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CONTINENTAL RULERS  
IN THE CENTURY

BY

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## PREFACE.

No one could approach this subject without being overwhelmingly impressed with its vastness and complexity. It is with awe that I contemplate the difficulty of treating the broad issues involved so as to place a clear and connected thread of narrative before my readers.

Such an ideal necessitates the presentation in chronological order of the characters and conduct of all the leading personalities—whether crowned heads or high ministers of state or supremely influential subjects—who guided the councils of Europe during the death struggle for external freedom, which was waged during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars closing in 1815, and also during the subsequent Democratic strivings towards an epoch of internal freedom, such as startled the nations in 1848. Moreover, this task includes the tracing of cause and effect in movements still agitating the great centres and trade routes of Europe.

The condition, for instance, of the nearer Eastern Question, when Catherine pressed it forward towards the close of the eighteenth century, must be noticed in relation to its present position.

It will best interpret the objects of those who entrusted me with this task, to survey events, as they come within the scope of my subject, from the great centre of modern thought at Berlin, and so tell the story of Europe's deliverance from Napoleon, as it appears to the eye of those who make use of the best European sources of information.

It must be for another pen than mine, that of Mr. T. H. Escott, to tell more particularly how, under the ægis of George III., King of Great Britain and Ireland, and of Pitt, Nelson, and Wellington, a nation of fifteen millions did such yeoman service in securing peace for the Old World. That the causes and effects of the French Revolution must once again be considered and pronounced on here is a clear necessity of the story I have undertaken to tell; but I desire to treat the changes of a kindred character which occurred in other capitals besides Paris in a proper sense of proportion, being careful to record as an opinion, that the troubles in France took the peculiarly destructive form with which we associate them on account of special reasons of an historical character, long germinating, whilst the general yearning for constitutional and social changes had been felt at an even earlier period at Berlin, Vienna, and in some smaller states of Europe, before they reached Paris, the fair capital of France, on the banks of the Seine.

Nor will a record of these events be at all complete without an introductory chapter showing how the

trend of opinion varied in conservative Austria, wherein the heroism of Maria Theresa was succeeded by the efforts of a reforming Emperor in Joseph II., her son, whose crude proposals for change evolved much difference of opinion.

It is impossible therefore to avoid the consideration of six short preliminary studies before the body of the subject on hand—viz., Continental Rulers—can be attacked.

I purpose therefore to commence my work with a few thoughts on—

(1) Prussian History before the opening of the nineteenth century, and to add equally brief and succinct chapters on—

(2) The dual kingdom of Austria-Hungary.

(3) Russia. The Northern Powers and the Eastern Question before the French Revolution.

(4) The domestic side of the French Revolution.

(5) Opening of the Revolutionary Wars and decline of the Reign of Terror after Robespierre's death.

(6) States of Southern and Central Europe, 1792–1795.

It was obvious when I undertook this duty, that the personality of Napoleon Bonaparte would overshadow that of any other continental ruler, until the curtain fell on the scenes of his achievements in 1815, and although it has been found possible to draw in outline the characters of subsidiary actors on the European stage, notably those of the Czar Alexander I., of Frederick William III. of Prussia,

and Queen Louisa, also of Stein and his coadjutors, yet the plan of recording events by means of biographical notices could not be pursued continuously until Napoleon was taken to St. Helena on the Northumberland.

The lives of Louis XVIII., Prince Metternich, Charles X., Baron Hardenburg, the Czar Nicholas I., and Frederick William IV. will all lead us down successively to the times of Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon, and the Emperor Francis Joseph.

It is my intention to carry this summary of continental affairs to the close of the nineteenth century so far as is possible, but any comment later than the accession of the Emperor William II., the present ruler of Germany, must of necessity be merely chronological, because we cannot be in a position to form judgments on purely contemporary events.

Such a scheme as I have indicated will, however, involve biographical comments on the lives of the Czars Alexander II. and III., and tell of the accession of Nicholas II. Summaries of events since the fall of the Empire in France in 1871 must necessarily include the outline of Republican rule since 1871, while the contemporary histories of Russia and Turkey will necessitate comments on the future of the Eastern Question, both in Europe and Asia.

In the strictest sense of the word Queen Victoria was ever a great European ruler, and the course of these pages must necessarily attest alike to her wis-

dom and discretion. Indeed, the impossibility of entirely excluding English contemporary rulers from a history dealing with those of the Continent in the nineteenth century is as great in the last decade as it was found to be during the first.

PERCY M. THORNTON.

LONDON, ENGLAND.



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# CONTINENTAL RULERS IN THE CENTURY.

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## CHAPTER I.

### PRUSSIA BEFORE 1801.

CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE INCREASE IN THE POWER OF PRUSSIA.—NUCLEUS OF THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA.—PRUSSIA UNDER A SUCCESSION OF WISE AND BRAVE RULERS.—DECREASE IN PRUSSIAN POWER UNDER WEAK RULE.

THE original nucleus of the kingdom of Prussia was the province of Brandenburg. Under Charlemagne, between 791-6 A. D., the provinces on the outskirts of his empire, of which this was one, were administered by supreme judges or "grafs," whence they derived their term of "margrave." Between 1237 and 1283 A. D. Prussia proper was conquered by the Teutonic Knights, an order of military monks, like those of Malta. It was not, however, until A. D. 1415 that Frederick, Count of Hohenzollern and Burgrave of Nuremberg, bought from the Emperor Sigismund the margravate of Brandenburg, which carried with it the dignity of hereditary Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, and headed a line of princes

to whose talents and patriotism Prussia owes its pre-eminent position in the present German Empire, which could never have been united but for the foresight and wisdom of the later Hohenzollerns. A little more than a century after the establishment of his family on the Havel, Albrecht, after having been chosen Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, A. D. 1511, managed to secure the dukedom of Prussia.

Modern Prussia may be said to have owed the striking position in Europe which she held at the close of the eighteenth century to an "Apostolical Succession" of wise and brave rulers:—Frederick William, the great Elector of Brandenburg (A. D. 1620 to A. D. 1688); his son Frederick I., first King of Prussia, who, after gaining the title from the emperor, crowned himself with notable pomp at Königsberg in 1701, and spent the rest of his reign as the patron of science and art, the friend of Leibnitz and the founder of the University of Halle; and his grandson Frederick William I., father of Frederick the Great, who laid the foundation of a military power on the Spree. The Prussian kings exercised an influence among the European powers far in excess of their mere territorial sway.

Frederick William I., whose queen was Sophia Dorothea, sister of George II. of England, delighted in surrounding himself with the tallest guards in Europe, and would pay almost any price and not shrink from force or fraud to keep his favorite regiment up to the desired standard. A spurner of liter-

ature, and himself ignorant of science, he endeavored to prevent his famous son, the Great Frederick, from mingling in the world of letters, thus driving him, A. D. 1730, to attempt an escape from Prussia. The scheme being prematurely discovered, the future master of war was confined in the castle of Custrin, and had to see his young accomplice, Lieutenant Katte, executed before his eyes.

Such was the barbarous state of things under Frederick William I. However, this rigorous and ruthless disciplinarian espoused the cause of the persecuted Protestants of Heidelberg and Salzburg, thereby bringing many thousands of industrious workers into his dominions. At his death, in 1740, the king left a treasury amply stored and an efficient army of 66,000 men.

The reign of his mighty son, familiar to the English-speaking race through the genius of Thomas Carlyle, must be treated but in outline here.

Frederick the Great, born A. D. 1712, had received, in spite of his father's opposition, a fair education in literature and music. Soon after being released from his imprisonment of some months, he obeyed his father's command that he should marry the Princess of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, and consequently not only effected a reconciliation with that harsh father, but obtained permission to engage in the literary pursuits for which he yearned. He then composed several works whilst corresponding with Voltaire and other distinguished men of letters.

Frederick the Great made the most of the scanty resources of Prussia, raised even before his reign to an influence far in excess of the nation's population and wealth, owing much of his success to the habits of government engendered amongst the people themselves by local representative institutions which the Hohenzollern princes had consistently fostered. In this particular Prussia had a great advantage over France, where the Revolution came upon a nation whose few free institutions were paralyzed and who were accustomed to look for direction to Paris even from the most distant divisions of the ancient Bourbon monarchy.

Few readers of Carlyle's *Frederick the Great* will forget the "Tobacco Parliaments," wherein the affairs of small towns and even country hamlets were discussed and settled; when political opinion, as we understand such matters in England, her Colonies, or the United States of America, simply did not exist as a factor controlling the Government.

Frederick, it is true, allowed certain nominated "Provincial Assemblies" to meet, but only to receive the orders of the Crown officers, so that the constitution of Prussia was in the same imperfect condition at his death A. D. 1786 as it had been A. D. 1740 when he came to the throne.

But nevertheless he had changed the whole military condition of the country and created an army second to none in Europe, not even to that of Austria.

The rivalries of these two German Powers rendered

the subsequent successes of France possible, and there will be recorded in this volume more than one instance in which this cause foiled diplomatic hopes, to the disadvantage of European peace.

Frederick the Great, moreover, in the course of his career ministered to the growing neglect of national rights and greed for unjust spoliation of territory, of which spirit the French Republic and the Emperor Napoleon availed themselves so freely.

Both the invasion of Silesia in 1743, and the subsequent crime committed in 1772, when Poland suffered its first partition, warrant a historian in declaring that responsibility for the revolutionary spirit of conquest cannot be justly laid altogether at the doors of the French Republicans, but found precedents in earlier days amidst the conservative states of Europe.

Taken as a military study, the career of Frederick dazzles the reader, and, considering the inadequate character of his resources, his achievements are not eclipsed by the glories of Napoleon or the strategy of Wellington in the Peninsula.

So well was this great Prussian monarch served by his system of secret intelligence that he was apprised in time of the impending hostile alliance of Russia, France, Austria, and Saxony in 1756, and actually fought it out so magnificently in a struggle culminating in the Franco-Austrian defeat of Rossbach on November 5, 1757, that all the Prussian conquests of twenty years were secured in 1763, a

position further improved from a military point of view by the first partition of Poland.

Frederick, on ascending the Prussian throne, found in his states a population of only *two millions and a quarter*, and left it with *six millions*—a result attained chiefly by his talents as a general and a legislator.

It is not generally realized that Frederick the Great's views on foreign policy and the needs of Prussia can be found in his own writings, which include a *History of his Own Times*, *The History of the Seven Years' War*, *Considerations on the State of Europe*, *Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg*, Poems, etc.

The whole story, however, is comprised in Carlyle's gigantic work, wherein his hero's sentiments and opinions are fully communicated, and to the English-speaking race its perusal may be recommended as a necessary preliminary to the full understanding of the state of Prussia before the Revolutionary War. This famous king of Prussia possessed habits of a singularly simple and unostentatious character. He rose constantly at five, when he employed himself in reading despatches and reports, all of which were addressed to himself in person, and to each of which he marked an answer in the margin, consisting generally of no more than a single word. At about eleven he reviewed his regiment, and dined at twelve, the remainder of the day being passed in literary pursuits and in the enjoyment of music; and at ten he retired to rest.

It is sad to relate that the dictates of religion never appealed to his heart, and he remained a sceptic, although encouraging the Lutheran observances throughout his realm.

These personal details have been dwelt upon somewhat fully, so that my readers may see what effect the removal of such an overpowering personality as Frederick the Great naturally must have exercised on Prussia. The mainspring of life and action disappearing, the machine could not be expected to revolve with an equal facility or correctness.

Great indeed were the resources placed in the hands of Frederick William II., nephew to Frederick the Great, when, in 1786, the welfare of Prussia was committed to his charge. But this king had been indoctrinated with the tastes and loose morals of the Court of Versailles, and although possessing considerable ability and a lively imagination, which occasionally drifted into mysticism, he evolved no scheme of policy and allowed State affairs to drift. Professor Seeley, however, in his comprehensive life of Stein points out that Frederick William II. did not fail for want of brain-power, and acted as he believed best for his country when the French Revolution forced him to decide how to act in the face of events and portents the like of which could not be found in the records of modern history.

It will be necessary to pass an opinion hereafter as to how Frederick William II. and the statesmen who

surrounded him passed through the heavy ordeal destined for them.

But a sound judgment regarding the foreign policy of Prussia at this period cannot be formed without bearing steadfastly in mind the internal anomalies of the kingdom.

The nobility had no political independence, and although, as has been said, the Government busied itself in unison with the inhabitants in every particular of urban and country life, yet an exaggerated form of the feudal system prevailed in a nation wherein parliamentary institutions had not taken root.

Classes were arbitrarily separated one from another, "nobles," "burghers," and "peasants" being forced to undertake different occupations, while marriage between members of the different orders of society was absolutely forbidden.

The vast majority of the peasants seem to have been mere serfs, whilst the upper classes were not enabled to exercise any influence upon the Government. In fact the executive had to issue orders on its own initiative, receiving little advice from those who had a stake in the country, whether they were born of noble blood or sprung from the people.

Frederick the Great, for purely military purposes, had tolerated serfdom because he could more easily mould his subjects into soldiers when the habit of obedience was the first law of life, while each manorial lord had the power of carrying out his sovereign's



behest inculcating use of the ploughshare when the sword was sheathed.

It must be clear to every one who thinks about it, that such a system of government as the great Frederick administered was certain to languish when no master-hand remained to direct, and when carefully considered schemes had sometimes to be carried out by unsympathetic and inexperienced successors.

Moreover, the decisions which Frederick William II. of Prussia had to make were the most momentous in European story.

If at this distance of time, with the archives of all the great nations opening before our eyes, men yet hesitate to speak decidedly as to the causes of the French Revolution, or the character of statesmanship displayed in attempting to assuage its symptoms, how can any observer sit in judgment and proclaim a verdict of unqualified condemnation upon the action of the Prussian rulers in 1792-3, without forfeiting the title of historian?

Leaving the closing years of the 18th century in Prussia to be dealt with in a future chapter, we pass on now to consider the position prior to the Revolution of the sister German state—that of Imperial Austria.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE DUAL KINGDOM OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

ACQUISITION OF AUSTRIA BY RUDOLPH, COUNT OF HAPSBURG.—THE STRUGGLES BETWEEN MONARCHICAL NATIONS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.—HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF HAPSBURG.—TRANSITORY POSSESSION OF THE BOHEMIAN THRONE BY FREDERICK, ELECTOR PALATINE.—WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.—THE ATTEMPTED CONQUEST OF VIENNA BY THE TURKS.—AUSTRIA SOUGHT AFTER AS AN ALLY BY EUROPEAN NATIONS.

LIKE Prussia, the part of the Eastern Kingdom (Oesterreich) known as Pannonia to the ancients, and to ourselves as the Dukedom of Austria, had, after 796, been part of Charlemagne's dominions. Rudolph, Count of Hapsburg, elected Emperor of Germany in 1273, acquired Austria five years later, and from 1493 to 1806 his descendants as Dukes of Austria were elected Emperors of Germany.

How this state of things came about requires a few words of explanation.

The German traditions and the sustenance of the Roman Catholic religion were primarily entrusted to Austria, whose sovereigns were one by one chosen to wear the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, where the Protestant cause had sunk to its lowest ebb,

when, A. D. 1789, the first awakenings of the anti-feudal reaction, destined to come to a head in revolutionary upheavals, sent electric shocks throughout the whole European system.

Indeed, so startled were the sovereigns and statesmen both at Vienna and Berlin, that for a time all other considerations were laid aside in the belief that unless monarchical nations combined at once to oppose the Revolutionary forces, there would speedily be no option left. And yet the ancient antagonism for supremacy in Germany was only sleeping for a brief period, and soon contributed to that speedy reaction which, by spreading dissension in the European camp, invited the advance of French revolutionary forces on to what men now know as the sacred territories of the Teutonic "Fatherland."

Following the method which has been adopted here concerning the outlines of Prussian history, I go on to trace lightly the modern history of the House of Hapsburg.

It is necessary to notice at the very outset how the whole course of that narrative proves the dissimilar interests of the elected Holy Roman Emperor and of his German co-trustee at Protestant and Lutheran Berlin.

The Great Emperor Charles V., the modern Charlemagne, had a brother, Ferdinand I., who, taking the title of "Emperor" on the death of his famous kinsman A. D. 1558, shared the fate of Queen Elizabeth of England one year later, and was refused acknowl-

edgment of title by Paul IV., the most imperious Pope of the sixteenth century.

Nevertheless, it is recorded that the Emperor Ferdinand I. turned the other cheek to the smiter and sent ambassadors to the Council of Trent one year before he died at Vienna, in 1564.

Rudolph II., a son, Maximilian II., a son, Matthias, a nephew, and Ferdinand II., grandson of Ferdinand I., successively governed Austria until the seventeenth century was well advanced, but in the reign of Ferdinand II. occurred the revolt which gave Frederick, Elector Palatine, a transitory possession of the Bohemian throne.

Marrying the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of James I. of England, this sovereign was progenitor of the present British royal family.

Ferdinand II., Emperor of the West, was thus unfortunate enough to wear the Holy Roman diadem when the 'Thirty Years' War commenced, the emperor championing the Roman Catholic cause against the Protestant interest in central Europe.

It is true that he drove the unfortunate Elector Palatine and his romantic Princess out of Bohemia by winning the battle of Prague A. D. 1620; but the flames of religious warfare once ignited, it took thirty years to extinguish them. Tilly and Wallenstein distinguished themselves at the head of the Imperial armies, while the names of Gustavus Adolphus and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar were as household words amongst the Protestants.

Anyhow the faith of Luther lost any ground it had ever gained in Austria at the end of this war, and Prussia became more than before the Protestant power of Germany. Ferdinand III., also named Ernest, succeeded his father, Ferdinand II., as Emperor A. D. 1637, and from A. D. 1648 to his death, A. D. 1657, his reign was comparatively uneventful.

The long reign of Leopold I., the next Emperor of the West, contained many events of European importance within its scope of forty-nine years.

Trained by the Jesuits, Leopold I. never gave that attention to affairs which his predecessors, to do them justice, had generally striven to pay.

Hence it was that when the Commonwealth controlled England and Cardinal Mazarin held sway in France, the affairs of Austria were committed to various ministers according to the manner in which the Government favored Hungary or the German portions of the Empire. At one time in this reign an alliance of the Sultan with Hungary brought the Ottoman armies to the gates of Vienna, and it was in the same year, A. D. 1683, that John Sobieski at the head of his brave Poles drove the Turks before him and saved Austria from destruction.

Leopold died in the midst of the war of the Spanish Succession, A. D. 1705.

His successor, his brother Charles VI., was fortunate in having a general, in Prince Engène, who drove back the Turkish armies towards their own frontiers.

At his death in A. D. 1740, after a disturbed reign of 35 years, Charles handed down his Imperial trust to his daughter the magnanimous Maria Theresa, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, Archduchess of Austria and Empress of the West.

Her bravery and resource have concentrated attention on the romantic fidelity with which she appealed to the Magyars of Hungary to aid her against victorious Prussia and Bavaria who threatened to obliterate the Austrian power. It is a commonplace of history how faithfully the Hungarians responded.

Maria Theresa succeeded to the dominions of Charles VI. by reason of what is known in European history as the "Pragmatic Sanction." This mode of procedure was a royal ordinance concerning Church or State affairs such as the kings of France sometimes issued.

In Austria the presumption in favor of the House of Hapsburg becoming Emperors of Germany had foundation in a "Pragmatic Sanction," and by such an ordinance, promulgated April 19, 1713, Charles VI. settled his throne on that daughter destined to become so renowned, a heritage which was nevertheless destined to convulse Europe with war.

The blot on Maria Theresa's memory is the acquiescence and participation together with the King of Prussia (the Great Frederick) and the Empress Catherine in the first dismemberment of Poland in 1772, inasmuch as from that moment may be said to

date the lust for ill-gotten territorial expansion which set an example too easily followed when revolutionary passions swept over Europe after 1789.

Both Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II., the next Hapsburg emperor, were reformers, and the great Hungarian queen made some efforts to secure justice for those who did not see eye to eye with the Jesuits. Joseph came to the throne of Austria in A. D. 1764, when his father, Francis I., consort of Maria Theresa, died, and the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia were placed on his head in 1780 after the demise of his famous mother.

Very much indeed have the Emperor Joseph's motives been questioned and his policy canvassed, but Frederick the Great's verdict is worth recording. He writes to Voltaire saying :

“ Joseph is an emperor such as Germany has not had for a long time. Educated in splendor, his habits are simple ; grown up amidst flattery, he is still modest ; inflamed with a love of glory, he yet sacrifices his ambition to his duty.”

Maria Theresa and Francis I. had three other children of note, viz., Leopold II., Emperor of the West, upon whom, at his succession in 1790, fell the full force of the revolutionary wave which rolled across France into all parts of the Continent, sparing neither North nor South Germany in its progress. Another lives in history as the undaunted and unfortunate Queen Marie Antoinette, wife of Louis

XVI. of France, of whom anon. The third was Queen of Naples, whose husband's throne in Sicily was saved by Lord Nelson's fleet.

Such was the royal line that ruled over the heterogeneous territories comprising the Austrian Empire before the revolutionary wars which commenced in the eighteenth century.

What is most remarkable in the history of Austria is not, as has been sometimes hastily assumed, that her rulers learn nothing, and fail to profit by experience, so much as the fact that acquisition of territory without reference to nationality seems to be the one supreme object which the statesmen of Austria pursue.

It is argued, however, that the territorial expansion sought after must contribute to a homogeneous whole, by strengthening and extending strategic bulwarks of the Empire such as the geographical situation of Austria necessitates. On this plea, and on this alone, can be justified the apparently unimportant acquisition of territory in regions where the advance of the Austrian eagle engendered abiding hostility.

Poland was partially absorbed instead of being preserved as an intermediate power between herself and the gigantic hosts of Russia. Italy was overrun and not abandoned until the fortune of war necessitated retreat; and at the moment when the French Revolution rose on the horizon the government of Leopold I. lamented the necessity of defending



possessions so far from Vienna as the Netherlands, which very early in the European struggles the veteran statesman Kaunitz was prepared to exchange for Bavaria, a counsel of perfection the nation has never been enabled to pursue.

Constantly beaten in the field and foiled in the council chamber, no fresh European changes have ever been attempted for the last 120 years, without the dominant European minds making the disposition of Austria a leading factor in their arrangements.

Certainly no great community in the world's history has received so many historic defeats at crucial moments, and yet remained a desirable ally for contending nations.

In 1789-90 the sovereign of Austria was head of Germany.

The Rhine provinces were ruled by ecclesiastical princes who owned the House of Hapsburg as entitled to an elective priority amongst other sovereigns for the traditional throne of the Cæsars, known as the Holy Roman Empire. Emperors of the West, the defence of Germany was specially allotted to their arms, this responsibility having been vested in the sovereign who held court in Vienna since the fifteenth century.

It is true that, in theory, the German Diet had its representative body at Ratisbon, whence for war purposes the Empire was divided into circles, but the prince-bishops and petty princes and free cities were not organized for practical purposes, and, as the

Napoleonic wars were to show, depended for their defence upon the armies of Austria and Prussia, two powers drawn down farther into antagonism of religion and race than they had been in the earlier days of their history.

Eleven different languages were spoken in the Austrian Empire in 1792, together with numerous dialects, and "of the elements of the population the Slav was far the largest, numbering about ten millions, against five million Germans and three million Magyars."

Such was the material out of which those brave, long-suffering armies were composed, that never quailed before the foe, however unfortunate the issue of the struggle upon which they entered.

Conquerors, statesmen, and diplomatists of the eighteenth century, including Napoleon, Pitt, and Talleyrand, held the Austrian power in the same respect, no matter how dark the immediate prospects before the Empire, as did Cavour and Bismarck when the nineteenth century had run more than half its course. The reasons for this stability of apparently decaying, loosely united, and even hostile nationalities in the teeth of scientific historical prophecy and in presence of the antagonistic liberalism of Europe, must, I believe, be sought for in the geographical position of Austria. Situated on the flank of Germany, to whom she must ever be either a danger or a powerful ally, by her contiguity to Russia and the shrinking Ottoman dominions, she is

in a position to contribute a determining word in any abiding settlement of the nearer Eastern Question. That France could not pursue a course of revolutionary aggression without coming into contact with these natural forces, the course of the present narrative will soon show.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE NORTHERN POWERS AND THE EASTERN QUESTION BEFORE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

PETER THE GREAT'S PROGRAMME IN THE EAST AS ENTRUSTED TO EMPRESS CATHERINE II., AND THE EMPRESS' OWN ACTIONS IN THE MATTER.—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE OF ENGLAND, PRUSSIA AND SWEDEN AGAINST RUSSIA.—TURKEY DECLINES IN POWER AFTER HER ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE VIENNA.—THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE SAVED BY THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.—THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN TURKEY WHEN SAVED.

I DO not propose in these introductory sketches to dwell long upon Imperial Russia, because the course of European history in the nineteenth century, told in a biographical form, will introduce my readers successively to the Emperors Paul, Alexander I., Nicholas I., Alexander II., Alexander III., and the present Czar, Nicholas II. But the actions of the Empress Catherine II., when carrying out the programme of Peter the Great, so impregnated the politics of Europe in the last decade of the eighteenth century that it is impossible to understand the springs of international action when the French Revolution appeared, without knowing what was the policy of the northern nations and of the Romanoff family in particular, when, after her first Turkish

war in 1774, Catherine gained for Russia the Treaty of Kainardgi, a veritable landmark in the Eastern Question, inasmuch as the Crimea was severed from Turkey and a protectorate over Greek Christians at Constantinople insured, while Russian commerce gained access to the Black Sea. It is not necessary to recite the alleged provisions of Peter the Great's will, to know what the traditional policy of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire has been for all time, but it is a necessity to show how thoroughly Catherine II. did her part.

After Maria Theresa's death, in A. D. 1780, Catherine entered into an alliance with the Emperor Joseph II. of Austria, who desired to drive the Turks out of Wallachia and Moldavia so that he might gain additional territory, her intention being to bring about the immediate destruction of the Turkish Empire and the partition of its dominions. She hoped to witness the erection of a Greek Empire at Constantinople, subservient to her own direction and sway. It was an old undertaking so far as Russia was concerned. By capturing (A. D. 1696) the fortress and harbor of Azof, and by building a Black Sea fleet, the great Peter had laid the foundations of Catherine's advance, although a military check in Moldavia during A. D. 1711 had rendered the immediate realization of his aims impossible. Urged forward, alike by national aspirations and the long known literary suggestions of Voltaire that Greek discontent should be utilized as a means of

driving the Turks out of Europe, Catherine availed herself of Austria's coadjutorship so apparently adverse to the interests of that empire, but given by the enthusiastic Joseph *con amore*. And so vast were the armies launched on the Sultan's dominions that there appeared to be no prospect of the allies suffering any abiding check before the Greek flag waved from St. Sophia and Constantinople was once again in Christian hands. But it happened that Gustavus III. of Sweden was hard pressed in his struggles with Denmark, and in danger of being destroyed or reduced to impotence amongst the nations of Europe by a country practically a vassal of Russia, under whose influence Gustavus's territory must have straightway fallen had not England, guided by Mr. Pitt, and Prussia, at the instance of Frederick William II., stepped on to the European stage and formed with Sweden a triple alliance. Pitt undoubtedly believed that it was to the interest of Great Britain that the Ottoman Empire should not be straightway destroyed, and Constantinople ruled over by a nominee and vassal of the Empress Catherine, whose schemes were of the most far-reaching character and even embraced projects for approaching the Indian frontier. However idealistic and impracticable these may be thought, they nevertheless pointed to the ultimate object of the Russian policy when nominally seeking to gain a footing in the Mediterranean.

Frederick William II. seems to have imagined

that he wielded the power and influence of his late uncle, Frederick the Great, and desired to renew the struggle with Austria which the great Prussian king had waged.

The negotiations between the three powers, England, Prussia, and Sweden, were of an extended character and spread over a considerable period before the full effect of the compact became apparent.

In 1791, however, about a year after the Emperor Joseph's death, and when Austria under Leopold the First was less anxious to continue the Turkish War, Mr. Pitt armed Great Britain to prevent the seizing of Oczakow, a strip of land between the Bog and Dniester, believed to possess strategical value in the Black Sea.

Prussia had made a defensive alliance with England at this moment, and, the despatches show, was fully prepared for war either with Russia or Austria, preferring to meet the latter, owing to long-standing jealousies not to be allayed until 1814.

Pitt failed, owing to the opposition of Fox and the Whigs, to carry through his policy in the House of Commons, and the long desired ejection of the Turks from Europe seemed likely to take place.

Joseph II. of Austria never lived to see carried to the verge of success his darling project, which at this crisis probably miscarried only because of the disagreement amongst the European Powers, and an unsuspected fund of strength and resource amongst the Turks.

Putting an end to the Eastern branch of the Roman Empire by entering Constantinople in 1453, this mixed race of Tartars and the nations they had conquered actually besieged Vienna itself in A. D. 1683, the period which may be called the zenith of their power. Since John Sobieski, King of Poland, saved the Austrian capital from occupation and destruction on this occasion, the Ottoman influence has been almost continuously declining. The nadir of their humiliation had been attained in 1774, when the Peace of "Kainardgi" had been signed. In the very year in which the French Revolution began, by the calling together of the States-General, A. D. 1789, Turkey was apparently at the mercy of Marshal Suwarrow and the Austrians, while Sultan Selim III., on coming to the throne, began his reign, regardless of the hazardous position of his empire, by an outburst of folly and dissolute extravagance. It did indeed seem as if the fates had at last conspired to drive the Crescent before the Cross, inasmuch as Marshal Suwarrow had stormed Ismail and put 40,000 men to the sword, and the border fortresses were nearly all subdued.

However, just as the Ottoman Power in Europe seemed on the point of being annihilated, insurrections in Hungary and the Netherlands, caused by apprehension of the reforms intended by Joseph II., together with the above-mentioned triple alliance against Russia saved it from utter ruin. But the process of disintegration caused by this war had shaken



the internal organization of Turkey to its centre. Ali Bey had assumed in Egypt the rank of an independent sovereign, and the Servians rose to arms at a moment when the fanatical sect of the Wahabees were threatening the Sultan's authority at its base in Arabia.

In these circumstances, Selim III., shaking off his early vices, displayed considerable talents and statesmanship, which were exercised in keeping aloof from the struggles of Europe consequent on the French Revolution, while a complete remodelling of the Turkish army gave a strength to the defence of Acre against the French in 1798, which will be mentioned hereafter.

It was fortunate for Austria that during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars she had not on her flank a powerful and hostile Turkey instead of the retreating barbarism which Joseph II. and Catherine II. had so nearly split into fragments.

That Russia and Austria will ever again combine in an effort to place the Muscovites in Constantinople, and the Cross on St. Sophia, seems now improbable, when the vast power which would necessarily be surrendered to the Czar is considered.

Never yet in history has a great maritime people possessed such a vantage city as Constantinople, commanding an inland sea wherein naval preparations can proceed unseen and unhindered, whilst an impregnable passage through the Dardanelles is at the same time secured for its rulers, provided they

possess a fleet sufficiently numerous and well-equipped to alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean whenever the rivalries of other naval competitors present an opportunity.

When the French Revolution broke out the Eastern Question exercised a restraining effect on the counsels of the Powers of Central Europe, and in unison with the partition of Poland prevented, as will be seen, any well-conceived and energetic invasion of France occurring when Louis and his family were on the verge of destruction.

Two of the northern powers, Denmark and Sweden, whose influence might have been considerable, maintained neutrality in the war of 1792-3, Prince Frederick of Denmark acting in this manner under the wise influence of Count Bernstorff.

In Sweden, also, despite the fact that Gustavus III. met his death at a masked ball in 1792, when on the point of leading a Swedish contingent into France by the side of the Duke of Brunswick's army, peace was preserved during the ministry of that sovereign's son, Gustavus IV., when the Duke of Sudermania acted as Regent.

Gustavus IV., however, proved so inimical to the victorious French armies that he ultimately lost his throne.

## CHAPTER IV.

THE DOMESTIC SIDE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION  
1789-1801.

THE VARIOUS CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—JEALOUSY OF LOUIS XV. OF THE PARLIAMENTS.—LOUIS CLAIMS ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY.—THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF FRANCE.—THE CONDITION OF FRANCE FROM THE END OF THE AMERICAN WAR TILL THE REVOLUTION OF HOLLAND.—LOUIS FORCED TO CALL THE STATES-GENERAL.—HOW THE NEW CONSTITUTION WAS BUILT UP.

NEVER did history present a more manifest conspiracy of various causes, resulting in a social cataclysm, than that which agitated France prior to the French Revolution. It is indeed a marvel to students whose conclusions are formulated by Mr. Lecky in *England in the Eighteenth Century* that no means were found by French statesmen to disperse these humors which, if allowed to increase, obviously threatened to poison the body politic, and in default of immediate antidotes destroy it.

Contemporary observers of these events in France, however, it is true, seem only to have thought it necessary to resist the edicts of the sternest monarchical autocracy outside Russia; and they ascribed the overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty, and the anarchy

which ensued, more to individual action than to the advance of those great forces of intellectual enfranchisement which were mainly brought into being by the writings of Rousseau and Voltaire.

The result of my own researches has been the abandonment of the view hastily imbibed in youth that individual actors in the scene, such as Louis, Duke of Orleans, known best as Philippe l'Egalité, and Mirabeau, set in motion forces which might have been permitted to sleep quietly for ages, had not the prince's vast fortune been used in undermining the loyalty of the soldiery, and if the unsurpassed eloquence of the great Satirist had not scathingly and unsparingly lashed the foibles and vices of his times and nation.

These dark faults and weaknesses were doomed to be punished by more unrelenting revolutionists than the gifted Mirabeau.

At the end of the year 1753, Lord Chesterfield, surveying the condition of France in a letter to his son, spoke of the coming troubles as follows :

“The king (Louis XV.) neither respected nor beloved, jealous of the Parliaments who would support his authority, and a devoted bigot to the church that would destroy it.”

“No ministers at all to be relied on, poverty dominant throughout France ; under these circumstances, the French nation reasons freely, which they never did before, upon matters of religion and Government.”

“The officers do so too ; in short, all the symptoms

which I have ever met with in history previous to great changes and revolutions in government now exist and daily increase in France."

Lord Chesterfield seems to have summarized, expressly or by implication, all the threatening elements in French society, and the student will not judge amiss if he takes the points one by one.

These "Parliaments" of Paris and the provinces were not elected bodies, but their members received nomination at the hands of the Crown, while a certain degree of independence was supposed to be insured because the seats were held for life. As a matter of fact they were freely purchased. These bodies once possessed a control of Crown land which placed them in some antagonism to the sovereign, and the Parliaments in the provinces also claimed some control over finance, such as was incompatible with the prerogatives of the Crown since Richelieu rendered it supreme.

The debates in these Assemblies, which had the authority of courts of law, and were therefore much recruited by trained advocates, were frequently carried on very ably, and a school of rhetoric existed in the country which enabled the numerous lawyers and professional men who held seats in the Parliaments to take part with such *éclat* in the famous conflicts which followed the reassembling of the States-General in 1789.

At the moment when Lord Chesterfield wrote, the Parliaments were engaged in a conflict with the

Church, and, although obedient to the king, were evincing a constitutional strength which the monarch thought likely soon to threaten his authority, and which, indeed, as events were to show, brought matters to an issue thirteen years after Lord Chesterfield's reflections were made. The utterance of Louis XV. in 1766 to the Parliament of Paris which had protested against the arrest and trial of some members of the Parliament of Brittany, at once testifies to the royal jealousy named by Chesterfield, and demonstrates the purely absolute authority which the kings of France then claimed to exercise.

"It is in my person alone" (declared Louis XV.) "that the sovereign power resides. It is from me alone that my courts derive their existence and their authority; it is to me alone that the legislative power belongs without dependence and without division; the whole public order emanates from me."

The king ended by threatening to sustain his claims by force if need be.

Mr. Lecky points out that a degraded monarchy, which had reduced France to poverty, steadily continued to act upon this principle, and did so up to the assembling of the States-General in the next reign.

When the king wished to levy money on one of the provinces without the concurrence of its Parliament he held what was called "a bed of justice," which he sometimes attended himself; and, despite angry remonstrances, the royal edict formulated on these occasions was "transcribed in the registers."

Another important feature of the despotism developed by Richelieu was the sovereign's power to issue "lettres de cachet," and so, on his own authority and responsibility, to send to prison without trial those who were obnoxious to himself or to those who could influence the royal will.

And this cause undoubtedly helped to alienate influential members of the aristocracy, some of whom drifted in consequence into giving timely support to revolutionary doctrines.

Another matter named by Lord Chesterfield claims a brief notice, viz., the reasoning "upon matters of religion and government" by the officers of the army, which was never heard of in France until this period, and is interesting as showing that the spirit of unrest which animated the military a few years later was not altogether attributable to the contact with American Republican principles which the troops of Louis XVI. experienced when that monarch joined the Colonists in their successful efforts to overthrow British authority. In some degree doubtless it may be said that Lafayette's soldiers did learn to cherish a spirit of disrespect towards the monarchical institutions of France; and certainly allegiance to the fount of power became less general in the ranks years before that revolt against the monarchy and all recognized authority, which men term the Revolution. But upon a merely contributory cause such as this it is needless to dwell when one realizes that the whole atmosphere of France, previous to the assem-

bling of the States-General, was charged with the yearning for intellectual change which moved those who had the ability to impress their opinions on the French people.

“Political speculation,” says Mr. Lecky, in his *England in the Eighteenth Century*, “accompanied the desire for political experiment, the disregard for traditions and customs, the deep sense of the intolerable evils of existing laws and institutions.”

Scarcely a young man left college who did not think it his duty to “enlighten the human race about its first interests” and instruct rulers how to govern.

And this when the Government, even if administered by a benign and well-meaning monarch, was an absolute despotism, controlled only by institutions which had lost any constitutional root they ever possessed. Fuel was added to the rising popular flame by the menaces of the “provincial” nominated Assemblies, which were considered by Louis XVI. and his advisers to bear more affinity to law courts than Parliaments; not even the so-called Parliament of Paris was exempt from a similar limitation of prerogative. There was nothing in France analogous to the English “Habeas Corpus Act.” No trial by jury, no liberty of the Press, no religious freedom, no national representation of an elective character.

It is interesting to speculate whether a king of the type of Henry the Fourth of France or Frederick the



Great of Prussia would have been better able to cope with the Revolution than the amiable and not unthoughtful Louis XVI.

In my own opinion any opposition derived from mere strength of character and power of mind which a sovereign might have possessed could not have done more than delay the evil hour, which would have confronted a less gifted successor.

I am so far in agreement with Mr. Lecky in his belief that if a statesman, such as the younger Pitt, had appeared early in the reign of Louis XVI., with power to create a free constitution on the lines of the old States-General, there might have been some hope that the storm would have passed by without venting its full force on luckless France.

But it is not credible that, unless measures of a popular character had been united with a reforming spirit on the part of the Government, and a strong executive had been created to watch over authority which might in time come to be respected as well as obeyed, there could have been any chance of coping peacefully with the French reforming spirit.

But it must not be imagined that the present writer desires to dwarf the great reputation of French statesmen such as Fénelon, who, under Louis XIV., designed for the Burgundian provinces a scheme containing all the elements necessary to give liberty to the people and preserve the rights of the several orders which formed the ancient States-General. The premature death of the Duke of Burgundy, eldest

son of Louis XIV., from the hideous scourge of small-pox which then ravaged Europe, and France in particular, not only subjected the nation to the disabilities inherent on a minority, but after he lost this son Louis listened no more to the counsels of Fénelon, who had been tutor to the late duke.

Turgot, the minister who was called to the counsels of Louis XVI., although one of the most active political reformers in the eighteenth century, attempted to readjust the constitutional laws and customs of France, but never endeavored to strengthen the popular element in its government. And this omission, in the condition to which France had been brought, precluded ultimate success, even if Turgot's reforming zeal in other directions had not alienated the Queen, Marie Antoinette, and as a consequence subjected him to the hostility of Court opinion.

With Turgot fell, in that fatal May, 1776, the thoughtful and wise Malesherbes, who thus early advised a convocation of the States-General, which he desired to see restored under a greatly mitigated feudal system, preparatory to the abolition of a state of affairs fitted for the Middle Ages and not adapted to modern times and ideas.

It was, indeed, under conditions totally different from those prevailing in other parts of Europe that constitutional reformers entered upon their task in France.

In Great Britain there might be—as Mr. Pitt believed—a necessity for persuading the holders of

boroughs such as Old Sarum, practically bereft of voters and bought and sold at will, to resign their privileges to an increasing industrial class, while in Germany the need for some modification of the feudal system was soon to be proved by the prescient and patriotic Stein.

Even amongst the conflicting nationalities of Austria concessions to Hungarian nationality might alternate with sympathetic consideration of that Slavonic wave of thought and opinion which from time to time threatens the balance of power in the dual Empire. But in France, as Sir James Mackintosh pointed out in his *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, the "grand nation" was in reality an aggregate of independent states, the monarch was in one place King of Navarre, in another Duke of Brittany, in a third Count of Provence, in a fourth Dauphin of Vienne.

Under these various denominations he possessed, at least nominally, different degrees of power, and he certainly exercised it under different forms. The mass composed of these heterogeneous and discordant elements was held together by the compressing force of despotism.

Under the shadow of the great Turgot's failure to consolidate this strange constitution, the efforts of clever financiers, such as Necker and Calonne, were as futile as the endeavors to stem the revolutionary waves which were made for a brief period by a former Foreign Minister of Louis XV., Maurepas.

The merits of Charles Alexandre de Calonne, one

of the eminent Frenchmen who sought refuge in England, did not receive adequate recognition at the hands of his countrymen. Between the more famous Necker's two administrations, one closing in 1781 and the other commencing before the States-General were called together, he made incessant endeavors, on replacing d'Ormesson in 1783, to bring about financial reform, and it was at his advice that the "Notables" were called together in February, A.D. 1787.

The alarming financial statement which he then made led to his dismissal.

Calonne was a moving spirit amongst the emigrés who frequented Coblenz before the commencement of the revolutionary wars.

None of these men were trained in the guidance of representative assemblies such as those in England and America, and yet the yearning of the French people pointed to something of the sort being necessary if the Monarchy was to be preserved, and with it public order and safety. It is, however, just to Necker to recount that he did attempt to set up elective provincial assemblies, leaving to the nominated Parliaments those purely magisterial and judicial functions which were always the main portion of their duties.

But the refusal of the Parliament of Paris to acquiesce led to Necker's resignation on May 19, 1781. Moreover, all hope of restoring a financial balance had disappeared when, in 1778, Louis

XVI. sent an army and fleet to America to assist the Colonists there against Great Britain.

So hazardous in the state of French affairs did this course of action appear to the prescient British king, George III., that he totally declined to believe his brother monarch would proceed to such extremes, until, on reading Ford the English diplomatist's letter from Paris announcing the Franco-American Compact as a fact, the English sovereign calmly wrote to Lord North, "Ford writes without flowers," and straightway prepared to face the situation.

Whether the action of the Bourbon king on this occasion was of a disinterested character or not, the financial situation after the Americans gained independence grew month by month more intolerable, while across the Atlantic political gratitude was not evinced towards the French Monarchy, and was felt but slightly towards a revolutionary movement quite different in nature to that which had triumphed in America. There could be no two opinions as to the gradual pauperizing of the middle and lower classes in France under the pressure of financial deficits, while the gulf between these sections of society and the very rich nobles of the kingdom yawned ever more dangerously.

These omens were apparent when the passing popularity of the American conflict had given France a position among the Councils of Europe which the defeat and partial destruction of her fleet by Lord Rodney had not obliterated.

It is also worthy of notice that to retain this popularity and outbid Austria, the Government of Louis XVI., to use Mr. Lecky's words, "fearlessly supported and stimulated the democratic spirit that had arisen in the Netherlands." Strange that so despotic a government should dare to adopt a democratic foreign policy, even when striving to undermine Austrian influence in the Low Countries!

It must have been a perplexing fact to statesmen unable to readjust the French finance successfully, that an evidence of inherent life and vigor in the nation should have been revealed at this moment of anxiety by that sudden bound of industry and commerce which occurred between the Peace of 1783 and the assembling of the States-General in 1789. Indeed, travellers gifted with powers of observation, such as Arthur Young, were amazed at the new docks and harbors, improved roads and canals which spread over France.

"I doubt," said Ségur, "whether any period can be named in which the French Monarchy enjoyed a higher degree of consideration than in the years between 1783 and 1787, that is, from the end of the American War till the Revolution of Holland."

Although not engaged in writing a history of the French Revolution, nevertheless, I have to prepare the minds of my readers to understand the position of each continental ruler, and, of course, of those guiding France after the Bourbon Monarchy and the Directory had given place to the Consulate. I have

therefore given a résumé of the state of France before 1789, showing the lights and shades which deceived contemporaries and, despite these aforementioned elements of confusion, led men to believe in the stability of the French Monarchy and its contingent social state.

When at last the furious rivalries between the "Notables" and the Parliament of Paris, struggling in concert with the provincial Parliaments to prevent the king levying taxes without their acquiescence, reached their height, all contentions culminated in one universal appeal to the sovereign for the assembling of the States-General, so that it needed a stronger man than the luckless Louis to refuse.

How the new constitution which sprang out of this demand was built up, and what ensued, shall form the subject of the next few pages.

There had been disorders and tumults in the provinces during 1788, while in Paris itself seditious and treasonable papers were from time to time found posted in the streets.

That the Parliament of Brittany should elect to meet early in June, contrary to the king's express command, was perhaps the most significant and ominous provincial symptom; while in the capital the rising sense of insecurity gained its height when the Breton Nobles, for protesting against the suppression of their Parliament by military force, were sent to the Bastille.

Spasmodic efforts to consolidate the finances and

to reduce the expenditure succeeded one another, for Louis' Council saw that if the monetary problems remained unsolved the condition of the people could not improve, and the general situation could afford no food for hope.

At this moment amongst the economies resolved on was that of reducing the *Genes d'Armes* and other household troops considerably in number; so that the Court entered upon the coming times of turmoil, disorder, and ultimate bloodshed without that body-guard which had been the nucleus of military strength and despotic power in the times of his two predecessors, Louis XIV. and Louis XV.

This disability must be considered when judging the policy of M. Necker's administration, which commenced in the second half of this year, 1788, amidst much popular joy and hope.

The executive impotence of the nominal supreme authority overshadowed all other shortcomings of the administration when the crisis arrived, during which the ancient Monarchy of France was shattered, and the foundations of society were uprooted.

It seems to have been a rise in the price of bread in Paris to four sous per lb., one and a half sous at a bound, that engendered the unpopularity which drove M. Necker's predecessor in the position of prime minister into retirement. M. Brienne, the Archbishop of Sens, had gained his position originally through a favorable popular opinion both of his talents and disposition, inasmuch as he acted in



unison with the leaders of opposition to the Crown, and was familiar with their secrets.

Things, however, had reached such a pass that, in endeavoring to discover a *via media* between the two conflicting factions, the Archbishop of Sens grew extremely unpopular, and, staggered at the distressful state of the metropolis, where business was stagnant, distress rampant, and employment not forthcoming, he resigned his office on August 25, 1788, and fled to England, leaving the luckless Louis XVI. to weather the surging tempest as best he could.

The king found himself so embarrassed by the desertion of his prime minister that, conscious of his own inability to direct the executive, and convinced that much of the unpopularity of the Court was owing to the actions of his brother, the Count d'Artois, and those surrounding him, the sovereign threw himself into the arms of the popular party and accordingly recalled to power the idol of the hour, M. Necker.

A Swiss by birth, and therefore a Republican, M. Necker was forgiven for being a foreigner and a Protestant, but the expectations of benefits to follow on his financial expedients were so extreme as to be beyond all reason and probability.

Men talked as if the minister could pay off the national debt without any increase of resources, and at the same time lower the price of bread. The very magnitude of the blessings prognosticated was likely to render even a partial disappointment intolerable.

The funds rose and a general sense of hopefulness seemed for a brief season to spread over France.

M. Necker certainly did not fail in patriotism, as he sacrificed a part of his private fortune in order to pay all immediate demands on the treasury in ready money, and by so doing restored such a sense of confidence as reacted favorably on the public credit. But the most important step he took in the autumn of 1788 consisted in the summoning of a fresh convention of the Notables, who straightway advised the calling together of the much demanded States-General, the ancient Parliament of France, which had been suppressed since 1614. The meeting was fixed to take place in the spring of 1789.

Written questions were placed before the Notables concerning the organization of the States-General—the mode of voting, the number to be returned for respective districts, the proportion of members in each of the three orders of Nobles, Clergy, and Representatives of the people, the latter to be chosen by some form of popular vote. This assemblage did not conceal its preference for the traditional and equal proportion being preserved between the three orders.

It would be unfair to criticise the constitutional composition of the restored States-General as if those responsible for its remoulding had thought matters out away from the pressure of inflamed public opinion; but it now seems to ourselves that the doubling of the numbers of the Third Order without deciding

whether the Estates were to sit separately or in one assembly, to which the king agreed at Necker's suggestion in opposition to all the Notables except the Duke of Orleans, formed an initial error from the effects of which the Monarchy never recovered.

It is true that if the Nobles, Clergy, and Third Order had voted in three separate chambers, and no law had been allowed to reach the statute book which had not passed at least two of the three Houses, then the increase of the elected representatives would have been innocuous ; but when this question of separate or joint voting came to be thrown down for future public discussion, there could be little doubt of the result in the state that France had been brought to in 1789.

The matter was, as things turned out, relegated for decision to the States-General itself, where 300 of the Nobles and 300 of the Clergy were to be commingled with the 600 legislators chosen by popular election.

It was at this moment that M. Necker's lack of experience in creating free institutions or guiding deliberative assemblies rendered his particular financial and other abilities unserviceable to the task committed to him. It is no excuse for the unfortunate statesman that most of the moderate politicians of the day urged a waiting policy, the king proposing no plan but leaving the question of one, two, or three chambers to be decided by the Assembly.

This mistake seems to have been the more unfor-

tunate, inasmuch as Madame de Staël, M. Necker's thoughtful daughter, has told us how the queen had thrown her influence into the scale in favor of doubling the number of representatives sent up by the Third Order, and how in consequence at that moment, the Court being not unpopular, a bold and far-seeing prime minister might have secured a second chamber for distracted France. But the opportunity passed by not to return until the Revolution had run its terrible course.

The convocation of the States-General at Versailles on May 5, 1789, will ever be regarded as an epoch destined to bring fundamental changes upon the European world; and if not mentioned at present, by those who value freedom of constitutional expression, with that remarkable enthusiasm which was displayed by many Liberals when the feudal ideas were first superseded towards the close of the eighteenth century, it still possesses friends throughout Europe ready to celebrate the event itself with satisfaction while looking askance on the holocaust of human life which was destined to follow it in the history of France and Europe.

It will ever be a question strongly debated whether on the whole the world gained, setting to the debit and credit side of the account, respectively, the cruelty and bloodshed, on the one hand, which temporarily triumphed and deluged the Continent, and on the other the assertion of the right of mankind to a proper share in the control of human affairs, which

has become general in all European states but Russia and Turkey, while even in these communities the change of ideas has been progressive in character. But it should be remembered by the extollers of the French Revolution that the establishment of Free Parliaments does not date from 1789, but that both England and America at that date possessed institutions which enabled them to make full use of their geographical detachment, and, by preserving such liberties, saved society from the taint of violence and bloodshed which will ever sully the pages of French history between 1789 and 1815.

It had been hoped that the two Upper Orders might, by combining, bring about a healthy balance of power in the National Assembly; but this hope was soon seen to be void of foundation, inasmuch as a majority of the Clergy, despite the total abolition of their tithes, were very soon found to be making common cause with the elected members of the Third Order, and in due time some of the Nobles followed their example. The Paris mob exercised potent influence on the Assembly, which resolved to reject any proposal for a second chamber. The Abbé Sièyès, the great authority on the creation of new constitutions, on June 17, 1789, asked the Third Estate to declare itself "the National Assembly," while the other Estates were invited to join them. The Court made an ineffectual attempt to let this Revolution—for such it undoubtedly must be called at the stage arrived at—proceed more gently than

the leaders of the Third Order desired, but the insubordinate spirit displayed by the National Guard in Paris, and the distress caused by dear bread amongst the people, accelerated what all beholders saw had become a most dangerous crisis.

For the temper of the regular army was unknown and suspected, while whether the troops, poured into Paris at the instance of the Count d'Artois, could really be relied on, might be fairly described as the problem of the hour.

M. Necker's temporary retirement from office ministered to the general confusion and aroused fresh passions, which speedily animated the military themselves. It seems that arrears of pay gave the regular army their long-sought-for opportunity to join the Parisian populace and the National Guard in an attack on the Bastille, which was stormed July 14, 1789. Moreover, as similar outbreaks occurred at this time in the provinces, there now began that rush to the frontier, on the part of the nobles and other holders of property, which created the class called emigrés, whose influential advocacy at the German Courts was soon to arouse an international strife far more sanguinary even than the domestic tumults and atrocities which afflicted France. Whether such a state of things as this could have been avoided by following the examples set by England and America in the conduct of their popular assemblies, I am not prepared to say, because statesmanship of a deeper character than that of creating

parliamentary machinery alone could have dealt completely with the situation.

I am nevertheless disposed to agree with the late Professor Seeley in his opinion that the great blot on the revived States-General consisted in the practical obliteration of the executive, which ensued when Louis XV. and Necker attempted a nominal guidance, and yet left the young Assembly to drift helplessly on to its course of license and anarchy.

The wise creators of the American constitution, Hamilton, Adams, and Jefferson, distinctly provided for this, while their Senate is if anything too unbending and powerful a second chamber.

In Great Britain the cabinet system of collective responsibility has again and again saved the situation, by taking the main burden of constitutional responsibility from the sovereign.

It is interesting at this stage to remember in brief what was the special constitution which met with such success in America, and to contrast it with the seething mass of discontented beings who met in one chamber at Versailles in the name of the ancient States-General.

The Third Order in France, as has been said, elected 600 members, and it is worthy of note that the voters were subject to a qualification equal to the price of three days' labor, while in America the vote was given to every resident citizen.

The "United States" were "United" for the purpose of mutual protection, the general legislative

powers being confided to a congress, consisting of a chamber of representatives chosen biennially and a senate elected every six years. The executive was entrusted to a president and vice-president chosen every four years, while each state, possessing a corresponding form of government, retained the management of its own internal affairs.

But the arrangements regarding the executive were definite and distinct, separating that function of government from the legislative duties assigned to the two chambers.

I have lingered over the constitutional aspect of the French Revolution too long, possibly, before expressing sympathy with the noble advocacy of Burke on behalf of that suffering nation, which soon either attracted the warm sympathy or aroused the repulsion of rival parties in Europe.

But it is difficult on the whole to disagree with the above-named great Irishman, whose conclusions have been indorsed by Thomas Carlyle, to the effect that the proceedings in France under the "National Assembly" were of such an unjustifiable character, that whether or not it be true that a cataclysm of some sort was unavoidable in the condition of the ancient French Monarchy, yet a blot tainted our common humanity when so great a country could comport itself in such a way.

On the 4th of August, 1789, every incorporate and vested right in the kingdom was cancelled by a single vote, and, on September 20, Louis XVI. was



compelled to sanction a decree by which the entire royal authority was swept away and France virtually became a republic, the sovereign being henceforth merely an hereditary magistrate bearing the regal title. And had the course of events been smooth and prosperous, justifying such an experiment, there would have been no ground to criticise the deliberate action of the Assembly as a national representative body, but the more prerogatives the luckless monarch surrendered the more aggressive and minatory became the proceedings of the Parisian populace who, in the mingled madness engendered by threatened famine and popular excitement, attacked the Palace of Versailles on 6th of October, 1789, massacring the guards and compelling the king and his family, at the peril of their lives, to remove to Paris, whither the National Assembly also repaired at the very moment when the political club known by the name of "Jacobin," and consisting of forty members, commenced its sitting.

During the year 1790 the royal family remained in the Tuileries in a condition scarcely distinguishable from that of prisoners.

On June 16 the Assembly abolished titles and every distinction of rank, and in November passed a decree ejecting from their benefices all those clergy who refused to recognize the new order of things. As Louis XVI. and his family had been accompanied from Versailles by excited crowds shouting "les Évêques aux lanternes," this outcome was not to be

marvelled at any more than that the early clerical tendency to make terms with the Revolution should have failed to appease their inexorable foes. To realize the dreadful position of the French king and queen with their family at this period, it should be remembered that M. Necker had not only resigned but left the country, together with all of the titled and property-holding class who were able to imitate his example. What wonder then that in June, 1791, the harassed monarch made his historic attempt to escape to Montmédy by Varennes, from which place, alas, he had speedily to return?

The death of Mirabeau, when he had made some approaches to the royal family and is believed to have favored their flight to the frontier, was an untoward event for the luckless Louis XVI., and when the subsequent attempt to escape was frustrated by a series of accidents, the sense of desolation and abandonment which he must have felt when returning to Paris in captivity, is of itself sufficient to arouse sentiments of pity.

Moreover, there was an appalling episode during the return journey, when the Count de Dampierre, a resolute Royalist, was shot by the escort when endeavoring to kiss the king's hand as a protest against the insulting menaces of the crowd.

Such in outline was this famous Revolution, before the coils of foreign war combined with those of internal discord to render the people of France of all nations most disturbed and miserable.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, 1792-1795.

OPENING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WARS.—THE RESOLUTION OF THE KING AND QUEEN OF FRANCE AFTER THEIR ARREST AT VARENNES.—THE MEETING OF THE AUSTRIAN AND PRUSSIAN SOVEREIGNS AT PILNITZ.—SEIZURE OF THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY OF PARIS BY ROBESPIERRE, MURAT, DANTON, AND THEIR COADJUTORS.—THE SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE.—GENERAL CUSTINE'S CAMPAIGN ACROSS THE ALSATIAN FRONTIER.—THE DECLINE OF ROYALISM IN FRANCE.—THE LEADING EVENTS IN THE WAR DURING 1794.—ROBESPIERRE'S COMPLETE DICTATORSHIP.—THE DEATH OF ROBESPIERRE.—THE DECLINE OF THE REIGN OF TERROR AND ITS EFFECT ON THE COUNTRY.

WHEN the king and queen of France returned to Paris after their arrest at Varennes they resolved to act faithfully and fairly by the ruling parties in the newly-elected Parliament, wherein, by a so-called "self-denying ordinance," none of the members of the defunct National Assembly had been allowed to be candidates.

No fewer than 100,000 emigrés were collected on the frontier, and Marie Antoinette wrote to her brother, the Emperor Leopold, deprecating the part these exiles were playing, inasmuch as without any countenance or authority from their own sovereign they seemed bent on provoking an invasion of France

which, in presence of the passions there prevailing, would also of necessity complete the ruin of the Monarchy.

The Count d'Artois, afterwards Charles X., and the Count de Provence, afterwards Louis XVIII., persuaded the emigrés that the French Court acted under the authority of the revolutionary leaders, and the Emperor Leopold and Frederick William II. had to discriminate what the real facts of the case might be.

It certainly is strange to find the French queen looked upon, as she was at Coblenz, as too sympathetic with the Revolution! And when Louis XVI. accepted the new constitution in September, 1791, he was actually branded by the emigrés as unfaithful to his royal trust, so that the Emperor Leopold was asked to treat the Count of Provence as Regent of France.

The Emperor Leopold, as later researches enable us to discern, strongly opposed any precipitate action against the French Government, at least before the flight to Varennes.

After he knew that the royal family were back in Paris and uninjured he again hoped against hope, being aware, as Mr. Lecky tells us, "that the Austrian Netherlands were seething with the revolutionary spirit," and were not so secure as in former years, because of the dismantlement of the barrier fortresses.

But the reception of further communications in

cipher from his sister, Marie Antoinette, early in July, 1791, declaring that she had been over-persuaded to form a too favorable conception of the situation in Paris, and that in Her Majesty's opinion "the new constitution was a tissue of impracticable absurdities," led to another swing of the pendulum in her imperial brother's mind.

Hence it came to pass that the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns met at Pilnitz in August, 1791, and declared that they considered the "present situation of the king of France a matter of common interest to all the sovereigns of Europe." This was acknowledged, let it be remembered, by Sweden, Spain, and Sardinia, while, in theory at least, Catherine of Russia indorsed a policy of active opposition to the French Revolution.

In France, these partial declarations were treated as evincing hostility to the French nation; and the position of the king and queen in Paris became daily more insecure.

The advance of the Duke of Brunswick with 60,000 men, 10,000 being Austrians, which ceased after the cannonade of Valmy on September 20, 1792, had not been undertaken in time to save the royal family of France, to whose assistance the expedition was designed to press forward.

For, on August 10th, Robespierre, Marat, Danton, and their coadjutors had seized the municipal authority of Paris, and having subordinated the already discredited National Assembly to their ends, preached

the doctrines of pitiless massacre at home and of inexorable war abroad.

And it is scarcely credible that the Duke of Brunswick could have done anything but precipitate the destruction of the royal family, had he approached nearer to Paris and yet been unable to secure a safe retreat for Louis and his queen with their relatives.

That the advance was not made sooner than September, 1792, is attributable to more than one cause, and to one at least not having its origin in Berlin or Vienna—inasmuch as contradictory advices came through Marie Antoinette herself from Paris, just when Frederick William II. at Berlin had entered into the Compact of Pilnitz in a half-hearted fashion.

Jealous of Austria and hostile to her policy on the Eastern Question, by nothing but an overpowering sense of the common peril to all crowned heads was the Prussian king induced to negotiate; and the subsequent advance of the Duke of Brunswick, with 10,000 Austrians in his train, into France, was only undertaken because Austria had consented to Prussia participating in the coming dismemberment of Poland.

Hence it came to pass that after a general agreement had been arrived at to go into France if necessary, to save Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette from destruction, every excuse for subsequent delay was embraced, both at Berlin and Vienna, giving the Girondins in Paris, led by Brissot, the impression that the associated monarchs were willing, yet afraid,

to strike, and hence encouraging the Parisian revolutionists to hasten the accomplishment of their long-cherished schemes against the royal authority.

The declaration of war by France against the "king of Hungary and Bohemia" on April 20, 1792, did not include Germany in its scope, nor was a state of hostility thereby engendered with Prussia, though General Dumouriez, then French minister of war, under Brissot, must have been well aware that he was acting in the manner most likely to bring about a union of the two great German-speaking communities, as well as a European coalition against his own Government.

But a delay of thirteen months between the meeting of Pilnitz in August, 1791, and the advance to Valmy, September, 1792, simply gave the enemies of Louis XVI. the breathing space they desired.

For this was the period during which Robespierre, the greatest enemy of the Monarchy then living, consolidated more than ever his power and influence.

It must be remembered that the flight of the king to Varennes gave Robespierre the first opportunity of announcing his Republican views, while in June of that same year he was named "Public Accuser," an office which he held till April, 1792.

Although he neither took active part in the attack on the Tuileries of August 10th, nor sanctioned the massacres of September, Robespierre proved himself the inexorable foe of Louis XVI. and spoke in the Convention for his execution. How this man

became a veritable dictator after having destroyed the Girondists and sent his most formidable rival, Danton, to the scaffold, is a part of the revolutionary story that cannot be dealt with completely in this introduction; but it is worth remembering that it was not by reason of influence in the popular chamber, so much as by control over the Jacobin Club, and finally by gaining sway over the municipality of Paris, that Robespierre, Marat and Danton were enabled to overthrow the Monarchy and destroy the king with his family.

The lesson to be learnt is that, in a great capital city, the paramount authority should be that of the National Parliament, and that no single municipal authority should be allowed to usurp complete local power, but that it should be checked by the establishment of minor bodies of an elective character, whose power—while necessarily less than that of the central authority—should be clearly defined and unassailable. “What,” says Thomas Carlyle, in his *French Revolution* when seeking a remedy for the municipal chaos, “if we should split Paris into, say, a dozen separate municipalities, incapable of concert!”

When the “National Assembly,” dissolved in 1791, was succeeded by the “Legislative Assembly,” the great mistake followed of proclaiming what was called a “self-denying ordinance,” which forbade those who had been members of the late chamber to become candidates, the consequence being that many coadjutors of Robespierre exercised their talents in



places outside of Parliament, and utilized the Paris Commune with the ill-effects now apparent.

As for the unfortunate French royal family, after Danton had, on August 10th, practically established the Republic, by letting "an armed mob loose upon the Tuileries," which Louis quitted without giving timely orders to the Swiss Guard either to fight or retire, so that 180 of them died at their posts before it was known that the king desired a cessation of hostilities, there could be little doubt in the temper of Paris of the fate of those whom a foreign army came to protect. The Swiss made their noble defence in the presence of a young officer of artillery, Bonaparte by name, who remarked that they would have won if properly led.

"Valmy" is a great historic event, and its date September 20, 1792, an epoch in modern history. Marshal Kellerman was proud to take his Dukedom from the place, although as a battle it cannot take rank amongst the more important struggles which ensued. It seems now to be clear that when the Duke of Brunswick found his stately deployment of masses, moving slowly forward under the support of his cannonade, did not overawe the almost ragged conscript regiments of the revolutionary host, and that his supplies from Germany were not equal to feeding the emigrés as well as his own army, he hesitated to put all to the touch after the artillery duel had proved inconclusive.

The Prussians easily acquiesced in retreat, because

thereby they would save their army to secure the Polish provinces allotted to them, and hold the balance of power in Europe.

Austria, finding her own Flemish frontiers threatened, fought on of necessity, but ignorant alike of the warlike passions which had been unchained in France, and of the military genius which was so shortly to be developed amongst the French Democratic leaders; nor could the Emperor Leopold and his advisers divine the aptitude for camp life which the ordinary French revolutionist possessed. This first coalition against France was moreover deceived into believing that the internal commotions of that country, displaying as they did much disunion in its councils, would paralyze the military efforts of its people.

The Revolution was destined nevertheless rather to consolidate than disunite France, inasmuch as not only did the Island of Corsica become reconciled to her rulers, but Savoy, on the Swiss frontier, and the Low Countries yielded to conquest, while in the Rhine provinces, Switzerland, and even in Piedmont itself, the principles known as those of 1789 made speedy progress.

General Custine's campaign across the Alsatian frontier, which commenced in October, 1792, was a great political event, more by reason of the sympathy for revolutionary principles evoked on the confines of Germany than in consequence of the successes which followed, though these included the

taking of Spires, in the Bavarian Palatinate, full of Brunswick's abandoned stores, and the capture of Mainz (Mayence) on the Rhine.

In March, 1792, the Emperor Leopold had died, and his successor, Francis II., was a man opposed to the reforming zeal of Joseph, and even to the sympathetic attitude towards those momentous changes which his immediate predecessor presented.

Louis XVI. and his family placed their confidence in a reed shaken by the wind when they took refuge in the National Assembly, after the Tuileries had been stormed and the Swiss Guard killed on August 10, 1792; and thenceforth the decline in the royal authority day by day increased, so that, by order of the Legislative Assembly, the king was deprived of his functions and imprisoned with his family in the Temple.

The division in that Assembly, which destroyed the French monarchical system on August 10th, was only attended by 284 out of 745 deputies—not a respectable average for a Government bill dealing merely with municipal matters, in the English House of Commons—and yet in such perfunctory fashion was dismissed the most ancient of European monarchies! The trial and execution of the king were preceded by the massacres of September, in which the French historian, Taine, tells us 1,300 human beings suffered.

All this occurred within a few days of the battle of Valmy, and before General Custine invaded Germany and penetrated to Mayence, laying the richest

part of the Rhine provinces under contribution and proclaiming the French Republic there without protest. Also at a time when Dumouriez, fresh from his triumph over Brunswick, was meditating the attack on Flanders which resulted in the victory at Jemappes, of Nov. 6, 1792, and the retreat of the Austrians; whereupon the French general occupied Mons and Brussels successively.

Moreover, during this period the king of Naples received a visit from the French fleet, which compelled him to remain at least neutral for the moment and desist from influencing the Turks against receiving a French envoy. France also annexed both Savoy and Nice, taking them from the King of Sardinia.

Spain, on the other hand, awaited the penalties to be charged against her, for thus early opposing the cause of the Revolution.

On January 21, 1793, Louis XVI. suffered on the scaffold, where he comported himself as a king of France should do in the hour of death, and henceforth the people of England were destined to be added to the foes gathering around the devoted land of France.

For in over-running the Low Countries, the French threw Antwerp open to the commerce of Europe, thereby violating a treaty which deeply affected the interests of Great Britain, but nevertheless neither the formal declaration of war, nor the real provocation, came from England.

That Pitt desired to live in history as a minister of peace, and in company with his cousin, Lord Grenville, exhausted all possible diplomatic methods before he made preparations for the conflict forced on his country on February 1, 1793, is too well known to be disputed.

Lord Macaulay has left on record his opinion that the younger Pitt waged war "feebly," but notwithstanding this verdict it is impossible to deny that France found herself in a totally different description of struggle after England had been added to her foes in 1793. In the first place, pre-eminence in the Mediterranean, as in the Channel, was henceforth in dispute, and in the former sea the king of Naples gained an ally against the hitherto autocratic French admiral whose proceedings have been just mentioned.

The year 1793 was one of retrogression for the French forces, and the secession of Dumouriez to the Royalists forms an epoch which Republican writers speak of as "treasonable," although it is well known that the cruel proceedings in Paris had inclined the general towards a restoration of the Bourbons. The battle of Neerwinden, fought on March 18, 1793, was in some degree the correlative of Valmy, inasmuch as great results were gained without severe fighting, and as an outcome of the struggle Flanders was temporarily re-opened to the Austrians.

This check in the Low Countries happened almost simultaneously with the retreat of General Custine from Germany, and also with the outbreak in La

Vendée, destined to try so hardly the courage and resources of the French Republicans.

The national yearning for some change in the internal condition of France will be presently forced more particularly on the reader's attention, but it is interesting to learn that in 1793 Burke spoke of it as follows :

“ The State of France is perfectly simple. It consists of but two descriptions, the oppressor and the oppressed.”

So that thus early in the Revolutionary period it became apparent that some Saviour of Society must sooner or later be evoked in the cause of mercy and civilization.

That the Saviour of Society in Paris would also prove to be the greatest continental Captain since Cæsar was certainly not known to the world at the close of 1793.

How on the whole the days of Revolutionary terror should have been those of territorial expansion is difficult to explain, but the condition of France under this inexplicable passing phrensy is admitted by all political thinkers to have been abnormal.

The frightful barbarities of this period, which included the execution of Marie Antoinette on October 16, 1794, after her beloved son the Dauphin had been pitilessly torn from her arms and consigned to the charge of Simon, a shoemaker and friend of Marat, who ill-treated him and forced the child to take

strong alcohol in lieu of food—a captivity which, happily for the sufferer, terminated in death on the 8th of June, 1795—were probably due to a consciousness in Robespierre's mind that it was doubtful whether, with the war in La Vendée raging, the Revolutionary leaders would not also be stopped in their course by an uprising in the army.

Once only did the brave Queen Marie Antoinette evince the slightest lack of self-possession, and that occurred during the massacre of September, 1792, when the head of her beloved and murdered friend, the Princess de Lamballe, was brought to the Temple so that the bitterest grief might be rendered as replete with horror as man could devise.

Danton had hitherto urged France on to attack her neighbors in the name of Liberty and Fraternity, but he shared in May, 1794, the fate of the Girondists, and even of Philippe Egalité, the recreant Duke of Orleans, who was no safer as a Prince for the vote he gave favoring the death of Louis XVI.

The extirpation of Royalism, root and branch, rendered more thorough by the execution of the king's sister, Madame Elizabeth, was thus being accomplished, while towards such an end the death of the Dauphin was a great advance, considering the unpopularity of the Counts de Provence and d'Artois. One alone of Louis' children escaped death, his only daughter, the Princess Marie Thérèse, being sent to Vienna in an interchange of French and Austrian

Vendée, destined to try so hardly the courage and resources of the French Republicans.

The national yearning for some change in the internal condition of France will be presently forced more particularly on the reader's attention, but it is interesting to learn that in 1793 Burke spoke of it as follows :

“The State of France is perfectly simple. It consists of but two descriptions, the oppressor and the oppressed.”

So that thus early in the Revolutionary period it became apparent that some Saviour of Society must sooner or later be evoked in the cause of mercy and civilization.

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Those aims, undoubtedly, were to render a return to monarchical government impossible by destroying all those suspected of sympathy with such a movement.

Every device was employed to propitiate ever-changing public opinion, and the Goddess of Reason previously honored by the Jacobins, was, in 1794, succeeded by the establishment of a new religion, whose feast, celebrated with pomp, was that of the Supreme Being.

But not even the reverting to Deism could save Robespierre from those of his former associates who descried their own impending downfall, and formed a conspiracy for his destruction. Instead of acting with his usual decision, he secluded himself for more than a month, and when he again made his appearance in the Convention he was openly accused by Tallien, whose fiancée was awaiting death at Robespierre's instigation, of seeking to subvert all constitutional methods; and the majority present assenting, he was arrested amidst cries of "à bas le tyran," together with his brother and his coadjutors, St. Just, Couthon, and Le Bas, and sent to the Luxembourg prison. In the night, however, Robespierre and his friends were set free by the sympathetic keeper, and conducted to the hall of the Commune of Paris where Henriot, commander of the National Guard, and others were waiting to receive them. Meanwhile his foes proceeded to action. Barras and other commissioners directing the military of Paris seized the fallen tyrant and his associates, and he

entered his solitary room with apparent indifference. Le Bas had a pair of pistols and killed himself with one of them, but whether it be true that Robespierre shattered his left jaw with the other weapon, or if Mena the attendant gendarme's own statement be trustworthy that he fired the bullet which rendered the dictator speechless, has not been rendered quite clear to the present day.

Thomas Carlyle places Mena's statement in a note in his *French Revolution*, whilst Mr. G. H. Lewes takes the fact for granted in his *Life of Robespierre*.

