





3 1761 04131 6001

CORRESPONDENCE OF
LORD BURGHERSH
1808 - 1840









Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

CORRESPONDENCE OF LORD BURGHERSH



SARAH, COUNTESS OF WESTMORLAND.

E.B.
~~W5334C~~

CORRESPONDENCE OF LORD BURGHESH

AFTERWARDS ELEVENTH EARL
OF WESTMORLAND

1808—1840

EDITED BY HIS GRANDDAUGHTER
RACHEL WEIGALL

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

128828
24 | 7 | 13

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1912

D
352
.8
W4A4
1912

PREFACE

WITH the centenary of the Napoleonic period interest in all that relates to that time has been stimulated. The inner history of great events is being constantly revealed, and fresh points of view presented by the publication of memoirs and biographies of an earlier generation. It is therefore hoped this collection of letters from Lord Burghersh's private and official correspondence may interest the general reader who, preferring fact to fiction, finds recreation in the personal records written by those who took an active part in moulding the destinies of nations.

Though circumstances placed Lord Burghersh in the midst of great events, he was but one of many who played a part at a time when the names of Wellington and Napoleon overshadowed all others. It has therefore seemed better that the short introductory sketches of contemporary events should serve more as a background to elucidate and connect the letters, rather than to enter into the private life of Lord Burghersh, which was singularly happy and domestic.

I should like to take this opportunity of offering my thanks to Lord Westmorland, for having placed our grandfather's papers at my disposal, and to the Duke

of Portland, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Londonderry, and Lord Heytesbury, for having given their consent to the publication of letters written by their relatives.

I am also much indebted to Mr. Marindin and Mr. Murray for their valuable advice in preparing the book for press.

R. W.

August, 1912.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. PARENTAGE—EARLY MILITARY LIFE: 1804 TO 1808	1
II. THE PENINSULAR WAR: 1809 TO 1812 - - -	15
III. WITH THE ALLIED ARMIES: JANUARY TO APRIL, 1814 - - - - -	53
IV. MINISTER AT FLORENCE: DECEMBER, 1814, TO FEBRUARY, 1815 - - - - -	61
V. NAPOLEON'S ESCAPE: FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1815	101
VI. MURAT'S REVOLT: MARCH AND APRIL, 1815 -	123
VII. ADVANCE OF MURAT: APRIL AND MAY, 1815 -	144
VIII. THE HUNDRED DAYS: MARCH TO AUGUST, 1815 -	171
IX. MURAT'S END: SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER, 1815 -	192
X. THE SECOND BOURBON RESTORATION: SEPTEMBER, 1815, TO JULY, 1816 - - - - -	205
XI. THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: JUNE, 1818, TO MAY, 1820 - - - - -	217
XII. REVOLUTION IN NAPLES: SEPTEMBER, 1820, TO JUNE, 1821 - - - - -	226
XIII. ENGLISH AFFAIRS: 1823 TO 1832 - - -	251
XIV. THE EASTERN QUESTION: 1838 TO 1840 - -	275
INDEX - - - - -	294

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	TO FACE PAGE
SARAH, COUNTESS OF WESTMORLAND -	<i>Frontispiece</i>
JOHN FANE, LORD BURGHERSH - - -	128
From a painting in the possession of Lady Rose Weigall.	
THE RIGHT HON. LORD BURGHERSH, K.C.B. - -	224
After Sir Thomas Lawrence, P.R.A.	
LEOPOLD I., KING OF THE BELGIANS - - -	278
From a pastel drawing by Sir George Hayter.	
MAP: SPAIN AND PORTUGAL - -	<i>page</i> 16

CORRESPONDENCE OF LORD BURGHESH

CHAPTER I

PARENTAGE—EARLY MILITARY LIFE

JOHN FANE, Lord Burghesh, was the only son of the tenth Earl of Westmorland and Sarah, only child and heiress of Robert Child, banker, whose marriage at Gretna Green on May 20th, 1782, was an eighteenth-century romance. Enough to say here that, being very much in love and brooking no opposition, Lord Westmorland and his bride fled to Scotland, Mr. Child in hot pursuit. He arrived over the border too late; his daughter was already Lady Westmorland. Furious at the frustration of his desire for her to make what he considered a suitable alliance, Mr. Child made a will leaving his immense fortune and fine property at Osterley Park in the female line, so that no heir of his son-in-law should benefit by it. He had naturally wished for a son-in-law who would be able to take over the conduct of the banking house, impossible in those days for a man of Lord Westmorland's position, to say nothing of the fact that he was somewhat of a spendthrift. A year later, a reconciliation having taken place, Mr. Child intended to alter the will, but died suddenly before doing so.

Lord Burghesh was born on February 3rd, 1784. The child of romance was destined to live his life in the great world—as a young man amidst the clash of arms which followed the French Revolution, and later as a leading figure in the diplomatic strifes which followed those wars, when the principle of nationality

aroused by the call to arms was to find its true patriotism in an almost equally severe struggle for political liberty.

In 1790 Lord Westmorland was appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and in a childish letter to his grandmother Lord Burghersh, then seven years old, after describing how he rides "three times a week in the Riding School and full gallop," adds: "I was at the Birthday Ball, and stood under the canopy behind Mama and Papa." His school-days were passed at Cheam, and afterwards at Harrow, and at eighteen he entered the army as an Ensign. Two years later he started on a military tour to visit the battle-fields of the Rhine. In 1807 he went with his regiment to Sicily, the town of Palermo being under British protection, and from that time until the Congress of Vienna was, with short intervals, employed in active service.

By the Peace of Amiens, March, 1802, a truce had been declared between France and England, both weary of war. This agreement, however, was but general, and from its nature could be but temporary.

Among other important questions left undecided was that concerning the surrender of the island of Malta to the Knights of St. John. The refusal of Great Britain to consent to such surrender was the signal for fresh hostilities to break out in May, 1803.

Napoleon Bonaparte was then rising to the zenith of his power. His Grand Army was assembled at Boulogne, and the invasion of England appeared imminent. The Government at home then put forth all its power to induce the chief countries of Europe to take an active part against the French on the Continent. Of these Powers, Prussia maintained a neutrality, Austria was ready and willing to fight, Russia wished to stand well with England for purposes of trade, though the Emperor Alexander was personally inclined to Napoleon, whose one staunch ally was Spain.

The annexation to the French Empire of Lucca and Genoa brought about a crisis which decided Austria and Russia to take up arms at once. Napoleon, no longer able to contemplate the invasion of England, owing to the annihilation of the French and Spanish

fleets at Trafalgar (October 21st, 1805), brought the Grand Army into Germany, and utterly defeated the combined Austrian and Russian troops at Austerlitz on December 2nd, 1805. Prussia no longer remained neutral, and the campaign of Jena in October, 1806, added a fresh victory to the French arms.

The invasion of Russia followed, ending with the Peace of Tilsit, July, 1807, by which Napoleon gained the domination over both Russia and Prussia. With the object of adding another subject kingdom to his frontier, Napoleon had conferred the kingdom of Naples, including the island of Sicily, upon his brother, Joseph Bonaparte.

But the Sicilians refused to acknowledge any Sovereign except Ferdinand, the deposed King of the Two Sicilies, who retired to Palermo, at that time garrisoned by British troops.

An attack from the island under General Stuart was made upon the mainland, resulting in a victory at Maida, which, however, was not in time to prevent the capitulation of Gaeta to the French in July, 1806. Early in the following year another expedition set out for the Dardanelles to assist Russia in an undertaking against the Turks. After being repulsed before Constantinople, an attack was made upon Egypt, this, too being unsuccessful.

Hitherto the policy of the English Government had been chiefly in favour of isolated expeditions and the occupation of islands, which could be carried out under the protection of the fleet. The success of our arms in purely military undertakings had been very slight, but now it was resolved to try a different method, and make a determined effort to try and break the invincibility of the French by sending a powerful army against them on the Continent. For this purpose a friendly base of operations was necessary, and the opportunity for it arose in Portugal. This country was England's most faithful ally, and had been invaded by a combined force of French and Spanish under Junot in 1807. At its approach the Prince Regent had fled, and the nation, resenting his departure, offered little resistance to the invaders. But soon feeling the oppression of military government, on the withdrawal of the Spanish troops (in consequence of a revolution

in their own country against the French) the Portuguese rose and declared themselves independent of France. The best of their troops having been sent by Junot to assist the Grand Army in Germany, the assertion of Portuguese independence was much handicapped, and an appeal for help was made to England. A strong force under Sir Arthur Wellesley was immediately despatched to their assistance, and, marching south, defeated Junot at Vimeiro, August 21st, 1808.

By the Convention of Cintra (August 30th) the French agreed to evacuate Portugal, thus leaving it free as a base of operations for England, from which, in the following year, the Peninsular War was prosecuted.

Lord Burghersh to his Father, Lord Westmorland.

BERLIN,
June 7th, 1804.

DEAR FATHER,

I had intended writing to you sooner, but I have waited for an answer to my letter proposing a military tour, which I have not as yet received; and as the time in which I must take it begins to approach, I determined to set off to-morrow on the route I have sent you. You will see the object is chiefly to visit the fields of battle of the armies on the Rhine during the last war, than which for the instruction of a military man there is unquestionably nothing more serviceable, and particularly so as the officer who is with me commanded the whole of the horse artillery in those campaigns, and being in addition attached to the Commander-in-Chief, was perfectly acquainted with all the dispositions.

I have left England now about a year, and my expenses are, first, the £200 given me for the journey, and £610 up to this time—that is, £10 more than my allowance; but that you will not care about. I take it

the journey I am now going to make will cost me something more than the others, because, in addition to the post-horses, I shall be obliged to take saddle-horses to visit the different fields of battle; and besides, as the time of returning to England approaches nearer, one is more likely to lay out money in purchasing articles one could not meet with at home, and particularly as I have some commissions from Lady Westmorland and my sisters; but I am sure you will have no objection to any just or reasonable expenses. I bought a carriage at Vienna which cost me £65; it is a tolerable good one, but I was forced to buy one of some sort, as it was impossible any longer to be taking the chance of another person's carriage.

I am hearing every day of the system of raising soldiers for rank; it would be useless in me to mention to you how much it is my object to get out of the subordinate ranks in the army, and therefore, if it were possible, I should desire to raise a regiment; but as my object in the military line is rather to look forward to the higher rank of General, I should be very sorry to do anything which should frustrate it, or even retard my promotion; but I mention the raising a regiment in case you could make some stipulation that I should continue to have permanent rank, as in the case of Lords Paget and Craven. You must be aware how unpleasant it would be to me to be commanded by a younger person than myself, and particularly as, whatever I may be in other sciences, I do flatter myself I should yield to few of my age in the art of war. I therefore should beg of you, if possible, to get me in some line of advancement.

I shall be at Prague at the latter end of September, which will be the third Austrian encampment I have

seen. What I shall do from there I do not know, but if you think there will be no necessity for my returning to England, I should think the best way would be to pass the winter in the North—namely, in Russia and in Sweden; but I shall hear from you before that, and I think there may be something which may call me to England, for I must say I expect some new and strenuous military measure will be adopted under your and Mr. Pitt's* administration, in which I may hope to get a feeble military shove.

You had better in future direct your letters to Mr. Jackson, as he will have the goodness to forward them to me according to my directions. I am a little puzzled how to act with respect to the officer I have with me, but I suppose if I give him £50 when he has been with me to Prague it will be enough; he is a very clever soldier, and has been of infinite use to me.

Pray give my love to Lady Westmorland† and my sisters, and believe me,

Your affectionate son,

BURGHESH.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

PALERMO,
January 11th, 1807.

MY DEAR FATHER,

I arrived in Sicily with Mr. Drummond about three weeks ago. The army is entirely on the other side of the island; but as it has been decided that, for the present, no offensive operation shall take place, I am remaining here.

When I last wrote to you I was inclined to believe

* Mr. Pitt succeeded Mr. Addington as Prime Minister in April, 1804.

† Lord Burghersh's step-mother.

there would be a corps of Italians formed in Sicily; upon my arrival I found it was so, and that up to that time there had been no Lieutenant-Colonel appointed. I have written to General Fox to ask for the appointment, but as yet could not have received an answer; indeed, I do not much expect to succeed, for as there is a Major already appointed, the General may make an objection to putting me over his head, although the latter has had the rank only two months.

If (as we have it now reported) the French have been beaten in the North, we may expect to have some fighting in Italy. The French are weak in these parts of the world, and our forces here would be equal to driving them from Naples; but if the remainder of their forces are not otherwise employed, it would be but of little service to make a movement which must in the beginning be attended with loss, and in the end by the massacre of the people who espoused our cause.

I hope you have spoken to the Duke* about my rank. I made his kindness to me one of the arguments for getting the appointment I applied for; but I hope that in one way or another I shall get advanced before the campaign is over.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

OFF TENIDOS,
February 6th, 1807.

DEAR FATHER,

We are just returned from Constantinople, after two severe actions in passing the Dardanelles, and after having been *frightened* at the fleet, etc., of the *Porte*. I fear we cannot boast of more than of having fought bravely, having destroyed twelve sail of men-of-war,

* *I.e.*, the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief of the forces.

and having been in a position where, with abler men, a great deal more might have been done. But we are Englishmen, and I believe by nature not negotiators; the event will prove the fact. But let whatever have been in our power, nothing can excuse the English Minister having sent seven ships of line to impose the most disgraceful terms upon an empire of such resources as the Turks. How a Government could have asked an empire to "*deliver up their fleet,*" "to renounce all connection with *France,*" and to make peace, and a *disgraceful* one, with Russia, with only seven ships of the line and not a single soldier to enforce their terms, is to me incomprehensible, and when there were at Constantinople, not including the twelve destroyed at Abydos, 12 sail of the line and 14 frigates, ready for sea, and six or seven more of the line nearly so, besides more than 200 pieces of cannon mounted on the walls of the town. But these are calculations into which it is difficult to enter. The natural inference would be that those who conceived such a plan must be mad; but in England they are Ministers, and in this part of the world we are only to put their plans into execution if we can, for which we are now going to Egypt. We shall sail from here in two days, and I suppose arrive at Alexandria about the time the troops will do so from Sicily. I can now congratulate myself on having seen service; it has not been quite in my own profession, although a trifling but disgraceful affair on the Prince's Island was partly military. I offered my services, but was only accepted as a volunteer, in which character I went on every duty that was undertaken. I only scrape the honour of having taken the swords of the officers in the line of battle ships which I boarded, and of being told that, if the plan

I offered for the attack of Prince's Island had been pursued, a different event would have been the consequence. All this is flattering, but I look at it as so much in the way of making me some day an officer of some consideration in the English army that is always my object, and I may say I came upon this expedition, as I went with Sir T. Lewis's fleet in the summer, that I might see in every situation the service of war. I hope these feelings will not act against my promotion, and I must say it will be hard if I should always be put on a footing with Lord Petersham* and others, who rise to be my superiors by seeing six years' service in the Park!

I do not know in what situation I shall find myself in Egypt: General Fraser, a friend of mine, I believe, commands the troops that are, I suppose, about 5,000. When I arrive there I shall be able to settle what service will be the most instructive; but if we are to be quiet possessors without fighting, I do not think I shall remain long.

I hope soon to hear from you, which I have not done since my arrival in the Mediterranean, and I hope your letter will bring me some hopes of promotion.

We have been a considerable time in the sight of Troy: of the old one there are no vestiges; of that built by Alexander there are still some temples; but as no one can land without the certainty of having his head off, I do not think it worth the price.

You will hardly believe that in the four forts of the Dardanelles there are 300 and odd pieces of cannon: the two inner castles only a mile across, and firing marble shot, some of them the enormous weight of 900 pounds; if you can believe me, pray do, for I assure

* Afterwards fourth Earl of Harrington. He held the rank of Colonel in the army.

you I have seen three weighed, one 750, second 820, and third 900 all but 2 pounds. One of this last calibre came across the quarter-deck near where I was standing, and smashed 3 men, so that there were only the legs of one, a part of the shoulder of another, remaining. These you may think stories, but I assure you they are facts, and it is a miracle that none of our ships were sunk.

I hope I shall soon have occasion to write to you from Egypt. These are interesting parts of the world, and I hope I shall not leave them without advantage.

I remain,
Your very affectionate son,
BURGHESH.

OFF THE DARDANELLES,
February 18th, 1807.

DEAR FATHER,

You will be surprised to find I am still on this side the Dardanelles; but the wind has been constantly unfair since our arrival, and till to-day we have had no prospect of a change. The wind is now fair, and if you receive this letter we shall have passed the passage on the 19th.

From the Turks we have received no information, except that they are determined to oppose us. They have been throwing up some new batteries under the direction of French engineers, but we hope the lazy Turk has not as yet been able to complete them; however, they have fortified the strong castles of Sestos and Abydos with cannon that carry immense marble shot, and placed on a narrow wall of a mile and a half. The shipping fear more from these castles than from anything else, but after having passed them we

expect to meet no difficulty in our way to Constantinople, and we hope very little there, although there are twenty-four ships of the line and about twenty frigates.

The Russians have got us into this new war; the Porte had granted something that was asked, and after it was apparently settled the Russians took possession of Moldavia and Wallachia, in consequence of which the Turks declared war; and Arbuthnot,* conceiving it right to support our only allies, has determined to put in execution the threat of taking the Turkish fleet and Egypt, for the execution of which this squadron is now going up and the troops are embarked from Sicily. I hope we shall be successful. I shall have no means of communication till we return from the Sea of Marmora, as of course, after having passed, we can only get back by another fight.

My love to Lady Westmorland and my sisters, and believe me,

Your most affectionate son,

BURGHESH.

ALEXANDRIA,
March 29th, 1807.

DEAR FATHER,

We arrived off this place the day it capitulated; as there was but little fighting, I do not so much regret not having been present. Rosetta and the places of the Delta are not yet in our hands, but are to be attacked by a division under General Meade. Sir T. Duckworth is now getting under way, but, as there will be ships of war going to Malta in a few weeks, I have determined to remain here for that time. I shall be put in orders as Aide-de-Camp to Meade, and

* Charles Arbuthnot (1767-1850), diplomatist and politician. Ambassador Extraordinary at Constantinople 1804-1807.

shall be with the army during its active operation, after which I shall return to Palermo.

I have not as yet received any letter from you, nor do I at all know what is doing in your part of the world. We hear the Russians have beat the French in a second engagement,* but I am convinced that before this time the fate of Europe has been in a great measure decided. I do not understand the movements of Ministers. If it was their plan to have a British army in Sicily to act in Italy in case of a favourable opportunity, they have destroyed it by taking Alexandria, and I very much doubt if 12,000 men now remaining is equal to defending Sicily.

Pray remember to push my promotion; I hope I shall deserve it, if showing desire to be active in my profession is any recommendation.

Remember me to Lady Westmorland, and believe me,

Your affectionate son,

BURGHERSH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Burghersh.†

LAVOS,
August 3rd, 1808.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I received this morning your letter of yesterday, and your report is very satisfactory. I landed this day, the infantry and artillery having nearly completed their disembarkation. I hope we shall have everything on shore to-morrow.

I should very much like to have a report of the state

* Napoleon attacked the Russians at Eylau in February, 1807, and after a long fight the Russians eventually retired, after inflicting severe losses on the French army.

† Published in the Duke of Wellington's despatches, compiled by Colonel Gurwood, vol. iii., p. 51.

of things at Visen, and I have nothing else for you to do here at present. If I should move before your return, which is not very probable, you can easily overtake me.

I think that if I can get 5,000 good Portuguese troops and 2,000 regulars it is as much of that description as I shall want; more would only embarrass us, and I think it very desirable that we should have an eye to the course of Douro. I suspect the truth of these second and third Spanish victories in the neighbourhood of Benevente, and I see clearly that, at all events, the intelligence respecting them given to Colonel Trant is not correct, for he is mistaken in repeating the date, even of the first action, which took place on the 14th, and not on the 12th; and he says that a reinforcement came from Andalusia, which is the southern kingdom of the Peninsula. The same reasons, therefore, which induced me to confine my requisition of Portuguese troops to 5,000 men, and to recommend a collection of troops to watch the enemy's movements from the northward, still exist.

Ever yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

LAVOS,*
August 5th, 1808.

MY DEAR BURGHESII,

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 4th instant. The difficulties and inconveniences attending the state of the arms of the Portuguese troops will, I hope, be removed entirely as soon as they will receive the English arms, which I have sent to them, and some ammunition.

* Published in the Duke of Wellington's despatches, vol. iii., p. 52.

I am obliged to you for your routes. One of them, that of the left column, is the best road of the three; but I am afraid that we shall not be able to use it, as in one very important part of it there is no communication between that road and the others on its right. Loison has retired across the Tagus. The situation of my friends the Spaniards gave me some uneasiness when I heard that he had passed.

Spencer has arrived, and his corps will probably be here to-morrow. You had better return, therefore, as I shall march as soon as they shall be on shore.

Ever, dear Burghersh,

Yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.


CHAPTER II

THE PENINSULAR WAR


IN spite of his signal victory at Vimeiro, Sir Arthur Wellesley was recalled to England, as were also two other Generals, Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple, each of whom had in turn superseded Sir Arthur. Sir John Moore now took command of the army. The differences between French and Spaniards in Spain had broken out into open warfare at the attempt of Napoleon to place his brother Joseph, then on the throne of Naples, on that of Spain in June, 1808. The capitulation of the French at Baylen brought Napoleon in person to conduct affairs, and after three decisive victories he entered Madrid on December 13th. On hearing this news, Sir John Moore marched northward, with the object of drawing the French troops away, and so preventing the invasion of Andalusia. The French command was now taken over by Soult (Napoleon returning to fight against Austria), and the Battle of Corunna took place on January 16th, 1809.

Soult, in spite of great losses, turned south to invade Portugal and occupy Oporto. Sir Arthur Wellesley was now sent out again from England to take command. He at once drove Soult back from Oporto, and, marching towards Madrid, gained the victory of Talavera (July 28). This engagement was not, however, sufficiently decisive to prevent the French occupying Andalusia, but it proved to those at home that the change of policy was right, and that they had a General capable of carrying it to a successful issue. Hitherto there had been some division in the Government as to the wisdom of the new method, but now, inspired by belief in their military leader, the country supported and encouraged Wellington* in forming the Anglo-

* Sir Arthur Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington after his victory at Talavera.



**SPAIN
AND
PORTUGAL**



Prussian units into a magnificent fighting army, disciplined and efficient. To carry out this work of organization, he retired into winter-quarters at Badajoz. In the summer of 1810 active operations were resumed, Marshal Masséna marching from the north-east, and Soult from the south-east, intending to drive the British out of Portugal and join forces at Lisbon.

Wellington fell back before Masséna to Busaco, where the latter was repulsed. The Anglo-Portuguese troops then retired to the defensive lines of Torres Vedras, devastating the country as they went. This made it very difficult for Masséna to maintain his army, and Soult not coming to his help as expected, Masséna was unable to attack again, and in the spring of 1811 retired into Spain.

Throughout this campaign Lord Burghersh served as Aide-de-Camp to Lord Wellington. He had quickly got promotion, but owing to an informality his rank of Lieutenant-Colonel was cancelled. This was a serious professional set-back, and naturally a great disappointment to a keen soldier.

After the retirement of Masséna, Lord Burghersh was invalided home. He became a frequent visitor at the house of Lord Wellington's brother, Mr. Wellesley Pole, renewing an acquaintance with the Pole family, begun three years previously at Brighton. The friendship he had then made soon ripened into intimacy, and on June 11th, 1811, he married the youngest daughter, Priscilla. Lord Wellington was delighted at this marriage of his favourite niece. He wrote to congratulate Lord Burghersh, and in the letter gives a review of affairs in the Peninsula. Lord Burghersh now returned for a time to regimental duty at Brighton and Ipswich.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh.

DOWNING STREET,
May 31st, 1809.

DEAR BURGHESH,

Your father will have communicated to you the considerations which have induced him on your part to waive the promotion you had received. Had the question stood on the grounds we first argued it, and

had your six years' service been open to no cavil (however strong the feeling is even amongst our own friends on the general subject), I think we could have stood upon it; but the fact which came to our knowledge for the first time in the course of the debate—namely—that your commission as Ensign bears date nine months before your name was submitted to the King—has opened so new and so serious a difficulty as to deprive us of all hope of reconciling the House to it, as coming within the spirit of the conditions upon which the King had declared his consent to take your case out of the Regulations lately published.* The practice of antedating is not very defensible in itself; and if it could be defended on the ground of precedent, I believe no case could be produced where it could be carried so far back. The same reasoning would call in question your commission as Captain, which was granted within the two years of reckoning from the *Gazette* of December, 1803, but here the commission is *perfected*. That of the majority and lieutenant-colonelcy is not signed; and although the King's prerogative is indisputable, the opinion was that to complete the present arrangement under all the circumstances of the case itself, and the persevering attacks against it, was not to be attempted.

You see I have written undisguisedly on this painful subject; I know your liberal and manly mind will be best reconciled to a serious professional disappointment by learning the truth. I feel very deeply myself

* Promotion in the army had for some time been largely due to intrigue and backstairs influence. The subject was brought before Parliament, and, after lengthy debates, H.R.H. the Duke of York resigned the post of Commander-in-Chief, and new regulations were issued which forbade the promotion of officers until they had served a stated period in subordinate rank.

for you in learning that your standing in the army has been thrown back, but I am sure you will not be discouraged, and that you will continue, as you have invariably done, to do honour to yourself and your profession in whatever rank you may serve.

Believe me, my dear Burghersh,

Ever sincerely and affectionately yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Burghersh.

ABRANTES,

June 16th, 1809.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I received the accounts this morning of your disappointment from Lord Castlereagh and Lord Westmorland, and I have since received your letter.

I strongly recommend you to remain in Portugal; whether in my family or with your regiment is a question which we may consider when we shall be more at leisure.

I also recommend to you, whatever you may feel on your disappointment (and you have a right to feel a good deal), to keep your mind to yourself. You are the victim of the times, and will only make your situation more uncomfortable by breathing a complaint respecting it. Let me see you as soon as you can come up; I expect to be able to march now in a day or two.

I desired Villiers to speak to you on this subject.

Ever yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

LISBON,
June 23rd, 1809.

I have received your letter about the Austrian success,* and most happy it has made me. I augur from it a great deal of good to the world in general, and particularly to the operations in this country.

I have received a letter from Sir A. Wellesley extremely kind about my disappointment, but begging me to join as soon as possible, as he expects me to move in a day or two. Victor's army is retiring, and I fear we shall not easily overtake him; but if a formidable army of English, Portuguese and Spaniards can be found upon the Tagus, I have no fear but that we shall drive the French over the Ebro.

You must send us more troops; the moment for exertion is present, and I am sure the whole exertion should be made at one point, and that should be in Spain.

Before you receive this, great news will have arrived in England, Bonaparte will have had a difficult job to cross the Danube, and if he does not succeed he is doing nothing. I foresee at least a great prolongation to the war, and therefore an incitement to us to drive the French from Spain before they can be reinforced.

I hope you will tell the King from me how much obliged to him I feel for his kind intention towards me, and that although I have received a great disappointment, yet that nothing will abate my zeal for his service, or make me forget that the first law a soldier should cheerfully obey is to serve where he is ordered,

* The Austrians attacked the French at Aspern and Essling on May 22nd, and forced Napoleon to retreat from his position on the north bank of the Danube, which he succeeded in crossing a few weeks later.

without questioning whether the rank or the service is or is not agreeable to him.

Some regiments are already arrived here from England; I am extremely glad of it. I think a force of 10,000 more men would make us perfectly secure in this country, and I understand that nearly that number is coming. We shall have a most respectable army in a few months, particularly if you send us arms enough for the Portuguese Militia, who are fine troops, and ought all, to the number of 51 regiments of 1,100 each, to be armed and embodied. If such a force is called out and disciplined in the way the Portuguese are now going on, we shall have more than 100,000 native troops, commanded mostly by English officers, and supported by, I hope, 50,000 English; and with such an army you may rest assured Spain can never remain in possession of France, unless, indeed, she sends almost her whole army there, which is made in some degree possible, I fear, by the marriage of Bonaparte.* You lost a great moment in the last campaign; I always foresaw how great an opportunity would open to us with the Austrian War, and of how much consequence it would be to strike a blow with all our strength. But the time is lost, or, indeed, misused. I fear we shall be long before we can make up for it.

Report says that Bonaparte has proposed you peace. I really believe, if he is wise, he will make us great sacrifices to obtain it, for he has conquered as much as his ambition can have pointed out to him, and it surely is necessary for him to conciliate and to assure his empire; besides, he is aware of the serious injury France is suffering from the want of trade and

* It is uncertain to what this refers. Napoleon married Marie Louise, April, 1810, but it may be considered doubtful that a letter of this date should mention this project.

from the horrid burden of taxes and the conscription, and, more than all that, that his army is tired of war ; that his soldiers begin to see and to feel most severely that their lives and youth are sacrificed only to his immoderate ambition ; that the officers, enriched by plunder, are desirous not to fight and expose themselves, but, on the contrary, to retire in ease and enjoy their wealth ; that they see no prospect of it with him, but find themselves constantly called from war to war, and never left to rest. All this must be known to him, and all must make him anxious for peace ; and yet upon what terms, but the restoration of Ferdinand, he can expect it, I cannot conceive.

The French are forming corps upon the northern frontier, and I believe Junot, Kellermann, and Loison, are at Valladolid. This army with Ney's corps at Salamanca is what, I suppose, will some day attack us. In the south the French have retired from Merida towards Almaraz, and I cannot but have some suspicion of that column : that it is intended to form a junction with Soult from Talavera upon Placencia, and so form an attack on this country, by Castel Branco, upon Abrantes, while from the north the French will enter by Almeida, but I do not think they will have any prospect of success ; we are very strong in a strong country, and, with fortresses upon almost all their approaches, they will find no means of subsistence but what is brought with them, and which must pass close to some fortress in our possession, or through countries difficult from nature as from hostility to them. All this combined, and the certainty that with the force we have, if we are driven to the positions of Torres Vedras, we cannot be beaten in any battle however unequal the numbers, make me

feel confident in the success of our campaign, supposing us to be attacked. Different from any of your politicians in England, I bow to their knowledge with deference, but still that is my opinion.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

TALavera DEL LA REYNA,
July 30th, 1809.

The movement of the French in retreat, of which I gave you an account in my last letter, was a most masterly one. The advice and interference of Wellesley to the Spaniards saved them from inevitable destruction, and his ability has secured to the combined or rather to the British arms a most glorious and brilliant victory.

It appears that the French retired on the morning of the 24th to St. Olaia and Torrijos, taking the road to Toledo. The Spaniards (despising the advice of Wellesley to move to Cevolla) followed the retreating army to St. Olaia. On the 25th the French effected the junction of the three corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and King Joseph, thus forming an army of 50,000 men. On the 26th they advanced against the Spaniards, and beat in their advanced guard the night before Wellesley had requested Cuesta* to retire upon Cevolla, as it appeared clear that the French intended a movement in advance. The attack upon the advanced guard supported this advice, and Cuesta, with his whole army, retired on the 26th to the heights in front of this place. The 27th the French continued their advance, and in some measure came up with the division of General Sherbrooke, which was posted at Casa

* Commanding the Spanish army.

Leguas to protect the retreat of the Spanish rear-guard. By one o'clock, however, everything was safely across the Alberche, and General Sherbrooke and the Spanish army were ordered immediately into a position which Wellesley had fixed upon, having the right on Talavera, the left on a hill about two miles north-west of it. About two o'clock the French began to engage upon the Alberche with the division of General Mackenzie, which had been left to oppose or retard the passage of the river. The enemy, however, appearing in force, the division was ordered to retire gradually to the position in the rear. The enemy having passed a number of troops, this movement brought on a serious affair, and the French followed up their advance till we were arrived in our position, and then, without a single moment of retard, attacked the height upon our left, and for a moment (owing to the conduct of some of the German legion) carried it. The brigade of General Stewart and Tilson recovered it immediately, and so ended the action of the 27th, with the only exception that the enemy's cavalry attempted the Spanish line on the right, but were repulsed.

On the morning of the 28th the whole of the French force was formed in front of the British army; a division at the bottom of the hill on the left was the first which began the action, by storming with about 8,000 men the height they had lost the night before. This attack from its nature could not be of long duration. Although supported by an immense train of artillery from an opposite height, the enemy was driven back with an amazing loss and thrown into complete confusion. Owing to accident our cavalry was not near enough to charge; otherwise the whole of the French divisions forming the attack and support

must have been cut to pieces. After this attack had been repulsed, the enemy confined himself for a considerable time to a cannonade, in which he had a great superiority of guns, but by which nothing but the destruction of a few guns and horses was effected. At the end of about two hours the fire on both sides ceased, and there succeeded an interval of about two hours' tranquillity.

At one o'clock the firing recommenced on the part of the French, and immediately after an attack with three columns upon our centre; the action was furious, but in half an hour the attack was completely repulsed, with an amazing loss on the part of the French and some considerable suffering on ours.

The enemy did not lose courage; they determined on a third attack, and a most tremendous one it proved. Four or five columns, or the whole of Sebastiani's *corps d'armée*, 18,000, attacked the centre, while three strong columns of infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry, threatened to turn our left by going round the height, which they had already twice attacked. Our cavalry was ordered to charge this body, and although by a mistake or some accident, and by the great strength of infantry in close columns against cavalry, the charge did not succeed, and on the contrary proved very fatal to the 23rd Dragoons, yet its effect was such as entirely to stop the advance of the intended attack, and to relieve us in a short time from the fear of an attack upon our left. In the meantime, however, the attack on the centre became tremendous, some of our battalions were forced to give way, and the Guards, by an imprudent but gallant charge in front, were so cut up by some artillery and several columns of infantry as to be obliged to fall back. Wellesley, when he saw

the advance of the Guards, dreaded the result, and ordered the 48th Regiment from the left to support them in case of necessity. The steadiness of this regiment saved the day. The Guards passed through it, and it supported the whole of the attack that was pouring down, and stopped the French advance. Under cover of this regiment the Guards and the other regiments formed, and in a quarter of an hour returned into action with a huzza, which, repeated through the whole line, terminated the action. The French on their appearance slackened their attack and retired, and in a short time the action ended. We observed the French columns retiring to the Alberche, and before dark their rearguard quitted the ground it occupied.

I will not go further into detail about this great action, for unless I could enclose a plan of the ground you could not understand it; but you will perceive by what I have said that our army was on the left, the Spanish on the right forming a line of the sort I enclose; that the French attack was entirely directed against us; and that, owing to the want of discipline in the Spanish armies, Wellesley dare not make use of them to leave their position and attack the left of the French while engaged with us. One or two of their regiments behaved well; others, whom Wellesley saw on the slight attack of cavalry the first night, fired their first volley, and then threw away arms, clothing, etc., and ran away. In short, I fear we are only 20,000 English, and that that is our whole fighting army; the rest may do for demonstration, but little else. Our loss has been severe, 4,500 killed and wounded, but we have since been joined by Crawford's 3,000 men. Such another victory would hurt us considerably.

I hope you will begin to see the necessity of sending a powerful army when you look to the great results. What is the situation in which the British Government has placed this army? Why, having gained a victory, we can do nothing! The French with their whole army are in position opposite to us, waiting, I believe, the arrival of General Suchet's corps from Saragossa, to make it impossible for us to advance. However, the British army has done, and will continue to do, more than can be supposed possible for men. I hope, therefore, we may be favoured by fortune, and that some accident may place us in a situation to relieve a still greater part of Spain from the yoke of France. But as to any great result, such as the conquest of all Spain with the army we have, the idea is ridiculous.

The French lost in the action, I should think, at lowest 12,000 men. Their dead are in heaps before us, and the wounded that they carried off are too numerous to be counted by the peasants who have met with them.

I hope you will give this army some mark of distinction for the gallantry it has displayed, and do not forget that the present is the only instance, since the French have been so reputed in arms, in which a large army, equipped in everything, commanded by their best officers, has been beaten by an army half its numbers.

I have been extremely fortunate in the action; although I was engaged in the heaviest of the fire, no accident happened to me. In the night of the 27th I believe I contributed materially to the saving the heights on our left, and my Dragoons horse was wounded in the chin.

* * * * *

There is a strong report that Soult's army is moving upon our rear towards Placencia. I think it probable,

but I do not believe he can do us any material harm. However, it serves to show the situation in which the army is left. Venegas has operated upon Toledo and Aranjues, but not as was at first intended; as yet he has created no diversion in our favour, except that the King José* has gone with his corps of 6,000 to Madrid. Sir Robert Willson is returned to Escalona; he had advanced beyond it to within three leagues of Madrid. . . .

You will be tired of this long letter. I have endeavoured to give you some account of the battle we have fought, and hope with the addition of Wellesley's letter you will be able to understand it.

My horses arrived this day; they have all sore backs, but I hope will soon be fit to ride. No uniforms or clothes have arrived, nor, indeed (from want of means of transport), do I expect them, if they even were arrived at Lisbon.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

SEVILLE,
September 18th, 1809.

I have this moment received your very kind letter of the 17th of August, and, as a courier is going off to England, I seize a moment to write to you.

Your advice about the profession is most perfectly in accordance with my feelings. I have no intention of giving up my rank, and, indeed, to do so would be to me to commit a sort of *felo-de-se*; for however hurt I am at my disappointment, etc., yet the military is a profession which I most sincerely love, and in which I cannot help having hopes that some day or other I may be distinguished. But to enter really into my

* Joseph Bonaparte.

feelings you have only to remember part of a passage in your own letter, "that at my time of life, and with my (unfortunate if you will) acquaintance and knowledge of the world, it is not surprising that I *cannot feel myself employed* by the situation of a Captain in a regiment; that I should be struggling for something higher; that I should be anxious during this eventful period of the world to be a somebody, for as Captain I am nobody; and that with these feelings I should ask for some employment more suited to me (as I may flatter myself) than the one in which I stand." These are really the feelings that are constantly worrying my mind. I wish to be placed in a situation for which I feel myself equal, and I wish to quit one where I think I am of no use to myself, and am indeed nobody. Everybody will in a degree enter into this sentiment. If I had been backward in life, accustomed to live with younger men than myself, fond of drinking, etc., it would have been alike to me that I remained in the same society with or without my rank; but I have lived constantly, both at home and abroad, with men from whom I gained instruction, and thence have acquired a knowledge of the present state of the world and society which makes the society of a mess irksome to me, and makes my rank so also, because I have accustomed myself to look at subjects on a more elevated scale than my rank of Captain will authorize me to do, and doing so will allow me the opportunity of acting upon, so that I am really in a state of dispute with myself. I like the army, and yet I see no prospect in it. I hate the situation in which I stand because I think I ought to be above it, and yet I feel the difficulty of leaving it, unless I received an appointment which would not interfere

with my military career, but would place me where I think I ought to be. . . .

I have just received your two letters from Brympton,* 29th and 31st of August. You mention the person concerned (Canning, I suppose) as willing to forward my views. I thank him much, but at the same time believe but little of it. However, my views are as I have detailed them to you. I cannot think myself placed where I have a right to be, as Captain in the army, and therefore am extremely desirous of some situation which may ameliorate my position in the world, and enable me to act as a person of some responsibility. I have received an order from Lord Wellington to go through Granada, Murcia, and Valencia, and report the state of those provinces. I shall set out in a day or two, and suppose the tour will employ me at least six weeks.

I am glad you were satisfied with the account of the battle; but you do not mention having put it into the *Courier*, where I saw it.

I hope you intend sending troops to this country; if not, adieu, for do not fancy there is a Spaniard to fight.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Wellington.

GRANADA,
October 10th, 1809.

MY DEAR LORD WELLINGTON,

I have not written earlier to congratulate you upon the honours you have received, because I thought you would be pestered with such sort of letters, and I hoped you would (even without one from me) believe that no person would feel more sincerely

* Brympton, Lord Westmorland's estate in Somersetshire, now the property of Sir Spencer Ponsonby Fane.

gratified at any reward or honour that you may receive than I should, and that no person was more persuaded of how greatly they were deserved.

Since I have left you, I am sorry to say I have seen nothing military to be remarked on ; in this province there is positively nothing. One squadron of dragoons is forming, and one battalion of French infantry is doing duty in this town ; but beyond that there is not a soldier, no depot of recruits, no provision of any sort for keeping up the armies to their present force, or in any way for carrying on the war. All seems at rest. The hordes of deserters which are known to be about are not meddled with, and, indeed, the encouragement given to desertion by that means is so great that I cannot wonder at what I know to be the case—that numbers of families are sending for their sons from the armies, assuring them that they will not be punished. The original evil has been in the execution of the conscription. In the great towns, the rich of some of them have by means of bribery saved their sons, and the remainder, upon whom the lot fell, refused to march if the others did not, and by these means scarcely any persons were sent from such a town as Malaga. The weight fell upon the poor of the neighbouring villages ; these know and feel the injustice, and therefore are not very willing soldiers, and the first opportunity they get they escape ; and as there are no proper means of apprehending them, it is no wonder that they amount to several thousands, at which number the deserters are stated.

With regard to the defence of the province, it appears to me of the greatest interest ; the mountains from Gibraltar across the Peninsula cover Granada, Malaga, and Murcia ; the passes are extremely defensible, and

therefore, if the French were already in Seville, I think the most difficult task would be yet to come in gaining possession of this country—to defend Granada from Seville and La Mancha.

The forts of Laya, Alcala Real, Castello de Arenos, and Cambil, are the most interesting; indeed, they cover every approach for any sort of carriage, and are extremely strong: 30,000 men, 2,000 of whom cavalry, would perfectly defend these approaches, and in the east a corps of 600 or 700 men in the advanced positions of Huescar and Pitez Rubio, or the nearer one of Lusena, would defend all approach to this city.

I cannot help thinking that the seat of Government should be here; for if the Sierra Morena should be forced, the Spanish army could by no movement cover Seville—at least, in no favourable position; on the contrary, if they retire on Jaen, which is now fortified, and from thence to the positions in the mountains of Granada, they will have a better position to defend than before, and therefore would be concentrated in a much smaller space.

The people here are in absolute darkness as to every true fact that relates to them, either at home or abroad. Everything is misrepresented to them, and they are humbled and tyrannized over by a Junta of thirty-five or more persons who equal or exceed in tyranny the Central.* No word is spoken but in dread, and the actions of every individual are watched and reported to the Junta. Before my arrival I had heard that the Junta of Granada was at variance with the Central: it is no such thing; for to support the usurped power of themselves they must hold up that of the Central, and this

* *I.e.*, Central Junta.

feeling will be clear when the paper of the Fiscal Sempère (ordered to be published as the sentiment of the Junta) appears. Not only in that paper is the sentiment of the Junta supported, but, as I understand, an attempt is made against the prerogative of election to the Cortes. But what is most singular and most wicked is the conduct of persons in power here about England. A member of the Central Junta now at this place declared, and continues to do so, "that England had never made any representations against the government of the Junta, but, on the contrary, that she was most satisfied, and wished it to remain:" so that the people, who feel the usurpation of the Central as well as of all the Juntas, are almost detesting England, as one of the supporters of the tyranny that no people ever suffered before. The other class of intriguers, with better grounds, see England with the greatest jealousy, because they know her sentiments are contrary to their infamous usurpation. This being the case, no sacrifice or exertion of England can make her popular in Spain; for it is the usurped authority they hold that the Juntas seek to support, and it must be by keeping England at a distance from themselves and the Spanish people that they can hope to succeed. For this reason every sort of misrepresentation is made in this place against England. As an instance, the Fiscal Sempère, a man of the greatest weight in this Junta, declared at Malaga, to a corps of officers of a regiment who went to wait upon him, that the greatest circumspection was necessary with regard to England; that her views were dangerous, and, notwithstanding her apparent exertions for Spain, that her policy was to be dreaded. This was said, not in private society, but to the body of officers of the Malaga Regiment of

the Line, and therefore in some degree to be considered as official. But the whole conduct of the Junta of this place is of the same texture, and, indeed, it is natural it should be. They dread the appearance of an Englishman where likely to hear the true state of their government, and they also dread him among the people they govern, because he is the only person who can speak truly with respect to their conduct.

There is one fact of which I am now persuaded : Spain (that is, the governing Juntas) are *not* employed in the defence of their country ; they have forgotten it, or think it secure ; but they are defending their usurped authority. All their measures tend towards that point, and nothing but that now interests them. One of these measures is to encourage a distrust of England. To serve that purpose, and to carry it on as much as possible, they have spread every sort of ridiculous reports, both as to our armies and our line of policy ; and to these measures, I am convinced, may be traced all the apparent coldness of Spain towards England. To remove this, I believe the effectual and only remedy would be to let the people know what England has done and is doing. A manifesto to the people would have that effect—not one containing more than the views of England, and the sacrifices she has made. Such a paper might rouse a fresh spirit in the people—might give them hopes of rising from the tyranny they now suffer, and might give Spain a chance of success. As it now is, it is impossible. If one action is fought, there are no men to fill up the vacancies, and nobody will go. All is in detestation of the Government and of their measures, and the Government are not thinking of defence.

*Lord Wellington to Lord Burghersh.**

ESTREMEZ,
October 28th, 1809.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I received this day your letter of the 18th from Granada, and that in which you enclosed the paper to which you had referred in the former; and I am very much obliged to you for the interesting information which these letters contain. It is obvious that the longer and the more intimately we become acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do they hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French, may spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to establish a Government in the country. But there is no probability of a glorious termination to the contest.

I have been at Lisbon to settle some business there, and am now on my return to Badajoz, where I shall arrive to-morrow. My headquarters have been there since the beginning of September, and there they are likely to remain.

The French army in Estremadura and Castile is too large for us to hope to make any impression upon it by any offensive operation, and we have only to wait till our allies will be sufficiently strong and efficient to attack the enemy, or till the enemy will attack them.

There is a corps of 30,000 men now in La Mancha, which has forced Eguia's and Venegas' army to retire to La Carolina; Soult and Mortier are at Talavera, and Oropesa and Ney at Salamanca. The corps of the

* Published in the Duke of Wellington's despatches, vol. iii., p. 567.

latter was defeated a few days ago by the Duque del Parque in an attack which they made upon him in the position of Tamames, near Ciudad Rodrigo. The Spaniards took one piece of cannon, and killed and wounded some men and drove off the French.

I am much disturbed at the accounts of the disputes of our friends, and the break up of the Administration, which will certainly be the consequence sooner or later. Is it true that Lord Westmorland has resigned?

I understand that Franceschi is confined in the Alhambra at Granada. I wish you would try to see him and tell him that I am endeavouring to prevail on the Spanish Government to concede to his exchange; but hitherto I have had no success. Give him, however, any money he may want, and let me know what you give him.

Ever, my dear Burghersh,

Yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

MURCIA,
November 2nd, 1809.

I have received your letter of the 28th, and shall be extremely anxious about your affairs in England till I hear from you again. The duel between two Ministers* does not sound well, and particularly to persons abroad who look to the English Government for salvation.

