, Ghici, Robebacher, and Bossuet. Cardinal Cajetan says distinctly that the six days were not real days, but meant to indicate order. And I may cite also Cardinal Gousset, "Theol. Dogmatique," t. i. p. 103, *seq.*; Frayssinous, "Défense du Christianisme," conf. "Moïse, historien des temps primitifs;" Perrone, S. J., "Prælect. Theol.," vol. i. p. 678 (édit. Migne, 1842). But it is really needless to speak of writers during the last few years, for books are daily printed at Rome *with the permission of authority* such as Perrone, just mentioned, also Tongiorgi and Pianciani ("Cosmogonia Naturale," p. 24), before referred to. In English we have Cardinal Wiseman's "Science and Revealed Religion," Lectures v. and vi., and only last year a similar work was published in London by the Rev. Dr. Gerald Molloy.

So much for the question of the six days. But before leaving the subject of Christianity and evolution, there is yet one more point which it may be well to notice. With respect to the hypothesis I advanced that Adam's body might have been formed by evolution like those of other animals, the soul being subsequently infused, Professor Huxley remarks:—

"If Suarez is any authority it is not Catholic doctrine. 'Nulla est in homine forma educta de potentia materiæ' is a dictum which is absolutely inconsistent with the doctrine of the natural evolution of any vital manifestation of the human body. Moreover, if man existed as an animal before he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in accordance with the elementary requirements of the philosophy in which Mr. Mivart delights, have possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetative soul or souls. Hence, when the 'breath of life' was breathed into the manlike animal's nostrils, he must have already been a living and feeling creature. But Suarez particularly discusses this point, and not only rejects Mr. Mivart's view, but 'adopts language of very theological strength regarding it.'"

Professor Huxley then quotes from Suarez a passage ending "ille enim spiritus, quem Deus spiravit, anima rationalis fuit, et PER EAMDEM FACTUS EST HOMO VIVENS, ET CONSEQUENTER, ETIAM SENTIENS," and a conciliar decree condemning the assertion of the existence of two souls in man.

It is surely not less prudent than it is just to refrain from speaking authoritatively of that which we have not studied and do not

comprehend. The fact is that Professor Huxley has completely misapprehended the significance of the passages he quotes. No wonder if reasoning perfectly lucid to those who have the key appears a mere "darkening of counsel" to those who have not mastered the elements of the systems they criticise.

To say that Suarez "rejects Mr. Mivart's view" is absurd, because no such view could by any possibility have been present to the mind of any one of his day. To say that anything in the passage quoted is, even in the faintest degree, *inconsistent* with that view, is an utter mistake. This is plain, from the doctrine as to the infusion of every soul into every infant, which was generally received at the period when Suarez wrote.

This doctrine was that the human fœtus is at first animated by a vegetative soul, then by a sentient soul, and only afterwards, at some period before birth, with a rational soul. Not that two souls ever coexist, for the appearance of one coincides with the disappearance of its predecessor—the sentient soul including in it all the powers of the vegetative soul, and the rational soul all those of the two others. The doctrine of distinct souls, which Professor Huxley attributes to me as a fatal consequence of my hypothesis, is simply the doctrine of St. Thomas himself. He says (Quæst. lxxvi., art. 3, ad. 3):—"Dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quæ est sensitiva tantum, qua ablata advenit perfectior anima quæ est simul sensitiva et intellectiva ut infra plenius ostendetur." Also (Quæst. cxviii., art. 2, ad. 2):—"Dicendum est quod anima præexistit in embryone, a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum autem sensitiva et tandem intellectiva."

He then answers the objection that we should thus have three souls superposed, which he says is false because—

"Nulla forma substantialis accipit majus aut minus, sed superadditio majoris perfectionis facit aliam speciem sicut additio unitatis facit aliam speciem in numero. . . . Ideo dicendum quod cum generatio unius sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima et adhuc amplius. . . . Sic igitur dicendum quod anima intellectiva creatur a Deo in fine generationis humanæ quæ simul est et sensitiva et nutritiva corruptio formis præexistentibus."

Now I am not saying anything about the truth of this doctrine, but only that it perfectly harmonizes with the hypothesis thrown out; while that it was the doctrine generally held in Suarez's day should be known to everyone who writes upon such a subject at all. This agreement between the doctrine and the hypothesis will readily be apprehended, for if Adam was formed in the way of which I suggested the possibility, he would, till the infusion of the rational soul, be only animal vivens et sentiens, and not "homo" at all. But when

the rational soul was infused, he thereby, as Suarez justly says, "factus est homo vivens, et consequenter, etiam sentiens."

The dictum, "Nulla est in homine forma educta de potentia materiæ," is nothing to the point, because I never supposed that the "forma rationalis" was in potentia materiæ, but only the "forma sentiens," which would disappear and become non-existent as soon as the "animal," by the infused rationality, becomes "homo." Thus, so far from being inconsistent with my hypothesis, it supports it; for the dictum must have been applied by Suarez to every child, the "forma sentiens" of which he must have allowed to be "educta de potentia materiæ," although the "forma rationalis" in his doctrine, as in my hypothesis, is directly created by God, and is in no way "educta de potentia materiæ." Professor Huxley has read Suarez *ad hoc*, and evidently without the guidance of any one familiar with that author, or with his philosophy, and the necessary consequence of writing on such a subject under such circumstances follows of course.

I think that it must now be plain to all readers, from the passages referred to, that there is perfect freedom for even the very strictest Christians, not only as regards the question of the six days, but also with respect to the full doctrine of Evolution.

Professor Huxley, indeed, must know well that, in addition to the authority of approved writers of ancient and modern times, there is a *living authority* in the Church. That authority, moreover, is ready at any moment to condemn heresy in the published expressions of any of her children, and certain to detect it; the question as to such views as evolution being tenable *solvitur ambulando*. The Professor congratulates himself prematurely on the "spontaneous retreat of the enemy from nine-tenths of the territory which he occupied ten years ago." Not *one step backwards* has been taken by the enemy Professor Huxley seems to detest above all. In proof of this I can refer to the *Rambler* of March, 1860, wherein a position was at once taken up, which is substantially identical with that which I maintain now.

A word as to what I cannot but consider the very regrettable animus which Professor Huxley displays in this matter. We have been accustomed to hear again and again the assertion that men of science differ from the devotees of theology, in that they enter on their inquiries *æquo animo*, free from prejudice, and desirous only of truth. Believers have been warned, *usque ad nauseam*, that a wish to believe vitiates all their arguments. But what weight can we attach to Professor Huxley's conclusions when he tells us with regard to the doctrine of Evolution that "the position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism which, in his opinion, it occupies to the Catholic Church, is 'one of its greatest merits in my eyes.'" A similar, though less striking, theological prejudice is also exhibited by Mr. Darwin himself. He tells us, in his "Descent of Man," with

characteristic candour, that in his "Origin of Species" his *first object* was "to show that species had not been separately created," and he consoles himself for admitted error, by the reflection that "I have at least, as I *hope*, done good service in aiding to overthrow the dogma of separate creations."*

I have already refused to allow that I contend for less than the intellectual and religious interests of all Christians. But, in fact, I may claim a yet wider sympathy; for in my book I have supported the dogma of creation as against all those who decline to assert the existence of a God, on the one hand, or those who identify him with the creation on the other; and I have endeavoured to uphold the Theistic conception as opposed to Antitheism † and Pantheism respectively.

Professor Huxley tells us that the necessity of a belief in a personal God, in order to a religion worthy of the name, "is a matter of opinion!" Of course the word may be employed in some unusual sense. I recollect reading of a certain Emersonian who, having accompanied his wife to see Fanny Elsler dance, and being charmed, remarked to her during the performance—"Margaret, this is poetry." To which his wife replied—"No, Paul, it is *religion!*" Of such religion I willingly make a present to Professor Huxley. But, apart from such *bizarre* employments of the word, I firmly adhere to my proposition. I know that Buddhism is sometimes asserted to be atheistic, but the conception of a power or principle apportioning after death rewards and punishments according to a standard of virtue, necessarily involves the existence of an entity, which, as being most powerful, intelligent, and good, is, virtually, and logically, a personal God, whatever be the name habitually applied to it.

I do not know what precise meaning Professor Huxley would give to the word religion. He speaks of "worship, 'for the most part of the silent sort,' at the altar of the Unknown and the Unknowable," but he has not (as far as I recollect) explained to us as yet the full and exact nature and tenets of that religion the ritual of which is thus hinted at. Mr. Darwin's conception of religion is, however, sufficiently definite. He tells us ‡ that it consists "of love, complete submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps other elements."

Let us apply this to the Unknown and the Unknowable. "Love"

* I am indebted to Mr. Chauncey Wright for calling my attention to this remark, which had escaped my notice.

† By antitheism I mean that opinion which is opposed to theism, without dogmatically denying the existence of God. Antitheists deny that we can make any assertion whatever about that which underlies phenomena, and which they term the "unknowable."

‡ "Descent of Man," vol. i. 68.

for that of which we can by no possibility know anything whatever, and to which we may as reasonably attribute hideousness and all vileness, as beauty and goodness! "Dependence" on that of which treachery and mendacity may be as much characteristics as are faithfulness and truth! "Reverence" for an entity, whose qualities, if any, may resemble as much all we despise as all we esteem, and which, for all we know, may be indebted to *our faculties* for any recognition of its existence at all! "Gratitude" to that which we have not the faintest reason to suppose ever willingly did anything for us, or ever will! "Hope" in what we have no right whatever to believe may not, with equal justice, be a legitimate cause for despair as pitiless, inexorable, and unfeeling, if capable of any sort of intelligence whatever!

This is no exaggeration. Every word here put down is *strictly accurate*, for if that which underlies all things is to us the unknowable, then there can be no reason to predicate of it any one character rather than its opposite. If, on the other hand, we *have* any reason to predicate goodness rather than malice, nobility rather than vileness, then let preachers of the unknowable abandon their unmeaning jargon, for it is no longer with the unknowable we have to deal, and we are plunged at once into a whole world of as distinctly dogmatic theology as can be conceived—a theology the dogmas of which are profoundly mysterious, while they are even more trying, and at the same time more illuminating, to the reason, than any others of the whole catena which logically follow.

Although I have taken up this broad ground in controversy, and only contended for truths common to all believers in revelation, nevertheless I would not have it supposed that I in any way shrink from openly avowing my position as a Catholic Christian, and I cannot consider it other than a compliment to my creed that Professor Huxley, in his attack on Christianity generally, singles it out for his special hostility. All Christians owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Huxley, for calling forth more clearly the certainty that their religion has nothing to fear from the doctrine of evolution. It is, however, Catholic Christians who are pre-eminently beholden to him for occasioning a fresh demonstration of the wonderful way in which their greatest teachers of bygone centuries, though imbued with the notions and possessing only the rudimentary physical knowledge of their days, have yet been led to emit fruitful principles by which the Church is prepared to assimilate and harmonize even the most advanced teachings of physical science.

Professor Huxley indulges in rhetorical declamation as to a "blind acceptance of authority," but such acceptance is as much repudiated by me as by Professor Huxley. The Church, in addressing unbe-

lievers, appeals to "reason" and "conscience" alone for the establishment of that Theistic foundation on which she reposes, and no acceptance of authority can be called "blind" which results from a clear perception both of its rational foundation and of the harmony of its dogmas and precepts with those highest faculties of our nature, reason and conscience.

I confess myself weary of these tedious declamations as to the incompatibility of science with Christianity on the one side, as also of timid deprecations on the other. The true position of these two powers justifies neither such hopes nor such fears; for, in truth, no possible development of physical science (and as to Biology I claim to speak with some slight knowledge) can conflict with Christian dogma, and therefore every attempt to attack from that basis is necessarily futile.

On the other hand, so far from the Christian religion tending to cramp or fetter intellectual development, it is notorious that some of the profoundest thinkers of recent as of more ancient times, have been believers in Christianity, and I am convinced that every man who rejects that belief is *ipso facto* necessarily condemned not only to a moral but also, and as inevitably, to an intellectual inferiority as compared with what he might attain did he accept that system in its fulness. The Christian creed has long been before the world. I would invite Professor Huxley to formulate his system in distinct propositions, that it also may be tested by our supreme and ultimate standards—"reason" and "conscience."

With the extreme hatred of Catholicity which animates my critic, it is easy to understand the irritation which my demonstration of the harmony which exists between the Church and modern science has caused him. He lets it be seen that he had supposed science to have thoroughly refuted some of the Church's fundamental dogmas, hence the vehement reproaches I have unwittingly drawn down upon my head by my endeavour to promote concord. I feel persuaded, however, that an intolerance which would exclude from the band of "loyal soldiers of science," a Secchi, a Van Beneden, and a Sullivan, merely because they happen to be at the same time "true sons of the Church," will not commend itself to the great bulk of my scientific fellow-countrymen any more than the wish to deprive Catholics of their common rights as citizens will be approved of by the English-speaking races generally.

Turning to Professor Huxley's observations in another branch of philosophy, I proceed now to say a few words as to his strictures on the psychology of the Quarterly Reviewer.

I apprehend that my critic's psychological views coincide in the main with those of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Now it is not of course

possible within the limits of this article to write a treatise on psychology, and nothing less would be requisite to explain the grounds of my complete and fundamental divergence from the views referred to. It must suffice to say here, that Professor Huxley has adduced no argument and has brought forward no kind of illustration which I have not maturely considered and deliberately rejected as inadequate and fallacious. Another time I hope to be able to go at length into this question and to endeavour to explain, according to the system I adopt, the facts adduced by the opposite school; as also to support my views by positive arguments. In the meantime I heartily re-echo Professor Huxley's tribute to the supreme importance of "the philosophical questions which underlie all physical science," and I am confident that vast good would result if only men could be brought to undergo the labour and persevering application necessary for their thorough investigation.

I must here, then, confine myself to the clearing up of some misapprehensions and misrepresentations.

In the first place, Professor Huxley objects to the assertion that "sensation" is not "thought," "though sensations supply the conditions for the existence of thought." He says:

"If I recall the impression made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly remember blueness or muskiness, I may say with perfect propriety that I 'think of' blue or musk; and so long as the thought lasts, it is *simply* a faint reproduction of the state of consciousness to which I gave the name in question, when it first became known to me as a sensation."

"Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation which we call the memory of it, is *properly termed a thought*, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between thoughts and sensations. If sensations are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations. No amount of sound constitutes an echo, but for all that no one would pretend that an echo is something of totally different nature from sound."

To this I can now only reply by observing that according to my view a recalled thought is not a "rudimentary sensation," though the sensible memory is made use of with regard to it. I also deny utterly that the faint recurrence of a sensation can ever be properly termed a thought, and the act of "recalling" such sensation is only to be so named on account not of the sensation recalled, but of the intellectual, voluntary act of recalling.

The analogy of an echo is false and misleading. An echo is merely a particular kind of sound, but a thought is *not* merely a particular kind of sensation.

Again, Professor Huxley objects to the assertion that sensations supply the conditions for the existence of thought or knowledge—saying:

"If this implies that sensations supply the conditions for the existence of our memory of sensations, or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a truism which it is hardly worth while to state so solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply anything else it is obviously erroneous. And if it means, as the context would seem to show it does, that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large part of the subject-matter of our thought or of knowledge, are not sensations."

It seems to me that this argument is quite unfair, and that it is a false dilemma. The reviewer's words evidently point to "sensations" as the condition of our knowledge of external objects, and this, at least, is no truism. For my part, if I understand Professor Huxley rightly, I should assert that to be "axiomatic" which he says is "obviously erroneous."

The short summary in the *Quarterly Review* of the psychical characters common to man and brutes on the one hand, and peculiar to man as a rational animal on the other, was evidently not intended as an exhaustive catalogue, but merely as a concise statement of certain leading and essential differences. Therefore "emotion," as avowedly common to man and brute, and volition and memory, as beside the question, were reasonably left unnoticed.

A carping criticism as to the word "agency" as applied to sensation in these reflex acts in which sensation intervenes, is what, I confess, I should not have expected from Professor Huxley. He certainly would never think of denying the intervention of sensation in such acts.

As to his assertion that the *Quarterly Reviewer* in conceding to animals his first four groups of actions, "grants all that is necessary for the purposes" of his critic, it is an error which arises from the thorough misapprehension by Professor Huxley of the *Reviewer's* position, as will be made manifest by what I have to say concerning reason and predication.

Professor Huxley gives us, in illustration of his views, a comparison between a gamekeeper and a greyhound, both engaged in coursing, the relevancy of which, I confess, escapes me.

No one denies that man is an animal. No one denies that the sensitive faculties of the greyhound are possessed by the man just as are his digestive and locomotive faculties. No anatomist denies that man's bodily structure closely resembles the brutes', and I, at least, have been forward in asserting it. I maintain, however, that though man and dog agree in exhibiting the phenomena of *feeling*, they differ altogether as to the phenomena of *thinking*, of which man alone gives any evidence.

Professor Huxley asks a singular question. He says—"What is the value of the evidence which leads one to believe that

one's fellow-man feels? The only evidence in this argument of analogy, is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to one's own." Surely it is not by similarity of actions, in any ordinary sense of the word, but by *language* that men are placed in communication with one another, and that the rational intellect of each perceives the rationality and sensibility of his fellow-man.

Professor Huxley asserts that by "a combination of sensible images," the Quarterly Reviewer must mean more than his words imply, or otherwise a greyhound would not run after a hare. Certainly the Reviewer could hardly have suspected that any one would take him to mean that brutes are destitute of appetites and emotions. The conjunction, however, of these appetites and emotions with sensible images in complex associations is certainly amply sufficient to explain all that is exhibited by dogs in "the noble art of coursing," and this Professor Huxley must allow if, as I suspect, he would attribute nothing essentially higher to the gamekeeper himself.

On the question concerning morality I have, I conceive, some reason to complain of Professor Huxley's treatment of my observations. From the remarks which he has again and again made, it is evident to whom he attributes the article in the *Quarterly Review*. Nevertheless, he, in the first place, misrepresents my statement in my book, and attributes to me an absurdity which is not in it, but which is distinctly pointed out and repudiated in the *Quarterly Review*. In the second place, he accuses me of neglecting a remark made by Mr. Darwin, which remark is not only referred to, but actually quoted in the same review.

First, with regard to Mr. Darwin. In this matter Professor Huxley accuses me of charging that gentleman "with being ignorant of the distinction between material and formal goodness," though Mr. Darwin himself "discusses the very question at issue in a passage, well worth reading, and also comes to a conclusion opposed to Mr. Mivart's axiom." As I have said, this passage is not only referred to, but actually quoted in the *Quarterly Review*. In that passage, however, Mr. Darwin, though he notices, gives no evidence of fully understanding my distinction, nor, though he notices an objection, does he meet the difficulty in the least. Professor Huxley seems to think that because Mr. Darwin has *referred to an objection*, that that objection has thereby *lost its force*. The objection, however, has not been refuted either by Mr. Darwin or Professor Huxley, and hence it becomes probable that, as I am convinced is the case, it *cannot be refuted*.

We will turn now to the more serious misrepresentation of which I have to complain. My critic exhibits me as committing the absurdity of maintaining that no act can be "good" unless it is done with

deliberate and actual advertence in every instance—as if I thought that a man must stand still, consider and reflect in each case in order to perform a meritorious action. He also implies that I am so unreasonable as to deny “merit” to actions done unreflectingly and spontaneously from the love of God or one’s neighbour.

What I assert, however, is, that for an act to be “good” it must be really directed by the doer to a good end, either actually or virtually. The idea of good, which he has in the past apprehended, must be influencing the man at the time, whether he adverts to it or not, otherwise the action is not moral. The merit of that virtue which shows itself even in the spontaneous, indeliberate actions of a good man, results from the fact of previous acts having been consciously directed to goodness, by which a habit has been formed. The more thoroughly a man is possessed by the idea of goodness, the more his whole being is saturated with that idea, the more will goodness show itself in all his even spontaneous actions, which thus will have additional merit through their very spontaneity. Now this was actually expressed in the *Quarterly Review*, where of such an act it is stated that “it is moral as the continuation of those preceding deliberate acts through which the good habit was originally formed; and the rapidity with which the will is directed in the case supposed may indicate the number and constancy of antecedent meritorious actions.”

Not only, however, does Professor Huxley avoid notice of this passage, but he quotes my words as to the unmeritorious nature of actions “unaccompanied by mental acts of conscious will directed towards the fulfilment of duty,” so as to lead his readers to believe that I say this absolutely. He takes care not to let them know that here I am speaking * only of the “actions of brutes, such as those of the bee, the ant, or the beaver,” which, of course, never at any period of the lives of any one of these creatures were consciously directed to “goodness” or “duty” as an end, so that no later spontaneous actions could in their case result from an acquired habit of virtue, on which account I was fully justified in speaking of their actions as devoid of morality.

Professor Huxley speaks of “the most beautiful character to which humanity can attain, that of the man who does good without thinking about it” (p. 468). Does he mean that the absence of thought is the cause of the beauty? If so, then if I do the most beneficial acts in my sleep, I attain this apex of moral beauty. This, of course, he will not allow. Therefore, it is not by reason of the not thinking about it that the action is beautiful, but, as Professor Huxley goes on to say, “because he loves justice and is repelled by

* See “Genesis of Species,” p. 221, 2nd edition.

evil." In this last, then—in this habit of mind, the beauty consists. But will the Professor say that the man got himself into this state without previous acts of conscious will? Can a man love justice without being able to distinguish between the just and unjust? if he loves moral beauty, must he not *know* it?

Professor Huxley does not, I believe, mean what he says when he asserts that acts may be moral which are not directed to a good end. Were it so, such words as "virtue" and "goodness" would have no rational and logical place in his vocabulary.

Similarly, I do not believe him when he says he "utterly rejects" the distinction between "material" and "formal" morality. I do not, because he has elsewhere asserted that "our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events." If, however, he rejects the distinction he says he rejects, he thereby absolutely denies every element of freedom and spontaneity to the human will, and reduces our volition to a rank in the "course of events," which counts for no more than the freedom of a match as to ignition, when placed within the flame of a candle. With the enunciation of this view, "formal morality" most certainly falls, and together with it every word denoting "virtue," which thus becomes a superfluous synonym for pleasure and expediency.

Adverting now to the question of "reason," according to Professor Huxley (p. 463), "ratiocination is resolvable into predication, and predication consists in marking, in some way, the succession, the likeness and unlikeness, of things or their ideas. Whatever does this, reasons; and if a machine produces these effects of reason, I see no more ground for denying to it the reasoning power, because it is unconscious, than I see for refusing to Mr. Babbage's engine the title of a calculating machine on the same grounds."

"Thus it seems to me that a gamekeeper reasons, whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether his reasoning is carried on by neurosis alone, or whether it involves more or less psychosis."

According to my idea of the matter, predication essentially consists not in marking "succession, likeness and unlikeness," but in *recognising* these relations *as true*.

To this extent I may shelter myself under the authority of Mr. John Stuart Mill. Mr. Mill, in criticising Sir William Hamilton's definition of judgment, makes the following remarks ("Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 346):—

"The first objection which, I think, must occur to anyone, on the contemplation of this definition, is that it omits *the main and characteristic element* of a judgment and of a proposition. . . . When we judge or assert, there is introduced a new element, that of objective reality, and a *new mental fact*, belief. Our judgments, and the assertions which express them, do not enunciate our mere mode of mentally conceiving things, but

our conviction or persuasion that the facts as conceived actually exist; and a theory of judgments and propositions which does not take account of this, *cannot be a true theory*. In the words of Reid 'I give the name of judgment to every determination of the mind concerning *what is true* or *what is false*. This, I think, is what logicians, from the days of Aristotle, have called judgment.' And this is the very element which Sir Wm. Hamilton's definition" [and I may now add Professor Huxley's also] "omits from it."

Further on Mr. Mill says:—

"Belief is an *essential element* in a judgment. . . . The recognition of it as true is not only an essential part, but *the essential element* of it as a judgment; leave that out, and there remains *a mere play of thought*, in which no judgment is passed. It is impossible to separate the idea of judgment from the idea of the truth of a judgment; for every judgment consists in judging something to be true. The element belief, instead of being an accident which can be passed in silence, and admitted only by implication, constitutes the very difference between a judgment and any other intellectual fact, and it is contrary to all the laws of definition to define judgment by anything else. The very meaning of a judgment or a proposition is something which is capable of being believed or disbelieved; which can be true or false; to which it is possible to say yes or no."

In addition to this, Mr. Mill, in his notes on his father's, Mr. James Mill's, "Analysis of the Human Mind," ably shows, against Mr. Herbert Spencer, that rational belief cannot be explained as being identical with indissoluble association (vol. i. p. 402).

In denying, then, reason to brutes—in denying that their acts are rational, I do not, of course, deny for a moment that they are rational in the sense in which Mr Babbage's machine is calculating, but what I *do* maintain is, that brutes have not the power of forming judgments in the sense above explained. And I still more emphatically deny that brutes have any, even the very dimmest, consciousness of such ideas as "ought" and moral excellence. And because I further believe that no amount of sensible experiences can generate these conceptions, I deny that any brute is *even potentially* a moral agent. Those who credit brutes with "morality," do so by first eliminating from that idea all its essential characteristics.

One word now of explanation. Professor Huxley seems much disturbed at my speaking of virtue as, in his view, *a kind of retrieving*, and accuses me of imposing an "injurious nickname," and making a "joke." Nothing could have been further from my intention than either one or the other. As it happens the expression was not *my own*, but was picked up in conversation with as thorough a Darwinian even as Professor Huxley himself, who used it, as I understood, not as a nickname, but as a handy mode of bringing home his conceptions to my mind. I made use of it in all innocence, and I still think it singularly apt and appropriate, not certainly to express the conception

of virtue, but to bring home the utilitarian notion of it. Professor Huxley says, "What if it is? Does that make it less virtue?" I answer, unhesitatingly, that it not only makes it "less virtue," but prevents its being virtue at all, unless it springs as a habit acquired from self-conscious acts directed towards an end recognised as *good*.

Professor Huxley regrets that I should "eke out" my arguments against the views he patronises, by ascribing to them "logical consequences which have been over and over again proved not to flow from them." But it was to be expected that a disciple of Mill,* such as Professor Huxley, would know that in matters of this kind it is impossible to reason *à posteriori*, on account of the complexity of the conditions; and that the *à priori* argument, by deductions from inevitable tendencies, can be alone employed. If Professor Huxley is persuaded of the evil consequences of Christianity, I am equally persuaded of the evil consequences of his system.

No one has a greater esteem for Professor Huxley than I have, and no one is more convinced than I am of the uprightness of his intentions and his hearty sympathy with self-denying virtue. Nevertheless, the principles he unhappily advocates cannot but tend, by a fatal necessity, in one direction, and to produce results socially, politically, and morally, which he would be the first to deplore. They tend in the intellectual order to the degradation of the mind, by the essential identification of thought with sensation, and in the political order to the evolution of horrors worse than those of the Parisian Commune. I refrain from characterizing their tendency in the moral order.

Before concluding, I must make one observation with regard to Mr. Wallace. I emphatically disclaim having had any intention of depreciating obliquely Mr. Darwin, though I desired to do justice to Mr. Wallace. It is an undoubted fact that there are many men who, if they had thought out natural selection simultaneously with Mr. Darwin, would have clamorously sought a recognition of the fact,


* In speaking of the application of the experimental method to social science, Mr. Mill remarks:—"This mode of thinking is not only general with practitioners in politics, and with that very numerous class who (on a subject which no one, however ignorant, thinks himself incompetent to discuss) profess to guide themselves by common sense rather than by science; but is often countenanced by persons with greater pretensions to instruction As, however, the notion of applicability of experimental methods to political philosophy cannot co-exist with any just conception of these methods themselves, the kind of arguments from experience which the chemical theory brings forth as its fruits (and which form the staple, in this country especially, of parliamentary and hustings oratory), are such as, at no time since Bacon, would have been admitted to be valid in chemistry itself, or in any other branch of experimental science." (Mill's "Logic," vol. ii. p. 454.) "It is evident that Sociology, considered as a system of deductions *à priori*, cannot be a science of positive predictions, but only of tendencies." (*Op. cit.* p. 477.)

and have lost no opportunity of asserting simultaneity. No one can affirm that Mr. Wallace has shown the faintest inclination of the kind, while no one can deny that if he had followed the clamorous path, his name would have been more widely known and more popularly associated with natural selection than has been, in fact, the case.

It is a gratuitous assertion on the part of Professor Huxley to say I have suggested that Mr. Darwin's eminence is due to Mr. Wallace's modesty, in any other sense than what I have now explained—namely, that had Mr. Wallace put himself more prominently forward, he would have been seen more distinctly by the popular eye, an assertion no one can question.

As a fact, I believe that Mr. Wallace, in the passage quoted by Professor Huxley, allows his modesty to deceive him. From what I know of Mr. Wallace, I venture to affirm he underrates his powers, and I am convinced he *could* have written as good a defence of natural selection as even the "Origin of Species." There are not wanting those who, though they have carefully studied Mr. Darwin's work, only fully understood his theory when presented to their mind in the clear, lucid, and admirable writings of Mr. Wallace.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.



THE IDEALISM OF MILTON.

THE critic who would find some single expression which resumes the tendency of each of an artist's works, or an expression which resumes the tendency of all his works taken together, is commonly engaged in falsifying the truth of criticism, and in all cases runs a risk of losing the faithfulness of sympathy, the disengagedness of intelligence, the capacity for assuming various spiritual attitudes which should belong to him. A man will not be comprehended in a formula, nor will the work of a man. But in the case of Milton, and those who resemble him in his method as an artist, this doctrinaire style of criticism is at least not illegitimate. No poem, of course, is reducible to an abstract statement or idea; yet the statement, the idea, may be the germ from which the poem has sprung. A tree glorious with all its leaves and blossoming is much more than the seed in which it lay concealed; yet from the seed, with favourable earth and skies, it grew. Milton never sang as the bird sings, with spontaneous pleasure, through an impulse unobserved and unmodified by the intellect. The intention of each poem is clearly conceived by himself; the form is elaborated with a conscious study of effects. There is in him none of the delicious *imprévu* of Shakespeare. Milton's nature never reacted simply and directly, finding utterance in a lyrical cry, when impressions from the world of nature or of society aroused the faculty of song. The reaction was

checked, and did not find expression until he had considered his own feelings, and modified or altered them upon the suggestions of his intellect. Milton's passion is great, but deliberate, approved by his judgment, and he never repents, feeling that repentance would be a confession, not only of sin, but of extreme weakness and fatuity. He is not imaginative in the highest—in Shakspeare's—manner. Each character of his mask, his drama, his epics, is an ideal character—a Miltonic abstraction incarnated. He himself is, as much as may be, an ideal personage: his life does not grow in large, vital unconsciousness, but is modelled, sometimes laboriously, after an idea. And consequently his life, like his writings, lacks the *imprévu*. He resolves in early youth that it shall be a great life, and he carries out his resolution unflinchingly from first to last. He tends his own genius, and observes it. He waits for its maturity, and watches. He accepts his powers as trusts from God, and will neither go beyond nor fall short of them. He is noble, but we are sometimes painfully aware that it is a nobleness *prepense*. He loves to imagine himself in heroic attitudes—as defender of England and of liberty, as the afflicted champion of his people, fallen on evil days. His very recreation is pre-arranged—Mild heaven ordains a time for pleasure.*

In all this Milton was unlike Shakspeare; and as the men differed, so did the times. During the brighter years of the Elizabethan period, when life—life of the intellect, life of the imagination, religious life, life of the nation, and life of the individual—with one great bound had broken through and over the mediæval dykes and dams, and was rushing onwards, somewhat turbid, somewhat violent, yet gaining a law and a majestic order from the mere weight of the advancing mass of waters—at that fortunate time to live was the chief thing, not to adopt and adhere to a theory of living.

"Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven!"

At the time when Milton reached manhood, the unity of this new life of England was broken, and there were two conspicuous theories of life, to one of which each man was compelled to attach himself; two experiments of living, of which each person must assay one; two doctrines in religion, two tendencies in politics, two systems of social conduct and of manners. The large *insouciance* of the earlier fashion of living was gone; everyone could tell why he was what he was.

Thus the character of the period fell in with Milton's natural tendency towards the conscious modelling of his life as a man, and

* Sonnet to Cyriac Skinner.

of his works as an artist after certain ideals, types, abstractions. It is not a little remarkable that we have the authority and example of Milton himself for applying to his writings that criticism which looks for an intention or express purpose as the germinal centre of each, and which attempts to discover an unity in them all, resulting from the constant presence of one dominant idea. In the "Defensio Secunda" Milton looks back over his more important prose works, and he finds that they all move in a harmonious system around a central conception of liberty. An ideal of liberty was that which presided over his public life, his life in the world of action, and the books which were meant to bear upon the world of action refer to that ideal. There are three forms or species of liberty, Milton tells us, which are essential to the happiness of man as a member of society—religious liberty, domestic, civil. From an early period the first of these had occupied his thoughts. "What he had in view when he hesitated to become a clergyman," Professor Masson remarks, "was, in all probability, less the letter of the articles to be subscribed, and of the oaths to be taken, than the general condition of the Church at that particular time." Prelatical tyranny, and the theories by which it was justified, inspired the indignant pamphlets to write which Milton resolutely put poetry aside. Domestic liberty "involves three material questions—the conditions of the conjugal tie, the education of children, and the free publication of one's thoughts."* Each of these was made a subject of distinct consideration—in "Tetrachordon" and other writings on the question of divorce, in the Letter addressed to Samuel Hartlib on education, and in the Speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing. Were it one of Milton's critics, and not Milton himself, who had thus classed the "Areopagitica" amongst the treatises in defence of domestic liberty, or who had represented the letter to Hartlib as concerned with liberty in any of its forms, should we not be ready to declare that he had departed from the sincerity of criticism, and was forcing the author's works at any cost to accord with a theory of his own? Yet there is no forcing here; there is only the compulsion put upon Milton himself by his dominant idea. Civil liberty occupied him last. He thought at an earlier season that it might be left to the magistrates. It was not until events had proved that his pen might be wielded as a powerful weapon in its defence, that the "Iconoclastes," the "Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio," and the "Defensio Secunda" were produced.

Thus we are directed by Milton himself to observe how the great cycle of his prose works revolves around this controlling idea of liberty. One is tempted to go on, and endeavour to apply this

* "Defensio Secunda."

authorized kind of criticism to Milton's poetry. Would it be surprising, or not rather a thing to be expected, if a certain unity of idea became apparent in the work of the poet as in that of the pamphleteer? Milton being what he was, a man governed by ideas, and those ideas being persistent and few—Milton's poetry at the same time dealing with moral truth, and the abiding meanings of things—might we not naturally look for a single chief tendency, a permanent presence of one dominant conception in all his poetical self-utterance, epic and dramatic?

Milton's inner life, of which his poetry is an expression, as his prose is an expression of his outer, public life, was an unceasing tending from evil to good, from base or common to noble, a perpetual aspiration to moral greatness. Not less than Goethe he studied self-culture. But while Goethe, with his deliberate Hellenism, made man an end to himself, Milton, over whom the Hebrew spirit kept jealous guard, considered man at his highest as the creature of God. And in the hierarchy of human faculties Milton assigned the place of supreme authority, as Goethe never did, to those powers which lie upon the Godward side of our humanity, to those perceptions and volitions which are concerned with moral good and evil. The impartiality of Goethe's self-culture was undisturbed by any vivid sense of sin. No part of his being seemed to him in extreme peril from spiritual foes, no part appeared the object of a fierce assault; it was easy for him to transfer his attention serenely from this side of his nature to that, while with resolute and calm persistence he strove to attain completeness of self-development. To Goethe the world was a gymnasium or academy, and life a period of higher education. The peculiarity of Milton's view was, that before him the world lay as a battle-field, life was a warfare against principalities and powers, and the good man a champion of God. The sense of sin never forsook him, nor that of a glorious possibility of virtue. To Goethe nature presented itself as a harmonious group of influences favourable, upon the whole, towards man; what he chiefly feared was a mistake in his plan of culture, the substituting in his lifelong education of a subordinate power or faculty of his nature for the master power. What Milton feared before all else was disloyalty to God, and a consequent hell; and to him nature, in its most significant aspect, was but the scene of an indefatigable antagonism between good and evil. In other words, Milton was essentially a Puritan. In spite of his classical culture, and his Renaissance sense of beauty, he not less than Bunyan saw, as the prime fact of the world, Diabolus at odds with Immanuel. He, as well as Bunyan, beheld a Celestial City and a City of Destruction, standing remote from one another, with hostile rulers. Milton added, as Bunyan also added, that final

victory must lie upon the side of good. That is, he asserted eternal Providence. There is a victory, which is God's, not ours; it is our part to cleave to the Eternal One, his part to achieve the triumph on our behalf.

Here we possess the dominant idea which governed the inner life of Milton, and the dominant idea around which revolves the cycle of his poetical works, as that of his prose works revolves around the idea of liberty. There is a mortal battle waged between the powers of good and evil. Therefore in each of Milton's greater poems there are two parties, opposed as light and darkness are opposed, there are hostile forces arrayed for strife on this side and on that. But God is omnipotent, the everlasting Jehovah. There is, therefore, in every instance a victory of the righteous, wrought out for them by Divine help.

In addition to this, let it be borne in mind that Milton, as an artist, works in the manner of an idealist. His starting-point is ordinarily an abstraction. Whereas with Bunyan abstract virtues and vices are perpetually tending to become real persons, with Milton each real person tends to become the representative of an idea or a group, more or less complex, of ideas. Hopeful, and old Honest, and Mr. Feeble-Mind, as we read, grow by degrees into actual human beings, who, had we lived two centuries ago, might have been known to us as respected Puritan neighbours. Samson and Dalila, and not alone these persons of remote Eastern tradition, but Lady Alice Egerton and her brothers, veritably alive and breathing, are, as Milton shows them, objects (to borrow a phrase of Dr. Newman) rather of notional than real apprehension.

"Comus" is the work of a youthful spirit, enamoured of its ideals of beauty and of virtue, zealous to exhibit the identity of moral loveliness with moral severity. The real incident from which the mask originated disengages itself, in the imagination of Milton, from the world of actual occurrences, and becomes an occasion for the dramatic play of his own poetical abstractions. The young English gentlemen cast off their identity and individuality, and appear in the elementary shapes of "First Brother" and "Second Brother." The Lady Alice rises into an ideal impersonation of virgin strength and virtue. The scene is earth, a wild wood; but earth, as in all the poems of Milton, with the heavens arching over it—a dim spot, in which men "strive to keep up a frail and feverish being" set below the "starry threshold of Jove's Court,"

"Where those immortal shapes
Of bright aerial spirits live inspher'd
In regions mild of calm and serene air."

From its first scene to the last the drama is a representation of the ..

trials, difficulties, and dangers to which moral purity is exposed in this world, and of the victory of the better principle in the soul, gained by strenuous human endeavour aided by the grace of God. In this spiritual warfare the powers of good and evil are arrayed against one another; upon this side the Lady, her brothers (types of human helpfulness weak in itself, and liable to go astray), and the supernatural powers auxiliary to virtue in heaven and in earth—the Attendant Spirit and the nymph Sabrina.

The enchanter Comus is son of Bacchus and Circe, and inheritor of twofold vice. If Milton had pictured the life of innocent mirth in "L'Allegro," here was a picture to set beside the other, a vision of the genius of sensual indulgence. Yet Comus is inwardly, not outwardly foul; no grim monster like that which the mediæval imagination conjured up to terrify the spirit and disgust the senses. The attempt of sin upon the soul as conceived by Milton is not the open and violent obsession of a brute power, but involves a cheat, an imposture. The soul is put upon its trial through the seduction of the senses and the lower parts of our nature. Flattering lies entice the ears of Eve; Christ is tried by false visions of power and glory, and beneficent rule; Samson is defrauded of his strength by deceitful blandishment. And in like manner Comus must needs possess a beauty of his own, such beauty as ensnares the eye untrained in the severe school of moral perfection. Correggio sought him as a favourite model, but not Michael Angelo. He is sensitive to rich forms and sweet sounds, graceful in oratory, possessed, like Satan, of high intellect, but intellect in the service of the senses; he surrounds himself with a world of art which lulls the soul into forgetfulness of its higher instincts and of duty; his palace is stately, and "set out with all manner of deliciousness."

Over against this potent enchanter stands the virginal figure of the Lady, who is stronger than he. Young men, themselves conscious of high powers, and who are more truly acquainted with admiration than with love, find the presence of strength in woman invincibly attractive. Shakspeare, in his earlier dramatic period, delighted to represent such female characters as Rosalind, and Beatrice, and Portia; characters at once stronger and weaker than his Imogens and Desdemonas,—stronger because more intellectual, weaker because less harmoniously feminine. Shelley, who was never other than young, exhibited different types of heroic womanly nature, as conceived by him, in Cyntha of "The Revolt of Islam," and in Beatrice Cenci. Something of weakness belongs to the Lady of Milton, because she is a woman, accustomed to the protection of others, tenderly nurtured, with a fair and gentle body; but when the hour of trial comes she shows herself strong in powers of judgment

and of reasoning, strong in her spiritual nature, in her tenacity of moral truth, in her indignation against sin. Although alone, and encompassed by evil and danger, she is fearless, and so clear-sighted that the juggling practice of her antagonist is wholly ineffectual against her. There is much in the Lady which resembles the youthful Milton himself—he, the Lady of his college—and we may well believe that the great debate concerning temperance was not altogether dramatic (where, indeed, is Milton truly dramatic?), but was in part a record of passages in the poet's own spiritual history. Milton admired the Lady as he admired the ideal which he projected before him of himself. She is, indeed, too admirable to be an object of cherishing love. We could almost prolong her sufferings to draw a more complete enthusiasm from the sight of her heroic attitude.

The Lady is unsubdued, and indeed unsubduable, because her will remains her own, a citadel without a breach; but "her corporal rind" is manacled, she is set in the enchanted chair and cannot leave it. Richardson, an artist who like Milton wrought in the manner of the idealists, conceived a similar situation in his *Clarissa*. To subdue the will of the noble and beautiful woman against whom he has set himself is as much the object of Lovelace as to gain possession of her person. His mastery over her outward fate grows steadily from less to more, until at length it is absolute; but her true personality (and Richardson never lets us forget this) remains remote, untouched, victorious, and her death itself is not defeat, but a well-conducted retreat from this life to a position of greater security and freedom. Meanwhile,—to return to "Comus,"—the brothers wander in the wood. They are alike in being aimless and helpless; if they are distinguished from one another, it is only as "First Brother" and "Second Brother," and by one of the simple devices common to ideal artists—first brother is a philosopher and full of hope and faith; second brother is more apprehensive, and less thoroughly grounded in ethics and metaphysics. The deliverance of their sister would be impossible but for supernatural interposition, the aid afforded by the Attendant Spirit from Jove's court. In other words, Divine Providence is asserted. Not without higher than human aid is the Lady rescued, and through the weakness of the mortal instruments of divine grace but half the intended work is accomplished. Comus escapes bearing his magic wand, to deceive other strayers in the wood, to work new enchantments, and swell his rout of ugly-headed followers.

Little need be said of "Paradise Lost;" the central idea is obvious. There is again a great contention, Heaven and Hell striving for the mastery. Satan and his angels are warring, first tumultuously and afterwards by crafty ways, against God and Messiah,

and the executors of God's purposes. Each of the infernal Thrones and Dominations is an ideal conception, the representative of a single living lust. Satan himself is *the spirit of disobedience*, that supreme sin of which all other sins are but modes; he is a will alienated from God, and proudly accepting such alienation as the law of his nature. Man's virtue is placed upon its trial. Paradise, so far from being the peaceful garden, is the central battle-field of the whole universe. Adam falls, and evil for a time appears to have gained the day; but such an appearance cannot but be fallacious—the woman contains within her the seed of promise, the great Deliverer who shall bruise the serpent's head. To "assert eternal Providence" is the declared intention of the whole work. It closes, if in no triumphant strain, yet in a spirit of serious confidence concerning the future:—

"Some natural tears they dropp'd, but wiped them soon;
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide:
They hand in hand, with wand'ring steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way."

By the time "Paradise Lost" was written, Milton had known love as distinct from admiration, the attraction not of identical but of complementary qualities. The novel delight of surrender to a charm, the charm of a being weaker and fairer than himself, had been enough, and he had not provided for the difficulties of accommodating this new self-surrender to the self-maintenance which was his natural and his habitual temper. Ere long the discovery was made of feminine frailty. The Lady of "Comus" had been created out of elements which belonged to his own character. Eve was created out of all that he was not and could not be. The Lady is admirable; Eve is supremely desirable. If the Lady had been seduced by the fraud of Comus, and had fallen, we should leave her among the monsters, and despair of goodness; but Eve, when she has eaten the apple, is hardly less loveable than before, and we know that hardly any fall is fatal to a character like hers, which has no inexorable virtue; it bends, but is not broken. "Eve is a kind of abstract woman; essentially a typical being; an official mother of all living." She is the Miltonic conception of the "eternal feminine" (*das Ewigweibliche*) in nature.

What passage in the life of Christ would Milton select for treatment as the subject of his second epic? Paradise had been forfeited by the disobedience of Adam; by the perfect obedience of the Son of God it was recovered. The supreme act of submission to his Father's will was surely his obedience unto death, "even the death of the cross." "O my Father, if this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, Thy will be done." The contrast

is absolute between such obedient fidelity as this, and the wilfulness and disloyalty of the first Adam. And when Christ had suffered death, and despoiled hell, and risen again, then Paradise was truly and completely regained. Yet it is not the passion, the death, and the triumphant resurrection of the Saviour which Milton determined to render into song. Does the reader not feel a certain incongruity in the appropriating of this name "Paradise Regained" to a poem which leaves Christ at the outset of his earthly career, with his crown of thorns yet to wear, and his cross to be borne to Calvary? Not so did Milton feel. To him the first complete victory over Satan was equivalent to the final overthrow of the kingdom of darkness, and the restoration of the reign of all goodness. The great warfare was then brought to an issue—then, for the first time—and that issue was decisive. Satan had found one mightier than he in the Divine Man. Now, obviously, no passage in the life of Christ illustrates in such naked contrast the struggle between the powers of good and of evil as the assault made upon the virtue of Christ himself by the arch-enemy. Victory in such a contest as that must be ultimate victory. This, therefore, naturally from Milton's point of view became the subject of "Paradise Regained."

In treating the history of the temptation in the wilderness, the genius of the poet moved under peculiar advantages. Milton was never dramatic in the high sense of that word. Varying, vital movement of thought and passion he was unable to exhibit. The mystery and obscurity of life do not belong to the characters created by him. Each of them is perfectly intelligible. But Milton excelled in the representation of characters *in position*, and more particularly in the discussion of a "topic" by two characters who occupy fixed and opposing points of view. This was not dialogue; there is no giving and taking of ideas, no shifting of positions, no fluctuant moods, no mobility of thought. It was rather debate, a forensic pleading, with counsel on this side and on that. It was a duel, not with rapiers gleaming under and over one another, and in a moment's irregular strife changing hands—not such a duel, but one much more deliberate, the antagonists alternately letting off their heavy charges of argument, and alternately awaiting the formidable reply. "Paradise Regained" is a series of such debates, which remind us of the scene between Comus and the Lady in Milton's early poem, where already the Miltonic manner appears fully formed.

By obedience Christ regains Paradise. Loyalty to God, fidelity to the righteous Father, is the supreme excellence of his character; its strength is not Pagan self-dependence, but Hebrew self-devotion to the Eternal One. The consciousness of filial virtue, of the union

of his will with that of the Father, supports him through every trial. At the same time this obedience, unlike that claimed from Adam, does not lie in the passive accepting of an arbitrary rule. The Saviour is a champion of God. He is filled, like the ancient heroes of the Jewish race, with active zeal for the glory of God; and his people's service:—

“Victorious deeds
Flamed in my heart, heroic acts; one while
To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke;
Then to subdue and quell, o'er all the earth,
Brute violence and proud tyrannic pow'r,
Till truth were freed, and equity restored.”

He is a worthy leader of mankind in the great warfare against sin and death, greater in his virtue than Adam could possibly have been, because the virtue of Christ is generous and aspiring, not mere obedience for obedience' sake. Such an antagonist no power of evil could withstand. Satan is not only foiled, but crushingly defeated. The purpose and the promise of God are fulfilled. As the poem closes we hear the anthems of angelic quires sung for the victory of the righteous cause.

“Samson Agonistes” remains to be briefly studied. Once again there is the antagonism of good and evil. God, the people of God, and their afflicted chieftain are set over against Dagon, his impious crew of worshippers, the enchantress Dalila, and the champion of the Philistines, the giant Harapha. It is apparently an unequal warfare. Samson is blind—

“Ask for this great deliverer now, and find him
Eyeless in Gaza at the mill with slaves”—

and his nation is likewise in bondage. God's order seems to be reversed. It is the hour of Dagon's triumph. Worst of all it was by the moral weakness of their leader that the people of Israel had fallen. But Adam had sinned and was an exile from Paradise, and yet God's order stood. Christ was in the wilderness in his humiliation, cold and hungry, drenched with rain, environed by the powers of hell. The Lady sat enthralled by the spells of her deadly enemy, alone in the midst of a rout of unclean creatures, and yet deliverance had been wrought. And now the chosen nation, God's representative among the peoples, was but tried and afflicted for a time. A sudden and awful victory is achieved on their behalf. And once again the choral song which ends the tragedy is a confession of a divine order of things, an assertion of eternal Providence:—

“All is best, though we oft doubt
What th' unsearchable dispose
Of highest Wisdom brings about,
And ever best found in the close.”

What is Samson? He is the man gifted with divine strength; one who is great by the grace of God, yet a mortal, and therefore liable to fall. As Milton's first important dramatic conception, the *Lady*, is wrought out of materials supplied from his own character and inner experience, so is this, the last. But as the beautiful youth, a poet more than a fighter, full of noble hopes and unrealized aspirations, differed from the aged man who had warred a good warfare, who had known disappointment and defeat, and now was fallen on evil days, so widely does Samson differ from Milton's first glad ideal. The transformation is a strange one, and yet we recognise the one same personality. Samson's manner of self-contemplation is precisely that of Milton. He loves to present to his own imagination the glory of his strength, the greatness of his past achievements, and his present afflicted state. This strength which he possesses he looks upon as Milton from his early years was accustomed to look upon his own extraordinary powers—as something entrusted to him, of which he must render an account. It is his sorrow that such a noble gift should be compelled to base uses, and be made the gaze and scorn of his enemies. But no suffering is so cruel as the memory of his folly. Had Milton ever been betrayed into such weakness as that of Samson (Milton never was), he would have felt precisely as Samson feels. The single fall is fatal and irrecoverable. He is not one of those who, under the influence of time, and the world, and changing action, can slip back into his self-respect. Being despicable once, he must be always despicable. The thought of an honourable death, self-inflicted, yet not criminal nor weakly sought, must have been the one partial assuagement of his grief that ever came to him. In this death which befalls Samson there is something deeper than poetical justice. It brings peace and consolation, and "calm of mind, all passion spent," as nothing else could. It is the witness of God to the faithfulness, through all weakness and folly, of his champion.

Harapha, the Philistine giant, is so unmistakably contrasted with Samson, that it is impossible to miss Milton's intention. Samson is the man gifted with divine strength; Harapha is the type of the fleshly strength of this world, insolent and brutal. He is the force which Christ in his ardent youth burned to subdue over all the earth,—

"Brute violence and proud tyrannic power."

It was Harapha after the restoration of Charles who insulted the bodies of Cromwell and Ireton and Bradshaw. It is Harapha who still rules wherever material power is dissociated from moral and spiritual. He is boastful, pitiless, vulgar, and, with all his insolence,

in the presence of divine strength he is a coward. Let the Chorus interpret for us the significance of the meeting of the two champions:—

“ Oh, how comely it is and how reviving
 To the spirits of just men long oppress!
 When God into the hands of their deliverer,
 Puts invincible might
 To quell the mighty of the earth, th' oppressor,
 The brute and boist'rous force of violent men
 Hardy and industrious to support
 Tyrannic power, but raging to pursue
 The righteous and all such as honour truth;
 He all their ammunition
 And feats of war defeats,
 With plain heroic magnitude of mind
 And celestial vigour arm'd.”

The brute violence of the flesh has for its appropriate ally the deceitful beauty of the flesh, full of vanity, and lust, and cruelty. Such beauty has now lost all its fascination for Samson. Even Harapha is less intolerable than Dalila—“ Out, out, hyæna ! ” The Lady of “ Comus ” was created out of all that Milton conceived as admirable ; Eve out of all in woman that is desirable ; Dalila out of all that is detestable. Her feminine curiosity, her feminine love of dress—she comes towards the blind prisoner “ with all her bravery on ”—her fleshly desire, her incapacity for any noble thought, her feigned religion, her honeyed words implying the weakness and fatuity of him whom she addresses, her wifely treachery and hard-heartedness, make up a personality which, above all others, must have been hateful to Milton. Shakspeare would have smiled, and secretly accepted the enchantress as a fruitful subject of study. Milton brings her upon the scene only to expose her, and drive her away with most genuine indignation. The Lady, Eve, Dalila—these are the women of Milton ; each a great ideal figure, one dedicated to admiration, one to love, and the last to loathing.

We have now gone the round of Milton's poetical works. A line will recapitulate the substance of this essay. Milton works from the starting-point of an idea, and two such ideas brought into being what he accomplished as a man and as an artist. His prose works, the outcome of his life of public action, have for their ideal centre a conception of human liberty. His poetical works, the outcome of his inner life, his life of artistic contemplation, are various renderings of one dominant idea—that the struggle for mastery between good and evil is the prime fact of life ; and that a final victory of the righteous cause is assured by the existence of a divine order of the universe, which Milton knew by the name of “ Providence.”

[EDWARD DOWDEN.



MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND SAVAGE LIFE.

Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom. By EDWARD B. TYLOR, Author of "Researches into the Early History of Mankind." Two Vols. London: John Murray.

EVERY one who has been even moderately acquainted with the progress of ethnology must have been growingly persuaded that its investigations were destined to bring out results of deep interest to the mental philosopher. On the other hand, philosophy itself seems to have realised, that the facts of savage life might come to bear closely on many of the psychological questions disputed in the schools. Abundant evidence of this may be gathered from philosophical writings of note, and specially from those which deal with theories of moral distinctions. The steady increase of materials has, of late years, been bringing us towards a position where a survey might be made with at least an approach to a world-wide induction. We are now far in advance of the period when fragmentary references to savage life to be found in philosophic works, such, for example, as those in Locke's Essay, can be regarded as satisfactory. Our acquaintance with remote tribes is now so vastly extended, that we are completely delivered from a large number of misapprehensions which, till recently, rested on seemingly good authority. With the published observations of such travellers as Baker, Burton, Livingstone, Palgrave, Speke, and Wallace, and of such missionaries as Ellis, Moffat, Williams, Turner, and a whole host of competent witnesses, we are in a position more favourable than ever before for carrying out a careful induction. And when, to the accumulated records of travel and missionary labour, we add the investigations of such

ethnologists as Lubbock, Tylor, and M'Lennan, in our own country, and researches into the Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft, which Germany has supplied, we are plainly reaching the point—if we have not actually reached it—when philosophy must avail itself of the materials so lavishly provided.

The task of pronouncing on the philosophical significance of these materials, perplexing and delicate enough in any circumstances, has been greatly simplified by the publication in course of this year of the new work of Mr. Edward B. Tylor, an author already so well known by his previous treatise, entitled "Researches into the Early History of Mankind." This new work, bearing the title of "Primitive Culture," is by far the most important contribution which the British press has yet given to the departments of anthropology and ethnology. It embraces "researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art, and custom," and gathers into one work a vast store of information, with ample reference to authorities, such as never before was within the reach of inquirers. Whatever estimate may be formed of Mr. Tylor's theories, he is entitled to very high honour for the extent of his range of inquiry, for thoroughness of investigation, and for caution in reaching conclusions. Mr. Tylor upholds the theory of progression, and many of his arguments are coloured somewhat by his theoretic predilections, but too much praise cannot be awarded for his painstaking endeavours to elucidate the facts.

The first difficulty belonging to the question is that of ascertaining the facts accurately and fully. There is obviously more credit attaching to those who have been long resident in a district than to those who have done nothing more than make a hurried visit. And still more importance is to be assigned to critical acquaintance with the language of the natives, without which no sure reliance can be placed on statements affecting their convictions. For these reasons, special weight needs to be given to the testimony of missionaries, governors, and civil commissioners, as witnesses who are likely to have had fuller opportunity for ascertaining facts than travellers could possibly have.

But a second and still more serious difficulty is connected with the *interpretation* of native convictions and practices. We need to ascertain not only what are the beliefs and practices prevailing among savage or barbarian tribes, but also the most probable explanations of these. We must seek to reach a theory of their theories,—a reasonable explanation of their common acceptance of peculiar systems of belief. It is at this point we come upon the philosophical problem involved. And here we are most dependent on the aid of ethnologists, who have made it their special work to compare together all varieties of savage thought, and subject them to criticism. The task they undertake is one of peculiar difficulty. They must compare all

known examples of uncivilized or half-civilized life, in order to form some general theory of the present condition of the human race, such as may afford a key to the human history. In view of the vast field of observation, and the very puzzling questions to be settled, one cannot wonder if those occupied with ethnological inquiry express serious misgivings as to the certainty of the results hitherto attained. Even Mr. Tylor admits this in the most decided manner. He says: "A combined intellectual and moral measure of human condition is an instrument which *no student* has as yet learned properly to handle." (i. 25.) Such an admission from one who is certainly among the most competent authorities on the subject is sufficient to induce caution in our reasonings.

The great question between ethnologists themselves is, whether the condition of savage tribes is to be accounted for by a theory of *degradation* from a higher level, or whether the condition of civilised nations is to be accounted for by a theory of *progression* from a low level. And between these rival theories stands the perplexing question as to the *original condition* of the race. Between the contending theories I shall not attempt to adjudicate. I greatly doubt whether ethnology can bring us at all near a satisfactory solution of the question as to man's original condition. But, looking at things as they are, it seems quite impossible to deny that there is very widespread evidence both of *deterioration* and of *progression*. In fact, there can be no adequate theory which does not allow for the continual presence of both. Nevertheless, if we contemplate human history on a wide scale, there appears to be little reason to hesitate as to the evidence that *progression* is the primary or ruling principle. That "culture must be gained," is a self-evident truth, whether individual or national life be contemplated. And what is gained can be preserved. Men are not so completely independent that each man's acquirements are entombed with his body. The present inherits a legacy from the past. There is a continuity in human acquirements—there is influence for a man's thought after he himself has gone from the scene—application for serviceable inventions, long after the inventors have been forgotten. To use a favourite term with Mr. Tylor, there is a "*survival*," not only of the superstitions, but also of the discoveries made amongst a people.

While, then, it may safely be admitted that *progression* is the governing principle in human history, some care needs to be taken in the references made to the starting point. To say that the starting point was "*a low original condition*,"* is not only an unwarranted assertion, as unproved, but is apt to be misleading on account of its ambiguity. Low civilization and low morality are not identical. They are not even necessarily related to each other; for it is possible that

* Tylor, i. 32.

there may be a high morality with a low type of civilization. Modern examples we have of this, such as the description of the Dyaks of Borneo given by Alfred R. Wallace in his "Malay Archipelago." They are a people who have "passed beyond the first stage of savage life in which the struggle for existence absorbs the whole faculties,"* and Mr. Wallace says, "they are truthful and honest to a remarkable degree;"† and, except in war, "crimes of violence . . . are almost unknown."‡ With such an example as this before us, it must be obvious how careful we need to be, in order to guard ourselves against hasty generalizations, specially such as would involve morality and civilization in necessary relationship, as if the degree of the one might be accepted as evidence as to the degree of the other.

Suppose, then, that with these explanations we accept the progressive theory, as embodying the governing law of human history, though not the only law which has determined its course, what does the progressive principle imply? It amounts to this, that the human family is capable of self-improvement; that it is possessed of powers, in the exercise of which the comforts of individual and social life can be steadily increased, intellectual development can be advanced, and also, though less uniformly and certainly, moral elevation secured. I here throw out of account the question as to the original condition of man, and I seek only to ascertain what is at the basis of a progressive theory of human history. If, then, the statement just given as to the general aspect of the progressive theory be accurate, it is obvious that its whole strength rests upon the capabilities of man as a *rational* being. I refrain from complicating the question at this stage, by adding the *moral* to the *rational*. At the very least, it is as a *rational* being that man is capable of a history so different from all other forms of animate being in the world, and which finds its explanation in a theory of progression. It is by the power of *thought* that men are capable of contrivances for increased comfort and wider use of the resources of nature; it is by power of thought that they are able to bring their lower nature into subjection, and raise the standard of culture for the higher nature; and, to whatever theory of ethics a man lean, it is still uniformly admitted that reason guides him to the practice of morality. Looking now at the progressive theory in this light, how does it apply to the different stages of savage and barbaric life? It clearly involves the position that there is a logical consistency in human thought even in its lowest types. Allowing for tradition and custom, and for the superstition which is incident to a state of ignorance, there is a coherence in the system of beliefs, laws, and sacred rites, such as makes the system assume the appearance of a consistent unity in the eyes of the people by whom it is accepted. And as knowledge increases and thought becomes

* Mal. Ar., i. 139.

† Ibid.

‡ i. 140.

more searching, this principle of logical consistency continues to assert itself, pressing the people forward along the highway of civilization and culture. Widening and deepening thought supplies the condition of all human progress. If, for example, a belief in spirit-life may develop into a belief in future life of the soul, and that into a whole religious system, this is a development under the constraining influence of logical consistency. And so it is everywhere, whether you deal with the social, intellectual, or religious condition of the people.

Since, therefore, ethnological inquiry cannot restrict itself to the lower levels of material progress, but must contemplate the higher ranges of moral and religious life; and since, in doing so, it must construct a theory of that which is characteristic of man, as illustrated by numerous examples, it comes necessarily into contact with philosophical inquiry. With what apparent results it has been at work in ethical questions I desire now briefly to indicate. The question is this, What light has it thrown on the essential features of man's moral nature—so far as observation of the lowest types of human nature may be supposed to throw light on what is essential? And how far does this light fall, still more widely and remotely, on philosophical theories of man's moral nature? In connection with these questions there are two points specially prominent in the stores of literature bearing on savage life, and to these I shall restrict attention at present. I refer to the illustration of ethical conceptions, 1st, in *law* and *morals*; 2nd, in prevailing views as to *a future state*. The first and widest matter of interest is the facts, and the narrower and more difficult question is the legitimate and philosophical interpretation of the facts. We need first to ascertain what are the opinions and practices found among savages, and then what is "the hereditary standing of each opinion and practice,"* and how far it bears upon the philosophical question, which is distinct from the antiquarian.

I. *Ethical conceptions discovered in law and practice among savage tribes.* Law and practice may be taken together, on account of the close relation existing between them. At the same time, it is to be borne in mind, that practice gives much wider testimony than law, as morals outstretch the boundary of legal enactment. Men do not in any case legally enforce all that they regard as morally right; but they do enforce what they on some ground or other regard as right in some sense.

That men even in the lowest stage of savage life do distinguish between what they regard as right, and what they account as wrong, may be held as proved from the consideration that all tribes have some form of government, with laws which are enforced by regulated punishments for those who transgress. Our difficulties begin, how-

* Tylor, ii. 409.

ever, when we attempt to reach satisfactory evidence as to the exact nature of the conceptions of savages as to good and evil. No doubt, laws often exist, and continue to be enforced, on other than ethical grounds, which laws, nevertheless, are vindicated as just and right. We need, therefore, to penetrate to the substratum of thought which approves and sustains the laws or practices which prevail in any country. It is indeed very difficult, by any form of questioning, to discover with certainty the fundamental convictions of the people. The utmost care is, therefore, needed to guard against hasty conclusions, based upon single utterances. Take, for example, the reply of the Pawnee chief to the question, "Who are the good?" The answer was—"The *good* are good warriors and hunters." From such an answer it might be inferred that this man made no account of moral distinctions, and indeed the author who records it says this would also be the opinion of a *wolf*, if he could express it.* Yet the notions of the Pawnee chief and the impulses of the wolf would be very different, even if both were gifted with expression, and said exactly the same thing. Fighting and hunting are the two outstanding engagements of the savage. In these are seen all the good qualities of a man—his bravery, his patience, his endurance, his industry, his defence of those depending upon him, and his provision for their wants. In all this there is great room for knowledge of moral qualities, and probably the most decided test of its existence among savage races. It is not without reason, therefore, that Mr. Tylor says in this connection, "If experience has led societies of savage men to fix on certain qualities, such as courage, skill, and industry, as being virtues, then many moralists will say that such a theory is not only ethical, but lying at the very foundation of ethics."† That is to say, if even the savage recognises that such qualities as courage, endurance, and defence of his wife and children, are worthy of the dignity of his nature, while the opposite qualities would be a disgrace to him; that others warrantably expect these qualities, and with equal warrant condemn him if he play the coward and leave his family exposed to danger, while he provides for his own safety—there is a clear recognition of moral distinctions. No doubt there may be at the same time the most horrid cruelty to enemies, and the most fiendish delight in bloodshed. Savages are savage in their life, and we turn our attention to them now, not in the hope of finding a high type of moral excellence, but with the view of ascertaining whether, in the midst of all the darkness and vice, there be any recognition that virtue is virtue, and vice is vice. We are seeking for some traces of *knowledge*, not for evidence of *motive power* sufficient to secure action in accordance with it. We do not even seek for *adequate knowledge*, but only for such as may be applicable to the

* Alger's "Future Life," p. 93.

† ii. 81.

circumstances in which savage men are placed, for this is all that even an intuitional theory of morals would lead us to expect. And so far is this knowledge from being absent, that Mr. Tylor says even of those races who are so low that their religion has little in it representative of the moral element—"It is not that these races have no moral sense, or no moral standard, for both are *strongly marked* among them, if not in formal precept, at least in that traditional consensus of society which we call public opinion, according to which certain actions are held to be good or bad, right or wrong."*

Not only from common opinion among savage tribes, but still more definitely from the *laws* enforced among them, do we find a clear recognition of the distinction of right and wrong. And as these laws upheld by common consent very frequently apply to a form of vice common among the people, they discover very plainly a substratum of ethical thought which continues to exist in the mind even of those who constantly seek opportunity for violating the law. Take, for example, the "Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs," published by Colonel M'Lean, C.B.; long Chief Commissioner in British Kaffraria. The Kaffir tendency of stealing cattle is well known, and the practice may be said to be common to all the tribes. And yet, so far from its being a sanctioned practice, the Kaffir laws on theft are decided, and strictly enforced, and they are such in their nature as to afford a curious example of toleration for lawlessness, and at the same time punishment of dishonesty. "Seizing property by force on the plea of retaliation, . . . or under any other pretence whatever, does not come under the head of stealing."† Yet "in all cases of *theft* of live-stock, the law allows a fine of ten for one."‡ Again, "*concealing* a theft is no crime," showing how slight anxiety they have to make execution of the law easy; but "*assisting to commit* a theft" is a crime punishable at law.§ The Kaffirs are a people not in the lowest stages of savage life, yet they are far removed from civilization; and though they are a people continually in the habit of stealing, and obviously, by the structure of their laws, desire to leave some scope for their favourite indulgence of "cattle-lifting," such is their regard for justice as the final resort, that they affirm crime to be a theft, and impose heavy penalties on those who are found guilty.

Looking across the records of savage life, and considering the circumstances in which many races exist, the marvel is that in the midst of deep moral degradation, there should be such evidence of a substratum of thought which bears witness to the recognised sacredness of moral distinctions. In multitudes of cases it is obvious that the people give themselves little concern with the reasons of things, and are content to acquiesce in the hereditary claim of

* i. 386.

† p. 64.

‡ p. 65.

§ p. 67.

existing laws. Nevertheless, where these laws clash effectually with the known tendencies of the people, the unreasoned consent to the enforcement of justice, even in a rude form, bears witness to a power in man which is stronger than inclination, and passion, and all the forces of vice. Long before men begin to philosophize, they see clearly the need for bowing before moral obligations. Mr. Tylor singularly reverses this order, and affirms "that doctrines which in the lower culture are *philosophical*, tend in the higher to become *ethical*."* To speak of philosophy as one of the accomplishments of the lowest order of savages is something new—placing a wider chasm between the lowest type of man and the highest of the inferior animals than current theories in other departments of science are disposed to allow; but we fear the accomplishment is more imaginary than real. Ignorant conjectures as to the processes of nature, rude theories connecting such conjectures together, and the wildest myths created by the savage's love of the wonderful, all sanctioned by the traditional respect of the tribe, cannot be dignified with the name of philosophy. And while I think Mr. Tylor, without entering into the theoretic difficulties of the question, gives us evidence of the recognition of moral distinctions even amongst the lowest savages, it must be observed, from a philosophical point of view, that an unreasoned morality is a morality without a philosophy, bearing witness to a recognition of moral distinctions as natural to man. Whereas, if a progressive theory have any truth in it, making an increased exercise of reason the necessary condition of human culture, a reasoned system of conviction in any department must always be a later attainment.

I pass on now to the second division of the subject, namely, the views of savage tribes as to a future state, which, as concerned with a region of thought more removed from the sway of passion and custom, though not of superstition, seems to me in some respects a more reliable source of evidence as to the degree in which ethical conceptions exist in the lowest levels of human life.

II. *Conceptions of savage races as to a future state.*

In dealing with this part of the subject it is impossible to embrace the views of savage tribes as to the Deity or their systems of religion. These I must be content to leave untouched, in order to give some fair degree of attention to what is involved in their prospects as to a future state of existence.

Whether there are any tribes altogether destitute of the conception of a future state seems exceedingly doubtful, many of the instances in which this was supposed to be the case having now been turned over to swell the vast multitude of examples of the contrary. On this point it seems enough to quote the words of Mr. Tylor. He

says: "There may well have been, and there may still be, low races destitute of any belief in a future state. Nevertheless, prudent ethnographers must often doubt accounts of such, for this reason, that the savage who declares that the dead live no more, may merely mean to say that they are dead,"*—that is, that they live no more among their friends here. For example, the East Africans say their dead "are ended," and the Zulus say that they "rise no more," yet both, it is now proved, firmly believe in the continued existence of the spirits of their ancestors. In another passage Mr. Tylor says: "So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance."†

At the basis of savage belief concerning a future state there seems to lie the conviction of a spiritual nature belonging to man. The savage seems generally to hold that his true personality is superior to the ravages of death. Thus when the Tongans were explaining to a European their belief in the continued existence of those who had died, one of them took hold of the stranger, and said, "This will die, but the *life* that is within you will never die;"‡ and Bernau narrates that the Macusi Indians of Guiana say, "that although the body will decay, 'the man in our eyes' will not die, but wander about."§ Some trace of this belief there seems to be in all theories of another state of existence. In some cases it is modified by a belief that only some enter into the blessed state beyond, while others perish altogether, either at death or beyond it—a theory of annihilation instead of continuity of punishment, or at least of suffering. With this conviction as to the separate existence of souls, spirits, ghosts, or shades, there comes great variety of description as to the place of their abode. In many cases the spirits are supposed to haunt the familiar scenes of former days, and need to be driven away. For instance, the Bodo of North-east India, on the funeral day of a friend, take with them to the grave the usual portion of food and drink for the deceased, and, addressing him while they present the repast, they say: "Take and eat; heretofore you have eaten and drunk with us, you can do so no more; you were one of us, you can be so no longer; we come no more to you, come you not to us."|| The Naga tribes of Assam, on the contrary, invite their dead to come home again, telling them that their house is swept and clean, and that rice and water are set for them. Beyond such notions of continued existence, there are definite descriptions of the places of the dead, most of these being naturally coloured by the character of the scenes in which the natives spend their earthly term of existence. Two grand divisions, however, emerge, according as a theory of *trans-*

* ii. 17. † i. 384. ‡ i. 389. § i. 389. || ii. 28.

migration of souls to other bodies is adopted, or a theory of *continued existence in a separate state*. Under the first there is transmigration to inferior forms, such as animals, and even trees, or even inanimate objects, or to higher forms of being. Under the latter there are commonly two states of existence—a bright and a gloomy, a blessed and a miserable.

The questions which arise in this relation are these: How far are ethical elements to be found in the varied theories of a future state? And, where present, what philosophic significance attaches to them?

In reply to the first, I would remark that, after having gone carefully over the large array of examples given by Mr. Tylor, I am unable to select any instance in which an ethical element is not present. Mr. Tylor himself being apparently of a contrary opinion,* I shall refer to the most prominent of the examples which he regards as favouring that view, or at least appears to regard in this light; for his words are not quite explicit. The first example to which he points is from the testimony of Ellis, in the "Polynesian Researches."† The passage is of some importance in the discussion. After telling us of the place of misery and place of blessedness in which the South Sea Islanders believe, he says, "I never could learn that they expected, in the world of spirits, any difference in the treatment of a kind, generous, peaceful man, and that of a cruel, parsimonious, quarrelsome one." There is one thing, as it seems to me, peculiar in the test which Mr. Ellis here employed. The virtues named are kindness, generosity, and gentleness. Now these are of all the virtues those which savages are least likely to esteem; and when over against them are set cruelty, parsimony, and quarrelsomeness, these are, in the same way, the vices which savages were little likely to condemn. If we are to judge of the presence or absence of ethical convictions, it is clear we must look for evidence by referring to virtues most likely to be esteemed among the people, if any are. If Mr. Ellis had spoken of courage, endurance, and perseverance, the test would have been in every way more natural. And that in this case the test has not brought out a sufficiently trustworthy result I think is shown from other parts of Ellis's book. He tells us that the abode of spirits is called Po, the state of night; but heaven is called Miru, sweet-scented Rohutu, and glorious Tamahani; and then he adds that these two places "were the destiny of individuals, altogether irrespective of their moral character and virtuous conduct."‡ And this last remark is confirmed thus far, that he informs us that a most profligate race of priests were believed to be raised to the Elysian state merely on the ground of their priesthood. But here it is to be borne in mind that profligate as these men were, their profligacy was connected with their religious rites, and they were regarded as holy

* ii. 82.

† i. 397-8.

‡ i. 397.

men on account of their office. Nay, more, these priests were supposed to continue in the Elysian state the very same profligate indulgence practised here. But that this did not involve an utter disregard of moral distinctions in the future condition of men generally Mr. Ellis shows by telling us that, according to the belief of the natives, every disease was inflicted by the gods for some crime. Further, in the description given of their burial rites, he informs us that a priest offered a prayer—

“That all the dead man’s sins, and especially that for which his soul had been called to the Po, might be deposited there” * in the grave. And again, “All who were employed in embalming . . . were . . . carefully avoided, as the guilt of the crime for which the deceased had died, was supposed in some degree to attach to such as touched the body.” . . . “As soon as the ceremony of depositing the sins in the hole was over, all who had touched the body fled precipitately into the sea, to cleanse themselves from the pollution.” †

I think it is here shown that the test of Mr. Ellis is not altogether reliable, and this instance, selected as being the most decided of the number, may be taken as illustrating my meaning in saying that all the examples given appear to involve moral distinctions, even though a contrary opinion be expressed by the author.

In confirmation of what I have said as to the necessity of testing the point in dispute by a reference to virtues such as the people are likely to appreciate, I can only point to such examples as these, that according to the Greenlanders it is only *valiant workers* who go to the happy land of the Great Spirit; that, in the eyes of Indians of Virginia, those who have *defended their country* are the good; with the Tupinambas of Brazil, the effeminate are the worthless, who go to the Evil Spirit for not defending their country; and so with the Caribs, the brave ones of their nation “go, after death, to happy islands.” ‡ It does not alter the matter, that with most, if not all of these tribes, the good are themselves, and the wicked are their enemies; for the distinction is thereby at least recognised, while it is clear that, even among themselves, the cowardly and self-indulgent are accounted wicked.

To pass now to more general considerations, applicable equally to the transmigration theory, and to the theory of continued separate existence, it seems to me that *wherever diversity of experience is affirmed of those who enter the future state, some explanation of that diversity is needful*. Take the transmigration theory. If some souls go to dwell in beasts or inanimate objects, while others are elevated to the rank of subordinate deities, in a spiritualised body, we need some explanation of the marked difference. Or, taking the continued existence of the souls apart from the body, if there are two states for such souls, we need some key to the duality. Now,

* i. 402.

† i. 403.

‡ Tylor, ii. 79.

under both schemes, such duality appears to be almost uniform ; and of this fact I can see no adequate explanation but the recognition of a moral element. In the vast majority of cases the existence of such an element is unmistakable ; and, in more doubtful cases, this seems a more natural explanation than any other which has been offered. On this point, however, I shall quote the opinion of Mr. Tylor as to retribution. He says :—

“It is well not to speak too positively on a subject so difficult and doubtful as this of the history of the belief in future retribution. But on the whole, the evidence tends towards the opinion that the genuine savage doctrine of the future life either involves no moral retribution, or accepts it only at a rudimentary stage. In adopting this opinion, however, we are left to deal with several statements recorded among low races, assigning reward and punishment to good and bad men after death.”*

Though I am not able to concur in the view thus taken, I grant the importance of what Mr. Tylor urges, when he says, “We must not too readily interpret good and bad according to the highest moral ideas of the lower races, and still less according to civilized definitions of vice and virtue.” But I have already shown that a regard to this difference of standard rather favours the opinion that there are ethical elements present, than points to the opposite. The case of the Tonga Islands is perhaps the most difficult, where an aristocratic feature comes in sight, though a good deal of uncertainty hangs over the question whether there be no more than this, and the example I have already given of the native of Tonga, squeezing the hand, and saying, “This will die, but the life that is within you will never die,” seems to me evidence, almost amounting to certainty, that there is something more. But wherever there is a soul-conflict after death, which some escape, and under which others fall, as with the Greenlanders, the Fijians, and the negroes of Guinea, there is a plain reference to retribution. And when Mr. Tylor says of the Mintira of the Malay Peninsula, that they do not believe “in a future reward and punishment,” † and yet tells us of a happy paradise or “Fruit Island,” and of a desolate retreat, known as “Red Land,” we want some deeper explanation than is contained in the reference to the fact that those slain in battle go to the Red Land. And so in cases where the duality of states does not markedly appear, as with the Nicaraguans, there is still a twofold experience, pointing equally to an ethical distinction, for, according to them, “if a man lived well, his soul would ascend to live among the gods ; but if ill, it would perish with the body, and there would be an end to it.” ‡

But if we find far and wide—without positively saying in all cases—a recognition of moral distinctions in the theories of the future

* ii. 83.

† ii. 79.

‡ ii. 19.

state, what philosophic account may be given of this? We cannot content ourselves with a vague utterance, such as, that "it has come into men's minds" to think in this way, or in that. We must ask how such things came into men's minds. And if a progressive theory have any value in it—if it be framed on the acknowledgment that logical consistency runs through even savage theories—if it point to an ampler use of reason as the condition of progress—the progress referred to is not mere movement, in the sense of continuance on the same level, but progress from lower to higher conceptions of man's life and destiny. If this be the very meaning of a progressive theory, then the lower which leads to the higher cannot adequately, of itself, explain that which is higher, any more than the less can account for the greater. It is not new experience which accounts for new thought, but new thought which leads into new experience. The development of loftier phases of human theory does not come *into* man's mind, but comes *out of* that region. If savages regard themselves as possessed of a spiritual nature—if they consider that their personality may continue, though the body die—and if you say that "the doctrine of a future life is the all but necessary outcome of savage animism" or belief in spirits, you still want a philosophic theory as to the possibility of all this. If savages have a recognition of the distinction between mental and bodily life, it is because of what they know of themselves. If they believe that the mind can exist apart from the body, this cannot be explained by supposing, as Mr. Tylor does, that it is reached by the aid of *dreams*, for if it be true that they see the departed in their dreams, it is just as true that in their dreams they see the living, and themselves among the number, in scenes where they know they never have been. And if it be not explained thus, it can be accounted for only by the knowledge of what their own personality involves. And if, recognising the possibility of separate mental existence, they believe in two distinct forms of experience in a future state—and two distinct places of existence—this is "the natural outcome" of the former knowledge, only if you superadd a further knowledge of moral distinctions, without which the new conception is unexplained. Thus, it seems to me, recent investigations of savage life are tending towards a confirmation of an intuitional philosophy; and what is now required to make this more manifest, is a rigid scrutiny of the vast mass of evidence now at command, such as would make it possible to throw off the accidental, and clearly mark out the constant and uniform testimony of the several stages of life on the highway towards civilization. In a word, what is now most urgently required for ethnology is that some one should do for that science what Kant did for philosophy, attempt a scientific separation of the necessary from the accidental.

H. CALDERWOOD.



THE ENGLISH AND SCOTCH CHURCHES.

IN these days of travel, nothing is more astonishing than the ignorance which still prevails as to nationalities and national institutions differing from our own. It seems to be possible for even cultivated people to visit strange lands and reside in them for some time, and yet to remain almost entirely ignorant of the genius, temper, and religious and social characteristics of those amidst whom they have been living. This lack of sympathy with the features of another national life, and incapacity of appreciating its habits and modes of thought, have been sometimes said to be peculiarly English. But national narrowness is certainly not confined to England. The French might be supposed, from the advantages of their geographical position, and the natural quickness and liveliness of their sympathies, to be superior to such narrowness, and able to enter into the meaning and force of national facts differing from their own; but in truth they are notoriously deficient in this respect. The impressions of French travellers are probably less to be trusted than those of any other travellers; while the supreme complacency of their superior ignorance and constant mistakes, not only as to the subtler aspects, but as to the very nomenclature of foreign customs and ways, are more flagrant and ludicrous perhaps than those of any other people. Till the experience of the recent war, it may be safely said that the majority of educated

Frenchmen derived all their ideas of Germany from the vague pictures and vapoury nonsense of Madame de Staël's well-known book, "De l'Allemagne;" and the mass of the French soldiers, without knowledge of the roads of their own country, probably had no conception whatever of the real confines of that Rhine-land which they yet coveted with a passionate lust of conquest which can only be bred in vain and ignorant minds. Even now, it may be doubted whether the temporary head of the French Republic has any real appreciation of the characteristic forces which, during the last twenty years, have gradually, with a slowly accumulating, but irresistible energy, welded the peoples of Italy into a powerful nationality.

But it must be admitted that John Bull, if not exceptionally ignorant of other things than his own, has a very pretty share of national blindness. And what is particularly inexcusable on his part is, that he insists on maintaining this attitude towards countries like Ireland and Scotland, which are integral parts of the British Empire with himself. Of course there is something reciprocal in the attitudes of these nationalities towards him. There are evidently plenty of men in Ireland—as the Home Rule agitation shows—who, notwithstanding the abolition of the Church of England there, still regard John Bull as a species of tyrannical monster, ready, if he only had the power, to thrust all his forms of political and social order upon a people impatient of them, and keenly sensitive as to external interference. And there may be in Scotland those who still look upon England as their "auld enemy," as there are certainly here and there true blue Presbyterians, who see in the forms of the English Church only the rags of Popery, and may even denounce with King James—before he went to England and learned better—the Prayer Book as an "ill-said mass in English." I do not doubt that such types of provincial narrowness are still to be found in these countries. But even blindness or prejudice like this is not quite equal to the dense obscurity which veils to the average English mind the special characteristics of Scotch or Irish nationality. I confine my remarks, for the present, to the relations of England and Scotland, and indeed to the relations of the two Established Churches of these countries, which have received some striking illustrations from recent events.

It is well known that Scotland is a pleasant hunting-ground to many Englishmen in autumn. In addition to the more favoured hundreds who go there to kill grouse on the breezy moorland, or to lie in wait for the deer in the corries of the hills, there are thousands who hunt for health and recreation amidst the picturesque spurs of the Trossachs, or along the noble route of the Caledonian

Canal. It might have been supposed that as the result of this, Scotland and the Scotch would really have been pretty well understood, at least by the travelling English public. But there is good reason to doubt whether this is the case. It is even doubtful whether some of the most obvious geographical features of the country have impressed themselves upon the minds of men who have not only been educated at the English universities, but who now hold distinguished positions at the Bar or in the Senate. There are whispers that a certain distinguished legal luminary, who had promised to lecture in Edinburgh, actually engaged himself to stay with a friend, at a place forty miles distant, under the idea that it was close to the scene of his lecture, if not a part of Edinburgh. And there can be no doubt that letters from high quarters—even Government offices—are sometimes addressed to Aberdeen, and even Glasgow—not to mention Edinburgh—when intended for some official in an ancient University, whose prior existence marks an epoch in the history of Scottish civilisation. But these are trifles. Knowledge of geography, it is well known, has never been a strong point with university men; and it is too much to expect, that minds which have devoted their energies in youth to making nonsense verses in a dead language should be impressed with the importance of knowing the exact features of a country which was a savage waste when this language was spoken in its purity.

The outflow of ignorance regarding the Scotch National Church, which has enlivened many of the English newspapers during the last autumn, is a more serious if not a more excusable phenomenon. And yet nothing could be more simple and natural, and in itself—divested of conventional accessories—less deserving of astonishment than the incident which has led to so much discussion. We feel almost ashamed to be supposed to attach any undue importance to it, or to be under the necessity of bringing it once more under public view.

Glengarry is one of the loveliest glens in the north-west highlands of Scotland. It is so pleasant a spot, and the modern mansion which rises in comfortable and stately elegance almost under the shadow of the old highland tower, now silent and tenantless, is such a hospitable retreat, that we do not wonder that English bishops, and even archbishops, find their way there in those leisure autumn days when so many home-staying flocks must be left to strange, and, it is to be feared, meagre pasture. Some way up this glen there stands on a bank above the picturesque stream, and by the side of the road which traverses it, a modest parish church. The building is modern, and as like a church as one expects to see in such a district. Here on two Sundays this autumn, two dignitaries of the

Church of England conducted a simple service to the edification and delight of the homely inhabitants of the glen. Some of the congregation no doubt never saw a bishop, still less an archbishop, before; but probably they thought very little of the ecclesiastical position or dignity of those who conducted their devotions and preached to them. They must have been very unlike an ordinary Scotch country congregation if they had such things much in their mind. They thought a good deal more, I feel sure, of the quality of what they heard, and how far it really touched and interested them.

So simple and natural a Christian act on the part of men whose function it is, according to St. Paul, "to preach the Word, and to be instant in season and out of season," it might have been thought, would have met with approval everywhere, or, better still, have been allowed to pass without special observation. The open Church was there—the parish minister necessarily absent in the discharge of his duties in a more distant part of the glen—the congregation was gathered from many a moorland hut away among the hills; and a minister of the Divine Word was at hand, otherwise unemployed. To those who are strangers to ecclesiastical subtleties, it must be wonderful that the fact of Christian ministers doing what appears so obviously to have been their duty in the circumstances should have called forth any extraordinary remarks; still more wonderful that it should have provoked a storm of vituperative indignation; and afterwards have been made the subject of elaborate explanation and excuse on the part of these ministers themselves. All this, however, has happened; and the ideas which have thus come to the surface in a large class of minds are deserving of examination, if the incident itself may very well be forgotten. It cannot, indeed, be said that there is any novelty in these ideas. They are as old as the beginning of all ecclesiastical error. But there has been a vivacity in their tone, and a mixture of insolence and ignorance in their expression, which may have been imposing to some minds. Only John Bull—and he when in cassock and *in excelsis*—could well have made such an example of himself.

I think I am not mistaken in generalising the objections made to Archbishop Thomson and Bishop Wilberforce preaching at Glengarry as follows: The Presbyterian Church of Scotland, it is said, has no claims to be considered a branch of the Catholic Church. It is, indeed, properly speaking, no church at all, but only a Presbyterian sect accidentally established by unhappy circumstances in the northern part of the island. The true Church of Scotland is the Scottish Episcopal Communion—a small body thinly permeating the country, but on this account all the more precious as alone bearing the vessels of divine grace in a dry and barren land. Scottish Pres-

byterianism has not only wilfully separated itself from Catholicism, but it has injuriously repelled and derided the sacred idea of Episcopacy. It denies, moreover, the validity of priestly succession and the efficacy of sacramental rites. It is even sworn to the "extirpation of prelacy or church government by archbishops, bishops, &c.," an avowal which an English Church newspaper* associates directly with the Westminster Confession of Faith—the doctrinal basis of Scottish Presbyterianism. The avowal in question, it is almost needless to say to our readers, is no part of the Confession of Faith, but is extracted from the "Solemn League and Covenant," commonly bound up in the same volume with the "Confession." The "Solemn League and Covenant" is a remarkable historical document belonging to the same period; but it has no more to do with the creed of the Scottish Church—in fact, it has far less to do with it—than the Act of Uniformity xiii. Carol. 2 has to do with the Thirty-nine Articles commonly found in the same volume. The Act of Uniformity, in all its harsh and unchristian exclusiveness, is still unhappily binding upon the Church of England. The Church of Scotland has no legal relations whatever, and has not had for two hundred years, with the "Solemn League and Covenant." This is only one specimen of the marvellous blunders which pervade the whole attitude of the extreme High Church party.

Granting that the Presbyterianism of the seventeenth century was so embittered by the abuses of sacerdotalism, or what it called prelacy, that it vowed its extirpation—what has this to do with the relations of the English and Scotch Churches as they now exist, or with the present temper of Presbyterianism? Is the Church of England, even as represented by modern Ritualists, ambitious of affiliating the petty tyrannies of Laud or the brutal cynicism of Sheldon? Are not only the sins of the fathers to be visited on the children—but their blind prejudices and wicked enmities also to descend to them? The "Solemn League and Covenant" was a powerful instrument of terror in its day; and I have no wish to defend it. It is indeed a melancholy monument of human bigotry—yet scarcely more so than the Caroline Act of Uniformity with all its superior dignity and more apparent courtesy of phrase. But it has no more to do with the present religious consciousness of Scotland than the Lambeth Articles has to do with the religious belief of the High Church party.

It is a uniform tendency of religious narrowness to confuse all stages of historic culture. Unconscious of growth itself, it has no perception of growth in others. And so modern Scotchmen and Presbyterians are supposed to be identical with the Covenanters, and even with John Knox. That more than two centuries have elapsed

* *The Church Herald*, Nov. 15.

since the Covenant was sworn ; and more than three centuries since John Knox preached with such effect that the people rose and destroyed the supposed monuments of idolatry which they had previously revered—is nothing to the ecclesiastical Philistine. He has got a few official ideas into his head, and he cares not to enlarge them. He believes blindly that Knox himself destroyed the cathedrals—that the Scottish Protestants were a horde of savages—and that every Presbyterian is still a Covenanter in disguise, cherishing dubious designs against bishops and archbishops.

But let us look a little historically at this presumed antagonism betwixt the Church of England and the Church of Scotland. That the one Church is Episcopalian, and the other Presbyterian, is beyond question. And equally so is it beyond question that there has been—let us admit from the beginning—those in either Church who have asserted the exclusive *jus divinum* of their respective forms of Church government. We willingly grant that the Anglo-Catholic party is a natural out-growth of the Church of England system, and we can perfectly appreciate its theory when held with intelligence, learning, and a fair respect for the opinions of others. But it is equally true that this party has never in any period constituted the Church of England, and that in point of fact it had less to do with its constitutional origin than either of the other two parties which it has always more or less embraced. This could be shown with overwhelming force of evidence did our space permit, and were the pages of this Review the appropriate place for such detailed discussion.* But in proof of what we say it will be enough to refer briefly to the declared opinions of some of the most distinguished Church of England divines in the sixteenth century, to the standards of the Church, and to its practice in its earlier and better days before the Restoration.

(1.) If any man had to do with the constitutional origin of the Church of England, Cranmer had ; and his opinions on this subject are notorious. In answer to the famous questions propounded in the autumn of 1540 by Henry VIII. to the bishops, one of which was, “whether priests or bishops were first?” his well-known answer was: “The bishops and priests were at one time, and were not two things, but both one office in the beginning of Christ’s religion.” Cranmer, in fact, was as Erastian in the matter of Church government as any Broad Churchman of the present day. He seems to have doubted of the independence of the sacred office altogether, and to have looked upon it as validly constituted by the supreme civil

* We refer our readers to a careful and abundantly minute discussion of the subject in a volume by the late Dean of Ripon, Dr. Goode, entitled “A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Church of England on the Validity of the Orders of the Scotch and Foreign Non-Episcopal Churches,” 1852.

magistrate, or even by the people, without the interposition of any clerical or priestly authority at all.* Dean Stanley could not express himself more philosophically as to the purely natural and historical origin of the Episcopate. If we pass from Cranmer to Jewell, we find him quoting with approbation Chrysostom's saying—"between a bishop and a priest in a manner there is no difference" (1 Tim., hom. 11); and so also the well-known opinion of Jerome, that "priests and bishops are all one;" and even Augustine very much to the same effect.† The opinions of Whitgift are still more decided. He explicitly denied that there was any "one certain and perfect kind of government prescribed or commanded in the Scriptures to the Church of Christ," and maintained that the "only essential notes of the Church were *the true preaching of the word of God, and the right administration of the sacraments*"—in this respect, emphasising his agreement with "Master Calvin" and the "judgment of *the Reformed Churches* as appeareth by their Confessions."‡ So far from Whitgift, or any of the Elizabethan divines, being advocates of an ecclesiastical *jus divinum*, it was this very point which was in conflict betwixt them and their Puritan opponents—Whitgift and Cartwright in one case, and Hooker and Travers in another.

The Puritans were the advocates, and the only advocates, in the sixteenth century of the Divine right of a single type of church government to the exclusion of all others; while the Church of England by all its highest minds maintained the wider and truly Catholic theory of the Church as constituted by Divine realities—not by institutional forms. This, and nothing less than this, is the clear lesson of Hooker's great work. Everywhere he holds forth in it the idea of the Church as rationally comprehensive—resting not on this or that formal prescription, but on the higher principles of Divine law revealed in nature and history. In this sense, and in no other, did Episcopacy appear to Hooker to possess Divine right. It was a true and proper expression of Divine order in the Church. It was conformable to Scripture and the Christian reason, and had its origin directly in the historical development of this reason. But with all his love and admiration of the ecclesiastical polity which he so nobly

* His words are: "A bishop may make a priest by the Scripture, and so may princes and governors also, and that by the authority of God committed to them, and the people also by their election," &c. This is his answer to Question 11, as his former answer given in the text was to Question 10, of the series proposed by the king to the bishops. The questions and answers are to be found in Burnet's "History of the Reformation," Vol. I., and also in Collyer's "Ecclesiastical History." In the face of such deliberate expressions of opinion, illustrated by his well-known conduct, it is a vain task, as attempted by Dr. Hook in his recent volume ("Lives of the Archbishops," Vol. II., New Series"), to vindicate what is called Cranmer's churchmanship.

† "Def. of Apol.," Pt. II., c. 9.

‡ Def. of Answ. to Adm., 1573, p. 81.

defends, he was so far from limiting to that polity the character and privileges of the Church that his special polemic throughout is that the idea of the Divine cannot be limited by any external polity. As to the question of Orders, he distinctly allows the validity of non-episcopal ordination. "There may be just and sufficient reason," he says, "of ordination made without a bishop."*

But it is needless to multiply quotations, or to call to mind once more the terms of the "bidding prayer" prescribed to all the English clergy in the canons of 1604, to pray "for the Church of Scotland" at a time when this Church was as essentially Presbyterian as it is now. There is no end to the subtleties of casuistic interpretation by which the plainest statements may be evaded; and I do not write this paper to stir the ghost of controversy, which is often as unimportant as it is tedious and stupid. I make bold to say that there is no student of history, who has not a special purpose to serve, will venture to maintain that the original theory of the Church of England was an exclusive theory. Even Keble, with all his predilections, is forced to admit that the Elizabethan divines are content "to show that the government by archbishops and bishops is ancient and allowable," and "never venture to urge its *exclusive* claim, or to connect the succession with the validity of the Holy Sacraments."† These divines, in their intercourse with foreign Churches, may have regretted that those Churches did not adopt Episcopacy; but the spirit of their intercourse is entirely at variance with the idea that they deemed the recognition of episcopal orders to be a necessity of Christian communion.‡ Even Archbishop Bramhall, long afterwards (1659), repudiates strongly on behalf of his episcopal brethren any idea of "unchurching either all or the most part of the Protestant Churches, or of denying those Churches to be true Churches wherein salvation may be had."§ It has been left to the Tractarians and their descendants the Ritualists, to take up this exclusive ground, and to rejoice in the sacred fence which shuts them out from any rude communion with their Christian brethren. The idea of a "mission" service to members of the Church of Scotland (however it may be explained), is scarcely a more happy form of the same vulgar and narrow prejudice from which we have seen all the greater minds of the Church of England in its earlier days to have been so completely free.

* Ecc. P. vii. 14.

† Preface to Hooker, pp. lix—lxii.

‡ The intercourse of the English Church with the Foreign Reformed Churches continued active, it is well known, till the Synod of Dort in 1618, to which Deputies were sent from the Church of England, among others Hall, afterwards Bishop of Norwich, and Davenant, Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. Such a broad, historical fact as this is worth volumes of ecclesiastical casuistry.

§ Works, Vol. III.

(2.) It is almost needless to say that there is not a word in the Thirty-nine Articles on the subject of Episcopacy. Nor are the clergy of the Church of England anywhere bound to the recognition of the three-fold ministry as a necessary dogma of belief. The statement in the Preface to the Ordination Service is simply a statement of fact that the three orders have been in existence from the time of the Apostles. And whatever be the value of this statement, it is not designed to be accepted as a Divine truth. The definition of the Church in the Thirty-nine Articles is as comprehensive as can be imagined. It is "a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's Ordinance, in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same."* Again, in reference to ordination, the Articles are no less moderate and liberal. "It is not lawful," they say, "for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching, or ministering the Sacraments in the congregation, before he be lawfully called and sent to execute the same. And those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent, which be chosen and called to this work by men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation, to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard." † It is hardly possible to evade the plain meaning of this Article. The words are obviously designed, as they have been almost universally allowed, to include the ministry of foreign non-episcopal Churches. Their intention may be said to be placed beyond all doubt by the fact mentioned by a recent writer ‡ that they are "nearly a transcript of one of thirteen articles published amongst Archbishop Cranmer's papers, and probably drawn up for the agreement of the Protestant English and German divines, who held their conferences in London, A.D. 1538."

The definition of the Church in the Confession of Faith is very much to the same effect as in the Thirty-nine Articles. "The visible Church," it is there said, in the twenty-fifth chapter, "consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children, and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation." As there is not a word of Episcopacy in the one document, so there is not a word of Presbytery in the other. In both the idea of the Church is prominently held forth as spiritual, and not ritual. *Ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi Ecclesia*, is in effect the statement of both. It is surely strange in these days to find any ecclesiastical party less liberal than the creeds of the sixteenth and

* Art. XIX.

† Ibid., XXIII.

‡ *Christian Observer*, Oct. 1871, p. 783.

seventeenth century, and disposed to read a harsher rather than a milder meaning into these traditional forms of opinion.

(3.) In reference to the practice of the Church of England as to intercourse with other Churches, it is evident that during the sixteenth and a great part of the seventeenth century a very different state of things prevailed from that which has been common since the Restoration. In the time of Elizabeth, and subsequently, ministers who had only Scotch or foreign orders were not only recognised as clergymen within their own sphere, but were freely permitted to preach, and even deemed eligible for preferment, in the Church of England. John Knox himself—although the fact of his having been ordained in the Church of Rome makes his case not exactly one in point—was, as is well known, one of King Edward's chaplains, and the king, with the consent of his Privy Council, offered him a bishopric. If he could only have accepted the English Reformation, this would probably have been his fate, and the Church of England, rather than the Church of Scotland, might have reckoned Knox amongst her heroes. How few of our modern Ritualists have any thought of this! But there are facts more strictly to the point. There is positive evidence that ministers only in Scotch orders, "ordained to the holy ministry by the imposition of hands, according to the laudable form and rite of the Reformed Church of Scotland," were formally admitted to the cure of souls in the Church of England. A well-known case is narrated in Strype's "Life of Archbishop Grindal,"* 1582; and the language we have quoted above is taken from the official licence issued on the occasion.† There is further the testimony of Bishop Flectwood, who says expressly in a work published a few years after he became a bishop, in 1708, that "during the reigns of King James and King Charles I., and to the year 1661, we had *many ministers* from Scotland, from France, and the Low Countries, who were ordained by presbyters only, and not bishops, and they were instituted into benefices with cure . . . and yet were *never re-ordained*, but only subscribed the Articles." This testimony, considering its date, might have been questionable if it had stood by itself; but it is merely the sequel to a *catena* of testimony from Bacon downwards. In a supplement to his "De Augustinis Scientiarum," Bacon reprobates the preaching of "some

* Edit., 1710, p. 271.

† The case is that of a minister of the name of John Morrison, who, having been previously ordained in the Reformed Church of Scotland, was formally admitted "to administer Holy things throughout the province of Canterbury," by Dr. Aubrey, Vicar-General of Archbishop Grindal during the sequestration of his see. Aubrey was an eminent civilian, and the case has therefore a special legal significance. It shows that "the Statute Law, and the preface to the Ordinal, as it then stood, were regarded by lawyers as allowing Presbyterian ordination to be a qualification for ministering in the Church of England."—*Christian Observer*, Oct. 1871, p. 787.

indiscreet persons," who had spoken derogatorily of "the Churches abroad," "insomuch," he adds, "that some of our men, ordained in foreign parts, have been pronounced unlawful ministers."* Then in 1641 Bishop Hall writes: "What fault soever may be in the easy admittance of those who have received Romish orders, the sticking at the admission of our brethren returning from Reformed Churches *was not in case of ordination*, but of institution. They had been acknowledged ministers of Christ without any other hands laid upon them; but according to the laws of our land they were not, perhaps, capable of institution to a benefice, unless they were so qualified as the statutes of this realm do require." And Bishop Cosin, whom even High Churchmen will recognise as an unimpeachable authority on such a subject, states distinctly, in reference to ministers of the French Reformed Church—non-episcopal, it is needless to say—that in the event of such ministers "receiving a public charge or cure of souls among us in the Church of England (as I have known some of them to have so done of late, and can instance in *many other* before my time) our bishops did not re-ordain them." "Nor," he adds, "*did our laws require more of such ministers than to declare their public consent to the religion received amongst us, and to subscribe the Articles established.*"†

The law of the Church of England on this subject before the Restoration was contained in the Statute 13 Eliz. c. 12, which provided that any professing to be a priest or minister of God's word and sacraments, who had been ordained by any other form than that prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer, should be called upon, as a condition of retaining his preferment, to declare his assent, and subscribe to the articles of religion. The intention of this Act, it may be held, was mainly to apply to priests who had been ordained according to the Romish form; but the language is general, and has been universally held by ecclesiastical lawyers to include also ministers ordained by foreign non-episcopal Churches. By the Caroline Act of Uniformity, however, it was expressly declared that no person could hold preferment in the English Church without being ordained a priest "according to the form and manner of the Prayer Book." Since the passing of this Act, the practice of the Church of England has been to seclude itself from all ecclesiastical connection with other Churches not Episcopal.

The preface to the Ordination Service may be again quoted. It is, no doubt, the great stronghold of Anglican exclusiveness, and its express provision that no man was to be accounted a *lawful* minister in the Church of England unless Episcopally ordained,‡ may be said

* "Works," 1733, Vol. II., p. 300.

† Letter to Mr. Cordel, in Besire's Account of Bishop Cosin.

‡ The exact words are, "No man shall be accounted or taken to be a lawful Bishop.

to be at variance with the above liberal interpretation of the Statute of Elizabeth. But the facts are nevertheless as we have stated them. "The practice of the Church during the century preceding the Act of Uniformity whilst the preface to the Ordination Service was in force"—the Statute in question "recognising the holding of preferment by ministers not Episcopally ordained"—in conjunction with the twenty-third article of religion "recognising such orders as valid according to the general principles of the Christian Church," are all strongly in favour of the liberal view, and must be held to modify the seeming exclusiveness of the Ordinal. The language marked above as quoted is almost verbatim from a valuable opinion lately given by three eminent ecclesiastical lawyers of the present day regarding the legal relations of the Church of England and other non-episcopal Churches as to intercommunion, who express doubts whether, even since the Act of Uniformity, it is illegal for such ministers to preach occasional sermons in any Church of England, with the permission of the incumbent.*

The result of our narrative—in which we have kept closely to a few prominent points—is conclusively to show that the extreme theory of Episcopal orders is without legal or historical sanction—certainly up to the time of the Restoration. For, giving every force that can be due to the preface to the Ordination Service, all that it amounts to is that no man can be a lawfully constituted minister of the Church of England who has not been Episcopally ordained. But this is not the point in question. In a sense, no one is concerned to deny such a proposition. Every Church has the right to determine the qualifications of its own ministers. The High Church theory, however, as lately propounded, goes greatly beyond this. It maintains, not only that a man cannot be a minister of the Church of England, but cannot be a minister at all, without Episcopal ordination. In other words, it shuts out all otherwise ordained from the pale of the Catholic Church as having no validly-constituted office or title to administer its sacred rites. A pretension so grossly offensive as this, proceeding from the ministers of a National Reformed Church, may very well excite indignation, if it were not more worthy of ridicule. Within the bosom of a Church, which, like the Roman Catholic, discredits all biblical and scientific inquiry, and warns its clergy from the free exercise of their reason, such a pretension may not at once

Priest, or Deacon in the Church of England, or suffered to execute any of the said functions, except he be called, tried, examined, and admitted thereunto according to the form hereafter following, or hath had formerly *Episcopal consecration, or ordination.*" The latter clause in italics was only added at the Restoration.

* This important opinion has only within the last few months been given to the public in the pages of the *Christian Observer*, Nov. 1871, pp. 834, 835. It is signed H. M. Cairns, J. Parker Deane, J. Fitzjames Stephen.

provoke contempt. It passes for a piece of dogmatism, not more absurd than many other things sanctioned by the official authority of the same Church. Roman Catholicism claims the right to say what is true about everything without further inquiry. But even those members of the Church of England who disown the name of Protestant, have not yet put forward any such claim; and they have no absolute official authority to fall back upon, like the Roman clergy. Such a tenet, therefore, is greatly more obnoxious and degrading in them. It is held in defiance alike of sense, Scripture, and charity. It is at once superstitious and insolent—a falsehood and an offence.

Viewed scientifically or historically, such a question as that of the exclusive validity of Episcopal orders admits of no argument at all. There is not a single mind, I venture to say, whose judgments are entitled to any rational consideration that holds clearly the affirmative. Not to mention the host of general considerations opposed to it, every biblical scholar, who has looked at the question simply to ascertain the truth, is forced to admit that the distinction of Bishop and Presbyter has no foundation in the New Testament. The most elaborate examination of the point which has been lately made, is by the Hulsean Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, Dr. Lightfoot—probably the first Exegetical authority in the Church of England; and he has come without any doubt to the conclusion that the names of Presbyter and Bishop in the Apostolic writings are merely different designations of the same office—a conclusion, he says, “now generally recognised by theologians of all shades of opinion.”* What then becomes of the Episcopal office as of special Divine institution? It has the same Divine sanction as any other function of useful order in the Church—and no other. The office, as Dr. Lightfoot explains, arose naturally as a “development from the subordinate office. In other words, the episcopate was formed not out of the apostolic order by localisation, but out of the presbyterial by elevation; and the title which originally was common to all, came at length to be appropriated to the chief among them.”† No development could be more natural, or possibly more important in the history of the Church; and coming as it did so immediately after, or even within the verge of, the Apostolic age, the Episcopal office has a claim upon the reverential regard of every Christian student. But this is something entirely distinct from an exclusive Divine authority. Episcopacy as a useful fact generated by the historical necessities of the Church, and Episcopacy as a Divine right, limiting all other rights in the Church, are two very different things.

In the former of these aspects, Presbyterianism itself does not

* Epistle to Philip, Diss. I. p. 93.

† Ibid., p. 194.

disown, and certainly does not denounce, Episcopacy ; and there are few wise Presbyterians who do not see weaknesses in their own system arising from the disuse of it. In the Church of Scotland, this natural and practical form of Episcopacy has been frequently more or less recognised. Its early order of superintendents was nothing else than this, and its practice of appointing commissioners to visit parishes and committees to supervise Church work, show that the mere idea of *oversight* is not inconsistent with its ecclesiastical system—although its operation is naturally watched with jealousy. From the beginning, in fact, there has been in the Scotch Church a party, not only not inimical to Episcopacy in this sense, but strongly in favour of it—a party of whom Leighton may be said to be the most distinguished representative. And as we have seen that there is nothing in the Confession of Faith against Episcopacy, so neither is there any legal obligation laid upon the clergy of the Church of Scotland to hold Presbytery as of exclusive Divine institution.

In the mere legal and constitutional status, therefore, of the two Churches, there is abundant room for practical Christian intercourse. They are both Churches of the Reformation, resting so far as their special government is concerned upon a legal compromise. Episcopacy is the fully equipped form of Church order to the one ; Presbyterianism is the accepted and popular form to the other. The advocates of an ecclesiastical *jus divinum* have never been more than a party in either Church. Sacerdotalism is no part of the creed of the one ; and Presbyterianism as held by the Covenanters was expressly rejected by the other. They represent different types of the reformed faith and of the ecclesiastical order developed at the Reformation—adapted to nationalities of different temper and quality. That is really all the difference in the eyes of rational people. Both Churches profess the very same doctrines. Betwixt the Thirty-nine Articles and the Confession of Faith there is no substantial difference, although the former may have followed more the Lutheran, as the latter has followed more the Calvinian, type of orthodoxy. When Archbishop Thomson preached at Glengarry I feel certain that the simple folks detected nothing different in his sermon from what they are in the habit of hearing from their parish minister. Her gracious Majesty, the Queen, worships with equal edification, it is understood, in both Churches. Are all these Christian realities to go for nothing in deference to certain conventionalities of Church order ? Are the prejudices of party passion to subvert the Divine unities of a common faith and hope and charity. I cannot think this, notwithstanding fanatical outcry and Episcopal evasion.

Surely in a time like this the two National Churches of England and Scotland have something else to do than to call into view their

respective Divine rights, or the traditionary claims which they may reciprocally urge against each other. They had much better consider, I think, their undivine restrictions, and the hindrances, both dogmatic and practical, which interfere with their Christian usefulness. As the phrase is, they are both now on their trial, and the real question that will be asked of them in their day of judgment will not be as to their orders or forms of government, but as to what national Christian good they may have done and are doing. In a time when religious thought has reached a pitch of almost intolerable disorganisation, what are they doing to help men under speculative and spiritual difficulties? What light have they for darkened minds? and what peace for perplexed and burdened hearts? In a time when pauperism and drunkenness and social misery in so many forms seem eating into the very vitals of our national prosperity, what power is there in them to meet these evils and help the great work of the statesman and the philanthropist? When the Anti-State Church Society is thundering at their gates, and legislators are talking dubiously how long their fate can be postponed, is it not too much trifling to be prating of "mission services" in the parish of Glengarry?

Undoubtedly if our National Churches are to survive at all they can only survive in *common work for the national good*. Superstitions about orders and theories of Divine rights, which are utterly dead in the minds of all rational people, must be laid aside. The past may be accepted, but it cannot be resuscitated.¹ "Let the dead bury their dead." It is really too absurd that we should continue to be dominated, not merely by the good thoughts, but by the evil prejudices which have descended to us from Mediæval, or even Patristic, Catholicism. The clerical mind must clear itself of cant, and the episcopal mind of conventionality, if once more they are to be living forces in the national history. There are plenty of realities for them to cope with. Let them take to the work of Christian thought and of Christian charity, and try to build up once more the temple of Faith and Brotherhood on some spiritual basis that the modern mind will accept. And let them be sure they will best accomplish this, the less they think of their own ritual dignity, and the more they realise the spiritual equality of all Churches and all men in the sight of God.

J. TULLOCH.



JOHN HUSS AND THE ULTRAMONTANES.

INTELLECTUAL, political, and politico-religious movements in the East of Europe have scarcely as yet in this country attracted attention proportioned to the effect which they may, perhaps, be destined to produce on the future history of a considerable portion of the human race. Among the most remarkable literary, or politico-literary controversies that have arisen in the Austrian Empire, under the present change of circumstances and *régime*, are two which have been, and still are being, carried on with considerable vehemence in Bohemia, with regard to the celebrated John Huss. The Czechs naturally consider him a kind of national hero, and claim for him, and for themselves, a high and noble position in the history of the world, and in that of the development of the human intellect, particularly in the assertion of the supremacy of conscience. The Ultramontanes assail the Czechian martyr as the mere victim of his own vanity and self-sufficiency, and point to the miseries and horrors of the Hussite wars, as the consequences of his ill-starred resistance to the authorities of the Church. The Austro-Germans, especially those of the "Diaspora" or non-German countries, look upon the resistance offered by the Czechs in general, and, as they suppose, by Huss in particular, to the progress of the Teutonic element, as high treason against light and civilization, which they appear to claim as the

exclusive property of their race, so all-absorbing has their feeling of nationality become of late. Thus the liberal German and retrogressive Ultramontane elements are banded together in a somewhat unnatural alliance against the Czesko-Slavonians, who turn to England for a fair hearing for the greatest disciple of her great Wycliffe, and their own historical claims upon the gratitude and respect of civilized man.

The publication of the second volume of Dr. F. Palacky's "History of Bohemia," mainly from genuine documentary evidence which had never before been available for historical purposes, the first part of which, containing the reign of Wenceslas IV., appeared in 1845, and the second, containing the history of the Hussite wars, in 1851, produced such a sensation in Bohemia, that it was demanded by the clerical party that a reply to it, giving the Ultramontane view of the life and character of Huss, should be issued by the "Matice Czeska," the admirable national society at whose cost Palacky's history was being given to the world. Baron J. A. Helfert was selected for the task, and did his work honourably and carefully, producing in 1857 an interesting and attractive octavo volume of 287 pages in the Bohemian language. Between 1865 and 1868 K. J. Erben edited the three volumes of Huss's Bohemian works, an account of which was given in this Review in April, 1869. Finally, Dr. Palacky issued a large octavo volume of 768 pages, containing everything necessary for forming an independent judgment upon both Huss himself and the religious controversies and movements in Bohemia in his days, and for a few years subsequently.*

The question between the German and Slavonic elements in the state of Bohemia will scarcely at the present juncture be so interesting to British readers as that between the National and Roman parties in the Church. Indeed, it is rather of local than general interest altogether, unless those are right who see in the Czesko-Slavonic question the elements of a future European war. We shall, therefore, devote our principal attention to the ecclesiastical and intellectual points of controversy, touching only upon certain salient matters in the question of nationality, which come to the front at once, and will not be denied.

Three considerable teachers had arisen among the clergy in Bohemia during the latter half of the fourteenth century, one of them, Conrad of Waldhausen, an Austro-German, the other two Slavonians, Miliez of Kremsier, in Moravia, and Michael of Janow. But no succession of teachers and preachers could have produced results of the nature and magnitude which we find to have been in fact produced in Bohemia, had not the seed been sown on ground

* Of this vol. we gave a brief notice in our number for July, 1869, p. 449.

prepared to receive it, and had not the national language been brought to such a pitch of cultivation as to be fit and ready for the discussion of abstract points of philosophy and theology. That Wycliffe, though a greater thinker and reasoner, produced, comparatively speaking, so much smaller immediate results in England than Huss in Bohemia, appears due to the fact that the English language was not yet in a suitable condition for a great national and intellectual movement to be carried on in it. Had Chaucer, that "well of English undefiled," who is generally considered to have made our language what it is, preceded Wycliffe, instead of the converse, the history of England would probably have told a very different story as regards the reformation of religion.

That the Bohemian language had arrived at so high a state of cultivation was due to a noble layman, THOMAS OF STITNY, passages in some of whose as yet unedited works show him to have sympathized deeply with both Conrad and Miliez in their denunciations of those who "lived unholily in holy positions," and in the persecutions they endured from the "thunder" of those "who say of evil that it is not evil, and of the good that they are evil." Stitny wrote his first work in the Bohemian language—a translation of Augustine's tract, "De Conflictu Vitiorum et Virtutum"—about the year 1370, and his second and most remarkable one, addressed to his children, in 1376. This is intitled, "O Bbecnych vecech Krestanskych"—"Of General Christian Matters"—and is a perfect encyclopædia of theology and morality.* "God hath commanded me," says he, in the first preface to this work, "as also every father, to lead you, my children, in his ways, and show Him to you. So testify the books of the old law." And in his second preface he gives his reasons for writing in the Bohemian language, in spite of the opposition of the priesthood and the learned of the day.

"A sermon of St. Augustine's," says he, "has encouraged me to be bolder in writing Bohemian books which relate to the Holy Scriptures; for from it everyone can see how good a thing it is to read the Holy Scriptures. And those who condemn books in the Bohemian language, even if good ones, wishing, perhaps, to be the only persons who appear wise, might well dread the vengeance of God, when they reflect how guilty those are who would wish to stop the letters and necessary messages therein, and to prevent the Lord God, the Eternal Bridegroom, from teaching his bride his will, and comforting her in her distress thereby. Yea, justly would he be in terror who should stop the letters of a king addressed to his queen, if he knew that the king was aware of it. And how much greater is the Lord God than any king! How much dearer to him is his bride—that is, every soul that longeth for Him—than ever was queen dear to any king! Wiser

* The University of Prague, in 1852, celebrated its fifth centenary by printing and publishing this work, with a glossary and life of the author, under the editorship of K. J. Erben.

men understand this, and know that a Bohemian is as precious to Him as a Latinist."

Thus the Czechian nation and language received a thorough theological and scientific training through the numerous writings of Stitny, as well as those of Miliez and Matthias of Janow, and was as well prepared to enter into the arena of controversy with the pen as with the sword. Political circumstances were also such as to evoke a powerful feeling of nationality, and to cause a strong reaction against the overbearing foreign and Teutonic element, which threatened the very existence of the national element, or "language," "*język*," as it was always termed by the old Bohemians.

When the Emperor Charles IV., the son of the blind King of Bohemia, John of Luxemburg, who fell in the battle of Crecy in 1346, founded, by a "Golden Bull," the University of Prague, in 1348, his aims were dynastic and imperial, rather than patriotic and national. As Paris was the great university of the *langues d'oc* and *d'oïl*, so did he design that Prague should become the great university of the German Empire and all nations lying on its borders, which might some day become incorporated with it. He therefore divided it into four "nations," in all but one of which the German element became practically dominant, owing to the considerable German towns, like Breslau, in otherwise Slavonic districts. These nations, each of which had an equal voice, were (1) the Bohemian, including the Moravians, Hungarians, and South Slavonians; (2) the Bavarian, including the Austrians, Swabians, Franconians, and Rhinelanders; (3) the Polish, including the Silesians, Lithuanians, and Russians; and (4) the Saxon, containing the people of Meissen, of Thuringia, of Upper and Lower Saxony, the Danes, and the Swedes. This arrangement was successful enough, so long as Prague was the capital, and the King of Bohemia the head, of the German Empire; but it was manifestly unsuited to the state of things that arose after the deposition of Charles's son, Wenceslas IV., in 1400.

JOHN HUSS (*John Goose*) himself was born in 1369 at Husinetz, in the circle of Prachin, in Bohemia, of humble, though comparatively well-to-do, parents. He studied at Prague, and took the degree of Bachelor of Arts in September, 1393, of Bachelor of Theology in 1394, and finally that of Master of Arts, which was the genuine superior degree of an unpapalized university, in 1396. His name invariably appears about the middle of the list of those who graduated at the same time, whence the probable, although not certain, inference is, that he was not especially distinguished as a scholar in his earlier years. However, in 1398 he came forward as a public teacher in the University of Prague, and in 1399, at a

disputation held in the Rectory of St. Michael, in the Old Town of Prague, became for the first time involved in an open contest with his colleagues through defending some of the doctrines of Wycliffe. Still on Oct. 15, 1401, he was elected Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in the University, and as such presented to the office of Preacher in the Chapel BETHLEHEM, in the Old Town of Prague, by the royal favourite, John of Milheim, who had built and endowed it. The General-Vicar of the Archbishop of Prague granted him letters of investiture to this on March 14, 1402, and in the following October he attained the highest academical dignity, that of Rector of the University of Prague, which he held till the end of April, 1403.

Strango and shocking was the aspect presented by the state of affairs in the Church during the greater part of Huss's lifetime. On the 8th of April, 1378, the Archbishop of Bari was elected Pope at Rome by the name of Urban VI., and on the 20th of September in the same year Cardinal Robert of Geneva was elected Anti-pope at Fondi, under that of Clement VII. The Emperor Charles IV. refused to recognise the latter in any way, and his political skill and prudence would probably have healed the breach, which was known in history as "the great schism," had not his death, on the 29th of November in the same year, removed him unexpectedly and prematurely from the scene. Two lines of rival Pontiffs at Rome and Avignon continued to anathematize each other and each other's adherents, until, in 1409, Benedict XIII. and Gregory XII. were deposed, and Alexander V. elected in their room, by the Council of Pisa. Neither of the previously existing Anti-popes was, however, willing to submit to the decision of the Council, so that the simple result of its labours was, that there were now three Anti-popes instead of two. In 1410 Pope Alexander V. died, and was succeeded by Cardinal Balthasar Cossa, under the name of Pope John XXIII, who was more than suspected of having caused the death of his predecessor.

But it was not merely in the highest regions that the Church presented a disgraceful and horrible spectacle. Simony was rampant everywhere, and loud were the outcries of both the laity and the respectable clergy for reform. The clergy were exempted from the ordinary operation of the laws, a circumstance the abuses arising from which we shall leave Huss himself to describe. "Antichrist," says he, in his Bohemian sermon on the second Sunday after Easter,* "has no mightier net than the putting a stop to the service of God, whereby the priests obtain their will, whatever it is. With this net they defend their covetousness and riches; with this net they

* Vol. ii. p. 173 of Erben's edition.

have severed themselves from suffering either in property or person, so that, whereas the primitive holy Christians, especially the priests, joyfully endured it, when people took their goods from them, or reviled, beat, tortured, and slew them; they never put a stop to Divine service, but prayed the more, offered Christ and preached the more; the present backsliding priests, on the contrary, have so fenced themselves with Antichrist's institution, that if any one takes anything from a priest, even if justly, or if they seize a priest in the commission of adultery or robbery, a stop is immediately put to Divine service, if a priest, who is an adulterer or a robber, is imprisoned. If, again, a box on the ear is given a priest in a quarrel in a tavern, when there is a dispute about dice or about a harlot, citations and excommunications are issued. If, however, a priest's blood is drawn, they put a stop to Divine service, and compel the person who has done it to go to Rome, saying that no one, save the Pope, can absolve a man who draws the blood of a priest. But if a priest cuts off any man's foot or hand, or kills a man who is guiltless, they do not excommunicate the priest or put a stop to Divine service. Why so? Because one devil does not pick out another devil's eyes."

The enormous wealth of the clergy, too, in many countries was the cause of vast and intolerable evils. Baron Helfert seems scarcely to have been aware of several facts, which we shall presently adduce, or he would never have condemned the perseverance of Huss in his outcry for reform in the teeth of his ecclesiastical superiors, on the plea, that, however bad things might have been in other countries, Bohemia was a land on which the existing evils pressed but lightly. The annual value of the Archbishopric of Prague amounted to more than 80,000 "kopy" or "schock" of Bohemian groschen, each "kopa" containing sixty groschen, and amounting in value to two ducats. It is difficult to ascertain the exact value of these sums and coins on account of various depreciations and debasements of the coinage, of which Stitny speaks very feelingly; but we do not think we shall be far out if we suppose the archiepiscopal see of Prague to have enjoyed revenues approaching £80,000 a year. That of the chapter of Veysegrad was not much inferior, and those of many conventual establishments are supposed to have been on a similar scale.

Archbishop Zbynek Zajetz of Hasenburk (Hare of Harecastle), who became Archbishop of Prague in 1403, was unable to read and write at the time of his elevation, and was obliged to learn these necessary arts after his consecration.

Magister Andreas of Broda, first a friend and colleague and afterwards a zealous opponent of Huss, closed his "Tractatus de

origine hæresis Hussitarum," which he wrote at Leipsic in 1426, with the following remarkable admissions :—

"In the clergy there was no discipline whatever; in the courts of the Pontiffs there was public simony; in the monastic state, if I may use the term, there was boundless covetousness. And, to make an end, there was no vice among the lay people which the clergy had not practised first and most notoriously. There is nothing, therefore, for us to say but this, which the holy Church reads and chants—'All that Thou hast done unto us, Lord, Thou hast done in righteous judgment, because we have sinned against Thee, and have not obeyed Thy commandments.'"

Under the influence of Huss, first as Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, and then as Rector of the University, and of his friend Nicholas of Leitomyšl (1401—1403), the doctrines of Wycliffe had free scope in Bohemia. But when these offices passed in due course to men of other "nations," a reaction arose, which presently assumed a national complexion. On May 28, 1403, the first condemnation of Wycliffe's doctrines took place at Prague, twenty-one fresh articles being added to the twenty-four condemned in the Council of London in 1382. Great complaints were made at the discussion of garbled statements of doctrine being fathered upon Wycliffe, even as he had himself complained, that the Council of London had ascribed to him articles that he did not acknowledge. Huss reminded the assembly of two persons, who had not long before been condemned to death and burned at Prague for adulterating saffron, and asked whether the adulterators of the doctrines of others were not as worthy of punishment as the adulterators of saffron?

Passing over the two imprisonments of King Wenceslas, his war with his brother, King Sigismund of Hungary, and other events of greater or less political importance, we shall confine ourselves, as much as possible, to the ecclesiastical and intellectual movements in Bohemia. The long-continued preaching of John Huss in the chapel, Bethlehem, must be ranked among the most important phenomena of those days. Less vehement in his language than Conrad Waldhauser, less enthusiastic, or, we may almost say, fanatical in his views than Miliez of Kremsier, he did not produce so powerful an effect upon his hearers at the moment; while, on the other hand, the results of his preaching were far more durable. He appealed, in the first place, to the understanding of his hearers, aroused them to thought, reflection, and self-examination, instructed and persuaded them, and then, and not till then, did he bring the fire of "words that breathe and thoughts that burn" to bear upon their awakened and enlightened consciences. Acute and well-read, especially in the Holy Scriptures; never at a loss for illustrations, possessed of remarkable tact in penetrating and seizing the kernel of every matter in question; agile and skilful in the use of all

dialectical weapons, offensive and defensive; unrivalled in his day in following up a chain of reasoning; he reached an eminence far above any of his contemporaries. Add to this his thorough fearlessness, when his moral sense was aroused by the perception of wrong or evil; his strong feeling that he was speaking for God and against Satan, or, as he usually expressed it, against Antichrist; his inflexible resolution, which his admirers would ascribe almost to a species of inspiration, while his enemies described it as a compound of vanity and obstinacy; and we have a man of rare gifts, and well-fitted for contending in the arena of a most stormy age. His personal advantages of figure and countenance are well known from his portrait; and against his life and conduct in a moral point of view his deadliest enemies have never ventured to utter a word.

Huss's qualities and conduct obtained him not merely extraordinary popularity at Prague, but also the especial favour of Queen Sophia, the second wife of King Wenceslas, who selected him for her own confessor and spiritual adviser. The Archbishop Zbynek, who, in spite of his ignorance and want of education, was by no means destitute of good sense and acuteness, also placed especial confidence in him till the end of the year 1407.

In 1408 a regular attack upon Wycliffism commenced in Bohemia, which eventually obtained the support of the Court, because King Wenceslas felt that his position as a claimant of the dignity of King of the Romans, his deposition from which in 1400 he steadily refused to recognise, was rendered untenable by the evil reputation of Bohemia in foreign countries as a hotbed of heresy. Wenceslas had exerted himself to withdraw his subjects from obedience to Pope Gregory XII., and endeavoured to occupy a position of complete neutrality between him and his rival, Benedict XIII., in hopes that the schism might be effectually healed by the approaching Council of Pisa. Magister John Huss and his Wycliffite friends were, however, the only members of either the university or the clergy who expressed a willingness to join the king in his neutral position, whereupon Archbishop Zbynek prohibited Huss, as a disobedient son of the Church, from further exercise of his functions as a preacher; a prohibition to which Huss declined to render obedience, declaring that it was his duty to remain neutral in the contest between the two rival popes, even as an obedient son ought to remain neutral in a contest between his father and mother.

The foundation of the University of Cracow in Poland, in 1400, had produced a very disastrous effect upon that of Prague, reducing the Polish "nation" in the latter almost entirely to Germans from Silesia, Prussia and Pomerania, so that the Bohemian "nation" had now to contend against what were practically three Teutonic bodies.

The practical inconvenience felt through this by the Bohemians in their own country caused a temporary union among them, whether favourable to the doctrines of Wycliffe or not, and in 1409 deputations from both the Teutons and the Bohemians appeared at Kuttenberg, to lay their complaints and recriminations before the King. Wenceslas at first received the Germans favourably, promising to uphold them in the enjoyment of all their privileges, while he inveighed with great vehemence against Huss, charging him and his friend, JEROME of Prague, with bringing the country into ill-repute and suspicion of heresy, and with causing the King himself to meet with slights and mortifications abroad. Huss left Kuttenberg in an almost hopeless state of mind, and fell, whether from mental or physical causes, into so serious an illness, that his life was despaired of. Meanwhile some of the King's favourites and councillors, especially Nicholas of Labkovitz, had given an entirely different turn to the matter. Representing to the King, after an audience of a French embassy on the subject of the schism, that the Bohemian "nation" was willing, while the Germans refused, to comply with his views and those of the French court as to the observance of neutrality between the rival popes, and also showing that the arrangement of the votes of the four "nations" did not rest on any statute, but merely on custom, they induced him on the same day (January 18th) to issue an edict, assigning three votes to the Bohemian "nation" and one only to the foreign element in the University. After a vain endeavour to obtain the repeal of this edict, the German professors and students left Prague in a body, and Prague ceased to be the centre of intellectual life and movement in Germany, which henceforth added the celebrated University of Leipsic to what was already existing at Vienna and Heidelberg.

We see thus, that Huss had very little to do with the "exodus" of the German element from the University of Prague. That it has been so pertinaciously ascribed to his influence is due to the fact that the manifesto of the Germans and their petition to the King were answered and criticized in a most biting manner by Magister John of Jesenitz, whose pamphlet has been commonly, though erroneously, attributed to Huss.* Huss also published a letter, refuting the charge of having been the cause of the expulsion of the Germans, the fragments of which are also given by Palacky.†

In 1409 the Council of Pisa broke with Wenceslas's rival in the empire, Ruprecht, acknowledged Wenceslas as King of the Romans, declared both Benedict XIII. and Gregory XII. schismatics, and proceeded to the election of Pope Alexander V., who, however, grievously disappointed all hopes and expectations by giving himself

* See Palacky's "Documenta," pp. 355—363

† pp. 353—354.

up to the influence and guidance of the wicked Cardinal Legate of Bologna; Balthasar Cossa. The Bohemian clergy, with the Archbishop of Prague at their head, continued to adhere to Gregory XII., in defiance of the King. When, therefore, Huss spoke boldly in the pulpit of the moral corruption of the clergy, he was for a time supported by the dominant tone of feeling and language at the court.

The first official complaints and proceedings against Huss commenced in 1408, as we find from the "Documenta," p. 163, and not in 1409, as appears to be stated in Palacky's History, vol. iii. p. 247 of the German edition. Suits and countersuits were carried on against and by Huss in the Papal Curia, the details of which will scarcely interest our readers. Huss's grand object appears to have been to gain time, in all probability with the hope, and perhaps expectation, that a real reform at Rome would procure acceptance for his views in the highest ecclesiastical quarters, and eventually secure him a triumph similar to that enjoyed by his remarkable precursor, Miliez of Kremsier.*

A bull was issued by Pope Alexander V. on December 20th, 1409, threatening all who did not submit to Archbishop Zbynek within six days with excommunication, but its practical effect was greatly diminished by the Pope's death on May 3rd, 1410, as well as by the resistance made on national grounds by the courtiers of Wenceslas, who represented Zbynek as a traitor, whose words and actions supported the statements of the emigrated Germans, that heresy was gaining the upper hand in Bohemia. Still the Archbishop kept on his course, caused Wycliffe's books to be publicly burnt, and, on July 16th, solemnly and formally excommunicated Huss. Huss was protected by the court in Bohemia, but was cited before the Papal Curia by the new Pope, John XXIII., on August 25th. His friends would not allow him to appear at Rome, and he himself excused his default on the plea of personal danger.

On May 18th, in the same year, the rival King of the Romans, Ruprecht, died, and before the year was out the Christian world saw with amazement, not only the chair of Peter disputed by three rival popes, but also the crown of Charlemagne claimed by three rival brothers, Wenceslas, King of Bohemia; Sigismund, King of Hungary; and Jost or Jodocus, Margrave of Moravia, the death of whom, on January 17th, 1411, again reduced the pretenders to the sacred crown to two. In the course of this year King Wenceslas became reconciled with the Bohemian clergy, and new dangers threatened Huss, which were temporarily averted by the death of Archbishop Zbynek, on the 28th of September.

* See our number for February, 1870, pp. 200—202.

His successor was Albicus of Uniczow, to whom the pallium was not brought from John XXIII. till May, 1412. But the same embassy that brought the new Archbishop the sacred garment was also instructed to proclaim a crusade against Ladislaw, King of Naples, the great supporter of Gregory XII., and to issue indulgences to all who should directly or indirectly participate therein. Huss and his adherents denounced this traffic in the strongest terms, and Voksa of Waldstein and Jerome of Prague parodied the public burning of Wycliffe's books two years previously by a satirical procession and public burning of papal bulls. These things caused the greatest ferment in Bohemia, especially in the capital, and the Faculty of Theology began to take vigorous proceedings against Huss, who, however, was warmly supported by the greater part of the University.

Huss, with eight of his adversaries, was summoned before the King's Council, at the castle of Zbrak; and, when accused of neglecting, after repeated requisitions, to give in a statement of his doctrines in writing to the Dean of the Faculty of Theology, he replied, that he had taught nothing in secret, but everything openly, and that therefore his views were no secret; he was, however, ready to state and give in his doctrines in writing, provided his accusers were willing to enter into an engagement to prove him guilty of heresy under the *lex talionis*, i.e., under pain of suffering the same punishment, i.e., of being burned to death, which he would himself have to suffer if convicted of heresy. The eight doctors were thunderstricken at this proposal, and wished to fix on one of their number, who was to enter into the engagement. Huss, however, insisted that, as they had joined in the accusation, so must they also join in the engagement and consequent danger; and the final result was, that the Council simply urged both parties to endeavour to come to terms in a peaceful manner.

Huss's most dangerous adversary was Magister STEPHEN of PALECZ, formerly a zealous Wycliffite and a personal friend of his own, who now broke with him, as Magister STANISLAS of ZNAYM had done previously; and these two men, aided by the clergy of Prague, found little difficulty in procuring from Pope John XXIII. a formal excommunication of Huss, which the King permitted to be published at Prague.

On Oct. 2, 1412, a number of German citizens, with the consent of the Council of the Old Town of Prague, assembled in arms and marched, led by a Bohemian named Bernard Chotek, to the chapel Bethlehem, where Huss was preaching at the moment of their arrival, with the intention of dispersing the audience and arresting the preacher. As, however, the Bohemians in the chapel stood up

courageously in defence of themselves and their preacher, they were obliged to return without effecting their purpose. It was next proposed to carry out the orders received from Rome, and destroy the chapel itself; but this design caused such excitement, and met with such opposition, that the idea was given up. The ill success of lay interference rendered the major part of the clergy of Prague more zealous in the observance of the interdict, which had meanwhile been proclaimed. All divine service ceased in most of the churches, the sacraments were refused to all without exception, and the dead were buried without any religious ceremony, so long as Huss remained in Prague. The king complained in vain; no regard was paid to his wishes or commands. Huss appealed to Christ as the true Head of the Church, and his proctor, Magister John of Jesenitz, endeavoured to prove before the University, on Dec. 18, that the excommunication of Huss was legally invalid. The excitement which prevailed among the people induced the king personally to request Huss to leave the capital, promising himself to do all in his power to promote his reconciliation with the clergy and shorten the period of his exile.

Archbishop Albicus had taken no very earnest part in the case of Huss, and found himself in so uncomfortable a position between the parties that he resigned his dignity in favour of Conrad of Vechta, Bishop of Olmütz, who was not, however, formally installed in his see till July 17, 1413.

While in the country, an exile from Prague, Huss usually resided in the castle of Krakovetz, in the circle of Prachonitz, which belonged to one of the royal favourites, Henry Lefl, of Lazan. He preached frequently in the neighbouring market towns and villages, and the people streamed from all quarters to hear him, so that his exile contributed to the spread of his views in the country, a circumstance which was not without influence on the subsequent history of Bohemia. Here Huss appears to have written his longest theological work in the Bohemian language, on the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, an account of which is given in our number for April, 1869.

On Oct. 30, 1413, King Sigismund came to an arrangement with the plenipotentiaries of Pope John XXIII., at Viglud, near Lodi, that a General Council should be convened at the city of Constance, on the lake of the same name, on Nov. 1, 1414. Sigismund also communicated directly with Huss, offered him a safe-conduct, and promised his co-operation in order to bring his case to a satisfactory solution. The principal objects of the Council were to be three, (1) the putting an end to the great schism in the Papacy; (2) the reformation of the Church in head and members; and (3) the sup-

pression of the Wycliffite and Hussite heresy, which threatened to destroy the edifice of the hierarchy.

Huss's first proceeding was to arm himself with testimonials of orthodoxy from home. After publishing his intention of appearing before the Council, by means of placards posted up in various places in the Latin, Bohemian, and German languages, he endeavoured to obtain a kind of preliminary hearing from Archbishop Conrad in a diocesan Synod, but was informed that a matter laid before the Synod by the king was under discussion, and was therefore refused admission. But the Inquisitor or *Judex Hæreticorum*, Nicholas, Bishop of Nazareth, without hesitation, gave him a certificate in the following terms:—

“I have often and frequently conversed with Magister John Huss, eating and drinking with him, and have often been present at his sermons; and, making many comparisons of divers matters appertaining to Holy Scripture, I have never found in him any error or heresy, but in all his words and works I have always found him a true and catholic man.”

Huss then, on Sept. 1, addressed a letter, which has only lately been discovered and printed,* to King Sigismund, thanking him for his gracious kindness, and begging him to take measures to prevent his being judged in secret, and to cause him to be heard and examined in a public audience, and to be allowed therein to declare his doctrines and principles peaceably and without interruption; adding, that he well knew that severe trials from his bitter enemies awaited him, but that he was ready even to suffer death for that which he acknowledged and believed to be the truth. Early in October he wrote a farewell letter to the Bohemians† on his departure for Constance, “in recessu ad Constantian,” and on Oct. 11 commenced his journey, without waiting for the promised safe-conduct, accompanied by two Bohemian noblemen, Wenceslas of Duba and John of Chlum, as well as by Magister John, Cardinal of Reinstein, and PETER OF MLADENOVITZ, a Bachelor of Arts of Prague, whose “*Relatio de causâ Magistri Joannis Hus in Concilio Constantiensi acta*,” is carefully edited by Dr. Palacky in the “*Documenta*,” pp. 237—324. On Nov. 3 he entered Constance, and on Nov. 5 Wenceslas of Duba brought the safe-conduct, which had been prepared at Spires on the 18th Oct. previously. Pope John XXIII. had already arrived on Oct. 28; Huss's most zealous enemy, MICHAEL of Deutschbrod, commonly called Michael DE CAUSIS, from the office of a “*procurator de causis fidei*,” to which he had lately been appointed, was already there; and soon afterwards arrived Magister Stephen of Palecz with the Bishop of Leitomysl.

* “*Documenta*,” p. 69.

† This is given *in extenso* in our number for April, 1869, p. 545.

Long and wordy were the articles of accusation exhibited against Huss, both by his Bohemian accusers and by the University of Paris, the whole of which, with his answers and interlineations, are carefully given by Palacky in the "Documenta." One thing we will quote at length, and that is a passage of a letter from the celebrated John Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, to Conrad, Archbishop of Prague, dated Sept. 24, 1414, which indicates the particular matter in the teaching of Huss that caused Gerson to pursue the Bohemian with the relentless animosity of which Huss himself complained, and by which he considered himself deeply aggrieved.

"The error," writes Gerson, "which, amongst others, is most pernicious as regards the preservation of the body corporate and of peace, and which the teachers of dogmatic theology consider as a pestiferous root, which has already been cut off by various axes of sentences by the supreme pontiffs and in other quarters, appears to me to be this—That a foreknown (*præscitus*) or evil person, being in mortal sin, hath no dominion or jurisdiction or power over others in a Christian people. Now it seems to my littleness (*mea parvitate*) that all authority, whether spiritual or temporal, ought to arise against this error for its extermination—rather with fire and sword than with curious reasoning; for those persons are devoid, not only of understanding, but of common sense, in the State, who with such arrogant and seditious rashness rave contrary to the apostolic and philosophic maxim, 'Obey your masters, even the froward.' For political dominion on earth is not founded on the title of predestination or charity, since it would have been very uncertain and deceptive, but is established on other grounds according to laws ecclesiastical and civil."

Into the circumstances of the arrest of Huss, on Nov. 28, and his long and cruel imprisonment, the flight of Pope John from Constance, and the failure of Sigismund to assert the dignity of the empire in his safe-conduct, which was undoubtedly violated by the arrest of Huss untried and uncondemned, we do not propose to enter. We wish rather to turn our attention to the grounds on which Baron Helfert endeavours to justify the conduct of the ecclesiastical party in arresting Huss, and to the gravamina which he selects as the most serious charges against him:—

"If," says he (p. 190), "we must absolutely reject the idea that Huss had made an attempt to escape, still a different view is taken by our judgment as regards the second question—Whether Huss had not, by other proceedings, deprived himself of the rights given him by his safe-conduct? Huss was, up to his arrival at Constance, under the papal ban, and every place in which he stayed was subjected to the interdict. He was also, a thing which was included in his excommunication, suspended from all priestly functions, particularly reading holy mass and preaching. The interdict and excommunication, so far as they affected his intercourse with others and his presence at certain ecclesiastical rites, were removed by the Pope some days after his arrival at Constance; but his suspension from the personal performance of divine service in the mass and in preaching was never removed. But Huss did not allow this to interfere with his pro-

ceedings. As at Prague it had been his custom to pay little regard to the orders and penalties of his ecclesiastical superiors, with regard to which he had invented a new kind of appeal directly to Christ Himself, even so did he demean himself on the road to Constance, and even so in Constance itself. . . . With everyone whom he met on the road, whether clergyman or layman, he made a display of his theological learning, and gave vent to his rhetorical invectives against the Pope and clergy. Nay, he boasted himself that he had received applause from all with whom he had personally conversed. He had composed a special notice in German, which he caused to be publicly placarded, first at Nuremberg, and afterwards in all places at which he arrived, and in which he remained any length of time. As regards his sojourn in Constance, it is certainly an undoubted fact that Huss never preached there *in public*; and it was manifestly an audacious hoax, when one day it was rumoured in Constance that Huss intended to preach the next Sunday in the principal church, and that everybody who attended the sermon was to receive a ducat. On the other hand, it was generally known that *in his lodging* he used to say mass in presence of a large assembly,* and allowed himself to discuss his doctrines unreservedly with everyone who desired to converse with him. Through this improper conduct, the Bishop of Constance felt himself compelled to send two of his clergy to Huss, to remind him that he was not allowed to say mass. When, therefore, Huss, according to his usual custom, disregarded this warning, the bishop in the strictest terms forbade his clergy and the neighbours who lived near Huss's lodging to attend Huss's masses.

"From such a state of things it appears to us that it is possible to throw light upon two points: first, that the Council felt itself unavoidably compelled not to leave Huss in freedom any longer; secondly, that it required a great deal of enlightenment for King Sigismund to be persuaded of the legality and unavoidableness of this step. For it was impossible to prove its legality by simply pointing to some manifest fact, as would have been the case, had it been proved that Huss had attempted to escape. On the contrary, it was necessary to set forth the entire conduct of Huss, which, though apparently quiet and blameless, was nevertheless illegal, and in continual violation of the conditions of the promised protection. Its unavoidableness, then, did not lie in the fact that Huss's person was secured to prevent his flight; for this it was impossible to produce a weaker proof, whereas, on the other side, two important circumstances could be cited: one, that Huss had come to Constance, not only without compulsion, but also without a safe-conduct; the other, that from the time of his arrival he had never once crossed the threshold of his lodging. The absolute necessity of the imprisonment of Huss could only be substantiated by the fact that in a place where people with the most different ideas about the Church met together, and at a time when it was all-important that the unity in the Church, which had been interrupted by internal and external circumstances, should be restored again, it must have been dangerous in the highest degree to leave a man of such attractive personal qualities and such thrilling eloquence as Huss in free intercourse with those who every day and at every hour visited him in his abode, before whom, with unreserved self-complacency, he continually discussed the dangerous subjects of his teaching and preaching."

*We should like to know Baron Helfert's authority for this statement of the presence of a *large assembly*, when divine service was performed by a man *who never left his lodgings once* before his imprisonment. But the absence of references is a great drawback to Baron Helfert's work.

Such is the best defence that Baron Helfert can make for the violation of King Sigismund's safe-conduct on the part of the Council. It appears to us, that he has omitted to take into consideration two things, which, perhaps, had really greater weight with the Fathers of the Council than any of the matters which he has alleged in justification of their course. The first is the principle which was fully adopted by Ferdinand of Arragon (as we find from a letter of his quoted by Baron Helfert, p. 194), though not recognised by King Sigismund, that *NO FAITH NEED BE KEPT WITH HERETICS*; the second, that it was desirable under the circumstances of the Council, for the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal power to be manifested by some overt act. King Sigismund felt the insult most keenly, and left Constance for a week in consequence; neither did anything induce him to submit to it, but the conviction that, if he did not give Huss and his safe-conduct up, the fair prospects of reform and reunion in the Church, which he thought lay before him by means of the Council, would at once be put an end to by its dissolution. But one thing, to the great advantage of posterity, he did insist on, viz., that Huss should have a public trial, an authentic record of which survives, not merely in the acts of the Council, but in the more trustworthy pages of the Bohemian *Mladenvitz*.

What Huss's own idea of the virtue of the king's safe-conduct was, is manifest from a letter (No. 70 in the "Documenta"), which he wrote to his Bohemian friends, complaining of the inconsistency of Sigismund.

"I ask," writes he, 'for God's sake, that all the lords will collectively petition the King for a final audience; because, after what he said alone in the Council, that an audience should be granted me very soon, his confusion will be very great if he fail to fulfil that statement. But I think that his word is as steadfast as that respecting his safe-conduct, with regard to which people told me in Bohemia to beware of his safe-conduct. And, otherwise, "He will give thee to thine enemies himself." And Lord Mikesh Divoky said to me, in the presence of Magister Jesenitz: "Magister! know for certain that thou wilt be condemned." I think he knew the King's intention. I thought he loved the law of God and the truth; now I understand that he loves them not much; he condemned me before my enemies did. If he had even acted as the Gentile Pilate, who, on hearing the accusation, said: "I find no fault in this man." Or even if he had said: "I have given him a safe-conduct; if then he is not willing to abide by the decision of the Council, I will send him to the King of Bohemia with your sentence and attestations, that he may judge him himself with his clergy;" because he (Sigismund) thus intimated to me, through Henry Lefl and others, that he would appoint me a sufficient audience, and, if I did not submit to the judgment, that he would send me safe back again.'

Upon this Palacky remarks, that—

"It is scarcely credible that Sigismund could have given such a promise

as that indicated in the latter part of Huss's letter ; if, however, he really did so, too much stress ought not to be laid upon such thoughtless language, as it clearly exceeded the limits, not merely of his rights and privileges, but also of his power."

What Huss had a right to expect under the circumstances was fair and honourable treatment before condemnation ; and his chivalrous conduct in placing himself in the hands of his adversaries before receiving the promised safe-conduct ought to have aided him towards obtaining such treatment. But the chivalrous maxims of the Bohemian laity were little regarded or appreciated by the Romish ecclesiastics assembled at Constance.

Almost everything that had been brought against Huss had been reduced to very diminutive dimensions by his explanations and qualifications, except the point raised against him so vehemently, as already mentioned, by the celebrated Gerson. This, however, is confined to his Latin works, and it is manifest that his practical and popular teaching was perfectly clear from the "crass" doctrine of predestination, which Palacky in his history somewhat contemptuously lays to his charge. But two singular scenes occurred at Huss's last hearing with respect to this point, which we will give in the words of Baron Helfert :

"They proceeded to the doctrine, that a priest or bishop or pope, as soon as he sinned mortally, ceased to be a priest, bishop, or pope. Huss endeavoured to give this a more moderate turn by explanation, saying that he intended only to speak of internal essence and worthiness before God (*quoad meritum*), but not external position in office (*quoad officium et hominum reputationes*), adding : 'Likewise as regards a king, if he sins mortally, it must be said that he is no more a king.' Sigismund had gone aside for a time into a bay window, where he was conversing with the Count Palatine and the Burg-grave of Nuremberg on the danger of the doctrine, which had just been inquired into. When, therefore, Huss uttered these words, the prelates requested the king to approach, and desired Huss to repeat before him what he had just said. Then Cardinal d'Ailly stormed vehemently against Huss, saying that, not being satisfied with depreciating the clergy, he wanted also to subvert the temporal power. Sigismund at the moment said nothing more, than that there was no man who was without sin. But when, after the hearing, Huss had been removed to his prison, and the major part of the assembly had dispersed, the king remained in the hall surrounded by several cardinals and prelates, with whom he conversed about the measures requisite in this important matter. At a little distance, waiting for the king, yet unobserved by him, stood the Bohemian lords, John of Chlum and Wenceslas of Duba, as well as Peter Mladenovitz, who had been assigned as secretary to John of Chlum, and had, according to Huss's own statement, been a 'most faithful and steadfast comforter' to him throughout his imprisonment. These three heard Sigismund conclude what he was saying with these words : 'Truly I was still young, when this sect arose in Bohemia, and ah ! how greatly it has grown and increased. Therefore delay not in this matter, and make an end to his disciples as soon as possible. If he refuses to recant, burn him, or do with him what shall

seem good to you. And if he wishes to recant, I counsel you, trust him not, as neither would I trust him; for if he should return to Bohemia, he would cause much more evil than before.' "

This speech is said to have cost Sigismund a crown, and it certainly caused the personal detestation in which he was held by the Bohemians.

"It was not this," says Palacky, "that the Bohemians took ill in Sigismund, that he did not protect Huss against condemnation and execution as a heretic; the much canvassed safe-conduct never had this meaning, therefore no question could have been raised about a breach of it thereby; but they never could forget, that instead of acting as an intercessor for Huss, he had rather egged on the fathers to condemn him."

Great efforts were made by the Council to obtain a recantation from Huss, and in these a "father," whose name is unknown, but who appears to have taken especial interest in him, and to have gained his confidence above all others, played a very prominent part. When entreated on the 5th of July, for the last time, by both deputies from the Council and the Bohemian magnates, especially John of Chlum, not to allow false shame to hold him back from a salutary course, Huss replied, with tears: *

"Lord John! be assured that if I knew that I had written or preached against the law and Holy Mother Church ought that is erroneous, I would humbly recant it, God is my witness; but I always desire that they should point out to me better and more probable passages of Scripture (*Scriptura*) than are the things that I have written and taught, and if these are pointed out to me, I will most readily recant."

At which one of the bishops present answered: "Magister John, wilt thou be wiser than the whole Council?" But the magister said to him: "I do not wish to be wiser than the whole Council; but give me, I ask, the least in the Council, who will instruct me with better and stronger passages of Scripture, and I am ready to recant forthwith." Thus, it would appear, that it was the Protestant principles of private judgment, as against mere authority, and of appeal to the Scriptures, as against the living exponents of Church doctrines, for which Huss was condemned and suffered, and not for any deliberate or intentional variation of doctrine from what he supposed to be the teaching of the Church in his day.

But in his correspondence and intercourse with the nameless "father," and subsequently, another, and that a very singular element, appears to play a very important part, which requires the more attention from us, as Palacky has passed it over in silence in his history. It was not merely doctrines which he held that Huss was required to recant, but doctrines which he maintained to have been falsely ascribed to him. The formula of recantation which the "father" urged upon him was as follows: †—

* "Documenta," p. 316.

† p. 121.

“I, So and So, &c. Over and above the protestations made by me which I desire to consider repeated here, I protest anew, that, although many things are laid to my charge, which I have never thought of, yet respecting all the things laid to my charge or objected against me, whether extracted from my books or by the depositions of witnesses, I submit myself humbly to the merciful ordinance, definition, and correction of the sacrosanct General Council, to abjure, revoke, retract, undergo merciful penance, and do all and singular that the said sacrosanct Council shall mercifully and of its grace consider right to ordain for my salvation, recommending myself most devoutly to the same.”

In letter seventy-nine (p. 126) Huss lays great stress on the sin which he thought he would commit if he were to recant what he had never held.

“This is,” says he, “my final determination in the name of Jesus Christ: that I will not admit the articles, which have been truly extracted, to be erroneous; neither will I abjure the articles laid to my charge by false witnesses; because to abjure is to confess that one has held an error or errors, and to depart from them and hold the contrary. Because God knoweth that I have never preached those errors which they have concocted, removing many truths and adding falsehoods.”

So that the submission to authority required of him was not merely the acceptance of the wisdom of others in lieu of his own, but also something that would have completely annihilated his moral being, and from which his moral sense, as a true and honest man, indignantly revolted. Indeed, after the conversation with Sigismund above related, the leading members of the Council seem to have felt that they must of necessity either crush or burn him.

Passing over, for want of space, the interesting particulars of his degradation from the priesthood, and the other preliminaries to his execution, we will give the account of his last moments in the words of Baron Helfert:—

“When they arrived at the place they arranged themselves in a wide circle, and orders were given to Ulric of Reichenthal to ask Huss whether he wished to confess; and a priest named Ulric Sorand came forwards and said: ‘Dear sir and magister, if you will leave your unbelief and heresy, for which you must suffer, I will gladly hear your confession: if, however, you will not, you know yourself that it is not proper to give divine things to or perform them for a heretic.’ To this Huss replied, that, not being conscious of mortal sin, he had no need of his assistance. He wished to address the people, but the Count Palatine prevented it, and bade the executioners commence their work. They placed him at the stake with his face towards the east; but when one of those present observed it, he was obliged to remove to the opposite side with his face towards the west. Now he stood fastened to the stake with chains and iron bands, surrounded up to his neck by faggots, mixed with straw and smeared with pitch; and now the dreadful act was about to begin, when the Lord of Pappenheim, the marshal of the empire, sent by the king, suddenly arrived, and entreated him to save his life and soul by recantation. But Huss replied that he was willing to die a cheerful death for the truth, which he had taught in

his lifetime. Then both noblemen gave the signal by clapping their hands, and turned away. In a moment the pile was in a blaze of fire; flame and smoke soon stifled his voice, as he gazed towards heaven, as some imagined they heard, singing psalms,—as others relate, screaming with agony, THE MARTYR OF ERROR AND DISOBEDIENCE.”*

Such is the account of Huss's last moments and the causes of his death, which the Ultramontanes would wish to have accepted by the world; the change of type in which is Baron Helfert's, not ours. Such is the view of his fate, which was intended to counteract the effect produced by the history of Palacky, which, however, itself appears to us to have done Huss but scanty justice, and to reflect the impression conveyed by his Latin rather than by his Bohemian works, most of which were then unprinted and unknown, except to a few. But their subsequent publication by Pan K. J. Erben produced an effect in Bohemia, the results of which have not yet fully appeared. So great was the sensation produced by the impossibility of finding adequate ground for the condemnation and execution of Huss in his Bohemian writings, that it was actually in contemplation to collect signatures for a petition to the so-called Ecumenical Council, requesting it to review the case of Huss, and possibly to reverse the decision of the Council of Constance, and rehabilitate him as a good and faithful Catholic. But the national press gave so unfavourable a reception to the proposal that it was soon abandoned. The words of the *Narodni Listz* (“National Letters”), a national, but not a Protestant, paper, on July 4th, 1869, upon the subject are so remarkable, both in themselves and as expressing the general feeling of the enlightened portion of the Bohemian or Czeskish nation, that we cannot but think that we shall do good service by placing them permanently on record.

“We have just read,” says the *Narodni Listz*, “in one of the local papers, that an idea has started up in Prague to frame and procure as many signatures of Bohemians and Moravians as possible to a petition to the coming Ecumenical Council, to undertake a revision of the case of Huss.

“With this idea it is impossible for us to agree, either from the standpoint of the historical traditions of our nation, or from that of modern relations; we hold it therefore to be our duty to pronounce publicly against it, although we certainly doubt whether the wish for the revision just mentioned can have come from the public itself, and can have found adherents in wider circles. What would be the necessary consequences of such a petition, not to say of an actual revision? Certainly only this: that we should thrust anew into public discussion a long ago completed act of the great tragedy of our nation; that we should again transfer an event, which has now only a historical and literary significance for our nation, to

* “*Mucennika bludu a neposlusentsoi.*”—N. B. Mladenovitz gives the very words which he chanted firstly, secondly, and thirdly.—“*Documenta*,” p. 323.

the ground of religious disputes, which our age has happily done with, and for which our nation cannot entertain any longing, especially at a time when a matter much more important to us is in question—the preservation of the political and national existence of the Slavonic race in the lands of the Bohemian crown. On this political struggle we must for the time concentrate all our powers. Is it that some of us have a wish for arguments with the hierarchy at the Romish Council on the questions, ‘Whether a man is *predestinated* to or *foreknown* for salvation?’ ‘Whether a Council is above the Pope, or the Pope above a Council?’ or, lastly, ‘Whether Huss was a good Catholic or not?’

“We honestly acknowledge that, personally, we have not much taste for wasting time in such discussions. These matters have long ago been brought to an end, and belong, thank God, merely to history. We do not wish to sharpen our wits even on the questions, whether the Council of Constance acted under other influences than the guidance of the Holy Spirit, or whether that Ecclesiastical Council was infallible or not. All this we gladly leave to the Fathers of the Church to amuse themselves with at the Council; we content ourselves with the consciousness that the people has long ago hit upon ideas more practical, and much more advantageous to its spiritual and material welfare. To whom would a fresh analysis of the dogmas of Magister John Huss be convenient at the present time? Scarcely to enlightened Catholics, and certainly not to the orthodox Catholic priesthood. This surely will not make up its mind at the present day to receive into its midst, as a faithful Catholic, a man who has been for four centuries and a half excommunicated as one of the most detested heretics. We are told, indeed, that the people who condemned Huss to the stake are dead, and that no procurator at the present (Ecumenical Council will be affected by their passions. What! do we not observe how even now the representatives of the Fathers at Constance skirmish against the doctrines of the pious Magister of Husinetz? Do we not see how they fill the columns of their papers with fresh and fresh anathemas against the Martyr of Constance? Can we hope from these gentlemen, that, devoid of passion, they will finally acknowledge that, up to this time, they have been condemning an innocent man?”

“The projected revision would not therefore be convenient to anybody; nay, it would not be advantageous for our own nation. The Bohemian nation stands no more in need of any such revision. The idea of reform, which it took up as a foster-mother out of the flames of Constance, and suckled with its own blood till the great reformation of the whole Christian world, has long had its character cleared and been recognized, not only by the whole of the present enlightened world, but also by history, which exercises jurisdiction, as a supreme judge, even over Popes and Ecclesiastical Councils. What would there be to reconsider? Perhaps the truth of some of those humble principles which Huss defended before the Council of Constance.

“Those principles were only the first germ, the seed from which through the intellectual activity of the whole nation during two centuries—as even the German historian, Ranke, acknowledges in his latest work—the whole of the great Reformation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sprang and developed itself. That Reformation means not merely reform in the Christian Church, it means also the progress of mankind in the path of enlightenment and freedom in general. Our nation, in becoming the fosterer of the modest doctrine of Huss, became also the foremost combatant in the path of human progress. Do you wish by a revision, which would be limited merely to the Council of Constance, to depreciate the

significance of the whole of Hussitism? Do you wish to annihilate that gigantic labour of great wars, that lasted two centuries, by means of the retraction of a few articles of the accusation preferred at Constance, which are insignificant in themselves, and affect nobody any longer?

“Neither do we recognize the need of any revision even from a purely formal standpoint. Indeed, our nation has already itself revised the proceedings at Constance. It revised them in good earnest on the helmets of the crusaders in the victories at Domazlitz, Ouste, Tachor, Sudomer, and elsewhere. By the power of its arms and the irresistible might of its truth, it induced even the Ecclesiastical Council of Basle to repeal the sentence of that of Constance. Go to the Museum of the Bohemian Kingdom, and read for yourselves in golden letters the humble recantation of the fiery decision of the Fathers of Constance! See there the ‘Compactata,’ in which an Ecclesiastical Council not merely acknowledged the truth of the doctrine of Magister John Huss, but, more than that, acknowledged the rectitude also of the later and much more advanced Hussite Reformation, by declaring the successors of Huss ‘good Christians and especial sons of the Holy Church!’

“Do you wish to entreat pardon for your great Reformer from a Council of Bishops and Patriarchs, who, in the nineteenth century, are going to meet for the purpose of condemning enlightenment in general and of proclaiming the infallibility of the Pope as a new article of faith?


“You wish to clear the character of Huss, and see! by your projected petition for the revision of the proceedings against him in a new Council of Bishops, you are yourselves violating a chief article of his doctrine. Magister John Huss, indeed, laid the greatest stress on this truth, which he first enunciated in the chapel Bethlehem, that the Church is the assembly of all believers, and that to that assembly alone it appertains to decide infallibly about articles of faith. But you wish to betake yourselves to an assembly of obscure ecclesiastical dignitaries, ascribing to them the right of deciding matters which appertain to the judgment of the whole Church.

“We should therefore find ourselves, after four centuries and a half, just in the position of those who burned him at Constance. And that is not enough. A formerly victorious and heroic nation you want to make all at once into humble servants of the Romish hierarchy; you want the Bohemian nation, which for whole centuries was the only one in Europe that did not bend its neck beneath the sway of ambitious Rome, and which most steadfastly opposed her, all at once, in a time of enlightenment and universal emancipation from hierarchial rule, to surrender itself to the mercy of Ultramontanism, to disown its past history and to ask for absolution for the errors of its predecessors. We are to exchange our mighty past for the contempt of all enlightened people of the age in which we are living!

“After having hitherto drawn our great strength in the struggle for the independent existence of our nation from the glorious times of the Bohemian Reformation, we are all at once to annihilate its significance! The great Bohemian Reformation is to be crumpled up into a few insignificant articles of the defence of Huss at Constance, and the great Reformer is to be made into an obscure, insignificant priestly zealot, who was condemned only ‘from personal feeling,’ and is now to be accepted to mercy, as a pious member of the Romish hierarchy!

“Do but leave that curse of the Council of Constance on the heads of those who burnt him and on the heads of their present representatives. A great Reformer condemned by an assembly of bishops and prelates has much greater significance in the history of human enlightenment than a priest accepted to mercy by the selfsame Romish hierarchy.”

A. H. WRATISLAW.



ON THE MODE OF DEALING WITH THE WORDS
WHICH OCCUR MOST FREQUENTLY IN
TREATISES ON MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

EVERY reader of Locke is aware of the importance which he attached to words. Half our errors, he said, more than half of our controversies, are owing to them. That sentence, adopted from him, has become a commonplace amongst English writers on ethics and psychology. One of Locke's most intelligent admirers—the one who was most a philologer by profession—Horne Tooke—says that the “*Essay on the Human Understanding*” is a treatise on words.

It is startling, then, to read in Sir William Hamilton's “*Lectures on Metaphysics*” that Locke was of all writers the most careless in the use of words. No one, I suppose, ever suspected him of insincerity; he was indifferent to any opinions which did not affect practice. How, then, is it possible to accept the accusation of the illustrious Scotchman, which implies that he habitually set at nought his own warning? If we could refute it, we Britons of the south should delight to do so. But the evidence in favour of it is too strong. No one can read half a dozen pages of Locke without being struck by instances of words which he not only does not define, but which he resolves not to define; the meaning of which he takes for granted, and expects his readers to take for granted. He does not

fall by chance into a colloquial style; he adopts it by preference when his subject seems specially to demand a severe and accurate treatment.

Fully acknowledging this fact, I do not attribute it to any unwillingness in Locke to bind himself by the laws which he had imposed on others—not even to any forgetfulness of his own maxims. The mischiefs in the use of words to which he was most alive were those which had their origin in the schools. He had a painful recollection of Oxford; he did not believe in Logic; he had the dread which a physician of the new age felt for Aristotle, because he had held such dominion over the former age. He was involved in all the affairs of his time; if he was more than a man of the world, he was that in the highest degree. It was his function to deliver men of the world from the notion that they were not as much interested in the facts and laws of the understanding as any who assumed a technical acquaintance with them. He had the greatest excuse, therefore, for supposing that he *was* vindicating the simple, honest use of language when he discarded the formalities of nomenclature, the strictness of definitions. Might not a *provocatio ad populum* be the best course for one who was denouncing innate ideas, and was asserting the worth of ordinary experience?