Next morning the inanimate body of Robespierre, his sky-blue coat soiled with blood, was taken to the scaffold, and thus came practically to an end the Reign of Terror, just at the time when the project of a joint invasion of France by Prussia, Austria and England had been proved futile.

Treating the death of Robespierre as the declining point in that madness which had afflicted the French people since the States-General were called together in 1789, it will not be out of place to consider what has been gained to the world by sacrifices so terrible and unexampled.

France may be compared to a ship drifting away from its companions in the fleet, and both burning and exploding to their detriment for a long period, and yet it may be hoped forming a warning to future navigators who elect to carry combustibles on board their vessels. That men and women laid down their lives in such numbers for no beneficial results—

social or political—is most certainly not in accordance with fact, inasmuch as *the abolition of feudal rights* which shut out other classes altogether from the land had been gained in company with (even if it did not immediately entail) *equality in the eye of the law, the establishment of independent tribunals for the administration of justice, national representation with taxation, a qualified liberty of the Press, and a certain amount of religious toleration, and last but not least the abolition of torture.* These form the leading changes of a beneficent character given in exchange for the ghastly horrors of the Terror in Paris, where neither sex nor patriotism availed anything in extenuation of alleged and unproven treason to the Republic, the young Princess of Monaco sharing the same fate as the illustrious but temporarily unsuccessful soldier Custine, whose son in turn died at the hands of Marat and Robespierre because he let fall some expression of attachment to his father.

Nor is it possible to reflect on the sanguinary war in La Vendée without lamenting the spirit of savagery which had been aroused when 500 Royalist children of both sexes, the eldest not fourteen, were shot down in revenge for the Republican soldiers who had died in this struggle between the Royalists and Republicans, which never entirely closed but with the Revolution itself!

As the revolutionary fires cooled in 1795, so did the French arms succeed beyond all expectation on the Continent; but this occurred happily when, in

sympathy with calmer views prevailing in Paris, it was no longer true, as had been proclaimed at the outset of the war in 1792, that "all governments are our enemies," all "peoples are our allies."

Success had engendered a more reasonable tone in French foreign politics.

The loss of the Netherlands by the Austrians meant the occupation of Antwerp by the French, as well as the isolation of the Duke of York's English army, which after a terrible march to Hanover returned home.

The possession of Antwerp, with its docks and anchorage, said Napoleon in after years, meant a pistol presented at the head of England, and, had the French fleet gained command of the sea, a standing menace would have existed within easy sail of British ports.

At the end of 1794, Belgium, Nice, and Savoy had been annexed to France, the armies of that Republic being in possession of Holland, as well as of Germany west of the Rhine.

On the Rhine itself the Austrians under General Clerfayt were allowed to remain idle, when, by attacking Mayence, they would have drawn away some of General Hoche's troops from Quiberon, where, on June 27, 1795, that notable Republican soldier defeated the flower of the old nobility of France under the guns of the British fleet from whose decks they had embarked, this disastrous defeat being a blow to the Royalist hopes which entirely precluded a restoration of the Bourbons by force of French arms.

The events which followed the establishment of a new constitution in France during 1795 so clearly form a part of Bonaparte's career that they must be reserved for another chapter, which tells how, between this date of 1795 and the closing year of the eighteenth century, the greatest European military genius produced by France during the revolutionary struggle became *First Consul*.

The year 1795 saw the partition of what remained to Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Kosciusko, the Polish patriot, was defeated, wounded and taken prisoner by the Empress Catherine's troops, while Suwarow, the Russian marshal, stormed the suburbs of Warsaw and took that capital city, after which the Polish king, deprived of the regal title, subsisted at St. Petersburg on a Russian pension.

Thus did Russia, Prussia, and Austria, after protesting against the lawless spirit of the French Revolution, perpetrate one of the most consummate acts of injustice recorded in modern history. Their patent and acknowledged intrigues had fomented those very disorders which were made the pretext for their original intervention and subsequent aggressions.

The two great nations, Russia and Prussia, had abandoned the originally hostile attitude they assumed against the French Revolution. No sovereigns had spoken more strongly or allied themselves more promptly with England in 1793 than Catherine of Russia, although her armaments and resources were utilized to retain the share of Poland allotted to

Russia rather than in succoring Austria on the Rhine.

The conquest of Holland by France had determined the wavering policy of Prussia, and on January 22, 1795, a treaty of peace and amity was signed with the French Republic at Bâle. Thenceforth the counsels of statesmanlike action framed to preserve the balance of power were exchanged at Berlin for those of delay and prevarication. It had, however, become apparent to the rulers of all continental nations that they had to deal with an aggressive power in France whose resources increased year by year, and the character of whose government, although beyond external control, must become a matter of vital concern to all.

## CHAPTER VI.

STATES OF SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE,  
1792-1795.

THE BOURBON FAMILY.—THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ENGLAND  
AND FRANCE FOR THE COMMAND OF THE SEA.—CHARLES III.  
OF SPAIN AS A REFORMER.—POPE PIUS VI. OF ROME.—ACTS  
OF WISE REFORM.

THE Bourbon family occupied two European thrones outside France at the time of the French Revolution, but held them by members of one branch.

Charles III., King of Spain, of whom anon, left the joint kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to his younger son, Ferdinand IV., when, in 1759, he was called to the guidance of affairs in the Peninsula.

Ferdinand IV. had married a younger sister of Marie Antoinette, and naturally felt the strongest sympathy with her French relations in that royal family whose griefs and wrongs had stirred the culture of Europe to its depths, but still failed to obliterate the necessity which existed for deep and fundamental change in the status of mankind.

The victorious French armies could reach Naples by land, but their sway over the Mediterranean Sea



was destined to be brief, so that the Bourbons of Naples and Sicily owed it to England that they were not blotted out of the map by the triumphant revolutionary hosts which spread all over Italy, and threatened to submerge both Spain and Portugal. Nor should it be forgotten that the history of the struggle between England and France for command of the sea contains the story of how Lord Nelson was destined to protect Sicily from the French.

In Spain, Charles III. proved to be a great reforming sovereign, but he never succeeded in bridging over that wide gulf between the educated classes and the bulk of the nation which has foiled the best intentions of statesmen desirous of bringing about reforms of a sound character in that part of the Peninsula. In 1788, a year before the French Revolution commenced, Charles III. died, and his son, Charles IV., inherited his kingly authority, retaining for a brief period his father's Neapolitan ministers, who were, however, replaced by the famous Godoy, called "Prince of the Peace," because, in 1795, he negotiated with France that treaty of Ildefonso which, far from bringing peace, threw the politics of the Peninsula into sanguinary confusion.

Charles IV. had been slow to espouse the cause of his French relations, but after Louis XVI. had been executed in 1793, the Spanish king took the field on the Pyrenean frontier, at first with some success, but not such as to be of an abiding character, inasmuch as directly the French Republic could spare suf-

ficient troops to send into Spain, the fortune of war changed.

Hence it came to pass that Godoy persuaded his sovereign to make peace in 1795; a year later, by the aforementioned Treaty of Ildefonso, he gave over all the naval resources of his country to France, a policy for which Spain had to suffer long and terribly, when face to face with the naval might of Great Britain.

Portugal had remained faithful in spirit at least to her alliance with England, although after Godoy made his famous change of policy and joined the French, he invaded the unrepentant sister kingdom with 40,000 men and compelled the Portuguese to close their ports to Great Britain. This happened in 1801, during the sway of Charles IV., King of Spain, and also that of John, Regent for his mother, Maria I., Queen of Portugal, whose mental condition kept her in retirement until she died, A. D. 1816.

The gallant fidelity of Portugal to the cause of Europe between 1810 and 1815 has given her a prominent position in the history of the nineteenth century.

Switzerland, although torn with internal commotion, had not, in 1795, yielded to the conquering advance of her French neighbors, although such differences were made an excuse by Bonaparte to overrun the country three years later.

Italy did not exist, in common parlance, being severed into no less than ten separate communities, viz. :

I. The Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia, bereft of Savoy.

II. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany.

III. and IV. The Republics of Venice and Genoa.

V. The States of the Church.

VI. Naples and the two Sicilies.

VII. The Grand Duchy of Parma.

VIII. The Grand Duchy of Modena.

IX. Placentia in northern Italy (now Piacenza), a Roman colony which preserved its identity until 1805, when Napoleon absorbed it in Tuscany.

X. Lucca, on the river Serchia, also founded by the Romans, and successively a Lombard Duchy A. D. 1327 and a free city A. D. 1370.

Not one of these states could hope alone to arrest the advance of a united foreign foe, such as France under revolutionary influence. A modern division of territory consequent on the French invasion comprised Milan and its surroundings, being a portion of the Austrian Empire at the commencement of war in 1792. Venice, sensible of its own declining power, endeavored to continue its political existence without siding with either party, and was certain thereby in the long run to be overwhelmed by the contending forces of France and Austria.

Pius VI., who reigned at Rome between 1775 and 1800, was the Pope unfortunate enough to have to deal with the French Revolution.

His early Papacy was spent in acts of wise reform, such as that of draining the Pontine marshes, and he is also remembered for having completed the Museum of the Vatican. When Joseph II. attempted to free

the religious orders in Austria from Papal jurisdiction, Pius VI. journeyed to Vienna, and, although honorably received, made no impression on the sanguine Imperial reformer.

Far worse, however, was the position of this Pope when, having consistently opposed the French revolutionary principles, he had to deal with his enemy in the gate.

Pius VI. was an unfortunate Pontiff, having been involved in differences with the Empire of Austria and the French Republic, first during his historic visit to the Emperor Joseph at Vienna when the Pope went to deprecate the threatened reforms and again when Joseph's successor Leopold insisted, in 1792, that the Church should be indemnified by France for the loss of Avignon.

Pius' intrigues against the French proved his ruin in 1797, so that taken across the Alps by Bonaparte, who had made the Pontiff prisoner in Rome, he died there August 29, A. D. 1799.

Tuscany and Genoa were even more defenceless when bereft of Austrian assistance than the states of the Church proved to be when the Imperial standards had been driven out of Lombardy.

And if the famous fable of the bundle of sticks being strong if united, and weak if separated, was plainly exemplified in the Italian Peninsula, still more did it apply to the condition of affairs existing on the Rhine where, under the German Empire, governed theoretically from Ratisbon, the Rhine provinces

were given over to prince-bishops and petty princelings, whose nominal allegiance to the Emperor and inclusion in the Imperial defensive circles was not of a character to enable them thereby to present a bold front to an invader.

Altogether it may be said that the geographical conditions of France rendered the vast revolutionary host brought together for objects of aggression exceptionally dangerous to Europe when the leading nations surrounding the French frontiers were so remarkably divided.

But for the command of the sea, which fell to Great Britain, nothing would have alleviated the cataclysm of invasion which beset Germany and Italy.

And now I have concluded my preliminary task, and endeavored to show how Europe was situated at the time of the French Revolution, and it remains to introduce upon the world's stage those "continental rulers" who exercised their power when the nineteenth century came into being.

## CHAPTER VII.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S YOUTH, AND CAREER  
FROM 1796 TO 1800.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE ; HIS YOUTH AND CAREER FROM LODI, MAY 10TH, A. D. 1796, TO MARENGO, JUNE 14TH, A. D. 1800.— ALSO GENERAL MOREAU'S ACHIEVEMENTS FROM FLANDERS, A. D. 1784, TO THE BATTLE OF HOHENLINDEN, DECEMBER 3RD, A. D. 1800.

THE leading continental ruler of the nineteenth century had scarcely been heard of outside Corsica, when, by means of his friendship with Barras, the young Bonaparte was called on to take his part as commander of artillery in suppressing the Royalist revolt known as that of "the Sections."

The Bonaparte family was of Tuscan origin. It was settled in Corsica in the sixteenth century, at the capital town of Ajaccio. They had an ancient title of nobility from the Genoese Republic, and possessed the right to sign *de Bonaparte*, which they never used. The first syllable of their surname was pronounced *Buo* in Italian. Napoleon Bonaparte's father was Charles Marie Bonaparte, who was born in 1746, and took a law degree at Pisa University in 1769, having married when only eighteen the beauti-

ful Letitia Ramolino, who had attained the tender age of fifteen. Neither position nor means came to Napoleon's father through this marriage.

As all of Charles Marie Bonaparte's children were, in different degrees, continental rulers, I enumerate them here, so that Napoleon's brothers and sisters may appear recorded by the side of the fount and origin of their power and fame.

Thirteen children were born, of whom eight lived, and their names are as follows :

1. Joseph, King of Naples, and afterwards of Spain, born 1768.

2. Napoleon, born August 15, 1769.

3. Lucien.

4. Eliza (Princess Baccioli).

5. Pauline (married first to General Leclerc, afterwards to Prince Borghese).

6. Caroline (wife of Murat), who became Queen of Naples.

7. Louis, King of Holland.

8. Jerome, King of Westphalia.

Although he was a moody, thoughtful child, noted for courage and resolution in tender years, since, as Sir Archibald Alison tells us, he would never cry when corrected, Madame Letitia de Bonaparte did not recognize any marked signs of youthful genius in the future ruler of Europe. It is true that he evinced early in life the possession of political ideas, not usually appertaining to childhood, but then he had witnessed, as a boy of eight, the last struggle for

the independence of Corsica. "I was born when my country was sinking," he wrote to Paoli in 1789; and, reared up in the midst of revolutionary passions, he had the greater ease in preserving the conspicuous self-possession which characterized Napoleon Bonaparte, both in the internal commotions of France and on those battle-fields which he made stepping-stones to fame.

After a few probationary months spent at Autun in learning French, at the very same school to which, strange to say, his future rival, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, likewise came to seek similar instruction, the young Bonaparte, through the influence of Count Marbœuf, Governor of Corsica, gained admission at ten years of age to the military school of Brienne.

This was in April, 1779, and he remained there five years, passing, during 1784, into the School of Paris as a gentleman cadet.

In the next year, 1785, he received a lieutenant's commission, and commenced a soldier's career at Valence. It is remarkable that, in this same year, 1785, Charles de Bonaparte, his father, died, aged thirty-eight, at Montpellier, of the disease destined to be fatal to his world-renowned child.

At Brienne he was considered as "taciturn, fond of solitude, capricious, extremely disposed to egoism," "ambitious, and of boundless aspirations."

Nor did his ability shine pre-eminently enough to excite wonder amongst his associates, although, being



studious, his advance in the studies of mathematics and geography was remarkable.

Of French writers, Rousseau seems to have been the one who exercised most influence over him.

Napoleon Bonaparte underwent an extensive barrack experience between 1785-9, having been quartered from time to time at Valence, Lyons, Douai, Paris, Auxonne, and Seurre. Thus it was that, although comparatively ignorant of French when he joined the service, young Bonaparte had the best possible chance of mastering that language, the ignorance of which had rendered his life so gloomy at Brienne and Paris.

Corsican politics in 1788 represented, on a lesser stage, those in Paris when the States-General were revived.

The island had been wrested by Paoli from the Genoese, but became a dependency of France in 1768, by reason of an arbitrary occupation by the greater nation, which the late Professor Seeley compared to the partition of Poland.

In 1789, Paoli, who had returned from exile, persuaded the people of Corsica to acquiesce in French rule if an adequate autonomy were granted for local purposes; but unfortunately in 1792 the whole question was reopened, and Bonaparte appeared as the advocate of a complete change of administration, which was framed so as to make French influence absolutely pre-eminent, thereby placing himself in antagonism to his friend and youthful hero, the

patriotic Corsican leader, Paoli, who summoned a national consulta, or insular Parliament, wherein the Bonaparte family were charged with sowing the seeds of dissension in the island.

Napoleon retorted by endeavoring to seize the citadel of Ajaccio, but failing, was subjected, in company with all his family, including Madame Letitia, his mother, and Fesch, his uncle, to the fury of the populace, before which the Bonapartes retreated and took ship for France.

Arriving at Toulon in June, 1793, at the moment when the Girondins were losing power and falling wholesale beneath the guillotine as a consequence, Napoleon gave his sympathy and active support to the "Party of the Mountain," so named because their members sat on highly elevated benches in the Convention. The two Robespierres held France in the hollow of their hands, and the younger brother was a friend of Napoleon, who actually commanded the artillery for the Convention in July, 1793, under Carteaux, when that general was attacked by a force from Marseilles led by Rousselet.

All authorities concur in pointing out how close was the intimacy between Napoleon and the younger Robespierre, and how nearly the future Emperor was enticed to Paris, where, under the Reign of Terror, neither his finesse nor his genius would in all probability have saved his head when the Mountain fell, and its chief, Robespierre, went the way of those 4,000 human souls who were launched into eternity

during this particular phase of revolutionary madness, which afflicted the ruling powers in France in the days of the Terror.

According to Marmont, Napoleon disapproved of these proceedings, but nevertheless, conscious of what had happened and was still in progress in Paris during the summer of 1793, he fought for this faction which was misruling so grossly, and had he been called on to state his political views at this period and answered honestly, he must have declared himself a Jacobin.

It was in accordance with the bright star of fortune which directed his footsteps through life, that instead of visiting blood-stained Paris, where he would have been forced to embrace a declining cause and would probably have lost his life, whatever course he had adopted, Napoleon should at this crisis have been chosen to command the artillery at Toulon, which port was in British possession from August 27 to December 19, 1793. Here an opportunity was afforded for displaying his peculiar military intuition by discovering the key of the position and seizing a point at the extremity of Cape l'Eguillette, which separates the two harbors, after which the English fleet abandoned the defence. Napoleon is believed to have said, "Toulon is there," when he pointed to the key of the situation, and in the eyes of military observers his prescience received attention.

It now becomes necessary to show how the rising

reputation of the youthful artillerist, Napoleon Bonaparte, led to his being employed whenever a political crisis arrived which demanded firmness and determination in dealing with it. Such an occasion arose in 1795. The régime of the Mountain had ceased to exist, and a constitution for France of a definite character was under consideration. If a free election could have been held without any fear of the people revenging the Terrorist Reign by reverting to some form of the ancient Monarchy, the triumphant opponents and destroyers of Robespierre would gladly have concurred in such a popular appeal. But it seemed probable that the voice of France freely expressed would at all hazards place on record its abhorrence of the late sanguinary proceedings without reference to parties or dynastic interests. That the Monarchists would have profited had they found their Monk, to give France the opportunity of voting, is as certain as that no particular predilection for the Bourbons themselves animated a majority of the nation.

Under these circumstances a new constitutional expedient was adopted by declaring the existing Convention as the first legislative body under the new régime, whilst this assembly was to be renewed periodically to the extent of one-third at a time.

This led to a revolution of all those who hoped, and hoped reasonably, that, having undergone the heat and labor of the day, they were to reap the political fruits. In the ranks of the "Sections," not

by any means Royalists in entirety, there were many friends of the ancient dynasty. The party owed its strength to the adhesion of numbers amongst the National Guard besides "the richest and most enlightened portion of the population of Paris." One element of strength the Sections did not possess, and that consisted of a powerful artillery such as Barras induced Napoleon Bonaparte to command on this occasion. Overmatched in the most vital military particular, the Sections speedily succumbed before the historic "whiff of grape-shot," and although the real conqueror kept his name in the background, a career was marked out for Napoleon Bonaparte as the successful soldier second in command to Barras on this October 5, 1795. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the same achievement led to Napoleon becoming commander of the army of the interior, involving, as such a post necessarily did, control over the forces in Paris.

These events were followed by Napoleon's marriage with Josephine de Beauharnais, widow of an officer who had suffered death under Robespierre, and whose son had asked Napoleon to obtain for him the sword of his father. Napoleon treating the youth kindly was rewarded by a visit from Josephine herself to express her gratitude.

The engagement which followed was, in the opinion of Napoleon's bitter critic, Lanfrey, the result of a strong affection on the great soldier's part, while Josephine obtained for him that command of the

French Army in Italy which exercised so strong an influence on his fortune.

The reader is now at the threshold of the greatest military career in either the eighteenth or nineteenth century, but before commenting on the campaigns which swiftly succeeded in Italy and Egypt, I desire to lay especial stress on the particular form of constitution which was adopted in France after the defeat of the Sections in 1795. The chief object of the committee appointed by the Convention to draw up a fresh constitution in 1795 was to secure France against the evils which they admitted had sprung since 1792 from the rule of a single Assembly.

No check had been possible when the Convention encouraged the Reign of Terror and allowed a committee of its body to rule France without reference to any laws, whilst the right of appeal did not exist. The object of the creators of a new constitution in 1795 was to separate the legislative functions from those of the executive, and also to render it impossible for any party to destroy its enemies by passing a measure framed for such purpose without having been approved by two independent chambers.

“A chamber of 500 was to submit laws to a council of two hundred and fifty ancients, or men of middle life; but neither of these bodies could exercise any influence upon the actual government,” which was in the hands of “A Directory of five members chosen by the Assemblies, but not responsible to them except under impeachment,” which could only be

valid if it represented the decision of both chambers.

Two-thirds of the Deputies were, however, appointed from the existing Convention, so that it might be impossible to obtain a Royalist majority at the forthcoming election; and this was the proviso which brought about the revolt of the Sections that Napoleon quelled.

But after this event, foreign nations had to deal with the Directorate of Five, whose conduct of Foreign Affairs proved to be of so warlike a character. It is necessary to dwell upon the character of the French Constitution, established in 1795, because it was that which Napoleon was destined to destroy, when the system of government associated with his name first took root, although four eventful years in the history of Europe were to pass before the blow was struck which led to Napoleon becoming First Consul.

Napoleon Bonaparte was twenty-six years of age when he entered on his first Italian Campaign of 1796. Without trenching upon the work of another pen, I find it necessary to recount the facts here, because otherwise the political prescience of the young General would not be realized by my readers. At the moment when the new Constitution, known as Vendémiaire (October 5, 1795), was saved by General Bonaparte's artillery, the Austrian armies under Clerfayt and Wurmser were forcing the French, led by Jourdan and Pichegru, to desist from the inva-

sion of Germany and re-cross the Rhine. It was, however, known to the Directory that, Prussia having withdrawn from the war in April, there was no fear of an irruption into France from that quarter.

General Bonaparte, however, designed a counter-stroke against Austria, whom he hoped to drive out of Italy, when Sardinia and Piedmont, like Prussia, should come to believe that, except for their immediate interests, it was not worth while to encounter the French Armies.

Sardinia had already lost Savoy and Nice, so having made some show of defence as an ally of Austria, she retired from the conflict after two defeats at Ceva and Mondovi, so that on April 5, 1796, a Convention was signed at Cherasco, which placed the chief fortresses of Piedmont in the hands of France, and left General Bonaparte to devote his attention to the conquest of Lombardy, where the Austrians were in the midst of an alien population.

Storming the bridge over the river Adda on the 10th of May at Lodi, the victorious young General entered Milan on the 15th, this being the prelude to a tough struggle for the Fortress of Mantua, to raise the siege of which the victorious Wurmser came from the Rhine, reaching the Tyrol at the end of June with 50,000 men. But the contest was destined to be of a desperate and determined character on both sides, although General Bonaparte's genius and lucky star combined ultimately prevailed.

It was after the surprise of Arcola failed, in No-



vember, 1796, and Bonaparte was delivered from what seemed certain defeat, and found himself victorious, that the future Emperor learnt to have a supreme belief in his own fortune. The year 1797 saw the defeat of General Alvinzi at Rivoli on the 14th January, succeeded by the surrender of Mantua.

A pause in the war between France and Austria then enabled Bonaparte to deal with the Pope Pius VI., whose territories he invaded, conquering decisively the first army opposed to him and capturing the second.

The Treaty of Tolentino of February 19, A.D. 1797, while it stripped the Papacy of Avignon, the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, the Romagna and Ancona, yet acknowledged in principle the temporal power of the Pope, a policy popular amongst the increasing number of devout Catholic worshippers in France. Bonaparte then pressed forward through the Tyrol with a united and reinforced army, which drove back the Austrians under the Archduke Charles until they were near to Vienna, so that in April, 1797, the preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben, being followed in October by the definitive treaty of Campo-Formio, which is famous for giving effect to the partition of the ancient Republic of Venice, a transaction equally flagitious with that which had destroyed Poland two years previously.

But for the possession of the Venetian district within Italy, Austria could no longer claim territory in that land of sunshine and beauty.

England was left in October, 1797, after the treaty of Campo-Formio, without any ally but Portugal, but was no longer precluded from making peace because Austria had not acquiesced in the negotiations.

How heartily desirous Mr. Pitt was to put an end to the conflict with France, the negotiations between Lord Malmesbury and the French Directory prove, both in 1796 and 1797. On the latter occasion the hopes of peace were shattered by a coup d'état on September 4 in Paris, when a majority of the Directory sent troops to surround and disperse the two legislative councils, sending forty-two members of one chamber and eleven of another to Cayenne or French Guiana, forty-two editors of journals and about one hundred and eighty priests sharing this fate. Moreover, the elections were annulled in forty-eight departments.

Carnot and Barthélemy were the two directors against whom this savage policy was aimed.

Although Napoleon silently acquiesced in the change thus brought about, he took, if Lanfrey is to be credited, no active interest in the coup d'état at Paris. Indeed, at the precise moment of action, he had not returned from Italy. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that he benefited from the new order of things, while doubtless expecting so to do. How imminent was the danger of a Royalist Restoration cannot be now discovered; but it is a fact that General Pichegru had been elevated to the Chair of the 500, and his proclivities were well known.

Anyhow, the outcome of these changes was of a warlike character, such as for the next two years the Directory elected to embrace.

Despite the fact that England was prepared to admit the claims of France to annex Holland in a definitive treaty, the war was pursued inexorably with the island neighbor, destined to strike the last blows in the cause of European liberty.

The Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, September 4, 1797, was so far the commencement of a new order of things in France that, after a short sojourn in Paris, Napoleon felt himself strong enough to turn his mind towards Egypt and the East, there to combat England, who had been refused a reasonable peace at the hands of the Directory. Generals Augereau and Hoche, the Republican generals, compromised themselves in the attack on the members of the directorate to such a degree that no danger to the Napoleonic schemes of future Consular or Imperial sway could be apprehended at their initiative, the current of events being turned into a different channel by these soldiers of the Revolution themselves. How Napoleon's studies at the Louvre in ancient Egyptian history, which are said to have fired his imagination and led to his undertaking an expedition to that romantic country, were not accompanied by the common sense which should have calculated the strength of the rival navies of France and England more accurately, will forever be a source of wonder to mankind.

He seems not to have considered Nelson and his fleet as likely to determine the fate of his expedition if he met it at sea, a contingency which so nearly occurred on the night of the 22d of June, 1798, that the French and English ships crossed each other's track. However, Napoleon's seizure of Malta and his landing in Egypt early in July were succeeded by the Battle of the Nile, August 1, which rendered 1798 a year when English supremacy at sea in the Mediterranean was attained, not to be again surrendered.

Napoleon's situation, despite his brilliant strokes of military genius at the Pyramids and around Cairo, then became a desperate one, and all his skill in trumpeting forth those victories was needed to obscure the real truth from the French nation.

The loss of the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile was practically complete, as two ships of the line and two frigates alone escaped out of the seventeen sail which Nelson discovered in the Bay of Aboukir on August 1, 1798, so that Napoleon's return to France must necessarily have been of a surreptitious character. Moreover, when he essayed to attack the Turks in Syria, command of the sea was possessed by the English during the siege of St. Jean d'Acre and other operations on the coast.

It is just to the French nation, of whom Napoleon stands as the representative between 1799-1815, to say that the Expedition to Egypt was devised for the purpose of succoring the interests of France in India, which, although languishing, still existed in a

diminished form. The owner of Egypt necessarily commanded one, if not even then the shortest, route to Hindustan, and Napoleon recognized this fact when he accepted the invitation of the Directory to take an army, under 40,000 in number, to that romantic land which has proved to be the prize of supremacy in the Mediterranean.

Nelson's great naval victory over Admiral Brueys, who perished when his magnificent three-decker *L'Orient* was destroyed by fire, was certainly the naval engagement which exercised most influence over contemporary politics during the eighteenth century. France had no reason to be ashamed of her children when that sad day for her gallant marine closed, if devotedness and bravery are to be accounted virtues, but the result was to leave Napoleon under the necessity of making swift and repeated successes on land or covering an uncertain retreat by magnifying those that had passed under a halo of exalted patriotic phrases. It would have been well for his reputation if this latter policy had been adopted before he conceived the idea of raising Asia Minor against Sultan Selim, a venture which resulted disastrously for France, inasmuch as the Christians of Armenia and the Lebanon remained quiescent, whilst Napoleon at Jaffa was constrained to destroy two thousand Moslem prisoners in cold blood, whom being unable to guard or feed he must otherwise have liberated.

The English fleet having saved St. Jean d'Acre

from capture, and the campaign in Syria having proved abortive, it was small satisfaction to cover a sensational voyage back to France, via Corsica and Fréjus, by high-sounding bulletins of victories over the already disintegrated Egyptian forces.

The emotion and delight evinced in France when Bonaparte returned from Egypt in October, 1799, were, at the period named, universal, and he seems to have been looked on as a fascinating character by a majority of his countrymen. The darker side of the general's nature was obscured by reflection upon the necessity which existed in France for government by some strong man. Moreover, his personal appearance, as well known to posterity as to his own contemporaries, conspired to increase the fervor of devotion felt for this extraordinary individual.

During his absence in Egypt the French arms had not been successful against the military combination between the Austrians and Russians, the latter led by their famous General Suwarrow. Indeed, Russian troops had passed victoriously alike through the passes of Switzerland and the plains of Lombardy.

Men felt that a unity of design in conduct of the war was lacking, and forgetting the failure in Egypt to accomplish any solid conquest, as well as the loss of the French fleet at the Nile, hailed Napoleon as a deliverer, when after the coup d'état, known as Brumaire, which was accomplished on the 9th November, 1799, a new constitution was prepared by Sieyès, by which the Executive power was entrusted to three

Consuls, of whom Napoleon Bonaparte was chosen to take the title of "First." Henceforth, known by the title of "First Consul," the step to Imperial dignity became only a question of time. For as France could only be governed by a soldier under the new régime just initiated, and no other reputation amongst generals destined to survive or reside in France approached his own, the evidence he had given of great constructive and administrative ability decided the matter in the minds of Napoleon's countrymen, who gladly responded to the appeals made to them from time to time in his behalf. Moreau and Masséna, who alone at this time could claim to possess European celebrity amongst Napoleon's French military contemporaries, did not place themselves forward as rivals to him at the fall of the Directorate, which was a movement made in the interests of the army, and indeed Moreau had thrown his influence into the balance when a military revolution was proposed, and commanded the troops which surrounded the Luxembourg, where the two remaining directors were living when arrested on November 9, 1799, the date famous in French history as "Brumaire."

Not even the histrionic mistake of Napoleon when he entered the Chamber of Five Hundred, escorted by armed grenadiers, proved fatal to his cause in that hostile assembly, which, captivated by his brother Lucien's eloquence, allowed their members to be driven from the Hall of St. Cloud, where the assemblies had been called together according to a con-

stitutional proviso made when the Directorate was first formed.

The most dramatic of all Napoleon's campaigns was undoubtedly that of May, 1800, when the First Consul of France crossed the Alps and descending on the rear of Melas, the Austrian general in Italy, fought the battle of Marengo, which, when apparently lost beyond hope, was won decisively by a cavalry charge of the younger Kellermann's ordered by Desaix, who declared that a battle lost might become a battle won.

Indeed, the immediate effect of this engagement was unparalleled, inasmuch as an armistice was brought about when all the Italian fortresses, west of the Mincio, had been surrendered by the Austrians. Although "the most brilliant in conception of all Napoleon's triumphs," the results of Marengo were scarcely of such a determining character eventually as those which followed Moreau's crushing defeat of the Austrians on December 3, 1800, in the Forest of Hohenlinden in Bavaria, so well known to the readers of Campbell's poems, but yet not so celebrated in popular history as the better advertised successes of the First Consul in Italy.

But it certainly was remarkable that, at the zenith of his youthful and most seductive military triumphs, the future conqueror of Europe should find a military leader amongst his own countrymen, who competed not disadvantageously with himself in the path of glory, as Frenchmen understood it.



Jean Victor Moreau was born at Morlaix in 1763, being six years Napoleon's senior. Though entered at the law, he early abandoned those studies and enlisted before he was eighteen, his father procuring his speedy discharge to the great vexation of the future general.

However, the Revolution gave him the needed opportunity, and he became commander of the first battalion of volunteers raised in the department of Morbihan, at the head of which he joined the Army of the North.

It was here that, having greatly distinguished himself, he became the friend of Pichegru, under whom he served, and in 1794, being made a General of Division, was entrusted with the command of a separate force in Flanders, where he took several strong places and established the reputation which led to his being selected to command on the Rhine in 1796, where his skilful retreat from Germany before the victorious army of the Archduke Charles of Austria further strengthened the prestige of his name.

Had Hohenlinden been fought and won previously to Marengo, it is doubtful whether the First Consul would not have found a lion in his path which he could not remove; but it is not the intention of the present writer to enter into the controversy between Napoleon Bonaparte and Moreau.

In his public utterances the First Consul was constrained to admit the admirable character of his adversary's dispositions previous to Hohenlinden, and

with privately reported criticisms I have nothing to do.

The fact remains that in the Forest of Hohenlinden the Austrian army was completely wrecked, being surrounded on all sides when the roads were choked by snow.

Thunderstruck by such a disaster, the Imperialist forces retired behind the Inn, and Vienna was so gravely endangered that the Austrians were induced to agree to peace without reference to her faithful ally, Great Britain.

These results give Moreau a high place in the list of great captains in European nineteenth century history, and he may therefore be considered one of the continental rulers.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA, 1801.

DEATH OF FREDERICK WILLIAM II. OF PRUSSIA ; ACCESSION OF FREDERICK WILLIAM III. AND ASSASSINATION OF THE CZAR PAUL.—ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER I. TO THE THRONE OF MUSCOVY.—PRINCE ADAM CZARTORYSKI, FOREIGN MINISTER OF RUSSIA.

IN Prussia there was a new king when the dead century, marking the completion of one thousand eight hundred years since the Christian Era, had run its course. Frederick William II., nephew of Frederick the Great, had given place, A. D. 1797, to the young sovereign, Frederick William III., who had learnt his lessons of military rule and government at the hands of his great uncle.

The defunct sovereign had had to fill a difficult position both as successor to Frederick the Great and also as the Prussian sovereign destined to cope with the Revolutionary storms which rolled across Europe between 1789–97. He was of an easy-going nature, fond of pleasure, his court degenerating to a moral level comparable to that of Charles II. of England ; and he did not possess the capacity for hard work necessary when great results were to be hoped

for from the deliberations of cabinet or council. Until he demonstrated his personal courage in the war of the Bavarian Succession, in 1778, the Great Frederick would take no notice of him. When he became king, Frederick William II. endeavored to lighten the burdens of his people as regards taxation, and encouraged trade. But he was too much under the influence of favorites, and two leading decisions of his are said to have been made without the concurrence of Heinitz, Herzberg and other statesmen best able to assist their royal master.

One of these occurred during the conflict in Holland when in 1788 the Stadtholder was dispossessed at the expense of Austrian influence in the Low Countries ; and another when in 1792 he associated himself with the Emperor in war against revolutionary France.

The separate peace which Frederick William II. concluded in 1795 gained for Prussia her share of the final partition of Poland and added to the territories of that kingdom.

He did not live to discover the full force of the Napoleonic designs, nor does he seem to have suspected either the breadth or character of those dangers which threatened his country when France entered on a war of revolutionary aggression. Doubtless the fact that Frederick William the Second's two previous interventions in the affairs of Holland and France proved so unpropitious, precluded a fair consideration of the situation in the later aspects which it pre-

sented. He died on the 16th of November 1797. Of his son and successor, Frederick William III., the history of Prussia and Europe speaks for forty-three years and he takes his place amongst the worthies of Hohenzollern story.

The devoted and charming Queen Louisa, daughter of the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, to whom Frederick was allied in 1793, not only unflinchingly shared her husband's shifting fortunes, but ennobled disaster by her courage and patriotism. The loftier impulses of this noble personage powerfully influenced the slower intelligence of her worthy consort.

Unlike his father, Frederick William III. did take counsel from accredited and trained ministers, and even if one could wish that the policy of Count Haugwitz might have been put aside for that of Heinitz, Herzberg and others holding closer to the views and ideas of the great Frederick's day, there was undoubtedly a great deal to be said for the course of husbanding resources and adopting rigid non-intervention when other countries were subjected to the ravages of war. The concession of territory, however, on the left bank of the Rhine which was made to Napoleon at the Treaty of Luneville in 1801 seems, by the light of all experience, so adverse to the interests of Prussia and Germany that there is little wonder a train of evils should have followed in its course.

“Frederick William III.,” says Professor Seeley, “though he committed great errors for which he was

mercilessly punished, assuredly deserves our esteem, and, if ever sovereign did, our pity."

Despite a bad education and evil social surroundings he had grown up uncorrupted; favourites reigned no more; by the King's side stood a young Queen, "fascinating and virtuous, the idol of the Prussian nation." The sovereign himself, generally taciturn, and when giving utterance honest and homely, could not, on the other hand, in truth, be said to have possessed necessary decision of character at the moment when Prussia needed a first-class mind to guide her destiny.

Indeed the neutrality deprecated by Frederick William II., which that king submitted to but never approved, was raised to the level of a dogma during the early days of Frederick William III.

That it led to the ruin of Prussia can scarcely be denied. It has generally been admitted that the joint policy attributed to Haugwitz, the Foreign Minister, and Lombard, a Diplomatist much employed by Frederick William III., was the source of this heresy which dominated these peoples and nations of Northern Germany; but it should nevertheless be remembered that some penalty must of necessity be paid by a military State whose resources were stretched and strained to sustain itself amongst stronger European nations, yet which resolutely declined to make a firm alliance with any of them.

In Russia, Paul, son of Catherine the great empress, had ascended the throne in 1796 at the age of forty-two. Not permitted by his august parent, who

treated him harshly and condemned him to a life of solitude, to take any part in acts of government during her reign, he relied at first a good deal on the advice of his ministers, Rostopchin and Arakcheef.

In 1798 Paul was appointed Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, and, alarmed at the minatory advances of the French Republic, joined England, Austria, Naples and Turkey in a coalition against that nation, and hence occurred the campaigns in Italy and Switzerland under Suwarrow, to which allusions have already been made.

When still in a state of total inexperience the Czar had set free the Polish patriot, Kosciusko, and had performed other generous actions; he thus aroused hopes in the minds of his subjects as to the future of the reign, which were by no means to be realized.

1800 had not passed before Paul, distrusting Austria and jealous of the trade and sea-power of England, entered into an agreement with General Bonaparte whereby a crusade should be made against British commerce, both vessels and goods being seized which happened to be in Russian ports. The French and Russians also engaged themselves to make a raid upon India, a project said to have been initiated by Peter the Great, which has haunted the St. Petersburg War Office throughout the nineteenth century.

The English had denied the right of neutrals to

carry warlike stores, and resolved to utilize their naval strength to preserve the privileges inherent to a command of the sea.

The points at issue between Great Britain on the one hand and *France, Russia, Sweden, Denmark*, and, for a short period, *Prussia* on the other, were these, as clearly summarized in Fyffe's *Modern Europe*: "Great Britain claimed the right to seize all French property in whatever vessel it might be sailing, and to confiscate as contraband of war not only muskets, gunpowder and cannon, but wheat, on which the provisioning of armies depended, as well as hemp, pitch, iron and timber," without which ships of war could neither be built nor repaired.

"The neutrals on the other hand demanded that a neutral flag should give safe passage to all goods on board, not being contraband of war;" "and that contraband of war should include no other stores than those directly available for battle."

England treated this declaration of armed neutrality as a declaration of war by the allies of France, and seventeen ships of the line, under Sir Hyde Parker and Nelson, sailed from Yarmouth for Copenhagen and the Sound on the 12th of March, A. D. 1801. To reach Copenhagen the fire of the Swedish batteries commanding the Sound had to be faced, but no fire was opened on the British fleet from that quarter and, despite the full weight of the artillery at Elsinore being poured on Nelson's ships when passing through the eastern side of the Channel, the



famous English admiral appeared before Copenhagen on March 30th, A. D. 1801, at midday.

On April 2 the six Danish men-of-war and all the floating batteries were destroyed, Nelson neglecting Admiral Parker's signal to retire. A truce and subsequent armistice of fourteen weeks followed, Nelson believing that the latter period was sufficient for him to deal with the Swedish and Russian fleets in like fashion to that which he had adopted at Copenhagen.

But the opportunity for testing this calculation of the British admiral never arose, inasmuch as on the night of March 23d Paul, Emperor of Russia, was murdered by confederates of Count Pahlen, who, placing an officer's sash around the Czar's neck, suffocated their sovereign. It is said that he mistook one of the assassins for his second son, and the last words Paul uttered were: "You, too, my Constantine!" As a matter of fact, Alexander, the future Czar, and Constantine were weeping bitterly in an adjoining room and beseeching Count Pahlen to spare their father's life. The Russian Court and the oligarchy that governed the Muscovite Empire had revolted against Paul's eccentric methods, and there is no doubt that latterly his mind was distraught. He left his mark on Russian procedure as regards the Succession, inasmuch as by an imperial edict all living male heirs, even of previous generations, were to be preferred to those of female sex nearest to the throne, though no Salic law prevailed in Russia excluding women, as such.

The defeat of the Danes had been preceded a month previously in Great Britain by the resignation of Mr. Pitt, who, Prime Minister for 17 years, gave place to Mr. Addington. The portents seemed to point towards an arrangement of differences between France and England, such as took effect a year later at Amiens, March 25, A. D. 1802. The tendency to admit Great Britain as supreme at sea was evinced by the suspension of French claims to Egypt, while all attempts to drive the French out of Holland were temporarily abandoned.

The time is approaching when, following the plan of this volume, it will become necessary to illustrate by biographical treatment the personal side of the military despotism in Paris which, after Brumaire, reigned supreme, but the ground must be previously cleared as regards Europe.

British supremacy in the Mediterranean, rendered absolute by later events consequent on the Battle of the Nile, influenced the struggle in Egypt so completely that Kléber and Menon's efforts to sustain the French position were foiled in June, A. D. 1801.

This result was brought about in a great degree by the prescience and bravery of Sir Ralph Abercromby, but a moral strength had accrued to the British, who knew that Lord Wellesley, Viceroy of India, had despatched an Anglo-Indian contingent under General Baird.

The dusky children of Hindustan were not again sent to succor their English compatriots and coad-

jutors within a sphere of action outside the Indian Empire, until Lord Beaconsfield despatched a similar expedition to Malta in 1878, when Russia had threatened to take Constantinople.

But by far the most important event in Europe was the accession in Russia of Alexander I. Alexander I., Paul's eldest son, was born December 22, 1777. His life commenced more happily than that of his father, whose childhood had been spent amidst harsh surroundings, something akin to captivity, and it is to Paul's credit that he gained the affection of his family. Alexander was two years older than his brother Constantine, with whom he was brought up, and nineteen years older than Nicholas, his successor, who was a child of five when Paul met a violent death by assassination. In March, 1801, Alexander was crowned at Moscow, when a ukase was issued alleviating taxation and evincing a merciful tendency in administration extending to the manner of recruiting for the army, which rendered the main arm of Russia so much the stronger; while the customary leniency at the accession of a Czar towards prisoners who were not guilty of political crimes was not absent, debtors being in most cases released from prison, and so given the better chance of discharging their dues, while even desertion from the army was not treated as inexpiable. This young Prince at twenty-four years of age entered on his great inheritance with hopes of the highest character founded on a natural tendency to philanthropy, which early dis-

tinguished his actions and determined the choice of friends and advisers.

No limit seemed to be set to the schemes for benefiting humanity, which were not to be hindered by the bureaucratic traditions of Russian officialism.

Thus in company with his Polish coadjutor in conduct of foreign affairs, Count Adam Czartoryski, an attempt was made to bring about a new era of enlightened rule throughout Russia. Banishing Pahlen, the murderer of his father, to Siberia, on the ground of impetuous conduct contemptuous of western methods of government, and incompatible with the opinions the young Czar and his ministers sought to propagate, Alexander entrusted the Russian state to the care of three or four young men about his own age, of whom Prince Czartoryski was the most influential, M. de Strogonoff and M. Nowosiltzoff possessed at least an equal administrative grasp of affairs. But the danger to foreign states, attracted by the ideals placed so prominently forward in the earlier part of this reign, would obviously consist in believing that Russia condemned Catherine's opposition to the French Revolution, which should have been welcomed rather than restrained, while the partition of Poland had been an outrage, and that thenceforth Russia was bent on a different mission, protecting the weak and curbing the strong, and while intervening from time to time in the struggle prevailing between England and France to persuade, and if necessary force, both of

these contending powers to consider the needs and interests of other nations in any settlement that might be attained.

While believing that the Emperor Alexander I. did his duty to Russia and Europe very nobly during the Napoleonic wars, it is easy to trace the one weakness which from time to time caused his well-considered purposes to be temporarily broken and his judgment deflected, in that tendency to vanity which his country's foes, perceiving, were not slow to avail themselves of.

Moreover, it has been a misfortune to the Polish spirit of nationalism that reasonable hopes of self-government have been rendered from time to time futile by such advocacy of their claims as that of Alexander I. In the very nature of the government he administered was to be found the cause of the certain denial of their aspirations and the extinction of Poland's very name when their patriots produced the qualified promises and halting pledges which, given and suggested during crucial moments in Russia's nineteenth-century story, find a counterpart in the illusory constitution promised to Finland in 1809.

The conduct of Alexander I. in relation to other powers in Europe will be better understood if the objects and aims of those with whom he was associated in governing Russia until after the Treaty of Tilsit A. D. 1807 are thus clearly stated, and their tendency emphasized at the outset.

Prince Czartoryski had spent his early years in

Great Britain and been educated at Edinburgh University, so his predilections for free government are accounted for. His whole existence was devoted to endeavoring to retain Polish national autonomy within the iron confines of Russia, and, born in A. D. 1770, he lived to see the cause he existed to nurture patronized by two Napoleons ruling France; by Napoleon I. actively, as the course of this story shows, and by Napoleon III. sympathetically, just when the Russian statesman died at Paris in A. D. 1861, aged ninety-one.

Although once a continental ruler by reason of his guidance of Russia in the reign of Alexander I., he tried for an ideal it seemed cruel to encourage, however noble the spirit of patriotism animating its adherents.

Very strongly did Prince Czartoryski's early patriotic belief influence the course of that story I am in the course of narrating.

M. de Nowosiltz, Alexander's Minister of Finance, made himself celebrated by negotiating the coalition of 1805 with Mr. Pitt.

## CHAPTER IX.

## GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN RULERS.

FRANCIS II. OF GERMANY AND FIRST EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.—THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES.—COUNT THUGUT.—AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR AND PRINCE CLEMENT METTERNICH, HER RISING DIPLOMATIST.

THE men who stood by the side of the Emperor Francis during the earlier struggles for European liberty possess an interest which justifies their particular mention in a roll of the European rulers in the nineteenth century, while the sources of strength in the Austro-Hungarian kingdom bear directly on the condition of Europe, whose interests have again and again been defended from Vienna during the nineteenth century.

The Emperor himself, while not aspiring to genius, displayed a tenacity during the development of national dangers which atones for any subsequent inability to perceive where reforms became necessary in order to stave off revolution.

Born in 1768, he had succeeded, as has been said, his father, Leopold II., in 1792; and when Napoleon's authority as First Consul had obscured that of the defunct Directorate and he had won Marengo

in person, as well as Hohenlinden by means of Moreau's skill, the Austrian ruler could only take refuge in that peace of Luneville, the results of which are recorded in a former chapter. But if defeated, Austria was not unduly humiliated, owing to the finesse of her famous diplomatists, which always has secured the best terms for the valiant soldiery who, fighting gladly, are ready to die whenever the interests of the dual kingdom—Austria-Hungary—are at stake.

It must be remembered that before the peace of Luneville the French armies were assumed by large populations in all parts of Europe, Austria not excepted, to be the messengers of freedom, bringing a new life to the poor and neglected.

But the methods which the French armies had found it necessary to use in prosecuting their triumphant campaigns had disillusioned these dreamers of dreams.

Moreau's army for instance levied in a few months requisitions equal to £800,000 in English money, the localities being overwhelmed by such exactions.

In the words of Sir Archibald Alison, "Requisitions and taxes, merciless requisitions, grievous taxes, had been found to follow rapidly in the footsteps of these alluring Republican expressions" and promises of deliverance.

Perhaps the discovery of the inexorable character of warfare under the French commanders led the Austrian nation to rally more unitedly around its



sovereign in the stress of peril and in times of military disaster. Nor was this noble nation served by inferior advisers. Possibly shining more in the council chamber even than the field, inasmuch as again and again was the situation saved by the advice of a Thugut, a Cobenzel or a Metternich, yet the brave legions and incomparable cavalry so grandly officered were directed by at least one master mind.

The position of the Archduke Charles amongst European captains will doubtless be decided in this series by another pen than mine. His greatest military achievement dates from 1796, when, at twenty-five years old, he drove the French out of Germany, defeating successively Jourdan at Teiningen and Moreau at Rastadt.

Wrestling successfully, in 1799, with his old opponent Jourdan in Swabia and checking Masséna in Switzerland, the Archduke Charles had at this period of my narrative established the reputation of being one of the most able and prominent of European generals.

Opposed to Moreau when that commander was advancing on Vienna after Hohenlinden, the Archduke concurred in that armistice which proved to be the preliminary step to the treaty of Luneville. Not always trusted by the government at Vienna, he was called on to stand aside and act as a mere spectator during several of the most acute crises which threatened the Empire, while impaired health conspired with causes of the above-named description to sub-

ordinate the Archduke Charles as a soldier to his great rival, Napoleon.

It would be a matter of opinion whether or not he or Moreau could claim supremacy in their profession of arms.

Prominent amongst Austrian diplomatists up to the peace of Luneville (February 9, A. D. 1801) stands the name of Thugut. Born in 1734, he was a trusted agent of Maria Theresa, and in that capacity came into contact with Frederick the Great when striving to avert a war for Bavaria.

Thugut, following the opinions of Kaunitz, viewed the Prussian alliance with Austria for the purpose of checking the French Revolution with manifest disfavor.

His main object seems to have been, through all the varying phases of his career, to acquire territory for Austria, and his hand can be plainly seen in all the negotiations between 1792-9.

Although their objects were not identical, Thugut had been able to work smoothly with Mr. Pitt, from whom he obtained, in 1795, the subsidy which enabled Austria, as Great Britain's ally, to continue the war when Prussia had retired from the conflict.

Throughout all the campaigns with France, frequently so destructive to the Austrians, Thugut maintained an immovable front to the foe, and so animated those around him. After Hohenlinden, however, further immediate resistance becoming impossible, he was driven from office by means of

French influence, so that the Emperor Francis II. thereby lost the active services of one of the most notable and distinguished sons of Austria. The second year of the nineteenth century saw the young Prince Clement de Metternich established when only twenty-nine years old as Secretary of the Austrian Legation in Russia, and from that moment his rise was destined to be as continuous as his services proved paramount to his country. Born at Coblenz, A. D. 1773, and educated at Strasburg, he early acquired information regarding public affairs by travels in Germany, Holland and Great Britain. Prince Metternich soon afterwards entered the diplomatic service, and acted as Secretary to the Congress of Rastadt, A. D. 1799, where his abilities first attracted special notice and led to his being appointed to the above-named Embassy at St. Petersburg in 1802; in 1803 he became Austrian Ambassador at Dresden, and at Berlin in 1805.

The course of these official duties together with other diplomatic services will necessarily find prominent mention in these pages. After Thugut's retirement in 1801, Cobenzel was the minister who exercised most influence in Austria until Stadion, a statesman of the old-fashioned conservative type, appeared on the scene previous to the war of 1809.

Although not a rich country in comparison to France or England, the mineral resources of Austria are considerable, coal, iron and copper being found in Bohemia and Styria. It is, however, not to be said

of Austria, as of France, that it is a self-contained nation, producing within its confines all that man needs for sustenance.

Agriculture is the leading interest of the Emperor-King's dominions, furnishing employment to numbers of the population, while the dual kingdom boasts of extensive forests, and a great export of timber forms one of the national assets.

At the Peace of Luneville the public debt of Austria stood at one hundred and twenty-two millions in British money, her territory comprising 254,000 square miles. She now entered on a brief period of peace, which she used under the Archduke Charles's able guidance in repairing the losses incurred by her much tried armies, and generally consolidating the resources of the Empire.

Whence those stolid battalions and unsurpassed horsemen have been constantly drawn, has seemed a marvel to the onlooker, as well as a puzzle to the historian.

In 1801, with an income of about twenty-five million sovereigns, Austria maintained an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Drawn from so varied a population, including denizens of mountain districts, as well as of rich agricultural plains, the Austrian army, says Sir Archibald Alison, "possesses within itself, if properly directed, the elements of almost every species of military virtue."

The unconquerable energy of the Hungarians vied

in Austria with the skill of the Tyrolean Riflemen, to support the rank and file taken from German and Bohemian sources.

The army was recruited during the Napoleonic wars by a system of ballot for conscription, while so patriotic was the spirit evinced whenever the Emperor called on his subjects that Francis II., in the midst of his greatest embarrassments, never failed to obtain by voluntary enrolment the required number of recruits for public service.

But this spirit of self-sacrifice never could have brought Austria into the military prominence the wars of the 19th century claim for her in Europe, but for the possession of a breed of horses that enabled her to mount the cavalry which again and again had saved her armies from defeat and sometimes from destruction, so that among the time-honored institutions of the country must be reckoned the stud farms which existed in Transylvania when Napoleon attempted to dominate completely all the nations of Europe.

The religious wars of the seventeenth century had left no abiding change in the faith of Austria, which remained Roman Catholic, the reformation principles gaining no permanent foothold amongst the various groups of nationalities which comprised the dual kingdom; the ruler of which had been for centuries elected "Emperor."

Whether the mutual distrust of Prussia and Austria, so prominent previous to the Revolutionary

wars, had its origin in a religious character, it is difficult to decide, but when once the liberties of Europe were held to be endangered no such consideration animated the advisers of the Emperor Francis.

The Treaty of Luneville made the Rhine, so far as the Dutch territories, the boundary of France and diminished Austrian influence within the states of the German Empire, but it left the Emperor Francis's territories in Venetia and the Tyrol untouched.

## CHAPTER X.

### FROM THE CONSULATE TO THE EMPIRE.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—SIEYÈS.—MOREAU.—CAMBACÉRÈS.  
—SAVARY.—FOUCHÉ.—TALLEYRAND.—THE MURDER OF THE  
DUC D'ENGHEN.

It has been the object of the writer to describe in bare outline the events of the French Revolution, in order that the reader may have discovered the need for some new governing system which should possess the authority of the Ancien Régime, and yet adapt itself to the national sentiments aroused in France by the Revolution. Moreover, the absolute necessity for some such reconstruction of society, involving order and obedience to settled government, must be apparent to any careful student of the epoch in question.

The result has been that two different schools of thought have arisen dealing with this period—one that elevated Napoleon, bent on establishing autocracy at all hazards, to the height of a deity, as well as his conspicuous followers and coadjutors to that of angels; and another represented by Lanfrey, whose criticisms have been directed against what,

after pitiless dissection, he assumes to be one of the worst composite governments in history, directed by one of the most unscrupulous of men. Now, however justifiable this latter view may be as an abstract deduction made without reference to what had occurred between 1789 and November 9, 1799 (known in revolutionary history as the 18th Brumaire, the date when a military government deposed the Directorate), it is at least necessary to remember what the condition of France had become owing to the overthrow of her institutions and the destruction of her social system.

In 1799 it had been decided in France practically to re-establish some sort of monarchy, or to acknowledge that the 18th Brumaire with its military concomitants was to be given a trial by the French people.

The joint consulship—Napoleon, Sieyès and Roger Ducos—formed the initial compromise between these two eventualities.

Talleyrand in his memoirs points out with great force, when foreign minister to these originally appointed consuls in November, 1799, that although some form of monarchical government had become desirable if society was to be re-constituted on a sound basis, yet "re-establishing monarchy did not mean raising the ancient throne again." In Talleyrand's opinion the execution of Louis XVI. had so far fulfilled the purpose of those who brought about his death, as to render the immediate succession of



any Bourbon Prince to the sceptre of St. Louis an unattainable object.

There are, as Talleyrand pointed out, three degrees or forms of monarchy, "the elective for a time," "the elective for life," and "the hereditary," and to reach the third of these regal attributes in France at the end of the 18th century without "passing successively by the two others, unless the nation were in the power of foreign forces, was a thing absolutely impossible."

Such being the official conception of the practical minister directing the external affairs of France at the institution of the consulate A. D. 1799, it will not be so difficult, having mastered the facts of his previous career, to see how Napoleon Bonaparte was destined to pass from one of these stages successively to another. But it is nevertheless remarkable that according to the astute Talleyrand's view, held at this crucial moment in French modern history, there might nevertheless be an opening some day for the House of Bourbon if it so happened "that he who was to occupy the throne proved himself unworthy and deserved to lose it."

In 1799 the dominant statesmen in France believed that in order to reconstitute society, torn into unrecognizable fragments by successive shocks of revolutionary disturbance, it was, to use Talleyrand's words once more, "necessary to make a temporary sovereign who might become ruler for life, and eventually monarch." The question was not whether Napoleon Bonaparte had the qualities most

desirable in a monarch ; he had unquestionably those which were indispensable to accustom France again to monarchical discipline, as she was still infatuated with every revolutionary doctrine ; and no one else possessed those qualities in the same degree as he did.

I have transcribed Talleyrand's words because thereby the case for the Napoleonic domination, which was destined to become paramount for over a decade in France, is stated from official sources ; and it will now become necessary to show what were the two discordant elements which were from time to time certain to be opposed to such doctrines, but which from their own incompatibility, both of design and sentiment, could not combine, and so left Napoleon's supremacy—despite his manifold errors and iniquities—still practically secure. I allude, of course, first to the Royalists who acknowledged Louis XVIII., known as Count de Provence, as king, and secondly to the still powerful Republican sentiment which survived the Convention and the Directory, and which was, generally speaking, represented by the ideas of Sieyès in the Consulship and by Moreau in the Camp.

Napoleon, who, on Talleyrand's advice, had kept the threads of foreign affairs in his own hands from the first moment of his appointment to coadjutorship with his two colleagues, made a prompt expression of his desire to seek reconciliation with the King of England and the Emperor of Austria at the close of the year A. D. 1799 ; but it necessarily followed that these

two sovereigns and tried allies, actuated by a common desire to see the Bourbon throne restored in France, and questioning the stability of a new rule based on military domination, replied through their respective Foreign Ministers, Lord Grenville and Count Thugut, by a rejection of the propositions of the First Consul.

And this I mention here to show how the ideas which conspired to bring about the Empire in France were, previous at least to the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, understood in that country, and there alone. There can, however, be no manner of doubt that some of the domestic actions of Napoleon after the Peace of Amiens were of a character which, had they been committed in the early days of the Consulate, would very likely have precluded those successive advances towards the goal of imperial power which was ever before his eyes. But of the glory which had accrued to France there can be no question. Indeed, it may be said without the least exaggeration that outside Egypt the arms of France had prospered wherever the tricolor had appeared, and it is worthy of note that this state of affairs had been brought about in less than two years and a half, that is from the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 9, 1799) to March 25, 1802, when Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte signed the treaty of peace between England and France at Amiens.

Napoleon, while attending to Foreign Affairs, had not forgotten domestic reform. Skilfully re-estab-

lishing order in the finances, restoring to ministers of religion the honor which the Revolution had contemptuously permitted to lapse, and wisely no longer proscribing either Jacobins or Emigrés who were prepared to obey the laws, he allowed many of the latter class to re-enter France. At this moment, and in some degree as a consequence of such a liberal policy as has been described, industrial advance became marked, and with it an improved condition of increasing prosperity set in, which augured well for the future. Capital had already been attracted and security alone seemed necessary, such as most Frenchmen believed Napoleon had already given it.

What wonder then that, when on August 2, A. D. 1802, two of his colleagues moved in the legislative bodies that Napoleon Bonaparte should hold his office of the Consulate for life, the proposal was hailed with an unanimous and favorable vote.

This elevation of the First Consul to supreme power for life was well received by the European Cabinets, who interpreted the tidings as on the whole forming a probability of peace for the world.

In England Mr. Addington, who became Prime Minister after Mr. Pitt's resignation in February, 1801, and had directed the outlines of those negotiations which were successful in bringing about peace with France at Amiens, expressed his warm congratulations at Napoleon's receiving the First Consulship for life; while although some anxiety prevailed regarding the alleged ambitious designs of the French

Government, yet on the whole they were believed by George III. and his people to be on a right course when occupied in controlling the spirit of the French Revolution.

In Prussia King Frederick William III. and his advisers were glad to welcome alliance with a government led by such conspicuous ability as Napoleon's, instead of being remembered for having concluded a premature and unworthy peace with the convention in 1795. Indeed the Prussian Minister, Count Haugwitz, addressed cordial congratulations to the French Ambassador and, as M. Thiers tells us in his *Consulate and Empire*, was prepared to suggest that the simplest and best thing would at once be to convert the dictatorship for life, just conferred on Napoleon, into some form of hereditary sovereignty. The Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, despite the prejudices of some of his aristocracy, expressed himself with "courtesy and kindness" respecting this great event. In Vienna, moreover, a like sentiment prevailed, notwithstanding the wounds that Austria had received at Napoleon's hands, and the Archduke Charles, at the head of the War Office, observed to M. de Champagny, the French Ambassador, that the First Consul had by his campaigns proved himself to be "the greatest Captain of Modern Times," who had likewise signified by three years of administration that he could claim to be "the ablest of Statesmen." Indeed no sentiment of jealousy or detraction came at this moment from the lips of Austria's most

notable warrior, whose estimate of his great opponent, so far as military criticism is concerned, needs no justification, although it is impossible not to demur to the highest constitutional epithet of "Statesman" being applied to the Military Dictator who was to fill the throne of France.

For, skilfully concealed as were his aims, his remedial measures were all conceived with an intention to render this dénouement inevitable.

Some of those, however, who had suffered most at the hands of the Revolution and its attendant horrors were not unwilling to see Napoleon ascending step by step to the Imperial dignity. Caroline, the famous Queen of Naples, mother of the Empress of Austria and sister to the murdered Queen Marie Antoinette, is said by M. Thiers to have expressed her congratulations to the French Ambassador at Vienna on Napoleon's elevation to the Consulship for life. "General Bonaparte," said she, "is a great man. He has done me much injury, but that shall not prevent me from acknowledging his genius. By checking disorder among you he has rendered a service to all of us. If he has attained the government of his country, it is because he is most worthy of it. I hold him out every day as a pattern to the young princes of the Imperial family; I exhort them to study that extraordinary personage, to learn from him how to direct nations, how to make the yoke of authority enduring by means of genius and glory."

It will be observed that the Queen of Naples here

spoke simply as an Austrian and without reference to the treatment of her adopted country, Naples and Sicily, which soon had reason to lament the elevation of Napoleon to the purple, accompanied as it was by the power and will to obliterate smaller European states that disputed his omnipotent sway.

Pope Pius VII., fresh from the establishment of a "Concordat" with the Consular government of France, blessed Napoleon as the re-establisher of religion and, notwithstanding what the Pontiff regarded as "many crosses," considered this work as the glory of his own reign, a sentiment which was to find an echo in the voice of Spain's Catholic sovereign, Charles IV.

It would therefore seem to a transient observer that the monarchical sentiment of France and Europe was satisfied and contented at the prospect of Napoleon's unhindered sway in the country where the Revolution had changed the face of society, religious, civil and military.

But this was by no means true. Not only had the proposal of Louis XVIII. to make Napoleon his chief subject and chosen general been courteously but decidedly rejected by the First Consul, but a reciprocal suggestion that the Bourbons should resign their claims to the French throne had been immediately spurned in words of uncompromising dignity and firmness by the hereditary successor of Henry IV. Napoleon himself was, however, undoubtedly to some extent lulled into the belief that a spirit

prevailed amongst the monarchical party which would render his rule tolerable to a majority of the dissentients, and cause the stern refusal of the Count de Provence to make terms with the new order of things as harmless as had hitherto proved the machinations of the Count d'Artois and the Emigrés.

From this dream there was destined to be a rude awakening, inasmuch as on December 24, A. D. 1800, as the First Consul was going to the opera in Paris with Josephine, an attempt to blow up his carriage only failed because the explosion spent its full force away from the vehicle, which was nevertheless lifted from the ground. Napoleon at first firmly believed that the Jacobin party, and not that of the Royalists, had been his assailants. Assured to the contrary by the astute Fouché, after careful inquiry had been made, the First Consul took the opportunity of banishing those of the Jacobins whom he knew to be adverse to his government, but resolved nevertheless for the future to recognize the inexorable character of the Royalist conspiracy which had been discovered to exist. Although doubtless desperate and dangerous while supported by generals such as Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, and Georges, the brave Chouan leader, whose deeds in La Vendée have an imperishable record in that obstinately Royalist district of France, the conspiracy of the supporters of Louis XVIII. could scarcely have been perilous to Napoleon's throne, nor, after the leaders were safe in prison, to his person.



While Pichegru observed a complete silence, Georges honestly averred that he spurned any attempt at assassination, but intended to attack the First Consul by force in the midst of his guards at Paris and if possible carry him off.

Nor would half the importance have been assigned to the trial of these conspirators but for the alleged connivance of the great Republican general, Moreau, in their schemes.

He had been the close friend of Pichegru through more than one campaign, and undoubtedly met and conferred with him during the time when the hero of Holland was negotiating with the Royalists.

Moreover, just as Moreau had played into his opponents' hands by contributing to place Napoleon in his position of Military Dictator when he helped to suppress the Directory on November 9, 1799 (18th Brumaire), so, when accused of complicity in the Royalist plot, did he commit himself by writing to the first Consul an explanation of his meetings with Pichegru, which was straightway reserved for production at the trial.

Undoubtedly the rivalry between these two men, representing jointly the sword of France, but individually different systems of civil government, had become acute. Moreau affected a Republican simplicity, both as regards his own outward garb and that of his wife, which contrasted deeply with the pomp of the new government officialism and the glitter of a court, such as Napoleon and Josephine

even then, early in the Consulate, presided over. But the answer of France came in the reply that she needed not stern Republican observances so much as a bright and attractive Court Entourage to act as the counterpart of the conventional splendor of the defunct monarchy.

Moreau does not seem to have concealed his aversion towards the Consulate and Napoleon's tenancy for life therein, but no evidence has ever been brought to prove that, even if he did consort with Pichegru during the Royalist conspiracy, the Victor of Hohenlinden had changed his Republican opinions.

But what proved fatal to him and led to his arrest and trial appears to have been his own disingenuous explanation of his position, given in confidence to Napoleon, and the fact that for some time he had had cognizance of Pichegru's previous friendly relations with the Royalists, and had long kept this knowledge to himself in order to spare an honored brother-in-arms.

With Pichegru, Georges and Moreau housed in prison, Napoleon was delivered from the fear of any immediate Bourbon outbreak, and the energies of Savary and Fouché, Chief of Police, were employed in endeavoring to capture some of the princes of the blood who, report said, desired an entrance into France for the purpose of raising an insurrection there.

But the Consular Government and Napoleon himself in particular seem to have increased the con-

confidence of the moneyed classes both in France and throughout Europe, by the manner in which this conspiracy was exposed and the leaders captured, leaving the issues of life or death to be dealt with by due process of law.

The First Consul, moreover, could congratulate himself on all opposition from Moreau's old soldiers of the Rhine being rendered impossible by the fact that these Republican warriors had for the most part gone to St. Domingo in order to quell the negro rebellion in that island. They might, it is true, have been called to play a different rôle, inasmuch as if the advice of the Abbé Sieyès had been taken during Napoleon's absence in Egypt, his rival, Moreau, would have been elected to the chief post in a more constitutional administration of Republican character, in which case the trained legions of the Rhine would scarcely have been called on to waste their energies and sacrifice their lives in St. Domingo. But the fact of Moreau's refusal stood him in good stead when his trial came about, and may have contributed to banishment, and not death, being the sentence registered against him.

It cannot be urged against the First Consul that he failed to deal with the legislative needs of France which the Revolution had rendered so apparent.

In the words of the late Professor Seeley, "The globe was at peace and thanked Buonaparte for it. The equilibrium which had been destroyed by the Revolution seemed at length to be restored," and this

at a time when "a strong, intelligent government was the great need of France and repose the great need of Europe."

Most of the institutions created under the First Consul at this period remain in France to the present day, and make up the prosperous society with which those who know the country best associate its name.

Among the creations of Napoleon which have taken the most prominent positions in history are the Civil Code, known later as the Code Napoleon, and the Concordat with Pope Pius VII. It is true that the best jurists in France were engaged on the task of codifying the Civil Code of French Laws, but nevertheless they were stimulated to sustained action by the presence of Napoleon's master mind in their midst, and he desired that his fame should rest on this necessary work, for which France remains thankful to the present day. "Through its conciseness," says Mr. Fyffe in his history of modern Europe, "its simplicity and its justice" Napoleon was enabled "to carry a new and incomparably better social order into every country that became part of his empire."

As for the "Concordat," the negotiating of some such treaty was a necessity if the Church was to be detached from the Bourbons as an organization. After two millions a year had been guaranteed from the State to pay for an establishment of Bishops and clergy in France, the clerical interest was no longer likely to go solid for Louis XVIII. in that peculiarly insinuating fashion which it had ever been the

habit of those ruling the Gallican Church to employ.

Parties for and against the Empire or the Monarchy there might be in the future, but no longer after the Concordat would Pius VII. place a silent ban on the Consular or Imperial progress.

At the same time it is worthy of mention that Napoleon took full security in the Concordat for the celebration in France of civil marriage, and restrained the pretensions of the clergy who would otherwise have dictated how, when and where a nuptial union not under Church tutelage should be made.

Pius VII. hesitated before acceding to this provision of the Concordat, but assented finally, believing that he would in the long run gain by means of the mighty protection of his beloved and faithful son, the Emperor Napoleon.

Other Napoleonic institutions recognizable in France at the close of the nineteenth century consist of:—

- (1) The Judicial System, founded in March, 1800 ;
- (2) The Bank of France, the establishment of which dates from the same year ;
- (3) The University, which was established on May 1, 1802 ; and
- (4) The “ Legion of Honor,” designed to reward worthy recipients of a nation’s favors.

The fact that these institutions have continued to the present day reminds the reader that as no similar mass of legislation can be ascribed to any other ruler

in any epoch of history, so was the situation unique which enjoined the immediate replacement of religion, law, education and order, in an ancient country which had cast off deliberately its former habits, methods and ideas.

It remains now, in winding up this portion of the subject, to summarize briefly some leading points in the characters of those who were most prominently associated with the First Consul before he became Emperor.

Chief amongst these, by reason of seniority and personal experience of the Revolutionary period, stood the Abbé Sieyès, the most notable creator of representative bodies, popular and non-popular, and not the least disillusioned French Republican who had hailed 1789 and the opening of the States-General with fervor.

Responsible in a lesser degree than Louis XVI. and Necker for doubling the numbers of the third order on that crucial occasion, he had both moulded and guided the Chamber which generated the revolutionary changes, more than any other existing politician. No matter what shape the French Revolutionary government was destined to take during ten years of wild chimeras and disappointed hopes, the Abbé Sieyès was called in to advise how the parliament of democracy could best be checked in its too rapid action, and in later times asked to decide by Napoleon and his advisers whether the demon could not be so muzzled as to retain a merely advisory

authority. For it had come to this in 1801, when a nominated Senate claimed the right to decide which members of a kindred legislative assembly should retire annually.

As the number was fixed by law at one-fifth, Napoleon and his advisers, who had a majority in the Senate, thereby had the opportunity—which they used freely—of removing all the independent and critical opponents of the government, so that the legislature became as subservient as the army to the new Cæsar.

That the Abbé Sieyès, who contended with success in 1789 for a Single-Chamber form of government in France, should, in the capacity of Senator, be an unwilling but unprotesting accomplice in this portentous change to legislative subserviency, must be accounted one of the curiosities of history. Born in 1748, Sieyès was in the prime of life at the commencement of the nineteenth century, but his career as a force in politics was practically closed when Napoleon gained control of the helm, for the First Consul was not the man to forget that the Abbé would have desired to see Moreau conducting a Republican régime of a parliamentary character, rather than witness the rise of an armed Imperialism, fraught, as men then believed, with great possibilities for France, but as yet undeveloped and widely distrusted. But the judgment of Sieyès upon these matters could but be fallible, coming as it did from one so deeply implicated in the Revolution, who had voted for the

king's death. Probably Napoleon never could have gained his elevation to the First Consulship but for the joint employment of Fouché, as his head of police, and Savary, in the capacity of aide-de-camp and coadjutor in all their joint projects between November, 1799, and May, 1804, when the Empire was proclaimed.

Joseph Fouché, the son of a captain of a merchant ship, was born at Nantes in 1763. It was intended he should follow the same trade as his father, but he chose that of the law, and the Revolution soon brought him into notice, in company with many others of his profession. He was one of the most responsible actors in these terrible scenes, especially at Lyons in 1793, and voted for the death of Louis XVI.

Napoleon utilized his peculiar qualities as head of the police, and ultimately made him Duke of Otranto.

Anne Jean Marie René Savary was born in Champagne in 1774 and, entering the army in 1790, soon distinguished himself with the Army of the Rhine. As General Desaix's aide-de-camp he accompanied him to Egypt, and later at the battle of Marengo, in which Desaix was killed at the moment of victory, rescued his body and conveyed it to Napoleon's headquarters. He was then transferred as aide-de-camp to Napoleon. From that moment he appears as the faithful henchman of the First Consul during the five eventful years which followed. In 1810 he administered the Police instead of Fouché.