I am now so far on my tour to Valencia. I shall

* A disaster to the English troops in the marshes of Walcheren was attributed by Mr. Canning (Foreign Secretary) to the incompetence of Lord Castlereagh (War Minister). A quarrel ensued between the two Ministers, ending in a duel and their resignation of office.

leave Murcia to-morrow for Alicante, from whence I shall proceed almost immediately, and return from Valencia to Seville.

What is to become of us? or what is to be done in Spain? I have not an idea! I do not think I am likely to see England for some time, and yet I do not see what is to be done here. However, I hope some change in the Government here may give Spain some energy, and that something towards her salvation may be effected.

No exertion in the provinces; all apparently in peace. Granada has sent 33,000 paper men since the beginning of the revolution, Murcia about 15,000, and with these exertions they are satisfied. No money even to carry on the manufacture of powder; no arms; no means of taking deserters (who now amount almost to the effective strength of the Spanish army; for without pay, clothing, or food, every one of the conscripts deserts at the first opportunity). In short, the whole system is so bad I can give you no account to equal it; and yet the French are but few in Spain, and there is an implacable hatred towards them in the breast of every Spaniard of the lower classes. But the expression of *Die every Frenchman!* satisfies his hatred, and he does no more—indeed, why should he?

The present Government is more tyrannical than the last. No word is spoken, no paper published; all is governed by the Juntas, who now think but of maintaining themselves. In short, I believe the gentlemen employed by Government in Spain last year thought more of getting themselves received as Princes (as Doyle has done everywhere) than of giving correct information; and as it is impossible to detail the state of the country, you must wait till some

great event will prove it. Much depends on Austria, and we know nothing of the state of negotiations.

I am at the Marquis of Villa Franca's house here, and everywhere have received great civilities.

Remember me very much to Lady Westmorland.

Lord Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

BADAJOS,
December 17th, 1809.

I have received your letter of the 5th from Valencia. My letter to you, which you had not received, contained only letters from Madame Franceschi to Franceschi, and a request that you would give him some money. You will probably have received them since you wrote, and at any rate, finding that you had quitted Granada, I charged Wellingham with other letters from the General for his wife, and requested him to give him 100 dollars.

The last events in Castile, coupled with those in La Mancha, have induced me to make the movement with the British army which I had projected to carry into execution in the fine weather in December, as soon as I heard of the conclusion of the peace with Austria.*

It is obvious that the first operations of the French upon the arrival of their reinforcements must be to obtain possession of the north bank of the Tagus to its entrance into the sea, and we ought to be on the frontier of Castile to resist the execution of this project. The army commenced its march a week ago, and I wait only till the troops will have passed through this town to move my headquarters.

* Treaty of Vienna, October 14th, between France and Austria, by which the latter ceded Western Galicia and Krakau to the Duchy of Warsaw and the Eastern Adriatic seaboard to form the "Illyrian Provinces" under the direct rule of Napoleon.

The Spanish people are like gunpowder—the least spark inflames them; and when inflamed there is no violence or outrage they do not commit, and nothing can stop their violence. They have already fired upon our people between this and Merida, and they killed a soldier in this town two nights ago, and I am obliged to stay, either to moderate and quiet the storm or to take a high tone, according to circumstances, upon the occurrence of these accidents. The fact is that these people have no reason to complain of us. We have spent and paid a million of money in this part of the country, and I never knew the British soldiers behave so regularly or so well; but the Spaniard is an undisciplined savage, who obeys no law, despises all authority, feels no gratitude for benefits conferred or favours received, and is always ready with his knife or his firelock to commit murder. At the same time, bad as they are, their vices and defects and the lamentable state of their country afford some hopes of the issue of the contest, and we cannot with honour withdraw from it till we shall be obliged to do so.

It would be very useful to me if you would, at your leisure, draw up a memorandum stating the names and character and the family connections, etc., of the principal acting people in the parts of the country in which you have been.

I understand that Valencia has again submitted to the Central Junta.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

January 4th, 1810.

I am waiting anxiously for some decision from home about our army here. I am satisfied you will

not be so unjust as to leave 25,000 exposed to fight 100,000, and that you will either reinforce or withdraw us.

I have written to Lord Wellington to say I should like to go to England, if he does not immediately expect to be called upon to act.

I am waiting here a day or two to receive an answer from Lord Wellington; I shall then go to Cadiz, and I think embark for Lisbon. Depend upon it Spain has nothing to defend herself. She counts about 70,000 men in arms, but reckon them worth about 20,000, and that is all that can be brought into the field.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

SEVILLE,
January 7th, 1810.

I have just received your letter of the 12th and 14th, and am extremely happy to hear that Lord Wellington has spoken to Lord Wellesley about my letters from Granada. As regards myself, I do not think it is of much import, for the stating facts as they really existed was its only merit; but I am happy to know that my way of seeing them was communicated to Lord Wellesley, as I am sure the result of the present contest will bear me out in the opinion I then gave.

Everything is at present at a perfect standstill in this country. No exertion is making; on the contrary, it seems as if the whole Junta and people were waiting some new event, and as if perfectly ignorant that the one which will indisputably arise is the entire possession of Spain by France. Perhaps that moment

will not be the least favourable for the Spaniard, as I am convinced the only hope of Spain is in the extension of the French armies over its immense territory, and the consequent weakness which that must bring upon them.

I have not received as yet any letter from Lord Wellington about my movements, so that I do not know where I shall first go, although I suppose to Cadiz, for the purpose of embarking for Lisbon.

I am sorry to hear about Maria's* illness, although your account is more satisfactory. I am obliged to close my letter for the courier, but if I have more time I will write again.

I hope you will remind Lord Wellesley about me, although I have so bad an opinion of the Spanish cause, as well as of the leading men, that I would hardly be prevailed upon to serve amongst them.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

LISBON,
March 28th, 1810.

Everybody in this country has the greatest confidence in the contest before us, and cry out most bitterly against the cowardice of the many speakers in England who speak against the retention of the force here. I hope they will be unavailing, and that you will not neglect to send us all the force you can dispose of, for we deserve that the odds we shall have to fight against should be reduced, and that, if possible, we should be made superior.

* Lord Burghersh's sister, Lady Duncannon.

*Lord Burghersh to his Father.**March 30th, 1810.*

The French have retired from Badajoz, and, followed by two divisions of Romana's army, under Ballesteros, are now within five leagues of Seville. The other column from Merida is still about Caceres and Truxillo. I do not understand these movements; it may be a trick to place Ballesteros between two fires and march upon him, both from Seville and Merida; but yet Romana is strong at Badajoz, and is looking out to prevent such a movement. In the north, Junot is moving towards Astorga—with what intention I do not know. Report from Salamanca says Bonaparte has incorporated the country north of the Ebro with France; if so, I should not be surprised that he should offer to negotiate with you upon returning Ferdinand to the remainder of Spain.

I have been kept here for the last fortnight by a severe cold. I am now pretty well, and shall set off for the regiment at Coimbra in a day or two. I am anxious to receive your letter in answer to mine about promotion, for I wish very much to go home and see what I may, with any prospect of advantage to myself, undertake.

The Parliament exhibits a curious picture to Europe. All the people of these countries think we are mad to employ such a moment as this in discussion about Lord Chatham's statements,* etc. I am extremely hurt about the usage he has met with; it gives us all a lesson: serve the country ever so well—one fault, and that however trifling, and everybody deserts you.

* Concerning the strength and disposition of the troops. Lord Chatham had commanded the unsuccessful expedition to Walcheren.

I hope to receive a letter from you soon. Report says Duroc* is in London; one cannot but be anxious about the truth of it.

I am much pleased with the manner in which my case seems to have been felt in the House of Commons; indeed, most people seem to be kind about it (without assuming anything to my ability), that my not having my rank and serving as intended with the Portuguese will be a loss to the service. The people of this country want to see some men of rank come amongst them, and during the short interval that I was making my arrangements to serve them I had an opportunity of witnessing their satisfaction at my arrival.

I suppose I shall join my regiment, though I have not as yet received the clothes you tell me you have sent; I suppose I may expect them with my horses, for which I am most anxiously looking out. Sarah† tells me Colonel Shipley hopes something may soon be done for me. I own I despair of anything these two years; if you see any comfort for me, pray let me know it. I have heard that the regulations are to be done away, but my misery is that the present most interesting campaign, and most likely the three or four next (in which I have a good chance of being pretty well knocked about), I must serve as a Captain without responsibility or situation, or anything that can be a reward for the services I have already performed. I have received none of my newspapers; pray speak about them, and fix some mode by which I may receive them.

* Gérard Christopher Michel Duroc, Duc de Frioul, and Grand Maréchal du Palais to Napoleon, who employed him on several diplomatic missions to foreign Courts.

† Lord Burghersh's sister, afterwards Countess of Jersey. She was the heiress of Osterley.

I think my case has been harshly stated to the public; surely some contradiction might be given to my never having been with the regiment, as also that if I had remained with it I should not have seen shot fired.

Lord Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

VISEU,
April 19th, 1810.

I received your letter of the 16th. It has never been an easy matter to say in one week what would be the military state of affairs in the Peninsula in the next, and I think it still more difficult now than it has been yet. The French are in strength nowhere, excepting, possibly, in our front. It is obvious that they can do nothing till they will collect their forces, and at the same time I doubt whether any movement we could make would have any effect, excepting to oblige them to collect and become still stronger than they are in our front. In the meantime we are gaining strength every day. I have now got a stronger and more efficient British army than I have had yet, which a short time will increase still further. The troops are remarkably healthy and in good order, and the cavalry horses improving. The Portuguese will improve in discipline and equipment daily; and if I can keep matters quiet for another month, we shall be really in a great situation in this country. I therefore don't propose to move unless the French should weaken themselves so much in my front as to enable me to strike some blow of importance.

From this statement you will judge of the probability of activity here. I have always been of opinion that if we were attacked it would be after the middle of

June, and I am decidedly of opinion that it would not be our interest to disturb the state in which the French have got themselves in the Peninsula, and that we are gaining in strength and efficiency every day. I shall really have an enormous effective army in a short time.

In respect of your employment in Spain, I can employ you as well as Lord Wellesley, and can send you to the place where you would be most useful. There is a great deal to be done in many parts of Spain as well as in Portugal.

If I could use the resources of England and Spain as well as of Portugal, I would try to give Bonaparte sufficient employment in the Peninsula. But money and arms are wanted, and we are going in England to *husband our resources*. I mean to try, however, whether I can't do something with Spain.

Whatever line of life you may determine upon for the next years of your life, don't be prevailed upon to quit the army. Get the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as soon as you can, and then take to something else or amuse yourself. Your military rank and experience, as well as your experience in affairs in general (as well as those provided for you by the Captain), will always be of use to you.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

MANGUALOE,
May 31st, 1810.

Since I came into Portugal in February to this time we have had, I think, but two fortnights at different periods of dry weather, but the rain for the last month has been incessant. Of course, as all operations in

Portugal must be delayed till the rivers are down, we have not as yet commenced the campaign, but I should think in a fortnight from this time we shall have begun.

I am going on a visit to Lord Beresford and Lord Wellington; they are one three leagues, and the other five leagues, from this place.

I hope you will send everything you can from England. You may depend upon it, if you make a great effort, Portugal will not be French, and while it is not Spain will never be. But if you only send us what may be convenient, you will lose Portugal and all the expense you have laid out upon it.

Lord Burghersh finally left the Peninsula in 1811, and returned to England.

Lord Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

QUINTA DE S. JOÃO,
July 8th, 1811.

MY DEAR BURGHESH,

I have received your letter of the 18th of June this day, and I cannot express to you how delighted I am to hear of your marriage with Priscilla.* I believe her to be one of the best girls in the world, and I hope that she will make you happy, and I congratulate you both most sincerely.

You knew enough of the state of our affairs before you quitted this country to feel an interest in what has occurred since. I forget whether Romana died before you left; but that event, followed as it was by the defeat of the Spaniards at St. Christobal, and by the

* Priscilla Anne Wellesley Pole, daughter of Lord Maryborough (afterwards third Earl of Mornington), and favourite niece of Lord Wellington, married Lord Burghersh on June 11th, 1811.

subsequent fall of Badajoz* by treachery, had immense effect on the close of Masséna's campaign in Portugal, on occurrences since that period, and on existing situation of affairs.

The defeat of the Spaniards rendered it necessary that I should detach more than a third of the effective army to the frontier of Estremadura, while two-thirds were engaged in the pursuit of Masséna. During the whole of the operations in March, April and May in Beira and in the frontiers of Castile, we were infinitely inferior in numbers to the French and in the actions at Fuentes d'Onoro. I had three divisions and the light division against four *corps d'armée*, and about 900 knocked-up cavalry against above 4,000, more than half of which were fresh and in excellent condition, and 900 of the Imperial Guards. If I could have employed the whole army in pursuit of Masséna's whole army, I think that not a man of the latter could have got out of Portugal; but the misfortunes and treachery of the Spaniards rendered it necessary to detach more than one-third of the army and nearly half the cavalry to the frontiers of Estremadura, as soon as the first object was secured, viz., that of preventing Masséna from occupying the line of the Mondego, which he had intended to occupy. Our subsequent operations were necessarily cramped by this deficiency of force.

Then the fall of Badajoz was an event of vital importance, probably the most so of any that had occurred during this war. And Imaz surrendered it without cause (for there was no breach, and the bastions in the flank of the curtain intended to be breached were untouched) on the night after he had received from me

* February 19th.

the intimation that Masséna had retired, and that a force was going to his relief. It was impossible to do anything to the south till Badajoz should be again in our hands; and although Beresford was in a situation to invest the place on the 25th of March, a variety of unfortunate events, into which it is not necessary now to enter, but against the occurrence of which I had provided, as far as I could, by orders and letters, prevented them from investing the place till the first week in May. Then came the Battle of Albuera,* which, together with the loss in the first siege of Badajoz, almost destroyed two divisions of infantry for me. I came down here in April, in the interval between Masséna's retreat from Portugal and his attempt to relieve Almeida; and seeing how matters were going on, I determined further to reinforce this point as soon as Almeida should be in our hands, and accordingly ordered off the 3rd and 7th Divisions on the day that Almeida was evacuated. These arrived here in the last week in May, and I immediately recommenced the operations against Badajoz. It was obvious, from everything that was going on around me, that I had only a limited time in which I could perform this operation—the siege of Badajoz. Nineteen battalions of the 9th Corps were in march to join Sault, and I calculated they would arrive by the 5th or 6th of June, and by the 7th or 8th he would be ready to advance again. I must then have raised the siege of Badajoz. The operation, therefore, was to be calculated on that basis, and to be undertaken in such a manner as to afford a chance that we should have the place before the second week in June. We should have had it if the ordnance and stores of Elvas had

* May 16th.

been worth a pin; unfortunately, they were of the worst description. The shot did not fit the guns. The guns were 150 years old, and were destroyed by the use of them—only sixteen during the siege! We fired at a mud wall for eight days within 400 and 600 yards, and could not break it. Finding that I really could not take the outwork of St. Christobal by storm, and that I could not expect to break the mud wall in any reasonable time, that the whole disposable force in Spain was in march towards Estremadura, and that the useless continuance of the siege would have exhausted the stores of Elvas, which there were no means in Portugal of replenishing, I determined to raise the siege, still increasing the blockade.

Soult, having been joined by the 9th Corps, moved forward from Almeida on the 13th, and on the same day the advanced guard of the army of Portugal from Castile arrived at Truxillo. I collected our troops at Albuera, still keeping the blockade of Badajoz, and on the 17th retired across the Guadiana without loss of any description.

The French troops thus collected in Estremadura amounted to above 60,000 men, of which 7,000 cavalry. Including 12,000 Spaniards, I had then about 40,000 men, of which 2,000 cavalry. I proposed to Blake either to take his line with us and remain in Estremadura, or to recross the Guadiana at Mertola, and operate in the Arroio del Molino upon Seville. He preferred the latter, and I made a movement to the left and joined with the British troops which I had left in Castile in May, and which had followed the movements of the army of Portugal, and had crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and I took up a position

near Campo Mayor to protect the provisioning and equipment of that place and Elvas.

The enemy have looked at us here, but do not like to attack us. We have about 50,000 English and Portuguese, including about 4,000 cavalry of both nations; the French 60,000, including 7,000 cavalry. In the meantime Blake recrossed the Guadiana at Mertola on the 22nd. On the 30th at night he made an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla, where there were 300 French infantry, and failed. And, hearing that a division of infantry had returned to Seville, he was about to embark for Cadiz. If he had gone to Seville, and had destroyed the stores, etc., then the siege of Cadiz must have been raised, as it depends entirely on what is at Seville; or if he had remained in the Arroio del Molino or on the Guadiana, Soult must have drawn such a force into Andalusia as would have left Marmont (who now commands the army of Portugal) too weak for me, and I might have been able to strike a great blow. But the Spaniards will always be the same, and we must be reconciled to our disappointments.

The collection of the French force, however, for this expedition into Estremadura has obliged them to evacuate the Asturias, Astorga, and all the open country of Castile. There is hell to pay there! El Principe, the guerilla, has attacked Valladolid, and Don Julian, Salamanca. All communication with Ciudad Rodrigo is cut off, and Don Julian and Mina have taken two valuable convoys with money—one going to Ciudad Rodrigo, and the other, with plunder (belonging to Joseph, they say), to France. I likewise believe that one party of guerillas got into Seville on the 28th of last month, but they were driven out.

I have thus given you a précis of our campaign and of our present situation, which I hope will be interesting to you, notwithstanding that you have now other things to attend to.

Pray give my best love to Priscilla, and believe me, my dear Burghersh,

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

The mare is in capital condition, and her back quite well. I rode her from Elvas to Gallegos, near Ciudad Rodrigo, in three days, and back again in the same time, which is pretty well in this climate.

FUENTES GUINALDO,
May 25th, 1812.

MY DEAR BURGHersh,

Some time has elapsed since I have written to you, and, indeed, I have never answered a very long letter which I received from you shortly after you were married, for which I was much obliged to you, although I have never replied to it.

I think we are now in a great situation. The blow which I made Hill* strike a few days ago upon the enemy's establishment at Almaraz has given me the choice of lines of operation for the remainder of the campaign, and do what we will we shall be *safe*. If I have luck we may do great things; at all events, the campaign is ours, I believe. The French, however, are confoundedly strong. I reckoned that Marmont

* Lord Wellington had taken both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. General Hill had taken and destroyed the French bridge of boats at Almaraz. Lord Wellington's prediction of a successful campaign was not mistaken. He gained the Battle of Salamanca on July 22nd, and prepared for the operations of 1813.—*Note by Lord Burghersh.*

and Soult could have assembled 60,000 men to raise the siege of Badajoz, the former leaving from 13,000 to 16,000 in Castile and Leon, and the latter maintaining the blockade of Cadiz and garrisoning Seville, Malaga, and Granada. But I see in an intercepted letter from the chief engineer with Soult to the Duc de Valmy he says that we had "*enlevé Badajoz à la barbe de 80,000 hommes*" which might have been assembled.

By our blow at Almaraz we have cut off the best—indeed, I may say the only—military communication by which these bodies are connected; and if I can subsist in advance I may operate in safety upon that part of them that I choose. This is a great blow, therefore, and it has already been attended by the advantage of making the enemy give up all their plans, and I think I have misled them respecting mine.

So we stand at this moment, and I think you will agree that our situation is rather better than it was when Slade told you in the garden by the Coa that I should establish a character as an officer for ever if I could get the army out of Portugal in safety.

I hope that Priscilla is quite well. Pray give my best love to her, and believe me,

Ever yours, my dear Burghersh,

Most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

CHAPTER III

WITH THE ALLIED ARMIES

Two years after his marriage Lord Burghersh was appointed English Commissioner attached to the headquarters of the Austrian army. During the time he had spent with his regiment in England, the Continent had been one vast battle-field, but now the Napoleonic star seemed waning.

The second invasion of Russia, culminating in the Battle of Borodino and the retreat from Moscow (September, 1812), had encouraged Prussia to make alliance with Russia, and the war of liberation in Germany began. After the failure of the Congress of Prague to bring about peace (July, 1813), a second campaign was entered upon, Austria then joining the allies.

Lord Wellington had followed up his successes in Portugal by expelling the French from Spain, finally driving them beyond the Pyrenees, and establishing a new base from which to invade France. The British troops being thus occupied in the south, the Government, to show their alliance with Prussia, sent an officer to be attached to the staff of each of the allied armies. Lord Burghersh, as stated, was sent to that of Austria under the command of Prince Schwartzberg. Lady Burghersh accompanied her husband, and after a somewhat adventurous journey* they reached Berlin just after the Battle of Leipsic (October 18th, 1813).

Soon after their arrival Lord Burghersh received orders to join the allied armies, which were then pursuing Napoleon towards the Rhine. He went at once to the headquarters at Frankfurt, where abortive peace

* See "Letters of Lady Burghersh," published in 1903.

negotiations again took place, and the invasion of France was agreed upon. Napoleon had met with severe reverses; the ranks of his army were depleted; the French nation was disaffected, and no longer desired to continue a war for the personal vainglory of their self-appointed monarch. Nevertheless he maintained a stubborn fight, and succeeded in inflicting heavy loss on the Prussians under Blücher.

Elated by this success, he again rejected terms of peace at the Congress of Châtillon. Fighting continued throughout the months of February and March, the invading forces with their superiority of numbers pressing forward, and finally entering Paris on March 31st.

The English representatives at the Congress of Châtillon were Lord Cathcart, Lord Aberdeen, and Sir Charles Stewart. The latter (afterwards Lord Stewart, Earl Vane, and Marquess of Londonderry) was at that time Minister to Prussia. He was a great personal friend of Lord Burghersh, and throughout his life a constant correspondent.

The abdication of Napoleon took place on April 6th. Louis XVIII. was recalled, and made his public entry into Paris on May 3rd. Lord and Lady Burghersh remained in Paris a few weeks for the fêtes of the Restoration, returning to England in the month of June.

Lord Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

ST. JEAN DE LUZ,
January 12th, 1814.

I have received your several letters* to the 19th of December, and I am very much obliged to you for the interesting details which they contain.

You will have seen the official accounts of our proceedings, and the Ministers will most probably have

* "A Memoir of the Operations of the Allied Armies under Prince Schwartzemberg and Marshal Blücher in 1813-14." These letters were written by Lord Burghersh from the headquarters of the allied armies in Germany, and were published in 1822.

made you or Lord Aberdeen acquainted with the state of affairs here, as detailed to them in my reports.

I was obliged to put the Spanish army into cantonments as soon as I passed the Nivelles. It would have been useless to attempt to keep them in the state in which they were, and I should have lost them all. This circumstance, but more particularly the state of the roads from the constant bad weather, have cramped my operations since, but I hope that I shall soon be able to renew them in style. In the meantime Soult has received another large reinforcement, being the third since the Battle of Vittoria.

We have found the French people exactly what we might expect—not from the lying accounts in the French newspapers, copied into all the others of the world, and believed by everybody, notwithstanding the internal sense of every man of their falsehood, but from what we know of the government of Napoleon, and the oppression of all descriptions under which his subjects have laboured. It is not easy to describe the detestation of this man. What do you think of the French people running into our posts for protection from the French troops, with their bundles on their heads and their beds, as you recollect to have seen the people of Portugal and Spain?

I entertain no doubt that, if the war should continue, and it should suit the policy of the Allied Powers to declare for the House of Bourbon, the whole of France will rise as one man in their favour, with the exception, possibly, of some of the *Préfets* and of the Senate, and that they will be replaced on the throne with the utmost ease. I think it probable that the allies will at last be obliged to take this line, as you

will see the trick that Bony has endeavoured to play by his treaty with King Ferdinand.*

If Priscilla is with you, give my best love to her. I received her letter from Berlin, and I have sat to Mr. Heaphy for a picture for her, which I suppose will be sent to her, unless one of her sisters or her mother should seize it.†

Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

CHÂTILLON,
1 a.m., March 11th, 1814.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

Caulaincourt ‡ asked for an interview and conference to-day, which saved us any direct proceeding. He has given us in our sitting a Tableau Historique de l'Europe, a great deal of crimination and invective against Russia and England, particularly pointing out their aggrandisement, etc.—in short, a most bitter paper. We asked for an acceptance or a refusal of our project. He begged us to consider his observations as preparatory to modification. We rejected the possibility, and said the conference must end according to our instructions. He then produced a declaration which he begged to add to our proceeding *verbally*—viz., “that the Emperor of the French would renounce his titles, acknowledge the

* Napoleon, being pressed for troops, proposed to Ferdinand, whom he had ousted from the throne of Spain and kept as a prisoner, to restore him, on condition that English and French troops should be withdrawn from the kingdom. The offer, however, was refused.

† Miniature now in possession of Lady Rose Weigall.

‡ Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicenza, Napoleon's representative at the Congress of Châtillon. He was a personal friend of the Emperor Alexander, at whose Court he had been Ambassador during the alliance between France and Russia. His appointment at this time as Foreign Minister in succession to the Duc de Bassano was considered evidence that Napoleon desired peace.

independence of Germany, Holland under the P. of Orange, Spain under Ferdinand, Switzerland under the Antient Constitution, and that if it would tend to make Peace more durable *France would even cede some of her Colonies.*"

The whole of this is so wide from our mark that, unless we are *devilish firm* indeed, I conclude we shall receive orders to break off. However, there is no knowing anything in these strange times. If Blücher could gain a victory, Bonaparte would yield to what we desire (I don't think he seems as if he would else), and this proceeding is evidently for delay. W. may with manœuvring, and I think will, hold out six or eight days longer, and much may happen before then. Keep this all to yourself; you know it's sacred.

Lady B. has given me a letter for you early in the evening, which I enclose; she told me you did not get any prog. I send you, therefore, some *good wine*, and what I have in the larder to-day.

I send you also Cobbet, which may amuse you. You shall know when we are likely to move at least twelve hours before, in order that you may send your ideas to Lady B. I conclude she must move to Chaumont or Langes.

Ever yours most sincerely,

C. S.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

NEAR PARIS,
March 30th, 1814.

I congratulate you! We shall go into Paris to-morrow. I am very well. God bless you!

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

PARIS,
April 7th, 1814.

I ought to have more time than it is possible to have at this place, and, in the middle of a revolution such as we are witnesses of, to give you some trifling idea of what has happened.

Bonaparte has neither shot himself nor asked anybody to do it for him; but I believe he will quietly go to the island of Elba: in the meantime the Bourbons are restored. The Senate have made, I believe, a curious Constitution. The King will be taken care of by a good many of those who voted the death of the late one. The ancient nobles will be badly off; their estates remain sold, but Bonaparte is down, and the world will be quiet. Conceive this man to have made such an exit. He proposed to his army to march upon Paris, and, if successful, to burn it. The Generals could not swallow. I send you the *Moniteur* which will amuse you.

I suppose my commission is now nearly over. I shall wait some time, but I wonder whether I shall have any office of employment. I don't think Paris very gay; it may get better. How curious it will be to see the ancient families return! I have not heard from Priscilla, but I believe she is safe at Dijon, and I should hope would by this time be coming up to this place. If I can hear where she is, I shall go and meet her. The society here is very bad. Rascals of every sort—nothing else. Quiet is the order of the day.

No person would believe we were occupied in de-throning Bonaparte, the terror of the world.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

PARIS,
April 13th, 1814.

I have just received the enclosed from Robinson. I have since seen Lord Castlereagh, who is very anxious I should undertake the duty* proposed for me. It will be a curious mission to escort this great man to his grave. I have agreed to go. I will tell you more when I hear further; at present the instructions are not made out. I don't know when I am to be off—perhaps to-morrow. I have received your letter of the 9th; you will not be a little surprised with all that has happened here. The Comte d'Artois† was received with enthusiasm.

Lord Burghersh to his Father.

PARIS,
April 17th, 1814.

I have just received your letter of the 14th. I hope you may enjoy Apethorpe as much as we do Paris.

Monsieur's‡ entry was very fine.

Bonaparte went off, I believe, this morning. Upon consideration, I prevailed upon Lord Castlereagh to let me off the journey with him. It would have been too long, perhaps five or six weeks, and I don't think I should have gained credit; on the contrary, should have honoured the beast Napoleon too much in dancing attendance upon him. I was to have gone

* Lord Burghersh was named one of the Commissioners to attend Napoleon to Elba, but declined on finding he was expected to remain at Elba. Colonel Sir Neil Campbell was named in his place.

† Louis XVIII.'s younger brother, afterwards Charles X.

‡ Louis XVIII.

to the Isle of Elba with him. A few days would have been very well, but for so long a journey it would have been too much.

My mission is now at an end. Have you ever spoken about any new situation for me?

I think it odd that Lord Castlereagh should have approached Gordon, the Minister to the French Court, without mentioning it to me, but it does not much signify. I think I shall soon get to England.

CHAPTER IV

MINISTER AT FLORENCE

DURING the long years of war while nearly every capital in Europe was under the sway of Napoleon (with whose Government England refused to hold diplomatic relations), diplomacy as a distinct profession for Englishmen had practically ceased to exist. When peace was declared and missions were to be sent again to the various Courts, it therefore became necessary to recruit diplomatists from other professions.

Anxious to have a settled home, and peace making the prospects of military promotion less likely, Lord Burghersh was glad to accept the post of Minister to the Court of Tuscany now offered him—a position for which he was admirably fitted by his knowledge of foreign countries and their languages, as well as by his general abilities. Accompanied by Lady Burghersh, he left England again in September, 1814. They spent a short time in Paris with the Duke of Wellington, and, continuing their journey by Mont Cenis and Turin, reached Florence towards the end of November.

The Congress of Vienna had just met, charged with the difficult task of resettling the territories of Europe. Of the many delicate problems involved, none called for more skilful diplomacy than the settlement of the claims between Naples and Sicily. By the Treaty of Paris the Duke of Tuscany had been restored to his kingdom, Piedmont and Genoa were ceded to Sardinia, Austria retained possession of Lombardy, and the Papal States remained under the jurisdiction of Rome; but the rival claims between Murat, King of Naples, and Ferdinand of Sicily for the throne of Naples constituted a complex question of momentous issue.

Murat had been placed on the throne by Napoleon, and by a treaty in January, 1814, Austria guaranteed

Murat in his possessions, and promised to try and obtain the consent of the allies to this guarantee, and further undertook to support a claim from Murat, at a general peace, for territory from the Papal States. Murat on his part renounced all claim on Sicily, and agreed to place a large army in the field against Napoleon; but on receiving the news of Napoleon's temporary successes in the spring he had remained inactive. Count Neipperg, on behalf of Austria, had tried without success to persuade England to become a party to the treaty with Naples. Lord William Bentinck, British Agent to the Court of Ferdinand, agreed, however, to an armistice by which hostilities between Naples and England should be temporarily suspended.

The great difference between the position of England and Austria in regard to Murat lay in the fact that, while Austria had recognized and held diplomatic relations with him for years, England had never done so, and was bound by a treaty of alliance to maintain Ferdinand's rights to the throne of Naples.

At the Congress, Metternich, on behalf of Austria, was anxious that the recognition of Murat as King of Naples should form a basis for the settlement of Italy. On the other hand, Talleyrand, representing France and the Bourbon interest, demanded his dethronement and expulsion, and the recall of Ferdinand. Lord Castlereagh, England's representative, supported Talleyrand's claim in general, though anxious that no breach should occur with Austria upon this question. Murat, hoping to profit by the conflict of interests which this and other matters aroused at Vienna, and annoyed at the exclusion of his representative from the Congress, made great parade of his military resources. He endeavoured to foster an idea of Italian unity, with a view that, should opportunity arise, he could declare war for his own aggrandizement, on the plea of national independence. He continued to occupy the marches of Ancona with a large force, threatening to invade the Papal territory if any decision unfavourable to himself should be pronounced. This produced a state of unrest throughout Italy, which was increased by the near vicinity of Napoleon in his exile kingdom on the island of Elba,

and the knowledge of intrigues existing between him and Murat was the occasion for constant alarm.

Lord Burghersh, from his position at Florence, was the nearest English diplomat to Elba. Sir Neil Campbell, British Commissioner on the island, was officially under him, and all communications between Sir Neil and the Government at home were transmitted through Lord Burghersh. His post was therefore important and interesting, and it was not long before the lime-light of events, which had been turned towards Vienna, was cast on Florence as the channel for information, when Europe was startled by the dramatic news of Napoleon's escape.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
December 1st, 1814.

MY LORD,

I have the honour of reporting to your lordship my arrival at this capital on the 26th ultimo. On the following morning I wrote to His Excellency the Senator Fossombroni, His Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand - Duke of Tuscany's Minister for Foreign Affairs, acquainting him with my arrival, and requesting an early permission to wait upon him. According to appointment, I had the honour of an audience of His Excellency in the afternoon. I expressed to him the satisfaction I felt at having been the person named by H.R.H. the Prince Regent to congratulate the Grand-Duke on his return to his ancient dominions, and to hope that I should at an early period be allowed the opportunity of presenting to him my credentials. The Grand-Duke was absent from his capital, but I have received from the Senator Fossombroni the assurances of His Imperial Highness's anxious wish to receive me at as early a period as

possible on his return from the tour on which he is now engaged to Pisa and Leghorn.

The Senator Fossombroni entered very largely into what he conceived to be the present state of Italy. The partisans of the policy which lately held out the hope of independence to that country he conceived to be numerous, their strength to be augmented by the persons whose interest seemed to rest on the fomentation of troubles and disquietude. The points to which these people looked with hope of assistance were certainly the island of Elba and Naples.

Marshal Bellegarde,* the Duke of Modena, with almost all the persons interested in the tranquillity of Italy, were persuaded of this fact, and particularly with him in the opinion that with Bonaparte and Murat, and particularly with the former, intrigues dangerous to the repose of the world are going on. Nothing official had, however, come into his hands. He requested me to assist him in endeavouring to discover the correspondence which he was convinced existed, and he relied on the vigilance of Colonel Campbell to further our object.

Several suspicious circumstances appeared lately to have arisen with regard to the communications from Elba. I enclose for your lordship's information on this point the despatch from Colonel Campbell.

The Prussian man-of-war, the decoration of the officers of Bonaparte's corvetti, the examining of a spy on the embarking of artillery, do not prove any material fact.

Bonaparte sent lately an agent, who was received, to congratulate the Grand-Duke on his return to his ancient States.

* The Austrian General.

The day before yesterday, Mr. Colonna, who was formerly Prefect at Naples, and is now occupying the first situation of the home of Bonaparte's mother, arrived in this town. He waited on the Senator Fossonbroni to ask, in the name of Napoleon, whether the report of the marriage of the Grand-Duchess Marie Louise with the King of Prussia was founded on fact. He stated that his master had been considerably alarmed by a statement to this effect he had seen in the papers, and had sent him to this capital to transmit to him information on this subject.

Such is the information I have been able to collect as relating to Bonaparte. The Austrian officers I have met with in Italy, as well as the Ministers of the Grand-Duke, appear to be convinced of the danger to the repose of Italy in the neighbourhood of Napoleon. Persons inclined to favour him make constant use of his name in support of the cause they would espouse, whether with any sanction of his I have not yet ascertained.

The conduct of the Court of Naples excites in this place very considerable alarm. It appears that monster Murat has lately reinforced his army at Ancona; amongst the troops advanced to that position are some of his Guards. He has an army of the line amounting to 70,000 men, and a corps of 30,000 militia. He ordered on the 9th or 10th of last month an additional army of 6,000 horses and 25,000 men. This decree directing this army was not made public, but Prince Esterhazy assures me he had an opportunity of seeing the persons who were employed in raising the force, who stated the impossibility of obtaining the number of horses, unless they were provided with money and allowed to purchase them in the Roman States.

The discontented persons in Italy, and more particularly officers, are received and employed by the Neapolitan Government. The force on foot is more considerable than the country can bear. The composition seems not to point it out as destined merely for the defence of the kingdom of Naples. The restless disposition of Marshal Murat, the falseness of his character, the views of aggrandizement he does not at all times conceal, form the grounds of apprehension in this Government; and if he should remain in his present situation the repose of Italy will never be secured.

The Austrian Minister at this place is Prince Esterhazy, who is lately returned from Naples. I do not believe Count Mier, the Austrian Minister at Naples, to be quite aware of the character of the person near whom he is accredited. Marshal Murat constantly states himself as only aiming to obey the call of the Emperor of Austria, whenever he may want his assistance. He, notwithstanding, took some opportunities of insulting the Austrians in the persons of Count Mier and Prince Esterhazy. An order not to salute them when on board a Neapolitan man-of-war, which was traced to the Minister of War and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a particular instance. The details have been transmitted to the Austrian Government.

The continued occupation of the Marches of Ancona, notwithstanding the note transmitted from Prince Metternich, increased in the Roman Government the alarm at the neighbourhood of Marshal Murat.

The suppression of a late revolt in Calabria was effected with a very considerable loss on the part of the Calabrese.

Much discontent at the government of Marshal Murat is still represented to exist amongst that people. The Grand-Duke of Tuscany has raised a regular force, at present consisting of 2,600 men. The skeletons of other battalions exist, which, if completed, will place the force of Tuscany at about 5,000 men of the line. There exists an organization for a militia. It is represented as good, and calculated to furnish a respectable force in a short time. The Senator Fossombroni remarked that "if troops were wanting to march to the South of Italy, the Grand-Duke could furnish in a short time from 3,000 to 4,000."

I am not aware, as yet, of the amount of the present revenue of the country. The taxes on wine and tobacco lately laid on have excited some discontent. The tax on wine was yesterday repealed.

Not having received any instructions from your lordship, I have conceived it to be my duty to confine myself entirely to collecting information and transmitting it to you. It is not difficult to penetrate the very serious alarm entertained at this Court at the prospect of Bonaparte or Murat's remaining in its neighbourhood.

Upon the subject of Murat, with the well-informed and well-affected people of Italy, but one opinion seems to prevail, that their country will never rest in tranquillity while he remains a Sovereign within it.

My lord, with the greatest respect, I have the honour to remain,

Your lordship's most obedient servant,

BURGHESH.

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

PORTO FERRAJO,
December 6th, 1814.

DEAR LORD BURGHERSH,

I hope that my report to Lord Castlereagh, sent herewith for your lordship's information, will sufficiently explain the alarming reports received at Florence, and I think your lordship will agree with me that Napoleon's views are of a higher cast than connection with Murat, or any sudden irruption with his own means. The more I see of him the more I am convinced of this. He is in good health and spirits!

I have made a minute narrative of my conversation with him on Sunday, and another yesterday, which I shall have time to copy by next messenger.

In course of this he mentioned an opinion given by Funti, and immediately stopped himself, with an appearance of embarrassment. There is a Funti who was a senator at Paris, and is now at Florence. Is it not possible that Mr. Colonna, or some of his friends, see this man? Having lost a good income, and full of disappointed national Italian pride, there is no saying what he may do. I believe he is in the Tuscan Government; or if not, he is much with Fossombroni and Funlaqui. I think it right to mention it to you, that you may be able to inquire particularly about him. I need not mention that my name may not be confided to Fossombroni, or any other, upon this subject. Napoleon has always asked me if I knew this Funti or saw him.

I really believe the Tuscan Government is the weakest of all weak Governments.

Napoleon and all about him seem to believe in the

report of the Empress going to be divorced to marry the King of Prussia. Colonna has probably been sent to ascertain it. Napoleon says Marie Louise promised to write to him daily,* and he has never heard from her since she went to Vienna. I told him your lordship had desired me to mention your arrival, and to offer every attention consistent with your duty. There is no circumstance of any remark which is not mentioned in my despatch.

I arrived here upon Friday night, but have not had any safe opportunity until this, by the return of the *Partridge* (Captain Adye). He has some thoughts of paying a visit to Florence, in which case he will pay his respects to your lordship.

A person arrived here from France and had a long interview with Napoleon last night. His name is Gallizini. He was Commissary here, and left this some years ago to settle his accounts at Paris; his wife is a native of Corsica. I have the honour to be, my lord,

Your lordship's faithful and obedient servant,

NEIL CAMPBELL.

Mr. Fossombroni was desirous to know whether a letter in French, signed by Rothery, Secretary of Napoleon, and taken upon Ettore,† the spy, was feigned or not, when he talks of Fanny, his mother and children. As far as I can yet ascertain, he is here a single man; therefore these must be terms in a concerted correspondence.

* In later years the Empress Marie Louise told Lady Burghersh that she had constantly written to Napoleon, but all her letters were intercepted.

† Ettore, a spy from Elba, arrested at Leghorn. He was kept under inspection, but no very conclusive evidence appears to have been obtained; he appeared to be in the confidence of both Marshal Bellegarde and Napoleon (Sir N. Campbell's Journal, p. 320).

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

PORTO FERRAJO,
December 9th, 1814.

As the arrival and departure of particular persons from this island, and various circumstances which are omitted in my despatches to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, may nevertheless be deserving of your lordship's notice, from the vicinity of Tuscany and other causes, I shall hereafter do myself the honour of transmitting your Excellency a separate communication thereof, and now transmit a memorandum enclosed.

Memorandum, December 5th, 1814.

Arrived from France by way of Leghorn, Mr. Gallizini. This person was Commissary in the island of Elba, and went to Paris some years ago to settle his accounts, as he had large claims against the French Government, and was therefore unable to pay his debts, which are still due here. He is married to a Corsican woman, and it is supposed he is on his way to that island. This evening he had a long interview with Napoleon, being formerly presented in full dress uniform. A Mr. Litta arrived here lately from Milan. He is of a good family in Italy or Piedmont, and is said to be violent against the existing Governments in Italy. He was an officer of Engineers.

The Countess Misognac de Jersey de Rohan has lately been here from Leghorn with her son, a youth of fourteen years of age—her carriage and servants to remain here for the winter. She visits Napoleon, his mother and sister Pauline. She says she is the widow

of a Count de Jersey, who had been first married to a Princess de Rohan. She has resided for a few years in London, in an expensive establishment, paid for by a merchant of the name of Plimmer. She went from England to Malta last year, when she lost her daughter; came lately to Leghorn in a Government vessel furnished by General Maitland, and brought letters of recommendation to the Tuscan Governor, General Spannoitre.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
December 10th, 1814.

. . . Whatever may be the future prospects of Bonaparte, the conduct he has up to the present moment pursued seems to have baffled every attempt to discover the mode in which he may be designing to come forward.

If it were to be credited that a mind like his could remain in quiet within the limits to which it is at present confined, I should be inclined to believe that it was unoccupied with those gigantic projects with which, by many people even at this moment, Napoleon is charged.

I have received applications from French emigrants, pensioners of Great Britain for the arrears and continuation of their salaries.

It is right to inform you that Mr. Colonna, the person I stated as residing here from Bonaparte, called upon me this morning. He was first announced to me as Colonel Campbell, whom I desired should be admitted; when I was informed of the mistake I did not think it was worth an explanation to refuse his visit. He

remained with me a short time, and stated his being in the same inn with me as a reason of his having called. He did not mention the name of Napoleon.

The statements I transmitted in my last despatch as coming from the officers and agents of the Napoleon Government continue to create considerable alarm in Italy.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
December 16th, 1814.

I have the honour of enclosing despatches from Colonel Sir N. Campbell, together with the minute of conversation held by Bonaparte.

Many Englishmen of late have visited the island of Elba; they are received with attention. Foreigners of various habits and relations have also gone there. Bonaparte gives audiences to every person, and converses without reserve upon the many transactions of his life. From the general manner of his reception, it is difficult to decide the degree of importance which should be attached to the visits of persons of intriguing characters.

M. Litta, who, with his whole family, was pointed out to me by General Bellegarde at Milan as being at the head of the discontented in Italy, has had an interview with him of much length, and is still remaining at Elba. M. Colonna is remaining at this place. The Tuscan Government are purchasing some of the cannon selling by Bonaparte.

Some disturbance is reported lately to have taken place at Naples during the Marshal Murat's absence. It is stated to have been quelled with facility. No

movements have been remarked in the troops of that Government.

About the time of my arrival at this place (in consequence of some remarks made by the Minister Gallow upon the delay), the Grand-Duke wrote to the Marshal Murat as Sovereign of Naples to announce his return to Tuscany. Marshal Murat has determined to send an officer (Prince Pignatelli) to return the compliment. It is not yet known in what way this person will be accredited, whether for a temporary or permanent mission.

ENCLOSURE.

Memorandum of a conversation between Napoleon Bonaparte and Colonel Sir Neil Campbell at Porto Ferrajo, December 4th, 1814. Published rather more fully in Sir Neil Campbell's Journal, 1869. See p. 325 of the Journal.

After some general conversation, a question respecting the Congress, which led to the name of Talleyrand, he inveighed against him in the grossest terms. That he was a man of the vilest heart, "un scélérat, un homme de la Révolution, un prêtre défroqué." He knew long ago that he was inimical to him, and would betray him if an opportunity occurred. He therefore charged Cambacérès (who was left with the Empress Marie Louise at Paris, and who accompanied her to Orleans) not to let Talleyrand remain in Paris in case of quitting it. He was weak enough, however, to yield to the pitiful supplication of the latter.

I asked him whether the letter which appeared in the Journal as a copy of one addressed to him was authentic—written by Talleyrand to dissuade him from

war with Spain. He said it was not. No such letter ever was written. So far from that, Talleyrand first proposed to him the invasion of Spain. After being turned out of office by him in consequence of repeated complaints from the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, of shameful and unjust exactions of money for himself, he continued to frequent his evening society along with Fouché, who was then in office. He endeavoured to revive his credit with Napoleon, and advised him to profit by the differences in Spain, and to place one of his own family upon the throne. He presented a memorial, containing the information and plan of a person employed under the Prince of Peace.

He asserted that Talleyrand very often urged him to get rid of the Bourbons by assassination, or by a plan of their being carried off by smugglers and brought over to France. He always refused it, saying he would not injure their persons as long as they kept out of France.

It was quite another affair with the Duc d'Enghien,* who came to the frontier of France, even to Strasbourg, to foment conspiracies. His death was likewise an act of Talleyrand's. It was proposed by him, and had it not been for him his life would have been saved even after his trial, for the Duke wished to speak

* The Duc d'Enghien, son of the Duc de Bourbon, born August 2nd, 1772. On the outbreak of the Revolution he left Paris with his father, and became a distinguished soldier in the civil war. Married la Princesse de Rohan Rochefort in 1794, and in 1801 settled at the Château d'Ettenheim on the Rhine. When war broke out between France and England in 1804, the Royalists attempted a Bourbon restoration; their plot was discovered, the leaders seized and executed. A raid was made on the Château d'Ettenheim, and the Duc d'Enghien arrested. He was taken to Vincennes, hastily tried, and, though there was no evidence to connect him with the plot, he was immediately shot.

to him. This request was communicated to him: "Cela me touchait. J'ai voulu voir le jeune homme, mais c'était déjà trop tard. Il avait pris les mesures pour l'empêcher; c'était lui, Talleyrand, qui était la cause." In this relation he showed much enmity to Talleyrand, but no emotion or regret at the circumstance—at least, very little.

He asked me whether I had heard or knew anything of the various reports respecting Marie Louise and the divorce which, it was stated, was to take place. He said it had appeared in the journals of Genoa and Milan.

