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CORRESPONDENCE.

NATCHITOCHEE, LA., }
October 27th, 1864. }

General: Your letter dated October 21st, reached me by Courier yesterday.

The copy of the opinion in the McKee case received by you was not sent by me. I have never had a copy of the opinion—although if I had had the control of one, and supposed you desired it, I would very cheerfully have forwarded it to you.

I understand from your letter that the order received by you from Department Headquarters and communicated to me, at your request, by Lieut. Fuselier—that there should no longer be any delay in the execution of McKee, was made in reply to a letter from you to the Department Commander in which you informed him that “the execution would probably be delayed by proceedings before the civil Court.”

This letter to the Department Commander was written when you “learned the purpose of the prisoner to apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus.” The writ to which you refer was issued about 6th of August, so that your communication to General Smith was between, say the 1st and 6th of August, General Smith it appears, “misapprehending your letter” (you perceive General, I am not alone in misunderstanding you) and supposing you designed a delay with the sole view of enabling the accused to sue out a writ replied directing you not to delay the execution. The communication made by you to me through Lt. Fuselier contained no intimation of the circumstances under which the order from Department Headquarters—not to delay the execution, was made—and I was obliged to consider that as it was communicated to me, under your instructions on the 2d Sept. some time after the proceedings under the writ had commenced, and while they were in pro-

gress—that the order was in disregard of them. You will bear in mind that the order from Department Headquarters, thus communicated to me on the 2d Sept. was accompanied with a statement from you that McKee would be shot on that day. Lieut. Fuselier (your own counsel) the counsel of McKee and myself, all, I will not say concurred, but assumed as a matter of course, that in accordance with this order from Department Headquarters you had fixed the day for the execution. It appeared, however, from your letter to me of Sept. 6th, that we were all in error in supposing that you had fixed the day. You say “the statement is erroneous in representing that I had announced a purpose of my own, when in fact a reference to my letter will show, that I designed simply to make known the instructions of another party in connection with the fact that a certain time had been ‘fixed for the execution.’” This language it appears to me can be understood but in one way, namely: you did not intend to announce to me a purpose of your own in fixing the day for execution—but the purpose of another party to do so. As I was not aware that you could receive orders from any other person in the Department than Gen. Smith, there was not left for me any other conclusion than that the order fixing a day for the execution of the prisoner, came from Department Headquarters. It turns out however, from your explanation that General Smith is free from censure in this regard, and I regret very much having made a statement that does him injustice and for which I shall do all in my power to make amends. But it is due to myself to say, that the error into which I fell was caused by you. I do not now, understand why you should have communicated to me, pending the proceedings under the

Habeas Corpus, an order from Department Headquarters directing you not to delay the execution of the prisoner, when that order was made, when General Smith had no knowledge that McKee was before a civil tribunal on a writ of Habeas Corpus and was made with no purpose whatever to thwart the power of a court of justice. Nor do I understand why I was informed that McKee was to be shot on the 2d of Sept. when no such order was made by you, or emanated from Department Headquarters. Had you not communicated to me, that McKee would be shot on the 2d, no notice could have been taken of it. But as when the Decree was made, I had been informed of the intended execution, the fact became important to be placed upon the record, as evidence of a willful disregard of the sanctity of the judicial proceedings. Your letter to me is full of very appropriate and judicious observations demonstrating that you must necessarily attach as much importance to such a fact as I possibly could.

I make these statements to set myself right and to do justice where I have done injustice and abstain from commenting upon them. I have no wish to complain of you. I bear my willing testimony to the perfect propriety of your course throughout this whole matter, although you will necessarily attach no value to any commendation of mine. Nor, from your letter, can I see any cause of complaint against General Smith, and I very much regret that the explanation you have now made did not accompany your letter to Lieut. Fuselier or the one to me of the 6th Sept., or was not given immediately after the receipt of the manuscript copy of my opinion sent to you by Mr. Dumcau about a month ago. Had you made the explanation in time, the error into which I was led would have been corrected, while now, the injustice I have done General Smith (you will

pardon me for repeating, caused by you, though wholly unintentional) will go forth with the opinion which I see by a Shreveport paper received yesterday has just been printed.