But the mainspring of the French Consular and Imperial Government during its rising stage was undoubtedly the Count Perigord, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, the celebrated diplomatist. Born in Paris, A. D. 1754, he was descended from one of the most illustrious houses of France. Intended for the Church, he entered the seminary of St. Sulpice, and his ready wit, insinuating manners, and a quick penetration into the real character of men, caused him, A. D. 1780, to be named Agent-General for ecclesiastical affairs. Eight years later he became Bishop of Autun, and he had gained considerable reputation as an ecclesiastic when the Revolution commenced. Chosen deputy by the clergy of his diocese to the States-General in 1789, the Bishop of Autun threw himself warmly upon the popular side, and the part he took afterwards in consecrating bishops not approved at Rome brought upon him excommunication by Pope Pius VI. As a result of this, he gave up his bishopric and came into the Legislative body as member for the Department of the Seine. In this capacity he gave to the nation the original ideas which led to the foundation of the Institute, one of those conceptions that Napoleon utilized when First Consul. In 1792, Talleyrand travelled to England on a secret mission, but trusted neither by Jacobins nor Emigrés, he received orders to quit Great Britain, A. D. 1793, in company with M. Chauvelin, the French Ambassador, when war commenced with England.

During the first three years of this conflict, Talleyrand was in the United States, but the Directory recalled him, A. D. 1796, by a special decree.

On his return he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs through the influence of the celebrated Madame de Staël, daughter of M. Necker, and so far justified his appointment as to prove himself impervious against the attacks of the various parties that sought to govern France. Together with the Abbé Sieyès, he encouraged the first ambitions of Napoleon and exercised a consequent influence in the early cabinets of the First Consul.

He negotiated the Peace of Luneville with Austria, as well as that with England at Amiens.

Pius VII. having released him from celibacy, he married Madame Grandt, and Napoleon constantly sought to employ him in the region of Foreign Affairs.

To his Memoirs historians must owe much of the information which enables them to speak with authority of the Empire and the Restoration, under both of which régimes he was a trusted Minister; while he also lived to supervise the politics of France during the reign of Louis Philippe.

Another potent coadjutor of Napoleon was Jean Jacques Cambacérès, who was born in 1753 and soon attracted the attention of the convention.

He may be described as one of Napoleon's intimates, and is believed to have designed many of the splendors of the new court, including the famous

green liveries, which were known in all the chancelleries of Europe.

To tell of the men and women celebrated in French society who supported the Napoleonic system of government, would be to write a book much larger than that entrusted to my pen; but in substance power was wielded by the aforementioned statesmen and advisers, the outlines of whose lives have been traced to the early years of the nineteenth century.

The question asked by contemporaries at this period naturally came to be: "What will the wielder of this great engine of unbridled power do with the authority entrusted to him?" On the Continent and even in England, as has been said, after the peace of Amiens some of the omens were propitious but not of a character to justify the extremely sanguine hopes which seem to have prevailed. It appeared likely to thoughtful contemporaries, who had observed the character of the First Consul and were aware of the ambitions he cherished, both on behalf of his country and for himself, that the ample extensions of French territory and influence in Holland, on the Rhine and in Italy were all gained under the Republic or the Directory, and that if the name of Napoleon was to be that of France's greatest modern conqueror, for which title he scarcely disguised his desire, both in India and the East and also in Europe must a farther advance be soon made.

The other bar to a continued state of peace consisted in the mutual ambitions and thinly veiled

jealousies which subsisted between France and Great Britain, for although a seventeen years' war had been joyfully closed by the sinking of international animosities, such dangerous passions, alas ! only slumbered, while a few months of suspicion, magnified by the press on both sides of the Channel, might easily arouse even these again. On the other hand, Napoleon's schemes of conquest were not formed hastily; and, if abandoned for the time from necessity, it was felt by Mr. Pitt and those who acted with him that, when England had abandoned Egypt and Malta, the route to the threatened British dominions in Hindustan would be less secure, so that the pressure of public opinion was very adverse to the treaty of Amiens being thus carried out to the letter, while Napoleon broke it in spirit, if not in intention also, by the contemptuous incorporation of Piedmont with France.

Mr. Addington was undoubtedly constrained to take up a firmer attitude in contending that the treaty must be observed in its entirety, or the part which dealt with a British surrender of Malta could not be fulfilled, and, as events proved, the premature disclosures of Napoleon's projects in the East confirmed the British Government in their resolution.

Anything approaching a one-sided surrender would have proved the death-blow of Mr. Addington's administration, and it is impossible to doubt that this decision of Lord Hawkesbury, the Foreign Minister, represented the national feeling. The rekindling of the embers of war between the two countries was,

it is true, gradual, but flames appeared in several directions as early as in November, 1802.

Napoleon complained in the first instance of the license given to the British newspapers, and to French pamphleteers, such as Peltier, for attacking the First Consul from the safe retirement of London.

Mr. Addington, the Prime Minister, retorted that the articles in the *Moniteur*, the official organ of the French Government, were uniformly hostile to England, whose Ministers raised no objection to such a mode of journalistic attack, and that the freedom of the press was established by law on the English side of the Channel.

While agreeing to expel the Emigrés from Jersey, owing to its contiguity to France, the British Prime Minister told Napoleon that no engagement could be entered on binding England to render up the Bourbon Princes or infringe in any way upon the general right of asylum.

In the matter of the Jersey exiles, the Government of Mr. Addington incurred a good deal of criticism at the hands of its political opponents, and it was probably unable to make kindred concessions in the region of foreign politics.

On the other hand the French people, who saw Malta held by England (at first on a justifiable diplomatic plea, founded on Russia's hesitation to make that island over to the Knights of St. John, and afterwards because France had overrun Switzerland

in November, 1802, and incorporated Piedmont in her dominions contrary to the Peace of Luneville, which only placed it "in trust"), sided with the First Consul in demanding the British evacuation of that insular place of arms in the Mediterranean, which ever must be a strategic point of the first importance, and a link in the chain of communication between England and India.

It is not to be wondered at that Napoleon should have contested this action of the English administration; and while Addington and his colleagues were hesitating, he threw down a challenge on the 13th of January, 1803, in the shape of a report upon Egypt by Colonel Sebastiani, showing that the French Government based their policy on a renewal of the Egyptian expedition and a revival of French schemes in the East.

The British Government asked for explanations, and avowed their intention to retain Malta at all hazards, unless satisfaction was given upon this head.

So it came to pass that as the French pointed to the Treaty of Amiens as unfulfilled by England in regard to Malta, so great Britain averred that the occupation of Switzerland, the annexation of Piedmont and the avowed intentions of Sebastiani concerning Egypt formed just causes of complaint. Thus the two countries continued to argue in a circle until it became clear that war could alone decide the issue.

But perhaps the event which stirred British feeling most deeply was the entrance into Switzerland on October 4, 1802, of a French army and the establishment there of a new Chief Magistrate of the Helvetic Confederacy, who was subservient to the First Consul's authority, the central Government being powerless in the hands of France, so that mere cantonal self-administration alone remained of the national independence.

The undisguised character of the usurpation stirred England to its depths, as was expressed by the illustrious Admiral Lord Nelson himself in the House of Lords, while the king's speech declared "that the changes in operation on the Continent demanded measures of security on the part of Great Britain."

The interview between Napoleon and Lord Whitworth, the English Ambassador, February 18, 1803, has been generally considered as the prelude to the recommencement of hostilities, nor could the rival claims of the two nations have been summarized by more able and notable champions.

The complaints of Napoleon as to the non-evacuation of Malta were met by the familiar counter-claim as regards the illegal annexation of Piedmont, while Sebastiani's avowed designs on Greece and Egypt were skilfully paraded by the British representative, who received for reply, as to the latter expression of French policy, that it was merely intended to secure a fair share to France of the tottering Ottoman Em-

pire, whenever the catastrophe of its collapse, which seemed so near to the First Consul, might occur.

After a year and two months of a peace, which may almost be called a truce, hostilities re-opened between England and France in May, 1803, and the sanguinary influence affected gravely the future of Europe.

To condemn Napoleon wholesale for his part in the transaction is an easy way out of the difficulty; but in his position, had he allowed Malta to be retained by Great Britain and preserved peace without some consideration being given to France, such a check would have been received by French diplomacy as would have been used by the political enemies of the First Consul, then meditating on his ascent to an Imperial throne.

How far self-restraint exercised by both nations might have led to an extended peace cannot be ascertained, but the renewal of the conflict spread kindred discord all over Europe and was responsible for carnage, scarcely to be realized, although the details will be placed before my readers.

When war was declared in May, 1803, Napoleon determined to render it a stern reality for Englishmen, and he arrested those of British nationality who were travelling in France at the time and placed them in captivity.

This unwise and unjustifiable action of the First Consul gave a bitter complexion to the struggle which was quite unnecessary. That threats of im-



minent invasion were by no means merely minatory in character, the French preparations were soon to show. Indeed Napoleon had himself foreshadowed them in his conversation with Lord Whitworth at the Tuileries on February 18, 1803. “ ‘If I have a war with Austria (said Napoleon), I shall contrive to find the way to Vienna.

If I have a war with you, I will take from you every ally on the Continent; I will cut you off from all access to it.

You will blockade us, but I will blockade you in my turn; you will make the Continent a prison for us, but I will make the extent of the sea a prison for you.

However, to conclude, there must be more direct means: there must be assembled one hundred and fifty thousand men, and an immense flotilla; we must try to cross the strait, and perhaps bury in the depths of the sea my fortune, my glory and my life.

It is an awful temerity, my Lord, an invasion of England.’

And, having uttered these words the First Consul, to the great astonishment of his auditor, began himself to enumerate the difficulties and the dangers of the enterprise; the quantity of materials, of men, of ships, which must be pushed into the straits, for the purpose of attempting the destruction of England.”

The full account of these conversations (for there were two) at the Tuileries between the First Consul and Lord Whitworth will be found in M. Thiers’

*Consulate and the Empire*, at the point where the great work deals with February, 1803.

It was unfortunate for France that this rupture with her historic foe across the Channel took place when a marked revival of prosperity had set in throughout the country. The brief period of peace had to some extent conspired to bring about this improvement, which also rested on the confidence of the capitalist class in the First Consul's power to retain a strong and peaceful administration. Therefore, despite the increasing resources of the French nation, it needed more than the inspired sentences of the *Moniteur* and the servile concurrence of a nominated legislature to dispel the rising anxiety of the moneyed classes, who had concurred in Napoleon's elevation as a security against revolution and who now saw before them a conflict to the death with all the patriotism and wealth of England, to be followed, so soon as the matter could be arranged, by a struggle on the part of the European nations to avoid further aggression.

That Napoleon did intend his scheme for the invasion of England to be pressed to the bitter end is, I think, proved by the fact that the arrangements were in train before Russia or Austria stirred themselves to renew the conflict they had abandoned after Zurich and Marengo respectively. As early as June, 1803, the First Consul set out on a journey amongst the ports on the coast between Boulogne and Antwerp, where his progress was one long ovation, and

from that moment until the march to Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805, Napoleon devoted all his energy and intelligence to preparing a flotilla to carry the army across the Channel, which he gradually collected under canvas at Boulogne.

Thereby he was able to keep England in a perpetual state of preparation, involving great expense, and throwing her on her defence, so that by her fleets alone could she exercise influence in the world.

Two reasons have been given for believing the great army of Boulogne not to have been originally designed for an attack on England, but rather collected to restrain Austria from recovering her Italian possessions. First, that Napoleon would not have visited Italy and been crowned king of that country during June, 1805, if he had seriously intended to invade Great Britain, because he was thereby breaking an understanding with Austria and daring her to combat; and secondly, Metternich's famous conversation with the Conqueror in Paris some years later, when the Emperor averred that he had always designed the Boulogne armament as a check to the hostile European powers and never seriously intended to invade Great Britain.

Against the latter averment I would set the published letters of Admiral Decrès as well as those of Napoleon himself in that collection discovered by M. Thiers in the state archives, one of which to Cambacérès, his brother Consul, on November 16, 1803, has the following statement from Boulogne:

“ I have passed these three days amidst the camp

and the port. From the heights of Ambleteuse I have seen the coast of England, as one sees Calvary from the Tuileries. One could distinguish the houses and the bustle. It is a ditch that shall be leapt when one is daring enough to try."

As regards the coronation of Napoleon at Milan, it occurred just when the French fleet was in the West Indies, and Napoleon left Prince Eugène Beauharnais as his viceroy at Milan before the crisis he had so long been anticipating could possibly occur in the Channel.

Nor was the Army of England, as Napoleon styled it, ill-employed in raising fortifications and excavating new basins at Boulogne, Vimereux and Ambleteuse, while its lines extending on the southern coast in camps from Antwerp to Bayonne did not, as events proved, militate against speedy concentration, when a vast host of warriors inured to fatigue and burning for distinction on the battle-field went forth animated with an enthusiastic devotion for their chief.

But another and more ready means was to hand of striking against the interests of England than this immense undertaking, which, whatever its fate, presupposed, as Napoleon admitted in his letter to Decrès, dated September 8, 1805, an absolute calm at least for two days in the Channel before his vast flotilla could be rowed across to the English shores.

Immediately war had been declared with England, General Mortier crossed the frontier of Hanover with a French division and overwhelmed that country, of which George III. was king.

In 1795 the neutrality of Hanover had been observed by the revolutionary armies, but this fact did not influence the First Consul, who remarked that if the province could have raised an army of 200,000 men, the English would have employed them against him; he then proceeded to appropriate its resources.

The command of the River Weser, itself an important interest, threatened by the attack on Hanover which Prussia could not safely disregard, was, however, dwarfed in importance by Mortier's next step, when he despatched some French troops to Cuxhaven in order to stop British commerce at the source of the Elbe and so hinder England's communication with the interior of Germany. The British Government straightway announced to Frederick William III. that they should blockade both the Elbe and the Weser against the ships of all nations unless the French occupation of Hanover was annulled. And now occurred the crisis wherein the Court of Berlin, advised by Haugwitz and, alas! by Hardenberg likewise, made the initial error which precluded Prussia from taking up her natural position as the guardian and defender of Northern Germany.

From the moment that the French were allowed to remain unchallenged by the Prussian armies in Hanover, so most surely was it foreordained that the star of Frederick the Great's memory must pale before the rising genius of the new Cæsar who held France so securely in his grasp.

Thus early in the struggle did Prussia allow the

linen industry of Silesia to be suspended, lulling herself into acquiescence by sending a weak envoy to Brussels in the person of one Lombard, who returned satisfied with the First Consul's complimentary phrases.

But the occupation of Hanover, however it influenced the future relations of France and Prussia and embittered the conflict which the First Consul had entered on with England, may be said to have paled before that event which more than any other determined that this struggle for command of the seas would spread to the Continent also. I allude to the murder of the young Duc d'Enghien, son of the Prince de Condé, and therefore a scion of the Bourbon race, whom the First Consul both feared and hated deeply. Residing at Ettenheim in Baden, twelve miles from the French frontier, as a pensioner of England, this young prince had been warned that he might be seized by the First Consul, as the subjoined letter from his father will show.

It appears that, having retired to Ettenheim at the end of the last war, he remained in the neighborhood, attracted by a passion for the Princess de Rohan, while he could also satisfy his love for the chase in the neighboring locality of the Black Forest. Hence, as the French Government had occupied themselves in vain in endeavoring to secure the persons of the Count d'Artois, afterwards Charles X., and the Duc de Berri, the father of the Duc d'Enghien felt an anxiety lest his son should fall a

prey to the First Consul's desire to punish some member of the Bourbon family, as well as the heads of the conspiracy, Pichegru, Georges and presumably Moreau, whom he had under lock and key in Paris. The letter which appears in M. Thiers' *Consulate and the Empire*, in regard to the events of March, 1804, runs as follows :

“THE PRINCE DE CONDÉ TO THE DUC D'ENGHIEN,  
WANSTEAD, 16th June, 1803.

“MY DEAR SON,

“For six months past a report has been current here that you have paid a visit to Paris; others say that you have only ventured to Strasburg.

“You must admit that this is most imprudently perilling your life and liberty. As for your principles I am not at all alarmed about them, they are as deeply graven in your heart as ours. It appears to me that you need no longer conceal the facts, and if you have made such journeys you may tell us the result of your observations. Now as to your safety, so dear to us on many accounts, it is true that I told you you might render your position very useful. But you are very close to danger; take great care of yourself, and insure timely warning to effect your retreat, should it enter the Consul's mind to order you to be seized.

“Do not imagine that courage requires utter neglect on this score.

“(Signed)           LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.”

Like other French Emigrés of royal blood, the Duc d'Enghien was opposed to the form of government in France, but there is not the slightest evidence, to use M. Thiers' words, "that he knew anything about the conspiracy of Georges . . . everything that is known about him tends, on the contrary, to the supposition that he was ignorant of it."

Owing, however, to the confusion of a person in the young prince's suite, by name De Thumery, with the well-known Royalist sympathizer, General Dumouriez, the suspicions of Napoleon's spies were aroused at the moment when a servant of Georges, arrested with him, had deposed that not only was there a conspiracy, but "that a prince was at its head."

Leaping at the conclusion that the Duc d'Enghien answered to the latter description, a detachment of dragoons was sent across the Rhine on March 15, 1804, in the middle of the night to Ettenheim and, disregarding the infringing of the territory of the Duke of Baden, carried off the Duc d'Enghien to the citadel of Strasburg.

Despite the solicitations of Josephine, so creditable to her heart and judgment, the First Consul relegated this dark deed of cowardly murder to his subordinates, one of whom, Savary, has had to bear the main brunt of infamy, because, when the victim was put on a mock trial before a military commission at Vincennes, that creature of Napoleon suppressed d'Enghien's request to be confronted with the First Consul that he might



prove his innocence of the special charges brought against him, of which there were no proofs in the papers discovered upon the prince's person, while no such documents, as might lead in the slightest to exculpate Napoleon, have been discovered elsewhere.

When the Duc d'Enghien arrived at Vincennes on the evening of March 20, 1804, his grave was already dug, according to a letter of M. Laporte Lalanne, a member of the committee of inquiry, so that the noble demeanor and truthful answers of the unfortunate prince were of no avail before General Hullin's Military Commission, who, after half an hour's pretended deliberation, allowed the Duc d'Enghien to be conducted down a dark staircase to the ditch of the château of Vincennes, where after hearing his sentence read by his open grave, and delivering a letter to the Princess de Rohan into the hands of those entrusted with carrying out his destruction, this brave young prince fell under the bullets of Napoleon's soldiers, by his authority.

Attempts to shift responsibility on to subordinates did not prevent this action from so embittering the feelings of the sovereigns of Europe against the First Consul and his methods, that the probability of war becoming general by a coalition being formed against France was thereby greatly increased. This will be made clear hereafter, but at present it is only necessary to relate that the infamy of the deed, if soon destined to be eclipsed in France by a later sensation caused by General Pichegru being found strangled

in his prison on the 6th of April, 1804, left an abiding stain on the consulate and its chief consul more particularly. As to Pichegru, according to the *Moniteur*, he took a hearty meal, and went to bed at midnight. After the servant who waited on him had retired, Pichegru drew from under his bed, where he had placed it, a black silk cravat, which he wound round his neck. A fagot, which he had put aside, now helped him in carrying out his project of suicide. He passed this stick round near the glandular part of the neck as many times as was necessary to close the air vessels; when his breath was nearly gone, he fastened the stick behind his ear so as to prevent it getting loose. Pichegru, naturally stout and sanguine, choked by the food he had just taken and the pressure he experienced, expired during the night. Public opinion in Paris varied as to the value of this official document, some who reprobated the First Consul's treatment of the Duc d'Enghien suggesting that it proved too much, and the verdict consented to by Talleyrand in his Memoirs is to the effect that a mystery existed, which will never be elucidated.

It certainly is a remarkable fact that the keeper who attended Pichegru entered his room in the morning to light his fire, and "neither seeing him nor hearing him move, was afraid some accident had happened," and immediately informed Forconnier, the porter of the Temple, without examining whether his supposition was right or not. According to Lanfrey's *History of Napoleon*, Pichegru had been

entrusted with more than one secret about the First Consul, and had determined to speak out at the coming trial.

But for the death of the Duc d'Enghien no surmise of foul play would probably have ever passed into the public mind, and I am disposed to believe that Napoleon stood in such a position of supremacy at this moment that the words of Pichegru, spoken in defence of his life at a public trial, would have proved innocuous in comparison to the dark doubts aroused by a mysterious death, rendered still more inexplicable by official explanations.

There was but one anxiety upon the First Consul's mind, besides the suspicions and recriminations connected with the tragedy of Vincennes, to be faced before accepting the Imperial Crown, which both legislative chamber and senate were eager to confer, namely, the trial of Georges, Moreau and the Royalist conspirators.

From the former and his coadjutors, Napoleon feared nothing, being free to carry out sentence, involving either ruin or death, which must inevitably be passed upon those who gloried in their actions. Avowed Royalists, such as Georges, able only to free themselves from the stigma of desiring to use the assassin's methods but burning to resort to the sword in order to free France from Napoleon, could only expect one fate at the hands of the government they desired to destroy.

But it was otherwise with Moreau, the rival in

military glory to the First Consul himself, whose coadjutorship with Pichegru had never involved sympathy with a Royalist restoration, but rather bitter reprobation of the new Imperialism which he saw arising around him. Could it have been possible to guarantee Moreau's acceptance of pardon, the dilemma, which the Victor of Marengo felt when instituting a prosecution for treasonable practices against the stern Republican military leader who won Hohenlinden, would have speedily disappeared.

Moreau, however, assumed an attitude at the trial which was so dignified that the sympathy of his old brothers-in-arms was by no means the only sentiment of the kind with which the government had to cope at a moment when Napoleon could ill afford to display himself before the world as the proscriber, if not executioner, of the leading military men to whom he could apply for counsel or assistance in time of need.

It was a fortunate decision of the courts for the Empire, which assigned to Moreau a sentence of two years' imprisonment, which Napoleon hastened—it is said at Madame Moreau's desire—to remit in favor of banishment to America.

It has been inferred that "the Emperor"—for so he had become before he exercised the right of pardon towards M. Armand de Polignac and sent Moreau away from the imperial sphere of influence—acted under the inspiration of feelings of jealousy and revenge towards a rival military genius. But it

is just to record that delight in the privilege of according forgiveness from the steps of the throne seems to have been the dominating feeling in his mind.

True it is that he did not study to restrain either rage or indignation at Moreau not having been condemned by the death sentence he desired to annul.

“Aut Cæsar aut nullus” was the necessary motto of the new French Empire, and the public subordination of the great Moreau had become as essential as that passing effacement of his name from the minds of Frenchmen, which either death or banishment would soon involve.

May 18, 1804, is the date of the *Senatus Consultum*, which established the Empire in France, with the solitary protest of Carnot; Napoleon being given the power of adopting an heir in default of issue, so creating a bitter controversy between Josephine's relations, the Beauharnais, and the Bonapartes, while the succession was vested, first in the children of his brother Joseph and his descendants, and then in his brother Louis and his children. The remaining brothers, Lucien and Jerome, were excluded, because the Emperor reprobated the marriages they had contracted. “Napoleon” was to be substituted for “Bonaparte” — “Sire” and “Majesté” being attendant titles—while grand dignitaries of the court became, respectively, Arch-Chancellor and Arch-Treasurer, the homely “citoyen” of the Republic and

Directory giving way once more to the ancient "Monsieur." Pope Pius VII. was induced to visit Paris and anoint the Emperor of the French in Notre Dame.

The wily Italians of the Cardinalate, led by Consalvi and Fesch, Napoleon's uncle, stipulated and once again obtained, as a consideration for the visit, the right of appointing Bishops in France, who by the Concordat were to owe their institution to the State. It is strange to read, moreover, that the Pope declined on any terms to be introduced to Madame de Talleyrand. Of her husband Pius the Seventh added: "M. de Talleyrand: I love him. May God save his soul."

The coronation of Napoleon and Josephine on December 2, 1804, proved to be a splendid ceremony so far as money and invention could jointly provide, but the attempt to restore the dignity of the ancient monarchy and combine it with the barbaric splendor of the Western Empire, as embodied in Charlemagne, could not prove an æsthetic success.

On the other hand, the presence of the Pope gave unwonted interest to a scene, to which the glorious Church of Notre Dame lent that solemnity, without which a national pageant in a Christian country lacks the most essential element. The Empress Josephine had confided to Pius VII. that her marriage with Napoleon had been of a purely civil character, and the Pontiff had persuaded the Emperor to repair this omission the very evening before the coronation. So

the new Cæsar had yielded in private to the dictates of that Church he had restored to an acknowledged, legalized position in France.

So anxious, however, did the Imperial organizers seem to be to keep the lay element in this great ceremony apart from the clerical, which, despite the Papal presence, it was necessary on this occasion at least to subordinate, that they made the mistake of keeping Pius VII. waiting an inconvenient time for Napoleon, while the procession, in which he was the chief object of public interest, filed slowly through the beautiful boulevards of Paris to the cathedral.

Josephine's splendid jewels and the glass coach which Napoleon tenanted during this royal progress seem to have been the objects which gave most delight to the Parisian populace.

At Notre-Dame Napoleon placed the crown both on his own and Josephine's head, so that the Pontiff, supreme as regards the purely religious ceremonial, had to admit a civil subordination to the will of the Conqueror of the Western Continent.

It is said that such success as this dramatically devised splendor could claim—and for Napoleon's purpose it seems to have been marked—was owing to the knowledge that the Count de Ségur, the Grand Chamberlain of the Empire, possessed of those monarchical ceremonies, with which he had been once familiar as a former Ambassador of Louis XVI. to Russia. The knowledge which the present genera-

tion can claim of this dramatic scene is owing to the brush of David, that artist who, once an enthusiastic follower of "the Convention," lived to celebrate and extol the passing glories of a new monarchical system.



## CHAPTER XI.

THE MARSHALS, GENERALS AND ADMIRALS OF  
THE FRENCH EMPIRE.MILITARY AND NAVAL RESOURCES.—NAPOLEON'S SCHEME FOR  
INVADING ENGLAND.

It is open for critics to deprecate the pomp and show of the Imperial Court set up by Napoleon, and to lament the suppression of literary talent such as that of Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, and Chateaubriand ; but, while lamenting the existence of these disabilities thrust upon a nation of acute intellectual vigor, I desire to put on record the names and careers of the soldiers and sailors, without whose aid this fresh, aggressive, monarchical system could never have been tried in France.

The government of Napoleon being essentially military in character, I shall be forgiven for granting precedence here to the military, by those of my compatriots who, with truth, regard the navy—at least within the confines of Great Britain—as the senior service. But it should nevertheless be simultaneously admitted that, despite the special strength which a body of skilled and daring divisional com-

manders gave to the French army under the Empire, Napoleon's hopes, in the spring and summer of 1805, were based on carrying his design of invading England to a successful issue by means of the French Navy.

The individuality of each prominent Imperial commander by land and sea must, therefore, in outline be delineated in any record of those who bore sway in France when she threatened to overrun and dominate Europe so remarkably.

There had been notable variations in that great fighting force, the French army, both as regards numbers and discipline.

Louis XIV. once collected no less than 446,000 men under his banner, and in the last two decades of the seventeenth century, when Louis' military reputation was highest, the population cannot have exceeded 19,000,000, because, when calculated officially in A. D. 1700, it is given at 19,669,320.

Napoleon had more than 27,000,000 to draw his conscripts from, as the first estimate of the Consulate proves, when this figure was exceeded by 349,000 souls.

But, between these two epochs, Louis XV. allowed the service in question to decline considerably, so that in the time of his unfortunate successor, Louis XVI., it fell in numbers to 163,000 men, so officially recorded during A. D. 1784, after which epoch readers of this book are aware the French king had neither means nor opportunity to improve his armies.

Indeed, as a result of the great Frederick's victories, France had resigned the military supremacy in Europe to Prussia, while Austria held her in something like political vassalage.

It is due to the Revolution to say that a change took place in this state of things, which may be said to date from 1795, when once more the soldiers of France became sufficiently numerous and trained to place their country in that position of prominence, which its geographical position, the character and number of its people, and peculiar internal resources warrant.

To a certain degree the example of Frederick the Great must have been before the eyes of the French commanders when re-organizing their army, and it was generally believed that the pattern of military perfection still was to be found in Berlin.

Professor Seeley points out, however, in a dissertation on Militarism in Europe in his *Life and Times of Stein*, how in Prussia the despot came first and created the army, while in France the army, called into existence by the threat of invasion in 1792, took little more than ten years wherein to create a despotism and find a despot.

And to do Napoleon justice, when called in to repair the French military position, he overlooked and directed its reform so well that the voice of criticism can speak but with one approving note.

After Brumaire (November 9, 1799), France became a counterpart of what Prussia had been under

Frederick the Great, "a purely military State, ruled despotically by a great soldier," only wielding the resources of a far richer country and those of a population three times as great.

During the autumn of 1793, in the days of a revolutionary *levée en masse*, the French army, it is true, had nominally reached a million, which number fell after Valmy and the Austro-Prussian retreat from France to 871,000, while it shrunk further in 1795 to 450,000.

But on September 5, 1798, General Jourdan's law came into force, which enjoined recruiting of a voluntary character, supplemented by conscription.

For the next two years, 1799 and 1800, about 350,000 men passed under the tricolor by means of this method, but the establishment of a Consulate, and with it the supervision of Napoleon and Carnot, the skilled engineer known as "organizer of victory," placed the whole force in trained hands.

Under these circumstances were raised the enormous armies, which for nearly fifteen years threatened feeble countries with dissolution and failing institutions with destruction.

This firm basis of military power could not have been perfected from time to time but for the able generals who surrounded the Emperor, and for the most part regarded him with devotion.

When Napoleon had to choose the twenty marshals of the Empire, who were immediately to bear that title, two such posts being reserved for future merit,

it was impossible for him to reward a majority of those who had revived French military reputation, either under the banners of pure Republicanism, the Directory, or the Consulate.

Hoche, the victor of Quiberon, whose talents were remarkable, had paid the debt of nature in 1797, while Desaix, a brilliant lieutenant both of Moreau and Napoleon, had fallen on the field of Marengo. Kléber, also, had been assassinated in Egypt. Pichegru's mysterious death in prison, just before his trial for conspiring to restore the Bourbons, must be fresh in the reader's mind, but with his death passed away one whose scientific knowledge of war, learnt at Brienne, had borne rich fruit in the conquest of Holland.

Dumouriez, who came into the world as early as 1739, had served Louis XV. so well that at twenty-four years old he had received twenty-two wounds and been made a Knight of St. Louis; he, the subsequent inspirer of the Republican host at Valmy and the subjugator of Belgium, having resumed his early allegiance to the Bourbons, was an exile, so that his sword was not under Napoleon available for the cause of France.

Last, but by no means least, the great Republican general, Moreau, was crossing the Atlantic to seek an Arcadian life in the New World.

Four honorary marshals were created. One was Kellermann, the Duke of Valmy; another, Lefèbvre, an experienced soldier, who had assisted the Emperor

at successive stages of his career to seize and retain supreme power.

Although amongst those not designed to active command, Lefèbvre's military future proved a brilliant one: he commanded the Imperial guard at Jena in 1806, and took Dantzic with great éclat in 1807.

Two veterans, Periguin and Serrurier, attained to this eminence because of the respect in which they were held by the army, while accepting the Empire as the Government of France.

Fourteen marshal's bâtons were given to officers, of whom a brief notice follows:

*Jourdan*, the organizer of the modern French military system, whose earlier experiences had been gained in America against the British, and who won the battle of Fleurus in June, 1794.

*Berthier*, the companion of the Emperor during his campaigns in Italy, Egypt and Germany, to whom the highest military honors naturally fell at this moment. His remarkable skill in drawing up despatches, joined to unwearied application and methodical habits, proved of incalculable value to Napoleon in the vast pressure of his affairs.

To speak of *Masséna*, justly chosen as a marshal, is to tell of the greatest military subject Napoleon possessed at the moment of his elevation to the throne.

Second only in reputation amongst French soldiers of his time to Moreau, André Masséna saw light at Nice, A. D. 1758, and passed through the Italian mili-

tary service by the usual gradations. Commencing this career at seventeen, after fourteen years of service he obtained his discharge, but the revolutionary wars of 1792 attracted him again to the camp, his promotion becoming rapid. Napoleon favored Masséna greatly, discovering genius in the man whom, after the battle of Roveredo, in 1797, he called "the favored child of victory."

Masséna's conquest of Switzerland in 1799, when he drove the Austro-Russian army out of that country, has been spoken of previously, while the long defence of Genoa, in 1800, redounded to his credit.

*Ney*, called by the Emperor "the bravest of the brave," gained the coveted distinction of marshal at thirty-six, the age both of Napoleon and Lannes, and had already established a reputation for intrepid bravery in the army of the Rhine, becoming a brigadier-general in 1796.

Married to Mdlle. Anguié de Lascans, the friend of Hortense de Beauharnais, wife of Napoleon's brother Louis, the future Duke of Elchingen attracted the First Consul by personal considerations. He presented Ney, on the occasion of the nuptial ceremony, with a magnificent Egyptian sabre, and desiring his genius, chose him to command the army for the invasion of England, subject, however, to his own supreme guidance as Emperor.

But neither Ney, Lannes nor Soult, the last two generals being among the chosen marshals, had

attained their European celebrity when the Empire was proclaimed.

*Lannes* commenced life as a dyer and was rapidly promoted in the army, which he entered in 1792. Napoleon owed him a deep debt for the support given when engaged at Paris in that year against "the Sections," and thenceforth he saw service in succeeding campaigns. Amidst many of *Lannes*' experiences, that at *Aboukir* gave him the opportunity of displaying impetuous courage, and he was also prominent at *Marengo*.

Marshal *Soult* was destined to become the greatest strategist of all Napoleon's lieutenants, and a varied service, dating from 1785, marked this notable French soldier out for distinction. It is interesting to reflect that *Soult*, like *Ney* and *Lannes*, was a contemporary both of *Wellington* and *Napoleon*, being born in that year big with fate, A. D. 1769.

*Soult* is said by *M. Thiers* to have been raised to the marshalate for services in Switzerland, at *Genoa*, and in the camp of *Boulogne*.

Marshal *Augereau*, born at *Paris* in 1757, had taken his part in bringing about the consulate; he became prominent in the first revolutionary wars, and in the battles of *Castiglione* and *Arcole* during 1796 his personal bravery shone so conspicuously as to call for comment in high quarters.

*Brune* was made Marshal of the Empire for his successful campaign in *Holland* during 1799 against the English army under the Duke of *York*, but had



been a tried and effective officer under Dumouriez at Valmy and Jemappes, and afterwards gained rapid promotion under General Bonaparte in Italy. He was in his fifty-second year when he gained his marshalate.

*Joachim Murat*, the famous cavalry officer, was one of the chosen marshals, but this honor was destined to be merged in the kingly title which he bore, when raised to the throne of Naples.

The son of an innkeeper at Cahors, Murat was born in 1771. Intended for the Church, but escaping from the college of Cahors, he enlisted as a chasseur, being, however, soon dismissed for insubordination.

An active revolutionist, he joined the army again early in life, reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel when just of age, and at the moment when the Directory succeeded to the Terror, was made a General of Brigade.

In the Italian campaign of 1796, he was one of Bonaparte's intimate companions, being on the staff, and then first gained the reputation of a brilliant leader of cavalry, impetuous and fearless. In 1800 he married Napoleon's youngest sister, Marie Caroline.

General *Bessières*, the head of the Imperial Guard, was made a marshal at thirty-seven years old, after serving brilliantly on various fields, whereon he proved himself worthy of this distinction.

General *Moncey* was an experienced soldier of solid reputation, but it was as organizer of the Gendarmerie

that he performed the services which gained him a marshal's bâton at forty-one years of age.

His subsequent career was successful, especially in Spain, where he helped to take Saragossa.

Marshal *Mortier* is known to my readers as the conqueror of Hanover, and had before him one of the brightest military futures, even in those days of famous French captains.

But, perhaps, the most wonderful career, previous to becoming Marshal of the Empire, was that of *Bernadotte*, who had risen from the rank of a private soldier to that of colonel by the time that the war of 1792 commenced, when he was employed on the Rhine under General Custine. In 1793, he so distinguished himself under Kléber as to become a General of Brigade, and evinced the possession of talents of a diplomatic character during a mission to the Austrian court. There seems to have been a mutual distrust between Bernadotte and Napoleon, which might have been expected to prevent his inclusion in the coveted list of marshals, had all the current stories of the alleged Imperial antipathies been true, but in this case the Emperor clearly preferred consulting the interests of France to indulging his own personal prejudices.

Bernadotte, it is well known, became king of Sweden and Norway, Napoleon thus founding one dynasty only which survived the century.

I have left *Davoust's* elevation to the marshalate to the last in order to notice that he alone of all his

compeers, raised simultaneously to this honorable position, had possessed the advantage of a military education at Brienne, where he was a fellow-student with Napoleon, who was his senior by one year.

A brilliant soldier, Davoust had already fought his way to the post of general of division by his services in Belgium, under Dumouriez, on the Rhine, and afterwards in Egypt.

The young Prince Eugène Beauharnais, Josephine's son and Napoleon's adopted child, was destined to wield his sword with effect during more than one campaign, and in 1805 the Emperor made him, being just twenty-one, Viceroy of Italy after the coronation which took place at Milan in June.

It is worthy of note that nearly all the chosen soldiers of France owed their positions to the careers opened up for them by the Revolution, many being originally lawyers who embraced the profession of arms when the opportunity afforded.

One of the most proved scientific captains in France, General *Gouvion St. Cyr*, was not amongst the list of marshals, and M. Thiers explains this by saying that Napoleon, "who had pardoned Bernadotte his petty treacheries, knew not how to forgive General St. Cyr his disparaging spirit."

The two faithful aides-de-camp of the Emperor, *Junot* and *Marmont*, shared the same fate as St. Cyr, the trio being consoled by receiving the, to lay minds, strange titles of "Colonels-General."

Nor can the omission of *Duroc's* name be accounted for, except that, not having recovered from his wound received in Egypt, his place was by the Emperor's side as aide-de-camp, and in this capacity he certainly went to Boulogne.

Amongst the absentees from this brilliant array of talent was the name of General *Macdonald*, who was descended from a Scots family which had taken refuge in France after the rebellion of 1745, and who had seen the most varied service, guarding Versailles during the military Revolution of Brumaire, and rendering his name forever famous by his passage of the Splügen during A. D. 1800.

It is averred that, as a sympathizer with Moreau, he had let an unfavorable opinion of his treatment reach Napoleon's ears.

Of other friends or lieutenants of Moreau, Richepaure had died in Guadaloupe, Decaen and Lecombe were in the West Indies. Neither Vandamme nor Suchet had yet established their reputations; and the same must be stated of numerous leaders in the forthcoming wars bearing familiar names in military history.

And at the head of this devoted band of marshals and generals, ready to do or dare at their chief's command, stood Napoleon himself, perhaps a trifle sterner in demeanor than when Talleyrand noted his appearance after his first successful campaign under the Directory in 1796, but there still remained the "charming" countenance, "fine eyes," pallid and

“almost consumptive look,” which, combined with the constant “halo of victory” which surrounded him, rendered this extraordinary individual ever interesting to those around him.

At the moment when he was gathering this vast trained host around him, Napoleon was full of antagonism and hatred to England, the foe he had hitherto been unable to strike vitally, and with whom he had resolved to wrestle unto the political death which he found at St. Helena. But in 1805 the peril was imminent and real for the sea-girt isle.

It is impossible to read carefully the correspondence of Decrès, the Minister of Marine, with the Emperor, regarding the naval preparations for invasion of England (remembering at the same time what was going on in the French ports, including those of Holland, and in 1805 those of Spain, as well as at Boulogne), without having to admit that Napoleon’s sanguine hopes of holding the Channel with a superior force for a time were not altogether groundless.

Depending, as the Emperor’s calculations were, on the variations of winds and weather, together with the movements of watchful and admittedly skilful opponents, who were to be deceived and decoyed in an opposite direction to that taken by the Toulon fleet when it escaped to sea, the whole scheme was admittedly problematical and depended for success on the commanders of the several squadrons being daring, capable and fortunate all at once.

The two admirals, whom Napoleon chiefly trusted,

were *Latouche Tréville* and *Brioux*. The former was in the Emperor's opinion the most daring of his naval officers, and possessed a long experience in the West Indies and the Mediterranean. In A. D. 1801, when a flotilla for the invasion of England was designed at Boulogne, he had successfully foiled Nelson himself when the British admiral was attempting to destroy the newly invented gunboats.

Latouche Tréville was intended by Napoleon to get out of Toulon with ten ships by persuading Nelson, then watching that port, that another expedition to Egypt was pending. A camp formed on the hills above the town was intended to give color to such an idea.

The French admiral, released from Nelson's surveillance, was desired by Napoleon to sail for Rochefort, where six vessels, under Missiessy, would join him, and the sixteen sail of the line were to make for the Channel and appear outside Boulogne to escort the flotilla to England.

This, says M. Thiers, was the first conception of Napoleon, but one that he soon changed as involving inadequate naval means.

The gallant Latouche Tréville never had the opportunity of testing his powers, for he died at Toulon in August, 1804, of a disease contracted in St. Domingo and rendered acute by catching cold at night in the signal station erected above the harbor.

Napoleon had a wide choice before him when he replaced Latouche Tréville at the head of the Toulon

fleet. He would have desired to entrust it to Brioux's safekeeping, but that officer was in such weak health that he never accepted another command.

Available French admirals of reputation—none of whom were apparently trusted by the Emperor—were eleven in number.

*Decrès*, Minister of Marine ; between him and Napoleon a long correspondence was kept up, which is now in the French archives, and has been published. From part of it M. Thiers wrote his account of the French preparations for the invasion of Great Britain.

*Ganteaume* was the admiral in command at Brest, *Missiessy* at Rochefort, where *Lallemand* succeeded.

*Dumanoir*, afterwards celebrated for his ill-fortune in not getting his division into action at Trafalgar ; *Villaret*, *Bourdon*, *Magon*, *Rosily*, *Linois*, the victor of Algeciras ; and finally *Villeneuve*, whom the Emperor and Decrès chose, after full consideration, to take the chief part in the naval assault on England. It is a Bonapartist tradition that the deaths of Latouche Tréville and Brioux sealed the fate of Napoleon's project, which could only have succeeded in the hands of a captain ready to tempt fate amidst the gloom of uncertainty and against great odds. For the necessarily hasty ship-building, which had been resorted to in the ports from Antwerp to Brest and on every stream in France, had not resulted in turning out work of the highest class, although it had doubtless very properly and when most required ministered to the needs of unemployed workmen all along the coast.

Napoleon's own words to Decrès of April 21, 1804, written from St. Cloud, must here illustrate my meaning :

“ There are many unemployed workmen in Provence and there will be many more at Bayonne and Bordeaux ; therefore collect three thousand workmen at Antwerp. Stores from the north, wood, iron, everything reaches there.

“ If we were three years at war, we ought still to build twenty-five vessels there. Everywhere else this is impossible. We want a navy, and we cannot be considered to have one till we have *a hundred* ships. We must have them in five years. If, as I think, ships can be built at Havre, two must be put on the stocks there. Two new ones must also be begun at Rochefort, and two more at Toulon, the four last mentioned should, I think, be three-deckers.

“ The flotilla will soon be complete everywhere. It is necessary therefore to find employment for that host of workmen at Nantes, Bordeaux, Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, etc. We must consequently begin building frigates, brigs and tenders. It is necessary, as a matter of public spirit, that the workmen on the coast be not allowed to die of hunger, and that the seaward departments, which have been the least friendly to the Revolution, be made to perceive that the time approaches when the sea will also be our domain.”

But the weak side of Napoleon's projected descent on England in 1804-5 consisted in the fact that he



could not, as he believed, wait five months, let alone the five years he admitted to be necessary for the attainment of that numerical equality at sea with his island enemy, without which a lucky chance was requisite to secure victory.

For numbers of line-of-battle ships and frigates might be created without securing efficiency, as Villeneuve found out on his famous cruise with Gravina, the Spanish Admiral, to Martinique and the West Indies.

The ships demanded by the French Emperor were badly built, of indifferent iron and wood, and worse manned, and sailing under such circumstances became useless in the first gale. Indeed, Villeneuve's own letter on this head, published by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, should be perused before Napoleon's eventual condemnation of his naval chief is indorsed by posterity. But I desire here to briefly set forth the naval situation in 1805, clearly and without prejudice to the two great nations straining for maritime supremacy.

Pierre Charles de Villeneuve, born in 1763, and entering the French Navy in 1778, rapidly rose to the rank of rear-admiral. He commanded a division at the battle of the Nile, and escaped with several ships from that memorable conflict.

After once eluding Nelson's blockade, but being cast back to Toulon in a storm, he received further orders of a definite character from the Emperor, dated March 2, 1805, which were to make the best

of his way to Martinique, call for Admiral Gravina at Cadiz to unite with the Spanish squadron there, and wait forty days for Ganteaume on arrival in the West Indies. The latter was at the same time ordered, it must be remembered, to get out of Brest with his twenty-one vessels, taking advantage of the first equinoctial gale to elude the English fleet under Lord Cornwallis, which, under such circumstances, and having regard to the prevalent winds in March and April, would not be able to observe a perpetual blockade. Ganteaume was then to proceed to Ferrol, pick up the Spanish squadron there and go with it to Martinique, where he would meet Villeneuve's fleet and also that of Missiessy, which had already escaped from Rochefort.

In all there would then be assembled forty sail of the line, which were to return to Europe forthwith and make Boulogne roads their trysting-place.

Villeneuve succeeded a second time in eluding Nelson at Toulon, which harbor he left on March 30, 1805, with twelve line-of-battle ships and six frigates. Touching at Carthagen and Cadiz, where Admiral Gravina joined him with six semi-prepared Spanish battle-ships, three of which were unable to accompany him the whole way, the French admiral, so far, had carried out Napoleon's instructions to the letter.

Nelson, on the other hand, was waiting for Villeneuve between the coasts of Sardinia and Africa, but learnt by April 16, which direction the French fleet had taken. Detained by contrary winds, he did

not set out from Gibraltar on his pursuit with eight ships of the line and three frigates until the 13th of May.

Ganteaume, as it happened, experienced uniformly calm weather in the spring of 1805, so that Lord Cornwallis sealed the port of Brest up effectively with his fleet. In consequence of this inevitable delay, Napoleon issued orders to Villeneuve by the frigate *La Topaze* on March 8, 1805, telling that admiral not to await Ganteaume but to return immediately to Europe, passing by Ferrol, where he would find fifteen French and Spanish ships awaiting him.

At the head of thirty-five vessels he was to attack Lord Cornwallis outside Brest, and, breaking the blockade, take Ganteaume's twenty ships with him to Boulogne, where, if all went well, they would appear fifty-five strong.

Villeneuve had, however, several alternatives allowed him in his orders, viz., that of going straight to Boulogne, or—a more feasible plan, one would think—of resting contented with the twenty-five ships of Missiessy and his own combined and, seeking a route whereby, doubling Scotland and sailing along the east coast, he would reach Boulogne through the Straits of Calais. There was also the alternative of doubling Ireland with the prospect of encountering a British fleet off Cork.

On June 10, Villeneuve, with General Lauriston attached to his person by the Emperor as an adviser, commenced his voyage to Ferrol from the West Indies.

Nelson, when he learnt that the French fleet had returned to Europe, set off in pursuit on June 13, and took the precaution of sending his fastest brig, the *Curious*, to Plymouth in order to acquaint the British Admiralty with Villeneuve's approach. The *Curious* saw the French fleet on its way, and, verifying the direction in which it had been sailing, left it half becalmed, but itself catching a favorable wind reached Plymouth on July 9.

Six days later, a fleet under Sir Robert Calder of fifteen first-class battle-ships was on its way to arrest Villeneuve's progress close to Cape Finisterre.

On the 22d of July, about fifty leagues from that point, the two fleets came into contact and a battle ensued. The numerical superiority was on the side of France and Spain, whose twenty battle-ships and seven frigates were opposed to England's fifteen line-of-battle ships, several of the former being three-deckers carrying one hundred guns.

A fog came on in the afternoon, which obscured the struggle of individual vessels from the rival commanders, and the French aver that their rear (which comprised the Rochefort division) under Magon, a notoriously gallant officer, never got into action, owing to the British line comprising fewer sail and therefore being less extended; also that, owing to the mist, which lifted about 6 P. M., Magon had no opportunity of coming to Villeneuve's assistance.

The English Admiral did not renew the fight having

dealt havoc amongst the Spanish contingent and captured two disabled line-of-battle ships, while two of his own vessels, including the Windsor, were partially dismasted and in tow. The French, on the other hand, had not only wounded men on board but many sick from fever contracted in the West Indies. To a certain degree, Villeneuve's battle-ships had suffered during the action, but not to the extent of those of Spain under Gravina. It should not be forgotten that when, after visiting Vigo, the combined fleet gained Ferrol and went into harbor there—to use M. Thiers' words—"All the captains who had been in the action were anxious to refit."

Moreover, "the whole squadron was thus detained for forty-five days."

Villeneuve found orders from Napoleon and Decrès enjoining him to sail to Brest forthwith and liberate Ganteaume, and when at last the Franco-Spanish squadron again put to sea reinforced by nine Spanish ships it had reached the total of twenty-nine vessels.

Such a fleet, allowed by M. Thiers to "merit every confidence," and approved enthusiastically by Villeneuve himself, should not surely have been deflected from its goal, as M. Lanfrey tells us it was, by a merchant vessel giving a report that a British fleet twenty-five strong was approaching.

At all events Villeneuve no longer hesitated, but, veering to the south and turning his back on Brest, made sail for Cadiz.

And so ended Napoleon's great project for bringing a Franco-Spanish fleet into the British Channel to join the assembled Dutch squadron, and cover the advance of his flat-bottomed flotilla, laden with 130,000 picked soldiers of France, towards the shores of Kent, so allowing Marmont to issue out of the Scheldt with a reinforcement of 27,000 more.

There is a divergence of opinion amongst naval writers as to the conduct of Villeneuve on this occasion, and his strongest justification will be found in Decrès' letter to the Emperor, which is dated August 22, 1805, wherein he expresses his private opinion that the inevitable issue of any such attempt on the Channel, after the English Admiralty had been warned of the design, could but lead to "great catastrophes." Before Sir Robert Calder's action Decrès had thought otherwise, as his official orders found at Ferrol demonstrate. The evidence as to the strength and dispositions of the several available British fleets is of a conflicting character, the account of M. Thiers contradicting Lanfrey in important particulars. But to the writer it seems that, while it was impossible that Villeneuve could have reached the Channel without fighting desperate battles either outside of Brest or near Boulogne, he might just as well have risked his fleet for the original purpose for which it was gathered together as see it destroyed later in the year at Trafalgar for no urgent reason except because Napoleon ordered him to Naples to support St. Cyr's attack on that kingdom.

That, if he had avoided Brest and doubled Scotland late in August, there would have been ships to encounter him in the Channel, is proved by Admiral Verhuell, commander of the Dutch flotilla, meeting with numerous opponents, including line-of-battle ships, when rounding Cape Grisnez in July of this crucial year, 1805.

Moreover, it should be remembered that Nelson himself had reached Portsmouth with two battle-ships, so his counsel was at the command of the Admiralty as well as his sword.

But Napoleon, who had originally thought sixteen sail of the line sufficient to open the Channel for a few hours, naturally fumed and denounced Villeneuve for failing to utilize twenty-nine such vessels at Ferrol. The Emperor's letter from Boulogne on August 22, 1805, to Villeneuve is sufficient to tell how deep must have been his chagrin and disappointment when he knew the fleet was at Cadiz.

"I hope, Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, that you are arrived at Brest. Set out, lose not a moment, bring my united squadrons into the Channel and England is ours.

"Be here but for twenty-four hours, and all is ended."

To the Emperor it was nothing that the British Admiralty had been warned, and indeed he never seemed to realize that fact until it was brought to his notice by Decrès' pertinacity.

In the end, the project of invading England was

deferred until after the campaign against the fast gathering European coalition, and Decrès' advice was not that of permanently abandoning the scheme, but deferring it.

Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, it may be declared that France, in alliance with Spain, possessed a fleet of great strength, capable of improvement, and likely to be reinforced; and at such a moment as September, 1805, this adjunct to the military forces of the Empire, which were already numerous and powerful, could not but prove encouraging to the Emperor, whenever he found time to reflect on the whole situation, which was apparently not the case before Trafalgar.

But if the fleets of France and Spain needed but time to render them formidable combatants with the Island rulers of the waves, there was no military acumen needed to tell how powerful an engine of military offence Napoleon wielded in the autumn of 1805, when at last it became necessary for him to prepare to meet the coalition of the European powers, skilfully welded together by Mr. Pitt, whose return to power was almost concurrent with the establishment of the French Empire.

Whether the exact numbers directed upon Bavaria touched the 200,000 declared by Lanfrey's research to have been available, or if the more moderate estimates of Alison and Thiers be credited, at the very least 180,000 men, perfect in discipline and physical condition, and possessing military science beyond the



average of contemporary armies, converged upon that part of Germany, where their great commander discerned his best chance of being overwhelmingly strong in the presence of paralyzed opponents.

It should be remembered that Napoleon, being a specialist in artillery, had not been content with manœuvring on the shores near Boulogne, without going forth fully equipped in this most necessary arm of the service, while the Imperial Guards, 8,000 strong, that were to have been first to set foot on the soil of Kent, had to exercise the marching qualities which constant attention to bodily condition fitted them to perform equally with the picked Italian regiments, which Napoleon longed to display to the wondering eyes of his British foes.

The eight corps of cavalry under Murat were also magnificently caparisoned, nor could the Austrians themselves claim superiority in this, their special arm of service.

It is not beyond the scope of the present chapter to tell how this notable host could never have continued in arms and stood fully prepared in time of need, had not their Imperial Chieftain been himself a financier, and so economized and improved the resources of the richest European nation, by timely adjustment of taxation, that at last France possessed a contented peasantry, attached to the soil. This explains the exceptional character of the offensive strength which Napoleon possessed when the European coalition of 1805 was formed against France,

It is true that the rapid increase in the military and naval expenditure of France, before the campaign in Germany, was bringing about a financial crisis such as could only be assuaged by making the enemy provide requisite funds through contributions; but the resources of the country were nevertheless increasing steadily.

## CHAPTER XII.

## STORM CLOUDS BURSTING OVER EUROPE (1).

THE COALITION OF 1806.—TRAFALGAR AND AUSTERLITZ.—  
COUNT COBENZEL.—COUNT HAUGWITZ.—DEATHS OF MR.  
PITT AND LORD NELSON.

I WOULD gladly take up the pen to write of some other supreme continental ruler than Napoleon Bonaparte, and see that title yielded up to the accomplished and imaginative Alexander I. of Russia, linked together by the garlands of victory with the modest, but sensible, Francis I., Emperor of Austria, for such had been his title since 1805, when it was adopted with the concurrence of Europe and the congratulations of the French Government. Still better would it have been for the world if the supremacy of military strength and skill had reverted to Berlin, when the high-minded and honored Frederick William III. and his beloved consort, Queen Louisa, had sustained the integrity of their own dominions, and, by placing a timely check upon foreign aggression, likewise preserved peace amongst the nations. That such an outcome was possible when the French first essayed to invade Hanover has often been contended by the

school of the patriotic and wise Stein, although, unless the struggle that must have followed had assumed the complexion of one waged for the defence of Germany as a whole, the relative strength of Napoleon's army and that of Frederick William III. could not be favorable to the latter, so far as numbers or leadership were concerned.

Even in 1803 France possessed the most effective and numerous force, and, just as in 1805-6, it was commanded by the first captain of the day; but during the latter period Baden, Würtemberg and Bavaria were ranged on the side of France.

Mr. Pitt, when he undertook to bring the European powers into line again in 1805, received but a qualified reception at the hands of Prussia, whose statesmen, Baron Hardenberg in particular, thought that by a policy of non-intervention, and even one of inclination towards France, peace might be preserved, and the aggressive policy of Napoleon held in check. It is remarkable, moreover, that Baron Haugwitz, who has always, with truth, been previously cited as the apostle of Prussian surrender, did not agree with his former coadjutor in the conduct of foreign affairs, who was henceforth mainly responsible for the course of events so far as Prussia could guide them; indeed Haugwitz seems, on this occasion, to have favored the coalition against France.

The late Mr. Fyffe states this fact, derived from original documents, in his *History of Modern Europe*, and it shall be emphasized in these pages because no

character during the Napoleonic wars has been more justly criticised for untimely concessions, made on behalf of Prussia, than Baron Haugwitz, and it will be shortly seen how heavy is the burden his memory must still bear in connection with the terrible catastrophe so soon to shake the throne, once tenanted by Frederick the Great, to its very foundation. He seems, however, to have had grave doubts as to Prussia separating herself from Russia, Austria, England and Sweden. Mr. Pitt found that, although the murder of the Duc d'Enghien had led Frederick William to abandon all idea of an alliance with France, yet on the whole his attitude would remain that of neutrality.

Within a brief period of hostilities breaking out, Napoleon boldly offered Hanover to Prussia as a consideration to be given in return for an active alliance between Frederick William and himself.

Hardenberg, following his above-named inclination towards a French alliance, as that whereby Prussia and Europe could alone secure permanent peace, advised his sovereign to close with Napoleon's offer. Frederick William III., however, hesitated to enter on a course which involved the possibility of immediate conflict with Russia, Austria, Sweden and England.

The Emperor Alexander, who once felt grateful to Napoleon for placing a check upon the Revolution and admired his talents, had received the news of the Duc d'Enghien's murder with feelings of grief and

indignation, which he expressed by receiving the French Ambassador in mourning, and causing his whole court to wear it also ; nor did these sentiments tend to reconcile the Czar to the various continental aggressions for which France had become responsible.

When, however, desired to join the coalition, Alexander endeavored to secure the rendition of Malta to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem by England, as provided in the treaty of Amiens, and, according to M. Thiers, Mr. Pitt's negotiations seemed likely to fall through so far as Russia was concerned unless the English gave way on this head. But just when a deadlock seemed most likely, Napoleon unveiled his intention of absorbing the Republic of Genoa in the French Empire in order to enlist the Genoese sailors in his fleet, and this lawless action turned the scale against France at St. Petersburg, so that the vast resources of Russia were added to those of England and such other powers as Mr. Pitt might attract to the allied camp.

Austria at first hesitated to give ear to the diplomatic agents of Mr. Pitt, not because she was backward in desiring to strike a blow for the liberties of Europe, and protect her own imperilled interests in Italy, but because her finances had declined to such a low ebb that if Imperial troops were to take the field it must not be with hopes raised by mere promises of monetary help, but by guaranteed material assistance of a substantial character.

This need being promptly supplied by England,

the armies of the Emperor Francis were speedily placed on a war footing, hostile measures against France being welcomed by the party to which Count Cobenzel, the First Minister, belonged. The Austrians held that the treaty of Luneville had been contemptuously and flagrantly infringed by Napoleon when, ignoring his promise to preserve the constitution of the Trans-Alpine Republic, he was crowned King of Italy in Milan Cathedral in June, 1805, and utilized the crown of Charlemagne for that purpose. Nor had the incorporation of Genoa in the French Empire, and the extinction of the Republic of Lucca, increased the friendly relations existing between these two countries.

One other nation, Sweden, was prompt to join in the third coalition against France in 1805.

Gustavus IV. had ascended the throne when his father, Gustavus III., was assassinated in 1792: although the hostility to the French Republican principles, which had led that monarch to coalesce with Spain and threaten invasion of France, was not indulged in by his successor, yet the mock trial and death of the Duc d'Enghien so enraged the Swedish king that he vowed eternal hostility to Napoleon. Not only did Gustavus break off diplomatic relations with France, but he returned the King of Prussia the order of the Black Eagle, with which the French Emperor had also been invested, saying that he never could, according to the laws of knighthood, consent to be brother companion of an assassin. Gladly then

did Gustavus IV. embrace the opportunity of giving rein to his hostile sentiments against Imperial France by agreeing to put Stralsund into defensive order, and by finding ten thousand men to join an English force and operate jointly with it in an attempt to recover Hanover.

England agreed to pay at the rate of £12 10s. per annum for each man, and £50,000 to spend at Stralsund.

To enable Russia and Austria to bring their forces into the field, Great Britain also promised to find £1,250,000 for every 100,000 of regular troops brought into the field, while the payment of an identical sum was forthwith made to Austria, who after the campaign commenced was to receive monthly instalments until the whole preliminary payment, under the name of "*Première mise en campagne*" should reach three millions.

In return the Emperor of Austria promised to produce 320,000 effective soldiers. Russia was also one way and another to employ 180,000 men, either on or beyond her frontiers.

The objects to be obtained by this coalition are thus stated in Alison's *History of Europe*, Chapter 39, 2d edition of 1839, where also is to be found the detailed information regarding the finance from which I have quoted :

- (1) The evacuation of Hanover.
- (2) The establishment of the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland.



(3) The re-establishment of the kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont.

(4) The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, together with the Island of Elba, by the French.

(5) The establishment of an order of things in Europe which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the several states. It will be observed that Belgium was to remain French, and the left bank of the Rhine in the same hands.

This portentous programme was indeed worth some sacrifice to attain, and Mr. Pitt appraised it so highly that the wealth of England was freely dispensed for that high purpose, and critics of such methods of conducting war must remember that the European coalition was opposed to a conqueror, who, for the first time in modern history, had made war pay by the dual process of quartering huge armies on the conquered countries, and at the same time denuding them of their most costly treasures.

The French Emperor's views on making war profitable may be seen in the third volume of Lanfrey's *History of Napoleon* (edition 1886), page 40.

John Bull, by putting his hand thus freely in his pocket, so ordered it that pillage of art galleries and undue contributions on private persons or public communities were not temptations to which his allies were exposed. On paper this great combination appeared superior in numbers to the army of Napoleon, the character of which I endeavored to de-

scribe in the last chapter; but the contingents of the minor states were not practically available, and to count 35,000 men from Hanover, Sardinia and Naples, as part of the 500,000 soldiers that the coalition relied on in the last instance, was to reckon upon the help of these as a reserve which obviously could not be brought into action so long as the French occupied two of those countries, and was in a position to invade the other.

Much depended on the campaign in Bavaria, where the Austrians, under General Mack, commenced a forward movement on the Inn, some weeks before Napoleon was assured that Villeneuve had retired to Cadiz with his fleet, and could not appear at Boulogne to protect the invading flotilla on its voyage to England.

Imperialist forces were also concentrating on the Adige, presumably directed against Masséna's army of 50,000 men, left in Italy by Napoleon in order to protect that country governed by Prince Eugène Beauharnais as Viceroy. Talleyrand's protests against these movements led to angry contention between the Cabinets of Paris and Vienna, so that, taking into consideration expressions in Napoleon's own letters which convey his intention to employ "the Army of England" against Austria under certain eventualities, it becomes clear that the advance upon Germany by forced marches, the details of which he dictated straight off to Duroc, was really part of a long-matured and well-digested scheme. It is

necessary to consult a map carefully before it becomes possible to realize how much farther the Muscovite armies in the heart of Russia had to march to reach Bavaria than the most distant of Napoleon's battalions at Brest.

Indeed, it was the end of October, and after Ulm had fallen, that Kutusoff, with a force of thirty thousand men which had been located near the Russian frontier, reached the Inn.

How much less reason ever existed that the unfortunate General Mack could look for timely succor at the hands of Alexander's legions!

Napoleon's movements were as swift as well considered, and he availed himself thereby of the "blunder," which Talleyrand says in his *Memoirs* he considers the Austrians were guilty of when they failed to await the arrival on the Inn "of the Emperor Alexander and his hundred thousand Russians," for then "Prussia would have been infallibly drawn into the coalition."

It must be remembered, on the other hand, that Mack believed that his presence in Bavaria might determine the wavering action of the Elector of Bavaria, whose army of twenty-five thousand men was an important factor at this conjuncture, and although this force ultimately joined the French at Würzburg it is not fair to charge to the Austrians, as Talleyrand does, a mere "desire to show that they alone were able to engage in the struggle and win the day." But how it came to pass that Mack, having ensconced

himself in Ulm, was not better informed, by cavalry vedettes and scouts, of the fact that he was gradually being surrounded by French forces on all sides, and that Bernadotte was marching with his corps d'armée over the neutral Prussian territory of Anspach to complete the investiture of Ulm, has never been elucidated.

The Aulic Council of the Austrian Empire, finding that after three years' efforts of the Archduke Charles to reform the Imperial Army to his satisfaction, the task had been relinquished by that great commander, placed at the head of the War Office General Mack, who was considered the most scientific strategist available, and who was chosen to the command in Bavaria despite the fact that on the last occasion when he appeared in the field, at Naples, he suffered a check which was attributed to ill-fortune. Moreover, it had since been discovered that England and Russia were both anxious to see Mack in a prominent command, Mr. Pitt especially crediting the reports of his talent for war. As regards the situation, Napoleon, when he reached Stuttgart, had no false illusions, for he wrote to Talleyrand: "I am acquainted with Mack's movements; these are all that I could desire. He will be caught in Ulm like a fool." Historians, dealing with this period, have sometimes taken the capitulation of Ulm, after its investment by Napoleon's forces, so much for granted, that they have omitted to narrate the striking opening phases of the campaign, involving deeds of arms worthy of reputa-

tions such as those of Ney and Mortier, the former gaining his Dukedom of Elchingen at the bridge of that name, which he repaired under fire and then crossed, afterwards driving a large body of Austrians back on Ulm, after a sanguinary conflict. Mortier, on the other hand, fought his way through a vastly superior force of Imperialists, when destruction or surrender stared him in the face. But more than one victorious combat in the country surrounding Ulm was attributable to the presence of Murat with his eight thousand cavalry, which on one occasion enveloped four thousand Austrian infantry at Vertingen, and destroyed them as a fighting force. At Memmingen, four thousand Austrians, destitute of provisions, laid down their arms when surrounded by Soult's corps, but generally speaking the soldiers of the Emperor Francis acted with their wonted bravery and devotedness. Napoleon himself underwent extraordinary fatigue, never relaxing his energies until he stood on the heights of Michelsberg, which, with those of Les Tuileries, command every part of Ulm; and it is said he did not take off his clothes for nearly three days. The endurance of body, allied to vigor of mind, displayed by the great captain in this campaign, is more remarkable when it is remembered that, when giving his last personal instruction to Talleyrand at Paris, he was seized, as will be seen in the *Memoirs*, with some kind of fit, during which he lost consciousness, but as to which, soon recovering, he enjoined silence on the diplomatist.

Mack was in a hopeless condition at Ulm after the French seized the key of the position on the heights of the Michelsberg, whence Napoleon beheld the town crowded with troops within half-cannon shot of where he stood.

The Archduke Ferdinand had succeeded in cutting his way to the Bohemian frontier, but this dividing of forces precluded that general sortie and retreat to the Tyrol, which Napoleon was prepared to see his enemy attempt. When summoned to surrender Ulm, Mack assumed that the Russians were far on the march to his assistance, and stipulated that if his garrison gave themselves up unconditionally the following day Marshal Ney's corps of occupation should not evacuate Ulm until five days later—miserable terms, sooner than submit to which the 30,000 brave men thus trapped and forced to surrender would gladly have fought on to the bitter end.

Then occurred a scene, happily not repeated until the later years of the century, when fortresses at Metz and Sedan, containing armies far more numerous than that of Mack, capitulated to vast hosts environing the defenders' means of exit, and commanding their ramparts.

It has not been customary, within the last few decades of the nineteenth century, to subject brave men to the humiliation of piling their arms before a conqueror. No such sacrifices were demanded of the French at Sedan in 1870 at the hands of Prussia, or of the brave Turks at Plevna in 1877 by Russia.

Napoleon at Ulm, on the other hand, surrounded by his staff, and standing by a bivouac fire on an elevation north of the city, occupied several hours in beholding the officers and soldiers of the Emperor Francis file before him.

Addressing his captives he gave incidental admonition to his "brother, the Emperor of Germany," enjoining him to make peace speedily, remembering "that there are limits to all Empires, however powerful." Moreover, he added this, October 20, 1805, being the very day before the Battle of Trafalgar, "I want nothing on the Continent, there are ships, colonies, and commerce which I desire."

It is not untimely that, at this conjuncture of events, the alleged justification of Napoleon for his aggression in Europe which made the third coalition take up arms, should be stated as extracted from various sources. It is as follows ·

The conquests of Great Britain in India and the Mediterranean, as well as those of Russia in the Crimea, the Caucasus and Poland, should (he maintained) have reconciled those two powers to France seeking compensation elsewhere; and if she had chosen to preserve her conquests, half of Austria, Holland, Switzerland and Naples would have belonged to her before the war commenced.

Napoleon went on, however, to contend that the Adige and the Rhine were the real limits of his country, and the trend of events was soon to show

how far this alleged guiding principle influenced his conduct.

For the events at Ulm were destined to deal a deadly blow at the European combination, joined under the ægis of England's patriot statesman, Mr. Pitt, to whom the reception of the news undoubtedly gave a shock which so lowered the great Minister's already weakened constitution, that his energies visibly relaxed directly the defeat of Mack was confirmed.

It was in company with Lord Mulgrave, the Foreign Secretary, that Mr. Pitt first heard of Mack's surrender, which they could scarcely credit, until shortly after a full account reached the Foreign Office by means of a Dutch paper.

The consternation which ensued can only be realized by contemplation of the fact that General Mack, who actually possessed certain organizing abilities, had been credited by the English ministry with a unique grasp of military operations—an illusion which vanished before the stern touch of war; and so the surrender of Ulm really gave Pitt the shock once attributed to Austerlitz. It should, however, be remembered that if the British Minister, himself a volunteer soldier, made too high an estimate of General Mack, he had shared the opinion with the Austrian War Office, while Prince Metternich vouched for the vanquished general's accredited faculty for administrative detail.

Napoleon pressed forward upon Vienna after Ulm



had capitulated, and reaching that city with his army practically intact, and when no Austrian force was within striking distance of the capital, the question of its occupation by the French was only that of days. For, although the Archduke Charles had hastened to the rescue with 80,000 men, he had at first to contend with Masséna's pursuit, and afterwards chose retreat into Hungary when it became known that Mack's army had been destroyed as a fighting force.

General Kutusoff, with 30,000 Russians, had also reached the Inn, but retired into Moravia to meet expected reserves, the retreat being conducted with remarkable skill.

The consequence was that the campaign could only be brought to a close by Napoleon winning a great pitched battle against forces at least as numerous as his own, nay even, as the event proved at Austerlitz, superior.

Kutusoff, the successor of Suwarrow in command of the Russian armies, was sixty years of age at this period, and had learnt the art of war at Strasburg. Entering the Russian army in 1759, he served successively against Poland and Turkey, showing great gallantry at the siege of Oczacoff, and gained his lieutenant-generalship at the storming of Ismail. His qualities as a leader were destined to be sorely tried in Moravia, but, despite the dissipation of the European coalition against Napoleon which the events of 1805 brought about,

General Kutusoff's reputation remained unsullied. It must be remembered that, however threatening the situation might outwardly appear to Napoleon's future prospects before Austerlitz, yet the surrender of Ulm and the occupation of Vienna had given the French armies a quite unprecedented prestige, so that the enthusiasm and devotion of officers and men had been raised to such a pitch that it approached the level demanded by that extraordinary individual, the French Emperor, before whose all-conquering advance Vienna had yielded, that capital city which had turned back the tide of Ottoman invasion in the seventeenth century and had never before known the tread of a foreign foe.

This victory had, moreover, been rendered more secure by Murat and Lannes seizing the bridge over the Danube by stratagem before the Austrian engineers could destroy it, so that egress and ingress were afforded to the French during the coming occupation.

It is a remarkable fact that Napoleon took up his quarters in the Imperial Palace of Schönbrunn just after his future wife, Marie Louise, had escaped to join her father at Olmütz.

On the other hand the prospects of the allies did not appear altogether unpromising if unity in council, patience and skill were evinced by those guiding the Emperors Alexander and Francis.

The whole of the Austrian army had not been obliterated at Ulm, and the Archduke Charles was in Hungary with 80,000 men whose military efficiency

had been tried by hard and not unsuccessful fighting with Masséna's army in Italy. Reinforcements from Russia did actually reach Kutusoff, which increased the number of Muscovites under his command to 68,000 men, so that with 14,000 Austrians the allied forces reached the total of 82,000.

General Bennigsen was also approaching from Russia with additional troops, while it really did seem to be true that Prussia was about to join the coalition against France.

Frederick William III. had at last become greatly incensed at the infringement of his territory at Anspach by the French, and all the portents were indicative of a limit having been reached to meekness under Napoleonic provocations at Berlin.

On October 25, 1805, occurred the historic meeting at Berlin between Alexander and Frederick William. Travelling as the Comte du Nord, the Czar desired to learn how far he could depend on the Prussian armies during the campaign which had opened so disastrously at Ulm, and whether the illegal conduct of Bernadotte in marching his troops at Napoleon's express command through the neutralized territory of Anspach really had at last fired the latent spirit of that still great military power which owed its prominence in this particular to Frederick the Great.

The answer came, so far as it was possible to discover, in the famous visit of the two sovereigns to the grave of the man who revived the Prussian State, and had only died some twenty years previously.

When then Alexander took leave of Frederick William and Queen Louisa, as Sir George Jackson, the British Ambassador to Berlin, writing in his diaries of the period, tells us he did "in the vault where Frederick the Great's remains are deposited," the two monarchs had agreed to the Treaty of Potsdam signed on that same November 3, within one month of the battle of Austerlitz.

By this treaty "Prussia undertook to demand from Napoleon an indemnity for the king of Piedmont; and the evacuation of Germany, Switzerland and Holland; failing Napoleon's acceptance on these terms 180,000 men were to take the field." I quote the words, from Mr. Fyffe's *Modern Europe*, because within these plausible terms of agreement any amount of delay seemed possible, and as a matter of fact what really resulted was that the Prussian army was recalled from the line of the Vistula, and placed near the confines of Bohemia, so that it might fall on the retreating French after the coming conflict should have closed in a presumable victory for the allies.

The drama played out around Olmütz and Brunn proved how much trust could then be placed in Hohenzollern diplomacy. On November 18, when preparing an advance on the allies at Znaim in Moravia, Napoleon, on sitting down to dinner, received a despatch which Berthier communicated to him.