I told him that the British officer who commanded at Genoa confined himself to his military duties, and did not interfere, probably, with the newspapers. That, by all accounts, the attachment of Marie Louise to him was unaltered. He then inveighed against the inhumanity of keeping her from him. She had promised to write to him every day upon her return from Switzerland to Vienna, but he had never received one letter since that period. His child was kept there like those taken by conquerors in ancient days to grace their triumphs. The Emperor of Austria ought to recollect how differently he had acted towards him when he was entirely in his power, and when no ties of marriage subsisted between them. He had twice entered Vienna as a conqueror. It was not he who had solicited the marriage; it was forced upon him. "J'ai été très heureux avec ma femme, mais la mariage a été très funeste pour moi." He said it would have been much more advantageous for him to have married a Russian Princess, which would have taken place had it not been for the difference of religion. He said he was prepared for every act of personal hostility and oppression,

even to that of taking his life. He spoke of reports of his being removed from Elba to England with a degree of belief that it would be less politic than leaving him in Elba. He presumed he would have personal freedom. He would have society, and an opportunity of doing away prejudices against himself by explaining many circumstances of his own life and conduct which were misunderstood. As to his connection with France (where four-fifths were for him in preference to the Bourbons), in Elba he could have no communication but what must be known. In England he could freely communicate with those who wished to see him. He described the humiliation of France, and the feelings of the people, and the results to be expected from it in the usual way, adding that the consequences might be of that magnitude that the Sovereigns of Europe would, for their own security, hereafter call upon him to check them.

He said that the appointment of Mr. Brulart* as Governor in Corsica could be with no other view than a plan of the Bourbons against his life, and since that he had always been accompanied by four armed horsemen to protect him. Brulart had no connection with Corsica; he had been always employed in the conspiracies of the Bourbons with Georges, Pichegru, etc., and therefore it was evident he must have been selected with that view. He had removed lately from

* Brulart was one of those who laid down arms on Napoleon's assuming the Consulate, and was allowed to reside in Paris. A friend of his, desiring to return to France from England, whither he had emigrated, applied for permission to Napoleon through Brulart, who was directed by the Emperor to encourage his friend to come over. Immediately on landing in France he was seized and executed. Brulart fled to England, and, in the height of his rage and grief at being made the means of decoying his friend to death, wrote to Napoleon threatening to assassinate him. This was the cause of Napoleon's present alarm (Scott's "Life of Napoleon").

Ajaccio to Bastia to be nearer Elba. He spoke of the invectives against him in various publications—the epithets of Nero, Brutus, Lache, etc. “I shall say nothing of my life as a soldier. It is no proof of my courage, every day of my present life shut up here in this *bicoque* of a house, separated from the world, deprived of every interesting occupation, and of society to afford interest—even without money!” Here he stated the sums he had left in France, and what he had brought with him. The latter was so trifling that he was obliged to send to Marie Louise at Orleans for an additional sum before his departure from Fontainebleau.

Even in this French exposé of the Budget there was abuse against him, and it was a false statement in itself, for there was no notice taken of four millions of *domaines privés* received by the Royal Family. It was one time his intention to have replied to that attack upon himself, but afterwards he thought it better not to do so. The Bourbons ought to follow the same line of conduct which he had done towards them after he had ascended the throne of France, which was neither to permit invective nor praise.

In conversing upon the state of affairs in Naples, that it was reported that Murat had ordered a levy of 25,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, which betrayed a want of confidence on his part in the decision of the allies. He said: “Depend upon it, Murat does nothing but in concert with Austria. When my sister the Princess Pauline left Naples, the Minister of Austria was more the Sovereign of the kingdom than Murat.” Whatever terms the allies chose to impose upon him, he must subscribe to them—at least, his resistance would be fruitless, unless to seek his own death and

to fall with arms in his hands, rather than to yield to the decision of the Congress.

He repeated former observations upon the impolicy of England in wishing to remove Murat; the uncertain prospect of tranquillity in Europe, with discontent in Italy, and the same boiling in every part of France. Even in Germany that the arrangements of the Congress have not been well received, for many of the petty Princes are not satisfied. Prince Furstenberg and many others have presented a petition to the Emperor of Austria, which so affected him that he shed tears. Bavaria and Würtemberg must observe this with uneasiness.

He animadverted in a strain of great ridicule upon the nomination of the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia to be Colonels of Austrian regiments. What childishness! This bore no resemblance to the circumstance of Frederick of Prussia paying a visit to the Emperor of Germany in Bohemia, dressed in the uniform of the Austrian new liveries, as he was a member of the Germanic Empire. These regiments might yet be employed against the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia. "L'Empereur Alexandre est un acteur; il est faux, tout à fait Grec." It would have been very well to give the use of a regiment at Vienna to that Ostrogoth Constantine for his amusement and exercise. He detailed the operations of his army in France during last year, nearly in the usual terms: That had Marmont been true and had marched in the first place to Châlons as he had ordered, at the time he himself quitted Aras, he would have cut up the whole of Prince Schwarzenberg's army by falling upon his flank and rear; and that he would again have attacked the allies after his arrival at Fontainebleau, had he

not been prevented by Marmont's desertion. He had now no regret at having refused to make peace upon the terms proposed at Châtillon;* he would do the same over again, even foreseeing the consequences which have followed. The terms proposed at Frankfurt† were the only ones which could be considered equitable, but these were prevented by Lord Castlereagh.

He recounted the history of his own life from the siege of Toulon, in the beginning of the French Revolution, until his return from Egypt and becoming first Consul.

(Signed) NEIL CAMPBELL, *Colonel.*

Sir Neil Campbell to Viscount Castlereagh.‡

ISLAND OF ELBA,
December 9th, 1814.

MY LORD,

I now have the honour of transmitting to your lordship herewith a minute of my conversation with Bonaparte some days ago, as mentioned in my despatch, No. 38.

I think it also proper to report to your lordship a part of his conversation upon the following day, when I presented to him Captain Adye, commanding His Majesty's ship *Partridge* (at present stationed here for the assistance of any duties), as it displays his former plans and opinions with respect to the invasion of England.

He says that it was sincerely his intention to have

* By the terms proposed at Châtillon, Napoleon might have kept the throne of France with its boundaries of 1792.

† By the terms offered at Frankfurt in 1813, France might have extended her frontier to the Rhine.

‡ Published in Sir N. Campbell's Journal, p. 340.

attempted it, which was only prevented by repeated disobedience of orders on the part of the Admiral Villeneuve—in the first place by unnecessary waste of time in the West Indies ; in the next place by going to Vigo and Cadiz, instead of proceeding directly up the Channel to protect the flotilla in its passage across Boulogne to the coast of Kent. He only required that his fleet should obtain the superiority in that part of the coast for one week, in order to obtain which he had despatched Villeneuve's fleet to the West Indies, thereby to draw away so great a portion of the British fleets in quest of him that there would not be a sufficient force to oppose him for that space of time upon his return.

He considers this manœuvre to be infallible as long as Great Britain is unable to oppose a superior fleet to remain with the flotilla, as well as to blockade the French fleets and to guard her foreign possessions ; and in this point of view he considers the formation of the port of Cherbourg to be a most serious consideration to Great Britain. It was never intended to force the passage across the Channel with the offensive means of the flotilla, but they were provided with guns in order to encourage that opinion, and to mask his real plan for beguiling the British fleets to a distance. He would have preferred making his descent upon the right bank of the Thames, or near it, so as to turn all the towers, canals, etc., which had been multiplied by Mr. Pitt ; but that would also depend much upon the wind and tides, and would be at the discretion of the naval officer. His object would be to get over as quickly as possible, and to advance immediately to London. No British force could be collected in sufficient number to oppose him. His subsequent

measures, in case of success, would arise out of circumstances, but he would certainly have separated Ireland from Great Britain. He considered success as certain. I asked him whether he had resolved to accompany the first party in person; he replied that he had. He always foresaw that, if these preparations were not put in execution, it would have the effect of making Great Britain a military power by land as well as by sea, by rousing the energies of the whole people, and creating armed bodies who would gradually become martial. It was this which gave the impulse and the materials for the British army in Spain.

The Intendant-General of the island of Elba informs me that Napoleon's troops and vessels cost him one million of francs per year, and all his sources of revenue, including the contributions, will not nett four hundred thousand this year.

In addition to discharging a number of servants lately, he had reduced to one-half the salary of his surgeon, treasurer, and some others who hold civil appointments in his household, and who accompanied him from Fontainebleau.

(Signed) NEIL CAMPBELL, *Colonel.*

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
January 3rd, 1815.

. . . Nothing has occurred at Elba worthy of any particular remark. Mr. Litta may have been connected with those persons who have been arrested in Milan; propositions may have been made by him to Bonaparte; whether any have ever been listened to

with serious intentions it has been impossible to discover.

The police of this Government is bad. The many persons who pass through this State to Elba, and return without being even known to the Government, is very great. The journey of Mr. Litta was not reported either to the police of this place or of Leghorn.

A Comtesse Balsini lately passed from Ancona to Elba; she there saw Bonaparte several times, and came away (taking her route for Naples) charged with a considerable number of letters. The whole of this was unknown to this Government, and when I gave the information, though the person was in the town, the police were unable to discover her residence till she had quitted it for Rome.

M. Colonna is still here waiting, as he states, for letters from the Empress Marie Louise. Other persons of intriguing character are resident in this town. M. Fossombroni persuades himself they are perfectly quiet and strictly watched by the police; the latter I have great reason to doubt.

There have lately appeared several printed papers in which the project of an Italian kingdom ruled by Murat is constantly put forth. It is to answer the double purpose of increasing that person's popularity and of threatening the Austrians, in case they should doubt as to the policy of their late treaty with him.

In a former despatch I stated to your lordship that the disaffected officers and men from all parts of Italy were assembled under the Napoleon banner. Such still continues to be the case. M. Fossombroni told me yesterday he had reason to think Marshal Murat meant to evacuate Les Marches d'Ancona. In a military point of view this would not be an object of

much consequence to him. The Roman State is destitute of every means of defence; the same is the case with Tuscany.

The Austrians have a very small force at Bologna and in front of it, and, from everything I have been able to learn, there would be (in the present arrangement of their troops) nothing that could prevent Marshal Murat from occupying Italy to the banks of the Po. Whether he should, therefore, now evacuate a part of the Roman States to conciliate the allies would be of little consequence to him; in as many marches he could return to occupy it.

The state of public opinion is such in Italy that, formed as the Neapolitan army now is, with the independence of Italy as a watchword to assist it, I should be inclined to think it would be joined by considerable forces if it succeeded in occupying any great extent of country. The character, however, of Marshal Murat does not stand high. The want of any other person with strength to support his claim to the Italian kingdom would alone be the groundwork of his opportunity. Count Starhemberg, who commanded the Austrian troops at Lucca, and who during the late campaign formed with his division the advance of General Nugent, has resided at this place for the last week. I asked him for some information on the part that Marshal Murat acted while in co-operation with the allies. I have received from him a very detailed account of the campaign, by which it appears that the Neapolitan troops not only were not employed to the advantage of the allies, but that on every occasion they were directed so as to counteract the general objects in view, and in many instances to betray the Austrians into situations of danger, and in

others directly to interfere in saving the troops of the enemy.

Count Starhemberg has within these few days intercepted a correspondence, which has not yet been traced to its source, in which a reference is made to the organization which is proceeding in Italy, and where it is stated that bodies to act as partisans are to be formed instead of the great corps before recommended. Several depots of ammunition are represented as existing, one of them at Sarzanne. I do not think this information can, as yet, be relied upon. Count S. is, however, persuaded that an extensive organization exists throughout Italy from Milan to Naples.

Amongst the many publications which come from Naples, the *Moniteur* of the 22nd of December is not uninteresting. From the debate in the House of Commons of the 25th of November, it is stated to be proved that Marshal Murat is distinctly acknowledged by the British Ministers, the existence of their adhesion to the treaty with Austria is extolled, and Mr. Ponsonby is represented as saying that to make war on the King of Naples would be an act of hostility to England. This statement, which was copied into the *Gazette* of this capital, created considerable sensation.

As I was in the habit of seeing the editor, I gave him the English paper in which the debate was reported, and recommended him, if he thought the conclusions of the Neapolitan editor were not borne out by the speeches, merely to state it in his next publication.

Count Buol, the Austrian Minister at this place, informed me he had received letters from his Court in which it was stated that by a despatch from your lordship all British authorities in Italy were directed

to act in support of the views of the Austrian Government. It has constantly been my note of conduct, although I have never received any instructions whatever.

I enclose the proclamations from Genoa, also a letter written to the Government containing information on the whole of public opinion in that town. The people, I am sorry to say, seem most dissatisfied with the measures adopted for them by the Congress.*

Count Sena, the late President of the Government, is expected here. At Lucca there is, perhaps, more dissatisfaction than in any part of Italy. The people are heavily oppressed by the Austrian troops which occupy the country, and they have in prospect their union with Tuscany, which, above all things, renders them most miserable.

From the best information I can obtain, I conceive the Austrian force in Italy to be at present from 45,000 to 50,000 men; 8,000 of this force are on this side of the Po. The force of Marshal Murat amounts to 50,000 men disposable of the line, and about 30,000 militia.

Your lordship may already be aware that the King of Sicily has lately married the Princess Paterno,† though this act has not yet been publicly declared. Still, I believe there is no doubt upon the subject.

Mr. Walker, Consul at Naples, to Lord Burghersh.

January 3rd, 1815.

The British commerce here certainly labours under some difficulties, and greater than were experienced under the old Government. I have had occasion to

* At Vienna.

† Queen Caroline, wife of Ferdinand, had died in the autumn.

make some representations on the subject which have been well received, and have not been without their effect.

Being at a ball the other evening given by H.R.H. the Princess of Wales, at which the King and Queen were present, the Duke of Gallo informed me that the King wished to have some conversation with me. On accompanying the Duke to His Majesty, he began immediately to assure me of his sincere attachment to the British Government; of his most anxious desire to promote and encourage a commercial intercourse between the two countries on the most liberal footing; and of his wish to establish a commercial treaty for their mutual benefit, and with considerable advantage to England.

I took the opportunity of saying that the duties with which certain commodities were charged were such as either to prevent the importation or to encourage smuggling; in either such case his revenue must suffer materially. He replied that he knew it, and that a new tariff was forming which would remove many of the objections; that the system established some time ago was entirely French, and should be remedied, but could not be done so all at once. I told him I was sorry to be under the necessity of making some further representations to the Duke of Gallo, who was present. The King immediately replied: "I know you have never required anything unreasonable; state whatsoever you have to complain of at all times, and be assured that every possible attention shall be paid to it." He seemed to be fully impressed with the necessity of making considerable alterations, and I trust will not be diverted from doing so gradually. ' .

Your lordship doubtless knows that H.R.H. the Princess of Wales was received here, and continues to be treated with every attention due to her exalted rank.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
January 13th, 1815.

Count Jules Polignac,* who lately passed to Rome, returned the day before yesterday on his way to Florence. He has had several interviews with the Pope, in which he states himself to have recommended him a military organization for his States and other objects.

I am inclined to believe he was charged with some commissions from the French Government. He was mysterious upon that subject, as upon the information he had obtained in Rome. He assured me, however, he was possessed of a letter from Marshal Murat to Bonaparte, and another to the Princess Pauline. He objected either to give me a copy of these letters or to let me see them; the story may, therefore, altogether be untrue; but he states the letters to convey assurance of friendship from Murat to Bonaparte, which circumstances will in a short time enable him to prove. They state the daily increase of his partisans, the friendship of England, and the neutrality of Austria.

Count Jules flatters himself that the Italian people turn to the King of France as their only protector, and of the French name bear only now in mind the glories of five-and-twenty years of victories.

* Italian Ambassador at Vienna.

Your lordship will have observed that the Roman Government has allowed some articles, which will not be agreeable to Marshal Murat, to be published in its papers. Having mentioned this to Prince Pignatelli, he replied that some balance of power was necessary in Italy, and that Ancona must belong to Naples.

M. Fossombroni is in much anxiety about a person of the name of Olivier, who is employed by Count Stasemberg in the Government of Piombino, and who was in the service of the Grand-Duchess.

Fossombroni conceives that this person is the channel of communication between Naples and Bonaparte.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh.

January 15th, 1815.

I hope you like your situation in Florence, and that Lady Burghersh enjoys it more than the bivouac of last winter.

We go out but slowly here, but celerity was never the characteristic merit of a Congress.

I have not sent you any instructions, having (hearing?) no Italian politics at present to avoid or to direct upon. I wish you to keep quiet; send me all the information you can, do nothing to commit your Court to any future system, but give Austria and the Reichstadt authorities every countenance and assistance in your power in governing the country.

I shall be glad to know what is going on everywhere, but I do not wish Colonel Campbell to engage in the proposed mission.* When I have anything more

* The proposed mission was to go to Naples to observe what was passing there.

precise to say, you may rely upon hearing from me. Many thanks for your despatches, which do you credit.

Letter from Mr. Vaughan, English Commissary in Sicily, giving an account of affairs at Palermo and the Parliament there, a Liberal Constitution having been granted by King Ferdinand to Sicily under the auspices of Lord William Bentinck.

PALERMO,
January 28th, 1815.

MY DEAR LORD,

I wish I could give you a good account of this place; it is not uninteresting to those who look on. The Houses of Lords and Commons refuse to grant any supplies, the army is unpaid, and every second officer is *literally* without a shirt. First, they say because the King would prorogue the Parliament if they did; and if it is urged that he has passed his word not to do so, their answer is "Phoo!" and, secondly, because they apprehend that the Ministers will embezzle and give no account, knowing that, were they themselves Ministers, it would infallibly happen, and these are the reasons they themselves give. The King* is expecting every moment to be called to Naples (having privately married the Princess Paterno moglie di coscienza, as he calls her) with his adherents; and upon this occasion all the abhorrence the Neapolitan feels for the Sicilian, which is unextinguishable, has broken out, with every bitterness and contempt. It is but a few evenings ago that I was assured by a very grave gentleman of the Court that there is not a Sicilian that does not deserve to be hanged. This is

* Ferdinand IV.

their political state; for their moral I say nothing, since no such thing exists.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
January 31st, 1815.

The police of the Roman States appear lately to have been actively engaged in seeking out and arresting the agents of the Neapolitan Government established in Rome. The superintendent of the Neapolitan *élèves* settled in the different institutes in the Roman States has been directed to leave the country. A lawyer, Lanzetti, and a person of the name of Agretti, with several others, have been arrested and their papers seized. The Pope's Government has refused to allow a Neapolitan Post-Office to be any longer maintained in Rome. Marshal Murat, in return, has threatened to break all communication with that capital, and to direct his correspondence from the States through Ancona.

On the subject of the Marches of Ancona some increased alarm has of late existed, on a report that the Neapolitan authorities had dropped the term *provisoire* in the public acts they issued.

An Englishman of the name of Marshall lately passed through this town, coming from Naples. He desired to speak to me, when he stated himself to be charged with most important despatches from Marshal Murat, which he was desired to request I would put under a cover with my name upon it. I hope your lordship will think I did right in refusing to have anything to say either to the despatches or the courier of a foreign Government. The same sort of thing has

happened this day; a Mr. Macirone,* coming from Naples, has waited upon me with a letter from Lord Oxford, requesting I would grant that gentleman a passport, stating him to be charged with papers for Government, for the purpose of avoiding his being arrested under a Neapolitan passport, as was the case with himself in France. I am in this way called upon to legalize a correspondence with Naples through English agents, which I do not feel to be my duty. I have therefore confined myself to the usual visitation of this person's passport.

Mr. Macirone stated on every side that Marshal Murat was determined to resist any decision of the Congress which might be hostile to him. He stated the Neapolitan army to amount to 81,000 regular troops and 90,000 militia, the whole attached to the Sovereign, and anxious to be led into the field under his command. Such is the language at present held by all the Neapolitan agents in Italy.

In the Neapolitan *Gazette* of the 16th of January there is an article detailing the great zeal displayed by the people of all ranks upon the appeal of the Government to form a general armament. The youth of every class in the provinces, and in the capital are represented as having flocked to the standard of King Joachim, for which His Majesty returns thanks, and praises the spontaneous feelings with which his subjects have come forward to offer themselves at the call of their country to follow the paths of *fatigue* and *glory*.

I have not been able to get any information on this

* Colonel Macirone was for some time aide-de-camp to Murat when King of Naples. He was afterwards employed as a police agent in Paris by Fouché. He wrote a book, "Memoirs of the Life and Adventures of Colonel Macirone" (London, 1818).

armament, but I believe it has been a late appeal to form a number of volunteer companies.

The partisans of Marshal Murat do not hold so confident a language with regard to the favourable disposition of the Congress as they lately did. The friendship of England is still insisted upon by them, and with that country's support the independence of the Italian kingdom is represented as being easily to be secured.

Since I have been in Italy I have had much occasion to hear discussions on the question of an Italian kingdom. In Lombardy, and more particularly at Milan, where the splendour of a Court is still remembered, and where the Austrians have pursued a course calculated rather to hold a people in subjection than profiting by their virtue and military pride, to make them respectable to themselves and a strength to their Government, the question of independence or any change is popular.

Wherever the Austrian troops have been quartered for any length of time, the manner in which their officers, as well as men, have behaved themselves, as also the heavy contributions which have been raised by the Generals, has given universal dissatisfaction, and, I fear, has totally alienated from them the minds of the Italian people. I should be inclined to think that no dominion could be less sure at present (except maintained by the weight of military power) than that of Austria in Italy. In the Papal States, I have been led to believe, there is a considerable party hostile to the government of the Church.

In Tuscany, the government of the Grand-Duke, for its mildness and equity, is generally beloved.

The class of people many of whom were called into

activity by the late Government in Italy, and all those who feel themselves possessed of talents and are anxious to be called into the great scene of the world, are disappointed and dissatisfied with the present state of their country. By the Austrians they are none of them called into high situations ; by the smaller States their services are not required. In Tuscany, to belong to an army which may amount to 3,000 or 4,000 men cannot flatter the pride of any man ; in a civil line, the service required by the Government is necessarily on so small a scale, and, from the state of its treasury, the rewards so limited, that neither the ambition of the rich man nor the wants of the poor man with talents will find their reward in devoting themselves to the service of their country. The consequences of this general state of feeling are to be traced in the numberless partisans amongst the most active and intelligent Italians in favour of the great kingdom in which the talents might be exercised. The glory of the ancient Italian name would excite some ardour in certain classes of the lower orders. It would, however, be confined to those who are exasperated against the German troops. For I am persuaded that, with the people of Italy, no measure could be so hurtful or unpopular as the forming of their country into one kingdom. The different States into which it has so long been divided has separated the feelings and the interests of the people. The inhabitants of no separate country hate each other more thoroughly than those of the neighbouring States of Italy. Repeated instances of it have occurred during the last twenty years, and even at Milan, in the change of the Government which took place before the Austrians entered, the first act of the people was to banish

the deputies from Bologna as strangers whom they hated.

The people are, besides, attached to their different capitals. They glory in the privileges they enjoy, and the inhabitants of Naples, Rome, and Florence, would be most unwilling to see their cities reduced to the state of provincial towns.

With feelings such as I have described, the project of an Italian kingdom, set forth and conquered by the great military power, seconded by the most active and able part of the Italians, might for the moment be established, but I doubt its being popular with the mass of the people; its after-details would encounter the greatest difficulties.

* * * * *

From the various reports which reach me at this place, I am impressed with a belief that the Neapolitan Government is preparing some movement. It seems generally understood that unfavourable news has been received from the Congress, which has caused Marshal Murat to increase his activity. The dissensions existing with Rome, which by the Papal Government have been carried on with some violence, may effect a pretext for the advance of some Neapolitan troops. The occupation of Rome and the country in front of it, such as Civita Vecchia, Civita Castellana, the bridge of the Borgetto, Narni, Terni, Spoleto, and Foligno, are necessary to the defence of the Neapolitan States. I should fear that on the first favourable opportunity they will be seized upon by Marshal Murat.

M. Fossombroni feels great alarm at the different reports received from Naples. He has given me a

paper, which I have the honour of enclosing. Its object is to support the claim of this Government to Lucca and other arrondissements. He gives the plan of a sort of balance of power in Italy by which its tranquillity might be preserved. It is, however, right to observe that in a moment of some danger, such as the present, nothing is farther from the views of the Grand-Duke than to arm even the few men that in ordinary times would be necessary for his dominions.

When I arrived here, M. Fossombroni talked of the army being raised to 5,000 men. I find, however, on the contrary, there are only two regiments of infantry—one of them of 600 men, and the other about 400. There are two squadrons of cavalry, which amount to 300 horses. This is the whole of the Tuscan force.

When M. Fossombroni spoke to me of the equilibrium he wished to see established in Italy, I answered that, to prove its possibility, the States that desired it ought to show with what forces they would be ready to maintain it, and he ought to tell me with what number of troops he intended Tuscany should appear in case the contest he dreaded is not far distant.

He had no troops to offer, but hoped the militia might be of some assistance if called upon.

The militia have, in fact, no existence, so that Tuscany is totally unprotected. The Roman States are in the same situation.

I don't know whether it would enter into your lordship's views to recommend in these countries the formation of armed force, which, combined with Powers of more considerable strength, might assist

in preserving the independence of these States, and in securing the permanence of the arrangements to be made in Italy.

Sir Neil Campbell to Lord Burghersh. [Private.]

PORTO FERRAJO,
11 at night, February 2nd, 1815.

DEAR LORD BURGHERSH,

As Captain Adye returns to Leghorn early tomorrow morning, and I have only this moment left Napoleon, it is not in my power to write a despatch to Lord Castlereagh nor, indeed, have I any particular circumstances to mention.

As usual, there are various reports and suspicions, but I wish first of all to examine them, thinking it most probable that, like many others, they will prove of little consequence.

There was nothing remarkable in the subjects of his conversation to-night. He was unusually grave and dull.

I have not seen any of the French squadron. Mr. Colonna applied to Captain Adye for a passage to this place, and came with us. He had been detained there twenty-two days by the severity of the weather. The Vice-Consul here tells me that he thinks the vessel commanded by Giacomo Olivari (described in the passport dated from the Vice-Consulate at Rome) was here about a month ago, but he is to make the necessary inquiries of the Master of the Port.

I have the honour to be, dear Lord Burghersh, your lordship's faithful and obedient servant,

NEIL CAMPBELL.

*Sir W. A'Court, English Minister at the Court of
King Ferdinand, to Lord Burghersh.*

PALERMO,
February 16th, 1815.

I will not let this opportunity escape me of writing you a few lines, though I have in fact nothing to communicate.

Our Parliament continues its sitting, but does nothing but exhibit its incapacity to perform those functions which were expected from it. Indeed, the whole fabric is crumbling to pieces. The decision of the Congress will be its *coup de grâce*.

We have just received an addition to our corps in the person of the French Minister, the Count de Narbonne.* As far as I can judge from the little I have seen of him, I think we shall pull very well together. He is more of an Englishman than a Frenchman, having spent the last twenty-four years of his life in London. Our acquaintance did not commence under very auspicious circumstances, as we were engaged in some angry correspondence about some deserters before he had been twenty-four hours in Palermo. He conducted himself remarkably well on the occasion, and we are now the best of friends. Notwithstanding the endeavours of the Court party to bring him forward on all occasions in opposition to me, he keeps studiously in the background, and refuses to be made the instrument of their folly and ingratitude.

We are still without any positive intelligence from

* Accredited by Louis XVIII. to King Ferdinand.

Vienna about Naples. We hear, however, that they are rather uneasy in that capital, and we have a proof of it in the demand made by the Princess of Wales for a frigate to carry her away. She does not condescend to inform me whither she intends to go, as she is a declared Muratist, and in open hostility with everything and everyone connected with this Court. She and Lady Oxford* have had a terrible quarrel, which the latter attributes to jealousy on Murat's account.

Lord Stewart† to Lord Burghersh from the Vienna Congress, just before the receipt of the news of Bonaparte's escape, which news Lord Burghersh transmitted by his A.D.C., Captain Aubin.

VIENNA,
February 17th, 1815.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

As Clancarty is writing a long history to Cooke, which you will be privy to, it is useless for me to enter into details. I wrote to Cooke some days since by the post. On reflection this was indiscreet, but I hope this letter arrived safe.

Since Castlereagh's departure Metternich takes his fling. The Duke,‡ wishing to fix him to at least a particular hour in every day to communicate his progress, urged him to this effect. Metternich fixed between four and five, and every day since when the Duke has

* Lord Oxford, then living in Naples, was a declared friend of Murat, and suspected of assisting him in his various intrigues.

† Sir Charles Stewart, half-brother of Lord Castlereagh, and afterwards third Marquess of Londonderry, created Lord Stewart and Ambassador at Vienna in 1814.

‡ The Duke of Wellington succeeded Lord Castlereagh as English representative at the Congress when the latter had to return to England for the assembling of Parliament.

been (not as yet up to Metternich's pranks) he has found the Minister.

I think, therefore, we shall have a little grace, more especially as there are tableaux, romances, and little comedies, preparing as more fêtes at Court. At Switzerland we are still working. Austria had ceded them Valtellina, and now wants to get it back for her Italian arrangements.

It appears Marie Louise objects to the Austrian arrangements, and will not yield her rights by treaty to Parma; this has caused difficulty. The Emperor Alexander, with his usual chivalry, supports Marie Louise, against her papa; Eugene seems in the plot, and there is still a "kettle of fish" about Italy. I want to give the *Fiefs Imperiaux* only for an arrondissement for my friend D'Ivernois at Geneva. We are all, except a certain Minister, *d'accord* about Murat, and I hope this will be managed well.

Castlereagh got a guarantee from the Emperor as to Turkey previous to his departure; this is a great point.

You keep such great house at Florence our Austrian Minister cannot keep pace with you, and has desired his recall. You are to have a M. and Mme. Aboney in their room. She is reckoned pretty and pleasant here, but I don't know her.

I send you the project of the Declaration at the close of Congress. It is an outline; how far it will be ultimately *fiated* I know not. Alexander says it is "très bien, idée charmante." Still, I think, on his looking at the map of Europe, and seeing the enormous new projecting position of his empire, he will like soon to bring his acquisitions in line, and having a salient point forward. He will ere long deploy right and left,

and, with 500,000 men at his back, he is a bold man who will say where he is to stop. It is vain for Europe to hope for a long peace while Prussia is actually on the Oder.

I don't like to send you the protocols, etc., even by a messenger, as I know not if it is permitted as yet to promulgate them, but as soon as I can you shall have all things in detail.

Yours very sincerely,

STEWART.

CHAPTER V

NAPOLEON'S ESCAPE

THAT Napoleon intended to make some movement as soon as a favourable occasion should present itself had been strongly suspected. That he was a man who preferred to make his own opportunity rather than wait for it to occur does not seem to have been so entirely realized.

The news of his escape was sent to Lord Burghersh by Sir Neil Campbell, who set off in the vain hope of arresting Napoleon; but within three days he was on French soil, marching triumphantly through the country at the head of an armed force, each day bringing more troops back to his allegiance. On receiving Sir Neil's despatch, Lord Burghersh at once sent off his secretary, Captain Aubin, to carry the news to the Congress at Vienna.

Despatch from Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

LEGHORN,
4 p.m., February 26th, 1815.

Captain Adye left this upon the afternoon of the 22nd instant to visit Elba and Palamyola during my absence, and to return here this day to carry me back.

From a memorandum transmitted to me by Mr. Ricci,* containing information of what has occurred there since my departure upon the 16th; from what Mr. Mariotti,

* Acting British Vice-Consul at Elba. Formerly British Vice-Consul at Longono, when that port belonged to the King of Naples.

the French Consul here, heard from his spy at Elba and Corsica; from what Captain Adye, this *moment* arrived, tells me, and other information I have obtained here, combined with suspicious circumstances for a short time past, I am fully persuaded that Bonaparte means to quit Elba and join Murat *immediately*, or to be in *readiness* if there is any decided step taken by the latter. The strongest circumstance is that his brig, bombard, and two vessels from Rio, are at Porto Ferrajo, the latter having taken on board ammunition, rice, and salt provisions.

Several cases of muskets have been sent on board.

Mr. Colonna sailed last week for Naples; it was said he was to prepare a residence for Madame Mère. Several large cases of Pauline's* plate arrived here yesterday. They were sent here by Mr. Sisca of Elba to George Costacchi and Son, merchants, insured for 5,000 francs. The broker of the same person has been employed some days past in procuring a large vessel to freight from month to month, and there are reasons to suppose it is for Porto Ferrajo. There are numerous circumstances which combine, and which I shall transmit to your lordship more fully as soon as my time will permit. I mean to sail this night for Elba, and, as my remaining on shore would not enable me to obtain so much information as by sending a boat on shore, I shall cruise about with Captain Adye, communicate with General Bertram (as if from Leghorn), and see Mr. Ricci at sea, privately. I shall send your lordship expresses from Piombino as often as necessary, through a channel which I shall detail hereafter, and will thank your lordship to write to me to the same place.

* Princess Borghese, Napoleon's sister.

Since I have informed Captain Adye of my suspicions he has related to me the following, which did not at the time appear so extraordinary :

He sailed from this on the 22nd, and arrived in Porto Ferrajo at midnight on the 23rd. The *Inconstant* sailed out at daylight on the 24th, stood for Leghorn until hull down. About 9 a.m. she stood in to the coast of Italy, and no further notice was taken of her. At midday Napoleon's half-decked boat went out of the harbour, and stood round the north point into the Piombino channel.

Captain Adye went out of harbour that afternoon, and in the Piombino channel met the brig, the bombard (*l'Étoile*), and the half-decked boat (*Caroline*), coming from the southward, who stood into Porto Ferrajo, and he saw the *Inconstant* there at anchor yesterday. Captain Adye was informed after his arrival that the brig had sailed for Leghorn to repair her stern post. I have no doubt that she went to pick up some person between Leghorn and Piombino, and then to steal down the coast to go to Naples with the bombard, who would join in the passage. In consequence of Captain Adye's arrival or other circumstances, the boat was sent to meet them in the Piombino channel, and to bring them back.

I beg leave to suggest to your lordship it would be highly advisable at this crisis to have another man-of-war. The *Aboukir*, *Alemere*, and *Wizard*, are at Genoa under Captain Thomson. One could carry my despatches while I pursue my objects with the other. If I can ascertain that Bonaparte, any troops, or extraordinary stores, are on board, I shall request Captain Adye to fire into them like pirates, and to take the most certain method of securing them

or destroying them. I have not written to Lord Castlereagh.

It is possible my suspicions may be too strong, but at this critical moment it is better to err on that side, leaving it to your lordship to transmit this information or not.

I never did think it probable that Bonaparte would risk himself till some favourable opportunity should occur; at the same time, that he was capable of any sudden eccentric step, if pressed by poverty.

I have written this in so much haste that it is probable there will be many inaccuracies. As Napoleon has so many spies here, I have requested Mr. Mariotti and Mr. Falconer not to let any person know of my suspicions, and Mr. Mariotti will transmit me privately any information which he may receive from his correspondent at Elba.

I shall request of the Commandant at Piombino to receive any letters which Captain Adye may give him *for* your lordship, or *from* your Lordship *for* him, as it is better they should not know that *I* am on board, for Napoleon's spies at Piombino would immediately let it be known.

General Spanocchi, the Governor here, is an excellent old man, but seems to know nothing and to suspect nothing.

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

ON BOARD H.M.S. PARTRIDGE,
OFF PORTO FERRAJO, ISLE OF ELBA,
*Midday, February 28th, 1815.**

This morning, being becalmed, I landed in a boat at Porto Ferrajo, and after remaining on shore an hour returned here. Bonaparte left Porto Ferrajo upon the

* Compare with Sir N. Campbell's Journal, pp. 372-374.

26th instant at 9 p.m., on board of his brig *L'Inconstant*, the bombard *L'Étoile*, his half-decked boat, *La Caroline*, and four fellucas. Yesterday at 10 a.m. he was seen from Porto Ferrajo to the northward off Capraja, and was lost sight of soon afterwards. There was very little wind. He carried with him all his guards and Corsicans, and all his civil followers, also a few horses.

Mr. Grattan, an English gentleman, happened to be at the time at Porto Ferrajo, and has been prevented from quitting the island, as there has been an embargo for four days. He saw the embarkation of the whole, and saw them yesterday in the situation described. I am therefore induced to change the opinion I had entertained of Bonaparte's intention to go to Naples, and think he is destined for the frontier of France and Piedmont. Captain Adye will steer in that direction, so as to endeavour to overtake them before they land; for every information and preparation has been made in Italy in case he has gone to Naples, and there is no chance of my being in time to prevent his disembarkation. Besides, Mr. Grattan proceeds immediately, in a boat I have taken, from Porto Ferrajo to Leghorn, to convey this despatch, and will give every other information respecting his departure.

Upon landing at Porto Ferrajo I went to Mr. Lapis, formerly a Mayor of Porto Ferrajo, and one of Bonaparte's Chamberlains, who told me he was left as Governor by Napoleon, his Sovereign, and would not give up the place to any person but him. I told him I must therefore consider the island as in a state of blockade, and should warn the inhabitants not to send away any boats.

Bonaparte's mother and sister Pauline, and General

Bertram's wife, and all females connected with his followers, have been left behind.

Of course there was no person there who could or would give me any information as to Bonaparte's intention.

Mr. Grattan says the soldiers spoke more of Antibes and Milan than of Naples. I have requested Mr. Grattan to transmit a duplicate of mine from Leghorn with this information to the senior officer of the army and navy at Genoa, and I have now sent off a confidential person to Florence, by way of Piombino. I hope to fall in with some French men-of-war off Capraja, and some boat or vessel by which I may write to the officer commanding in Corsica.

I am very sorry to say it is a dead calm, as it has been for two or three days, and it is probable that it will continue so. Bonaparte has taken provisions with him for six days, and some pieces of artillery. If he has gone to Naples, this can only be to mask his projects. But in that case he certainly would not have thrown away the first day and night in going to the northward.

I have transmitted a duplicate of this despatch to Genoa, to be forwarded to Paris and London.

If Providence enables Captain Adye and myself to overtake this pest of tranquillity, the world shall be eased of him and his adherents.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
March 2nd, 1815.

I have learnt from Mr. Ricci, who has been acting as British Vice-Consul of Elba, that Bonaparte's fleet consisted of the three armed vessels as before

stated, with a polacca, a sparadora, and two vessels fitted for the transport of iron from Rio, and each of seventy tons burthen.

The suspicions of Bonaparte's departure seem to have begun about the 16th; from Friday, 24th, it was the general talk of the place. Naples was first named by the officers as the place of destination. Toulon was afterwards more generally talked of, where it was reported Marshal Masséna, with 60,000 men, was ready to join Bonaparte.

Mr. Ricci declared to me in the most positive manner that the French squadron of ships-of-war, which has for some time been cruising between Elba and Corsica, came in sight of Porto Ferrajo, in the direction of the island of Capraja, on Friday, 24th. The British sloop *Partridge* was at that time anchored off the island of Elba. On Saturday the French ships were not in sight, but on Sunday they appeared again. Bonaparte is stated to have been looking out for them, and upon their appearance to have ordered the embarkation of his troops, and in the night to have stood towards them.

Mr. Ricci assures me he saw these ships with Bonaparte's fleet on Monday, and that he is convinced they were sailing together.

I cautioned Mr. Ricci against deceiving himself or the world upon a subject of so much consequence, but he continued to assure me he had seen what he related. If such should really be the case, the French squadron must have sided with Bonaparte, and perhaps may convey him to Toulon, where the feelings of the people and navy are supposed to be in his favour. I regret to state that a feeling has very generally been excited in Elba, at Leghorn, and to a degree at this

place, that the English were privy to and connived at the escape of Bonaparte.

This report originated in the language of Bonaparte's officers, who perhaps were instructed to hold it. A dissatisfaction with the King of France's Government was given as a reason why the English wished again to see Napoleon in that country. The British sloop-of-war *Partridge* was stated to have brought him a letter to that effect on Friday, and afterwards to have left the island with a view of his escaping.

The proclamation issued at Elba by the Governor, M. Lapis, speaks of the recall of Bonaparte to his former state of glory, and promises his protection and love to the people of Elba. There being, in the meantime, but about 100 troops there, the Austrian commander at Piombino has shown an inclination to take possession. The Government of Tuscany do not feel strong enough to do so.

I have received a letter from the Consul and factory at Leghorn, representing the alarm which has been occasioned by the departure of Bonaparte. I have assured them I would transmit every information which could in any way be interesting to them.

Count Buol has informed me that he has recommended Marshal Bellegarde to take the island of Elba.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh. [Private.]

FLORENCE,
March 3rd, 1815.

It is with feelings of very great regret I think myself called upon to mention the subject of Colonel Sir N. Campbell. From an unwillingness to act unkindly towards an officer of Sir Neil Campbell's merit, I have

abstained from bringing under your lordship's consideration the improper manner in which, I felt, he did the duties of the situation in which he was placed. His absences from the *Elba* were constant, and at times of considerable duration. I represented my feelings to him at various times, and begged—at least till the Congress was over and the world placed at rest—he would remain steadily at his post.

Sir Neil felt that his situation about Bonaparte was unpleasant, and that the duty was better done by occasional visits. This opinion was at variance with mine. I begged Mr. Cooke, of the Foreign Office, who happened to be here, to speak in recommendation of a more continued residence. Mr. Cooke spoke to him in that sense, but Bonaparte was gone before Sir Neil Campbell had returned.

I do not mean that any residence of a British officer could have prevented the event which has taken place; information, however, with regard to the intention might have been obtained.

Sir Neil Campbell is one of the most zealous officers I know in the service; I differed with him on the subject I have stated. Most reluctantly I have felt called upon to mention it. The feelings of regard I bear him would have continued to impose silence upon me had not a public duty forced upon me this communication.

*Note on the back of this letter made some years later
by Lord Burghersh.*

Lord Burghersh represented to Sir N. Campbell the impropriety of his conduct in coming from *Elba* to *Florence* on the last occasion, and begged

him immediately to return. If he had done so, he would have got to Elba the day or two days before Bonaparte left, which in truth he could not have done in the presence of the sloop-of-war, which would have carried back Sir Neil. Bonaparte's departure on that occasion would certainly have been prevented. He had only a small weak brig with four or six guns, which never could have fired the *Partridge* sloop-of-war. The rest of his vessels were small merchant brigs full of troops, which could have made no attempt to force their way against an armed sloop. The misfortune of the war of 1815, for that time at least, would certainly have been avoided if Sir Neil Campbell had either followed directions Lord Burghersh had previously given him, and had remained with his sloop-of-war in Elba, or if, as he was entreated to do, he had returned on the day after his arrival at Florence.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh. [Private.]

Received at Leghorn, April 10th, after Bonaparte had got to Paris at the head of his army.

VIENNA,
March 3rd, 1815.

I have written a long letter to Lady Burghersh, and I know not that I have anything to add worth your perusal.

You will see we shall all have to draw our swords again, and your melodies at Florence must yield to the sound of trumpets. I am a little afraid Bonaparte may be too rapid for the Duke. I believe the army in the Low Countries very *unfit*; our own troops never

have seen a shot fired, and are very young. The Guards all recruits, the Hanoverians without officers. I have no idea of the Dutch battalions being great things; German cavalry are the only weapon that is tolerably reported on. We must get everything we can from England, and at least 10,000 cavalry, and then we shall do.

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

NICE,
11 a.m., March 10th, 1815.

MY LORD,

I have omitted no opportunity to transmit to your lordship every information in my power, and shall continue the same, although as long as I remain here my despatches for Lord Castlereagh shall be sent by way of Paris.

My last letter to your lordship was by the *Wizard*, which informed you that I was then making towards Antibes, after having examined Capraja. Owing to calms and contrary winds, we did not reach Antibes till the afternoon of the 8th. You will see by the time we took as a single man-of-war (although unlucky) how fortunate that ruffian has been. Within three days and nights from the time that he shut the gates at Porto Ferrajo, and first communicated to his troops his projects, he was fairly landed in France with all his means.

I have the honour to enclose a list of the principal persons who accompanied Bonaparte. Incomplete as it is, it may perhaps be useful. I was in hopes to have been able to give a very complete list with the aid of the prisoners taken at Antibes, but they had

already gone to Toulon. I enclose a journal of all the information I have yet obtained.

There are so many reports here that it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The Frenchmen in this place wish to hide their own stupefaction or treason, and to overrate their enthusiasm and attachment to the Bourbons.

The Piedmontese and foreigners who are here seem prejudiced, and not to make sufficient allowance for a circumstance so very unexpected and so calculated to stupefy those who formerly served under Napoleon.

I wished to have gone from this to Draguignan, but the French Consul seemed to be averse to it; and unless I could stick to the front to *see* the operations against Bonaparte *with my own eyes* (which would give offence, would probably not be permitted, and not possible from want of means of conveyance in the mountain road which he has taken), I am more likely to form a candid opinion here. The French Consul promises to give me all the intelligence he receives as does the Piedmontese Governor, who has two officers with French and Piedmontese passports at Draguignan. I have not, however, yet abandoned the idea if it seems eligible and practicable. Another reason is that I think it probable Bonaparte will be driven back among the mountains on this frontier, so that I am ready to pass up towards Turin, or, if your lordship and Lord William Bentinck* think that my knowledge of Porto Ferrajo and the inhabitants can be of any use in persuading Mr. Lapis to surrender, I am here in readiness.

I have written to Lord William Bentinck, who I hear is at Genoa, and enclose this despatch to be

* English Agent to the Court of Ferdinand.

forwarded from thence. I shall follow this plan daily through the same channel during my stay here, and request the honour of a few lines from your lordship if I can be serviceable with regard to Porto Ferrajo or at any other point.

If operations commence in the South of Italy, perhaps your lordship would wish me to transmit the military correspondence until that arrangement should be approved of by H.M. Government, in which case I should be happy to be honoured with your commands; but if nothing is to be done there, and Napoleon's career is terminated, I propose going to Paris and London without delay from this place, if I can get up my carriage and baggage from Leghorn.

*List of Persons who embarked with Bonaparte on the
"Elba," February 26th, 1815.**

†General Count Bertrand, French.

General Count Drouot, French.

General Count Cambron, French.

†Adjutant-General (Colonel) Lebelle, French.

Colonel Baron, Commander of the Poles.

Chevalier Fourreau, médecin, French.

†M. Gatte, pharmacien, Frenchman; married a few months ago Mdlle. Nenchi, whose father is a merchant at Leghorn.

M. Peyrouse, French.

†M. Deschamps, French }
†M. Baillon, French } }fourriers de Palais.

M. Ponz, Administrateur des Mines before and since the arrival of Bonaparte at Elba, formerly

* Published in Sir N. Campbell's Journal, p. 382.

Chef de Bataillon under Masséna, who, with Lacépède, the Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, are his friends and patrons. A violent and intriguing fellow; wears glasses, very short-sighted.

†M. Talliaide, formerly of the French Marine, and until lately commander of Bonaparte's brig; married to a person of Longono.