I beg leave to call your attention to the following passage from your letter which under the explanations made by you is not intelligible to me: "I deemed it my duty to inform you as I did through Lieut. Fuselier, of my instructions in connection with the fact that the day of execution under the postponement alluded to had been fixed for the 2d Sept., and that the instructions I had received forbade a postponement beyond that time" I have underscored these last words, because I say it respectfully, they do not appear consistent with the explanations made by you. Regarding your letter in a liberal and candid spirit, I understand from it, that the order not to delay the execution of McKee was made at Department Headquarters, in ignorance of the proceedings under the Habeas Corpus, and that no order came from Department Headquarters, directing that the execution of McKee should take place on the 2d Sept.

I proceed to another subject.

You say: "I was surprised therefore, to find in reviewing the record yesterday, the following note in pencil mark, apparently written by you (me) on 'Henry's letter and signed with the first two letters your (my) name.

"Rejected by the Court, see page 79. The insertion of this letter among the evidence is an outrage against law and justice."

Mo."

If the letters "Mo." were intended as an abbreviation of my name, and made for the purpose of indicating me as the writer of the "note," all I have to say is that a forgery has been committed. Of that note, I did not write a word or a letter, nor was it written with my knowledge, or by

my advice or suggestion. When the record was in my possession "the note" was signed with the initials of J. W. Duncan, Esq., or I am most grievously mistaken. But be this as it may, I expressed my surprise to Mr. Duncan that such a memorandum should be made upon a document in the record. Without the slightest hesitation Mr. Duncan avowed himself the writer of it, and declared he considered himself fully authorized to make it.

I have replied to all that I deemed essential in your letter. I have carefully avoided expressing myself with any asperity, and have withheld making comments where the matter would seem to call for them. The tone of your letter precludes me from saying much that I should have been pleased to say, had you thought proper to address me in a different spirit. I merely desire to add that there are portions of your letter that imply that I have sought to cast censure on you. In this, as in many other things, you are wholly mistaken. I have never had any feeling for you but that of respect, and notwithstanding the harshness of your letter, which I have lived to but little purpose if I cannot afford to overlook, I have still no feeling for you but that of the most entire respect.

I have the honor to be,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

E. WARREN MOISE.

To S. B. BECKNER,

Lt.-Gen. Comd'g. D. W. La.

HEADQUARTERS, DIST. WEST. LA. }
Alexandria, Oct. 27th. 1864. }

SIR:—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th inst. A few points of it demand a reply.

I was not mistaken in supposing that you would regret the injustice you had done General Smith; but I am certainly surprised that you should charge me with being the occasion of it. The true reason is, as I be-

fore intimated, that you undertook to give to other departments of the government a history of the actions of the military authorities, when in fact you knew very little about them; when it does not appear that you sought full information on the subject, and when their conduct was not before you, for adjudication. I supposed you were sitting in judgment on the right of the Court Martial to try McKee. You asked me to show under what authority I held him. I replied fully to your demand. I did not see, or do I yet see that you were sitting legitimately in judgment upon extraneous questions of military administration. You state in your argument that much that you will say "is not necessary for the decision of the questions presented for solution." If you went beyond the point which your duty required and reflected unjustly upon the conduct of military officers you should consider yourself, and not others, responsible for the error. If you were in fact sitting in judgment on the conduct of General Smith, and had asked of me information on the points under investigation, I would have informed you of what I knew. But you asked me nothing of the sort. You issued a decree the preamble of which seems entirely unnecessary to the proceeding and which did injustice to me. I wrote you a letter correcting your error. I sought to convince you that you were wrong in attributing to me a purpose of interfering with the civil proceedings. My "purpose" had been previously indicated in my instructions, already cited, to the Adjutant to defer the execution. You made an extract from that letter, inserted it in your published opinion, and made it the basis of an incorrect allegation against the Department Commander. I wrote you with a view of correcting this last error. I pointed out to you the improper construction you had placed upon my language. I added a succinct statement of the circumstances attending the action of the military authorities. I deemed it my duty to do so. You had connected my name with the charge against the Department Commander, and as an honorable officer, I had not the privilege of remaining silent. I would gladly have done so, if a sense of justice to others had permitted. You seem still to think that my language is justly susceptible of the interpretation you placed upon it. I think not. In addressing you I had a right to think that you would study the laws which you were called upon to interpret in the case before you. You would have found in them that the reviewing officer, General

Walker, or his successor in the command, was the person to act on the sentence of the Court Martial. You would have found in the proceedings of the Court Martial which were officially before you that the sentence was to be executed at a time to be designated by the District Commander. I think you would have deduced from these facts, that the Department Commander could not fix the day of the execution. Then, as I did not say that he fixed the time, what right has any one to infer such a statement from the language of the letter?