It contained an outline of the disaster at Trafalgar, the fact that he no longer possessed a "fleet in being,"

and that Lord Nelson had fallen in the hour of victory, one day after Ulm surrendered.

To quote Lanfrey: "He displayed no emotion," but wrote to Decrès, saying "that he should wait for more particulars before he formed a definite opinion upon the nature of this affair, and that it would moreover in no way change his plan of cruising."

The design of invading England had thenceforth to be superseded by that of persuading the Continent to refuse her manufactures, and hold no commercial dealings with her.

Such a plan of commercial exclusion had not been decided upon definitely before October 21st and its catastrophe to the French navy, brought about by Napoleon's peremptory orders to the gallant Ville-neuve. Decrès had thought it quite possible to get command of the Channel by a timely ruse, provided the best ships of the French fleet were selected for the purpose; and it is conceivable that had Villeneuve remained at Cadiz, Napoleon might have chosen to return to Boulogne, where he had left Brune at the head of twenty-five thousand men, instead of making the campaign of Jena. But as, owing to the Battle of Trafalgar on October 21, 1805, England's shores were no longer subject to sudden invasion during the Napoleonic wars, it is surely allowable to claim for Lord Nelson, the greatest seaman of the nineteenth century, the title of "Continental Ruler."

The full measure of injury done to the sea power of France by the Battle of Trafalgar will be best

realized by recording that Villeneuve left Cadiz with thirty-three vessels, and that after the storm, which occurred on the evening of the fight, and in which three retreating ships were destroyed on the rocks, eight only gained port. But if the impatience of Napoleon to try conclusions at sea with England (expressed in his letter to Decrès of November 2d, in which he said, "Let my squadrons leave. Let nothing stop them. I will not have my squadron remain in Cadiz") led to a great naval disaster, so had the course of events in Moravia, combined with the strategy adopted by the allies, conspired to promise a compensatory continental triumph to the French army.

In the first place, Napoleon deftly turned aside the ultimatum of Prussia which Count Haugwitz brought to Brunn on November 28th, by urging that discussion at Vienna, and with Talleyrand, as the accredited Minister of France, was the mode of diplomatic communication most likely to reach conclusions satisfactory to both nations.

Haugwitz, who doubtless contemplated yet another change of front, should fortune smile on the French eagles, weakly fell in with the Emperor's suggestion, and joined Talleyrand at Vienna.

Secondly, when the fear of an immediate movement on the part of Prussia was removed from Napoleon's mind, he was further encouraged by the movements of the allies being precisely those which gave him the opportunity of utilizing the grand army prepared

at Boulogne in the manner most likely to display its invincibility.

He had chosen his position between Brunn and Austerlitz at leisure some days before the conflict, indicating it as such to his staff; and although he could hardly have believed it really probable that a flank march should be so carelessly attempted for the vain purpose of cutting his communications with France, as events proved true, yet he certainly did prepare his generals for some such design.

There was clearly a lack of unity in the Russo-Austrian army, where Weyrother, another Imperial strategist of the Mack school, was allowed to override the wiser suggestion of Kutusoff that pointed to such a degree of patience being displayed as should at least give the Archduke Charles's advancing army a chance of influencing events. But a scarcity of provisions, and the consequent restlessness of the Russian troops, seem to have turned the scale in favor of challenging Napoleon to instant combat, a policy favored by the Czar, whose presence in the camp was a burden and anxiety to his generals, and, according to his wisest counsellor, Prince Adam Czartoryski, should have been avoided.

The unveiling of the "Sun of Austerlitz" from the mist of night on the wintry morning of December 2, 1805, has been ever since proverbial of Napoleon's brightest fortune, and on that day was consummated the greatest victory which one nation has achieved

over a combination of opposing powers in the nineteenth century.

The mistakes of his opponents in separating their forces were speedily punished by swift and determining blows, which the admirable concentration of the Napoleonic host rendered possible in the presence of superior forces. So obstinately did the Russians fight that, no matter what the military situation became, they simply died at their posts; nor did the horror of crowds of men sinking through ice which Napoleon's artillery played upon lead to the semblance of a general rout.

Forced off the field in the retreat which necessarily accompanied such a defeat, Sir A. Paget, the British Ambassador, coming out of Olmütz and meeting the beaten allied army, did not realize the completeness of Napoleon's triumph, and indeed, owing to no Englishman having witnessed the disasters at Austerlitz, Mr. Pitt was temporarily led, the public records tell us, to take a more hopeful view of the case than after Ulm, believing that it might, even thus late in the conflict, be possible to bring Prussia into the field.

Count Haugwitz, however, by his conduct, gave an index of the truer nature of the European situation after Austerlitz, when he approached Napoleon, on December 15th, and offered him an alliance with Prussia. Hanover, it was proposed, should be granted to that vacillating state, which in return was to cede Cleves and Neufchâtel to France, and Anspach to



Bavaria. This treaty of December 15th appears to have been originally made on Haugwitz' own responsibility, or so honorable a statesman as Hardenberg would not have told Lord Harrowby, on December 7th, the day after the news of Austerlitz arrived, that the Prussian army was to be ordered into Bohemia. That the claims of neither the English nor Russian governments for fulfilment of solemn diplomatic promises at this conjuncture moved the king's ministry at Berlin to action is, alas! as true as that a speedy and even too cruel retribution awaited that unhappy court and nation, whose woes and future hopes will be the subject of my next chapter.

Owing to the despatch of Sir A. Paget, giving an inadequate idea of the extent of the disaster to the Russo-Austrian arms at Austerlitz, the British Government still hoped against hope, Mr. Pitt, just before his end, asking whether the wind was in the east, so that Lord Harrowby might return bringing tidings of Prussia's adherence to her promises.

The chief diplomatists of the Continent were, however, swiftly apprised of the truth, Talleyrand being conducted over the field of carnage the day after the battle by Marshal Lannes, who, after pointing out the chief positions of the rival armies, could remain no longer on that scene of horror and death in which he had so lately been an actor.

Metternich at Berlin swiftly understood the nature

of the calamity to Austria, as he tells us in his autobiography, in which we also learn that Austerlitz was the place where the betrothal of the Princess de Metternich had taken place, henceforth to be associated with "sad memories." Like several other great battles Austerlitz was decided by the fate of a picked reserve brought into action at the crisis of the struggle, and pitted against similar troops of the enemy. On this occasion the Russian Imperial footguards were struggling on apparently equal terms for mastery with the division of Vandamme, when the Grand Duke Constantine in person brought 2,000 Russian Cuirassiers of the Guard to succor their brethren, breaking the French column under foot and capturing an eagle. Napoleon, however, seized the moment to launch Bessières with the cavalry of the guard upon Constantine's horsemen. "Squadron to squadron," man to man, they struggled for a brief five minutes, and then onlookers perceived that the enthusiasm of the French cavalry had overcome the determination of the Russians, after which both arms of the allied force were slowly driven back to the walls of Austerlitz.

The Emperors Alexander and Francis viewed this decisive clash of arms from a position of advantage. Among the foremost of the French was Rapp, formerly a favorite aide-de-camp of Desaix, and later of Napoleon when First Consul, who rode in the front rank of the French cavalry of the guard; and Gerard, the painter, seized the moment of Rapp's return with

his charger covered with gore to tell the French Emperor and staff of his success, for the well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz.

During that hard-fought day leading officers of the grand army especially signalized themselves by achievements worthy of their reputations: Soult more particularly, on account of his being in command on the night when the main attack on the allies was made; Davoust, Lannes, Bernadotte, Murat and Suchet were other names most bruited forth in connection with Napoleon's grandest triumph.

The French Emperor met his defeated Austrian opponent, the Emperor Francis, at a windmill on the roadside near Sarntschitz, and after two hours of friendly conversation the armistice which preceded the negotiation at Presburg was arrived at.

It has been ascertained by Lanfrey, whose correctness in figures is remarkable, that the Russians lost twenty-one thousand men, killed or wounded, the Austrians nearly six thousand, while one hundred and thirty-three guns, with many standards, were captured by the French, who also took a great many prisoners, many of whom, however, were amongst those wounded.

Alison's rough estimate of thirty thousand killed, wounded and prisoners is probably close to the mark.

As for the French losses, Napoleon's estimate in the official bulletin of eight hundred killed and one thousand five hundred wounded is clearly fallacious, and all authorities point to an approximate calcula-

tion vouched for by Lanfrey being as nearly true as is ascertainable, viz., "eight thousand five hundred men" *hors de combat*.

The decision of the Emperor Francis to treat immediately and personally with Napoleon has not then been seriously criticised from the point of view of his right to act as his advisers thought best for Austria, under the terrible circumstances in which his Empire was situated.

The Emperor Alexander was contented to withdraw his troops to Russia, being under no further engagement except the Imperial promise that they should cross the frontier, and not even Mr. Pitt, in his patriotic distress which prompted him to "roll up" the map of Europe, which would not be wanted for many years, desired to suggest that his allies, or Austria in particular, had failed to perform their portion of the compact so far as the chances of war permitted.

England, according to a Memoir presented by Austria to the British Government after the Peace of Presburg, had suggested, in concurrence with Russia, Mack's appointment to command in Germany, while no joint military demonstration, on the part of Sweden and Great Britain, took place in the north of Germany according to the original scheme of the allies, and if an error of judgment did take place in not waiting longer at Olmütz for the advance of the Archduke Charles, such shortcoming was fully counter-balanced by these latter considerations. The fact is that the nations comprising the third coalition did

not allow of Napoleon's celerity of movement which precluded the English, threatened with invasion, from appearing on the scene.

Napoleon on his part was not slow to come to terms, for he had not only staked his military reputation on the success of this campaign, but he must also have desired to be delivered from the anxiety consequent on having infringed the Constitution of France most flagrantly by disregarding the rights of the Legislative Chamber to vote supplies which had been long anticipated and spent at Boulogne, an illegality not likely to be forgiven by his enemies in the event of defeat, because a subservient Senate had condoned the omission.

Austria by the Peace of Presburg, signed within a month of Austerlitz, December 27, 1805, in addition to the loss of the Tyrol ceded to Bavaria, and Venetia to Italy, had to pay France a contribution equal to £1,600,000 of English money in addition to an equal sum levied already in the conquered districts, so that the aforementioned constitutional question was unlikely to be raised at Paris in the hour of her victory. By the Treaty of Presburg Austria thus lost two important provinces, and was separated from Italy, Switzerland and the Rhine, while the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg were at this time raised to kingly dignity by Napoleon, who took the opportunity of having German princes as active allies to create a "Confederation of the Rhine," consisting of the small potentates, lay and ecclesiastical, whose possessions, being contiguous to that Teutonic stream,

were necessarily subject to the influence of the giant power of France, the frontiers of which country, nominally bounded by the left bank of the river, practically stretched far into Germany.

This insidious means of distracting and disuniting that country had its obvious merits from a French point of view, but created a state of things which Stein, Radowitz and Bismarck successively had struggled to destroy, though sixty-five years passed ere German unity was really achieved.

But the temporary success of Napoleon's project led to the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, which fact the Emperor Francis of Austria wisely recognized on August 6, 1806. This proved to be the most striking historical change which the French Revolution brought about in Europe, when the new Western Empire whose Capital was Paris, being founded on a reaction against its excesses, gained such influence in Germany that the ancient institution, dating visibly from A. D. 800, when Charlemagne was crowned Emperor of the West by Leo III. at Rome, became so unhinged and distracted by disunion, that its constitution fell to pieces.

In the thirteenth century seven Princes assumed the right of nominating the Emperor, and were as follows: The Archbishops of Mayence, Trèves and Cologne, the King of Bohemia (represented by Austria), the Elector of Brandenburg (represented by Prussia) and the Elector of Saxony, together with the Elector Palatine. An eighth Elector, that

of Bavaria, was added A. D. 1648, and a ninth (Hanover) A. D. 1692.

The Elector Palatine, acquiring Bavaria in A. D. 1777, reduced the number to eight.

At the Treaty of Luneville, in January, A. D. 1801, two of the Ecclesiastical Electorates, viz., Trèves and Cologne, were suppressed as well as secularized at the instance of the victorious First Consul of France, but Mentz (Mayence) was permitted to retain an Electoral Vote exercised in practice by the Prince Dalberg, an adherent of Napoleon, who also then created three fresh Electors of Baden, Wurtemberg and Hesse. Under these arrangements Austria was not completely dispossessed of the position gained for her by the Pragmatic Sanction of 1439, which placed the Duke of Austria and King of Hungary on the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, but as during the war of 1805 three Electors had sided with France against Austria and the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine placed the course of that river nearly to the sea under French influence, the action of the Emperor Francis of Austria, in renouncing the Imperial Crown, alone prevented Napoleon from legally gaining the inheritance of Charlemagne.

The last thing the French Emperor desired was to destroy the Holy Roman Empire ; he wished rather to set himself on the throne of the Cæsars. Napoleon took the opportunity to revenge himself on the King and Queen of Naples, whose veiled hostility had latterly

been notorious, and whose rule in Naples he declared must cease, ordering General St. Cyr to take possession of their Kingdom. This was carried into effect so far as Naples was concerned, although the British sea power continued to protect the two Sicilies, where Ferdinand and his wife exercised sovereignty under the ægis of the British fleet.

But the Kingdom of Naples was given to Joseph Bonaparte, who had previously declined the throne of Italy because he regarded himself as heir to that of France. This appointment, the precursor of others similar in character soon to follow, marks a prominent feature in the Napoleonic sway over Europe.

Owing to Trafalgar Napoleon was more than ever inclined to include England in the category of those he desired to punish for opposing him, but as Nelson was dead and Pitt passing away to his end, which took place January 23, 1806, it followed that what has not inaptly been described by Mr. Canning as "Europe's darkest day" was also one of mourning on the Thames.

I shall now endeavor to trace the course of European events that led up to the great catastrophe of Prussia.



## CHAPTER XIII.

## STORM CLOUDS BURSTING OVER EUROPE (2).

THE AGONY OF PRUSSIA.—FREDERICK WILLIAM III. AND QUEEN LOUISA BEFORE AND AFTER JENA AND AUERSTÄDT, A. D. 1806-7.—CHANGE OF POLICY IN ENGLAND AFTER MR. PITT'S DEATH.—LORD GRENVILLE, PRIME MINISTER, AND MR. FOX, FOREIGN SECRETARY.—GREAT INDIGNATION AT PRUSSIAN DUPLICITY.—FREDERICK WILLIAM III. JOINS FRANCE IN HER POLICY OF COMMERCIAL HOSTILITY TO GREAT BRITAIN.—INDUCES A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN LONDON AND BERLIN.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE BETWEEN NAPOLEON AND MR. FOX.—OFFER TO RESTORE HANOVER TO ENGLAND DISCOVERED BY PRUSSIA, WHO PROCLAIMS WAR WITH FRANCE.—PATRIOTIC CONDUCT OF QUEEN LOUISA DISTORTED BY NAPOLEON'S BULLETINS.—EXTRAORDINARY COLLAPSE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY AT JENA AND AUERSTÄDT.—SHAMEFUL SURRENDER OF STRONG FORTRESSES.—FLIGHT OF KING AND QUEEN.—OFFERS OF BRITISH ASSISTANCE ARRIVE TOO LATE.—THE CZAR'S ARMIES ADVANCING.—PRUSSIA REFUSES TO TREAT ALONE WITH FRANCE.

By far the most interesting Royal Family on the Continent in 1805 was that of Berlin, where the Court and Army of Frederick the Great existed, much the same as he had left them at his death twenty years before.

Probably a romantic marriage to a beautiful, engaging and patriotic Queen had intensified the love and devotion of the Prussians for their Sovereign,

whose halting and even unreliable conduct of Foreign Affairs had not sapped the sources of his traditional power rendered so solid in the eyes of the people by early contact with the Great Frederick.

Bishop Eylert, in his life of Frederick William III., tells how he had himself seen "the garden-seat under the beech trees at Sans Souci where Frederick and his great-nephew sat together for the last time." On that occasion the Victor of Rossbach had spoken of the belief he possessed that some great European disorders were likely to appear, generating through "ferments" already visible in France: "And when this state of things comes to a crisis," added the King, "it will be the devil let loose." "When that day comes watch over the honor of our house, be guilty of no injustice, but at the same time tolerate none." That Frederick William honestly endeavored to profit by the advice he had received from his great-uncle it is impossible to doubt, but how to carry it out, in the specially difficult situation which confronted Prussia in 1806, formed a problem which different elements in Berlin desired to solve in diverse ways.

At the outset it becomes necessary to realize how the patriotic works of the Swiss historian Müller had combined with the later publications of Gentz to arouse educated opinion in the Universities, and thence through the youth of Prussia in the homes of the land. Gentz had plied his pen in Austria as well as Prussia, and a spirit was arising through the

German-speaking peoples which encouraged other publicists to issue pamphlets and tracts urging subject Teutons to burst their chains. This was the mode of opposition which Napoleon dreaded most, and he determined to make an example. A pamphlet published anonymously, and called *Germany in its Deep Humiliation* was sold by different booksellers in Bavaria, and amongst them by Palm, a resident in Nuremberg. This obscure and humble individual being singled out and subjected to precisely the same treatment as the Duc d'Enghien, was tried by a military court martial and condemned to be shot within twenty-four hours.

This judicial murder aroused a secret spirit of hostility even within the subject territories of Wurtemberg and Bavaria, and outside the Confederation of the Rhine and in Prussia itself indignation reigned supreme.

Queen Louisa was herself a daughter of the Duke of Mecklenburg Strelitz, and therefore of pure German birth, so that it was unlikely that, with her notable intelligence, she should be behind the current public opinion.

It has been generally assumed that Queen Louisa led what has been described as a "War party" in Prussia, and Napoleon in his bulletins from time to time gave color to this assumption, which implied a certain antagonism to her Royal husband upon Foreign Policy on the part of this revered woman.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to state briefly

the facts and illustrate them by reference to the leading spirits in Frederick William's Court.

The nearest surviving relation of Frederick the Great in 1805-6 was Prince Ferdinand, his youngest brother, then a very old man, and the children of this interesting survivor of Prussia's palmy days were Prince Louis Ferdinand and the Princess Radziwill; the former had been trained up as a soldier from childhood, combining a knowledge of his profession as inculcated at Potsdam with keen appreciation of the great changes which the Revolution in France had brought into Europe, especially as to the new military system which was fast superseding the antiquated methods in vogue twenty years before.

Victories were gained under the Generals of the Revolution, by means of celerity in massing together superior numbers, and striking swiftly at any isolated foe; while Napoleon improved upon this conduct of offensive operations, until it reached perfection in the ranks of the grand army, and registered the measure of its power on the field of Austerlitz. Prince Louis Ferdinand, and those in Berlin who thought with him, did not essay at a time of crisis to undertake the rôle of military reformers, but they argued, and argued, it appears, with reason, that an admittedly smaller army than that of Napoleon, such as that of Prussia, should have promptly declared war when Napoleon sent Mortier to occupy Hanover on June 5, A. D. 1803, just after the renewal of the contest between France and Great Britain. They held that

the introduction of French troops into Hanover was incompatible with the independence of Prussia.

The Grand Army of Boulogne had not then reached its full organization, and although a concentration of Napoleon's forces would certainly have been made upon Berlin, rendering Northern Prussia the theatre of warfare, yet the fact that England and Sweden could at that time have acted in friendly and speedy military co-operation in full command of the North Sea leads to the belief that a great opportunity was lost by Frederick William and his advisers on that occasion.

These views, of which Prince Louis Ferdinand was a champion, did not necessarily involve the adoption of analogous opinions in 1805 when Mr. Pitt was forming a coalition against Napoleon's aggressions.

Prussia had doubtless a greater risk to run on this occasion because, had she boldly joined the allies in 1805, the Army of Boulogne might have swooped down on Berlin instead of Ulm.

In 1803, however, the Prussian army was at its full war strength, while a fatuous belief in the invincibility of France and Prussia combined in mock *alliance*—for no other term describes Haugwitz's engagements, entered into without Frederick William's cognizance after Austerlitz—assumed the Prussian State to be so secure that a reduction was made in the war establishment, and continued until the Peace of Presburg in December, 1805.

The prognostications of Prince Louis Ferdinand

and those who thought with him had not proved unfounded, for Prussia in 1806 had to deal with Napoleon at his zenith of power, when she had touched her nadir, both as regards preparation for war and skilful diplomacy.

The great historian, Ranke, who has carefully examined the situation of Northern Germany in A. D. 1806, pronounces the opinion that Prussia drifted on to a fate that her rulers were destined not to avoid, and refrains from hard judgments on individuals; but surely it is most unworthy and unjust to charge the memory of Queen Louisa with the guilt of fomenting war, when, after thinking over these arguments and admiring the patriotism of those who promulgated them, she endeavored to let the King see the other side of that shield which the Court entourage, led by Haugwitz and Lombard, had constantly presented to him. Indeed, it is for the historian's pen to remove any such stain from this noble woman's memory, inasmuch as, from all it is possible to gather (now that the Chancellories of Europe are opening to the inquirer), the real war party consisted of those who persisted in believing that Napoleon would allow Prussia to enjoy the position of a Military Power second only to France in 1806, and yet not to enter heart and soul into an Alliance, offensive and defensive, involving the subordination of all interests at home and abroad to those which were paramount on the Seine. In fact Prussia was drifting towards an impending struggle against England, Russia and

the embers of Germanic life still stirring in Austria, should she permanently embrace a French Alliance.

That Queen Louisa wept sisterly tears over the sorrows of the Imperial family of Vienna, when, obliged to escape from their palace at Schönbrunn to Olmütz, they received the dread tidings of Austerlitz, is undoubtedly true, and it was a political instinct which forbade a Prussian Queen to follow the example of those German Princes who were seeking the protection of the Conqueror without reference to the rights or feelings of their nationality. Indeed Europe owes it to Queen Louisa that her own convictions sank deep into the heart and intelligence of her second son, the future Emperor William, a youth of tender years, but whose early impressions, learnt at this adored mother's knee, were of the highest patriotic character.

The army which had been sent to the frontier of Bohemia, to cut off Napoleon's retreat had he been defeated at Austerlitz, came back to Berlin ill-satisfied with the rôle they had been called on to play and impatient of the contempt freely expressed by the populace at seeing their soldiers return without striking a blow for what they believed to be the common cause. Moreover the officers were also so mortified at a prospect of routine life in Potsdam without having taken part in the stirring events in Moravia or even attempted to influence them by marching to the aid of the hard-pressed Russians

and Austrians, that their leader, General Ruchel, so far infringed Court etiquette at Berlin as to insist on an interview with the King at all hazards, and scandalized the guard by repeating his request in commanding tones. Frederick William hearing these words between Generals Ruchel and Von Köckeritz, came forward to meet the intruder with a friendly greeting, but was astonished to hear the former loudly exclaim: "I am come to express to your Majesty the intense grief of the Army at the miscarriage of this Campaign." To astonishment succeeded indignation as the Sovereign asked General Ruchel proudly, prefacing his query with a reprimand, "Since when has the Army taken the lead of the resolutions of the Cabinet?" and withdrew without another word. Indeed the coldness between the King and a most popular General threatened to become injurious to the prospects of the Army, had not the Queen effected a reconciliation between them. Her Majesty had taken no part in favor of those following Prince Louis Ferdinand's lead in agitating for war, and indeed never did more than allow her natural honesty to have fair play when reproaching the miseries and degradations visited upon the people of other European nations with whose Sovereigns her husband had promised to become allied. With her high spirit she could not have done otherwise and, as Miss Hudson has said in her admirable *Life and Times of Queen Louisa*, it was what she was and not what she did that made the



Queen of Prussia's name a watchword for the enemies of Napoleon.

The King's brothers, Princes William and Henry, were in accord with Prince Louis Ferdinand, and incurred the danger of their Sovereign's displeasure when urging him by memorial to give up Count Haugwitz as an adviser, and to arm speedily. General Ruchel and Blücher were active members of this party, who possessed the sympathy and advocacy of one of the greatest of modern Germans.

Henrich Karl Friedrich von Stein was born on October 26, 1757, being the youngest son of Karl Philipp von Stein, a Privy Councillor of Mainz, the family belonging to the class termed in Prussia Knightly, so that the future Minister bore the title of "Imperial Knight."

The youth was afforded such an education that a diplomatic career was open to him should he desire to embrace it.

After spending the allotted period at the Göttingen University, he visited Wetzlar, Ratisbon and Vienna in order to study the history and constitution of the German Empire. The Courts of Mannheim, Darmstadt, Stuttgart and Munich were also traversed by the young Stein before he returned to his family home at Nassau on the Lahn, a tributary of the Rhine near Coblenz.

In A. D. 1780 admiration for the character and public policy of Frederick the Great induced Stein to enter the Prussian service and spend his time in

endeavoring to extract an enhanced revenue out of the mining resources of the Kingdom, for which purpose he mastered the elements of chemistry and mineralogy, but, as he tells us, was saved from becoming a mere "writing machine" by the patronage and friendship of the Minister Heinitz, who evidently perceived the talent which was destined to raise the young official to the dignity of a statesman, genius refusing him to remain only a bureaucrat, the necessary fate of many able men under such a system as that then in vogue in Prussia.

But so much of Stein's time had been occupied in the duties connected with exploiting the national resources under Heinitz's authority, that this Government official was competent to give timely advice when advanced in A. D. 1787 to the department of "War and Domains." In fact no subject of Frederick William III., not excepting Hardenberg, knew Prussia better than Stein.

I have been guilty of a digression in thus introducing Germany's great recoverer on to the scene, but it becomes necessary to emphasize how potent a coadjutor the forward policy of Prince Louis Ferdinand possessed in this high-bred and honorable man of sterling ability, a German to the core, who felt that all was not well within the confines of his beloved Prussia, though as yet the invader's hoof had only trodden the fields of Austria and South Germany, sparing temporarily the Northern Fatherland from invasion.

Stein had not been a congenial spirit to his Royal Master Frederick William II., who never seems to have consulted him; and a tendency to resort at will to the privileged manner of an Imperial Knight, when he desired to express horror of the Napoleonic aggressions and dissatisfaction at Prussia being in any way privy to them, precluded his influence from extending fully into official circles even when he became Minister of Trade and Finance in 1804.

Frederick William III. never unreservedly took Stein into council until the calamities of the State forced extraordinary measures upon him.

Ever since his accession the King had hankered after a French understanding, which, while leaving him free to throw out the hand of friendship to the Sovereigns of Russia and England, should yet insure his dominions from the fate of Italy and Switzerland without involving the sacrifices which had decimated Austria.

Persuaded by a certain sprinkling of army officials, contented with the good pay they enjoyed in times of peace, who found spokesmen in Lombard and Haugwitz, *that the path of abstention from War could only be trodden by appeasing Napoleon*, the King was impervious to the arguments of the war party.

Due allowance must be made for this good Sovereign, overweighted by the responsibility of his position; we must remember that Prussia was a comparatively small State, endeavoring to sustain great military efforts to insure protection, on slender means

which threatened from time to time to become insufficient; and that Frederick William III., while husbanding those resources carefully, dreaded their diminution as forming a probable prelude to national decline.

On the other hand he never seems to have realized the grave character of Napoleon's aggressive projects in Northern Germany; and he remained, on the very threshold of the Campaign of Jena in 1806, more impressed with the fact that Prussia, with a population of *nine millions*, had to sustain an army of 250,000 without overrunning its resources, than conscious that, bereft of Allies, one by one coldly discouraged, he had sooner or later and, alas! at the choice of an unscrupulous invader, to cope with a power possessing the resources of France and Italy combined when Germany was half crushed, the population of the first alone being over twenty-seven millions.

These considerations had led to dissimulation, quite unprecedented in Prussian annals, which continued for several years, and in September, 1805, Sir George Jackson, the British Ambassador at Berlin, entered in his Diary: "Nobody knows how Prussia can stand aloof except perhaps the King," who at this time told the Austrian Ambassador, after acquiescing in his general arguments as to the danger to be apprehended from Napoleon, that nevertheless he could not then "decide on war."

Prince Metternich was then Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, and in his memoirs dealing with the period

records frankly his opinion that Frederick William was under the influence of some adviser in the "pay" of France, and indicates Lombard by name.

For vigorous language, combined with succinct phraseology, expressing the conduct of the Prussian Government regarding Hanover, no one has however equalled Mr. Fox.

"The conduct of Prussia," said he, in the House of Commons, "in this transaction is a compound of everything that is contemptible in servility with everything that is odious in rapacity." Well might the honest Hardenberg repudiate to Sir George Jackson responsibility for negotiations which, commencing without his authority, he strongly disapproved.

Both Hardenberg and Stein, however, as statesmen bent on attaining German Unity, favored the incorporation of Hanover with Prussia, but not by the tortuous methods of Haugwitz.

The subsequent visit of the Czar Alexander in November, 1805, when together they visited the tomb of Frederick the Great and resolved to uphold European liberty, was the stimulus that ultimately carried the Prussian King painfully forward to the goal of honor; but alas! the historian is called on to record more than one diplomatic lapse before that end was gained amidst sorrowful domestic cares, happily absent at the earlier times of crisis now before the reader.

For when the necessity arose to meet the nation's enemies in 1806, that Queen who so wisely had

waited before utilizing her unique opportunities of pressing the King forward on a course she did not pretend fully to fathom, became indeed the Mother of her Country in the moment of its peril and disaster, the apt Consort of her brave and conscientious husband, but alas! when victory smiled on the Prussian standards in 1813, she had been taken from the world of care and sorrow.

Early in 1806 a paper was drawn up by Stein, speaking plainly to Frederick William of the character of the men surrounding him and indicating the necessity of a change of advisers as well as the establishment of a responsible *Council*, so that a guarantee might exist that outside advice did not supersede that of tried Statesmen in times of peril.

The mission of Haugwitz at Austerlitz, and the acceptance of the treaty he made after that contest behind Hardenberg's back and without his authority, illustrated exactly the danger which this unusual action of Stein's strove to render impossible in future.

Frederick William's passing resentment afterwards drove the latter patriotic minister from his service for a brief period; but the embarrassments of the King, which accounted both for versatility and indecision, will become apparent when attention is turned on the drama to be shortly enacted at Paris.

After the peace of Presburg, Napoleon's progress through Europe to Paris was one long triumph, and at Munich, where the Empress Josephine met him,

he announced to the Elector on the 31st December his elevation to Royal Rank as King of Bavaria, a dignity which has existed ever since.

There also Eugène Beauharnais, the Emperor's adopted son, received the hand of the new Sovereign's daughter, Augusta, at the same time that the Viceroy of Italy's sister was married to a Prince of Baden. Indeed South Germany seemed to vie with France itself in doing obeisance to the rising star of Western Imperialism.

From Strasburg to Paris, travelling rapidly, the Emperor passed through triumphal arches at every town and in most of the villages. When he reached the Capital on the night of 26th January, 1806, the municipality and people of Paris suffered a disappointment owing to the extreme haste which he evinced to reach the Tuileries, and the consequent absence of any ceremonial to celebrate his arrival. It appears that, ever since the Grand Army left Boulogne, there had been ominous threatenings in financial quarters which betokened a crisis at the Bank of France. Without removing his clothes the Emperor spent the rest of the night in company with the Minister of Finance at the Tuileries, and next day, the Council watching over that department deliberated nine hours before electing M. Mollier to succeed M. Marbois, who, it was believed, had over-estimated the Bank Reserves. But the crisis had been really brought about by the extravagant expenditure of the Imperial Govern-

ment, which forestalled its income and discounted every available asset when constructing ships to compete with England for command of the sea, and sparing no conceivable expense in equipping an armed host such as that which, spreading across Europe, enveloped Ulm in its deadly grasp, and struck down the armies of Russia and Austria at Austerlitz.

But for the contributions levied during this war, and the subsequent indemnity paid by Austria, the financial crisis would have gravely disturbed the calculations of the Emperor, and, if the war had dragged on for any length of time, the evil to be cured might have proved impossible to deal with.

Indeed three such friendly authorities as Bignon, Bourrienne and Savary all concur in believing that, by protracting the contest in Moravia for a few months, the allies would have brought the French Government to bankruptcy.

The deficit on the public contracts for the debt alone was five millions six hundred thousand pounds in English money, and there was an outcry against the system of raising money from such sources, but nevertheless, to conduct his Wars, the Emperor had shortly to revert to that method and replace M. Marbois in office as President of the Chamber of Accounts.

But financial reforms, however sound, could not cure the tendency of an aggressive militarism to expend year by year sums vastly in advance of the



National income. To deal with this warlike expenditure by issuing loans, as was done in England by Mr. Pitt, and afterwards by the governments of Lord Grenville, the Duke of Portland, Mr. Percival and Lord Liverpool, presupposed a credit which the France of 1806 did not possess. A Budget for 1805 presented to the French Chambers admitted a deficit of *twenty-three millions six hundred pounds* in English money, the balance being provided by contributions from Foreign States, inasmuch as from the first moment the Grand Army crossed the Rhine it had lived at the expense of Germany.

But the report of the Minister of the Interior reconciled the Chambers by a striking picture of the general prosperity of the vast Empire Napoleon had acquired, and allowed no shadow to fall over the brilliant prospect depicted, dismissing Trafalgar curtly by remarking, "The tempests have made us lose some vessels after a combat imprudently engaged in," while England was invited to make peace, as if there was equality between her and France at sea. The next few months were devoted to the beautifying of Paris and the erection of magnificent public monuments to commemorate the late Conquests in Germany and Italy.

The Arch of the Carrousel between the Louvre and the Tuileries was the idea of Napoleon himself, while the Municipality erected the famous Vendôme column constructed from the Austrian cannon taken in the Campaign of Austerlitz.

The Statue of Napoleon originally surmounting this monument was carried by Alexander I. to St. Petersburg after 1814-15, and King Louis Philippe replaced it by the bronze figure of the Conqueror familiar to the world before the Commune levelled the whole structure in 1871. Now the Great Emperor is represented in a guise less offensive to Republican taste than in the two preceding Statues and, in lieu of the Imperial cocked hat and spurs, wears a simple wreath.

The letters of Madame de Genlis and also those of Madame de Remusat, wife of Napoleon's Master of the Ceremonies, give interesting pictures of the French Capital at this period of Imperial success.

The Emperor appreciated to the full the advantage of a friendly literary coterie exercising its influence in his favor, and at this time gave Madame de Genlis apartments in the Arsenal at Paris and endowed her with a pension of 5,000 francs.

In fact, he seemed to regard her amicable effusions and timely warnings as antidotes to the winged shafts of Madame de Staël which still reached Paris during the residence of that gifted person at Berlin.

It is perhaps natural that Napoleon, whose power was based on the necessity of healing wounds made by the Revolution that had dismissed the Bourbons, and of finding a substitute for their ancient régime, should not have rested content without persuading the aristocratic denizens of the Faubourg St. Germain to transfer their devoted Royalist allegiance to

his own dynasty. When told by letters of Madame de Genlis, received after Austerlitz, that this element in French society remained inexorable, the Emperor seemed greatly agitated, and, while vowing he would teach these proud spirits the necessity of unbending, received comfort from knowing that one or two ladies of high extraction had joined Josephine's bedchamber.

So illusory did Napoleon consider the prospects of his dynasty even at this very zenith of his power, that he prepared to take the only security open to him by entrusting conquered Kingdoms and Principalities to the Sovereignty of his own family.

The most important of these measures, from an historical point of view, after Joseph Bonaparte's successive sovereignty in Naples and Spain, was the unwilling acceptance of the Crown of Holland by Louis Bonaparte, whose third son survived to be chosen Emperor of the French as Napoleon III.

The Bourbons of the Spanish branch alone possessed an uncontested crown in 1806, that of Etruria being nominally an appendage to the Spanish throne, so the new dynasty enthroned at Paris was well on its way to obliterate its ancient rivals from the map of Europe.

But whether this height of prosperity was to be sustained by the Bonapartes depended in a great degree whether Frederick William the Third of Prussia's proffered hand of fellowship represented the desire of the Prussian people for a firm and fast union

between the two nations, or whether the mutual promises made to one another by the Emperor Alexander I. and the great-nephew of Frederick II. in the vault at Charlottenburg on November 3, 1805, were to remain binding.

Count Haugwitz had signified his arrival in Paris during January 1806, in order to present to Napoleon the Prussian King's request for some modifications in the treaty signed hastily by this negotiator after Austerlitz had been won.

It must be remembered that on that occasion Haugwitz had arrived on the very different mission of delivering an ultimatum equivalent to a declaration of war by Prussia against France, but had substituted for this after Austerlitz a new policy, which it is now allowed he had power given him by the Cabinet of Frederick William to determine on under the very contingency which had arisen.

The Prussian King, who had not divulged to the English Government the nature of the engagement then entered on with Napoleon, now wished to be permitted to retain Hanover as agreed on, but not to derive his title by reason of Napoleon's invasion, but rather as the result of England's concurrence which he hoped to obtain.

This proposal irritated the French Emperor in the highest degree, and he sternly refused to allow the King of Prussia to escape from giving his "pound of flesh."

Not only was Haugwitz forced to give way com-

pletely as to the point raised, but he agreed to sign a new treaty in which Frederick William was to openly defy England by closing the ports of Northern Germany, together with the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, to British Commerce.

The astonishment prevailing in England may be imagined when a Prussian proclamation appeared on March 28, 1806, stating that Hanover had been acquired by Frederick William at the hands of Napoleon and that English ships were thenceforth excluded from the ports of Prussia, thus contradicting earlier announcements of official origin.

This document was promptly answered by the seizure of 400 Prussian vessels in British harbors, and by the practical extinction of the Northern German commerce by reason of the privateering straightway directed against it, a calamity which, the sage Metternich remarked from his Embassy at Berlin, would destroy Prussia, who, if she lost her commerce for any considerable time, would most surely be ruined. But this loss of trade was not destined long to afflict the people whose growth and power were attributable to the great Frederick's forethought and skill.

The blow came from that direction whence the most thoughtful statesmen in Europe had long expected it to issue.

There was a most dramatic scene described by the British Ambassador, Sir George Jackson, in his despatch of April 25, when that envoy demanded his pass-

ports at Berlin. Count Haugwitz's only plea was that of necessity, and he had the assurance to hint at a possible invasion of England by Prussia and France combined if the exclusion of English commerce from the North seaports was not acquiesced in. That Jackson should have attributed importance to any such threat or have retained his belief that Napoleon meditated a descent on England in April, 1806, is incredible except on the assumption that naval events of the last few months in the West Indies had not been communicated at Berlin.

Indeed it is remarkable how few accredited histories recount how the Brest Fleet escaped when the English Admiral watching the harbor was blown from the station by violent winds on December 13, 1805, and how five ships under Admiral Leisseignes reaching St. Domingo were destroyed or taken by Admiral Duckworth commanding a superior force of seven battleships and four frigates.

Nor is it generally realized that the other half of the Brest Fleet, under Admiral Villaumez, being dispersed in a tempest, were ultimately driven ashore or destroyed except the Foudroyant which gained Havana.

Admiral Linois' Squadron had made havoc of the Merchant Marine of England in the Indian Ocean for several months, no friendly British harborage existing within reach where fugitive vessels could take refuge; but had itself to succumb after rounding the Cape of Good Hope, four out of five

of his frigates being taken by Sir Samuel Hood on March 14, 1806.

The previous day had seen Linois' own surrender, in the battleship *Marengo* of eighty guns, to Sir John Borlase Warren.

Of all the French naval detachments that of Rochefort, under Lallemand, alone remained afloat, and his Squadron was called "the Invisible." Certainly the Spring of 1806 was not exactly a propitious moment for France to design an invasion of England with Prussia, whose flag was swept from the seas.

After Mr. Pitt's death a composite Government had been formed in England of "all the Talents," at the head of which the defunct Statesman's cousin, Lord Grenville, presided, while Foreign Policy was directed by the redoubtable Mr. Fox, the soul of this administration, whose political life since the French Revolution had been one long brilliant protest against the War policy of his late great antagonist and predecessor in directing British Foreign Policy, Mr. Pitt.

Fox was now called on to apply these principles practically in the direction of Peace, and gladly took advantage of an opportunity to open negotiations, founded on an alleged design to assassinate Napoleon, tidings of which had reached the Foreign Office.

At the time of the Peace of Amiens Mr. Fox had been the guest of the then First Consul, and established personal relations of a friendly character such as insured a prompt attention at the hands of Talleyrand when his proposal reached him.

Space does not admit of dwelling at length on the negotiations which Lord Yarmouth conducted on behalf of England under Mr. Fox's guidance, but the cardinal points of the British demands, without which an accommodation was considered impossible at the British Foreign Office, were first, the rendition of *Hanover to England*, and secondly, that the Independence of the two Sicilies should be kept intact from the attacks of Joseph Bonaparte and General St. Cyr, such immunity being the reward of that command of this portion of the Mediterranean Sea specially battled for and won at Trafalgar.

Sicily was the rock upon which this attempt to restore Peace between England and France was destroyed, but it became known to the Prussian Government through Lucchesini, their Ambassador at Paris, that the offer of Hanover had been made to England, although in transition the despatch, announcing his betrayal to Frederick William, was opened and deciphered by one of Talleyrand's spies, so that Napoleon had the start of some weeks in preparing for the inevitable conflict which ensued.

The Prussian King at last gave rein to the tempestuous indignation of his people, and ordering the Duke of Brunswick to mobilize the army, boldly threw off the mask by sending appeals to Vienna, St. Petersburg and London for assistance.

From the last two Courts friendly assurances were soon received, although a state of war between George III. and Frederick William nominally pre-



vailed, but Mr. Fox had been cured of his former sanguine reliance on Napoleonic benevolence, and the British people knew well that an unshackled Prussia could not remain unfriendly to England when bent on opposing the 180,000 trained soldiers of the grand army which approached Frederick William's dominions.

Nor was the Emperor Alexander unwilling to forget the tardy nature of his friend and neighbor's, Frederick William's, rally to the cause of European liberty.

From Vienna came only the answer dictated after consultation with the Archduke Charles, who reported the Army inefficient and unprepared, that Austria would preserve neutrality, nor could another reply have been expected within eight months of Ulm and Austerlitz.

It is, however, interesting to reflect that Mr. Fox through Mr. Adair, the British Minister at Vienna, after counselling the avoidance of any rash decision by the Austrian Government, yet offered them the fullest financial help should a resolution be arrived at to succor Prussia. It is certainly remarkable how these "instructions" to Mr. Adair prove beyond all doubt, as Sir Archibald Alison declares, how "clear an insight Mr. Fox at this period had obtained into the insatiable ambition of Napoleon."

Precluded by the design of this work from attempting to trace the military movements in detail which accompanied the Campaigns of Jena, Eylau

and Friedland, I will proceed to indicate in outline the course of events.

Prussia labored under the disadvantage of having to defend a country having few natural defensible barriers west of the Rivers Saale and Elbe, before Berlin was reached.

She was also outnumbered and outgeneralled by reason of Napoleon's presence with the pick of his Marshals, while the French Army had been used to successful operations in the field, such as Prussia had not experienced since the Seven Years' War. On the other hand there was in her favor the fact that a popular uprising of the people was about to take place, of which she could only avail herself by adopting a temporizing policy, such as Dumouriez, then resident at Berlin, had advised, which, while possibly giving Napoleon the advantage of an unopposed advance into Prussian territory, would enable the Russians to come to Frederick William's assistance, after which, in the midst of a *levée en masse* of the inhabitants throughout Northern Germany, the French might have found it difficult to sustain their position in a hostile country and face to face with two large armies. But two objections existed to the adoption of such a policy, one being that the line of the Elbe was at such a distance from the Russian frontier where Alexander's forces were forming, that any battle in defence of the Capital must, in consideration of Napoleon's speedy advance, have been fought by the Prussian Army immediately available,

and concentrated as swiftly as possible, without reference to any adventitious assistance at the hands of Volunteer bands formed from those serfs whose newly aroused patriotism might prove the future salvation of their country, but which, from the nature of the case, could not be rendered immediately effective before such enemies as the Conquerors of Austerlitz.

The Prussian Army itself has been criticised for having drawn its rank and file from a socially degraded class, and doubtless had the legislation of Stein and Hardenberg preceded the Campaign of Jena, the legions which followed the Duke of Brunswick would have been both more numerous and more formidable.

But, so far as it is possible for a layman to discover, the agony of Prussia was not brought to its acutest phase so much by the defeat of her armies in the field (although Jena and Auerstädt were terrible and heart-breaking disasters,) as by the paralyzing inaction of elderly Generals who rendered up the Fortresses one by one (six first-class strongholds in all) in a manner never explained to the present day.

There was truth in the statement made by Mr. Fyffe in his history that the Army of Prussia was but that of Frederick the Great grown twenty years older, while it was opposed to a French force raised by conscription and perfected for warlike purposes by Napoleon, who had revolutionized the art of War within the seven years before Jena.

But another cause precluded the initial retreat of the

Prussians in order that they might commingle with their Russian allies; and this consisted in the belief of the Duke of Brunswick, a veteran of seventy-two trained by the great Frederick and chosen by King Frederick William to lead his troops, that a forward policy was that alone likely to succeed in presence of a French Army. There was doubtless truth in his contention, but it appears from Jomini and other critics who have followed him in his criticism that the advance of Brunswick at the head of 90,000 men to attack the French when concentrating on the Main would, if firmly persisted in, have afforded the best opportunity of gaining the inestimable prestige of a success at the outset of the war, instead of which a delay took place near Erfurt for deliberations that resulted in a change of plan.

It happened by means of this indecision that Lannes gained an advantage during the first encounter of note at Saalfeld on October 10, which exercised a moral effect far exceeding its military importance owing to the death of Prince Louis Ferdinand, the popular young prompter of a warlike policy.

Moreover it was resolved after this disaster, accompanied as it was by loss of artillery and ammunition, to do that which was at first thought undesirable, and retreat from the line of the River Saale on Magdeburg and the Elbe.

To effect this Prince Hohenlohe had to be left at Jena with a portion of the army to hold an advancing foe in check, while Brunswick moved northward

to Naumburg near the junction of the Saale and Elbe. But Napoleon with 117,000 men reached Jena, and detached Davoust with 27,000 to outflank what the French leader believed to be the whole Prussian force instead of 40,000 under Hohenlohe. Bernadotte was also ordered to advance to Dornberg with his division for the purpose of cutting off the enemy's retreat on Weimar. Napoleon therefore, according to Fyffe and Lanfrey, on October 14, 1806, fell upon the Prussians only 40,000 strong at Jena with double that number of men and, being in possession of the heights of Landgrafenberg, which dominated the town, and which he had gained by his own energy, and the exertions of his men on the previous evening, held a commanding advantage in the great conflict which resulted so disastrously, but not disgracefully, for the Prussian Army. For if any casual critic doubts my statement let him consult the pages of Jomini or those written in later years by Lanfrey, and there learn if any fault could be found with the officers and rank and file of Prussia when at the cannon's mouth in vastly inferior numbers at Jena. But Napoleon possessed the very genius of War and on this day he reached the apex of his glory and power.

At four in the morning Napoleon despatched Suchet to attack the Prussians in front of their position and clear the way through the defiles of the Landgrafenberg. Prince Hohenlohe could descry nothing of the combat through the mist that prevailed and never

realized that he was confronted by the whole French Army until Napoleon had utilized the advantage gained for him by Suchet and brought overwhelming forces into action. The advance of the French seems to have been continuous to the end of the conflict, while by numerical superiority the Prussian forces had been outflanked on either side.

Nevertheless Hohenlohe's troops fought stoutly, the cavalry especially distinguishing itself, once breaking the French horse and enveloping Ney when in command of an advanced corps of infantry; it would have captured that redoubtable Marshal, but for a counter movement of Bertrand's horsemen despatched for the purpose by the Emperor.

The Prussian Centre and Right gave way gradually after this incident, despite the "intrepid resistance" which Jomini records, and although their cavalry took several cannon and thus greatly encouraged Prince Hohenlohe on the left of his position, the full weight of numbers was at last telling but too decisively, and Napoleon, seeing signs of wavering in the weakened and dispirited ranks before him, launched Murat's 12,000 magnificent heavy cuirassiers upon them.

After this, although the Prussians struggled bravely on until their lines were broken, symptoms of a rout began to appear; horse, foot, and artillery pressing in confusion to the rear.

Hohenlohe lost all his cannon, while the whole of his right wing was captured through an impetuous advance of Soult's.

The Duke of Brunswick and King Frederick William at Auerstädt, on the other hand, with 50,000 men fell in with Davoust's outflanking division of 27,000, and had not a fog obscured the view until it was too late to learn the truth, a different complexion might have been placed upon the contest as well as the course of the campaign. But Davoust having seized the pass of Kosen on the road to Naumburg availed himself most ably of the broken and steep ground which he defended, and the Prussians attacked with smaller detachments than their numbers would have allowed. Several critics, including Jomini and Lanfrey, believe a united advance, concentrated on one supreme effort, might have proved successful.

General Schmettau, who arrived too late to carry out Brunswick's order to occupy the post of advantage at Kosen, being repulsed in a first attack, had recourse to the aid of his Lieutenant, Blucher, in order to break down resistance with the cavalry.

After Blucher's horsemen had, however, failed to dissipate Davoust's squares of infantry at the entrance of the pass of Kosen, the aged Duke of Brunswick put himself at the head of two hitherto intact infantry divisions and, leading them to the charge, fell mortally wounded; General Schmettau and Marshal Möllendorf were also stricken down, the former being killed and the latter grievously injured. Many other officers and men were also disabled in this ineffectual attempt to overcome the gallant French defence.

It was at this moment that the King in person, with Prince William, led several cavalry attacks, the Prince being wounded, while the King had two horses shot under him. The failure to make any abiding impression on the enemy led to the Prussians falling back in disorder such as permitted the skilful Davoust to seize the neighboring heights of Eckartsberge and crown them with artillery. This occurred about twelve o'clock in the day, just when Napoleon's final rush upon Hohenlohe's inferior forces had driven his troops off the field of Jena; and as two divisions of Frederick William's army were still intact and numbers remained largely on the side of the Prussians around Auerstädt and Kosen, it is not impossible that an attack *en masse* which had not hitherto been attempted might have there succeeded. Davoust had lost nearly a quarter of his force despite the successful planting of his artillery on a post of vantage, while all accounts agree that the gallant French soldiers were wearied and in many cases, according to Lanfrey, "sinking with exhaustion."

At this moment Frederick William, bereft of the advice of his commander-in-chief, when more than one leading spirit amongst his generals was quenched in the sleep of death, resolved to rejoin Hohenlohe with the intention of returning to a joint attack on the enemy's position.

The King was, however, ignorant of the rout of Jena, the few miles between the two battle-fields rendering this disability difficult to understand until



it is realized that the turning-points of both conflicts were almost contemporaneous, so that probably the earliest possible tidings were those brought by the fugitive crowd itself, whose flight under Napoleon's deadly artillery and swift cavalry pursuit had been rendered more than ever headlong and disastrous by the incidental overwhelming of General Ruchel's division of 20,000 men, who, while endeavoring vainly to stem the torrent, not only lost their gallant commander, but, forced back by numerical superiority, joined the panic, which soon became general.

It appears that when halfway between Auerstädt and Weimar, about six miles from each, the retreating army of Frederick William found Bernadotte's corps drawn up on high ground and at the same hour became intermingled with the vast band of fugitives of Hohenlohe's army, closely pursued by victorious French cavalry under Murat, while Napoleon, Ney and Lannes, with at least 80,000 men, the flower of the Grand Army, came thundering along in pursuit.

Under these circumstances, when obliged suddenly to change their line of retreat, it is not amazing to read of the confusion, alas! soon degenerating into panic, which overtook the battalions still under the Prussian sovereign's command.

Frederick William, seeing his still considerable army share the military dispersion of Ruchel, well nigh encountered the same personal fate as that of his whilom critic and friend, while all accounts concur in recording the peril that the King encoun-

tered in endeavoring to rally the panic-stricken remnant of the great Frederick's army.

Indeed Jomini tells how nearly at this moment the Prussian sovereign was taken prisoner, and how he duly reached Sömmerda by a circuitous route, there to receive the official story of Jena.

The reader will not unnaturally desire to know what had been the movements of the Queen after this conflict, so disastrous to Prussia, commenced. From Gentz's diary of the three weeks before Jena it is known that she remained in the camp because her presence was considered to be serviceable to the King and the wounded. Her headquarters had been at Weimar under the Duchess's protection and in the Ducal Castle, the Duke himself being with the army. On the afternoon before the fatal twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt, Queen Louisa set out from Weimar to join the King and actually met him when the army was in full march towards the enemy, who was distinctly visible. However, the Duke of Brunswick, seeing Her Majesty in this dangerous position, insisted on her accepting an escort of dragoons to take her to Weimar; and the King speaking hopefully, as the Princess of Orange, Queen Louisa's sister, narrated, endorsed the old Duke's decision, promising to let the first advantage gained be immediately communicated to his wife.

Unwilling as the Queen had been to fall in with this advice of the Duke's, her hesitation is to her credit because, after war had been declared, her pres-

ence with the soldiery had been encouraged by no less a personage than the King's constant military attendant, General Kalkreuth, one of Frederick's veterans who held an unfavorable view as to Prussian military prospects in this war, which he had desired to avoid, owing to alleged unpreparedness and because the age of the Duke of Brunswick unfitted him for supreme command.

Nevertheless General Kalkreuth valued the joint presence of the King and Queen amongst the troops as a most valuable means of inspiring them with loyal ardor.

From Weimar General Ruchel persuaded the Queen to return towards Berlin through the circuitous route of the Hartz Mountains with a guard of fifty men, as the main roads were unsafe owing to French "strolling parties" being already scattered over the country as far as Leipsic. Leaving Weimar on that misty October 14th, so big with Prussia's fate, Queen Louisa could hear the distant artillery, but could not learn what was happening to the army with whose hopes she had indelibly associated her name. Before the close of that October 14, A. D. 1806, both King and Queen of Prussia were fugitives in different if contiguous parts of their dominions.

At Brunswick, reached by Her Majesty on the 15th, she spent a night and told her fears to the Princess of Orange, who confided to Sir George Jackson that her Royal sister was much unnerved, and had better have been spared such close contact

with the scene of conflict. At Brandenburg, reached four days after the Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, a courier sent from the field by General Kleist told of the defeat and dispersion of the Army, but gave no tidings of the King. Surely such a messenger had better not have been sent, but for the postscript that advised an instant retreat even from the Capital with the Royal children.

At Berlin the evil tidings had become partially known in official circles, but the public had been excited by a report of a Prussian victory and like the Queen, as expressed in her own words at this time of trial, "journeyed on between the mountains of hope and the abysses of despair." Accompanied by Hufeland, the Royal Physician, Queen Louisa travelled to Schwedt where she found her children, and confided to them the sorrows of their country, bidding the future Frederick William IV. and his still more famous brother William, the German Emperor, then fourteen years old, not to rest content with grieving for the loss of their noble relative, Prince Louis Ferdinand, but "resolve to persist in exertions to give independence" to their "country" and for Prussia's sake be willing to confront death as "he confronted it."

Here at Schwedt the Queen first heard from Count Hardenberg a reliable account of the King's safety, but had broken to her the terrible nature of the calamity which had befallen Prussia in all its fulness.

Hardenberg begged Queen Louisa to push forward

to Custrin on the Oder where he hoped she might meet the King.

One week only had elapsed since they parted at Auerstädt, but on that sad field and at Jena Prussia lost 20,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners, while the strong places were surrendering both on the Elbe and Oder, so that any correct estimate of the numerical losses the kingdom had suffered was unattainable, nor could it possibly be told how much might be saved from the general wreck.

The Queen also learnt that the Princes Henry and William were both wounded, and the latter was met by his young wife who had been a wanderer through the land like her royal sister.

It must have been a sad consultation which the members of Prussia's Royal House held at the Castle of Freyenwalde, where the widow of Frederick William II. had resided until her death. Moreover it was a brief reunion, as the troopers of Murat were speedily advancing with Napoleon and his staff in their midst.

There could be little doubt as to the necessity for the King and Queen removing with the Court from Berlin and the choice of Königsberg, the old capital of Eastern Prussia, and after 1657 the home of the Electors of Brandenburg, as a temporary residence was very wisely made from a political point of view.

For Napoleon was soon to issue an invitation to the Poles to rise, promising that if they did so unitedly and with influential leadership, they would

find him friendly to their cause ; but as this proclamation, glittering with sounding generalities, never, it will be seen, entered into particulars, the presence of Frederick William and his popular consort was a healthy equipoise from a Prussian point of view.

Davoust was permitted by Napoleon to enter Berlin with his troops on October 25th, two days before the triumphal entry of the French, in order to mark the Emperor's appreciation of the noble stand with vastly inferior numbers at Auerstädt, which had never been admitted in the bulletins as having contributed to the result of the complete overthrow of Brunswick's army; on the contrary the triumph had hitherto been announced to the French people as Napoleon's own, resulting from Hohenlohe's overthrow at Jena. The dominating influence of the French Emperor certainly marked the campaign as a whole—especially in the pursuit of his beaten enemy and occupation of his country, celerity and method combining to render success as swift and sure as possible.

The humiliation suffered by the Prussian nation could not be enhanced by the evidence of their military defeat thrust upon the citizens of Berlin, when Frederick William's Guards were paraded through the city in the Victor's train of triumphant soldiery.

Indeed it was impossible to visit a community with heavier penalties, moral and material, than those which fell on this branch of the German race for not having discovered in time that Europe made a dire mistake in encouraging the Napoleonic supremacy

in France as the best available form of government to succeed a Republic once discredited by its sanguinary barbarity, and afterwards dreaded for its ambition.

One other outward sign of the changed order in Berlin the Conqueror did not fail to supply when on visiting Frederick the Great's tomb he carried from it the sword and scarf of Prussia's most famous King.

As for the young officers whose public spirit had burned with such undisguised indignation under the dishonorable rôle thrust upon their country by Baron Haugwitz after Austerlitz, the French Emperor spoke of them with bitterness : " I will make that noblesse," he said, " so poor that they shall beg their bread."

Singling out the Duke of Brunswick and the Grand Duke of Hesse Cassel, as being English in connection and sympathy, he dispossessed them of their dominions in order to create the kingdom of Westphalia for his brother Jerome. Saxony and Weimar were spared and placed within the Confederation of the Rhine, the Elector of Saxony being raised to kingly rank, and, strange to narrate, adopting the Roman Catholic faith as part of the agreement.

But these annexations and adjustments in the interests of French domination did not so directly affect the trading and commercial classes of Prussia as the famous " Berlin Decrees," whereby it became illegal to possess any article of British produce, raw or

manufactured, so that the new Custom House officers could search the warehouses of Hamburg or Berlin for bales of Manchester cotton, or their shops for Leeds cloth goods.

Nothing could have been devised more certain, than the espionage necessarily attending the carrying out of these decrees, to extend the spirit of hatred against the French which several years of exactions in Hanover and the murder of Palm had generated before a shot was fired, and which were destined to prove not the least potent factors in that arousing of the Northern nations which preceded the overthrow of Napoleon a few years later.

One word as to the contributions levied, the day after the Battle of Jena, upon the countries at war with France. A share amounting to about twelve millions sterling in English money, as Sir Archibald Alison tells us, at the price of exchange then current, was jointly borne by the Prussian States west of the Vistula and by Saxony; so that the monetary questions agitated in Paris before Napoleon started for the campaign were not allowed to hinder its advance.

The same system of exaction was speedily extended to the Duchy of Brunswick, the States of Hesse and Hanover, the Duchy of Mecklenburg and the Hanse Towns, including Hamburg.

General Clarke became Governor of Berlin and Governor-General of the conquered Kingdom, gaining an unenviable notoriety by having to extort these



sums. General Henri Jacques Clarke, who was three years the French Emperor's senior, had led a chequered existence, having joined the army of Louis XVII. just before the Revolution. He was in London with the French Embassy in 1790, and on returning to France served with the Revolutionary armies until thrown into prison by the Committee of Public Safety for alleged aristocratic leanings. The Directory at the instance of Carnot made him a General of Division, and Napoleon, recognizing a talent for administration in Clarke, entrusted him with the difficult and invidious duties of ruling Berlin and extorting contributions from the surrounding districts.

It was not unnatural that the performance of such a task should, in Prussia at least, overwhelm his memory with obloquy not necessarily merited, although the shooting of the Burgomaster of Kiritz for parting with arms to a flying detachment of Frederick William's adherents has left a stain on his memory. The Duke of Feltre—for so he became in 1807—tried to persuade Louis XVIII., in 1815, that this was but "an unhappy error." "Say rather," replied the restored French King, "an unworthy crime."

To such a condition of political depression had Prussia fallen that all the civil authorities who remained in the conquered provinces were obliged to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor, and swore to hold no correspondence with his enemies. It can scarcely be wondered that an

attempt was made by the Prussian Plenipotentiary, M. Lucchesini, to seek peace on anything approaching reasonable terms, but Duroc, Napoleon's representative, insisted that all the fortresses not already surrendered should be immediately given up, including Colberg, where Gneisenau was destined to make his name first famous by a brave and scientific defence.

Napoleon also had a clause inserted whereby Frederick William promised that all foreign troops should leave his territories not under French occupation, so precluding all subsequent help from the Russians advancing towards the Vistula.

Indeed it is said, according to Alison, that Lucchesini and his colleague Rastrow only agreed to such terms provisionally, believing that Frederick William would refuse to sign, as indeed he did, and so Napoleon was delayed at Posen and time afforded for the Russian troops to reach the Vistula.

There could therefore be nothing urged against the Prussian Sovereign's decided refusal, beyond repeating the trite aphorism that "Self-preservation is the first law of nature."

On the other hand accession to such terms would have been treason to the brave spirits who needed but the chance to assert their patriotism and gain better terms for their beloved Fatherland. At this moment, it seems to the writer, Napoleon stood at the very apex of his power and glory. More extended conquests and equally startling victories

were yet to be his, but the moment the Conqueror's heel was lifted from the body of Prussia there arose upon the emancipated soil a burning spirit of nationality, nurtured by a learned and well considered patriotism before which mere armed Imperialism necessarily quailed directly an opportunity arose, not alone in Prussia itself, but in other portions of oppressed Europe, where the flames of well directed indignation were destined to spread.

Stein and his patriotic coadjutors, it is true, rested temporarily under a cloud, for as Minister of Finance Stein had indignantly refused to find 300,000 crowns for Napoleon's table and household at Berlin, and had accompanied his protest with an undisguised disinclination to become Frederick William's First Minister until the peace-at-any-price adherents in the Cabinet had been dismissed, this declaration involving resignation from his former post, and alienation from the Court until that time when Prussia possessed a soul she could call her own again.

The disasters which precluded Prussia from getting reasonable terms of peace from Napoleon did not reach their consummation until the day after Napoleon's triumphal entry into the Capital on October 27th. Prince Hohenlohe surrendered at Prenzlau with his main army reduced in numbers to 10,000 on October 28th.

Custrin, an important fortress on the Oder, and Magdeburg, with its 24,000 defenders and ample supplies, may neither be said to have made the

slightest resistance ; and their fall, occurring shortly, thenceforth took all heart out of the Prussian defence, save at neutral Lubeck, where the gallant Blücher struggled on until overpowered by vastly superior numbers on November 7th, at Dantzic, which held out honorably until the Spring of 1807, and at Colberg, which under Gneisenau gained the proud distinction of "Invicta" to the close of this sad war for Prussia.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## STORM CLOUDS BURSTING OVER EUROPE (3).

EYLAU TO FRIEDLAND.—UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES TO EUROPEAN PEACE RESULTING FROM MR. FOX'S DEATH.—HIS STRONG POLICY AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—NAPOLEON BIDS HIGH FOR SUPPORT OF THE POLES AT WARSAW.—GREAT BATTLE AT EYLAU, BUT RESULTS INDECISIVE.—CZAR APPEALS IN VAIN TO THE WHIG GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND FOR TIMELY AID.—DEFEAT OF THE RUSSIANS AND PRUSSIANS AT FRIEDLAND.

THE death of Mr. Fox, Sept. 7, A. D. 1806, exercised an influence over the Continent which has not been apprehended by any writer since Sir Archibald Alison; but the facts that are from time to time disclosed from English and German official sources fully confirm the view of that historian, and go to show that had the great Englishman lived Russia never need have separated herself from the cause of Europe in 1807; so that the Alliance between Napoleon and Alexander I. would not have taken place; the deliverance of Germany, Italy and Switzerland might have been consummated long before 1815, instead of being retarded for seven years; and the holocaust of human lives that was yet destined to darken millions of homes in France, Austria, Russia, Prussia and the Peninsula would in all probability not have

stood recorded. This I am aware is a strong opinion to deliver, and it is necessary to prove that it is in accordance with evidence given by those best able to judge.

In the first place Mr. Fox had been thoroughly disillusioned as regards Napoleon's alleged peaceable character and methods of government, both by the negotiations in regard to Hanover and by the murder of Palm ; and his last weeks at the Foreign Office, where he attended until the end of August, 1806, were spent in advising the friendly Powers how to act should war break out between France and Prussia.

It has been stated in the last chapter that Austria was warned by Mr. Fox not to commit herself to a new struggle prematurely, but was assured that, should a decision be taken by the Emperor Francis to support Prussia, then his effort would be seconded by all available British resources.

Mr. Adair, the English Minister at Vienna, received precise instructions to this effect, and before a blow was struck in Northern Germany, Lord Morpeth was despatched to arrange a like co-operation with Frederick William's Cabinet. The British Envoy, however, only arrived two days before Jena, and was avoided by Baron Haugwitz, who hoped that after the matter at issue had been entrusted to the fell arbitrament of Mars, there might be no necessity to surrender Hanover either to England or France. However, as matters turned out, Lord Morpeth

never delivered what may be considered as Mr. Fox's dying testimony as regards the conduct of the Continental War, because King, Court and Diplomats were in a few hours' time flying in inextricable confusion through North Germany to the Elbe and Oder.

It is true that Mr. Fox's eyes had been closed in death for more than a month ; but having regard to the fact that his hand had been on the helm through all the negotiations for peace with France up to the end of August, and that he had himself inspired every diplomat in British employment, it can scarcely be contended that Lord Howick his successor deflected the great Whig Leader's policy within a fortnight of his death—and yet such must have been the case if the instructions given to Mr. Adair at Vienna, and to Lord Morpeth before starting for his mission to Prussia, were not inspired by Mr. Fox himself.

Indeed Lord Howick fully admitted his adherence to his late chief's policy by carrying out at the same time another portion of the latter's Continental designs, viz. by encouraging the Emperor Alexander to come to Prussia's aid when war was first declared with Napoleon. Later however, by their own showing, Lord Grenville's Government infringed the principle laid down by Mr. Fox.

In Mr. Adair's *Mission to Vienna*, pp. 11f., will be seen the views inculcated by the Whig Foreign Secretary as regards "subsidies", which were not to be granted, under the new régime succeeding that of Mr. Pitt, to half-hearted Governments doubting which

course to pursue, but only to nations which were resolved to combat the system which Napoleon had created. In 1806-7 both Prussia and Russia answered to the latter description, while after the French occupation of Berlin, and Frederick William's retreat to Königsberg, Alexander I. may be said to have stood practically alone in his military opposition, inasmuch as the Prussian and Swedish contingents were too small to remain in the field unless in the train of a large Continental army.

The gravamen against Lord Grenville's Government and Lord Howick as Foreign Secretary was that through the failure of the promised English forces to co-operate with the Swedes they had not rendered Russia the assistance she sorely needed on the Vistula, at the very moment when Great Britain was mistress of the seas and possessed also an effective army available of at least 100,000 men. A fifth of these sent to Pomerania would have created a diversion such as must have changed Eylau from a drawn battle to a Napoleonic disaster. But Lord Grenville's administration also refused a subsidy to Russia, and proposed as an alternative a loan of six millions raised in England on the security of a preference on Russian Custom duties, a suggestion contemptuously refused by the Czar, who connected English co-operation with the more liberal treatment Russia had received at the hands of Mr. Pitt, and regarded the proposal as involving a slur on his credit.

In the Foreign Office Mr. Canning found in



1807, when he took the Foreign Office Seals, no less than twenty separate appeals from Russia for aid sent through the British Minister at St. Petersburg, the Marquis of Douglas.

The burden of these communications was to the effect that "unless effectual aid were sent to the Emperor Alexander, he would be forced to abandon the contest."

The earliest date of these deprecatory epistles is November 28, 1806; and this probably points to the precise epoch when the directions of Mr. Fox were abandoned, and the best part of Mr. Pitt's policy, which had been embodied by his great rival, was cast to the winds; and having regard to what followed in consequence, it is not difficult to enter fully into the spirit of Sir Walter Scott's lines regarding the sepulture in the venerable Abbey at Westminster of these great men.

"Drop upon Fox's grave a tear,  
"Twill trickle to his neighbor's bier."

The Government of Lord Grenville had but one valid excuse to urge in extenuation of their fatal omissions, one tangible effort and one only having been made by England to succor the Czar in his noble stand against Napoleon. I allude to the forcing of the Dardanelles by Admiral Duckworth in February, 1807, just when Eylau had been fought, but not too late to have rendered timely relief to the hard-pressed Muscovites, provided that events had shaped themselves more favorably at Constantinople.

War with Turkey had been decided on at St. Petersburg just before Prussia was crushed at Jena, so Alexander had two continental struggles on his hands at the same time. No less than 50,000 of his picked troops encamped in Moldavia and Wallachia, the centre of the campaign being around Bucharest. Napoleon, however, who at this time possessed the warmest friendship for Sultan Selim, "whose enemies," he said, "were his," and whose friends were "his own," sent General Sebastiani to Constantinople as Ambassador of France.

The English Government had despatched their fleet of seven line-of-battle-ships and four frigates to go through the Dardanelles and pay a surprise visit at Constantinople, and there insist on the Czar's demand regarding the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia being immediately agreed to, or in default to bombard the Turkish Capital, and even to effect an occupation by the sailors and marines.

The first portion of this programme was carried out with success, inasmuch as the Turks, being taken by surprise, only opened a damaging fire upon the British ships between the Castles of Europe and Asia where the Straits are little more than a mile broad, and there did inflict some slight losses on the English fleet, which nevertheless passed triumphantly up to the Princes Island within sight of Seraglio Point.

On the way Sir Sidney Smith, second in command, had captured four Turkish frigates, and a fifth was most gallantly cut out at the mouth of the Straits

by Lieutenant Nicholls of the Marines, and after a sturdy resistance succumbed; all five vessels were committed to the flames.

At first such was the terror at the Palace of the Sultan, that instant surrender was urged by his court followers, while a panic raged in Constantinople; but Sebastiani, whose immediate dismissal had been demanded by Sir James Duckworth, took advantage of the illness of the British Ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot, to urge on the Turks the use of that familiar weapon, procrastination, while the shore defences were repaired, and the people stirred to oppose the British landing. The French Ambassador persuaded the Sultan that only delay was needed. "Your ramparts," said Sebastiani, "are not yet armed, but that may soon be done; you have weapons enough, use them but with courage, and victory is secure. The cannon of the English fleet may set fire to a part of the town, but, without the assistance of a land army, it could not take possession of the town."

Duckworth, who had proved himself a skilful and brave sailor, was at a loss as a negotiator, and, instead of attacking Constantinople forthwith, allowed the Turks to temporize for four days until the coasts were armed completely with artillery, 917 cannons and 200 mortars being ranged along the shores, the enthusiasm of the defenders having been at the same time stirred to fever-heat by this clever agent of Napoleon. Moreover the gunners on the Dardanelles batteries had naturally done everything within their

power to prepare for an assault on the English Fleet, whose return was rendered inevitable by the risk of provisions running short, should the Admiral be detained in these inhospitable seas for any length of time owing to adverse winds.

At length, on March 1st, a breeze from the Black Sea favoring return to the Mediterranean, the dreaded passage was braved again under a continuous cannonade, the enormous stone projectiles fired from the Castles of Europe and Asia doing considerable havoc both to men and ships, before, on March 2d, the Straits were cleared and anchor cast at Tenedos, in order to blockade the Dardanelles.

Two hundred and fifty men were killed and wounded in the British fleet on its way in and out of the Straits, and it must have been a source of much disappointment to the British Government to know how nearly this project had succeeded, and yet to reflect that the 50,000 Russians in Moldavia still were unable to march to the aid of their brethren on the Vistula.

It might doubtless be some compensation to remember that since Mr. Pitt's death and during the year 1806 his scheme for the capture of the Cape of Good Hope had been successfully carried out after a fair and square struggle between equal forces, 5,000 in number, of British and Dutch, but that 7,500 men should in the same year have wasted their energies in a fruitless struggle at La Plata in Buenos Ayres, while another 5,000 soldiers made a purposeless

irruption on Egypt, does not speak well for the business management of this administration of "all the talents" after Mr. Fox's death.

How sadly were those 12,500 warriors needed to make the longed-for diversion in favor of the Russian army on the Vistula, in company with the brave Swedes pining to advance from Stralsund!

And this mismanagement seems the more culpable when it is remembered that by threatening to invade England Napoleon had rendered that country a camp of armed men. The quality of the British soldier was moreover demonstrated by Sir J. Stewart's little army at Maida in Calabria where, on July 6, 1806, they overthrew General Regnier's force at the point of the bayonet.

Events at Constantinople have, however, been slightly anticipated in order to tell how English Fleets and armies were occupied when Lord Grenville's administration deserted the Czar so unfortunately. I must also ask my readers to return in imagination to the frontiers of Prussian Poland, which Napoleon was about to cross, after having failed to bring Frederick William to consent to a peace gained without reference to his ally the Emperor Alexander.

The grand army had its difficulties to solve, just as those of the Czar have called for consideration.

Napoleon was in the first place considerably embarrassed by having to explain to certain Polish deputies, culled from their most prominent represent-

atives from families best known in the land, as to what his professions of adherence to their national cause really portended. He had gone so far in the first instance as to send for the Patriot Kosciusko with a view to arousing the hopes he could not pretend wholly to satisfy, although their very profession had gained for the French armies 40,000 recruits of a high military standard. The truth is that at Warsaw the French Emperor was really imbued with the spirit of Polish nationality and entered sympathetically into their hopes, but scarcely expected to be so soon constrained either to express those sympathies in a concrete form, or else run the risk of losing an adherence of the greatest value when a campaign was about to commence against Russia on Polish soil.