The appeal was successful. A plebiscite reversed the decrees of the schools. Locke was hailed even more as a deliverer from the dialecticians than from the champions of divine right.

A great reaction in favour of technical language, of formal definitions, has taken place in our days. It is not confined to one ethical or psychological faction; all have been affected by it. Mr. Mill, sincere admirer as he is of Locke, has done nearly as much to promote it as Hamilton, to whom he is in many respects so much opposed. It commenced, but only commenced, in the days of our fathers. Bentham and Coleridge, each for his own purposes, had denounced the looseness of the market phraseology, had tried to reproduce some of the scholastical distinctions. Each had incurred ridicule for that as much as for any of his departures from the accepted rubric. *Now* Bentham's formulas are quoted as one of the conspicuous signs of his moral and puristical wisdom. And if Coleridge has won no other recognition from public opinion, a complaint which he uttered less than fifty years ago—that the words "objective and subjective" had disappeared from our vocabulary—has met with so extraordinary a response, that one hails with surprise and delight any article in a review or newspaper, any schoolboy theme, any theological tirade, in which they do not occur half-a-dozen times. That writers like Hume and Reid, who, different as they were in genius and in purpose, were alike in appealing to common instincts either for or against

scepticism, should be succeeded by a writer so eminently scholastical as Hamilton—that he should even be accepted as their interpreter—would be even a more remarkable sign of this reaction, if there had not been always in the Scotch heart a strong inclination towards terminology—one nourished by its theological confessions, resisted, not overcome, by the fascination of Hume's ease, of Scott's geniality, of Carlyle's encouragements to swallow formulas.

In the beginning of his "Logic," Mr. Mill protests against the doctrine that names represent thoughts, and not things. That appears to me a useful and necessary re-assertion of an old and simple maxim against a modern refinement. The name or noun does, as the ancients told us, stand for the thing. He has made another not less valuable observation. He says that if we throw away the names which are commonly used to denote things under the pretence of investigating things impartially, we deprive ourselves of much instruction which might enable us to pursue this investigation, and to correct the errors which names sometimes transmit and perpetuate. But that remark suggests a necessary limitation of the former. Names or nouns are only one part of speech. If we deny that speech as such represents thoughts, and not chiefly the things on which thought is exercised, we shall be continually making guesses about the likeness between things and their names; and so shall be turning them into actual expressions of our own thoughts, perhaps of our least sifted thoughts. Whereas if we frankly own both the names which have been given to things and those words which describe acts or qualities, or the persons who do the acts and exhibit the qualities to be indexes of the thoughts of races of men and of mankind, we shall approach the consideration of them with at least as much reverence as we approach the consideration of the facts of the external world; we shall think that we are bound to gather hints about both from all quarters, that we may not twist either according to our pleasure.

I venture to think that many of the definitions of metaphysical words which we find in our most approved books assume this licence, and that it is one which requires a severe restraint. No doubt it is much better and more honest that a man should announce the sense which *he* gives to a word than that he should suppress it. If he proposes to call that white which I call black, I am thankful to him for giving me notice of his intention. He enables me to consider whether there is any likelihood of our coming to an understanding, and, if not, whether I shall not save much time and temper by holding my peace. But supposing he is sufficiently persuaded of the truth of his conclusions to desire that his readers should have an opportunity of examining the premises that lead to them, he should

take some pains to prove—if not to me who may be incapable of entering into the proofs, or may be incurably prejudiced, but to his countrymen generally—that the signification which he attaches to any given word is that which they in their soberest and most considerate moods attach to it; the signification which is traceable through all the different changes which it has undergone, through the particular shapes which it has assumed in special circumstances or under the manipulation of different schools and parties; the signification which was latent in its etymology; that of which the different derivatives from it bear witness; that which may be recognised in those writers who have used their mother-speech with most care and reflection; that which helps us best to explain their divergences from each other, and to draw profit out of them; that which best accounts for what are confessedly vulgar, distorted, impure applications of the word. If Locke had used this diligence, he would have escaped Sir W. Hamilton's censure, and yet he might have effectually justified his own preference of the common wisdom to the school wisdom; he might have made us feel why he especially, as a vindicator of the place which the senses hold in human development, was bound to entertain that preference.

The notion that he dreamed of founding a sensation school has been often exposed; nothing could be so far from his design as to found a school of any kind. The Cartesians had reviled the senses; had treated the organs which connect man with the animals as ignominious, however they might deserve to be studied for his sake; had exalted the mind, the soul, and intellect, as *containing* man's most precious treasures. Locke rebelled against these sentences; claimed a dignity for the senses; denied that without them the mind, the intellect, the soul, would be a mind, or an intellect, or soul; asserted, therefore, implicitly, though not with the carefulness which might be expected from a man of his profession, the worth of our bodily organization, and the close relations between us and all creatures that have senses. It was a most important work. If it had not been performed, primary education—the true maternal education—would have had no secure basis. And though the exercises of the senses being simply directed to things have nothing to do with words, yet an observation of those exercises would have been a quite invaluable help, not only in discerning the line which divides things from words, but in explaining why mere definitions of words are unsatisfactory. There is a necessary duplicity in every act of Sense. That which is touched implies a toucher; that which is seen a seer. On the other side, there cannot be a toucher without something touched; a seer without something seen. When I get general words

to describe these processes—when I speak of sense and sensation—the same duplicity pursues me. If I demand a formal definition of either of these words, I must suppress one part of the fact that I may give prominence to the other. I lose the thing seen in the seer, or the seer in the thing seen. To give the word its complete force, I must contemplate it first on one side, then on the other; I must contradict myself and show how other men have, not carelessly, but inevitably, contradicted themselves, whenever they have tried to reach its subtlety and truth.

Now Locke, being occupied above all others with these words, Sense and Sensation, was evidently aware of this fact, and with his customary honesty *did* contradict himself again and again, rather than gain credit for an apparent consistency at the price of ignoring some of the elements which composed them. But there was one unfortunate circumstance in his position which has deprived us—not altogether, but in a very great degree—of the good which this sincerity might have done us. He was a polemic. His business was to confute the Cartesians. He must begin with using their words, with talking about the mind, the intellect, the soul, and, above all, *ideas*. We cannot start from the point which, according to his own hypothesis, is the actual starting-point of all inquiries. We must not begin with smelling, tasting, handling, seeing, hearing. “No ideas without these.” I dare to say not. But I do not care about ideas. I want to hear about my senses. “Oh! but the mind is nothing, until the senses have brought their information.” Exactly. Then do not trouble me about the mind. I will wait to know what that is till you have initiated me into these exercises of my bodily organs. “Whether you like it or not, you must own that you have much in common with the animals.” I supposed so. I have no objection. Only let me hear of that community, and keep what is special to my race for future consideration.

Many a great book, especially many a book which adorns *our* literature, has suffered grievously in its positive teaching from the negative form which circumstances gave to it; none, I think, so much as the “*Essay on the Human Understanding*.” What might have been an admirable discourse on aesthetics—not like the first book of the “*Critique on the Pure Reason*,” a valuable exposition of the conditions under which we use our senses—but a practical English examination of the senses themselves, of their relation to the outer world, and of their relation to man, as indicated by the words in which men have given an account of them—what might have been, therefore, an appeal to common experience—as Locke would have wished it to be; what, moreover, might have become—though this was not contemplated by him—an excellent introduction to the art

which are connected with the eye and the ear—has been accepted as a mere refutation of a doctrine previously in vogue. And so men have lost themselves, not, as Locke complained that his predecessors had done, in “an ocean of being,” but in an ocean of notions and ideas, in loose talk about Mind and Intellect, which is profoundly satisfactory to them, because it convinces them that older teachers were very foolish and wrong, and therefore that they are wise and right. A continual appeal to experiment terminates in the use of phrases which have been subjected to no experiment—a determination to throw off authority ends in the acceptance of a set of conclusions which rest altogether on authority. Certainly that is a result which it behoves all who recognise the worth of Locke’s teaching to counteract by all means in their power.

One had a right to hope for such a counteraction from a writer so accomplished and popular as Mr. Bain. The title of his book, “The Senses and the Intellect,” afforded the greatest promise that the Senses would have received the fullest and most careful consideration before we were introduced to any questions about the Intellect. As Mr. Bain’s purpose is fully to investigate that physical organization which Locke only contemplated from a distance, as modern inquiries throw so much light upon the connection of our organization with that of other animals, it seemed but reasonable to suppose that he would postpone all consideration of what is peculiar to man till he had explained to us what is *not* peculiar. There was no Descartes to answer, no prevalent dogma about Ideas to overthrow. All his lessons might, therefore, have been clear and experimental. How perplexing it is, then, to meet with such a passage as this at the very outset of this elaborate treatise :—

“The operations and appearances that constitute Mind are indicated by such terms as Feeling, Thought, Memory, Reason, Conscience, Imagination, Will, Passion, Affection, Taste. But the Definition of Mind aspires to comprehend in few words by some apt generalisation the whole kindred of mental facts, and to exclude everything of a foreign character.

“Mind, according to my conception of it, possesses three attributes or capacities :—

“1. It has Feeling, which term includes what is commonly called Sensation or Emotion.

“2. It can act according to Feeling.

“3. It can Think.”

Assuredly, we are all glad to know what acts and qualities Mr. Bain attributes to this “it,” which he calls a Mind. But since we are told that all these can be deduced from our bodily organization, why might not any information about it have been reserved till that had been fully expounded to us? Then, if he found a necessity for asking—And what is Mind—have each of us got it, or is it the

idiosyncrasy of some particularly fortunate individual?—he might have entered with advantage upon this inquiry ; at present we have no data for it.

The other volume of Mr. Bain's, which is entitled, "The Emotions and the Will," opens in more distinct and imperative language :—

"Mind is comprised under these three heads—Emotion, Volition, and Intellect.

"Emotion is the word here used to comprehend all that is understood by Feelings, State of Feeling, Pleasures, Pains, Sentiment, and Affection.

"Consciousness and Conscious States also, for the most part, denote Modes of Emotion, although there is such a thing as the Intellectual Consciousness."

I do not raise any question about this division of Mind. For aught I know, it may be as good as any other, or the best possible. But when I am informed that one of these divisions includes, "All that is understood by Feeling, States of Feeling, Pleasures, Pain, &c.," I am desirous to inquire, *What* is understood by each of these terms? I have no hope of finding out *all* that is understood by them, but I should like to have a little breathing time, that I may ascertain whether we do understand each other at all respecting these expressions, or whether we have no common understanding about them, and each one is obliged to take them in his own way, without any respect to his neighbours.

I. Mr. Bain, then, not having fulfilled this task, I wish to urge some one (or some twenty or thirty ones, if they will undertake it) to do what it seems to me has been left undone. I should wish the one, or the many ones, carefully to consider each of the words which Mr. Bain enumerates whether it points to Sense or Emotion ; and resolutely to dismiss all such words as Mind, Intellect, Volition, till these have been fairly and earnestly examined.

In doing so he may profit, I think, by one or two warnings. 1. The value of dictionaries is unquestionable. But their value consists more in their illustrations than in their explanations. The last tend to separate the different applications of a word from each other, to furnish some tolerable, often rather lengthy, equivalent for any ordinary or extraordinary use of it. The examples link the different uses of a word together. If we turn to the rich store of Johnson's quotations, he will enable us to perceive that the Sense of hearing and of seeing has an intimate connection with the Sense to which I prefix the adjective "good" or "common." The student may miss the link, may be long in detecting it, may receive many precious corrections from those who know more of his own language and literature than he does, or who bring light to it from other

languages and literatures. But he must hold fast his belief that the link exists; otherwise the facts of language will not only be dark to him themselves, but will be continually throwing their darkness upon physical facts. Acting on this conviction, he will consider all such words as Sense, Sensation, Sensibility, Sentient, Sensuous, Sensual under the same head and in their order. He will endeavour to ascertain the varieties of meaning which have been given to them by good authors, or are given to them in common conversation, without the least reference to any theories which may prevail in one circle or another, except so far as they may be supposed to affect our ordinary dialect. And on the whole it will be safer to consult that literature which is the least likely to be exposed to such influences.

On the other hand, in treating of Mr. Bain's other favourite (and most useful) term, *Emotion*, it will be well first to associate the word with the words Motion and Motive, and ask ourselves how they are related to it. Since we are carefully excluding everything which is or can be supposed to be purely human, we shall consider wherein the Motion of a stone differs from the Motion of a horse. So we may be led to conclude that the gallop presumes an *Emotion* in the animal, however that may be evoked by whip and spur, while Motion which is not Emotion, is simply produced by a force from without. Hobbes will be far more intelligible to us if we remember that his first reflections on the Motive forces which influence a man were suggested by observations on the way in which anything passes from a state of rest into movement.

After that, each of the other words which Mr. Bain groups under this one may pass under review, care being taken to bring those together which are clearly of the same origin; allusions to feelings, states of feeling, pains, pleasures, affections of ours being admitted only when they are of the same kind as we may fairly ascribe to any creature which has Senses and Emotions.

2. The student must be prepared for many contemptuous remarks on the confusion which he makes between metaphorical language and unmetaphorical. He can only meet that charge by earnestly requesting his critic to tell him what language he considers not metaphorical; by begging that he will be good enough to furnish him with a set of phrases which have nothing whatever to do with the living world, which are abstracted from all sights, sounds, and tastes, and all the sympathies which these awaken. When this *hortus siccus* has been fully displayed before him, he may consider whether the plants which he finds in it are better for our use and nourishment than those which grow up and bud and bring forth fruits. In the meantime we may take this as a specimen of the language which those speak who

have a great fear of falling into metaphors. "Nature, my dears," so philosophers speak to an audience of little children, "Nature writes in your minds, which would be otherwise mere sheets of white paper, certain characters. These are what you receive through the instrumentality of your senses." Since there are no metaphors here, we must presume (1) that the mind *is* a sheet of white paper. If it is only like one, *how* like? Is it like that or anything else besides? (2) That *characters* (which translated into the child's speech mean the letters of the alphabet) are actually marked upon the white paper. (3) That Nature is a woman, who, if she has no other feminine qualities, has at least acquired the power of scrawling lines which it is very hard to decypher. But of this lady I shall have more to say hereafter.

II. A grown man who is not quite satisfied with this account (it was given him as particularly suitable to his infantine capacity), of what happened when he opened his eyes or ears, begins at last to ask himself these troublesome questions: It was Nature then that did this for me? Nature put something into my head? Had *I* anything to do with this operation? Was it not *I* who saw and heard? Very audacious inquiries indeed, as Mr. Huxley intimates to us in his interesting lecture on Descartes. For what, he asks, do any of us know about this *I*? Could not he gather together a council of physicists and metaphysicians and vote it out of our language? Much diligent exertion has been used at different periods to secure such a result; something has interfered with the experiment. And there have been dangerous men—not unhonoured in either class—who have suddenly risen up and demanded that the word should not be banished, who have even intimated a conviction that without as distinct a recognition of it in the schools as it has in our common existence, the two must always remain apart, and the first can contribute nothing to the elevation or purification of the other. Such a teacher was the one upon whom Mr. Huxley has bestowed so much cordial and discriminating praise. Descartes was an earlier and more perilous invader of accepted formulas than Locke. And the terror of the invasion arose not merely from the process so admirably described in his "*Méthode*," not merely from the boldness with which he stripped off one after another of the vestures in which learned books and men had dressed him—it was the discovery that one whom he called *I* was the wearer of these vestures, that *I* could not be reduced into the term of any proposition. The fatal passion for "terms" undoubtedly pursued the brave discoverer into the recess to which he had fled from them: the marvel before which he stood aghast "as a guilty thing surprised;" that which was beneath all logic—*I think, I am*—must

be put into a logical shape, and so be subjected to all logical dissections. And, again, *I* must be changed into "the soul," and so must be set up to make the body contemptible. The need of Locke's protest against such violence I have fully recognised; I have only lamented that it was not more effectual; that he did not vindicate the exercises of Sense and the organization with which he, as a physician, was most concerned, leaving the Mind and Soul and Ideas to take care of themselves. So justice would have been done to other animals as well as to men; many toilsome discussions about their relations to us might have been saved. And the questioning of Descartes would have brought Man into the field when he was able to show why and how he claimed a position which he could not attribute to any creature that had senses and emotions like his own. That physicists should allow the merits of Descartes as an experimentalist in their direction must be a high gratification to us, who, being incompetent to estimate these merits, have felt profound obligation to him for his defence of that monosyllable with which physics are not concerned. We have no grudge against physical philosophers; we rejoice to hear them say, "We cannot find any *I* amidst the things which we examine." But we do feel a bitter grudge against accomplished men like Hamilton, who translate the troublesome monosyllable into the "Self-conscious Subject," so emptying it of all its vital force, so converting it into the mere material of a Psychological System. I see no way of rescuing it from the claws of the system-mongers, except that of examining carefully the adjectives and substantives which they have adopted into their service. Very remarkable words they are; words which open a new world to us entirely unlike that to which we are introduced by the words relating to the Senses. It is the world of thought, not the world of things. Yet it is that world in which we discover how men exercise dominion over things, how they exercise dominion over each other. Every word is linked apparently to some act of sense. I *apprehend*, I *comprehend*, I *perceive*, I *conceive*, I *recollect*, I *reflect*. But the seizing or grasping is not with the hands: I take an object thoroughly into me, but not with my eyes. I take it in so that it mingles with something which was there before, and becomes part of me; but not by one sense or all the senses. I re-collect that which has become scattered, but my fingers are unequal to the exercise. I turn back upon something which was gone by, but no movement of the head enables me to do that. All are metaphors, if you like to call them so, and drawn from the facts with which we were busy before. They lie beneath those facts. "You only mean to say in roundabout words that your mind performs these acts as the body performs the others."

I did not use that language because I had not settled that I had a mind. I did not discover it among my senses, or among the objects on which my senses were exercised. And now that you suggest the word, I would rather look at it in connection with the verb which is cognate to it. A boy tells me that he could not come in time to the village school because his father set him to *mind* the birds or the sheep; or his mother to *mind* the baby. Whether the boy learned this psychology from his parents or from some instinct of his own, he clearly intimates more than that he was to see the crows, or the sheep, or the infant in the cradle. He was to do something beside that. He was to give them *attention*. He was to exercise that power which Newton exercised in the highest degree, that in the steady exercise of which he supposed his difference from other men to consist. That which minds or attends, I suppose, is the mind. I can find no other meaning for it. I dare not say whether or not it *comprises* the Intellect within it. At all events that word suggests to me a different meaning. It seems to indicate that I have the power of choosing among a number of different things or thoughts that are submitted to me. And if you give me as change for this word "the Understanding," that seems again to give me a different hint, viz., that there is some common ground between me and the people with whom I converse; that if I can stand with them on the common ground I may converse with them to some profit; if otherwise, to none.

To *remind* is even a more wonderful word than to mind. It brings us back to that word which stands first on our list. If I am conscious I cannot be only conscious of that which I am at any given moment. What I have been is linked inseparably to what I am—to what I shall be. The marvel of Consciousness involves the marvel of Memory.

III. What I have said hitherto of Sir W. Hamilton has had no reference to the subject on which, above all others, he delighted to dwell—our incapacity for knowing anything of the infinite or unconditioned. I have complained only of some of the tendencies which make themselves manifest in the field which he cultivated with so much success, from which he has brought forth such valuable fruits. *Facile princeps* as a British psychologist, it is not surprising that he should have wished to bring everything in heaven and earth under the domain of psychology. Earth, it seems to me, suffered more than Heaven by that experiment. He could not treat the Senses fairly—could only consider them when they gave up their own character and consented to be shut up in a definition. Eager to exalt consciousness and to expose any who disparaged it, he yet handled it so roughly that it became nearly unconscious. But it is impossible to measure our obligations to him for not tolerating a rival near the

throne of psychology in the form of pneumatology. If there is in us a human spirit—if there is a human Understanding, as Locke's title seems to presume there is—it cannot be limited by the measures of individual consciousness, it must be the characteristic sign of the *race*. Psychology, of course, can take no account of its exercises, for that *is* limited by the individual consciousness, and only by tortuous and illegitimate struggles can affect to rise above it. Pneumatology would be an effort to confine within certain terms that which, if it exists at all, must transgress them. Whether it does exist at all is a question which I should not answer by dogmatical *assertions*. If dogmatical *denials* supplied a satisfactory answer, it would have been disposed of long ago. But language—the language of the people, of our own people and every other—may be fairly appealed to in this case also. There ought, perhaps, to be no such word as Spirit, as some have said that there ought to be no such word as ought. But it is imbedded in human speech. It only means Breath, and no doubt breath is a very airy, evanescent, scarcely visible thing. Still it performs certain needful functions for the human body; when it is gone, we say the body is dead. We cannot get rid of this fact, nor can we get rid of the fact that all belief in any being above man, all prayer, all worship, presumes a life in man which must be sustained by going out of itself. That is a paradox; so is every act of sense a paradox. No sense has an existence in itself; it is not a sense till it goes out of its organ—till it has communion with something that is distinct from it. That is no law devised by transcendentalists; it is a law which goes through our lives. If you want to extinguish the paradox, you must make a clean and clear sweep of all the facts of our existence—a desirable and perhaps necessary process in the construction of a psychological system, but one to which human creatures may mildly and modestly express an objection.

Leaving this word, Spirit, we may pass to those which I craved a right not to consider before because they did not make it clear to us that we were in want of them. If *Will* is changed into *Volition*, it becomes an innocent word, which may receive any force that any particular teacher likes to give it, which will fit without resistance into any corner of a system that is not otherwise occupied. Retaining its old name, it has proved a most disturbing force in the universe. What is it? Why *will* it appear when all things could be arranged so comfortably if it were not there? These are questions which philosophers have been obliged to ask themselves, because common men are asking them; because they are sure that a will is in them if it is ever so impotent; that they are rattling their chains if they are ever so much in bondage. Wherever there is

that experience, there is also this. The Will turns to some higher Will, either to denounce it as the author of its slavery, or to ask that it may be made free. Have any theory you please about volition; only let these facts have their recognition. I do not care to draw inferences from them.

And so as to the *Reason*. That may be, as Hobbes said it was, only the name for the calculating faculty. Highly desirable it is to have a calculating faculty—to be able to do sums. Or if you mean more than this—if calculation includes foresight, and if foresight involves retrospection, that is a very grand faculty. Still men have felt that, besides this—which they have been in no wise inclined to disparage—there was something which delighted in Order for its own sake, which abhorred disorder, something not contented with phantoms and shadows, which desired to lay hold of that which is. It may not be Reason. Call it by any other name which you like better. But it deserves to have a name, seeing that it points to a reality—seeing that it must be connected somehow with Knowledge or Science. If it owns itself not to have knowledge, not to possess in itself that which it always seeks after, then it will, I apprehend, acknowledge a Perfect Reason. And the Trust in that as a Power which is unfolding our Reason and drawing it to itself will be what we have been used to call *Faith*.*

And so that word Idea, which Locke rather dosed us with, which interfered with a true acknowledgment of the obvious results of sense, may find a signification which is more practical, and which leaves both the Senses and the Intellect undisturbed in their operations. Hamilton was greatly shocked that finite creatures should presume to conceive of the Infinite. No doubt a reasonable fear. But is not a complete Justice implied in every incomplete Justice, a complete Charity in all incomplete Charity, a complete Truth in all incomplete Truth? Infinite Justice, Infinite Charity, Infinite Truth, is Justice *not* bounded by our conception. If I call that the Ideal Justice or Charity or Truth, or the Ideas of Justice, of Charity, of Truth, I am using language which is justified by all the habits of artists. I am only maintaining that all approximations to this standard are not fictitious. If you have any more convenient expression, by all means produce it; but it seems to me a wholesome one, from the study of which we may learn much. That we cannot use it to much practical advantage, unless we think that the Idea has been realised, that it has been proved to bear upon life, I cheerfully confess.

* I have scarcely hinted at the use of the treasures of Comparative Philology in the examination of metaphysical language; partly because I hold that the merely English scholar may obtain great clearness by simply considering his own words; chiefly because I should be quite incompetent to wield the other armoury. But I am thankful

Before I close this paper I would illustrate what I have said by an examination of the word Nature. Nature has been used to explain the operation of the Senses, it mingles with all psychology, it especially perplexes those who talk about the Will. If my treatment of it is clumsy, I hope I shall provoke wiser men to expose me. At least, I shall show that I do not select the authors whose uses of it I consider from any doctrinal agreement with them.

Most readers of Lucretius must have asked themselves what he meant by the splendid invocation to Venus, the mother of the Romans, with which his poem opens. He could not hope to propitiate his countrymen by affecting a respect for the mythology which he was about to defy and attack. To suppose that he resorted to a vulgar personification would be equally to slander his character as a poet and as a philosopher. The obvious answer, which is derived from the context, that he saw a principle of love or desire quickening the breasts of all creatures, is true as far as it goes. But it does not account for his saying, "*Thou alone governest the nature of things.*"* The nature of things was to be the subject of his work. He desired to vindicate it from the associations by which it had been surrounded in popular opinion. Only a few lines further on, we read (I adopt Professor Munro's version) of those first beginnings of things "out of which *Nature* gives birth to all things and nourishment and increase.† Here Nature has risen to be the author of the whole Kosmos. A little after he attributes the dread which men feel of the future to their ignorance of the *nature* of the soul, whether it be born or, on the contrary, is insinuated into men at their birth, whether it perishes together with us when severed from us by death or visits the shades of Orcus.‡

The nature of the soul answers to the nature of things in the title of the poem. It has lost its creative character. Then we hear of a

to quote this remark from the great Anglo-German champion of the study in support of an arrangement. Mr. Max Müller says in his lecture on the "Science of Religion," "If, then, there is a philosophical discipline which examines into the condition of sensuous perception, and if there is another philosophical discipline which examines into the conditions of rational conception, there is clearly a place for a third philosophical discipline that has to examine the conditions of that third faculty co-ordinate with Sense and Reason—the faculty of perceiving the infinite which is at the root of all religion." Mr. Max Müller's tripartite arrangement, the Sensuous, the Rational, the Spiritual, answers to the Animal, the Personal, the Human, which is mine.

* "*Quæ quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas.*"—1st book, line 21.

† "*Unde omnes Natura creet res auctetque alatque.*"—Line 56.

‡ "*Ignoratur enim quæ sit natura Animai,
Nata sit an contra nascentibus insinuetur,
Et simul intereat nobis cum morte dirempta
An tenebras Orci visat vastasque lacunas.*"—Lines 112-115.

darkness cast over the mind by superstition which must be dispelled not by the rays of the sun and the glittering shafts of day, but by the aspect and law of nature.* There is a law, or principle, or purpose, to be discovered in the phenomena of Nature which is not to be confounded with them. But presently Nature resumes her dignity as the creatrix of man. "Why?" the poet asks, and is prepared with an answer. Could not *Nature* produce men of such size and strength as to be able to wade on foot across the sea and to rend great mountains with their hands? † Once more: Nature appears in the opposite character, not indeed as an absolute destroyer of things, but as reducing them into their elements; the death-giving as before the life-giving power. Yet it is said "she suffers the destruction of nothing to be seen till a force has encountered it sufficient to dash things to pieces or to pierce through the void spaces within them and break them up." ‡

All these examples occur in the first two or three hundred lines of this great Poem on Nature. I have quoted them, because I believe Lucretius to have been a careful student of words, as well as of things. He watched, he says, the clear night through (line 142) that he might find equivalents in his own language, which he accused of poverty, for the phrases of his Greek teachers. Most readers would say that his diligence was rewarded; that he succeeded in compelling his speech to express whatever he wished it to express. No word could be so sacred or important to him as "Nature." For every reason, he would take the utmost pains that his friend Memmius and his readers generally should give it the most exact force of which it was susceptible. If he allowed it to assume many apparently inconsistent significations, we must not suspect that he claimed any licence for himself because he was writing in verse. I do not imagine a consummate artist such as he was would dream of asking for licences; at all events, he would reserve them for cases which did not interfere with the very meaning of his discourse. I do not think there are many of the expressions which I have quoted that might not be justified by examples from modern writers;

* "Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necesse est,
Non radii solis neque lucida tela dici
Discussant, sed Naturæ species ratioque."—Lines 146-149.

† "Denique cur homines tantos Natura parare
Non potuit, pedibus qui pontum per vada possent
Transire et magnos manibus divellere montes."—Lines 199-202.

‡ "Quod nunc æterno quia constant semineiquæque,
Donec vis obiit quæ res diverberet ictu,
Atque intus penetret per inania dissolvatque
Nullius exitium patitur Natura videri."

from writers in prose, from writers who dwell much on the danger of employing words carelessly and in different senses, from writers who are entirely opposed to the Epicurean theory. I believe we owe thanks to Lucretius for bringing our own modes of speaking and thinking to light, and that we may profit as much by considering those which we are least likely to imitate, as those into which we fall most easily.

As he devoted so much labour to the translation of Greek words, it may be well to speak for a moment of that word of which *Natura* was the best rendering that he could find. It will be admitted that the radical meaning of *Φύσις* is best ascertained from its cognate verb. Out of the instances of its use which Liddell and Scott furnish us with, I will refer to two. The first is in the dialogue between Glaucus and Diomed, in the sixth book of the "Iliad;" the other is from the last chapter in the ninth book of Herodotus. The reader who will carefully consider these, will, I think, be convinced that birth and growth must be implied in any substantive which has this verb for its origin.

With these hints we may go on to consider such phrases as these. 1. Love of Nature. 2. Law of Nature. 3. State of Nature. 4. Moral Nature. 5. Human Nature. The adjective "Natural," and one of its derivatives, may also suggest some thoughts to us.

1. The phrase "Love of Nature" may admit almost any amount of degradation or elevation. It may be translated into that "taste for the picturesque" to which an auctioneer's advertisements of "a lawn, plus vistas of hills, plus a park-like inclosure," make their appeal. Or it may mean that which is expressed in Wordsworth's lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey, wherein he tries to recall the feelings of his early youth:—

"Nature then
To me was all in all. I cannot paint
What then I was. The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion; the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their forms were then to me
An appetite, a feeling, and a love
That had no need of a remoter charm
By thought supplied, or any interest
Unborrowed from the eye."

These recollections have every mark of fidelity, and are especially valuable as being so curiously unlike the later stages of Wordsworth's history; for no one certainly had afterward *more* need of the "remoter charm by thought supplied," or was less satisfied with the mere interest which is borrowed from the eye. Nature must

have been to this young man exactly what the word *Φύσις* indicates. He had a vision of things coming forth into birth, growing, developing an ever fresh life; a shadow of death being, no doubt, over them, but a shadow which made the light look more glowing, the teeming life more various and wonderful. His delight helps us to interpret that of the elder poet brought up in an entirely different atmosphere, "when he beheld the earth manifold in works putting forth sweet-smelling flowers; the levels of the sea laughing; the wild herds bounding over the pastures and swimming the glad rivers." There, too, was the same joy in sense; thought, if not suspended, yet cheerfully yielding to the charm borrowed from the eye.

But neither for the Roman nor the Englishman would this endless vicissitude, this ever new-becoming of things, however delightful for a while, have been long endurable, if it had had no human associations, nay, if they had been unable to subordinate it to that which was human. No school-boy notion that he was bound to personify because he was writing hexameters, but the strongest necessity of recognising some personal centre for the manifold complications around him, for the incessant rush and whirl of living atoms, led Lucretius back to the traditions which he was casting indignantly aside. To get rid of the gods he must make Epicurus one. Nor was that enough. Venus, the author of his race, must be the patroness of his toil, must be hailed as the Mistress of Nature itself. Wordsworth confessed in a very memorable sonnet how powerfully these same traditions, in which he had not been educated, laid hold upon him when he perceived that Nature, with all its magnificence, could make no head against the world, with its gettings and spendings:—

"I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed out-worn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
And hear old Triton blow his wreathéd horn."

This mood, we know, passed away; even while it lasted, it must have been checked by the thought that Proteus rising from the sea could not have brought him much news about the liberation of Spain, and that the horn of Triton would not have announced the defeat of Napoleon—for these were, indeed, nearer his heart than the winds or the moon. But these documents remain a standing evidence that the most genuine and intense love of Nature demands something more than the variety of things to call it forth and to sustain it.

2. I approach with much greater alarm the second phrase of which I proposed to speak. I suspect that those who use the expression

“Law of Nature” most frequently would be scandalized by being reminded that they mean the same Nature as that which awakens the poet’s love. And yet surely it is the same. The ever-changing Φύσις, that which is ever becoming, ever passing into, something else is that of which they demand the Law. Lucretius, at all events, was busy in seeking for the *species ratioque* of that same Nature which he noted in its vicissitudes. I believe our physical students do themselves great injustice if they deny that their subject-matter is the same as his. Nor can I help advancing one step further, although quite aware how perilous a step it is, and how much contempt I may incur by taking it. I maintain that not only the word “Nature,” but the word “Law,” must bear its ordinary, and not an extraordinary, sense. The oracle was delivered many long years ago—some of us can remember it for nearly half a century—that Law as applied to human transactions derives all its force from the sanction which is appended to it; that Law, when it is applied to Nature, means the generalization of certain Phenomena. But often as one has heard this dogma repeated, and high as are the authorities by which it is enforced, I must confess to a stubborn incredulity respecting it. On any questions which I know the philosophers have investigated, I should make a great effort to overcome such incredulity. I do not perceive that questions about the use of language are those on which their special knowledge gives them a right to claim infallibility. In them we are all interested, and about one of them I must venture to propound my doubts. I do not fancy that we can use such a word as “Law,” which is mixed with all our thoughts and habits from our childhood upwards, in a certain sense, in reference to one class of subjects, and then invest it with an entirely different sense when we apply it to another. “But then the sanctions?” Well, whether there are or are not sanctions to what are called the Laws of Nature (I am told there are strong sanctions), I apprehend that by the hypothesis the sanction is *added* to the Law to give it effect. What is that to which it is added? We should ordinarily say that it is a Command, let the penalties which enforce it be what they may. And this feeling of a command does, I believe, mingle unconsciously with the thoughts of all who speak about a Law of Nature. A Government in Nature we saw Lucretius was obliged to admit, even at the hazard of fostering opinions which he most longed to be rid of. If the Goddess of Desire did not quite satisfy his conception of this Government, if she had too much of caprice and fluctuation, he longed to find something more answering to those Twelve Tables which determined the acts of rulers as well as subjects. He might much prefer his Greek teachers to the maxims of his uncouth ancestors. But they had a hold on him which no later wisdom could loosen, and he

carried into his study, not indeed the wish to make Nature subject to national or human decrees, but certainly the wish to prove that there are laws regulating its movements, as real as any which regulated the movements of the Romans. "Generalization" is a much longer word than "Law." It may have weight in proportion to the number of its syllables. But English men of science will have some difficulty in persuading me that they do not like the simpler word best, and do not secretly translate the other into it.

3. The phrase "State of Nature" leads us from Nature to Man, as the phrase Law of Nature led us from Man to Nature. The State of Nature is, according to our ordinary usage, the state in which man is left to Nature—in which he grows up, as Hobbes would say, brutal, "nasty," without culture, at war with his fellows. It seems singularly at variance with the admiration of Nature which was implied in the phrases I considered before, and yet it receives illustration from them and gives back illustrations to them. Nature, as a mere *caput mortuum*, without the life which Lucretius and Wordsworth saw quickening every part of it; Nature as a mere collection of active energies without a law to direct them; one or the other of these is the State of Nature. We only feel how dreary it is when we connect it with our own race.

4. How the phrase "Moral Nature" gained currency it would be interesting to inquire. Most men would consider "Physical Nature" a startling pleonasm. And yet one must be intended as the counterpart to the other; if the first is reasonable, it is difficult to exclude the second. By Moral Nature, I suppose we are to understand all those capacities in human creatures which may become manners, if some influence or energy calls them forth and cultivates them. If any different force is given to the phrase, if it is supposed to intimate an unweeded, unwatered garden, which yet bears sweet flowers and fruits, I know not what school would adopt it. Hobbes and Rousseau, who stand at the extremes of opinion about Nature, would both disclaim it, since each on his own grounds demanded education for children.

5. The ambiguity which attaches to this expression belongs also to one which has taken much stronger hold upon us, which Hobbes and his opponents use with equal readiness. When we speak of "Human Nature," do we think first of the adjective, or first of the substantive? Is Humanity a particular form of Nature, or do we mean that Humanity has a certain kind of Nature attached to it? Hobbes answered this question for himself very distinctly. He contemplated all Natures, from the stone upwards, as subject to some moving force. Man was one of these Natures; to determine what force moved him was the business of the moralist and politician. It does not seem to

me that Butler, or any of those who opposed Hobbes, did present the question to themselves with equal clearness. Their business had been with men; their interest was in men. Nature, as apart from men, they had considered very little. They had observed (it was strictly an observation, not a theory or a dogma), that men had social tendencies, that they were not merely the self-regarding animals that Hobbes affirmed them to be. But when they said, "These social qualities belong as much as the self-regarding qualities to their *Nature*," they fell, I conceive, into some perplexity, which became very obvious and startling indeed when they went on to affirm that there was in this Nature a controlling or magisterial power over its own operations. That a Conscience is implied in the exercises of every human being, I think they showed very clearly; when they affirmed that it was part of the *Nature* of every human being, the facts and the logic of Hobbes, it seems to me, were irresistible against them.

At this point we may pass to the adjective "Natural." The contrast between *Natural* and *Artificial* is, no doubt, strongly present to those who speak of a Moral Nature. Artificial Manners seem to them essentially bad manners; Artificial Morality is immoral. What is spontaneous, they say to themselves, must be better than what is forced. The same feeling is traceable in the old Greek discussion about *Φύσις* and *Νόμος*. That which was the result of decree or convention could not have the same worth as that which sprang from some inward root. The *Natural man* is used by Coleridge in his "Dejection" to denote that in Man which is in sympathy with Nature. He says that by abstruse research he had, for a time at least, destroyed this in himself; that he could see, not feel, how beautiful the earth was. He would, I suppose, being at that time probably a disciple of Hartley, have said that the wires of the human instrument had ceased to vibrate in harmony with those in the outer world. He deduces from his own experience the maxim that,—

"In our light alone doth Nature live,
Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud."

A peculiar sense is often given to the phrase *natural man* by theologians, but as *Ψυχικός* is the word in St. Paul on which it is grounded, I have no excuse for touching upon it. There are other applications of the adjective which deserve examination. *Natural Philosophy* has a simple enough meaning; no one doubts that it means a philosophy about Nature, distinguished from a philosophy about Morals, or Metaphysics. *Natural Religion* has a much less definite signification, or rather has two or three quite distinct and scarcely compatible significations. It may mean a religion which is deduced from an observation of the external world or is found in the external world. It may mean

a religion arrived at by certain faculties in man, which are called Natural. It may mean that which a man finds in himself and is a law to himself. These meanings run strangely into each other; even earnest and thoughtful writers often make little effort to separate them.

Whilst there is so much vagueness in our use of the simple epithet, it is not wonderful that there should be frequent fighting about the compound. Some assume that the supernatural is the irregular, the unusual, the disorderly. But we have seen that the poet of Nature found it impossible to express the coherency and harmony which he discerned in Nature, without referring it in some sense or other to a goddess who governed it. His desire for a Law of Nature was a desire to find something over Nature which was constant and unchangeable. Any one who says that the Nature of Man of necessity bows to certain motives confesses those motives to be supernatural powers. So far there is great agreement between Epicureans and Stoics, between the disciples of Hobbes and those who acknowledge a conscience. The real questions between us are,—*What* is the Supernatural Power which we recognise? If Nature is associated with Humanity, in what way is it associated? If there is a Law over it, has that Law any connection with the Law which is over man? Is the Law which is over man a Motive which holds him in bondage, or does it proceed from a Will that seeks to set him free?

F. D. MAURICE.



THE EDUCATION DIFFICULTY.

IT surely is time that the attention of those who are arraying themselves against Mr. Forster's Education Act of 1870 should be recalled to the serious consideration of the interests of the million of children whom two or three years' postponement of the work of carrying out its principles into practice will rob of that fair start in life which the Act admits to be their due.

The difficulties which are blocking up the way are mainly what are called "*religious*" difficulties, and as far as those so prominently urged by Nonconformists are concerned, they are practically the same religious difficulties which prevented an Education Act being passed twenty years ago.

Twenty years ago (January 22, 1851), Mr. Cobden moved the following resolution at a large meeting at Manchester, held by the "National Public School Association" :—

"That the present aspect of the educational question gives high testimony to the value of the efforts of this Association, and promises a complete and speedy triumph."

In his speech on that occasion, Mr. Cobden advocated what he called a system of *secular** common schools, and he thus explained why he did so :—

* But it was a "secular" system which did not exclude the Bible. "I never will be a party to any scheme that attempts to lay down in an Act of Parliament this mon

"I have really passed the time in which I can offer any opposition to any scheme whatever, come from whatever party it may, which proposes to give the mass of the people of this country a better education than they now receive. I will say more—that in joining the secular system of education, I have not taken up the plan from any original love for a system of education which separates itself from religion.

"I confess that for fifteen years my efforts in education, and my hopes of success in establishing a system of national education, have always been associated with the idea of coupling the education of this country with the religious communities which exist. But I have found, after trying it as I think in every possible shape, such insuperable difficulties in consequence of the religious discordances of the country, that I have taken refuge in this, which has been called the remote haven of refuge for the Educationists—the secular system—in sheer despair of carrying out any system in connection with religion. I should, therefore, be a hypocrite if I were to say I have any particular repugnance to a system of education coupled with religious instruction."

What Mr. Cobden advocated in 1851 was very nearly the same system as that which those Nonconformists who have joined the League are urging now. But Nonconformists were Mr. Cobden's most determined opponents then. He complained of their attitude in the following words:—

"Well, I must say we have endeavoured to be very accommodating to these gentlemen, and have found it very difficult to please them. When the attempt was, for many years, to have an education combined with religion, then these same gentlemen told us that it was contrary to their consciences either to receive or to pay money raised by taxation for teaching religion. When we offer to separate it, we are told by these same gentlemen that it is contrary to their conscientious convictions to separate religious from secular teaching."

In another speech at Manchester in December of the same year, Mr. Cobden again complained of the attitude of the Dissenters, who were, as a body, opposing national education altogether:—

"There's no doubt but that it (*i.e.*, public education) is determined on by the great mass of the community, and however any body, in sincerity, which is so involved in this question as the dissenting body is, can be moving about the country and trying to advocate or plead for that impossible cause—no public education at all—passes my comprehension."

And then, alluding to the religious difficulties in the way of the great national object, he continued:—

"I believe that the great mass of the people take less interest in this sectarian squabbling than many others of us are apt to imagine. The great mass of the people want education for their children; they are sick to death of these obstacles you throw in their way. I believe, when our extended franchise throws more power into the hands of the multitude, you will see that what I say is true, that there is a feeling for national education

strous, arrogant, and dictatorial doctrine, that a parish or community shall not, if it please, introduce the Bible into its schools."—(Speeches, ii. 599.)

which will sweep away all the cobwebs with which you attempt to blind the great mass of the people, and feeling this, and having done my best to do justice to all parties in the matter, I say now emphatically—'I vote for education: I'll do the best I can for Dissenters, but I'll never oppose a system of education which promises to give to the mass of the people an opportunity of raising themselves in life and benefiting their children, by having a share in its advantages which those alone above them have hitherto enjoyed.'"^{*}

After twenty years' delay, involving the robbing of millions of English citizens of their fair start in life, and not until household suffrage had been conceded to the people, at length, in 1870, an Education Act was demanded and passed. And yet now, in 1872, it becomes needful again to ask seriously whether religious difficulties, about which the masses of the people do not probably care more than they did, are to be allowed to step in between their children and the education they so much need?

There are practical difficulties in the way of national compulsory education of quite another kind, affecting deeply the interests of the working classes, of the million and a half of children in the existing schools, and, above all, of the million children who are in no school at all. And I am firmly convinced that not until the whole question comes to be regarded from a more practical point of view, not until we are willing to go on with the work of removing these practical difficulties, will the English system of education be made national in the view of the masses of the people, and in the interests of their children. At the same time, I am equally firmly convinced that the moment the nation feels that the system is to be made national in this more general and more practical sense, there will arise a national feeling, such as Mr. Cobden spoke of, in favour of national compulsory education, based upon the common-sense view of it—a faith in its practical realisation and the blessings it will bring with it—which will enable the Education Minister who shall succeed in realising for the nation its own better mind to remove every legitimate religious difficulty in a way in which it would not be possible to remove it now.

It has occurred to me that some advantage might arise from a calm and impartial attempt to point out how, by carrying out the principles of Mr. Forster's Act to their legitimate results, the English system of education may be made truly national and compulsory, regard being had mainly to the interests of the masses of the people and the needs of their children; and how in making it so, the religious difficulties which grow chiefly out of the sectarian feelings of the middle and upper classes may probably be made to vanish.

The principles of Mr. Forster's Act I take to be these:—

^{*} "Mr. Cobden's Speeches," ii. 603; Dec. 1, 1851.

1st. Free trade as to the supply of schools, it being, nevertheless, the duty of the State to see that everywhere *suitable* schools are provided.

2nd. Free choice to parents as to how they educate their children, it being, nevertheless, the duty of the State to see that in secular subjects they are properly educated.

Mr. Forster has been abused by the opponents of the Act, and especially by Nonconformists, for adopting these principles.

They have urged that supplementing the free-trade supply of schools by filling up the gaps in each district with Board schools is practically giving up the idea of making the system of schools national in any fair sense of the word.

But a national system is not necessarily composed of none but absolutely State schools. There might, on the other hand, be State schools everywhere, and yet no national system; and the question whether the English system is to be national or not depends upon how far the schools in each district, Board schools or others, can be marshalled by the State into a system which shall meet the national needs.

When the present Government first took the matter of education in hand, the public provision for education was roughly as follows, viz. :—

1. The universities.
2. The public schools.
3. The endowed grammar and other schools.
4. The elementary schools, many of which were aided by Government grant.

Side by side with these public schools were all kinds of voluntary agencies, private colleges, tutors, and schools. The problem was how to make this disjointed haphazard system into a harmonious national system, and one which, as regards elementary education, would bear the strain of compulsion. The Government undertook to deal separately with the universities. They already professed to be national institutions, and it undertook to make them so in reality by the abolition of tests. This was one branch of their task. The five public schools were also to be dealt with separately. The Endowed Schools Act of 1869 was passed to marshal the grammar schools and other endowed schools into their proper place in the national system, to make them fulfil their proper places as the middle rounds of the educational ladder by which the elementary schools at the bottom were to be connected with the universities at the top of the system. There remained the question of the elementary schools, and Mr. Forster laid his hands upon them in the Act of 1870.

Now, in applying the same principles, which apply to the national

system as a whole, to the elementary schools as a most important part of it, the question arose, What is the fair common-sense view which the nation ought to take of the problem how to regard the existing elementary schools which are already at work?

In the first place, there were probably (according to the Report of the Duke of Newcastle's Commission) more than 30,000 strictly private schools,* containing from 800,000 to 900,000 scholars, about two-thirds of whom probably belonged to the working classes. These strictly private schools obviously could not be converted by Act of Parliament into national schools.

But there were in 1858 the following schools which professed to be public schools of some sort or other :—

CLASS I.—SCHOOLS SUPPORTED BY RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS.

Denomination.	Week-day schools.	Number of scholars.
Church of England	19,559	1,187,086
British	1,131	151,005
Roman Catholic	743	85,866
Wesleyan (Old Connexion)	445	59,873
Congregational	388	33,163
Baptist	144	9,388
Unitarian	54	4,088
Calvinistic Methodist	44	2,929
Jewish	20	3,204
Society of Friends	33	3,026
Presbyterian (in England)	28	2,723
Primitive Methodist	26	1,342
Presbyterian (undefined)	17	2,592
Methodist (New Connexion)	14	1,851
United Methodist Free Church	11	1,176
	22,657	1,549,312

CLASS II.—SCHOOLS NOT SPECIALLY CONNECTED WITH RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS.

Ragged schools	192	20,909
Orphan and philanthropic	40	3,762
Birkbeck schools	10	1,427
Factory schools	115	17,000
	357	43,098

The extraordinary disparity disclosed by this list between the number of schools in connection with the Church of England and that of others must be admitted to be to some extent the result of the unfortunate attitude of opposition to national education and Government grants in aid of it assumed by the Nonconformist body as a whole,† to the great regret of Mr. Cobden in 1851, and maintained by them till within the last few years. It has no doubt increased

* By "schools," in the following figures, is meant schools, or departments of schools, under a separate head teacher.

† The Wesleyan bodies were the chief exceptions.

immensely the religious difficulty of dealing with national education, and has so completely given the Church of England the start, as compared with Nonconformists, that no legislation can possibly place the latter on a practical equality as to their influence or the number of their schools. No legislation can give them back the ground they have lost by the false attitude they assumed twenty years ago, or rob the Church of England of the vantage-ground it has gained. But even though all this be granted and deplored, and, further, even though it be admitted, as for my part I think it must be, that many of these schools would not have existed but for what Mr. Lowe described in his speech at Halifax as the mistaken action of Parliament twenty-five years ago in throwing its aid so exclusively into denominational channels rather than undertaking itself the provision of unsectarian national schools, still the practical question remains—Was it, or rather is it, for the interests of the nation that these quasi-public elementary schools should all be left out of the national system as though they were merely private schools, or ought they to be taken into the national system, and made into efficient and suitable public elementary schools?

If we are to have a national system, it surely would be better, if possible, to marshal these schools into their proper places in it, rather than to leave them out. It surely would be better to harness the interests and forces already at work in them to the national object, rather than to turn them into rival and clashing agencies. And when it is considered that as regards many of these schools, the State, having contributed something like one-fourth of the cost of their erection, and having for years past defrayed out of public money something under one-third of their annual cost by Government grants, has clearly the right to marshal them into the national system, if it chooses, surely any Education Minister who should throw them away by releasing them from their obligations to the State, and by so doing should turn them from servants into open foes, would have to account to the nation for a prodigal waste of national resources on the one hand, and for the creation of a powerful vested interest, opposed to national education, on the other. In 1870 there were 14,565 schools—*i.e.*, probably about one-half of the whole number of quasi-public schools—in receipt of Government aid. These State-aided schools were educating from one million to one million and a half of scholars. Mr. Forster concluded to convert these schools into suitable and efficient public elementary schools. The fact that these schools were in part erected and supported by public money, gave to Mr. Forster the power which he wisely used to impose upon them, as a condition of their continued receipt of the Government grant, the following terms:—

1st. The time-table conscience clause.

2nd. Government inspection as regards the secular instruction given.

3rd. Such further conditions as shall be contained in the minutes of the Education Department in force for the time being (the chief of them being that the grant shall be given for results in secular instruction only).

Now let this policy first be looked at from the point of view of the million and a half of scholars in attendance at the schools immediately affected by it. By making these schools into public elementary schools, and marshalling them into the national system, those million and a half of scholars at once received national protection against any attempt to tamper with their consciences, and national security for the efficiency of the secular instruction given; while, had these schools been left out in the cold, they would have remained without either the one or the other.

Let the same policy be looked at from the point of view of the nation and the tax-payers. On *their* behalf, the claim was made and secured, that the schools were, as regards the secular part of their teaching, subject to the control of Parliament and the Education Department, and whatever conditions either the one or the other might impose to secure their efficiency and suitability as members of a national system.

That the conditions have not hitherto been made stringent enough may very possibly be true, but that is a reason for making them more so, and not an argument against marshalling the schools into the national system, or in favour of leaving them without any conditions at all.

There is also a provision in the Act that any conditions imposed by the Education Department in its minutes "shall not give any preference or advantage to any school on the ground that it is, or is not, provided by a school-board." And further, as the Bill was brought in by Mr. Forster, let it be remembered that every condition imposed by the Act on Board schools was made to apply to the other schools also, there was to be no difference at all. It was at the instance of Nonconformists and Secularists that the principle was broken, and in the Act as it stands, the only exception which is made to the rule of equality is a restriction upon the religious teaching in Board schools, which is not applied to the others.

The truth then is, that by Mr. Forster's Act the State is committed, as it ought to be committed, to the principle that these State-aided voluntary schools, no less than Board schools, are to be made into efficient and suitable schools, and there only remains the task of carrying out the principle into practice under the various circum-

stances which may from time to time arise. The principle has been settled once for all, that all State-aided schools are to be marshalled into the national system, but much of the actual marshalling requires to be done.

Let me take one crucial instance by way of illustration. I will choose one involving a religious difficulty.

In places where there is a choice between a National and a British school, and these schools are managed in compliance with the spirit of the Act, there will probably be little religious difficulty in the application of compulsion, even though there may be no Board schools. But the way to test whether the system will bear the strain of compulsion, in the rural as well as in the more populous districts, is to put the case of a parish where the only school is in the hands of one denomination alone. The question is, whether in such a case you can compel the children of all sects virtually to attend that school—there being no other within reach—without raising a religious difficulty. If not, then it cannot be held that the mere acceptance of the conscience clause has converted the school into a suitable school within the spirit and principle of the Act. There is nothing to prevent such schools from being suitable schools, provided that the spirit and principle of the Act be thoroughly accepted and acted upon by their managers. But by far the greater number of these rural schools are in connection with the National Society, and the National Society has apparently assumed an attitude so faithless to the spirit and principle of the Act, as to raise at least a reasonable doubt whether their schools can be left in the position of the only schools, and considered as "suitable" schools, for the children of Dissenters as well as Churchmen. The monthly paper of the National Society, published at the National Society's depository, and bearing the stamp of the National Society on its title-page, has consistently, ever since the passing of the Act, urged upon the schools in connection with the society which accept Government grant, and make themselves public elementary schools, the importance of keeping up, as far as compliance with the mere letter of the conscience clause will allow, their distinctive character as Church schools, and even as proselytising agencies, whose *raison d'être* it is to make the children attending them into Churchmen. It is in vain that any number of individual clergymen repudiate the policy of the National Society, as of course many of them do, even vehemently, and it is equally in vain that the National Society should disclaim responsibility for the leading articles in its own organ. The National Society is one of the great societies which profess to represent the Church of England. Its monthly organ may have but a small circulation, and still smaller influence, among the clergy; but Dissenters

cannot be expected to know this. The monthly articles alluded to have been read by them, passages from them have been republished by the League. They have naturally, little by little, stirred up the indignation of Dissenters, and intensified their opposition even to the tolerance which the Act shows towards Denominational schools. Under these circumstances, it cannot be surprising that Nonconformists should assume that the bad advice of the National Society will be followed in too many cases. And as regards these cases, it is obvious that when tried by the test of the application of compulsion, the mere enforcement of the conscience clause will not have made these avowedly Church and proselytizing schools into schools suitable for the children of parents who are not Churchmen.

What then, it may be asked, is the way out of the difficulty? The alternatives are obviously these:—

1. To make the existing schools into suitable schools, by taking better and adequate securities that they shall be honestly free from proselytizing or sectarian teaching during the public school-hours, when children of all sects are expected to attend; and, failing this—
2. To set up Board schools in rivalry with them.

Now there is this difficulty in the way of the second alternative. If a School Board be forced upon a rural parish, and be a fair representative of the parish, it will probably happen that the men elected will be hand and glove with the predominant party, who again will probably be the squire and the vicar, whose real interest will lie in their own Denominational school. This leads to an almost grotesque anomaly, a breakdown in local self-government, and the interposition of Government officials to override the wishes of the majority. This may be a legitimate proceeding in the last resort; but unless the national conviction in favour of local self-government is to be somewhat rudely infringed, it ought to be very sparingly used. The first alternative seems to me to be the better for all parties, and the simpler of the two. When the majority in a parish wish for a rival Board school, by all means let them have it; but failing this, let the existing school, somehow or other, be made honestly undenominational during the hours at which children of all sects are expected to attend. Whether any, and what, further legal conditions may be required to secure this, and so to make the Church schools into suitable schools, is a question which I have shown can best be answered by the National Society itself. But under the principles of the Act, they must somehow be made into *suitable* schools. And very possibly, if the National Society should adhere to its present attitude, it will be needful to apply the same rule to State-aided Voluntary as to Board schools, and to relegate the strictly denominational part of the teaching to a separate and voluntary sitting of the

school, only the undenominational part of the religious teaching being retained within public school-hours (as in Board schools), under the protection of the conscience clause. If this should not prove to be a sufficient protection from evasion of the spirit of the Act, even further conditions may have to be imposed, involving, probably, public control of the choice of school-books and masters. Is it too late to hope that the necessity of all this may be prevented by a general condemnation by the Church party itself of the evil complained of, or, what would be still better, by the generous withdrawal by them of what is avowedly a Denominational flag from the schools which claim to be National schools?

No one can deplore more than I do the necessity of thus haggling, as it were, for legislative provisions to secure what common honesty and high feelings of honour ought to secure without them. I am disposed as much as any one to act in the spirit of a Gallic towards these ecclesiastical difficulties, which are raised by the clergy on either side, and which neither on the one side nor on the other are at all influentially backed by the laity. But it seems needful to insist that if we are to have a national compulsory system, without necessarily having Board schools everywhere, then the principles of the Act as well as public morality require that those schools which offer to supply public education should do so honestly; they must be willing to allow a clear line to be drawn between their national and their sectional objects, and expect the nation to guard jealously the hours devoted to the national purpose from any dishonest attempt to abuse them for a sectional end.

Is there, then, even in this crucial instance of a religious difficulty (which I have admitted to be real), anything which condemns the principles of Mr. Forster's Act of 1870? Certainly not! I have proved, I think, that the Act itself lays down the principle which, if carried out into practice, would remove the difficulty.

We are not in the habit of railing against Magna Charta because it needed a Habeas Corpus Act to secure it from invasion. The Act of 1870 was the Magna Charta of the million and a half of children in the Denominational schools, and the million more who are at no school at all. Shall we rail at it because special evasions of its principles may hereafter require special devices to outflank them?

And who are the railers at Mr. Forster's Act? It is almost beneath the gravity of the subject to adopt an argument *ad homines* when a matter of principle is involved, but when Nonconformists go over in shoals to the League, and join it in railing against Mr. Forster's Act, it may not be either uncourteous or beside the mark to ask them to consider why they did not rail against the League for proposing the following solution of the difficulty—a solution which,

equally with Mr. Forster's, infringes the principles which they now assert so loudly.

In the heads of their suggested Bill of 1870 the League proposed:—

“In places where there is sufficient accommodation provided by existing schools receiving Government grants, the School Board shall have power to send children, provided the managers are willing to receive such children, and to undertake that no creed, catechism, or tenet peculiar to any sect shall be taught to them, unless the parents or guardians have signed a form desiring that such teaching shall be given. And whenever the Board shall send children to the existing schools receiving Government grants (subject to the above-stated provision as to religious teaching), the Board shall pay out of the school fund a proportion of the total expense of the school, equivalent to the proportion which the children so sent bear to the total number of scholars, provided that such number in no case exceed one-third of the number of the whole. Schools receiving this payment shall receive the present allowance from Government on the remaining children.

“Existing schools under Government inspection, admitting all children free, and arranging their religious teaching in such a manner that it may be at a distinct time, either immediately before or after ordinary school business, and that attendance at such religious teaching shall not be compulsory, and that there shall be no disability for non-attendance, shall receive two-thirds from Government. But any portion not exceeding one-half may be withdrawn if the inspector reports unfavourably.”

It is obvious that, under these clauses, the League deliberately proposed—(1) Treating in rural districts the existing Denominational schools as suitable schools at which the children of all classes could be compelled to attend. (2) Considering a practical guarantee to children against religious teaching disapproved of by their parents sufficient (as regards any religious difficulty) to convert a Denominational school into a *suitable* school.—The very principles complained of in the Education Act of 1870.

But the League in these clauses also proposed a principle which was not adopted in the Education Act, and against which Nonconformists surely ought to have protested, viz.:—(3) Contributing money out of the rates directly in support of the Denominational schools, so as to make up, when added to the amount received from Government grants, the whole cost of the education of the children sent to them by School Boards, *even though the parent should elect that his child should receive denominational teaching.*

This brings me to another point. The Act of 1870 is not only the Magna Charta of English children, in the sense of securing them from obnoxious religious teaching, and securing for them efficiency in the secular teaching; it also secures for them elementary education, on an average, at one-fourth of its actual cost. And it attempts to do this also *without* infringing the principle laid down by Mr.

Gladstone relative to the severance of public money from the support of denominational teaching—a principle which the scheme of the League so clearly *did* infringe in the clause above quoted.

Now what is the true principle upon which the State attempts to cheapen elementary education in public elementary schools?

Starting with the fundamental principle that it is the parent's duty to educate his child, and that it is the duty of the State to see that this parent's duty is discharged, the difficulty which has to be met is, that the cost of education is more than the parent can afford. The cost of elementary education is about eightpence per week per child, and the working classes—almost the whole of them in rural districts, and the lower grade of them in big towns—cannot afford out of their scanty wages to pay so much.

Now the real object of the State in removing this difficulty is to *help the parent*, and if the State were to say to the parent "We will refund to you three-fourths or the whole of the cost of your child's education, provided you satisfy us that in secular subjects the child is efficiently taught," the *pecuniary* difficulty would be at once removed, without raising any *religious* difficulty at all. But such a course would tend to pauperize the parent. Therefore the object is sought to be indirectly gained by cheapening secular instruction in the schools, and offering it at one-fourth its cost to the parent, instead of putting the money into the parent's pocket to enable *him* to pay the whole cost himself. Whichever way it be done the object is the same, *i.e.*, aid to the parent and not aid to the school. By limiting Government grants in the case of schools to results in secular education only, elementary education in its secular branches is cheapened by the State in all public elementary schools, whether Board schools or not, for the benefit of parents, without raising the shadow of a religious difficulty in any reasonable mind. At all events, those whose objections upon principle against the application of public money to religious teaching of a sectarian kind are the strongest, must feel that every possible care has been taken in this case to guard against the infringement of their principle.

But a hot agitation has been raised against clause 25 of the Act, which authorizes the payment by School Boards of the school fees—not as the League proposed of all children sent by the Board to Denominational schools under their compulsory powers, but only—of those children whose parents are too poor to be able to pay for them. As the clause makes it a condition of such payment, that it shall not take away from the parent the choice of schools, it is alleged that these fees may be taken to Denominational schools, and so go to pay

Denominational teaching as, of course, they might have done or the still more objectionable proposal of the League.

Now what is this religious objection really worth? If all State aid to cheapen education has so obviously, as we have shown, for its object aid to the parent and not aid to the school to which the parent's child may go, still more clearly must it be so in such a case as this, in which the payment or remission of the fee goes directly into the pocket of the parent, and relieves his poverty from a payment due from him and from no one else. I have already made elsewhere a suggestion on this subject which I append below.* I cannot bring myself to believe that what reasonable men object to in clause 25 is its principle. Any religious objection to its principle seems to me to be so refined and sublimated, and so entirely based upon a misapprehension of the object of State aid to education, that I cannot think it can be long maintained. What Nonconformists really do fear as regards this clause is surely that its principle will not be adhered to in practice. They fear that cases of payment of fees on the ground of poverty will become too numerous, that managers of Denominational schools will get careless and lenient in the collection of fees, and bring in long lists of poor children in their schools, whose fees they want to have paid by the Board. The use of the

* In a letter to the *Spectator* I ventured to suggest that neither the religious liberty of parents nor the consciences of Nonconformist ratepayers need be infringed upon by carrying out Section 25 of the Education Act, if School Boards under their bye-laws would but make their *practices* conform strictly to the *principle* of the section and of the whole Act.

Let the payment of school fees in cases of poverty be invariably treated as a matter strictly between the Board and the parent; and in each ascertained case of real poverty let the payment be made *direct to the parent*, in the shape of a cheque or order upon the treasurer of the School Board, in some such form as the following, viz. :—

(Under Section 25 of the Elementary Education Act, 1870.)

“To THE TREASURER OF THE ——— SCHOOL BOARD.

“Pay to [John Smith] the sums mentioned on the coupons attached hereto, being the school fees of his child [James Smith] for ——— weeks ending ———, 1871, the certificate on the back of the coupons being first filled up and signed by the secretary of such public elementary school as he may select.

“Signed, ———

“N.B.—The coupons attached will be taken in payment of the school fees of the above-mentioned child at any public elementary school in the district.”

[Here follow the coupons, with the certificate of the child having attended school, on the back of each.]

By such a strict conformity to the principle of the clause in the method of carrying it out, it would at least be made clear that the payment of the school fees of poor parents out of the rates was in no sense in principle or in fact a rate in aid of any schools whether denominational or otherwise, but plainly a rate in aid of poor parents, to enable them to do what the State compels them to do without starving their families. By the adoption of such a method of payment Denominational schools would be prevented from coming to the Board for the wholesale payment of the fees of their poor scholars, and on the other hand, no pretext would any longer exist for robbing poor parents of the right of choice of schools which the Act gives to rich and poor parents alike.

clause ought not to be sacrificed to these fears of its abuse. Would it not be far better to take further precautions, if needful, to secure that cases of poverty are taken up strictly, as they should be, on their own merits, reduced to a minimum in number, and, if possible, prevented from arising?

I shall have more to say upon this latter point by-and-by; but in the meantime I want to impress upon those who demand the repeal of clause 25 on the ground of the possibility of its permitting public money to find its way to the support of Denominational teaching, or on the ground of fears such as I have described, that their strongest assertions against this clause involve no charge against the principles of the Act; they simply require what reasonable people might be apt to consider an unreasonable over-scrupulosity in carrying out one of its principles into practice.

I venture, then, to appeal to those Nonconformists who are opponents of the Act on the ground of religious difficulties, whether it be indeed the principles of the Act against which they ought to contend; whether it be not rather by asserting those principles and urging their being carried out more fully into practice, that their own real object may be most easily and logically attained; and, lastly, whether the resolute and patriotic abstention on the part of both Churchmen and Dissenters, and especially their rival clergies, from making religious difficulties, be not the only way by which they can really in the end be wholly overcome.

I now proceed to consider how other difficulties of a more practical character, and affecting more directly the interests of the masses of the people and the million of untaught children, are to be removed.

The first point on which I wish to fix attention is the advisability of marshalling the schools in the matter of *school fees*.

The League proposes to do away with school fees altogether. But there is this advantage in them, on which Mr. Forster laid great stress in his speech introducing the Act of 1870, viz., that they keep alive the sense in the parent's mind of his parental duty in educating his child.

On the other hand, there is this difficulty in school fees, that unless they could be graduated according to the means of parents, or fixed universally so low as to meet the needs of the poorest parents, and so be made almost nominal, the too wholesale remission of them on the ground of poverty can hardly be avoided.

The pecuniary difficulty is to be met, as regards the upper rounds of the educational ladder, by scholarships, which the poorest child, if sufficiently clever, can gain; whilst it is assumed that if he be not clever enough thus to climb the ladder to a higher point, he has

probably climbed as high as is really for his own benefit. But the bottom rounds of the ladder ought, it is admitted, to be climbed by all children, and so ought to be brought within reach of all, even of the poorest.

How is this to be done without sacrificing altogether the system of school fees?

I have elsewhere suggested how this object may possibly be attained. I may be allowed to repeat the suggestion here, for I believe the object it is intended to reach is one of the utmost importance in more ways than one:—

“ Let all the public elementary schools in each district be classified into recognised grades,—say into infant, middle, and senior schools,—and the school fees in each grade of schools be made uniform throughout the district: the fees in the infant schools being the lowest, in the middle schools somewhat higher, in the senior schools higher still. Then let the certificate of the inspector that a child has passed through any *lower* school entitle the child to pass through any *higher* one without increase of fee.”

The advantages of such a system would, it seems to me, be as follows:—

(1.) The poorest child, by beginning at the beginning of the school course in the infant school, would be able to earn his way through the whole school course at the lowest possible fee, which very few indeed would be too poor to pay. The remission of fees on the ground of poverty would thus be reduced to a minimum.

(2.) It would be a premium on due and early attendance at school, and so tend to lessen the difficulties of compulsory education.

(3.) The children of parents in better circumstances, who are not in the habit of using infant schools, would, without invidious distinction, be able to enter the higher schools at the higher fees, in free competition with poorer children at lower fees, whose previous training in the lower schools would place them on a merited equality.

(4.) The bottom round of the educational ladder would be placed within reach of the poorest child, and form the prelude to the scholarships which are to connect the elementary with the grammar schools.

(5.) The average of school fees would probably remain much as before, owing to the higher fees obtainable from the children who would enter the higher schools without having passed through the lower. A re-arrangement of the Government grant, increasing its amount as regards children with certificates from the lower schools, and lessening it as regards children entering at the higher fees, but without necessarily altering its total amount, would probably be all the financial arrangement required.

(6.) As the certificates would be given by the inspectors, and be Government certificates, there would be no reason why they should not be available in reduction of fees at any higher elementary school in the district, according to the parent's choice, or even, under proper rules, at the schools of any other district into which the child might remove.

Lastly, this marshalling of the schools (and upon this I lay great stress), whilst it would not, I think, unduly interfere with their freedom of action, would tend to accomplish what the conscience of the nation is more and more demanding—viz., that proper subordination of their sectional to their national object, which alone can justify their receipt of so large a share of Government grant.

There is another direction in which further legislation will obviously be required before the system can be made truly national, in the sense of meeting the needs of the children of the masses of the people: I mean the provision everywhere of suitable half-time schools, and of a local authority with power to arrange with employers of labour what hours the children employed in labour shall be at school. Even School Boards have as yet no power under their bye-laws to compel employers of children to make this arrangement, and they are not yet compelled themselves to provide half-time schools. A "Half-time Schooling Act" will therefore become an urgent necessity the moment compulsion is made general, and it is to be hoped that it will be undertaken at once by the Education Department, and treated as an extension of legislation on national education, and not as belonging to the Home Department.

Without entering into details, its provisions will, I presume, in some way or other have to cover the following points:—

(1.) There shall be in each school district a local authority, who shall provide (if not otherwise provided) suitable provision for the instruction of children employed in labour.

(2.) No child under thirteen shall be employed in labour, without having first produced to his employer a certificate of the local authority, stating that due arrangements have been made for his education, and also the times at which he is to attend school.

(3.) That no child engaged in labour over ten shall be required to be at school more than fifty hours per month.

(4.) Employers of labour employing children under thirteen without such certificates as aforesaid, shall be liable to a *small* penalty.

(5.) Employers of labour employing any child under thirteen, after receiving notice from the local authority that such child is not in due attendance at school, according to the terms of his certificate, shall be liable to a *much larger* penalty.

(6.) The parent shall be considered as employer of labour if there be no other.

(7.) The Act to be construed as a part of the Elementary Education Act of 1870.

Now as soon as such an Act as this is added to the Education Act, it is obvious that a further marshalling of the schools will be required. It will involve no little strain upon the schools to supply the requisite half-time classes, even in parishes so small that separate schools may not be required. And any one who takes the pains to read the passages in Mr. Stewart's "General Report" for 1870,* which describe the confusion to whole-time schools involved in the introduction into them of half-time scholars, will, I think, come to the conclusion that, as a general rule, separate provision will have to be made for them. This, I think, will be the case, whether the plan adopted be that of half-time schooling each day, or of alternate days, or longer periods, of schooling and work, or whether a choice be offered of all or any of these plans.

The fact that the passing of a half-time schooling Act may involve an important re-arrangement of the school system of a district, is an urgent reason why it should be promptly enacted, lest much of the work of arrangement should have to be done over again. The necessary provision of half-time classes or schools in almost every parish would, I think, be one of those matters which would strongly suggest the importance of combination and division of labour between the several schools rather than the existing rivalry. The impossibility in most places of maintaining *separate sets* of junior, middle, senior, and half-time schools, both for boys and girls, will be one of the things which may tend to draw what are now conflicting agencies into harmonious action; which may tend, in other words, towards the realisation of a system of common schools.

Now in support of the two practical suggestions just made, I have this further important reason to urge, viz., that I believe, when taken together, they would place in the hands of School Boards the key to the success of compulsion.

Mr. Forster urged, on the introduction of his Bill, that it introduced the principle of compulsion. Whatever further legislation is needful to make compulsion general, instead of optional, as now, or to make the national system bear the strain of compulsion, is simply carrying out his principle into practice.

When the Education Act was passing the House, I ventured, in an article in the *Fortnightly Review*, to answer the question, "Can compulsory education be made to work in England?" in the affirm-

* Education Report, 1870-1, p. 213.

ative. I there pointed out that children may be divided into two classes, (1) those who are too young to work and earn wages, and (2) those who are already at work.

With regard to the first class, to send them to an infant school at a penny per week is the cheapest thing that the poorest parent can do. It is a boon, and not a loss to parents to have their children a few hours a day under proper care while they work themselves. Were the marshalling of the schools before suggested in the matter of school fees carried out, and the educational ladder so brought down within their reach, the difficulties, as regards the application of compulsion to this class of children, would, I think, be reduced to a minimum.

With regard to the children who are earning wages, their case would be fairly met by such an elastic system of half-time schooling as I have also suggested. So soon as the duty of setting them free for schooling is made to fall on the employer of labour, as well as on the parent, the hardship of sending them to school would be reduced to a minimum. For the hardship now is that parents cannot make terms with employers. The choice practically is between full days' work and no employment. If the terms were arranged for them under a half-time schooling Act the hardship would almost vanish.

I will not here enter into further details. I will merely repeat the conviction that, were the needs of the two great classes of children met in such a way as proposed, it might be reasonably urged that, so far as the difficulties in the way of compulsory education, which arise from the poverty and outward circumstances of parents, and questions of labour, are concerned, daylight might be seen through them, and that in other respects also making the system in the best sense *national*, would make it bear the strain of the application of compulsion.

This brings me to the last point, and not the least, which I have ventured to write this article to suggest.

It is this—By whom is the marshalling of the schools, which I have advocated so strongly, to be effected and carried out, and by whom is compulsion to be applied?

No doubt it must needs be done under central control by some local authority. Mr. Forster has more than once appealed to the instincts of his Radical friends in favour of local self-government. The only true answer to the question is surely, therefore, "by a *School Board* in every district." School Boards are just now unpopular, because they seem to have spent so much of the first year of their service in denominational squabbles. But all this must sooner or later have an end. The sectarian topics will some day

have worn themselves threadbare, and public indignation will probably set in against sectarian squabbling, because it interferes with practical work. The causes which occasion religious squabbles will one by one be removed; and, as they get to practical work, School Boards will more and more be composed of practical men. Give them this work of marshalling to do, let them have to work out such a system of school-fees as I have hinted at, let them have to adjust the claims of labour and schooling, let them have to arrange a system of half-time schools, and denominational questions will be more likely to subside into their proper places, to make room for practical matters, the solution of which will require practical men. Especially will this be likely to be the case in rural districts, where the religious difficulty is theoretically the greatest. The parents and the employers of labour would become more and more interested in the work of the Board, as labour questions and the working of compulsion became mixed up with it, and they would be sure in the long run to elect their own men upon the Boards as well as the clergyman. The so much feared "Jupiter of the village Olympus" would soon be found to be one only in the council of the gods. The national conviction in favour of local self-government would be respected, and in every parish there would be a standing reminder that the English educational system was meant to be national as well as compulsory.

I have before pointed out that in order to carry out the half-time principle to all kinds of labour, a local authority will have to be provided. If School Boards be the proper local authority, why should not the opportunity be taken in the "half-time schooling Act" to provide for the election of School Boards everywhere?

To sum up the suggestions I have made. I advocate the honest attempt to remove religious difficulties (even including those which may be but crotchets) out of the way of the practical working of the Education Act; not by the repeal of any of its main provisions, but by whatever further legislation is necessary to carry out its principles to their legitimate results, under circumstances as they may arise.

But still more earnestly I advocate immediate legislation which shall at once convince the masses of the people that for the sake of their children the system is really going to be made national in the sense of being made to meet the practical every-day needs of the people.

The interests of the masses of the people and their children seem to me to require such immediate legislation as shall secure—


(1.) Such a marshalling of the schools and arrangement of school-fees as shall place the bottom rounds of the educational ladder fairly within their reach.

(2.) Such an elastic half-time system of schooling as shall fairly adjust the claims of labour and education, and enlist employers of labour, as well as parents, in the working of education.

(3.) The election of School Boards in every parish, entrusted with the work of carrying out the foregoing arrangements, and securing the attendance of the children who are now growing up untaught.

I believe that the earnest attention of Parliament to these points would do more to raise in the minds of the masses of the people faith in the realisation of a truly national system, and in the blessings it ought to confer, than any amount of legislation against religious difficulties which affect the consciences of those above them rather than their own. Let us remember that it is after all for the masses of the people that the long-delayed boon of national compulsory education is asked, and that the question between Church and Dissent is, after all, only a side issue, to be fairly and justly met to the best of our ability, but not to be magnified by either party into a matter of such immense importance, as that *for it* another generation of children are to be allowed to grow up into manhood, unfitted to discharge its duties. Let it be remembered that hundreds of thousands of children are every year going out into the streets instead of the schools, to receive another kind of education from that which it is the intention of the nation to secure—an education which no future efforts will be able to undo; an education which will foster poverty and crime, and result too often in inflamed passions, lawless selfishness, and precocious cleverness in sin; an education which will be deplored too late, when so many of our future citizens have suffered irretrievable wrong, when what we call “the dangerous classes” have been reinforced by a fresh infusion of lawless blood; when the foundations of the Churches have been a little more undermined, and the hold of Christianity itself on the nation loosened. It will be a hard blow upon religion in the eyes of the masses of the people if good men, carried away by sectarian zeal, whether churchmen or dissenters, push their rivalries (which, after all, are rivalries between Christian and Christian) so far as to incur responsibilities so terrible, by deliberately choosing again to intrude ecclesiastical difficulties between the children of the people and their acknowledged rights.

F. SEEROHM.



FENIANISM.

A NARRATIVE.

BY ONE WHO KNOWS.

THE Irish are an intensely religious race, but even in their religion they are inclined to be "Nationalists," and among some of them at least the Hebrew prophets are not held in higher esteem than St. Patrick, St. Columbkille, and others of minor note, to whom was deigned the gift of prophecy for the comfort of the faithful and the confusion of the stiff-necked Pagans among whom they lived. The utterances attributed to these worthies have been preserved by the Irish-speaking peasantry down to the present hour, and by the labours of antiquaries they have been transcribed and published. A volume of this kind lies open before the writer; and among the many predictions of evil to the Saxon which abound in its pages, there is one which fixes 1867 as "the year in which the English race was to be finally expelled from Ireland." By a singular coincidence, it came about that, in the chapter of accidents, that very year witnessed the attempt at an insurrection, commonly known as the "Fenian Rising." The outbreak of five years ago is fresh in the recollection of all; and yet, so rapidly do events crowd upon one another in these days, that it seems already to have glided into the region of history. Fenianism no longer affords material for panic-

mongers ; the time has come when it may be made the subject of a plain, unvarnished narrative, dealing with its origin and progress, and the circumstances which produced the "Rising of the 5th of March."

Such, then, is the object of these pages. It is not intended to speculate upon the causes of Irish discontent, or to deal in theories for its removal, but merely to lay before our readers the story of this extraordinary conspiracy—a conspiracy of which, "after much consideration and reflection," Lord Kimberley deliberately declared in Parliament that it was more formidable than any Irish movement since 1798; and this, moreover, although Ireland had been the scene of two rebellions in the present century, and the opinion of the ex-Lord-Lieutenant was pronounced before the occurrence of any of the startling events that afterwards gained for Fenianism a place so prominent in public attention.

The credit of organizing this conspiracy is due pre-eminently to two individuals whose names have become notorious in connection with it. James Stephens, one of the persons referred to, was a clerk in some business house in his native town of Kilkenny. The other, John O'Mahony, held a farm in the county Tipperary. Both were compromised in Smith O'Brien's rebellion, and fled from Ireland to avoid arrest. Stephens, indeed, was wounded in the affray at Ballingarry; and the story is told, that, to facilitate his flight, his friends gave him a martyr's funeral, and a coffin full of stones, bearing his name upon the lid, was interred with considerable ceremony in Kilkenny. Be this as it may, he succeeded in escaping to France; and in Paris he was joined by O'Mahony and some other refugees. How long these men remained together does not appear, but certain it is that here the new conspiracy was planned. Taught by their recent failure, and guided by the experience of continental revolutionists, they determined, in again organizing a revolt, to insist on greater secrecy than had characterized previous movements in Ireland; and it needed no great genius to discover that powerful aid might be obtained from the Irish population in America. Here, then, were the fundamental principles that should govern the movement they were about to inaugurate; it must not only be oath-bound, but absolutely secret; and America must supply the material resources. Thus connected with America, and with the France of 1848, it is not difficult to account for its having in fact assumed so intensely republican a phase.

It was accordingly determined that Stephens should return to Ireland, while O'Mahony undertook to organize the Irish race on the other side of the Atlantic. The "Phoenix" conspiracy, the first result of Stephens's labours, soon afterwards attracted notice in

Munster ; but, lacking American support, this society had but little vitality, and was apparently extinguished by the arrest of its leaders, who were brought to trial in 1859. There is no doubt, however, that Fenianism sprung from its ashes. The result of O'Mahony's earlier efforts in America appeared in the establishing of the "Emmet Monument Association ;" an ingenious name suggested by the closing passage in Robert Emmet's speech in the dock : " When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then, and not till then, let my epitaph be written." Other associations of Irishmen were also organized in different states of the Union, under the name of " Phœnix " clubs ; and the *Phœnix* newspaper was started by O'Mahony as the organ of " Nationalist " Irish opinion. These societies, however, were feeble and short-lived, and soon gave place to the " Fenian Brotherhood." At a meeting held in New York in the autumn of 1858, O'Mahony was appointed " President " and " Head Centre " of the new organization, which at that moment numbered only forty members.

It may be well here to explain the relations between the Fenian Brotherhood in America and the organization at home which is popularly known by that name. There is no doubt that the Irish Republican Brotherhood, as the conspiracy in the United Kingdom is called, was organized upon the pattern of the continental revolutionary societies—possibly of the " Mari-Anne," a club whose existence first became known to the British public through the pages of " Lothair." According to the design of its founder, it was to be essentially a secret society, every member of which was to bind himself by an oath to pay allegiance to the " Irish Republic," then " virtually established," and to take up arms at a moment's notice in its defence. A certain number of members constituted a distinct lodge or " circle," and each " circle " was presided over by its own officer, who was termed the " centre." The " circles " were grouped together in districts, under the charge of " district centres," and Stephens controlled the entire conspiracy, with the high-sounding title of " Chief Organizer of the Irish Republic." Each section of the Irish Republican Brotherhood therefore, down even to the " sub-circles," into which the lodges were divided, formed a perfect organization in itself ; and, in theory, the knowledge of the conspiracy possessed by the rank and file was confined to what passed in their own " circle." The Irish Republican Brotherhood was intended to furnish the soldiers who should accomplish the revolution, and every member was to be instructed in the use of arms and in military tactics. It was designed in fact to be a hidden army, secretly preparing itself for the field. It was in order to subsidize this army, and provide it with war material, military officers, and

reinforcements of men—to supply, in a word, all the requisites for a campaign, that the Fenian Brotherhood was established in America. The Fenian Brotherhood was rather a civil than a military organization. In the United States they had no need of secrecy as to their designs; and in hope of conciliating the priesthood, a form of pledge was adopted in lieu of a secret oath.* It must be remarked, however, that, with a view to expeditions against Canada, the Fenian Brotherhood became, to a great extent, an independent and purely military society, and in so far abandoned its original mission.

The new movement made rapid progress in America. Some estimate may be formed of its growth and extent, from the fact that, founded in 1858 with a nucleus of but forty members, forty regiments or military companies were enumerated in the *Phoenix* newspaper of the 19th November, 1859, as then connected with it in the different States; and at the beginning of the civil war, the number of enrolled members was estimated by the leaders at about 50,000.

It is impossible to fix with equal accuracy the date when the Irish Republican Brotherhood was first established at home. Probably, indeed, it was no more than a reorganization of the Phœnix Society under a new name. It is certain, however, that for a time the movement made but little progress. The remembrance of past failures restrained the people from joining it, and a display of strength was evidently needed to rouse their enthusiasm and inspire them with confidence. Accordingly, when Terence Bellew McManus, one of the high-treason convicts of 1848, died in California in the autumn of '61, the event was hailed as an opportunity for a Fenian demonstration. The remains of the departed patriot were brought to Ireland by a committee carefully chosen for the duty, and his obsequies were celebrated in Dublin. The Fenians expected to be allowed the use of the Roman Catholic cathedral for the funeral ceremony; but on this occasion, for the first time, an open rupture took place between the conspirators and the priesthood; Cardinal Cullen refused them admittance to the chapel, and prohibited his clergy from taking any part in their proceedings. The remains lay in the theatre of the

* The oath of the "Irish Republican Brotherhood" contained a provision of secrecy so stringent as to preclude the initiated from disclosing its affairs even in the confessional. The Fenian pledge was in the following terms: "I, ———, solemnly pledge my sacred word of honour, as a truthful and honest man, that I will labour with earnest zeal for the liberation of Ireland from the yoke of England, and for the establishment of a free and independent Government on Irish soil; that I will implicitly obey the commands of my superior officers in the Fenian Brotherhood; that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my membership, as laid down in the constitution and by-laws thereof; that I will do my utmost to promote feelings of love, harmony, and kindly forbearance among all Irishmen; and that I will foster, defend, and propagate the aforesaid Fenian Brotherhood to the utmost of my power."

Mechanics' Institute for a week, and were daily visited by thousands, "in honour of the old cause for which the martyr suffered." On the 10th of November a monster funeral procession brought the demonstration to a close. In spite of the opposition of the priesthood, the success of the affair fully justified the sanguine expectations of its promoters. From that moment, Fenianism rapidly gained ground in Ireland. The Fenian oath was eagerly taken, new members were enrolled, and new circles organized throughout the four provinces. Drill meetings were secretly held in every direction; lectures, bazuaars, and raffles were resorted to in aid of the Fenian funds; arms were smuggled into the country; and no pains were spared to tamper with the military in the various garrison towns. Such was the history of the movement for the next three years and a half, during which the agents and emissaries of the conspiracy steadily pursued their efforts, almost without a check.

There has never been any lack of seditious journalism in Ireland, and at the time now under consideration the "nationalist" press was peculiarly outspoken and violent in tone. Stephens, nevertheless, began to feel the need of a newspaper of his own, to be "the avowed and accredited organ of the Brotherhood." This scheme once devised, he prosecuted with his accustomed energy, and on the 28th November, 1863, appeared the first number of the *Irish People*, a paper of which so much was heard during the State trials of two years later. This paper was published weekly until the 16th September, 1865, the date of its seizure by Government. The literary merits of its leading articles were of no mean order; and a perusal of its columns would perhaps justify the statement that it was not more unscrupulous than is the newspaper press in general in advocating its distinctive views. It commanded an extensive circulation, and its influence was considerable. Its articles moreover are interesting, as affording what is so often asked for—a statement of the Irish question from the Fenian point of view, and an authentic and official declaration of the aims and objects of this conspiracy.*

* The following are characteristic extracts from the *Irish People* articles:—

"By force of arms, Ireland was wrested from her rightful owners, the Irish people. By no other means will she ever be restored. And is she not 'a land worth fighting for?' The sentence is an admirable one. It indicates at once the means and the end, the only means that can ever prove effectual, the only end that is worth the work. These means are simply the rifle and the sword and the cannon in the hands of those who know how to use them."

"The overthrow of tyranny has always been the work of the people. It is by their combined and determined efforts that rulers are made and unmade. America and France have furnished us with glorious examples of this. But in the streets of Paris, and upon the rich soil of America, blood was shed before freedom came; and so it must be in Ireland. To win for ourselves an independence, to raise Ireland to her proper rank amongst the nations, we must not when the time comes, be chary of our own or the enemy's blood."

"Something more even than a successful insurrection is demanded. And what is

It has been hinted that the organization at home received no serious check until the summer of 1865, and until this same period the Fenian Brotherhood in America had an equally successful career. The civil war, no doubt, drew away thousands from its ranks, but in the end it provided it with an army of experienced veterans, in lieu of the regiments of half-drilled volunteers that were the boast of the Fenians before 1861. The first "National Convention" of the Brotherhood was held in Chicago in November, 1863, under the presidency of John O'Mahony. They met, he declared in an opening address, to adopt measures for rendering their organization more efficient, as the time was fast approaching when they should have to strike a blow for the independence of Ireland. Various resolutions were adopted, announcing the object of the Fenian Brotherhood to be the "National Freedom of Ireland," declaring their allegiance to the constitution and laws of the United States, urging the younger members to study military tactics and the use of arms, inviting the co-operation of all sincere friends of liberty, defending the organization from the charges brought against it by some of the Roman Catholic clergy, and protesting against all priestly interference with the exercise of their privileges under the American Constitution. Other resolutions were passed binding the Brotherhood "to direct their whole force, moral and material, from all points towards the overthrow of British tyranny in Ireland," and "declaring the Irish people to constitute one of the distinct nationalities of the earth." The published reports of the convention alluded to three additional resolutions which, though unanimously adopted by the delegates, were withheld from the public for necessary reasons. These were a proclamation that "the Republic of Ireland was virtually established," an acknowledgment of Stephens as "the representative of the Fenian Brotherhood in Europe, and the supreme organizer of the Irish people," and an assurance of their unbounded confidence in his leadership.

Having disposed of these matters, a form of government for the Brotherhood was considered and adopted. A "Central Council" of

that? An entire revolution which will restore the country to its rightful owners. And who are these? The people."

"We saw clearly that the people should be taught to distinguish between the priest as a minister of religion and the priest as a politician, before they could be got to advance one step on the road to independence."

"Our only hope is in revolution. But most of the bishops and many of the clergy are opposed to revolution. Is it not then the duty of the Irish patriot to teach the people that they have a right to judge for themselves in temporal matters? This is what we have done. We have over and over declared it was our wish that the people should respect and be guided by their clergy in spiritual matters. But when priests turn the altar into a platform, . . . we believe it is our duty to tell the people that bishops and priests may be bad politicians and worse Irishmen."

five was appointed to share with the Head Centre the supreme authority; "State Centres" were named to control the organization in their several States, and "Centres" to preside over the various circles.

What the McManus funeral was to the conspiracy at home, the Illinois Convention proved to be to the organization in America. In an address delivered fifteen months afterwards in Cincinnati, its results were thus described by O'Mahony, and the statement, though highly coloured, was in great measure justified by facts:—

"In consequence," he announced, "of the vital energy derived from the Chicago Congress, instead of sixty-three branches, most of them apathetic, which were there represented, I see around me to-day the centres, delegates, and proxies of somewhere about three hundred, making an increase of about two hundred and thirty-seven circles, most if not all of them full of life and hope. The increase in our financial receipts has been in proportion to our increased extension. I can safely say that it has exceeded the sum of our receipts during the seven years that have elapsed since the Fenian Brotherhood was first established. The result of our first congress has been to extend our organization nearly fivefold."

The meeting in Chicago was followed up in March, '64, by a monster bazaar, or "Fenian Fancy Fair." Contributions were sent to Illinois, not only from the other States of the Union, but also on a large scale from the United Kingdom. It was reported that the sale produced 55,000 dollars, and the proceeds were to be wholly devoted to the overthrow of English rule in Ireland. The enthusiasm thus created lasted throughout the year; and at the Cincinnati Convention in the January following, the leaders, encouraged probably by the prospect of an early termination to the war, began to provide for the speedy execution of their schemes. On this occasion, as at the former congress, none but accredited officers of the Brotherhood were admitted to the meetings. In the inaugural address, from which an extract has been already given, O'Mahony entered fully into the condition and prospects of the organization. He proclaimed that they were "virtually at war with the oligarchy of Great Britain;" adding that, though there was no Fenian army as yet openly in the field, such an army, nevertheless, existed, preparing and disciplining itself for the coming struggle. He urged the importance of depending entirely on Irishmen to accomplish the freedom of Ireland, and declared that it was toward Ireland alone that their efforts should be directed: there it was that English tyranny must receive its death-blow. In the subsequent meetings, committees were appointed to attend to the routine business of the association. Among the manifestoes issued by the Congress were addresses to the people of Ireland and to the Irish in America, proclaiming the "deliberate resolution of emancipating Ireland," and

appealing to every Irishman at home and abroad to aid in the effort. The people, moreover, were urged not to forsake their country, "as the day of deliverance was probably very near."

A tax was imposed upon the organization at large, in aid of "the men in the gap;" and by a unanimous vote full powers were given to the executive to make "a final call," and to issue bonds of the Irish Republic as soon as they should feel convinced that the time for action had come. These measures were due to the influence of a powerful party in the Brotherhood, who, siding with Stephens against the more sober judgment of O'Mahony, insisted that war must be declared, or the organization dissolved, within the year '65. The Central Council met in February, and their deliberations resulted in the despatch to Ireland of a trusted emissary to report whether the home organization was really ripe for revolt. Kelly, the hero of the Manchester outrage in 1867, was entrusted with this mission; and before the council reassembled in May his report was received, urging the Brotherhood to immediate action. Other agents of the Council concurred in recommending the promptest measures; and in June O'Donovan Rossa arrived from Dublin to procure the issue of the "final call." The council, still hesitating to take a step so serious, determined to commission two of their own body to accompany Rossa to Ireland, with absolute power to decide the question whether an outbreak should be attempted within the year. Their decision was unequivocally for "war;" and accordingly the "final call" was issued on the 5th of August, and preparations were rapidly pressed on to aid the intended insurrection. Within a fortnight no less a sum than £6,000 was received at the Fenian head-quarters, and bills for this amount were forwarded from time to time to the leaders in Dublin.

The report of the plenipotentiaries from the Council carefully suppressed the fact that one of their number had lost his letter of credentials, and a draft for £500 with which he was entrusted. These documents were picked up at the Kingstown railway station, and placed in the hands of the Dublin police. The disclosures thus afforded appear to have put the authorities more than ever on the alert. But the difficulties of the situation were great. It was easy to entrap minor agents of the conspiracy, and obtain their conviction; but the caution of the leaders baffled all the efforts of the police. Meanwhile the state of affairs became more and more serious, and an intense feeling of uneasiness was spreading among the well-disposed throughout the country. At this crisis the Executive determined to outstep the bounds of law in order to deal with men who were setting all law at defiance; and on the 16th of September the office of the *Irish People* was seized, and the staff of the paper arrested.

This bold stroke of policy met with merited success. Strawn about through the office were found documents of the most private and secret character, amply sufficient to justify the seizure and to ensure the conviction of the leaders. Luby, the nominal proprietor of the paper, O'Leary, the editor, and O'Donovan Rossa, the publisher, with others of less note, were afterwards convicted on charges of treason-felony at a special commission held in November. Important arrests were made also in the provinces with similar results. For nearly two months Stephens evaded the police; but he too was apprehended on the 11th of November, and at once committed for trial with his confederates. It will not be forgotten how, with the connivance of a jail official, he broke prison within a fortnight of his arrest, and succeeded in making good his escape.

The news of the seizures in Ireland produced no little excitement among the Fenians in America. Another general convention was summoned, to meet in Philadelphia on the 16th of October. The Brotherhood mustered in force on the occasion, and considerable enthusiasm prevailed. An envoy from Ireland reported himself with despatches from Stephens, demanding instant subsidies for the outbreak, which was declared to be imminent, notwithstanding the recent reverses. The letters from the "Chief Organizer" were received with vehement applause, and his policy was endorsed by acclamation. An earnest desire was expressed by him for the services of John Mitchel, who was then in custody for political offences arising from his warm attachment to the Southern cause during the war. Bills for £3,000, posted to the leaders in Dublin before the tidings of their arrest reached New York, had been intercepted by the Irish Government; and to guard against the recurrence of similar losses, it was deemed important to have a "financial agent" in Paris, to whom future remittances might be sent. As Mitchel was perhaps the only person everybody would trust, he was nominated for the post. A deputation from the Congress was accordingly despatched to Washington, to treat for his release. The delegates soon returned to announce the success of their mission; and they further claimed to have received from President Johnson and Mr. Seward a favourable hearing for proposals they had laid before them to attempt a seizure of British territory in America—a statement the truth of which depends on the character of the men who made it, and this after all is not saying much for it. It may be remarked, however, in passing, that the "Irish vote," which affects so seriously even our English statesmanship at home, seems to be utterly demoralizing in its influence upon American politicians.

It is important to mention, with a view to subsequent events, that

the Congress adopted a new "constitution;" and in lieu of the "Head Centre" and "Central Council," they appointed a President, with a Senate of fifteen and a House of Representatives, as the government of the organization. These changes were brought about by the enemies of O'Mahony, who were rapidly gaining the control of the Brotherhood. The *quondam* "Head Centre," however, had still sufficient influence to secure his election to the presidency.

Stephens's envoy returned to Ireland immediately, and the leaders at home were greatly cheered by his report of the Philadelphia Congress. Within a month, O'Mahony received another despatch from the "Chief Organizer," informing him that, notwithstanding the arrests which had been made, the organization was still intact, and his "military council" had definitely fixed the last week of December as the date of the insurrection. On receipt of this news, O'Mahony summoned his Cabinet, explained to them the situation, and urged the immediate issue of the Irish bonds. His proposals, however, were coldly received. At the Philadelphia Congress, a man named Sweeny, a general of volunteers, and a major in the U. S. army, had been admitted to the Brotherhood and gazetted "Secretary of War." This man's hobby was a movement on Canada, and his colleagues concurred with him in ridiculing the idea of a rebellion in Ireland. Here was a regular dead-lock in Fenian affairs, and the crisis was rendered more serious by the news of Stephens's capture reaching New York at the moment. This last intelligence, however, was quickly followed by a communication from the president of the "military council" in Dublin, F. F. Millen, of the Mexican army, announcing that the plans for the outbreak were unaffected by the arrest; and the now notorious Coridon arrived with a letter from Kelly, reporting the intended rescue of his chief. O'Mahony therefore determined to act on his own responsibility, and to issue the "bonds of the Irish Republic."* The Senate assembled forthwith, vetoed the issue of bonds, and summoned the President before them; upon which O'Mahony declared the senators a corrupt faction, and banished them from the Fenian head-quarters. The senators retaliated by deposing O'Mahony and electing Wm. R. Roberts President in his place. At this juncture, when the Fenian treasury was empty, and the energies of the leaders were exhausted

* The bonds were printed in the style of bank-notes, and were in the following form:—"It is hereby certified that the Irish Republic is indebted unto _____ or bearer, in the sum of one hundred dollars, redeemable six months after the acknowledgment of the independence of the Irish nation, with interest from the date hereof inclusive, at six per cent. per annum, payable on presentation of this bond at the Treasury of the Irish Republic."

There were also bonds for smaller amounts. They were freely purchased at Fenian meetings in America.

in mutual quarrels, Millen arrived from Dublin to take command of the promised expedition for the liberation of Ireland. The year had then but ten days to run, and in such a state of things it was only too clear that the long hoped-for insurrection must be postponed once more. And yet so reluctantly did the leaders at home yield to the necessity, that the scheme of an outbreak in '65 was not finally abandoned until the 29th of December. On that day, Stephens summoned his military council in Dublin, and it was decided by a majority of one to defer action for a few weeks longer.

Meanwhile, O'Mahony had convened the "Fourth National Congress of the Fenian Brotherhood," to meet in New York on the 3rd of January. Owing to the excitement produced by the disasters in Ireland, the assembly proved one of the largest the Fenians ever brought together. As on previous occasions, the proceedings were secret, the doors being guarded by a company of the 99th State Militia in uniform, a regiment of which O'Mahony was colonel. The schismatic senators absented themselves; but Sweeny attended and pressed his views upon the meeting. His schemes, however, were rejected; and "War in Ireland," and in Ireland alone, was declared the policy of the Brotherhood. The senators were dismissed from office; the "Chicago Constitution" was once more adopted; and O'Mahony was re-elected "Head Centre," with a "Central Council" as before.

This last measure had the effect of confirming the division between the two parties of the organization; for Roberts and the Senate insisted on retaining the position they had assumed, and they set themselves to prosecute with vigour their schemes against Canada. A "war circular" was issued by them on the 16th of January, signed "T. W. Sweeny, Secretary of War, F.B." This document ordered the military members of the Brotherhood to hold themselves in immediate readiness to take the field, and, after an appeal for the necessary funds, it proceeded to intimate Sweeny's plan of operations in the following terms:—

"We need a spot on which to raise our flag, and obtain a recognition of our rights as belligerents. We cannot have it within the territory of the United States. We need a Port from which our vessels can sail, and to which they can bring their prizes. Do not believe that we mean side issues. Ireland must and ever will be our grand objective point. Trust to the experience of men who for long years have studied war's secrets in anticipation of the day when they could strike the foe of their race and country. Respond to my call as freely as your means will permit, and within three months we shall have fought our first battle, gained our first victory, and Ireland will have taken the first step towards the throne of liberty."

Meanwhile the state of affairs in Ireland appeared to become daily

more serious. Stunned for a while by the imprisonment of their leaders, the conspirators had recovered themselves, and increased activity was manifested. Three manufactories of Fenian arms were discovered in Dublin, and there were frequent seizures of weapons and ammunition belonging to the organization. The disaffection of the population in certain counties was alarming, and day by day it was spreading through every part of Ireland. Fenian agents from America were scattered over the country, enrolling members, tampering with the soldiery, and themselves prepared to lend to the insurrection an experience acquired in the recent civil war. Upwards of five hundred men of this stamp were actually known to the police, and the number was being constantly augmented by fresh arrivals from America. In Dublin itself there were said to be three or four hundred men besides from England and Scotland, awaiting, under Fenian pay, the signal for an outbreak. "It was impossible," Lord Naus declared, in looking back to this period, "to overrate the very great sense of alarm which pervaded almost all classes in the country." Such was the state of things disclosed in a letter from the Lord-Lieutenant to the Home Secretary, on the 14th of February. A Cabinet council was immediately summoned to consider it; and on Saturday, the 17th, the "Habeas Corpus Suspension (Ireland) Act" was passed through both Houses of Parliament, and received the Royal assent. In anticipation of the Bill becoming law, a raid was made on the prominent Dublin leaders on the Saturday, and over a hundred of them were placed in custody. In the provinces, too, the principal agents and emissaries were apprehended. The arrests were numerous during the next three months. It may be mentioned in passing, that the number of persons in custody under the Act, reached a maximum of six hundred and seventy on the 31st of March, and the total arrests before the change of Government in July amounted to seven hundred and fifty-six.

The effects of this measure in restoring peace and tranquillity to Ireland were most remarkable. The conspirators abandoned their meetings; such of the leaders as escaped arrest fled from the country; the public alarm entirely subsided; and, strange to say, the summer of 1866 was one of the most peaceful that Ireland has witnessed in recent years.

It is a singular fact that when the news of the 17th of February reached New York, it produced results the very opposite of what took place at home. A circular was promptly issued by O'Mahony, requiring the "centres" to call their "circles" together immediately. "Send us all the aid in your power," said he, "and, in God's name, let us start for our destination." Fenian meetings were held in New York almost every night. At a monster gathering convened in Jones's

Wood, the number present was estimated at tens of thousands, and a large sum was said to have been realised by the sale of Irish bonds. The activity of the leaders and the ardour of the entire body continued unabated throughout the month of March. A denunciation of the movement by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York in his sermon in the cathedral on Patrick's Day, seemed to have but little effect, even with the masses. Funds were accumulated, and munitions of war provided. Both sections openly declared the time for action had come; and the rival leaders pledged themselves "to liberate Ireland, or perish in the attempt." There was no doubt what this meant from the lips of Roberts, for his designs against Canada were notorious. But the activity of the O'Mahony party took a most unlooked-for turn. Doran Killian, the Secretary of the Fenian Treasury, had been a member of the deputation to the White House during the sittings of the Philadelphia Congress, and his head was filled with the idea of inciting a quarrel between England and the United States. With this view he proposed a plan to seize upon the Island of Campobello, New Brunswick, and there to hoist the flag of the Irish Republic. M'Cafferty and Halpin, two of the recently-pardoned convicts, were then in New York as envoys from Stephens, and they gave their votes in favour of Killian's scheme. Accordingly, a "secret circular," bearing their signatures in common with those of O'Mahony and his Council, was issued on the 31st of March, calling for all the men and material available to be sent to head-quarters. A small steamer was purchased at a cost of 30,000 dollars, to convey the arms and men to their destination; and the reckless and foolhardy expedition actually took place in the first week in April. The only question the raiders had to decide as they neared the scene of their intended conquest, was whether they would be captured by British or by American forces. They gave the preference to the latter, and the affair began and ended without a single shot being fired. This *fasco* brought disgrace upon O'Mahony, and the Roberts-Sweeny faction rapidly rose in popularity. Preparations were pressed forward for the proposed attack on Canada. The Senate met in New York; extremely warlike speeches were delivered, and Roberts pledged himself to resign his office of President if war were not commenced before a day then fixed, but not publicly mentioned. The public, however, seemed to have lost confidence in the entire movement, and the newspaper press began to hold it up to ridicule.

At this juncture Stephens landed in America. He arrived in New York on the 10th of May, and was received most enthusiastically by the Brotherhood. His presence had been earnestly desired, as the only hope of healing the dissensions among the leaders; but his arrogant pretensions served merely to widen the breach. He con-

demned alike the Eastport raid and the proposed invasion of Canada, and claimed that all the resources of the conspiracy should be placed at his sole disposal, with a view to action in Ireland. Mitchel had written to O'Mahony from Paris, entreating him not to allow the Irish leader to obtain the control of the American organization; but the Head Centre was powerless to prevent it, and accordingly he resigned in his favour. Stephens assumed the reins, and began a course of public meetings, to revive the ardour of the people and replenish the Fenian treasury.

At his first meeting in Jones's Wood he announced his policy to be "War in Ireland, and nowhere else;" and he added, "As surely as I address you to-day, we shall take the field in Ireland this very year,"—a pledge which he repeated on every opportunity during the next five months. He declared that money alone was needed. He had two hundred thousand fighting men in Ireland, fifty thousand of whom were drilled, ready to obey his summons.

Meanwhile Roberts and Sweeny were rapidly maturing their scheme of a Canadian raid, and the project was consummated on the 31st of May. On that night some six hundred Fenians crossed the Niagara River at a point in the neighbourhood of Buffalo, and "planted the Irish flag on British soil." In the absence of the general who was expected to lead the expedition, the command devolved upon "Colonel" John O'Neill, a man who had served in the Federal army during the war, and is said to have received a captain's commission for his bravery in the field. A number of the raiders fled at the first approach of the Canadian troops; but about five hundred men pressed forward as far as Ridgeway, and some serious skirmishes took place, in which several lives were lost. On the 2nd of June the Fenians retraced their steps, and escaped from Canadian territory; but before they could effect a landing they were captured by an American gunboat. President Johnson promptly issued a proclamation declaring the raid a misdemeanour, and ordering the arrest of its promoters.


The conduct of the United States Government in this transaction was deemed most praiseworthy, and served greatly to damp the ardour of the Fenians, who counted on the inactivity, if not the sympathy of the authorities. But the effects of this policy were vitiated by the general desire to propitiate the Irish vote, in view of the elections which were then approaching. Before three weeks elapsed, Roberts was introduced upon a Fenian platform by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The prosecution of the Canadian raiders was abandoned, and a bill altering the neutrality laws in the Fenian interests was actually passed by the Lower House, and "tabled" in the Senate. At the same time, by a resolution of

Congress, the use of a public building in Washington was granted to the Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, Stephens had been making a tour through New England, though without his usual success. The dissensions increased, and funds came in but slowly. The Irish Head Centre was actually arrested for a debt of 4,000 dollars by a man who had been a member of O'Mahony's "Central Council." Meetings were becoming less frequent, and the movement was sinking in public estimation, when a new impulse for evil was imparted to it by the action of public men in bidding for the Irish vote. The Roberts party once more avowed their designs against Canada, and Stephens issued a manifesto announcing in the plainest terms his intention of leading an Irish outbreak within the year. In the beginning of August he called for returns of the men who were ready to start for Ireland "at an hour's notice," and of those who would be prepared to follow on the commencement of hostilities. Later in the month the Fenian arms which had been seized at Campobello were restored to him, and he had also at his disposal the steamer purchased for that expedition. His position was further strengthened by the arrival of a number of Fenian officers, just released from Irish prisons. In an address to their leader these men gave an encouraging account of the state of the movement in Ireland, and expressed their readiness to return at a moment's notice. But, in spite of all this, Fenianism was manifestly declining, and money could not be obtained. It appeared from a financial statement published by O'Mahony that the amount received by him up to the previous May for Fenian purposes was 460,000 dollars; but of this only a few dollars remained in the treasury, and the personal extravagance of Stephens was a serious drain upon the funds. It was plain that no military expedition could be despatched to Ireland. Stephens, nevertheless, maintained his popularity by the audacity of his public announcements. At a meeting in Jones's Wood, on the 24th September, he repeated, with increased solemnity, his determination to take the field. "The men in Ireland," he declared, "are determined on fighting this year, and I am as fully determined on being with them, come weal or woe." A month afterwards he made his last public appearance in New York. On that occasion (28th October) he attended another monster meeting in Jones's Wood, and delivered himself in the usual strain. He announced that Fenianism in Ireland was as strong as ever, and that within the next two months would be decided the great question of Irish independence. "I speak to you now," he continued, "for the last time before returning to Ireland." "There are two hundred thousand men in Ireland as brave as you are, who want to fight more than you do." "My last

words are, that we shall be fighting on Irish soil before the 1st of January, and that I shall be there in the midst of my countrymen."

It has already been stated that during the summer all fears of Fenian disturbances in Ireland were dismissed; and when in August Lord Abercorn's Government sought a renewal of the "Habeas Corpus Suspension Act," the demand seems to have been made rather with a view to enable them to deal with the three hundred and twenty prisoners who remained in custody, than with the expectation that occasion would arise for any vigorous use of the powers conferred by it. Indeed, during the next three months, only seven warrants were issued under the Act; and at the end of November the number of those in custody under its provisions was reduced to seventy-three. But these declarations of Stephens had an extraordinary influence upon the conspirators at home; and their effect was enhanced by the arrival from time to time of Fenian officers, who had sailed from New York under the conviction that an outbreak was really imminent. There is no doubt that Fenianism was by no means as formidable as it had been in 1865, but towards the close of the year appearances became fully as alarming. Great activity was again manifested by the conspirators; the usual measures for collecting money were put in active operation; arms and ammunition were smuggled into the country; reports were industriously circulated that an immediate rising was intended; and it was rumoured that the men who were pledged to lead the insurrection had actually left America. Numbers of persons fled from their homes in consequence. There was a run upon many of the banks; and in one small town in Munster sums amounting to £5,000 were drawn in gold during three days in November. The Government were inundated with demands for protection from every part of Ireland; and a state of alarm, almost amounting to panic, prevailed from one end of the country to the other. In such a state of things the Executive was again compelled to seize upon the local leaders and the emissaries of the organization; and in December, ninety-seven of the most prominent among the conspirators were committed to prison under the Lord-Lieutenant's warrant. This opportune severity produced the happiest results; and so rapidly did the prevailing excitement die out, that before the meeting of Parliament, in February, the authorities at Dublin Castle came unanimously to the opinion that the extraordinary powers with which they were invested might at once be dispensed with; and an announcement to that effect was made in the speech from the Throne. Every one doubtless is aware how signally and how soon the hopes thus entertained were doomed to disappointment. In the concluding part of this paper we shall glance at the course of events in America, to which their failure was due.



HENRY WARD BEECHER.

PART I.

Mr. Ward Beecher and Mr. Spurgeon.

IT would be no compliment to call Henry Ward Beecher the American Spurgeon. He may be that, but he is more. If we can imagine Mr. Spurgeon and Mr. John Bright with a cautious touch of Professor Maurice and a strong tincture of the late F. W. Robertson—if, I say, it is possible to imagine such a compound being brought up in New England and at last securely fixed in a New York pulpit, we shall get a product not unlike Henry Ward Beecher.

Mr. Beecher is quite as remarkable for what he lacks as for what he possesses. With the exception of a strong and energetic personality which is highly original—he is almost without originality. He has no mental monomania, no idiosyncrasy, no new “doctrine,” no new “tongue,” no new “revelation;” and it is altogether remarkable that the two most prominent preachers in England and America respectively should be alike in this, that they have added nothing to the fertile field of theological dogmatism. Perhaps we ought to be thankful for the omission—it may be a hopeful sign of the theological times—a new era may be dawning upon a world “weary of the heat and dust of controversy,” when men shall no more run to and fro crying Lo here! and Lo there! because they will feel that the kingdom of God is within them. Perchance the still small voice of common sense has whispered in the ear

of each orator, "There is quite enough theology in the world, you need not manufacture any more; do you not think it is time to see about the religion of the people? There has been plenty of theology without religion, can you not fit up some of the old theological vessels (of wrath?) with a good sound freight of religion and morality, instead of sending to sea great argosies of pain and havoc, without a human heart on board, full of brimstone and all ablaze like so many fire-ships?"

As both Mr. Spurgeon and Mr. Ward Beecher are emphatically men of the day, each has unconsciously reflected the characteristics of the vast dissenting body over which he presides. As English dissent in its general tendency is narrow and evangelical, so American dissent is broad and latitudinarian, and these tendencies are faithfully reflected on the one hand by Mr. Spurgeon, and on the other by Mr. Ward Beecher. It is perfectly extraordinary how able and powerful the great Baptist can be within his very narrow doctrinal limits—it is equally remarkable how wide and catholic is the teaching of the great American Congregationalist, and yet how devoid of anything like doctrinal novelty. Whether this be a strength or a weakness, we must leave others to decide; we have already hinted at our own view of the question. He who has no one doctrine around which all others group themselves, and which in his hands becomes a new truth, will leave no school behind him, because he will either leave no formulas or too many. He who has some one point which he has the genius to bring out at the right time, or for the first time, will leave a school strong and coherent enough, but pledged to support one dogma at the expense of every other. If Mr. Spurgeon fails to leave a *school* it will not be for want of his definite Evangelical cast of doctrine, but merely because he is the eloquent exponent of a dying tradition. The crowds that flock every Sunday to the Metropolitan Tabernacle are not really drawn thither by the doctrine preached there—the same doctrine is constantly heard elsewhere, and inspires the impartial listener with something very unlike religious emotion. Had Mr. Spurgeon lived a century ago, when *conversion* was proclaimed in the form of a mighty reaction against the Slow Church—that word would have been nearly as electric in the mouth of his followers as it is in his own, and he would have founded a school; but as it is, *conversion* has become the stock-in-trade of the Slow Church, which has, in fact, preached itself to death with the watchwords of the faith it once persecuted. But Mr. Spurgeon resembles the last rose of summer. His fragrance is undoubted, his robustness, considering the time of year, remarkable—only he stands blooming alone. His religious influence will, we doubt not, be lasting, but his doctrinal influence will be nothing. Chapels raised by his exertions have sprung up, and, we trust, will still spring up, throughout the land. Long may

they increase and multiply; but in a very few years the men who aspire to fill them will have to preach a doctrine at which the ears of Mr. Spurgeon would probably tingle.

If Mr. Ward Beecher leaves no followers it will not be because his doctrine is obsolete, but because so much of it is already the common property of the world. It is better so. The time must come when all that is true in religious doctrine will be like the air and the sun and the sea—the common property of mankind. Perhaps Mr. Beecher sees this more clearly than other men, and perhaps this is one great secret of his influence.

There is a great deal of plausible and superfine talk about the influence of the pulpit being dead; and if by this is meant that the influence of a good many pulpits is dead, nothing could be at once more true and more fortunate for society. But to talk about the influence of the pulpit itself as an institution being destroyed by the printing press, or the spread of knowledge, is like saying that the influence of corn is going out, since the invention of Australian potted meats. The masses will no doubt now get more meat, and, therefore, will be less utterly dependent upon the baker, but the consumption of flour will probably not decrease, and it is possible that the quality may be improved. Now just as a due proportion of farinaceous food seems essential to the health of civilized communities, so religious eloquence has hitherto been found indispensable to their religious life; there never was a time when an eloquent preacher could not attract a large audience, and even when a dull man chooses to speak about religion, he is certain to get some one to attend to him. It is very possible for literary gentlemen who attend "no regular (nor any other) place of worship," but who kindly devote their eloquent pens to the enlightenment of a grateful public, to suppose that all churches and chapels are either empty or filled with fools, and that all sermons are either dull or fanatical. But a more impartial view of New York and London would probably lead to the modification of these opinions.

When a man in the midcurrent of American civilization steps in between the impatience of American thought and the hungry greed of American money-getting, and for more than twenty years induces a New York congregation of between three thousand and four thousand persons, infinitely more intellectual and more influential than that of Mr. Spurgeon, to listen with rapt attention to the expression of his opinions upon every conceivable subject, we may say, in the words of an influential London paper, "Verily Henry Ward Beecher is a power in the State!" But he has great claims to attention in England. He is already widely known to us by his "Life Thoughts," and several volumes of his published sermons have reached our shores. When he came to London in the midst of the agitation

about American slavery, and not long after the appearance of his sister's book, "Uncle Tom's Cabin," he was looked upon too much as a kind of American Beales. He was run after without being appreciated, and it was generally understood by an influential section of the public that he was lecturing on slavery at Exeter Hall in the character of a rabid political demagogue. We wonder how many now regret having lost the opportunity of listening to perhaps the greatest orator now living. However, before Mr. Beecher left our shores the general public had quite made up its mind about his oratory. It became as difficult to get into any hall where he was going to speak, as it is now difficult to get into the Court where the Tichborne case is going on. The favourite phrase used by the reporters was, "that you could literally have walked upon the heads of the people" assembled to hear him. We hope that before the close of this article our readers will find themselves in the enviable position of sitting in their own arm-chairs instead of Mr. Beecher's narrow and uncomfortable pews, and listening without any unpleasant crush to the utterances of the great American preacher; but if this is to be the case we must ask them to begin by conjuring up Mr. Beecher himself.

Mr. Beecher in Person.

Mr. Ward Beecher was born in 1813, and is now, therefore, nearly sixty years of age. Every motion and every utterance of the man proves him to be in the full possession of all his remarkable powers of mind and body. A writer in the *Globe* newspaper, who has lately given an account of his experiences in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, New York, says that Mr. Beecher, in appearance, is very like the actor, Mr. Buckstone, and his preaching is compared to the Falls of Niagara—after which our readers may infer that the Sunday services at Plymouth Church are neither dull nor passionless.

We have before us two portraits. In one Mr. Beecher is sitting down; in the other he is standing up. Yet the impression left on the mind is exactly the same. First, there is a regular American before us—a man who understands the meaning of the monosyllable "'cute"—a man of singular "go"—and also, we should say, great wisdom, prudence, and impartiality—a man who can afford to wait and bide his time, and be a master of men by firmness, tact, and intrepidity. In one face, which we suppose is the Buckstone face, there is a slight curl of quiet humour about the upper lip, but humour, we should say, under great control. As he stands—full facing us with his arms folded—in a perfectly easy attitude, he seems to be saying (his own words), "Blessed be mirthfulness—it is one of the renovators
world; men will let you well-nigh scale them and skin them,

if you will only make them laugh. There are a great many men who will not go into the kingdom of God if you approach them soberly, but who will go in if you will weave a sunbeam cord of mirth to draw them in by." It is Mr. Beecher in one of his cheery, hopeful, and most irresistible moods.

The other face is more thoughtful and preoccupied. The preacher is not in the pulpit now; he is sitting at home, very grave, but perfectly serene. His side face is turned towards us, and he may be about to reply temperately to some advocate of the "total depravity of man" (again in his own words)—"Human nature is bad enough, but there are many things about it that are good, there are many tendencies in it that are noble. Since there is so much heroism in common life and among common people, it is a very dangerous habit to speak indiscriminately of the evil side of human nature." There is very little of Niagara about this, but the deep, broad river is not always leaping down precipices; it flows sometimes through simple, green pastures, and is content to fertilize as it sweeps on, territories by no means remarkable for beauty or richness of cultivation.

"But," says a recent eye-witness, who records a sermon preached on Charity, and who is struck with the quiet intellectuality of the opening (after the first half hour or so, we suppose)—

"But by this time the preacher had passed from the quiet stream of discourse into the rapids. He moved quickly about the platform; his gesture became more violent—at last he raised both clenched hands above his head and seemed to rise to twice his height as he poured out a volume of sound which electrified us. He then stopped abruptly, went back to his Bible, and began again calmly—presently to hurry on to new rapids, and to thunder over a fall to another peaceful beginning."

From this it will be seen that Mr. Beecher does not preach from a pulpit, but from a platform, on which is placed a gorgeous arm-chair—the only gorgeous thing in his very plain chapel, except the profusion of flowers or autumn leaves by which at each season of the year he loves to be surrounded during the service, and which he knows how to use so admirably on occasion for illustration and even for argument.

Mr. Beecher was brought up in the country. His novel, "Norwood"—not very readable, by the way, although full of charming passages—abounds in woods and streams, hills, and dales, and flowers. "The willows," he tells us somewhere, "had thrown off their silky catkins, and were in leaf; the elm was covered with chocolate-coloured blossoms, the soft maple drew bees to its crimson tassels." Would that all preachers and writers used no more offensive and superfluous flowers of speech than such as these!

Mr. Beecher's biography, as it appears in biographical dictionaries, is so bare and uninteresting that it is hardly worth while troubling the reader with it. His life is in his mind, in his pulpit, and in the hearts of his people. His father was a clergyman and a theological professor. He was educated under him at Lane Seminary. His first cure was at Lawrenceburgh, Indiana, where he stayed two years; his next cure was at Indianapolis, where he stayed eight years. He then (1847) came to Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, where he has remained ever since, at the head of the largest and most influential congregation in the United States. Besides preaching, he is an eloquent writer and a highly effective lecturer, especially to young men. But if these outlines are meagre, the little autobiographical glimpses we get in his sermons are highly suggestive, and often piquant enough. We have before us six volumes of sermons, four of which at least were all preached between 1868 and 1870; each volume contains between twenty and thirty sermons, and in these volumes we have counted no less than sixty allusions to himself and the history of his life. His teaching is made radiant by his own experience.

When he wants to illustrate the comfort of a powerful, unseen, though protective love, he tells us how, as a boy, he woke up one midsummer night and listened, with a sense of half-uneasy awe, to the wild cry of the marsh birds, whilst the moonlight streamed full into his room; and then, as he grew more and more disturbed, he suddenly heard his father clear his throat, "a-hem," in the next room, and instantly that familiar sound restored his equanimity. The illustration is simple, but it hits the mark, and goes well home. His affectionate tributes to his father and mother are constantly breaking forth in spite of himself. "I thank God," he says, "for two things. First, that I was born and bred in the country, of parents that gave me a sound constitution and a noble example. I never can pay back what I got from my parents Next I am thankful that I was brought up in circumstances where I never became acquainted with wickedness." How delightful it is to think of a man who, without a taint of conscious insincerity, but simply out of the fulness of his heart, can get up before four thousand people, and say:—

"I never was sullied in act, nor in thought, nor in feeling when I was young. I grew up as pure as a woman. And I cannot express to God the thanks which I owe to my mother, and to my father, and to the great household of sisters and brothers among whom I lived. And the secondary knowledge of those wicked things which I have gained in later life in a professional way, I gained under such guards that it was not harmful to me" (vol. iv., p. 130).

He often dwells upon the observance of the Lord's day, and recalls pleasant anecdotes of the way in which even as a child he grew out of the dry letter into the free spirit of rest, recreation, and worship. "My memory goes back to the Sabbaths of my childhood, to the bright hill-top, to the church bell." Yet he wisely inveighs against making Sunday a dull day to children. "One Sunday afternoon with my aunt Esther, did me more good than forty Sundays in church with my father; he thundered over my head, she sweetly instructed me down in my heart." Let all parents mark, learn, and inwardly digest the following hints:—

"I think to force childhood to associate religion with such dry morsels (as the Catechism) is to violate the spirit not only of the New Testament, but of common sense as well. I know one thing, that if I am 'lax and latitudinarian,' the Sunday Catechism is to blame for a part of it. The dinners I have lost because I could not go through 'sanctification,' and 'justification,' and 'adoption,' and all such questions, lie heavily on my memory. I do not know that they have brought forth any blossoms. I have a kind of grudge against many of those truths that I was taught in my childhood, and I am not conscious that they have worked up a particle of faith in me" (vol. ii., p. 226).

Mr. Beecher is never tired of taking us into his greenhouse or showing us over his garden; and much of his teaching could be epitomized in the words of a greater preacher, "Consider the lilies of the field how they grow." He describes his gloire de Dijon roses, his apples, his crops, and always *apropos* of something which everybody is the better for hearing about. At last he may be said to get almost too free with his horticultural information—too free for his own interests when he exclaims, "Come up and steal some of my flowers any of you that want to next summer. I shall not miss them. I have so many that you might take a wheelbarrow load and I should have enough the next morning." This requires explanation. Does Mr. Ward Beecher mean that every one is to bring his own wheelbarrow, or that there is to be but one wheelbarrow for four thousand? if four thousand people with four thousand wheelbarrows waited upon him for four thousand loads of flowers, how much would be left for Mr. Ward Beecher the next morning? Of course it all turns on the size and fertility of the rev. gentleman's flower-beds. We are content to put the question and leave it there. It is a very simple sum in arithmetic.

Nothing is too homely to serve his turn.

"I have a cat in the country," he says, "that knowing there is a rat in the drain will lie crouched in the grass for six hours together, waiting for that rat to come out. And I know people that watch at doors where Christians are to come out just as patiently, and with just as much humanity. . . . They spy out the faults of professed Christians, and say, 'If those are Christians, I do not need to become a Christian.'"

In another place he tells them that the lock of his door is a very bad one, and that the latch-key requires a deal of humouring. Sometimes when he comes home he has to stand for ever so long trying to get in. But he says to the door, You have got to come open, and you shall come open. Oh, if there was in the soul the same diligence. "Strive (agonize) to enter in." He has a wonderful way of importing his leisure hours into the pulpit, and making the great cooped-up multitude feel something of the joy and freshness of his own exhilaration. One golden day above others seems to have dwelt in his mind. He refers to it again and again.

"When I walked one day on the top of Mount Washington—glorious day of memory! Such another day I think I shall not experience till I stand on the battlements of the new Jerusalem—how I was discharged of all imperfection; the wide far-spreading country which lay beneath me in beauteous light, how heavenly it looked, and I communed with God. I had sweet tokens that he loved me. My very being rose right up into his nature. I walked with Him, and the cities far and near of New York, and all the cities and villages which lay between it and me, with their thunder, the wrangling of human passions below me, were to me as if they were not."

Some of his sermons are full of vacation-rambles. He passes through woods and gardens and plucks flowers and fragrant leaves, which will all have to do service in Brooklyn Church; he watches the crowded flight of pigeons from the treetops, and thinks of men's riches that so make themselves wings and fly away. As he scales the mountains and sees the summer storms sweep through the valleys beneath him, he thinks of the storms in the human heart—"many many storms there are that lie low and hug the ground, and the way to escape them is to go up the mountain sides and get higher than they are."

Mr. Beccher's travels in Europe were not thrown away upon his ardent and artistic temperament. He has stood before the great pictures to some purpose, and has not failed to read their open secret.

"Have you ever stood in Dresden to watch that matchless picture of Raphael's, the 'Madonna di San Siste?' Engravings of it are all through the world; but no engraving has ever reproduced the mother's face. The Infant Christ that she holds is far more nearly represented than the mother. In her face there is a mist. It is wonder, it is love, it is adoration, it is awe—it is all these mingled, as if she held in her hands her babe, and yet it was God! That picture means nothing to me as it does to the Roman Church; but it means everything to me, because I believe that every mother should love the God that is in her child, and that every mother's heart should be watching to discern and see in the child, which is more than flesh and blood, something that takes hold of immortality and glory."

He likens the early heroes of the world battling under rude cir-

cumstances with imperfect means to Van Eyck's pictures, where the drapery looks like tin for stiffness, and yet you can hardly stand before them without tears in your eyes. They are beautiful in spite of all the infelicities of an early school of painting; a nation is thrilled even by rough heroes. History has been made radiant by them; the heart answers to every exhibition of moral excellence and moral truth.

Without violating the seal of any confession, he constantly permits us to see how intimate are his relations with those who have learned to trust and love him. He tells us of a man who came a long distance to ask him to save him from impending ruin. Of another who told him how he had first come to believe in God and religion through finding himself wholly unequal to the task of conducting a large overgrown school. On another occasion he says:—

“There came to me last week one whose bad ways I had known, and whom I had avoided, supposing that he was but a sponge; but, having since January last maintained a better course, he came to me, and, to my surprise, spoke of his past life, of his degradation, of his new purpose, and said, ‘The kindness that some friends have shown me has been very comforting and very encouraging.’ As I sat there my heart trembled. I rebuked myself that I had ever had any other thought than that he might be rescued; and as he went on my heart went out towards him. I longed to take him up in my arms, and out of the entanglements and temptations that beset him, and make a man of him.”

We have given but a fragment of the passage—again it is Mr. Beecher in one of his irresistible moods. From fragments here and there we might imagine that Mr. Beecher was conceited and egotistical, but he is only so in the same sense in which Mr. Spurgeon has been called profane. The orator who can create an atmosphere makes almost everything lawful for himself. But it does not follow that everything which he says in the warm midcurrent of feeling which he has created will bear repeating in the cold and limp atmosphere of unsympathetic gossip. Mr. Beecher is indeed full of an unconscious egotism, which is one of the most charming traits about him. He speaks before assembled thousands as simply and as unconstrainedly as if he were standing and chatting on his own hearthrug at home. In short, he talks about himself to his friends as much as ever he chooses, but always like one who knows that he is in sympathy with them, and they with him. “There is nothing that comforts me so much as to know that my preaching has made you better.”

“I am angry when I hear people talk of the awful responsibility of being a minister. People sometimes say to me, ‘I should think you would shudder when you stand up before your congregation.’ I shudder! What should I shudder for? Do you shudder when you stand up before a garden of flowers? Do you shudder when you go into an orchard of fruit in

October? Do you shudder when you stand up in the midst of all the richness and grandeur of nature? I shudder in your midst? 'But the responsibility!' I have no responsibility. I am willing to do my duty; and what more is there than that? I will not stand for the consequences. I will do the best I can. I will say the best things I can every Sunday; I will bring the truth home to you; and I will do it in the spirit of love. Even when I say the severest things it is because I am faithful to love. 'But your care!' I have not a bit of care. I forget the sermon a great deal quicker than you do. 'Your burden!' I have no burden. I take up the battle, and I lay the battle aside again as soon as it is over. And I shall sleep to-night as sweetly as any man that is here. And every man that is in the ministry, and is willing to love men, and be faithful to them, will find joy in it from day to day."

No preacher ever impressed us more with the feeling of living with the life of his people. He wishes to be one with them, not underrating their difficulties, not imposing imaginary and disheartening standards of life and conduct, but with each new standard supplying a motive power, that so none may put their hand to the plough and turn back. Although he would always rather rejoice with them than suffer with them, he is content to bear their sorrows, hear their confessions, and be depressed by their doubts and trials. There is something almost Pauline in the way he seems at times to lift the burden of each one individually, to hold on to the souls of his people as one who cannot bear to let them go, whilst feeling that they must go, and are going "from the great deep to the great deep."

We shall close our personal glimpses of the great American preacher with these very touching words. They occur at the end of a long and glorious evening sermon, all through which we cannot help feeling that the congregation must have hung upon his lips, so gracious and searching, so sustained and tender is he throughout.

"I linger, and yet I know that it is in vain by added words or by intenser expressions to reach the heart. My dear brethren and friends, I am joined to you to-night in sympathy, I am joined to you in love. We are pilgrims together, we are moving on—of this we are conscious. My sight grows dimmer, whiteness is coming on these locks, and you are keeping company; I observe it. Those who were little children when I came here are now carrying their little children in their arms. The young men with whom I took counsel are now speaking with their grandchildren," &c.

Some of his most eloquent passages are not always the most grandiloquent; but his words come kindled from the fire that glows in his heart, and although he has laid aside many tricks of the old and stately rhetoric, he has gained proportionably in a certain incomparable vigour and directness of address. But we shall have abundant occasion to show that he can be stately enough, rhythmic, and at times almost lyrical. The reader of his sermons must not be affronted at a few Americanisms, and some strange words here and

there that he has perhaps never had the advantage of hearing before. What "dark and pokerish" may mean we hardly know; what "thin and slazy song" may be we are at a loss to conjecture. We have noted many other strange words, such as "scrawny," "demark," "bested," "avertness," &c., but we need not dwell upon them, as we have much more important work on hand.

Mr. Beecher's Theology.

The days of stilted preaching are over. If a man has got anything to say people are, and always will be, glad to hear him; but if he has nothing to say let him hold his peace. Never was there a greater impatience with mere rhetoric than in these latter days. People may say that whole speeches of Mr. Gladstone are mere rhetoric, but what seems only rhetoric to persons out of sympathy with the Premier (1871), is not rhetoric to him or to those who understand him, it is merely the expression of a power to will and to do. When a man's words are understood to mean this he will be listened to in the Senate or in the Pulpit, and he will have the privilege of conveying his meaning in any way he pleases. Mr. Ward Beecher fully avails himself of this privilege. Nothing comes amiss to him. As for the dignity of the pulpit, he knows of no dignity save the dignity of doing good, of winning men by all means, of talking common sense in the most forcible manner possible.

Like almost every great preacher, Mr. Beecher is a real humorist; his satire burns, but it does not harden; he will laugh men out of their sins if he cannot otherwise persuade them, and he will show how very ridiculous an action may be, when he feels that no other kind of denunciation is likely to affect his hearers. There is one very amiable and singular trait about his teaching. It is the justice usually done to his opponents. He will show what he thinks good in them; he will state their case for them, better perhaps than they could state it for themselves, and when the point of antagonism is reached, instead of scolding them with polemical invective, he will hold not them, but their erroneous opinions, up to the mildest, most good-natured, but most irresistible ridicule.

But it is now time to turn from general characteristics to the subject-matter itself of Mr. Ward Beecher's preaching, which we venture to say will bear a little close attention. His fertility and freshness are alike remarkable.

"I asked," says a casual attendant at Mr. Beecher's church, "I asked a gentleman who sat behind me whether he was a regular attendant, and if so, whether he remarked any difference in the quality of the sermons or any repetition. He said, 'I have sat

here five years and I never heard any man repeat himself so little. I have heard other celebrated preachers, and have heard no one equal to him; as for the sermon to-day it was not better or worse than his discourses in general. It was an average sermon." And this is quite the impression left on the reader who chooses to study—we will not say wade through, for it is more light reading than wading—the six volumes before us.

A man who undertakes to treat the whole of human life from the moral standpoint has set himself no easy task. He who would do justice to all the various theological tendencies of his own age, has entered upon a field of difficult and perilous action, from which he can scarcely expect to issue perfectly unscathed, and yet it is astonishing how on the whole Mr. Beecher manages to justify his own description of himself as reasonably orthodox. The late Mr. F. W. Robertson managed to draw the teeth of many an offensive dogma by attaching a highly spiritual meaning to the doctrinal letter. This is not always Mr. Beecher's method, but the most exasperating shibboleths become harmless in his hands, owing to his singular faculty of seeing a common-sense side to every question; in short, his gospel is emphatically the Gospel of Common Sense. In his highest flights of thought, in his deepest expressions of religious feeling, he never loses a certain solid sobriety. To combine this with an impetuous temperament and a burning enthusiasm, such as he undoubtedly possesses, is a rare if not an original gift. How well Mr. Beecher employs thought and passion, common sense and a quite mystical religious fervour, perhaps they only can quite estimate who, to use a slang expression, "sit under him." But as the echoes of his voice travel across the Atlantic, we shall try and gather up the subject-matter of his teaching in a succinct form, and as the manner is altogether untranslatable, we must leave that to the imagination of our readers. The matter will range itself conveniently under two principal heads:—

I. RELIGIOUS TRUTH. Dealing with theological doctrines and their application.

II. SECULAR TRUTH. Dealing with all sorts of social and political topics of very various interest and importance.

RELIGIOUS TRUTH.

It being prefaced that the doctrine-hunter will have to put on his very best spectacles and go a long way before he finds anything corresponding to his idea of sound doctrine, we may proceed to inquire what views does Mr. Beecher hold concerning—I. The Trinity. II. The Person of Jesus Christ. III. The Atonement. IV. Regeneration. V. The Bible. VI. The Church—Sects and

Sacraments. VII. Infidelity and the Devil. Under one or other of these heads we shall contrive to say all that properly belongs to what may strictly speaking be called Mr. Ward Beecher's theology.

I.—The Doctrine of the Trinity.

Mr. Beecher's definition of this doctrine would satisfy the most exacting orthodoxy; for he states in so many words that "the Unit of the Old Testament has been superseded in the New Testament by a Divine Being represented by the terms 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Holy Spirit,' a one God with three manifestations," and (no doubt anxious to avoid Sabellianism) he is careful to add, "which manifestations answer to our idea of *personalities*" (i. 408). He does not venture upon the historical ground. He does not tell us, with one of the most learned of modern writers (Emanuel Deutsch), that "the Christians of the second and third centuries were far from having a clearly recognised and understood doctrine on this high subject" ("Chambers's Encyclopædia," Article—Doctrine of Trinity); nor does he care to remind us that it was not until A.D. 325 that the Church, at the Council of Nice, was led to define the relation of the Son to the Father. These matters Mr. Beecher probably felt would prove as uninteresting to his congregation as they evidently are to himself. Neither do we get an elaborate argument such as F. W. Robertson has provided us with in his Third Series; where the doctrine of the Trinity is elaborately explained by a reference to the complex nature of man, and found to be altogether in agreeable harmony with the laws of the human mind. Neither historical investigation nor metaphysical subtlety is much to Mr. Beecher's taste, yet before he dismisses the theory of this difficult and perplexing dogma, he does not forget to point to the great law according to which, as we ascend in the scale of animated being, we find an ever-growing distinctness in the variety of parts bound up in some higher unity. And again carefully avoiding the Sabellian heresy, of saying that God is but one person under the three manifestations, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he introduces a really subtle remark about the possibility of three *Persons*—not *parts*—being bound up in some higher essential Unity of Beings called one God. It is of course imaginable that God is one Person revealed to man under three different aspects; but that is heresy: it is also imaginable that the Deity may be composed of separate impersonal forces comprehended in one larger force called a personality; but that appears to be also heresy, as also every other possible way of defining God, save as three *Persons*—not manifestations or parts—but three *Persons* in one God, that is, a Unity of Being,—whether personal or not hardly appears, but if personal, at all events, not one Person but

three Persons. To meet this conception of three Persons, so understood, in one God, Mr. Beecher makes the following ingenious conjectures; it is his one contribution to the general metaphysics of this abstruse doctrine:—

“Because our acquaintance with vital intelligent sentient life is limited, because the class of beings with which we are familiar exist in unity—unity and diversity as far as faculty is concerned, but unity without diverse personality—we are not to suppose that this exhausts all possible modes of being.”

And then, after showing the enormous complexity of all high life (human nature, for instance), he adds, with very remarkable force and clearness, “Infinite complexity” (such as must be involved in the notion of God, the loftiest existence)

“Infinite complexity may be easily imagined to be not merely an agglomeration of faculties in one being—but a range higher than this—so that beings shall be agglomerated in a being, and that there shall be personalities grouped into unity.”

But clever as is this contribution to theological metaphysics, Mr. Beecher has evidently no great delight therein. He does not kindle over his metaphysics like Robertson; he is glad to be off to the ready and powerful applications of God's Holy Spirit to the actual wants and diseases of the human heart. The greater part of the sermon on the Trinity is taken up with such practical teaching—which is admirable, but not new; and therefore we may pass on to his views about

II.—The Person of Jesus Christ.

Mr. Ward Beecher treats the great central figure of our faith from his own peculiar point of view. He is very fond of falling back upon authority whenever authority will help him out of a difficulty. He is equally impatient when it thwarts the free development of his religious or social instincts. The authoritative declaration about Jesus Christ in the Scriptures is generally held to be that He is God—that He is the Saviour of man. In what sense He is God is nowhere clearly explained in Mr. Beecher's sermons. In the passage already quoted about the Virgin and Child, the Child was God; but then other mothers are to look on their children, and see the God within them. Yet Mr. Beecher would be unwilling to be classed with Unitarians on the strength of this saying. Nay, we find passages in which the Unitarian sense of Christ's divinity is clearly negatived in favour of a far more orthodox view. Yet clear exposition on this subject is almost cautiously avoided. We do not get any such helpful definition as Mr. Robertson's “Christ is God, under the limitations of humanity,” or any such subtle and luminous hypothesis as that there was from eternity something in the Creator which had sympathy

with what we call human nature—that this Humanity of God came forth in Jesus Christ. No such results of hard and patient metaphysical thought are noticeable in Mr. Beecher's sermons on Christ. He gives us the authority of the Bible generally for the divine personality of Christ; he dismisses it without explanation. Is it too rash to try and express what seems to us to be a very general undercurrent of thought just now prevalent upon this subject, and which would be something like this:—"Tell me exactly what you think God is, and then I will tell you in what sense I believe Christ to be God. Until I know exactly what to understand by God, I cannot tell you exactly what I understand by Christ." Meanwhile, Mr. Beecher falls back upon the Bible. He gives us the same authority for what is usually called a scheme of redemption, in which Christ appears as the Saviour of mankind; he dismisses this also without explanation. He then constantly bends his whole power upon the life of Christ, as providing a solid and perfectly practical ideal for all men to work upon at all times and in all places. However, on the divinity of Christ he is explicit, if nothing more, as far as assertion goes.

Christ is God; "for if the emotions expressed by the Apostles towards God are worship, then the emotions expressed towards the Lord Jesus Christ are not one whit lower in the scale of worship" (i. 408). Christ was made perfect through suffering—"perfect, that is, as a Saviour; for as God he needed no perfection." It is hardly possible to assert more and to explain less.

III.—The Atonement.

On the doctrine of the Atonement and the general scheme of Redemption, Mr. Beecher expresses himself with a certain freedom and laxity calculated to astonish and alarm the orthodox believer; and yet it would be difficult to accuse him of wilful obstinacy and spiritual blindness for reminding his hearers that many opinions had been held about the Atonement, and that he could not undertake to say which was the most correct. We might have been spared some theological controversy if this method of treatment had occurred to a few other notable divines. Still, Mr. Beecher is anxious to preach the fact of an Atonement and the fact of man's Redemption. We must let him speak for himself. After quoting several passages relating to Christ's death, he asks, "Can a plain man avoid inferring from such declarations that Christ did suffer in the place of men and for men" ("Vicarious Sacrifice," Heaton, vol. i.)? But this assertion is obviously capable of a dozen different explanations, and the eagle eye of orthodoxy will at once be strained to discover somewhere the confession of an *opus operatum* on the unseen world, owing to the

death of Christ. Was the power of the devil broken by the Saviour in mysterious single combat? Was the mind of God the Father changed towards man, so that without any action of his own, but simply by accepting the death and sacrifice of Christ, the believer passes from death to life, in a way which would have been impossible without that death and sacrifice? To such inquiries Mr. Beecher virtually replies, "I don't know;" unless an eager theologian can extract any more satisfactory meaning from passages like this: "I do not say that the mediation and vicarious suffering of Christ contains in it nothing more than that which is contained in the action of every family, &c. . . . There are other elements that spring from the mysterious relation of Christ to the moral government," &c.; but, as far as we can discover, these "elements" are nowhere set forth, although more than once we are reminded that the work of Christ had some mysterious effect upon the powers of evil, and in some way changed the relations between God and man, without any action on man's part.

One of the finest of Mr. Beecher's sermons is on "Vicarious Suffering" (Heaton, vol. i.); yet, although we get an ample exposition of a doctrine of substitution, or vicarious suffering, we get no nearer any exposition of the Atonement in the sense of Christ's death procuring God's pardon for sinners, in a way external to man's own righteousness and repentance. In a passage of great force and high cumulative eloquence, which we cannot quote at length, our preacher gives the view of vicarious suffering which has most impressed his own mind:—

"If it be impugning the character of God to teach that there is a doctrine of substitution and vicariousness, by which the just suffer for the unjust, then it is a doctrine which strikes clear through outward creation. Who pay for vice? Not the vicious. The virtuous pay for it. Who pay the taxes of the community? The men whose vices are the leakages? This community is a vast hull, and at every seam there is leaking and leaking. Whose work is it to calk it up? Why, it is the industrious man that pays for the waste of the shiftless man in the long run. It is the vice of the community that is the tax-gatherer of the community. . . . If it were not for good men, communities would break down under the vices and crimes of bad men. . . . And if you say that it is against the idea of divine benevolence that God should let just men suffer for unjust men, then your idea of divine benevolence is a false one. It is not in accordance with past reason; it is not in accordance with the facts of human life; it is not in accordance with your own ideas. . . . When you call to mind your own feelings as a father, and when you take lessons from the household, then your conception of a being that is true to the laws of the universe must recognise the principle of suffering one for another. What would you not do for a child? How much would you not suffer? How long would you not bear with him if only through your instrumentality he might be saved? Now lift that sublime form of parental life which is familiar to you up into the sphere of the Infinite. Crown it, and enthrone it, and call it

God, Saviour, and how glorious it becomes! Is it not adorable and praiseworthy when it rises to the proportions of divinity, and becomes typical of the character of the Creator Himself?"

The noble grasp which Mr. Ward Beecher has over what we call the human side of every divine question is never more striking than in his treatment of Jesus Christ as the ideal man. Around this central figure all high moral and spiritual life must revolve. The ideal will never be outgrown. For it is an ideal which lays hold of the whole range of human powers and aspirations. Nothing is more denied than this in the present day. It is said that Christ's character was in many ways deficient, his intellectual sympathies limited, his circumstances so different from ours that no fair comparison between our lives and His is possible. To all which Mr. Beecher in many places gives a summary contradiction. "Here is the sum and substance of Christianity," he says, "that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith. It is the whole of Christianity in the same way that an acorn is the whole of a tree" (iii. 352). The Christ planted in a man is the one thing needful. The author of "*Ecce Homo*" has probably inspired Mr. Beecher with his materials for rebutting the charge of want or deficiency in Christ's character. The limitation of His sympathies will probably not be felt by those who perceive that He was under historical as well as individual limitations. It would have been mere waste of time for Him to have unfolded a number of interests for which the world was not ripe, to have propounded systems of government which at the time would not have been adopted, or truths of political economy which would not have been understood. Suffice it to say that all good government is to this day assisted and fostered by the principles of the Christian life, benignly unfolded beneath them like flowers beneath the sun; and that no hitherto ascertained precept of political economy is otherwise than in perfect harmony with the spirit, if not the letter, of an enlightened, a developed, nay, an ever-developing Christianity.

The imitation of Christ is in one sense impossible, nor, if possible, would it be desirable; but He is in a profound sense an example, since in Him were all the faculties that are in us. "As He was, so are we in this present world." All that properly belongs to human nature was tried. He was tempted in all points (though not in all circumstances), like us, yet without sin. Only an extensive acquaintance with these sermons will convince us how thoroughly Mr. Beecher sees his way to harmonizing every legitimate sphere of modern life with the spirit and power of Christianity, not as it is found in this or that sect, but as it is found in Jesus Christ; and he who will undertake to do this in the present day, without losing his sympathy with, or misconceiving, the scope of modern doubts and

difficulties, and the complexities of modern civilization, must certainly be accounted a great Christian teacher.

IV.—Regeneration.

If there is one doctrine more than another susceptible of two extreme and opposite interpretations, it is the doctrine of conversion, or conscious regeneration. Baptismal regeneration is of course absolutely set aside by Mr. Beecher; but upon conversion, upon "the majestic reality, the sublime truth that a man may be born again," Mr. Beecher is never tired of descanting. What he does *not* mean by conversion is amusingly clear from the following passage:—

"A man goes to the minister, and says, 'What must I do to secure eternal life?' 'You must repent,' says the minister. So the man cries, and cries, and cries, and feels bad, and feels bad, and feels bad. That is the way he pays for his insurance. By-and-by he feels better, and he asks the minister, 'Is that the evidence that I have my policy?' 'Yes,' says the minister, 'you have had your bad state, and you have come to your joyful state, and now you have your hope.' And the man goes home, and says to his wife, 'My dear, I have passed from death unto life; and, come what may, I am going to be saved. I may wander, to be sure; but I have my evidence, my hope, my insurance.' Oh!" exclaims the preacher, "is there any heresy comparable with this spiritual indifference and spiritual security?" (Heaton, vol. i. 276.)

That is an instance of the good-humoured way in which an ignorant, bigoted, but once very common view of conversion, is treated. The opponent is not raved at or excommunicated, but he is quietly put out of court with a few words selected from his own favourite vocabulary. No spiritual state can supersede watchfulness; no experience here on earth can place us beyond the reach of harm; but, this granted, let the soul be open to every breath of divine influence, let the wind sweep through it and purify its innermost caverns, let the sun shine out, and render fertile its barren plains, let the blessed dews of regenerating grace work their gracious will. How different from our last quotation is the earnest tone of the following passage, in which the true doctrine concerning regeneration is propounded:—

"Sometimes men complain of the doctrine of a regenerated life, as if it were a requisition—it is not—it is a refuge. Oh, what would not a criminal, who at thirty-five years of age found himself stung with disgrace, and overwhelmed with odium, give, if in the policy of human society there should be any method by which he could begin back again, as if he had not begun at all, and with all his accumulated experience build his character anew! But in the economy of God in Christianity there is such a thing as a man at fifty and sixty years of age—hoary-headed in transgression, deeply defiled, struck through and through with the fast colours of depravity—having a chance to become a true child again. God sets a partition-wall between him and past transgressions, and says, 'I will remember them no more for ever.'" (Heaton, vol. i. 192.)

Some men are regenerate from their birth; they have always grown up surrounded by good influences, and appropriating them. We must not insist upon their going through convulsions and paroxysms of repentance, and coming out new men. There remains in them, of course, a certain proneness and proclivity to evil; they have got to watch and pray like others, but they walk consciously with God; they often do unconsciously what is right, following the higher law of a nature which has become the subject of spiritual influences.

There are others who have learned the dignity of the moral law, but who grow up for some time without becoming the subjects of any of the higher spiritual influences. To them the raptures and ecstasies of the devotee are unknown; to them the purification through trial and sorrow is a mystery; prayer is an unvitalized form of words; their conversion is to come; perhaps, like Peter's, it may come through some startling fall, some unexpected failure to obey the moral law. Perhaps the light of eternity may first break upon the soul through the darkness of pain and loss, through the rent clouds of agony and despair. There is in all men the higher nature; there is in most men the sleep of that higher nature, until the voice rings out, "Awake, thou that sleepest; arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee life," and that awakening is conversion. Without giving chapter and verse for the above general statements, we believe they do substantially embody Mr. Beecher's views upon the doctrine of conversion through the regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit.

V.—The Bible.

There is one sermon of Mr. Beecher's on the Bible so eloquent, so attractive, and so typical of his teaching in every way, that we need make no further apology for presenting our readers with an exceedingly bold, and in some respects satisfactory, view of the much-vexed question of the inspiration of the Bible. To say that Mr. Beecher's utterances in this sermon are altogether consistent with many of his inferences elsewhere, would be going too far. In places where dogmatic doctrines, such as the "Divinity of Christ" and "Miracles," have to be stated and accepted without discussion, Mr. Beecher falls back upon Bible statements with real, child-like simplicity; yet in this sermon he frankly admits that the authority and authenticity of the Bible books is by no means unimpeachable, and he gives us the vaguest and least critical hints about how we are to decide upon what is theologically true to be believed. He is so completely satisfied about what is morally and spiritually true in the Bible, that the rest does not seem to disturb him, and this is highly

characteristic of Mr. Beecher's mind. It is a mind which, whilst it has been developed in practical grasp and readiness by constant preaching, has been left undeveloped in mental consistency, as only the habit of constant preaching can leave a mind undeveloped. It is in no unfriendly spirit that we make this criticism. If Mr. Beecher possessed the logical consistency of a Newman or the close reasoning of a Mill, he would probably have far less power as an orator. It is the instantaneous reflection of all that is going on around him that gives him his power. He will state one view of truth that is uppermost at the time, and at another time he will state another view, which it would be difficult to accept were the first truth present to the minds of his hearers; but then it is not, and so no one is perplexed, and every one goes away with the idea that there is no real difficulty in believing, and no real difficulty in acting; the part has been put for the whole with a fervour and skill which carries everything before it. We do not blame Mr. Beecher for this; it is the method which makes all great action possible. The men of one idea have carried most of the great reforms, and done the real work of the world. Mr. Ward Beecher has many ideas; but he never keeps more than one at a time before his hearers, and perhaps he is quite right; only, when one comes to sit down quietly and reflect on the orthodox way in which he founds many of the current doctrines of Christianity upon a certain selection of Bible texts, and then reflect upon some of the statements, which we shall have presently to notice, in this really great sermon on the Holy Scriptures, of course the criticism is forced upon us,—If the dogmatic theology is right, then this view of the Bible is doubtful; but if this view of the Bible be right, then the dogmatic theology becomes doubtful.

We do not wish to press these delicate questions any further just at present; we should like our readers to forget them, and to get into a Brooklyn pew for a few minutes and listen themselves to what, in the mouth of the preacher, no doubt sounded like the words of infallible truth. In our opinion, it is certainly the best truth about the Bible that we have met with for some time.

The text promises well for orthodoxy, as it contains the words, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God"—a clause which is to be lightly but summarily dealt with—"and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works;" upon which last clause the whole stress of the sermon is really laid. After noticing that the Holy Scriptures must mean the Old Testament, as the New Testament was not then in existence, the word "inspiration" is characteristically dealt with:—

"There is no theory or philosophy of inspiration propounded in any part of the sacred books. It is manifest that it is a divine influence, an inbreath-

ing of God upon those who wrote ; but the theories of inspiration are modern and human. We may take it as stated in general that the sacred books were composed and given to the Church under divine direction or influence."

We may repeat that much controversy might have been avoided had theologians been willing to agree to some such general statement as this ; at the same time it would have been still easier to say at once that everything takes place either by divine permission or under divine direction or influence, and that thus the books of the Bible share the common lot of everything. We are then told that we need not lay much stress upon the authority of the Bible because inspired, but because its actual contents are profitable for doctrine, for reproof, &c. The Scripture makes the test of its own validity to be in what it can do. And here at the outset we must call attention to what seems to us a weak link in the chain of argument. If the contents of the Bible, it is said, are granted to be true, it does not matter where they come from. There is no dispute in respect to the great moral and spiritual truths of the Bible, and then in the next sentence we read, "On all the essential truths of Scripture there is an agreement between all Christians—I might almost say between all men." But then the reader may ask, What are essential truths of Scripture? Moral and spiritual truths, says Mr. Beecher, which do not rest upon authority, but upon human experience; yet elsewhere the truth of Christian miracle, and in this sermon the immortality of the soul, are both treated as essential truths, yet neither of these can be properly said to authenticate themselves in the same way that moral truth does, and yet under the name of spiritual truth Mr. Beecher is constantly mixing up such propositions as *The soul is immortal*, *Christ rose from the dead*, and *Thou shalt not steal*.

Passing this over, we come to a most wholesome exposition of what the Bible really is. It is not one book, it is fifty-seven separate books, written by thirty-six different writers, living hundreds of years apart, speaking different languages, being subject to different governments, and not having necessarily any knowledge of each other's work. The binder's art has made these books, or tracts, *one*. They have a certain moral unity—the same sort of relation which the writings of the earliest chemists have to the latest chemists—that is to say, the latest include the earliest; the unity is what he calls "an accidental or providential one." We ought not to wonder, then, that the Bible contradicts itself, for it is not like a book composed by one mind. It is the religious works that appeared for thousands of years; it is the religious light that was developed in the world through long periods; the records are brought together merely for convenience. If, then, we find that parts of the Bible are not to be held, that would not invalidate the book, because it is

only one book by accident. If a large bundle of title-deeds contains by mistake the MS. of a novel or a poem, yet, if the other title-deeds are genuine, the odd manuscript does not injure their validity. They are neither better nor worse for being bound up along with it. In the following passage there is a certain bold and robust humour, as of a man who will have his say and let others make what they can of it; which, in its breadth and freedom, is so little characteristic of the modern pulpit that we may as well quote it.

“Bishop Colenso thinks he has shown that there are mistakes in the writings of Moses. Very likely. And suppose it should be shown that Moses never wrote them at all? What then? It would be shown, that is all. And suppose they should be taken out of the Bible, what then? They would be taken out, that is all. And how would it be with those that are left? Why, they would be left, that is all.”

This is intended to pacify the people who have been frightened by the “all or nothing” doctrine. The actual way in which the records came into existence serves to explain errors, discrepancies, or partial knowledge in the Bible. It is asserted that the light and the instruction which was vouchsafed to the best men in any age was drawn up into a record; that record represented the ripest truth to which the human mind had attained in religious ideas in that age. But we should never forget that, as everything in this world is subject to development, so is revelation itself; and, as the truth could not come much faster than the human mind could receive it, the early revelations of truth, being addressed to the yet undeveloped moral sense of the world, were comparatively scant. And there has been a constant augmentation of light from the beginning up to the present. The early books stand related to us differently from those which have been written since. Just as rough early legislation is different from modern legislation. The latest is really all, and more than the earliest. But large parts of the earliest have to us only an historic value. The books of the Bible had a first work, and have now past to a secondary use. Some of them were more important once than they ever can be again. But they are still valuable, because they show how man has been developed as a moral being; they show the method of divine teaching, and how a good many moral truths have been preserved. “But” (and here is the pith and marrow of the sermon), “in so far as we are concerned, in this age the Bible must be judged by what it can do for us;” then follows a series of very eloquent paragraphs, but possessing very weak logical coherence. First, the Bible proposes a schedule of human nature and human condition, which is found to be perfectly true to nature; but then as the Bible is largely historical and experimental, it will be difficult to see how its account of human affairs would be anything but true to human

nature. Above all, and herein we presume is one mark of its divine insight, it shows us that the misery to which we are subject springs from the imperfection of the human mind, and from the sin which flows out of that imperfection. So Mr. Beecher. But it is impossible not to remember that only part of our misery is the result of mental and moral imperfection, and that the only explanation which the Bible gives of physical misery is contained in the history of the fall of man, which does not explain physical death, which existed before the fall, and physical suffering in the animal kingdom, which has always existed, and which cannot be conveniently linked with the fall of man, whatever that is. But indeed, as we shall have occasion to see, Mr. Beecher is not strong upon the story of the "fall." Then what becomes of the imperfection of the human mind and the disease and misery of the body as a Bible revelation? Probably every savage is sufficiently conscious of the fact, that his want of knowledge, and want of power, and want of self-control are among the great sources of his misery, and he needs no Bible to teach him that. At the same time it is perfectly true that the delineations of the wickedness and depravity of the human race which are found in the Bible from beginning to end, are wonderful and masterly, and that their function will never cease. We are next told that the Bible reveals to us the lenity and amenities of God—that the just Judge is a God of love. It is quite true that the arithmetic in Moses's books has very little to do with this statement, but the authority that tells us that God is a God of love, has a great deal to do with the manner in which we regard the announcement. Human experience goes largely against the assertion, yet we suppose that Mr. Beecher wishes to class the love of God among the essential truths, about which there is said to be no dispute. In short, the love of God is simply assumed, just as if it were a moral truth about lying and stealing. Once more, Mr. Beecher, throwing argument to the winds, exclaims at the close of this paragraph, "Cipher away about Moses, fools! I will cling to the hope of Christ and salvation by him." And no doubt in Brooklyn Church the rhetoric won the day. Mr. Beecher adopts a sounder and to us a more persuasive rhetoric when he exclaims—

"I declare that Christian instruction is more profitable than anything else in the whole Bible. The doctrines of humility, meekness, gentleness, non-resistance under injuries, the whole schedule of Christian dispositions which were marked out by the Saviour, shine as though they were so many gems and jewels brought down from the bosom of God."

Next we come to the doctrine of immortality, for which Bible authority is given, and which is dismissed with an illustration, but without any argument at all. Now this is not quite fair in a sermon which begins by admitting frankly that there may be mistakes,

partial errors, and whole books in the Bible unauthentic and ungenune. The preacher in this sermon has been descanting upon human sin, the love of God, and the immortality of the soul; and he ends by asking, "Who wishes to take these things away from us?" And adds, "You have not touched these great truths when you have made any amount of criticisms upon texts." Of course the reply is, "That quite depends upon the amount of texts criticised, and the nature of the criticism. What the preacher who accepts the doctrine of historical criticism, as applied to the Bible, has to do, is to show in each case whether it be a question of the divinity of Christ, or miracles, or the love of God, or the immortality of the soul, that the assertions about these several things in the Bible are or are not the best hypotheses we have for explaining the facts of human experience, human history, human consciousness generally. When, then, Mr. Beecher says that the question which every one of us should propound in respect to the Scripture is, "Does it teach the truth on these fundamental matters?" he is really assuming that we know what the truth about these matters is without the assistance of Scripture. If we do, what is the use of Scripture as a revelation? If we do not, how are we to judge whether the Bible teaches the truth or not? There are some things in the Bible which can be proved by human experience to be true; such are the general rightness and fitness of those moral precepts, obedience to which holds human society together under the conditions of progress and civilization. There are other things in the Bible which cannot be exactly proved; such are the relations between God and man, and the destiny of the human soul. It would have been better to draw the line between the moral, historical, and spiritual departments, and to say, "Man has found the moral law true by experience. Historical truth is only got through historical criticism. With reference to the spiritual doctrines to which reference has been made, they offer intellectually as hypotheses the best explanation which has yet been found of man's religious tendencies. They account for a large number of otherwise inexplicable and constant facts, and thus become the legitimate objects of faith; though not resting upon the same kind of evidence as historical and moral law, or susceptible of the same kind of demonstration." When Mr. Beecher comes up to the point-blank question, "How do you know that the Bible is true?" it is merely riding off on a side wind to say "Try it, and see if it isn't true." Of course that will apply very well to the moral law,—See if society won't go to pieces if you don't give in to the Ten Commandments, or most of them; and Mr. Beecher takes care only to select the moral law in the illustrations which he proceeds to give. It would be obviously absurd to say, "Try the immortality of the soul, and

see whether it is not true." What the modern preacher has to do in view of such a doctrine as that, is to announce it as proclaimed in the Bible, and then show, if he can, how indispensable it is to the constitution of man as an essentially moral being. Put the puzzle together, and then see whether "Immortality" is not the bit left out—if so, fit it in, and complete your map. Yet, although we have pointed out what we conceive to be loose about the argument of this very noble sermon, on the whole, we repeat, there are more true things about the Bible said in it, and they are better said, than in any sermon we have ever read or listened to.

VI.—The Church, Sects, and Sacraments.

There is no subject on which Mr. Beecher more forcibly dilates than on the Christian Church and its various sects. The almost innocent freedom with which he discusses the whole question is calculated to make many pious hairs stand on end. We need not say that his view of Christ's Church is different from the "high" or the "low," and less conventional than any other popular view.

Probably for many years it will be a hotly-disputed question amongst theologians whether "grace" or special teaching mission, and a form of church government, have been committed by God to a caste called the priesthood, or whether the priesthood is merely representative, with no more real power than what belongs to every man, and with no authority to impose on the people one form of government rather than another, with no power but personal power, and those ecclesiastical functions committed unto them by the people for the people. We need not say which view Mr. Beecher, who reigns by the will of the people, supports. The Roman view of grace and apostolical succession is not to be lightly set aside. In the hands of equally able disputants it would perhaps be equally difficult either to prove or disprove. The fatal thing for the Roman side of the controversy is that fewer and fewer able and good men care either to defend or attack Roman Catholic opinions upon any subject. These opinions seem to bring a great deal of comfort to a few excellent young men and a great many women, and a little feeble interest is stirred when a Döllinger or a Hyacinthe kicks over the ecclesiastical traces. A few Protestant lecturers still get a more or less precarious livelihood off the Pope and "The Confessional Unmasked," and large masses are still held together under the name of Roman Catholics, who are really such in name, and in nothing else, whilst Professor Huxley seems not unwilling to stir up a little reaction in favour of Roman Catholicism, by administering the old-fashioned stimulant labelled "Persecution" in a very mild form to Roman Catholic schools and religious seminaries.