M. Chauslard, Capitaine de Frigate, lately appointed to the command of the *Inconstant* brig.

M. Richon, commanding the bombard *l'Etoile* of the French Marine.

†Colonel Socoski, a Pole; his wife with Princess Pauline.

Captain Roule, Officier d'Ordonnance, confidential officer for Bonaparte's person; Frenchman.

M. Perez, of Elba, Officier d'Ordonnance.

M. Valtini, of Elba, Officier d'Ordonnance.

M. Phillidore, Captain of the Post at Porto Ferrajo, probably taken away by force in order to return to Elba or Naples with the flotilla.

†Captain Paoli, Corsican, Captain of the Gens d'Armes.

N.B.—Those marked † have left their families at Elba.

Those are the names of the principal persons about Bonaparte, and all that I can recollect; but, excepting a few officers and men (who were at Lonjono, Pianoso, and Palmayola, and who were too late to embark), every person French, and Italians, whether in the military or civil service, secretaries, servants, etc., accompanied him.

His whole force may be estimated as follows :

Old Guard	600
Polish Lancers	100
Corsican Battalion	300
Gens d'Armes, mostly Italians and Corsicans	50
					<hr/>
Total military	1050
Civilians, including servants	100
					<hr/>
Total in number	1150

General Bartolozzi, formerly Commandant de Place in Milan, was left behind in Porto Ferrajo.

NICE,
March 10th, 1815.

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

DRAGUIGNAN,
Midday, March 12th, 1815.

It is but justice to the Prefect of Var to say that his actions have equalled perfectly the language of his addresses, and have been well seconded by every one of his department.

It would not be fair to expect, under all circumstances, that a force could be assembled immediately to oppose Bonaparte in his march upon every road, in the commencement, previous to his arrival at Sistéron; but there were troops and National Guards upon the roads from Juan to this place, as well as to Fréjus.

Count de Bouthillier, who resides here as Prefect of the department, received yesterday a letter from Colonel Ferra, commanding the National Guards

of this department, dated Sistéron, 10th instant. He states that he had just received orders from General Mirles from Grasse to march immediately to that place, where he was with some detachments of regulars and National Guards advancing farther; that Bonaparte had approached near by to Grenoble, but was then checked by the 5th of the Line and some National Guards, "qu'il était armé à tous côtés." It is chiefly the National Guards that are assembled against him, and they are animated with a spirit of enthusiasm for the Bourbons. It is very fortunate that the prefecture of this department is filled by a man possessing the feelings, talents, and energy, of the Count Bouthillier, whose example has given the same impulse to others.

No person has yet joined Bonaparte. The stragglers and persons taken from him (exclusive of those at Antibes) who have passed through the department are about fifty in number. If beat before Grenoble, there seems no alternative left for Bonaparte, if he survives it, but to throw himself into Piedmont or Switzerland; and that seems scarcely practicable, excepting as fugitive individuals in disguise, by all the information which I can obtain here as to the passes to the eastward. It seems certain that Bonaparte counted on possessing himself of Antibes by treachery immediately on landing, and that his project failed from some want of combination not yet discovered. The troops of the line in Antibes would probably have joined him, and I am induced to think he would then have proceeded against Toulon.

Marshal Masséna has shown great energy and fidelity to the King, and in his proclamation to the Marseillais pledges himself to adhere to the oath

which he has taken to Louis XVIII. as his Sovereign, and to shed the last drop of his blood for him. I have in my possession three proclamations, and regret I have not the means of sending copies to your lordship.

One is entitled "A Antibes le 1 Mars, 1815: Napoléon, par la grace de Dieu et la Constitution de l'État Empereur des François—Au Peuple Français," and signed "par l'Empereur, le Grand Maréchal, Major-Général de la Grande Armée, BERTRAND."

Another, signed in the same way, commences: "L'Empereur Napoléon à l'Armée—aux Soldats"; and a third, signed by all the officers and soldiers of the Imperial Guard who are with Bonaparte, is addressed to the Generals, officers and soldiers of the army.

Bonaparte's addresses are quite revolutionary, declaring to the soldiers and the people of France that, called by them to the throne, all that has been done during his absence is illegal, and that their present King was forced upon them by their enemies and the Prince Regent of England. The Prefect of Digne is greatly to blame for neither publishing the information sent him nor taking any means to animate the people, from which conduct no opposition was made to Bonaparte on his advance. This man's name is Duval; he was at the head of the police in Paris under the Directory.

The Prefect of Var expects a report from Colonel Ferra, commanding the National Guards of the Department of the Var, this day, and if it arrives before this letter is despatched I shall enclose it as an additional memorandum.

I find it impossible to advance nearer to the scene of action than this place, circumstanced as I am, and

there is no place where I can receive quicker or better information.

By the explanations I have received, I am much more satisfied with what he has done than appeared to me when at Antibes and Nice. I think I am not too sanguine in feeling persuaded that this revolutionary firebrand has nearly terminated his career, and that all attempts which he has made will prove in the end a most fortunate event to consolidate the repose of Europe, by removing the few embers which, unfortunately, were allowed to remain without extinction.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
March 13th, 1815.

MY DEAR BURGHESH,

Many thanks for your letters which I have received to the 6th inclusive. Bony's conduct is very extraordinary, and, in my opinion, certainly the *effet d'illusion*. We ought to have known of his intention before he put it into execution, and then we might have hoped to have had some of our six sails of the line with their etc., etc., now in the Mediterranean, off the island by the 26th.

Here we are all zeal, and I think anxiety, to take the field. I moderate these sentiments as much as possible, and get them on paper, and in the meantime am working at a great exertion, in case things should become serious in France. But I think the King will settle the business himself, which is the result most to be wished.

I'll enclose our declaration* if I can get one.

* The declaration against Napoleon.

I write a line to Priscilla. I have desired Lord FitzRoy to send you your picture.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

Remember me most kindly to Cooke, whose letter I have received.

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
4 p.m., March 15th, 1815.

I had the honour of acquainting your lordship in my letter of the 12th, from Draguignan, of Bonaparte having passed Gass, and my information and observations to that date.

The Prefect was sanguine in receiving favourable intelligence, although he had no letters as usual from Colonel Ferra concerning his National Guards. The courier elated everyone by announcing, upon the authority of a Director of Posts, in writing, that Bonaparte could not escape being surrounded (*cerné*), Draguignan being the seat of the prefecture; and the Count de Bouthillier* promising to communicate all his intelligence, I remained there with anxiety until 2 a.m. on the 13th, when he received two letters from the Mayors at Valence and Aix.

I immediately set off for this place, and arrived last night, considering it of importance that Mr. Hill and Lord W. Bentinck should know it from a source to be depended upon, as well as to explain the cause of my fears, that no part of the regular force would fight against Bonaparte, from what I saw at Antibes and

* Prefect of the town.

Draguignan, in my conversations with some officers and men of the army.

Upon my arrival here late last night, I was sorry to find from Mr. Hill and Lord William Bentinck that my bad news were known by the route of Chambéry, and reports of his (Bonaparte's) having even got possession of Lyons on the 10th. That Monsieur had escaped towards Paris with only forty persons, and that the magistrates had gone out to welcome Bonaparte. No letters have been received from that quarter to-day by Turin, as before, which is considered as a confirmation of this melancholy intelligence. I fear it is too true, and that all the Marshals (excepting Augereau* and Marmont) and the principal persons of the army are in the plot. Masséna's conduct and Miollis's seem suspicious, and to have been previously settled, so as to facilitate Bonaparte's arrival at Grenoble, and to counteract the enthusiasm of Comte de Bouthillier, Colonel Ferras, and the National Guards. Comte de Bouthillier tells me that Ponz was at Toulon not long ago, and in surveillance by him; but he had no idea of Masséna being connected with him, although I hinted at the possibility of it. It is reported here that Soult is in arrest at Paris. Your lordship may recollect that Suchet was appointed to the command at Strasburg by him in place of Augereau.

Alas! these are gloomy prospects—indeed, none of tranquillity in the world for a lifetime, unless Providence removes that ruffian, Bonaparte, to another world by the hand of some enthusiastic adherent of

* Augereau, Duc de Castiglione, swore allegiance to the Bourbons in 1814, but nevertheless offered to serve Napoleon again on his return from Elba. Napoleon, however, refused his services and declared him a traitor. Marmont, Duc de Ragusa, on the other hand, after swearing allegiance to Louis XVIII. kept his oath and did not try to return to Napoleon.

the Bourbons, which I confess I am not ashamed to wish for.

I shall leave this to-morrow or the next day, for England by Switzerland, or the most direct road that can be pursued with safety, but shall not travel very rapidly, as it may be useful from time to time to transmit to Mr. Hill and Lord William Bentinck any useful intelligence in my way.

I am sorry to find that Governor Lapis still remains in Porto Ferrajo; it is too late now to influence him or his garrison, after Bonaparte's great success.

I enclose a printed paper, which justifies the conclusion in regard to the conduct of Miollis and Masséna, in addition to other circumstances.

It is said that all the garrisons of Embrun, Briançon, etc., near Grenoble, joined Bonaparte, and that General Drouot marched out of that place at the head of 8,000 men.

Captain Adye agrees with me in thinking that the French frigates upon the Elba station were also in the plot, for the captain certainly told me a falsehood in asserting that he was off Capraja all Monday, the 27th.

At Antibes I saw a French ship of 200 tons which conveyed 300 of Bonaparte's men. She had anchored at Porto Ferrajo the day before, and was seized by him on the 26th.

P.S.—Mr. Ponz was at Marseilles and Toulon some months ago, and was in surveillance by the Prefect of this department (my authority for saying so). It is reported that he has now been taken up.

4 *p.m.*

No intelligence yet received from the Committee, but the Prefect has this moment received a letter

from the Prefect at Lyons, which I have read. Monsieur had arrived there to form an army. The account of Bonaparte's disembarkation was issued at Paris by telegraph upon the evening of the 4th instant. Other letters state that Monsieur had gone to Grenoble with eight regiments of the household in post; he was received at Lyons with enthusiasm.

CHAPTER VI

MURAT'S REVOLT

THE commotion caused throughout Europe by the sudden developments that had taken place was not without great effect on Italian affairs. Murat no longer made a pretence of keeping faith with the allies. Inspired by the news of the national movement in France against the Bourbons, he attempted a similar movement in Italy against Austria and the restored Governments.

The Neapolitan troops had for some weeks been concentrated on the Roman border, and as soon as the news reached Murat that Napoleon was again in possession of Paris, he ordered them to cross the frontier. This act of hostility was virtually a declaration of war against Austria and the rest of Italy. The Austrian and Tuscan forces, under Generals Bianchi and Nugent, marched to oppose Murat, whose plan of action was to divide his army into two columns—the Royal Guard, under Pignatelli-Strongoli, to march through the Papal States and Tuscany, towards the Valley of the Po; the main army, under Murat's own command, to march northward from Ancona. By thus occupying both sides of the Apennines he hoped to prevent any gathering of Tuscan force on the western side which might threaten Naples. Feeling secure in the armistice signed by Lord William Bentinck the previous year, Murat thought he need have no fear of the danger which had so long threatened Naples by sea from Great Britain. But Lord William, now at Genoa, issued a formal note stating that, by virtue of the alliance existing between Great Britain and Austria, the armistice would be considered at an end if hostilities broke out between Austria and Naples. The

English Government supported this view, and on April 11th Lord Burghersh authorized Captain Campbell* to commence operations by sea against Naples. The arrival of Pignatelli's column in Tuscany on April 8th, and the occupation of Florence, caused the Grand-Duke, with all the Corps Diplomatique, to retire to Pisa, whence Lord Burghersh went on to Leghorn.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
March 14th, 1815.

Since I last wrote to your lordship, considerable alarm has been felt at times by the Tuscan Government. The spirit of the military, both at Leghorn and this place, more particularly amongst the officers, appeared unfavourable to the Government. The movement which had taken place in the Neapolitan dominions encouraged a belief that the expedition of Bonaparte might have been connected with some advance of troops from those States.

The first reports of some success of Napoleon's in France contributed to increase the dread of some general commotion in Italy. It appeared at such a moment desirable to learn from this Government whether it had the intention of making any effort, either in its own defence if attacked, or in support of the general interests and tranquillity of Italy. The Sardinian troops, with a part of the auxiliary British corps, had marched to guarantee the Italian frontier. It became a subject of great interest to know whether they would be supported in case of necessity from Tuscany. Marshal Bellegarde wrote a strong repre-

* Senior naval officer at Leghorn; not to be confused with Colonel Sir N. Campbell.

sentation to M. Fossombroni, calling upon him to place himself in a situation to assist the general effort which might be necessary to maintain the present arrangements in this country. I took the opportunity to ask M. Fossombroni for some account of the views and measures about to be adopted by the Tuscan Government. I did not feel it to be my duty to ask for this information by an official note; I was convinced that such a proceeding could only embarrass the Government, and produce no good effect. The constitution of the Government of this State at the moment precludes the possibility of its making an effort either to save itself or assist its friends. I requested, therefore, only in conversation that this information might be given me. M. Fossombroni thought he could offer 3,000 men, and declared his intention of organizing a militia. I fear he was too sanguine in his calculations. There are not that number of troops existing in the country. It is also remarkable that none of the soldiers have yet taken the oath to their Sovereign or received their colours.

The Austrian Minister of this Court, lamenting the inactivity of the Tuscan Government, pointed out to me the advantages which result to it if in future the defence of the State should be entirely entrusted to Austrian troops, for which, according to a proportion varying in peace or war, a subsidy should be paid by the Grand-Duke to the Emperor. M. Fossombroni appeared very much to dislike this proposition.

Mme. Pauline Borghese has continued to remain arrested, near Lucca. An officer sent from Naples by Marshal Murat had a conversation of some length with her four days ago, and returned by the Isle of Elba.

Several other couriers are reported to me to have delivered letters to her.

Mme. Elisa Baciocchi,* who for some time has been resident at Bologna, is reported to have shown herself in public more frequently since the escape of Bonaparte than she has ventured to do before.

By a report received by M. Fossombroni from M. Lebseltern at Rome, dated the 11th of this month, it appears that the Neapolitan troops are increasing in number in the confines of the Papal States; a considerable train of artillery has been advanced. It appears also from the same authority that Bonaparte's project was known to the Government of Naples on the 17th of last month. The Tuscan Government at Nice reports that he saw the arrival of Bonaparte's fleet at Cannes, and witnessed the disembarkation. He states a frigate to have been in company with the other vessels, but he was unable to discover to what nation she belonged. Many persons believe she was Neapolitan.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
March 15th, 1815.

Since my despatch of yesterday I have learnt that the brig of war which carried Bonaparte to France sailed directly from Cannes to Gaeta, where she arrived on the 7th and 8th of this month. This circumstance, combined with the movements of the Neapolitan troops to the frontiers of the Roman States, as also the conversation publicly held at the Court of Naples, has

* Napoleon's sister, who was Duchess of Lucca till the fall of Napoleon.

much strengthened the belief that Marshal Murat is likely to act in correspondence with the advance of Bonaparte.

I have this moment seen a letter from M. Lebseltern at Rome, addressed to M. Fossombroni, and communicated to me by that Minister, by which it appears that Lucien Bonaparte, as also Cardinal Fesch, had received communications from Murat. Lucien Bonaparte communicated the purport of the letter he had received to Cardinal Pecca, and requested to know whether, if the Neapolitan troops advanced through the Roman States, with an assurance that they would not remain within, would it meet the views of the Pope to retain his residence at Rome ?

In consequence of this notice the fortress of Civita Vecchia has been put in a state of defence, and the Pope has for the present come to the determination of retiring there in case of any hostile movement from Naples. M. Lebseltern has recommended that he should rather retire to Florence and Milan. This news has much alarmed M. Fossombroni.

By a despatch from Prince Metternich, in case of necessity the Ministers of Tuscany are requested to communicate with Marshal Bellegarde.

The offer of 3,000 men, as stated to your lordship in my last despatch, has already been made ; the answer is expected. M. Fossombroni has urged me to make some declaration of the views of England to Prince Pignatelli, conceiving that a statement of the ill-will with which my Government would see any hostile movements in Italy might have very considerable effect in preventing them. As I have never received any instructions from your lordship, I have felt a difficulty in doing this. I can hardly agree with

M. Fossombroni in the effect it might produce. I may still, however, say something in conversation to that purpose.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
March 18th, 1815.

MY DEAR LORD BURGHERSH,

I received last night your three letters of the 15th, and to-day by express your further intelligence by Mr. Lebseltern respecting Murat. I thought he would not have moved until Bonaparte's success had been more decided. I thought, with his wavering character, he would rather have waited till he could have given Bonaparte decisive assistance than have risked his existence prematurely, where for the moment his assistance cannot advance Bonaparte's affairs materially. But it appears I was mistaken.

You have acted so confidently and handsomely by me that I feel I can have no secret from you. I shall therefore send you a copy of a private letter I have written to Lord Bathurst about Italy; there is nothing new in it, but it recapitulates exactly what I have always thought, and you have heard me express. I shall go by the *Partridge*. I think all is lost in Italy. I fear the Austrians cannot stop Murat. Italy is then in a flame. I must even regret the policy which has despised such great resources, and which will throw them eventually into the hands of the enemy.

We seem to have negotiated for good weather, and not for bad. When the sea is still, any bark, however crazy, navigates in safety. I think of writing both to Palermo and to Gibraltar for some assistance. This place will not be safe without a good British garrison.



JOHN FANE, LORD BURGHESH. K.C.B.

From a painting in the possession of Lady Rose Weigall.



I propose to write to Bellegarde to ask in what light he considers the advance of Murat, and whether he views it as an hostile measure. His answer will determine the course we ought to pursue towards him, and I shall communicate his answer to the commanding naval officer in the Mediterranean.

The diligence has arrived from Lyons. Bonaparte had gone to Dijon, where there is a part of his old Guard. The remainder are in Touraine, and this is said to be the object of his march in that direction, and I think this not unlikely.

The Comte d'Artois is said to have harangued the people at Lyons, and to have concluded with crying, "Vive le Roi!" The answer was not, as with us, an echo of the speech, for the troops cried out, "Vive l'Empereur!"

The Duc d'Angoulême is said to be at Nismes; wherefore I know not.

A French officer came here yesterday from Chambéry with a letter from the French Commandant there to Bubna, containing a letter from Bonaparte to Marie Louise. He came to tell this to me, as it were, officially, that I might not distrust the communication.

Murat will, I think, drive the Austrians behind the Po; they ought to attack him as soon as possible, but I doubt it. The King has asked me to go to them to talk about the defence of his States. This is a sorry commission, but I shall go, and I think return by Milan and see what Bellegarde says. I shall not, however, go till Lady W. comes. Thompson sailed for her to-day.

Best regards to Lady B.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
March 20th, 1815.

The news to-day is rather of a better complexion, because there seems something like resistance. I have seen an English gentleman of my acquaintance who left Marseilles five days ago, and he says that nothing can be better than the spirit all through the South of France in favour of the Bourbons. This alone will not do much against the French regular army; but if that army can be occupied elsewhere, the insurrection in the South will make a very good diversion. I send you an order of the day of Masséna, and also of Soult. I think the latter as bad a thing as ever I read—a loose, disgusting piece of bad taste—and will not make a convert. It is so violent and so inefficient as to its end that I suspect the sincerity of the author.

Sir N. Campbell goes to-night to England with our despatches. His head has unfavourably suffered by this mishap.

Regards to Lady B.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Burghersh.*

ROME,
March 20th, 1815.

I think it right to acquaint you that yesterday evening a Commissioner arrived from Murat to the Pope requiring His Holiness to permit a passage through the Papal territory of a division of Neapolitan troops, in order that they might form a junction with

* An English agent at Rome.

his other troops in the marches, under the pretext (which is false) that the road by Arezzo is impracticable for cannon. To this demand the Pope has not assented, but has given a qualified refusal to gain *time*.

I am at the same time to inform you that Murat is making every exertion to man his fleet, in order to secure his coasts during the absence of his armies. I am to request your lordship will be good enough to communicate this intelligence to Lord William Bentinck, in order that measures may be taken to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the British naval forces. The Austrian Minister has no advice from Naples of the designs of Murat, but he considers that I agree with him that he will not advance and commit himself till he hears from Vienna.

Sir John Dalrymple (sent on a mission to Murat's headquarters) to Lord Burghersh.

ANCONA,
March 28th, 1815.

I arrived here yesterday at noon, and soon after had a long audience of the Duc de Gallo.* The object of my mission was to obtain some explanation of the military movements and preparations on this side of Italy by the Neapolitan Government. To expect a satisfactory one I was not at all prepared, but, of course, I was not a bit surprised at their having a plausible one. It amounts to this: "The Emperor of Austria has not fulfilled his engagement with me (the King of Naples). The whole affairs of the North have been decided, and he has not, as the price of that

* Murat's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

decision, obtained any recognition by France, or by the Northern Powers, and is no sooner free from apprehension about the peace of the North than he orders 100,000 men into Italy. He tells France: 'I will prevent any violation of the territories governed by myself or the Princes of my house in Italy'; but he says not a word of them to me, his ally: therefore, to what purpose are these 100,000 men? To crush me, if he can? I know it, and I will prevent it. I don't want war, but I must have a guarantee; and if I am to be attacked, let me be attacked when I was at the Peace of Paris. I have sent to England and to Vienna to declare my amiable intentions with respect to England; I wish to be her friend, and she is necessary to me, and I might be useful to her if she chose to make use of me. In respect to Austria, she will not be friends with me, because she cannot fulfil my treaty without parting with some of Italy as an indemnity to Sicily; and she will not do that, because she has adopted the same system of supremacy as to Italian affairs which Bonaparte held."

I have thus given your lordship in a few words the result of a long interview with Gallo, and a very long subsequent interview with the King. I cannot call it conversation, for he began an harangue as I entered the room, and went on for a good hour without almost stopping. He afterwards asked me to stay to dinner, when, as there were only three or four people present, he spoke pretty openly, and after dinner got me into a corner and declaimed it all over again. The only observations I made to him were that he could not be surprised at our suspicions, seeing that we were only in armistice with him; and that all the rest of Europe were either our allies or in

positive peace with us, and that his movements came at the very time of Bonaparte's invasion; and, thirdly, that he had fully as good a right to ask questions as Bellegarde, and that it was impossible we could see with indifference the sensation his movement had produced in Rome and Florence.

To the first of these he answered that our armistice with him he hoped never would be broken; that it was for the Congress to fix an indemnity for Sicily, and it would be followed by formal peace. On this subject he said he was sure of the Neapolitans, that he was beloved by them; that his army was very much improved, and some of his regiments equal to any he had ever had under him as a French General.* That, if France had attacked him as she threatened, he was persuaded that the King† would not have found a regiment in France to fight against him—one of themselves. As to Bonaparte, he declared himself totally unconnected with him and his escape; that when he heard of it, he said that either he had been encouraged by Austria and England (!) or invited by the French; that he would succeed because the Bourbons were hated; that he loved him as his friend, his General, his patron, and his relation, but that the Emperor never would forgive him;‡ that his movement was ordered as soon as he heard of the advance of the Austrians, and had nothing to do with Napoleon. Lastly, he did not complain of our suspicions, but he was totally at a loss to know the motives of the Pope's conduct.§ However, he believed the French and Sardinian Ministers had persuaded him to it. That the

* That is, as General of the Restoration. † Louis XVIII.

‡ For having made terms for himself with the Austrians the year before.

§ In refusing a passage to his troops.

Austrians were setting everything in motion to make him odious and suspected by all parties, to cover their own infidelity; but that, although for his plans he would have found a great convenience in crossing part of Tuscany, he had refrained from asking a passage lest the Grand-Duke should take umbrage thereat. Your lordship is better able to judge of the truth of this than I am, but I should not be surprised if at this moment a corps of his was in Tuscany, notwithstanding his professions to the contrary.

My own opinion is that Murat is persuaded Austria means to attack him, and that he means to meet the blow the best he can, and the more advanced the better. I think he will try to get his right upon the Po somehow or other, and as much country between his rear and the Adriatic as he can secure. He expects his line-of-battle ship and the frigate here. I do not think he wishes to go to war; his present movement is entirely owing to the last despatches he received from Vienna. He wishes to be guaranteed, and if not he will advance before the Austrians have their reinforcements. *He knows the feelings of the Italians.*

Yours, etc.,

J. H. D.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
March 22nd, 1815.

I have received your letter and despatches of the 16th. I have no more instructions from England respecting Murat than you have, and can give you none.

He has offered the Austrians, and even the King of France, to join in the general confederacy against

Napoleon, which offer has not yet been accepted by either; and in regularity he ought not to march, and in marching he commits an act of direct hostility against the Pope, against Austria, and against the world.

It may be questioned whether that act of hostility can or ought now to be resented, if Murat should himself gloss it over with the profession of good intentions. When I say "it may be questioned," I hope you will believe that I consider it only a question of means, and that, if the Austrians had the means, they ought forthwith to fall upon him. I take it, however, to be almost certain that, unless he has coupled this act of hostility with a declaration that he intends to be King of Italy he will not be attacked, and I recommend to you to shape your course accordingly.

Our last accounts from Paris are of the 14th. At that time matters were in a very uncertain state; and although I understand that the Legislature intended to accompany the King if he should quit the capital, the existence of the means of a civil war appeared to be very doubtful. The solution of this question would probably decide upon the measures to be adopted against Murat.

I am going into the Low Countries to take command of the army as soon as I shall have settled here a treaty something like the Treaty of Chaumont without the subsidiary part.

Other matters here are going on but slowly, and Napoleon's expedition has not increased our facilities.

Give my best love to Priscilla, and believe me.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
March 25th, 1815.

I am very sorry to tell you that in this very moment I come from the Secretary of State's office, and have heard that Bonaparte entered Paris the 20th, and that Oudinot, Ney, Suchet, *cum multis* allies, have joined him. Macdonald, St. Cyr, Le Corps under Macdonald, have remained *fidèle*. I know nothing more. Shall we not regret our policy towards Italy? Hill and I are going to Turin in a day or two. I am always sanguine, and hope the salvation and greatness of Italy will rise out of these misfortunes.

March 28th, 1815.

I have just received your letter of the 25th. I am shocked at the news from Lord Wellington.* The 22nd he stated things to have been uncertain on the 19th; that the Legislature would accompany the King if he left Paris. Starhemberg† is returned from Murat, and seems to believe he would move as soon as he got his courier from Vienna, who reached him yesterday. Starhemberg therefore expects he would move to-day, and be at Bologna on the 31st. Lord Wellington does not seem to believe such will be the result of the Austrian answer. The Grand-Duke has announced he will go to Pisa. The Pope takes also that direction.

* Of Bonaparte's entry into Paris.

† Commanding the Austrian cavalry at Bologna. He had been sent to inquire of Murat what were his intentions in assembling a large army on the confines of the Roman Legation.

The Duke of Modena announced that a corps of 8,000 men, Austrians, will pass through his capital to-morrow; that forces are moving which will stop Murat from attacking.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
March 29th, 1815.

The best news we have here is that a merchant here has received a letter from London informing him of the ratification of the peace with America,* and that the guns were then firing. From France we have no news. There are reports which seem not unlikely, that Bonaparte left Paris on the 23rd for Strasburg, and that Caulaincourt† is gone to Vienna.

Captain Campbell has asked my opinion, officially, whether I thought under our armistice the *Aboukir* would be justified in delaying the *Neapolitan* (74)? I enclose you my answer, written hastily. I send it because my opinion differs from yours, which seldom occurs.

If you are likely to come this way, give us notice that we may get a lodging for you, which is very difficult I think you will not be obliged to go away. Murat, I am sure, will not act, and I am almost as sure that the

* The declaration of war against England by the United States in 1812 was the outcome of Napoleon's attempted blockade system by which he hoped to exclude all English exports from the Continent. In order to protect herself, England took severe action towards neutral ships, which caused some embarrassment to America. That country retaliated by suspending all trade with France and England. General Ross succeeded in taking Washington, but in January, 1815, Sir E. Pakenham was repulsed and killed at New Orleans, a disaster that would have been avoided if news of the Convention of Ghent, signed on December 24, could have been sent more quickly.

Austrians will not act against him. They ought to destroy him, because he is, as he was before, a hollow friend, and would be a ruinous enemy if things go on ill. I predict that the Austrians will be satisfied with one of their half-measures, either that he should remain at Ancona or should go within his Neapolitan territories, from whence, whenever B. comes, he will be ready immediately to join him.

This was my advice and opinion before, and is my advice and opinion now.

Lord Burghersh to Lord W. Bentinck.

FLORENCE,
March 29th, 1815.

The Neapolitan troops entered Pesaro yesterday ; thus the *Rubicon is passed*.

I wish I had heard from Sir J. Dalrymple, or knew what you had instructed him to say. Since you are in communication with Murat, I had better do nothing till I hear from you, or I may be going *contresens*.

I have sent letters to the British Consuls, telling them it would be advisable to put British property in security. Tuscany now begins to talk of arming ; I wish she may. In the event of her being invaded and having time to retire her troops, I think she would be well at Lucca, where they might join the Austrians and have a sort of support from you. Let me hear your views on this subject.

The Grand-Duke goes by Pisa, whither I shall accompany him. From thence I shall go by Sarzanne to Genoa, where I hope you will take care of me, and even get me a billet for a day or two. From Genoa I shall go to Milan, as I think in the North of Italy I shall

be most useful. I know nothing of the advance of the Neapolitans from Terracina. I suppose they must be marching, but from Rome the 26th we know nothing of it.

I wish you would let me know whether you consider us at war, Murat having attacked the Austrians. Lord Wellington thinks *yes*, but he alluded only to the violation of the Roman territory, and thought that from prudence Murat would be allowed to make an excuse, and would not be attacked by Austria, although *de facto* he considered him at war with the *whole world*, or nearly to that extent.

I have mentioned in my despatch Dalrymple's having gone by, and my waiting to hear the result of his mission before I take any measures.

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

PALERMO,
April 1st, 1815.

You seem to be much misinformed as to our situation here, or you never would have supposed that we were in a situation to attack Murat. Setting aside any consideration of the armistice, which exists, and which must be denounced three months previous to the commencement of hostilities, how, in God's name, are we to proceed to offensive operations with our present force? The utmost amount of the British army in Sicily is 4,200, of which 1,800 are Germans whose term of service is passed, and an order for whose discharge arrived by the last packet. The Sicilians have not 7,000 men in a state to take the field, and these totally deficient in all the *matériel de guerre*—is this a force with which to court hostilities?

The whole would not be sufficient to garrison the single fortress of Messina, and yet this is all we have to trust to for our defence.

The whole naval force in the Mediterranean consists of four ships of the line, three frigates, and some five or six smaller vessels. Corfu, Sicily, and Genoa, are to be protected, and when this is done what remains for the bombardment of Naples (even if it were desired) or the attack of Orbitello or Civita Vecchia? Your situation is a ticklish one, but you must build on no assistance from us. If Tuscany be easily lost it may as easily be won, and surely Austria is not to be overrun with Murat and his 40,000 men. On the other hand, if he once gets possession of Sicily, the whole force that England could spare would never drive him out of the country. Neither in your letter nor in that of Mr. Douglas is any mention made of the progress or position of Bonaparte. Send us every detail, for our communication with the Continent is most uncertain, and we seldom hear anything we can depend on. . . . It is of the utmost importance to the public service that we should be kept *au fait des affaires*.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

TURIN,
April 7th, 1815.

I understand you are expected at Genoa, and therefore I wrote to Lady W(illiam) the news brought by Dalrymple. I have begged her to read it to you.

I have directed Sir John to go to Frimont's* headquarters and remain there till relieved by you, as you told me you intended to go there if driven from

* The Austrian Commander-in-Chief.

Tuscany, and I think you cannot do better. I am to-night going to Frimont, and I expect to be with him to-morrow night. I want to see how the land lies, when the Austrians will be in force to resume the offensive, what they wish us to do, etc. If they are not very expeditious Murat will be too much for them, and this recent success,* to which nothing but the stupidity of the Austrians would have exposed them, will exalt excessively their warm imagination.

If you mean Lady B. to go away, I would recommend you to send her off as soon as you can, or otherwise I much fear her being cut off. This country is in a sad defenceless state, and their military totally inefficient and good for nothing.

I hear Murat, if he can get into connection with Piedmont, as Dalrymple thinks he will, will get hold of all their old soldiers.

I have letters from the Duke of Wellington dated 28th from Vienna, stating his opinion that our armistice will be at once at an end if Murat and Austria go to war.

Lord Burghersh to Captain Campbell.

LEGHORN,
April 10th, 1815.

I have received your letter of this day's date in answer to mine from Florence. In my letter to you I stated that, in consequence of the attack made by Marshal Murat upon the Austrians, I felt no hesitation in declaring that the armistice existing between the two Governments was virtually at an end. You ask if you are to consider England as actually at war with

* The Neapolitan attack on the Austrians at Modena on April 4th.

Naples, and if you will be justified in giving directions for reprisals. You are therefore authorized to act in hostility against Marshal Murat, and to assist, whenever it may be in your power, the troops of Austria. In a letter transmitted to me by the Duke of Wellington, and directed to Lord W. Bentinck, it was stated, in case Marshal Murat should attack the Austrians, it is desirable that the officer commanding His Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean should be informed that the armistice is at an end, in order that he may co-operate with the Austrian troops, and particularly protect and aid the latter in passing from Dalmatia to the opposite coast. It is also stated that, in the probable case of the Austrian army being able to assume the offensive against Murat, it would be most desirable to co-operate with the British troops and ships from Sicily. I beg, therefore, you will transmit this letter to Admiral Penrose, and, as it is at the same time most desirable to secure as much as possible the British property at present in the Neapolitan territory and in the Mediterranean, I beg you will transmit a vessel for such purpose to Naples, and to such other points as you may think most advisable for the accomplishment of this object.

Lord Burghersh to Admiral Penrose.

LEGHORN,
April 11th, 1815.

. . . Since my last letters to you Marshal Murat has continued his attack on the Austrians. Towards these, as towards every Power in the South of Italy, he has violated every principle of public faith. He has attacked the provinces occupied by the Austrians

without previous warning or declaration. He has violated the territories of the Pope, and as a proof of his legal Jacobin education he has occupied the grand-duchy of Tuscany notwithstanding a letter he was at the pains to write to the Grand-Duke declaring he never would enter that country. Under these circumstances I never felt a doubt that the engagement by which England was bound to the allies by the Treaty of Chaumont, now renewed, as by the Declaration of Vienna, obliged her to take part against Marshal Murat, and by all means in her power to assist the Austrians as well as every other Power engaged in the support of the tranquillity of the world. These opinions have been backed by Lord W. Bentinck, as by letters received yesterday from the Duke of Wellington at Vienna. I have felt, therefore, no hesitation in authorizing Captain Campbell to commence hostilities against the Neapolitans. I have begged him, however, to take every means in his power to protect British property.

CHAPTER VII

ADVANCE OF MURAT

THE Neapolitan force under Murat's command advanced so rapidly that Bianchi, the Austrian commander, was forced to retire. Taking up a defensive position at Modena, he was attacked there on April 4th and obliged to retire farther. Four days later a second attack by the Neapolitans failed; reinforcements were sent to Bianchi, who was now able to assume the offensive and prevent Pignatelli's column of the Royal Guard effecting a junction with the main army. The Neapolitan divisions were scattered, and retreated towards Bologna in the hope of reconcentrating. Murat, not wishing to risk a decisive battle without the assistance of the Royal Guard, decided to continue his retreat towards Naples by way of Ancona rather than by Florence, the former route offering better defensive positions and easier means of receiving supplies and reinforcements from Naples. Instructions were sent to Pignatelli, now at Pistoja, to rejoin Murat as speedily as possible by way of Arezzo. On April 16th the Austrians held a council of war at Bologna to determine the course of future operations and the disposition of available troops. It was decided that one force of 17,000 under Neipperg should pursue Murat in retreat; Bianchi, with 14,000 men, was to march via Florence, Arezzo, and Perugia, with a view to cutting across the Neapolitan lines of communication; Nugent, with a small force, was to push on towards Rome.

Bianchi left Bologna on April 17th, and by a forced march reached Arezzo, a distance of 115 miles, in six days. From there he again pushed on towards Tolentino, expecting to get into touch with Neipperg.

Murat, realizing he was hemmed in, gathered his remaining divisions together, and on May 2nd the Battle of Tolentino was fought, at which he was utterly and finally defeated.

Lord Burghersh was present at the battle, and hurried on to Rome to communicate the news of the victory to Sir William A'Court (English Minister to the Court of Ferdinand), and press for the co-operation of a British force from Sicily in the event of an attempt by Murat to defend the fortress of Gaeta.

Murat, having fled to Naples (where his wife Caroline had already agreed with Captain Campbell to terms for her own surrender), sent the Duc de Gallo to the Austrian headquarters to negotiate for peace. Finding that nothing but unconditional terms would be granted, he agreed to the Convention of Casa Lonza, which recognized Ferdinand as King and put an end to hostilities.

Lord Burghersh was one of the signatories, and the part he took as England's representative on this occasion is described in a private letter to Lord Castle-reagh. Two days later he accompanied General Bianchi and Prince Leopold of Sicily on their entry into Naples.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
April 14th, 1815.

I told you in my last I was going to the Austrian headquarters, where I arrived on Sunday last, finding them at Mantua. I saw Frimont. The Neapolitans had made a movement towards Ferrara with the intention, as he thought, of attacking the Tête de Pont, near Lago Scuro.

To frustrate this he had sent 10,000 men to Occhio Bello, and 25,000 to Borgoporte. These compose his whole disposable force. If Murat attacked at Lago Scuro, he (Frimont) should march upon him from Borgoporte; if Murat advanced in Lombardy, he

(Frimont) would cross at Borgoporte, fall upon his line of communication, and attack his rear.

This latter part I believe he does not intend to do, but I suspect he means to wait for his reinforcements, which, to make him equal with the Neapolitans, will not arrive before the end of the month. Dalrymple calculated that Murat about the 15th would have 45,000 men of his own. He says his infantry is very good, his artillery middling, and his cavalry very bad. D. states the enthusiasm to be very great in the countries occupied by him, and that muskets alone are wanting—arms in any number to carry them at his command.

He is too wavering a man to succeed in a cause that deserves the greatest boldness and enterprise. I think the French will be in no state to assist him for many weeks to come. I endeavoured when there to ascertain if the Austrians would pursue him to destruction when they had a decided superiority. I could not learn that this was their intention. Schinina was stopped as he was crossing the Po with letters from Campochiaro.* He was a prisoner in Mantua, and I saw him. Frimont showed me Campochiaro's letter. It said that things might still end *heureusement* for Murat, and he referred the King to Schinina's verbal communication. Schinina told me that he was ordered to say that the flight of Bonaparte might authorize Murat *de se faire valoir*, and enable him to profit by the importance which his co-operation might entitle him to claim from his allies. I should think this likely to be true. Frimont would not allow him to go on. You must know, I should think, that the Emperor is to be immediately proclaimed King of Italy, Bellegarde his

* Murat's envoy to the Congress of Vienna.

lieutenant, the Archduke John coming to receive for the Emperor the homage of his new subjects. The Archduke John* then goes to the Grand Army in the direction of the Rhine, the Archduke Charles† at his own request Governor of Mayence, Archduke Ferdinand commands the reserve, the Archduke Louis a corps of grenadiers in the reserve, and the eldest son of the Emperor a brigade of cuirassiers in ditto. We have no news from France. At Milan it was said Bonaparte was marching into the Low Countries. Shall you stay in Tuscany if the Grand-Duke remains neuter?

Lord Burghersh to Lord W. Bentinck.

PISA,
April 14th, 1815.

I have received news from Nugent. The corps of Bianchi advanced in two columns. The one on Carpi beat the Neapolitans on the 10th at that place; took 500 prisoners. On the 11th both corps from Carpi and Reggio entered Modena. I have seen a letter from that town since they entered. Murat seems to have attempted the plan I supposed. He had an affair on the 9th at Occhio Bello, meaning to pass the Po. He was, however, beaten back. Frimont was to assume the offensive on the 11th. I suppose he would act on Panaro and from Comachio? Murat would thus be threatened from Modena, Ferrara, and Comachio, having also Nugent at Pistoja.

* Archduke John, brother of the Emperor Francis. He married the daughter of a postmaster in the Tyrol. In 1848 he was made Reichsverweser in the short-lived Frankfurt Parliament.

† Archduke Charles, a distinguished general in the Austrian campaign against Napoleon. Later he acted as a sort of Regent to his feeble-minded nephew, the Emperor Ferdinand.

His troops have made a bad beginning. I think he will hardly in such a position risk a general action. He must then retire on Rimini, where he will have his enemy on his front only, or he must come to Florence. I incline, however, to the former. Nugent has held in check two divisions of the Guards. They are said to have retired from his front towards Florence. He has had many small affairs, in all of which he has been successful.

In case Murat should retire, he will most likely halt in a position between Civita Vecchia and Ancona—that is, occupy that line of the country. Nugent would wish in that case to embark and go to Naples. I have told him this must depend, for naval means, on your being able to spare them. He is anxious for co-operation from Sicily. I have written to A'Court upon the subject, but the plan should come from you. I don't know how you are engaged in Genoa, or you might think of commanding the Neapolitan expedition yourself. You would then carry greater means, and the cause of Ferdinand would perhaps be safer. There is no knowing what may be Metternich's views. I merely hint this *sans connaissance de cause*.

I am going to Nugent at Pistoja to pay a visit tomorrow. I shall hear from him what are his plans. Things towards Bologna will be more advanced. From Modena, Bianchi may be sending Nugent reinforcements. I will let you know the result of my journey. Nugent conceived the possibility of the Neapolitans from Provence moving upon Leghorn. He has reinforced the port at Porte d'Era, and has prepared to fall back upon and defend Leghorn. I do not think this movement likely. The proclamations of Murat have had no effect. The people at Florence tear them

down. His attempt at raising Italy has failed. The sooner he thinks of defending his States, the better for him, unless he can gain a decided victory.

Lord Burghersh to Captain Campbell.

PISA,
April 13th, 1815.

I enclose the copy of a letter from General Nugent; you will understand from it his views, and I have no doubt you will be of essential service to him in forwarding them should the opportunity offer.

From the state of things in this part of the world, I can have little doubt that Marshal Murat will not prosper. His troops are neither distinguished for courage nor attachment to their leader; and if the call should arise of an attack on Leghorn without a train of artillery, I confidently look to its being successfully defeated.

Intelligence of the position of Marshal Murat should be sent to Sicily. His expedition from thence might be encouraged by it. In the state of feeling existing in the Neapolitan soldiery, an attempt on the kingdom of Naples might have considerable effect. If it was prepared immediately, it might act in concert with the movement in the same direction contemplated by General Nugent.

Captain Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

LEGHORN,
April 13th, 1815.

. . . I am extremely happy to hear the Austrians have obliged Murat's army to retreat. With respect to this place I wrote General Nugent this morning.

I should hope, in the event of Murat's coming this way, that we could hold out till Nugent was strong enough to attack them. The people are well disposed; and if he can get here before them, I have no doubt as to the result. I shall destroy all the sea-batteries, that my people may secure a retreat. Your lordship is aware that my means are but small—only two ships, and they about 100 short of complement; and should we be so unfortunate as to lose the marines, the ships would not be effective. I have directed 200 to be ready to land. I have ordered the two transports to come as near the shore as possible. With regard to Sicily, I have no vessel to send, and at present the wind is in the south-east.

Lord Burghersh to Lord W. Bentinck.

FLORENCE,
April 18th, 1815.

Everything is going on here as well as possible. I came to this place from Pistoja an hour after Nugent on Saturday last. The Neapolitans are running away so fast that Nugent's advance has not been able to overtake them. They are beyond Arezzo. At least 1,500 men of the column at this place have already deserted.

Bianchi arrived the day before yesterday at Bologna. Murat is stated to be gone to Ancona, where he is supposed to intend concentrating his troops.

The plan of campaign now arranged, and which I think very good and worthy of all our assistance, is that Nugent should pass on the road to Sienna, and get as soon as possible with his corps, which is 4,300 strong, to Viterbo. From that place he will menace the Bridge of Borghetto, and the road from Foligno to Rome. He will also place himself in communication

with Civita Vecchia and Orbitello, from either of which places, as the preference may be given, he will embark, with Captain Campbell's assistance, and land either at Sperlonza or any other favourable point in the kingdom of Naples. The whole column of Bianchi (namely, all the *divisions* under his command), stated to be 30,000 effective men, will march through this place upon Arezzo and Perugia. When Nugent is at Viterbo, Bianchi will be at Arezzo. The first division of his troops will be here to-morrow. The rest of the Austrian effective army, under Neipperg, will march towards Ancona as far as Fano, to co-operate with this place and to arrange things according to Frimont's views as expressed by you to Campbell. The following arrangements have been generally agreed to, with reference to the bad news also from the South of France.

Captain Thompson, with the *Aboukir*, will be sent to Genoa to take the *Clarinda* under his orders, to give protection and assistance on that side, and to observe the movements at Toulon. The *Tremendous*, *Rivoli*, and *Alemene*, will run down with a Sicilian sloop-of-war, now at Leghorn, to the Bay of Naples, look in there to see if the Neapolitan ships of line are there, and, after having effected that object, detach, as may appear necessary, either both the *Rivoli* and the *Alemene*, or only the *Rivoli*, to the Adriatic, to go at once to Ancona. The *Tremendous* will then return to Civita Vecchia to prepare for Nugent's expedition. The Tuscans show the very best spirit; recruits are coming in every day.

So many absurdities have been set about in this part of the world with regard to us, that, having got hold of a letter from a Bishop of Orthosia at Rome,

published in the *Journal de l'Empire*, I answered it, and put a translation by Morani into the Florence paper of this day, under the signature "*Un Amio della Verito.*" I send it enclosed for you. I wrote it in a great hurry after the opera, where I was made very angry by some nonsense that was talked. Of course no one knows I am the author.

Captain Campbell would have written now, but he prefers delaying it till he can send you the final arrangements from Leghorn to-morrow. I wish you would make some sort of proclamation or declaration which may let the world know what we are about.

I enclose you the instructions taken upon a Mr. Binda* at Lucca, going to you. He had your letter from the Duc de Gallo, and that Minister's answer to you, which I don't send, as you will otherwise have them. He had besides a letter of recommendation to you from Lord Holland, and also a paper of considerable length detailing a plan of constitution for the kingdom of Naples, in the handwriting of Lord Holland.

Thanks to Lady William for her letter. Believe me.

Lord Burghersh to Lord W. Bentinck.

FLORENCE,
April 20th, 1815.

I send you the letter written to you by Lord Holland, and taken by Mr. Binda, who is now on his journey to Milan. Pray let Lord Holland know you

* Mr. Binda was the intimate friend of Lord and Lady Holland. He was sent by the Duc de Gallo to Lord W. Bentinck, and taken by the Austrian troops in Lucca as a Neapolitan spy, passing with official documents through the Austrian cantonnements; but, upon the representations of Lord Holland, I succeeded in obtaining from General Nugent that his life should be spared, and that he should ultimately be released.—*Note by Lord Burghersh.*

have received it, though opened, contrary to the assurances the Governor of Lucca had given me.

