

THE CORNER-STONE

*of*

PHILIPPINE  
INDEPENDENCE

FRANCIS BURTON  
HARRISON



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**THE CORNER-STONE OF  
PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE  
A NARRATIVE OF SEVEN YEARS**







FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON  
Governor-General of Philippine Islands, October, 1913—February, 1921



# THE CORNER-STONE OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

A NARRATIVE OF SEVEN YEARS

BY

FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

OCTOBER, 1913—FEBRUARY, 1921

ILLUSTRATED WITH  
PHOTOGRAPHS



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To  
THE HON. MANUEL L. QUEZON  
FILIPINO PATRIOT  
AND  
LOYAL FRIEND



## PREFACE

**I**S the United States Government imperialistic? The American people, upon the whole, are not, but under our system of government a state of war may be forced upon the people and, as a result, foreign territories annexed without any clear understanding of the issue on the part of the voters. It is not the peculiar privilege of the Anglo-Saxon peoples to profess one principle and practise another, but, unfortunately, the other nations of the world already look with distrust upon our designs. Certainly our neighbors to the south and across the Pacific have their doubts as to our intentions. To them the acquisition of the Philippines and Porto Rico, Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands; our virtual protectorate over Cuba and Panama; our military expedition to Siberia, and the invasion by our marines of Hayti and the Central American States in recent years seem to justify suspicion. The average American citizen is usually not consulted in these matters; if he is, it is always our "honor" which is involved, or we are said to be acting in an unselfish desire to benefit the people whose country we invade. These, also, are the arguments used by the statesmen of the frankly imperialistic governments of Europe for their annexations of territory. If the United States is really embarked upon a course of empire, our people are entitled to know the truth and to express an opinion upon the policy. The cost in armaments is already prodigious; the ill-will toward us of the other nations of the world is growing. The price we may have to pay in foreign wars in the future may prove our ruin. Let us at least

consider, before it is too late, where the path will lead upon which our Government has taken the first steps.

The Philippines may well be the test case in this problem. We have thus far acted with unparalleled generosity toward the Filipinos, in giving them self-government and promising them their independence. They believe in us and in our promises; they were absolutely loyal to us during the war; they have made astonishing progress in self-government; they desire independence. The time is close at hand when we must redeem our promise, or else forfeit their confidence and good-will, and break our given word.

The following pages have been written in the hope of conveying to those at home who may read them an idea of what the Filipinos have done with the self-government we granted them in 1916. The purpose of the book is to portray their ideals and ambitions, their trials and problems, their accomplishments and development, rather than to describe the achievements of our fellow-countrymen in the islands. The writer is convinced that the Filipinos are now ready for independence, that they have already set up the stable government required of them by the Jones Act as a prerequisite, and that, in the words of President Wilson in 1920, in his last annual message to Congress, "It is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet."

FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON.

Caithnesshire, Scotland,  
September 10, 1921

# CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I INTRODUCTION . . . . .	3
II THE FILIPINO RACE . . . . .	10
III EARLIER YEARS OF AMERICAN OCCUPATION . . . . .	31
IV THE NEW ERA . . . . .	50
V FILIPINOS IN CONTROL OF THE LEGISLATURE . . . . .	60
VI FILIPINIZATION . . . . .	75
VII THE MOROS . . . . .	92
VIII CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN MOROLAND . . . . .	105
IX THE HILL TRIBES OF LUZON . . . . .	123
X THE AMERICAN GARRISON IN THE PHILIPPINES . . . . .	143
XI INCIDENTS OF WAR TIMES . . . . .	169
XII FILIPINO LOYALTY DURING THE WAR . . . . .	182
XIII THE JONES ACT . . . . .	192
XIV THE NEW FILIPINO GOVERNMENT . . . . .	202
XV THE FILIPINO LAWMAKERS . . . . .	216
XVI IN THE PROVINCES . . . . .	231
XVII NEW VENTURES IN COMMERCE AND FINANCE . . . . .	250
XVIII THE FILIPINO ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGNERS . . . . .	269
XIX THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES . . . . .	285
XX THE JAPANESE "MENACE" . . . . .	306
XXI EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES UPON THE EUROPEAN MASTERS OF ASIA . . . . .	320





## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	<i>Frontispiece</i> FACING PAGE
Francis Burton Harrison . . . . .	32
Part of the famous Zig-Zag, Benguet Road . . . . .	33
Pagsanhan Falls, Laguna Province . . . . .	48
Naguilian Road to Baguio . . . . .	49
Pasig River Front, Manila . . . . .	96
A bird's-eye view of the Luneta, Manila . . . . .	97
The Sultan of Jolo and other prominent Moros . . . . .	112
Government pier, Jolo . . . . .	113
Moro "Datos" or District Officials . . . . .	128
An old masonry bridge . . . . .	129
Typical modern concrete bridge . . . . .	160
Gilbert Bridge, Laoag, Ilocos Norte . . . . .	161
After a tropical rain . . . . .	176
A typical busy market-place . . . . .	177
Primary school pupils of the public schools of the Philippine Islands	208
Hon. Manuel L. Quezon . . . . .	208
Hon. Sergio Osmeña . . . . .	209
Old Council of State of Philippine Islands, July, 1920 . . . . .	209
New Council of State of Philippine Islands, July, 1920 . . . . .	224
Cocoonut rafts, Pagsanhan River, Laguna . . . . .	225
Gathering nipa sap . . . . .	272
Marienda at home of Mauro Prieto in Mariquina . . . . .	273
Transplanting rice . . . . .	288
William Jennings Bryan and Francis Burton Harrison . . . . .	289
Columbian Association, Manila, February, 1921 . . . . .	



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# THE CORNER-STONE OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

## A NARRATIVE OF SEVEN YEARS

### CHAPTER I

#### INTRODUCTION

WHY should n't you be governor-general, yourself?" asked Manuel L. Quezon, delegate to Congress from the Philippines. This was on August 18, 1913, at the end of a long conversation in his office in the House of Representatives in Washington. I had been trying to persuade Mr. Quezon to support the candidacy of a friend whom I thought eminently qualified for the position. It appeared, however, that the President did not look with favor upon his candidacy. The idea of my own appointment struck me with amazement, as I was then engaged in an entirely different kind of work, in the House of Representatives during the revision of the tariff.

Mr. Quezon at once enlisted the support of Mr. William A. Jones, the veteran Representative from Virginia and Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, who in turn interested Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State, and four days later President Wilson sent my name to the Senate, which body, out of courtesy to a member of Congress, suspended the rules and at once confirmed the nomination. So in less than a week

after the first suggestion was made I found myself destined to immediate departure from all my customary surroundings and occupations and to an entirely novel service as the chief executive of the Philippines, twelve thousand miles away.

At a meeting of Members of Congress, a few evenings later, at the Washington home of Representative Kent of California, I was presented, through the genial offices of the Speaker, Champ Clark, with a souvenir from the House of Representatives as a token of goodwill. Speeches were made by leaders of the different political factions, including the Republican minority leader, James A. Mann, and Representative Victor Murdock from Kansas, for the Progressives.

I then made the acquaintance of General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, a stanch and true friend in many an hour of subsequent political trial, and of Major-General Wood, who was cordiality itself. A few days later I met my immediate chief, Mr. Garrison, the Secretary of War, who had been absent on a tour of the army posts of the West at the time of my appointment. On the tenth of September my party sailed from San Francisco on the Pacific Mail liner *Manchuria*, westward bound.

These personal incidents are introduced to show the atmosphere of kindly good-will in official circles which surrounded my venture into this new line of public service, an atmosphere from which political partizanship was entirely lacking, and which left me utterly unprepared for the political hornets' nest into which I stepped upon arrival in Manila. The distant horizon seemed very bright. To be sure, I was conscious of the possibilities of international troubles to

come, for I remember my farewell to my lifelong friend James W. Gerard, just appointed Ambassador to Germany, when I told him that he and I were going to the two places in the world where something was likely to happen. It happened to him!

My experiences in the Philippines, while of an unexpected nature, were only such as any man should be prepared to face if charged with putting into effect in a remote station a policy which runs counter to the wishes or ambitions of his fellow-countrymen on the spot. All through my service I received generous support from the President and in Congress, where there was no disposition to play politics with Philippine administration. When, later on, the Republicans gained control of Congress, nothing was ever done by them to embarrass or interfere with the Philippine situation. From Americans in the islands I received very little support.

President Wilson, with his fine inspiration for political liberties, and in accordance with the successive pronouncements of Democratic platforms, was determined to bring self-government to the Filipinos and hasten the day of their independence. He would not appoint any American resident of the Philippines to the Philippine Commission. In a long conversation, the Sunday morning before I left Washington, he gave me in general terms his instructions as to Philippine self-government. I found him wonderfully well informed as to Philippine conditions, as I had previously found him a master of the intricacies of tariff revision. He was then, as always, when I have been privileged to meet him, of the most charming courtesy. In after years, thinking over this conversation with



him, I could find only one point upon which he seemed to me to have been misinformed. He told me that the Filipinos were so afraid of the Moros that one Filipino regiment had thrown down its arms and refused to go into action against them. I was never able to trace that story to its source, and all my own observation leads me to believe that the Filipino, equally well armed and reasonably well led, is the match for the Moro in any circumstances.

Upon leaving the White House, I met at the Metropolitan Club the Hon. Charles E. Magoon, formerly Governor of the Canal Zone and of Cuba. He told me of his "instructions" upon his last appointment. Passing through Washington, he was invited to the White House to dinner. As he greeted Mr. Roosevelt, the President put his finger on Magoon's shirt stud and said: "You to Cuba." "What instructions do you give me, Mr. President?" Mr. Roosevelt replied: "Go see Root." Next morning Governor Magoon reported to Secretary Root for instructions, and the secretary said, "Oh, well, I have no instructions; just go govern." This was as laconic as President Grant's advice to the Japanese, when, during his trip around the world, they asked him how they could learn the art of self-government. "Govern yourselves!" was the reply.

Few judges elected to executive office make successful administrators; their inclination is to spend all their time weighing the pros and cons of every question, when what is needed are decision and despatch. Few legislators find their previous experience particularly useful in executive office; their training is all toward talk, and then more talk, and divided responsi-



bility; they have, however, one characteristic of prime advantage in a democratic as opposed to an autocratic system: they have a proper appreciation of that peculiar psychology known as the legislative mind, and an earnest disposition to learn public opinion. The great danger to an executive, after all, is that he shall come to rely more and more exclusively on his own opinion, and lose touch with the public. In my farewell call upon Secretary Bryan I expressed the hope that with the great powers given by law to the Governor-General of the Philippines I should not become autocratic. That hope and my desire to bring all the liberties possible to the Filipino people were my qualifications for the office with which President Wilson and the Senate had entrusted me.

There is no room in the United States Constitution for colonies; officially speaking, we have none. Alaska and Hawaii are territories; Porto Rico and the Philippines dependencies, or insular possessions. Guam, Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone—all are naval or military stations. There are few traditions of colonial service in the United States. Perhaps that very freedom from fixed ideas and red-tape has enabled our Government to make a swifter development of policy than is possible in the European colonial offices. There is no great body of "elder statesmen" returning home after a lifetime of colonial service with hidebound opinions as to how things should be done, determined to resist any and all changes in their ideas of colonial management. The arguments in favor of a permanent Colonial Civil Service are, after all, similar to those in behalf of a permanent body of diplomatic officers; the drawbacks are the same. Such permanent officials

imbibe, in the one case, a rigid caste attitude toward the "subject races," and in the other they are affected by the atmosphere of ceremonial court intrigue and do not keep up with the progress of thought in the home land. The British, an intensely practical race, select for viceroy of their greatest possession, India, not a member of the Indian Civil Service, but some man fresh from active public life at home.

Up to 1913, the only traditions of Philippine service known in the United States were those of the "Taft dynasty," as it became known, which began with Mr. Taft's inauguration as civil governor in 1901 and continued in unbroken succession through his terms as Secretary of War and President. The generous sympathies and wise liberalism of his earlier management of the Philippine problem, which won over many Filipinos to support American policies, seem to have dwindled and vanished as he grew older and as he fell out of personal touch with the Philippines. Later a bureaucracy was built up around his policy, assuming toward the subject race all the hard and patronizing superiority typical of European colonial administrators of modern times. Distrust of the Filipino and a determination to see him kept as a dependent as long as possible were the new features of the policy. The governors-general who succeeded Mr. Taft were as able and conscientious a set of administrators as our country could wish for, but the Filipinos were becoming yearly more restless and dissatisfied, and the Chief of Constabulary, General Harry H. Bandholtz, had predicted in his report for 1912 the probability of disturbances in the provinces. Growing distrust and ill-feeling between the two races were more evident each

year. The Taft dynasty, which had done so much for the Filipinos, and made such a contribution to the problem of colonial government, seemed to have reached the end of its rope. Its representatives could not go backward, and were unwilling to move forward; they had started a national movement in the Philippines, and then wished to arrest it in mid-career; they had found that such principles as liberty and self-government cannot be turned on and off like water from a tap, however benevolent the hand in control. An explosion was to be expected soon.

## CHAPTER II

### THE FILIPINO RACE

**W**HAT are the Philippines, and where are they? These were the questions asked by the average American when news came that the United States had acquired title to these strange and far-away lands, by the Treaty of Paris in December, 1898. It was explained that they are a group of about three thousand islands, half-way around the world from us; that they had been held by our recent foes, the Spanish, for more than three and a half centuries; and, above all, that Manila Bay was the scene of the naval victory which brought undying fame to Admiral Dewey. They looked very small upon the map of the Eastern Hemisphere, and it was difficult to believe that their land surface was as large as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware combined; as large as Great Britain and slightly smaller than Japan. The islands were known to contain a population larger than about twenty of the modern states of the world. Concerning the inhabitants of these scattered islands virtually nothing was then known in the United States. It is true that Dewey had reported that the Filipinos were more fit for self-government than the Cubans, but others described them as ferocious head-hunting savages. The best-known expression of Filipino sentiment was the farewell hymn of patriotism written by Dr. José Rizal the night before his execution by the Spanish in

1896, which had caused a stir of sympathy around the world. But the chief source of our knowledge were Spanish writers who were evidently anxious to justify their administration of the islands, and, so far as the native inhabitants were concerned, their chronicles of later centuries were mainly the type of literary effort which a jailer might be expected to produce concerning prisoners behind the bars. The writings of Rizal and of European scientists and travelers such as La Gironière, Jagor, and Blumentritt, were virtually unknown in America.

It is not my purpose, of course, to write a history of the Philippines; others far better qualified than I are producing, year by year, "histories" of the past. But it is fair to enquire, What is history? Is it anything more than the deduction a certain man makes from certain (or uncertain) facts? Do not most historians start with a concrete thesis, and then develop it to suit themselves? Were we not all brought up to worship at the shrine of Napoleon, Alexander, and Cæsar? And now comes H. G. Wells and outlines all three as unmitigated curses to the human race; the third Napoleon, he says, was a much abler and more astute man than the first; Alexander was a vain and drunken adventurer. Ferrero tells us that the historic romance of Antony and Cleopatra was merely a political alliance to dominate the eastern half of the Roman Empire. Even statistics, as every legislator knows, can often be used to prove opposite arguments upon the same point. The people of each great nation are convinced that their own culture is superior to that of all others and their own flag the only real symbol of justice and honor.



In attempting a very brief review of the history of the Philippines, I wish to admit my own bias, which has been acquired not by deliberate intent but through nearly eight years of effort to understand the Filipino people, and from many travels in other lands: it is that possession of national characteristics by accident of birth is a fallacy; that pride of race is justly based only upon the training and collective circumstances of existing racial life,—not upon inherited race instinct; that men are all, by nature, very much the same, with similar mental processes, wants, and ambitions, given a similar training and environment; that the brotherhood of man is a fact, and that a profound philosophical truth is embodied in the statement that “all men are *created* equal.” Nothing arouses so much fury and resentment among a certain class of writers as the phrase just quoted from our Declaration of Independence. The inequality of men comes from their training and education, not from their physical birth. Our fetters, mental and political, are imposed upon us by our fellow-man; our failures to attain a moderate level of civilization are due to lack of opportunity, or to the selfishness, rapacity, egotism, bigotry, or superstition of others.

Most of the travelers' tales of the great age of modern exploration, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are replete with purely superficial observations upon the different races of man. The ordinary modern of European descent regards any difference from his own type as not only a mark of inferiority but an absolute offense. He cites differences of the sort as arguments why such people as exhibit them should

be either exterminated or else subjected and made to work for his benefit. Least of all is he willing to admit that these peoples are capable of adopting or assimilating his own standard of civilization. Finally, he is usually ignorant concerning the facts of the immediate past of his own nation, and is not told how very recent is anything like general education among the peoples of the Western world. There is a fascinating and as yet almost unexplored field of theory and conjecture as to the striking resemblances of custom and adornment of ancient mankind, in all widely different portions of the world. Historically speaking, the marked differences in the races of modern man are acquired, not inherent. As James Bryce says in his recent great work on "Modern Democracies": "All fairly normal men have like passions and desires. They are stirred by like motives, they think upon similar lines."

The Filipinos are of Malay descent. In the dim ages of the past, their ancestors came from the nest of the human races in central Asia. A stream of Mongoloid emigration poured down in successive waves from behind the mountains of eastern Tibet, and over what is now southern China, Siam, Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies. The Filipino of to-day is first cousin to the natives of Java and Sumatra, and second cousin to the Siamese. These prehistoric emigrants were quick to take up the life of the water, since, in the impenetrable jungles along their route, the rivers and tidal shores offered the easiest means of travel. They became hunters and fishermen, perforce abandoning the pastoral life of their ancestors, and bold sailors, slipping from land to land across

the eastern seas. Their type of village was not unlike that of the ancient lake-dwellers in Switzerland, the houses built on tall piles, out over the water, for purposes of protection as well as sanitation. A perfect type of these ancient villages survives to-day in Brunei, a British protectorate in west Borneo, but the city is fast dwindling and will soon be gone forever.

The government of these people was purely patriarchal, like that of their far-away forebears in central Asia. Their villages were largely self-governing communities, presided over by a chief whose office had become hereditary. At different times these villages combined in confederacies, or were conquered and bound into a kingdom. The village communities were self-sustaining, and travel was impelled chiefly by desire for conquest or because of over-population. Commerce was brought to them by the Chinese or the Arabs, and agriculture by the natives of India. The free and adventurous spirit of the hunter and the roving fisherman developed a brave and reckless type which in later ages came to be known for a guerilla warfare by sea that stamped them as pirates. Those who so called them had, themselves, possibly as good a title to the name.

The Philippine Islands were settled by adventurous voyagers who made their way thither in small boats, from the islands of Java and Sumatra. We can picture them in their long, slender vintas with bamboo outriggers, the paddles beating in unison, the warriors chanting, with sword and spear ready at hand; we can see their eager faces as they leap ashore from the sparkling waters of Manila Bay



to found the nucleus of a nation which now, long ages after, is growing to manhood. So the invading Danes, Angles, and Saxons, a little later on in history, must have appeared to the terrified inhabitants of early Britain. Early Chinese and Arabic chronicles refer to large settled communities in what are now the islands of Jolo, Mindoro, and Luzon as long ago as the fourth century. Through the Middle Ages infusions of Chinese and Japanese blood from the north and of Hindu from the south were marked, and many evidences of such ancestral strains are visible to-day. Nor, when these Malay wanderers first reached the islands, were they uninhabited. The original native type known to-day as the Negrito, a very small black man with woolly hair, had already been forced to take to a nomadic life, in the dense forests of the higher mountains, by the Indonesians, who were bolder, better armed, and better organized. They in turn were the ancestors of the peoples known to-day as the Igorots and Ifugaos, and were later on driven into the mountains by the successive waves of Malay immigration. There are to-day in the Philippines about 70,000 Negritos<sup>1</sup> of more or less pure blood, and about 400,000 other mountaineers of non-Malay types, in whom, however, there is a strong infusion of Malay or Polynesian blood. Most of the remaining population of the islands, totaling 10,300,000 in the census of 1918,

<sup>1</sup> Professor H. Otley Beyer, in "Population of the Philippine Islands in 1916," gives the following figures:

Unclassified Pagan Peoples (mostly aboriginal primitive types):

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| 1. Distinct Negrito and Negroid types..... | 35,926 |
| 2. Non-Negroid or Semi-Negroid types.....  | 46,015 |

Total	81,941
-------	--------

are of a fairly uniform Malay type.<sup>1</sup> They are of medium stature, with brown complexion and straight black hair and virtually no beard or mustache; their eyes are black or dark brown, set rather slanting under an intelligent brow; their muscular development is excellent, with broad shoulders, slender waists, and small hands and feet. They are brave, active, graceful, and inured to a hardy outdoor life, and still devoted to the chase and fond of living on or near the water. An indication that the race, before entering the tropics, was originally much lighter in color may be found in the fact that the new-born infants are generally paler of complexion than their parents.

It is the custom to deny to the Malay people the traditions of great organized government. The individualism of isolated village life is an obstacle to centralized power. But many times in recorded history empires vast in territory but sparse in population have been founded by Malay chieftains, formed from shifting groups of lesser kingdoms. Many of their royal families to-day, shorn of their powers, still claim descent from such heroes of antiquity as Alexander and Mohammed. The greatest of all their efforts at empire was that of Madjapahit of Java, for the history of which in relation to the Philippines I am indebted to Professor H. Otley Beyer of the University of the Philippines.

<sup>1</sup> In the Philippine Census of 1920 the population of the islands is estimated as follows:

Christian population .....	9,463,731
Mohammedan .....	394,964
Pagans .....	437,622
Other religions .....	54,413
Total	10,350,730

In a quarrel between princes of the leading house in Java in 1292, Raden Widjaya appealed to the Chinese Emperor Kublai Khan for aid; the Great Khan sent two of his ablest generals, with a large fleet and twenty thousand troops. With their assistance, Raden Widjaya established himself upon the throne and then turned upon his Chinese allies, driving them out of Java with a loss of more than three thousand men. From them he had learned the use of firearms, which explains his subsequent success in founding a large empire and subjugating all his neighbors. The greatest of the line of rulers of Madjapahit was the fourth, named Hayam Wuruk, and it was during his reign of fifty years in the fourteenth century that the empire attained its greatest dimensions, including the whole Malay Archipelago, Borneo, Celebes, and the Philippines, as well as Java and Sumatra. The kindred races in Siam and Cambodia were rendered tributary. Indian-Javanese culture spread rapidly through the empire, and many evidences of it survive to-day. In the Philippines the chief centers of the imperial power, as mentioned in their records, were on Manila Bay, near Lake Lanao in Mindanao, and in Sulu. There and in many other places traces of their culture survive; even among such primitive peoples as the pagan Mangyans of Mindoro, the inhabitants to-day communicate with one another in the old Indian syllabic writing. The imperial federation was finally overthrown by the Mohammedan incursions from the west. To them and to the first Spanish priests is due the destruction of the ancient culture of the people of the Philippines.

In considering the Philippines, the importance of

this long membership in the empire of Madjapahit, lasting nearly two centuries, is not often appreciated. This was the time of greatest civilization in ancient Java. The reforms of Buddha, revived in India by the great King Asoka, and soon stifled there by the priestcraft, had flourished in Java for many centuries. The best ideas of early Hindu culture, the traditions of prehistoric Aryan ideas, and many words of Aryan origin, were thus disseminated through the islands of the East Indies. The Philippines received their share, and to-day many of the personal traits or manners of simple village life there, especially the very things which strike Americans as peculiar, are also to be noted by the most casual observer in India. It is not too much to state that the long-cherished traditions of Hindu culture as apart from religion, surviving almost without effort or intention through the ages, are to-day the key to Filipino character. The very name of the most numerous division of the Filipinos—Visayans—is the Vishaya, or merchant and landowning class of the Aryan Rig-Vedas. Fortunately for the Filipinos, the grotesque religious customs of the modern Brahmin priests seem never to have reached them; their instruction was received from the purer, more spiritual, and infinitely more decent priesthood of the reformed Buddhistic schools in Java.

Then came the great wave of Mohammedan conquest. It was carried to Mindanao and Sulu by the petty kings of Sumatra, the Malay Straits, and Borneo. By the fifteenth century, Mohammedanism was firmly established in Sulu and Mindanao. Proselyting with fire and sword was being carried forward zealously, from island to island. Then came the Portuguese and



the Spaniards, and under the latter the Cross and Crescent met in combat in the southern islands of the Philippines, and continued in fierce conflict at intervals down to the very days of American occupation. Like the Christian invaders of a later day, the Moham-medans brought monotheism to the Philippines, but they also taught abhorrence of idolatry, and established, among all true believers, a rough form of social democracy.

The year 1521 is one of the great dates of Philippine history, in fact, the first authentic date of European records. Then it was that Fernando Magellan, the Portuguese navigator in the employ of the King of Spain, landed at Cebú, and thus ended his immortal voyage of adventure, and, incidentally, lost his life. The peoples of Malaysia were not without a rough kind of armor,—indeed, not without cannon. But the Spanish arms and equipment were superior. Cautious negotiations with the King of Cebú led to a few conversions to Christianity. To strengthen the impression already made, Magellan offered to attack and subdue the petty rival of the King of Cebú across the narrow straits, on Mac-tan Island; he boastfully insisted that he could do it with only a handful of his own men. He promptly met his death, overwhelmed by numbers. When his one surviving ship completed the voyage around the world, the King of Spain remarked that it was lucky for Magellan that he had lost his life when he did, adding that he would have received worse than death if he had returned home, because of his conduct in the newly “discovered” lands.

It was not until the arrival of Legaspi in 1565 that Spain really tried to colonize her new possessions in

the East Indies. This really great man extended the sway of his sovereign through most of the Visayas and Luzon by peaceful and sympathetic negotiations, and his work was ably carried on by his grandson, Juan Salcedo. From that day until the surrender of Manila to the American forces, Spain held the Philippines under her dominion, except for a brief interval in 1792 when England occupied the islands.

Many volumes have been written concerning the three hundred and fifty years of Spanish rule in the Philippines, but comparatively little about the Filipinos of those days. In other words, the Filipinos are generally referred to scornfully as "Indios" (Indians), while pages are devoted to glorification of Spanish exploits and achievements. The best that can be said of Spain in the islands is that she christianized them, and thus set up the only Christian country in the Orient,—with much of Christianity's modern outlook upon life. To the women, particularly, Christianity brought dignity and freedom from Hindu and Mohammedan degradations.

While the Spanish conquistadores of the vast empire in America held the sword in the right hand and the cross in the left, their chief interest was economic. Millions of unhappy Indians perished around the shores of the Caribbean to satisfy the Spanish adventurers' lust for wealth, as the good Father las Casas testifies. The Spanish Viceroy Toledo, in Peru, estimated that in the seventeenth century there were eight million Incas living; in two hundred years these had been reduced to eight hundred thousand. Fate was kinder to the inhabitants of the Philippines. Here were little gold and no silver, no precious stones, ex-

cept pearls, no mines to be worked. To be sure, the Spanish arms and military organization in the early days in the Philippines destroyed much of the existing culture; forced labor was pitilessly imposed in the shipyards and in construction of the monumental churches which still exist; conscript service in the army for purposes of further conquest broke up thousands of homes; the priests in zealous rage against paganism destroyed all existing records, all writings and works of art, as they did in Mexico, in the belief that all that was not Christian must be anti-Christian. One Spanish priest boasted of having destroyed more than three hundred scrolls written in the native characters. Early Spanish writers admit that literacy was fairly wide-spread when they took the Philippines,—more than could be said of the Spain of that day; certainly the literacy of the “Indios” was greater than that of the contemporary Incas of Peru or the Aztecs. Few pre-Spanish records survive to-day. However much we may lament this destruction of a culture, we must admit that in its place the Spanish gave, to a limited number of Filipinos at least, access to the splendid tongue of old Castile, and through that to all the glories and traditions of European civilization. Those interested in the pre-Spanish culture of the islands may find much of interest in the publications of Professor Austin Craig of the University of the Philippines.

Spanish administration of the Philippines, measured by modern standards, was a failure. The colony was poor and far from the source of government. Seldom could the Spanish Crown induce the best men to go to Manila; many of those who went, it is to be feared,

were induced by the hope of clearing up a great fortune outside their official salaries. Governmental policies, on the economic side especially, were monopolistic, narrow, and foolish in the extreme. Once a year a galleon sailed from Acapulco, Mexico, to Manila, and then sailed back with the change in the monsoon. Foreign traders were jealously excluded. China regularly drained the Philippines of the Mexican currency brought over by the galleons; very little progress was made in developing the islands, or in educating and elevating the people. To sum it all up, it might almost be said that the Philippines sank into a deep sleep, to be awakened at last by Dewey's guns.

It was, however, as a field for missionary endeavor that the Philippines were chiefly valued through these centuries by His Most Catholic Majesty. The government soon became theocratic in substance, if not in form. The Archbishop of Manila was nearly always the real power. A governor-general who did not submit to the archbishop and the religious orders was soon recalled to Spain. Governor-General Bustamante, indeed, in 1719, tried to reform the religious orders, and was killed on the steps of his own palace by agents of the priests. In the provinces, each village was under the actual rule of a priest. So absolute was the control of the priesthood that no large army was needed to keep the people in subjection.

It is easy enough to point out instances of malfeasance on the part of these ecclesiastical authorities. Religious rule in civil affairs will hardly ever withstand the searching tests of modern criticism; too much is done by favor, and too little with justice; character is stifled, and dogma is substituted for intel-



ligence. Progress is difficult and independence of thought savagely stamped out. Nevertheless, according to their lights and measured by the standard of their day and generation, most of these priests did the best they could for their flocks. Many of them were, indeed, men of integrity and piety; many, moreover, gave their people new forms of agriculture and industry. For two hundred and fifty years we hear of few attempts at general revolt. There are few black deeds to record such as stain the pages of other colonial histories. Nevertheless, these long years of priestly domination are musty with the dust of a stationary civilization. The priests imposed their religion upon the people, but in turn imbibed some of their superstitions and gave them back others.

The present Archbishop of Manila, Monsignor O'Doherty, a man of learning and piety, agrees with me, unqualifiedly, upon the advantages of the present separation of Church and State.

In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines showed unmistakable evidences of decay and weakness. How different Philippine history might have been if the present popular and enlightened King Alfonso XIII had then been on the throne! Exercise of autocratic power by the governors, both civil and ecclesiastical, had led to gross abuses of power. In the decades from 1850 onward greed and arrogance marked the religious orders, which had absorbed most of the riches and the best lands. The meager recognition of the people, on the part of the Government, grew less and less. The formation of secret societies among the people was discovered and led to savage reprisals. The last Span-

ish archbishop, Nozaleda, was the most bloodthirsty of the ecclesiastics. The Filipino poet Rizal was executed for his supposed responsibility for revolutionary movements, though his books, which were then not allowed to be circulated, show that his main protests were against the excesses of the priests, and his chief demand was that the people should be educated. The insurrection of 1896 broke out under Andres Bonifacio and the Spanish authorities were unable to suppress it. Aguinaldo soon became the military leader of his people. A compromise followed, which left matters in a state of suspended animation until the war with the United States burst upon unhappy Spain soon afterward.

In wealth, in education, in political rights, the mass of the Filipinos had advanced but little in the three and a half centuries of Spanish rule. In each locality, it is true, the sons of the leading men were selected for education at Santo Tomás University (founded in 1611) and the other church colleges in Manila. The more ambitious were sent later by their parents to complete their education in Spain, France, and Germany. Groups of these young men took part in the various liberal movements of nineteenth-century Europe. They wrote and spoke in behalf of liberal institutions for their countrymen at home, in terms which would have cost them their lives in the Philippines; Rizal was put to death upon his return to his native land.

In Spain several of these young Filipinos rose to eminence in the public service, a right which was denied them at home except in a few cases in the minor judiciary. In the eighties and nineties a brilliant

group of young men—of which Rizal, the painter Juan Luna, M. H. del Pilar, Lopez Jaena, and Dr. Pardo de Tavera were the leading spirits—made a deep impression in the literary and artistic circles of Madrid, Paris, and Berlin. A newspaper was founded by them in Madrid to further their political views. Although proscribed in the Philippines, their books and articles were circulated *sub rosa* in the islands and helped to consolidate the growing unrest. The secret society “Katipunan” added thousands to its rolls. The Masonic Order was particularly hated and suspected by the Government. At the time of the revolution of 1896 against Spain, scores of prominent Masons were arrested on the instigation of the church authorities and imprisoned in Fort Santiago; many of them were led before the firing-squad on the old Bagumbayan, now the Luneta, in Manila.

Twenty years later, I had the pleasure of entertaining about eight hundred Masons in Malacañan Palace, the very spot from which the execution of so many members of the order had been decreed. In Tondo, the poorer quarter of Manila, there stands a monument to these Masonic martyrs, in charge of one of the survivors of those days, Timoteo Paez. I asked him recently whether those whose lives had been given in the days of revolution would be satisfied if they were alive to-day, and he answered simply: “En este dia, estabamos ‘Indios’; hoy dia, somos Filipinos. [In that day we were ‘Indians’; now, we are Filipinos.]”

In Spain itself the attitude of the court and people was not unfriendly to the Filipinos. The Spaniard at home has little of what the Anglo-Saxon races know as race prejudice. At one time delegates from the

Philippines were admitted to the Spanish Cortes, but subsequently this privilege was withdrawn. Promises of liberal reforms were made from time to time, and then promptly forgotten. Liberal governors-general were sent out occasionally, only to fall before the reactionary stand of the Church in the islands, backed, as it probably was, by the united body of Spanish residents. Such liberals were succeeded by conservatives of the strictest kind, such as General Weyler, known to us as "Butcher Weyler" from his government in Cuba just before the Spanish-American War. At the behest of the friars Weyler terminated a dispute between tenants and landlords of the friar lands in Calamba by sending out the artillery and shooting down the tenants.

The pitiful decline in the ability of Spanish government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so dramatically portrayed by Buckle in his *History of Civilization*, had, of course, its reflex action in the Philippines. Vanished was the class of zealous, inspired priests and bold military adventurers who had been sent to the Philippines in an earlier age. Priests were too often drawn from the most ignorant type of peasant family, except, of course, those of the Jesuit Order, of whom there were always very few in the islands. Governors, too, were often needy noblemen, sent out to recoup their fortunes; lesser government officials too frequently favorites or *parientes* of persons influential at court, without any qualifications for colonial service,—indeed, sometimes entirely illiterate. With men of these types a haughty and arrogant suppression of the Filipinos was due not, perhaps, to race prejudice, but to a secret determination to assert for



the Spanish race a superiority which, in their own hearts, they knew they did not individually possess. At any rate, social equality was rarely accorded even to the educated Filipino, and to the governors talk of political equality was, of course, rank treason. When the storm burst, all classes of Filipinos, from the highest to the lowest, joined in the insurrection, and the fight was of the fiercest nature.

One of the leaders of those days, General Juan Cailles of Laguna, known later to the American Army as a gallant and courtly opponent, told me recently of the violent hatred of the Spaniards with which the Filipinos went into battle. His forces would fire four or five rounds from the fifty odd rifles they possessed and then his five thousand men would close in at a rush with the bolo, absolutely irresistible except to well-placed artillery. No wonder the feeble and inefficient Spanish Government was unable to suppress the insurrection.

And what of the great mass of Filipinos during these centuries? The novels of José Rizal, sympathetically translated into English as "The Social Cancer" and "The Reign of Greed," give a profoundly touching picture of the wrongs and oppressions of his fellow-countrymen,—at least, of those upon the vast friar estates. He paid with his life for these books, but if he foresaw coming events he must have felt that the sacrifice was well worth while.

It would be idle, however, to assert that all the governing class throughout the islands were of the type portrayed by Rizal, or that this excess of greed and arrogance on their part had been of very long standing; no people would have long endured it, least of

all the proud and self-respecting Filipinos; indeed, the insurrection was their answer to it. The greater part of the Filipino people during these centuries, especially in the less settled regions, were performing their daily round of agricultural toil under more or less the same conditions as had their ancestors for generations in the past,—a few hectares of rice land, or coffee-bushes, a cool and pleasant bamboo house in a grove of glorious mango-trees, the patient carabao to do the plowing and take the grain to market, here and there roads and bridges to connect the little farm with the outer world, and monumental churches for hours of religion, art, and social life. Patriarchal or feudal life in the remote districts was still the order of the day. Authority, always of powerful influence in Malay history, was elevated to the rank of a religion. In the villages a modified form of self-government was permitted, though the local priest was always the power behind the throne and the court of last resort. Schools were maintained by the *padres*, and instruction given in the native tongue,—in rare instances in Spanish. These schools were, however, skilfully used by the Spanish to accentuate and develop the differences in local dialects. Theirs was the principle “Divide and rule.” Originally all speaking the Malay tongue, the Filipinos were encouraged through these centuries to enlarge and enrich the local differences of pronunciation, until to-day the Ilocano, the Tagalog, and the Visayan can hardly converse with one another except through English or Spanish. The grammars written by the priests accomplished their purpose. Writing was discouraged by them except upon the religious themes prescribed by the priest himself. Dr. Niewen-

haus, the head of the youthful but rapidly growing Educational Department of Java, upon his second visit of inspection to the Philippines recently, told me that in Java, in twenty years, the people had broken down the differences between their five dialects and fused them all again into one Malay tongue; it was his opinion that we could, with our much larger public-school system in the Philippines, amalgamate the large number of local dialects into one tongue within five years of teaching in the primary grades.

Finally, the rule of Spain came to an abrupt end through a joint assault by American and Filipino arms. More than three centuries of human life had been passed in a dream of religious government. The *civitas dei* which animated the noblest souls of medieval Europe reached a qualified reality in the Philippines. The final abuses of power and departure from the earlier and higher standards naturally brought their own punishment. Her Oriental empire is forever lost to Spain, and to-day comparatively little of Spanish influence and Spanish culture remains to testify to her long domination of the Philippines. With the older generation this in turn will pass away before the practical directness of the American school system. Only in the Church, invigorated and reformed, will the Spanish heritage long endure.

It is the custom among many Americans to refer carelessly to the Filipinos as 'Spanish-Americans. They have never been truly Spanish, and are not American by race. They might have, in a truer sense, possessed the Spanish culture of the past, had their masters educated them in the beautiful idiom of Castile, but this the Spaniards refused to do. Many Filipino

intellectuals to-day still prefer and admire the Latin culture, but this was always denied to the common people. A few traces of the Spanish social system still prevail in customs, in manners of expression, and in ceremonies. Far stronger and more enduring, however, is the Filipinos' own culture; and the simple and dignified customs of village life to-day do not, in all probability, vary substantially from those handed down to these people by tradition from the remote past. Nothing is so quick to destroy memory and family tradition as wide-spread education. I remember attending the pagan religious ceremonies of the rice harvest in an Ifugao village in the mountains of Luzon; the head of the house was chanting the names of his ancestors, of whom he could enumerate thirty-five,—a modern imitation of the Book of Genesis! There were five old men in that village who could repeat without differing from one another the whole saga of the Ifugaos, though the poem took three days to recite. When these remote mountaineers have learned to read and write, these marvelous feats of memory will have disappeared, together with the necessity for them. The great mass of Christian Filipinos were left uninspired and untaught during all the generations of sleepy Spanish rule. Into this land of dreams America burst with astonishing energy; in twenty years American ideas have worked a social revolution.



## CHAPTER III

### EARLIER YEARS OF AMERICAN OCCUPATION

OUR occupation of the Philippines was the most unexpected result of our war with Spain; it was purely fortuitous in the beginning, and simply the logical result of Dewey's brilliant victory in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. No doubt, the final disposition of the Philippine Islands was the subject of much diplomatic intrigue and international jealousy. Germany had, to her ultimate complete undoing, recently abandoned Bismarck's precepts concerning colonization and had shared in the division by other European powers of vast African territories. She had purchased from Spain the Caroline and the Ladrone Islands a few months before the Spanish-American War began, and is believed to have been negotiating for the Philippines. When war was declared, the United States had but one friend among the European powers,—Great Britain. Immediately after Dewey's annihilation of the Spanish fleet at Cavite, a German warship drew alongside Commodore Dewey's ship in a provoking and arrogant manner; Dewey's firm stand, and the openly expressed friendship of the British commander, Captain Chichester, who promptly placed his own ship facing the German, probably averted aggressive action on the part of the kaiser.

Indeed, it seems entirely probable that Admiral von Diederichs came to Manila Bay as the result of some

negotiations then pending with Spain, and it seems equally probable that some one high in authority in the United States Government had previously, in a possibly unauthorized exercise of power, expressed to Germany our acquiescence in her ambitions.

Our country thrilled with pride in Dewey's victory; our people, naturally enough, were carried on a wave of patriotic imperialism by our easy successes in arms. I have but little doubt that the British Government urged our own to keep the Philippines, so that the islands should not fall into the hands of her rivals. American armies arrived a few weeks later and Manila was taken after the firing of a few shots by the Spanish commander to save his honor, and under previous arrangement with the American general. The rest of the Spanish forces throughout the islands promptly surrendered, wherever possible, to our flag. But a new and embarrassing element had entered into the situation. Aguinaldo, the military leader of the recent insurrection against Spain, had been recalled by Dewey from his *pro-forma* exile in Singapore. To him the American commodore gave the stand of thirty thousand rifles captured in the Naval Arsenal at Cavite. Aguinaldo states that the commodore promised him the independence of the Philippines; this Dewey subsequently denied.

It is incontrovertible that the Filipino Army, which quickly gathered under the old insurrecto leaders, thought they were invited to take over the sovereignty of the islands from Spain. The small outposts of the Spanish Army resisted the Filipinos as best they could; in the village of Baler, on the remote east coast of Luzon, the handful of Spaniards fortified them-



PART OF THE FAMOUS ZIGZAG, BENGUET ROAD



PAGSANHAN FALLS, LAGUNA PROVINCE



selves in the old church and put up a gallant defense for many months. Many Spanish priests were captured by the Filipinos, and while a few were severely abused in reprisal for the wrongs committed by their class, the greater part were kindly and considerately treated as prisoners.

The Filipinos took part in the assault on Manila in August, 1898, but were kept outside the city by agreement of our general with the surrendered Spaniards. For five months the Americans within the city and the Filipinos drawn up in a semicircle around it, with forces on both sides rapidly increasing, lay face to face. The Filipinos gradually became convinced that our army would never give over the country to them; relations became more and more strained, and in January, 1899, the inevitable conflict burst forth. For a year the war progressed with more and more decisive victories for our arms; the Filipinos were gradually pushed northward from Manila, and finally scattered, and their general, Aguinaldo, fled to the remote mountains of the east coast where he was finally captured by General Funston through a daring and dramatic ruse. At no time did the Filipinos have more than forty thousand rifles, and they had virtually no artillery. They were divided in their own councils because of the jealousy of Aguinaldo, who finally put to death his best soldier, General Luna, through treachery.

We had at one time 85,000 troops engaged in the campaign, and the showing they made was excellent, considering the difficult nature of the country. Their achievement is better appreciated when we remember that the British Army employed to subdue the Boers

reached a total of 300,000, the same figure reached by their expeditionary force in German East Africa, where they failed to subdue Von Lettow's force of 15,000 in a five-years' campaign. It is only a pity that we were obliged finally to resort to "reconcentration" to subdue provinces near Manila, the very system we had so energetically denounced when it was used by Spain in Cuba. Aguinaldo's short-lived republic soon collapsed under the pressure of our military forces. His government had been rather generally accepted in theory by the Filipinos throughout the archipelago, but it never had a chance to demonstrate its ability except in the fortunes, or misfortunes, of war against a superior foe.

Much time is spent, by those seeking an excuse to criticize the Filipino people, in denouncing Aguinaldo's government. The truth is that the insurrectionists had adopted a liberal, democratic form of constitution which never had any opportunity of going into effect. I have known a number of the men, both military and civil, who surrounded Aguinaldo as his advisers at that critical time, and esteem them as intelligent, well-educated, and conservative men of affairs; even in the arena of an adverse war Aguinaldo would have prospered better with his government had it not been for defects in his own character. He was unwilling to take advice from the very men he had selected for that purpose, and the practical existence of martial law all through these months enabled him to do as he pleased. After his surrender, the war collapsed, and a period of the customary guerilla warfare continued until the partizan leaders still under arms were persuaded, largely by their own countrymen, to surrender to the

inevitable. The war had been fought on their side with spirit and determination, but without hatred and bitterness against us such as had inspired them against the Spaniards. Reconciliation was not so difficult in the circumstances, and gradually came to pass under the wise liberalism of American policy. Aguinaldo retired to private life on his farm in Cavite, where he has ever since maintained a dignified and conciliatory attitude toward the American Government; he has been loyally faithful to his oath of allegiance to the United States in every sense of the term.

Meanwhile, in the United States the Philippine question had caused the most profound anxiety and searching of conscience. Anti-imperialism was the chief issue of Mr. Bryan in his campaign of 1900, and upon that issue he was defeated. Nevertheless, the Anti-imperialist League contained in its membership many of the most independent and respected citizens, especially in New England, and the public conscience was uneasy. How were we to reconcile the holding of the Philippines with our Constitution? what had become of our fundamental requirement of the "consent of the governed"? I have no doubt that President McKinley and his cabinet were seriously concerned over this, but saw no other way out of the embarrassing situation thus presented than to hold tightly to the newly acquired Oriental domain, and do the best they could for its inhabitants. To be sure, the first Philippine Commission sent out by President McKinley was presided over by President Jacob Gould Schurman of Cornell, who reported in favor of Philippine independence, and even went so far as to argue that the worst government of Filipinos by Filipinos was better than the best gov-

ernment of them by Americans. But there was the perplexing international situation to consider, and when reports began to come in from our army in the Philippines, the verdict of the American officers was to the effect that the Filipinos were not fit to govern themselves. Military men are seldom inclined to believe that any people can govern themselves: their whole training is a negation of the principle of self-government. So the government in Washington decided to hold on, and to make the best of it. The Philippine policy of President McKinley as expressed in his pronouncement, supposed to have been drafted by Secretary Root, is a model of wise statesmanship. He expressed the hope in January, 1899, that the commissioners would be received as bearers of the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation "and that the Philippines are ours, not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path of duty which we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us." This fairly represented the real and honest intentions of all classes of Americans at that time, once it had been decided to hold the Philippines; it is the basis on which developments of policy have since been built. Nevertheless, the fact remained that we had by force of arms overthrown self-government in the Philippines and established there an autocratic government of our own. This has always been a matter of deep concern to conscientious and liberal-minded people in our country, and was always the cause of the insertion in Democratic national platforms of a plank in favor of Philippine independence. It was made clear that the exercise of



imperial autocracy in those far-away islands was not only inconsistent with our own Constitution, but a danger of corruption to our own ideals and principles; in the words of Abraham Lincoln: "This nation cannot exist half slave and half free."

The president of the second Philippine Commission, and first civil governor, was the Hon. William H. Taft. He arrived on June 3, 1900, when the islands were still under military rule. General Otis had already given the Philippines a fairly liberal code of laws, and the war was virtually over. A few months later the government was turned over to Mr. Taft and the civil commission, an executive board entrusted also with legislative powers. The commission set to work to restore law and order, to liberalize still further existing laws, to settle outstanding questions with the Spanish, and to make friends with the Filipinos. But the situation was greatly complicated by the virtual refusal of the American military officers to recognize the new civil government. Many clashes between civil and military officials occurred which would have been ludicrous had they not been so embarrassing to Mr. Taft and the new commission. This was in the "days of the Empire," when every white man, especially in the military service, was a sort of petty king; the islands were full of adventurous and rough-and-ready young Americans who had stayed on after the war, enchanted with the easy life of the tropics, or looking for a new means of livelihood. Some of the discharged soldiers of that day, who had saved up perhaps six months' pay, started in businesses which have since made them rich men; others, falling under the spell of the unaccustomed languor of the tropics and of the

native gin, sank down to the level of beachcombers, living upon the poorer class of native women, until rounded up and deported by the authorities as vagrants.

Life in Manila was gay and irresponsible; the streets were full of uniforms. The reaction from the hardships of campaigns in the field was natural. The Americans had beaten the Filipino, and meant that never for one second should he forget it. Many topical songs and verses have come down from those boisterous days, and many an elderly man still sighs for the "days of the Empire." Into this paradise of military power and prestige came Mr. Taft and his colleagues, talking of the rights of the Filipinos in a community which was interested only in the rights of Americans. "He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain't no brother of mine," they sang. Resistance to Mr. Taft's efforts to conciliate the Filipino and extend greater civil rights to him was encountered not only from military officials, but from virtually all the white population. Finally the governor lost his temper, and in a speech in Iloilo told the Americans that they were neurotic and that if they did not like the government they could take the first boat home. The sting of this remark is still smarting in the hearts of the survivors of the days of the Empire in the Philippines,—there is no such thing as a statute of limitations upon hatred!

Mr. Taft's efforts met with immediate response from the Filipinos; he associated with himself as members of the Philippine Commission Messrs. Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, and José R. Luzuriaga, and traveled throughout the islands speaking

to excited and enthusiastic crowds of Filipinos. His theme was "The Philippines for the Filipinos." The new government was soon generally accepted and settled down to the works of peace. One of the first acts was the importation from America of a boat-load of one thousand school-teachers and schoolmarms, the beginning of a public-school extension which is to-day justly considered one of America's greatest achievements in the islands. Many of these devoted teachers ventured forth into lonely and remote regions, not yet entirely pacified, and several paid with their lives for the noble ideals which inspired them.

One of Mr. Taft's problems was the settlement of the dangerous agrarian question concerning the friar lands. It has already been shown that the friars as landlords had been largely responsible for the insurrection against Spain. They held title to enormous tracts of the best lands, and the question as to the disposition of these lands was acute. Mr. Taft went to Rome as unofficial ambassador for Mr. Roosevelt in an effort to settle this question, and arranged on behalf of the Philippine Government to purchase these lands for \$7,000,000, for which amount the "Friar Land Bonds" of the Philippines were issued. To the success of his mission was attributed much of the strong support given to Mr. Roosevelt's candidacy in 1904 and to Mr. Taft's in 1908 by the Roman Catholic voters in America. The friar lands have been gradually sold by the Government upon easy instalments to the tenants; the pity is that all the friars' holdings were not bought at that time. Large tracts still remain in their hands, and are to-day a source of much discontent and occasionally a menace to public order.

Mr. Taft not only was discharging a wise public duty, but was clever enough to recognize what some of the people of the islands do not seem to realize, even to-day, the great influence and practical value to the Government of the support of a friendly church in the Philippines.

Mr. Taft and his colleagues also adopted for the Philippines such parts of the public law of the United States as they thought applicable, and combined them with existing Spanish law to form the admirable system of jurisprudence existing there to-day. One member, inspired by the beauty of the municipal code of his native town in New England, tried to introduce it *in toto* in Manila, even including the ordinance for the prompt removal of snow from the sidewalks! The outstanding controversy in regard to the legal system in the Philippines, among American observers and visitors, concerns the absence of the jury system; in that respect the commissioners left unchanged the Spanish system, which, indeed, exists in all the Latin countries of Europe, where the Judge of First Instance decides both the facts and the law. While obvious injustices occasionally occur, it is not clear that they are so frequent as under the jury system in the United States. As a former law clerk in the office of Mr. Joseph H. Choate, then the acknowledged leader of the American Bar, I remember his sarcastic denunciation of the jury system; and he later made one of his annual addresses to the American Bar Association upon that thesis. The worst that can be said against the Philippine Code in that respect is that the errors in judgment for which a sole judge is responsible are more likely to be made to the disadvantage of the prisoner



at the bar, while in America the gross injustices of the jury are generally in his favor. It is my belief that the jury system will soon be introduced in the Philippines, although the Bench and Bar at present are inclined to oppose such a proposition.

