


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
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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

EUROPEAN CRISIS.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
August 1914.*

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128	Sir F. Villiers ..	Telegraphic	1,	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium expects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power ..	67
129	Luxemburg Minister of State	2,	German Government have informed Luxemburg that the German military measures in that country do not constitute a hostile act, but are only to insure against attack from France..	67
130	To Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	1,	British merchant-ships have been detained at Hamburg. To request immediate release. Points out deplorable effect on British public opinion if detention continued ..	68

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131	To Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	Aug. 1, 1914	Russian Government report readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to objections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No. 97). Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication in order to avoid tension.	68
132	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	1,	Russia consents to British formula for basis of mediation (see No. 103) ..	68
133	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	1,	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with participation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's Government will assume direction of them	69
134	Sir F. Bertie ..	Telegraphic	1,	Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President justifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobilising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Government do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war ..	69
135	To Sir G. Buchanan. .	Telegraphic	1,	Has received reliable information that Austria-Hungary has informed German Government that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Military action would continue against Serbia for present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian counter measures would cease. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs	69
136	Sir F. Bertie ..	Telegraphic	1,	General mobilisation in France ordered owing to German military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ..	70
137	To Sir M. de Bunsen	Telegraphic	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrians will respect territorial integrity of Serbia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia	70
138	Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	1,	Conversation with German Secretary of State. German Government have ordered mobilisation. Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be regarded as creating a state of war. Russian Government will be so informed	70

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139	Sir G. Buchanan	.. Telegraphic	Aug. 1, 1914	Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Austrian domination of Serbia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Government and German preparations have forced Russian Government to order mobilisation, and mobilisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonof would adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans ..	71
140	Sir F. Bertie	.. Telegraphic	1,	French Minister for War has impressed on British military attaché that only way of securing peace was for Great Britain to take military action. Minister of War maintains that France has, by withdrawing from frontier, given proof of her desire to abstain from any provocative act ..	72
141	Sir M. de Bunsen	.. Telegraphic	1,	Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Excellency thinks that German Government desired war from the first. Explains nature of Russian mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain ..	72
142	Sir E. Goschen	.. Telegraphic	1,	General mobilisation of German army and navy	72
143	" "	.. Telegraphic	1,	Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of State has promised to send orders to release steamers without delay..	73
144	" "	.. Telegraphic	2,	German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are in a state of war.. .. .	73
145	" "	.. Telegraphic	2,	Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions taken	73
146	Sir F. Villiers	.. Telegraphic	2,	Belgian Government confirms report that German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg	73
147	Luxemburg Minister of State	Telegraphic	2,	Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representatives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State	73
148	To Sir F. Bertie	.. Telegraphic	2,	Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting protection by British fleet of French coasts or shipping subject to consent of Parliament. Question of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality	74

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150	Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	3,	Detention of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No information available ..	75
151	Sir F. Villiers ..	Telegraphic	3,	French Government have offered five army corps to Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers, and will decide later on their action	75
152	To Sir F. Bertie	3,	Communication from French Ambassador to effect that Italy does not consider <i>casus federis</i> has arisen	75
153	To Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	4,	Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have been informed that German Government have proposed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and of German threat in case of refusal. Belgian Government have declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance from German Government that they will not proceed with threat or violate Belgian neutrality ..	75
154	Sir F. Villiers ..	Telegraphic	4,	Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian reply, German Government have threatened to carry out their proposals by force	76
155	To Sir F. Villiers	4,	To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist attempt to infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Government prepared to join with Russia and France in assisting Belgian Government to resist German aggression and to guarantee independence and integrity in future years ..	76
156	To Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	4,	To demand immediate release of British ships detained in German ports ..	76
157	Communicated by German Ambassador	Telegraphic	4,	Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ..	76
158	Sir F. Villiers ..	Telegraphic	4,	German troops have entered Belgian territory. Liège summoned to surrender ..	77
159	To Sir E. Goschen ..	Telegraphic	4,	Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Unless German Government prepared to give assurance by 12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium, His Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passports and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold their treaty obligations ..	77

Correspondence respecting the European Crisis.

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 2.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

COUNT MENSENDORFF told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Serbia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Serbia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Serbia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that, if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Serbia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Serbia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Serbia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 4.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

“Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :—

“La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.”

Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

Cette tolérance coupable du Gouverne-

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THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade :—

“On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government :—

“‘Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.’”

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal

ment Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la "Narodna Odbrana," et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :—

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

"Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

"Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et repudie toute idée ou tentative

Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their "Official Journal" of the 13/26 July the following declaration :—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of inter-

d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le "Bulletin officiel" de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite "Narodna Odbrana," à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ;

des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de

fering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of the Army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;

5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory ; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto ;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch,

l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo,

8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière ;

à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note.

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo ;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations :—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lectures à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique ; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche - Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom ; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to

Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinovic, le nommé Milan Čiganovic et Trifko Grabež avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic.

2°. Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinovic et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic.

3°. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions :—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinovic, one Milan Čiganovic, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinovic, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganovic and Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depôt of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4°. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganovic enseigna à Princip, Čabrinovic et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5°. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinovic et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganovic.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganovic taught Princip, Čabrinovic, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinovic, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

NOTE addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

No. 8.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary.

The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitively to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between

Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13.

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.

(Translation.)

M. SAZONOF télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914 :

“La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

M. SAZONOF telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914 :

“The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

“ Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

“ En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

“ Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

“ Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne.

“ M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique adhèrera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.”

“ In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

“ In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

“ A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

“ Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.

“ M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.”

No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburg), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible ; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

No. 16.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

YOUR telegram of the 24th July* acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

* See No. 11.

No. 19.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

LANGUAGE of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nisch, where the Skuptchina will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

YOU spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

* See No. 6.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, that if what I contemplated, was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

“The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning.”

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

* See No. 21.

No. 28.

[Nil.]

No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the present strained relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Sarajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Serbia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Serbia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 31.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

SERVIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-

Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.*

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

* See No. 21.

No. 35.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 26, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

WOULD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

* See No. 18.

No. 38.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

Sir,

Rome, July 23, 1914.

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionments which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENELL RODD.

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois* et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gêner les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le 18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th* instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for

* Old style.

Sarajevo ; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, de preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante :

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars,* 1909, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant, il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la

the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration :—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March,* 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake :—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of

* New style.

tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbes'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15 juin; et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement

which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this

Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle ; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïslav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15* juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'ac-

purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding,

* Old style.

cepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

No. 40.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris† arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

* See No. 26.

† See No. 36.

No. 41.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

* Nos. 36 and 37.

No. 43.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

* See No. 36.

No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

* See No. 6.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

* See No. 44.

No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

* See No. 37.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

No. 48.

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

COUNT MENSENDORFF told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out

that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

POUR mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle con-

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Servia a formal declaration, in con-

formément à l'article 1^{er} de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

formity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Paris, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

(Translation.)

PAR une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Petersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they

jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne[sic]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.

may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering, in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London, a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

No. 52.

Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 juillet, 1914.

THE Government of the Republic accepts Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

French Embassy,
July 27, 1914.

No. 53.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

(Translation.)

Saint-Pétersbourg,
(Télégraphique.) le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une révision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

St. Petersburg,
(Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914.

THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

(Translation.)

Saint-Pétersbourg,
(Télégraphique.) le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

St. Petersburg,
(Telegraphic.) July 15 (28), 1914.

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

* See No. 44.

No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

* See No. 46.

No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday* to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

* See No. 47.

No. 60.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

* See No. 43.

No. 61.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

* See No. 46.

† "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

No. 63.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

* See No. 27.

No. 64.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you :—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.†

* See No. 43.

† See No. 46.

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

* See No. 55.

No. 70.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 29, 1914.

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.*

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.*

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

No. 71.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Serbia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

* See No. 46.

No. 73.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Serbia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Serbia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Serbia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

* See No. 4.

No. 74.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

* See No. 75.

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,† which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant‡ was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she

* See No. 67.

† See No. 57

‡ See No. 69.

knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

No. 79.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

IN your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

* See No. 46.

† See No. 43.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

* See No. 64.

No. 82.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

No. 83.

Mr. Crackanhorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 29, 1914.

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government

should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

No. 85.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

* See No. 77.

No. 86.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff, that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was of course too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would

be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July† and of my reply to it.‡ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers

* See No. 84.

† See No. 64.

‡ See No. 81.

over her dispute with Serbia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, without taking territory and while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Serbia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 30, 1914.

(1.)

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof.

(Translation.)

Vienne,
(Télégraphique.) *le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise était devenue si aiguë, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future.