Lord Holland's Constitution the Governor will not give up. Since I wrote to you Frimont has changed his plan, as you will know by Nugent's letter. He sends only about 30,000 effective against Naples. If you could spare a small force or direct one from Sicily, it would be of greater effect; we ought to finish this Murat before Bonaparte has established himself in a state to assist him, which I still persuade myself must take a month or six weeks.

Frimont remains at Mantua. I shall send, therefore, Aubin with Nugent to report to me, and to assist him with the navy. . . .

Murat is said to be at Rimini, but I suppose he has passed on to Ancona; the advance of Bianchi will be at Cortona after to-morrow. Three or four days will bring it in some force, so as to menace the Foligno road; Murat must therefore make his dispositions quickly. We are getting established again.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
April 21st, 1815.

I received yours of the 18th yesterday. I am glad things are going on so well on your side; and if Murat is pushed with vigour, I hope he may be destroyed: all that I can do shall be done. You already know what I have ordered—that Macfarlane should assemble all the disposable force of Sicily at Melazzo, which cannot be calculated at less than 8,000 British and Sicilians. I have seen no return of the Sicilian army for many months, but, from recollections

of what it was in September last, they must have at least 8,000 men fit for service, and the greater part fair troops enough, better than the greater part of Murat's. As soon as Thompson arrives, I shall arrange with him to send from hence all the empty transports to Sicily, to be ready for any favourable opportunity that may arise.

I am most anxious (because I think it may be decisive as to the fate of Italy) that Murat should be *destroyed*. The Austrians must not give up the pursuit until they have killed and eaten him. He has *manqué'd* his coup, and with his failure he must have lost his credit. His plan must either be to fight a battle out of the kingdom of Naples, or to retire for the purpose of defending his State and of drawing away the Austrian army, or of withdrawing his own so far that he may think the Austrians will not venture to pursue him, and of being ready to come forth when the French army shall enter Italy. I have so bad an opinion of his *hardiesse* that I think he has already taken flight. If he has, will the Austrians pursue him closely or not? because upon this the success of our future operations depends.

If the Austrians do pursue him and keep his main army occupied, much more if they gain any advantage over it, Nugent's force, added to our own from Sicily, might make reasonably the greatest impression. If he retires with his army untouched, these corps must be destroyed as well as those who have joined them. Be so good as to give me the earliest and fullest information upon these points. I shall desire Dalrymple to ask Frimont what he means to do.

I hear from Latour that Suchet has arrived at Lyons; that he is equipping an army to consist of seven divisions, intended for Italy. He gives this out, and

has given directions for the greatest activity to be employed. I hear this fact, which is fully believed at Turin, has given great alarm. Do not omit to tell me all you can discover of the Austrian intentions.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
April 22nd, 1815.

I mean to stay here till I hear from England, and this must happen, I think, before I can receive an answer to the letter now written to Frimont. If I remain in command, and operations go on against Naples, as I most earnestly advise, I should then go first to Italy to agree with the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, and from thence proceed to Sicily. I just received your letter of the 20th, the contents of which excite my great regret. How can Frimont hesitate as to the line of conduct he should pursue? If he loses this moment, it is all over with the Austrian army in Italy. I will write again to-morrow.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
April 25th, 1815.

I am just about to set off for Milan, and afterwards for Mantua, if occasion should require. You shall know either from Mantua or Milan what may be decided upon. I have nothing new from any quarter. I suppose in the course of the next week we must get some instructions from home, and every hour we may expect Lord Exmouth. We have been very much embarrassed here for the want of an Admiral. I am

very anxious to know what is to become of you in this great *bouleversement*. Pray tell me, and believe that I cannot be indifferent to what regards you.

Best regards to Lady Burghersh.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
April 29th, 1815.

While I was at Alexandria I received by a King's messenger from Vienna a triplicate copy of a despatch directing that the army of the Mediterranean should be broken up; that I and the staff officers should return to England; that our force at present was barely sufficient for the defence of our garrisons, hereafter to be independent one of the other; that Messina alone should be kept; that the 10th Regiment should be sent from Sicily to Malta; Sir J. Dalrymple to be sent to the Ionian Isles as a Brigadier; Italian levy to be augmented to 5,000 men.

I am so penetrated with the very bad effect that would follow the breaking up of the Middle Army at this moment that I have resolved to suspend for a short time the execution of this order. Lord Bathurst's despatch is dated 29th March, and the Duke of Wellington's desiring us to co-operate is dated 28th March. Our co-operation cannot be very great, but may be very important, and I am sure that Murat is very much afraid of it. The fact is that the influence is all with us; and whether the attack is carried on by the Austrians or by Ferdinand's Neapolitan troops, the effect will be much greater by the addition of a British force, however small.

The Government at home did not know of Murat's

operations, nor did they know of our offer of assistance to the Austrians, and therefore I cannot but think they will approve. The not withdrawing at this moment hath the appearance of a diversion, and the reality of it if practicable. I have written to Macfarlane in this sense.

Sir John, as you see, is appointed to the Ionian Isles. He is not calculated to ingratiate himself with the Austrians, and what he cannot hear from others he is not likely to obtain by his own personal observations of the affairs that may take place. I meant to ask you if, until some other person is named, you could undertake the correspondence from that army through Church, who, I am told, has been sent by Lord Clancarty to Nugent and Aubin. Pray answer me this question confidentially. When I get your answer, I will write you what I particularly wish to be done about Sicily.

Unluckily, neither the original nor the duplicate of the triplicate despatch has been received. In one of these I presume there will have been a private letter from Lord Bathurst, telling me if any other employment is intended for me. I fear these letters have fallen into the enemy's hands, because the messenger who is come was stopped at Strasburg, was detained two hours by Suchet, who hesitated whether he should not seize his despatches. If these letters do not come, I shall set off by myself to England. If they do come, and give me the hope of employment, Lady W. and I shall go together to England; if giving no hopes, we propose returning to our old quarters at Florence. I had expressed a wish to serve in the Duke of Wellington's army, but probably there is no room for new-comers.

I have seen a gentleman from Vienna who says there is no doubt of the intention of the Austrians to pursue Murat till he is completely destroyed. He tells me that the Emperor had advised that Prince Leopold (of Sicily) should join the army, and show himself to the Neapolitans, and that he was about to set out immediately from Vienna.

I received a letter last night from Hill of the 28th. It appears that there is no assembly of troops in the South of France.

My Vienna friend tells me that a proclamation is about to be addressed by the Emperor to all the Italians in Murat's army, promising them in *their own country* the same rank and pay as in Murat's service.

He tells me that the allies will not be able to begin general operations before the middle of June—that it is Talleyrand's opinion that Bonaparte cannot resist.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
May 4th, 1815.

Admiral Penrose moved here yesterday from Sicily via Leghorn. They are assembling their force at Messina and Melazzo, and it amounts to above 8,000 men. The King was also going to Messina, and says he shall be received like the Messiah. The Admiral sailed again this morning for Palermo. He will send a vessel to Civita Vecchia to carry intelligence to Sicily. I have a letter from Sir J. Dalrymple in which he tells me from Frimont that he will push Murat to extremities. I send you a letter from Hill that came last night.

You will be amused with the new character of Whig and patriot King that Bonaparte has assumed. It will serve his turn, I dare say. I am desirous to augment the Italian levy. Would the Grand-Duke permit us to venture in Tuscany? I should think the deserters, Italians, from Murat's service would do very well for us.

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

PALERMO,
May 4th, 1815.

Our proposed operations are suspended by an order from home to send away almost all our force, and to limit ourselves to the sole defence of Messina. What this can mean I know not, unless the country is completely exhausted, that we give up all idea of extending our protection to others as heretofore.

We are in the greatest confusion here from the obstinacy and Jacobinism of our Imperial House of Commons. How Lord William could ever have conceived that he could more easily muster the reserves of Sicily, and more readily direct its counsels, by the establishment of popular assemblies, I am at a loss to understand. Our honourable House in England runs a little restive sometimes; the honourable House here is always unmanageable. . . .

Lord Burghersh to Sir W. A'Court.

ROME,
May 6th, 1815.

I have this moment received your letters. They give me most excellent news. I hope when you receive my news with this you will have no difficulty

in moving. I really believe you would do well to land as near as possible to Naples, or you may join Nugent, who will be moving on the line from home to St. Germano. The Neapolitans are ready to do anything. Be vigorous, and I believe with little loss of blood we may establish our legitimate friend. The Neapolitan soldiers will not fight. Colonel Church has the command of the Neapolitans forming for King Ferdinand; his corps is increasing fast. He wants arms; send them if you can. God bless you, and success attend your enterprise!

Captain Campbell to General Nugent.

OFF NAPLES,
May 6th, 1815.

. . . After I left you at Florence I made the best of my way to Leghorn, where I arrived the next day, and went to sea with the *Rivoli* and *Melpomene*. On my arrival here I received information that the two Neapolitan line-of-battle ships were on the eve of sailing for Toulon with the mother and brothers of Napoleon, but for some unfortunate circumstance they did not sail. I remained out of sight for two days in hopes of seeing them, but that is all at an end now; they are snug at an anchor off Naples. On Monday last *Rivoli* captured a French frigate of forty-four guns. She did not bring to at first, and returned the fire; in consequence she lost twenty-five men and fifty wounded. She was coming to fetch Bonaparte's mother and brother. From her sinking state I was obliged to send *Rivoli* with her to Palermo.

. . . I have much communication with Naples. They all insist that the armistice is not at an end with Great

Britain, and the Queen begged me to luncheon, which of course I refused, and have detained several vessels in the bay, and bring everything through by vessels from the westward (three weeks from Gibraltar). An Admiral had arrived with six sails of the line; they report the flag to be white at the fore, but do not know the name.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
May 9th, 1815.

I am delighted with the intelligence you sent me from Tolentino. I trust we may soon hear of the total dispersion of Murat's army. The Admiral, Lord Exmouth, is arrived with his fleet, and will sail about the 13th or 14th to the coast of Naples to give all aid and co-operation. I mean to accompany him.

We have desired the troops from Sicily (about 7,000) to meet us off Naples Bay, where I calculate they will arrive between the 20th and the 25th. I wish you would communicate this intelligence to General Bianchi.

I do not see how Murat can make much resistance. I wish you would write to me at Civita Vecchia. We have no news from France.

Lord Burghersh to Lieutenant-General Macfarlane.

ROME,
May 11th, 1815.

Since I last had the honour of addressing you, the march of the different columns against the kingdom of Naples has continued. . . .

The duration of the campaign against Marshal Murat

will very much depend on the success of the allies in intercepting or not his march upon Naples at Popoli. The advanced guard of General Bianchi may be at that place on the 13th. Generals Neipperg and Ekart will arrive there on the 15th. If Marshal Murat shall have passed Popoli before that time, the Austrians will march upon Colvi, where they will hardly arrive till the 22nd. General Nugent before that time will have advanced considerably on the road to St. Germano; but his corps, amounting to not more than 3,500 men, assembled at present with him, will not be able to effect anything of very decided importance, although it may very considerably annoy the march of the Neapolitan army from Popoli, and will serve as a support to the loyal inhabitants of the country, who are already stated to have shown the most anxious desire for the return of their lawful Sovereign. From this detail you will best judge of the direction in which the force under your orders could with the greatest effect be applied. From Ponza you will have communication with Terracina, and I shall endeavour to keep you informed of everything through that channel. You will determine whether your corps can be most effective acting alone upon Naples, or by landing either at Sperlonza or Terracina for the purpose of forming a junction with General Nugent. The Neapolitan army which fought at Tolentino suffered very considerably in that battle. From that time it has been in continual march, with facilities for desertion, and must have been harassed both by the corps pursuing it as by those arriving at Popoli. Its force at Tolentino was about 18,000 men; the division of Carascosa joined after the action. A garrison of 3,000 men has been thrown into Ancona. I do not conceive the army

Marshal Murat can assemble to cover Naples can be of any very considerable amount. There was yesterday a small affair near Fondi, where the inhabitants took part with the Austrian and Papal troops, when forty Neapolitan prisoners were taken.

Lord Burghersh to General Bianchi.

TEANO,
May 19th, 1815.

The campaign which originated with Austria by an attack made upon her by Marshal Murat in the midst of the most profound peace, and the war engaged in by Great Britain in support of her intricate ally, having been at this moment brought nearly to its close, we are invited to prevent the disasters which might attend our continuation of further hostilities. The Austrian army is within a day's march of the capital, with no means of resistance on the part of the enemy to oppose it; on the part of England, the town of Naples on the side of the Po is rendered defenceless by the capture of the Neapolitan ships-of-war; an expedition, composed of British and Sicilian troops, is either arrived or immediately arriving off that city. Under these circumstances to consent to such an arrangement becomes the character of Austria as of England; to save the miseries attendant on the prolongation of hostilities beyond the absolute necessity is a duty enforced on every government.

To be just towards a nation returning to its ancient Sovereign our ally, we must, however, be careful to secure to it all the advantages our situation without treaty would enable us to obtain, and, as far as it is possible in the negotiation for the suspension of mili-

tary movements, to leave to the Government about to be established the full measure of advantage it is entitled to. The lines of any preliminary arrangement upon which we can agree to suspend the operations of the allied arms are the abdication of Marshal Murat, his placing himself within our power, his releasing from its engagement to him both the Neapolitan nation and army, and engaging publicly not to touch any public money, and as a security of the sincerity of the act as well as for the tranquillity of the country, to cede to us at once all the fortresses of the kingdom—those of Capua, Gaeta, and the capital. The two first of these places are convenient, but not absolutely necessary to us: they might hope to remain unoccupied for a short time longer, but their defence would in no degree stop the operations we are engaged in; the latter (the capital) is necessary to prevent the misfortunes that might attend a popular movement, and is, besides, within the almost immediate reach of our attainment. To secure the tranquil cession of these advantages, we are not in a situation to be called upon for any corresponding concessions. To Marshal Murat we offer a safe retreat, and an assurance of that consideration his conduct towards the people he has governed, in not prolonging their miseries, ought necessarily to procure him. The money he should be left in possession of does not belong to us to decide upon; the commanding situation we hold frees us from the necessity of entering upon a subject on which we have no authority to act further than in the assurance of a liberal proceeding towards him. To the army we offer the security it may wish in affixing to it a line of demarcation till it shall receive directions from its lawful Sovereign, and to the nation we promise

security and peace: we bring to it the paternal sentiments of its ancient monarch, supported by the guarantee of the allies. To the points thus touched upon, it appears to me, we should confine the negotiations we are at present called upon to enter into. The further arrangements may hereafter be discussed; the allies will have the means of declaring their sentiments, and of concluding the engagement it may meet their views to enter into.

Lord Exmouth to Lord Burghersh. [Private.]

BOYNE,
NAPLES BAY,
2 o'clock, May 20th, 1815.

If it was prudent to trust to paper all I wish to say without knowing the safety of the conveyance, I should gladly open to you our situation.

We are anchored so as to command completely the city, and I hope by to-morrow you will be able to reach me either by land or water, which will afford me great satisfaction. The sooner you can come to us, the better. We have many difficulties about embarking the Queen.* Everything is quiet at present. If I land our marines, it will be to secure tranquillity, and I shall take part only, and hold possession either for Ferdinand or in the name of the allies.

9 p.m.

I have waited until night in hopes of hearing from General Nugent by my schooner, which just now returned to me, not being able to find the *Berwick*, which I had believed was at Terracina or near it. I

* Caroline Murat, wife of Murat and sister of Napoleon. Not to be confused with the other Queen Caroline, wife of King Ferdinand and daughter of the Empress Maria Theresa.

find Captain Campbell has sent the *Partridge*, and I have sent the *Sparrow* this day, to assist in any operations you may have on the coast in crossing the Volturno, and I shall endeavour to procure a safe escort to an officer by land to you in the morning by sending Rear-Admiral Sir J. Rowley, who is fully acquainted with my situation and views on the subject of Naples; although I have hopes of hearing from you in the morning through the Court, the Queen not having yet embarked.

I am in hourly expectation of Admiral Penrose with the King and the army under General Macfarlane, as I understand they were to embark on Monday at Melazzo.

Mme. Murat was about to take refuge on board the Tremendous when Lord Exmouth wrote the following letter. Austrian troops took possession of the town next morning.

BOYNE,
NAPLES BAY,
May 20th, 1815.

. . . You will learn that Murat went off last night. He tried to obtain a passport from Campbell, but, failing, is supposed to have gone to the coast and embarked for Corsica in an open boat, and I have no doubt you have received his abdication by the hand of Carascosa to-day. The town is perfectly tranquil, and I hope will remain so without my being obliged to land any marines; I hold about 800, however, ready, and the ships are so near that nothing can withstand them. If I do land, I shall try the effect of uniting the names of Austria and England as possessing in the name of the Congress, or take the more decided

measure of declaring for Ferdinand. The Queen is most pressing for my guarantee for the safety of her partisans, about 800 or 1,000, and she hesitates to embark without their being placed in safety. I have, as I have told her, no sort of doubt of the pledge mentioned by General Bianchi. . . .

I have offered passports if they can find conveyances, or that they shall be protected on Ischia until the King* arrives, with whom I will interest myself all in my power in their favour. I feel no doubt of the King's agreeing to the Vienna Treaty, and we are also called upon by every principle of honour to prevent the possibility of such events as once passed in this bay. But I am determined not to be a party to any agreement I cannot secure the execution of.

Captain Campbell receives the Queen, and I shall have her landed about Antibes, and I should think Ferdinand will rejoice to permit all her partisans to go away. She proposes to remain till His Majesty arrives.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh. [Private.]

TEANO,
May 21st, 1815.

I send you some most excellent news; the close of the business in this part of the world before the struggle in another begins is magnificent. I have been in difficulties, however. When the negotiations began I agreed, and forced myself to be present; I maintained our share in the business, from which we were about to be totally excluded. I wrote to Lord W. Bentinck and Lord Exmouth, and begged them to send

* Ferdinand.

me their sentiments, and even authority if they thought necessary, but neither of them was to be found or heard of. When the negotiation was nearly closed, I stated I would sign, *subject* to the ratification of the Commanders-in-Chief; but this being totally opposed by all parties, and my receiving at the moment a letter by which I learnt that neither Lord Exmouth nor Lord W. Bentinck were arrived at Civita Vecchia on the 18th, I then thought all chance of seeing them was over, and I was obliged to sign as I did, or leave the whole thing to the Austrians alone. The article of the Convention bound England to no one thing but the cessation of hostilities, for the return of Ferdinand. At the moment it was offered, *we* (England) had no means of co-operation; the Austrians were ready at every instant to say that, our commander never having appeared or assisted, they could not delay advantages within their own grasp, for a form with persons of whose arrival I could give no assurance. I have been much disappointed that nothing even from Sicily should have arrived. I had pressed A'Court and General Macfarlane by all means in my power, but I fear they have not even yet sailed from Melazzo. I hope you will approve the conduct I have held since the beginning of Murat's campaign. I have acted upon your general instructions to support Austria, and upon the Duke of Wellington's letters. Lord W. Bentinck begged me to go to the army, as there was no person with it, and he had no great opinion of the exertions of Sir J. Dalrymple. I really believe I have been of service I beg you will let me know as soon as possible what is your feeling upon the whole transaction.

*Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.*NAPLES,
May 23rd, 1815.

Prince Leopold of Sicily by the universal applause of the people made his entry into this city at the head of the Austrian troops on the 22nd. The passage of that Prince through his father's States to his capital has been a march of triumph. The whole of the inhabitants from considerable distances from where he passed flocked to meet him, and, decorated with their ancient national cockade, brought him proofs of their unabated attachment to his family, and their detestation of the rule they were escaping from, imposed upon them by conquest and maintained by force. By the Convention transmitted to your lordship in my last despatch, the allied armies were to have been placed in possession of Naples only on this day. The popular feeling had, however, so strongly manifested itself against the then existing Government on the 20th and 21st, that Marshal Murat left the town in disguise, and his wife sought the security which had been assured her on board a British man-of-war. General Carascosa sent to General Bianchi requesting he would prevent the misfortunes with which the town was ensnared, by entering it immediately, and Mme. Murat, by the same request to Lord Exmouth, prevailed upon him to land a body of 500 marines to maintain tranquillity. Marshal Murat appears to have been fully aware of the little support his usurped dominion would receive when menaced either from the army or the inhabitants of the kingdom. His children were already placed at Gaeta, where a French officer commands.

From every part of the country but one universal sentiment of attachment to their ancient monarch is expressed. No disturbance of any serious nature has taken place. The enmity against such as are supposed from their employments to have been attached to the late Government is great, but the activity with which General Bianchi has carried assistance to the points where it might be required has retained the country quiet.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HUNDRED DAYS

WHILE these events were taking place in Italy, the armies of Europe were once more assembled and prepared to strike the final blow against Napoleon. Jealousies had arisen at the Congress of Vienna which threatened to wreck the peace negotiation, but the news that their common foe was again at the head of a French army speedily caused the monarchs to sink their differences for the time and act in concord. They resolved at once to carry into effect the Treaty of Chaumont, by which England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, were bound in an offensive and defensive alliance to induce France to keep within her ancient limits. The armies which had seemed likely to be drawn against each other were all united under command of the Duke of Wellington, and a fresh treaty of alliance was signed by which the four Great Powers, in addition to providing 180,000 men, stipulated that none should lay down arms until the power of Napoleon was completely destroyed.

Lord Burghersh was in constant communication with Lord Stewart, both officially and privately. These letters, and those from other correspondents at this time, all breathe the same fear, engendered by the first successes of the French during the hundred days. This fear brought about a spirit of unanimity for the campaign, and made the victory of Waterloo possible.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
March 30th, 1815.

The Duke of Wellington left Vienna yesterday to take the command of the allied armies in the Low Countries. The remainder of the business at Congress

is to be carried on by the three Plenipotentiaries. The accounts from Paris of the 21st announce Napoleon's entrance into that capital, and the formation of his Ministry.

Strasbourg has declared with Marshal Suchet for Napoleon; great fears are entertained of all the other garrisons.

The King of France has been heard of safe on his way to Lisle, at Peronne. The Treaty of Chaumont has been renewed, and the utmost vigour, preparation, and unanimity, reigns among all the Sovereigns of Europe against Napoleon.

I beg you will keep me informed of what passes near you worth communicating.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Burghersh.*

VIENNA,
April 7th, 1815.

. . . By all our accounts from Paris, the Revolution lately effected has been the work of the Jacobin party, who, taking advantage of the general predilection of the army in his favour, conceiving that, if the King's (Louis XVIII.) power should be suffered to continue, his mild government would so attach the people as to render the return to Jacobinism impossible, have called back Bonaparte in order to get rid of the King, in the hope that at a future period they may find the expulsion of the power the more easy task. Accordingly, you will see that his Ministry, or at least the leading members of it, are Jacobin; in all the addresses to him the wild notions of 1793 are revived, and in his answers he is obliged to re-echo them back. The new

* Richard, second Earl of Clancarty, G.C.B. Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna, 1815.

line of Murat's cannot fail to embarrass him; it will produce a constant struggle between him and his advisers; his disposition for war is well known; theirs for peace has been proclaimed; he has already been obliged by a decree to abolish the censors of the press; he has renounced the *Grand Empire*, and they were extremely angry with his dissolution of the Assemblies upon his arrival in Paris, assimilating his conduct to that of Cromwell. In order to pacify them, he has therefore been obliged to call the Electoral Assemblies for the month of May, in order, as he states, to have a real representation of the people, and to take their sense upon the late events. . . . Berthier,* who attended the King into the Low Countries . . . has advised immediate attack, stating that Bonaparte has neither arms nor money; men we know he can have in any number, and it is certain that the devotion of the regular army to him is extreme. . . . The communications from Genoa affirm that the South of France has not given itself up to Bonaparte's rule . . . that the Duc d'Angoulême was lately at Marseilles, where, in addition to a perfect reception, he was enabled to organize a considerable force of Gardes Nationales, all of whom are stated to be in the best disposition.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

MY LORD,

VIENNA,
April 13th, 1815.

I have the honour to inform your lordship that the respective Cabinets here in conference have determined to send orders immediately to the frontiers,

* One of Napoleon's Marshals, who had, like Talleyrand, deserted him, and had taken service with the Bourbons.

that all ports from France should be stopped, and that all persons in the employment of Bonaparte should be arrested.

Other individuals who may be travelling are to proceed to places that are to be agreed on, in Austria, and Prussia, until further orders. It is thus determined to exclude all communications with the existing French Government. Information has been received that two parties exist in Alsace and the neighbouring country against the present government of France, the strongest being in favour of a republic, the other for Louis XVIII.

It is with regret I have to acquaint you that a bad spirit has been observed among the troops of Baden. Despatches arrived from England last night to the 3rd of April.

The Anglo-Hanoverian and Dutch army occupy a line from Alost by Enghien to Soignies. A Prussian corps of 40,000 men are between the Meuse and Jemeppe. It appears Bonaparte does not seem to be collecting as yet in that quarter. M. de Montion's arrival has given rise to various histories. I hope all is as it should be. There is a *projet* in agitation for another declaration of all the Powers; when anything is decided, you shall have it as early as possible. I hope the affairs of the Congress are nearly brought to a settlement. Austria and Bavaria are very nearly agreed. Italy is settled, and I believe everyone will be contented but the Spanish Plenipotentiary.

I have the honour to be, your lordship's obedient, humble servant,

STEWART, *Lieutenant-General*.*

* Lord Stewart had served with distinction in the Peninsula, and had been Adjutant-General to Wellington, 1809-1812.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
April 15th, 1815.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

. . . We have nothing very material in the way of news here. Your quarter is most interesting now. I have sent Colonel Church to Nugent, to get the best information of the Austrian operations. Of course this will in no shape interfere with your reports, for I have instructed him accordingly. But we are in the dark, and it is necessary to have a British officer actually with the army.

You will learn two of the Cabinet are gone to Brussels to consult *militarily* and *politically* with the Duke of Wellington. It would appear the foot are a little in a funk. But our unanimity here against Napoleon will, I trust, give them spirit. We are *indivisible* as to war against *him*. But as to the restoration of the King great intrigue exists. The Emperor of Russia hates all the Bourbons, and is convinced they cannot reign in France. A strong party exists for the Duke of Orleans. The Embassy here and Talleyrand are not very divided in their opinions. In short, I see much devilment on this head.

My best regards to Lady Burghersh. I know nothing as yet of my own motions. My house, etc., here is always at your orders if you have bad times.

Yours ever,

STEWART.

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Burghersh.

GENOA,
April 17th, 1815.

I have to thank you for yours of the 13th. To begin with our news: Captain Coghlan left Marseilles three days ago. The tricolour flag was flying there as well as at Toulon. He says there was a second action near Valence, in which the Duke of Angoulême was beat and made a prisoner. While he was off Marseilles, a Colonel of Bonaparte's came there with a very small escort, ordered the tricolour flag to be hauled and Bonaparte's proclamation to be put up, and it was done without the smallest resistance. This could only be the consequence of a decisive action, for the spirit of the people is as decided and hostile to Bonaparte as possible. Will or will not a French army now come into Italy? I have always given two months for the tranquillization of the South by Bonaparte, and till that was done he could detach nothing here. Nugent had better retire with his infantry upon Spezia, where, if I have notice of him in time, transports shall be sent. We have only one horse transport, which carries fifty horses.

Mr. Johnson to Lord Burghersh.

PISA,
April 18th, 1815.

. . . I beg leave to transmit an extract of a communication by estafette from our Consul at Nice to Lord William Bentinck, which was received at Genoa on the 15th: "I have thought it my duty to inform you that we have this morning observed that the tricolour flag is hoisted at Antibes, and it is therefore

supposed to be equally so at Marseilles, Aix, and Toulon. This news, combined with that we have received of Murat's successes in Italy, has produced a general fright in Nice."

The above news is certainly true of Antibes, probably also of Toulon, but I doubt its being true of Marseilles. It is impossible, however, to calculate on the conduct of Frenchmen, who seem to have lost all principle, if ever they had any; and I think it probable that in a short time the bad news from France will be true in the fullest extent, for it is evident that, although the French may not feel any attachment to Bonaparte, they still consider him the man best calculated to obtain for them once more that military renown of which they are most desirous, more than of civil liberty or any other advantage which they could hope for from the Bourbons. In the present state of things I consider it one of the greatest misfortunes that can happen to Europe, that an army of 80,000 Austrians should be employed even for two or three months in Italy, and I trust that we shall send a powerful expedition to Naples without loss of time to hasten the total destruction of that detestable leaven,* which so long as it is suffered to subsist will ferment and corrode everything with which it comes in contact. Although I hope I am not a charlatan, and am sure I am not much of a Catholic, I wish the Pope could be sent with the expedition; the effect would be rapid and irresistible.

* Murat and French ideas of liberation.

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

LONDON,
April 22nd, 1815.

DEAR LORD BURGHERSH,

I am unwilling to be thought forgetful of your lordship's and Lady Burghersh's great kindness, and trust that an account of my proceedings since leaving Italy may not be unacceptable.

Notwithstanding my anxiety to return to England to afford explanations to His Majesty's Ministers, I would have cheerfully remained longer in Italy had there appeared any prospect of my being useful there, or being employed under Lord Stewart or in connection with your lordship at Elba or elsewhere; but Lord W. Bentinck gave no encouragement to my proposals, and, not having heard from your lordship, I felt it my duty to leave Italy without delay. I had the honour of dining with Lord Westmorland last week, for which I presume myself indebted to your lordship's favour.

Upon my arrival here I found such a hue and cry as made me almost fear to be known. However, from the explanation which Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh were pleased to give in the first debates upon the escapes of Bonaparte, all those unfavourable opinions were removed. I am in hopes of being continued under Lord Castlereagh, but am dreadfully afraid of being consigned to Lord C——t's command. If your lordship and Lord Stewart can extricate me from this horrifying prospect, it will be doing me the greatest possible favour. Colonel Upton, who has just been discovered in a scrape with Lady ——, is a candidate, strongly supported by the Duke of York.

Colonel Coppin, who has just lost his situation in the Mediterranean, is recommended by Banbury, so that I have only the support of my friend Torrens to back me, and the claims of my having devoted myself for the last two years to this line of service, to the sacrifice of my party and British advantages.

As De Lancey has arrived here on his way to the Duke of Wellington, I presume that Lowe will again rally at Blücher's standard.

A few days ago a party of fifteen or twenty of the senior Peninsula Generals, with Lord Lyndoch in the chair, and a few Colonels beside myself, dined together at the British, where some resolutions were entered into for the formation of a Peninsula club, no rank under this being admitted. The resolutions were sent to the Duke of Wellington to request him to become president; and it is expected to be very respectable, as all the Generals who served there have requested to join it. I took the liberty of putting down your lordship's name, being responsible for your approval, which I hope will be the case. Wilson is here grumbling at not being included in the K.C.B., having a regiment, etc., and expresses openly his resolution never to serve again. No officer can receive this order unless he has at least *five* medals, until he has the rank of General, and may then get it without that number.

I have just received two more for Martinique and Guadeloupe, which gives me a cross.

Colonel Cooke went over to Ostend about a week ago, I presume to join Lord Stewart.

As I propose doing myself the honour of writing your lordship again very soon, and being extremely hurried at present attending Ministers and public

offices, I shall only add my respectful compliments to Lady Burghersh, and the assurance of being, my dear lord,

Ever faithfully and respectfully, etc.,

NEIL CAMPBELL.

Mr. Johnson to Lord Burghersh.

PISA,
April 22nd, 1815.

. . . Your lordship will have learned that the unfavourable intelligence contained in my last letter is fully confirmed, and that there is no longer any open resistance to the new Government in the South of France. Bonaparte's success at Lyons was evidently the work of the soldiery, as it is found necessary to adopt severe measures there in order to keep down the persons who are ill-affected to the present order of things. A master of a coasting vessel who is arrived at Genoa, and left London on the 11th instant, says that the first attempt to hoist the tricolour flag was made on the 11th, and that it was not until the day following that the military, finding themselves far superior to the National Guard, hoisted the new colour in every part of the town and fired guns of rejoicing. He represents the National Guard and people as generally averse to the new order of things. The same person asserts that at Marseilles the people united with the National Guard, pulled down the three-coloured flag and threw it into the sea, but have not hoisted any in its place. I have read with great pleasure some observations in the Florence paper on the letter of a certain Bishop; they appeared to me necessary and judicious. . . . The letter of the Bishop

in the French papers was evidently published to produce a feeling unfavourable to us, which it was rightly presumed would be strengthened by all the silly arguments of egotism and stupidity. A letter from Vienna tells me of a *scene* that took place between the Emperor Alexander and the *Great Duke* (I mean, of course, the only really Great Duke existing). The Emperor asked with a good deal of violence, "Pourquoi l'avez-vous laissé échapper?" Lord Wellington coolly asked in his turn, "Pourquoi l'y avez-vous placé?"

This simple question, put with characteristic coolness, put an end to all recriminations.

My letters from Switzerland are very encouraging. Dread of Bonaparte is the predominant feeling, and the troops have been put under the command of General Bachman, a decided enemy of the French, and of General Reding, a true Swiss patriot.

Lord Hill has arrived at Brussels to act as second in command; the people of the Low Countries are delighted with their new kingdom, and rally round the Sovereign, but the officers of the Belgian troops have shown such a bad spirit that it has been found necessary to send them to Dutch fortresses. I am sorry to say that the English travellers have been making themselves as ridiculous in the Low Countries as in Italy; the moment they heard of Bonaparte getting to Paris they all took flight, and publicly prognosticated that the French army would be in Brussels in a week. I think the English are never so respectable as when then they are shut up in their own island and at war with the whole world. . . .

Sir N. Campbell to Lord Burghersh.

LONDON,
June 7th, 1815.

I congratulate you, dear Lord Burghersh, upon the brilliant finish to Murat, notwithstanding the regret I experienced in not partaking of your operations. I hope this is a prelude to the fate of his brother-in-law. Recollecting your friendship and kindness, I have done myself the pleasure of writing your lordship on several occasions since my return, and I am now induced to trouble you in order to acquaint you with the footing on which I stand with Ministers, as there will be many prejudicial conjectures in consequence of my not continuing in Lord Castlereagh's department. I therefore enclose his letter* to the Duke of Welling-

* *Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington on Sir N. Campbell's conduct in the island of Elba.*

FOREIGN OFFICE,
May 27th, 1815.

MY LORD,

Colonel Sir Neil Campbell being about to join his regiment in Flanders, it is with much satisfaction that I avail myself of this opportunity to address your Grace for the purpose of assuring you that His Majesty's Government have had every reason to be satisfied with the activity and intelligence manifested by Sir Neil Campbell during the time he was serving under the direction of this department, as well as the siege of Danzig, and in the campaign in Germany and France of 1813 and 1814, as more particularly during the very difficult and delicate charge imposed upon him while residing near the person of Napoleon Bonaparte in the island of Elba.

The unfortunate evasion of that person from Elba, wholly unexpected as it was, and disastrous as the event must prove to the cause of humanity, cannot, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, be attributed to any proper exertion and activity on the part of Sir N. Campbell. It is not, however, judged advisable at the present moment to continue the services of Sir Neil Campbell as Resident with any of the allied armies under the orders of this department, and he has therefore, in a most honourable manner, decided to return to the performance of his military duties. As I can entertain no doubt that Sir Neil Campbell's conduct under your Grace's command will continue, as on former occasions, to receive

ton; he sent myself one copy, and another to the Duke of York. Whenever his lordship told me that my being among Ministers and foreign Generals might promote discussions about Bonaparte's escape, which Ministers desired to avoid, I told him I would not press any explanation, but merely wished him to place me upon such a footing with the Duke of Wellington as would secure me against any suspicion of blame with him or the army. That I was very happy to resume my military duties, for I cannot get the Bath without a fifth medal, and I have only four. My ambition is to be a soldier, not a diplomatist. It was accident which placed me in that line. It *leads* to nothing without great interest. I wish to avoid the prejudice which is imbibed in the army against those (like myself) who may continue it long. In short, I am very happy at what has taken place. I go over as Major of the 54th, but I am persuaded the Duke of Wellington is too liberal to let me do duty in the situation *under a Lieutenant-Colonel* for two years. I do not believe there is any staff appointment open for me consistent with my rank, and there are no British brigades, but I hope to get a foreign brigade. If your lordship has an opportunity in course of your private correspondence with the Duke to mention my name without saying it was my request, it will probably serve me considerably. In one of my former letters I informed you that I had taken it upon me to insert your name as a member of the Peninsula Club.

your approbation, I have only to add that every mark of confidence which, in the course of the ensuing campaign, your Grace shall have an opportunity of bestowing upon him will be highly gratifying to His Majesty's Ministers and personally to me.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my lord,

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

It is now proposed, or resolved, I may say, to absorb this and the other clubs in one general club, and I have also given in your name for it. We expect to purchase the house at present held by the Union (the Duke of Leeds's in St. James's Square), and I hope we shall rival Brooks or the Alfred. . . .

I have had the honour of meeting Lady Jersey on several occasions, and was at one of her parties.

Sir R(ober) W(ilson) is going about a champion of opposition, and will not even now admit that the game is up with Murat, or that the state of operations there and of the country give us any advantage. In the House of Peers I saw him go out to prompt Lord Grey during one of his speeches, and upon returning again his lordship asked for Sir R(ober) W(ilson)'s despatches as well as those of Lord W. Bentinck and General Nugent. I could not help giving him a lecture, and recommending him to go out to the British army to his military duties. . . .

I hope Lady Burghersh's health has not suffered during the storm occasioned by Murat. I beg my best respects to her ladyship, and my compliments to Phelps and Aubin.

Sir Thomas Picton leaves this immediately for Brussels. Sir L. Cole follows soon after uniting his future fate to a daughter of Lord Malmesbury. I have seen Lady Aberdeen sometimes at parties here, but she scarcely condescended to recognize me.

It is scarcely necessary for me to recommend Mr. Ricci to your lordship. You know his attachment to the British Government, and the persecution he suffered. I was very much satisfied with his conduct. I am persuaded you will be able to obtain for him

some comfortable appointment from the Neapolitan or British Government. I have written to him to that effect.

Mr. Bandini to Lord Burghersh.

June 14th, 1815.

Your deputies are the first that have given any relief to the public mind for an age back—since, indeed, the Peace of Paris. People have quite cheered them, and not the less because an Englishman seems to have had a hand in the matter. Now you have so gloriously concluded and consummated your South Italian campaign, it is to be hoped that moving up to the headquarters in the North you will meet Lord Wellington in the enemy's land.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

NAPLES,
June 17th, 1815.

Having received the King's commands to attend him on his entry into his capital, I had this day the honour of being present with His Majesty and of witnessing the enthusiasm with which he was received by his people.

The King entered Naples at the head of his own troops together with the Austrians and British, who defiled before him on his arrival at his palace. The constant attachment the Neapolitan people are known to have ever borne their legitimate Sovereign makes it unnecessary to detail to your lordship their joy at his return. His Majesty reassumes the government of his country beloved and respected by all classes of his

subjects, and looked to by them as their security for a reign of justice and tranquillity.

By a letter from Lord Bathurst, the British force under General Macfarlane having been directed to assemble at Genoa, the transports for the cavalry from Sicily will immediately be sent to bring it to this rendezvous.

In the meantime the 3,000 infantry will be transported to Leghorn. By the return of the ships that carry them the British troops will be ready to be embarked for Genoa.

The Commandant of Gaeta, having intimated his intention of surrendering the place, two officers (according to his request) were sent to treat with him. The terms he proposed were the permission to send a courier to Murat to consult him on the propriety of giving up the trust entrusted to him, and next to stipulate that Mme. Murat should be sent with her property to France. The terms were necessarily unattended to.

I have received from the Marquis of Circello the official communication of the thanks H.S.M. has been graciously pleased to order should be conveyed to me from him for the part I acted in the campaign which re-established him upon his throne. His Majesty, in token of his appreciation of my military services, and to record his obligations to those who signed the military convention of Casa Lonza, has been pleased to decorate me, as one of them, with the Order of St. Ferdinand of the First Class. I have to request your lordship will obtain for me H.R.H. the P(rince) R(egent)'s gracious permission to accept and wear this mark of H.S.M.'s favour.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh (before Lord Stewart knew of the Battle of Waterloo).

IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS,
HEIDELBERG,
June 20th, 1815.

You will find by the letters I forward that I expect we shall meet at Philippi. What you have done with Lady Burghersh I cannot guess; but I shall not be surprised if she is campaigning again, for I doubt if Italy in the rear of the armies would be a pleasant residence. We are in great anxiety here for news from the Low Countries.

We are waiting here the Russian army. Our grand object is the concentration of the whole in the old ground of Langres and Nancy. The Austrians go, as you will know, by Basle, etc., left of the Vosges. The Russians (60,000) with Bavarians (40,000), under Prince Royal of Würtemberg, proceed on the right. Schwarzenberg and the Boutique will go with this column. The last of the Russians will be over the Rhine the 29th. Wrede will move from Deux Ponts or Sargemine on the 22nd. We expect Frimont the 29th at Geneva. General Upton is with Wrede, Colonel Leake with the Swiss, and Colonel Coppin with the Piedmontese. I send transmissions to Macfarlane, Lowe, and write to Nugent and Lord Exmouth for an expedition from the South of Italy to Marseilles. When anything of moment occurs, I shall now always send to the headquarters of Frimont to be forwarded to you.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh, transmitting the news of Waterloo. Lord Burghersh received the news of the battle at the first post on the road from Rome to Florence, to which place he was proceeding en route from Naples to join the allied armies, who had entered France from Italy. Lord Burghersh sent the leading postilion of his four horses with this news to Cardinal Pacca at Rome to be communicated to the Pope.

HEIDELBERG,
June 22nd, 1815.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I lose no time in sending you enclosed such details as I have already learnt. Our glorious and incomparable victory has been bought dear. But, in the lamentation over our friends, we must be supported by considering to what a pitch England's military fame, and the name of Wellington, have been carried. In breaking to you poor Fitzroy's* having lost his arm, I can equally assure you he is doing well. Poor Hardinge, with Blücher, has had his carried off by a cannon shot. I have no detailed accounts from our army, but the enclosed† are heads of what I have collected. We march to-morrow to Mannheim, on the 2nd we shall be at Kaiserslautern, and on the 9th at Nancy, where I hope to come into close communication. I do not write to Lady Burghersh, as I know not where she may be, but I conclude you will take care of Fitzroy's misfortune being broke in a proper manner to her.

Ever yours most affectionately,

STEWART.

* Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan, brother-in-law of Lady Burghersh.

† No enclosures preserved.

*Lord Burghersh to his Father.**

There is hatred and detestation of everything that belongs to what has happened. The return of the Bourbons is foremost in the list. A nation that desired reform, that wished to live well with its neighbours, a people that could reflect on the blessings of peace, and which was not composed of enemies to the House of Bourbon, would rejoice in its return to govern them. But a Frenchman thinks but of his war. His vanity beats his reason; he thinks now but of going to London, etc. The army that is to be destroyed must vote its executioners. France will be covered with the disbanded soldiers, who parting with their companies promise to meet again, and not spare their enemies. Paris is subject to riots every day. The Tuileries is the constant scene of them. Two people were killed last night, and others often before. "Vive l'Empereur!" is constantly cried about, and no one punished.

What, in such a state of things, is to be done is not easy to decide. The Ministers of the King are thought to be looking to be well with France and all Frenchmen, whatever may happen.

I shall recommend compacting the frontier of Savoy, giving the fortress of Briançon to Piedmont, destroying Grenoble, giving the Pays de Gex and the Fort de l'Écluse to Switzerland, taking Alsace and the German provinces, giving a line of French fortresses to the Netherlands and holding the other strong places, and keeping an army within the French territory till the contributions are paid and France is quiet. In such

* Lord Burghersh visited Paris in July, 1815, and this undated portion of a letter probably was written during that visit.

arrangements Prussia is feared, and Russian views, I think, could be got the better of. France will yet be the bane of Europe, the destroyers of her repose. England must most immediately be affected by it. The ambition of other powers is not so alarming to her. Such are my views as yet ; I may see reasons to change them, but I fear I shall not. I shall leave this to-morrow for Tuscany.

I was the day before yesterday robbed while asleep in my bedroom. Some person walked in and carried off the Order of St. Ferdinand, my purse, shoe-buckles, and other things. I have not as yet heard anything about them.

I wish you would get the Act of Parliament for raising the regular militia, as also the one for the local militia, and send them directed to General Dessolles, commanding the National Guard of Paris. Let my name be put on the outside of the cover, with my compliments.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

PARIS,
August 6th, 1815.

MY LORD,

I have received from the Chevalier Kracane, charged with the affairs of Tuscany, a note relating to the circumstances under which the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany was robbed of its monuments of art, and reclaims from the allies, now in possession of them, their restitution. No declaration of war preceded the occupation of Tuscany by the French armies. In a state of profound peace that country was broken in upon and pillaged. To reclaim the treasures carried off from it under the successive acts of aggression

committed by the French would, at this moment, be too considerable to impose on the Government of France ; the works of art alone form the prayer of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

In the first invasion of the French, statues, pictures, and mosaics, belonging to him, were all of them taken away.

Under the reign of the King of Etruria, the Venus of Medici was obtained by a trick from the Court of Palermo, where it was in deposit, and in later years, when the Tuscan States had, without a shade of justice, been annexed to France, M. Denon was sent to them as Commissioner from Bonaparte to examine and bring away for the Parisian gallery all the monuments he should find worthy of being transplanted.

To these different robberies, no excuse, no colouring of justice, can be urged. The French Government can advance no claim on the property demanded, except an actual possession, founded on a violence committed in contravention of every principle of justice and good faith.

I hope it may be within your lordship's power to influence the decision of the allies in favour of the Tuscan claims ; it will restore to Italy a portion of its property carried from it in plunder of the most unjustifiable nature.*

* By the Treaty of Paris, November, 1815, all the art treasures confiscated by Napoleon were restored to their respective countries.

CHAPTER IX

MURAT'S END

AFTER his flight from Naples, Murat landed in France, and settled near Toulon to await events. On the news of Napoleon's final overthrow, and the second Bourbon restoration, a Royalist agitation broke out; a reward was offered for the capture of Murat, and this forced him to go into hiding. After some days of wandering he decided to escape from France, and, with three companions, embarked for Corsica in an open boat on August 22nd. Weathering a fearful gale, they reached Bastia on August 25th. Murat went to the house of one of his former generals, Franceschetti, and there felt in comparative safety. The Bonapartist faction in Corsica was at that time in the ascendant, and, with many of his own old soldiers in the island, an attempt to arrest him would have required an armed force. Fearing, however, that he might be publicly outlawed, as Napoleon had been, by the Powers of Europe, he applied to the British political agent at Bastia for a passport to any place approved by the Powers. Not receiving this in the course of a few days, he suddenly resolved to make one last wild attempt to regain the throne of Naples. Accompanied by Franceschetti and a few followers, he marched to Ajaccio, the principal port of Corsica. Arriving there on September 23rd, he met with a favourable reception from the townspeople. On the 28th Colonel Macirone arrived to offer him a passport to Trieste, and a British ship for his conveyance. Bent now on his new plan, Murat rejected both these, and set sail that night with a little fleet of six vessels and less than 200 men. Disaster soon came. A violent storm dispersed the ships; that

bearing Murat was blown down the coast to Pizzo, where he landed on October 8th. Meeting with a hostile reception, he was chased from the town, and, after being nearly lynched at the hands of the mob, was arrested, tried by court-martial, and shot on October 13th.