In 1904, Mr. Taft was made Secretary of War in Mr. Roosevelt's cabinet, in which position he was by law still charged with supervision over Philippine policies. He continued his active interest in the progress of the Philippine policy, and in 1907 went to Manila with a large party of officials, to install the Philippine Assembly, an elective lower house of the Legislature newly created by authority of Congress. Upon that occasion he placed his hand upon the shoulder of Sergio Osmeña, the first Speaker of the Assembly, and said that hereafter he would be the second man in the islands. This ranked the Speaker officially over the commanding general, the admiral, and the (subsequently created) vice-governor, and has been generally observed ever since, until the creation of the Philippine Senate. President Quezon of the Senate still accords social precedence to the Speaker, but the Senate is jealous of any assertion of official priority on the part of the House of Representatives.

Politically, Mr. Taft was not so fortunate as he was both administratively and in his legislative character as president of the commission. He strongly believed that the Filipinos could be won over to complete acquiescence in American domination; that they would be so well satisfied with the liberal and generous treatment he accorded them that all national longings would gradually disappear. This was an entire misconception of the feelings of conquered races toward the

invader. In Porto Rico, for example, where we have granted to the inhabitants the gift of American citizenship—with the logical implication that the island will one day be a State in our Union—instead of grasping eagerly the great advantages this confers upon them, the people are now clamoring for independence. In the Philippines Mr. Taft founded a “Federalista” political party for closer political relations with the United States; a number of their leading men were induced to join, and were appointed to high office, to their own great subsequent discomfiture. Meanwhile, as soon as it was clearly perceived by the Filipinos that the right of assembly and of free speech was guaranteed to them, the “Nacionalista” party was openly organized with great vigor. The chief, if not the only real aim of the Nacionalistas from that day to this has been and is the independence of the Philippines, and they have gradually drawn into the party most of the brains and talent as well as most of the voters of the archipelago. This evidently surprised and disconcerted Mr. Taft and his associates, who had hoped to perfect a permanent settlement of the Philippine question without independence.

From that time on, as Secretary of War and as President, he grew colder in his attitude toward the Filipinos. No doubt he thought them ungrateful after all that he had done for them; as if the surrender of human liberty were a matter of gratitude! At all events, he entered the lists of controversy against Philippine independence, and in arguing against the feasibility of it he was drawn into a more and more critical and unfriendly position regarding the Filipinos themselves. His popularity in the Philippines gradu-

ally vanished. Absence from the islands and accessibility to the whispered advice of that numerically small but influential section of our citizens who desire to hold the Philippines indefinitely for the financial advantage of the United States doubtless influenced his mind. Was he not described when President as a large body entirely surrounded by men who knew exactly what they wanted? Then, too, as Secretary of War, he soon forgot his desperate struggle to take over civil control of the islands from the military rulers of earlier days, and in the agreeable atmosphere of the War Department he was only to hear contemptuous criticisms of, and remarks derogatory to, the Filipinos. The continuity of policy of the military, the cohesiveness of army sentiment, is a very real power, especially in the retired corridors of a government department. Some military officers are still longing for the "days of the Empire"; many of them still refer to the Philippine Government as the "Civil Government," as if there still existed out there, also, a "military government" which had temporarily stepped aside, but was ready at any moment to resume its rightful place. At all events, Mr. Taft, who had restored civil rights to the Filipinos, appointed several of them to high office, encouraged their national sentiments and self-respect by his maxim, "The Philippines for the Filipinos," given them the first stage of self-government by the creation of the Assembly, soon became known as the most prominent opponent of Philippine independence. He must have thought that in the islands he had raised up a Frankenstein against himself. When confronted with the moral issue as to whether the United States could justly hold the Fil-

ipino people in subjection against their will, he expressed the vague idea that they might be fit for independence "in some generations." The Filipino people had for thirteen years been accustomed to look to Mr. Taft as the source of all authority on Philippine questions, and as an overwhelming majority of them were actively engaged in formulating the demand for independence, it was plain to all that a very complicated and disagreeable situation was rapidly coming to a head.

One of the most serious causes of complaint was the failure to carry out President McKinley's instructions and repeated subsequent promises of American representatives that, wherever possible, the government offices should be filled by Filipinos. As the attractions of Philippine life grew upon the American officials, so grew their willingness to believe in the incapacity of the Filipinos for office. In 1913 only one Chief of Bureau, Manuel Tinio, was a Filipino, and he was in charge of the smallest and least important bureau,—Labor. In fact, it seemed to all that a determined attempt was being made to build up a permanent colonial civil service on the model of that in India. But in 1913 the Americans in the Philippine Civil Service numbered 2600, with half as many more in the unclassified or temporary lists. When it is realized that the British Indian Civil Service which directly or indirectly governs 319,000,000 people, consists of only about 1200 officials from England, the situation seems extraordinary. Many Americans were employed in merely clerical positions, and many others in offices for which they had little training or aptitude. They were encouraged to invest in the Philippines



what money they had, that they might take a permanent interest there, and American party politics was rife among the American employees at times of national elections at home. It seems quite certain that the colonial policy of Lord Curzon and Lord Cromer was the model upon which they were building. The American official did not, it is true, assume the air of haughty superiority toward the "native" which marks the British "raj" (rajah, *i.e.* king) as the ordinary Briton is known in India; such a manner does not come easy to an American. In their attitude toward the Filipino most of them were courteous and considerate enough in official life, but there was virtually no social intercourse between the two races. At official receptions, of course, the Filipinos attended in force, but the governor-general who went further and included Filipinos in his private entertainments was discreetly but pointedly chaffed by his intimates. Around the American supper-table the matter went much farther; every possible story, real or fabricated, which stirred up hatred of or heaped ridicule upon the Filipino people was told there with gusto, and all were probably carried forth and repeated by the patient-looking and apparently uncomprehending Filipino *muchachos* (servants) who waited upon table.

The exhibition of the Filipino flag, under which they had fought their war against us, was made by statute a criminal offense. Patriotism was never encouraged in the schools, nor ideas which tended to arouse their own national consciousness. Everything which might help to make the pupils understand their own race or think about the future of the country was

carefully censored and eliminated. Nevertheless, the good sound stock of American ideas which they received instructed them inevitably in our own democratic ideals, and in our pride in our own liberties. Their teachers could not well be surprised that they thought of freedom themselves.

It was fashionable among Americans to explain that the demand for independence came only from a few agitators or hotheads or demagogues working for their own advantage. Those who are familiar with any struggle for human rights, the world over, will recognize the terms.

One of the commonest stories of those days was of the American official's question to a simple farmer in the country, "Well, you want independence. What are you going to do with it?" When the farmer could not give a concise and satisfactory answer, the story went round that the Filipinos think independence is some sort of toy that will be given them in a box.

The United States Government was succumbing rapidly to the accepted standards of European colonial administrators, of which the incapacity of the "native" was the principal article of faith, and the invincible superiority of the white man in every human affair a religious tenet to be maintained at any cost and in any way. The Filipinos soon saw that they had helped to oust the Spanish merely to fasten other masters upon their necks. They freely admitted the advantages in many ways of this change of masters, but they wanted to be their own masters,—certainly no ignoble ambition, and one with which every American should sympathize.

One of the greatest safety-valves of those days was

the presence in Washington, as one of the two delegates from the Philippines in the House of Representatives, of the Hon. Manuel L. Quezon. These delegates have no vote, but they are given a voice in the House, and the voice of Mr. Quezon was worth many votes. His attractive personality and personal good looks, his popularity with the membership of the House, his remarkable command of English, acquired since his arrival in Washington, gained him an immediate hearing. His brilliant speeches made an impression upon Congress, and every American Representative who heard him felt sympathy for this young man so ably pleading for the independence of his race. His most famous speech was that in which he thanked the United States for what she had done for his people, but declared the unwillingness of the Filipino to remain as "a bird in a gilded cage."

Mr. Quezon's activities in behalf of independence provoked the wrath of Mr. Taft's adherents; the then Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs called him in, one day, and told him that he was stirring up too much trouble, and they were going to get rid of him. Mr. Quezon replied that he was only representing the Filipino people, who had, through their Legislature, sent him to Washington, and that he would continue his campaign for independence. Mr. Taft himself, speaking at the same banquet as Mr. Quezon, lost his temper completely.

Mr. Taft's four immediate successors as governor-general were constantly in direct communication with him as their superior executive officer, either in the War Department or the White House. They exhibited the same energy and good-will he had shown in working

for the welfare and development of the islands; they were men of the highest caliber, and of the best American traditions. Each of them was personally liked and respected by the people they were sent to govern. The school system rapidly extended until six hundred thousand children were enrolled; a splendid road and bridge system was initiated and two thousand miles of first-class road constructed. A breakwater was built off the city of Manila, and the old moat of Fort Santiago was filled and turned into a park and playground.

There is no evidence that any of my predecessors differed in any respect from Mr. Taft in their views on the Philippine question; only, he had assigned them, in the circumstances, an almost impossible task: you cannot create a national sentiment and then arrest it half-way. In 1911 and 1912, quarrels developed between the American-dominated commission (upper house) and the all-Filipino Assembly, resulting in a dead-lock and the failure to pass the appropriation bill (budget). The governor-general, in default of funds with which to run the government, decreed the renewal of the appropriations for the year before, a power given by Act of Congress about five years later. Irritations, political and social, began to appear above the surface. Had it not been for the conservative and responsible Filipino leaders, particularly the Hon. Sergio Osmeña, president of the Nacionalista party and Speaker of the Assembly, affairs would have rapidly gone from bad to worse.

Thus superficially I have stated the forces on two sides contesting the Philippine question at the time when Woodrow Wilson was elected President. From his speeches and from the party platform upon which





NAGUILIAN ROAD TO BAGUIO





PASIG RIVER FRONT, MANILA

he stood, the people of the Philippines expected a substantial change in their fortunes. Fifty thousand Filipinos paraded the streets of Manila in a drenching rain-storm the day the news of the election of Mr. Wilson was received.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NEW ERA

ON October 6, 1913, our steamer passed the fortress of Corregidor Island and crossed the waters of Manila Bay. The navy had provided an escort of four destroyers, and the army a military escort at the pier. We were met by a small group of government officials, who conducted us through immense crowds to the Luneta, where a stand had been prepared for the speeches. I delivered there a message from President Wilson to the people of the Philippines, which reads as follows:

We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands.

Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence. And we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step taken experience will guide us to the next.

The administration will take one step at once and will give to the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the Appointive Commission, and thus in the Upper as well as in the Lower House of the Legislature a majority representation will be secured to them.

We do this in the confident hope and expectation that immediate proof will be given in the action of the Commission under the new arrangement of the political capacity of those native citizens who have already come forward to represent and to lead their people in affairs.

The significance of this promise from the President was at once apparent, and was received with enthusiasm by the people. The Philippine Commission was the upper house of the Philippine Legislature, and was appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate. It then consisted of five Americans (three with portfolios) and four Filipinos (one with portfolio). Serious legislation had become impossible because of the dead-lock between these five Americans and the Assembly, or lower house, composed entirely of elected Filipinos. It is probable that the impartial historian will decide that in all the points at issue the reasonable side had been taken by the Assembly, but the struggle was deeper than the mere questions of appropriations: it was a fight for absolute control of the purse-strings of the Government. The dead-lock was now to be broken, and the Filipinos to be given control of their own Legislature.

The announcement of this fact confirmed the worst fears of the American official organization: the Americans were no longer to run the Philippines as they pleased, but the Filipinos were to have a voice. Suspicions as to some such radical change had preceded me upon my journey across the Pacific, although I had carefully refrained from making any statement whatever about Philippine policies or politics until that moment on the Luneta. Before leaving Washington I had been frankly told by a former editor of a Manila newspaper, now employed by one of the greatest banking firms in Wall Street, that if I did not govern to suit the American financial interests in the Philippines, matters would go hard with me. I told him that

I had become accustomed to threats like that, during the tariff revision.

The campaign began before I left America; it was well organized and well managed, and apparently conducted without any scruples; it would be "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable" to recount here all of its features. No misrepresentation was too gross and no rumor too wild for transmission to those in the United States who knew how to make use of them effectively upon the platform and in the press. I was constantly on the defensive, replying by cable to requests for explanations from the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, as to what was going on in the Philippines, especially during my first year of office. The "organization" had determined that I must go, the sooner the better, but they counted without the indomitable will of President Wilson, who then and always, during my nearly eight years of service in the islands, permitted nothing to deflect his generous and loyal support of me as governor-general.

The attacks and exaggerations during those first few months became so extreme that finally the War Department grew chary of listening to the complaints of "indignant business men." The chief effect of the campaign, which, as the years passed, gradually dwindled down to the activities of a few recalcitrants, was to discredit the Philippines as a field for American investment, and to discourage commerce with the islands. Capital is naturally timid, and it had never to any considerable extent sought the field in the Philippines, from the beginning of American occupation. The noisy campaign of 1913-15 made capital stand aghast. The nationals of European countries in Oriental ports were



delighted with the chance to ridicule American attempts at colonial government. Even the steamship lines on the Pacific joined in, and emphatically advised travelers not to go to the Philippines, although the islands are a perfect wonder-world of natural beauty for the tourist. "Old Manila residents" spread the bad tidings to all the quarters of the wind. An active lobby was maintained in the Manila Hotel which seized on each traveler upon his arrival and filled him full of race prejudice and gloom; strangers were told that the Democratic administration was turning over the islands to a mob of irresponsible, dishonest Filipino politicians who were headed toward chaos and disorder.

The after-effects of that campaign are still holding back the islands to-day. Upon his visit to Manila in 1919, I asked Dr. George Vincent, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, why his institution did not undertake some of its excellent work for the improvement of health conditions in the Philippines; he hesitated and then explained that "conditions are so unsettled here"! The Foundation is putting its money instead into such "settled" countries as China and Nicaragua. Above all, I was generally charged by the "organization" with ruining American prestige in the East. Well might Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India in the British Government, say of the word "prestige":

Oh, India, how much happier would have been your history if that word had been left out of the English vocabulary! But there you have Conservative Imperialism at its worst. . . . We do not hold India by invoking this well-mouthed word; we must hold it by just institutions, and more and more, as time goes on, by the consent of the governed.

It is of little profit to recount all this to-day; the fight was the kind which any public man must face if he undertakes to place human rights above the claims of big business; or if he values the man above the dollar. One of the most frequent charges I heard was that Woodrow Wilson was not a "real American President" and that I was "anti-American." It somewhat lessened the blow to learn that some of the most active in charging this were German and Austrian Jews doing business in Manila!

My constant effort during all these years was not to "answer back" in similar terms, not to engage in personal controversy with my opponents. Indeed, I have always hesitated to participate in newspaper controversies, and never wrote a magazine article so long as I was in office. My purpose now is not to revive the memory of those days of acrimony, but to present to those who may have the patience to read this book, the difficulties with which the Filipino people must contend to get their case before the generous American public. If any reactionary policy as to the Philippines is ever determined upon by an administration in Washington, the American public has little chance of knowing the real facts. The Filipino people will be virtually helpless before the campaign of misrepresentation which will be launched against them. Having, myself, a slight personal acquaintance with Mr. Melville A. Stone, head of the Associated Press, I obtained through the Secretary of War the removal of the Associated Press Manila representative, an Englishman, for gross misrepresentation of the situation as to Filipinos in the auditor's office.

Through it all I never failed to understand the rea-

son for the attitude of those conducting this campaign, although I seldom agreed with their judgment as to the results. The existing American political organization in the islands had come to believe that the Philippines were theirs to have and to hold; they must treat the Filipinos gently and with justice, but must never forget that they were only "little brown children"; American prestige was built up, for them, by the assertion of the strong arm, which was backed by an army always at hand.

These are sentiments natural to men of European descent, and are accepted as gospel truth by the greater part of the white race, which derives its opinions from propaganda in eulogy of the colonial administrations of Lord Cromer, Lord Curzon, Lord Kitchener, and Lord Milner,—a noble band of which Kipling is the poet laureate. To them democracy is an odious necessity for the white races, but must never be applied to the "inferior" natives of the tropics. A paternal justice, tempered with kindness, must be administered with condescension to these unhappy wards, who do not know what they want, themselves, and must be firmly told what to want, by those who are better qualified to think for them. Cavour said that any one can govern by martial law, and he might have added that that way also lie honors, preferment, promotion, and the plaudits of the crowd; the results are announced to cheering audiences, flattered by the assertion of the physical domination of their sovereignty.

That splendid body of officials the English in the Indian Civil Service, have just experienced a revolution in all their accepted ideas and standards through the introduction of reforms of self-government in Brit-

ish India at the instance of the British Government. Members of the civil service were all, apparently, opposed to the new idea; some of them bitterly so, but they seem to be determined to carry out generously the policy of the home government, now that the change has been instituted. To Americans it is always a source of great surprise and admiration to find the British scattered throughout the world standing so solidly in support of the home government, and so loyally expressing a common opinion upon foreign and colonial policies, once those matters have been settled at home. Our system is infinitely more individualistic: the American sticks to his own opinions through thick and thin; he does not consider it necessary, even before outsiders, to support his President if he happens to disagree with him; he is violent in his denunciation of the current of home affairs, even in mixed groups of foreigners all through the treaty ports of the Orient. Is it not possible that so much washing of dirty linen in public is incomprehensible to the rest of the world?

It was not until August 29, 1916, when Congress passed the Jones Act by almost unanimous vote, that the new Philippine policy, thus confirmed and extended, was generally accepted by American residents in the far East. Up to that time, for nearly three years, they seemed to consider President Wilson's Philippine policy as the vagary of an irresponsible and theoretical visionary, put into execution by a governor-general who was, to say the least of it, without sense of responsibility and ignorant, and bound to be overwhelmed sooner or later by the results of his folly.

I cannot, however, conclude this disquisition without expressing my deep gratitude to those few Americans



in the Philippines who supported me through all the years of storm and stress; to those American officials, of whom there were many, who did try their best, possibly despite their own opinions, to put the new policy into effect, and to those personal friends who did so much to make happy the leisure hours of a political era of high feeling.

It was frequently stated that I was filling up the offices with Democratic politicians from the United States. I brought six appointees over from America in all my years of office, four of whom might perhaps be called political, in the sense that they were recommended by party leaders; the other two were selected not for party reasons, but because of special fitness for the positions they occupied: Dr. Bernard Herstein, who had won the high esteem of the Ways and Means Committee in Washington for his work as a tariff specialist, I appointed Collector of Customs; and Stephen Bonsal, the well-known author, I chose as my secretary. Five of my six appointees from home were soon driven from the Philippines and out of the service by the hostility and bitterness of their fellow-Americans in Manila. Even at the very end of my service a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, the Hon. Percy M. Moir, who for many years previous to my arrival had been in the islands as a judge, and was honored by the general public, resigned with the statement to me that he could no longer stand the hatred and abuse of his fellow-Americans, whose animosity was caused by the fact that he was a Democrat.

Race prejudice is one of the most poisonous growths of modern times. It was unknown in the Roman Empire, when citizenship was conferred upon all annexed



populations; an African of negro descent, indeed, once ascended the imperial throne at Rome. Throughout the middle ages there are few evidences of race prejudice. Educated men generally spoke Latin in those days and a man of position was at home in any country. With the rise of the principle of nationality, the dominant note of the last two hundred years, has come also a tendency on the part of each nation to distrust if not dislike the citizens of all others. Even to-day race prejudice drawn upon the color line is not aggressive in those countries of Europe which once formed the backbone of the Roman Empire. Outside the Anglo-Saxon races, it is hardly known in other portions of the world. Among our people it is probably based upon our experiences with negro slavery, an institution which was the curse of the United States until 1865, and has left behind the heritage of hatred and passion. The Filipinos are in no single respect, as far as I can observe, like the negro race. Yet the American living in the Philippines and among other large Oriental populations shows that prejudice against color is the most deep-seated of his racial instincts. It is a matter concerning which no argument can be sustained and no calm judgment exercised. It is there, as a part of American racial inheritance, and it raises a question as to our qualifications for government or control of vast colored populations. Many Americans in the Philippines—in fact most of them—really like the Filipinos individually, since the latter are courteous, self-restrained, and refined in their social deportment; they are intelligent, modest, and agreeable personally. Sexual crimes are extremely rare between the races and, fortunately, intermarriage has not been of suffi-

cient frequency to complicate the situation. Both races, Americans and Filipinos, disapprove of intermarriage, and interracial unions are not likely to be happy ones, with the pressure of both communities in opposition. In fact, among the Filipinos there have been fewer marriages with Americans than with any of the European peoples. The Filipinos contend that the Germans have made the best husbands of any of the white races, more faithful and more considerate. But let no one approach a discussion of the Philippine problem without considering this delicate matter, the race question, which is apt at any moment, and in the most unexpected manner, to crop up and baffle the plans and policies of all those who are in good faith wrestling with public issues.

## CHAPTER V

### FILIPINOS IN CONTROL OF LEGISLATURE

**I**T is not my intention to write here a history of the Philippine Government during the past eight years. As a participant in the work of that administration I could not, in all probability, write impartially of it. The records are all there, and it is too soon to pronounce final judgment. Those of us who have been connected with the administration have many times given public expression to our purposes and public record to our explanations. Most of it is already embalmed in the mortuary of government reports on file in Washington and Manila. Some Filipino historian in the years to come will probably, from the angle of vision afforded those who come after us, go through the musty records of the past, and give to this period a few chapters in a history of the Philippines.

My hope is that in this volume I may contribute something of interest to the world-wide discussion concerning the capacity of the tropical races for self-government, as observed by one who has been engaged in giving to the Filipinos the fullest possible opportunity to demonstrate such capacity. If for this purpose government records and statistics are quoted, it will be in the endeavor to show to what an extent the Philippines have developed politically, economically, and otherwise materially, under their own government.

It is impossible, however, to avoid frequent reference to the governor-general and his relation to the general situation; his position is by tradition the very nerve-center of Philippine administration, and he is given by law very full powers of supervision and control. It was one of my purposes to assign gradually to the proper functionaries the responsibilities which should be theirs.

The Governor-General of the Philippines receives a salary of \$18,000 a year from the Insular Treasury, and the residence known as Malacañan Palace in Manila is set aside for his use. The salary had been \$21,000, but was reduced, at my insistence and against the wishes of members of the Legislature, during my first weeks of office, when for reasons of vitally necessary economy other salaries were being cut. The salaries of the Governor of Hong-Kong and the Governor-General of Java are about three times as high; of the Governor-General of British India about four or five times as much. It costs the Governor-General of the Philippines from twice to four times his salary to live in Malacañan, according to his disposition in the matters of entertaining and general style of living. No motor-car is furnished him, and no servants, but he has free light and water and a cottage allowed him in the mountains in Baguio, known as the Mansion House. Free music is provided for entertainments in Manila, furnished by the Constabulary Band. Before leaving I was instrumental in arranging that the appropriation bill should provide for the "entertainment of distinguished guests" out of the \$100,000 appropriated in the General Purpose funds, when "approved by the Council of State." This should lighten the financial

burden of my successor. It was made use of once in my last few months of office to the amount of about \$3000, to pay for the extraordinary expenditures necessary for entertainment at Malacañan of the visitors who were members of the Congressional party.

Malacañan Palace is one of the most comfortable and delightful homes in the tropics. The Spaniards were the best of all the European races as builders in the hot countries, perhaps because they learned how to build in their own. The English make themselves miserable in the tropics by reproducing in every respect possible the houses and methods of life of their own cold climate. Malacañan was originally purchased by the Spanish Government about a century ago as a *casita* or country house, and has been added to from time to time until it has now a huge floor space of old hand-hewn hardwood, and is admirably fitted for large entertainments. The balcony projects over the swiftly flowing Pasig River, and there is generally a pleasant breeze there, even during the hottest weather. The thermometer in my room generally stood at 83°, and seldom went below 76° or above 89°. The gardens along the river are noted for the fairy-land illumination displayed at evening entertainments. Malacañan has been greatly enlarged and modernized in the last few years, and a beautiful new executive office building in the garden has just been completed.

In the disastrous earthquake of 1865 the big stone palace of the governor-general, on what is now Plaza McKinley, was totally destroyed, and the governor-general moved temporarily into Malacañan; like so much else that the Spanish intended as temporary, it has become his permanent residence. When I settled



in Malacañan I was the ninety-fifth governor-general, and served in that position for seven and a half years, or longer than any one of the forty-four who had directly preceded me, dating back to the eighteenth century. The governor-general has an office in Malacañan, but when he was also President of the Philippine Commission, which sat daily during the Legislative sessions, it was customary for him to go to the Ayuntamiento, or City Hall, every day for his office work.

It was frequently charged that in my first months of office I would not consult with "the Americans"; so far as I am aware, I saw all Americans who wished to advise with me,—indeed, gave hours to that service, day after day, year after year. The real difficulty was that I did not always take the advice, not of "the Americans," but of certain Americans who had composed what had been popularly known as the "kitchen cabinet," or "polo cabinet" of recent years. Few of them held official positions, and many of them seemed to me to be inspired by private financial interests rather than the public interest. Any one who has ever held public executive office will know how very great a part of his time is occupied in seeing people and receiving advice. This is particularly so in the Philippines, where for ages a paternal government had been conducted, with the governor-general, whether by law or custom, the head and center of it all. Week after week my time was occupied with receiving complaints, advice, or requests, often from the same people again and again. Finally I came to feel that my office was not unlike that of a medical man: persons came to me only when in trouble, and for consultation and relief.

At the very beginning I made of record the fact that I had come to govern the islands in consultation also with the Filipinos. I was thus brought into immediate and daily contact with Mr. Sergio Osmeña, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, president of the Nacionalista party and the leading representative of the Filipino people. This remarkable man had already been Speaker for five years, and still holds that office. I found him extremely well informed, not only about Philippine affairs, but about American history and Constitutional law. Wise, astute, and cautious, of an impressive personality, he was also possessed of most remarkably courteous good manners, which never failed him. For the past thirteen years he and Mr. Quezon have been the dominant personalities in Philippine politics. I have never heard either of them speak a word of criticism or ill-will against the United States or the American people, and only very rarely against an individual American. They have always had a faith in our country and an appreciation of what our country has done for their people far above the petty level of political and racial feelings in Manila.

Our first duty was to select for recommendation to the President the names of the new Filipino majority in the commission which was promised by his message. Mr. Osmeña furnished a list of a dozen names, and we proposed to submit them for approval to the Philippine Assembly, so that all the elected representatives of the people might have a share in the selection, but this plan was vetoed by the Secretary of War. I then consulted Chief Justice Arellano, Resident Commissioners Quezon and Earnshaw, and Colonel Harbord,

Chief of Constabulary. The five names agreed upon were cabled to the Secretary of War, and the commissioners were shortly nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as follows: Victorino Mapa of Iloilo as Secretary of Finance and Justice; Rafael Palma of Manila, for several years already a member of the commission, for reappointment; Vicente Ilustre of Batangas; Jaime de Veyra of Leyte; and Vicente Singson-Encarnacion of Ilocos Sur. Palma and De Veyra were members of the Nacionalista party, Mapa sympathetically inclined to that party, Ilustre an independent, and Singson the leader of the Progresista party in the House of Representatives. For nearly three years, until the change of government under the Jones Act, we worked together through seasons of political excitement and turmoil with perfect harmony and mutual good-will. It may serve to illustrate the types of older Filipino leaders to describe these commissioners here.

Secretary Mapa, who sat for twelve years upon the Philippine Supreme Court bench, is short of stature and dignified in demeanor. He served in Spanish days as Alcalde (or Mayor) of the City of Iloilo. His courtesy and modesty are so great that none but his intimate friends know his rare sense of humor and fund of anecdotes and proverbs. Some of his best stories are of playing *tresillo* (cards) with Governor-General Weyler, who was a short man like himself, with a terrific military reputation and menacing gestures; Mr. Mapa incidentally points out that General Weyler in all his long life had never once been under fire himself. As a member of the commission, Mr. Mapa's services were invaluable; nobody in the islands has a better

legal mind, and he was constantly appealed to by his colleagues for his opinion on all legal points, never offering his advice in general discussions until it was asked. He was generous and kindly always, but in a parliamentary fight, once he had made up his mind, he was absolutely fearless, a veritable little Lion of Justice. His face is like an engraving of a French statesman of the seventeenth century, and his sense of honor and fair play are above all party or political considerations. He was recently made Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to succeed the late Chief Justice Cavetona Arellano, but had to resign his position before a year of incumbency, on account of ill-health.

Rafael Palma is generally considered the third man in Filipino politics. His somewhat severe and melancholy face frequently lights up with an unexpected and sunny smile, as his sense of humor is pronounced. He has a good legal mind, rare literary ability, and a talent for public speaking; and he speaks in the choicest Spanish. He is modest and industrious, and a loyal party man, upon whom a large part of the burden of party management was placed by Speaker Osmeña. His service in the House of Representatives, the commission, the Philippine Senate, and on the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines has been marked by absolute integrity and by a devotion to the cause of public instruction. As Secretary of the Interior he handled successfully many of the most delicate problems of the Government. Just and fair, he is popular with Americans and Filipinos alike. Being a very poor man, he has recently retired from the cabinet to enter business, as he has, in the Filipino fashion, a large and growing family.



Jaime de Veyra was governor of the great province of Leyte during the troublesome days of the uprising of the pulajans, or outlaws, about fifteen years ago. His literary ability is marked, and illuminates his reports and papers, as he served an apprenticeship as a newspaper editor. He has held office in the House of Representatives and the commission and as Secretary of Commerce and Police, and then as Executive Secretary of the Government. His charming wife is a great asset to him, with her facility for making and keeping friends among the American Congressional ladies, since Don Jaime is now one of the two Representatives in Congress from the Philippines. He is of a thick-set figure, somewhat darker than his colleagues, and of a very serious turn of mind, rarely smiling or talking except when he has something to say, when he develops a rather unexpected eloquence. He is extremely tender-hearted and inclined to sentiment.

Vicente Ilustre has dark and handsome features, and is possessed of much dignity and grace of manner. He served as a member of the Revolutionary Junta in Hong-Kong during the insurrection, and since then has practised law and watched over his sugar plantations in Batangas. He came from private life to the commission, where he did arduous and valuable work in drafting the laws for the reformation of the Justice of the Peace service, and also the new code for the government of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, in 1914. He, like Mr. Mapa and Mr. Singson, has considerable wealth, and lives in a luxurious home surrounded with all comforts and with works of art. Mr. Ilustre was always something of an insurrecto in politics, and though he gained a seat for the short term in the Sen-



ate, in 1916, he was ousted by his opponent in 1918 and has since practised law. He is rather more suspicious of the intentions of the United States than are his colleagues, and is aggressively in favor of the immediate independence of his country. His education was completed in Madrid in the later days of Spanish domination, and he has imbibed there some of the old-world cynicism as to the promises and agreements of nations.

Vicente Singson is a tall, slow-moving figure of the mestizo type. He is an able public speaker, and has served in the House of Representatives, the commission, and the Senate. He is a Conservative and his interests are largely those of business and finance. Humor seldom disturbs his dignity, but his manners are affability and courtesy personified. His talents are those of the world of commerce, rather than of legislative halls, but he is ready and able to advance his views and defend his opinions on all occasions. His presence strengthened the business side of the commission. Like Mr. Palma, he has been to the United States twice, and seems to like American customs and ideas.

I find on reading over these descriptive sketches of my first Filipino colleagues that I have stressed the dignity of them all; they are all of the older type and generation, and of them only Mr. Palma speaks English readily; none have had an American public-school education. Dignity of demeanor is essentially an Oriental characteristic,—dignity with an impassive tinge. In the expression of most of the older Filipinos there is a trace of melancholy, as there is in all the Filipino music of older days,—the mark of centuries of service as a subject race. Men of the younger genera-

tion, already coming upon the stage in business and public affairs, look full of hope, ambition, and American hustle. Upon first acquaintance, Americans are not aware of the sense of fun of the Filipinos; their solemnity is an affair of manner rather than of mind. I remember several meetings of the all-Filipino Council of State in which the bursts of laughter must have disconcerted the officials on the other side of the swing-doors. Loyal friends, good companions, dependable advisers—I regret leaving them all.

In public affairs I found them ever conscientious and patriotic, with a fine sense of the respect owed the United States Government, and a due consciousness of obligation to their own people. Never was an anti-American measure introduced intentionally. They realized that the Filipinos were on trial, and that they themselves were the representatives of their fellow-countrymen before the world. Hardly a possible problem of government but came before the commission or the Council of State during these years. I found them in debate, and in the care with which they cast their votes, as full of responsibility and of intelligent understanding as any legislators I have known anywhere. Those departments of government which they had never possessed before, and which were therefore new to them, were studied with the utmost care and deliberation. In later chapters I shall discuss the development of Filipino governmental abilities.

Within a few months the membership of the Philippine Commission was completed by President Wilson, and there arrived from the United States the new American members,—Vice-Governor Henderson S. Martin, a progressive Democrat from Kansas, genial

and sunny-tempered, with a decided leaning toward all liberal and democratic ideas; Winfred T. Denison, Secretary of the Interior, sensitive and high-minded, one of the Progressive Republicans from New York, loyally devoted to the principle of Filipino self-government; and Clinton L. Riggs of Baltimore, Secretary of Commerce and Police, a Democrat of the most conservative type, whose bias in favor of the generally accepted standards of colonial government soon earned for him among the resident Americans the nickname of "the White Hope."

General Riggs was a most charming social companion, and a most difficult colleague in government. He was, from the very beginning, out of sympathy with the new policy in the Philippines, and, I think, came out with the idea of replacing me when my removal was accomplished by the campaign then under way. He was closely in the confidence of the Secretary of War, who also was greatly disturbed at the reports coming from the Philippines; and although Secretary Garrison subsequently became disgusted with the misinformation about the Philippines which was being disseminated through the United States, and in a spirit of generous indignation entered into a sharp controversy with Mr. Taft in the public press in defense of my administration, I am sure he would, himself, say that he never really sympathized with our radical plans in the Philippines; indeed, it will be remembered that his resignation as Secretary of War was based partly upon his dissatisfaction with the speedy preparations for Philippine independence. General Riggs stood firmly upon his interpretation of the law which gave the governor-general only "supervision" of the

other department secretaries; he told me that "supervision" gave only an advisory power, and no right of interference in his department, which included the Philippine Constabulary, of which by law the governor-general was commander-in-chief. The Jones Act of 1916 cleared up this controversy by giving the governor-general "supervision and control" over all departments of government. During the eighteen months of our controversy, General Riggs and I, after the fashion of Anglo-Saxons, managed to remain, personally and socially, good friends. He went home ill in the summer of 1915, and his resignation was accepted by the President in December of that year.

Poor Denison was the official who suffered most from the troublesome political storms of those early days; his was a spontaneous, frank, and sincere nature, and he was genuinely inspired with a desire to bring self-government to the Filipinos. He was not of the stern stuff necessary to face public criticism and abuse. Within his first few months he made a speech at the City Club in Manila in which he advocated giving the Filipinos their rights, or, as he phrased it, "give them what they want." He at once became the target for a veritable bombardment of ridicule and abuse from the "organization," and his spirit was completely shattered. He left the Philippines a year later, in a most melancholy frame of mind, absolutely broken on the wheel of the "organization's" criticism.

Vice-Governor Martin, of a serene and well-balanced disposition, rode the waves successfully and rendered excellent service in the commission. His chief work was in the public schools, in founding the Rural Credit Association system, and in drafting and forcing



through the charter of the Philippine National Bank. He resigned in the autumn of 1916, and I think has since regretted that he did not remain to carry on the work he liked so well. He was a valuable and much valued pillar of support in our Philippine policy. He was succeeded in June, 1917, by Vice-Governor Charles E. Yeater of Missouri, at the present writing acting Governor-General of the Philippines.

To the Filipinos, the majority upon the commission meant that the dead-lock as to appropriations and other important measures would be broken instantaneously, and that in the selection of their higher officials, such as bureau chiefs, and judges of the First Instance, they were to have the controlling vote in the commission, to which, by existing law, such nominations were sent for confirmation. Long-standing grievances which they wished to remove were now in their hands for settlement. Above all, the new policy was a recognition of their political rights and race dignity, for which they showed immediate gratitude. The morning after the announcement of the new step forward, "La Vanguardia," the leading Filipino paper, theretofore a very resolute opponent of American policies in the islands, expressed in Spanish the general sentiment editorially under the heading "Dawn of the New Era" as follows:

MAGICAL EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S GRAVE AND  
DIGNIFIED MESSAGE . . .

COMPLETE DISAPPEARANCE OF ALL HITHERTO EXISTING  
PREJUDICES AND A GREAT IMPROVEMENT IN  
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE.

Much has already been said and written in regard to the necessity of a better understanding, of harmony and coöperation, but, hitherto, results have been always negative and all



efforts seemed fruitless. Matters went from bad to worse. Now, however, it has been sufficient for the chosen representative of President Wilson to make a simple and frank statement of policy, and the situation as a result is completely changed. These statements have been sufficient to revive in a most admirable and complete manner the faith of Filipinos in the justice of the American people, and all prejudices and misunderstandings that have grown up in the past have been immediately wiped away. As a result, it can be said that since the decided views of the Democratic Administration have been announced never before in our mutual history have respect and consideration of American sovereignty been as firmly rooted in these islands as it is now.

The editor of the "Vanguardia," Mr. Alejandro Roces, the most influential and independent daily publisher in the islands, maintained the same attitude unswervingly during my whole administration. His unselfish patriotism and determined freedom from any official connections lent weight to his opinions.

Upon the day after the delivery of the first message to the Legislature—October 16, 1913—the Philippine Assembly gave official expression to similar views in a resolution, reciting the firm stand of the Filipino people for immediate independence from the day of the insurrection against Spain in 1896, through all trials and vicissitudes, and their patient confidence that ultimately the United States Government would redress "all errors and injustices." The resolution concluded as follows:

We believe that, happily, the experiments of imperialism have come to an end, and that colonial exploitation has passed into history. The epoch of mistrust has been closed. . . . A few days have sufficed to bring about a good understanding between Americans and Filipinos, which it had been impossible to establish during the thirteen years past. We are convinced that every onward step, while relieving the Amer-

ican Government of its responsibilities in the Islands, will, as in the past, fully demonstrate the present capacity of the Filipino people to establish a government of its own and guarantee in a permanent manner the safety under such government of the life, property and liberty of the residents of the Islands, national as well as foreign. We do not wish to say by this that there will not be difficulties and embarrassments. Nor do we even expect that the campaign, open or concealed, of the enemies of the Filipino cause will cease soon, but we feel sure that through a conservative use of the powers entrusted to us, the Filipino people will, with God's favor and the help of America, emerge triumphantly from the test, however difficult it may be.

A few days later, when the Filipino majority was appointed to the commission, the new commissioners cabled their thanks to the President, accepting the offices in order to "aid the work of laying down a basis for a stable, free Filipino Government." A joint meeting of the Legislature on October 31, 1913, resolved "that the principle of immediate action has taken the place of the announcement of promises." These quotations have been given not only to show the response of the Filipino mind to the new policy, but for the light they cast upon past history in the islands. For a century at least the home government, first of Spain and then of the United States, had, in moments of liberal impulse, promised reforms and made political professions, and then turned to other matters and left the field to the forces of reaction and inaction.

## CHAPTER VI

### FILIPINIZATION

**A** Filipino majority on the commission was regarded by the Americans in the service as a weapon aimed straight at them. At one stroke they had lost their power of complete domination. They still held control, however, of the executive branches of the Government. To be sure, of the nine thousand members of the Classified Civil Service in 1913, only twenty-six hundred were Americans, but the latter held all but half a dozen of the higher offices. This was one of the chief sources of resentment on the part of the Filipino people. How were they to prove their capacity if they were not given a responsible share in the administration? There were in 1913 actually more Americans in the Civil Service than in 1907 or 1908. The resentment of the Filipinos over this state of affairs has a respectable precedent in our own history. The Declaration of Independence says of George the Third: "He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance."

Some bureaus, such as the Customs, were full of Americans in merely clerical positions. What, asked the Filipinos, had become of the instructions of President McKinley thirteen years before? He had laid down the rule to the second Philippine Commission "that in all cases the municipal officers, who administer

the local affairs of the people, are to be selected by the people, and that wherever officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be selected in any way, natives of the islands are to be preferred, and if they can be found competent and willing to perform the duties, they are to receive the offices in preference to any others." What, moreover, had been done in the enforcement of Section 6 of the existing Civil Service Act, which required the appointing officer to select, where other qualifications were equal, first, Filipinos; secondly, honorably discharged persons from the American military or naval service; thirdly, citizens of the United States? This had been one of the long-standing issues between the Filipinos and the then administration, this and the high salaries paid to the more important officials, a subject which was accentuated by the dangerous financial position of the Government. I heard it recently stated in the British House of Commons that the insurrection of 1920 in Mesopotamia was directly caused by the policy of employing too many British officials in that new state.

In these circumstances it was highly desirable to gain the confidence of the Filipino people by some move to show them the sincerity of the new administration. They were tired of oft-repeated promises, so slow in fulfilment. There was an undercurrent of feeling among them that the existing organization would be too strong for us; while local American sentiment on the matter was that I should not dare to take any further steps, and should soon be relieved of office in any event. The Filipinos in responsible positions, such as Messrs. Osmeña and Quezon, were in a difficult situation. They were pledged to the policy of Filipiniza-



tion, and yet were fearful of the opposition which would be aroused in the United States with all the existing danger of having the true state of affairs misunderstood and misrepresented there. Nevertheless, we decided to cut the Gordian knot, though we understood perfectly that this was the most difficult and perplexing task before us. The administration for the past decade had been carried on by an organization of some fifty chiefs and assistant chiefs of bureaus and offices, who were not in the Classified Civil Service, being appointed by the governor-general and confirmed by the commission. The bureau chiefs were the active agents who carried out the policies of the administration. Their power had increased to such an extent in certain instances that they had assumed an attitude of rivalry and antagonism toward one another, if not toward the Government itself, like the feudal barons of old; their "prestige" was all-important, and they were generally inspired with a disbelief in the ability of the Filipinos to carry on any important work of government. They stood together upon that issue, like the Old Guard at Waterloo, ready to die, but never to surrender. If not in accord with the policy of the department heads and of the Legislature, they could block to a very large extent the working out of any reform. The new policy would be impossible if bureau chiefs were to perform political sabotage with the official machinery. Only two of the chiefs or assistant chiefs of bureaus were then Filipinos. The problem of Filipinization of the bureaus was, therefore, one of the first magnitude, and bound to cause strife.

The first step taken was to give a majority of Filipinos upon the Municipal Board of the City of Manila,



then chiefly appointive; the mayor is nominated by the governor-general, so this reform was but following in the footsteps of the Washington administration in the appointment of the new Philippine Commission. In the bureaus of the Insular Government, it was decided to retain Americans as chiefs, for the most part, and appoint Filipinos as assistant chiefs whenever vacancies occurred, for a period of probation; this was done in the bureaus of Internal Revenue, Prisons, Agriculture, and Health, during the first year.

Among the half-dozen resignations I asked in the directorships or assistant-directorships of bureaus, only one was asked for political reasons,—that is, in the sense of American politics. The Republican National Committeeman was chief of an important bureau, and I believed it would be difficult to carry out the new policy with him in that influential position. The resignation of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was requested because he had been sponsor for the sale of large tracts of public lands to corporations in contravention of the wishes of the Filipino people and the views of my party in Washington. In his place I appointed Manuel Tinio, a capable Filipino, then Director of Labor. The Assistant Director of the Bureau of Lands, an American, at once resigned, stating that he would not serve under a Filipino.

Insubordination immediately developed in the Bureau of Printing, through the director and assistant director. They had read in the local papers a statement that salaries were to be cut, and wired to Washington and to the Typographical Union in the United States. Had they come to me I could have assured them that the Legislature had under consideration only

the reduction of salaries above \$3000, and that their employees would not be affected. Instead, they secretly attempted to array the great power of one of the most important American labor unions against the administration. I therefore accepted their resignations immediately, and appointed a subordinate in their office, E. E. Gessler, one of the strongest union men in the service, as Director of Printing. The Director of Printing thus relieved, John S. Leech, had while in Washington caused much trouble to President Roosevelt, and since his transfer to the Philippines had frequently proved a storm-center in Manila.

The resignation of the Chief of Police of Manila and of the prosecuting attorney of the city were requested for purely administrative reasons; the Assistant Chief of Police, an American, was promoted, and Filipinos appointed as prosecuting attorney and city attorney; two of the bureau chiefs, F. W. Taylor, Director of Agriculture, and Mortimer L. Stewart, Director of Prisons, soon voluntarily resigned, much against my wishes, the former to return to the United States and the latter to become editor of a local newspaper. Judge Crossfield voluntarily resigned from the Court of First Instance, to my great regret, in order to enter private practice. Other changes were chiefly promotions in the service. Solicitor-General George R. Harvey was appointed to the bench, and Rafael Corpus, a Filipino, made Solicitor-General. A vacancy occurring in the position of Executive Secretary of the Government, Attorney-General Ignacio Villamor, a Filipino, was appointed to that important position, virtually the head of the bureau chiefs, and Judge Ramon Avanceña of the Court of First Instance

was made Attorney-General. The Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue, an American, whose usefulness was somewhat impaired by superannuation, was displaced by the appointment of General Venancio Concepcion, a Filipino.

These, then, were the principal steps in Filipinization in the early months of the administration. In only five cases in the insular service and four cases in the service of the City of Manila were resignations forced upon officers of the Government. Not a very radical move, one might think, but sufficient to arouse a whirlwind of criticism on the part of the local American political junta. The papers in the United States were filled with charges that I was destroying the Government in the Philippines, and even that I was giving all official positions to "deserving Democrats," a charge which was soon dropped, however, for entire lack of foundation,—and this despite the enormous mass of requests for appointments from my many personal acquaintances in Congress. Disorganization of the Civil Service and "wholesale removals" therefrom were alleged. In answer I quote from a statement of November 13, 1913, by Dr. Bolivar L. Falconer, who soon thereafter left the post of Philippine Director of Civil Service for serious reasons of health, and is now Secretary of the United States Civil Service Commission for New England. He reported: "You have not removed any American from the classified Civil Service. Unquestionably the letter and spirit of the Civil Service Act and Rules have been strictly observed during the period October 6, 1913, to date."

There had, in the past, been little permanency in the American personnel of the Philippine Civil Service;

in the ten preceding years an average of 646 Americans had each year left the Classified Civil Service, for voluntary or involuntary reasons, some 22 per cent. of the total. For the period of a year from the date of my arrival, the number was 716, but their places were filled by Filipinos, not by Americans brought over for the purpose.

Comparatively few of the Americans, from the very beginning, had been trained for the service. Many of them were ex-officers or soldiers of the volunteer army of invasion of the Philippines; many others, young men lured to the tropics by the hope of adventure or of making a career there. Many of them had developed into useful and unselfish public servants; some of them were men of truly remarkable ability; others had merely "hung on" in clerical positions. The truth is that the Americans in the Philippine service have always been a shifting body of restless, ambitious, and adventurous young men.

The rapid progress of Filipinization, however, led to genuine alarm among American officials and employees. To some of them it really seemed as if the immediate end of the official life of them all was at hand, especially upon reading President Wilson's reference to the Philippine situation in his Message to Congress of December 2, 1913, in which he said, referring to his creation of a Filipino majority on the commission:

I believe that in this way we shall make proof of their capacity in counsel and their sense of responsibility in the exercise of political power, and that the success of this step will be sure to clear our view for the steps which are to follow. Step by step we should extend and perfect the system of self-



government in the Islands, making test of them and modifying them as experience discloses their successes and their failures; that we should more and more put under the control of the native citizens of the Archipelago the essential instruments of their life, their local instrumentalities of government, their schools, all the common interests of the communities, and so by counsel and experience set up a government which all the word will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their own control at last. I hope and believe that we are beginning to gain the confidence of the Filipino peoples. By their counsel and experience rather than by our own we shall learn how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision. Let us once find the path and set out with firm and confident tread upon it and we shall not wander from it or linger upon it.

The nervousness of Americans in the service increased from week to week for the first few months; the excitement among them was continually fed by the skilful efforts of opponents of the new policy, in the press and on the platform. Secretary Garrison, on July 22, 1914, felt it necessary to answer one of the many statements put forth by the imperialists. He said:

In some papers statements were made that as many as 500 Spanish-American War veterans had been discharged by the new administration in the Philippines. This whole statement is so wide of the truth that I desire to state the facts.

He then pointed out that during the first four months of the new administration, instead of five hundred, there had been dropped, of ex-soldiers or ex-sailors,

. . . a total of 22, not half of whom were Spanish War veterans. Of this number, four have been transferred to the United States Civil Service in the Islands, and six were transferred to the United States Civil Service at home. This total



of ten who were transferred to the civil service included every man on the list who applied for transfer.

Other rumors which were widely circulated by the press at this time were as far removed from the facts as the foregoing. Reports of business depression and of the abandonment of the annual Manila carnival were spread broadcast, but the carnival that year was a record-breaker; and as the Philippines soon entered upon a period of unprecedented prosperity, another weapon had to be discarded.

Next, rumors of destitution among Americans as a result of the policy of Filipinization began to appear in the press. Upon investigation, it was reported by the Chief of Police, Colonel George Seaver, that there were fewer destitute Americans in Manila than at any previous time in American occupation, and that no American was in want. Americans "out of a job" were mostly discharged employees of the Quartermaster's Department of the United States Army, and not of the Insular Government. Although a number of Americans during these months left the service to enter private business, it was for the most part greatly to their own ultimate pecuniary advantage. Those who failed did so principally because they were unfitted for a life of work in the tropics. An example of this was the fate of the Agricultural Colony at Momungan in Mindanao, founded in 1914 by government subsidy as a method of employment for deserving cases of the humbler class of Americans out of work, mostly those with Filipino wives and families. The location selected was excellent, the soil was good, access to markets was provided, and the altitude of eleven hundred feet in-

sured a reasonably good climate for outdoor labor. At the end of three years all the Americans had left and Filipinos were settled in their places.

One reason for the exodus of Americans from government service into private business was the prosperity in commercial circles during the years 1915-19; another, no doubt, was the new regulation put into effect in December, 1913, absolutely prohibiting government officials and employees from engaging in private business enterprises. This well-established rule of the British colonial service had not been in effect in the Philippines, and in several instances its omission had led to scandal. In many others private interests had at the very least distracted the attention of the official from his public duties. When faced with a choice a number of the office-holders elected to keep their business and retire from the public service. They have in general made a genuine success in business, and are now thankful for the step then taken.

All Americans who left the insular service with a good record were entitled to certain payments by way of accrued leave or otherwise. In February of 1916 the civil retirement act known as the Osmeña Law was adopted, by the terms of which those who applied before a certain date (since extended from year to year) became entitled to a bonus of one year's salary for ten years of service, in addition to their accrued leave; those who had served less than ten years but more than six years were entitled to a proportionate amount. During the five years from 1916 to 1920 (inclusive), 913 Americans availed themselves of this privilege, receiving Pesos 3,474,923 in gratuities, and 212 Filipinos receiving Pesos 261,010.

The echoes of the vigorous local fight against Filipinization resounded down through the succeeding seven years, and have colored much of the "information" given the American public during this period. The policy was not accepted by the local Americans generally until the passage by almost unanimous vote of Congress of the Jones Act of August 29, 1916, confirming the state of progress in Filipinization and advancing it a step further. Even after this many "old-timers" in Manila kept up the fight, more or less *sub rosa*, though the American business houses generally adopted this policy in their own office forces.