(2.)

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.

Saint-Petersbourg,
(Télégraphique.) *le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de trans-

St. Petersburg,
(Telegraphic.) *July 16 (29), 1914.*

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there has been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my

mettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne ; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany ; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.)

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.

Saint-Pétersbourg,
(Télégraphique.) *le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

St. Petersburg,
(Telegraphic.) *July 16 (29), 1914.*

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

No. 94.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for

Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:—

“If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.”

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

No. 98.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.

Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

PRÉSIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought that Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

* See No. 85

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.*

* See No. 98.

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,* and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* See No. 97.

No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day,* and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

* See No. 103.

No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

M. CAMBON reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.

(Translation.)

*L'Ambassade de France,
Londres,*

Cher Sir Edward, *ce 23 novembre, 1912.*

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance,

*French Embassy, London,*Dear Sir Edward, *November 23, 1912.*

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event

soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun ; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
PAUL CAMBON.

threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours &c.

PAUL CAMBON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.

(Translation.)

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier ; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent ; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16^e Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8^e venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15^e Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière ; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne ; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation : or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi,* le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

THE German army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday ; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

* Sic in original. The actual date of the presentation of the note was, in fact, Thursday, July 23.

No. 106.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

* See No. 84.

No. 108.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday.* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

* See No. 101.

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1913.

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

* See No. 99.

No. 117.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

No. 118.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

M. CAMBON referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

“Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.”‡

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

* See No. 103.

† See No. 97.

‡ TRANSLATION.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

No. 121.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

* See No. 111.

No. 122.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.†

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

* See No. 114.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* See No. 122.

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

ON the receipt at 8:30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10:30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

* See No. 114.

No. 125.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

* See No. 124.

No. 126.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.

No. 128.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

BELGIAN neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

* See No. 115.

No. 129.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, 2 août, 1914.

Luxembourg, August 2, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

MINISTRE d'État du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant que les mesures

(Telegraphic.)

The Luxemburg Minister of State Eyschen has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures

militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

“(Urgent.)

“Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: ‘Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.’”

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

TRANSLATION —“Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’”

No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

M. DE ETTER came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

No. 134.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold, and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram of to-day.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to

* See No. 131.

discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

MY telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonof had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonof informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram

* See No. 120.

of 31st July,* had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

* See No. 120.

No. 140.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom. which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

No. 141.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

No. 143.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

* See No. 130.

No. 144.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. 145.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

MY telegram of 1st August.*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

* See No. 143.

No. 146.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

(Télégraphique.)

Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du

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Luxembourg,

August 2, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and

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pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Etrangères à Berlin.

in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 1st August.*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship “Sappho” at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,† I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

* See No. 143.

† See No. 130.

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 2nd August* : Detention of British ships at Hamburg.
No information available.

* See No. 149.

No. 151.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day :—

“ We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.”

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication :—

“ In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied :—

“ The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.”

In making this communication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms :—

“ Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing

free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence

whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158.

Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

* See No. 153.

Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir,

London, August 8, 1914.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,† and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

* See "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)," No. 153.

† See "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)," No. 159.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.*

At about 9:30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their

work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at
Berlin respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic
Relations with the German Government.

[In continuation of "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)":
Cd. 7467.]

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command
of His Majesty. August 1914.*

MISCELLANEOUS. No. 9 (1914).

DESPATCHES

FROM

HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN

RESPECTING AN OFFICIAL

GERMAN ORGANISATION

FOR

INFLUENCING THE PRESS OF OTHER
COUNTRIES.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
September 1914.*

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DESPATCHES FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING AN OFFICIAL GERMAN ORGANISATION FOR INFLUENCING THE PRESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

No. 1.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

Sir,

Berlin, February 27, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the establishment, under Government control, of a powerful secret association for the purpose of influencing the foreign press in the interest of the German export trade and of the spread of German influence generally.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Report.

FOR some time past a variety of schemes had been ventilated in the press with the object of improving German prestige abroad. It was said that in certain foreign parts Germany was being persistently and wrongfully abused, that she could obtain no fair hearing because the press of those distant countries was in hands hostile to any German enterprise, and because the telegraphic agencies serving those countries were equally biassed. An "*Association for World-Commerce*" was to have remedied this evil by a persistent pro-German propaganda in the countries most bitterly complained of. It was hoped that the necessary funds could have been raised by contributions from all the trading and industrial societies interested in the German export trade, and, in view of the supreme importance to Germany of her export trade, it was intended that agents of the Association should be sent and stationed abroad to assist the exporting industries by timely advice and an active policy generally, such as private individuals could pursue more effectively than officials.

The opportunity for realising this scheme seemed to offer itself under the following circumstances. A plan was being prepared to start a German-American Economic Society. Similar societies with an application to other countries already exist—*e.g.*, a German-Argentine Society, a German-Canadian Society, a German-Russian Society, &c. The foundation of a German-American Society had been advocated in connection with the revision of the American

tariff which gave German industries new chances of an intensified export to the United States. As was natural in any matters dealing with German-American affairs, M. Ballin, of the Hamburg-America Line, was approached to take the matter in hand. He consented. Under his inspiration the idea of a German-American Society was abandoned and the idea of a World Society was substituted. A preliminary meeting was held at which the various German-foreign societies were represented; there were present also representatives of the "Central Association of German Industrials," and of its great rival, the "Federation of Industrials," as well as of most of the leading industrial firms. Internal dissensions, however, soon appeared, and several important members sent in their resignations.

The details of the foundation were to have been settled at a meeting convened for the 26th February; to-day the whole scheme stands prorogued *sine die*. If it is ever realised its plan will have to be considerably altered. In the meantime the original plan of a German-American Society has been revived. This society is, in fact, to be constituted in Berlin early in March in the form originally intended.

It would seem strange had M. Ballin so readily accepted defeat. The explanation lies in the fact that, at the request of very highly-placed persons, his interest has been transferred to another more delicate and more or less secret organisation, devised to undertake those duties of M. Ballin's would-be "Weltverein" which concerned the German reputation abroad.

A short time ago, a meeting, of which the secret has been well kept, was convened in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which Dr. Hamann, the notorious head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office, was the originator and at which the Foreign Secretary himself was present. The meeting was attended by members of the leading industrial concerns of this country: the North German Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Allgemeine Electricitätsgesellschaft, Siemens and Halske, the Schuekert Works, Krupp, the Cruson Works, &c. They formed a private company with the purpose of "furthering the German industrial prestige abroad"—a conveniently vague purpose. The company will be financed by private subscriptions and by a Government grant. The sum at first suggested as a necessary revenue from private subscription was 12,500*l.*, but the company present at the first meeting was so enthusiastic that it definitely promised annual subscriptions amounting to 25,000*l.* The Government will add 12,500*l.* per annum—the whole Secret Service Fund, in fact, at the disposal of the Imperial Foreign Office for similar purposes (*e.g.*, for the payment of subsidies to certain papers abroad).

The company has entered into an agreement with the "*Agence Havas*"* that the latter will in future only publish news concerning Germany if supplied through "*Wolff's Telegraphen-Bureau.*" The

* NOTE.—Information since furnished to the Foreign Office has conclusively established that such an agreement, whilst apparently intended by the German Company, was not in fact entered into, or indeed ever contemplated, by the "*Agence Havas.*"

latter will receive its German news exclusively from the new company. The company intends to make a similar arrangement with Reuter's Telegraphic Bureau for those foreign countries in which Reuter controls telegraphic communications. If Reuter declines, the "*Deutsche Kabelgesellschaft*," a smaller German news agency supplying telegrams from certain countries (*e.g.*, Mexico) and working in agreement with Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, is to be financed by the new company to run a service in competition to Reuter's.

All the concerns represented at the meeting have furthermore agreed to pay into the company's hotchpot the very vast sums which they are accustomed to spend abroad for their advertisements in foreign papers. The total of this item alone is believed to be not less than 25,000*l.* per annum—so the annual sum available for the purpose of the new company will reach a total of 50,000*l.* to 75,000*l.* The company will in future issue the advertisements of its members only to those foreign papers which publish German information originating exclusively from the new company, which is to be regarded as the only authentic source of information concerning Germany and all things German. This information they are to receive free of cost or at a nominal sum—so that the willing foreign papers will derive very material benefits from their collaboration with the company; *viz.*, lucrative advertisements and free matter written in the language of the country in which the papers are published. The foreign press is to be watched by the company's agents appointed in the various foreign centres. Any incorrect reports are to be telegraphed home and corrected by telegrams issued by the company. The countries in which the system is to be immediately inaugurated are chiefly the South American States and those of the Far East, but the system is to embrace all countries outside Europe. The German cable rates for press telegrams are to be reduced in the interests of the new company.