Mr. Beecher is far too sensible to waste his time in cheap attacks on Roman Catholics or Ritualists; he does not look in this world for infallibility any more than perfectibility; but he does look for work. He is for patting every one on the back all round, and bidding each do his very best. Whether a religious teacher comes to him in a chasuble, or a black gown, or a white tie and a swallow-tail coat, he is for sending him straight into the Master's field. There is plenty of work to be done there—plenty of seed to be sown, plenty of souls to be saved. It is hard if the man with the most bigoted views cannot do something. Let doctors and schoolmen, in the words of Professor Maurice, play their "Theosophic fiddles whilst Rome is burning;" but let all who call themselves Christ's ministers set to work with the best opinions they can get, and see what they can make of them. Mr. Beecher seems to agree with St. Paul, that so long as Christ be preached, even though it be in a contentious spirit, he, at all events, will rejoice. So far from objecting to sects, he highly approves of them. He says they are like flowers, all born of the sun, and brought into their life and power, and yet they are widely different in their structure and appearance. "Would you," he exclaims, "reduce them all to one, and have nothing but daisies, nothing but tulips, or nothing but violets?" "I believe," he says elsewhere, "in the organization of Christians into churches, as I believe in the forming of churches, by elective affinities, into sects." The air on the other side of the water must be very different from ours. Poor Mr. Beecher grows quite naïve on the subject of sects; his apparent innocence is positively touching; he seems not to know that he is no better than a bull in a theological china shop when he says, "I do not see any harm in denominations. I would just as soon see twenty more as twenty less. . . . But sects are not Christianity; they do not represent the whole of it. . . . The specialities which distinguish one from another usually are specialities that have in them a truth which is nowhere else developed with such breadth and force. . . . Christianity is represented by the sum of all the sects—not by any one of them" (ii. 99). He elsewhere points out very forcibly that all Christian sects agree substantially about the ends to be gained; they only differ about the instruments to be used. All Christians aim at the regeneration and enriching of man's spiritual nature; what they quarrel about is how to organize people after they have got them into the Christian Church. They quarrel about robes and the days to be used, or instruments of teaching, and churches, and doctrines, and speculative or philosophical forms; but they don't quarrel about this, that every man needs to have the grace of God in his soul, that he must love God and his fellow man, and that he must have that love exercised in him, so as to control every one of the vulgar in-

instincts of his nature. Mr. Beecher looks forward to the time when he will be able to worship at the hands of a Roman Catholic priest, and be edified, just as he was edified in England, by the Church of England clergy and bishops. "I do not object to bishops," he says; "I daresay I should like to be a bishop myself." The time is coming, he thinks, when men will give up the foolish notion of abolishing denominations and sects. Christianity will be open and free to all alike; there will be a similarity of beliefs in the final sympathetic union towards which the Church is moving. But you will never get men to hold the same philosophical creeds all alike. Churches will never be brought together on such ground as that. It is well to lay down general points of belief around which a congregation may gather; but a creed is not a whip of scorpions with which we are to lash each other's backs.

All this is very satisfactory as far as it goes; but there is perhaps a pardonable haziness about the essentials and non-essentials of religious belief. We have got to content ourselves with a few hints on practical morality, and such excellent and Emersonian utterances as, "When we come to be released from the narrowness of our own church or sect, how joyful is the brotherhood of good men, and how strong are we!" All which sayings are like a well-known beverage, highly "grateful and comforting" to those who agree with Mr. Beecher, and decidedly the reverse to everybody else.

On questions of ecclesiastical government, our preacher's views are too pronounced and trenchant to be passed over. All Churches, as to outward form, are merely human; they stand on the same ground as common schools and literary institutions do; as far as ordinance is concerned, no one Church is any better than another. There is no pattern whatever laid down in the New Testament according to which Churches should be organized. "Every Church is good enough that answers the purpose of a Church." There is no apostolical succession, and if there were we should not be any the better for it. As to Sacraments, the Lord's Supper or Baptism is good enough when administered by the pope, or a cardinal, or a priest, or any dissenting minister, "or if you administer the Sacrament to yourself, it is just as good—the Lord's Supper belongs to every man who belongs to Christ, and he has as much right to administer it to himself as to have it administered to him by a priest." These opinions may startle some persons, but in reality they are not far removed even from the orthodoxy of the Church of England. Lay baptism has been generally held valid in Reformed Churches, and even in the Roman Catholic Church. Mary, Queen of Scots, when denied a priest, did not scruple to baptize the child of one of her attendants with the usual formula (Froude, vol. xii.). If

one Sacrament may be administered by the laity, it is really difficult to see why the other may not, and as to the question of a man's administering a Sacrament to himself, it is done every time the priest consecrates, for he always administers the bread and wine to himself first. A little plain speaking on these questions, in some Church of England pulpits, would do a great deal of good. The Ritualists say plainly enough what they mean by the Sacraments, and it is a great pity, for the sake of a bewildered laity, that the liberal clergy do not speak out as clearly on their side of the question. Few of the clergy, except the Ritualists, give their congregations a chance of either agreeing or disagreeing with their views on the Sacraments, for it is quite impossible, from their ordinary sermons, to understand what the clergy mean; or whether they mean anything.


VII.—Infidelity and the Devil.

Mr. Beecher is what Mr. Spurgeon would probably call "weak" on the devil. He says, "the devil is distributive in our days—some of him is in governments, some of him is in judges," &c.; in other places he seems to hold to one devil, or prince of devils, but evidently believes in many other devils or evil powers, invisible personalities ranged against man. He observes, no doubt, that there are plenty of devils in the body about, and if there is any spiritual world, the obvious inference is that there are plenty more devils out of the body about. We do not know that he is very far from sound doctrine here, but on the question of Infidelity he will probably be weighed in the balance with orthodoxy and found wanting. We shall not venture to do more than give his definition of Infidelity, and leave him to his worst enemies, observing only that he is careful to condemn "the roystering infidelity of vulgar and ignorant men," and also "the cold indifference of educated materialism."

"Unbelief," he says—such unbelief as abounds amongst the intelligent young men of our days—"unbelief is the drifting of sensitive natures, famished and hungering and searching for something that shall feed them" (ii. 324).

And now we can promise our readers that if they have followed Mr. Beecher with any interest in his views and opinions on "RELIGIOUS TRUTH," they will find him quite as interesting and vigorous in his treatment of those various social and political subjects which will range themselves in Part II., under the heading of "SECULAR TRUTH," and which have contributed more than anything else to spread his fame as an orator far beyond the limits of the American public.

H. R. HAWES.



RATIONALISM AND RITUALISM

IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT ECCLESIASTICAL DECISIONS.

The Sling and the Stone. Sermons by the Rev. CHARLES VOYSEY.
Trübner and Co. 1886-70.

Appeal to the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council.
By the Rev. CHARLES VOYSEY. Trübner and Co. 1870.

Freedom in the Church of England. Six Sermons suggested by the
Voysey Judgment. By the Rev. STOPFORD A. BROOKE.
Henry S. King and Co. 1871.

*Judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case
of Hebert v. Purchas.* Edited by EDWARD BULLOCK, Esq.
Butterworth. 1871.

IT used to be urged as a reproach against the Church of England that it was without law. It had often been compared to a ship without a mast or a rudder, driven to and fro by every wind; or to a kingdom without a ruler, where every man did what was right in his own eyes. The diversity of doctrines was indeed great, and notwithstanding all Acts of Uniformity, the modes of worship were many and widely varied. The idea of a comprehensive Church had been realised till the existence of the Church itself seemed to many to be in danger by the very extent of its comprehensiveness. The cords were distended till they were about to break. It had become evident to most people that however wide the boundaries might be made, it was imperative for self-preservation that the line of demarcation be drawn somewhere.

This as a general principle must be admitted by all, even by those who are condemned by the Judgments. Mr. Voysey, for instance, would exclude a clergyman who taught atheism; and Mr. Purchas, we suppose, would not extend the shelter of the Church to Papal Infallibility, the Immaculate Conception, or any other Roman dogma which

is still ahead of English Ritualists. In their own particular cases they will think the judgments arbitrary. They can both quote men who have taught the same doctrines, or nearly the same, as they teach, and yet have remained in the Church without being molested. It does seem unjust that the law should fall upon one, while another has escaped. It does seem arbitrary that the law should speak at certain times and be silent at other times, or, as it may happen, at some future time pronounce a different judgment from what it has pronounced at present. We may regret these things, but they are among the conditions of life. If the Church had any different government from that of the world, we might look for a fixed infallible judgment, but existence has to be accepted as it is, with its anomalies and imperfections.

We do not start with perfection. It is rather the goal to be reached at the end of the ages of progress. If Mr. Voysey had remembered this, he would not merely not have complained of the judgment passed on him, but he would never have provoked it. Pierre Leroux, speaking of the old religions of the world, says that we have had many to show us the falsehood of these old beliefs, but we now want some one to show us their truth. Mr. Voysey steps over the old theologies of saints and prophets like a giant stepping over the mud huts that are the dwellings of a feeble people. With the vehemence of a prophet of destruction, he has told us of the falsehood and superstition of the popular beliefs. We should have been more thankful if he had told us how much truth was in them.

The charges against Mr. Voysey concerned the atonement, original sin, justification, the incarnation, and the Holy Scriptures. On all these subjects he maintained that in substance he agreed with the Articles of Religion. But the popular or traditional theology may fairly claim kindred with the Articles. It is simply impossible to deny the one and yet hold by the other. It happens that on the first subject, that of the atonement, one of the Articles says expressly that Christ died to reconcile his Father to us. Another says that he was the propitiation for all the sins of the world, both original and actual. In the popular doctrine of the atonement, there is nothing really stronger than the words of these Articles. Mr. Voysey quotes from the Homilies to show that the "horrible doctrines" in them, which are the counterpart of popular theology, are not in agreement with the Articles. But as the Homilies and the Articles had the same men for the most part as their authors, we should have reasoned that the one was the proper interpreter of the other.

It is not, we confess, without very considerable effort that we have been able to make out Mr. Voysey's position. So long as he was denouncing what he calls the popular theology, or commonly

received opinions, we thought he might only have before him some extreme form of Calvinism. We can understand a man defending the Articles of Religion, and at the same time opposing doctrines which are mere glosses on the Articles. But the denial both of reconciliation, and the necessity of reconciliation, is contrary to all that we ever understood to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Moreover, we believe it to be impossible to deny, as Mr. Voysey expressly does, the "Pauline doctrines" of atonement and reconciliation, and yet not contradict the Articles of Religion. The theology of the Reformation was essentially Pauline, so that whatever interpretation be put on St. Paul, the same is applicable to the Articles of Religion. Mr. Voysey's object, we imagine, was simply to avoid direct contradiction of the Church's formularies, expecting that so long as he did this he would have liberty to preach against everything that the Church believed.

The doctrine of the atonement is confessedly a doctrine encompassed with difficulties. When we stand on the ground of simple Theism, it seems unnecessary. In the last century it became the final test of Deism. A man like Mr. Voysey, who believed atonement unnecessary, however much he might have professed belief in Christianity, was regarded as a Deist. And the ground of this was, that the atonement not being a doctrine within the discovery of reason, was purely derived from revelation, and so a matter of mere faith. The Deists, as they were called, rejected it because reason, they said, was against it. The ignorant pagans offered sacrifices to appease their terrible deities, but the philosophers who believed in one God maintained that the only conditions of forgiveness were repentance and amendment of life. The Deists, therefore, rejected the atonement as allied to paganism, and only acknowledged Christianity so far as it was a republication of the religion of nature.

The men of that day were clear reasoners, but they were not profound. In the present time, whether a man believes or does not believe, what we shall call the Pauline doctrine of the atonement, he cannot say that it is contrary to reason. It will be objected that we merely put it in a rational form. Our answer is, that if it is capable of a rational form, it should not be denounced as "horrible" and "hideous." We do not admit that reason is altogether on Mr. Voysey's side. A doctrine which has taken such universal hold on the religious mind, must have some reason in it. That it has been connected with fearful superstitions it is not necessary to deny. All that we contend for is, that the abstract idea of atonement is in conformity with reason. The highest philosophical conception which we can have of Deity, is that of absolute impersonal Justice. He is that Everlasting Order which opposes all disorder.

If we look only to the course of this world, we cannot deny that one man suffers for the sins of another. The Divine law is broken, and like every violated law in nature, the consequent suffering falls on all who come within its reach. With this conception of God, we can understand the necessity of what we call an atonement. In Kant's philosophy there was a place found for satisfaction because of the absolute justice of Deity. On this ground, one school of his disciples were strenuous defenders of the orthodox faith.

If we had capacities to form a theology in conformity with our conceptions of the Absolute, many of our present difficulties on subjects that refer to God and his attributes would disappear. But the question of the atonement is usually discussed in that lower sphere where we think of God as a Being with "parts and passions." The objections to the atonement are all anthropomorphic. They ignore the transcendental Unity in which Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one. They make God a person as if He were a man, and take all "passions" that are ascribed to Him as if they were ascribed literally. When the orthodox say that we are children of wrath, or that Christ has delivered us from wrath, those who object to the atonement think it awful. But is there really anything meant more than that being in antagonism with everlasting Order, we were liable to destruction till Christ delivered us? The "wrath" is a mere figure, which comes and goes with our conception of God as a person.

The Pauline theology speaks of something which Christ did for man's redemption. This is put in so many forms that it is really impossible to take any of them literally. The cautious John Locke, after a careful study of St. Paul's Epistles, described the atonement as a "transaction" between God and our Saviour, beyond our ken or guess. We may dislike the word "transaction." It is quite as objectionable as price, substitute, or satisfaction. But if we really believe that Christ did something to deliver men from evil, we may easily find a guide to the true meaning of the forms in which it has been clothed by the language of Pauline or popular theology. Perhaps the best form of expressing the atonement is that in John's Gospel, where Jesus says that He lays down his life for the sheep; or, again, where He speaks of his death as that of one dying for his friends. The same is well expressed by a modern writer, who says that Christ went among "the wheels of the disordered creation." We are quite justified in interpreting the language of the apostolic epistles as different modes of representing or illustrating the simple fact, that Christ in some way delivered men. The writers being Jews, and mostly writing for Jews, it is not surprising that they should take their language and their illustrations from the Temple service.

It would doubtless be well if preachers would avoid language

which shocks the moral sense, even though it may seem to be sanctioned by the Evangelists or Apostles. It was indeed "horrible" for the late Bishop of Peterborough to describe the climax of Christ's sufferings as being reached when *He fell into his Father's hands*. Figures may be carried too far, and sometimes may even be taken for realities. But we think, in entire opposition to Mr. Voysey, that the language of Pauline theology is not generally pressed to its literal meaning. It is used more frequently as the language of piety. Speaking personally, we have no belief in any form of Calvinism, but we should unwillingly exchange for anything in Mr. Voysey's sermons—

"Rock of ages cleft for me,
Let me hide myself in Thee."

We do not suppose that God ever literally required to be appeased, nor to have his wrath turned away in any human sense, yet we have no scruples to say or sing—

"Not all the blood of beasts
On Jewish altars slain,
Could give the guilty conscience peace
Or wash away the stain.
But Christ, the heavenly Lamb,
Takes all our sins away;
A sacrifice of nobler name
And richer blood than they."

Forms of speech that become popular do not convey to ordinary minds all that they do to those who press them to their last meaning. The verses just quoted do not make people think of wrath and revenge. They are not associated in the devout mind with any repulsive ideas of "blood." Their one idea is the fact of Divine forgiveness. John Wesley, who is responsible for half the popular religion of England, translated and introduced into his hymn-book a hymn beginning—

"Jesus, thy blood and righteousness
My beauty are and glorious dress,"

and yet it is well known that he entirely repudiated the whole doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness—"It can never," he said, "consist with God's unerring wisdom to think that I am innocent, to judge that I am righteous, because another is so. He could no more in this manner confound me with Christ than with David or Abraham." In the hymn we have an idea justifiable in the language of devotion, but which we must not convert into an article of rigid theology.

It is not necessary to follow Mr. Voysey through the whole scene of his warfare with orthodox modes of faith. But if the same principles which we have laid down are applied to the other subjects, it

will be found that the orthodox side is not so destitute of reason as he wishes to make it appear. Some of our old divines, as Jeremy Taylor and Daniel Whitby, thought to escape charging original sin on God by charging it on nature, as if God were not responsible for what is done by nature. They admitted a taint or infection of nature which we have inherited, but, like Mr. Voysey, they wished to deny that men are "by nature children of God's wrath." This doctrine Mr. Voysey calls "simply absurd," and "pure nonsense." But it does not appear that the fact of inherited corruption is in any way less absurd than the doctrine of imputed sin. It is philosophically the same idea translated into the language of personification. That there are people who really regard God as a man, and ascribe to Him all the passions of men, is no doubt true, but this is not necessarily inferred from the use of words or ideas that refer to God under the conception of Him as man. The truth in these conceptions is to be acknowledged, and the error to be corrected, by the higher, but more difficult, conception of God as transcending the limits of human personality. It would be unjust for any judge to impute to one man the sin of another, or to punish one man for the sin of another. But in the Divine proceedings we must look at the whole scheme. The natural world reveals the fact that men are born with inherited infirmities, that the sin of one is visited upon another; in other words, is imputed. This fact, standing simply by itself, is equally against the justice of God in whatever form it is expressed. But we have not yet seen the whole of the Divine procedure. It is true, indeed, that there are forms of the popular theology which absolutely prevent the possibility of the exercise of Divine justice. Such is the rigid doctrine of election, or the belief that men may suffer eternally for Adam's sin; and perhaps the doctrine of never-ending suffering, which would be an unjust infliction for anything that the worst of men could do in this brief and troubled life. Had Mr. Voysey confined himself to denouncing doctrines absolutely irreconcilable with reason and our sense of justice, he would have been unmolested either by Church Association, Archbishop, or Privy Council.

On justification our Articles clearly adopt the Pauline, Augustinian, or Calvinistic form of expression, that for Christ's merits we are "accounted righteous." In other words, we are acquitted, or reckoned just. The idea is forensic, and so far it is a fiction, but the thing intended is no fiction. Mr. Voysey fights against the form as if it were a reality, which is simply the mistake of those who take justification only in a forensic sense. St. Paul's meaning, as addressed to Jews who looked for salvation by ceremonies, or who accounted themselves just, is not, apparently, difficult to discover; and Mr.

Voysey seems to have discerned the great significance of this doctrine at the Reformation, as opposed to the sacramental system of the Church of Rome. Indeed, with the light he has on this subject, we wonder what he can mean by saying that "we do not need atonement or justification."

The other judgments have to do with an entirely distinct class of offenders. The same hands which introduced into our formularies the Reformed theology, made Articles and rubrics condemning and protesting against the peculiar doctrines of the Church of Rome. That these had been dealt with distinctly in express Articles, had always, until our day, been reckoned a sure barrier against their re-introduction into the Church of England. But a party has arisen that our fathers knew not. It affects, indeed, to find its genealogy in the High Church divines of the seventeenth century. But these divines, even the most advanced of them, as, for instance, Andrewes, Laud, Cosin, and Sancroft, were decided Protestants. They were not ashamed of the English Reformation. They revered the names of Cranmer, Latimer, and Ridley. This party, on the other hand, finds in the Reformation only apostacy, and in the Reformers "scoundrelism." It has been trying, first by stealth and now openly, to establish what it calls "Catholicism" or "Catholic truth" within the bosom of a Church whose Articles of Religion are mainly occupied in repudiating the very heresies and superstitions which this party calls "Catholic truth."

In addition to the Articles, changes were made at the Reformation in the services of the Church which were themselves a constant and public protest against the Roman doctrines rejected in the Articles. To undo these changes was, therefore, a great object for the party that was bringing back "Catholic truth." The clergy at St. Alban's, Holborn, had proceeded so far in the direction of the Roman use as to elevate the consecrated elements, to use incense, to mix water with the communion wine, and to burn candles during the celebration of the Eucharist. At the request of the bishop of the diocese, and with a growing sense of their illegality, some of these practices were discontinued before the judgment was given in the Court of Arches. The charges, however, were proved, and a monition issued to the Incumbent that they be discontinued. The monition was kept in the letter, but evaded in the spirit. The candles were not placed on the table, but on "a narrow movable ledge of wood resting on the table." The cup and the wafer were elevated, but not "over the head." At a part of the consecration prayer the Incumbent bent "one knee," and in so doing he confessed that his "knee might momentarily have touched the ground." Notwithstanding the praiseworthy ingenuity of these devices, he was condemned by the

Privy Council, their lordships assuring him that "a mere evasive compliance with the monition would not suffice."

The Purchas case, like the St. Alban's, does not directly touch doctrine. It is only concerned with the legality of practices and dresses which, however, are confessed on both sides to be connected with doctrine. The charges against Mr. Purchas were, mixing water with the wine in the Communion, standing with his back to the people while reading the prayer of consecration, using wafer-bread, and wearing, or causing to be worn, sundry vestments utterly unknown in the service of the Church of England. There was also a charge of setting up holy water for the use of the congregation; but this was not proved. The really difficult part in this case was what concerned the vestments. It is strange that though the black gown has been in use from time immemorial it is nowhere prescribed,* and yet there is a rubric which at first sight seems to prescribe vestments which, from the Reformation, till the days of Mr. Purchas and his friends, nobody ever saw in the Church of England. This rubric is that "such ornaments of the Church, and of the ministers thereof, at all times of their ministrations, shall be retained and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI." The Prayer-book used in that year describes these "ornaments" as "a white albe, plain, with a vestment and cope," to be worn by the priest in the administration of the Communion; and when there were other priests or deacons to assist, these were to wear "the vestures appointed for their ministry, that is to say, albes with tunicles." In the reign of Edward, the Prayer-book was revised (1552), when it was ordered that the minister was to wear "neither albe, vestment nor cope," but "a surplice only." In the Prayer-book of Elizabeth (1559) it was provided that "the minister at the time of the Communion, and at all other times of his ministration, shall use such ornaments in the Church as were in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI." This Prayer-book, however, contained an Act of Parliament known as Queen Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity, which provided that these ornaments were to be retained "until other order shall be therein taken by the authority of the Queen's Majesty, with the advice of Her Commissioners." During the reign of Elizabeth, as a simple matter of history, all these vestments disappeared, while her "advertisements" require that in all prayers, rites of the Church, as well as in the Communion, the minister shall "wear a comely surplice with sleeves." At the Hampton Court Conference the Puritans objected to the surplice only, which is an argument that no other vestment was

* This is evidently because it existed before any of the present prescriptions.

in use, except, of course, the gown to which they did not object. The Prayer-book was revised in 1604, and the ornaments-rubric retained: but the canons published at the same time provided that, in cathedrals and collegiate churches, the principal minister should wear "a decent cope" in the administration of the Communion; but in other churches, on all occasions, whether sacrament or prayers, the minister was to wear "a decent and comely surplice with sleeves." At the Savoy Conference (1662) the Puritans objected to the ornaments-rubric as it stood in the old Prayer-books of Elizabeth and James. The rubric was then inserted as we now have it, which follows for the most part the words of Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity. In this rubric the ornaments of the ministers, whatever they may be, are not confined to the Communion, but are to be used "at all times of their ministration." They are to be "retained," which the judges say could not refer to some ornaments to be restored, but must have referred to those that had never been out of use. These were the cope and the surplice. The judges, therefore, decided that these are the only legal vestments in the service of the Church. The time of preaching is, of course, excepted. In no case is preaching ever included as a ministration. The dress in the pulpit was a point on which discussion was never raised. The original question was concerning the vestments in the Communion, and the decision was that only the surplice is to be worn. The usual form of expression is—in the prayers, Communion, and "rites," which are the measure of what is meant by "ministration."

The interpretation of the rubric which the judges have made is really the only one that, by a fair investigation of the whole case, they could have made. They confessed that their task was difficult, and though we approve of their judgment, we think there is still something about this rubric which is unexplained. We all know why Elizabeth wished the restoration of the ornaments that had been laid aside in the time of Edward, and we also know why her archbishops and bishops were strongly opposed to them. By the time of James, as we have seen, they had ceased to exist, and though the rubric was retained, the canon specially regulating the dresses of the clergy gave it a definite meaning. Moreover, the changes made in the Prayer-book at this time were not properly changes. Those who made them expressly called them "explanations." But after the Puritans in 1662 had called attention to the danger of the rubric, and after the commissioners had been at the trouble to recast it, it is strange that any reference should have been made to any ornaments of the time of Edward VI. It is, of course, possible that the revisionists of 1662 had forgotten all that the rubric originally meant. They evidently supposed that the Puritans were aiming only at the surplice, and so determined that the rubric should "continue as it

was." And yet they did not suffer it to continue as it was, but in that spirit of passion, prejudice, and love of opposition which, alas! too clearly characterized other changes of this date, the rubric was made, if possible, more objectionable to the Puritans than it was before. This seems to be the whole secret of the history of this rubric. There is no evidence whatever that the revisionists who recast it ever contemplated the restoration of the pre-Reformation vestments.

Mr. Purchas's other offences had not even the plea of an ambiguous rubric. Two indeed were dismissed for want of evidence. He carried a biretta in his hand, but it was not shown that he had put the fools' cap on his head. There was "holy water" in the Church for the use of the "faithful;" but it was not proved that it had received consecration at the hands of Mr. Purchas. The judge in the Court of Arches had decided that Mr. Purchas could not lawfully mix water with the Communion wine at the time of the service, but that he might do it by stealth in the vestry, or in his own house. The judges in the Privy Council, however, decided that he must give the communicants undiluted wine. They also pointed out to him that the rubric is very plain against wafer bread. It says that "the bread shall be such as is usual to be eaten." On the last and all-important question of how the "priest" should stand when he performs the awful act of consecration the judges had again to exercise their capacity for historical inquiry. Before the days of Ritualism, it was always supposed that the north meant the north, and so the minister stood as directed in the rubric, at the north side of the Communion-table. But Mr. Purchas and his friends were capable of a new idea. They said that a Communion-table had not four sides, but two sides and two ends, and as the table stood with one end towards the north and another towards the south, there was consequently no north side. And so they determined that the "priest" was to stand on the northern part of the west side with his back to the people. But the rubric says that he is to break the bread "before the people," which does not seem possible if the people are to be behind him, and his back turned upon them. The rubric involves the dilemma that either the north side must mean the north end, or "before the people" must mean with the priest's back to the people. But this was not the fault of the rubric-maker. The whole difficulty is cleared up by history. At the Reformation, when the old stone altars were removed to signify the abolition of the sacrifice of the mass, tables made of wood were put in their places. These were to stand "in the body of the Church or chancel." As a matter of fact, in the time of the Communion they commonly stood with the two ends east and west and the two sides north and south. There was then a proper north side, where the minister standing

could break the bread "before the people." But when Laud wished to re-convert the ministers into "priests" and the wooden tables into altars, he ordered the tables to stand "altar-wise," as they now stand, with the sides east and west and the ends north and south. He was resisted by Bishop Williams and many of the bishops and clergy of his day; but the tables are now nearly all turned as he wished them, and hence the impossibility of properly keeping a rubric which did not contemplate the tables standing as they now stand. The judges, after making themselves acquainted with this, had no alternative but to determine that the only way to keep the rubric was to stand at the north end of the table.

The case of Mr. Bennet is at present before the Privy Council. The Dean of Arches has already acquitted him, but only on the ground of a retraction in the way of correcting the words in the first edition of his pamphlet. At the Reformation special care was taken to exclude from our formularies the doctrine of transubstantiation. Words more express than the Articles contain could not be devised, and facts more certain do not exist than that our Reformers died at the stake rather than believe this doctrine. It is true that it can be modified. Because of our ignorance of what substance is, there may be a question as to what is changed. If the substratum of matter, as some metaphysicians have supposed, be merely spirit, then the presence of Christ's body may be only the presence of a spirit. This explanation may be found in some Roman Catholic writers; but it is not that of Trent. It was not that of the Roman Catholic theologians in the time of Mary; it was not even that of our Reformers. This uncertainty of what substance is did not occur to them, certainly not as an explanation of transubstantiation. Mr. Bennet did not scruple to write that we have the "visible presence of our Lord upon the altars of our churches." The Dean of Arches said he "read these words with much surprise and sorrow." He said also, as he well might, that Mr. Bennet's language was "lamentably loose and inaccurate;" but as the words were withdrawn, he gave Mr. Bennet the benefit of a doubt that they may have meant more than he intended.

The acquittal was, however, expressly grounded on the conclusion that our formularies teach an "objective, actual, and real presence," external to the communicant. This judgment the judges in the Privy Council cannot fail to reverse if they go into the subject as thoroughly as they have done in the Purchas case. The Dean of Arches went through a multitude of arguments and materials as the ground of his judgment, but they were all borrowed at second-hand from Pusey, Hook, and some other writers of the same school, whose authority is the authority of moonshine. There are some theories which have come to be generally received in the Church of England

just because of the persistency with which they have been repeated by interested parties. One of these is the belief on which the Dean of Arches seemed chiefly to rest, that Ridley believed in the real, that is the "objective," presence, and succeeded in instilling his view into Cranmer. There is no authority whatever for the supposition that Ridley believed in any "objective" presence, and there is even less for the theory that he in any way caused Cranmer to change his views. Cranmer and Ridley both persisted in using the rhetoric of the Fathers concerning Christ's presence in the sacrament. But they both added that they meant only a sacramental presence, and this they distinctly explained as a mere figure, meaning that the bread was called Christ's body because it represented Christ's body. The examiners at Oxford took the extravagant language of the Fathers literally, and when they found that Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer did not also take it literally, they condemned them as heretics. Ridley on his trial, made efforts to reconcile his views with the language of the Fathers, but the explanations were so violent that all the Catholics hissed him.*

The Dean of Arches was misled by another theory, which is a pure invention of some of Mr. Bennet's friends. This is that our formularies were so framed as to "exclude the Zwinglian idea of a bare commemoration." The truth is, that Zwingle never did teach any such doctrine of bare commemoration as is generally ascribed to him. Moreover, whatever Zwingle's doctrine was, our Reformers embraced it in express words. Nor is it a difficult question to know what Zwingle's doctrine was in its main idea. Cranmer said that Zwingle did not differ from Ecolampadius, that Ecolampadius did not differ from Bucer, and that he himself did not differ from any of them. They all taught a real presence, but only to the worthy recipient. Christ was present to the faith of the believer. Hooker and Waterland, two of the best authorities on such a subject, both declare expressly that this is the true doctrine of the formularies of the Church of England. A real presence in this sense has always been admitted, and any extravagant or rhetorical language that may have been retained in our formularies, has been retained with the understanding that it is to be interpreted only in this sense. The "real presence" of the Church of England is the presence which every Christian recognises in every act either of true faith or true worship.

For all these judgments the Church of England has cause for

* A remarkable case is the strange language of Augustine on Psalm xxxiv. (Vul. xxxiii.), which is supposed to refer to David at Gath; an old version of 1 Sam. xxi. 13, read, "He carried himself in his own hands." This was not true, Augustine says, of David, but it was true of Christ, for when He instituted the sacrament "He carried his body in his own hands." Ridley explained Augustine as meaning the sacramental body, so that *in a sense* Christ carried his body in his own hands.

devout thankfulness. It is now proved that there is a difference between license and lawlessness. The law of progress is not impeded, but it has been made to appear that there are conditions which must be obeyed. We have not to deal with mere abstract questions, but also with circumstances which we inherited and did not make. It is not allowed us to break away by a violent effort from the past. There may be occasionally prophetic teachers with new truth, or with what they suppose to be new truth, severed by a wide interval from all that we have hitherto believed. But the course of the world is that these teachers be martyrs for what they have to teach. In Mr. Voysey's case the judges wisely decided that though great license might be granted in the interpretation of the Articles, yet an entire departure from them could not be allowed. Those who see further than their contemporaries, or who think they see further, have their choice either to break with the Church collective, or to wait till the light is more generally diffused. There are periods in the history of progress when violent conflicts are inevitable. There may be circumstances that bring about a separation, as when the old prophets were stoned, or when the disciples of Jesus were thrust out of the synagogues. But there are other times when those who see beyond the present can quietly wait without pouring contempt and scorn on the beliefs of those who do not yet see as they do. "If," Mr. Brooke says, "one believes in the progress of revelation, one must also hold that truth must be continually reclothing itself." He that has such a belief—

"Places his useless form upon the] shelf, as he binds and lays by a book which he has loved and drained dry, for it forms part of the history of his own growth, and is part of the history of the world's religious growth. I cannot endure the abuse which is lavished by some on bygone religious systems, nor the virulence with which some turn upon their early beliefs; it is the feeling of the mob and not of cultivated men."

There is a reverence due to old beliefs, and to those who still retain them. This is a reverence which has been yielded by all really wise reformers, except when their reforms have been like the "crackling of thorns beneath the pot." They have remembered the advice of Lessing:—"Thou abler spirit who art fretting and restless over the last page of the primer, beware! Beware of letting thy weaker fellow-scholar mark what thou perceivest afar off, or what thou art beginning to see!"

The result of these judgments is to determine what are the legal doctrines and practices of the Church. It is well to know this, as a point from which to start. It does not follow that these doctrines are true, or that the ritual may not be changed. But it is something to know our true position. That we have all departed from the theology of the Articles of Religion, should not be concealed. Nor is

it necessary, for this is done by express permission of the law. But this should not lead us to ignore the truth concerning the Articles themselves. We are not bound to take them as they were meant by those who wrote them, but we are bound to know honestly what was their first original and natural meaning. To make them mean what they were never intended to mean is a greater sin than the sin of heresy itself. When we have seen fairly what is their proper meaning, we can determine for ourselves how far we have departed from them, and how far we are justified in using the license which is allowed by the law of subscription. When a clergyman ceases to believe them as thoroughly as Mr. Voysey appears to have done, and feels like him called in the spirit of a prophet to denounce the theology which they teach, it is time for the law to speak.

We admit, and the judges seemed to admit, that the line cannot be drawn with absolute justice. With the persons concerned, it is a matter of conscience; with the Church it is a matter of duty for self-preservation; and with the judges it is a matter of determining what the doctrine or ritual of the Church is, and how far the law can give license. Mr. Voysey was condemned because he rejected the authority of books in the Bible, and denied doctrines, not on "critical grounds," but according to his own "private taste and judgment." But the same thing might be said in some sense of every heretic, whatever his learning or his discernment. What are critical grounds to one are not critical grounds to another. The judges here plainly recognised a kind of consciousness in the community of the Church, as represented by the learning of the general body of the clergy. This is a vague rule, but sufficient for general use. When Mr. Voysey was citing passages from other heretics of the Church, Sir R. Phillimore rightly said that all these men should be prosecuted too. Their heresies did not help Mr. Voysey, who was on his trial. They had never been prosecuted, and if they had been, the law might have condemned them. It might, however, also have embraced them without being capable of extending comprehension to Mr. Voysey. The result of the judgments as to doctrine plainly is, that the teaching of the formularies is to be the basis, that a wide margin will be left for freedom, and that the limits of this freedom will be fixed by a kind of common spirit of the Church.

In regard to ritual, the law allows considerably less latitude than in respect of doctrine. The same judgment which has come on Mr. Purchas may come on every other offender who has sinned after the similitude of his transgression. While unprosecuted, a clergyman may exercise liberty in ritual, and depart from the law of the Church, but if he provokes prosecution, his condemnation is sure.* It

* The Bishop of Ely has recently given an instance of forbearance which, though,

may seem unfair to the High Church party that they are not to have the liberty in ritual which is given to the other parties in doctrine. It is now understood by all that ritual represents doctrine, that the vestments and posture bespeak a certain belief. The prohibition of them is, therefore, a denial that their doctrine is that of the Church of England. The inequality of freedom is not, however, so great as it appears at first sight. High Churchmen are still at liberty by the license of law to hold their views of the Eucharist. They are only forbidden to be too obtrusive, to disturb the peace of parishes, or by extravagance to provoke a prosecution. It is not to be regretted that this judgment sweeps far beyond mere ritualism. It justly embraces the whole High Church party whose innovations in the Reformed Church of England are distinctly traceable in history. It has been a custom with this party from its earliest beginnings, which were towards the end of the reign of James I., to maintain that it represented the true Church of England. Its first movement was to deny the Calvinism of the Articles of Religion, and to invent a theory unknown to the Reformers, that they were articles of peace intended to comprehend both parties. It then, as we have already seen, put the communion-tables out of their place, and on this followed, for the most part in our own day, the position of the clergyman out of his place also. But the law has met the transgressor, and determined that the High Church party, with its doctrines and customs, has never been more than a party tolerated in the Church.

We have to be thankful for these judgments, because they determine that we shall not go back to the theology of Rome, which has been already rejected, and because they leave room for progress under normal conditions. A relaxed subscription to the Articles, on the whole, both generous and prudent, is yet not what we should have recommended. The Vicar of St. Ives had introduced some novelties, and persisted in some of the practices condemned in the recent judgments. The pariah churchwarden, Mr. Read Adams, presented the vicar at the bishop's visitation, and afterwards called upon the bishop to take action in the case. His lordship declined. The churchwarden again wrote to the bishop, enclosing the following quotation from a letter by the Archbishop of Canterbury: "Can a bishop's authority stand still while the affections of the people are being alienated by practices intended to undo all the benefits which the Reformation has conferred upon this country. If the bishop is called upon by a proper authority, it is evident that he must act, and it may be that he may find it necessary to act of his own accord. In judging what is lawful in the Church, he must remember that he is a bishop of the Church of England and not that of Rome." The Bishop of Ely answered that he had resolved not to prosecute any of his clergy for small deflections from the rubric, and he was sure that the same course would be adopted by the archbishop. It cannot fairly be expected that the bishops should be involved in the expense of a legal prosecution, yet it is due to the people that they admonish offending vicars, and warn them of their danger in departing from the laws of the Church. If the last vestige of a bishop's authority is not entirely gone, he ought to be able to compel his clergy to a strict observance of the rubrics, when any parishioners, much more a parish churchwarden, complains of their violation. This could be no hardship to the High Churchmen if the same conformity were exacted from every clergyman of whatever party when novelties were introduced into the service that alienated or divided the parishioners.

but still a subscription, combines a basis with freedom. Doubtless were the Articles to be written again, they would take another shape; but this is scarcely to be expected. The alternatives are either to subscribe them or to set them aside. The latter, in some respects, would be the better if it were really practicable; but this is doubtful. To subscribe them is not so great a hardship as to some men it appears. They embody substantially the doctrine which we still believe; but under forms which the enlightened Christian consciousness has outgrown. It has often been proposed to reduce subscription simply to the canonical Scriptures; but here we encounter the same difficulties. The senses in which the Scriptures are believed are as varied as the senses put on the Articles of Religion. The canon itself has to be settled, besides the genuineness, authenticity, authority, and inspiration of the different books. It is indeed an anomaly to subscribe to doctrines as if they were settled, and yet claim the freedom to regard them as open questions; but it is an anomaly from which at present there is no escape.

Last of all, but not least, we have cause to be thankful for the judgments that they furnish a basis for the union and comprehension of all Christians within fixed yet wide boundaries. The judgments in the cases of the Ritualists declare distinctly with legal and historical evidence that sacerdotalism is simply tolerated in the Church of England, but that its vagaries and eccentricities are not to be endured. It is a great matter to have it distinctly proclaimed that the pretensions of a priesthood have no true home in the Church of England. We have borne with them hitherto because we knew that they had no real foundation, and were sometimes to be overlooked because of the sincerity of those who held them. Their only alarming feature was their claim to be essentially of the Church of England; but this is now removed. The sacerdotal principle is incompatible with progress. It represents a view of revelation different from that which we must now embrace, and in which rests our only hope of an enlightened conception of Christianity, and a proper understanding between differing communities of Christian men. Sacerdotalism must ever be in sharp opposition to all which differs from it. In accordance with this, it now claims independence of the State, and refuses obedience to the law. It wishes to be a law to itself, on the ground of its supposed Divine appointment to be the channel of truth to the world. This claim is consistently made only by the Roman Catholic, who holds with it belief in an infallible Church. But the Church of England as interpreted by the law of England is found to rest on another basis. It acknowledges no priesthood and no infallibility; but submits to the same law of progress which rules alike the Church and the world.

JOHN HUNT.



THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

WHEN the Gospel of St. John was first given to the world, it appeared as a small separate publication. Any reader who might glance over its pages would see at once that it was a religious work respecting Jesus Christ, to whom some new revelation was attributed; and that the writer's aim was to communicate a knowledge of facts and doctrines, which he regarded as both certain and important. If the reader was acquainted with the other Gospels, a cursory perusal of this one would show remarkable agreements and differences. Like them, it is chiefly occupied with the last days of our Lord's history; but the preceding portion is very unlike. Less than the others has it the character of a complete biography; nor does it profess to be an account of the public ministry of Jesus. The plan is simple, but peculiar. After an introduction which connects the new revelation with the old, and a statement of the first testimonies to Jesus, as the Messiah, the Son of God, the writer gives his own account of what he describes as a Divine manifestation.* A series of events are related, some miraculous and some not, but all symbolical as well as real; and with these a series of conversations and discourses, addressed to inquirers or to opponents. The wedding at Cana, and the purification of the Temple, are the first of these events, and they are followed by the conversations with the Jewish

* i. 14; ii. 11; xii. 45.

teacher and the Samaritan woman, both referring to the new life which comes from the knowledge of God. In the early chapters the favourable acceptance of the ministry of our Lord in Jerusalem, Judæa, and Samaria, is recorded; but the hostility of the rulers is noticed in connection with his first public act, and this, ere long, led to his departure for Galilee.* From the fifth to the tenth chapters the opposition of the rulers is more fully related in connection with four Jewish festivals. At one of these he stayed in Galilee because the Judæans sought to kill Him, and on the three other occasions when He appeared in Jerusalem and taught, He was driven away by the violence of his enemies. From the eleventh chapter to the seventeenth, events and discourses are related which continue the account of the manifestation of Christ, and conduct to the close. The raising of Lazarus is recorded, with the lessons then repeated respecting the eternal life, seen in Jesus and received from Him; and the determination of the rulers no longer to defer the execution of the hostile designs which they had cherished from the beginning. The supper at Bethany, and the entry to the Holy City, are two events, followed by the last public discourses of our Lord, declaring that his death would be for the life of the world. After this the writer gives his own reflections, accounting for the rejection of Jesus, notwithstanding his wonderful works; and adding a summary of the words of Jesus respecting his relation to the Father.† Two other symbolical actions, the washing the Apostles' feet, and the Last Supper, precede the full account of the last conversations of Jesus. After this there is the narrative of his apprehension, trial, death, and resurrection, as in the other Gospels. Though the references to times and places are peculiarly distinct, the work has not at all the character of a consecutive history. It does not profess to be anything of the kind. The writer shows how words and works, which afforded progressively the knowledge of Jesus Christ, were accepted by some as a message from heaven, and rejected by others with increasing enmity. What the manifestation of Christ was in its chief characteristics, how it was received and resisted, and how it triumphed, are here seen in a selection of events and discourses. The statements of the introduction respecting the previous revelations of God are shown to be true of the revelation now given in Jesus Christ. "The light shines in the darkness." "He came to his own people, and they accepted Him not." "But such as received Him," of every race, they became "children of God."

Who wrote these things? is an inquiry, certainly important, though not indispensable. In seeking an answer to this question, it is natural and proper to begin with what is near and certain, not with

* ii. 19; iv. 1.

† xii. 44.]

what is distant and doubtful. We have the book before us. Does the writer show anything of himself? What is there in his work to confirm or contradict such indications of authorship? And, lastly, what may we learn from ancient testimony respecting its author?

I.

What does the writer show of himself?

1. It is manifest that, whatever his name and station, and whenever he wrote, the writer was a Christian, possessing the faith in Jesus which he sought to promote. It is equally evident that the features of our Lord's character to which he gives most prominence are *truthfulness* and *love*. These, as springing from *faith* in God, and as exercised for the good of men, are the chief points illustrated by the narratives, and inculcated by the discourses. All that is said and done is described as testimony to the truth. God is to be honoured by the *truth*; men are to be benefited by the *truth*; opposition must be expected on account of the *truth*; but for the *truth* one should wish to live, and for the *truth* one should be willing to die. The writer states these things of the Master, and with evident sympathy, showing the same spirit. The character, then, of the writer, as shown in his work, is a sufficient ground for confidence in his truthfulness. As we become acquainted with him, we feel that he could not be false on any subject, still less could he give false testimony respecting One whom he supremely loved and honoured. The awe which, on several occasions noticed by him, prevented the Apostles from questioning the Lord, the writer felt; and he could never think of adorning with human fictions what he revered as a Divine reality. It may be said that good men have not been always truthful, and that pious frauds have not been uncommon. This we must allow, but still maintain that there is nothing to shake our confidence in the writer of this Gospel. Christians have been false, when forgetting the truthfulness of their Lord, but not when commending this grace, and inspired by its influence. They have stooped to deception, when temporary dissimulation seemed to offer some great advantage, but not when there was no semblance of necessity, no apparent good to be gained by falsehood. Pious frauds have always come from the absence of faith in Christ, and are utterly incompatible with the loving, reverential trust which the writer manifests. They are as contrary as light and darkness. If the writer did not believe that Jesus changed water into wine, healed by a word the child in Capernaum, and the sick man at Bethesda; that He fed five thousand men with a few loaves and fishes, and walked on the lake of Galilee; that He gave sight to the blind man in

Jerusalem, and raised the dead at Bethany, why did he say these things? There was no necessity for these statements, nor any prospect of doing good by such a series of falsehoods. We only say now that most certainly the writer himself fully believed in the reality of what he has recorded.

But, though he could not be a deceiver, might he not be deluded, and deliver as facts the fictions formed in the minds of others? We ask, does he write as one who had learnt from the reports of others? or as one who had himself seen and heard what he relates? Here, too, there is no place for doubt.

2. It is quite certain that the writer wished to be regarded as an original witness. There is no acknowledgment of dependence, nor the slightest indication of it. On the contrary, at the beginning and towards the close of the work, the writer claims for himself the authority of an eye-witness.* “We beheld his glory.” “He who has seen has testified.” And throughout all the narratives and discourses details are given which no tradition would preserve or produce; which are natural in the testimony of an eye-witness, but in later works could only be the counterfeits of such testimony. Who but an eye-witness, or one wishing to be so regarded, would relate that it was near the tenth hour of the day, when Jesus invited to his house the two disciples of John—or state the number, material, and size of the water vessels used at the wedding in Cana—or notice that it was the sixth hour of the day when Jesus sat by the well of Sychar, and that the woman left her pitcher when she went back to the town—or that the loaves given to the multitude were of barley, and that there was much grass in the place—or that the disciples had rowed twenty-five or thirty furlongs when the Lord came to them on the water—or that Jesus spat on the ground, made clay of the spittle, anointed the eyes of the blind man, and said, “Go wash in the pool of Siloam”—or mention that one of his discourses was spoken in the treasury of the Temple, and one in Solomon’s porch? Who but an eye-witness, or one wishing to be so regarded, could give the narrative of Martha and Mary, with the mourning and questioning people who accompanied them to the grave, and describe the manifest sympathy of Jesus, his inward struggle, his tears, the lifting up of his eyes, the expression of praise, the loud voice, the figure coming out of the tomb, with the hands and feet bound and the face covered—or state that at the supper in Bethany, Lazarus sat with the guests, while Martha served, and Mary poured the precious ointment on the feet of the Lord—or that Greeks in the Temple court came to Philip, that he mentioned their request to Andrew, and that these two disciples then spoke to Jesus—or, again,

* i. 14; xix. 35.

that Jesus, when with the Apostles the night before his death, rose from the supper-table, laid aside his garments, took a towel and girded himself, poured water into a basin, and began to wash the disciples' feet—or that Peter suggested to another Apostle that a question should be asked, and it was so answered that one knew what the others did not, respecting the traitor—or that Peter began the conversation after supper, and was followed by Thomas, and then by Philip, and then by Judas, not Iscariot—or that in the middle of the conversation there was a change of attitude, Jesus bidding them all to arise? Who but an eye-witness, or one wishing to be so regarded, would relate that Peter drew his sword, and cut off the right ear of Malchus, the High Priest's servant—that Peter and another disciple followed Jesus into the palace court, that the other disciple went in with Jesus; while Peter stood without, that the other disciple spoke to the portress and brought in Peter? The mention of these particulars is natural, if the writer was this disciple, but not otherwise. Subsequently, we have the running of two disciples to the empty tomb, the arrival first of the disciple whom Jesus loved, the bending down, the sight of the linen clothes and the handkerchief, the entry of Peter, and then of the other disciple, with the confession of his want of faith. The evidence of these details, and many more might be given, is cumulative. A few instances might be set aside; but the collective proof is to most minds conclusive. No traditions would preserve such particulars, and no mythical tendencies would produce them. They are either most skilful artistic counterfeits of reality, or the simple marks of the testimony of one who was present at the scenes described, and wrote what he himself remembered. Such statements, often repeated for the instruction of others, would be well preserved in the writer's mind; and so the remembrances of youth would be retained, with their original freshness, even to old age.

3. Many of the statements noticed only show that the testimony is professedly that of an eye-witness, a disciple of Jesus; but many show also that this disciple was an Apostle. Nothing is recorded but what one of the Apostles might have seen and heard; but there is much of which they were the only witnesses. There is no sign anywhere of the ignorance and uncertainty of one who used the testimonies of others; but the author invariably writes as one who had himself the highest authority. The narratives are not only clear and consistent in detail, but for religious instruction they are complete. The conversations and discourses not only contain minute particulars, such as one present would notice and record; but they are all appropriate to speakers and occasions; and they are thus given when only Apostles were present. Who but an Apostle could relate the inci-

dents and conversations of the Last Supper? Here it is quite clear that the writer wished to be regarded as one of those who saw and heard what is related. If we are certain of his truthfulness, we may be equally certain that he was one of the Twelve Apostles.

4. There are indications in the work that the writer was John, the son of Zebedee and Salome, the brother of James. The proof of this identity is contained in seven passages of a similar kind, which refer to a disciple, without mentioning his name. The most important of these follows the account of the death of Jesus (xix. 35). "He who has seen has testified, and his testimony is true; and he knows that he declares what is true, that you may have faith." The testimony is that of the spectator, "he who has seen," but the purpose must be that of the writer, for it respects the readers of the Gospel. Only if the writer was himself the witness, could the consciousness of the truthfulness of the witness be added to the assertion of the truth of his testimony, "he knows that he declares what is true." And only if the writer and the witness are the same, could it be said that the object of the witness was "that you may have faith." Moreover, if the writer were not himself this witness, he would surely say something of one to whose testimony he so emphatically refers. The witness and the writer are professedly identical; and if the truthfulness of the writer be considered, and the purpose here attributed to the witness be compared with the writer's subsequent statement respecting the purpose of the whole book, it will appear quite certain that the writer was himself the witness whose testimony is given.* Of this witness something more may be learnt from preceding statements. The disciple whom Jesus loved stood by the cross with Mary, the mother of the Lord, and she was committed to his care. He is the only disciple mentioned, beside the women; and therefore the only one to whom, according to the narrative, the testimony concerning the death of Jesus could be referred. The name of the disciple whom Jesus loved, to whose care Mary was entrusted, could not be unknown, and would surely be given, if the writer and this disciple were not the same person. In three other passages mention is made of the disciple whom Jesus loved, and in all there is the same proof that the writer refers to himself, accepting the description given to him by his brethren. The name could not be omitted from ignorance, and the use of a description instead of a proper name, when the names of the other Apostles are given, would be unnatural and unaccountable, if the writer were not himself the disciple whom Jesus loved. He to whom Peter spoke in the Last Supper, who ran with Peter to the tomb, and who was the first to recognise the Lord, when again with Peter in the boat, could not be an unknown disciple.

* xx. 31.

The description and the association point only to St. John.* This is admitted by adverse critics. One of the most learned says: "It is plain that the author meant his work to be taken for the Apostle's. It was composed in a way to convey the impression that it proceeded from an Apostle especially beloved by the Master, and admitted to His secret thoughts." Then we say, it is what it professes to be. Such indications of an assumed personality are unparalleled. One so truthful as this writer, so full of faith and reverence, could not falsely pretend to be an eye-witness, and to be the Apostle John. It is quite impossible. The last two verses of the book do not appear to have been written by the Evangelist. They give, with a change of number and person, the testimony of a contemporary who deemed it enough to say that the writer of the Gospel was the beloved disciple, and that his testimony was true.

II.

Does the character of the work agree with the profession of the writer, that he was an Apostle?

1. The representation which it gives of the person of our Lord is some proof of this. Though quite consistent with the picture drawn by the other Evangelists, it is different. The incidents added to the life of Christ by the apocryphal Gospels are plainly human inventions; and the views they offer of his character only obscure and disfigure it. But wherein this Gospel differs from the writings of the other Evangelists, it is only by the more intimate and complete knowledge which it shows. The writer says that he beheld the glory of Christ,† and his work manifests this; for the portrait could be drawn only by one who beheld the Divine original. Think of his sympathy with family joys at the wedding feast, and with family sorrows at the funeral of a friend; of his compassion in removing sickness, and supplying food; and of his exercise of miraculous power only as a means for promoting that faith which releases from sin, and gives new life to the soul. Remember his primary regard for Jews, and his equal love of Gentiles,—his human weakness and tenderness, sitting wearied at the well, weeping with the mourners, troubled by the wickedness of a disciple; and then his Divine dignity, when

* xiii. 24; xx. 2; xxi. 7. The association is the same in the other two passages, and the absence of the description is easily explained. The companion of Andrew is not separately referred to, and the companion of Peter, when they went together to the palace, is appropriately described as an acquaintance of the High Priest (i. 41; xviii. 16). Additional confirmation may be found in the absence of the distinguishing title, the Baptist, when the prophet John is mentioned—in the description of Salome, his mother, as the sister of Mary—and in the position of the sons of Zebedee, after the other Apostles (xix. 26; xxi. 2).

† i. 14.

meekly remonstrating with an enraged people, and calmly reproving unjust judges. Consider his diligence in active service, his prudence in avoiding needless danger, his readiness to suffer when the time came, his constant acknowledgment of dependence on the Father who sent Him, whose work He did, whose glory He sought, to whose will He submitted; and then the declaration of his authority over all mankind, to teach, to govern, and to save. Observe his solitariness, as separate from sinners, above the comprehension and sympathy of his disciples, alone in a world of darkness, and disorder, and wrong; and then his confidence that the light which came from Him would enlighten the world; that his disciples, in the strength imparted by Him, would overcome the world; that they would all be raised by Him to the glory of the sons of God; that his self-sacrificing love would draw all hearts to Him in willing subjection; that by purity and patience He should accomplish the Father's purpose, being the Lamb of God, to take away the sins of the world. Could the portrait, of which this is a feeble outline, be given by any but an Apostle? It is the only supplement to the other Gospels which does not dishonour Christ. It alone declares more fully the glory of the Lord.

2. The special aim of this Gospel is a further proof of its apostolic origin. The general design is declared at the close of the twentieth chapter; and this is the same for all the Gospels. The peculiarity of this book is, that it is evidently intended to produce that form of Christian faith which must first have been received by an Apostle, and which in Christians of after times may be generally attributed, more or less, to the influence of this book. A loving trust in the person of Jesus Christ is the characteristic of the writer, and the promotion of this faith appears to be his constant aim. All that is recorded serves to declare and illustrate the character of the Son of God, as coming from the Father to draw men to Himself by love and goodness. Evidently, the writer of this book had a strong personal affection for Jesus Christ; and so had the other Apostles, with one exception. Whatever their deficiencies and faults, they loved and trusted Him; not his words, nor his works, so much as Himself. The other Evangelists relate discourses which refer to details of duty, and the diversities of men's condition; but, according to this Evangelist, the knowledge of Christ comprehends the principles of all duty, and is sufficient for all classes. Faith in Him renders other motives to right conduct of less importance. They are the lower teaching which others can give who are not Apostles. The holy love of the Saviour of the world is here shown, as only an Apostle could declare it—a love, Divine and human, sympathizing with human joys and sorrows, but ever seeking to remove sin; patiently enduring the opposition of men, in the assurance of an appointed service, accord-

ing to the will and for the glory of the Father. The other Gospels give more fully the earthly life of our Lord; here the results of this knowledge are declared as the consequences of the past and the effects of the present life of Him who is ever the same, exalted above the heavens, but present by his Spirit, the power of an endless life, in the hearts of all who know and love Him.

3. The peculiar relation of the fourth Gospel to the other three is additional evidence of its authenticity. That it came after the others is universally allowed; but that it belongs to the age of the Apostles appears from the similarity of its style, statements, and spirit. Where the events related in the other Gospels are referred to, there is perfect agreement, but entire independence. The differences which are manifest in every part show that the writer never copied from the other evangelists, and never cared for consistency with them. But in these differences there are no contradictions. They have been often asserted, but never proved. Inferences from the various accounts are contrary, and this is all. But that *plausible inferences from partial evidence* should be disproved by further evidence is the common experience of every day; it is so in all judicial, scientific, and historical investigations. That St. John should give his testimony, independently of the other Evangelists, is what might be expected of him; but that any Christian writer of a later age should compose a work merely from fancy or tradition, sometimes relating the same and sometimes different things, and that the accounts should fit into one another so that there should be no real inconsistency, but perfect harmony—this is a supposition on every account unreasonable. The agreement of narratives that are independent, but complementary, is among the surest proofs of genuineness. Even more conclusive is the evidence afforded by the consistency of independent delineations of character, when that character is absolutely unique. No accident or skill could produce the formal difference and essential agreement which we see, when the representation of Jesus Christ here given is compared with that of the other Gospels. There is the same combination of the natural and supernatural, the national and the universal, the human and the Divine.

4. That this work was not written, as some suppose, in the middle of the second century, appears from the entire absence of all marks of that time. Can it be supposed that the writer carefully abstained from using the terms and alluding to the opinions of his own age—that he removed himself altogether from its influence, so that there should be no sign of the thoughts and practices of men around him? No truthful person would aim at this, and the most skilful would fail. Every literary production, treating of matters of great present personal interest, is sure to betray itself, if not genuine, by manifesting the spirit of its age, by supporting or opposing, directly or

indirectly, the views and sentiments of the time. There is an immense difference between the books of the New Testament and all the Christian literature of the next century. Now the Gospel of St. John has all the characteristics of the one class and none of the other. The second century was distinguished from the first by metaphysical discussions respecting the nature of Christ, by the unsettled claims of Church officers, and by the peculiar efficacy attributed to the sacraments. Of these controversies there is in this Gospel no sign. The many strange speculations of the second century respecting the mysteries of the Divine Nature are not referred to in any way. The teaching of this Gospel is evidently prior to the heresies which then arose, and to the forms of expression then adopted by many orthodox writers. The reading in the epistle, "The Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit," is shown to belong to a later age by the use of unscriptural correlatives. And so the reading in the introduction of the Gospel, "The only begotten God," is manifestly the phraseology of the Fathers. Nothing like it is to be found in the writings of St. John, or anywhere in the New Testament or the Old.*

The organization of the Church, and the authority of its officers, were in the second century subjects of much interest, and became in the following the occasions of much controversy. Here they are not referred to. The Apostles are described as *witnesses* for Christ; this was their glory; and it is said that the results of their ministry, when they received the Spirit of Christ, would be like his—the sins of some being *removed*, and the sins of others *retained*. This is all that is said of Church government.†

As little reference is made to the sacraments. Neither the institution of Christian baptism nor of the Communion service is noticed. There are two figurative passages often appealed to as showing the peculiar nature and necessity of these rites; but the proof depends entirely on the incongruous interpretation of metaphors. The statements of the third and sixth chapters, whatever their sense, certainly are not such as a writer of the second century would introduce,—not if he wished to support the doctrines of spiritual birth by the water of baptism, and of spiritual sustenance by the bread of priestly consecration; nor if he wished to oppose these opinions.‡

Lastly, there are none of the mistakes respecting places, seasons, and persons, which might be expected in a writer of the second century. They who invent tales of other countries and times avoid difficult and dangerous details, or they are sure to be exposed by the inconsistencies and inaccuracies which always mark traditionary legends and literary impostures. The hostile criticisms to which this Gospel has been subjected, make more manifest its truth.

That any writer of the second century should be able to give, with

* 1 Ep. v. 7; i. 18.

† xv. 27; xx. 23.

‡ iii. 5; vi. 53, 63.

perfect accuracy, a large number of particulars respecting a former age, a different people and country, is one improbability. Then that he should avoid all indications of his own age is another improbability. That, being a truthful Christian, he should wish to conceal his distance from the events related, and to represent himself as an eye-witness, even the Apostle John, is another separate improbability. That he should give a view of the person of Christ, surpassing in human tenderness and Divine dignity that of the other Evangelists, and more conducive to Christian comfort and improvement than any other book, this is another improbability. That it should differ so much from the other Gospels, and agree so well, is another. But all these combined improbabilities must be accepted, if we take this Gospel to be the composition, honest or dishonest, of any Christian of the second century, or of any one but the Apostle. To all these two further improbabilities must be added—that the writer of such a work should be always in what is called miraculous concealment; and that, within thirty or forty years of its composition, it should be received by Christians of distant countries and conflicting parties as of apostolical authority, a work the genuineness of which was above controversy.

The evidences to which we have primarily referred, the profession of the writer, and the confirmations found in his work, are evidences which all readers can understand and feel. We may therefore consider the common belief of Christians, in all subsequent ages, as resting mainly on this foundation, and declaring its sufficiency. Few could know anything of ancient testimonies; and works supported only by early traditions were soon neglected. The faith that rests merely on tradition can only have the value of the primary authorities, and becomes feebler with the lapse of time. But that which rests on the moral character of a writer and his work becomes firmer the longer it lasts, every generation setting its seal to the judgment of those which preceded. We do not believe merely because of what we see, nor merely because of what others have said, respecting the book and its author; but we believe because evidence which seems satisfactory to our own minds, has produced the same conviction in the minds of nearly all Christian men, of every age and country.

What, then, are the adverse reasons which modern criticism has discovered? The most plausible objections are drawn from the contents of the book; but these appear to rest on gratuitous assumptions.

1. It is said that the view given of the public ministry of our Lord differs in time, and place, and character from the statements of the other Evangelists. But there is nothing to show that it was the writer's purpose to relate the public ministry of Christ. This is occasionally referred to, but only in brief general statements. Respecting its *duration*, the other Evangelists notice one spring in this

period, and one Passover is noticed here,* so that, according to all, there were two years, and no more is declared. Of the *places* mentioned, they refer chiefly to Galilee and Perœa, because the public ministry which they relate was in those provinces; but they show that the ministry of Christ did not begin in Galilee, and that He often taught in Jerusalem.† St. John refers chiefly to Jerusalem, because the opposition to Jesus which he describes began and prevailed there; but he shows that the ministry in Galilee attracted most notice.‡ As different subjects are narrated, different localities are mentioned. Of the *popular discourses* of our Lord, the other Gospels supply many examples, but in this Gospel not one is recorded. St. John relates conversations with inquirers, and adversaries, and with the Apostles; but only a few sentences addressed to the people in general. The words, therefore, differ, in subject and style, from the popular discourses of the other Gospels; but the teaching is always consistent, and the controversies in all are similar. The early assumption of the office of Messiah is said to be peculiar to this Gospel, but it is clearly shown in all. The testimony of the prophet John, the sermon at Nazareth, and the sermon on the mount, are obviously Messianic in the highest sense. All the works of Jesus were to show that He was the Christ, and in this character He spoke from the first; what was avoided and forbidden being the merely verbal statements, which would be useless and injurious.

The view given by St. John of the person and character of our Lord is also said to be inconsistent with that given by the other Evangelists. That there is difference is obvious, but it is only such as would naturally result from differences in the position and purpose of the writers. The Christ of the synoptical gospels is as lofty in his assertion of Divine authority, as wide in his claims to the love and trust and obedience of the world, and as severe in his denunciations of falsehood and wrong, as the Christ of St. John. And the Christ of St. John is as perfectly human, as humble in acknowledging dependence on the Father, as gentle in his conduct to all, as the Christ of the other Gospels. The moral character is exactly the same—the same supreme regard to the honour of the Father, the same sympathising love for all men, the same lowliness and dignity, the same prudence and fearlessness, the same devotedness to truth and the moral welfare of mankind.

2. Besides these general alleged dissimilarities, it is said that there are statements in this Gospel directly contrary to those of the other evangelists, showing that in one or the other we must have erroneous traditions. The most important of these are chronological, respecting the time of the purification of the Temple, of the Last Supper of our Lord, and of Pilate's sentence. St. John relates a purification of the

* Matt. xii. 1; John vi. 4. † Matt. iv. 12; xxiii. 37. ‡ vi. 2; vii. 41.

Temple at the commencement of the ministry of Christ, and the other Evangelists relate a similar even at the close.* That the profanation of the Temple, allowed by the priests for the sake of private gain, should be reproved at the beginning, is surely what might be expected; and that the people should support even a stranger in practical protest against such a wrong, is not at all improbable. Then that the abuse, ceasing for a while, should be renewed, is very likely; and that the correction should be repeated is equally probable. The first event is not mentioned by the other evangelists, for they say nothing of the period in which it occurred; and the second is not mentioned by St. John, for he says little of the last public ministry in Jerusalem, and for his purpose the first was sufficient. The differences in detail, and in connection, show that two different events are related. The supposed contradiction results from a supposed identity, of which there is no proof.

Of the time of the Last Supper it may be said, that the alleged discrepancy arises from taking one meaning of ambiguous terms, *πάσχα* and *παρασκευή*, when another is equally supported by usage, and better suits the connection. The other evangelists state that the first meal of the Passover festival preceded the Crucifixion, and St. John is supposed to state that it followed. Now St. John states that before the Passover—before the Supper with which the festival began—Jesus gave some peculiar manifestation of his love to the Apostles; and He did this by washing their feet.† After the Supper, He was thought to give direction respecting some other meals and sacrifices of the festival.‡ The priests who went to Pilate, wishing to share in such services, would not defile themselves by entering the residence of a Gentile.§ In the New Testament, besides this passage, the expression, “to eat the Passover,” occurs only in reference to one event—the Last Supper of our Lord. They who ate the lamb on the evening of the first day of the festival were said to eat the Passover. But so it might be said of those who afterwards shared also in the other sacrificial meals of the festival. In the Old Testament other sacrificial meals are called the Passover, and to eat of these is said to be to eat the festival.|| On the preparation day which belonged to the festival—the day before the Sabbath—Jesus was condemned and crucified.¶ The testimony of St. John agrees exactly with that of the other Evangelists; for he does not say, as is usually supposed, that the Supper was before the festival, but that the manifestation of the love of Christ was before the festival; and He washed the disciples’ feet before the evening meal with which the festival began. His direction was supposed to be for the next morning. In the same day, not in the following, the priests wished

* John ii. 14; Matt. xxi. 12. † xiii. 1. ‡ xiii. 29. § xviii. 28.

|| Deut. xvi. 2; 2 Chron. xxxv. 7—9; xxx. 22. ¶ xix. 14; Mark xv. 42.

to share in the sacrifices of the festival. In the festival, and not before it,* Barabbas was released, and Jesus condemned.†

The other supposed discrepancy is in the time of the Crucifixion. This is stated by St. Mark to have been in the third hour of the day, and the other Evangelists, by their reference to the sixth hour, confirm this statement. Of the time of the Crucifixion St. John says nothing, but he speaks of the time of Pilate's sentence. Before describing the close of the judicial proceedings, he notices that the day was the preparation day, and the hour *as* the sixth—not the sixth, or near to this, but like it, taken for it. The sixth hour was the usual time for closing the courts, and the third the usual time for opening them. But the trial began at dawn—three hours before the usual time—and this was that it might end earlier, because of the coming Sabbath. The dawn had been taken as the third hour, and therefore the third hour was as the sixth; and sentence was then pronounced. The narrative of St. John shows that the Crucifixion was in the early part of the day, and proves that he did not put the sentence so late as the middle of the day.‡

3. Other ambiguities have given rise to other apparent contradictions. To *know* a person may denote a general acquaintance, or some particular knowledge. If the statement of the prophet John,§ “I knew Him not,” be taken in the former sense, it is contrary to the testimony of St. Matthew;|| but if in the latter, it is quite consistent. The prophet had given this testimony, “Behold the Lamb of God, who beareth away the sin of the world.” Of the design and source of *this* knowledge he speaks when he says, “I had not known Him, but that He might be manifest to Israel;” and again, “I had not known Him, but He who sent me to baptize with water, He told me.”

In some connections *πατρίς* denotes one's native country, but in others the town of one's family. The difficulty of the statement that Jesus went into Galilee, because a prophet has no honour in his own country, is removed by a more correct translation. Jesus went into the country of Galilee, because a prophet has no honour in the town of his family.¶

In some connections *πρό* refers to time, but in others to place, *in front of*, suggesting opposition. The difficulty of the statement, that all who preceded Jesus were thieves and robbers, is removed by the local interpretation which the connection requires. Jesus said, “I am the door for the sheep”—the door of the fold. “They who came in front of me”—the door, stopping the way of the sheep—

* John xviii. 39.

† For a further statement of evidence on this subject, I may be allowed to refer to a note to the Gospel of St. Mark, where the date of the Last Supper is discussed (p. 167).

‡ Mark xv. 25; John xix. 14. Maimonides, quoted by Lightfoot on St. Mark; Horat. Sat. i. 9, 35; Mart. Epig. iv. 8; Sueton. Claud. 34; Joseph. Vit. 54.

§ i. 31.

|| iii. 14.

¶ iv. 44.

“they are thieves and robbers”—even as they who did not enter by the door.*

So *ἔρχεται* may mean either *goes* or *comes*, referring to the place where motion begins, or where it ends. If Mary Magdalene were said to *come* to the sepulchre when it was still dark, the statement would be contrary to that of another Evangelist; but not if she is said to *go* there. It was dark when she left her house at a distance; but the brief twilight passed, and the sun had risen, when, with her companions, she arrived at the sepulchre. †

The way in which the writer of this Gospel refers to the Jews has been urged as a strong objection to apostolic authorship. But that the writer was a Jew by education is certain from the style, the references to the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, and the entire character of the work. This difficulty, too, results from keeping to one signification of an ambiguous term. The designation of a part of the Jewish people, *Ἰουδαῖοι*, was extended to the whole; but it continued to be used in the narrower as well as in the wider sense. When national affairs are referred to, the wider meaning must be taken; but when some of the people are distinguished from others, or the rulers are referred to, the narrower sense is given. The Passover was that of the Jews; but a Judæan disputed with the disciples of John. Jesus withdrew from Judæa, because the Judæans sought to kill Him. ‡ St. John was a Galilean, and the way in which he refers to a portion of the people as *Ἰουδαῖοι*, exactly agrees with his position as *Γαλιλαῖος*. It would be unnatural for a Jew to use a term exclusively national, as St. John uses the term *Ἰουδαῖοι*. But it is quite natural that a Galilean should refer, as he does, to the Judæans. §

* x. 1, 8. † St. John xx. 1; St. Mark xvi. 2. ‡ iii. 25; vii. 1; xi. 8.

§ The absence of any account of the raising of Lazarus in the other Gospels would be inexplicable, if St. John had represented this event as the sole or principal cause of the opposition of the Judæan rulers to Jesus, and of the support of the people when He came publicly to Jerusalem. But he does not say this. He has before mentioned repeatedly the hostility of the rulers, showing that from the beginning they sought the death of Jesus, and that they had been hindered by the people. The effect on the Sanhedrim of the resurrection of Lazarus was simply to hasten the execution of long-cherished designs, still kept secret. And this is naturally noticed by the Evangelist who relates the event, though it had no great importance, and is unnoticed by the others. So the same event is referred to as one of the reasons of the conduct of the people of Jerusalem, but not as the only one; and with it the Galileans would be less concerned. Only three instances of restored life are recorded in the Gospels—one by the first three Evangelists, one by St. Luke alone, and one by St. John. These seem to have been exceptional miracles, for people were not encouraged to seek the renewal of life as the removal of sickness. Such works had no special value as evidences, and their repetition was not to be expected. Publicity was therefore less desirable, and it was not promoted when it could not be prevented. St. Matthew and St. Mark do not at all refer to the period in which Lazarus was raised; and this may account for their silence respecting the fact. St. Luke refers to this time, and could hardly be entirely unacquainted with such an event; but having already related two similar miracles,

These are the principal objections drawn from the work itself to show that it was not written by an Apostle. If all the explanations offered should not be deemed satisfactory, they at least show the uncertain nature of such arguments. Compared with the proof of genuineness which the Gospel itself gives, they are of small worth.

Of the internal evidences, one more remains to be briefly noticed. That the Gospel was written by St. John appears from its accordance with other writings declared to be his. The Epistles also are without his name; but the first professes to be written by one who had seen, heard, and touched Jesus Christ.* All agree with this Gospel in a very peculiar style. The words and thoughts are similar; the form of instruction, by development, contrast, and partial repetition, is the same; the doctrine is the same; and there is the same spirit of gentleness, purity, and love.

That the style of the Apocalypse differs much from that of the Gospel must be admitted; but this may be fully accounted for by the difference in the time and character of the two works. There was probably a distance of more than twenty years in the time of their composition, during which the writer was always using the Greek language. The first work is a poetical description of a series of visions, like the poems of the Hebrew prophets, copying their phraseology; the second is a simple relation of events and discourses, with a few reflections. In works so far removed in time, and so different in subject and form, no dissimilarity of style would prove diversity of authorship. The alleged difference in spirit and doctrine rests on the literal interpretation of figurative passages. The Apocalypse presents no objection to the authorship of this Gospel; while the Epistles confirm the conclusion, that both the Gospel and the Epistles were written by St. John.

III.

From the book itself we now turn to ancient testimonies. If we had only the internal evidence, this would be sufficient; but the external is equally satisfactory. In estimating this, it must be remembered that there are no works giving any comprehensive view of Christian literature till the latter part of the second century, much having perished. Moreover, both before and after this time, books were not used as they are by us; partly from the absence of literary culture, and partly, it may be, from the primary diffusion of Christianity by oral instruction. The works of Irenæus are the earliest there was the less need of his referring to this. The Evangelists do not relate all they knew. The omission of this narrative may also have been for the sake of Lazarus: not merely lest he should be persecuted by enemies, but also that he might not suffer from the oppressive and unprofitable curiosity of friends and strangers. St. John states that the priests sought to put him to death. The other Gospels were probably written during the life of Lazarus, and this after his removal.

* i. 1.

writings of such a kind, that the want in them of references to the Gospel would be real adverse evidence. But his statements, and those of many contemporaries, show that the Gospel of St. John was one of the four Gospels then universally received, with exceptions quite insignificant. Irenæus was born in the early part of the second century; he was a disciple of Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, and from A.D. 177 he was Bishop of Lyons. He refers to his intercourse with many who saw the Apostle, and says: "Not long ago was he seen, but almost in our age, at the end of the reign of Domitian" (A.D. 96).^{*} After mentioning Matthew, Mark, and Luke, he adds: "Afterwards John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned on his breast; he likewise published a Gospel while he dwelt at Ephesus, in Asia" (Adv. Hæres. iii. 1). Again he says: "So firm is the ground on which these Gospels rest, that the very heretics themselves bear witness to them—those, moreover, who follow Valentinus making copious use of that according to St. John" (iii. 11). Irenæus was not infallible, and he received traditions which were not true; but there is no reason for distrusting this testimony. Knowing, as he did, the associates of the Apostles, he could not, if this Gospel had been unknown to them, have received it without hesitation as the writing of St. John. This was a matter of fact, concerning which the associates of the Apostle could not be mistaken; and the authorship of the Gospel cannot be doubtful, because traditions respecting its design, and respecting the meaning of our Lord's figurative instruction, and other matters of opinion, are manifestly erroneous. Moreover, it is impossible that he could be mistaken in testifying to the general reception of the four Gospels, and his statements, if not true, would be useless falsehoods. He does not seek to prove that there were four Gospels by his analogies, but thus to account for facts that could not be questioned. His testimony to the Gospel of St. John is confirmed by contemporary writings: the Epistle of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, the Clementine Recognitions and Homilies, the works of Tatian and Theophilus, of Clemens Alexandrinus and Tertullian. These testimonies are undisputed. A harmony of the four Gospels was written by Tatian, and a similar work by Theophilus; and a commentary on St. John's Gospel, often quoted by Origen, was composed by Heracleon about the same time. These works are sure proofs of its existence and reception long before, since harmonies and commentaries are only for works ancient and acknow-

^{*} Irenæus adv. Hæres. v. 30; Euseb. Hist. Ecc., v. 8. *ὁυδὲ γὰρ πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἰωραθήη.* At the beginning of the chapter mention is made of those *who had seen* John; the Apostle is himself the subject of the preceding and following sentences; and the time when *he was seen* is the only point of importance, not the time when the Apocalypse was seen. The supposition that the *latter* is the subject to be supplied is the chief support of the later date of the Apocalypse.

ledged. The Muratori fragment of the New Testament canon contains this Gospel, and its testimony is not affected by accompanying errors; and it was in the Italic and Syriac versions of the second century. Clemens Alexandrinus and Tertullian, as well as Irenæus, declare that there were in their time the four Gospels which we have, and no others of any repute; and so Eusebius places this with the other Gospels as universally acknowledged. They appeal to the uniform testimony of those who preceded, as the source, but not the sole ground, of what they declare to be the present belief of all Christian Churches throughout the world. But it is quite impossible that this Gospel should have been thus received by all Christians in the latter part of the second century, if to the aged men of their day, the contemporaries of the Apostle, it had been an unknown work, or one attributed to any other author.

The references to the Gospel of St. John in earlier works are merely subsidiary evidence, though often treated as the principal proofs. If so regarded, their number and character, however occasioned, would make their evidence incomplete; but taken simply as confirmatory proofs, they are quite sufficient. The earlier publication of the other Gospels, and their more comprehensive character, would naturally lead to references to them, rather than to a later work of a less popular nature. It is satisfactory to know that Justin Martyr, in the middle of the second century, refers to two or three passages of this Gospel, in his appeals to the writings of the Apostles and their companions; and that before him, according to Hippolytus, Valentinus quoted from it; and Basilides, in the early part of the second century.* The criticism of these references has not shaken their evidence; but if it had made this at all doubtful, it would not in the least make doubtful the existence of the Gospel, and its acknowledgment by Christian Churches from the beginning. We have the testimonies of Christian writers, bishops, presbyters, and philosophers, from distant countries and conflicting parties, showing the almost universal acknowledgment of the Gospel of St. John by those who lived with the associates of the Apostle; and there is no evidence of any other authorship.

* Just. Apol. i. 61; Dial. c. Try. 88. The quotations given by Hippolytus are unquestionably from the Gospel of St. John. It is possible that he may have been mistaken in their authorship, but there is no reason to suppose this. Of Valentinus he writes: "On account of this, he says, the Saviour declares, 'All who have come before me are thieves and robbers'" (Ref. vi. 30). And of Basilides he writes: "And this, he says, is that which has been declared in the Gospels, 'There was the true light, which enlightens every man coming into the world'" (vii. 10). The Christology of Justin is admitted to be different from that of this Gospel, and inferior. Hence it has been inferred that the superior is the later production; but the contrary would be a more just conclusion, the Christian writings of the second century being all inferior to those of the first. Still more extraordinary is the inference that Justin could not
 * book, because his system does not exactly agree with it.

External evidence against the genuineness of this Gospel is entirely negative. A few persons in the second century rejected it, as they did other canonical books, assigning it to Cerinthus; but no one attributes any value to this heretical conjecture. All that can be objected to this Gospel is, that there are some early writers who do not give any testimony to it. But this is not adverse evidence, unless it be evident that, if the work were known, it would certainly be referred to. Now it never has been shown that references to the Gospel of St. John would be, not only appropriate in our judgment, but more suitable in the judgment of the writers, for their purpose, than the statements which they give. Merely negative evidence is seldom of much value; and it is of no worth when the documents are few, and the writer's purpose is not known to require the references which are wanting.

There are no references to this book in the Epistles of Clemens Romanus and Polycarp, nor in the fragments of Papias. But Clemens seldom refers to any of the Gospels, and to none by name. In the short Epistle of Polycarp there is a reference to the 1 Epistle of John; and there is no apparent occasion for referring to the Gospel. The writings of Papias are known only from extracts preserved by Eusebius. He gives, of things learnt by Papias from the presbyter John, some statements respecting St. Mark and St. Matthew. From the silence of Papias in this extract, it may be inferred that he had not *thus* learnt anything respecting the Gospel of St. John; but not that he nowhere referred to it, still less that he was unacquainted with it. The mention by Eusebius that Papias used testimonies from the 1 Epistle of John and the 1 Epistle of Peter is explained by the need of confirmation for these writings, which the Gospel of St. John did not require.* A precisely similar statement is made by him respecting Irenæus, and certainly he was not unacquainted with this Gospel.† The Epistles of Ignatius have been so much interpolated, that their references are of little argumentative value; and the works of the Barnabas and Hermas of the second century are too late, and too peculiar in their character, to make their neglect of this Gospel of any significance. No one knows who Barnabas was, or who were the few persons to whom he wrote. He sought to keep them from Judaism, and has many references to the Old Testament, some very unwise. He has one quotation from the Gospel of St. Matthew, but none from the Epistle to the Galatians, though this would be most relevant, and could not have been unknown. In the visions and similitudes of Hermas there are no quotations from the Old Testament or from the New. If the silence of a few writers could not be accounted for, it would not lessen the value of the testimonies which are given to the genuineness of


* Euseb. Hist. Ecc. iii. 39.

† Ibid. v. 8.

this Gospel. These are not by contemporaries of the Apostle, but they are by the contemporaries of his associates. They come so near to his time, that, considering their wide extent, their adverse sources, the high importance of apostolical authorship, and the great reverence of the early Christians for the sacred Scripture, their evidence is conclusive; more so than would be the evidence of a few contemporaries whose testimony is wanting. The external evidence agrees with the internal, and gives to it all needful confirmation.

The contrary conclusions to which learned and upright men have come in recent times respecting the genuineness of this Gospel must at first excite surprise; but it may be explained by the preference which they give to different descriptions of evidence. Some hold signs of truthfulness to be of much value, others of very little. Some attend chiefly to differences and difficulties in the Gospels, and therefore view them as very important; others give to them no special regard. An eminent person of our day has shown, by theory and example, how the ablest men may adopt most erroneous opinions. If, when the mind has once *assented* to a proposition, the amount of evidence in its favour is disregarded, and everything adverse is set aside as worthless, unless seen at once to be demonstrative, it naturally follows that the conclusions maintained will be, not according to the whole evidence, but according to that part, whether small or great, to which assent has been first given. They who begin with matters obscure and doubtful, and attend much to these, are likely, through the influence of association, to view with distrust even that which is plain and certain. The evidence which scholars only can appreciate, though it be slight, is often unduly prized by them, above all the proof which appeals to the conscience, the common sense, and the common experience of mankind. The religious excellence and influence of a work are to some the surest proofs of reality and truth, manifestations of the Divine Spirit; but to others these elements are inappreciable, or seem consistent with any measure of delusion and deception. If the principles which regulate judgment are so different, contrary conclusions are inevitable. While we find everywhere that unexplained difficulties belong to unquestionable truths, and can find nowhere a single spurious production really like the Gospel of St. John in marks of truthfulness and of truth, we need not fear that a book which the Christian Church has for seventeen centuries esteemed as one of its most precious treasures, a pillar of sacred truth, will be now rejected, because it does not meet all the unreasonable demands of an arbitrary and sceptical criticism. It was written for the world, and will abide for ever.

JOHN H. GONWIN.



DR. NEWMAN'S ESSAYS.

Essays Critical and Historical. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. Two Vols. Pickering, 1871.

AT a time when the Vatican decrees are eliciting hostile manifestations from one government after another in Europe for their political significance, and are being deliberately rejected in Germany by a compact body calling themselves old Catholics, and including persons of all ranks and professions, except the Episcopate, for their alleged incompatibility with "that great first principle of the Catholic faith, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*;" when excommunications are being hurled about right and left abroad against all who maintain or encourage such views, except those who cannot be attacked with impunity; and when even at home Archbishop Manning significantly reminds his clergy that "the salvation of the flock is to be preferred to the salvation of a few;" Dr. Newman, almost without comment, certainly without the least hint of their relevancy to what is uppermost in most minds, if not in his own just now, reprints, unasked, a collection of essays, all, with one exception, "written while their author was Fellow of Oriel and a member of the Established Church," on the ground, "mainly," that they had been published before. "He cannot destroy what he had once put into print." *What I have written, I have written*; or, *Litera scripta manet*, as he phrases it. He reprints them accordingly, that it might be seen of how much of them he has ceased to approve, and by consequence to how much he still holds, or else cannot reply to;

“and he is sanguine that he has been able to reduce what is uncatholic in them, whether in argument or statement, to the position of those ‘*Difficultates*’ which figure in dogmatic treatises of theology, and which are elaborately drawn out, and set forth to best advantage, in order that they may be the more carefully and satisfactorily answered.” Such, in his own words, is his own estimate of what he trusts has been achieved by this reprint. The Essays themselves have been republished, he is careful to tell us, with their text unchanged, or, at all events, only changed for the better in point of style; the notes appended to them, so few and far between, are not in his own judgment answers to them, but only suggestive of answers; not refutations, but only remarks. “There is an argument in the foregoing pages,” he says in one place, “on behalf of the Anglican Church which perhaps calls for remark from a Catholic” (i. 379). In another—“Of course I am not laying down the law on a point on which the Church has not directly and distinctly spoken, nor implying that I am not open to arguments on the other side, if such are forthcoming, which I do not anticipate” (ii. 77).

He puts his finger on “what is uncatholic in them,” makes a difficulty of it, sets it forth to best advantage, suggests what may be said in reply to it, yet positively leaves it unanswered after all; in conclusion, bids us take notice how little there is uncatholic in them by the scantiness of his notes. Out of fourteen essays, mostly controversial, only two have notes appended to them exceeding six pages in length. Several that are reproduced entirely without comment contain passages that he may have well preferred leaving alone to remarking upon. Astounding, that his *main* reason for republishing them at such a time should, on his own showing, when it has been unravelled and expressed in plain English, amount to this; and of how many more reasons is it not suggestive which he withholds? That he should turn away deliberately from the one subject engrossing and perplexing so many consciences everywhere, to reiterate conclusions that he had enunciated so many years back, and anything but in harmony with it; or if not to reiterate them all, at least to let people know how few of them he disavows, and only disavows for reasons which he considers himself of more or less force, but hesitates to say are conclusive till they have been more carefully weighed. Why, what else can this be but a pendant to the days in which these Essays were before the world for the first time; when their author first “saw the ghost;” when he was brooding over the situation “in retreat” at Littlemore, not at Edgbaston; and bishops had been “directing charges against him” by sixes or sevens, instead of six hundred at once? Certainly no man was ever a greater

martyr to any principle than Dr. Newman to Episcopacy. Ken and Sancroft were martyrs to their notion of the divine right of kings, but then it was concentrated in one king—the king whom God had set over them: to William of Orange, whom they deemed a usurper; to Louis XIV., who was not their sovereign, it bound them by no such tie. Dr. Newman has alternately quailed before bishops whom the Roman Church considers no bishops at all, and before bishops whom the Anglican Church considers intruders; he has disagreed with, and yet been loyal to, both in his day; he has not ventured to challenge their judgment, for all that he has not been able to subscribe to their views. For dead bishops, indeed, he does not seem to feel, or, at least, exhibit the same deference. He has told us more than once that it was not the Episcopate which saved the Church from Arianism in the fourth century. What he would have done then, had he lived then, it is perhaps unfair to inquire; but of living bishops, whatever judgment he may form in his own mind, he acts uniformly on the principle that they can do no wrong. He seems to point to something that has occurred recently when he says: “The general reception of the definition of an Ecumenical Council may avail to determine for us what the records of antiquity now extant leave doubtful, or only imperfectly testify;” (ii. 109) but to its general reception or non-reception (supposing him to refer to what has occurred recently) he does not seem willing himself to contribute so much as the weight of a feather, unless by biting his lips.

I look upon Episcopacy myself as a Divine institution; and bishops as the heads of Christ's Church; and Christ's Church as infinitely more beneficial to man, and therefore infinitely more worth upholding, than any bond, social or domestic, of whatever kind in the natural order. But for that very reason I hold there can be no greater duty than that of resisting bishops to the utmost when they teach heresy, tamper with truth, or override law. Error or injustice in them is infinitely more prejudicial to our best interests than error or injustice in kings. Accordingly the extra reverence which we owe them in general should alone bind us, in my opinion, to resist them all the more resolutely when they do wrong. And hence I cannot help recording my conviction that whenever posterity sits in judgment on the character of Dr. Newman, as it will some day, dutifulness to bishops will not be reckoned among his *strong* points, or commended as a principle of action in general, from the success with which it was practised in his case.

With these prefatory remarks, I pass to the consideration of what Dr. Newman has suggested may be said in reply to himself; and the first thing which strikes me is that there is a good deal in it

which I had prominently before me seventeen years back, and which in fact led me to join the Roman Communion. Now I should not have retraced my steps, most certainly, had I continued to think it conclusive. But before dealing with this as a whole, which I shall do presently, let me advert to two or three points on which I should have thought Dr. Newman inconclusive even then. For instance, in discussing what he calls "the Anglican paradox" (i. 185), he says, "If unity lies in the Apostolic succession, an act of schism is, from the nature of the case, impossible; for, as no one can reverse his parentage, so no Church can undo the fact that its clergy have come by lineal descent from the Apostles." I may be mistaken, but I never remember to have heard or been told before that the Apostolical succession was to be insisted on as a note of unity. I should have said it had no more to do with unity than with sanctity or catholicity. The Catholic Church is of course all these together—one, holy, catholic, apostolic; but, viewed abstractedly, these characteristics are not correlatives either in fact or idea. From the presence of one we cannot infer the others. I well remember going over all this in my own mind ages ago, when I reflected that Arians and Donatists, Nestorians and Armenians, had the Apostolical succession more clearly than we had; at the same time I realised that it was not to be the less prized on that account as one of the notes of the Church. Why greater stress should have been laid upon it in the Church of England than elsewhere is obvious enough. It happens to be precisely that which distinguishes her from all other bodies that separated from Rome in the sixteenth century, and that have separated from herself since then, and this is a fact which Rome has been, in porportion, as anxious to ignore as she to maintain. Rome will not hear of drawing a line between Anglicans and all other Western Christians not of her own fold; Anglicans rejoice that such a line exists, and being a fact, should be acknowledged. Anglicans may have exaggerated its importance in maintaining it, but Rome must be allowed to have exaggerated its importance by disputing it; once acknowledged as a fact, I feel confident it would never be pressed as an argument on the Anglican side for more than it is worth; neither do I believe that even now it is apt in Anglican minds to be confounded with what it has no direct concern. Accordingly, all that Dr. Newman says in another place about "unity being a duty prior in order and idea to Episcopacy" (ii. 96), I consider irrelevant; and all that he says about "Anglicans believing they belong to the true Church because their orders are valid," in contradiction to Roman Catholics, who "believe their orders are valid because they are members of the true Church," mere jingle, because no such antithesis exists in truth. It is a fact that the Greek,

Nestorian, and Armenian Churches lay as light stress upon their Apostolical succession as Rome herself, and Anglicans insist upon theirs for no other reason beyond this twofold one; namely, that besides being one of the notes of the Church, it distinguishes them from all other Protestants abroad and at home.

There are some further remarks upon "unity," that I should have thought all but refuted themselves. It is said in one place—

"Who will in seriousness maintain that relationship, or that resemblance, makes two bodies one? England and Prussia are two monarchies; are they therefore one kingdom? England and the United States are from one stock; can they therefore be called one state? England and Ireland are peopled by different races; yet do not they form one kingdom notwithstanding?"—(i. 185.)

Surely, no Anglican ever maintained that governmental unity, whether ecclesiastical or civil, was the tie by which the Church is made one! Of what force, then, is the analogy? Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, and Wesleyans live under the government of Queen Victoria, no less than Anglicans; are they, therefore, one Church? And Dr. Newman himself obviates my dwelling on the unity which is the result of Church government, by what he says in another place:—

"If then the New Testament is to be our guide in matters ecclesiastical, one thing at least is certain. We may doubt whether bishops are of obligation; whether there is an Apostolical succession; whether presbyters are priests; whether St. Stephen and his six associates were the first deacons; whether the Sacraments are seven or two; but of one thing we cannot doubt, that all Christians were in the first age bound together in one body, with an actual intercommunion and mutual relations between them, with ranks and officers, and with a central authority, and that this organized association was 'the body of Christ,' and that in it, considered as one, dwelt the 'one Spirit.'"—(ii. 96.)

What Dr. Newman may mean by the "central authority," which, according to him, forms part of "the one thing we cannot doubt," is probably best known to himself; but that this organized association was "the body of Christ," and that in it, considered as One, dwelt the "One Spirit," is a fact from which no student of the Bible could dissent. And how were proselytes incorporated into this "body" but by baptism? by baptism, the first in order of all the Sacraments: the only Sacrament that, administered in due form, no matter by whom, is received once for all. "This external unity," proceeds Dr. Newman, "is pre-supposed, typified, required by the Sacraments properly so called;" rather, it is the unity to which they admit, and they alone. So that, consequently, the true name for it is "Sacramental unity," and it is by this, and no other, that the Church is made one. I suppose that Dr. Newman himself would not dispute

that were the whole Chinese population to acknowledge themselves subjects of the Pope to any extent short of receiving baptism, they would be no nearer to this unity than they are now; nor, again, that were all Christian Churches everywhere—the Pope's included—to agree to admit everybody to communion who, having been duly baptized, led a moral life, and professed his sincere acceptance of the Nicene Creed, everybody would be a sharer of this unity to the fullest extent possible, no matter under what form of Church government he might be living. This being admitted, it must follow necessarily that even under existing circumstances everybody belongs to this unity who, having been duly baptized, has never afterwards been excluded from it for any crime of his own; if he has in mature years been taught and accepts all the articles of the Creed in good faith, he belongs to it all the more closely; if he has the happiness to be a devout partaker of a valid Eucharist, all the more closely still. There may be various degrees of realising this unity, but it is identical in kind all through: that to which all are without exception admitted by Christian baptism, being only what they make their own afterwards through the Lord's Supper in perfection.

Space alone forbids my touching upon several other points that I think I could have met equally well seventeen years ago as now. The remaining instance which I shall adduce will bring me to the threshold of what I was unable to meet then, and have only seen my way to meeting effectually within the last few years, whatever others may say or think. This is, I am well aware, tantamount to admitting that the Anglican position is not really defensible by the arguments that were current in its behalf seventeen years back, and that persons will find it break down under them unexpectedly who think it is. Such has been the result of my own experience; but in abandoning them I feel equally certain that it can be most conclusively defended upon other grounds, whether I can do justice to them or not in stating them; and of these grounds some have been kept out of sight or escaped notice for centuries; others have been placed in our hands by Rome, to her own cost, quite recently.

Dr. Newman contends, then, in one place, that "there is nothing evasive in his refusing to decide the question of orders by the mere letter of an Ordination Service, to the neglect of more elementary and broader questions" (ii. 80); to justify this, "the Anglican bishops," he asserts, "have lived and died in heresy for three centuries;" and in proof of this, "how many Anglican bishops," he asks, "have believed in transubstantiation, or in the necessity of sacramental penance? yet to deny these dogmas is to be a heretic." *Pace tanti viri*, I have rarely seen special pleading more feebly disguised. I thought from the unscrupulous insinuations preceding it,

which gave me the greatest pain as I read them, Dr. Newman must have felt he had no alternative but to play the advocate. Who says "to deny these dogmas is to be a heretic," but the Church of Rome? Well, in a controversy between two, the word of one is as good as the word of the other till proved false. The Church of England says that to deny these dogmas in the sense in which the Church of Rome holds them is to be orthodox. Trials would be curiously managed if the "*ipse dixit*" of one side decided them.

I cite this passage, not for its intrinsic merits, for it is about the feeblest in the volume, but for the clear insight it affords of the assumption that underlies them all, and should therefore be forgotten by nobody reading these Essays—namely, "That the Church of Rome is the Catholic Church." This is, of course, what Dr. Newman believes himself; he was persuaded of it when he left the Church of England; and he argues on this hypothesis throughout, whether he is persuaded of it or not still. But that he arrived at it by confining his attention to England and Rome—by looking at them as though one or other of them must be the Catholic Church, to the exclusion of both, and of all others, and then drawing his inference—I am simply certain, as well from having been brought to the same conclusion in the same way myself, as from observing that it is precisely this process which is repeated in these comments. There is nothing discussed here practically but the question between England and Rome; and this, again, is discussed, not in the abstract, but from the standpoint of his foregone conclusion that Rome is the Catholic Church. It is as if he had said at starting to his opponents, "Heads I win, and tails you lose." Accordingly, they would find it sheer waste of time to attempt grappling with his arguments in detail while this is unchallenged.

But it is just this position which nothing short of a direct revelation would induce me to admit now. From personal experience gained as a Roman Catholic, from historical evidence forced upon me while a Roman Catholic, I was convinced, step by step—and, I will add, much to my own surprise—that nothing could be more false.

From personal experience, first—In an eloquent passage too long to extract entire (i. 382-5), Dr. Newman says, "Catholics act according to their name; Catholics are at home in every time and place, in every state of society, in every class of the community, in every stage of cultivation. No state of things comes amiss to a Catholic priest; he has always a work to do and a harvest to reap." Applied to the Primitive Church, whence the author draws his description, all this is at once real and ideal: applied to the Roman Church, as the author means it to be, it is a pure stretch of the ima-

gination, and not fact. There was no subject that engaged me more, on being enrolled a member of the Roman Catholic body, than that of missions and missionaries. I was a constant visitor at the Missions Etrangères in Paris, and of the French priests I knew best and saw most frequently, one was a Lazarist Father, another a director of the Missions Etrangères, who had been a missionary, another an actual missionary, trained and sent out from thence. From all that I learnt and saw there—putting its excellence as an institution and the zeal of its inmates, both of which filled me with admiration, on one side—I could not help doubting in my own mind whether, after all, these were true missions to the heathen, such as was St. Augustine's to the Anglo-Saxons; and the moment I set my foot in the East, I no longer doubted, but was convinced they were not. The impression I brought home with me from those parts was that Rome was the most untiring of proselytizers among Christians, but very little better than England, if at all—and that in degree, not in kind—as an evangelizer of non-Christians. In Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, all round the Levant, I found her missionaries nowhere but where there were Roman Catholics from Europe to minister to, and native Christians to win over from other Churches. The missionaries themselves were either Europeans or of European extraction. There was nothing approaching to a regular onslaught upon Islamism anywhere,—diplomacy forbade this,—and not more attempted among the Jews even than could be done with safety. That there were missions to the heathen in other quarters I was well aware; but I also knew of the constant appeals then making to the French Government to interfere in Cochin China, where some of the devoted men that were sent thither were cruelly martyred, and it was soon hoped the Gospel would be preached there under protection of the French flag, as in fact it has been of late years. Then I inquired about results, and nowhere could I hear of a single nation or country that had been won to the faith by Roman Catholic missionaries since the Reformation, as England had been in the seventh century—king, nobles, people, all brought over to Christianity in a body, and subsequently forming a native Church under a native priesthood. I could neither hear nor read of such in any quarter. In South America there had been conquest, and amalgamation or extermination of the native races, by the Spaniards, as in North America and in Australia by ourselves. Japan and Madagascar had been often attempted, but nothing like national effects had been produced in either to this day. In China the Nestorians succeeded in obtaining a firmer footing at one time than any that have succeeded them; and Russia probably penetrates deepest in our own. In India neither the French nor Portuguese, who preceded us, had done more than convert by

driblets, just as we are doing ourselves now. As I looked at the Russian pilgrims that I met at Jerusalem, and asked myself the question who had converted Russia, I remember wincing somewhat unpleasantly to think it was the Greek, not the Roman, Church.

When I returned to England, and commenced subscribing to the society called the Propagation of the Faith, what was my confusion to find that while what Roman Catholics in England contributed to this society could be reckoned by hundreds, what they *drew from it* in support of their Church in Christian England, notwithstanding that, since the creation of their hierarchy, it could no longer be regarded *in partibus infidelium*, amounted to thousands of pounds; and when I saw with equal amazement that other Christian countries drew from it also largely besides England, I could not help exclaiming, though then a Roman Catholic myself, "If this is not humbug and rottenness, what is? What if the Church of Rome should, after all, prove to be *the Established Church of Europe*, and no more?" I had no notion, when this idea first struck me, that I was about to embark in historical researches of any kind calculated to throw light on it, still less that it was the very conclusion that they would force upon me above all others. But circumstances having induced me to investigate the causes of Christendom's divisions from original sources, the moment I had got fairly beyond the outer crust of what, for want of a handier name, I shall call the Greek question—in other words, the division of the Eastern and Western Churches—scales fell from my eyes, and I awoke to the reality that I was but a Latin Christian after all. Dean Milman had given his history a truer name than even he was aware when he fixed its title.

What I mean by getting beyond the outer crust of the Greek question is getting beyond the traditional view of it in which most, if not all of us, have been brought up. I say of this view, that as it has come down to us, it is a medicated or cooked-up view, manufactured by prejudice, partly from distorted or suppressed facts, and partly from fictions, in former days, and then repeated till it was believed. Take any of our current histories, for instance, and you will find the religious part of the controversy represented invariably as having commenced with Photius, instead of Charlemagne; the Crusades, as having been undertaken to rescue Palestine from the Mahometans—which, ostensibly, no doubt, they were—their secret purpose, notwithstanding, which the late Sir F. Palgrave was the first to unmask, having been as certainly to subjugate the East in Church and State to the West; the extinction of the Eastern Empire, as a Christian power, ascribed to the prowess of the second Mahomet, when, in fact, its real destroyers were the Venetians and Pope

Innocent III. And lest isolated events connected with it might be supposed to have been described with more accuracy, let me say of the second Council of Lyons, by way of specimen, that I know of no ecclesiastical history in general use amongst us, in which the account given of it is not a tissue of falsehoods from beginning to end in the main.

And now let me state briefly what, having got beyond this outer crust, I found to be true. First, *apropos* to a subject already discussed from another point of view—missionary labours and results—I found that during the whole period of the Middle Ages—from the consummation of the schism between the two Churches in the eleventh century downwards—the only mission to non-Christians that had ever sped from Roman Catholic Europe was that of John de Monte Corvino to China; and this originated in fear of the Tartars, and was followed by no lasting results of any kind. Europe was swarming all this time with clergy, half its soil was in their hands, the very mendicants by profession were housed in magnificent cloisters; and literally not one nation was from first to last won to the faith, and but in one case attempted to be. Christian bishops armed to the teeth engaged hand to hand with the infidel, instead of preaching to him. All who fought were encouraged to hope they would expiate their crimes in proportion to the blood they shed. It is stated in the life of St. Francis, that he actually attempted the conversion of a Soldan of Egypt; but of missions organized for the purpose of converting the infidel, there never was fact enough even to warrant a legend. Proselytizers of the Nestorians, Armenians, Jacobites, and other Christian bodies, to be sure, were numerous enough while the Crusades lasted; and in one case, that of the Maronites, achieved a permanent triumph, *exceptio probat regulam*—viz., that of failure in all others. Literally, the only conversion of a whole nation to Christianity achieved since the schism has been that of Russia by the Greek Church; and in Russia, probably, whose colossal proportions are steadily on the increase, there is a conglomeration of races and languages equal to all those of the existing Church of Rome put together. Indeed I should not at all wonder, were the question of Catholicity to be determined by *professing races*, if the Russo-Greek Church was found at least as Catholic in the east now, as that of Rome in the west.

I pass from these external phenomena to the more esoteric questions of Church order and dogma, of which that of the Creed stands first. The facts relating to it recently brought out are beyond dispute; but to many they have doubtless appeared too antiquarian or too subtle to be of any present interest; while their collective importance may have escaped others, from their collective bearing

upon Church principles not having as yet been recognised. Persons, again, may or may not entertain these principles themselves; but all may be judges of the extent to which they have been adhered to, or departed from, in a given case.

I begin, then, by observing that people are much mistaken who consider this question in any light but that of a living and eminently practical one. For a thousand years all the Churches of the East—orthodox, schismatic, and heretical, have—with one consent, persisted in refusing to adopt the Western interpolation of the words “Filioque” into the Nicene Creed, at any price. Nor can any student of history doubt but that it was due to this refusal, more than to anything else, that Constantinople was sacked by the Latins in the thirteenth century, and has been, since the fifteenth, in the hands of the Turks. Whatever we Englishmen may think of the dispute involved in these words, it is associated in the Eastern mind with so much national humiliation and endurance, that it will never cease to be regarded in that part of the world as a holy cause; and being one which probably through Russia numbers more votaries than ever now, is as likely to prove the excuse for a fresh conflagration some day as it ever was.

Again, people are much mistaken who consider that the dispute involved in these words is one which is limited to the existing Churches of the East and West—which from henceforth I shall call Greece and Rome. It is a dispute, really, between Rome of the last thousand years, in round numbers, on the one hand, and Greece, for the same time, backed by the whole Church of the preceding eight hundred years, on the other. The Roman Church of the first eight centuries is, in short, in every respect as much opposed to the Roman Church which exists now, as the Greek Church is, or ever has been; and further, it is a dispute in which Roman Catholic principles tell against Rome most of all.

Long before the infallibility of the Pope in defining doctrine was pronounced by the Vatican Council, the infallibility of General Councils confirmed by the Pope and accepted by the whole Church, on matters of faith, was a current axiom with Roman Catholics; and this infallibility was held to attach to everything decreed by them on dogma, no matter what form it took. Hence while canons on discipline were considered at all times liable to be modified or become obsolete, canons on dogma were never considered otherwise than unalterable. Each of the dogmatic chapters of the Vatican Council is followed by such a canon: each of the dogmatic chapters of the Council of Trent by a number of such canons. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Councils appended a similar canon to their dogmatic definitions, respecting the Creed as it then stood; but it is on their dog-

matic definitions themselves, in reality, and not only this canon, that the dispute turns. The canon itself ran as follows:—

“The holy and ecumenical synod has *defined* that it is lawful for nobody to propose, that is, compile, put together, hold, or teach others, another faith. Those who dare either to put together another faith, or *produce, teach, or deliver another creed* to any desirous of returning to a knowledge of the truth from heathenism, Judaism, or any heresy whatsoever, are deposed, if bishops or ecclesiastics; if monks or laymen, anathematized.”

Of the creed in question, the definition of the Fourth Council declared solemnly that “concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, it expressed,” or set forth, “the perfect doctrine.” In the eighth century, the Council of Frankfort, in adopting the Caroline books, to which I will refer again presently, declared of this same creed, that the perfect doctrine respecting the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost was *not* set forth in it, unless those words “Filioque” were inserted. On these grounds the Council of Frankfort pronounced for their retention, and, as everybody knows, they are retained by the Church of Rome to this day.

When the Caroline books, which the Council of Frankfort had endorsed, were submitted to Adrian I.—the reigning Pope—he replied to them chapter by chapter himself: and on this point, in particular, he warned everybody concerned in them “that any persons calling in question the creed authorized by the Fourth Council *contravened its definition.*” He further quoted his immediate predecessor, Stephen IV., as “anathematizing all those who should maintain another creed or doctrine besides that of the six General Councils,” thus asserting entire harmony between them all as regards the creed.

With contemporary testimony like this in my rear, I can have no hesitation in maintaining there is a contradiction in strictest logic on high dogma between Rome *with* the Filioque, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Councils, including Rome, *without* it—the express declaration of the one being that the perfect doctrine respecting the Trinity was set forth in the creed without it—the implied declaration of the other in adopting and imposing it upon others, that the perfect doctrine could only be set forth with it.

Further, that the penalties of the canon were incurred by its insertion, can hardly be disputed by any reasonable person informed of the sequel. The Eastern Church, then in a majority, protested, and protests to this day, against it, as involving another faith, and it has divided the east and the west ever since. What departure from the creed by all the schismatics and heretics upon record ever entailed more fatal or more lasting effects? But if the penalties of the canon *have been* incurred really by the Church of Rome, to what

extent has the validity of Roman orders been impaired thereby? Besides, there are graver, and many may think plainer, counts against the Church of Rome on the score of this canon. "No other faith," says this canon, "no other creed is to be produced, taught, or delivered to any desirous of returning to a knowledge of the truth from heathenism, Judaism, or any heresy whatsoever." It was at once the creed in which the faithful were to make public profession inside the Church, and to which persons coming over from any heresy whatsoever outside the Church, were to subscribe. The sum of all doctrine necessary to salvation having been expressed in the existing creed, this canon said virtually, "Be it enacted, that no believer shall in future be required to profess more." But the practice of the Church of Rome has long been to exact the creed of Pope Pius, a macrostyché by comparison, from every proselyte coming over to her from other Christian bodies. Previously to this Clement IV. attempted to force a similar creed of his own framing upon the Greeks; and now the new dogmas promulgated by Pius IX. alone bid fair to furnish matter for a third.

So much for those Councils whose infallible utterances have never been questioned in any part of the Church. Now for Popes, whose utterances, *ex cathedrâ*, were but the other day declared infallible by their own surroundings. St. Ambrose said of the great heresy of his own day that it was "decapitated by the sword it had itself unsheathed." Possibly some later age may have this to say of the Ultramontanes themselves. Certainly the *clearest* result as yet achieved by their intrigues has been to place Pius IX. and his whole Church under formal anathema, not of one or two, but a long line of Popes; for who will assert any Popes ever spoke more infallibly than those who addressed the whole Church before the schism, than those who gave the whole weight of their official authority to the faith and creed of the Fourth Council in the exact form in which they had received and confirmed it themselves? Thus St. Leo says of its definitions that they were "perfect and irrevocable;" of its "rule of faith," or creed, that "nothing could be added to or subtracted from it;" of both together, that "perfection cannot receive increase, nor fulness addition." Hormisdas, of the doctrines of its creed, that "they are perfect, and so neither need any supplement, nor can admit of any change." Vigilus, of its definitions, that "he is alien from the Catholic Church who departs from them." Pelagius I., of the faith in its published definition, that he "anathematizes all who deviate from it in one syllable, one word, or thought." Pelagius II., of its faith, that "he keeps it intact," and of its definitions, that "he would sooner die than not keep them irrevocable;" of both together, all that St. Leo had said before him. St. Gregory I., of its

faith, that "any person adding to it or taking from it has fallen under its anathema." John IV., of its faith, that "it is perfection." Theodore I., of its creed, that "he allows no augmentation in it, and says anathema to all adding to or taking from it;" of its canon, that its meaning is, "that nobody should add anything to or subtract anything from the one creed authorized, to the exclusion of all others." St. Martin, that "anybody not keeping them all, *usque ad unum apicem*, is condemned." St. Agatho, that "it was his perfect knowledge to guard its definitions intact . . . for that the true faith cannot be changed, or preached in one way now and in another hereafter." Stephen IV., that "anybody propounding another creed or another doctrine besides what was taught in the Fourth and two succeeding Councils was, by his anathema, pronounced alien from the Church"—a sentence which, as I have said already, was renewed by his successor, Adrian I., on the suggestion being made to him that its creed was wanting in explicitness on one point. Finally, Leo III. crowned all, by forbidding the insertion in it of the formula devised for giving it the required explicitness on the very point in question, viz., the "Filioque."

After this I think there will be few plain-spoken Englishmen who will not go with me to the extent of concluding:—1. That if Rome has not incurred all the penalties denounced by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Councils for adding to the creed then authorized, and compiling and exacting others, then dogmatic canons, to use plain language, must be simple bosh. 2. If the "Filioque" is really required in the creed to express what all Christians ought to believe of the Trinity, the dogmatic definitions of Ecumenical Councils must be greater bosh still. 3. If Rome has not lain under Papal anathema for centuries, Papal infallibility must be the greatest bosh of all. In a word, that, unless all these consequences are conceded, what are called Church principles are really chameleons or chimeras. But if they are granted, what becomes of the claim of Rome to be the Catholic Church? On the contrary, she that is under anathema, both of Councils and Popes, and therefore in schism or heresy for certain, how can it be otherwise than schism to adhere to her, otherwise than righteousness to depart from her? On every Church principle, clearly, there can be no such thing as schism from schism.

Let us examine the same thing on Church principles yet once more, but from another point of view. Who was it who first accused the Nicene Creed of not being explicit enough on a point of high doctrine—no less a point than the procession of the Holy Ghost? Who but Charlemagne? We have his *ipsissima verba* for it—words such as had never been heard before; words directly contradicting all that General Councils and Popes had said hitherto. Well, Rome

rebuked him for them at first; resisted them passively for a longer time; but in the end acknowledged their point by accepting all they contended for. As a Roman Catholic I established as much as this; but I have learnt more since. In penetrating the maze in which the Athanasian Creed has been for so long involved—and here let me say, in passing, that I both commenced and completed this inquiry, without reference to anything but *the Greek question alone*—in penetrating this maze I was brought face to face with the following undoubted facts at last:—1. That the first authentic mention of this Creed, by whomsoever compiled, under the false name which it still bears (for “fides” and “symbolum” are plainly synonymes in this case), occurs in a general capitulary promulgated by Charlemagne A.D. 802, bidding all his clergy to learn it, and the Apostles’ Creed, by heart. 2. That the next authentic mention of it occurs in a letter of some monks of his to vindicate their use of the “Filioque” in the Creed to the Pope. 3. That the next authentic mention of it occurs in several controversial treatises in defence of the “Filioque,” written at his command against the Greeks. 4. That it was substituted throughout his dominions as a standard of orthodoxy for the “Nicene faith.” 5. That the publication of the Apostles’ Creed under a false name formed part of the same design is shown from his own use of it against the Seventh Council, with which he was then at open-mouthed feud. Each of these creeds in the form, and two of them under the false names, endorsed by him was adopted by Rome subsequently, together with all the disciplinary regulations *en masse* prescribed at Aix-la-Chapelle, by him or his successors, for the Churches in their dominions. By means of these and their capitularies conjointly they both founded and feudalized what has since been called, by way of distinction—and a most true distinction it is—the Mediæval Church; and thus Rome, through their instrumentality, broke with the Primitive and the Eastern Church, and became the Established Church of Europe from thenceforth in a much more complete sense than ever the Anglican Church broke with Rome, and became the Established Church of England at the Reformation. In particular, as regards theology, never was anything achieved by Edward VI., Queen Elizabeth, or James I. by means of “Articles of Religion,” to compare with what Charlemagne achieved in the Roman Church by means of the Athanasian Creed alone. You have only to turn to the “Theological Sum,” as it is called, of the Angelical doctor to be convinced of this. The Latin clergy had not learnt it by reciting it week after week for four centuries in their Sunday office for nothing. It had become the corner-stone of their theology. Was the word “Person” applicable to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost? The last Council over which the true Athanasius had presided, on being pressed for advice

on such subjects, had earnestly deprecated using any such expressions at all in speaking of God. The greatest of the Latin Fathers had admitted it, as he says himself, only from the necessities of the case, in *disputing against heretics*. Even the pseudo-Dionysius attests the generally-received axiom of Nicene times, "Universaliter, non est audendum dicere aliquid de Deo præter ea quæ nobis ex Sacris Eloquiis sunt expressa." Are we then to refrain from using this word? "Sed contra est dicitur in symbolo Athanasii, 'Alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti,'" is the reply. Is the Nicene Creed right or wrong on the procession of the Holy Ghost? The Nicene Creed says, "Who proceedeth from the Father;" and stops there. "Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius in symbolo suo, 'Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio: non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, nec procedens,'" is the reply once more. The spurious creed overrides even the creed of the Church. On Church principles alone, then, we are bound to denounce the Athanasian Creed as combining both rebellion and imposture. From the purposes to which we have just seen it applied, it is proved *another creed* from the Nicene—a spurious authority pitted against and followed in preference to the true. We may be ever so much in favour of dogma in the abstract—indeed, what science can exist without dogma?—but this is a question not between dogma and no dogma, but between Nicene dogma and pseudo-Athanasian. Can anybody professing Church principles doubt which side he ought to take? A third count against it is that, if examined dispassionately, it will be found to have been framed on Rationalistic principles, and, as a direct consequence, to have taught the Roman Catholic Church Rationalism. I have not space to substantiate this at any great length, and therefore limit myself to explain my meaning.

Theological speculation is one thing; theological dogma necessary to salvation another. I do not say that we are not at liberty to argue from points on which Scripture is express to other points on which Scripture is silent, and draw our conclusions; or that all such inferences are delusive. But I do maintain that at best they are probable, not necessary, conclusions; and that to propound them as Articles of Faith, necessary to salvation, is Rationalism of the very worst kind. The Jews were told to "search the Scriptures" in the same breath, and by the same authority, that warned them against the perverse deductions of the scribes and Pharisees from those same Scriptures in such awful terms. In one case they had argued that because the Bible said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour," it said, by implication, "Thou shalt hate thine enemy;" and this last they had, in consequence, taught as a duty no less binding than the first.

Can anything, *mutatis mutandis*, better illustrate the relative positions of the Latin and Greek Churches on the subject of the

procession of the Holy Ghost? Both agree that the Holy Ghost is both given and sent by the Son, as well as the Father, for all purposes connected with the Christian dispensation, Scripture being express to this effect. What the Latins affirm, and what the Greeks deny, is that He proceeds from the Son, as from the Father, in a still higher sense—viz., from eternity. Scripture nowhere says that He proceeds from the Son in this sense. Notwithstanding, a belief in this has been made necessary to salvation in the Latin Church, and the proof given of it by the greatest of her schoolmen is, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are only distinguishable from each other by what Aristotle terms “the opposition of relation,” in his work on the “Categories,” according to the laws of which, it follows either that the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son, or the Son from the Holy Ghost. This, as speculation, is bold enough; as dogma, it is Rationalism of the worst kind. And I hold it to be implied, though not expressed, in the Athanasian Creed for this simple reason: that the Athanasian Creed has been from first to last uniformly put forward in its defence. But the Rationalism of the Athanasian Creed is made most apparent by contrasting its structure with the principles that animated the framers of the Nicene Creed, of which the first was the employment of Scriptural language to express dogma; and the second, the limitation of dogma necessary for all believers to what it contained. The Athanasian Creed is in marked contradiction to both of these. In opposition to the first, it invites reason to assist in mapping out the province of faith, utilizes its deductions without scruple in the construction of dogma, invoking the laws of dialectics where Scripture is silent in expounding, and terms of philosophy where Scriptural terms will not express its own subtleties to the full. In opposition to the second, it declares *all that it contains* necessary to salvation, whether found in the creed of the Church or not; some of them being actually points which must have been omitted from the creed of the Church by design. On Church principles there is not a word to be said for it, I repeat; and the secret of its undoubted charm is, *that it tickles the reason so well.*

Now, there can be no stronger proof of the influence of this creed on the teaching of the Church of Rome than the broad fact that Rome never compounded or propounded a creed herself till she had thoroughly imbibed this. I consider I have proved to demonstration in connection with it, that what we call the Apostles' Creed was not only distinct from the Roman, but was never even used at Rome till after the days of Charlemagne, and that the old Roman Creed, which was never imposed upon any Churches outside the city of the Cæsars, and was abandoned by Rome herself for the Niceno-Constantinopolitan and Apostles' Creeds in succession, is that on which

all candidates for baptism in the Roman communion are still questioned. Accordingly, the first creed ever known to have been compounded and propounded by Rome was that which Clement IV. framed for the Greeks A.D. 1267, whereby for the first time, what Dr. Newman calls "developments of doctrine," but what I prefer calling "dictates of reason," were propounded as terms of communion in a formal creed. Test any one of them separately—the doctrine of the sacraments, of transubstantiation, of purgatory—add to them the doctrines of indulgences, of concomitancy, of the temporal power of the Pope and his infallibility—you will find the real security for each lies in its having been *logically* drawn from others previously received, or from axioms approved to the reason, not in anything enjoined in Scripture or practised by the Apostles. I say of them all, therefore, that they are the deductions of reason, and that being the deductions of reason, to make them articles of faith is to introduce Rationalism into the creed; and I recognise in them the strongest confirmation, on intrinsic grounds, of the conclusion forced upon my mind by cogent facts, that the Church of Rome is and has been for the last one thousand years the Established Church of Europe, and nothing more; and that if not actually cut off from its communion for disobeying its laws—though declared so, she may not have been from there being nobody "to bell the cat"—she has at least no right or title, consistently with facts, or on Church principles, to be called, or to claim to be the Catholic Church.

There is one more argument that is apt to be urged in favour of Rome, and it is pressed home as a dilemma. If the Church of Rome is not the Catholic Church, certainly no other Church is; *ergo*, there is none at all. This "*ergo*" I deny. On the contrary, Church principles, I contend, as well as present facts and past history, are much better harmonized in another way. Test each of the principal Churches by their missions, on which so much has been already said. In the east Greece is *facile princeps* in having Russia to point to; but Greece never sent a single missionary to the aborigines of North or South America or of Australia. Whatever Christianity there is, or has been, in these countries is due to England or Rome; and England and Rome both send missionaries to the east as well. Still by neither of them has ever been founded a native Church like that of Russia, since the schism. Accordingly, Greece is more catholic than both together in the east; less catholic than either of them in the west; Rome, as being both older and more extensive, more catholic than England in general. But take them singly, and there neither are nor have been any such things as catholic missions since the schism. Take them collectively, and between them you may be said to have the Catholic Church at work

and alive still. During the Middle Ages the Popes themselves, in their various endeavours to re-unite the Eastern and Western Churches, were accustomed to say that the Church was divided as regards her members, but united as regards her faith. The last Pope who said this was Eugenius IV. in summoning the Council of Florence A.D. 1439, and when he said it there had been no intercommunion in the strict sense between the Eastern and Western Churches for at least four hundred years. On these principles, the Church is as much one now as then; the divisions which have occurred since have been equally confined to her members, and not affected her faith—not affected her faith, for the same creed, the only creed known to the Church, the Nicene, is professed everywhere, now as then; and Sacramental unity, though stunted and sickly for want of a common Eucharist, is by Baptism upheld in life. Intercommunion even now, on the highest Church principles, is all that is needed to make the objective unity of the Church complete.


How many crucial difficulties in Church history are thus solved unexpectedly by the teaching of the Popes themselves! Holy wars, and the indulgences attached to them, whether against Turk or heretic; the depositions of kings and emperors in and out of Council by Christian bishops; the whole question of investitures, and a vast deal more that was enacted in those Councils of Lateran, Lyons, and Vienne—justifiable measures, in some respects, it may be, for those days of feudal relations between Church and State, but all full of embarrassment, when the Catholic Church is made responsible for them in every age; not so the moment they are regarded as the work of a part of the Church only, and in the peculiar circumstances in which it was then placed. Diocesan, provincial, and still more national synods, in which kings sit as well as bishops, representing Church and State, therefore, conjointly, may in their wisdom order many things to be done for local or occasional emergencies, for which, on Church principles, one would think, few could desire to see the entire Church of Christ in all ages made responsible. I submit, then, that from this point of view alone, many more difficulties are solved by the theory that the Church of Rome is *not* the Catholic Church than by the theory that she *is*; and that the majesty of the Catholic Church is in fact infinitely more consulted by acknowledging her divisions than by misrepresenting her unity.

With this I take leave of Dr. Newman and his Essays, trusting that I have said nothing that can be construed into disrespect to him personally, nor unfair to his later as compared with his earlier judgments. Few of us that were at Oxford in his day have not been debtors to him in a hundred ways, many more than we could acknowledge, perhaps, if we wished it ever so. Nevertheless, in

the one act in which I followed him most, though certainly least at his instance, I am bound to say I have come to regard it as the greatest mistake of my life; and that it is my deliberate conviction in mature age, that for all who prize "truth for its own sake," there is no spiritual pasture more favourable to it anywhere than that of the Church of England.

At the same time, it is my conviction also that England is weak in point of argument against Rome without Greece, but would be with Greece invincible, for this simple reason: that Greece has never ceased to be true to the Nicene faith, has never added to it, and to this day knows of but one creed. Of that one creed the history is as transparent as crystal from beginning to end; no mystery, no myth, ever attached to its name; it comes to us on authority patent to all, and to which all on Church principles are bound to defer. These are points which are passed over in these Essays entirely; but it is on these grounds that I have no hesitation in professing, without any reserve, my desire to see an *entente cordiale* with all speed established between England and Greece as regards creeds.

EDMUND S. FOULKES.



WHAT IS COMMON SENSE?

“**M**EN rarely ask,” says Dr. Reid, “what Common Sense is; because every man believes himself possessed of it, and would take it for an imputation upon his understanding to be thought unacquainted with it.” Considering, however, that the study of the Mental operations which direct a very large part of our daily life is quite as important to a scientific Psychology as that of Logical formulæ, Ethical systems, or Absolute existence, I venture to hope that an attempt at a scientific analysis of those operations may not be regarded as an imputation upon the understanding of any of those to whom it is now submitted.

The term “Common Sense” has been used in so great a variety of acceptations (of which a most learned collection will be found in Sir William Hamilton’s supplemental note to Dr. Reid’s essay), that it is requisite to state, *in limine*, which of these I intend to make the basis of our discussion. No more concise, or at the same time comprehensive, account of its nature seems to me to have been given than that of Dr. Reid himself, when he says that the office of Common Sense, or the first degree of Reason, is to “judge of things self-evident,” as contrasted with the office of Ratiocination,* or the second degree of

* The term “Ratiocination” is not used by Dr. Reid; but as he distinguishes the *first* degree of Reason by the term Common Sense, it seems desirable to employ a distinctive term for the *second*.

Reason, which is "to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are." For although exception may be taken to the use of the verb "judge," where the "self-evident" character of the "things" cognosed seems to exclude any other possibility; yet, as I shall presently endeavour to show, a justification may be found for it in the history of the process by which that "self-evidence" comes to be recognised and accepted.

The distinction between "Common Sense," and "Ratiocination" or the "Discursive power," is regarded by Sir William Hamilton as equivalent to that which the Greek philosophers meant to indicate by the terms *vous* and *διανοια*; and our colloquial use of the former, as corresponding to that cultivated Common Sense which is often distinguished as "good sense" is thereby justified.

There are, however, two principal forms of this capacity, which it is desirable clearly to distinguish:—

The *first* is what the *philosopher* means by Common Sense, when he attributes to it the formation of those original convictions or ultimate beliefs, which cannot be resolved into simpler elements, and which are accepted by every normally-constituted Human being as *direct cognitions* of his own mental states. The existence of such "necessary truths," or "fundamental axioms," as a basis on which the whole fabric of our subsequently acquired knowledge is built up, is admitted alike by those who regard them as Intuitional, and by those who maintain that they are generalizations of Experience. We may take as examples of such universal deliverances of "Common Sense," our conviction of our own existence; our conviction of our own continuous individuality or personal identity; and our conviction of the existence of a world external to ourselves.

It is the *second*, however, which constitutes what is *popularly* meant by "Common Sense," as in the following passage from a recent newspaper article on the "Dangers of the London Season:—" "Any builder for a few pounds may save us from the dangers of the sewers; but nothing short of unpurchasable common sense will preserve us from the deadly effects of our gaities." This form of common sense, though the possession of Mankind in general, varies greatly, as to both range and degree, among different individuals; serving, however, to each as his guide in the ordinary affairs of life. That it is *acquired* in great part from experience, will probably be disputed by no one; but the *capacity for acquiring it* is by no means uniform. Inasmuch, moreover, as we no longer find its deliverances in constant accordance, but encounter continual divergencies of judgment as to what things are "self-evident"—some being so to A whilst they are not so to B, and others being self-evident to B which are not so to A—it cannot be trusted as an autocratic or infallible authority. And

yet, as Dr. Reid truly says, "disputes very often terminate in an appeal to common sense;" this being especially the case when to doubt its judgment would be ridiculous.*

It will be my object to show that these two forms of *ordinary* Common Sense have fundamentally the same basis; and, further, that this basis is the same as that of the *special* forms of Common Sense which are the attribute of men who have applied themselves in a scientific spirit to any particular course of inquiry—Science being, as has been well said by Professor Huxley, "nothing but trained and organized Common Sense;" and things coming to be perfectly "self-evident" to men of such special culture, which ordinary men, or men whose special culture has lain in a different direction, do not apprehend as such.

What we call the judgment of Common Sense appears to me to be *the immediate or instinctive response* that is given, in Psychological language, by the Automatic action of the Mind, or, in Physiological language, by the Reflex action of the Brain,† to any question which can be answered by such a direct appeal to "self-evident" truth. The nature and value of that reply will depend upon the *acquired condition* of the Mind, or of the Brain, at the time it is given; that condition being the product of two factors:—(1) The Original Constitution of the individual; (2) the Aggregate of the Psychical operations of which he has been the subject. For I presume that no Psychologist doubts that the mental condition of every individual Man, as he exists at any moment, is the *general resultant* of the agencies which have affected the development of his inherited constitution, whether these agencies have been brought to bear upon him *ab externo*, or by his own power of self-direction. And as a Physiologist, I cannot doubt that this general resultant has been *embodied*, so to speak, in his Nervous Mechanism; in accordance with that general law of Nutrition which so remarkably distinguishes any living Organism from a mere machine, and which, underlying Habit of every kind, is particularly noticeable in Man;—namely, that it *grows* to the mode in which it is habitually exercised, so as to *form itself* into an apparatus specially adapted for the automatic performance of any kind of action it has been trained to execute.

* Hence the force of such appeals is often intensified by the humorous form in which they are expressed; as was eminently the case with the pithy sayings of Sydney Smith and the pregnant jokes of President Lincoln.

† The doctrine that "the Brain can remember, create, and understand" having been explicitly accepted by so eminent a Metaphysician as Archbishop Manning, the Physiologist may lay aside all fear of being misunderstood in the use of whatever language best expresses his view of the phenomena of Man's compound nature. All that is here said of Organization or Mechanism may be stated equally well in terms of Mind; the Nervous apparatus being admitted by every Psychologist to furnish the *instrumental conditions* of Mental Activity.

What I mean by "embodying in the organization the generalized result of the past experiences of consciousness," may be made more intelligible to those who have not been accustomed to look at questions of this kind from the Physiological point of view, by the parallel case of the Automatic Movements of the body, the capacity for the performance of which, like that of "judging of things self-evident," may be either *original* or *acquired*.

Those *primarily* automatic or *instinctive* movements, which are performed by every Human being, and are necessary to the maintenance of his Organic functions, depend upon the excitement, by some external stimulus or impression, of the congenital aptitudes inherent in the nervo-muscular apparatus. Thus the first movement of Inspiration in the new-born infant is excited by the contact of cold air with its skin, more particularly with that of the face; the first act of suction by the contact of the nipple with its lips. If either the congenital aptitude, or the stimulus fitted to call it into play, be wanting, the action does not take place. Thus prolonged pressure during parturition may induce a torpor of the nervous centres, which prevents them from responding to the accustomed stimulus, though a stronger impression (such as a slap of the hand on the infant's back) will arouse them to activity. On the other hand, seclusion of the face from free contact with cold air withholds the ordinary stimulus, and thus the first inspiration may be delayed until (through failure of the circulation) the nervous centres have lost their excitability.

Such actions are termed Reflex, as involving a sort of reflection by the nerve-centres, along the motor or efferent nerves, of the impression brought to these centres by the afferent. In the cases just cited, and in others of a similar character, the impression calls forth the respondent motion without affecting the consciousness. But in other instances that affection of the consciousness which we term Sensation necessarily intervenes; this being the case with most of the movements, if not all, that are excited through the organs of Special sense—such as the start on a loud sound, or the closure of the eyelids at a flash of light.

In each case it is to be noted that a particular stimulus automatically calls forth the consentaneous action of a number of separate and independent muscles:—thus, in the act of Sucking, the contraction of the muscles which close the lips is combined with that of the muscles of inspiration; whilst in that of Coughing to expel a source of irritation, the muscular closure of the glottis is combined with a violent action of the muscles of expiration. This co-ordination cannot be attributed to anything else than a congenital arrangement of the nervous mechanism, in virtue of which a special response is made

to each particular kind of stimulus ; just as an automaton that executes one motion when a certain spring is touched, will execute a very different one when set going in some other way.

Of those *secondly* automatic movements, the capacity for the performance of which is acquired by habit, no better example could be selected than the act of *walking erect*. It must be obvious to any one who watches with the requisite intelligence the gradual acquirement of this power during the early period of child-life, that while experience is the basis of its acquirement, only an organism which is at the same time generally adapted for erect progression, and possessed of a special *co-ordinating* faculty, can turn this experience to account. The balancing the body in the erect position at starting, the maintenance of that balance by a new adjustment of the centre of gravity as the base of support is shifted from side to side and from behind forwards, and the alternate lifting and advance of the legs, involve the harmonious co-operation of almost all the muscles in the body. Although, when we have once learned to walk erect, we find ourselves able to maintain our balance without any exertion of which we are conscious, this co-operation is brought about in the first instance by the purposive direction of our efforts towards a given end, under the guidance of our visual and muscular sensations. We may readily assure ourselves of this, by attending to the process by which the adult learns to walk on a narrow base, such as a rope or the edge of a plank. For the co-ordinating action has here to be gone through afresh under altered and more special conditions, requiring a greater exertion of the balancing power ; yet when this has been fully acquired, it is exerted automatically with such an immediateness and perfection, that a Blondin can cross Niagara on his rope with no more danger of falling into the torrent beneath, than any of us would experience if walking without side-rails along the broad platform of the suspension-bridge which spans it.

To the Physiologist it scarcely admits of doubt, that during any such process of acquirement the Nervous mechanism must be *growing to its work*, like the Muscles in the arm of a blacksmith or in the legs of an opera-dancer. And thus when the nerve-centres have come to make the same response in Man to a stimulus which calls forth their activity, as they give from the very first in such among the lower animals as perform the like actions on their entrance into the world, we can scarcely do otherwise than attribute to them the like construction in both instances ; the only difference being that what has been *originally developed in them*, in accordance with hereditary type, *forms itself in him*, in accordance with the mode in which the apparatus is habitually called into activity—the *resultant* of the whole process of acquirement, generalized by the co-ordinating faculty, thus becoming embodied in his Nervous Mechanism.

Now what is true of the action of external impressions in calling forth respondent Movements of the Body, can scarcely be otherwise than true of their action in calling forth those affections of our Consciousness, or primary actions of the Mind, which we call Sensations. No one doubts that the production of sensations depends upon the *original endowments* of the Nervous Mechanism, called into activity by the various *stimuli* to which it is fitted to respond; what we call the "reception of sensations" being even more obviously the product of these two factors than the performance of the primarily-automatic movements, which often appear spontaneous. The response of the Sensorial mechanism to the impressions made upon it, whereby our Sensational Consciousness takes cognizance of those impressions, is the lowest form of proper Mental activity. It is purely and originally Automatic; that is, like the primarily-automatic movements, it involves no choice or self-direction on our own parts. And no other account can be given of it than that it takes place in accordance with "a law of our nature;" even Mr. J. S. Mill admitting that our belief in our own sensations is an ultimate fact of consciousness.—This uniform deliverance of our Sensational Consciousness as to the "self-evidence" of its cognitions, I would take as the fundamental form of original "common sense;" and in Physiological language I should term it the product of the *upward* reflection of the Sensory Ganglion to which the impression is brought, any automatic Motion linked on to it being the result of its *downward* reflection.

Of such really Intuitive or primarily-automatic Visual cognitions we have an example in the *Sense of Direction*, which enables us to recognise the relations of the points from which the luminous rays issue, and thus to see objects *erect*, though their pictures on the retina are *inverted*. Some philosophers have, indeed, asserted that this is an *acquired* faculty; the Infant seeing all objects inverted, and only acquiring the notion of its erectness by the corrective experience gained by touching and handling them. But this is a pure assumption, founded on an entirely erroneous notion of the nature of Sensation. For it supposes that we look at the picture formed on the retina, by the "mind's eye" placed behind it, just as we look at the picture formed by a camera with the bodily eye; whereas the fact is unquestionable that Sensation is a state of consciousness excited by the transmission to the Sensorium (through the optic nerve) of the impression produced by the picture on the retina; and as we know nothing whatever of the mode in which the merely Physical change is *translated*, so to speak, into the Mental, there is no reason why it should be *less natural* for the retinal impression to *suggest to the mind* the notion of the *real* position of objects, than to call up a representation corresponding to the *inverted* picture. As

a matter of fact, it is found that persons who have for the first time acquired sight by operation, at an age when they can describe their sensations, are able to recognise the *direction* of any luminous object, though quite incapable of appreciating its *distance*. And it appears from the experiments of Dr. Serre, that the luminous spectra produced when pressure is made upon the eye in a dark room, are seen in a direction which has in each case a constant and definite relation to the part of the retina that is affected by the pressure, either directly, or secondarily through its transmission to the opposite side of the globe. By an extensive series of observations on the relation of the positions of these primary and secondary *phosphènes*, both to each other and to the seat of compression, Dr. Serre has been able to deduce the important conclusion, that the lines joining these spectra and the spots of the retina by the affection of which they are produced, all pass through a common "centre of direction," which is situated nearly in the middle of the crystalline lens. And from these facts it seems a legitimate conclusion, that our sense of the relative directions of external objects which affect different points of our retina by their luminous rays, is derived from a kind of mental projection of each point of the retinal image along the line which joins it to the "centre of direction."

I have now to show that what we call "Sense-Perceptions," or affections of the Perceptual Consciousness, bear the like relationship to the secondarily-automatic Movements of the body; depending, like them, on the embodiment in the organization of the general result of experience; so that the Nervous Mechanism, from the time when this embodiment has been effected, makes its *perceptual* response to the sensation, with the same directness and certainty that it originally made its *sensational* response to the impression which called it forth. The intimacy of this relationship is shown by the fact that the more special forms of secondarily-automatic Movements require for their guidance, not simple Sensations, but Perceptions; with which—especially the Visual—the muscular actions come to be so precisely co-ordinated, that it is scarcely possible to conceive of such co-ordination as otherwise than mechanical. Thus when Robert Houdin found himself able, after the lapse of thirty years from the time when he had last performed such a feat, to keep up three balls in the air whilst giving his continuous attention to a book; or when an expert billiard-player executes, not merely with certainty, but with freedom from any special effort (carrying on a conversation, perhaps, at the moment), a stroke which no calculation would have enabled him to direct with the same success; it is scarcely to be doubted that the co-ordinating process, whereby his muscular efforts are automatically combined and directed under the guidance of his

visual and tactile perceptions and of his muscular sense, has expressed itself (so to speak) in the construction of a Nervous Mechanism, analogous to that of which the congenital possession enables a Flycatcher to peck at an insect with unerring aim, immediately on its own emersion from the egg. If this be true in any one case of those sequential acquired movements which, at first Volitional, become Automatic by habitual repetition, it is doubtless true of all. And if such a Mechanism *forms itself* in the lower Nervous centres to particular habitudes of *bodily* action, there seems strong analogical ground for the belief that the *higher* part of the Nervous Mechanism which is concerned in *mental* action will follow the same law; forming itself to the mode in which it is habitually called into use, so as at last to be able to evolve, by a direct response, a result of which the attainment originally required the intervention of the Conscious Mind at several intermediate stages of the process.

One of those primary judgments, which we call Perceptions, is the recognition of the *singleness* of the object which forms a simultaneous visual picture in both eyes. This has been considered by many Physiologists to be an original or intuitive conviction, necessarily derived by "a law of our nature" from a certain structural relation between what have been termed "corresponding points" on the two retinae; "double vision," or the recognition of two distinct images, taking place whenever, through a want of harmony in the action of the muscles, the axes of the two eyes do not converge in the object looked at. But this view of the case is inconsistent with the fact that if such abnormal conditions should become permanent (as in squinting) the vision after a time becomes "single" again, notwithstanding that the pictures are formed on parts of the retinae which do not correspond. Further, if the muscular irregularity be rectified by surgical means, so that the axes of the two eyes can be again brought into convergence in the object looked at, double vision recurs for a time, although the images are now formed upon the original "corresponding points." It is also a fact well known to ophthalmic surgeons, that if an opaque spot has been formed in the centre of the cornea, or an artificial pupil has been made at the margin of the iris, so that the most distinct vision is gained when the axis of one eye is directed, not to the object, but to some other point, such direction will become habitual; yet although, when the two eyes work together, there is a decided squint, there is no "double vision." Since it is clear from these facts that the recognition of the singleness of the object of sensation is the result of experience in the cases in which it supersedes a temporary "double vision," it may be fairly so regarded in the case of the infant; more particularly since observation shows that the convergence of its eyes upon the object looked

at is, in the first instance, by no means so immediate or exact as it subsequently becomes. And, further, it is obvious that if (as seems probable) there is some structural arrangement which conduces to Singleness of vision when the images are thrown on the originally-corresponding points of the two retinae, such mechanism must have developed itself *de novo*, whenever "single vision" is the result of the habitual conjoint use of two eyes whose axes do not converge.

The same process of experiential acquirement of Perceptual cognitions having the immediateness and trustworthiness of the Sensations on which they are based, is demonstrable in regard to those notions of *form* which we derive from the Visual sense alone, when it has been educated by *co-ordination* with the Tactile. It may now be affirmed with certainty that Sight originally informs us only of what can be represented in a picture—that is, light and shade, and colour; and it may be affirmed, with equal certainty, that the notions of form which we obtain through the sense of Touch (when exercised in combination with muscular movements, of which the "muscular sense" renders us cognizant) are originally unrelated to those derived from Sight; so that when a blind adult first acquires vision, objects with which he (or she) possesses the greatest tactile familiarity are not recognised by its means till the two sets of sensations have been co-ordinated by repeated experience. When once this co-ordination has been effected, however, the composite perception of Form derived from the Visual sense alone is so complete, that we seldom require to fall back upon the Touch for any further information in regard to that quality of the object.

In a recently-recorded case in which sight was imparted by an operation to a young woman who had been blind from birth, it was remarkable to contrast the rapidity and accuracy of her Tactile perception, which was highly educated, with the slow, laborious process by means of which she arrived at a conception of the shape and nature of an object through the medium of her newly-acquired and imperfectly-educated Vision. "I found," says the operator, "that she was never able to ascertain what an object really was by sight alone, although she could correctly describe its shape and colour; but that after she had once instructed one sense, through the medium of the other, and compared the impressions conveyed by Touch and Sight, she was ever after able to recognise the object without touching it. In this respect her memory was very perfect: I never knew her fail in a single instance, though I put this power frequently to the test of experiment. It was curious to place before her some very familiar object that she had never compared in this way, such as a pair of scissors. She would describe their shape, colour, glistening metallic character, but would fail in ascertaining what they really

were until she put a finger on them, when in an instant she would name them, and laugh at her own stupidity, as she called it, in not having made them out before."*

Still more remarkable is the acquirement of those Perceptions of *solid form* or *relief* which we derive, as Sir C. Wheatstone's admirable investigations have shown, from the mental combination of the dissimilar perspectives that are projected by solid objects upon our two retinæ. When we bring to our right and left eyes respectively, by means of the Stereoscope, pictures corresponding to those which would be formed on their two retinæ by the actual object if placed before them at a moderate distance, the resulting perception of the solidity of the image seems as necessary and immediate as if it were the product of an original Intuition; and this perception is strong enough to assert itself in spite of our intellectual knowledge that we are looking at two plane surfaces. Now, although it may be inferred from the actions of many of the lower Animals, that the perception of the relative distances of near objects or of parts of an object (which constitutes the basis of the conception of solidity) is in their case congenital, it may be affirmed, as a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt, that this also is *acquired* by the Human infant during the earliest months of its life, by a co-ordination of its Muscular and Visual sensations; which enables the automatic mechanism to adopt the dissimilarity of position between corresponding points in the two pictures, as the measure of their relative distances. The self-education of this perceptive faculty which goes on during the first few months of infantile life, is the basis of our subsequent Visual knowledge of the external world, as it seems to be for the most part also of the primary belief in its objective reality.

Now in this Visual recognition of the solid form of an object by the mental combination of its two dissimilar perspectives, we seem to have a typical example of a "Common-Sense" judgment, which may be as implicitly trusted (at least under ordinary circumstances) as if it were authoritatively delivered by a congenital faculty, but which really rests on a basis of experience. It is scarcely conceivable that the infant consciously asks itself the question, "What do I see?" But there can be little doubt that in the earlier stages of its experience it is incapable (like the newly-seeing adult) of distinguishing between a picture and the solid object which it represents; and that the essential condition of a judgment—the possibility of the opposite or of something else—therefore exists for it. But with every consentaneous exercise of the visual, tactile, and muscular sensations, during the infant's gaze at an object grasped in its hands and carried to different distances by the motion of its arms, there

* See Critchett, in *Med. Chir. Trans.* vol. xxxviii.

is a new co-ordination which helps to supply the deficiency in the sum of all that preceded ; and this process is repeated until the complement of the whole serves as the basis of the cognition which we thenceforth rightly characterize as "self-evident."

It is not a little remarkable that even that Visual perception of solidity, which is based on the binocular combination of dissimilar perspectives, may, under certain circumstances, be antagonized by a higher experience, so as to be for a time, or even permanently, excluded. The very ingenious Pseudoscope, contrived by Sir C. Wheatstone, effects a lateral reversal of the perspective projections of actual objects on the two retinae, corresponding to that which would be made by "crossing" the pictures in the Stereoscope ; and thus, in viewing through it any solid object, we ought at once, if the visual perception were a necessary product (as Sir David Brewster maintained) of the geometrical relations of the two images, to see all its projections and depressions reversed—the exterior of a basin, for example, being changed into a concave interior, and the projecting rim on which it rests into a deep furrow. But this "conversion of relief" is generally resisted, for a time at least, by the preconception of the actual form which is based on habitual experience ; and it only takes place immediately in cases in which the "converted" form is at least as familiar to the mind as the actual form. Thus, when we look with the Pseudoscope at the interior of a mask, or at a plaster mould of a face, the mental representation of the image in relief is at once called up. But when we look pseudoscopically at the face of a plaster bust, or at the outside of a mask, it is only after a lengthened gaze that such "conversion of relief" occurs ; the mind being so much more familiar with the actual form, that the mental image of the interior of a mould or mask is not called up until the visual representation has overcome, as if by continued pressure, the resistance of the preconception. In the case of the *living human face*, however, it seems that no protraction of the pseudoscopic gaze is sufficient to bring about a "conversion" of its relief ; the Perceptive consciousness (probably here under the domination of the Intellectual) refusing to entertain the notion of an actual visage having the form of the interior of a mask.

Further, it seems not difficult to show that even those Visual Perceptions to which, in ordinary cases, we give the most implicit trust, may depend for their correctness on a judgment that is based on a much wider range of experience than that acquired during infantile life. This seems to me clearly the case (though I have not seen the fact anywhere noticed) with regard to our notion of perpendicularity. If we stand at a moderate distance from the middle of the base of the front of a cathedral (York Minster, for instance), having two

lofty square towers, all the perpendiculars forming the boundaries of those towers must *visually* converge towards a "vanishing point" in the sky; just as the parallel horizontal lines of street architecture converge towards a "vanishing point" in the remote distance. For as the summit of either tower is more distant from the eye than its base, in proportion as the hypotenuse of the triangle formed by drawing a line from the eye to that summit is longer than the base-line, the visual angle between the two margins of either tower, or between the inner margins of the two towers, must be as much lessened at the top as it would be at the base by the removal of the towers to a horizontal distance equal to the length of the hypotenuse. Yet any one who should say that such towers gradually taper, or that they really incline towards each other, would be accounted deficient in "common sense." Now the contrary verdict of Common Sense is obviously a *judgment* based on a wide range of acquired experience, which leads us to interpret the visual picture in accordance with the notion of perpendicularity which we have originally acquired from cases (such as the interior of a room) in which there is no perceptible convergence of the vertical lines; which thence extends itself to cases (such as the front of a house) wherein that convergence is so slight as only to be detected when our attention is called to it, the expectation of perpendicularity being, moreover, so strong as to be almost irresistible; and thus finally dominates in those in which we can scarcely be said to have any guiding experience, save that which makes us feel it improbable that such towers should be built otherwise than vertically. And the best proof of the complete possession of our minds with this improbability is to be found in the rule of Perspective, that all the vertical lines in a building must be pictorially drawn as vertical, so as to represent what is seen by the *mental* rather than by the bodily eye.

Every such acquired Visual Perception, then, may be regarded as the generalized result of our whole previous experience relating to the object of it; such generalization, however, not being effected by a process of conscious reasoning, but being the direct response given by the Ego, whose nervous mechanism has *formed itself* in accordance with it, so as to acquire powers of reaction of a far higher kind than it originally possessed. The "self-evidence" of the truthfulness of the Perception is of the same kind, therefore, as that of the Sensation which has called it forth, the mental affection being in each case the *immediate* and *invariable* response of Organization to the impression made upon it. But whilst that response, in the case of the deliverances of our *Sensational* consciousness, is given by our *original* constitution, it is given in the case of our *Perceptual* consciousness by our *acquired*

constitution; in which are embodied those results of primary experience which are common to every normally-constituted Human being. But it would not be difficult to show that many Perceptions derived through Binocular Vision *go beyond all actual experience*; and this fact points to an *original* aptitude for the formation of such immediate judgments, which (like the aptitude for walking erect) experience has served to train and develop.

If this be admitted as true in regard to our Perceptual consciousness, there seems no reason why the same doctrine should not be extended to the Ideational. Thus our Intellectual conviction of the existence of the world external to ourselves would, on this view, be derived from the effect produced upon our *original* constitution by the automatic generalization of a multitude of separate cognitions of individual objects of perception, as distinct from the percipient self; this generalization having probably been embodied in the Nervous Mechanism long before the Intelligence is sufficiently developed to cognosce the *idea* which mentally represents it. And I think that the same may be shown to be probable of the Axioms of Geometry, and of those other first truths of a purely Intellectual character, the aggregate of which constitutes the Common Sense of the Philosopher; the conviction that they are not only true within the range of actual experience, but that they *must be universally true*, being an *acquired intuition*, which no *ratiocinative* generalization of experiences would justify. Any such Movement of the Mind, like a secondarily-automatic Movement of the Body, is the immediate and direct response of the Organism to the appropriate stimulus; the Organism being itself the resultant of the embodiment of Experience and the *original* constitution—the product of those two factors.

In such a view, as it appears to me, we may find the fundamental reconciliation (as by a “ground-bass”) of the two doctrines of Intuition and Experience, which otherwise seem discordant.

The same view may be extended to that acquired aptitude “for judging of things self-evident,” which is *popularly* known as Common Sense, the deliverances of which may be regarded as based on the aggregate of our past experiences, which have ranged themselves in the unconscious depths of our Intellectual nature by a process of automatic co-ordination, and have become embodied in our Cerebral organization. We often find it strongly manifested by persons of very limited acquirements, who are said to have a “fund of native good sense.” On the other hand, we often meet with a singular want of it in persons of great learning, whose judgments about things that are “self-evident” to men of ordinary capacity are obviously untrustworthy. And if we examine into the nature of this difference, I think we shall find it in the range of the *unconscious co-*

ordinating action, which in the former case brings the *whole experience* to bear upon the question, whilst the decisions of the latter are based upon a *limited*, and therefore *one-sided*, view of it.

Now, in so far as our conscious mental activity is under the direction of our Will, we can improve this form of Common Sense, as to both its range and the trustworthiness of its judgments, by appropriate training. Such training, as regards the purely intellectual aspect of Common Sense, will consist in the determinate culture of the habit of honestly seeking for Truth,—dismissing prejudice, setting aside self-interest, searching out all that can be urged on each side of the question at issue, endeavouring to assign to every fact and argument its real value, and then weighing the two aggregates against each other with judicial impartiality. For in proportion to the steadiness with which this course is *evolutionally* pursued, must be its effectiveness in shaping the Mechanism whose *automatic action* constitutes the “unconscious thinking” of which the results express themselves in our Common-Sense judgments. Such was eminently the habit of mind of Joseph Hume, a man whom it was the fashion to abuse and ridicule, simply because his honest and consistent advocacy of great principles, now universally accepted, placed him in advance of his time; but who in private life, as I have been informed by a member of his family, was so noted for the excellence of his judgment, that he was continually resorted to by his friends for advice. This was readily and explicitly given, and was almost invariably justified by the event; but he could never assign reasons for his conclusions. All he would say was, “Such is my opinion, but I cannot tell you how I have arrived at it.” And thus his judgments were obviously the deliverances of his originally strong “Common Sense,” improved by the discipline of the determinate and systematic direction of his conscious thinking to the attainment of Truth, the reaction of which on his automatic mechanism imparted to its operations the like tendency.

Besides the Common Sense of Mankind in general, there are *special forms* of the faculty of “judging of things self-evident,” which are required in particular pursuits, and which those pursuits are specially fitted to develop. Thus the certain assurance of the Q. E. D. felt by every person capable of understanding a Mathematical demonstration, depends upon the “self-evidence” of every step of it; but we not unfrequently meet with individuals not deficient in *ordinary common sense*, who cannot be brought to see this “self-evidence;” whilst, on the other hand, the advanced Mathematician, when adventuring into new paths of inquiry, is able to take a great deal for granted as “self-evident,” which at an earlier stage of his researches would not have so presented itself to his mind. The

deliverances of the acquired intuition can in most cases be readily justified by the reasoning process which they have anticipated. But the genius of a Mathematician—that is, his special aptitude developed by special culture—will occasionally enable him to *divine* a truth, of which, though he may be able to prove it experientially, neither he nor any other can at the time furnish a logical demonstration. It seems to have been thus that Newton devised his celebrated “Formula for the Solution of Equations,” the correctness of which has been attested by the results of its application in every conceivable variety of case, yet the *rationale* of which remained a puzzle to succeeding mathematicians, until discovered by the persevering labours of Professor Sylvester, who is himself specially distinguished for his combination of penetrating *insight* with ratiocinative power.

A more familiar instance will be found in the daily experience of the man of Literature, who has acquired by culture the art of writing correctly and forcibly, without having ever formally studied either grammar, the logical analysis of sentences, or the artifices of rhetoric. Such a one will continually feel, in criticizing his own writings or those of others, that there is something faulty in style or construction, and may be able to furnish the required correction, whilst altogether unable to say *in what* the passage is wrong, or *why* his amendment sets it right.—Or, to pass into an entirely different sphere, a practised Detective will often arrive, by a sort of divination, at a conviction of the guilt or innocence of a suspected person, which ultimately turns out to be correct; and yet he could not convey to another any adequate reasons for his assurance, which depends upon the impression made upon his Ego by minutiae of look, tone, gesture, or manner, which have little or no significance to ordinary observers, but which his specially-cultured common sense instinctively apprehends. Such a case differs from the *scientific* recognition of the phenomena of nature by the trained observer, and the interpretation of them by the sagacious reasoner, in this :—That while their experience enables them not only to see what would escape ordinary notice, but to attach the highest significance (as in the case of Spectroscopic inquiry) to indications which might seem of the most trivial character, they can always *explain their reasons* for doing so. Thus the recognition of the gaseous condition of certain nebulae (as distinguished from those which are very remote clusters of stars), by the nature of certain lines in spectra that are themselves so faint as to be only visible to the trained vision of a Huggins or a Lockyer, is effected by the *δiavoiα*; whilst the immediate divination of the detective is the work of his *vouσ*.

But in the ordinary affairs of life, our Common-Sense judgments are so largely influenced by the Emotional part of our nature—our

individual likes and dislikes, the predominance of our selfish or of our benevolent affections, and so on—that their value will still more essentially depend upon the earnestness and persistency of our self-direction towards the Right. The more faithfully, strictly, and perseveringly we try to disentangle ourselves from all selfish aims, all *conscious* prejudices, the more shall we find ourselves progressively emancipated from those *unconscious* prejudices which cling around us as results of early misdirection and habits of thought, and which (having become embodied in our organization) are more dangerous than those against which we knowingly put ourselves on our guard. And so in proportion to the degree in which we habituate ourselves to try every question by first principles, rather than by the supposed dictates of a temporary expediency, will the Mechanism of our “unconscious thinking” form itself in accordance with those principles, so as often to evolve results which satisfy both ourselves and others with their “self-evident” truthfulness and rectitude.

I remember to have heard it remarked by a man of large experience of Human nature and action, that the habitual determination to do the *right* thing marvellously clears the judgment as to matters purely intellectual or prudential, having in themselves no moral bearing. And of this we have a good illustration in the advice which an eminent and experienced Judge (I have heard the story told of Lord Mansfield) is said to have given to a younger friend newly appointed to a colonial judgeship:—“Never give reasons for your decisions; your judgments will very probably be right, but your reasons will almost certainly be wrong.” The meaning of this I take to be: “Your legal instinct, or specially-trained common sense, based on your general knowledge of law, guided by your honesty of intention, will very probably lead you to correct conclusions; but your knowledge of the technicalities of law is not sufficient to enable you to give reasons for those conclusions which shall bear the test of hostile scrutiny.”

But, further, in any of those complicated questions that are pretty sure to come before us at some time or other in our lives—as to which there is “a great deal to be said on both sides;” in which it is difficult to say what is prudent and even what is right; in which it is not duty and inclination that are at issue, but one set of duties and inclinations at issue with another,—experience justifies the conclusion to which science seems to point, that the habitually well-regulated mind forms its surest judgment by trusting to the Automatic guidance of its Common Sense; just as a rider who has lost his road is more likely to find his way home by dropping the reins on his horse’s neck, than by continuing to jerk them to this side or that in the vain search for it. For continued argument and discussion, in which the feelings are

excited on one side, provoke antagonistic feelings on the other ; and no true balance can be struck until all these adventitious influences have ceased to operate. When all the considerations which ought to be taken into the account have been once brought fully before the mind, it is far better to leave them to *arrange themselves*, by turning the conscious activity of the mind into some other direction, or by giving it a complete repose : as was long since pointed out by that sagacious thinker, Abraham Tucker,* who could scarcely have given a better account of this Automatic judicial process than in saying that "our organs do not stand idle the moment we cease to employ them, but continue the motions we put into them after they have gone out of sight, thereby working themselves to a glibness and smoothness, and falling into a more regular and orderly posture than we could have placed them with all our skill and industry." If adequate time be given for this unconscious co-ordination, which is especially necessary when the feelings have been strongly and deeply moved, we find, when we bring the question again under consideration, that *the direction in which the mind gravitates* is a safer guide than any judgment formed when we are fresh from its discussion.

Not only may the range and value of such Common-Sense judgments be increased by appropriate culture in the individual ; for of all parts of our higher nature, the aptitude for forming them is probably that which is most capable of being transmitted hereditarily, like the acquired instincts of a Pointer or Retriever ; so that the descendant of a well-educated ancestry constitutionally possesses it in much higher measure than the progeny of any savage race,—it seems to me to be in virtue of this Automatic co-ordination of the elements of judgment, rather than of any process of conscious Ratiocination—by the exercise of the *vous* rather than of the *διανοια*—that the Race, like the Individual, emancipates itself from early prejudices, gets rid of worn-out beliefs, and learns to look at things as they are, rather than as they have been traditionally represented. This is what I understand to be meant by the "Progress of Rationalism." For although that progress undoubtedly depends in great part upon the more general diffusion of knowledge, and the higher culture of the intellectual powers which are exercised in the acquirement of it, yet this alone would be of little avail, if the self-discipline thus exerted did not act *downwards* in improving the mechanism that evolves the self-evident material of our Reasoning processes, as well as *upwards* in more highly elaborating their product. If we examine, for instance, the history of the decline of the belief in Witchcraft, we find that it was not killed by discussion, but perished of neglect. The Common Sense of the best part

* "Light of Nature Pursued," 2nd edit. 1806, vol. i. p. 248, chap. x. § 4.


of mankind has come to be ashamed of ever having put any faith in things whose absurdity now appears "self-evident;" no discussion of evidence once regarded as convincing is any longer needed; and it is only among those of our hereditarily-uneducated population, whose general intelligence is about upon a par with that of a Hottentot or an Esquimaux, that we any longer find such faith entertained.

There is, in fact, a sort of undercurrent, not of actually-formed opinion, but of tendency to the formation of opinions, in certain directions, which bursts up every now and then to the surface, exhibiting a latent preparedness in the Public Mind to look at great questions in a new point of view, which leads to most striking results when adequately guided. That "the hour is come—and the man," is what History continually reproduces; neither can do anything effectively without the other. But a great idea thrown out by a mind in advance of its age, takes root and germinates in secret, shapes the "unconscious thought" of a few individuals of the next generation, is by them diffused still more widely, and thus silently matures itself in the "womb of time," until it comes forth, like Minerva, in full panoply of power.

Those who are able to look back with intelligent retrospect over the political history of the last half century, and who witness the now general pervasion of the public mind by truths which it accepts as "self-evident," and moral principles which it regards as beyond dispute, can scarcely realise to themselves the fact that within their own recollection the fearless assertors of those truths and principles were scoffed at as visionaries or reviled as destructives. And those whose experience is limited to even the last ten years must see, in the rapid development of public opinion on subjects of the highest importance, the evidence of a previous preparedness, which I believe to consist mainly in the higher development and more general diffusion of that Automatic co-ordinating power which constitutes the essence of Reason as distinct from Reasoning, of the *vous* as distinct from the *διανοια*.

Thus, then, every course of Intellectual and Moral self-discipline, steadily and honestly pursued, tends not merely to clear the mental vision of the Individual, but to ennoble the Race, by helping to develop that power of "judging of things self-evident" which may be termed Immediate Insight, and which, in Man's highest phase of existence, may be expected not only to supersede the laborious exertions of his Intellect, but to reveal to him truths which lie beyond its scope.

W. B. CARPENTER.



THE ENGLISH LAND QUESTION.

ALTHOUGH a variety of topics of the utmost importance, such as the Ballot, Irish Education, Licensing Reform, and many others, are demanding the immediate attention of the public, there yet remains one subject which though hardly as yet belonging to their number, nevertheless in intrinsic importance exceeds them all. This question is the English Land Question. Whether it be that Lord Derby addresses the magnates of the manufacturing North, or that the agricultural interest is gathered together in solemn conclave, or that the members of a London democratic association hold their meeting at some little-known public-house, yet from each and all of these assemblies, however different in composition, however discordant in feeling, arises the same cry that there is an English land question which ought to be dealt with. At one time it is vendors and purchasers who are complaining of the uncertainty and delay with which their transactions are attended, at another it is the man of business who is comparing dealings in land with dealings in stock or in shares to the disadvantage of the former; at one time it is the tenant farmer with an eye to the want of fixed improvements, at another it is the agricultural labourer with a wish for better cottage accommodation who is the complainant; at one time it is the political economist lamenting the ever-increasing separation of the labourer from the soil, at another it is the hardworked town mechanic with a grievance which

he can hardly distinctly formulate who indicts the land system of his country. These are well known facts, and with every allowance for the exaggeration of grievances there can be no doubt that the old saying "no smoke without fire" holds good in this case as in others.

In approaching this question, it is necessary to begin by settling clearly what are the practical objects which any system of land laws should aim at; in other words, what principles should be their foundation. The aim of every system of land laws should be, to give security to property, and to promote the best distribution and the maximum production of wealth from the soil. In so far as a system of land laws promotes these objects it is a good system; in so far as it does not promote them it is a bad one. Starting, then, from these principles, after a few words on inheritance from intestates, our land laws will be here considered under the following heads: first, in their relation to the settlement of land; secondly, as they affect the enclosure of waste spaces; and, thirdly, as they affect the title to property, including under this last head a few remarks on the present system of mortgage.

And first as to inheritance from intestates. It is regulated by the law of primogeniture, about the abolition of which we hear so much. Now the abolition of the law of primogeniture taken by itself is a matter of little or no moment, for the simple reason that intestacy in the case of the owners of real property is a rare event. But taking this law for what it is worth it certainly offends against the principles of natural justice; for intestacy pre-supposes the absence of that provision for younger children which in the case of a will or settlement of lands is invariably made by means of portions or otherwise; and, further, it necessarily tends to the accumulation of wealth in a few hands, a tendency already sufficiently strong in these times.

It is a very unfortunate thing that the facts as to the law of primogeniture are so little understood. Nothing, for example, is more common than to meet with persons who imagine that the abolition of this law implies the substitution for it of a law similar to that which exists in France, which compels the division amongst the next of kin of the deceased owner of the real estate owned by him. These mistakes may be traced to a confusion of the law and the custom of primogeniture. It cannot be too often repeated that the law and the custom of primogeniture are two distinct things, though the latter is probably the child of the former. The death of the one might ultimately end in that of the other, but if the custom does die it will die an easy death, brought on by the operation of natural causes.

Far more important than any questions which arise out of the existence or the abolition of the law of primogeniture, are those which

are involved in the consideration of the law of settlement and entail. As a considerable amount of misapprehension exists as to what the law does and does not allow under this head, it will be as well to preface the discussion of this part of the subject by a brief statement as to the character of the law of settlement. It is often said that we owe the law of settlement to our old feudal institutions. This assertion, though to a certain extent true, is but half the truth. We owe the law of settlement quite as much to the ingenuity of the seventeenth century conveyancers as to that of the feudal lawyers and barons who preceded them. The early history of our law of real property is the history of a struggle between freedom of alienation and its opposite. The details of that struggle involve a dry mass of legal antiquities, with which it would be useless to detain the reader. It is only necessary for the present purpose briefly to point out how the power of settlement on unborn children arose.