It is true that I received instructions not to delay the execution. I have explained to you the misapprehension under which those instructions were given. I was myself under a misapprehension in regard to them at the time they were received. You say justly, that there have been misconceptions on the part of others as well as of yourself. But I think the other parties alluded to were more just in one other respect. They did not make their misconceptions the basis of an allegation against an innocent party. They confined themselves strictly to their duty; and corrected their errors of judgment by the developments of time. You are correct in your present construction of my statement that the instructions from Department Headquarters did not fix the *date* of the execution. The date had been previously fixed at District Headquarters. I was also correct in stating that "the instructions I had received 'only made a postponement beyond that time,' I say "beyond that time" because that date had been fixed in the orders from these Headquarters, and the order of the Department Commander, though issued in ignorance of the day fixed, must be construed to have reference to the state of things existing when the order reached here. Had the day of execution been previously postponed by me to the 1st December that would have been the day referred to in the Department order unless some other day had been specially designated. No day was designated in that order. The order was of a character to forbid any further postponement. It was issued even in ignorance of the day to which the execution had been deferred; and yet if I had obeyed it, the prisoner would have been executed on the 2d September, because it was to that time that, in anticipation of the completion of the proceedings of your Court, the execution had been postponed by orders from District Headquarters. If you will consider that the law and custom required the District

Commander to fix the date; that the adjudication was complete when the District Commander had acted; that until he had officially promulgated his action, it was as impossible for the Department Commander to interpose as it would be for the President to veto a bill before it passed the Congress, you will easily perceive, I think, the distinction between a recognition of the judicial action of the District Commander, as announced in orders, and an allegation against the Department Commander of usurping the judicial functions of the District Commander by interposing between the Court and the reviewing officer and fixing the time of execution. The judicial action under the military law was complete when thus announced. The Department Commander rested under no greater obligations and possessed no greater authority in this case than in any other case tried in the military district. The judicial proceedings were complete when the District Commander finally acted on the judgment of the Court. The execution could take place at the will of the District Commander without even a reference of the subject to his superior. The Department Commander was not in any way responsible for the judgment of the military Court. The law did not place the revision of the proceedings in his hands and he could not interpose between the reviewing officer and the Court. When its judgment was officially announced, then, but not until then, it was competent for him to say whether the public interests required an immediate compliance with the judgment, or a postponement of the execution. He judged that the interests of his command required the consummation of the proceedings, and he instructed me accordingly. I did not think it necessary that you should know what determination I may have reached in reference to obeying those instructions. I do not think it now incumbent on me to tell you. It was a military question between General Smith and me. You had nothing to do with it, nor have you now anything to do with it. You might have considered it an imperi- nence in me to have volunteered my purposes in reference to my military Commander. But I conceived it my duty, as I had responded to the writ, to possess the Court with the knowledge of all matters calculated to affect the prisoner. I therefore reported the instructions I had received. The question had been before the civil Court many days. I did not know but a determination had already been reached. If so it was

probable that I might receive it by the time fixed for the execution. If the decision of the civil Court were in favor of the jurisdiction of the Court Martial the order of General Smith could be obeyed and no question would arise between us. If it were adverse, there would be a conflict of authority in which I must take the responsibility of disobeying either my military superior or the civil Court. It is not strange that I sought to relieve myself from the embarrassment and to avail myself of any opportunity that might properly offer to obey the orders of my military superior if the decision of the civil Court were favorable to the jurisdiction of the Court Martial. But I heard neither from you nor from General Smith. Notwithstanding this the prisoner was not executed. I regarded the civil authority as the superior of the two. I awaited its action and obeyed its mandate. General Smith fully approved my action, and the facts show that the order given by him was given under an erroneous supposition that no writ had been issued. By limiting our action strictly to our duty I think we have avoided the errors into which the civil Court has fallen, when, to use the language of your written opinion it has discussed matters "not necessary for the decision of the questions immediately presented for solution."