It is difficult to say whether the evil which the new company is to remedy really exists, or exists to any perceptible extent, but it is certain that a very influential private company has been called into existence with every official encouragement commanding an enormous revenue for the purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda. Whether the evil exists or not—the money will be spent on secret service to popularise Germany abroad. It does not seem to have occurred to the promoters of the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of international blackmail—hardly a proper way to reach the desired end.

No. 2.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

Berlin, April 3, 1914.

In my despatch of the 27th February last concerning the secret foundation of a German society to supply the foreign press of certain countries with news favourable to Germany and German interests, it was foreshadowed that German cable rates for press telegrams would probably be reduced in the interests of the new society.

I have the honour now to report that, in fact, reduced rates for telegrams to the United States, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru, and the German colonies are to come into operation as from the 1st April, 1914. These telegrams, which are to be officially known as week-end telegrams, will be admitted at a reduced rate between Saturday midnight and Sunday midnight, to be delivered on Monday or Tuesday respectively. These week-end telegrams must have reached the cable station at Emden before midnight on Saturday, but can be handed in at any telegraph office in the course of the week.

The rates, which in some cases represent a reduction to one-fourth of the usual rates fixed, are :—

	Pfennigs per word.
To New York, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru (minimum charge for each telegram 20 M.)	80
To Togo and Cameroons (minimum charge 18 M.)	90
To German South-West Africa (minimum charge 15 M.)	75

Negotiations are pending for extending the week-end telegram service to other distant countries.

Telegrams sent to the United States or Canada are sent at the reduced rate only to New York or Montreal respectively; thence they are forwarded either free of charge, by letter, or at the local telegram rates per word by telegram.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 3.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey.—(Received May 4.)

Sir,

Berlin May 2, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to an announcement in the "North German Gazette," the system of reduced rates for what are called "week-end telegrams" is to be extended as from the 1st instant to Cape Colony, Natal, The Orange Free State, Transvaal, South and North Rhodesia, Nyasaland, British India, Burma, Ceylon, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan, under the conditions described in my above-mentioned despatch.

The rates are as follows :—

	Pfennigs per word.
To Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal	70
To South Rhodesia, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan	80
To North Rhodesia and Nyasaland	95
To British India, Burma, and Ceylon	50

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 4.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

Sir,

Berlin, June 9, 1914.

I HAD the honour, in my despatch of the 27th February last, to explain a scheme under which a society had been founded with the object of supplying the foreign press, by telegraph, with information favourable to Germany generally and to German industrial enterprise in particular. I have since transmitted lists of the countries to which, under the name of "week-end telegrams," the cable rates have been very considerably reduced to assist the propaganda of the said society.

I to-day have the honour to forward a translation of a cutting from the "Deutsche Export Revue," of the 5th June, 1914, in which the existence of the scheme is, for the first time, as far as I know, admitted in public print.

The "Deutsche Export Revue," which is published in Berlin, is a weekly periodical devoted to the interests of the German export trade. It is regarded as well informed, and enjoys a good reputation generally.

The article confirms the various particulars set out in my despatch; it confirms more especially the fact that the Imperial Foreign Office is supporting the scheme with an annual subscription of 12,500*l.*, paid out of its secret service fund. It supplies a list of the members of the society, the names of the directors, &c. The last paragraph of the article merits special attention on account of a certain refreshing ingenuousness.

I am informed that the order has gone forth from high official quarters not to reproduce or in any way to refer to this article, as its inadvertent publication is not unnaturally considered extremely inopportune and embarrassing.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

 Enclosure in No. 4.

 EXTRACT FROM THE "DEUTSCHE EXPORT REVUE" OF JUNE 5, 1914.

 GERMANY'S WORLD—WIDE ECONOMIC AIMS.
A Syndicate for the Supply of News Abroad.

OUR readers will remember that one of the items in the programme of the German Association for World Commerce was the establishment of a news service abroad on generous lines. Whilst the other parts of the Association's programme met with hostile criticism as soon as they became known, the proposed service for the supply of news abroad was greeted with general sympathy, as such activity promised to have a useful effect on our foreign relations. The failure to organise the Association for World Commerce seemed

unhappily to render it doubtful whether the organisation of the news service could be realised. It is all the more gratifying that, according to information which has reached us from well-informed quarters, the scheme for a German news service in foreign countries has by no means been abandoned, but that, on the contrary, an extensive organisation is actually doing work in the desired direction.

A German syndicate was very quietly formed a few weeks ago for the purposes of this foreign news service. It uses the organisation of a news agency already in existence; its activity is gradually to be extended over the whole globe. Its main object will be to reply in an appropriate form to the prejudiced news concerning Germany and to the attacks made upon her, and by the judicious publication of newspapers inspiring the necessary articles to spread abroad the knowledge of the true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements.

We are in a position to give the following information concerning the organisation of the enterprise. It is presided over by a directorate, consisting of three men, viz. :—

Privy Councillor von Borsig;
 "Landrath" Roetger (retired); and
 Herr Schacht, a director of the Deutsche Bank.

A special administrative board, the main duty of which it is to make suggestions as to the organisation and the methods of reporting, comprises among others :—

Professor Duisburg, of the dye works, "Bayer";
 Herr Hagen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft;
 Commercial Councillor Hasenclever, of Remscheid;
 Herr Hermann Hecht, of Berlin;
 Director Heineken, of the North German Lloyd;
 Director Helfferich, of the Deutsche Bank;
 Director Huldermann, of the Hamburg-America Line;
 Director Kosegarten, of the "Deutsche Waffen-und Munitions-Fabrik";
 Herr von Langen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft;
 Privy Councillor Rathenau;
 Director Reuter, of the Maschinen Fabrik, Duisburg;
 Director Salomonsohn, of the Disconto Gesellschaft;
 Privy Councillor von Siemens;
 Herr Edmond Bohler, Hamburg, &c., &c.

The management will be entrusted to two managers, Herr Asch and Dr. Hansen. The former has for years edited several foreign news agencies; the latter is known to the readers of the "Deutsche Export Revue" through a series of articles dealing with the question of a supply of news covering the whole world.


For the present the enterprise has taken the form of a loose syndicate constituted for three years, which is, later on, to be replaced by a more systematic form of organisation. The annual subscription payable by the firms which are members amounts to a minimum of 50*l.* It is a significant fact that the Imperial Foreign Office has voted a grant of 12,500*l.* towards the expenses of the

syndicate, provided the same amount is contributed by German industrial houses. As the subscriptions and the contributions by the latter already exceed the sum of 12,500*l.*, the contribution from the Foreign Office funds seems secured. As every firm subscribing a sum of 50*l.* has a vote, or, rather, as for every 50*l.* subscribed the subscriber receives a vote, it may be expected that the Imperial Foreign Office will have a powerful and decisive influence upon the management of the syndicate generally and upon the development of the news service in particular.

We further learn that efforts are now being made to induce the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies to join the syndicate, as these societies embrace pre-eminently merchants and manufacturers interested in the German foreign trade. These societies, it is true, appear to be still divided in their opinion concerning the new enterprise—at least, so far no definite decision has been arrived at.

It is believed that an increasing membership will make it possible to establish a reserve fund out of subscriptions and voluntary contributions received, so that, later on, the interest of the reserve fund may suffice to defray the expenses of the news service. It is also hoped that the foreign press may eventually be induced to pay for the news supplied. Finally, it is intended to send journalists to the various countries who are there to busy themselves in favour of German interests in the manner indicated above.

The task which the syndicate has set itself is in itself worthy of acknowledgment. But only the future can show whether the task can be accomplished in the manner indicated. We are of opinion that good results could be achieved, and perhaps with greater success, by utilising the German legations and consulates abroad, if ample funds for this purpose were placed at the disposal of the official departments. At the same time, the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies might well, as indeed some of them already do, work quietly for a better appreciation abroad of the state of German industry and of German cultural progress. The intended despatch of journalists we believe, however, in any case to be a mistake, as it would certainly soon become common talk in the editorial offices in the several places abroad that they represent a syndicate officially supported by the German Empire. If such things are intended, it would be better to fall back upon gentlemen who are already in touch with the respective editorial offices, and who could serve German interests without attracting so much attention as would journalists sent out for the purpose.



MISCELLANEOUS. No. 10 (1914).

DESPATCH

FROM

HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

RESPECTING THE

RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

WITH THE

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT.