After the first few months, the process of transferring the offices to the Filipinos was accomplished without any convulsive effort, effected naturally by the simple means of filling the offices as they became vacant through natural routine causes, by nomination, generally by promotion, of Filipinos. This process was greatly accelerated when the United States entered the war and a large proportion of the splendid Americans then left in the service hastened to join the United States Army. During these five years the Government was gradually transformed from one of Americans aided by Filipinos, to one of Filipinos assisted by Americans. The act of transfer was sealed, signed, and delivered by the passage by the United States Congress of the Jones Law.

To the hundreds of Americans who accepted the changes and stayed in the government service, promotion was rapid, and was made without any reference whatever to their home political affiliations; in fact, far more Republicans than Democrats held office and were promoted to higher posts under my administra-

tion,—owing, no doubt, to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Americans in the Philippines, both in and out of the public service, are members of the Republican party.

By 1921, with the exception of the bureaus of Education, the Mint, Prisons, Forestry, Science, Weather, the Quarantine service, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Metropolitan Water District, the other thirty bureaus and offices of the Government had Filipinos either regularly appointed as chiefs or acting as such, and in virtually all cases Filipinos were assistant chiefs, in training for future greater responsibilities. No disposition was shown at any time by the Filipinos to desire offices of a technical nature, such as those enumerated above, for which they had no men of sufficient experience or training. It seems probable that in the event of independence they will make an effort to secure the services of American advisers or directors for bureaus of a scientific or technical nature, after the manner of Japan during the first thirty years of her entry into modern forms of government.

In the University of the Philippines, for example, after Don Ignacio Villamor was appointed from the presidency to the Supreme Court bench, a great effort was made to secure a capable American to succeed him; Jacob Gould Schurman and Professor John Dewey of Columbia were among those approached for the purpose; finally, Dr. Guy Benton was selected. In the Philippine National Bank, the first two presidents were Americans, the next a Filipino, and now an American is again in charge. In the Bureau of Science, no Filipino has as yet endeavored to secure appointment as assistant chief, and in the Weather Bureau a Span-



iard remains as chief and another has just been appointed assistant. As will be noted presently, Americans were appointed managers of the two largest government-ownership enterprises, the Manila Railroad Company and the National Coal Company.

Regarding the policy of Filipinization announced by our Presidents from McKinley to Wilson, and of the specific provisions of the Jones Act, it will be seen that while Filipinos have by now come to occupy most of the posts of tactical or administrative power, they have shown prudence in approaching the scientific or technical branches of office-holding, and they manifest a genuine appreciation of the services of those Americans who have continued to work for their welfare and the development of their country.

It was customary for enthusiastic Americans under prior régimes to claim for the United States all the credit for the achievements of earlier years; no mention was made of the eagerness in coöperation of the great numbers of Filipinos in subordinate positions and in the provincial and municipal service. So, in the later years of trial under the new form of government granted by the Jones Act, it has been the custom for patriotic Filipinos to claim for their own people all the substantial accomplishments of the new administration. This was natural enough in view of the situation; they had been by American policies deliberately put on trial as to their capacity. The fact is, however, that part of the credit was due to Americans who so wisely and devotedly served the new government. If mistakes have been made, and mistakes there have been, here as elsewhere, criticism therefore should be impartially distributed.



It is customary to attribute to Filipinization an impairment of efficiency of administration; it would be only just to say that in many respects efficiency had been gained, in that the new government had the support and coöperation of the people to a marked degree, thus making much easier the task of administration. The distribution of executive power and the exercise of more genuine authority by many officials, the gradual withdrawal of the central Government from minute inspection and direction of minor functions—in other words, the extension of self-government and the spread of democracy—may in themselves have impaired somewhat the efficiency of administration. If so, that disadvantage is more than offset by the gain in contentment of the people, the growth of respect and friendship for the United States, and the valuable lessons in self-government secured by the Filipinos.

In a later chapter, more extended reference will be made to the American policy of Filipinization, and the profound effect it has had upon the relations of the Filipinos to our country, as well as upon the colonial policy of various European governments.

At the present time, with the change of administration in the United States, and consequently in the Philippines, a great discussion is under way as to whether the Filipinos have succeeded in their new responsibilities; it is difficult for political partizans upon either side to state the case impartially; to pass a fair judgment upon the situation requires freedom from political bias and from race prejudice. With that freedom, an impartial observer will, it is certain, be struck with the real success attained by many if not

most of the Filipino officials charged with heavy responsibility in an age of world-wide disturbance.

It is not unusual, in our own country, for a certain type of campaign orators to claim for the party in power all credit for the sunshine and the rains, for the good crops and the prosperity of the people. It would be difficult for a scientific observer to state in any given case how much the well-being of the people of any country is to be attributed to the activities and policies of government, and how much to the people themselves and to extraneous influences. It would perhaps be invidious to claim for the Filipinos the credit for the unprecedented prosperity of the islands during the years 1917-19; it would be equally unjust to blame them for the recession of prosperity in 1920-21. It can, however, be positively stated that the wave of general satisfaction with their government and with the United States made it much easier for the Filipinos to meet and sustain the changes of prosperity and depression. Of the great material advantage to the United States of having during the war a loyal and contented population in the Philippines, there can be no doubt.

As to what concrete achievements are to be credited to the Filipino officials, both in the Legislature and in administrative branches, during these past eight years, in which they have increasingly taken charge of the government, more detailed analysis will presently be made. This chapter might best be concluded with a brief statement of the progress in certain lines from 1913 to 1921. It matters less what particular official, American or Filipino, is to be credited with a specific accomplishment than it does to note the spirit of the

whole governmental body, admittedly under Filipino control, both as to appropriations and as to policies during this period. Within these eight years the mileage of first-class roads more than doubled, increasing from 2233 kilometers to 4698 kilometers; 1620 permanent (concrete or steel) bridges were constructed; 725 permanent government buildings were built, including schools, public markets, hospitals, provincial capitols, and large and beautiful edifices for the university and the Insular Government; a network of wireless stations was erected throughout the provinces; a vast program of improvements in port works was launched, and a bond issue of ten million pesos was sold in the United States for harbor improvement in Manila alone; irrigation works estimated to cost about ten million pesos, and designed to benefit 150,000 acres of land in sixteen different localities, were initiated; 949 artesian wells in the different provinces, an average of one to each municipality, were drilled at a total cost of nearly two and one half million pesos, and 55 new waterworks systems were installed with 36 more under active construction, to cost more than three million pesos. The artesian wells and new waterworks are providing excellent water for approximately one and one half million persons who had always previously been supplied with more or less contaminated surface water.

The progress in agriculture, of which fuller mention will presently be made, was remarkable; the point of interest here is that the placing of Filipinos in control of the agricultural departments greatly enlarged the power of the Government to influence the people to increased production. Of rice alone 625,000

acres more were planted during these eight years; 528 rural-credit societies were established, and coöperation in agriculture, a new spirit among the farmers, encouraged and explained. In education the program was enlarged by appropriations which were increased from Pesos 7,600,000 in 1913 to Pesos 18,000,000 in 1920, thus allowing 300,000 more children to enter the public schools; taxation was revised and increased, and the government revenue, which in 1913 had been only Pesos 22,000,000, rose to Pesos 80,000,000 in 1919; there are twelve banking institution in the islands now, instead of only six, and the money in circulation has risen from Pesos 50,000,000 in 1914 to three times that figure. To conclude this list, last but not least must be mentioned the legislation and administration during these years which established friendship and mutual understanding between the Christian Filipinos and their non-Christian kinsmen, a movement carried out with the same spirit of altruism as that which had guided their American predecessors. This brief and partial summary constitutes a record of which no people need be ashamed.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE MOROS

**W**ITHIN recent years in the United States, the Moros have monopolized ninety-five per cent. of the discussion of the Philippine problem, although constituting but four per cent. of the population of the Philippines. At the census of 1918 there were 358,968 Mohammedans (Moros) in the islands, while in the same Department of the Philippines there lived 159,132 Christians and 205,555 pagans. About nine million Christians inhabited the islands to the north. I was obliged to make an important decision in the Moro problem in the first two months after my arrival in Manila.

The fame of the Moros was wide-spread through the American army officers, who had fought them in many a tight corner and had effected the conquest over them which Spain had for three centuries sought in vain. An amusing picture of Moro life was given to the American public at home by George Ade's operetta "The Sultan of Sulu." The personality of the Moro is picturesque; his history is stained with blood.

The Moro is of the same racial stock as the Christian Filipino,—of a later migration, perhaps, but a blood brother, all the same. The chief difference is that he is a Mohammedan, while ninety-two per cent. of the Filipinos are Christians. The Moro Province, as constituted in 1913, contained most of the great islands



of Mindanao, nearly as large as Luzon, and the Sulu Archipelago, stretching right across to the shores of Borneo. This region, potentially the richest part of the Philippine Islands, is very sparsely settled, and almost undeveloped, owing to the intractable nature of the Moros, and their peculiar history.

At intervals during nearly three hundred years the Spanish had sent expeditions against the Moros, and succeeded only in maintaining a few garrisons on the coast. The old walled city of Jolo (Sulu) looks like a scene from an opera, but death awaited the luckless outsider who ventured beyond its walls, until Wood and Pershing broke the power of the Sulu Moros.

Instead of overcoming the Moros, the Spaniards, who gave them that name in remembrance of the Mohammedan Moors with whom they had for centuries contended in the home peninsula, only made a bad situation worse. For their own purposes and protection, they had completely disarmed the Christian Filipinos, and left them defenseless against the sea-pirates of the southern islands. Again and again the Moros sallied forth in small, swift-sailing vessels, in bands of two or three hundred well-armed warriors, and raided the coast villages to the north for plunder and for slaves. The Spaniards were utterly unable to cope with them. Their raids were to a great extent stopped by Dutch and English gunboats in the nineteenth century, and finally the United States, in the twentieth century, broke their military power. As late as 1870 Moro raids were suffered in the Straits of San Bernardino, at the southern end of Luzon. All along the shores of the Philippines stood little stone watch-towers and the cry "*Hay Moros en la costa!*" caused

a panic in the near-by towns and a hurried flight to the mountains. Constant intermarriage with the women raided from the northern islands kept alive the kinship with the Filipinos.

The "treacherous Malay" of the novels is the type we know as the Moro. The first really authentic description we have of him is in the story of the voyage of Captain William Dampier at the end of the seventeenth century. He spent nearly a year with the Sultan of Maguindanao, and was treated by the Moros with the same mixture of urbanity and rapacious treachery for which they were known to the Spanish and earlier Americans. The history of their scattered strongholds in Mindanao and Sulu is one long weary tale of bloodshed and intrigue. Settlement of the lands harried by them was impossible except under arms and with constant vigilance. The story is not unlike that of our own two hundred years of struggle with the Indians of the Atlantic coast. The population was kept down by incessant warfare, and vast areas of the richest lands in that part of the world lay uncultivated. Even to-day there are only about a half-million people in Mindanao, while in the island of Java to the south, of about an equal area, there are about thirty-four million inhabitants. As Norman Angell has said of the red Indians of our own country, "A hundred thousand" of them "starved in a country where a hundred million modern Americans" have abundance.

To-day, the Sultan of Maguindanao has surrendered all pretensions to leadership and lives quietly in a village near Zamboanga. The Sultan of Sulu has kept alive the traditions of petty royalty, but has now made friends with the Filipinos as well as with the Amer-

icans, and when he dies, there will die with him a dynasty of six hundred years of power. The Moro Province is now fundamentally and essentially a part of the body politic of the Philippines, and it is to be hoped that we may never hear again the suggestion, current twenty years ago, that the Moro Archipelago be separated from the Philippine Islands; this suggestion aroused the cupidity of various European powers, and was even advanced by anti-imperialistic Americans in an attempt to solve the Philippine question, upon the supposition that the Filipinos could never control the Moros if they were given their independence. Every year now makes it more probable that this political question at least has been fairly settled. The Filipinos are determined that fractional minority of their eleven millions of inhabitants shall not be used as an excuse to deprive them of one of the richest parts of their heritage. The story of how this adjustment of the apparently insoluble Moro problem came about is worth the telling in some detail.

The military command of the Moro Province was, up to 1914, one of the great prizes of the army administration. It brought with it the governorship of the province under the Insular Government, and offered a life of excitement and achievement. The position had been held by such distinguished officers as General Leonard Wood and General Bliss, and the governor when I arrived was the famous John J. Pershing. Both Generals Wood and Pershing had fought sanguinary battles with the Moros in Jolo (Sulu) in which thousands of Moros had been killed. Minor skirmishes by the score had necessitated that our scattered detachments always keep their "powder dry" and their bayo-

nets bright. Finally General Pershing had virtually accomplished the disarmament of the Moros and the foundations of civil government were fairly laid. He had gradually relieved many of the military officers from administrative posts under him and filled those positions with civilians, especially officers of the constabulary.

Soon after my arrival in Manila, I received word from General Pershing that he wished to be relieved after four years of service as Governor of the Moro Province. I earnestly requested him to remain, but the condition of his health absolutely forbade that. So, in November, 1913, accompanied by the commanding general, the late Major-General J. Franklin Bell, Major (later Brigadier-General) Herman Hall, and Dr. N. M. Saleeby,—an American physician at Manila, who was a recognized expert on Moro dialects, and had during his previous residence in Syria learned Arabic, a language which the Moro leaders generally understood,—I joined General Pershing at Zamboanga for a tour of inspection.

Zamboanga, the capital of the southern islands, is the most attractive of the coast towns of the Philippines, and is a port of call for a few Australian and Singapore steamers. Indeed, as in culture and traditions the southern islands are closely connected with the parent stem of the Malay world, the commerce and associations of the petty rulers of those islands had for generations been chiefly with Singapore. As public order gradually became more assured in Mindanao, Zamboanga became the point of debarkation for an increasing number of immigrant Visayans from Cebú and Bohol, and there was also a mixture of descendants





A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE LUNETTA, MANILA





THE SULTAN OF JOLO AND OTHER PROMINENT MOROS  
Waiting for the arrival of the Congressional party

of Tagalogs from Luzon, four hundred miles to the north, whence their grandfathers had been deported by the Spaniards, chiefly for so-called political offenses. Even Rizal was for some time a political prisoner, having been deported to Dapitan on the north coast of Mindanao. From year to year the trade and political relations of the great islands of Mindanao had drawn more and more closely to those of the North. Although only four degrees above the equator, Zamboanga is blessed with cooling breezes from three points of the compass, and, owing to an equable rainfall and freedom from typhoons, it is one of the garden spots of the archipelago. There General Pershing had his headquarters as Governor of the Moro Province. The nearby Moros were friendly and their chief or dato, Mandi, was loyal to the Government up to the day of his death.

In physical characteristics the Moros are very much like other Filipinos. In dress they are infinitely gayer and more picturesque. Their petty sultans lived in much style in past generations, and when their power was broken a great number of small chieftains set up their claims to local leadership over more or less savage followers. Their dignity of bearing is notable, as is their personal vanity. Decked in bright colors and with pearls from the near-by Sulu Sea, they imitate in a feeble way the magnificence of the Indian rajahs. The only gold coins in circulation in the Philippines were gradually collected by the Moros to make buttons for their gay silk jackets. Gaudy head-dresses and skin-tight trousers complete their costume, while a murderous-looking kris, or wavy-bladed short sword, and a dagger with handle of carved ivory and gold

adorn the dato. The greater the dato, the larger, of course, his following of personal attendants, the more important his umbrella of state or decorated walking-stick. A servant behind him carries his buyo box, made by some Moro artisan, of finely chased silver and inlay work, and containing lime, betel-nut, and leaves for chewing.

The Moro are men of great personal valor, as they showed in many a hand-to-hand combat with cold steel over the ramparts of their little forts; a rush of these warriors armed with the kris was almost irresistible by a party of men advancing single-file through the high cogon grass. The three or four hundred thousand Moros scattered over this great territory have made as much trouble in the past as ten times their numbers of more peaceful and tractable people could have made. Their sheer courage made them popular with our military men.

There is something in Mohammedanism, especially of Arab tradition, which renders the followers of the Prophet difficult to deal with. Their religious training, which consists merely in committing to memory the verses of the Arabic version of the Koran, inclines them to live in an atmosphere of tribal hostility and restless intrigue, like their cultural ancestors in the days of Mohammed. How much of the present-day spirit of hatred, revenge, and jealousy even among the nations of Europe is due to the direct teachings of the Old Testament? The Moros are difficult to influence with modern ideas, but the American school system is now operating vigorously to leaven the mass. The Moros have plenty of panglimas, or priests, but no hierarchy through which the Government might

reach and control them; there are many hadjis,—men and women who have performed the pilgrimage to Mecca,—but they are, perhaps, the most ardent upholders of the old system. The Moro is a poor Mohammedan, after all, and practises chiefly the superstitions of a faith of which he is intensely proud without having a true understanding of its spiritual enlightenment. As Governor Carpenter has said, “. . . he is still a pagan with a veneer of Mohammedanism.” His religion is not of the militant type, he does not make any effort to impose his faith on others, and is entirely tolerant of other beliefs. He apparently values Islam as a superior caste to which he is proud to belong.

The chief settlements of the Moros are in Jolo and Siasi, in Zamboanga, in Cotabato, in Lanao, and in southern Palawan. All of these places were visited on our first trip of inspection. Public meetings were held in each locality, and the native speeches (duly interpreted for our benefit) were often picturesque with Oriental imagery and enlivened with brief conventional outbursts of real or simulated passion. The Moro is a great boaster, but, like many more primitive races, he is an accurate and shrewd reader of character. His tendency is to tell the visitor just what he thinks the person addressed will like. Military men are generally treated to many references to the bloodthirsty valor of the Moros, and are told these brave warriors would as soon cut off the head of a Filipino as eat breakfast. Filipino officials, on the contrary, are addressed with much sentimental talk of friendship and brotherhood. The Arab merchants of earlier days, and the modern wandering Arab priests are their teachers. The un-



reliability of the Arab is proverbial; only the other day, in the British House of Commons, I heard a frank statement, made by a recognized expert on Arabian politics, of how completely Sir Percy Sykes was "taken in" by the Arab chiefs in Damascus in 1920.

At every meeting the most important question raised by the Moros was whether or not the Government intended to interfere with their religious customs. We always assured them, to the contrary, that the United States Government did not interfere in matters of religion. Religious interference was the historic cause of the failure of Spain with the Moros: the aim of the Spanish Government was conversion to Christianity, and every Moro was willing to fight to the death for his religion. The disheartening failure of our own American colonists to deal peaceably, or even honorably, with the Indians (except in Pennsylvania for seventy years under Quaker rule) was due to the land hunger of our race. The Spaniards had no success in dealing with the Moro because they insisted upon religious conversion. Under American rule, once the religious question was out of the way, the path was cleared for a policy of conciliation and attraction.

There is always the possibility of confusion in the mind of the Moros between religion and custom, their sultans being the religious heads of a people over whom too often rule meant the right to steal cattle and enslave women. Lord Cromer, in his first meeting with the beaten chieftains of the Soudan and after his promise to respect their religion, was confronted with English public opinion at home. Did that mean to permit slavery? The main source of trouble with the Moros now is the question of polygamy. While that



is not, strictly speaking, a religious tenet of the Mohammedans, and is not enjoined by the Koran, it is universally permitted by their religion. When the Jones Bill came before Congress, I wrote Secretary Garrison that a law already existed in the Philippines against polygamy, but if the Government wanted somebody to enforce that statute among the Moros, it would have to find another governor-general, since the Moros were reduced to order for the first time in history, and I knew of no issue upon which I was sure that all of them could unite except that of polygamy. As an example of the petty war which might result, I cited to him the forty years of fighting just terminated in North Sumatra between the Dutch and the Achinese. As I then stated, the only way successfully to stamp out polygamy among the Moros is to educate them in the public schools,—especially the girls. The process of education is now going on, though meeting with some resistance on the part of the older datos, as was evidenced by the affray at Pata, near Jolo, in December, 1920, when the constabulary killed thirty-three Moros in a fight growing out of local resistance to the attendance at school of some Mohammedan girls. It seems certain that when they are educated, the women themselves will oppose the practice of polygamy. Many of the younger men, too, would probably welcome a change. There are not enough women to go around, now that piratical raiding of near-by communities has been stopped. The peculiar Malay practice of running amuck, or going *juramentado* (oath-taken), in which the individual dedicates himself to death in a mad frenzy of killing right and left all whom he meets, is often due to rage on the part of the young men because

the young women are brought up for the harems of the chiefs.

Our visit to Jolo gave us an opportunity of meeting the sultan, Hadji Mohammed Jamalul Kiram, and his "prime minister," Hadji Butu, later on appointed senator in the Philippine Legislature. The sultan is a small man, of less impressive personality than others of his caste whom I have met in Borneo and Java. He had a gay time on Broadway, on his visit to New York several years ago, and was famous on the "Great White Way" for his pearls. He is well disposed toward Americans, for the Moro is an intensely practical man when it comes to a final recognition of overwhelming force; he has of late years made friends with the Filipinos. Had he been a stronger man, he would have been of great use to the Government, but his rule had always been disputed even in Jolo, where two or more factions have generally existed through the generations.

Generals Bell, Pershing, and Hall accompanied me on a motor trip across the island of Jolo, past the little mountain of Bagsak, where five months before Pershing had broken the Moro power in a pitched battle in which thousands of fighting Mohammedans, men and women, were killed. Some years later, I met a young lady who was one of the few survivors of that Moro camp; she was then teaching school at a little village on the other side of the island. General Pershing had been much criticized by good people at home for the killing of women in this battle, but, as he explained to me, the women fought in the front ranks with the men, and one could not tell men and women apart behind the trenches. It is a curious fact that the Moro

men and women are often indistinguishable; the men have no beards nor mustaches, and both sexes wear the hair long. Many of their fiercest warriors are slender men with a feline or feminine countenance. On this same inspection trip, on the road to Lanao, General Hall stopped an individual who was passing and asked if it were a man or woman; the person addressed replied with a smile that he was a man and a fighter! His smile and his sense of humor are the most pleasing of the Moro's characteristics.

Our motor trip across the island of Jolo was intended to prove the pacification of that much-vexed region. Until recently, no visitor had ever ventured outside the walls of the city of Jolo without an armed escort. A few months before, that splendid young American, Governor Vernon I. Whitney of Jolo, a former football star from Iowa—then just recovering from a wound received in storming a *cota*, or fort—was walking outside the walls of Jolo when he was suddenly attacked by two Moros armed with bolos. He managed to "tackle" one of them, emptied his small revolver into the other, then took the bolo from the man he held and literally cut him in two.

In all engagements against the Moros, even when entrenched, Filipinos have fought under our officers with great zeal and valor alongside the American soldiers, generally taking the positions by storm. The last pitched engagement against the Moros was the reduction of the Bayan Cota, the remaining fort on the south shore of Lake Lanao, in 1917. About fifteen hundred Moros, in revolt against the Government because of opposition to the schools and to the land survey, had gathered there and refused to give up their

guns. That time the constabulary borrowed from the army a battery of mountain machine-guns, or "mule guns," an officer, and forty Scout soldiers, and positive orders were given to restrain the Filipino constabulary forces from storming the cota. Instead of suffering the usual severe casualties, the government forces sustained the loss of only one Filipino officer and one soldier wounded, and the machine-guns utterly broke up the resistance and drove the Moros from the cota.

The peace we found upon our visit to Jolo in 1913 was that of subjugation, for few persons were visible, and little cultivation was to be seen on the surrounding hills. Just three years later, on the same spot, with a small party of government officials and friends, I had a delightful two days in camp with about seven hundred armed Moros, when we went deer-hunting with spears on horseback. Our party was unarmed and without escort. This second trip across the island was through fields of grain and banana plantations. But for the work of General Pershing, civil government could not have been instituted in Jolo; and but for civil government, Jolo would still be unsafe for the visitor.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN MOROLAND

**T**HE impending departure of General Pershing for home necessitated an immediate decision on the appointment of his successor, which involved the question of installing at once a civil government in Moroland. The War Department had already proposed to me the name of a well-known general as Pershing's successor, but my predecessor as governor-general had, I understood, intended that the next governor of the Moro Province should be a civilian, and that was my own earnest desire. A long-continued government of military men is in itself an invitation to war. Men who had just come through many a hard-fought skirmish with and surprise attack from the Moros could hardly be expected to believe them fit for civil government. Such regarded them as untamable wild animals, and the custom, along the Lanao Military road at least, was to take a pot-shot at any Moro seen on the hillsides. The military manner in administration, moreover, leads to all sorts of irritation and sometimes to reprisals. The recent rebellion of Dato Ali and his men was an illustration in point. In 1905, at the headwaters of the Cotabato River,—a region never brought under effective government control until about 1917,—lived several thousand Moros who had taken to the mountains in defiance of established order. Their chief was Ali, who claimed he had never submitted to



any man. One day, Dato Ali came slipping alone up to the military headquarters at Cotabato, to present some grievance to the Government. The American sergeant-in-charge had some dispute with him and ended by kicking him down the stairs. A very picturesque little war resulted, lasting several months, and costing a number of lives and much money. Dato Ali and many of his followers were killed in battle.

Both General Bell and General Pershing recommended to me the appointment of a civilian as governor; and General Bell stated that he wished to remove all white American troops from the province. Both policies were agreed upon, and promptly carried out. We canvassed names for the office of Governor of the Moro Province, and the two generals could agree on only one man, Frank W. Carpenter, the then Chief of the Executive Bureau, in Manila. The wisdom of their judgment was proved by the event. I cabled to the Secretary of War the result of these conferences and that "Peace is established throughout the province and is liable to be permanent if properly managed." This opinion was entirely justified by the outcome, but largely because of the tact, courage, and skill of one man, the new Governor of the Moro Province, who was for seven years to preside over the destinies of its much discussed and restless population.

Mr. Carpenter was at first somewhat reluctant to abandon the forum of his fifteen years of activity in the seat of government in Manila, but on December 15th he became the governor, "believing with me," as I cabled home, "that now the time has come to inaugurate a policy among the Moros which will thereby greatly increase peace and prosperity in these re-

gions." On December 20, 1913, the name of the Moro Province was changed to "Department of Mindanao and Sulu," and the special-government provinces in Mindanao, such as Agusan and Butuan, which under the Secretary of the Interior had been the source of endless administrative friction, were included in the new department, of which the land area was now 36,500 square miles, about one third of that of the entire Philippine Islands.

Three months later I again inspected these same regions; Governor Carpenter was in full control of matters, and his extraordinary ability and incessant activity were already producing results. Meanwhile, Commanding-General Bell had withdrawn all the white soldiers from the department and had left garrisons of Philippine Scouts (Filipinos) at Overton and Keithley in Lanao, at Ludlow Barracks in Cotabato, and at the barracks in the towns of Zamboanga and Jolo. The strength of the constabulary in the department had been increased to sixty officers (partly American) and nine hundred and seventy-two men, all Filipinos, under Colonel Peter E. Traub of the United States Army. Colonel Traub during three years (1914-1917) continued the policy of General Pershing as to disarmament, and confiscated one thousand firearms without serious resistance from their possessors, often being helped by the Moros themselves, who were tired of being harried and robbed by their own outlaw desperados. Later on, when our country entered the World War in 1917, even the Scout garrisons were withdrawn from the department, except one battalion at Pettit Barracks, Zamboanga.

On March 26, 1914, I was able to cable to the Secre-

tary of War: "Just returned from an inspection trip Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Conditions generally excellent. Agriculture extending materially Lanao and Jolo. Peace conditions improving there and particularly in mountains head Cotabato Valley." And again on May 21, 1914: "Report peaceful surrender yesterday Cotabato famous Moro outlaw Alamada with more than 3000 men. Alamada outlaw chieftain since Spanish days." The next winter Alamada accompanied Governor Carpenter, with other datos, to the Manila carnival. He seemed to me like a wild bird, poised for instant flight, and supremely uncomfortable among the large crowd of officials at Malacañan Palace; his hand was cold from suppressed nervousness and embarrassment. He had agreed to come to Manila upon the assurance that he could carry his kris at all times, and that he would not be obliged to wear "Christian" clothing. Before the end of his first day in Manila he had discarded his kris and surreptitiously procured an American suit of clothes. Upon his return to Cotabato, he became insistent in his demands for schools. There were many similar cases in the records of these years.

All of Governor Carpenter's reports are to be found printed in full, in the Bureau of Insular Affairs in Washington. No extended analysis of his great work is intended here. He kept on terms of friendship with all the varied elements of an uneasy and perplexing population. His daily conferences were with Moro datos, American navy and army officers, investors or speculators of a dozen different nationalities, bishops and missionaries of the Christian churches, Arab priests, Filipino and American officials, tourists and

visitors, Japanese hemp-planters and merchants, Chinese traders and smugglers, newspaper men and emissaries from the near-by ports of Borneo and Celebes, and shy, pagan men from the forest-clad mountains of Mindanao. That he was able to reconcile all those diverse and potentially antagonistic elements speaks for itself; he did more: he brought them into some sort of cohesion and coöperation to work for the development of that vast territory and for the establishment of public order. He was particularly kind and patient in his dealings with the suspicious and "jumpy" Moro datos. He received much assistance from the ladies of the family of the Sultan of Sulu, who, as is so often the case among the Mohammedans (as for example in Afghanistan to-day), were the real managers of the sultan's affairs. He exercised the utmost care in encouraging in the Moro chieftains a sense of social ease and conventionality, even teaching hands accustomed only to the sword and spear how to use the complicated machinery of the modern tea-table, against the day when they should visit Manila. Above all, he was firm, as firm as any military commander could be, when military operations were necessary; but his firmness was finely tempered with tact and understanding of human nature.

The history of his negotiations with the Sultan of Sulu gave him an opportunity for the display of his diplomatic talents. The House of Sulu had indeed come upon unprofitable days. Their genealogy of six hundred years now served them to no greater purpose than their claim to descent from Alexander the Great. To be sure, the sultan was treated as a monarch when he visited Singapore or that portion of Borneo which



he had leased to the British North Borneo Company. There, at least, he flew his own flag and received a salute of twenty-one guns. But in the Philippines his position was anomalous. Under Spain he had exercised *de-jure* and *de-facto* sovereignty in the Sulu Archipelago, except in the ports of Jolo, Siasi, and Bongao. He was then a "protected" sovereign. He never opposed the United States in arms, and never surrendered to our army. He had executed a treaty in 1899 with General Bates which failed of adoption by the United States Senate because it recognized polygamy. This "treaty" was abrogated by President Roosevelt on March 2, 1904, because the sultan had failed to keep order in Sulu, according to his agreement. He replied that the Americans had insisted upon the disbanding of his army, and he had never surrendered his claim to sovereignty. To say the least, the legal position of the sultan and of the lands in the Sulu Archipelago was unsettled.

Governor Carpenter undertook to straighten out the tangle. On March 11, 1915, after eleven days and nights of negotiation, with which I was kept in touch by cable, he signed an agreement with the sultan by which the latter, for himself and his heirs, renounced temporal sovereignty over the Sulu Islands, including the "right" to collect taxes, the right to decide lawsuits, and the reversionary right to all the lands. In exchange, he was recognized by the Government as head of the Mohammedan Church in the Philippines, his pension of Pesos 12,000 was continued for life, and he was given a grant of land in Jolo. He was wise enough to accept the substance, however small, for the shadow, however great. So ends the Sultanate of Sulu.




One clause of the agreement states that "The Sultan of Sulu and his adherents and people of the Mohammedan faith shall have the same religious freedom had by the adherents of all other religious creeds, the practice of which is not in violation of the basic principles of the laws of the United States." This bars polygamy.

If Governor Carpenter had been a citizen of one of the European colonizing powers, he would have been loaded with honors by the home government; as it is, his name is unknown to one per cent. of the American public. He has been given a substantial pecuniary grant by the Philippine Legislature, and is still active in the service in Manila.

His chief agents in Mindanao and Sulu were, first, the constabulary as patrols and, later, when the hinterland was gradually brought under control as permanent posts; next, medical men or Filipino *practicantes* who set up their little dispensaries in the most remote regions; and finally the public-school teachers, also, for the most part, Filipinos. The shyest tribesman quickly gave his confidence to the medical man. In the course of a few years the leading Moros were clamoring for public schools in widely separated districts. In fact, the demand for schools, in view of these people's occasional antagonism later on to compulsory school attendance, is hard to understand. Certainly, nothing has been done by the school-teachers to offend their prejudices. Perhaps it is, as Governor Guingona explained in his report for 1920, because the older Moros believed that the schools "were good only if those who were educated in the same could be immediately employed in the public service." Perhaps, however, the

parents were zealous enough in theory for the education of their children, but in practice were made uncomfortable by the new ideas brought home by the younger generation. Very little had been done for non-sectarian education prior to 1914. In that year the Insular Legislature made its first contribution for that purpose to the department funds, Pesos 204,523. Later on, Pesos 1,000,000 was voted for primary schools among the non-Christians. By the end of 1919 there were 30 American and 785 Filipino teachers in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and 32,438 pupils in the public schools, of whom nearly one half were girls. The church missionaries, American, Dutch, and Spanish, helped on the good work with their own schools. Bishop Brent had both schools and hospitals.

My own relations with Governor Carpenter were, of course, those of utmost confidence in his administration. At a distance of four hundred miles across the Sulu and Visayan seas, I recognized the impossibility of constant interference with his work. I tried to give him the same freedom of judgment and action as was accorded me by Washington. If the Secretary of War felt at times uneasy over the rapid progress I made in Filipinization, I had the same sentiment of doubt about the Filipinization of Mindanao and Sulu by Governor Carpenter. It had been a frequent boast of the Moros that they would kill any Filipino officials sent to govern them. I was truly apprehensive of the effect of any disaster of that nature. While it is true that they had killed the Filipino village officials who took charge of Cotabato during the early days of American occupation of the Philippines, their killing seemed to be indiscriminate; they had also killed Spanish and



GOVERNMENT PIER, JOLO



*Philippine Bureau of Science*

MORO "DATOS" OR DISTRICT OFFICIALS



Americans whenever possible. When I was at Lanao in 1915, my aide-de-camp, Major George S. Holmes, who had served there before in the years of "excursions and alarms," met an old Moro friend who said:

"You see how well we treat the Filipinos now? Why, a Filipino could lie right down to sleep beside us and we would n't kill him!"

A reassuring state of progress; was it not?

The Philippine Commission had the exclusive power of legislating for the non-Christian population of the islands down to the time of the passage of the Jones Law in August, 1916, when general legislative powers as to all parts of the archipelago were given to the Legislature. Up to October, 1914, the commission, as we have seen, was controlled by an American majority. Thus the Filipinos had not yet been entrusted with the control of the non-Christian minorities. The idea seemed to be that they would exploit them or neglect them for their own selfish advantage. When the change was made to Filipino control on the commission in 1914, and later in the whole Legislature, I never observed a single act of discrimination or lack of generosity on the part of the Filipino officials toward their less advanced kinsmen. On the contrary, they seemed anxious to prove their qualification for guardianship over the welfare of the non-Christians. A great deal of care and energy was expended by them in these matters, and they showed the greatest concern in the progress and development of the Mohammedans and pagans, and a determination to assimilate them as rapidly as possible into the general body of citizens. Few cases of oppression or lack of justice in dealing with the inferior populations came to my attention



during these years; on the whole, this is one of the brightest pages in the history of the decade, and one of the most substantial accomplishments of American ideals and example.

The commission had entrusted the Hon. Vicente Ilustre as a sub-committee with the work of drafting a new code of laws for the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. This was worked over with the greatest care and circumspection, and passed in the summer of 1914, effective September 1st of that year. Although it is never easy to legislate in general terms for a population composed of varying strata of civilization, this new code was a substantial accomplishment. The main idea was to break down the barriers which had kept the inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu apart as wards or children, and give them the privileges of the general laws of the islands in so far as that was then possible, to begin in earnest the process of assimilation. The all-important question of the attitude of the Filipino leaders toward their less-advanced brethren can best be expressed in their own language, in the preamble of the new code for Mindanao and Sulu (No. 2408, Philippine Commission, July 23, 1914):

WHEREAS it is the desire of the people of the islands to promote the most moral, social, and political development of the inhabitants of said department in order to accomplish their complete unification with the inhabitants of other provinces of the Archipelago; and

WHEREAS for the accomplishment of this purpose the extension thereto of the general laws of the country and of the general forms and procedures of government followed in other provinces under certain limitations in harmony with the special conditions now prevailing in said department, is among other measures advisable and necessary, but always with the understanding that such limitations are temporary and that

it is the firm and decided purpose of the Philippine Commission to abolish such limitations together with the departmental government, as soon as the several districts of said region shall have been converted into regularly organized provinces; now, therefore, . . .

It is gratifying to be able to report that the Philippine Legislature in 1921 redeemed the promise of that last clause; the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was then by law abolished, and the constituent provinces absorbed into the general body politic.

When the new department government was organized on January 1, 1914, the governor, the secretary, Edward Bowditch, Junior, the attorney, William M. Connor, Junior, the engineer, H. F. Cameron, the Superintendent of Schools, C. R. Cameron, and the health officer were all Americans, the last-named being the brilliant and efficient Major E. L. Munson of the Army Medical Corps, who was soon relieved for wider work with the Insular Government. A year later, on January 1, 1915, Governor Carpenter's organization consisted of a Filipino secretary, Isidro Vamenta, a Filipino attorney, Ponciano Reyes, a Filipino delegate (deputy governor), Doroteo Karagdag, and a Filipino health officer, Jacobo Fajardo. The administration of the schools and public works had been transferred to the Insular Government under the new code.

On September 1, 1914, the new code was put into effect, and the new provincial government of Zamboanga installed with a Christian Filipino as provincial governor, an American as secretary-treasurer, and a Mohammedan as third member. At the same time a Moro was made third member of the Provincial Board of Cotabato. These were the first high offices given

to Mohammedans, and they were thoroughly appreciated by the leaders of that faith as an evidence of the "square deal." Americans were then governors of the provinces of Sulu, Cotabato, and Lanao (the Moro provinces), and Filipinos as governors of Agusan, Bukidnon, Davao, and Zamboanga, only the last mentioned containing any large Moro population. The 21 organized municipalities and 178 municipal districts of the department had generally Christian Filipinos, Mohammedans, or pagans as presidents.

Governor Carpenter stated in his annual report for the year 1914:

The Mohammedans are beginning to realize that the Christian Filipinos holding government offices are rather devoting their time to the fulfilment of their duties for the benefit and welfare of all the inhabitants under their control, regardless of the religious beliefs of the latter. . . .

This was the opening wedge in the campaign to win the confidence and coöperation of the Mohammedans for the Christian Filipinos. In the course of six or seven years the whole of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was gradually placed under Filipino officials, from the acting department governor down to the hundreds of teachers, except for the local chief of constabulary, Colonel Waloe, the department superintendent of schools, Mr. Moore, and the Governor of Jolo, Paul Rogers. The last-named had married a Moro lady of high rank and much personal charm and education, and during the last year of my administration he kept pressing me for permission to retire from the service, to go into business in Jolo. I persuaded him to stay as long as I did, because it could be truthfully said that there was real peace in Jolo under Governor

Rogers for the first time in generations! During all these years of Governor Carpenter's administration no violence was offered to a single Filipino official throughout the department, except that several constabulary officers were killed or wounded in apprehending outlaws. The most dangerous district of the Moro regions to-day, potentially, is Lanao, where the vast regions of the interior offer an easy avenue of escape to disturbers of the peace. The datos of that region are proud and may at any moment become turbulent. The present Governor of Lanao, Captain Santos, a young Filipino constabulary officer, is cool, intrepid, tactful, and vigilant. No better man could be found for that position.

Of Governor Carpenter's chief lieutenants in the work of civilization and organized government, besides those already named, special mention should be made of Captain Allen S. Fletcher, of the Scouts, who during 1914-15 controlled the almost unexplored regions between Lanao and Cotabato; Henry Gilsheuser, ex-colonel of Constabulary, former Governor of Lanao and now in business there; C. B. Carter, ex-major of constabulary and Governor of Cotabato, retired; Ex-Governor Posadas of Zamboanga, now Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue in Manila; Colonel Waloe, the wise and kind local chief of constabulary since 1917; W. S. Coverston, in his turn Governor of Lanao; and Ex-Governor Teopisto Guingona of Agusan, for years Governor Carpenter's chief deputy and acting governor in his place, a Filipino of extraordinary field ability, an incessant traveler, of keen powers of understanding and prompt decision. Mr. Guingona is



now a senator in the Philippine Legislature for the Moro regions.

The permanent policy for the future is to turn the local governments in the Moro regions over to the Moros themselves just as quickly as fit instruments for administration are educated and developed among them. Young Mohammedans are rapidly coming on through the public schools and will soon be ready for responsible positions. The Moros themselves recognize their lack of training for modern, democratic government. Their representatives in the Legislature have not taken an active part there. Senator Hadji Butu and Representatives Dato Benito, Dato Tampugaw, and Dato Piang regard their residence in Manila during the sessions as a sort of exile. I remember seeing Dato Piang, the powerful "boss" of Cotabato Valley, sitting one afternoon at the window of his residence in Manila. His old face was expressive of unhappy longing for his wide rice-fields and herds of carabao in the Cotabato Valley. To these older men the "Manila Government" is something far away from the needs and realities of everyday Moro life! They have, however, a wholesome respect and admiration for their young men who are educated in the American school system. Behind all their self-assertion there is a safe and sane understanding that their followers must perforce forever abandon the old life of incessant warfare, and that now the only way for them to protect their rights is to square themselves with modern conditions and a modern system of government.

Governor Carpenter's "personally conducted" annual tours of Moro chieftains to Manila have worked a wonderful change in their comprehension of the



powers and resources of the Philippine Government. It has also brought to them a secret sense of embarrassment and a desire for the education which will bring them social ease and equality.

The department government founded an agricultural colony in the wide and fertile valley of the Cotabato, and transported there steamer-loads of emigrants from the Visayas. There are about three thousand Mohammedans and twenty-five hundred Christians now living in peace and order in this colony, competing side by side in the growing of rice. In 1918 the Government brought twelve thousand Christian immigrants into Mindanao.

During 1918-20 Governor Carpenter was detained in Manila a great part of the time by his duties as head of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes, and Teopisto Guingona was generally in charge of the department, as acting governor. By that time, it will be observed, almost all the instruments of administration in active contact with the Mohammedan population were Christian Filipinos, and the transition had been accepted by the followers of Islam with good-humored acquiescence.

I have before me a statement made on February 28, 1920, before the Secretary of the Interior, by Senator Hadji Butu, for twenty years the Prime Minister of the Sultan of Sulu. He says:

I can assure you that the people of Sulu are entirely satisfied with the actual state of affairs and always will be so if the government of Sulu should be entrusted to Filipino hands. Those of Sulu prefer that the governor of the province should be a Filipino, because if a Moro were nominated he might be partial in his administration. My people wish for and are in conformity with independence [of the Philippines], and when

that is conceded, I can assure you that nothing will happen between the Moros and the Christians, not only now while the majority of the Moro race is uncivilized, but also when the Moros shall have embraced civilization.

He then suggests that whenever a Christian Filipino is made governor of a Moro province, the secretary should be a Moro, and, vice versa, when a Moro is governor, there should be a Christian as secretary. This quotation is offered as showing how far, in six years, the good-will and understanding between the Moros and their Christian fellow-Filipinos had proceeded. It is to be hoped that no exigencies of American politics in the future may be found as a reason for reviving the distrust and antagonism of past years between the two peoples.

From time to time delegations of their *datos* came to Manila to see for themselves what was going on there. One such party came after the passage of the Jones Act by Congress in 1916, when the air was resounding with vivas because self-government by the Filipinos had been installed throughout the archipelago. The *datos* came in some perturbation, but their anxiety was merely to know whether or not their religion was to be interfered with, and they went back to the southern islands completely reassured.

The Jones Act provided for the appointment by the governor-general of two senators and nine representatives to represent those non-Christian territories not yet considered sufficiently advanced for general elections. The idea of the Secretary of War was that I should appoint "persons in my confidence" to these posts, but I thought it wiser to give recognition where possible to the non-Christians themselves. Among

those appointed were Senator Hadji Butu, and Datos Piang of Cotabato and Benito of Lanao. They were allowed by the Legislature to take the oath of office upon the Koran, which was considered by their constituents a very significant concession. In fact, all visiting Moros in Manila during these years were treated with marked consideration and hospitality by the Christian Filipino leaders, and the suspicions and hostility of former years were gradually being replaced by mutual good-will and confidence. How significant the change is can perhaps be appreciated only by those who handled this problem during the earlier days of conflict and distrust between the adherents of the two religions.

Governor Carpenter's last report as Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, written on March 26, 1918, concludes with the following epilogue, which should be, and is, adopted by those who control affairs in the Philippines as a part of their political creed:

Law and order now obtain throughout Mohammedan Philippine territory, but popular compliance and coöperation are as yet only tentative and easily lost. They may be firmly established only in the course of time and by constancy in the present policies of responsible authorities in Manila, conscientiously and correctly executed by local officers who establish themselves in the hearts of the people through invariable kindness, respect for local customs, religious ceremonies, and faith, absolute honesty, and justice in both official and private relations. Neither Mohammedan nor pagan Filipino has national thought or ideals. They are now yielding to a policy of attraction directed at them as substantive Filipinos, and if they do not come directly into increasing and eventual absolute homogeneity with the highly civilized Filipino type the fault will be of the latter. The more intelligent leaders of these Mohammedans and pagans have a glimmer of light as

to the advantages and necessity for unity on a more comprehensive basis, without religious distinctions, approximating national existence.

Before me as I write lies a beautiful dagger, with ivory handle and scabbard of gold-and-silver workmanship, one of the best examples of Moro art. On it Governor Carpenter has had inscribed. “. . . the deadly weapons of the Mindanao and Sulu Moros have become mere souvenirs.” I hope he may prove as sage as a prophet as he is as an administrator. At least the foundation is laid, and the Filipinos themselves must build upon it. With tact and wisdom such as they have already shown, the “Moro problem” may be permanently solved. Although sporadic local disturbances may at any time occur in Lanao or Sulu, or in the islands to the south, no general uprising of the Moros is to be expected. To bring that about, a policy of incredible foolishness is needed. They are to-day better off than they have ever been before; freed from the internecine warfare of the past, and from the tyranny and abuse of their own chieftains, Mindanao and Sulu have entered upon a real era of agricultural and educational development.



## CHAPTER IX

### THE HILL TRIBES OF LUZON

OUTSIDE of Mindanao and Sulu, the principal center of non-Christian population is in the mountain range running from north to south of Luzon like a backbone. According to the census of 1918, there were some 250,000 pagans<sup>1</sup> scattered throughout this region, principally in the Mountain Province. They were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippine Commission until the Jones Law of August 29, 1916, gave complete control to both houses of the Legislature. The Secretary of the Interior is administratively in charge, though in 1917 the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes was, by direction of the Jones Law, reëstablished in his office. Scattered groups of non-Christians, chiefly Negritos, about nine thousand in number, live in the mountains of Zambales, Tarlac, and Bataan on the west coast of Luzon,—the first land sighted by travelers approaching Manila from Japan or Hong-Kong. Another group of 13,044, roughly classed as Mangyans, live in the island of Mindoro, directly south of Manila.

The pagans of Luzon are of intense interest to the ethnologist and anthropologist. Politically, their situation has been frequently used in argument by those Americans who were campaigning against Philippine

<sup>1</sup> According to the Philippine census for 1920, the pagans of the islands number, in all, 437,622.



independence, in an effort to prove that the Filipinos would abuse or exploit these primitive people if put in charge of them; this argument was based upon the tradition that pagans had originally fled to the mountains to escape from persecution at the hands of the early Malay immigrants, also upon cases of individual ill-treatment and exploitation by Spanish, Filipino, and Chinese merchants and contractors in later times. The response of Congress to these arguments was to give, in the Jones Act, the control of these peoples, together with that of all the non-Christians of the Philippines, over to the Philippine Legislature. A Filipino Secretary of the Interior has been in administrative charge of their affairs since October, 1916, first Rafael Palma, and during the last year, Teodoro Kalaw. The Bureau of non-Christian Tribes was, after 1917, presided over by Frank W. Carpenter, in addition to his duties as Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, until in 1920 he became chairman of the Finance Commission of the Government and Teopisto Guingona was placed at the head of the bureau.

The governors of all the provinces concerned have of late years been Filipinos, either elective or appointive, except in the sub-province of Ifugao, where Major F. E. Dossor of the constabulary still holds his post as governor with much credit. Until 1914 an aggressive effort was made to keep the Filipinos from all interference with or control over these pagans of the mountains, and to accentuate in every way possible the separation of the races. Territorial changes were even made, taking away strips of land from organized Christian provinces, to give to the Mountain Province

access to the seas to the north and west, after the fashion of empire-builders in Europe. Whether or not it was hoped by this means to secure a final separation of these portions of Luzon from an independent Philippines is not known. The Americans in charge, in these days under the Department of the Interior, have accomplished a truly great work in the pacification and conciliation of these hill people; for the first time in history inter-tribal warfare has been stopped, and the mountains have been opened up to travel and development. This is one of the chief points of interest to traveling Japanese officials, who have utterly failed to deal successfully with the similar wild tribes of the island of Formosa, where their policy seems to be one of extermination.

The Philippine administration had succeeded in winning the confidence of the pagans of the Mountain Province and establishing order throughout heretofore inaccessible regions. At that point, apparently, a balance had been struck and the status quo maintained, except for the further extension of trails and some impulse given to better agriculture. In February, 1914, there were but 3205 pupils in the public schools among this population of a quarter of a million. A tendency had appeared to maintain the mountain tribes like ethnological specimens in a vast reserve or like an interesting anthropological collection within a glass case. The pagans, however, were by 1914 ready to receive gradual instruction in the modern spirit of coöperation with their fellow-man, and to learn by contact with the Filipino that under the new order of things the timidity, suspicion, and ill-feeling of past centuries were dead and buried. To be sure, the outer

fringes of the pagan population, such as the Tinggians of Abra and Ibanags and Gaddangs of Isabela, had during recent generations become partially absorbed in the surrounding Filipino Christian populations, and in such cases individuals of the two or three different strains of blood can scarcely be told apart; indeed, several of the most distinguished officials to-day in the insular service are the grandsons of these former "wild men." The time had now arrived to train the mountaineers for gradual participation in the main body of Philippine citizenship. While no attempt at actual assimilation has ever been made by the Government, it is believed that in the course of time this will come to pass naturally and without compulsion or injustice. The premature forcing of modern standards upon backward peoples has in other parts of the world often resulted in their utter destruction. At all events, the history of the past seven years has shown that the Filipinos can and do manage the destinies of the mountain tribes with generosity and conscientious consideration. They have a keen sense of responsibility toward their wards. The annual report for 1915 of Secretary Palma is an admirable program of the best Filipino thought upon this problem. He sincerely regards his less fortunate fellow-men as brothers, as, indeed, I have more than once heard him address them at conferences in the mountains.