There is a rule of law that if a lesser and a greater estate coincide in one and the same person without the intervention of an immediate estate, the lesser is merged in the greater. Thus, supposing Brown to have been a tenant for life with remainder to his eldest son and the heirs of his body, and, in default of such issue, with remainder to Smith and his heirs in fee, if by any means the lesser estate of Brown became united with the greater estate of Smith, before the former had a son, the contingent remainder to the children of Brown was lost. There were a variety of ways by which this "merger," as it was called, could take place. The purchase of the remainder of Smith by Brown, or of the life interest of Brown by Smith, could effect it, or it could be accomplished, as it often was, by an operation called a wrongful feoffment. The effect in each case was the same, viz., the destruction of the contingent remainder to the unborn son. Some interesting remarks by that eminent authority, Mr. Joshua Williams, contained in a paper read before the Juridical Society* point to this conclusion, that contingent remainders to unborn children were unknown in their present shape to the courts previous to the reign of Philip and Mary, and that previous to the civil war, even where they existed, they were liable at any moment to be destroyed by the act of the tenant for life. To avoid this taking place, the ingenuity of Sir Orlando Bridgman and other eminent barristers who betook themselves to conveyancing during the civil war, devised the appointment of trustees to support contingent remainders in whom there was vested an estate in remainder for the life of the tenant for life, to commence whenever that estate determined otherwise than by his death. The merger of the life estate with the remainder in fee was thereby rendered impossible,

* 21st May, 1855; see the vol. of reprinted papers, 1855-8.

and contingent remainders to unborn children became indestructible. The state of things thus produced has been stereotyped by the 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, which renders the destruction of contingent remainders by merger an impossibility,—a reform so far as it went, since the appointment of trustees becoming unnecessary subsequently to the passing of the act, the length of deeds was diminished. Beyond allowing the devices above mentioned the courts would not go. Acting on the maxim that “English law abhors a perpetuity,” they never allowed the object of a settlement to be accomplished any further than could be done by giving estates to the unborn children of living persons. This, coupled to the power which a tenant in tail possesses when of age of barring the entail, remainders and reversion included (with the consent of the tenant for life if living), prevents any settlement affecting an estate longer than lives in being and twenty-one years after. Such, then, is the law of settlement and entail. But now observe its practical working. It sounds a paradox, but it is nevertheless true, that the operation of this law of ours, which we are told “abhors perpetuities,” is to produce a state of things of which perpetuity is the foundation and chief cornerstone. A tenant in tail comes of age and bars the entail. True, but with the object of resettling the estate. The former tenant in tail in remainder takes a life estate with remainder to *his* children, and, the same performance being gone through by each successive generation, the result of these settlements and resettlements is that it can only be by some very strange accident that an estate is ever owned by any one but a tenant for life. Witnesses examined some years ago before Mr. Pusey’s Committee on agricultural customs estimated the estates under settlement to be more than two-thirds of England, but it is probable that since that time the number of settled estates has diminished. What are the effects thereby produced on the various classes of which society is composed? To what extent, if at all, are the conditions which have been laid down as distinctive of a wholesome land system thereby complied with? The tenant for life, except under certain exceptional powers existing either in the settlement itself or conferred by statute, has no power of disposition over the estate of which he is the owner. The result naturally is that any improvement carried out by him may and often must be carried out at the expense of the other members of the family, and he is consequently under a strong temptation to starve the estate for their benefit, or for that of other persons to whom he wishes to make bequests. This evil is most acutely felt on estates of a moderate size, and by those owners who own real estate only. Again, the tenant for life is generally the victim of the charges of successive family settlements, and his improving powers are crippled in proportion. To

quote the words of Mr. Vernon Harcourt in his inaugural address to the Social Science Association : *—

“The tenant for life is the mere recipient of the rents of the land or of such portion of it as remains over after the payment of charges created by previous incumbrances. What is the practical result of this state of things? The person whom I venture to call the nominal proprietor is in the receipt probably of an income barely sufficient for the immediate wants of himself and his family. For want of capital the land languishes, while the proprietor himself, with a great nominal income, scrapes along in splendid penury.”

But it may be said that these evils do not really exist because family settlements do not affect that class which we designate as that of the “occupiers,” as distinguished from the “owners” of land. Such an objection is really no objection at all, for the custom of England is that the landlord should execute the permanent improvements, and agricultural fixtures are consequently, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the property of the landlord. Any system therefore which paralyzes the improving power of the tenant for life generally paralyzes the power of improvement altogether.

It can hardly be doubted that the demand, which in some places is beginning to make itself heard, for the extension of the provisions of the Irish Land Act to England, and for the tenant to be allowed to put improvements in the soil and recover their value without any special contract to that effect, may in a great measure be traced to the existence in many parts of the country of tracts of land owned by men who cannot do their duty by them, and at the same time of a class of farmers who think they could do it themselves, if they had the necessary security. There is no real necessity for any such violent change in the habits of English rural economy as that to which the demand above alluded to points; but to prevent its growing in strength, and before long justifying itself, the landlords of England must support legislation which will render them masters of the lands they own, and enable them to improve in a manner sufficient to silence complaint.

And now as to the bearings of this question on the condition of the agricultural labourer. The law of real property in its present shape is inimical to the labourer, in so far as it keeps land out of the market, and lowers the rate of wages by keeping capital from investment in the soil; in so far also as owing to estates being owned by tenants for life it checks cottage improvement, and in so far as it has permitted, under the name of Inclosure Acts, the greatest injustice to be done to the owners and users of common rights during the last century and a half. On this subject the words of those whose opinions are weighted with all that responsibility which attaches to the ex-

*. Since published as a pamphlet.

pressions of persons who speak as members of a Royal Commission are far more valuable than those of any individual writer. I allude to the recently published Reports of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the condition of women and children employed in agriculture, and whose inquiries ranged over every subject, whether directly or indirectly connected with their more immediate object. These Reports are of inestimable worth, and no apology is needed for quoting their remarks on the remoter effects of the law of settlement, and of those of the Inclosure of Commons.

On the former topic they observe : * —

“Greatly as any legitimate increase of the pecuniary resources of that large proportion of the labourers in agriculture throughout the country, which is in the receipt of the lower rates of wages, might be expected to further the progress of effectual education among their children, the good results of such education must be liable to be counteracted in all the, unhappily, still very numerous cases in which the labourer’s dwelling is of such a kind as to cause great and serious discomfort, and to make the decencies of life all but impossible.

“The picture, indeed, of the wants of the country in this respect, presented by the whole of the Report of the Assistant Commissioners for both years, is, notwithstanding all that has been done, of a very serious nature.”

Our Assistant Commissioners distinguish the following classes of estates on which bad cottages are found. They are thus more particularly described by Mr. PORTMAN, Mr. CULLEY, and Mr. NORMAN. (H. 135, I. 121—3, J. 82).

“I.—The most favourable class of estates is the one free from incumbrances and unentailed, but still not yielding an income sufficiently large to enable the possessor to spend more than a small sum annually in improvements.

“II.—The large and scattered estates that have been entailed for generations, and considerably encumbered.

“III.—The small estates, in good order, but incapable of bearing such extra charges as would be required under the existing law, enabling money to be raised for improvements.

“IV.—The neglected estates of absentee landlords.

“V.—The properties of small owners who have built cottages on speculations in the open parishes and villages.

“VI.—The properties of small freeholders, usually labourers, who have built their own cottages.”

On the first four cases described above, Mr. PORTMAN and Mr. CULLEY make the following important observations :—

Mr. PORTMAN says :—

“It has been suggested to me that, not only should the present regulations as to the borrowing of money be altered and made less expensive, but that in some form more enlarged powers should be given to owners of life-estates to charge their property within certain specified limits for improvements, and for cottages.

* Second Separate Report of Mr. Tremenheere. 1869. Sections 195, 196, 197.

"I would venture to suggest for your consideration whether it is not expedient that legislation should take place in such a direction as to bring into the market those large tracts of incumbered land, enabling those who have capital to acquire such land if they desire so to do, and conferring a boon on those who now possess them by giving them money to spend on such an amount of territory as they wish to concentrate around their homes, while at the same time the curse of poverty and misery will be removed from those districts whence all the profit is drawn, and to which none returns. Bad cottages would, I think, then become more rare; a portion, at any rate, of the profits would be spent upon the spot; a more contented race of farmers and of labourers would be found, and the education of the people, now flagging for want of funds, would progress.

"Some may say that this question of the dwellings of the poor in agricultural districts is a passing question of the hour, and that it is not really so great an evil as is represented. I would answer, Go into the country and see for yourself. Use your common sense, and call to mind the effect of absenteeism on Ireland; and say whether or not, in those portions of England where poverty and misery arising from the same cause meet you at every step, there is not urgent reason for dealing with the evils now existing by some legislative enactment, which shall put an end to a state of apathy and indifference in many holders of incumbered estates, and open the doors for the spending of capital on lands by those who are able, in the place of those who are now unable to do so." (H. 136—8.)

Mr. CULLEY states the grave questions that arise under this head for consideration, as follows:—

"There constantly arises to me, and I doubt not to my colleagues, the feeling that in speaking of the state of cottages, I am exhibiting a dark picture as if it was the fault of a class, many of whom are powerless to change it, and few of whom are answerable for it.

"We are calling upon the landowners of to-day to remedy the evil growth of many past generations, and nine-tenths of those who reside in the four counties which I have visited under your orders are already busy at the work, as far as their means will allow.

"I could point out to you two very large estates in these counties, upon the general improvements of which,—cottages having a large share,—the whole income has been spent for many years past, and will probably, if the present owners live, be spent for many years to come. What can a landowner do more? How many landowners are in a position to do as much? And, above all, what must have been the condition of these estates to demand such a sacrifice from the present owners?

"What then has led to the state of labourers' dwellings being such as to justify me in speaking of it as a national disgrace? And why are so many landowners now powerless to deal with it?

"If I were to answer these questions, judging from the history of the estates I have visited, I would answer at once, the encouragement given by law to the creation of limited interests in land, and the power of entailing burdened estates.

"What can the poor life-tenant, especially if his estates be burdened, do towards providing good cottages for his labourers? Nine times out of ten he strives to do his duty, and suffers fully as much as the ill-housed labourers on his estates.

"The unhappy propensity to create limited interests, and entailed and burdened estates, tells hardest against the smaller properties, where, if the

owner lives, as all the world expects him to live, there is no margin left for estate improvement, especially cottage improvement. Even on a large estate, by the time all is done for which farm tenants most loudly call, unless burdens be light, or the owner unusually self-denying, there is very little left to expend in the expensive luxury of cottage building.

"The case of small estates, however, is the worst, and, in spite of the supposed protection of the law of entail, they are being swallowed up by their larger neighbours, or passing into the hands of men whose whole means are not invested in land. Would it not be better that they should be allowed so to pass before they have inflicted undeserved suffering on everybody connected with them?"

These opinions are equally decided on the results of the Inclosures which have taken place under various Inclosure Acts since 1710.* —

"In very many, probably the great majority of cases, the inclosure has deprived the cottager of the benefits he has enjoyed from the waste, without any compensation. The cases are those in which the cottager was merely a tenant. Compensation for the privileges attached to the tenement would, at the time of the inclosure, be awarded to the landlord. The plot of land so assigned to the landlord might be immediately thrown by him into an adjoining farm, or otherwise disposed of without reference to the tenant of the cottage. It will be seen in future paragraphs (§§ 312—316), that such losses of what has been valuable privileges to the cottager, have been of frequent occurrence.

"Again, if the cottager was the holder of a freehold cottage, and, as such, had enjoyed rights over the waste, or if he had obtained rights by user, which, after an enjoyment of twenty years, are recognized by the General Inclosure Act (8 & 9 Vict., c. 48, § 50), a portion of land would, indeed, on his proving the value of such rights, be assigned to him at the time of the inclosure; but he is immediately subject to the temptation to sell his portion to the owner of the farm which it may adjoin, and the temporary benefit of the proceeds is a small compensation for the permanent privileges which will have been extinguished. (§ 313.)

"Further, the inclosure of wastes puts it out of the power of all future generations of agricultural labourers to acquire, as their forefathers did, new right and privileges over the waste by a grant or user; a loss of advantage which is not fully compensated for by the increased employment which the inclosures create."

In a pamphlet entitled "The Case of the Labourers in Husbandry," by Rev. D. Davies, rector of Barkham, Berks, published in 1795, it is stated that—

"Cottages have been progressively deprived of the little land formerly let with them, and also their rights of commonage have been swallowed up in large farms by inclosure.

"Thus an amazing number of people have been reduced from a comfortable state of partial independence to a precarious state, as mere hirelings, who, when out of work, come immediately upon the parish. (Volume of 'The Labourers' Friend Magazine,' for 1835, p. 12.)

"In 1827 a witness examined before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Emigration, Mr. B. WILLS, stated (s. 3812), 'I could load the Committee with information as to the importance of the cottagers renting a portion of land with their cottages: it keeps them buoyant, and

* First Joint Report of Mr. Tremenheere and Mr. Tufnell. 1868. Sections 266, 267, 268, 269, 295, 296.

it keeps them industrious;’ and he urges that every agricultural cottage should have a piece of land, ‘enforcing his opinion of the duty of placing such land freely within their reach, on the ground that, since 1760, they had lost 4,000,000 of acres of common, which they had formerly the privilege of using for their pigs, geese, and a variety of other things.’

“According to the estimate made by the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Emigration, in 1827, and the calculations of Mr. PORTER, in 1843 (‘Progress of the Nation,’ Title—Agriculture), 7,175,520 statute acres had been enclosed in England and Wales since the first Inclosure Bill in the year 1710 up to the year 1843. To these, since 1843, have been added 484,893 acres, as appears by the annual report of the Inclosure Commissioners for 1867, making together 7,660,413 statute acres added to the cultivated area of England and Wales since 1710, or above one-third part of the total of 25,451,626 acres in cultivation in 1867, as given in the agricultural returns for that year, recently presented to Parliament. Of the total of 7,660,413 acres inclosed since 1710, only 334,974 were inclosed between 1710 and 1760, leaving 7,325,439 acres inclosed between 1760 and 1867. * * * * * The bare statement of the total is sufficient to call attention to the fact of the vast extent of land which has within the last century and a half been placed in a condition which, for the most part, removes it out of the reach of the agricultural labourer, and prevents his acquiring any benefit from it, except that which he may derive from employment at day wages.

“As no summary of the number of acres so allotted is given in the annual reports of the Commissioners, we have endeavoured to ascertain the number, by careful examination, from each report since 1845.

“The result, we believe, is approximately as follows :—

“Acres inclosed since 1845 . . .	—	—	—	484,893
“Number of acres under section 31 of the General Inclosure Act, which gives power to the Commissioners, where common rights were unstinted, to require public allotments for gardens to be assigned to the labouring poor	—	—	320,855	—
“These 320,855 were disposed of as follows :—				
“Assigned to the Lords of Manors and other persons having titles to a portion of the land enclosed, and out of which public allotments for gardens were made to the labouring poor	—	261,255	—	—
“Of those 261,255 acres, only 2119 acres were assigned as public allotments for gardens to the labouring poor.				
“Assigned to Lords of Manors and other claimants, without any public allotment for gardens being made to the labouring poor	—	59,600	—	—
“Reasons given why, in the case of those 59,600 acres, no public allotment was made to the labouring poor :—				
“Because the poor have gardens already	19,516	—	—	—

“Because the land was distant from the cottagers’ dwellings, elevated, or otherwise unsuited for garden allotments. . . .	30,103	—	—	—
“For other specified causes, such as enclosure very small, &c. . . .	9,981	—	—	—
	<u>59,600</u>	<u>320,855</u>	<u>320,855</u>	<u>484,893</u>

“Number of acres not coming under sec. 31 (the common rights being stinted), 164,038.”

Another evil effect of family settlements is that they tend to the impoverishment of the land through their influence on the claims of creditors. By English law marriage is a valuable consideration. Let an owner in fee simple be deeply in debt and make a marriage settlement. The lands he owns are thereby placed beyond the reach of his creditors. It often happens that an honourable feeling prompts the debtor to do all he can to clear himself of his liabilities, but if he does so it is of course at the expense of the estate, which meanwhile remains stationary and unimproved. Again, it often happens that on a re-settlement the tenant for life and tenant in tail concur in charging the debts on their respective interests, while the former perhaps insures his life and then mortgages the policy by way of further security. The result of this is the same, viz., a further unremunerative drain on the resources of the estate.

These evils have been, no doubt, diminished by the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, and the power of sale now usually contained in well-drawn settlements, which in some cases can be made use of to sell the whole or part of a settled estate; but to argue, as did Mr. Hayes in his controversy on this subject with Professor Fawcett some years ago, that they have thereby been practically removed, is unfair on the public.*

It may be as well to notice more at length the powers of sale above alluded to, since it is behind them that the defenders of the existing system invariably shelter themselves, insisting that they give all the requisite power of alienation. “There is the power,” triumphantly exclaims Mr. Hayes, “it exists, and, if dormant, sleeps from the absence of occasion or desire to use it.” “It is objected,” says Lord St. Leonards, “that these purposes are effected by a complicated and expensive machinery, but who ever complained of the complex movements of a well-regulated watch?”

The sale of the whole or part of a settled estate can be exercised either through the instrumentality of powers contained in the settlement itself, or through those conferred by statute. The power of

* “Free Trade in Land,” by William Hayes, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law. 1868.

sale contained in well-drawn settlements is vested in the trustees of the settlement, to be exercised upon the request and by the direction in writing of the tenant for life, the money resulting from the sale to be used in one of two ways, either in the payment of incumbrances charged upon the hereditaments for the time being subject to the uses of the settlement, or in the purchase of other lands. The purchase is not to be made without the consent in writing of the tenant for life, and the lands purchased are to be settled to the uses of the settlement. The purchase-money, until laid out in land, is to be invested, and the income paid to the person who would have been entitled to the rents if the lands had been purchased and settled. In keeping with the doctrine that whatever is fully agreed to be done equity looks upon as actually accomplished, the money to be laid out in the purchase of land is real estate in the contemplation of the Court of Chancery, and is consequently capable of having the same estates carved out of it as real estate. Now, will anyone pretend that a power of sale of this kind is at all the same power as an owner in fee has over the land he owns? Except in the case of a sale to pay off incumbrances on the inheritance, there is no possibility of converting the real estate into personalty. Unless accordingly there happens to be other real property in the market of the exact quality and quantity wanted by the tenant for life, he will not have any inducement to use the power, except for rounding off the corners of his estate. Mr. Hayes quotes a friend of his in the North, who says: "We see from day to day the transfer of landed property from the drones to the industrious members of society, and witness the daily exercise of powers of sale in the disposal of entailed estates." This is doubtless true. The operations of building societies in the North of England are well known. A tenant for life living near a large town finds an easy method of clearing off portions by a sale of part of the family estate to a building society. Interest no doubt often prevails over sentiment; and it would have been instructive if Mr. Hayes had proceeded to inform us if the "industrious members of society" at once entailed the land which they had purchased from "the drones." But to what conclusion, after all, does the above quotation point but this, that when the ties of a strict settlement can be slipped off it is found very advantageous to do so? Why, then, not make the so-called landowner the judge of the interests of his estate, and enable him to take advantage of each opportunity as it arises. He cannot do so under the present arrangement, while the trustees, never at any time the occupants of a very agreeable position, have to consider the interests of all parties claiming under the settlement before they proceed to a sale; their decision has to be arrived at after balancing various conflicting arguments, and their own advantage lies in a

policy of masterly inaction, except in the rare cases where there can be no possibility of a doubt, such as those just alluded to.

“For determining upon what occasions the trustees would be justified in proceeding to a sale,” says Mr. Lewin, in his work upon Trusts, “it will be proper to notice, in the words of Lord Eldon, the intention of the settlement in so framing the power. The object of the sale, he said, must be to invest the money in the purchase of another estate to be settled to the same uses, and the trustees are not to be satisfied with probability upon that, but it ought to be with reference to an object at that time supposed practicable, or at least the Court would expect some strong purpose of family prudence justifying the conversion, if it is likely to continue money. Sir William Grant is said to have concurred in the same sentiments; so that clearly the trustees, as between them and their *cestui que* trusts, would not be justified in selling to gratify the caprice or promote the exclusive interest of their tenant for life. Generally speaking, the trustees ought not to convert the estate without having another specific purchase in view, and then not for the mere purpose of conversion, but for the benefit of all parties claiming under the settlement.”

It must also be recollected that the existence in family settlements of these powers of sale is by no means a matter of course. Mr. Hobhouse, in his recently published “Suggestions for Amending the Law relating to the Devolution and Transfer of Land,” considers Mr. Hayes to have been misled by his own great familiarity with large properties and well-drawn settlements, and proceeds to quote cases within his own knowledge of land being unsaleable owing to the disability of the tenant. Again, the power of sale—as shown above—is only to be exercised with certain clearly defined objects, viz., to pay off incumbrances charged on the lands, subject to the uses of the settlement, and to purchase other land. But it may be said, the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act covers this objection, as well as those arising from the omission of the power of sale in many settlements. A brief statement of the contents of the above-named Act will easily show that this is not the case. The Court of Chancery, to which all operations under the Act are naturally confided, may not authorize a sale unless it considers that such a sale would be proper and consistent, with a due regard for the interests of all parties entitled under the settlement. Every application for a sale to the Court must be made with the concurrence or consent of the following parties, viz. :—

The tenant in tail under the settlement and all persons in existence having any beneficial interest or estate under or by virtue of the settlement prior to the estate of such tenant in tail, and all trustees having any estate or interest on behalf of any unborn child prior to the estate of such tenant in tail, and in every other case the parties to concur or consent shall be all the persons in existence having any beneficial estate or interest under the settlement, and also all trustees

having any estate or interest on behalf of any unborn child.* Notice of any application to the Court is to be served on all trustees whose *cestui que* trusts are interested.† Notice of the application is to be given in the newspapers; parties considering themselves aggrieved to be heard in Court; and, finally, none of the powers conferred by the Act on the Court shall be exercised if an express declaration or manifest intention that they shall not be exercised is contained in the settlement, or may be reasonably inferred therefrom or from any extrinsic circumstances or evidence.‡

Powers shackled with all these conditions are clearly not the same thing as true liberty of alienation, while the uncertainty introduced by the twenty-sixth section of the Act is a source of perpetual doubt and litigation, sufficient in itself to deter many persons from having recourse to it.

It may be said that were it not for family settlements the old English family estates would be broken up. This, no doubt, might happen in some cases, and it would surely be far better that it should be so rather than that great tracts of country should remain in the hands of bankrupt and improvident owners. But on the other hand, if the system of family settlement be once destroyed, which says, in so many words, to each future generation, "your acts of improvidence shall not bear their natural consequences," the number of the bankrupt and improvident owners which the present system not only protects but actually creates will be enormously diminished, and the old family estates would consequently be as likely to gain as to lose.

It is undoubtedly one of the great economic not to say political advantages of the existence in a country of a class of large landholders that it gives that country a number of persons whose fortunes being connected with the soil rest on a sure foundation, and who consequently are not at the mercy of every shifting breeze of commercial security and insecurity. Such a body of persons in times of difficulty is and ought to be a source of strength to the economic fabric of society. They are like the reserve of the Bank of England. Where no large landlords exist, one of two things will in all probability result; either the State will be the landlord, as was the case in India previous to the land settlement, or as in France the State will have to be perpetually stepping in to help the suffering cultivator through a period of misfortune. In other words, centralization and all its disadvantages will exist. But what is to be said of a system of land

* S. 17.

† S. 19, 20.

‡ S. 26. It may be observed that sec. 18 allows the petition to be granted without the consent of all parties, so that the rights of the non-consenting parties be saved. But the exception does not hold if the non-consenting party is a person entitled to an estate of inheritance.

tenure under which the landlord must improve at the expense of all the members of the family except the successor under the settlement, or, if he refuses to do this, can only avoid having to abandon improvement by asking the State to come to his rescue with loans under statutory powers.

Speaking of these grants, Mr. Wren Hoskyns well observes : *—

“The immediate benefit conferred by their machinery is no proof of the political wisdom of the system. That a public company, itself borrowing public money, should have to be invoked to help a landowner to carry on the business of his own estates, would offer a singular commentary upon the state of the English land-laws to a person uninformed of the cause. And of this we may be sure, that wherever a series of supplementary devices manifests itself in order to meet a state of things at variance with the progress of the day, it indicates the undercurrent of a law struggling against worn-out barriers that will not long be able to withstand it.”

Such, then, is the English land system. It may be tinkered at for years in vain. The old copper pot may be mended fifty times over till the tin plates which cover the chinks are as thin as those at the bottom of the Megæra, but the break-up will come at last for all that, and be all the more complete the longer it is delayed. Such a system does not and cannot give security to property. That it interferes with agricultural improvement, with the free circulation of land as a commodity, and has an indirect tendency to lower the rate of wages by hindering the investment of capital in the soil, has already been shown. All the conditions of a good land system are accordingly wanting.

One word here about the free circulation of land. These remarks are not inspired by any preconceived opinion about the advantages or disadvantages economically considered of large or small properties, nor do they arise from any feelings of alarm at the statement made by Mr. Mill that there were only 30,000 owners of land in England. The statement has since been shown to have arisen from Mr. Mill having been under the impression that a certain number of persons being returned in the census as landowners implied that only the persons so returned owned land. However great may be the respect which every Liberal feels towards Mr. Mill, it is impossible to help observing that the mention of the words “landlord” or “rent” has the same disturbing effect on his mental powers as the waving of a red rag is supposed to have on the temper of certain animals. Still there can be little doubt that so long as family settlements exist an unnecessary obstacle is placed in the way of those who wish to invest their savings in a freehold. To argue, as Lord Derby recently did, that because the

* “Cobden Club Essays.” 1869. Page 127.

rate of profit from land is less than the rate of profit from trade there would not therefore be any one found ready to invest money in the former as a matter of business involves an argument which loses sight of the true nature of the causes which produce different rates of profit. Profits, strictly speaking, are resolvable into three parts, remuneration for abstinence, or interest; remuneration for risk, or insurance; and remuneration for exertion, or the wages of superintendence. According as the risk or the exertion of a business is greater or less, the rate of profit will *ceteris paribus* be greater or less too. It is because they are less in agriculture than in trade that agriculturalists are and will continue ready to invest capital at a lower profit than that which might be obtained in trade. Lord Derby's argument proves too much; not to mention that it loses sight of the great force of habit in deciding a man in choosing a profession or an investment. It would be just as good against a tenant farmer as against a freeholder, and if pushed to its legitimate consequences would force us to argue that no one would invest his money in three per cent. stock because there are railway shares which pay a higher rate.

We now approach the grievances under which vendors and purchasers suffer in making out the title to the land in which they deal. Title to land may be evidenced in two ways, by actual possession, or by the evidence of documents. It is clear that only in a very rude and elementary state of civilization can possession alone be sufficient evidence of title. Accordingly, in all civilized communities the title to land rests on written documents, all of which must be known before the title can be said to be perfect. The law empowering the purchaser to look for evidence beyond the mere fact of possession by the vendor generally affords the purchaser the means of satisfying his legitimate demands without unnecessary delay and expense. In other words, a registry of title exists in most civilized countries. England forms an almost solitary exception. The purchaser in England has to look to the possession of documents on the part of the vendor as the sole grounds of assurance that the title set before him is a true title. But possession of deeds, taken by itself, is not much safer evidence than the mere possession of the land. Deeds may be suppressed or kept back by mistake or by accident, or they may be destroyed, and yet the possible existence of unproduced documents affords no justification to a purchaser wishing to retire from a contract on which he has entered. Nor does the evil stop here. The actual loss of security or purchase-money is no measure of the harm done, for the purchaser, with the fear of the suppression of deeds before him, institutes expensive inquiries, which are among the chief drawbacks to the purchase of land.

Speaking on this subject, the Real Property Commissioners thus expressed themselves in 1830 :—

“No doubt can be entertained that the mischiefs which might be expected to flow from such a state of things exist to an extent which would alarm the holders and purchasers of land if they were aware of the risk to which they are exposed, and that in a great number of instances estates and especially securities for money are defeated in consequence of latent defects of title arising from the non-production of documents. An examination of the Appendix to the Report and of that to our former Report we believe will afford abundant evidence on this head, although it is to be observed that owing to various causes it is difficult to produce many instances well authenticated. Cases which come into Courts of Justice do not appear in the printed Reports unless they furnish occasion to lay down some new principle of law, yet the records of conflicts between persons who have taken successive securities on the same land are sufficiently numerous, indeed many of our text books contain distinct heads with subdivisions referring to decided cases on various parts of the general subject. It is to be observed that in most instances the case is so free from doubt that the party against whom a document is brought forward yields without a struggle, or upon terms of compromise often without even taking the opinion of counsel, and the professional agent employed on each side either keeps no exact memorial of the transaction, or, for various reasons, may be supposed to be unwilling to bring it to the public notice. It may be confidently said, however, that there is scarcely a professional man of considerable standing who has not met in his own practice with instances, or at least had some brought within his observation.” *

Again, owing to the division of an estate, the same deeds may constitute the title or part of the title of different persons. Attested copies, no doubt, are generally made, and a covenant entered into to produce the originals if required ; but attested copies are an expensive amusement, and the covenant is of little use after a second alienation by either the original vendor or the original purchaser. These deeds, too, like others, are liable to be destroyed or lost. Such drawbacks necessarily lead to a great loss in dealing with landed property. The burden of proof may, indeed, as is not ordinarily the case, be shifted in a great measure from the shoulders of the vendor to those of the purchaser, or the purchaser may accept an imperfect title. Still, the result is the same ; insecurity and consequent risk, or security at an enormous expense. Amongst other instances cited by the Real Property Commissioners, was one in which a purchaser of a small property finding himself entitled to insist upon attested copies and a covenant for production, which would have cost the owner more than the amount of the purchase-money, consented to waive his

* It is true that these remarks were written in 1830, and that since that date very great law reforms have been carried out. The evils, however, arising from latent defects in title have not been materially affected thereby, and I have consequently had no hesitation in applying the above quotation to the existing state of things.

right only on the terms of having the estate for nothing ; and another, where an estate having been sold in several small lots the expense of the attested copies, which were insisted upon by the purchasers, exceeded the whole amount of the purchase-money.

To avoid the great practical inconveniences arising from this state of things, the old conveyancers used to avail themselves of the distinction between legal and equitable estates by the assignment of what was known as an outstanding satisfied term in trust to attend the inheritance as a protection against mesne incumbrances. This highly technical device—too technical to be here described—bore on its face the condemnation of the system which rendered its adoption necessary. It was also cumbrous and often uncertain in its operation. The Real Property Commissioners in 1831 recommended its abolition, and the establishment of a Registry of Title. The former of these recommendations has been carried into effect. As regards the latter, it is true that some documents are now required to be registered ; for example, wills of personal and real estate, but not of real estate alone. Again, annuities, judgments, insolvencies, and bankruptcies are registered. But these are all—comparatively speaking—of minor importance, and their registry in most cases takes place at different places. The counties of York and Middlesex and the Bedford Level also have local registers, which, though imperfect, are yet of considerable use. It is also true that by two recent statutes, what are supposed to be facilities for the establishment of title, have been given by allowing the Court of Chancery on petition to make a declaration of title, and by the establishment of a central and permissive Registry Court ; but so expensive and cumbrous is the machinery in both cases, that it is seldom used, and the officers of the Registry Court are consequently among the best paid sinecurists in England. It can hardly, then, be said that much has been done for registration of title since 1831, although two more Commissions have sat on the subject since that date. On the other hand, the evils which exist are almost as urgent now as they were then.

Another very practical grievance under which the vendor and purchaser of land suffer, lies in our present cumbrous system of mortgage, which, curiously enough, had its origin in the mistaken notions of our ancestors on the subject of usury. The legal estate in the mortgaged lands being conveyed to the mortgagee, and reconveyed after the repayment of the loan, the number of the necessary deeds and the length of abstracts of title is enormously increased, while it is clear that every uncertainty which may arise in the title of the representatives of the original mortgagee is a blot on the title of the borrower.

These evils would disappear if a *principal* sum could be charged on land at law as well as in equity.

"I propose," says Mr. Joshua Williams, "entirely to abolish the present system of mortgaging lands. I would render valid at law a charge on lands of principal and interest, with all necessary remedies, including a power to convey and sell the fee simple. I would then prohibit the conveyance of the legal estate to any person simply as for the purpose of securing the payment of money lent. I would cause a receipt for the principal and interest secured to operate as a discharge of the encumbrance. Being discharged, it would then cease to affect the title."*

Such, then, roughly sketched, are the chief defects incident to our present real property laws. There are others of minor importance, all of which will have to be considered whenever this subject becomes a public question. One of the most important of these is the present basis of payment to solicitors, which is very fully discussed in the paper just quoted. It is probable that no one would gain more by a change than the solicitors themselves; but the discussion of this topic lies beyond the immediate range of these remarks.

It may fairly be assumed that before many years are past the law of primogeniture will be abolished, and the devolution of realty be assimilated to that of personalty in the case of intestacy. A large majority of the House of Commons has already once pronounced in favour of such a course. The requisite changes in the law of mortgage have been indicated above. As they are of a purely business character, and cannot by any possibility be mixed up with political questions, it may be hoped that they may before long obtain the attention they deserve. The Inclosure Bill of last session will be re-introduced this year, and will in all probability pass into law. Its main provision is that on any inclosure taking place under the auspices of the Inclosure Commission, at least one-tenth shall be reserved for allotments and recreation ground, except in the case of commons of more than 500 acres, where the allotment must be at least fifty acres, and may be as much as one-tenth. Valuable, however, as these provisions are, one grave defect still exists in the bill, which it may not be amiss to point out here.

There are two lawful ways in which a common or part of a common may be enclosed. The first is by agreement between the lord and all the other persons interested; the second is by application to the Inclosure Commissioners. There is a third and unlawful manner: the lord of the manor, trusting to the ignorance or the poverty of the commoners, or being himself unaware of what are his rights as lord of the manor and what are not, runs up a fence on his own account round the common, and then, as time goes on, pleads undisturbed possession. A large portion of the inclosures made in England before 1845 were probably made in this way, and the process is still going

* See the vol. of reprinted papers (1858-63) of the Juridical Society, 24th March, 1862.

on. What a lord of the manor will do, even in the neighbourhood of London and in the year 1870, is illustrated by the recently decided case of "Warwick v. Provost and Scholars of Queen's College, Oxford." To prevent this going on, it was last year proposed, in the Select Committee on the Inclosure Bill, to prohibit any inclosure whatever taking place except through the medium of the Inclosure Commissioners, and to repeal the practically obsolete statutes of Merton and Westminster the second, which might in some cases be set up as a defence. The amendment was, however, lost. It was urged that an undue interference would take place with the rights of the lord in cases where a common law inclosure takes place. To which it can be replied that the slight interference in question is as nothing compared with the destruction of the existing proprietary rights of the poorest class by the illegal inclosures referred to.

Speaking on this subject, a writer in the *Saturday Review* (December 16th, 1871) says :—

"In parts of Kent and Surrey there is scarcely a village but can boast its common or its fragment of a forest. These lie often far away from railways and high-roads, and are only accessible by lane or bridle path. Near as they are to towns, they are remote from any influence of public opinion. The local opinion is infinitesimal, and counts for nothing. The farmers and cottagers know little of their rights, and have no means of vindicating them if they did. The lords of the manor, on the other hand, act as if their rights were as absolute as they would desire them to be. They literally assume the property they covet, and run their park fence off-hand round the possessions of their poorer neighbours. We know cases where this is being done now, and others where it is in course of tentative discussion."

The epigram is still true—

"It is a sin 'gainst man or woman
To steal a goose from off a common ;
But can he plead that man's excuse
Who steals the common from the goose ? "

When the gradual destruction of a common takes place in the manner above alluded to, not only are the labouring poor entirely deprived of the compensation which, under the clauses of the Inclosure Bill, it is proposed to give them for the practical enjoyment they have hitherto had—whatever may have been their strict legal rights,—but also in many cases of actual rights which, if brought into a court of law, could be supported. It has been said that such inclosures are inclosures under the Statute of Merton, but this is a misnomer ; for an inclosure under the statute, to be justifiable, supposes the lord to leave sufficient common for those who are entitled, not to mention that the statute can only be set up against common of pasture, and not against other rights of common, and that the burden of proof lies on the lord in every case. It must also be recollected that inclosures by ordinary agreement among the parties

interested of the whole or the greater part of a common are practically non-existent. The lord and the commoners are hardly ever able to agree as to the distribution, and therefore apply to the Inclosure Commissioners for an award.

The Statute of Merton was passed at a time when the whole circumstances of the country were totally different from what they are now. The inclosure of the enormous wastes which then existed, and the greater part of which were of no use to anyone, presented itself as the simplest way of increasing the gross produce of the soil, without at the same time the smallest risk being run of interference with the existing rights of the commoners. This is no longer the case. Continual inclosures have left the commoners in many cases but very little, and it is at least open to doubt if the change from a pasture grazed by the cattle of the commoners to one grazed by that of the lord, or into a ploughed field, is of any advantage to the country, when the difficulty of obtaining milk is known to be among the chief disadvantages of the life of the agricultural labourer. It is not of course proposed to interfere with a single inclosure already made, but to prohibit those inclosures taking place in future for which the statute might possibly be set up as an excuse, though the plea would in almost every case be useless if the point were once tried. Again, the Inclosure Bill rests on the supposition that the labouring poor of the neighbourhood have a sufficient interest in the common—apart from strict legal right—to be protected, when an inclosure takes place under the award of the Inclosure Commissioners. This practical enjoyment exists as much in one case as in another, and should be protected in all alike. It is said that Parliament has only the right to impose such conditions as "*dominus litis*," in the same way that it imposes its own conditions on a railway company; but it cannot be imagined for a moment that Parliament would arbitrarily transfer fifty acres of a common to the labourers on an inclosure taking place, if they had not a practical right to compensation for the loss of a previously existing interest. Such a transfer would otherwise be confiscation and an act of tyranny. Its equivalent could not be found in any conditions now imposed on a railway company, but only in some such condition as the payment of a bonus towards the reduction of the national debt.

The most important reform of all remains. It is the establishment of local land registries, in which registration should be compulsory. But such registries are practically an impossibility so long as the complicated interests in land, which now exist, are allowed to be created, interests which, as already shown, have a very disastrous effect on the agricultural progress of the country. To establish registries, and at the same time allow these complicated interests to

be created, would be an attempt to register the unregistrable. The true basis of reform is to be found in a fee simple being made the only recognised form of tenure either at law or in equity, and in the establishment of registry courts. There is, however, an objection often taken to the first of these suggestions, which it may be as well to consider before proceeding any further.

Why, it is said, forbid the settlement of land when analogous powers exist of settling personalty through the instrumentality of trustees, though not by carving estates out of it. Subject to the same rule of perpetuities as land, personalty can be settled on trust for the lives of any number of persons in being and twenty-one years after. Mr. Hayes also, in the paper quoted above, attempted to argue that it was possible to create an estate tail in personal property, because the proceeds of the sale of land directed to be re-invested in land, are held to be real estate even previous to their re-investment. The reason of this has been pointed out above. It is indeed true, that this device of directing the land to be sold, and the proceeds re-invested in land, is resorted to in cases where there is but a remote intention of investing as directed, and the phrase "entailed money," is consequently well known. It is, however, open to doubt, if the long delay which often takes place is really defensible according to the doctrines of equity, the risk of a fraud on the power or breach of trust being run; and the fact remains that it is only by having recourse to a very technical doctrine of equity that it can take place at all.*

Putting this particular point aside, the general argument from the settlement of personalty to that of realty assumes that the power of settling in the case of the former is a good thing; and secondly, that what is good in the case of the former is necessarily good in the case of the latter. Now, the first of these two propositions may well be questioned, but its discussion here would be irrelevant to the main issue. Assuming, then, that the power of settlement is a good thing when exercised on personalty, the fact remains that there is an intrinsic difference in the subject-matter of personal and of real property, which is quite sufficient to render that which may be good legislation in the case of the former bad legislation in the case of the latter.

There is to begin with that distinction which has of late been so much insisted upon, and also so frequently attacked, that land is limited in quantity, personalty or at least most kinds of it unlimited. It is objected that, practically speaking, land—the whole surface of the globe included—is unlimited. This may be true, without its

* See some remarks on this subject in Lord St. Leonards' *Real Property Law*, p. 223.

impugning the original position. What is asserted is, that land considered as a source of national wealth is limited in quantity. Land is one of the three great sources of wealth, labour and capital being the other two. Anything which interferes with the unfettered use of any of the three for productive purposes is an evil—except in a few exceptional cases—but an interference with the free use of that which is limited in quantity and cannot be replaced, is a double evil. If a man has a business and neglects it, a rival competitor soon steps into his place; but if a man allows his property to go to waste, another property cannot be brought on to the spot from a distance to replace it. There is an immediate loss to the wealth of the country. Again, the power which the mere possession of land gives to the landowner over the well-being of all connected with it, is a power to which nothing similar exists in the case of the possessor of personal wealth. It no doubt makes a difference to society if the possessor of a large sum of money squanders the income arising from it, a still greater difference if he dissipates the principal; but the evil consequences in either case are only indirectly felt, and are quickly repaired by the rapidity with which personal wealth is accumulated in a country such as ours. Not many persons beyond the immediate possessor and his nearest relatives perhaps have any very intimate connection with the squandered property. It is far otherwise in the case of land. There, if the owner is a spendthrift, a blight settles on the estate and all connected with it. From the largest farmer to the poorest labourer, all are alike affected. A mass of individuals are the comparatively helpless sufferers till the next change of ownership takes place. Since then so great a difference exists between land and personalty, there would be nothing in itself extraordinary if the law considered it to be of greater importance to protect the former than the latter from the dead hand of the past and the unborn child of the future.*

To return to the question of a land registry. The greatest divergence of opinion exists as to what is the best system. The Real Property Commissioners of 1831 suggested one scheme; the Commissioners of 1857 suggested another. Mr. Joshua Williams has proposed one of his own, resembling the former rather than the latter. The Commission, which quite recently reported on the causes of the failure of the existing Registration Court, suggested a fourth, to which Mr. Fowler, in the Cobden Club Essays of 1872, gives in a qualified adhesion. Other writers, like Lord St. Leonards, object to registration altogether. Speaking roughly, the different proposals mentioned above resolve themselves into those which

* See generally on this part of the subject Mr. Vernon Harcourt's Inaugural Address, p. 54.

propose a simple registration of title—*i.e.* of the right to convey, coupled to a system of notices to protect partial interests, and those which propose a register of assurances. The Report of 1831 and the plan of Mr. Joshua Williams incline to the latter; the Report of 1857 to the former of these alternatives. Again, these various schemes fall under different heads, according as they propose that the registry should be one of places, of estates, or of the names of the owners; according as they propose that registration should be central, or that it should be local, that it should be permissive, or that it should be compulsory. Whatever be the scheme adopted, the abolition of complicated interests in land would enormously facilitate its operation. If the register be one of assurances, their length and their intricacy will be diminished; if of title alone, the danger of litigation (owing to the diminution of the number of parties having possible interests) will be equally certain to become less.

It is not, however, the object of these remarks to urge the legal so much as the economic objections to complicated interests being carved out of land. The machinery of law is made to serve the general objects of civil society, and it is sufficient for the present purpose to prove that complicated settlements are bad from an economic point of view. Even if it could be shown that they were as easily registered as a fee simple, the case against them would remain intact.

The difficulty of starting an effective system of registration ought not to be underrated. Besides the points mentioned above, a variety of others at once suggest themselves; for example, the exact machinery to be adopted for the protection of partial interests, should constructive notice be allowed, should registration be noticed, should a guarantee fund exist to compensate the owners of partial interests which may have been injured, and fifty others. It would be presumptuous here to enter into the details of a legal reform, on which so great a diversity of opinion exists, and on which so much learning has been expended, hitherto unfortunately with little result beyond furnishing an armoury for the future use of reformers. It is sufficient to point out that men of the greatest professional experience, against whom the charge of wild innovation and reckless scheming can by no possibility be brought, have pronounced registration possible. Political economy follows in their wake, and declares registration to be necessary. It goes further, and advocates extensive changes in the law of real property itself, suggesting at the same time to the lawyers that it is the want of these changes which have hitherto rendered registration impossible.

Granting however to the fullest degree the difficulty of the task, it remains to be seen why England, a country where political education is more generally spread than in any other, and where

each day extends and adds to it, should be unable to do what other and less favoured nations have done. Every year adds to the necessity of facing this question, in proportion as the existing evils become more widely known and more keenly felt. There is another reason for doing so arising from the political character of the times. Schemes are abroad for treating this land question in a very different manner from that indicated here. The principles from which these remarks start are those which animated Mr. Cobden when, in the last public speech he ever made, he spoke of free trade in land. But now grand schemes for nationalizing the land and intercepting the increment of rent are put forward, the one inadvisable, as it would entail—unless accomplished by confiscation—a loss of £57,000,000 per annum, as recently shown by Sir John Lubbock, not to mention the fundamental objections to all landlordism on the part of the State; the other impossible, as no conceivable machinery for carrying it out could avoid introducing the greatest uncertainty, inequality, and injustice. Both schemes strike at the idea of individual liberty and individual property, ideas which go far in making up that complex whole known as the English character, and both are children of a second-rate continental philosophy, the teachings of which are alien to everything which has prospered on the soil of this country. Indeed the difference with which this land question is treated in England and abroad affords a good illustration of the characteristics which distinguish what may be called French Socialism from English Radicalism; the first springing from abstract ideas of the rights of man, the other inductive in its method and practical in its object; the first proud to forget everything before 1793, the second claiming as its own a long historic past, and liberties hardly yet securely gained; the one developing a succession of brilliant yet one-sided glories, the other in which no partial principle has ever attained an exclusive ascendancy; the one, finally, in which the gain of to-day is but too often obtained by the loss of the acquisition of yesterday; the other in which the present triumph may be less complete, but the seed planted in the past bears blossom and fruit, and does not wither. Progress constant yet sure has ever been the characteristic of our civilization, of our institutions, of our laws; and their characteristic it will remain, for national character in its broader features does not vary. Under its influence the land question will be solved, not by those who rush to seek some panacea sprung fully armed out of the head of an individual, but by those who seek to uproot, with a firm and unsparing hand, the parasitic growths which have overgrown and deformed the laws.

EDMOND FITZMAURICE.



DEAN STANLEY AT EDINBURGH.

DR. STANLEY went down to Edinburgh in January, and gave four lectures on the history of the Church of Scotland, which have had, and are likely to have, a remarkable fortune. The admirers of the Dean as an historian have been disappointed with them. They say they are not up to his mark. We may, I think, find reason to believe that this is because they were not intended by him to be properly historical essays. Still, whatever be the reason, English readers have again missed what they have often desired, and what Dean Stanley could have executed for them better than any man living or dead—a short, complete, and luminously intelligible sketch by the hand of genius, unfolding once and for ever from within outwards that very tangled affair, the ecclesiastical history of Scotland. This has not been attempted, and has certainly not been accomplished. No one will come to understand Scottish Church History by reading the volume. It unfolds, nothing, either in order of time or of principle. It is simply a picturesque pamphlet—four turns of the historical kaleidoscope, with the objects admirably selected and arranged for the purposes of the exhibitor.

But if Dean Stanley has in this instance failed in writing history, it is because he has been doing a more important thing—making history. The contents of his lectures are, according to Charles Lamb's translation of *sermoni propiora*, "properer for a sermon;"

for while in them he has been teaching Englishmen from the past history of Scotland, he has been preaching to Scotchmen what their future history should be. This view has been universally accepted in the north, and rightly. Dr. Stanley is too well known in Scotland as an author for his central and significant position as a Churchman not also to be understood; and Edinburgh men who would have passed a mere English bishop without curiosity, went to hear him with eager anticipation. They were certain that, however others might content themselves with mere comments, edifying or amusing, on the varied scenes of their history, it was a moral impossibility for the Dean of Westminster to do so. That most mild but at the same time ceaseless and consuming zeal, which animates him, could scarcely be laid aside on such an occasion. In voluntarily choosing the Kirk as his subject, he had elected to deal with the very embodiment of the two principles in opposition to which he has for some time seemed to breathe—the passion for doctrinal truth on the one hand, and church independence on the other. The result of such a collision would at any time have excited the widest interest in Scotland, even if it had not drawn forth in Professor Rainy a champion of Presbyterianism, under whose intellectual prowess smoulders an extraordinary moral power. The Scottish Episcopalians, too, are much irritated at being invited by an English dignitary to accept an ancillary attitude towards a fragment of that Presbytery which they once hoped to replace, and equally so by his putting it on Erastian grounds. But it appears to me that the thing which has, on the whole, caused the greatest interest in these utterances of Dean Stanley, is the revelation of a hitherto unacknowledged crisis in the Established Church of Scotland—a crisis which the Dean's lectures have brought out so vividly to the minds of Scotchmen that they have almost seemed to create it.

For in Scotland the Dean of Westminster's defence of Establishment has struck men with the force of a paradox. They feel dimly that Establishment, in the whole history and legislation of those northern parts, has been not so much different from the Broad Church idea as directly opposed to it. In Scotland the Church has always been supposed to be established for the sake of the truth to which it was the witness. It was indeed hardly too much to say that our Establishment was, originally, before all things the establishment of truth, and of doctrine which is the form of truth. Statute after statute, Covenant after Covenant, the Claim of Rights, the Revolution Settlement, the Treaty of Union, every transaction in which for hundreds of years the State dealt with the Kirk, observes carefully the order laid down by William III.'s Parliament, "in the first place to settle and secure the true Protestant religion as it hath of a

long time been professed within this land, *as also* the government of Christ's Church within this nation." It need not be said how contrary this, the popular idea in Scotland, is to the conception of a National Church as held by the school headed by Dr. Stanley—a school dominant for the moment in English literature, though provincial and insular if we take even the modern world as a whole, not to speak of the wider world of theology. The latter theory, with its necessary surrender of the idea of establishment as being in any way a homage to truth, is not only new and strange, but is abhorrent to the Scotch mind. The essential obligation of a national church to conform itself and its creed to the nation, is one recognized by only a very small section of Scottish Churchmen, and by them scarcely avowed. It is a doctrine which circumstances have strongly recommended to the more thoughtful minds, but which the mass of the people still implacably reject. And the skilful and cautious presentment of it by its greatest teacher has had anything but the effect of reconciling them to it.

No doubt, legally, Dean Stanley is right. On the principles of the great judicial decisions of 1843, it is certain, that if Parliament were next year to ordain the Church of Scotland to set up the worship of the Virgin Mary, or to ignore in its Confession the Divinity or Atonement of Christ, it and all its ministers and elders would be bound to do so. They would be bound, both legally and morally, to do it—provided they continued members of the Church. Individuals could save themselves by seceding from it; but since 1843 the Church has no longer the right, under any provocation, of separating from the State, any more than it has, without separating, to disobey a controlling statute. Now to Dr. Stanley this appears the best and the only true relation between the State and the Church, and we all know how very much may be said for it. There is, in the first place, no danger that such enactments will be passed, at least until the Scotch members of Parliament and the majority of the people who elect them demand it. And if Scotland shall wish such a change, why should the Church of Scotland refuse it? Then in present circumstances it is clear that any coming change will not be in the direction of imposing doctrine or ritual on the unwilling Church. It will be rather in the direction of sponging out doctrine and enlarging the freedom of discipline and ritual: a change in which the English Parliament, and especially the Scotch part of the legislature, would above all things study to carry with them the majority of the Church. And if the recently defined constitution of the Church is not likely to entail any practical collisions, why should not Dean Stanley maintain, even in Edinburgh, what he has always consistently proclaimed elsewhere, that "the circumstance that all changes in the doctrine and

ritual of the Church must in the last resort be determined by the voice of the whole nation as expressed in Parliament," is to the Church itself a "guarantee of justice, freedom, and enlightenment" ?* There was just one reason why he should not. The people, not of the Free Church and United Presbyterians merely, but the people within the Established Church of Scotland, are still dead against it. It is true that only half the Church felt so outraged by the settlement of principle in 1843 as to break with the State. But abstract principle is one thing; carrying it out is another. As he himself said, in a passage which evoked a general growl in his otherwise most courteous audience, "there is no other country in the world where the consciences of so many excellent people could have been wounded to such a degree by the intricacies of a legal suit" as to issue in the solemn farewell to Establishment of Dr. Chalmers and his fellows. But every Scotchman knows that if the principles then settled were now to be acted upon by the legislature—I do not say in the way of intruding English High Churchism or Broad Churchism on the Kirk—but even in statutorily compelling the most minute observance, however unobjectionable otherwise, another huge secession would instantly occur, and three-fourths of the laity of the Established Church would involuntarily adopt the language of the Church's independence which had been so familiar to their fathers.

But there were considerations which justified Dr. Stanley in making the attempt. There is in the Established Church of Scotland a small but influential section of Broad Churchmen, to whom circumstances have given a wholly disproportionate and for the present nearly dominant power. They are strong in the sub-consciousness that they, and they alone, hold views consistent with the legal position of their Church. And they are far stronger in the general sense of justice which urges an Established Church, especially one which seems to number only a minority of the population, to abandon religious and doctrinal distinctions which exclude others from national and even pecuniary privileges. And lastly, they are strong in that doctrinal Broad Churchism which most cultivated men profess; and while in some of them it is quite consistent with an honest attachment to the Creed, in others it takes the form of a persistent and corrosive opposition to it. As a consequence of all this, the steady and skilful effort to liberate the younger minds from the statutory fetter of the Confession of Faith, and to smooth out the more marked features of Scottish Christianity, has been crowned with more success than could have been expected. At present no doubt the large majority of the Assembly honestly love the hereditary faith of Scotland. But how it may be

* "Essays on Questions of Church and State." 1870. Preface, p. 27.

ten or even five years after this, is a matter on which the odds are freely given and taken in the Parliament House, or wherever critics congregate. Already, even before Dean Stanley came down, thinking men forecast the time when broadening the Kirk according to his view must be the only refuge from that disestablishment, the shadow of which has for the last three years haunted its conscience. It seemed a great opportunity; and there was reasonable ground to hope that the leading men of the National Church, however strongly opposed privately to the sense in which the lecturer was to advocate Establishment, would at least be willing to say nothing, and not openly repudiate it.

Accordingly the Dean of Westminster came down, and, in four lectures read before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, passed with swift and graceful, but sometimes inaccurate, finger over the whole history of Scotland, addressing now Episcopalians, now Free Churchmen, and now Voluntaries and Cameronians, but always looking forward to the conclusion best expressed in the following striking summing up: *—

“While insisting on the elements of Scottish religious life, which are above and beyond all institutions and parties, I should be shrinking from my task to-night if I did not ask what institution—I will not say what party—but what institution most corresponds to these aspirations? And here I cannot doubt that, viewing it as a whole, and with all allowance for its shortcomings, it must be that institution which alone bears on its front, without note or comment, the title of ‘The Church of Scotland.’ As of the Church of England so of the Church of Scotland, and so of every national church; its glory is, according to the golden maxim of the ever-memorable Hailes, to carry like the prophet a blank shield with no device of sect or party. . . . Whatever Scottish Christianity is prepared to become, that the Church of Scotland ought to be prepared to be. It treats, or ought to treat, Presbyterianism, Episcopacy, Patronage, Non-intrusion, as in themselves mere accidents. It has gone through the successive phases of the wild, monastic clanship of the Culdees, of the Anglo-Norman hierarchy of St. Margaret, of the Scottish hierarchy of Robert Bruce, the mixed Presbyterian and Episcopal government under Queen Mary and James VI., the mixed Episcopal and Presbyterian government under Charles I. and Charles II., and the purely Presbyterian government from William III. downwards. It has passed through the Liturgy and Confession of John Knox, through the Solemn League and Covenant, through the Sum and Substance of Saving Doctrine, the Westminster Confession and Westminster Directory; and again, the alternations of domination from the Regent Moray to Andrew Melvil, to Rutherford and the Covenanters, to Carstairs and the Moderates, to Chalmers and the popular party. None of these phases need be—none ought to be—altogether lost to it. The Westminster Confession, no less than the Solemn League and Covenant, will always be treasured up among its historical documents, though both may have ceased to express the exact mind of the modern Church of Scotland. Its independence, its romance, its

* My quotations are from a newspaper report which seems to have been taken from the manuscript: the volume advertised has not yet reached me.

exquisite and unrivalled humour, its fervour, its prudence—these are the true heirlooms of the Church of Scotland, which it has never lost from first to last, and which, whatever be the change of its outward forms, it need never lose.”

The proposal to the Church with the majestic Puritan creed to adopt a blank shield, and to hold Presbyterianism, and seemingly even Protestantism, as a mere phase in its history, and the recommendation to other Scotchmen to join it *because* of this proposed colourlessness, was bold even for Dean Stanley. But he spoke the carefully considered convictions of a lifetime, and no one supposed that he had any other interest in the matter than that of a student and statesman. And the lectures, hasty and imperfect historically, were a marvel of conciliatory zeal, coruscated with the most contrasted sympathies, and throughout recalled that mild light which glows upon every page of Dr. Stanley's writing, which shines but never burns, and leaves no scar upon any human heart.

And yet they have missed their mark in Scotland, and I venture to think they ought to do so.

The minor inaccuracies are of little importance, were it not that they are generally so manifestly due to the haste to enforce the questionable moral. Thus the little sect of the Sandemanians was contrasted with the great body of the Seceders, nothing being said of the famous “Marrow” controversy of the latter, where the freeness of the love of God in the Gospel was the point jealously guarded by the Erskines against the orthodox Moderates, while the Sandemanians are praised for their “simple and unostentatious piety,” and Sandeman, their leading theologian, is singled out as teaching in an “inoffensive attitude.” The fact is, that the theology of the Sandemanians was a strong Hyper-Calvinism, the leading tenet of which insisted on saving faith as a purely intellectual and unemotional act; and Sandeman in particular, while a writer of the highest ability, is perhaps the most keenly intolerant of all controversialists. The late Dr. John Duncan (whose *Colloquia** Dean Stanley justly praises, and who had more liberality and learning, as well as more mass of intellectual manhood generally, than all the professed Broad Churchmen who at present exist in Scotland, or are likely to do so

* “*Colloquia Peripatetica*,” (Edinburgh, 1870,) from which Dr. Stanley made several admirable quotations, but missed *the* sentence bearing on his theme: “The best of our fathers were more anti-Erastian than anti-Episcopal, and more opposed to a bad liturgy than anti-liturgic.”

A saying of old Glas, Sandeman's father-in-law, himself a good and pious man, though too weak to impress his influence on his community (which has become the coldest and most unemotional of all existing sects), was told me by Dr. Duncan with intense appreciation:—“Oor Robert,” old Glas used to say, speaking of Robert Sandeman, “Oor Robert first states the truth clearly, and then he says, ‘Gin ye dinna see it, Deil pyke oot yer een.’”

to the end of the century) used to say, that Sandeman was the only theological writer he knew comparable to Swift, for purity of style and bitterness of sentiment. A still stronger instance of "premature construction" is seen in Dr. Stanley's reference to Whitfield:—"It was from the Church of the Moderates, not from the Church of the Covenanters, nor yet of the Episcopalians, that three thousand communicants went forth to receive the Holy Eucharist from what Seceders called the 'foul, prelatic hands' of the English clergyman;" and when the parish minister of Cambuslang sent for him to assist him in that great Revival, the Seceders denounced them both. Now if there is anything certain in the history of the last century, it is that the Moderates were unanimous in scoffing at Whitfield with the whole energy of their shallow natures, and that the "Church of the Moderates," exactly in proportion as it was under Moderate influence, contemned and denounced him, as they did the parish minister of Cambuslang and all within their own borders who shared in the great preacher's spirit. No doubt the Secession quarrelled with him; but why? Not because they were less willing to receive him than M'Culloch of Cambuslang and the Evangelicals, who belonged to their own school within the Church but had not seceded; but precisely for the contrary reason—because they had first discerned his greatness and invited him to Scotland, and so unwisely claimed that he should preach for and with them alone. And so he preached from Evangelical pulpits inside the Establishment, to the indignation of the Moderate party, who had not at that time got their Act passed excluding such interlopers from pulpits—an Act which subsisted from 1799 till it was repealed by the Evangelical party, augmented by the return of not a few Seceders, in 1842. But these are mere straws that show the swiftness of the indiscriminating current in so candid a mind. They were adduced as tending to prove that in Scotland, as everywhere else, Establishment is a liberal thing and Dissent is both narrow and narrowing. Now without picking up minutenesses, which turn out so unreliable, let us at once ask the general question. There are three considerable bodies of Presbyterian Dissenters in Scotland—the Cameronians, the United Presbyterians, and the Free Church. Have the Cameronians become more or less narrow during their steadfast existence of nearly two centuries? Every one in Scotland knows the answer. Have the much larger body of United Presbyterians not got far more liberal and tolerant than they were at their outset? The affirmative is so signally true that it should not have been passed over in any estimate of Scotch ecclesiasticism. And, indeed, the recent history of this important body, compared with its contentions and splits immediately after being severed from the Establishment, suggests in the strongest way the advantage, for the sake

of liberality as of everything else, of giving Establishment and questions of Establishment, what sailors call a wide berth. The greatest narrowness in Scotland has always been on the rocks and shoals, either before or immediately *after* the vessel has broken from the beach, and while it is yet entangled with half-secular questions of duty to the time. But take even the Free Church, which has been only a quarter of a century on the wave. Nothing is clearer to any one who has watched it critically, with a special eye to this very matter of liberality, than that it has made steadfast progress year by year since its birth; and so certainly is this the case, that a minority within it, which has a political interest in being supposed to support orthodoxy, is never weary of pointing out that its liberality, growing for many years, amounts, in their view, to a general and increasing laxity in doctrine. The truth is, it is a very striking historical phenomenon how bodies like these should have subsisted so long without any external tie such as establishment supplies, and should on the whole have decidedly increased in liberality, *while never letting go the faith*. It is far more than can be said for the Established Church during the same length of time. And whatever may be our judgment upon that relaxed hold of central truth which the Dean admires under the name of the Moderatism of last century, or upon the so-called Evangelical Revival in our own, the contrast between these strange alternations of sentiment within the Establishment, as compared with the steadfastness in doctrine and progress in liberality outside of it, should not have been omitted from any historical review.

I am puzzled by the first thing which Dean Stanley remarks of "the Scottish ecclesiastical struggles—that they are almost entirely of a negative character." No doubt, as the history went on, the Church bristled into all kinds of contentions and negations, applying its original principles to meet the difficulties and aggressions which surrounded it. But surely no one can read the history without seeing that the *chief* key to it must be the intensely positive and affirmative character of the belief originally taken up. The aspiration—

" That the hail world may see
There's nae in the richt but we,
Of the auld Scottish nation ! "

—(though certainly not sung by the Covenanters at Dunse Law) may give the explanation of the thing admirably, in so far as it was a characteristic of the national temper; but deeper than even the desire to subjugate others was the original conviction of having found "the right" in religious matters. "There is no other country in the world," it is said, "that has what calls itself in so many words

a negative Confession." Now, not to say that one of the most important justifications of Confessions has always been acknowledged to be pressure on the faith from outside—not to say, also, that the very name *negative* Confession, applied to the Covenant of 1580, implies a reference to the fundamental Confession, framed by Knox, which is throughout full of burning affirmation: to say nothing of all this, I challenge the world to produce an example of a greater explosion of positive conviction than is contained in the head and front of this "negative" Confession itself! Read the very first sentence of it, and cease to marvel that a nation which could utter this with some good measure of honesty should have its place in the world to fill:—

"We all and every one of us underwritten, protest, That, after long and due examination of our own consciences in matters of true and false religion, we are now thoroughly resolved in the truth by the Word and Spirit of God; and, therefore, we believe with our hearts, confess with our mouths, subscribe with our hands, and constantly affirm, before God and the whole world, that this only is the true Christian faith and religion, pleasing God, and bringing salvation to man, which now is, by the mercy of God, revealed to the world by the preaching of the blessed evangel; and is received, believed, and defended by many and sundry notable kirks and realms, but chiefly by the Kirk of Scotland, the King's Majesty, and the three estates of this realm, as God's eternal truth, and only ground of our salvation!"

When the notable kirks and realms come once more in our day to feel the same hunger of the heart after the central truth, then they may be able rightly to judge of the history of Scotland. But, till then, they have nothing to draw with—and the well is deep.

Of course, even this massive block of affirmation—the corner-stone of all the Covenants—shows already in its rugged outlines the errors into which the Kirk was to fall. It was a noble Confession for a man freely to make: but it was a tyrannous test to impose on a family or people! At least it became so when to this first utterance of common faith were added binding references to the details not only of creed but of the manifold legislation with which Scotland had buttressed its Creed, and above all, when the Creed of the Church, freely uttered, and liable to be freely changed on farther light as to the truth of God, was imposed under penalties by the State. All through the history of Scotland, there was no greater service that could have been rendered to us by a distinguished stranger like Dean Stanley than to point out how Scotland, holding the positive truth firmly, might yet hold it freely—making a just distinction between essentials and circumstantial, or, at least, between more vital and less vital parts of the organic truth—leaving room in the Church, or in the Porch, for the youthful inquirer, the ignorant inquirer, and the doubting inquirer—cherishing the flame, without choking it, as the lamp

swings in the troubled air. Scotch Presbyterianism has been gradually feeling its way towards this in all its sections, each touching the other, and gaining courageous liberality from the contact; but the essential condition of their attaining it has been that which is dear to all of them, but which their mentor earnestly repudiates, under the name of spiritual independence—a name which, in Scotland, means simply the catholic doctrine that the Church in purely Church matters must obey God rather than man. But even in this matter of its independence, the danger of the Kirk has always been to make it rather a national than a catholic matter; to lay too great stress on statutes recognising its rights and establishment, and giving it privileges; and so to harass the consciences of others, and weaken its own. Hence Dr. Stanley finds it possible to say that this “independence is as secular, as political, as national, as ever was the compliance of the most latitudinarian of Erastians”—a great mistake, contradicted by the documents of the Kirk on all its great occasions, but countenanced even at this moment by a few ecclesiastical suicides, who find it easier to rest on some political transaction, like the Treaty of Union, than to adhere to anything like a principle.

But whatever difficulties Scotchmen may have felt in adjusting this principle among themselves in time past, they will be pretty nearly unanimous when it is broadly impugned by one who is so well entitled to represent Erastianism. And Dr. Stanley has everywhere implied one thing which has been hidden from many of his sympathisers in Scotland, till his lectures have been the means of bringing it out to all—that the supremacy of the State *necessarily* means in the long run abnegation of absolute faith on the part of the Church as a society. If all that is essential to establishment is, as he lays it down, first, “some religious expression of the community,” no matter, seemingly, what external fact it bases itself upon; and, secondly, that ever this “religious expression be controlled and guided by the State,”* the State may, indeed, have a religious conscience, but the Church can have none. The Creed, to go no farther, is in the hands of the State, not of the Church. And thus we come back at once to the relation of the Scotch Kirk to its Confessions—a matter which, on its own idea of spiritual independence, was perhaps not an easy thing to regulate; but if a trial, was a great and noble trial of living faith. For on the two principles of positive faith and freedom which the Scotch Church holds, it became not merely a natural but a necessary thing for it to repeat continually the great Protest, prefixed by the pen of Knox to the Scottish Confession:—

“That if any man will note in our Confession any article or sentence repugning to God’s Holy Word, that it would please him of his gentleness,

* “Essays on Church and State,” p. 347.

and for Christian charity's sake, to admonish us of the same in write ; and we of our honours and fidelity do promise unto him satisfaction from the mouth of God, that is, from His Holy Scriptures, or else reformation of that which he shall prove to be amiss."

So, in 1647, the Kirk threw off the Confession of Knox in a day, and re-formed its faith into another symbol : and so day by day and year by year it is its duty to make its Confession a true one, holding to the faith but binding upon its members no more than they are bound to confess. A hard duty, but a noble one, and one only compatible with freedom. For, as we may now be allowed formally to conclude, Establishment in Dr. Stanley's sense is demonstrably incompatible with independent belief in the Creed, on the part of a Church which has given absolute power to the State either to retain or alter it,—which has indeed bound itself to teach the State's Creed.

But it will be said—though not in Scotland—what matters it what the Church, as a body, does as to creed, provided individual ministers and members take the enlightened course? And this raises the matter of subscription—the proposed treatment of which implied in every line of these lectures fills me with absolute dismay, all the more that there are so many influences tending to the result. The creed of all the Presbyterians of Scotland, established and otherwise, is the same, or nearly so ; and they all bind their ministers by subscription, though the Formula of the United Presbyterian Church is the only rational and Protestant one.* But the non-established Presbyterian Churches all claim the right to vary or abolish the existing Confession, and substitute other utterances better expressing the Church's faith, and also to vary or abolish the Formula. (The suggestion recently made from within the Free Church that this religious duty cannot be performed, I throw out of account, as an unintended heresy, good only for forensic purposes.) In the Established Church the change can only be effected by Parliament. Now I am not to decide the question whether subscription should exist at all. There is a great deal to be said on both sides of the question, and it should always be in the Church's own hand to decide whether it shall do so or not. But there are infinitely pathetic reasons why subscription, if it exists, should be honest, and why no man should sign a creed or formula which he does not believe. It is a subject on which no one can speak without expressing his deep admiration of Dean Stanley's exertions (whether we wholly agree with his reasons or not) in the matter of the English Church's subscription ; and I cannot but regret that on this question alone these most courteous and kindly lectures on the sister Church should faintly remind one of the maxim *Fiat experimentum in, &c.* For it is a ghastly experi-

* "I acknowledge the Westminster Confession and Catechisms as an exhibition of the sense in which I understand the Holy Scriptures."

ment to make, and one to save Scotland from which any sacrifice is justifiable. And yet it is one which is imminent, and which many, like the Dean of Westminster, treat as inevitable. If you speak to a student of the Free Church Divinity Halls about the Confession of Faith, the chances are that he may express uneasiness of conscience about the exact form of some minor things in it, and earnestly desire that his sluggish Church leaders would strip it of needless complexity; but he is satisfied with it as a whole—or if he is not, he slowly and sadly retires (Scotland has many who have done so) from the clerical profession. If in this year 1872, you speak to a student of the four Halls of the Established Church, on the same subject, it is quite likely that you may find him in the most serious state of discordance with the symbol of the Church's faith; but you do *not* necessarily find him raising the question whether he ought to retire from his profession. And yet both sign the same Formula, "sincerely owning and believing the whole doctrine contained in the Confession to be the truths of God, and owning the same as the confession of his faith." And the mass of the people to whom the licentiate preaches, accept these words in their natural and plain significance. Whatever may be done in England, the people of the North know nothing about "Articles of Peace." Now, who in this case will be forward to blame the subscribing ministers? Certainly not those laymen, who, having themselves slipped their necks out of God's collar, have no intention of ever signing any Creed at all, but honour the high office which they are unworthy to fill. We may not blame individuals; but what a future for our country if men are to commence systematically false subscription with a view to gradually relegating the Confession to its place among historical monuments! The price is too great to pay for *any* result. It is no comfort to reflect that the same mournful process has been going on in the past in many a land before us. Think of the unspeakable laceration and abrasion of conscience that must have occurred for generations in those orthodox German States, whose thrice-complicated subscriptions Dean Stanley has recalled in his paper on the subject. Think even of the "martyr Renwick" taking his elders bound, when ordained on the hill-side, to stand by "all the lawful acts of all the lawful General Assemblies of the true Reformed Kirk of Scotland." What slow-consuming ulcers have preyed on the hearts and consciences of men of the finest nature when standing between their oath on the one hand, and the credulous people on the other! And are we in Scotland on the verge of all this once more? Far better by statute to abolish the Confession of Faith altogether, or to strike asunder the bond of subscription—far better do *anything*, than begin again in the consciences of one half the people of Scotland that hideous process of mingled petrification and decomposition!

For we have gone through it all already—we remember the worm-wood and the gall. I have not space to refer in detail to the history of Creed, in Scotland in the last century, a most instructive chapter which threatens to repeat itself in our own. The Moderates—an evil race—Dr. Stanley's elevation of whom as the model for the Kirk, has conclusively deprived his lectures of all dangerous power in Scotland—had, in their time, the opportunity of dealing with this question of Creed; and they did it characteristically. To quote Hugh Miller, they, as a class, “robed themselves in the habiliments of unbelief, but took the liberty of lacing it with Bible edgings.” Of course they were not theoretical disbelievers in Christianity: Warburton, when he said the Scotch clergy were one half fanatics, and the other half infidels, swung his mace with his usual reckless energy. The unbelief was of the heart rather than of the head. But it was prepared and entered upon with very considerable deliberation. Early in the century there was a great controversy on Creed, in which the orthodox side was defended in the mildest way, and as it died out the Moderates seem to have resolved to leave things very much as they were. They went on signing the Confession. They raised few controversies even about details of it. But they began to treat the great doctrines of it as things which it would be ridiculous for a gentleman and a scholar earnestly to believe: and in their Creed, as in all Christian Creeds, if the great doctrines are to be believed at all, they can only be believed earnestly. And so the thing went on, till towards the close of the century a number of the clergy in the West, having become distinctly Socinian, again raised the question, and urged upon their leaders the necessity of getting rid of a faith which all enlightened men throughout the Church had ceased to believe. Principal Robertson retired rather than consent to it; the French Revolution and the new century came in, with its revival of Evangelism, and ultimately an Evangelical majority, and with all the new responsibilities as to the expression of the faith which devolve upon men who believe it. The old bad time had passed; but at what an expense! Take only one life which the Moderates had cast away, that of Robert Burns—“a pearl, richer than all their tribe.” It has recently been said that on them lies the responsibility that Burns, when he broke with the orthodoxy of his time, did not seek something better. I am thoroughly satisfied that this is a long way within the truth. An able writer* has recently pointed out that the turning point for evil in Burns' life was his joining those clubs in Irvine and Mauchline, which compounded for private recklessness of life by flinging themselves into the controversy raging at the time between the Ayrshire Moderate ministers and the orthodoxy they had sworn to and

* In last month's *Blackwood*.

despised. But when it is suggested that the poems of this date should be omitted from all future editions as vulgar stuff, the answer is, that it is impossible. Leviathan is not so tamed. Such a ringing trumpet-call as—

“Orthodox, orthodox, wha believe in John Knox,
Let me sound an alarm to your conscience,
There’s a heretic blast has been blawn in the West,
That *what is no sense must be nonsense*”—

can never, once written, be forgotten in Scotland, though the “non-sense” in question was the Divinity and Atonement of Christ. But it was not drunken writers and boozy lairds alone who desired to seduce Burns into the Moderatism which they could trust, as a religion that made pleasant provision for the flesh. There is an unspeakably touching story handed down by tradition in Ayrshire, of Burns, when quite a young man, having been visited, we know not how, by that sudden consciousness of sin and despairing aspiration after a higher life, which comes once in a lifetime to many a man. He went, it is said, with his “convictions” to the minister of the parish where he happened to be—a Moderate of excellent character—who heard all he had to say; and gave it as his advice to him not to trouble himself about these things—to “go to the first penny-wedding he could find, and think no more about it.” I have been unable to trace this story past the general tradition, but the following fact I have from the most eminent of modern Indian missionaries, Dr. Duff, who heard it when on his missionary tour in 1836, from an aged clergyman who in his youth had been a contemporary of Burns. Dr. Smith, the venerable minister of the Laigh Kirk of Kilmarnock, remembered the poet and many passages of his early career well, and he also knew Dr. McGill, who, in Burns’s youth, was the leader of the whole Moderate party in Ayrshire.* McGill was a man of great attainments and reputation, but the chief of the Socinianizing Presbyterians; and having seen a small manuscript collection of Burns’s earliest poems, he sent for the poet. He treated him kindly and praised his book; but pointing out passages here and there which were tinged with the traditional religion which the writer had imbibed under his father’s

* Dr. Smith himself, like Burns, came across McGill on a critical occasion. He had once to lecture and pray in presence of the Presbytery of Ayr, as a candidate for licence. He knew they were pretty nearly Socinians, and as a young man he looked up to his judges with great timidity. His views were (like *their* Creed) Puritan and orthodox, and he felt strongly urged, not wholly to deny them, but to avoid expressing them distinctly even in his public prayer. In the mental struggle his conscience was victorious, and he prayed as he believed. Dr. McGill sent for him next day, and stretching out his right arm with a steadfast look, put to him the question, “Young man, do you believe what you said yesterday?” He answered in the affirmative, quaking a little; and the Doctor emphatically replied, “I pity you—good-bye.” The incident, Dr. Duff writes me, “from its sad singularity, has stuck tenaciously to my memory ever since Dr. Smith narrated it, when a very old man.”

roof, advised him, for the sake of his own future reputation, to avoid all drivelling pietism, and keep henceforth such unpoetical stuff out of his poems. Whether these incidents were before or after the club-life and the first satirizing of the orthodox clergy, I do not know; but assuming that the latter were as narrow and bigoted and bitter as Burns, poor fellow, describes them, it is plain that the failure of his higher aspirations were due not merely to that general atmosphere of infidelity which his Moderate friends certainly spread around him, but to their positive contact and interference at the time when that glorious nature was struggling to open itself to heaven. And so, long after, when the weary life was drawing to a close, and a stranger seeing Burns walking heavily into Dumfries took his arm to support him, and recognizing the well-known face, broke out into affectionate religious talk, the world-worn poet is said, by what I believe is an undoubtedly true tradition, to have simply and kindly thanked him, adding that "there was a time when he might have taken an interest in these matters, but—he feared it was past now." A true man, almost always speaking the truth about himself, and worthy of having the truth spoken upon his tomb. But the truth about Burns, if it bears hard (as it does) upon even the faithful part of the Church in his day, can never be other than scathingly contemptuous of the Scottish Moderates.

And as they were in Ayrshire, so they were in Edinburgh. Dr. Stanley celebrates the friendly terms in which the leaders of the party lived with the chief theoretical opponents of Christianity.

"Hume was the great sceptic of a sceptical age. He was, however, of such a truly Christian character, that such a good judge as Adam Smith said of him, 'that he was the most perfectly wise and virtuous man he had ever known.' Nor did Hume, like the scoffers on the continent, ever put himself forward as an unbeliever. He said, 'I am no Deist: I do not so style myself; neither do I desire to be known by that appellation.' His reward was that the graces of his character were acknowledged even more by the clergy than by the laity . . . He lived on the most intimate terms with the leading clergy of Edinburgh. Blair openly defended him from attacks which he believed to be unjust. The General Assembly steadily refused, though hard pressed, to censure his writings."

It is all true, and it is not without its pleasing side. But was there any particular reason why the leading Moderates should *not* be friends with David Hume? He had six times their brains; his kindly good-nature passed with them and with Adam Smith for virtue; he was tolerant of themselves and seldom very contemptuous of the religion they professed; and if he made it a rule "never to put himself forward as an unbeliever," they were equally anxious never to put themselves forward as believers. It was all very natural; but I fail to see anything in it very meritorious or difficult of attainment. The cheapest of all virtues is tolerance on the part

of men who have no faith : and to have no faith, (in our nineteenth-century sense of earnest belief,) was the very badge of the Scottish Moderate.

For, finally, I cannot but regard the Dean of Westminster's treatment of what called itself Moderatism in the Church of Scotland, as alike misleading in history and mischievous in principle. Historically, the name belongs exclusively to the dominant party in the Church of Scotland in the later part of the last and the beginning of this century. It is permissible to point out analogies between this party and others who lived before or after them ; but it is not a legitimate use of history to include under a hitherto specially appropriated name, men of the most diverse character alike from those who bore it and from each other. What authority is there for calling Carstairs, the friend of William III., a Moderate ? Still more, what right can we possibly have to speak of Robert Douglas as belonging to that class ? We might almost as well put MacCulloch of Cambuslang among them. If the answer is that these were men of moderation, it is true ; but so, in the most eminent degree, was Henderson, the Moderator of the Assembly of 1838, and a far greater Presbyterian than either of them, and so, in an eminent degree, was Welsh, who handed the Disruption Protest to the Queen's Commissioner in 1843. Moderation is a natural gift or a Christian grace which individuals of all churches and parties have shared ; it is the monopoly of no nation or sect, and it does not belong peculiarly to those who value themselves exclusively upon it. On the contrary, I do not hesitate to maintain that the moderation of men of deep convictions, who happen also to be wise and loving men, may, indeed, pass by the same name as the moderation which in others springs from want of convictions, but that it is, seminally and essentially, a different quality, *and another thing*. And so, when Scotchmen are taught that "with the Revolution Settlement begins the full ascendancy of that great philosophic virtue and evangelical grace in the Church of Scotland, which has sometimes in these later days been considered deadly heresy, but which the Apostle commends to us as one of the most indispensable of Christian duties—'Let your moderation be known unto all men'"—the question is only raised whether the *ῥὸ ἐπιεικὲς* of the enthusiastic Apostle of the Gentiles and the moderation of Blair were one thing ; or whether rather they were not two things in their inward nature so irreconcilably opposed, as to have little in common but a word. But I must go farther. To confound Moderatism with moderation appears a misreading of history ; but it is no less an error, I suspect, to confound it even with Latitudinarianism ; as it certainly is, not to distinguish it from breadth. All the Moderates were not Latitudinarians, nor were all the Latitudinarians Moderates. The Scotch Moderates, indeed, as a rule, clung to a literal

orthodoxy and to Presbytery, as they did to their livings, and when they lapsed, lapsed into a literal and narrow sort of Socinianism. They had few tendencies to latitude; and, most certainly, they had no breadth. Shallowness was their characteristic rather than breadth, and it was an easier virtue to attain. They were no doubt largely influenced by the great and learned men who formed the Latitudinarian party in England; but the influence, as it took effect on them, seems to me to have been of a peculiarly unfortunate kind. For Latitude is eminently an ambiguous virtue. In one man it is a great and noble attainment; in another it is the poor result of a poor nature; and in all it is to be judged, not according to its degree, but according to its kind. And as a transmitted virtue it is received *in modum recipientis*. The Moderates were men who had not got rid of doctrine, but who kept the doctrine and got rid of its life; and it is only in a remote way that this can be said to be derived from Tillotson and Chillingworth and the Latitudinarian school. But infinitely less can it be said to be derived from Baxter and Leighton! These men, I take it, were not so much Latitudinarians as men of breadth (and the difference is often simply infinite); but their latitude, like their moderation, was a whole pole asunder from that of their supposed successors. It is surely an astounding assertion that,

“However much in later days the Moderate party in Scotland may have become ‘of the earth, earthy,’ it was something for them to be able to claim as their first founder the most apostolical and the most saintlike of all Protestant Scotchmen.”

There is no such genealogy—that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit! Leighton had really no connection with the Scotch Moderates, and Baxter had still less. These two men were broad, and the Moderates were narrow; they loved peace, and the Moderates loved sloth: they loved central truths earnestly, and would, therefore, dispense with circumstantials, while the Moderates loved nothing well enough to dispense with anything for the sake of what they loved. An unlovely, cold-blooded race! on their belly they must go, in history, as in the century which they adorned.

Now, how is it that Dean Stanley, the quick-eyed, sympathizing friend of whatsoever things are lovely and of good report through the wide realm of history, has seemed to all Scotland to recommend a gradual return to its condition in last century as on the whole the best thing for the Scotch Church? It is because his theory makes it a necessity; because Erastianism (at least when superinduced upon a Church that is free in the utterance of its creed), requiring, as its condition, a having-in-readiness to dispense with all Church beliefs, requires also for its practical working that the energy of Church life shall be lowered to prepare for the inevitable conditions of the case. And

therefore it is that those Scotchmen who admire him most personally, and are indeed under the greatest obligations to his unfailing courtesy and kindness, are yet unable to keep silence when the question concerns the dearest interests of our country. For it is a Scotch question. It would be excessively rash to look with confidence for equally disastrous results of Erastianism in England. We have had a very different history, moving on a level of conscious Church life, from which it is possible ruinously to fall. That that Church life has in the past been too restricted, too dogmatic, and too selfish, is certainly true. The real heir-looms of the Presbyterianism of Scotland have been its *depositum* of faith and its fiery though contracted heart of love; but it has need of the steadfast exertions of its sons in these days to add to these the liberality and tolerance, "the independence, the romance, the humour, the fervour, the prudence," which, however insufficient as a heritage in themselves, are precious as accessories and as aids. And in this direction it is making progress, though too timidly and slowly—too slowly, even though we grant that no permanent progress can be made *per saltum*, and that the first necessity for a country's future is not to break with its past. But while it would be unwise to break suddenly with the past, even in matters of indifference and detail, it would be ruin to break with its whole vital principle in the way that is now proposed. It is not merely that Scotchmen have a pathetic and patriotic interest in the kirk and creed of their fathers; that—

"The souls of now three hundred years,
Have laid up here their hopes and fears
And all the treasure of their pain—
Ah! yet consider it again."

We are bound to consider it under a sense of responsibility to the present; for as a nation judges its history, it is itself being judged. And the great law, for a man or a people, is, "*We needs must love the highest when we see it, not Lancelot, nor another.*" The dashing, romantic, Scottish Episcopalian type of Walter Scott has been our Lancelot, flushed with the light from the "low sun" of departing chivalry; and it will not be forgotten. But we have had a higher and graver call, and, with many faults of self-conceit and hardness and narrowness, have yet as a nation hearkened to it. No doubt we need catholicity, elasticity, variety, and sympathetic adaptation; but there are more ways than one in which a nation may seek these gifts. The one way is very easy, and very worthless; the other, that which retains ardent religious conviction, and strives to add to it toleration, is very hard and high. But it is the only way in which it is fit that Scotland should walk, or in which it is desirable to succeed.

ALEX. TAYLOR INNES.



SCIENCE AND IMMORTALITY.

HE who pretends to have anything new to say upon so old a subject as the immortality of the soul, must expect to arouse certainly opposition, and probably contempt. Nevertheless, this at least is certain, that the tendency of science, which has powerfully affected every domain of thought in new and unexpected ways, cannot but place the old doctrine of immortality under new and, it may be, unexpected lights, abolishing old arguments, and suggesting new ones that have not yet obtained the consideration they deserve. My object in this paper is, to endeavour, by the aid of all-victorious analysis, to throw some little light upon the relations of the belief in immortality with scientific thought; and at the outset, I wish distinctly and positively to affirm, that it is not my intention to construct any argument for the belief against science, but merely to explain the conditions under which, as it seems to me, the question must be debated. Those conditions, though in themselves plain and simple, are, I believe, very imperfectly understood, and much bewildering nonsense is talked upon both sides of the question by men who have not clearly realised the nature of evidence, the amount of proof required, or the sources from which that proof must be derived. I think it possible to lay down a series of propositions with which, in principle at any rate, most reasonable minds would agree, and which would have the effect of defining the area of debate and the true

point of conflict. This may sound presumptuous, whether it be really so or not, the event alone can prove.

Now, the first demand of science is for an accurate definition of the object of discussion, that is, that both religious and scientific thinkers should be quite sure that they are discussing the same thing. Immortality is bound up in the minds of religious people with a vast amount of beautiful and endearing associations, which form no part of the hard, dry fact itself. The definition of immortality, viewed scientifically, is, I take it, something of this sort: the existence of a thinking, self-conscious personality after death, that is, after the bodily functions have ceased to operate. This personality may or may not exist for ever; it may or may not be responsible for the past; it may or may not be capable of rest, joy, and love; it may or may not be joined to its old body or to a new body. These, and a hundred similar beliefs with which religion has clothed the mere fact of existence after death, form no essential part, I must again affirm, of the fact itself. And throughout the argument, this, and no other than this, will be the sense in which I use the word immortality; because it is the only one that I have a right to expect that the scientific mind will accept.

It may be well, also, before going further, to make it clear to ourselves in what sense we use the word religion. Men who would be very much ashamed of themselves if they were detected using scientific words inaccurately, do, nevertheless, attribute meanings to the word religion, which it is difficult to hear with patience. I have heard an eminent scientific man upon a public occasion, and in a serious manner, define religion to be duty, making a mere idle play upon the original meaning of the word. Without, however, entering into verbal discussions, it will be, surely, enough to define religion as a practical belief in and consciousness of God and immortality; and, as the latter is now absolutely essential to the idea of religion as a motive moral power, and as, moreover, it includes, or at any rate necessitates the belief in the existence of God, we may fairly conclude that, for all practical purposes, and certainly for the purpose of this argument, religion is synonymous with a belief in immortality. And if, for any reason, mankind does at any time cease to believe in its own immortality, then religion will also have ceased to exist as a part of the consciousness of humanity. To clear up, therefore, the relations between immortality and science becomes a matter of the utmost importance. It will be well next to analyse briefly the effect which science has upon the nature of the proofs by which this, like all other facts, must be demonstrated. Let us, for convenience sake, regard the world as a vast jury, before which the various advocates of many truths, and of still more numerous errors, plead the cause of their

respective clients. However much a man may wrap himself up in the consciousness of ascertained truth, and affirm that it makes no matter to him what the many believe, yet nature is in the long run too powerful for him, and the instinct of humanity excites him to plead the cause of what he knows to be truth, and to mourn in his heart and be sore vexed if men reject it. Truth is ever generous and hopeful, though at the same time patient and long-suffering; she longs to make converts, but does not deny herself or turn traitress to her convictions if converts refuse to be made. There is a sense, indeed, in which it may be said that truth only becomes actual and vital by becoming subjective through receiving the assent of men. What then must the advocate for the fact of the immortality of the soul expect that science will require of him, when he pleads before the tribunal of the world for that truth which, because it is dear to himself, he wishes to enforce on others?

The alterations in the minds of men which the tendency of modern thought has effected in respect of evidence, may be summed up under two heads. First, the nature of the evidence required is altogether altered, and a great many arguments that would in former days have gone to the jury, are now summarily suppressed. Fact can only be proved by facts, that is, by events, instances, things, which are submitted to experience and observation, and are confirmed by experiment and reason. And secondly, the minds of the jury are subject to *a priori*, and, on the whole, perfectly reasonable prepossessions before the trial begins. The existence of changeless law, the regular, natural, and orderly march of life, the numerous cases in which what seemed to be the effect of chance or miracle have been brought within the limits of ascertained causation; all these things predispose the mind against pleadings for the supernatural or the divine. Most true, of course it is, that there are most powerful prepossessions on the other side as well; but the difference is, that these are as old as man himself, while the former have only been of later times imported into the debate, and if they have not been originated, have at least received their definite aim and vivid impulse from the results of scientific research.

Now, the first result which flows from these alterations is the somewhat startling one, that all the arguments for immortality derived from natural religion (so-called) are, in the estimation of science, absolutely futile. To put this point in the strongest form, all the hopes, wishes, and convictions of all the men that ever lived, could not, and cannot convince one single mind that disbelieves in its own immortality. Unless the advocates of religion clearly apprehend this truth, they are, it seems to me, quite disabled from entering into the discussion upon conditions which their opponents, by the very law of this opposition,

cannot but demand. It is true, indeed, that this temper of mind is confined at present to a comparatively few persons, as in the last century it belonged to the philosophers and to their immediate followers. But then it is as clear as the day that, as science is getting a more and more practical hold upon men's minds by a thousand avenues, and mastering them by a series of brilliant successes, this temper is rapidly passing from the few into the popular mind; that it is becoming part of the furniture of the human intellect, and is powerfully influencing the very conditions of human nature. Sooner or later we shall have to face a disposition in the minds of men to accept nothing as fact, but what facts can prove, or the senses bear witness to. In vain will witness after witness be called to prove the inalienable prerogative, the intuitional convictions, the universal aspirations, the sentimental longings, the moral necessity, all which have existed in the heart of man since man was. Nor will the science of religion help us in the hour of need. There can be a science of religion exactly as there can be a science of alchemy. All that men have ever thought or believed about the transmutation of metals may be brought together, classified as facts, and form a valuable addition to our knowledge of the history of the human mind, but it would not thereby prove that the transmutation had taken place, or that the desire for it was anything more than man's childlike strivings after that which could only be really revealed by the methods of natural science. So also the science of religion can prove what men have held, and suggest what they ought to hold. It can show that they have believed certain things to be true, it is utterly powerless to prove that they are true. It can strengthen the principle of faith in those who do not require positive demonstration for their beliefs; it cannot even cross swords with those, soon to be the majority of thinking men, to whom positive demonstration has become as necessary to their minds as food to their bodies. Nay, they will resent rather than welcome the attempt to put a multitude of hopes and myriads of wishes in the place of one solid fact, and will soon confirm themselves in their opinions, by the obvious argument that these hopes and wishes are peculiar to the childhood of the race, and form only one out of many proofs, that man is liable to perpetual self-deception until he confronts fact and law. Not indeed that they will indulge in the equally unscientific statement that there is no such thing as immortality. The attitude of mind which they will assume will be that of knowing nothing, and of having no reasonable hope of ever discovering anything about man's future destiny. And while they will think it good that man, or at any rate that some men should allow themselves to hope for life after death, yet they will steadily oppose any assertion that these hopes ought to guide men's conduct, influence their

motives, or form their character. Now if this be true, it is difficult to overrate the importance of thoroughly and distinctly realising it. That the evidence for the truths of natural religion is overwhelming, is one of the statements that are accepted as truisms, at the very moment that science is slowly leavening the human intellect with the conviction that all such evidence is scientifically worthless. Nevertheless the opposite idea has taken firm hold of the religious mind, and forms the basis of many an eloquent refutation of the "presumptuous assurance" and "illogical obstinacy" of modern thought. Men must have smiled to hear themselves alternately refuted and rebuked by controversialists who did not understand the tone of mind against which they were arguing, or who assumed as true the very things which their opponents resolved to know nothing about, either in the way of belief or rejection. It is very certain, however, that this error will not yield to the mere statement that it is an error, and therefore I will go on to examine a little more minutely the various arguments by which men seek to prove the doctrine of immortality. These are mainly fourfold:

- (1.) That it is an original intuition, and arising from this,
- (2.) That it is an universal belief.
- (3.) That it follows necessarily from the existence of God.
- (4.) That it is essential as a motive for human morality.

(1.) I take the statement of this argument from the words of one, than whom no man has a better right to be heard on such a subject. Professor Max Müller, in his preface to the first volume of his "Chips from a German Workshop," writes as follows: "An intuition of God, a sense of human weakness and dependence, a belief in a Divine government of the world, a distinction between good and evil, and a hope of a better life, these are the radical elements of all religions. . . . Unless they had formed part of the original dowry of the human soul, religion itself would have remained an impossibility." Now I am not quite sure that I understand in what sense the writer means to assert that these intuitions, which, for practical purposes, may be limited to three, God, sin, and immortality, are part of the original dowry of the human soul. If it is meant that there was a special creation of the human soul, furnished from the beginning with these three intuitions, then science will resolutely refuse to admit the fact. There can be no mistake about the position held by the bulk of scientific men, and little doubt I should think as to its reasonableness. If there is anything that is in ultimate analysis incomprehensible, or any fact that cannot be accounted for by natural causes, then the possibility of special creation and original intuitions must be candidly allowed, but not otherwise. There is just a chance, for instance, that the difference between the brains of the lowest man

and the highest animal, may ultimately be regarded as a fact inexplicable upon any theory of evolution, more however from a lack of evidence than from any other cause. Be this as it may, the possibility of special creation finds a distinct foothold in the acknowledged fact that the connection between thought and the brain of animals as well as of man, is an ultimate incomprehensibility, a mystery which the law of man's intelligence prevents his ever even attempting or hoping to understand. The famous saying "*cogito ergo sum*," the foundation of all modern metaphysics, may come to be a formula under which religion, philosophy, and science may all take shelter, and approach each other without ever actually meeting.

But the three intuitions of God, sin, and immortality, can all be accounted for by the growth of human experience, as everyone knows who has at all studied the subject. At some period of the world's history, science will answer, an ape-like creature first recognised that it or he had offended against the good of some other creature and so became conscious of sin, or was created as a moral being. Thus much Mr. Darwin has affirmed, but (speaking from memory) I do not think he has called very special attention to that still greater epoch (or was it the same ?) in man's history, when this ape-like creature seeing one of its own species lying dead, recognised as a fact "I shall die." This is what we may term the creation of man as an immortal being, for in the very conflict of the two facts—one, the reflecting being, the self-conscious I, the other, death, the seeming destroyer—lies embedded all man's future spiritual cravings for eternity. And the idea of God would come in the order of nature, before either of these, to the creature which first reflected upon the source of its own existence, and recognised a "tendency in things which it could not understand." This is, in brief, the scientific account of man's creation, and of the growth of the ideas of natural religion within his mind; and we may remark in passing that it must be a singularly uncandid and prejudiced mind, which does not recognise that the book of Genesis, which, upon any theory, contains man's earliest thoughts about himself, expresses in allegorical fashion, exactly the same views.

The same views are also apparently expressed by Professor Max Müller, in a very beautiful passage in the article on Semitic Monotheism, in the same volume:—

"The primitive intuition of God and the ineradicable feeling of dependence upon God could only have been the result of a primitive revelation in the truest sense of that word. Man, who owed his existence to God, and whose being centered and rested in God, saw and felt God as the only source of his own and all other existence. By the very act of the creation God had revealed Himself. Here He was, manifested in his works in all His

majesty and power before the face of those to whom He had given eyes to see and ears to hear, and into whose nostrils He had breathed the breath of life, even the Spirit of God."

The first impression made by this passage may be, that, in speaking of a "revelation in the truest sense," it affords an instance of that hateful habit of using religious words in a non-natural sense. But a little deeper consideration will show that no possible definition of a revelation, accompanied and attested by miracles, can exclude the revelation made by nature to the first man who thought. In fact, we have here a description of creation, which science with possibly a little suspiciousness at some of the phrases may accept, while, at the same time, natural religion is carried to its utmost and highest limits, and along with this a foundation is laid for a truer theory of the miraculous. But while gladly admitting all this, the fact remains that these intuitions, following upon a revelation in which nature herself was the miracle, are still plainly only the expressions of man's inward experiences, and that however old, and venerable, and exalted, they are still only hopes, wishes, and aspirations, which may or may not be true, but which are incapable of proving the actual facts towards which they soar. It is open, therefore, to any man accustomed to look for positive demonstration, to dismiss them as dreams of the infancy of man, or to relegate them into the prison-house of the incomprehensibilities, or to content himself with a purely natural theory of human life which rejects and dislikes the theological.

(2.) But when we come to inquire how far these primary intuitions have been universal, and whether they can be fairly called ineradicable, we are met by some very startling facts. The dictum $\delta \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota \delta\acute{o}\kappa\epsilon\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\acute{o} \alpha\iota\nu\alpha\iota \phi\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$ is so reasonable in itself that no serious attempt would be made to question a belief that even approached to being universal, even if it could not be shown to be part of the original furniture of the mind. But the real difficulty lies in finding (apart from morals) any beliefs of which this universality can be predicated, and assuredly the immortality of the soul is not one of them. The mind of man at its lowest seems incapable of grasping the idea, and the mind of man at its highest has striven to emancipate itself from it altogether. The evidence for this statement lies within the reach of all, but I will just adduce three names whose very juxtaposition, by the sense of incongruous oddity stirred up, may make their joint testimony the more important. I mean Moses, Buddha, and Julius Cæsar, all of whom, though widely separated in time, race, and character, representing absolutely different types of human nature, approaching the subject from widely different points of view, do, nevertheless, agree

in this, that the consciousness of immortality formed no part of the furniture of their minds.

Moses lived one of the most exalted lives, whether regarded from the religious or political side, that has ever been lived on earth, and yet, as is well known, there is not a shadow of a trace to prove that he was moved by the hope of a reward after death, or that the idea of existence after death was ever consciously presented to his mind. He may be, on the whole, claimed by modern science (the miraculous element being by it excluded) as an example of those who perform the greatest practical duties, and are content to stand before the mystery of the Unknowable without inquiry and without alarm, so far as the doctrine of man's immortality is concerned. Here is another of those strange links that unite the earliest thinker and legislator with so much of the spirit of modern thought and law. Buddha, on the contrary (or his disciples, if it be true that his original teaching is lost to us), cannot be quoted as one who did not realise the possibility of life after death, nor is any scheme of philosophy that is practically Pantheistic inconsistent with immortality, if we limit the word to the bare idea of existing somehow after death. But I rather quote him as one of those who show that the very consciousness of undying personal life, the existence of a self-reflecting ego, which gives all its shape and force to the desire for life after death, may come to be regarded as a positive evil, and painless extinction be maintained as the ultimate hope and destiny of man. And the case of Julius Cæsar is, in some respects, stronger still. He is one of the world's crowning intellects, and he lived at a time when men such as he were the heirs of all the ages, the possessors of the treasures of thought in which, for generations past, the greatest men had elaborated doctrines concerning religion, duty, and life. And he represents the views of those whom the truest voice of science now repudiates as running into unscientific extremes. With him non-existence after death was a matter of practical belief. It coloured his opinions upon politics, as really as Cromwell's religion affected his. He spoke against the infliction of the penalty of death upon the conspirators in Catiline's case, because death was a refuge from sorrows, because it solved all mortal miseries and left place for neither care nor joy. And Cato expressly applauded his sentiments, though with a touch of reaction from popular theology, which sounds strangely modern. To this then all the original intuitions of the human mind, all the glowing aspirations enshrined in Greek poetry, legend, and art, all the natural theology contained in the works of Socrates and Plato, had come at last. Will any reasonable man affirm that an age, which breathes the very air of materialism, and whose children suck in the notions of changeless law with their

mother's milk, will arrive at anything better if it has no facts upon which to rely as proofs that its hopes are not unfounded? And how can that be called a truth of human nature, or be allowed to exercise a real influence upon men's minds, which is capable of being either entirely suppressed, or earnestly striven against, or contemptuously rejected?

(3.) The remaining two arguments need not detain us long; indeed, I should not have mentioned them were it not that very eminent divines have based the belief in immortality upon the existence of God or the necessities of man. Let it once be granted that we are the creatures of a personal, loving, and sustaining God, concerning whom it is possible to form adequate conceptions, and then doubts as to our immortality would be vain indeed. But the rejoinder from the scientific view is plain enough. This, it would be said, is a mere *obscurum per obscurius*. The belief in God is simply the working of the human mind striving to account for the beginning of its own existence, exactly as the belief in immortality is the result of the attempt to think about the end thereof. If the definition of God be a stream or tendency of things that we cannot otherwise account for, then it will not help us to a belief in immortality. It is surprising indeed to see how the plain conditions of the case are evaded by enthusiastic controversialists; and I am almost ashamed of being obliged to make statements that have an inevitable air of being the baldest truisms.

(4.) The idea that immortality is essential to the moral development of man, and that therefore it is demonstrably true, seems to receive some little countenance from Professor Max Müller in the close of his article on Buddhism, in which he thinks it improbable that—

“The reformer of India, the teacher of so perfect a code of morality, . . . should have thrown away one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of every religious teacher, the belief in a future life, and should not have seen that, if the life was sooner or later to end in nothing, it was hardly worth the trouble which he took himself, or the sacrifices which he imposed upon his disciples.”

The true bearing, in all its immense importance, of man's morality upon his belief in immortality will have to be considered hereafter; but when used as a demonstration, it is at once seen to belong to the class of arguments from final causes which science resolutely rejects. A much more fatal answer, however, is found in a simple appeal to history, from which it will be found that, in Mr. Froude's words, no doctrine whatever, even of immortality, has a mere “mechanical effect” upon men's hearts and consciences, and that noble lives may be lived and exalted characters formed by those who are brave enough to disregard it. Nay, what is worse, immortality

may be a powerful weapon for evil as for good, if it chime in with a perverted nature. The Pharaoh before whom Moses stood believed it, and we know with what results. Only that, once more will science retort, which can be proved to be true upon sufficient evidence, can be positively known to be useful.

To sum up, then, what has been said, we have seen that, however strong may be the wishes of man for immortality, however ennobling to his nature and true to his instincts the belief in it may be, there is nothing in natural religion to answer the demands of modern thought for actual proof, and nothing therefore to impugn the wisdom or refute the morality of that class of persons, representing, as they do, a growing tendency in the human mind, who take refuge in a suspense of thought and judgment upon matters which they declare are too high for them. Occasionally we may suspect that the garb of human weakness does but conceal the workings of human pride, never perhaps so subtle and so sweet as when human nature meekly resolves to be contented with its own imperfections, and to bow down before its own frailty; but denunciations of moral turpitude only harden the hearts of men who ask for the bread of evidence and receive stones in the shape of insults.

We turn next to consider the effects of modern thought upon the evidence for immortality derived from Revelation. And here the difficulty of obtaining assent to what seem to me obvious truths will be transferred from the advocates of religion to those of science. Nevertheless, I maintain an invincible conviction that it is possible to state the terms of debate in propositions which commend themselves to candid minds, and which do not, as I have said, pretend to solve the controversy, but merely to define its conditions.

Now the first proposition is: That the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, if assumed to be true, does present actual scientific evidence for immortality. An illustration will make my meaning clear. Whether or not life can be evolved from non-living matter is a subject of debate; but it is admitted on all hands, that if a single living creature can be produced under conditions that exclude the presence of living germs, then the controversy is settled, and therefore Dr. Bastian sets himself to work with the necessary apparatus to prove his case. So, in the same way, if any man known to be dead and buried did rise again (as for the moment is assumed to be the case), and did think and act and speak in His own proper personality, then immortality (in the scientific sense of the word) is thereby proved. Accordingly, those who wish to prove their case, betake themselves to history for the required evidence, which they may or may not find, but which, such as it is, must be allowed to go to the jury. Science may refuse to listen to arguments for facts derived

from men's hopes and beliefs ; it ceases to be science if it refuses to listen to arguments which profess to rely upon facts also. Were there to happen now an event purporting to resemble the Resurrection, it would be necessary to examine the evidence exactly as men are commissioned to investigate any unusual occurrence, say, for instance, the supposed discovery of fertile land at the North Pole. All this is plain enough, and leads to no very important conclusions, but it is, nevertheless, necessary that it should be stated clearly and distinctly apprehended.

Two other propositions may also be laid down as to the nature of the evidence for the Resurrection, both of them once more sufficiently obvious, but still not without their value in leading to a fair and reasonable estimation of the exact state of the case, and tending also, as we shall see presently, in one direction. It may be taken for granted, in the first place, that nothing can be alleged against the moral character of the witnesses, or against the morality which accompanied and was founded upon the preaching of the Resurrection. Mistaken they may have been, but not dishonest; enthusiasts, but not impostors. Furthermore, the deeper insight into character, which is one of the results of the modern critical spirit, enables us to see that they numbered among their ranks men of singular gifts, both moral and intellectual, who combined in a wonderful degree the faculty of receiving what was, or what they thought to be, a miraculous revelation, and the power of setting it forth in a sober and measured manner. All this is candidly admitted by the best representatives of modern thought.

Again, it may safely be asserted that, judged by the critical standards of historical science, the evidence is abundantly sufficient to prove any event not claiming to be miraculous. Let us suppose such an event as an extraordinary escape from prison related in the same way, though I admit that it requires a considerable intellectual *tour de force* to eliminate, even in imagination, the supernatural from the narrative. It is not going too far to say that no real question as to its truth would in that case ever be raised at the bar of history, even though a powerful party were interested in maintaining the contrary. A strictly scientific investigation, for instance, has brought out in our own days the absolute accuracy and consequent evidential value of the account of St. Paul's voyage to Malta. On the whole, then, we may conclude that the testimony is really evidence in the case, that it proceeds from honest and capable men, and that no one, *apart from the existence of the supernatural element*, would care to deny its truthfulness, except upon grounds that would turn all history into a mass of fables and confusion.

There remains, then, the old argument, that it is more easy to

believe the witnesses to be mistaken than the fact itself to be true, and that we cannot believe a miracle unless it be more miraculous to disbelieve it. To this argument I avow my deliberate conviction, after the best thought I can give the subject, that no answer can be given regarded from a merely intellectual point of view, and subject to the conditions which modern thought not only prescribes, but is strong enough to enforce. It goes by the name of Hume, because he was the first to formulate it, but it is not so much an argument as a simple statement of common experience. All men who, from the days of St. Thomas, have disbelieved in miracles have done so practically upon this ground. And to the "doubting" Apostle may be safely attributed the first use of the now famous formula, "It is much more likely that you, my friends, should be mistaken than that He should have risen." Now, to such a state of mind, what answer short of another miracle could be given then, or can be given now? True, you may point out the moral defects in the mind of Thomas which led him to disbelieve, but these are immediately counterbalanced by a reference to the intellectual defects of Mary Magdalene, which prompted her to accept the miracle. There is no real room for weighing the evidence on both sides, and pronouncing for that which has the greatest probability, when your opponent, by a simple assertion, reduces all the evidence on one side to zero. Once more let me ask Christian apologists to realise this, and having realised it, no matter at what cost to the fears and prejudices of theology, let us then proceed the more calmly to examine what it precisely means and to what conclusions it leads us.

We observe, first, that this argument is derived not from the first of the two ways in which, as we saw, science influences belief, namely, by altering the nature of the evidence required, but from the second, namely, by predisposing the minds of men against belief upon any attainable evidence whatever. We have seen that the evidence is that of honest men, that it is scientifically to the point, and sufficient to prove ordinary historical events. More than this cannot be demanded in the case of events which do not come under law or personal observation. But the minds of men are so predisposed by their experience of unchanging order to reject the miraculous, that, first they demand more and more clear evidence than in other cases, and secondly, they have recourse at once to the many considerations which weaken the force of evidence for things supernatural, and account for men's mistakes without impugning their veracity. Anyone who reads Hume's essay will be struck at once with the, so to speak, subjectivity of the argument. Upon this very point he says, "When anyone tells me he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately *consider within myself*," &c., &c. We ask then, at once, "To

whom is it more likely that evidence of a miracle should be false than that the miracle should be true?" and the answer must of course be, "Those who, rightly or wrongly, are predisposed in that direction, by their experience of a changeless law, growing ever wider and more comprehensive." Nor is Paley's answer, which assumes the existence of God, at all available as against Hume, who, in his next section, puts into the mouth of an imaginary Epicurus all the arguments against such a belief. But it is a most just and reasonable remark that this predisposition does not exist in the case of those who—again rightly or wrongly—are wishing to know God and hoping to live after death. It is at this point that natural and revealed religion, weak when divided, becomes strong by combination. The Resurrection would certainly never be believed if it did not fall like a spark upon a mass of wishes and aspirations which are immediately kindled into life. Granted a man (and this is no supposition, but a fact), whose whole nature craves not to die, and whose mind is occupied by the standing miracle of its own immortality, and then the Resurrection, so far from being improbable, will be the very thing which gives life to his hopes. The more he sees that natural religion cannot give him facts as proofs, the more he will welcome Revelation which does, just because it will satisfy the rational desire which science is creating in the human mind. And just as there is no answer to Hume's argument for one predisposed as Hume was, so is there none to one predisposed as this supposed (but very actual) man is. The one is as incapable of disbelief as the other of assent. Hume and Paley do not really grapple with each other, but move in parallel lines that never meet. As Hume himself said of Berkeley, "His arguments admit of no answer and produce no conviction," so might each of the two say of the other. On the one hand we have all the results of human experience, a severe standard of intellectual virtue, a morality which confines itself to its duties towards humanity, and the power of being able not to think about ultimate incomprehensibilities. On the other hand, we have intense longings after the infinite, which science, admitting, as it does, the existence of the Unknowable, cannot possibly deny to be legitimate in those who feel them sincerely; also a body of evidence, sufficient to prove ordinary events, for a fact that gives certainty and power to all these longings; a morality, which has reference to a Supreme Judge, and an absolute incapacity for life and duty until some sort of conclusion has been arrived at concerning the mysteries of our being and destiny. Both of these represent tendencies of human nature with which the world could at this stage very badly dispense; both may have their use and their justification; either may be true, but *both* cannot, for the Resurrection either did or did not happen.

From this account of things some very important considerations follow, a few of which I will endeavour to sum up in three heads. The scientific value of Revelation-as a necessity, if there is to be any vital and practical religion at all, will, I hope, have been sufficiently indicated already.

(1.) The lines of a long and, perhaps, never-ending conflict between the spirit of Religion and what, for want of a better word, I will call the spirit of Rationalism, are here defined. Neither of the two being able by mere argument to convince the other, they must rely upon gradually leavening the minds of men with prepossessions in the direction which each respectively favours. The time may come when Rationalism will have so far prevailed that a belief in the miraculous will have disappeared; the time may also come when the Christian Revelation, historically accepted, will everywhere be adopted as God's account to man of ultimate incomprehensibilities. Surely, no man who has ever fairly examined his own consciousness can deny that elements leading to either of these two conclusions exist within his own mind. He must be a very hardened believer to whom the doubt, "Is the miraculous really possible?" never suggested itself. And he must in turn be a very unscientific Rationalist who has never caught himself wondering whether, after all, the Resurrection did not take place. Nor, so far as we may at this epoch discern the probable direction of the contest, is it possible to estimate very accurately the influence which science will exercise upon it. On the one hand, it will certainly bring within the mental grasp of common men that view of law and causation which, in Hume's time, was confined to philosophers and their followers, and was attained rather by intellectual conceptions than by such common experiences of every-day life and thought as we have at present. On the other hand, it will purge religion of its more monstrous dogmas, and further, by calling attention to the necessity of proving fact by fact, and again, by clearing up the laws of evidence, will tend to deepen in the minds of religious people the value and meaning of Revelation; while, at the same time, by its frank admission of hopeless ignorance, it will concede to faith a place in the realm of fact. Every man will have his own views as to the issue of the conflict: for the present it is sufficient for him, if he can be fully satisfied in his own mind.

(2.) The predisposition in men's minds in favour, whether of Religion or Rationalism, will be created and sustained solely by moral means. This is the conclusion toward which I have been steadily working from the beginning of this paper to the end of it. The intellect of both Christian and Rationalist will have its part to play; but that part will consist in presenting, teaching, and enforcing each its own morality upon the minds of men. I need not say

that I use the word morality as expressing in the widest sense all that is proper for and worthy of humanity, and not merely in the narrower sense of individual goodness. Rationalism will approach mankind rather upon the side of the virtues of the intellect. It will uphold the need of caution in our assent, the duty of absolute conviction, the self-sufficiency of men, the beauty of law, the glory of working for posterity, and the true humility of being content to be ignorant where knowledge is impossible. Religion will appeal to man's hopes and wishes recorded in nature and in history, to his yearnings for affection, to his sense of sin, to his passion for life and duty, which death cuts short. And that one of the two which is truest to humanity, which lays down the best code of duty, and creates the strongest capacity for accomplishing it, will, in the long run, prevail; a conclusion which science, so far as it believes in man, and religion, so far as it believes in God, must adopt. Here, once more, it is well-nigh impossible to discern the immediate direction of the conflict, whatever may be our views as to its ultimate decision. Science is almost creating a new class of virtues; it is laying its finger with unerring accuracy upon the faults of the old morality; it is calling into existence a passion for intellectual truth. But then religion has always given the strongest proofs of her vitality by her power of assimilating (however slowly) new truths, and of rejecting (alas! how tardily) old falsehoods, at the demands of reason and discovery. A religious man can always say that Christians, and not Christianity, are responsible for what goes amiss. It is because religious practice never has been, and is at this moment almost less than ever, up to the standard of what religious theory exacts, that we may have confidence in gradual improvement and advance, until that standard, towards the formation of which science will have largely contributed, be attained.

(3.) Closely connected with the above, follows the proposition that all attempts on the part of religion to confute the "sceptic" by purely intellectual methods are worse than useless. There is no intellectual short cut to the Christian faith; it must be built up in the minds of men by setting forth a morality that satisfies their nature, consecrates humanity, and establishes society. It is not because men love the truth, but because they hate their enemies, that in things religious they desire to have what they can call an overwhelming preponderance of argument on their side of the question, the possession of which enables them to treat their opponents as knaves or fools or both. Religion may have been the first to set this pernicious example, but, judging from the tone of much modern writing, Rationalism has somewhat bettered her instructions. No doubt it is a tempting thing to mount a big pulpit, and then and there, with much intellectual pomp, to slay the absent infidel—absent no less

from the preacher's argument than from his audience. Delightful it may be, but all the more dangerous, because it plunges men at once into that error, so hateful to modern thought, of affirming that intellectual mistakes are moral delinquencies. No one, least of all science, denies that men are responsible for the consequences of their belief, provided these consequences are limited to such as are capable of being recognised and foreseen, and are not extended to comprehend endless perdition in a future state—an idea which is supposed, rightly or wrongly, to lurk beneath the preacher's logical utterances, and which religion has done next to nothing to disavow. And so we come to this conclusion: to build up by precept and example a sound and sufficient morality; to share in all the hopes and aspirations of humanity; to be foremost in practical reforms; to find what the instincts of mankind blindly search for by reference to the character of God finally revealed in Christ, and to the hope of immortality which his Resurrection brought to light; to endeavour to clear religion from the reproach of credulity, narrowness, timidity, and bitter sectarian zeal;—these are, as our Master Himself assured us, the only means of engendering in the hearts of men that moral quality which we call Faith: for "HE THAT IS OF THE TRUTH HEARETH MY VOICE."

In a future paper I hope to show, by reference to the facts of man's nature, how this faith in immortality is being, and is to be, so far wrought into his mind as to form a predisposition towards a belief in the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of Christ as a proof of that which he cannot help but desire to believe.

T. W. FOWLE.



HENRY WARD BEECHER.

PART II.

Theology and Life.

MR. WARD BEECHER'S Theology is able, but not from a theologian's point of view. It is what the Evangelical would call "unsafe," and what a Ritualist would call "loose," and if safety depends on "system," and salvation on "tightness," there is little hope for Mr. Beecher and his followers in this world or in the world to come.

When we call his theology "able," we mean that it is admirably fitted to produce the kind of effect which Mr. Beecher has set his heart on producing. It will not make casuists, but it will make men.

It will not always give a man arguments, but it is sure to inspire him with principles. It will not settle every difficulty, but it will give life such a moral resilience as shall enable those who are in earnest to rise to the occasion and master circumstances. He who looks for a compact and logical scheme of theology—plan of salvation, or any other plan—will be disappointed; but he who goes to Mr. Beecher to learn his duty and get motives for doing it, will not be disappointed.

It is, then, with feelings of unmixed satisfaction that we now proceed to leave the theological arena, fascinating as are many of its spectacles, and go forth into the more or less common and despised world of what we may call

"SECULAR TRUTH."

Under this wide and somewhat confused term, we might proceed to fill many whole numbers of the *Contemporary Review*, taking as our texts certain passages from the six volumes of Sermons before us. There is hardly a little by-way or alley in the great "City of Life" into which Mr. Beecher does not enter at some time or other. There is something of the genial Socrates spirit about him. He will be everywhere a man amongst men. We can imagine him in the midst of just such scenes as the wandering philosopher of old loved to frequent. Here is a crowd gathering; but who is this fine, muscular fellow, courteously but firmly pushing his way into the centre of it, to find out what is the matter? Some one has fallen down in the street—that is all. Drunk or in a fit? That interests Mr. Beecher—it is his business; at all events to the nearest "store" the man must be taken—must be taken in—must be taken care of.

A wandering circus! Can that have anything to do with an earnest preacher? Yes; there is a man there "built like a second Apollo, magnificent in every physical excellence, and as handsome as a god." That is important—that makes a cord vibrate in his heart—he pauses to tell a story about him which brings out a trait of moral excellence as well, and completes the man.

With the firm touch of a master moralist, he is not afraid to cull his illustrations from a strolling player, a circus, and a very doubtful romance of real life:—

"A young lady of one of the very first families there, attracted by his beauty and grace, became enamoured of this athlete. He, of course, complimented, reciprocated this wild attachment; and in the enthusiasm and ardour of her unregulated and foolish affection she proposed an elopement to him. Ordinarily a man would have been more than proud, because she was heir to countless wealth apparently, and certainly stood second to none there, but with an unexpected manliness which surprised everybody, he said to her, 'No; I cannot afford to have you despise me. I am older than you, and although I am highly complimented and pleased, by-and-by you would reproach me, and say that I ought to have taught you better, and ought to have done otherwise. I will carry you back to your friends. I will not permit you to sacrifice yourself on me.' And he refused to take advantage of the opportunity which she offered him.

"Ten thousand men admired this man's athletic skill in the circus; but when that story was known, every one of them thought infinitely more of him than they did before. Here were two traits," &c. (Series iii. 252.)

It is a busy time in the afternoon—the stores in the principal streets of New York are crowded. We can imagine Mr. Beecher coming in; and wanting to know the price of grain, he takes up a handful—sifts it with the air of a connoisseur—tells the owner

something about it which rather surprises him ; the man sees he is found out—will he be exposed ? No ; Mr. Beecher does not want to kill him—he wants to cure him ; but if there is inferior grain at the bottom, or bad mixed with good sold for all good, it is his affair ; if there are false weights it is his business—and he is “acute,”—he is “smart,”—he will let a man know that he knows about him, and has found him out, and he will scourge him ; he will be what some ministers call very “faithful” to him.

We should like to know the man who would sell Mr. Beecher a rickety horse, or any other kind of “shoddy.” He would hear of it—not by name, perhaps—but, depend upon it in some way or other, he would be turned inside out from the pulpit in Brooklyn Church before the whole of the United States of America, and the “stars” would hear of it, and the “stripes” would lie very flat upon his back for some time afterwards.

If Mr. Ward Beecher would only confine himself to “sound doctrine,” as the elder advised the young preacher to do, what a comfort it would be to his neighbours ; for, as the said elder observed, he never could do any harm by sticking to the “doctrine.”

But no—Mr. Beecher breaks out—he is irrepressible ; the market is his, so is the counting-house, and the family dinner, and the family quarrel, and the farmer’s barn and yard and potato field, and the senate, and the nursery, and the circus, and the reading-room, and the kitchen, and—no wonder his hearers are out of breath long before he is—no wonder they listen and are anxious to know what is coming next—“the dignity of the Pulpit.” Bah ! “Who stole sticks ?” “Who sold a bad cow ?” “Who swindled the miller ?” “Who drugged the beer, and sanded the sugar, and watered the milk ?” When these little matters are set to rights, it will be time to see after “the dignity of the Pulpit.” His description of what he calls his own business is extremely pungent, and quite explains the sort of moral terrorism which he has found out how to exercise in New York :—

“If I know my own business—and the presumption is I do—it is to hunt men and to study them. . . . Do you suppose I study old musty books when I want to preach ? I study *you* ! When I want to deliver a discourse on theology, I study *you* ! When I want to know more about the doctrine of depravity, I study *you* ! When I want to know what is right and what is wrong, I see how *you* do ; and I have abundant illustrations on every side !” (i. 314.)

“I know that there are operations in railway management that outrage every law of prudence. I know that where mighty capital is combined and capitalists are joined together, a fraternity of villains, they shall be able to swamp legislatures, and sweep whole communities to destruction. And when this accumulation of peril begins to globe up and fill the very horizon, I know it is my business to sound the alarm and say to men, ‘There is no

prosperity to society so long as such gigantic swindles and frauds as these are going on.' And when I do say it, they say to me, 'Are you a railroad man?' 'No; but I am after railroad men.' 'Do you understand this business?' 'No; but I understand the men that are in this business.' 'Is it a part of your parochial affairs to meddle with such matters?' 'Yes; it is a part of my parochial affairs. I am a citizen of the United States; and my parish is the United States; and you are my parishioners; and I see that you are criminals pursuing culpable courses which violate honesty, and purity, and conscience, and that you are not honourable men, and do not pass for such before God, though you may before men; and it is just my business to tell you these things.' And when it is said, 'No one can give advice in regard to the affairs of any given department unless he belongs to those affairs,' I say that a cock does not need to be in bed with you to know that morning has come, and crow! It is because he is out of doors, and sits aloft, and sees where the sun is coming up, that he becomes the clarion of the morning, and gives you the signal for waking up" (i. 315).

If we hope to be read at all, it is obvious that in dealing with a man who concerns himself thus with the United States and all that in them is, we must absolutely make our selection from the mazes of SECULAR TRUTH. We shall perhaps have time just to deal with a few heads which may be ranged as follows:—

- I. Women.
- II. Marriage.
- III. Children.
- IV. Money.
- V. Politics.
- VI. Foreign countries.

I.—Women.

Mr. Beecher sees in the high and pure conception of family life, the regeneration of the individual and of society. In this he closely resembles Professor Maurice, though, perhaps, no two men meaning the same thing, ever expressed themselves in such utterly different language. Each has that kind of hold over the subject, and that intense sympathy with it, which can only be really felt by good, unspoiled men.

Mr. Beecher is conspicuously an unspoiled man. To a worldly eye he is absurdly full of enjoyment—there is no "dull decay" of feeling about him—no thirst for artificial excitement—no unsubdued hankering after forbidden fruit—apparently no ill-regulated desires or unrestrained appetencies. This being the case, he naturally extols with full sympathy the simple and natural relations of family life. The worse a man gets the less he cares for family life in any form. The unhappy individual who cannot live without pickles, Cayenne pepper, and absinthe, shrinks naturally enough from merely wholesome food; and yet, with every culinary device and subtle artifice, he cannot ex-

tort from his jaded palate a tithe of the satisfaction which the healthy man derives daily from his homely meal of roast beef and potatoes.

This is just what Mr. Beecher is fitted to feel and to express so strongly. The country air! There's nothing like it—plenty of it—more of it. Whisky, brandy, beer, wine! Nonsense; man doesn't want these—is better without them. Fresh, sparkling spring water! Plenty of it; more of it. Young men will be young men; they must have their day—a little loose society at times—a little rollicking fun—a little fashion and pleasure, and so forth! All a delusion—a mistake; a fatal mistake. He who indulges in such things does so because he does not know—has never been man enough to learn what a decent life means—what conservation of force there is in it—what elasticity, health, buoyancy—nay downright animal pleasure—incomparably keener, better in quality, more in quantity than the professed voluptuary has a chance of getting. One smile from a pure woman is better than a thousand illicit charms.

It is only when language of this description comes from a man who really believes it himself, that it has a tendency to bring conviction to the eager and inflammable young minds to which it is principally addressed. Mr. Beecher touches his difficult subjects with a purity, a delicacy, and, at the same time, a realistic firmness not to be surpassed. On the very confines of romance, his fine tact and true feeling save him from sentimentality.

“The maiden with hospitable intent lights to the door the now frequent visitor, and a gentle courage sustains her in such farewells as a moment before she would have shrunk from. The unsteady lamp goes out, and yet never was twilight so bright, nor were inarticulate sounds ever so full of meaning” (ii. 271).

The Woman is the Queen of the household. How great is her office—how noble are her endowments—how incalculable for good or evil are the influences she brings to bear upon the husband all along—upon the child, until he or she passes out into the battle of life—prepared or unprepared; upon the domestics who are subject for a time to a hundred depressing or elevating influences whilst under her direction; to all who frequent the house, and perceive what a household under good or bad direction may be or ought not to be.

In view of the importance justly attributed to women, we are not surprised to find Mr. Beecher a strong partisan of what we suppose we must call “Woman's Rights.”

There is undoubtedly a vast amount of ignorance and prejudice on this subject in England—we might say in Europe. Women are to be taught to make pies and puddings—they are to look after children—they are to wear enormous chignons—they are to go to church—they

are to tinkle on the piano and warble ditties fit only for a lunatic asylum ; but write ! study science ! get a livelihood with their brains, and instantly a sort of blatant cry is raised of " Blue Stocking ! " and once raised is cheerfully taken up by a number of idiots, to whom the demon of Ignorance has communicated a kind of stolid hydrophobia, and who go about the world foaming and snapping at every gifted or industrious woman they meet, until they sink at last exhausted in the mud, and are kicked back into their original obscurity.

Nevertheless, these useless " flaneurs " of society succeed in doing a good deal of harm, just as a wretched hound will sometimes bite a good many people before it gets its *coup de grâce*. The fact is, by the incessant repetition of a phrase or an epithet, a kind of flabby, indolent public opinion is actually formed ; and once formed is like venom, propagated venom, difficult to reach or destroy. We shall let Mr. Beecher speak for himself, calmly and decidedly, and (what is more significant) with the air of a man who is addressing an audience ready for much more advanced doctrine on this subject than he would be likely to find at present in England. The fact is, that with all its extravagances, its experiments, and its " high-falutin " failures, America is steadily pointing to the future in social matters. If we want to know what Europe will be socially in fifty years, we must look at what America is becoming. Many will say, God forbid ! And yet the demoralisation, nay, the social disorganisation at present rife in transatlantic society—especially the wild views prevalent about the freedom of woman and the relations of the sexes—may be, nay, we believe, are, pointing vaguely but persistently in the direction of certain reforms and readjustments of moral and social law, which are needed, which must be carried, and which, when they have been carried, will prove to be the foundation of a new and a better order of things. The transition period no doubt appears chaotic, and society goes blundering on in an alarming manner ; but in the process real progress is achieved. Order, from disorder, is the law of life. Better living disorder than dead order. At this time those who, looking at America, see farthest, see in its social and political convulsions not only order coming for itself, but order coming for the civilised world—and those who hold these opinions, and who express them, are called visionaries !

But, perhaps, after all, the visionaries are those who can quietly contemplate the revolutions of the past, and still believe that society needs no changes, and that no changes will come, or that beneficial changes will come without pain and loss, exaggeration or caricature. It is pitiful for the common sense of mankind to mark how the chief visionaries, the crowned madmen of every age, have turned out to be right, and the practical people wrong. But let us not thrust honours

upon Mr. Beecher which he might be inclined to deprecate. He is not exactly a seer. He is not prophetic, like Emerson. He reflects too immediately, too intensely to be prophetic; but what he reflects we cannot afford to despise. We are indeed beginning to entertain the opinions he boldly assumes to be commonly accepted and acceptable, and much of the following weighty and valuable matter will, doubtless, find an echo in many English hearts and homes. Whatever does not, let us ponder over; as poor Artemus Ward used to say about some of his very worst puns, "they will require some thought but will amply repay attention."

"The increasing intelligence in women is destined to have an important influence upon the American family. It is in vain that men cry out against the emancipation of woman from the narrow bounds of the past. It is destiny; it is God that is calling, and woman must obey. The world has unrolled and unfolded until the time has come. It is a natural law, and not the turbulence of discontented fanatics that calls for a larger development and culture. The world's history has travelled in one direction. Woman began at zero, and has through ages slowly unfolded and risen. Each age has protested against growth as *unsexing* women. There has been nothing that men have been so afraid of as unsexing. Ah! God's work was too well done originally for that. In spite of centuries of unsexing, women retain their sex, and they will. Every single footfall forward on that long journey which they have already pursued has been a footfall that was supposed to be a deviation from the proprieties of their sex. If you should take to Turkey or Greece that which every man in his senses allows to be proper in woman, it would be considered monstrous. And still, in earlier ages through a hundred degrees of development, woman has been met with the same cry—that they are stepping beyond their sphere. It is the cry to-day, as woman, taxed, punished, restrained in all higher industries, asks that vote which carries with it control of circumstances. It is unsexing woman! A citizen in our day without a vote is like a smith without a hammer. The forge is hot, the anvil waits, the iron is ready, but the smith has nothing to smite with. The vote is the workman's hammer to-day" (i. 429).

"A woman's nature will never be changed. Men might spin, and churn, and knit, and sew, and cook, and rock the cradle for one hundred generations, and not be women. And woman will not become man by external occupations. God's colours do not wash out. Sex is dyed in the wool" (i. 430).

We may be excused on so important a subject—emphatically an American subject—if we linger over the utterances of a highly typical American. It is worth while to take at first-hand the real views of the best Americans about women: we have heard plenty of extravagant nonsense on this subject from our Transatlantic brethren, let us be patient and hear a little more sense from one who seldom utters anything but sense.

"In the new years that are coming a nobler womanhood will give to us nobler households. Men seem to think that the purity of our households

depends upon their meagreness and upon their poverty ; but I hold that that household is to be the strongest not only, but the purest, the richest, the sweetest, and the most full of delicacies as well, which has in it the most of power and of treasure. Augment the thinking power of womanhood. You detract in no wise from her motive power. Is the heart cheated by the husband's head? Nay, it is rendered stronger. The frailty of the fair sex will cease to be the theme of deriding poets, one day, when women learn that strength is feminine, and that weakness is the accident of sex, and not the beauty nor glory. That will be a wholesome and happy period when men and women alike will be left free to follow the call of God in their own genius. The time will come when there will be liberty for all who are ordained artists to become artists without rebuke, when scholars may become scholars, and when orators may be orators, whether they be men or women."

II.—Marriage.

Mr. Beecher has raised his voice against the extravagance of modern times, not as it ministers to real refinement or even to luxury, but as it erects a barrier to early marriages. The lesson is needed in England. Parents will have wealth for their children, and so of course, children expect to start in life from where their parents leave off, instead of from where they began. Young men and women nowadays, cannot marry without a fine house, without servants, and horses and carriages ; young wives must be dressed like princesses ; but as this cannot be, men dress others who are not their wives like princesses, and drop the fine house and servants, until such time as they can afford a virtuous woman with the necessary additions.

Marriage is of course a risk, so is life, so is every thing, but young men, industrious, honourable, with unspoiled hearts and a fair prospect (who by the way speculate in most other things) ought to be able to speculate a little more in marriage. With health, and all life before them, they ought to be strong, they ought to feel courage and confidence in taking a virtuous girl to her new home, even if it should not turn out to be a gilded palace. How many middle-class parents who began life on £300 and now have £3,000 per annum, refuse to allow their children with equal chances, perhaps better education, and better abilities, and better opportunities than ever they enjoyed, to marry under £800 or £1,000 per annum. The rotten extravagance of our social entertainments is to blame for this—the hollow and the heartless show and expenditure that people on visiting terms, even in the middle-classes, exact from each other is to blame. With half the money commonly spent on dinners, and house decoration, and furniture, and servants, in well-to-do houses, there might be twice the refinement, and five times the comfort now enjoyed by the unhappy victims of an artificial code of propriety, who are wretched, and pinched, and in debt, because they will affect a style of living just above their means. There must be a change of feeling

throughout society, before our young men and women can be delivered from their present enforced celibacy and spinsterhood. And America is no unfit herald of reform in this direction. In no other country does a man so count for one, and a woman for one, as in America. Worth of any kind tells over there sooner and more powerfully than in any other country, and it is exactly in this appreciation of personal worth, that the remedy for conventional worth must be found. If the man is worth knowing, do not ask whether his acres are broad; if a man is worth marrying, trust something to the future—he need not be a millionaire to make a woman happy; and as for refinement and luxury, if the mind is refined, the home will be so—let luxury, or what is good of it, come by-and-by; if the mind is vulgar, all the gold of California will only serve to call attention to the fact.

Modern society does not love manhood but moneyhood; and as long as this is so, men will grow up caring more to be moneyed than to be manly, more to have than to do, more to seem than to be. And this temper reacts fatally upon marriage; it postpones it until life has lost its sweetness without losing its power, and has become bitter; it parodies it by a number of short-lived intrigues, which cast the blossoms of the soul to the four winds of hell; and it profanes it by reducing the marrying man to a heartless dummy of forty, who steps forward with a handful of gold, to invest in a hollow heart! Pathetically and truly does Mr. Beecher observe:—

“Young men just beginning life need what they cannot have. At no after period, perhaps, in their life do young men need the inspiration of virtuous love and the sympathy of a companion in their self-denying toil, or when they first enter the battle for their own support” (i. 431).

“Early marriages are permanent moralities, and deferred marriages are temptations to wickedness. And yet every year it becomes more and more difficult, concurrent with the reigning ideas of society, for young men to enter upon that matrimonial state which is the proper guard of their virtue, as well as the source of their courage and enterprise. The battle of life is almost always at the beginning. Then it is that a man needs wedlock.” “Society is bad where two cannot live cheaper than one! And young men are under bad influences who, when in the very morning of life, and better fitted than at any later period to grow together with one who is their equal and mate, are debarred from marrying through scores of years from mere prudential considerations, and the heart and the life are sacrificed to the pocket. They are tempted to substitute ambition for love when, at last, over the ashes and expiring embers of their early romance, they select their wife. It is said that men who wait till they are forty or forty-five years of age select prudently. Alas for the wife who was not first a sweetheart!”

III.—Children.

As one might suppose, Mr. Beecher is powerful on the subject of children and family training. Himself one of a large family, and

the father of another large family, he ought to know something about it, and he does. His sympathy with children is full of delicate insight : he understands them perfectly, he rules them wisely, he loves them dearly. His allusions to the loss of his own little ones are full of feeling :—

“I have been called,” he says, “to give up dear ones not once, nor twice, nor thrice alone, but many times I have sent my children on before me. Once wading knee-deep in the snow, I buried my earliest. It was March, and dreary, and shivering and awful ; and then the doctrine that Christ sat in an eternal summer of love, and that my child was not buried, but had gone up to One that loved it better than I, was the only comfort I had.” (Heaton, vol. ii. 209.)

Every now and then his glimpses of child-life are so vivid that he seems like one who sits opposite the child and takes an instantaneous pistol-gram—quick and vivid as a flash of light, the child’s mobile face and very look are caught and fixed.

“When the child, a little animal greedily seeking to eat, drink, and warm itself, comes under the care of the parent, and is taught that it must not feed itself at the expense of its little brother, it is learning love. The parent says, ‘You must be generous, my child. Why ! will you not let poor little brother have anything ?’ And his great big stomach says, ‘No ; I want it all myself.’”

But there is one long and exhaustive sermon on children and family training, which we had intended to give a lengthened analysis of, only we are afraid at this stage to multiply extracts. We must here content ourselves with a few pregnant hints to parents and guardians.

First, the greatest stress is laid on what we must call the human stock. An enlightened public opinion, an enlightened conscience, ought not to allow mis-alliances ; incurable maladies ought not to be transmitted—men are reckless about nothing so much as this. They are reckless about their health in the procreation of children—they are reckless of times and seasons—they are reckless of person and circumstances ; and yet through their children they damage posterity—they influence the race—they set a-going currents of misery, which will never cease, and which will be traced back to them. Mr. Beecher would allow a very wide and wholesome margin for the play of affection in the selection of wives and husbands. He is doubtless aware that an experiment made in one of the Slave States—not so long ago—to raise a superior breed of slaves entirely failed, because it was found that natural affection played an important part in the production of even a physically fine race, and the slaveowner had never thought of such a thing as natural affection between two slaves. Mr. Beecher would doubtless be the last to overlook all moral and mental

and affectionate influences in connection with marriage, but still he is quite right in saying, that the recklessness of modern marriages is highly foolish, and even criminal.

“If a man wants a flock, he doesn't say, ‘Sheep, sleep!’ he says, ‘Give me Saxon, or Spanish, or Southdown.’ When it is a wife or children he doesn't care; when it is a horse the kind is very important; when it is an immortal soul—anything will do.” (Heaton, i. 331.)

Yet men do not only transmit their physical constitutions, but their mental qualities; not only so, but they have acquired powers and dispositions. What a responsibility! Will they not make themselves ready for marriage? A good moral stock is what is wanted as a basis to rear the fabric of a family upon. A child may be born to truth, conscience, fidelity, openness; on such dispositions the religious life will be grafted. Religion, it is true, is almost always an after-blossom; but suppose you graft the religious life upon an imperfect moral stem, why then you have those anomalies of which society is full. How striking and how true is the following passage; how a parent's heart must condemn itself as it sees the religious life really growing in the child, but struggling, almost vainly, at enormous disadvantage with inherited tendencies to lie, to cheat, to excesses of various kinds:—

“How beautiful is religion in an honest man! We often hear it said, ‘That is a good Christian, but not a very honest man.’ People say it is censorious. It is true, nevertheless. The world sees it better than you are willing to see it, and declares it to be a fact. The man has many aspirations, and longings, and struggles, and repentances; and yet these are all of them rooted in a temperament and in an education that is being swept this way and that by the force of temptation. And men see that he is selfish, though he prays beautifully; that he is proud, though he is devout; that he is vain, though he has a great deal of religious sensibility; and they pronounce him a hypocrite. The trouble is that his religion was planted in bad moral soil. If he had been educated in boyhood to conscience, and honour, and truthfulness, and his religion had been planted in these as a soil, the world would not have seen the inconsistency which he exhibits.” (Heaton, i. 343.)

But preliminaries being granted, the question of how to deal with the children when they arrive, endowed with more or less excellent dispositions, still remains. Children take a deal of understanding. Parents must learn from their children how to bring them up. Mothers are much quicker at this than fathers. The apostle does not say, “Mothers, do not provoke your children,” but, “Fathers, provoke not your children to wrath.” Women have intuition and wisdom. In intellectual matters men are stronger and wiser than women, but in matters of the heart women are unspeakably stronger and wiser than men. Well, then, the mother must learn what is the plan of

the child's character. A child's mind is not, as Mrs. Pipchin held, to be torn open like an oyster. It should rather be allowed to unfold like a flower; and it is better to be over indulgent than over severe with young children. Very often a child has its mother's temperament, and then its father does not understand it; or its father's temperament, and then its mother does not understand it. We are often needlessly anxious about our children: we think them strange, unnatural—we expect from them what they are not ready to give; but our own ignorance is to blame. Then, we are easily frightened: we fancy that every phase of the child's development is going to be permanent; we might as well fancy that the measles were going to be permanent, or the mumps. A child has mumps of obstinacy, mania or rash of irritability, measles of lying. At some periods children will steal. Well, all this seems very dreadful; and, indeed, such tendencies must be watched patiently and checked firmly. But the child is not going to turn out a malefactor for all that. It is simply a little undeveloped creature at six or eight, not much is developed except the animal nature; a few affections perhaps, not much reason—moral elements are more fancies to it than regulating forces; but instruct the child; time will do wonders; by-and-by all the parts will be developed. Then conscience will take care of that lying tendency, and cut it up by the roots. "How many parents now look back to the childhood of their children, simply to think of its development."

"It seems impossible to say of that royal woman, as serene as the evening sky, and as glorious and pure as the stars which are in it, that she gave signs and tokens of the utmost depravity in youth. But she did. It was, however, only a fitful manifestation: it was scarcely to be distinguished from a morbid state of the body, and after the patient waiting of a few years, when all the faculties began to get the mind regulated, this depraved tendency disappeared." (Heaton, vol. i. p. 335.)

Again, too much government spoils a child. Mr. Beecher says that he thinks he was about as well brought up as most children, because his father was so busy, and his mother had so many other children to look after that he was let alone. Some parents cannot let their children be. They are always fussing at them. But government *over* a child is of little use to him. What is wanted is to put government *in* the child. If you put too many influences outside of him, you take from him the chance of learning how to govern himself. Then, if children are to behave themselves, they must have something to do. Let them have their daily work. They will have to go down and be knocked about in a dangerous world, but they will be less liable to temptation if they can work, and have learned to love work.

The faults of a good many children are often excellences in

disguise. They are rude and immature forms of virtue. You must not taste pears in June. They would be sour, because immature. Now, if some children taste sour, it is because they are simply immature. There are many things to be done before a man is ripened, and there are three principal things which Mr. Beecher thinks a child should be well grounded in. He says :—

“I think truthfulness and openness of conduct is the first qualification, and the first foundation of the kingdom of God and the kingdom of man in the human soul. The older I grow the more I believe it. . . . The next element is self-respect, or the habit of acting, not from what others may think, but from a sense of what is befitting to you. . . . The man who is only restrained from wrong-doing by the influences around him will, when he goes away from home, where he is not under the operation of those influences, find his powers of resistance too weak to withstand temptation. The last element is conscience. Truthfulness, honour, and conscience train for these three qualities. Talk with your children about them. Interpret them to them by your own conduct.”

There are many valuable and pleasant sayings about children and child-life scattered throughout the volumes before us ; but this sermon on family training is a brilliant little compendium of all Mr. Beecher's mind upon this important subject, and we especially commend it to perplexed and anxious parents.

IV.—Money.

The great question of the almighty dollar is not one likely to escape Mr. Beecher. There is one very long sermon on the love of money which is a perfect masterpiece. It must have taken considerably more than an hour to preach, and must have been delivered with more than his ordinary energy, as at times the apostrophes are almost incoherent, a thing very unusual with Mr. Beecher, and indicating a very high pressure of excitement. Indeed, just about the last page he seems to have got completely exhausted, and repeats himself a little like a man who means to come to an end, but whose brain goes on surging for a few moments after it has lost real impetus. In all other respects the oration—for it deserves the name—is one of finished eloquence and very highly sustained power. As we pass through its vivid stages, we are reminded of Hogarth's *Rake's Progress*. New York life supplies the terrible etchings, and one after another they are dashed off in fiery haste by the hand of a master. The worst that has been said of American money-making is here justified by an American, and again and again the mournful voice of warning is raised, “They that will be rich fall into temptation, and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition : for the love of money is the root of all evil ; which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith,

and pierced themselves through with many sorrows." By the time we get to the end of the sermon almost every word of this text has begun to glow with prophetic meaning. Riches, we are told at the outset, may be rightly held and rightly used; but here is the evil: men would prefer to have riches and keep honour, but they *will* have riches. "So men that will, at all hazards and at any rate, be rich, give up honour, faith, conscience, love, refinement, friendship, and sacred trust, and having given all these up, God blesses and blasts them—blesses, for they are rich, and that is what they call blessing—blasts, because it is not in the nature of God himself, without an absolute change of the laws by which he works, to make a man happy who has for the sake of gaining wealth divested himself of those elements in which happiness consists. . . . Wall Street is my commentary—Broadway is my commentary!" The slowness of honest gain, and the quickness of dishonest speculation, are dwelt upon at length. "One said to me, who had spent some forty years in honest and ordinary toil in commercial life, and who went into speculations during the war, 'I have been all my life fumbling and blundering, and I have just learned how to make money, and now I can make just as much as I want;' and to-day he is a bankrupt—thank God." Money warps the conscience. Money kills the sense of truth. The moneyed man may lie and cheat, and society will applaud. Only the poor need be virtuous. The poor man who lies in trying to get rich, and fails, is a sorry knave. "If a man gives his word and forfeits it, and goes under, you say it is a righteous judgment on a liar: if a man gives his word and breaks it, and carries off five hundred thousand dollars in the operation, what do men say? They do not say anything!" Mr. Beecher has noticed how soon those that will be rich at any hazards fall into hurtful lusts. Temperate young men take to drink. The excitement of money-getting is too much for them. They cannot bear the relapse. "After every great operation they and their companions go down to the *corner* and have a good time there behind the screen;" and, as we all know, drinking leads to divers other lusts. The love of money kills natural affection. "How often does the old man linger unconsciously long—how do the children wait and wonder that he does not die. 'Father is remarkably tough,' says one. 'The old man will never give out,' says another. Who is this old man? It is their own father, that reared them in their young days, and taught them the way of life. But he holds in his hands too tightly for them the purse-strings, and they are sitting about like so many vultures waiting for their victim to die, that they may pick his bones." What a terrible picture of America is drawn in the following three brief sentences:—"Almost every crime that fills our jails has money at the bottom of it. To-day the whole

Atlantic seaboard is covered with smuggling—money. The whole land is a pandemonium of swindling—money.” Mr. Beecher next bears witness to the number of suicides which take place in the commercial world. He also says that numbers are annually driven crazy by sudden gain or sudden loss, and adds, with a pardonable touch of malice, “It used to be raised up as an objection against revivals of religion that they set men crazy, that religion addled their heads. Ah! ten men go crazy after money where one goes crazy in religious excitement, and yet nothing is said in the papers about that.” There are many men belonging to business circles in New York who “stop out,” and what is the matter? Softening of the brain. “Hardening of the heart is very apt to end in softening of the brain. There are many whose business goads them on—whose troubles harass them to such an extent that some latent tendency induced or inherited is developed in them, and they become insane. And shall nobody mark these things? Is it enough to say of a man, ‘O, he is gone crazy’? Shall nobody say, How? Shall nobody take young men aside in the streets, and say, ‘What is the matter with that man?’”

It is not possible that preaching of this searching kind should altogether fail of its object. Nor can we wonder that the young men flock to Mr. Beecher and listen intently to his strictures on American life and commerce, when every few minutes an image so vivid is presented to them that they may well turn round or peer into the air, expecting to see the form appear which has been conjured up by the orator to their mind’s eye. “Young men, full flushed and conceited, copying these fatal examples, and seeing the victims go out at the other end of the street, say, ‘Behold! that man once controlled the whole money market of New York.’ There he goes—the old, conceited fellow. He has buttoned up his coat by the only two buttons that are left, and he keeps his arms down, that you may not look through and see the white; the white seams that run up and down, and that he cannot brush out; neither can he brush off that thread-bare, waxy, oily look which he has; and he goes round, a poor, miserable imbecile!” Hogarth could not do much better than that.

V.—Politics.

We are bound to say that, if Mr. Beecher’s view of the commercial world is dreary, his opinion of the political world is not more encouraging.

His allusions to politicians are truly startling to English ears; and if things are really as bad as he represents them to be, and they are likely to be a little worse, if anything, it is difficult to see how any Government can go on. It is still more difficult to understand the lofty encomiums occasionally lavished by him upon a Constitution which

is declared to be riddled through and through with corruption. But this is characteristic of Mr. Beecher. He has great bursts of enthusiasm and great bursts of indignation, and for the time a part stands for the whole. All that can be said is, that American institutions may be free and glorious, but they are abominably corrupt. The Senators are bought and sold, the Judges are bribed. It is hinted that even the President is no better than the rest, or, what is almost worse, there is no particular reason why he should be. If a man wants to keep his hands clean, he had better keep away from politics. The better classes in America avowedly leave politics to the beasts of the people. "Citizens that stay at home pay the expenses of politicians that go racketing about the country and doing nothing but mischief."

The franchise may be a fine thing, but in America we are told that votes are purchasable, and are mere quicksands, "and the Government built on them is built on quicksands, and cannot stand." Mr. Beecher at times seems almost to despair of his country. He does not think its institutions bad, but he finds the citizens to be incorrigible. "Bribery and corruption," he says, "the most profound, the most atrocious, and apparently increasing, is in our legislatures, and that is not the worst of it. It is known in every town and every county that the next legislature will be as bad as the one that went before it, and it is denounced accordingly; and when the Republican goes down and the Democratic comes up it is just as bad, and *vice versa*; whichever party goes to Albany it is all the same. Men are about alike after being dissolved in that cauldron." Imagine any one discoursing of the English Parliament in similar terms. Suppose that Dean Stanley in Westminster Abbey were to remark quite simply to a large evening congregation that the House of Commons was a den of thieves, that the Lords were liars to a man; that as for the Prime Minister, it didn't much matter who he was, for the office would make the best man a knave in a fortnight; that it was a notorious fact that the judge had taken bribes from both sides in the Tichborne case, and that a daily paper of good position in a leading article had characterised the transaction as "smart." Yet these are the sort of things Mr. Beecher declares are done in America. The highest office in the State seems to be contemptible in his eyes. Of Daniel Webster he says:—"I mourn over him. I see how his great, variously endowed, rich life was a matter of self-denial for the poor, paltry office of the Presidency,—an office that never makes a man great: as we have many instances to show, and which *belittles* a good many men that might have been great." He speaks in no doubtful language of vast plans organised in moneyed circles, by which "the highest magistrates are hurled

from their high duties, sacred laws destroyed, courts of justice eaten to the core by corruption ;” and yet in the following passage, which contains a graceful compliment to England, we find the American Government extolled in a burst of enthusiasm in which its sins and the sins of the people who tolerate it seem blotted out:—“The growth of liberty in England is one of the most important studies for a Christian philosopher. I regard no one feature of our time as so striking as this ; and no one event in our age is more striking than the fact of our great war, and the results of it in the development of the spirit of liberty, and of faith in it among the nations of the earth. . . . No crowned head, not even the Czar himself, could have put a million along a base of a thousand miles, and sustained them with ever-growing strength through four years of war. No exchequer of any monarch could ever stand the drain to which the treasury of this Government was subjected, and which was supplied by the taxation and labour of a free people. All Europe predicted our bankruptcy—my own ears heard it. Manchester, and Liverpool, and London said to me, Oh, your money is but paper ; besides you are only a democracy, and what is property in a democracy ? Do you suppose your people will bear taxation ? I said to them, ‘There is no people on earth that will bear such taxation as a people that tax themselves.’ Your Government comes down to your people, and they do not like it, and they do not like to be taxed to support it, and the life of your Government depends on light taxes ; but our people do like their Government, and are willing to be taxed, and heavily taxed, if necessary, for its support. Our Government represents the living wants and the present judgment of our people, and they shrink from no self-sacrifice that may be required for its preservation.’”

The last statement about England is obviously untrue. The English like their Government as much as the Americans like theirs, and a good deal more than the Southern Americans like the Northern. The English tax themselves just as much as the Americans tax themselves. For years there never has been any difficulty in raising taxes, and if they were twice as heavy they would still be raised. The Englishman pays and grumbles, and practically the American does the same ; but to speak of a Government that is “rotten to the core,” and “built upon the quicksand of corrupt votes,” as representing the “living wants and the present judgment of the people,” is to depreciate the wants of the people and to cast a serious slur upon their judgment. Foreign politics are not Mr. Beecher’s strong point ; but he has taken a most active and honourable part in the policy of his own country. For years he has stood out manfully in the teeth of public opinion against slavery—more than any one

man he has contributed to its downfall. When the great struggle between North and South came on, Mr. Beecher sent his sons to the war, and never ceased to preach the duty of being faithful to what he considered to be the great cause even unto death. Could he have helped that cause better by turning soldier, he would doubtless have gone to the war himself; but he knows as well as any man in the United States that his strength is to sit still, or rather to stand where he is, in Plymouth pulpit, and send out winged words throughout the length and breadth of the land. In view of the part which he took against slavery, it would not be too much to call him the American Wilberforce.

We would willingly follow Mr. Ward Beecher farther in connection with politics. His sermon on "The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty" shows a thorough acquaintance with the writings of Mr. Mill and all the ablest modern philosophers: the theory of Representative Government has seldom been more eloquently set forth than in that sermon (ii. 285).

VI.—Foreign Countries.

His strictures and encomiums upon foreign countries, though not always just, are full of point, and often very amusing: as, for instance, when, during his stay in England, he enters an inn and finds several Scotchmen gravely taking their whisky and water in solemn silence, preparatory to going to bed, the whole performance is unintelligible to him. He understands sociable drinking and conviviality, but this sort of morose sober drinking beats him; one after another, having finished his tumbler or tumblers, rises and walks off silently to bed, leaving the American observer to wonder at manners and customs so opposed to those of the great Republic, upon which the sun never sets, and, we may add, in which the tongue is never silent.

The German beer-gardens delight him, although perhaps there is a little too much of that washy mixture, called "beer" by courtesy, absorbed there, but then it is washy, and so does not do so much harm; but to see large families, father, mother, children, cousins, friends, all enjoying themselves sociably together—this is quite in Mr. Beecher's line, and he sighs, as some Englishmen sigh, for some such respectable public places of amusement for the middle and lower orders. After all, "non cui vis," &c., is it given to be always going out to the Crystal Palace? It takes money to go there; and it takes money to get back. We want beer-gardens with good bands nearer home—a good many of them, instead of so many public-houses; there should be some such nice place as the old Marylebone Gardens, which Handel and the respectable clergy were not above

frequenting. There should be one or two to every district, like Bayswater, Marylebone, Islington, and decent folk ought to be able to go there with their wives and families for an hour or two on summer evenings and half holidays. There is absolutely nowhere for people to go in London in a quiet sociable way; no places except music halls, theatres, the parks, and the streets.

There is one curious circumstance which it is just worth while to allude to. Mr. Beecher seems less up in the poets, British or American, than any man of equal culture we ever remember to have met with. In the six volumes of Sermons before us, there is hardly a quotation or a poetical allusion. We get a hymn or two, and we get ample tribute paid to the worth of poetry; but the poetry is absent: it does not come naturally to him. No one will maintain that his subject-matter excludes it—his subject-matter invites it. An edition of Mr. Beecher annotated from the poets, after the fashion of the classics, would be an easy work to compile; but Mr. Beecher is not likely to contribute much to it.

Are we to conclude that our preacher cares nothing for the poets, or has not read them? By no means; but it is likely that, like many most successful orators, he has a strong repugnance to commit anything to memory. On this point he remarks significantly enough: "As long as a man thinks of what he is going to say, he cannot be a public speaker. His speaking must get ahead of him, and he must go on behind it and find out what he has said, as it were. That is the sensation that he has."

Conclusion.

In conclusion, we must confess that we have not done justice to Mr. Beecher's eloquence. It is impossible to do so without quoting at very great length. Whole pages sometimes prepare the listener for a sentence which is destined in that connection never to leave the memory, but which, if isolated, would fall still-born.

However, as we have come to the close, we may well be pardoned for presenting the reader with three closing passages characteristic of Mr. Beecher in three of his many powerful moods.

The first is Beecher rugged, and forcible, and Spurgeonesque:—

"How is it, brother? I do not ask you whether you like the cup which you are now drinking; but look back twenty years. . . . What has made you so versatile? What has made you so patient? What has made you so broad, so deep, so rich? God put pickaxes into you, though you did not like it. He dug wells of salvation in you. He took you in his strong hand, and shook you by his north wind, and rolled you in his snows, and fed you with the coarsest food, and clothed you in the coarsest raiment, and beat you as a flail beats grain till the straw is gone, and the wheat is left.

And you are what you are by the grace of God's providence, many of you. By fire, by anvil-strokes, by the hammer that breaks the flinty rock, God played miner, and blasted you out of the rock, and then He played stamper and crushed you, and then he played smelter and melted you, and now you are gold free from the rock, by the grace of God's severity to you" (i. 24).

The next quotation is Mr. Beecher in one of his most delicate and poetic flights:—

"Is it because seeds have failed in the south that birds begin to flock north? Is it because summer has ceased to warm the fields there that they are flying hither? Near the time appointed of God for their migration the birds begin with their peculiar instincts to yearn and long, and they abstain from their wonted food, till by and by, at a given signal, they lift themselves up, and move in throngs through the air toward the land where there is a new summer.

"Now God breathes a spiritual migratory instinct into the hearts of men. Not because they are not well off here, not because they would be unclothed; but because beyond and above them there is something better and nobler than this life. They long for perfectness." (Heaton, i. 286.)

We observed that Mr. Beecher could be stately on occasion, and that at times the majesty of his rhythm had quite a Shakspearian ring about it. We might select many passages in illustration of this; the following must suffice, it closes a fine sermon on "Self-control possible to all."

"Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible," and the two garlands are then, for the last time, as it were, held up before us, whilst we are called upon to contrast once more the runners in the earthly and the heavenly arena:—

"While yet they live, the leaves grow sear upon their brow. Their very footsteps with which they sound the dance, shake down these withered leaves; and they are discrowned in the very wearing of their crowns. But around about our heads that follow Christ invisible leaves there are; or if they are visible, men call them thorns, as they should be called, since we follow Him that wore them; but as the angels behold them, they are those imperishable flowers—that amaranth which never blossoms to fade or to fail. And our crown shall be bright when the stars have gone, and the sun has forgotten to shine!" (i. 94.)

We need only add that the four volumes of Sermons quoted from are "Four Series," issued by J. B. Ford and Company, New York, 1871; besides these we have had before us Vols. I. and II., issued by Heaton and Son, Paternoster Row, London.

For the benefit of any readers who propose to continue for themselves the study here commenced of Mr. Ward Beecher, we subjoin a short list of the most remarkable sermons in the above volumes:—

Ford and Co. *Series I.*: "Pilate and his Modern Imitators," "The Love of Money," "Sphere of the Christian Minister,"

“Morality the Basis of Piety.” *Series II.*: “The Right and the Wrong Way of giving Pleasure,” “The Moral Theory of Civil Liberty,” “The Apostolic Theory of Preaching.” *Series III.*: “Paul and Demetrius,” “Coming to Oneself,” “Fragments of Instruction,” “Spiritual Blindness.” *Series IV.*: “Night and Darkness,” “Law of Hereditary Influence.”

Heaton and Co. *Vol. I.*: “The Holy Scriptures,” “Vicarious Suffering,” “The Indwelling of God,” “Divine Visitations.” *Vol. II.*: “The Earnest of an Inheritance,” “Evil Communications corrupt Good Manners.”

We do not wish to cast any slur on the other sermons by pointing out these. Mr. Beecher, by the testimony of his own congregation, is remarkably even. One is always sure of a good sermon, and looking back upon our survey, we must admit that the volumes before us richly deserve the amount of attention which we have bestowed upon them.

H. R. HAWES.



THE STATE : THE GOVERNMENT : AND SCIENTIFIC MORALITY.

Thoughts on Government. By ARTHUR HELPS.
Social Statics. By HERBERT SPENCER.
Over-Legislation. By the same.
Railway Morals and Railway Policy. By the same.
Specialised Administration. By the same. (*Fortnightly Review*.)
Administrative Nihilism. By PROFESSOR HUXLEY. (*The same*.)
The New Attack on Toleration. By HELEN TAYLOR. (*The same*.)
The Reign of Law in Politics. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL.
Fors Clavigera. By JOHN RUSKIN.
The Sphere and Duties of Government. By WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT.

IN the *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1871, Professor Huxley printed, as an article, with the title of "Administrative Nihilism," an address which he had delivered at Birmingham to the Members of the Midland Institute in October. The greater part of this Address consisted of an attack upon that theory of the duties of Government (the words *State* and *Government* are used by the learned professor interchangeably, but I propose to insist upon a distinction) which makes "the proper form of government an *astynomocracy*, or police government." Professor Huxley has so much malicious humour that he might almost be suspected of having put this Greek compound in the front for the express purpose of creating a prejudice in the *épicier* mind—only that the *épicier* hardly reads either Mr. Herbert Spencer or him. We can, however, well conceive the indignation of a free-born Briton at being told that an attempt was contemplated by a set of *doctrinaires* to get him governed "neither by a monarchy, nor an aristocracy, but by an *astynomocracy*, or police government." It may safely, be

asserted that the brief reports of this Address which found their way to the lower and far more numerous sections of the politically enfranchised were loosely understood by them to mean that certain philosophers advocated as the best system of government a sweeping despotism of their natural enemies "the Bobbies;" especially as Professor Huxley added that the astynomocratic theory forbade the spending of public money upon parks, or pleasure-grounds, or libraries, or the spending of a sixpence upon the relief of starvation. Against a doctrine branded with such a name and described in such terms an easy victory awaited Professor Huxley's own first principle, adopted from Locke, that "the end of Government is the good of mankind." Not five persons, perhaps, in any given thousand would be able to criticize this "noblest, briefest formula;" and in fact nothing would be more assured than the triumph of the argument as thus stated.

In an article in the December number of the same periodical, Mr. Herbert Spencer, under the heading "Specialized Administration," explained and (in my opinion) partly justified his own well-known opinions on these questions, and added this:—

"I have greatly regretted to see Professor Huxley strengthening, by his deserved high authority, a school of politicians who can scarcely be held to need strengthening—their opponents being so few. That [he] should have come to [such] conclusions will be discouraging to the small number who have reached opposite conclusions. . . . I greatly regret this avowed antagonism of Professor Huxley to a general political doctrine with which I am identified."

I also regret that Professor Huxley should have delivered and reprinted that Address, especially in the present position of public affairs; but as his avowed political doctrine is implicitly contained in his general ethical doctrine (which is to be very easily gathered from his other speeches or writings) nobody could be surprised at the position he took up: nor is it easy to condemn his policy, unless we lay it down that every man ought to abstain, out of chivalry, from attacking theories which are understood to have only a small following, though he firmly believes those theories to be mischievous. But I have also regretted to find Mr. Herbert Spencer, holding the unique and very eminent place as a great thinker which he does in fact hold, expressing his regret in any such terms as I have quoted. It would take a good many Addresses and Review articles to discourage some of us: even if the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer did not, as they do, contain as to these matters an arsenal of argument and illustration never surpassed for range and force, if ever equalled, in the history of philosophy. It would, for one thing, be a great point gained if this attack upon Astynomocracy (—pray, let us retain a

word which is so much better than Mesopotamia, even though it be inappropriate) should induce Mr. Spencer to change the order of the published programme of his contemplated philosophical writings so far as to give the world in a definite, compact shape, that doctrine of Sociology which came so very low down in the list as it stood. Indeed, in the article in the *Fortnightly Review* he has discounted a part of the exposition, and has done so with his usual lucidity of method and amazing force and range of illustration.

But, besides this, are we quite sure that the outlook of the "general political doctrine with which" Mr. Spencer is "identified" is at this moment so very inauspicious? I think not. In some parts, a light breeze has been growing and gathering to which all who are identified with the same general political doctrine may well spread their sails with a little hope. Besides this, in politics—and surely in many other things, though Mr. Spencer does not give the French proverb its wider application—it is the unexpected which always happens. Of this we have lately had some startling illustrations. The Franco-German war itself was almost "expected" from year to year, and military men in general believed the German arms would be victorious, but the whole extent of their victory and the other issues of the war no human being could have contemplated. Anything more unlikely than the sudden and disgraceful clamour for the creation of a universal citizen army—in other words for constituting the Government a sort of monster press-gang—could scarcely have been thought of in this country and in the midst of (what are called) free institutions. Yet it happened. Take, again, the Republican movement. It has been said, and plausibly, that Republicanism is put back in England for half a century. And what did it? An invisible breath of miasm that sent one single human creature to a sick-bed. Something quite as small and quite as incalculable may at any hour modify the movements of political opinion in this country, and twenty years hence may see the "general political doctrine" which Professor Huxley opposes the dominant doctrine of the time. The present look-out in America, in Great Britain, and on the Continent, is unfavourable enough—nay, desperate in some particulars; but we need not be dismayed;—for all things are possible to the god To-morrow.