[In continuation of "Miscellaneous, No. 8 (1914)": Cd. 7445.]

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1914.

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Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir,

London, September 1, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchirsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly

the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.* On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations, with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary

* "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.* M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great

* See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to

provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

DEPARTER from His Majesty's Ambassador at
Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic
Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment.

[In continuation of "Miscellaneous, No. 8 (1914)":
Cd. 7445.]

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MISCELLANEOUS. No. 11 (1914).

DOCUMENTS

RESPECTING THE

NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE WAR

PUBLISHED BY

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
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DOCUMENTS RESPECTING THE NEGOTIATIONS
PRECEDING THE WAR, PUBLISHED BY
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

No. 1.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs.*

Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, à 6 heures du soir, au Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un délai de quarante-huit heures pour l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajouté verbalement que pour le cas où la note ne serait pas acceptée intégralement dans un délai de quarante-huit heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la légation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournée électorale ont été rappelés et sont attendus à Belgrade demain vendredi à 10 heures du matin. Patchou, qui m'a communiqué le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et déclare qu'aucun Gouvernement serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de l'Autriche.

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

(Telegram.)

THE Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patchou, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Belgrade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 A.M. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia and declares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of Austria.

No. 2.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

TEXTE de la note qui a été transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie au Gouvernement serbe :

(Telegram.)

TEXT of the note presented to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day.

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see "Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914)" [Cd. 7467], No. 4, p. 3-6.]

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

No. 3.

Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 A.M. on July 11 (24), 1914.

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est trouvé dans la nécessité de remettre le jeudi 10 (23) du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie.

THE Austro-Hungarian Government have found themselves obliged to present the following note to the Servian Government through the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade on Thursday, the 10th (23rd) instant.

[Suit le texte de la note.]

[Here follows the text of the note.]

No. 4.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.

St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

VEUILLEZ transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit :

(Telegram.)

PLEASE convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs :—

“La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la

“The communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers the day after

présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

“Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

“En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

“Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases mêmes des relations internationales.”

Communiqué à Londres,
Rome, Paris, Belgrade.
(Signé) SAZONOW.

the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade affords to the Powers a period which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

“In order to prevent the consequences, incalculable and equally fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared herself to be disposed to inform the Powers of the facts elicited by the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study those facts.

“In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well-founded, they would be in a position to offer corresponding advice to the Servian Government.

“A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the representations made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international comity.”

Communicated to London,
Rome, Paris, and Belgrade.
(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 5.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris.

St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Télégramme.)

ME réfère à mon télégramme à Koudachew d'aujourd'hui ; nous espérons que le Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence à son Représentant à Vienne de se prononcer dans le même sens.

Communiqué à Belgrade.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Translation.)

(Telegram.)

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudachef* we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language.

Communicated to Belgrade.

No. 6.

Telegram from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie dès les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a déclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir une enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujets était prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autorités austro-hongroises. Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la note austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignité comme État indépendant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du

THE Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Serajevo. Serbia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Serbia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon

* Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna.

Gouvernement dans l' "Official," et un ordre du Souverain à l'armée, où nous réprimerions l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous-mêmes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides. On nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les nôtres à l'instruction et pour surveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note. Nous avons reçu un délai de quarante-huit heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Légation d'Autriche - Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêts à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un État indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acceptation nous sera conseillée par votre Majesté; toutes les personnes dont la participation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punies par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans des changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donné un délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration du délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions votre Majesté de nous donner son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieuse de votre Majesté qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nous fait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par son généreux cœur slave.

En ces moments difficiles j'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbe, qui supplie votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'in-

to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Serbia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carrying out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are required to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest

téresser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia.

No. 7.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

Tous les journaux du matin, même ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent l'impossibilité pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posées, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton énergique adopté par l'Autriche. L'officieux "Local-Anzeiger" est particulièrement agressif; il qualifie de superflus les recours éventuels de la Serbie à Saint-Petersbourg, à Paris, à Athènes et à Bucarest, et termine en disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la situation dans la péninsule balkanique va enfin s'éclaircir.

(Signé) BRONEWSKY.

(Telegram.)

ALL the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Servia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-official "Lokal-Anzeiger" is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan peninsula is to be cleared up at last.

No. 8.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LA copie de la note officiellement remise à Belgrade a été communiquée par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvernement français. Plus tard l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visité le Ministre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la

(Telegram.)

A COPY of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been communicated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador. The German Ambassador later visited the Minister and read to him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in the event of a

part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligée de recourir à une pression et, en cas de besoin, à des mesures militaires; la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'à l'avis de l'Allemagne cette question devrait être résolue directement entre l'Autriche et la Serbie et qu'il était de l'intérêt des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux parties intéressées. Le gérant du Département politique, qui assistait à l'entretien, demanda à l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considérer l'action autrichienne comme un ultimatum—en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas où la Serbie ne se soumettrait pas entièrement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilités étaient inévitables. L'Ambassadeur évita une réponse directe en alléguant l'absence d'instructions.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

refusal on the part of Serbia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to military measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Serbia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum—in other words, whether, in the event of Serbia not submitting entirely to the Austrian demands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions.

No. 9.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

PACHITCH est rentré à Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le délai fixé, c'est-à-dire demain samedi à 6 heures du soir, une réponse à l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui même aux Puissances la prière de défendre l'indépendance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inévitable—nous ferons la guerre.

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

(Telegram.)

PASHITCH has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit—that is to say, to-morrow, Saturday, at 6 P.M.—showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers to defend the independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war.

No. 10.

Announcement by the Russian Government.

St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

LES derniers événements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum à la Serbie préoccupent le Gouvernement Impérial au plus haut degré. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement l'évolution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifférente.

RECENT events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

No. 11.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Comte Berchtold se trouve à Ischl. Vu l'impossibilité d'y arriver à temps, je lui ai télégraphié notre proposition de prolonger le délai de l'ultimatum et l'ai répétée verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la communiquer à temps au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, mais a ajouté qu'il pouvait prédire avec assurance un refus catégorique.

(Signé) KOUDACHEW.

(Telegram.)

COUNT BERCHTOLD is at Ischl. In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to communicate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal.

No. 12.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

SUITE à mon télégramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la réponse négative

(Telegram.)

IN continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard from Macchio that the

du Gouvernement austro-hongrois à notre proposition de prolonger le délai de la note.
(Signé) KOUDACHEW.

Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note.

No. 13.

Russian Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914.)

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

JE transmets la réponse que le Président du Conseil des Ministres serbe a remis au Ministre austro-hongrois à Belgrade aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du délai de l'ultimatum.

(Telegram.)

FOLLOWING is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum.

[Here follows the text of the Servian reply, for which see "Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914)" [Cd. 7467], No. 39.]

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

No. 14.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

Ai reçu votre télégramme du 11 (24) juillet. Ai communiqué son contenu au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. Il me dit que le Gouvernement anglais l'a également prié de conseiller à Vienne la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum; il a communiqué cette démarche télégraphiquement à Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre démarche, mais il craint qu'à la suite de l'absence de Berchtold, parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses télégrammes ne

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th (24th) July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berchtold, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the

restent sans résultats ; il a, en outre, des doutes sur l'opportunité pour l'Autriche de céder au dernier moment, et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai répondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait céder sans porter atteinte à son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus précises. Même lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir à Vienne pour éviter la possibilité de conséquences redoutables, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères répondait chaque fois négativement.

(Signé) BRONEWSKY.

lack of time, his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative.

No. 15.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

Ai reçu le télégramme du 11 (24) juillet concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le Représentant de France à Vienne a été muni d'instructions conformes.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th (24th) July respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions.

No. 16.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

REÇU télégramme du 11 juillet. Grey a prescrit à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'appuyer notre démarche concernant la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en même temps que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche était venu le voir et avait expliqué qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer à la note autrichienne le caractère d'un ultimatum; il faudrait la considérer comme une démarche qui, en cas d'absence de réponse, ou en cas de réponse insuffisante au terme fixé, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le départ immédiat de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entraîner cependant le commencement immédiat des hostilités. Grey a ajouté qu'à la suite de cette explication il a indiqué à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne que dans le cas où il serait trop tard pour soulever la question de la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arrêt des hostilités pourrait peut-être servir de base à la discussion.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 11th July. Grey has instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him, and had explained that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explanation he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ultimatum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion.

No. 17.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

DANS le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation,

(Telegram.)

IN the event of any change for the worse in the situation

pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du côté de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'équilibre européen, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passé, et qui serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order to maintain the European balance of power, for which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be compromised in the event of the triumph of Austria.