The writings of Professor H. Otley Beyer of the University of the Philippines, who prepared himself for his work by six years of residence among the Ifugaos, are the best scientific statements we have of the ethnological classifications of the mountain tribes of the Philippines. His point of view is one of sym-

pathy with these people, and of a recognition of the natural dignity of man. We have had too much neglect by scientists generally of the fundamental and essential resemblances of human beings in different strata of civilization. An amusing parody might be written by an educated Igorot upon the peculiarities of the white races; it would assist us to see ourselves as others see us, not as we think we are. Modern differences between races may some day be scientifically analyzed and grouped according to geography, or climate, or environment. The North American Indians, for example, before the coming of the white man never founded what we could call a civilized state. How much of this failure was due to the absence of iron tools and domestic animals? And how many Americans to-day would deny the Indian the capacity for civilization, or would be ashamed of a strain of Indian blood in his own veins? It has been shown, beyond doubt, that the non-Christian tribes of central Luzon are susceptible of training along modern lines, and capable of intelligently considering and debating their own future status. These men are, however, of a semi-civilized type; the only true wild men of the Philippines are the Negritos, the dwarf race which lives in scattered family groups in the deep forests, and of whom mention will be made later.

The Igorots, Bontocs, Ifugaos, Ilongotes, Kalingas, and Apayaos of the Mountain Province may be generally classed as Indonesians. Their ancestors came to Luzon from the mainland at some unknown period in the past, possibly soon after the land masses partially subsided and left the present islands off the coast of southeastern Asia. Many of them mixed with the



Negritos and later with the Malays when they arrived, as is shown by the shorter, darker, more Mongoloid types familiar among the Bontocs and Igorots of Benguet. Others, again, have rather light skin and aquiline noses, evidently being a purer Indonesian type. Among these, the average stature is about five feet, nine inches; white men over six feet in height are not unusual. In the course of time they developed a somewhat general culture of their own, but little affected by outsiders, to whom, indeed they were hostile. The Chinese merchants are the only ones who seem to have penetrated into the high valleys of the interior, and left behind some impress of their fashions and manners. The pagan culture is in some ways very peculiar, but many groups of these people to-day are but little behind their Malay neighbors in civilization.

The Indonesian culture and dialects are similar in all the groups. It is difficult to generalize about their manners and customs, for each group has its own characteristics, traceable back into the remote past, and all groups now shade off into the culture of their Christian neighbors of the lowlands. As a type of them all, mention might be made of the largest group, the Ifugaos, who have a culture of high development but little influenced from outside during recent centuries. They have met the problem of agriculture upon the hills with their wonderful terraced and irrigated rice-fields, which extend thousands of feet up the steep slopes. The Ifugao stone-faced walls for rice-cultivation would, if placed end to end, total twelve thousand miles, reaching half-way around the world, and the Ifugao population numbers only about sixty thousand. The same form of terrace-agriculture was





AN OLD MASONRY BRIDGE



TYPICAL MODERN CONCRETE BRIDGE

adopted by the Incas in Peru, and may be found to-day in southern China and northern India, as well as in Italy, on a much smaller scale. The Ifugaos developed weaving, wood-carving, and basket-making, and had a system of private ownership of real property, and a strong sense of personal dignity, with equal rights for both sexes.

Among the Benguets gold- and copper-mining and smelting were extensively carried on. Indeed, at the time of the Spanish invasion of the Philippines, these Indonesians in the mountains were probably living in a state of civilization very similar to that which Pizarro discovered among the Incas of Peru. That the Spanish did not destroy the culture of the *Provincia Montañosa* in Luzon was due to the fact that they never conquered it, and rarely did individuals dare even to enter it. A few priests, like the devoted Father Villaverde, a few garrisons of soldiers in the foot-hills to stop depredations from above,—that was all. When the Frenchman La Gironière in 1830, after the death of his adored Spanish wife at Jalajala on Laguna de Bay, plunged into the wilderness to forget his sorrows, his life was hardly worth the snapping of a twig; near the spot where the government building now stands at Bontoc, he states, he was forced to drink, with the victorious head-hunters of that village, a mixture of human brains from a cocoanut-shell. This is the nearest approach to cannibalism of which there is any record in the Philippines.

The Indonesians may have originally taken to the mountain ranges of Luzon to escape from the better-armed Malays along the coasts. It is doubtful if their population has ever been substantially larger than it is

to-day. There is not food enough in the Mountain Province to sustain the present inhabitants. Twice the Ifugaos have settled on the lower levels of the Magat River, and abandoned the attempt because disease wiped them out. To-day, they cannot be persuaded to colonize the lowlands; they fear death if they settle outside their beloved mountains.

Many a brush between the mountaineers and the constabulary occurred in the years 1900-13; there were many tedious days of cautious approach over trails set with poisoned bamboo; many a rush from warriors armed with long spears and bows and arrows,—stoical men who when wounded and captured could watch with a smile the amputation of a hopelessly maimed limb.

In the spring of 1914 I watched the Ifugao school-boys at Kiangan playing volley-ball in the field beside the splendid stone school-house they had built themselves. When either side scored a point, that team leapt forward with extended hand and gave the deep-throated war-cry of their fathers. Less than a decade before the same cry had often struck terror through these valleys. In 1913 the Secretary of the Interior had been attacked on the Campote trail by the Ilongotes; in 1914 our party went unmolested over the same trail, and the sole unfavorable sign was that only the women and younger men attended the *cañao* and athletic games; the older men had retreated to the forest above in fear of punishment for the demonstration of the year before. In 1916 the Secretary of the Interior reported that no attack had been made for several years upon any American or Filipino by the mountaineers.

The fact is that timidity was the chief reason for at-



tacks by the "wild men" upon the invading whites. As soon as they learned that no wrong was intended, that justice and absolute honesty in the keeping of promises and in payment for services rendered were the order of the new day, their hostility vanished like mists before the sun. The hardest task of the United States Government was not to make friends with them, but to stop their head-hunting raids upon one another. Prolonged public meetings were held at which each chief had his say, and an agreement was finally reached which settled the important question. This shows how easy it would have been for the American colonials to make friends with the Indians,—as, indeed, it was for our Pennsylvania Quakers. But our great-grandfathers were bent upon despoiling the Indians of their lands. They adopted the maxim that "The best Indian is the dead Indian." A similar maxim has been adopted by the Japanese in Formosa. That we have been able in Luzon to establish a new, high standard for dealing with backward peoples is due not only to the latter-day general spread of more humane ideas through the world, but also to the special efforts of reformers such as those who gather in annual conference at Lake Mohonk, New York. Much of the improvement may be due, also, to the separation of Church and State in modern nations. The excuse of earlier white conquerors for the extermination of whole nations of primitive peoples, as in the Caribbean, in Tasmania, in South Africa, and in Newfoundland, was that these people were not Christians, and so had no souls and did not matter. A similar attitude of cruelty to domestic animals survives to-day in the most church-ridden countries of Europe.



In dealing with backward peoples, the first and only safe rule of conduct is to be chary of promises, and, a promise once given, never to break your word. Primitive men surviving in the world to-day would have no toleration for the easily given and quickly broken promises made by statesmen at election time in the civilized countries. It is not clear whether this insistence upon the sanctity of a promise is the inherent sense of honor of natural man, or whether it is necessary in a community where the law is more or less in the hands of each individual. At Bontoc there is a handsome prison, built by the United States Government for prisoners of the mountain races. It had been found that such men, if incarcerated in the lowlands, soon died of homesickness. Indeed, it has even been found necessary, in the case of long-term prisoners at Bontoc, to grant a "leave of absence" for two weeks every year, so that they may go home to visit their families. Such a prisoner, his word once given, never fails to reappear at the prison on the appointed day, even if that involves a three-days' journey through tempests, and the hazardous swimming of mountain torrents, in flood-time.

There are comparatively few criminal cases among these people to-day. A curious illustration of their sense of morality and the sternness of the enforcement of their own code came to me on a journey through Benguet at Christmas time in 1913. At the rest-house at Kilometer 59, on the Baguio North Trail, a wrinkled old woman was sitting patiently in the rain beside the door. She had come to petition for the pardon of her husband and two sons, who were serving a life-sentence in Bontoc prison for the murder of her daughter. She

insisted that they were not guilty, and stated as proof of the fact that they were all three crying when they returned from the forest where the girl had been hanged. Later investigation of the case showed that the girl had been educated at Mrs. Kelly's school at Bua, near Baguio, and instead of returning home to the smoky hut, to labor in the sweet-potato plantation of her parents, had gone to live with a Chinese at Baguio. According to the Igorot code, she had committed an offense punishable by death, and the men of her family had gathered in council upon the case, condemned her, and executed the sentence. They were later granted a conditional pardon.

Another incident occurred on the east coast of Luzon which was pitiful in its results. When in camp near Baler in 1916, after a "powwow" with a band of semi-civilized Negritos, I had lectured them upon the necessity of abandoning the traditional state of warfare with the neighboring Ilongotes of the forests. The next year, at the same camp, the old chieftain appeared with the sad story of the massacre of his family by the Ilongotes. When I asked him why the men of his settlement had not beaten off their assailants, he replied that he had promised me in the name of his tribe not to fight any more! The subsequent constabulary expedition and punishment of the Ilongotes concerned hardly seemed an adequate reward for his faithfulness.

Head-hunting is a religious custom peculiar to the non-Christians of Luzon and Formosa, to the Dyaks of Borneo, and the hill peoples of New Guinea, though certain tribes in India are said to practise it still. The heads when taken were dried and adorned the houses of the warriors, like game trophies in the homes of

American millionaires. As soon as the mountain men found that the Government was determined to put a stop to this practice, the "trophies" disappeared. The custom has been eradicated to-day, and no cases of the taking of heads have been reported by the constabulary for several years past. The chief reactionaries in this matter are the old women, who still preach in secret to the young men that they are not worthy of marriage until they have taken at least one head. They also incite the taking of a head to break a drought, or, again, in order that some person of importance may rest quietly in his grave.

In 1915, to lessen the danger of bloodshed between rival *rancherias* or settlements, the Infugaos were persuaded to abandon their spears when upon the trails. The other tribes soon followed their example, and to-day use of the spear in controversies is replaced by appeal for arbitration, made to the local justice of the peace. The mountaineers have accepted the *pax Americana* in good faith, and for the past decade have been traveling the trails from valley to valley throughout the province in a way unknown in the past. Christian Filipinos from Ilocos now emigrate in large numbers across the mountains to the rich lands of the Cagayan Valley, and are quite unmolested. Americans are at all times perfectly safe, and ladies travel without escort for days all over the wonderful system of trails.

The journey on horseback through the Mountain Province should be more widely advertised; it is the most interesting and beautiful trip to be taken in any territory under the American flag. Comfortable rest-houses are placed at intervals of thirty kilometers, an

easy journey for the little ponies; on a big American horse, the distance of two rest-house periods a day may be comfortably traveled. Any able-bodied tourist can make the journey on foot or on horseback. The trails are excellent, the air cool and bracing at an altitude of from three thousand to eight thousand feet, the scenery gorgeous beyond description. The inhabitants are amiable and hospitable, and the visitor coming suddenly upon a silent band of Ifugaos or Bontocs single-file on the trail is always greeted with a smiling "Good morning." The most trying feature of official trips throughout this region is the necessary ceremony of the *bubud*, or drinking of the rice wine, which is handed around by the chief of the village in an old beer bottle from which all must drink without glasses or cups! In official parties, the struggle for precedence is here reversed: the most important man must drink first, so the effort is to become as unimportant as possible.

The absence of animal and bird life along the trails is noticeable. Throughout long ages the population of the Mountain Province has been kept down by the restricted area under cultivation; they seem always to have lived up to the utmost possible food supply. Birds and game have but a small chance with these hungry tribes; even the mountain streams are bereft of fish. At Austin Pass in the mountains of Neuva Viscaya, where my gallant and generous friend, E. W. Austin, the district engineer of Neuva Ecija, contracted his fatal illness from exposure to a four-day typhoon, without food, I noticed bird-huts on the ridges of the passes, where the Igorots trapped birds at night



with the use of a light, as the Italians do their song-birds.

The *cañao*, or feast, is the usual preliminary to conferences and a feature of all official visits in the mountains. Sometimes several thousand mountaineers gather from all directions; as many as fifty-five carabaos or buffaloes were killed at one feast in Bontoc in 1913. The carabaos are not used as work animals generally by the Igorots, but the practice of killing them for feasts is wasteful, and is discouraged by the Government. An immense amount of energy is displayed by the natives in dancing in a circle around the camp fire to the monotonous sound of the *gansa* or Chinese gong. All night long, and well into the next night the beating of the *gansa* keeps up, accompanied by mournful chanting and much drinking of *bubud*, brought in carefully preserved antique porcelain jars.

Very few of the non-Christians of the Mountain Province wear much clothing: a "gee-string" or girdle for the men, with perhaps a shirt, and a brief petticoat for the women suffice; in the rice-paddies and in the more remote stations even these scanty garments are dispensed with. The virtual nakedness of these people is a source of much chagrin to the more civilized inhabitants of the islands. They have been, of course, widely photographed and advertised, and shown in various countries as examples of the "Filipinos." Seventeen years of effort have not served to remove from the minds of those Americans who visited the "dog-eating Igorots" at the St. Louis Exposition, the impression that these were the average Filipinos. The dog market in Baguio on Sunday mornings is a never-ceasing source of interest and satisfaction to visiting

Americans. The eating of dogs, however, came from the Chinese; it is in common practice around Canton to-day. While only a small proportion of the mountaineers are dog-eaters, the desirability of dog flesh to them is due not only to the dire scarcity of other meat, but to the fact that the dogs may be led without exertion from the market to their home, perhaps two or three days' travel on foot; any one who has ever tried to drive a recalcitrant pig will appreciate the difference! The commonly circulated stories of cruelty to dogs are entirely without foundation. I heard, on the floor of the House of Representatives in Washington, a member who was afterward in the cabinet, and who had previously spent a few weeks in the Philippines, dismiss the whole Philippine question in debate by a sneering reference to the dog-market in Baguio!

Much merriment was provoked this year by a newspaper article which I saw in both American and French newspapers describing the introduction in the Philippine Legislature of a bill by Senator Lope K. Santos, formerly Governor of Nueva Viscaya, alleged to be a law compelling the Igorots to wear trousers. The bill, which was not acted upon, really appropriated funds to supply clothing to the mountain people, and forbade them to enter the "government" towns with insufficient clothing. Major (afterward Brigadier-General) E. L. Munson, of the United States Medical Corps, who made a study of this question at the instance of the Philippine Government, reported that the mountaineers really suffer a decided lowering of vitality from want of sufficient clothing. There is no doubt that these people would wear clothes if they could afford them. The sight of a naked man is more

and more infrequent, even in the most remote localities, as prosperity increases from year to year in the Mountain Province. I shall never forget the suffering of a Mangyan who was watching with me one evening at a point where a tamarao trail came from the forest at the summit of Mt. Calavite in Mindoro. A gale of wind had sprung up, accompanied by gusts of rain. All was silent, except for the roar of the wind, when I happened to glance around at my almost-naked companion. He was having a violent chill, his arms and legs jerking like those of a jumping-jack. I really believe that the copious drafts of hot tea administered to him beside the camp fire a half-hour later saved his life. One of our precious flannel shirts made a new man of him. And yet there are those who sneer at primitive man for his nakedness. It used to be the fashion in "civilized" courts of Europe to make fun of the physical sufferings of cripples or idiots! I have actually suffered more, myself, from the cold upon exposed mountain tops in the Philippines than in mid-winter in Quebec.

The truly primitive man of the Philippines is the Negrito. About seventy thousand Negritos roam the forests of the Philippines. The men are usually about four feet, six inches in height, and sometimes only three feet, ten inches. They are evidently kin to the now extinct bushmen of Australia and South Africa, and to the Adaman Islanders. They seem incapable of becoming civilized, and the unmixed types refuse to live in settlements, preferring the roaming life of the forests. They have no habitations, and most of them are badly scarred from huddling to sleep around the camp fire. They may linger on for generations in their

forest reserves, but I fear the Government can do little for them, except to see that they are unmolested. Nothing can surpass the interest of a visit to the tribes of Negritos on the slopes of Mariveles, opposite Corregidor. I once spent several days with about two hundred of them, gathered together by Forester Diaz, in whom they had absolute confidence. I have watched the Negritos at their hunting with bow and arrow and with the blow-pipe, at their dancing, and at a wedding ceremony. What most impressed me was the facility with which they made fire by rubbing two sticks together. It took them only about thirty seconds to strike a spark, and I have often envied them when trying in vain to light a match in a high wind.

To return to the two hundred and fifty thousand Indonesians who are generally classed together as the non-Christians of the Mountain Province: they are certainly not "primitive" men; they are "backward peoples" to-day, but only because of lack of opportunity. We are giving them education, the elements of modern sanitation, and a sense of security in their mountain home. There are now many public schools in the province; the Church is doing its share, especially through the noble and self-sacrificing efforts of the Belgian Mission. The Belgians began their work in 1907, and to-day have about fifty schools in the mountains, with nearly four thousand pupils. Bishop Charles H. Brent of western New York has established a Protestant Episcopal mission at Baguio and another at Bontoc.

It was in 1915, I think, that I saw the recruits coming in for a battalion of Scouts at Camp John Hay in Baguio. They had been brought on foot from their



rice-terraces in Ifugao and enlisted as volunteers in the United States Army. Many of them were the shyest and "wildest" type of semi-civilized man; to-day they are as smart a body of soldiers as may be found anywhere, prompt, obedient, and with the swagger of the British Tommy in uniform. Incidentally, they are the best rifle shots in the army. For the first few years I was in Manila I used to hear the sound of the *gansa* at night, from the army post across the valley; now an Ifugao regimental brass-band plays the latest popular music for the dances at the Country Club.

Among the representatives in the Assembly appointed in 1916 were old Juan Cariño, the Baguio Igorot, and Rafael Buluyangan, the Ifugao; the mountain clothes and Ifugao hair-cut disappeared in a few weeks and the two men soon became entirely conventional, though modest, participants in the making of general laws for their country. A nephew of Juan Cariño recently graduated at the University of Pennsylvania, and is now the government medical officer at Baguio; incidentally, he writes excellent English and is a contributor to current periodicals. Many of the Indonesians are serving under Filipino provincial officers as subordinates, and most of the elected village presidents in the Mountain Province are native sons of the hills. To understand how thoroughly capable these people are when given a chance, one should visit the public school in the Trinidad Valley near Baguio. There, two American teachers, Mr. Wright and Mr. Bartholomew, have gathered together about four hundred boys from all the representative Indonesian groups. They are taking not only the ordinary public-school courses in English, but studying scien-

tific agriculture as well. From days spent, while shooting, with various of these boys, I can testify that they are as bright mentally and as responsible morally as boys of their age in any of the principal countries of the world. In them lies the future redemption of their people, among whom they go forth from each graduating class to teach. I remember that the best stenographers and bookkeepers in the school were Kalingas, whose forefathers, with feathers in their hair and pointed head-axes ever at hand, had been the terrors of the North.

By the appointment of Joaquin Luna as governor of the Mountain Province in 1916, to succeed E. A. Eckman, a Filipino was for the first time put in direct charge of the province. Mr. Luna comes of a distinguished family, being a brother of General Luna, the greatest military leader of the insurrection against the United States, and of Juan Luna, the greatest Filipino painter, who met a tragic end in Paris after winning recognition there and in Madrid. Governor Luna made an unqualified success of his work, holding the confidence of the mountain people and of the Americans as well. His chief Filipino lieutenant-governors were José Martinez and Juan Ortegas. When Mr. Luna was appointed to the Senate to represent the Mountain Province, Dr. Aquilino Calvo, former Governor of Pangasinan, and later elected senator from that province, took his place as governor. Dr. Calvo's administration was a failure; he was relieved in 1920, and Governor Luna again assumed the office.

To the non-Christians, government is a matter of men, not of laws. The personality of the governors is all-important. Justice, exact and unwavering, must be

administered if he is to govern the backward races. "There need never be any trouble with the Indians," said William Penn; "they are the easiest people in the world to get on with if the white men would simply be just." Penn's was the only one of the American colonies to get on with the Indians. The American officials in the Philippines who laid the foundation of the present edifice of peace, order, and progress in the Mountain Province displayed the best qualities of our race. The best-known active field agents among them were William F. Pack, Jeff D. Gallman, E. A. Eckman, Major O. A. Tomlinson, P. C., Eugene de Mitkiewicz, John H. Evans, Leo J. Grove, Samuel E. Kane, W. F. Hale, C. W. Olson, George Connor, Captain Wilfrid Turnbull, P. C., Captain A. H. Gilfillan, P. C., Captain F. A. Whitney, P. C., and Major William E. Dossier, P. C. Often absolutely alone and surrounded by warlike men who had always in the past been regarded as savages, and had until then defied the white man, they worked steadily and unafraid along the paths of honor, justice, and reform. The only mistake made on the part of the Government was in leaving some of them so long at their lonely posts; in several cases they broke in nerves or health, gradually undermined by the influences of solitary life and unlimited power. To the Filipinos the service is not attractive, far away from gaiety and association with their own people; they accept it, as Governor Luna has done, from a sense of duty. But the fact that they so strongly feel this sense of duty and are determined to "carry on" in the work of their American predecessors, is the best guaranty for the future.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE AMERICAN GARRISON IN THE PHILIPPINES

**I**S the American army garrison kept in the Philippines to repel possible invasion from without, or to keep down Filipino uprisings? For the former purpose it is too small; for the latter, the Scouts and the constabulary would be sufficient for any conceivable emergency.

From a military point of view, opinions differ as to whether even Manila and Corregidor can be held by American arms in the face of a hostile attack from without; the best professional judgment is that an invasion of the Philippines eventually would be definitely decided upon the high seas by a naval engagement.

The expense of maintaining the considerable army garrisons of white, negro, and Filipino troops, and of keeping up the army property and holding large tracts of land and buildings in Manila and throughout the provinces as army reservations, is, together with the expenditures for the naval stations at Cavite and Olongapo, the chief cost of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Small sums are also expended by the home Government upon the salaries in the Philippines of one or more officials of the Philippine Health and Quarantine Service, and one half of the cost of the Philippine Coast and Geodetic Survey is borne by the United States. Otherwise the Philippines, under



the American flag, are self-sustaining, and have been so since the beginning of American occupation.

The Filipinos have had a very considerable respect for American arms ever since our success in overthrowing their "republic" under Aguinaldo. The unpopularity of that campaign in the United States has obscured from American vision the real credit of the performance from a military point of view.

During the World War, all white American troops were withdrawn from the Philippines except a regiment of coast artillery at Corregidor. During 1917 and 1918, the Philippines were quieter politically than they were either before or afterward, when the garrison was restored. The same is true of the Moro country; since the American soldiers were withdrawn in 1914 from Mindanao and Sulu, that region has been phenomenally peaceful. When, after the termination of the World War, the American garrison in the Philippines was again largely increased, Secretary Baker asked me to tell the Filipinos that this was merely an incident of army administration and was not aimed at them. The fact is, however, that the United States Army is an integral part of the Philippine political problem, and exercises a large influence upon politics both locally and in the United States. The only way to prevent military influence from pressing heavily upon the solution of the political problem in the Philippines, would be to confine the whole garrison upon Corregidor Island, and thus remove them from continual and often unfriendly contact with Philippine civil affairs.

The institution of civil government in the Philippines was accomplished by Mr. Taft only after a pro-

tracted struggle with the army officers; my own efforts to give the Filipinos self-government were hampered by organizations of veterans. Since that day, the army has been quiescent or active in their dislike of Filipino government in proportion to the control over them of civil influence in Washington.

The relations, therefore, of the governor-general with the army authorities in Manila are always a matter of importance to the Filipinos. I was constantly preoccupied with the effort to keep these relations upon a uniform level of cordiality and coöperation, from which they lapsed for only two brief periods of time. Filipinos know that most military men are opposed to independence; they believe that most of them look with disfavor upon self-government. The military mind is genuinely biased everywhere and in all countries toward the inability of men to govern themselves. Their training is to look up to a superior, not down to the people, as the source of authority. Many of the republics in the world to-day are not democracies because they are based upon military power.

The governor-general, while ranking above the commanding general, has no direct control over him, and no authority over the army and the navy in the Philippines, except that he may, by law, call upon either branch "to suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion," subject to subsequent modification of his action by the President. The Secretary of War, on the other hand, has no authority *per se* in the Philippines, and is not mentioned by name in the Jones Act, except in Section 25 and Section 26 thereof, dealing with the insular auditor, evidently an inheritance from former statutes and an inadvertence in the draft-

ing of the present organic law. The Jones Act does say of the governor-general: "He shall annually and at such other times as he may be required make such official report of the transactions of the Government of the Philippine Islands to an executive department of the United States to be designated by the President." President Wilson designated the Secretary of War, who had theretofore always been charged with supervision over the Philippine Government. Another President may designate the Secretary of State, if the Philippine question assumes an aspect of international negotiation, or perhaps, the Secretary of the Interior, to whom the affairs of Hawaii and Alaska are reported, if the Philippine question is decided on the grounds of eventual statehood in the American union.

The official relation of the War Department to the Philippine Government as it exists, may be a misfortune to the Filipinos if military counsels on purely political questions are in the ascendancy in the office of the Secretary of War; on the other hand, the secretary may be able to avert serious trouble between the army authorities in the Philippines and the civil population by his official and personal influence over the governor-general and the commanding general. At all times, so long as Major-General Frank McIntyre, as Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, continues to maintain his present relations with the Philippines, the rights of the civil population there may rest secure in his wise and firm protection.

Most of the world powers make the governor of a colony the commander-in-chief of all forces within his jurisdiction; even this plan has not always averted trouble, due to the fundamental difference between the

civil and military mind, as was evidenced by the quarrel between Lord Curzon, the viceroy, and Lord Kitchener, the commanding general, in India, resulting in the retirement of both by the British Government. The American system in Hawaii, Porto Rico, and Alaska, and in the former territories now the Western States of our Union, has been adopted in the Philippines. It was well described by Major-General Thomas H. Barry when President Roosevelt asked him if he understood what his relations would be with Governor Charles E. Magoon in the second occupation of Cuba.

“Yes, Mr. President,” said the general. “If there’s peace, Magoón’s king; if there’s war, I’m king.” This displays the basic defect of the American system: such is the weakness of human nature that the civil authorities are inclined to go too far to avoid martial law, the military too far to bring it about.

The *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole question may be seen in China, where there is a civil governor and a military governor in each province; the former enforces the laws and collects tribute (taxes); the latter commands the army, also collects “tribute,” and, in the case of dispute, seizes the civil governor and his government. Both issue paper money in time of personal need!

In the course of several years the Philippine official has the privilege of knowing most of the higher officers of the regular army. The Philippine station has always been of interest to the army, and residence in the islands generally welcomed by officers and their families for the two years’ tour of duty allowed by the law. I had the pleasure of serving with eight successive commanding generals, the late J. Franklin Bell



and Thomas H. Barry, Hunter H. Liggett, Charles J. Bailey, Robert K. Evans, Henry A. Greene, Francis H. French, and Francis J. Kernan. All of these names are justly known as those of men of professional ability and upstanding character. I am glad to say that I enjoyed the personal friendship of each of them throughout their service as commanding generals; I had serious administrative difficulties, to be later described, with two of them. Of the list of eight, Generals Barry and Liggett gave the Philippine Government the most unhesitating support; Generals Evans and Kernan the least.

The regular army in the Philippines consists of white and negro soldiers, and of the Philippine Scouts, enlisted from among the population of the Philippines under special authority of Congress. The constabulary is the insular police force, and has no direct relation to the army. However, the practice for years was to appoint an officer of the army as General and Chief of Constabulary, on detached service, and some half-dozen other army officers as Colonels and Assistant Chiefs of Constabulary, or inspectors therein. To them was due from the beginning much of the credit for the organization and training of the constabulary, a unique and, in some respects, an unrivaled body of men. Those army officers who were especially prominent in the constabulary during my service were James G. Harbord, William C. Rivers, Herman Hall, Mark Hersey, Peter E. Traub, and Marcus Cronin,—all, I believe, later major-generals at the front during the World War. All were withdrawn from the constabulary either because of the completion of their terms of service or due to the exigencies of the new army in

the war. A finer lot of men and officers I never expect to meet. Generals Harbord, Herman Hall, and Traub deserve credit not only for the upbuilding of the constabulary, but also for a wise and important influence exerted by them in the growth of Filipino nationality and good-will to the United States. Among other officers who were of the greatest service to the Philippine Government, though not so directly connected with it, during my time, were Colonel John B. Bellinger, Chief Quartermaster during 1918-20, Colonel (afterward Major-General) David C. Shanks, and Colonel (afterward Major-General) Hinds.

When a new commanding general of the Philippine Department arrives in Manila, there is at once much anxiety as to whether or not he is going to "coöperate" with the Philippine Government. Under one who is unsympathetic, and merely formal in attitude, the Philippine Command may rapidly become permeated with anti-Filipinism. The Army and Navy Club in Manila then becomes the center of anti-Filipino rumors, and the ladies of the army families indulge in unlimited anti-Filipino talk, constantly revolving around whispers of intended "insurrections." Older officers, who are serving their third or fourth tour of duty in the Philippines, begin again to live in spirit in the "days of the Empire," before civil government was instituted. The enlisted men, generally less vocal in their political views, and too often homesick and restless in the confined life of barracks in the tropics, begin to react to the psychology of their officers. Such is the supreme influence in a military command of its chief. The material at hand then becomes full of promise of an explosion; the army seems to be "looking for

trouble," and trouble is not hard to start when there are different races living in the same community.

At times such as these the Philippine Scouts are the political storm-center. The officers are generally ex-sergeants of the army enjoying rank as captain in the Scouts, and are in a state of continual dissatisfaction. They consider that they have not been generously treated as to promotion and retirement by army politicians in Washington; they also feel that if the Philippines were given their independence the army would be withdrawn and their corps abolished. From a military point of view the Scouts are a splendid body, but they are impatient because of long disuse. Their Filipino enlisted personnel would make the finest kind of soldiers, but are often a source of concern to the civil authorities, due to their quickly imbibed disdain of civilians, and the idle life they lead. Scout officers and soldiers are generally employed as agents of the local Military Information Division of the army, owing to their special opportunities for familiarity with the country and its inhabitants; when news of Filipino "unrest" is lacking, they sometimes proceed to manufacture it. All officials who have had to do with secret-service organizations will recognize this failing; they are prone to overzealousness in order to justify their employment. Upon two occasions at least I have known "M. I. D." men of the Scouts to act as *agents provocateurs* to try to stir up an "insurrection" after the manner of the one-time secret agents of the czars in imperial Russia.

An example of this was the "Christmas Eve uprising" of December 24, 1914. Manila and its environs were at the time somewhat restless, owing to the ac-

tivities of General Artemio Ricarte, one of the insurgent leaders of the insurrection of Filipinos against us in 1899-1901, who is still recalcitrant against the United States. He had refused to come in and "be good," but had fled the country and now dwells, I believe, as a barber in Japan. For years he issued manifestos signed "Vibora" (Viper) to his people in the Philippines, and dealt out to them commissions in his "army" at from fifty cents to five dollars a head. The main purpose of his organization, from his point of view, seemed to be the collecting of revenue. During the autumn of 1914, the secret organization in the Scouts was at last convinced that the time had come to "start something." From week to week, for nearly three months, a date was fixed in the provinces around Manila for an "uprising" by Ricarte's "army"; twenty-seven times it was "postponed." There is evidence that important members of my own official family were privy to the plan for political reasons, but the extraordinarily efficient Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, General Rafael Crame, who was then head of their secret service, and knows his own people as does, perhaps, no other individual, was puzzled and nervous because of his inability to trace these rumors to their source and explain the prevalence of disquiet among the Ricarte adherents. On Christmas Eve the "insurrection" occurred and consisted of a gathering, at the Botanical Gardens in Manila, of several dozen ignorant men, without arms, mostly of the cook and coachman class, who were arrested by the city police. This disturbance was heralded in the United States press as an insurrection, and was evidently expected to have an adverse influence upon the passage of the



Jones Law then under consideration in Washington. When questioned, the prisoners stated that at their preparatory meetings two Filipino sergeants of the Scouts had attended and had promised them arms if they would rise up. A small group which had been arrested in the vicinity of the Scout barracks at Camp Nichols, near Manila, stated that they were waiting for assistance from the camp.

I have watched seven commanding generals, one after another, agitated soon after arrival by reports of "unrest" from their Information Division; it was generally only after prolonged personal inspection that each commanding general decided that conditions in the Philippines were peaceful even under the surface. Unfortunately, minor troubles have arisen through the mutual jealousies and rivalries of the Army Information Division, the Information Division of the constabulary, which is a really effective organization, the Secret Service of the city police, and the confidential agents of the Customs. The European war, of course, quickened the activities of all these organizations, and several volunteer bodies of citizens joined in the work of secret service. All this rivalry would, perhaps, be at times amusing, if it were not so serious in its consequences. It is at the very least a source of much administrative worry, and contains ever-present germs of real trouble. The army authorities, at times, assume the attitude that they, not the governor-general, represent the United States in the Philippines: their secret agents then busy themselves with securing reports, more or less accurate, about the insular and provisional government officials for secret transmission to Washington. This would not be so dangerous

if the Military Information Division were unprejudiced or efficient. Such of their reports as we were able to discover, were generally the wildest moonshine. Their agents were protected against us by "military etiquette." Upon one occasion several of their men were caught concealed under the house of the head of the Information Division of the constabulary and haled into court. The head of the Army Information Division, an officer of high rank, went into court and testified under oath that these men were unknown to the army!

In general, the army in the Philippines leads its own life, apart from the ordinary current of events. Occasionally, under a commander as courteous and generously broad-minded as Lieutenant-General Liggett, the officers mingle in Manila society and occasionally attend Filipino social affairs. At other times army society keeps strictly to itself.

There is, of course, a constant stream of official business flowing between the Philippine Government and the army authorities, touching not only upon questions affecting personnel, the army transports, and the civil and military populations, but upon the many and varied business enterprises of the military organization. As has been already mentioned, the army has reservations which formerly held army posts; the military concentration upon Manila Bay in the past decade, and the final establishment of peace and order throughout the archipelago, have caused the abandonment of many of these reservations, as in Cebú and Iloilo, in Mindanao and Sulu, and in other provinces. The Philippine Government is naturally anxious to see this unused territory returned to the public lands,

for settlement or occupation. While Colonel John B. Bellinger was chief quartermaster, he made great progress in this direction, both in the interest of army economy and in coöperation with the desires of the Government. He also greatly assisted the government of Manila in the development of plans for the beautifying of the city, for which he lent idle trucks and horses. In this way he subsequently drew down upon his head the full wrath of the ultra-military clique in the army.

During the spring and summer of 1920, the relations between the army and the civilians reached a tense point. Two regiments had been withdrawn from the Siberian expedition and sent to Manila. For eighteen months they had lived a life of excitement and adventure in the "no man's land" around Vladivostok. They were demoralized both as to discipline and as to their conception of the rights and feelings of others. Whatever bad results may flow from our ill-advised and foolish participation in the Siberian expedition, among them may certainly be counted the evil effects upon several thousand young Americans who took part in that campaign. When they arrived in Manila, these troops were still under the command of Major-General Graves, whose character and judgment had earned him the respect of all who met him, and whose conduct had redeemed, so far as that was possible, the folly of our participation in the events of Siberia. He was sent to command the army post at Fort McKinley, near Manila, and he told me confidentially that all his days were spent in riding his post to see that his "green" officers made no serious breaks.

The 27th Infantry was detached from his command

and quartered in Manila. They found the city intolerably dull after the lawlessness of Siberian days. Soon things began to pop, in and around Manila. Frequent assaults upon civilians and the constant theft or "borrowing" of motor-cars became the order of the day. The soldiers who were arrested were at once turned over by the police to the military for trial. The result of the courts-martial could not, for many months, be ascertained.

Our first notice of the new spirit which was abroad in officers' circles was the sensational court-martial of a regular army officer arrested for embezzlement of the funds of officers of the National Guard. I had referred his case, as was the custom, to the commanding general. The Attorney-General had told me that he would be sentenced in one hour in any court of the Philippine Government. It would serve no purpose now to recall the details of this trial before the court-martial, in which the public took the deepest interest; the principle is all that matters. The court-martial acquitted the accused; the commanding general disapproved the finding of the court; there the matter rested. Army "prestige" had been protected, but American prestige had suffered. A series of similar incidents occurred in rapid succession; in all cases the military seemed to be secure in crimes against those persons who were not in the army. The greatest indignation at these perversions of justice was freely expressed in Filipino circles and in the Filipino newspapers. Truly, the evil men do lives after them! Upon the Fourth of July of that year, I stood beside a general officer upon the Luneta while he observed the annual ceremony of reading the Declaration of Inde-



pendence. Several thousand Filipinos heard him recite our own ancient grievances against George the Third:

He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislature.

He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power. . . .

For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States:

For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world. . . .

The most serious incident of these days of early summer of 1920, however, occurred during my absence upon a vacation in Java. The spirit of insubordination among the ex-Siberian troops had led to many instances of petty disorder and infractions of military discipline. The Military Provost Guard, or police, was strengthened, and for the first time in many years began to patrol the streets outside the military reservation. Soldiers, it seems, were wisely forbidden to visit the resorts or dives in Pasay near Manila which when closed by the Government from time to time had as regularly sprung up like mushrooms overnight. On June 5, 1920, a Filipino named Marcos Concepcion, a reputable person of good Laguna family, traveling in his automobile on the Manila south road, in Pasay, was halted by a soldier in uniform who demanded to search the car; when Concepcion attempted to pass on, the soldier shot and killed him. This soldier, who had no legal right to be in arms, stationed upon the public streets for the purpose of stopping civilians, was acquitted by the court-martial upon the ground that he

was only doing his duty. Higher military authority, in approving the sentence of the court, added in excuse of the lack of judgment shown by the soldier, that he was "young and inexperienced."

Another incident occurred a few weeks later in the province of Pampanga, near Camp Stotsenburg, where a praiseworthy effort to stop the smuggling of liquor into the reservation was being made by the military authorities. At midnight of July 7th, the provost marshal of Stotsenburg entered the house of the acting governor of the province with a detail of armed soldiers, and with threats of establishing martial law, his hand on his revolver, forced the governor to sign under protest an order for the suspension of the Chief of Police of Angeles, without waiting for the hearing set two days thereafter. Martial law could be proclaimed only by the governor-general, but many of these untrained officers had a different understanding. In fact, there is strong reason for believing that there was a positive hope upon the part of many officers, during July and August, 1920, of bringing about a state of affairs in which martial law would be necessary. Reports of the need for military interference were already filling the American press, sent home by reputable journalists visiting the Philippines who had obtained their "information" at military headquarters.

One of the stories told was that, owing to Filipino objection to the recently passed United States Coastwise Shipping Law, the Filipinos were for the first time in years on the verge of revolt, and were being led into war against the United States by Senate President Manuel L. Quezon. The facts were the exact

contrary. The extension of our coastwise laws to the Philippines was, indeed, vigorously opposed in the Philippines; it always had been; President Taft had vetoed such a proposition ten years before. I well remember decisive debates against it in the House of Representatives in Washington when I was a member. When the law was at length passed, in 1920, the public in Manila held many meetings, to protest in an orderly, peaceable, and respectful manner against the measure. President Quezon most eloquently voiced the prevailing opinion. Since when have we denied people the right peaceably to assemble and petition? Attention is again invited to the Declaration of Independence.

Anti-Filipino feeling reached a climax early in August, 1920, during the visit to Manila of the large Congressional party which was then making an unofficial tour of the Orient. The American-printed papers in Manila—several of which, by the way, are under the control of foreigners—seized upon the opportunity for a political play. They issued, apparently upon a concerted plan, a series of articles ridiculing the Filipinos and severely denouncing their alleged shortcomings, to show their incapacity in government. It so happened that these papers were all printed by Filipino employees. All of these employees one day walked out of the offices of the papers which were engaged in making such unjust and humiliating attacks upon their race. No disorder accompanied the walk-out, which was in sharp contrast, by the way, with the conduct of the American Marines in Nicaragua, a few months later, who retaliated upon a native newspaper, which had abused the United States, by wrecking the newspaper office.

The presence of the Congressional party, the newspaper strike, and the general political excitement due to an organized effort on the part of many American residents of Manila to discredit Filipino self-government, led to great though secret activity in army headquarters. One evening all the officers were hastily summoned from their clubs and hotels and all soldiers ordered to barracks, where they were held under arms; machine-guns were mounted upon trucks to be ready at any moment; all soldiers were ordered off the streets except armed patrols disguised as military police, which were massed at strategic points. All of this was done without consulting or informing the officials of the Insular Government. When we learned of it through the agents of the city police, it is hard to say whether more surprise or indignation was expressed in the Council of State. There was no possibility of any concerted disorder in Manila, and absolutely none of the agents of the Government could explain the action of the military. What was coming? Suppose a dozen citizens acting under the impulse of some real or fancied grievance or insult from one of the bands of "provost guards" had caused a street brawl. The state of mind of the army officers was evidently similar to that which preceded the Boston Massacre in 1770, or the slaughter of Amritsar in the Punjab in 1919. Might not the Scouts be employed as professional killers, like the Gurkhas of the Indian Army? It needed only a spark to cause an explosion. Had any clash occurred, the press in the United States would have been loaded to the brim with stories of insurrection and Filipino revolt. How well founded was the anxiety of the Filipinos in the Council of State in those days




may be guessed from the results of the rioting of the Egyptians in Alexandria in May, 1921. These riots have been joyfully seized upon by the newspapers of all the colonial powers of the world as the chief remaining argument against the independence of Egypt. Some of the excitement in Manila evidently spread under cover to the provinces. A secret-service report I had at that time from San Fernando, La Union, one hundred and fifty miles away, was as follows:

While at San Fernando I heard a lot of discussion as to the Independence question, and there is a lot of bad feeling. I found about every other man talking about it. Several people told me seriously that Martial Law was to be declared in Manila and that the Military were going to take over the Government. One story repeated at least a dozen times with a little difference was: that the General commanding the Division had called Governor-General Harrison, Quezon, and Osmeña to his office at General Philippine Headquarters one night and given them twenty-four hours to stop the strike [the newspapers] or he would declare Martial Law. . . . There are all kinds of versions of the Military police being employed in Manila and if those newspaper arguments about those points keep up, they will be ripe in some places in the province for trouble.

To illustrate how aggressive the sentiment was at that time in American commercial circles in Manila, the leading American banker, a resolute opponent of Filipino self-government, advocated to me taking away the responsible officers of government from the Filipinos. I asked him if he did not understand that his policy would, in the course of time, really lead to disorder. His eyes gleamed as he replied: "Well, then, let's have the revolt, the sooner the better, and have it over with; we should strengthen the army now!"

And all of this occurred while the Filipinos were



GILBERT BRIDGE, LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE



AFTER A TROPICAL RAIN

priding themselves upon their loyalty to the United States and were convinced of the generous good-will of the Americans toward them.

I suppose that Secretary Baker was too much occupied with matters nearer home to pay much attention to my cablegrams of those days; and, always at his elbow stood the figure of General Peyton C. March, that "dread two-handed engine at the door." To him, as much as to any individual, we ascribed the virtual failure, in 1917 and 1918, of the most vigorous concrete effort of the Filipino people to show their gratitude for what America had done for them by the organization of a division of volunteers for service with the army during the European war. How this division was hampered, delayed, and thwarted by army politics is a depressing tale of intrigue and indifference; how it was used by certain army politicians to discredit the Filipinos by misrepresentation and abuse is an exhibition of the most ungenerous and unattractive side of the imperialistic character.

During the early winter of 1916-17, when the probability of our entering the war was increasing week by week, inquiries were made by the Philippine administration whether compulsory military service should be instituted in the islands. Both President Wilson and Secretary Baker looked with disfavor upon the idea. However, when our diplomatic relations with Germany were severed, a special session of the Legislature was called, and President Quezon's Militia Act No. 2715, was passed. This gave to the governor-general the power to introduce compulsory military service in the islands, by providing for the inclusion in the Philippine National Guard of every able-bodied citizen be-



tween the ages of eighteen and forty-five; no restriction was made in the law upon the service to which the Guard might be disposed by the governor-general. Speeches in the Legislature by the leaders of the different parties showed unanimous support of the United States. This, it must be remembered, was not provoked by an anti-German spirit, for Germans were personally popular with the Filipinos; it was purely pro-American. The act created a militia commission as advisers to the governor-general as Commander-in-Chief of the Militia. Most of the members of the militia commission were Filipino officials of the Government. They were unanimously in favor of active participation in the European war after we had entered the conflict, and on April 25, 1917, resolved to "offer the services of the Philippine National Guard to be organized" for that purpose.

Immediate steps were taken to organize a division of volunteers, by proclamation of the governor-general on April 12, 1917, and General McIntyre was urged to secure legislation by Congress which would permit the President to accept the services of a division of Filipinos for foreign service. So eager were the Filipinos to show their loyalty that they decided to send a board to Washington, consisting of General Aguinaldo, Senate President Quezon, and General Thomas L. Hartigan of the Guard to urge acceptance of the offer by the United States. Major-General Hunter Liggett, the Department Commander of the Philippines, and his successor, Major-General Charles J. Bailey, were enthusiastically in favor of the division of Filipino volunteers. Major-General Shanks was one of the militia commission until he was called home for other service.

Lieutenant-Colonel (afterward Brigadier-General) Francis C. Marshall, Jr., U. S. A., was the first Adjutant-General of the Philippine National Guard, until he, too, after a few weeks was summoned home, to be followed by Major (afterward Brigadier-General) Lincoln C. Andrews, also immediately called home; Captain W. N. Hensley, Lieutenant R. N. Perley, and, later, Captain Richard Donovan, all of the regular army, were detailed to assist the organization of the Guard.

All these preliminary steps were being watched by the Filipino people with the most intense interest; all through the provinces the flower of Filipino youth were preparing to volunteer, and many of the leaders were impatient to be up and doing.

From that point onward the history of the Filipino division is one of disappointments and delays. We were advised from Washington not to send the committee composed of Aguinaldo, Quezon, and Hartigan. The two latter gentlemen, therefore, went to Washington to act, not as a committee, but as individuals, as best they could. On June 6th, Mr. Quezon, accompanied by Resident Commissioners de Veyra and Yango, and Ramon Fernandez, saw President Wilson; they assured the President of the loyalty of the Philippines, and Mr. Quezon made offer of the Philippine National Guard. Replying, Mr. Wilson said: "It may have a wholesome effect even in Europe to have Filipinos there fighting for the cause of Democracy." The Secretary of War was favorable to the idea of organizing such a division, and Mr. Quezon cabled back that the enthusiastic reception accorded by the American press to the offer of Filipino volun-

teers "is taken in the United States as a vindication of the Philippine policy." That was the exact point at issue. The Filipino people, before self-government had been given them, had been suspicious of the United States, and at least indifferent if not discontented. Now they were volunteering the best of their youth to the United States for service on the European battle-fields. That was a "vindication" of considerable significance.

However, in Washington, the President, Secretary Baker, and General McIntyre were occupied with duties of overwhelming importance to our own country; and in the War Department the army was necessarily in control. Congress was preoccupied. Filipino volunteers could cool their heels and their impatience. It was not until nine months later, on January 2, 1918, that Congress passed a law permitting the President to accept the Filipino volunteers.

Meanwhile, the gallant Liggett and Bailey and their principal officers had gone to the front, there to add luster to American arms. A retired general was sent to the Philippine command, from which substantially all the American soldiers had been withdrawn. Under him and several of his staff, discontented and embittered at being left behind in the Philippines in such times as these, a persistent and determined effort was made to retard the organization of the National Guard division. Every possible obstacle was put forward, every delay introduced. Instead of officers being lent to teach and organize the Guard, attempts were frequently made to deprive it of the three regular officers at National Guard headquarters. Colonel Ralph W. Jones of the constabulary was Adjutant-General of

the Guard, a medal-of-honor man because of heroic action in the former campaign in Samar. General Thomas Hartigan was representing the Guard in Washington. The Philippine Government was exerting every effort to secure permission and help from the War College in Washington, and offered to pay all the expenses, if only the authorities would give or lend equipment. In the Philippines, the remnant of the Regular Army would not coöperate.

At the beginning of the war, in the conference with Generals Liggett, Bailey, Morrison, and Shanks, it was agreed to furnish the National Guard with the twenty-five thousand extra rifles stored at Fort Santiago in Manila; in December of that year we found that these rifles had been sent to the United States; the only rifles available for the officers' training-camp were one thousand of the old type left unused at Fort Santiago. In order to prevent the Guard's securing these, the army hastily condemned them and secretly threw them into the deep waters of Manila Bay; medical officers were refused, Scout officers anxious to volunteer were discouraged and forbidden to communicate with the Guard. There was a storm of opposition in the local American-printed newspapers which were in touch with the army, until the governor-general ordered the deportation of a British subject who edited one of these papers, on the ground that he was obstructing the defense plans of the United States. The Filipino people were, naturally, sore and bewildered at the reception accorded their well-meant offer. In those days I could detect at once the otherwise well-concealed bias of any American or foreigner in the Philippines, pro- or anti-Filipino, by his attitude toward the Guard.



Meanwhile, messages from army headquarters in Washington to their representatives in Manila were, by their indifference or slighting references to the Guard, highly encouraging to those who were fighting it locally. On June 12, 1917, Adjutant-General McCain in Washington cabled General Evans in Manila: "In view of short period of training Philippine Division, not considered necessary to permanently assign regular officers." From Manila we petitioned Washington by cable: "Let us have all Scout officers and men who will volunteer. . . . Filipinos cannot understand delays and our explanations worn threadbare." A few days later General Evans was relieved, General Henry A. Greene was sent out in August to take his place, and promptly coöperated in the organization of the Guard. On October 5th, the officers' camp was completed and Camp Claudio, near Manila, prepared for recruitment; on November 11th the Division was mobilized, and on November 20th, or nine days after the Armistice, was mustered into the federal service.

The division was commanded by Brigadier-General F. R. Day, U. S. A.; all officers above the grade of major, by insistence of the army, were Americans, except Lieutenant-Colonel Vicente R. Barros, a West Point graduate. Most of the higher officers were from the Scouts and the constabulary, and were possessed of wide experience in the field and long service. Altogether, it was an organization which any soldier might well have been proud to command. Out of 28,000 volunteers offering, only 14,000 were authorized by Washington, and they had only one month's service at federal expense; two months' more were added at

the expense of the Philippine Government. The United States spent approximately \$515,000 in this acceptance of the whole-hearted and spontaneous offer of the Filipinos; the Filipinos spent \$2,406,000 upon the same object; how much they expended in unrequited sentiment and in disdainfully accepted good-will and loyalty will never be known. Had they met with appreciation and encouragement, the resultant pride and satisfaction in the Philippines would have been a valuable asset, in the future, to our country. It is to be feared, however, that had the Philippine National Guard, despite opposition, been more quickly organized, the clique dominant in army politics would have sent them only to the Mexican border, a move known to be antagonistic to the sentiments of the Filipinos and expected to be a severe strain upon their good-will.

All of the other nations engaged in the war made effective use of their colonial troops, generally by methods of compulsion, either in the various arenas of active campaign or in holding down other discontented populations. The Filipinos needed no holding down; all the repression exercised toward them was in holding down their enthusiasm for the American cause by snubbing their efforts to volunteer for service. Their loyalty was complete and unanimous, but did not receive much active encouragement from Washington. That the Guard would have made a brilliant record for itself, if given an opportunity, must be conceded. It is also certain that such a record would have been a powerful stimulus to the national pride of these people and would have gained them appreciation from the

great powers, thus advancing their claim to independence. Perhaps this was the chief and only defect of the Philippine National Guard in certain minds then in the ascendancy in Washington.