What I shall now beg leave to say in relation to the "general political doctrine" in question, I will open by a few extracts, which will lead up to the question whether we have yet got a clear issue.

In Professor Huxley's paper, "Administrative Nihilism," occurs the following sentence:—

"The higher the state of civilization, the more completely do the actions

of one member of the social body influence all the rest, and less possible is it for any one man to do a wrong thing, without interfering, more or less, with the freedom of all his fellow-citizens."

Requesting the reader to bear in mind, in passing, the equivocation which for the purposes of this discussion may lurk under the words "wrong thing," I will pass on to an expression of opinion, from another source, upon the same question. Mr. Arthur Helps, in his "Thoughts upon Government," has this passage, which occurs at page 19, at the opening of the second chapter, which is entitled, "Government not less, but more wanted, as Civilization advances." These are the words :—

"It is an opinion of some people, but, as I contend, a wrong and delusive opinion, that, as civilization advances, there will be less and less need for government. I maintain, on the contrary, that there will be more and more need. [For] it is a melancholy fact that civilization is mostly attended by complication. And, moreover, it is attended by a diminution of power, as regards individual effort."

Here, again, I interrupt the course of mere quotation to observe that there *may* exist some equivocation in the use of the word "government" in this last passage. Mr. Helps proceeds to illustrate his meaning by concrete cases, and instances water-supply. Now it is clear that, abstractly, there can be no more reason against ten thousand people in a city agreeing upon certain regulations for procuring and using a supply of water with mutual regard to each other's convenience, than against any ten people stranded on a lone island doing the same kind of thing. Supposing the agreement as to method to be absolute, the obvious rule, *volenti non fit injuria*, applies; and, as any one who, without just cause, afterwards broke the agreement would be simply in the position of a man who refused to pay his butcher's bill, *i.e.*, would be just guilty of a breach of contract, it might be right for the remaining parties to the contract to inflict any penalty that had previously been agreed upon between the contractors.

One more remark, applying to Mr. Helps's instances, may at this stage be necessary. In the case of an incorporated company for the supply of water or artificial light, the government is an actual party to the contract, standing abstractly in the position of a paid official, bound to enforce the terms of that contract if any of the contractors prove negligent of them to the injury of the rest. Whether, in cases of "incorporation," the part assigned to the government is more, or less, or in any way, other than it should be, is another question. And whether a government should take an initiative upon itself in such a matter as that of water-supply is another question still.

But, to continue the extracts. Let us pass to the article in the *Fortnightly Review* in which Mr. Herbert Spencer comes forward to explain (with reference and partly in answer to Professor Huxley's paper) his own often-stated opinions in these matters. In the first place, Mr. Spencer's article is entitled "Specialized Administration ;" which carries with it a very plain meaning. And he emphasizes, by using italics, the following sentence :—

"It is a law universally illustrated by organizations of every kind that in proportion as there is to be efficiency, there must be specialization, both of structure and function—specialization which implies accompanying limitation."

And he lays it down as essential that—

"The entire aggregate of individuals, acting through the legislative and executive as its agents, should put upon each individual, and group of individuals, the restraints needful to prevent aggression, direct and indirect."

Now, let us quote from Wilhelm Von Humboldt a passage selected by Mr. Helps as justifying his own view. Von Humboldt says :—

"The State, indeed, should in no wise provide for the positive welfare of the citizens,—therefore also not for their life and health,—unless indeed these are endangered by the actions of others—but certainly for their security. Only in so far as this security itself may suffer, *forasmuch as fraud takes advantage of ignorance*, could such supervision come within the sphere of action of the State."

The italics are those of Mr. Helps himself.

I will make in this place only one more quotation, which shall be from an anonymous article written in a newspaper and necessarily in great haste, immediately upon the appearance of the ordinary brief reports of Professor Huxley's address :—

"Professor Huxley took occasion to observe that he did not agree with those who regarded police as the sole function of Government, and he went on to say, supposing him correctly reported, that the encouragement of science, among other matters, lay distinctly within the province of Government. We shall not here discuss the question so far as it relates to science ; but it is obvious to remark that, if all the members of a State, without exception, agreed in the propriety of a vote of money for scientific purposes, or if a certain majority agreed in its propriety, there being a distinct compact that such a majority should always hold the deciding power, no *injustice* could possibly be done to any living adult member of the community. [The abstract propriety of a vote of public money for encouraging science is another matter.] The difficulty in such matters arises when you have a Government that is not truly representative of the State. . . . Nobody that we know of affirms, or ever did affirm, that a Government never should, under any circumstances whatever, take upon itself other than *purely* police duties. . . . *It must be observed, too, that the office of a constable widens as life widens, and refines as our needs and risks refine.* In a city like London or Glasgow it is as much a matter of just and fair police

interference to prevent a man's going where he pleases with smallpox upon him as to prevent his going where he pleases tipsy with a loaded gun in his hand. . . . To say, as numbers will be ready to say, that the suppression of bad preaching or bad novels lies within the province of a Government, and that the only reason why we cannot now deal with such evils is the lack of unanimity among those who are the ultimate depositaries of power, is to assert in indirect language the absolute right of the strong over the weak, to justify every persecution that evèr was waged, and throw things back into anarchy. . . . The only ground, for example, upon which compulsory education, supported by a general tax, could be justified, is that life has grown so that without a certain amount of knowledge no human being is a *safe* citizen."

The reader will make his own guess at the writer of these paragraphs. They will complete my extracts.

And now let us see how we stand.

Mr. Spencer, Wilhelm Von Humboldt, and—*longo intervallo*—the writer last quoted, are dead against what is usually called "paternal government," and emphatically committed to the doctrine that the sphere of government proper, is limited to the enforcing of rights.* Professor Huxley and Mr. Arthur Helps are opposed to this view of the functions of a Government. Yet, all five of these writers are found using, without concert, the same language as to "specialized administration." And then Mr. Helps, quoting Von Humboldt, pits, so to speak, Von Humboldt's own words (quoted above) against the principle Von Humboldt lays down.

It is certain, then, that we have *not* yet got a clear issue. On the one hand we have certain writers who oppose "paternal government," making certain statements as essential parts of their doctrine. On the other, Mr. Helps, who advocates "paternal government," quotes those very statements as fatal to the first principle of the writers on the other side of the question. A more confused state of things could hardly be imagined. The remarks that follow will be devoted mainly to an attempt to clear up the issue; but a rapid, elliptical (not essentially incomplete) argument will almost necessarily run through them.

Let us, however, begin by an endeavour to clear still a little more of the ground. In the first place, we all know the exceeding difficulty of getting attended to in these matters. It was only the other day that I saw, in a "Liberal" newspaper, in an article upon a question of pure principle, this remark:—"The first question asked by Englishmen will be, whether any injustice of this kind is likely to arise under the Act." No doubt this is true; but scientific morality is not concerned with the first question that Englishmen are likely to

* I use this large phrase, because it will cover defensive war, as well as civil matters *within* what is called "the State."

ask upon points of practice. Upon this very point the utmost confusion of thought prevails. It is certain that some degree of imperfection of expression and of working must attach to every human law; but this is constantly thrown in our teeth as a justification of what are called compromises when first principles are at stake. "Nothing human is perfect; we must give and take; bear and forbear." The answer is, *Quis negavit?* But what scientific morality asks concerning a law is, not whether it will "work," but whether it is or is not so framed as *necessarily* to lead to injustice, supposing it to be worked with the very utmost exactitude. If it be so framed, it is intolerable, is in itself a crime; though not a single "practical" inconvenience should have been proved in its working. In the discussions upon the Education Act we were told, even to weariness, that the religious difficulty would vanish upon trial, and only a very few publicists, who could scarcely make their voices even heard, had the courage or the consistency to maintain the contrary, though facts have proved the contrary to be the truth. The whole argument of the friends of compromise was, in fact, simply this, "Put on the screw, and you will see what you will see." But we knew all this before. We knew, and know, that if you will only back any rule or law whatever with penalties, and give it certain advantages of a social and pecuniary kind, it will probably, almost certainly, "work." But what does this mean, put into plain, brutal English? Why, simply, that you may do anything you please with the majority of mankind, because they are dull, idle, tied to vested interests, and only half conscientious.

It is, indeed, too plain to be argued that all talk of this kind is only a roundabout repetition of the old dictum that you may do whatever evil you please, in order that good may come. Nor, in saying this, do I assume any *code* of morals whatever. We have a melancholy illustration ready to our hand in the arguments used by Mr. Gladstone and others in the question of certain Acts of Parliament which bear a very nauseous name. Here indeed, though inexorably opposed to these Acts, I have the misfortune to be as much at war with the generality of the opponents as with the friends of the obnoxious law. I take my stand, with Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. Mill (though the latter is, in my opinion, inconsistent, as a Utilitarian, with himself*) upon grounds which utterly foreclose even the discussion of the Acts as they stood. The case was, as lawyers say, "unarguable." To us, of the Left, it was simply idle to say, as Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bruce did, that they would be guided by the evidence produced before the Commission, and propose the repeal of

* Not exclusively in this case, however. Mr. Mill, as has been repeatedly argued, is profoundly, nobly inconsistent with himself in his treatment of moral questions.

the Acts, if it was proved that they led to immoral consequences. It needed no Commission and no evidence to prove that if you seize by force a certain number of sick people and cure them, you so far do good ; or, that, if you follow that up by putting them under good moral influences, you, so far, do good again. Again, we say, *quis negavit?* But, next we say,—what then? For, first, though least, no induction of this kind possible to any Commission or series of Commissions could establish a case of final preponderance of good results over bad. And, secondly (which is the main point), we say that all legislation of this order violates necessary first principles, and is *therefore* unarguable. It is perfectly conceivable that some one should hold it proved that the best thing he could do for somebody else's welfare in this world *with* the next, and also for the good of society, would be to knock him on the head. But is that an arguable matter? Or, if, in some fit of madness, Parliament had passed a law compelling women to acquiesce in polygamy or polyandry, would it be reasonable to appoint a Commission, and announce, in reply to remonstrants, that if the Commissioners reported against the moral consequences of the Act, it should be reconsidered? Yet this is putting the case but weakly. For we on the Left, contend that while it is an arguable proposition that either polygamy or polyandry voluntarily adopted by all the parties concerned would be utterly without the pale of governmental interference, there are no cases conceivable in which it could be lawful to pass some of the compulsory provisions of certain Acts ; and no cases conceivable in which it could be lawful to tax a Jew or a Secularist for getting the New Testament read. We say—and so far Professor Huxley has accurately understood us—we say these things are in themselves and for ever unarguable ; and that any amount of resistance to a law which justifies them is certainly permissible, and might possibly be a duty.

There is a well-known passage in Dr. Newman's "Apologia," in which he says it is the "Catholic" doctrine that it would be better for all the millions on the face of the earth to die in extremest agony than that a sin should be committed. This is the only kind of basis on which any question of principle can possibly be discussed.

It is with regret, though not with surprise, that I find Mr. Helps, in his book (which is mainly addressed to what I should call policy), adopts the usual course of finding positive advantages in certain qualities of the English people which, if words are to carry any definite value at all, can only be reckoned relatively advantageous. It was an advantage to the bad fiddler that *as* his "stopping" was wrong, his strings also should be compensatingly out of tune, so that between the two wrongs a sort of right was struck out ; but if it

would not have been better that both his strings and his stopping should be right, we had better cease to define language at all. Only the other night, Mr. Gladstone repeated the old discovery that government by party is a wonderfully good thing. The true proposition would be that, while under the circumstances it has its advantages, it is a most serious obstacle to improvement, and a very demoralising thing too. Here, again, we have Mr. Helps complimenting the English people in the strongest language upon their "horror of pressing any doctrine to its extremes. We abjure," he proceeds, "pure science in common life and politics, and are never fascinated by the desire for completeness. Our proceedings . . . are often very ragged at the edges, and *we really like this raggedness.*" Self-congratulation could scarcely go lower. This is just finding a guiding-star of hope for humanity in the fact that most people, being rather dull and unconscientious than otherwise, are of opinion, as George Eliot puts it, that though the radii of a circle have a tendency to be equal, the spirit of geometry may be pushed too far. It is clearly advantageous that the laxity of the average mind happens to come in now and then to prevent its attempting too much in the way of putting principles into practice; and it is a decided advantage for minorities that majorities have too little faith in their own principles of action to use them energetically. But to push the case an inch farther is to congratulate a mariner on his "horror of pressing to its extreme the doctrine" that he must be guided by his compass and his charts in the direction he takes.

But Mr. Helps has one paragraph which excites almost more surprise than regret. He positively declares, on pages 10 and 11, that in Britain a man may be in "a minority of one," and yet "not be in any peril from persecution." Surely a more courageous statement never was made by any man of the world who was also a thinker. With very recent events before us we cannot even affirm that a man is not frequently in peril of life or limb in these islands simply for expressing obnoxious opinions. Did Mr. Helps ever hear such names as Murphy,* Dilke, and Odger? I hasten to add that I am no friend to any Republican agitation, and blush with shame for such discussions as those upon the use the Queen makes of her income, and the

* The case of the coarse and troublesome agitator, Murphy, was a disgrace to a free country. He had a perfect right to say whatever he pleased short of personal slander; and if anyone, Romanist or not, did not see that *his* duty was to keep his hands off, he ought to have been taught the lesson, by fine or imprisonment. The instance is much in point here, for it furnishes a concise illustration of the confused ideas that exist as to the duty of a Government. Most people, including journalists, really seemed to think it was the duty of the Government to put down Murphy. But, siding as I do with Mr. Spencer and Baron Humboldt in such matters, I venture to say it was the duty of the Government to protect *him*, and to punish rioters.

dowry of the Princess Louise. But, having said this, let me ask whether it is possible Mr. Helps can be ignorant of such facts as I am going to mention. I say, then, it is fact, and known fact, that so strong is the force of social and the risk of political, and otherwise physical persecution in this country, that it takes weary years of laborious and self-restrained propagandist labour before new opinion is allowed even to creep into sight. I say, it is a fact that the mere holding of exceptional opinion is dangerous in Britain, and that not one hundredth part of the exceptional opinion that is actually held upon public questions dares to find its way to the front. The severest part of my own labour as a publicist has always been spent over the art of *not* saying things ; and it has been and is the case with hundreds of publicists of more importance than myself. And one great reason for this state of things is that the Government while it exhausts its force in doing heaps of facts which are outside of its province and placing restrictions where none should exist, seriously neglects its plain duties of the negatively controlling kind.

Mr. Helps quotes Goethe as saying that "all greatness and good sense are found in the minority," and not only condemns it as "a fanciful notion," but actually thinks he has proved that "the maxim is entirely conditional" when he has observed that free-trade as a doctrine was once in a minority but is now in a majority. But what sort of answer is that ? Of course, a remark like Goethe's, made in conversation, must be read with allowance, if necessary ; but the *final* meaning stands in need of no allowance whatever. Even in the matter of free-trade, and other such things, the "good sense" is still, as Goethe said, "to be found in the minority ;" for six-tenths or more of the traders of Britain would have sided with the very sanguine deputation that waited on Mr. Lowe the other day to get certain co-operative stores persecuted if it could. But that is not the final, essential point. The Best Thing is not only, of necessity, in a perpetual minority, but in a perpetual minority of one. Free-trade being secured, the point of departure for progress has shifted, and the battle of the few against the many begins again upon some other question. If I had not read with my own eyes Mr. Helps's criticism I should have thought that nothing was more incontestable upon a general survey of life, politics included, than that it was, so to put it, the hydrostatic paradox over again—the drop of the "good" balancing the immense waters of the questionable. The parallel is of course not on all fours ; and thank Heaven the "good" maintains in some sort, a winning fight ; but *how*—Heaven only knows !

To pass to Professor Huxley, and still to continue clearing the ground by indirect discussion. Mr. Herbert Spencer has, avowedly, forborne, for reasons stated, to criticise the learned professor in detail.

It seems to me that the armour of the latter is wide open at three points which are susceptible of the casual treatment which is all this article can afford—treatment which is yet designed never to lose sight of the principles in question. A fourth point I defer.

In answer to some of those arguments from ultimate consequences which have been urged by Mr. Spencer and others against every form of government interference of what is loosely, but sufficiently called the "paternal" kind, Professor Huxley takes the case of a man's liability to over-eat himself. What he says might be briefly put thus:—Gentlemen of the Astynomocratic School, you urge that if the Government is bound to overlook a boy's schooling, it is equally bound to follow his father and mother into the whole of their life, by night and by day; to control their eating, their drinking, and a great deal more besides. But really, gentlemen, cannot a Government know when to stop? It would be as pertinent to argue that a man ought never to dine because he is liable to over-eat himself. Let him stop eating when he has had enough.

But there is an obvious paralogism here. The man dining is no parallel case. What is wanted is a case in which it should be proved certain that one person could regulate compulsorily the eating and drinking of another without ever doing him the smallest injury. Neither is it conclusive to reply that, take which view we may, we may be pushed into dilemmas of practice. We may. But this kind of answer is essentially a repetition of the argument from compensation, which I have quoted from Mr. Helps, and which is so very commonly put to a wrong use. We cannot do all we ought. True. But we can refrain from doing anything we ought not to do. And that, in truth, is the whole case in a nutshell. Because it is certain we *may* do some injustice or make some errors, start from what data we please, does it follow that one set of data is as good as another? Above all, does it follow that we must abandon the direct guidance of first principles for the indirect clues of empiricism? Nobody tells a boy over his Euclid that his compasses will make a perfect circle, that with his pencil and his T square he can make true right angles, or that he will ever actually bag a "point." But all proof *assumes* the strict accuracy of the data, and though the mechanist knows that he must allow for friction, he assumes the strict accuracy and true applicability of certain laws. In like manner, we Astynomocratical people know very well that we may meet with puzzling cases—*quis negavit?* But, for all that, we think we can, by the light of first principles, pronounce positive decisions. For example: if a man wilfully maims or starves his child, we say the Government should punish him. But if a Peculiar-People father refuses to send for a doctor to his child, and has him anointed by an elder instead, we

say the Government has no more right to punish that father than it has to punish one who has his child treated with homœopathic globules—which, in the opinion of most people, are just as effective as an elder's oil would be. Then, when we come to the case of the Welsh fasting-girl, we admit that it seems to lie upon the borderland. It is perplexing. Yet, we hasten to add, it would probably have been, in fact, a good deal less so, if the true provinces of Governmental and social interference had been by this time better discriminated. Again, when we come to the case which Mr. Helps puts in italics out of Von Humboldt,—“forasmuch as fraud takes advantage of ignorance,”—we say it can be demonstrated that the Government is bound to punish the “fraud” on one side, but has nothing to do with curing the “ignorance” on the other.

The second point in Professor Huxley's address is this. In maintaining the right of “the State” to interfere with religions, among other things, he instances Thuggee. In writing an open letter, years ago, to Mr. Helps, I thought the case of Thuggee so simple as only to require a line or two. If all questions of right or duty presuppose the right to live, we are entitled to deal with the case of Thuggee as one of the aboriginal dilemma of force against force. As to Suttee (which may occur to some people) I believe the fact is that the widows were always drugged with opium, and forced to the funeral pile. But if any sane woman sought, of her own free will, to burn herself to death, then I hold that the Government had no more right to interfere to prevent it than it has to treat suicide as a crime—that is, none at all.*

Thirdly, Professor Huxley, rejecting the doctrine of Von Humboldt, prints in large capitals, from Locke, this first principle:—“The end of government is the good of mankind.” But have we gone so very far round only to get no farther than this? You might as well say, “The end of government is Abracadabra.” This is one of the everlasting dead-locks of every form of Utilitarianism. That certain things are convenient and pleasant we know; but who knows anything about the “good of mankind?” A Government, set up by mutual compact, to protect each person in the free pursuit of his *own* good is intelligible; but imagine “the State”—that hideous old Pagan abstraction—set up to see to “the good of mankind.” If “the State” has all or one-tenth of the rights over the citizens that have latterly been claimed for it, then we, on the other side, affirm that it has a right to commit infanticide, fœticide, and worse, on any scale, at any time when the majority may happen to think such things likely to promote “the good of mankind.” A far stronger—an almost infinitely stronger—case can be made out from “beneficial consequences” in favour of certain State applications of infanticide than was ever

* See the closing chapters of Mr. MacDonald's “Wilfred Cumbermede.”

made out before any Commission or Committee in favour of certain unpleasant Acts of Parliament. Let us take illustrations as they arise. Suppose that the whole story of the war of Sparta against the Messenians, the origin of the Partheniæ, the conspiracy with the Helots, the departure of the Partheniæ, and the founding of Tarentum, to be true. Here is a story in which the birth of a city is traced to a case of State-promoted promiscuity. Now, I should like to hear somebody *prove* that that either was or was not for "the good of mankind." Where are the data? And, supposing the question arose to-morrow, whether "the State" (whatever "the State" is) should promote promiscuity under circumstances similar to those of Sparta in the Messenian war, the same question arises—Where are your data? Say not that such questions do not now present themselves. They do, and worse questions. And if all we can say is that "the end of government is the good of mankind," I thunder in the ears of Anti-Astynomocrats again, Where are your data? I deny that any conclusion founded on empirical considerations is possible. Nobody knows, nobody *can* know, on any such grounds, whether it would or would not be for "the good of mankind" that a city of Tarentum should be founded and peopled by such means.

And here, to quote Mr. Matthew Arnold, I see my enemies waiting open-mouthed to devour me, but, to continue the quotation—I shall elude them. And I will put one more case before closing for this month. Suppose "the State" has a right, under the 73rd clause of the Education Act, to fine or imprison (for that is what it must come to) a parent who sent his child to a tutor or a school where an educational experiment was being tried of which a Government Inspector disapproved. Let it be borne in mind, though it is not essential to the point, that the tutor might be a much better judge than the Inspector, or any one on the School Board, or on the Council, and that the experiment he was making might be one of the most vital importance to the "good of mankind." Now, I say, supposing "the State" has a right to put down such an experiment, why would not the "State" have a right to go to Switzerland, and, supposing it disapproved of the Swiss system of national education, force Switzerland at the cannon's mouth to adopt the system approved by "the State"? Why have we not the right to go and make educational war on China at this moment? It is quite certain their system is very defective. There are three hundred millions of people there. I should like to hear it proved that it would not be for "the good of mankind" to blockade their ports till they submitted themselves to Clause 73. Unwary persons may perhaps be whispering, "But China and Switzerland are States by themselves;"—unwary, † say, for we shall speedily discover that *that* is not the way out.

r is there any argument capable of establishing the right of "the

State" to put down, under Clause 73, an educational experiment, which would not equally prove the right of any conceivable Universal Dictator (who had got sufficient cannon at his back) to put down every school he pleased; and, also, the right of the author of this paper, if he could command the means, to plant an infernal machine in Bridge Street, Blackfriars, and blow the London School Board into atoms, for "the good of mankind."

The subject will require another article. Meanwhile it does not concern Mr. Spencer, but it does the reader, to know that, though fundamentally at one with the distinguished thinker, I do not wish to suggest that he would accept all my particular conclusions or illustrations. A more important matter is the urgency of the whole question. It is twelve years since the present writer wrote:—"Notwithstanding all this talk about free-trade and freedom of conscience, we are rapidly drifting along to a Fools' Paradise of meddle and muddle, an organized tyranny of experts, and a universal spy-system, with a standing army, under another name, in the hands of the Civil Executive." And now let any one look carefully into those Nasty Acts. Let him look at Mr. Bruce's new Bill, which is in some respects more audacious still. Let him look at the Royal Parks and Gardens Bill. Let him look at the law which makes it an offence for a marine-store dealer to buy less than 56 lb. of old metal at a time,—a law worthy of the most insane centuries of protective despotism. Let him look at the amazing by-laws of the London School Board, made for working Clause 73. Let him remember how, in an evil day, the Government were permitted to buy up the telegraphs, and how it is now urged that they should also buy up the railways. Let him note the tendency even in private legislation (*e.g.* in the Lloyds Bill and the Liverpool Improvement Bill of last year) to snub individual interests, toady great concerns, and set up protective despotisms. Let him note the growing tendency on the part of judges, juries, magistrates, coroners, and other officials to stretch their powers, and create "judge-made law." Lastly, for the present, let him note the alarming tendency to high-handedness on the part of all upper governmental action; and the energy of certain currents of political sentiment which have been flogged up mainly by the *Saturday Review*, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, Mr. W. R. Greg, and Mr. Matthew Arnold; and he will not be startled to hear it affirmed that the England of Queen Victoria is likely to end by being far less free than the England of the Plantagenets. But there is a bright as well as a dark side to what I have just written—namely, that all things are possible to the god To-morrow.

HENRY HOLBEACH.



JOHN HOOKHAM FRERE.

The Works of John Hookham Frere, in Verse and Prose, now first collected, with a Prefatory Memoir by his Nephews, W. E. and Sir BARTLE FRERE. In Two Vols. London: Pickering. 1872.

WHATEVER differences of opinion may exist as to the capacity of John Hookham Frere as a statesman or diplomatist, there can be no question as to the scholarship and literary calibre of the friend of Canning, the author of "Monks and Giants," the translator *par excellence* of Aristophanes and Theognis. The press has availed itself of the long-looked-for advent of Frere's remains to construct from the prefatory memoir, which is subscribed with the initials of Sir Bartle, biographies *in petto*, in some instances exceeding in interest the pages which have supplied stock for them. But, as a rule, journals and weekly reviews have, from lack of space or from cheaply rating the translator's gift, slurred over the very portion of these handsome volumes which constitutes their chief value, and most truly represents the man himself. The purpose of the following remarks is to pursue the opposite course. A glance at Hookham Frere's life and antecedents is necessary to explain the aptitudes of the man for the task of writing satire which, if the general public esteemed it less than "Beppo" or "Don Juan," the author of those two famous poems regarded as a model of humour as well as rhythm; and of translating Aristophanes with such a zest, insight, and distillation of the original spirit, sense, and flavour, that it is not too much to say that the Athenian comic poet lives again in all his occasional coarseness. Such scholarly aptitudes bespeak

the cultivation of our old systems of liberal education at their best; and justify the consistent opinion of the subject of this article that the old-fashioned curriculum of classics and mathematics was the best mental training to fit a boy to educate himself in after-life, and that "it is not so much what you learn as how you learn it, which is important" (xx, xxi). It may be said, on the other side, that he practically admitted the inaptness of his training for the conduct of affairs and for aught save the pursuits of literature by his early retirement from public life; but the answer is, that what precipitated that retirement was not incapacity, but independence; independence in a double sense; in some degree a dignified principle of waiting silently for time and candour to judge his acts; in a greater degree, that possession of a competent fortune and landed estate, which is apt to make a man too solicitous of his own comfort and too negligent of his fame and self-assertion. And yet this man of the old scholar type, this bookworm and nothing more, as some accounted him, this abstracted, dreamy rhymester, of whom such good stories are told (see pp. clv and ccxvii), was at the great crises of his brief public career a man of affairs and action. It had been wiser perhaps in Sir Bartle Frere to have left to past vindicators, such as Southey, the justification of his uncle's conduct when Minister Plenipotentiary to the Spanish Junta, and his connection with the events that ended in Corunna. It is surely *de trop* to institute a comparison betwixt Sir John Moore and Wellington in writing a Memoir of John Hookham Frere; and, apart from a feeling that a quasi-filial piety perforce dictates partial advocacy, the instinct of most readers of those pages which concern his connection with Spanish affairs will tell them that the history of all this is better written elsewhere, and that much of it is supererogatory and tedious. But this does not prevent a conviction born of the perusal of Southey's Peninsular War and other less favourable histories, that if John Hookham Frere erred in his interference with Sir John Moore, in his advice to the Junta, and in his selection of intermediaries, his errors were on the side of vigour, of resolute prompt measures, of true British patriotism, and manful resistance of the menacer of the peace of Europe.

John Hookham Frere was the eldest son of a Norfolk squire, whose place as second wrangler in Paley's year, and descent from fellows of Trinity, are more suggestive facts than that he came of Norman ancestry. His sire, a good scholar and a sometime M.P. for Norwich, had married a clever heiress, Jane Hookham, with whose "Cobwebs to Catch Flies," published under the *nom de plume*, "Mrs. Lovechild," readers who are somewhere about the age of the century may possibly have had an unwitting acquaintance. Thus on both sides John Hookham Frere and his troop of more or less distinguished

brothers had a right to brains. The subject of the present memoir was born in 1769, sent to Eton in 1785, and associated with Canning—his fast friend from that time forth—within a year of his entering Eton in the conduct of the *Microcosm*, the first and most brilliant of school magazines. His prose contributions to this strike one more favourably than those translations at the age of sixteen, which deserve unearthing chiefly as an unformed germ of tastes which ripened in after years to most rare perfection. But it must have been the prestige of scholarship and association with scholars and youths of promise at Eton which enabled him, at the expiration of his Cambridge course, to secure a fellowship at Caius upon an *ægrotat* degree, and which marked him, whilst a young clerk in the Foreign Office under Lord Grenville, for a seat in Parliament, and very shortly afterwards for office under Pitt. A bosom friend of Canning, he shared with him the intimacy with Pitt, which that reserved minister accorded to so very few; and the staunchness with which to his life's end Frere upheld these two great names against all detractors is a trait in his character almost as notable as his Proculian *animus paternus in fratres*. It was while both were serving under Pitt that they and other younger men of their party started, in 1797, the *Anti-Jacobin*, a satirical weekly during the session, which began its brief life with elaborate essays, but won its fame and is best remembered by its lighter shafts of exquisite parody, and its poetical caricatures of the "woodnotes wild" of the "bards of freedom." Our literature contains no livelier models of political satire, no wholesomer correctives of a depraved literary taste, than these joint effusions of Canning, Frere, and Ellis, a triumvirate to the vigorous maintenance of which Frere was no perfunctory contributor. But such political engines seldom recommend themselves to the elder heads of a party, and, in 1798, the *Anti-Jacobin*, probably in deference to Pitt's advice, was discontinued. The next year Frere succeeded Canning as Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, and in 1800—1804 he was Minister at Lisbon and at Madrid successively. His recall from the latter Court arose, as Mr. Pitt explained, from an unpleasantness between him and Godoy, the "Prince of Peace," as to which the English Government approved of their envoy's conduct, although they held it expedient to remove all obstacles to a friendly settlement of points at issue between England and Spain. In 1808 Frere was again accredited Minister to Spain, which had, by this time, broken with France, and was governed by a Junta, and animated by a patriotism which elicited the common praises of Canning and Sheridan. As has been already observed, this passage of Frere's life is still a theme of controversy; a problem which he who was most concerned was too proud or too magnani-

mous to assist in solving by any explanation or justificatory words. Both at the time and in after years he declined to answer calumnies and unjust criticisms. He left history to justify his conduct; and while the Spanish sense of his services may be inferred from their investing him with what Sir William Napier is perhaps over-smart in designating the *ironical* title of "Marquez de la Union," it is hard to discover that aught but the periodical clamours for a victim to appease popular dissatisfaction, and to atone foreign reverses, called for the severe though silent blame and slur which fell upon a spirited and zealous envoy. That he felt and understood his supersession is seen in his thenceforth declining ambassadorial functions, as well as on two occasions the offer of a peerage. Henceforth, Canning being now out of office, he fell back on the patrimony which had come to him by his father's death, in 1807, and divided himself somewhat unevenly between Roydon and town, between the improvement of his estates and the cultivation of the social Muse, between rural beneficence and conferring on the best society of the capital the charms of polished wit, playful fancy, affluent scholarship, and rare conversational powers. Gradually Norfolk became less his constant home, though in his long voluntary exile at Malta he was ever devising schemes for the good of his poor people at Roydon, schemes prompted by a mother's example, who seems to have been as full of good works and almsdeeds that she did, as of literary and refined tastes which she imparted to her children. A pleasing trait of this good woman is given in a note at p. cxliv, and may be quoted no less as an illustration of strong maternal forethought than as a clue to the strong brotherly feeling subsisting between the Frere brothers and sisters:—

"When her strength was failing, she summoned to her bedside her eight children who were in England, and after calmly and cheerfully talking of that their last meeting upon earth, 'bade them go to dinner which she trusted they would enjoy, and never to let their sorrow for her make them neglect their own health; and she promised that she would send them down a toast,' after the fashion of the day. This she did in the words 'our union,' which in memory of the occurrence and in accordance with her wishes, her youngest son Temple afterwards had engraved as the motto on signet rings bearing the device of the seals which Walton tells us were given by Dr. Donne 'to many of his friends.'"

Frere's element, however, was town life, in which his learning, wit, and conversational powers fitted him to shine, and where he might have won a higher social and literary name, had he had a less fastidious taste or a stronger stimulus to ambition. From the date of his retirement from political life, his books and the wife whom he married in 1816 seem to have shared the monopoly of his thoughts, saving always the constant flow of brotherly affection. In the

Dowager Countess of Erroll he found a help truly meet for him, not less on the score of personal charms than of a sympathy in sound sense and accurate literary judgment. His postponement of every other consideration to those of her health and happiness must have hourly confirmed her in the soundness of her estimate of the absent-minded scholar, who, as the story goes, kept the carriage that was to take them into the country waiting till near dinner-time, while he was reciting his "Monks and Giants" to the late Mr. John Murray, and who at the beginning of their acquaintance proved his "difference from other men" by himself drinking up at an evening party the glass of negus that he had handed her down-stairs to procure for her. It was for her sake that in 1820 he engaged a ship for a cruise in the Mediterranean, in the hopes of recruiting her health; for her sake, though he adapted himself very kindly and easily to the necessary change of life and habits, that in 1821 he took up his abode at Malta, which was continued with little interruption for the quarter of a century through which his life was prolonged. The Countess of Erroll died in 1831, but the loving care of his sister, and afterwards of Lady Erroll's niece and her husband, supplied, to the utmost of their power, the loss of so much tender solicitude; and it is pleasant to think of the "white days" of his existence, which must have occurred in the visits of Sir Walter Scott, in the autumn of 1831, and of Sir George Cornwall Lewis, in 1836, to his retreat, and the learned leisure of his house overlooking the Quarantine Harbour, described by Mr. G. T. Clarke in p. ccxxxviii. The visit of the "Wizard of the North" he thoroughly enjoyed, and this, too, *more suo*. "We were told," writes Mrs. Davy, "that between Mr. Frere's habitual absence of mind, and Sir Walter's natural Scotch desire to shake hands with him at every meeting" (whilst Sir W. was in quarantine), "it required all the vigilance of the attendant genii of the place to prevent Mr. Frere from being put into quarantine along with him" (ccxvii). With Sir George Lewis he had the pleasure of more extended intercourse during that scholar's tenure of a commissionership at Malta, and if he did not succeed, as he waggishly expressed a hope, in making a good Tory of him, he at least possessed him with so high a sense of the value of his Aristophanic translations, that, on his return to England, Sir George took great interest in their appearance in print, though only for private circulation, and in the year after Frere's death wrote a very appreciative review of them in the *Classical Museum*. It seems clear that all men of genius and scholarship were attracted towards the genial recluse whom Coleridge rightly characterized as *ὁ καλοκαγαθὸς καὶ φιλόκαλος*.

The history of his life from the date of his retirement from diplomacy is really the history of his works, and these, though intrinsically valuable, are but too few. The fragmentary "Monks and Giants,"

or "King Arthur and his Round Table," which, as we have seen, he read to Murray on a memorable occasion, was published in 1818, and consisted of four cantos, to which he declined to add more because of the stigma attached to the metre after the publication of "Don Juan." It was a pity, for the metre—Frere's own introduction—is almost perfect, and the extant cantos overflow with wit. Perhaps, as has been remarked by a friend, the secret of its not having won more lasting favour may be that while "'Don Juan' is fearful from its reality, 'Monks and Giants,' or 'The Round Table,' succumbs through its unreality." Yet it is quite as likely that the reason was that, being humorous rather than personal, it lacked piquancy for those who set personal satire above harmless and playful burlesque. In 1820 Mr. Frere first identified himself with Aristophanic studies and translations, by a review of Mitchell's "Aristophanes" in the *Quarterly*, which attracted much notice at the time, and which is still worth the perusal of all who desire either to get a nicer insight into the Greek comic poet's vein, or to realise Frere's principles of translation. In 1823 and 1824 he seems to have made some progress in translating the "Frogs," the "Birds," and the "Acharnians;" and at any time up to the year 1837, when he availed himself of Sir G. Lewis's offer to superintend the printing of them at the Maltese Government Press, his chief literary occupation would seem to have been the perfecting of the above-named comedies, as well as the "Knights." Though these have, in spite of the many typographical errors, for which the Maltese press is responsible, possessed for many years a fabulous value in the second-hand book-market, they have never until now been published, and we believe the fragment of the "Peace" is now for the first time in print. His "Theognis Restitutus," a clever attempt at re-arranging, as well as translating, the disjointed remains of the gnomic poet, Theognis, so as to construct a biography from their internal evidence, was put forth in 1841, the year in which Mr. Frere was first threatened with paralysis. This translation has been longer in reach of English readers than the "Aristophanes," inasmuch as it was appended to the prose version of Theognis which the writer of these remarks made for Mr. H. G. Bohn in 1856, in the same volume with "Hesiod" and "Callimachus." At intervals he seems to have thrown off trifles of original verse, always neat, lively, and scholarlike, and stray translations from Horace and Catullus, and other poets of more or less merit. The fine old man, whose residence for twenty-five years at Malta had been broken by a single visit to England and another to Rome, and who had endeared himself to all classes by the noble-heartedness and generosity which can be traced in his portrait prefixed to the first volume, succumbed to an attack of paralysis at the ripe old age of seventy-seven years, on the 7th of January, 1846. A consistent Conservative and aristo-

crat, he had, nevertheless, the kindest sympathy with the poor of his fatherland, as well as of Malta; and though he lived in an age when political consistency was commoner than in our own, he was an example of the compatibility of strong aristocratic predilections with steadfast espousal of the interests and amelioration of the working class. It was no unmeaning spirit of badinage in which he said in 1831, of the Reform movement that was imminent, "I have no doubt that it would do great good if everyone in England would invite himself to dinner, drink his own health, and endeavour to reform himself" (ccxviii).

But to turn from Hookham Frere's life to his literary remains. The first matter of real interest is his share in the poetry of the *Anti-Jacobin*. It is known that here he had a hand with Canning in the inscription for the door of Mrs. Brownrigg, the prentice-cide's cell at Newgate—a parody on Southey's inscription for the apartment of Henry Martin, the regicide, at Chepstow Castle; in the imitation Sapphics of the colloquy between the Friend of Humanity and the needy Knifegrinder; and in *La Guillotine*, a new song imitated from the French. The beginning of the "Progress of Man," a longer effort to brand with ridicule Mr. R. Payne Knight's "Progress of Society," is attributed to Canning; and to him probably is to be ascribed the capital derivation of "didactic" (*à propos* of such kinds of poetry), "from *didaskhein*, to teach, and *poema*, a poem, because it teaches nothing and is not poetical," p. 79; but in the last fragment of this poem there are certain touches which connect, to our mind, the concluding lines with the sportive Muse of Frere; the lines, to wit, in which he presents in mocking vein Kotzebue's *Reformed Housekeeper*, the Adelaide of whom a former generation of playgoers had a dreary reminiscence in the now exploded drama of the *Stranger*. A comparison of the playful verses to his sister in 1815, touching her own and her cousin's joint house-keeping (p. cliii), with those to which we refer, will be followed by a discovery of internal evidence for one and the same authorship, though the lines now quoted are the inspiration of severer satire:—

"With look sedate and staid beyond her years
 In matron weeds a housekeeper appears,
 The jingling keys her comely girdle deck,
 Her kerchief colour'd, and her apron *check*.
 Can that be Adelaide? that 'soul of whim,'
 Reformed in practice, and in manner prim?
 On household cares intent, with many a sigh,
 She turns the pancake and she moulds the pie;
 Melts into sauces rich the savory ham;
 From the crushed berry strains the lucid jam:
 Bids brandied cherries by infusion slow
 Imbibe new flavors and their own forego,
 Solo cordial of her heart, sole solace of her woe, }

While still, responsive to each mournful moan,
The saucepan simmers in a softer tone." (i. p. 85.)

In the "Loves of the Triangles," a famous skit upon Dr. Darwin's "Loves of the Flowers" and "Botanic Garden," the editors of the volume before us attribute to their relative the proem or first canto; and this is much, seeing that it includes the loves of Trochais and Smokejack, a rare bit of mock heroic, as well as the examples, from child-storyland, of youthful Horner and glass-slippered Cinderella (pp. 92-3). The notes to these passages are as excellent fooling as the verses themselves, and supply an often-adopted pattern of mock annotation. But it is needless to quote what our readers have read and forgotten, or read and cannot forget. The drama of the *Rovers*, or the *Double Arrangement*, is, however, the *chef-d'œuvre* of the poetry of the *Anti-Jacobin*, and clings to the memory through the extravagance of its plot, the absurdity of its situations, and the humour of the burlesque, in which, to use the language of the prologue—directed at the German school, and the *Stranger* or *Reformed Housekeeper*—it evolves—

"How to two swains one nymph her vows may give,
And how two damsels with one lover live."

Wherever he has a field for it, Hookham Frere is great in stage directions. Of this we are certain. In obedience to this law of his poetic mind we can conceive to be his handiwork the grand *dénouement* of the Amœbæan Sapphic stanzas where the Friend of Humanity "kicks the Knifegrinder, overturns his wheel, and exit in a transport of republican enthusiasm and universal philanthropy" (p. 55). His we know to be the stage directions, distinct and proper, which give so much added life and point to his translations of Aristophanes, and as to which a word or two will be said further on. The scholiasts may here and there have furnished the keynote for these, but it is Hookham Frere himself who has shaped them to subserve the reader's enjoyment, and enhance the interpretation of the original. And so in the *Rovers*, it is a plausible supposition to ascribe to Frere's rare fancy, as indeed the editors justify us in doing, the very best hit of all, the grand final scene, which may be described as stage-direction run mad, all action and no dialogue. If any doubt this, let them refer to the last scene, Act iv., where the Abbey is surprised by the combined forces of Knights Templar, Troubadours, and English noblemen, Roman warriors and British grenadiers, legions, eagles, battering-rams, blunderbusses, and pocket-pistols. But of the dialogue also of this mock-heroic drama the most part, replete with quizzical fun and outrageous parody, is by Hookham Frere, though the famous song, by Rogero, anent "The

University of Gottingen," and several other songs and choruses, are attributable to Canning and Ellis.

Of a higher and more original calibre, though still in the region of poetry which he most affected, the burlesque and mock heroic, was Frere's unfinished poem, variously called "King Arthur and his Round Table," and "Monks and Giants," the latter title being perhaps the more appropriate. If this poem had no other claim upon the lovers of poetry than its author's successful acclimatization of a perfect Italian metre, it would still entitle him to lasting remembrance. According to such judges as Stewart Rose and Southey, it was Frere, and not Byron, who introduced it, and bade it thrive on English soil. But the poem has other merits than the transplanted stanza of Pulci and Berni. In its author's mind it was designed to represent the "burlesque of rude uninstructed commonsense," of Sancho's type, rather than the burlesque of imagination, which is Quixotic. If only it had had its free course, if the continuation, which we learn hung, though unwritten, on the author's tongue, and ever and anon was poured forth late in the evening to a favoured few, had but come to the birth, it would probably have asserted a more settled place in English poetry to its gifted and versatile author. The snatches of the unpublished portions, *e.g.*, the feats of Ascopart—which the editors give in pp. clx, clxii—justify this presumption. As the case stands, the fragment represents a commonplace Suffolk harness-maker's treatment of a lofty theme with a realism such as could only have been imparted to the stanzas by one of Frere's observation and humour; and, whilst in many places it recalls the poetry of the *Anti-Jacobin*, in many also it evinces true poetic beauty. Of this latter cast is the character of Sir Gawain, in the last five stanzas of the first canto, although underneath some of these there lurks a vein of playful irony, as in stanza xxiv. for instance, which looks like a contemporary portrait:—

"On every point in earnest or in jest
His judgment and his prudence and his wit
Were deemed the very touchstone and the test
Of what was proper, graceful, just and fit;
A word from him set everything at rest,
His short decisions never fail'd to hit;
His silence, his reserve, his inattention
Were felt as the severest reprehension." (p. 214.)

This irony comes out sharper in the prefatory lament for the good old days of patrons and dedicatory epistles, of which the Whistlecrafts are made to say—

"In former times all persons of high stations,
Lords, Baronets, and persons of gentility,

Paid twenty guineas for the dedications :
 This practice was attended with utility,
The patrons lived to future generat'ons,
The poets lived by their industrious earning,—
So men alive and dead could live by learning." (p. 206.)

In the portraits, too, of divers of King Arthur's guests and knights at merry Carlisle are mingled gravity and fun. A stanza begun in earnest is sure to provoke a laugh or smile before the eight lines are read through. Here is a sample containing a stray shot, presumably, at the "bucks" of Frere's day:—

"And certainly, they say, for fine behaving
 King Arthur's Court has never had its match;
 True point of honour without pride or braving,
 Strict etiquette for ever on the watch:
 Their manners were refined and perfect,—saving
 Some modern graces, which they could not catch,
 As spitting through the teeth and *driving stages*,
 Accomplishments reserved for distant ages." (p. 210.)

If our memory serves us aright, the ambition of men of rank and wealth to turn "jarvies" is satirized in one of the *Musæ Etonenses* of a somewhat subsequent date. In the second canto our poet carries the knights from the festive board to a struggle with certain giants, and amusingly represents Sir Tristram's desultoriness and Sir Gawain's staid, matter-of-fact dignity. This canto is full of lively hits and happy thoughts, such as the speculation on "True Courage" (st. xli.), the summary treatment of the giants by Sir Tristram when he had stormed their fortress, in which the words are accommodated to the action:—

"He found some giants wounded, others dead—
 He shortly equalizes *these* with *those*" (st. lii.);

and the simile which illustrates, with inimitable bathos, the valiant Tristram's difficulty of finding the secret track (ii. xxix), and which we should quote were there not a richer example of the same figure in the next canto. This is *à propos* of a certain prudent monk, who held aloof from his brethren in the views and steps they took with reference to the rupture with their giant neighbours, detailed in the third canto. Here is the simile preferred:—

"Wise curs, when canister'd, refuse to run;
 They merely crawl and creep about and whine,
 And disappoint the boys and spoil the fun—
 That picture is too mean—this monk of mine
 Ennobled it, as others since have done,
 With grace, and ease, and grandeur of design;
 He neither ran, nor howl'd, nor crept, nor turn'd,
 But wore it, as he w^ok'd, quite unconcern'd." (p. 239.)

A few stanzas beyond this occurs another simile, that trite one of

the *apes æstate novâ*, &c.; but so neatly, gracefully represented in its first half, and then so naturally and playfully drawn off to a description of the operation of "tanging," that it constitutes in itself one of the best imitations of the poem. Space does not suffice for going into the plot, so far as there is one; nor is it of much importance in the case of a mere fragment. In canto the third occur three excellent stanzas in ridicule of Bryant's mythological theories (ix.—xi.), a clever imitation of monkish Latin in three more stanzas accommodated to the metre of the rest of the poem, and a very graphic account of what the neighbouring mountains thought and felt when first the monks began a-ringing their new bells, and when—

"Cader-Gibbrish from his cloudy throne
To huge Loblommon gave an intimation
Of this strange rumour," &c., &c.

The fourth canto has some capital stanzas about the inner life of the monastery during its siege, the death of the old abbot, and the election of a fighting-friar into his place, who is in some eight or nine stanzas compared with Pericles. All of a sudden the giants appear to slacken their assault. There is a great lull. Friar Martin, who had gone a-fishing, returns unmolested. The besieged peep out, and taking courage in Virgilian fashion, go out to see the "*Dorica castra Desertosque locos*," of which stanza lii. is a very happy parody. The humour of the close of the fragment consists in its bringing the reader round to where he started. King Arthur's festival was broken up in the first canto by the report that the giants had carried off some women; at the end of the fourth we learn that the giants have raised the siege because their attention is distracted by the same bevy of women:—

"They went, in short, upon their last adventure
After the ladies,—neither more nor less—
Our story now revolves upon its centre." (p. 259.)

How the author would have worked out his complete poem it is supererogatory to speculate. Possibly it is no worse for its fragmentary condition, in which there is enough to laugh over, with no premonitions of tediousness. Assuredly it asserts Frere's mastery of his penchant, the burlesque, at the same time that occasional bits of poetic description bespeak his powers in a higher poetical vein.

There is little else to take account of in the first volume of Frere's "*Remains*," the "*Fables for Five Years Old*" being simply what they profess to be, and perhaps almost too practical and sober-minded for the five-year-olds of modern high pressure. The epistle to his friend Whiter is lively and Swiftian, with a dash of the flavour of Horace, whom he had at his fingers' ends. The epitaphs for Can-

ning's monument are very interesting both as compositions and as the testimony of one than whom none knew Canning better. But the first is more of an obituary notice than an epitaph, and the second will not satisfy those of Canning's admirers who have read the first and miss some of its kindest features. Both these, however, are *bonâ fide* portraitures. The third is a satirical afterthought in epigrammatic shape and form:—

"I was destroyed by Wellington and Grey.
They both succeeded. Each has had his day.
Both tried to govern, each in his own way;
And both repent of it—as well they may!" (p. 313, vol. i.)

By far the most lasting and worthy memorial of John Hookham Frere remains to be noticed. His translations of Aristophanes stand alone above all other classical translations in the English language. It is, or ought to be, needless to repeat here the arguments in proof of this averment, which were given at some length in a paper on "English Translations of Aristophanes" (*Contemporary Review*, December, 1867). Suffice it to say that the writer of the present remarks there endeavoured to show, by a comparison of Mr. Frere's translations of the *Acharnians* and *Knights* with those of Dunster, Cumberland, Mitchell, and Walsh, that the first-named, and he alone, succeeds in effecting the precise compromise between literality and paraphrase, and in compensating, upon a give-and-take principle, the spirit and humour of the original, which are all and everything to the translator of Aristophanes. Frere's unerring good taste has kept him clear of the servile attempt to represent exactly, or by forced modern equivalents, those personal and local allusions in the original, which are best resolved by a translator into the genera of which, as local and personal varieties, they are but the accidental type. He has steered clear also of the affectation of making the characters introduced by the Athenian comic poet talk the language of Elizabethan or Caroline dramatists, judging accurately that the garb which should clothe a translation, if it is to live and be popular, should neither be too new nor too old, and should be a free, spontaneous adoption of the speech of the time being, with no foreign importations, and nothing to mar the pleasure of plain English readers. Stress was also laid in the article referred to upon the tact which Frere shows, in conformity with the principle enunciated in his article on Mitchell's translations of Aristophanes, in the *Quarterly Review* of 1820, in reference to the reproduction or qualification, or omission, of coarsenesses and impurities with which an Athenian comic writer had to occasionally flavour his dialogue. Admitting that in theory a translator, to give a fair notion what Attic comedy was, must give an occasional spice of its

indecent and low joking, he deserves the credit of having reduced this flavouring to a minimum, and of having generally disguised it in "Parliamentary language." As the Knights and Acharnians formed the ground of our quotations in the former paper referred to, it may not be amiss to illustrate Mr. Frere's principles and practice of translation in the present from the delightful comedy of the Birds, and, if it will not weary the reader, from the "Fragment of the Peace," which is the more noticeable as its first appearance in print is in the volume before us.

About his "Birds" Frere wrote in 1824, "I have done 1,200 lines of it, which in my humble opinion are excellent" (p. clxxxv); and, as Sir G. C. Lewis's preference for his Acharnians and Knights in the *Classical Museum* is possibly no more than the action of his mind's bias towards the originals, we may fairly include the dramas from which we are going to quote amongst the best of the list of which Miss Frere wrote in language which will be acquitted of partiality by those who can judge of its truthfulness, that "independently of their merit as a faithful rendering of the sense of the original, the lively representation of character, with the play of fancy expressed in such genuine English, choice phraseology, and variety of harmonious measure, makes a very delightful reading. There is the spirit and life of an original composition" (p. cxcviii).

No play more thoroughly than the Birds realises what Mr. Frere lays down as the constituent elements of an Aristophanic comedy, "impossibility of situation along with perfect reality of dialogue." Pisthetærus, a citizen of Athens, and dissatisfied political adventurer, quits his home with Euelpides, the normal buffoon of Attic comedy, in quest of a city in the air, where—through favour of Epops or Hoopoo, a mythological kinsman of the Athenians, and now King of the Birds, as once he was of Thrace,—they may escape the unrest and the litigations of their native city. When the King of the Birds has with difficulty persuaded his subjects to listen to the strangers, Pisthetærus fills them with his plans for recovering them their rights and privileges, and for a grand centralization of the whole race of birds into one great city. Capital scenes are made up of the solemnities attending the foundation of the colony and inauguration of "Cloud-cuckoo-town," the building of which Euelpides undertakes to superintend. Accounts are brought to Pisthetærus that the work progresses, but these are belied by the fact that although it was to *build out* the gods, Iris, their messenger, finds no impediment to free passage any whither. Meanwhile, he is beset by applicants for wings, from his old city, and is puzzled not to be able to turn them to any account. Sacrifices to the gods being discontinued, the gods themselves are obliged to fall in with the new-

fashioned worship of the bird race, and Zeus himself surrenders his throne to Pisthetærus, who has got round Hercules, an envoy from the gods, by the bribe of certain roast birds, arrested for their aristocratic aims. In the finale, Pisthetærus celebrates his nuptials with Basileia, himself brandishing the thunderbolts of Zeus, and accompanied by a procession of all the birds. But the plot—as this attempt to sketch it will have shown—is the merest peg on which to hang dialogue, chorus, and parabasis. One of the best bits in the early part of the play is where Pisthetærus is bamboozling Epops, and made to risk his neck being wrung, whilst he takes a lesson in astronomy. Other skits at the prevailing fashion of Aristophanes's day for astronomy and physical science occur in the piece, but this exhibits the adventurer's ready wit upon occasion of discoursing with a novice :—

PEIS. "Come, what d'yo see?
 HOOP. The clouds and sky; that's all.
 PEIS. Well that we call the pole and atmosphere;
 And would it not serve you birds for a metropole?
 HOOP. Pole? is it called a pole?
 PEIS. Yes! that's the name.
 Philosophers of late call it the pole;
 Because it wheels and rolls itself about,
 As it were, in a sort of roly-poly way.
 Well there then you may build and fortify,
 And call it your metropolis—your acropolis.
 From that position you'll command mankind,
 And keep them in utter thorough subjugation;
 Just as you do the grasshoppers and locusts.
 And if the gods offend you, you'll blockade 'em,
 And starve 'em to a surrender.
 HOOP. In what way?
 PEIS. Why thus! your atmosphere is placed, you see,
 In a middle point just betwixt heaven and earth.
 A case of the same kind occurs with us.
 Our people in Athens if they send to Delphi
 With deputations, offerings, or what not,
 Are forced to obtain a pass from the Boeotians:
 Thus when mankind on earth are sacrificing,
 If you should find the gods grown mutinous
 And insubordinate you could intercept
 All their supplies of sacrificial smoke.
 HOOP. By the earth and all its *springs!* *springs* and nooses!
 Odds, nets and snares! this is the cleverest notion!
 And I could find it in my heart to venture,
 If the other birds agree to the proposal."

(p. 149, vol. ii. Ar. Av. 178—97.)

It is worth noting here how cleverly vv. 6—7 of the above extract express the spirit of the charlatan's derivation of πόλος—ὅτι δὲ πολέεται τούτο καὶ διέρχεται ἅπαντα διὰ τούτου, καλεῖται νῦν πόλος (vv. 181—2). On the principle which has been before adverted to

about local allusions, it will be seen that λιμῶ Μηλίῳ in v. 186 is generalized in translation; and in the ejaculation of the Epops is found, as Mr. Frere takes a pride in assuring his readers, the exact transcript of the original "exclamation and oath, exactly in the style of Bob Acres." In his translation of *μὰ παγίδας*, it seems that he saw in the words, *παγίς* or *πάγη*, and *πιγγί*.

At the exciting point of the drama, where Epops has much ado to keep his fellow-birds' claws and beaks off the two strangers whom his connection with Pandion's daughter enables him to call friends and kinsfolk, five or six lines of his to the Birds upon the prudence of learning sometimes from a foe—*fas est et ab hoste doceri*—are paraphrased by Mr. Frere into fifteen, in consideration of the war changes and improvements, and in the art and practice of war, which, he remarks, were fresh at Athens at the time of the representation of the Birds (B.C. 414), when the power and revenues and armaments of the State had been increased by the favourable peace of Nicias. They are too long to quote, as they ought to be quoted, with the Greek before or after them, but it is worth the reader's while, if he retains his command of Greek, to compare them (Birds, 376—81; cf. Frere's Translation, pp. 154—5) one with the other, and to note how nothing is imported into the paraphrase which has not its germ, at any rate, in the original. Pisthetærus's proofs of the former dominion and consequence of the bird-tribe (Birds, 480, &c.), and his picture of their present degraded estate (521—37), are lively rendered in pp. 159—61, and it is amusing to compare the original with the copy of the Bird-king's depreciation of himself and his subjects in the scene that follows. Epops doubts whether men will transfer their homage to winged fowls from the denizens of Olympus. Pisthetærus rejoins—

"Poh! nonsense I tell you—no blockhead but knows
That Mercury flies; there is Iris too
Homer informs us how she flew:
'Smooth as a dove she went sailing along.'
And pinions of gold, both in picture and song
To Cupid and Victory fairly belong.

HOOP. But Jove's thunder has wings; if he send but a volley,
Mankind for a time may abandon us wholly.

PEIS. What then? We shall raise a granivorous troop
To sweep their whole crops with a ravenous swoop:
If Ceres is able, perhaps she may deign
To assist their distress with a largess of grain.

EUELP. No! no! she'll be making excuses, I warrant.

PEIS. Then the crows will be sent on a different errand,
To pounce all at once with a sudden surprise
On their oxen and sheep, to peck out their eyes;
And leave them stone blind for Apollo to cure.
He'll try it: he'll work for his salary sure!"

(Gr. 573—84. E. p. 164—5.)

A good reproduction of the lively dialogue of the Greek; just as the *Parabasis*, which shortly follows, is, in Frere's rendering, an enhancement, through his taste and fineness of touch, of the fine treatment of a sublime subject by the Attic comic poet. An exact comparison of Greek and English would show how well the translator has known how to make his version readable and attractive without any of the coarse allusions which, it would seem, the Athenian taste required as "caviare." But, to omit the choruses, of which a word or two anon, the only other passage of the *Birds* which can be cited here is from the scene where Pisthetærus is beset with knaves and impostors of divers kinds from the mother country, eager to get some share of the good things of which it is clear that he will be the sole dispenser in the new city. First comes a priest, and shortly after a poet, ragged and shabby. Pisthetærus "requisitions" the former to furnish articles of clothing for the latter; "the first act of confiscation," as Frere informs us in quaint following of the scholiast, "being directed against the property of the Church." In this interview the marginal stage directions vastly help the enjoyment and perception of the translation, and this is still better seen in the dialogue between Pisthetærus and the soothsayer who succeeds the poet on the stage. This quack quotes spurious oracles. And Pisthetærus extemporizes a counter oracle, which he tacks to Apollo, as follows:—

"If at the sacrifice which you prepare,
An uninvited vagabond should dare
To interrupt you and demand a share,
Let cuffs and buffets be the varlet's lot.
Smite him between the ribs and spare him not."

SOOTH. Nonsense you're talking!

PEIS. (*With the same action as the soothsayer as if he were feeling for papers*).

Look at the book and see!

'Thou shalt in no wise heed them, or forbear
To lash and smite those eagles of the air,
Neither regard their names, for it is written,
Lampon and Diopeithes shall be smitten.'

SOOTH. Is all this true? •

PEIS. (*producing a horsewhip*). Look at the book, and see!

Get out with a plague and a vengeance.

SOOTH. Oh dear! oh!

PEIS. Go soothsay somewhere else, you rascal, run."

(*Birds*, 981, &c. E. T. pp. 180, 181.)

As far as we are aware, Mr. Frere divines all these explanatory touches and stage directions by his own lively insight of the original, thereby supplying some of "that sort of comic shorthand," which in his essay on Aristophanic translation in the *Quarterly Review* he regards as contained in "the actors' tone and gesture" (cf. vol. i. p. 185).

It is hard to find words of praise warm and strong enough for Mr.

Frere's choral songs in the *Birds*: they are so light and airy such perfect metrical outpourings, such complete assumptions, by the translator, of the Attic poet's salt and spirit. Nothing can exceed the beauty or melody of his rendering of the Hoopoo's serenade to his mate (209—22, cf. p. 150), or the lyric beginning with "Hoop, hoop! come in a troop," which almost immediately follows it, and in which the granivorous birds are addressed as—

"Birds of an humble gentle bill,
Smooth and shrill,
Dieted on seeds and grain,
Rioting on the furrow'd plain,
Pecking, hopping,
Picking, popping,
Among the barley newly sown." (p. 151.)

Or again, at vv. 1058—70, p. 185, the definition by the chorus of the functions of the *soi-disant* bird deities, and the perfect little ode which follows the "epirrema" (p. 186) (*εὐδαιμον φύλον πτηνῶν, κ.τ.λ. vv. 1088—1100*):—

"Blest are they,
The Birds alway,
With perfect clothing,
Fearing nothing,
Cold or sleet or summer heat.
As it chances,
As he fancies,
Each his own vagary follows,
Dwelling in the dells and hollows,
When with eager, weary strain,
The shrilly grasshoppers complain,
Parch'd upon the sultry plain,
Madden'd with the raging heat;
We secure a cool retreat,
In the shady nooks and coves,
Recesses of the sacred groves,
Many a herb and many a berry
Serves to feast and make us merry."

One can hardly conceive translation which so thoroughly divests itself of the impression of being fettered. Imitations, of course, such as that of Mr. Courthope based on this very play, give larger scope for invention and fancy, but it is difficult not to envy the faculty possessed by Frere of wearing so gaily and jauntily the livery of the Greek, that any one might take his songs to be at first-hand.

The "Scenes of the Peace," now for the first time printed, are that in which Trygæus appears at heaven's portals and alights from his dung-beetle (180—300); that in which Mercury brings out Peace, rescued from durance vile, to the chorus of Rustics (603—774), and which includes the parabasis of this play; and a fragment of a chorus (*οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ἡϊτιον, κ.τ.λ. 1140—55*) taken down, it is

stated in a prefatory note, from Mr. Frere's dictation. There is the same life and spirit in this as in the other Aristophanic translations, though here and there a ground for suspicion whether the translator had quite ascertained the bearings of his Greek. Even in such cases, however, a happy vagueness leaves the sin venial and its commission doubtful. A quotable passage from Mercury's rating of the Athenians for their faults and follies and undue heed to demagogues in the Peloponnesian War is all that we can find space for. (Peace, vv. 637—48, p. 303, Frere's Tr.)

"But the speakers all combined with *pitchforks of collusion lies*,
Thrust *her* headlong from the ramparts, and began to tyrannize
(With their treasonable charges) over all the first and best
And the richest of our subjects—and to ransack every chest;
Made a mess of confiscations, which they dealt to you for food,
And with hasty condemnations *trained you to the taste of blood*;
For the city pale and sickly—lonely, lurid, and forlorn,
Sat in stench and darkness waiting for the victims to be torn,
And whene'er the jails were opened with devouring fury pounced
On the wealthy carrion paunches cast before her and denounced.
Lashes, stripes, and groans were sounding, and the states that heard the crash
Stopt the mouths of our accusers *with a plug of present cash*:
Thus they rose to wealth and greatness, Greece declined to want and ruin,
Such were all your faults and errors, this was all the Tanner's doing."

Of course, by *her*, in the second line, is meant the "Goddess of Peace." The other italicized words in the passage are meant to draw attention to happy renderings of such expressions as *δικροῖς κερράγμασιν, τοῦτον ὡσπερ κυνίει ἐσπαράττετε*, and *ἐβύνουν τὸ στόμα*; but the general result is, after all, quite as successful as particular lines.

From the sparkling sallies of Aristophanes to the elegiac querulousness of Theognis the descent is drear, and it might puzzle the superficial reader to guess the attraction which the latter can have possessed for one who had won his literary spurs in the field of parody and burlesque. But it is traceable, probably, to the sympathy of Frere with aristocratic principles, wherever or however developed, and with the Conservatism, which he preferred to call Toryism, though assuredly he did not connect that name with "no progress." Aristophanes was a Liberal-Conservative, or, as Sir G. C. Lewis calls him, a Tory-Radical. Theognis was a more anti-reforming aristocrat, embittered by exile, disappointment, and the desertion of his friends. Howbeit, the lessons which both poets teach in their quite diverse manners, are equally directed against democracy and mob rule, as well as, it should be added, against tyranny. Another clue to Mr. Frere's attraction to Theognis may be found in the fascination of the task, suggested by Welcker, of rearranging the scattered fragments of this poet, so as to weave them into a coherent and consistent fabric. If the arrange-

ment which Mr. Frere has given is, after all, arbitrary, and if also the foundations on which he builds his structure are, as all must admit, slender, the meed of ingenuity is none the less due to the subtlety and patience with which he has wrought out his task. For a good sketch of the "Theognis Restitutus," with all the best quotations that could be culled from it, the review of it in the 72nd volume of the *Quarterly* may with advantage be consulted (pp. 452—73). This critique, Frere himself, in a letter to his brother Bartle (i. cclxxx) attributes to Hallam. Two passages not extracted by the reviewer we venture to give, as very good specimens of the translator's work. The first recommends a discreet choice of instruments, and a distrust of untried friends. The second sounds the praise of the sole solace and support of an exile such as Theognis was.

xxxiv. "Never engage with a poltroon or craven,—
 Avoid him, Kurnus, as a treacherous haven!
 These friends and hearty comrades, as you think
 (Ready to join you when you feast and drink) }
 These easy friends from difficulty shrink.

For a shrewd intellect, the best employ
 Is to detect a soul of base alloy;
 No task is harder or imports so much;
 Silver and gold, you prove it by the touch.
 You separate the pure, discard the dross,
 And disregard the labour and the loss:
 But a friend's heart, base and adulterate,—
 A friendly surface with a core of hate!
 Of all the frauds with which the Fates have curst
 Our simple easy nature—is the worst:
 Beyond the rest ruinous in effect;
 And of all others hardest to detect;
 For men's and women's hearts you cannot try
 Beforehand, like the cattle that you buy.
 Nor human wit nor reason, when you treat }
 For such a purpose, can escape deceit; } (vv. 113—23.)
 Fancy betrays us and assists the cheat."

lxxix. "For human nature Hope remains alone
 Of all the deities: the rest are flown.
 Faith is departed: Truth and Honour dead:
 And all the Graces too, my friend, are fled.
 The scanty specimens of living worth
 Dwindled to nothing or extinct on earth.
 Yet while I live and view the light of Heaven,
 (Since Hope remains, and never has been driven
 From the distracted world,) the single scope
 Of my devotion is to worship Hope:
 When hecatombs are slain, and altars burn.
 With all the deities adored in turn,
 Let Hope be present, and with Hope, my friend,
 Let every sacrifice commence and end.

Yes! insolence, injustice, every crime,
 Rapine and wrong may prosper for a time;
 Yet shall they travel on to swift decay
 That tread the crooked path and hollow way."

(vv. 1131—46. Frere, ii. 383.)

If these two specimens attract our readers to a study of Frere's *Theognis* with the Greek text side by side, the result is certain to be admiration of the versatility which is displayed in the transition from the grotesqueness of Attic comedy to the sombre sedateness of the Megarean gnomic poet, and in the command of success in both fields.

Of the various translations which make up the remainder of the second volume, the length of this article would be a valid excuse for saying nothing; but there is one amongst them—that of Catullus's *Epithalamium* of Julia and Manlius—in which Mr. Frere's tact and refined delicacy are so marked that it were unfair to withhold all mention of it. As all must allow, one chief characteristic of his Aristophanic versions is the judgment displayed in softening down the occasional coarseness and indelicate allusions which an advancement in civilization votes "bad taste." He does not wholly suppress this feature of the ancient classics; but he tones it to presentable form. So it is in the Catullian ode, as he renders it. One of the prettiest bits therein is where the gossips, or the poet, or both, in allotted stanzas, difficult to distinguish nicely, "chaff" the bridegroom, and predict the consequences of the step he is taking. After expressing their sense of the perfect meetness of "either for other," and their good wishes for a union so honestly inaugurated, they proceed:—

"Sport your fill, and never spare—
 Let us have an infant heir,
 Of the noble name:
 Such a line should ever last,
 As it has for ages past,
 Another and the same.

"Fear not! with the coming year
 The new Torquatus will be here,
 Him we soon shall see
 With infant gesture fondly seek
 To reach his father's manly cheek,
 From his mother's knee.

"With laughing eyes and dewy lip,
 Pouting like the purple tip
 That points the rose's bud;
 While mingled with the mother's grace,
 Strangers shall recognise the trace
 That marks the Manlian blood.

“So the mother’s fair renown
 Shall betimes adorn and crown
 The child with dignity,
 As we read in stories old
 Of Telemachus the bold,
 And chaste Penelope.”

(pp. 465—6. Catull. lxi. 211—230.)

In the same poem are many other stanzas equally fresh and good indeed, one lesson, which those who may read Frere’s works with a view to ascertaining the secret of his admitted pre-eminence as a translator can scarcely fail to learn, will be the need of discerning how far the process of transmutation will bear the sacrifice of even the unpleasant features of the original author. Frere’s system of compromise was a nearly perfect reflection of the author he translated, as free as he could consistently make it from indelicacy and repulsiveness. Another lesson, too, he may teach to some modern translators, for which the mass of English readers will thank his memory. Success in metrical translation depends not, as some fancy, on the cleverest reproduction of the original metres so much as on embodying the words and spirit of the translated author in an approximately equivalent English measure. No ear could desire truer presentments of the lyrics of Aristophanes than are found in many of Mr. Frere’s choruses, where, however, the likeness to the originals is the very reverse of servile. So, too, with the ode of Catullus, just quoted. Which version is likelier to please an English ear, or to find a place in an English reader’s memory—that in which Mr. Frere has moulded his transcript of the Glyconics of Catullus to a downright English metre, or the dance-in-chains, of which all must be conscious who read Mr. Robinson Ellis’s fac-simile version, and of which this that follows is a sample?

“Some Torquatus, a beauteous
 Babe on motherly breast to thee,
 Stretching, father, his innocent
 Hands, smiles softly from inchoate
 Lips half open a blessing.” (Ellis’s Catullus, p. 45.)

We need hardly press the question to an issue.

To Englishmen of his own condition Hookham Frere’s life and works should point a lesson which, except by a chosen few, runs the risk in the present age of being overlooked; that of the embellishment added to a public position and a part in the conduct of affairs by the highest culture and scholarship. It might be urged that Frere’s premature withdrawal from the public service points to the incompatibility of a scholar’s habits with administrative powers. But this is not proven. He had to be sacrificed to popular clamour, and, like a true and noble Englishman, he acquiesced in a sacrifice

which prevented damage to his party. But this sacrifice was lightened, even as his active life was diversified, by the studies which made him a delightful companion, a well-informed public servant, and the possessor of the secret of contentment in active life or in retirement. Tastes like those of Hookham Frere conduce to independence, self-resource, and self-respect.

There may not be in his published works much evidence of the originality which goes to the making of a first-rate poet, though none will deny to him the gifts of a bright fancy, a correct ear, an abundant flow of lyric power. His classical predilections and the bent of his humour disposed him to content himself with the praise of complete mastery of Aristophanes, and successful efforts in the region of burlesque. Referable indeed to this taste and aim are almost all of his best and happiest literary efforts. The "Monks and Giants" would not entitle him to rank high among original poets, but as an outcome of the same vein of humour which we trace in the *Anti-Jacobin* and in the Aristophanic free translations, they claim a place of honour amid the writings of English humorists. This in fact was his *métier*. It was because his fancy saw the best chance of developing this in rendering the Aristophanic comedies in an English dress, that the name, which the volumes before us cannot fail to revive, will, as long as our language lasts, be associated with Aristophanes and his dramas.

JAMES DAVIES.



SOCIAL FORCES OF THE HOUR.

IT is a confusing thing to many candid persons to read the statements which are often put forth, exhibiting the contrast between the English life of to-day and that of the last century, or the last century but one. Setting aside the large number of men whose constitution inclines them to a violently peculiar view of the past in its comparison with the present, there are always to be found a good many open-minded thinkers who ask for nothing but facts to guide them in forming their conclusion. They neither depreciate nor glorify that extinct state of affairs, of which all they really know is, that it no longer exists. They believe neither in the superlative wisdom nor the lamentable ignorance of their ancestors. They are quite ready to believe anything whatever concerning the past in its contrast with the present, which can be established by real proofs. All that they require is that the question shall not be settled by *a priori* hypotheses, or by any assumption of the existence of some mysterious law which condemns the English people to continuous degradation, or which confers on them the blessing of irresistible progress.

That unprejudiced and truth-seeking persons of this class should at the same time be bewildered and almost awe-struck by the social phenomena of to-day, is not, I think, to be wondered at. These phenomena are, in some respects, nothing less than appalling. Moreover, there

often seems to be no way out of our present difficulties. Every agency that is brought to bear upon these gigantic evils seems to fail. Philanthropy and benevolence appear sometimes to be the most mischievous of all elements in English social life. Theological teaching has failed, and now simple charitableness has failed also; and what more remains? The old organic system which existed a hundred years ago, and has come down even to our own time, is breaking up in all quarters, and what is to take its place? It is all chaos and confusion, and the shattering of landmarks, and the uprooting of habits, and the rending of ties, and what is to come of it all? It is not, therefore, surprising that the most prudent thinkers should be sometimes led to accept the dogmatic assertions of those who believe in the existence of a bygone golden age, which, according to their temperaments, they fix either in the middle ages, the renaissance period, the Commonwealth, the revolutionary epoch, the earlier days of George III., or even the days of George IV. himself.

Nor do I for a moment pretend that this question of the comparative happiness of the present, and let us say, the last century, is one that is easy of solution. The popular cant about the blessedness of the English life of to-day is as odious to me as it is to the most irrational believer in an extinct period of perfection. Of all the rubbish that has been uttered, none is more worthless than the current praises of our modern civilization, and no word is more grossly abused than this very word "civilization" itself. I cannot see that we are anything more than a semi-civilized people up to this day; or, to use the word which is precisely identical in meaning, but more unpleasant in the sound, we are nothing more than a semi-barbarous people, judging by any rational standard of civilization and barbarism. Morally, religiously, æsthetically, in politics, in diplomacy, in legislation, in administration, in education, in our amusements, in our very dress and our dinners, we are still but half civilized, or semi-barbarous, choose whichever form we will.

If, then, I venture upon giving some reasons why I think that we are not worse than our fathers, it is from no absurd belief in the nineteenth century, as an age in which self-glorification may be tolerated, or as an age, indeed, which is not full of perils, and in which the evils which were generated in the past may not be tending to some tremendous crash at some not far distant period. The social atmosphere is, indeed, filled with explosive materials, and it is simply absurd to assume that because we have hitherto escaped any tremendous convulsion, we are, therefore, secure for the future. There is an unquestionable political and economical truth in the old Hebrew saying, that "the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," which may be pre-eminently appli-

cable to ourselves. The mistakes, whether selfish or unselfish, of one generation are often as slow as they are prolific in bearing their natural fruits; and it is quite possible that it may be our lot to suffer through the operation of social and economical laws, whose revolutionary work is really due to the follies, the ignorance, or the vices of our ancestors. The organic life of a people is continued from generation to generation, and it is no more possible to avert the effects of past errors, by simply opening our eyes to their existence, than it is for an old debauchee to enjoy the blessings of a vigorous old age by simply avowing and lamenting the excesses of his youth.

At the same time the difficulty of instituting any comparison between the operation of the social forces of to-day, and that of those which were at work at the beginning of the present century, or a hundred years ago, is very great. It is difficult enough to form a fair estimate of the tendencies of the life in which we are ourselves taking an active part. But when the inquiry is transferred some two or three generations backwards, the scarcity of trustworthy materials is doubly striking. The moment we apply ourselves in a thoroughly critical spirit to test the value of the records of the English life of the latter half of the eighteenth century, and of the beginning of our nineteenth, the visionary character of the popular ideals is irresistibly apparent. Whether those ideals are true or false, the fact is undeniable, that to a large extent they are the result of unmitigated guess-work. The very statistics of the period are not to be relied on, our present system of statistics-gathering being then unknown. Statistics in those days were the work of a few isolated individuals, urged on by a scientific instinct, and altogether in advance of their age. The figures they got together were, therefore, drawn from most limited areas, and even as far as they went, were often extremely partial and misleading. And seeing how hard it is to interpret the full significance of the carefully-sought statistics of to-day, it needs no words to prove that when the statistics themselves were fragmentary and incorrect, they can serve scarcely any purpose beyond that of giving hints to the cautious and acute inquirer.

But it is not merely in the matter of formal statistics that we are at a loss for materials for comparing our own life with that of our recent forefathers. Wherever we turn in examining the records of their personal and social history, we are struck with the absence of the two characteristic phenomena of the English life of to-day. They knew nothing of our intense self-consciousness, and of our passion for decorum. Surely never before, since men became civilized, was there an age which so fondly cherished this habit of self-inspection, in which we now delight. Everybody now is a critic of something or other, and has his views of the internal condition of

society and of the future of his country. The whole nation is possessed with a mania for examining, so to say, its own conscience, and discerning its short-comings, and tabulating its offences in a sort of spiritual diary. Spontaneity seems dying out amongst us, while rarely has an age been more thoroughly un-selfconscious and spontaneous, both in its vices and its virtues, than was the period with which we are in the habit of comparing our own. A hundred years ago the violence of political party-spirit was nothing less than ferocious, and the distinctions of caste were absolute walls of separation between the noble and the plebeian, the rich and the poor. But all alike spoke their mind without fear of consequences, and whatever were their faults, no love for morbid self-inspection and self-criticism is to be detected among them.

As a consequence, or perhaps rather as a cause, they knew nothing of that devotion to decorum which amounts among ourselves to a perfectly fanatical worship. The very notion of being "content to dwell in decencies for ever" may have suited the idiosyncrasies of an infinitesimally small minority. But of that adoration of "propriety," which runs throughout the whole of English society, high and low alike, the age had none. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers had thrown off the unbridled licence of the Restoration period. They had come to recognise the eternal differences of right and wrong. They had learnt to admire great ideas, and to struggle for them like men. But they had not yet fallen in love with decency, as such, and for its own sake, without regard to the hideous body which decency might be clothing. At this day, their talk, their diaries, their letters, their plays, their novels, their caricatures, their newspapers, are often not producible in their integrity, so free-spoken were they, and so rigidly decorous are we.

And further, the reign of universal philanthropy had not then set in. It was a coarse, rough, vigorous, nay, brutal age, when the finest sensibilities of to-day were not awake and alive. Its virtues took another form, and effeminacy was comparatively unknown, except as a mark for insult and derision. Now, with ourselves, it is a very suggestive fact that effeminacy is rarely made a butt for public ridicule. We have adopted the softer virtues into our moral code; and the possession of refinement, of delicacy, of cultivation, is no longer supposed to indicate a want of manliness and courage. Comparatively speaking, the very idea of the "fop" of the last century is now forgotten. He is a rarity, even when he appears in a modified form amongst us. Refinement and manliness have, apparently at least, shaken hands with one another; and the "fop" is, so it seems, a relic of the past, still lingering amongst us. I say "so it seems," for the very question is, how far we have gained in true manliness

and the more vigorous virtues. The difficulty is to ascertain how far the contemporary pictures of the latter half of the eighteenth century were real pictures or gross and untrustworthy caricatures. We want to learn whether its apparent brutality was real brutality, or only a deficiency in nervous sensibility; whether its coarseness was in word only; and whether its disregard of human suffering arose from ignorance or from sheer cruelty. All we can assume, on first studying its literature, is that it was unquestionably rough, rude, and regardless of many things which we now cherish as the most lately developed results of the spirit of Christianity and civilization.

In the midst of these puzzling phenomena we have but one trustworthy clue to their interpretation. A wise man will surely devote himself to a wide and careful study of the whole range of social facts which have come under his own personal observation. He will inquire whether these facts seem to indicate a forward or a retrograde movement in the national life, and how far they fall in with the ordinary laws of human action, or are due to the violent operation of transient external causes. He will then apply his conclusions to the investigation of the records of the periods lying beyond his personal experience, and ask himself whether the movements which he has traced are the simple working out of principles which have been long in operation at the heart of English life, or whether they are due to some sudden incursion of radically new and temporary ideas. In a word, if the inquirer is satisfied that English society has moved in one direction during some thirty or forty years, during which he has been personally cognizant of its true character, and that this character harmonizes with every detail that he can gather as to its nature when it passes beyond the range of his personal experience, then surely he is justified in concluding that the movement of the last thirty or forty years is but the continuation of a movement which is a hundred or a hundred and fifty years old. If, during his own knowledge of it, it has been a backward or downward movement, then undoubtedly we are in bad case altogether. If the reverse, the vaticinations of the desponding are the mere moanings of ignorant discontent, and the country is far indeed from being on the road to ruin.

Turning, then, to details, it is to be noted that the complaints of those who believe in our present degeneracy are nearly all of them the results of one single conviction—the conviction that the structure of society has become more or less disorganized, and that its elements are resolving themselves into a chaotic confusion. This, I think, is a fair account of the source of the dread which has taken possession of not a few of the more moderate and sensible believers in our national decay. They do not believe in the degeneracy of the individual Englishman so much as in the operation of certain tendencies which

go to break up the social and political fabric, and which will plunge us, if not forcibly arrested, in some sort of hideous disaster and anarchy. The forms which their lamentations assume vary according to personal temperament and circumstances. It is social or domestic life, or political life, or religious life, or commercial life, which furnishes these terrible indications of impending ruin, just as the mourner happens to be interested in domestic details, or religion, or politics, or business. But the notes of the melancholy *refrain* are the same, though one voice chants it in one language, and another in another.

And the burden of the song is ever harping upon one word. That word is "independence." This is the bugbear of innumerable men and women in all but the lower strata of society. Everybody has got now-a-days to be so "independent," that it is impossible that affairs can go on much longer without coming to some fearful break up. Workmen are so "independent" that there is no carrying out the great commercial system in peace and quietness. Servants are so "independent" that there is no controlling them. Children are so "independent" that they care no more for their parents and teachers than for utter strangers. Even soldiers and sailors are "independent," and the government of a ship and the discipline of a regiment have involved the necessity of paying some regard to the feelings and the rights of the human beings under command. Clerks and shopmen are so "independent" that it is absolutely necessary for employers to remember that they are all of identically the same flesh and blood with themselves, and that the inferior cannot be bought and sold at the pleasure of the superior, like a pair of carriage horses or a case of hardware.

Most astonishing of all, the world of curates has learnt to be "independent." For generation after generation the Church of England has existed upon the theory that the curate is not a being of the same nature as other men. He is the unit from which is made up that numerous class who are described as the "inferior clergy." The market for curates was not like the market for any other human commodity. The curate was to be bought at something like a fixed price; and that price bore no reference, or the mere shadow of a reference, to his intrinsic value or the work that was to be got out of him. He was, in truth, a drug in the market. Anybody who wanted him could get him almost on his own terms; at any rate, the market price of the curate was as nearly as possible a fixed quantity, and was kept down to starvation point. If I say that fifty years ago the market price of a curate was about eighty pounds a year, I believe I am by no means overstating the fact.

Now all this is changed. The curate is ill enough off, indeed; but he is recognised as a human being. The supply of curates is scarcely

equal to the demand. Certainly the supply of good curates is not equal to the demand; and, wonderful to say, the quality of curates is a thing which has come to be appreciated. Formerly a curate was a curate; just as in ordinary English cookery-books an egg is an egg, whether it is a big egg or a little one. The curate was, as I have said, the ideal representative of the "inferior clergy." He was the ecclesiastical plebeian; the *roturier* of aristocratic Germany, where all the world is divided into two classes, the noble and the non-noble. Just as in Germany, if a man is not a "Von" he is a nobody, and all those who are not "Vons" are more or less alike; so it was with our curates. They were "hired" at so much per quarter to do certain duties, which may be termed the menial portions of parochial work, and one curate could do those duties pretty nearly as well as another.

To-day the curate knows his value. He has not yet condescended, or risen, to the full perception of the value of combination in order to raise his salary and reduce his working hours. Strikes have hitherto been the nearly exclusive privilege of the town-bred mechanic, and the agricultural labourer is only just learning their practical value. By-and-by, when the bucolic mind has grasped the full significance of a strike, we may see the curates follow in the same path, and unite to obtain for every one of their number "a fair day's wage for a fair day's work."

In the meantime, it is undeniable that this spirit of "independence" has taken possession of the curate mind, and that, whether intentionally or not, he has given an impetus to a principle which has never hitherto obtained recognition in the Church of England. And it is difficult to overrate the significance of even this feeble impetus. Never, since the Church of England existed in its present shape, have its ministerial affairs been regulated on the principle, that the largest pay should be given for the best work. The recognised theory of clerical rewards has been from the first one of the most monstrous inventions that ever possessed the minds of well-intentioned people. I do not hesitate to assert that could we approach the subject free from all prepossessions, and with understandings unclouded by the mystifications of selfish ignorance, the notion of regarding the right to nominate the parochial clergy as a species of marketable property would startle us as an invention too absurd for serious discussion. Nothing less blinding than long habit could foster that confusion of thought which prevents honest Churchmen from seeing that the question of simple parochial patronage, as opposed to popular election, is one thing, and the money value of that patronage is another. And until Church Reformers come to grasp the full significance of this distinction, all their efforts will come to nothing. If they wish to uproot the present system, with all

its scandals, they must look out for the real social forces which are moving the English life of to-day, and apply them to the question they have in hand. Till they do this, their efforts will be confined to a few languid and spasmodic manifestations in newspapers and magazines, and on platforms and in private talk.

The real question, I repeat, is not merely between the Nonconformist and the Church methods of clerical appointment, but between the principle that payment shall be proportioned to the quantity and quality of labour, and the principle that Church endowments are the property of patrons. Between the two views the hostility is irreconcilable. And if there is one force more mighty than another now supplying energy to the various movements of national life, it is the conviction that sinecures, as such, are evils, that every man's abilities and acquirements should come fairly into the market, that a good price should be ungrudgingly given for rare and valuable merit, and that the less work a man does the smaller should be his remuneration. Against this conviction the lovers of abuses have been keeping up a hand-to-hand fight for the last fifty years, and the struggle is still fiery and fierce. The first loss to the party which maintains that the holders of sinecures have a vested right in their possessions was suffered when the Pension List was revised and partially abolished. Those who know only the political conflicts of to-day cannot realise the enormous difficulties which beset the reformers of a past generation, when they laboured to destroy the intolerable scandals of the Pension List. But the victory was won, and from that day to this, the same mighty social force has been slowly modifying the views of almost every grade of society.

Its last triumph, however, will be won, when, amidst the cries and the lamentations of the vanquished, the nation takes possession of every sort of ecclesiastical endowment, and redistributes them all in proportion to the necessities of the people; still allowing, it may be, the existence of personal patronage, but introducing into the Church the same system which prevails in every other English profession. And the time may soon arrive. It is impossible that we should much longer be content to adopt one system in the law, in physic, in education, in the army and navy, and another in the Church. There are abuses enough, it is true, in every profession; but nowhere else is there the formal consecration of the theory that abilities and labour are to count for little or nothing in the distribution of payments. Nowhere else have we a parallel to that perversion of all ideas of right and wrong, which permits a few hundred rich men to regard endowment for religious teaching as their private property, to pay one clergyman many hundreds, and even thousands, a year for doing little, and doing that little ill, and to pay another a

miserable pittance for the devotion of the highest abilities to the hardest work. What, indeed, is to be said for the existing system of patronage in a Church, which allowed the author of the "Christian Year" to live and die in an obscure Hampshire parsonage, and which, with a few exceptions, fills the episcopal bench, the cathedrals, and the large town parishes with men whose sole claim to preferment is their personal mediocrity or their family connections? In no other section of English life would the existence of such a system be now endured. However, let those who are most scandalised be comforted. Patronage, as it now stands, is an anachronism, and anachronisms, even though consecrated by the superstitions of ages, perish at last.

Leaving, however, the clerical aspect of the great question of the rights of labour, I would appeal to those observers who have had long experience of life to bear me out when I profess my entire inability to join in the popular lamentations over the increasing dissatisfaction of what are called the working classes. These classes are discontented. That is, they are not satisfied with their wages, and the general position they hold in the world. But when were they otherwise? I can call to mind no such age of Christian resignation to the inevitable. I have read of such a phenomenon in fiction, in partizan speeches, and books, and I have heard of it in sermons; but I never beheld any proofs of its existence. I never met with such contented people in my life—that is, as a class. I have seen a few such in all ranks; but I see just as many of them to-day as I saw forty years ago. If there is any difference between the temper of the millions who now labour around us and that of their fathers and grandfathers, I should say that it is in favour of the present generation. They may be as discontented as those who went before them, but they are less sullen; they do not believe that class interests are hopelessly antagonistic, and that the rich man is necessarily the master of the poor man and ordinarily his tyrant. It may be that they are less resigned to their lot; if a hopeless, dreary, gloomy acquiescence in destiny can be called resignation. But I do not think that such discontent as this is an evil sign for the future. It does not prove a radical distaste for the whole order of society. It only shows that the multitude does not consider its situation hopeless.

And I would ask every candid man to contrast the demands and the temper of the millions who are now struggling upwards, with those which followed upon the close of the Napoleonist wars. Surely every comparison between the agricultural, the manufacturing, and the metropolitan labour agitations of forty and fifty years ago and those of to-day tends to show that working people are gradually getting fast hold of the first principles of constitutional freedom, as opposed

to the passions of frantic rebellion and bloodthirsty anarchy. They combine, it is true, with ever-increasing activity, skill, and success. But how does this prove an increasing alienation from an old belief in law and order? I think it proves the very reverse. When they did not play at anarchy in former days, it was because they thought it a hopeless game, and because when they did attempt it, they were cut down with ruthless force. I am as far as possible from being a vehement apologist for the working man; but I do say, that as far as my experience goes, he is more civilized, better-principled, and more awake to the blessings of law and order than was his father and his grandfather before him.

And here I will venture a remark on that change in the outer manners and bearing of the present generation, of which we sometimes hear a good deal. The free-and-easy bearing of all classes, and the general want of respectfulness, which we are assured are characteristic of the day, are attributed to that excessive development of individual self-assertion which is leading us on to social anarchy and democratic levelling. Where, we are asked, are the grand manners of our grandfathers? Where is the stateliness of our grandmothers? Where is the deference which youth was wont to pay to age? Where is the homage which the poor paid to the rich, the servant to the master, the plebeian to the patrician? Here and there, it is said, is still to be seen some relic of the courtliness and polish of the good old days, who by his noble suavity and deferential considerateness, especially towards women, reminds us of the loss which the world has sustained. But such relics of the past are rare, and a universal disregard of the *bienséances* of good breeding is rapidly becoming the rule of English life.

Yet, when we look at facts, can there be a more absurd and untrue accusation? Will any man who remembers what was the tone and what were the ordinary manners of Englishmen of every rank when George IV. was king, pretend that the average politeness and general good breeding of the country was then higher than it is now? Undoubtedly, we have changed a few of the technical conventionalities of good breeding; just as we have changed the cut of our coats, and have left off writing substantives with capital initials. But these are mere trivialities. Forms of speech are no necessary indications of genuine courtesy or respect, otherwise no people would have been so uncouth and rude as the Greeks, to whom our feudal forms of mutual address were unknown. My own whole personal observation tells me that the good manners of every class of Englishmen have undergone a marked change for the better. Compare the astounding personalities of Parliament, of the public meetings, and of the periodical literature of forty and fifty years ago, with the standard

now recognised as absolutely binding upon every man. Compare the civility with which most men of noble birth or large wealth think it incumbent on them to address those whom they think their inferiors, with the prevailing hauteur of other days. Observe how little incivility one meets with in going about the world, and how little positive vulgarity offends one's taste, even in quarters where it used to be common. I do not believe it is mere fancy, when I think that I see a manifest improvement in the manners of shopmen and shopwomen. It is the same in the class of mechanics and labourers. They are often rough and bearish enough, but my impression is that I remember them as being far worse; and I am certain that in no class of society is the difference between gentlemanliness and vulgarity more keenly felt. Or, take that vast crowd of railway officials who throng the innumerable stations all over the land. How seldom one meets with any rudeness or bearishness among them! Some people, indeed, have a special gift for meeting with rudeness everywhere, as others have a gift for being cheated. But the English railway porters and guards, as a rule, are, I suspect, far more well-bred than the railway servants of France and Germany; while, contrasted with the race of men who preyed upon travellers in the old coaching days, they are nearly faultless.

This notion of gentlemanliness is, in truth, one of the most universal and prolific of all existing social forces. There can be no question that it is becoming accepted as a rule of life, if not for adoption, at least for imitation, through the whole fabric of English society, and it is striking root in every European nation. If the national origin of the word is to be taken as an indication of the local origin of the idea, the "gentleman" is essentially an English product; and more than that, he is the product of English liberty, triumphing over the ruins of feudalism and its offshoots. At any rate, the idea has been found so alien to any foreign term, etymologically corresponding to it, that it is being adopted in its English shape in every country where modern liberty is finding its way. It is, in itself, the embodiment of the conviction that individualism is, so to say, the unit out of which the complex organization of modern life is built up; and that while society recognizes the indefeasible rights of the individual, it insists upon such an assertion of those rights as shall avoid trenching in the smallest degree upon the rights, and happiness, and well-being of others. It is not the same thing as the old notion of "honour," which was held to be at once the characteristic and the privilege of the non-plebeian mind. The idea of "honour" is essentially one of pride, and its aim is to assert itself against all insolence, and to cherish "reputation" spotless. The idea of the "gentleman" involves, indeed, the idea of self-respect, but it is

that self-respect which does not depend upon the opinions of others, and its essence is not self-assertion, but deference to the feelings of others. The "gentleman" is essentially a product of the Christian idea of human perfection. The idea of "honour," good up to a certain extent, is purely Pagan in morals, and feudal in historical origin.

And the substitution of this idea of gentlemanliness for the old aristocratic instinct, and its gradual spread through all classes, both in England and abroad, supplies one of the happiest possible auguries for the future. That this spread is still but gradual is not to be denied. But it is equally certain that the taunt of "ungentlemanly" conduct is one of the most stinging which can be addressed to men in ranks of life in which, a couple of generations ago, the very elements of such an idea were unknown.

For another popular complaint of present degeneracy there is equally little foundation: I mean the assertion that the relation between master and servant has very much changed for the worse. The old family ties, we are told, are loosened or shattered. The recognition of a common interest between the employer and the employed is no more. The "good old servant," like "the fine old English gentleman," is an extinct being. I do not believe one word of it. I can see no proofs of the assertion anywhere. If the attached old domestic of whose perfections we read in books, and who seems to live in the vague memories of people who don't like to be cross-questioned—if such a being was ever very common in English society, he never was common in my experience; and I can detect no sign that he was ever common in the literature of any age. Certainly, if we are to trust the dramatic literature and the novels of any past period, the typical domestic servant was a rogue, whether of the male or female sex. I do not doubt that in the past, just as in the present, there were wide differences in the systems and the tones of different families and different employers of labour. Now, also, dissatisfied servants possess greater facilities for change, and will "put up," as they say, with very little. But it is the same with dissatisfied heads of families. They can change their servants with the utmost ease, and refuse to "put up" with faults which bygone households were forced to endure.

And when we carefully go over the domestic histories of the various families whose inner life we know of or have heard of, surely the number of instances in which servants have lived in one household for twenty, thirty, or forty years, and up to the time of old age and death, is quite surprising. And it is the same with employers of labour. It is a fiction to imagine that workpeople do not remain for any considerable length of time in the employment of the same master. Bad masters, ill-tempered masters, grinding masters, of

course, are never well served, and no man remains with them who can change for the better. But it is a pure illusion to fancy that mechanics, as a class, have any disposition to leave really good places, or that if they are regularly paid fair wages and treated as human beings, with feelings and infirmities of their own, they are not susceptible of attachment to the masters whom they serve. I do not say that they are generally susceptible of any strong attachment of this kind. But why should they be so? Why should they care more for the masters whom they serve than the masters care for them? It is one of the most absurd of popular notions, that in arrangements, which are after all simply business arrangements, the man who receives payment as the market equivalent for his labour, is bound to return a certain amount of personal gratitude to the man who buys his labour for what it is worth, over and above any gratitude which may be expected from the purchaser to the seller of the same labour. In the competition among sellers of all kinds, whether of labour or of any kind of goods, each seller feels obliged to those who choose to purchase from himself, rather than from his competitors, and the profuseness with which some tradesmen profess their "gratitude" for the custom bestowed on them is as common as it is ludicrous. At the same time, the obligation is alike on both sides. I buy a man's labour because I want it, not because I wish to benefit him; and it is unreasonable to regard the transaction as establishing any claim to affection or thankfulness on his part towards myself.

It is only in the case of the agricultural labourer that the personal relations between the employer and the employed have been fundamentally changed during the last hundred years. It is, indeed, by no means easy, whatever speculative people or the makers of statistics may say, to ascertain the precise amount of change which has taken place in the well-being of the English peasantry since the middle or latter end of the eighteenth century. One fact, at the same time, is undeniable. It was a widely prevailing custom for the unmarried labourers to live under the same roof with their employers, and generally an amount of equality existed in the intercourse between farmers and their servants which has now ceased.

What were the social and moral effects of this intercourse I do not pretend to say. Whether it merely generated familiarity, or created real personal friendship, I am utterly at a loss to decide. The custom is not yet extinct in some of the more northern parts of the kingdom; but I cannot make out that it is more fruitful in fostering friendliness than is the system of wages-paying, when the master is a good master, and the servant a good servant. That the social distinctions between the farmer and the labourer are every day growing

more marked, is, indeed, unquestionable; but this is simply the consequence of the vast strides which have been made in agriculture as an art. The power of capital, as one of the mightiest of social forces, is becoming more and more irresistible in the manufacture of meat and bread; and it is vain to hope to stem it. No man who knows anything of farming can expect the small proprietor to compete successfully with the capitalist tenant farmer. The creation of a race of landowning peasants, stimulated by the excitement of ownership to extract from the soil an amount of produce which it will yield to none others, is a dream of the student, uninformed as to the conditions of successful tillage and cattle-breeding. The vast increase in the productiveness of the land, and in the breeding of sheep and oxen, and the improvement in the races of the animals themselves, is absolutely the result of that union of intelligence, energy, and capital, which at the same time drives the small proprietor out of the field.

Unquestionably instances are frequently to be met with of men who rise from the condition of the labourer, first into the position of a small farmer, and afterwards into that of a large farmer. But these instances are totally misinterpreted by that half-instructed school of economists who believe in the virtues and powers of peasant-proprietors. Men who thus rise are, in the first place, persons of quite exceptional force of character and practical intelligence, and it is delusive to assume that their successes are typical of the successes possible to the average of mankind. In the second place, such men live lives of extraordinary parsimony and self-denial. They enjoy vigorous health, and are hardy beyond most men, and they are saving and miserly to the very depths of their nature. Such persons are clearly rare exceptions among their fellows. But beyond this, when they rise they rise through the force of capital, supplementing and sustaining their personal labour. They save every possible shilling, till shillings swell into pounds, and go on investing their savings, that is, their slowly accumulating capital, in stock, in additional land, in farming implements, and in the hire of labour. Their mainstay is not merely their own industry, but the money which they gain by successful buying and selling, and by the exercise of that peculiar gift for watching the market, which is as necessary to the rising peasant as it is to the wealthiest of merchant princes.

Those who imagine that an extinct social force, such as the stimulus of proprietorship, can be resuscitated for the purpose of contending with the mighty force of capital, which is the representative economic force of the day, should be reminded that in many parts of England the land is now made to yield the utmost possible return of produce of which it is mechanically and chemically capable. If in some places it is possible to extract still larger returns, it must be

by the employment of still more ingenious machinery, and the more liberal application of manure. In other words, the small proprietor will be less able than ever to contend with his wealthy competitor, who rents his five hundred or thousand acres, and has an available capital of six or twelve thousand pounds wherewith to cultivate them.

How far it may be possible to apply the co-operative system to agriculture, and how far it is applicable, on a wide scale, to manufacture and production in general, is quite another question, which I am not now discussing. But I cannot help noticing the singular illusion which possesses many people's minds, when they use this new and magical word, "co-operation." They talk of co-operative farms, co-operative collieries, co-operative factories, and co-operative stores, all in one breath, as if they were all of them illustrations of the working of one and the same economic principle. In reality a co-operative store has nothing whatever in common with a co-operative manufactory, whether of an agricultural or non-agricultural kind. The object of the co-operative store is to convey the manufactured article, after it is produced, to its consumer, with as little additional cost as possible. The object of the co-operative factory is to unite the capitals of several small capitalists into one large capital, and enable them to compete in production with rich individual capitalists. As for beating the individual capitalist in the cost of production, they never dream of it. Their peril is that they may not be able to rival him, through a division in their energies. Their aim is excellent, but it is something very different from the setting up of labour against capital.

The conflict of the co-operative stores, on the other hand, is with the modern system of trade. It is based on the conviction that there is an enormous waste of labour involved in the system of middlemen; that is, that the existence of the middle-man, the retail tradesman, is, in many branches of business, a costly mistake. He buys of the wholesale dealer, or manufacturer, in order to sell again. Of course, he must live by his occupation, and besides, he must receive interest on the capital he employs. The only effect of the system is, that he adds nothing whatever to the productive power of the country, and absorbs a considerable portion of the paying powers of his customers, in order to reimburse him for his outlay, and pay him for his non-producing labour. In many branches of business trade is a necessity, and co-operation an impossibility. But wherever trade is not a necessity, it is an economic mistake. It is a waste of labour and a waste of capital.

Returning for a moment to the case of the agricultural labourer, it is to be observed that his future can be foretold far more clearly than that of any other class of the wages-receiving community. In some

respects he is behind his twin-brother in his advance towards a happier condition of life. But on the other hand, his improvement is not hampered with the enormous obstacles which hinder the permanent improvement of the mechanics and of the labourers who are their attendant inferiors. The one great misfortune of the farming man is the lowness of his wages, and everywhere this evil is in the way to be redressed. The facility of communication and locomotion, which is one of the characteristic forces everywhere at work, is carrying the surplus labour of the fields to more profitable quarters, and the natural result is following—labour is growing scarce, and commands a higher price. The tenant farmer must have the labour, and must pay for it; but in the end the landlord must pay for it, for its cost must be considered in the agreement or lease on which the tenant rents his land. That the landlord will lose in the end is not to be expected; for while labourers are growing scarcer, those who remain are growing more intelligent, and they are well worth their higher wages. And as agricultural wages rise, so will the culture of the labourer himself, and corresponding will be the improvement in the cottages he lives in. The coming generation of farm servants will resolutely refuse to live, like beasts, in the hovels which contented their grandfathers, and which still exist in tens of thousands in every English, Scotch and Irish county. And whether they will or no, the landowners must and will meet the demand, for they are beset by none of those overmastering difficulties as to situation, space, and cost of site, which make the improvement of the dwellings of the labouring population of large towns one of the most perplexing of all the perplexing problems of the day.

The farm-labourer, again, like the farmer himself, does not suffer from those variations in the demand for his produce which so often paralyse all other manufacturers, and eat up the mechanic's sources of living by the roots. There is always the most urgent demand for the fruits of the earth, in the largest quantity in which they can be supplied. The farmer's peculiar machinery, that is, the weather, is often out of order, but he is never compelled to close his factory because there is no market for his wares. As long as men live, they must have bread, and beef, and mutton, and beer. Prices may and will vary, but the demand never ceases. Neither the caprices of fashion, nor the paralysing influences of war, nor the chances of commercial speculation, affect the market for farm produce. People must eat and drink, even if they go almost in rags. The need for agricultural labour is therefore a nearly steady demand, and the labourer suffers from none of those violent fluctuations in the market which so seriously affect the condition of almost all other classes who live by weekly wages.

Employers, too, are never wanting. Farming is unlike every other sort of manufacture, in that it possesses a charm of its own, so that farms are sought for with an avidity which knows no cessation. It is the least profitable of business investments, and yet the most popular. It is almost impossible to make those gigantic fortunes which are made in trade and in other manufactures, for purely physical reasons. Not only are the farmer's affairs necessarily spread over an entire twelvemonth, so that he cannot "turn over" his capital again and again in the course of a year; but it is physically out of the question that he should bring the control of many thousand acres under his own personal management, without which any great commercial success is not to be looked for. Nevertheless, farming is a more pleasant occupation than any ordinary business, and therefore tenant farmers throng the market for vacant farms. I cannot, therefore, share the perplexities of those who regard the elevation of the English peasantry as one of the most formidable difficulties of the time. The laws of supply and demand, aided by newspapers and railways, are fast changing their condition, and nothing can hinder the happy revolution.

It is in the profound modification of our old ideas on the subject of business of all kinds that we must expect the most unexpected and the most serious revolution in the framework of English life. While the prejudices of a past feudalism are rapidly dying out, another mighty force is taking their place, whose ultimate operations it is impossible to foresee. Now that the natural love of wealth and luxury is stimulated by the destruction of the ancient aristocratic scorn of trade and commerce, a prospect is before us on which, so far as I can see, it is vain to speculate. The antipathy to honest labour, whether professional or commercial, which was so universal among our later ancestors, was contemptible enough. In adopting the new belief that no honest work is debasing to a gentleman, the country has grasped a great and a Christian principle. But it is fatally easy to pervert this principle into a sanction for a passionate devotion to money-making and all its social distinctions, which is as fatal to the Christian character as were the oligarchical bigotries of our ancestors.

Nor are its mischiefs confined to the purely religious aspect of the future. Those economical theories which treat the personal pursuit of boundless wealth as one of those necessary laws of human society which lead naturally to national prosperity, are narrow and half untrue altogether. The science of political economy is based upon a recognition of the phenomena of human desires, so far as they tend to the production and distribution of what we technically term wealth. And, as ordinarily expounded, this science assumes the absolute supremacy of the selfish principle; a supremacy which

undoubtedly must to a large extent be admitted as complete, but which is not necessarily the master of human action in all possible states of society. The modifying influences of the present idea of human life are never, or very rarely, taken into account by economical writers; and yet such influences are realities, and it is quite possible that the time may come when they will seriously change the aspect of human affairs.

In the meantime, that boundless devotion to money-making, under the guise of the glorification of industry, is surely a thing pregnant with momentous and perilous consequences. To my mind there is something as suicidal as it is ludicrous in that adoration of business capacities which is current in all ranks of English life. I turn away with unconquerable aversion from those popular eulogies upon men who have amassed colossal fortunes, as if the perfections of what humanity is capable are to be measured by a man's rent-roll or his balance at his banker's. The typical "Saint" of this latter portion of the nineteenth century has come to be a man who begins life with half-a-crown, and ends it in the House of Lords. The new Bible which is placed in the hands of children, and preached from upon platforms, and exhibited to working men as containing the true consolation for their miseries, is a catalogue of the self-reliant heroes who have done honour to their race by working night and day, starving themselves, and saving their miserable shillings, till shillings have grown into pounds, and single pounds into hundreds, and hundreds into thousands, and hundreds of thousands and millions. This is the fashionable gospel of the hour, a gospel whose roots lie far deeper down in men's and women's passions than any of the so-called religious "movements" of the time. The evangelist who preaches the great duty of money-making and of rising in the world, appeals to an element in human nature, in comparison of which every source of theological eccentricities is a feeble emotion.

And whatever may be said by the votaries of this new gospel, its social mischiefs are on a par with its corrupting moral influences. The hindrances to the production of national wealth, and the fearful inequalities in the distribution of the wealth actually produced, are mainly due to the operation of the passion of selfishness, worldliness, and eager money-making, when uncontrolled by some principle which is not recognised in economical treatises. Of all disturbances in commerce and manufactures there are few which cannot be traced to the operation of an unbridled love for riches. That operation may have to be sought in the follies of a past generation, but its reality is the same nevertheless. Almost every war is the immediate consequence of a desire for vast wealth. Nine bankruptcies out of ten are the consequence of the absence of the spirit which is contented with

a moderate income, and which is stimulated by the throbs of social ambition. All the trickeries, the rash speculations, the swindlings, which spread ruin far and wide, paralysing industry, making the rich richer, and reducing the poor to pauperism, spring from that profoundly anti-Christian idea of human happiness which is dominant in English literature, English talk, and English speech-making. To pretend that the nation generally is made more wealthy and more happy by the encouragement of this false estimate of the value of huge fortunes, is to overlook the plainest facts of human life and to deny the first principles of really profound economical science. We hear a great deal about social evils, and especially about that which is described as "the social evil." Yet what is any one habit which lies on the surface of the social fabric, affecting chiefly its more dissipated and thoughtless portions, compared with an unbridled passion, adopted by the whole of the respectable and influential members of society? What mischief can be compared with that universal lust for gain which is now taught on every side as the secret of national prosperity, and as at least not inconsistent with the profession of Christianity as a religious creed? What, in all honesty, is to be expected from a generation which believes that he who gives up his nights and days to business, and devotes the best years of his life to the conversion of ten thousand pounds into a hundred thousand, is a wise and prudent man, whereas he is in truth the victim of suicidal folly?

If it is said that in discussing economic subjects I have no right to introduce the moral or religious aspects of life, I reply, that economic subjects are essentially questions of human motive. Take, for instance, the question of free trade and protection. What is this, but a question of human motive? It is to be decided by certain conclusions as to the probabilities of human action under various contingencies. Place men, it is argued, under such and such influences, and they will act in such and such a manner. In other words, it is purely a question of human motives, desires, and passions. I am fully justified, therefore, when I argue that the fresh stimulus which has been applied to the natural passion for large possessions by political and social changes, brings with it its own special national dangers, and that these dangers are only to be met by the inculcation of such motives, call them moral, or religious, or what we will, which will act as modifying social forces.

Examining the economic condition of the country, I see, in the first place, an enormous waste of producing power in the keeping up of standing armies all over the world, the fighting population being entirely withdrawn from industrial pursuits, and living upon the labours of others. Besides this, fabulous sums are yearly expended in the manufacture of warlike implements and defences, whose sole aim

is the destruction of the produce of human labour of some kind or other. It is difficult in such cases to make exact estimates, but I shall hardly be exaggerating if I say that at least one-tenth of the possible products of human labour is thus practically destroyed. In other words, one-tenth of the entire people are doomed to worthless idleness.

And this is not all. The disturbing influences of war are almost without limit. They create sudden and spasmodic demands for labour, alternating with equally sudden and spasmodic cessations, whose effect is to paralyse the healthy movements of manufacture and commerce, materially diminishing the amount of production and increasing its cost to the ultimate consumer. Add to this the frightful destruction of actual civil property which war entails, and it is impossible to deny that the anti-Christian passion for riches, which is the original source of nearly all wars, is the deadliest enemy of human industry and the most impoverishing of elements in human life.

So it is with the various other causes which interfere with the production of wealth and its more equal distribution among all classes in the country. These causes are almost all of them the effects of a false estimate of the practical value of huge fortunes, and they are to be modified only by the diffusion of new motives to action in society in general. The actual producing power of a country like England is now enormous, and the possibilities of industry are incalculable. The experience of ages and the development of machinery has placed in our hands capacities for the creation of wealth, such as the world never before has seen. If wars, speculations, swindlings, and the keen competition of commercial rivalry were now to cease, in a few years poverty would cease from the land. Were it not for the crimes, the follies, the ambitions, and the lust for money, of the last hundred years, there would not now be a single English family which was not in possession of the comforts and advantages now within the reach of men with incomes of five or six hundred a year.

And up to a certain point, the possession of wealth is a clear gain, even from the most strictly religious point of view. It is good for a man to be able to live in a house sufficiently large for health and decency, to have leisure and money for mental culture and amusements, to be freed from the necessity for labour with advancing years, and to continue the education of his children till it is fairly on the way to become a real cultivation of their higher nature. So far, wealth is to be steadily sought for and seriously desired. But instead of putting forward this rational view as a principle to be recognised by all classes, society tacitly or openly sets up the worship of huge incomes as a singular blessing to those who have the happiness to inherit them or the skill to create them. Thus, the distribution of

the national wealth is made a matter of trivial importance, and the whole country falls down and worships the few into whose hands it has fallen in the most immense proportions.

Yet what indescribable folly it is! Is there any one sign that the possessors of fabulous riches are one whit happier or better than men of moderate means? On the whole, is not the reverse the case? Is a man's daily enjoyment of life quickened by having twenty thousand or a hundred thousand a year at his disposal? What is the element of happiness involved in the command of an army of servants, of carriages and horses by the score, and of houses which serve the sole purpose of awakening other people's envy? It is an opinion which will be shared by few persons who are believers in what is termed our modern civilization; but, for myself, I believe in the old theory, that in a healthy condition of the commonwealth, private possessions will be modest and public possessions magnificent. I should love to see rich Englishmen less rich, and poor Englishmen less poor, than they now are; and our national monuments and treasures ten times as numerous and splendid as we yet have made them.

And all this can only come about by a revolution in men's fundamental estimate of life and its pleasures. Legislation can do nothing towards it. It can upset feudalism and help to consecrate the triumphs of commerce. It can establish free-trade, and tax any portion of the community which parliament may single out for the burden. It can set up kings, or republics, and reform the lords, or leave them unreformed. But it cannot touch the inner motives of men. It can only substitute one channel for another for the outlet of existing passions, and change the names of the idols in the national Pantheon.

Whether or not we may look for a revolution in men's motives from any other source, it is fruitless to speculate. That the spirit of Christianity is in radical antagonism to our money-worshipping spirit, cannot seriously be doubted. But then, when has the spirit of Christianity been dominant in any section of Christendom? And if it has never been the ruling power among Christians, is there any probability that it is about to win victories hitherto denied it? What is to be the practical issue of that pouring of the new wine of criticism into the old bottles of tradition, which is the characteristic of the religious activity of to-day? Will liberalism of thought regenerate mankind, when Rome and England and Geneva have alike conspicuously failed? Who can say? An impenetrable cloud shrouds futurity from our gaze, and we cannot tell whether we are standing upon the edge of a precipice, or whether our path is to lead us through rich pastures, and blooming gardens, and fields of golden corn.

J. M. CAPES.



THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.

I.—OUR NEED OF IT.

OVER his pipe in the village ale-house, the labourer says very positively what Parliament should do about the "foot and mouth disease." At the farmer's market-table his master makes the glasses jingle as, with his fist, he emphasizes the assertion that he did not get half enough compensation for his slaughtered beasts during the cattle-plague. These are not hesitating opinions. On a matter affecting the agricultural interest, it is still as it was during the Anti-Corn-Law agitation, when, in every rural circle, you heard that the nation would be ruined if the lightly-taxed foreigner was allowed to compete in our markets with the heavily-taxed Englishman: a proposition held to be so self-evident that dissent from it implied either stupidity or knavery.

Now, as then, may be daily heard among other classes opinions just as decided and just as unwarranted. By men called educated, the old plea for extravagant expenditure that "it is good for trade," is still continually urged with full belief in its sufficiency. Scarcely any decrease is observable in the fallacy that whatever gives employment is beneficial—no regard being had to the value for ulterior purposes of that which the labour produces; no question being asked what would have resulted had the capital which paid for the labour taken some other channel and paid for some other labour. Neither criticism nor explanation appreciably modifies these beliefs. When

there is again an opening for them they are expressed with undiminished confidence. Along with these delusions go whole families of others. People who think that the relations between expenditure and production are so simple, naturally assume simplicity in other relations among social phenomena. Is there distress somewhere? They suppose nothing more is required than to subscribe money for relieving it. On the one hand, they never trace the reactive effects which charitable donations work on bank-accounts, on the surplus capital bankers have to lend, on the productive activity which the capital now abstracted would have set up, on the number of labourers who would have received wages and who now go without wages—they do not perceive that certain necessities of life have been withheld from one man who would have exchanged useful work for them, and given to another who perhaps persistently evades working. Nor, on the other hand, do they look beyond the immediate mitigation of misery; but deliberately shut their eyes to the fact that as fast as you increase the provision for those who live without labour, so fast do you increase the number of those who live without labour; and that with an ever-increasing distribution of alms, there comes an ever-increasing outcry for more alms. Similarly throughout all their political thinking. Proximate causes and proximate results are alone contemplated; and there is scarcely any consciousness that the original causes are often numerous and widely different from the apparent cause, and that beyond each immediate result there will be multitudinous remote results, most of them quite incalculable.

Minds in which the conceptions of social actions are thus rudimentary, are also minds ready to harbour wild hopes of benefits to be achieved by administrative agencies. In each such mind there seems to be the unexpressed postulate that every evil in a society admits of cure; and that the cure lies within the reach of law. "Why is not there a better inspection of the mercantile marine?" asked a correspondent of the *Times* the other day; apparently forgetting that within the preceding twelve months the power he invoked had lost two of its own vessels, and barely saved a third. "Ugly buildings are eye-sores, and should not be allowed," urges one who is anxious for æsthetic culture; and, meanwhile, from the agent which is to foster good taste, there have come monuments and public buildings of which the less said the better, and its chosen design for the Law-Courts incurs almost universal condemnation. "Why did those in authority allow such defective sanitary arrangements?" was everywhere asked, after the fevers at Lord Londesborough's; and this question you heard repeated, regardless of the fact that sanitary arrangements having such results in this and other cases, were themselves the outcome of appointed sanitary administrations

—regardless of the fact that the authorised system had itself been the means of introducing foul gases into houses.* “The State should purchase the railways,” is confidently asserted by those who, every morning, read of chaos at the Admiralty, or cross-purposes in the dockyards, or wretched army-organization, or diplomatic bungling that endangers peace, or frustration of justice by technicalities and costs and delays,—all without having their confidence in officialism shaken. “Building Acts should insure better ventilation in small houses,” says one who either never knew or has forgotten that, after Messrs. Reid and Barry had spent £200,000 in failing to ventilate the Houses of Parliament, the First Commissioner of Works proposed that, “the House should get some competent engineer, above suspicion of partiality, to let them see what ought to be done.”† And similarly there are continually cropping out in the press, and at meetings, and in conversations, such notions as that the State might provide “cheap capital” by some financial sleight of hand; that “there ought to be bread-overseers appointed by Government;‡ that “it is the duty of Government to provide a suitable national asylum for the reception of all illegitimate children.”§ And here it is doubtless thought by some, as it is in France by M. de Lagevenais, that Government, by supplying good music, should exclude the bad, such as that of Offenbach.|| We smile on reading of that French princess, celebrated for her innocent wonder that people should starve when there was so simple a remedy. But why should we smile? A great part of the current political thought evinces notions of practicability not much more rational.

That connections among social phenomena should be so little understood, need not surprise us if we note the ideas which prevail respecting the connections among much simpler phenomena. Minds left ignorant of physical causation, are unlikely to appreciate clearly, if at all, that causation so much more subtle and complex, which runs through the actions of incorporated men. In almost every house, servants and those who employ them, alike believe that a poker

* Of various testimonies to this, one of the most striking was that given by Mr. Charles Mayo, M.B., of New College, Oxford, who, having had to examine the drainage of Windsor, found “that in a previous visitation of typhoid fever, the poorest and lowest part of the town had entirely escaped, while the epidemic had been very fatal in good houses. The difference was this, that while the better houses were all connected with the sewers, the poor part of the town had no drains, but made use of cesspools in the gardens. And this is by no means an isolated instance.”

† Debates, “Times,” February 12, 1852.

‡ Letter in “Daily News,” Nov. 28, 1851.

§ Recommendation of a Coroner’s Jury, “Times,” March 26, 1850.

|| “Revue des Deux Mondes,” February 15, 1872.

leaned up in front of the bars, or across them, makes the fire burn ; and you will be told, very positively, that experience proves the efficacy of the device—the experience being that the poker has been repeatedly so placed and the fire has repeatedly burned ; and no comparison having been made with cases in which the poker was absent, and all other conditions as before. In the same circles the old prejudice against sitting down thirteen to dinner still survives : there actually exists among ladies who have been at finishing schools of the highest character, and among some gentlemen who pass as intelligent, the conviction that adding or subtracting one from a number of people who eat together, will affect the fates of some among them. And this state of mind is again displayed at the card-table, by the opinion that So-and-so is always lucky or unlucky—that influences are at work which, on the average, determine more good cards to one person than to another. Clearly, those in whom the consciousness of causation in these simple cases is so vague, may be expected to have the wildest notions of social causation. Whoever even entertains the supposition that a poker put across the fire can make it burn, proves himself to have neither a qualitative nor a quantitative idea of physical causation ; and if, during his life, his experiences of material objects and actions have failed to give him an idea so accessible and so simple, it is not likely that they have given him ideas of the qualitative and quantitative relations of cause and effect holding throughout society. Hence, there is nothing to exclude irrational interpretations and disproportioned hopes. Where other superstitions flourish, political superstitions will take root. A consciousness in which there lives the idea that spilling salt will be followed by some evil, obviously allied as it is to the consciousness of the savage filled with belief in omens and charms, gives a home to other beliefs like those of the savage. It may not have faith in the potency of medicine-bags and idols, and may even wonder how any being can reverence a thing shaped with his own hands ; and yet it readily entertains subtler forms of the same feelings. For, in those whose modes of thought we have been contemplating, there is a tacit supposition that a government moulded by themselves, has some efficiency beyond that naturally possessed by a certain group of citizens subsidized by the rest of the citizens. True, if you ask them, they may not deliberately assert that a legislative and administrative apparatus can exert power, either mental or material, beyond the power proceeding from the nation itself. They are compelled to admit, when cross-examined, that the energies moving a governmental machine are energies which would cease were citizens to cease working and furnishing the supplies. But, nevertheless, their projects imply an unexpressed belief in some store of force that is not

measured by taxes. When there arises the question—Why does not Government do this for us? there is not the accompanying thought—Why does not Government put its hands in our pockets, and, with the proceeds, pay officials to do this, instead of leaving us to do it ourselves; but the accompanying thought is—Why does not Government, out of its inexhaustible resources, yield us this benefit?

Such modes of political thinking, then, naturally go along with such conceptions of physical phenomena as are current. Just as the perpetual-motion schemer hopes, by a cunning arrangement of parts, to get from one end of his machine more energy than he puts in at the other; so the ordinary political schemer is convinced that out of a legislative apparatus, properly devised and worked with due dexterity, may be had beneficial State-action without some corresponding detrimental reaction. He expects to get out of a stupid people the effects of intelligence, and to evolve from inferior citizens superior conduct.

But while the prevalence of crude political opinions among those whose conceptions about simple matters are so crude, might be anticipated, it is somewhat surprising that the class specially disciplined by scientific culture should bring to the interpretation of social phenomena methods but little in advance of those used by others. Now that the transformation and equivalence of forces is seen by men of science to hold not only throughout all inorganic actions, but throughout all organic actions; now that even mental changes are recognized as the correlatives of cerebral changes, which also conform to this principle; and now that there must be admitted the corollary that all actions going on in a society are measured by certain antecedent energies, which disappear in effecting them, while they themselves become actual or potential energies, from which subsequent actions arise; it is strange that there should not have arisen the consciousness that these highest phenomena are to be studied as lower phenomena have been studied—not, of course, after the same physical methods, but in pursuance of the same principles. And yet scientific men rarely display such a consciousness.

A mathematician who had agreed or disagreed with the view of Professor Tait respecting the value of Quaternions for pursuing researches in Physics, would listen with raised eyebrows were one without mathematical culture to express a decided opinion on the matter. Or, if the subject discussed was the doctrine of Helmholtz, that hypothetical beings occupying space of two dimensions, might be so conditioned that the axioms of our geometry would prove untrue, the mathematician would marvel if an affirmation or a negation came from a man who knew no more of the properties of space

than is to be gained by daily converse with things around, and no more of the principles of reasoning than the course of business taught him. And yet, were we to take members of the **Mathematical Society**, who, having severally devoted themselves to the laws of quantitative relations, know that, simple as these are intrinsically, a life's study is required for the full comprehension of them—were we to ask each of these his opinion on some point of social policy, the readiness with which he answered would seem to imply that in these cases, where the factors of the phenomenon are so numerous and so much involved, a general survey of men and things gives data for trustworthy judgment.

Or, to contrast more fully the mode of reaching a conclusion which the man of science uses in his own department, with that which he regards as satisfactory in the department of politics, let us take a case from a concrete science—say, the question, **What are the solar spots, and what constitution of the Sun is implied by them?** Of tentative answers to this question there is first **Wilson's**, adopted by **Sir William Herschel**, that the visible surface of the Sun is a luminous envelope, within which there are cloudy envelopes covering a dark central body; and that when by some disturbance the luminous envelope is broken through, portions of the cloudy envelope and of the dark central body, become visible as the **penumbra** and **umbra** respectively. This hypothesis, at one time received with favour mainly because it seemed to permit that teleological interpretation which required that the Sun should be habitable, accounted tolerably well for certain of the appearances—more especially the appearance of concavity which the spots have when near the limb of the Sun. But though **Sir John Herschel** supported his father's hypothesis, pointing out that cyclonic action would account for local dispersions of the photosphere, there has of late years become more and more manifest the fatal objection that the genesis of light and heat remained unexplained, and that no supposition of auroral discharges did more than remove the difficulty a step back; since, unless light and heat could be perpetually generated out of nothing, there must be a store of force perpetually being expended in producing them. A counter-hypothesis, following naturally from the hypothesis of nebular origin, is that the mass of the Sun must be incandescent; that its incandescence has been produced, and is maintained, by progressing aggregation of its once widely-diffused matter; and that surrounding its molten surface there is an atmosphere of metallic gases continually rising, condensing to form the visible photosphere, and thence precipitating. What, in this case, are the solar spots? **Kirchhoff**, proceeding upon the hypothesis just indicated, which had been set forth before he made his discoveries by the aid

of the spectroscope, contended that the solar spots are simply clouds, formed of these condensed metallic gases, so large as to be relatively opaque; and he endeavoured to account for their changing forms as the Sun's rotation carries them away, in correspondence with this view. But the appearances as known to observers, are quite irreconcilable with the belief that the spots are simply drifting clouds. Do these appearances, then, conform to the supposition of M. Faye, that the photosphere encloses matter which is wholly gaseous and non-luminous; and that the spots are produced when occasional up-rushes from the interior burst through the photosphere? This supposition, while it may be held to account for certain traits of the spots, and to be justified by the observed fact that there *are* up-rushes of gas, presents difficulties not readily disposed of. It does not explain the manifest rotation of many spots; and, indeed, it does not seem really to account for that darkness which constitutes them spots; since a non-luminous gaseous nucleus would be permeable by light from the remoter side of the photosphere, and hence holes through the near side of the photosphere would not look dark. There is, however, another hypothesis which more nearly reconciles the facts. Assuming the incandescent molten surface, the ascending metallic gases, and the formation of a photosphere at that outer limit where the gases condense; accepting the suggestion of Sir John Herschel, so amply supported by evidence, that zones north and south of the Sun's equator are subject to violent cyclones; this hypothesis is, that if a cyclone occurs within the atmosphere of metallic gases between the molten surface and the photosphere, its vortex will become a region of rarefaction, of refrigeration, and therefore of precipitation. There will be formed in it a dense cloud extending far down towards the body of the Sun, and obstructing the greater part of the light radiating from below. Here we have an adequate cause for the formation of an opaque vaporous mass—a cause which also accounts for the frequently observed vortical motion; for the greater blackness of the central part of the umbra; for the formation of a penumbra by the drawing in of the adjacent photosphere; for the elongation of the luminous masses forming the photosphere, and the turning of their longer axes towards the centre of the spot; and for the occasional drifting of them over the spot towards its centre. Still, there is the difficulty that vortical motion is by no means always observable; and it remains to be considered whether its non-visibility in many cases is reconcilable with the hypothesis. At present none of the interpretations can be regarded as established. Here are sundry suppositions which the man of science severally tests by observations and necessary inferences. In this, as in other cases, he rejects such as unquestionably disagree with unquestionable truths. Continually

excluding untenable hypotheses, he waits to decide among the more tenable ones until further evidence discloses further congruities or incongruities. Checking every statement of fact and every conclusion drawn, he keeps his judgment suspended until no anomaly remains unexplained. Not only is he thus careful to shut out all possible error from inadequacy in the number and variety of data, but he is careful to shut out all possible error caused by idiosyncrasy in himself. Though not perhaps in astronomical observations such as those above implied, yet in all astronomical observations where the element of time is important, he makes allowance for the intervals occupied by his nervous actions. To fix the exact moment at which a certain change occurred, his perception of it has to be corrected for the "personal equation." As the speed of the nervous discharge varies, according to the constitution, from thirty to ninety metres per second, and is somewhat greater in summer than in winter; and as between seeing a change and registering it with the finger, there is an interval which is thus appreciably different in different persons; the particular amount of this error in the particular observer has to be taken into account.

Suppose now, that to a man of science, thus careful in testing all possible hypotheses and excluding all possible sources of error, we put a sociological question—say, whether some proposed institution will be beneficial. An answer, and often a very decided one, is forthcoming at once. It is not thought needful, proceeding by deliberate induction, to ascertain what has happened in each nation where an identical institution, or an institution of allied kind, has been established. It is not thought needful to look back in our own history to see whether kindred agencies have done what they were expected to do. It is not thought needful to ask the more general question—how far institutions at large, among all nations and in all times, have justified the theories of those who set them up. Nor is it thought needful to infer from analogous cases, what is likely to happen if the proposed appliance is not set up—to ascertain, inductively, whether in its absence some equivalent appliance will arise. And still less is it thought needful to inquire what will be the indirect actions and reactions of the proposed organization—how far it will retard other social agencies, and how far it will prevent the spontaneous growth of agencies having like ends. I do not mean that none of these questions are recognized as questions to be asked; but I mean that no attempts are made after a scientific manner to get together materials for answering them. True, some data have been gathered from newspapers, periodicals, foreign correspondence, books of travel; and there have been read sundry histories, which, besides copious accounts of royal misdemeanours, contain minute details of every military campaign,

and careful disentanglings of diplomatic trickeries. And on information thus acquired a confident opinion is based. Most remarkable of all, however, is the fact that no allowance is made for the personal equation. In political observations and judgments, the qualities of the individual, natural and acquired, are by far the most important factors. The bias of education, the bias of class-relationships, the bias of nationality, the political bias, the theological bias—these, added to the constitutional sympathies and antipathies, have much greater influence in determining beliefs on social questions than has the small amount of evidence collected. Yet, though in his search after a physical truth, the man of science allows for minute errors of perception due to his own nature, he makes no allowance for the enormous errors which his own nature, variously modified and distorted by his conditions of life, is sure to introduce into his perceptions of political truth. Here, where correction for the personal equation is all-essential, it does not occur to him that there is any personal equation to be allowed for.

This immense incongruity between the attitude in which the most disciplined minds approach other orders of natural phenomena, and the attitude in which they approach the phenomena presented by societies, will be best illustrated by a series of antitheses thus:—The material media through which we see things, always more or less falsify the facts: making, for example, the apparent direction of a star slightly different from its real direction, and sometimes, as when a fish is seen in the water, its apparent place is so far from its real place, that great misconception results unless large allowance is made for refraction; but sociological observations are not thus falsified: through the daily press light comes without any bending of its rays, and in studying past ages it is easy to make allowance for the refraction due to the historic medium. The motions of gases, though they conform to mechanical laws which are well understood, are nevertheless so involved, that the art of controlling currents of air in a house is not yet mastered; but the waves and currents of feeling running through a society, and the consequent directions and amounts of social activities, may be readily known beforehand. Though molecules of inorganic substances are very simple, yet prolonged study is required to understand their modes of behaviour to one another, and even the most instructed frequently meet with interactions of them producing consequences they never anticipated; but where the interacting bodies are not molecules but living beings of highly complex natures, it is easy to foresee all results which will arise. Physical phenomena are so connected that between seeming probability and actual truth, there is apt to be a wide difference, even where but two bodies are

acting: instance the natural supposition that during our northern summer the Earth is nearer to the Sun than during the winter, which is just the reverse of the fact; but among sociological phenomena, where the bodies are so multitudinous, and the forces by which they act on one another so many, and so multiform, and so variable, the probability and the actuality will naturally correspond. Matter often behaves paradoxically, as when two cold liquids added together become boiling hot, as when the mixing of two clear liquids produces an opaque mud, or as when water immersed in sulphurous acid freezes on a hot iron-plate; but what we distinguish as Mind, especially when massed together in the way which causes social action, evolves no paradoxical results—always such results come from it as seem likely to come.

The acceptance of contradictions like these, tacitly implied in the beliefs of the scientifically cultivated, is the more remarkable when we consider how abundant are the proofs that human nature is difficult to manipulate; that methods apparently the most rational disappoint expectation; and that the best results frequently arise from courses which common sense thinks unpractical. Even individual human nature shows us these startling anomalies. A man of leisure is the man naturally fixed upon if something has to be done; but your man of leisure cannot find time, and the man to be trusted to do what is wanted, is the man who is already busy. The boy who studies longest will learn the most, and a man will become wise in proportion as he reads much, are propositions which look true but are quite untrue—as teachers are now-a-days finding out in the one case, and as Hobbes long ago found out in the other. How obvious it appears that when minds go deranged, there is no remedy but replacing the weak internal control by a strong external control. Yet the “non-restraint system” has had far more success than the system of strait-waistcoats. Dr. Tuke, a physician of much experience in treating the insane, has lately testified that the desire to escape is great when locks and keys are used, but almost disappears when they are disused. And in further evidence of the mischief often done by measures supposed to be curative, here is Dr. Maudsley, also an authority on such questions, speaking of “asylum-made lunatics.” Again, is it not clear that the repression of crime will be effectual in proportion as the punishment is severe? Yet the great amelioration in our penal code, initiated by Romilly, has not been followed by increased criminality but by decreased criminality; and the testimonies of those who have had most experience—Maconochie in Norfolk Island, Dickson in Western Australia, Obermier in Germany, Montesinos in Spain—unite to show that in proportion as the criminal is left to suffer no other penalty than that of maintaining himself under such restraints only as are

needful for social safety, the reformation is great : exceeding, indeed, all anticipation. French schoolmasters, never questioning the belief that boys can be made to behave well only by rigid discipline and spies to aid in carrying it out, are astonished on visiting England to find how much better boys behave when they are less governed—nay, among English schools themselves, Dr. Arnold has shown that more trust is followed by improved conduct. Similarly with the anomalies of incorporated human nature. We habitually accept the assumption that only by legal restraints are men to be kept from aggressing on their neighbours ; and yet there are facts which should lead us to qualify this assumption. So-called debts of honour, for the non-payment of which there is no legal penalty, are held more sacred than debts that can be legally enforced ; and on the Stock-Exchange, where only pencil memoranda in the respective note-books of two brokers guarantee the sale and purchase of many thousands, contracts are far safer than those which, in the outside world, are formally registered in signed and sealed parchments.

Multitudes of cases might be accumulated showing how, in other directions, men's thoughts and feelings produce kinds of conduct which, *a priori*, would be judged very improbable. And if, going beyond our own society and our own time, we observe what has happened among other races, and among the earlier generations of our own race, we meet, at every step, workings-out of human nature utterly unlike those which we assume when making political forecasts. Who, generalizing the experiences of his daily life, would suppose that men, to please their gods, would swing for hours from hooks drawn through the muscles of their backs, or let their nails grow through the palms of their clenched hands, or roll over and over hundreds of miles to visit a shrine ? Who would have thought it possible that a public sentiment and a force of custom might be such that a man should revenge himself on one who insulted him by disembowelling himself, and so forcing the insulter to do the like ? Or to take historical cases more nearly concerning ourselves—Who foresaw that the beliefs in purgatory and priestly intercession would cause the lapse of one-third or more of England into the hands of the Church ? or who foresaw that a flaw in the law of mortmain might lead to bequests of large estates consecrated as graveyards ? Who could have imagined that robber-kings and bandit-barons, with vassals to match, would, generation after generation, have traversed all Europe through hardships and dangers to risk their lives in getting possession of the reputed burial-place of one whose injunction was to turn the left cheek when the right was smitten ? Or who, again, would have anticipated that when, in Jerusalem, this same teacher disclaimed political aims, and repudiated political instrumentalities, the professed successors of

his disciples would by and by become rulers dominating over all the kings of Europe? Such a result could be as little foreseen as it could be foreseen that an instrument of torture used by the Jews would give the ground-plans to Christian temples throughout Europe; and as little as it could be foreseen that the process of this torture, recounted in Christian narratives, might come to be mistaken for a Christian institution, as it was by the Malay chief who, being expostulated with for crucifying some rebels, replied that he was following "the English practice," which he read in "their sacred books."*

Look where we will at the genesis of social phenomena, and we shall similarly find that while the particular ends contemplated and arranged for have commonly not been more than temporarily attained if attained at all, the changes actually brought about have arisen from causes of which the very existence was unknown.

How, indeed, can any man, and how more especially can any man of scientific culture, think that special results of special political acts can be calculated when he contemplates the incalculable complexity of the influences under which each individual, and *à fortiori* each society, develops, lives, and decays? The multiplicity of these factors is illustrated even in the material composition of a man's body. Every one who watches closely the course of things, must have observed that at a single meal he may take in bread made from Russian wheat, beef from Scotland, potatoes from the midland counties, sugar from the Mauritius, salt from Cheshire, pepper from Jamaica, curry-powder from India, wine from France or Germany, currants from Greece, oranges from Spain, as well as various spices and condiments from other places; and if he considers whence came the draught of water he swallows, tracing it back from the reservoir through the stream and the brook and the rill, to the separate rain-drops which fell wide apart, and these again to the eddying vapours which had been mingling and parting in endless ways as they drifted over the Atlantic, he sees that this single mouthful of water contains molecules which, a little time ago, were dispersed over hundreds of square miles of ocean swell. Similarly tracing back the history of each solid he has eaten, he finds that his body is made up of elements which have lately come from all parts of the Earth's surface.

And what thus holds of the substance of the body, holds no less of the influences, physical and moral, which modify its actions. You break your tooth with a small pebble among the currants, because the industrial organization in Zante is so imperfect. A derange-

* Boyle's "Borneo," p. 116.

ment of your digestion goes back for its cause to the bungling management in a vineyard on the Rhine several years ago ; or to the dishonesty of the merchants at Cette, where imitation wines are produced. Because there happened a squabble between a consul and a king in Abyssinia, an increased income-tax obliges you to abridge your autumn holiday ; or because slave-owners in North America try to extend the "peculiar institution" further west, there results here a party dissension which perhaps entails on you loss of friends. If from these remote causes you turn to causes at home, you find that your doings are controlled by a *plexus* of influences too involved to be traced beyond their first meshes. Your hours of business are pre-determined by the general habits of the community, which have been slowly established no one knows how. Your meals have to be taken at intervals which do not suit your health ; but under existing social arrangements you must submit. Such intercourse with friends as you can get is at hours and under regulations which everybody adopts, but for which nobody is responsible ; and you have to yield to a ceremonial which substitutes trouble for pleasure. Your opinions, political and religious, are ready moulded for you ; and unless your individuality is very decided, your social surroundings will prove too strong for it. Nay, even such an insignificant event as the coming-of-age of grouse affects your goings and comings throughout life. For has not the dissolution of Parliament direct reference to the 12th of August ? and does not the dissolution end the London season ? and does not the London season determine the times for business and relaxation, and so affect the making of arrangements throughout the year ? If from co-existing influences we turn to influences that have been working through past time, the same general truth becomes still more conspicuous. Ask how it happens that men in England do no work every seventh day, and you have to seek through thousands of past years to find the initial cause. Ask why in England, and still more in Scotland, there is not only a cessation from work, which the creed interdicts, but also a cessation from amusement, which it does not interdict ; and for an explanation you must go back to successive waves of ascetic fanaticism in generations long dead. And what thus holds of religious ideas and usages, holds of all others, political and social. Even the industrial activities are often permanently turned out of their normal directions by social states that passed away many ages ago ; as witness what has happened throughout the East, or in Italy, where towns and villages are still perched on hills and eminences chosen for defensive purposes in turbulent times, and where the lives of the inhabitants are now made laborious by having daily to carry themselves and all the necessaries of life from a low level to a high level.

The extreme complexity of social actions, and the transcendent difficulty which hence arises of counting on special results, will be still better seen if we enumerate the factors which determine one simple phenomenon, as the price of a commodity—say, cotton. A manufacturer of calicoes has to decide whether he will increase his stock of raw material at its current price. Before doing this, he must ascertain, as well as he can, the following data :—Whether the stocks of calico in the hands of manufacturers and wholesalers at home, are large or small ; whether by recent prices retailers have been led to lay in stocks or not ; whether the colonial and foreign markets are glutted or otherwise ; and what is now, and is likely to be, the production of calico by foreign manufacturers. Having formed some idea of the probable demand for calico, he has to ask what other manufacturers have done, and are doing, as buyers of cotton—whether they have been waiting for the price to fall, or have been buying in anticipation of a rise. From cotton-brokers' circulars he has to judge what is the state of speculation at Liverpool—whether the stocks there are large or small, and whether many or few cargoes are on their way. The stocks and prices at New Orleans, and at other cotton-ports throughout the world, have also to be taken note of ; and then there come questions respecting forthcoming crops in the Southern States, in India, in Egypt, and elsewhere. Here are sufficiently numerous factors, but these are by no means all. The consumption of calico, and therefore the consumption of cotton, and therefore the price of cotton, depends in part on the supplies and prices of other textile fabrics. If, as happened during the American Civil War, calico rises in price because its raw material becomes scarce, linen comes into more general use, and so a further rise in price is checked. Woollen fabrics, also, may to some extent compete. And, besides the competition caused by relative prices, there is the competition caused by fashion, which may or may not presently change. Surely the factors are now all enumerated ? By no means. There is the estimation of mercantile opinion. The views of buyers and sellers respecting future prices, never more than approximations to the truth, often diverge from it very widely. Waves of opinion, now in excess now in defect of the fact, rise and fall daily, and larger ones weekly and monthly, tending, every now and then, to run into mania or panic ; for it is among men of business as among other men, that they stand hesitating until some one sets the example, and then rush all one way, like a flock of sheep after a leader. These characteristics in human nature, leading to these perturbations, the far-seeing buyer takes into account—judging how far existing influences have made opinion deviate from the truth, and how far impending influences are likely to do it. Nor has he got to the end of the matter even when he has

considered all these things. He has still to ask what are the general mercantile conditions of the country, and what the immediate future of the money market will be; since the course of speculation in every commodity must be affected by the rate of discount. See, then, the enormous complication of causes which determine so simple a thing as the rise or fall of a farthing per pound in cotton some months hence!

If the genesis of social phenomena is so involved in cases like this, where the effect produced has no concrete persistence but very soon dissipates, judge what it must be where there is produced something which continues thereafter to be an increasing agency, capable of self-propagation. Not only has a society as a whole a power of growth and development, but each institution set up in it has the like—draws to itself units of the society and nutriment for them, and tends ever to multiply and ramify. Indeed, the instinct of self-preservation in each institution soon becomes dominant over everything else; and maintains it when it performs some quite other function than that intended, or no function at all. See, for instance, what has come of the "Society of Jesus," Loyola set up; or see what grew out of the company of traders who got a footing on the coast of Hindostan.

To such considerations as these, set down to show the inconsistency of those who think that prevision of social phenomena is possible without much study, though much study is needed for prevision of other phenomena, it will doubtless be replied that time does not allow of systematic inquiry. From the scientific, as from the unscientific, there will come the plea that, in his capacity of citizen, each man has to act—must vote, and must decide before he votes—must conclude to the best of his ability on such information as he has.

In this plea there is some truth, mingled with a good deal more that looks like truth. It is a product of that "must-do-something" impulse which is the origin of much mischief, individual and social. An amiable anxiety to undo or neutralize an evil, often prompts to rash courses, as you may see in the hurry with which one who has fallen is snatched up by those at hand; just as though there were danger in letting him lie, which there is not, and no danger in incautiously raising him, which there is. Always you find among people in proportion as they are ignorant, a belief in specifics, and a great confidence in pressing the adoption of them. Has some one a pain in the side, or in the chest, or in the bowels? Then, before any careful inquiry as to its probable cause, there comes an urgent recommendation of a never-failing remedy, joined probably with the remark

that if it does no good it can do no harm. There still prevails in the average mind a large amount of the fetishistic conception clearly shown by a butler to some friends of mine, who, having been found to drain the half-emptied medicine bottles, explained that he thought it a pity good physic should be wasted, and that what benefited his master would benefit him. But as fast as crude conceptions of diseases and remedial measures grow up into Pathology and Therapeutics, we find increasing caution, along with increasing proof that evil is often done instead of good. This contrast is traceable not only as we pass from popular ignorance to professional knowledge, but as we pass from the smaller professional knowledge of early times to the greater professional knowledge of our own. The question with the modern physician is not as with the ancient—shall the treatment be blood-letting? shall cathartics, or shall diaphoretics be given? or shall mercurials be administered? But there rises the previous question—shall there be any treatment beyond a healthy regimen? And even among existing physicians it happens that in proportion as the judgment is most cultivated, there is the least yielding to the “must-do-something” impulse.

Is it not possible, then—is it not even probable, that this supposed necessity for immediate action, which is put in as an excuse for drawing quick conclusions from few data, is the concomitant of deficient knowledge? Is it not probable that as in Biology so in Sociology, the accumulation of more facts, the more critical comparison of them, and the drawing of conclusions on scientific methods, will be accompanied by increasing doubt about the benefits to be secured, and increasing fear of the mischiefs which may be worked? Is it not probable that what in the individual organism is improperly, though conveniently, called the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, may be found to have its analogue in the social organism? and will there not very likely come along with the recognition of this, the consciousness that in both cases the one thing needful is to maintain the conditions under which the natural actions may have fair play? Such a consciousness, to be anticipated from increased knowledge, will diminish the force of this plea for prompt decision after little inquiry; since it will check this tendency to think of a remedial measure as one that may do good and cannot do harm. Nay more, the study of Sociology, scientifically carried on by tracing back proximate causes to remote ones, and tracing down primary effects to secondary and tertiary effects which multiply as they diffuse, will dissipate the current illusion that social evils admit of radical cures. Given an average defect of nature among the units of a society, and no skilful manipulation of them will prevent that defect from producing its equivalent of bad results. It is possible to change the form of these

bad results; it is possible to change the places at which they are manifested; but it is not possible to get rid of them. The belief that faulty character can so organize itself socially, as to get out of itself a conduct which is not proportionately faulty, is an utterly baseless belief. You may alter the incidence of the mischief, but the amount of it must inevitably be borne somewhere. Very generally it is simply thrust out of one form into another; as when, in Austria, improvident marriages being prevented, there come more numerous illegitimate children; or as when, to mitigate the misery of foundlings, hospitals are provided for them, and there is an increase in the number of infants abandoned; or as when, to insure the stability of houses, a Building Act prescribes a structure which, making small houses unremunerative, prevents due multiplication of them, and so causes overcrowding; or as when a Lodging-House Act forbids this overcrowding, and vagrants have to sleep under the Adelphi-arches, or in the Parks, or even, for warmth's sake, on the dungheaps in mews. Where the evil does not, as in cases like these, reappear in another place or form, it is necessarily felt in the shape of a diffused privation. For suppose that by some official instrumentality you actually suppress an evil, instead of thrusting it from one spot into another—suppose you thus successfully deal with a number of such evils by a number of such instrumentalities; do you think these evils have disappeared absolutely? To see that they have not, you have but to ask—Whence comes the official apparatus? What defrays the cost of working it? Who supplies the necessaries of life to its members through all their gradations of rank? There is no other source but the labour of peasants and artisans. When, as in France, the administrative agencies occupy some 600,000 to 700,000 men, who are taken from industrial pursuits, and, with their families, supported in more than average comfort, it becomes clear enough that heavy extra work is entailed on the producing classes. The already-tired labourer has to toil an additional hour; his wife has to help in the fields as well as to suckle her infant; his children are still more scantily fed than they would otherwise be; and beyond a decreased share of returns from increased labour, there is a diminished time and energy for such small enjoyments as the life, pitiable at the best, permits. How, then, can it be supposed that the evils have been extinguished or escaped? The repressive action has had its corresponding reaction; and instead of intenser evils here and there, or now and then, you have got an evil that is constant and universal.

When it is thus seen that the evils are not got rid of but at best only redistributed, and that the question in any case is whether redistribution, even if practicable, is desirable, it will be seen that the "must-do-something" plea is a quite insufficient one.

There is ample reason to believe that in proportion as scientific men carry into this most involved class of phenomena, the methods they have successfully adopted with other classes, they will perceive that, even less in this class than in other classes, are conclusions to be drawn and action to be taken without prolonged and critical investigation.

Still there will recur the same plea under other forms. "Political conduct must be matter of compromise." "We must adapt our measures to immediate exigencies, and cannot be deterred by remote considerations." "The data for forming scientific judgments are not to be had: most of them are unrecorded, and those which are recorded are difficult to find as well as doubtful when found." "Life is too short, and the demands upon our energies too great, to permit any such elaborate study as seems required. We must, therefore, guide ourselves by common sense as best we may."

And then, behind the more scientifically-minded who give this answer, there are those who hold, tacitly or overtly, that guidance of the kind indicated is not possible, even after any amount of inquiry. They do not believe in any ascertainable order among social phenomena—there is no such thing as a social science. This proposition we will discuss in our next article.

HERBERT SPENCER.



IS ETERNAL PUNISHMENT AN OPEN QUESTION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND?

IF this question had been demanded of the last generation of Anglican divines, it is easy to surmise what kind of answer would have been returned—an indignant denial, coupled with an expression of surprise that any doubt on the point could be entertained. The certainty of the truth of this doctrine was almost universally received as an axiom. So little critical were those times—so glibly did the most awful terms, “eternity,” combined with “torment,” fall from the lips of grave and reverend divines and scholars—so unexamined and unscrutinized did the most frightful ideas and images that the human intellect can conceive, or human imagination portray, establish themselves in the inmost persuasion of innumerable minds! He who would shrink from giving a moment’s unnecessary pain or annoyance to a fellow-creature in this world, would speak in level tones and without emotion of the hopeless and eternal misery of the vast majority of mankind. A vengeance pursued without limit, unexhausted by the lapse of millions of ages, and still to burn unconsumed in immortal vigour—all this attributed to a GOD whose name is Love, and whom we address as Our *Father*, would seem an almost impossible persuasion to be arrived at by any rational being.

But this is, in truth, only half the difficulty. Endless sin is

always supposed to be the concomitant of endless suffering. The lost one—and we must bear in mind that the lost are not a few of the worst and most outrageous specimens of humanity, a few monsters who have appalled the world by their crimes, but in truth the moral average of Christians—the “many,” as compared with the “few”—the lost one, we say, is always represented as no longer in a state of possible amendment, but as given over finally to the empire of Sin and Darkness. He will sin and suffer, suffer and sin, in an endless cycle. In other words, GOD will be dethroned from all regulation and government of more than half His Moral Universe. He parts with all control over it. Satan is thus represented as the more potent and prevailing God of the Unseen World. In truth, he is the veritable God of both worlds, while the true God—the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—only succeeds in securing to Himself—to goodness and to happiness—a minority of His creatures, a remnant of His flock!

Here, then, is a double difficulty of the most staggering kind. To survey suffering must be as repugnant to the love of God—we may say, to the heart of GOD—as sin is repugnant to His holiness. Yet, according to the current and accepted theory of the Universe, Sin and Torment are its predominant and eternal characteristics.

Now, all this is not meant as an argument, but as a mere statement; and if the statement cannot be made without including a somewhat impassioned argument, the fault is not mine. I have only stated what is necessarily involved in the doctrine of Eternal Punishment; and I have done so in order to bring forcibly before the reader the strangeness that a doctrine involving such consequences should ever have been received as an axiom in Protestant Christianity—that it is only now beginning to be disputed—that its hold on the mind is only now beginning to be shaken. Assuredly the fact is very strange, and not very creditable. Yet so recently as the year 1853, Mr. Maurice was expelled from the Professorship of Divinity at King's College, London, because he controverted this fearful thesis. At that time even Bishop Blomfield, a liberal-minded prelate, did not venture to interpose between the offended orthodoxy of Dr. Jelf, Principal of the College, and the doom of his victim. He did venture to assert that it was an Open Question in the Church of England. No one then held it to be so. It is not considered so now; but the object of this paper is to show that it *ought* to be so considered. If in Theology there exists, or is permitted, any open question, surely it is this. Augustine laid down this wise rule, which has commended itself to the judgment of all succeeding generations—“In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.” Is then Eternal Torment, linked with eternally progressive guilt, a

necessary article of the faith on which no liberty is permitted, because no doubt can fairly exist as to its truth? If we were to reverse the proposition, and say that *ex necessitate Divinæ Naturæ*—or, to clothe the thought in the words which the youthful honesty of Paley suggested for discussion in the schools of Cambridge—“*Æternitas pœnarum contradicit Divinis Attributis*”—the proposition was necessarily false—should we not be nearer the truth? But not to allow any liberty of difference is surely strange.

It would have been more honourable in Bishop Blomfield, whose heart must inwardly have spurned the part that he was acting, if he had refused to lend his sanction to the expulsion of Professor Maurice, and had bravely maintained the liberties of the Church of England. But he was appalled by the thought of probable consequences; he dreaded to open the floodgates of religious inquiry. Did he suppose that he could keep them closed for ever? Did he never foresee a time when the long pent-up waters would burst all restraints, and possibly sweep away on their turbulent bosom not only things light and valueless—the leaves, the chaff, and the rubbish—but buildings also, and shrines and temples which seemed made for ages. Now if, at that critical moment in 1853, he had set forth in a clear, temperate, but unflinching manifesto the imperative reasons for allowing a diversity of opinions on this dread doctrine, exposing the irrational and insupportable tyranny of dogmatism, and that on the cruel side, he would indeed have precipitated a contest—he would have antedated by a few years the opening of a Great Controversy—he would have made himself a target for all the envenomed missiles of theological rancour;—but he would have been supported by greater forces on his own side, and by the nobler minds. By the many he would have been counted injudicious, but he would have been hailed by the far-seeing few as wise and brave—“the censure of whom ought, in his allowance, to have o’er-weighed a whole theatre of others.” If, from his high and commanding situation in the Metropolitan See, he had vindicated the “liberty of prophesying,” and had uttered words of reason and charity, and rebuked the fierce intolerants, who wished “to shut the gates of mercy on mankind,” he would have recommended Christianity, and relieved it of a load which almost sinks it. He would have been assailed by remonstrances from every quarter of the religious world; he would have been denounced in pulpits and pamphlets innumerable—his own brethren of the lawn and mitre would have disowned him as a traitor; but he would have lifted up a standard which, streaming out in stormy weather, and “torn but flying,” would have been blessed by millions, who would learn for the first time that the Gospel requires no abdication of our

better instincts and feelings,—that it is eminently sweet and reasonable, and conformable to the principles of impartial and universal justice: in short, that the justice and humanity of the Upper World is, at all events, not inferior to what would be called justice and humanity in this lower world—not a very unreasonable demand one would think.

Still, the commotion caused by the mere declaration of the Metropolitan See that the question was an open one—and that taking the merciful side, and, therefore, one would suppose the more Christ-like side, was not a legitimate ground for the Professor's ignominious expulsion—would have been immense, both violent and long continued. For it was not only in ancient times that "words of truth and soberness" were sometimes accounted madness. The fierce spirit of Dogma is no less impervious to reason. Still, a few such words uttered from the chair of authority would have had a magical effect—such an effect as we may sometimes see in a dark and stormy sky: the heavens are covered with black clouds, but there is a rift in those clouds, through which shafts of golden light are descending. We mark the warm and pencilled rays with rapture; and, minute as the space is which they fill, and vast as is the extent of sky over-spread with gloom, yet we know that the light comes from that distant sun which is the abode of heat and splendour, the truest symbol of the Deity, and that the angry and dark expanse is but a congregation of earthly vapours, having their seat and origin only in this lower world. Such would have been the effect of some calm words of reason, some few tones of heavenly love issuing from authority, to repress the excited dogmatists, and to reclaim the rights of reason and conscience—yet, observe, only to this modest extent—to leave Everlasting Punishment an open question; not to allow a clergyman's prospects to be ruined because his head and heart alike recoiled from so tremendous a dogma.

Still, to do this, to proceed thus far and no further, required a higher courage than Bishop Blomfield possessed. Hence Professor Maurice was, in 1853, turned out of King's College as introducing strange doctrines, and as no longer worthy to teach Anglican theology. What an exhibition!

And yet if the dogma be not certain and undeniable, the question ought to be left open. If only a reasonable doubt may exist as to its truth, then consciences ought not to be forced—men ought not to be coerced to embrace and to teach it. It may be alleged that no coercion is necessary, that no one objects, except indeed some wrong-headed individual, here and there, like Mr. Maurice, and then it is the obscure person who holds no high preferment or station of authority. This is true, but the appearance of what we may call a

dread unanimity in holding this dismal and desolating doctrine is quite delusive. There is not the liberty to think; it is denied socially and professionally, if not legally. Few have courage to announce a belief which to the mass seems dangerous and is even distasteful. Those who cannot alter their thoughts, at last cease to think, and repel the intrusion of doubt. What a thought, that even to doubt the everlasting misery of the great masses of all who are born into the world should be positively distasteful to a profession which bears the sacred word of Mercy on its banner, and which is named after the name of CHRIST! It is strange, but true, that a clergyman who had received a presentation to a living would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the signatures of three beneficed clergymen to his testimonials, which assert that he has not "held, written, taught, or maintained anything contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England," if he was known to have embraced the opinion of Origen. The bishop would reject a candidate for Holy Orders who would not pronounce an eternal *lasciate ogni speranza* to the vast preponderating majority of mankind as soon as they close their eyes on the world of trouble which they leave.

And now comes the question, By what right do they do this? Such a dread dogma as this, if insisted on, ought to be clearly declared in the Creeds and Articles of the Church; and I am prepared to show that this is not the case, and that we are ruled in this matter by a tyrannical tradition, the relic of barbarous times, which it is not permitted, under the pains and penalties of heresy, to contradict or even question.

If Everlasting Punishment be not a mere tradition, but an expressed dogma, it must be found in the three great historical Creeds, as given in the Prayer-Book or in the Thirty-Nine Articles. Let us see how the case stands. We will first examine the Apostles' Creed.

In this Creed there are just three clauses which relate to mankind in the Unseen World. I do not say in the "Future World," or in the Next World, nor in "the Future Life," or "the Next Life," but I use the more comprehensive phrase—the Unseen World; for it is no longer "next" or "future" to those countless millions who have departed this life, and who are now enjoying the fulness of life in other spheres of creation. I believe there is scarcely any one now who holds the dismal and irrational tenet of the dormancy of the soul, of an utter suspension of consciousness till what is called "the end of the world."

Now, the three clauses which relate to the Invisible World as connected with man are these,—

"From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead."

Here the scene of the Judgment is immaterial for the purpose before us. We are made to profess our belief in Judgment to come, in the

judgment of all, without exception, but no more than this; not a word is said as to the duration either of the reward or of the punishment of those so judged. The Judgment is announced, but of the issues of that Judgment not a word is said.

But is either the nature or the duration of these necessarily implied? Assuredly not; that finite and strictly measurable guilt should be visited with an absolutely immeasurable penalty, with an endless and boundless vengeance, is a proposition so startling, so repugnant to our sentiments of justice, and to our primary instincts of humanity, that it ought, out of sheer mercy, to have been stated in all its naked horror, and not to have been left to an *innuendo*. Or was it really believed by the Church, but suppressed in the one and only Creed which sufficed for the Church during its three first and purest ages, as being a belief too horrible to be stated? If true, it surely behoved to be proclaimed. Or did shame and horror interfere, and prevent the avowal? A doctrine which is too horrible to be announced ought to be considered infamous even to hold. But such is the stupefying effect of custom and tradition, such is the unreal, parrot-like way in which religious terms are used, that we need not wonder at the strangest phenomena of this kind.

Common sense and common usage must tell us that in any document, much more in a Creed, the main facts and most material things require to be stated, and only minor or subordinate things can be left to implication. But here, on the *orthodox* supposition, the main fact of all, the most momentous and overwhelming consequence, is *wholly left out!*

But there is a subsequent clause of this Creed, in its third portion, which throws strong light on the subject:—

“I BELIEVE IN THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS.”

Observe that this proposition is here made in the most absolute terms. There is no limitation of it, and no restriction. It is the master-truth of the Gospel, to proclaim which was the end for which Christ came into the world. The Apostles' Creed announces it in the broadest and most unqualified manner. It is a truth which results from the loving Fatherhood of GOD to his frail and fallible creatures, and must be as everlasting as GOD'S own nature and essence.

But observe to what puny and pitiful dimensions this glorious clause of the Creed has been reduced by the progress of Dogmatic development. “Forgiveness of sins” is limited—to this world and to this life! We must have our pardon sealed in heaven before we go hence and be no more seen. Forgiveness of sins, then, is a thing of time and space; it is a geographical consideration. It is accorded only within the narrowest limits. That

which results from, and is an expression of, the unchanging mind and nature of GOD is a thing "subject to all the skyey influences." The temperature changes; there is a sudden access of frost or cold, the man dies; from that moment the hitherto relenting Deity, who wooed the sinner with the sweetest tones of mercy and the fullest assurance of pardon, is changed on the sudden, and is henceforth and for ever to him as deaf as the wind, as inexorable as the roaring sea. The Eternal is subject to Time!—the Omnipresent is limited to a poor corner of Space!

These considerations are enough to disprove the whole doctrine and show it to be but a fable. According to the current doctrine, what is true of the Almighty to-day may be false to-morrow. He is merciful one day, inexorable the next. This is not the lesson which the Psalmist teaches,—“Hath God forgotten to be gracious, and will He shut up His loving-kindness in displeasure? but I said, *This is my infirmity*; I will remember the years of the right hand of the Most Highest.” That unworthy limitation of the Divine mercy, which the Psalmist rightly attributed to “his own infirmity,” has been most unfortunately adopted by the Reformed Church, and has maintained its place through ages too dull and uncritical to perceive its real enormity. The Church of Rome never *can* err—the Church of England never does. But no such doctrine as that which I combat is contained in the Apostles’ Creed, but the exact contrary of it is declared. “The Forgiveness of Sins” is declared without restriction as a substantive and eternal truth. The limitation of it to this world and to this life is a traditional gloss, an evil development which annuls the declaration of the Creed, and replaces it by the monstrous figment of Eternal Vengeance, an Unforgiving God!

Evidently the popular doctrine is not to be found in the Creed, but the opposite of it. But it may be said that the belief in the Judgment to come is derived from the words of Our Lord; and that the mention of the Judgment draws along with it the sequel (St. Matthew, c. xxv. v. 46), “and these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal.” Here, without any reason, our version translates the same word differently. *Αἰωνιον* is translated in one case “everlasting,” in the other “eternal.” “Everlasting” sounds rather stronger and more definite than “eternal;” hence, perhaps, our translators assigned it by preference to “punishment.” But *αιων* signifies not “eternity,” but “an age,” “the duration of a system.” It is applied in Scripture to many things which have long passed away, or which are in themselves perishable, as the “throne of David,” “the mountains,” &c., the destroyed Cities of the Plain are represented as “set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of *eternal* fire.” The fire consumed them—finished

its work, and there was an end both of it and of them. The fire was "eternal" in this sense, it destroyed them finally, but it did not burn for ever. Yet this term is held to be conclusive for the dread doctrine of Everlasting Torments! The adjective *αιωνιος* signifies that which lasts an *αιων*. And that *αιων* does not denote "eternity" appears clearly from the form *εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων*, in Latin, *secula seculorum*—ages of ages—a long indeterminate period, whereof we cannot see the end, without in the least implying that there will be no end. We are to measure its force by the subject to which it is applied: as applied to the glory of GOD, it is of course absolutely endless; but as applied to "punishment," it is limited, for suffering is in its very nature limited, both in intensity and duration. All our experience shows us the sharper pain is the shorter it is. Sorrows end us or themselves. All physical reasons and all moral reasons combine to make this certain. Everlastingly renewed suffering is a horror for which we are solely indebted to dogmatic development within the Church.

And now a word to our theological Literalists. It is easy to turn the tables on them completely, and to show that they have but small respect for the letter, when it does not suit their purpose. Adhere to the *letter*, and not the endless torment, but the annihilation of the wicked is the doctrine of Scripture! It will be easy to show this. How does the dogma of eternal existence in misery accord with the sentence, "The soul that sinneth it shall *die*?"