But if, on the other hand, Napoleon had given full rein to the belief in a general Polish Restoration, the fact must have been faced that Austria would have forthwith joined her forces to those of the Czar, acting in defence of her tenure in Galicia.

And, indeed, the only reason to believe that the French Emperor ever seriously intended to brave the perpetual enmity of Russia and Prussia by re-erecting Poland at their frontiers, consists in the half-suggestion he made to Austria, that if she cared to surrender her hold on Galicia, compensation might be sought and found by acquisition of a territorial equivalent in Silesia. This not being accepted, there was nothing left for Napoleon but to express to the

Polish Nobility his hopes for their national cause ; and this he accordingly did in the bulletin of the 1st December, 1806, in the following words :

“The love which the Poles entertain for their country, and their national feeling, are not only preserved entire in the heart of the people, but have become more profound from misfortune. Their first passion, their universal wish is to become again a nation. The rich issue from their châteaux to demand with loud cries the re-establishment of the Nation, and to offer their children, their fortunes, their influence in the cause. That spectacle is truly touching. Already they have everywhere resumed their ancient costumes, their ancient customs. Is then the throne of Poland about to be restored, and is that great nation destined to resume its existence and independence? From the depth of the tomb is it destined to start into life?

God alone, who holds in His hands the combination of all issues, is the arbiter of this great political problem ; but certainly never was an issue more memorable or worthy of interest.”

Platonic assurances are these indeed, interspersed with obvious truisms, which sufficed to keep the spirit of the Poles still high, but pledged the French to nothing in particular ; so that when at the peace of Tilsit a colorless autonomy was given to the Duchy of Warsaw, nominally rendered subject to Napoleon's vassal Saxony, France could still count on the young Poles joining the ranks of her Armies, and it was by

asserting such rights by reason of an over-lordship gained by treaty, that Napoleon translated that Suzerainty which modern statesmen find so difficult to define.

Nevertheless, there arose a party in Poland, who held aloof from expressions of French partisanship, and doubted the permanence of the Imperial patronage thus diplomatically dispensed.

The campaign which ensued on the Vistula was waged for the possession of Königsberg, and took place in the depth of winter. The Russians and French were in about equal numbers, the Grand Army being bereft of numerous detachments necessary to besiege such few Prussian fortresses as had not yet surrendered, and to generally occupy the conquered territory.

The conflict was fought, as I have said, in the depth of winter, and in a frigid climate to which the Muscovite battalions were much better accustomed than their opponents.

Napoleon had around him most of his famous Generals, whilst the veteran Kamenskoi soon gave up the Russian leadership to General Benningsen.

In the series of engagements commenced north of the Vistula, and at Pultusk, in blinding rain and heavy mud, the French first learnt what difficulties they had to contend with beyond meeting the stubbornest of foes. The bloodshed in this campaign was terrible owing to the lack of covered positions, a mutual disability which the flat nature of the country necessitated.



Benningsen attempted to surprise Ney and Bernadotte on the extreme French left, near the Baltic, and nearly succeeded, so that Napoleon, breaking up winter quarters, set out to force his way into Königsberg at a time when the whole country was covered with snow and ice.

Benningsen retired to Eylau, where, on February 8, A. D. 1807, occurred one of the most important battles in nineteenth century story. The undulations were so slight that only at Eylau itself, in the centre of the French position, could any immunity from artillery fire be obtained. Here, however, during the battle Napoleon was nearly surrounded by the enemy and might have been captured had his opponents realized that his staff stood, with the Emperor in their midst, isolated from the body of his army.

Again and again every possible military manœuvre was resorted to by the French Marshals, but little impression was made on the serried ranks of the determined Muscovites.

Successes, however, on the French right at Kleinsaugarten, the most elevated Russian position, were ably pressed home by Napoleon's skilful generalship, and at the end of the day it was difficult to say which of the two contending armies was entitled to claim success. A withering cavalry charge of Murat's had been met by a counter stroke on the part of the Cossacks of the Don, whose revenge taken upon the most famous cavalry in Europe forms a celebrated episode in the battle.

Napoleon had commenced a forward movement with all his line, which was arrested by the arrival of 13,000 Prussians under that energetic leader Lestocq. The laurels gained by Frederick William's troops on this sanguinary day resembled those plucked at Waterloo, when their advent turned the course of events far more decidedly.

So far as it is possible to learn from the best available accounts, the confusion in the Russian ranks, when the French Emperor made his supreme effort, was much greater than their opponents knew, and the subsequent retreat to the confines of Königsberg rather confirms that view.

It is admitted that the men were much fatigued, needing rest and food, so that Benningsen's strategy was probably the wisest available.

On the other hand Napoleon, who had openly declared his intention of entering Königsberg in triumph, took a retrograde march to the river passage and awaited reinforcements.

The field of battle, being an open expanse of unenclosed ground undulating into small eminences between which were lakes covered with the thickest ice, presented a terrible spectacle when some 50,000 dead and wounded men were scattered about on the snow in every direction within the space of two leagues, and none of Napoleon's conflicts were followed by more terrible scenes than those witnessed after Eylau.

The French Emperor's visit to the field the day

after the fight is admirably depicted by Le Gros in his famous painting which now rests in the Louvre. Although largely reinforced by the corps of Marshal Lefèbvre two days after this fearful struggle for possession of Königsberg, Napoleon deliberately resolved not to make an immediate attack on the Allies, although Benningsen's army was in the dangerous position of having its rear to the sea and the river Pregel, so that defeat would have been identical with ruin to the Russians.

On the contrary the French Emperor first proposed an armistice to the Russian General, and then attempted to make a separate peace with Prussia, but neither General Benningsen nor King Frederick William thought the moment appropriate to enter a European Congress under Napoleon's Presidency.

The very fact of his making such a proposition, so soon after the battle of Eylau, proved to the satisfaction of his opponents that at last the greatest of all modern fighting forces had been checked, however temporarily, in its triumphant course.

It was a festal season in Paris, and Christmas had been succeeded by the New Year celebrations, gaiety and contentment being undisturbed by the pending Campaign, for it had come to be considered an article of faith with true French men and women that the Grand Army was unconquerable. Suddenly, however, rumors began to prevail that despite the conscription of 1806, and the consequent addition of 80,000 youths to the Army, a resolute Russian op-

position had been encountered on the Vistula. Unfriendly critics even suggested a reverse, and refused to sink again into silence, until a Bulletin announced a victory which was received with the accustomed salvoes of cannon.

But a kindred demonstration had taken place at St. Petersburg also, and with more reason considering that it had been openly proclaimed that Napoleon meant to rest his tired troops in Königsberg on February the 9th, and yet never attempted to molest the retreating enemy, except by a futile irruption of Murat's cavalry, made nine days after the battle, which resulted in a French loss of 400 killed, while the Cossacks carried off three hundred men prisoners into the city.

Soon it became known in Paris that Augereau's division had been nearly obliterated, and such had been the bloodshed at Eylau that scarcely a Parisian family but had to deplore the death or grievous injury of some near relative. According to the account given by Madame Junot, who had become the Duchess d'Abrantes, in her famous memoirs, and also by Savary, the Imperial family was at this crisis divided as to the succession should Napoleon be taken captive or killed on the Vistula, the Empress Josephine contending for the pretensions of her son, Prince Eugène, and Napoleon's sister Caroline exercising her influence to secure the nomination of her husband Murat to fill a possible vacancy at the Tuileries.

The darkness of the general outlook in Paris was

certainly not illumined by a message of Napoleon to the Conservative Senate, dated March 26th, which asked for a fresh conscription, anticipating that of 1808 by one year. Indeed, this was the third such demand on the people of France, to surrender so large a proportion of the manhood of their country to the Moloch of Imperial ambition, which had occurred since War with Prussia was declared.

The average of young men annually subject to conscription in France being 200,000, and the number chosen by ballot 80,000, the measure of the sacrifice demanded for the cause of glory can be fully understood.

It may be imagined what a sensation was created throughout Europe by the tidings of this pause on the Vistula of the Imperial Eagles. Men looked anxiously to Austria gathering her armies on the frontiers of Bohemia, and still more to the banks of the Thames, where unfortunately Lord Howick, the British Foreign Secretary, as Sir Archibald Alison regretfully records, remained obdurate in his refusal to send men or money in answer to the urgent requests of both Prussia and Russia.

The consequence was that Austria preserved neutrality also, and Europe was delivered over once more to the unequal chances of a War wherein her only two defenders, Russia and Prussia, were bound to become numerically inferior to a power that had Poland, Italy, the Low Countries and two-thirds of Germany in its train.

Hence it was that the spring of 1807 was spent by both the Czar and Napoleon in strengthening their armies in front of Königsberg, and although considerable reinforcements reached General Benningsen, including the guards under the Grand Duke Constantine, who numbered 20,000 bayonets, while a reserve was advancing under Prince Labanoff of 30,000 men, yet the Russian host, assembled on the Alle to meet Napoleon in June, 1807, only reached a total of 121,800.

Napoleon on the other hand stood on the Passarge and Narew, surrounded by the largest host which had ever been seen on a European battle-field during the XVIIIth or XIXth centuries.

Without considering the armies guarding the Elbe and garrisoning the fortresses, no less than 150,000 infantry and 35,000 horse obeyed the Imperial orders.

It is scarcely to be wondered at that, although the ensuing campaign again evidenced all those qualities of courage and endurance which have become synonyms for the names of Russian and Prussian, yet the stars of Alexander I. and Frederick William III. paled before that of the French Emperor, whose qualities as a Commander were exercised in their fullest brilliancy at the very moment when his resources in men and money, extracted from conquered countries, were at their zenith.

Friedland, which was fought on June 14, 1807, was therefore a battle of giants, but the ultimate result was not in doubt after an epoch-making charge

of Ney, stopped only by the Russian Imperial Guard, who in turn had to yield to numerical superiority when Victor's reserve corps joined the *mêlée*.

Benningesen's forces were by no means annihilated, and although they abandoned Königsberg to the enemy, they crossed the Alle without molestation, this being a moment when it seemed as if the great Imperial Conqueror failed to follow up a retreating foe with his usual assiduity. It seemed, however, to onlookers like Sir Robert Wilson, that such was the apprehension and confusion in the Russian ranks, that had Napoleon acted with his usual celerity in pursuit of his foe, the army of Alexander I. must have suffered destruction.

It would involve a grave omission to conclude this page of history without recording the success of the Prussian division under General Lestocq in retarding the French advance on Königsberg, while ultimately withdrawing in good order when overwhelming numbers of the French swarmed into every portion of the city.

The defence of Colberg by Gneisenau, the cavalry sorties by Schill and the able tactics of Lestocq, together with the fearless bravery of the Russians, must have formed some small consolation to the dispossessed King and Queen, Frederick William and Louisa, at Memel.

The armistice asked for by the Czar after the occupation of Königsberg by Marshal Soult, and immediately acceded to by Napoleon, was not resolved on

by the Russians without communication with Frederick William and his Minister, Hardenberg. They must have known that Prussia's late treaty of amity with England would subject her to the bitter enmity of the French Emperor, but the alternatives were untenable and no practical choice remained. The Czar, on the other hand, was also much exercised against statesmen of both parties in Great Britain, notwithstanding that a change of policy was coincident with the defeat and consequent resignation of Lord Grenville's administration on March 24, 1807.

Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh, the moving spirits of the new Government, held out the hand of warm fellowship to the sore-pressed allies by acceding to the Convocation of Bartenstein, signed in April, whereby supplies of money and men were promised to Russia and Prussia.

But, alas, this occurred too late to propitiate the Emperor Alexander, who was unable to differentiate between British political parties, and only knew that the belated despatch of 10,000 British soldiers who occupied the Island of Rügen had not been made in time to prevent an armistice being signed at Stralsund by the beleaguered Swedes with Mortier, or to bring any appreciable relief to the sorely-pressed Russian army. King Gustavus III. of Sweden deprecated any extension of the armistice at Stralsund when he learnt of the accession of the late Mr. Pitt's friends to power in England, but his steady adhesion to the cause of Europe was marred



by notable lack of tact in the open and untimely avowal made to Marshal Brune, during the negotiations consequent on Friedland, that he acted solely in the cause of the Bourbons, and for the restoration of Louis XVIII. in France.

It soon became apparent that the continuation of the war by Russia was improbable, as the Czar did not spare his comments reprobating English tardiness in coming to his assistance, while he was surrounded by Counsellors who expressed the opinion that these fearful sacrifices in blood and money, such as those at Eylau and Friedland, should not be made except for purely Russian interests, which were not only in this war relatively smaller than those of other countries at war with Napoleon, but before Tilsit were less immediately threatened. On the other hand, the Grand Duke Constantine had influential adherents when opposing a French alliance and ever citing the fate of his father the Emperor Paul as a warning against the adoption of any such course.

The determining cause of Alexander making peace and joining hands with Napoleon, according to Hardenberg, was the abiding vexation felt at the refusal of Lord Howick to guarantee subsidies to Russia unless any such advances were secured by pledging the customs duties on British shipping that entered Russian ports, such dues, moreover, to be collected in British harbors before the vessels sailed.

Alexander seems to have regarded this proposal as a reflection on the common honesty of his Govern-

ment, so that he magnified in his mind the subsequent delays in the arrival of troops on the island of Rügen, as well as the tardiness of the Duke of Portland's new administration in furnishing the promised supplies in money, arms and ammunition; but this sloth was due to the dissipation of the Transport Service under Lord Grenville.

Alexander was also moved by the determined neutrality of Austria, the excited and threatening state of the Polish provinces, his own financial exhaustion, and the ill-fed condition into which his troops had drifted owing to difficulties of transit and an indifferent commissariat, at the same time persuading himself that none of these things would have happened but for tardy British co-operation.

Hence, it is probably true that when Alexander stepped on to the historic raft on the Niemen and met Napoleon, his first words, "I dislike the English as much as you do," not only determined the solidity of the temporary agreement between these two Potentates, but also disclosed the real cause of the peace of Tilsit.

Lanfrey gives such a striking picture of Napoleon as he joined the Czar on this occasion that I venture to reproduce it here in outline.

"Exceedingly robust health had given a heaviness to the Emperor's figure which had destroyed the resemblance to the effigies on ancient medallions observed by persons of classical taste, who looked on him as the modern Cæsar. He literally lived on what

killed other men, he thirsted after the excitement of war until it had become necessary for his temperament, needful to the health of his physical system, and in a manner, food, indispensable to the sustenance of that fierce activity which was his dominant characteristic. War gave Napoleon sleep and appetite, the campaign in Poland in which he lost 50,000 men was only salutary exercise for him. Under recent fatigues his iron frame had been tempered and strengthened, and had gained embonpoint, although he retained the quickness of his fiery Corsican nature, and the inquisitive penetrating eyes."

While avoiding, so far as possible, extracts of any description in the writing of this work, I think an exception justifiable when the personality of the greatest of all Continental Rulers is before the reader at this very crucial moment of his extraordinary career.

With Napoleon were Bessières and Duroc, together with Caulaincourt, Chief Equerry, a descendant of a noble and ancient family of Picardy, who had suffered imprisonment as a suspected Royalist early in the Revolutionary frenzy of 1789-92, but on war being proclaimed was liberated on the condition of serving in the popular army. He rose rapidly from rank to rank until he became Napoleon's aide-de-camp.

Alexander presented a striking contrast to Napoleon, possessing a fine head, tall and majestic figure, noble expression, and dignified demeanor, and therefore looking every inch a Czar. In his train to

Tilsit came his brother the Grand Duke Constantine, and the two famous warriors, the aged Suwarow and Benningsen the hero of Eylau.

The bridge at Tilsit had been destroyed a few days previous to this meeting, so Napoleon ordered a raft to be placed on the river in the middle of the stream, so that onlookers could survey the scene from the banks, while on the raft a wooden erection had been hastily put together, and adorned with the brightest colors available.

The Emperors embraced, and then in the sight of many soldiers of each nation retired to the decorated Pavilion to decide the fate of Europe, and Prussia in particular. This preliminary conversation lasted an hour, but the whole interview stretched over three hours, during which the unfortunate King of Prussia was riding on the shore amidst torrents of rain. Sir George Jackson, the British Ambassador, was a witness of this strange scene.

At Alexander's request, Napoleon agreed to be introduced to Frederick William III. on the following day, when that successor of the great Frederick had to suffer the humiliation of hearing from the French Emperor how deluded Prussia had been by "the intrigues of England." Throughout the festivities which ensued the Prussian King had the good taste to let his demeanor reflect his country's misfortunes, although such conduct did not ingratiate him with the ruthless Conqueror who had determined to render Prussia as nearly a subject state to France as possible.

When, however, Frederick William found that the chief fortresses of Prussia were to remain in his enemy's hands, and that Magdeburg, the key of the Elbe, was amongst these, he resolved to send for Queen Louisa to try and soften the heart of Napoleon, who, in his Bulletin after Jena, had so basely calumniated her.

Hufeland, Her Majesty's physician, records that when the Queen received her Royal husband's communication, she wept, saying that it was the hardest sacrifice possible she had to undertake, and one can well understand the repugnance felt against the destroyer of her beloved country, for the remnant of which, however, she was nevertheless prepared to make this great sacrifice when much reduced in strength by illness, privation and anxiety—"With my broken wing," said Queen Louisa, "how can I succeed?"

Prompted by Hardenberg to save Magdeburg, Silesia, and Westphalia, but anyhow the former, this devoted lady encountered Napoleon's covert sneers, and—worse still—accepted graciously his tactless courtesies.

He commenced by commenting on the white crape dress Queen Louisa wore, to which she promptly replied: "Shall we speak of such light things at such a moment as this?" Acquiescing in silence in this view of their meeting, Napoleon broke ground boldly in another direction and abruptly asked the Queen how Prussia dared to make war on him, to which he

received the remarkable reply, repeated to Talleyrand and recorded by Miss Hudson in her life of Queen Louisa:—"Sire, on the strength of the great Frederick's fame we may be excused for having been mistaken with respect to our own powers and the means at our command; if indeed we have entirely deceived ourselves."

Again did Napoleon prefer silence to attempting any immediate retort, so plunging *in medias res* the Queen of Prussia pleaded warmly for her country, driving her antagonist to the utterance of empty compliments and platitudes, binding him, as M. Thiers records, to nothing.

When dwelling on the woes of her husband and the Prussian people, Queen Louisa lost her self-command for a few moments, shedding tears freely, and then, thinking from Napoleon's manner that he might possibly relent, she concentrated all her remaining energies on a prayer that Magdeburg might at least be spared. It is said that this interview closing without any definite result of her efforts being announced to the Queen, Talleyrand, fearful that the Emperor's mind was warped by the attractions of this most insinuating and beautiful woman, interfered in the conversation, and never felt safe until Frederick William arrived, and by intervening in the conversation allowed Napoleon to escape.

But the Queen of Prussia was not silenced, and took more than one opportunity of recurring to the subject close to her heart before the treaty of Tilsit

was finally settled. On the other hand, the French Emperor had admitted to Talleyrand that he expected to see "a beautiful woman and a Queen with dignified manners, but I found the most admirable Queen, and at the same time the most interesting woman I had ever met with." Presuming on this feeling of admiration, the French Emperor ventured to offer Queen Louisa a rose, when, despite such trivial attentions, circumstances went to show that the destiny of Prussia was fixed beyond diplomatic recall. Hesitating for a moment, the wife of Frederick William answered, smiling softly, "Your Majesty offers this with Magdeburg at least, I trust." Then said Napoleon, "It is for me to beg, for you to accept or decline." "There is no rose without a thorn, but these thorns are too sharp for me," sadly answered this quick-witted and most beloved of German women.

Well may M. Thiers, as a Frenchman and an historian, lament this inexorable conduct of Napoleon's towards Prussia on this occasion, which contributed so largely towards his own decline between 1812-14, and his ultimate fall in 1815.

Frederick William lost half his dominions at the Peace of Tilsit, ceding to Napoleon all the country formerly Prussian west of the Elbe, and the whole of Prussian Poland except a district on the lower Vistula. The Polish territory thus surrendered was merged in the so-called "Duchy of Warsaw," which came under the government of the King of Saxony,

who had a treaty right of using military roads through Silesia.

Jerome Bonaparte was given the conquered territory west of the Elbe, and called King of Westphalia, while, at the Treaty of Tilsit, Alexander acknowledged also the sovereignty of Joseph Bonaparte over Naples, and that of Louis over Holland.

But Prussia had been spared the threatened descent to a principality of Brandenburg, and owed, it is said, her very existence as a Monarchy to the Czar. Nevertheless, as will be shown, the contributions and restrictions long kept impoverished Prussia from asserting herself.

Such were the published provisions of this strange Treaty, but those of a secret character remain to be mentioned.

The secret of Napoleon thus tyrannizing over Prussia undoubtedly consists in the fact that he was sensible enough to be aware that he had at last to deal with a spirit of nationality which, although he might partially suppress, it was vain to try and extinguish. Of course it was the very pith of the Tilsit understanding between Napoleon and Alexander that Russia should join in the exclusion of British goods from her ports, so that the Czar was exposed to the expostulations of his late allies, two of whom, Turkey and Sweden, had more reason to complain than England, who by a strange fatuity had missed a golden opportunity to intervene in favor of an abiding European Peace.



Russia actually obtained an accession of territory at Tilsit from Prussian Poland, 200,000 souls being added to the number of her subjects, while she secretly persuaded Napoleon to join her in the two idealistic projects of invading India and partitioning Turkey. Neither Talleyrand nor Metternich, who as Austrian ambassador at Paris became familiar with Napoleon's projects as regards Turkey, could ever clearly discover what part of the spoil was to fall to France and which to Russia; but according to Bignon, a reliable authority, there was only an agreement, doubtless formally drawn out, but not a formal treaty. O'Meara tells us that Napoleon declared at St. Helena that although he thought "it would enlighten the world to drive those brutes, the Turks, out of Europe," yet he refused to concur completely in Alexander's proposals, because they involved the possession of Constantinople by Russia. "I would not allow that," added Napoleon, "as it would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. I reflected that France would gain Egypt, Syria and the Islands, which would have been nothing in comparison with what Russia would have obtained."

This statement coincides with that of Bignon, relied on by Sir Archibald Alison. Napoleon never seems to have swerved from the view herein expressed, and being under the fixed impression that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of dissolution, he paid more attention to the share France was to ob-

tain than to the opposition which Metternich believed would be offered by the Turkish Empire itself. In fact, Metternich was convinced that France and Russia would find partitioning the Ottoman dominions a very different matter from the assimilation of Poland in 1772 and 1792 by Russia, Prussia and Austria.

It will come on for consideration, later in this volume, whether there existed any valid reason for an alteration of policy towards Turkey by the Mediterranean powers during the Crimean War, and also when the Russo-Turkish war of 1878 broke out.

Another secret agreement at Tilsit was that whereby the fleets of minor powers in Europe, including eighteen line-of-battle ships of Denmark, were to be pressed into the service of Napoleon and his allies. It seems that an energetic attempt was made to collect a new fleet by massing the vessels of war owned by Napoleon's allies together, and adding them to the remnant of the French Navy, as well as ultimately to those on the stocks at Antwerp, Cherbourg, Brest and Toulon.

Some mysterious personage, having heard the resolution arrived at by the Czar and Napoleon in the Pavilion on the raft at Tilsit, which agreed that the French should become Masters of the Danish and Portuguese navies, straightway communicated his information to the British Government; and Mr. Canning with prompt celerity despatched to Copenhagen an expedition under Admiral Lord Gambier whose twenty-seven ships of the line carried 20,000 men, and were

joined by 10,000 from the Isle of Rügen, the whole force, 30,000 strong, being under the command of Lord Cathcart.

Sir Arthur Wellesley led 10,000 of these troops on a land attack made in co-operation with the naval forces. The struggle was a stout one, the bombardment lasting for three and a half days before, on September 2, 1807, a surrender took place amidst a vast and extending conflagration. The safe conduct of no less than eighteen sail of the line as prizes to England was conducted with conspicuous success, said to be without precedent, inasmuch as after the victories of Howe and Nelson many of the prizes had been destroyed at sea after capture, owing to storms prevailing, or the crippled condition of the vessels.

Much criticism was directed against this action of Mr. Canning's, both in England and on the Continent, because the assumed collusion of the Danish Prince Royal with Napoleon and Alexander seemed only conjectural although the fact that the Emperors intended to presume on the weakness and isolation of Denmark had not Great Britain intervened, never was denied.

Who the mysterious informant, bent on apprising Mr. Canning of the conspiracy to abstract the Fleets of Denmark and Portugal from their harbors, and anchor them within those of France, may have been, remains a secret, but it has been suggested in diplomatic circles that probably one of the Russian negotiators of Mr. Pitt's last coalition against France in 1805 gave the timely signal. It must neces-

sarily have been some one close to the person of the Czar.

It should be remembered that England only held those eighteen ships as hostages until peace arrived, and acted purely in self-defence.

I have previously ventured to give the opinion that Napoleon passed his zenith of power when he entered Berlin after Jena, and that the apparent access of glory attained by Friedland and consummated at Tilsit was not nearly so substantial as it appeared to the world. And in truth the provisions of the published Treaty not only enchained and degraded a still geographically and ethnologically powerful state in Prussia, but left the undaunted spirit of her people unsubdued, so that they were ready to seize the earliest opportunity to shake off their bonds.

As for the projects for invading India and partitioning the Ottoman Empire, these were, as Metternich tells us, subordinated to Napoleon's schemes against Spain and Portugal in the Peninsula, where he encountered another hostile nationality welded together in the bonds of suffering and consecrated by the sacred fire of patriotism.

There is reason to believe that the secret part of the Tilsit agreement gave Napoleon a free hand in Spain, so far as the Czar's approval could secure this result.

## CHAPTER XV.

## NATIONAL AWAKENINGS (1).

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY JUNOT.—NAPOLEON DECOYS CHARLES IV., HIS WIFE AND SON TO BAYONNE AND EXTRACTS AN ABDICATION OF THE SPANISH THRONE TO WHICH HE APPOINTS JOSEPH BONAPARTE.—POPULAR INSURRECTION COMMENCES IN MADRID AND SPREADS TO THE PROVINCES.—BATTLE OF BAYLEN AND SURRENDER OF GENERAL DUPONT WITH 20,000 MEN TO THE SPANIARDS.—SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY EXPELS THE FRENCH UNDER JUNOT FROM PORTUGAL.—HIS CAREER UP TO 1803.—NAPOLEON SWEEPS THROUGH SPAIN WITH 300,000 MEN BUT FAILS TO CUT OFF THE ENGLISH CONTINGENT.—SIR JOHN MOORE DIES AT CORUNNA.

NAPOLEON seems to have lost sight of his otherwise steady purpose of endeavoring to injure England when, by attacking Spain and banishing the reigning dynasty there, he drove that country into the arms of his sea-girt foe across the Channel.

The gross ingratitude of such an action speaks for itself, when the noble bid for victory made by Admiral Gravina and his fleet at Trafalgar are remembered, as well as how the ports and naval resources of Spain had long been at the service of her ally across the Pyrenees. Nor had Charles IV. refused to send upwards of ten thousand men, the flower of the Spanish army, to the North Sea

Provinces under the Marquis de Romana in order to strengthen Napoleon's advance against Russia and Prussia.

Directly the war with these Powers was over, the French Emperor made joint demands upon Denmark and Portugal that they should prostitute their naval resources by placing them at the disposal of France, and accompanied this international illegality with requests for stricter commercial exclusion on lines unfriendly to Great Britain.

My readers have learnt how the disposal of Denmark's eighteen sail of the line was solved under the thunder of cannon at Copenhagen. But at Lisbon the Prince Regent of Portugal declined to desert his ancient Britannic alliance, and crossed the Atlantic to Brazil under the convoy of an English squadron, in company with the eight or ten ships of war coveted by Napoleon.

As a result of this attitude of the Portuguese Regent, Napoleon sent Marshal Junot across the frontier to Lisbon with ten thousand men, Charles IV. weakly acquiescing in accordance with the Treaty of Fontainebleau of October 27, A. D. 1807, whereby the partition of the Iberian kingdom had been agreed on.

As there was no manner of defence provided for in Portugal, Junot received little opposition from the ill-disciplined national forces, and had not Sir Arthur Wellesley reached the coast on August 1st, 1808, with a slightly superior force, and been victorious

both at Rolica and Vimiera, Torres Vedras and its heights would never have become the base of operations against Napoleon's Marshals in Spain. Indeed, Wellington's subsequent successes were greatly attributable to his forethought in fortifying those famous natural defences.

But the fate of Spain was really bound up with that of Portugal by reason of the aforementioned Treaty of Fontainebleau, by which the Portuguese Provinces of Alemtejo and Algarve were to be erected into a principality for Godoy, the favorite of Charles IV., known as the Prince of the Peace, into whose unreliable hands the Government of Spain had practically fallen.

When, however, Junot was established in Lisbon, then Napoleon refused to ratify this part of the Treaty, and began to foment the dissensions existing in the Royal family of Spain. Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, had refused to marry a relation of Godoy's, and exposed to his father the prevailing abuses in the Government, which he desired himself to take part in directing. Godoy, however, fearful for his own position and authority, persuaded the King that his son, the Prince of the Asturias, had formed a conspiracy against his life, and in consequence, on October 29, 1807, got Ferdinand arrested and imprisoned.

But the junta appointed to try the heir-apparent unanimously acquitted him, and the public voice was loudly in praise of their independent action.

Meanwhile, owing to the traitorous action of Godoy, the French had been allowed to place garrisons in several of the principal fortresses of the Kingdom, and a strong division under Murat entered Madrid with no opposition either from King or Minister.

But the Spanish people at once showed that they had to be reckoned with, and, flocking to Aranjuez, where the Court resided, burnt the Palace of the Prince of the Peace and vowed vengeance on that unpopular personage.

Charles IV., in despair at the condition to which he had driven the country, made a public abdication in favor of his son and heir, Ferdinand, on March 20, 1808.

But this arrangement by no means satisfied Napoleon, whose object was to get the Government into his own hands, just as he had previously effected a surreptitious occupation of all the frontier fortresses.

Consequently, he prevailed on the new Sovereign to meet him at Bayonne on the 5th April, 1808, when, throwing off any further disguise, he treated Ferdinand as a prisoner, and insisted on a formal cession of the Spanish Crown. Charles IV. and his Queen, together with Godoy, reached Bayonne shortly after, and Charles, declaring that his own relegation of authority to Ferdinand was extorted by popular violence, made, on May 5th, the abdication required by Napoleon, and exercised his parental authority



over his son to such effective purpose as to extract from him a like surrender of the Crown. Hence, the Bourbons of the Spanish branch were practically removed from the stage.

In June, Napoleon threw off the mask completely and undeceived Murat, who had hitherto believed that he was to reign at Madrid, by declaring Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain, while the great cavalry leader was granted regal authority over Naples.

But the spirit of the Spanish people was thoroughly aroused, and an insurrection in Madrid early in May became the signal for a general rising all over the country. Ferdinand VII. was proclaimed King; Juntas were everywhere established to act against the invaders; and although Joseph was able by the aid of French soldiers to enter Madrid on July 20th, his power did not then extend beyond the outposts of the Armies by which he was maintained in his position.

The people, though nearly undisciplined and rudely armed, performed prodigies of valor, while one of the few remaining French squadrons was compelled to surrender in the harbor of Cadiz. General Dupont, one of the heroes of Friedland, whose former achievements had placed him on the threshold of the Marshalate, had set out from Madrid with upwards of 20,000 men to save this fleet at Cadiz; but he never reached the scene, and his wearied and tried army had to surrender to General Castanos, who surrounded them at Baylen on July 20th.

Meantime the Bourbon Princes of the Spanish branch were interned in France at Valincay, a seat of the Prince de Talleyrand, who did all in his power to render their captivity tolerable. Nor did the Foreign Minister of France in after years conceal his strong repulsion for Napoleon's conduct in this matter.

Two of the French Emperor's trusted soldiers were destined to lower their military reputations in their master's eyes during the summer months of 1808 within the Peninsula.

Dupont's disaster was indeed so overwhelming that his previous brilliant achievements seem to have been forgotten, and he lost at Baylen all opportunities of future distinction. Indeed it is difficult to understand why, with such a record of brilliant military achievements behind him, some inspiration did not come to his aid, such as at Friedland and elsewhere had marked the now baffled General as a future Marshal of the Empire.

But confronted by the strongest Spanish force in the field and with his men entirely demoralized and short of water he is said to have shared their despair when immediate resolution was most necessary. The Spaniards in their triumph refused to carry out a first stipulation of Dupont's that he should take his army to the coast, and sail from San Lucas and Rota, provided that the two divisions of Generals Vedel and Dufour were included in the capitulation.

When, however, it was found that a few outposts of Vedel's alone remained of his whole force, and

that the main body had escaped some hours before the capitulation, then Castanos repudiated the engagement altogether, and gave Dupont the alternative of death or surrender.

To cut his way through in the absence of Vedel's division seemed impossible, and as at the unanimous wish of his officers that General was induced to return and share the sad fate of Dupont's army, upwards of 20,000 men capitulated at Baylen.

But the Junta of Seville still refused to carry out the original stipulation, and the troops remained prisoners of war until 1814.

Dupont, having bitterly complained of this "breach of faith" to the Governor of Andalusia, received the following answer: "What right have you to demand the execution of a treaty concluded in favor of an army which entered Spain under the veil of alliance and of friendship, which has imprisoned our King and his family, sacked his palaces, assassinated and robbed his subjects, laid waste his country and usurped his Crown?"

Two wrongs, however, do not make one right, and doubtless in the spirit of ancient Spanish chivalry, had not a war of hatred and recrimination been initiated by the French themselves, the soldiers of Dupont would have been allowed to return like those of Junot to France. The latter general has been previously spoken of as one of Napoleon's favorite aides-de-camp, celebrated alike for his bravery at Toulon and his signal services both in Italy and

Egypt, and although his defeat by Sir Arthur Wellesley at Vimiera brought the caustic censures of the French Emperor on his head, yet he was given command both in the Peninsula and also, after the struggle of 1809 with Austria, in Dalmatia, when that province had become a portion of Illyria and was subjected to France. He was also created Duke of Abrantes. His Duchess, the author of the celebrated *Memoirs*, has left an abiding reputation owing to the brilliancy of her pen; but although the incidents of Parisian Society during the Napoleonic wars are therein graphically described, as well as the historical events themselves, yet these bright records must be read with that cautious correction which a general knowledge of the time can alone provide. This lack of trustworthiness such extended contemporary jottings, dealing with years big with fate in Europe, could not altogether avoid.

The Duchess d'Abrantes' estates were confiscated at the Restoration, and she, electing to live by the pen, died in poverty so late as 1838.

To the authoress of the *Memoirs* I gladly acknowledge my own debt when endeavoring to learn all available facts concerning those Continental Rulers who came under her comprehensive glance.

Junot was blamed by Napoleon for not holding his own against Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal; but it is strange to reflect that Spanish, Portuguese and English on the other hand all combined, both in and out of their armies, in wholesale condemnation

of the Convention of Cintra, whereby the French troops were allowed to be conveyed to France and serve wherever Napoleon ordered.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, the saviour of the Peninsula, always defended that Convention on principle, and characteristically chose to share its unpopularity, although his successor in command of the British army, General Sir Hugh Dalrymple, was the person responsible for making it.

Without pledging himself to details in carrying out this engagement, Sir Arthur contended that to clear Portugal of the French, and establish our military base there firmly in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, was the only true policy for England, who then in communication with the sea and commanding it through the fleet, was in the only possible position to succor the Spanish Revolution. The English people, however, in one of their phases of patriotic fervor looked eagerly for land triumphs on the Napoleonic scale just as they had been accustomed to sweep the ocean under Howe and Nelson.

Moreover, the battle of Baylen and Dupont's complete surrender with 20,000 men had naturally led both British and Spaniards to draw comparisons to the detriment of Sir Arthur Wellesley's manner of ejecting Junot from Lisbon.

Nor did the Portuguese generally display the gratitude one would expect to the British General for ridding them of the incubus of a French occupation.

The man chosen to command the English armies in the Peninsula after the Convention of Cintra was not Sir Arthur Wellesley, who returned to his Parliamentary duties at Westminster, but Sir John Moore, eight years senior to the future Duke of Wellington. Moore was born in 1761, the son of a Glasgow physician. He spent nine years in the army, most of them in America, before he saw a shot fired in action, that event occurring in 1795 in Corsica; then he went to the West Indies, and afterwards distinguished himself during the Irish Rebellion of 1798, in Holland—where he was severely wounded—in Egypt with Abercromby, and finally in Sweden during 1807. He had also successfully instilled military knowledge into the Home Army at Shorncliffe when preparing for a Continental War.

In Sweden, Sir John Moore had not agreed with that eccentric Sovereign, Gustavus IV., but the soldier's reputation was so high that Lord Castlereagh, perceiving his abilities, gave him the post in Spain wherein he rendered his name so famous.

Napoleon resolved to put an end to the Peninsular war if possible before the close of 1808, and for that purpose assembled 319,000 picked men on the frontier led by Victor, Bessières, Soult, Moncey, Lefèbvre, Mortier, Ney, St. Cyr and Junot.

The 50,000 dispirited French soldiers who in the middle of August were concentrated on the Ebro, were swiftly swelled to 180,000 available for offensive operations, and although the Spanish armies,

very numerous on paper, were led by men like Castanos, the victor of Baylen, and Palafox, the hero of Saragossa, who had defended that heroic city with the successful co-operation of its inhabitants for two months and two days, i.e., June 13th to August 14th, yet it could scarce be expected that half-trained levies, welded together with a small but reliable regular army, could contend against the magnificent martial array which on this occasion accompanied the Imperial Eagles. Moreover, the arrival of Napoleon towards the close of October animated the vast host so perceptibly that as he pressed on with the Imperial Guard and Victor's corps, Madrid fell on October 2d, and the French swept over the surrounding country like wolves "on the fold." From Madrid, Napoleon made his famous dash at the head of 50,000 men in order to overwhelm the British army under Sir John Moore, who, having been joined by Sir David Baird and General Hope, had concentrated 30,000 men near Astorga, being so placed that they could if necessary retreat either on Portugal or Corunna.

Timely warning was given to Sir John Moore, both of the utter defeat of the Spanish armies in the field and of Napoleon's approach with vastly superior forces; and although an advance was continued until late in December, the skilful dispositions of Moore, under circumstances of a depressing character, rendered retreat possible over the Esla towards Galicia and by its mountain passes to the sea and Corunna.

It was not the French Emperor's fault that he failed

to cut off Moore's retreat, as he positively transported 50,000 men from Madrid to Astorga, two hundred miles in all, incidentally crossing the swollen torrent of the Esla as well as the Guadarrama range in a snow-storm, during eight days, an average of twenty-five miles a day ! It is said that Napoleon himself was recalled by Courier, owing to the increasing preparations of Austria, but when he left the pursuit to Soult there was no longer hope of destroying Moore's army without a pitched battle near the coast, such as occurred on January 16, A. D. 1809, when the skilfully chosen defensive positions of the British enabled them to beat off the superior numbers of Soult and embark their men in the fleet of transports waiting near the shore, but not with their "lost leader," Sir John Moore, who, like Wolfe before him, fell in the hour of victory. As Wolfe's namesake wrote :

" We buried him darkly at dead of night,  
The sods with our bayonets turning ;  
By the struggling moonbeam's misty light  
And the lantern dimly burning.  
  
No useless coffin enclosed his breast,  
Not in sheet nor in shroud we wound him ;  
But he lay like a warrior taking his rest  
With his martial cloak around him."

The spirit that arose in the English army when they read of the deeds of their comrades at Corunna was of a character that confers the name Continental Ruler on their dead Chieftain, so distinguished as a soldier and honored as a man.

Very little that had occurred in Spain during A. D.



1807-8 could have encouraged the Czar to believe he had gained anything by the treaty of Tilsit or its indorsement, at Erfurt, so far as that agreement dealt with the Peninsula, or the Balance of Naval Power.

The much-abused Convention of Cintra, for instance, enjoined that nine sail of the line and one frigate, then at Lisbon, under Vice-Admiral Semavin, should be deposited in a British port until peace had been restored between Russia and England, Admiral, officers and seamen being conveyed at once to St. Petersburg. Nevertheless a state of war continued between the two nations, under which the restoration of Europe's anti-British Naval armament did not progress in the ratio expected by its designer, Napoleon.

According to Jomini, the Nations united against England, after Tilsit, had originally been intended to total 180 ships of war, 60 being French, 25 Russian, and 40 Spanish—fifteen Danish and ten Portuguese were also relied on.

Of these at least thirty had already in 1809 been accounted for, while the Swedish contingent of fifteen had not yet been rendered up to their enemies. There remained the swift shipbuilding to dread which France was carrying on, more particularly at Antwerp, as also in the young port of Cherbourg, so that it is almost impossible to limit the immensity to which the French Naval armaments might have attained, if patience and consideration had been exercised before the ruin of Trafalgar and the dissipation

of the remnants that remained in the West Indies and Southern Atlantic during A. D. 1806.

But Napoleon and Alexander had not advanced in their joint Naval projects in 1809, and the French Emperor according to Jomini owed this failure to "the faults committed in the Spanish War."

It will be seen that English Statesmen endeavored to deal with the danger from shipbuilding in Antwerp by the Walcheren Expedition, which, unfortunately for them, miscarried miserably.

There are diversities of opinion as to the wisdom of Austria contending alone in Europe against Napoleon in 1809; but out of that controversy one fact stands out as uncontestedly reliable and true, and it is the opportunity thereby given to Great Britain to persevere in the policy which had resulted in the expulsion of the French from Portugal, while Sir John Moore had proved what a small English army was capable of effecting by way of a diversion even against the vast forces of French Imperialism. Therefore, when Sir Arthur Wellesley presented to the British Government his scheme of defending the Peninsula from the French, his arguments were so far successful that he was entrusted with the carrying out of his own military conceptions.

It was the essential element in any British campaign in the Peninsula that it could only be attempted with comparatively slender forces which were to form a nucleus around which the scattered patriot bands of Spaniards might rally whenever the

moment came to cross the Portuguese frontier. Arthur Wellesley, third son of the Earl of Mornington, cannot be excluded from the category of Continental Rulers within the Nineteenth Century. He came into the world at his father's house in Merrion Square, Dublin—as told to myself by his eldest son, the second Duke of Wellington, when the fact that authorities differed as to the place of birth was brought to his notice—in that same year, 1769, which gave to the world the genius of Napoleon, and the lives of Chateaubriand, Soult and Alexander Humboldt. While very young he was sent to Eton, and soon afterwards to the military seminary of Angers, where, under the celebrated instructor Pignerol, he remained six years and imbibed the strategy of the School of Turenne and Vauban so far as their methods were adapted to modern warfare. It is remarkable that Napoleon Bonaparte also passed through the same curriculum at Angers. Before young Wellesley was eighteen he joined the army as ensign in the 73d Foot, and after several changes became Major of the 33d and then Lieutenant Colonel of that regiment, with which he is mainly associated.

At twenty-one he entered Parliament for Trim, where it was erroneously asserted he had been born amidst the Mornington estates, and where he thus had a family position; his eldest brother, the future Marquis Wellesley, being appointed "Commissioner for India" by Mr. Pitt.

In command of the 33d Colonel Wellesley went to the Low Countries with the Duke of York in May, 1794, and took part in that unsuccessful campaign, covering the retreat at Antwerp and displaying the same judgment which served him so well in the future. After a short voyage to the West Indies in 1795, he was sent to India in 1797, where he remained until 1805; during this period he was engaged in all the great achievements of the East India Company's forces, the Siege of Seringapatam, and more particularly the Battle of Assaye, giving him a military position unknown in British India since the days of Clive. Local honors and rewards unbounded were thrust upon Wellesley, and he received from the British Government a Knight-Commandership of the Bath, and was given the thanks of Parliament for his share in the events which occurred at Copenhagen, 1807, when he drove before him the militia levies of the ill-fated Danes.

We have seen how readily he responded to the task intrusted to him during 1808 when confronted with Junot in Portugal, and are now fairly familiar with the past history of this remarkable personage who, resigning both the office of Secretary for Ireland and his seat in the House of Commons, took command of the British forces around Lisbon on the 22d of April, 1809, amidst the plaudits of those Portuguese who had seemed so ungrateful on a former occasion.

The advance into Spain which ensued, the passage

of the Douro, and the Battle of Talavera on July 28, 1809, where the English Army proved itself worthy of the nation that had, in former years and in different periods, won Cressy, Poitiers and Blenheim, led Europe at last to perceive that Napoleon by threatening to invade England had re-created a military spirit in a militant nation.

Nor did the shortcomings of the Spanish regular armies at all deter this great chieftain from patiently adapting his means of action to their peculiar needs and powers.

For, although not always reliable in a general action, and far too impulsive for half-drilled troops before the hosts of Imperial France, yet from time to time both his Spanish and Portuguese allies did give Sir Arthur Wellesley good support in the great task Great Britain had undertaken of conquering Spain from Napoleon and draining the much strained resources of the great Nation which entrusted itself so blindly to him.

Sir Arthur was the last man not to acknowledge the value of blind patriot courage such as the Spaniards displayed, for instance, in the second Siege of Saragossa, which ended on February 20, 1809, only by the town becoming a mass of blackened ruins beneath which Palafox would gladly have been buried rather than be taken into a weary captivity in France.

I will conclude this chapter with Sir Archibald Alison's description of the Spanish patriots in the field.

“Inferior to many other nations in the firmness and discipline with which they stand the shock of battle, they are superior to them all in the readiness with which they rally after defeat and the invincible tenacity with which they maintain a contest under circumstances of disaster, when any other people would succumb in despair. In vain are their armies defeated and dispersed, are their fortresses taken, their plains overrun, their capital subdued; singly or in small bodies they renew the conflict; they rally and reunite as rapidly as they disperse; the numerous mountain chains which intersect their country afford a refuge for their broken bands; their cities make a desperate though insulated defence; and, from the wreck of all regular or organized opposition, emerges the redoubtable Guerilla warfare.”

It was the spirit that animated resistance to Napoleon on lines such as these which encouraged Stein and his patriot coadjutors in Prussia to believe that at last the dawn was breaking upon a revival of European life and liberty, and with those hopes I purpose to deal in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## NATIONAL AWAKENINGS (2).

STEIN, MINISTER OF PRUSSIA, AND HIS REFORMS.—SCHARNHORST, MILITARY ORGANIZER, AND HIS COADJUTORS AT BERLIN, A. D. 1808.—SYMPATHY FOR SPANISH PEOPLE IN PRUSSIA.—STEIN WELCOMED BY NAPOLEON AS FREDERICK WILLIAM'S MINISTER IN SUCCESSION TO HARDENBERG—NOTABLE ERROR MADE ON THIS OCCASION.—STEIN AS A REFORMER.—SCHARNHORST'S MILITARY SYSTEM.—HIS CAREER.—ANTECEDENTS OF GNEISENAU, BLÜCHER AND NIEBUHR.—RENEWAL OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA AT ERFURT.—STEIN PROSCRIBED BY NAPOLEON, WHO INTERCEPTED ONE OF HIS LETTERS CONTAINING OPINIONS HOSTILE TO THE FRENCH.—THE EXILED MINISTER HAD ENDEAVORED TO PERSUADE THE PRUSSIAN SOVEREIGN TO JOIN AUSTRIA IN HER PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE FRENCH.—ALTENSTEIN OCCUPIED STEIN'S POSITION IN THE PRUSSIAN MINISTRY UNTIL HARDENBERG RETURNED TO POWER IN 1810.

THE events in Spain were bruited about and reached the whole Continent, leaving the deepest impression amongst all German people, who, from that moment, slowly but surely gravitated towards the unity which so potently influenced the modern European system. Ultimately the sentiment, which for convenience' sake I will speak of as that of "Nationality," was destined to arrest Napoleon in his lawless and headstrong course, even if long years of

painful probation were still to be passed under the harrow of foreign subjection.

An early consequence of the Spanish Revolution was seen in a new life arising in Prussia. Frederick William III. had not only lost half his dominions at Tilsit, but the remaining provinces were held in military subjection by Napoleon quartering 150,000 men in the country until a vast indemnity had been discharged. Hardenberg, the Minister, who had been chiefly relied on by his Sovereign, even when Haugwitz held temporary sway over foreign affairs, received his dismissal at the French Emperor's instance, while the same supreme authority, strange to add, welcomed Stein as successor in the apparently impossible task of recuperating Prussia, or what remained of it, at Berlin.

Napoleon, however, calculated that an official in the Department of Finance might be able to raise the contributions required to pay the expenses of the French occupation, but would not be likely to attempt any wide schemes of national restoration in Prussia. Never, however, was the Conqueror of Europe more mistaken. Stein entered on his duties at a moment when the ancient jealousies of North and South Germany had disappeared, as well as the rivalries of the House of Brandenburg with that of Hapsburg, Prussian and Austrian patriots being completely combined in sentiment, if not able to concert immediate action.

It is true that this arousing of the forces of national life was necessarily secret, because in a very impor-



tant part of Germany the French occupation was temporarily secured by the existence of the Confederation of the Rhine, while it seemed as vain to ask shackled Prussia to participate in such a movement as to seek financial assistance from an individual just able to meet family charges imposed on him by his forefathers, or expect princely munificence from successors to estates who have just paid enormous death duties. Napoleon himself, fearful lest the continued resistance of the Spaniards should shake the allegiance of Prussia, invited the Czar to the famous gathering at Erfurt, near Weimar, which took place on October 7, 1808. There the nobility and the literary savants of the Rhine Provinces vied with one another for the passing favor of the Conqueror of Europe.

It is not agreeable to a German's sense of patriotism to find Goethe and his friend Wieland acting as courtiers to Napoleon, and to discover that Germany's greatest man scarcely counted her as one of the European nations.

It is interesting to observe that in Alexander's train on this occasion was the young Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, uncle of Queen Victoria, destined to become a continental ruler in Belgium.

Prussia utterly failed at Erfurt to gain any remission from her burdens, and Napoleon there gave rein to a strong outburst against Stein when the Ambassador of Frederick William was present, and so left it to be understood that open resistance, unless made in unison with potent allies, could not hope for suc-

cess. Hence it came to pass that the secret organization of the "Tugendbund" suddenly gained such enormous influence. Founded by Moritz Arndt, the German poet, this so-called "League of Virtue" permeated every rank of Prussian society, and created the spirit which enabled the people to take future advantage of the opportunities afforded by their leaders.

Stein, however, knew full well that it was not by the propagation of new ideas, Masonic in character, that any abiding strength could be added to the kingdom about to be committed to his care. Frederick William III. had hitherto regarded his new adviser with a certain amount of distrust, because on more than one occasion he spoke with unaccustomed plainness, not to say brusqueness, regarding political rivals in Prussia who were recipients of royal favor.

The King seemed to remember that his own dignity had not been adequately regarded by a proud, if gifted, subject.

Stein, however, who probably felt that in form, at least, he had in the past been blamable in this particular, very properly treated his Sovereign's desires with a becoming deference, while devoting all his talents and energies to the cause of sorely wounded Prussia.

This conduct of Stein's was welcomed thankfully by interested onlookers, such as Hardenberg, Scharnhorst, Blücher, Arndt and Fichte, who thought they saw the star of hope arising before eyes long blinded

to patriotic life, which had previously burned but in the hearts of these men, and had no visible popular existence. But to secure the object of their ardent desires, Stein saw that it would be speedily necessary to bring about three leading reforms.

First, the abolition of serfage.

Second, a change in the Prussian Army system ; and

Third, the creation of municipal institutions, both in cities and country districts, the latter portion of this last scheme not gaining completion during the Minister's term of office.

There is, moreover, no doubt that had Stein been allowed a free hand, and not been limited by time and opportunity, he would have created some sort of Parliament, and not have permitted his country to have languished so long without providing the Hohenzollern monarchs with a healthy constitutional safety-valve such as even Bismarck tolerated, and with which the Emperor of Germany has now to rule.

The edict of October 9, 1807, which brought personal servitude to a close in Prussia, also permitted land to pass from one class to another ; and although it was left to Hardenberg four years later to completely free the peasant from feudal obligations to his lord, yet the enhanced independence of action which Stein secured to the poorer classes that lived on the soil, awakening an interest in the nation to which they belonged and quickening their desire to undergo some self-sacrifice in its behalf, was conferred

most opportunely upon the most numerous section of Frederick William's subjects.

But even this beneficial change must have been inoperative but for Scharnhorst's reorganization of the Prussian Military System.

The Kingdom split in twain, a Foreign force, 150,000 strong, quartered on the soil, the Nation of Frederick the Great had been reduced to keeping a standing army of 40,000 men by the exactions of Napoleon; but this difficulty Scharnhorst solved by the now familiar method of adopting short service under the colors, and the constant drafting of trained soldiers into a Reserve; while a Landwehr or Militia, for defence of the country, was in the last instance to be supplemented by general arming of the adult population on the Spanish Guerilla system, which he termed Landsturm.

Probably no single individual during the last hundred years, not even Stein, Bismarck or Moltke, can be said to have forwarded more notably the interests of Prussia, and laid the foundations of her future power to promote German Unity more securely, than Gerhard Scharnhorst, who, born at Bordenau near Hanover in 1755, owed his early love for military knowledge to that distinguished literary soldier, Count Lippe-Buckeburg, who instilled into the pupil's mind the incipient idea of the military system which resulted in Prussia taking her due part in the deliverance of Europe.

At twenty-five Scharnhorst wrote a history of the

Siege of Gibraltar, which was soon followed by a Biography of his instructor, Count Lippe-Buckeburg.

Welcoming warmly the inception of the French Revolution, Scharnhorst soon came to reprobate its excesses, and after serving under the Duke of York in the army of Hanover during 1795, he became acquainted with Stein and communicated to him the ideas of Army Reform which they eventually put in practice.

The military measures of Scharnhorst proved so successful that without Davoust, the General commanding the French army of occupation, becoming aware, nearly 200,000 men had passed under the colors before the struggle of 1809 commenced; and the preoccupations of Napoleon, both in preparing for this Austrian war and holding his conquests in Spain, prevented any interference from French sources.

It is remarkable that several distinguished German Patriots were of Hanoverian birth, amongst them both Scharnhorst and Hardenberg, as well as Schön—Stein's reforming colleague in the Government. Gneisenau, on the other hand, was a Saxon and Blücher first saw the light in Mecklenburg. It is a fact worth noting that the former of these two soldiers was a member of the German contingent, hired by England to defend her American Colonies from the army of Washington, and that after the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, at Yorktown, the future

German General spent some months in Canada, being quartered both at Halifax and Quebec.

The next active service experienced by Gneisenau occurred during the partition of Poland under Frederick the Great; and then, twenty-four years having elapsed, "Blücher's head," as "Marshal Forwards" was accustomed to call him, was wounded at Saalfeld, when Prince Louis Ferdinand fell; he was also present at Jena, where he is said to have observed to good purpose Napoleon's swift pursuit of a beaten enemy, being himself destined to put such experience into practice at Waterloo.

When Stein became Prussian Minister, Blücher was already sixty-five. He had been taken prisoner by the Prussians in the Seven Years' War, and having been induced to enlist in their army, complained to the King of a youth of high family being promoted over his head, for no other reason than his rank; he received from Frederick the Great the following characteristic answer:—"Captain v. Blücher is relieved from his service, and may go to the devil."

The Campaign of Jena, that of old men, was redeemed from absolute military infamy by the bold stand that Blücher made, until overwhelmed by superior forces near Lübeck. The career of another of Stein's fellow-workers must be noticed namely, that of Niebuhr, the historian and philologist, by birth a Dane, who entered the service of Frederick William III. in 1805, and was at once charged with important diplomatic negotiations.

The ratification at Erfurt of the new treaty between France and Prussia necessitated the speedy retirement of Stein, because the only Foreign Policy thenceforth possible was that of subservience to the existing order in Europe; and this was, naturally, intolerable to the Minister, who had given the French Emperor the chance he was seeking by writing to Prince Wittgenstein, some weeks before, a denunciatory letter against the Napoleonic system, which fell into the hands of spies at Berlin.

It was not until December 16, 1808, that the decree of proscription was issued against Stein, whose fate was thus that of Hardenberg after Tilsit. These two men are linked together as helmsmen of the Prussian State, when most threatened with shipwreck; and it is worthy of notice, how, being intimate in youth, and yet alienated by divergence of character and social tastes in mature years, they never failed to support one another in measures patriotic.

Henceforth, Stein could only serve his country as an exile, while Hardenberg's recall to power did not occur for two years, during which period Altenstein became the adviser of the Prussian King, performing for Hardenberg much the same kind of service that Addington did for Pitt in Great Britain, during his retirement from office. Stein, although he had profited by the organization of the Tugendbund, and applauded the enthusiasm of those who stirred Germanic patriotism, either in song or prose, was yet by nature neither a conspirator nor a mere enthusiast. He was

aware that time would not be allowed him wherein to perfect Prussia's preparations to renew the war, and trusting to the rising of the German people, which Count Stadion was initiating in Austria, as well as to the assurances of aid from England, he fearlessly endeavored to persuade his Sovereign to risk his Kingdom forthwith in the impending struggle.

Stein's most prominent misconception consisted in the belief that the Czar had tired of the French Alliance before Erfurt, where it was discovered that for the sake of acquiring the Danubian Principalities, securing his hold on Finland, which had been allotted him at Tilsit, and retaining a free hand in his war with Sweden, Alexander was prepared to give adhesion to Napoleon's schemes in Spain, and even as well to stand idly by while Austria was attacked, Prussia being too bound up by financial and military fetters to take action.

It is easy to argue that Stein was wrong, because the deliverance of Europe took place gradually in six years' time, and Prussia gained all that she desired without endangering her existence to the extent she must have done in 1809. It should, however, be remembered that nobody in a responsible position in Europe imagined such an event as Napoleon's invasion of Russia to be within the scope of possibility. As the weakening of power and authority, which ensued on the loss of his army in 1812, certainly contributed, more than any other event, to



a restoration of Peace in 1814 and the banishment of the great disturber of Europe, so if this stupendous catastrophe had never occurred amidst the snows of Muscovy, then might the deliverance of Europe have been indefinitely deferred.

It is not too much to say that, but for the unexpected happening, as a great British Statesman, Lord Beaconsfield, contended it often did, Prussia could not have regained her position amongst the nations, at least, during Napoleon's natural life, which, whatever its limit, would not have closed in the solitude of St. Helena.

For these and other reasons it is important to emphasize the full force of Prussia's unreadiness on this occasion, which had its effect in 1809, during the great conflict in Austria, and the rising in the Tyrol.

Although, as has been shown, they suffered temporary eclipse, the ideas of Stein and Scharnhorst are those which have most influenced the Old World during the nineteenth century.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## NATIONAL AWAKENINGS (3).

THE PREMATURE AROUSING OF AUSTRIA, A. D. 1809.—NAPOLEON TRIES TO THROW THE BLAME OF THE COMING WAR ON HIS OPPONENTS.—POPULAR PROGRAMME OF COUNT STADION, THE AUSTRIAN MINISTER.—THE ARCH-DUKE CHARLES, WHO HAD OPPOSED THE BREAKING OUT OF HOSTILITIES UNTIL REFORMS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE ARMY BECOMES AUSTRIAN COMMANDER.—SLOW MOVEMENT OF THE ARCH-DUKE AND CHANGE OF PLAN OF CAMPAIGN FROM THE GERMAN FRONTIERS OF BOHEMIA TO THE VALLEY OF THE DANUBE.—OPENING SUCCESSES OF THE FRENCH.—RISINGS IN GERMANY BY SCHILL, DORNBERG AND DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.—DRAWN BATTLES IN AND AROUND ESSLING AND ASPERN.—ARMISTICE DURING WHICH THE EMPEROR FRANCIS APPEALS IN VAIN TO FREDERICK WILLIAM III., FOR ALLEGED PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE.—BATTLE OF WAGRAM AND PEACE OF VIENNA.—DIVERGENCE OF FRENCH AND RUSSIAN POLICY.

COUNT PHILIPPE STADION was the Minister who conducted the war waged on behalf of German nationality and European freedom by Conservative Austria in 1809. Like Stein, he was of ancient lineage and an Imperial Knight whose enthusiasm for Teutonic history had been generated at the University of Göttingen, where he followed the future

Minister of Prussia some six years after the latter had finished his residence.

Proud and plain-spoken, grasping great ideas and standing by them firmly, there was a certain similarity of character between Stadion and Stein.

At the elbow of the Minister during the negotiations with France, prior to the outbreak of war, stood the famous Corsican diplomatist, Count Pozzo di Borgo, an inexorable foe of Napoleon, while the latter by insulting bulletins seems to have prepared the way for what, in view of the State of Spain, where Wellington's position in Portugal rendered the tenure of France most uncertain, must have been an unwelcome contest. Much has been written by rival writers to show who was the aggressor, France or Austria, in 1809, but the truth is that the Peace of Presburg, made after Austerlitz, had crippled the dual Kingdom so greatly that it became only a question of time when a renewed conflict should commence. Moreover the genuine popular dissatisfaction in the Austrian Empire with Napoleon's rule, as developed in later years, had conspired to arouse the spirit of nationality in quarters where no such thoughts had ever before been harbored.

For instance, the harsh replies given to Pius VII., when negotiations were proceeding regarding the French Episcopate, rankled in the hearts of those to whom they were reported, being reprobated by every good Roman Catholic.

It is true that the French Emperor refrained from

annexing the States of the Church and taking Pope Pius VII. a captive to Savona until after Vienna had fallen, but the sturdy determination of the threatened Pontiff had become notorious before the legions of France crossed into Bohemia, so that indignation best describes the sentiments of his faithful followers all over the world, and especially those in the Austro-Hungarian provinces as well as the Tyrol.

Subjected by an article of the Treaty of Presburg to Bavaria, the gallant mountaineers were conspiring to restore Austrian rule, and elected a champion worthy of the occasion in Andrew Hofer. Forty-two years of age, he had followed his father's occupation of innkeeper until the Archduke John of Austria, establishing relations with this brave man, drew him into the vortex of politics connected with his native land. Bavaria had utterly failed to satisfy the aspirations of these Tyrolese, and Hofer became the Tell of their country, so that as a result of an insurrection under his guidance the soldiers of Napoleon's German Vassal were expelled.

Here, as in Austria, the Roman Catholic Clergy were found encouraging the people to a war of nationality, the harsh treatment of the Pope by Napoleon having been bruited abroad and silently condemned. The Clergy, moreover—omnipotent with the people—revolted against the Bavarian Government, who confiscated all advowsons, and the Bishops declining to surrender their patronage were championed by the Priests.

Indeed, it seems probable that the Tyrolese would have overlooked increased taxation, however unpopular, if the Bavarians had respected their religious uses and customs.

Such was the spirit and determination of these simple people that 15,000 of them successively induced 3,000 Bavarians at Innsbruck and a column of French under General Brisson to surrender at discretion, the first after a sharp engagement, and the second because they had little or no ammunition. Indeed, the tactics of the Tyrolese in getting close to their enemy and silently surrounding him in a rugged and mountainous country reminds a reader of the conflict between British and Boers in Natal during 1899. Moreover, the loss of General Brisson's column seems to have been brought about by similar causes to those which governed the surrender of Colonel Carleton at Nicholson's Neck near Ladysmith.

Owing to the joint efforts of Stadion and the Archduke Charles, Austria had 260,000 men ready to take the field in March, 1809, and although destined to be outnumbered by the legions of France, collected from its vast if incongruous empire, yet the high-souled spirit of Patriotism which had been aroused seemed likely to atone for a numerical inferiority in trained troops—if not in popular levies, which daily joined the standards of the Emperor Francis in enormous numbers.

Undoubtedly the hopes of Stadion and the Archduke Charles, who on this occasion almost entirely super-

seded the Aulic Council of Austria, were in the first instance directed towards Northern Germany for co-operation, and to Prussia in particular. The outspoken statements of Stein were known to have voiced the feelings of many thousand men whom Scharnhorst had armed, while the appeals of the philosophic Fichte and the patriot lyrics of Arndt conspired to stir the hearts of those whose lives were spent in comparative seclusion.

Nor had the influence of the Tugendbund, or league of virtue, entirely declined, although a sense of depression nearly akin to hopelessness had crept over Prussia after Stein had fled from the country.

The Austrians, therefore, rejecting in the first instance the traditional movement down the valley of the Danube, massed their forces on the north-west of Bohemia, intending to launch them into Central Germany. Given an uprising of Prussia, Davoust's force of 60,000 men in North Bavaria must necessarily have been gravely endangered.

Schill, the brave Prussian cavalry leader of Colbert fame, evidently believed that the Austrians intended to pass by Ratisbon towards the Valley of the Elbe, but found to his cost that the plan of campaign had been changed, and that Napoleon's vigor had again triumphed over his opponent's irresolution.

Retreating to the coast, he threw himself into Stralsund, and there fell fighting in the vain hope to arouse his countrymen, on May 25, 1809. Previous to this catastrophe, an ineffectual attempt to raise

the Hessians against King Joseph in Wurtemberg had failed ignominiously although Dornberg, the chief actor in this inauspicious affair, escaped and lived to take a leading part in the War of 1813.

It should also be remembered that the gallant Prussian officer Katt "made a bold attempt to seize the fortress of Magdeburg, likewise surviving the dark days of his country."

But, however, for the lack of concerted action between Austria and Prussia, men such as these would not have lost their lives or wrecked their prospects in vain, because from all sources, diplomatic and military, and to each Government concerned, came information regarding the internal state of Prussia, tending to the belief that the nation was ripe for rebellion against Napoleon's despotism, and eager for a national war of deliverance. Austria, though isolated from other European powers, whether or not they sympathized with her, entered on the strife with far greater resources than she possessed in 1805, but was not nearly so happily situated from a military point of view, because then the might and wealth of the great Muscovite Empire had been exercised on her behalf, while Prussia and England were on each occasion allies, anxious to strike but doubtful how to do so.

The Archduke Charles, second up to this period only to Napoleon as a captain, had done wonders in reforming the army, and had created a Reserve, or Landwehr, which added considerably to the numerical strength of the Imperial forces.

Moreover he was with one consent elected to lead the armies of the Emperor Francis in the field.

Political reasons apparently led to a hesitancy as to the precise field of operations, and Jomini joins other authorities in averring that the opening five days of the campaign, which concluded at Eckmühl in Bavaria, saw Napoleon at his zenith and the Archduke Charles at his nadir. Indeed the lack of coherence from which the Emperor Francis's army suffered after these shattering engagements, wherein Austria lost, according to Mr. Fyffe, the immediate services of some 60,000 men, was so great, that another occupation of Vienna became inevitable when it was seen that the Archduke Charles intended to concentrate his forces in Bohemia before making any immediate attempt either to save or relieve the capital, towards which Napoleon pressed on triumphantly, making his entry on May 13, 1809.

No peace, however, seemed possible so long as an enormous Austrian host was encamped on the left bank of the Danube opposite to Vienna, four miles from which city the river in its course to the Black Sea passes the island of Lobau, a league in length and three leagues in circumference.

The broader channel was that on the right side of the Danube and the arm of the river nearest to Vienna. It was easy for Napoleon to cross this by pontoons, because, sheltered by the island itself, neither the engineers employed in making the bridges, nor the 40,000 troops who immediately crossed



over them, could suffer from the artillery fire of the Archduke Charles, who with 80,000 men was in position on the opposite bank. On the 21st of May, when Napoleon had bridged the narrower channel and occupied the famous villages of Aspern and Essling with this advanced guard of his army, the Austrians launched heavily-laden barges down the swollen torrents of the Danube, fed at the time by melting mountain snows, and so carried away the bridges on the broader channel of the river over which reinforcements from Vienna must necessarily pass.

Fancy then the perilous position of the French on the 21st of May when, fighting with the Danube at their backs and retreat only open into the island of Lobau, they lost Aspern, and only held Essling by means of Masséna's magnificent resolution combined with the approach of nightfall, to which (Lanfrey seems to think) should be added the Archduke Charles's strange hesitation. For indeed the moment had arrived when, with a victorious force twice that of the French in number, the Austrian leader might, as Lanfrey believes, "have driven the French army into the Danube." And it was some such undeniable success for which Frederick William of Prussia was waiting, before declaring war against the French,—not the sanguinary duel on more or less equal terms which ended, after two days' more carnage, by Austria abandoning the villages of Essling—Aspern, and Napoleon resting his army on the island

of Lobau, but with his bridges rebuilt and communication secured between his forces and Vienna, whence reinforcements under Prince Eugène were triumphantly advancing from Italy.

Marshal Lannes fell on the second day's fighting, losing both limbs by a cannon-ball.

Neither side can be said to have gained any decided advantage in this horrible scene of human destruction whereon, as Lanfrey computes it, "50,000 men lost their lives" in a three days' conflict; and although the public opinion of Europe was much impressed by the fact that the Great Napoleon had again met his match as before at Eylau, yet the state of things which had induced Frederick William to promise the exiled Prince of Orange to intervene conditionally, did not seem to have arrived in the opinion of that honorable, if over-cautious, monarch.

Lanfrey speaks of these "formal promises of speedy co-operation" as being "positive assurances," and the Emperor Francis certainly regarded the situation after the battles of Essling and Aspern as being of the particular character provided for by the understanding between the two monarchs, and sent Colonel Steigentesch to Königsberg with a letter dated June 8, 1809, about a fortnight after the indecisive struggles on the Danube. Frederick William, who was meditating a return to Berlin with Queen Louisa to take up the threads of government when the soil had just been freed from French occupation, hesitated and expressed a fear of Austria making a "separate

peace," a question which Steigentesch naturally thought from his instructions had been previously settled.

"The time has not yet come," pleaded the King. "If I were to declare myself now, it would be my ruin. Strike one more blow and I will come, but I will not come alone."

The writer of these studies holds no brief for the Hohenzollern sovereign thus wavering in the hour of Germany's suspended fate, but finds it impossible not to deplore the absence of Stein's strong arm at his master's side when such a momentous decision had to be arrived at.

A few burning words from the regenerator of Prussia, interpreting the doubtful compact in a patriotic sense, might have nerved Frederick William to again risk in one fell throw the edifice of government he had been employed for two years in laboriously recasting; but the wizard had been driven from the monarch's presence-chamber, and his wand was idle, not even grasped by the less firm hands of faithful but undecided successors. And yet there were portents abroad which should have renerved Prussia to seize the only possible occasion whereon the rising of German nationalities could have been made complete amongst themselves, when the sacred torch of liberty spread across Spain, aye! and was welcomed with acclaim in Portugal also when Wellington, approaching Soult at Oporto, slowly drove him over the Spanish frontier.

That there was a risk of failure, which would have implied Prussian obliteration, is undeniable ; but had Stein been minister, the word destined to have put all to the touch would most probably have been spoken.

It was, however, foreordained that Austria should "tread the winepress alone" on this dire occasion, and if she dared so much, at less risk of complete destruction than the Prussian Monarchy would have been required to incur in alliance with the Hapsburgs and Great Britain, neither the Emperor Francis nor Stadion knew how their despairing efforts to subdue Napoleon on the terrible field of Wagram were to bear fruit.

In the writer's opinion the European dominion of the French Emperor was doomed when the nationalities arose against him one by one, and substituted the prayers and striving of many peoples for the cabals of monarchs and the intrigues of interested advisers.

Nor should it be forgotten that the War of 1809 first imported this popular element into the Napoleonic struggle.

The battle of Wagram fought on July 5 and 6, 1809, was on the whole a conflict wherein the Austrians lost their chief positions and decided on retreat, which they effected in good order ; yet the acceptance of peace at Schönbrunn is by no means indefensible.

England did not strike swiftly or state the purpose of her great armament preparing to sail to an undefined point in the North.

Prussia, as has been said, looked wistfully on in

inglorious inaction, save for the gallant rush of 2,000 Black Brunswickers, under their "fated chieftain" into the recreant King of Saxony's capital, from which they drove him temporarily, and then escaped themselves to the coast.

Wellington at this time had to retreat to Portugal after the victorious conflict at Talavera, and Austria under such circumstances believed she had no alternative but to make the best terms possible with the foe she had engaged on not unequal terms.

But however fatal to the position of Austria's Emperor and Hungary's King Napoleon's terms set forth on this occasion might appear, there existed within these proposals one element of discord between France and Russia, which was destined to destroy the alliance framed at Tilsit.

Austrian Galicia was for the most part to be made over to the Duchy of Warsaw, and the Czar strongly reprobated any such arrangement, as being totally antagonistic to the understanding arrived at on the raft at Tilsit.

Forced as Alexander I. henceforth became to dissemble and nurse his feelings of revengeful distrust against France and her Emperor, it mattered the less to Austria that she was stripped of her seaboard, and lost the Tyrol—the gallant Hofer perishing by reason of his own unreasonable refusal of compromise—while 50,000 square miles together with 4,000,000 inhabitants were wrenched from the country of Maria Theresa.

The goal of impending freedom in Europe was in sight. immediately Napoleon and Alexander I. seriously disagreed; but men failed to recognize it in the guise wherein it first appeared.

In France the nation was amused and appeased by the celebration of new triumphs, while the Emperor endeavored to sustain his dynasty by divorcing the Empress Josephine (to whom he owed his position as General of the Army of Italy, from which appointment sprang all his glories), and marrying an Austrian Princess.

Shallow observers believed that when Marie Louise shared with Napoleon the Imperial throne of the Tuileries, the age of Peace would supervene at last, and that the dynasty of the Bonapartes would firmly and permanently grasp the sceptre of Charlemagne and Henry IV.

Empty and vain illusion indeed, for the stifled groans of millions had a visible counterpart in the still defiant people of Spain, amongst whom the organized legions of Wellington were soon destined triumphantly to mingle.