I am surprised that you should state so positively that the first letter to which I allude as having been written to General Smith, "was between, say the 1st and 6th of August." Fortunately I need not go further than your own previous statements to refute this supposition on your part. It appears from your narrative of the progress of the case, that the writ of Habeas Corpus when issued, about the 6th of August, was served on General Walker, who was then in command. You state that at that time the trial was represented as only progressing. You state that on the 7th, General Walker, who was still in command, requested you to make the writ returnable in Alexandria; and that you accordingly made it returnable there on the 12th of August.— You state that you were too ill to attend the trial. The writ therefore died because you did not renew it. You also mention the General Order of Major-Gen. Walker, which was dated August 17th, at which date he was necessarily in command and which approved the sentence of the Court Martial. It appears further from your narrative that it was not until after the issuance of this order, and when it was repre-

mented to you that the trial was concluded that the writ was revived by your touch and converted into the new writ to which I allude. It was then for the first time addressed to me, who, subsequent to the 17th of August succeeded Gen. Walker—and was made returnable at Natchitoches. How can you reconcile with your own previous history of this case, this new decision that I, as the Commander of the District, had, "between the 1st and 6th of August," before the trial was completed and before I had assumed command, reported to General Smith the day which had been fixed for the execution? If you can so misconceive the tenor of your own statements it is perhaps unreasonable in me to expect you to draw correct deductions from mine. The fact is that I did not assume command until Aug. 18th, and the letter in question was written on the 19th of the same month—and that at the time at which you so positively infer that I wrote the letter, I was actually in Texas and knew nothing whatever of the case. The action of General Smith will appear in a still clearer light, when I make a correction which I desire to make in reference to my letter of the 19th of August. My previous communication was written from my recollection of the statements contained in that letter and at a moment when it was not of ready access. A reference to the letter book to-day shows that the letter of the 19th simply reports the official action of my predecessor in the case, and does not refer to the subject of the Habeas Corpus. My reference to the Habeas Corpus was not made until the 28th; and it was altogether unlikely that General Smith could have received information of the issuance of the writ, before the instructions to execute the sentence were given.

I deeply regret that I have unintentionally done you injustice in reference to the annotation made on the record of the Court Martial. I have this excuse for my error. The record was left with you. I did not conceive that it would be placed in the hands of the Counsel of the prisoner. I could not see why he, who was merely pleading the cause of his client before you could undertake to make an addition to the record in your hands and sit in judgment upon the acts of the Court Martial. I deemed you responsible that the record should be returned in the same condition that it was placed in your keeping. You sent it to me by the hands of the Hon. Mr. Kemmer, M. C. It is now in precisely the same condi-

tion in which I received it from him. I could not for a moment think that Mr. Keener the bearer of the record, could make any alteration in it. His character and all the circumstances attending him, as simply the medium of communicating the record precluded the supposition. It was reasonable therefore for me to conclude that you were responsible for the annotation. It bore the signature which every one to whom it has been submitted, before and since the reception of your last letter, has read as the first two letters of your name. It is with satisfaction, however, that I add, that your disavowal completely exonerates you from any complicity in this matter; and in my statement on the record, it will be with pleasure that I will render you that justice.

I regret that you think the tone of my letter to you improper. It was not intended to be offensive. I considered myself improperly the subject of your animadversions. I considered that your reply to the Marshal looked to the "execution" upon me of what I regard as the illegal part of your decree. I considered that I had cause to complain of an unnecessary use and improper construction of my letter, which was made unjustly to reflect upon another officer. I knew that that officer entertained the greatest respect for the civil authorities, and the history which I gave of the case showed that both he and I had rendered implicit obedience to that authority. In the face of this you commented in the harshest manner and in a way in which I thought myself embraced, upon our disregard of civil law. My letter to you was intended to refute what I considered unjust allegations in your written opinion. I did not cast stones—I sought only to employ a shield. I regard a proper administration of the military body as one of the most efficient supports you can receive. I consider it my duty to render that support. But I consider also that erroneous allegations against the action of the military authorities should be refuted. If they were not refuted, the stain which they inflicted—though immediate would remain and impair our influence for good. A proper sense of justice and official dignity required me to notice your animadversions. As Gen. Walker's successor, having charge of the record of the Court Martial, it was particularly incumbent on me to notice the unauthorized addition made to the record, and which I disregarded as an act of disrespect and of contempt towards the action of a legal tribunal. I spoke plainly on the subjects which I thought it my duty to ne-

ce. I think I spoke dispassionately. I did not intend to be offensive and I regret that you considered that I was. A reiteration of errors of judgment does not, with me, involve personal feeling. I have told you wherein I have thought your judgment wrong, and your animadversions indecorous and unjust. I intended nothing more. My letter has convinced you of some of these errors and you express regret. Your reply has shown me that I have committed unintentionally an injustice to you. For that I desire to make every amend.