## CHAPTER XI

### INCIDENTS OF WAR TIMES

**A**MONG the pleasant memories of Philippine days, association with our naval officers is among the brightest. Admirals Cowles, Nicholson, Knight, Gleaves, and Casey B. Morgan, and Captain Edward Simpson and their respective staffs, all, in turn, helped in countless ways the progress of Philippine administration during my service there. Professionally keen and socially popular, they helped on the work of making friends with the Filipino people. Their training as men of the world enables naval officers to adapt themselves with dignity and geniality to their surroundings wherever they may be sent. It has often been a matter of wonder to me why our Government does not employ its retired admirals as ambassadors, instead of distributing diplomatic posts as political plums to rich campaign contributors after each election day.

Our Navy Department has profited from the sad experience of Spain on May 1, 1898, in Manila Bay; Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet off Cavite is to have no parallel in American annals. We keep no ships of value in Philippine waters, only a cruiser as flagship, an old monitor, a few destroyers, and a number of submarines. The great power of the United States Navy is concentrated at points nearer home, whence it can strike when needed. Even the flagship of the Pacific Fleet is seldom at Manila, for the



admiral upon that station is usually in Chinese, Japanese, or Siberian waters, and served our country as auxiliary ambassador in the midst of recent events so stirring in world politics.

There are two naval stations in the Philippines,—Cavite, where the Spanish arsenal still serves our sailors and marines, and Olongapo, at Subig Bay, about fifty miles up the coast. A controversy always raged in the Navy Department over these two stations, and it was understood that as soon as Admiral Dewey died the post at Olongapo would be abandoned, and all forces concentrated at Cavite. This has not yet come to pass; all efforts of the Philippine Government, vigorously seconded by Admiral Knight, to secure the old dry-dock Dewey at Olongapo for a government shipyard with precedence for naval work, have failed; the papers concerning the plan have been pigeonholed in Washington. So far as the Filipinos are concerned, the navy could have for the asking, either before or after Philippine independence, such additional sites as they desire for naval stations in the archipelago. The navy is popular with the Filipinos, many thousands of whom serve as mess-boys or as laborers at the yards.

Professional jealousy between the army and the navy, even since the war, is not unknown in the Philippines. When the commanding general was asked to designate an officer to serve on the public committee to solicit funds for the erection of a Dewey memorial in Manila, he refused, adding: "Why Dewey? Why not General Otis?" The only memorial to our gallant admiral there to-day is Dewey Boulevard on the waterfront, recently so named by resolution of the Filipino Municipal Board of Manila. Other memorials, it might

be added, are holes from Dewey's shells through Aguinaldo's home at Cavite and through the church at Malate. The best memorial of all, however, is the remembrance of the kindly and heroic personality of Dewey, and the recognition that it was primarily due to him that the United States secured the opportunity to be of world service in the Philippines. Since his day, and up to the time of our entrance into the World War, the navy in the Philippines has had little direct participation in the public affairs of the islands. It rendered, however, notable service at one time in putting a stop to the opium smuggling carried on by the Moros and Chinese in the southern islands.

In August, 1914, soon after the outbreak of the European war, I had my first occasion to call on the navy for assistance. Manila was then the only safe neutral port for German merchant vessels trading along the China coast, in Indo-China, and in Japan. About two dozen of them at once made full speed for our waters. A wireless message signed "Captain *S.S. Mark*," came to me one evening in Manila, stating that the sender's ship was pursued inside the three-mile limit by a British cruiser, and calling on me to enforce our neutrality. The United States cruiser *Albany* had arrived that afternoon at Manila from China, and its captain at once responded to my request by calling his men back from shore leave, which caused great momentary excitement along the waterfront. A few hours later, the *Albany* escorted the *Mark* safely to anchorage inside the breakwater. Nearly three years later, the *Mark*, a splendid merchant vessel, was the first of the locally seized and repaired German vessels

to leave Manila Bay under our flag for the transporting of American soldiers across the Atlantic.

Upon another occasion, however, I was not so successful with the navy. On February 3, 1917, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the President addressed Congress, breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. There were then seventeen German merchant vessels in Manila Harbor, three at Cebú, and three near Zamboanga, all rusting at their anchorage for the past two and a half years. They were generally referred to locally as the "interned" ships, but, as a matter of fact, they had been free to depart at any moment their captains chose to apply for clearance. The certainty of capture by British or Japanese cruisers outside the three-mile limit had kept them at their anchorage. Only one of them had tried it, the *Princess Alice*, which, early in August, 1914, had cleared from Manila for Tsingtau, run southward around Mindanao, and made for Yap, only to find the wireless station there destroyed, and to learn that Japan had entered the war; she put about immediately at full speed and arrived in Zamboanga upon her last ton of coal. Later, she was moved to the safer anchorage in Cebú by request of her captain.

About twenty-four hours before the President announced the severing of diplomatic relations the commanders of the twenty-three German ships in Philippine waters, evidently by prearrangement, had the machinery of their ships so damaged as to disable the vessels completely. Word was brought to us immediately of this fact by the customs authorities, and cabled by me to Washington, with request for advice whether to seize the vessels or only search them for

explosives. The Secretary of War replied that if suitable excuse could be found the vessels should be searched, that no merchant vessels had been seized in the United States, and that if in my judgment "evidence is clear of intention to destroy or sink ships, you should take necessary steps to prevent it. If necessary to assume control of ships, make it clear that it is to protect harbor and property and not to take title to ships." The administration in Washington was still in no position to authorize directly any action which might be considered hostile by Germany, so I determined to act myself.

On February 5th I called a conference at Malacañan, consisting of Admiral Winterhalter and his Chief of Staff, Commanding-General Hunter H. Liggett, the Chief of Constabulary, General Herman Hall, and the Collector of Customs, John S. Stanley. I notified the admiral that in order to prevent lawless violence I had determined to seize the ships, and that I called upon him to do it, to avoid any possibility of resistance which might be encountered if we employed for that purpose the Filipino constabulary soldiers, the only armed force at the direct disposition of the Insular Government. Admiral Winterhalter replied that he would like to know my reasons; I explained them to him and then read the law of Congress giving the governor-general the right to call on him for such a purpose, explaining that I assumed full responsibility and it was not "his to reason why." He demurred and a two-hours' discussion ensued. Finally I called attention to the hour, four o'clock, and said that before dark the ships would be seized, and again called on him to do it. He replied that he could not get ready that day.



“Yes, sir,” broke in his Chief of Staff, Captain Sypher, who had been sitting there red in the face and evidently bursting with impatience, “we have been ready since six o’clock this morning.”

Driven into a corner by this, Admiral Winterhalter finally refused to seize the ships, but said he would stand by in small boats to support if there were any trouble. I then directed General Hall to take the constabulary and take over the ships; he did in less than an hour, without confusion or resistance. Those at Cebú and Zamboanga were seized the next day. All were eventually repaired, and turned over to the Shipping Board. The seventeen largest were used in the Army Transport Service to carry troops to France; the smaller ones were left to the Philippine Government to use as commercial vessels, and were of great service during the acute shortage of bottoms of those years. The news of the seizure of the German ships in the Philippines caused some confusion in the State Department at the time, as I was later on informed by my friend Frank L. Polk, Under-Secretary of State; in Washington, they were at the moment balancing to a nicety the delicate situation with the German Government. On February 7th came a message from the Secretary of War, cautioning me as to the legal situation and to claim no seizure or ownership of the vessels. On February 27th came another message:

Attorney for Hamburg-American Line desires, if possible, that vessels be placed in charge of their crews. Is it practicable and advisable, in your opinion, by securing bonds or other guarantees, to permit this?


To which I answered, "Present status quo the most satisfactory at this time." On March 3d the State Department was preparing a reply to the claim of the German Government that crews of German vessels in the Philippines had been illegally removed from their vessels and detained. I cabled the authority of Philippine Law under which action had been taken. The discussion was definitely halted by the declaration of war by Congress, on April 6th.

At that time, Admiral Knight arrived to command the Pacific Fleet, and at once took a most vigorous part in the preparations for war; his knowledge of international law and prompt power of decision and action were of invaluable service; we were most fortunate in his presence at Manila, and he exemplified the best traditions of the United States Navy.

The proclamations fixing channels for shipping, for wireless control, for the harbor defenses of the Philippines were largely the work of Admiral Knight. So were the repair and refitting of the captured German vessels, which were done either directly by the navy at Ilongapo or under the direction of naval officers; the despatch of these vessels carrying Manila hemp for the navy at home was a material assistance in the equipment and transportation of our forces. Later on, one of the most delicate of negotiations was, during the absence of the admiral, accomplished by Captain Simpson, commandant at Cavite. In March, 1918, Captain Simpson brought me a confidential despatch from Washington directing him to seize under the right of "angary" the three Dutch ships then in Manila Harbor, but to use no force in doing so. The seizure was accomplished by Captain Simpson in ac-

cordance with the command to "use no force," although one of the Dutch captains, a fine bearded Viking of a man, at first received the polite demand for his vessel with a roar of defiance. I feel sure that in his heart Captain Simpson sympathized with him. Holland was neutral, and the Dutch captains did not know that their home government was acquiescent. Nor, for that matter, did the Dutch of the neighboring colonies of Java, Borneo, and Sumatra, and one of the results of the ill-feeling thus engendered was a gasolene famine in the Philippines. The Dutch in those islands refused, for several months, to send us any more cargoes of gasolene, despite our assurances that no further seizures of their ships would be made.

The years of our participation in the war were busy ones for American officials in the Philippines. The seizure of Germans and Austrians guilty of propaganda or otherwise believed to be undesirable in the Philippines, under the circumstances including virtually all of them in the country, their deportation to the United States, the work of censorship of the mails and cables, the seizure of all German property under the alien-property custodianship, the enforcement of the Espionage Act, the vexatious restrictions upon commerce, the severe regulations upon passports and letters of clearance for vessels—all the machinery of modern war, much of it un-American in spirit and tradition—were carried out under directions or laws from Washington by the American representatives in the islands. In a narrative dealing with Filipino self-government, these activities have little significance, except that they were all acquiesced in willingly enough by the Filipino people, as part of the frame-



A TYPICAL BUSY MARKET-PLACE





PRIMARY SCHOOL PUPILS OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

They receive daily physical training in the form of group games, folk dances, and callisthenic exercises

work of war times, even though at times it may have seemed to the Filipinos that unnecessary severity was being exercised or even injustice was being done.

Truth to tell, the Germans in the Philippines had never been unpopular with the Filipinos, whose great prophet Rizal had studied in Berlin, and received recognition by the scientific circles there; his friend Professor Blumentritt in Austria had written papers so sympathetic to the Filipino people that they had made almost a legend of his name. German business men had invested much money in the Philippines, and had a high standing in the Filipino community. They were without that race arrogance to which tropical peoples are unfortunately accustomed in other European races. The German commercial method of studying the wants of the new markets, in contrast to the older customs of forcing the home customs and styles down the throats of the prospective customers, was bearing fruit. Personal relations with Germans in the islands were agreeable, and marriages of Germans with Filipinos had been exceptionally happy. Whether the Germans were good colonizers or not, I have no personal basis for judging, never having visited a German colony; reports of the model German city of Tsingtau, and the extraordinary devotion of the natives of German East Africa to the gallant Von Lettow during the war are certainly evidence in their favor.

During the winter and spring of 1914 a German fleet had been stationed in Manila Bay, consisting of the *Leipzig*, the *Sharnhorst*, the *Gneisenau*, and a small war-vessel, the *Cormorant*, which was subsequently blown up by her German commander in Guam Harbor to prevent her being seized by the American officers.

The admiral in command was the famous Count von Spee, one of the heroes of the war. Of Danish descent, he had all the charm of personality we expect in the Danes. He was immensely popular in Manila society, and we followed his career with the deepest interest,—his defeat of Admiral Craddock off the coast of Chile, when the British fleet was sunk, and the subsequent complete destruction of his whole command off the Falkland Islands by the British battle-cruisers, in which engagement Von Spee and his two sons went down with their ships. As illustrating Von Spee's chivalry, the account of the dinner at Santiago de Chile the day after the victory over Craddock is but little known. The German consul at the banquet given in his honor rose and proposed the toast, "To hell with the British Navy." The victorious Von Spee at once sprang to his feet, and with all his officers left the banquet-hall.

The German consul in Manila had been Dr. Franz Zitelmann, whose authority, as we learned later, had been somewhat circumscribed, by that powerful but unofficial organ of the German Government, the Manila branch of the commercial house of Behn, Meyer, and Company. While rather stiff and reserved socially, Dr. Zitelmann was a cultivated and highly trained official. I had been obliged on more than one occasion, during the years of our neutrality, to caution both the British consul-general and the German consul that their zeal was leading them to unwarranted aggression upon our Government. After the rupture of diplomatic relations, I had the duty of conveying to Dr. Zitelmann the orders for his recall. He received the momentous news with much dignity. He was allowed

passage on a United States Transport to San Francisco, as was later his wife, though neither of them was allowed ashore by the Japanese at Nagasaki. I afterward had a letter from Dr. Zitelmann, upon the point of embarking from Hoboken for Germany just before our declaration of war; he thanked me for the manner in which his departure from Manila had been arranged.

A picturesque German personality of war times deserves mention here,—Captain Sorensen. He had been the captain of the German steamer *Marie* which landed a cargo of arms and ammunition for the hard-pressed Von Lettow in German East Africa in 1916, and escaped with his ship to a neutral port in Java. On January 1, 1917, Sorensen with four German companions was cast ashore at Davao Bay, having sailed in a small open boat through the Celebes Sea. They were arrested for violation of the immigration laws, and later released. Sorensen disguised himself as a waiter on an American army transport and got as far as Honolulu before he was discovered and sent back to Manila. He was subsequently one of the six hundred or more enemy subjects we deported to the United States for internment at the detention camp at Hot Springs, Arkansas.

Another much-discussed German in the Philippines was Andre, vice-consul at Cebú; I had reason to believe that he was engaged in trying to organize a Filipino revolt in the southern islands, where he was widely known and very popular. Just at that time, the United States Espionage Act was passed and made effective in the Philippines. I wired to the Governor of Cebú, General Roa, who was the sheriff of the



province by virtue of his office as governor, to arrest Andre. He seized him and then wired that the American judge in Cebú had granted Andre a writ of habeas corpus and he would be released in twenty-four hours if no proof was meanwhile given against him. I replied by cable to Governor Roa that the Espionage Act, just passed, suspended the writ of habeas corpus in such cases, and told him to hold Andre and deliver him to me in Manila, which he did. Andre was confined in the constabulary barracks of Santa Lucia, and when I went around to inspect I found he was evidently not suffering much personal hardship in his imprisonment, for he was playing a jolly game of tennis there with three American constabulary officers. He was the picture of innocence. He, also, was subsequently deported to the United States, though the case against him was never actually proved.

Upon the whole, the Philippines were singularly free from incidents of warlike import during these years; had our country entered the war at the beginning, we should probably have had a hostile visit from the *Emden*, whose commander made such a picturesque reputation at Madras and Singapore, before the destruction of his ship off the Cocos Islands by an Australian vessel.

The foreign duties of the Insular Government from 1914 to 1917 were to see that our neutrality was respected, which brought about a number of controversies with British officials, either through my good friend Consul-General John B. Rentiers, or through the Department of State in Washington. As is well known, the British Government has never conceded our traditional contention for freedom of the seas, and the suc-

cess of the assertion of our Philippine neutrality rights in a number of contested cases through the State Department was due, no doubt, to the desire of the British Government to conciliate the good-will of the American administration. Prompt assertion of the American position in protection of our rights and interests as a neutral nation was made in every instance of aggression by British officials or British vessels, and we received the full support of the Department of State on every point. The manifest ill-feeling throughout the Orient at that period between Americans and British was due more to the working of the British "black-list" than to any other cause, and was based upon commercial, not political, disputes. In administration circles we had to deal not only with aggressions under the "black-list," but with actual breaches of international law in the invasion of the three-mile limit, in the stoppage and search of neutral vessels, in interruption of the mails, and, in one instance, with the actual landing of an armed force upon the Tawi-Tawi Islands, the nearest Philippine territory to North Borneo. The seizure of two German civilians upon a Philippine vessel in the Visayan Sea by a British cruiser was vigorously protested by our Government; discussing this matter with the British admiral in person, I finally asked him if he had ever heard of the Trent affair, so famous in history, and he blandly replied that he never had!

## CHAPTER XII

### FILIPINO LOYALTY DURING THE WAR

ALL through the war, we had not the slightest anxiety about the attitude of the Filipinos, and little concern over internal affairs in the Philippines. Was not the war being fought for the right of small nations to their independent existence? The coming disappointments of the Peace Conference were as yet unexpected by the people of the world at large. The professions of the allied and associated powers as to their aims and purposes in the war aroused hopes and aspirations in the hearts of mankind which, though grievously disappointed by the outcome of the Versailles Treaty, will not die until the world is settled on new lines of justice and tolerance.

The Filipinos, since the passage by Congress of the Jones Act on August 29, 1916, had reason to believe that the United States was the best friend a small nation could have. Had we not generously and unanimously promised independence when a stable government was set up in the Philippines? Every sentiment, every impulse, every hope of the Filipinos was enlisted in the cause of the United States. Support of the Government appeared unanimous. What this meant in a material sense, it is difficult to estimate; Great Britain is believed to have been obliged to withhold from the main arena of war half a million men to hold down discontented populations in her extensive

colonies. The loyalty of the Philippines meant, at the very least, freedom from worry and concern on the part of the home Government at the time of its greatest responsibilities.

Five days after the declaration of war, a telegram from Speaker Osmeña from Cebú stated that the President's proclamation "had been heard by the Filipinos everywhere with great respect and unqualified loyalty," adding that he attributed this fact in part to the recent passage of the Jones Act. He also stated that one of the most prominent Americans in the islands, a former widely known official of the Insular Government had, "at last night's meeting of the American Club here, made some malicious remarks on the dealings of the President regarding the war and I, being on the platform of the speakers, had the privilege of replying to the criticism through an unqualified endorsement of President Wilson's policies both domestic and international." This was the keynote of Filipino gratitude and loyalty,—to defend the American President who had entered the war, even against the malice and abuse of his fellow-countrymen. This was the spirit that made it possible to withdraw American soldiers and American naval vessels from the Philippines during the war, and leave to the Filipinos the privilege of defending American interests and the American flag.

This was the attitude which rendered utterly abortive German attempts to stir up disaffection among the people of the islands, or to use the Philippines as a base for plots against the security of neighboring colonies of the allied powers. What that meant to our country may be guessed by reflection upon what had



happened in Singapore in 1915. The Governor of the Straits Settlements told me in 1916 that the insurrection of the Sepoy regiments in Singapore, which had taken possession of the city and shot many of the white residents, had been organized and promoted by the local branch of the German "commercial" firm of Behn, Meyer, and Company. Upon that occasion, the British residents were finally saved by the landing of marines from a Japanese warship which happened to be in the harbor at the time. No such incident could have occurred in the Philippines, because of the loyalty of the people for the United States. Even the picturesque attempt of the mysterious American schooner *Henry S.* to carry arms and ammunition from the German merchant vessels in Manila Harbor to near-by colonies, utterly failed in 1915.

On May 5, 1917, a parade was held in Manila by about fifteen thousand Filipinos. These later gathered in front of the governor-general's residence, and speeches were made expressing their devotion to the American cause. The special session of the Legislature, and the attempts to form a division of the National Guard for foreign service, as an expression of the general Filipino sentiment, have already been described. These having failed, through obstructions and delays previously mentioned,—in which the Filipinos had no part and which bitterly wounded their self-respect and offended their spirit of generosity,—the active participation of the people of the islands was slight indeed. Many Filipinos had enlisted in the army and the navy, and some of them gave their lives on the field of action, such as Tomas Claudio, Dadison, Manalo, Ubrantes, and others; but as an entity the

Philippines were not allowed to take an active part in the war. They were far from the stirring events of active campaigns, since the German Navy had already been swept from the seas, and the Japanese had taken over the German base at near-by Tsingtau.

When the Legislature met again in regular session, in the autumn of 1917, a resolution was promptly adopted setting forth "the unequivocal expression of the loyalty of the people of these Islands to the cause of the United States of America," which, as the resolution stated,

is based on the evident justice of the enforced intervention of the American people in this war, in which they have been guided solely by the supreme interest of defending universal democracy and upholding the right of the small nations to live in confidence and security under their own governments, safe from the threats and perils of autocracy and imperialism. We firmly believe that the final triumph of democracy, in securing for the world the principle of nationality for the benefit of the small nations, will, finally, enable our people to attain the ideals for which we have always struggled, namely, our constitution into a free and independent nation, with a democratic government of law and order, ready to be another instrument of democracy and universal progress.

To this, President Wilson replied:

Please convey to the Philippine Legislature, in warmest terms, my appreciation of its admirable resolutions. . . .

A fortnight later the Legislature adopted joint resolution No. 7, as follows:

That the Governor-General be, and hereby is, authorized to take all necessary steps for the earliest possible construction, under the direction of the Government of the United States and at the expense of the treasury of the Philippine Islands, of a modern submarine and a modern destroyer which shall,

as soon as available, be offered to the President of the United States for service in Philippine waters or elsewhere, as said President may require or authorize.

Six months later this act was formerly approved by the President, and in the autumn of 1919 the fine new-type destroyer *Rizal* was launched from the Union Iron Works in San Francisco and later commissioned and put in service, officered by Americans and manned by Filipinos, in American waters. The frequent offers of the Philippine Government to pay for this destroyer were not accepted by the United States Government, so the Filipino people now have no claim to the possession of this vessel, which was intended to serve as the nucleus of a future Philippine navy; meanwhile it would have been of the utmost service in putting a stop to the wholesale smuggling of opium from the government monopoly of British North Borneo into the southern islands of the Philippines. The proffered submarine was never constructed. The reception of the Filipinos' offer of a submarine and a destroyer was, to say the least, half-hearted on the part of Washington officials, and it is difficult to calculate how much of this lukewarmness was due to overwhelming preoccupation in far greater matters, and how much to reluctance in certain quarters in America to advance or further encourage the development of Filipino nationalism.

While, as we have thus seen, the Filipinos had no opportunity to participate actively in the wonderful military achievements of the United States, their coöperation in the subsidiary activities of war was spontaneous and whole-hearted.

Upon the suggestion of Secretary Baker, a local

branch of the Council of National Defense was organized, consisting of twenty-four Americans and ten Filipino members, with the end in view of "coördinating the resources and energies of the country for the prosecution of the war." It served, as in the United States, as the official agency for all war work not already covered by the executive departments. Through this agency, German propaganda and insinuations were combated and stamped out; a speakers' bureau was formed to educate the people as to the causes of the war and the aims of the United States in the war; campaigns were launched for the Liberty Loans; War-Savings stamps and Red-Cross drives were organized; public and private economy was encouraged, sedition prevented, and Americanization instilled throughout the islands.

By this time the war enthusiasm was in full swing throughout the Philippines. All elements, with a few exceptions in the ranks of the German-Americans or among other people of foreign birth, were enthusiastically at work in war efforts. The Americans promptly buried all political or factional differences for the duration of the war, and coöperated with the Government, both federal and insular, with the utmost unselfishness and energy. There was a great exodus from the ranks of the Philippine service for commissions in the army, and most of the American constabulary officers, engineers of the Bureau of Public Works, and numerous other American residents entered the army; many of these men stayed on in the army after the war, especially those who came from the constabulary, and I know of no finer material than those men who were thus contributed from the Philippine service.



The Insular Government, naturally, suffered a considerable loss in efficiency by the withdrawal of so many experienced and valuable officials from the several departments of the permanent service.

The zeal and activity of the local Council of National Defense, and its agents and "four-minute speakers," both American and Filipino; its mail news bulletin service, paid for by the Philippine Legislature; its activity in locating and stamping out disloyal utterances, compared favorably with the whole-souled work done in the United States at the same time. So zealous did certain agencies become that it was difficult, especially in the matter of deportations of enemy subjects, to observe any judicial calm, and protect individuals against obvious injustice. Those who were in the United States during these exciting months will recognize the symptoms and understand the psychology of this war phenomenon. The Military Information Division of the army in Manila was so eager to search out Germans or Austrians for internment and deportation, that they pressed me to deport substantially all those residents of the Philippines with German names, including several highly patriotic American government officials. It made no difference to these army agents whether their list contained numbers of American citizens: they sounded German; that was sufficient. So impatient did they finally become with me that the commanding general asked Washington to take that work out of my hands, and give it to the army, a request to which no attention appears to have been paid in the War Department, since the Department of Justice was already uneasy over the stream of German

and Australian civilian "prisoners" from the Philippines.

The drives for Liberty Loans and the Red Cross were so enthusiastically conducted and received that the Philippines rather overstrained their own resources in contributions for these purposes, and this has been one of the causes of the financial indigestion of the islands ever since. In the Liberty Loan campaign, nearly 40,000,000 pesos of the various issues were sold in the Philippines; local payments for the Alien Property Custodian, and for transmission to the Red Cross Society at home, took an additional 10,000,000 pesos at least from the comparatively slender resources of the Philippines. Americans, individually and through such organizations as the Elks Club, vied with Filipinos, British, Chinese, Japanese, Syrians, and Swiss in their work for the Liberty Loans; the T. Daniel Frawley Opera Company, which was visiting Manila that season, helped on the good work. On October 12th, designated by President Wilson as Liberty Day, seventy thousand people of a dozen different nationalities took part in a parade. Five days later the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan closed with the islands' subscriptions reaching the figure of 23,247,000 pesos, or more than double the quota allotted to the Philippines. Of this sum, about 9,000,000 pesos came from provinces where fully ninety-five per cent. of the subscribers were Filipinos.

The food-production campaign instituted under the Council of National Defense, and directed by Dr. Galicano Apacible, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and National Resources, not only

effected a far larger production of staple food crops, but vastly increased the area and numbers of vegetable gardens, through the instrumentality of the public schools and the boys' and girls' agricultural clubs. The productive school gardens were increased to more than 400,000, while 103,000 boys and girls were engaged in home gardening with an area of 4122 acres under cultivation. Another distinct and permanent benefit of these war activities was the expansion of the membership of the Woman's Club, which, organized in Manila under patriotic American leadership, rapidly extended throughout the provinces and gained a permanent increase in membership in all important centers. This gave the Filipina, for the first time, the opportunity, of which she has since so eagerly availed herself, to participate in public meetings and take part in organized works for public welfare and civic improvement. This is bound to result in a decided benefit to Philippine public life.

These war campaigns thus, in their lessons of patriotism, of unselfishness, and of giving, in the custom of public service, and in the enlistment of the Filipino in one common purpose and achievement, are certain to have a permanent and beneficial effect upon the future of the islands. The contributions made by individuals for purposes of charity and public welfare, had always in the past been confided to priests, or agents of the Church; now, for almost the first time, the people generally contributed directly to public purposes. The conscious, organized effort, in which all elements of the population were encouraged to take part, resulted in a strengthening of the feeling of national life. It

is said that the war left no country in the world exactly as it was before; even the Philippines, remote from the scene of conflict, have felt and responded to the new spirit of the age.



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE JONES ACT

**I**N the preamble to the Jones Act, by almost unanimous vote of both parties, the Congress of the United States declared:

WHEREAS it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the war with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and

WHEREAS it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and

WHEREAS for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence: Therefore . . .

On August 29, 1916, the bill became a law, and crowned with success the labor of many years of the devoted Representative William A. Jones of Virginia, the chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House, and Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, the head of the Senate Committee.

The bill in its final form was in the nature of a victory for the House, because the Senate, by the

deciding vote of Vice-President Marshall and supported by Senators Kenyon, McCumber, and La Follette from the Republican side had previously added the Clarke Amendment, proposed by Senator Clarke of Arkansas, around which a great political battle raged in the House. This amendment conferred complete and unqualified independence upon the Philippines in not less than two years and not more than four years from the date of the approval of the act; it contained, when first introduced, a temporary guaranty of independence. President Wilson had supported the Clarke Amendment after its adoption by the Senate, and had urged acceptance of it upon those members of the House who were understood to be opposed. This, it will be remembered, was the principal cause of the resignation of Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, who considered the Clarke Amendment too radical. On May 2, 1916, the Clarke Amendment was defeated and struck from the bill in the House of Representatives by a vote of 213 to 165. About 28 Democrats bolted the party leadership and voted with the majority of the Republicans against independence; these bolting members were virtually all members of the Roman Catholic faith, and it is understood that their attitude was the result of intervention by Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore, acting, it is supposed, at the instigation of the ecclesiastical authorities in the Philippines.

It is to be presumed that the long history of the islands had accustomed the Filipinos to church intervention in politics, for there was no active campaign of attack or reprisal of any sort upon the church there. The present archbishop, Monsignor O'Doherty,

has frequently announced himself as being in favor of independence, so the opponents of independence cannot, it is probable, count upon the solid influence of the Church upon any subsequent occasion.

One of the most telling answers to this Irish-American defeat of Philippine independence was made by Senate President Quezon at the St. Patrick's day banquet in Manila in the next year. All the local dignitaries of the Church were there, and most of the speeches had touched on the subject of the freedom of Ireland. Mr. Quezon's speech consisted of thirteen words; he said: "We Filipinos wish for your Irishmen the same independence you wished for us."

Senator Warren G. Harding, permanent Chairman of the Republican Convention, on June 8, 1916, referred to the recent defeat of the Clarke Amendment as an effort of the Democratic administration "to renounce its guardianship of a race of people and leave them to walk alone when they had not been taught fully to creep. A few rebellious Democrats," he added, "joined the Republican minority in sparing us this national disgrace." He then made some eloquent denunciations of "hauling down the flag."

In the Philippines, during these months of debate in Congress, there were the most intense interest and excitement. A few of the richer Filipinos, especially of the mestizo type, were frightened at the prospect of the sudden independence promised in the Clarke Amendment. The bulk of the people, and most of the leaders, supported it solidly. A characteristic note was struck by the late Don Antonio R. Roxas, the best-known Filipino millionaire. Some of the financiers had endeavored to persuade him that independence would

bring disaster upon the rich; he replied: "I don't believe it, but if it did, I would be ready to sacrifice my last centavo for the freedom of my country."

The final passage of the Jones Bill was by almost unanimous vote of both parties. The bolt in the House had destroyed the fixing of a date for independence, but the preamble contained the promise of independence when a "stable government was established." Representative Jones cabled Speaker Osmeña:

I congratulate the Philippine people through you upon the final enactment by Congress of the fundamental legislation giving to them the substance of self-government and the solemn assurance that in due time complete independence will be theirs. It practically confers upon the Filipinos the power to determine when they shall take their place among the independent nations of the world.

The advocates of independence in the United States felt that a great step forward had been taken; the opponents that the evil day had been postponed. Certain shrewd lawyers tried to belittle the promises of the preamble because, they argued, it was not in the body of the bill, and could not bind the American people. Such chicanery, unworthy of those who deal with the faith or honor of a nation, made no permanent impression upon the discussions of Philippine policy.

Any one who was present in the Philippines during those days will forever remember the outburst of wild enthusiasm of the people. In every possible way demonstration was made of their pride, satisfaction, and gratitude for the self-government granted. Local American opposition was for the moment stilled; Congress had spoken in no undecided tone, and,



after all, had they not escaped the Clarke Amendment? Resident Commissioner Quezon returned to Manila a real popular hero; he received ovations on all sides. Soon thereafter the election was held for the new Senate which was to take the place of the appointive commission, and the first all-Filipino Legislature came into effect on October 16, 1916. The ceremonies were held in front of the Ayuntamiento before an immense crowd which filled Plaza McKinley. In the new Legislature sat three Moros, an Ifugao, and an Igorot, symbolizing the increasing unity of the Filipino people.

The spirit as well as the letter of the Jones Act was to turn over to the Filipinos most of the powers of government of their own internal affairs. There were still restrictions upon their borrowing capacity in the new charter, and Congress retained the final right to annul any law they passed,—a right never yet exercised, and most unlikely to be employed under any circumstances. The governor-general, the vice-governor, the justices of the Supreme Court, the auditor and deputy auditor were still to be appointees of the President; all the other officers were under the control of the Filipinos, either directly or by the right of confirmation of nominations of the governor-general, bestowed by the new constitution upon the Philippine Senate. This was the point over which most opposition was encountered in Washington; if I can justly claim any influence upon the form of the Philippine Constitution, it is perhaps in this particular. I urged in season and out that the Philippine Senate be given this right, so that never again might the people of the islands be ridden over against their will

by officials booted and spurred with hostility and race prejudice.

The organization of the new government will presently be referred to at greater length. The passage of the Jones Act did not lay to rest the incessant agitation and race and party antagonism of the Philippine problem. It contained, on the contrary, the germs of future dispute and controversy. The preamble promised independence "as soon as a stable government can be established therein." What did these words mean? There can be no doubt about the phrase "as soon as"; it is not "after" or "when" but means immediately upon the fulfilment of the required condition. What, then, is a stable government? Does it mean a stable government composed entirely of Filipinos? If not, there had been a stable government in the islands ever since the American occupation. Evidently the intention was to promise independence when the new form of government prescribed by the Jones Act had proved itself stable. The whole controversy, then, circles about the word "stable." Who is to be the judge of this stability? Naturally, the United States Congress, which has the constitutional right of determining the final status of the Philippines.

The arrival in the Philippines of members of Congress, even though they are traveling for recreation and not officially, or of any persons who are supposed to be in touch with Congress, is the signal in Manila for a renewal of the controversy. The Filipinos claim that they have already, after a lapse of nearly five years, established the required "stable" government, and are entitled to immediate independence; those

opposed to their aspirations contend with equal determination that the stable government has not yet been established. So the dispute has been transferred from the question whether the Filipinos are "fit for self-government" to this equally annoying and irritating debate over stability. Both questions involve discussion of the "ability" of the Filipinos, and call forth more or less angry or sneering criticisms of the people and their leaders.

The basis is thus laid for a quarrel of increasing intensity, permitting as it does the free expression of opinion upon the capacity, character, and ability of a whole race of people. Was it not Burke who said that you cannot indict a whole people? That is exactly what many imperialists or retentionists have thought it wise to do in regard to the Filipinos; their statements are usually accompanied by a self-satisfied protestation of altruism and of a regard solely for the interest and welfare of the Filipinos. The characteristic dignity of manner and appearance of self-restraint of the Filipino race deceive the visiting critic as to the spirit in which his observations are usually received. These people are deeply sensitive, and there is a point beyond which their acquiescence in these sage and sometimes hypocritical summings-up of their defects will not be endured. A distinguished citizen of New York recently published a book in which he devoted several chapters to the Filipinos; he had spent eight days in the Philippines, mostly at the Manila Hotel and the Army and Navy Club, and his conclusions as published were entirely unfavorable to Philippine aspirations. It so happened that every one of his enumerated criticisms was incorrect and

based upon false evidence purposely given him by the retentionist "junta" in Manila. All of this is perfectly understood by the Filipinos and correctly estimated by them. How many years of this sort of misrepresentation will they cheerfully and patiently endure? Fortunately, they have a clear conception of the disinterested good-will of the American people at large toward them, so that they still have complete faith in us as a nation.

What, then, are the tests of a "stable" government? Must it be a government which under any circumstances can withstand aggression from without, and at all times be able to preserve its independence? If so, has there ever been a stable government in history, and is there one upon the face of the earth to-day? Must it be perfect in all its details? If so, has the human race ever set up a stable government? Must it conform exactly to American standards of government? If that is to be the test, must it conform to what we Americans would like to be, or to what we know of our institutions in actual practice? If the latter, there have been times in our own recent history when that test would not have been approved even by Americans. Must it be financially beyond criticism and its credit above reproach? If so, how many of the great nations of the world to-day could answer that requirement? Finally, must the Filipinos be judged by a committee or by persons known to be resolutely opposed to their independence, or is not the faith of our country involved in the preamble to the Jones Act?

At the moment of present writing there is in the Philippines a commission sent out by President Harding to report to him on present conditions there.



All members of the party are army officers, except one civilian, a former governor-general noted for his opposition to independence. General Wood, at a recent banquet in Manila, is reported as making the following definition of a stable government:

A stable government means civic courage, courts of justice which give equal opportunities to the senator as well as to the simple *tao*, resources ready for disposal at any moment they are needed by the country, organization which will enable the country to defend its integrity, adequate hospitals all over the Islands which are not found in the provinces we have just visited, social organization which shows keen human interest in the protection of the needy and the poor, effective public sanitation, common language, and many others.

Diogenes, with his lamp, searched for less than this!

All of the requirements mentioned by General Wood would be desirable in the Philippines; so they would be in the United States. Could either country ever fulfil them in the eyes of a hostile critic? Do any of the existing governments of the world to-day fulfil them? Would not the "common language" bar Switzerland, where there are four official languages, —French, German, Italian and Romansh? One fourth of the Canadians speak French, and English is hardly understood in Quebec. Would the Canadians relish this test as applied to them? Are they unfit for independence because they have not a "stable government"? Have they "adequate hospitals" throughout the provinces, and an "organization which will enable the country to defend its integrity" against all comers? Has Belgium? Has the millennium yet arrived in any part of this troubled globe? I seriously doubt it.

Fortunately, the words "stable government" have an exact definition when employed in American official

documents. This definition is fixed by usage and honored by tradition; it is known to the Filipinos as it is to all the world, and has been used before Congress by Filipino representatives. It was employed by President Grant in his statement of foreign relations, and later reaffirmed by Elihu Root when he was Secretary of State. It declares a stable government to be one which is elected by the suffrages of the people, is supported generally by the people, and is capable of maintaining order and of fulfilling its international obligations. The present Philippine Government fulfils the last requirements; it is supported generally by the people of the islands, is capable of maintaining order and does so, and is able to discharge its international obligations, having a due regard to the safety of foreign residents and their investments; it can fulfil the first requirement of being chosen by the people just as soon as the United States removes its governor-general and soldiers, and permits the Filipinos to elect the first President of the Philippine Republic.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE NEW FILIPINO GOVERNMENT

**T**HE elections for the new senators on October 3, 1916, resulted in a great victory for the Nacionalista party, which had already in the election of June preceding retained complete control in the Assembly, now to be called the House of Representatives. All but two of the twenty-two elected senators were candidates of the Nacionalista party; the Speaker of the House was the president of that party, and the new President of the Senate, Manuel L. Quezon, was its vice-president. The way was clear for a prompt decision upon the form of the new government. Secretary Baker, in his telegram of congratulation to the new Legislature, had called them "in the Orient, the successors of that Continental Congress which more than a hundred years ago established free institutions in America." The members felt a very solemn sense of responsibility concerning their new powers.

To the new Legislature the power was given by the Jones Act to "increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments, or make such changes in the names and duties thereof as it may see fit, and [it] shall provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General." The use of this power was the most important problem before the body.

There is little doubt that what the Filipinos desired

was a responsible ministry and a form of government like that of Canada, where the governor-general is a mere figurehead. But the Jones Act did not permit this; in fact, it had considerably strengthened the hands of the governor-general, giving him executive power and control over all departments of the administration, and for the first time the veto power over all acts of the Legislature, and, as has just been noted, the power to nominate the heads of executive departments. However, the spirit of the Jones Law was without question that of self-government for the Filipino people, and it was incumbent upon the governor-general to carry out the terms of the act with as much consideration as possible for that principle. A responsible ministry was hardly feasible, so a means was sought to bring the cabinet to be constructed into as close touch as possible with the Legislature. That has been generally recognized as one of the defects of the American system,—the complete separation of executive and legislative functions.

Vice-Governor Henderson S. Martin was in Washington and insisted, much to our regret, upon resigning his office; that left the post open for nomination by President Wilson, as prescribed by the new law, the position carrying with it, as its only function while a governor-general was in the islands, the office of Secretary of Public Instruction. Eugene E. Reed, Secretary of Commerce and Police, had accepted a position as president of the newly acquired government railroad, the Manila Railroad Company. Rafael Palma, the acting Secretary of the Interior, had been elected to the Senate, so a new slate was possible all around. It was at first decided to ask Speaker Osmeña to



enter the cabinet as the responsible party leader; he had for the past nine years been the recognized leader of the lower house, with all the powers and influence of the office of Speaker of the American House of Representatives rather than those of the non-partizan position known to the British House of Commons. After some hesitation Mr. Osmeña declined, but suggested that the Legislature should authorize an additional legislative member of the cabinet. He apparently decided that he could not hold the post, for example, of Secretary of the Interior and remain Speaker, and preferred to remain where he was, especially in view of the fact that the Senate had refused to part with its new president, Mr. Quezon, to let him enter the cabinet. Act No. 2666, known as the Reorganization Act, passed both houses and became a law early in November, 1916. It rearranged the former executive entities, dividing Finance and Justice into two separate departments; changing Commerce and Police so that the constabulary were placed under the Secretary of the Interior, and establishing a secretariat of Commerce and Communications; creating a new Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and leaving the bureaus of Public Health and Public Instruction under the vice-governor, who was to be appointed by the President.

It was finally decided to appoint Senator Rafael Palma Secretary of the Interior, so that he should serve as a liason officer between the executive and legislative branches. Further, all secretaries were given the right to appear before either house of the Legislature when summoned. That was all that could be accomplished in the direction of "responsible gov-

ernment" until the extra-legal creation of the Council of State in the following year. The new cabinet was appointed on January 11, 1917, as follows: Assistant Secretary of Public Instruction, Felix Roxas, formerly Mayor of Manila; Secretary of the Interior, Rafael Palma, President pro tem of the Senate; Assistant, Theodore Kalaw; Secretary of Commerce and Communications, Dionisio Jakosalem, Ex-Governor of Cebú; Assistant, Catalino Lavadia; Secretary of Justice, Victorino Mapa, Ex-Secretary of Finance and Justice; Assistant, José Escaler; Secretary of Finance, Alberto Barretto, Judge of the Court of First Instance; Assistant, Miguel Unson; Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dr. Galicano Apacible, Ex-Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the Assembly; Assistant, Rafael Corpus. A few months later, Charles E. Yeater of Missouri was appointed Vice-Governor and Secretary of Public Instruction by the President, and the cabinet was complete.

These secretaries remained in office during the rest of my service as governor-general, or more than four years longer, except that Don Victorino Mapa became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the summer of 1920 and Attorney-General Quintin Paredes was thereupon made Secretary of Justice; and also in the autumn of 1920 Don Rafael Palma surrendered his post as Secretary of the Interior in order to be able to devote himself to private business. His twelve years as commissioner, acting Secretary of Public Instruction, and in the Department of the Interior, where the social burdens are especially heavy, had left him almost penniless. Assistant Secretary Kalaw then became head of the Department of the Interior.

So, during four important years, in which the added strain of the entrance of the United States into the war greatly increased their difficulties in countless directions, economic and commercial, these same men presided over the administration of the executive departments. A fixed term of office, coincident with the life of a legislature, and the reappointment of all in office at its expiration, obviated the criticism of instability of government so frequent in the European countries where ministries survive sometimes only a few weeks. To be sure, these ministers were not directly responsible to the Legislature, but, under the circumstances, they were proportionately of infinitely greater prestige and influence with the lawmakers than are the secretaries of department in Washington, who are little more than personal secretaries of the President. Ranking after the presidents of the two houses, these men were looked upon by the Filipinos as their highest representatives, and of them was expected and exacted responsibility not only as administrators but also as the chosen leaders of a people who were on trial as to the capacity of their race. They responded with serious acceptance of these responsibilities. Not once did an adverse vote or vote of censure of one of them pass the Legislature, or either house thereof; had this come to pass, the cabinet officer thus affected would have resigned, though not by law obliged to do so, as having lost the confidence of the Legislature. Occasional appearances of cabinet officials before committees of the Legislature were usually connected with the budget, annually presented by the Secretary of Finance. On two different occasions, the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Commerce came back from the

hearings somewhat ruffled by their cross-examination, but I suspect that the committee members had been enjoying the process of baiting them under examination.

The positions of assistant secretaries of department were created with the intention of having them serve as permanent under secretaries, after the English system. This plan did not work out successfully, owing largely to the fact that the men originally selected were of too important a position politically, and were no doubt always hoping to be promoted in the Government; there was also some dissatisfaction among the under secretaries over the apparent subordination of their positions to those in the Legislature. Several changes in their personnel took place during these years.

The cabinet met every Wednesday morning, under the presidency of the governor-general. In the absence of a secretary, his under secretary sat in his place with full powers. Occasional emergency meetings were called at times of need. Usually the cabinet met behind closed doors, though frequently public hearings were held upon live topics. All matters of general policy were decided upon in the cabinet, and gradually the Legislature transferred to the cabinet, acting collectively as a unit, certain legislative functions, such as the distribution of appropriations where it was seen the elasticity was needed. At all cabinet meetings harmony and dignity prevailed, and I cannot believe that in any country, over a similar period of time, more conscientious or seriously patriotic attention is given to the duties and responsibilities of office than was given by these men in their years of service as



cabinet officials. From the date of adoption of the Jones Law the administration in Washington conceded the fullest liberty of action and freedom from interference to the Philippine Government. Especially during the war it operated almost as an independent government, always, however, scrupulously careful of the interests of America and Americans. The cabinet discussions ranged over the widest possible scale, touching upon almost all those subjects which are usually dealt with by independent sovereign countries except foreign relations. The heaviest single piece of work each year was the preparation and introduction of the budget, the budget system having been adopted in 1917 by the new Legislature. It must be remembered that prior to 1914 this function of government had been withheld from the Filipinos. Alberto Barretto, Secretary of Finance, displayed truly remarkable abilities in the preparation of a scientific budget, and each year it was with reasonable promptitude passed by the Legislature. It is to be noted that one of the moving purposes of the adoption of the budget system by the Filipino Legislature was to avoid the introduction of log-rolling which has in other countries caused such scandal and damage to the treasury and the public morals.

The constitution of the Philippine cabinet necessarily removed the governor-general from such immediate contact with the bureau chiefs as had previously existed. I observed some disposition to stand upon their dignity on the part of certain secretaries, upon those rare occasions when I had through haste or inadvertence failed to consult them before talking over a policy with one of their bureau chiefs. Con-



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HON. MANUEL L. QUEZON  
President, Philippine Senate



HON. SERGIO OSMEÑA  
Speaker, House of Representatives



OLD COUNCIL OF STATE OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, JULY, 1920



NEW COUNCIL OF STATE OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, JULY, 1920

sultation with officials concerned is a primary rule in administration everywhere, and in all countries neglect of it must lead to irritation, but it is sometimes difficult to remember, and occasionally is a source of delay in action. Where a specific function was conferred by the Legislature upon a certain secretary of department, I once or twice detected an inclination upon his part to consider the matter exclusively within his charge, but I always insisted upon the provision of the Jones Law that "all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General." As a general policy, I endeavored to give to the Filipino executives all possible opportunity to exercise their own discretion, and even forced upon them responsibilities of decision and action as frequently as possible. At first some of them displayed a tendency to undue caution in their decisions, but the exercise of self-government later became perfectly natural and easy to all of them,—to such a point, indeed, that at times I had to exercise all the discretion I could summon not to appear to be interfering with them with insufficient excuse. Occasions of this sort arose with less and less frequency after the general public gradually learned to appreciate the fact that the governor-general was not the sole fount of authority, and that the heads of department must be consulted upon all matters affecting their functions.

My relations with each and every one of these heads, both official and personal, were exceedingly satisfactory and harmonious, and I look back with the deepest feeling of pleasure to the days and years I spent in



association with them. We never had a quarrel at a cabinet meeting, and never left a subject until all those interested had been given an opportunity to have their say. It is one of the most curious features of human nature that however strongly a man may feel upon a given policy, he will finally accept an adverse decision of the majority if only he has been given an ample opportunity to "get it out of his system" by stating his views. There were many days when it must have seemed tedious to the members of the cabinet to prolong discussions the ultimate decision upon which was a foregone conclusion, but the net result was a harmony and good feeling which enabled us to serve together in friendship and without a break through all those years.

Upon no occasion did I ever perceive among my colleagues in the cabinet any unworthy motive of personal gain or personal advantage, political or financial; there was no tendency to favor any given locality; no jealousy of or prejudice against other offices of government; no playing of politics in the unworthy sense of the word. All were alike imbued with a desire to do the best they could for their whole country; they displayed no hostility against any race or class of people, and avoided not only the danger but even the appearance of being pushed by groups of capitalists, either foreign or native.

So strong did the cabinet organization become that the leaders of the Filipino people, Messrs. Osmeña and Quezon, soon decided to raise again the question of their participation in this executive body.

Speaker Osmeña, who is a close student of constitutional history, finally brought forward the plan of a

Counsel of State, and this was put into effect by executive order of the governor-general late in 1917.

It had been my custom, during the three years before the Jones Act came into effect, to consult frequently, indeed almost daily, with Speaker Osmeña, not only as to the qualifications of the Filipinos selected for appointment to office, but also as to general policies of administration. He was the recognized leader of his people, their highest elected representative. Association with him had been of the greatest benefit to me, since his knowledge of Philippine personalities was unsurpassed, and, moreover, a decision taken with his approval was fairly sure to meet with the support of the Filipino official world. With the new government, however, difficulties in the established relations between the governor-general and the Speaker of the House soon arose. The Senate resented intervention from one outside their body in the form of advice upon executive nominations. When it was pointed out to their leaders that Mr. Osmeña advised on nominations not in his capacity as Speaker of the House, but as president of the Nacionalista party, the reply was that this was "invisible government." The administrative officials felt that the law had given to them, through the members of the cabinet, the right to decide upon departmental policies. Mr. Osmeña, who had borne the burden of the fight for Filipino ideals for many years, felt himself in an untenable position. The creation of a Council of State solved, apparently, all of these difficulties, and carried out more logically the principle of responsible government. The body is unknown in American constitutional law, unless it can be said that such entities as the Governor's Council in

Massachusetts and Maine carry out the same idea. The Council of State, however, is a familiar institution in all Latin American countries, at least wherever the somewhat remorseless logic of the Napoleonic law prevails.

The executive order creating the Council of State described it as a body appointed to advise the governor-general, under his presidency, and to be composed of the members of the cabinet and the presidents of both houses of the Legislature. It at once superseded the cabinet as a body, and thenceforth meetings of the council were held weekly. Upon motion of President Quezon, Speaker Osmeña was elected by the council as its vice-president, and so became once more officially recognized as the "second man" in government circles. The new body drew the executive still closer to the Legislature, and virtually insured the support of any reasonable executive policy among the legislators. It thus greatly enhanced the power of the machinery of government. On the other hand, the council sometimes displayed that delay and vacillation inherent in divided responsibility. An executive board is never as strong in action as a single executive agent, and although the council was by its terms only an advisory body, its decisions gradually acquired an aspect more and more definitive.

Although I frequently offered, during the first year of its existence, to sign a bill establishing by law the Council of State, the Speaker always hesitated to press the matter in the House, and the bill was never introduced. In my last year of office I announced to the council that I would not then sign such a bill if it were presented to me, not wishing to bind the hands

of my successor. The council became, finally, the target for many attacks in the opposition press and in the minority in the Legislature. While the real object of attack was the political machine of the Nacionalista party, the council offered a shining mark, because not found in the organic law. It was pointed out in reply to criticisms that the council was only an advisory body, and that the governor-general had the right to seek advice from anybody he wished, especially from the heads of the party in power; nevertheless, replied the critics, it gave the governor-general too much power over the Legislature. Arguments in favor of the complete separation of executive and legislative appeared frequently. So the matter was left at the end of my term. My successor may, if he wishes, abolish the Council of State with a stroke of the pen; or, if he prefers, he can add to it as many other persons as he desires to consult.