It has been stated* that apparently no record exists of the attitude adopted by Sir William A'Court when he and the Austrian Minister to Naples were consulted by the Neapolitan Government as to the fate of Murat. His letters to Lord Burghersh are interesting, as furnishing a definite proof of the advice he gave on that point.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
September 23rd, 1815.

I have received several letters from Admiral Sir Josias Rowley relating to the affairs of Corsica. It appears by them that Murat is still in that island, having moved into the interior. The French commanding officer, Colonel Vernier, is for taking the means necessary for arresting him, or preventing the mischiefs which may arise from his rebellion.

Captain Hornby,† having informed that officer that he had orders to assist in opposing Murat, required that every means should be used to take him prisoner, in which state he should be retained till a decision with regard to him from the allied Powers should be received. Captain Hornby had no answer to this declaration; he therefore took on board his ship the chief of Colonel Vernier's staff, and sailed for Leghorn

* See "The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy," by R. M. Johnston, vol. i., p. 404.

† Commanding the naval force off Elba.

to consult with Sir J. Rowley. He has since left that place for Genoa to concert the means of enabling the well-affected Corsicans to act against the menaced usurpation.

Sir Josias Rowley has in the meantime directed H.M.S. *Mæander* to proceed off Bastia, together with a division of Sicilian gunboats which were on their way from Genoa to Messina, and which he has detained for the purpose of that service. I hope your lordship will approve the principle on which I undertook to recommend the measures which have been adopted to thwart the views of Murat.

The appearance of the British ships on the coasts of Corsica, with the declaration of the officers, will be more likely than any other means that could now be brought against him to thwart his undertaking.

I enclose a printed copy of the treaty signed between the Pope and the Emperor of Austria, fixing the military route through the Papal States for the Austrian troops passing to and from the kingdom of Naples.

In consequence of an intention expressed by the Grand-Duke of Tuscany to the Pope, of re-establishing a portion of the convents formerly existing in Tuscany, and of ceding to them for that purpose the property formerly belonging to them, which remained confiscated but unsold in the country, the Court of Rome sent to this Government as Legate the Archbishop Monseigneur Arezzo, directing him to arrange the different questions relating to the restoration so intended. This person appears to have been directed to insist on these preliminary points :

1st. That all laws of mortmain, or against the

acquisition of property by the Church, should be abolished.

2nd. That, on the re-establishment of the convents, the laws of the country forbidding the reception of females as nuns till they had attained the age of twenty-four should be repealed, and the decisions of the Council of Trent affixed by treaty, as the rules by which the convents should be governed.

3rd. He required that all monks and religious orders should be totally subservient and dependent on the generals and chiefs of their respective orders resident at Rome.

These articles were rejected by the Tuscan Government; the negotiation has been referred to Rome. The amount of Church property yet unsold and likely to be restored amounts to a revenue of about 180,000 dollars a year.

A proclamation has been transmitted to me by this Government, by which the Grand-Duke refuses to acknowledge the convention entered into for the evacuation of Porto Ferrajo by the French troops, and regulates other points relating to the occupation of that place by his forces.

Captain Bastard to Lord Burghersh.

H.M.S. *MÆANDER*,
LEGHORN ROADS,
October 2nd, 1815.

. . . I take the opportunity of informing you that I left Bastia yesterday evening in consequence of a letter I received from Colonel Macirone* (who, I

* Colonel Macirone acted as secret intermediary between Fouché and Wellington after Waterloo. He had also remained in touch with Murat until he went into hiding (Johnston's "Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy," vol. i., p. 394).

believe your lordship knows, was charged with a mission from the Emperor of Austria to offer Murat an asylum in his dominions) at Ajaccio, acquainting me that Murat, having refused to sign the proposal, embarked suddenly in the night of the 28th September, and sailed with about 150 officers and men, as you will observe by the extracts of Colonel Macirone's letters which I have the honour to enclose.

I regret that Colonel Macirone, in the hurry of meeting, did not mention the size and description of the vessels in which he embarked, to enable me to judge of his probable destination. I believe, however, from the information of the person who conveyed the express to me, that he sailed with three vessels called "gondolas," capable of containing about fifty men and a week's provisions, but I can form no opinion where he is gone.

I despatched yesterday two of the gunboats under my orders at Bastia, with the information to Naples and the coast of Italy, and I left one there to convey any particulars of Murat's departure and embarkation the Governor of Bastia might learn after my quitting it.

It appears that Murat was favourably received by the inhabitants of Ajaccio, in spite of the Governor's endeavours to prevent his entering the place. I have obtained the names of some of the officers supposed to have accompanied Murat, which I have the honour to enclose, together with a copy of Murat's answer to a proclamation of the Governor of Bastia on his first landing in Corsica.

Colonel Macirone to Captain Bastard.

AJACCIO,
September 29th, 1815.

I have the honour to inform you that immediately on my arrival here yesterday afternoon I communicated by letter to King Joachim the purport of my mission. He refused to sign the proposals of the Austrian Government, declaring that they contain nothing more or less than a simple abdication, with the only condition of delivering up his person into the custody of the Austrian Government.

I enclose you, sir, my letter and his answer, which he did not send me before this morning, when at the same time I was informed that he had sailed suddenly in the night with about 150 men, several generals and officers, most probably for the coast of Calabria. I think you may be in time to intercept him, as I am in hopes that you will receive this letter to-morrow night.

I think it my duty to make all possible haste to Paris.

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

NAPLES,
October 13th, 1815.

As the courier will probably not set out till the affair is finished, I write these few lines by the post to inform you that Murat, having rejected the offers of the allies, sailed with 150 men in six small vessels on the night of the 28th from Ajaccio. They were dispersed by a tempest, but on the morning of the 8th

Murat himself with two of the vessels reached the coast of Calabria, and immediately landed at Pizzo. He ran into the market-place, followed by about sixteen persons all armed, and cried out to the people, "Behold your King! Cry, 'Long live the King!'" The people, instead of doing as they were bid, ran to arms, fired upon the party, and, after killing one and wounding three or four others, made the rest—and amongst them Murat—prisoners. The vessel was put off to sea immediately with those who had not landed. Two other of these vessels have since been taken by the gunboats. Murat is at present in the Castle of Pizzo. I should rather say *was*, for I trust that by this time he is *fusillé!*

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

NAPLES,
October 23rd, 1815.

I enclose the Neapolitan papers which contain the *pièces justificatives* of the execution of Murat. I hear of no dissentient voice respecting the justness of his fate, except amongst some of our countrymen, his quondam friends. As an act of justice or of policy it is in my mind equally to be justified, and I am not afraid to own that I gave this opinion very plainly and unequivocally to the Neapolitan Government the moment I heard of the landing. My opinion, I have reason to believe, had some weight in the business. . . .

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

NAPLES,
November 9th, 1815.

His Neapolitan Majesty has determined to extend mercy to those individuals who accompanied Murat in his late ill-fated expedition. As they are for the most part subjects of His Most Christian Majesty, they will be given up to his disposal, and be detained in prison only till his pleasure be known. Your lordship will, I doubt not, approve this act of clemency. We already begin to feel the beneficial effects of the wholesome severity exercised towards the leader of this expedition. Many who were wavering in their opinions, and who kept aloof from a fear of those extraordinary changes which late years have rendered familiar to us, begin now to pronounce themselves more openly, and to take a more decided part than they have hitherto done.

The death of Murat, at the same time that it has destroyed their hopes, has diminished their fears, and this double consideration has contributed greatly to strengthen the loyalty of many of His Majesty's subjects.

A considerable degree of bad spirit, however, now exists amongst certain classes of the Neapolitans, the continual exercises of which must, I fear, in some measure be attributed to the great leniency and supineness of the existing Government. There is a point after which forbearance becomes weakness, and then it can only tend to encourage faction and disorder.

With a view to avoid the horrors which accompanied the last counter-revolution in this country, the allied

Sovereigns very wisely insisted upon a total amnesty for the past ; but it never could have been their intention that impunity should be secured to every individual engaging in conspiracies and treason for the future. One extreme is nearly as bad as the other, and equally argues an incapacity in those who govern. There are now in confinement here several individuals whose guilt will not admit of a doubt, and yet the Government still hesitates to bring them to trial. The Intendant of the Province of Basilicata and the commander of the National Guards are amongst the number from whom letters were intercepted about the period of Murat's invasion, exhorting the secret societies known by the name of Carbonari to cancel their engagements to Ferdinand, and to renew their oath of fidelity and allegiance to Murat.

The circumstances of the country require that such traitors should be brought to public trial, and, if found guilty, to public punishment ; but evident as this necessity is, the Government cannot determine upon the measure.

"Il est si beau," says M. de Medici, "to declare to Europe that Murat has no adherents here, and that it was necessary to spill no blood but his!" It might be so if the assertion were founded on facts, but when this is merely gratuitous the moral beauty of the proceeding is very sensibly diminished.

Another favourite argument of M. de Medici is, 'that, as they formally erred on the side of severity, it becomes them now to run rather into the opposite extreme, in order to convince the Powers of Europe of the sincerity of their repentance.' The fatality of this reasoning can need no comment from me. A deviation from justice on either side can only prove that they

have no fixed principle of conduct, and that they are merely governed by circumstances.

Indeed, my lord, the situation of this country is such as to require all the attention of a vigorous and strong administration. It is not that I think that there is any immediate danger to be apprehended from parties within the kingdom, for the disaffected, though active and turbulent, are few in number and in consequence; but in the present state of things it would require a very trifling assistance from without to throw this kingdom again into revolution and disorder. Any fresh disturbances in France would make a sensible impression here. An immense number of secret societies known by the name of Carbonari exist all over the kingdom, the secret object of the leaders of which is the establishment of Italian Independence and the principles of pure democracy.

The common people are taught to believe that they are united solely for the support of the Catholic religion; and the crown of thorns which they wear at their initiation, whilst it only indicates to their leaders the difficulties they are to experience in the prosecution of their object, is explained to the lower classes as a symbol of religious devotion. The great mass of the persons composing these societies is by no means hostile to the reigning Government, but all are sworn to obey the injunctions of their chiefs, and may at any time be made the instruments of revolution.

The present administration is little equal to meet the difficulties which are here presented.

I have already had occasion to call your lordship's attention to the maladministration of the War Department under the direction of Prince Leopold.

The removal, however, of H.R.H.'s private secretary, M. Ambrosio, whom M. Circello has promised me to send upon a mission to Portugal, will put an end to one of the principal sources of the evil.

The Department of Finance is ably administered by M. de Medici, but this Minister is also charged with the Portfolio of the Police, the duties of which, were he fitted for the situation, he would find it impossible to perform in addition to those of the Finance Department.

M. de Tommasi is *Ministre des Cultes* and *Ministre de l'Intérieur*, for either of which he is well adapted, but not for both.

This gentleman is of low birth and obscure connections, and was educated as a lawyer, and, though possessed of considerable abilities, is prevented by these circumstances from playing more than a secondary part.

These, with the addition of M. de Circello, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, form the whole of the Neapolitan Government.

The character of His Sicilian Majesty is not unknown to your lordship. He is open to conviction, and will readily listen to arguments clearly and firmly expressed; but it requires more character and energy than are possessed by the present administration to insure execution even to the measures of the policy of which no doubt is entertained. His Majesty must be forced to act, and the eighty years under which M. de Circello labours incapacitates him for such an office, as for the more difficult task of controlling the Cabinet and preserving order and amity in the Councils.

Such, however, is the dearth of talent and integrity in the country that I should be at a loss to point out

the man who might more properly be placed at the head of affairs with a view to form a more efficient Government.

M. de Medici, with all his talent, is too doubtful in his political creed, and too visionary in his projects, to be safely entrusted with the master-place. M. de Ruffo, with the sole drawback of his indolence, is the person perhaps best calculated for the situation, but his admission into the Cabinet has met with a thousand difficulties, and the jealousy of M. de Circello, has again effected his removal from the circle of His Majesty's observation. He is to return to his post near the person of the Emperor in the course of the present week.

One of the most essential objects at the present moment is to increase the Council and to give to every department its efficient Minister. To obtain this point has been the principal object both of the Austrian Minister and myself. To this we have been led solely by a consideration of the real interests of His Sicilian Majesty, being perfectly confident that everything we may do which can contribute to consolidate his power and strengthen the hands of his Government will meet with the approbation of our respective Courts. I am not without hope that our endeavours may be crowned with success.

The interest always taken in the welfare of one of its oldest allies by the British Government makes me enter more fully into these details than I should have done under other circumstances. I am aware that the affairs of this country are now but of secondary importance. Connected, however, as they are with the general tranquillity of Italy, they cannot but merit some attention, and I shall not, therefore, consider

myself as unduly trespassing on your lordship's time in forwarding every detail which may enable you to form the most accurate idea of the difficulties which are to be overcome before this country can look forward to security from without, and to prosperity and tranquillity within.

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND BOURBON RESTORATION

WITH the death of Murat and the defeat of Napoleon, peace now seemed assured. The chief task remaining to the allies was to keep in check the political passions in France. A Royalist reaction had set in, and while the King (Louis XVIII.) and his Ministers advocated a policy of moderation, the majority of the Lower Chamber clamoured for vengeance against all who had served Bonaparte. The Duc de Richelieu was at this time the most prominent figure in France. He had left the country on the outbreak of the Revolution, and taken service in Russia, where he earned a reputation for wise statesmanship and gained great influence over the Tsar. With these qualifications, added to the important fact that he had never been in arms against France, he was recognized, on the fall of Talleyrand, as the one man likely to be acceptable to all parties. He consented to form a Government, and set to work to establish a policy of moderate royalism, his desire being "to royalize France and nationalize the monarchy," and so induce the Powers to withdraw the crushing burden of their armies from French soil. The difficulties of his task were much increased by excesses of speech and action on the part of the ultra-Royalists. Great as was the influence of the Duc, the Government was powerless to prevent the extreme measures taken against some of the more prominent Bonapartists. The vindictive spirit which insisted on the execution of Ney and Labédoyère merely served to fan the embers of revolutionary feeling against all royalism, and it was not until more moderate principles gained the day at the elections in November, 1816, that the Powers felt justified in withdrawing the greater part of their army of occupation.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Burghersh, giving an account of the state of things in Paris just after the resignation of Talleyrand's Government.

PARIS,
September 26th, 1815.

I have been here ten days . . . things are by no means *couleur de rose*. The removal of the Ministry have not mended them. Our present difficulty is to settle the treaty with France, on part of which the Court is reluctant in the extreme, and the embarrassment is not removed.

The new Ministry is not completed. The Duc de Richelieu has never seen one of his colleagues, so no measure can be taken for some days, and no one can be assured what line will be taken. The ultra-Royalists are in spirits and talk high, and count upon the Legislative Body, but they may be deceived. In the meantime the general cry of Paris is against the Bourbons, and what alarms me is no appearance that the Royal Family or the capital can be safe a day without the protection of foreign troops.

No real news can be sent you until the Chambers have met, and their sentiments are expressed as to the demands of the allies and the general conduct to be pursued; things change so from day to day that all is mere conjecture. I do not like to prognosticate ill, but I do not know how to think very favourably. If the Court would take a comprehensive line and embrace all parties, and act fairly, firmly, but constitutionally, things might go on. I do not believe they have force to play the high Royalist game.

Read Fouché's second report. The facts are in general tone; his dismissal increases the spirit of the

anti-Bourbons. I believe Talleyrand has been the dupe of his own cunning, but his resignation will render him popular, though I think he did not intend it.

Count Pozzo di Borgo to Lord Burghersh.
[Translation.]

PARIS,
September 25th, 1815.

MY DEAR LORD,

We have discussed politics to satiety for six months. You already know the result of the combined wisdom. The French are stunned by the blow, and more astounding in their conduct than ever. There are not lacking amongst them heads which survey well the whole situation, and would like to employ themselves in improving it; but there are others which no human wisdom can understand or direct, because they act directly against their own ends.

The Duke *par excellence* remains here in the name of Europe, and observes, "We are here to act together" (de concert); he will have great glory in preserving the peace of the world. You know, or rather you do not know, my great admiration and attachment for him, and each time I see him I say to myself: "*Remember the eighteenth of June!*" What activity! what serenity of heart and mind! what a comprehensive glance! and, though it were the last of his gifts, what proud bravery!

You will not, I suppose, allow to escape the chance of profiting by the Court of Milan, but agree that your Florence is the nicest of all towns of those in the valleys of the Arno.

I hope to retire while there still remains to me

enough strength to follow a partridge, and enough heart and mind to recall the past.

Adieu, my dear lord.

I am your good friend,

POZZO DI BORGO.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Burghersh.

PARIS,
November 3rd, 1815.

We hope to sign and seal everything* on Thursday or Friday, and to go off on Saturday.

You know all the outlines of the treaty with France, which we all agreed to; and the Powers renew their Chaumont engagements, guarantee all the treaties, and pledge themselves from time to time to look over their engagements, and do everything to preserve the peace of Europe and the order of things existing in France.

The Ministry are triumphant in the Chambers, and the Court are in better spirits, but still immense difficulties occur as to forming the King's Guard and a new army.

The jealousy and hatred between the *émigrés*, the old noblesse, and the parvenus, is the great obstacle to a settlement, and the folly of the former, who have no chances of a restoration, increases rather than diminishes.

I believe Lord Wellington and his troops will winter here. There is no security without them. I think the reception of the treaties by the Chambers of the nation to be the *Pierre de Touche*.

* The quadruple alliance between Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England.

Ney's trial commences to-morrow before the special court; they say he will plead against the jurisdiction as incompetent.

Our intercourse with the French is very little. It is impossible in our respective circumstances.

Clancarty goes to Frankfort to settle the German points between Austria and Bavaria. Sir C. Stuart* is going to marry one of the Ladies Yorke.

Poor Blücher went the other day to some horse-races, in which some of our officers rode. His horse started at the ropes, threw him, and dislocated his shoulder, but he is doing very well.

I have no news from England of any consequence. They say what we are doing here gives satisfaction, and deservedly. They say the Government means to follow up the strong measures of the Chambers, so we are to wait the effects of a coercive system. In the meantime one must always reflect there is no army.

I am pretty well, but not a match for the office.

Dawkins is coming to you instead of Ward; he is a very clever, agreeable man. Ward goes to Lisbon.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

November 19th, 1815.

I have figured in an official despatch to you in order to open something like communication between us, as it is possible it may be useful to H.R.H.'s affairs

* Sir Charles Stuart was a grandson of the third Earl of Bute, and married in 1816 Lady Elizabeth Yorke. They were the parents of Lady Canning and Louisa, Lady Waterford. Sir Charles was created Lord Stuart de Rothesay in 1828, and was at one time English Ambassador in Paris. He is not to be confused with Sir Charles Stewart, afterwards Lord Londonderry.

in Italy; and it may thus be worth while the public should be at the expense of an occasional messenger, even in these times of reform and economy.

I have a letter from Castlereagh in high terms and spirits at the conclusion of his labours.

The Bourbons are behaving very foolishly, attempting to lower the Duke. I hear the Duc de Berri* said Wellington could never be a great man, because *il est un parvenu*. The Duke of Wellington told this story himself at a large dinner at Castlereagh's, so it must be true.

The Duchesse d'Angoulême told old Blücher, when he went to her, that she was very glad to see him, and respected him, as, "au moins, vous êtes conséquent." In short, it appears there is no end to the folly of these people.

I would send you all the *officials*, but I have scarce myself waded through them, as I had *six weeks'* letters yesterday, and I have nobody to copy volumes which there are like the Congress papers. I think if Aubin takes a trip to Milan with half a dozen secretaries he will get through them! What are your plans? Shall you come to Milan to make your bow to the Emperor?

Pray don't delay my messenger, as he goes to Milan on the important concern of getting me a house.

If I come to Florence with the Emperor, you must look out for a good billet for me. I don't mean *en militaire*, for we Ministers pay high now.

* Second son of the Comte d'Artois, and nephew to Louis XVIII. His elder brother having no children, he was the only hope of excluding the Orleans branch from the French throne. He was murdered on February 13th, 1820.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VENICE,
December 5th, 1815.

MY LORD,

A messenger arrived here from Paris yesterday, which he left on the 23rd ultimo. Lord Castlereagh signed the treaty on the 20th of November at night, both with the French Government and with the allies, and settled everything to his entire satisfaction.

As the messenger has despatches for Naples, I forward him by Florence, and avail myself of this opportunity to enclose your lordship the papers enumerated in my last despatch, for your perusal and information. Having no copies, I must entreat your lordship to send them, with the least possible delay, to Milan by messenger, for which place I set out in a day or two, purposing, however, to go by Mantua and Genoa. There are, besides these papers, some notes to the French Government to place our relations as to internal measures on safe and good ground, but as yet I cannot forward them to your lordship.

I understand there is no doubt as to the issue of Ney's trial, and Lavalette* has been convicted before a jury. These examples will do a great deal to sustain the authority of the Government.

The Duc de Richelieu expects to be able to dispense with the presence of foreign troops at Paris by the end of the month.

I must beg your lordship to communicate anything you conceive important, and that he may be ignorant of, to His Majesty's Minister at Naples.

* Lavalette escaped by the heroism of his wife.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and esteem,
my lord, your lordship's obedient and humble servant,
STEWART.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

FLORENCE,
December 14th, 1815.

. . . However much the late events in Europe have dispirited the agitators of Jacobins in Italy, they have not succeeded in removing from them the hopes of some future return to confusion and disorder. To keep alive these expectations, reports of disagreements between the allied Powers, of menaced usurpations, are constantly circulated. The belief that England will let Bonaparte escape, with the view of again creating hostilities, by which her commerce and maritime dominion are supported, is also continually kept alive.

Of late, however, the fortifications raising at Genoa by the labour of British soldiers, proving (as it is stated) the determination of England to maintain herself in possession of it, for the purpose of becoming an Italian Power, has been announced as the forerunner of hostilities.

These accounts have been circulated with astonishing perseverance and with great success. The works were stated to be carried on by torchlight, and other falsehoods as absurd were added to increase the disquietude very generally created.

There having appeared in the *Moniteur* an article giving currency to the idea of some menaced usurpation on the part of England, I took the opportunity of insisting on an answer to it in the *Gazette* of this place.

The treaty between the Papal Government and that of Tuscany has been terminated. It has not as yet been officially communicated to me. As soon as I receive it, it shall be transmitted to your lordship.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

MILAN,
December 29th, 1815.

I have a letter from Castlereagh of the 4th; everything political quite smooth at home.

France has agreed to the Ionian arrangement. Maitland, now at Malta, is to be the Lord Commissioner. The King of the Netherlands and the King of Sardinia, having both accepted the arrangements of Paris, the Bavarian point alone remains for Clancarty to settle at Frankfort. This will still cause trouble.

Bonaparte arrived at St. Helena on the 22nd of October. He was out of sorts at leaving, not liking the aspect of the island.

I have no more in my budget.

Austria is pushing Sardinia on the Simplon; but it will not do, and this fine work will be lost.

Is there good wine to be had at Florence? How would it do for me to have apartments in the inn? You know I have all my establishment of cook, etc., with me, as if on campaign in a small way.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
May 8th, 1816.

MY DEAR BURGHESH,

You will see by my official transmission the cause of my sending Adamberger. It is inconvenient

to me, but as I think the progress of negotiations at Naples may be arrested, if the late despatches do not quickly arrive, I have not hesitated even in these economical times. I hear all our salaries are about to be reduced, and God knows whether we shall have the wherewithal to keep a *decent* appearance.

The Foreign Office write in horrible spirits—losing their candle-ends and cheese-parings, Castlereagh says. The nation last year would have given millions to save the Continent; at this moment the Continent and those who saved it sink into insignificance compared with an imaginary saving by the reduction of some trifling office of £1,000 a year.

I have written to Lady B. all my jabber, so have no more for you, but to assure you how much I am,

Your most affectionate friend,

S.

If you will part with a brace of your pointers at any sum, and send them by Adamberger, you will very much oblige me.

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

NAPLES,
July 18th, 1816.

The new Austrian Minister, Prince Jablonowski, has done more towards conciliation in a few days than his predecessors (with, I believe, equally good intentions) did during the whole of their stay here. The appointment of Governor of the town has been abolished, and the army of General Mohr now takes its orders directly from His Sicilian Majesty. A part of the equipment is to be deducted from the 25 millions,

and an amicable arrangement has taken place with respect to the donations, which was a very ticklish point to settle.

Jablonowski has taken up the thing in precisely the right way, and will in the end give as much satisfaction to this Court as he will, no doubt, give to his own.

All is going on smoothly, and the number of Muratists daily diminishes. I do not quite approve of their being taken completely into favour, or that Ambrosia and Filangini should so soon have been appointed members of the Board, which conducts all military affairs. I am, however, positively assured that the business could not have been carried on without them. The downfall of Napoleon may possibly make them very good subjects. Gaeta still holds out. The bombardment began yesterday, and is to last for three days, before the expiration of which period we presume M. Bégani will grow tired and give in. He has asked for permission to send an officer to the headquarters to ascertain if the capture of Paris be true. This has, of course, been refused.

We hear that you are in possession of a copy of Lord Wellington's official despatch, and of a list of the killed and wounded. If this be true, pray send us a copy of them here.

Our orders have all been distributed, but I have heard nothing as yet of our diamond stars. The Russian Minister, who is a keen inquirer into these matters, assures me that they are to be of the value of 30,000 francs each. This will be some consolation in the event of our being refused the permission to wear them.

Almost all our English are gone. The Duchess of Bedford sailed for Genoa in the *Montague*. Lord

Ebrington and Lord W. Russell are gone by land. Your mamma-in-law has taken her departure for Rome with the banker Torlonia. In short, we have none left but the two Chamberlains and Sir Thomas Maitland. The latter leaves us in a day or two for Leghorn.

You have been very slack in your correspondence since your departure, though you have had a world of news to communicate. Pray have mercy upon me, and send us the earliest intelligence of Napoleon's departure for another world.

I enclose a letter from Admiral Penrose and a packet for Rose, which I shall be obliged to you to forward.

CHAPTER XI

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

THE final evacuation of France and the terms of her reception into the European alliance were to form the subject of discussion at the Congress to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle in September, 1818.

It was felt that the result of this Congress would greatly depend on the attitude to be adopted by the Tsar Alexander. His strong Liberal tendencies were viewed with suspicion by Austria and England, and the diplomacy of Metternich and Castlereagh was employed to induce him to agree to the policy of reaction they believed necessary to stamp out any lingering revolutionary sentiments. A declaration to this end was signed in November. An attempt on Metternich's part to establish Austrian supremacy throughout the German States did not meet with entire sympathy from either Russia or England. Discussions on this point culminated in the Vienna Final Act of May 15th, 1820. This Act re-established the doctrine advocated by the Tsar and Lord Castlereagh, of non-intervention in the internal affairs of independent kingdoms.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

PARMA,
June 12th, 1818.

MY DEAR LORD CASTLEREAGH,

I have been overwhelmed with kindness at this place. The Archduchess* has done everything in her power to mark respect and consideration for me and

* Marie Louise, wife of Napoleon.

the character I bear. She is extremely well, and is going to Vienna for three months. I shall go on in a few days to present my credentials at Modena, where I understand a marriage is on the *tapis* between one of the King of Sardinia's daughters and the King of Etruria. The families are at present united there.

I was sorry to find in my passage through the Tyrol* that there existed a spirit of discontent towards the Austrian Government. The two principal causes appear to be a taxation to which that people had never been subjected, and a stagnation of commerce consequent on the restrictive edicts on the importation of foreign goods into the Austrian States, which have entirely destroyed the transit and carrying trades upon which the Tyrolese mainly depend.

The Archduke, Rainier, is stated to have done much good since his arrival in Italy; his conduct has been most conciliatory, and many advantages are expected from his government. He is at present at Venice. He is reported to be likely to marry the Grand-Duke of Tuscany's daughter, but I have not yet ascertained the truth of this supposition.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
September 15th, 1818.

I was delighted to see your handwriting, although I was on the point of writing to you and yours by Jablonowski. As he will give you the little news this place affords in the absence of Metternich, it is only necessary for me to inform you that, after im-

* Lord Burghersh had been on leave to England, returning through Germany and the Tyrol.

measurable storms and hard weather, I have got my battered vessel near into port ; however, as there may be shoals and quicksands even at the harbour, I don't like to tell you to wish me joy until all danger is passed. Those certain peers are so consequential, for the sake of being so, that I should not be surprised if I still had a breeze to encounter that may be disagreeable. However, if Frances* and I love, they cannot separate us long, so let them do their worst. Your friend Philipps has behaved to me throughout most friendly and loyally, and I hope, if you ever write to him, you will express how much I have made his *éloge* to you, as that will give him pleasure.

I trust, my dear friend, we may meet next summer in Italy, as I think a little person will be most happy to have a trip there, and I shall be most delighted to gratify her.

I don't think Aix will last long unless something unforeseen occurs, and I should think the main Act will be confined to the pure and simple evacuation and two treaties, one between the allies and one between them and France. This, with the treaty of evacuation, as far as I learn, will be the principal measures. How France will be managed is the question. But her true position is not to be part of an integral party of the alliance, but to be the ally of that alliance.

Metternich was very kind, as also the Emperor, in wishing me to go to Aix, and I have written for orders ; but my belief, and indeed almost my wish, is to remain quietly here.

God bless you, my dear B. ; I have time for no more, as Jablonowski waits.

* Lord Stewart married in April, 1819, *en seconde nocces*, Frances Anne, only daughter and heiress of Sir Thomas Vane Tempest, of Wynyard Park.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
December 30th, 1818.

I have been lazy in not writing to you for this age; but the fact is, you have not been much more diligent towards me. An entertaining letter from McKenzie received yesterday obliges me to scribble to him, and I cannot send you an enclosure without adding a few lines.

With regard to politics, the Emperor of Russia's visit has passed off harmoniously, but there is nothing very extraordinary. I don't think the territorial questions at Frankfort of Baden and Bavaria have been much approximated. Some other public questions—slave-trade, Barbary powers, mediation between Spain and her colonies—remain much as they were at the close of Congress. The news from France is not what it ought to be, but the Ambassador here thinks the Ministry will still keep together.

The distresses in the money market have occasioned another opinion with respect to a more protracted period for the payments. I think the Emperor of Russia improved in every way since 1814. He inspires more confidence, seems more quiet, and, unless he is the falsest of men or hypocrisy personified, it is impossible to hear him converse on every interesting political subject without adding faith to what he utters.

His diplomatic agents may intrigue *par principe* to keep up the Northern influence in the Southern kingdoms, and to make this great Emperor the referee. But we are all deceived if the Emperor Alexander has any real mischievous intentions, or if he severs from

that alliance which has accomplished, and will secure, the peace of Europe during our times.

You will lose Apponyi soon, as he replaces Jablonski at Naples. He goes, as you know, Ambassador to Spain to recruit his finances. On this account I thought it as well not to express your discontent about the former when he was here. He dined with me once, but I took little notice of him.

There are several great places here vacant, military and civil, on account of recent deaths; but I have not yet heard who is to have the artillery in the room of Colorado, which is the most important towards a radical reform in it. Schwarzenberg is tolerable. He is now sitting to Lawrence,* whom I have here going on with his mission. He will proceed from here to Rome, to paint the Pope and Cardinal Gonsalvi. I know not that he has any noted diplomatic or military character to take at Florence, but I have no doubt you can select for him some rare work of Nature which would hang well even among his dandies. They consist in Emperors Alexander and Francis, King of Prussia, Metternich, Nesselrode, Czernicheff, Capo d'Istria, Hardenberg, Duc de Richelieu, Suwaroff, Blücher, Platoff, Schwarzenberg, and the Pope and Gonsalvi fill up the collection.

Lawrence will not finish here much before February, when he will be with you. He is a delightful companion—a great resource to me now.

I go to England in a few days, from whence you will hear of me; if you do not hear of me, don't forget me, nor allow your wife to do so: for although I have

* Sir Thomas Lawrence, commissioned by George IV. to paint the crowned heads and chief statesmen of Europe. The portraits are now in the Waterloo Gallery at Windsor.

many faults, want of affection for those I value, and who *deserve nobly* to be esteemed, is not in my character. God bless you!

Sir Thomas Lawrence to Lord Burghersh.

PALAZZA QUIRINALE,
September 12th, 1819.

Accept my best thanks for your very kind letter. I need not say what pleasure it gives me to have the prospect of seeing the many objects of high interest which Florence presents to an artist, under your auspices. Yet I know not how to encroach so far on your convenience as to accept your obliging offer of giving me residence in your house, for I am come with domestics and large packages, which would place Lady Burghersh under the necessity of affording a lodging to an Archduchess, an Emperor, a Cardinal, and a Pope, besides the first Minister of Austria, Lord Stewart, Blücher, etc. Lady Worcester would (be) amongst them, and would a little alleviate the situation. I certainly shall not be ten minutes in Florence without acquainting your lordship of my arrival. Your lordship has been at Rome, and knows how difficult it is to leave it. I believe, too, you know, too, how difficult it is to leave a picture whilst anything remains wanting to it, which you know a little additional trouble will secure.

You congratulate me in very gratifying expressions on my professional success; I fear a great part of it is owing to the general courtesy and liberality that I have experienced on the Continent, particularly by its artists, the influence created for me by patriotism or impartiality of my countrymen, and the respect paid

to the known purpose and mission of His Royal Highness. I am but one of many whom his judgment might have selected on this occasion, and whose talents and attainments should be better represented.

Your lordship has mentioned a part of the Florence collection that strongly excites my curiosity. I mean the portraits of artists and of men in other ways distinguished by their skill and knowledge. Whether vanity may tempt me at some future moment to add another portrait to the former series, I know not. It will be the only one existing of me, for I have found myself hitherto too bad a subject and too impatient a sitter. But I must better deserve a station in the file before I endeavour to secure it.

Is it in your lordship's power to procure and send a *laszio passaro* for me to present on my arrival at the frontiers of the Grand-Duke?

I come with packages only of the result of my labours on the Continent, and articles of necessity in my profession; but it would be unpleasant to me, and possibly injurious to the pictures, to have them opened and repacked, and if, without much trouble to your lordship, I can be secured against it, I shall be glad to owe this additional obligation and service to you.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

VIENNA,
May 25th, 1820.

The Emperor has left this for the marriage at Prague, and Metternich went last night to join him, after having forwarded, with great credit to himself and with general unanimity, the great work of the federative treaty.*

* The Vienna Final Act, May 15th, 1820.

It will certainly add another bulwark to European security, and I cannot help thinking, however Radicalism may work at home or Liberalism blaze out in France, Revolution rise up in Spain or Anarchy show her head amongst the infatuated of Germany and Italy, that the perfect union existing between the great monarchs, added to this mass of strength in the centre of Europe, will insure *us* as long as *we* live from all *new war*, or from such scenes as we have witnessed in times that are passed. Those times, my dear fellow, were most interesting, replete with big events, which we little thought of as they rolled on day after day. But when quietly one looks back, one can hardly believe that we have seen and lived as we have done.

From England you hear as I do; nothing of great secrecy is ever detailed at so great a distance. I am not, however, overpleased at what I get at ex-officially. The reports of the changes of administration have subsided, but the dissatisfaction in a higher quarter will subsist, I should think, in a higher degree from the mortification of not having succeeded, of having the odium of abortive wishes without the fruit. In short, however smooth the atmosphere, the clouds may lower at a short warning. I am very sorry, I own, for a *certain* change, because when an arrangement is understood by the *fashionable world*, and has worked long without glaring offence, it becomes a harmless and quiet understanding. But when this is laid aside, and the new-born vanity of another deeply intriguing spirit embraces every occasion to develop itself, when maturity of years no longer affords excuse for downright public exhibitions of amorous dalliance, and when lately the state of the private affairs of one of the parties should render a



JOHN FANE, LORD BURGHESH. K.C.B.

After Sir T. Lawrence.

new history *most dangerous just now*—when all this occurs, I say, how can sincere and devoted friends not deeply repine?

I fear the new favourite is in her heart attached to her brother's politics.

I will write again soon, my dear friend. Believe me,
Ever yours most sincerely and affectionately,

VANE TEMPEST.*

* Lord Stewart assumed the name of Vane on his second marriage.

CHAPTER XII

REVOLUTION IN NAPLES

THE discontent and misery inseparable from the period of transition which must follow years of war in any country had given rise to the formation of many secret societies. In Naples especially the Carbonari found a favourable recruiting-ground. Disloyalty was rife in the army amongst those who, having served Murat, were now displaced by the Royalist followers of Ferdinand. Much resentment was also felt at the restoration of their estates to the clergy.

Ferdinand had been restored to his throne under the protection of Austria, with the understanding that no advance in a constitutional direction should take place without that country's approval. In July, 1820, a revolution broke out; the King under protest, and frightened by the demands of the leaders, took the oath to a more liberal Constitution, and then turned to Austria for advice.

The Congress of Troppau met in October to consider the question of the Neapolitan outbreak, and whether the Powers could intervene, having regard to the terms of the Vienna Final Act. Metternich maintained that Austria's security was so largely bound up with Naples that intervention was justified. Lord Castlereagh disagreed, holding that the troubles in Italy were of a domestic rather than an international character, but admitting that England could not object to any action Austria might consider it necessary to take on her own responsibility for her own security. The Troppau Protocol* was issued; Castlereagh again dis-

* The Troppau Protocol declared: "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other States *ipso facto*, cease to be members of the European alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives

senting, no definite conclusion was come to, and the Congress agreed to meet again at Leybach early in the following year, Ferdinand being also present. In the interval efforts were made for a peaceful settlement at Naples. These proved unavailing, and Ferdinand set out for Leybach, having once more sworn to the Constitution. But he was scarcely out of his kingdom before he repudiated his repeated promises, and so played into the hands of Austrian policy. If he had come to the Congress still pledged to a moderate Constitution, England and France would probably have upheld his promise; now negotiation was impossible, and the task of restoring him to the throne as an absolute monarch was to be undertaken by Austria. Troops at once occupied Naples, and the subjection of that State and of Piedmont, where revolution had also shown itself, took but a few weeks.

Then followed the iron rule of the Austrian hand under a shadowy glove of self-government that led to a system of repression and official espionage. It was hatred of these methods that first gave rise to a common feeling amongst the people of Italy, which, after passing through the various stages of new-born patriotism, with all the attendant difficulties and dangers, resulted in Italian unity.

Lord Burghersh held strongly anti-Austrian views concerning the revolution, and complaints of his attitude were made from Vienna. The kindly tone of the reproof which Lord Castlereagh wrote to him privately, and Lord Burghersh's reply, bear evidence to the friendly relations between them, and the harmony with which they worked officially.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

MY DEAR BURGHESH,

VIENNA,
September 18th, 1820.

I profit of Jablonowski's departure to send you a few lines, although on public points I have little to

guarantees for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the great alliance."

say. Jablonowski will put you so much in possession of all the language here that it would be quite useless for me to write anything.

I sent you, in cipher, the Austrian propositions. I have not heard from home since, nor is there anything new from Warsaw.

The refusal of the Emperor of Russia to receive C . . . ,* and his *renvoi* from hence, are two good points. Our friends the Austrians take things up in a high tone. Metternich is so determined that I think they will succeed in restoring the King of Naples to an unfettered exercise of his rights. It will be very difficult, when the present Junta and Carbonari are put an end to, to know what to do to satisfy the nation, and to prevent Naples being a burden to the other important objects Austria has to attend to. But I have full confidence in Metternich's wisdom, as I have seen him of late at the Congress here manage the contending interests of Germany with so much dexterity.

The difficulties in our business at home, I hear, are immense. They do not expect the defence† in the Lords until December. It will be January before they get into the Commons. The examinations at the Bar will then be interminable, new points of law and difficult constitutional questions arising at every step. However, if our Government go straight forwards, patience and perseverance and vigour will carry them through it. There never was such a "devil incarnate" as the lady!

I have been obliged to give up Pest, as we look for conferences here. The Duke of Cambridge, who has been here ten days, is gone there, and the camp will

* Name illegible. "C——tile" is all that can be deciphered.

† This refers to the trial of Queen Caroline.

be interesting. I conclude we are now anchored for the winter in town. Our house is undergoing great alterations, and we are very miserable in it. Lady S. is pretty well, and desires to be remembered to Lady B. Give my affectionate remembrances to her also, and I am delighted to hear you are forming a battalion so rapidly in these revolutionary times. God bless you!

Believe me ever,

Yours most affectionately,

VANE STEWART.

Sir W. A'Court to Lord Burghersh.

NAPLES,
October 9th, 1820.

Since I last wrote to you, I have had despatches of the highest importance from Lord Castlereagh. They are much too long and contain too many enclosures to be sent to you in cipher, and, on the other hand, are of too delicate a nature to be sent without being ciphered. I must therefore limit myself to telling you generally that my views have all been adopted. In the event of a move of the Austrians hitherwards, I am to make a declaration of strict neutrality so long as the Royal Family shall be respected, and no attempt made to carry them into the interior as hostages. Should the demagogues either insult them or attempt to carry them off, I am to declare our neutrality at an end and threaten to lay Naples in ashes. A strong squadron will be sent to support me here, of which two are already arrived. You will see the necessity of keeping all this extremely secret, as a knowledge of my instructions would defeat the main purpose for which they were given—namely,

the security of the Royal Family. I think we shall play the *beau école* in this miserable business.

There has been a good deal of bloodshed in Sicily, but a telegraphic despatch has at length announced that Palermo capitulated on the 6th. The Parliament is beginning to show the republican spirit by which it is animated, in rejecting every nobleman as yet proposed for the Council of State. They style their President "Citizen President," and when they send for their Generals to question them, the appellation used is always "Citizen General." This does not please the military recruits, and conscripts are daily arriving and daily departing, for the deserters are nearly equal to the levies. No other news.

Carascosa gave in his resignation yesterday, but has been forced to resume his portfolio again by the earnest entreaties of the Vicar-General. This cannot last. If he resign, the whole machine must crumble.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Burghersh.

The following letter was consequent upon some complaints made by Lord Burghersh's Austrian colleague, that he was inclined to favour the Neapolitan attempt at obtaining a Constitution, and disinclined to the march of the Austrian army to put it down.*

CRAIG FARM,
October 21st, 1820.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

In addition to my official despatch, I think it right to apprise you that Metternich has had reports

* There was some truth in this supposition, but its extent was exaggerated, and the Neapolitans afterwards ran away in so disgraceful a manner that all sympathy for their revolutionary leader was done away.—*Note by Lord Burghersh.*

from his Italian correspondent that you have held a language very adverse to the views which the Austrians are supposed to take of the events of Naples. The representation I have received on this subject has been by no means an awkward one to you, but claiming at the same time that I should awaken you to the prejudice they must suffer at such a moment from a tone on the part of a British Minister hostile to their interests and policy. I am sure it is only necessary to mention this to insure your avoiding any expression of sentiment which could give umbrage. What has been reported, I have no doubt, has been exaggerated, but it is extremely desirable at such a moment to avoid giving the smallest cause for complaint; and as I see from the tone of your letter that the view you take of their position in Italy is not favourable, I consider it all the more necessary, after the intimation I have received from Vienna, to beg you to be on your guard.

Pray remember me most kindly Lady Burghersh, and believe me,

Ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Castlereagh.

November, 1820.

I must thank you very sincerely for the kindness of your letter, and, although I conscientiously believe that nothing but the exaggeration you mention could have called for the representation from Prince Metternich, I neither will take the offence at the line he has pursued, nor against the persons who may have induced him to do so. In justice, however, to myself, I must enter with you into some explanation of my conduct,

and a little into the system adopted by some of the Austrian agents in this country.

Count Apponyi arrived in August last at the Baths of Lucca, breathing war and destruction against Naples, and calling upon me to agree with him in wishing rather to see bloodshed and massacre deluging that country, than that a system of good government should grow out of the revolution which had taken place.

To this extent, I confessed, I could not go along with him, stating that, with every sentiment of regret for the change which had been effected, and for the means by which it had been brought about, yet I could not view without apprehension the spirit in which he argued with regard to it, as well as the menace of immediate invasion in which, at that time, he was indulging. These opinions, stated in conversation which might be construed into anything but a Ministerial *abouchement*, seem to have been sufficient for his representations to Vienna; the substance of them he detailed to Count Nugent, who repeated them to me, and who was desirous of carrying back to him the explanation I had given.

I requested, however, that this should not be done, as I was indifferent as to the rectification of opinions Count Apponyi had no business to understand. Since that period I am not aware of any part of my conduct which can have given rise to similar misrepresentation, further than that I have not always given credit to the very exaggerated statements as to Neapolitan affairs which have constantly been made by the Austrian authorities, nor have I concealed my hopes that the hostilities with which the South of Italy was menaced might be averted by some more amicable interference.

With Count Figuelmont I have often conversed as to the system of the Austrian government in Italy, the true and perhaps only cause for the apprehension they entertain from the change of government in Naples, and generally, indeed almost universally, he has appeared to entertain the same opinions as myself, stating to me the many proposals he had himself made for a change of those measures which he felt to be fraught with the gravest dangers: my observations were, however, always grounded on the anxiety that every well-wisher to the repose of the world and the prosperity of Austria must entertain: that the fine provinces that country possesses in Italy should become an efficient part of her strength and power, instead of remaining, as they now do, a source of inquietude during peace, and a certain drawback to her resources if she should be engaged in war. I have, with the same person and with others, set right a false and malicious representation which some of the Austrian authorities were at the pains of transmitting to Vienna against the conduct of the British Consul at Leghorn, whom they stated to be a member of a secret political society, some of the meetings of which were represented as having been held at his house. I have also repelled some accusations of Radicalism, which some of these gentlemen have not hesitated to make against all English generally, not excluding the British Government itself.

I need not enter with you into proofs that I am neither a Radical, nor that I have so far forgotten the principles which I have been brought up in, not to view with disgust the spirit of subversion and Jacobinism which is abroad; but I must at the same time declare that the system pursued by the Austrians

in Italy, the ungenerous treatment of the Italians subjected to their government, will, as long as it is persisted in, accumulate the dangers which surround them, while all their decrees against secret societies, etc., will not add one jot to their security.

Minute by Lord Burghersh of a conversation with the Duchess of Florida, December 30th, 1820.

FLORENCE,
December 30th, 1820.

The Duchess of Florida stated how entirely Naples was changed. The revolution was brought about by the over-confidence of Medici, who has always believed that the Neapolitans talked much, but would never act.

Nugent had, also, constantly promoted the persons who had been with Murat, rather than the Sicilians and officers who had been with the King in Sicily.

She had suffered much in the first days of the revolution. Her sons, as Sicilians, had not sworn to the Constitution, and this brought a great deal of suspicion upon her. Latterly the state of things had been better.