No. 18.

Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

IL nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue par quelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note autrichienne avant qu'elle ait été remise, et n'a exercé aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tort qu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche les revendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.

Avant tout elle désire, comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencement du différend austro-serbe, que ce conflit reste localisé.

WE learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany, is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Servia, which she considers justified.

Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Servian dispute, that this conflict should be localised.

No. 19.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

ME réfère à mon télégramme du 11 (24) juillet.

Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publié, sous une forme pas entièrement exacte, les déclarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent à cette démarche le caractère d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, très impressionné par ces divulgations, a visité aujourd'hui le Gérant du Département politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caractère de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a déclaré que l'Autriche avait présenté sa note à la Serbie sans entente précise avec Berlin, mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche, et que certainement "la flèche une fois partie" (ce sont là ses propres paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs d'alliée.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

(Telegram.)

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 11th (24th) July.

A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form, the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Serbia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly "the bolt once fired" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally.

No. 20.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

GREY m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a déclaré que le Gouvernement allemand n'avait pas été informé du texte de la note autrichienne, mais

(Telegram.)

GREY has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian note,

qu'il soutenait entièrement la démarche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demandé en même temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentir à agir à Saint-Petersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a répondu que cela était complètement impossible. Le Ministre a ajouté que tant que les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les intérêts anglais n'étaient engagés qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait prévoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que dès ce moment on se trouverait en présence d'une situation à laquelle seraient intéressées toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se réservait pour ce cas une complète liberté d'action.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

but that they entirely supported Austria's action. The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisation, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

No. 21.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

MALGRÉ le caractère extrêmement conciliant de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, à 6 heures et demie du soir, le Gouvernement serbe par note, que n'ayant pas reçu au délai fixé une réponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la légation. La Skoupchtina est convoquée à Nish pour le 14 (27) juillet. Le Gouvernement serbe et le Corps diplomatique partent ce soir pour la même ville.

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

(Telegram.)

In spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6:30 P.M. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the legation. The Skupchtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town.

No. 22.

Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 12 (25), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

GREY a dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'à son avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entraîner la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre générale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en présence des mobilisations autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immédiate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan nécessitait avant tout l'agrément de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas mobiliser. En conséquence il a adressé tout d'abord à Berlin une question à ce sujet.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

(Telegram.)

GREY has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this point at Berlin.

No. 23.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome.

St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'ITALIE pourrait jouer un rôle de tout premier ordre en faveur du maintien de la paix, en exerçant l'influence nécessaire sur l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude nettement défavorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait être localisé. Il est désirable que vous exprimiez la conviction qu'il est

[995]

(Telegram.)

ITALY might play a part of the first importance in favour of preserving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia

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impossible pour la Russie de ne
pas venir en aide à la Serbie.
(Signé) SAZONOW.

cannot possibly avoid coming to
to the help of Servia.

No. 24.

*Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs.*

Prague, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LA mobilisation a été décrétée.

(Signé) KAZANSKY.

(Telegram.)

MOBILISATION has been
ordered.

No. 25.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at
Vienna.*

St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

J'AI eu aujourd'hui un long
entretien sur un ton amical avec
l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hon-
grie. Après avoir examiné avec
lui les dix demandes adressées
à la Serbie, j'ai fait observer
qu'à part la forme peu habile
sous laquelle elles sont pré-
sentées, quelques-unes parmi
elles sont absolument inexé-
cutables, même dans le cas où
le Gouvernement serbe déclai-
rerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi,
par exemple, les points 1 et
2 ne pourraient être exécutés
sans un remaniement des lois
Serbes sur la presse et sur les
associations, pour lequel le con-
sentement de la Skoupchtina
pourrait être difficilement ob-
tenu; quant à l'exécution
des points 4 et 5, elle
pourrait produire des consé-
quences fort dangereuses et
même faire naître le danger
d'actes de terrorisme dirigés
contre les membres de la Maison
Royale et contre Pachitch, ce

(Telegram.)

I HAD a long and friendly
conversation to-day with the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.
After discussing the ten demands
addressed to Servia, I drew his
attention to the fact that, quite
apart from the clumsy form in
which they were presented,
some of them were quite im-
practicable, even if the Servian
Government agreed to accept
them. Thus, for example,
points 1 and 2 could not
be carried out without recasting
the Servian press law and associa-
tions law, and to that it might
be difficult to obtain the consent
of the Skupchtina. As for en-
forcing points 4 and 5, this
might lead to most dangerous
consequences, and even to the
risk of acts of terrorism directed
against the Royal Family and
against Pashitch, which clearly
could not be the intention
of Austria. With regard to
the other points it seemed to
me that, with certain changes

qui ne saurait entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me semble qu'avec certains changements dans les détails, il ne serait pas difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues étaient confirmées par des preuves suffisantes.

Dans l'intérêt de la conservation de la paix, qui, aux dires de Szapary, est précieuse à l'Autriche au même degré qu'à toutes les Puissances, il serait nécessaire de mettre au plus tôt possible une fin à la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait très désirable que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fût autorisé d'entrer avec moi dans un échange de vues privé aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 10 (23) juillet. Ce procédé permettrait peut-être de trouver une formule qui fût acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le sens de ce télégramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.

No. 26.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin.

St. Petersburg, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

VEUILLEZ communiquer le contenu de mon télégramme à
[995]

(Telegram.)

PLEASE communicate the contents of my telegram to

Vienne d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir que de son côté il trouvera possible de conseiller à Vienne d'aller au-devant de notre proposition.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

Vienna of to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

No. 27.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Directeur du Département politique m'informe que, lors de la communication qu'il a faite à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de la réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas caché son étonnement de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donné satisfaction à Giesl. L'attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du Département politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

(Telegram.)

THE Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador of the contents of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory attitude should produce the best impression in Europe.

No. 28.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AUJOURD'HUI l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et lui a fait les déclarations suivantes :

“ L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations:—

“ Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions, and that

qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg dans un sens modérateur."

Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagne pourrait de son côté entreprendre des démarches analogues à Vienne, surtout en présence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur répondit que cela n'était pas possible, vu la résolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances — l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France — ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des démarches à Saint-Pétersbourg et à Vienne, puisque l'affaire se réduisait en somme à un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur alléguait l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa d'adhérer à la proposition allemande.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet, and consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg."

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers—Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France—could not make representations at St. Petersburg and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal.

No. 29.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Directeur du Département politique a déclaré qu'à son avis personnel, les démarches successives allemandes à Paris ont pour but d'intimider la France

(Telegram.)

THE Director of the Political Department has expressed the personal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at in-

et d'amener son intervention à Saint-Pétersbourg.

timidating France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburg.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

No. 30.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

APRÈS la réception à Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'armée autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composée, aux dires des journaux, en partie d'éléments autrichiens, se livra à une série de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancée de la soirée les manifestants se massèrent à plusieurs reprises devant le palais de l'Ambassade Impériale en poussant des cris hostiles à la Russie; la police était presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.

(Signé) BRONEWSKY.

(Telegram.)

ON the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Serbia, a large crowd, in which the papers report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the evening the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken.

No. 31.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AI reçu votre télégramme du 13 (26) juillet. Prie me télégraphier si, à votre avis, vos pourparlers directs avec le Cabinet de Vienne s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la médiation des quatre Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Saint-

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July. Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassa-

Petersbourg que vous étiez disposé à accepter cette combinaison, Grey a décidé de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite hier soir à Berlin, à Paris et à Rome.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

dor at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

No. 32.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London.

St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une révision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise on toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Telegram.)

THE British Ambassador has enquired whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in summoning a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of finding a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I had begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hoped, might be favourable. I had not, however, received as yet any reply to my proposal for the revision of the note by the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet proved impossible, I was ready to fall in with the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind likely to lead to a favourable settlement of the dispute.

No. 33.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

St. Petersburg, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AI pris connaissance de la réponse transmise par le Gouvernement serbe au Baron Giesl. Elle dépasse toutes nos prévisions par sa modération et son désir de donner la plus complète satisfaction à l'Autriche. Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient être encore les demandes de l'Autriche, à moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un prétexte pour une guerre avec la Serbie.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE taken note of the reply returned by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Servia.

No. 34.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne a conféré aujourd'hui de nouveau longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du Département politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insisté sur l'exclusion de toute possibilité d'une médiation ou d'une conférence.

(Signé) SEVASTOPOULO.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any mediation or conference.

No. 35.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AI conféré avec le Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Étran-

(Telegram.)