I expressed in my former letter, my regret as feeling compelled to write to you on this subject. That regret will be lessened, if the issue should be the establishment between the civil and military authorities of relations of confidence and mutual support so essential, under existing circumstances, to the maintenance of discipline in the army, and of civil liberty in the country.

Rest assured, sir, that you will not find me wanting either in respect to yourself personally, or to the judgments of the Court over which you preside.

I am, sir,

Very respectfully,

S. B. BUCKNER,

Lieut-General Comd'g. District.

To Hon. E. WARREN MOISE, Judge Confederate Court, for District La., Natchitoches, La.

—
NATCHITOCHEs, Nov. 6th, 1864.

GENERAL:

Your letter of the 29th was received the day before yesterday, and would have been answered more promptly, but for a severe headache. I shall reply to some portions of it. I excise from this, as from my previous letter, any criticism on or rejoinder to your views as to the correctness of the opinion and decree in the McKee case, as also all comment on what you think proper to regard as an attack on the military authorities. I desire, however, to correct an error into which you have fallen. You say, "to use the language of your written opinion, it has discussed matters 'not necessary for the decision of the questions immediately presented for solution,'" and in another place you observe that "you state in your argument that much that you will say is not necessary for the decision of the questions presented for solution." A reference to the opinion (a copy of which I received a few days since) will shew that what I said was that "the magnitude of the principles involved" &c., has "induced me to *put on* re-

corla full and detailed account of the case from the beginning, although this is not necessary for the decision of the questions immediately presented for solution." I shall not stop to inquire whether in judicial opinions it is unusual to go into a more complete history of the case, than is essential for the rendition of a judgment.

You appear to think that I was not aware that the reviewing officer, or his successor was "the person to act on the sentence of the Court Martial." You are mistaken. A very recent statute (Feb. 17, 1864) had impressed this on my memory. It was the knowledge of the law on the subject that occasioned surprise when the inference was drawn that the day for the execution had been designated in an order from Department Headquarters, and there was some speculation by others, as well as myself, as to the embarrassment to which such an order might subject you—an embarrassment, by the way, on which you animadvert in your letter. Your letter of the 21st October gave me the opportunity of relieving Gen. Smith from the responsibility of having issued this order. I think that neither of us will be able to convince the other of the correctness or incorrectness of the inference I drew from your communication of September 6th. Your letter before me affords very ample materials for a farther discussion of that question but as I do not perceive any good that can come from it. I hope you will agree with me in the propriety of dropping the subject.

You are correct in saying that I erred in assuming the date of your letter to Gen. Smith to be between the 1st and 6th. It appears that you were not in command until the 18th. Having no copy of my opinion nor any memoranda from which to refresh my memory, it is not to be wondered at that I made this mistake of date in a matter wholly immaterial. This mistake of mine in a letter to you (not in the opinion) arose in this way: You informed me that "having learned the purpose" of McKee to apply for the writ of Habeas Corpus, you wrote the letter which Gen. Smith "misapprehending," directed you not to delay the execution. Now as the writ was issued about the 6th (that is the alias writ, the original was in July,) it appeared to me, that as at the time you wrote to Gen. S. you had only "learned the purpose" of McKee to apply for the writ, your letter to Gen. S. must have been written before the 6th, the date of the issuance of the writ.

On the 18th, when you took command, the writ had been outstanding nearly two weeks. In other words, when you wrote to Gen. S. the prisoner's "*purpose*" was accomplished. I could not possibly suppose that when you wrote that you addressed Gen. S. at the time you "learned the purpose" of McKee to apply for the writ, that your letter was written after that "*purpose*" was consummated. I think you labor under some confusion of ideas about writs and return days, and that your want of precision was the result of this. But the subject is not worth dwelling upon. You will permit me to remark *en passant*, that you certainly ought to excuse me for this error of date, when I had no materials to refer to, when you, yourself with access, if not "ready access," to your letter book, inform me that a letter which you thought you had written on the 19th, was in fact, not written until the 28th. A word in reference to the record and the "note." The record was handed to me by Lieut. Fenselie, and was never out of my possession until it was sent to you. It was, doubtless, used by the counsel on both sides to prepare their arguments, before it was handed to me.