Again, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear Him who is able to *destroy both soul and body* in hell." Surely to say that "to destroy or kill both soul and body," means to *keep both alive* in a state of everlasting torture, is to falsify the meaning of words, or—to speak mildly—to apply them in a non-natural sense. Yet the persons who so apply them are the very persons to complain that we do not understand Scripture literally. It is they who refuse the literal sense, for the literal sense means—annihilation! According to them, "destruction" means preservation!

Again, we are told "the wages of sin is *Death*."

Of the wicked it is said, "whose end is destruction." Again, "who shall be punished with everlasting destruction."

Again, it is said, "If ye live after the flesh ye shall *die*," and "they that have sinned without law, shall also *perish* without law." The Lost are said in very many passages to "die"—to "perish"—to be "destroyed."

Observe the admirable comment of John Locke on the prevailing interpretation of these expressions. "By death, some men understand endless torments in hell fire. But it seems a strange way of

understanding a law, which requires the plainest and directest words, that by 'death' should be meant eternal life in misery! Can any one be supposed to intend by a law which says 'the felon shall surely die,' not that he should lose his life, but be kept alive in exquisite and perpetual torments? Would any think himself fairly dealt with that was so treated?"

How false then is the claim which the sticklers for Everlasting Torment assert to be regarded as adhering to the literal sense of these tremendous passages! I am sure I am right in affirming that five or six of the strongest words which the Greek language contains to express the final extinction of being—in one word, "annihilation"—are applied in the New Testament to the condemned at the Great Assize. Why then do they not believe in the extinction of the souls of the Lost? They are bound to do it on their own principle of literal interpretation.

But we may go farther, and say that not only will the Doomed be extinguished, but that the process of their destruction will be a very rapid one. What destroys more swiftly than fire? and fire is the agent to which they are represented as condemned. In the parable of the tares, our Lord describes himself as saying, "Gather ye first the tares, and bind them in bundles to *burn them*, but gather the wheat into my garner"—the one to be preserved, the other to be put an end to—destroyed.

Perhaps they will say that the soul is like the fabled salamander, and can live in fire—that it is an immaterial Being, and has no relation to fire, and therefore cannot be consumed or destroyed by it. But if so, neither could it experience any *suffering* or *pain* from fire. If, however, in an amiable solicitude that fire may still be the agent, they should allege that "the worm dieth not," and that the fire is "unquenchable," what can this mean but that the fire is not "quenched" before it has utterly consumed its prey? Fire let alone is unquenchable, until its fuel fails. We may say of fire, what Romeo says of "delights"—"these violent" torments "have violent ends, and in their triumph die." Sodom and Gomorrha are said to "suffer the vengeance of *eternal* fire," *i.e.*, the fire raged till it utterly consumed them, but it was not more lasting than the fire which last autumn consumed Chicago.

But if resorting to high transcendental metaphysics these "*unmerciful doctors*" assert—the argument is to be found in most orthodox treatises of theology—that the soul cannot be destroyed, being in its own essence indestructible—then we can only say that they are at direct issue with the already quoted words of Christ, who asserts that man can only kill the body, but that GOD can destroy

both body and soul, *i.e.*, God can destroy the soul in the same sense that man kills the body—that is, destroy its functions for ever.

If we are to be bound by the letter, then unquestionably “annihilation” for all guilty souls is the doctrine of Scripture. “Eternal judgment,” *αιωνιον κρισιν*, which our translators most unwarrantably render “everlasting damnation,” means a judgment from which there is no appeal and no reversal. “Eternal death” is a death from which there is no deliverance, no reversal. In so understanding these expressions there is no forcing of a sense; we only interpret them naturally. Nor does the phrase “the second death,” present any difficulty. The first death only takes effect on the body, the “second death,” destroys the man utterly, soul as well as body. We see thus that not even in the most fearful images which are found in Scripture, is the slightest countenance given to the doctrine of never-ending torment. And yet such is the utter torpor alike of mind and heart produced by dogma that this hideous belief is so paramount that neither doubt nor discussion of it are permitted!

I am not so raw and unknowing as to hope to see a general abandonment of an old belief even on the most imperative call of reason and conscience, but my contention is, that it ought to be at least an open question. Archbishop Whately, after showing that the letter of Scripture goes, not for the eternal misery but more for the final extinction of evil souls, thus expresses himself:—“On the whole, therefore, I think we are not warranted in concluding, as some so positively have done, concerning this question, as to make it a point of Christian faith to interpret figuratively and not literally ‘the death’ and ‘destruction’ spoken of in Scripture, as ‘the doom of the condemned,’ and to insist on the belief that they are to be kept alive for ever.” It can only be described as a monstrous tyranny which there is nothing in the Apostles’ Creed to justify. That Creed asserts a Judgment, but not a word is said as to the result. Nay, the three last clauses—“the Forgiveness of Sins,” (here affirmed absolutely) “the Resurrection of the Body, and the Life Everlasting,” either include all, or relate to the “saved” only—the doom of the rest being passed over in solemn silence.

We now come to the Nicene Creed, which, in its full and enlarged form, was enacted so late as A.D. 381, nearly four centuries after Christ, and certainly long enough for the faith to be thoroughly digested and understood. In one clause of it, touching the Inspiration of Scripture, we may observe a vast superiority to the uncritical, indiscriminate statements of modern theology, a penetration and an insight not to be found in the latter. In the paragraph relating to the Holy Ghost it says, “who spake by the Prophets.” It does not affirm an equal inspiration throughout, according to our blundering

tradition, but it singles out the "Prophets," as especially exhibiting it. It does not answer for the rest, in the wholesale undiscerning way so common to modern theologians.

The same awe and reverence is observed by it in treating of the Dead. "And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead." Not a word is added touching their doom. Least of all is any encouragement given to the hideous doctrine of everlasting pains. The clause which follows is much more patient of an Universalist interpretation—"Whose kingdom shall have no end." According to the accepted doctrine, it is rather the Devil's kingdom which will have no end, seeing that it will perpetuate sin and misery to all eternity, and that over the largest proportion of the human race. But when the Nicene Fathers affirmed that "Christ's Kingdom would have no end," they almost seem to affirm that there will be no end to its conquests in point of extent, as well as no end to its sway in point of duration. And if the Creed affirms this, and makes it an article of the Faith, it seems to affirm nothing more than that which is so confidently asserted by St. Paul,—“He must reign till He hath put *all enemies* under his feet. . . . And when *all things* shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him : that God may be all IN ALL.” And in so speaking, he is only consistent with himself in another and glorious statement of his, that “GOD Our Saviour will have *all men* to be saved.” Now, the orthodox doctrine makes a very different statement, which it insists on as necessary to be believed, and it is just this : “Satan's kingdom will have no end, and it will embrace more subjects than the kingdom of God's blessed Son.”

In the final paragraph of the Creed the three clauses which bear upon our subject are these,—“I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins, and I look for the Resurrection of the dead, and the Life of the world to come. Amen.” The Creed ends with a cheering, hopeful, almost triumphant, tone, and not a word or allusion to the dark side of the Eternal World. Hence it is a Creed intended to be chanted as a triumphal ode, as a strain of joy and praise.

We now see that in the two main Creeds no such doctrine as that under consideration is contained or even hinted at. We now come to the third, or Athanasian Creed. But it does not stand on the same footing as the other two, but altogether on a lower level. It was written, unknown by whom, nor even in what century ; it never received the sanction of any Council ; it was introduced into the Church sometime in the Dark Ages. The Eastern Church never received it ; our American sister Episcopal Church has cast it out ;

an inward revulsion seizes the minds of all who hear it ; one's gorge rises at the very name of it. It is worthy of the Holy Inquisition. It has exercised a similar terror, and, we must admit, a most effective one. Its frightful and menacing tones have reverberated through centuries, and have not yet wholly lost their power. The words in it which concern us are these,—“ Which Faith, except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly ;” and “ they that have done evil shall go into everlasting fire.” O shade of Torquemada ! with what deep inward glee must you have repeated this sentence ! But stern as it is, it does *not* teach never-ending torment. It teaches *annihilation*. Undeniably so by all fair reasoning, and in due candour. Fire consumes, and that very swiftly. If it does not consume the sinners subject to it, neither would it pain them—they, in that case, would have no relation to fire—and the whole is a *brutum fulmen*. Again, take the word “perish.” If the sinner continues to live, and that for ever, he does not “perish” at all. Therefore, the only sense of “perishing everlastingly” must be—and a genuine *bond fide* sense it is—that his “perishing” will be final—without appeal—no resuscitation—no revival. We are told how shameful it is to use words in a non-natural sense—we are told that lawyers are rightly called upon to adjudicate in cases of doctrine, because they have only to do with the grammatical sense of the document, and the natural meaning of words. If so, a lawyer would be bound, in the case of an alleged controverting of the Athanasian Creed, to affirm that the penalty threatened in it is that of—annihilation.

But it will be said, “ this is a hideous doctrine ;” and so it is. I do not hold it myself ; but assuredly it is less hideous, and that by infinite degrees, than the accepted doctrine on the subject. This only will I say, that if there be some souls—very few, indeed, they are likely to be—who cannot be reclaimed by any or all of the infinitely wise methods which Divine Love can apply—souls who have chosen Evil as their final good and portion—then it would become the Almighty to extinguish those perverse and irreclaimable spirits, and not to continue them in an existence which would be a fruitless misery to themselves, and a curse and contamination to all who came in contact with them. We are represented in Scripture as vessels in the hand of the Potter, but the Potter does not preserve misshapen vessels, which serve neither for use nor for ornament ; he breaks them up. It has been reserved for Dogmatic Theology to invent an infinite horror, and to insist upon it as a *sine qua non* of the Church's belief, though it finds no place in the Creeds ; and not even to allow the liberty of an alternative opinion. By this we see that a tradition is often harder to cope with than an expressed and authoritative doctrine.

If this monstrous dogma had been made the subject of an Article of Religion, or nakedly expressed in a Creed, it would have challenged the world's contradiction, and would have found numbers to accuse or else to excuse it. But existing as it were latently, and taken for granted by unthinking generations, it seems to have a vitality by reason of its very grossness and natural incredibility.

Lastly, we come to the Thirty-nine Articles, and we ask is it to be found there? If it be a true doctrine, it assuredly ought to be asserted there, for it concerns a fact of unspeakable urgency. It is the primary fact for all who are born into the world. Now what is the case? It is not mentioned nor even alluded to in the whole of the Thirty-nine Articles. But this is understating the case. In the first draft of our Articles, in the reign of Edward VI., one was introduced, the Forty-second, which contained a decree on this subject; it runs thus:—"They also are worthy of condemnation who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered pain for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice." This appeared in the first Prayer-Book in 1549; but in 1562, when the final form of the Articles appeared under Queen Elizabeth, the Forty-second Article was struck out, nor was any expression of the contrary doctrine substituted for it. What results from this fact?—that the members of the Church of England have entire freedom on this awful subject.

It has been said that the error was a transient one, and not likely to revive, and therefore it was unnecessary to draw attention to a defunct doctrine. Why, the opinion was sure to revive as long as the heart of man beats in his bosom, and as long as reason and conscience are not quite extinct. Human nature rebels against endless torment for finite offences. One of these crimes is that "of confounding the Persons, or dividing the Substance."

But although our Reformers suppressed the Forty-second Article, the heading of which was, "That all men will not be saved at the length," they retained the Article denouncing the Anabaptists' error, "Article XXXVIII., Of Christian men's goods, which are not common." Did they deem this the more dangerous and long-lived error? Professor Maurice justly remarks, "the omission was made by persons who probably were strong in the belief that the punishment of wicked men is endless, but who did not dare to enforce that opinion upon others." But, unfortunately, practical tradition enforces it, though, as we have proved, no such doctrine is to be found in either the Creeds or the Articles of the Church.

Now, it is true that since his expulsion from the Chair of Divinity

in 1853, Mr. Maurice has been inducted into a benefice, though he has certainly neither directly nor indirectly recanted the obnoxious doctrine. Yet this fact does not prove that a Bishop would admit to Holy Orders a candidate who avowed his disbelief of Everlasting Torment. Nor does it prove that such disbelief would not operate against a man obtaining the necessary testimonials for induction to a living. In the case of Mr. Maurice, the liberal-hearted Bishop Tait, who then filled the See of London, would not himself be inclined to raise the question, but many or most of his brethren would. Nor is the case of a distinguished man, who had hosts of friends, and who could avenge himself in print, a fair test of the working of the system. A humbler man might be crushed unheard. And, as a matter of fact, it is beyond question that the question is *not* an open one in the Church of England. The wrong is all the greater that no such belief is demanded in the Formularies, and, as it appears for that very reason, the wrong is only the more firmly entrenched, and the more difficult to assail.

There is a second instance in the same Diocese of aberration from the orthodox standpoint. The Rev. Samuel Minton, minister of Eaton Chapel, Eaton Square, openly teaches the doctrine of utter annihilation for the condemned, and has published numerous tracts enforcing the same idea, and showing very conclusively that if we are bound by the letter of Scripture we cannot refuse his belief. Here it is indeed true that "the letter killeth" in the most strict and absolute sense. I utterly disown this slavish principle of bondage to the letter, and the doctrine which results from it—a doctrine, as I conceive, most dishonouring to the Deity, who has made his intelligent and sensitive creatures so abominable that the bulk of them are only fit to be destroyed. But it is a belief less hideous and less dishonouring than that which it replaces.

Here then are two instances of perfect liberty; but the rest of their brethren are still in bondage, and I plead for their emancipation. In the name of justice and of mercy, let the question be henceforth an open one. Let not the gracious and glorious possibilities of an Infinite Future, all germinating with life and promise, be included in the grasp of a cruel Dogma!

An encouraging sign has just been exhibited at Oxford. The Congregation has resolved that the Thirty-nine Articles are no longer to form a subject of examination, even for members of the Church of England, on taking the ordinary degree. The thoughts of the students will henceforth be left more free, and they will not fail to find their way to a more reasonable, just, and merciful theology than that which has been hitherto prescribed to them on this great subject.

I am unwilling to close these remarks without adverting to a common argument, recently adduced by the late Archbishop Longley, to the effect that the same word "eternal" (*αιωνιος*) is applied to both states of the Departed, and that if Heaven is "everlasting," so must the other state be. The same word, they say, cannot be used in two different senses in the same sentence. The answer is not very clear or satisfying, if we assume that the Good are fixed in Heaven for ever by an immutable decree, and that falling from it is an impossibility. The very essence of spirit is freedom, and we cannot be secured an "eternal heaven" by any sort of mechanical fixation. An eternity of either virtue or blessedness cannot be guaranteed to us—it must depend on ourselves. Are we not told of certain "angels who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation"? A fall may be improbable, but it can never be impossible, so long as Mind and Free choice remain. Hence I cannot but conclude that "eternal" is applied in one and the same sense in both cases. The word in question signifies a duration *as far as we can see*, but one quite indeterminate in length.

The upholders of the dread Dogma seem strongly to resemble Job's three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. They like to be on the strong side, and care not how hard they press on frail mortality. They delight to array God's greatness against man's weakness, in order to crush the latter out of all heart and hope. There is a show of piety in being, as they suppose, on God's side. But it is a mere show of good. Let them learn the true nature of their proceeding by what is said in the last chapter of that sublime book. Did the champions of the Almighty, as they thought themselves, get much credit for their pains? Far from it. We are told how "the LORD said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath." It was Job, then, who complained with the natural voice of suffering humanity, who was really on God's side. Observe how the tables are completely turned on the foolish arguers for God as against man. It is said, "My servant Job shall *pray for you*: for him will I accept; lest I deal with you after your folly, in that ye have not spoken of me the thing which is right, like my servant Job."

It is high time that this was made an open question, not furtively, as it were, in one or two instances, but avowedly, undeniably, so that no clergyman shall suffer for holding the view of justice and mercy and reason, and that no candidate shall be refused Ordination who abjures the popular dogma. Let the Bishops ponder the counsel of St. Augustine, who recommends a mild treatment of the "merciful doctors;" who thinks that they ought to be dealt with as friends, not

as enemies or aliens from the faith, and who seems to have inclined to their belief himself.

“Nunc jam misericordibus nostris agendum esse video et pacifice disputandum, qui vel omnibus illis hominibus quos justissimus Judex dignos Gehennæ supplicio judicabit, vel quibusdam eorum, nolunt credere pœnam sempiternam futuram, sed post certi temporis metam pro cujusque peccati quantitate longioris sive brevioris eos inde existimant liberandos.”—Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xxi. c. 17.

Agreeing with this too is the opinion of St. Jerome: “Quod nos Dei solius debemus scientiæ derelinquere cujus non solum misericordiæ sed et tormenta *in pondere sunt*, et novit quem, *quomodo, et quamdiu* debet judicare.”—*Commentary on Isaiah*.

Better doctrine, I think, than that of an all-devouring and infinite vengeance, raging on to all eternity without measure or limit.

The Bishops complain that they have lost their influence. They have learning, piety, and moderation; and they think it passing strange that these qualities do not secure their moral ascendancy. They forget that this is a thinking and progressive age, and they are stationary. Their ambition is to keep the old doctrines unchanged. It cannot be; the improved reason and feeling of mankind will not allow it. To retain their influence, they must lead the thoughts of the age, and not foolishly hope to maintain the old level of doctrine. We ask no grace and no favour when we demand that this question shall henceforward be an open one. After a careful review of the Church's Formularies, we are enabled to assert that liberty on this point is the right of every member of the Anglican Communion.

I have lately been struck by observing how utterly contrary to the express declarations of many of the Collects of our Church is the strange limitation of God's mercy and forgiveness to the petty dimensions of man's brief life on this planet. Just consider the words of the often-repeated Collect—

“O GOD, whose *nature and property is ever to have mercy and to forgive.*” The orthodox doctrine is a flat contradiction to this glorious assertion.

Take another Collect—that for the eleventh Sunday after Trinity:—“O GOD, who declarest Thy almighty power most chiefly in showing mercy and pity.” If the current doctrine be true, the Almighty's power is most chiefly declared in showing eternal and unforgiving vengeance.

If, again, we go to the Psalms which are daily repeated, we find


this doctrine—"O give thanks unto the Lord ; for He is gracious, and *His mercy endureth for ever*,"—an assertion which is the burden of every verse, and twenty-seven times repeated in the same Psalm.

Or consider the words of the 89th Psalm : " My song shall be always of the loving-kindness of the Lord . . . for I have said, *Mercy shall be set up for ever* : Thy truth shalt Thou stablish in the heavens." According to the current dogma, mercy is only set up for this world ; and there is one truth for this life, and another truth for the unseen world.

I will only allude to one more passage : it shall be the *Gloria*. What do we find there ? " Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, *as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be*." This most ancient formula, than which none is more familiar to universal Christendom, asserts in the strongest form the continuity and identity of the Divine nature and purposes from everlasting to everlasting, and rebukes the notion, as unscriptural as it is absurd and unphilosophical, that what GOD is *now*, He will cease to be as soon as a certain physical event called Death shall arrive. He is *now* a tender Father, He will *then* be to the majority for evermore unrelenting and implacable, debarring them from all hope of restoration either to happiness or to virtue. Surely this is a doctrine worthy only of the priests of Moloch !

But just consider it under the light of the following instance. A man dies just at the stroke of midnight. He is in full possession of his faculties. The clergyman is with him during his last hour ; he assures the dying sinner that the Almighty may still be found, that He is still gracious and willing to forgive. The clock strikes twelve, and the man expires. All is now changed : the Almighty is henceforward obdurate and implacable. In regard to this individual God's dispositions and intentions are wholly reversed ; His mercy is clean gone for evermore. Surely this is the *ne plus ultra* of impiety. Here is a God whose moral qualities change with the changing hours. One hour he is merciful, the next implacable. Who that thinks can believe it ?

ANGLICANUS.



PEASANT PROPRIETORSHIP.

FEW aspects of the "Land Question" have been from time to time more warmly discussed than the character and size of holdings. Quite a considerable school of political economists have argued strongly in favour of what are called "small" holdings, and especially in favour of the ownership of land by a great number of small proprietors. They give two reasons: first, that the possession of land by a great number of the people of any country acts as a social safeguard; and, secondly, they assert that ownership on a small scale is far more effectual than that on a large scale, because an owner who is at the same time a cultivator, and whose daily comfort and that of his family (not to say their existence) depend on the success of his labour, will do far more to secure the due cultivation of the land than the owner of a wide domain, who cannot trace any direct result to the presence or absence of his own personal industry.

A similar line of argument is used in favour of small farms as against large holdings by tenants, it being assumed throughout that by the dispersion of the land amongst a great number of occupiers, whether owners or tenants, the happiness and comfort of a greatly increased number of the people are secured, and the nation is at the same time a gainer by an increase in the production of the soil.

I shall endeavour to show that, without denying that the system of small holdings has been in some points of view successful, and

admitting that it has been largely adopted by almost every nation of Europe, the law should in these things stand aloof, and allow nature to work undisturbed, on the ground that men are more likely to find out what is really beneficial than are lawgivers who must lay down general rules, and cannot adapt their regulations to meet the requirements of an infinite variety of cases.

It may safely be asserted that no system of agriculture can succeed which is introduced by some sudden freak of legislation, and is not the result of the gradual progress of the art amongst the people. You cannot create skilful farmers as you would make pairs of shoes. You want men with a certain amount of capital, with experience of managing land on their own account, with habits of strict economy and industry, and where are these to be found? The case of Prussia, so often quoted, is really not to the point; for there the small farmers were on the spot, and all that the law did was to turn them into proprietors, subject to the relinquishment of part of their land, and to the payment of certain moneys either at once, or by instalments spread over a term of years.*

“What the law of 1811 did was to force the lord of the manor to sell his manorial overlordship to the copyholder for one-half or one-third of the copyhold. By this process he was put in possession of more land than he was possessed of before. What he was deprived of was labour. The tenant lost one-half, or one-third of the land he possessed before, but obtained the ‘dominium directum,’ as well as the ‘dominium utile’ over the remaining half or two-thirds; what was, however, much more important, he got back the free use of his own labour. The landlord sold labour and bought land; the tenant sold land and bought labour.”

The plans proposed by our land reformers would not, like the Prussian law, improve the position of existing holders, but would turn them out that they might see their holdings subdivided and handed over to a number of new men—probably the very labourers whom they had employed. Without saying one word in opposition to small farming or peasant proprietorship as such, I can conceive of no plan more certain to degrade the agriculture of the country, and grievously to injure the very classes whom it is intended to benefit.

I do not mean by saying this to argue against change, or to assert that our present system is perfect. I have recently expressed elsewhere my strong sense of its defects. It is obvious that a system of tenure may be very ancient, and, in a sense, natural to a country, and yet it may have failed; but the causes of failure may be numerous, and may have nothing to do with the size of holdings. For instance, I do not think it would be safe to argue against small

* See Morier, “Cobden Club Essays,” 1870, p. 292.

holdings, because in some parts of France* and in Ireland they have failed to secure agricultural prosperity, inasmuch as other causes, independent of the size of the holdings, may in both cases have had a very important influence on the life of the people, and have prevented their systems of agriculture from being fully tried. So at home, large holdings have not had fair play, because so much land has been held by tenants at will under impoverished landlords. The fact of failure may prove the need of some change; but it requires the utmost care how we assume that any one cause is the only one which is operating adversely to the prosperity of the people.

In the *Times* of September 13, 1871, is a letter from Mr. J. Sproule, which contains the following passage:—

“Agriculture has this peculiarity—that it is a thing of circumstances to a degree unknown in any other branch of industry. Throughout entire districts of the United Kingdom tillage by the aid of machinery cannot be introduced. As regards tillage husbandry, it is, indeed, only in the richer and comparatively level parts of the country that the large capitalist can find a field for his operations. Under no conceivable change of circumstances can the poorer, hilly districts be traversed by the steam plough or cultivator. The spade, the riddle, and the hand-hoe must continue to form the mechanical appliances of the farms of these regions. . . . As farms become vacant in all the more fertile and level districts the natural tendency will be towards consolidation and consequent increase in the size of the holding, while elsewhere the small farmers will maintain their ground.”

This argument seems to be extremely sensible. Surely no statement can be more extravagant than that what suits one country is sure to suit another, or that a tenure which is exactly fitted for one part of a country must be the best for the whole. The Flemish tenants and the Irish cottier (before the Land Act of 1870) both held small pieces of land by a rather precarious tenure, with this distinction, that the soil of Flanders is very inferior to that of Ireland, but the former, thanks to his thrift and good sense, had far more success than the latter. It is not the large estate or holding as such, or the small estate or holding as such, that is best; but that estate or holding

* “Let us place ourselves in the centre of France, in the mountains of Limousin. There we find a poor granitic soil, a wet cold climate; cereals do not flourish, and do not pay for the expense of cultivation; rye predominates, and gives but a poor return; but vegetables and roots flourish. Irrigation is made easy by the frequency of springs, the fertilizing quality of the water and the slopes of land; animals can be bred and fattened under most favourable circumstances. It is very nearly the soil and the climate of a large part of England. Everything demands *la grande culture*. Unfortunately, by a succession of events which have nothing to do with agricultural pursuits, it is *la petite* which predominates, and it is of necessity unproductive. Cereals exhaust the soil, and insufficient manure fails to restore it. Manual labour is used to an extent which is out of all proportion to the result obtained; the cattle, badly fed and worn out by work, give no profit; rent is almost reduced to nothing, and wages are miserable.” (M. de Lavergne, “Écon. Ruf. de l’Angl.,” p. 134.)

through which the largest amount of capital (using that word in its widest sense) is brought to bear on the cultivation of the land.

It will not be out of place here to remark that most erroneous notions prevail as to the average size of English farms. People hear of a few great farms in a neighbourhood, and then adopt the idea that all or the greater part of the land is so held, whereas such statements require great modification. It appears from the Agricultural returns for 1870, that 54 per cent. of the farms of Great Britain are under 20 acres, 28 per cent. between 20 and 100 acres, and 18 per cent. above 100 acres. On the other hand, taking the total area under crops to be 30,408,000 acres, 66 per cent. or 19,940,000 acres are held in farms of over 100 acres, averaging 215 acres in extent; 16 per cent. or 4,800,000 acres in farms from 50 to 100 acres, averaging 75 acres; 10 per cent. or 3,010,000 acres in farms from 20 to 50 acres, averaging 35 acres; 7 per cent. or 2,250,000 acres in farms from 5 to 20 acres, averaging 15 acres; and 1 per cent. or 408,000 acres (really a little more than 1 per cent.) in farms not exceeding 5 acres. We have 529,150 farmers in Great Britain, of whom only 93,071 occupy holdings above 100 acres, and though they occupy a great area, still it may fairly be asserted that we have the "mixed system."

At the same time there is no doubt that our system stands in marked contrast to that adopted on the continent of Europe. To us our system may seem a natural one; but the advocates of peasant proprietorship and small holdings point to the continent and assert the contrary. It is certainly very remarkable that over great areas, where, according to English ideas, much economy would result from the adoption of large holdings, small farms, whether held by tenants or owners, prevail; but there are great exceptions, which show that the system of large holdings is really as "natural" in the sense here used as its opposite. In the statement of the Hon. R. Lytton in the second part of the Reports of Her Majesty's Representatives as to the Tenure of Land in Europe, when speaking of the legislation of 1848, by which the feudal system was abolished throughout the Austrian Empire, he says (p. 9)—

"The legislation of 1848, in Austria, did not turn tenant farmers into proprietors, for the bondsmen whom it emancipated were already proprietors. It simply converted feudal proprietorship into free proprietorship. It did not deprive the great proprietors of their properties, it only deprived them of certain feudal rights over the property of others."

He then points out how various is the condition of the different parts of the Empire as to the prevailing size of properties. After giving many other interesting details, he proceeds as follows (p. 14) :—

“In most of the provinces, and especially in Upper and Lower Austria, the small proprietary is decidedly flourishing; the owners of small properties are able to maintain themselves in a considerable amount of comfort. Their mode of life is less expensive, less luxurious, and more primitive than that of our great tenant farmers; but it is an easy and independent one, and they are a well-contented and well-to-do class.”

Having thus borne willing testimony to the success of the system of small ownerships up to a certain point, he goes on to say (p. 20):—

“My personal impression is that the two classes have mutually benefited, and greatly benefited, by their co-existence and juxtaposition, and that the total annihilation of either class would involve a material disadvantage to the remaining one. But it is a notorious and striking fact that, in this most agricultural Empire, agriculture flourishes only in those provinces where great estates and great landowners prevail, and that, in all those parts of the country where the peasant proprietors predominate, the state of agriculture is singularly rude and primitive.”

I would refer also to the report of Mr. Colnaghi on Lombardy in the same volume (p. 379). After giving a very exhaustive account of the condition of the small proprietors, the tenants, and the labourers, he says:—

“Public opinion would appear to hold that the systems of tenure in use in Lombardy are, on the whole, suited to the nature of the country and of the product. In Upper Lombardy, where none but an owner would labour to force the precipitous hill-sides into verdure, small properties predominate. In Central Lombardy, where the multifarious products of the soil—the vine, the mulberry tree—require, if not the ownership, at least, the interested co-operation of the cultivator, the ‘metayer’ system prevails. In Lower Lombardy, the region of meadow lands, and suitable for high farming, large tenancies are conducted by farmers of capital and experience.

“It would be impossible to compare with any profit these different tenures the one with the other; from an agricultural point of view each system has its merits and demerits under different circumstances. From a social point of view, and looking to the well-being of the peasant, there is no doubt but that his position is improved whenever he shares in the produce of the soil, and that he is more independent in spirit as a small proprietor, unless his freehold be too small to enable him to make a living from the land.”

Even in the case of France, as M. de Lavergne has so well pointed out (“L’Agric. et la Pop.,” p. 179) political rather than natural causes, even before the Revolution, led to small properties and small holdings. And now, as he goes on to remark, if capital will not do its part “so long as the application of science to cultivation shall be considered as a ruinous folly, small property and small cultivation will extend; it is inevitable and even desirable; where science and capital are wanting, labour ought to prevail.” But whatever may be decided as to what is or is not “natural” in this matter, it may safely be asserted that except, perhaps, in America,

"nature" has never yet had a complete trial, for, over a large part of the continent, forced subdivision prevails with more or less modification, and with us and in parts of Germany, forced accumulation, inasmuch as the subdivision which would naturally take effect, is constantly prevented by the operation of settlements or *fidei commissa*. Apart, however, from the question how the systems of small or large holdings have arisen or are maintained in any country, it will be interesting to consider some of the evidence as to the working of small holdings, especially as we have recently received so much light on the subject from the reports just mentioned.

Take the case of France. There all objections to the Code Civil and its rigid rule of subdivision are answered by the assertion that the system works well; that though families may disappear, the state remains, and prosperity prevails amongst her peasantry. M. de Lavergne asserts that the most divided parts of France are the best cultivated, though he is fully alive to the dangers of extreme subdivision. As he says—"A family of peasants can live very well with an income of 1200 francs (£50), and if they have an excess of a few hundred francs, the land will not suffer in their hands, but the contrary; nowhere is it the object of more assiduous care, nowhere does it return with more liberality the affection which it receives."*

Again, he says (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, December, 1867, p. 757):—

"The true causes of our agricultural inferiority are not these" (that is in subdivision of the land); "they are in our military, financial, and administrative organization, which drains the country of men and capital, and which would drain them yet more but for the counterpoise of small properties."

The same distinguished man, speaking of Arthur Young's complaints in 1789, says:—

"He" (Arthur Young) "was mistaken as to the facts in attributing to the division of the soil the backward state of French agriculture in 1789. The most subdivided provinces were, on the contrary, then, as now, the best cultivated, with a few exceptions, and one may say, speaking generally, that before, as after 1789, agricultural progress has advanced in France along with the division of the soil, provided it was natural and voluntary. That it should be always so is not quite so certain, excessive subdivision has its inconveniences, and the advantages of the 'grande culture' begin to be remarked, the more markets for produce are extended. In any case, Arthur Young would have been entirely in the right, if he had no other object but that of attacking *forced* division." ("Écon. Rur. de la France," p. 429.)

Mr. West, in his Report to Her Majesty, quotes from the Enquête Agricole of the late Emperor, and speaks warmly as to the success of

* "Écon. Rur. de l'Ang.," p. 121.

small farming in France, with the caution that where the subdivision has become excessive, as in Lozère, the result is, on the authority of M. de Lavergne himself, an "universal indigence." It is obvious that there may be a natural limit to division which is not forced, but where the limit to a forced division is to be found it is very difficult to see.*

M. de Lavaleye asserts ("Cobden Club Essays," 1870, p. 244) that—

"All over the continent of Europe there is more live stock kept, more capital owned, more produce and income yielded by small farms than by large estates."

And, again :—

"The working capital of a farm, which in England is estimated at from £10 to £12, amounts here" (in Flanders) "to £20. The gross produce may be taken at £24 per hectare" (two acres and a half). "As regards live stock there were to be found in 1846, 55 head of horned cattle, 12 horses, and 8 sheep on every 250 acres.

"For England" (not including Ireland and Scotland) "M. de Lavergne gives the following averages for the same year :—33 head of horned cattle, 6 horses, and 200 sheep for 250 acres.

"Bringing these figures down to the common standard of heads of horned cattle, we find 64 heads in England, and 68 in Flanders ; the land of Flanders being, at the same time, worse than any in England. The average rent of land in Flanders is £4 per two and a half acres, and the value, or selling price, varies from £140 to £160. Rents and selling prices have doubled since 1830. These results are not equalled in any other part of Europe."

Again, he says (p. 249) :—

"In the Eastern Provinces of Prussia" (Prussia proper and Posen) "there are hardly any but large estates, worked by the owners themselves. In Westphalia and the Rhenish Provinces there are to be found peasant proprietors and small farmers. The Eastern Provinces are inferior to those of the West, even with respect to live stock, as appears from the following table :—

"There are to every square mile in the

Provinces.	Metres of Road.	Inhabitants.	Heads of Large Cattle.
Posen	5,000	3,000	2,989
Prussia	4,000		
Westphalia	14,000	6,000	3,569
Rhineland	17,000		

* It would be easy to bring a host of other witnesses who see nothing but good in the division of land in France. It is enough to quote M. de Lavergne, as the most moderate and best informed advocate of the system.

“In the Western Provinces agricultural wages are double what they are in the Eastern ones; and while in the latter there are nine inhabitants to every house, there are but five and a half in the former.”

Mr. Grattan, in his Report as to Belgium, quotes with approval the following passages from Mr. Van Aelbroeck's work on the farming of Belgium (Reports, Part I., p. 157):—

“If a small cultivator possesses a bad piece of land he will endeavour to improve it by constantly digging and turning up the soil; he will even labour for years to overcome its defective qualities and to render it productive; whereas land of a similar quality in the hands of a large proprietor is in general neglected, and will remain uncultivated. . . . So convinced are the people in Flanders of the advantages of small holdings that large farms are frequently divided and converted into small ones. A part or all the buildings are removed, and the lands are let to various small agriculturalists, who may be inclined to increase their farms. This occurs chiefly in thickly populated districts. The landlord incurs the outlay for the repair of buildings, and obtains a higher rent for his land.”

Mr. Grattan expresses himself thoroughly satisfied of the success of small holdings in Belgium, not, however, merely because they are small, but because the system suits the people and the circumstances:—

“For, in order to meet with success, it” (the system) “must have been developed naturally by the force of circumstances and events, and be, moreover, in harmony with the customs and institutions of the inhabitants, and adapted to the climate and general capabilities of the soil.” (p. 158.)

Mr. Gordon, in his Report as to the condition of Wurtemberg, gives the following quotation from Baron Varnhüler, with apparent approval of its arguments:—

“Anyone who has had opportunities of intercourse with the people will recollect how, among the poorer classes, industry, good faith, economy, moral behaviour, are accustomed to attach themselves to the acquisition of a small property; how the house servant, or farm labourer, or small mechanic usually doubles all his efforts from the moment when he has obtained the right of calling a small plot of land his own; as also, how he seems to place all his happiness in maintaining, extending, and tending this possession, and how incredibly large are the returns which, in addition to his other labour, he is enabled to extract therefrom.”

Mr. Baillie, speaking of the neighbouring country of Baden, says:—

“The prevalent public opinion is, that the system of small freeholds tends to promote the greater economical and moral prosperity of the people, to raise the average standard of education, and to increase the national powers of defence and taxation.

“It seems to be a generally established fact, that the small farmers realize larger returns than the larger farmers do from the same number of

acres, and the result is that large properties and large farms are disappearing, and being parcelled out among a number of small farmers. In fact, the price of landed properties is determined less by their intrinsic value than by the possibility of selling or letting than as small holdings."

Speaking of the condition of the labourers of Prussia, Mr. Harris Gastrell says (Reports, Part I., p. 357) :—

"The day wages are apparently higher than the wages of the farm and field labourers who are employed by the year ; but if allowance be made for the risk of want of work and for other incidents of the day-labourer's earnings, they are not really higher, but, on the contrary, he probably is in a worse position than the regularly engaged farm labourer. The difference is his payment for his independence and family life. On the other hand, this position makes him exert more diligently his powers. . . . Dr. Meitzen adds, 'the inclination of the German to establish his family upon its own plot is a blessed trait of the greatest moral advantage. It has been sufficiently shown that the possibility of acquiring land fosters hope, encourages energy, and never lets useful activity flag.' He is one of a multitude who think with him in Prussia."

Again, in referring especially to the labourers of the North-East Provinces, where the holdings are chiefly large, he says :—

"The agricultural labourer lives and dies a mere day-labourer. He knows he cannot change his lot. How different all would be if he saw ever before his eyes the opportunity of acquiring a plot of land by the exercise of economy ! The proof of this is repeated in the numberless examples which in this respect are offered by the Rhine province and other districts with minutely subdivided land. Thousands of agricultural labourers who formerly had not a single inch of soil, have, by a period of economy, purchased house and a plot of tillage. . . . From them," (the labourers of the Western Provinces) "through the various classes of small proprietors, the dark colours rapidly fade out." (p. 361.)

Again (p. 365) :—

"The peasants lose nothing, so far as I am acquainted with them, by being compared with the corresponding classes in England. The middle proprietors are distinguished for their liberality in religion, their conservatism in politics, their careful economy in money matters, their praiseworthy sobriety in morals, their conduct in social relations, and their practical knowledge of agriculture. . . . In purely agricultural districts pauperism is very rare, and beggars are unknown. . . . As regards the returns of land, the small and middle proprietors obtain a greater return per acre than the large proprietors. . . . Moreover, the profit to the individual cultivator seems, in Prussia, to be universally larger from good ordinary farming than from high farming with expensive manuring. . . . Medium farming seems to be better and more careful than the medium farming of England. This, at any rate, can be noticed, that the average farming of the less-acred middle proprietors is more careful than the average farming of the corresponding tenant farmer in England. This applies, in the main, to the small proprietor also, who has a cow, or a couple of cows, or a team of oxen, or a horse for farm work. The gardening cultivation is renowned for its care and intelligence."

Speaking of the department of Langensatzza, the same gentleman says (p. 408) :—

“The condition of the department manifests the phenomenon of a landed peasantry prospering after the influence during centuries of the pre-alienation of land and of equal division on inheritance of land. It seems also to warrant the inference that a proprietary peasant is, by the fact of possession of the land, rendered exceedingly prudent and foreseeing, and is instinctively impelled by the interests of the family to manifest an unconscious observance of the economic law which restricts the population of a given district to the number which can be sustained by the produce of the district.”*

I have hinted at the case of America as an illustration of a “natural” system of tenure, where the law and the customs of the people have combined to bring about the utmost freedom in the dealing with the land and a practical absence of all forced accumulation, although in some States settlements by will are legal. It is needless to give statistics to prove the success of American agriculture. The wonderful results are not, of course, due merely to the character of the holdings, though, as a matter of fact, small farms predominate where the greatest success has been achieved. The nature of the climate and soil, and the character of the people would have secured large returns, even with a bad state of the law, but certainly the prosperity has been greatest where the law has not interfered with the industry of the people. For it is to be observed, that in those very districts where the laws as to slavery practically encouraged large holdings and an antiquated form of society, agriculture languished as compared with its condition in those Eastern States where freedom found its way into the land-law, as well as into the forms of Government. America has, in fact, tried both systems, and already, as soon as the incubus of slavery has been removed, the division of the land of the Slave States has commenced. What the results will be is not hard to predict. Many a neglected estate will find an owner, who will restore it by free labour, which, under the old system, could not have been employed by reason of the presence of slavery. A better illustration of the good effects of true freedom it would not be easy to discover.

In other parts of the same Reports may be found further abundant proofs how great has been the success of these small holdings in various parts of Europe. It would be tedious to give additional extracts. The evidence is scattered throughout the volumes under all sorts of variations as to climate and the position of the holdings.

But it is important to present the other side of the picture, which will show that the size of the holdings will not of itself secure the

* See Mill's “Political Economy,” vol. i., Appendix, as to this point in the case of France.

desired result, and that you may have bad farming and great misery amongst the peasantry with small as well as with large holdings.

Nothing is more common than to see glowing accounts of the "metayer" system of Tuscany. In Part IV. of the Reports above mentioned, will be found the following summary of a very careful consideration of the state of the peasantry by Mr. Herries :—

"Here is a mass of concurrent testimony (and much more could be brought forward to the same purpose) extending over a period of thirty-seven years. It proves clearly that the ordinary condition of 'mezzainoli' is one of privation and distress; that as a rule they cannot live upon what they are entitled to receive in exchange for their labour; that they depend for their subsistence upon the supplementary assistance given to them by their landlords; and that failing such aid they must beg, steal, or starve." (p. 30.)

He quotes Professor Cappari in 1858, who says :—

"At present the owner and the labourer are in a state of continual though covert strife. The latter, for fear of not enjoying the fruits of his toil, of which he may be deprived suddenly by eviction, abstains from improvements which might notably increase the produce of the farm, and does not perceive that his dread of an uncertain loss makes him undergo a certain one. The landlord too proceeds cautiously, because he does not wish his capital to turn to the benefit of the labourer, and is reluctant to adopt innovations which might be to the advantage of the latter, not considering that the increased prosperity of the occupier would in the end be a gain to himself."

Another passage from the same Report is interesting (p. 16) :—

"In his remarks upon the agriculture of Tuscany in particular, he" (Professor Cappari) "says that little attention is paid to conditions of climate and soil, the same crops being grown almost everywhere and in the same manner. Indian corn, vines, and wheat, are frequently raised on soils that are not adapted to their cultivation, an inconvenient practice which he attributes chiefly to the system of 'mezzeria,' and partly also to the great division of property, both occupiers and small proprietors being desirous to get out of the land what they want for their own consumption.

"He declares it to be irrational to apply the same mode of cultivation to the hills as to the plain, and remarks thereupon, . . . 'At present, in the greater part of the hill country, the 'mezzeria' system is struggling against impossibility. This is shown by the economical results which are equally disastrous to both of the parties interested, the landlord and the tenant ('colono'), the former being obliged to spend the greater part of his moiety of the produce in providing for the necessities of the latter, whose share does not suffice for his support.'"

Bad as is the state of our own peasantry, we can afford to compare it with the following statement in the same Report (p. 23) as to the Italian labourers :—

"Whatever may be the extent of the emigration of agricultural labourers, the existence of the misery which has been declared to be its principal cause can hardly be doubted. The evidence of their deplorable condition which is to be found in the Report on the Census, the Report of the Royal Commission of 1869 in the Emilian provinces, and Signor Morpurgo's work on

Venetia has already been recorded. Further testimony may be adduced. In the well-known Report of the Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on Brigandage in 1863, the wretchedness of the rural population of many of the southern provinces was pronounced to be the primary cause of that evil. Professor Virgilio, in his work above cited, says, 'Except in the principal towns and a few centres of industry, working men in general, and agricultural labourers in particular, are so miserably paid that they cannot even procure wholesome and sufficient nourishment.' Another writer tells us that a peasant in the south can hardly get his daily food, which consists of onions, potatoes, 'polenta,' beans, and cheese; that his habitation is more like the den of a beast than a human dwelling, and that his clothing is nothing but a filthy heap of rags. A work of authority which was published at Milan last year ('Della Carità Preventiva dell' Ordinamento delle Società di Mutuo Soccorso in Italia,' di Enrico Fano) may also be consulted. Nothing can be more dismal than the picture it gives of the state of the peasantry throughout Italy."

I do not see how the existence of such a state of things can surprise anyone who remembers that so great a proportion of the owners and tenants of Italy are themselves poor, and only just removed in the social scale above the labourers whom they employ.

I have referred to one opinion as to the condition of the people of Wurtemberg. Mr. Phipps (Report, Part I., p. 85) gives a rather different picture. After stating that in Wurtemberg subdivision has been carried to an extreme, he says:—

"As far as the class of really small peasant cultivators are concerned, there is no doubt that the evils of small proprietorship are felt most sensibly. In the Neckar and part of the Black Forest districts, there is hardly a commune without a number of dwarf properties, and many where there are no middle-sized properties at all, and where small properties possessing any sort of vitality are in the minority. In many communes, owing to want of sufficient area or the poverty of the soil, the inhabitants are unable to obtain a livelihood from agriculture, and the conditions of obtaining a livelihood from industrial pursuits are wanting, and consequently a redundancy of population prevails."

Still, Mr. Phipps asserts, that the opinion of political economists in Wurtemberg is favourable to the system of small holdings, the cases above referred to being regarded as exceptional. They occur chiefly in the vine districts, where the vine-grower has no land from which to procure food in bad seasons.

Even in Belgium, the instance most commonly adduced to prove the success of small holdings, there can be no doubt from the evidence of M. de Lavaleye himself, that the condition of the farmer, where the land is most subdivided and the holdings are the smallest, is a much harder one than in those parts where the farms are larger, and it is equally clear that the lot of the labourer in Belgium is one of the most abject poverty. His condition may not be worse than that of an English labourer in the most backward parts of England, but is certainly worse, as I read M. de Lavaleye's testimony, than that of our

labourers where the system of large holdings has a fair trial, that is, where both landlord and farmer have sufficient capital to do justice to the land. The small occupier in Belgium is generally poor and rack-rented, and he cannot be expected to pay highly for labour. There, as everywhere else, the want of capital is especially felt by the labourer, who gets none of the produce of his labour directly, but depends on the resources of another for his remuneration. But M. de Lavaleye thinks the true distinction to be that a small *tenant* does badly, and the small *owner* succeeds, and he contrasts Flanders, a land of tenants, with Luxembourg, a land of small owners. In the latter wages are double what they are in the former, with cheaper food. The very small farmer is really poorer than the very small owner. No Englishman will, I think, be surprised at this.

Another remarkable case is that of Portugal, where, spite of the wide diffusion of small properties, Mr. Brackenbury is compelled to describe the condition of the people as follows:—

“Not only is the consumption of food lamentably below the standard, the production itself is no less deficient. Portugal has never within living memory grown sufficient corn for her own frugal wants; and the present annual deficiency of the cereal crops is calculated to be equal, on the average, to the total yearly consumption of Lisbon. The increase again in the population is so slow, that it is calculated it would take more than two centuries and a half, at the present rate, to double itself. As regards agricultural improvements, with the exception of the adoption here and there of a few French and American ploughs, and of the more liberal use of manure, the processes here are much the same as they were two hundred years ago.”

Mr. Brackenbury attributes the agricultural condition of Portugal to past mistakes, when great areas were held in mortmain and tied up by entails, but it is evident that the changes in the law, though radical in their character and directly tending to subdivision, have not sufficed alone to effect what was desired. The law may discourage and cripple an intelligent people, but the law alone cannot change a population of ignorant peasants into a race of good farmers like those described by M. de Lavaleye.

It seems impossible not to refer to the case of Ireland, where certainly the system of small holdings has not been an entire success. But it would not be fair, as stated before, to attribute the failure of agriculture in Ireland to the size of the holdings. Her political history, the peculiar character of her people, and the prevalence of tenancy at will, are causes quite sufficient to counteract any benefits which she might otherwise have derived from a system of small holdings; but certainly the condition of Ireland suffices to show that small holdings; will not alone suffice to secure good husbandry, even if they do not discourage it, as some would have us believe.

No one can, I think, rise from the perusal of these Reports without admitting that the subdivision of the land amongst a vast number of peasant proprietors and tenants does diffuse very much happiness and comfort amongst the people under a great variety of circumstances, and in various countries which differ, in other respects, in almost every possible particular. It is, however, a system which is by no means always successful, for it does not always suit the habits or genius of a people or the peculiar climate or soil of the country in which they dwell. The same may be predicted of large holdings, You can find in England many happy, prosperous homes where land is cultivated on a large scale by men of ample capital, whose skill and enterprise not only enrich themselves, but also spread comfort and contentment all around them; and both here and on the Continent you may find abundance of examples of large farms which are cultivated in a most slovenly fashion by men who have neither the means, nor the intelligence, nor the energy which are required to ensure success. The results of both systems being thus various and depending on so many varying circumstances, it seems to me absurd to attempt to force either one or the other on our people by law, and I regard as equally unsound both those laws which enforce subdivision, and those which, like our own, directly or indirectly discourage or hinder the natural distribution of the land amongst the people.

If we consider merely the amount of production, the verdict must be given in favour of the English system, as more surely securing economy of labour and the bold investment of money by the farmer, greatly as he is hindered by our system of tenancy at will, and the absence of anything in the shape of tenant right. This appears clearly from the following table, which I take from Mr. Harris Gastrell's Report on Prussia (p. 221) :—

	Agricultural Population to Total Population. Per cent.	Average return of Corn per Hectare. Hectolitres.	Head of Cattle per 1000 Inhabitants.	Head of Cattle per 100 Hectares.
Russia in Europe	85 to 90	16	693	86
Italy	77	16	291	249
France	51	14.6	494	346
Belgium	51	19.3	402	660
Prussia	45	19.8	540	369
Austria	25	16	635	307
Spain	25	16	316	151
Holland	16	20	492	539
United Kingdom	12	4.8	515	478

I have no means of testing the whole of these figures; but the figure for France appears to me too low, as according to the Agricultural Returns for 1870, the average produce in France in 1865 was 17 bushels an acre, which will give 42.5 bushels or 15.5 hectolitres per hectare. On the other hand, there is a decided exaggeration as to

England, for 40 hectolitres equal 110 bushels, which gives 44 bushels per acre, whereas the average of 1870 (a very good year) was only 28 bushels according to the above returns. The correct figure would be 70 bushels per hectare, or 25·5 hectolitres as against 40. But, making all allowance for this error, the figures are certainly very remarkable. It is evident that Great Britain produces more corn per acre than any country in Europe by the labour of a far smaller portion of her people, thus leaving a much larger amount of labour free for the manufacture of wealth in other ways. This is a fact of the highest importance.* I do not say that it is by any means conclusive, but it deserves very careful consideration. The explanation, no doubt, is that more capital is habitually invested in English agriculture. As M. de Lavergne puts the case, speaking of the habits of English farmers :—

“All invest money in the soil with perfect confidence. In this country (England) where industry and commerce are on all sides asking for capital, and promising it a brilliant return, there are still a great number who prefer agriculture to trade. While our cultivators (as they say themselves) shave an egg, and consider what is not spent as so much gained, in England the question is, who can put most money into the land. It is especially through the *grande culture* that considerable expenses have been incurred, it is that which gives every day the most striking examples of the spirit of industry applied to cultivation; but the *moyenne* and the *petite* cultivation follow close on the heels of the other. The small farmer who has only a few thousand francs has no more hesitation than the great capitalist who has ten times or a hundred times as much. Both, at the same time, and more often than not on the security of a mere tenancy from year to year, engage in expenses which would seem to us enormous, and which only proprietors would undertake. . . . Generally the substitution of horses for oxen and of machinery for manual labour in field work is attributed to the *grande culture*. So it is also said of the large purchases of manure and of improvements of all sorts. Here is a fresh confusion. The use of these perfected processes, that is to say, the intelligent employment of capital, is a sign rather of a rich and enlightened cultivation, than of cultivation on a great scale. Small farmers and farmers with moderate-sized holdings understand the advantages of these processes quite as well as the large holders, both in England and everywhere where cultivation is thus advanced; they are despised only by poor and ignorant husbandmen. Now, if English cultivation is rich, it is not less enlightened and skilful.” (*Écon. Rur. de l'Angleterre*,” p. 128.)

In the same volume will be found an estimate of the produce of England as being just double that of France, and in his “*Économie Rurale de la France*” (p. 60), the same author calculates that it

* How important this consideration has appeared to be to economists of standing may be seen from the following extract from Mr. M'Culloch's notes to Adam Smith (p. 569) :—“This is the powerful spring that has done more, perhaps, than any other to carry our commerce and manufactures to their present unexampled extent, that impels us forward in the career of improvements, and enables us, without difficulty, to support what would otherwise be a very heavy load of taxes.”

would take France three-quarters of a century to arrive merely at the point of agricultural development at which England had then arrived (1866). This is a remarkable testimony from the best witness in Europe, and one who is a warm admirer of peasant cultivation.

Another comparison, taken from the "Agricultural Returns, 1870," may be interesting :—

	Acres under Crops.	Horses.	Cattle.	Sheep.	Pigs.
Great Britain . . .	30,407,579	2,050,000	5,403,317	27,395,000	2,171,000
France	80,000,000	2,313,000	12,733,000	30,386,000	5,889,000
Prussia	50,000,000		7,996,000	22,262,000	4,875,000
United States . . .		8,248,800	25,484,000	40,853,000	26,751,000
Sweden	10,895,000	401,019	1,741,000	1,409,000	300,000

Very recently both Lord Derby and Lord Leicester have publicly expressed the opinion that the agricultural production of our country might be doubled, were our processes improved, and ample capital applied in their perfection; so that while we have surpassed our neighbours, we have yet much to do. We need, not merely more production per acre, but we also require a larger rural population, if we would secure that greater social stability which all desire, but which we shall look for in vain, so long as so vast a population of our people are crowded in the pestilent courts and alleys of our towns.

But it would be a very hasty and doubtful policy were we to endeavour suddenly to introduce the continental system by act of law, and not rather to wait for the more slow and sure results of an improvement of our laws as to the tenure of land. We can neither force men to dwell in the country, nor can we compel them to invest their capital in agriculture; but we can adopt a more natural law of inheritance, so as to have as few limited ownerships as possible, and in this way we should attract capital to the business of cultivation. By so doing we should quickly increase the numbers of our rural population, and we should also improve their condition, for the expenditure of money in improved dwellings and in modes of cultivation, which involve a higher scale of wages paid to workmen of a better class, must result in an improved mode of living amongst the whole people, to be followed or accompanied by a superior education and better morals. We may well be instructed by the good points of the continental system without seeking slavishly to copy it; and while removing the defects of our own laws, we may avoid hasty changes, which might really discourage the application of capital to agriculture. We might easily make far greater progress in production than we have yet done, and at the same time remove those hindrances which have made the condition of our rural population a disgrace to the most wealthy nation in the world.

WILLIAM FOWLER.



THE PLACE OF MIND IN NATURE AND INTUITION IN MAN.

THAT the universe we see around us was not always there, is so little disputed, that every philosophy and every faith undertakes to tell how it came to be. They all assume, as the theatre of their problem, the field of space where all objects lie, and the track of time where events have reached the Now. But into these they carry, to aid them in representing the origin of things, such interpreting conceptions as may be most familiar to the knowledge or fancy of their age: first, the *fiat of Almighty Will*, which bade the void be filled, so that the light kindled, and the waters swayed, and the earth stood fast beneath the vault of sky; next, when the sway of poetry and force had yielded to the inventive arts, the idea of a *contriving and adapting power*, building and balancing the worlds to go smoothly and keep time together, and stocking them with self-moving and sensitive machines; and now, since physiology has got to the front, the analogy of *the seed or germ*, in itself the least of things, yet so prolific that, with history long enough, it will be as spawn upon the waters, and fill every waste with the creatures as they are. The prevalence of this newest metaphor betrays itself in the current language of science: we now “*unfold*” what we used to “*take to pieces*;” we “*develop*” the theory which we used to “*construct*,” we treat the system of the world as an “*organism*” rather than a

"mechanism;" we search each of its members to see, not what it is *for*, but what it is *from*; and the doctrine of *Evolution* only applies the image of indefinite growth of the greater out of the less, till from some datum invisible to the microscope arises a teeming universe.

In dealing with these three conceptions,—of *Creation*, *Construction*, *Evolution*,—there is one thing on which Religion insists, viz., that *Mind is first, and rules for ever*; and whatever the process be, is *its* process, moving towards congenial ends. Let this be granted, and it matters not by what path of method the Divine Thought advances, or how long it is upon the road. Whether it flashes into realization, like lightning out of Night; or fabricates, like a Demiurge, through a producing season, and then beholds the perfect work; or is for ever thinking into life the thoughts of beauty and the love of good; whether it calls its materials out of nothing, or finds them ready, and disposes of them from without; or throws them around as its own manifestation, and from within shapes its own purpose into blossom,—makes no difference that can be fatal to human piety. Time counts for nothing with the Eternal; and though it should appear that the system of the world and the ranks of being arose, not by a start of crystallization, but, like the grass or the forest, by silent and seasonal gradations, as true a worship may be paid to the Indwelling God who makes matter itself transparent with spiritual meanings, and breathes before us in the pulses of nature, and appeals to us in the sorrows of men, as to the pre-existing Deity who, from an infinite loneliness, suddenly became the Maker of all. Nay, if the poet always looks upon the world through a suppliant eye, craving to meet his own ideal and commune with it alive; if prayer is ever a "feeling after Him to find Him," the fervour and the joy of both must be best [sustained, if they are conscious not only of the stillness of His presence, but of the movement of His thought, and never quit the date of His creative moments. In the idea, therefore, of a gradual unfolding of the creative plan, and the maturing of it by rules of growth, there is nothing necessarily prejudicial to piety; and so long as the Divine Mind is left in undisturbed supremacy, as the living All in all, the belief may even foster a larger, calmer, tenderer devotion, than the conceptions which it supersedes. But it is liable to a special illusion, which the others by their coarsely separating lines manage to escape. Taking all the causation of the world into the interior, instead of setting it to operate from without, it seems to dispense with God, and to lodge the power of indefinite development in the first seeds of things; and the apprehension seizes us, that as the oak will raise itself when the acorn and the elements are given, so from its

germs might the universe emerge, though nothing Divine were there. The seeds no doubt were on the field; but who can say whether ever "a Sower went forth to sow"? So long as you plant the Supreme Cause at a distance from His own effects, and assign to him a space or a time where nothing else can be, the conception of that separate and solitary existence, however barren, is secure. But in proportion as you think of Him as never in an empty field, waiting for a future beginning of activity, as you let Him mingle with the elements and blend with the natural life of things, there is a seeming danger lest His light should disappear behind the opaque material veil, and His Spirit be quenched amid the shadows of inexorable Law. This danger haunts our time. The doctrine of Evolution, setting itself to show how the greatest things may be brought out of the least, fills us with fear whether perhaps Mind may not be last instead of first, the hatched and full-fledged form of the protoplasmic egg; whether at the outset anything was there but the raw rudiments of matter and force; whether the hierarchy of organized beings is not due to progressive differentiation of structure, and resolvable into splitting and agglutination of cells; whether the Intellect of man is more than blind instinct grown self-conscious, and shaping its beliefs by defining its own shadows; whether the Moral sense is not simply a trained acceptance of rules worked out by human interests, an inherited record of the utilities; so that Design in Nature, Security in the Intuitions of Reason, Divine Obligation in the law of Conscience, may all be an illusory semblance, a glory from the later and ideal days thrown back upon the beginning, as a golden sunset flings its light across the sky, and, as it sinks, dresses up the East again with borrowed splendour.

This doubt, which besets the whole intellectual religion of our time, assumes that we must *measure every nature in its beginnings*; admit nothing to belong to its essence except what is found in it then; and deny its reports of itself, so far as they depart from that original standard. It takes two forms, according as the doctrine of Evolution is applied to Man himself, or to the outward universe. In the former case, it infuses distrust into our self-knowledge, weakens our subjective religion or native faith in the intuitions of thought and conscience, and tempts us to imagine that the higher they are, the further are they from any assured solidity of base. In the latter case, it weakens our objective religion, suggests that there is no originating Mind, and that the divine look of the world is but the latest phase of its finished surface, instead of the incandescence of its inmost heart. Let us first glance at the theory of HUMAN evolution, and the moral illusions it is apt to foster.

I. Under the name of the "Experience Philosophy," this theory

has long been applied to the *mind of the individual*; and has produced not a few admirable analyses of the formation of language and the tissue of thought; nor is there any legitimate objection to it, except so far as its simplifications are overstrained and cannot be made good. It undertakes, with a minimum of initial capacity, to account for the maximum of human genius and character: give it only the sensible pleasures and pains, the spontaneous muscular activity, and the law by which associated mental phenomena cling together; and out of these elements it will weave before your eyes the whole texture of the perfect inner life, be it the patterned story of imagination, the delicate web of the affections, or the seamless robe of moral purity. The outfit is that of the animal; the product but "a little lower than the angel." All the higher endowments,—our apprehension of truth, our consciousness of duty, our self-sacrificing pity, our religious reverence,—are in this view merely transformed sensations; the disinterested impulses are refinements spun out of the coarse fibre of self-love; the subtlest intellectual ideas are but elaborated perceptions of sight or touch; and the sense of Right, only interest or fear under a disguise. If this be so, how will the discovery affect our natural trust in the intimations of our supreme faculties? Does it not discharge as dreams their most assured revelations? By intuition of Reason we believe in the Law of Causality, in the infinitude of Space, in the relations of Number, in the reality of an outside world, in all the fundamental conceptions of Science; but here are they, one and all, recalled to the standard of Sense, which they seem to transcend, and emptied of any meaning beyond. By vision of Imagination we see an ideal beauty enfolding many a person and many a scene, and appealing to us as a pathetic light gleaming from within; but here we find it all resolved into curvature of lines and adjustments of colour. By inspiration of Conscience we learn that our sin is the defiance of a Divine authority, and, though hid from every human eye, drives us into a wilderness of Exile,—for "the wicked fleeth, though no man pursueth;" but here we are told that the ultimate elements of good and evil are our own pleasures and pains, from which the moral sanction selects as its specialty the approbation and disapprobation of our fellow-men. Thus all the independent values which our higher faculties had claimed for their natural affections and beliefs are dissipated as fallacious; they are all based upon a *sentient measure* of worth which lies at the bottom; they are like paper money, refined contrivances representative of the ultimate gold of pleasure, but, where not interchangeable with this, intrinsically worthless. And so the feeling almost inevitably spreads, that we are dupes of our own characteristic capacities; that the loftier air into which they lift us is a tinted and

distorting medium, and shows us glories that are not there ; that the idea of an eternal Fount of beauty, truth, and goodness, behind the pleasingness and concinnity of phenomena, is an illusion ; and that the tendency, irresistible as it is, to cling to this idea as something higher than its denial, is but a part of the romance. Is this scepticism imaginary ? Let any one, in studying the modern writers of this school, compare the solid, manly, sensible way in which they deal with everything on the physiological and sensational level, with their manner towards all the convictions and sentiments usually recognized as the supreme lights of our nature ; the tone now of forbearing indulgence, now of sickly appreciation, often of hardly concealed contempt, that is heard beneath the interminable conjectural analyses of Moral and Religious affections ; and he will feel the difference between the honour that is paid to truth, and the constrained patience towards what other men revere.

By a recent extension, the theory of Evolution has been applied to the whole natural history of our race ; and the resources of *Habit*, already serviceable in explaining the aptitudes of individuals, have been turned to account on the larger scale of successive generations, transmitting by inheritance the acquisitions hitherto made good. In the training of a nature, the world thus becomes a permanent school, the interruption of death is virtually abolished, and life is laid open to continuous progress. By this immense gain of power, it is supposed, all the differences which separate Man from other animals may be accounted for as gradual attainments ; and many an intuition of the mind, too immediate and self-evident to be a product of personal experience, may yield to analysis as a more protracted growth, and stand as the compend of ages of gathering feeling and condensing thought. Among creatures that herd together for common safety, each one learns to read the looks of anger or of good-will in its neighbours, and discovers what it is that brings upon him the one or other ; and insensibly he forms to himself a rule for avoiding the displeasure and conciliating the favour in which he has so large an interest. This rudimentary experience imprints and records itself in the nervous organization, and descends to ulterior generations as an original and instinctive recoil from what offends, and an impulse towards what gratifies the feeling of the tribe : so that the lesson needs not be gone over again ; but the offspring, taking up his education where the parent left off, accumulates his feeling, quickens his mental execution, and hands down fresh contributions to what at last emerges as a Moral Sense. In this way, it is contended, the Conscience is a hoarded fund of traditionary pressures of utility, gradually effacing the primitive vestiges of fear, and dispensing itself with an affluence of disinterested sympathy. And the religious consciousness that visits the soul in its

remorse, of an invisible Witness and Judge who condemns the sin, comes, we are told, from the deification of public opinion, or the fancy that some dead hero's ghost still watches over the conduct of his clan.

This vast enlargement of the doctrine of Evolution, while increasing its power, and removing it from the reach of accurate tests, alters neither its principle nor its practical effect. It undertakes to exhibit the highest and the greatest in our nature as ulterior phenomena of the lowest and the least. And it usually treats as a superstition our natural reverence for the rational, moral, and religious intuitions as sources of independent insight and ultimate authority; and, in order to estimate them, translates them back into short-hand expressions of sensible experience and social utility. Nor can we wonder at this scepticism. If the only reality at bottom of the sense of duty is fear and submission to opinion, whatever it carries in it that transcends this ground, and persuades us of an Obligation in which fear and opinion have no voice, is an ideal addition got up within us by causes which produce in us all sorts of psychological figments. If the only facts that lie in our idea of Space, are a set of feelings in the muscles and the skin and the eye, then whatever beliefs it involves which these cannot verify are naturally discredited, and treated as curiosities of artificial manufacture. If our human characteristics are throughout the developed instincts of the brute, differing only in degree, then the moment they present us with intuitions which are distinct *in kind*, they begin to play us false; and those who see through the cheat naturally warn us against them. And so we are constantly told that our highest attributes are only the lower that have lost their memory, and mistake themselves for something else.

It is not my present intention to call in question either of these varieties of evolution. Inadequate as the evidence of them both appears to be, I will suppose their case to be made out: and still, I submit, it does not justify the sceptical estimate which it habitually fosters of the intellectual, moral, and religious intuitions of the human mind. For,

(1.) Though animal sensation, with its connected instinct, should be the raw material of our whole mental history, it is not on that account entitled to *measure all that comes after it*, and stand as the boundary-line between fact and dream, between terra firma and "airy nothing." That which is first in Time has no necessary priority of rank in the scale of truth and reality; and the later-found may well be the greater existence and the more assured. If it is a development of Faculty, and not of incapacity, which the theory provides, the process must advance us into new light, and not withdraw us from clearer light behind: and we have reason to confide in the freshest gleams

and inmost visions of to-day, and to discard whatever quenches and confuses them in the vague and turbid beginnings of the Past. With what plea will you exhort me, "If you would rid yourself of intellectual mysteries, come with us, and see the stuff your thought is made off: if you would stand free of ideal illusions, count with us the medullary waves that have run together into the flood-tide of what you call your conscience: if you would shake off superstition, look at the way in which the image of dead men will hang about the fancy of a savage, or the personification of an abstract quality impose on the ignorance of simple times"? Is our wisdom to be gathered by going back to the age before our errors? And instead of consulting the maturity of thought, are we to peer into its cradle and seek oracles in its infant cries? If the last appeal be to the animal elements of experience, we can learn only by unlearning; and by shutting one after another of the hundred ideal eyes of the finished intellect, we shall have a chance of seeing and feeling things as they are. If nothing is to be deemed true but what the pre-human apes saw, then all the sciences must be illusory; with the suicidal result that, with them, this doctrine of Evolution must vanish too. Or if, stopping short of this extreme distrust of the acquired intuitions, you make a reservation in favour of the new visions of the intellect, what right can you show for discharging those of the conscience? The tacit assumption therefore that you upset a super-sensual belief by tracing the history of its emergence among sensible conditions, is a groundless prejudice.

(2.) Further, the question to be determined may be presented as a problem in physiology, to be resolved by corresponding rules: What is the *function* of certain parts of our human constitution, viz. the Reason and the Moral Faculty? Now it is a recognised principle that, in estimating function, you must study the organ, not in its rudimentary condition, before it has disengaged itself from adjacent admixtures and flung off the foreign elements, but in its perfect or differentiated state, so as to do its own work and nothing else. In order to give the idea of a time-piece to one who had it not, you would not send him to one of the curious mediæval clocks which could play a tune, and fire a gun, and announce the sunrise, and mark the tides, and report twenty miscellaneous things besides; but to the modern chronometer, simple and complete, that, telling only the moment, tells it perfectly. And in natural organizations, to learn the capabilities and project of any structure, you would not resort to the embryo where it is forming but not working: you would wait till it was born into the full presence of the elements with which it had to deal: not till then could you see how they played upon it, and what was its response to them. In conformity with this rule, whither would you

betake yourself, if you want to measure the intrinsic competency of our intellectual faculty, and determine what its very nature gives it to know? Would you take counsel of the nurse who held you "when you first opened your eyes to the light,"* or otherwise study "the first consciousness in any infant," "before the time when memory commences,"† and disregard everything "subsequent to the first beginnings of intellectual life"?‡ On the contrary, you would avoid that soft inchoate promise of nature, only nominally born, where the very structures of its finer work have not yet set into their distinctive consistency and form; and would hold your peace till the faculty is awake and on its feet, and can clearly tell you what it sees for itself, and what it makes out at second hand: just as, to gauge the lunar light, you must have patience while the thin crescent grows, and wait till the full orb is there. Still less can you take the report of the Moral Faculty from the confessions of the cradle, or from the quarrels and affections of the apes: the conditions being not yet present for the bare conception of a moral problem. The most that can be asked of an intuition is, that it shall keep pace with the cases as they arise, and be on the spot when it is wanted; and if you would know what provision our nature holds for dealing with its Duty and interpreting its guilt, you must go into the thick of its moral life, and bid it tell you what it sees from the swaying tides of temptation and of victory. The "purity" of intuitions is not "pristine," but ultimate: cleared at length from accidental and irrelevant dilutions, and with essence definitely crystallized, they realise and exhibit the idea that lay at the heart of all their tentatives, and constitutes their truth. Am I told that it is hopeless at so late an hour to separate what is an indigenous gift from what is implanted by education? I reply, it no doubt requires, but it will not baffle, the hand of skilled analysis: it is a difficulty which, in other cases, we find it not impossible to overcome; for there are assuredly instincts and affections, strictly original and natural, that make no sign and play no part till our maturer years, yet which are readily distinguished from the products of artificial culture.

If, to find the functions of our higher faculties, we must look to their last stage and not to their first, we at once recover and justify the ideal conceptions which the expositors of Evolution are accustomed to disparage as romance. For among these functions are present certain Intuitive beliefs—for the Reason, in Divine Causality; for the Conscience, in Divine Authority; together blending into the knowledge of a Supreme and Holy Mind. These august apprehensions we

* Mill's Examination of Hamilton, 3rd Edition, p. 172.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. p. 160.

are entitled to declare are not the illusions, but the discoveries, of Man ; who, by rising into them, is born into more of the Universe of things than any other being upon earth, and is made conscious of its transcendent and ultimate realities. If these trusts are indeed the growth of ages, from seeds invisibly dropped upon the field of time, be it so ; it was not without hand : there was a *Sower* that went forth to sow.

II. We turn now to the Second Form of doubt raised by the doctrine of Evolution : under which it weakens our objective trust in an originating Mind.

A naturalist who to his own satisfaction has traced the pedigree of the human intellect, conscience, and religion, to Ascidian skin-bags sticking to the sea-side rocks, is not likely to arrest the genealogy there, at a stage so little fitted to serve as a starting point of derivative being. Or, if his own retreat should go no further, others will take up the regressive race, and, soon passing the near and easy line into the vegetable kingdom, will work through its provinces to its lichen-spotted edge ; and, after perhaps one shrinking look, will dare the leap into the dead realm beyond, and bring home the parentage of all to the primitive elements of "matter and force." To give effect to this extension over the universe at large of the theory of Evolution, the scientific imagination of our day has long been meditating its projected book of Genesis, and has already thrown out its special chapters here and there ; and though the scenes of the drama as a whole are not yet arranged, the general plan is clear ; that the Lucretian method is the true one ; that nothing arises for a purpose, but only from a power ; that no Divine Actor therefore is required, but only atoms extended, resisting, shaped, with spheres of mutual attraction and repulsion ; that, with these *minima* to begin with, a growth will follow of itself by which the *maxima* will be reached ; and that thus far the chief and latest thing it has done is the apparition of Mind in the human race and civilization in human society, conferring upon man the melancholy privilege of being, so far as he knows, at the summit of the universe.

The main support of this doctrine is found in two arguments, supplied respectively by physical science and by natural history ; each of which we will pass under review.

i. The former relies on the new scientific conception of the *Unity of Force*. When Newton established the composition of Light in his treatise on Optics, and the law of Gravitation in his Principia, he conceived himself to be treating of two separate powers of nature, between which, quick as he was to seize unexpected relations, he dreamt of no interchange. Yet now it is understood that when collisions occur of bodies gravitating on opposite lines, the momenta

that seem to be killed simply burst into light and heat. When Priestley's experiments detected the most important chemical element on the one hand, and the fundamental electrical laws on the other, he seemed to move on paths of research that had no contact. Yet in the next generation, chemical compounds were resolved by electricity; which again turns up in exchange for magnetism, and can pass into motion, heat, and light. To see the transmigration of natural agency, trace only through a few of its links the effect of the sunshine on the tropic seas. So far as it warms the mass of waters, either directly or through the scorched shores that they wash, it stirs them into shifting layers and currents, and creates *mechanical* power. But it also removes the superficial film; and thus far spends itself, not in raising the temperature, but in changing the form from liquid to vapour, and so altering the specific gravity as to transfer what was on the deep to the level of the mountain tops. It is the Pacific that climbs and crowns the Andes, resuming on the way the liquid state in the shape of clouds, and as it settles crystallizing into solid snow and ice. The original set of solar rays have now played their part, and made their escape elsewhere. But there is sunshine among the glaciers too, which soon begins to resolve the knot that has been tied, and restore what has been stolen. It sets free the waters that have been locked up, and lets their gravitation have its play upon their flow. As they dash through ravines, or linger in the plains, they steal into the roots of grass and tree, and, by the tribute which they leave, pass into the new shape of *vital* force. And if they glide by the homesteads of industry, and raise the food of a civilized people, who can deny that they contribute not only to the organic but to the *mental* life, and so have run the whole circuit from the lowest to the highest phase of power? That the return back may be traced from the highest to the lowest, is shown by every effort of thought and will; which, through the medium of nervous energy, in one direction sets in action the levers of the limbs, and in another works the laboratory of the organic life, and forms new chemical compounds, of which some are reserved for use, while others pass into the air as waste. Still further: all doubt of identity in the force which masks itself in these various shapes is said to be removed by the test of direct measurement before and after the change. The heating of a pound of water by one degree has its exact mechanical equivalent;* and a given store of elevated temperature will overcome the same weights, whether applied directly to lift them, or turned first into a thermo-electric current, so as to perform its task by deputy.† The inference

* Viz., the fall of 772 lbs. through a foot. See Mr. Joule's Experiments in Grove's Correlation of Physical Forces, p. 34, 5th Edition.

† See Grove's Correlation, p. 255, 5th Edition.

drawn from the phenomena of which these are samples is no less than this ; that each kind of force is convertible into any other, and undergoes neither gain nor loss upon the way ; so that the sum-total remains for ever the same, and is only differently represented as the proportions change amongst the different forms of life, and between the organic and the inorganic realms. Hence arises the argument that, in having *any* force, you have virtually *all* ; and that, assuming only material atoms as depositories of mechanical resistance and momentum, you can supply a universe with an exhaustive kosmogony, and dispense with the presence of Mind, except as one of its phenomena.

To test this argument, let us grant the data which are demanded, and imagine the primordial space charged with matter, in molecules or in masses, in motion or rest, as you may prefer. Put it under the law of gravitation, and invest it with what varieties you please of density and form. Thus constituted, it perfectly fulfils all the conditions you have asked ; it presses, it moves, it propagates and distributes impulse, is liable to acceleration and retardation, and exhibits all the phenomena with which any treatise on Mechanics can properly deal. In order, however, to keep the problem clear within its limits, let us have it in the simplest form, and conceive the atoms to be all of *gold* ; then, I would fain learn by what step the hypothesis proposes to effect its passage to the *chemical* forces and their innumerable results. *Heat* it may manage to reach by the friction and compression of the materials at its disposal ; and its metal universe may thus have its solid, liquid, and gaseous provinces ; but beyond these varieties, its homogeneous particles cannot advance the history one hair's breadth through an eternity. It is not true, then, that the conditions which give the first type of force suffice to promote it to the second ; and in order to start the world on its chemical career, you must enlarge its capital and present it with an outfit of *heterogeneous* constituents. Try, therefore, the effect of such a gift ; fling into the pre-existing cauldron the whole list of recognized elementary substances, and give leave to their affinities to work ; we immediately gain an immense accession to our materials for the architecture and resources for the changes of the world,—the water and the air, the salts of the ocean, and the earthy or rocky compounds that compose the crust of the globe, and the variable states of magnetism and heat, which throw the combinations into slow though constant change. But with all your enlargement of data, turn them as you will, at the end of every passage which they explore, the *door of life* is closed against them still ; and though more than once it has been proclaimed that a way has been found through, it has proved that the living thing was on the wrong side to begin with. It is not true,

therefore, that, from the two earlier stages of force, the ascent can be made to the vital level; the ethereal fire yet remains in Heaven; and philosophy has not stretched forth the Promethean arm that can bring it down. And if, once more, we make you a present of this third phase of power, and place at your disposal all that is contained beneath and within the flora of the world, still your problem is no easier than before; you cannot take a single step towards the deduction of sensation and thought: neither at the upper limit do the highest plants (the exogens) transcend themselves and overbalance into animal existence; nor at the lower, grope as you may among the sea-weeds and sponges, can you persuade the sporules of the one to develop into the other. It is again not true, therefore, that, in virtue of the convertibility of force, the possession of any is the possession of the whole: we give you all the forms but one; and that one looks calmly down on your busy evolutions, and remains inaccessible. Is, then, the transmigration of forces altogether an illusion? By no means; but before one can exchange with another, *both must be there*; and to turn their equivalence into a universal formula, *all must be there*. With only one kind of elementary matter, there can be no chemistry; with only the chemical elements and their laws, no life; with only vital resources, as in the vegetable world, no beginning of mind. But let Thought and Will with their conditions once be there, and they will appropriate vital power; as life, once in possession, will ply the alembics and the test-tubes of its organic laboratory; and chemical affinity is no sooner on the field than it plays its game among the cohesions of simple gravitation. Hence it is impossible to work the theory of Evolution upwards from the bottom. If all force is to be conceived as One, its type must be looked for in the highest and all-comprehending term; and Mind must be conceived as there, and as divesting itself of some speciality at each step of its descent to a lower stratum of law, till represented at the base under the guise of simple Dynamica. Or, if you retain the forces in their plurality, then you must *assume* them *all* among your data, and confess, with one of the greatest living expositors of the phenomena of Development, that unless among your primordial elements you scatter already the germs of Mind as well as the inferior elements, the Evolution can never be wrought out.* But surely a theory which is content simply to assume in the germ whatever it has to turn out full-grown, throws no very brilliant light on the genesis of the Universe.

ii. The second and principal support of the doctrine under review is found in the realm of natural history, and in that province of it

* Lotze's *Mikrokosmos*, B. iv. Kap. 2, Band ii. 33, seqq.

which is occupied by *living beings*. Here, it is said, in the field of observation nearest to us, we have evidence of a power in each nature to push itself and gain ground, as against all natures less favourably constituted. There is left open to it a certain range of possible variation from the type of its present individuals, of which it may avail itself in any direction that may fortify its position; and even if its own instincts did not seize at once the line of greatest strength, still, out of its several tentatives, all the feeble results would fail to win a footing, and only the residuary successes would make good their ground. The ill-equipped troops of rival possibilities being always routed, however often they return, the well-armed alone are seen upon the field, and the world is in possession of "the fittest to live." We thus obtain a principle of self-adjusting adaptation of each being to its condition, without resorting to a designing care, disposing of it from without; and its development is an experimental escape from past weakness, not a pre-conceived aim at a future perfection.

I have neither ability nor wish to criticise the particular indications of this law, drawn with an admirable patience and breadth of research, from every department of animated nature. Though the logical structure of the proof does not seem to me particularly solid, and the disproportion between the evidence and the conclusion is of necessity so enormous as to carry us no further than the discussion of an hypothesis, yet, for our present purpose, the thesis may pass as if established; and our scrutiny may be directed only to its bearings, should it be true.

(1.) The genius of a country which has been the birth-place and chief home of Political Economy is naturally pleased by a theory of this kind; which invests its favourite lord and master, *Competition*, with an imperial crown and universal sway. But let us not deceive ourselves with mere abstract words and abbreviations, as if they could reform a world or even farm a sheep-walk. *Competition* is not, like a primitive function of nature, an independent and original power, which can of itself do anything: the term only describes a certain intensifying of power already there; making the difference, under particular conditions, between function latent and function exercised. It may, therefore, turn the less into the more; and it is reasonable to attribute to it an *increment* to known and secured effects; but not new and unknown effects, for which else there is no provision. It gives but a partial and superficial account of the phenomena with which it has concern; of their degree; of their incidence here or there; of their occurrence now or then: of themselves in their characteristics it pre-supposes, and does not supply, the cause. To that cause, then, let us turn. Let us consider what must be upon the field, before competition can arise.

(2.) It cannot act except in the presence of some *possibility of a better or worse*. A struggle out of relative disadvantage implies that a relative advantage is within grasp—that there is a prize of promotion offered for the contest. The rivalry of beings eager for it is but an instrument for *making the best of things*; and only when flung into the midst of an indeterminate variety of alternative conditions can it find any scope. When it gets there and falls to work, what does it help us to account for? It accounts certainly for the triumph and *survivorship of the better*, but not for there *being a better to survive*. *Given*, the slow and the swift upon the same course, it makes it clear that the race will be to the swift; but it does not provide the fleeter feet by which the standard of speed is raised. Nay more, even for the prevalence of the better (“or fitter to live”) it would not account, except on the assumption that whatever is *better* is *stronger* too; and a universe in which this rule holds already indicates its divine constitution, and is pervaded by an ideal power unapproached by the forces of necessity. Thus the law of “natural selection,” instead of dispensing with anterior causation and enabling the animal races to be their own Providence and do all their own work, distinctly testifies to a constitution of the world pre-arranged for progress, externally spread with large choice of conditions, and with internal provisions for seizing and realizing the best. On such a world, rich in open possibilities, of beauty, strength, affection, intellect, and character, they are planted and set free; charged with instincts eagerly urging them to secure the preferable line of each alternative; and disposing themselves, by the very conditions of equilibrium, into a natural hierarchy, in which the worthiest to live are in the ascendant, and the standard of life is for ever rising. What can look more like the field of a directing Will intent upon the good? Indeed, the doctrine of “natural selection” owes a large part of its verisimilitude to its skilful imitation of the conditions and method of Free-will;—the indeterminate varieties of possible movement; the presentation of these before a selective power; the determination of the problem by fitness for preference;—all these are features that would belong no less to the administration of a presiding Mind; and that, instead of resorting for the last solution to this high arbitrament, men of science should suppose it to be blindly fought out by the competing creatures, as if they were supreme, is one of the marvels which the professional intellect, whatever its department, more often exhibits than explains.

(3.) But, before competition can arise, there must be, besides the field of favourable possibility, *desire or instinct* to lay hold of its opportunities. Here it is that we touch the real dynamics of evolution, which rivalry can only bring to a somewhat higher pitch. Here, it

must be admitted, there is at work a genuine principle of progression, the limits of which it is difficult to fix. Every being which is so far individuated as to be a separate centre of sensation and of the balancing active spontaneity, is endowed with a self-asserting power, capable, on the field already supposed, of becoming a self-advancing power. Under its operation, there is no doubt increasing differentiation of structure and refinement of function may be expected to emerge; nor is there any reason, except such as the facts of natural history may impose, why this process should be arrested at the boundaries of the species recognized in our present classifications. Possibly, if the slow increments of complexity in the organs of sentient beings on the globe were all mapped out before us, the whole teeming multitudes now peopling the land, the waters, and the air, might be seen radiating from a common centre in lines of various divergency, and, however remote their existing relations, might group themselves as one family. The speculative critic must here grant without stint all that the scheme of development can ask; and we must leave it to the naturalist and physiologist to break up the picture into sections, if they must. But then, *Why* must he grant it? Because here, having crossed the margin of animal life, we have, in its germ of feeling and idea, not merely a persistent but a self-promoting force, able to turn to account whatever is below it; the mental power, even in its rudiments, dominating the vital, and constraining it to weave a finer organism; and, for that end, to amend its application of the chemical forces, and make them better economize their command of mechanical force. Observe, however, that, if here we meet with a truly fruitful agency, capable of accomplishing difficult feats of new combination and delicate equilibrium, we meet with it *here first*; and the moment we fall back from the line of sentient life, and quit the scene of this eager, aggressive, and competing power, we part company with all principle of progress; and consequently lose the tendency to that increasing complexity of structure and subtlety of combination which distinguish the organic from the inorganic compounds. Below the level of life, there is no room for the operation of "natural selection." Its place is there occupied by another principle, for which no such wonders of constructive adaptation can be claimed;—I mean, the dynamic rule of *Action on the line of least resistance*;—a rule, the working of which is quite in the opposite direction. For evidently it goes against the establishment of unstable conditions of equilibrium, and must therefore be the enemy rather than the patron of the complex ingredients, the precarious tissues, and the multiplied relations, of sentient bodies; and on its own theatre must prevent the permanent formation of any but the simpler unions among the material elements. Accordingly, all the great enduring masses that form and

fill the architecture of inorganic nature, its limestone and clay, its oxides and salts, its water and air, are compounds, or a mixture, of few and direct constituents. And the moment that life retreats and surrenders the organism it has built and held, the same antagonist principle enters on possession, and sets to work to destroy the intricate structure of "proximate principles" with their "compound radicals." With life and mind therefore there begins, whether by modified affinities or by removal of waste, a *tension* against these lower powers, carrying the being up to a greater or less height upon the wing; but with life it ends, leaving him then to the perpetual gravitation that completes the loftiest flight upon the ground. Within the limits of her Physics and Chemistry alone, Nature discloses no principle of progression, but only provisions for periodicity; and out of this realm, without further resources, she could never rise.

The downward tendency which sets in with any relaxation of the differentiating forces of life is evinced, not only in the extreme case of dissolution in death, but in the well-known relapse of organs which have been artificially developed into exceptional perfection back into their earlier state, when relieved of the strain and left to themselves. Under the tension of a directing mental interest, whether supplied by the animal's own instincts or by the controlling care of man, the organism yields itself to be moulded into more special and highly finished forms; and a series of ascending variations withdraws the nature from its original or first-known type. But wherever we can lift the tension off, the too skilful balance proves unstable, and the law of reversion reinstates the simpler conditions. Only on the higher levels of life do we find a self-working principle of progression: and, till we reach them, development wants its dynamics; and, though there may be evolution, it cannot be self-evolution.


These considerations appear to me to break the back of this formidable argument in the middle; and to show the impossibility of dispensing with the presence of Mind in any scene of ascending being, where the little is becoming great, and the dead alive, and the shapeless beautiful, and the sentient moral, and the moral spiritual. Is it not in truth a strange choice, to set up "*Evolution*," of all things, as the negation of *Purpose* pre-disposing what is to come? For what does the word mean, and whence is it borrowed? It means, to unfold from within; and it is taken from the history of the seed or embryo of living natures. And what is the seed, but a casket of pre-arranged futurities, with its whole contents *prospective*, settled to be what they are by reference to ends still in the distance? If a grain of wheat be folded in a mummy-cloth and put into a catacomb, its germ for growing and its albumen for feeding sleep side by side, and never find each other out. But no sooner does it drop, thousands of years

after, on the warm and moistened field, than their mutual play begins, and the plumule rises and lives upon its store till it is able to win its own maintenance from the ground. Not only are its two parts therefore relative to each other, but both are relative to conditions lying in another department of the world,—the clouds, the atmosphere, the soil; in the absence of which they remain barren and functionless:—and *this*, from a Cause that has no sense of relation! The human ear, moulded in the silent matrix of nature, is formed with a nerve susceptible to one influence alone, and that an absent one, the undulations of a medium into which it is not yet born; and, in anticipation of the whole musical scale with all its harmonies, furnishes itself with a microscopic grand piano of 3000 stretched strings, each ready to respond to a different and definite number of aerial vibrations:—and *this*, from a Cause that never meant to bring together the inner organ and the outer medium, now hidden from each other! The eye, shaped in the dark, selects an exclusive sensibility to movements propagated from distant skies; and so weaves its tissues, and disposes its contents, and hangs its curtains, and adjusts its range of motion, as to meet every exigency of refraction and dispersion of the untried light, and be ready to paint in its interior the whole perspective of the undreamed world without:—and *this*, from a Cause incapable of having an end in view! Surely, nothing can be evolved that is not first involved; and if there be anything which not only carries a definite future in it, but has the whole *rationale* of its present constitution grounded in that future, it is the embryo, whence, by a strange humour, this denial of final causes has chosen to borrow its name. Not more certainly is the statue, that has yet to be, already potentially contained in the pre-conception and sketches of the artist, than the stately tree of the next century in the beech-mast that drops upon the ground; or the whole class of Birds, if you give them a common descent, in the eggs to which you choose to go back as first; or the entire system of nature in any germinal cell or other prolific *minimum* whence you suppose its organism to have been brought out. Evolution and Prospection are inseparable conceptions. Go back as you will, and try to propel the movement from behind instead of drawing it from before, development in a definite direction towards the realization of a dominant scheme of ascending relations, is the sway of an overruling end. To take away the ideal basis of Nature, yet construe it by the analogy of organic growth, will be for ever felt as a contradiction. It is to put out the eyes of the Past, in order to show us with what secure precision, amid distracting paths and over chasms bridged by a hair, it selects its way into the Future.

If the Divine Idea will not retire at the bidding of our speculative

science, but retains its place, it is natural to ask, what is its relation to the series of so-called Forces in the world? But the question is too large and deep to be answered here. Let it suffice to say, that there need not be any *overruling* of these forces by the Will of God, so that the supernatural should disturb the natural; or any *supplementing* of them, so that He should fill up their deficiencies. Rather is His thought related to them as, in Man, the mental force is related to all below it; turning them all to account for ideal ends, and sustaining the higher equilibrium which else would lapse into lower forms. More truly, yet equivalently, might we say, these supposed forces, which are only our intellectual interpretation of classes of perceived phenomena, are but varieties of His Will, the rules and methods of His determinate and legislated agency, in which, to keep faith with the universe of beings, He abnegates all change; but beyond which, in His transcendent relations with dependent and responsible minds, He has left a glorious margin for the free spiritual life, open to the sacredness of Personal Communion and the hope of growing similitude.

JAMES MARTINEAU.



FENIANISM.

A NARRATIVE.

BY ONE WHO KNOWS.

PART II.

AT the table of a Frenchman resident in New York, Kelly and Stephens had made the acquaintance of an individual whose name has since become notorious in connection with sadder and greater events than Fenianism is likely to give birth to. General Cluseret, for the war minister of the Paris Commune is the person referred to, was an exile from France on account of the violence of his political views. The son of a colonel in the French army, he himself began life as a subaltern officer in the military service of his country. While on duty with his regiment in Africa, he was gazetted a captain; and he commanded his company during the Crimean campaign, for which he is said to have received not only French decorations, but also the English medal. Soon afterwards he was forced to resign his commission, on account of the intemperance with which he avowed his republican sentiments; and finding a congenial spirit in Garibaldi, he served under that General during the Italian campaign of 1859-60. At the outbreak of the American war he offered his sword to the Federals, and for services rendered upon General Fremont's staff, he was gazetted a brigadier-general at the close of the campaign. Cluseret had thus gained a fair reputation as a soldier,

and he was well known as an enthusiastic Republican. To him, therefore, Stephens made overtures to take command of the Fenian army in Ireland, and as he happened then to be idle in New York, and had other reasons for an early visit to Europe, he accepted the proposals of the Irish leader. He took care, however, to make good terms for himself, and to secure a considerable sum for pay in advance. As his adjutant-general, he appointed an officer of engineers named Fariola, who had held the rank of colonel in the Federal service; and a Frenchman named Vifquain, who had been intimate with Fariola at the military academy of Brussels, was also nominated for a high command. Patrick Condon, or, to use the name by which he is better known, Godfrey Massey, was at this time a commercial traveller in New Orleans, and he too was induced to join the proposed expedition to Ireland. To the leaders Stephens repeated in private the same tissue of falsehoods by which he had already gulled the masses through his speeches in Jones's Wood; and, until the middle of December, no doubt seems to have been entertained at the Fenian head-quarters that a formidable movement was imminent. At that time, however, a meeting took place which completely changed the aspect of affairs. Stephens summoned his officers, and urged that action in Ireland should again be postponed, as he found himself unable to fulfil the pledges he had given. The meeting was decidedly opposed to delay, but broke up in confusion without arriving at any decision. Finding the general opinion so strong against him, Stephens reassembled the military officers on the 21st, and put the question whether they were willing to start for Ireland immediately. Several responded to the appeal, and some of their number actually sailed within the next few days. The leaders held another meeting before New Year's day and appointed Kelly "Chief Executive" of the organization, Stephens being formally deposed for incompetency and dishonesty.

This last meeting precipitated matters in Ireland. Kelly was as determined and reckless as Stephens had proved vacillating and timid, and he earnestly applied himself at once to the task he had undertaken. The exhausted treasury was replenished by the sale of the steamer which Killian had purchased for the Campobello expedition; and on the 11th of January, Massey was despatched from New York with £550 in English gold, to distribute among the Fenian officers who were awaiting in Ireland the promised outbreak. Kelly, Cluseret, and Vifquain started next day for Paris, whither Fariola had preceded them some two months before.

There were in the United Kingdom at this time a large number of Irish-Americans, who had come over in batches during the previous six months, in expectation that Stephens would follow them, and with

promises that, in the meantime, funds would be supplied for their support. Finding themselves neglected by their chief, and disappointed as to the promised orders and supplies, they were loitering inactively about London, Liverpool, and other English towns, many of them reduced to a state of absolute destitution. Among the most reckless of the gang was McCafferty, who had been present at the first of the December meetings in New York, and who, therefore, had the best of reasons for distrusting Stephens's promises of help. Headed by this man, a number of these desperadoes, resolving to wait no longer upon American support, banded themselves together under the title of "The Directory," and decided to promote a movement without further delay. Abandoning the idea of a bonâ fide military insurrection in Ireland, they decided to make some bold attempt, as daring as it might be hopeless, and then escape from the country. In Chester Castle were stored at this time a large quantity of government arms, with but a small garrison in charge of them; and the audacious project of McCafferty was to concentrate a number of Fenians in Chester, attack the Castle, carry off the arms, seize the first train for Holyhead—being careful of course to destroy railway and telegraphic communication behind them—take possession of the Irish Mail steamer, and make for the Irish coast, there to effect a landing, probably in Kerry, where some other rowdies would hail their arrival as the signal for an outbreak.

The existence of the "Directory" was known to the organization at large, but the details of their scheme were a profound secret. Moreover, a large section of the conspirators were opposed to precipitating matters in this way, and when the news of Stephens's fall reached this country, the clique were induced to defer action until the arrival of the new "Chief Executive." Before the end of January, Kelly, Cluseret, Massey, and Fariola met in London; but the "Directory" had gained such a footing with the local "Centres," that they found themselves unable to veto McCafferty's scheme, which accordingly was prosecuted with eagerness by its promoters. McCafferty and some of the other ringleaders arrived in Chester on Monday evening, the 10th of February, apparently to make preliminary arrangements; and next morning the inhabitants were startled by the appearance of over a thousand strange-looking men, who poured into the city in batches from every side. But, strange to say, no disturbance of any kind took place. An informer had disclosed the entire plot the evening before; and the leaders, finding the authorities on the alert, countermanded the attack. The raiders dispersed as peaceably as they had assembled. Most of them returned to their homes. Others left for Ireland, probably expecting an outbreak there; and on the 12th, no fewer than sixty-three were appre-

hended in Dublin on the arrival of the first boat from Liverpool. McCafferty himself was arrested ten days afterwards in attempting to land from a Whitehaven collier.

In ignorance, it may be, of the collapse of the Chester raid, or more probably in utter indifference as to results, the emissaries who had been sent to Kerry, actually attempted an outbreak on the morning of the 13th. Small bands of armed men collected in the neighbourhood of Killarney and Cahirciveen, and several outrages were committed. Notably, a coast-guard station was sacked, and a mounted police orderly was wounded and deprived of his horse and accoutrements and the despatches he was carrying. It is worthy of being recorded in connection with the latter outrage, that though a determined attack was made upon the constable, and several shots were fired at him in succession, yet, when his assailants discovered he was wounded, they expressed their regret on his behalf; the leader offered him his brandy-flask, and he was left in a neighbouring cottage, with a promise that the priest and the doctor would be sent to him, a promise, moreover, which was faithfully fulfilled. The "Kerry rising," as it was called, was contemptible in extent, the number of the insurgents not exceeding probably a hundred; and before many days elapsed order was completely restored to the country.

Meanwhile preparations for the more general and accredited movement were being pressed forward by Kelly and his confederates. At one time, indeed, their schemes seemed in danger of being entirely thwarted, as McCafferty had gained the support of the local "Centres," through whom alone communication with Ireland could be maintained. The Chief Executive was rescued from this difficulty, however, by the opportune arrival of delegates representing the Irish organization in the four provinces. These men met in Kelly's lodgings, in Chenies Street, on the 10th of February, and gave their formal approval to the programme submitted to them. In view of the approaching insurrection, they constituted themselves the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic, Kelly, Cluseret, and Fariola being admitted *ex officio* members of their Directory. Having then considered and adopted a manifesto to be issued as soon as the insurgents should be in possession of Limerick, the meeting broke up, and the delegates returned to their several districts in Ireland.

Massey left for Dublin on the 11th, with orders to take returns from the various "Circles," of the fighting strength of the organization in arms and men; and also commissioned to acquire a knowledge of certain parts of the country, with a view to military operations. The result of his inquiries and observations he was to report to the Commander-in-Chief. It is important to notice that, according to the returns thus furnished, the number of men available in Cork and

Dublin was 18,000 in the former, and in the latter 15,000 ; while all the arms at their disposal, including pikes, numbered only 3,000 in Cork, and about half as many in the metropolis. Nor does it appear that any addition was made to the stock before the 5th of March. Having accomplished his mission to Ireland, where he visited a number of the officers who were waiting at the posts assigned to them, Massey was recalled to London on the 24th, to receive additional funds from Kelly and fresh orders from Cluseret. The night of Shrove Tuesday, he learned, had been fixed as the date of the intended outbreak. The insurgents were then to muster at the centres of railway communication, with the view of preventing the massing of troops. For field purposes they were never to form in larger bodies than 500 men ; nor were they ever to risk an encounter unless where success seemed certain. If forced from the selected points, they were to move into the mountainous districts, driving cattle before them for sustenance, and there to carry on a system of guerilla warfare.

Massey returned immediately to Ireland to communicate the orders he had received, and was followed within the next few days by such of the subordinate officers as were still in England. Cluseret left for Paris. Kelly and Fariola remained together in London for a week ; when the latter was ordered to Cork, where it was hoped the influence of his name would have considerable effect in stimulating the conspirators. It may be mentioned here that Cluseret had expressly stipulated before leaving New York, that, as Fariola and himself were neither Irishmen nor Fenians, they should not be required to take any active part in the conspiracy ; but they pledged themselves that so soon as a Provisional Government had been proclaimed in Ireland, they would lend their aid as Republican soldiers, and take the command of an army actually in the field. Moreover, as has been already hinted, Cluseret had other business to attend to at this time. He had obtained from the Governor of the State of New York a commission to investigate and report upon the European systems of military organization ; and during his stay in England, he was occupied in visiting the chief military depôts of the kingdom, and otherwise in procuring such information as the nature of his inquiries demanded. His absence, therefore, from Ireland at the time of the outbreak, was no violation of the bargain he had made. With Kelly of course it was very different, and his presence in his comfortable London lodgings on the 5th of March, was one of many signal proofs he has given of possessing a talent almost amounting to genius, for keeping clear of dangers into which he has recklessly driven others.

On the 26th of February, Massey had communicated to the Fenian "Centres" and officers in Dublin the detailed plans of the proposed

outbreak ; and, by an informer, the entire plot was immediately disclosed to the Irish Executive. Thus forewarned, the authorities were prepared to deal with an insurrection of a much more formidable character than the impending movement proved to be. Moreover, the ranks of the Fenian officers were broken by several important arrests before the 5th of March, including the apprehension of Massey himself, who was seized on the night of the 4th, on his arrival at the Limerick Junction, where he was to have taken the command of the rebels.

To attempt an enumeration of all the incidents that marked the outbreak, would add inordinately to the length of these pages ; but, at the same time, it would not be proper to omit from a paper of this character a brief narrative of some of the leading events of the movement. It should be premised that Dublin, Cork, Tipperary, Limerick, Clare, the Queen's County, and Louth, where a sharp skirmish occurred in the town of Drogheda, were the only counties in which the public peace was seriously disturbed. No "rising" took place in Connaught, owing to the absence of Vifquain, who was named to command in the West ; for the conspirators in that province having had the promise of a French general, and hearing that Fariola was in Cork, refused to turn out without a foreign officer to lead them. An attempt at an outbreak in Ulster appears to have been scarcely contemplated by the Brotherhood.

In the county Dublin there were several bands of Fenian insurgents in arms on the night of the 5th. One party, several hundreds strong, assembled at Donnybrook, in the southern outskirts of the city. Having captured a patrol party of the Metropolitan Police, they started for the village of Stepside, making some slight delay as they passed through Dundrum, in hopes of getting possession of the constabulary barrack. At the Stepside barrack they halted once again, and demanded its surrender "in the name of the Irish Republic." After several volleys had been exchanged, the rebels began measures to burn the house, whereupon the police in charge, five in number, admitted their assailants ; their barrack was sacked, and they themselves were placed in the ranks, along with the prisoners who had been previously captured. The insurgents then proceeded to Glencullen, where they arrived at about seven o'clock on the morning of the 6th. A similar attack was at once commenced on the village police barrack, and after some resistance the constable in command surrendered, upon learning that the lives of his comrades from Stepside would be sacrificed if he persisted in his refusal. The rebels then started immediately for Tallaght, leaving all their prisoners in Glencullen barrack, with a small guard in charge of them. This party did not again come into contact with the military or

police. Seized no doubt by some panic, they must have dispersed soon after they left Glencullen.

The hill of Tallaght seems to have been designed as the principal rallying point for the Dublin Fenians. The force in charge of the barrack at that place consisted of eleven men ; and these were reinforced before midnight by the arrival of a sub-inspector from Rathfarnham, with two constables who volunteered for the duty. None of the insurgents had yet reached the hill ; but before long was heard the tramp of armed men approaching by the Greenhills road. Doubtless a fierce attack was looked for, but no sooner did the officer challenge the advancing party, than they turned and fled, without a single shot being fired. After an interval, another party was heard approaching the hill from the Roundtown side. The order to halt and disperse was met by a volley from the Fenians, but the moment the police returned the fire, the rebels beat a precipitate retreat, many of them flinging away their arms to facilitate their flight. The police started in pursuit, and succeeded in making numerous arrests. Among the prisoners were five wounded men, who fell under the single volley from the rifles of the constabulary.

A force of military under Lord Strathnairn had left Dublin early in the night for the scene of these disturbances, but the only service they were enabled to render was the capture of prisoners. These, with some sixty more arrested by the constabulary, were marched into the Lower Castle Yard on the afternoon of the 6th. A preliminary magisterial inquiry was there and then proceeded with, and upwards of 150 men were remanded to jail upon a charge of high treason. The police in the southern suburbs of the city continued making arrests of stragglers until nightfall, and the total number of persons apprehended in the county, for sharing in the outbreak, amounted to about 250.

In the South, the rebellion, though it scarcely attained more formidable proportions, was marked by events of a more deplorable character. On the evening of the 5th, a number of the Fenians assembled at Middleton, in the county Cork, under the command of a man named Daly, and when challenged by a constabulary patrol as they left the town at midnight, they fired a volley upon the police, inflicting wounds which in one case proved fatal. They then proceeded to Castlemartyr, where they were joined by other bodies of insurgents, and at once prepared to attack the police barrack ; but the constabulary succeeded in defeating their assailants, who retreated to the neighbouring hills, leaving Daly, their leader, dead upon the ground.*

* At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, a similar attack was made upon Ballyknockin constabulary barrack, in the same county. The insurgents succeeded in

The town of Kilmallock was the scene of the most serious encounter that took place in connection with the "rising"; and here the constabulary were afforded an opportunity for a display of bravery such as well merited all the praise bestowed upon the Force. The police barrack, though strongly built of stone, was ill fitted for defence, as it had no fewer than twenty-six doors and windows, and was almost entirely surrounded by walls, which afforded shelter to an attacking party. A head-constable was in charge of the station, with fourteen men under his command. Late in the evening a body of Fenians had assembled under the leadership of an Irish-American, named Dunne, and called at several houses making demands for arms. During one of their visits, a gentleman, the manager of a bank in the town, was fired at and seriously wounded for refusing compliance with Dunne's requirements; and the doctor, who was sent for to attend him, was shot dead on returning from the patient's house. Warned by these outrages, the entire force of police remained under arms during the night. Shortly before six o'clock in the morning, the Fenians, then about 200 strong, surrounded the barrack and commenced an attack. For three hours the fighting lasted, a well-sustained fire being kept up on both sides. The rebels held their ground with the greatest determination, and gave way at last only because of the arrival of a reinforcement of police. The sub-inspector in command of the district had started for Kilmallock on hearing of the first disturbance the night before. Reaching the town too late to join his men, he hurried back to Kilfenane, and returned with a party of eleven to relieve their beleaguered comrades. Approaching the barrack at the rear, the ring of their rifles was the first notice the rebels had of their presence; and a single volley from so unexpected a quarter created a panic in their ranks.

breaking open the door and setting fire to the house. Whereupon the five policemen in charge were forced to surrender; but on giving up their arms they were allowed to retire unmolested.

The Ardagh police barrack in the Newcastle district, county Limerick, was also attacked, and the windows riddled by Fenian bullets; but in this case the rebels were signally defeated. Similar outrages were attempted with a like result at Emly and Gurtavoher, in the county Tipperary; and at Kilbaha, a village in the extreme west point of Clare, well known to tourists who have visited Kilkee, a coast-guard station was sacked by the insurgents.

At Kilfeacle, on the borders of Tipperary, a large party of the insurgents assembled under the command of one of their most trusted officers, a "Colonel" Thomas Burke, afterwards convicted of high treason for his participation in the outbreak. From the stables of one of the resident gentry, the leaders provided themselves with horses, and then the party proceeded to a place called Ballyhurst, where they remained inactively until noon. Upon the first approach of the military they dispersed precipitately, without offering any resistance. Burke flung himself from his horse in hope of escaping with the crowd, but he had already attracted the notice of his pursuers and was immediately captured.

Taking advantage of the confusion, the police combined their forces, and a bold attack upon their assailants ended the affray. The Fenian leader seized a horse from a stable hard by, and was the first to escape.

The foregoing narrative will serve to give a general view of the outbreak of 1867. The result of divided counsels at a time when the conspiracy was in a great measure disorganized, it is not surprising that the movement proved so completely a *fiasco*. In the autumn of the previous year, Lord Kimberley expressed the opinion that "if the rebellion had broken out in the South and West of Ireland, nearly the whole, if not the whole, of the tenant farmers would have joined it." When the outbreak actually took place, scarcely a single individual of that class was found among the ranks of the insurgents. It is too much to hope that this was due to any want of sympathy with the movement. It is rather a proof that the people themselves had no confidence in its success. One feature of the "rising" has never received the prominence to which it is entitled, and that is the fewness of the wanton outrages committed by the rebels. Although some districts were entirely at their mercy during the night of the 5th of March, such outrages were not the rule, but the rare exception; and these were the work of American desperadoes, strangers in the country. This fact deserves to be recorded to the credit of the Irish people. Without entering here upon the probable causes to which this result was due, it may be noticed in passing that the outbreak was free from the element of religious rancour which embittered the rebellion of 1798.

It may not be out of place, in concluding this notice of the "Fenian rising," to give an extract from the manifesto already mentioned as having been adopted in London on the 10th February. The style and character of the address is, perhaps, to be accounted for by the fact, that at this time the Fenian chiefs were in communication with certain individuals who then claimed to be the leaders of the English Republican movement, and who were, until recently, the least disreputable persons connected with it. The document was headed, "I. R. Proclamation! The Irish People to the world;" and was signed, "The Provisional Government." After a few periods about the "centuries of outrage" endured by Ireland, and the "equal rights of man," the address proceeds:—

"We therefore declare that, unable longer to endure the curse of Monarchical Government, we aim at founding a Republic based on universal suffrage, which shall secure to all the intrinsic value of their labour. The soil of Ireland, at present in the possession of an oligarchy, belongs to us, the Irish people, and to us it must be restored. We declare also in favour of absolute liberty of conscience,

and the complete separation of Church and State. We appeal to the highest tribunal for evidence of the justice of our cause. History bears testimony to the intensity of our sufferings. And we declare in the face of our brethren that we intend no war against the people of England. Our war is against the aristocratic locusts, whether English or Irish, who have eaten the verdure of our fields; against the aristocratic leeches, who drain alike our blood and theirs. Republicans of the entire world, our cause is your cause; our enemy is your enemy; let your hearts be with us. As for you, workmen of England, it is not only your hearts we wish, but your arms. Remember the starvation and degradation brought to your firesides by the oppression of labour. Remember the past; look well to the future; and avenge yourselves by giving liberty to your children in the coming struggle for human freedom. Herewith we proclaim The Irish Republic."

Immediately after the outbreak, Special Commissions were issued for the trial of Fenian prisoners in Dublin, Cork, and Limerick. The Court sat in Dublin on the 8th of April, and the final adjournment of the Limerick Commission took place on the 19th of June. 169 prisoners were arraigned for various offences connected with the conspiracy. Of these, 110 acknowledged their guilt in open court; seven only were acquitted, and fifty-two, who stood their trial, were convicted by Irish juries. These facts ought not to have been lost sight of in the outcry recently raised at a signal failure of justice in Dublin. Eight individuals were found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death; but in every case the capital sentence was commuted. Twenty-five were sentenced to terms of penal servitude, and upwards of fifty more suffered imprisonment for various periods.

This will be a convenient opportunity to recur to the course of events in America after the departure of Kelly on the 12th of January. Stephens, finding himself in complete disgrace, followed his former associates to Paris, and there remained in straitened circumstances during the year. A man named Gleason was appointed to the vacant Head-Centreship, and every effort was made still to keep the organization together. The Irish paragraph in the Queen's Speech was the cause of the greatest excitement among the members. It was telegraphed from New York to the various Circles throughout the States, and meetings were held to proclaim the welcome news. The announcement of the Kerry outbreak in no way served to lessen the enthusiasm. It was declared that, as the British Government had taken the control of the Atlantic Cable, the reports of the "rising" could not be relied on, and doubtless the whole country was in arms. Upon the arrival of full intelligence, the enthusiasm vanished; and

the gloom was deepened by the news that the dreaded "Habeas Corpus Suspension Act" was about to be renewed. This again was followed by the report of the outbreak of the 5th of March. A mass Fenian meeting was at once convened in New York, for the purpose of expressing sympathy with the insurgents in Ireland; and it was computed that upwards of 10,000 persons assembled, though the meeting was held in the open air, and the rain fell steadily during the proceedings. A Fenian delegation also waited upon the President, to ask for belligerent rights for the Irish people in arms; and, if the newspaper reports are to be relied on, Mr. Johnson replied that the one question for his decision was whether a *de facto* government existed; he assured them of his sympathy, and promised the matter his consideration. These events were soon followed by the announcement of the total failure and suppression of the outbreak, and forthwith the popular excitement entirely died out.

Not so, however, the determination of the leaders. While the news of the disasters at home was still fresh in New York, they were engaged in organizing another expedition to incite the Irish to revolt. In this affair, the prime mover was a "Colonel" James Kelly, who was then the military chief of the O'Mahoney or Chatham Street section of the Brotherhood. A number of American rowdies were canvassed to join the expedition, and to each, who accepted the overtures made to him, an oath of secrecy was administered. Upon the 12th of April these men, in number about forty, met by appointment in a house in East Broadway, New York, and proceeded in batches to the quay, where a steamer was in waiting to convey them down to Sandy Hook, in the outer anchorage of the bay. There they remained at anchor until the afternoon of the following day, when they were taken on board the "Jackmel," a brigantine of some 115 tons register, which had been chartered for the voyage across the Atlantic. The only cargo of the vessel consisted of munitions of war. If the informers are to be believed, there were stowed away on board upwards of 5,000 stand of arms, including a quantity of breech-loading rifles, and some hundreds of "Spencer repeaters." There were also three small field-pieces, and a proportionate supply of ammunition. The small-arms were packed in cases, ostensibly as machinery and pianos consigned to some Spanish port. Besides the soldiers of the expedition, there was a ship's captain, with two subordinate officers, and a crew of six. The commander of the party was a "General" James E. Kerrigan, a man who is said at one time to have sat in Congress, and more recently to have served as a colonel in the Federal army. William J. Nagle and John Warren, whose cases afterwards attracted so much notice here and in America, were among the "Colonels" of the expedition. All the officers received from Kerrigan regular com-

missions, which had been signed by Kelly at the Fenian headquarters.

It had been intended to procure, on some pretence or other, clearance papers for the "Jackmel;" but the efforts made for the purpose proved unsuccessful, and a mutiny was well-nigh breaking out in consequence before the vessel left the roads. Some of the officers were strongly opposed to sailing without papers, but the majority, with the leaders on their side, insisted on proceeding. At first they took the West Indian track, in order to elude any cruiser that might be sent in pursuit of them; but on the afternoon of the next day they changed their course and steered for their destination. Occasionally during the voyage they hoisted the British flag, when other vessels came in sight; but upon Easter Sunday (21st April) the green flag of Ireland was hoisted at the fore, and a salute was fired in its honour. Upon the same occasion Kerrigan read to the assembled officers the orders he had received, commissioning him to land the men and arms in Ireland. About a month afterwards they first sighted the Irish coast, and on the 23rd of May they entered the Bay of Sligo.

Upon the 20th of April a Fenian emissary named Hayes had left New York by steamer to apprise the conspirators in this country of the sailing of the "Jackmel," and to arrange that on her arrival she should be boarded by an agent from the shore, with information as to the state of the country, and orders to guide the landing of the expedition. The vessel, therefore, was anxiously expected; and Ricard Burke, afterwards of Clerkenwell fame, was deputed to await her coming in Sligo. There he lived under the name of "Walters," representing himself to be an English tourist. He hired a small hooker, ostensibly for excursions of pleasure, and in this craft he was frequently sailing in the bay, watching for the "Jackmel." He failed, however, to fall in with her on her arrival; and on the night of the 23rd two of the party were put ashore to look for him. The brig continued cruising between Sligo and Donegal until the night of the 25th, when Burke arrived in his little boat, and had an interview with the leading officers, the result of which was that the brig sailed at once for Dungarvan. Disappointed of promised signals from the shore when they reached the southern coast, the party became mutinous, as their provisions were nearly exhausted and water was scarce on board. Finally, on the 1st of June, thirty-one of their number were induced to land at Helvick Head, in Dungarvan Bay, all of whom were arrested on suspicion before many hours had elapsed. Some of the "Colonels" had gone ashore with Burke at Sligo. Others of the leaders returned with the vessel to New York. And, thus, without a single shot being fired, or a single rifle landed in

Ireland, ended what was, perhaps, the most romantic episode connected with the Fenian conspiracy.

A notice of the prosecutions to which these arrests gave rise, as also of other Fenian trials in Ireland, would be not only interesting but important, especially on account of their bearing upon the question of indefeasible allegiance,* which thus gained prominence in this country and America; but to introduce such a notice here would break somewhat the thread of the present narrative.

Suffice it, therefore, to remark that only two of the "Jackmel" prisoners were convicted of treason-felony, and these men were soon afterwards discharged. The prosecution in Nagle's case proved abortive, all the technicalities of our criminal law being resorted to in his favour; and the proceedings were abandoned against his somewhat insignificant confederates. Nagle himself ended his days ingloriously in a drunken fit, shortly after his return to New York.

It is remarkable that, though Fenianism has never attracted so much public notice in England as during the latter half of 1867, there has been no period in the history of the conspiracy during which it was more thoroughly disorganized. The utter failure of all their successive efforts had brought the leaders into disrepute, and destroyed the ardour of the rank and file of the Brotherhood. Indeed, to any one acquainted with the organization, the events which startled the British public towards the close of the year referred to, afford signal proof of the total demoralization which prevailed. The activity of the conspirators for the most part spent itself in the perpetration of wild and objectless outrages, or in schemes of vengeance against those to whom they deemed their successive disasters were due. Some of the officers of the 5th of March, who were still in hiding in the country, placed themselves at the

* A perusal of the American blue-books which give the correspondence relative to these prisoners, will be found instructive. It is almost amusing to notice the effrontery with which the Fenians insisted on the subtlest technicalities of our law in their own favour, while denouncing as an outrage and an insult to America, the conduct of the Crown in adhering to principles that are common to the jurisprudence of both countries. It may not be generally known that the plea of alienage in these trials never had any bearing whatsoever upon the real point at issue, or upon the equity of the case, but merely upon technical details, such as questions of venue. The cases of Warren and Nagle, of the "Jackmel," afford a good illustration of this. Warren was a British subject naturalized in America; Nagle was a native of the States. Both were tried for the same offence supported by the same evidence. But on grounds of public convenience, Warren was arraigned in Dublin; and in order to bring his case within the venue, formal evidence was given of the outbreak in the Metropolitan county. But the evidence offered of the attack on Glencullen barrack had no more to do with the merits of the case, than the equally necessary evidence that Glencullen was situate in the County Dublin. Nagle, on the other hand, being an alien, had to be tried in Sligo, where the principal overt act charged against both was committed. In his case the Crown was thwarted by the difficulty of obtaining a jury *de medietate linguæ* in a provincial town.

head of small bands of reckless men, and for a time kept certain districts of Munster in alarm, by frequent raids upon the houses of the gentry, whose arms they seized in the name of the Irish Republic. A few gunsmiths' shops also were rifled in the same lawless way; and one night in December the gunners in charge of a Martello tower near Queenstown, were surprised by an armed party, who carried away what weapons and ammunition they could find. Assassination committees also were organized in Dublin, for the removal of spies and informers; and several attempts were made, some of them with fatal success, to murder suspected persons. Such plots were extended even to London, where a young bandsman of the Guards, named Macdonald, was assassinated outside a public-house, owing to his being mistaken for the informer Coridon.

These events, however, the significance of which was scarcely known outside Fenian circles, excited but little attention in England. It was not until the nation was astounded by the outrages at Manchester and Clerkenwell, that Fenianism received much attention here, even from public men. The circumstances connected with the arrest and rescue of Kelly are too well known to require more than a passing allusion to them. Apprehended on the morning of the 11th September (1867), he was brought up on remand on the 18th; and on the return of the prison van from the Court-house in the afternoon, it was attacked by a party of armed men, who easily overpowered the Borough constables that formed its only escort, and set the Fenian leader at liberty. The police-sergeant in charge of the van was shot dead by the assailants, and for this offence three of the party were convicted and executed, their names being thenceforth added to the bead-roll of Irish martyrs.

Immediately after the arrest of Kelly, who was still regarded as the chief of the organization, the question was raised of appointing a successor to his office. Ricard Burke, whose name has been already mentioned, was nominated for the post, and would no doubt have been honoured by election to it, but for the escape of the "Chief Executive." His own safety was soon to become the concern of the conspirators, as he in turn was arrested on the 28th of November. This man had come from America in 1865, to act as arms agent for the Fenians at home; and most admirably did he discharge the duties then entrusted to him. He hired a store in Birmingham, and, trading under the name of E. C. Winslow & Co., he procured large quantities of war material for the organization. From a single gunmaker in that town he obtained £2,000 worth of rifles, revolvers, and ammunition in the months of December, '65, and January, '66; and it is probable that this was only one of many similar purchases. He had also filled other positions of trust in the

Brotherhood, and his imprisonment was felt to be as great a loss as that of Kelly himself. It was determined, therefore, to spare no effort for his rescue, and the remarkable attempt was made on the 13th of December. The plan was concocted partly by Burke, and partly by his confederates outside. A certain hour of every afternoon, he spent in the exercise-yard of Clerkenwell Prison where he was confined; and it was arranged to blow down the wall which separated this yard from the public street, due notice being given to the Fenian leader by a preconcerted signal. It was remarked that while the prisoners were at exercise on the 12th, a small white ball was thrown over the jail wall into their midst, and immediately Burke fell out of the ring and retired to a corner of the yard, complaining that a stone in his shoe was injuring his foot. It afterwards transpired that the fusee of the powder barrel was actually lighted on this occasion, and the angle of the wall in which Burke stood fiddling with his shoe was the only spot within the yard sheltered from the falling débris when the explosion took place next day. A meeting of the conspirators was held that night, at which it was decided to renew the attempt on the 13th, and Michael Barrett, afterwards hanged for the crime, was entrusted with its execution. Meanwhile, however, the authorities had received information of the plot; and though but little credence appears to have been given to the report, the precaution was taken of exercising the prisoners in another part of the jail. The explosion and its consequences will not easily be forgotten. The entire metropolis was thrown into a state of panic, which soon spread throughout the country. Three days after the outrage, a circular was issued from the Home Office, calling for the enrolment of special constables in London, "as it was possible that, owing to the designs of wicked and evil-disposed persons, the ordinary police force might be found insufficient to perform the duties required of them." Many other places in England followed the example of the metropolis. In several towns where the Irish were numerous, the borough constables were armed; and "Fenian scares" abounded for a considerable time.

Up to this time there never had been any connection between that branch of the Fenian Brotherhood over which Roberts presided, and the organization at home. But, taking advantage of the disgrace into which Kelly and his associates had fallen after the outbreak, the leaders of the Canada party determined to make overtures to the conspirators in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, Daniel O'Sullivan, Roberts's "Secretary for Civil Affairs," was despatched to England on the 10th of May (1867), two emissaries, named O'Donohue and Cooke, having preceded him on the same mission some weeks before. The President himself followed on the 1st of June, and awaited in

Paris the result of their labours. Meanwhile, O'Sullivan had visited the principal towns of Great Britain and Ireland, and obtained the election of delegates to meet his chief, with power to treat with him in the name of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. In the beginning of July, these men met in the French capital; and on the 4th of that month, the "Treaty of Paris," as it was ostentatiously called, was signed by the Fenian President and his Secretary on the one side, and the Delegates upon the other. Under this compact it was agreed, that, on the fulfilment of certain specified conditions, Roberts's organization would liberally supply material aid for an insurrection in Ireland, to be promoted simultaneously with a raid upon the dominion of Canada. One term of the bargain was that Roberts's association should be recognized as the true "Fenian Brotherhood;" and, for this end, it was arranged that a "Supreme Council" should be elected as the governing body of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, whose declaration in this respect would be authoritative and final.

These matters settled, Roberts returned to America, and at a Congress of the Brotherhood, which met at Cleveland (Ohio), on the 3rd of September, he announced the entire success of his mission to Europe. The assembled Fenians were greatly elated by the welcome news, and pledges of the most definite kind were given on behalf of the "Circles" represented at the Convention, that, within the next few months, the funds necessary for a campaign would be paid into the treasury. Moreover, the moment seemed peculiarly opportune for proposing a union with the rival organization; and, for this purpose, negotiations were begun which well nigh proved successful. Roberts was President of the one association; John Savage, the would-be consul to Leeds, was then "Head Centre" of the other. It was agreed that both should resign, and that John Mitchel should be called to assume the control of the united organization. The choice was certainly well made, for no name would have commanded more confidence on both sides of the Atlantic; but the ex-rebel has always spoken contemptuously of the Fenian movement, and he declined the honour sought to be conferred upon him. The only hope of an amalgamation was thus disappointed, and the two sections maintained their antagonistic position. Still sanguine, however, on account of the turn affairs were supposed to have taken at home, the Senate met in secret conclave in January, and various resolutions were passed "to give practical effect to the war policy of the Brotherhood." At the same time Roberts resigned the Presidency in favour of O'Neill, the hero of the Ridgeway raid, who was deemed a fitter chief in view of the contemplated hostilities.

By one of the resolutions referred to, the members of the Senate pledged themselves to use their personal efforts, in public and

in private, to obtain the funds necessary to put an army in the field. O'Neill accordingly started with his Vice-President on an organizing tour through the Western States, and in spite of the discredit soon afterwards cast upon the movement by the murder of Mr. Darcy Magee, in Canada, his exertions were tolerably successful throughout. The exigencies of American politics had led the House of Representatives to pass resolutions on the 9th of January, in favour of the Fenian prisoners in Ireland and in Canada; and these proceedings, accompanied as they were by speeches hostile to England, strengthened the hands of the Fenian President. But though considerable enthusiasm was here and there displayed, and money was liberally promised, the treasurer's receipts showed no corresponding increase. Whatever funds were collected, however, were spent in procuring munitions of war; and in view of immediate hostilities, the element of a secret oath was introduced, the members of the "Irish Republican Army," as the military section of the Brotherhood was called, who volunteered for service, being required to swear obedience to the orders of their chiefs. But month after month passed by, without anything being heard of the promised campaign; and when the next Convention met in Philadelphia (November, 1868), the first business of the delegates was the appointment of a committee to investigate the causes of the delay. It then transpired that not even a third of the amount promised at the Cleveland Congress had been paid in the interval; and, moreover, the opposition of the Savage party had deprived them of the support of American politicians, from whom, it was said, "under the favourable circumstances of a national election, a large sum of money could have been procured." The gross receipts for the year amounted to a little over 100,000 dollars, and of this sum only 23,000 dollars remained in the treasury. In this state of things the Congress approved the policy of the Senate, which had met in July and decided on again postponing the conquest of Canada.

The delegates had also to consider O'Sullivan's report of his mission to Europe, and to learn that the boasted union with the home organization had come to nothing. An agent of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, named Power, had been present at the Cleveland Convention, and there avowed himself so enthusiastic a supporter of Roberts and his party, that the Fenian President commissioned him to return to Europe and assist his Secretary in the work in which he was engaged. O'Sullivan's chief care at the time was to procure the election of the "Supreme Council." This body was to consist of seven members. One to be elected by each of the four Provinces of Ireland, two by the organization in England, and the seventh to represent the Scotch constituencies. Although three months had elapsed since the Paris compact was signed, but two places on the Council had as

yet been filled. An Irish priest, who had been one of the delegates to France, was appointed as member for Leinster; and the southern district of England had elected a man who had been an apothecary's assistant in London, and who recommended himself to O'Sullivan by his antipathy to Stephens and Kelly. Indeed, he had actually shared in a plot for the assassination of the "Chief Organizer," and his subsequent career in New York proved his fitness for carrying such a scheme into execution.

Such was the disorganization of the Brotherhood in the United Kingdom at this time, that it was a matter of some difficulty to get the "Circles" together, and arrange for the election of the other councillors. This duty, therefore, the Secretary intrusted to Power, being careful himself to keep as much as possible out of the jurisdiction of Dublin Castle and Scotland Yard. The agent performed this part of his mission zealously and well; but, the elections completed, he betrayed the interests of his employers, and urged upon the Council the wisdom of holding entirely aloof from the American organizations, and bidding for the support of both. Hearing of Power's duplicity, O'Sullivan hastened to England to tax him with it; but the subordinate was again loud in his protestations of fidelity to the cause he had espoused, and thus succeeded in deceiving his chief, who, like most of the Fenian leaders, was weak-minded and vain. O'Sullivan, moreover, was almost helpless in the matter. His fears, carefully fostered by Power, led him to believe that every detective in the kingdom had special instructions for his arrest, and that even in Paris his steps were dogged by English spies. With the exception, therefore, of a few flying visits to this country, his time was spent in bewailing the treachery of his agent, which soon became too manifest, and in making efforts to secure the early assembling of the Council. In this matter also he was frustrated by Power, who, fearing the influence of O'Sullivan, had the meeting postponed upon one pretence after another, until he felt sure of the result. At last the members were convened in February; but though their travelling charges were paid by O'Sullivan, he himself was refused admittance to their meeting, on the pretext that he represented no constituency of the home organization. Power, nevertheless, was allowed to be present, and to take a prominent part in the proceedings. Nothing, therefore, remained for the Fenian Secretary but to return to New York, and by his report to his chief to add another page to the tale of deception and fraud that mark the entire history of Fenianism. The Council formally decided to repudiate all American interference with the organization they claimed to govern; and an agent was deputed to proceed to New York to explain their programme, and to demand aid from all parties of the Fenians in the States. A procla-

mation was issued soon afterwards, declaring their principles and the objects for which their Directory had been formed. The Roberts organization condemned their treachery and repudiated their authority; and new emissaries were sent to this country, liberally supplied with funds, to proselytize among the "Circles" that had acknowledged the Council. So long as the American agents had money to distribute, the interests of their party gained ground, and in some quarters were in the ascendant; but ultimately the Supreme Council became everywhere predominant. The rivalry thus created, however, seemed to revive the Fenian excitement, and gave to the conspiracy an air of activity which was in a great measure fictitious. Meetings were held with unusual regularity throughout the kingdom, and the rival factions vied with each other in distributing arms among their respective adherents.*

Meanwhile the state of Fenian affairs in America remained unchanged, save that fresh quarrels were constantly breaking out among the leaders. Immediate action was once again determined on by the Senate, met in secret session in New York on the 19th of August; but yet the year 1869 passed by without a single Fenian being seen on the Canadian frontier. O'Neill, however, was indefatigable throughout the winter; and early in the spring of 1870 he announced the near completion of his preparations. But the Fenian Senate was composed almost entirely of politicians who traded upon the movement for their own advancement, and the excessive zeal of their new President was obnoxious to them in the extreme. They set themselves accordingly to thwart him in every way in their power, to prevent the fulfilment of the pledges they themselves had given. In hope of misleading the Canadian authorities, O'Neill issued a summons for Congresses to meet in New York on the 8th of March, and again on the 19th of April, intending to lead a raid upon the Dominion a week before the latter date. But one of the senators communicated his plans to the newspapers, and the movement had again to be postponed in consequence. Fearing that their President's influence would be too much for them in New York, the senators beguiled him into uniting with them in calling a Convention to meet in Chicago on the 11th of March, and to revoke the summons he had previously issued. But, discovering ere long that the object of this proposal was to insure his defeat, he issued a third circular, recurring to the arrangement for a Convention in New York on the 19th of

* The "Habeas Corpus Suspension Act" lapsed in March, 1869. When renewed in May, 1867, there were 211 prisoners in custody under warrants issued by the Lord Lieutenant; and when it was re-enacted for the last time, in February, 1868, the number had dwindled to 96, although 81 arrests had been made in the interval. These were all discharged before the prorogation of Parliament. The total number of arrests under the powers conferred by the Act was about 1050.

April. The result was that the Senate met in Chicago without their President, and the President convened the delegates in New York in defiance of the Senate.

In spite of every obstacle, however, O'Neill pursued his course with an earnestness and determination that would have done him credit in any other cause. The balance in the Fenian treasury had dwindled to 70 dollars by the 15th of March; but before that date, the arms required for a raid were actually located on the Canadian frontier; and as the military section of the Brotherhood declared in his favour at the New York Convention, he was soon afterwards in possession of the necessary ammunition, the want of which had till then been his chief difficulty. It was accordingly decided in secret council, to make the long-deferred movement on the 23rd of May; and on the 25th the raid was actually attempted. The scheme of the Fenian leader was to capture St. John's on the Richelieu River, half way between Montreal and the frontier; and at the same time to seize the town of Richmond, where the western branch of the Grand Trunk Railway joins the main line. These places in his possession, he hoped to be able to hold the field until his ranks had been reinforced by thousands of desperadoes from the refuse population of the American cities. He counted upon having at least 2000 men to execute his plans, but scarcely 200 appeared at the principal rendezvous. Nothing daunted, however, O'Neill crossed the border at a point north-east of St. Albans with a handful of men under his command. But the Canadian troops were so judiciously posted to receive him, that the idea suggests itself whether the Fenian Senate was not in communication with the Government of the Dominion. It will be an interesting disclosure if there should be discovered hereafter, among the State papers at Ottawa, a letter from the "Secretary for Civil Affairs, F. B.," disclosing the plan of this campaign. No sooner did the Fenians come under fire than they wavered and fell back. O'Neill addressed them in a few excited words, declaring they had disgraced themselves, and hurriedly returned to look for reinforcements. He was relieved from his embarrassment by being arrested by the United States' Marshal immediately he recrossed the line. To do him justice, the failure of this ridiculous affair was due to no fault of his. His scheme was as feasible as any other that could have been devised, and might possibly have been attended with a momentary success, if only the Fenians had all been like himself, and provided also the Canadian authorities had been asleep. It may be taken for granted that the failure of the plot was due as much to treachery as to cowardice. Certain it is that the Queen's troops in Canada never had an easier task than repelling the Fenian invasion of 1870. O'Neill

and some of his confederates were prosecuted by the United States Government for a breach of the neutrality laws, and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. It is scarcely necessary to add that all were released from custody as soon as the next elections drew near.*

But little need be added to conclude the story of the Fenian conspiracy. At home there have been but few events of a striking kind to mark its course in recent years; and these, such as Rossa's election for Tipperary, and the murder of Head-Constable Talbot, are so well known as not to call even for a passing mention. A remarkable feature in the career of the organization of late has been the bitterness of the antagonism between its members and the "Hibernians." The Ribbon Society aims at the extermination of the Protestant owners and occupiers of land in Ireland. The object of Fenianism is the establishment of an Irish Republic by force of arms. The difference between the two conspiracies is great, but it seems scarcely sufficient to account for the animosity which has marked the quarrels of their respective adherents.

The fate of the Fenian convicts, and the efforts then making on their behalf, seemed almost to engross the attention of the conspirators in this country during 1870; and since the date of the amnesty granted at the close of that year, the conspiracy has given way in prominence to the new movement in favour of "Home Rule." In England especially, numbers of the Fenians are availing themselves of the agitation promoted by Mr. Butt, to escape the further payment of "weekly levies" and "monthly subscriptions." The organization still exists, however, not only in Ireland but in Great Britain; and it is not likely to die out so long as the set of "organizers" and "agents" who at present live upon it, can keep the members together. At a meeting of the "Centres" for the North of England, fifteen months ago, they had to bewail the loss of over £300 through "swindlers and defaulters;" and at a similar gathering recently convened, it transpired that one of their most trusted agents had absconded in the interval with a considerable sum of money belonging to the Brotherhood.

Every effort having failed to bring about a real union of the rival Fenian Brotherhoods in America, the idea at last suggested itself of constituting a federal association, that should include them all, and yet leave to each the management of its internal affairs. The release of the political prisoners afforded a favourable opportunity for making

* When upon his trial, O'Neill acknowledged that the raid had proved a "ridiculous farce," and avowed his intention of discountenancing all such attempts in future. Notwithstanding, he was the promoter and ringleader of the Pembina raid last October. This affair is not included in the narrative, as it was not sanctioned by the Fenian Brotherhood, but it is worth mentioning to prove how little these men deserve the consideration they receive from the American Government.

the experiment ; and amidst the enthusiasm created by their arrival in New York, the "Irish Confederation" was established.

But, in truth, the game of American Fenianism seems well nigh played out. The allurements of political life and the attractions of honest trade are prejudicial to Irish patriotism in the United States. Even O'Donovan Rossa, the darling of the people, yielded to the fatal influence at once, and resigned his official connection with the new Confederation, to contest the seat that Mr. Tweed at present occupies in the Legislature of New York. Moreover, the thousands of reckless idlers trained to arms, that were the strength of Fenianism at the close of the civil war, are gradually being absorbed in the vast field of American enterprise and labour. The animosities towards England, which the events of that war gave rise to, are happily dying out, and the people of America are beginning more fully to reciprocate the kindlier feelings with which they are regarded by the inhabitants of Britain. All these considerations, combined with the waning importance of the Irish vote, encourage the hope that the labours of the Fenian agitator will year by year become more difficult and thankless, and that even such veterans as John O'Mahony himself, who, in spite of the abuse heaped upon him by his co-conspirators, is one of the only honest men among them, instead of having hereafter to bewail the follies of a fruitless life, may yet seek and find legitimate employment, and become useful citizens of their adopted country.*

If John Mitchel has been opposed to Fenianism, it is certainly not to be ascribed to any love for the Government that Fenianism would overthrow ; and here is his deliberate judgment of it, expressed in a recent letter to the "Nationalist" member for Meath :—"The project was in itself wild, and could only be made to appear feasible by systematic delusion and imposture." These words express no more than the honest truth. Falsehood, fraud, deceit, and treachery have marked throughout the secret history of the organization. Surely Irish credulity and folly must have a limit ; and that limit cannot be far distant with regard to what Mitchel has elsewhere so well described as "that enormous sack of gas called Fenianism."

But we must not fail to distinguish between the project and organization of this conspiracy, and the movement which it has embodied and controlled. The strength of Fenianism as an organization has been owing to the fact that its base of operations and supplies was laid in America, beyond the reach of English law and English bayonets. And Lord Kimberley made a wise remark when, in commenting on this fact, he said that "so long as the organization lasts,

* James Stephens seems already to have abandoned the trade of a conspirator : when he returned to New York last year, it was in the capacity of agent to a wine merchant in France.

the danger will continue"—the danger, not of a single triumph being achieved by the conspirators, but of the rising tide of prosperity in Ireland being turned back once more by a repetition of their follies and their crimes. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the vitality of the movement of which this organization is the outward form, has been due to the deep-seated longing in the Irish breast for the forbidden fruit of national independence. Ere Fenianism has had time to run its course, this longing is finding a fresh vent in the newly-raised clamour for "Home Rule." And what this last agitation may lead to, as yet it is hard to tell. Whether England's ultimatum refusing the demand, will pacify the people by satisfying them of its hopelessness, or be made the signal for an angry outburst of disloyalty, it may be of rebellion, the imminent future will reveal.

It is easy to enlarge upon the mischief Fenianism has caused; but it is a more pleasing task to point out the good that has resulted from it. Nothing has tended so much to corrupt English statesmanship with reference to Ireland, as the circumstance that in that country political power has hitherto been divided between the landlords and the priests; and as the influence of the priesthood has always been the more compact, and therefore the more available, it has generally commanded the first and highest bid. No one who is not intimately acquainted with the country can estimate the change that must have taken place to account for elections such as those which placed O'Donovan Rossa at the head of the poll in Tipperary, and returned the present members for the two Meaths. Ten years ago the only political platform in Roman Catholic counties was the altar; but the lesson of "No priests in politics," which, since the days of the *Irish People*, Fenianism has been teaching so assiduously, is bearing fruit at last. Doubtless the change is by no means free from danger. If the priests persist in hurling anathemas at men whose only offence consists in repudiating their dictation at the polling-booth, the people may be driven into infidelity. And, moreover, in the ecstasy of new-found liberty, some excesses may be committed, such as returning the name of a rebel convict upon the Speaker's writ. Nevertheless, if this change should prove as real and thorough as for the moment it promises to be, it may almost amount to the political emancipation of the Roman Catholic peasantry of Ireland—their admission to the privileges which the Legislature intended to confer upon them by the Act of 1829. Possibly the historian may yet have to record how Fenianism helped to open the way for English statesmanship to stand for the first time face to face with the Irish peasant, to hear from his own lips the statement of his grievances and of his need, and in return to urge its claims upon his respect and confidence, if not upon his gratitude.



THE STATE : THE GOVERNMENT : AND SCIENTIFIC MORALITY.

PART II.

Thoughts on Government. By ARTHUR HELPS.
Social Statics. By HERBERT SPENCER.
Over-Legislation. By the same.
Railway Morals and Railway Policy. By the same.
Specialised Administration. By the same. (*Fortnightly Review.*)
Administrative Nihilism. By PROFESSOR HUXLEY. (*The same.*)
The New Attack on Toleration. By HELEN TAYLOR. (*The same.*)
The Reign of Law in Politics. By the DUKE OF ARGYLL.
Fors Clavigera. By JOHN RUSKIN.
The Sphere and Duties of Government. By WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT.

EXPERIENCE proves that the main stress of the difficulty in all abstract discussion is to get people to attend to first principles. The mass of mankind are Experiential thinkers of the most bigoted school; they talk prose all their lives without knowing it, and this rule is true for the educated as well as the rest. But, though this description holds, there are immense numbers of men, these, again, constituting the majority of the majority, whose minds are full of blind alleys. We can deal with a thinker like the late Mr. Samuel Bailey; he is consistent, or at least consistent in (what we of another school consider) his inconsistencies. But with the greater number of public men, there is no dealing, on any terms of logic whatever. Mr. Blank, M.P., for example (I omit the names I had written) is alternately a Utilitarian, an Infallible Dogmatist,* and an Intui-

* There is, of course, no *final* difference between any Ultramontane in the world and a Protestant who believes in an infallible book susceptible of infallible interpretation. Nor is there any *working* difference in the use to which each is prepared to put the power of "the State," except one of convenience or degree.

tionist. In his speeches and his policy he slides about from Insight to Dogma, and from both or either to Utilitarianism; but the complexion of his thinking and policy is on the whole Utilitarian. And he is a fairly typical man. But, then, you hear from more or less clear-headed men, some of them high in place and ability, as well as from men of the ordinary citizen-wit, like Mr. Blank or Mr. Blank, the same cry for compromise or broad views. And it is at this point that we on the other side feel the great difficulty of getting attended to. But let us once more try, before going further. I repeat, then, we know, for it is obvious, that, take what first assumptions you please, you may meet practical difficulties. But can you prove that our first assumptions must necessarily lead to practical injustice? If not, you have proved nothing to our disadvantage. We, on the contrary, affirm that your first assumptions (as to the rights and duties of "the State," or the Government) must necessarily result in practical injustice, and that this is what disproves them. Take, for passing illustration, a powerful letter from the Rev. Llewelyn Davies, recently printed in the *Spectator*. He places the Dissenters in nearly as great a difficulty as to the *working* of an Education Law as any in which the Dissenters can place the Churchmen. But what then? His argument is the *reductio ad absurdum*, not of the position of either side, but of State education. But—and here I would specially request the attention of the friends of broad views and compromises—supposing it admitted as a matter of expediency that "the State" should educate (personally I refuse any such admission), because a person who cannot read an Act of Parliament is an unsafe citizen, we on this side shall still find our first principles useful. The difficulty, we affirm, is of your making; but we may partially help you out of it. For since we deny the right of "the State" to educate at all, we say that at the farthest it must not go beyond secular teaching. Now, here arise all the difficulties put by Mr. Llewelyn Davies—quite obvious in themselves, and long familiar to us on the other side. It is plain that you cannot draw an infallible line between the secular and the extra-secular. You cannot strike the names of God and Christ out of literature; nor will you find one teacher in five millions of men who has the nicety either of conscience or intelligence which would enable him to convey religious teaching to the mind of a child (or a grown person) in ultimately catholic forms, and without demanding too much intellectual assent. But—we go on to say—if you choose by your own act to run against this difficulty, you *must* cut it down to its lowest figure, and exclude from your State-schools not only the Bible, but every book whatever which assumes Protestantism, Catholicism, Christian Theism, or what not, just as you would exclude Buddhism, Mohammedanism, or Secularism (as a

creed). It will be time to discuss the duty of a Christian *nation* when somebody has condescended to make that figure of rhetoric any more intelligible to the Scientific Moralist than the phrase, a Christian pair of boots. A nation or a "State" is, for his purposes, made up of citizens who are of any religion or none, as the case may be. The alternative is, the right of a nation or a "State" to impose a "religion" on all, by just as much force as may be expedient, from cutting off heads in the style of Charlemagne or Olaf to methods more modern but not less detestable.

And this will be the most convenient place in which to introduce that fourth point in Professor Huxley's address, to which I referred in the former paper.

Several years ago in reading a copy of Mr. Spencer's "Social Statics" I found pencil annotations made here and there by different hands. Out of all these only one had any force, or even application. In a certain place, Mr. Spencer had used some such phrase as "a member of the community." The new annotator wrote in the margin:—"What constitutes a member of the community?" This went to the bull's-eye of a certain inevitable question, and that question is suggested by Mr. Huxley in the extract about to be reproduced. But it must be noted that all the ridicule of the notion of a social contract has proceeded from confounding questions of scientific morality with questions of political organization. Here are Mr. Huxley's words:—

"Much as the notion of a 'social contract' has been ridiculed, it nevertheless seems to be clear enough, that all social organization whatever depends upon what is substantially a contract, whether expressed or implied, between the members of the society. No society ever was, or ever can be really held together by force. It may seem a paradox to say that a slaveholder does not make his slaves work by force, but by agreement. And yet it is true. There is a contract between the two which, if it were written out, would run in these terms—'I undertake to feed, clothe, house, and not to kill, flog, or otherwise maltreat you, Quashie, if you perform a certain amount of work.' Quashie, seeing no better terms to be had, accepts the bargain, and goes to work accordingly. A highwayman who garottes me, and then clears out my pockets, robs me by force in the strict sense of the words; but if he puts a pistol to my head and demands my money or my life, and I, preferring the latter, hand over my purse, we have virtually made a contract, and I perform one of the terms of that contract. If, nevertheless, the highwayman subsequently shoots me, everybody will see that in addition to the crimes of murder and theft, he has been guilty of a breach of contract.

"A despotic government, therefore, though often a mere combination of slaveholding and highway robbery, nevertheless implies a contract between governor and governed, with voluntary submission on the part of the latter; and *à fortiori* all other forms of government are in like case.

"Now a contract between any two men, implies a restriction of the freedom of each in certain particulars. The highwayman gives up his

freedom to shoot me, on condition of my giving up my freedom to do as I like with my money ; I give up my freedom to kill Quashie, on condition of Quashie's giving up his freedom to be idle. And the essence and foundation of every social organization, whether simple or complex, is the fact that each member of the society voluntarily renounces his freedom in certain directions, in return for the advantages which he expects from association with the other members of that society. Nor are constitutions, laws, or manners, in ultimate analysis, anything but so many expressed or implied contracts between the members of a society to do this, or abstain from that."

To the two last sentences of comment, there is no objection whatever, if only certain prior conditions be clearly understood. First, that all this leaves it still an open question whether every person who is nominally a party to the contract is really so ; in other words, what Mr. Spencer calls "the right of the individual to declare himself independent of the State" must be assumed. Secondly, it must not be taken for granted that even universal consent can make everything lawful in itself ; in other words, there are things which human beings have no right to agree together to do, or get done, either among themselves, or upon others.

It is at this point that we feel that something is missing in Mr. Huxley's instances, and that if we are not led into an error by them, it is no thanks to the chooser. When the words "voluntary submission" are applied to the case of the slave, and the citizen robbed by threats of violence, we feel as if we were played with ; though the use of the word "voluntary" is, like that of the word "contract," susceptible of a certain kind of defence. It is, however, nothing less than absurd to begin by saying, "No society ever was or ever can be really held together by force ;" and then to explain this by adding that "the slaveholder does not make his slave work by force, *but* by agreement" (—note the force of the word *but*—), and that when you give a highwayman, who demands "your money or your life," your money, there is, in any applicable sense, a contract between you and him. The robber, if he afterwards shoots you, is indeed guilty of a breach of contract as well as of a murder ; but if, the moment his back is turned, you knock him down, recover your purse, and haul him, stunned, to the station-house, you are no more guilty of a breach of contract than is a general who makes a feigned sortie. In war, we have all the rights of belligerents. Warning is given, or is understood, that trust is at end, and we use force if we can, stratagem if we cannot. Not only all ethics, including those of lunatics, would justify the man who broke his contract with the robber, but all the civil law in the world declares a contract made under duress,—nay, under undue influence—void : as certain legatees have discovered !

But observe—whereas Professor Huxley has just affirmed that the contract with the robber implies “voluntary submission” on the part of the robbed, and that the kidnapped slave works “by agreement”—he now uses the word “voluntary” again in saying that in “every social organization . . . each member of the society voluntarily renounces his freedom in certain directions in return for” certain advantages of association.

I entirely accept this last proposition; but that, even with the help of the phrase *a fortiori*, the two kinds of contract are in similar sense “voluntary,” I deny. Some exercise of will must accompany every conscious human action; but to put a contract, which creates an obligation for one side only, upon the same kind of footing with a contract which creates an obligation on both sides alike is an abuse of language. The only social contract which can be made the basis of a scheme of social morality is one in which the parties are supposed equal in rights and in force, and equally free to enter into the contract, to continue it, to withdraw from it, or to form a new one, or any number of new ones. That there never was, will, or can be, any such contract we know,—it is obvious; but not only does that not imply any lack of right to assume it as a basis; it is plain that we can no more have a scientific morality without assumptions of this order, than we can have geometry without asking the student “to let it be granted that a circle may be drawn from any centre, and with any radius,” though this looked at practically is an absurd postulate. There never was, never will, never can be a possibility of drawing a circle from any centre and with any length of radius. Yet it is by making assumptions as impossible as this that we guide ourselves in aiming at the most important practical results. And we do in fact arrive at such results.

But let no one think that by permitting “the State” to take charge of the “secular” education of the citizens he has got out of the wood; for it would be a premature cry. When Sir Roundell Palmer proposed that professors in the universities should pledge themselves to teach nothing opposed to the Christian religion, it was obvious and conclusive to reply that no such pledge would be of the smallest value. Why? Because it could not prevent the natural working of the primary assumptions of any given professor’s teaching. The great majority of scientific men at the present time pursue a purely Positive method, and the primary assumptions of that method are fatal to all theological conceptions. It should not need much argument to show that they are, at lowest, fatal to any theological conceptions such as those upon which Christianity as a system is necessarily engrafted. Now a professor might preach an orthodox sermon every Sunday, subscribe Sir Roundell Palmer’s pledge *ex*

animo, and have Christian prayers before and after class, and yet if he taught science after the manner of Büchner, he would be opposing not only Christianity but Theism with the whole stress of his mind, and his pupils would, at the best, turn out sceptics. John Sterling said that Shakspeare was indirectly a more useful opponent of Evangelicalism than all its direct enemies put together; and he was right.

The inference is a wide one, and is only too obviously applicable to the Education question. Let us suppose, for a moment, Professor Huxley's "whole power of the State" is enlisted in behalf of giving all the citizens' children the best possible secular education they can have. This will include science, and plenty of it. The most accredited scientific experts will compile, or superintend, the books and the methods. Throughout the mass of these books and permeating the whole of the methods, there will run a direct or indirect suppression of any doctrine of final causes;* and, we may be sure, a very direct repudiation of any such "axiom of causality" as that stated by Mr. James Martineau in a former volume of this Review. Those, if any, who imagine that these characteristic features cannot and would not of necessity be introduced into the "secular" teaching of the young under State sanction—who think that an anti-theological *animus* cannot be made effective in the instruction given to children—are very much mistaken. So far concerns the distinctively religious classes of all creeds, from Romanism down to bare Theism. But, besides all this, it is certain that the scientific secular teaching, watch it whoever may, will be quick with directly anti-Christian suggestion and inference. Most of the scientific teaching all over the world is so. See, then, the pass to which we come. It is perfectly true that if you use in education the manuals of leading scientific experts you will meet the same conditions, whether you use these manuals voluntarily or under compulsion. But here, let us say in the interest of the clear issue, lies all the difference. We may be sure, to begin with, that Archbishop Manning (whose Lenten pastoral is well worth reading) and his clergy would take care, if they had their own way, that the children did not have access to Huxley or Tyndall in the lump. But when we come to compulsion applied by "the State" it is another matter. It is bound to do its best to get science taught from the "best" manuals. Ten years hence, there may not be a single scientific expert in England who would not affirm that final causes are a block, an injury to science, and an illusion of human ignorance. The doctrine would find its way into the State teaching; and only by indulgence would a scientific manual, drawn up say by

* It is nothing to the purpose that Bacon, though he called final causes barren virgins, professed himself a Christian.

Mr. Mivart, for the Romanist schools, be tolerated. Vain is it to reply, These are not *questions brillantes*. They are not, and they are; and if they are decided in favour of State-supplied education on the secular basis, they simply introduce the thin edge of the wedge: and after the whips will come the scorpions; after the deeds in the green tree the deeds in the dry. And we should have, already, this state of things:—Paid for in part by the religious classes, compulsory secular teaching that is necessarily pervaded by a spirit which they regard as anti-religious. On the other side of the dilemma, we have found no way out; nor is there one here. Thus, “the State” cannot teach religion without wronging somebody. And “the State” cannot give compulsory secular teaching without wronging someone. In neither case, too, is the matter in issue one which admits of compromise. If I had a child likely to come within the scope of the Education Act, I would, for no bribe and for no penalty, allow him to attend either a “secular” or a “denominational” school, and I hope the old spirit is yet so far alive in this country that those conscientious people who are liable to be wronged by the Act, will, under the guidance of those who can explain it to them, steadfastly refuse, at all risks, to heed its provisions. If the Vaccination Act can be defied, so can this.*

Nor can the friends of compulsory State Education be permitted to ride off on the assumption that compulsory State education *appears* to be favourable to morality or general progress. In Switzerland many causes concur in the present state of facts as to culture and good conduct; and it is not yet proven that Switzerland, to say nothing of her short-comings, will not eventually prove the very worst example that could be cited in favour of State education. From the condition of Germany nothing decisive can be inferred. America is, in my opinion, an alarmingly unfavourable example. And, apart from all *ex post facto* considerations, we say, if a thing is wrong in principle, there is an end. We know by a surer rule than any induction as to alleged beneficial consequences, that “it is not nor it cannot come to good.” But whether we are right or wrong in taking this ground, what competent answer, considered as political only, has any “State” in the world, if a citizen says merely this:—“You take the boy out of the gutter, and teach him reading and writing and what you call his duty. But why should I thank you for your pains? Left to his gutter, he might just have run a short

* It seems to me, on the whole, expedient that children should at present be vaccinated; but it is certainly not proven that *the Act of Parliament* has not hindered the scientific stamping out, by other methods, of small-pox. At Chatham (I think) there is a man who regularly refuses to have his children vaccinated, and will not pay the fines. The Anti-Vaccination Society support his wife and family while he is in prison.

career as a pickpocket or a burglar—trained up in your school he grows up to be a Fisk or a Redpath; and for this result you make me pay part of the money that was due to the better training of my own child. Now, I object. What are you to do? Leave it alone, and mind your own business.”

It does not however follow, because the “State” refused to educate a child, that it should leave it alone in the sense of omitting all activity of a kind which might bear upon its education. The Government does not prescribe the quantity of coals you put in your grate or how often you shall have your chimney swept; but it may apply a deterring motive by fining you if you get your flue on fire. In a similar way, if a child under a certain age did wrong, it might punish the parent as well as the child; and so supply motives to the parent for getting the child properly trained. This, however, is only by the way. So, also, is the reference which I now make to Dr. Brewer, M.P., who, at the commencement of the Education discussions, proposed to make a certain standard of attainment the condition of certain social benefits. The plan was—of course—immediately denounced as *doctrinaire*; but for all that, a governmental examination at stated times, with penalties to the neglectful parent and disabilities to the neglected child, would come far nearer to an equitably workable plan than any scheme under which “the State” provides or regulates the educational means and compels a citizen to use them, as so regulated or provided.

Taking State Education as an example, because it is a burning question, we have, then, arrived at this—that by no conceivable means can compulsory State Education be made right in itself, or just to the citizen. The only hypothesis on which (as to the latter point) the rule *volenti non fit injuria* could apply is the impossible one, that every citizen, without exception, assented now and for all time to the State system, whatever it was. The alternative, disguise it as you may, is the rule by force of the majority over the minority in a matter in which they have not agreed to be so ruled; and here we come back to the question of a “social compact.”

It is absolutely impossible to conceive a human being—not even an idiot or a selfish savage—so constituted as not to give forth spontaneously, upon any infringement of his liberty or ease being attempted, this first axiom of social relation:—No man has a right to interfere with me in the pursuit of my own good, unless I prevent his pursuing his own good. This is an axiom—it comes to the surface more certainly than the ring of the anvil when the hammer strikes it. A., in his selfishness, may injure B., but not only will B. immediately exhibit a profound appreciation of the

axiom, but A. himself, in his turn, will exhibit his, if C. comes up and injures *him*. Nor is it possible, again, to conceive of any sane body of men entering into a social compact which omits this postulate, or, except for a temporary purpose and by consent, places it in abeyance. Nor, except by consent, can any number of men acquire rights over any other number of men such as will justly permit them to violate the axiom. If they can, it is required to know by what process.

First, we start with our aboriginal two men, A. and B. Introduce a third, C., and what change have you made? None. Introduce D., and what change have you made? None. Go on bringing in new individuals up to Z. and still you have introduced no fresh element into the position, considered as one of Scientific Morality, though you have now twenty-six persons instead of one. Now, turn your twenty-six into twenty-six thousand, and it is obvious that you have still made no change. Nor, if the twenty-six thousand are supposed to make some kind of compact among themselves, and to take the name of "The State," does it make any difference? They may agree to part with their freedom of action in certain particulars, and if the agreement be absolutely perfect, no political wrong is done; but no man can really part with a primitive personal right for himself; much less can he really rob another man of such a right by agreeing with a majority that the other man shall not be allowed to exercise that right. It is absurd for the twenty-six thousand to constitute themselves into an imaginary whole, and calling that whole "The State," affirm that they may slaughter at the pleasure of a majority of their number such rights of the individual as may seem to such a majority injurious to their imaginary whole—I say imaginary, for no such whole is possible. "The State" is a figment begotten in pre-scientific times, when predatory egotisms were the basis of morals, and the recognized existence of a servile class permitted the mind to form to itself, unchecked, ideas of political unity and domination which are of necessity at war with justice. If this pagan and unscientific notion is once admitted, all the pagan consequences irresistibly follow. Admit the baseless idea of a Social Whole with a welfare of its own, a "good of mankind," to pursue, and there is no crime which you may not legalize; no goodness that you do not at once imperil; no flower of human hope that you may not trample down; no avenue of divine access that you may not be found conspiring to choke up; no kind of bestial tampering, no organization of murder, no conspiracy of abominable things,—that you may not, nay, that in course of time you will not, be found to have embraced in your guilty methods. There is no such thing as a political whole, entitled to dispense with the smallest right of the

meanest worm that crawls its floor ; no National Unity of so splendid a tradition that the smoke of one personal wrong may not quench it ; no mesh of social contract ever yet woven, or in the future weaveable, between the dome and the pit, that the free soul of man may not claim to rend in the name of Him who made it free.

Nor, obviously, is there any final difference between "the State" thus considered, and any Dictator, who might happen to get power enough to carry out his own ideas of right and wrong, not only in a given community accidentally forming "a nation," but all over the world. Clearly, it is, in the last resort, a simple question of how much force you can impound in support of your own ideas of right and wrong. Whether it is A., or all the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, or twenty-six thousand times A., or one man with as much physical force at his command as the twenty-six thousand, can make no difference to the question of principle. At a recent Permissive-prohibitory Bill Meeting, Mr. Hughes complained that he had had in Massachusetts to walk half a mile before he could get a glass of porter to drink.* Some other speaker observed that he hoped to make it as difficult to get a glass of porter in England. Now if I look at a man of this stamp cranioscopically, I probably say, "Ah, just what you would expect,—large Self-Esteem, deficient Conscientiousness, Ideality and Causality nowhere." But the immediate question is this. A man who cannot see that he is no more entitled to hinder my buying a glass of wine than I am to hinder his buying a pound of tea, would be only consistent if he set to work to get a seventy-thousand pounder at his back and then went on to erect a universal dictatorship. No conceivable difference is made by any boundary line on the map ; and we find, in fact, that the idea of "the State" tends to find its *logique* in universal empire. I do not care to turn back the page of history to find this : I find it in America, and in a modified form in Germany, in France, and in Russia. I do not hesitate to affirm that the *logique* of the political Idea of the United States is universal dominion.

To hasten to a close. It is confusing the issue to suggest that the advance of civilization alters, or can ever alter, the original basis of human freedom, or change the first condition of scientific morality. That there must be more legislation as civilization increases is not so much a truth as a truism. But of what kind ? It is the question of quality, not of quantity, that we on this side are concerned with just now. The points to which "specialized administration" must address itself will often be in the same line with those to which paternal govern-

* Adding, however, that if he had understood the word "Samples," in certain shop-windows, he need not have taken that trouble.

ment would naturally address itself; but, for all that, the two things are not *in pari materia*. Take an instance or two. I hold that if a man sells me beans for coffee he is as much guilty of an offence with which the law should deal as if he refused to pay his own promissory note. Punish him, then, for the breach of contract. The same if he sells me short weight. Punish him for the breach of contract. This is no more paternal government than is the flogging of a garotter. But it would be paternal government to appoint Inspectors and Examiners of Food: we say it would defeat its own end to appoint such inspectors, and we object to the present system of dealing with deficient weights and measures. We have no patience with the cry, "The poor man is robbed by the dishonest tradesman." We answer, Then let the poor man look to it, and take his own methods of convicting the cheater. He cannot do it? Then that is no business of ours. Let him go and acquire the capacity; and as to his sufferings in the meanwhile, we hand him over to the "altruistic instincts." Take Lord Campbell's Act, again. We could easily prove that this Act does more harm than good; and also, that if the law did its duty in certain other particulars, which as clearly fall within its province as the objects of that Act do not, the most important of those objects would be secured.

Take, again, Mr. Charley's absurd and unjust Bill for the Protection of Infant Life. Here, indeed, I am glad to find that a member of the Government, Mr. Winterbotham, appears clearly to see that the Bill is likely to do no good; and also that certain ladies of the Left have determined to oppose it. It was powerfully and unanswerably criticised in one of their journals lately, and there is hope that it may never become law. Here, again, we say, the worst part of the mischiefs you are seeking in this "paternal" fashion to remedy (but which you will certainly increase by such a method), are of your own provoking. You have, in these matters, done the things which you ought not to have done, and left undone the things you ought to have done; and this patchwork is an additional infamy. We, on our side, are quite ready to turn on the screw of *responsibility* in these matters, up to almost any point you please, if you will apply it in the right place; but this is the wrong place altogether. We say you have a perfect right to punish parents who neglect their children. You have a right (of high expediency to say the least) to compel every couple who become parents within your boundaries, and tacitly take advantage of your protection, to register the birth, in order that you may know who is responsible. Whatever blame naturally attaches to the act of a human pair who, in the midst of a crowded society, become parents without acknowledging the responsibility of the act, that blame let them bear. But you have no right in the

world to create, by bad laws, smelling of the dark ages, an *artificial* legal stigma, and then prevent either man or woman from getting out of the way of it, if possible. Nor will you succeed in doing this by any such measure as Mr. Charley's Bill.

I postpone to another time and place fully half of what I had written, and not without hope of making the discussion much more satisfactory. The chief points which seemed to me to want clearing up I have endeavoured to indicate; and will only beg those who might perhaps be disposed to think that I, personally, am ignorant or unmindful of practical difficulties, or that political and social action, founded on "Astynomocratic" principles must necessarily disregard expediencies, and run mad,—to dismiss any such notion. These things are *not* so; common sense is *not* the exclusive property of the people who call confused and unconscientious views "broad" ones.