Nevertheless, the public discussion which raged about the council in 1919 and 1920 afforded a most useful basis for instruction in constitutional law. It was a very decided advantage to the executive to have the legislative leaders in an advisory council; it was, on the other hand, an advantage to the members of the two houses to have access, through their presidents, to the innermost thoughts and reasons of the executive. The objections to it are based upon opposition to a concentration of powers, and a justifiable and proper jealousy on the part of the Legislature of the influence of the executive. In the Philippines, in its final analysis, the opposition to the Council of State sprang very largely from a growing revolt even within his own party against the domination of Speaker Osmeña.



The question of the abolition of the Council of State by law was never seriously considered in the houses; how could they abolish a board of advisers created by executive order? How could they by resolution prevent the governor-general from consulting whom he wished? Additional embarrassment arose from the fact that, though it had not been created by law, the Legislature had in numerous laws confided to the Council of State prerogatives of parceling out extensive classes of appropriations. I always made it clear that the council was established at the express wish of the Filipino leaders, that I thought it had been of decided benefit both to the Legislature and to the executive; that I did not consider it an intrusion upon legislative privileges, and that if the two houses did not wish their respective presidents to sit in the council, they only had to say so.

It is my final impression that the abolition of the Council of State would be a step backward, as a lessening of their acquired exercise of self-government. The opposition to the council finally resolved itself into opposition to Speaker Osmeña. His attitude toward the council had too greatly stressed his own idea of responsible leadership; this was made most apparent by an incident which occurred toward the end of my administration, after a sharp discussion between Messrs. Quezon and Osmeña which was the nearest approach we ever had to a quarrel in either the cabinet or the council. The matter under discussion was the granting of government subsidy through the National Development Company, a branch of the Government, to a private company to be formed for the manufacture of cement, a greatly needed industry in

the Philippines. Mr. Quezon had taken one side of the discussion, Mr. Osmeña the other. The council was evidently with Mr. Quezon, and I was about to put the final motion when, to my surprise, Mr. Osmeña broke in with a statement that if the motion carried he would resign. The meeting was at once adjourned, and with a little patience all feelings were subsequently smoothed out, and the subsidy agreed upon. The point of interest is that Mr. Osmeña evidently believed that a vote adverse to his expressed opinion would destroy his responsible leadership.

If too much emphasis has been laid upon these discussions and debates, they may at least interest the student of political science. They may, moreover, illustrate to the unbeliever the progress of the Filipinos in the art of government.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE FILIPINO LAWMAKERS

UP to the year 1914 the Philippine Assembly offered the best field for studying the capacity of the Filipinos in government; then they were given control of the upper house as well, though under the strong influence of an American minority. Until then they had been denied all effective or responsible participation in administrative affairs.

In 1916 the Jones Act gave them real self-government, but with the constant presence of an American governor-general and vice-governor, the latter in direct charge of the two important branches of Public Instruction and Public Health. It is therefore easy for the unfriendly critic still to claim for American influence whatever he approves in administration and to blame as Filipino whatever he dislikes. That, in reality, this attitude is unjustifiable and not supported by the facts, may make but little difference in this political controversy. The Legislature at least since 1916 has been composed entirely of Filipinos, and they may be credited with the form and substance of the wise laws they have adopted, or reproached with the shortcomings in legislation. Their critics have, during these five years, been active in observation and not always unprejudiced in comment.

It would be unpardonable in a brief volume, such as the present writing, to attempt a report and analysis

of all the laws passed during these five years; certainly, if mistakes have been made, they have been open to the attack of an exceedingly alert and powerful body of critics who have widely advertised any action of the Filipinos which they thought might be used to their disadvantage.

The general trend of legislation has been progressive and distinctly advantageous to the development of the country. The first session under the Jones Act was dedicated, with entire reason, to political considerations,—the reorganization of the government. After that, matters of domestic reform were taken up, to be interrupted by the irresistible pressure of new questions due to the war. These were largely in the field of political science in which direct participation had always been denied to the Filipinos,—the economic,—and it is all the more creditable that they grasped and handled the problems with so much vigor and determination.

Banking and currency, the export and import markets, coinage questions, the gold or silver standard, food control and the stimulation of certain crops, shipping and railroad ownership and development, the building of sugar centrals and the price of sugar, the marketing of hemp and tobacco,—these were the principal topics of consideration and debate in the Legislature. Every possible means within the limits of prudence was adopted to enable the economic resources of the country to meet the acute stringency of conditions during the war and after the Armistice. The success of the Filipinos in these matters is of public record, and will stand investigation and analysis. If mistakes were made, so they were in all other countries during these



years of war. Is it necessary to belittle the ability of the Filipinos if they, too, suffered from world-wide economic disturbances? The point of emphasis is rather that the islands came through the crisis as well as they did, that they were by comparison really prosperous in the midst of depression elsewhere, and that they suffered less than those other countries of the Orient which, like the Philippines, were outside the theater of active warfare. From the point of view of the student of civics, it is a matter of congratulation that no graft, no jobbery, no log-rolling, no cheap politics, no selfish localism, no cynical opportunism, and no hypocrisy is to be charged against the management of the Philippine Legislature. Its budget is intelligently debated, subjected to minute scrutiny, honestly considered from a national rather than local standpoint, and is free from gross extravagances and absurdities.

There is a very marked difference in the organization and management of the two houses. The House of Representatives is controlled by a powerful organization headed by Speaker Osmeña, and the program of legislation is managed with considerable skill. The Senate, a smaller body, of course, is democratically organized and much freer in debate, but the extraordinary leadership of President Quezon is evident the moment a "government" measure is in danger. In both houses the committees are of much less proportionate importance than those in the American Congress. Private bills, as they are defined in the British Parliament, are infrequent, and deal mostly with franchises for electric-light plants which, before approval, are referred to the Public Utility Commission.

All of the members of both houses, except those appointed for the non-Christian territories, are highly educated men, and for the most part are university graduates. There are as yet very few members educated by the American public-school system and, consequently, the debates are always in Spanish. English will come into use as the younger men come to the front. Representative Eulogio Benitez, in the session of 1920, made the first speech in English ever delivered from the floor of the House. The manners of the members are above reproach, and the presiding officers are seldom obliged to call to order the participants in a debate. The speeches are eloquent, and often full of allusions to history and literature. In fact, the Anglo-Saxon must often bewail the fact that the oratorical talent of the Filipino is so much more pronounced than his own. Even among the school-boys, and in the remote provinces, one usually hears a more eloquent public speech than the average American can achieve. It must be admitted, however, that in this nation of orators the chaff is, by the audience, usually separated from the wheat, and mere histrionic oratory accomplishes little more than entertainment.

The members are largely lawyers or doctors of medicine; one familiar with the composition of parliaments in countries of Latin civilization will be prepared for this; the doctor is always well educated, and generally a keen appraiser of human nature.

The press in the Philippines is active, keen, and well written. Professional ethics are high among the journalists, and there are few instances of imputing to a public man statements he never made, or of refusing to publish corrections. Certain journals, however, es-

pecially those dedicated to some particular political issue or campaign, often go to lengths unfavorable to the peace of the public mind and prejudicial to public order. These are not, however, of wide circulation in the provinces.

The defects of the Philippine Legislature are the defects of inexperience. The worst faults are due to the habit of voting with the leader,—a criticism also applicable to most of the South American parliaments. The minority in the adjustments sessions is most deplorably weak in numbers, and uncertain of its rights. The most active minority members, General Sandiko in the Senate and Claro M. Recto, the Batangas poet, in the House, though obviously sincere, often seem to the observer to be “barking up the wrong tree.”

Bills are not printed when introduced, but are mimeographed, and then, and in their amended form, are not given sufficient publicity. If they were, they would be subjected to the most caustic dissection in the opposition press, the editors of which are sleepless in their attacks upon the majority; the journalists, for the most part, are ex-office-holders, or those who hope to step from the editorial chair into public office. The tone of legislative life would be improved by a proper publicity of the measures introduced. Even up to the moment of passage, and afterward, it is difficult to get a copy of a bill. Political opponents may ascribe this to a desire on the part of the organization leaders to suppress the facts of pending legislation, but the truth is that they are so sensitive over years of attack upon them by certain American influences, that they devote a most scrupulous attention to the phraseology as well as the substance of every bill presented, before it is al-

lowed publication. How often have we seen in our own country a State legislature or even Congress discredited by a bill with wildcat ideas or faulty diction introduced by some member acting on his own responsibility? The British Parliament gives the most exhaustive analysis to every bill before it is permitted introduction as a government measure. Nevertheless, the present Philippine method of refusing to have the bills printed upon introduction and at their various stages is open to criticism, and has sometimes defeated the very purpose of the practice. Wise or careful members of the bodies would probably have spied out before passage and insisted upon eliminating the objectionable features of the few bills which have subsequently met the executive veto.

Their worst practice, however, and one easily capable of reform, is the withholding of most of the measures until the last night of the legislative session. This reprehensible practice is common in the American Congress, as well as the State legislatures; in the Philippines, it is carried to excess, and is to be blamed principally upon the House of Representatives. It prevents proper discussion and understanding of many of the measures adopted at the end of every session. Many members, in those last crowded and exciting hours, hardly know what they have passed or what they are voting upon. Making due allowance for the dilatory side of human nature apparent in all countries, and especially in the tropics, it must be said that in the Philippine Legislature the party management often deliberately withholds measures until the last moment with the hope of rushing them through without debate and thus holding firm control over the legisla-



tive program. To be sure, the result is that the administration generally gets its bills passed, but it is probable that the same result would be attained and with more general public satisfaction if generous debate and orderly consideration were always permitted before passage. At least it can be positively stated that this practice has never been deliberately employed in the Philippine Legislature to pass unworthy or improper legislation, and never for any selfish interest. There are prospects now that it will eventually be reformed, for the Senate has recently, upon several occasions, gone on record in emphatic disapproval.

The disposition to meet American imperialist arguments is apparent in another feature characteristic of the present Philippine Legislature. One of the charges against the Filipinos most commonly made is that they are not a united people, but are a congeries of different races, tribes, and nationalities who could never really work together in national endeavor. The charge is entirely without foundation, and respecting it the evidence is strong that "the wish is father to the thought." Nevertheless, the Filipinos are extremely sensitive to this reiterated criticism. They have been, above all, determined to prevent a decision on any measure before the Legislature upon sectional lines. Ilocanos, Tagalogs, Visayans all vote, irrespective of the section they represent. The Nacionalista party is strong in every division and locality of the islands, and votes are cast without reference to difference in language or dialect. The principle, however, is adhered to to an extent unusual in American or European legislatures. The legislators in Manila try to arrive at a unanimous vote whenever possible, upon every bill.

If a strong minority develops upon any measure, and efforts to convince the opposition are futile, the project is likely to be deferred until the next session. Many times in the American Congress I have seen bills carried by a few votes; once during my service there a proposed constitutional amendment was defeated by one vote in the House of Representatives. This is not the Filipino custom; the House must be nearly unanimous, or the matter is dropped. To such lengths have the charges of disunion and "separation" brought the Filipino representatives! Their caution is not only due to the fact that they feel themselves to be acting in a "show window"; it is due above all to a desire and determination to avoid everything which retards or seems to impair the ever-increasing solidarity of the Filipino people.

Another Filipino characteristic which induces the leaders never to press a vote where opposition has developed is the lack of real party platforms in elections. The importance attached by both parties to the independence issue has obscured in elections all other questions submitted to the voters. Since both parties subscribe to the demand for independence, the campaigns are conducted chiefly upon the record of the party in power, and naturally enough sometimes degenerate into an exchange of personalities and utterly unfounded charges. The opposition candidate claims that he is more fit to care for the interests of the people, more interested in purity of administration, less tyrannical. There is thus little general discussion at election times of issues of national interest, such as the tariff, Chinese immigration, the land laws, suffrage and divorce, public ownership of public utilities, or the

relations of landlord and tenant. When such matters finally come to discussion in the Legislature, the party in power has no expressed mandate from the people upon which to rely. Both parties have hesitated to throw bones of contention into the elections, so that, hotly contested as they are, the public spirit is aroused by personalities rather than by appeals to principles.

At the joint committee hearing of Congress upon the Philippine question in June, 1919, a member asked President Quezon, who was then testifying, what the difference was between the parties in the islands. Mr. Quezon, with characteristic frankness, immediately replied: "Those who are in office are trying to hold it, while the 'outs' are trying to get in." Former Representative Emiliano Tria Tirona, the leader of the Democrata party, who was then also present as a member of the "Independence Mission," tried to expatiate upon the differences between the parties; I could see the progressive stages of boredom reflected upon the countenance of the chairman, Senator Warren G. Harding. That is the feeling the subject inevitably induces in any disinterested auditor.

The elections in the Philippines call forth the utmost activity among the politicians; the vote is unusually large; in 1919, the last general election, 92 per cent. of the qualified voters cast their ballots. Universal suffrage has not yet been conceded; property or educational tests limit the list. Charges of fraud are frequent in the more active provinces, and consist not of claims of bribery but of manipulation of the ballot boxes and fraudulent returns. An effort is now being made to pass a better electoral law, which shall provide really adequate watchers at the polls. The election



COCOANUT RAFTS, PAGSANHAN RIVER, LAGUNA





GATHERING NIPA SAP

charges are carried at once to the Courts of First Instance, but, it must be admitted, are seldom substantiated. The elections, however, in Ambos Camarines and Albay are notoriously corrupt, and at the first session of the new Senate the two senators from that district were not seated. Such election scandals as those of recent years in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio have been carried broadcast through the American periodicals and have had, to say the least, an unfortunate influence upon the conduct of elections in the Philippines. The actual purchase of votes is unusual, a condition in sharp contrast to the situation in the rural districts of the State of New York, where a quarter of a century ago at least one third of the voters were carried on the campaign books of each local party manager as "doubtful," i. e., purchasable. The character of the *paisano* or countryman is, moreover, fertile soil for the success of election manœuvres; his loyalty to his friends, to his patron or leader, opens the door to election frauds. These, however, are not so serious as to affect the final results; during my nearly eight years of service in the islands I have known only one member of the Legislature whom I believe to have been actually seated by fraudulent votes. The election cases in the Assembly have been a source of serious complaint; the custom of the controlling machine there has been to stifle election contests in committee, and let them die of inaction; while this was foolish and perhaps entirely unnecessary from their own point of view, at least it may be said that it did not go to the unpardonable lengths common in the House of Representatives in Washington twenty years ago, where an election contest was then never settled

on the merits, but by a strictly partizan vote, in the grand manner of the historic Tilden-Hayes contest for the Presidency. At the session of 1920-21, the Philippine House reformed this custom and gave apparently just consideration and decision in pending contests.

Throughout all the provinces and municipalities local affairs are administered and local ordinances and regulations adopted by Filipino provincial boards and municipal councils. The provincial boards are now all elective except in certain non-Christian provinces, and consist of the governor and two other members. The municipal councils, consisting of a president, vice-president, and from five to ten additional members, are also elective. Both the provinces and the municipalities are limited in the scope of their authority, for taxes are laid and income apportioned in bulk by the insular Legislature. The acts of both the boards and councils are reviewable by the Secretary of the Interior, and are occasionally disapproved by him. Local questions relating to roads, bridges, artesian wells, to the schools, to police questions, to the rinderpest and locust campaigns constitute the bulk of the work of these provincial and municipal legislatures. Generally speaking, their work is conscientiously done, and they are distinctly entitled to credit for the satisfactory average of their performances.

Finally, some mention should be made of the two dominant personalities in the Philippine Legislature, Messrs. Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmeña, each of whom, as president of his respective chamber, exercises a profound influence in public affairs. Of radically different character, they are absolutely united for



what they believe to be the welfare of their country; frequent efforts are made by their more ambitious followers to bring about a breach between them, and it is the constant preoccupation of those in the administration to preserve the existing harmony between them. Mr. Quezon is a Tagalog, and Mr. Osmeña a Visayan, but fortunately for the country their followers are not divided upon provincial lines; the Tagalogs have thus far shown a marked superiority to the Visayans in political talent; in fact, within my experience, with the exception of Speaker Osmeña, there have been only five Visayans in the front rank politically,—Chief Justice Mapa, Resident Commissioner de Veyra, and Senators Clarin of Bohol, Filemon Sotto, of Cebú, and Francisco Enaje of Leyte. The Visayans, however, are numerically superior to the Tagalogs, so that as political forces they are fairly evenly balanced. While Speaker Osmeña can generally secure the support of the Visayans, President Quezon has many influential followers among them; the Speaker has many devoted adherents in the Tagalog provinces. Mr. Osmeña's strength comes from his conservative attitude on public questions, and his reluctance to advocate changes in the time-honored social system in the provinces; this secures for him strong backing among the Filipino clergy, headed by Bishop Ivan B. Gorordo of Cebú. The present archbishops and bishops of European descent are more in sympathy with Mr. Quezon, as are the missionaries of the Methodist and Presbyterian denominations. Having been a major upon Aguinaldo's staff in 1899, Quezon has a strong backing among the "Veterans of the Revolu-



tion'' among whom a strong opposition to Osmeña has developed.

The Senate is the progressive body in legislation and the House the conservative, so naturally the young men, especially in the university, are enthusiastic followers of President Quezon, who addresses them from time to time upon the state of the country. Mr. Quezon has been the Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Masons of the Philippines, and is the president of the Columbian Association in Manila, composed of young men who have been educated in the United States. The capitalists in the provinces are more inclined to Mr. Osmeña, and those in Manila, where his personal influence is the determining factor, to Mr. Quezon, despite the fact that he has made himself the champion of the newly born cause of the laboring men in the Philippines. The Chinese merchants, a very powerful body in financial circles, are on Osmeña's side; Mr. Quezon is frankly pro-American and is the ablest and most effective friend the Americans have in Philippine political circles; Mr. Osmeña is not unfriendly toward any nationality, but is cautious and reserved in his attitude toward all the non-Philippine races.

Mr. Osmeña is the calm, well-balanced director of policies and organizations, though upon occasion he can emerge from the security of his office and deliver eloquent and telling addresses; Mr. Quezon is the bold and active fighter before the public, whether in America or the Philippines, for the rights of his people. He is brave and impulsive, as quick as lightning, extremely formidable in debate, and of most attractive personality, making friends of all whom he meets. It is the

fashion in political circles to speculate upon which of the two would win in a contest before the country; the contest is not at hand, and the present emergency in the relations of the Philippines with the United States will necessitate their continuing to act shoulder to shoulder in the same cause. If the split between them should come, which would win? *Quien sabe?* Their forces and resources seem so evenly balanced that many believe they would only succeed in neutralizing one another's candidacies, and that the result would be to bring to the front some third man, such as Senator Rafael Palma, agreeable to them both and to their respective followers.

During the earlier years of my service the Assembly gave unqualified support to my recommendations and requests as governor-general; after the formation of the Senate and the development of plans for the reform of social institutions had led to sharp divisions of opinion upon such questions as woman's suffrage, divorce, the relations of landlord and tenant, and the rights of laboring men, my support came chiefly from the Senate.

As the active leader in the front of the firing line in the political fight for independence, Mr. Quezon has for years drawn the attacks of the army officers and imperialists in Washington and Manila; at the same time he really deserves their warmest support, having manifested upon many occasions his sincere regard for the Americans and deep respect and affection for the United States. On one point, he would never yield to America,—the question of independence. Inasmuch, however, as Congress has formally promised the freedom of his country, Mr. Quezon justly maintains that his attitude in that respect is entirely pro-American.

As a friend and ally, his services are absolutely invaluable; to him no sacrifice is too great, and no trouble too taxing when he has undertaken to do anything for a friend; he has, moreover, in abundant measure that prime requisite of the successful statesman: he always keeps his word. As this is at times too impulsively given, he is led into occasional difficulties. Mr. Osmeña is exceedingly chary about making any promises whatever, and that is baffling to those who go to him to ask his political advice and opinion.

Working in combination, these two men make a political team which is almost irresistible; should they decide to part company, the harmony and effectiveness of the political organization would be sadly disturbed, and it would lead to an inevitable regrouping of the forces in both houses of the Legislature, to a reorganization of the Nacionalista party, and possibly to the domination of a new political party in the country. Should this upheaval occur in the near future, it is important to note that the tendency to division is upon the basis of public policy, not of personality, the present forces inclining to group themselves into "stand-pat" and "progressive" parties upon questions of domestic concern. If the independence question, or that of the relation of the Philippines to the United States, again is to obscure the whole political horizon, all differences between Filipino political groups will be immediately buried and the whole force of their organization will present a united front to the world.

## CHAPTER XVI

### IN THE PROVINCES

**I**F Paris is France, it is not true that Manila is the Philippines. The country is primarily and markedly one of small agriculturalists, and ninety-five per cent. of the inhabitants live on their own farms, somewhat less than forty acres being the share of the average family.

If the visitor could be transported on the magic carpet of the Arabian Nights to any remote country village in the Philippines he could not at first glance tell in what part of the islands he had been deposited. The houses are very much alike in all provinces and the daily life of the Filipino, his dress, and his manner of living are strikingly similar in all parts of the country. There are no large cities except Manila, with its population of 300,000, and Iloilo and Cebú, with about 60,000 each. The bulk of the 11,000,000 inhabitants of the islands live in small towns and villages.

The house of the Filipino countryman is small and neat, raised upon posts about six feet above the ground. It is built, usually, of bamboo, and the roof, thatched with nipa palm, gives it a somewhat shaggy appearance. There is very little furniture within, and the poorer families usually sleep upon mats upon the springy bamboo floor. The houses are admirably suited to the climate, and the moment one enters them, the blinding glare and intense heat of the tropics are



forgotten. A stranger is welcomed with hospitality in the most remote hamlets, and the best of everything the natives have to eat and drink is his, together with the best chair, and perhaps the only bed,—which is made, as in India, of leather thongs stretched over a framework. To the visitor, the family at first seems very solemn, but little by little the children become more inquisitive and bolder, and when the ice is broken, all are suddenly at their ease and found to be full of humor and good nature. Comparatively few of the towns and none of the smaller villages have hotels, and the traveler puts up at the town *presidencia* or with the local school-teacher or constabulary officer; otherwise, if a Filipino, he stays with his friends or his *parientes*.

A few pictures—perhaps one of some saint and one of their hero Rizal—adorn the walls, while the American sewing-machine and gramophone are ubiquitous.

The family seldom sits at the table with the guest, all members serving him first and sitting down to the remains of the feast. Rice is the staple food, with usually a few eggs or beans, or chopped dried fish.

Their wants are very simple, and they possess few garments, which they keep scrupulously clean; as the Filipino village is usually situated close to some stream, the most familiar domestic scene shows the washer-woman beating clothes on the rocks, or the people taking their daily bath, the boys in one group, and the women and girls in another in perfect modesty, never exposing themselves to the public gaze.

The children are bright and attractive, especially the little boys. The men are very fond of the children, and the grandfather spends hours every day looking

after the babies, of which there is a plentiful crop. The baby is carried astride of the hip, as we see children carried in India. In his imaginative painting of a Neolithic family group in prehistoric Europe, the French artist Fernand Cormon has represented the baby in this position.

Infant mortality has reached extraordinary heights in the Philippines, two thirds of all the children dying in infancy in some localities, a figure now happily decreased one-half by the spread during the last twenty years of modern sanitation through the efforts of the Bureau of Health and of the women's clubs throughout the provinces. The figure of infant mortality in the United States is only ten per cent., and with the installation of artesian wells in almost all municipalities in the Philippines, the virtual elimination of small-pox, the stopping of great epidemics of cholera and the plague, the use of the rice hulls for the making of *tique-tique*, a specific against beriberi, and the diffusion of modern ideas of child-feeding and child welfare, a great increase in the population of the Philippines is on the way. If intestinal parasites, which are almost universal, could be reduced, or done away with, a marked impulse in national energy and vitality would at once appear.

The people are unaffectedly simple in manner, with a great natural dignity. Nothing can exceed the hospitality and attentions of the country folk to a visitor to whom they wish to show honor.

The houses of the richer Filipinos, in the provinces as well as in Manila, are handsomely built of hardwood, elegantly furnished, and equipped with modern plumbing. Their recreations are automobiling, dancing,

and musical soirées. The Philippines, however, are not yet a country of rich and poor; there are few millionaires, and almost no abject poverty in the islands.

Official visits in the provinces are accompanied with much speech-making, processions, the erection of graceful and artistic bamboo arches over the roads, and the loud welcome of the brass-band which is an inevitable feature of every village. It is perhaps, however, to my many shooting-trips in a dozen different parts of the islands that I owe my pleasantest recollections of country life; free from the formal attentions and intervention of the officials, and spending many days in the fields and forests with the simple country people, natural-born sportsmen that they are, I have had the good fortune to make lasting friendships with Filipinos in different provinces. It is too much to say, perhaps, that country life is everywhere the best environment for the making of human character, but certainly no type in the Philippines is more admirable, more truly friendly and dependable than the great bulk of the country folk. Some of the happiest days of my life have been spent in camp or in simple homes in the provinces, especially under guidance of my friend Don Serafin Linsangan of Pantabangan and his *compadres*, in the province of Nueva Ecija.

These people consider no effort too great to be made for the comfort of their guests, no toil too tiresome, and no hardship too severe. They are cool in danger, devoted to their leader, and the very stuff of which admirable soldiers may be made. In return for their hospitality, it is an insult to offer pecuniary reward. It is due to knowledge gained on these many hunting-trips that I venture to write with assurance

of the Filipino people,—not merely of the rich or political classes. The long conversations I have had, hour after hour, in the mountain camps, or in the shade of the village bamboo groves, have given me a real respect for the natural intelligence, political insight, good heart, and faithful friendship of the Filipinos. The reader may guess that I should like to write of the sport of wild-carabao hunting which I have enjoyed in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Ifugao, Tayabas, and Jolo; of the days given to the chase of the tamarao in Mindoro, of the ducks of Bataan and the Cotabato Valley, or of the excellent snipe-shooting in the ten provinces of central Luzon, but, as Kipling says, that is another story. Aside from the sport enjoyed, all this was an unrivaled method of getting to know the people, and a tonic of unequalled inspiration, which sent the busy official back to his office in better health, and on better terms with the world at large.

Of the domestic animals of the Filipino, first and foremost is the carabao, or Indian water-buffalo, upon which, in large measure, the wealth of the country depends. He is slow and ponderous, with the most wicked-looking horns possessed by any of the large animals of the world; he is suspicious of strangers and often hostile to them, but the smallest Filipino child can soon reduce him to obedience. He is immensely powerful, and his broad hoofs enable him to drag the plow through the deep mud of the rice-paddy as no other animal could do. The motor tractor has largely superseded animal power in cultivating the fields for sugar-cane or corn, but can never take the place of the



carabao in the rice-fields, whence the main food supply of the people comes.

The horses are small and reedy-looking; originally a mixture of the Spanish barb and the pony from the plains of Manchuria, they have degenerated in size through lack of care in breeding. They are extraordinarily sturdy, and can go all day in the great heat with a heavy burden; the fact that most of the saddle horses are stallions makes an expedition with a large party on horseback a lively affair; the little creatures often fight together like demons.

Cattle are raised either as beasts of burden or for food; milk is supplied only by the carabao. Chickens are small, of the original type known as bantams from the province of that name in near-by Java. The wild chickens in the forests are of exactly the same type as their domestic kindred. Eggs are small,—hardly more than half as large as those from an American hen. Roosters are a prominent feature of every village community; they are trained for the Sunday-morning cockpit, and their owners seem to spend hours stroking them and preparing for the next fight. Cock-fighting may impress the American visitor unfavorably, but there is even worse to be told: unless one is utterly insensible to sounds, and without any nerves at all, he is doomed to nights of misery until he becomes accustomed to village life. The roosters crow all night, a challenge from one being taken up and answered from yard to yard until the sleepless traveler fairly writhes in torture. When we were children and were told of Peter's hesitating denial of Christ, while the cock crew thrice at night, the crowing seemed to us some supernatural manifestation of divine warning.

When you have visited the Orient, you find that this crowing at night is—to the attentive observer—the main function of the rooster. And then the dogs—but enough said! The Filipinos have an aversion to killing the surplus dogs and cats, and every village is infested with them. In the absence of locks or bolts upon the door the watch-dog is no doubt a necessity, but one may hazard the opinion that, as to numbers at least, he is overdone. In the province of Albay alone, during an epidemic of cholera, Dr. John D. Long, the head of the Bureau of Health, directed the killing of stray dogs, and reported that thirty thousand were destroyed in a few weeks in that one locality.

The allegation that the Filipinos are lazy is usually made by the foreign visitor who is abroad during the hot hours of the day when native man and beast are prudently resting. The carabao requires a half-hour at least for total immersion in the water after every four hours in the sun. The Filipinos work from earliest dawn, and again in the afternoon, and sometimes all night by the light of the moon. Nobody who has tried to navigate the mud of the rice-paddies could call lazy a race of people who wring a living from such soil; it might also be a lesson in industry to watch the laborer stripping hemp.

In the rice-fields, the farmers work in family groups, or in community bands, and the toil is eased by a guitar player thrumming on the nearest *pilapil*, or paddy bank. The music, however, is too gloomy for our taste.

The greatest dangers to Philippine agriculture are the locusts and the rinderpest. The latter is always endemic in the country, as it is in India, and the Government has devoted large sums of money to its elimi-

nation, through inoculation, quarantine, and the importation of immune types of cattle. Nevertheless, it returns periodically in virulent form. For the last few years there has been comparatively little rinderpest, but the severe epidemic at the time of the revolution dealt the agriculture of the country a blow from which it took years to recover. While quarantine regulations are naturally unpopular, they have never met with organized resistance as in the State of Illinois five years ago during the outbreak there of the foot-and-mouth disease, when the embattled farmers resisted the quarantine officers with shotguns! In the Philippines the difficulty of quarantine is almost insurmountable, since there are few fences in the country, and the cattle graze in large herds; infection is also carried by dogs, pigs, ducks, and even by the deer. As for the locusts, it is hard for one to picture the myriads that come, literally darkening the sky. In a few hours a whole crop is eaten, and the farmer sees the year's work go for naught. He shrugs his shoulders and says it is the *voluntad de Dios* (the will of God). The locusts breed in the cogon (tall grass) of the uninhabited regions, and when full grown fly for miles, even from one island to another. They can be successfully combated only when in the "hopper" stage, before they can fly; then the whole village turns out, and the armies of hoppers are driven into ditches dug for the purpose, and are buried. Fortunately, Nature regulates the multiplication and increase of locusts in some mysterious way; while they may be a pest for two or three years in succession, there comes, usually, a long period of respite. One adviser in Washington solved the locust problem by prescribing as a remedy that all the

waste land of the archipelago be put under cultivation!

The Philippines have greatly increased their agricultural production during the last decade; the six leading crops—rice, corn, hemp, sugar, cocoanuts, and tobacco—were planted to an acreage in 1920 forty-five per cent. greater than in 1910. This is due partly to the high prices obtaining in recent years, in the world's markets, for Philippine staples, partly to peace and security in the provinces. A vigorous effort has also been organized by Secretary Apacible and carried out by General Adriano Hernandez, the Director of the Bureau of Agriculture, to increase the food crops, so as to render the country self-sustaining, as it was in the days of Spain. That this has very nearly been accomplished is evident from the figures for rice-production for 1920, when 1,019,399,503 kilos were produced in the islands, or double the amount of 1910.

The total amount of rice grown in 1920 and sold in the municipal markets brought the sum of Pesos 254,855,385. The imports of rice for 1920 were slightly more than 11,000,000 kilos in contrast with the average of about 200,000,000 kilos imported for the past decade. During the years 1919 and 1920, when the export of rice from Indo-China (the chief source of Philippine imports) was suspended by the French Government, a rice dictatorship of the distribution was established by the Philippine Legislature. This was accomplished through Secretary Dionisio Jakosalem of the Department of Commerce and Communications, with entire success and singularly little friction and disturbance. The value of this achievement will be better appreciated when it is recalled that in 1918 the



cabinet in Japan fell from power upon the rice question.

The remarkably high prices for sugar during recent years have led to the erection in the Philippines of about twenty new modern sugar centrals, and more and more acreage is yearly planted to sugar-cane; it now bids fair to supplant abaca (or hemp) as the favorite crop for export; the hemp-planters have been gravely dissatisfied with the manipulation in the United States of the market for their product by the International Harvester Company. Projects for the local manufacture of cordage in the Philippines, to steady the price of their staple, have met with opposition from the "Cordage Trust" in the United States.

One of the most striking developments of recent years has been in the production of cocoanuts from which the cocoanut oil of commerce is expressed. There were nearly eighty million cocoanut trees planted in the Philippines by the end of 1920, giving the country an important position in the export market; while copra is still exported to England, Spain, France, and even to South America, the greater part of the crop is pressed into oil at the mills in and about Manila and Cebú, which have, however, suffered of late from the efforts of overcapitalization and incautious overbuilding. To the people of the cocoanut provinces, the rise in the price of copra has brought great prosperity, and many a small farmer of modest mien has several thousand pesos in the bank or family "stocking" against a rainy day,—or rather, against the day of typhoons.

The nerve center of the Filipino psychology is the land; he loves his native soil with passionate devotion,

and seldom is willing to emigrate to other countries, or even to other and more fertile parts of the Philippines. Without a thorough knowledge of Filipino traditions and customs, the foreigner is doomed to failure as a landlord in the islands; there is an unwritten code of reciprocal rights and duties among the people who win their living from the soil that cannot be easily changed and may never be disregarded. This should be clearly borne in mind in any plan for the acquisition of large territories in the Philippines for purposes of exploitation and development. The apparently passive and docile countryman can be suddenly aroused to passion and to deeds of violence by any infringement of his traditional rights in and to his land.

Fortunately, the Government has, under American occupation, understood and guarded, as far as possible, against agrarian troubles. The problem of the friar lands, as has already been mentioned, was successfully if not completely solved in the earlier days of American domination; but the lesson of the insurrection against Spain will never be forgotten. The law forbids any individual from acquiring from the vast public lands by homestead more than twenty-four hectares, the individual from purchasing more than one hundred hectares of public lands, or the corporation from so obtaining more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares. The dangers of the Diaz régime in Mexico, with its legacy of revolutions and disorders for succeeding generations in that distressed country, are to be avoided in the Philippines if possible. Any change in the public-land laws of the Philippines requires the signature of the President of the United States; there is, however, no disposition upon the part

of the Filipinos themselves to open up the country to large landed proprietors; in fact, the tendency is quite the other way. The recent Public Land Act, finally approved by President Wilson in 1919, after a year and a half of delay, closes the public lands of the Philippines to all but Americans or Filipinos, a restrictive measure which called forth inquiries and informal protests from the governments of Japan, France, Spain, and Great Britain. The act was finally put into shape to meet all technical objections, but it is believed that the hesitation of the Washington administration to approve it was due to an especial effort to avoid all questions of controversy with the "allied and associated Governments." The Filipinos felt that if they were not able to secure approval of this law under the powerful wing of the United States, they would never be able to secure its passage in later years. The Government of the Straits Settlements had in 1918 passed a similar law, aimed, it was understood, against the invasion of American capital. The Japanese were unable to make an effective protest against it because the Philippine law had been skilfully drawn after a study at Tokio of the Japanese land law, and was based as exactly as possible upon it. Subsequent negotiations, approved by the Philippine Legislature, to protect Japanese investments in the hemp plantations of Davao will be discussed in a later chapter.

Minor agrarian disputes are occurring with increasing frequency upon the larger estates in the provinces near Manila and in Negros. The rapidly disappearing survivals of the feudal system are based rather upon tradition than upon law; the oppressive custom on the part of a few Filipino landlords, as for example in the

province of Bulacan, of exacting from tenants payment in kind of a portion of the crop at fixed prices below the market, has aroused much resentment and some threat of disturbance in a few localities; it is hoped that prosecutions under the amended usury law may diminish this custom; the small farmer is gradually learning his rights, and is beginning to assert them with vigor and determination. The power of the cacique or landed "boss" to retain his tenants attached to the soil in a condition somewhat resembling peonage is lessening year by year, as the small man grows more self-confident and independent.

One of the cherished features of the American bill of rights is denied to the Filipino; he cannot bear arms except upon license granted by the governor-general. This is usually accorded to all responsible persons who desire shot-guns, but almost never in the case of rifles or revolvers. When the Filipino is taunted with his inability to form an army to defend his own country, he points to the fact that he is not permitted by law to carry arms; and he may add that his attempt to organize a National Guard was discouraged in Washington.

The average Filipino pays very few taxes in the provinces,—a small land tax of  $1\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. upon the value of his land, a cedula or poll-tax of two pesos a year, and a sales tax of 2 per cent. on his gross sales of produce. Repeated recommendations of the executive to the Legislature to increase local autonomy, especially in the direction of permitting self-taxation of various communities for school and road funds, have as yet met with no success. The demand for roads and schools in the country districts is constant, and



would overwhelm the insular treasury if granted to the amounts requested. Village pride in a new school-house calls forth great rivalry between neighboring communities. Public-spirited citizens are constantly donating funds for school buildings when the Government has been unable to respond. The country people themselves will make any personal sacrifice to send their children to school, and the neatly dressed youngsters with their "shining morning faces" are a source of pride to the whole community. Seventy per cent. of all the inhabitants of the Philippines over ten years of age are literate, as shown by the census of 1918, a percentage almost as high as that of some of the Southern States of the Union, higher than that of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Rumania, Servia, or any of the new countries organized since the war.

Roads are as vigorously demanded as schools,—new roads and then more of them. They are excellently constructed and kept in general good repair; in fact, they compare favorably to any state road system in the United States. The modern roads and schools are due not only to a wise policy of government, but also to the insistent demand of the people themselves. The proper relation of these much-needed public improvements to the revenue would be better understood in the provinces if more self-government were accorded by the Legislature to the provincial boards and to the municipalities. The allotment of school funds to the different localities has been managed by the central Government with conspicuous impartiality and fairness; more complaints are heard about the division of road and bridge funds, which are by law apportioned in bulk among the provinces in proportion to popula-

tion. Thus the very provinces which could in all probability themselves supply the funds for emergencies and deficiencies, are those which receive the largest share in the distribution. There is, in consequence, a vast difference in the development of the road systems of large provinces like Cebú or Pangasinan, and small ones like Isabela, Antique, or Sorsogon. This is a cause of some public discontent.

To the traveler the village school-house is always the point of greatest interest. The boys and girls go to the same school, which is a source of complaint and criticism on the part of the older priests of the Catholic Church. The children are keen and well-behaved in the class rooms, but are seen to greatest advantage during the recreation hours, playing volley-ball or baseball, or practising for the track games. They are surprisingly efficient at all these games, and the performances of the college boys in baseball and track athletics would be hard to beat at any of the smaller American colleges. The recent return of the successful Filipino team which won the Far Eastern Olympic games at Shanghai, over China and Japan, was the occasion for a great demonstration in Manila. They had carried off the palm in tennis, baseball, sprints, pole vault, and jumps, and the shorter swimming-contests. The Japanese won at longer distances, both in the foot-races and in the water. Gone are the days in the Philippines when any form of exercise except that on horseback was discouraged by the Spanish as ungentlemanly; the enthusiasm for athletics is spreading fast; in December, 1920, the Philippines led all countries in the purchase of athletic and sporting-goods from the United States.

The healthy, bright-eyed, and athletic Filipina girls are especially a revelation to the other races of the Orient. I remember an exhibition given by the Filipina girls' baseball team at Peking, which aroused great curiosity and surprise. A member of the Chinese cabinet who stood by me, himself an old Andover baseball-player, rushed off to try to secure the bats and balls for Chinese use. In the grandstand about us were numbers of painted Chinese ladies with crippled feet and tottering gait. No doubt they were more shocked than pleased by the artless vigor and spirited good health of the Filipina maidens.

The attitude of the provincial Filipinos toward the Government is far more respectful than that American officials are accustomed to at home. Respect for authority is an old-time Malay trait, and has been intensified in the Philippines by the Spanish régime. The Spaniards punished an *atentado contra la autoridad* very severely indeed. The habit of mind of the *paisano*, or countryman, is still one of submission to authority. He was accustomed for many centuries to submit to all kinds of imposition, if not cruelty and abuse, from the Spanish governors. Then came revolt and revolution. Even to-day he will carry on for a long time against real or fancied governmental injustices until the inevitable explosion comes. He is far, far easier, however, to lead than to drive. The attitude toward government as something inevitable and supreme is gradually breaking down under the spread of democratic ideas. He is beginning to perceive that he, himself, is the Government, but his feeling is never asserted, and disrespect toward and resistance to the Government are infrequent. Grievance has hereto-

fore led to flight to the mountains and the forming of lawless bands, or *remontados*, who in some inaccessible spot in the hills sought freedom from government injustice. To-day these bands have almost disappeared and the citizen with a grievance resorts to political speeches and complaints in the public press.

Nevertheless, this remembrance of many generations under a despotic system, when a government was something apart from the people, mysterious and full of injustices, lingers on. A natural result was the universal sympathy, of which more than a little still survives, for him who has been caught in the toils of the law. The executive is constantly besieged with requests for pardon or commutation of the sentence of a criminal; the prisoner, when finally released, goes directly back into his home community, little the worse in public esteem for the sentence he has served. A refreshing difference, you will say, from the American system of proscribing and persecuting the ex-convict! Yes, perhaps so; but also, most unfortunately, evidence that the people do not fully understand that they themselves are making the laws for their own protection, and that the criminal statutes are not imposed upon them by some remote and foreign authority.

Other inheritances from the paternal government of former days remain in the petitions or addresses to the governor-general. I well recall one day in 1915 when the governor of a near-by province came to me for advice in his troubles. "You know," he said, "I look on you as my father." A few hours later, the same morning, the Municipal Board of Manila came to my office for assistance; their spokesman began by stating that they looked upon me as their grandfather!



This, coming from Don Isabelo de los Reyes, who was twenty years my senior, quite floored me.

To the courts the Filipinos pay an almost exaggerated deference. The judge, sitting without a jury, represents in his person the full majesty of the law. The ability of Filipinos as judicial officers was recognized even under Spain; under the United States the number of Filipino judges rapidly increased. Nothing seems to have marred the respect in which the courts have been held until within the last few years. Now, with the spread of representative government and the increase of the electorate, contested election cases are frequent in the Courts of First Instance, and are conducted with much party feeling by the contestants. In some cases, through the production of myriads of witnesses and other dilatory devices not unknown to counsel elsewhere, the respondent has been able to delay the trial for months and even years. The idea obviously is to secure delay in the decision until the one seated *de facto* shall have been able to serve out his term of office. Certain of the judges have appeared totally unable to despatch their business, despite the constant urging of the Secretary of Justice, and much public resentment has been occasioned in several provinces. There is no suggestion that the judges have been tempted by any pecuniary considerations, but it is sometimes suspected that the influence of political or personal friendships may have affected them.

If the people, whether rightly or wrongly, come to believe that they cannot secure justice, a great and permanent injury will have been done to the Government. The consciousness that freedom of speech is now secured to them by the Bill of Rights is having

an evident effect among them. Decisions of even the American Supreme Court justices in election cases or upon political issues are nowadays widely debated and sharply criticized among the Filipinos. The judicial veto has disclosed as strong differences between the Supreme Court and the Legislature, as it has in the United States. The judiciary is now under frequent criticism for the first time, and the old-time almost unnatural deference to the courts is rapidly passing away.

This stimulation of public opinion is in itself a valuable check upon the judiciary; it should, however, be carefully directed by the leaders of the people into conservative and reasonable channels. As Lord Bryce has said, "Public opinion is in all countries produced by the few and improved and solidified by the many." Those partizan leaders in the Philippines who in the heat of party passion are most severe in their denunciation of the courts are assuming a heavy responsibility.

The growth of free discussion of public questions in the provinces is, however, one of the healthiest signs of the times. The newspaper press in circulation is very limited, and public opinion is generally formed in public meetings, after the fashion of our town meetings in New England. In the provinces they are coming more and more to the point of taking a proper interest in the actions of their elected representatives. Upon this, security of their democratic institutions must depend.

## CHAPTER XVII

### NEW VENTURES IN COMMERCE AND FINANCE

IN the Philippines, a purely agricultural country, very little opportunity existed until the recent industrial boom for the development of "Captains of Industry." The internal trade, while considerable in the aggregate, has always been conducted by small Chinese peddlers or shopkeepers throughout the provinces, and the money thus earned by them was usually sent back to China, and never invested in the country,—a practice which aroused the indignation of the Spanish governors from time to time. Even the Mexican silver dollars brought over by the galleons in olden days soon disappeared from the Philippines and reappeared on the China coast. The Filipinos have always been a farming people, and learned but little of trade and finance, in which respect they resemble the Russian people and the Turks; even the aristocracies of European countries before the war knew little of commerce, and looked down on "trade." Up to the last decade the few rich Filipinos were landed proprietors, such as the Roxas family. Foreign trade was until recently closely controlled by a few prominent British or Spanish firms; later, Americans and Germans entered the field of commerce. The Filipina woman was always the business head of the family, took the wages or earnings of her men-folk, went to market, and negotiated the sale of the crops. Even to-day most of the

Filipino *tiendas* or shops throughout the islands are kept by women.

With the coming of American ideas and ambitions the Filipinos became interested in the opportunities for trade; they were repeatedly told that they would not be fit for independence unless they learned to take their share in the commerce of the country. Beginnings had been made by the Fernandez Brothers, who established a successful line of inter-island steamers, and the Earnshaw Brothers, whose shipyard in Manila laid the foundations for the family fortune. Their fellow-countrymen were ambitious to emulate them. The most successful has been Don Vicente Madrigal, who, starting fifteen years ago with a capital of two thousand pesos in the coal business, built up, through lucky speculations in ships and in wise contracts for coal, a fortune estimated at one time to amount to fifteen million pesos. An all-Filipino cigar factory was established in Manila and has been fairly successful, but the bulk of the tobacco trade and of the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes remains in the hands of Spaniards and Americans. Ten years ago the sugar *hacenderos* began to agitate for capital to enlarge their old-fashioned *muscovado* mills into modern sugar centrals, a movement which resulted by 1921 in the erection of some twenty-three new centrals in American or Filipino hands.

Then came the sudden boom in cocoanut oil, and during the years 1917-19 mills sprang up almost overnight. The excitement over the rapid creation of Filipino oil millionaires led to excesses in over-capitalization and expansion, as might have been expected. By 1920 the boom had passed, the price of oil had



fallen, and the reorganization of various of the oil companies will take some years before they are placed upon a sound financial footing. It must be added that Filipinos were not alone in this movement; English and American capitalists were carried away by the visions of sudden wealth; the operations in oil of a Britisher brought several of the banks to the edge of disaster by 1920, and one American speculator indulged in such "high finance" in an attempt to secure control of the oil trade that his operations were investigated by the Philippine Senate in 1918. Early in the year 1921, two foreign financiers were indicted in Manila for the practice of getting money from the banks to cover their extensive operations by giving as security *quédanes* or warehouse receipts for oil and hemp which were not in existence.

The sale by the Alien Property Custodian of several large one-time German houses gave the Filipinos an opportunity of buying in at auction commercial and import businesses, of which they took advantage. The prices paid by them were far too high, however, and the disturbances in the world markets since the Armistice have nearly ruined these investors.

Sugar, oil, hemp, and cotton piece goods fluctuated so violently in price, during and after the war, that the moment was most inopportune for the first ventures of Filipino capitalists into the field of industry and commerce. Sugar at the present time still offers such enormous gains that it may be the salvation of their general financial condition. The experiences of recent years have not been favorable to the growth of that prudence and steadiness in capital operations so necessary to permanent success; this is all the more

unfortunate because the tendency of the provincial producers has always been to speculate upon their crops by holding out for a higher price instead of being satisfied with a reasonable profit; too often this holding for the top of the market has resulted in selling later at the bottom.

Thomas Jefferson may have been right in wishing to preserve the United States as an agricultural country, but modern industrialism and commerce are too strong a force for any country to resist, if it would; if the Filipinos have eaten of the bitter as well as the sweet of financial enterprise, they may derive some satisfaction from the reflection that financial disturbances from 1914 to 1921 were not confined to their country, but were of world-wide occurrence. What has happened, for example, to the crop of war millionaires in New York?

An important chapter of this discussion is the venture of the Philippine Government in public ownership or control of various industries in their own country; Mr. Charles Edward Russell, the author, during a recent visit of inspection to the Philippines, stated that the feeling directed against the administration, among so many of our fellow-countrymen there, was based really upon the activities of the Government in public ownership. This interfered, he said, with opportunities for investment. However, the growth of the idea in the Philippines was not due to a desire to preëempt the field for investments, but arose simply and solely from the refusal of sufficient American and foreign capital to enter the country.

From the beginning of American civil government in the Philippines, the administration had taken in hand

the management of various utilities for which there was then offering no adequate private enterprise; thus, the Insular Government owned and operated an ice- and cold-storage plant; a printing-office for official publications; various coast-guard ships; the telegraph and inter-island cable systems, with a cable-ship for the repair of them; a purchasing agent and a Bureau of Supply for all the departments of the Government and, of course, a Bureau of Public Works. The officials of the Bureau of Supply were always instructed to purchase when possible from local merchants, but the existence of this bureau was from the beginning a source of criticism and attack. The ice-plant was a powerful influence in keeping down the price of ice, but efforts made by the Government in 1914 to sell the ice-plant, and in 1920 to abolish the Bureau of Supply, met with no success. The price-fixing of staple commodities by the Government during the years of war, 1917-18, was generally recognized as being dictated from Washington and regarded as a necessary incident of the war; on the whole, it may be said that price-fixing, except in the case of the rice crisis, of which mention has already been made, was a failure, and did more eventual harm than temporary good.

The first step in "interference" with capital by the new Filipino-American administration was the creation early in 1914 of a Public Utility Commission on the model of the New Jersey statute; this has proved a success and has rendered generally appreciated services to the public. Then came the purchase by the Government in 1916 of the main transportation system in the islands, the Manila Railroad Company.

Whatever may be the view of the reader as to public ownership of railroads in the United States, he must remember that the situation is entirely different in the Philippines. Indeed, attention should be given to the fact that the railroads are generally owned and operated by the governments in all near-by countries and colonies. Government ownership of railroads is the rule in Japan, Indo-China, the Federated Malay States, Java and Sumatra, Burma, Ceylon and British India. In China the administration is now trying to get back the railroad concessions from the aggressive groups of foreign capitalists who own them; the Chinese have been thoroughly alarmed by the political use made of railways in their country as the opening wedge of territorial conquest by the great powers.

The causes that led to the acquisition of the system in British India by the Government were, it is said, similar to those in the Philippines. The Manila Railroad Company was an English enterprise, first started in 1888; the lines are entirely in the island of Luzon, and extend north and south from Manila for, altogether, about one thousand kilometers. New railroad construction was government-aided soon after American occupation by an agreement on the part of the administration to guarantee the interest on the bonds to be issued. The line had never been very profitable, and no doubt the English capitalists were getting tired of it; at all events, after the outbreak of the war in 1914, no more English capital was forthcoming. The Philippine Government, from 1911, had been lending from the Gold Standard Fund all sums for new construction, and were usually required to pay a substantial sum each year in default on the interest on the railroad



bonds. The management was still all English, but an American government railway supervisor was detailed to see that the construction money was properly spent. In spite of his efforts, the construction work, especially in the right-of-way department, had by 1912 become a public scandal. Through 1913 and 1914 constant efforts were made to force the company to change its methods, but in vain. This scandal arose through the practice of the railroad company's agents buying up the necessary land at nominal figures from the owners, and then selling it to the company at a high figure. This swindle had grown to gigantic proportions, and about nine millions of pesos had been lost in this way,—a sum upon which the government guarantee of four per cent. interest on the bonds had to be met. Two Spaniards and a Filipino were the active agents of the railroad right-of-way department in these transactions. The Filipino was subsequently sentenced to prison for his part in them; the Spaniards had escaped to Spain and could not be extradited from their own country.