I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign

gères, en présence de Berthelot, immédiatement après mon retour à Paris. Tous les deux m'ont confirmé les détails concernant les démarches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo vous a communiqués dans ses télégrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirmé par écrit sa déclaration d'hier, savoir :

1. L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attende pas à l'intégrité de la Serbie. Son unique but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité.

2. Par conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre.

3. L'Allemagne et la France, complètement solidaires dans l'ardent désir de ne pas rompre la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens modérateur.

Le Baron de Schoen a spécialement souligné l'expression de la solidarité entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'après la conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les démarches susdites de l'Allemagne ont pour but évident de désunir la Russie et la France, d'entraîner le Gouvernement français dans la voie des représentations à Saint-Pétersbourg et de compromettre ainsi notre allié à nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la responsabilité non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France.

(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, which Sevastopoulo has already telegraphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, *i.e.* :

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

No. 36.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

IL ressort de vos télégrammes du 13 (26) juillet que vous ne connaissiez pas encore la réponse du Gouvernement serbe. Le télégramme par lequel cette nouvelle m'a été communiqué de Belgrade a été également en route pendant vingt heures. Le télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères français expédié avant-hier, au triple tarif, à 11 heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre démarche, n'est parvenu à sa destination qu'à 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce télégramme n'ait été retenu intentionnellement par le télégraphe autrichien.

(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

(Telegram.)

It is clear from your telegrams of the 13th (26) July that you were not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The telegram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office.

No. 37.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communiqué au Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères que la réponse de la Serbie a été jugée insuffisante à Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autriche procéderait à des "actions énergiques" dont le but serait de forcer la Serbie de lui donner les garanties nécessaires. Le Ministre ayant demandé en quoi consisterait ces actions, l'Ambassadeur répondit qu'il n'avait

(Telegram.)

ON the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia's answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambassador replied that he had

pas de renseignements exacts à ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage de la frontière serbe, d'un ultimatum et même d'une déclaration de guerre.

(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war.

No. 38.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

J'AI prié le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'appuyer à Vienne votre proposition tendant à autoriser Szapary d'élaborer, par la voie d'un échange de vues privé avec vous, une rédaction des demandes austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a répondu qu'il était au courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis de Pourtalès que, puisque Szapary avait commencé cette conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il télégraphiera dans ce sens à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Vienne. Je l'ai prié de conseiller d'une façon plus pressante à Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller à l'Autriche de céder.

(Signé) BRONIEWSKY.

(Telegram.)

I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way.

No. 39.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AUJOURD'HUI, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Étran-

(Telegram.)

BEFORE my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

gères, ce dernier avait reçu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France, qui avait tenté de lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative à une action en faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercée simultanément à Saint-Petersbourg et à Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France. Cambon a proposé que ces Puissances donnent à Vienne un conseil dans les termes suivants: "S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle." En adoptant cette formule voilée on éviterait de mentionner la nécessité de s'abstenir d'une invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a opposé à cette proposition un refus catégorique, et cela malgré les instances de l'Ambassadeur, qui a fait valoir, comme un bon côté de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances grâce auquel on évitait l'opposition de l'Alliance à l'Entente, ce dont s'était si souvent plaint Jagow lui-même.

(Signé) BRONEWSKY.

to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Serbia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente—a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained—was avoided.

No. 40.

Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

VOTRE Altesse Royale en s'adressant à moi dans un moment particulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments qui m'animent à son égard et sur ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.

Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la situation actuelle et mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentes difficultés. Je ne doute point que votre

WHEN your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people.

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt

Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne veulent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pour arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie.

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré notre plus sincère désir, nous ne réussissons pas, votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

that your Highness and the Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia.

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Servia.

No. 41.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères est absent. Pendant un entretien prolongé, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout à fait amicaux, attiré son attention sur l'impression défavorable qu'a produite en Russie la présentation par l'Autriche à la Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque État indépendant, bien que petit. J'ai ajouté que ce procédé, qui pourrait amener des complications les moins désirables, a provoqué en Russie une profonde surprise et une réprobation générale. Il faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence des assurances du Représentant allemand à Vienne, lequel pendant toute cette crise a joué un rôle d'instigateur, a compté sur la probabilité de la localisation de

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conversation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the

son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilité de porter à cette dernière impunément un coup grave. La déclaration du Gouvernement Impérial concernant l'impossibilité pour la Russie de rester indifférente en présence d'un tel procédé a provoqué ici une grande impression.

(Signé) SCHÉBÉKO.

dispute with Servia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great sensation here.

No. 42.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 14 (27), 1914.

(Translation.)

Télégramme.)

GREY vient de répondre à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui était venu le questionner sur la possibilité d'une action à Saint-Petersbourg, que cette action devrait se produire à Vienne et que le Cabinet de Berlin serait le mieux qualifié pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en même temps que la réponse serbe à la note autrichienne dépassait par sa modération et son esprit de conciliation tout ce à quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajouté qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseillé à Belgrade de donner une réponse modérée et qu'il pensait que la réponse serbe pouvait servir de base à une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question.

Dans ces conditions, a continué Grey, si l'Autriche malgré cette réponse commençait les hostilités, elle prouverait son intention d'anéantir la Serbie. La question placée sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui pourrait amener une guerre

(Telegram.)

GREY has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to

dans laquelle seraient impliquées toutes les Puissances.

Grey a enfin déclaré que le Gouvernement anglais était bien sincèrement disposé à collaborer avec le Gouvernement allemand tant qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire l'Angleterre se réservait une pleine liberté d'action.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

a war in which all the Powers would be involved.

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preservation of peace was in question; - but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

No. 43.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Telegram.)

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude on the part of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 44.

Russian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'ÉTAT de siège a été proclamé en Slavonie, en Croatie et à Fiume et en même temps les réservistes de toutes les catégories ont été mobilisés.

(Signé) SALVIATI.

(Telegram.)

STATE of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up.

No. 45.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre

(Telegram.)

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I pointed out to him in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia would involve.

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic

la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise était devenue si aiguë, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

(Signé) SCHÉBÉKO.

measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had been incited to such a pitch, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future.

No. 46.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Bureau Wolff n'a pas publié le texte de la note responsive serbe qui lui avait été communiqué. Jusqu'à ce moment cette note n'a paru *in extenso* dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui selon toute évidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de l'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs allemands.

(Signé) BRONEWSKY.

(Telegram.)

THE Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming effect which it would have on German readers.

No. 47.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE décret sur la mobilisation générale a été signé.

(Signé) SCHÉBÉKO.

(Telegram.)

THE order for general mobilisation has been signed.

No. 48.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

St. Petersburg, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

En présence des hostilités entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est nécessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action médiatrice et que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit immédiatement suspendue. Autrement la médiation ne servira que prétexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera entre temps à l'Autriche la possibilité d'écraser complètement la Serbie et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balkans.

Communiqué à Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Telegram.)

In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Serbia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans.

Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

No. 49.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has

cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes entre le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army had crossed the Servian frontier. I begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and Russia, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I pointed out at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account all methods suitable for finding a peaceful solution would be to arrange for parallel discussions to be carried on as to a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, en France, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some goodwill and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in England, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

No. 50.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris.

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LORS de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

Communiqué à Vienne, Rome et Berlin.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Telegram.)

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, recorded in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schebeko's* telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram amount to a refusal on the part of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Russian Government.

Hence nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome, and Berlin.

* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 51.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

SUR ma question s'il avait une réponse de Vienne relativement à votre proposition de pourparlers privés à Saint-Petersbourg, le Secrétaire d'État a répondu négativement.

Il déclare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout ouvertement. Parlant à Cambon, il a même ajouté qu'en cas d'une pression trop évidente l'Autriche se hâterait de mettre l'Allemagne en présence d'un fait accompli.

Le Secrétaire d'État dit qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui un télégramme de Pourtalès d'où il constate que plus que les premiers jours vous êtes disposé à trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai répliqué que probablement vous avez été dès le commencement en faveur d'un compromis, bien entendu à la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais également pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commencé à mobiliser sur la frontière autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la possibilité de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de préparatifs sur notre frontière. J'ai répondu que, d'après les renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait également sur notre frontière et que par conséquent nous devons prendre

(Telegram.)

ON my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative.

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a *fait accompli*.

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day from Pourtalès, stating that you seemed more inclined than you previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our frontier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession, Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that consequently we had to take similar steps. I added that whatever measures we might, perhaps,

des mesures analogues. J'ai ajouté que les mesures que nous avons peut-être prises de notre côté n'étaient nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne.