The object of the leading persons in the revolution was certainly a republic. The King before he left Naples had made up his mind to grant his people a Constitution. She regretted he had not some wise and trusty counsellor about him; he never would communicate with Gallo; she feared Ruffo would join him from Vienna, for, notwithstanding the good conduct of this person, he was now so violent against what had passed that he would hurry on a war, which she feared was too decidedly the object of the Congress.

She could only hope to see the remaining years of the King secured to him in peace and happiness, and she dreaded hostilities ; there was no answering for their termination.

Comte Blacas, who accompanied the King, was a worthy and excellent man, but he, too, seemed inclined for war. Medici was living in security, but very much retired, at Naples. It was not true he had written the King's speech at the opening of Parliament ; the heads were directed by the King, and it was written by Zurlo.

The King had been encouraged to make the promises to his people at his departure by the Foreign Ministers, with a view of getting him safe from his capital.

She was in great distress at separating from the King, and feared for his health at his advanced period of life ; it was, however, better. During the Congress she should be absent, as otherwise whatever was done against Naples would be attributed to her. She hoped, when the meeting of the Sovereigns was over, the King would return to this place ; she thought it much more suitable than that he should go to Vienna, the capital from whence the war against his country would be directed. The King was wavering in his decisions upon this subject when he left her. Although she could not wish for war, yet she did not know how things would be settled without it. A Constitution such as that of England or the one formerly in Sicily might be agreed to if offered. The Hereditary Prince was a worthy, excellent person, firmly attached to the King, but he liked the Constitution ; he was in hopes it might be conciliated with the interests of his father, himself, and his family.

Lord Burghersh to Lord Stewart.

FLORENCE,
January 16th, 1821.

A'Court writes me after having received my despatches containing the conversations of the King and Gallo, and says in his private letter the King is playing a double, and therefore an unbecoming, part; and I do not think the allies are inclined to separate him from his people, as he is inclined to separate himself, notwithstanding the oaths he has taken.

In his despatch to Lord Castlereagh, a copy of which he sends me, he declines going to Leybach on the following grounds: He ought not to leave Naples while the fleet is there; for though at present the state of Naples offers nothing alarming for the safety of the Royal Family, yet no human foresight can determine what may be the consequences of the issue of the negotiations at Leybach. If he was present at the Congress, the public would not believe that the British Minister was not taking upon himself his share of the responsibility in what was decided, whereas by his instructions he would have no power of acting. He, besides, could have no weight there, and would be in a false position.

By my despatches, the language of the King at Florence seemed to be most imprudent.

His Majesty's oaths and promises are fresh in the memory of everybody; and if the sad necessity of violating them should exist, such intention should have been kept up for the high-minded Sovereigns he was going to meet. As it now was, the news of what had passed at Florence would soon reach Naples, and its effect cannot be doubtful.

His Majesty said the foreign Ministers advised him to save himself; that his acts were not valid. Neither Count Stackelberg* nor himself ever gave any other answer on such a point, but that "Your Majesty must judge what is proper; we can offer no advice upon the subject." As far as regards Naples, that the business will end in the adoption of a more reasonable and moderate Constitution—if such is the wish of the allies—he both hopes and believes. But the question of guarantees is still one of exceeding difficulty; that one cannot proceed to decision with too much caution and circumspection. After the line we have announced, it is evident the less we have to do with the business the better, and with this opinion he hopes he has done right in not proceeding to Leybach.

I send you this extract of his despatch and letter in case he should not have communicated directly with you. From hence we have no news.

Lord Burghersh to Mr. Gordon.†

FLORENCE,
March 11th, 1821.

MY DEAR GORDON,

I have been rather amused than otherwise by learning from you that my conduct in presenting the circular was brought into discussion by the bigwigs of Leybach.

I thank God I am not amenable to that court, and care not a d—— for its decisions with regard to me. If, however, the contrary was the case, I should have a good cause to plead.

* Russian Minister at Florence.

† Brother of Lord Aberdeen; afterwards Sir Robert Gordon, Envoy to Brazil, 1826; to Constantinople, 1828; Ambassador at Vienna from 1841 to 1846.

Upon the receipt of the circular from Lord C. by courier, I had only to decide whether, under all the circumstances, I ought to set clear our line of policy. I came to the conclusion that I ought, because the representatives of the Great Powers were on all occasions, officially and otherwise, declaring that England was heart and soul with them, and was only acting an underpart from the fear of the Parliament, but that, in fact, by sending a fleet to Naples she had adopted a line of conduct more hostile than any other Power. To counteract these declarations, which was the evident intention of the instructions I received, I determined to present the note, and I have been most happy to find I did right.

I could not send a copy of the instruction I had received. I could only translate the arguments of the circular and say I had orders to present them, and, if you look at my note, you will find that my only study in the translation was to *adoucir* the expressions. I made no remark, and left the thing to speak for itself.

I have heard that there was great regret that this note should have been known here when Gallo passed; but for this no person is to blame but Lord Castle-reagh, who, in a system of policy as fair and honourable as the contrary would be otherwise, sent off without any loss of time the declaration of the sentiments of England to Italy, where it might arrive so as (for as much as it was worth) to be of use to the weaker Power in the contest, with regard to which we declared ourselves neutral.

I hope it is not expected of us that we should be *playing tricks*. With all our affection for Austria, we can never be brought to such a system.

You say you are anti-Constitutional, and so am I,

more particularly Spanish Constitutional, which never can succeed. But I have a few other fancies in my head about the independence of nations, the sacred principles of justice, etc., which of late, I fancy, are a little passed over where force and convenience have been opposed to them.

The turn of affairs here it is impossible to foretell. The Neapolitans, last campaign in '15, ran away like children; they may do the same now. If they do not, the Austrians have no chance in their favour. They will not attack with more than 40,000 effective troops, and the Neapolitans will have near 100,000 of all sorts. If Frimont carries the position of Introdoso—the news of which we are expecting—unless it is done by the running away of the whole Neapolitan army, he will lose many men, and afterwards only will his difficulties begin. The more he advances, the more he will be isolated and surrounded by bodies of troops, which, if they understand their business, he will never *find* to beat. His provisions, detachments, etc., will be taken, and he will be left in the midst of a nation contending for its independence, commanding only the ground he stands upon. It is impossible that the force he commands can conquer the country, excepting always the miracle of a whole army and nation yielding from panic; it is impossible he can do more than establish himself in the Abruzzi, from whence he may at some future time undertake the conquest of Naples.

These opinions I am giving merely as military ones, without appreciating the relative valour and conduct of the opposing armies. This very day we may receive news which may destroy them all by stating that the whole corps of Pepe* has laid down its arms. Against

* General Pepe, commanding the revolutionary troops.

such events I cannot attempt to argue, but such victories as the Austrians have set forth in the bulletin of the affair of Rieti will not carry them to Naples. The noise they have made of this, which was evidently but a reconnaissance by Pepe, and in which he entirely succeeded, argues ill for their hopes of great and decisive victories, or they should have said less about this.

There is one observation to make on the present position of the Neapolitans: They are said to be strongly fortified, and to have brought a great train of artillery to Introdoso. If these guns are in closed fortifications, the defence may be long and vigorous; but if they are only placed in field works, open in the rear, these works will be turned; and if the corps defending them is beat, the disaster will be greater because all the guns will be taken.

A'Court's last letter to me, of the 6th, says that the whole nation is united—a very different story from the one you heard from Church; and, as far as I can judge, there is no division whatever, the contest will be a long one! National Independence is a holy cause, *reste* only à *savoir* if the Neapolitans have hearts to feel and persevere in it. If they have, I should repeat a sentence written in a memoir I published some time ago on the campaigns in Spain and Portugal, in which, speaking of Bonaparte, I say: "But the strength of patriotism in a whole people was as yet unknown to him. The constant reduction of his forces, the ever-succeeding evacuations of apparently conquered provinces by his troops, the never-ending conflicts in every corner of the Peninsula, have since convinced him that a great people, with one intent and one resolution, with patriotism as their guide, are too powerful

to be subdued, though they have neither armies nor military science to oppose the invaders."

You will be tired with this long epistle, which I might have spared you, for it will most likely go by the courier who carries the news of the result of Frimont's great attack.

Pray write to me, and don't send me enclosures without a word from you. Believe me,

Most sincerely yours,

BURGHESH.

Mr. Gordon to Lord Burghesh.

LAYBACH,
March 21st, 1821.

DEAR BURGHESH,

You are so completely in the centre of all the news which at present interests Europe, that I suppose you no longer turn your attention this way. I am bound, however, to thank you for your letter of the 11th. Since then many great events have occurred to curtail our speculations, and we may calculate with certainty upon one grand result—viz., the speedy arrival of the Austrians at Naples.

I confess I never for a moment admitted the chance of a successful Neapolitan resistance, because I never believed that their enthusiasm, if it existed at all, was in any way ardent enough to make their prowess different from what we have always known it to be.

If I am not mistaken, you disapprove of the military operation from hence, as being contrary to the spirit of justice, which you wish to be held predominant over that of force. Now, although an equal admirer of this doctrine, I cannot but think the Austrian march justi-

fiable, and in no way endangering it, nor can I discover anything in the language of our Government that does not permit me to form such an opinion, or, rather, that does not authorize it.

The question upon which Great Britain has differed appears to me to have been quite distinct from such right of interference, or I certainly should not presume to defend it. Nay, I even think Austria was entitled to give the courts in Italy to understand that we perfectly assented to the principle of her interference, although declaring our own state of neutrality; for in our circular—which was called forth by other most reprehensible causes—it is expressly said: "*H.M. Government is prepared to uphold the right of any State or States to interfere, where their own immediate security or essential interests are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State.*"

The recent events in Piedmont have proved how immediate has been the danger to the Austrian Government, and how its only safe hopes of existence can be founded upon a forcible administration.

I should be very sorry to attempt its defence upon any other grounds than the above, and am as far as you can be from approving of those principles upon which Austria at first, with other of her allies, had wished to defend it. But so long as they use a sword which has the single and no sharper edge than our circular gives to it, I must think their cause is not at variance with the principles of justice, which you appreciate, and in which I hope you allow me to participate. I am sure you would not thank me for réchauffing a dish of obligations by existing and projected treaties, which it was hoped we might have been polite guests enough to digest. Our unceremonious rejection of them has,

I trust, banished such a dish for ever from the *Conferential* table.

What say you to the march of 100,000 Russians into Italy? Here is a remedy that seems indeed to be equivalent with the evil. Your friend Pozzo has a good deal of this to boast of and to answer for. Supposing the submission of the Parliament to the King restores peace to Naples, and has a similar tendency upon the rebellious troops and subjects in Piedmont, I sincerely hope our Government will interpose a loud voice against this Northern invasion. I fear there is but too little disposition here to countermand it under any circumstances.

The overwhelming character of the revolution in Turkey has added a terrible complication to the whole question. This, and the uncertainty as to the state of France, will not allow the allies to relax any of their vigour in defending themselves from the contagion which has gained such a head in Italy.

The Emperor Alexander has erased Ypsilanti from the list of Generals, and refused all protection to Moldavia. He reproves instead of defending, as they had hoped, the insurrection of the Greeks, but will preserve a strict attitude of non-interference, drawing a cordon between his empire and theirs. There is, you will say, some inconstancy in all this, but the *principle de force* could never be brought into play by an Emperor, Greek by religion, joining the Mohammedan ranks against a Greek nation.

The Duke of Modena arrived here for a day, bringing news of the fire and fury dispositions of the Duc de Genevois, and his proclamation, which I suppose you have seen? He carries back to-day the high appreciation of the Sovereigns, and promise of their support.

His Highness (or Majesty) is advised to await the result of his own *demarches*, and, in case of their failure, he is to have the direction of *la marche des cent mille Russes*.

I conclude that you will soon lose the company of H.S. Majesty. His wishes to remain away from Naples are badly reprimanded by the Sovereigns and Cabinets here, and the allied Junta is ordered to labour with all their force to carry him thither.

We have but little here in the way of discussion, but great anxiety as to passing events, which are notified at Florence *en passant*, and consequently need not be dwelt upon by me. Herz, who carries this letter, is hurrying on to Naples, in order with other bargainers, Rothschild, etc., to fleece the Government by loans made to pay for their misbehaviour.

I wish you could find time to write to me now and then. We may remain here, for anything I know, for three months longer. The Russians cannot be in this neighbourhood before then, and Alexander will, of course, wait to see them arrive. General Jermaloff is named Commander-in-Chief; there will be 75,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry and artillery, and 4,000 Cossacks—quite enough to eat up poor Italy.

I hope Lady Burghersh is well, and beg you will remember me to her. Believe me,

Yours very faithfully,

R. GORDON.

Lord Burghersh to Mr. Gordon.

FLORENCE,

March 27th, 1821.

Your letter of the 21st has reached me. I have little news to give you in return for it, but such as you are prepared for. The courier who takes this will

announce to you the occupation of Naples. Upon the question of the measure which has led to this result, we should be perfectly agreed as to the principles upon which you declare your approbation of it.

The British Government speaks of the immediate security of *essential* interests seriously endangered as giving a right of interference, and on that ground for two reasons would I instantly subscribe to the system which had been pursued by Austria. First, because I feel personal attachment to the prosperity of that empire, and, next, because I sincerely believe that upon the power and strength of that country does the salvation of Europe mainly depend. The whole difference of my feelings, therefore, on the measures lately pursued, has rested, and will rest, on the truth of the danger menaced. I deny it altogether, except as far as the establishment of a better form of government might have obliged Austria to some change in the one she still maintains in Lombardy, but except in that way no danger is so great as the detestation of all Italy which she has brought upon herself, through the revolution in Piedmont, which has only been effected in opposition to the supremacy Austria was taking in Italy by the invasion of Naples. No mischief half so great as this, and many others she will soon have dinned into her ears, was in reality menacing her. She has been too precipitate in putting herself into the hands of *faiseurs*; though her first Minister is a great one, he will be beat in the end. The great people in his rear will play him more tricks than he is aware of. And when we are talking of danger to Austria, I should like to ask which would be greatest—to have a representative Government at Naples, which might have been modified by friendly counsels, or a Russian army

at Piedmont, another in Poland, and a third ready to move into Moldavia, and with a principle established, and not resisted by England, that as a guarantee to England you may occupy a country where there has been a revolution, notwithstanding that the revolutionary Government may cease its functions; and that in cases of this sort the strong and powerful are to be judges of their own cause, the weak not to be allowed to speak even in their own defence. You say you hope our Government will interpose to prevent the Northern invasion if the revolution should have ceased, but remember the principle upon which Austria went to Naples. "Whether you change your former Government or not, so as to please us, we have decided in Congress to occupy you." England did not interpose a loud voice to prevent this, and how can she do so with impartiality to Russia? Now that Power will wish to do the same thing in Piedmont.

It is the great speculation of the Russians, and they begin to fancy that the Austrians are so disliked in Italy that without the assistance of their troops she would not be able to hold her ground, and they boldly maintain that short of three or four years, when they are once in Italy, it would be out of the question to leave it.

In all this I see very great danger to Austria—danger which I most sincerely regret, but which I think has been brought about by being in too great a hurry to fire the first cannon in Europe; no one can tell when will be the last.

I hate revolutions, Jacobins, etc., but I cannot at once condemn all people who seek to effect ameliorations in their Governments!

At Naples it had been for years the object of almost

every person of rank in the country. The thing was ill done, and a detestable system chosen, and by bad means; but if it did not seriously endanger Austria, which from my heart I am convinced it did not, there were no reasons for interfering with the right an independent nation has to govern itself.

The principle of war to all revolutions has now been established, and, if I mistake not, war upon war will be the consequence.

From Genoa, I am sorry to tell you, there is bad news; the Governor, who obeyed the Duke of Genevois, has been arrested, the Constitution proclaimed. This event is seized upon by the Russians to prove that their army must not be stopped. They begin to suppose that Metternich will get England to interpose to bring this about. They say it will only create a coolness with the Emperor; will have no effect with him, but prove to him that there is a different measure to be dealt out where the interests of Austria are in question to those of Russia.

Lord Stewart to Lord Burghersh.

LAYBACH,
June 30th, 1821.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your kind private letter of the 21st, as well as the other interesting communications you have sent me. I wish I had a good opportunity, in return, of sending you the exact details of all that has passed at this meeting as well as that of Troppau. But there is no use in giving you all my opinions and *raisonnements* by a conveyance so uncertain and liable to be known in other quarters as a courier who belongs to others; and as to sending

you one of my own, I have had considerable objections—first, because, whatever *our* line may be, I am anxious, as far as possible, to keep up the moral sentiment and avoid giving suspicion to our friends; and second, because, if I sent direct to you and A'Court, it would look as if I wished to give him earlier information, and afford him a greater scope for such conduct as his judgment points out to adopt, than that which his colleagues will have. Upon the whole, then, I have determined to send my present communications both to Florence and Naples by the Russian or French courier. I have so guarded what I have written that, in the event of the courier's being apprehended and robbed of his budget, *we* shall not fare worse than our neighbours.

My line here has been to preserve our *true attitude*, although our friends have anxiously desired to ally us to their own proceedings and *constructions*, by *sweeping denunciations*, and by casting a veil over that position which ought not to be subject to misconception.

The French Plenipotentiaries have played another game, wishing to range themselves with the three other Powers, and at the same time to keep clear of being committed to *les mesures de rigueur*. They have surrounded themselves with *les diplomatiques et la valeur des termes*, and they have taken upon their own authority to pronounce an adhesion, which still may be fought off by their own Government.

It is not worth while by this Russian conveyance to add more. I wish it were possible to meet; but how can this be, as your wife wants you, and mine is low and suffering, and I shall be obliged to return to her?

Give my kindest regards to Lady Burghersh, and tell her I do not write, as I have given up all my private correspondence since these confounded conferences. I hope your boy continues well. Believe me,

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE STEWART.

I open my despatch again to say that last night we had our decisive conference to announce the *arrêt* to the Duc de Gallo, who was invited to it. Various documents were read to him, and he was put in possession of the sentiments of the *souverains alliés*, taking care to make clear that, although our august master was generally included in the denomination, he altered on this occasion to a vigorous neutrality, and took no part in the acts emanating from the conferences at Leybach, and I was there as simple témoin.

Gallo looked very humble, very submissive, and I entertain no doubt the army will have a quiet march to a simple occupation.

At this moment I receive your most affecting note of Lady Burghersh; it makes me most unhappy. I tremble for Lady S. She has suffered such agony at our repeated separations, and at this last more than at any other. I can only hope and pray for the best, after all, in this d——d diplomatic traffic and worry. *Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*, and I believe I must cut.

I am at a loss to guess how our despatches parted in their arrival to you. But this shows how useless almost it is to write but by our own messengers.

One point you will not fail to remark, that, however objectionable and imprudent the K.'s conduct was at

Florence, or from whatever quarter the advice came, which made H.M. act as he did, it forms a cover and excuse for the conduct of *our* friends, while their reciprocity protects H.S.M. There is no use in pronouncing an opinion upon all this.

Ever yours,
V. STEWART.

CHAPTER XIII

ENGLISH AFFAIRS

THE correspondence in the present chapter is chiefly concerned with English politics. After the peace of Waterloo, England, high in the counsels of Europe, found herself in some danger at home from the refusal of her Ministers to realize that a new political era must begin. Heavy taxation, bad harvests, and the poverty of agriculture, had brought about a fierce feeling of discontent. The demand for radical reforms to readjust the State machinery to changing conditions was met with blank opposition by the Government.

Lord Liverpool was Prime Minister, but Lord Castlereagh's influence was supreme by virtue of the great part he had played as Foreign Secretary. Through him the Government was imbued with Metternich's idea that political progress was synonymous with revolution. On Lord Castlereagh's death, in 1822, Mr. Canning became Foreign Secretary, and at once entered on a more liberal policy. His appointment as Prime Minister in 1827 broke up the Ministry, the Tories, led by the Duke of Wellington, declining to serve under him. Canning died that same year, and, after the temporary Cabinet of Lord Goderich, a Tory Government was formed under the Duke of Wellington. In 1831 the crisis arose over the Reform Bill. After an appeal to the country the new House of Commons passed the Bill, only for it to be rejected by the Lords, who were, however, compelled to give way before the overwhelming agitation caused by their action.

Lord Stewart's letters naturally reflect the ultra-Tory point of view; those on the state of parties during the progress of the Reform Bill are curiously reminis-

cent of more recent agitation concerning the House of Lords.

* * * * *

The latter years of Lord Burghersh's mission at Florence were very pleasant. The country rejoiced in its freedom from French domination, and did not yet feel the oppression of Austria. The Grand-Ducal Court was very simple, with an absence of ceremony, and almost paternal relations, existing between the Government and people. Lord and Lady Burghersh entered thoroughly into social life, and kept open house for all the English travellers continually passing through Florence on their way to or from Rome. Amongst the residents, too, there was then, as now, a considerable population of English, attracted to the town by the cheapness of living as well as by the advantages of climate and society. There were also many families of political refugees who, having been implicated in revolutionary plots, were forced to leave their own country, and had settled in Florence, where they lived unmolested and were freely received.

Amongst this cosmopolitan society the Burghershes made many friends, one of the most intimate being Napoleon's wife, Marie Louise, who was then living at Parma. She had spent a winter in Florence soon after the Burghershes went there, and, forming a great affection for Lady Burghersh, continued to show them both the greatest kindness throughout her life.

In addition to the agreeable society, Lord and Lady Burghersh thoroughly appreciated the intellectual and artistic opportunities Florence offered. In music and painting they both possessed gifts above the average, and Lord Burghersh spent much of his spare time in the study and composition of operas. In 1822 he founded the Academy of Music in London on the model of the Italian academies, and to the end of his life took a keen interest in the institution and its students.

In 1829 Lord Aberdeen offered the mission to Spain to Lord Burghersh. He accepted on the condition that the Duke of Wellington approved his decision. This the Duke declined to do, and wrote a kindly letter giving his reasons. Other letters from the Duke in

the same year relate to the question of the Roman Catholics in Ireland. No direct diplomatic relations were ever maintained officially with the Pope, but one of the Secretaries nominally attached to the Legation at Florence lived in Rome, and necessary communications were carried on unofficially through the British Minister at Florence.

In 1830 Lord and Lady Burghersh visited England. Before the time came for them to return to Florence the Government had fallen, and Lord Burghersh resigned his post. In those days it was not considered loyal for a pronounced Tory to serve under a Whig Cabinet, even in a diplomatic position. The next few years were spent quietly in England. A family of beautiful children was growing up, and these domestic ties kept the Burghershes much at home in London, where they lived in intimate friendship with the leading diplomats and statesmen of the day.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh.*

MILAN,
April 10th, 1823.

MY DEAR BURGHESH,

We arrived here three days since, having passed a day at Parma with your friend Marie Louise, where we had a dinner, a concert, and a *déjeuner à la fourchette*. Nothing could be kinder or more civil than she and *le Général*.

I am still all in perplexity as to what our operations will be after Easter, when Mr. C. develops our foreign relations. In my own opinion, the tone of the Ministry and Opposition has only tended to practise a base and imprudent fraud upon the Spaniards, by giving them hopes which we cannot desire to realize without, in the smallest degree, arresting the progress of the French. As to these movements, if they really are

* Lord Stewart succeeded his brother as Marquis of Londonderry in August, 1822.

to take place, the sooner they are commenced the better. They will have bloodless victories in my view of Spanish energy and preparation, and must resort to their national system of lying in their bulletins to gratify French vanity.

I hear Victor, on his arrival at the army, found everything in the worst possible state as to the preparation for march *en avant*—the commissariat and other arrangements. Bubna's language here is quite *anti* action—that is to say, he declares Austria has nothing to do but to stick to England and turn her back upon all Russian entreaty or effort to mix the least in the war.

I should think from this that Metternich, with his usual address, will play the game of his own.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh: An account of the state of parties in England after the death of his brother and the appointment of Mr. Canning as Foreign Minister.

HOLDERNESSE HOUSE,
July 12th, 1823.

. . . You will probably like to know what I hear and think of the state of things? I should conjecture that the machine does not work as expected, and the D(uke) has hard work to keep things together. However, the conduct of the Government may be right upon the line of neutrality. Lord Liverpool's and Mr. Canning's speeches have revived us with our foreign allies, and we may fairly congratulate ourselves on being *toto divisos orbe Britannos*. Everything is done amongst the foreign Cabinets abroad without our knowing or hearing anything whatever. The Lievens, Esterhazys,

etc., have little or no communication with our Foreign Office, and the Spanish subscriptions and Spanish balls, etc., make these foreign embassies so irritable and enraged that the society is much changed in consequence, and things are in many respects most unpleasant.

Mr. C. in the House of Commons has very much failed in working for the Government and taking up the proper tone which was expected. Occasionally, but rarely, he states his opinion; but he never *places* the Government, and they are one and all dissatisfied.

Peel holds off from jealousy, it is said. Robinson has done best, but the whole Treasury Bench look different ways. I do not think the Duke is satisfied with either Mr. Canning or Lord Liverpool, and, if I was to judge from what he has dropped, it is with the greatest discomfort and annoyance he carries on the concern with them. But the question is, How to mend it?

The King is very decidedly better, and is now giving parties, etc. He talks of sailing.

I think Mrs. Pole looking remarkably well; your father not so. He swooned, I hear, at Almack's the other night, and to my eye is certainly very much altered.

Town is clearing and everybody going different ways; therefore we shall now have no news till next session. Whether things will then go on in the House as they do now I think very questionable.

I have not been near the F.O., and know no news of your shop for you. I learn none of us are supposed to have any right to pensions, and if asked for will be refused. This therefore looks bad for those who want to settle at home.

God bless you, my dear Burghersh! Give my

affectionate remembrances to Lady B. I ardently hope your dear children may go on well, and all happiness attend you.

Ever yours most affectionately,

V. S.

My Correggios are the wonder of the world!

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh.

HOLDERNESSE HOUSE,
June 1st, 1824.

I am very grateful for your kind recollection. Had my life been anything but a constant scene of badgering, and had I not known you would receive all the details of Mr. Battrer through the private prints, I would have bored you with an account of the adventures of this Johnny Gilpin and the inadvertent manner in which I was hooked into his history. As it turned out, he challenged me because he was *sure* I would not go out with him; but, being deceived in this, his subsequent conduct showed up the contemptible nature of the wretch. Many abuse me for having given him satisfaction, but I am quite sure whatever man refuses a challenge on any grounds whatsoever is always more abused than if he accepts. And as to being shot at, you and I know how very indifferent this is to us.

I hear Canning wanted to oust you to Sweden to get in Lord Francis, and I am glad you have properly disappointed him. Sooner or later, however, he will fish out all he chooses, or he will shipwreck. This latter, in my mind, is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The D. of W. looks very unwell, and is, alas! not

what he was, or else I think he would not quietly submit to the discordance evident in the seat of government. Marlborough, I see, is very angry with him, and, indeed, *Britons* ought to support each other.

In Parliament everything has been smooth by the Opposition flirting with Canning.

The K. is more devoted to his family than ever, and they have it all their own way.

Mme. de Lieven started for a journey supposed to be Johannesburg, but stated to be St. Petersburg. She got, however, very sick at Dover from some unlucky cause—letters or packets—and she is returned to town ill and wretched. You know, perhaps, the diplomacy of all this?

Adieu. My best regards to Lady B., in which Fanny joins me.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh : At the time of the change of Government on the illness and retirement of Lord Liverpool.

WYNYARD PARK,
February 25th, 1827.

How can I tell you news when I am now absent from the fountain-head? I am obliged to delay going to London, from county business, until after the 1st of March. Of course Lord L—— is politically dead. The fight is between the D. of W——n and the Tories, and C——g and the Whig party in the Cabinet. You can speculate as well as me who will be victorious. I have so long witnessed the unceasing and domineering influence of C——g that, if his health stands, he will, I think, be supreme. Both parties in the Cabinet, in my opinion, will like to keep office and preserve their places, so I do not apprehend Lansdowne,

Holland, or any Whigs, will come in. But I consider the struggle will be whether C—g is to have more preponderance in the Council by being Premier and having another vote or two in the Cabinet, or whether under Lord Bathurst or some nominal head. The drama is to be continued as at present. The Catholic Question is the great rub.

Now, my dear fellow, I have given you shortly my speculations, and all I know.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh: On the appointment of Canning as Prime Minister.

April 16th, 1827.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

Our recent sad loss has so much occupied my time I have not been able to write, or would have done so at this crisis. That this Machiavellian politician has turned out all our friends is not the least surprising to me, as I early told the Duke at Vienna what he might expect. But, I confess, I was not prepared for such a reign of intrigue, insolence, and upstart dominion, as now exists.

You will see C — g has formed his Government on the sergeants and corporals of the old Tory party, and under a strict promise to the K—— that Protestant principles are to have the ascendancy in the Cabinet. So much for his patriotism on that question. You will also learn from his insolent and sarcastic correspondence he has forced out the D. of W——n and everyone that could in his Cabinet be anything, but a creature of his own. At the same time he tells the Whigs the arrangement is only *provisional*, and they are to give him at first a *Romantic* support. The end

is easy to be perceived. C——g must by degrees join with the Whigs and overturn the King's mind on Protestantism, or he cannot hold on.

You will be in an embarrassment, my dear friend, but I think, if I know you, you will sail in Wellington's boat; and I believe no man was worse used of late in the Cabinet by C——g than your father. Fitzroy's loss of office, etc., is sad to him, so is poor Hardinge's; but we have all gallantly stuck to our chief, and I write these few lines that you may be aware there is a gallant squad at home with plenty of pluck for a jolly opposition.

Ever yours most affectionately,

V. L.

*Lord Burghersh to Lord Conyngham.**

FLORENCE,

April 3rd, 1827.

MY DEAR LORD CONYNGHAM,

I forward you by this post the music I spoke to you of in my last letter. I beg you to have the kindness to present it with my humble duty to His Majesty, and to express my hope it may be found worthy of His Majesty's most excellent band.

I have just received very distressing accounts of the failure of the speculation of the concerts for the Academy.† What can be the cause of a falling off in a concern which promised so well, I cannot at this distance explain; but the result will be the shutting up the Academy, if by some other means it is not supported. It is in this case, as in all others where any national institution is to be supported, where any

* Henry, first Marquess Conyngham, was Lord Steward of the Household 1821-1830.

† Academy of Music.

benevolent undertaking is to be propitiated, that we naturally turn our eyes towards the fountain-head, towards the gracious promoter and protector of all such establishments—His Majesty. This institution for the classical instruction of music—the only one which has been attempted in England, while other countries are covered with them—has in a triumphant manner succeeded in producing pupils of the greatest talents. It has afforded the opportunity to a vast number of young persons of establishing themselves in the world, and of doing credit to their country. It would be melancholy, when such vast sums are spent on foreign artists, to see such an establishment destroyed for the want of a paltry sum of a few hundred pounds, and yet how to obtain that sum is the difficulty.

It has appeared to me that in this season when no public charity is afloat, if a dress ball at the opera or one of the theatres was undertaken, and if it was honoured by the high patronage of His Majesty, it might produce £1,500 or £2,000, which would entirely save the concern. I have stated this to the committee of management, and should it be undertaken, if you see no impropriety in so doing, you would infinitely oblige me if you would mention it to His Majesty. I am certain that the King, in his great kindness to me, and in his anxiety for everything which tends to any national ornament or advantage, will forgive my having ventured to suggest this measure; as I am convinced it would effect the object proposed, so am I most anxious it may be undertaken.

With my best compliments to Lady Conyngham, I beg you to believe me,

Most sincerely yours,

BURGHESH.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh.

WYNYARD PARK,
October 20th, 1827.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

The account of Lady B.'s safety,* and at your having got another recruit even at this remote corner, and at a distance so great, has given me excessive pleasure. God grant that she may rapidly and entirely recover! The more I see of the world, the more I am persuaded there are few really good people in it, and much fewer real friends.

The changes of late years in persons and positions are fearful, and make me consider that to begin to grow old and to look forward to eternal rest is no bad prospect. In the meantime, as *dum vivimus vivamus*, we have had the Duke in the North, and we have treated him *en demi Dieu*.

Cæsar's triumphs never exceeded the public entries, illuminations, firings, fêtes, etc. He is gone away vastly pleased, and thinks there is some good in us Northerners.

It has been a bitter pill to the new patchwork concern. They think the Duke has been electioneering, and say it is foul-play, and the Whigs cannot but admit there has been in the great demonstration of feeling something more than the military victories of twelve or fourteen years' standing.

From all I hear, the ex-Whigs, Jerseys, Bedfords, Grey, Rosslyn, etc., are more *decided now* than last session, and there will be as many Whigs coming to Opposition as there will be any trimness to Lord Goderich.

I think H.M. Ministers are too divided amongst themselves and too despicable if they could be

* Hon. Julian Fane was born October 2, 1827. He was afterwards secretary at the embassies of Vienna and Paris, and died April 19, 1870.

united to make head against the high aristocracy of both the great parties, and no one has any confidence that the Blubberer* can long be Premier.

Lord Lansdowne, I hear, is an altered man; his friends have told him he has discredited the name of Whig by his subserviency and pleasing, and Lady L. is alarmed about his health and spirits, and says she will die if he remains in.

Dudley has an earldom for his great Foreign Office services, his treaties, his acute diplomacy, and his elaborate instructions to Capo d'Istria to overturn the Turks and take Constantinople.

A monument is erecting to Mr. C. for his great public services, but no one can perceive what they are or state *any one* act.

The Blubberer has got the warrant signed for his £3,000 a year, and so has Huskisson; but you'll hear more of this anon. And now I forget—I am writing to a man in office, and all this will be deemed faction; therefore it is addressed to your dear wife, and not to *you*. Now, do row that beast Bartolini, and say if I am ever to expect my statues or *not*.

God bless you! Assure Lady B. *je la baise la main*, and believe me,

Ever yours most affectionately,

V. L.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

LONDON,

May 7th, 1829.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I have received your letter of the 20th of April, and Lord Aberdeen has communicated to me that

* Canning had died on August 8 and Lord Goderich had succeeded as Prime Minister, but, being unable to arrange difficulties within the Cabinet, he resigned in the following January (1828) and was succeeded by the Duke of Wellington.

which you had written to him. I have declined to accept for you the mission to Spain.

I had the offer made to you because I was sensible that long ago you ought to have been promoted; and that you felt that you had not been treated with justice, much less with kindness. I was anxious to see justice done to you, and that you should be satisfied that you were not neglected.

However, I must say that I never thought the mission to Spain was that one which suited you.

Under existing circumstances we have not much intercourse with Spain—indeed, none of importance. This mission does not lead to more than that which you hold at present. For these reasons it is not desirable to you. But for other reasons it is desirable that you should not go there. The climate of Madrid, although in such a latitude, is too harsh for Priscilla and your children.

It is not a bad climate, but it is variable—at times very hot, suddenly very cold; and I don't think it would suit her or your children. I have thought it best, therefore, to decline for you to accept the situation; and, between ourselves, I have been the more particularly induced to do so because I think I see an early prospect of making another arrangement for you. The principle of our R.C. arrangement has been to leave the Church of England, and everything regarding the communication with Rome, exactly where it was. Of course, therefore, this arrangement affords no opening.

Believe me,

Ever yours most affectionately,

W.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

SUDBOURNE,
October 19th, 1829.

You are aware of the relation in which we stand towards the Roman Catholics in Ireland. The old laws in respect to communication with Rome are strictly in force. But there is no doubt that the peace and welfare of Ireland depend in a great degree upon the selection of the men appointed to fill the places in the episcopal mission to that country. We cannot officially admit the existence of the interference of the Pope, we cannot at all acknowledge it; but we are anxious that it should be exercised in such a manner as will promote the peace and harmony of the country.

The gentleman is dead who filled the office of Bishop in the Diocese of Waterford. His name was Kelly. He had been Coadjutor of Baltimore in the United States. The person who is recommended by the priests in that part of Ireland for the office is a Mr. Foran, respecting whom the intelligence which I have received does not lead me to believe that his appointment to the dignity in question would be beneficial to the peace of the country.

The person who has been suggested to me is Bishop Weld, Coadjutor of Canada. This gentleman, who is connected with some of the best families in this country, would be of great service in Ireland. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will lose no time in exerting all your private influence at Rome to have this appointment made.

The R.C. of this country have now all that they can require from H.M. in the way of political privilege.

There remains no concession to be made excepting

our religion, our properties, and our lives ; and I should think that the authorities at Rome will see that the interests of religion coincide with the political interests of the State in rendering it desirable that gentlemen selected for the performance of episcopal duties of a spiritual nature in Ireland should be well disposed towards the State, and such as the Government can approve of.

Pray lose no time about this affair, and manage it with discretion.

Believe me,
Ever yours most sincerely and affectionately,
WELLINGTON.

Bishop Weld is now, I understand, on his way to Rome.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

LONDON,
November 18th, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 1st of November. I am delighted to hear of Priscilla's new talent.* I received from Rome by courier the letters of which you sent me the copies, and was obliged to pay *eighty* pounds for the same! Sir H. Dalrymple sent the courier by desire of Mr. Horton, who availed himself of the good opportunity to send the papers to the *Times* newspaper, and they will be published to-morrow.

Vive la libéralité! Believe me,
Ever yours most affectionately,
W.

I saw your father lately quite well.

* She had taken up portrait painting.

The Empress Marie Louise to Lord Burghersh.
(Translation.)

PARMA,
December 10th, 1829.

I do not know how to tell you, dear my lord, how frightened I was on learning of the accident* which has occurred to you and my lady; Simonis had told me of it a few minutes before your letter arrived, and I thank you from my heart for having told me, for you know how people like to exaggerate everything in the neighbourhood. Although you say it is nothing, I must confess that I am very worried, and, knowing my great affection for you and my lady, you can easily understand this, and you will be most kind if you will send an exact account. Is it true that your servant had an arm and a leg broken?

I am so glad that you have decided to give your "Torneo"† at Parma. All that I have heard of your composition is so beautiful that this music must please me, and I hope the company will not spoil its effect on the public.

Simonis has not yet received the parts, but is already promising himself a feast. I hope that this occasion will give me another satisfaction, that of seeing you again, as well as Lady Priscilla; but even as I say the word *hope* I shudder, for I have always before my eyes the overturned carriage, and I would not wish, by my egoism, to be the cause of a second upset. I confine myself, therefore, to saying that if you come I shall be very happy.

At a concert on the 12th your beautiful symphony

* Lord and Lady Burghersh had been upset in their carriage on the road between Bologna and Florence.

† An opera composed by Lord Burghersh.

is to be played, and on the 25th part of the Masse,* if the cold is not too great.

Everyone is well here, big and little. Mme. Amelie and I both caught horrible chills at the funeral service of my aunt, but thanks to some drugs the pains are passed.

Give much of my love to milady. I pray she may soon feel nothing of her fall, and believe the sincere love I always bear her.

Yours very affectionately,
MARIE LOUISE.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Burghersh.

LONDON,
January 19th, 1830.

I have this day received your letter of the 5th instant, enclosing one from Cardinal Albani, to which I do not think it necessary to request that any answer should be given. I earnestly recommend to you to be cautious in all your communications with the Papal Government, and to confine them to matters of private civility.

It would be very desirable, however, to know what is the mode of appointing what is called a Bishop in Ireland, if that information can be obtained without a breach of law.

I am happy that Priscilla is so well. She will have been much shocked by the death of Sir Thomas Lawrence.

* Mass for full orchestra, solo parts, and chorus, composed by Lord Burghersh. Performed in the Church of San Giovanni by the Philharmonic Academy of Bologna.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh: On the state of parties during the progress of the Reform Bill.

WYNYARD PARK,
November 19th, 1831.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I am very glad to see your letter dated from Brighton, as I know Lady B. was anxious to get fresh sea-air, and it always does children good. Indeed, in these times we have nothing to do but to take care of ourselves, and see if we can escape the general swamping that seems to surround us. All feelings of public conduct and public spirit are become dead, and mortified by the imbecile apathy of the monarch, and the weakness which pervades his character, makes me feel we shall have no security or peace in England until the Almighty delivers us from his reign.

The case as to the Bill, or a measure as efficient, stands thus—Lord Grey and his colleagues are pledged to it, and bound, if anything can bind them, to a common act, except the determination, come what may, to stick to their places. The majority of peers appear to me in honour, in conscience, in uprightness, in justice to their peerage and their ancestry, (bound) to resist again any Bill that can be shown to be as effective in *revolution* as the last Bill. What then must be the issue?

All the intimidation which has been used against the Church and the late majority are so many additional grounds, in my mind, for us Opposition peers to adhere to our principles and our votes; for base and cowardly indeed must that mind be which delivers an opinion before God and his country, and then abandons it, or changes it from the menaces and machinations of the revolutionist and the mob.

The crisis, therefore, in my mind, must resolve itself into this—Either the King must make peers, and then the country becomes not worth living in, or by His Majesty's resistance (of which I have no hopes) some better, but at present totally unforeseen, chance may arise to give us more breathing time, if it does not save us from the gratuitous and wanton deluge which Lord Grey has been pleased to inundate this hitherto happy country with.

The cholera at Sunderland has added much to my private anxieties, as well as the state of public events, which has made my thoughts most gloomy on general politics. Although I am persuaded the accounts have been largely exaggerated, still, that an unusual epidemic reigns there cannot be denied, and with wife, children, and servants, who are all of the weaker and timid nature, it is not quite easy to eschew all rumours, apprehensions, and daily histories, that arise. Still, I felt that, had I abdicated and given way to the alarm, the mischief that it would have occasioned in this country would have been incalculable. It would have been the tocsin for a general emigration.

Neither Lord Cleveland, Durham, Ravensworth, nor any person of note, is now resident here, but my family and myself, and, with the large number of persons in my employ, my fears would have given general dismay. Whatever I may, therefore, individually feel, and however I may be ill at ease in my own mind for those I love and cherish far more than myself, and whose early years may make their lives valuable, while mine has run far more than half its course, I have determined to put the best face I could upon the general position, and place my faith in Providence more than in any of the doctors and their reports.

I wrote my letter to the *Standard*, however, to give all the confidence I could, and by going over to Seaham and Sunderland two or three times a week I show outwardly no apprehension, while I trust my children are as safe here as they well can be.

I am very glad you approve of the course I have taken, as it is always gratifying to know one's friends think one has done right.

I hope the Duke will intimate to those at a distance what he wishes them to do. Having taken my line here, and doing all the good I can, I should be very sorry to move till after Christmas; indeed, I should like to stay in the country as long as possible, and I could send my proxy for the meeting. Unless, therefore, I hear it is particularly wished, I should not stir for the meeting if it is so early as the 6th of December. You, however, will hear the best intelligence, and I shall take it as a great favour if you will communicate.

Seaham Harbour also promises well, and I have made up my mind to work on as well as I can in my own little nook and in my own humble way, until *le bon Dieu* chooses to call me elsewhere.

Kindlest love to Lady B. Pray write on a bad day, which is (I know) the devil at Brighton, of all places under the globe.

Ever your most attached friend,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh.

WYNYARD PARK,
October 8th, 1832.

I was delighted to see your handwriting, and, as you say of your own health, I trust it is quite restored.

I have not written to you since we parted, as, really, in this secluded North I could only give you electioneering, which, ignorant of the locale, could not much amuse you.

I have had a hard fight here to make any stand against the overwhelming Whig power, which, aided by the ingenuity of Durham's contrivances and the host of Liberal bully myrmidons at his and Lord Cleveland's back, entirely counted upon ten members here as *their own*. Their rage and malice at finding any head made against them, the expense and trouble of contest, knows actually no bounds, and even if I should fail in unseating any of the Whigs, I shall at least have the satisfaction of making them empty their purses and bow down their heads. However, I hope for good luck and to carry three Conservatives out of ten, which will not be bad work, if you knew all we have to struggle with.

I have, fortunately, a fine little fellow as a candidate in the North Division, and his two duels in one day have placed him on the pinnacle of fame.

I rejoice very much to think that your father is at last doing what is right. Had I been him, however, in these times, you should have been for the county, where they required you, and your brother for Lyme.

If our great Tories will not exert themselves, if Hertford turns his back, and Lowther goes abroad and others act tamely and indifferently in the same fashion, there is an end of Conservative power, and nothing now will ever get the Whigs out. Had the King given us a chance before the new Parliament, by dismissing Lord Grey, the game might have got into our hands. I think a quarrel might have been picked

with him on his still suffering the political unions, etc. ; and if there had been a change, I should have expected a great *revirement* in the country.

But the truth is, so long as royalty is bound up ostensibly with Whiggery, you cannot get the moderate men in the country to budge. But place the King in jeopardy, or put him with a new Tory Ministry on a good quarrel with the Whigs, and the inherent attachment to monarchy in the nation would break out.

We have sad uphill work now ; but it is a *raison de plus* in my mind not to go to sleep. Having done all I can here, I set out to-morrow, bag and baggage, for Ireland, as I trust not *Downshire* ; still, I think Frederick is impregnable. In Londonderry I have made 300 more votes, and the two Conservatives are sure. I hear McDonnell talks of Antrim again, but he behaved ill last time, and I shall steer clear of him.

We have had people coming and going here ; acting French and English, etc., have been the order of the day, and time passes, and, alas ! we grow old. I shall be back here by Christmas. Pray write and keep me informed in Paddy's land. Direct to Mount Stewart.

Lord Londonderry to Lord Burghersh.

ST. PETERSBURG,
January 4th, 1836.

I was much rejoiced to see your handwriting. You seem to have enjoyed yourself in the land o' lakes. I know well the joys of Abercairny and Co., and can well imagine that as *garçon* you engrossed *des grandes attentions*, and *que vous vous êtes bien tiré d'affaires*.

The picture you give of home politics is sadly gloomy, but, I fear, true enough. This session will be passed as the last. The muzzle on the Peers, the attendance slack in the Commons, partly from distrust and partly from idleness on our side, and the Bills, as last year, sent by small majorities, which will be rejected and remodelled by the Lords being whipped in after Easter. This is so entirely my opinion that, having heard from no one that attendance is desirable, I shall not hurry my private movements, and shall certainly not be in London till after Easter, when some railway and coal concerns will force my presence.

Our *séjour* these last three weeks here has not been so fortunate as *dans le commencement*. Both Lady L. and Seaham have been very ill, and have enjoyed nothing. The climate, clearly, agrees with neither, and we have had some very trying weather—one day 25 degrees of cold, the next a complete thaw and 8 or 10 of heat. These immense transitions are very trying, especially at the age of Seaham, and I believe no girls of twelve to eighteen ever get on here. Perhaps when you are born here, or long used to it, you may sustain the temperature and the sudden changes without serious mischief. But to us *Oiseaux de passage* it is very bad. Lady L. and Henry are thin and changed, it is melancholy to see them; and the former has been deprived of all the numerous dinners, balls, gaieties, etc. I only wait for the end of the month to get a good frost to "cut our stick," for I cannot bear to see my companions so poorly. As to me, I delight, and so would you, in this place. *Le luxe et pompe* beyond what I ever saw elsewhere, in reception, splendour, and all the desirables of life. The women, though not positively in consistency and firmness equal to our

English madams, still, in *tournure*, dress, and *agrément*, they are very fascinating. The dress and toilette, indeed, beat everything in Paris, London, and elsewhere.