Germany, it is true, had not dared to strike, mistrusting the weapons at her disposal. But the fires of patriotism smouldered even in the fair Rhine land, bowed down by foreign subjection and the opportunity to strike for freedom was destined to arise sooner than at this apparently dark moment seemed possible.

Alexander had retired moodily to his Steppes and

to take counsel with his advisers amidst the barbaric splendors of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Amongst those counsellors was soon to be numbered the Baron Stein, and the advice he gave it is not difficult to imagine.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## DELIVERANCE OF EUROPE (1).

THE REVOLT OF RUSSIA AND CAMPAIGN OF MOSCOW, A. D. 1812.—FRANCE ANNEXES HOLLAND.—THE REPUBLIC OF THE VALAIS AND OLDENBURG.—THE LATTER ABSORPTION RESENTED BY THE CZAR.—BERNADOTTE CHOSEN TO BE CROWN PRINCE OF SWEDEN.—BIRTH OF NAPOLEON'S SON THE KING OF ROMÉ.—MASSENA SENT TO PORTUGAL, BUT FOILED BY THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.—FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ.—BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.—OCCUPATION OF MADRID BY WELLINGTON AND SUBSEQUENT BRITISH RETREAT FROM THE SIEGE OF BURGOS.—HARDENBERG AGAIN BECOMES MINISTER OF PRUSSIA AT THE DYING REQUEST OF QUEEN LOUISA.—SIGNS HUMILIATING TREATY WITH FRANCE.—PRUSSIAN FORCE JOINS NAPOLEON'S ARMY INVADING RUSSIA.—AUSTRIA ACTS IN LIKE MANNER.—WARNINGS OF RISINGS IN GERMANY RECEIVED FROM KING JEROME.—DAVOUST AND RAPP.—STEIN AT ST. PETERSBURG IMPRESSED WITH INSUFFICIENCY OF CZAR'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS.—POPULAR UPRISING AGAINST FRENCH INVADERS.—SUCCESSFUL ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH TO MOSCOW.—THE RUSSIANS DESERT AND BURN MOST OF THE CITY.—AFTER FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS, RETREAT COMMENCES AND THE FRENCH ARMY IS NEARLY DESTROYED BY COLD AND DISEASE TOGETHER WITH HARASSING COSSACK ATTACKS.—NAPOLEON LEAVES RUSSIA FOR PARIS SURREPTITIOUSLY.

NAPOLEON found his hands too full in Central Europe, when he returned to Paris after Wagram, to make his way to Spain and command the 300,000



Frenchmen there, who could get no firm and unchallenged footing in the Peninsula. Three annexations had been resolved upon in Europe, which needed his personal attention to consummate. Louis, King of Holland, had not proved sufficiently pliable, and preferred his people's interests even to his Imperial brother's demands, and had endeavored to lighten the commercial restrictions which pressed so heavily on the Dutch people. English goods not having been altogether excluded, menacing communications from the French Emperor led Louis to flee across the frontier and rid himself of a burdensome throne.

A week after this occurred, Holland was formally incorporated with the French Empire, and before the year 1810 closed, two more communities, nominally independent, shared a similar fate, that is, the Republic of the Valais, said to have failed to safely guard the Simplon Pass, and Oldenburg, a portion of Westphalia, the possession of which barred more effectually English merchandise from passing up the Elbe and Weser.

Napoleon's sway was thus nominally unchallenged, except by England, Spain (still in revolt), Portugal, Sweden and Turkey—where Sultan Mahmoud remained at war with the Czar until 1812—while Russia, soon to join this unrelenting group of nations, gave a forecast of her future attitude by withdrawing in December, 1810, from the Commercial system, which, since Tilsit, had pressed so heavily on her people. Other reasons of Alexander for thus prepar-

ing to defy Napoleon were, the adding of West Galicia to the Polish Duchy of Warsaw, and the complaints of the Duke of Oldenburg, Alexander's relation, at the encroachments made on his rights, when Napoleon occupied the dominions from which his title was derived.

The year 1811 was ushered in by the accomplishment of a new dynastic settlement in Sweden, where King Gustavus IV. had been overthrown the year before by a military conspiracy; his successor and uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, having no heirs, Bernadotte, the famous French Marshal and Prince of Ponte Corvo, was at Napoleon's instance elevated to the position of Crown Prince. This same year saw the birth of a male heir to Napoleon, known in French history as the King of Rome, and entitled at Vienna, after the fall of the Empire, the Duc de Reichstadt.

Paris gave way to one of her characteristic rejoicings on June 9th, when, as M. Thiers says, "she blazed with triumphal fires," and the Emperor presented his child to the Nation with an emotion which soon communicated itself to all around. "Not," as M. Thiers records, that the enthusiasm of the Parisians was "like that of earlier times," although they "still applauded," being however, "carried away, as all populations are, by the excitement of grand fêtes."

The fact was, that, as the same historian admits, the French nation "longed for peace," and yet had

before their eyes the spectre of a great impending struggle with Russia, which they rejoiced to think was not so imminent that diplomacy had altogether ceased to speak.

And all this time the Spanish war was drifting on and gradually draining the resources of the French Empire when it was likely most to need them. Unable, for the reasons just stated, to go to the Peninsula in person, Napoleon despatched as his *alter ego*, in June, 1810, that great soldier, Marshal Masséna, with the laurels of Essling, Aspern and Wagram thick upon him. Of all the French Generals under Napoleon he had done most to beat back the steady advance of the hosts led by the Archduke Charles.

The duty assigned to this trusted Pro-Consul by the French Emperor was to invade Portugal, into the recesses of which Wellington had retired after the battle of Talavera.

Investing and subduing Ciudad Rodrigo, Masséna launched 70,000 men into Portugal and, despite a check at Busaco, found his way by devious ways towards the coast, until confronted with the aforementioned lines of Torres Vedras, of the precise character of which he seems to have had neither exact statistical nor military knowledge. Wellington was ensconced behind these rugged mountain battlements with 50,000 English and Portuguese, drawing his supplies from the British Fleet, while Masséna's army, soon reduced to something close on starvation, was obliged to retreat on November 14, and, har-

assed by Wellington's troops, regained Spain with the loss of no less than 30,000 men, rendered inefficient by death, disease, and the relentless guerilla.

Nor did 1811 bring abiding relief to the French, who were operating so far from their base and found it difficult to keep open communications amidst a consistently hostile population.

In both of the pitched battles of Fuentes d'Onoro and even Albuera, which occurred in this year, M. Thiers is constrained to admit that the French had to yield to Wellington and Beresford respectively, and this although Napoleon, himself being absent, was represented by Masséna and Soult, than whom none abler could have been found. Although during the autumn inaction ruled supreme in either camp, this was but the prelude for an advance by Wellington, strongly reinforced, and commanding 50,000 British and 27,800 Portuguese, against Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the fortress pillars of Spain. One he carried by assault, in January, and the other in April, 1812; in the latter instance the onslaught being rendered terrible both by the gigantic losses incurred during the operation and the savage scenes of reprisal which somewhat sullied the victory.

In the summer of 1812, just when the invasion of Russia commenced, Wellington marched against Marmont, and after skilful manœuvres and swift marches the French Marshal gave his opponent an opening at Salamanca of which he was not slow to avail himself.

The conflict which ensued resulted in the retreat of the French to Burgos after a sanguinary battle fought July 22, wherein the French admitted a loss of 6,000 men killed, wounded and missing, the British and their allies suffering scarcely less severely, the official losses reaching 5225.

Wellington entered Madrid in triumph, although his subsequent advance to Burgos was soon followed by another retreat to the frontier which did not depress the spirits of the English soldiery.

Henceforth, Portugal was secured as a certain base of operations to the British, and this occurred just at the moment when, matters having come to a crisis between Napoleon and the Czar, a colossal clash of arms had become imminent on the theatre of Northern Europe, the precise limits of which could not be fixed, but which occurred when the two great historic German powers were so depressed as to form part of the French host invading Russia. The story of how this became possible is partly known to my readers, but the final humiliation of Prussia, so incredible and heart-rending, calls for a few moments' attention.

After Austria had admitted not unequal struggles at Aspern and Wagram to be reckoned as defeats because no allies were immediately forthcoming, it could not be expected that she would again oppose Napoleon in three years' time, when a family tie had drawn the Courts of Vienna and Paris closer together, and when Metternich, the author of Marie

Louise's sacrifice to her country's exigencies, was advising the Emperor Francis.

Nor could anything be hoped from Prussia, who, relinquishing the capable and timely service of Altenstein, had, it is said at Queen Louisa's last request, recalled Hardenberg to the side of the sorely stricken and perplexed Frederick William.

When the situation came to be fully considered, not even this patriotic counsellor could advise his Sovereign to defy Napoleon at the moment when Alexander, avowing his friendship for Prussia, still declined to move a man beyond his own territories, where, as he told Stein, he intended to imitate the successful tactics of Lord Wellington, and retreat into carefully entrenched camps within his own steppes, into which the French might follow at their peril.

Frederick William and Hardenberg, on discovering this, were likewise cognizant of the fact that Napoleon would hear of no faltering on the side of Prussia, who could choose between war with France and an alliance enjoining participation in the coming campaign across the Niemen.

Moreover, as the Statesmen at Königsberg and Berlin had only discharged twenty-three millions of francs out of a French claim that amounted to sixty-eight millions, the Conqueror of Europe did not need any fresh excuse to overrun their territories and utilize their resources. Under these circumstances every consideration should be shown by the historian for the unexampled embarrassment of a noble mon-

arch and a distinguished minister, who at sixty years of age took upon him again the burden of office.

The grief-stricken Frederick William and the disillusioned Hardenberg, being left to face Napoleon alone under the above-named circumstances, signed one of the most inglorious treaties of which history makes mention, and on Feb. 24, 1812, covenanted to find 20,000 men to accompany Napoleon to Russia, a decision which immediately led to Scharnhorst's resignation and to the issue of a bitter denunciation from Stein, who thenceforth never forgave Hardenberg, both magnifying his errors and unduly minimizing his patriotic virtues.

I am not about to justify this base surrender, but it had a counterpart in the conduct of Metternich and the Emperor Francis, who, although they ruled a State half bankrupt by reason of its former efforts to save its own independence and incidentally secure that of Europe, yet took moral refuge behind a new-fangled theory of armed neutrality, and persuaded the French Emperor to allow the Austrian contingent to remain comparatively inactive on the Dnieper under a General of their own army who was subordinate only to Napoleon. Moreover the bribe offered by Napoleon to Austria formed an important consideration, being the restoration of the Illyrian provinces and a recovered seaboard.

So it came to pass that practically the whole of Germany was engaged in prosecuting a purely French quarrel with Russia, which was to issue in

by far the most extensive campaign, having reference to the extent of country traversed and the number of men engaged, which modern history records.

All Alexander's illusions as to the alleged friendship felt for him by the French Emperor had been dissipated by the reports sent of long prepared military schemes, as well as of movements of the troops themselves, by the Czar's own aide-de-camp, Czernitcheff, the soldier-diplomatist, who was one of the prime favorites amongst the salons of Paris. Nor was the conduct of Foreign Affairs by Maret, Duc de Bassano, so friendly to Prussia as that of the late Minister Talleyrand.

Napoleon spoke out but too plainly from the mouth of this admiring follower installed at the Foreign Office, and such was the infallibility of judgment which the French Emperor claimed that he positively refused to listen to the warnings addressed to him by his advisers in North Germany before he launched the armies of France into the territories of the Czar.

"If any persons speak to your Majesty of tranquillity and submission," wrote King Jerome of Westphalia on January 16th, 1812, speaking of Germany and Prussia, "they deceive you. Excitement exists in the highest degree, the wildest hopes are fostered and nursed with enthusiasm, the example of Spain is everywhere welcomed, and should war break out, every country situated between the



Rhine and Oder will be the focus of a vast and energetic insurrection."

Marshal Davoust and General Rapp spoke in exactly the same way as regards Hamburg and Dantzic, the result being only to irritate and stir the contempt of the French Emperor.

Over Europe itself there seemed at this time to brood a hopelessness engendered by the failure of past co-operation between the nations, and by the prospect of the extension of the Napoleonic system into the one great continental nation which remained to dispute the Conqueror's will.

For Alexander himself was far from confident that the stand he was about to make would not be abortive, although when once he had taken the resolution to oppose Napoleon by re-opening his ports to England, the Czar was prepared to undergo every possible self-sacrifice and ask the same of his devoted people, sooner than bend the knee again to the ruthless spoiler of nations. In his anxiety the Czar appealed to the exiled Prussian Statesman, Stein, "whose energy of character and extraordinary talents" had attracted his attention, averring that "Napoleon would complete the enslavement of Europe and to this end would subjugate Russia." How to meet such attacks in the most effective fashion, Alexander desired to be advised by Stein, whose first suggestion against the coming storm was a plan for raising an insurrection in Germany, which should be succored by English co-operation,

naval and military, directed from the North Sea. Stein, when at St. Petersburg, and afterwards on his way from St. Petersburg to Moscow, saw sufficient of the Muscovite armies to tell him that they were inadequate in every way to meet the hosts of Napoleon. Neither so numerous nor so well organized as before Eylau, these first levies did not, it is true, fairly represent the might of Russia, but they did betoken a probable military inferiority at the outset of the campaign; nor did Alexander's belief, that by retiring to an entrenched camp, at Drave, he would embarrass and delay the invading legions of Napoleon much as Wellington did those of Masséna at Torres Vedras, prevent Stein from dreading another Friedland.

It happened, however, that the Prussian Statesman witnessed in Moscow the national enthusiasm for the Czar as his country's defender, and soon discerned in Russia a patriot movement akin to that which no defeats or humiliations could suppress in Spain; and from that moment he looked with confidence to the ultimate, if long deferred, triumph of Russia.

Indeed, as Professor Seeley says, in the third volume of his *Life of Stein*, "his joyous confidence only rose higher and higher" even when some courtiers went over to the peace party.

It was not that Stein believed either that Drave had the defensive capabilities of Torres Vedras or that the able and energetic veteran Kutusoff was endowed with the strategic strength of Wellington;

but, rightly or wrongly, he did think that a people literally exploding with enthusiasm (some of whose nobles, Soltikoff and others, offered to raise whole regiments themselves) entered upon the contest better furnished to cope with the hordes of Napoleon than the world at all realized.

And yet, although Stein was avowedly hopeful and even sanguine, neither he nor any other onlooker in Russia or elsewhere ever dreamed of the complete dissipation of the vast host now gathering under the French eagles, which was destined to ensue so speedily.

I am estopped by the work entrusted to my pen from dwelling in detail upon this portentous and crushing failure, fraught with such hideous suffering and terrible loss of human life.

In the field, although the Russians displayed all their old persistence and valor, the tremendous battles of Smolensk and Borodino were nominal victories for the invaders. Then when Moscow was occupied the mysterious flames gradually consumed the major part of the city which Kutusoff left to the French, delaying them by appearing to lend an ear to their suggestions to negotiate, until retreat was resolved on, and then consigning them to the joint ravages of winter snows and Cossack enterprise, interspersed with occasional conflicts in which Napoleon's troops had on the whole a superiority, even up to the banks of the Beresina, in crossing which river so many lives were sacrificed. It was June 24 when

Napoleon crossed the Niemen, bent on invading Russia, September 14 when the French occupied Moscow, November 8 when he reached Smolensk in the midst of the snow and frost that were Alexander's best allies. On December 3, Caulaincourt and Duroc being amongst his companions, the French Emperor clandestinely resolved to return to France. He travelled by sledge, having entrusted Murat with the remnant of the army, and reached Paris, December 18, 1812.

It has been calculated that of the French army which crossed the Niemen 125,000 perished in battle, 132,000 died of hunger, cold and fatigue, while wounded and prisoners totalled 193,000, including 48 generals and 3,000 inferior officers. This calculation of a German officer gives a total 50,000 in excess of Mr. Fyffe's estimate in his *History of Modern Europe*, and also exceeds that of M. Thiers, who claims that of the 533,000 who crossed the Niemen originally, about 90,000 "gradually rejoined their country across Poland and Germany." These estimates tally approximately, but according to Jomini no exact computation was possible. But it must be remembered that amongst the few who escaped were some of the most experienced soldiers of the French Empire, who straightway assisted their chief to organize his new levies and persuade the nation that all was not lost so long as Napoleon reigned at the Tuileries.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## DELIVERANCE OF EUROPE (2).

DECEMBER 1813-14.—GENERAL YORK TAKES THE PRUSSIAN CONTINGENT OVER TO THE ALLIES.—STEIN EMPLOYED BY THE CZAR TO ADMINISTER RECONQUERED PRUSSIAN TERRITORY.—DISSATISFACTION OF FREDERICK WILLIAM III. WITH STEIN.—PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT FORCED TO JOIN THE CZAR BY THEIR PEOPLE.—CAMPAIGN OPENS ON SAXON SOIL.—NAPOLEON MORE THAN HOLDS HIS OWN AT LÜTZEN AND BAUTZEN.—ARMISTICE AND MEETING OF NAPOLEON WITH METTERNICH AT DRESDEN.—AUSTRIA JOINS THE ALLIES AND NAPOLEON WINS HIS LAST BATTLE OF THE NEW CAMPAIGNS AT DRESDEN.—DESPERATE FIGHTING AROUND LEIPSIK, WHERE THE FRENCH ARE OUTNUMBERED AND BEATEN.—RETREAT OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY INTO FRANCE AND PURSUIT OF THE ALLIES.—ABLE STRATEGY OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR CANNOT SAVE PARIS FROM OCCUPATION.—ADVANCE OF LORD WELLINGTON FROM SPAIN TO TOULOUSE DRIVING SOULT'S FORCES BEFORE HIM.—FRENCH LEGISLATURE RECALLS LOUIS XVIII., AND NAPOLEON, ABDICATING AT FONTAINEBLEAU, IS TAKEN TO ELBA.—ENTRY OF THE KING INTO PARIS TO GIVE THANKS AT NOTRE DAME.

THERE is a historical error into which students of this period frequently fall, and it is that of taking for granted the political destruction of Napoleon after the retreat from Moscow. Had France alone been the country to be reckoned with by Russia, and had the Czar's victorious armies remained sufficiently intact to commence a march across a friendly

Europe, the probabilities would have been strongly adverse to the French Emperor recovering his power.

On the other hand, not only were Prussia and Austria allies of Napoleon, with battalions in the field under orders to oppose the Russian advance, but the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine remained faithful to their French allegiance. Moreover the Russian army had lost three-fourths of its fighting strength in this terrible campaign, while old General Kutusoff, who had completely expended his own energies, was content with the almost total destruction of the French armies in the snowy plains of Muscovy.

It happened that General York, an officer of the type favored by Frederick the Great, commanded the Prussian contingent under Marshal Macdonald, and after informing himself as to the real condition of Napoleon and the retreating French, and also as to the feelings of Alexander for Frederick William, a nominal foe, but not to be so treated by the advancing Czar, withdrew 15,000 men from the ranks of Macdonald's division, and on December 30 signed the truce of Tauroggen, which resulted in the restoration of the fortress of Königsberg to Prussia.

It was not so much, however, the improved military position brought about by York's act which rendered it such an important event, but the universal enthusiasm thereby straightway evoked throughout

Germany. Although the Prussian King, in the capacity of Napoleon's ally, made a formal protest and talked of trying York by Court-Martial, yet when, early in January, 1813, Alexander appeared across the Niemen and sent Stein into Königsberg to direct the Government of those Prussian territories, no valid opposition was received at the hands of Frederick William or his Minister Hardenberg, who finally signed the treaty of Kalisch with Stein on February 27, 1813. It was then promised by the Czar that the Prussian territories should be restored to an equal area and strength with that which they possessed previous to the fatal campaign of Jena, and before the two allied nations again laid down their arms. Prussia, however, was called upon by this proposed settlement to renounce the territories around Warsaw acquired in the second partition of Poland in 1792, and, with the exception of a small strip connecting the provinces gained in like manner and from the same nationality in 1772, to give up the bulk of its Polish populations in exchange for others of German origin.

This arrangement, the realization of which at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 undoubtedly led ultimately to the supremacy of Prussia in Germany, and to its commanding position in the comity of European nations, was stoutly opposed by many of the subjects of Frederick William III. and looked upon sorrowfully even by Stein himself. And yet if some such settlement as this had not been ar-

rived at Prussia would have been a Slavonic almost as much as a Teutonic nation, in which capacity it never could have aspired to the headship of Germany.

It must not be imagined that this happy turn of events for Europe was brought about without considerable difficulty, because, although braced up to further action by the firmness and energy of Stein, the Czar had to cope with considerable opposition within his own dominions, while even Frederick William strongly reprobated the interference of his late Minister Stein in the name of a neighboring Sovereign, and afterwards always looked askance upon Germany's great patriot Reformer.

Count Nicholas Romanzoff, formerly the Czar's ambassador in Paris, had always championed the advantages of a French Alliance for Russia, and had seen the best side of Imperialism in the prosperity and bright social life of the capital city to which he had been diplomatically attached. The friend of the respected "Madame Mère," Napoleon's aged mother, and familiar with the leading members of society in the French capital, he had endeavored, on his return to Russia, to prevent the war from breaking out with France, and finally exercised all his influence to deter Alexander from yielding to Stein's proposals and advancing to join hands with the patriotic insurrectionists of Prussia.

Nevertheless, as has been shown, the course of events was adverse to Romanzoff's policy, and, the



French having retreated to the Elbe, war was declared on March 17, 1813, by the long-suffering but much tried sovereign, Frederick William III.

The ensuing campaign, although fought by popular Prussian levies organized on Scharnhorst's well-known principles of military service—that noble soldier giving his life to his country at the indecisive battle of Lützen, called by the Germans Gross-Görschen—yet led to no solid results.

Napoleon succeeded in raising a fresh army, and still having nearly 300,000 men under the tricolour, appeared in such irresistible force before Dresden that he straightway decided the wavering intentions of the King of Saxony and his Minister, Count Snefft, who had proposed to join Austria in the armed mediation adopted at this time by Metternich.

Stein had needed but a little more time to render Snefft's policy an actual fact, and see Saxony given the longed-for opportunity of rising against the foreign dictation to which she had been so long subjected. The Prussian Statesman claimed connection with Count Snefft, who had married the daughter of Louise Stein, the reformer's sister, who strange to say had consecutively rejected the advances of no less prominent personages than Hardenberg and Goethe. But Napoleon's advent shattered Stein's premature hopes, and the Saxon soldiers fought and bled for Napoleon both at Lützen and Bautzen.

When, moreover, after closely contested and

sanguinary struggles on both these fields—Marshal Duroc falling on the latter occasion—a retreat was resolved upon by the Allies, Frederick William told the Czar that he feared the same results would ensue as those which followed Jena and Auerstädt, and that his family would again become fugitives in a distant portion of his dominions.

The moment had however arrived when Austria, being mistress of the situation, spoke through Metternich's sage lips to the effect that his country's mediation for a general peace was at the service of the combatants.

Here occurred probably the greatest mistake ever made by Napoleon in accepting such proposals, unless he intended to concur in the terms dictated by the wily statesman who held the trump cards in his hands.

All that was asked by the Austrians of Napoleon in return for their alliance was a very moderate rectification of the Prussian frontiers to the Rhine, the restoration of the Western Polish provinces to that country and the abandonment by France of North Germany.

The Emperor Francis, on the other hand, was to recover his Illyrian and Galician dominions lost in 1809, and with the former the coast of the Adriatic together with Dalmatia.

According to such a settlement as was thus proposed by Austria, the Confederation of the Rhine would still exist, while Jerome Bonaparte continued

his reign in Westphalia, and a young Bonaparte, brother of Napoleon III., remained Grand Duke of Berg.

No alteration seems to have been suggested either in Italy, Naples or Switzerland, so Napoleon and his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, would have ruled Europe between them, despite which injurious eventuality to both their interests, Russia and Prussia merely dissented in a half-hearted way to the terms proposed by Metternich, and ultimately concurred in order to bring Austria into the negotiations.

Strange to say, this offer of the olive branch was decisively rejected by Napoleon, who had apparently miscalculated the numbers of the Austrian army by one half, believing that one hundred thousand and not two hundred thousand men could be collected at the command of the Emperor Francis.

However this may be, he treated the armistice merely as a breathing-space, during which his forces could be collected to fight Russia, Prussia and Austria combined. It was at this period that Napoleon held the famous interview with Metternich in the Marcolini Palace at Dresden, which lasted ten hours and is graphically described by the Austrian Minister in his memoirs.

The French Emperor seemed on this occasion to pose as the only Conservative force in Europe which could stand between the ancient Austrian throne and renewed revolutionary disturbance such as must have overwhelmed it, an argument which, it is true, had

been widely accepted when the Empire first succeeded the Republic in France, but which failed to impress the representative of a nation whose children's blood had flowed like water to escape from a domination which had proved so terrible to the sister kingdom of Prussia. Metternich having remarked on the extreme youth of the new French levies, "not soldiers, but children," Napoleon replied eagerly, "You are no soldier, you do not know what passes in a soldier's mind; I grew up on the field, and a man like me troubles himself little about the lives of a million men." Then, added Metternich, he used an expletive not to be repeated, and threw his hat violently in a corner of the room.

The diseased character of the French Emperor's mind stands here revealed in its full malignity, for in those few words can be found the explanation of how Napoleon came to leave the remnant of his army to their fate after the retreat from Moscow, and how again he stood prepared to direct another vast sacrifice of human life, just because he could not gain peace and preserve his conquests in Poland, Illyria and North Germany. It was not sufficient to obtain a renewed European guarantee for the sovereignty of Italy and Belgium, as well as the Rhine as a frontier of France, but another carnival of slaughter must be indulged in because the Imperial eagles would no longer remain the symbols of universal dominion and unrivalled glory if a compromise was made with this insatiable and consuming militarism which was

eating the heart out of France and dragging other nations in the wake of its bloodstained car.

It is strange to find that the ultimatum, which forced Napoleon either to make a reasonable peace or do battle with three great European powers, was issued by Austria, arising phoenix-like from the ashes of 1805 and 1809. The fact is that any one, who has seen the secret intelligence which reached the British Foreign Office at the latter date, is aware that the vast host which submitted to a tricky peace represented a power by no means exhausted, but one resolved to take up arms once more at the earliest convenient opportunity. Wagram was no Austerlitz, and the realization of that fact became general in Viennese military circles, although the financial state of the Austrian Empire seems to have been at this time alarming.

Therefore did Metternich deal tenderly with the French Emperor, for whom a golden bridge was constructed whereby, if he could be induced to cross it, honorable retreat and power only limited by small territorial concessions might both be secured. Nevertheless, as has been said, Napoleon spurned the idea of yielding to what he regarded as Metternich's veiled menaces, and lightly undertook a new war with armies inferior in number to the swiftly gathering levies of the Prussian Landwehr and the tried soldiery from Bohemia and Hungary who made up so large a portion of the Austrian army.

The allies felt that in one particular, namely the

possession of commanding military talent, they must necessarily remain inferior so long as the great Corsican kept the field; and on this account they were induced to tempt General Moreau, returning from exile in America, to make the great error of his life and serve against the soldiers of his own nation.

No matter how unjustly he may have once been treated by ungrateful contemporaries, who ignored his glorious laurels won at Hohenlinden, yet all true-hearted Frenchmen were constrained to regard with sorrow and displeasure this last action of one of France's greatest military heroes.

The new campaign which took place in Saxony differed from that which concluded at Bautzen, because on the former occasion the Russians and Prussians were outnumbered.

On August 10, 1813, Austria, entering the war, added 200,000 men to the enemies of Napoleon, who over the whole military front were then as two to one of the French.

Napoleon remained on the defensive at Dresden, but sent Marshal Oudinot, one of his most experienced lieutenants, to capture Berlin with 80,000 men, and it is remarkable that both offensive movements failed, inasmuch as at Dresden the French Emperor won his last decisive success by repelling the assault of Schwarzenberg, then in command of the Austrian army—Moreau receiving his death-wound when speaking to the Emperor Alexander—,

and that the consequent retreat of the Austrians was neutralized by the defeat of Oudinot by Bernadotte at Grossbeeren as well as that of Macdonald by Blücher in Silesia, disasters crowned by the isolation and surrender of Vandamme in the Bohemian Mountains at Kulm with 10,000 men.

Thus the balance of successes was not uneven, although the advancing forces of Europe seemed overwhelming in numbers as well as equal in valor and capacity—moreover, patriotic levies led by Blücher, who had proved themselves at least to be worthy foes of Ney and his hitherto dreaded cohorts at Dennewitz on September 6th, were slowly gathering in mighty concentration on Leipsic.

After the above-named destructive conflicts Napoleon retreated upon the university city of Saxony, around which, on the 16th and 18th of September, 1813, raged the most gigantic clash of arms Europe beheld in the Nineteenth Century. Outflanked and overmatched numerically, the French gradually gave way amidst scenes of carnage too horrible to contemplate.

But the end had come, unless, opposition on the part of French armies being completely beaten down, dormant dissensions should reveal themselves amongst the allies, who made yet another memorable offer of peace to Napoleon on November 9th at Frankfort, if he would surrender the conquests of France beyond the Alps and Rhine.

Again were the friendly hands of the Emperor

Francis and Metternich stretched out to save a ruler of France who would not consent to treat otherwise than as a conqueror.

The insane compliance of Frenchmen, which in the next year, 1814, gave Napoleon one more levy of 300,000 youths to sacrifice on the altar of his ambition, was doubtless conceived in a spirit of the noblest patriotism, which the sons and daughters of France have ever displayed in all ages and under all forms of government; but the strange refusal of a return to the limits of France in 1792, whereby Belgium would have been retained under the tricolor, is simply inexplicable, inasmuch as after January, 1814, when these terms were rejected at Chatillon there was nothing left for France but to admire the extraordinary military skill of her baffled Emperor and applaud the never-failing courage of her children during the unequal but remarkable campaign in France itself, which preceded the capture of Paris on the second of April and the abdication at Fontainebleau on the 11th of that month in that year 1814, so big with the fate of nations.

With a force vastly inferior in number Napoleon kept at bay various hostile armies during two months, and electrified all Europe by the rapidity and skill of his movements.

In the opinion of the Duke of Wellington, as communicated to Lord Stanhope, the study of this campaign gave "a greater idea of his genius than any other. Had he continued that system a little



while longer, it is my opinion," said the Duke, "that he would have saved Paris."

But since I have named Wellington, it is time to tell how the efforts of England's great captain had at last resulted in freeing Spain from the invader and turning the tables so completely on Soult that the French Marshal had to conduct defensive operations in his own country.

He successively defeated Marmont, as was previously narrated, at Salamanca, in June, 1812, and overthrew Jourdan a year later at Vittoria in complete and irretrievable rout, King Joseph, who was present, having no course open to him but flight; while in September Soult, retreating through the Pyrenees, fought three unsuccessful but sanguinary combats at Toulouse, Orthez (where Wellington was wounded), and Bayonne. The fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pampeluna had successively fallen. So it happened that the English army under Wellington was slowly advancing towards Tours when the tidings of the capture of Paris put an end to hostilities.

It has been found necessary, when describing the rise of Napoleon's power, incidentally to state the remarkable abilities of those marshals and generals without whose efforts neither Austerlitz, Jena nor Friedland could ever have been brought to a triumphant close. These great soldiers aptly take their places in this volume as "continental rulers"; and therefore, having regard to the effect which Wellington's Peninsular victories had upon the

general European conflict (it was Napoleon's own opinion, declared to Las Casas at St. Helena, that this was the venture which contributed most of all to his ruin), there would be a flagrant omission did not my pages record the services of the British generals who are indelibly inscribed on the roll of fame as coadjutors of the great Duke of Wellington. When the highest title in the British Peerage was conferred on the deliverer of Spain and Portugal, kindred honors of different grades were showered on Sir Thomas Graham, who became Lord Lynedoch, and on Beresford, the victor of Albuera, and Sir Rowland Hill, who became known respectively as Lords Beresford and Hill.

Amongst others marked out by their country as worthy of laurels on this occasion were Picton, Cole, Leith and Clinton, household words to those who are familiar with Sir William Napier's dramatic pages, or who rise from the perusal of M. Thiers' generous appreciation of his country's brave rivals in that remarkable work, "The Consulate and the Empire."

To form the highest possible estimate of Wellington's own tactics throughout this campaign simply reflects the combined opinion of all military critics who have written on the subject. It is true that M. Thiers points out in his above-named book how the youthful character of some of the French forces, left by Napoleon in Spain when he invaded Russia, weakened Marmont at Salamanca and Jourdan at

Vittoria. Raw levies could not be expected to fill the places of picked and tried regiments which had been sent to Moscow, and bear the hardships of a guerilla war like seasoned veterans. But having regard to the difficulty of acting with Spanish generals who could never, as the great Duke remarked himself, get the victory of Baylen out of their heads and wanted to control the tactics on critical occasions, the successive overthrows of such celebrated captains as the above-named, and also Junot, fully warranted the reputation gained by Lord Wellington at this time, which placed him second to no living man as a military leader, although the French armies still believed in the star of their late Emperor, temporarily submerged by the events of 1812-14.

But the eyes of the assembled nationalities at Paris were all turned towards Louis Stanislaus Xavier, surnamed by the Royalists, "Le Désiré," eldest surviving brother of Louis the Sixteenth, who has been mentioned from time to time in this history as the "Count de Provence."

Since the Peace of Tilsit, when residence of a Bourbon Prince in Russia was no longer tolerated by the Czar, Louis had made his home at Hartwell, in Hertfordshire, a seat of Lord Dacre's. Of an acute intelligence, possessing much tact, he was enabled to enhance his popularity as a Sovereign, and during days of exile had certainly been the one of the French exiled Princes most favored by the people. Unfortunately he was but little known to the generation

springing up in 1814, while the Royal family had been connected in the public mind with the name of his less popular brother, the Count of Artois, who, being deficient in tact, had gained a reputation for a leaning towards autocratic rule of the type discarded at the Revolution, together with a subservience to priestly domination, repugnant even to the most religious adherents of the ancient dynasty, who desired to see a Restoration joyfully acquiesced in. This reputation came to influence his future career adversely.

The French Senate, at the instance of Talleyrand, after a long debate on the night of April 5th, which extended until seven in the morning of the 6th, recalled Louis XVIII. to the throne, and his heirs, according to the established order previous to the Revolution.

This decision had not been reached without considerable deliberation amongst the Allied Sovereigns, two of whom, the Emperors of Austria and Russia, inclined towards a Regency under the Empress Marie Louise, until the King of Rome should be old enough to occupy the throne. But as this did not dispose of the intermediate period during which Napoleon must necessarily exercise paramount influence over his wife and child, when living as a Sovereign at Elba, close to the coast of Tuscany, the Restoration of the Bourbons seemed to be the only remaining course open.

Caulaincourt, Napoleon's faithful aide-de-camp,

and Macdonald, true to the defeated French Emperor, as had been the Marshal's own father to the exiled Stuarts in Scotland, together with Maret, Duc de Bassano, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cambronne, and, of course, the ever-reliable Bertrand, were among the few leading men who did not make the best of their way to Paris and seek favor in the light of the rising sun, as exemplified by the representative of the ancient line of kings. Even Rustan, the Mameluke, who had accompanied Napoleon on to every battle-field since he returned from Egypt, set off for the Metropolis with Constant, the valet, who admits in his memoirs that he secreted 100,000 francs, with which he had been entrusted, only disclosing the spot in Fontainebleau Forest, where it was buried, because the fraud had been detected before his master went into exile.

Even Berthier left Napoleon without bidding him farewell; and, indeed, the spectacle of the courtiers of the late Imperial Court acting like rats on a sinking ship is not an ennobling one to contemplate, although, happily, it is possible to feel better satisfied with our common humanity when learning that nobler instincts beat at least in the hearts of those glorious soldiers of the Old Guard, whose sobs and tears, when their master left them for Elba, will touch the hearts of many yet unborn who follow the course of this narrative.

So exceptional was this devotion to the submerged Imperial cause, that I subscribe the names of a few

comparatively obscure soldiers and courtiers who had the grace not to leave the ex-Emperor until he had set out for Elba from Fontainebleau: Generals Drouet, Belliard, Gourgaud, Korakowski, and Vonsowitch; Colonels Anatole and Montesquieu, with Baron de la Place, form this honourable band.

When the desertion of his old companions-in-arms had been fully realised, it is well known that Napoleon made an endeavour to destroy his own life by poison, which proved futile, either owing to the deterioration of the drug used or to the comparatively small quantity swallowed.

The respectful salutations of the soldiery were general wherever the ex-Emperor passed through their ranks on his way to Fréjus, the point of embarkation for Elba; but the signs of disapproval, and even hostility, from the civil population, which began to greet him half-way between Lyons and Valence, and became universal in the absence of the soldiery, must have proved a strange revelation to the ex-Emperor, and partly prepared his protector, the British Commissioner, Colonel Campbell, for the violent scenes which occurred at Orgon and Saint Cannat; while sooner than incur the furious enmity of the people of Aix, the former popular idol skirted that town and escaped to the coast in an Austrian uniform.

The ex-Empress, Marie Louise, with her son, the little King of Rome, experienced a similar desertion at Blois, and does not seem to have opposed her

father, the Emperor of Austria, or the Czar, at all strenuously, when at Rambouillet they urged the desirability of returning to Vienna and making a home in her native city.

Paris did not deny herself the delight of a spectacle when Louis le Désiré, with the Duchess of Angoulême, the only daughter of his murdered brother Louis XVI., by his side, went in procession to Notre Dame to give thanks to the Almighty, on the 3rd of May, A. D. 1814, in the presence of a "prodigious concourse of spectators," the flower of the French army, as also of soldiers wearing the uniforms of every leading European Power.

But although the aspect of the crowd was always respectful, and sometimes enthusiastic, those reading between the lines of observation must have felt that the restored throne, if not re-erected on sand, yet, in the doubtful sympathies of the all-powerful military caste, so sullen in demeanour and unsettled in purpose, rested on foundations by no means securely fixed.

Josephine, ex-Empress of the French, lived just long enough to see her former husband exiled to Elba, her remarkable career ending at Malmaison, on the 29th of May, 1814. Born at Martinique, in 1763, her maiden name was Rose Tascher de la Pagerie. When almost a child she was taken to France by her father and married to the Viscount de Beauharnais, whom she had met when he was Governor of the Antilles. The two children of this marriage

were Eugène and Hortense, the former celebrated as Napoleon's adopted son, and the latter as the wife of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland, and therefore mother of Napoleon the Third. The Viscountess de Beauharnais experienced to the full the horrors of the French Revolution, seeing her husband, a brave soldier who had fought for France on the Rhine, thrust into prison, and then executed, a fate she was only saved from immediately suffering by her feeble condition of health, brought on by the shock of the Viscount's violent death. Fortunately for the widow, Robespierre perished himself while she was still in the depths of bodily weakness, which had deferred her intended execution; and Tallien then allowed her to escape from prison, an act which was not forgotten by Josephine or her son, Eugène, who assisted the ex-Jacobin in the dire poverty of later life.

It has been related in this volume how Eugène Beauharnais, then fifteen years old, demanded his father's sword from General Bonaparte, after that parent had been guillotined, and how an interview with the mother led to that alliance which gave Napoleon the requisite opening as General of the Army of Italy. When Empress Josephine had gained the reputation of great beneficence and mercy, many emigrants owing their return to her intervention, Napoleon is said to have told her, "I can win battles, but you win hearts."

The position of Josephine, when a divorce was re-



solved upon for State reasons, is one of the most pathetic recorded in history, which must tell how she considered the future of France more than her own happiness when concurring in a measure involving the most painful self-sacrifice imaginable.

Preferring to remain at Malmaison rather than live far from the scene of her former triumphant elevation to the throne, Josephine, much distressed at Napoleon's fall, and full of kindly feeling towards her rival, the ex-Empress Marie Louise, was visited by the Emperor Alexander in her last illness, and treated with great respect and regard by this Master of many legions, who sent his physician to her aid, but alas! when no human skill could avail anything. I gladly close this chapter with a well-merited acknowledgment of the virtues of a good woman, who held the highest position of any of her sex in Europe for ten years, and nobly did her duty.

## CHAPTER XX.

## THE DELIVERANCE OF EUROPE (CONCLUDED).

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.—VISIT OF THE ALLIED SOVEREIGNS TO ENGLAND.—CAREERS OF VON HUMBOLDT AND LORD CASTLEREAGH, PRUSSIAN AND BRITISH PLENIPOTENTIARIES.—DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE HARDENBERG AND STEIN SYMPATHISERS IN GERMAN UNITY.—SAXONY PRESERVED AS A KINGDOM, AND DUCHY OF WARSAW ANNEXED BY RUSSIA.—TALLEYRAND SECURES THE ALLIANCE OF ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA TO OPPOSE EXTREME RUSSIAN VIEWS.—NAPOLEON'S ESCAPE FROM ELBA UNITES DISSENTIENTS.—WONDERFUL JOURNEY OF NAPOLEON FROM CANNES TO PARIS.—THE ARMY GRADUALLY YIELDS TO HIS APPEALS, AND DISCARDS THE WHITE COCKADE.—LOUIS XVIII. LEAVES PARIS FOR GHENT.—NAPOLEON RE-ENTERS THE FRENCH CAPITAL, AND PREPARES FOR AN ATTACK ON THE LOW COUNTRIES.—BATTLES OF LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS, WHERE THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK FELL.—CRUCIAL STRUGGLE AT WATERLOO.—PRUSSAINS UNDER BLÜCHER JOIN WELLINGTON AT CLOSE OF DAY.—DEFEAT AND FLIGHT OF NAPOLEON WITH HIS ARMY.—NAPOLEON BANISHED TO ST. HELENA.—MARQUIS DE GROUCHY, AND HIS WORK IN THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

THE Congress of Sovereigns and Ministers at Vienna in 1814, held after the occupation of Paris and presided over by Prince Metternich, is celebrated for having devised a scheme which was

wonderfully successful in keeping war of a serious character away from the European Continent for more than thirty years. On the other hand its conclusions did not content the deeper political thinkers who looked far into the future, and believed a united Germany, a free and independent Italy, with a statesmanlike but not slavish adherence to respect for national race proclivities throughout the smaller States of Europe, together formed the best security for the adoption of sound domestic politics as well as the only sure means of avoiding another general war.

But however true these theories of Arndt, Schleiermacher, Fichte and Stein might be, they were found impracticable to apply to the Europe of 1814 when derelict fragments of nations had to be restored to the condition in which they were before the French Revolution, or confirmed to possessors who had won them by bending beneath Napoleon's sword and so incurring the deadly enmity of these aforementioned political thinkers in Germany, who regarded the Sovereigns and the rulers of States created by the late French Emperor as those who, having bowed the knee to Baal, could claim no quarter. It was indeed a vast undertaking before the Allied Sovereigns, and there is little wonder that they prefaced their labors by a visit to that land of mystery beyond sea, upon which no invader's foot had stood during the twenty-three years of ruin and sacrifice which had afflicted the vine-clad hills of the Fatherland equally with

the oft-trodden valley of the Danube and the fair plains of Lombardy. It was in June, 1814, that these interesting sightseers reached Dover and thence travelling to the metropolis enjoyed the civic sights and festivities of London. So attracted were the Czar and his fellow Sovereigns with the proceedings of the House of Commons that they did not disguise their preference for some such ideal representative Institution, at least in the abstract.

It is said that the Emperor Alexander went so far as to ask Earl Grey, the future Reform Prime Minister of 1830, whether if he set up a Parliament in Russia the British Statesman would undertake to find him an Opposition, to which query the Whig Reformer replied: "If your Majesty creates an electoral chamber I can promise you that an opposition will at once arise."

Oxford and Portsmouth were successively the scene of this extraordinary gathering, thirty sail of the line under the Duke of Clarence, England's future King as William IV., testifying to the sea power which had enabled her to maintain the Peninsula Armies and play a great part in the Deliverance of Europe.

On this epoch-making occasion Frederick William III. was accompanied by his two sons, the Crown Prince and the future Emperor William.

The Czar had in his train Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the future King of the Belgians, who

then saw—and afterwards won the hand of—George IV.'s daughter, the interesting but ill-fated Princess Charlotte.

But the scene must be shifted to the famous Congress at Vienna, which commenced in the autumn of 1814, attended by the men who had guided the councils of the greater European nations through most of the sorrows and vicissitudes initiated by a reign of revolutionary disturbance which never ceased troubling until after wars more extensive and sanguinary than living men had experienced or students seen recorded.

Of these representatives three were pre-eminent, Metternich, Castlereagh and Talleyrand, while Hardenberg, the experienced Prussian Chancellor, had at his side W. von Humboldt, the elder brother of the great philosopher and naturalist of that name. Born at Berlin in 1767, the Prussian Diplomatist had been early trained in his profession and was Frederick William's Minister at Rome in 1802, where his antiquarian tastes, which were of the highest character, had become well known. Minister of Education in Prussia when the nation was commencing its new life after Erfurt, W. von Humboldt afterwards in 1812 represented his Sovereign at Vienna, which Embassy retained his able services during the War of Liberation. Hence it resulted that acute intelligence, marked discretion, and considerable experience were exercised to secure for Prussia her former place in the Councils of Europe.

Of Hardenberg, the sage and patriotic adviser of his Sovereign, there is nothing to add which has not been revealed in the previous pages of this work, except that the wielder of an admiring pen would fain close his record of this Statesman at an epoch the most encouraging and glorious of the first half of the Century, and not record that his later duties were performed when a bright intellect had been dulled by gradual but undoubted decay.

Stein, an informal monitor of the Czar during the Congress, always lamented that Hardenberg's marriage had not been of a character to elevate the intellectual tone of his home, and spoke of his deterioration as a private individual in consequence. It will be remembered that Stein's sister Louisa had been enthusiastically admired by her brother's rival, the Prussian Chancellor, who at this famous Congress suffered from the infirmity of deafness.

The relations between Hardenberg and Stein were not destined to improve, for, strange to say, the late Professor Seeley, in his great work on the Life and Times of Stein, tells how Hardenberg's failure to secure the Austrian estate of Johannisberg for his fellow Land-Reformer widened the breach between the two men.

Johannisberg, as is well known, fell to the Metternich family by direction of the Emperor Francis, and Stein died at his seat on the Lahn near Coblenz; but that the Imperial Prussian Knight, discarded by the Aristocracy whose privileges he had curtailed,

should have desired so much to end his days as a Lord of the Soil in Conservative Austria does certainly seem to involve considerable inconsistency, not in keeping with the character of the great German Patriot. At all events, personal sympathy between Hardenberg and Stein seems after the Congress to have steadily diminished.

Any record of "Continental Rulers" at this epoch would of course be incomplete if Lord Castlereagh were not named and his remarkable powers not recognized. Second only to Metternich in knowledge of the Chancellories of Europe, the leader of the British House of Commons was as conspicuous in courage, as in possessing a far stronger capacity for controlling the greater affairs of nations than an indecisive and unfinished style of public address would appear to convey. Nevertheless his tact and resolution making up for what was lacking in fluency, Castlereagh's reputation as a Minister stood higher in England than that of any other of Mr. Pitt's associates, not even excepting Mr. Canning. Not that the immediate author of the Union between England and Ireland in A. D. 1800 was able to claim a past career free from political errors ; he had reaped acute obloquy and painful unpopularity from certain sections of the Irish race who reprobated the submerging of Grattan's Parliament.

When, however, all that can be said as to a lack of discretion, in not disguising his contempt for popular verdicts, has been recorded, the reputation and con-

spicuous abilities of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, can never be permanently obscured.

At Vienna neither Metternich, Talleyrand, nor Stein, who, as I have said, was the unofficial adviser of the Czar Alexander in the Congress, more thoroughly reflected the peculiar idiosyncrasies of their respective nations than did the proud and noble aristocrat around whose memory controversial clouds so long hovered, but whom men now generally acknowledge as the capable and trusted Foreign Minister of Great Britain at the gravest crisis of her history.

Associated with his half-brother, Lord Castlereagh, was Charles, Baron Stewart, better known in the Peninsula—where he had become famous as a cavalry leader—as Sir Charles Stewart. Born in 1778, when little over fourteen he joined the army as an ensign, and after being with the British forces in Holland during 1794, he was sent on a mission with Colonel Crawford to the Austrian army operating on the Danube against General Moreau, where he was severely wounded. Subsequently with Sir John Moore in Spain as Brigadier-General until his leader's death, he gallantly distinguished himself, and held the post of Adjutant-General to the Army under Sir Arthur Wellesley from 1809 to 1813.

For his striking cavalry achievements when in pursuit of Marshal Soult's army across the Douro, and also for the affair of El Bodon, Sir Charles



Stewart received the thanks of Parliament. As British Minister to Berlin in 1813, the duty of persuading Bernadotte to join the allies and act vigorously with them was entrusted to this remarkable Englishman, whose success in this mission powerfully aided the cause of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna, Lord Stewart—for he had been created a baron—strongly protested against Napoleon being allowed, in the capacity of Sovereign of Elba, to remain within sight of the Italian shores, possessing every opportunity to conduct intrigues with his military adherents in France ; and he advocated the acceptance of a residence in the Cape Verd Islands, offered by Portugal, as being less accessible and therefore more suitable. The Czar and Prince Metternich would agree to no such change of plan, having, it was urged, pledged their word to the contrary.

There seems to have been little valid difference of opinion in this sage assemblage as to the wisdom of treating France with leniency and mercy. It is true that Hardenberg and the Prussian sympathizers present, of course including Stein, strongly objected, at the close of the Congress, to Alsace and Lorraine not being restored to some representative of the race from which Louis the Fourteenth had wrested them, but it was argued on the other hand that the strong places on this side of the frontier had better be temporarily occupied by the allied forces, and then the Government of the Restoration be ultimately entrusted with a line of fortresses such as should ren-

der France safe from external attack on the German side.

The Teutonic nations might thus be safely consolidated in mutual defence in some form of confederation. Hardenberg, let it be said, however, left his final protest against this arrangement regarding Alsace and Lorraine as certain to provoke future wars, and his utterance must be regarded as prophetic when the vision of 1870 and the Franco-Prussian struggle of that date rises up before our eyes.

But, conscious of inability to complete an ideal programme in sympathy with their patriotic beliefs, Hardenberg and Von Humboldt—prompted doubtless by Stein—joined the Czar in a stern resolution that they would renew the war rather than yield up any territories conquered by Russian and Prussian armies and in actual occupation of those forces.

This, be it remembered, would have obliterated the kingdoms of Saxony and Bavaria, and of course powerfully conspired to promote the gradual unity of Germany under Prussia, a tendency of events which Metternich dreaded for Austria, and he therefore persuaded Lord Castlereagh to join with the representatives of that heterogeneous empire, and also those of the revived Kingdom of France, in resisting the pretensions of Russia and Prussia.

Strife waxed so strong upon this matter that despite an apparent settlement of the Saxon question a renewed conflict would have been possible, had not the sudden irruption of Napoleon into France

from Elba disturbed the meditations of the most distinguished assemblage ever collected together in one European capital, and entirely dissipated smouldering dissensions, which not even the dulcet blandishments of Beethoven's genius, beguiling the leisure of the Congress, had done more than mitigate amongst those who thronged the Assembly rooms in Vienna to hear him.

In principle a compromise had been reached both as to Saxony, Bavaria, and Poland before the Duke of Wellington set out for Paris in the capacity of British Ambassador. Poland, with a nominal constitution, had been united to Russia under the name of the Duchy of Warsaw, and a passing fancy of Alexander's thereby satisfied, inasmuch as for a year or two previous to the Congress the Czar had been as hostile to Polish nationality as he appeared to be afterwards favorable to its revival, when—as appears certain—the influence of Prince Czartoryski reasserted itself.

On the whole, despite the necessity of partially yielding to the Northern Powers, the most successful of all the assembled Ministers at the Congress was the President, Prince Metternich; for not only did he succeed in regaining the Illyrian and Italian provinces of Austria for his master, the Emperor Francis, but he retained for him at least a leading position in the Councils of Germany, which a newly-constituted Prussia, with ten millions of inhabitants, necessarily challenged. Amongst the representatives of

France were diplomatists not only able but ready to join Austria in checking what they termed Revolutionary ideas connected with German Unity. Talleyrand and his master, Louis XVIII., with whom he daily corresponded, were at one in their resolution to prevent the immediate establishment of a united Germany, and found their efforts in this direction ably supported by one of the most notorious experts at the Napoleonic trick of humoring the Teuton peoples and yet preventing them from becoming a nation.

Carl, Duke of Dalberg, Prince Primate of Napoleon's defunct Institution, the "Confederation of the Rhine," like Talleyrand had once been a Cleric, and had adopted secular titles and authority.

He was a German by birth, and a man of high culture in the domain of literature, being specially devoted to science and philosophy, which he had encouraged amongst the people of the Confederation. But Dalberg was an avowed sympathizer with the French connection and had in the first instance welcomed the Revolutionary idea promulgated by that people.

After identifying himself, however, with a patriotic movement during the invasion of Germany in 1797, Dalberg was afterwards induced to assist at the Coronation of the Emperor Napoleon in 1804, and subsequently to act as his *alter ego* in the Rhenish Provinces when the Confederation of the Rhine came into being.

The other two French Plenipotentiaries were the Comte de Noailles and the Marquis de la Tour du Pin Gouvernet, the latter a Colonel at the outbreak of the Revolution, and afterwards Minister at the Hague. Subsequently an Emigrant, he lived to follow Talleyrand to Vienna.

The Comte de Noailles was born in 1783 and suffered imprisonment for giving publicity to a Bull of Pius the Seventh against Napoleon in 1809. He fought in the Campaign of 1813 as Bernadotte's aide-de-camp, and again in a like capacity until the capture of Paris.

Talleyrand took to Vienna as Secretaries "the faithful and clever La Bernardière" whom the Minister regarded as "the most distinguished man" who had appeared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a great many years, and also M. de Firmond, the chief officer "in the cipher department" at Paris, who became French Consul at Bucharest after the 100 days, serving his country successively at Cagliari and Livonia until he retired in 1840. Talleyrand was also accompanied by his niece, the Comtesse de Périgord, who by "her superior intellect and tact" according to the Minister's own statement, was successful in attracting and pleasing both by nobleness of demeanor and brilliancy of talent.

It has been said that the Czar Alexander acted occasionally at the Congress without reference to his diplomatic representatives, the chief of whom, Count Nesselrode, possessed an European reputation which

lasted until after the next great conflict in which Russia engaged during 1854.

He had been a favorite of Napoleon's during the Russian Alliance, and at Erfurt used his influence to prevent the Czar and the Emperor of Austria coming to any immediate understanding. It is said that his influence with Alexander was highest during the Congress of Vienna, where with Rasumoffsky and a trained staff of diplomats, Alexander's interests were most ably defended.

Nevertheless, as has been said, the Napoleonic Kingdoms of Saxony and Bavaria continued to exist by leave of the Congress, although both Russia and Prussia combined to prevent it.

Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, had ruled over his country for forty years and was both honored and beloved by his people. He had refined tastes and collected a beautiful gallery of Art at Dresden. He undoubtedly cringed before the power of Napoleon, but like other German Princes seemed absolutely cowed by the results of the Jena and Auerstadt Campaign, when the military power of Prussia fell so suddenly.

The hostile visit paid to Frederick Augustus's capital by the Duke of Brunswick with his Black Brunswickers will be fresh in my readers' memories, and although the Saxon King returned to Dresden again after the rude shock he then sustained, it was only to make a painful choice between the interests of Germany and those of France when Napoleon re-

turned defeated from Russia. After Leipsic, this unfortunate Sovereign was interned in a Prussian fortress.

Scarcely less interesting was the restoration of William, Prince of Nassau, to his hereditary dominions. Born in 1772, he was the son of the Stadtholder, William V., and commanded the Dutch forces in 1794-5.

After the French invasion this young Prince entered the Austrian service and in 1803 obtained, in exchange for all his rights in Holland, the Abbey of Fulda, just secularized. But having in 1806 embraced the cause of Prussia he was dispossessed of this as well as of all his other estates. It will be remembered that the Prince of Orange was sent by the Emperor Francis to demand fulfilment of an alleged promise from the King of Prussia to come to Austria's assistance before Wagram.

This the King met by asseverating that the time had not yet arrived, and that he would not come alone. Reference to the Foreign Office Papers has convinced the present writer that the Prussians looked for assistance from England, which had been directed from the North Sea to Antwerp, where it was hoped to carry the fortress by a *coup de main*, and so render it impossible to build more ships of war there in hostile opposition to Great Britain, who had been greatly impressed by the faculty for recuperation evinced by the French Navy since Trafalgar.

The Prince of Orange, on succeeding to the throne

of Holland and Belgium, formally ceded the Cape of Good Hope to England, in return for a money payment of six millions and the Island of Java. Portentous day for Great Britain, when she thus secured (with the deliberate acquiescence of Europe) this port, so necessary for the Power possessing Hindustan and charged with the duty of guarding the way to that vast Empire, as well as to Australian possessions then in infancy !

Bernadotte, once a private French soldier, rose to be one of Napoleon's ablest Generals, and had been chosen Crown Prince of Sweden, thereby founding a new dynasty. In the settlement of 1814, Norway was added to the Swedish territories in lieu of Finland, which had been absorbed by Russia after Tilsit, the Finlanders not acquiescing without a sanguinary struggle during 1808-9, after which Alexander swore to observe the Finnish Constitution, which limited the extent of Military Service amongst the inhabitants.

Like the Polish compromise this settlement was destined to prove the precursor of a long controversy not yet closed, although no one can doubt that Finland will ultimately have to submit to the dead level of autocracy current in Russia.

The restoration of Frederick, Duke of Brunswick, to his Dukedom, which had been attached by Napoleon to the Kingdom of Westphalia, brought a potent ally to the side of England, the land which had given him protection in the hour of exile.

After his raid into Saxony in 1809, the two thou-



sand Black Brunswickers escaped to Great Britain, whence they returned at the Peace of 1814 to the Low Countries with their ill-fated Chieftain, destined to lay down his life at Quatre Bras and to have his name for ever enshrined in Lord Byron's immortal "Childe Harold."

Perhaps the most important of all the restitutions made by France at Vienna was that of Savoy and Nice, which had been submerged by the early revolutionary wave.

Destined to form the nucleus of Italian Unity, the noble family of Savoy was represented in 1814 by Victor Emmanuel, second son of Victor Amadeus III., who succeeded in 1772 when his brother Charles abdicated.

He reigned only in the island of Sardinia during the first French Empire.

After various vicissitudes this House of Savoy-Carignano, as will be shown, gave freedom to Italy through the joint efforts of Victor Emmanuel II. and Cavour.

Other diplomatists at the Congress worthy of mention were Lord Castlereagh's secretary, Mr. Cooke, whose knowledge of the details of the British Foreign Office seems to have been unsurpassed in his day, and Count von Schulenberg, the King of Saxony's representative, whose skilled diplomacy was instrumental in saving his master's throne.

The Elector of Hesse and the King of Hanover—King George III. of England—regained their territo-

ries directly the Kingdom of Westphalia was dissolved after the battle of Leipsic.

The former recovered his dominions at the age of seventy, and straightway endeavored to set the clock back to a time previous to the Revolution, abrogating all changes, good or bad, that had occurred since the Campaign of Jena. It is said, according to Mr. Fyffe, that the common soldiers in Hesse straightway returned to pigtails and powder. In Hanover an absentee King was a necessity during George the Third's life, as the British sovereign was incapacitated by mental disease from performance of his duties in England, where the Prince Regent transacted affairs of State. The Secretary of the Congress was the famous Frederick von Gentz, one of the most prominent political writers in Europe. He has been previously named, having been consulted by Mr. Pitt as to the Coalition of 1805, and he was regarded by Talleyrand as the enemy of France.

M. de Labrador, the Spanish Plenipotentiary, gained a reputation for terse and vigorous speech when urging the restitution of Sovereign rights to the imprisoned King of Spain.

While Bernadotte, a French Marshal of the Empire, gained a legal title as future Sovereign of Sweden and Norway from the Allies, another great soldier of Napoleon's simulated abandonment of former stout allegiance to his dynasty—Murat, ruling at Naples as the French Emperor's vassal, made no sign of changing sides until after the Battle of

Leipsic, when he went over to the Austrians. Although he was not unnaturally distrusted by many of the allied diplomatists at Vienna, who were aware how such conduct implied base ingratitude to his gifted brother-in-law and benefactor, such as could offer no probability of real fidelity to the cause of Europe, yet the Congress resolved to give Murat a chance of proving his good faith towards the Allies.

Ferdinand of Sicily had therefore to rest content with Sovereignty in that island, although his son-in-law, Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, went to London in order to press the Bourbon claims for an immediate return to Naples.

This decision of the Allied Powers undoubtedly gave the Bonapartists a great advantage when their leader was carrying on his intrigues from Elba, so close to his great cavalry-soldier's dominions.

The Federal Organization of Germany was about to be dealt with by the Congress, when the astounding news of Napoleon's having left Elba reached Vienna a day or two after the ex-Emperor arrived in the Gulf of Jouan in France.

There undoubtedly occurred some hesitation amongst the troops who were confronted suddenly with the face and form of their late Emperor, but the assembled diplomatists in Vienna never seem to have doubted that a struggle of a stupendous character was again before them, and on March 13th, they declared Napoleon an outlaw, and the common enemy of mankind. Their belief in the power of the Napoleonic

legend to reanimate the soldiery with dreams of glory and conquest, was thereby proclaimed.

On March 1st Napoleon had landed on the shores of the Alpes Maritimes, and despite a cold reception both at the hands of the Prince of Monaco, passing at the time to his Principality, and also from the garrison at Cannes, he pressed on through Gap to Grenoble with 1,000 of the Old Guard. Here he was joined by Colonel Labédoyère and the 7th Regiment of the line ; while Marshal Ney, who had been sent to capture him, went over to his old leader, so that by the time he reached the scene of his late abdication at Fontainebleau, most of the military force in France was once more under his standard.

Exception must be made in the case of La Vendée, where some of the soldiers held back for a considerable time, and although ultimately they acted for the Napoleonic Government against insurrectionists, led by a brother of the famous Henri de La Rochejaquelein, who fell in the conflict, and the Duke d'Angoulême, yet a force of 20,000 picked men had to be left by Napoleon to watch the Royalists in their well-known strongholds, a fact that powerfully affected the situation at Waterloo.

On the evening of the 20th of March, Napoleon re-entered the Tuileries, Louis XVIII. having fled from the capital early that morning to Ghent.

With the notable exceptions of Masséna, Augereau, Marmont, Oudinot and a few others, nearly all officials in Paris, civil and military, readily embraced

the Imperial cause, and Napoleon once more seated himself on the throne amidst scenes of triumph and adulation on the part of the Old Guard and other veteran soldiery, which rendered this epoch the happiest, as he said to Las Casas, in his whole life.

The transports of joy with which Napoleon was received in Paris were almost exclusively evinced by military circles; but nevertheless the scene in the Inner Court of the Carrousel "from the triumphal arch to the foot of the great staircase," when a dense and brilliant crowd of epaulettes, as well as a splendid array of Imperial Court beauties holding violet bouquets, received him with demonstrations of delight, must have been one of the most inspiring ever known in the annals of the French army.

Sir Archibald Alison compares it favourably to the well known welcome of Charles II. of England at Dover, on his return from exile; but in each case the expectations aroused were destined to suffer grave disappointment.

It can have been no source of satisfaction for Napoleon to know that Murat, his secret adherent in Naples, had suddenly taken up arms under the pretext of striking a blow for Italian freedom and unity, and being promptly defeated by the Austrians had no alternative but flight, so that the way was at last clear for the return to Naples of the hated line of the Bourbons in the person of Ferdinand.

The end of Murat, the greatest of French Cavalry leaders, romantic and dramatic, was extremely

sad. After the final overthrow of the first Empire he fled to Corsica, and thence sailed with a few adherents to endeavor to regain the Kingdom of Naples. A gale off the coast of Calabria dispersed his vessels, but Murat forcing his way ashore was seized and taken in chains to Pozzi, where a court-martial condemned him to be shot; this sentence was carried out on October 13, 1815, when he met death with the undaunted courage that he had displayed at Ulm and Austerlitz.

His death left Napoleon's youngest sister, Caroline, a widow.

But if the necessities of biographical narration involve an occasional digression, such as that connected with the close of Murat's career, I will now endeavor to bring Napoleon's final attempt to save the First Empire by crushing the Allies before my readers, by describing the events in which one of his ablest lieutenants participated, one moreover who has not been previously named in these pages.

Emanuel, Marquis de Grouchy, sprung from a noble Norman family, and was three years older than the Emperor. In 1789 he was a sub-lieutenant in Louis XVI.'s Gardes du Corps, but like many others of his class, embracing the Revolution, gave his sword to France. When the nobles of that country were forbidden to take rank in the army, young Grouchy served as a private, and by sheer gallantry worked his way gradually to high military position. In 1798, under General Joubert, he was instrumental in uniting Pied-

mont to France by persuading the King of Sardinia to abdicate, and from that moment his career was one of great bravery and brilliancy.

At Novi it is recorded that Grouchy received no less than fourteen wounds, and his prowess was asserted successively on the fields of Hohenlinden, Eylau, Friedland, Wagram, and in the Campaigns of Russia and Leipsic, so that shortly before his abdication Napoleon had given him the Marshal's bâton.

Aware that magnificent ceremonies, military and theatrical, were necessary to placate the Parisians, Napoleon on his return from Elba straightway made preparations for a grand fête on the Champs de Mars, but he felt also that however successful he might be in reorganizing the Grand Army, re-fitting its artillery and remounting its cavalry, it would involve considerable tactical danger if an insurrection were permitted to flourish in the fastnesses of La Vendée and also to germinate in the southern Provinces when the Imperial forces were engaged in Belgium.

Marshal Grouchy was therefore sent to the scene of action, and displayed both tact and skill in suppressing a somewhat abortive rising which, after Louis de La Rochejaquelein's death, gradually languished, owing, it is said, in a great degree to Fouché's intrigues.

It had been agreed that 15,000 soldiers of Royalist proclivities should march on Lyons, while a body of equal strength moved from Bordeaux into La Vendée and Brittany.

To realize how formidable such a scheme necessarily was, under the circumstances, it is only necessary to consult a map. But Grouchy, by a brilliant display of military skill and ready tact, brought the brief campaign near Lyons to a close at Pont St. Esprit in Dauphiné, actually capturing the Duke d'Angoulême; and though the Bourbon Prince was subsequently set at liberty, owing to a mistaken interpretation of Napoleon's orders, this escape of a descendant of Henri IV. could not really have been displeasing to Napoleon. Moreover, although it was adjudged necessary to leave 20,000 men to watch the Royalist province of La Vendée, Grouchy's services were needed in Belgium, and he therefore received an important command in the Army secretly preparing to invade that country.

Although Napoleon could not take the field in anything approaching the numerical strength which he had wielded in his later campaigns against Austria, Russia or the Allied Sovereigns, still he captained 122,000 picked French Veterans and trained soldiers, the army being replete with the flower of the French Cavalry and furnished with an artillery superior to that of either Blücher or Wellington, whose forces, numerically larger, he resolved to separate as he had done those of the Allies in 1814 with such extraordinary temporary effect.

Conscious that the Congress of Vienna had left the question of Germanic Confederation unsettled, he artfully introduced into his Proclamation to the



troops sentences which deprecated an impending obliteration of the smaller states of Germany, so that had a victory at Waterloo by the French been followed by an advance towards the Rhine, strong dissensions might have been aroused in the ranks of his enemies. I am precluded by the scheme of this volume from a topographical study of the Campaign in Belgium of June, 1815, which is relegated to another pen; but it is necessary to relate how on the 16th, while Ney, with 40,000 men, of whom he had to send away 20,000 to join Napoleon at Ligny, failed to shake the British and Brunswickers at Quatre Bras, at Ligny Napoleon inflicted upon the Prussians under Blücher a decided if not crushing defeat, wherein Blücher lost, it is said, 12,000 men *hors de combat*, and was himself left apparently dead after two squadrons of cavalry had passed over the spot where he fell.

Napoleon, having hesitated to launch all available forces after the retreating Prussians, somewhat tardily selected Marshal Grouchy for the duty of following them with 31,000 men to Sombrefe near Wavre, between which place and Namur it was thought the main body had gone.

The fact appears to have been that the French had lost between six and seven thousand men in this Battle of Ligny, and over four thousand at Quatre Bras, and were themselves too shaken to attempt immediate pursuit of Blücher or follow Wellington in his subsequent retreat to Waterloo.

On the 18th of June, when the Battle of Waterloo

was fought, Grouchy with his 31,000 men engaged General Thielmann near Wavre, having received a written order from Napoleon "to march upon Sombreffe, and there take up a position." Verbally, the French Emperor had added directions which enjoined a close pursuit of the Prussians, of whom he was not to lose sight, but attack when possible. Another order from Marshal Bertrand enjoined watchfulness lest the Prussians should unite with Wellington. At twelve o'clock, about half an hour after the great conflict at Waterloo had commenced, the cannonade was heard by Marshal Grouchy, at Sart les Walhain, who received advice from Count Gerard, holding a command under him, to abandon his pursuit of the Prussians and fly to Napoleon's aid.

This Grouchy thought neither feasible nor in accordance with his instructions. Moreover the following order was at four o'clock P. M., placed in the Marshal's hand from Soult, dated ten o'clock, 18th June, 1815, from the field of Waterloo. "The Emperor desires me to inform you that at this moment he is about to attack the English army, which has taken up a position in front of the forest of Soignies. His Majesty desires that you should direct your movements upon Wavre in order to approach us, and conduct our operations in concert, driving before you all the Prussian corps who have taken that direction, or who might stop at Wavre, where you should endeavor to arrive as soon as possible."

These orders Grouchy carried out until six o'clock,

when a second despatch directed an immediate change of front on St. Lambert, in order to check the historic advance of Bulow's Prussian column. But it was received by Grouchy too late to influence the result; and after repulsing Thielmann's attack on the morning of the 19th, the unhappy Marshal learnt the news of the rout of the French and of their pursuit by victorious Prussians, who had taken them in flank at the close of a day of wild struggles to overwhelm the solid British Infantry, and of despairing charges by Napoleon's Guards, Horse and Foot. Grouchy received orders to retreat on Laon and unite with the remnants of Napoleon's host. His retreat into France though quiet has been praised by the late Sir George Chesney, as being conducted with remarkable skill.

For a long time there was no better abused man upon the French boulevards than Emanuel Grouchy, Marshal of France, although a scientific knowledge of the course of one of the most interesting, as well as most decisive, battles in history has successfully relieved this noble French soldier from an unjust aspersion.

For Napoleon there was left nothing but St. Helena; and although his captivity was suffered at the hands of that foe he had himself pursued most inexorably, he owed to Great Britain that opportunity (of which he availed himself so fully) of explaining and throwing favorable lights upon a career so dazzling and full of genius that not even his

crimes and vices, nor the proved inaccuracy of his memoirs, have entirely destroyed the halo which glows still around that name once so dear to France.

Controversy as to the relative merits of the generalship of Wellington and Napoleon, at Waterloo, has been already carried to such an extreme that it would be desirable to avoid the topic if possible. But the condemnation of Grouchy, which has found its way through French sources even into British biographies, seems to be founded on so palpable a misconception that it is advisable to expose the fallacy involved.

It is not disputed that Grouchy's original force was some three thousand less than the Prussians under Thielmann, at whose "heels," to quote Napoleon's words, he was following at Wavre. What reason there is to believe that one of these Commanders could possibly have reached the field of Waterloo, without his rival exercising influence over the final issue, no writer of any nationality has ever explained.

Indeed 15,200 Prussians never left the neighborhood of Wavre until after Waterloo was decided, having been obliged to defend the Prussian communications from Grouchy's attack.

Sir Herbert Maxwell's lately published volumes on Wellington have proved how much Napoleon underrated that great opponent, and also the British troops under his command. Marshal Soult, who knew them but too well, in the Peninsula, had told him in answer to the opinion that "nine chances to

one," were in French favor, "Sire, I know these English; they will die on the ground on which they stand before they lose it."

"You think Wellington is a great General, because he beat you," answered the French Emperor, "but I tell you he is neither a great General, nor are his men great soldiers."

Sir Herbert Maxwell throws no fresh light on the much-worn controversy as to Grouchy's non-arrival at Waterloo, and therefore on the facts I have given I claim for that distinguished general that the denial of his Marshalate after the Restoration resulted from a misapprehension.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## GUARDIANS OF THE PEACE, 1815-1830.

LOUIS XVIII. AND MINISTERS OF THE RESTORATION.—CAREER OF CHATEAUBRIAND, AND NOTICES OF TALLEYRAND, FOUCHÉ, DUC DE RICHELIEU, AND M. DECAZES.—SURRENDER OF EX-EMPEROR TO CAPTAIN MAITLAND OF THE "BELLEROPHON."—MARSHALS ST. CYR AND MACDONALD REORGANISE THE FRENCH ARMY ON A TERRITORIAL BASIS.—EXECUTIONS OF NEY AND LABÉDOYÈRE.—THE HOLY ALLIANCE, AND CAREER OF MADAME DE KRUDENER.—THE "CONGREGATION" RELIGIOUS SOCIETY IN FRANCE.—DEATH OF LOUIS XVIII.—EARLY CAREER OF LOUIS PHILIPPE, DUKE OF ORLEANS.—CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.—KOTZEBUE'S MURDER, AND THE "CARLSBAD DECREES" ISSUED BY PRINCE METTERNICH.—MURDER OF THE DUC DE BERRI.—DEATH OF NAPOLEON.—DEATHS OF HARDENBERG AND LORD LONDONDERRY, BETTER KNOWN AS LORD CASTLE-REAGH.—ALSO OF LOUIS XVIII., THE CZAR ALEXANDER I., AND MR. CANNING.—THE GREEK REBELLION, AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830.—ABDICATION OF CHARLES X., AND ACCESSION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE TO THE THRONE OF FRANCE.