In reference to the remark made by me in a private letter to the Marshal (an old acquaintance for whom I have great regard,) that degrees are "executed not served." I had no more intention of saying any thing disrespectful of you than I had of speaking disrespectfully of Louis Napoleon. This disclaimer will be sufficient without going into any narrative in relation to the circumstances under which this language was used.

This correspondence was commenced by you, I suppose, with two objects:

1st. To induce me to do justice where I had done injustice.

2d. To find fault with me for the "note" in the record.

I have acknowledged the injustice I have done Gen. S., though I have insisted on the justice of the inference that occasioned it. You have acknowledged your error in charging me with writing the "note," &c.

I placed in the opinion your letter of Sept. 6th from which I drew the inference of which you complain, so that if I erred the reader could detect the error. You say that I made my "misconception the basis of an allegation against an innocent party," and in doing so I acted differently from others who had also made misconceptions. To your candor I submit the inquiry whether you are not amenable to the censure you

attach to me? Have you not made an allegation against me wholly unfounded, and to which I did not contribute directly or indirectly?

You will ever find me willing to act in harmony with the military authorities when I can do so consistently with my duty. I desire to cultivate the best relations with all. You act on your sense of duty, I act on mine, and both of us will continue so to act, and I trust without danger of collision, or disrespect. I close this correspondence in the same good spirit with which I entered into it, and take pleasure in subscribing myself,

Very respectfully,

Your obt. serv't.,

E. WARREN MOISE.

To S. B. BUCKNER,

Lt.-Gen. Com'g., &c., Alex., La.

HEADQUARTERS, DIST. WESTERN LA. }
Alexandria, Nov. 10th, 1864. }

SIR—Your letter of the 6th inst reached me yesterday. When wise heads have been involved in doubt in reference to your opinion, it is perhaps excusable in one so unlearned as I to "labor under some confusion of ideas in reference to writs and return days," as discussed by you. But neither you nor any other person can doubt, reading my letters, that the writ to which I allude was the one which was received and served upon me. No one will pretend that the writ or as you learnedly term it the "*alios* writ" possessed the virtues of the fabled Phoenix and after expiring on the 12th, could spring up with fresh life from its own ashes. It required your revivifying breath to enkindle new life, and it required a fresh representation or application of the prisoner's counsel to induce that action on your part. Whatever "confusion" may appear from my failure to employ the learned language of the law, in reference to the large family of "writs" and "return days," my meaning, expressed in plain English is so clear that you justly remark, "the subject is not worth dwelling upon." The justice of your criticism is therefore not perceived, as I am not yet a convert to the maxim that the purpose of language is to conceal ideas instead of to elucidate them.

I do not perceive the force of your argu-

ment which, after you express regret for the injustice you have done General Smith, now seeks to justify, or palliate the publication of the allegation on the ground that it be incorrect a careful reader might detect the error by discovering that the published extract from my letter does not sustain the allegation. The difference between your position and mine in this particular is, that my allegation with your disavowal were sent forth together; and had the dimensions of the newspaper admitted it, my acknowledgment of the error with the reasons which had led me into it, would also have accompanied your explanation. This acknowledgment on my part, already made to you, is delayed in publication from no fault of mine.

You remark that you "had no more intention of saying anything disrespectful of me than of speaking disrespectfully of Louis Napoleon." As I think you introduced a great many foreign elements into the discussion of the question which evoked your opinion, and as I am not advised of the personal relations existing between you and the Emperor of the French, or how you may have considered him responsible for the improper arrest of McKee, it might be unsafe in me to hazard any deduction from this association of my name with that of so eminent a personage. I assure you however that it is certainly gratifying to me to find, as I do from a perusal of both of your letters, that you are convinced that I sought to pay full respect to the decision of your Court.

As I think I have said all that is necessary on the matters which were the subjects of discussion between us, I readily accede to your suggestion of "dropping the subject" which I took up reluctantly, without personal feeling, and only from a sense of duty.

In conclusion, let me add, that it is also in the kindest spirit that I close this discussion, and that I reciprocate your wish for the most cordial co-operation in future of the civil and military authorities of the District.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obt. servant,

(Signed)

S. B. BUCKNER,

Lt.-Gen. Com'g. Dist.

To Hon. E. WARREN MOISE, Judge C. S.
Dist. Court, Natchitoches, La.

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