A word or two is all that can be spared for Miss Helen Taylor's powerful attack upon Professor Huxley's paper coupled with some words of his at the London School Board. It will be very instructive to read it in connection with a leading article, intended as an answer, which appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Some references to Mr. Ruskin's *Fors Clavigera*, want of space compels me to omit. It is from no partiality for my own words that, with an eye to this "new attack on toleration," as Miss Helen Taylor calls it, I venture to quote certain passages which will at least prove that, in my opinion, the present state of things was clearly predictable years ago, and is the perfectly natural result of the influence of certain forces, political, literary, and social, often discussed by me:—

"We live in ticklish times. The working-classes, having been long and unjustly excluded from (a certain form of) political power, are now admitted to it; but it remains to be seen whether we shall not be punished for our previous injustice to them, by being taught, to our cost, that their advent to power will be far from an *immediate* gain to liberal ideas. The writer of these lines firmly believes that that bitter lesson awaits us all. The question of national education, settle it as we please, comes late in the day—we have a long journey to go before we reach results. And in the meantime, we have already said what we think are the dominant tendencies of the hour. Much depends upon the individual outlook, and opinions must differ; but what *we* think we see is before the reader. A most threatening tendency to mere crowd-worship, or waiting on the will of numbers. A *schwärmerei* of humanity without faith in God. An inclination to crush individual responsibility out of sight. A tendency to promote a segregating despotism under the name, or by the path, of culture. *The importation of the conceit of scientific certainty into a new and alien sphere . . .* We are at present on the way to an overwhelming tyranny from a perfidiously *tolerant* public opinion. Public opinion is, in nearly every one of its departments, rotten with scepticism. I do not mean scepticism of 'miracles' or 'inspiration,' but scepticism of goodness, and God, and human nature,—a scepticism which snatches blindly at the first clue of Convenience for guidance, because it has

lost all trust in principles. Now, this scepticism is tolerant enough about forms of faith, *so long as the majority are not agreed about them.* But in the meanwhile it indemnifies itself by tyrannising over the outer machinery of life. It does this upon the plea of the public good, the greater amount of happiness, and so on ; but its inspiration is fear. It stands in terror of human nature ; and, seeing no God—who shapes our ends, rough hew them as we will—it anticipates security in uniformity alone. All it cares for is to get along comfortably ; its piety, if it pretends to any, is a piety of good taste ; and it is capable of just as much persecution as the worst bigotry that ever swore by a relic or a victim's blood."

The other quotation will be more specific ; it comes from articles written in June, 1868, and I have only now supplied half a dozen words at the opening :—

"One of the most alarming signs of the times is a mixture of arrogance and pinchbeck tenderness which appears, in some inscrutable way, to affiliate itself to the continuity of force and the laws of heat. It begins by praying to oneself and loving Humanity, and it will end, if it runs its natural course, in the most merciless and horrible tyranny the world ever saw. It *may* run its natural course ; but we object to its making the circuit in stolen terminology. There is no copyright in great truths, but there is in symbols and watchwords when fighting is to be done."

Again :—

"It may be doubted whether a Liberal Government will find its hands as free as sincere Liberals hope. The Tory party have now had a long innings for them, and no man is more skilful in profiting by experience than Mr. Disraeli. The strong and rapidly growing reaction against *laissez-faire* is all in his favour ; there is so much resemblance between a paternal-Government Liberal and a rather liberalized Tory that, on certain questions of the very order which are sure to be prominent, confused fighting—confused from a party point of view—must inevitably follow. It is but too certain that the Liberal party are not awake to the gravity of the reaction in question, or of the facility with which they may be drifted or entrapped into positions in which they will look almost as strange as Tories passing a Reform Bill. The average working-man is at bottom a Tory and Protectionist. He has absolutely no Liberalism in him, except that which readily lends itself to the improvement of the condition of his own order, and he is quite capable to-morrow, if he had the power, of enacting sumptuary laws as contemptible as any that ever were framed. The Comtists know this fast enough—it was to women and workmen that Comte openly said he looked for the first proselytes to his new despotism. And it is from working men and women that the new dangers of Liberalism will arise, as fast as those classes get political power. Let us deny fair play to no human being, and let all fighting be on just terms ; but let us know what we are about, and foresee our new perils if we can. The precise peril which we now signalize is that we are undoubtedly entering upon a time of reaction, in which Government interference in various shapes will be found forming part of programmes of progress called Liberal, and that the traditionally stupid party will be clever enough, for all its stupidity, to manipulate such programmes for its own ends."

On the subject of toleration there is something more to which I

crave attention. About thirteen years ago a book was published by Parker of the Strand, entitled "On Liberty." It was written by a Mr. John Stuart Mill. An enlightened press went into raptures over it. It was masterly, it was eloquent, it was subtle, it was profound, it was the most magnificent political apology ever seen since the days of Milton. Very good. Now, towards the end of this book—the publicists, who went into raptures over it, can of course remember the very wording of the passage—there was a paragraph in which this Mr. Mill denounced in the strongest terms the "language of downright persecution," into which the English press habitually broke out when Mormon polygamy was on the carpet. And he went on to stigmatize, as an infamous and cowardly persecution, any "civilizade" against that institution. Now, I have only two remarks to make, and I make them with an eye on what Mr. Helps has said as to the safeness of holding exceptional opinion in this country. First, then, during the recent anti-Mormon procedure in America, I asked a friend, who read more newspapers than I did, if he had seen in one single journal in this free country the faintest reminiscence of Mr. Mill's language,—which, by-the-by, went on to say that if civilization could not get the better of this polygamy without force, it was high time civilization received an infusion of fresh blood from energetic barbarians, such as were likely to practise the "peculiar institution." My friend, who is a humourist, wrote in reply: "Do you think any newspaper would dare to fly in the face of Providence by quoting those sentiments of Mill's?" Secondly, I undertake to say that so safe is it to hold exceptional opinion in this country, that if Mr. Mill had dared to utter at a public meeting that particular protest of his, neither his years, nor his achievements, nor his disinterested career, nor his special detestation of the "peculiar institution," would have saved him from being mobbed, to the danger of his limbs or his life; and that in six days it would have been generally believed in England that he had been in the habit of retiring to Avignon every year expressly for immoral purposes. For myself, I shall not condescend to say that my detestation of the "peculiar institution" is as great as any man's can be. But I *will* say this, that though Brigham Young ought long ago to have been hanged ten times over, it was not for having forty wives, if the forty wives were free agents, but for offences of a very different complexion. And if the Government had in this case previously interfered in the right place, it would have never had occasion to interfere in the wrong one.

I will conclude with two suggestions of a practical bearing,—the humourist will please to observe that I do not venture to call them practical suggestions.

I. There is, or was lately, existing somewhere a society bearing some such name as "The Public Rights Defence Association." My impression, perhaps a wrong one, is, that it has some sort of connection with the liquor trade. Whether it has or not, an Association for the defence of public rights and for the education of public opinion on certain questions would be a very proper and useful one. If it were constituted of intelligent men and women, perhaps Mr. Herbert Spencer would consent to allow his name to be used as that of Honorary President ; but I speak entirely in the dark, and have myself no gift for forming associations.

II. Our "representative institutions" will, before long, be overhauled and revised in various ways. Whatever else may be in the air, something analogous to the following should be made constitutional,—namely, that if a certain number of the "represented" in a certain number of the constituencies concur in demanding it, the passage of any Bill through the House of Commons may be suspended,—in fact, that in case of need, the legislative powers of that House may be suspended,—until an understanding be come to between the intervening constituents and the members, or until the latter are, it may be, withdrawn from their seats by public vote. This is, of course, very roughly put, and there is no space here to discuss the possible bearings of such a plan in diminishing the gross evils of ordinary dissolutions and of party government. But the necessity for some check of the kind upon "the never-ending audacity of elected persons" grows every hour more plain.

HENRY HOLBEACH.



PLEASURE AND DESIRE.

IF anyone interested in observing contemporary opinion were asked what was the prevailing moral system in England at the present day, he would probably answer Utilitarianism. And if anyone interested in promoting practical morality had to state the most radical and morally important of the differences among human dispositions, he would probably take occasion to contrast the selfish and sympathetic man. It is, therefore, somewhat singular that the *former* answer should be ambiguous precisely in respect of the contrast pointed in the latter: that a "Utilitarian," in common usage, should nearly as often mean one who acts from self-interest as one who aims at the general good; and that in the writings of professed assailants, as well as professed defenders of Utilitarianism, the Egoistic and Altruistic principles should frequently appear inextricably blended, or at least indissolubly connected.

At the same time it is not difficult to find reasons for this close union between principles and systems from one point of view so antagonistic. In the first place, both are equally opposed to the "intuitive," or "common-sense" morality: and the alliances of doctrines as of nations are as often due to common enmity as to natural affinity. But, further, the systems of Epicurus and Bentham are essentially similar in being both *dependent* systems; that is, in prescribing actions as means to an end distinct from, and lying outside the actions; and

thus both consist of rules which are not absolute but relative, and only valid if they conduce to the end. Again, the ultimate end, or entity regarded as intrinsically good and desirable, is in both systems the same in quality, *i.e.*, pleasure, or, more strictly, the maximum of pleasure attainable, pains being subtracted. Besides, it is of course to a great extent true that the conduct recommended by Egoistic Hedonism coincides with that inculcated by Universalistic Hedonism (as for comparison's sake we may term Bentham's Utilitarianism). Though it is only in an ideal polity that "self-interest well understood" leads to the perfect discharge of all social duties, still, in a tolerably well-ordered community it prompts to the fulfilment of most of them, unless under very exceptional circumstances. And, on the other hand, a sincere Benthamite may fairly hold that his own happiness is that portion of the universal good which it is most in his power to promote, and which therefore is most especially entrusted to his charge. And the practical blending of the two systems is sure to go beyond their theoretical coincidence. It is much easier for a man to move in a sort of diagonal between egoistic and universalistic hedonism, than to be practically a consistent adherent of either. Few men are so completely selfish, whatever their theory of morals may be, as not occasionally to seek the general good of some smaller or larger community from natural sympathetic impulse unsupported by Epicurean calculation. And probably still fewer are so resolutely unselfish as never to find all men's good in their own with rather too ready conviction.

In spite of all this, the distinction between one's own happiness and that of people in general is so natural and obvious, and so continually forced upon our attention by the circumstances of life, that some other reason is required to explain the persistent confusion between the systems that respectively adopt either end as furnishing the right and reasonable standard for each individual's conduct. And such a reason is found in the theory of human action propounded by Bentham, and, generally speaking, maintained by his disciples. Though ethically Epicureanism and Benthamism may be viewed as standing in polar opposition, psychologically Bentham is in fundamental agreement with Epicureans. He holds that a man ought to aim at the maximum felicity of men in general; but he holds, also, that he always does aim at what appears to him his own maximum felicity—that he cannot help doing this—that this is the way his volition inevitably acts. Bentham takes every opportunity of putting these two propositions with characteristic sharpness and clearness. "The greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question is the only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action in every situation." But "in the general tenor of life,

in every human breast, self-regard is predominant ;” or, more explicitly, “on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness, whatsoever be the effect of it in relation to the happiness of other similar beings, any or all of them taken together.” He goes on to refer those who doubt to the “existence of the human species as being itself a proof, and a conclusive one.”

Hence if self-interest be not the “right and proper end of action,”* it is at any rate not wrong or improper, because it is inevitable. If Bentham is asked, “Why then do you inveigh (as you certainly do with much bitterness and emphasis) against lawyers and statesmen who seek their own interest when it unfortunately happens to diverge from the public interest ?” his answer is ready and clear : “I do so with a view of removing the divergence ; by my own disapprobation and the disapprobation of all I can persuade to sympathize with me, I would supply the force that is wanting to turn the wills of these public servants in the direction of public duty.” If he is asked again, “But when you concern yourself about the public good, and call it the right and proper end of action, do not you recognize a principle of duty, obedience to which you prefer to your own pleasure ?” he answers unhesitatingly, “No I concern myself about the public good, *because in me selfishness has taken the form of public spirit*, and when I call it the proper end, I mean that I wish all other men to take it for such, with a view to its attainment, with which the attainment of my own greatest happiness is bound up.”

There is, therefore, in Bentham’s mind no confusion and no logical connection between his psychological generalization and his ethical assumption. But it has been so common among moralists of all schools to identify the natural and the ideal, and to argue from what men universally or normally do to what they ought to do, that it is not surprising that a utilitarian of Bentham’s school should be thought to approve of the egoism which he accepts as inevitable, and in some way to base upon it his universalistic hedonism. And we find that the latest expositor of utilitarianism, Mr. Mill, does try to establish a logical connection between the psychological and ethical principles, which he holds in common with Bentham, and to convince his readers that because each man naturally seeks his own happiness, therefore he ought to seek the happiness of other people.

* As far as I am aware, this term is never applied to it in works written by Bentham himself. In the Deontology, and elsewhere where the composition is due to Dumont, we find a loose and vague syncretion of Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism, which it is impossible to attribute to so exact and coherent a thinker.

Now, it is my object to prove that this psychological generalization is in no important sense true. In so doing I do not wish to attack the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mr. Mill, with which I in the main agree, but to disentangle it from the egoistic hedonism with which their theory of human action continually causes it to be confounded.

It will be as well to quote the words in which Mr. Mill states the theory. "It will hardly," he expects, "be disputed that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon:" or, still more precisely, "we desire a thing *in proportion* as the idea of it is pleasant." It is important to notice the italicized words. For it must be admitted that if we leave them out, the experience of mankind would *prima facie* confirm Mr. Mill's assertion. Most men would say that whatever they desired was always something which was pleasant in prospect. I shall presently argue that even this on closer examination seems to be an inexact account of consciousness. But few would assert that what they *most* desired was always that which they thought would give them most pleasure. It would be generally allowed that men not only desire, but are actually impelled to do what (even in the moment of yielding to the impulse) they know will cause them more pain than pleasure on the whole. "Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor" is as applicable to the Epicurean as to anyone else. If any evidence is needed of this, I cannot do better than quote Mr. Mill himself.* "Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures . . . They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good." I confess that I cannot reconcile this sentence with the one previously quoted from the same author. If we always desire more strongly what is in idea most pleasant, how can we choose what we know to be the less valuable pleasure?

It may be thought, however, that this is an exceptional case, offering an interesting psychological puzzle; but that it still remains true that the ordinary, normal phenomenon in the action of men is that each individual seeks his own greatest apparent pleasure; and that, in order to prove that the greatest pleasure is intrinsically desirable, we only require the proposition that the greatest pleasure is *ordinarily* desired, not that it is *always* so.

Before we examine this more qualified assertion, it will be as well to define our terms as clearly as possible. In the passage which I first quoted, Mr. Mill goes on to say that "desiring a thing, and finding it pleasant, are, in strictness of language, two modes of naming

* "Utilitarianism," C. 2. p. 14 (of 3rd edition).

the same psychological fact." If this be the case, it is hard to see how the assertion we are discussing requires to be determined by "practised self-consciousness and self-observation;" as the denial of it would involve a contradiction in terms. The truth is that there is an ambiguity in the word pleasure, which has always tended seriously to confuse the discussion of this question.* By pleasure we commonly mean an agreeable sensation not necessarily connected with desire or volition, as it may arise from external causes without having been foreseen or desired at all. But when we speak of a man doing something at his own "pleasure," or as he "pleases," we signify the mere fact of choice or preference; the mere determination of the will in a certain direction. Now, if by "pleasant" we mean that which influences choice, exercises a certain attractive force on the will, it is not a psychological truth, but a tautological assertion, to say that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears "pleasant." But if we take "pleasure" to mean "agreeable sensation," it then becomes a really debateable question whether our active impulses are always consciously directed towards the attainment of agreeable (or the avoidance of disagreeable) sensations as their end. And this is what we must understand Mr. Mill to consider "so obvious, that it will hardly be disputed."

It is rather curious to find that the best-known of English moralists regards the exact opposite of what Mr. Mill thinks so obvious, as being not merely a universal fact of our conscious experience, but even a necessary truth. Butler distinguishes, as is well known, "self-love," or the impulse towards our own pleasure from "particular movements towards particular external objects—honour, power, the harm or good of another;" the actions proceeding from which are "no otherwise interested than as every action of every creature must from the nature of the case be; for no one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own." Such particular passions or appetites are, he goes on to say, "*necessarily presupposed by the very idea* of an interested pursuit; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object." We could not pursue pleasure at all, unless we had desires for something else than pleasure; for pleasure consists in the satisfaction of just these extra-regarding impulses.

Butler has clearly over-stated his case; † for many pleasures (as was just remarked) occur to us without any relation to previous

* The confusion occurs in the most singular form in Hobbes, who actually identifies Pleasure and Appetite, "this motion in which consisteth pleasure, is a solicitation to draw near to the thing that pleaseth."

† The same argument is put in a more guarded, and, I think, unexceptionable form by Hutcheson.

desires, and it is quite *conceivable* that our appetitive consciousness should consist entirely of impulses towards such pleasures as these. But taken as a mere statement of actual fact, his doctrine faithfully represents a great, probably the greater part of our experience. Throughout the whole of our appetitive life we may distinguish (primary) *extra-regarding* impulses, desires of some end other than our own sensations, from secondary, reflexive, self-regarding impulses towards the pleasure which attends the fulfilment of the former.

I will begin with the appetites of hunger and thirst, because it is important to show that there is no difference between "sensual" and "intellectual" impulses as regards the point in question.

Hunger and thirst are impulses, due to bodily needs of food and drink representing themselves in consciousness. Their objects are respectively food and drink, not the pleasure that we shall feel while the food is being eaten and the water drunk.

It is, no doubt, true that appetite makes us regard food as pleasant, and is frequently and naturally accompanied with anticipation of the pleasure of eating; and further, that in proportion as the desire is strong, the anticipated pleasure appears great. These undeniable facts render the proposition which I am combating plausible, so that it requires careful introspective observation to convince us of its unsoundness. But I think such observation will show that conscious anticipation of pleasure is by no means an inseparable concomitant of appetite; and that, even when it exists, it is not its object. We may have a secondary desire of this pleasure along with the primary appetite, but the two are not to be identified. This statement I must again guard by admitting that the analysis which distinguishes the two is not applicable everywhere. Very often they are indistinguishably blended; and, as the evolution of consciousness is always from the vague to the definite, it is, perhaps, most exact to say that, in the earliest phase of any desire, the strictly extra-regarding impulse is not yet "differentiated" (as Mr. Spencer would say) from the strictly self-regarding. Still this differentiation soon takes place, and there are many occasions when we can quite clearly distinguish the two elements by the different actions which they respectively prompt. For as the pleasure depends to a great extent, as Butler says (though not entirely), on the strength of the appetite: the desire of the pleasure prompts men not only to gratify, but to stimulate, the appetite. The gourmand, who takes a walk in order to enjoy his dinner, is impelled by one sensual impulse to aim at producing another: here, at least, we are in no danger of confounding the two.

Again, let us examine a class of pleasures which occupy a very important place—according to some judges, the most important—in our sensitive existence: the pleasures of *pursuit*. These illustrate

peculiarly well the difference between the extra-regarding and self-regarding impulses, and also the dependence of pleasure on desire, instead of *vice versa*. Take, for example, the favourite amusement of rich Englishmen. What is the motive that impels a man to fox-hunting? It is not the pleasure of catching the fox. Nobody, before entering on the chase, represents to himself the killing of the fox as a source of gratification, apart from the eagerness produced by pursuit. It is upon this eagerness that the pleasure depends; the desire, stimulated to a strange intensity by vehement action, is the prior fact; and the pleasure arising when the desire is gratified is proportioned to the pre-existing desire. It will be said, however, that what the fox-hunter desires is, not to kill the fox, but to enjoy the pursuit. And, no doubt, this is his rational motive, that, in a tranquil state of his mind, initiates the whole series of actions. But the peculiarity of the case is that of these pleasures at which he rationally aims, the irrational desire to catch the fox is an essential condition. Before we can enjoy pursuing, we must temporarily want to catch — want it very vehemently and absorbingly. Hence the often-noted paradox which such activities present to the prudential reason: we cannot attain the prudentially rational end of maximum pleasure without exciting what are now* highly irrational impulses.

Another very important observation suggests itself in connection with these latter pleasures. In the case previously discussed, although we could distinguish appetite from the desire of the pleasures consisting in the satisfaction of appetite, there appeared no incompatibility between the two. The fact that the gourmand is dominated by the desire of the pleasures of eating in no way impedes the development in him of the appetite which is a necessary condition of these pleasures. But when we turn to the pleasures of the chase, we seem to perceive this incompatibility to a certain extent. In all forms of pursuit a certain enthusiasm is necessary to obtain full enjoyment. A man who enters on it in too epicurean a temper, thinking too much of the pleasure, does not catch the full spirit of the chase; his eagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the pleasure its highest zest and flavour. Here comes into view what we might call the fundamental paradox of hedonism, that the self-regarding impulse, if too predominant, defeats its own end. This effect is not visible, or at any rate is scarcely visible in the case of purely sensual pleasures; and also where there is a very keen, natural susceptibility in any direction, the operation of the general

* I do not enter into the history of these impulses. In dealing with questions of which the decision depends, as Mr. Mill says, on "practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others," it seems to me important to put carefully aside the necessarily hypothetical method of historical psychology.

law is counteracted. Hence we see, first, why epicureanism has always had, practically, in ordinary minds, a tendency to sensualism, which it certainly has not theoretically, because sensual pleasures are least of all diminished by directly pursuing them; and, secondly, why it has not had this tendency in philosophic minds, because in them the intellectual impulse is so strong originally as to resist the corrosive effect of the epicurean principle. But of a great part of our more refined enjoyments, intellectual and emotional, it seems true to say that in order to attain them, at any rate in their best form, the direction of our impulse must be objective, extra-regarding, not fixed upon our own sensations as its end. The activities upon which the pleasures attend seem to require a certain self-abandonment, incompatible with the conscious predominance of self-love. For example, the pleasures of thought and study (which the materialist Hobbes declares to be "far exceeding all carnal delights") can only be enjoyed by those who have an ardour of curiosity which carries the mind temporarily away from self and its sensations. In all kinds of Art, again, the exercise of the creative faculty is attended by intense and exquisite pleasures; but in order to get them, one must forget them; the gaze of the artist is always said to be rapt and fixed upon his ideal of beauty. Still more clearly does the law appear when we contemplate the sympathetic activities and susceptibilities. Even Professor Bain admits that the desire to give pleasure to, and remove pain from, others constitutes an exception to his general theory that each individual's volition is determined by his own pleasures and pains, actual or ideal; and it is upon the existence of this strictly unselfish impulse that the much-commended pleasures of benevolence depend.

So far I have insisted on the felt incompatibility of the self-regarding and extra-regarding impulses only as a means of proving their essential distinctness. I do not wish to overstate it, as it has been not unfrequently overstated by the anti-hedonistic moralists who have been perfectly right in drawing attention to it. I believe that in the commonest state of our activity the incompatibility is only momentary, and does not prevent a real harmony from being attained by means of a sort of alternating rhythm of the two impulses in consciousness. Desire is, I think, not ordinarily a conscious impulse towards pleasure; but where there is strong desire in any direction, there is commonly keen susceptibility to the corresponding pleasures; and the most devoted enthusiast is sustained in his work by the recurrent consciousness of such pleasures. But it is important to point out that the familiar and obvious instances of real conflict between self-love and some extra-regarding impulses are not paradoxes and puzzles to be explained away, but occasional phenomena,

which the analysis of our appetitive consciousness in the normal state, when there is no such conflict, would lead us to expect. Such conflict is generically the same, from a psychological point of view, whatever be the quality of the impulse which comes into collision with self-love; but the very important distinction introduced when we apply the ethical notions "higher" and "lower," and consider some impulses superior, others inferior in grade to self-love, has caused this resemblance to be overlooked. In the case of the appetites we consider (as Butler says) that self-love has a natural claim to rule; and if, yielding to a sensual impulse we take the course of action which is attended with less pleasure on the whole,* we condemn ourselves afterwards. But a similar result may occur in the case of a higher impulse, the subordination of which to self-love is not equally recognised by common sense; this involves us in a certain perplexity, which however is not due to any psychological anomaly but purely ethical, because the conduct appears to us in a certain sense irrational, and yet we do not condemn it. Let us represent to ourselves a case in detail. Suppose a man to have been for some time under the influence of a ruling passion of a noble kind: love of truth, love of beauty, or personal affection, or devotion to a cause, or desire to achieve any particular laudable end. For some time, perhaps, he has been borne along by a feeling in which the selfish and unselfish elements are not yet distinguished: he could not tell if asked whether he did what he was doing from a disinterested impulse or because he found his pleasure in it. But suddenly this passion or enthusiasm is thrown by circumstances into collision with other impulses and needs: the man is thus put into the attitude of prudential reflection, and finds, on estimation of probable resulting pleasures and pains, that the course of action to which his habitual impulse tends is distinctly opposed to the judgment of self-love. In fact, his enthusiasm demands a sacrifice; and he is at once able to distinguish clearly the proper external object of the impulse from the pleasure which normally attends its pursuit and attainment. He can ask the two distinct questions, "Is the sacrifice intrinsically worth making?" and "Will it repay me?" He is conscious that he can answer the second question in the negative, and yet the first in the affirmative. He can say, "It will not repay me, but it is worth it, and it shall take place."

I have been describing a phenomenon of by no means unfrequent occurrence even outside the sphere of properly moral impulses. But

* The victorious sensual impulse in this case is in general consciously directed towards pleasure; and the case is one of preference of a less pleasure to a greater, not of some external object to pleasure. Still it equally constitutes an exception to Mr. Mill's supposed universal law that desire is always proportioned to anticipated pleasure.

it is no doubt most common in the case of these latter ; the sacrifice is generally demanded in the name of what is right, reasonable, virtuous. And here I would again appeal to Mr. Mill himself as a witness on my side ; referring in this case to his Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. Readers may recall the passage in which he speaks of the supposed religious duty of worshipping as "good" a Deity to whom the term is not applicable in any intelligible sense ; rather than do so, he says, "If such a Being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." The case is of course purely hypothetical, being intended as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the belief in an incognizable God. But a hypothetical instance does just as well as a real one to test a principle ; and this supplies me with just the hypothesis most perfectly adapted to illustrate my view. Mr. Mill avows, we may say, a hypothetical preference for hell.* Now he can hardly maintain that such preference would involve "finding hell most pleasant," even in idea ; as it is understood in the very notion of hell, that it is more painful to be there than to be anywhere else. He therefore recognizes the conceivability of a practical impulse tending in the direction of maximum infelicity ; and even asserts that such an impulse could and would determine his volition.


To sum up, in contravention of the doctrine that our conscious active impulses are always directed towards the production of agreeable sensations in ourselves, I would maintain that we find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulse, directed towards something that is not pleasure ; that in many cases this impulse is so far incompatible with the self-regarding that the two do not easily coexist in the same moment of consciousness ; and that more occasionally (but by no means rarely) the two come into irreconcilable conflict, and prompt to opposite courses of action. And this incompatibility (though it is important to notice it in other instances) is no doubt specially prominent in the case of the impulse towards the end which competes in ethical controversy with pleasure—the love of virtue for its own sake, or desire to do what is right as such, which in the view of stoicism is essential to right conduct.

It may be said that whatever be the case with our present adult consciousness, our original impulses were all directed towards pleasure, and that any impulses otherwise directed are derived from these by "association of ideas." I do not think this can be proved ; and the results of observation, as far as we can carry it, seem to tend in the opposite way ; as preponderant objectivity seems characteristic of the earlier stages of our consciousness, and the subjective attitude does

* Mr. Mill, no doubt, draws a distinction between Desire and Will. But I think he means to imply, in the case supposed, a preference as well as a determination.

not become habitual till later in life. But supposing the assertion were proved, it would have little bearing on the present question. The Hedonist says, "I prove Pleasure to be intrinsically desirable by showing that all men actually do desire it." It is answered that all men do not now desire pleasure, but rather other things: some in particular having impulses towards virtue, which may and do conflict with their desire for their own pleasure. It is no reply to this to say that all *once* desired pleasure, except on the assumption that our earlier impulses have a prerogative in validity over our later. But no one appeals from the artist's sense of beauty to the child's; nor are the truths of the higher mathematics thought to be less certainly true, because they can be only apprehended by a highly developed intellect. In fact, this disposition to attribute some strange importance and special authority to what was *first* felt or thought belongs to an antiquated point of view. In politics we have quite abandoned the idea that even if we could establish irrefragably the original condition of the human family, it would at all help to determine jural obligations in our existing societies. The corresponding opinion still lingers in psychology and ethics, but it may be expected not to linger very long; as the assumption that our earliest consciousness is most trustworthy is not only baseless, but opposed to the current theories of the Evolution and Progress.

H. SIDGWICK.



MORALITY AND IMMORTALITY.

THE general result arrived at in my former paper on "Science and Immortality," may be summed up as follows :—

1. The desires and opinions of men upon the subject of their ultimate destiny do not amount to such an absolute demonstration of the truth of immortality as science demands, whereas the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, *assumed to be true*, is an actual instance of the fact requiring to be proved, *i.e.*, that men can live after death.

2. There is enough evidence to satisfy a reasonable man of the truth of the history of the Resurrection, provided there was nothing miraculous in that history.

3. Minds that are already deeply concerned with the miracle of their own immortality will find no difficulty in accepting the narrative, even though it includes a miraculous element, whereas minds that are not so concerned will find no difficulty in rejecting it.

4. Hence it follows that the controversy will ultimately turn upon the question, whether the doctrine of immortality can or cannot be recommended to the minds of men as necessary to, and necessitated by, human morality in its widest sense. If it can, then men will continue to believe the Resurrection, the evidence of which is, apart from the miraculous, sufficient and reasonable; if it cannot, then they will cease to believe that which has no moral value for them.

It now becomes my duty to abandon the neutral position I have

hitherto endeavoured to maintain, and to assume that of an advocate for Christianity. But it is necessary to observe that this does not imply either that I should advocate Christianity as it now is, or find fault with science for holding aloof from it. On the contrary, the best hope for religion lies in the fact of science continuing to utter a clear and outspoken protest against the errors that are bringing discredit upon her name, and sensibly, though gradually, weakening her influence for good. Assuredly, if Christianity is to prevail by being morally attractive to all that is best in humanity, then there is nothing in the modern forms it has assumed to attract minds trained in the severe love of truth, and in the search for facts whereon truth may repose. Christian apologists are too apt to speak as though the ideal Christianity which they represent had any real hold upon the minds of the mass of men, and to forget that practically it means ultramontaniam and sectarianism, the infallibility of the Pope balanced by the infallibility of the Bible. Its moral value in special departments of life is not denied, but it is contended that these gigantic sins against humanity and truth do at this present moment, on the whole, outweigh its claims in other respects. This is not, however, a very practical question, nor one into which I greatly care to enter; it is enough to point out that unless (what I fully expect) science reforms religion in the same way as did the revival of classical learning, religion will cease to be the custodian of man's deepest thoughts upon morality and eternity.

My business is simply to call attention to facts, which seem to show that a belief in immortality is essential to the highest powers, as well as to the most general needs of human nature. This enquiry belongs to the science of religion, and is strictly scientific in its method and results. Let me once more state what the proofs thus obtained really amount to. It is quite possible to examine the facts of human nature and of history, and from them to discover whether or not they lead, and will continue to lead, to a desire for immortality; but such a desire amounts to no scientific proof of the fact itself. That the desire for immortality is natural to man, and in accordance with his instincts and circumstances is what I believe, and am about to endeavour to show. But then, why should I have to do it at all? Surely it might be thought that so obvious a duty would be discharged more than sufficiently in all the sermons and writings produced by a fertile and laborious theology. Yet, so far as my own reading of modern religious books goes, I have met with no systematic attempt in this direction, indeed, with nothing but an occasional remark occurring amidst a crowd of other and irrelevant topics. Christian literature, taking its tone from Dr. Newman, may be said, on the whole, to attempt to answer these questions by an evasion of

the laws of evidence. This is, indeed, a just and fitting punishment. If men choose to return to scholastic subtleties and verbal definitions, if the minds and pens of Catholics and Evangelicals alike are occupied with questions about the methods and meaning of Regeneration, Justification, The Real Presence, Church Government, and Ritual Observance, then they must be content to leave the weightier matters of humanity to those who stand outside of Christianity altogether, and who watch them with malicious amusement paying tithes of mint and cummin, enlarging the borders of their garments, and compassing sea and land (not to say the law courts) that they may make one proselyte—with what result let the tone and temper of the religious press declare.

We are now to consider some plain facts of man's nature as bearing upon his wish for immortality. And first, I avail myself of the old truth that men must seek their own happiness, only substituting for that much abused word one that Christianity has sanctioned and science will accept,—the joy of existence. Of what elements is this composed? What are the things by which men live, and to which they have, as it were, a personal and inalienable right? What, when we examine the wonders of our own being, can we claim of God, who has made us what we are, and therefore made us to wish for that which we find ourselves incapable of not wishing for? I have worded this last sentence so as to include both the Christian and scientific conception of God, but in future I shall speak of the facts of life and nature under the terms which religion has given them. Now the answer to these questions may be summed up under these three words, power, reputation, and rest, to which, though in a somewhat different category, may be added love. I do not put these forward as a scientific classification, though it is obvious that they may be taken to cover the joy of existence regarded as present, past, and future. But I state them as simple facts of human nature which history and consciousness assure us to be true, and I propose to take them in order, and see what they teach us concerning man's desires for immortality.

I might, of course, trace the sense of power to man's consciousness of being a free agent, that is, a creative and originating being, but as this would lead us straight to thorny metaphysical discussions, I prefer to rest it upon the simplest fact of observation and experience. Every human soul is different from every other, and the further we ascend in the scale of civilization grows more widely different. Life, when regarded from the stand-point of the doctrine of evolution, may be compared to a cluster of mountains crowded together at their base, but whose peaks shine far apart in solitary splendour. Every man has a character of his own, a part of his own to play, duties which

none but he can discharge, persons dependent on him for love and help. God (it would be equally true if we said law or nature) cannot consistently with Himself create two moral beings exactly alike, to each is given a special spark of the divine life; when we realize this then the whole astonishing conception of man's essential divinity rushes into the mind. And therefore every true soul cannot but demand the power to live out its life, and to fill its place in the universe of God. To learn more of that knowledge which is open to all, to perform better those duties which are common to all and yet special to each, to become more useful in our place and calling, this is power and right and life. But this consciousness of individuality and of progress pleads for a life to come; it is the combination of the two that makes the desire irresistible. Men resent the idea of final death because they have learnt to feel that humanity progresses by the progress of individuals, and death interferes just when the moral being is developing towards perfection. It is of course tempting to adduce the case of those who die in the prime of strength and usefulness as filling mankind with an inextinguishable desire for completion in a future state; but in truth the argument is far stronger if we take, not the exceptional, but the typical case, that of men who depart in the fulness of age. On the one hand there is a sense of departed power, a consciousness of thwarted labour, a faintly sad smile as of those to whom work has become impossible; on the other there is a tender sagacity that has ceased to strive here and is preparing for work hereafter, a special and anxious care for those around as though they could never cease to be objects of love and care: in a word, the decay of autumn, when the flower is fading and the seed within is ripening. Such is the old age of men who have worked and hoped, and such is the life which if anyone has ever possessed it, or rather been possessed by it, he will not lightly part with it, or cease to wish that it may be continued in a world to come. The *onus probandi* is as it were changed, and he insists on desiring immortality unless it can be shown that death is final. His desire may be destroyed by contradictory evidence, or rather it may be shown to rest upon no evidence at all, for to adduce evidence that we are not immortal is a contradiction in terms, and requires immortality to do it. But assuredly it will welcome any fact which throws light upon its own yearnings, and gives force and power to its own convictions; and thus it fastens upon such an event as the Resurrection, supported as it is by reasonable evidence, with a tenacity that will defy the assaults of persons otherwise minded and in other ways supported. Nor can it be blamed upon moral grounds for so doing; much less can it be shown to be contrary to scientific conceptions. Natural development is carried on by means of minute physical variations in each

successive generation, but when we ascend up to man the moral variations in descendants are so great and so complex that they do not form, and cannot be classed under a new species, but become separate individuals, which, just because they are separate, lay claim to an eternity, in which each may live out its life to the fullest, discharge its duties, and fulfil its destiny.

Next let us observe how the desire for reputation and rest, perfectly natural, legitimate, and praiseworthy, kindles within the soul a hope of immortality. The connection between the two is indeed so obvious that it will be enough merely to observe how true to the facts of human life the desire for reputation and for rest is, and then the result follows at once: the same remark may indeed be made as to any of the primary elements in man's moral nature which we shall adduce, for all alike, the moment they are mentioned, seem to breathe the air and suggest the idea of immortality. The desire for fame is then the craving to be fairly judged and recognized according to the way in which we have used the "power" of which I have been speaking. It is an universal instinct of mankind, from which no civilized man has ever been exempt, and exemption from which would be treated as utterly immoral. No one who has tried to do his duty does not wish to be kindly remembered after death: man has a right to a just judgment, which in turn is not a thing to be escaped from as a false theology teaches, but to be welcomed as an inestimable privilege from the Creator. For no one can really be content to be subject to the unaided judgment, the rough, partial haphazard decisions of men, even of those dearest to us. The praise of men, like their gratitude, oftener leaves us mourning. One of the most certain results of modern thought is that the so-called verdict of history is a mere pretence for hiding man's incapacity to decide upon the actual character of historical personages, and that history will more and more occupy herself with the delineation of great movements and the part that each man played in them. And what is true on a large scale is true on a small one: no man is ever known for what he really is. A poor consolation indeed for those who have endured neglect, obloquy, and what is far worse than either, the being compelled by the inequalities of the world to a life far below their power and their deservings. Real reputation is the reflection of the glory of God upon the lives of men, but when men feel that they are not really known for what they are, nor condemned for their real faults, nor honoured for their real merits, then with desperate despair they make their appeal to another life and claim to stand before the eternal judgment-seat as men who are wrestling with the sharpest agony of death. On such a matter we may perhaps be willing to

listen to the authority of one of the chief of those who have needed eternity to repair the mistakes of time :—

“ Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil,
Nor in the glistening foil
Set off to the world, nor in broad rumour lies ;
But lives and spreads aloft by those pure eyes
And perfect witness of all-judging Jove ;
As he pronounces lastly on each deed,
Of so much fame in Heaven expect thy meed.”

Next comes rest, which men, being what they are, must also demand. The analogy of nature, the needs of the body, the usages of life, the instincts of their being, leave them no choice in the matter, so long at least as sleep, holidays, old age, amusements, and the like, remain upon earth. But it is important to observe what rest really means. Physical science explains to us the allegorical assertion that God rested from His work, by showing that He ceased from the travails and birthpangs of creative work, from the slow crushing power of ice and water, from the upheaval of surfaces, the submerging of continents, the gradual curbing and restraining the youthful powers of nature till she became answerable to man's control, or at least afforded him a foothold in her midst. So does moral science proclaim that man needs rest, not from work, but from the conditions under which work is carried on here, from the chaos, so to speak, of life. He is placed here to perform onerous tasks under painful conditions, and he desires, as the real source of rest, that change to a higher form of existence which every modern discovery (evolution more than any other) tends to make familiar to him, and which takes all selfishness out of rewards, because in the light of science it is seen to be a regular, upward, orderly progress. That religion has yet to learn from science what are the true primary elements of rest, reward, and judgment, may be true, but it affords no ground for disbelieving in the great facts which religion teaches, though much for attempting to teach her to teach them better.

The next great fact in man's existence which I shall adduce as proving the necessity of wishing for immortality is the necessity under which he finds himself for loving ; and here it may be well to say a word or two upon the nature of love, for there is a kind of spurious sentimental view of it which I take leave to denounce as being (among other things) utterly unscientific. Love then is sometimes regarded as having its roots in simple self-sacrifice for the good of others, and Christianity is appealed to as giving weight to this opinion by those who are willing to accept a few “ elegant extracts ” from its moral teaching, while repudiating its historical truthfulness.

Now the plain fact is that whatever a plausible humanitarianism may say on the subject, the teaching of the Bible and of science agrees in representing the essence of love to be rooted in the delight or benefit which the thing loved conveys to him who loves it. God, says the Bible, loved the world because He saw that it was "good," that is, a source of delight to its Creator. Men love their fellows, says science, ultimately and originally from the same instinct that teaches animals (and for that matter the vegetable world also) to love those in whom they find comfort, pleasure, and support. Everywhere love is measured by and pre-supposes a self-conscious "I," so that in its deepest and most natural utterance men are commanded to love their neighbours *as* themselves. And the whole effect of religion, as historically developed in the Bible, is, while keeping this natural self-love in mind, to raise men up to true, that is, to divine conceptions of what real pleasure, comfort, and support consist in, and to show how they are to be obtained. The life of Christ answers both questions by declaring that goodness is the only thing really worthy of love, and that this must be created in others by self-sacrifice on our part, so that we may enjoy their goodness. He revealed the perfect working of the law of self-sacrifice, namely, to give up everything for the cause of human goodness, that humanity might become delightful to God and to itself. It avails very little to enter into bewildering discussions as to whether this idea of self-sacrifice is or is not as noble as the one which contemplates entire destruction and abnegation of self as a being conscious of the results of its own sacrifice, but it is surely of the greatest importance to discern which idea has its foundation in fact and law. And if the theory of evolution be true, then what Butler called "reasonable self-love" is found to be a natural instinct, shared with the animals, from which man can no more emancipate himself than he can give himself a new parentage, though of course this instinct requires to be made "reasonable" by the teachings of morality and religion throughout the progress of humanity. Therefore whatever a transcendental philosophy may say (such philosophy having no foundation in the realm of fact), men will continue to love that which is good to them, just because it is good to them, and religion will continue to teach them what goodness is, and how they are to create it in others by their own self-sacrifice.

I beg my readers to observe the force of this argument. It is one of the many instances in which the verdict of science is given in favour of religion, and, it must be added, of common sense. If Mr. Darwin's account of the origin of morality in the social affections be true, then by the law of man's being love must have a conscious reference to self, and cannot be mere self abolition and annihilation. Exactly this the Bible recognizes as true of the love of the Creator,

and recounts in history as true of the love of the Redeemer, who will "take his friends to himself, that where he is they may be there also." And exactly this the daily experience of common life testifies to as being true of the love which binds human souls together. The desire for immortality lies imbedded in the primary instincts of our nature. If to any human soul any other soul is dear or pleasant, in one word, good, then that soul cannot choose but crave for a continuance of such love after death. A man may of course rid himself of these desires, because he has an unbounded power of perverting his nature, resisting experience, and doing violence to facts. But wherever the course of human life is true to the law of nature as expounded by science and enforced by religion, there love will be an intimation of immortality. And so in fact we find it to be, though details that would require a volume must here be discussed in a few sentences.

Take for instance, as a type of the love of equals in age, that of married life. Its essence is that it is progressive. It deepens with the deepening forces of life, and grows with the growth of years. All common labours, trials, joys, and cares, form so many links invisible but real that are binding souls together. The memory of the past and the anticipations of the future fuse two souls into one common life, one moral being, and yet they are haunted by the dim sense of approaching change, that breathes in the words,—

"There's something flows to us in life,
But more is taken quite away ;
Pray, Alice, pray, my darling wife,
That we may die the self-same day."

And so the thought of final separation becomes impossible. That love should perish they resent as the worst of blasphemies. The inspired genius of St. Paul, which shed light upon every aspect of the spiritual world, exactly as Shakespeare upon the world of man, or Newton upon the world of nature, saw this when he called Christ the "husband" of the Church, that is of humanity. Take again the love of parents for children, as seen especially in the case of those who die young. They will not endure to part for ever with the object of so much hope, labour, and care. They know that there is no such thing as death, in the sense that anything perishes entirely, and that a dead body is but resolved into other forms, and so passes into new life. Modern materialists wax eloquent on the eternity of force or matter, and I for one can sympathize with them. But then I crave leave, again with St. Paul, to carry this truth into the analogous domain of moral life also. A child may have a power hidden within its brain capable of moving the world and it dies before it utters a word. There must be use for this power also in a world in which there is no waste; so love declares and triumphs over death. At

death physical power passes into new modes of existence, if so, then why should not moral power also—in both cases to carry out the dictates of what we see to be an universal law? To desire the immortality of a dead child does not indeed require any such analogy, men desire it because to do so is true to the instincts of nature and to the facts of their creation. It was some such instinct as this that in spite of the national unconsciousness of immortality touched the heart of David with a vague sense of a life to come, and suggested words that meant so much more than he could grasp, “I shall go to him, but he will not come back to me.”

The same may be said of the love of children for parents; indeed, the parent is to the child the very idea and possessor of immortality, merely because it is the fountain of his life. We might parallel David's yearning for his child with Augustine's love for his mother. But enough has been said to indicate, that left to themselves and to nature, men do and will desire immortality, that they may continue to love and be loved in turn. To strengthen and purify this love in families, and then in wider circles of neighbourhood, country, Church, Christianity, and humanity itself, is the office of religion. It is here emphatically, that men are asking for morality at her hands, and are being put off with theology and ceremonies. If religion can succeed in making men moral in respect of such things as these, they will, if I may so speak, make themselves immortal. People who love cannot bear to die, and people who do not love can have by the nature of the case, no wish to live. As Arthur says,

“Thou hast not made my life so sweet to me,
That I the king should greatly care to live.”

If a man came to me in anxiety as to his own immortality, and desiring arguments to convince his reason, I should be inclined to ask him upon what terms he was living with his wife, his children, his parents, and his neighbours. And it is because religion, occupied as it is in teaching men of one school to “save” their souls, and of another to “make” them, has got no real voice or power in that which makes up so large a part of the normal life of ordinary men, that they are beginning to seek for instruction and morality elsewhere.

I proceed next to consider the effects of another great fact in human life upon man's desires for immortality; I mean the sense of sin, or in less theological words, the consciousness of evil. And here once more I will endeavour to adduce nothing more than the simplest truths of everyday experience. The first consciousness of evil comes to men in the order of nature, when they realize that they have done irreparable wrong to other people. They have done mischief in the world, set a train of evil going which they have no power to stop,

corrupted others, done them harm, and added their contribution to the great heap of human error, folly, and crime. And in so doing they have offended against a law of goodness and beneficence, which may be expressed in these terms : that if all men were good then all men would be happy. Therefore, the first desire is to be brought into harmony with the law of goodness—in religious terms, to be reconciled to God. But then this desire for pardon, which has assumed such disproportionate, not to say monstrous, forms in modern theology, is soon followed by another ; for mere pardon is nothing if the evil still continues ; to save one's soul, a very poor thing if souls that one has helped to ruin remain in ruins. And so the next demand is for another state of things altogether, for a world in which there shall be, if not perfection, at least progress towards perfection, so that the results of evil shall die and fall away, or be seen to have wrought out the purposes of God. Thus, from the simple consciousness of evil, men spring upwards to the desire for immortality, for if there be no life after death with a transmuting harmonizing power belonging to it, then the evil they have done remains perpetual, running throughout all generations of men, not to be washed away by any amount of repentance, or counteracted by any good actions in other directions : a thought which is simply unbearable, the agony of which is generally the first prelude to that literature of immortality which we call prayer. Or again, a man reaches the same desire for perfection in a life to come, when he regards not so much the evil that he has done as the evil that is in him. He sees in himself boundless capacities for good, as though he had all the makings of a perfect man in him, and yet he is constrained by an evil power over which he longs to gain a decisive victory. Professor Huxley's whimsical desire to be wound up like a clock every morning, in order that his moral being may perform its functions with mechanical regularity, has at least this about it, that it expresses from the scientific point of view a theory of moral duty, which corresponds pretty closely to the religious hope of heavenly perfection. And the same idea of perfection man, when he looks abroad, finds everywhere present, only broken up in bits and scattered abroad among different men. If something could be taken from one man or added to another, if the self-devotion of Howard could be joined to the faculties of Julius Cæsar, if things could be got out of disorder and confusion, then that idea might be realized,—

“ That type of perfect in his mind
In Nature can he nowhere find,
He sows himself on every wind.”

Another fact of human experience completes the picture, and it is one that has exercised a profound influence upon the greatest souls.

Man gifted with an instinctive desire for justice, finds that there is no such thing in this present world, except what his own feeble endeavours may achieve. The contrast between the elaborate care with which society in the effort of self-preservation seeks to mete out justice, and the indifference with which nature, or law, or chance, or fate, (by whatever name we call it) mocks the vain attempt, is suggestive indeed, and has ever been felt as one of the greatest of the mysteries of life. The effects for instance of the destruction of Lisbon upon two such men as Goethe and Voltaire are a case in point. That men do not suffer because they specially deserve it, we know from the lips of Christ himself, and if there be another life we can acquiesce, although even so with difficulty, in that which it is hard to understand. Once more, however, I must say, that to my mind the doctrine of evolution, carried forward by analogy into the realms of spiritual life, suggests the explanation which later moralists and theologians will have to elaborate. A perpetual reaching forward into higher modes of life by means of catastrophe, death, sorrow, and suffering fills men's souls with submission to the workings of a higher Will, while the hope of personal participation in the higher life, satisfies their cravings for justice to themselves and others. Thus, then, it comes to pass that those whose sense of sin compels them to long for pardon, perfection, and justice, will also continue to long for immortality, and will welcome the evidence which purports to establish it as a fact. And although the remark does not belong logically to the precise proposition I am endeavouring to make out, yet it would be doing injustice to the tremendous power which the argument has upon the human soul, if I did not observe in passing that the proof of the bare fact of immortality, derived from the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, is bound up with a life, a character, and a teaching, that claim to meet, and, as Christian people think, succeed in meeting, every natural requirement of man for power, rest, and reputation, for love and reunion, for pardon, perfection, and justice.

Another class of arguments is derived from a totally different source from those we have been considering, and possesses even more value from the strictly scientific point of view. It may no doubt, to a certain extent, be contended that these facts of human nature and experience, may be modified and altered to an extent almost inconceivable at present, and I readily admit that if a morality more suitable to man's wants, and more true to his nature can be devised, he will cease to believe in his own immortality. But then, I also affirm that no trace of such morality has yet been propounded in theory, much less been wrought out in practice; and what is more to the point still, I maintain that, so far, scientific discovery goes to show

that the facts which lead to a belief in immortality are rooted in the constitution of man. The next class of argument, however, has to do with the external world, with our material surroundings, in a word, with the home in which we find ourselves placed. Now, from the impressions thence arising, there is no escape, as there need be no mistake about their meaning. Man's home is prepared and provided for him, and just as differences in scenery or climate work ineradicable distinctions upon the minds and bodies of those who are subject to them, so is humanity at large subject to impressions from nature and from external conditions, which are simply unavoidable. The world is not ours to make or unmake, it forces itself in upon us through eye, ear, and brain, and is in truth a real Revelation, a word from that power which is not man, and is therefore God. Now, endeavouring once more to grasp an immense subject within a few convenient divisions, what are the things that man both in fact and by right, asks of the world in which he lives? I answer, to know it, to use it, and to enjoy it, because these correspond to man as a scientific, an industrial, and an artistic being. Nor, shall I be prevented from asserting that the same conceptions floated through the mind of the writer of the book of Genesis, in the allegory which represents the first man as giving names to the beasts, tending the garden, and living in an earthly paradise.

First, then, man desires to know the earth on which he lives, and which seems to be ever inviting him to know her better. Nature lies open, as it were, to the embrace of the human mind, not tendering any information about herself, but yielding it to the pursuer after that truth which is nature's word for love. But it is when men contrast the possibility of unbounded knowledge with the reality of their actual information that the desire for another life is generated, and this in more ways than one. Many, for instance, are absolutely, not to say shamefully, ignorant of common scientific truths, because nature (even when bountiful to them in other respects) has denied them the time, or the faculties, or the education, or the inclination for the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Speaking for myself, I may confess that the desire to be put to school, and, if necessary, to a sharp school too, to learn something more about the creation of God, stirs within me a longing for immortality hardly inferior to the desire for pardon or rest. Those, again, whose lives are devoted to scientific studies can hardly refrain, if they give utterance to their true convictions, from hoping that they may share in the "eternal" knowledge; nor will they welcome as a higher morality the teaching that they ought to be content to believe that men will learn after they are dead, and that it is selfish and unnatural to seek for a participation in the harvest of that knowledge, of which in patience and faith they

sowed the seeds. But there is yet another and a stronger argument still to be stated, and it is this : nature proclaims distinctly that there are secrets quite beyond the range of human faculties to discover. The origin of life, the mystery of thought, the essential meaning of "law," are instances that will at once occur to every one. "In ultimate analysis," says Professor Huxley, "everything is incomprehensible, and the whole object of science is simply to reduce the fundamental incomprehensibilities to the smallest possible number." But however we may reduce them, the desire to know the residue will still remain as an intimation of immortality, just as the confession of the existence of the incomprehensible affords a basis for religious faith. The incomprehensible—that is God : to know it—that is life eternal. Elsewhere he says that "he does not know, and never hopes to know," the connection between the mental process of thought and the physical process of the brain. These words seem to me at once entirely scientific and entirely unscientific. They are the former, because they are evidently meant to take a candid and accurate estimate of the facts of the case ; they are the latter, because any confession of hopeless ignorance upon problems that are presented to human intelligence, and come within experience, is an absolute contradiction to the spirit of science. If we read them with the addition of a simple religious phrase as follows, "I never hope to know *IN THIS LIFE*," then they still remain true to the facts of the case, while leaving scope to that spirit of inquiry from which all life departs the moment limits are set to its aspirations. No man has any business to confess hopeless ignorance of anything whatever. In this saying, therefore, I think I detect science melting into religion, and bearing unconscious witness to man's desire for an immortality in which he shall no longer "know in part, but know even as he is known." Furthermore, the confession of ignorance lies at the root of the poetry of nature, and accounts for its Pantheistic or Polytheistic tendencies. Poetry takes up the tale exactly where science lays it down. When once we have discerned the existence of the Incomprehensible, then a voice is heard in the breathing of winds, the murmuring of waters, in all the teeming prodigality of life, in all the tremendous powers of destruction, the words of which, when interpreted by a religious mind, seem to recal a promise once given by the Master of nature and humanity Himself, "What I do, thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter."

Man's right to use the world is but another expression for that instinct of civilization which found its first utterance in the words of the ancient writer, in which God is bidding men go forth and replenish the earth, and subdue it. The keynote thus struck of the true harmony between God, man, and the world, was never

wholly lost in the Jewish mind, and presents another bond of union between it and modern thought. The same spirit is breathed in many of the Psalms, notably in the noble and exalted language of the eighth, "Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet"—language which, when contrasted with the actual facts of the case, suggested to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews the hope of a future immortality to be realized in Christ, "crowned with glory and honour." Every word of this seems to me to be a prophecy in the true sense of the word (that is, a presentiment of an inspired mind,) of the modern spirit of industrialism and civilization. But when men possessed by this idea begin to reflect that under any circumstances many generations must pass before there is an approach to the fulfilment of their hopes, and that there is much reason for thinking that ultimately the world will be exhausted in man's service, its treasures used up, and itself relapsed into chaos; then it seems impossible for them not to desire a further life, in which this contradiction, having fulfilled its work in the great process of evolution, shall have disappeared.

Lastly, in respect of the enjoyment of nature, I must really refer my readers to its legitimate exponents, poets and painters. The argument of Wordsworth's famous ode is capable of being expressed in logical forms, but assuredly would gain no weight from being thus treated. A solid fact, which would be none the more impressive from being dragged forth, lurks under Shelley's lines of one who does

"Not heed nor see, what things they be,
But from these create he can,
Forms more real than living man,
Nurslings of immortality."

But if I might make the attempt in humble prose, I would say that men, who view nature with the poet's mind or through the medium of his descriptions, do in sober fact get themselves involved, as it were, in the consciousness of God and of Immortality. The down-flutter of an autumn leaf, the patient field resting its winter's rest, the curve of a stream, the far-off echo of a solitary wave, a lonely tree,—these, and a thousand other such things, cause the human soul to bow down before the altar of God, and swell with the thought of ages past and to come. The mystery of love, of labour, of purity, of judgment, and of power shines around, and the thought of God drifts into the mind through a thousand channels. And yet men cannot enjoy nature enough or understand her aright; she is seen to be doing something for them which must be finished before it can be either enjoyed or understood in all its perfection. A poem of Mr. Browning's, "Two in the Campagna," illustrates this idea, and

its closing words bring out the inevitable contrast between what man has and what he wants—

" Only I discern
Infinite passion, and the pain
Of finite hearts that yearn."

So far, then, science, civilization, and poetry add their contribution to man's desire for immortality. But it must be remembered that man does not merely live in a world which by its nature and laws suggests the possibility of another life to come, but rather amidst an universe of worlds which suggests the very place and mode of future existence, and makes it impossible for him to confine his aspirations to this "dull spot which men call earth." Mr. Morley, I think, somewhere denounces Napoleon's appeal to the stars—"Very true, gentlemen, but who made all these?"—as the most inconclusive reply ever made since the days when Berkeley was refuted with a grin. If by this is meant that the existence of other worlds can afford no demonstration for the existence of a Creator which is not already afforded by the world in which we live, and further, that such demonstration does not amount to evidence that science can deal with, then I agree with him, though the needless violence of the language employed does but engender confusion in a discussion in which everything depends upon the parties in it clearly understanding what each other means to assert. And what is meant by arguments of this nature (however rhetorically they seem to assert more) is, that so long as the stars exist, no merely negative argument will avail to hinder men from wishing to believe in a personal Creator and an eternal life. It is striking, moreover, to observe how all progress in knowledge fortifies and gives assurance to this desire. Science puts forth a faltering hand towards the mystery of what may be man's future home, just as faith sends an anxious hope heavenward. We now know something and hope to discover more about the stars; not merely that they obey the same laws of motion, but that their composition, so far as it is yet investigated, resembles that of the earth; and thus a more keen and vivid interest in them is excited which will assuredly modify the scientific mind by creating a link between this world and others, or, in religious words, between the finite and the unknown infinite, between earth and heaven. The same idea is also forced upon us by the limited use and enjoyment which we have of the starry universe, which, though far away from us, and as it were unconscious of us, does nevertheless come within the scope of our mental and moral being, and suggests to us an irrepressible hope for a share in the larger life which it seems at once to predict and to contain. In plain words, no man can see a thing of beauty, majesty, and grandeur, without desiring a further and fuller acquaintance with

and enjoyment of it. We shall gain nothing by robbing men of the natural hope that somewhere and somehow in the midst of so vast an universe room may be found, in the order of development by the law of evolution, for him and his. Much, on the other hand, may be gained if the proper office of religion is forced upon those who teach it—that is, if science, adopting the natural hopes of men as facts of humanity, insists that religion shall strip immortality of all sentimental, foolish, unworthy, and sensuous accessories, and shall describe it in the brief Puritanic fashion of the Bible as a “new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.”

There remain two points of considerable importance to be discussed. First, if the desire for immortality be so rooted in the constitution of man as I have been endeavouring to show, how comes it that many minds, even of the highest order, and, at present, in increasing numbers, should be without it; and secondly, can it be shown to have any practical effect upon human morality that could not be obtained in any other way? The answer to these questions will lead us to consider the abuse and use of the doctrine.

One difficulty, indeed, which I have been astonished to find seriously felt, may be dismissed at once. It is urged that nations of antiquity did not possess the consciousness of immortality, and that many savages do not possess it now; but surely it is a reason for believing it to be true, that the truth about it has grown up gradually. We might just as reasonably be surprised that the arts of cultivation have not always been practised or the use of steam understood. The knowledge of immortality was not put into each man's soul at the beginning (a most unscientific conception), but grew by virtue of the same laws as led men to discover musical harmony, family life, or natural causation: nor does the fact of a special objective revelation in the “fullness of time” in the least interfere with the true bearings of the analogy between the progress of religion and civilization. And like all other good things, this knowledge grows, whether in the consciousness of mankind or of individuals, in proportion to their energy, their industry, and their zeal for truth. It does not, however, require to be pointed out that this does not apply to the case of good or great men who have renounced the hope of immortality after it has been distinctly put before them. And yet here, too, the answer is not difficult to find. Recurring to the three typical instances mentioned in my last paper—Moses, Buddha, and Julius Cæsar—we discern at once the law underlying the unconsciousness or denial of a life to come. In each case it arose from the abuse of the tremendous spiritual force, placed in the hands of religion by man's belief in a future state, for all history goes to show that if religious belief becomes corrupt or false, the truest and noblest souls are thrown into some form of oppo-

sition, which again re-acts favourably upon religion herself. Thus the thought of judgment to come did not prevent the Egyptians from being sensual, cruel, and superstitious ; rather it was employed to give a fictitious sanction to some of the worst tendencies of human nature. Therefore the Jewish people were called under Moses to be the spiritual worshippers of one righteous God, and to build up a commonwealth owning no King but Jehovah ; nor is it at all wonderful that, having a very practical and pressing work to do in this world, nothing was said to them about the next. The hope of the Messiah was to be to them a substitute for that of immortality, and the temporal fortunes of the kingdom took the place of judgment to come. In a word, the knowledge of immortality had been so debased by the Egyptians that it was withheld from the people through whom God was laying the foundation of a religion that was to make men good.

The examples of Buddha and of Cæsar illustrate from immensely different points of view the same law. Like Moses, Buddha was a reformer, and the preacher of a new religion ; like him, he revolted from the depraved morality of his times, by which the demon of priestcraft was turning to its own purposes man's natural hope of a life to come. His work and teaching, need it be said, fill an important and necessary place in the history of religion, especially when we remember the surrounding tendencies, which centuries afterwards culminated in the gross and immoral conceptions of a Mahometan paradise. It is only by running into extremes that the balance of forces in religion and morals (there is something akin to this in nature also) can be sustained until some truth emerges which harmonizes apparent contradictions. Julius Cæsar once more represents the same law at a different stage of its history ; that is, at a time when the greatest minds, cast in a secular, and not in a religious mould, can only show that the religion of the day is worthless to them by revolting from it altogether. It was surely for nothing but good, at any rate it was necessary by the law of continuous moral development that Paganism should be seen to have lost its hold upon men like him. Here, again, we have the same state of things : a religion founded on emotions, fancies, legendary tales, and perverted for immoral purposes by the priestly spirit which then, as ever, assumed to keep the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And I make bold to say that Christianity, while claiming to reveal immortality as a simple fact, did nevertheless follow the example of the older religious movements in this : that it reduced the doctrine to the fewest and plainest moral conceptions, and called men's attention to the practical duties and work of life. The kingdom of heaven which Christ founded, and the keys of which the Apostles did in

sober fact hold, was not that to which later (and, in their time, perhaps needful) notions have reduced it, a blissful state to be enjoyed hereafter by the chosen few, but was in its essence the establishment of God's rule, order, and righteousness upon earth, to be continued hereafter in other spheres of thought and action. It would be amusing, were it not inexpressibly saddening, to see how the whole stand-point of the Messiah has been unconsciously changed by those who have claimed to represent his teaching throughout Christian times ; but it is a question which does not immediately concern us now. To sum up the whole argument, it is plain that the law of evolution applies to religious as well as to physical development, and accounts for the rise of different types, each of which has arisen out of surrounding circumstances, to meet pressing wants, to do a special work, to preserve one side or portion of the truth of humanity. And a Christian clergyman may be pardoned for adding the expression of his own personal belief that in religion, as in nature, there is a "survival of the fittest."

The application of the law to this present day is, I should hope, clear enough. There are men in every way entitled to be heard, who disavow all necessity for a belief in immortality as a motive for duty or a part of humanity. And (a far worse sign) it is plain that whereas many men *hold* this belief as a doctrine, yet that it has the slightest possible *hold* upon them, and does not enter into their lives as an animating and consoling faith. Religion invents a hundred reasons to account for this, and to conceal her own fault. These, shallow and unreal as they are, are often no more than a mere statement of the fact in other words, or empty lamentations over the depravity of human nature, which are just as reasonable as the complaint of a doctor that his patients persist in dying. We hear, for instance, that the tendency of science is to make men materialists, and to crush spiritual life ; that it is a revolutionary age in which people like to shock their friends by extravagant assertions ; that disappointment and failure cause men to give in and despair of justice and righteousness to come ; that the intellect is more thought of than the heart, and knowledge held of more account than duty. All which does not touch the root of the matter ; indeed, it is a mere evasion to lay the blame upon human nature, or the circumstances of the times, or the spirit of the age, instead of holding those responsible to whom the care of Christianity is committed, that is, Christians themselves. By their own confession, or rather claim, the duty of bringing men to believe in immortality as revealed in Christ, devolves upon them ; and if, for any want of moral right or intellectual truth the duty is not fulfilled, the blame must rest upon them, and not upon the world or the age which they have failed to convert. I have

no desire, however, of entering upon the unwelcome task of drawing the indictment against the religion of the day; enough to say that Christian teaching, practices, politics, morality, and society, in respect of such virtues as self-sacrifice, sympathy, union, love of truth, and the like, must bear the responsibility for what goes amiss in respect of the belief in immortality. This truth has precisely the same effects upon those who believe it, as the hope of inheriting a large estate has upon the heir when young. If he be selfish, weak, and indolent, it will do him harm; if otherwise, the knowledge of future responsibilities will make him doubly watchful and industrious. Therefore, the world at large looks to see what are the moral and intellectual effects of the doctrine of immortality in accordance with a certain wise saying, "By their fruits ye shall know them." The point is *not* that outside observers detect flagrant inconsistencies between men's lives and their beliefs, which, though a common, is, in the case at any rate of "thinkers," a most absurd excuse for infidelity; but it is that the very belief itself is perceived to have a bad and perverting effect upon the mind and morals of those who hold it; in plain words, men are beginning to suspect that the hope of immortality is ceasing to make people good. And that this is the case to a large and growing extent, who that knows anything of current opinions upon the secret of happiness, the principles of God's judgment, the nature of eternity, can venture to doubt? But, then, the same law which teaches that reaction follows upon a corruption of religion, and in turn creates a reformation, explains also within what limits the reformation will work. Evolution means progress as well as destruction, and when certain truths have once clearly emerged, and been satisfactorily established, they, however perverted they may have become, will survive as the basis of the new teaching. Thus, it is extremely significant to observe that when Luther confronted the old evils in the most aggravated form he was not obliged to cut men off altogether from the consciousness of immortality, but only to reform, and in a measure rationalize it. It has been once for all, so we believe, brought to light by the Resurrection, and has become an abiding possession of the human race; therefore, although man's weakness and folly, or the inevitable corruptions of time, may still drive souls into revolt, yet religion will always be able to reform herself upon this basis, and will never cease, so long as she exists, to believe in immortality as defined, explained, and demonstrated by Jesus Christ.

We are now to consider the moral use of the belief in immortality in answer to the challenge whether it exercises any special effects upon human conduct which can be obtained in no other way. It is at once tempting and easy to answer that the great mass of weak and ignorant men require some such motive as this to enable them to struggle upwards into a higher moral life; but it must be confessed

that this answer would carry no weight with those to whom these arguments are addressed. A belief in immortality, it would be urged, may have its relative and temporary uses until the world at large becomes philosophical ; but that does not prove it to be true in the most real sense, and to the highest minds. Still, it must be remembered that this consideration has of all others the most legitimate and powerful influence with minds that are already disposed to embrace religious truth, and all that is required is that Christian advocates should perceive to what uses it may be logically and fairly put. For ourselves, and for our present purpose, we must look elsewhere. And examining the moral tendencies of an age in which the hope of immortality is waxing faint, we find that there is a growth of evil exactly in those directions which a more vivid consciousness of a life to come would tend to check ; these are (amongst others) materialism, revolution, and despair, having a rough correspondence to the old division of flesh, world, and spirit.

It is needless to say that nothing can be attempted more than the briefest mention of the facts that mark the growth of these tendencies. Concerning the first it is enough to indicate what every newspaper confesses and deplora. Over-eating and drinking, (the former attributed to the highest intellectual circles) ; barbaric splendour in dress and equipment ; the gradual invasion of the professional classes by the spirit of money making (I know nothing more sad than to see how men coin their brains into money, and call it success) ; the resistance to diminished hours of work by the employing classes ; sensuousness in art, poetry, and religion, the latter becoming more and more a thing of materialistic mysteries and ceremonial show ; all these are some of the admitted signs of the times which wise people view with regret and alarm. Something of this sort surely lies at the root of Professor Huxley's protest that he is not a materialist. Now surely it is as capable of demonstration as anything of this nature can be, that the consciousness of a spirit, not merely dwelling in the body, but able and destined to live after bodily dissolution, is a specific remedy for this disorder. Given a man anxious to raise himself above the dead level of his sensuous surroundings, feeling himself tempted and provoked to mere bodily enjoyment, despising himself for being what he is, and yet not capable of any great moral and mental effort, and it is clear that no remedy could be devised so powerfully and precisely adapted to give him the requisite help and support as a distinct persuasion that he himself was an immortal being, distinct from and higher than the body from which his soul must be one day separated, when the work of evolving a higher type of life was accomplished. People, it is to be feared, will continue to "eat and drink," if they are persuaded that "to-morrow they will die."

The spirit of revolution is not very easy to define in words, but the expression is, perhaps, the best that could be chosen to describe that over-impatient zeal, which by a refinement of selfishness causes men to do more harm than good in their attempts to make things better. Men find themselves in a world of injustice, inequality, suffering, and disorder, too often thinly cloaked under the name of law, and deriving a decent sanction from religion. And yet, though animated by an almost fanatical love of humanity, and ready to make any sacrifices in its behalf, they become in practice guilty of gross immorality and selfishness; they give way to violent passions of hatred and revenge; they adopt desperate schemes, sometimes foolish and sometimes wicked, of change and revolution; practically they come to regard the happiness of men as coincident with the reign of their own unchecked supremacy; and they die readily for an ideal humanity which they love, if only they may curse the actual human beings whom they hate. It is this mixture of good and evil in the better spirits of the Commune that has divided the heart of feeling men with these mingled emotions of censure and sympathy, best expressed in the single word pity; but thinking men may well set themselves to work to discover the cause why persons so possessed by the desire to do good to mankind should be capable of doing so much harm. And yet, after all, the reason lies upon the surface. Revolution is not the cause of the decay of the belief in immortality, but exactly the reverse is the case. Let us put ourselves in the position of one who thinks that this life is his only one, who is, at any rate, sure that it is the only one he cares for. He sees its blessings and advantages unequally distributed, withheld from himself, his friends or his class. Shall he then be cheated out of the one existence he can call his own? Better that everything should be pulled down now, at once, without delay, in the hope that the good may come to him; surely some change, radical and immediate, in the laws of government or property, or in the rulers of the State, will give him the enjoyment he desires. Now, to such a cry of agony, with which it must be a callous soul that can find no point of sympathy, the one only sufficient answer is that this life is not the only one, but a progress towards another and a better one. If science, as expounded by Mr. Darwin, gives a true account of the origin of man's social instincts, then the desire to share in the welfare of our race is imbedded in our constitution, and is not to be satisfied by the shadowy hope of a fleeting reputation after death, or by a mere self-approval, or by the thought that men may be better and happier when we are gone. False religion, with its perpetual depreciation of the world and of humanity, inculcates a tame acquiescence in hardship and wrong, and so drives men into that negation of religion which


cannot acquiesce in anything. True religion, on the contrary, by setting forth a future world to be evolved out of men's moral and spiritual exertions and experiences here creates that spirit of divine patience, self-sacrifice, and above all, self-control, which can die at least as bravely as the other, and leave with its parting breath, and in its abiding moral influences, a blessing and not a curse behind it. And as the belief in immortality confronts the revolutionary spirit with the power of patience, so does it breathe hope into the spirit of despair. What turns some natures to madness causes others to retire heart-broken from all conflicts and labours that have humanity for their object, and produces the feeling that in Pagan times found its last and most mournful expression in self-destruction. Suicide, then too often the last and applauded action of noble minds, has become in Christian days the meanest and most despised resource of the weak and feeble, and this contrast measures the extent of the practical good that religion has done for morality in setting forth a life to come. Napoleon's final reason for not committing suicide after his abdication is a curious illustration of this—"Moreover," he said, "I am not altogether destitute of religious sentiment." If humanity, and each man that comprises it, is to be developed through many stages, then the work of each stage becomes inexpressibly important, and to abandon it is to abandon the future as well. But if all ends here, and failure here means failure absolute and perpetual, then I know not what should prevent a man who has clearly realized what failure is from saying with Brutus, at Philippi, "Certainly, we must fly, but with our hands, and not with our feet."

It is necessary to make one more remark, or rather to repeat one already made, before I close. The case for immortality may have seemed so strong as to suggest the possibility of dispensing with positive evidence, as though the Resurrection could not make it much more certain than it is. Now this is a state of mind with which it is incumbent upon science to wage incessant warfare. Wherever the positive evidence is nil, that is, where no instance of the conclusion desired can be adduced, then the more vehement, universal, and what is called "natural," the desire is, the more certain is it that men are the victims of their own delusions, the more likely they are to allow themselves to form erroneous conceptions of life and work, the more imperatively it becomes the duty of positive thought to warn them against the evil results of believing what they wish to believe. If a thing be true, there must have been some instance sufficient to establish it as a fact throughout the course of ages; failing this, immortality sinks to the level of the elixir of life or the philosopher's stone, a thing much desired, but having no existence in the solid ground of fact, and a fruitful source of mis-

leading errors and misdirected labours. Or at best, it might be admitted to be possibly true, if it were debarred from exercising any vital influence upon human conduct. I am, of course, well aware that the same remark in an altered form may be applied to the evidence afforded by Christianity, and the assertion that men believe the Resurrection only because they wish to believe it is one that may be fairly made and must be honestly met. But then there is no reason why it should not be met; we are here upon the solid ground of events and evidence; we can discover for ourselves who are the witnesses, what they say, and whether they are dressing up a tale to satisfy their own desires for a future life. To believe a fact for which there is not a scintilla of positive evidence, because we desire it, is one thing; to believe the evidence for a fact, because we desire it, is another and very different thing. The former must be scientifically wrong; the latter may or may not be right; and time is the only ultimate arbiter in the contest. I may, however, possibly take an opportunity of recurring to the relations of Christianity with the hope of a life to come.

I have now brought to a close this rapid, and I fear I must add, perfunctory survey of the conditions and circumstances of human life as they bear upon man's desire for immortality. I have taken the best pains I could to draw my conclusions from indubitable facts of human experience and consciousness by a process of reasoning which would satisfy the demands of the logic of science. What I think I have proved is this: that it is in accordance with man's natural instincts, and with the necessities of morality, that he should desire a life to come; and that, this being so, he will welcome, in spite of its indispensable supernatural element, the evidence of historical fact which purports to prove it, and so attempts to rescue humanity from a maimed, unnatural, and lifeless condition. Much that has been said may appear trite enough, but it has been placed, I hope, under a new light, and been read under the influences of those mental conceptions and that theory of the universe which the doctrine of evolution has made familiar to the minds of men. In such cases details are everything, and to work out the details may afford labour and satisfaction to the science of religion for years to come. But this will be impossible so long as religion and science remain apart in a defiant and disdainful attitude, more anxious to spy out defects than to combine the truths special to each in one harmonious perfection. Any attempt, therefore, to apply the methods of science to the subject-matter of religion, and thus to bridge the gulf between the two, will be, I feel certain, candidly judged, if seen to have been candidly made.

T. W. FOWLE.



THE EIGHTH ARTICLE.

IT is not our intention on this occasion to re-enter on the general question of the Athanasian Creed.* Other opportunities will occur for this.

But there is one episode in the controversy which may be conveniently cleared away, and it is the more important to do so, because it involves the revival of a larger question which, it was to be hoped, had become practically extinct. We refer to the use occasionally made by some eager disputants of the language of the Eighth Article, "On the Three Creeds."

The whole of the English Episcopate, (by implication) have echoed the voice of the vast majority of the clergy and people of England, — that the Athanasian Creed contains passages

* I have neither time nor inclination to engage in the personalities which have formed a chief part of the arguments that have been used in this matter. There is one honourable exception, to which I gladly refer—the essay, as courteous in tone as it was interesting in substance, by Mr. Garden in the pages of this Review, "On the Word Person." Without at present entering on this particular question, I will here content myself with saying, that so far as the main drift of my argument is concerned, it is enough to find it admitted on all sides that "*the term 'Person' cannot be employed to denote the distinctions in the Godhead without considerable intellectual caution.*" On the general question I have nothing to change or modify, except so far as the Carolingian date and composite character of the present form of the Creed—established by the researches of Mr. Ffoulkes and Professor Swainson—have released us from the necessity of discussing the various hypotheses of earlier authorships.

which in their plain and literal sense no one at the present day believes. The Cambridge Professors of Divinity have confirmed this declaration by their recommendation that these passages should be removed from the Creed. The Oxford Professors have confirmed it (less directly but not less powerfully) by recommending that a note should be added to the Creed, explaining that these passages either do not mean what they are commonly supposed to mean, or else mean nothing at all.

In the face of these various movements, it has been alleged that the English Clergy are estopped against expressing any dissent from any part of the Creed by the Article which declares that "*The Three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.*" Whether the words of the Article, strictly speaking, may not, as an eminent Prelate has observed, admit of another interpretation, we do not pretend to inquire. We will assume here, for argument's sake, that they express the most complete adhesion to every word of the Creed that its most ardent admirers would demand. But in that case, we remark that if the principle is to be adopted of thus enforcing every expression of this and the other Articles, a new yoke is imposed on the Clergy, which neither we nor our fathers have been able to bear, and which a few years ago we believed had been for ever shaken off.

Let us look at the facts of the case.

It is alleged that no clergyman is at liberty to contradict any part of this Article. Such a statement when expressed in detail amounts to this: No clergyman is entitled to contradict the assertion of the Article that the Creed is what the Article calls it, in the most emphatic manner, "*Athanasius's Creed.*" Dr. Waterland, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Ffoulkes, are all alike silenced; for the Eighth Article, while it allows that the Apostles' Creed is not the work of the Apostles, declares that this is "*Athanasius's;*" and therefore to ascribe it to Hilary, Victricius, or Paulinus is alike inadmissible. No clergyman is entitled to say that the Creed contains, as Bishop Jeremy Taylor and many others have held, "opinions speculative, curiosities of interpretation, and minute particularities, things which ought never to have been made articles of faith." The Article (if it be intended to enforce on the English clergy the absolute truth of every part of the Creed) unquestionably asserts the everlasting perdition of the whole Eastern Church, which denies the Procession "*from the Son;*" and of Bishop Bull and Bishop Pearson, who denied that "*in this Trinity none is afore or after other; none is greater or less than another;*" and of those who have re-translated the 19th

clause because they think, with Professor Swainson, that it "savours of heresy." All these things the Article, on this theory of its obligation, binds for ever on the consciences of the English clergy.

We repeat that into the truth or falsehood of these statements of the Article,—into the question, for example, whether it is right in asserting that Bull and Pearson "shall without doubt perish everlastingly."—we do not here inquire. We merely repeat the argument of those who maintain that all the assertions of the Article must be literally and fully received by every clergyman.

If this be so, then all the freedom which used to be tacitly assumed, and in the Clerical Subscription Act was solemnly guaranteed by the Legislature, is to be extinguished.

I. In the old times, before the beginning of this century, it was generally argued, as the defence of the existing system, that the subscription was to be taken in a liberal sense, and that the Articles were Articles of Peace. When, in 1792, they were first imposed on the Episcopal Church of Scotland,—

"The Primus answered to the English Bishops that he believed the Scottish clergy had no objections to the *general doctrine* of the Articles, although they might not approve of some particular expressions: but he objected to their being required to subscribe them as the *Articles* of the Church of England." It was said, in reply, that it was only the *general doctrine* of the Articles to which subscription was required even in England; and that they might be subscribed by the Scottish clergy, in proof of their wish to be considered in communion with the English Church.*

"Certain expressions in the *Thirty-nine Articles* were objected to by some of the Scottish clergy as admitting an interpretation opposed to the teaching of the Church. The Primus himself was of opinion that some explanations were proper to show that the Scottish Church rejected the Calvinistic interpretation of the Seventeenth and Twenty-third Articles, and to mark in what sense she was willing to receive the *Thirty-fifth, Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh.*"†

On this general understanding only they were adopted by the Scottish Episcopates, as on this general understanding only they had been continued in the Church of England. Such a contradiction between the actual usage and the stringent terms of the subscription may have been highly inexpedient and misleading, and many attempts, happily at last successful, were made to remove it. But nevertheless it was the only condition in which the usage could be maintained at all.

II. When again in later days Tract No. 90 was published as an expression of the sense in which alone the subscription of the High Church Clergy could be made, the same trouble was caused for the interpretation or rather negation of some of the most

* *Scott. Eccles. History of Scotland*, by Dr. Hall.

important of the Articles; and this has, on the republication and re-affirmation of the Tract in our own days, been sanctioned by the general acquiescence of the Bishops, the Clergy, and the public Press. On that more recent occasion a well-known quarterly journal,* ably representing the High Church party, and whose strong expressions have never been disavowed by any of the school which it represents, thus spoke:—

“One is tempted to ask with wonder, How is it that men ever “have placed such implicit belief in the Articles? . . . No “other answer can be given than that they have been neglected and “ignored. . . . It is impossible to deny that they contain state-“ments or assertions that are verbally false, and others that are very “difficult to reconcile with truth. . . . What service have they “ever done, and of what use are they at the present time? Their “condemnation has been virtually pronounced by the ‘Eirenicon.’

“The ‘Explanations,’ which in Tract XC. were regarded as pieces “of the most subtle sophistry, are repeated in the ‘Eirenicon’ not “only without rebuke from anybody, but with the approving sym-“pathy of thousands.

“What the Bishops and others, in a panic of ignorance, condemned “in 1841 is accepted and allowed to be entirely tenable in 1865.”*

The Eighth Article is certainly not stronger in its assertion of “Athanasius’s Creed” than is the Twenty-first in its assertion of the fallibility and failure of General Councils, or the Twenty-ninth against “The participation of Christ by the wicked” in the Lord’s Supper. Any explanation or repudiation that can be made of the Eighth is more than covered by the recognized explanation and repudiation of the Twenty-first and Twenty-ninth, not to speak of others which are, in the words of the Journal before cited, “very difficult to reconcile with the truth” as received by the leaders of the High Church party. It will be understood that we do not challenge the right of these eminent persons to maintain this view—we only repeat that it carries with it the whole question of which we are now speaking.

III. Yet again, this general latitude was formally recognized by the Legislature in the Clerical Subscription Act, when in the place of the old stringent declarations was substituted the designed and avowed relaxation for which so many had been anxiously asking. The effect of it is best described in the words of one of the Royal Commissioners—the late lamented Charles Buxton—who in his place in Parliament, without contradiction, made a full and forcible statement of the whole scope and intention of the changes in their bearing on the enlargement of the future terms of clerical subscription:—

* *Christian Remembrancer*, January, 1866, pp. 163, 167, 179, 188.


“It was of the greatest importance to observe that all those phrases which indicated that the subscriber declared his acceptance of every dogma of the Church had been swept away; and this had been done expressly and of forethought. As regarded the Thirty-nine Articles, the Commission had agreed to sweep away the words, ‘each and every of them;’ implying, therefore, that the subscriber was only to take them as a whole, even though he might disagree with them here and there. As regarded the Prayer-book, the change was even still more marked; for, instead of declaring his assent and consent to all and everything it contained, he only declared his assent to the Book of Prayer—that is to say, to the book as a whole; and his belief that the doctrine of the Church therein set forth was agreeable to the Word of God. Observe that he would not declare that the doctrines, in the plural number, or that each and all of the doctrines, were agreeable to the Word of God, but only the doctrine of the Church in the singular number. It was expressly and unanimously agreed by the Commission that the word ‘doctrine’ should be used in the singular number, in order that it might be understood that it was the general teaching and not every part and parcel of that teaching to which assent was given.”

And the change so made was received, not only with full acquiescence in Parliament, but in Convocation (in spite of long previous opposition) with an enthusiasm which in that body has rarely, if ever, been equalled.

It is therefore to be hoped, that the delicate question of the Athanasian Creed, for which every thinking person desires that a pacific solution shall be found, may not be embroiled by reviving an extinct controversy respecting subscription to the Articles, which has been thrice dead and buried. It is within our recollection, that when the great attack was made on Tract XC. and its followers in 1845, a venerable Judge still living raised his warning voice, in the words of Lord Strafford, against “rattling up the sleeping lions,” which, when once they are aroused, devour with equal indiscrimination on the right hand and on the left. That same warning is still applicable—and it is in the hope of averting at least one source of needless embitterment, that these few words are published.

Every one must desire to diminish the points of difference on a subject of this kind—and it is clear, from the foregoing remarks, that the dispute respecting the Eighth Article should be gladly and entirely eliminated from the field of argument, not less out of consideration to the interests and feelings of those who wish to enforce than of those who wish to relax the public recitation of “Athanasius’s Creed,” of which the Eighth Article is attempted to be made the temporary bulwark. There are uses which the Thirty-nine Articles may still serve; but for this and the like purposes they cannot be employed, without manifest absurdity.

A. P. STANLEY.



THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.

II.—IS THERE A SOCIAL SCIENCE ?

ALMOST every autumn may be heard the remark that a hard winter is coming, for that the hips and haws are abundant : the implied belief being that God, intending to send much frost and snow, has provided a large store of food for the birds. Interpretations of this kind, tacit or avowed, prevail widely. Not many weeks since, one who had received the usual amount of culture said in my hearing, that the swarm of lady-birds which overspread the country some summers ago, had been providentially designed to save the crop of hops from the destroying aphides. Of course this theory of the divine government, extended to natural occurrences bearing but indirectly, if at all, on human welfare, is applied with still greater confidence to occurrences that directly affect us individually and socially. It is a theory carried out with logical consistency by the Methodist who, before going on a journey or removing to another house, opens his Bible, and in the first passage his eye rests upon, finds an intimation of approval or disapproval from heaven. And in its political applications it yields such appropriate beliefs as that the welfare of England in comparison with Continental States, has been a reward for better observance of the Sunday, or that an invasion of cholera was consequent on the omission of *Dei gratia* from an issue of coins.

The interpretation of historical events in general after this same

method, accompanies such interpretations of less important events; and, indeed, outlives them. Those to whom the natural genesis of simpler phenomena has been made manifest by increasing knowledge, still believe in the supernatural genesis of phenomena that are very much involved, and cannot have their causes readily traced. The attitude of mind which, in an official despatch, prompts the statement that "it has pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe to the British arms the most successful issue to the extensive combinations rendered necessary for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Chenaub,"* is an attitude of mind which, in the records of the past, everywhere sees interpositions of the Deity to bring about results that appear to the interpreter the most desirable. Thus, for example, Mr. Schomberg writes:—

"It seemed good to the All-beneficent Disposer of human events, to overrule every obstacle; and through His instrument, William of Normandy, to expurgate the evils of the land; and to resuscitate its dying powers."†

And elsewhere:—

"The time had now arrived when the Almighty Governor, after having severely punished the whole nation, was intending to raise its drooping head—to give a more rapid impulse to its prosperity, and to cause it to stand forth more prominently as an EXEMPLAR STATE. For this end, He raised up an individual eminently fitted for the intended work" [Henry VII.].‡

And again:—

"As if to mark this epoch of history with greater distinctness, it was closed by the death of George III., the GREAT and the GOOD, who had been raised up as the grand instrument of its accomplishment."§

The late catastrophes on the Continent are similarly explained by a French writer who, like the English writer just quoted, professes to have looked behind the veil of things; and who tells us what have been the intentions of God in chastising his chosen people, the French. For it is to be observed in passing that, just as the evangelicals among ourselves think we are divinely blessed because we have preserved the purity of the faith, so it is obvious to the author of *La Main de l'Homme et le Doigt de Dieu*, as to other Frenchmen, that France is hereafter still to be, as it has hitherto been, the leader of the world. This writer, in chapters entitled "Causes providentielles de nos

* Daily paper, January 22, 1849.

† The "Theocratic Philosophy of English History," vol. i. p. 49.

‡ Ibid., vol. i. p. 289.

§ Ibid., vol. ii. p. 681.

malheurs," "Les Prussiens et les fléaux de Dieu," and "Justification de la Providence," carries out his interpretations in ways we need not here follow, and then closes his "Epilogue" with these sentences:—

"La Révolution modérée, habile, sagace, machiavélique, diaboliquement sage, a été vaincue et confondue par la justice divine dans la personne et dans le gouvernement de Napoléon III.

"La Révolution exaltée, bouillonnante, étourdie, a été vaincue et confondue par la justice divine dans les personnes et dans les gouvernements successifs de Gambetta et de Félix Pyat et compagnie.

"La sagesse humaine, applaudie et triomphante, personnifiée dans M. Thiers, ne tardera pas à être vaincue et confondue par cette même Révolution deux fois humiliée, mais toujours renaissante et agressive."

"Ce n'est pas une prophétie: c'est la prévision de la philosophie et de la foi chrétiennes.

"Alors ce sera vraiment le tour du Très-Haut; car il faut que Dieu et son Fils règnent par son Évangile et par son Église.

"Ames françaises et chrétiennes, priez, travaillez, souffrez et ayez confiance! nous sommes près de la fin. C'est quand tout semblera perdu que tout sera vraiment sauvé.

"Si la France avait su profiter des désastres subis, Dieu lui eût rendu ses premières faveurs. Elle s'obstine dans l'erreur et le vice. Croyons que Dieu la sauvera malgré elle, en la régénérant toutefois par l'eau et par le feu. C'est quand l'impuissance humaine apparaît qu'éclate la sagesse divine. Mais quelles tribulations! quelles angoisses! Heureux ceux qui survivront et jouiront du triomphe de Dieu et de son Église sainte, catholique, apostolique et romaine."*

Conceptions of this kind are not limited to historians whose names have dropped out of remembrance, and to men who, while the drama of contemporary revolution is going on, play the part of a Greek chorus, telling the world of spectators what has been the divine purpose and what are the divine intentions; but we have lately had a Professor of History setting forth conceptions essentially identical in nature. Here are his words:—

"And now, gentlemen, was this vast campaign [of Teutons against Romans] fought without a general? If Trafalgar could not be won without the mind of a Nelson, or Waterloo without the mind of a Wellington, was there no one mind to lead those innumerable armies on whose success depended the future of the whole human race? Did no one marshal them in that impregnable convex front, from the Euxine to the North Sea? No one guide them to the two great strategic centres of the Black Forest and Trieste? No one cause them, blind barbarians without maps or science, to follow those rules of war without which victory in a protracted struggle is impossible; and by the pressure of the Huns behind, force on their flagging myriads to an enterprise which their simplicity fancied at first beyond the powers of mortal men? Believe it who will: but I cannot. I may be told that they

* "La Main de l'Homme et le Doigt de Dieu dans les malheurs de la France." Par J. C., Ex-aumonier dans l'armée auxiliaire. Paris, Dumol & Co., 1871.

gravitated into their places, as stones and mud do. Be it so. They obeyed natural laws of course, as all things do on earth, when they obeyed the laws of war: those, too, are natural laws, explicable on simple mathematical principles. But while I believe that not a stone or a handful of mud gravitates into its place without the will of God; that it was ordained, ages since, into what particular spot each grain of gold should be washed down from an Australian quartz reef, that a certain man might find it at a certain moment and crisis of his life;—if I be superstitious enough (as, thank God, I am,) to hold that creed, shall I not believe that, though this great war had no general upon earth, it may have had a general in Heaven? and that, in spite of all their sins, the hosts of our forefathers were the hosts of God.”*

It does not concern us here to seek a reconciliation of the seemingly incongruous ideas bracketed together in this paragraph—to ask how the results of gravitation, which acts with such uniformity that under given conditions its effect is calculable with certainty, can at the same time be regarded as the results of will, which we class apart because, as known in our experience, it is so irregular; or to ask how, if the course of human affairs is divinely pre-determined just as material changes are, any distinction is to be drawn between that prevision of material changes which constitutes physical science and historical prevision: the reader may be left to evolve the obvious conclusion that either the current idea of physical causation has to be abandoned, or the current idea of will has to be abandoned. All which I need here call attention to as indicating the general character of such interpretations, is the remarkable title of the chapter containing this passage—“The Strategy of Providence.”

In common with some others, I have often wondered how the Universe looks to those who use such names for its Cause as “The Master Builder,” or “The Great Artificer;” and who seem to think that the Cause of the Universe is made more marvellous by comparing its operations to those of a skilled mechanic. But really the expression, “Strategy of Providence,” reveals a conception of this Cause which is in some respects more puzzling. Such a title as “The Great Artificer,” while suggesting simply the process of shaping a pre-existing material, and leaving the question whence this material came untouched, may at any rate be said not to negative the assumption that the material is also created by the Great Artificer who shapes it. The phrase, “Strategy of Providence,” however, necessarily implies difficulties to be overcome. The Divine Strategist must have a skilful antagonist to make strategy possible. So that we are inevitably introduced to the conception of a Cause of the Universe continually impeded by some independent cause which has to be out-generalled. It is not every one who would thank God for a belief,

* “The Roman and the Teuton,” pp. 339-40.

the implication of which is that God is obliged to overcome opposition by subtle devices.

The disguises which piety puts on are, indeed, not unfrequently suggestive of that which some would describe by a quite opposite name. To study the Universe as it is manifested to us; to ascertain by patient observation the order of the manifestations; to discover that the manifestations are connected with one another after a regular way in Time and Space; and, after repeated failures, to give up as futile the attempt to understand the Power manifested; is condemned as irreligious. And meanwhile the character of religious is claimed by those who figure to themselves a Creator moved by motives like their own; who conceive themselves as discovering his designs; and who even speak of him as though he laid plans to outwit the Devil.

This, however, by the way. The foregoing extracts and comments are intended to indicate the mental attitude of those for whom there can be no such thing as Sociology, properly so called. That mode of conceiving human affairs which is implied alike by the "D.V." of a missionary-meeting placard and by the phrases of Emperor William's late despatches, where thanks to God come next to enumerations of the thousands slain, is one to which the idea of a Social Science is entirely alien, and indeed repugnant.

An allied class, equally unprepared to interpret sociological phenomena scientifically, is the class which sees in the course of civilization little else than a record of remarkable persons and their doings. One who is conspicuous as the exponent of this view writes:—"As I take it, universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here." And this, not perhaps distinctly formulated, but everywhere implied, is the belief in which nearly all men are brought up. Let us glance at the genesis of it.

Round their camp-fire assembled savages tell the events of the day's chase; and he among them who has done some feat of skill or agility is duly lauded. On a return from the war-path, the sagacity of the chief and the strength or courage of this or that warrior, are the all-absorbing themes. When the day, or the immediate past, affords no remarkable deed, the topic is the achievement of some noted leader lately dead, or some traditional founder of the tribe: accompanied, it may be, with a dance dramatically representing those victories which the chant recites. Such narratives, concerning as they do the prosperity and indeed the very existence of the tribe, are of the intensest interest; and in them we have the common root of music, of the drama, of poetry, of biography, of history, and of litera-

ture in general. Savage life furnishes little else worthy of note ; and the chronicles of tribes contain scarcely anything more to be remembered. Early historic races show us the same thing. The Egyptian frescoes and the wall-eculptures of the Assyrians, represent the deeds of their chief men ; and inscriptions such as that on the Moabite stone, tell of nothing more than royal achievements : only by implication do these records, pictorial, hieroglyphic, or written, convey anything else. And similarly from the Greek epic, though we gather incidentally that there were towns, and war-vessels, and war-chariots, and sailors, and soldiers to be led and slain, yet the direct intention is to set forth the triumphs of Achilles, the prowess of Ajax, the wisdom of Ulysses, and the like. The lessons given to every civilized child tacitly imply, like the traditions of the uncivilized and semi-civilized, that throughout the past of the human race the doings of the leading persons have been the only things worthy to be remembered. How Abraham girded up his loins and gat him to this place or that ; how Samuel conveyed divine injunctions which Saul disobeyed ; how David recounted his adventures as a shepherd, and was reproached for his misdeeds as a king—these, and personalities akin to these, are the facts about which the juvenile reader of the Bible is interested and respecting which he is catechized : such indications of Jewish institutions as have unavoidably got into the narrative, being regarded neither by him nor by his teacher as of moment. So too, when, with hands behind him, he stands to say his lesson out of *Pinnock*, we see that the things set down for him to learn, are—when and by whom England was invaded, what rulers opposed the invasions and how they were killed, what Alfred did and what Canute said, who fought at Agincourt and who conquered at Flodden, which king abdicated and which usurped, &c. ; and if by some chance it comes out that there were serfs in those days, that barons were local rulers, some vassals of others, that subordination of them to a central power took place gradually, these are facts treated as relatively unimportant. Nay, the like happens when the boy passes into the hands of his classical master, at home or elsewhere. “Arms and the man” form the end of the story as they form its beginning. After the mythology, which of course is all-essential, come the achievements of rulers and soldiers from Agamemnon down to Cæsar : what knowledge is gained of social organization, manners, ideas, morals, being little more than the biographical statements involve. And the value of the knowledge is so ranked that while it would be a disgrace to be wrong about the amours of Zeus, and while ignorance of the name of the commander at Marathon would be discreditable, it is excusable to know nothing of the social condition that preceded Lycurgus or the origin and functions of the Areopagus.

Thus the great-man-theory of history finds everywhere a ready-prepared conception—is, indeed, but the definite expression of that which is latent in the thoughts of the savage, tacitly asserted in all early traditions, and taught to every child by multitudinous illustrations. The glad acceptance it meets with has sundry more special causes. There is, first, this universal love of personalities, which, active in the aboriginal man, dominates still—a love seen in the child which asks you to tell it a story, meaning, thereby, somebody's adventures; a love gratified in adults by police-reports, court-news, divorce-cases, accounts of accidents, and lists of births, marriages, and deaths; a love displayed even by conversations in the streets, where fragments of dialogue, heard in passing, prove that mostly between men, and always between women, the personal pronouns recur every instant. If you want roughly to estimate any one's mental calibre, you cannot do it better than by observing the ratio of generalities to personalities in his talk—how far simple truths about individuals are replaced by truths abstracted from numerous experiences of man and things. And when you have thus measured many, you find but a scattered few likely to take anything more than a biographical view of human affairs. In the second place, this great-man-theory commends itself as promising instruction along with gratification. Being already fond of hearing about people's sayings and doings, it is pleasant news that, to understand the course of civilization, you have only to read diligently the lives of conspicuous men. What can be a more acceptable doctrine than that while you are satisfying an instinct not very remotely allied to that of the village gossip—while you are receiving through print instead of orally remarkable facts concerning notable persons, you are gaining that knowledge which will make clear to you why things have happened thus or thus in the world, and will prepare you for forming a right opinion on each question coming before you as a citizen. And then, in the third place, the interpretation of things thus given is so beautifully simple—seems so easy to comprehend. Providing you are content with conceptions that are out of focus, as most people's conceptions are, the solutions it yields appear quite satisfactory. Just as that theory of the Solar System which supposes the planets to have been launched into their orbits by the hand of the Almighty, looks quite feasible so long as you do not insist on knowing exactly what is meant by the hand of the Almighty; and just as the special creation of plants and animals seems a satisfactory hypothesis until you try and picture to yourself definitely the process by which one of them is brought into existence; so the genesis of societies by the actions of great men, may be comfortably believed so long as, resting in general notions, you do not ask for particulars.

But now, if, dissatisfied with vagueness, we demand that our ideas shall be brought into focus and exactly defined, we discover the hypothesis to be utterly incoherent. If, not stopping at the explanation of social progress as due to the great man, we go back a step and ask whence comes the great man, we find that the theory breaks down completely. The question has two conceivable answers: his origin is supernatural, or it is natural. Is his origin supernatural? Then he is a deputy-god, and we have Theocracy once removed—or, rather, not removed at all; for we must then agree with Mr. Schomberg, quoted above, that "the determination of Cæsar to invade Britain" was divinely inspired, and that from him, down to "George III., the GREAT and the GOOD," the successive rulers were appointed to carry out successive designs. Is this an unacceptable solution? Then the origin of the great man is natural; and immediately he is thus recognized he must be classed with all other phenomena in the society that gave him birth, as a product of its antecedents. Along with the whole generation of which he forms a minute part—along with its institutions, language, knowledge, manners, and its multitudinous arts and appliances, he is a resultant of an enormous aggregate of causes that have been co-operating for ages. True, if you please to ignore all that common observation, verified by physiology, teaches—if you assume that two European parents may produce a Negro child, or that from woolly-haired prognathous Papuans may come a fair, straight-haired infant of Caucasian type—you may assume that the advent of the great man can occur anywhere and under any conditions. If, disregarding those accumulated results of experience which current proverbs and the generalizations of psychologists alike express, you suppose that a Newton might be born in a Hottentot family, that a Milton might spring up among the Andamanese, that a Howard or a Clarkson might have Fiji parents, then you may proceed with facility to explain social progress as caused by the actions of the great man. But if all biological science, enforcing all popular belief, convinces you that by no possibility will an Aristotle come from a father and mother with facial angles of fifty degrees, and that out of a tribe of cannibals, whose chorus in preparation for a feast of human flesh is a kind of rhythmical roaring, there is not the remotest chance of a Beethoven arising; then you must admit that the genesis of the great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown. If it be a fact that the great man may modify his nation in its structure and actions, it is also a fact that there must have been those antecedent modifications constituting national progress before he could be evolved. Before he can re-make his society, his society must make

him. So that all those changes of which he is the proximate initiator have their chief causes in the generations he descended from. If there is to be anything like a real explanation of these changes, it must be sought in that aggregate of conditions out of which both he and they have arisen.

Even were we to grant the absurd supposition that the genesis of the great man does not depend on the antecedents furnished by the society he is born in, there would still be the quite-sufficient facts that he is powerless in the absence of the material and mental accumulations which his society inherits from the past, and that he is powerless in the absence of the co-existing population, character, intelligence, and social arrangements. Given a Shakspeare, and what dramas could he have written without the multitudinous traditions of civilized life—without the various experiences which, descending to him from the past, gave wealth to his thought, and without the language which a hundred generations had developed and enriched by use? Suppose a Watt, with all his inventive power, living in a tribe ignorant of iron, or in a tribe that could get only as much iron as a fire blown by hand-bellows will smelt; or suppose him born among ourselves before lathes existed; what chance would there have been of the steam-engine? Imagine a Laplace unaided by that slowly-developed system of Mathematics which we trace back to its beginnings among the Egyptians; how far would he have got with the *Mécanique Céleste*? Nay, the like questions may be put and have like answers, even if we limit ourselves to those classes of great men on whose doings hero-worshippers more particularly dwell—the rulers and generals. Xenophon could not have achieved his celebrated feat had his Ten Thousand been feeble, or cowardly, or insubordinate. Cæsar would never have made his conquests without disciplined troops inheriting their *prestige* and tactics and organization from the Romans who lived before them. And, to take a recent instance, the strategical genius of Moltke would have gained no great campaigns had there not been a nation of some forty millions to supply soldiers, and had not those soldiers been men of strong bodies, sturdy characters, obedient natures, and capable of carrying out orders intelligently.

Were any one to marvel over the potency of a grain of detonating powder, which explodes a cannon, propels the shell, and sinks a vessel hit—were he to enlarge on the transcendent virtues of this detonating powder, not mentioning the ignited charge, the shell, the cannon, and all that enormous aggregate of appliances by which these have severally been produced, detonating powder included; we should not regard his interpretation as very rational. But it would fairly compare in rationality with this interpretation of social phenomena

which, dwelling on the important changes the great man works, ignores that immense pre-existing supply of latent power he unlocks, and that immeasurable accumulation of antecedents to which both he and this power are due.

Recognizing what truth there is in the great-man-theory, we may say that, if limited to early societies, the histories of which are histories of little else than endeavours to destroy or subjugate one another, it approximately expresses the fact in representing the capable leader as all-important; though even here it leaves out of sight too much the number and the quality of his followers. But its immense error lies in the assumption that what was once true is true for ever; and that a relation of ruler and ruled which was possible and good at one time is possible and good for all time. Just as fast as this predatory activity of early tribes diminishes, just as fast as larger aggregates are formed by conquest or otherwise, just as fast as war ceases to be the business of the whole male population, so fast do societies begin to develop, to show traces of structures and functions not before possible, to acquire increasing complexity along with increasing size, to give origin to new institutions, new activities, new ideas, sentiments, and habits: all of which unobtrusively make their appearance without the thought of any king or legislator. And if you wish to understand these phenomena of social evolution, you will not do it though you should read yourself blind over the biographies of all the great rulers on record, down to Frederick the Greedy and Napoleon the Treacherous.

In addition to that passive denial of a Social Science implied by these two allied doctrines, one or other of which is held by nine men out of ten, there comes from a few an active denial of it—either entire or partial. Reasons are given for the belief that no such thing is possible. The essential invalidity of these reasons can be shown only after the essential nature of Social Science, overlooked by those who make them, has been pointed out; and to point this out here would be to forestall the argument. Some minor criticisms may, however, fitly precede the major criticism. Let us consider first the positions taken up by Mr. Froude:—

“When natural causes are liable to be set aside and neutralized by what is called volition, the word Science is out of place. If it is free to a man to choose what he will do or not do, there is no adequate science of him. If there is a science of him, there is no free choice, and the praise or blame with which we regard one another are impertinent and out of place.”*

“It is in this marvellous power in men to do wrong . . . that the impossibility stands of forming scientific calculations of what men will do

* “Short Studies on Great Subjects,” vol. i. p. 11.

before the fact, or scientific explanations of what they have done after the fact."*

"Mr. Buckle would deliver himself from the eccentricities of this and that individual by a doctrine of averages. . . . Unfortunately the average of one generation need not be the average of the next : . . . no two generations are alike."†

"There [in history] the phenomena never repeat themselves. There we are dependent wholly on the record of things said to have happened once, but which never happen or can happen a second time. There no experiment is possible ; we can watch for no recurring fact to test the worth of our conjectures."‡

Here Mr. Froude changes the venue, and joins issue on the old battle-ground of free will *versus* necessity: declaring a Social Science to be incompatible with free will. The first extract implies, not simply that individual volition is incalculable—that "there is no adequate science of" man, (no science of Psychology); but it also asserts, by implication, that there are no causal relations among his states of mind: the volition by which "natural causes are liable to be set aside," being put in antithesis to natural, must be supernatural. Hence we are, in fact, carried back to that primitive form of interpretation contemplated at the outset. A further comment is, that because volitions of some kinds cannot be foreseen, Mr. Froude argues as though no volitions can be foreseen: ignoring the fact that the simple volitions determining ordinary conduct, are so regular that prevision having a high degree of probability is easy. If, in crossing a street, a man sees a carriage coming upon him, you may safely assert that, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a thousand, he will try to get out of the way. If, being pressed to catch a train, he knows that by one route it is a mile to the station and by another two miles, you may conclude with considerable confidence that he will take the one-mile route; and should he be aware that losing the train will lose him a fortune, it is pretty certain that, if he has but ten minutes to do the mile in, he will either run or call a cab. If he can buy next door a commodity of daily consumption better and cheaper than at the other end of the town, we may affirm that, if he does not buy next door, some special relation between him and the remoter shop-keeper furnishes a strong reason for taking a worse commodity at greater cost of money and trouble. And though, if he has an estate to dispose of, it is within the limits of possibility that he will sell it to A for £1,000, though B has offered £2,000 for it; yet the unusual motives leading to such an act need scarcely be taken into account as qualifying the generalization that a man will habitually sell to the highest bidder. Now, since the predominant activities of citizens are

* "Short Studies on Great Subjects," vol. i. p. 22.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 24.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 15.

determined by motives of this degree of regularity, there must be resulting social phenomena that have corresponding degrees of regularity—greater degrees, in fact; since in them the effects of exceptional motives become lost in the effects of the aggregate of ordinary motives. Another comment may be added. Mr. Froude exaggerates the antithesis he draws by using a conception of science which is too narrow—he speaks as though science always connotes exactness. Scientific previsions, both qualitative and quantitative, have various degrees of definiteness; and because among certain classes of phenomena the previsions are but approximate, it is not, therefore, to be said that there is no science of those phenomena: if there is *some* prevision, there is *some* science. Take, for example, Meteorology. The Derby has been run in a snow-storm, and you may occasionally want a fire in July; but such anomalies do not prevent us from being perfectly certain that the coming summer will be warmer than the past winter. Our south-westerly gales in the autumn may come early or may come late, may be violent or moderate, at one time or at intervals; but that winds will be in excess from that quarter at that part of the year we may be quite sure: and similarly with the north-easterly winds during the spring and early summer. The like holds with the relations of rain and dry weather to the quantity of water in the air and the weight of the atmospheric column: though exactly-true predictions cannot be made, approximately-true ones can. So that, even were there not among social phenomena more definite relations than these (and the all-important ones are far more definite), there would still be a Social Science. Once more, Mr. Froude contends that the facts presented in history do not furnish subject-matter for science, because they “never repeat themselves,”—because “we can watch for no recurring fact to test the worth of our conjectures.” I will not meet this assertion by the counter-assertion often made, that historic phenomena *do* repeat themselves; but, admitting that Mr. Froude here touches on one of the great difficulties of the Social Science (that social phenomena are in so considerable a degree different in each case from what they were in preceding cases), I still find a sufficient reply. For in no concrete science is there any absolute repetition; and in some concrete sciences the repetition is no more specific than in Sociology. Even in the most exact of them, Astronomy, the combinations are never the same twice over: the repetitions are but approximate. And on turning to Geology, we find that, though the processes of denudation, deposition, upheaval, subsidence, have been ever going on in conformity with laws more or less clearly generalized, the effects have been always new in their proportions and arrangements; though not so completely new as to forbid comparisons, consequent deductions, and approximate previsions based on them.

Were there no such replies as these to Mr. Froude's reasons, there would still be the reply furnished by his own interpretations of history; which make it clear that his denial must be understood as but a qualified one. Against his professed theory may be set his actual practice, which, as it seems to me, tacitly asserts that explanations of some social phenomena in terms of cause and effect are possible, if not explanations of all social phenomena. Thus, respecting the Vagrancy Act of 1547, which made a slave of a confirmed vagrant, Mr. Froude says:—"In the condition of things which was now commencing . . . neither this nor any other penal act against idleness could be practically enforced."* That is to say, the operation of an agency brought into play was neutralized by the operation of natural causes coexisting. Again, respecting the enclosure of commons and amalgamation of farms, &c., Mr. Froude writes:—"Under the late reign these tendencies had, with great difficulty, been held partially in check, but on the death of Henry they acquired new force and activity."† Or, in other words, certain social forces previously antagonized by certain other forces produced their natural effects when the antagonism ceased. Yet again, Mr. Froude explains that, "unhappily, two causes [debased currency and an alteration of the farming system] were operating to produce the rise of prices."‡ And throughout Mr. Froude's *History of England* there are, I need scarcely say, other cases in which he ascribes social changes to causes rooted in human nature. Moreover, in his lecture on "The Science of History," there is a distinct enunciation of "one lesson of History;" namely, that "the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity. . . . Justice and truth alone endure and live. Injustice and falsehood may be long-lived, but doomsday comes at last to them, in French revolutions and other terrible ways." If we change its terms, this statement is that certain social relations and actions of certain kinds are inevitably beneficial, and others inevitably detrimental—an historic induction furnishing a basis for positive deduction. So that we must not interpret Mr. Froude too literally when he alleges the "impossibility of forming scientific calculations of what men will do before the fact, or scientific explanations of what they have done after the fact."

Another writer who denies the possibility of a Social Science, or who, at any rate, admits it only as a science which has its relations of phenomena so traversed by providential influences that it does not come within the proper definition of a science, is Canon Kingsley. In his address on *The Limits of Exact Science as applied to History* he says:—

* "History of England," vol. v. p. 70.

† *Ibid.*, vol. v. p. 108.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. v. p. 109.

"You say that as the laws of matter are inevitable, so probably are the laws of human life? Be it so: but in what sense are the laws of matter inevitable? Potentially or actually? Even in the seemingly most uniform and universal law, where do we find the inevitable or the irresistible? Is there not in nature a perpetual competition of law against law, force against force, producing the most endless and unexpected variety of results? Cannot each law be interfered with at any moment by some other law, so that the first law, though it may struggle for the mastery, shall be for an indefinite time utterly defeated? The law of gravity is immutable enough: but do all stones veritably fall to the ground? Certainly not, if I choose to catch one, and keep it in my hand. It remains there by laws; and the law of gravity is there, too, making it feel heavy in my hand: but it has not fallen to the ground, and will not, till I let it. So much for the inevitable action of the laws of gravity, as of others. Potentially, it is immutable; but actually, it can be conquered by other laws."*

This passage, severely criticized, if I remember rightly, when the address was originally published, it would be scarcely fair to quote were it not that Canon Kingsley has repeated it at a later date in his work, *The Roman and the Teuton*. The very unusual renderings of scientific ideas which it contains, need here be only enumerated. Mr. Kingsley differs profoundly from philosophers and men of science, in regarding a law as itself a power or force, and so in thinking of one law as "conquered by other laws;" whereas the accepted conception of law is that of an established *order*, to which the manifestations of a power or force conform. He enunciates, too, a quite exceptional view of gravitation. As conceived by astronomers and physicists, gravitation is a universal and ever-acting *force*, which portions of matter exercise on one another when at sensible distances; and the *law* of this force is that it varies directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance. Mr. Kingsley's view, is that the law of gravitation is "defeated" if a stone is prevented from falling to the ground—that the law "struggles" (not the force), and that because it no longer produces motion, the "inevitable action of the laws of gravity" (not of gravity) is suspended: the truth being that neither the force nor its law is in the slightest degree modified. Further, the theory of natural processes which Mr. Kingsley has arrived at, seems to be that when two or more forces (or laws, if he prefers it) come into play, there is a partial or complete suspension of one by another. Whereas the doctrine held by men of science is, that the forces are all in full operation, and the effect is their resultant; so that, for example, when a shot is fired horizontally from a cannon, the force impressed on it produces in a given time just the same amount of horizontal motion as though gravity were absent, while gravity produces in that same time a fall just equal to that

* P. 20.

which it would have produced had the shot been dropped from the mouth of the cannon. Of course, holding these peculiar views of causation as displayed among simple physical phenomena, Canon Kingsley is consistent in denying historical sequence; and in saying that "as long as man has the mysterious power of breaking the laws of his own being, such a sequence not only cannot be discovered, but it cannot exist."* At the same time it is manifest that until he comes to some agreement with men of science respecting conceptions of forces, of their laws, and of the modes in which phenomena produced by compositions of forces are interpretable in terms of compound laws, no discussion of the question at issue can be carried on with profit.

Without waiting for such an agreement, however, which is probably somewhat remote, Canon Kingsley's argument may be met by putting side by side with it some of his own conclusions set forth elsewhere. In an edition of *Alton Locke* published since the delivery of the address above quoted from, there is a new preface containing, among others, the following passages:—

"The progress towards institutions more and more popular may be slow, but it is sure. Whenever any class has conceived the hope of being fairly represented, it is certain to fulfil its own hopes, unless it employs, or provokes, violence impossible in England. The thing will be.†
"If any young gentlemen look forward to a Conservative reaction of any other kind than this . . . to even the least stoppage of what the world calls progress—which I should define as the putting in practice the results of inductive science;—then do they, like King Picrochole in Rabelais, look for a kingdom which shall be restored to them at the coming of the Cooqigrués."‡

And in a preface addressed to working men, contained in an earlier edition, he says:—

"If you are better off than you were in 1848, you owe it principally to those laws of political economy (as they are called), which I call the brute natural accidents of supply and demand," &c. §

Which passages offer explanations of changes now gone by as having been wrought out by natural forces in conformity with natural laws, and also predictions of changes which social forces at present in action will work out. That is to say, by the help of generalized experiences there is an interpretation of past phenomena and a pre-

* *Ibid.*, p. 22.

† "*Alton Locke*," new edition, preface, p. *xxi*.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. *xxiii*, *xxiv*.

§ *Ibid.*, preface (1854), p. *xxvii*.

vision of future phenomena. There is an implicit recognition of that Social Science which is explicitly denied.

A reply to these criticisms may be imagined. In looking for whatever reconciliation is possible between these positions which seem so incongruous, we must suppose the intended assertion to be, that general interpretations and previsions only can be made, not those which are special. Bearing in mind Mr. Froude's occasional explanations of historical phenomena as naturally caused, we must conclude that he believes certain classes of sociological facts (as the politico-economical) to be scientifically explicable, while other classes are not: though, if this be his view, it is not clear how, if the results of men's wills, separate or aggregated, are incalculable, politico-economical actions can be dealt with scientifically; since, equally with other social actions, they are determined by aggregated wills. Similarly, Canon Kingsley, recognizing no less distinctly economical laws, and enunciating also certain laws of progress—nay, even warning his hearers against the belief that he denies the applicability of the inductive method to social phenomena,—must be assumed to think that the applicability of the inductive method is here but partial. Citing the title of his address, and some of its sentences, he may say they imply simply that there are limits to the explanation of social facts in precise ways; though this position does not seem really reconcilable with the doctrine that social laws are liable to be at any time suspended, providentially or otherwise. But, merely hinting these collateral criticisms, this reply is to be met by the demurrer that it is beside the question. If the sole thing meant is that sociological previsions can be approximate only—if the thing denied is the possibility of reducing Sociology to the form of an exact science—then the rejoinder is that the thing denied is a thing which no one has affirmed. Only a moiety of science is exact science—only phenomena of certain orders have had their relations developed from the qualitative form into the quantitative form. Of the remaining orders there are some produced by factors so numerous and so difficult to measure, that development of their relations into the quantitative form is extremely improbable, if not impossible. But these orders of phenomena are not therefore excluded from the conception of Science. In Geology, in Biology, in Psychology, most of the previsions are qualitative only; and where they are quantitative their quantitateness, never quite definite, is mostly very indefinite. Nevertheless we unhesitatingly class these previsions as scientific. It is thus with Sociology. The phenomena it presents, involved in a higher degree than all others, are less than all other capable of precise treatment: such of them as can be generalized, can be generalized only within wide limits of variation as to time and amount; and there remains much that cannot be

generalized. But so far as there can be generalization, and so far as there can be interpretation based on it, so far there can be science. Whoever expresses political opinions—whoever asserts that such or such public arrangements will be beneficial or detrimental, tacitly expresses belief in a Social Science ; for he asserts, by implication, that there is a natural sequence among social actions, and that as the sequence is natural, results may be foreseen.

Reduced to a more concrete form, the case may be put thus :—Mr. Froude and Canon Kingsley both believe to a considerable extent in the efficiency of legislation—probably to a greater extent than it is believed in by some of those who assert the existence of a Social Science. To believe in the efficiency of legislation is to believe that certain prospective penalties or rewards will act as deterrents or incentives—will modify individual conduct, and therefore modify social action. Though it may be impossible to say that a given law will produce a foreseen effect on a particular person, yet no doubt is felt that it will produce a foreseen effect on the mass of persons. Though Mr. Froude, when arguing against Mr. Buckle, says that he “would deliver himself from the eccentricities of this and that individual by a doctrine of averages,” but that “unfortunately, the average of one generation need not be the average of the next ;” yet Mr. Froude himself so far believes in the doctrine of averages as to hold that legislative interdicts, with threats of death or imprisonment behind them, will restrain the great majority of men in ways which can be predicted. While he contends that the results of individual will are incalculable, yet, by approving certain laws and condemning others, he tacitly affirms that the results of the aggregate of wills are calculable. And if this be asserted of the aggregate of wills as affected by legislation, it must be asserted of the aggregate of wills as affected by social influences at large. If it be held that the desire to avoid punishment will so act on the average of men as to produce an average foreseen result ; then it must also be held that on the average of men, the desire to get the greatest return for labour, the desire to rise into a higher rank of life, the desire to gain applause, and so forth, will each of them produce a certain average result. And to hold this is to hold that there can be prevision of social phenomena, and therefore Social Science.

In brief, then, the alternative positions are these. On the one hand, if there is no natural causation throughout the actions of incorporated humanity, government and legislation are absurd. Acts of Parliament may, as well as not, be made to depend on the drawing of lots or the tossing of a coin ; or, rather, there may as well be none at all : social sequences having no ascertainable order, no effect can be counted upon—everything is anarchic. On the other

hand, if there is natural causation, then the combination of forces by which every combination of effects is produced, produces that combination of effects in conformity with the laws of the forces. And if so, it behoves us to use all diligence in ascertaining what the forces are, what are their laws, and what are the ways in which they co-operate.

Such further elucidation as is possible will be gained by discussing the question to which we now address ourselves—the Nature of the Social Science. Along with a definite idea of this, will come a perception that the denial of a Social Science has arisen from the confusing of two essentially-different classes of phenomena which societies present—the one class, almost ignored by historians, constituting the subject-matter of Social Science, and the other class, almost exclusively occupying them, admitting of scientific co-ordination in a very small degree, if at all.

HERBERT SPENCER.



CHRISTIANITY AND IMMORTALITY.

IT may be desirable to explain at the outset what is the precise object of the present paper, inasmuch as the title may be thought to cover much wider ground than I am at all disposed to enter upon. The relations of the Christian belief in the Resurrection of Christ to the doctrine of immortality, have been already pointed out, (see p. 470), and do not need to be further discussed. That the Resurrection, if true, amounts to a scientific proof of immortality, that the witnesses for it are honest, and the testimony sufficient to prove any non-miraculous event, are statements which, even if they be challenged, I do not think it necessary to substantiate by additional arguments. Life after all is but short, and may be wasted in endless discussions upon matters perfectly obvious to all who are not blinded by invincible prejudice. The man who says, "I do not believe the history because it is avowedly supernatural," is, need it be remarked, an intellectually honest man, and deserves the most respectful attention. But the man who says, "I have no prepossessions against the supernatural; but I disbelieve the history upon exactly the same grounds as I should any statement whatever," who tries, in short, to reach Hume's conclusion without the resolute common sense that marked his method, must be dismissed as impracticable. There is, it must really be remembered, an enormous *a priori* probability attached

to every straightforward statement made by, apparently, honest men, which holds good in all cases where it is not balanced by some antecedent improbability, such as the existence of a supernatural element in the narrative. There is, indeed, a conceivable case in which a man might claim to be heard. If there be anyone who believes that miracles have occurred more or less frequently, but that the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is not proved to be one of them, then the very absurdity of his position entitles him to be considered an honest thinker. But I deny that the term applies to any (if such there be) who do not, as a matter of fact, believe that miracles have occurred, and yet pretend to reject the Resurrection upon the ground that it is not proved by evidence sufficient to substantiate ordinary historical events. Some little impatience with the men who are constantly throwing up barriers against the progress of reason to right conclusions, or who try to direct her march into by-ways formed by their own intellectual idiosyncracies, is surely not altogether unjustifiable.

But the task I have in hand is a much more serious, and, to say the truth, a much more unwelcome one. I have let it be understood with tolerable plainness in various parts of my former articles that, in my judgment, modern religious teaching is answerable for the errors, whether of disbelief or of superstition, which have gathered about the doctrine of man's immortality. Modern Christianity does not make the doctrine acceptable or useful to men, because it does not possess the mind of Christ, and does not teach the nineteenth century the things which He taught the first. A kind of moral weakness and littleness is creeping more and more over the minds of religious people; and religious doctrines, once full of life and power, have become mere dogmatic negations of some error as unreal as themselves. Somehow or other, the salt has lost its savour in the judgment of those to whom intellectual truth and practical morality are things of the first importance. I say this with the same kind of feelings that might inspire a French soldier to speak of the moral and professional corruptions that have plunged the French army into the depths of disaster. My life is bound up with the religion to the faults of which it is impossible to shut our eyes. I am not insensible to the good works, the doing of which has come down to us as a tradition from the great Evangelical or Catholic revivals. I am keenly alive no less to the exalted history of the past than to the equally noble responsibilities and duties of the future; but in spite of all this, or rather because of it, the truth requires to be proclaimed aloud, that modern Christianity, as generally received, does not represent the teaching of Christ, and is not fit to be charged with the task of teaching the world a suitable and satisfactory mo-

rality. That this is true with respect to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul I now proceed to show.

The popular conception of the religion taught by Jesus Christ—a conception that underlies the doctrines and practices of all Christian churches—is to the following effect:—He came to reveal the facts of a future life, which, when revealed, are found to consist of an endless life of happiness or misery, our destinies therein being decided by the relation which we hold towards Him. In this conception we must distinguish two erroneous notions: the first, that His teaching mainly concerned the next life; the second, that it consisted in the proclamation of heaven and hell as the ultimate destiny of mankind. Of these, the first, though not so striking, contains a more subtle power of evil than the second, and will require careful examination.

I must, however, first say a word in answer to the objection that these conceptions have ceased vitally to affect the religion of the world, or can be said fairly to represent it. I am convinced that no greater mistake can be made. It may, indeed, be admitted that the belief in endless torments is ceasing to exercise a real influence upon men's minds, but even this admission must not be made too much of. In the Roman Church, and in many Protestant sects,* it is still a predominant feature of religious teaching, while in none has it been formally withdrawn as an article of faith. It is, perhaps, thought that it may die out in silence; but, apart from the moral cowardice this involves, all history seems to show that when once a doctrine has laid firm hold of the popular mind, nothing short of active denunciation and determined opposition can destroy it. And then, too, it must be remembered that the system of theology of which it forms a cardinal point, still remains and flourishes. All the power of the priesthood, and all the logical value

* Almost as I write this sentence, the *Standard* contains the following item of news. Can anything be more abominable?—"At Kingston, Jamaica, there has been considerable excitement, occasioned by a funeral sermon preached for the late Mr. Emanuel Lyons, a benevolent Hebrew of that city. The preacher, the Rev. J. Ratcliffe, endeavoured to prove beyond a doubt that the deceased had gone to heaven. The sermon had since been denounced as displaying as un-Christian sentiments as could come from the lips of any man. Christ, it was said, was dishonoured in it, as it indicated that any man may be saved without Christ on account of his own kindness, charity, and manly worth, and that the human soul, with its constitution, and the consciousness which it received from the Divine hands before a Bible was made or a revelation given, outweighs in importance all revelations and all religion. Several ministers had preached sermons specially designed to set forth Mr. Ratcliffe's errors, and also joined in the issue of a declaration denouncing them.

"The following ministers signed the declaration:—D. H. Campbell, Enos Nuttall, W. E. Pierce, Episcopalians; Henry Bunting, Samuel Smythe, Wesleyans; D. J. East, J. Seed Roberts, Baptists; James Ballantine, United Presbyterian; Mr. J. Gardner, L. M. Society; Mr. Griffiths and Mr. F. Church."

of the Calvinistic scheme of salvation, are really involved in ultimate ruin with the rejection of this doctrine. And again, though hell as a place of endless torment may be vanishing from men's minds, yet the idea of heaven as a place of endless happiness is almost as potent as ever. This seems to me the worst feature of all. Whatever may be said of the evils wrought by the fear of endless punishment, those wrought by the hope of endless happiness are certainly greater. The former is, at least, due to man's sense of the greatness of sin; the latter is the result of his selfish desires for enjoyment. The fear of hell has kept many a rough, wayward spirit in something like conformity to decent behaviour, and it has unquestionably been the turning point in thousands of lives, and the beginning of better things to men beyond the reach of any argument save fear. But the common idea of heaven can claim no such moral achievements, while it has enfeebled the character of myriads of human beings, and has ministered in the name of religion to human selfishness and love of ease. And if this assertion seems a strong one (as in truth I mean it to be), let any one who doubts whether it can be justified bethink himself of the hymns which have become more and more popular in these later days. Sentimental longings for paradise, excessive, though easily understood amid the moral wretchedness of the middle ages, are now among the most marked features of modern praise. Sensuous descriptions of mere outward details, passionate longings for happiness and idleness, are put into the mouths of grave British citizens, whose one great virtue is to do their duty like men, and who hate idleness as the source of all evil. How far we may believe that the minds of men are really drawn off from the realities of life, or how far they are merely softened and diverted for the moment, depends upon the amount of practical weight we are willing to admit that religion now possesses. All I am concerned to observe is, that there are tendencies which seem to be powerful, and are certainly popular, that are demoralizing in the extreme.

And lastly, as an additional proof that, however details may have been modified or abandoned, the general conception of the future life under the forms of heaven and hell is still a living part of the consciousness of man, I would point out how in times of earnest feeling it exercises a subtle influence upon the strongest minds. Two of the most eminent of living Englishmen, desirous of expressing themselves strongly in antagonism to popular notions, have done so by declaring their intention under certain circumstances of "going to hell." It is odd, on the other hand, to read of a man like Descartes affirming that he was as desirous to go to heaven as any one. The very idea of the two, hell especially, has been engrafted in the minds of men by grotesque poetry and legends. All this is indeed compatible with

the truth, which I do not for a moment deny, that there is a gradual loosening of the hold these beliefs once had upon the minds of men. What was once a tremendously earnest conflict between the preacher and his hearers, in which neither of the two ever doubted that the stakes were the endless destiny of an immortal soul, has now shrunk into a kind of amicable contest, in which the latter easily stops every attempt made by the former to reach his heart by means of the fear of hell. Respectable men no longer leave church with the same profound conviction, that without conversion their damnation is assured, and so that the only practical question is, how long it can safely be postponed. But then this is just the state of things in which doctrines, the errors of which might well be pardoned in consideration of their effectual moral power, have become nothing but pernicious. To confine all men's ideas of a future life to the one notion of decisive judgment, was certainly a mistake in the face of Christ's teaching, and of simple elementary moral truths. But to keep the idea of judgment before men's minds and force it upon their thoughts had at least a useful deterrent effect. But now that this is practically vanishing, there remains but one duty for all who love the truth as Christ taught it, and to whom human morality is unspeakably precious. Once more we are face to face with a popular religion that abuses the tremendous fact of man's immortality to unworthy purposes. The second Reformation must treat heaven and hell as the first treated purgatory and indulgences: it must preserve the moral idea while abolishing the literal fact, and must supersede the old forms of thought by new conceptions, gathered from the experience and the discoveries of the ages, but founded upon a closer adherence to the actual teaching of Christ.

In examining what the main characteristics of that teaching were, it is of great importance to observe in what relations it stood to the common religious teaching of His time. To begin then, it is not in the least true to say that Christ was the first to stamp the idea of immortality upon the minds of men under the forms of heaven and hell. He found, indeed, those ideas already existing, and He used them for His own purposes; but He took from them their future and remote, in order to give them a present and immediate, force and aspect. The Pharisees believed that the souls of good men would be for ever blessed (there is some doubt as to their ideas about the resurrection of the body), and that hell, or gehenna, would be the inevitable portion of the wicked. These beliefs had grown up exactly on the soil that might have been expected to produce them. They were the fruit of that, taken as a whole, dark and melancholy period of Jewish history which intervenes between the return from captivity and the coming of the Messiah. As in the middle ages, so in these,

which are the veritable middle ages of Jewish history. men had taken refuge from the intolerable miseries of life in the hope of paradise. and, powerless themselves to avenge the wrongs they endured, had fastened on the idea of endless and horrible torture in the world to come. In proportion as the ancient hopes of Israel became in the bad sense of the word merely secular, so by a strange but easily explicable contrast did the minds of men conceive the idea of immortality ; for, after all, a Messiah who should at some time restore their temporal greatness, could never satisfy the yearnings of individual souls for eternity. Something, too, must be ascribed to the influences of Paganism, to which they were ever after the Captivity increasingly subject, and thus it came to pass that the fierce wrath of the Jew against the enemies of his people or the apostates from his religion took, as it were, visible form in the purely Pagan idea which turned the valley of Hinnom into the symbol of the place of endless torment, and even placed the gates of hell within its limits. Add to this, that the virtues which were to win heaven were compliance with ceremonial observances invented or maintained by an arrogant priesthood who grew rich and powerful by trading on the superstitions of mankind, and we have a picture of a religious teaching concerning immortality, on the one hand clear and definite, on the other corrupting and demoralizing, and resembling all the worst epochs of spiritual degradation with which history makes us acquainted.

How then did our Lord treat the religious ideas about immortality with which He was confronted ? Mainly, in two ways. First, He seized upon the current notions, and used the truths which they contained to enforce a present heaven, an immediate judgment, a hell that was yawning to engulf the whole Jewish people. Secondly, He substituted by act and word the fewest and simplest moral conceptions of a future state, in place of outward, local, and detailed descriptions of it. Or, speaking more generally, He revived the old true Jewish belief in Messiah as the representative of God's government upon earth, and brought heaven down to men as the first and urgent preliminary to raising men one by one to heaven. He planted in the minds of His followers the necessity of a spiritual resurrection now, as being of far more consequence than that of bodily resurrection hereafter, and He recalled them from the contemplation of remote rewards and punishments to the tremendous realities that were already closing in around them. To make good this assertion it is, however, necessary to examine, with all needful brevity, the teaching of Christ concerning the Kingdom of Heaven, Hell, and Judgment, and then to note how few, how guarded, and how practical were His words upon the subject of the life to come.

There are statements which, though really new, are nevertheless con-

founded with truths that people have always held, or at any rate believe that they have always held. Such for instance is the statement, that by the Kingdom of Heaven Christ meant almost, if not quite, exclusively the establishment of God's rule and order upon earth. Upon hearing this, people immediately bethink themselves that this is merely another way of saying that the Kingdom of Heaven means the Christian Church. But the error lies not so much in denying any true interpretation of these words, as in substituting a secondary and comparatively unimportant interpretation for the primary and true one. Practically, the thought of heaven as part of the future life has swallowed up the thought of heaven as the rule of God upon earth. Popular theology is like a bad picture, in which all the foreground is blurred and confused, while the mountains in the background stand out in hard and unnatural distinctness. Men think of Christ first as revealing a future heaven, and then quite in a secondary sense, as establishing a community that should lead men into it. But the fact is that the foundation of the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, for its own sake, and for the present good of man independently of his future destiny, was the one great object of all His teaching; and the more we examine that teaching for ourselves, the more clearly we shall appreciate the truth of this assertion, and discern how entirely His soul was wrapped up in the work of the immediate present. As painted by the Master's hand, the picture is altogether clear and well defined in the foreground, while behind it the landscape fades away with a dim suggestiveness infinitely more subtle and impressive than the coarse naturalistic details with which later human teaching has obscured the outlines faintly drawn by the Divine hand, and just relieved from darkness by a few far-glancing rays darted forth from the Divine inspiration.

The above remarks are necessary if we would avoid the appearance of making a series of observations concerning Christ's teaching so obviously true, not to say commonplace, that every one will be inclined to believe he has always known them. The history opens with the announcement by John the Baptist, repeated by Christ, and put into the mouth of His messengers, that the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand—that it was shortly to be set up amongst them. The Sermon on the Mount, the first recorded instance of His public teaching, begins by declaring that the poor in spirit and in fact, were the persons to whom it was specially preached; and a great reward in heaven, that is, in the new kingdom, was promised to those who were persecuted for His sake. How many thousands of sermons have been preached to account for the self-invented difficulty that God meant endless happiness to be the portion of the poor rather than of the rich! How many delusive hopes have been fostered in the minds of

poor people by the thought that after a life of suffering here they would be rewarded by a life of enjoyment hereafter! The key-note, however, thus emphatically struck in the first teaching, was never forsaken or altered. "The Kingdom of Heaven is among you;" "Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God;" "There be some of them that stand here that shall not taste of death till they see the Kingdom of God come with power"—words which have exhausted the ingenuity of sophistry to explain them away. And, again, we hear of Capernaum exalted into heaven, but to be cast down into hell at the speedy approach of that day of judgment in which it should be more tolerable for the cities of heathendom than of Israel. Or, once more, in one single passage, the Jewish gehenna is distinctly named, and the disciples are told that anything in the world, however dear, which causes them to stumble at the Kingdom of Heaven then preached, or, still worse, which causes them to make others stumble, must be resolutely cut away, lest they come to the doom described in prophetic language as the place of the valley of Hinnom, where the worm never ceases to fatten on the dead bodies from within, or the fire to consume them from without. These, then, are the notes of time expressly laid down by the Teacher Himself. But the doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven is expressly and specifically contained in a series of parables, many of which begin with the well-known words, "The Kingdom of Heaven is like." Read in the light of modern theology, these all have reference to the last day and to a future life; read in the light shed upon them by the above-mentioned marks of time, they speak of immediate judgment and of a present life, and can only be applied to the former by indirect and very often incorrect references.

The first group of parables, in St. Matt. ch. xiii., which explains the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven, is plainly an account of the laws which govern the progress and especially explains the foundation of the Church on earth. In two of them, however, the notion of judgment is added, and I call attention to the parable of the Tares, as containing the germ of all future misunderstanding of Christ's teaching. The field, He says, is the world (*κόσμος*). Now, when, in the next verse, the unsuspecting English reader finds it said that the harvest is the "end of the world," and, in the verse after this, reference made to the "end of *this* world," he little thinks that the first word translated "world" is quite a different word from that in the two latter instances, though if he considered the matter for a moment even he might wonder how the harvest can possibly be the end of the field, and not the end of the crop upon it. That this last is our Lord's meaning, as in truth it is the only one compatible with common sense, is abundantly clear from

the word used, *αιών*, which means age or dispensation, and answers therefore to the crop which was then growing upon the field of the world. The good seed are the children of Christ's kingdom; the bad seed is perverted Judaism; the harvest is its coming complete downfall, to which surely may be added a glance at that break-up of all civil, social, and political order, when the genius of Paganism passed away at the destruction of the Roman Empire of the West. It is not necessary, once more let me remark, to deny that in a derived and mediate sense the moral truths expressed in the parable may be applied to all times and places, though even then a strict interpretation would require us to limit the application to the existing world. But what it is of the greatest importance to understand, is that the actual vision that was before the mind of Christ was the destruction of Judaism, and perhaps of Paganism; and that were there never to be another judgment upon earth the parable would still be adequately fulfilled. And that this was the fulfilment of which He was thinking we shall find abundant proof if we turn to a similar passage in the thirteenth chapter of St. Luke, in which the establishment of the Kingdom of God is predicted. In this the Gentiles are represented as coming in from all quarters, while the Jews are thrust out with weeping and gnashing of teeth, the whole at once suggesting and culminating in the lamentation over Jerusalem, "their house in which is left unto them desolate." And all this prediction of coming temporal judgment seems to be, if not certainly in the words of Christ, at least in the mind of the Evangelist, connected with His answer to the question, "Lord, are there few that shall be saved?"

Before we pass on to consider the final prophecy in which the idea thus started is worked out in some of the grandest utterances that ever fell even from the lips of Him who spake as never man spake, I must call attention to one parable upon the interpretation of which I am willing to stake the whole of my argument. It is the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard (twentieth chapter of St. Matthew), one of the simplest and most practical of stories. If ever there was a parable easy to interpret, this ought to be the one. It stands between the lesson, twice declared, which the Lord meant to be derived from it—"The first shall be last, and the last first." The circumstances which gave rise to it—namely, the sorrowful going away of the rich young ruler, and Peter's question, "What shall we have therefore?"—are clearly stated. Yet, in spite of all this, misled by false conceptions of the Kingdom of Heaven, the commentators find it almost unintelligible. Assuming that the day's wage is endless happiness or heavenly reward in a life to come, they are met by the insuperable difficulty as to how murmurers can enjoy it

or be fit for it, still less how the first can be last and the last first. And thus they are driven to all kinds of shifts, such as the unphilosophical notion of degrees of happiness. Now, all that is required is to regard our Lord as giving a plain moral description of what would take place at the establishment of His kingdom upon earth. The departure of the ruler suggests the reflection that it is hard for a rich man to enter into that kingdom. This, again, suggests Peter's natural but dangerous question, to which the answer is given that in the Regeneration, in the coming new birth of humanity, they should share the labours and the glory of their Master, as in truth they have done, and that in place of those which they gave up they should have new spiritual relationships and possessions upon earth, together, elsewhere it is added, as though to admit no possible mistake, with persecutions. How abundantly this promise was fulfilled we may conclude from the life of St. Paul, who had children and brethren in every city, and to whom the whole world was, as it were, a home. But then He goes on to warn them not to let the mere desire for a reward debase their spiritual character, for in that case the men who, like the twelve, had been called first, might become last in moral goodness. And He illustrated this tendency by a simple story of everyday life containing just the one moral that religion dislikes to face, namely, that a life of outward service and real Christian work may, if not watched, end in an envious, selfish, murmuring disposition, concerning which He says nothing and implies nothing as to its ultimate destination; but merely points out that it has missed the real blessedness of work, and has lost for all moral purposes its true reward, while strenuously seeking to obtain it.

We now come to the group of prophecies and parables which form the close of His teaching. And here we notice an important note of time occurring at a critical moment of the history. On His way to Jerusalem for the last time, He delivered the parable of the pounds, to counteract a delusion on the part of His disciples that the Kingdom of God should immediately appear. Up to this moment, then, this had been the natural result of His teaching and of the wide success with which it had been attended. Now, therefore, it becomes necessary to make it clear to them that this coming is to be a work of time and labour, and that they are to be employed in it during His absence according to the measure of their several capacities. The mental view is gradually enlarging, the horizon is receding farther into the distance, while yet the main interest is attached to the immediate present. Then He enters Jerusalem, and begins that last contest with the Pharisees which ended in His death. After a parable or two in which He puts before them the Kingdom of Heaven for their immediate reception, and warns them of the conse-

quences of refusal, He delivers that tremendous forecast of coming doom, which must either be a shameless forgery or else stamp Him as one who knew more than it is given to mere men to know. And just at this point it is that commentators, old and new, English and German, have launched out into their wildest excesses of interpretation. By some it has been asserted that the account in St. Luke refers to the destruction of Jerusalem, that in St. Matthew to the end of the world, in utter forgetfulness that this is simply to play into the hands of the mythic school of interpreters.* By almost all (for what I myself know, it may be by all without exception) it is understood that the chief thing which occupied His mind was the destruction of the world, the fall of Jerusalem being a comparatively unimportant type of the great and distant reality. Now I say that this is absolutely false. The true canons of interpretation are these: first, that every word must be applied first and fully (due allowance being made for metaphorical language mostly gathered from the prophets) to the fate which the Jews were then bringing upon themselves, and, I also think, to the general break-up of the foundations of society by the destruction of the old "world," which He apprehended as inevitable; second, that any reference to future judgments can only be understood as being based upon general moral principles herein laid down, and is quite independent of outward details or of special times, such as a supposed end of the world. The prophecy is, in short, a description of all judgment indirectly, but directly only of the judgment of Jerusalem. Nothing can be more precise than the notes of time by which He appears to have endeavoured to guard their minds from exactly those errors into which men have since fallen. He begins with the declaration that not one stone of the temple shall be left upon another. He speaks of the persecutions and false rumours that should assail the disciples. He bids them flee from Jerusalem, compassed about with armies. He tells them that they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven, and gathering in His elect from the four quarters; and lest this metaphorical language, descriptive of the growth of the Church, should be misunderstood, He adds that then they shall know that it is near, even at the doors. Then He emphatically announces that this generation shall not pass before ALL these things be fulfilled: and if any man wishes to see what human sophistry, stimulated by a false tradition, can accomplish, let him read the attempts that have been made to explain away these words. It is an instructive but mournful spectacle.

* In using the word "commentator," it did not occur to me that it might be taken to include Mr. Maurice. Need it be said that it is to him I owe the true doctrine of the kingdom of heaven?

After this, follow three prophetic parables, the Ten Virgins, the Talents, and the Sheep and the Goats, all turning upon the same point, but with one notable exception. The first describes his rejection or acceptance by the Jews as individuals. The second explains His relations to His own servants, that is, to all Christians, and prescribes their duties till His coming; though here, again, that coming once more seems to recede into the distance, nor need we deny a possibly direct reference to a future world, the more so, as a doctrine of rewards is laid down quite at variance with that of mere endless happiness, and suggestive of work, responsibility, and development. But in the third, the Master does, as it seems to me, in His closing words, practically abandon His standpoint in the present, and contemplate Himself as related to all mankind. I say this, not because the details of the parable would not equally well fall in with the other interpretation, but because the test by which He will try men at the eternal judgment is declared emphatically not to be that of personal relationship to Himself, but of simple human kindness on the part of those who never heard His name. Humanity, itself, may take heart and rejoice, the strongest opponents of Christianity may cease to strive, when they remember that in His final words, when He was claiming to be the judge of mankind, He asserted that righteousness would be recognized as the work of human nature in kindness, love, and help, and that every man who lived and laboured for his fellow-men would be found to have lived and laboured for Christ.

It was thus, then, that Christ called men's attention away from dreams of the future life to the present realities of their social, moral, and political condition; but it must be pointed out that, in assigning to these the first place in His teaching, we are not limiting the scope of the parables, but very much enlarging it. They become morally true of all human life, delineations of man in all his many capacities and relationships, all being ultimately referred to God. Heaven and hell, pardon and judgment, become very present and pressing realities, and religion is seen in the teaching of Christ to be throwing all her weight into the task of giving divine sanctions to the duties of the present world. The same applies to His teaching about the Resurrection, and, as linked with it, judgment to come. The Pharisees believed in some sort of physical resurrection and future judgment. Our Lord in the very beautiful discourse contained in St. John, ch. v., proclaimed, that as the Father raised the dead and quickened them, so the Son quickens whom He will, and that to Him all judgment has been committed. This He further explained by saying that all who believed in Him had already everlasting life; and to show beyond all doubt that He was thinking of the present life, He added, "The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice

of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live." And as though this were not enough, He used, a little further on, words which seem naturally to refer to the last final Resurrection as believed in by the Pharisees, to describe the spiritual Resurrection and rapidly approaching judgment—"The time is coming in which they that are in the grave shall hear His voice and shall come forth: they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of condemnation." Once more, when Martha adopts the current Jewish notion concerning her brother, "I know that he shall rise again in the Resurrection at the last day," she receives the rebuking answer intended to show that the raising of Lazarus was typical of the immediate raising of humanity, "I am the Resurrection and the Life." So that we have here the fourth Gospel from its very different point of view bearing witness to the truth I am upholding, and we see from it as from the others that the Lord declared His desire to raise Judaism as it were from the dead, and foretold certain condemnation to all who would not hear His voice. And it is words like these that give to the actual Resurrection of Christ that moral power which St. Paul afterwards saw so clearly and proclaimed so earnestly. To him it was the resurrection of humanity and of every human being that believed in Christ from sin and darkness. The teaching of the Apostles, indeed, bears evident traces of the difficulty they experienced in seeing clearly what was meant by Christ's coming in judgment, while their opinions seemed to have varied just as might be expected in the case of men who were living in the midst of the perplexities and agitations which that judgment caused, and whose very position prevented them from separating the outward and temporary circumstances from the abiding moral principles contained in His prophecy. However this may be, the fact that the resurrection was bound up first and chiefly with the rise of humanity from its past degradation, exercises a most important influence upon the value of the evidence by which the account of it is supported. For if it could be shown that the belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ was connected in the minds of the earliest Christian teachers with old Jewish opinions, or that it grew up in their minds almost unconsciously from the natural desire to give force and certainty to the longing for immortality, then the value of the evidence would be very seriously impaired. But when we see that it was attached to an entirely different set of moral conceptions, that it was welcomed rather as calling men to a life of practical goodness here, than as holding out to them the certainty of a life of endless happiness hereafter, we are obliged to admit that, except for the inevitable difficulty of believing in anything supernatural, the history has everything to recommend it to favourable reception by candid minds.

It may, however, be urged that we run some danger of cutting off the teaching and life of Christ from all reference to immortality whatsoever; but to this it may again be answered that, to adjust things into their proper places, it is often necessary to wrench them vigorously in the direction directly opposite to that in which they have been distorted. And I do not only maintain that the real application of the parables is to future life in this world, its judgments, rewards, and penalties, but I am also convinced that the sayings, in which the next world is expressly mentioned, bear witness, when examined, to Christ's desire not to fix men's attention upon the life to come to the prejudice of that which now is. Three of those exceptions, that prove the rule, occur to me now: the first, His own voluntary teaching; the last two, forced upon Him by circumstances. In the parable of Dives and Lazarus, He uses common Jewish expressions to point out the danger of wealth and luxury, but He does so in such a manner as to make any pressing of the details in their literal meaning a mere absurdity. The wildest imagination could hardly conceive this parable as meant to be a serious description of the actual future world. His answer to the Sadducees about the Resurrection was forced from Him, and he contents Himself simply with clearing the doctrine from material and unworthy notions, asserting it as a fact, and proving the assertion from the words of God to Moses. The third instance is His promise to the dying thief, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise," where once more the necessity of consoling the penitent man obliges Him to give a promise of the world to come in words which the man himself and they that stood by could understand. Sad, indeed, is it to think what a superstructure of barren speculation has been raised by the prying spirit of human dogmatism upon these simple words, and how the language of metaphor, used simply for the purpose of being intelligible to those whom it chiefly concerned, has been perverted into a literal statement of actual fact. But though I am sure that sayings of this kind are not to be taken for more than as affording a general indication of the existence of a life to come, yet it still remains to be pointed out that Christ did actually meet the cravings of the human soul for immortality. And this He did, not by making it the one main object of all His teaching, but by a single pregnant saying and by a single suggestive act.

Now let us ask at what time should we expect that Christ presented the idea of immortality plainly and decisively to the minds of His disciples. Any knowledge, however slight, of human nature and its necessities would teach us that the appropriate and, so to speak, moral occasion for this would be when the agony of ap-

proaching separation made it necessary to find consolation both for Himself and them, and when a new spirit was to be breathed into the men upon whose love and faithfulness depended the future destinies of the kingdom of heaven. At the beginning, therefore, of His final discourse to the disciples we find a plain and direct reference to what we call heaven, but which He carefully described under those simple personal and domestic terms which have made this saying especially dear to Christian minds: "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you: I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself, that where I am there ye may be also." Compare this sentence, in which the whole of Christ's direct teaching about immortality is contained, with the vast superstructure of the so-called Christian doctrine of the future state, and the striking contrast between the two will become apparent. How few, and yet how pregnant with all the thoughts that human nature requires for support and consolation, are the words of the Master! How many and how fatal to human morality are the words of those who speak in His name! The meaning and moral force, indeed, of what He taught in this saying it is not necessary to point out here; it is sufficient to call attention to it as Christ's authentic description of the life to come. It embraces all the beautiful or morally useful associations which are attached to a house that shelters us, to the home where our Father dwells, to resting-places, to variety of interests ("many"), to suitability of occupations ("prepared places"), to eternal communion with Christ Himself. But more than this, though straitly questioned, He will not reveal: once more He turns their thoughts to the heavenly life upon earth, bidding them follow Him as the "way," and to know the God whose house they were to inhabit hereafter by knowing His Son now and here. Instead of dreams of the imagination, curious questionings of the intellect, selfish desires of the heart, dogmatic utterances of miscalled authority, He confined His teaching concerning the future world to that which can be safely gathered from the moral analogies of the present. And if Christians had taught immortality as Christ taught it, they would not have been compelled to witness the revolt of man's heart or mind from the assurance of a life to come.

Still it may be said that a single sentence, standing almost alone, upon so vast a subject, affords but little ground whereon to build the fabric of man's belief in immortality, so far as it is revealed in the teaching of Christ. But a moral power, greater than can be conveyed in words, is contained in the act of His to which I have alluded. I mean, of course, the Ascension; for it is this that gives,

as it were, external shape to what He said, and certainty to what He promised. But, to bring this out more clearly, we must trace the connection between religion and science in working out the moral development of man.

When the Jewish poets looked up into the heavens, they found themselves alone with God, the universe, and their own souls. Not only would they abstain from worshipping the heavens, but they would, as it were, look them in the face and consider them. And it seemed to them that they were the home of God, who had set His glory above them. Still, however, in the thought of the Jews, as of the Gentiles, in religion as in philosophy, the earth was the centre of the universe, and for its sake the heavens existed: it was that for which God had framed and designed everything else. So that the heavens, while testifying of God to the Jew, did not testify of immortality. He saw only that all men perish and come to an end. But with the change of our belief as to the true relations of heaven and earth, the idea of immortality first becomes practically and morally possible. And this change we owe, first to the Ascension of Christ, to the simple fact that He had been seen to go up from earth to heaven, which thus became the goal of man's hopes, the real centre of God's universe. But then man's ignorance of the real facts as to the physical relations between the earth and the heavens prevented him for centuries from entering into the meaning of Christ's action, and gave occasion for the revival, or rather the continuance, of the old pagan conceptions of heaven and hell. Copernicus was the best commentator on the Ascension, and the Ascension was a prophetic intimation of his discovery. A true religious idea was given as the necessary step to a true scientific one; but the scientific idea, in turn, exploded all the errors which religion had built upon the original truth; because the ultimate end of this discovery is to banish the hope of selfish happiness, and substitute the idea of infinite variety, occupation, and progress, which the heavens, read in the light of modern science, now preach to us. They convey the same kind of impression as the earth itself must have conveyed to the minds of those who believed it to be boundless space; and we look up to the sky with much the same sort of feelings as men gazed across the Atlantic before Columbus crossed it. As the earth grows less, the heavens grow more and more. Our scientific discoveries do not measure things as they are there; our wisdom about man suggests much, but explains nothing as to the inhabitants of the worlds above.

Now it is just at the time when the "earthly" sciences are making it difficult to conceive the idea of a disembodied spirit, or to separate it from its material organization, that the science

of the heavens adds her emphatic testimony to the teaching of Christ, and to His action, more powerful than words, in ascending heavenwards. There is a place, or rather there are places, where men may live after death—so says science. There is a man who has gone there—so says religion. The law of progress will not consent to be bound down within earthly limits; when it has accomplished everything upon earth, it sighs for new worlds to conquer. So that the truest conception of immortality is precisely that with which we are becoming more and more familiar; that which on the physical side we may call evolution, on the moral side, education. To take the commonest instance, the soul of a thoughtful man, looking into futurity, resembles the soul of a thoughtful child just standing on the verge of this world's life. There are dreams of works, of honours, of friendships, and of success. Both are leaving school and beginning the larger life into which they will carry the character already formed, the preparation already made. The man is as sure that there is a world of work and of life beyond this, as the boy who hears and sees traces of the various callings and occupations of the world in which grown men act and move. Here, after the discipline of life is over, will be his future abiding and working place. Here, in one of the unnumbered worlds of God, may he carry onwards and upwards the life of an immortal being.

From the two propositions which I have thus endeavoured to substantiate, first, that Christ's direct teaching concerned almost exclusively the present world, second, that His teaching about the world to come represents it simply as the development of our moral qualities and spiritual life under higher conditions, there follow two conclusions to which I invite the serious attention of all who desire to see truths harmonized with each other instead of being set in endless contradiction. The first is, that the objections urged by modern thought against Christian morality do not apply to the teaching of Christ himself; the second is, that this teaching, so far from being opposed to the spirit of modern science, is in exact accordance with it. We are familiar with the objections to which I refer. Religious men, it is said, are diverted from the duties of this world, from realizing the sacredness of humanity, from seeing the necessity of immediate reforms and improvements, from sympathy with national and social life, owing to the too-present and absorbing contemplation of the life to come. No one, I suppose, really believes that this is practically the case to any considerable extent, at any rate at the present time; but it is contended that this escape is due simply to the fact that human nature is strong enough to triumph in the long run over the perversions of religious truth. But the objection, as an objection against Christianity, vanishes, if once it can be shown that the mind

of Christ was full of the present evils and pressing wants that afflicted his countrymen ; that His moral teaching was meant above all things to throw light upon human life and human nature under their present conditions ; that to do our duty here, to look for judgment now, to set up righteousness and justice in the world we live in, to be citizens, patriots, masters, and servants, in that larger and deeper sense which He saw and proclaimed, is the true kingdom of heaven which He died to establish. All this shines forth in the parables the moment they are removed from the false, unnatural glare which the almost exclusive notion of a heaven to come has cast upon them. But I confess, that even this reconciliation, important as it is, does not satisfy my ambition. I believe that the truth I am here insisting upon, is the missing link needed to bind together the morality of Paganism and Christianity. Whether or no Christian morality is or is not perfect, whether there is in it, not only something wanting, but even a certain one-sided, perverting influence, has been, and still is, the subject of a long and unsatisfactory controversy. On the one hand it is seen that there are certain moral truths which Christianity does not teach, and certain factors in human nature of which it seems to take no account ; on the other hand, to lay this at the door of Jesus Christ, or even of St. Paul, appears manifestly unreasonable. The object of the life of Christ was to add to humanity those last and highest ideas which complete man's conceptions of duty and of character, not to go over ground already traversed. He is the head of humanity, but not the whole of it ; he does not supersede what is true in other teachers, but gives motive power and divine perfection to what they have already taught. There is nothing exclusive about Him when we understand His mission aright, any more than there is about the call of the Jewish nation, when once we have realized that they were not the only nation pleasing to God, or exclusively occupied in accomplishing His will. The objection, however, that Christ's teaching is not only negative on some points (which in truth it could hardly fail to be, if it were to be human at all), but that it is absolutely one-sided, requires a different answer, and cannot be said to be unreasonable when we remember the absolutely pernicious effects which have, according to the testimony of history, flowed from that which has authoritatively claimed to represent it. The problem is this :—There are certain faulty results arising from Christian morality, and yet it is not fair to charge them upon Christ's teaching unless it contained something positively untrue, or upon His character unless He plainly did something wrong. If so, then, where do they come from ? Now the answer is, that perversions creep into the moral teaching of any man when the end which he himself has in view is altered, and the facts to which his teaching was adapted are wrongly stated.

View, for instance, the character and teaching of Christ through the atmosphere created by the ever-present consciousness of a future endless heaven to be obtained, and a future endless hell to be avoided, and then every evil effect which can, with any truth, be traced to Christian influences is accounted for at once. Softness, unreality, carelessness of intellectual truth, obstructiveness to the march of new ideas, unconscious selfishness, neglect of worldly virtues (so called), sectarianism in its best sense (that is, anxiety by any means for the salvation of souls in the only way believed to be true), can all be traced, not to Christ, but to Christianity, to the framework in which His teaching has been set. His morality is distorted when it is made to fit a different conception of life from what He intended. I do not venture to hope that the difficulty is altogether solved by this consideration, though I certainly think that the right clue to the solution has been suggested. Let us get rid of the notion that the future world was the chief and direct object of what He taught, and then His teaching will stand out as the crown and completion of all practical present morality, and will be seen to comprehend all other teaching by adding just the element of divine self-sacrifice which was required to give power, light, and life.

And secondly, I affirm that the teaching of Christ, rightly interpreted, is in harmony with the predominant idea which science is engaged in attaching to morality at this present time. The kingdom of heaven is civilization viewed religiously, owning God as its Creator and Judge, and looking for still nobler developments in other spheres. Men's moral capacities fit them for their place in the great hereafter, and judgment consists in assigning to every man the place for which he is fit, just as the true reward of a child at school is not the prizes which he gains, but the place in the world for which he has prepared himself. And if this be so, I challenge any reasonable man to deny that this view of Christian immortality is conducive to human morality in this present life. It finds man out exactly as science wishes him to be found out, that is, as a being growing upwards to higher modes of life which are conditioned by his present conduct. It brings before him a responsibility to his fellows, which death, so far from terminating, only intensifies. It makes judgment a very searching and personal matter, and allies it with the perfect justice and eternal purposes of God. It gives special sacredness and power to common things, and makes the ideas of the duty of citizens and neighbours to be larger and more fruitful of good. It holds before him that hope of self-culture and improvement which apart from God and immortality is so unspeakably selfish, non-human, and futile. And lastly, it is in accordance with what common sense teaches men to think as concerning their own immortality. Left to

themselves they do not, even when religious, think much of the future world, and they are right not to do so. As with Christ, so with all who are most true to the best instincts of their nature, present duties, hopes, and responsibilities fill the mind with thoughts enough to occupy their attention and maintain their interest in sufficient and worthy objects. But with all this the future life is felt as well, and that all the more powerfully for good because its impressions are vague and transient. It cheers, but only at specially dark moments; it blesses, but only at times of exceeding sadness; it explains, but only when disappointment is unwontedly heavy; it is the firm ground which men touch when the floods come over the soul, and whence they rise to work and hope once more; lastly, it forms the background of the picture of human life to which men rarely look, though they are never without the consciousness of its existence.

To conclude. Let science set herself to reform man's belief in his own immortality, instead of engaging in the unnatural and hopeless task of destroying it.

T. W. FOWLE.



VILLAGE COMMUNITIES.

Village Communities in the East and West. Six Lectures delivered at Oxford by H. T. MAINE. London. 1871.

ABOUT a generation ago some learned men in Denmark and Holstein,* proved that land in those countries was not originally occupied by individuals, but by races and tribes, and that these associations cultivated their common property on a principle of co-operation.

Before this time it had been supposed to be a peculiarity of the Germanic races that every family inhabited a separate farmhouse, surrounded by the land belonging to it, which also separated it from the neighbouring farmhouses. It was supposed that the villages now generally found in Germany had a later origin, when warlike and unsettled times compelled the country people to live closer together. The above-mentioned researches, the results of which were so opposed to previous opinions, have given rise in recent decades to further research, which has not only confirmed these new views, but has brought to light, among the other Germanic races, a state of things similar to that which prevailed in Jutland, Schleswig, and Westphalia. Finally, the present writer has endeavoured to show that the Anglo-Saxon race did not essentially differ in this respect from the other Germanic nations.

Mr. Maine compares this agrarian condition of ancient Germanic

* Olliefsen, Hanssen, and Michelsen in relation to the Cimbrian peninsula, and Baron von Hapthausen in relation to some parts of Prussian Westphalia.

Europe with that which now exists in India. In his learned and suggestive work he proves that it is not only in the science of language, by the comparison of Sanskrit with the Indo-Germanic languages of Europe, that a fruitful field of research is opened, but that in other departments of the history of civilization interesting and instructive analogies may be discovered by the comparison of India and Germanic Europe.

We will first glance at the results of German historical research, and then compare them with what Mr. Maine says of India.

When the Germanic tribes first advanced from the life of wandering shepherds to dwelling in more settled habitations, they divided the land upon which they settled amongst the communities of which they were composed, but reserved a superfluous portion as the common possession of the whole tribe. Thus, the "volkland" of the Anglo-Saxons was evidently land belonging to the whole nation. The kings had a special right to the use of it; with the consent of the Witenas they could also make grants of it to individuals, and this appears to have been done to a great extent in England in the Anglo-Saxon period. Most of the Anglo-Saxon archives that have come down to us mention such grants by the kings to the nobles in their service, to dignitaries of the church, to monasteries, &c. These were probably mostly grants of "volkland," and the extent of it was, therefore, much diminished towards the end of the Anglo-Saxon period.

Of the portions of land allotted to the separate communities a part in each was divided off on which to build dwellings. To each house a smaller piece of land was attached, large enough for a court-yard, a garden, and a bit of pasture, on which the flocks took refuge in case of need, all of which, together with the house, was enclosed by a hedge. The dwelling-places of a community were generally near together, and all surrounded by a village hedge.* These enclosed dwelling-places were the only strictly private property of the Germanic landowner, over which he had unlimited control. He had only the use of the rest of the land in common with the other householders in the district. This was especially the case with woodland and pasture; these were everywhere the undivided property of the whole community. No one had any portion of it for his exclusive use, and the use of these lands was subject to special regulations for all the inhabitants of the village.

While it can be plainly recognized that the dwelling-house and farm-buildings were private property, and pasture and woodland com-

* The Anglo-Saxon term *tūn*, which was used not only for separate farms but for the village collectively, is derived from *zaun* (hedge), while in Scandinavia and the North of England the word "taft" was used to designate the separate houses with their court-yards, gardens, &c.

mon property, the extent to which arable land was common is more doubtful. There seems early to have been a difference in this respect among different tribes. But the original state of things probably was, that arable land was not held permanently as private property, but was, from time to time, re-distributed amongst the community for temporary occupation by lot.

Up to the most recent times there have been, here and there, districts in Germany in which an annual re-partition of all arable land took place among the community,* and even now there are cases in which a portion of the arable is private property, another portion periodically allotted to, or used by the members of a community in a certain rotation. In England also the periodic allotment of meadows and plots of arable land which occasionally, though rarely, used to take place, points to a similar state of things. On the other hand, however, it is maintained by some that such alternations in the occupation of land since the historic period were always exceptional, and that private possession of it has been the rule amongst the Germanic races ever since their appearance in history. This controversy is connected with the other, namely, whether the distinction between pasture and arable land among the ancient Germanic races was a permanent or only temporary one.

Most Germans who have made researches into this subject are now of opinion that the village communities selected portions of land in turn to be used for some years as arable land, and that when exhausted by many crops, they lay fallow, and were for a long period only used as pasture. Thus, in course of time, the whole extent of land was under cultivation, and only a small portion of it exhausted at one time. Others, on the contrary, maintain, that there was a permanent separation of pasture and arable land, that land was allowed to lie fallow every second or third year, but was otherwise regularly sown. If the first view is correct, a periodic re-partition of the land would take place of itself. It would not pay to keep a particular piece of land in cultivation if it was considered to be private property for a certain number of years only, and was then allotted to general use for a much longer period. It would have given endless trouble to keep the plots of land separate in pasture time for decades, and considering the abundance of land, and the small outlay of capital upon it, it would have been useless. The regular cultivation of the same plots of land gradually made the periodic re-partition of it appear less desirable, and it became less and less frequent.

The decision of both questions depends partially on the meaning of the celebrated and much discussed passage in the "Germania" of

* See, especially, G. Hanssen, *die Gehöferschaften im Regierungs-Bezirk Trino*, Berlin, 1863.

Tacitus,* as well as on the importance attached to the accounts given by Julius Cæsar of the agriculture of the Suevi. The advocates of the first view, however, justly point to the deeper reasons and analogies which favour the idea that private property in arable land, as well as permanent separation of it from pasture, is the result of a later development of husbandry. To mention but one point, it is far more natural to suppose, as land was abundant, that when its productiveness was lessened by repeated crops, fresh land would be taken into cultivation, than that its fertility should be restored by manuring and ploughing. Such a system of interchange of arable and pasture land prevails among many nations in a low state of civilization; there are traces of it in our own civilized states, and especially in England, in the evidences occasionally found of common lands having formerly been sown.