No monarch ever undertook to occupy a more unstable throne, or throw himself upon the allegiance of a people less settled in political opinions, than did Louis XVIII., at the Second Restoration of the Bourbons in June, 1815, when, at the instigation of Chateaubriand, he left Ghent, and pressed on to Paris. Chateaubriand's later career had, at this period, been so identified with the idea of a restored

Bourbon monarchy of a constitutional type, while he was so much the most cultured adviser of the King, that a brief résumé of his life will carry the reader along the historical track, and reveal the outlines of a most attractive individuality, which not even the possession of considerable vanity could dim.

The same age as Wellington and Napoleon, this younger son of an ancient noble family entered the Army of Louis XVI. in the Regiment of Navarre when seventeen years old. At the outbreak of the Revolution he was, however, induced to travel in the New World, and slake his thirst for adventure in the lately constituted United States of America, a sojourn to which it has been said that he owed that love for liberty which not even the trammels of the ancient ceremonial of a revived French monarchy or the hostility of its extreme partisans could ever shake. In the words of an able writer on this period, Mr. Joseph Sykes, known as Julio, in his privately printed *Studies of Eminent French Writers*, "A Royalist he indeed remained, but the man of enlightened experience overpowered the political partisan."

This trans-Atlantic journey also developed his poetic faculties, his journal teeming with "the wild odor of forests, the majestic flow of rivers,"—impressions which re-appeared in literary form when its "harvest of reflections" impregnated the creations of fiction which bear the names of *Atala*, *René* and *Les Natchez*.

Returning from America, because a chance glance

at a journal revealed the terrible progress of the revolution in Paris and the peril of the King and Queen, he returned to Europe in time to accompany the Duke of Brunswick into France, and being wounded at the Siege of Thionville in 1792 and left apparently dying in a ditch, was thence conveyed in a most feeble condition to Jersey and finally to London, where his privations, due to penury, were so severe that his first work, an *Essay Historical and Political upon Ancient and Modern Revolutions*, was written, as he himself has disclosed, when the timely aid of the Literary Fund enabled him to keep soul and body together. As the rules of that beneficent society happily forbid the disclosure of the nomenclature of authors receiving assistance at their hands, it is well that men and women of literary taste, as well as those gifted with ample means, should know how the community that helped Chateaubriand in his distress still continues its beneficent labors from that centre of the British metropolis, commanding so fine a view of Father Thames at Charing Cross, known as Adelphi Terrace.

Chateaubriand's above-named essay on Revolutions attracted philosophical thinkers; but it betrayed a tendency to freedom of religious thought, not to be found in later productions, such as the *Génie du Christianisme* upon which his Parisian fame was founded. For he had returned to his native France after the 18th Brumaire, when Napoleon as First Consul was endeavoring to combine a revival of



religion with the establishment of a military and autocratic rule.

The career of Chateaubriand seems to illustrate very clearly what the reasons were which induced so many men of substance and ability to rally around Napoleon Bonaparte when that man of genius was bent on providing a substitute for the rejected monarchy, and yet treading out the embers of those revolutionary fires which, had they not been quenched after the Reign of Terror, would have obliterated France from the category of civilized nations.

The relations between the First Consul and Chateaubriand certainly form food for reflection of an interesting character, while a subsequent severance of such ties marks that epoch when Napoleon left the path he had first trodden for that of outrage and personal ambition. Chateaubriand became successively Secretary to the Roman Embassy and Minister to the Republic of Valais, when the future conqueror of Europe was restoring religious observances and social cohesion. Directly, however, the fatal murder of the Duc d'Enghien became known to the Christian Royalist whose abilities were being utilized in the service of his country, further official adherence to the Bonapartist Government seemed to him to involve an unwarrantable surrender of principle; so, braving Napoleon's wrath when it seemed likely to be most deadly, Chateaubriand returned to private life and to letters, which straightway gained him admission to the Academy, but vexed the

French Emperor by his dauntless independence. Gradually Chateaubriand came to be known as the literary prompter of the Bourbons, when that family emerged from the obscurity which enveloped its Princes during the palmy days of Napoleonic conquests ; and when it became necessary to answer the bulletins which issued from the Tuileries after Louis XVIII. left for Ghent, previous to the Battle of Waterloo, Chateaubriand's pen produced ready retorts to the magniloquent, albeit insidious, documents which were thrown broadcast over Europe. Moreover, he had appeared in the guise of a thoughtful Councillor to the embarrassed legitimate Monarch when it first became apparent that Napoleon had attracted the Army to his side, on his return from Elba.

And yet it is said that had Chateaubriand's advice been taken, Louis XVIII. would have endeavored to defend himself in Paris until the allies could come to his assistance, a policy based on the assumption that Napoleon, on returning from Elba, had no artillery immediately available. However, as the King was firm in the resolution to retire to Ghent, Chateaubriand went with him.

When the allies entered Paris after Waterloo, and while the Chambers were debating the future of France and Napoleon flying to the coast, before he surrendered to Captain Maitland, of the *Bellerophon*, Pozzo di Borgo urged the King to hurry into his Capital and claim a heritage which might otherwise fall into other hands. Chateaubriand says in his *Memoirs*

that to that timely information of the prescient Corsican Louis XVIII. owed his second restoration.

The Prime Minister of the exiled King at Ghent had been Monsieur de Blacas, whose violent and undisguised reactionary views rendered his continuance in office by no means desirable, so that Louis endeavored to secure the services of the brilliant and faithful Chateaubriand.

But it was found in effect that a Cabinet bereft of Talleyrand and Fouché was simply an impossibility in the unsettled state of France, and as Chateaubriand utterly declined to act in the Ministry if Fouché was to be a colleague, the Sovereign was reluctantly obliged, after much hesitation, to surrender his private desire to the immediate public interest.

A study of Fouché's memoirs certainly justifies the high-minded Royalist gentleman who made this ineffectual protest; for this work reveals that before the Battle of Waterloo Fouché was corresponding with Prince Metternich, and the Royalists of La Vendée, as well as with both the Duke of Wellington and Blücher in Belgium, pretending to keep these generals informed upon Napoleon's preparations and concerning the time chosen for crossing the frontier, while he so ordered it that the cipher despatches containing this information were not allowed to leave France, and that therefore the French Emperor's movements were unknown to the allies until Charleroi had been taken. This fact will be found in

the second volume of Fouché's memoirs, and surely proves Chateaubriand's estimate of the Duke of Otranto's character to have been correct.

Nevertheless, although excluded from the Cabinet, Chateaubriand exercised a strong influence over the policy of Louis XVIII., inducing him at all hazards to sustain the Constitutional Charter in France, which secured her Parliamentary Government and a responsible Ministry, so that, even if the property qualification was high and the voters consequently remained comparatively few, yet public opinion had some chance of being heard.

The fidelity of Chateaubriand to his Sovereign was of the greatest value at this period, because the Government were sorely in need of advice to which extreme Royalists would listen, as the advanced members of that party were clamoring for revenge on their political enemies, the reactionary mob of Marseilles and Avignon rivalling the much-reprobated Government of the Convention in perpetrating atrocities. Marshal Brune was cruelly murdered at the ancient Papal City when on his way to Paris, his body being thrown into the Rhône.

The impunity with which this murder and massacres both at Marseilles and Nîmes were accompanied rendered it necessary for the allied armies to intervene and surround the evil-doers, who, in the temper of French tribunals, never received that retributive justice which they merited. Moreover, so violent was the Clerical and Royalist reaction then prevailing,

that the elections resulted in the return of a large majority of extreme men, who made short work in the Chambers of the Talleyrand-Fouché combination, and led to the Duc de Richelieu becoming President of the Council (a Minister almost analogous to an English Premier), the other moving spirit being M. Decazes.

During the administration of M. Talleyrand, the King first gave peerages to a number of distinguished Frenchmen, whose fidelity to the throne was credited by the Royalists, even if some of them had served Napoleon's government in previous years, while by an ordinance of August 19, 1815, these creations were rendered hereditary.

Talleyrand, who was amongst the number thus honored, had been the prompter of such a measure. "We must have," he said, "stability; we must build for a long future."

Among the names in this honorable category were found those of M. de Blacas, the Comte de Chartres, the Comte d'Artois, the Vicomtes Chateaubriand and Jules de Polignac, the Duc d'Angoulême and the Duc de Berri, who were Princes of the Blood, Admiral Gantheaume, the sons of Marshals Berthier and Bessières, together with many others less known to the general reader.

On the whole this seems to have been a well-considered attempt to build up the monarchical edifice on its original constitutional lines, and to weld this traditional alliance of high position and heredi-

tary distinction into the Constitution granted by means of the Charter.

That its *permanence* could, in all probability, be only contemporaneous with *that of the Monarchy*, did not at the moment detract from the value of the honor conferred.

Chateaubriand continued to combat the extreme section of the Monarchists, who desired to curtail liberty of speech and action unduly, while he faithfully supported the Royal Prerogative.

*La Monarchie selon la Charte*, a brochure which contains the germ and essence of representative government, appeared about this time. The phrase, "the King reigns but does not govern," appears in its pages, while the author may be said to have devoted two years of journalism to "the alliance of liberty with a hereditary throne."

But the influence of Chateaubriand, although it did not end here, must be left to permeate the course of French Constitutional history under the Restoration, while a few lines are devoted to the antecedents of the Duc de Richelieu and M. Decazes.

And yet, before considering the careers of these statesmen, two important facts have to be noted.

In the midst of the Cabinet discussions concerning this attempt to strengthen the aristocracy by giving it a permanent nucleus of a hereditary character, the Allied Sovereigns returned to Paris upon July 8 and 9; and as they were the forerunners of a vast host, 800,000 of whom had already quartered themselves

on French soil, their joint dictum was one not to be disputed, and in accordance therewith France had to submit to a grave humiliation. The corps of Grouchy had not been disbanded on its return from Wavre, but despatched in company with other troops under Davoust beyond the river Loire, where they were quartered, 45,000 strong with 120 guns, and so well furnished with cavalry and mounted artillery that the neighboring peasantry could not be brought to believe that France had just lost a disabling battle and that the conqueror's heel was on her neck.

Davoust, rightly reckoning that 45,000 men could not hold their own against 500,000 available to crush him, called on his soldiers to give allegiance to Louis XVIII. and hoist the white flag, and so carried his men with him unanimously.

But the Allied Sovereigns insisted on the dissolution of a force which they considered to contain elements antagonistic to the sustenance of peace, and the Czar especially, through Nesselrode, demanded its immediate disbandment.

There seems to have been no opposition to this measure, although it was carried out through the intervention of the foreign invaders of France, and not at the instance of her King.

Marshal St. Cyr, the Minister of War, proceeded, in conjunction with Marshal Macdonald, to reorganize the whole military force, and extirpate, if possible, the Imperialist *esprit de corps* by suppressing the old regiments whose eagles had gained such glory at the

cannon's mouth, and replacing them by territorial battalions, raised separately in the several provinces.

Having thus freed themselves from the possibility of an Imperialist military outbreak, the Allied Sovereigns demanded the breaking up of the Museum in Paris, which had been fed by the accumulation of works of art, both in painting and sculpture, which Napoleon wrested from foreign capitals. Hence the return of Rubens's "Descent from the Cross" to Antwerp, of "The Horses of St. Mark" to Venice, and of the "Car of Victory" to the Brandenburg Gate at Berlin.

Armand, Duc de Richelieu, the new Prime Minister of France, was of the same family as the famous Cardinal. He reached this high office at the age of forty-nine. He had served in the Russian army under Suwarrow, and was at the assault at Ismail, afterwards joining the army of emigrant nobles under the Prince de Condé, when the Revolution had displayed its worst features. After 1794 he returned to Russia, and after Alexander I. became Czar enjoyed the favor and friendship of that benevolent Sovereign, who entrusted him with the duty of carrying out improvements in Southern Russia, one of which was the designing of a seaport at Odessa, a great export city which testifies to his forethought.

When Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, the Duc de Richelieu went to the aid of his old friend and comrade, the Czar, and shared his counsels up to the end of the war in 1814. He was with Louis XVIII. at



Ghent, and following him to France in June, 1815, served him with fidelity in a private capacity until, after Talleyrand's fall, it seemed desirable to appoint some minister who was in friendly relations with the Czar.

M. Decazes had had a less exciting career. Coming to Paris in the last days of the Empire to study law, and marrying the daughter of the President of the Court of Cassation, he was treated amicably by the Emperor, who, however, could never persuade Decazes to desert his political principles, so that during the 100 days he was banished 100 leagues from Paris.

Louis XVIII. concurred in M. Decazes becoming Prefect of Police in the summer of 1815; in this post he displayed zeal as well as devotion to the King, who desired a trustworthy coadjutor in the Ministry to keep him well informed as to the course of public opinion.

M. Decazes was celebrated for being the one man sufficiently familiar with the tergiversations and secret dealings of Fouché, upon whose actions Louis XVIII. desired to put some check.

The administration of the Duc de Richelieu has been almost universally blamed for giving way to the tempest of revenge which resulted in the executions of Colonel Labédoyère and Marshal Ney for treachery and treason to the King; but it should be remembered that these accused persons were given every opportunity and even encouraged to escape, and that when they refused to leave French soil, preferring, ap-

parently, trial and conviction to such banishment, the whole of Royalist France demanded that some examples should be made. Indeed, the names of the distinguished men who were threatened at this period with prosecution and death contained so many of those famous in the history of France, that it is not possible to rise from the perusal without a sense of relief that so little blood was shed by way of judicial reprisal.

That if Louis XVIII. had found it possible to pardon Ney and Labédoyère, it would have enhanced his popularity in France for all time, there is no manner of doubt; but so flagrant had been the delinquencies of both these brave men, that it is difficult to find any precedent in the history of nations which would have justified a Government in overlooking crimes which had led to the unnecessary deaths of so many human creatures.

Ney's conduct is inexplicable, except on the assumption frequently put forward, that the rudeness of the ladies of the Faubourg St. Germain to his wife led the Prince de Moskowa to harbor resentment against the Royalist régime. Otherwise, after promising to bring back Napoleon in an iron cage, he would scarcely have yielded so soon, even to the charmed voice of his former Emperor. But it remains a grave question whether the lives of Ney and Labédoyère were not explicitly protected under the convention signed before Paris surrendered.

It appears to have been mainly a knowledge of mankind that gave M. Decazes his position in the

Government, where he was enabled to explain the dispositions and weaknesses of those with whom he came in contact.

The new Ministry had the painful task before them of discharging contributions levied by the Allies up to the amount of £61,500,000.

In November, 1815, the Czar first formulated his scheme for a "Holy Alliance" between the Nations of Europe, so that the peaceful reign of Gospel truth might supersede the ravages of the sword, with which the Continent had become so painfully familiar.

Prompted by a fair enthusiast, Madame de Krudener, he formulated a document for signature by the Allied Sovereigns, embodying these ideas, Frederick William III. and the Emperor Francis concurring, but not the Prince Regent, who was advised by Lord Castlereagh to withhold his signature, while expressing sympathy with the aims and objects professed by the Czar and his associates.

Juliana, Baroness Valerie de Krudener, was a daughter of the Russian Governor of Riga, Vietinghoff by name, and had reached her forty-ninth year when she persuaded the Czar to form the Holy Alliance. Marrying Baron Krudener, Catherine the Great's Ambassador to Berlin, at the early age of fourteen, she afterwards enjoyed the friendship of the good Queen Louisa of Prussia, at whose death in 1810 Madame de Krudener fell into a state of profound melancholy, which she relieved by indulging in re-

ligious fervor, resulting in her wandering through Prussia preaching, prophesying and holding prayer meetings.

In 1814, meeting the Emperor Alexander, Madame de Krudener conceived the idea that her special mission was that of completing his conversion.

Persuaded by her eloquence, the Czar was led into the belief that a common international law, founded on the Gospel, might be devised, such as should for ever supersede the power of the sword. Such was the Holy Alliance, which exercised so strong an influence over Europe for at least a decade of the nineteenth century, and was participated in by nearly all the Continental Rulers.

Madame de Krudener afterwards offended Alexander by interfering in politics when the question of Greek independence was coming to the front.

Having indicated a few of the lions in the path of the restored Monarchy in France, I desire to tell something of the prosperous reign of the sovereign charged with the arduous tasks of government which I have endeavored to describe.

Some settled government was an absolute and urgent necessity for France at a moment when the Republic, Consulate and Empire had successively passed away; and France appeared to acquiesce readily in the adoption of a Monarchical form.

Louis XVIII., however, rightly judged that a return to the days before his late brother's violent death in 1793 was neither possible nor desirable, for

it would have involved suppressing the newly-gained constitutional liberties, to give free play to which (within certain limits), while preserving all the traditions and dignities of an ancient Court, the King believed to be his mission.

A well informed literary man, whose reading had commenced in the days of Louis XV., the Comte de Provence had not allowed the lessons of the Revolution to pass by without profiting by the sad experience of his family. And in this particular he differed much from the Comte d'Artois, the future Charles X., who, while upholding the stately pomp of Versailles restored by his brother, retained a dread of parliamentary Government and a preference for clerical rule, which rendered the permanence of the Monarchy by no means probable.

And although during the lifetime of Louis XVIII. the coterie of ultramontane sympathizers, who surrounded his brother and were known as belonging to the so-called " Congregation," never gained supreme influence, yet the seeds were sown by violent reactionaries throughout France, which ultimately produced the Revolution of 1830.

Originally a small community under Jesuit supervision, the " Congregation " came to include all the intensely Catholic and Legitimist partisans in the kingdom. They may be said to have attained to the proportions, and pursued the mission, of a vast friendly society formed for the purpose of inculcating fidelity both to Pope and King. This organization

had its own cafés and wineshops as well as elementary schools and colleges.

The "Congregation" also gave characters to domestic servants, whom the Catholic aristocracy preferred above others, and—not the least important step—secured the summit of Mount Valerien, now famous for the fortress that frowns over Paris, as a centre whence to propagate its opinions. A comfortable building was erected on the summit of the rounded eminence, and there well-to-do penitents could consult the Jesuit Fathers in surroundings not unlike a first-rate hotel.

The Congregation has been described as a Religious Carbonari, for, unlike the Italian secret society, it did not neglect the power of sacred rhetoric in disseminating its opinions.

Many able preachers were sent into the provinces, their advent being well advertised, so as to secure them a hearty welcome from well-trained sympathizers, who, if able under the Empire to exercise freely the rites of their faith, would not have attempted to proselytize in the aggressive fashion which became prevalent amongst the followers of the Comte d'Artois.

Not indeed until Louis XVIII. had paid the debt of nature did the Congregation become supreme at Court, or guide the Ministry, but its influence was gradually increasing even during the early years of the Restoration. It is said that Talleyrand, when Minister, was induced to walk ostentatiously in a

religious procession devised by the enthusiasts who guided the Congregation, and although it is difficult to believe that Ex-Bishop of Autun really gained much political strength thereby, the fact is significant of the way the wind blew.

Louis XVIII. never neglected his duties as the Catholic King of France; and uncharitable critics of this reign have not been slow to impute cynical hypocrisy to one, who in earlier years was believed to have admired Voltaire's writings, and to have adopted his views to some degree.

A well-known appreciation of a good cuisine, over which the King uttered many a *bon mot*, has also given the enemies of the Monarchy the chance of making most prominent this side of a character which, with all its defects, was that of a sovereign who dearly loved France.

Under Louis the ancient ceremonial politeness of the Monarchy revived, and with it the stately pomp of Versailles. It was the traditional right of a Frenchman to see the King of France and the Royal Family dine in public at stated times. The Duc d'Ercais was the "*grand maître de la cuisine*," the Comte de Rothe was royal cupbearer, and the Marquis de Montdragon devoted his energies to learning what his sovereign wished to partake of at dinner. Talleyrand became Grand Chamberlain, having cultivated the performance of kindred duties when Napoleon sought to reproduce some of the pomp associated with those Monarchs of France whom he secretly

desired in this particular to imitate. Louis XVIII. never forgot his dignity as a King, even when bowed down by infirmities and unable to use his limbs.

“A King of France dies, but he is never ill,” was one of his last answers to the courtiers, whose sympathetic devotion could not be restrained, when, towards the close of his life, Louis le Désiré was sustaining the courtly etiquette he so wisely prized. I have been, however, anticipating events; for it is necessary to allude to the relations existing before Louis XVIII. died between the Court and his cousin the Duke of Orleans, the son of Louis Égalité and Marie de Penthièvre, known in history as Louis Philippe.

This Prince had been educated under Madame de Genlis and at seventeen was furnished, in addition to a familiarity with modern languages, with much practical knowledge of a technical character, extending even to turnery, basket-making and carpentry, which must have proved useful during the vagrant life of a poor exile, such as Louis Philippe for some time endured.

Louis Égalité is said to have introduced his eldest son to the Jacobin Club, when thus prepared by education for the battle of life; but it was as a soldier that the future King of the French first became renowned as he was present at Valmy and gained distinction at Jemappes. The Orleans family, being descended from a younger son of Louis XIII. and on the female side from a legitimized son of Louis XIV.,



were descendants of the Bourbons, and cousins of the reigning line. Although attracted, as has been narrated, in youth towards the Jacobins, the young Duke of Chartres, apprehensive of the tragical fate which had overtaken even his regicide parent, the Duke of Orleans, fled from the Capital, but not before receiving an ominous summons to attend before the Committee of Public Safety.

Then came a period of privation and adventure, during which the Prince taught mathematics under an assumed name in Switzerland, sojourned in America and wandered over Europe, until at the Restoration he was permitted to return to France.

Although Louis Philippe paid due allegiance to Louis XVIII., the shrewd old King never thoroughly trusted his cousin's professions, and refrained from granting him the title of Royal Highness, a distinction, however, conferred by the generous, if superstitious, Monarch Charles X., together with the rich possessions of the Orleans family in France.

The Palais Royal, after the death of Louis XVIII., became the centre of liberal thought and a rival influence even to the Tuileries itself; but at present it is not necessary to do more than indicate the peculiar position of Louis Philippe in France.

The Duc de Richelieu was so prudent a Minister, and in such good repute with the Emperor Alexander, that when the Great Powers assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, three years after Waterloo, it was unanimously resolved to evacuate French terri-

tory. The hour of reaction had, however, set in, caused by the timidity of the Czar. When once the Russian opposition to such a course was removed, Prince Metternich ruled Europe from Vienna quite as despotically as Napoleon had done before 1814 from Paris, and Frederick William III. followed in the track of Austria.

This King had given a promise in May, 1815, to create Parliamentary institutions in Prussia; but certain fermentations amongst the students in the Gymnasias were pointed to by Metternich as signals of a coming revolutionary propaganda amongst them, while the murder of Kotzebue on March 23, 1819, powerfully helped to defer the creation of electoral machinery for the Prussian Kingdom.

August Kotzebue, a dramatic author of considerable ability, was born at Weimar in 1761 and emigrating to Russia gained the favor of the Emperor Paul, who recalled him from Siberia, where he had been sent on suspicion of being a Revolutionist. Paul acted thus, being charmed with a eulogistic drama, the hero of which was supposed to have been intended for the Czar himself.

After a short time spent in Prussia during the hour of national agony in 1806, Kotzebue returned to Russia in order to avoid contact with the French, and for a time devoted his pen to diatribes against Napoleon.

In 1817, Alexander paid him a salary of 15,000 roubles to report on literature and the progress of

public opinion in Germany, whence he wrote in terms so antagonistic to the opinions of Arndt, Stein, and the more liberal thinkers of the Fatherland, that he became extremely unpopular amongst the aforementioned students of the Universities, which were themselves attacked in Kotzebue's journals.

It was clearly an exaggeration to attribute to this writer the conversion of the Czar from a constitutional yearning for liberty to active participation in Metternich's reactionary crusade.

Nevertheless, this idea flashed through Germany when Carl Sand, an Erlangen student and an enthusiast, thought he saw a divine mission before him enjoining that Kotzebue should die at his hands, which, alas! he was destined to do, in the midst of his own family, on March 23, 1819.

Sand attempted to stab himself with the weapon which despatched Kotzebue, but recovering from the self-inflicted wound, suffered on the scaffold a year after, calling God to witness that he died so that Germany might be free. The opportunity to hasten the steps of reaction in Prussia was eagerly seized by the enemies of German Unity, while Metternich had a weapon to hand, which he did not scruple to use against his opponents.

Well might Hardenberg exclaim, when he heard of this strange tragedy, that a Prussian Constitution had for the moment become impossible.

Out of the reactionary impulses which sprang from Kotzebue's murder, Metternich swiftly moulded

the famous "Carlsbad Decrees," whereby the Austrian Chancellor hoped, as he admitted, to "defeat the German Revolution," as he formerly had "vanquished the Conqueror of the World."

The effectual suppression of Parliamentary Government by the joint orders of Austria and Prussia could never have happened, had not Metternich, at the close of the Congress of Vienna, craftily avoided the establishment of any central government over Germany when replacing the Napoleonic Confederation of the Rhine by a German Federation, with a consultative Diet at Frankfort, which had no legislative authority.

Except in a case of the direct and active attack on Germany by force of arms, such a body as this was not likely to make its power felt by united action, the main object of the settlement being to leave the power and privileges of the several states of Germany (of which there were then thirty-nine) intact.

In 1819 Metternich persuaded the Diet to pass his Carlsbad Decrees, establishing State control of the Universities, censorship of the Press, and a special Commission to inquire into the existence of democratic associations; nor did this all-powerful Austrian statesman by any means hold his hand here, but began to intrigue with the Duc de Richelieu in France in order to secure a majority in the Chamber for an ultra-reactionary policy, the Comte d'Artois and his adherents combining with Moderate Conservative supporters of Louis the Eighteenth's Govern-

ment. The temporary failure, however, of this combination drove Richelieu from the Government, and the popular young statesman, Decazes, of whom the King was so fond, became Prime Minister.

But an event occurred on February 13, 1820, which, if it rendered less secure the Monarchy of the Restoration in France, yet served Metternich's retrograde purposes but too well.

The Comte d'Artois had two sons, of whom the elder, the Duc d'Angoulême, married to his first cousin, Louis the Sixteenth's only daughter, was childless, and the Duc de Berri, the younger, the only hope of the elder Bourbon line, had but lately taken to himself a wife.

One Louvel, a workman devoted to the Napoleonic memories, who had accompanied the ex-Emperor to Elba, seized the Duc de Berri as he was leaving the Opera House at Paris, and plunged a knife into his breast. The Duchesse de Berri, it is true, gave birth, on September 29, 1820, to a son, the Comte de Chambord, known to the Legitimists as Henry V., but the despair that at first almost paralyzed Royalist counsels in France was unfortunately followed by violent political reaction, which forced even the wise government of Louis XVIII. into regrettable, if excusable, extremes. Heavy, indeed, was the loss, both personal as well as political, suffered by France, when the benevolent and honored Duc de Berri thus suffered a violent death.

The first regrettable symptom which appeared was

the unreasoning resentment of the bereaved parent, the Comte d'Artois, against the Decazes Ministry, which fell before the storm of indignation evoked by the Duc de Berri's murder, although it has never been suggested that Louvel had any accomplices even among the Bonapartes, whose cause he championed. The political mines, which may be said to have exploded after this sad event, had been planted two years before, when an attempted assassination of the Duke of Wellington coincided with a rumored plot to release Napoleon from St. Helena, and with conspiracies in Belgium, as well as the disturbances in Prussia already mentioned.

After Decazes' resignation, even the Duc de Richelieu, on resuming the reins of office, quailed before the tempest which had arisen, troops having to be called out in Paris to repress the demonstration of the populace, while Louis XVIII., evidently nearing his end, could no longer struggle with success against the Comte d'Artois, whose allies in the "Congregation" were at last masters of the situation. To Decazes France had owed the wise constitutional measures of 1817, which enlarged the electorate, and strengthened the Charter. After his fall no such sound policy would ever find support from the triumphant Clericalists led by the future Charles X.

Indeed, when approaching the fall of the Duc de Richelieu, which was a consequence of the reaction against those constitutional securities which had been the glory of the Restoration, one cannot but

lament the disappearance of that spirit of compromise which had rendered the period of five years since Napoleon's fall one of the most memorable for good government in French annals. The reign of Louis XVIII. had not quite ended, but the trend of events during the brief remnant of his natural life was to be in the hands of men who saw less deeply into the needs of their country, and had read its history to less practical purpose than those who ruled France between 1815 and 1820.

And just when the scene was thus shifting on the vast stage of French public affairs, a goodly band of actors in the great events of the first quarter of the nineteenth century passed in rapid succession from the scene.

On May 5, 1821, the caged Lion of Europe was released from the woes of captivity. Napoleon Bonaparte had, so to speak, dashed himself against the iron bars of his island prison-house for nearly six sad years, while England, who had been his chosen enemy, bore the obloquy which necessarily clung to the jailers of so great a man.

It is remarkable that the disease which killed him, a cancer in the abdomen, was that which destroyed his father's life at an early age. The deceased Conqueror of most parts of civilized Europe was himself but fifty-two years of age. *Sic transit gloria mundi.*

The Bonapartists in France were by no means extinct, but they held their party together at the

salons of sympathizers, ready to take advantage of the next turn of Fortune's wheel, and after Napoleon's death their watchword came to be the name of his son and heir, the Duc de Reichstadt, a youth of eleven, who, under his mother's care and the tuition of Madame de Montesquieu, was evincing remarkable promise. The fact that this young Prince was in Austrian keeping added tenfold to Prince Metternich's extraordinary authority and influence in Europe.

During the succeeding year, 1822, two notable figures passed from the scene in Prussia and England. Hardenberg had long given evidence of failing powers; but his career, taken as a whole, was of a character that enabled him to bestow great benefits on his country when she was staggering under a privileged land system, which precluded union between the various classes of the Prussian people. Assisting Stein to remove the ruder shackles which bound the serf to the soil and denied him a career elsewhere, Hardenberg himself put the finishing touch to those reforms which a commission of his own had been the first to recommend.

Like Stein, according to his opportunities, though perhaps with less unwavering persistency, did Hardenberg pursue the prize of German Unity, which slipped from his hands at Vienna in 1814-15.

The veteran Prussian Statesman's words, spoken when he knew that Alsace and Lorraine were to remain French, seem prophetic when read in the light



of memories fresh in some of our minds, ever to be recalled by the mention of Gravelotte, Sedan and 1870. "If we let it" (the opportunity of detaching Alsace and Lorraine) "slip, streams of blood will flow to attain this object, and the cry of the unhappy victims will call us to give an account of our conduct."

In England the firm hand of Lord Castlereagh, who before his death became known as Lord Londonderry, no longer grasped the helm of Foreign Affairs. Adjudged by no less a critic than the late Prince Bismarck to be the greatest figure amongst those followers of Mr. Pitt who guided British counsels, the deceased statesman had won his way under a regrettable partisan prejudice, now happily dead.

The instrument of his great master's intentions to create the Union between Great Britain and Ireland, which took effect in 1800, Lord Castlereagh was long the target for the diatribes of the dissatisfied Irish patriots; while the non-attainment, for Europe, in 1814-15, of the ideals of the lovers of liberty (which included an Italy concentrated under one flag and a Germany united and free) has led to the mistaken belief that the British Foreign Secretary was a reactionist first and a statesman afterwards. The best remedy for such a misapprehension is the careful study of Lord Castlereagh's correspondence during and after the Congress of Vienna.

Just before he died, in 1822, he left a memoran-

dum condemning the interference of Metternich and his Continental coadjutors with the internal politics of weaker nations, as evidenced by their conduct at Laybach, and declining to pledge his country to any such course without the concurrence of Parliament.

With regard to his guidance of the House of Commons, the second Earl of Harrowby, who had been under the enchanter's wand, told the present writer that his own experience in that great, historic, popular Chamber had ranged over the leaderships of Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, Lord Althorp, Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, Mr. Gladstone and Disraeli, and that for tactful management he gave the palm to the first of these. The more warmly we admire the talents and public services of Castlereagh, the more keenly must we regret that such a career should have been sullied by self-destruction, the result of an overwrought brain. Very soon did the great Foreign Minister follow George III. to the grave, that aged British Sovereign passing away in 1820.

During the last few years of his reign Louis XVIII. was much enfeebled by disease, and, as has been said, the tone of his government approximated more towards the autocratic ideas of his brother and successor, Charles X. When, on September 29, 1824, Louis le Désiré, that sapient ruler of France, passed away in presence of his nearest relations, men felt that there was an uncertainty as to the future they scarcely dared to name.

But these gaps in the mighty band of those who defended Europe's liberties, when most dangerously threatened, were not from the nature of the case so wide as that caused by the unexpected demise of Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, when that Monarch had been thwarted and embarrassed by the course of events in Greece. The professed friend of struggling nationalities, both in Poland and amongst the Christian inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, Alexander reprobated the form which the Greek Insurrection developed between 1821 and 1825. In the latter year he passed away at Taganrog in the Crimea, at a moment when the Russian people were loud in their discontent that the policy of active interference between Turkey and her Christian nationalities, adopted in 1821, had not been carried out when the Greek question became acute in 1825.

The last public appearance in Europe of Alexander, one of the greatest of Continental rulers in the nineteenth century, after Napoleon, occurred at the Congress of Verona in 1822, when, with Count Nesselrode, the Czar represented Russia, no other monarch being present. Amongst the chief topics discussed were the Eastern Question and the Greek Insurrection, and the assembled diplomatists, including Metternich, Chateaubriand, and the Duke of Wellington, agreed to extinguish Turkey's predominance in the Black Sea and establish general commercial rights therein for all nations; but as there was no general concurrence in the Russian claims put forward to a

general protection of the Christians under Turkish rule, as conferred by the Treaty of Kainardji in 1774, no concert of the Powers was arrived at which might serve to assuage the horrors then occurring in the island of Scio, and elsewhere in Greece, where, it is said, between 1820-26, 100,000 Christians suffered death, either by massacre at the sword's point, or from want and disease.

The jealousies of the Powers and the semi-encouragement of the Czar had spread this rebellion over such a wide area that it received support from enthusiasts, such as John, Count of Capo d'Istria, and George Gordon, Lord Byron. The former, a Greek Diplomatist in the service of Russia, was in the prime of life when—abandoning the bright career apparently before one chosen to be by the Czar's side both in the campaign of 1812 and at the Congress of Vienna—he gave his talents to the cause of securing freedom for Greece, and met a tragical end soon after the consummation of his hopes was attained, being assassinated during his Presidency of the Greek Government in 1831.

Lord Byron, on the other hand, infused a high tone into the aspirations of this young nation, when, prodigal of life, talents and estate, on behalf of Greece, he truly gave of his best, and not in vain; for although his life was cut short by fever at Missolonghi on April 19, 1824, at the early age of thirty-six, yet the chivalric intervention of England's most gifted poet of the nineteenth century

went far to accelerate that successful result, which the efforts of other great Englishmen were destined to secure.

I have named two prominent subjects of the British Crown, who contributed powerfully towards the attainment of Greek Independence. One was the Duke of Wellington, whose efforts must be recorded; but at least an equal share of this politic liberation was due to the eloquent and witty follower of Mr. Pitt, George Canning, whose death at the age of fifty-seven in 1827 sent such a shock throughout both the Old and New World. Towards the close of his varied career, he impressed upon those able to understand his aims and objects, and interpret his enthusiasm aright, that at last the hour had arrived when, in the words of Tennyson—

“The old order changeth, yielding place to new,”

propounding, in nervous and vigorous language, the principle laid down at Laybach by his great predecessor at the Foreign Office, Lord Castlereagh, that intervention by associated nations in the domestic affairs of independent countries could not be participated in by Great Britain, as being “inconsistent” with her “fundamental laws,” leading “to a system of continual interference, incompatible with European interests and the independence of nations.”

Thus was Portugal saved from becoming the scene of renewed conflict in 1826, when Charles X. and Chateaubriand were pushing their interference in the

Peninsula further than their means warranted them in attempting.

George Canning will be remembered as the Minister who in 1808-9, equally with Stein in Prussia, nerved Europe up to the requisite level of resolution to oppose Napoleon while his armies were being frittered away in Spain. Against the powerful opposition of the Greys and Grenvilles did Canning sustain the efforts of Sir John Moore and educate the British people into trusting Wellington.

That each of the South American Colonies owed its individual existence to Canning was made notorious when in his own phrase the New World was called in to redress the wrongs of the Old; and it was his patient and skilful diplomacy which brought about the Treaty of London in 1827, and in its train the creation of a Greek Kingdom. Almost at the same time he gained the Premiership of England—alas! held for such a brief time.

An event was approaching which, although really destined to influence rather an eddy in the stream of European existence than the great river itself, persuaded onlookers into the belief that those flood-gates were about to be opened again which had overwhelmed the Continent between 1789 and 1815, until—in Mr. Canning's eloquent words—"the subsidence of the deluge and the consequent reappearance of spires and pinnacles of ancient establishments towered once more above the waters."

Indeed, the French Revolution of 1830 appeared

to Prince Metternich and Frederick William III. of Prussia, and also to the Czar Nicholas I., likely to revive the scenes of bloodshed and desolation with which Europe had been too familiar at the above-named epoch.

The dreaded cataclysm did not strike France without due warning, nor even before the Government of Charles X. had begun to take measures of a preparatory character.

It has been shown how the predilections of the new King threw him into the hands of the "Congregation", from the dominance of which Louis XVIII. had striven in vain to be entirely free. The King's subjection to these Clerical and anti-Parliamentary influences did not become complete until there had been several changes made in the French Government, and constant attempts to alter the character of the representative assembly without infringing "the Charter" had only led to increased Liberal majorities in the lower Chamber. For a time the Government was entrusted to M. de Martignac, a popular and eloquent Conservative deputy; but when Charles X. found that the advice given by this sage counsellor was adverse to the desires of his advisers who hailed from the Congregation, he dismissed the constitutional minister and sent for the Comte de Polignac.

This belated adviser of the last legitimist sovereign who sat on the French throne had refused to swear to the Charter in 1814, and had been long notorious for his reactionary opinions. He speedily discour-

aged Martignac's proposal to give greater powers to local authorities, and employed Chateaubriand's talents in order to persuade France that a spirited Foreign Policy in support of Ferdinand's personal authority in Spain, and the sending of a contingent to the Morea, in order to save the Christian refugees therein from destruction, would atone for the denial of Parliamentary Government at home. Chateaubriand, let it be remembered, improved on this programme by inducing the French Government to plant their first Colony in Algeria, the forerunner of Colonial expansion in Africa.

Such a policy had merits as regards the last two heads of the programme, but the people of Paris were in no mood to look beyond the environs of their fair city ; and after a fresh dissolution had brought about another and larger Liberal majority, Charles X., at Polignac's instance, issued the three famous ordinances stopping freedom of the Press, dissolving a Chamber which had never met, and utterly changing its composition. This action of Polignac's was clearly contrary to the Charter of Louis XVIII., and, contrary to the general expectation of the Court, threw Paris into a state of revolution.

That this state of things could have been brought about without the intrigues of the Orleanists and the money of their instigator, the Banker Lafitte, the King himself was well aware ; but it is almost universally true that in these cases of popular revolt, caused by infringement of fundamental and consti-



tutional principles, the immediate motive power is often traceable to an insurgent spirit. The wealth and respectability of Louis Philippe, M. Lafitte and M. Casimir Périer would not have persuaded the people of France to accept their government if Charles X. had not been so constituted as to believe (in spite of all he had lived through) that Louis XVI. could have kept his throne by imprisoning Mirabeau and declining to summon the States General in 1789.

Three days' sanguinary fighting in the streets are commemorated by the well-known column of July, 1830, and on it stands recorded the fact that the Monarchy was overthrown.

Louis Philippe was entrusted by his cousin, the late King, with the guardianship of the young Duc de Bordeaux, son of the murdered Duc de Berri, and the legitimate heir on the abdication of his uncle, the Duc d'Angoulême; but the temptation was too strong when the title of King of the French was offered to this able son of Philippe Égalité.

But the bitter breach which ensued between Legitimists and Orleanists obscured the prospects of Monarchy in France for at least half a century. Charles X. went in solemn procession to the coast, on the way to his exile in Great Britain, unmolested, and even respected, by a people who had been accustomed to obey the behests of their rulers at Paris, and were probably not enthusiastic for any of the several claimants to the throne.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## WARS AND REVOLUTIONS AGAIN THREATEN EUROPE.

EARLY LIFE OF NICHOLAS I.—MILITARY INSURRECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG AT HIS ACCESSION.—REVIVAL OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.—BATTLE OF NAVARINO AND SUBSEQUENT CAMPAIGNS OF 1828-9.—GENERAL DIEBITSCH.—POLISH REBELLION QUELLED IN 1831.—THE TURKISH EMPIRE SAVED FROM MEHEMET ALI'S INVASION IN 1833 BY RUSSIA.—TREATY OF UNKIAR SKALESSI.—DEATHS OF STEIN, THE EMPEROR FRANCIS OF AUSTRIA, AND FREDERICK WILLIAM III. OF PRUSSIA.—BRIEF REIGN OF FERDINAND I. IN AUSTRIA.—VIENNESE REVOLT OF MARCH, 1848, FOLLOWED BY FLIGHT OF PRINCE METTERNICH.

IT is remarkable that so little should have been heard of Nicholas, the third son of Paul, during the reign of his brother Alexander I. Educated by his mother in seclusion with no prospect of ever occupying the throne, this future Emperor was only known in his own country as a soldier. He had nevertheless become familiar with most European languages and had a taste for music. In person, like his late brother, Alexander I., Nicholas was a man of remarkable dignity and commanding presence, being taller than his great predecessor.

After the Peace of 1814, the new Czar had travelled to the Courts of Vienna, St. James, and Berlin, and had become engaged at the last-named Capital to the Princess Charlotte, daughter of Frederick William III.—an alliance which powerfully affected the relations of the two nations down to the time of the Crimean War. Nicholas did not secure his sceptre without witnessing an *émeute* in St. Petersburg, which threatened to spread through the army, but was nipped in the bud by his own timely decision.

The Grand Duke Constantine had signed his abdication of the throne in favor of his younger brother some time before Alexander's death, and four copies of the document were in the hands of the Imperial Council when Nicholas hastened to take the oath of fidelity to the lawful heir.

Constantine, who was famous for having led a charge of the Russian Guards at Austerlitz and for faithful attention to military duties, evinced the utmost distaste for the responsibilities connected with the Czardom ; and from Warsaw, where he resided as Governor of the Polish Duchy, he repeated his determination to resign all personal claims and pay allegiance to Nicholas as Alexander's successor.

But three weeks' interval had occurred between the vacancy of the throne and the new Czar's acceptance of the Crown, which delay gave certain mysterious conspirators the opportunity they desired.

Refusing to accept the Crown without a personal assurance from Constantine as to the truth of his

abdication, Nicholas was at last proclaimed on the 24th of December, 1825.

Soon being apprised of the mine about to explode beneath his throne, the Russian Emperor resolved that the oath of allegiance should be taken individually and not in the mass, and drawing up the faithful household troops outside the Imperial Palace, confronted them with those who had received him with cries of "Constantine for ever." The Governor of St. Petersburg and the Metropolitan Archbishop besought the rebellious troops to give way without bloodshed, but in vain, for the artillery defending the Palace had to fire no less than ten rounds on these recalcitrant soldiers before they dispersed, leaving 700 of their number prisoners, many of them wounded. The Empress was present with her husband and witnessed this terrible scene, the reports of which not unnaturally impressed Europe profoundly.

"If Russia" (said Prince Metternich) "pays for a month's interregnum by the loss of several hundred men, she will have bought her experience cheaply." However, the Austrian Chancellor had even doubted the validity of Constantine's renunciation, four sealed copies of which existed. Metternich seems to have felt hostility to the new settlement, because Nicholas I. made no secret of his intention of taking up the Eastern Question. The Czar regarded the Greeks as rebels, but had to acquiesce in measures to bring about their incorporation as a kingdom, as otherwise, owing to the bloodshed and confusion which pre-

vailed, he would have forfeited the influence requisite to render a campaign against Turkey successful.

Unlike Alexander I., Nicholas possessed no illusions as to Polish independence, and no respect for the national principles proclaimed by the Greeks; but taking up the rôle of the Defender of Christians within the Ottoman dominions, which Catherine had won for Russia at Kainardji in 1774, he not only participated in the naval battle of Navarino, which destroyed the Turkish fleet on October 20, 1827, but afterwards forced Sultan Mahmoud to conclude the peace of Adrianople in 1829, and finally went very near to planting the cross on St. Sophia in Constantinople, when, after the revolt of Mehemet Ali in 1833, the Treaty of Unkiar Skalessi seemed at last to afford an opportunity of accomplishing the designs of Peter the Great, as set forth in his famous testamentary dispositions.

Although these events have their place more in a general European history than in a biographical notice of Nicholas I., two Muscovite Generals, successively pitted against the Turks, as well as Sultan Mahmoud and his rebellious vassal, Mehemet Ali, must be mentioned, while this involves passing attention to the condition of the Ottoman Empire after Navarino in 1827.

After the peace of 1791, Sultan Selim III., appalled at the dangers he had escaped when Joseph II. of Austria and Catherine the Great of Russia conspired together to compass Turkey's destruction in the years 1787-9, changed his dissolute habits

and displayed considerable talents, prudence and humanity. At a moment when it appeared as if the Ottoman Empire was about to dissolve through internal dissensions, Selim kept aloof from the quarrels of Europe so far as possible during the earlier French Revolutionary wars. Thus it came to pass that, by reorganizing his troops and husbanding his resources, the Sultan was enabled to send an army to the defence of Acre against Napoleon in the summer of 1799. In 1806, however, as has been previously narrated, the intrigues of Sebastiani prevailed upon the Turks to precipitate a war upon their late allies, the British and Russians. After Sir James Duckworth had forced the Dardanelles and the flower of the army had been despatched into Wallachia to meet the Russians, Selim's enemies in Constantinople seized the opportunity to imprison him and raise his nephew, Mustapha IV., to the throne. This rebellion was brought to a conclusion when the Pacha of Rustchuk, at the head of 40,000 Albanians, reached Constantinople—too late, indeed, to prevent the assassination of Selim by his baffled foes ; but the Pacha placed in the seat of the Caliphate the lawful heir, Mahmoud II., known in Ottoman story as “The Reformer.” This Sultan destroyed the Janissaries, the murderers of Selim. The standing army of Turkey was thus cut off to a man during 1826, Mahmoud himself both directing and witnessing this repulsive slaughter while standing within the railing of the Mosque of Sultan Achmet.

Daring and subtle to a degree, Mahmoud never believed that the combined fleets of England, France and Russia would really interfere with the landing of provisions for Ibrahim Pacha's army in the Morea, and so bring about the destruction of the Ottoman navy at Navarino, and when that "untoward event"—so styled by the Duke of Wellington—occurred, the Sultan's conduct became more and more inexorable towards the Greeks, while he hurled defiance at his traditional Muscovite enemy.

Nicholas I. was not the man to refuse to pick up the gauntlet, and so it came to pass that in the years 1828-9 occurred a contest which again threatened to submerge the Turkish Empire and kindle European strife as to the disposal of Constantinople, the prize for which Nicholas was undoubtedly striving.

Amongst the European Powers the greatest consternation prevailed, for at last it appeared to experienced statesmen, like Metternich and Chateaubriand (then inspiring the foreign policy of Prince Polignac and Charles X. in the last year of that monarch's reign), that the contingency so long dreaded had indeed arrived, without the nations concerned having concurred in any agreement regarding the partitioning of the dominions from which Mahmoud seemed about to be ejected. For was it possible to believe that the soldiers of 1812 and of Leipsic could fail to overcome, if not annihilate, Turkey, who had neither a fleet nor a regular army?

The General chosen to command the Russians in

the opening campaign was Count Wittgenstein, a veteran of 1812, who also led the late Czar's forces at Lutzen and Bautzen.

Nicholas I. had included his name amongst the Field Marshals in 1826, and his preparations for the invasion of European Turkey seemed likely to justify such promotion.

Having command of the sea, the Czar had no reason for giving unnecessary anxiety to Austria, and after passing through the Roumanian Principalities, Wittgenstein crossed the Danube on June 7, 1828, near where the mouths divide.

Scarcely 70,000 men had been collected on the Pruth, although all the resources of a great nation, which had done more than any other continental military power to reduce Napoleon's strength, had been contributed.

At first successful in reducing Ibraila and several coast towns, the Russians soon found that the sieges of Silistria, Shumla, and Varna would tax their energies to the uttermost.

Wittgenstein had been obliged to divide his scanty forces more than prudence enjoined, and as the larger part of the Turks were in an entrenched camp at Shumla, around that fortress was waged the critical struggle, which lasted until the second week in October; during this period the losses by disease were very severe, and the only prize of the campaign proved to be the capture of Varna. Europe looked on with amazement, and some of the Powers not with-



out satisfaction, as the baffled Muscovites withdrew to the Danube to wait until the spring of 1829. Nicholas, who had been present in the camp during 1828, wisely withdrew and took with him the aged Marshal Wittgenstein, entrusting his fortunes to a younger soldier who soon rose to fame, namely, General Diebitsch, a son of one of Frederick the Great's officers, who, at the Prussian hero's death, quitted that service for the army of Russia. The son, displaying a talent for organization in the campaigns of 1812-14, became Alexander's Quartermaster-General, having also rendered himself conspicuous by his bravery at Austerlitz, Eylau, Friedland and Dresden.

Diebitsch's generalship, during the campaign of 1829 in European Turkey, revealed a touch of genius, which lifted the Russian military operations completely out of the ordinary level of their national achievements. Obligated to mask Shumla with a considerable force, after making a timely descent on Reshid Pacha, the Grand Vizier, when that Commander least expected it, the Muscovite General defeated the flower of the Turkish army in open conflict, and pressing on across the Balkans, with the scanty force under his immediate command, reached Adrianople and struck terror into the Sultan and his advisers. Mahmoud never stopped to discover the precise strength of Diebitsch's legions, but hastened to come to terms, although it is certain that a determined and able foeman, like Mahmoud the Reformer, would never have consented to a humiliating peace,

such as that of Adrianople, had he been aware that he was dealing with a scant and exhausted army numbering only 20,000 men.

But Diebitsch had skilfully sent detachments into the Black Sea ports, which surrendered one after the other to the Russians, who had the support of their fleet on the coast.

Moreover, General Paskievitch, Commander of Nicholas' forces invading Asiatic Turkey, had captured both Kars and Erzeroum; accordingly overtures on behalf of peace were sent by the Sultan to the victorious Diebitsch.

Another revulsion of European feeling immediately took place. The high character of Diebitsch's tactics has been acknowledged by no less a critic than Moltke, present amongst the Staff; and in the universal appreciation of this newly-found Russian commander, the valuable services of Paskievitch in Asia seemed to have been temporarily obscured.

Metternich in Austria and Lord Aberdeen in England were apparently acting in combination to prevent Nicholas from advancing to Constantinople by conjuring up the menace of European opposition, so that the Russian Cabinet, quailing before the gathering storm which loomed ahead, proved exceedingly moderate in its hour of triumph. Russian influence at last became supreme in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; and the opening of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles to European commerce not only benefited all the nations whose ships

entered Russian or Turkish ports, but relieved the subjects of Nicholas by the removal of an unjustifiable disability which, shutting their trade from the sea, would soon have constituted a grievance of an intolerable character.

After the signature of the Treaty of Adrianople on September 14, 1829, it was impossible to contend that the geographical position of Russia on the Black Sea in any degree hindered her commercial prosperity.

Had Nicholas advanced to Constantinople in 1829 he would undoubtedly have found himself face to face with European opposition, although France, under Charles X., was prepared to agree to a partitioning of the Ottoman Empire which would deliver Constantinople over to the King of Holland, and Bosnia and Servia to Austria, while she herself took Belgium and the Palatinate—a plan wherein may be perceived the hand of Chateaubriand. This revival, however, of Napoleonic ideas was too fanciful and belated for practical adoption.

Nicholas was soon to be called on to deal with another trouble nearer home than the ever-recurring Eastern Question. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw, within the limits of which state an autonomy had been granted to the Russian Poles in 1814, threw off its allegiance because the National Diet or Parliament was suspended by the Czar. After vain attempts to negotiate with Nicholas, who was scarcely the man to condone the contemptuous disregard of his authority, the Diet declared the

House of Romanoff to have forfeited the Polish Crown. Diebitsch advanced with a powerful army, and drove the Poles into Warsaw; but his force sustained great losses and became subjected to a series of guerilla attacks, during which the cholera made its first appearance in this part of Europe and carried off, not only the gifted Diebitsch himself, but the Grand Duke Constantine, the Czar's elder brother.

In this dilemma, General Paskievitch, the victor of Kars and Erzeroum, stepped into the breach with conspicuous success.

Ivan Paskievitch had been known in youth as one of the cleverest of the Czar Paul's aides-de-camp, and his subsequent services were as varied as they were brilliant, comprising the Austerlitz campaign, the war of 1806 in the Principalities, several missions to Constantinople, the struggle for national defence in Russia during 1812, together with experiences both at Dresden and Leipsic in 1813; while his crowning honors were gained during 1829 in Asiatic Turkey. This wonderfully successful soldier not only completely overcame the recalcitrant Poles in 1831, so that after the capture of Warsaw on September 8th they were absorbed in the Russian Empire; but lived to command a victorious contingent which was sent in the summer of 1849 to subdue the Hungarian Revolt against the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph.

I have omitted from this remarkable record the war of 1826 between Russia and Persia, when Pas-

kievitch received a sword mounted in diamonds from the Czar to commemorate the victory of Elisavetpol. When this veteran had attained the age of 76 his Imperial master claimed his services during the Crimean War, and Paskievitch commanded the army of the Danube for a short time until, wounded before Silistria, he died in 1856.

But before the Russian arms had been carried to Hungary, or their armies placed again on the Danube, an appeal was made by the baffled Sultan Mahmoud to the Czar to save Constantinople from his triumphant vassal, Mehemet Ali, who had overthrown the Turkish forces at Konieh on December 21st, 1833, and had marched 100,000 men from Egypt to Scutari, an achievement which intensely impressed European statesmen, making them realize, since an Asiatic ruler on the Nile could conduct such a victorious advance, how manifold would be the perils to which the country of the Pharaohs must be exposed whenever France gained a footing in Syria, or Russia in Armenia.

Mehemet Ali was born in Roumania in 1769, the year which also saw both Wellington and Napoleon ushered into the world. Commencing life as a tobacconist, he soon volunteered into the Turkish army and raised a large body of men for Sultan Selim during the French invasion of Egypt, and afterwards, being placed in a position of importance there, himself seized the Pachalic and defied the Caliph, cutting himself off from Constantinople al-

together until the quarrel was compromised by payment of an annual tribute to the Imperial Treasury. Mehemet Ali, finding that no ruler of Egypt could be secure in his seat if the Mamelukes, or bodyguard, remained in their position about his person at Cairo, first offered them semi-independence in a distant portion of Egypt, and then, on their refusal, determined to destroy them altogether.

Having decoyed this jealous and proud soldiery into a toil, the relentless Pacha put them all to the sword, so that the Mamelukes were completely exterminated. Governing with great ability, even over the Soudanese provinces into Kordofan, Mehemet Ali despatched his adopted son Ibrahim into Arabia to subdue the Wahabees, who were threatening the Caliphate at the root of authority in Mecca and Medina, and after a sanguinary struggle defeated this wild tribe, so placing the Sultan under an extensive obligation.

Acting in hearty co-operation with Sultan Mahmoud during the Greek Rebellion, the Pacha of Egypt sent Ibrahim to the Morea and sacrificed his fleet at Navarino in the common cause of the Moslems. He nevertheless asserted a right to Syria in 1831, which the Suzerain Power at Constantinople could not but repudiate. Ibrahim, the Viceroy of Egypt's stepson, developed a considerable faculty for generalship, and it was by him that the triumphant campaign from the Nile to Scutari was conducted, not terminating until Constantinople, unde-

fended and helpless, seemed the prey to Mehemet's deep-laid schemes of aggression. But it was snatched from his grasp.

For at this juncture of affairs, having received simultaneous offers of assistance from France and Russia, Mahmoud accepted that of his traditional foe, and the Treaty of Unkiar Skalessi was signed in July, 1833, when both Muscovites and Turks were encamped together outside Constantinople.

By this diplomatic instrument, Turkey undertook to support Russia against all her enemies, and Nicholas gained such influence on the Bosphorus that his way seemed clear to establishing complete ascendancy there.

But the Treaty of Unkiar Skalessi, in making Turkey Russia's universal ally, rendered the Black Sea a haven whence Muscovite men-of-war could issue out into the Mediterranean by passing through the Dardanelles, while the ports and harbors of these two nations secured complete immunity from attack.

England and France deemed their joint interests threatened by this combination, and, receiving sympathetic assurances from other Powers, reserved to themselves the right to act as occasion might demand. Louis Philippe and Lord Palmerston undoubtedly improved their respective political positions by this decided policy of resistance to Muscovite aggression, and from this time may be dated the dread of those veiled schemes of aggrandizement emanating from St. Petersburg, which brought about the Crimean War.

During the year 1831 passed away the great German patriot, Stein, fearful of the return of another revolutionary epoch, which he expected when tidings of the abdication and flight of Charles X. reached Prussia. Stein did not live to see his own ideas prospering, and a united Germany had come to be considered a bright but unattainable ideal, except by a few sound thinkers whose faith never quailed before disappointments innumerable. Amongst the associates of Stein's last years was the restless author of the *Spirit of the Age*, Ernst Moritz Arndt, who was thenceforth deemed unsound and forbidden to teach in the Universities, a sentence which Frederick William III. did his best to soften without remitting, while Frederick William IV. acquitted the poet altogether.

These two friends could seek no more apt motto than Arndt's own patriotic lines, which lose seriously by translation into English:—

“ What is the German Fatherland?  
 Where shall I find this mighty land?  
 Where'er is heard the German tongue,  
 And German hymns to God are sung,  
     There is the land;  
 That, German, name thy Fatherland.

“ To us this glorious land is given.  
 O Lord of Hosts, look down from Heaven  
 And grant us German loyalty  
 To love our country faithfully,  
     To love our land,  
 Our undivided Fatherland.”



Stein died at the end of June, 1831; and a little below Stein Castle in the valley of the Lahn may be seen one of the national monuments of Germany, the statue of her most prominent land reformer, who was also unsurpassed for disinterested patriotism in the region of politics. Great changes were destined to pass over Prussia and the rest of Germany in the next few years without apparently advancing the hopes of those who believed Unity in the Teutonic Fatherland to be both possible and probable; on the contrary, during the bitter conflicts of 1848, those aspirations seemed doomed to suffer entire subordination to the fancy of the hour, if not indeed complete obliteration in the distressful, internecine conflicts which ensued. Owing to the noble work which the late Professor Seeley accomplished, the life and times of Heinrich Karl von Stein are known to the English-speaking races, and his hand is stretched out over intervening ages to grasp those of Bismarck and William, first Emperor of Germany.

Various were the portents that told of the approaching conclusion of Prince Metternich's autocracy at Vienna, as well as of the decline of his system throughout Europe—successful as he had been hitherto in shielding Austria from war and in excluding her patchwork nationalities from constitutional expression. The deaths of the Emperor Francis in 1835 and of Frederick William III. of Prussia in 1840 placed a new aspect on the face of the Old World in its most important centres. In

vain did the dead Kaiser in his will beseech the weakling successor, Ferdinand, "Decide no question relating to public affairs or persons without first hearing what he (Metternich) has to say;" but the times were getting out of their conservative groove so gradually and imperceptibly that men lazily threw all blame for the cataclysms of 1848, which occurred in Vienna, Berlin, Saxony, and Milan, upon the great and striking initial outbreak known as the French Revolution of 1848, without waiting to ask what connection there could be between movements possessing some common symptoms but often prompted by causes totally dissimilar.

The policy of Metternich has been identified with that of his master, the Emperor Francis, a good but narrow ruler, who displayed great courage under misfortunes, such as those of 1805 and 1809, not allowing the disaster of Austerlitz or the disappointment of Wagram to blind him to the needs of enshackled Europe.

It has been urged against the character of his rule that he wanted not "learned" but "good subjects," and that he descended to the level of a clerk by attending to minute details of government. The Emperor's perusal of police reports, and his thorough information as to the details of all manner of business, probably constituted the unobtrusive source of authority which was not challenged throughout his long and famous reign.

The last occupant of the throne of the Holy Roman

Empire, Francis, descended from that ancient throne to become Austria's first Emperor, and in that capacity did eminent service in rescuing Europe from military bondage.

In Austria, after his death, the various nationalities composing the Empire began to seethe with suppressed excitement: Italians, Germans, Hungarians, Bohemians, Poles, Croatsians, and Servians still flaunting their differences, but agreeing in a desire to be rid of Prince Metternich's masterful hand.

The Emperor Ferdinand being subject to incapacitating attacks of illness could not give his Chancellor the undeviating support he needed, and latterly nearly all the Archdukes, a number of the aristocracy, and many of the manufacturing employers of labor in and around Vienna, seemed to believe that the tranquillity and security of Austria demanded a change. Metternich attributed the riots and disturbances to foreign intrigue; but at last, when on March 13, 1848, a demonstration of Viennese students, which was accompanied by fierce street fighting in the city, brought matters to a crisis, the great statesman yielded and left the center of that power, which he then abandoned officially for ever. After the Revolution Prince Metternich spent part of his exile in England.

Events have proved the impossibility of reconciling by constitutional methods the conflicting national temperaments comprised within the Austrian Empire; and nothing is more certain than that, had the

floodgates of parliamentary wisdom been unloosed too soon after Napoleon went into exile, the prospects of the Dual Monarchy, guided so wisely by the present Emperor Francis Joseph, would be more shattered by internal discord, and darker even than at the present time, when the constitutional system, tried and found wanting, seems to languish as though with the approach of dissolution. Altogether it is safe to say that, during an epoch when the necessities of nations demanded the urgent efforts of giant minds, few stronger intellects were forthcoming to perform the mammoth tasks allotted to them than that of Clement, Prince de Metternich, the famous President of the Congress of Vienna.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 AND THEIR RESULTS (1).

THE ORLEANS RÉGIME IN FRANCE.—DIFFICULT POSITION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE.—BONAPARTIST ADHERENCE TO THE DUC DE REICHSTADT UNTIL HIS DEATH IN 1832.—THE ORLEANIST MINISTERS, LAFITE, CASIMIR PÉRIER, MARSHAL MORTIER, DE RIGNY, MOLÉ AND THIERS.—NAPOLEON'S REMAINS BROUGHT TO PARIS FROM ST. HELENA.—THIERS SUCCEEDED BY GUIZOT AFTER VARIOUS POLITICAL COMBINATIONS.—ATTEMPTS OF LOUIS BONAPARTE TO GAIN THE FRENCH THRONE.—HIS IMPRISONMENT AT HAM.—DEATH OF THE POPULAR DUKE OF ORLEANS FROM A CARRIAGE ACCIDENT.—SOCIALISTIC RISINGS IN PARIS ISSUE IN APPARENT CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION.—TUMULTS IN PARIS, AND FLIGHT OF THE KING AND HIS FAMILY.

THE neglect of Talleyrand by the Government of Charles X. was one of the causes which combined to create an Orleanist opposition in France. From his seat in the House of Peers, the aged diplomatist kept up a steady opposition to the reactionary measures of Polignac; and when the days of July, 1830, had resulted in the departure of the legitimate Sovereign to a residence in Great Britain, the post of French Ambassador at the Court of St. James was given by Louis Philippe to Talleyrand,

then seventy-six years of age. The acceptance of this position by so famous a statesman undoubtedly conferred prestige upon the new dynasty.

Had not the so-called King of the French been supported in his assumption of the monarchical dignity by men of the type of Talleyrand, Thiers, Guizot, Casimir Périer, Lafitte, the Duc de Broglie, and by most of the cultured politicians in Paris of moderate Liberal opinions, the designs of the veteran M. de Lafayette to revive the Republic would in all probability have proved successful. Indeed, the younger and more devoted adherents of that form of Government had taken up their quarters at the Hôtel de Ville, and there were ominous signs which pointed to the belief that the *ouvriers* of Paris had been lashed into a state of political unrest by the severe struggle, accompanied by bloodshed, which the column of July, 1830, commemorates; so that the cause of Monarchy might have passed into at least temporary oblivion at this moment, and with the good-will of most Frenchmen, but for the action of the above-named band of accomplished politicians, amongst whom M. Thiers made himself prominent as an active advocate of the establishment of the Orleanist Monarchy.

Indeed, he rushed off to Neuilly, the Duke of Orleans' home, directly the Revolution of 1830 was accomplished; and although it is said the Duchess Marie Amélie declined to sanction any project connected with her husband's elevation to the purple in

his absence, and considered the family debt of gratitude to Charles X. as being an effectual bar to supplanting that unfortunate Monarch, or ignoring the undoubted legal claims of the little Duc de Bordeaux, yet Louis Philippe's sister, Madame Adelaide being made of more ambitious stuff than her sister-in-law, seems to have given M. Thiers more encouragement to believe that the Duke of Orleans would accept the throne.

Upon this much debated question, as to whether the right course for Louis Philippe was to accept the Captain-Generalship of France and with it the guardianship of the Duc de Bordeaux as heir to the throne (as Charles X. wished), or to elude the rising Republican furore by placing himself at its head as Citizen King, it is doubtful if the last word has even to-day been said. Louis Philippe himself contended, in a famous interview with Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, recounted in Prince Metternich's Memoirs, that there was absolutely no choice between acceptance of the crown on popular terms, or a turbulent Republic; and that he would have been powerless to protect the young Prince's interests.

"It was as little in my power to have the Duke of Bordeaux recognized as to arrest the course of yonder sun," form the exact words of Louis Philippe, spoken on this occasion at Neuilly on May 23d, 1834.

The King went on to urge that, had he hesitated, a Republic, accompanied by "immediate Foreign

War," would have been the only possible alternative to an Orleanist Monarchy on popular lines. The Belgian Revolution must then have occurred "much sooner, and the entry of a French army into that country" have proved its natural concomitant. I have cited this defence, which Louis Philippe thought it worth while to make, because all the facts should be before the reader who is to form a judgment upon the breach between two parties of the French Monarchists, which never was healed, even in name, until shortly before the Comte de Chambord's death on August 24th, 1883.

Doubtless the Duke of Orleans was in a very difficult position towards the close of Charles the Tenth's reign, and if the perplexities encountered were in some degree inherited from his father and partly created by his own ambition, they were nevertheless real.

Those who have followed the narrative told in this book, how the Revolution of 1789 was dealt with by the Royal Family of France, must have been struck by the utter impracticability of the conduct of the Comte d'Artois, who again and again injured the prospects of the exiled Bourbons by his lack of discretionary moderation.

At the Restoration, unlike his brother, Louis XVIII., he had learnt but little by the family misfortunes; and when he ascended the throne, after sundry vacillations which exasperated instead of conciliating constitutional supporters of the Monarchy,



he relapsed into what his able successor termed "a feebly offensive attitude," such as rendered the name of Polignac, his minister, synonymous with all that is antagonistic to Representative Government.

To counteract the Restoration implied a practical repeal of the charter granted by Louis XVIII., and Louis Philippe, as King of the French, was given the opportunity of enthusiastically rallying around his person all those middle-class adherents who had acquiesced in the return of forms and signals of ancient monarchical custom and tradition, but were ready in 1830 to sacrifice much of these in return for the substance of freedom from Republican disturbances and probable immunity from war.

The sentiment for the courtly and high-minded exiles, Charles X., the Duc de Bordeaux and the aged Duc and Duchesse d'Angoulême, was for the next half-century not unlike that entertained by many in this country, at least until the Cardinal of York died in 1807, for those Royal Stuarts, whose romantic woes were caused by their vain attempts to regain their ancestral kingdoms. Louis Philippe was fifty-seven years of age when he came to the throne, and all his powers of tact and resolution were immediately needed to ward off war and stave off a Republican Revolution.

To effect this, the White flag had to give way to the Tricolor; and a veneer of popular sympathy, often natural in its effusiveness, was made to cover each action of the Government in Paris.

As a consequence, the National Guard adhered stoutly to their Citizen Ruler during the earlier years of his reign, when many of the working classes, who had been concerned in the days of July, 1830, favored the various popular movements of a revolutionary character which threatened the capital. Strong also in Louis Philippe's support were the middle class, the shopkeepers, the ranks of officialism, and the French Whigs, if I may be allowed the term, who thought they were about to give the blessings of the British Constitution to the wild democracy that had beheaded their King and Queen amidst sanguinary scenes of horror quite unrivalled in the last decade of the eighteenth century, and had for some time under Napoleon acquiesced in a militarism which brought terror to Europe at the commencement of another epoch of one hundred years.

And stranger still, all this was to be effected by means of a Legislature elected by a Constituency, which at one time only totalled 200,000 voters all over France. This was styled by the Orleanists "le juste milieu," and the problem to be solved was, how to keep the disenfranchised workmen contented while the country was governed exclusively by the better class of merchants, tradesmen, and well-to-do owners of the soil.

It was not long before Louis Philippe's courage and resolution were put to the test; and the skill and determination which he evinced in detecting and suppressing the various conspiracies gave the Govern-

ment an enhanced prestige in the eyes of the world. Indeed, if no other virtue be assigned to the calculating and not too romantic King of the French, it is but bare justice to give him credit for remarkable bravery.

After Fieschi's attempt to kill the King at Paris on July 28th, 1835, by means of an infernal machine, which he had invented, there occurred a lull in these reprehensible proceedings. The King had escaped unhurt, but fourteen people, including Marshal Mortier, were killed by the explosion, and a cry for strong and indeed stringent measures of repression came to be generally made throughout France.

In Foreign Policy, Louis Philippe was fortunate at the outset in securing the good-will of England, acting with her Minister, Lord Palmerston, in the Belgian question.

The Congress of Vienna had united two quite dissimilar people under one sceptre, when they placed the Belgians under Dutch rule, and a popular rising brought matters to an issue.

The people of Holland showed their accustomed determination and carelessness of life, when national honor was concerned; but even qualities of this noble description failed to mix oil and water.

Men of the type of Louis Philippe and his future son-in-law, Leopold I., who by the new Settlement became King of the young State of Belgium, were just the men to deal with such susceptibilities as these and, in the case of the latter Sovereign, to do all

that was possible to soften asperities such as sometimes threatened to issue in a European war.

Leopold, King of the Belgians, that sage statesman, born in 1790, owed a military education in Russia to being driven out of Saxe-Coburg by the French after Jena in 1806, and was a favorite at the Court of the Czar Alexander I. This brought about his meeting with the Princess Charlotte of England in 1814, when the Allied Sovereigns visited Great Britain. He married her in 1816, but became a widower in the following year. In 1832, a year after the establishment of the kingdom of Belgium, he married the Princess Louise, eldest daughter of Louis Philippe. He was consulted by the English Royal Family on great affairs of state until his death in 1865. Leopold's sister, Victoria, had married the Duke of Kent, and their daughter became Queen Victoria, Empress of India.

If Louis Philippe had not exercised great discretion, the necessity he was under, owing to overwhelming national pressure in France, of sending an army to the Siege of Antwerp, might easily have resulted in a fresh European conflict in the Netherlands. Russia, Prussia and Austria differed from England and France as to the advisability of bringing any force to bear on the Dutch, and when Louis Philippe's army crossed the frontier, any indiscretion on the part of his troops, who had actually to cross the field of Waterloo, might easily have caused a general war.

Nothing more is recorded, however, than the mutilation of the Belgian Lion's tail on the Mound overlooking the battle-field of June 18th, 1815; and France and England, having become jointly responsible for the creation of the new Kingdom of Belgium, were drawn together by a common purpose.

It is fair in this biographical notice of Louis Philippe to say that he did guide into peaceful paths the tempestuous feelings of those of his subjects who wanted to annex Belgium, although, like every other head of a possible Government at Paris, he was necessarily swayed at times by the ebullitions of a national sentiment, which claimed for France the prerogative of Europe in settling disputes. The Alliance between England and France prevented Russia from profiting by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skalessi and occupying Constantinople, as related in the last chapter; and although the two Powers were destined to part company in 1840 over the question of Mehemet Ali's claims to Syria, which M. Thiers supported and Lord Palmerston persuaded Russia, Prussia and Austria to deny, the general sentiment on both sides of the Channel contributed much to restore friendly relations between those two old antagonists, who united could defy the world, but whose recurrent rivalries remain the regret of thinking men to this day.

Louis Philippe, on the other hand, was confronted with the frigid disapproval of the Czar, who had acted cordially with Charles X. and deplored his

abdication. Metternich, in whose wake the King of Prussia still followed, had resolved during 1831 to intervene in Italy to nip an incipient revolutionary movement in the bud, and ignored a hint given to him by Louis Philippe and Lafitte, the first Orleanist Premier, that France would regard occupation of the States of the Church with hostile eye.

Treating the French protest with contempt, the Austrian Chancellor sent troops to suppress, as they speedily did, the Roman revolt in March, 1831; and this aggressive action was accompanied by a hint, that should France make any counter military move, the Duc de Reichstadt, who was now approaching the age of manhood, should be conducted towards Paris, where Louis Philippe's throne would not be much safer than that of Louis XVIII. after Napoleon's return from Elba, so great was the interest generally felt and devotion evinced, beyond mere Bonapartist circles in France, for this remarkable youth, the bearer of so great a name.

Dr. Bright, the celebrated British physician, has left an interesting reminiscence of the little King of Rome and his mother, the ex-Empress Marie Louise, at Schönbrunn during the Congress of Vienna in 1814. The unfortunate Empress seems to have impressed Dr. Bright, who speaks of her respectfully and admiringly, while he found Napoleon's son, in miniature hussar uniform, playing with a toy kitchen, which so completely absorbed the child that he would give none but the curtest, though "arch and bashful," replies.

Dr. Bright writes, "He was the sweetest child I ever beheld, his complexion light, with fine, white, silky hair falling in curls on his neck."

Unfortunately for the Bonapartes, this attractive boy had a weak constitution, and a rapid decline carried him off in 1832, when just of age. Greatly beloved by all who knew him, and possessing all the enthusiasm and passion of youth in strong force, there can be little doubt, according to his biographer, M. de Montbel, that the Duc de Reichstadt must have played a great part in French history, whenever it suited the Austrian policy to unchain the young Eagle. The delight with which he spoke to Marmont, his late father's aide-de-camp, of France and her glories is very interesting. Caring deeply for anything connected with his father's greatness, he seems to have probed the characters of those around him in a manner quite unusual for a youth of such tender years.