(Signé) BRONEWSKY.

have taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany.

No. 52.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AUJOURD'HUI le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gouvernement, a déclaré à Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralité.

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

(Telegram.)

THE Bulgarian Minister today declared to Pashitch, in the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

No. 53.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

A L'OCCASION de l'arrivée du Président de la République française, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères avait préparé un court exposé de la situation politique actuelle, à peu près dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la décomposition intérieure, s'est emparée du prétexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des garanties qui pourront revêtir la forme de l'occupation des communications militaires serbes ou même du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix dépend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit être "localisée" entre

(Telegram.)

FOR the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared a short summary of the present political situation, approximately in the following terms: Austria, fearing internal disintegration, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Germany is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" between Austria and Servia;

l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est-à-dire de la punition de la politique précédente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. De ceci l'Allemagne conclut qu'il faut exercer une action modératrice à Pétersbourg. Ce sophisme a été réfuté à Paris comme à Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a eu vain tâché d'entraîner la France à une action solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les mêmes tentatives ont été faites à Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a été répondu que l'action devrait être exercée à Vienne, car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter les rares réserves de la Serbie, et la déclaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre générale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent exercer une action modératrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande modération, surtout en conseillant à la Serbie d'accepter ce qui était possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui l'Allemagne paraît renoncer à l'idée d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action médiatrice à Pétersbourg et à Vienne, mais en même temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tâchent de faire traîner l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose à la conférence sans indiquer aucune autre manière d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mène des pourparlers manifestement dilatoires à Pétersbourg. En même temps elle prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolérées, ses prétentions augmenteront proportionnellement. Il est très désirable que la Russie prête tout son appui au projet de médiation que présentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire,

that question is the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Germany towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Servia's few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only, and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeavouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action. Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are manifestly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which

l'Autriche, sous prétexte de "garantie," pourra, en fait, changer le statut territorial de l'Europe orientale.

will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guarantees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe.

(Signé) ISWOLSKY.

No. 54.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AI communiqué le contenu de vos télégrammes du 15 (28) juillet à Grey. Il a déclaré aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient échoué, et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de Saint-Petersbourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche à la suite de la mobilisation de cette dernière. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement allemand s'est déclaré en faveur de la médiation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultés quant à la forme. Grey a insisté pour que le Gouvernement allemand indiquât la forme laquelle à l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux quatre Puissances d'exercer leur médiation pour éviter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la médiation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas où l'Allemagne consentirait à se ranger du côté de la paix.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador to-day that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from St. Petersburg that Russia was mobilising against Austria in consequence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war; France, Italy, and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

VIVIANI vient de me confirmer l'entière résolution du Gouvernement français d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette résolution est soutenue par les cercles les plus étendus et par les partis y compris les radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui présenter une déclaration exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques du groupe. Dès son arrivée à Paris, Viviani a télégraphié d'urgence à Londres que, vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Pétersbourg et Vienne, il était nécessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelât le plus tôt possible, sous telle ou autre forme, sa proposition concernant la médiation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a reçu aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui lui a renouvelé l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Allemagne désirait la paix elle devrait se hâter d'adhérer à la proposition de médiation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a répondu que les mots "conférence" ou "arbitrage" effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a répliqué qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots, et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre forme de médiation. D'après l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succès des négociations entre les Puissances il serait nécessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander à la Serbie. Viviani a répondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facile-

(Telegram.)

VIVIANI has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has telegraphed an urgent message to London that, direct discussions between St. Petersburg and Vienna having ended, the London Cabinet should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before seeing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Serbia. Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite

ment s'en enquérir auprès de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pourrait servir de base à la discussion ; il a ajouté que la France désirait sincèrement la paix, mais qu'elle était en même temps résolue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses alliés et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette résolution rencontrait la plus vive approbation du pays.

(Signé) ISWOLSKY.

easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis of discussion ; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends, and that he, Baron von Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country.

No. 56.

Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Translation.)

PROFONDÉMENT touché par le télégramme que votre Majesté a bien voulu m'adresser hier, je m'empresse de la remercier de tout mon cœur. Je prie votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie dont votre Majesté est animée envers mon pays nous est particulièrement précieuse, et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assuré, étant devenu l'objet de la haute sollicitude de votre Majesté. Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection de votre Majesté seront conservés pieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes.

(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

DEEPLY touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of everlasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs.

No. 57.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

J'AI communiqué à Pachitch le texte du télégramme responsif de Sa Majesté l'Empereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch, après l'avoir lu, se signa et dit : "Seigneur ! Le Tsar est grand et clément !" Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'émotion qui l'avait gagné. L'héritier est attendu à Nish dans la nuit.

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed : "The Czar is great and merciful !" He then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.

No. 58.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris.

St. Petersburg, July 16 (29), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

AUJOURD'HUI l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqué la résolution prise par son Gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses préparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commencé ces derniers qu'à la suite de la mobilisation à laquelle avait déjà procédé l'Autriche et vu l'absence évidente chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie.

Puisque nous ne pouvons pas accéder au désir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous reste que d'accélérer nos propres armements et de compter avec l'inévitabilité probable de la guerre. Veuillez en avvertir le Gouvernement

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador today informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and

français et lui exprimer en même temps notre sincère reconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui de notre alliée la France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette déclaration nous est particulièrement précieuse.

Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us.

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

No. 59.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nish, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Prince-Régent a publié hier un manifeste signé par tous les Ministres à l'occasion de la déclaration de la guerre par l'Autriche à la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: "Défendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie." Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de la Skoupchtina, le Régent lut en son nom le discours du trône, au début duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation démontrait l'importance des événements actuels. Suit l'exposé des faits des derniers jours—l'ultimatum autrichien, la réponse serbe, les efforts du Gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui était compatible avec la dignité de l'État pour éviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armée du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux côtés de laquelle se tient le Monténégro. En passant à l'examen de l'attitude des Puis-

(Telegram.)

THE Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Serbia with all your might." At the solemn opening of the Skupchtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that the place of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events—the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Serbia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review

sances en présence du conflit. le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est animée la Russie et sur la toute gracieuse communication de Sa Majesté l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et de la Russie un "jivio" formidable et fébrile secouait la salle des séances. Les marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent aussi relevées séparément et provoquèrent des "jivio" d'approbation de la part des députés. Le discours du trône se termine par la déclaration d'ouverture de la Skoupehtina et par l'expression du vœu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement.

(Signé) STRANDTMAN.

the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia. At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall resounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown by France and England was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the throne ended by declaring the Skupehtina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government.

No. 60.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

St. Petersburg, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne, qui vient de me quitter, m'a demandé si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourrait donner —de ne pas porter atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie —et indiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir à suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicté, pour être transmise d'urgence à Berlin, la déclaration suivante: "Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne, se déclare prête à

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action: "If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Servian question has become a question of European interest,

éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires."

· Veuillez télégraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouvernement allemand en présence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre désir de faire le possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'à faire gagner du temps à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche pour leurs préparatifs militaires.
(Signé) SAZONOW.

declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations."

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations.

No. 61.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

J'APPRENDS que le décret de mobilisation de l'armée et de la flotte allemandes vient d'être promulgué.

(Signé) SWERBÉEW.

(Telegram.)

I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued.

No. 62.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères vient de me téléphoner pour communiquer que la nouvelle lancée tout à l'heure de la mobilisation de l'armée et de la flotte allemandes est fausse ; que les feuillets des jour-

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false ; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so

naux étaient imprimés d'avance en prévision de toutes éventualités, et mis en vente à l'heure de l'après-midi, mais que maintenant ils sont confisqués.

(Signé) SWERBÉEW.

as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated.

No. 63.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

Ai reçu votre télégramme du 16 (29) juillet et ai transmis le texte de votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, que je viens de voir ; il m'a dit qu'il avait reçu un télégramme identique de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Saint-Petersbourg et m'a déclaré ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche.

(Signé) SWERBÉEW.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of 16th (29th) July, and have communicated the text of your proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.

No. 64.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

Ai communiqué le contenu de vos télégrammes des 16 (29) et 17 (30) juillet à Grey, lequel considère la situation comme très sérieuse, mais désire continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer à Grey que depuis que vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne pût profiter de ces attermoiments pour écraser la Serbie, la

(Telegram.)