In spite of our efforts the railroad management would not or could not change the system, nor reform these abuses. This led finally to an offer in 1915 on the part of the Government to purchase, at a price of \$4,000,000, the whole system. The offer was finally accepted after tedious negotiations, conducted for the Government chiefly by Clyde A. DeWitt, Public Utility Commissioner. Dissatisfaction at the terms was loudly expressed in the stockholders' meetings which ratified the sale in London.

Meanwhile the system had been allowed by the management to run down to such a point that during the

first three years of government ownership the profits were devoted entirely to the necessary work of repair to road-bed, buildings, and rolling-stock. This was rendered more difficult by the virtual impossibility during 1917-18 of getting materials and supplies under export license from England or the United States; and by the necessity of meeting the war prices for coal, which had risen from twelve pesos to forty-eight pesos a ton.

The company, since 1918, has been organized as an entity separate from the Government, which, however, is the sole stockholder. The voting power of the stock is vested in a board consisting of the governor-general and the two presidents of the houses of the Legislature. The board of directors has a majority of Filipinos, and Senate President Quezon is the president, serving without salary. Mr. Ernest J. Westerhouse, formerly the able Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is the general manager, and is entitled to much credit for the success of his administration in building up and repairing the system; he has, moreover, succeeded largely in rooting out the shocking system of graft among the employees, prevalent under the private management, which, when frequently challenged, has with cynical indifference replied: "What can you expect of the natives?" That it was not the fault of the "natives" was pointed out to them by comparison with the Philippine Government, which at the same time was comparatively free from graft, though employing many thousands more Filipinos than the railroad.

The purchase of the Manila Railroad Company was greeted at the time with volleys of criticism on the

part of the American local press; it is now universally accepted as a success, and no arguments are advanced against the further negotiations now pending for the acquisition by the Government of the two American-built lines in the islands of Cebú and Iloilo. While the Southern Island system of the Philippine Railway Company has been well and honestly managed, the construction work was far too expensive for the service required, and the government payments upon the deficit in interest on the bonds have, since their issuance in 1908, already amounted to more than six and one half million pesos.

The creation of a Government Sugar Central Board has already been mentioned; except for the American companies, one in Laguna Province and the other in the island of Mindoro, both of which were struggling to get started and experimenting with the subsequently modified plan of growing their own sugar-cane, the islands were hopelessly handicapped by the fact that substantially all the sugar produced was *muscovado*, or low grade, and could find a market only locally or on the China coast. Both of the American investments above mentioned were given government backing and financial aid with the hearty acquiescence of Filipino officials. The government board was created to supply the funds necessary for modern machinery for new centrals. It negotiated an agreement in 1915 with an English company for the machinery for one new central, but the deal fell through because the English concern could not guarantee delivery during the war. Thereafter the field was left to private enterprise, since several new American investments were forthcoming, and a string of new centrals was projected by

Filipinos themselves with money from the Philippine National Bank.

The coal shortage in the islands was one of the greatest financial hardships caused by the war. The price rose from about eleven pesos to nearly sixty pesos a ton. Although the Philippines were known to have large coal fields, no capital was offered to develop them. Philippine industries were obliged to send to Japan, China, Australia, North Borneo, and even to Calcutta for coal. The rise in freight rates made the price almost prohibitive. The Government alone, through the Manila Railroad Company and the Bureau of Supply, consumed annually about one hundred and twenty thousand tons of coal. At the new prices, this one item meant at least three and one half million pesos more to be found by government and railroad budget-makers every year. It was determined that, even though prices might fall later on, after the war, the Philippines should never again be caught in this awkward position.

The Legislature thereupon, in 1917, chartered the National Coal Company and supplied the capital in successive grants up to the amount of three and one half million pesos by the end of 1920. The board of directors, as in the case of the Manila Railroad, has a majority of Filipinos; the manager is an American, the first being Mr. Clifford H. French, ex-auditor of the Government. When he left the coal company to enter private commercial life, Mr. Claude Russell, the efficient Director of Public Works, was selected to succeed him. The National Coal Company is just entering upon a large production of coal, but has suffered



from inability to secure from other countries experienced coal operatives.

The National Cement Company was founded along lines similar to the National Coal Company. In the Philippines cement has cost in recent years more than twice its market price in the United States, and the Government alone has thus been obliged to expend in its building program about three million pesos a year too much. Cement is the material for all permanent improvements such as bridges, culverts, school-houses, and the larger public buildings. The materials for an excellent grade of cement exist in the Philippines, notably in the island of Cebú. Private capital had constructed a cement mill on the Laguna de Bay, but this mill had failed because of its remote location, being too far from the raw materials, and because the German machinery employed was antiquated. This, incidentally, was one of the many unsuccessful local business enterprises of the Catholic Church.

Impelled by the repeated suggestions of the manager of the Manila Railroad Company and of the builders in the Bureau of Public Works, the Government undertook in 1920 to erect its own cement manufactory. Such a resolution demands a good deal of moral courage, because it exposes the administration to constant sniping under cover from those whose financial interests are affected,—in this instance the importers of Japanese cement and the owners of the defunct cement plant on the lake. The plan evolved was to interest a prominent American cement man to put up the plant with government money, giving him the right to purchase at the end of a certain date, under

a perpetual contract to furnish cement to the Government at cost plus ten per cent. The saving to the Government is expected to equal annually the whole amount of capital originally invested by it.

The National Development Company has the broadest charter of any of these government auxiliaries; it really permits the Philippine Government to enter indirectly into almost any sort of business deemed to be in the interests of the people of the islands. It became the target for a concentrated attack on the part of the fiber monopolies in the United States when it was believed by them that the National Development Company was about to enter the hemp market to sustain prices after the manner of the *Comision Reguladora* of Yucatan. This step, however, was not taken, and the chief functions performed since its organization in 1919 have been to furnish capital for the coal and cement companies mentioned in the preceding paragraphs; several tracts of land have also been taken over by the National Development Company with a view of sale later to the general public in order to avert threatened agrarian troubles.

The largest business venture of the Government, however, has been in the charter and operation of the Philippine National Bank, which was created in 1916 by act of the Legislature. From a modest beginning, this bank grew like Jack's beanstalk in the fairy story. In three years its resources totaled 230,000,000 pesos. Then the setback came, and the hard times of post-armistice finance have pressed upon it with almost crushing effect. The fact that other banks in the islands suffered to an almost equal degree does not

serve to mitigate the criticism of the Philippine National Bank.

There were in 1915 in the islands five banking institutions, two branches of British Oriental banks, one American bank which followed the British lead like a tail to a kite, one Spanish-Filipino bank of issue controlled by the Catholic Church, and another church organization known as the Monte de Piedad, or pawnshop.

The two British banks and the American enjoyed the use of the government deposits at one per cent. on which they probably made an average of seven per cent. net. They made practically no investments in the islands, dealing almost exclusively with the export and import trade. There was much complaint on the part of the public that the government deposits were used to discriminate against American and Filipino trade. The foundation of the Philippine National Bank naturally was displeasing to these institutions already in the field, and their hostility has followed it ever since.

The new government bank was given the right to issue notes, to do a commercial business, and to invest not more than fifty per cent. of its capital in agricultural loans. The pressure to restrict by charter its operations to those of a purely agricultural bank was resisted because of the history of the Agricultural Bank in Egypt, where the people who had borrowed what in its final analysis was the money of their own Government, were not readily induced to pay off their mortgages when these were due, with the result that the bank was in danger of becoming, through foreclosure, the largest landlord in Egypt.

The Philippine National Bank was fortunate in securing as its first president, in 1916, Professor H.

Parker Willis, of Columbia University, Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board. He founded the institution on approved banking lines, and returned after about a year to resume his duties at home. His chief difficulties were in finding a trained personnel, since repeated efforts to secure Americans resulted in the coming of only three or four, while the Filipinos were untrained in banking. When he returned to the United States, Mr. Samuel Ferguson became president and served until his death in 1918; he was succeeded by the vice-president, General Venancio Concepcion.

Can any one who was in Manila in 1917 and 1918 forget the financial boom of those years? Men were "getting rich quick" through oil, hemp, coal, and shipping. The Philippine National Bank dealt out loans as though the supply was inexhaustible. The chief mistake, however, was that the government deposits in the bank, which should have been kept in New York and which constituted part of the current reserve fund, to the extent of more than \$40,000,000 were withdrawn by the bank and lent out in the Philippines to finance the erection of a string of sugar-mills. In 1919, after the Armistice, came the turn in the tide. Ever since then the Philippine National Bank has been slowly liquidating its credits, but that is difficult enough in a falling market. In 1919 Secretary Baker, on the urgent request of the Philippine Government, sent a party of expert bank examiners from Cleveland, Ohio, headed by Mr. Francis Coates, Jr., to look into the affairs of the Philippine National Bank. After six months spent in the Philippines, they rendered a report severely critical of the overindulgence in loans and credits, and the lack of experienced management



in the bank, but reassuring as to the question of personal honesty of its officials, and hopeful as to the eventual outcome. Then the paralysis of the foreign markets for Philippine staples came suddenly in July, 1920, and from that date onward the inability of the bank to force liquidation of its loans, and thus to repay to the Government its currency reserve fund, has greatly increased the financial difficulties in the Philippines; the frozen assets of the bank have tied up a large part of the capital of the Government both insular and provincial. In the autumn of 1919, the resignation of General Concepcion was accepted, the bank rechartered on slightly modified lines, and a new general manager, Mr. E. W. Wilson from San Francisco, an experienced banker, brought out to take charge with all the powers of the former president.

The Philippine National Bank has rendered substantial service to the country, in financing the Liberty Loans and the purchase of alien property which it was compelled to pay for in American dollars, thus losing over one million pesos; in opening the field of commerce and investment to Americans and Filipinos alike, and in founding the basis of great future prosperity in the Philippines through the new sugar centrals which are just now coming into operation. For the shortcomings and mistakes of the bank Filipinos were only partly responsible, but they have received all the blame. Politics, always to be feared in a government bank, have played but little part in the management, and then chiefly in the sense of general policies intended to benefit the country as a whole.

Meanwhile, the task of the government officials in the Department of Finance became increasingly diffi-

cult; they were confronted with the duty of maintaining the parity of the peso at two for one with the United States dollar. This is an unusual responsibility for a modern government, but the system of a gold standard fund had been adopted substantially upon the model worked in British India and the Straits Settlements. It is practicable in all these countries only in fairly normal times. When the export markets fell absolutely dead in 1920-21, the rupee fell to a discount of about thirty-three per cent., the Straits dollars about the same, and the peso, eleven per cent. This was attributed by some critics to the impairment of the currency reserve fund for investments in sugar centrals by the Philippine National Bank. That the weak situation of this fund was a contributing factor, cannot be denied, but it has become increasingly clear in these post-war years that there is a very limited amount of real money in the world and, of course, foreign commerce must be conducted chiefly upon credit; that such credit must be based upon the ability of a country to produce and especially to sell its products. The Philippines during these years produced more of its staples than it ever had produced before, but the market absolutely collapsed from July, 1920, to the spring of 1921. At the same time all the local banks, despite repeated warnings by the Government, continued to facilitate an unprecedented flood of imports into the Philippines, upon which American houses were unloading goods ordered during the war years that had suddenly become unsalable elsewhere. Coincident with this was the withdrawal from the islands of about eighty million pesos of capital in Liberty Loans, in alien property purchases, in ocean freights,

and by the increasing expenditures for Filipinos abroad and in the United States. The local banks were in part responsible through speculation in foreign exchange and through the transfer of funds to meet the pressing demand of their principals at home. The Philippine Government was in the position of one having guaranteed the balance of trade and thus the sale of exports of the whole country, functions over which it had no real concern.

The financial depression was not confined to the Philippines; it was substantially the same throughout the Orient. Shanghai, for example; in 1921 the banks were reported to be in a critical condition through the refusal of Chinese merchants to receive imports for which they had contracted in the sum of nearly one hundred million taels, and the Chinese dollar was falling from two hundred and twenty to less than par. As for the present exchange difficulties of the European countries, they are too well-known to require more than passing mention here. By the spring of 1921 the peso had risen to only a seven per cent. discount, and now that Congress has passed the law raising the debt limit of the Philippines from \$15,000,000 to \$30,000,000, the Government will again be able to sell exchange practically at par, and the peso should rise at once to parity.

Repeated requests that Congress raise the debt limit during 1920 received no attention, and the attitude of the United States Treasury was unfriendly to any suggestion of assistance. The credit of the Philippine Government was still of the very highest, as was shown by the sale in America of six million dollars' worth of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. public-works bonds in Novem-

ber, 1920, at slightly above par. The debt limit of the Philippines had been fixed before the recent years of prosperity in the Philippines; with the great expansion in commerce and general wealth it was found that the small boy had entirely outgrown his clothes. The administrative chaos visible in the Washington administration in the years 1919-20, the break-up of the government organization upon party lines, had its reflex in the Philippines. We were absolutely unable to obtain in Washington the permission to help ourselves by raising the borrowing capacity in the islands, or to secure any financial aid or backing whatever from the home Government. The situation was emphasized in the minds of the Filipinos by contrast with the ready assistance the United States Government was at the same time extending to so many of the European countries, especially to the group of small new republics there.

During eight years the Filipinos had acquitted themselves with real success in the complicated field of government finance. Reference has already been made to the introduction of the budget system in 1916, five years before it was adopted in the United States; and to its creditable handling by Mr. Barretto, Secretary of Finance, and its regular acceptance by the Legislature. Appropriations were conservatively and intelligently made, without wasteful extravagance, in an era in the world unparalleled in modern history for governmental waste and incapacity in handling expenditures; appropriations by the Filipinos were, moreover, entirely free from that form of preëlection bribery seen in so many other countries which consists in allotting amounts for political effect



in local constituencies,—the “pie-counter,” as it is known in Washington,—or subsidies to classes politically powerful such as we have seen made for alleged veterans of the war between the States. Taxes were collected justly and without friction, and at a minimum and constantly decreasing proportionate cost. Courage was shown in investing large sums of money in the creation of industries vital to the country. In so far as government finance bears any direct relation to the general prosperity of a country, it is to be noted that during these eight years the foreign commerce of the Philippines nearly trebled in value. Against all this must be offset the mistake of the Philippine National Bank in tying up the government funds in unliquid loans such as the creation of sugar centrals,—which, incidentally, will prove of great benefit to the country. It is understood that certain critics have now selected the financial situation at present existing as a triumphant proof of the incapacity of the Filipinos. A glance at the financial troubles of all the other countries of the world might be illuminating, but none are so blind as those who will not see. At least, an effort should be made to remove the beam from our own eye before proceeding to extract the mote from our brother's eye.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE FILIPINO ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGNERS

THE people of the Philippines have, officially, no foreign relations; all such matters are conducted through the Department of State in Washington. By custom, however, many questions affecting foreigners are in Manila taken up directly with the foreign consuls stationed there. This refers not only to the usual jurisdiction of consular officers in commercial or personal matters, but covers a wide field of international law. This is due, no doubt, to the remote situation of the Philippines, the expense and delay of cable communications, and the cosmopolitan character of the community. It was especially noticeable during the war, when the energy and attention of the home governments were absorbed in the world struggle.

One of the main requisites of an independent government is the ability to maintain friendly relations with foreign powers. How could the Filipinos acquit themselves in this respect? Their official attitude towards foreigners has, since they received the powers of self-government, been uniformly correct. What is their real feeling toward foreigners and how would they treat them in the event that independence was given them?

We can prophesy as to the future only upon the basis of present events. With the spread of democratic government and of universal education, the sentiments

of a people may be directed by their government in wise and prudent channels; the probability is, however, that the natural instinct or racial prejudice of the people themselves becomes yearly of more direct influence in a democracy. It is nowadays increasingly difficult for a cabinet, or administration, deliberating in secret, to control the feelings of a nation toward foreigners. The Boxer Rebellion in China was a clear indication of that fact; the Empress Dowager of China was obliged to join with the Boxers, or else lose her throne. In Japan to-day the Government is as determined as that in the United States to preserve the peace with her trans-Pacific neighbor; with the spread of "jingo" journals the fixed policy of the Government may be the last element that counts.

The easiest appeal for the orator is to the flag; from the moment that is mentioned, men cease to think; passion takes the throne of reason by assault. Nationalism is the significant note of the last two centuries. Every nation believes itself to have the best form of government, and considers all foreigners "suspicious" characters.

In the United States contempt for the foreigner is all the more remarkable because so large a proportion of our citizenship is made up of men and women of foreign birth. Yet the foreigner is commonly if good-naturedly designated as a "Guinea," a "dago," a "wop," a "harp," or a "Scandahoovian." I remember that fifteen years ago in Congress the surest way to kill a measure was to refer to its previous adoption and successful working by foreign governments.

In the Philippines there is no such public sentiment. Twenty different European, Asiatic, or American na-

tions are represented there by their nationals, who mingle actively in society, and engage in peaceful rivalry in business. In Manila alone there are 6731 Americans (outside of the army and navy), 1955 British, 635 other Europeans, 17,800 Chinese, and 1611 Japanese. There is much mixture of blood in the Philippines, as there is in America, but that has not brought about among the Filipinos, as it has among our own people, any feeling of race antagonism. The mixture of Filipino with Chinese or Spanish blood, for example, has produced a very efficient and admirable type of citizen. There is no opposition to foreigners as such in the Philippines; whatever anti-national feeling may be observed is traceable to specific grievances or occurrences.

The rise of modern nationalities really dates from the fifteenth century; a man to-day is no longer a citizen of the world, but a national of some country whose flag often means more to him than his life or his property, especially so in moments of wide-spread popular excitement. The spirit of nationality, growing during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, finally led to a collision in the World War which threatened the security of all. Unregulated or unrestrained feelings of nationalism have caused the people of almost every modern nation to look with suspicion and distrust upon those of every other. This result was perhaps unexpected or unforeseen by those great leaders to whom the peoples of Europe owe their present forms of national existence. From that point of view, Bismarck appears to have been the wisest of them all.

The world to-day begins to realize the dangerous excess to which the sentiment of nationalism has car-



ried it, and is earnestly striving to find a formula by which it may be regulated. This effort is hampered by the apparent failure of the Christian Church to teach or enforce Christian principles in public affairs, and by the intense passion with which the proponents of internationalism are attacked by the people of their respective countries. Unless some working basis for the international relations of the world can be found, the outlook for the future is gloomy indeed.

In inspiring in the Philippines a spirit of nationality, a genuine effort has been made by those Americans concerned, officials and missionaries, to instil sentiments of international comity and good-will. The official severity of the treatment accorded Germans in the Philippines during the war, has, it is hoped, not definitely destroyed the effects of such teaching. It is to be feared, however, that the propaganda of hate against the Germans by the various allied and associated powers has left behind a bad flavor in the mouth. At most, it may be stated that the Filipinos did not then hate individual Germans, and occasionally protested in a perfectly proper manner against their deportation and internment. Germans who had lived in the Philippines for years, and had assisted in a spirit of personal friendship and consideration in the building up of the country, were among the most popular of the foreigners.

Americans, of course, are not foreigners in the Philippines, but are recognized as those in whom the sovereignty of the country is temporarily placed. There is a citizenship law in the Philippines permitting all those qualified under the laws of the United States to acquire citizenship to become citizens of the Philip-



MARIENDA AT HOME OF MR. MAURO PRIETO IN MARIQUINA  
In Honor of Congressional Party, August 1, 1920



TRANSPLANTING RICE

F. de la Rosa  
MANILA 1910

pinos; no Americans have as yet taken advantage of it; all are still "citizens of the United States resident in the Philippines." The Filipino is not an American citizen, though he is somewhat confused by American court decisions and American administrative rulings as to whether he is at all times entitled to the benefits of American laws. Large and increasing numbers of Filipinos are going to the United States each year to seek a university degree, or to find work. An ideal of our country as the land of wonders and of gold is widespread among the young men and women. All laws affecting the Philippines, whether passed by Congress or by the local Legislature, maintain scrupulously the equal rights of Americans and Filipinos therein, except only the Civil Service law, adopted in accordance with President McKinley's dictum, giving the Filipino preference wherever possible in the matter of holding office in the islands.

It is safe to say that the Filipinos regard the Americans with liking and respect; they make allowances for differences in political opinion, and readily cooperate with Americans in the Government and in business. They are convinced, at present at least, of the good faith and generosity of our country toward them. Many Americans in the Philippines have been men of unusual ability, and numbers of them have been entirely unselfish and genuinely altruistic in their Philippine service.

Most American men and a few American women have a genuine liking for the Filipinos; they enjoy Filipino social affairs and dance with the Filipinos at their *bailes*. In the provinces the relations between the two races are even better than in Manila; ex-



tremely few instances of quarrels based on racial differences have occurred there in recent years. In fact, the Americans in the Philippines, despite frequent grumblings, really love the country, and lead a uniformly agreeable existence. When home on leave they are usually longing at heart for the day of return to the islands.

Of French, Dutch, Belgians, Italians, and Danes there are so few in the archipelago that there is no opportunity for estimating how they stand with the Filipinos; they are almost always courteous and agreeable, and would be well liked in any community.

Spaniards stand in a peculiar relation, owing to their long historical connection with the islands; they are still inclined to look down upon the humbler classes, though making warm friendships with the cultivated Filipinos. Personal and intellectual sympathy is strong between individuals of the two races, and the Casa Español, or Spanish Club, is always crowded with Filipinos at all times of festivity; the Spaniards turn out in large numbers at the fiestas of the leading Filipino social club, the Tiro al Blanco. In business the two races are closely associated, and throughout the provinces there are many Spaniards living on terms of intimacy and good-will with their neighbors. With the passage of time, as has already happened in the South American countries, past grievances will be forgotten and pride in the Spanish traditions will animate the Filipino. It is too soon, however, for all to have been forgiven; all middle-aged men of to-day lived through the last ten years of Spanish rule, and remember the excesses of the bloody Archbishop Nozaleda. The only occasion upon which I saw the

old spirit manifested was when, in 1921, a group of Spanish business men was formed to take over the directorate of the failing Spanish Bank from the church and the Filipinos; there was such an outburst of wrath and resentment on the part of the Filipinos concerned that the Spaniards absolutely refused to serve on the directorate. Spanish culture, Spanish literature, and the social graces of old Spain are, however, gradually healing the ancient sore; real friendship will not be many years in coming.

The British form a large and very important colony, influential both in business and in society; they have not of recent years openly displayed the customary manner of the English toward the native races in other colonies; they refrain most scrupulously from taking any part in the political movements of the day. Individuals among them have shown unusual ability in "getting along" with the Filipinos; have been considerate, generous, and kindly toward them. Nevertheless, there is a wide gulf between the two races, which is only gradually being bridged. The English have usually refused to allow their Filipino "boys" (servants) to speak English, as has been the policy in their own colonies; the denial of the right to use the same tongue is the denial of all possible social intercourse. In 1917, after the passage of the Jones Act, when Filipino nationalism began to grow, it was noticed at the first *baile* given at the Tiro al Blanco that no English were invited, though representatives of all other elements in the community were present. The explanation given was that no Filipinos were ever invited to the English Club! Surely Clive and Warren Hastings would never have tolerated such discrimina-

tion in India in their day! It remained for Curzon and the present-day British "raj."

The Filipinos would like to show hospitality and opportunity to the British Indians, but the immigration laws prevent any admission of their far-away kinsmen, except those of the merchant and tourist class.

Of much significance and direct influence is the Chinese community in the Philippines. American theory at home is distinctly and sentimentally favorable to the Chinese, but it does not go to the length of admitting them into our own country, or into the Philippines. To the Spanish, the Chinese in the Philippines were a great political problem. Occasionally they admitted a few thousands; at times they massacred them, or drove them out. There are to-day about sixty thousand Chinese in the islands, chiefly engaged in trade and foreign commerce. In many provinces the "Chino" is the keeper of the *tienda*, or shop, in every little village; the purchaser of the local crops; the middleman in distribution, and the one money-lender. His extortion and usury make him an object of dislike to the provincial Filipino; his control of the rice trade, the national food supply, draws upon him in times of want the ill-feeling of all classes. Those who have described the hatred of the Jew in old Russia, or of the Armenian in Turkey as religious, have entirely missed the point; it is economic, for the Jews and Armenians in those two countries have, so far as permitted, absorbed the economic resources of the people. In the Filipino mind there is a dark background of dislike of the Chinese, built up upon generations of extortion. It is one of the strongest passions in his heart. The fat Chino in the smaller communi-

ties, who sits day by day in the shade of his *tienda*, has probably secured control of the village belle and has certainly working for him upon petty loans a considerable number of the local farmers at rates of interest of from eighty per cent. to one hundred per cent. a year. This state of affairs has so frequently in the past led to reprisals that even to-day whenever an unusual noise is heard in the village street, the shutters of the Chinese *tienda* are the first to go up. The Chinese is always a banker or trader, never a producer of anything,—except children. Although sometimes he becomes nominally a Christian, probably in order to marry into some well-to-do local family, his heart is always in China, where all his earnings go, and where he hopes at last to find a resting-place among the graves of his ancestors.

The Chinese are wonderful workers in those countries where they are obliged to work; shall they be condemned because in the Philippines they have found it possible to live in comparative luxury like the lilies of the field, neither toiling nor spinning? In China, they either work or else die, by the million.

The Chinese residents of the Philippines constitute, as they always have constituted, a problem for the Government. Their type of civilization is apart from the current of modern thought, remote from European philosophies. The Chinese really looks down on the rest of the world as "foreign devils." His own social system is run upon a disregard of the beautiful maxims his learned men professed. He has found it easy to live upon the weakness of his fellow-man. In the Philippines he is the organizer and purveyor of the opium trade, and a natural-born gambler; his activity in the



corruption of public officials is notorious; when he finds that he cannot bribe the police or the revenue officer, he is wont to organize a skilful campaign for the defamation of his character. He is the despair of the police courts because of the maze of ingenious perjury, charges, and counter-charges which he creates.

Would an independent Philippines admit the Chinese without restrictions into the archipelago? A powerful movement is now on foot to introduce Chinese contract agricultural labor; it is sponsored by those active members of the Agricultural Congress who possess large sugar haciendas, and by those Americans and foreigners devoted to the phrases "development of the country" and "economic independence of the Philippines." There is a very strong sentiment in opposition, however, from the smaller landed proprietors who constitute the bulk of the population, and on the part of many who believe contract labor is a form of slavery. The British in Borneo and in the Straits Settlements built up their empire upon imported Chinese labor, but to-day the Chinese in Singapore own most of the tin mines and are rapidly acquiring the rubber plantations. The former "white lords and masters" are now in increasing numbers working for them as managers or overseers upon the plantations and at the mines. Their economic competition is irresistible because they can "underlive" most of the other races.

In the Philippines, when the proposal to admit coolies for agricultural labor for fixed periods of time is seriously entertained, as it is at present, it is interesting to speculate whether history is about to repeat itself. The following quotations are taken from

Jagor's Travels in the Philippines (1859), Chapter XXVI:

By 1615 the Chinese had again so increased that a decree was issued limiting them to six thousand, "these to be employed in the cultivation of the country"; while at the same time their rapid increase was taken advantage of by the Captain-General for his own interest, as he exacted eight dollars from each Chinaman for permission to remain. In 1639 the Chinese population had risen to thirty thousand, according to other information, to forty thousand, when they revolted and were reduced to thirty thousand.

\* \* \*

In 1709 the jealousy against the Chinese once more had reached such a height that they were accused of rebellion, and particularly of monopolizing the trades, and, with the exception of the most serviceable of the artisans and such of them as were employed by the Government, they were once again expelled. Spanish writers praise the salutariness of these measures, alleging that "under the pretence of agriculture, the Chinese carry on trade; they are cunning and careful, making money and sending it to China, so that they defraud the Philippines annually of an enormous amount.

\* \* \*

In 1757 the jealousy of the Spaniards broke out again in the form of a new order from Madrid directing the expulsion of the Chinese; and in 1759 the decrees of banishment, which were repeatedly evaded, were carried into effect; but, as the private interests of the officials did not happen to coincide with those of the creole traders, the consequence was that "The Chinese soon streamed back again in incredible numbers," and made common cause with the English upon their invasion in 1762.

\* \* \*

A decree, issued in 1804, commanded all Chinese shopkeepers to leave Manila within eight days, only those who were married being allowed to keep shops; and their residence in the provinces was permitted only upon the condition that they confined themselves entirely to agriculture.

\* \* \*

In 1850 Captain-General Urbiztondo endeavored to introduce Chinese colonial farming, and with this object promised a reduction of the taxes to all agricultural immigrants. Many Chinese availed themselves of this opportunity in order to escape the heavy poll-tax; but in general they soon betook themselves to trading once more.

In 1920 the Governor of East Sumatra told me in Medan that the Dutch Government was trying to put a stop to the importation of coolie labor, upon the ground that it was immoral. Whether upon that higher basis, or upon the more material question of the economic interests of the islands, it is to be hoped that in the future the Filipinos will consider well the consequences before they open the doors to Chinese labor. The present exclusion is maintained as a result of Mr. Taft's arguments before the committees of Congress. Is it not an integral part of his popular policy of "The Philippines for the Filipinos"?

A law passed at the 1921 session of the Legislature has provoked much remonstrance from the Chinese; although not in terms directed at them, they are the class chiefly affected by its provisions; this is the so-called "bookkeeping act" requiring all persons liable to the payment of internal revenue taxes to keep their books in English, Spanish, or one of the local dialects. The purpose of the act is to facilitate the collection of the revenue, since for many years past the books of Oriental foreign traders, particularly the Chinese, have presented an almost insuperable problem to the tax agents; the result is believed to have been great frauds upon the revenue. While this law might be defended upon the ground that it is only right to require the foreigners resident in the country to adapt

their methods and practices to those with whom they compete in business, its real justification is the undoubted need of protection of the revenue, and the liberality of its provisions makes it clear that it is not in any sense intended as anti-foreign.

With the Japanese, the problem for the Filipinos is quite different. It is no part of the Japanese general policy that their citizens shall labor in the fields and workshops of the tropics. Their idea is to manage or supervise investments in the lands to the southward. There is no restriction upon Japanese immigration into the Philippines, and yet the total number of Japanese in the islands has never at any recent time been more than fifteen thousand, and has lately diminished. Their venture in developing the rich hemp lands in Davao has been checked by the recent Public Land Act.

When Japan overthrew Russia in 1905 and later dispossessed the Germans from Shan-tung, they were not only impelled by economic reasons to expansion; they were establishing themselves in the hegemony of Asia. The Pan-Oriental idea was very attractive at first to the inhabitants of Asiatic countries which had been subjugated and were being held by the conquering whites. In a few years, however, Japanese aggressiveness alarmed the neighboring races, and their tactlessness in colonial government made the subject of a bitter propagandum by the white colonial powers, disheartened the brown and yellow peoples of near-by Asia. The Filipinos have had an additional reason for failure to understand the Japanese mind,—Christianity.

Their attention to the Japanese question is aroused and kept fixed by the constant arguments in American



periodicals that as soon as they gain their independence the Philippines will be gobbled up by Japan. The American Army in the islands, is, moreover, constantly reporting discoveries of Japanese "spies." The Filipinos to-day have apparently abandoned altogether the Pan-Oriental ideas of a decade ago, and are distinctly nervous about the "Japanese menace." This phase of the question will be discussed in a later chapter.

Japan has been well represented officially in the Philippines of recent years. Consuls-General Sugimura and Kurusu are trained diplomats, well versed in international law, and have handled their nationals with tact and good judgment. Consul-General Kurusu speaks English perfectly, has a broad, liberal outlook upon affairs, and has helped to allay anti-Japanese feeling based upon the acquisition of landed estates. Recently he persuaded a Japanese who had purchased a large estate near Montalban, about twenty miles from Manila, to sell it upon reasonable terms to its Filipino tenants, thus closing tactfully an "incident" of growing importance. He has also negotiated with skill and success the ratification by the Legislature of the leases of large haciendas in Davao to Japanese planters who had made application for the lands before the passage of the Public Land Act, and who had in good faith made substantial improvements upon the land. He remarked to me that he could understand the Filipino attitude upon the land problem because the Japanese had themselves but recently gone through a similar phase of suspicion toward all foreigners who wished to acquire lands in the empire. He found the Filipinos courteous, just, and reasonable.

In recent years Japanese visitors to the Philippines have been numerous. They have come in committees of investors, educators, and government officials. They have been scrupulously considerate of Filipino sentiment, and have made themselves popular. Japanese warships visit Manila from time to time, and are cordially received, and entertainments of the officers and crews are well attended by the Filipinos. No incidents of an unpleasant nature between Japanese and Filipinos have been observed, and they seem able to meet with genuine mutual respect and good-will, especially since Filipino alarm over the "landed invasion" of the Japanese has been allayed. No race prejudice or acrimony of ideas has appeared between the two; the only cloud upon the horizon is the often-mentioned danger of Japanese military aggression. Japanese merchants and business men have been prudent and scrupulous in their relations with the people. The lectures of Professor Matsunami at the University of the Philippines in the winter of 1920-21 were largely attended and cordially appreciated. The foundation is being laid for an excellent understanding between the two races.

While growing from year to year in the spirit of nationalism, in race pride, and in self-confidence, the Filipinos show no spirit to-day of intensive localism; no prejudice or animosity against the nationals of other countries, except the economic resentment already noted against the Chinese trader. Men of all nations live among them and are hospitably received by them. Their leaders are fully alive to the danger of permitting any substantial grievance to spring from their relations with foreigners. The Filipino is an

international in his recognition of the good qualities of other races. Perhaps in the days to come, he, too, may have his cause for national feeling against some other country. May it never be against the United States.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES

**T**HERE can be no profit in any further discussion as to whether or not the Filipinos are to have self-government; they already have it under the terms of the Jones Act, and have been exercising it for the past five years. No Congress, even under the suggestion of the most reactionary influences, would authorize the taking away of the share of liberty already granted. There will be no turning back of the hands of the clock.

The question now is simply that of independence, and America cannot in honor and good faith long delay the grant. It has been distinctly and definitely promised by almost unanimous vote of Congress. Unless the Jones Act is to become a "scrap of paper," the final step must soon be taken.

For the three years succeeding the passage of their new charter in the Jones Act, the Filipinos were comparatively quiet on the independence question. This was interpreted by some American observers to mean that the Philippine question was permanently settled on the basis of autonomy without independence. In this they were in error. Once planted, the seed of liberty will grow and thrive; it will not languish and die even in an atmosphere of luxury and ease; nor can it be destroyed by force or fraud.

Little was heard during those three years about independence, for the most obvious reason: first, be-



cause the Filipinos were fully occupied in setting up the stable government of their own required by the Jones Act; secondly, because in the cyclone of a world war it was a most inopportune time to launch a new and comparatively weak nation; and thirdly, because as if by common consent the Filipino people decided not to press their own affairs and questions upon the Government of the United States during the years of our great anxiety and effort in the war.

The moment that news came to Manila of the signing of the Armistice, the Filipino leaders gathered together to plan the next move in the independence campaign. They decided to send to America at once a mission of their leading men to lay their case before President Wilson. They were informed from Washington that the President would not be there to receive them and that there was no need to send the mission because in any event their interests were safe in his hands. They assumed as a matter of course that the League of Nations would soon be a vital reality, and that the Philippine Republic would then take its place as a member of the league,—the newest if not the smallest member of the body which was thereafter forevermore to make the world safe for democracy. This shows how permeated they were with the war-time propaganda. If the other distant populations of the earth were equally literal in their reliance upon the promises of the allied and associated governments, it may explain in part the profound disappointment and bitterness of large portions of the inhabitants of the world to-day.

It was decided, however, to send the mission to the United States, despite the absence of the President.

The leaders of the two political parties, many members of the Legislature, and prominent men in commercial life made up its membership. They were received in Washington by Secretary Baker, who in an eloquent address referred to the almost complete autonomy they now enjoyed, and said that their connection with the United States was tenuous, the governor-general constituting its only link. He also encouraged their hopes of independence. They were then given a hearing by a joint committee of the two houses of Congress, presided over alternately by Senator Harding for the Senate and Representative Towner for the House. The members of the commission there made their plea for independence, and were received and treated with great courtesy and consideration. From the attitude of the members of the joint committee—an attitude of polite attention, but of little deep interest—and from the absence of any controversial questioning of the Filipino representatives, they came shrewdly to the conclusion that nothing would be done for them by that Congress. As governor-general I attended the hearing, and joined in the recommendation for independence, stating before the joint committee upon my official responsibility that the stable government already existed in the Philippines which was demanded by the Jones Act as the prerequisite for independence.

At about the same time I made two requests of Secretary Baker: first, that Filipino delegates might be sent to the Peace Conference as was being done in the case of India; and secondly, that my resignation be accepted if a Filipino could be appointed governor-general. Both requests were denied.

It was not explained to me why the administration


was reluctant to have the Independence Commission come to Washington while the Peace Conference was in session, nor why Filipino delegates were not permitted to be present in Paris. It may be surmised that the administration felt embarrassed by the Philippine situation in advancing the fourteen points of President Wilson; in fact, the President in his address to the Senate upon his return from Paris stated that our possession of these far-away islands had created suspicion in the chancelleries of Europe; it was evidently desirable to keep the Philippine question in the background. It would have been wiser to present the Philippine situation before the gathering of nations, for our representatives at the Peace Conference could have stood frankly upon that issue, owing to the measure of self-determination granted three years previously by the Jones Act. The islands were not, at that time at least, a skeleton in the cupboard of the United States. It was unwise to keep the curtain drawn: the policy of the United States in the islands, if openly discussed at Paris, would have helped, not hindered, President Wilson in his struggle with imperialism. At all events, he himself had never wavered in his faith in Philippine independence; he probably felt sure of the League of Nations as the solution of the problem. Finally, in his last message to Congress, in December, 1920, he recommended as follows:

Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress, as precedent to the consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty



WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN AND FRANCIS BURTON  
HARRISON  
Seattle, August 1, 1919





COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, MANILA, FEBRUARY, 1921

and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.

In response nothing was done by Congress. The Republicans were already in control of both branches of the national Legislature; they had elected as President the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines; they naturally preferred to wait until President Harding was inaugurated before deciding upon so important a question as that of the Philippines.

It was plainly evident, however, in the years immediately following the Armistice that although the people of the United States were still well disposed toward the Filipinos, they were not inclined to take action at the moment upon Philippine independence. The war had shaken the faith and confidence of all people in the security of the modern world system. The effect of the war upon our own people was to strengthen the centralization of powers in the Government, to tighten up the bonds of national sentiment and thus cling more closely to all our resources and possessions. For the time being, liberalism was as dead as a door-nail in the United States; everybody had been obliged by officers of the law to think along the same lines in support of the Government; under the Espionage Act a determined effort was being made to crush out radicalism with the raiding-ax and the "third degree." Imperialism was in the air; the United States had shown to herself as well as to the rest of the world, her surprising energy and military power. The bulk of our citizen army came back from France with an added degree of aggressive Americanism, and a similar distrust of foreigners, of their

good faith and purposes. The Filipinos saw that they must wait.

The net accomplishment of the Independence Commission to the United States was that they had put their case once again, without party division, and without rancor, before Congress. They had created, moreover, in cities such as Washington, New York, and San Francisco—where they were most hospitably received and entertained—an atmosphere favorable to their people. The younger men, especially such as Camilo Osias, Assistant Director of Education, Conrado Benitez, Jorge Bocobo, and José Santos had enjoyed a real personal triumph. It was evident that the Americans at home liked the Filipinos when they had occasion to know them in person. The members of the party also gained the advantage of a closer knowledge of our country and its institutions. The impressive feature of the mission was the entire lack of all complaints or criticisms against the United States on the part of all its members. They asked for freedom simply because they longed to be free,—not because of any ill-feeling toward the United States. They showed no lack of appreciation of what had already been done for them by our country. On the contrary, they were full of expressions of gratitude for the substantial autonomy granted them, and for the unselfish attitude of our country toward them. Surely, this is a unique situation in history, and reflects the utmost credit upon the United States and upon the Filipinos alike,—upon the latter because, with all their present advantage, they still demand their freedom. Everywhere it went, the commission was listened to with respect and toleration.

It must have been apparent to all its members, however, that this was but the lull before the coming struggle. They knew that sooner or later they would be obliged to make a vigorous campaign to gain a serious hearing for their claim of final liberty. The first step was the founding of a publicity department in Washington. They had found that the Americans at home, with comparatively few exceptions, know almost nothing about the Philippines. They had through years of experience learned the difficulty of getting their case before the American public, of breaking through the ring of misrepresentation with which they were surrounded by their opponents; they also had reason to believe that the opposition was again organizing, and that it contained men of great wealth and of influence in the newspapers, and that insidious propaganda against them would soon assail once more the public eye and ear.

The Philippine Publicity Bureau is under the supervision of Resident Commissioners de Veyra and Gabaldon in Washington; it is managed by José P. Melencio, with the occasional assistance of Professor Maximo M. Kalaw. They constantly advocate independence, by articles for the press and by public addresses; the speech of Mr. Melencio before the Platform Committee of the Democratic National Convention at San Francisco last year was pronounced by Mr. Bryan to be the very best address made before the convention. The hundreds of Filipino students attending the various universities of the United States are valuable auxiliaries in the independence campaign. In fine, the Filipinos do not intend to let the question of their national existence be decided against them by default.



The stage is thus set for a determined struggle; let us hope that it may be concluded in peace.

Ever since Mr. Taft learned with pain and surprise that the Filipinos were not content with kind and soothing words and just laws, but were agitating for independence; ever since Mr. Quezon told Congress that they were not satisfied to remain as a bird in a gilded cage, an attempt has been made by those who opposed further liberties for the Filipinos to discredit their campaign by asserting that the Filipinos do not want independence; in that respect they would have us believe that the Filipinos differ from all other races of men. This campaign, they say, is all the work of hot-heads, of selfish politicians, of irresponsible demagogues. Visitors to Manila give out statements that they have been approached confidentially by Filipinos who begged them not to grant independence; names are never given, but mysterious hints are thrown out that these patriotic Filipinos are afraid to have their names known to the politicians. It is quite possible that such persons exist, and that they are either kept in a dark closet by their patrons or produced for secret interviews with distinguished visitors, or else that there are prominent and wealthy men who are actually afraid of independence. In this world those who have often live in dread of those who have not. It would be unreasonable to demand that every one of the eleven million inhabitants of the islands should be of the same opinion; it is not the democratic method of deciding public questions; in a democracy the vote of the majority decides; on a constitutional question a two-thirds vote in the United States Congress is required. Why demand that the Filipinos should be unanimous? The

“consent of the governed” never meant the consent of every individual concerned; many are given no vote and no voice; such a requirement is an absurdity. Were the Americans unanimous at the time of their Declaration of Independence? Were they not led by men like Samuel Adams and Benjamin Franklin, who were known to England to be “demagogues” and “hotheaded” politicians? As a matter of fact, a very large proportion of the American colonists were opposed to separation from England, and tens of thousands of Tories left the country upon the formation of the new union. Those who remained were neither justly nor generously treated by the Americans of that day. There is no such division of opinion in the Philippines; the sentiment there is as nearly unanimous in favor of independence as it is possible for any public question to be in any country.

There is more division of opinion on the form of independence desired; the subject has not until within the past few months been given much public debate in the Philippines. When asked by committees of Congress this very question, the leading Filipinos have always replied: “The most independence we can get!” They were too skilful to allow their cause to be jeopardized by such manœuvres; should they permit the main issue to be divided, their opponents might overcome them in detail; they might be forced into an untenable position if a request were made for a protectorate, which Congress might well deny. When I recommended upon my own responsibility before the joint committee in Congress in 1919 that independence be granted, I suggested that the “Platt Amendment,” as it was known in the grant of Cuban independence by

the United States, might be imposed upon the Philippines. This permits our country to intervene in Cuba under certain circumstances without intervention being considered an act of war, a right which we have already once exercised. My purpose was to secure for the new republic of the Orient a form of protection from outside aggression during the early years of its independent existence at least. Because of this suggestion I lost the support of the Anti-Imperialist League, a support which up to that time had been generous and gratifying. It seems that the exercise of supervision under the Platt Amendment had proved aggravating and offensive to the Cubans. Possibly the Anti-Imperialist League took a more long-reaching view of the matter than I did myself. It may be that for the sake of the Filipinos as well as our own country absolute independence would be the best course. There can be no doubt that if the issue were presented to the Filipinos, while many would wish for some kind of protectorate at least for the next few years, if that is found to be impossible, the vote for complete and absolute independence would be nearly unanimous.

The responsibility for the solution of this problem rests with Congress, a body which keeps alive the best traditions of Americanism. The problem must be faced and settled soon. It would be a matter of pride and satisfaction to all Americans to have discharged this duty with honor and without thought of self. It would soothe the national conscience, which was sadly disturbed by our venture in imperialism. It would secure our reputation for the keeping of the good faith of our country; it would make good the spoken word.

If, on the other hand, the Philippine problem is

much longer left unsettled by Congress, those suspicions of our intentions, those doubts of our good faith, those insinuations as to our real purposes which President Wilson encountered in the chancelleries of Europe, would have full sway. We cannot afford to disregard the public opinion of the world, especially in the matter of keeping our word. If we eat of sour grapes our grandchildren's teeth will assuredly be set on edge. The indefinite retention of the Philippines will signify to the other countries that we have behind the screen hypocritical counsels and double-dealing policies. They will measure us in the corridors of the European foreign offices by their own standards. Then, at last, we shall be obliged to gird up our loins and prepare for battle. The challenge to the other powers will be aggressive and unmistakable. Are we prepared to pay the price?

As for the Filipinos, they will, naturally enough, be embittered and disillusioned by our promises and professions. "Ah, but—" say the imperialists, those promises were not literally intended, and were made without consulting the American people. Nevertheless, these promises were set forth in the preamble of the Jones Act by nearly unanimous vote of Congress. Indefinite postponement, said Messrs. Quezon and Osmeña in a memorandum on November 19, 1918, "would be equivalent to frustrating the nearest and most vital hopes of the people, to reopening in their trusting minds the grave doubts and dark pessimism of years gone by; doubts and pessimism that we only by the most zealous perseverance and faith have succeeded in dissipating." Disillusionment in the Philippines may, it is true, be crushed by the military force of the



United States, but would still be known throughout the countries of the world. The national consciousness of the Filipinos has been deliberately aroused by the United States. The race pride is now involved. While they are at present substantially unarmed, is armament by them an impossibility? Has the United States so many friends among the other powers that we can count on all of them to refrain from secret or even open assistance to the Filipinos? It is as certain as any human prophecy can be that active insurrection in the Philippines would result from continued disregard of their aspirations. They could be easily led into further temporary acquiescence with the status quo; they could be convinced by the United States Government that, at any given moment, the problems of the Pacific were so complicated and dangerous that a brief prolongation of American rule was to their distinct advantage. But a term must be set by Congress to such a situation. Once the Filipinos become certain that we are playing with their aspirations, revolt will come. A second Philippine insurrection against the United States would be a lasting stain upon our escutcheon. If it were caused by a repudiation of our promises and inspired by selfish purposes, it would be a national disgrace. However far we might be able by chicanery and propaganda to deceive ourselves as to our own purposes, we could never convince the Filipinos, nor, for that matter, the rest of the world, of our good intentions.

The opposition among Americans to independence of the Philippines, aside from those who really desire to have the United States embark upon a course of empire, is centered chiefly in the army, various church

organizations, and certain classes of business men and investors.

The missionaries of the Methodist and Presbyterian churches in the islands have kept entirely free from politics and have proved uniformly helpful to each successive Philippine administration. They must be remembered by all officials, as well as by the many thousands of Filipinos to whom they have ministered both medically and spiritually, with the utmost gratitude. The Catholic Church is, at the present time, sympathetic to the aspirations of the Filipinos, although five years ago, as we have seen, it defeated Philippine independence in Washington. The Protestant Episcopal Church, however, arrayed as it almost always has been in history on the side of wealth and power, exerts a weak but perceptible influence against the idea of present independence; the Church of England, whence it sprang, adopted generally the same attitude in the American colonies. Sydney G. Fisher in "The Quaker Colonies" (page 38), describes the situation in Pennsylvania:

During Penn's life-time the Churchmen were naturally opposed to the whole government, both executive and legislature. They were constantly sending home to England all sorts of reports and information calculated to show that the Quakers were unfit to rule a province, that Penn should be deprived of his charter, and that Pennsylvania should be put under the direct rule of the King. They had delightful schemes for making it a strong Church of England colony like Virginia.

Outside of politics, the excellent work of American missionaries of all denominations in the islands should be better known and more appreciated at home. Without entering into a discussion of the merits of the

claims of the different denominations, all must unite in commendation of the work of the medical missions and of the various church schools, supplying gaps which the public revenue has not yet been able to fill.

The American business man in the Orient is generally opposed to independence of the Philippines. The British men of business along the coast cities of China and Japan set the fashion for political thinking among the Americans; their banking power and social prestige impress Americans very deeply with the value of imperialism. The steady if almost imperceptible growth of the present attitude of the white man toward "natives" in the Orient is largely the work of the financial investors and commercial classes of Great Britain; the American coming later in the field has accepted his stock of ideas on the subject and has hoped to emulate his success. There exists, however, a confusion in the mind of the ordinary man of commerce on the subject. It is not necessary to own or to dominate a country in order to trade with it; in fact, the greater the good-will, the greater should be the commercial intercourse. Sovereignty, with all its hazards and responsibility, is unnecessary for trade. For example, the British for years virtually dominated the foreign trade of the Philippines through their banking and shipping resources, without owning a foot of the territory. What the commercial man needs is reasonable domestic peace and order, an even chance in business, and good-will on the part of the people of the country. An American sugar magnate said to me in New York recently:

"I would rather have a free Cuba than hold it as an American colony; it means more to us men of business

to have a contented population down there than it would to have it held by force by the United States."

The case is different, however, with capital investments in a far distant or weak country,—railways, irrigation works, aqueducts, water-power plants, street railways, and so forth. The investor at home must have his eight per cent. interest; internal public order is of the very first consideration to the promoters of such enterprises; they are safe, so they believe, only if their armies are at hand to guard the money they have hazarded. Gold, oil, diamonds, and railways have usually been the cause of the downfall of numerous small or weak countries formerly independent and living under their own flag. To soothe the conscience of the public at home, the investor usually prepares the way with propaganda as to the faults or weaknesses of the "natives." Then a warship is sent. Little by little, territorial seizures follow. To appease home sentiment stories of native cruelty or inefficiency are glaringly circulated. Kipling owes his sudden fame and popularity largely to his having coined a phrase which brought unction to their souls. "The White Man's Burden" is to-day their formula. The native inhabitants, however, generally believe that the "White Man's Burden" is the "burden of his cash."

Lord Bryce has well said that "the spread of universal primary education" has "substituted reading for thinking." The newspaper press to-day relieves the ordinary man from the effort of doing his own thinking. The home public accepts at par value all the reasons given for territorial aggrandizement.