It can be imagined what a power the custody of Napoleon's son gave to Metternich in his diplomatic dealings with Louis Philippe, who fearing that Lafitte would rush into war with Austria over the intervention of that Power in Italy, kept back the despatch from his Prime Minister: the latter resigned in indignation, vowing that he lamented his part in placing the Orleanist family on the throne.

Lafitte had risen from the position of banker's clerk to be Governor of the Bank of France, and

was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. His extreme liberal views secured him a passing popularity when Charles X. seemed bent on infringing the Charter, and he seems to have persuaded influential waverers to support Louis Philippe. "Behold the best of Republics," said Lafitte, when he indicated the son of Philippe Égalité by the popular name of "Citizen King."

But the next counsellor of the King was one of a higher calibre, in the person of Casimir Périer. This Minister had been a soldier, and had served through the Italian Campaigns of 1799 and 1800 with credit; but inheriting a commercial connection, he entered a flourishing financial house. Like Lafitte, he strongly reprobated the attempts of Polignac to govern contrary to the Charter of Louis XVIII.

He was a man of a different calibre to his predecessor, memorable as a distinguished debater in the Chamber, of which he was elected President. His death in harness as Louis Philippe's Prime Minister in May, 1832, of that fell scourge, cholera, caused great grief in France, where conspicuous talents and patriotism combined have perpetuated his memory.

From November, 1834, Marshal Mortier presided over the Government. His Ministry was the first to include both Thiers and Guizot; M. de Rigny was his Foreign Minister.

Marshal Mortier had as successor the cultured Duc de Broglie, one of the few French aristocrats of ability who adhered to the Orleanist principles in



1830, and did not hide their talents in the Faubourg St. Germain.

The Broglie Cabinet contained men of great mark, including Thiers and Guizot, with Molé as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thiers separated from the Broglie combination after a year's co-operation, and then began the long struggle for office between himself and Guizot.

Thiers became Prime Minister on February 16th, 1836, but in six months the Government broke up over the Spanish Question.

It is interesting to note that the French landed their sailors, when campaigning earlier in the century, just as the British and Americans do at the present day: the Comte de Rigny, Marshal Mortier's Foreign Minister, had served in the "Imperial Marine Contingent" both at Jena and Wagram, before he commanded the French fleet at Navarino. Truly an almost unique career, rivalled only by the Spanish General Alava, who was both at Trafalgar and Waterloo, remaining near the Duke of Wellington throughout the latter action.

It must be allowed, however, that this is no argument for indiscriminate landing of sailors for military operations when they are needed to work their own ships; because at the time of Jena and of Wagram the French marine had little occupation out of port. There was no naval contingent at Austerlitz, the struggle for supremacy on the sea being decided almost simultaneously.

Louis Philippe's next Premier was the well-known and much honored M. Molé, a faithful servant of France, whose father had fallen a victim during the Reign of Terror, the son becoming an exile in Switzerland and England; but he returned to Paris under the Consulate, and subsequently attracted Napoleon by articles which expressed opinions of an absolutist character.

From this time Molé was promoted successively to various official positions under the Empire, and was given the title of Count. When Napoleon left Fontainebleau for Elba, he entrusted the ex-Empress Marie Louise and the King of Rome to Molé's care. So universal was the trust felt in this noble public servant, that he was made a Peer at the Restoration, and occupied the post of Minister of Marine under the Duc de Richelieu's administration, which he left when the influence of "the Congregation" brought reactionary tendencies to the fore just before Louis XVIII. died.

But although it has been demonstrated in these brief biographies how powerfully Louis Philippe was supported by the best class of educated Frenchmen, yet the Parliamentary success achieved was undoubtedly owing to the two intellectual giants, Thiers and Guizot.

Whether as a historian, a journalist or a Minister, the former shone pre-eminently by reason of the inexhaustible energy which enabled him to practise his talents on each available field of action. That he brought with him into the Cabinet literary pre-

possessions in favor of the Imperial Chauvinism favored by votaries of the Great Napoleon, and incidentally rekindled warlike passions by bringing the remains of the dead Emperor from St. Helena to the Invalides during 1840, is only to say that by such action he interpreted the wishes of a majority of his countrymen.

That he desired to preserve a Monarchical and Constitutional Government, while retaining such memories in the minds of the Parisians, implies, however, a blindness to the effect produced on a nation so impulsive as the French by confronting them with the one great name in their later history. It is strange to read in Sir Archibald Alison's History how the Funeral Procession of Napoleon to the Invalides united the days of the Continental Wars with those of the Orleanist Monarchy, when gray-headed veterans once belonging to the Imperial Guard were followed by a horse that the Great Emperor himself had once ridden in the field. The solemnity of the scene, so impressive in its silent grandeur, was calculated to affect powerfully even a less impressionable people than those amongst whom the Conqueror of Italy and Germany desired to rest. And a watchful Pretender was at hand, ready to take any advantage which might be presented, in the person of Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the only surviving son of Louis Bonaparte, the King of Holland, Napoleon's brother, by his Queen Hortense, the daughter of the Empress Josephine.

First in the succession (after the death of his brothers and the Duc de Reichstadt) in the eyes of those who believed the captive of St. Helena to have founded a dynasty, Louis Napoleon had already, during 1838, tried the allegiance of the Strasburg soldiery and found it lacking, at the sudden appeal of an unknown adventurer.

The Orleanist Government gladly paid the passage of this despised Pretender to America, apparently not realizing that he would inevitably return to some spot on the Continent—as he did, believing that amidst the mountains of Switzerland he was safe from his enemies.

Driven, however, from his haven in Switzerland at Louis Philippe's demand, the young Louis continued to scheme for the restoration of his family, following up his previous effort at Strasburg by one of a more elaborate character, which failed, off Boulogne on August 6, 1840. Sent to the fortress of Ham, Prince Louis Napoleon had as prison-companion General Montholon, who had likewise accompanied the ex-Emperor to St. Helena.

Count Orsi in his *Recollections* attributes the failure of the Boulogne venture to an untoward delay in London, and tells the story of the capture of the steamer *Edinburgh Castle*, together with the famous eagle bought at Gravesend and tied to the bottom of the mast during the voyage.

It is said that Louis Napoleon, being a fatalist, had a confidence in his own powers which could not

easily be shaken. He and his elder brother, Prince Napoleon Louis, had been concerned in an agitation against Austrian Rule in Italy as far back as 1831, both of them having joined the secret society of the Carbonari.

Napoleon Louis was cut off by death a brief time before the Duc de Reichstadt; he does not seem to have been by any means lacking in the family talents.

After Thiers was isolated by the Quadruple treaty of Lord Palmerston in 1840, dealing with Syria and Mehemet Ali's attempt to absorb that province of the Turkish Empire, Louis Philippe called on his great rival, M. Guizot, to become Foreign Secretary.

Born at Nîmes in 1787, this extraordinary personage, historian and politician was sprung from Huguenot stock; his father had perished in the French Revolution on the scaffold. A Protestant by birth and conviction, Guizot was led in after years to make a study of the British Constitution, which influenced the character of his writings. Indeed his studies of English Historical Epochs have held their own in this country, being translated and much read. Brought up in the Classical school as well as with a knowledge of English, German and Italian, the young student after entering the lists as a lawyer gave himself up to a literary life.

M. Guizot was a faithful supporter of the Royalists both before and during the Restoration, but when the murder of the Duc de Berri led to a reactionary

policy by the extreme monarchists, he desisted from taking active part in public affairs and devoted himself to literary work. But the matter of his political pamphlets was reprobated by M. de Villèle in 1825, and this opposition led to Guizot joining a political society bearing the title, "Aide-toi, le Ciel t'aidera," the idea being that given freedom of election, "Heaven helps those that help themselves."

M. Guizot's opposition to the Count de Polignac's fatal policy previous to 1830 did much to secure its defeat.

A brilliant conversationalist, M. Guizot was familiar with many men of letters and politicians of all shades in London, whither he came as Ambassador after 1837 for a brief period. In the autumn of 1840 the direction of Foreign Affairs in France was given him in the Ministry of Marshal Soult. Unfortunately this period is associated with Guizot's great error, the moral consequences of which injured both the Minister and his master, Louis Philippe, in that public opinion of France and Europe which had hitherto favored the Orleanist régime so remarkably.

Ferdinand VII. induced the Spanish Cortes to repeal the Salic law, current in Spain since 1700, in favor of his daughter Isabella, so excluding his brother Charles, known as Don Carlos. Guizot and Louis Philippe resolved to marry the heiress to the Spanish throne to her cousin, Francisco de Bourbon, while the Duc de Montpensier, the French King's

son, was intended to marry Isabella's sister Fernanda, next in the succession to that Princess.

After various diplomatic shifts and subterfuges, Guizot allowed this scheme to go forward when it was believed that Isabella's husband was not her choice and was "physically unfitted," according to Fyffe, for the position of King Consort.

The whole intrigue was so demoralizing and unworthy of the thoughtful Christian statesman that it has received general reprobation, and the account of these proceedings in Sir Theodore Martin's first volume of the late Prince Consort's Life will thoroughly bear out this opinion. But if Guizot's abortive attempt to carry out Louis the Fourteenth's idea of abolishing the Pyrenees destroyed his reputation as a Foreign Minister, so did a kindred obstinacy in the matter of Parliamentary Reform lead to his political fall. But before demonstrating how Guizot and Louis Philippe reached an untimely resolution of no surrender to those who asked but for a moderate constitutional extension of the franchise, I must sum up the position of the Dynasty anterior to its fall.

To the eye of ordinary observers the popularity of Louis Philippe had not waned, at least amongst the educated and middle classes, notwithstanding the clever and bitter pamphleteering of Chateaubriand, who never ceased to remind France, even after Charles X.'s death at the age of 80 (at Goritz in Austria, on November 4th, 1837), that to this exiled

and comparatively poor Monarch his prosperous successor owed lands and riches, as well as the family position which enabled him to pose in 1830 as a "Royal" Prince. So injurious were Chateaubriand's bitter and eloquent philippics deemed, that for a time the inexorable but brilliant penman was placed in confinement, from which he was released to go finally into retirement. Chateaubriand thus silenced, Prince Napoleon Louis, Hortense's second son, possessing personal attractions far beyond his brothers (according to Count Orsi), dead, and the surviving Napoleonic Pretender, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, safe under lock and key at Ham, there could be little immediate anxiety for a Royal Succession to which the heir was the Duke of Orleans, elder son of Louis Philippe, even though the personal hostility of the Emperor Nicholas remained so virulent that he recalled Count Pahlen in 1844 from Paris, lest, as Senior Ambassador, he should be called on to congratulate the King of the French on his birthday.

That the Duke of Orleans was a worthy representative of his family is proved by M. Guizot's recollections of him. Young, ardent and patriotic, his sudden end caused unfeigned sorrow even amongst those who were not adherents of the Citizen King; and it was indeed a sad message that flashed over the boulevards of Paris on July 13th, 1842, telling how the Duke of Orleans had been killed in a carriage accident near the Porte Maillot,



because the horses had bolted and the Prince had caught his foot in a rug when endeavoring to leap from the vehicle.

In a small auberge just beyond the old fortifications, with which Vauban had encircled Paris, lay the heir of so many hopes, stricken, as the medical men recognized at once, beyond the reach of human aid. He, who in his youthful and soldierly impulsiveness had longed to distinguish himself in the field (we read in Guizot's *Memoirs of a Minister* that he wished to fall on the Rhine rather than as a victim of Revolutionary discord in Paris), seems to have possessed just those qualities which would have rendered him a popular Ruler of France.

Agitation for a reform of the French Electorate had commenced when Guizot took office in 1840, but Louis Philippe resisted it inexorably, because he believed that a continuance of his peaceful policy would have been impossible; but a skilful propaganda, on the lines of O'Connell's Irish methods, was conducted all through France directly it was found that all protests were scorned in the Chamber by the all-powerful Guizot.

But no impression of any importance would have been made on the Government had not the Constitutional agitation been accompanied by a revival of Socialism amongst the workmen of France. By this time, indeed, the teachings of Fourier had sunk deep into the minds of many who earned their bread by daily toil.

So early as 1808 he had commenced publishing treatises on the evils which afflicted Society and the possible remedies; his "pill for the earthquake" consisting of an attempt to bring about better distribution of labor and the profits of it by means of social organization.

This movement seems to have been a shadowy forerunner of the Social Democracy of our own day, and would probably have proved merely an ephemeral catchword, but for the practical shape in which Louis Blanc presented the theory involved.

The working-classes were told by this plausible prophet that it was the duty of the State to provide labor or find food for the unemployed, who were thenceforth to claim their own considerable share in the profits of the capitalists. Indeed so deeply had this doctrine infected the masses that a new force had to be reckoned with in times of popular excitement.

That the Socialist Workmen did not care for the holding or withholding of State Reform Banquets is probably true; but nevertheless the unwise conduct of Louis Philippe and his Minister, in forbidding such opportunities for the open expression of Liberal opinions on electoral matters, gave their leaders the very opportunity for which they were seeking.

On February 23d, 1848, in the presence of barricades and of large masses of discontented Parisians, and finding himself confronted with an unexpected defection of the National Guard, Louis Philippe

agreed to sacrifice Guizot and to accept his resignation.

It was thought that thereby the crisis had been allayed and a more popular scheme of voting secured to the people, who straightway fraternized in the street with the Army and the National Guard.

Unfortunately, however, the Revolutionary Chiefs insisted on the defenders of barricades maintaining their positions. Then, by accident or, as some will have it, design, a deplorable conflict commenced in the streets on the evening of February 23d, which became acute the next day, when a collision between the rioters and the Army brought matters to a crisis.

On this occasion 80 persons were killed and wounded, and the working-class leaders paraded the dead through Paris by torchlight amidst sounding of the tocsin and Revolutionary cries which urged the people to arms.

The next morning, that of February 24th, the masses marched on the Tuileries, whence, in consequence of Guizot's retirement, nearly all the troops had been withdrawn; and although those soldiers who remained fought bravely, the mob surged on towards the Royal Palace, which Louis Philippe deserted before their arrival, after abdicating in favor of the Comte de Paris.

The King had ridden out amongst the National Guard, and finding them indifferent, gave way before the strain which the last few days had imposed upon a ruler who, whatever else may be said of him,

governed France peacefully for a prosperous and on the whole contented eighteen years.

The Paris mob wrecked the Tuileries, and the Duchess of Orleans' brave attempt to save her child's heritage met with no greater success than that of the Legitimists to retain a crown for the Duc de Bordeaux in 1830. It was not an easy thing to brave the fury of a hostile crowd in order to ask from the Chamber a recognition of the Comte de Paris as heir to the throne.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 AND THEIR RESULTS (2).

FREDERICK WILLIAM IV. AND THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA AT BERLIN.—BISMARCK ENTERS PUBLIC LIFE IN 1847.—RIOTS IN BERLIN.—THE KING YIELDS TO THE REVOLUTIONISTS.—FLIGHT OF THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA TO ENGLAND.—REFUSAL OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV. TO ACCEPT THE CROWN OF GERMANY WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF AUSTRIA.—BIOGRAPHY OF RADOWITZ, THE MINISTER WHO STROVE IN VAIN TO SECURE GERMAN UNITY.—THE PRUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC SURRENDER AT OLMUTZ, A. D., 1850.

THE death of Frederick William III. in 1840 had closed an era of an exceptional character, wherein Prussia had been threatened with relegation to the position of a third-rate power, from which fate she was saved as much by the high character of the King and Queen Louisa as by the patience and tenacity of her people.

These much-loved parents had bound their two sons, Frederick William IV. and William, afterwards Emperor of Germany, by a solemn promise, to do their best to strengthen the Fatherland and restore it to the condition subsisting before the fatal year of Jena, while guarding, and if possible uniting, the whole of Germany. Towards the realization of

this ideal the late Sovereign had himself done something, when in 1833 a Commercial League or Zollverein was agreed on by most of the Governments of Germany.

It remained for Frederick William IV. to keep the promises made by his father in May, 1815, by establishing a Parliament on popular lines. Indeed, the King had actually talked with enthusiasm about devoting his life to bestowing freedom on Prussia and unity on Germany.

When the expected Constitution came under serious discussion two months after his accession, the device was tried of summoning a Committee of the several Provincial Estates to meet at Berlin and discuss, not the affairs of Prussia, but subordinate matters, such as those relegated to a modern County Council or District Board.

And then Frederick William IV., disregarding the ominous discontent aroused by this evasion of his distinct pledges, occupied himself with pious works, such as restoring and completing Cologne Cathedral, promoting a Mission to China, and founding a Protestant Bishopric in Jerusalem; until so loud were the murmurs of his Prussian subjects, still harping on the attainment of Parliamentary Rule, that he had to abandon for a time the world replete with mediæval imagination, in which he loved to dwell, and to make a step forward in political reform. He now summoned eight Provincial Assemblies to one large United Diet, whose powers, al-

though limited, were strengthened by the importance and notoriety of the gathering.

It was in this United Diet that Otto von Bismarck first appeared in a representative body, so that its opening by the King on April 11, 1847, marks an epoch in the history of Germany.

This Constitutional experiment proved unsuccessful, and after squabbling for eleven weeks the Diet was dismissed, neither party pretending to be satisfied, and the King unable to understand why his declaring himself "the implacable foe of absolutism" did not atone for restrictions on the franchise or excuse a further pronouncement that he meant to bequeath to his successor undiminished authority for the Crown which had descended to him "unweakened."

Without a suspicion of the storm about to burst, Frederick William IV., leaving his brother, the Prince of Prussia, to act for a time in Berlin as Regent, sought rest and change in Italy. During his absence, news of the abdication of Louis Philippe and of the French Revolution of 1848 flashed over Europe, and infected Northern Germany with the same dissatisfied and violent spirit, which appeared almost simultaneously in Milan and at Vienna.

And that Germany should participate in such a movement was in accordance with precedent, for after the establishment of the Orleans family on the French throne in 1830 movements in favor of constitutional changes had taken place through Prussia

and Hanover. The King of the latter country, William IV. of England, was contending against the opponents of electoral reform at home, and therefore desired his German subjects to possess similar privileges; and just as this decision was received with rejoicing, so did a counter feeling of dismay spread over Germany, when in 1837, on Queen Victoria surrendering her title to reign in Hanover to her uncle, Ernest, Duke of Cumberland, he withdrew the Constitution granted by his brother.

But if desire for Representative Government animated the Germans of 1830, their successors of 1848 were even more eager to emulate the conduct of the people of Paris, so that Berlin was not likely to be behindhand when Cologne, Hanover, Baden, and Dresden had successively throbbled with Revolutionary excitement.

Frederick William IV., on hearing the first rumblings of the storm, announced his intention to summon the Diet periodically, thereby giving security for a vital Constitutional safeguard; but he was informed that a vast gathering in the Capital, attended by numerous loyal and law-abiding citizens, had declared that the Nation wished to be taken into the Monarch's complete confidence, and that unless electoral privileges of the widest character were straightway conferred on his people, the bonds of love and loyalty, which had so long united them with the Hohenzollern Dynasty, would be strained, even to the breaking point. Thereupon it came to pass that



the King, finding himself in this embarrassing situation, promised the reforms demanded; so that, animated with sentiments of joy, the populace of Berlin flocked down to the Castle to express their gratitude. But amongst the multitude were undoubtedly those who did not desire to see a peaceful end to the popular movement, and needless exception seems to have been taken to the presence of troops within the Royal Precincts, so that clamors arose for their withdrawal, not calculated to give confidence to those thus surrounded.

Very naturally the square in front of the building was cleared by a squadron of dragoons and a company of foot, no menacing demonstration of military force being either made or intended.

Unfortunately at this moment an incident occurred not unlike that which had turned the tide of the Revolution in Paris, and two shots, fired either wilfully or by mistake, gave the needed opportunity to the incendiaries present to raise cries of "Treason," "Revenge," and finally "To arms," such as left no doubt in the minds of those present that a Revolutionary movement, serious in character, was about to commence. Writers, who would wish posterity to believe that, when "200 barricades, defended by infuriated burghers, rose out of the streets like magic, and the city became a wild war scene of carnage," there had not been carefully prepared preliminaries, ask us to ignore all previous experience. The troops were necessarily launched against the

creators of this émeute, and as the rioters fought gallantly, there was deplorable bloodshed.

The spectacle of Frederick William IV. at the Palace assuring the deputations that he would still yield broad constitutional rights, if advocated peacefully and reasonably, but that he would not yield to force—nevertheless giving way suddenly when he discovered that revolutions, like wars, cannot be made with rosewater, is certainly most pitiable.

Nor is the contemplation of the victorious Prussian soldiery, withdrawing as if defeated from Berlin, any less distasteful because this well-meaning Monarch interspersed his fatal and misunderstood orders by eloquent addresses to his "dear Berliners."

But the clever and well-meaning King supplemented such conduct by permitting the bodies of those slain in the street-fighting to be borne in solemn procession past the balcony on which he stood bare-headed as if in penance, as though the mistakes had been all on the side of the Court and none on the side of the organizers of the revolt.

When the reader has realized this much, he will be prepared to learn that a further apologia was adjudged necessary and that Frederick William IV. himself rode through Berlin, attired in the folds of a Germanic flag, and followed by a medley crowd, in which were found Princes, Burghers, Ministers and raisers of barricades.

Well might the Czar Nicholas, on being told of the incident, exclaim that his Royal brother, the Poet

King, had adopted the rôle of circus rider in his own Capital.

This unfortunate *contretemps*, which brought passing unpopularity to the good King of Prussia, very much troubled him, while outspoken supporters of the throne, such as Bismarck, did not conceal their disapproval of the policy of needless surrender to the "gentlemen of the pavement." In the opinion of Germany's greatest adviser, the course adopted should have been to improve upon the success of the army in overcoming the insurgents by appealing to the German Princes to establish German Unity under the one Sovereign who could hold his own decisively against the machinations of the Revolutionary conspirators.

The Apostle of "Blood and Iron" believed that at the special moment of March 18, 1848, the rulers of small States and the Kings of Saxony and Bavaria would have embraced the Prussian headship, if they had seen Strength and Resolution at the helm. The King, however, acted as follows. First, he hesitated and permitted the movement for German Unity to progress on democratic lines, until a Parliament, elected by universal suffrage, independent of the several Princes, was elected to sit at Frankfort. "Germany," said the King in one of his speeches, "is in ferment within and exposed from without to danger from more than one side. Deliverance from this danger can come only from the most intimate union of the German Princes and people under a single

leadership. I take this leadership upon me for the hour of peril. I have to-day assumed the old German colors (gold, white and black) and placed myself and my people under the venerable banner of the German Empire. Prussia henceforth is merged in Germany."

Although the great Bismarck, at the very inception of his career, found himself obliged to disapprove of the course taken by Frederick William IV., there is no more touching incident in later European history than the meeting between this faithful, but outspoken, servant and the revered holder of Prussia's crown, as recorded in that inimitable work, the Prince's own *Reflections and Reminiscences*. Bismarck's belief was, that if the Berlin rising of March 18 had been not only crushed but "prevented" from any "recrudescence," the Emperor Nicholas would not have opposed the "reforming" of Germany "into a durable organization."

If, instead of the ride through the Capital in Germanic colors on March 21st, the King had thrown himself on a Congress of Princes, such as was actually summoned to Dresden on March 20—the notices being dated March 10—by Austria and Prussia jointly, then in Bismarck's opinion there would straightway have been a clear field for German Unity.

At the moment in question, every one of the German Rulers, threatened by Revolution, had been unsuccessful in putting down revolt, while in Austria,

not only had Metternich fled from Vienna, but confusion alternated with internecine conflict in every city of that heterogeneous Empire, which was also called at the same moment to wage a fierce war in Italy.

Surely, argued the future Minister and co-creator with William I. of the German Empire, this was the fitting moment for the Teutonic race to shelter itself under the folds of the victorious Prussian flag.

Frederick William IV. had pressed Bismarck to pay him a visit at Sans Souci, but the latter being, as he says, in a "critical mood," tried to excuse himself, but the King insisted, and sent his own aide-de-camp to "repeat the command." "After dinner," records Prince Bismarck, "the King took me on the terrace and asked me in a friendly sort of way, 'How are you getting on?' In the irritable state I had been in ever since the March days, I replied, 'Badly.' The King said: 'I think the feeling is good in your parts.' Thereupon I replied, 'The feeling was very good, but since we have been inoculated with the Revolution by the King's officials under the Royal Sign Manual, it has become bad. What we lack is confidence in the support of the King.' At that moment the Queen stepped out from a shrubbery and said: 'How can you speak so to the King?' 'Let me alone, Elise,' replied the King, 'I shall soon settle his business,' and turning to me, he said, 'What do you really reproach me with then?' 'The evacuation of Berlin.'

‘I did not want it done,’ replied the King, and the Queen, who had remained within hearing, added: ‘Of that the King is quite innocent. He had not slept for three days.’ ‘A King ought to be able to sleep,’ I replied. Unmoved by this blunt remark the King said: ‘It is always easier to prophesy when you know. What would be gained if I admitted that I had behaved like a donkey? Something more than reproaches is wanted to set an overturned throne up again. To do that (said Frederick William IV.), I need assistance and active devotion, not criticism.’

The kindness with which he said all this, and much more to the same effect, overpowered me.

I had come in the spirit of a *frondeur*; I went away completely disarmed and won over.”

I reproduce this passage verbatim from Mr. A. J. Butler’s admirable translation, because therein seems to be the secret of that ardent allegiance of Bismarck to the personal Monarchy in Prussia, which has changed the destiny of nations in Europe within the memory of many of my readers.

It will be seen that the King’s appreciation of his loyal subject’s talents did not in 1848 imply any intention to consult the rising statesman on more pressing matters of state; but he had elicited the great Prussian’s expression of devotion to the throne—nothing more—and yet so much had he gained thereby for the Fatherland, that his brother William, then Prince of Prussia, was afterwards served with the

sturdy allegiance which constrained Denmark, Austria and France successively to succumb in order that all Germany, from the North Sea up to the frontiers of Bohemia, should at last be united and strong.

The Prince of Prussia, being out of tune with the turn of events at Berlin, where, as Bismarck says, he was unjustly termed "Prince Cartridge" by the Revolutionists, paid during the next few months of 1848 a historic visit to England, where he came as an exile, pending the course of events.

In May, 1848, the German National Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, met in the Church of St. Paul at Frankfort, almost contemporaneously with the fulfilment of the Prussian King's promises to grant all that the extreme Liberals had agitated for in Berlin, where a Prussian Parliament had also been formed by popular vote.

The extremists admitted that there had been a mistake, and forgave Frederick William the overthrow of their barricades, remaining satisfied with the moral victory gained by the Court subjection, and the disappearance of the much maligned Prince of Prussia.

It was, however, when war with Denmark to save the Germans of Schleswig-Holstein from permanent alienation threatened to convulse the whole race outside Austria, and primarily to involve Prussia, that this great stirring of the Teutonic peoples was commenced.

The relegation of this Schleswig-Holstein dispute for future settlement, and the temporary subjugation of a German population to Denmark, was brought about, according to Baron Stockman's *Memoirs*, by the opposition of the Emperor Nicholas I. to change; and the Czar was at this period the stern arbiter of European politics.

The Prussian Parliament proved to be a tender plant: its meetings at Berlin, from the first on May 22d, were marked by disorderly scenes, which drove the King into maybe premature reaction, and placed him once more in unhappy antagonism to a large section of his people. Driven from Berlin by General Wrangel's bayonets to Brandenburg, this ill-fated Chamber perished by inanition, as the members did not attend its sittings.

The King then gave a constitution, nearly identical with that conferred on Belgium in 1831, but did not satisfy the agitation which had never flagged since the surrender of March 21st, 1848, which Bismarck deprecated so strongly.

On March 28th, 1849, the National Assembly at Frankfort elected the King of Prussia Emperor; but he felt that he had missed the opportunity of securing unanimously that which was offered him in this popular body by the moderate majority of 42, and shrank from the antagonism with Austria, which deep familiarity with history had led him to consider almost superstitiously as the home of the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the crown offered



to him would from its revolutionary origin have been one, in his own words, "picked up from blood and mire."

Not only did the King say, when answering the deputation, that the summons to the Imperial throne must come from the Princes of Germany, but that it must also have the consent of all Teutonic Governments, before a Hohenzollern could accept it.

That this answer was final, a letter subsequently received at Frankfort by the National Assembly conclusively proved.

That a serious crisis impended, no observer of the State of Germany could doubt, and the King of Prussia proceeded to attempt a solution in conclave with kindred minds amongst his subjects, chief of whom, not responsible as ministers, were Bunsen and Radowitz. Count Brandenburg, on the other hand, acted throughout this anxious period as Chancellor, a loyal Prussian of conservative predilections, considerable ability and the highest integrity.

But Frederick William IV. much desired the friendship and advice of that attractive scholar and statesman, Christian Bunsen, then in the vigor of intellect at fifty-eight years of age. As Ambassador at Rome, Berne and London successively, he had established a literary and artistic reputation which has somewhat obscured his fame as adviser on political matters to the King, who much liked his society.

Bunsen dearly longed for the unity of Germany, and is credited with the belief that if he had re-

mained near Frederick William when the Imperial crown was offered him a compromise might have been attempted, which, while assuaging the jealous susceptibilities of Austria, would have unified the Fatherland without war and in the very fulness of time.

But when Bunsen returned to Berlin he found the political crisis in question a matter of history, and the King much in the company of Radowitz. Bunsen was as popular in London as Berlin, the associate of the Prince Consort, the friend of Dr. Arnold of Rugby, and a typical German of piety and good taste. He died at Bonn in 1860. General Joseph von Radowitz was one of the most interesting personages at the Court of Berlin. He had been an officer in the army of Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia, and had been wounded and taken prisoner at Leipsic; but he gave his talents to the Government of Hesse when the Westphalian Kingdom was dissolved, and served in the Netherlands under the Duke of Wellington in 1815. A scientific soldier, his proficiency in mathematics, especially as applied to military affairs, led to his being placed on the Military Board when, in 1823, he joined the Prussian service, wherein he attained the responsible post of Chief of the Artillery Staff. A religious mystic, deeply read in the mediæval traditions and history of Germany, he was also attracted by politics, and this attraction grew by frequent converse with his kindred spirit and warm friend, Frederick William IV.

Ever since 1840, when he was recalled to Berlin to stir up the Austrian Government to oppose M. Thiers' schemes, Radowitz had been engaged in devising internal reforms in the Prussian administration, and in 1847 he was sent to confer with Metternich at Vienna as to a reconstitution of the Confederation. Indeed in some form the real Unity of Germany was ever before his eyes to be gained, as he hoped, by a voluntary arrangement between the Government and the peoples. When his hopes in the National Assembly had been frustrated, he became, in consonance with the views of the King, the prime mover in what was known as "the Union."

Frederick William desired to place himself at the head of a Federation of German States, voluntarily uniting under terms to be subsequently settled.

There had been two parties in the National Assembly which could not exist in Radowitz's proposed Union, viz., the Great and Little Germans, the former, wishing to include Austria, now bitterly hostile to the whole project, and the latter desiring to act without the co-operation of the Dual Monarchy.

Practically no authority remained in Germany, after the dissolution of the National Assembly, but the Austrian and Prussian armies.

Radowitz and the Prussian King strove to form by voluntary negotiation a Union of the German States, and for this purpose entered into treaties with most of their Rulers, including those of Saxony and Hanover, who afterwards recanted.

But the 28 smaller states had been advised to enter into the proposed arrangement, and amidst the rising enthusiasm of Germany the much-longed-for Unity seemed to be in sight, provided that Austria did not issue a *non-possumus*. Unfortunately, led by Prince Schwarzenberg, a remarkable statesman who had far-reaching designs, and supported by the Czar Nicholas I., Austria offered the alternative of war or submission to the Prussian King.

Radowitz, who had emerged from seclusion and taken the responsibility of conducting Foreign Affairs, counselled war, even when deserted at the pinch by Saxony and Hanover.

Moreover, according to Prince Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, the General had miscalculated the available forces of Austria in Bohemia, reckoning them at 28,254 men and 7,132 horses, while Bismarck knew from official sources that the real number was 100,000; and as the Austrians were always strong in cavalry, they would, when combined with the Russians, just triumphant over the Hungarian Revolutionists, have been formidable opponents.

There was a meeting of the Rulers concerned at Warsaw on October 29th, 1850, when the Czar, the Emperor Francis Joseph, and Prince Charles, brother of Frederick William IV., attended; but Nicholas seemed annoyed at the Prussian King's absence and straightway declared in favor of Austria, treating Count Brandenburg with a high-handed in-

difference which deeply hurt his feelings. Nothing but prudence influenced Frederick William IV. in making the notorious and, as Prussians consider, disgraceful surrender of Olmutz, which was consummated on November 29th, 1850, when Prussia, after mobilizing her armies, acquiesced in all the Austrian demands. Accordingly the German nation, which had been led to expect the long-hoped-for union, had to rest content with reverting to the German "Bund" arranged at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. But despite the disappointment and vexation of a vast nationality it is true that, as Moses was permitted from Mount Pisgah to view the Promised Land, so was the King placed by his defeated and discarded minister, Radowitz, in view of German Unity.

The Joshua who was to see the Teutonic peoples safely ensconced in the Land of Promise proved to be that Prince of Prussia who had lately returned to Berlin from England.

The lieutenant who was to guide him into the happy and long-desired valleys proved to be Otto von Bismarck, who was chosen to be the first Prussian Representative in the revived German Bund.

Frederick William IV. had said, "Send the man to represent us who most believes in the Institution." Bismarck preferred this revival of the settlement of 1815 to the adoption of the alternative rejected plan of "Union"; and the future Chancellor's *Reflections and Reminiscences* somewhat strangely suggest

that Romanizing was possibly Radowitz's object during that enthusiastic Catholic's dealings with Prussia's Protestant King.

## CHAPTER XXV.

## THE WAR NOTE THROBS ONCE MORE (1).

STATE WORKSHOPS DEvised BY LOUIS BLANC BRING ABOUT STREET FIGHTING IN PARIS.—GENERAL CAVAIGNAC RESTORES ORDER BY THE SWORD AFTER GREAT CARNAGE AND THE MURDER OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF PARIS.—RISE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON'S AUTHORITY, AND HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, DEFEATING CAVAIGNAC AND LAMARTINE.—MAZZINI AND THE CARBONARI AGITATE IN ITALY AGAINST AUSTRIAN RULE AT MILAN AND VENICE.—CAREERS OF POPE PIUS IX. AND CHARLES ALBERT OF SAVOY.—REVOLUTION IN ITALY QUELLED BY MARSHAL RADETSKY AT NOVARA, MARCH 23D, 1849.—ABDICATION OF CHARLES ALBERT IN FAVOR OF VICTOR EMMANUEL II., REGENERATOR OF ITALY.—KOSSUTH AND THE HUNGARIAN REBELLION OF 1848-9, WHICH WAS CLOSED ONLY BY INTERVENTION OF RUSSIAN FORCES UNDER GENERAL PASKEVITCH.—SULTAN ABDUL MEDJID REFUSES TO SURRENDER KOSSUTH AND BEM TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT.

THE end of the discord and strife, which led to Louis Philippe's abdication and flight in 1848, disclosed such bitterness amongst the working-classes, as well as indifference on the part of the National Guard and the middle class which composed it, that there really seemed to be some reason for the alarm created amongst property owners in France.

Louis Blanc's long-cherished design of providing

unemployed artisans with well-paid occupation in State "Ateliers" or Workshops, received the fullest possible trial, and those present in Paris at the time—one of whom, a thoughtful and gifted ex-President of the Wesleyan Conference, the Rev. William Arthur, communicated his experience to the writer—were generally impressed with the grave, indeed almost desperate, character of the crisis, through which Society was then passing.

For if the well-meant schemes of Fourier had really achieved the settlement of Law, Order, Peace, and Contentment of the deserving and industrious poor, then indeed would a short cut have been discovered to the bourn of earthly happiness, quite irrespective of the principles of the Revolution of 1789, which contemplated nothing of the sort. Indeed, had the ideas of Louis Blanc and his coadjutor, Albert, been sound, relief for poverty-stricken subjects would have been as much within the power of the Monarchy as of the Republican system to confer.

The Provisional Government, under the auspices of Lamartine and Ledru Rollin (the latter a politician dominated by the earlier Republican traditions) and, as has been said, controlled by the Social Democrats of 1848, had sanctioned an appeal to France by universal suffrage, a course condemned by Blanc and his friends in Paris, who desired to guide the Government according to the dictates of a majority in that fair city. Considered as a whole, the Assembly elected, in April, 1848, to the great surprise



of the doctrinaires, was of much the same type as the Parliaments of Louis Philippe.

Republicans though they were by profession, the members were not likely to become assailants of the property-owning classes, to whose ranks they themselves for the most part belonged.

Thence it became evident that sooner or later a conflict was certain to occur between the Assembly and the Parisian Democracy, daily reinforced by the crowds of unemployed who found their way from the provinces into the capital and took part in the farcical attempt to solve the Labor question, which, under Louis Blanc's auspices, was in progress there.

What articles were to be made or what work was to be attempted, seemed beyond the authorities, who directed the applicants at certain stated centres to decide, at least off-hand; so that in four weeks some 65,000 individuals were receiving ample wages and very few of them were giving any return, either by way of mental or manual labor, to their "Grandmother, the State."

The brief period between the decision to put in practice this strange experiment and the actual opening of the Ateliers had not afforded adequate opportunity for thinking out details, and, although men by no means bereft of brains, who had made a study of Fourier's theories, were employed on the task, the outcome of their labors seems to have been a gigantic failure. But perhaps the congestion at the National Workshops and the increase of the State-aided citi-

zens to 100,000 might not of themselves have brought the Assembly to adopt an openly hostile attitude towards the Red Republicans, had not their leaders organized an attack on the Assembly by physical force and, emulating Cromwell, invaded the Chamber and turned the Deputies into the street, during May, 1848. The excuse made for such outrageous conduct was the presenting of a petition in favor of Poland.

The National Guard, it is true, soon restored that public order which they had allowed to be disturbed in the last days of Louis Philippe; but it was apparent that this fantastic raid represented but a skirmish with the advanced guard of the public foe, whose stronghold was in and around those workshops which the Assembly in a weak moment had been persuaded by Louis Blanc to create. The people enjoying these exceptional privileges clearly meant to fight in order to keep them, and had for allies all the elements of disorder in a great modern city such as Paris.

The Assembly looked around for a General whom the soldiery might be trusted to follow, and a general opinion pointed to Louis Eugène Cavaignac as possessing the requisite qualities. One of the famous Marshal Bugeaud's associates in Algeria, gaining distinction at Isly during 1844, this soldier was the most likely man, in the absence of his chief, to bring the Paris insurrection—for such it had become—speedily to an end. Bugeaud himself had retired after the Revolution of 1848, dispirited at the

humiliation of his troops, who had not been allowed to act in the manner their General wished, and consequently had failed to save the throne. Moreover, Cavaignac was not only a member of the Constituent Assembly, appointed by their Minister of War, but also an enthusiastic and consistent Republican, while Bugeaud never wavered in his fidelity to the Orleansist Dynasty.

The whole of the eastern part of Paris became disaffected, and Cavaignac had a heavy task before him when his enemy was found to have barricaded most of the streets and loopholed every position of defence, each house being a little fortress.

The insurrection commenced on the 22d of June, and being entrusted with Dictatorship by the Assembly, Cavaignac entered upon the hardest street-fighting on record, the scene in Paris during the slow and sanguinary progress of the troops being one which those in the panic-stricken capital at the time never can forget. The fighting lasted four days, in the course of which the carnage was that of a battle rather than a Revolution, the noble Archbishop of Paris perishing on one of the barricades where he had intervened for the purpose of allaying this internecine strife. At length, when the last remnant of the Red Republican force had been surrounded and taken captive near Père la Chaise, men breathed freely again, and with one accord admitted that Cavaignac had saved society from disruption. But this high-minded Republican General straightway sur-

rendered his Dictatorship to the body from whom he had derived it, and resumed his seat as a member of that Assembly he had served so well.

Little is it to be marvelled at that a large party in the Chamber would have welcomed the Presidency of this disinterested Republican General, but a decision of that Assembly proved the death-blow to his hopes, when, contrary to the advice of no less a person than M. Grévy—himself destined to become President of a French Republic—the duty of electing a Supreme Officer over the Assembly was relegated to the people themselves. For when the great name of Napoleon was put into competition with that of Cavaignac in a contest for the Presidency, it seemed at once unlikely that the conqueror of the Paris Barricades would reap, at the hands of the Republic, what he might fairly claim as a just reward. And, indeed, Louis Napoleon played his part so well that by mingled modesty and patriotism, not unassisted by the machinations of those personal adherents who were soon to reap the reward of their fidelity, he daily attracted to his side fresh admirers. The fact is that the Napoleonic idea only needed to be skilfully presented to the French to be warmly embraced by them.

Returned, by no less than four Departments, to the Assembly, the son of Louis Bonaparte and Queen Hortense found his election ratified by a majority of the members after all that could be urged in opposition. But had not M. Thiers himself, by his strik-

ing history of the Consulate and Empire, drawn a picture of the First Napoleon which led a people, oblivious of the sorrows of 1815, to rejoice over the return of the Imperial ashes and their sepulture at the Invalides in 1840? Had not the lyrics of Béranger invested the exile at St. Helena of France's greatest soldier with a romance which appealed to the national spirit? Public opinion, thus aroused, soon evinced the intense desire of the middle class to pursue their lives and enjoy their property under the shadow of Napoleonic authority; and so it came to pass that after all General Cavaignac's martial achievements on behalf of public security, the French peasants rejected him for one whose knowledge of the military art was limited to what he had gained as a Volunteer in a Swiss Camp of Artillery, and who, to within a few months of his election as President, was not known by sight in Paris.

On December 10th the result of this contest showed seven millions of votes for Louis Napoleon, and between one and two millions for Cavaignac, who, nevertheless, fills a most honorable position in modern French history, as having both faithfully done his duty and unflinchingly preserved political integrity.

Alphonse Lamartine, at one time the most popular statesman of the Revolutionary Epoch which closed with 1848, celebrated alike as poet and orator, could poll but very few votes against these doughty opponents.

The election of the President had an important

bearing upon one aspect of the European situation. The news of the Revolution of 1848 had been received with fervor and delight in Italy, just as its tidings had thrilled sympathizers at Berlin, Vienna, and indeed the whole of Germany, while the echoes even resounded in sea-girt England; but in the first-named country, famed alike for its sunshine, its beauty and its romance, it seemed to be known intuitively that a friend in the Carbonarist Louis Napoleon ruled at Paris. True, he had not yet donned the Imperial purple, with which the Italians connected their fondest hopes—in strange ignorance or forgetfulness of the history of the great Emperor, his uncle, whose title he was about to revive. Nevertheless, the vow of a Carbonarist was no light responsibility even for a ruler of France, and the Prince President was not a lukewarm partisan of Italian Nationality. Indeed, it was the sad irony of that remarkable man's position that while he recognized the beneficence of unity, alike in Germany and in the Italian Peninsula, he could look for no support amongst his own subjects in making any advance towards the furtherance of national contentment within the bounds of these nationalities, unless at the same time such aggrandizement were given to France as war could alone obtain.

At the outbreak of the Revolution which overthrew Louis Philippe, Mazzini had hastened to Paris and kept himself in touch with the brethren of the Carbonari all through the various developments of affairs which resulted in Louis Napoleon's election.

Giuseppe Mazzini was born at Genoa in 1806, his father being a medical man and a University Professor, who gave his only son a good education. A long study of Dante, together with the society of other young Italians of culture, convinced him that the subservience of his country to Austria, as well as its subordination to the interests of other ruling Princes at Rome, Modena, Naples and elsewhere, was not a state of things to be tolerated one hour longer than could be avoided by the adoption of a Patriot policy. But in the condition of Europe before 1830, the profession of such opinions as these meant practical exclusion from political life, even if it did not lead to the tenancy of a prison at Milan or Naples.

So it came to pass that Mazzini joined the Carbonari and, when once committed to a Revolutionary programme, plunged deeper into the policy of promoting secret associations, joining that called Young Italy, with the motto "God and the People."

It has been said that during the inception of these ideas Mazzini condoned the offence of one who had committed himself to the doctrine of assassination; and a similar charge was made in the British House of Commons against the Right Honorable James Stansfield, M. P., an eminent Liberal sympathizer with the National movements in Europe, who was accused by his political opponents of condoning the deepest crime known to the law outside High Treason.

The strength of this attack, pressed home without any direct evidence implicating Mazzini, led to sympathy on his behalf.

At all events, so much did this feeling increase in England that when in 1844 Sir James Graham, the Home Secretary, opened the Italian conspirator's letters and furnished the Austrian Government with the character of their contents, thereby ensuring the execution of the brothers Bandiera, a feeling of indignation was engendered at the idea that the English Constitution had been infringed, if not in fact, at least in spirit.

Mazzini had been sentenced to death previous to this by the Sardinian Courts, and after an exile in Switzerland had become a refugee in London. Extremely adroit, and ready to shape every event to the mould of his patriotic purpose, Mazzini was, in June, 1846, delighted to learn how the newly-elected Pope had put forward Liberal professions.

Cardinal Gizzi had been the favorite character of the moderate party, and, as often happens at Papal Elections, an unknown man slipped in.

Mastai Ferretti, who took the title Pius IX. out of respect for Pius VII., was 54. He had been subject from his childhood to epileptic fits. In 1831 he had shown toleration towards members of the Carbonari; little else was known of one who as Pope was destined to see Italy a Nation and the Temporal Power taken away from the Vatican. But the sympathy he seemed to show towards Italian national



yearnings, early in his pontificate, linked the names of Pius IX. and Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, together in the national imagination. Born in 1798, the son of Charles, Prince of Carignano, a collateral branch of the House of Savoy, Charles Albert had no less than seven male heirs between himself and the throne. In 1821 he adopted revolutionary views and became temporarily Regent; and it is charged against him by some writers that by abandoning his post at this crisis he betrayed the Liberal cause, after having co-operated with its representatives.

Indeed, like Cranmer, he had for a time permitted human weakness to overshadow his real convictions, for which in the end both men suffered. By volunteering to join the Duc d'Angoulême in crushing the Spanish Constitution in 1823, he certainly seemed to give the lie to his professions of 1821.

When in 1831 Charles Albert came to the throne of Sardinia, his government bore little trace of that lapse into Liberalism which nevertheless had disclosed the natural bent of his mind. To explain how, after the French Revolution of 1848, the spread of Italian nationalism rolled over the land of Dante, like an advancing deluge, would take a volume; so general became the desire for Unity that it infected Princes and People alike, even the Bourbons of Naples participating in spasmodic efforts to welcome some change, in company with the Duke of Modena and the Pope himself. The fact that these potentates gradually relented does not detract from

the original force and fertility of the movement; just as the seed thrown from the windows of Professor Babington's Cambridge home in the sixties covered the still waters of Great Britain with the weed now widely known as "Babingtonia," so did the working-class triumph of March, 1848, in Paris spread national principles, disseminated by like forces, across the whole Italian Peninsula. Mazzini and his associates had so ordered it that the Milanese should seize this opportunity to rise against the Austrians, cowed and losing prestige by the tidings of Prince Metternich's fall, and conscious that Hungary was about to try conclusions with the sickly Ferdinand I., who grew more and more unfitted to rule. The first rush of the Italian Revolutionists proved irresistible; Milan, the much-loved and desired City of Lombardy, fell into their hands, while their standards spread victorious over the surrounding country. Then it was that Charles Albert, yielding to the prayers of his people, unfurled the banner of Italy's independence.

At first patriotism, allied with rare enthusiasm, prevailed; and there is every reason to believe that Lombardy would have been severed from the Hapsburgs there and then, but for the unexpected vigor and skill of an octogenarian Austrian leader in Marshal Radetsky. Two years older than either Wellington or Napoleon, this remarkable soldier made his first campaign against the Turks in 1788, and was with Napoleon in his Italian campaigns, when

doubtless he learnt the nature of that country where his name became famous after his appointment, in 1831, as Generalissimo of the Austrian force in Lombardy and Venetia. Radetsky had so distinguished himself at Aspern in 1809 and Leipsic in 1813 that, considering these with his after achievements, Austrian military historians naturally regret that he was not associated with their annals in the dark days of Ulm and Austerlitz. But, whether or not comparable to the Archduke Charles at the zenith of his powers, Radetsky in his 83d year displayed a masterly grasp of the military situation in Italy which entirely paralyzed the Revolution there. Step by step regaining the lost positions, the Austrian General at length compelled the Sardinian forces to evacuate Milan in August, 1848; and when, after an armistice of seven months, the pressure of public opinion forced Charles Albert to renew the contest, Radetsky smote his opponents hip and thigh in the briefest campaign recorded, which lasting only four days was concluded on the field of Novara, March 23, 1849.

There is something ineffably sad in the immediate abdication of this Prince and his death in exile at Oporto four months later.

But his son and successor, Victor Emmanuel II., afterwards the ally of England and France in the Crimea, took up, under Cavour's guidance, the burdens which had pressed so painfully on the unhappy Charles Albert, and lived to see Italy free from Alps

to Adriatic and united. But while Radetsky was saving Lombardy and Venetia for a period to Austria, the dual Kingdom appeared to be rent by furious dissensions at its very centre in Vienna, where the representatives of the heterogeneous nationalities ruled over (after the joint abdications of his uncle, Ferdinand I., and his father, Francis Charles, on December 2, 1849) by the present Emperor, Francis Joseph, seemed bent on a very dance of death over the political tomb of Prince Metternich.

As that sage statesman had opined, it was impossible to reconcile their various aspirations. Yet they would not have strained the Austrian Imperial system to the very breaking point, but for the action of the personality of Louis Kossuth, whose life commenced when the century was but little more than a year old, his father being a small landowner and of noble extraction. Brought up in a Protestant College, and a student of law, Kossuth early developed those talents which enabled him to shine in the National Diet of Presburg.

Condemned for high treason in publishing Press Reports of Speeches contrary to Hungarian law, Kossuth suffered imprisonment for a year and a half; but not in the least abashed, he returned to editorial work in Pesth until, when 1848 burst upon the world, he became the centre of constitutional life in Hungary and the champion of its liberal reformers. In July, 1848, the Diet being dissolved, an election occurred, resulting in the return of a popular major-

ity which made him Governor of Hungary and the champion of her claims to self-government during the Civil War of 1848--9.

But as Mazzini had to yield to the sword of Radetsky, so did the Hungarian statesman leader, Kossuth, succumb to the joint assaults of the Austrian Windischeratz and the Russian Paskevitch, the latter at the head of 150,000 of the Czar Nicholas I.'s picked troops.

Kossuth, in company with Bem and other refugees, retired to Turkey, and Sultan Abdul Medjid Mahmoud, the Reformer's only son, refused persistently to give them up to the death which, in the temper of the Austro-Russian allies, would most assuredly have been inflicted on them. The Turks standing boldly to their guns, Nicholas sullenly retired with his troops to the Steppes of Russia, but the controversy arising out of these transactions undoubtedly helped to bring about the Crimean conflict. And thus closed those extraordinary ebullitions of Revolutionary feeling which threatened most of the European thrones, overturning that of France and leaving men in doubt as to whether the great forces of the future were pressing forward. As my readers are aware, those of Italian and German nationalities were on the road to triumph.

When the aged and unrepentant Metternich returned from exile in 1850, he found he owed allegiance to an Emperor not yet of age, Francis Joseph, nephew of Ferdinand II., whose abdication

had been quickened by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg recognizing the danger of Imperial nervelessness at a moment of peril. Though foiled in his wish to unite Austria and North Germany in one huge State, the latter statesman had, nevertheless, triumphed at Olmutz by peaceful means quite as much as if the Austrians had regained their supremacy in the Frankfort Diet by force of arms. Doubters as to the possibility of ever grafting a workable parliamentary constitution upon patchwork, Austria seemed justified by the trend of events when they perceived Kossuth, despite the Magyar's recognized sympathy with Italy, supporting the use of Hungarian arms to crush out Freedom under Radetsky, because he thought that returning Croat troops would be used to gain autonomy for their own comparatively small nationality, and so wreck the movement for Hungarian independence.

Mr. C. E. Maurice, in his interesting work on the Revolutions of 1848-9, p. 336, points this fact out.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

## THE WAR NOTE THROBS ONCE MORE (2).

REOPENING OF THE EASTERN QUESTION IN 1853.—LORD MALMESBURY'S REVELATIONS AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.—ITALIAN UNITY ADVANCED BY THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN OF 1859 IN LOMBARDY, INCLUDING THE BATTLES OF MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO.—CAVOUR AND GARIBALDI AS ITALIAN PATRIOTS.—CONSOLIDATION OF GERMANY AT KÖNIGGRÄTZ IN 1866, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE AFTER SEDAN.—THREATENING CONDUCT OF THE CZAR TOWARDS AUSTRIA BEFORE THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1878.—WILLIAM I., THE GREAT EMPEROR OF GERMANY.—ACCESSION OF WILLIAM II., AND RETIREMENT AND DEATH OF BISMARCK.—EUROPEAN ASPECT AT THE CLOSE OF 1900.

WHY those loving to dwell on times of peace should look suspiciously upon "International Exhibitions" intended to gather together all peoples in amity, the history of the year 1851 will show.

Never in the course of the world's story did it appear more probable that the temple of Janus was to be closed forever than at the epoch I name. As this epoch is within the memory of many living now, my narrative must henceforth, for obvious reasons, become more condensed.

The reorganization of Continental Europe, consummated at the Congress of Vienna, had been neces-

sitated by the Revolutionary movement initiated in France during 1789; and after troublous and destructive storms, followed by scarcely less dangerous reactions, the passing tempests of 1848 swept over the nations without bringing a return of the miseries from which the Continent gained deliverance in 1815.

But the disillusioning of the Nations proved, alas! to be a speedy process, soon after the great mass of humanity gathered together in Hyde Park in 1851 had dispersed.

The Duke of Wellington having passed away one year later, the Eastern Question burst on the world and entangled France, Great Britain and Sardinia in a Russian War, wherein the existence of Turkey seemed once more at stake. More extraordinary still, this alliance of those ancient rivals, England and France, took place under the Government in the latter country of the great Napoleon's nephew, who regained the Imperialist throne during 1851 by a *coup d'état* similar to that of 1795, when Napoleon vanquished the sections, and that of the 18th Brumaire, 1799, a method of procedure which had been strongly reprobated by constitutional and Liberal thinkers both before and since the Napoleonic wars closed.

It is moreover necessary to add that the final Napoleonic *coup d'état* was confirmed by an enormous popular majority ascertained by plebiscite.

The alleged causes of "drifting," as Lord Claren-



don said, into the Crimean War are various and well known: some writers asserted that the peace party of Bright and Cobden gave Nicholas I. the encouragement which led him to imagine that he could assail Turkey with impunity; while Liberal writers of the type of Sir Spencer Walpole believed that it was Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's return as Ambassador to Constantinople which proved the proverbial straw.

But a "circumstance" disclosed in the late Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister* (1884, Vol. I., p. 402) throws "an entirely new light on the causes of the Crimean War" (to quote Mr. Henry Reeve, *Greville Memoirs*, Part III., Vol. I., p. 545). It appears that the Czar, in 1844, during a visit to London, met the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Commander-in-Chief, and Lord Aberdeen, Foreign Secretary, and appended his own signature to a memorandum signed by these three statesmen, to the effect that if the custody of the Holy Places at Jerusalem came in dispute again at any time, Russia was to be supported without consulting France.

In 1853, when the question did once more arise, Peel and Wellington were dead; but as the survivor, Lord Aberdeen, had become Prime Minister, the Russian Emperor naturally thought his contention as to Muscovite supremacy over the Holy Shrines would not be questioned by England. When, however, the Government of Lord Aberdeen supported France and not Russia, Nicholas I. forthwith commenced his

famous conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour. There is under the circumstances a pathetic aspect in the death of the Czar Nicholas I. on March 2d, 1855, before peace was restored.

It will always seem probable that his action regarding the Holy Places was taken under a natural misapprehension.

Nicholas I. offered England, through Sir Hamilton Seymour, Crete and Egypt in return for the Russian forces being temporarily permitted to occupy Constantinople.

The guardianship of the Dardanelles and the international interest therein was not mooted amongst the Powers before the war closed in 1856.

After the Treaty of Paris had, in 1856, suppressed the yet smouldering Muscovite ambitions for at least fifteen years, England became involved in a struggle with her mutinous Sepoy army for the retention of Hindustan, and so it happened that the ball once set rolling paused but briefly on its warlike course.

I have prepared my readers in a previous chapter for Bismarck's dramatic accomplishment of the unfulfilled but patriotic efforts of Stein, Hardenberg, and Radowitz to secure the unity of Germany. Under the modern wizard's wand certain international obstacles in the teeth of which this great blessing to the Teutonic peoples was destined to be attained, one by one fell away like the dog-shores which hold a monster ironclad with apparently tenacious grasp before she plunges into that element for

which she was designed. Thus did William I. of Prussia, Bismarck, General von Roon, and Moltke—the greatest of modern strategists—successively rescue the German population of Schleswig-Holstein in October, 1864, drive Austria out of Germany in 1866, after Königgrätz—the most important of all battles in later Germany history—and create a North German Confederation, while finally crossing swords with Napoleon III. at Wörth, Gravelotte, Metz and Sedan in 1870. By the last-named battle the sway of Queen Hortense's son was relegated to the domain of history as completely as that once exercised by his great uncle and forerunner Napoleon I.

All these striking Continental events had taken place within eleven years, the apotheosis of modern Germany dating from that memorable day, January 18, 1871, when the veteran son of Frederick William III. was proclaimed Emperor in the mirrored hall of Louis the Fourteenth's Palace at Versailles.

The eleven years here mentioned include the constitutional struggle in the Berlin Parliament, culminating in 1863, when the King, Bismarck, and Von Roon combined to force the needed military changes on Prussia. Indeed, but for the Schleswig-Holstein embroglio of 1863-4 and consequent distraction, domestic revolution must have taken the place of triumphant foreign war, and the King and Bismarck might even have met the fate of Charles I. and Strafford. It should be remembered how the influence

of Lassalle, the able Socialist leader, was given to Bismarck's foreign policy at the crucial moment of Germany's history.

It is worthy of record that the two sovereigns of Germany and France—Victor and Vanquished in 1871—had alike contributed during the development of their rivalries towards the making of Italy into a Nation. But for Napoleon III. sending his army into Lombardy and there joining Piedmont in retaining that fair province by freely shedding French blood at Magenta and Solferino during 1859, that deliverance never could have been effected. On the other hand, men cannot forget that to the Emperor William and Bismarck, Italy greatly owes the inclusion of Venetia in her dominions, together with the ability to choose Rome as Capital, because unless the military force of Prussia had triumphed over Austria in 1866 Napoleon III. would not have been spurred on to bestow Venetia on the Italians, and to take his troops from the Eternal City, thenceforth rendered free to welcome Victor Emmanuel as king. And one parting word regarding the diplomatic triumphs of Cavour, the Bismarck of Italy, who, although he never lived to see Venetia added to Victor Emmanuel II.'s possessions, or to know Rome as Capital, yet by his clever diplomacy at Plombières, where in the summer of 1858 he met Napoleon III., laid the foundations of the Italian kingdom. Together with Mazzini and Garibaldi, without whose aid the edifice never could have ap-

proached completion, this astute statesman stands as one of the most famous of Continental Rulers in this long line passing before us.

It may be said of Count Cavour,—for he was of noble family and devoted all his influence, sacrificing every social advantage, to the single object of welding Italian populations into one monarchical whole under the House of Savoy,—that as Mary of England died with Calais graven on her heart, so did he mourn, to the day of his death in 1861, over the loss of Savoy and Nice—annexed by France after the Revolution of 1789—which Napoleon III. resolved to retain at all hazards when his promise to free Italy from Alps to Adriatic remained unfulfilled. Cavour's last words embodied his cherished ideal of a Free Church in a Free State, and it has not been the fault of the Italian Government if the late years of Pius IX. and the Papacy of Leo XIII. have not been spent under the former condition.

After 1871, Europe's centre of gravity shifted automatically from Paris to Berlin, despite the almost superhuman diplomatic efforts of the veteran Thiers; and men looked on the German Emperor and his Consort, whilome the Princess Augusta of Weimar, as exercising the sway associated for eighteen previous years with Napoleon III. and the Empress Eugènie. But the statecraft, savoring of duplicity, by which these vast changes had been brought about created almost as great consternation in Europe, especially amongst the smaller States, as the knowl-

edge that under the new system of conscription, prevailing to some extent after 1871 in Russia, Germany, Austria and France, numbers must in the long run tell, might gain power to tyrannize over right as it had never done since the great Napoleon lost Leipsic and Waterloo. Hence occurred that later grouping of the Continental Powers known as the Triple and Dual Alliances, Prince Bismarck having, before his surrender of power, welded together Germany, Austria and Italy in a firm defensive Union, which not even the subsequent "alliance" of the Czar Nicholas II. with Republican France—the word "alliance" being the Russian monarch's own, spoken in Paris—has in the slightest degree weakened.

It is worthy of record that when in 1848 the same understanding was talked of the Duke of Wellington, according to Raikes's *Diary*, remarked that the House of Romanoff would never make an abiding alliance with Republican France; but the great Duke, with all his forethought and wisdom, spoke twenty-two years before 1870 and the totally unexpected predominance of Germany.

That there had existed urgent cause for an adjustment of the balance of power when Russia abrogated the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of 1856, regaining the right to build ships of war in Sebastopol, the events of 1876-8 went to show, when Alexander II., the hitherto mild Ruler of Russia known as Liberator of the serfs and as revolting from the autocratic militarism of Nicholas I., tried—as Bismarck proves

in his *Reflections and Reminiscences*—to induce the Emperor William to stand aside while the Russian armies attacked Austria, and on receiving a diplomatic answer, negatively worded, prepared to launch his legions across the Danube, avowedly to assist the oppressed Christians of Turkey and of Bulgaria in particular, so that the checks sustained at Plevna and the “thus far and no further” jointly uttered by Austria and England after the Treaty of St. Stefano in 1878 were not so unmerited as the advocates of a Russian occupation of Constantinople would have wished the world to credit. The Emperor William had doubtless saved Europe from a more desolating conflict of a Continental character by his timely refusal to acquiesce in Austria’s destruction, while avoiding participation himself in a subsequent contest which Bismarck believed not worth (to Germany) the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.

And this beloved veteran Sovereign ever gave his vote for peace after the attainment of the German ideal in 1871.

Indeed, the noble character of the Emperor William I. was not altogether lost even on the nation whose ancient Palace he tenanted in the hour of Germany’s triumph; and the happy conjuncture of shrewd judgment with what Bismarck termed “the powerful and distinguished nature which was inborn in this Prince,” enabled him to preserve peace after 1871 with his vanquished rival, curbing splenetic

outbursts of military aggressiveness at Berlin such as threatened to convulse Europe in 1875.

"Perfectly free from vanity," "no one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face." "He was a gentleman expressed in terms of a king, a nobleman in the primary sense of the word, who never felt himself dispensed from the principle 'noblesse oblige' by any temptations of the power which belonged to him." "He held fast to honor and loyalty, not only towards princes, but also towards his servants."

Truly a noble picture, painted by his gifted Minister, Prince Bismarck, of the greatest continental ruler of his times, a worthy son of Queen Louisa. He paid the last debt of nature on March 9, 1888.

Even if, as has been said, the means used by Bismarck to make Germany were characteristic rather of Machiavelli than Hardenberg and Radowitz, yet the result which he so triumphantly achieved was that aimed at by the "broken purposes" of his patriot forerunner the Baron von Stein.

Born shortly before Waterloo, on April 1, 1815, Bismarck learned at Göttingen and Berlin to know and reverence the past glories of Germany; but studies, the character of which became manifest in his letters and speeches, of the reigns of Frederick William II. and III., did not apparently result in a genuine love for Representative Government. In this particular Bismarck was out of sympathy with Stein, whose devotion to the Constitutional ideal was un-



changing. How far Parliamentary power has suffered in Germany through this fact will not probably be known until the political ideas of the coming twentieth century have been fully developed.

A cloud passed over the career of Prince Bismarck, the most successful Continental ruler since the great Napoleon, during the brief reign of Frederick III., husband of the Princess Royal of England, and burst under the sway of the present Emperor William II.; yet the Iron Chancellor had thoroughly won the hearts of the German people, as his touching farewell at their hands proved in 1890.

The laconic statement of the present Kaiser, before taking the burden of state on his own youthful but strong shoulders, seemed to his subjects at the time but a poor palliative to their wild regrets. "The post of officer to the watch has fallen to my lot. Her course remains the same, so now, full steam ahead." Nor has it, at the moment I write, been possible to place either untimely changes of policy or, indeed, any irrevocable political mistake to the charge of this young Hohenzollern monarch whose fast ripening powers are the glory of his race.

That Prince Bismarck's political retirement was not deferred till his natural death in 1898 is perhaps to be lamented; but the course of events has likewise enjoined that the sceptre of Russia should fall into the hands of a youthful ruler in Nicholas II., whose mind has been improved by travel and by every means known to the Russian educational world.

When Alexander II., the liberator of the Serfs, became the victim by assassination of the Nihilist conspiracy on March 13, 1881, the crown fell upon the head of that most conservative, orthodox and peaceful of the Romanoffs, Alexander III., whose death at Livadia when only forty-nine spread consternation over Russia.

The Czar Nicholas II. has already been called on to watch over the project that will inevitably bring greater political and commercial changes over the Continents of Europe and Asia than any event hitherto recorded, namely, the great Siberian railway which, passing through part of Chinese Manchuria, is to have its terminus at Port Arthur. There has indeed been a pause in this great advancement, owing to the necessity of Russia joining with the other Powers in rescuing the Legations at Peking from the Boxers, but the railway remains safe. And, as if in anticipation of this wonderful project, more than one other Continental nation has entered on a career of colonization, thus seeking new scenes where swiftly increasing populations can find room to live and expand, if successful in governing the native races. Hence it is that France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium are competing for the soil of Africa with the English and the Boers who, at the moment I drop my pen, are engaged in a fierce and stubborn fight for paramountcy in the Transvaal, and, as many believe, in the whole of South Africa. It is sad to think of the venerable Empress-Queen Victoria

witnessing the sanguinary contest 6,000 miles from her Capital, even though England wages a defensive struggle to gain equal rights for all races and populations in that part of the world.

The Republic proclaimed in Paris after the surrender of Napoleon III. to the Prussians at Sedan in 1870 has stood its ground in France against powerful enemies, although the dread that General Boulanger would attain to the position of Continental Ruler between 1886-91 bears analogy to the apprehension of military domination felt during the Dreyfus trials and contingent agitations.

Before his demise the Comte de Chambord gave adhesion to the representative character of the Orleanist branch of the Bourbons, so enjoining that no disputed succession need prevent France from again taking a Ruler from her Royal House. Napoleon III. died in exile at Chiselhurst on January 9, 1873, and his son, the Prince Imperial, was killed in Zululand on June 1, 1879; the present Bonapartist heir is Prince Victor, grandson of Jerome, King of Westphalia.

In 1900 the Great Paris Exhibition of the year occupied the industrial energies of the Nation, and the Republic held the field.

There have been numerous administrations in France since 1870-1, but the names of those presiding over her Republic from time to time stand as security for the eminence of her real Rulers. Thiers, McMahan, Grévy, Carnot, Casimir Périer, the son

of the famous Orleanist statesman, Faure, and Loubet, who now ably presides over French destinies, form a representative list reflecting the prevailing Republican thought between 1870-1900.

One of the most gifted orators and statesmen of this epoch was the lamented Leon Gambetta; and the present Prime Minister, M. Waldeck Rousseau, is among the most fortunate and successful rulers of modern France.

The smaller States of Europe, Switzerland, Holland, Portugal and Belgium have everything to gain by the preservation of peace, although their existence has been previously sustained amidst wars of great magnitude.

Christian IX. of Denmark is one of the most respected Sovereigns of Europe; in British eyes he is honored as the father of our new Queen Alexandra.

I close this volume expressing a hope that the ancient monarchy of Spain, bereft of its historical colonial connection with the New World, may so husband its still powerful national resources as to assert its just position in the European system. That statesmen, taking wisdom from experience, may always surround the youthful sovereign, Alphonso XIII., is much to be desired.

The Hapsburg Monarchy in Austria seems to be threatened with a suppression of the Constitutional liberties gradually gained after Prince Metternich's fall, and that statesman's fear lest the enmities of rival races should render such mode of government

impossible, and even sap the foundations of the Empire, now seems amply justified. Indeed, the Emperor Francis Joseph has lately and significantly told the Czech leaders they must not interfere with the army.

The nearer Eastern Question may await the course of events in the Far East before renewed attempts to solve it are made; but the Sultan Abdul Hamid must know that not even his victory over Greece, the possession of a fine army, nor the favor of the Emperor William II. can really compensate for the horror felt by many well-wishers to Turkey (who dread her absorption by Russia) at the massacres, recalling those which accompanied the Greek Rebellion, which occurred during 1894--5, in the merciless suppression of Armenian conspiracies. Not even the excuse that cynical Muscovite intrigues contributed to this distressful dénouement, will suffice to save the Empire, rescued by Lord Beaconsfield at Berlin in 1878, when the day of reckoning comes, as it surely must, unless methods such as these are forever abandoned.

Russia has it in her power to assail Great Britain by threatening the Indian Frontier, entering the Persian Gulf, encroaching on the trade of the Yangtse-Kiang in China, or, when opportunity offers, by occupying Constantinople, either at the nominal desire of the Turks or on her own responsibility, and seizing the Dardanelles, outflanking Egypt in so doing. But the later actions of the German Emperor have led to the belief that the Dar-

danelles International Treaty will not so easily go the way of that concerning the Black Sea clauses, which the signatories sacrificed in 1871. Austria will necessarily be guided in defending her interests by the attitude of other Powers who signed the treaty of 1856.

That peace reigns on the Continent now is happily true, and the last words I write shall express my hope that such clouds as threaten it shall early in the new century be dispersed, and the institution of a Court of International Arbitration by Nicholas II. prove the success it deserves.

## APPENDIX A.

### SPAIN.

QUEEN ISABELLA, who when a child was sustained alike against Carlists and Republicans by Marshal Narvaaz as her minister, was destined to lose the Spanish throne on November, 1868, through the conspiracy of General Prim. This Revolution was indirectly the cause of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, owing to the Duke of Augustenburg, a Hohenzollern Prince, becoming candidate for the vacant throne.

The Duke d'Aosta, a Prince of the House of Savoy, came to Spain as King on January 2d, 1871, four days after Prim had been assassinated, and despite personal popularity only remained on the throne for two years.

The Carlist revolt having assumed serious proportions, the Bourbons regained the throne in the person of Queen Isabella's son, Alphonso XII., and at the close of the nineteenth century his heir, Alphonso XIII., was titular sovereign under the Regency of his mother, Maria Christina of Austria.

Although under these auspices Spain lost Cuba and the Philipines, neither Carlists nor Republicans seriously threatened the monarchy at the end of the century.

Canovas de Castillo, the conservative statesman who met a death from assassination, and Sagasta, the present liberal Premier, shared political influence in Spain during the Regency.

The Ex-Queen Isabella, daughter of Ferdinand VII., survives, and lives in France.

There is still a Carlist pretender in the so-called Charles VII., but the vitality of his partisans has never equalled that of 1834-35, in June of which year Zumalacarreguy, the De Wet of the Basque provinces, was killed near Bilbao. Had these fastnesses of the Peninsula been essential to Spanish existence as a nation, this born leader would have been reckoned high among the Continental Rulers, just as to this day he ranks prominently amongst guerilla leaders of the century.

### BELGIUM.

Leopold, King of the Belgians, uncle to Queen Victoria and husband of the Princess Charlotte, only daughter of George

IV., and afterwards of Louise, daughter of Louis Philippe, King of the French, died 10th December, 1865.

He was succeeded by his son, Leopold II., the present Sovereign, who married the Archduchess Maria Henrietta of Austria.

Heir, his brother Philip, Count of Flanders, born 24th March, 1837.

#### HOLLAND.

William III. came to the throne 1849 and died November, 1890.

Present Queen, Wilhelmina, his granddaughter.

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## APPENDIX B.

THE death of Queen Victoria on January 22d, 1901, marks an epoch in European history, for even if her late Majesty's remarkable personal influence in Germany as the grandmother of the Emperor William II. had not been felt on crucial occasions, when Prince Bismarck was Chancellor, the godchild of the Czar Alexander I. thence deriving the prefix "Alexandrina," and the niece of Leopold I., King of the Belgians, who was also the senior Sovereign by age and length of reign, necessarily left a great gap behind her in Continental capitals.

The mists of antiquity are proverbial, but those of contemporary history seem far deeper and impenetrable.

One fact, however, stands out clearly, and it is that the late Queen of Great Britain wrote to the Emperor William a letter during 1875, which induced that Monarch to deter the war party in Berlin from scheming longer in favour of a renewed contest with France, when that country was unprepared and without allies.

King Edward VII. cannot of course expect to exercise at will such an influence as this betokens. But the family position which rendered Queen Victoria's counsels so potent in Berlin and St. Petersburg is also the precious possession of a popular and not inexperienced Sovereign.

That it is impossible for Great Britain's attitude and that of her Reigning Family to be regarded with indifference, the course of the present volume has shown, because in an estimation of the balance of power, continual glances have been necessarily directed across the Channel and to the Court of St. James's, notwithstanding that the course of the story has not dealt primarily with the British Isles or their Dependencies.



If the first year of the twentieth century has been saddened by the loss of this great and good Queen, so is the sorrow of Europe unquenched at the tragic end of the murdered King Humbert of Italy, which darkened the last year of the previous century. Victor Emmanuel III. ascended the throne in his 32nd year on July 29th, 1900.



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


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