We therefore consider this to be the original method of husbandry among the Germanic races. At what period the change was made to the private possession and permanent cultivation of land among each particular race, cannot be determined, the sources of information are far too scanty. On the whole, we cannot but suppose that, with few exceptions, the change took place comparatively early. The character of the Germanic races, the affection of the Germanic husbandman for the land he had tilled, was much more favourable to this advance, than the greater indifference and less settled character of the neighbouring Slavonic nations. In the Russian villages it is well known that the whole extent of land belonging to them is common property, and that from time to time all the cultivated land is re-distributed amongst the householders; while among the Anglo-Saxons at the time to which the archives collected by Kemble belong, the separation of arable and pasture land, as well as permanent private possession of arable land, seems to have been the rule. But after the ancient system of agriculture had disappeared, the use of the land for centuries was regulated by certain rules for the public interest, and when the land was lying fallow, as well as after harvest, it was used as pasture land by the whole village. Thus from time to time the land reverted to the state of common property, which indeed it only ceased to be during the time of actual cultivation. Common and private use were interchanged. The arable lands therefore were never like the dwelling places, separated from the pasture land by permanent hedges or ditches, but were merely enclosed by wooden

* "Agri, pro numero cultorum, ab universis per vices occupantur, quos mox inter se secundum dignationem partiuntur: facilitatem partiendi camporum spatia præstant. Arva per annos mutant, et superest ager. Nec enim cum ubertate et amplitudine soli labore contendunt, ut pomaria conserant, et prata separent, et hortos rigent: sola terræ seges imperatur."—C. xxvi.

fences from sowing time to harvest, and these fences did not merely enclose the plots of individual proprietors, but the whole extent of village land sown with summer or winter crops.

The greater part of arable land in England, Germany, and the north of France appears usually to have been divided into three parts, of which two were sown with summer and winter crops alternately, and the third lay fallow. Every husbandman had one of each of these plots, in order that he might take part in the general rotation. The farmers appear not only to have proceeded on a common plan, but also to have united their forces. We know, for example, that in villages in which every farmer had not the necessary team for a plough, generally eight oxen or horses, the teams of several were united and the ploughing was done in common. Thus in this stage of the development of agriculture it was rather a co-operative system of husbandry than a common ownership in the Germanic communities. But if it is allowed that the greater part of the land, pasture, woodland, and frequently meadows also, were common property, the farmland that surrounded these villages was very limited in extent, so that we are justified in speaking of co-operative husbandry in the ancient village communities.

In comparing the Indian village communities with these ancient Germanic ones, Mr. Maine justly adduces a great point of difference, namely, the smaller importance of pasture in Indian husbandry, from the nature of the climate and the diet of the people. In the imperfect state of agriculture in England and Germany during the middle ages, cattle-breeding appeared to be the most important branch of farming, while the Hindoo, living on vegetable diet, values cattle only as draught power, and considers the breeding of them as of comparatively small importance. But in the state of civilization which had been reached by the Germanic races in the middle ages, the systematic rearing of cattle on large tracts of land was possible, and it was the main object of co-operation. As we have seen, pasture land was common property, and arable land reverted from time to time to the use of the community as pasture. It is proved by numerous documents that these rights of pasture, this agrarian constitution was specially prized by the small landowner. It was this that formed the strongest bond of the village community. There is no such strong bond of union among the Indian villages, and therefore their husbandry is far less co-operative than that of the ancient Germanic races. But although that communism in the use of land does not exist in India, which is generally found in the farming of pasture land in a low stage of civilization, still, as in the ancient Germanic communities, there exist "minute customary rules binding on all for the cultivation of arable land—rules which in both cases

have the same object—to reconcile a common plan and order of cultivation for the whole brotherhood with the holding of distinct lots in the arable land by separate families. The common life of the group or community has been so far broken up as to admit of private property in cultivated land, but not so far as to allow the departure from a joint system of cultivating the land.”

Mr. Maine does not enter into the details of these rules; they probably differ very much in different places, while in the middle ages there is a remarkable uniformity in the husbandry of the German, English, Danish, and Northern French villages. The rotation of crops, the time of sowing summer and winter wheat, the time when land was to lie fallow, the mode of working fallow land, the system of manuring, and many other agricultural customs, were the same throughout a great part of central Europe.

An essential part of these rules in many Indian communities refers to the use of water for irrigation. These rules are, as Mr. Maine tells us, administered in every village by “the council of elders, by the elective or hereditary functionary who sometimes takes its place, or by the person who represents the community in its contracts with Government for the payment of land-rent.” This regulation of water interests for the whole village by the commune forms, perhaps, an equivalent for the common use of pasture land which does not exist in India.

The preponderance of the farming of arable land over cattle breeding also accounts for the fact that in India the re-partition of cultivated land has almost disappeared. Mr. Maine states that he has not found any instances of it among the Aryan races, and it now only occurs among the non-Aryan farmers, “who form a considerable proportion of the population in the still thinly peopled territory called the Central Provinces.”

But, if the traces of agrarian unity in the Indian villages are more effaced than in the ancient Germanic ones, the bond of union is not, therefore, less strong. The consciousness of original association has been preserved among the former, while it seems to have disappeared since the historic period in the villages of Western Europe. “The popular notion is,” says Mr. Maine, of India, “that the village landholders are all descended from one or more individuals, who settled the village, and that the only exceptions are formed by persons who have derived their rights by purchase, or otherwise, from members of the original stock.”

There are many reasons for concluding that among the Germanic races village communities and tribes originally coincided. Thus, Julius Cæsar states that the Suevi divided the land among “gentes et cognationes hominum,” and among the Anglo-Saxons the word

maegdh, signifying the tribal bond, is used with the same meaning as *provincia*. Again, as Kemble justly remarks, the patronymic names of places which so often occur, indicate that the villages were originally inhabited by tribes. But the village community was no longer a community of this sort in historic times. This can be clearly shown, especially in the case of the Anglo-Saxons, for among them, though the tribal bond had by no means been relaxed, it had become distinct from the agrarian and political community.

The usage in India that no landholder may sell his land without consent of the village community, indicates a sentiment of communism approaching relationship. A similar law existed in former times in the German villages, by which the villagers had a preference over strangers, as purchasers of land,—a law which existed in some German towns up to our times, and has only been abolished by legislation.

Another feature which, as far as our knowledge extends, has become more effaced among the Germanic than the Indian villages, is the creation of a number of hereditary offices for the regulation of trade and the government of the village. Besides the headman, or council of elders, Mr. Maine reckons up "the village accountant, the Brahmans, the blacksmith, the harness-maker, the shoemaker." All these persons were regarded as servants of the community as well as members of it, and were compensated for their functions "either by an allowance of grain, or, more generally, by the allotment of a piece of cultivated land in hereditary possession."

By such an arrangement every village must, of course, acquire a high degree of isolation and independence. Mr. Maine mentions that in many English parishes the existence of fields and meadows having the names of certain trades indicates that similar institutions must have existed in ancient Germanic villages. In a manor described by Mr. Williams in the "Archæologia,"* the meadows were divided into hams, which, at the time when Mr. Williams wrote, were annually allotted to the various landholders in the manor, but they still bore the names of the Smith's ham, the Steward's ham, the Constable's ham, &c. It may be added, that in the ancient English land register, the Boldanbook of the year 1183, artizans are frequently mentioned with the land which they received for their services; for instance, "N. N. faber tenet vi. acras pro servitio suo."

One thing which is at present of great importance in the Indian villages, as it was formerly amongst the Germanic ones, is the levy of taxes. The village "is the unit of all the revenue arrangements," and the Indian Government has more and more discovered that in

* Vol. xxxiii.

this respect it is desirable to treat the village as a unit and not to have transactions with the individual cultivator. Mr. George Campbell relates that "there are villages in the Madras Presidency which for half a century had submitted to the farce of a Government assessment on each individual, but had year by year lumped the individual assessments together and divided the total in their own way among the members of the community."*

It was, on the contrary, one of the greatest weaknesses of the ancient Germanic constitutions that they had no regular system of taxation. Wherever they went they put an end to the well-organized Roman system of levying taxes without substituting any other for it. It was the Norman kings who first again placed the State on a sound financial basis in England, and therefore for the Germanic village communities the payment of taxes had no meaning. Afterwards, however, the oppression by landlords from which we see the cultivators of the soil so grievously suffering almost everywhere in the second half of the middle ages, formed a similar community of suffering among the members of a village. Compulsory service and agricultural products were frequently exacted from the villages as units, and the assessment on individuals left to be managed by the villagers themselves.

With this subject we touch upon the further development of the agrarian constitution to which Mr. Maine devotes his fifth lecture, entitled "The Feudalization of Europe." He calls it the great problem of legal history to explain, how, from communities of landholders, with equal rights, among the Germanic races, that subjection of the cultivators of their own land to Lords of the Manor arose, which prevailed in the greater part of Europe up to the French Revolution. But it must be observed that the question, "How did the Manor arise out of the Mark?" is by no means the same as the question, "How and when did the Feudal System become prevalent among the Germanic nations?" The two inquiries should be kept carefully distinct.

In the history of most agricultural nations a distinction very widely prevails between a paramount right to property in land, and the usufruct of it on payment of rent or for service performed. We find it in classic antiquity, Greek as well as Roman, under very various names; we find it amongst many Slavonic and Germanic races as soon as they appear in history, and it prevails widely in India. We know from the earliest records we have of the Germans that lords of the soil, and peasants bound to cultivate it for their benefit, frequently

* "Tenure of Land in India," in the "Systems of Land Tenure in various Countries," published under the sanction of the Cobden Club. London, 2nd ed., 1870, p. 197.

existed, for Tacitus clearly states that it was so. He says:—
 “Ceteris servis non in nostrum morem, descriptis per familiam ministeriis, utuntur: suam quisque sedem, suos penates regit. Frumenti modum dominus, aut pecoris, aut vestis, ut colono, injungit: et servus hactenus paret: cetera domus officia uxor ac liberi exsequuntur.”

They were not therefore slaves to perform domestic service, but serfs like the Roman coloni, who lived in separate houses, cultivated the land allotted to them, and made payment to the landlord in kind. This practice was also widely prevalent among the Anglo-Saxons, according to the earliest records we have of them. “Laenland” is frequently mentioned, which is let for a life-time, or for two or three lives, and for the use of which the cultivator paid in cattle, bread, eggs, corn, fish, &c., or performed agricultural service. The cultivators of the soil were also partly bound to it as *glebæ adscripti*, and were alienated with it as “*instrumentum fundi*.” The expression for the transfer of such land, with the peasants living upon it, is “*mid mele et mid mannum*.”

The designation of the landed property of the landlord, is *Frohnhof*, manor. The peculiarity of it is the connexion between the manor house, *curia manorii*, the abode of the lord of the manor and his household, and the peasant holdings dependent on it. The relation between them is twofold. In the first place it is a legal one, as jurisdiction over the dependent landholders resides in the lord of the manor, particularly in minor and agrarian cases. But it is especially an economic one, for an estate is attached to the manor house for the support of the lord and his household (*demesne lands*, *terra dominica*) which is cultivated by the dependent landholders, the tenants of the manor. They plough, harrow, sow the demesne lands and gather in the harvest. Such a relation between the lord of the manor and his tenants, had in the stage of civilization to which the Germanic races had attained one thousand years ago, decided advantages over any other system, in enabling a man devoted to the military profession or who lived at Court, to enjoy the proceeds of a large estate. It was not possible simply to let the land or to have it cultivated by free day-labourers. The system of letting land, or of employing free day-labourers who sell their labour for money, are products of a more advanced stage of intercourse, which enables the farmer to obtain money by the sale of produce, to pay labourers or rent. But, as at that time no such intercourse existed, the only plan was to have land farmed by domestic serfs, or by tenants who paid rent in labour or products of the soil. This practice is doubtless very preferable to cultivation by bondmen, and the manorial system had

• *Germania*, cap. xxv.

the special advantage that it gave rise to personal relations between the landlord and tenant, and rendered possible various organizations among the country population.

In almost every manor there were landholders in very different positions in life, from the lord himself to the "cotarius," who possessed only a little hut and a few acres, but they were all united by a legal and economic bond. These gradations in society, and a bond of this kind, certainly possessed advantages over the uniform subjection of many village cultivators under one landlord, with whom they have no other connexion than the payment of rent. This special relation between the landlord and the landholders, which formed them into a legal and economic unit, appears to be very ancient among the Germanic races. It existed in England long before the Normans introduced the word manor. We possess Anglo-Saxon documents, defining the service which the dependent tenants had to render on the landlord's farm, and in which the various classes of inhabitants of a manor are distinguished, as they were after the Norman Conquest. We see that they distinguished between inland and utland, just as afterwards between terra dominica and terra hominum, or terra tenentum. And in relation to the administration of justice, the landrica or landhlaforð stood in nearly the same relation to the dwellers on his land as the lord of the manor afterwards stood to his tenants. He had also to see to the collection of taxes.

The feudal system is essentially different from the manorial system, and is a product of a later development of civilization. It may now be considered an established fact that it did not exist in England at the Anglo-Saxon period, and was first imported as an institution by the Normans. It had arisen in the States which had been formed by Germanic conquerors in former provinces of the Roman Empire, and was a union of two originally distinct systems—that of vassalage and the system of benefices. The practice of persons attaching themselves to the great, and especially to the King, as vassals under pledge of special devotedness, appears to have been most ancient. Along with this the custom arose of kings rewarding the great and powerful, and especially their own servants, for their services by grants of land (beneficia) from their own landed property, and among the Franks, also from confiscated church property. The want of any regular taxation and financial system in the Germanic States appears to have conduced to this practice. Both these relations occur in England during the Anglo-Saxon period. We have a number of documents in which the Anglo-Saxon kings make grants of land to their servants (fidei suo ministro), and just as these grants may be compared to the benefices of the Continent, the personal relation of the king to his servants may be compared to

the *Gesidhas* of vassalage. The faithful service of the *Gesidhas* was not at that time secured by grants of land; neither was vassalage or feudal service expected in consequence of grants of land. The military system was based upon what was at first considered the duty of all men to serve in war, but it was probably afterwards limited to the larger landholders. It was generally obligatory on the well-to-do classes; not in consideration of grants of land from the king. It was not in England, but in the Germanic States of the Continent, that the complete amalgamation of the two systems first arose which forms the essence of the feudal system. The recipient of benefices gradually became regularly bound to render personal feudal service, and what was at first the personal duty of the vassal to his lord became conditional on receiving grants of land. These relations were made use of to re-organize the military system. The service of vassals arising out of the feudal relationship was substituted for the universal military obligation of all free landholders. It was only after its complete development that this institution was introduced into England. It admirably suited a warrior race ruling over a subject people. In consequence of its origin, it bore completely a legal character, while the grants of land to the tillers of the soil were more private in their nature. The object of the feudal system was the conduct of public affairs, the organization of the State. Manorial rights over dependent peasants, on the contrary, had specially an economic object. In the feudal system, therefore, on which the mediæval state is based, it is not a question of personal relation, nor of the relation between landlords and tenants.

Although long before the rise of the feudal system, and as soon as the Germanic nations appear in history, we find inequality of property and lords of the soil as existing institutions, we can only form conjectures as to their origin, and gradual encroachment on the rights of the free peasants. Mr. Maine, following the example of German historians, mentions as one cause, "the extreme quarrelsomeness of these little societies," which led to frequent feuds, and to the subjection of whole village communities to other proprietors. He also justly remarks, that inequality of rank, which appears to have existed among the Germanic races from the earliest times, must have conducted to inequality of property. The upper classes would have the pre-eminence in military service and in the leadership of the people, and would receive more of the land and a large number of the prisoners taken during a victorious campaign. Besides this, we must refer to universal causes—the inequality of property, the varying abilities of mankind, and the vicissitudes of life. During the unsettled times of the early part of the middle ages this last must of itself have been a sufficient explanation.

We know that in Germany, in order to obtain the protection of great men, temporal or spiritual, many freemen entered into a condition of personal subjection, and acknowledged a paramount right to their land, for which they paid a moderate rent. Still more frequently, landless freemen sought to obtain some little dependent possession on the great man's estate, for in those times it was impossible to obtain the means of living without land. Thus grants of land by the kings to their servants or the church were of great importance. On large tracts of land thus obtained, the owners founded manors, to which the theory of English lawyers is applicable, that all the rights of the tenants on a manor were originally granted them by the lord of the manor.

But, however much all these causes might have conduced to bring the small free proprietor into a position of personal and actual dependence, the introduction of the feudal system into England was the final, and perhaps the most decisive step in this direction. A paramount right to all landed property was ingeniously constituted with one stroke. First to the king as supreme feudal lord, next to his immediate and then to his less dependent vassals, all free proprietors who did not belong to this feudal army were subjected. Everyone, even those who had up to this time preserved their liberty and kept their property free, came, as far as landed property was concerned, into a position of dependence. They became constituent parts of a manor. In this respect an important difference is now first observed between the agricultural condition of England and that of the Germanic States of the continent. In Germany, the Netherlands, and especially in Scandinavia, the whole of the land was never held on feudal tenure; but freehold property and feudal land in varying extent existed side by side. Village communities also maintained their position as perfectly free proprietors, acknowledging no paramount lord; while in England every beginner in the study of law is taught that he must entirely renounce the idea that there was any land entirely freehold.

For those proprietors whose possessions gave them manorial rights, this limitation of the rights of property was not of much consequence, but it made the situation of those who were subject to the lord of the manor materially worse. This was specially obvious in the case of pasture lands. Everywhere among the weak, scanty population who held arable land in the early part of the middle ages, the extent of uncultivated land was very large, and every village had so much that was used only for pasture, that when the population increased, more land could easily be brought into cultivation, or a colonial village could settle on the waste land. In Germany we know that during the middle ages, many such offshoots from the

parent village were settled, and dowered with lands from the common pasture lands belonging to it. But the free land was not at the disposal of the English village communities, who were constituent parts of a manor. They merely possessed a right to use something that was not their own, and the right was constantly being more strictly limited to the cattle required for cultivating their land, or for which they could themselves find fodder in winter. All waste land not required for these purposes could be appropriated by the lord of the manor.

Although, however, a variety of circumstances conspired in the first half of the middle ages to increase the landlord's power, we need not suppose that the agrarian bond of the village communities was at once destroyed, when the small landholders became subject to a landlord. They retained the divisions of their lands, the cultivation of it according to rules binding upon all, particularly a uniform rotation of crops, the legal right to the use of pasture lands, &c. In very many cases the lord of the manor himself shared in this communism. His land had to be tilled according to the common rules, was subject to the same rights of pasture, and his cattle grazed with those of his tenants upon the common pasture land. It is true that the bond was loosening, in consequence of the increase of manorial rights, but the process was a gradual one, and up to our times, traces of the old order of things remain almost everywhere in Europe.

E. NASSE.



CHRISTIANITY ON THE CONTINENT.

THE religious movements of the Continent can never fail to be of interest to us in Great Britain. Whatever influence "the silver streak" may have in debarring physical incursions, intellectual movements of the Continent cannot fail to reach us. It is to our advantage that it is so. All our best things have come from thence, and if we have made a better use of these things than our neighbours, yet the originating influence has not been ours. Our religion came to us from Asia and the East, by way of Rome and Germany. And it is the religious element which is of all the most important, lying, as it does, at the bottom of all great national and individual movements. Occupied as religion is with the highest and deepest interests of humanity, it cannot be but that it should do so; and the present and past history of Europe, especially since the time of the Reformation, manifests that such has been the case. We shall here concern ourselves, however, with but one aspect of the question, namely, the opposite ways in which one and the same religion has commended itself to the two great and divergent families which now inhabit and occupy Europe, the Latin and the Teutonic races. So differently has religion presented itself to these two great families, that one and the same religion would appear to be altogether another, as it is apprehended by the one or the other race. We are not, however, of those who imagine that a distinction of race is that which

occasions the great distinctions among mankind. This will by no means be sufficient to account for the variations which we find among the religions of humanity. The descendants of the Goths in Spain, and the Slavonic race in Poland, for example, are entirely opposed in their most distinguishing characteristics, yet each are equally the devoted servants of the Papacy. At the same time it is not to be denied, as a matter of fact, that Christianity has assumed so different an aspect, as it has been apprehended, at least, by the Latin and Teutonic races, that, as we have said, it would appear to be an altogether different religion. This is owing, no doubt, to the fundamentally opposite grounds on which the religion is embraced.

To the Latin or Celtic race revelation commends itself by the external signs and sanctions wherewith it was originally accompanied, and they receive it on the authority by which it is thus conveyed. To the Saxon or Teutonic race it is commended by the internal light which it contains, that is, by its meaning, and the consequences which this entails. The Latin family accepts its faith on the ground of authority and evidence; the Teutonic on that of reason and conscience. It may be said that these are not opposite quarters, but rather the first and second stages of the same road. But until we come to the second stage, the first stage is but of relative value, and is not sufficient in itself to give us that we need. Unfortunately at this stage the Latin race has halted. The Teutonic race has gone on to the second, it may be with too great an abandonment of the first. The first cannot be without the second, nor the second without the first, if we would have the full possession of Christianity; but it is seldom that we find both fully or adequately possessed by any one individual or family. It is possible that the Latins may not be capable of going beyond the first stage. Yet this can hardly be the case when we remember the magnificence of their past history, and the illustrious individuals who have adorned it not only in the field of art and literature, but of abstract thought and spiritual religion, Abelard, Aquinas, Vico, Jordano, Leonardo, Bruno, and others. Nevertheless, looking at the race as a whole, and its present state, it would seem as if it had attained its end, and would not go beyond. The exponent of the religious mind of the Latin race is the Latin or Roman Church; and it is not too much to say, if we judge by the later enunciations of that Church, that a bar has been put to farther progress in religion. The Teutonic race as a whole, is now farther on, and has interposed as yet no barrier to progress. Whether it will still advance, or rest where now it is, of course we cannot say; but looking at the shorter career it has run in the stage of history, it is probable that additional progress is still before it.

When races pass beyond the first conditions of spiritual life, and do not proceed to the second, they seem to die out for want of sufficient spiritual nourishment. This appears now to be the case with most of the Latin races. Mere outward civilization or physical progress is not alone sufficient, and indeed itself depends on a sufficient inward life. France, for example, grown to manhood in physical and social progress, is now without a proportionate growth in her spiritual life, and from want of adequate nourishment in this respect, she is sinking even in the social scale, wasting her strength in an effervescence of the senses, in developments that are but of the lower or animal nature, in baseless theories of social life, and in chimerical legislation. She has a religion, that is, ultramontane Christianity. But those who are possessed of it receive it merely on authority, and do not realize its meaning, or seek to find the real meaning which it has; the ground on which they receive it indeed forbids this; and to the others, that is, to those who do not receive it, and are consequently without any religion at all, it seems either an imposture or absurd. Shut up thus to a religion which does not afford a sufficient spiritual supply, France and the Latin race now in general are, we may say, without any sufficient religion at all. Consequently, the whole of these nations, if not retrograding, are certainly not progressing in spiritual life. And, accepting their religion on the grounds they do, it is increasingly difficult for them to make any further progress. If it was difficult before, the late Vatican decrees have now made it impossible. And the Vatican is the head-quarters of that authority on which they receive their religion. Before, if enquiry as to its meaning was possible, although difficult, now it is not only impossible to seek it, but improper. And, moreover, the ground on which it was received has become so narrowed and altered, that not only is external authority that alone on which it rests, but that is now an authority which has it in its power altogether *et sua sponte* to alter its nature. For this, no doubt, is the upshot of the late Vatican decrees. Starting from the assumption that revelation came down from heaven, these go on to assume that it has been consigned to guardians of whom the representative and mouthpiece is the Pope. It follows that being what he is in virtue of his office he is not only the guardian and interpreter, but depositor of Revelation, the plenary possessor of the Holy Ghost. Speaking as such, what he says is true; but it is so true that the present, if need be, may and must annul the past, being the interpretation and meaning of the past: the Canon of Scripture never can be full while he is alive, and while he is alive, that which he says is the only Canon. Nor must we start aside at this conclusion. It was come to in full knowledge

of its consequences by more than twice as many Bishops of the western as settled the Canon in the eastern church at the great Council of Nice. And the Pope said so himself, for he is the Vicar of Christ and the sole interpreter of his own privileges: the voice of the church, and as anterior to such in time, so in authority to the written Canon which was but a portion of its utterance. When he says, "It seems good to the Holy Ghost and to us," all question is at an end; and this he is capable of saying, and is bound to say whenever he thinks that there is need. Infallibility is a divine attribute. He is infallible, and Vicar of Christ, and therefore infallible and divine. Infallible alone apart from any coadjutor, the mouth-piece of the Spirit, and the truth. There was no intention to shrink from these declarations and their logical consequences on the part of those who came to this conclusion; on the contrary, the declarations were come to in a full knowledge of these consequences, and in order to obtain them. It was needful to obtain them for the possession of truth of doctrine, and unity of fellowship. It was clear that if they were obtained, unity of doctrine and fellowship must follow. And if in spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs, so also in temporal or mundane affairs. For an interpreter of the truth on the highest things to man must surely also be so on the lower. A judge of controversy and a final authority in earthly as in heavenly things. Once accept these premisses, and such consequences follow. In the Syllabus and Encyclical the Pope enunciated the truth both on heavenly and earthly things. And the subsequent dogma of infallibility made this irresistible and infallible.

Let us see how far the power claimed must go. All power is committed to the Pope in heaven and earth as to the declaration of truth. It is so of truths of all descriptions. All truth, he enunciates, stands on one and the same foundation. All are equally true, all equally supported. By this we know there is one God—a Redeemer, a Sanctifier. By the same we know that the sun goes round the earth, and the truth of the teaching of Alphonso Liguori.

By the Encyclical and Syllabus the most certain truths of science and the highest benefits of civilization are contradicted and denied—that is, of course, as the world estimates them. The Pope's estimate is different. For this reason, he tells us, he uttered his voice in 1864 that a cure might be laid before the world. Now, in things unseen it may be allowed that he is right, and so, in general, Latin Christendom passes these by; but when he comes upon things they know, such as temporal affairs, this cannot be, and the temporal governments are up in arms. What is the consequence? No doubt a rejection of the whole—of the unseen and the seen, for they go together. Yet, as Latin Catholics are bound to receive the doctrines

of the Pope on both heads by the Encyclical and the decree of Infallibility on the peril of their salvation, they must risk it therefore; and they do so. Save by a very small and decreasing number, such Christianity is rejected.

This is the state of the present; it cannot be less, but more, that of the future. And besides, it can hardly be doubted that it was owing to the presence of these principles, held as it were before in her bosom, that the Roman Church herself has been the main cause of the growing decadence of the nations in which she was supreme, and of which now—as a decadence of Faith—she herself complains.

Of this the Latin races are coming to be aware. Governments have now as the rule broken up their former arrangements and concordats; and although some tell us (as Sir George Bowyer, in the *Times*) that late changes mean nothing at all, equally great authorities tell us (as the *Tablet* newspaper) that they mean everything. And that everything is meant no logical man can easily deny. That such is the meaning both of the Pope's words and their interpretation by national governments nothing can more clearly show than the taking possession of his capital by the Italian government, and the refusal of other governments to interfere, or even to offer an asylum to the Pope.

But it must be to other quarters that we look for the real estimate of the modern position of the Papacy, and with it for the value of that aspect of revelation on which it entirely rests—that of external authority. The words of Dr. Döllinger's now famous letter (of March 11th, 1871) to the Archbishop of Munich most adequately describe the present position of affairs. In this he says—"He who wishes to measure the immense range of these resolutions (the late decisions) may be urgently recommended to compare thoroughly the third chapter of the decrees in Council with the fourth, and realize for himself what a system of universal government and spiritual dictation stands here before us. It is the plenary power over the whole Church as over each separate member, such as the Popes have claimed for themselves since Gregory VII., such as is pronounced in the numerous bulls since the bull *Unam Sanctam*, which is from henceforward to be believed and acknowledged in his life by every Catholic. This power is boundless, incalculable; it can, as Innocent III. said, strike everywhere; can punish every man; allows of no appeal; is sovereign and arbitrary, for, according to Bonifacius VIII., the Pope carries all rights in the shrine of his bosom. As he has now become infallible, he says in one moment and by one little word *orbi* (that is, that he addresses himself to the whole Church), makes every thesis, every doctrine, every demand, an unerring and irrefragable article of faith. Against him there can be maintained no

right, no personal or corporate freedom, or, as the canonists say, the tribunal of God and that of the Pope are one and the same. . . . As a Christian, as a theologian, as an historian, as a citizen, I cannot accept this doctrine."

Dr. Döllinger cannot accept it, because it does not harmonize with his knowledge of the past. But to meet this position it will, of course, be replied by those who accept the late decrees, first, that his estimate of the past, and of its propriety, is taken from some standard of his own, whereas it should be taken from that of the Church. And the Pope is the summary and mouthpiece of the Church. And moreover, were this not so, and were the past and present utterances of the Church, either by the Pope or otherwise, incapable of being harmonized, it is the past which must go, for it is the present which is our rule. But from this we must conclude that authority does not depend upon spiritual discernment, but spiritual discernment upon authority. The distinctions between sin and virtue in themselves, therefore, are not essential, but only arbitrary; and the declaration of the Pope, or (as it used to be called) the binding and loosing of the Church, is not merely a declaration, but an efficient cause, making an intrinsic change in the nature of things.

In the absolute sense the Church can, therefore, do no wrong, for she is the measure of right to be; that is, the office and object of the Church is now culminated in the Pope. And no doubt all this is reasonable, if it be true that the Pope, as Archbishop Manning says, is the delegate one, one who is to judge the world.*

People who feel the difficulty of this, and its difference from what used to be believed, and its dependence at least upon some antiquity, and some history of antiquity, to give its meaning and value, are told that, properly speaking, the Church has no antiquity; that she is simply the present incarnation of the Holy Ghost, of which the Pope is the speaking voice. The Church, it is held, rests upon her own supernatural and perpetual consciousness, and, consequently, there can be no question of new or old, but only of what is the present truth, and this is only known by the present and purposed utterances of the Pope. It is an old dictum that to the Church nothing is new or old—*Nullum tempus occurrit ecclesie*—but that the speaking voice is alone that of the Church, is a new rendering and interpretation of it. It was, indeed, the charge of the first Reformers that the Catholic doctrines were not primitive, and their demand was to revert to antiquity for the truth. But this the new doctrine renders unnecessary, precluding all appeal, being complete in itself; and not only so, but now it is heresy and treason to urge it. For, says Arch-

* See Manning's "Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost," pp. 226-7.

bishop Manning, "the appeal to antiquity is both a *treason* and a *heresy*; a *treason*, because it rejects the divine voice of the Church at this hour, and a *heresy*, because it denies that voice to be divine. How can we know what antiquity was, except through the Church?"

The cause and meaning of this argument no doubt are to be found in the difficulty which the new doctrines have in relation to the past. But the principle now laid down, if it be admitted, unquestionably does all that is required. And, so far, it carries reason with it, as this, that little of Revelation has ever been final, or altogether apart from the condition of the age wherein it was delivered. And accordingly it is no doubt true that much in the Old Testament Revelation has been set aside by that which is in the New. It is therefore argued that some part of the New may now be set aside by that which is more recent, yea, even, should it be necessary, the utterances of the Apostles and even of the Lord Himself by another and later utterance of the Holy Spirit, which spake of old by them, but now speaks by the Pope.

It is evident that a theory such as this is both new in itself, and that when it is brought into operation, and into connection with the past, must first practically alter all old foundations and then erect new superstructures of its own. And this its best advocates do not deny. They allow that the definition of the Papal Infallibility by the late Council is a new dogma. For Archbishop Manning, in his "Privilegium Petri" (Essay iii, p. 15), says that "every General Council from Nicæa to Trent, which has touched on the faith, has made new definitions, and that every definition is a new dogma, and closes what was before open, and ties up more strictly the doctrines of faith." All things relating to Revelation and Christianity are now, therefore, summed up and delivered to us by the Pope, and the Creeds are abbreviated to this one and final word of belief.

Dr. Döllinger has expressed himself indeed as being under the belief that the later and last actions of the Court and Church of Rome were merely adopted as a check to German science, and a protest against German theology. To a certain extent this may be true. But we do not think that this explains all that has taken place, and we believe that the real causes and meaning of these late decrees are far more reaching and profound than this; this, it is possible, may have been the motive, or a main motive cause, whilst the actors themselves were unconscious of the real springs which moved them. And the Latin Episcopate, as such, most probably is still so. Probably the great majority were under the influence of an instinct which they could not explain, rather than of a policy which they could clothe in words. In particular instances, such as that of Dr. Frohschammer, of Vienna, and the treatment of the congress at

Malines, Dr. Döllinger may be correct, but generally, and in other cases, such as the *Avenir* and Père Hyacinthe, we must look for the causes elsewhere. The majority acted under an instinct of self-preservation: an instinct arising from a growing experience that the past strength of the Church was not enough, either for authority in doctrine or in discipline. The progress of science and criticism, the experience of mankind in economical and political questions, had greatly tended to shake previous and formerly received opinions. If these were still to be maintained, something additional and sufficient had to be *done*: a determined centre and a sufficient power. In fact, all Christendom was more or less under the impression of the same conviction; that is to say, such portion of Christendom as rested on authority as the test of truth. It was a belief that such test existed in the Roman Church which led so many converts there from the Church of England. It was mainly from their discovery, when they got there, that that which they found was not sufficient which led to the promulgation of the late decrees. Not finding it so, in nautical language, they determined to "*make it so*," and they made it. They accomplished that which they proposed, and in some sort, therefore, found that which they required. Yet it was but by an inversion of the problem; they produced the result by working backwards, and so gained a false result, or remained but where they were before. They rightly considered unity as the test of truth, and they began with unity. But unity is the product, not the parent of truth, and they began with the product. They produced an artificial unity, and expected to come to a natural truth. But they got but the product of such a parent, a mechanical truth from a mechanical unity. In vulgar language, "they put the cart before the horse." They saw that unity was the result of the Gospel, but they did not perceive that men became one by that which came from it, not that it was the Gospel because it came from them. By becoming one they thought they would obtain the truths of Revelation; but the truths of Revelation, while making men one, are not produced by such a course. And the course they pursued, if it did not give that they sought, is preventive of it by putting something in its place. And this it accordingly has done; for what has been got is but the voice of the Pope bringing men to himself: Revelation—the Revelation of Jesus Christ—was given to bring men to God. Of course it may be said the Pope will do this, as was done by the Church and Holy Writ before. But if so before, what need now of another and different method? if it be not idle to say this in the face of such utterance as the Popes have given. Of course the answer to this is, He is the judge, and not we, of truth. But when it comes to this, *cadit questio*, all is over, and men are taught by common sense and reason and the

ordinary teaching of God, that no more is to be said or sought there. Accordingly this is said and done in the greater part of Europe already, and cannot but be followed in an increasing ratio.

But there was a good deal in the notion of the promises of the Church resting on external authority to excuse the mistake. If the promise of duration to the Church meant the presence of a visible continuity, and if this was the meaning of the promise made especially to St. Peter, where was it so likely to be fulfilled as in the occupant of St. Peter's chair? Rome, it was alleged, had been the chair of St. Peter. Where so likely to find that which was needed, as where once it had been, although since apparently lost? It was decided that it must be there, and must always have been there; it was decided so to be by more than twice as many Fathers and Bishops of the Church as had decided the gravest questions of doctrine and the Canon of Scripture itself at the great Council of Nice. These decided that what was required was to be found at the Vatican, and their decision has gone forth to all the Catholic world, and in a higher and greater sense than before, that Rome is *omnium urbis et orbis ecclesiarum mater et caput*. We are bound to believe that those who were thus seeking, and thus have found, are satisfied and at rest.

But it depends on what they sought; whether they were seeking God—God Himself—the highest spiritual good and truth, that is, directly and for itself, or only an apparatus or calculus for finding this. It is impossible to pursue this question here. It is plain that in this, the highest region of spiritual truth, that which is most high cannot be reached by physical apparatus, and that such method cannot give a Birth but a Burial of the Spirit. Yet this is all that those now can possibly have, who have devised this method. It is impossible that many of those who have accepted it, can be ignorant that it is so. What then will explain their acceptance of a system which has brought about such a result, and their acceptance of such a result as the test of their system? Nothing but the fact that they do not know where else to go—where else to look. Had they had the advantages of another system and the light which it affords, the system of apprehension of the truth by inquiry, and the light which is the result, this would not have taken place. But not having this, and in consequence not seeing that which the truth was, by not having the light of truth and receiving it by its force, no other course was open for them than that they pursued, and nothing else remained for them of that which they had possessed. And no doubt they were conscious on their old system of having possessed much. The word "Catholic" to them included much. Indeed to the greater part of Europe the word "Catholic" is synonymous with

“Christian,” and as this word is identified with the Pope, they could not abandon him without abandoning it, and it they could not abandon. The word “Catholic” as used in this sense has done an incalculable degree of damage to Christianity on the Continent, and is beginning to do the same among ourselves. No doubt as including in its sense the Catholic Creeds, and almost all the memories of Latin Christianity, it includes so much—although it is not a Scriptural word, nor a word capable of the application contended for, and of no such use among the Oriental Christians—that we doubt not that it is this word alone, and all which they think is dependent upon it, which has kept such men as have signed the late decrees without believing them—Haynauld, Gratry, Maret, and others like them—still in the Roman obedience. They will take the late decrees and all that they may be made logically to mean, and all they do mean, rather than part with all they have, or had, and go forth as it were naked of belief into the world. To such issues do false premisses lead. To this issue does the reception of Revelation merely on authority lead. Its ultimate issue must be the infidelity of such as thus receive it. And it is not too much even of such eminent men as those above described to say that they could not be said strictly to be believers, when they did what now they have done. Had they seen Revelation by its own light, and apprehended its meaning, it is not too much to make sure that they could not have called for such aids as now have been given to make it sure, nor accepted those now given. The present position of the Pope hides the other infallible and self-illuminating light from such, and this is their sole excuse for accepting what has been done.

But this is not all. The acceptance of Revelation solely on authority, without that authority leading on to secure the meaning and use of Revelation, not only deprives men of that meaning and use, but involves consequences of a much more serious kind. Rightly recognising its all-importance, and basing its reception on authority or force—force is made use of to spread and secure it. And the supposition of its all-importance being their warrant, such force has been employed, and with a righteous intention, as has not only subverted the first principles of nature, but has put in shade the worst excesses of merely ordinary authority. For it is doubtless true that the persecutions of the early Christians by the heathen Emperors were by no means so deadly as the cruelties of the Popes, as the extermination of the Albigenses, the persecution of the Vaudois, the fires of Smithfield, the massacres of St. Bartholomew, of Mexico, and of the Palatinate, the tortures of the Inquisition and such like, all put in use to propagate or maintain the principles of religion. Such views of the basis of religion can alone be secured by force. On no

other ground than this can we explain the otherwise meaningless and useless struggle for what has been called the Pope's Temporal Power. If it be said that those holding the opposite principles have been equally guilty of the use of force, it may be with truth replied that if it be so, then such persecuted in violation of, and not in accordance with their principles, and were doubly to be blamed. But if it be supposed that increasing knowledge and consequent charity has done away with persecution on both sides, it must be conceded that it has been by the adoption and spread of the second principle and not of the first.

There is one consequence which flows from a belief which rests on authority, so different from that which in this country is supposed to flow from it, so different and opposite that we must not pass it by, because its influence in this country is increasingly dangerous. It is that which conceives that a belief which rests upon authority and not on illumination, on faith, and on light—on ignorance and not on knowledge—is productive of a higher awe and reverence. What is called the "Catholic Revival" in England finds many supporters on this ground. Now this is far from being the case, and the result in the long run is entirely the reverse of that which is supposed. Experience has long shown that it is not so in Roman Catholic countries; it cannot have eventually a different result in this. At first, mystery may have this effect. All that has a relation to fear has it. But when that which is expected and apprehended from the supposed cause does not follow, and nothing alarming takes place, a reaction sets in, and reverence and awe are supplanted by freedom and even profanity; a freedom, and (as we should deem it) profanity as to sacred things, which we see exhibited in Roman Catholic countries, of which we have no conception in this.

We should not venture to allude to this subject, painful as it is to ourselves, and likely to pain many near and dear unto ourselves, who hold the principles, and are members of the Communion to which we allude, but we are so impressed with the terrible consequences which ever follow mistaken grounds of belief, that under the risk of doing violence to the feelings of some we esteem as among the highest and best of men and friends, we cannot but mention what we know, and use the knowledge in the hopes of preventing what may become with the spread of such principles a larger manifestation and sadder experience of their results. We allude to the character of thought as to sacred things, which a religion received apart from reason and conscience must produce, and the travesty it cannot fail to make of the subjects with which it is familiar when handled in ignorance of their real meaning and force. Such handling, of course, is

guiltless of the profanity which would attend it under other circumstances, as for example in Protestant and Bible-reading countries, where Christianity is received as a revelation to be apprehended and approached by its own light: but still the effect is deeply injurious, while it is evident that such apprehension of the subjects is entirely alien to and remote from their use and object as communicated to us by a Revelation from above. But what is meant may be most readily gathered from an illustration, however painful it may be to give, or even to read it among ourselves. Similar instances will occur to many, especially to those conversant with the state of the Roman Church in Southern Italy: but something of the same character is to be witnessed nearer home, and is to be heard, if not seen, in the oaths in use, for example, among the men in Irish Roman Catholic regiments. The instance I shall quote occurred in Calabria, and was given by an eminent and pious Roman Catholic priest as an example of the state of religion there produced by the principle of accepting Religion merely on authority, without any enquiry into, or experience of its real and spiritual nature.

The Parocco (parish priest) had been preaching and making a collection which had not been successful, in aid of the building fund of his church; and he thought he would do better by enforcing his argument by an illustration. The church was dedicated to St. Joseph. An inhabitant of the parish had just died—a bad and notorious character, distinguished, however, by some offerings he had been in the habit of making to St. Joseph. “Do you know,” asked the preacher in his sermon, “that So-and-so is dead? Of course you do, and also what kind of man he was, no doubt. Do you know then where he has gone to? I know what you would say; you are wrong. He has gone to heaven. You are astonished. You do not believe it. You do not believe it because you do not know the power of St. Joseph. Ah! very few do. It was all owing to St. Joseph. ‘How?’ you say. I shall tell you. When he got to the door, St. Peter would not admit him; he kept the key fast in the lock. Your old acquaintance knocked and waited, but the saint was obdurate. ‘Impossible,’ he said. ‘Impossible?’ said the man; ‘send for St. Joseph.’ St. Peter would not listen. At last, wearied by his importunities he called St. Joseph. St. Joseph, on seeing who it was, and considering, said, ‘Peter, you must let him in.’ St. Peter would not. At last Joseph got angry, and said, ‘Do you know who I am?’ ‘Yes,’ said St. Peter, ‘but it is all the same, he cannot get in.’ So off St. Joseph goes to the Virgin Mary. Says he at once, ‘Are you not my wife?’ ‘Yes,’ said the Virgin. ‘Then follow me to the door.’ She did so. ‘Now,’ said St. Joseph, ‘get that man in.’ Peter was afraid of the Virgin, but still he would not, and did not let him in. ‘Go then for

your Son,' said St. Joseph. And she went. The Saviour followed her to the door, and after him crowded all the host of heaven. At last the Père Eternal seeing he was left alone with the Holy Ghost, went to see, but ere then St. Peter had admitted the man. Now," the preacher concluded, "you are able to see something of the power of St. Joseph."

Leaving alone the fearful profanity to our ears of such a tale as this, it is not only impossible that such conceptions of Revelation could arise where revelation is seen by its own light, and the Bible is at all known, but it is impossible to doubt that such a system as this, irrespective of its inherent error and evil, leaves really unknown and unapplied all that Revelation and Christianity were intended to give. It is not too much to say, therefore, that where such knowledge, or rather, ignorance of Revelation is the rule, Christianity, properly so-called, has scarce had entrance. And we must not be surprised at the low civilization and moral condition of such countries, or at the opposition of so many of the more intelligent among them to what they suppose to be Religion, for this is all they know at least of Revelation, and Christianity as contained in it. Perhaps it will be thought that this example is unprecedently extravagant, and cannot be considered fair; the occurrence took place, as we have said, in Southern Italy; and such a character of thought will scarcely be found in the Roman Catholicism of the North of Europe. But then this is to be ascribed to the juxtaposition and interfusion of other principles, and not to any change in the principle itself, nor alteration in the character of its working. In the neighbourhood of Germany, and in Germany itself, this no doubt is the case. In France it is less visible, as since the expulsion of the Protestant element from that country all the religion of France, and especially of late years, has been of the ultramontane character. Yet so great an absence of perception of the spiritual nature of Revelation could scarce take place there, were it only because of the light, such as it is, which their scientific and social acquisitions have infused into the nation; and the real religion of France, the outcome, that is, of her spiritual nature, is but to be found at present in the outcome of those things.

But let us now turn to the ground on which Christianity is accepted by the Northern races, and the consequences which that has entailed. The ground on which the Teutonic races have accepted Revelation (since the days of Luther at all events) has been the light which Revelation itself affords, and the beneficial consequences which flow from this. This ground may be said to be the basis of experiment, or the same principle in religion as the Baconian when applied to the study of nature. And to some extent, also, the root is the

same as that which supports the Positive philosophy. But when this was first applied by Luther, neither the Baconian nor the Positive philosophy had come into existence, for neither Francis Bacon nor Auguste Comte had as yet written. Yet, like all other great things on their way, coming events had cast their shadows before, and the minds of men were running in that direction. Galileo and Roger Bacon had both acted upon the same principle, and if they did so unconsciously, still it was so; and when Luther applied the same principles to religion, he acted, if instinctively, yet no doubt in the same manner. We are in the habit of saying that Luther took his stand upon the Scriptures, and in one sense so he did. But not in the sense generally supposed, not on the ground, that is, of authority, or of the source whence they came, not, that is, as being accredited from without, but on the ground of that which they were in themselves, on the ground of that which they contained, on the ground, that is, of their intrinsic meaning and force. Scripture gave light to Luther, and he took it on the ground of the light it gave: he was influenced by the light, and he took the light for his guidance, simply as light. This was the ground on which he stood. He received Holy Scripture as divine, but not on the ground of the source from whence it came, but as being itself the evidence of its source. He argued from the effect to the cause, and not from the cause to the effect. He traced the stream to its source; he did not go from the source to the stream. He did not know the source. He denied it so far as the Church of Rome claimed to be, or to show it. He repudiated that Church as she presented herself to him as the source; and he did this on the ground of experience also, that being herself no light she could give no light. This is the explanation of his conduct, and the ground on which he stood. It is true that he made himself the standard of truth, or if not of truth, yet of that which was true to him. And what other could he do? What other standard is there to any man, than that by which he discerns, receives, and apprehends? There is no other standard, because there is no other access to a man but the access and measure of his own apprehending and judging power, his intelligence and his heart.

This may not give us what we call Objective truth, but it is the only means whereby we can receive and realize it. This objective truth Luther found sufficiently set forth for him in the contemporary records of the Revelation in Christ, the records of Holy Scripture. But Luther did not reckon all these of equal value; they were not of equal value to him, and so he said they were not of equal value. He dismissed the Epistle of James, we know, calling it "an Epistle of straw." This is the reason whereby we know that Luther did not take his stand on Scripture on the ground of

authority, but on the ground of the light which it contained to him. It is clear that this principle is not all-sufficient, but that it has an element in it of imperfection and danger. It cannot secure to us all that is true: for that which is light to one, may not be light to another, and that which is light at one period to the same person may not be at other times in his career. It is to be granted, indeed, that it cannot destroy anything which is absolutely true, but it may not recognize it, and it may prevent the access of it to others. Nevertheless, its use and necessity are absolutely indispensable, even if it do not supply us with that we need ere we can profit by it—for without discrimination real apprehension is impossible, and without real apprehension there is no true belief. Its use is indispensable for the recognition of truth; and if its first operation seem destructive, its second builds up that which its first seemed to destroy: that is, wherever truth is really present. This, no doubt, finally came to be the end with Luther and the Epistle of St. James.

Luther's successors have trodden in Luther's paths, and with the same result. The sacred writings have been so shaken and pulled to pieces by what is now called German criticism that for a long time little of them would seem to be left. But a reaction has set in, and now men are building up again what once they destroyed. We do not mean that texts have resumed their old integrity, or that the letter of Scripture remains where it was. But this remains, that by means of Scripture a light is given, and a Revelation made, which is gotten and possible in no other way, and both from what it is in itself, and from its practical effects, manifests itself to be actually Divine. So far from Christianity being made away with, it is becoming more and more apparent that it was the spirit of belief and not of unbelief which was at work—the spirit of Luther and not of Strauss—of belief, and not of unbelief in Revelation. It was a strange contrast during the late war, to examine the contents of the knapsacks of the French and German soldiers, and to find in those of the former but a pack of cards, or at the most some religious medal, and in those of the latter, a hymn-book, or the sacred Book itself.

The disintegrating process of German criticism, if it has had the effect of shaking the letter of the Record, has only brought out more clearly that there is in the Record something which the letter itself can neither give nor destroy; which is above the letter, and which is only so far dependent on it as all spiritual things must have material organs; whilst yet the organs are not themselves the life—a life which may still exist, when they are imperfect, and even in some sense destroyed—that is, they are a record of something above themselves and indestructible, which if they reveal they are not the means

of creating. And it is not alleged that the whole Bible is destroyed or destructible. No doubt, if—as we are urged to do—we interpret the Bible like any other book, we shall have a result like that of any other book; just as if we dissect a dead Jew, we come upon the heart and organs of another man, but in neither case have we the *spécialité* of either, and something was there which the dissection does not give.

That the principle of free-inquiry, and belief of that which the reason alone accepts, has the effect of elevating nations as the other has of depressing them, the respective standing of Protestant and Catholic countries has always shown. And if Belgium and the Italian republics of the middle ages seem exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of the principle of inquiry, it will be found that other reasons than that of implicit belief upon authority have been at work—reasons, however, which space forbids us to enumerate here.

Where the two principles come into collision there is ever more or less of disturbance, as we see in Ireland and the borders of Germany and France. The present internal divisions of the Roman Church have been curiously true to the general law. It is in Bavaria, and especially at Munich, that the head-quarters of the present controversy are to be found, and the absence at the late conference there of those who were beyond the border-land was very remarkable. The representatives there of the Roman Catholic Church were all German or German-speaking men. And it is evident that as far as the conflict has as yet gone, it is but the German-speaking race which will be much influenced by it. The head of the present movement is a German. Dr. Döllinger's position is sufficiently well known to us in this country not to require here anything beyond a brief explanation. It is that of a scholar and historian; as such he protests against the late decisions of the Vatican Council, and in consequence has been excommunicated. Supported by his Government in the offices he held before, he still retains them; and his learning, ability, and integrity give his position an influence which no excommunication in our days can ever greatly affect. The educated and upper classes of the Catholic laity everywhere, on the whole, more or less, are in sympathy with him. With Père Hyacinthe it is otherwise. He is the heart of the present movement, as has been well said, if Döllinger be the head. Distinguished above all men now alive in France as an orator, of which his discourses at Notre Dame were the outcome and proof, he is not inferior in scholarship or general acquirements to any of his own countrymen, and although but lately a barefooted friar, (he was Superior of the Carmelites Order at Passy, near Paris), he was formerly a Professor of Theology, and a man conversant with the world and its affairs.

Were it not that his influence is limited to his own nation, the attitude of Père Hyacinthe is the most impressive of any which has been brought out by recent events; and his teaching more likely to produce a general and profound effect, were it not that his eloquence is confined to the language of his countrymen; and his strength lies rather in his "orations" than in his pen. It would be a mistake, however, to limit his power to the mere use of language; the arguments used in his famous "Conferences" at Notre Dame are no less weighty than they are eloquent. But the real power of Father Hyacinthe lies in his moral elevation, which shrank from the Roman system before it culminated in the acts of the Vatican, and, both as against the vices of the capital in his Conferences, and afterwards in his famous letter two years ago from his convent at Passy, warned the Church of Rome of some of her errors with the voice of a prophet of old. He is not merely protesting against the present unhistorical and unscientific attitude of the Papacy, but, although a fervent Catholic still, against those principles of Rome which have destroyed her Catholicity, and, with her Catholicity, her truth likewise. Unfortunately his influence is limited to France; and in France the clergy are ultramontane almost to a man. The present Archbishop of Paris, however, is likely to enlarge that influence by driving the clergy he has beyond where even these desire to go; and we see that one of the Vicars of the Madeleine, M. Michaud, and others, are likely to tread in the steps of Hyacinthe.

In Spain and in Italy we may say that there is little interest in the present movement. The few laymen who are religious, no doubt wish it well. But religion in those countries has been so long coupled with all that was opposed to the freedom and progress of the respective nations, that there is more than indifference, there is a positive dislike to the subject. In the hearts of most men I believe that the dominant feeling is that the best fruit of all their Revolutions has been that they have got rid of the question of Religion altogether. For the formula of Count Cavour, "*Libera Chiesa in libero Stato*," of which so much has been made, and which has been quoted as a motto for ourselves by those ignorant of its true meaning, does not signify with him or them the Church's freedom from State oppression, or the State's deliverance from that of the Church, (although the latter comes nearer to the sense), but a method for the State of getting rid of Religion entirely. The Italians at least are weary of the subject in all its forms and memories. They believe that there is nothing in Catholicism at least but imposture or mistake. They have no interest in Church reforms, and no belief in them. They believe in no Church and no Revelation. If they are in search of any thing of the kind, it is not of a Church, but of a God. All their wish

on the subject is to be let alone. This it is which explains their want of representatives at Munich.

And at this moment we believe that it is best that they should be left without any formal effort to aid them. In time, and with quiet, they will find a Religion for themselves. And we believe that on this track they are now proceeding. It is an unconscious search, but by and by, we doubt not, they will come to that which they did not expect to find. They are now on the path of natural religion, tracking in Science the footsteps of God; and if as yet they see no footsteps, by and by we believe that they will discern them, and find in them not only the footsteps of God but of Christ.

Christ has so long in that country been but identified with the concerns of the Papacy, that as yet they are not able to recognize the difference: and identifying himself as the Pope of late has done with all that is inimical to the best interests of the nation, it is not strange if his name is in evil odour. And now the Pope sits at the door, and is seen at the window of every Christian temple, and the nation accordingly shuns both him and the temple. It seems strange that the Italian Government does not realize the antagonism of the two opposites—so that while it enters the Papal city by a breach it makes with cannon, it now desires, it would appear, to walk arm in arm with the Pope within the walls. While sitting on Cæsar's seat on the Quirinal and Palatine, no doubt the Italian Government does well to render unto God the things which are God's. But if it recognizes His Vicar to sit on the Vatican, as it declares it does, surely it should not have made its way to him by a breach in the walls! But all Catholic governments use the same language, and do the same things—a manifest proof that there is no real belief in the religion they profess—and assuredly no recognition of the character and scope of Revelation.

M. Thiers calls the Pope "God's Vicar," but hesitates at the same time to offer him a sanctuary. "I foresee" (said a late Minister of France) "Religion giving her sanction and guarantee to all social progress and amelioration," meaning a restoration of the Pope. "I shall reform the Mexican Church," (said the late Emperor Maximilian), "but I am a good Catholic." These all identify Religion with the Pope—identify and disobey, identify and hate. What a combination! Can such condition last? Impossible! Sooner or later they will awake to the error of the whole. In the late Encyclical and Syllabus, Rome declares war against all that has been proved most true and beneficial to man in his public and national relations: can it be true then as for individuals? But as to this, these nations do not inquire: they reject the whole in a lump, and who shall blame them? But what are they to do for want of a reli-

gion—will they seek for one? We have said we do not think so—certainly not by way of Protestantism. The regeneration of their old faith is too robust a proceeding. But how then? As we have said, not by search, but by gradual growth; first, disintegration, then construction, by the processes of nature up to God. It is no doubt a slow process. Have Italy and Spain strength to carry them through? We begin to doubt it. Italy, no doubt, has elements of prosperity, but they do not reach beyond political and commercial progress.

The late actions of the Papacy have no doubt awakened the Governments, even of Germany. Governments do not mind false doctrine, but when a thing comes against them like the late decrees, a Jael armed with the nails of the Syllabus and Encyclical and the hammer of Infallibility, they sit up and look out. And no doubt the people too are on their guard. How significant is the following sentence we quote from a Roman newspaper on the late guarantees to the Pope, and what a wonderful travesty must that have been of the religion of Jesus ere thus it could be spoken: "Nessun paese in Europa può concedere alla sua chiesa dominante tanta autorità e tanta libertà che noi ne concediamo alla Curia Romana e si che nessun stato si trova in posizione di doverne stare in sospetto più di noi che l'abbiamo nemica col suo quartiere generale nel nostro seno."

But nothing can save the Papacy, or the Church of Rome as now constituted by the Vatican Council. Already the proud doors on which are engraved "SACROS. LATERAN. ECCLES. OMNIUM URBIS ET ORBIS ECCLESIAE MATER ET CAPUT," look upon desolation. The saints are alone upon the housetop. St. John is again in the desert. The wild birds sing from the cornices. The dogma of Papal Infallibility, hoisted upon its doors, is already scribbled over with the grotesques of a thoughtless populace. The sap of the daily press undermines the foundations; increasing knowledge explodes the superstructure. The old mediæval prestige, like the shadow of St. Peter is passing by. "Tu est Petrus," and "Hoc est corpus meum," the Jachin and Boaz of later Roman Theology, crumble to their fall. Let us hope that they will rise to a better resurrection, with a spiritual, and not a fleshly body. For many a day there will still be Popes of Rome; but that which has stereotyped has limited their dominion. Popes there will be in one sense more than the Popes of old. Still Popes of Rome, but of Rome itself, and of Rome only.

But space will not allow us to pursue this subject further. We should like to have given our reasons more fully why we believe that the theological methods of Germany, while they disintegrate the form, do not destroy the substance of Christianity. But we have no room to do so. Nor have we space to consider the effect of the two-fold currents of Rome and Germany as they at present affect our own

country, where from the presence of both the Celtic and Saxon races, and the peculiar historical and geographical position of these islands, the effect is different, perhaps, from that which the opposing currents have had elsewhere. In Great Britain, indeed, it would seem that the Latin Christianity is making its last intelligent stand; that is, if Ultramontanism be intelligent. And certainly a very remarkable fact has accrued from the Roman conversions in England. Her later converts from this country have been her greatest triumph, but also they have been her greatest fall; for it has been mainly by their agency that the late, as we think, fatal decisions have been obtained—a remarkable triumph and a remarkable Nemesis.

The effect of the German or Baconian method of dealing with Religion has not as yet been experienced in its full force in England, and as yet we are but at the beginning of the movement. And we may say that England and its clergy have been taken by surprise. For until recent years the uninstructedness of the English clergy in matters of Theology, and their natural aversion to metaphysical pursuits, kept them greatly in ignorance of what was going on elsewhere; and even now, with too many of them, we fear it is true that they will fight upon ground which is no longer tenable, and, like their great ancestors of whom the first Napoleon spoke, are likely to be unconscious when they are beaten; while the stern conservatism of Scottish theology has kept that country all but fixed in the footprints of the first Reformers. A change in both countries, however, is coming on, and working its way among us—mainly, we believe, by the instrumentality of the laity, by the stream and current of ordinary literature, and the general agency of the press. And it is scarcely possible to estimate the change which will take place in meaning, when the records of the early Christian ages are scanned by lay and not by clerical eyes. Not that the latter were intentionally unjust, but that it was impossible for them to clothe the words with other than a traditional meaning.

That some crisis may take place ere the new and old boundaries are settled and adjusted is very probable, and it may to many at first seem so dark, that to avoid change—as so many Catholics now do—they will simply throw themselves back upon a blind conservatism, nay, even to the gates of Rome itself, if they do not go within. But this cannot continue, if Revelation be (as we believe it to be) true, and the end will not be thus. For we cannot doubt but that a brighter and not a darker day is reserved for Christianity; a day which has been but deferred by the corruptions which it has already undergone, many of which are on the point of being removed by the crisis, and movements which have already been. By and by, when better seen and understood, we believe that it will attract many who

are now averse to it; averse to it because ignorant of it in its true nature.

And we are bound to be on our guard against false alarms, and not to doubt our principles when they lead us into danger. In many things we must ever be worse before we can be better. The principles by which progress has already taken place among mankind, should not be shrunk from but pursued. There is no other way of safety. It is death to sit still and let the past close over us. We may have difficulty in knowing the truth, but we must not for that reason tolerate that which we know to be wrong. And, in the long run, the few who know ever lead onward the many who are ignorant.

And especially is this courage and conduct essential in all matters connected with education. The door of knowledge must be left open, and the key of knowledge must not be taken out. Under no guise should any system be permitted which prevents the influx of knowledge. All the present evils of the Continent have arisen from this system of repression of knowledge and from the domination of privilege. We have seen the result; human nature ever trying to free herself, and, when she cannot, dying in convulsions with anarchy and blood. False knowledge has been given, and forced upon the nations, and no means allowed for coming to the true. Let us not take up, as a nation, that which has been rejected elsewhere, and which other nations have dismissed. Let us have the benefit of their experience without the necessity of such experience of our own. If many have laboured and suffered that we should enter into their labours without their suffering, let us not allow them to have laboured and suffered in vain. The results cannot be different with us from what they were with them.

Now, what the Church of England has to fear is lest she tread in the steps of Rome and come to the same catastrophe. She is, indeed, far from being in the same state in which was the Church of Rome ere the Council of the Vatican, but there is more than a tendency to go in the same direction, a tendency much developed at all events among the clergy in these later years. Döllingers and Hyacinthes may no doubt be raised up within her, but let her see that, as in the case of the Mother Church, these Döllingers and Hyacinthes do not come too late. Döllinger and Hyacinthe came too late for Rome. Nay, it is possible that but for the events of the Council, Döllinger would not have spoken, but like another Erasmus had smiled and joked in quiet to the end. Hyacinthe, indeed, spoke out before, and his memorable letter in 1869 (ere the Vatican Council) showed a moral revolt which was of a higher order than that of the German historian. But Hyacinthe is no Luther; he is still "au fond catholique" of the


“catholiques,” and both he and Döllinger base the truth, not upon its inherent light, but on its external authority; at least, this, we think, is the case with Döllinger. But whatever it be they have spoken too late to save their Mother Church. That new church which is growing up under their feet, although they call it old, “and *the* old,” is new to all intents and purposes. And it must be *new* if it is to come to anything. We fear, however, that by dreading this word, and taking but an eclectic and antiquarian standing, it will not go beyond the scholar and the few. No doubt a reform has been inaugurated or something more, and we wish we could think with Döllinger that it will affect the old church so radically as he supposes. “Je suis vieux,” he lately said, “et je ne vivrai pas assez pour voir tout cela—mais ce qui a bien commencé doit bien finir: ce sera un réforme Radical de l’Église j’en suis certain.” What we fear is, that the greater portion of the Catholic Church will remain just as it was; the mass indifferent, and the more intelligent but quiet-loving souls, taking the later new and bad, on account of the former old and good which still exists. And the majority of the poor will remain practically unaware that any great change has taken place, and indeed, although such is the case in fact and logic, it may remain long unrecognized in practice and experience by the mass. Yet in these days of increasing education and cheap literature, it is scarce possible that things will remain as they were, or as now they are and at a stand still.

Yet the future of religion on the Continent is very dark. Döllinger and Hyacinthe will not become Protestants, and anything short of this—a Papacy without the Pope—will never move or suit the requirements of humanity. Such a conception indeed is far removed from the Christianity of Revelation, and removes those far from it who virtually adopt it. Alas, that something so very like it should now find favour with so many in the Church of England. That which is by some called the present revival of that Church, cannot, we fear, with truth be called a revival of anything but of obsolete theories and practices of the past. It cannot be said to be in the direction of progress or spiritual enlargement; it is altogether in the same spirit as has characterized the later actions, we may say, and all the moral actions of the Papacy. It is antagonistic to modern thought and the advance of knowledge. It is true that many, too many, of the upper-rank clergy of the Church of England sympathize with it; it is perhaps, natural that they should do so, for it is æsthetic and conservative in its spirit, but the unattached, and the “non adscripti glebæ,” the professional and thinking men, are all on the other side, as are the masses for whom it has no place, and who find in it no nourishment. The clergy, as we have said, however, largely sympathize with it, so largely that those of them who do not are at disadvantage with their

brethren. The two archbishops who do not belong to the movement, the Bishop of St. David's, Dean Stanley, and some others, are spoken of with bated breath in the clerical journals; and last autumn, as we all know, two prelates venturing to preach in the Established Church of Scotland, had virtually to apologize for so doing to their recalcitrant clergy. We have just seen in Convocation how difficult it was even for the Primate of all England to suggest a displacement from public worship of a barbarous creed of the worst periods of the Church's history, which condemns to perdition all who do not maintain its *ipsissima verba*. May it not be felt that there is greater spiritual danger in accepting than in rejecting such a creed? One Prelate strove to stave off the evil day until some fresh MSS. should be received from Venice, making our present creed, as it were, provisional!

Looking at such things, it is impossible not to feel that the Church of England is in danger, and from causes which have just made shipwreck of the Church of Rome. She is not occupied perhaps with precisely the same character of improper or unnecessary things, but then those with which she is occupied show that she has not at heart those which are higher, and those with which she should be occupied; with which if she were really occupied, these lesser matters would fall into a much lesser space. Many, if not among the clergy, at least among the laity, are aware that it is so, and some are more than aware, and are awake to the fact, and are bestirring themselves, and this even among the clergy. Would that their numbers were tenfold what they are! It is a good augury, however, to see at the head of this (the real) revival, His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, moving as he did to the admission of the fuller light at the late Convocation, speaking indeed with that caution and dignity which becomes his high office, but with the courage and insight also with which God has so greatly endowed him. This is as it should be; may he have many followers, Döllingers and Hyacinthes, who will be wise before and not after the event, to prevent the shipwreck, and not to mourn over, but attempt to construct a vessel out of the fragments which are cast ashore.

A. EWING, Bp.



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM; OR THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

PART II.*

HE who is inclined to Pessimist opinions, and sets himself to verify his subjective views objectively, and to build up a system of Pessimism, will undoubtedly find a vast amount of material at hand both in nature and history. He need not read Voltaire's vile and coarse work, "Candide, or the Best World," in which not only all the sorrows of life, but every sort of vulgarity and vice, is cunningly heaped together and portrayed in the most cynical fashion. Nature is the theatre of endless sorrow and destruction, not by accident, but of necessity, for the pleasure of one creature rests upon the pain of another, the life of one is dependent on another's death; so that the more life and happiness nature presents, so much the more sorrow and death must there be as a necessary condition. This circumstance explains the fact that it is the nations who live amidst the most luxuriant aspects of nature who most keenly feel the transitoriness of life, so that a feeling of sadness often forms the chief feature of their views of the world.

The history of man exhibits the same character and phenomena. So far as he belongs by reason of his physical life to the sphere of nature, he partakes of its universal destiny. The life and prosperity of man is always dependent on a fearful destruction of his animal, and to some extent even of his human fellow-creatures. The in-

* See *Contemporary Review* for August, 1871.

tellectual progress of humanity also, depends to a great extent on evil of various kinds. Not only is the political supremacy and prosperity of one nation generally founded on the decline of other nations, but even higher attainments, improved moral principles, and general advancement, can for the most part only be reached by the infliction of many ills upon mankind. Hence martyrdom and persecution, the disturbance of peace between men and nations, and the long prevalence of lawless deeds and suffering. To such an extent has this been the case, that even noble religious and moral doctrines have often been introduced and spread just because they were not practised by their representatives, who were obviously actuated by contrary principles. Even Christianity offers many examples of this.

These circumstances have given occasion for eloquent and piquant descriptions of the "miseries of life," and Schopenhauer and his followers have not failed to turn them to good account. They carefully detail all the evils of life, and paint them in the blackest colours; but since they cannot deny that life also offers much enjoyment and pleasure, this is explained to be mere semblance and delusion, or is said to be far out-balanced by evil. To prove this the whole category of pleasures and sorrows are laid in the balances. It is concluded that the sorrows far outweigh the pleasures, and that therefore it would be better not to be.

But, it may be asked, what is the object of all this weighing and reasoning? What is gained for theoretical knowledge or practical life by all these representations of Pessimist views of life? We must confess that to us Pessimism appears useless for theoretical knowledge; and for practical life, not only useless, but positively injurious. Theoretically useless—do men require to be so carefully and laboriously taught that this life is so full of suffering and misery that non-existence were better? If so, they must be perfectly aware of it from daily experience, and theoretical instruction on the subject must be superfluous. But if they do not know it by experience, and have to learn it theoretically, then this Pessimist teaching is proved to be untrue, because it contradicts the natural and universal consciousness of man, which is only partially or temporarily inclined to Pessimism. Suffering which is not felt, of which man is not conscious, cannot be reckoned as suffering, nor adduced as proof of it. Theoretically, then, if man was acquainted with his sorrows before, Pessimism is superfluous; if he is not acquainted with them, and has to learn them theoretically, it is untrue.

For practical purposes Pessimism is not only useless but pernicious. The troubles of life are indeed great and numerous, and afflict individuals in the most manifold forms; but it is of no use, therefore, to be continually complaining of them, to regard them as

invincible, and to submit to them in hopeless dejection. We should rather courageously resist them, restrict and overcome them as much as possible. It behoves man always to be superior to his destiny, and to be mastered neither by happiness nor by misery. But there is no greater foe to these sentiments and aims than fundamental, systematic Pessimism. The Pessimist theoretically heaps the sum total of all sorrows upon an individual at once,—whereas in reality they only assail him separately, and at the same time he lends him no strength to bear them, but, on the contrary, fills him with hopelessness. Men and nations who give themselves up to this universal Pessimism, become indolent and inactive, as the eastern nations abundantly prove.

This, however, does not apply to partial and temporary, but only to general and systematic Pessimism. The former, of course, is dependent on actual circumstances, and is necessary for the energy and progress of mankind, as well as conducive to them. He only who is sensible of the ills of life acknowledges them, and is dissatisfied with his state and condition, will feel the need of improvement and be incited to strive after it by his own efforts. Contentment leads just as much to indolence, stagnation, and retrogression as Pessimism.

We must protest against the mechanical balancing of good and evil, of the joys and sorrows of life as practised by the modern Pessimists, because it leaves the most important counterpoise against the supremacy of evil out of the question. It disregards, or does not sufficiently regard, the fact that to man has been granted a good of so great a value that it may well counterbalance all the evils of life. This is belief in God, in a higher divine power, with all the hope and consolation connected with it. This belief in God does actually exist, whether or not it may admit of proof; and so great a good is it for humanity, that where it exists in its greatest strength and purity all the ills and woes of life appear as nothing in comparison with the blessedness it confers. It is rarely found in the highest degree, except amongst choice souls, in persons of mystical tendencies, or in times of exalted religious enthusiasm, when men cheerfully endure any sufferings for the sake of their convictions, for God and for the truth—even court death, and suffer it joyfully, as in the early days of Christianity.

Meanwhile, if this faith in God, in ordinary times and with the majority of men, does not exist in this strength and energy, certain it is that always and everywhere it is the chief counterpoise to the evils of life, and has consoled and sustained innumerable men in pain and misfortune. Most certainly, therefore, this should not be left out of consideration in balancing the sum of the joys and sorrows of men; and every Pessimist calculation must be looked

upon as false which does not allow for this factor on the side of the good in life.

It also follows from this that the Atheism of the Pessimist view of the world, based on the consideration of the overwhelming evils in it, cannot be at once admitted to be justifiable. It is concluded that if an almighty, good, and just God, a consciously-perfect Being exists, and is the Creator of the world, it would be impossible for the world to be so imperfect, and for living creatures to lead so miserable an existence as they do. According to this view, the belief in mysterious powers, spirits, and deities arose at first from the fact that man, finding himself powerless when face to face with the powers of nature and the evils of life, and in his ignorance of nature and of natural causes, imagined himself to be surrounded by mysterious powers, and sought help and protection from them. But this faith could only exist so long as these mysterious powers were conceived of as rude and imperfect, so that their characters did not appear out of congruity with the imperfections of the world. The imperfections of the world, therefore, and the sufferings of humanity, which gave rise to the belief in divinity and sustained it, must have again disturbed it, as soon as the idea of God in humanity had been so far perfected that the imperfections of the world no longer appeared compatible with the existence of God. It would indeed be singular that the more imperfect man's idea of God was, so much the firmer would be his belief in the existence of the Deity, and the more perfectly the idea of God was developed and purified, the more incredible would the existence of a God appear! The more perfect, in this way, the idea of God became in the intellectual consciousness of man, the less could He be thought of as really existent. But this train of thought is deprived of its foundation if the imperfections of the world are not really so great as in the interests of denial of a God they are assumed to be, and as they would only be if faith in God and all the consolation and support derived from it, were not found amongst men. This must be denied, or assumed to be non-existent, in order to leave the evils of the world in all their magnitude; and so unmitigated that they would justify the denial of a God. But this is an unjustifiable argument, a *petitio principii*; and so the customary Pessimist argument of Atheism will not hold good, though, undoubtedly, the difficulties of the subject are by no means removed; and unsolved problems still remain for philosophical investigation.

But another consideration immediately suggests itself against the truth and correctness of Pessimism. The Pessimist conception of the world bears a contradiction on the face of it, for it is based both in itself and in the thinking subject on an ideal or optimistic founda-

tion, and could not, in fact, exist without it. All physical evil, all sorrow, pain, or suffering, is only rendered possible by the fact that a certain ideal perfection underlies the forms of nature, particularly in living organisms, and is realized in their constitution and life, as orderly arrangement, well-being, health, comfort, enjoyment of life. Suffering arises from the fact that the realization of this ideal is disturbed and more or less prevented. Thus well-being and enjoyment of life is the rule, the general order of nature; pain and suffering the exception, and from this point of view it can no longer be maintained that there is more suffering than happiness in creation. The perfect ideal forms the general condition, it gives rise to the idea of suffering, that is to a feeling of imperfection, of something contrary to the ideal. It is also subjectively possible for man to hold the world to be imperfect in some of its manifestations and conditions, and to form a Pessimist judgment of it only, because he has within him an ideal of perfection with which he compares it, and finds that it does not agree. The basis of Pessimism is therefore an innate and essentially optimistic mental endeavour to apprehend the ideal, united with a recognition and detestation of the imperfect and abnormal. The real ground of serious Pessimism is nothing but the optimistic tendency of human nature offended by the imperfections of the world, and the failure to find satisfaction for the eager longing after the ideal. It is clear that all is not evil in the world, since this tendency to the recognition of the ideal exists, and since the most profound sentiment of the human mind manifests itself in aim and endeavour as good and perfect, and therefore as optimistic.

We must, however, examine nature more closely in order to apprehend and estimate the quality and significance of physical evil, and that we may be able to form a judgment of the suffering in creation in its relation to true happiness and the perfection of the creature. Very little observation will show us that all the manifold impulses of nature in the sphere of life are dependent on the capacity for sensation in the living being. Enjoyment of life depends on the capacity for sensation, and of course pain and sorrow also. The life and habits of animals, from the highest to the lowest, essentially depend on both kinds of sensation. It must even be allowed that animals are induced to exertion rather by the endeavour to avoid and overcome pain than by the desire for happiness. If it were not for the painful sensation of hunger, the search for food and all the labour connected with it would not be undertaken, and a general cessation of life would take place. In the same way species would cease to be propagated but for the sexual impulse. So also the sensation of pain is necessary for the estimation and avoidance of danger to life and limb. Imagine the absence of these sensations

from the animal world : all the various instincts of life would come to a standstill. Pain, and the perpetual danger of it in the animal world, may also have contributed much to the perfection of it, as it is only the physically and especially the psychically stronger animals which have been able to maintain themselves in the conflict with all the dangers that beset them. At any rate Darwin's investigations favour the idea that suffering may not have been without a favourable influence on the maintenance and development of perfect species. Suffering and the endeavour to avoid it has probably contributed more than the search for enjoyment to the diligent use, and therefore development, especially, of the psychical faculties.

Death, however, which is perpetually engulfing all living beings, and the fact that the life and prosperity of one species is dependent on the destruction of others which serve them for food, appear strongly to favour the Pessimistic view of nature, and even seem to be satires upon the idea of a wise and good government of the world. But in opposition to this it must be observed that it is death in nature which gives rise to its perpetual youth, to perpetual growth and bloom with all its charms. Nature, as a whole, is not otherwise ordered than the living organism in individuals. As in these, the smallest organic forms, the cells, are conceived of as in a constant state of formation and dissolution, and as the living organism is preserved from decay by this perpetual change and renovation, so it is in nature as a whole. The dissolution of the individual parts is the condition of the ever fresh and blooming life of the whole. Undoubtedly creation, with all its glory and joy, has a very sombre and tragic background ; nevertheless, we may well believe that the mass of suffering in it is far outweighed by happiness, and that Pessimist opinions cannot be maintained on this ground.

As to the circumstance that animals devour one another, and that thus the life and happiness of one depend on the death and pain of another, it must be remembered that if, in order to render the youth and bloom of nature possible, death was inevitable, this mutual destruction appears to be the best method of effecting death and yet of avoiding the evil consequences of it. Life would be almost annihilated through the deleterious influence of innumerable corpses if all animals died what is called a natural death. This is avoided by their inflicting death on each other. Death itself nourishes and advances life, and in the animal world a much greater variety is possible than if this were not the case. Finally, regarding the subject in its general significance for the life and perfection of nature, it may be added that it is by this devouring of one creature by another that the advancement in the forms of life is chiefly effected, because the lower forms render possible the

existence of the higher. Thus animal life spent and sacrificed for the enhancement of life, is not extinguished in vain, but even in banishing a higher idea, it serves the perfecting of nature.

In a sense higher and more profound physical suffering has a similar significance for human life. This also is dependent principally on the capacity for sensation, and especially the sensation of pain. Imagine mankind without this capacity, the fundamental motive for all activity—life itself would disappear. The historical activity of the human race, at any rate in its rougher aspects, is entirely dependent on it. To avoid pain and suffering, to attain happiness and to enjoy life, are also the main motives in this sphere. These induce men to make great exertions, to undertake great enterprises, to exercise all their powers. Even the higher mental powers receive their chief impulse from this sensibility, and it offers the main incitement to moral and intellectual culture. The first efforts of the intellect were undoubtedly occasioned by the fact that man was impelled by the necessities of life, by the dangers which threatened, and the hunger which assailed him, to use not only his bodily but his mental powers. The invention of the first rude tools, of the first weapons of attack and defence, bears witness to this. Similar needs gave rise to their being perfected; and even at a later period when the higher arts and sciences were developed, and revealed the highest powers of human genius, though their aim was rather to beautify and ennoble than to meet the needs and sufferings of life, still even then art and science was constantly advanced by the suffering condition of man. In our own times this is still the case. Art and science still find practical realization, not only in improving and beautifying life, but in guarding against, and as far as possible overcoming its evils and imperfections. Had man been without this capacity for the sensation of pain—had he only been sensible of happiness and joy, the needful incitement would have been wanting for the development of the intellectual powers. A paradisaical state into which pain could not enter, would have kept man in a condition of very great intellectual imperfection. It is not in the most sensuously favoured lands, not in those where fruitfulness and lack of danger render life the most easy to man, that he reaches the highest stages of existence, but in those which by their less favourable natural circumstances give occasion to perpetual exertion, to the use of all the physical and mental powers.

Physical, and still more psychical suffering has, if possible, a still greater influence on the ethical nature and perfection of men. The beginning of ethical culture with a child appears essentially to depend on the sensations of pain and pleasure. By the varying condition of his being in these respects, and the varying estimate of

his actions, the child first attains to consciousness. Pleasure and pain cannot be described or defined; all that can be said is, that the one is felt to be desirable and normal, that the other is abnormal and is to be avoided. Only thereby is it possible to awaken a child's consciousness to good, to duty, and to what is ethically right, to rouse its attention to the difference between good and evil. The pedagogic wisdom of all ages and nations has recognised this, and turned it practically to account. Painful punishments have always been employed to induce consciousness of wrong, to awaken a conception of its being pernicious by the feeling of pain, and to deter from the repetition of faults. We all know too that it is in sorrow and calamity that man's moral strength is best fostered; that nobility of character and true mental dignity are best cultured and displayed in the greatest sorrows and severest trials of life. The highest spectacle that life can offer is that of the man who struggles with adverse fate, who comes unsubdued and morally purified out of the conflict, even if he succumbs to it physically. The lofty, ennobling, and at the same time pleasurable effect of tragedy, rests upon the same basis. A life without conflict or passion, made up of enjoyment only, would afford man no opportunity for cultivating his highest powers. A paradise would only be a fitting abode for children, for those who were always to remain in leading-strings.

Finally, physical, and in part also moral, evil is important for the cultivation of the highest of virtues—love of our neighbour. That one man can do anything for another, can lend him practical aid, or lovingly alleviate his lot, at the same time cultivating and perfecting himself, even growing God-like and a representative of Providence, is mainly dependent on the fact of man's sensibility to suffering. If this were wanting, the chief bond would be snapt which unites men to each other, and makes their life together a school of moral activity and perfection. Thus the sufferings of life become an incitement to the practice of moral virtues, both to the sufferer himself and to those who render him aid.

Besides this, they serve moral purposes by preventing immoral conduct, and by affording protection from many moral dangers. Imagine human life, as at present constituted, without suffering or sensibility to it, and realize the consequences! How presumption and listless idleness would prevail, how unbounded would be the dominion of selfishness, what an absence of all self-restraint would be the result! If we consider all this, and rightly estimate the significance of suffering in its various aspects for the human race, we shall no longer be able to call this the worst of all possible worlds, nor even to say that it is unconditionally bad. The good that results and is wrung from suffering has a value which far outweighs the pain.

There is another fact of the greatest importance, which proves that this life is not so utterly miserable and unworthy as the Pessimists would have us believe. It scarcely admits of dispute that the most blessed thing in life is love, the word being taken in its broadest sense, not in that more limited one in which the poets sing of it. It may be asserted that all the happiness of life is dependent on love; whether it be the love of anything great and important or insignificant, it is the most blessed—indeed the only blessed—thing in this world. A man who can love no more, or from whom everything is taken to which he has been devoted, will no longer wish to live. He will long for death and annihilation or sink into despair. The lover experiences this when he loses the glorified object of his affection; and so does the miser who has made gold his god, when he is suddenly deprived of it. Human nature is so constituted that it wants some object as a complement to itself, and finds happiness in devotion to it. That will naturally afford the highest satisfaction which is the most perfect and most truly answers to the ideal of the true, the good, and the beautiful; so that the most lasting and indestructible blessedness will be attained when man devotes himself to that which does not belong to this transitory life, but to that which is eternal and cannot pass away.

This blessed sentiment of love has also this peculiarity, that it so far succeeds in overcoming and alleviating the sorrows of which it is often the cause, that they are scarcely felt to be sorrows, or are joyfully borne. In the case of love which has relation to sex this is so, in the degree that it is genuine and heartfelt. All nature shows how self-sacrificing parental love is, and of what the enthusiasm of love to God is capable is proved by the faith of ascetics and martyrs. Even that caricature of real love, the affection of the avaricious man for his possessions, is not quite destitute of this characteristic, for he often sacrifices himself and this life for the sake of it. But still more—it is not only the characteristic of genuine love willingly and joyfully to bear distress and pain for the sake of others, it is even filled with desire to bear them, by some act or sacrifice to express its love and make the object of it happy. Love delights in making sacrifices, and mostly overcomes all selfishness and self-seeking.

A world in which so blessed a sentiment is possible and actual, in which a power exists, which can subdue selfishness, conquer sorrow, and ennoble the soul, which can make even painful sacrifices a blessed task—such a world cannot be conceived of as fundamentally Pessimistic, as unconditionally evil.

The question now arises how moral evil is to be reconciled with the idea that the world is good, and that it is the work of an all-wise, almighty, and just Creator. Moral evil appears not only as disgraceful and ruinous to the world, as utterly incapable of

advancing good, but also as directly opposed to God, as incompatible with His existence and works. Considerations of this sort have been long ago brought forward in various forms, and have given rise to manifold attempts to answer the question, to explain the existence and significance of evil, and to show it to be compatible with faith in an absolutely perfect God. It was in this attempt that the doctrines of original sin and predestination originated. People did not shrink from maintaining that the purpose of evil was to afford God the opportunity, which He would not otherwise have had, of revealing His justice by His revenge and wrath. We do not propose here to test these views, but will only briefly show how the existence of moral evil may be found to be compatible with the existence and works of God, and not only so, but actually to further the perfection of the world.

The perfection of creation demands that it shall be as good as possible, and, on the other hand, this perfection is demanded by the perfection of the Divine Creator, if a Creator is presupposed. Everyone will admit that that which is free and independent is more perfect than that which is not free, dependent, or lifeless. The perfection of the world demanded, and it was in accordance with the perfection of the Creator, that free creatures should be created—that is, beings gifted with free will; whose acts and resolves should spring from themselves, should, as it were, result from a creative principle within them in spite of the principle of causality in the events of life. Beings, therefore, who are the originators of their own acts, and are responsible for them, must ascribe the merit or demerit of them to themselves. Intellectual, conscious creatures of this sort possessed of wills are in the main God-like; at any rate, in so far as in their freedom of action they are counterparts of the eternal independent being of God, and in relation to their moral constitution, they are the creators of themselves, and, as it were, subject to no compulsion or necessity. Thus man participates in a prerogative of the Deity, as is the case in consequence of his possession of self-conscious reason. This is the condition of human nature in its true dignity and sublimity, as it triumphs over all the crime, sorrow, and vicissitudes of this life. But even by reason of this highest characteristic of his being, man is also capable of moral evil, and this is the *sine quâ non* of the highest perfection of created and mortal beings, as has been explained and proved by philosophers and teachers in former times. The highest perfection is conditioned by the deepest imperfection. The imperfect, the lifeless, the enslaved, would indeed make imperfection impossible, but it would also exclude all true perfection and perfectibility.

The perfection of earthly existence is dependent on necessity and free will, but so also is imperfection, or physical and moral evil. On

necessity in nature depends its conformity to law, the sure and constant course of things and its objective rationality. Through freedom of will, a higher aim, a peculiar significance, is given to the necessary conformity of nature to law, since by its means it can be turned to account for rational purposes, cultivated and exalted. Without necessity or constant conformity to law in nature there could be no true knowledge of it, no rational use of it for definite ends, no control over it for practical purposes; but without freedom the same results would ensue, and all that would be possible would be an aimless course of things constantly repeated.

The higher significance, the rational end of existence, and with it its perfection and perfectibility, is therefore dependent on necessity and free will. But imperfection is also dependent on both since they are finite, and must show themselves in the forms of time and space, and thus the sorrows and evils of life are possible and actual. It is always found that it is that same principle in creation which constitutes the idea of its perfection, its likeness to God, which renders possible and actually produces its imperfection and corruption. This, as Leibnitz has shown, is the necessary condition of its finite nature. Were it otherwise, were the world perfect without the possibility of corruption and decay, without, therefore, the need of development, it would be equal to God Himself, it would be a second God.

All this admits of proof without much difficulty, but, nevertheless, the Pessimists will not consider their complaints and doubts about the evils of life as disposed of, but will ask—Why, then, if a finite creation, even if the best possible, could not exist without evil, was it created at all? Non-existence, they maintain, would be much better than this suffering life. The mystery and nature of life is certainly, after all, impenetrable by the human mind; for, in order to comprehend it clearly, man must be equal to God; and we must be content to forego the comprehension of this final mystery, especially as there is so much in the world itself as yet unexplained and incomprehensible. Meanwhile, we may attempt a solution of the problem, Why this world was created, and was created as it is, from what we know of the character and aim of creation?

Of course the question, and the attempt at a solution of it, is without meaning if not regarded from a theistic stand-point—that is, for those who take the world to be the work of a personal Creator, acting with consciousness and free will. From the atheistic, naturalistic, or decidedly pantheistic stand-point, the question why this suffering world exists has no meaning, because, according to these systems, all possibility of its non-existence, or of its being different from what it is, is excluded beforehand. Neither has the question any significance for the semi-pantheistic system; for while according to this there is a distinction between God and the

world, it holds that it was necessary for God to reveal Himself by the creation of the world, though it is not exactly a necessary part of His being; so that according to this system, also, the non-existence of the world is an impossibility. Our problem, therefore, is only possible from a theistic stand-point—that is, on the supposition that the world was called into existence and created as it is as the result of God's resolve.

The question then is, why God, foreseeing the suffering, and especially the moral evil, of the world as inevitable, did not leave the world uncreated? In answer to this, it may be remarked that in any case it appears to be more in accordance with the goodness of God to create than not to create, supposing the latter as possible. For it appears to be in unison with His perfection, and especially with His goodness, to call beings into existence, to confer on them as far as possible the enjoyment of life, and the capability of attaining perfection. The motive, therefore, for creation appears stronger than that for non-creation. We conceive of existence as better than non-existence, and even in the world as it is, happiness outweighs suffering, so that by non-creation more happiness than pain would have been prevented. Possible, actual, necessary, and foreseen evil, therefore, could not prevent creation, as it could not affect the Creator more strongly than the preponderating happiness in the world. As to moral evil, it has been already observed that at least the possibility of it was inevitable, if creation was to be perfect and godlike. This perfection demands beings with free will, and they must therefore be capable of bad, as well as of good, actions. But had God abstained from creation on account of the possibility and future actuality of evil, to prevent the misery which might arise from it and from the abuse of free will, He would then have had more regard to the possible evil in the future creation than to the good, since to avoid the unhappiness which was not compulsory, He would also have avoided the good, and this appears neither fit nor justifiable.

It may also be observed that had God abstained from creating the world on account of future evil, evil, even before it existed, would have had more weight in the divine counsels than good. Even such a negative preponderance or preventive ascendancy of evil in relation to God is inadmissible, and so it must be acknowledged that in spite of the inevitable evil in the world the creation of it was proper for God and beneficial for the creature. The existing imperfections and suffering, therefore, are not a sufficient proof against the real existence of God, and no decisive contradiction of God-consciousness in humanity. And this it is the special mission of the Theodicy, so-called, to prove.

We do not hold with Leibnitz that every evil in the world is absolutely necessary, that the world could not stand if the least of them

were wanting; and for this reason, if the freedom of the will is once admitted, besides moral evil, much suffering must be looked upon as self-produced, and therefore might not have been. Neither can we agree with Rokitanski,* a follower of Schopenhauer, when he maintains that the sum of evil in the world remains always the same; for both with individuals and nations much evil may be avoided by knowledge and experience, so that suffering may be diminished for an individual or a nation without its necessary augmentation in others. To accept this doctrine without good reason would be to favour a too unscientific mysticism. On the other hand, neither can he who takes a theistic stand-point, who regards God as an absolutely perfect being, according to man's conception of perfection, adopt the view of Jacob Boehme that the positive root and source of the evil and suffering in the world is God Himself. For that which is designated as punitive or revengeful justice, the expression or effect of which is undoubtedly felt to be human suffering, is not a source or root of evil, but only reaction against it, and it has therefore not a positive, but merely a negative, relation to it. Besides, if Boehme's doctrine were correct, that peculiar consciousness of something wrong, which does actually exist in the human mind, could hardly find a place there, and evil and suffering would be conceived of as something substantial, whereas it universally manifests itself as something accidental, as perversion, disturbance, as may easily be observed in the case of physical maladies.

We may say that this world is the best in so far as it appears to be the work of divine goodness and wisdom, and is destined for the highest ends, the perfection and blessedness of created beings; but this does not exclude the fact that it is full of imperfection and suffering. It is intended for activity, independence, and self-improvement, and cannot therefore offer tranquil enjoyment, but demands energy, effort, and conflict; for it is only by these means that the creature can achieve or become anything. If human life were nothing but a perpetual scene of enjoyment, a round of amusements, what significance or dignity could it have, or to what loftier ends could it attain? If the world were less perfect and less destined for perfectibility, there might be less suffering and less possibility of evil. It might even be free from both if life and freedom were wanting, that is if only inane or unconscious beings existed.

Every man can best solve at least for himself the profound enigma whether this world is good or bad, the best or the worst, by turning it to the best account for himself. The world is the best, but only for those who know how to make it so, which is indeed a task of great

* Die Solidarität alles Thierlebens. Vortrag von Hofrath und Professor Dr. Carl Rokitanski. Wien, 1869. It is noteworthy that it is a natural philosopher and a physician who holds these views.

difficulty. It is given us as the best, but it is man's mission to make it actually so. It is not easy to see how it could be otherwise if creation is really to have any significance, and is not to be a childish and meaningless game with mere puppets.

The sweetest and sublimest harmonies are concealed in nature; but to reveal them to the world the musical genius is required, who has carefully cultivated his powers, and only discovers them himself with much pain and labour. So it is with the best world, so called, for man. And, further, even when the most enchanting musical tones are brought into harmonious conjunction, and a master-piece is produced calculated to elevate and rejoice, still, before it can delight the hearers, the art is required of bringing the work to light by means of voices and instruments, an art which can only be acquired with much labour and effort. Thus also the highest and best happiness for man in this world is near him, within and without, but it must be sought for, aimed at, and grasped, in order to make it a reality and to make the best of the world. He who will not earnestly strive to fulfil these conditions will not attain it; and for him the world will be the worst, although he will be everywhere surrounded with the possibility of the highest bliss. Just as the finest masterpiece of music does not exist for him, even though it lies before him, if he has not acquired the art of playing it, or will not take the trouble to do so.

As we have seen, our problem belongs in an especial manner to religions, and they try in one way or another to help nations and individuals to solve it. As we consider these different methods, we can assert without any hesitation that the Christian religion offers by far the best and most cheering solution; far better than the pessimism of Buddhism, the asceticism and quietism of Brahminism, or the predominant fatalism of Islamism. It may be said that the Christian doctrine unites all these solutions into a more lofty whole. It knows especially how to unite the needful submission and resignation with the equally needful energy and individual effort, thereby fitting man for the fulfilment of his mission without causing him to lose his individuality. This is rendered possible chiefly by the doctrine of God as proclaimed by Christ; by this, unlimited confidence in His fatherhood and care for all men is awakened, while at the same time the duty is laid upon all to labour faithfully, to prove their love and obedience to God, as well as to attain happiness and salvation by striving to fulfil the active duties of love towards their neighbour.

It is by these means that that optimism is established, which looks upon existence as a great good, but unites with this opinion the conviction that we must attain this blessedness for ourselves through suffering and by our own efforts.

J. FROHSCHAMMER.



JOHN SMITH AND HIS SELECT DISCOURSES.

IN the life and opinions of Whichcote, which we formerly reviewed,* the new movement of thought in Cambridge is seen taking its rise. It is found springing partly out of a fresh activity of the philosophical spirit wearied with the aridities of the exhausted scholasticism, and quickened by the revived study of Plato, and partly out of a re-action against the religious bigotries of the time, which in their violence and intolerance had disgusted the higher minds at the universities. The religious aspect of the movement is, in the first instance, more conspicuous than its philosophical character and affiliation. Whichcote's relations to the religious parties of his time come into more direct view than his relation to the speculative influences, which, beyond doubt, he also greatly modified. In other words, he is more prominently the rational religious thinker than the Platonic philosopher.

The explanation of this is easy. Religion masked every other interest in the seventeenth century. Both politics and philosophy, although they had broken the ecclesiastical yoke, and were seeking emancipation, had not yet accomplished it. In order to get a hearing for themselves, they had studiously to court theology, and assume a religious side; or at least to pay deference—if it were only as with Bacon, the deference of respectful distance—to what was still held to be the queen of the sciences. The philosophical attitude of Bacon is

* See *Contemporary Review* for October, 1871.

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Righteousness ;—such are the questions to which his “Discourses” are devoted. Religious in the highest sense, they yet involve in their mere statement the primary *data* of all philosophy ; and Smith, we shall find, handles them as a preacher indeed—for the discourses were intended for oral delivery—yet with a freedom, loftiness, and amplitude of grasp, which stamps him pre-eminently as a Christian philosopher.

Of Smith’s life unhappily we know little or nothing. In some respects the most remarkable of all the Cambridge school—the richest and most beautiful mind, and certainly by far the best writer of them all—he died at the early age of thirty-four. There was nothing to tell of a career so brief, and which never seems to have passed beyond the precincts of the University. He is a thinker without a biography. Two friends,—John Worthington, who edited his “Discourses,” and Simon Patrick, who preached his funeral sermon in the chapel of Queen’s College, where he himself had discoursed with such marvellous eloquence,—have given us some sketch of his character, but left much to be desired even in this respect. There is elevation and beauty, but also a good deal of indistinctness, in the picture which they draw. The lines are grand but wavering, and lose themselves, after the manner of the time, in vagueness and generality ; yet here and there there are touches of affectionate felicity, which, in the case of Patrick in particular, break into downright bursts of tearful tenderness over the loss of so much genius and goodness. *Quando ullum inveniet parem*, is the key-note of all he says, and the pressure of the painful thought interrupts the flow of his panegyric with the most honest exclamations of grief. “Who can think of his gracious lips, his profitable and delightful converse, his cordial love, without a sigh and a tear, without saying, ‘Ah ! my father ;’ ‘Ah ! his glory ?’” . . . A recent writer* has said that in all the literature of the period with which he is acquainted, he has “not met with a more pathetic production than this funeral sermon. The artistic skill is not great, but there is an expression of genuine feeling throughout, with an occasional outbreak of honest grief which produces an effect above all art.” This is quite true, and the fact is equally creditable to Patrick and the friend whom he and the University so deeply mourned.

John Smith was a native of Northamptonshire, where his father seems to have been a small farmer. He was born at Achurch, near Oundle, in that county, in the year 1618. Before his birth, Patrick

* Mr. Mullinger, of St. John’s College, who, in a small volume, entitled “Cambridge Characteristics in the Seventeenth Century,” has touched, but only very slightly, upon our subject.

says, "his parents had been long childless, and were grown aged." He was sent to Cambridge in 1636, and entered, as Whichcote had before him, at Emmanuel College. We would infer from this that his father, like many of his class, especially in the midland districts of England, had Puritan leanings, and sent him to the well-known Puritan Foundation to be trained in the true gospel of Protestantism. At this time Whichcote was a Fellow and Tutor in the College; and he is supposed also to have commenced his influence as a preacher. He was nine years older than Smith; and it is expressly stated by Worthington that he became tutor to the young and probably somewhat friendless undergraduate from Northamptonshire. This is one of the few facts embodied in Worthington's rhetorical "Address to the Reader," prefixed to the original edition of the "Discourses." It is also implied in his statement, that the tutor's comparative wealth was freely given to assist his pupil. His words are:—

"I knew him (the author of the 'Discourses') for many years, not only when he was Fellow of Queen's College, but when a student in Emmanuel College, where his early piety, and the remembering his Creator in those days of his youth, as also his excellent improvements in the choicest parts of learning, endeared him to many, particularly to his careful tutor, the Fellow of Emmanuel College, afterwards Provost of King's College, Dr. Whichcote; to whom, for his directions and encouragements of him in his studies, his seasonable provision for his support and maintenance when he was a young scholar, as also upon other obliging considerations, our author did ever express a great and singular regard."*

Smith took his Bachelor's degree in 1640, and his Master's four years later; and in the same year in which he became Master, or in 1644, he was chosen a Fellow of Queen's College. The explanation given of his not having received a Fellowship in his own College is, that by the statutes no more than one Fellow could be admitted from any one county, and that the Fellowship open to a Northamptonshire graduate was filled up at the time Smith became eligible. It was at this time, our readers will remember, that Whichcote returned to Cambridge, after a brief absence, and was appointed Provost of King's College. We have no trace of further personal relations betwixt the former Tutor and his pupil; but they, no doubt, renewed their old intercourse, and it is easy to imagine the enthusiasm with which a mind like Smith's would regard Whichcote's growing influence over the youth of the University. Smith's success, again, could scarcely have been less acceptable to his former teacher; while the discourses which he delivered in the chapel of Queen's must have been among the most powerful stimulants of the higher and more expansive thoughtfulness which was rapidly springing up

* Address to the Reader.

to the alarm of Tuckney and his friends. They "contributed," according to Tillotson's biographer,* "to raise new thoughts and a sublime style in the members of the University." Smith is said to have discharged his duties as tutor with great faithfulness, and to have had great aptitude and ease of expression in the communication of knowledge. Particular mention is made of his distinction as a mathematical lecturer in the public schools. His health seems to have been weak from the first, and his illness was borne with singular sweetness and patience. He died on the 7th of August, 1652, a few months after Whichcote closed his correspondence with Tuckney and the new movement may be said to have attained definite recognition and significance.

Worthington's description of his friend throws but little light upon his character. He tells us that he might "fill much paper" in recounting particularly his many excellences; yet, after all, he gives us but a very vague and indefinite impression in such sentences as the following:—

"I might truly say, that he was not only *δίκαιος*, but *ἀγαθός*, both a righteous and truly honest man, and also a good man. He was a follower and imitator of God in purity and holiness, in benignity, goodness, and love; a love enlarged as God's love is, whose goodness overflows and spreads itself to all, and His tender mercies are over all His works. He was a 'lover of our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity,' a lover of His spirit and of His life, a lover of His excellent laws and rules of holy life, a serious practiser of His Sermon on the Mount, the best sermon that ever was preached, and yet none more generally neglected by those that call themselves Christians." "To be short, he was a Christian not *ἐν λόγῳ*, but *ἐν πολλῷ*, more than a little, even wholly and altogether such: a Christian *ἐν χριστῷ*, inwardly and in good earnest: religious he was, but without any vain-gloriousness and ostentation; not so much a talking or a disputing, as a living, a doing, and an obeying Christian; one inwardly acquainted with the simplicity and power of godliness, but no admirer of the Pharisaic forms and sanctimonious shows, though never so goodly and specious."

Besides being thus "a truly God-like man," he was possessed of—

"Those other perfections and accomplishments of the mind, which rendered him a very rational and learned man: and withal, in the midst of all these great accomplishments, as eminent and exemplary in unaffected humility and true lowliness of mind." "To conclude," he says, "he was a plain-hearted friend and Christian, one in whose spirit and mouth there was no guile; a profitable companion; nothing of vanity and triflingness in him, as there was nothing of sourness and stoicism. I can very well remember, when I have had private converse with him, how pertinent and freely he would speak to any matter proposed; how weighty, substantial, and clearly expressive of his sense, his private discourses would be, and both for matter and language much what of the same importance and value with such exercises as he studied for, and performed in public."

* Birch's "Life of Archbishop Tillotson," pp. 6, 7.

Such are the most characteristic passages of Worthington's description in his "Address to the Reader." They are hearty but featureless, and fail to bring before us any familiar image of his friend. He might have added more, he says, but in the view of "the fair and lively character" drawn by Patrick, he thinks this unnecessary.

"If some part of that character," he adds, "should seem to have in it anything of hyperbolism and strangeness, it must seem so to such only who either were unacquainted with him and strangers to his worth, or else find it a hard thing not to be envious, and a difficulty to be humble. But those that had a more inward converse with him knew him to be one of those 'of whom the world was not worthy,' one of the 'excellent ones in the earth;' a person truly exemplary in the temper and constitution of his spirit, and in the well-ordered course of his life; a life *unius quasi coloris, sine actionum dissensione*, as I remember Seneca doth express it somewhere in his epistles, 'all of one colour, everywhere like itself;' and eminent in those things that are worthy of praise and imitation."

The character drawn by Patrick, amid all its elaborate eulogy, gives a more lively picture; yet, even in it, there are touches of mere declamation, which leave us very unsatisfied. The tone throughout is that of the preacher moved to an unwonted height of emotion, and giving too ready a flow to exaggerations of language, as he recalls the virtues of his friend.

"Let us first look upon him," he says, "in *his eminency, dignity, and worth*. A very glorious star he was, and shone brighter in our eyes than any that he ever looked upon when he took his view of the heavenly bodies; and now he shines as the brightness of the firmament, and as the stars for ever and ever, being wise, and having turned many, I believe, unto righteousness." . . . "He had such a huge, wide capacity of soul, such a sharp and piercing understanding, such a deep reaching mind, that he set himself about nothing but he soon grasped it, and made himself a full possessor of it. . . . He was a most laborious searcher after wisdom. 'A living library' better than that which he hath given to our college, and 'a walking study,'* that carried his learning about with him. I never got so much good among all my books by a whole day's plodding in a study, as by an hour's discourse I have got with him. For he was not a library locked up, nor a book clasped, but stood open for any to converse withal that had a mind to learn. Yea, he was a fountain running over, labouring to do good to those who, perhaps, had no mind to receive it. None more free and communicative than he was to such as desired to discourse with him, nor would he grudge to be taken off from his studies upon such an occasion. It may be truly said of him, that a man might always come better from him; and his mouth could drop sentences as easily as an ordinary man's could speak sense. And he was no less happy in expressing his mind than in conceiving. He had such a *copia verborum*, a plenty of words, and those so full, pregnant, and significant, joined with such an active fancy, as is very

* Βιβλιοθήκη τις ἐμψυχος, καὶ περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον, as Eunapius says of Longinus. Patrick quotes the original in his text.

rarely to be found in the company of such a deep understanding and judgment as dwelt in him."*

Whichcote's pupil, it is clear, had something of his own marvellous gifts as a teacher. He loved to discourse. His mind craved sympathy, and to unburden itself of its teeming thoughts. This was, no doubt, the secret of the enthusiasm with which his friends regarded him, and of the extraordinary interest which his death excited. They felt that not only a great student and thinker, but a great teacher was gone—one whose qualities pre-eminently fitted him to adorn the University, and to influence its higher studies.

"His learning," as Patrick phrases it, "was so concocted, that it lay not as an idle notion in his head, but made him fit for any employment. He was very full and clear in all his resolutions at any debates, a most wise councillor in any difficulties and straits, dexterous in untying any knot, of great judgment in satisfying any scruple or doubt, even in matters of religion. He was one that soon saw into the depth of any business that was before him, and looked it quite through, that would presently turn it over and over in his mind, and see it on all sides."†

Evidently a well-balanced, noble, intellectual nature, fitted to rule in the halls of learning, and to diffuse around him a quickening and powerful influence.

Nor were Smith's moral qualities less remarkable.

"He had incorporated," continues his eulogist, "or insouled" all principles of *justice* and *righteousness*, and made them one with himself. So that I may say of him in Antouious' phrase, he was *δικαιοσύνη βεβαμμένος εις βάθος*, 'dipped into justice as it were over head and ears;' he had not a slight superficial tincture, but was dyed and coloured quite through with it; so that wheresoever he had a soul, there was justice and righteousness. They who knew him, very well know the truth of all this. And I am persuaded he did as heartily and cordially, as eagerly and earnestly do what appeared to be just and right, without any self-respect or particular reflections, as any man living. Methinks I see how earnest he would be in a good matter which appeared to be reasonable and just, as though justice herself had been in him, looking out at his eyes, and speaking at his mouth. It was a virtue indeed that he had a great affection unto, and which he was very jealous to maintain; in whose quarrel he was in danger to be angry, and sometimes to break forth into a short passion."‡

Here we have a genuine bit of nature. Smith was evidently a high-souled, eager, and somewhat impetuous man, easily warmed into emotion for what he felt to be a just cause, and ready to give vent to his feelings with something of passionate earnestness. He had the quick temperament which kindles at wrong-doing or folly of any kind, and which goes straight at its object without management

* Funeral Sermon preached by Patrick, printed along with "Select Discourses."

† Ditto.

‡ Ditto.

or guile. The spirit which reveals itself by the eyes and mouth may not be a great spirit, and certainly may not always be right, but at least it is never crafty or deceitful. And in his case the diffusive expressiveness of the face was plainly the symbol of a large, liberal, and sensitively truthful soul.

It is this generous aspect of his friend's character that melts Patrick, as he proceeds in his description, and makes him exclaim :—

“And now what word shall I use? What shall I say of his *love*? None that knew him well but might see in him love bubbling* and springing up in his soul, and flowing out to all; and that love unfeigned, without guile, hypocrisy, or dissimulation. I cannot tell you how his soul universalized, how tenderly he embraced all God's creatures in his arms, more especially men, and principally those in whom he beheld the image of his heavenly Father. There one might have seen running τὸ συγγενὲς πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς, and he would even have emptied his soul into theirs. Let any that were thoroughly acquainted with him say if I lie. And truly my happiness is that I have such a subject to exercise my young and weak oratory upon, as will admit of little hyperbole. His *patience* was no less admirable than his love, under a lingering and tedious disease, wherein he never murmured or complained, but rested quietly satisfied in the infinite unbounded goodness and tenderness of his Father, and the commiserations of Jesus Christ He told me in his sickness that he hoped he had learned that for which God sent it, and that he thought God kept him so long in such a case, under such burdens and pressures, that ‘patience might have its perfect work in him.’ And really in his sickness he showed what Christianity and true religion is able to do; what might, power, and virtue there is in it to bear up a soul under the greatest loads.”

His “humility and faith, his ingenuity, courtesy, gentleness and sweetness,” are all commended in similar language. He was absorbed by religious earnestness, and resolved (so he said) :—

“If it had pleased the Lord of life to prolong his days very much to lay aside other studies and to travail in the salvation of men's souls;’ but at the same time he was free from all ‘devouring zeal’ He called for no fire to descend from heaven upon men but the fire of divine love, that might burn up all their hatreds, roughness, and cruelty to each other. But as for *benignity* of mind and Christian kindness, everybody that knew him will remember that he ever had their names in his mouth, and I assure them they were no less in his heart and life; as knowing that without these truth itself is in a faction, and Christ is drawn into a party. And this graciousness of spirit was the more remarkable in him, because he was of a temper naturally hot and choleric, as the greatest minds most commonly are. He was wiser than to let any anger rest in his bosom; much less did he suffer it to burn and boil till it was turned into gall and bitterness If he was at any time moved unto anger, it was but a sudden flushing in the face, and it did as soon vanish as arise.” †

* “πυρρὸς ἄγαστος,” as Nazianzen, I think, speaks,” Patrick adds in the text.

† Patrick's Funeral Sermon.

Having thus described all this "worth and eminency," and alluded to the last days of his friend's life, which passed away in "a kind of sleep," Patrick's feelings seem to give way altogether, as he breaks forth :—

"Have we not reason to be so sad, as you see our faces tell you that we are? But alas! half of that is not told you which your eyes might have seen, had you been acquainted with him. I want thoughts and words to make a lively portraiture of him: my young experience hath not yet seen to the height or the depth of these things which I have here given you a rude draught of; and so my conceits and expressions must needs fall far below that excellent degree of beauty wherein they dwelt in him . . . There is not one but will cry out with Elisha, 'O the chariot of this place, and the horseman thereof.' . . . O thou wast both my safeguard and my ornament! who wast a society by thyself, a college in brief, what a loss have we sustained by thy departure? . . . To which of us was not he dear? Who is there that was not engaged to him! Who can think himself as wise as he was when we had him?*"

The picture of mind and character raised by these grandiloquent touches is of so lofty a kind that we might be disposed to attribute it in some degree to that enthusiasm of personal friendship which often binds young university men together, and makes them exalt above criticism the parts and influences of some favourite tutor or companion-student. This is so common that we are apt to smile at youthful eulogy, knowing well that the only test of what a man is really worth, and what he is capable of doing for any branch of knowledge, is not the intense and frequently narrow judgment of a university, but the broad and well-sifted judgment of the intellectual world. Many a university marvel has come to little and done little for the world's good; whilst some who excited no special interest among their fellow-students have afterwards taken the lead, and left their stamp upon their generation in many impresses of noble and advancing thought. Accordingly, we turn to Smith's "Discourses" with some anxiety. They are all that survive to represent his genius. They first appeared in 1660, under the editorship of Worthington; and, although it was then stated by him that there were "other pieces of the author's" which would "make another considerable volume," no additional remains have ever been published.

It is the highest testimony to the genius of the author that the estimate of his friends is found fully sustained by these discourses. Written so long ago, and marked, like all the writings of the time, with many unaccustomed forms of language, they are yet instinct with a free, bright, and copious life of thought, which runs as freshly, or nearly as freshly, as it did to his contemporaries. The expression

* Patrick's Funeral Sermon.

of Worthington, that his mind was "a bountiful and ever-bubbling fountain," is exactly the expression suggested by their full, rich, and plentiful thoughtfulness. It is not mere eloquence and ability—the easy and large grasp of intellect, as in Chillingworth, or Barrow, or Cudworth—which distinguish them; but an ineffable light of spiritual genius shines in them all. They are "clothed," as the Chaldee oracle,* quoted by Patrick, says, "with a great deal of mind," and deeply "impregnated with Divine notions." Powerful and massive in argument, they are everywhere informed by a divine insight which transcends argument. Calmly and closely reasoned, they are at the same time inspired. The breath of a higher, diviner reason animates them all. The force of a logic nearly as direct and penetrating as that of Chillingworth directs an imagination as opulent as that of Jeremy Taylor. The result is a delightful admixture of Christian philosophy and poetry. Profound glimpses of spiritual truth everywhere open to the reader as he advances, charmed with the rich unfoldings of an exuberant intelligence, rejoicing in the amplitude of its powers and the sweep and glory of its flight. The poetic richness of the style seldom or never, as with Taylor, overbalances the weight of the thought. It is ornate and picturesque, without being florid or tawdry. It is *living* even through all the trappings and encumbrances of Neo-Platonical or other allusion. The rhetorical and rational, the imaginative and spiritual, are fused and blended into a common intellectual action which enlightens while it penetrates, and touches with beauty and colour the eminences of truth which it reveals.

The main drawback of the discourses to the modern reader is the incessant recurrence of quotations. The free course of the author's thought is constantly interrupted by confirmatory statements and illustrations from the treasures of ancient opinion; and sometimes, indeed, as in the third discourse on Atheism, his line of exposition runs almost entirely along an ancient track. The effect is now and then to give an additional richness and interest to the exposition, but more frequently to mar its flow and originality. The native texture of the author's composition is here and there so overlaid and patched, that it is barely distinguishable. It is like a rich garment covered with richer gems, which, while they give a new wealth to the original, yet hide its natural hue and folds. To the scholar and antiquarian student there is a special charm in this literary mosaic. They like the page studded with Greek and Latin quotations, and the reverend caution which seeks to fortify its steps as it advances by sentences from the ancient masters, and carries the *spolia opima* of past thought with it as it ventures into new regions of inquiry. But our more direct

* — πάλιν ἐσσάμηναι νοῦν.

habits of mind have made us impatient of the mere traditional ornaments of literature. The modern reader wishes to know what a man thinks himself, or has got to say for himself, rather than what Plato, or Plutarch, or Plotinus, or Tully, or Lucretius may have said ages ago. There is no indisposition, indeed, to listen to these ancient sages. On the contrary, it may be said, that there never was a time when any critical exposition of them was likely to be received with more interest or appreciation. But it is no longer accepted as a part of literary art to be able to weave their sayings into the texture of a theological or philosophical treatise ; and still less is it supposed that any modern writer necessarily adds to the weight of his own opinions by fixing them with even the most ingenious and pregnant quotations from ancient writers.

There can be no doubt that the Cambridge Platonists carried the system of quotations to excess. It was not merely a feature of their style, but a characteristic, so to speak, of their mode of thought which led them to lean too fondly on the past, and make too much of ancient authority. They were never able to throw off the weight of Neo-Platonic tradition, or to rise superior to what appeared to them a sacred lore. The shadow of Plotinus particularly haunts their highest speculations, and they escape but seldom into the clear daylight of thought. Smith is, perhaps, less an offender in this respect than Cudworth and More. Whichcote, in his sermons, offends least of all. He moves with a comparatively free and unembarrassed step. He had been more in the world than the others, and, as he himself tells us, owed less to reading than to his own thought and "invention." All the younger men of the school were more exclusively scholars and students. They gathered their thought more entirely from books, and, like all men who do so, they bear the trace of the library dust. They like to show the hidden treasure dug from the ancient graves, and which they have worked with so much love and interest.

The Discourses are ten in all. The first six are closely connected, and form, in fact, successive parts of a scheme of thought designed by the author in vindication of the "main heads and principles of religion." Starting with the important question of "the true way or method of obtaining Divine knowledge," he passes, after the polemical manner of the time, to discuss first the counterfeits or oppositions to Divine knowledge in the forms of Superstition and of Atheism. He then enumerates the main principles or articles of religious Truth to be—(1.) The Immortality of the Soul ; (2.) The Existence and Nature of God ; and (3.) The Communication of God to Mankind through Christ. He considers the two first subjects somewhat elaborately in successive discourses ; but he did not live to enter upon the special

treatment of the third. The discourse "Of Prophecy," which is the last of the connected series, was meant merely to be an introduction to this part of his subject; but so many inquiries "offered themselves to his thoughts" in discoursing upon Prophecy, that he had only finished this topic when his term of office as "Dean and Catechist" in the College expired. He died in the following summer; and thus, says Worthington:—

"He who designed to speak of God's communication of himself to mankind through Christ, was taken up by God into a more inward and immediate participation of himself in blessedness. Had he lived, and had health to have finished the remaining part of his designed method, the reader may easily conceive what a valuable piece that discourse would have been."

Yet, he adds, that the reader

"May not altogether want the author's labours upon such an argument, I thought good, in the next place, to adjoin a discourse of the like importance and nature delivered heretofore by the author in some chapel exercises."

In point of fact there are four discourses appended to that upon Prophecy. The volume, therefore, consists of two parts, the first part representing in some degree a connected treatise, and the second composed of such additional discourses as seemed to Worthington so far fitted to carry out the author's design, and to illustrate the special principles which he had intended to unfold in the sequel.

In expounding our author's religious philosophy, we shall follow his own outline of thought. The same ideas recur frequently, and the necessities of his argument and strict sequence of its various parts are not very carefully preserved.* The following may be said to be the particulars to which our attention is invited in succession:— I. Method of attaining divine knowledge. II. Opposites of the divine—Superstition and Atheism. III. Main principles of the divine—Immortality, God, Revelation. IV., and finally, The true character of the divine revealed in Christ. On all these points the discourses throw some true, and for the time, original light. We must confine our

* The following are the special titles of the several Discourses in the order in which they stand:—

- I. Of the true Way or Method of attaining to Divine Knowledge.
- II. Of Atheism.
- III. Of Superstition.
- IV. Of the Immortality of the Soul.
- V. Of the Existence and Nature of God.
- VI. Of Prophecy.
- VII. Of Legal and Evangelical Righteousness.
- VIII. Of the Shortness of Pharisaical Righteousness.
- IX. Of the Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion.
- X. Of a Christian's Conflicts with, and Conquests over, Satan.

exposition for the present to the first only—which, however, is so significant as to unfold in a manner the whole line of Smith's thought.

Smith's first discourse, "Of the true way or method of attaining to Divine Knowledge," is, in some respects, the finest of the series. It gives, as we have said, nearly the key-note of all his system of thought—as indeed to know the method of any thinker is more or less to know the substance of his thought, or the conclusions which he will reach. Are we to begin from without or from within? Are we to start with the senses or the soul, and advance along the line of sensation or the line of reason? The alternative is as old as philosophy itself. According as it takes the one path or the other—the subjective or the objective method—it falls into two great sections and sets up rival theories. To say that Smith was a Platonist is enough to settle the general character of his method. All knowledge to him, especially all higher divine knowledge, springs from the soul within. It is the reflection of our own souls—the interpretation of our own spiritual life. This will be found to be the pervading thought of the discourses—the central principle to which they all lead back. In its general philosophical aspect this is known as the old doctrine of *innate notions*, which Smith accepted without hesitation. This may be inferred from many of his expressions. But it is not in its general meaning so much as in its special theological application that he makes use of the principle. The kind of knowledge which he has everywhere in view is divine knowledge; the knowledge of God, and of a sphere of truth beyond that of sensible experience. The idea that there may be no such knowledge at all; that the sphere of sensible experience exhausts the circle of knowledge—an idea now so familiar—is not polemically present to his mind. There is no trace of Hobbes in any of the discourses. The "Leviathan" was in fact only published the year before Smith's death; and if he knew it at all, he makes no allusion to it. There is none of that consciousness of a living presence of atheistic speculation, or an antagonistic system of Corporealism, which meets us everywhere in the pages of Cudworth and More. The atheism which he describes is the atheism of Epicurus and Lucretius, without any hint of its revival in his own day. Accordingly Smith does not think it necessary to vindicate the general philosophic basis on which he stands. He takes that more or less for granted, and sets out confidently on the spiritual foundation from which all his thought rises.

The beginning of divine truth with him is a vital sense or faculty within us which lays hold of its appropriate objects.

“Every art and science,” he says, must start from certain ‘præ-cognita, or προλήψεις; and theology involves in its very nature the supposition of a power within us answering to, and apprehensive of, a Power above us. This power or faculty must be vital—of the nature of a higher sense.

For “Divinity,” he explains, is

“Something rather to be understood by a spiritual sensation than by any verbal description, as all things of sense and life are best known by sentient and vital faculties; γνώσις ἐκάστων δι’ ὁμοίτητος γίνεται, as the Greek philosopher hath well observed, everything is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogy with it; and therefore the scripture is wont to set forth a good life as the prolepsis and fundamental principle of divine science; ‘wisdom hath builded her house, and hewn out her seven pillars,’ but ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,’ the foundation of the whole fabric . . . They are not always the best skilled in divinity that are the most studied in those pandects, into which it is sometimes digested, or that have erected the greatest monopolies of art and science. He that is most practical in divine things, hath the purest and sincerest knowledge of them, and not he that is most dogmatical. Divinity indeed is a true efflux from the eternal light, which, like the sunbeams, does not only enlighten, but heat and enliven; and therefore our Saviour hath in his beatitudes connected purity of heart with the beatifical vision. And as the eye cannot behold the sun, ἡλιοειδής μὴ γινόμενος, unless it be sun-like, and hath the form and resemblance of the sun drawn in it; so neither can the soul of man behold God θεοειδής μὴ γινόμενος, unless it be God-like, hath God formed in it, and be made partaker of the divine nature. And the Apostle St. Paul, when he would lay open the right way of attaining to divine truth, saith, that ‘knowledge puffeth up,’ but it is ‘love that edifieth.’ The knowledge of divinity that appears in systems and models is but a poor, wan light; but the powerful energy of divine knowledge displays itself in purified souls: here we shall find the true πεδῖον ἀληθείας, as the ancient philosophy speaks, ‘the land of truth.’ To seek our divinity merely in books and writings, is to seek the living among the dead: we do but in vain seek God many times in these, where his truth too often is not so much enshrined as entombed: no, *intra te quaere deum*, seek for God within thine own soul; he is best discerned νοερῶ ἐπαφή, as Plotinus phraseth it, by an intellectual touch of him: we must ‘see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and our hands must handle the word of life,’ that I may express it in St. John’s words. Ἔστι καὶ ψυχῆς αἰσθησίς τις. The soul itself hath its sense, as well as the body: and therefore David, when he would teach us how to know what the divine goodness is, calls not for speculation but sensation, ‘Taste and see how good the Lord is.’ That is not the best and truest knowledge of God which is wrought out by the labour and sweat of the brain, but that which is kindled within us by a heavenly warmth in our hearts . . . It is but a thin, airy knowledge that is got by mere speculation which is ushered in by syllogisms and demonstrations; but that which springs forth from true goodness, is θεώτερόν τι πάσης ἀποδείξεως, as Origen speaks, it brings such a divine light into the soul, as is more clear and convincing than any demonstration. The reason why, notwithstanding all our acute reasons and subtle disputes, truth prevails no more in the world, is, we so often disjoin truth and true goodness, which in themselves can never be disunited; they grow both from the same root, and live in one another. We may, like those

in Plato's deep pit, with their faces bended downwards, converse with sounds and shadows ; but not with the life and substance of truth, while our souls remain defiled with any vice or lusts."*

Again :

"Such as men themselves are, such will God himself seem to be. It is the maxim of most wicked men, that the Deity is some way or other like themselves : their souls do more than whisper it, though their lips speak it not ; and though their tongues be silent, yet their lives cry it upon the house-tops, and in the public streets. That idea which men generally have of God is nothing else but the picture of their own complexion : that archetypal notion of him which hath the supremacy in their minds, is none else but such a one as hath been shaped out according to some pattern of themselves ; though they may so clothe and disguise this idol of their own, when they carry it about in a pompous procession to expose it to the view of the world, that it may seem very beautiful, and indeed anything else rather than what it is. . . . Jejune and barren speculations may be hovering and fluttering up and down about divinity, but they cannot settle or fix themselves upon it ; they unfold the plicatures of truth's garment, but they cannot behold the lovely face of it. There are hidden mysteries in divine truth, wrapt up one within another, which cannot be discerned but only by divine Epoptists. We must not think we have then attained to the right knowledge of truth, when we have broken through the outward shell of words and phrases that house it up ; or when by a logical analysis we have found out the dependencies and coherences of them one with another ; or when, like stout champions of it, having well guarded it with the invincible strength of our demonstration, we dare stand out in the face of the world, and challenge the field of all those that would pretend to be our rivals. We have many brave and reverend idolators that worship truth only in the image of their own wits ; that could never adore it so much as they may seem to do, were it anything else but such a form of belief as their own wandering speculations had at last met together in, were it not that they find their own image and superscription upon it. There is a 'knowing of the truth as it is in Jesus,' as it is in a Christ-like nature, as it is in that sweet, mild, humble, and loving spirit of Jesus, which spreads itself like a morning sun upon the souls of good men, full of light and life."†

Still again in the same vein :

"Divine truth is better understood, as it unfolds itself in the purity of men's hearts and lives, than in all those subtle niceties into which curious wits may lay it forth. And therefore our Saviour, who is the Great Master of it, would not, while he was here on earth, draw it up into any system or body, nor would his disciples after him ; he would not lay it out to us in any Canons or Articles of Belief, not being indeed so careful to stock and enrich the world with opinions and notions as with true piety, and a God-like pattern of purity, as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. His main scope was to promote a holy life, as the best and most compendious way to a right belief. He hangs all true acquaintance with divinity upon

* Discourse I., pp. 3—6, ed. 1821.

† Ditto, pp. 8—11.

the doing God's will, 'If any man do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.'"*

Then returning to his original thought, from which indeed he has never escaped, he once more sums it up in a definite sentence with the help of Plotinus :

"Divinity is not so well perceived by a subtile wit, *ὡςπερ αἰσθήσει κεκαθαρμένη*, 'as by a purified sense,' as Plotinus phraseth it."†

The ancients, he says, were not unacquainted with this method of attaining to the knowledge of divine things. Aristotle thought young men, with their youthful affections as yet uncooled, unfit to enter upon ethical studies. Pythagoras tested the sedateness and moral temper of his scholars,

"Before he would entrust them with the sublimer mysteries of his philosophy. The Platonists were herein so wary and solicitous that they thought the minds of men could never be purged enough from those earthly dregs of sense and passion, in which they were so much steeped, before they could be capable of their divine metaphysics : and therefore they so much solicit 'a separation from the body' in all those that would *καθαρῶς φιλοσοφεῖν*, as Socrates speaks, that is indeed, 'sincerely understand divine truth ;' for that was the scope of their philosophy."‡

As the attainment of divine truth, therefore, always involves a moral culture, we should seek it without dogmatism—neither committing ourselves to others' opinions nor too zealously opposing them.

"As we should not like rigid censurers arraign and condemn the creeds of other men which we comply not with, before a full and mature understanding of them, ripened not only by the natural sagacity of our own reason, but by the benign influence of holy and mortified affection : so neither should we over hastily *credere in fidem alienam*, subscribe to the symbols and articles of other men. They are not always the best men that blot most paper. . . . A bitter juice of corrupt affections may sometimes be strained into the ink of our greatest scholars ; their doctrines may taste too sour of the cask they come through. We are not always happy in meeting with that wholesome food (as some are wont to call the doctrinal part of religion) which hath been dressed out by the cleanest hands. Some men have too bad hearts to have good heads : they cannot be good at theory who have been so bad at the practice, as we may justly fear too many of those, from whom we are too apt to take the articles of our belief, have been. Whilst we plead so much our right to the patrimony of our fathers, we may take too fast a possession of their errors as well as of their sober opinions. There are *idola specûs*, innate prejudices, and deceitful hypotheses, that many times wander up and down in the minds of good men, that may fly out from them with their graver determinations. We can never be well assured what our traditional divinity is ; nor can we securely enough addict ourselves to any sect of men. That which was the philosopher's motto, *Ἐλεύθερον εἶναι δεῖ τῇ γνώμῃ τὸν μλλοντα φιλοσοφεῖν*, we may a little enlarge, and so fit it for an ingenious pursuer after divine truth : he that will find

* Discourse I., pp. 11, 12.

† p. 12.

‡ p. 15.

truth must seek it with a free judgment, and a sanctified mind : he that thus seeks shall find ; he shall live in truth, and that shall live in him ; it shall be like a stream of living waters issuing out of his own soul ; he shall drink of the waters of his own cistern, and be satisfied ; he shall every morning find this heavenly manna lying upon the top of his own soul, and be fed with it to eternal life ; he will find satisfaction within, feeling himself in conjunction with truth, though all the world should dispute against him."*

Divine truth is, therefore, the analogue of the divine spirit in man. It is to be sought neither in books nor traditions of any kind, but in the light in which the pure soul looks forth upon reality. The science of the Divine originates in a divine intuition which guarantees its own contents. Of the nature of a sense this intuition is yet rational in the highest degree. It is "the light of all our seeing." It is the spiritual eye with which we look out upon the spiritual world, and by the culture and enlargement of which we see always more clearly the great objects of faith and hope and love. There is nothing imaginary in the truths thus made known to us.

"The common notions of God and virtue impressed upon the souls of men, are more clear and perspicuous than any else ; and that if they have not more certainty, yet have they more evidence, and display themselves with less difficulty to our reflective faculty than any geometrical demonstrations : and these are both available to prescribe out ways of virtue to men's own souls, and to force an acknowledgment of truth from those that oppose, when they are well guided by a skilful hand. Truth needs not at any time fly from reason, there being an eternal amity between them. They are only some private dogmas that may well be suspected as spurious and adulterate, that dare not abide the trial thereof. . . . We must open the eye of the soul, 'which indeed all have, but few make use of.' This is the way to see clearly ; the light of the divine world will then begin to fall upon us, and those sacred *ελλάμψεις*, those pure coruscations of immortal and ever-living truth will shine into us, and in God's own light shall we behold him."†

He describes in conclusion the various degrees in which, in different orders of men, this spiritual faculty is cultivated. There is, first of all, what he calls the "complex and multifarious man, in whom sense and reason are so intermixed, and 'twisted up together' that his knowledge cannot be 'laid out into its first principles.'" And so he becomes the victim of custom and vulgar opinion. In such a man the higher notions of God and religion are "so entangled with the bird-lime of fleshly passions and mundane vanity, that he cannot rise to any but earthly conception of heavenly things." Such souls, as Plato says,

"Are *δπισθοβαρῆς*, 'heavy behind,' and are continually pressing down to this world's centre : and though, like the spider, they may appear sometime moving up and down aloft in the air, yet they do but sit in the loom, and

* Discourse I., pp. 14, 15.

† pp. 17, 19.

move in that web of their own gross fancies, which they fasten and pin to some earthly thing or other."*

There is, secondly, the Rationalist, or the man who "thinks not fit to view his own face in any other glass but that of reason and understanding." "In such a one the *communes notitie*, or common principles of virtue and goodness are more clear and steady." But being unfed and unfilled "with the practice of true virtue," they "may be but poor, empty, and hungry things of themselves." Thirdly, there is the mystic, who has an "inward sense of virtue and moral goodness far transcendent to all mere speculative opinions; but whose soul is apt too much to heave and swell with the sense of his own virtue and knowledge." "An ill ferment of self-love lying at the bottom" frequently puffs up such a soul with pride, arrogance, and self-conceit. Lastly, there is,

"The true metaphysical and contemplative man,† who, running and shooting up above his own logical, or self-rational life, pierceth into the highest life. Such a one, by universal love and holy affection, abstracting himself from himself, endeavours the nearest union with the divine essence that may be—knitting his own centre unto the centre of divine being. To such a one the Platonists are wont to attribute *θείαν επιστήμην*, 'a true divine wisdom,' powerfully displaying itself *ἐν νοεῖν ζωῆ* in an 'intellectual life,' as they phrase it. Such a knowledge they say is always pregnant with divine virtue, which ariseth out of a happy union of souls with God, and is nothing else but a living imitation of a godlike perfection drawn out by a strong fervent love of it. This divine knowledge, as Plotinus says, makes us amorous of divine beauty, beautiful and lovely; and this divine love and purity reciprocally exalts divine knowledge. . . . Such a life and knowledge as this is, peculiarly belongs to the true and sober Christian, who lives in him who is life itself, and is enlightened by him who is the truth itself, and is made partaker of the divine unction, and knoweth all things, as St. John speaks. This life is nothing else but God's own breath within him, and an *infant-Christ* (if I may use the expression) formed in his soul."‡

We could have wished to elaborate the special thoughts of the remaining discourses; but this our space forbids. Enough has been said to show how solid, fine, and rich a thinker Smith is. Of all the products of the Cambridge School, the "Select Discourses" are the best known, and the most widely appreciated. Many for whom the other members of the Platonic group possess comparatively little interest, and who have barely heard of Smith's teacher, Whichcote, have read with admiration these Discourses. And indeed no spiritually thoughtful mind can read them unmoved. They carry us so directly into an atmosphere of divine philosophy, luminous with the richest lights of meditative genius. Philosophic elevation is their per-

* Discourse I., p. 21.

† *ἄνθρωπος θεωρητικὸς*.

‡ Discourse I., p. 24.

vading characteristic. We see a mind religious to the core—tremulous in its inmost cords with pious aspiration—not only free from all pietistic weakness and dogmatic narrowness, but poising itself naturally at an altitude out of sight of them. Smith is not only no controversialist, but the dust of controversy has never touched him. His mind bears no scores of party conflict, but is fresh as a new-born life, with open eyes of poetic wonder and divine speculation. He has not painfully reached the serene heights on which his thoughts dwell; but these heights are the natural level of his lofty and abounding spiritual nature.

This elevation marks in our author both a certain intellectual and spiritual advance. The breadth and freedom of mind which we traced in Whichcote, still lies, in some degree, on a polemical and scholastic background. He had worked himself out of technical subtleties and obtained a firm, rational footing; but many of the trappings of the scholastic spirit still clung to him, as his correspondence with Tuckney plainly shows. He made a clear advance upon the theological spirit of his age, having pushed the lines of his religious thought manfully forward, till they touched all the diverse aspects of speculative and moral culture. He thus redeemed religion from the dogmatism and faction which were alike preying upon it, and taught men to see in it something higher than any mere profession of opinions or attachment to a side. He well conceived and drew its ideal as the spiritual education of all our faculties. But this, which may be said to form the summit of Whichcote's thought, attained through meditative struggle and prolonged converse with Platonic speculation, was the starting-point of Smith. He began easily on this level, and never needed to work out for himself the rational conception of religion. Religion was inconceivable to him under any other form than the idealization and crown of our spiritual nature. The Divine represented to him from the first the complement of the Human—the perfect orb which rounds and completes all its aspirations and activities. The assimilation of man to God was consequently the one comprehensive function of Christianity; and whatever contributes to this spiritual transformation, more or less of the nature of religion. Wherever there is, as he says, “beauty, harmony, goodness, love, ingenuity, wisdom, holiness, justice, and the like, *there is God.*”

But Smith did more than merely develop this comprehensive ideal of religion. He not only moralized and broadened the conception of the Divine, but he entered directly into its whole meaning, and inquired what it was as a phase of human knowledge as well as of human attainment. That religion cannot be separated from reason, nor morals from piety, was of the nature of an axiomatic

truth to him. His special thought was, how does reason authenticate religion, and the divine idea in its totality rise into a valid element of human knowledge? He was in short from the beginning, and by right of mental birth, a Christian philosopher. Divinity presented itself to him in the shape of a science. Even if the answers given by him to the questions which he thus raised had been less satisfactory than they are, it was yet a definite advance in the thought of the seventeenth century to ask such questions—to conceive the idea of a philosophy of the Divine. Theology had been hitherto viewed as a product of the schools, or, at the best, as a series of deductions drawn from a supposed infallible oracle. It was tradition, or dogma, resting on a verbal basis. And Smith, no doubt, had been taught it as a system of inherited formulæ ready to hand for the solution of all questions. But whatever traditionary impressions had thus been made upon him, had sunk into the large depths of his spiritual nature, and become merely food for its richer nurture, rather than left any formal trace behind. The great ideas of Theology were taken up by him from the first as vital elements within the sphere of the soul itself. Whatever they are, he felt that they must have a real conformity to man's higher reason and life; and that the only valid science of them is to be sought in the ascertainment of this conformity. A science of the Divine may embrace many things—elements of communicated and derived, as well as of primary knowledge; but its basis must lie on the primary affirmations of the soul, and all its structure be traced back to the great question of man's essential character in the scale of being. What then is this? Is man essentially a spiritual being? And if so, what are the true contents of his spiritual reason or consciousness? These, the eternal problems of religious philosophy, were the problems to which Smith directly addressed himself with clear-sighted and admirable perspicacity.

And his answers, upon the whole, go as nearly to the heart of their solution as any that have been given. He vindicated the distinctive reality of the human soul with clear effect, if not with any special resources of argument. All arguments on such a subject, from those of the *Phaedo* downwards, are indeed more or less of the same nature; and it may be safely said that no man, not already convinced, is likely to be convinced by them. Smith's argumentative details are not more conclusive than others. But he unfolds all the spiritual qualities of humanity with such a rich depth of insight that we feel, as it were, the fact of the soul to realize itself before us. The sense of the Divine grows quick within us at the touch of his living analysis; and it witnesses itself, not as the result of any elaborate inference, but as the primary being *which we are*—the original ground of all our life. And this is really

the most that any thinker can accomplish on the subject. For the question of spirit *versus* matter—of immortality *versus* epicureanism—comes in the end to a rational assumption on the one side or the other. We must start Spiritualist or Materialist—from within or from without. Or we may start from the meeting point of both—the eternal doubleness which seems to lie at the basis of being. The one cannot be logically deduced from the other; but the one may be found in the other; an essential antithesis—subject-object—with the subjective or spiritual side in front. And the thinker, who brings out most vividly, and helps us to understand most fully this spiritual side of human thought and life, does most, after all, to attest its reality.

The manner in which Smith attaches the belief in God to the belief in immortality, was also a special service rendered to the cause of religious philosophy. He saw clearly what has since his time been so often declared authoritatively by the highest thinkers, that the only basis for the recognition of the Divine in the world, was the recognition of the spiritual in man. Both the fact and the character of Deity must be primarily read in the human soul; and, without "this interpreter within," all life and nature would be really void to us of divine meaning. If we do not find God within ourselves, "the whole fabric of the visible universe may whisper to us of Him," but the whisper will be unintelligible,

"For we receive but what we give,
And in our light alone does Nature live."


All questions concerning God and religion thus really cluster round one root—the root of an original divine principle in man. Revelation itself is nothing else than the historical illumination of this fount source of the Divine; while practical religion is its growth or development on the volitional and moral side. Smith saw all this plainly and expounded it luminously. He saw also what perhaps Whichcote has not made so apparent, that the Divine, while thus linked to human reason, and finding its first and essential utterance in it, is yet as a living power something which human nature itself could never elaborate. No mere philosophy or moralism can ever transmute itself into evangelical righteousness. This has its rise within the heart no doubt, but not as a spontaneous product. It can only come from the original fount of Divinity—a new divine force within us springing up into eternal life.

While Smith therefore broadened, and in a sense humanized the conception of religion, he, at the same time, with admirable balance of mind, vindicated it as a distinctive divine power revealed in man—a righteousness not self-evolved, but divinely given "through the

faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith."* He was one of those rare thinkers in whom largeness of view, and depth, and wealth of poetic and speculative insight, only served to evoke more fully the religious spirit; and while he drew the mould of his thought from Plotinus, he vivified the substance of it from St. Paul.

JOHN TULLOCH.

* Phil. iii. 9.



ROSSEL.

Papiers Posthumes, Recueillis et Annotés. Par JULES AMIGUES.
Paris : Lachaud.

THE individuality of Rossel, with that of a very few others, stands out in strong relief from the crowd of professional demagogues, and rebels actuated by jealousy or rage, by whom the Parisian movement was perverted and doomed beforehand to destruction.

Prone to new ideas, he yet knew that they could only be realized in a country uncontaminated by cowardice or crime, and powerful enough to lend them safe sanctuary and force. Loving France from the depths of his heart and soul, the idea of any violation of her soil by foreign foes was to him intolerable. The word capitulation sounded infamous in his ears ; and while, on the one hand, men incapable of executing their mandate of defence, after declaring *pas un pouce de notre terre, pas une pierre de nos forteresses*, added the cession of two provinces to the shame of capitulation ; while, on the other hand, the leaders of the insurrection, for the sake of certain ameliorations of the condition of working men, forgot the honour and independence of their country, and remembered only that a Prussian victory would bring new disgrace upon the *bourgeoisie*,—Rossel thought only of discovering and organizing new elements wherewith to carry on the national war.

He had endeavoured by every means in his power to kindle the enthusiasm of the army ; he had sought to arouse the worthiest to revolt against Bazaine and the generals who prepared the capitula-

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sion of Metz; he had striven to awaken the old pride of the French soldier in the veteran Changarnier, and to turn to good account the honest ambition, good intentions, and natural instinct of the *Tribune*, manifested by Gambetta—in vain. Some lacked intellect, others heart; they all of them—and it was the most fatal symptom—lacked faith in their country's destiny and power.

Rossel was himself possessed of intellect, heart, and faith; and when the news of the cowardly concessions made to the enemy and of the movement in Paris reached him, he at once sent in his resignation to the Minister of War at Versailles, in the following letter, written from the camp of Nevers, March 19, 1871:—

“GENERAL,—I have the honour to inform you that it is my intention to go to Paris and place myself at the disposal of the governing power to be constituted there. Having learned by the publication of the despatch from Versailles this day, that our country is divided into two distinct parties, I do not hesitate to side with that party which has signed no treaty of peace, and numbers in its ranks no generals guilty of capitulation.”

On the 20th of March he was already in Paris, at the head of the 17th legion. We next find him imprisoned on I know not what charge, brought against him by officers whose capacity he had severely tested; then chief of the staff of the Minister of War (Cluseret), and president of a Court Martial which only pronounced one sentence of death, afterwards commuted; then, after the imprisonment of Cluseret, acting as Minister of War himself, and next compelled, by the anarchy of the elements by which he was surrounded, and the consequent impossibility of reducing his plans to action, to resign; and afterwards accused—as the habit was—of treason, and shamefully calumniated by the journals of Vallés and Pyat.

During the whole of this period Rossel laboured unceasingly to introduce such a system of organization as might have secured the triumph of the insurgents, and provided them with the arms and *matériel* for the recommencement of the war against their foreign invaders; but his every effort was rendered unavailing by the utter incapacity and irremediable lack of discipline around him—vices inherent in the government of the Commune. As a military man, he was, unquestionably, singularly gifted. Like our own Pisacane, he possessed not only revolutionary genius, but a synthetic grasp of mind, enabling him to comprehend the true value of every novelty or innovation, combined with a remarkable capacity for organization and the true instinct of discipline, qualities which had been developed and improved by long and serious study.

The great French Revolution and Napoleon would have perceived in him the stuff of a Hoche, Marceau, or Desaix. Gambetta saw him,

but only to neglect him ; the Commune hampered and surrounded him with jealousy and suspicion. Rossel felt that he was either misjudged or misunderstood, and he would have abandoned the enterprise, had he not considered it his duty to remain at the post he had chosen, whatsoever the cost, and even after he had lost all hope.

Of Gambetta he says, "This Minister of War had neither plans nor information concerning the position or disposition of the different corps or main body of the troops."

He, however, commends, with perfect impartiality, Gambetta's great natural capacity, his horror of bloodshed, rapid comprehension, and devotion to the revolutionary cause ; but he accuses him, I think deservedly, of indecision, ignorance of the existing military elements, frequent weakness, and constant concession to the men and things of the Empire.

"Gambetta," he says, "was not a leader, but a banner ; a banner which the Government made use of in order to *seem* virile and republican, and which the party of action endeavoured to make use of, in order to *be* virile and republican. He was a Louis XIII without a Richelieu, who busied himself about the making and unmaking of prefects while others were gambling away the fortunes of France with loaded dice."

Rossel had had one useless interview with Gambetta at Metz, in December, 1870. Afterwards, when the disasters of Beaugency had taken place, he tried to move him again with the following letter :—

"The mistakes committed every day, both in strategy and organization, rendered defeat inevitable. That defeat has come ; yet now, served and surrounded by the same incapable individuals, you are hurrying onward towards fresh disasters. Meanwhile every defeat yields a new portion of our territory to the enemy and destroys the remnant of our military power. You will be overwhelmed in the overthrow, and with you the hopes and liberty of our country. In the name of our common faith in that liberty and that country, grant me an earnest, serious interview. Grant me an opportunity of proving that I understand the art of war ; of explaining to you the causes of past defeats and of those hanging over us still. Is not the ineptitude of your administrators and generals sufficiently manifest yet, to give you the right of seeking some means of carrying on the war with better chances of success, outside the pale of the hierarchy ?"

Gambetta, who on the occasion of their first interview had promised him a second, did not even grant him an answer to his letter.

No man—myself or other—has passed a severer judgment on the Commune than Rossel, in the pages now before us ; and I feel bound to make this known, because its supporters have been silent on the subject. The sight of the names of Assy and Lullier among the signatures to the first *affiche* he saw upon his arrival in Paris, was, he says, his first disenchantment ; a disenchantment destined to be followed by innumerable others.

The quarrels between the *Revolutionary republicans*, and the *Delegates of battalions*, who usurped the municipal power only to misuse it through stupidity, or, at times, dishonesty; the quarrels, previous to the elections, between the Delegates of the *Central Committee of the Federation* and the *Committee of the Circumscription*; the quarrels between the *Delegates of the Commune*, and the *Council of the Legions*; the multiplicity of Commanders, whether of Circumscriptions, of the Artillery, or even of the different Barracks,—all equally idle, incapable, and vain of their epaulettes, horses and staff, and unwilling either to receive or execute the orders given them; the silly disputes, owing to which, at every election of officers, the tables of the ministers were inundated with protests, recriminations, and denunciations; the waste of public money through a system of universal and excessive payments; the multitude of revolutionists possessing neither knowledge, energy, fixity of purpose, nor steadiness of will, but all equally turbulent, jealous, and uproarious; the mass of duties neglected altogether, or executed only by fits and starts; the numberless attempts at action frustrated by the disobedience or even drunkenness of entire battalions; the idle and scandalous lives led by some of the most noted leaders, and the complete moral dissolution of the revolutionary army, which, though well-intentioned at the outset, had been led astray and corrupted by those who had assumed the position of chiefs; all these things and worse, are confessed and recorded in these pages written by one who fought and died for the cause of the Parisian insurrection.

The men who now preach vengeance to the people in the name of the Commune, *hold the dead body of Rossel aloft*, as he himself foretold, *and make of it a banner and a weapon in their own cause*; but it is a duty, alike in homage to the truth and in reverence to the memory of the dead, to enter our protest against them. Rossel, though so bitterly undeceived, stood firm to the last at the post to which he had felt himself called by his duty as a republican; but hoping always—though deluded even in that—“*to save the Revolution, IN SPITE of the Commune.*”

“The Commune,” he says, “neither possessed nor sought to possess statesmen or generals in its ranks. It surrounded itself with ruins, wanting alike the will and the power to establish a new order of things. An enemy to publicity, because conscious of its own stupidity; an enemy to true liberty, because consciously suspended in an equilibrium which a touch would destroy,—this Oligarchy of the Commune was the most odious despotism it is possible to conceive. Their sole method of government being that of paying sufficient wages to the people to retain them in their service; their extravagance not only wasted the funds of the democracy, but destroyed its hopes in the future by accustoming the people to live without labour. When I saw that the evil was indeed beyond all remedy; that every effort, every sacrifice was in vain, I felt that my task was at an end.”

Rossel had foreseen the disastrous result of the war, which was rendered inevitable by the universal administrative disorder, the absence of all proper precautions and the incapacity of the generals. In a rapid note, written from the Camp of Nevers, after his worst previsions had been fulfilled, he thus sums up some of the errors committed:—

“ . . . Ill-constructed plans and incapable chiefs. Chanzy alone gave some evidence of talent, and even he cannot be rightly estimated until we know what forces were opposed to him ; and he, the only general who might have inspired confidence, was left outside the chessboard, and employed, with utterly insufficient forces, in covering, what ?—Normandy, Brittany, and Poitou. . . . The re-occupation of Orleans was one of those palpable errors classified in military treatises under the title, ‘*Concentration upon a point occupied by the enemy.*’ The second taking of that city may also be classed among the most well-known errors ; it was a *scattered retreat*. The battle of Amiens might be described as a *passive defence*.

“ The march of Bourbaki to the east was a complete *muddle*. The mistake of keeping an army stationary along a neutral frontier, and laying bare its whole line of operations for a distance of a hundred and fifty kilometres, is a fault for which there is no name in military science.

“ Who can describe how defective was the organization, or how the deplorable inheritance left to us by the Empire, was still further mutilated in our hands ? The distinction between the army and the *mobiles* was forced upon us ; but we invented the *mobilized* ourselves ; the multiplication of systems and uniforms was our own, and ours the exclusion of all married men from the defence, on the feeble pretext that it would be ruinous to the country. Is not the country sufficiently ruined as it is ?

“ Then the incapacity of our organizers ! The only thing they feared was having too many to teach, and they rejected all the recruits they possibly could. They neither knew how to get soldiers, how to instruct, nor how to command them. The Government, too, doubled their labours by the senseless creation of new ‘camps of instruction,’ the folly and inutility of which I never could make them understand. . . . By the creation of new corps, the Government had created a number of new *dépôts*,—the care of which was entrusted to inexperienced administrators,—and isolated the *mobilized* troops at a distance from the towns. This was done, too, after it had removed all the regular troops from amongst them, so that they were left without either leaders or teachers.”

But, notwithstanding the radical defects introduced into the army by the Imperial system, and aggravated by the Government of Defence, Rossel still believed it possible to carry on the war with success, even after the fall of Paris.

“ France,” said he, “ still possesses an immense *matériel* of war, and a vast number of soldiers. The line of the Loire, which forms an excellent frontier, can scarcely be regarded as damaged, so long as Bourges remains ours ; but even if Bourges were taken, any attack upon the southern provinces is rendered extremely difficult by the strategic position of Auvergne, which obliges the enemy to divide his forces between Lyons and Bordeaux ; while

a check to the Prussian arms upon either of these places would disengage both.

"As a general rule a defence à l'outrance can never really be injurious to a nation. . . . Remember the battle of Cannes ; the invasion of Holland by Louis XIV. at the head of the two most powerful armies in Europe, commanded by Condé and Turenne ; the invasion of Spain by Napoleon in 1808 ; three cases in which the position was far more desperate than our own, and the chance of an honourable issue far less than ours, even after the taking of Paris. Yet each of these national defences was successful, and their success was in no way the effect of chance, but of an unvarying law by which victorious armies are doomed to dissolution.

"An army engaged in active warfare inevitably deteriorates, even though it has every facility of reinforcement. Fresh recruits may maintain its numerical force ; but cannot supply the place of the veteran soldiers and experienced officers it has lost. Napoleon's army was destroyed through lack of officers ; so also the army of Hannibal ; and such would be, even more rapidly, the case with the Prussian army ; without taking into account the effect of the possible death of Moltke or Bismarck. The saying of the victorious Pyrrhus is no paradox, and conquerors often find the germ of overthrow contained in victory itself,—their Cannes or their Moscow. Why should not the Prussians meet a similar fate ? Our business is to seize the right moment ; to harass them, to weary them, to allow them even to find their Capua in our cities—but never to make terms with them for our ransom."

I would recommend my own countrymen to bear these noble and energetic words in mind, for the evil days which, owing to the absence of all international policy in our rulers, and our lack of all trustworthy allies, may shortly dawn upon our Italy.

Every Nation is, if she wills it, immortal, and to be crushed by no foreign foe. But three things are necessary to render a war truly *national*, and, therefore, invincible. Her children must possess not merely courage, but constancy ; they must be endowed with a sentiment of nationality sufficiently intense to enable them to understand that their country's destiny centres round that point—wheresoever it be,—whereon her sons carry on the struggle in her name ; and they must find new leaders, chosen by merit and pointed out by local victories achieved, to guide and govern the war.

Men educated in the old military traditions, even though crowned by laurels won in regular warfare between Government and Government, are quite unsuited to the need.

And the cry that burst from the heart of Rossel with regard to his countrymen is, I fear, too true : "*This people is too variable, too sceptical.*"

I had long known that through many causes, first among which was a *theoretical materialism*,—gradually, and by logical necessity carried out in practice,—the original character of the French people had been undermined ; and I had long ago predicted the national decay, certain to follow thereupon. When the first rumours of war

began, and while the Imperial generals were vapouring of their *promenade à Berlin*, I published my conviction that the result would be fatal to the arms of France. But I confess that the actual facts far surpassed my predictions or previsions. I had believed that so soon as their first victories should tempt the Prussian generals to an invasion of French soil and threaten the unity of France, the whole nation would be kindled into new vigour of collective life, and awakened to an energetic and terrible resistance. But the canker had spread further and deeper than I knew.

It is unnecessary to trace all the causes of the failure of the war ; but it is well, in passing, to notice one which, although secondary, is nevertheless, of extreme importance. I allude to the prejudice, engrafted in the popular mind by the monarchical system, which centres the source and secret of victory in the capital.

I, myself, remember well, how in 1848, in the midst of the responsive outburst of enthusiasm aroused by my own exhortations to the people of Bergamo to resist the Austrians to the last extremity, a deadly silence suddenly came upon them, when I added that, even should Milan herself succumb, the Lombard provinces were bound to carry on the national war. The opinion, generally accepted, that so soon as the capital is taken, the war is at an end, is true in all regular wars between government and government ; but it is false when applied to a national struggle carried on by the people of a country against a foreign invader upon their own soil.

This prejudice, however, is more widely spread in France than elsewhere, and it was therefore to be expected that the fall of Paris, after an attempt at resistance, should prostrate the forces of the whole country. It did so to an incalculable extent.

The leaders of the war ought to have foreseen this result ; and knowing that it was impossible that the resistance of Paris should be indefinitely prolonged, they ought to have avoided spreading the fatal sense of defeat over the whole country by the fall of the capital. A simple, unresisted *occupation* would not have produced the same crushing effect ; it might even have been regarded as part of a profound military plan. It would have been far wiser, therefore, to have allowed the Germans to occupy the capital without resistance, and to have transported elsewhere their financial means, *matériel* of war, the army, the volunteers of the National Guard, and the Mobiles, indicating to them all a distant centre of organization ; and, meanwhile, to have dispatched commissioners from the government to organize a variety of *local* provincial centres of resistance, in such cities as were fitted for the purpose ; and to have, at the same time, withdrawn, from such as were either unable or unwilling to resist, all volunteers and fighting men ready to take

the field, and formed them into guerilla bands upon the Spanish model of 1808. By this means they would have gained time to re-organize the regular army, and would have harassed, wearied, and discouraged the enemy by the irregular destruction of individual officers and small bodies of troops, so successfully effected by this method of war. This plan would also have compelled the Germans to divide their forces, by leaving a large army of occupation in Paris, and to weaken their line by extension in various directions.

This method of warfare, if conducted by new men—by men of the temper of Rossel,—well selected, and well distributed, is one against which no foreign troops, brought from a distance, can ever long hold out. But it can only be effectually carried on by a people neither *variable* nor *sceptical*.

Does France still possess such a people? Was the fault in the people or in their leaders? These are questions upon which opinions will vary; but one thing is certain, Rossel was right. Duty, honour, and the future of France, alike commanded the attempt. There are germs of vitality hidden in the bosom of every nation, which, however latent, may be kindled into life by the generous initiative of a few noble spirits ready to face martyrdom, and full of faith in ultimate victory.

Rossel was convinced of this. "The leaders of the revolution," he says, "were unworthy of the revolutionary army,—they feared it." Nor could the delusions and the injustice he met with, avail to shake his belief in the people. He died prophesying its infallible future, and full of faith in the justice of its cause.

"When the educated *Bourgeoisie* made the revolution of 1798, they called up the peasants to burn châteaux, and the working men to batter down the Bastille. The working men have done their work; they now demand their reward. You who joined with them to make the revolution, share with them its advantages. . . . The *émeutes* of Louis Philippe's day were a trifle; the insurrection of June was a calamity; this affair of the Commune is a Revolution. If I were one of the *Party of Order* this *crescendo* would appear to me matter of very serious thought. . . . If the nations do not open their doors to the working classes, the working classes will turn to the International. There exists in society a numerous and laborious class, powerful because able to act in masses, to whom your laws of property, family, and inheritance, do not apply. Either you must modify your laws, or this class will obstinately persist in attempting to create a Society of its own, in which there will be neither family, inheritance, nor property."

The duty of the friends of the people, however, is to strive for the realization of their just demands; to clear the path towards their moral elevation and advancement; not to flatter them, urge them to revenge, delude them as to their actual capacity, or applaud them when they go astray.

This is the course adopted by too many at the present day; but

Rossel was not one to pursue it. He both saw the truth and declared it. Alluding again to the Commune, in a series of detached thoughts, he says:—

“I looked for patriots, and I found men who would have yielded up our forts to the Prussians rather than submit to the Assembly. I looked for liberty, and I found Privilege enthroned at every corner of the street. I looked for equality, and I found the complicated hierarchy of the Federation; an Aristocracy of the former *Condamnés politiques*; and a feudalism of ignorant functionaries, lording it over the vital forces of the City. But my greatest reason for astonishment was far other. Our disasters had sprung from Police-government, and the Commune had contrived to become a Police-government itself; Raoul Rigault, a victim in his own person of that system of government, was installed at the Prefecture of Police, and had become the real master of the Commune.”

Further on, speaking of the intellectual condition of the people, he says:—

“If, then, the people desire their legitimate share in the direction of affairs and the division of property, they must educate themselves. At present—I must speak out, without mincing words—the people are too stupid to govern; they have too few true ideas, and too many false ideas. I do not blame, I state facts. I know that it is not the people's own fault, but the fault of our legislators that they remain so inferior. I know that the French people—the Parisians especially—are clever and intelligent. But this is not enough: they require serious and thorough intellectual culture, before they can treat questions so grave as the management of public affairs. Our actual government is incapable, vicious, and of bad faith, if you will: I know it well, since I too, have laboured with all my might to overthrow it; but I confess that our people, when they had thrown over their government, were exactly in the position of a blind man who has lost his dog.”

May we have many such apostles of the popular cause as Rossel? The people want such men; men who seek not to inflame their passions, but to educate their good instincts and enlighten their dawning thought; men who will not content themselves with revealing to them their power; but teach them how to use it in the interests of the possible and true.

We want men, too, who will dare to speak the whole truth to those who call themselves the *superior* classes, as well as to them; who, far from leading them to an idolatry of material interests,—which, so long as they are pursued alone, can but generate the same egotism in the working, as in the middle-class;—men who, while prompting and assisting them to acquire the material means indispensable to moral progress, will teach them that religious conception of the duties of the Man and the Citizen, which alone can sanctify material things.

The elevation of an entire class to their just share of the obligations and the benefits of social life, should augment the elements of national vitality. It may not abolish the elements already in existence.

These truths were once acknowledged and accepted by the working classes of my own country, and their acceptance had given our workmen a real moral superiority which promised them an early victory. But now, through the misconduct of our government, the guilty indifference of our middle-classes, the insane credulity of certain sections of our working men, and the rash, inconsiderate lightness of speech of certain influential young men who take upon themselves to decide the gravest questions by the mere passionate impulse of the moment, unenlightened by study or reflection, wiser counsels are in danger of being set aside to give place to a struggle between workmen and *bourgeoisie*, calculated to keep alive a focus of civil war, beneficial to none in the present, and facilitating the path of tyranny in the future.

The poor misguided men who triumphantly subscribed their centesimi to the International in London, looking to it for a salvation they can only realize through the fulfilment of their own Italian duty, will sooner or later discover their mistake, and learn how absolute the void where they looked for an emancipating power. Bitter, however, will one day be the remorse of those who, through the inconsiderate utterances of random impulse, have contributed to bring about a period of class reaction and disaster, which they will themselves repudiate and abhor, too late.

Rossel's conduct during his imprisonment by the Versaillese, was that of a man in whom a naturally noble and elevated character is supported and consoled by a conscience at peace with itself. He was tenderly attached to his family, and he suffered deeply on their account, during the period while his ignoble enemies held the Damoclean sword suspended above his head. Of himself, however, he thought not; but devoted his last days to the service of his country, by transcribing those methods and ideas he believed best fitted to reconstruct an army of emancipation. Until the very eve of execution he dreamed only of France; and when his last hour sounded, he met death with dignity and courage, without manifesting a shadow of weakness or hesitation. His last words were words of peace and forgiveness, and a request that none who loved him should cherish thoughts of hatred or revenge on his account. Gifted with courage, fortitude, constancy, and faith in the future, the close of Rossel's in-contaminate and truly republican life was crowned with the tranquil serenity of a martyr.

"Death is my triumph," he wrote; "I have broken the imaginary chain by which the soldier is bound to his chief, even though that chief be miscreant or traitor. The brave and patriotic officers who have bent before exigencies so unworthy; who have accepted flight, capitulation, and civil war, have yielded to no fear of death, but of dishonour. That resource is yours no longer. My example will be a lesson to all that there are moments

in which the disciplined soldier is *bound by duty* to disobey, and can disobey without dishonour."

May all who have been taught to regard the soldier as servant to a man, rather than to the duty he owes his country, reflect upon these words, written by Rossel a few hours before his death.

I regret that I have not space to insert here the journal kept by Rossel in prison, without which my brief sketch of this pure and loving soul must necessarily remain incomplete; but I cannot refrain from quoting the touching and beautiful letter addressed to his family before his death, illustrative as it is of the strength, dignity, and tenderness of his character.

26th November, Evening.

"I trust, my loved and cherished ones, that you will return to Nîmes immediately after the event, instead of remaining here to weep; for should you wait here any time, one becomes so foolishly attached to places where one has suffered, that you would find it difficult to tear yourselves away. At Nîmes, on the contrary, you will be among sympathizing friends, who will help you to bear your sorrow. Should you remain at Versailles, the sight of these officers, deputies, and all these people still executing their functions after all hope is over for you, will only embitter your grief; perhaps even destroy some of its dignity and truth, by distracting your thoughts from the remembrance of your son, and perverting your sorrow into hatred against society.

"Therefore, having arranged your affairs as quickly as possible, hasten back among your friends; it would be even better to start at once, leaving M. Passa and M. Larnac to arrange what has to be done in Paris. Moreover, the climate of Nîmes suits father and the children; and I am certain it will have a beneficial effect on the development of my little god-daughter.

"I beg of you to bury me here. You love me quite earnestly enough to have no need of the sight of a tomb to remind you of me; I would rather you should remember your Lisé* as you were used to see him, than that you should seek a material sign calculated rather to recall my misfortunes and my execution, than my character and my affection for you. It is my life, not my death, I would have you remember. I may add that you would, probably, neither obtain permission to carry me away, or to raise a tomb—both of which I regard as things utterly insignificant.

"I am quite calm, my beloved ones, while writing this; it is only for you that I suffer; for, for my part, death, and such a death as mine, is not unwelcome to me. I count upon your energy and courage in this matter. Help each other to bear your sorrow, and do not give way too much to grief; each of you has need of the other's care; and, above all things, I recommend my parents to my sisters' care, and most of all my best beloved father.

"It is only when I think of him that I feel my tears rise; for I know him to be so good, so great; I know so well that his affection is strongest when least prodigal of expression, that I am full of bitter repentance for inflicting upon him so great a sorrow. If I have time to do it, I will write to each of you separately; but you are so well united in love of me that I cannot separate you in the love I bear you in return.

"May God bless and console you, my good, my best friends.

"I love you.

"L. NATHANIEL ROSSEL."

* Diminutive of Louis.

It is unnecessary to quote here Rossel's judgment of the individual members of the party. It is enough to mention that he speaks with fitting appreciation of Delescluze, Jourde, and Beslay, and impartially admits the talents and good qualities of men like Cluseret, with whom he was not on friendly terms. And that none may misinterpret the conduct or the heart of Rossel, I gladly record here that he concludes his well-merited censure of the Communists with these words :—

“I certainly am not prejudiced in favour of the Commune, but I feel bound to declare that I rejoice to have fought with the conquered rather than with their conquerors. If I had to begin my life again, it is possible that I should not take service under the Commune, but it is certain that I would never serve Versailles.”

In truth, though perverted and misdirected, the movement in Paris was inspired by an aspiration towards a higher future; the men of Versailles obeyed no other inspiration than that of egotism, and fear.

JOSEPH MAZZINI.


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