It is in vain to tell you how we have been *overpowered* with kindness from the Imperial Family, and the Emperor has presented Lady L. with a more splendid specimen of malachite in table and vases than ever yet has been seen in England. These proofs will at least show our enemies that the old school are appreciated abroad for their own sakes.

I have seen a great deal of, and have written a great deal on, this wonderful colossal empire, which is not at all known or estimated *chez nous*. My memorandums, if I don't publish them, may amuse you some day. . . .

Pray write to me at Berlin on receipt of this. How old some of my old friends there will have grown!

God bless you, my dear friend ; make my kindest love acceptable to Lady B. . . . Believe me,

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

Since writing the above the Emperor has sent me the Paris medal (Russian) of 1814, in the most flattering manner, in order to witness the great funeral ceremony of Alexander. He has also sent magnificent table and vase of malachite to Lady L. and vases of porcelain, pedestals, etc., to me. If the Radicals thought to do me mischief, they never could have done me so much good in their lives, as I am treated as if I was a victim !

CHAPTER XIV

THE EASTERN QUESTION

THE last of Lord Burghersh's papers deal with a subject that forms a definite connecting link between the European politics of a past generation and those of to-day. Under varying guises the Eastern Question is still with us in all its complexity of conflicting interests. Though we may congratulate ourselves on the peaceful settlement of Egypt in recent years, even at this present time a state of war exists between a European nation and the Turks.

For the origin of the state of affairs that arose in 1840 one must go back a few years. In 1833, Mahmud, Sultan of Turkey, had appealed to Russia for help against the aggressions of his vassal, Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was entered into between the two countries, by which Syria was granted to Mehemet, and the right of Russian arms to intervene in Turkish affairs was practically admitted. During the next few years Mehemet continued to extend his empire, until it became a menace to England's trade routes to India; her commercial interests were also seriously interfered with by the Pasha's system of Government monopolies.

In 1839 war again broke out between the Sultan and Mehemet. The Turkish army was defeated, and a week later the Sultan died. The Turkish Admiral treacherously gave up his fleet to Mehemet; and if the treaty of 1833 meant anything, the time had come to put it into practice.

In order to prevent any isolated action on the part of Russia, the European Powers at once united to place the young Sultan under their protection, and intimated to Mehemet that decision in the matter could

not rest with him. Beyond this, however, points of agreement were difficult. France had always been friendly to Mehemet as a sea-ally in the Mediterranean, and she now proposed that the Pasha should keep the territories he had conquered in Syria, and that England and France should agree to united action if Russia intervened in the Bosphorus. England would not consent to leave the Pasha in possession of all his conquests, and was thus in a difficult position, unable to agree with either France or Russia. Equally unable to keep aloof from the dispute—for by so doing there was the risk that France and Russia might combine to partition the Turkish Empire between them, and so upset the balance of power—England seemed indeed between the devil and the deep.

The Tsar seized this opportunity to try and widen the rift in the understanding between France and England. He offered to let the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi lapse, and was willing to agree to England's views with regard to Turkey and Egypt. The Russian Ambassador was instructed to arrange a coalition of the Powers, in which the Tsar was willing, though not anxious, to include France.

The French Government was then torn between public opinion, which favoured Mehemet, and the wishes of King Louis Philippe, who was opposed to any course that might be unfavourably received by the rest of Europe. Thiers was Prime Minister at this time, and, while still trying to keep on terms with the Powers, he endeavoured to come to an understanding with the Porte which should secure the dominance of French influence and Mehemet's position. The discovery of this intrigue decided the policy of the English Cabinet, which had hitherto hesitated to break with France. On July 30th, 1840, the Convention of London was signed by Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, by which these four Powers undertook to protect the young Sultan against Mehemet. The fact that this agreement was entered into without the knowledge of the French Ambassador caused the news of it to be received by France with hot resentment. The country considered it had been slighted, and a war-fever seized the nation. Matters assumed a serious aspect, and it was not until Guizot replaced Thiers

as Minister that peaceful counsels prevailed. An expedition of the allies was undertaken to eject Mehemet from Syria. Acre was captured on November 2nd, and three weeks later the Pasha resigned all claim to the country and restored the Turkish fleet. The Powers subsequently guaranteed to him the pashalik of Egypt.

King Leopold of Belgium had made great efforts to avert the menace of a European war,* and appealed to the Duke of Wellington to use his influence with Lord Melbourne and the Cabinet to counteract the effect caused by the somewhat tactless methods and hostile attitude of Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary.

Lord Burghersh paid a visit to the King at Laeken when affairs were at a crisis, and immediately on his return saw the Duke.

It is hoped that Lord Burghersh's record of those critical days may be found not less interesting than that of the stirring times in which he had taken a more active and conspicuous part.

Memorandum by Lord Burghersh of a conversation with King Leopold concerning the state of Belgium and English home politics.

August 8th, 1838.

The King spoke of his own affairs as very satisfactory. The clergy were with him, with the exception of some upon whom the Abbé Menais (?) had produced an effect by seeking to prove that the Christian religion was democratic and theocratic; but the people were profoundly religious and obedient, and were led by the priests, who looked to him to support them. The people in this country were proprietors, and were Conservative; his strength lay in them, and in the power they had over the elections; there were three times as many electors as in France, the franchise being much lower, so that the people of the country by their votes overbalanced

* See "Letters of Queen Victoria," vol. i., chap. ix.

those of the towns, who were more Radical. He said it was a curious fact that here the democratic party, seeing the effect of the franchise, wanted to raise it, but he never would consent to such a change. The country was much more solidly established than France or the greater part of Germany; the only disturbance which had taken place since his accession had been in favour of the Government, upon the affair of the subscription to buy the Prince of Orange's horses; he regretted all such movements, but liked them better to be in his favour than the contrary.

The settlement with Holland* with which the Conference in London was charged was a difficult matter; he must take advantage of the admission in the former protocols, that, if there was any error in the calculation of the sum he was to pay, it might be reconsidered; that there certainly were errors, perhaps not in his favour, but they would be a legitimate ground for opening the question, and that £800,000 a year, which was the sum fixed, was too much for him to get his Legislative Assembly to agree to pay now that all alarm as to their independence had passed away. The Northern Powers in ratifying the articles had made reserves, holding a power to reopen discussion upon them; they had done it to favour the King of Holland, but he now invoked this reserve with a view to his own objects. The feeling in favour of a connection with Holland he considered as almost entirely gone by. All the money now raised in the country was spent in it; the employees were all of the country's; the army was now (and he showed me the returns) effective—82,000 of the line—and with Landwehr 110,000 (42,000 were now present under arms).

* Concerning the possession of Luxemburg.



LEOPOLD I. KING OF THE BELGIANS.

From a pastel drawing by Sir G. Hayter.

He had a great advantage by the railroads ; he kept the whole administration in his own hands, which enabled him to employ a vast mass of employees, and by their means in a couple of hours he could bring 2,000 men from Louvain to this place, or move any number to any point which was menaced with disturbance. This was much better than to have a garrison in large towns where the soldiers got acquainted with the people of the town ; now he could bring them to act like strangers. That by degrees he was getting better laws enacted, giving him greater authority.

With respect to England, he had a great affection for the Duke, and he had acted with him on some points, and more particularly with regard to the army, so as to prevent the great mischief which was menaced by changing the power over it to the hands of the Secretary of War, who would be responsible to the House of Commons. He had told Lord Melbourne that if he consented to it, with the state of ignorance in which the Queen must be on such a point, he would dishonour himself ; yet he had reason to believe a part of the Government were still driving at it. He knew they had this spring, and even later, been employed in getting information as to the way the *Ministre de la Guerre* managed the army in France, and that, if it had not been for the Canada affair,* several of the Government would not have consented to bring forward the estimates asked this year without the contemplated change. Lord Howick† was the

* A quarrel concerning the legislation of Canada had broken out between the Upper and Lower Provinces. Lord Durham was sent out to report on the best method of readjustment, and the two provinces were united under a single Legislative Chamber in 1840.

† Second Earl Grey.

person who pressed it most, and he did not yet know whether Lord Melbourne would have the determination to say they must bring it forward without him. Those in favour of it said the army was Tory. He replied: "Can you wish to see any other army in England?" The Duke told him last year it was much better the present Government should go on than that, by a change which might not be maintained, another Government should be formed; the risk would then be that the democratic spirit might gain; that he had difficulty in persuading the ardent spirits of his party of this, but that all the *long heads* agreed with him, and that Peel coincided in this opinion. The King said the Duke had proved the truth of his declaration, for that upon the Canada question, as upon others, he might have turned out the Government, but that he kept them in; and he was very much amused with the last ridiculous caricature which had been sent him, of Peel carrying J. Russell over a difficulty, and Melbourne taking hold of the Duke while B—— and [blank] were pelting him.

He considered the Rhenish provinces of Prussia in a very bad state; the nobles, clergy, mercantile bodies, and the whole people, were against the Government; the employees were only in part in their favour. He spoke of the Queen,* his niece, as not able to judge of political questions, and not seeking to do so; she had, however, endeavoured to master the question of ballot, and he thought it would not be as dangerous as many people believed, because he had always observed the well-intentioned were timid, and would not come forward to expose themselves, but if they were covered by the ballot they would not be afraid,

* Queen Victoria.

and would vote in secret against the Radicals, which they dared not do if their votes were known.

With respect to England, he felt that he need take no heed about it; whatever happened, it would not immediately affect him, but in his conscience he had a desire to see it prosperous, and a bulwark against the revolutionary spirit; and his first object was to save the army, and if he effected that he thought he should alone by that service entitle himself to the thanks of all good Englishmen.

There were some other points on which he had taken an interest, and should not cease to do so, and on which he should act with the Duke.

*Memorandum of conversation at Laeken with King
Leopold.*

October 12th, 1840.

The King said the state of affairs was very serious, and there was the greatest agitation in France. He had heard yesterday from the King of France* that he had had very stormy councils, and with difficulty had prevented some violent measures from being taken; that he had convoked the Chambers, and he hoped from their meeting some explanations would take place; that he had transmitted a note by M. Thiers to the English Government, which was, in Leopold's opinion, well reasoned, able, and calm, and that it entered into all the points of the negotiation, and attached itself particularly to the mode in which the Convention had been signed in secret by the four Powers; that the manner of concluding it was in appearance offensive. All the other points were touched upon, and the King thought it was done in

* Louis Philippe.

a manner which might make it easy for the British Government to reply in a spirit of conciliation; that he (the King) had written to the Duke of Wellington, begging him to renew the declaration of his opinion to Lord Melbourne such as he had given him at Windsor. The Duke had then stated that, although he had then contemplated formerly an arrangement which would not have left St. Jean d'Acre to the Pasha, yet he had always considered it to be the first consequence to maintain the alliance with France. While that lasted France was tied down, and could not invade other countries; but if she was set loose it was impossible to say what mischief she might do, and although she might in the end not be successful, yet there was such a force and vitality in the country that she would not end with much harm to herself. He would therefore give up his original feeling as to St. Jean d'Acre.

The Duke also thought the proceeding of the signature of the treaty in secret was unwise. Lord Melbourne agreed in all the Duke said, but Palmerston only seized upon the expression as to *Acre*, saying: "You see the Duke would have gone farther than I have."

The King's desire that this communication from the Duke should be obtained was for the purpose of forwarding it to Palmerston, who was the only person to be converted, as Melbourne was already persuaded by the Duke's opinion, but he had not energy enough to enforce it on Palmerston.

Before Bülow* left England it had been agreed that Palmerston in his *note explicatoire* should state, in deference to the French, that the Convention of the

* Prussian Minister in London.

four Powers regulated only a part of the Turkish Question; that it was hoped and expected that France would join them in discussing and settling the remaining great points. Bülow had some fear that, notwithstanding the agreement, Palmerston would avoid it, and he begged the King to see it done before he left England. The King tried in vain to have this done, and the consequence was the note contained nothing of the sort.

Metternich had made three propositions nearly of the same tendency; but Palmerston had rejected them, saying that France had no cause for war, and would not and could not attempt it.

The King (Louis Philippe) felt that he had maintained himself and kept France quiet for the last ten years by enabling the French to feel that he had upheld the dignity of the nation, and had not lowered them in the estimation of Europe; but he thought, and the moderate and well-thinking people also thought, that in the present case the nation was lowered and their position degraded, and if such was the feeling of the nation he could not maintain himself, and the others to whom he alluded would run any risk and make any sacrifice to resist it.

Lord Ponsonby,* it seems, had gone beyond the letter of the Convention in getting the Porte to deprive the Pasha of the government of Egypt; that the Convention said: "After the Pasha shall have refused the terms proposed, the four Powers are to be consulted and decide on further measures." Prince Metternich therefore complained loudly of this proceeding, and Palmerston coincided in this feeling. The French were inclined to order their fleet to proceed to

* Ambassador at Constantinople.

Alexandria to protect the Pasha from this violence, but fortunately this had not been done ; for the King felt, if it had been, some collision might have ensued, and great mischief have followed. He felt now this might be the means of coming to some amicable explanations ; and if Acre and something more than was last proposed to France was left with Egypt to the Pasha, France might feel her dignity respected, and a satisfactory arrangement might be come to.

The conduct of M. Pontois in menacing the Porte had been explained, and the King thought nothing more would come of that discussion. The King had written to the Duke on all these points, and he expected to get an answer from him which he might send to Melbourne, whom he knew was desirous of following the Duke's opinion.

In the Cabinet, Melbourne, Normanby, Lord Holland, and Baring, were against Palmerston, and desired some concession to France to prevent war, but as yet Palmerston carried the negotiation entirely his own way ; that he felt he was supported by the Conservatives, but he must feel that Mr. Hume and O'Connell would not support a war. Therefore, how (with his divided party) was he to hope to carry it on ?

The Russians had played a clever game ; they were in possession of Armenia, and might march upon Ezeroum and Bagdad, and to the valley of the Tigris, and nothing could ever get them out. That in Belgium he (the King) felt he could maintain his neutrality, that his army could immediately be fitted up to 70,000 men ; but he feared nothing as long as a regular and the present Government existed in France, but if war broke out he expected revolution, and then he must

defend himself; that the people, with the exception of some *Industrielle*, would never submit to become French, and the religious feeling of the people would prevent it.

The British Cabinet had formed a singular opinion, which was that because the Emperor of Russia disliked the French Revolution, so the two Governments could never come into alliance, which he was convinced was a mistake; for the French would be desirous of that alliance, by which they might, by allowing Russia to make conquests in Asia, do the same for themselves in Europe; M. Guizot had said to him that for the last ten years France had been faithful to the alliance with England, which must be allowed to be one of a very quiescent and unprofitable nature. That the French were indignant at the treaties of '14 and '15; but while their dignity was respected they had borne with them, but if that was attacked they would undoubtedly seek to break them. That the conduct of the British Cabinet in Spain* was detestable he (the King) had told them all when they gave the Order of the Bath to Espartero.† That a man who could allow, in the presence of the army he commanded, his Queen to be insulted as Christina had been at Barcelona must be a man without honour or principle, and a disgrace to his profession. That they all flew at him for this declaration—Clarendon

* Civil war had broken out in Spain and Portugal concerning the succession to the thrones. In Portugal, Don Pedro claimed the throne for his daughter Maria against his brother Miguel. In Spain, Don Carlos was excluded in favour of his infant niece Isabella. Miguel and Don Carlos made common cause, and were supported by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, England and France upholding the cause of Maria and Isabella.

† General Espartero, Duke of Vittoria. He was appointed Regent of Spain for the infant Isabella when Queen Christina abdicated that post.

more than the others; but that it was all his doing, that the Spanish nation was now completely ruined, the Junta of Madrid was now the Commune of Paris of 1791 and 1792. The conduct in Portugal was just the same; whenever there was a chance of forming a moderate Government the British Government insisted upon more liberality, and upset every attempt at good government. Queen Victoria was as anxious to preserve peace as anybody could be, but she did not know how to act; she expressed herself to Melbourne, but he slept and let Palmerston do what he liked; that thus Palmerston was Minister and King, for he had no control over him. That he (the King) was persuaded, if King William had been alive, he never would have allowed a menace of war to have taken place about a ridiculous pashalik in Syria, and no administration would have dared go against his determination; but the young Queen did not know how to take a line and make herself respected. To conclude, he looked with great hopes to the opening which had been offered by the note of M. Thiers, if a conciliatory disposition was shown by the British Cabinet; he looked with hope to the interference of the Duke, and to the rectifying the error of Lord Ponsonby upon the decree for superseding the Pasha, and he hoped that at the meeting of the Chambers these explanations might be found satisfactory.

King Leopold to Lord Burghersh. [Private.]

MY DEAR BURGHESH,

LAEKEN,
October 15th, 1840.

Receive my best thanks for your kind note. Your statement is extremely clear and correct. Within a small compass you have in this way the

whole question as it really stands. Our excellent friend at Walmer,* who is more than anyone else distinguished by the quickness with which he finds out the practical side of a question, will, I trust, see that what you mention is the way to get out of our great difficulties.

My letters from London say that Ministers are pleased and well disposed. From Paris the news are that the interior agitation is augmenting, and that, if some conciliatory communication does not arrive from London *soon*, it *may be too late*.

King Leopold to Lord Burghersh. [Private.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

LAEKEN,
October 20th, 1840.

I find, from a letter of the Duke's of the 13th, that his idea now is that Mehemet Ali should keep nothing of Syria. To make this a question of war appears to me really not justifiable. If the Porte was a healthy State it would be different, but now, if even one went to war for it, would any reasonable creature be justified for doing so ?

Even for the Porte it is of the highest importance that no great European war should take place, and that the arrangements with Mehemet should be settled amicably.

In the ruinous state in which the Porte is at present she cannot stand much shaking; and if she was to tumble down, we know well enough who would pick up the materials.

If the expedition to the Court of Syria is strong enough to occupy Syria, of course there is an end of it ;

* The Duke of Wellington.

but this seems difficult, and it is believed that it will not succeed. If that happens, it is clear the Powers must come to an understanding, and to some compromise, some splitting of the difference.

France seems disposed to make large concessions, so that the Porte would get the greater part of Syria back; but it is really impossible, except by main force, to wring *every* part of Syria from Mehemet, when one did not succeed in taking it from him before now. Continental Europe, besides, will not bear to be made to get the chestnuts out of the fire for such an object; people kick beyond measure at having to suffer for Syria.

Really and truly it would be of the greatest importance that our dear Duke should relent, and not exact the whole pound. I am sure it could not be had without a good deal of bloodshed.

Forgive this hasty scrawl, and offer my homage to Lady Burghersh and Lord Maryborough.*

Ever yours,

LEOPOLD.

Lord Burghersh to King Leopold.

DEAL CASTLE,
October 25th, 1840.

SIRE,

I have had the honour of receiving your Majesty's two letters. I have this day seen the Duke of Wellington, who read to me the letter he had addressed to your Majesty on (I think) the 14th or 15th of this month, and which goes into the whole case of the present discussions on the Eastern Question.

* Lord Burghersh's father-in-law, created Lord Maryborough in 1821. He was at this time Captain of Deal Castle.

Upon the point to which your Majesty refers in your last letter to me—namely, the retention by the Pasha of Egypt of the fortress of Acre—the feeling of the Duke is this: “If you desire to give serenity and independence to the Porte, you must remove the Pasha of Egypt from Syria altogether, and place the desert between the possessions you leave him and those that are to return to the Porte.” This he considers as the only secure line of boundary between the aggressive and the defensive state, and he considers France as much interested in this object (the independence of the Porte) as any other State in Europe. If you are not seriously determined to obtain that object, then any other line might serve as well, or you might as well give up the object altogether. This is the view the Duke takes upon this part of the case, and which differs from that upon which the treaty of July 15th was negotiated.

Upon the other points to which the Duke has alluded in his letter to your Majesty, his views are so clearly set forth, and so ably discussed, that, fairly interpreted and acted up to, I cannot but believe they must lead to the maintenance of peace between France and England, to the independence of the Porte, and to the return of confidence in the preservation of tranquillity in the other States of Europe. But while I am writing this to your Majesty, the change of Government which is taking place in Paris* may alter the whole aspect of affairs, and may tend to facilitate the honest exertions of every good man to avert the calamity of war. Of a war which certainly was never contemplated by those who are accused of having made it imminent, because no offence, no injustice, and no want of consideration

* Guizot succeeded Thiers as Prime Minister on October 24th.

for the interests of France, could have entered into the mind of those who brought about the treaty which is made the groundwork of it. I will therefore conclude this letter by expressing my anxious hopes that your Majesty's exertions to accomplish this great object, *Peace*, may be crowned with the success they deserve, and I shall at all times be most happy to be entirely at your Majesty's disposition in any way in which I can be of service to you.

King Leopold to Lord Burghersh. [Private.]

December 5th, 1840.

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

I have to thank you and Lady Burghersh for the truly beautiful engraving of her excellent portrait of Lady Mornington, which is safely arrived, and which has highly gratified me.

I am very curious to hear your opinion on what has passed in Syria. The fleet has acted with a spirit and gallantry worthy of the best times of the British navy. Palmerston has had, however, it must be confessed, uncommon good luck to get a place like St. Jean d'Acre after four hours' bombardment; it is an uncommon circumstance. God grant that Mehemet may accept the terms which are offered him, and that in that way the execution of the treaty of July may be closed. If this is done, the Syrian Question will be over; but the European remains behind, and we shall have a very uncomfortable state of affairs on the Continent. I fear that this is the beginning of the end of the treaties of 1815, to which we may flatter ourselves to have contributed our share.

*Lord Burghersh to King Leopold.**December 18th, 1840.*

I am glad your Majesty thinks so highly of the spirit and gallantry with which the attack upon Acre was made by the fleet; I consider the taking up such a position in front, and close to such a line of fortification, from whence there could be no retreat, one of the boldest attempts that has ever been made. The result was truly fortunate, although such a result, when fighting against Eastern troops, is not entirely to be unlooked for. Yet Palmerston may certainly congratulate himself upon this great and easily-acquired success.

I have this day read the Convention between the Pasha and Captain Napier, and I understand that Palmerston is somewhat embarrassed by it; in truth, it acknowledges the principle which he has been combating—viz., that the allies should assume the right of dictation to the Porte upon the arrangements it shall make with one of its own subjects. Save this (the form in which the Convention is drawn up), it must be a most satisfactory thing to see the Eastern Question thus terminated. I am afraid this will not satisfy our *late allies*, the French. When, however, they shall have seen that none of the consequences which they foresaw, the *partition of Turkey*, the *establishment of the English at Suez*, etc., have taken place, and that nothing has been done, or was sought to be done, to injure their fair interests (if they meant fairly by us, and did not want to get an ally with whom to drive us out of the Mediterranean), I cannot but think they will find they have abused us more than we deserved, and will return to be as good friends with us as the rivalry of feelings and of sentiment will allow them. At present

it would seem as if every party in France were trying to captivate the public ear by the *quantum* of its abuse of us. I regret this very much ; it was natural in one part of the French people, it is lamentable that it should have extended to the whole.

With respect to the treaties of 1815 I conceive them to be the great security of the monarchy and the men of worth and property in France. Fortunately, by the great exertions of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh, in conjunction with the Emperor Alexander, France at that time was saved from the partition with which, your Majesty well knows, it was menaced. It has therefore no affront to revenge, except the being obliged, by the events of war, to return within its own limits. If, therefore, it now rises up against these treaties, it must be in the spirit of conquest and revolution, which would probably overturn the monarchy and bring anarchy and blood upon the people.

The armed attitude of France, after the cessation of hostilities in the East, would appear to be uncalled for ; but I conceive the difficulty for the French Government now to be to put a stop to it, although I am told to-day that the Austrian and Prussian Governments have taken some steps upon the subject, the necessity for which I should very sincerely lament.

Upon the whole question as it now stands, I feel persuaded that, by prudent and conciliatory conduct on the part of England and the allies towards France, backed, as I have no doubt it would be, by your Majesty's acknowledged influence upon all parties, that the peace of Europe will be maintained, and the reconciliation of those who in reality had no cause of quarrel be effected.

Lord Burghersh succeeded to the title of Lord Westmorland on the death of his father in 1841. The Tory Government had come into power again that same year, and he was appointed Minister at Berlin.

This was the beginning of the Victorian Age, and England was entering upon a new era. As yet, those of the older school thought that all they held most dear must be swept away by the measures of reform already being introduced. Of those reforms we reap the benefit, and it seems as though to our generation another parting of the ways had come. When the horizon is dark and the choice difficult, shall not our best inspiration come from the knowledge that our fathers were beset by similar difficulties, and met them with a courage that gave them victory on the battlefield, and power to use that victory to the benefit of their own and other countries ?

INDEX

- ACADEMY OF MUSIC:** founded by Burghersh, 252; financial difficulties of, 259
- A'Court, Sir William:** British Minister at Palermo, 97; on the force in Sicily available to resist Murat, 139; on the Jacobinism of the House of Commons, 159; Burghersh's advice to, 160, 168; his reports and action as regards the trial and execution of Murat, 197 *et seq.*; on affairs at Naples (July, 1816), 214, 215
- Acre,** capture of (1840), 277, 282, 290, 291
- Adey, Captain,** (H.M.S. *Partridge*), 69, 79, 96; and Napoleon's escape from Elba, 101 *et seq.*, 121
- Albuera,** battle of (May, 1811), 48
- Alexander, Emperor of Russia:** at the Congress of Vienna, 99; his scene with Wellington, 181; Lord Stewart's opinion of him, 220; and the Greek insurrection, 243
- Alexandria** occupied (1807), 11
- Alvarez:** Lord Hill's successful action at (May, 1812), 51 (and note); its effect, 52
- America,** ratification of peace with, 137
- d'Angoulême, Duchesse,** 210
- Apponyi** appointed Austrian Ambassador to Naples, 221
- Army of the Mediterranean,** break up of the, 156
- Army:** control of the, 279; promotion scandals, 18
- Archduke Charles,** 147
- Archduke Ferdinand,** 147
- Archduke John,** 147
- Art treasures,** confiscated by Napoleon, restored by the Treaty of Paris, 191
- Augereau, Duc de Castiglione,** 120
- Austria:** attitude of, towards Murat, 82 *et seq.*; towards the revolution in Naples (1820), 226, 228, 231 *et seq.*
- Austrian troops:** their behaviour towards the Italians, 92; the plan of campaign against Murat, 151
- Badajoz:** surrendered to the French by Imaz (February, 1811), 47; blockaded by Wellington, 49; its effect on Wellington's plans, 48 *et seq.*; captured by Wellington, 51 (and note)
- Bandini, Mr.,** 185
- Bathurst, Lord,** orders the break up of the army of the Mediterranean, 156
- Belgium,** state of, in 1838, 277
- Bellegarde, Marshal** (Austrian commander), 124, 127, 146
- Bentinck, Lord William,** 112; on Murat's movement, 129; on Sir Neil Campbell, 130; Murat to be destroyed, 154; he suspends an order from Lord Bathurst to break up the army of the Mediterranean, 156
- Berri, Duc de,** 210 (and note)
- Berthier, Marshal,** 173
- Bertrand, General Count,** accompanies Napoleon from Elba, 113
- Bianchi** (Austrian commander), defeats Murat at Tolentino, 145
- Binda, Mr.,** capture and release of, 152
- Blücher:** accident to, 209; and the Duchesse d'Angoulême, 210
- Bonaparte.** See Napoleon
- Borgo, Pozzo di,** on the state of France (September, 1815), 207
- Bourbon Restoration** (1815), 205 *et seq.*

- Brighton, Lord and Lady Burghersh at, 268, 270
- Brulart, M., appointed by Napoleon to be Governor in Corsica, 76
- Brussels, 181
- Brympton, Lord Westmorland's estate, 30
- Burghersh, Lady, 17, 46 (and note), 56, 57, 88, 119, 187, 188, 249, 261, 265, 266
- Burghersh, Lord : birth and parentage, 1 ; at Cheam School and Harrow, 2 ; enters the army (1802), *ibid.* ; visits the battle-fields of the Rhine, 2, 4 ; questions of his promotion, 5, 17 *et seq.*, 28, 45 ; with his regiment in Sicily, 6 ; joins Wellington in the Peninsula, 13 ; serves as his aide-de-camp, 17 ; invalidated home, *ibid.* ; marries Wellington's niece (Miss Wellesley Pole), 17 ; returns to regimental duty, *ibid.*, 46 ; his account of Talavera, 23 *et seq.* ; his anxiety for higher employment, 29, 30 ; his report to Wellington on the condition of the south of Spain, 31 *et seq.* ; her valueless army, 40 ; the Walcheren failure, 42 ; his case in the House of Commons, 43 ; leaves the Peninsula (1811), 46 ; appointed British Commissioner with the Austrian army in 1813, 53 ; arrives at Berlin and proceeds to Frankfurt to join the Austrian headquarters, 53 ; at the occupation of Paris in 1814, 58 ; named a Commissioner to attend Napoleon to Elba, 59 ; appointed Minister to the Court of Tuscany, 61 ; does not believe in the feasibility of Italian unity, 93, 94 ; his anti-Austrian views, 227 ; sends news of Napoleon's escape to Castlereagh, 106 ; reports unfavourably on Sir Neil Campbell to Castlereagh, 108 ; informs Lord William Bentinck that Murat has advanced against the Austrians, 138 ; directs Captain Campbell, R.N., to act with the Austrians, 142 ; orders General Macfarlane to co-operate from Sicily, 162 ; advises the Austrian General Bianchi as to the terms which may be offered to Murat, 163 ; explains to Castlereagh his reasons for signing the Convention with Murat, 168 ; decorated by King Ferdinand with the Order of St. Ferdinand, 186 ; receives news of Waterloo, 188 ; describes the state of France to his father (July, 1815), 189 ; is robbed of his Order of St. Ferdinand, 190 ; advocates the restoration to Tuscany of the works of art carried off by the French, 191 ; his opinion of Austrian severity towards Naples, 233 ; on the chances of the Neapolitan revolutionaries being successful (against Austria), 239, 240 ; on National Independence, 240 ; on Austria's right to invade Italy and interfere in Italian government, 245 *et seq.* ; the latter years of his mission at Florence, 252 ; returns to England (1830), 253 ; resigns his post, *ibid.* ; offer of the mission to Spain, 252, 262 ; his opera "Torneo," 266 ; his Mass for full orchestra, 267 ; interview and correspondence with King Leopold, 277 *et seq.* ; on the Syrian question, 291
- Cambridge, Duke of, 228
- Cambron, Count, accompanies Napoleon from Elba, 113
- Campbell, Captain, R.N., 124, 141, 143.
- Campbell, Colonel Neil : Commissioner with Napoleon at Elba, 59, 64 ; on a rumour of Marie Louise's divorce, 69 ; on Napoleon's plan to invade England, 79, 80, 81 ; reports the believed intention of Napoleon to escape, 102 ; reports his escape, 105 ; Burghersh's letter to Castlereagh on Campbell's conduct, 108 ; Lord William Bentinck on, 130 ; returns to London, 178 ; his explanations to Ministers, *ibid.* ; Castlereagh's letter to Wellington on his return to regimental duty, 182 (note)
- Campochiaro, Murat's envoy to the Congress of Vienna, 146
- Canada, Lord Durham's mission, 279 (note)
- Canning, Mr., 251, 253, 255 ; and Wellington, 257 ; becomes Prime Minister, 258 ; dies, 262
- Carbonari, the, their objects and methods, 200, 201
- Caroline, Queen of Naples (wife of Ferdinand), 165 (note)

- Caroline Murat, 165 (note), 169
 Castlereagh, Lord: his letter about Burghersh's promotion, 17; offers to send Burghersh as Commissioner to Elba (1814), 59; letter to Wellington commending Sir N. Campbell, 182; on Burghersh's reprobation of Austrian severity to Naples, 231 *et seq.*; his position as Foreign Secretary, 251; his death, 251, 253
 Caulaincourt, Duke de Vicenza, 56 (note), 137
 Chatham, Lord, and the Walcheren Expedition, 42
 Châtillon, proposed treaty of, 79
 Church, Colonel, commands Ferdinand's Neapolitans, 157, 160, 175
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 171, 172
 Cholera in Sunderland (1831), Lord Londonderry on the, 269
 Circello, M. de, Neapolitan Prime Minister, 202
 Ciudad Rodrigo, 51 (and note)
 Clancarty, Lord, on Napoleon's relation to the Jacobins (1815), 172; goes to Frankfort, 209, 213
 Cleveland, Lord, and the Whigs, 269, 271
 Cole, Sir Lowry, 184
 Congress of Vienna, 98, 99, 173, 174, 175
 Constantinople, abortive British expedition against (February, 1807), 7
 Conyngham, Marquis of, 259
 Cooke, W., English agent at Rome, 130
 Dalrymple, Sir John: his conversations with Murat, 131 *et seq.*; his estimate of Murat's force, 146, 158; to be sent to the Ionian Islands as Brigadier, 156; Bentinck's opinion of, 168
 Dardanelles, naval action in the (1807), 7, 9
 Drouot, General Count, accompanies Napoleon from Elba, 113
 Dudley, Lord, made an Earl (1827), 262
 Duel between Canning and Castlereagh, 36 (and note)
 Duncannon, Lady, 41
 Duroc, Maréchal, 43
 Eastern Question in 1840, the (Syria and Mehemet Ali) 275 *et seq.*; Duke of Wellington on, 288
 Egypt, 10, 11; Mehemet Ali and, 275, 276, 283, 286
 Elba: Napoleon at, 69, 70, 71, 72; his escape from, 105 *et seq.*
 d'Enghien, the Duc, Napoleon on his fate, 74 (note)
 England, Napoleon's scheme for invading, 79, 80
 English, behaviour of the, abroad and at home, 181
 Espartero, Duke of Vittoria, appointed Regent of Spain, 285
 Esterhazy, Prince, Austrian Minister in Tuscany, 66
 Exmouth, Lord, describes the embarkation of Caroline Murat and the occupation of Naples by Austrian troops, 166
 Eylau, Battle, of 12 (note)
 Fane, Hon. Julian, 261 (note)
 Ferdinand, King of Spain, 56
 Ferdinand, King of Naples: restoration of, 169, 170, 226, his entry into Naples, 185; the revolution of 1820, 226, 234, 235; his repudiation of his promises, 227, 236
 Florida, Duchess of, on the revolution in Naples (1820), 234
 Foreign Office, economies to be expected at the, 214
 Fossombroni: Tuscan Minister for Foreign Affairs, 63; on the defensive forces in Tuscany, 95; on steps to be taken on Napoleon's return to France, 125
 France, state of, in 1814, 55; in 1840, 215
 Fraser, General, commanding in Egypt, 9
 French people, Wellington on the, 55
 Frimont, Austrian Commander-in-Chief, 140, 145, 146, 147, 154, 155, 241
 Gaeta, bombardment of, 215
 Genoa: fortifications of, erected by the labour of British soldiers, 212; arrest of the Governor (1821), 247
 Goderich, Lord, 262
 Gordon, Sir Robert, 237
 Grattan, Mr., present at Napoleon's embarkation from Elba, 105, 106
 Grey, Earl, and the Reform question, 268
 Guizot, 276, 285, 289

- Hardinge, Sir Henry : at Waterloo, 188 ; loss of office (1827), 259.
- Hill, Lord, arrives at Brussels as second in command (1815), 181
- Holland, Lord, suggests a constitution for the kingdom of Naples, 152, 153
- Hornby, Captain, commanding naval force off Elba, 193
- Huskisson, Mr., 262.
- Italy : project for uniting all under Murat, 82 *et seq.* ; general question of the unity of, 92, 93, 94 ; the original causes of the new patriotism of Italians, 227 ; Burghersh's letter on National Independence, 240
- Jablonski, Prince : appointed Austrian Minister at Naples, 214, 218 ; Ambassador to Spain, 221
- Jacobins, the : and Napoleon (1815), 172 ; in Italy, 212
- Jersey (Sarah), Countess of, 43
- Juntas, Spanish, their dislike of England, 33, 34
- Lansdowne, Lord, his health (1827), 262
- Lapis, Mr. : left Governor of Elba by Napoleon, 105 ; his proclamation on Napoleon's escape, 108
- Lavalette, trial of, 211 (and note)
- Lawrence, Sir Thomas : at Vienna, 221 ; his mission from the Prince Regent to paint foreign celebrities, 222 ; his death, 267
- Lebelle, Colonel, accompanies Napoleon from Elba, 113
- Leopold, Prince (of Sicily) : enters Naples, 169 ; his administration of the War Department, 201
- Leopold, King of the Belgians, 277 ; on Wellington and the control of the army, 279 ; on Queen Victoria, 280 ; on the Convention of London (1840), 281 ; on Lord Palmerston's Egyptian policy, 282, 284 ; on France and Russia, 285 ; on Spain and Portugal, 285, 286 ; on the capture of Acre, 290
- Lieven, Madame de, 257
- Liverpool, Lord, his retirement (1827), 257
- London, Convention of (1840), 276
- Louis XVIII., 172, 174, 175 ; his second restoration, 205
- Louis Philippe and Mehemet Ali, 276, 283
- Macfarlane, Lieutenant-General : commands in Sicily, 153 ; Burghersh instructs him to support General Nugent, 162, 168 ; Lord Bathurst orders his force to Genoa, 186
- Macirone, Colonel (aide-de-camp to Murat), 91, 195 (note)
- Maitland, Sir Thomas, to be Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, 213, 216
- Marie Louise, Empress (and Archduchess of Parma) : a report of her being divorced, 69, 75 ; her letters to Napoleon intercepted, 69 (note), 75 ; claims her right to the Duchy of Parma, 99 ; kindness to Burghersh, 217, 252, 266 ; affection for Lady Burghersh, *ibid.*
- Marmont, Duc de Ragusa, refuses to join Napoleon, 120
- Marseilles during the hundred days, 173, 176
- Massena, Marshal, 120
- Medici, M. de, Neapolitan Minister of Finance, 202, 234, 235
- Mediterranean, Lord Bathurst's despatch ordering the break of the army of the, 156
- Mehemet Ali, 275 *et seq.*
- Metternich : at the Congress of Vienna, 98, 99, 219 ; and the revolution at Naples (1820), 226
- Modena, Duke of, 243
- Mornington, Lady, portrait of, 290
- Murat, King of Naples : his position in 1814, 61 *et seq.* ; his intrigues with Napoleon at Elba, 65, 67 ; his misgovernment, 67, 68 ; Napoleon's opinion (to Sir Neil Campbell), 78 ; his attitude towards Austria, 82 *et seq.* ; determines to defy the Congress of Vienna, 91 ; his action on Napoleon's return from Elba, 123, 127, 131 ; his conversation with Sir John Dalrymple, 131 *et seq.* ; Wellington's opinion of, 134 ; crosses the Pesaro and attacks the Austrians, 138, 144 ; Bentinck's opinion of, 146 ; his proclamations a failure, 149 ; totally defeated at Tolentino, 145 ; Burghersh advises Bianchi as to terms to be offered him, 163 ;

- leaves Naples in disguise, 169; settles near Toulon, 192; after Waterloo he escapes from France to Corsica, *ibid.*; sails for Italy, 196, 197; lands at Pizzo, is captured, tried, and shot, 198 *et seq.*
- Napoleon: his unpopularity in 1814, 55; his treaty with Ferdinand, King of Spain, 56; Burghersh named to attend him to Elba, 59; Colonel Neil Campbell appointed instead, 59; on Marie Louise's reported divorce, 69, 75; his his visitors at Elba, 70, 71, 72; on Marie Louise being kept from him, 75; on Brulart's appointment, 76; on Murat, 78; his plan for invading England, 79; Colonel Sir N. Campbell reports suspicious movements, 103; and that Napoleon had sailed from Elba, 105; Mr. Grattan's account of his embarkation, 105; Mr. Ricci's account, 106, 107; list of persons who accompanied him, 113; his landing and advance, 116; his proclamations, 117; his arrival in Paris, 136; Waterloo, 188; he reaches St. Helena, 213
- Naples: the claims of Murat and Ferdinand, 61, 62; Murat's bad government of, 65, 66, 67; the Neapolitans rejoice at the restoration of Ferdinand, 169, 170, 185; personnel of Ferdinand's new Government, 202; the revolution of 1820 at, 226, 230, 244; hatred of Austrian rule, 227.
- Narbonne, Count de, French Minister to Naples, 97
- Neipperg advances against Murat, 144
- Ney, Marshal, his trial, 209, 211
- Nugent, General Count: at Pistoja, 148; advances against Murat, 150; Macfarlane to support him, 162; and the revolution at Naples, (1820), 234
- Opera ("Torneo") composed by Lord Burghersh, 266
- Oxford, Lord, 98
- Palermo, Mr. Vaughan's account of the Parliament of (1815), 89
- Palmerston, Lord, and the capture of Acre (1840), 282; his masterfulness, 286
- Pauline Bonaparte (Princess Borghese) at Elba, 102, 105; at Lucca, 125
- Peel, Sir Robert, 255
- Peninsula club, proposal to form a, 179, 183
- Peninsular War, the, 15
- Penrose, Admiral, 142, 158
- Pepe, General, commanding the revolutionary troops at Naples (1820), 239
- Petersham, Lord, 9
- Picton, Sir Thomas, 184
- Pope, diplomatic communications with the, 253, 264, 265
- Pole, Miss Priscilla Wellesley, Lord Burghersh marries, 17, 46 (and note). See also Burghersh, Lady
- Polignac, Count Jules, 88
- Portugal: troops required for (1809), 21; Civil War in 1840, 285
- Promotion in the Army scandals, 18 (note)
- Queen Caroline (of England), trial of, 228
- Queen Caroline of Naples (Ferdinand's wife), 165 (note)
- Queen Caroline (Murat's wife), 165 (note), 169
- Rainier, Archduke, 218
- Reform Bill, progress of the (1831), 268
- Restoration, the second Bourbon (1815), 205 *et seq.*
- Ricci, Mr. (Vice-Consul at Elba), and Napoleon's escape, 101, 102, 106 *et seq.*, 184
- Richelieu, Duc de: forms a government on Talleyrand's fall (1815), 205 *et seq.*; and the foreign troops in Paris, 211
- Rivoli, H.M.S., captures a French frigate off Naples, 160
- Roman Catholic bishoprics in Ireland, appointments to, 264, 267
- Rowley, Admiral Sir Josias, 193
- Russia seizes Moldavia and Wallachia, 11; Lord Londonderry on, 274
- St. Helena, Napoleon's arrival at, 213
- St. Petersburg, Lord Londonderry at, 272
- Schwarzenberg being painted by Sir Thomas Lawrence, 221

- Seaham Harbour, Lord Londonderry on, 270
- Seaham, Lord, 273
- Sicily: the Parliament at Palermo, 89; the revolution of 1820 in, 230
- Somerset, Lord Fitzroy: at Waterloo, 188; loss of office (1827), 259
- Spanish Army, the, 40, 55
- Spain: condition of the south of, 31 *et seq.*; the Juntas dislike England, 33, 34; apathy of the provinces, 37, 40; Wellington on Spanish character, 39; Burghersh on her army, 40; Wellington on the prospect in Spain (1810), 45; Civil War in 1840, 285
- Starhemberg, Count, his mission to Murat, 136 (note)
- Stewart, Lady, 219, 249
- Stewart, Lord (formerly Sir Charles and afterwards Marquess of Londonderry): Ambassador at Vienna, 98, 174 (note), 209 (note); on Napoleon's return from Elba, 110, 172; communicates certain decisions by the Congress of Vienna, 173; on the concentration of the allied armies against Napoleon (1815), 187; sends news of the Battle of Waterloo, 188; his marriage to Miss Vane Tempest, 219; change of name, 225 (note); becomes Marquis of Londonderry, 253 (note); his account of the state of parties in England (1823), 254; on the retirement of Liverpool and appointment of Canning, 257, 258
- Stuart, Sir Charles (afterwards Lord Stuart de Rothesay), 209 (and note)
- Suchet joins Napoleon after Elba, 136; arrives at Lyons, 154, 157; at Strasburg, 172
- Sultan of Turkey (Mahmud), 275
- Switzerland opposed to Napoleon, 131
- Syria and Mehemet Ali, 275 *et seq.*, 286, 287 *et seq.*
- Talavera, Burghersh's description of the battle of, 23 *et seq.*
- Talleyrand opposes Murat, 62; Napoleon's remarks to Sir Neil Campbell on, 73 *et seq.*
- Thompson, Captain (H.M.S. *Aboukir*), ordered to Genoa, 151
- Tolentino, Murat defeated at, 145
- Torres Vedras, 22
- Troppau Protocol, the, 226
- Troy, vestiges of, 9
- Turkey, revolution in (1821), 243
- Tuscany: Burghersh appointed British Minister to, 63; Government of the Grand Duke beloved, 93; want of troops, 95; question of re-establishment of convents formerly existing in, 195
- Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 275, 276
- Vaughan, Mr. (English Commissary in Sicily), his account of Ferdinand's Parliament of Palermo, 89
- Vernier, Colonel, commanding for France in Corsica, 193
- Vienna: Treaty of (1809), 38 (and note); Congress of, 98, 99, 173, 174, 175
- Walcheren Expedition, 42
- Wales, Princess of, in Naples, 86, 87, 98
- Waterloo: news of, reaches Burghersh, 188; Wellington's official despatch, 215
- Wellesley, Marquis, 40
- Wellington, Duke of: lands in Portugal, 12; recalled after Vimeiro, 15; sent out again and drives Soult from Oporto, *ibid.*; his advice to Burghersh about his promotion, 19, 45; his remarks on Burghersh's report on the condition of Granada and the South, 35; on the Spanish character, 39; condition of the army in Portugal (April, 1810), 44; on the loss of Badajoz (February, 1811), 47; its effect on his subsequent operations, 48 *et seq.*; on the effect of Hill's action at Almaraz, 51, 52; at the Congress of Vienna, 98; letter to Burghersh about Napoleon's return to France, 118; his opinion about Murat's action, 134; scene with the Emperor Alexander on Napoleon's escape, 181; the Duc de Berri calls him a "parvenu," 210; his difficulties with Canning and Liverpool, 255; his health (1824), 256; rivalry with Canning,

- 257; becomes Prime Minister, 261, 262 (note); declines for Burghersh the mission of Spain, 263; on the Pope's selection of Roman Catholic bishops, 264, 267; on the control of the army, 279, 280; on Mehemet Ali and the Syrian Question, 288
- Westmorland, tenth Earl of: father of Lord Burghersh, 1; his runaway marriage with Sarah Child, *ibid.*; appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland (1790), 2; state of his health (1823), 255; his treatment by Canning, 259
- Whig party, power of the, 271, 272
- Wilson, Sir Robert, 184
- Ypsilanti, General, degraded by the Emperor Alexander, 243

THE END

D
352
.8
W4A4
1912

Westmorland, John Fane
Correspondence of Lord
Burghersh

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