One can usually foresee from following the prior campaign in the press of European countries, the seizure of any one of the defenseless portions of the earth. The natives have no voice whatever in the clamor of propaganda; all nations with colonies stand together on that point. Just now the "tribesmen" are in revolt in the new Spanish colony of Morocco; up to a few years ago these "tribesmen" had for a thousand years been citizens of virtually an independent country, and for half that period the governors of Spain. Suddenly they become tribesmen. Fifteen years ago the press propaganda was to the effect that Belgian officers were cutting off the hands of children upon the rubber plantations in the Congo. When the Congo matter was up for discussion, the Cape-to-Cairo railway was projected through all-British territory. The comment of the since-famous Belgian Cardinal Mercier upon the propaganda against his Government was that investors of another nation were looking with longing eyes at Naboth's vineyard. However, as my friend Father Patrick Lynch used to say in Manila, "Time is a gentleman." The Cape-to-Cairo railway may now, through the fortunes of war, be built through all-British territory without the necessity of taking the Congo from Belgium. The cutting off of hands is now restricted to that perpetrated in the press upon Belgian children by Germans.

Another example of the use of propaganda for the purpose of territorial seizure is the annexation of the ancient kingdom of Burma, preceded by a wide-spread circulation of shocking stories about its last monarch, King Thebaw; nothing was said by way of comparison about the monarchies of Europe. Again, the downfall

of self-government in Egypt was said to be because of the financial difficulties in which Tewfik Pasha had become involved, whether by accident or design. One excuse will serve as well as another. If one would analyze the extent to which this game has been developed, the skill and shrewdness with which it is played, the contemporary files of the newspapers of the day will, to the cynic, nearly always supply the key to the downfall of any independent country of the "backward peoples" of the earth.

Proponents of the cause of Philippine independence are often asked whether public order could be guaranteed. Public order is now guaranteed in Cuba by the United States through the Platt Amendment. No prophet of the future could guarantee indefinitely public order in the Philippines, or in any other country of this changing world. In our own country we have had, among the more significant facts of history, Bacon's rebellion in Virginia, Shay's rebellion in Massachusetts, Dorr's rebellion in Rhode Island, the "whisky insurrection" in Pennsylvania, not to mention the War of the Revolution and the great Civil War between the States. Nowadays serious public disorders which are of frequent occurrence in our country generally grow out of labor disputes such as those in recent years in Ohio, Idaho, West Virginia, Missouri, and Pennsylvania. All that can be done looking into the future is to require that any government shall be able eventually to put down public disorders. That the Philippine Government will without doubt be able to do, unless interfered with by some outside power. Sir H. H. Johnston has recently pointed out the probability of subjugation of an independent Philippines by the

Moros,—four per cent. of the population. He forgets that in the past the Moros were, through the action of the Spanish Government in disarming for their own purposes the Christian Filipinos, able to attack almost with impunity their brothers to the north. To-day the Moros are disarmed, and the Philippine Government has an efficient military arm,—the constabulary.

Peace and public order have been excellent in the Philippines during recent years; with every decade that passes, the local jealousies and provincial rivalries are diminishing. Attention has already been called to the successful effort of the Filipino Legislature to avoid all division upon provincial lines. The universities and the public schools are having a powerful effect in unifying the people. They now think nationally,—not as Visayans or Tagalogs. The greatest barrier to more rapid assimilation has been the existence of various dialects of the Malay tongue in different localities. The public schools might have already eliminated that impediment to closer union of thought if a common dialect had been restored through them, as has been done in Java; it can still be done, and within a very few years at the most. Day by day the danger of factional animosity is lessened.

Disorders, so common in the past, due to the existence in the Philippines, as in Spain, of large bands of ladrones (robbers), are now almost a thing of the past. They will not reappear on a large scale in the future unless discontent with the attitude toward the Filipinos of the "Metropoli," as they call the United States, shall break down the existing structure of trust and good-will; then ladrones would spring up again as

the precursors of insurrection against the United States.

The theory of many business men is that respect for our country must be based upon the power of might, upon aggressive assertion of race superiority. They are singularly unobservant of the facts. The respect most worth having is not always the respect wrung by force; a few years ago in Singapore comment was made of the typical personal attitude of the British "raj" toward the natives; they "impressed the natives" by assuming an air of austere and gloomy superiority; the very angle of the chin was patronizing. They did not know that their pose of being "like gods together careless of mankind" was described by the Malays among themselves by a humorous adjective translated as "airy." To the Filipinos, we are not always the demigods we may try to appear.

There is an old saying that you can bring a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink. We can station a large army in the Philippines, but we cannot make the Filipinos respect the flag unless we are true to our promises and keep our written word to them. The modern era of loyalty to the United States and of enthusiasm on the part of the Filipinos toward us is based largely upon the passage of the Jones Act. Many visitors have commented upon the universal respect shown in recent years by the Filipino crowds at the band concerts on the Luneta when our national anthem is played. Critics had feared that with the lessening of American governmental domination in the islands, the Filipinos would comport themselves disrespectfully toward Americans. Exactly the opposite has come to pass. When in October, 1919, the flag law



was passed in Manila, permitting once more the display of the Filipino flag, all observers reported that with the unfurling of their own flag there was a sudden outbreak of enthusiasm for the American flag, which appeared even throughout the provinces in far greater numbers than ever before.

As has been already noted, American business houses have generally in recent times followed the lead of the Government in Filipinizing their office forces, a policy found to work with economy and efficiency. But of even greater importance are the harmony and goodwill with which it has been accompanied. They are assets which business cannot afford to neglect. American goods have become increasingly popular as American firms have made friends with their customers in the Philippines. Public order is indeed essential as a basic proposition; public friendship, however, is the source of profits.

While many business men, who have no toleration for the political rights of the Filipinos and take ready offense at the mention of the subject, sincerely believe that it is our duty to retain the islands for the benefits we can confer upon the native inhabitants; while others, forgetting Cuba, applaud the phrase "where once the flag has waved it must never be pulled down," the real driving-force in their campaign is trade advantage for the United States. This is expressed in the Philippine tariff,—free trade with the United States and duties against the rest of the world. England has at least in this respect shown us a nobler precedent,—free trade with all nations in her British-controlled colonies. Our business men forget that our own Government is based upon the consent of the governed.

They would have us violate our own principles, encourage the resentment and hostility of an alien population of eleven million people, and challenge the opinion of the world by holding these people by force. If an emergency results, the consequent expenditures will far exceed the profits to be gained by financial interests through retention. In recent years, by the simple process of the income tax, the world of business has learned the lesson that governmental receipts do not grow on bushes, but are paid for by the people.

If independence is granted to the Filipinos, the investments of our business men will not suffer; on the contrary, they will profit from the gratitude and good-will of the Filipinos. They will not lose the respect of the people; instead, the Filipinos will be tied to us more firmly by bonds of affection than they can ever be by force.

In case of war with another Pacific Ocean power, would business men in the Philippines prefer to have the Filipino friendly, or a center of discontent and a danger upon our most exposed front? It is believed to have taken at least two hundred thousand of her best troops all through the war to enable Great Britain to garrison and hold Ireland and Egypt. Is this good business? Despite the somewhat wasteful and unscientific business methods peculiar to America during the last century, it is to be hoped that there can be found no business man in the Philippines who cannot see this proposition and who would risk the advantage of his country for his own fancied prospects of greater gain.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE JAPANESE MENACE

**T**HE near approach of the international conference of the powers at Washington upon the problems of the Pacific renders premature any present opinion upon the future relations between the United States and Japan.<sup>1</sup> The Philippine question is an essential part of a final settlement. Every intelligent person in the world must look with great anxiety upon the progress of these deliberations. The Pacific, as things stand now, bids fair to be the arena of the next great struggle between the nations. It is a thousand pities that the motion of Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi was not adopted to regulate the coming conference; he was for "open covenants openly arrived at." Memories of the results of the Versailles Treaty are still too recent; this is no time for greed, for levity, or for cynicism. It is not hyperbole to assert that the fate of the modern world depends upon the outcome. After all that has been suffered since 1914 it is to be expected that the nations concerned in this meeting will approach with sincerity, at least, the subjects to be discussed. Visitors to the second Hague Conference of 1907 came away with the impression that the nations there represented were all fencing for their own advantage; the delegates seemed only to

<sup>1</sup> The publishers call the reader's attention to the fact that Mr. Harrison completed his book in September, 1921.

have left their arms outside the great hall of the conference. The atmosphere was surcharged with hypocrisy and intrigue. The commissioners from Korea, come to plead that their independent existence of a thousand years be recognized again, rapped in vain upon the door. They were not admitted. Their case was not debated.

Nearly every nation to-day is literally staggering under the burden of armament; most of the governments are already actually bankrupt; the world is one large armed camp; all wish to disarm, but no one dares to be the first. The last time disarmament was proposed, Germany blocked the suggestion. Which country will it be this time? Whichever it is, that government may be confidently expected to become the next disturber of the peace. If the various animosities and rivalries can be frankly discussed, it is possible that a real gentleman's agreement can be reached. Without a genuine understanding upon the relations of the nations to one another the representatives will journey homeward sadder but not wiser men. After that every gentleman will carry his gun as before, and perhaps add a few concealed weapons. England has already abandoned her traditional two-power naval standard because the money for maintaining it cannot be found. The United States is rapidly approaching the one-power standard. Japan, with fewer ships, is not far behind. For what purposes are they arming? This is, or of right ought to be, the main topic of the conference. Uncle Sam, while professing the greatest interest in pacifism as an ideal, is in the best position to win in the competition for armaments; if asked to leave his gun at home, he is at least entitled to know



the intentions of his neighbors. He is now face to face with the two most astute diplomats of all time, John Bull and the Jap.

The future of the Philippines is one of the nerve centers of the Pacific problem. There can be no question of the cession of the islands to any other power; no administration in Washington would dare to propose such a move; no Congress would consider it. What, then, are we doing in the Philippines? It is doubtful if the other nations believe in our promises to set the islands free. Has not Egypt frequently been promised its freedom? In the old-style diplomacy, such words as "freedom" and "independence" were used to soothe naughty or troublesome little boys. England has been glad enough to have us retain the Philippines; that meant that none of her rivals in imperialism would get them,—particularly Germany. The Dutch in Java and the Australians want us to remain in the islands as a buffer state between them and Japan. Japan did not burst upon the stage as a full-fledged "great power" until after we acquired the islands. No doubt Japan is seriously worried at our forward thrust in the Orient, especially when coupled with our hectoring attitude toward her in China and Siberia. Japan has a Monroe Doctrine of her own. Our presence in the Philippines threatens her hegemony in the Orient; she considers it a danger to herself. She understands the meaning of the circle of posts from Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, to the Philippines prepared for us by our military "strategists"; she is accustomed to think in terms of "naval stations," though the American public at home is not,—in fact, is unaware of our provoking and offensive attitude

toward Japan. Although as a military problem the Philippines form the weakest link in the armor of the United States, especially vis-à-vis Japan, as a political problem, as the visible expression of American policy, their situation is of immense interest to the Japanese. This may explain the general support accorded by Japanese statesmen to the policy of independence of the Philippines. They want to see the United States contract its frontier in the Pacific Ocean, so that there may be one less dagger pointed at their own hearts. It is unnecessary to assume that Japan cherishes a secret design to seize the Philippines for itself; it would hardly be worth the candle. It would mean untold trouble for Japan from the Filipinos themselves, a Christian nation which would never submit willingly to Japanese rule; it would almost certainly mean a war with the United States, or another of the great powers.

It is believed that Japan would gladly consent to join in a guaranty of the independence of the Philippines, or in any agreement for their neutralization. It would be unnecessary to doubt the given word of Japan under these circumstances. To say that good-faith in her foreign relations is relatively as high as in the other nations is perhaps the faint praise that damns. She has at least stood loyally enough by her agreements with Great Britain and with us. Although in her expansion into Asia she has solemnly made use of all the stock in trade of those jugglers known as European diplomats, such as "special interests," "spheres of influence," "temporary occupation," and "protection of national interests," how can she be justly condemned for playing the game as it is being

played by her competitors? Japan was forced by American guns to open her doors to European civilization; the fate of China aroused her then to her own danger. Japan has been pushed into the struggle; shall she be abused by the older members of the concert for using the weapons they have put into her hands?

Taking the matter at the lowest level and placing reliance upon the promises of nations only when they are perceived to be in accordance with their selfish interests, Japan would keep her hands off the Philippines because it would be the utmost folly for her to do otherwise. The certainty of war, the comparative poverty of the islands, the impossibility of Japanese laboring in large numbers in the tropics, would deter her from the attempt to expand into the Philippines. Even though the United States had assumed no protectorate over the islands, had given no guaranty of independence, public opinion in our country would never consent to the subjugation of the Christian republic we had set up with the loftiest of motives, by the Japanese. If the forthcoming conference will make the neutralization of the Philippines the keystone of the arch to be erected across the Pacific, all doubts will be set at rest as to their future, and the structure thus created will endure for many a long year.

The Philippine question, however, is but one of our many vexed and delicate points of contact with Japan, though it is indirectly related to the most important matter which will come before the conference, the "open door" in China. Most American business men who advocate the retention of the Philippines do so because it would "make a base for our future trade in China." They take no note of the fact that the Phil-

ippines are far away from the shortest route between the United States and China; Chinese trade with North America does not pass through the Philippines, and never will. The islands have no more relation to the Sino-American commerce than has Guam or Samoa, Perhaps, though, these business men are thinking in terms of military "strategy"; they mean to force American goods, in competition with other strong-arm nations, down the throats of the Chinese with bayonets and machine-guns. If so, it would be well for them to reflect that our wisest military tacticians are unanimous in the opinion that the possession of the Philippines is our "heel of Achilles" and exposes us to great national peril. If Japan chose to attack us in the Philippines she would be selecting her own field of operations, for we should then be obliged to undertake the defense of these islands eight thousand miles from our own shores; the Batanes Islands to the north of Luzon are only thirty miles from Formosa, the nearest Japanese possession.

Ever since the days of John Hay as Secretary of State the "open door" in China has been supposed to form part of the foreign policy of the United States; it has, however, never been frankly placed before the American people for consideration; it has no real part in our national traditions, and it is doubtful whether, upon that issue, the American people would ever consider entering upon a war. The danger is that the administration, under our system, can so involve the country in disputes with other powers that war becomes inevitable. It should be clearly understood that the "open door" does not occupy a position in the hearts of the Americans such as is held by the Monroe



Doctrine. Nevertheless, without general knowledge of what is actually going on, and perhaps without approval of the policy in any sense, the "open door" now threatens to involve us in a war with Japan.

Naturally enough, Americans are in favor of the open door; it means that they shall have equal trade rights in the vast markets of China; we are also in favor of the open door everywhere else, if we can get it. We are actually struggling to open the door to the Mesopotamian oil-fields. Meanwhile we close the door of our own country with tariffs, with coastwise shipping prohibitions, and by forbidding the immigration of both Chinese and Japanese. It is a poor rule that will not work both ways. It is said, however, that all wars are economic. We have, under our Constitution, reserved to Congress the right to declare war; it is seldom more than a perfunctory process. The newspapers declare war, and the President is by them crowded into a position where he virtually commits our country to war, before Congress acts. Under the present circumstances, this same open-door question, which is the root of our trouble with Japan, may not be recognized by our people as the real point at issue until too late, and the disease will then run its course without diagnosis. Our commercial interest in China, which is the same as the commercial interest of all other countries, namely the desire to make money out of the Chinese, is presented to our public dressed in the benevolent disguise of lofty altruism for China's welfare and affection for those same Chinese whom we will not allow to enter our own country.

Comment has just been made upon the open door in China as the root of our trouble with Japan. It is

not meant thereby to suggest that we should not insist, and as vigorously as we can, that our commerce should have the same rights as that of Japan in the markets of China. That is the duty of the American representatives at the conference. The danger lies in the method of our foreign policy.

Japan is increasing in population at the rate of about six hundred thousand a year. Her people are already tired of the rather degrading forms of intensive agriculture to which they are forced by their narrow territorial limits. We will not permit the surplus of Japanese to enter the United States; we are affronted by their entrance in any large numbers into Mexico or South America. They are not admitted to British Columbia, Australia, or New Zealand. In between lie the tropical lands to which they are not by nature adapted. Where are they to go? If the other powers insist upon shutting up all the steam in the boiler, there is bound to be an explosion; and the noise thereof will shatter the world just at the moment when we are recovering from the effects of stifling the expansion of Germany. The resources and industries of Japan are growing in like proportion to their population. Where are they to find an outlet for their natural expansion in trade?

The natural answer to these questions is, of course, in Asia. Japan must expand to the westward, since she is denied all other safety-valves; and expand she must, or burst. Her methods of expansion are deplored by all the other powers, but they have been conducted according to the strictest rules of diplomacy observed regularly by the foreign offices of old Europe. We had an opportunity of protesting at the time when

we were in duty bound to do so,—when Japan annexed Korea with whom we had a treaty we should have then respected. Japan was snubbed and thwarted in turn by China, Russia, and Germany. She bided her time and struck them, one after the other, a telling blow. Now the other nations have drawn in their horns, and some of them are deliberately egging on the United States to face the music.

We do not desire to see Japan annex Manchuria and eastern Siberia, but are we ready to pay the price to prevent her? Is it really any of our business, or our concern? Japan is called the “Germany of the East.” It seems doubtful whether the world is prepared to administer to Japan the same treatment it accorded to Germany. The maps of Europe, Asia, and Africa are covered with territories annexed by European powers with less justification than Japan can find for her expansion westward. The law that is driving Japan onward is the law of existence; she must either grow or die. Who is preparing to give her the *coup de grace*? If it is secretly hoped by the concert of European powers that we will take on the task, let us first be sure that we are not merely serving their selfish purposes. If we push Japan out of China, it is certainly not in order to seize the Celestial kingdom for ourselves. But we may make it easier for others to seize it. France has already taken the southernmost portion of China; the English have Hong-Kong and a “special interest” in the great valley of the Yang-tse. Professor Dewey, in a recent article written from Canton, describes British financial aggressions in that neighborhood, and adds that the Chinese are as much alarmed over the invasion of the English in the South as of the

Japanese in the North. Pulling chestnuts out of the fire may be an exciting game, but it is reserved only for simpletons. Many of his friends wish that President Wilson had stepped aboard the *George Washington* when he held the threat of departure over the heads of the Council of Four in Paris; that he had then come home and said as Abraham Lincoln might have remarked: "Well, boys, we can't do business with those fellows; we don't speak their language."

When the other powers were bending every effort to crush Germany, Japan seized the opportunity in 1915 to present her "twenty-one points" to China; acceptance by that helpless Government meant a partial surrender of sovereignty. There is every reason to believe that before the war with China, in 1895, the Japanese in pursuance of their "Monroe Doctrine" were really trying to prevent the partition of China by Russia, Great Britain, France, and Germany. They have, despite the resistance of China, and galled by the contempt of the Chinese for the "dwarfs," succeeded in breaking up the organized attempt on the part of the Europeans to carve up the map of China. But they have earned the hatred of the Chinese people, and were eventually and most unwisely led into presenting their "twenty-one points." Some of the points were accepted by China under protest that they were forced upon her under duress. Our Government as the "next friend" of China also protested, but ended, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement, by recognizing the "special interests" of Japan in China.

The Old-World feudal kingdom of Japan, shut up within itself for so many centuries, had not learned to understand the sentiments and feelings of other races;



individually the Japanese are not tactful in their gestures toward the other nations. The attitude of the Japanese Government toward our own has always been correct and self-contained. It seems probable that the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, are determined to preserve the peace with America; the military party in their government is, however, constantly pressing toward collision with the United States. The people of Japan, under universal primary education, are great readers of the newspapers, and certain organs of the press in Japan are constantly inflaming public opinion against us. The atmosphere is no longer even friendly to American tourists, however correct and polite the official attitude toward traveling Americans may be. The constant journeys of our army and naval officers through Japan to and from China and the Philippines are a source of danger. An insult to one of them could easily be interpreted as an insult to the United States, however irresponsible the perpetrators. The killing of Lieutenant Langdon, U. S. N., by a Japanese sentry in Vladivostok last year might easily have brought on a crisis. Our participation in the denial at Paris to the Japanese of racial equality added fuel to the flames. The petty exactions and harassing questions of the minor officials of the Japanese customs, quarantine, and Public Health Department often throw whole parties of American tourists into a perfect fury. No doubt the Japanese Government is fully alive to the situation, and presumably deploras it.

The California question is not the real bone of contention. Japan is bound, like any other self-respecting nation, to protest at the discrimination against her

people in California. They know that the question is, as yet, local to that state. But Japan does not talk of going to war with Great Britain over the exclusion of Japanese from all the British colonies in the Pacific. On the contrary, Japan and Great Britain have a special treaty of alliance. This leaves us with the suspicion that the California question is being deliberately pushed to the front by the Japanese, to cloak the real issue; that it will form the basis for a "trade" in negotiations over the real point at issue. It may be assumed that this is freedom from interference by us in her drive into Asia.

The participation of the United States Army and Navy in the Siberian campaign of 1918-19 has never been fully understood by our own public; the Japanese, however, probably made it their business to know exactly what it meant. We had declared no war upon Russia, but were actively engaged in the campaign against her form of government which ended so disastrously for the allied armies upon the western front. If our troops were there to guard the railway material sent over by us before the collapse of the preceding Russian Government, the activities of our soldiers should have been confined to that purpose.

Although mankind repeats in every generation the folly of trying to kill "ideas" with the sword, nobody can be so foolish as to believe that we sent an army to Siberia to prevent by force of arms Bolshevik ideas from entering the United States. If history must repeat itself, it is regrettable that the most mischievous experiments are those most frequently repeated. Most of the American soldiers who served in Siberia came

home Bolsheviks. The real purpose seems to have been to prevent Japan from securing a permanent foothold in Siberia.

If, then, our army in Siberia was sent there to watch the Japanese, or even if they believe it to have been there for that purpose, the situation is serious enough from any point of view. They may not challenge the point directly, for at least we had as much right to invade Siberia as they had,—which was none! If, in their own secret councils, they entertain imperialistic ideas in regard to eastern Siberia, may they not also believe that we have the same? Certainly our active interest in China and our continued retention of the Philippines must seem to Japan to have that meaning. Well might they ask us as to Siberia: “What are you doing in this galley?”

All men of responsibility in the two nations must hope for a peaceful settlement of these questions at the forthcoming conference in Washington. War would be disastrous for Japan and possibly for the United States. Neither has anything to gain from it, both much to lose. We are the best customer for Japanese trade; we should frankly convince her that we entertain no thoughts of territorial aggression in Asia; and we should keep our word as to withdrawing from the possession of the Philippines, while at the same time we should insist upon equal opportunities for trade throughout the Orient. We must leave to military men an estimate of the outcome of trial in arms; naturally enough, we are confident we can beat Japan; so was Russia. As Norman Angell has proved, however, the country which wins a war really loses it.

The League of Nations has up to the present time proved for the Filipinos a broken reed; they now hope that they may secure their hopes and aspirations as a result of the Pacific conference.



## CHAPTER XXI

### THE EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES UPON THE EUROPEAN MASTERS OF ASIA

**A**N attempt has been made in the preceding pages to present the Philippine problem from the American and from the Filipino point of view. In conclusion, attention should be invited to the immense if unexpected influence of our policy in the islands upon the powers of Europe.

Upon the acquisition of our Asiatic dependency twenty-three years ago, we announced that we were to hold the islands temporarily and for the benefit and welfare of the native inhabitants, not for our own selfish purposes. This was a shock to the feelings of the colonial offices of Europe. Uncle Sam was a rude, hustling fellow who refused to take his appointed seat at the table and join the feast. Perhaps, after all, they thought, we did not mean what we said. When, however, we began to institute self-government in the Philippines and even to talk of independence, it was clear that we were threatening the established order of affairs throughout the colonial world. Our announcements were greeted with derision and ill-concealed alarm. This was going too far, said they, and moreover it was impolite. Did we mean to insinuate that they were holding a large portion of the globe in subjection for any other reason than because they had taken up the White Man's Burden? It was never gold,

or oil, or rubber that caused them to conquer weaker countries, but always "honor." When their honor or their "manifest destiny" was involved, they could not be expected to hesitate. Our thesis was little short of an insult!

The evidence that we were in earnest accumulated rapidly; we really did give the Filipinos self-government and in the Jones Act of 1916 promised them independence. Upon the whole, we had faithfully observed President McKinley's altruistic policy, although it is true that we showed selfish purposes in tariff legislation by which we have secured two thirds of the foreign trade of the Philippines for ourselves, and in the proposition to extend our coastwise shipping laws to the islands. If on these points we stumbled slightly in our program of unselfishness, we have certainly shown unparalleled generosity in our dealings with the native inhabitants of the islands and are fast developing them toward an independent nationality.

The displeasure of Great Britain in particular was apparent; if the British were, as it is supposed, mainly instrumental in persuading our Government to retain the islands, they must have long ago regretted their mistake. Last year in Simla the Liberal Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, asked me about the conditions in the Philippines. I explained our original embarrassment at finding the islands on our hands without any provision for that kind of ownership under our Constitution, which is based upon the "consent of the governed," and added that I supposed we had held the archipelago upon the insistence of England. "Well," he replied, "if that embarrassed your country, you

have no idea how much your Philippine policy has embarrassed us!" This conscientious and anxious man was at that very time trying to institute in the great empire of India some form of responsible self-government. He seemed particularly impressed with the fact that after self-government had been given the Filipinos they had stopped criticizing the United States and turned to their own political campaigns; he had the hope of the same outcome in India.

It has for the past century been a fundamental maxim of the European powers that the native races in the tropics are totally unfit for self-government; that the Asiatic is "inferior." Forgotten are the days of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when the first European adventurers brought home marvelous tales of the magnificence and power of the Great Mogul and of the Great Khan. Few Europeans were admitted to the presence of these rulers, and those few knelt humbly before them in palaces which are still among the wonders of the world. The wealth of the Indies set aflame the imagination and covetousness of the comparatively poor courts of Europe. It was not until the superiority of the white man's armaments became established that the total incapacity and unworthiness of the Asiatics to govern their own countries became the accepted creed. One after another the Oriental monarchs were overthrown by the less cultivated but more vigorous Europeans. Revenge was taken for the prior invasions of Europe from the East. Might was right, and few questions of international morality troubled the conquerors of those days. After all, were they not extending the beneficent sway of Christendom? To-day Japan alone stands as the only stum-

bling-block in the path of the complete conquest of Asia by the invading whites. China, Siam, Afghanistan, and Persia are only nominally independent; in all of them the hand of the white man bears heavily upon the reins of state. So far, China's complete dismemberment has been prevented by international jealousies. But now that Germany and Russia are put out of the running, and France deeply absorbed in Africa, England and Japan hold China in a *major tenace*. Similar is the fate of Siam, which has been gradually partitioned in the past thirty years between Great Britain and France. If one power seizes territory, compensation is sought by the other. Cambodia, the eastern third of Siam, with its ancient temple of Angkor Vat, was made a part of French Indo-China. At once England responded by seizing the provinces of Trengganu and Kelantan on the south. In Bangkok the King of Siam used boastingly to say that the bar at the mouth of the Menam River was a better protection to his country than military preparedness; but a European shallow-draft modern destroyer slipped over the bar and with its guns silenced his objections to aggression.

Under the plea of extraterritoriality, which means the right of foreign nations to have their citizens tried in Siam, as in China, by judges of their own nationality, the whole internal administration of Siam is directed by the whites. A few years ago a prince of the house of Siam mournfully asked me if the United States could not protect the independence of his ancient kingdom from England and France, as we were doing for Liberia. Instead, we are joining in the game of extraterritoriality in Siam.



The first reversal of the process was the defeat of Russia by Japan. The hopes of the colored races of Asia at once revived: had not the little Japanese, entirely unaided, overthrown the mightiest military power of the white man? At last, they thought, the tide had turned.

In no one of the long list of subjugated peoples from Tsingtau to Cairo had the white man won the confidence and loyalty of those upon whom he had imposed his rule. One axiom upon which all the European powers insisted was the inferiority of the Asiatic,—an inferiority mental and moral as well as social. The prestige of the white man must be maintained at any and all hazards. The Asiatic must not be recognized socially, he must not be admitted to any clubs or friendships of equality; he must be humble in address and cringe before his master; in fine, he must be kept in his place. Thus were some of the most ancient civilizations of the world held up to hatred, contempt, and ridicule. We cannot wonder that resentment has burnt into the soul of the Asiatic, and that he, too, prays for “The Day.”

It is to be noted that the idea of a colony, as understood in the days of ancient Greece, was a permanent settlement of emigrants from the native city, free from political control from the fatherland; such were Syracuse and Massalia, now Marseilles. Then came Rome and annexed to her empire large foreign populations, to whom the rights of Roman citizenship were eventually granted. The conquest of Asia by Europe in modern times has been conducted upon quite a different theory: it is the holding of distant peoples in perpetual subjugation, upon an acknowledged basis of

political and personal inferiority, for purposes of exploitation. This was the first article of faith, the unquestioned rule of white domination of Asiatics, until the United States entered the field with her Philippine policy.

The results of our heresy have been far-reaching, and have shaken seriously the colonial offices of Great Britain, of France, and of Holland; they have also brought hope and inspiration to millions of patient brown and yellow men who find in the new ideas of America a promise for the future. The European powers which control the news service of the world did nothing, naturally enough, to spread the new ideas. No mention of the Philippines was allowed to appear in any periodical for distribution in the colonies. The only reference to American work in the islands which I have seen in a British magazine was a picture in an English publication a few years ago entitled "American health work in the Philippines" which depicted a white doctor in a solar topee vaccinating a "Filipino." The "native" was trying to escape up a cocoanut palm, and the doctor had him by the foot; the Filipino was a frizzy-haired Zulu! Even so recognized a Liberal as Viscount Bryce tries in his last book to discredit the American theory of educating these natives for self-government, and classes the Filipino with the Bantu savages of Africa. Few Englishmen, officials or merchants, in Asia, until very recently, would even discuss the Philippines; if they did, it was generally in terms of hatred and scorn for the Filipinos, and ridicule for the fantastic ideas of the Americans. As expressed by Stephen Bonsal in his book, English opinion was that

it would be disastrous for the Filipinos themselves, and for you, and a thousand times more disastrous for all white men having an interest in the development of the East Coast, should your statesmen and legislators be "hoodwinked" by their bombastic proclamations into treating them as civilized men capable of self-government.

Yet, somehow, in that mysterious way in which news travels in the East, word went out to the farthest confines of the Orient of what America was doing in the Philippines. In the bazaars of India, along the harbors of Malaysia, and even in the far-away mountain passes of Armenia, the word was whispered about. Mr. Charles R. Crane, formerly Minister to China, reports that on his mission for the United States to Asia Minor in 1918 he found everywhere an eagerness that our country should accept a mandate under the League of Nations, for those populations, so that we could do for them what we had done for the Filipinos. In Madras, last year, Mrs. Annie Besant, formerly president of the all-India Congress, told me how largely the Indian movement for home rule had been inspired by our Philippine policy. Frequently I have been told by visiting delegations of Chinese that their belief in the honor and unselfishness of America was firmly based upon our attitude toward the Filipinos. The pressure of native opinion in Java, in Ceylon, and in Indo-China, which has led within the past five years to the beginnings in those colonies of native participation in the government, sprang in large part from the same source. The conclusion to be drawn is evident: ideas are still more powerful in the regulation of human conduct than mere force. Neither Poland nor Finland in their century of martyrdom lost their faith and

ideals; not even the greatest of armies could crush out their ideas.

It may seem surprising, in retrospect, to consider how indifferent the European masters have been to the policy of making friends with those whom they have conquered and whose territories they have annexed. One historian of India has stated that the social disqualification of the Indians dates from the arrival of the first English ladies in that country; he argued that Warren Hastings would never have committed such a dangerous mistake; he and Clive conquered and governed India through the Indians themselves, and knew personally all the intrigues and political movements of their time. Two generations later, when the line of social intercourse had been sharply drawn, the Mutiny took the British completely by surprise. Others have explained that the "prestige" of the white man is the chief reliance of the governors in ruling with a handful of Europeans vast populations of natives. The same idea of an imposing personal presence underlay the ancient Chinese method of wearing hideous masks in battle to frighten their opponents! The indifference of these rulers to the feelings and sentiments of the ruled can perhaps be better understood by a consideration of the motives which brought them to Asia and have induced them to stay.

Two of the smallest countries territorially, England and Holland, hold to-day the greatest empires in Asia; they were originally impelled by the same motive in entering the East,—the desire for financial gain. Portugal and Spain in their day of greatness had professed their desire of proselyting, of adding more Christians to the spiritual kingdom of the pope. England and



Holland, both already Protestant countries, sallied forth in search of riches; they won their empires by their skill and daring on the sea. Each power started with mere trading-posts or factories, upon the coast; each power was led little by little to interfere with the internal politics of the peoples of the interior; each eventually annexed an empire. In the middle of the eighteenth century the English defeated the French in India, and the path was clear for further annexations; peaceful settlement of rivalries with Holland was made by the exchange of Sumatra for Ceylon, and the gradual absorption of India was begun. It is curious to note how one step led logically to another. It is the same in court, where one misstatement by a witness inevitably leads him to an endless chain of others to cover his position. From the first seizures of territory along the coast, each further move inward was made to protect the bases already annexed; the process has developed until sovereignty or domination of all of southwestern Asia is now claimed by England as necessary to protect her Indian Empire. Beluchistan, Mesopotamia, Arabia, and even far-away Egypt are always cited as vital British interests on account of her Indian possessions. Afghanistan and Persia would have been gathered in the same capacious net, had it not been for the intrigues and rivalries with Russia. Mr. Morgan Shuster's book on "The Strangling of Persia" clearly sets forth the method by which the work of empire-building is carried on.

No question ever arises in imperial councils as to the political rights of the inhabitants of the countries annexed; personal rights are generally secured by just laws and wise administrators; order is usually imposed

and maintained, though, it is to be noted, generally at the expense of the people governed. Until recent years, few voices were lifted either in England or in Holland in assertion of the political rights of their Indian empires. The frequent appearance within the last decade, in the public press and in books and periodicals in Great Britain, of discussions of the rights of the Indian peoples shows that a steady searching of conscience is now in process. It is unnecessary to quote from severe self-criticisms by British authors of their position and administration in India. Undoubtedly, some of their officials have been better than others; some have been wise and sympathetic, others have not. The main point to be noted is that, despite traditions of public service in India ever since the empire was annexed to the Crown, traditions which would be a source of pride and credit in the main to any country, the British themselves are now beginning to be restless over the ethical question involved. It appears to many of their liberal writers to-day that the iron-bound system by which they have governed India violated those rights of man upon which the modern world is slowly coming to an agreement.

Prudence, moreover, dictates a shift of policy to meet the new movement for self-government so vigorous throughout Asia. Under the Montagu-Chelmsford plan, the germs of self-determination are now planted among the peoples of India. The impediment to prompt action in this direction by the British Government, an act which may have been too long deferred, thus illustrating the old adage "A stitch in time saves nine," has been the lack of information in Britain about the actual situation in India. At any

public meeting in England, until very recent days, when a criticism of British policy in India was attempted the flag was waved, the audience stampeded, and opposition at once became unpatriotic,—almost treason. In view of the fact that public meetings are usually governed by sentiment rather than reason, the issue of empire was always obscured. Upon one side of the discussion are ranged a solid phalanx of bureaucrats in the civil and military administration, the traders whose financial interests are supposed to be involved, those economists who believe imperial annexations to be the only safeguard of the food supply of Great Britain, and those statesmen who, like Oliver Twist, are always demanding “more”; on the other side are the discontented taxpayers who do not desire to pay for “more,” those serious and liberal-minded officials and writers who risk martyrdom at home by supporting the rights of the natives, and those far-seeing students of history who, with due regard for the future safety of Britain itself, guide the imperial administration into agreement with the modern political movements of the world.

The grant of self-government to the South African Confederation within a few years after the Boer War insured the loyalty to the allied cause, in the recent African campaigns, of the Boers themselves, with whose aid the conquest of the German colonies in Africa was effected. To-day, in all British colonies in which a majority of whites are found, autonomy amounting to virtual independence has been granted; they are no longer colonies, but dominions in a British commonwealth. They enjoy the protection of the British Army and Navy, and in return give generously

of their very best to imperial service. The prime ministers of the dominions are at intervals summoned to London, and in a sort of extraconstitutional parliament take their share in guiding the destinies of the whole empire. General Smuts, who twenty years ago was leading an army of Boers against Great Britain, is to-day recognized and hailed in England as one of the greatest of British statesmen.

In the Asiatic colonies occupied by colored races the situation is quite different. The inferiority of the Asiatic is still the accepted creed, and the first feeble steps in the path of self-government are bitterly resisted by those in the ruling country who would keep him inferior. It is upon this branch of the subject that the American policy in the Philippines has had direct bearing.

England, Holland, and France hold about one third of the territory of Asia to-day. Up to the beginning of this century they held together upon the traditional policy of considering the Asiatic merely as a source of wealth, to have and to hold for purposes of exploitation, though their methods of development have had quite different results in practice. Holland has made herself rich by making Java and Sumatra rich; England has enriched herself by making the Indians poor. For a graphic picture of the appalling poverty of the Indian peoples the student may consult any one of the growing library of books by British authors on the subject. A visit to India is the most depressing a modern traveler can make; the misery of the people strikes as dramatic a note as a painting by Gustave Doré. Although it is the fashion of Indians to exaggerate the greatness of their past, one cannot but feel to-day that



theirs is the saddest country on earth. This they generally attribute to British rule; English imperialists, on the other hand, ascribe it to the defects of Indian character. At all events, the population of India is now seething with discontent and revolt, and British rule is definitely challenged. The situation is critical in the extreme; has the beginning of self-determination been too long delayed?

Much of the unpopularity of foreign rule is due to the personal and official arrogance with which it has been administered. The truly dangerous position of the white man in Asia to-day might well have been avoided in time. One fact may be stated without any hesitation: the White Man's Burden in Asia up to within twenty years has conveyed to the peoples of Asia little share in the benefits of European civilization. The cardinal principle has been, with the British, Dutch, and French, not to interfere in the customs and beliefs of the native populations. This fact has been stated again and again with every evidence of self-virtuous unction. It is evidently regarded as a concession of supreme altruism to the natives. As a matter of fact, the phrase has concealed certain breaches of trust on the part of the governing races. General public education was never attempted until very recently, sanitation among the common people was neglected, and the inhabitants were left to sink into sloth and ignorance. While it would have been difficult, and perhaps dangerous, to attempt to change the social systems of these vast populations, and while their entirely different types of culture were without doubt entitled to their own development, it is in this policy that the clearest evidence is shown that Euro-

pean colonization has not been conducted in Asia for the benefit of the people, but for purposes of gain. Occasionally, it is true, reforms of degrading customs, such as that of suttee, or widow-burning, have been forced by public opinion at home. The good people of England have been aroused with horror that such practices should exist under their flag. On the whole, however, the much-vaunted principle of not interfering with native customs has often encouraged the existence of ignorance and vice. Deprived of whatever inspiration might come from self-government and the development of their own system of culture, the people sink into apathy and decay under a rule which offers them no social hope. But the wrong has not always been negative and passive; there have been sins of commission; for example, we must consider the opium traffic.

In 1906 it was calculated that the total gain from the sale of Indian opium since 1773 had amounted to two billion one hundred millions of dollars. Opium is a monopoly of the Government in India as it is in Singapore, Hong-Kong, Sandakan, and elsewhere. When this fact became known to the public at home, a wave of moral indignation forced the calling of an International Opium Congress, and several half-hearted attempts were made to reduce the traffic. In reality, the British authorities would not give up the revenues from opium; in several colonies no real improvement was made. The present situation is described by Miss Ellen N. LaMotte in her book "The Opium Monopoly." Despite virtuous sentiments expressed at the International Congress in 1906, by 1917 the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States still derived

fifty per cent. of their revenue from the opium monopoly; Hong-Kong one third; while British India still obtained more than three million pounds sterling revenue annually from that source; in French Cochin China an actual increase of revenue from opium appeared in the budget for 1917; in British North Borneo the opium trade had become a positive scandal by 1920; two successive English chief justices of that colony are said to have resigned because of the duplicity with which the officials there were forcing the traffic.

In India, the smoking of opium has long been known as one of the national vices, and is believed by many to be an effective cause of the degeneracy of the race. Certainly the student of Indian history must be struck with the frequent occasions upon which some Indian potentate who had displayed a youth of great vigor and achievement, faltered and sank suddenly to his downfall in the very heyday of his power. He was not "all there" when the crisis called; opium had destroyed his will and his mind. The British did not introduce opium into India; its use was one of the "native customs" with which they did not interfere. On the contrary, they took up the traffic as part of the government program and pushed it with the utmost vigor. This led to a collision with China, and thus to the acquisition of Hong-Kong. A British writer, Colonel A. M. Murray, in his book "Imperial Outposts" published in 1907, describes the situation in picturesque language:

The title-deeds of this great British stronghold [Hong-Kong] are unfortunately of bad origin. The acquisition of Hong-Kong will always be associated with the Opium War of

1840—a dark chapter in the history of the British Empire. No more unjustifiable war has ever been waged by a civilized nation. Cupidity was its cause, and cupidity of a demoralizing nature. The war can only be described as a successful piratical attempt to force an illicit traffic in a contraband and noxious drug on an unwilling people.

Lord Palmerston urged the Chinese Government, after he had won the war on that issue, to legalize the importation of opium in order to get revenue from it. The Emperor Tao Kwang refused, saying: "Nothing will induce me to derive revenue from the vice and misery of my people." This coming from an "inferior Asiatic" must have been a shock to the custodians, in England, of international morality. Opium in 1840, opium in 1920; not much progress visible there! An unfriendly critic might well denominate that portion of the British Empire which lies "somewhere east of Suez" as "England's opium empire." Not only have the "customs of the people" not been "interfered with" but their greatest and most debilitating vice has been encouraged, even forced upon them, for the sake of revenue. The White Man's Burden has been materially lightened by the money thus derived, and by the state of physical and moral ruin to which the people have been reduced. If they are thoroughly doped, they are more willing slaves.

In the Philippines, the importation, possession, and smoking of opium has from the beginning of American occupation been forbidden by law. The traveler notes few of those drug-sodden specimens so common in near-by colonies. The Filipinos, as yet, are not generally addicted to the drug, and smuggling of opium, which is one of the most difficult problems confronting



the Philippine Government, is chiefly for the trade with Chinese residents of the islands. When a large amount has been smuggled in, the police note an immediate decrease in the price in the contraband market. The drug is easy to transport and the profits are so enormous as to encourage ingenious plans to outwit the customs, worthy of the attention of writers of mystery stories. With the tremendous gain accruing to a successful smuggler, come temptations to corrupt public officials; the struggle to prevent the debauching of public office and the spread of the vice itself is one of the liveliest tasks of the Philippine Government. It would be fairly successful in that endeavor were it not for the British North Borneo Government Opium Monopoly in Sandakan. It is understood that in 1919 about six million pesos' worth of opium, Sandakan price, was sold for smuggling into the Philippines.

A glance at the map will show that the nearest of the Sulu group of islands are but a few miles from Sandakan; in fact, two of the small Philippine islands which command the entrance to the harbor of Sandakan are held by the government of that island under an informal permission of the United States. The Philippine Government is now trying to regain control of the "Turtle Islands." Scattered over hundreds of square miles are innumerable coral islets with shallow and tortuous passages frequently un-navigable by any boat of more than three feet draft. Through these the Moro smugglers, in their swift vintas, slip with their precious cargo of opium, defying pursuit and capture. Jolo, Bohol, Cebú, and Iloilo are their destinations, and in these places the Chinese

finance their operations. Occasional battles with the constabulary and police but lend a zest to the traffic so far as the Moros are concerned; these sanguinary little fights are reminiscent of their own traditions in the past. In 1920, upon a visit to Jolo, I found the government hospital there crowded with patients taking the cure for the opium habit.

Repeated protests against the situation in Sandakan were made to our home Government; I asked them to invoke the good offices of the Government of Great Britain to the end that the Government of British North Borneo should show some respect for our laws and some consideration for our institutions and people. The protest was presented in London by our Ambassador, John W. Davis, with no result. The answer was what is known as "playing for time," and was full of cynicism. It has already been noted that one half of the revenues of the British North Borneo Government comes from profit on the official sale of opium. Finally, I asked that President Wilson call another International Opium Congress to deal with this matter; it was pointed out that this was one of the subjects reserved for the League of Nations. The policy of "not interfering with the customs of the people" certainly cannot be extended to cover the facilitating of the spread of this odious vice among a neighboring people who are now comparatively free from it!

The Dutch in their India, as they call it, are perhaps the most conservative of the European nations in their colonial policy. Yet, following the example of the Americans in the islands to the north, they have now taken the first steps toward granting self-government

to their fifty million Malay subjects. About fifteen years ago they started a system of universal education, and, as a Javanese said at the time, education is the beginning of independence. At first only two per cent. of their budget was devoted to the public schools, but the school system is growing rapidly, and is worked out with that thoroughness and scientific accuracy for which the Dutch are famous. Up to the age of ten years the pupils are taught in the Malay tongue, then in Dutch, thus meeting the criticism of President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard upon our Philippine method of forcing the children to study in English from the first grade. Two years ago, the Javanese were for the first time admitted to a share in the direction of the policies of Dutch India by the calling together at stated intervals of an advisory body of natives known as "The People's House." This was the crowning work in the administration of Governor-General Count Limburg von Steerum, whom I had the pleasure of twice visiting in Java, and who impressed me as the most able of the various statesmen I met in Asia, with the possible exception of Marquis Okuma, Premier of Japan.

Of course it is in scientific agriculture that the Dutch have made the greatest advance; their agricultural laboratories should be the model for all the other countries. To-day Java is the garden spot of the world, and East Sumatra is rapidly developing to an equal plane. Out of this have come many of the great fortunes of Holland, and out of their Indian revenues most of the railways of the home country have been constructed. It is especially to be noted that the Dutch have also made their colony the richer by their own gain, and



are now with characteristic foresight admitting the native inhabitants to an increasing share in the profits, and encouraging their cultural development along their national and historic lines. The sultan at Medan, in Sumatra, for example, was twenty years ago a poverty-stricken and unimportant individual. The recent marvelous development by the Dutch in East Sumatra in tobacco and rubber, was directed by the Government so as to let the sultan have his share. A handsome mosque, built by him for his people, a fine private residence, and his own motor-car are evidences of the sultan's rise in the world. It is scarcely to be wondered that he and all his people are enthusiastic supporters of the Dutch. While the personal attitude of the Dutch colonial families toward the Javanese is still extremely rigid, indeed, arrogant, the political recognition of the natives already given is bound to lead to a modification of the social customs; that this will not be accomplished without infinite difficulty and ill-feeling on the part of the whites may be assumed as certain.

In Indo-China, the French successes have been chiefly military. The people are of mixed Malay and Chinese ancestry, and are treated with disdain and severity by their masters. Governor-General Albert Sarrant, now Minister for the Colonies in Paris, introduced the opening wedge three years ago for the recognition of the natives in the Government. The solidarity of the whites in this great colony will prevent much progress in that direction except as a result of serious disturbances. The French at home are not deeply interested in their Asiatic possession; the French colonists there all suffer from homesickness and spend their



days in longing for a return to *la belle France*. When asked why they hold the colony, they reply: "All the great powers have colonies, so we must have our share."

All the great powers have colonies! Are colonial possessions, then, the source of their greatness, or a result? From the beginnings of European history, the nations have sought upon the seas the vacant lands of the earth for their surplus or enterprising youth. To-day, all the vacant lands suitable for white residents have been appropriated. Vast territories in the tropics are still comparatively unoccupied, but medical science has not yet solved for the white races all the problems of permanent residence in tropical lands. The countries in Asia, however, were not vacant, but for the most part already densely populated; they have not been seized for purposes of colonization, but for gain; the idea is to make the people work for their overlords and they are expected to keep quiet about it and are required to pretend to like it. In the middle of the nineteenth century, under the wave of liberalism that then swept over Europe, the holding of far-distant colonies was considered a doubtful asset. Lord Durham in his celebrated report on Canada, from which the present dominion sprang, adopted the dictum of Charles James Fox that "the only method of retaining distant colonies with advantage is to enable them to govern themselves." Gladstone gave back the Ionian Islands to Greece, and avoided aggression in Egypt and the Transvaal. Then the pendulum swung the other way, and the wild scramble over the partition of Africa took place. England, France, and Germany led the pack, and upon several occasions came

perilously near to war with one another over the division of the spoils. Even Italy, as soon as she had straightened out her internal troubles, tried her hand in Abyssinia, with disastrous results; failing that, she undertook the doubtful venture in Tripoli. She has recently offered Italian citizenship to the natives of Tripoli,—a straw showing in which direction the wind is blowing. Russia, meanwhile, had pushed farther and farther into Asia from the north; England, France, and Germany from the south and east, until to-day their work, save for China, is nearly complete. It is evident that they all firmly believed that the acquisition of colonies, not merely for settlement, but in densely populated countries for purposes of exploitation, was essential to the greatness of a modern nation.

Let those who will, balance the financial advantages of securing a monopoly of tropical raw materials in any given colony, the profits from forcing the home products upon an alien people to keep the factory wheels going at home, with the staggering expense to the home taxpayer in maintaining the armaments necessary to hold the colonies in subjection and defend them from rivals from without. Even if the net result shall appear—which is more than doubtful—to be a financial gain to the average citizen of the colonizing power, the matter must finally be decided upon a higher basis, the basis of international morality. The world has just been through an excessive convulsion, unsatisfactorily brought to an end by the disappointing Treaty of Versailles. The old system has not worked well; quite the contrary: it has brought the existing European civilization to the very verge of ruin. Middle-aged people are still thinking with amazement of

the apparent security of life in this world in which they spent their youth. Despite the poison of newspaper propaganda, despite the submergence of all popular institutions, including the freedom of speech and thought, by the fervor of war, intelligent men and women in every country are now asking themselves how it all happened, and to what end. Various propositions for international, instead of national, action are offered as a solution. Socialists in all countries called the late struggle a "capitalists' war." Whether or not the modern organization of high finance in every country shall be found in subsequent analysis to be partially responsible, one fact is clear,—that the desire or hope of making money out of alien populations by seizing them and subjecting them to exploitation, is a dangerous game at which all can play. There are many who believe that this was the original cause of the situation which resulted in the explosion in 1914. Thus, in recognition of the danger to be avoided in the future, it was decided at Versailles that the colonies which changed hands by the treaty should be held as "mandates" for the benefit of their inhabitants, and upon a basis of equal opportunity for all nations.

However proud the white races may be of gazing upon the map and watching the spread of their empires, however acute their self-satisfaction with their deeds, the fact remains that the whole of continental Asia south and east of the plateau of Tibet is seething with discontent and with resentment toward the European conqueror. About seven hundred and fifty million people who inhabit those territories are kindling into fury against the white race on account of the European theory of colonization. While they point to individ-

ual instances of injustice and rapacity, the main burden of their complaint is that Europe had no right to annex their countries. The immense significance of this prevailing unrest has deeply impressed observers in all countries in Europe. Once started to thinking upon the ethical question involved, independent writers of different nations have begun, themselves, to question their moral right to govern these aliens against their consent. There is now a hope that with the new dispensation of world affairs these questions may come to be discussed openly and without reserve. There is a bare chance that with the rise in the recently low level of international morality, the colonial questions may eventually be settled upon principles of right rather than of might. When the day arrives for this momentous change in our modern system, the United States of America, because of her policy in the Philippines, can "come into court with clean hands." Let us make secure in the eyes of the world our sincerity and honor by giving to the Filipinos that independence which we have so definitely promised.







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