I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th) and 17th (30th) July to Grey, who looks upon the situation as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that—since you agreed with him to accept whatever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia

situation dans laquelle vous vous trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée. A cette époque nos rapports avec l'Allemagne n'étaient pas compromis. Après la déclaration de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Saint-Petersbourg concernant la mobilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient changé et sa demande avait reçu de votre part la seule réponse que pouvait donner une Grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne était revenu auprès de vous et s'était enquis de vos conditions, vous les aviez formulées dans des circonstances tout à fait spéciales. J'ai en même temps de nouveau insisté auprès de Grey sur la nécessité de prendre en considération la situation nouvelle créée par la faute de l'Allemagne à la suite de l'action de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a répondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

—the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action. Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments.

No. 65.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 17 (30), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne a demandé à Grey pour quelle raison l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a répondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractère agressif, mais que la situation était telle que chaque Puissance devait se préparer.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

(Telegram.)

THE German Ambassador has asked Grey why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situation was such that each Power must be ready.

No. 66.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

MALGRÉ la mobilisation générale, je continue à échanger des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de visées de conquête à l'égard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent également sur la nécessité pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'au bout l'action commencée et de donner à la Serbie une leçon sérieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir.

(Signé) SCHÉBÉKO.

(Telegram.)

IN spite of the general mobilisation, my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future.

No. 67.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

ME réfère à mon télégramme du 17 (30) juillet. D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le désir du Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule qui j'ai proposée hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai répondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous je vous transmets la formule modifiée en conséquence :

“ Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit

(Telegram.)

PLEASE refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as follows:—

“ If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between

anstro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, — la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante."

(Signé) SAZONOW.

Austria and Servia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Servia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

No. 68.

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères vient de me dire que nos pourparlers, qui étaient déjà difficiles à la suite de la mobilisation contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en présence des graves mesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y relatives sont, d'après lui, reçues ici de tous les côtés et devront provoquer inévitablement des mesures analogues de la part de l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai répondu que, d'après des renseignements sûrs dont je disposais et qui étaient confirmés par tous nos compatriotes arrivant à Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites se poursuivait également en Allemagne avec grande activité. Malgré cela, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les officiers de leurs congés et les troupes des champs de manœuvres.

(Signé) SWERBÉEW.

(Telegram.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discussions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisation against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manœuvres.

No. 69.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London.

St. Petersburg, July 18 (31), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

J'AI prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre à Grey l'expression de ma plus sincère reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a usé pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grâce à quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est pas encore perdu.

Je l'ai aussi prié de dire au Ministre anglais que je pensais que ce n'était qu'à Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques chances d'un succès quelconque, en facilitant à l'Autriche la nécessité d'un compromis.

Communiqué à l'Ambassadeur en France.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

(Telegram.)

I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.

I also requested him to inform the British Minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria.

Communicated to Russian Ambassador in France.

No. 70.

Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad.

July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

A MINUIT l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a déclaré, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, que si dans les douze heures, c'est-à-dire à midi, samedi, nous ne commençons pas la démobilisation, non seulement à l'égard de l'Allemagne, mais aussi à l'égard de l'Autriche, le Gouvernement allemand serait forcé de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma question si c'était la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a répondu par la

[995]

(Telegram.)

AT midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but

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négative, mais en ajoutant que nous étions fort près d'elle.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

added that we were very near it.

No. 71.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

GREY m'a dit qu'il a télégraphié à Berlin qu'à son avis la dernière formule acceptée par le Gouvernement russe constitue la base de négociations qui présente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifique du conflit. Il a exprimé en même temps l'espoir qu'aucune Grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilités avant l'examen de cette formule

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

(Telegram.)

GREY tells me that he has telegraphed to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered.

No. 72.

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

LE Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a posé aux Gouvernements français et allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralité de la Belgique.

La France a répondu dans l'affirmative, tandis que le Gouvernement allemand a déclaré ne pouvoir répondre à cette question catégoriquement.

(Signé) BENCKENDORFF.

(Telegram.)

THE British Government has enquired of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France answered in the affirmative, but the German Government stated that they could not give any definite answer to the question.

No. 73.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Autriche a visité hier Viviani et lui a déclaré que l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais était prête à discuter avec les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le Gouvernement français est très préoccupé par les préparatifs militaires extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontière française, car il est convaincu que sous le voile du "Kriegszustand" se produit une véritable mobilisation.

(Signé) ISWOLSKY.

(Telegram.)

THE Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of "Kriegszustand," mobilisation is in reality being carried out.

No. 74.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

A LA réception ici du télégramme de l'Ambassadeur de France à Saint-Petersbourg contenant la communication que vous a faite l'Ambassadeur allemand concernant la résolution de l'Allemagne de décréter aujourd'hui la mobilisation générale, le Président de la République a signé le décret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procède à l'affichage des listes d'appel des réservistes. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite à Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvelle com-

(Telegram.)

ON the receipt in Paris of the telegram from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Republic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani, but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility

munication, en alléguant l'impossibilité de déchiffrer les télégrammes qu'il a reçus. Viviani l'a informé de la signature du décret de mobilisation en réponse à la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait part de son étonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eût pris une telle mesure à un moment où se poursuivait encore un échange de vues amical entre la Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajouté que la mobilisation ne préjugait pas nécessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester à Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est resté à Vienne et celui d'Autriche à Saint-Petersbourg.

(Signé) ISWOLSKY.

of decyphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

No. 75.

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

JE tiens du Président que pendant les dernières journées l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a assuré avec force le Président du Conseil des Ministres et lui-même, que l'Autriche nous aurait déclaré être prête à respecter non seulement l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur cette déclaration. J'ai opposé un démenti catégorique à cela.

(Signé) ISWOLSKY.

(Telegram.)

I HEAR from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Servia and also her sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this declaration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.

Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 19 (August 1), at 7·10 P.M.

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaçante ne motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre à*) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude*) que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à votre Excellence ce qui suit :

* Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées d'avance et que par erreur elles ont été insérées toutes les deux dans la note.

THE Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:—

* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relevant le défi, se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.

(Signé) F. POURTALES.

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

No. 77.

Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Recent Events.

July 20 (August 2), 1914.

(Translation.)

UN exposé défigurant les événements des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères croit de son devoir de publier l'aperçu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvisé :

Le 10 (23) juillet, année courante, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade présenta au Ministre Président serbe une note où le Gouvernement serbe était accusé d'avoir favorisé le mouvement pan-serbe qui avait abouti à l'assassinat de l'héritier du trône austro-hongrois. En conséquence l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesures tendant à la découverte du complot, à la punition des sujets serbes y ayant participé et à la prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Royaume. Un délai de quarante-huit heures fut fixé au Gouvernement serbe

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review:—

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty-eight hours was

pour la réponse à la susdite note.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à Saint-Petersbourg avait communiqué le texte de la note dix-sept heures après sa remise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles étaient inexécutables quant au fond, tandis que d'autres étaient présentées sous une forme incompatible avec la dignité d'un État indépendant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa prépondérance dans les Balkans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, le Gouvernement russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale à l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de soumettre à un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne crut possible de consentir à une discussion de la note. L'action modératrice des autres Puissances à Vienne ne fut non plus couronnée de succès.

Malgré que la Serbie eût reproché le crime et se fût montrée prête à donner satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassa les prévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade jugea la réponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette ville.

Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des demandes présentées par l'Autriche, la Russie avait déclaré encore auparavant

given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she could

qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fût acceptable pour l'Autriche et ménageât son amour-propre de Grande Puissance. En même temps la Russie établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme État indépendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement Impérial dans cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, après s'être dérobé à toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à la mobilisation, déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a accompagné la déclaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé et exécuté le crime de Serajewo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancée contre tout un peuple et tout un État attira à la Serbie par son inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la société européenne.

A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, malgré la déclaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester indifférente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial jugea nécessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement serbe et les premières démarches de

not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajewo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first

la Russie cinq jours s'étaient écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques ; au contraire, la mobilisation de la moitié de l'armée austro-hongroise avait été décrétée.

Le Gouvernement allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie ; il lui fut en même temps expliqué qu'elles n'étaient que la conséquence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial déclara que la Russie était prête à continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de négociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soit, en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une conférence des quatre Grandes Puissances non intéressées directement, voire, l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua également. L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se déroba à la participation à la conférence des Puissances projetée.

Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la paix. Répondant à la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à quelles conditions nous consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères déclara que ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question austro-serbe avait revêtu le caractère d'une question européenne, et la déclaration de

steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary ; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands

cette même Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.

La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on reçut à Saint-Pétersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation générale par l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le territoire serbe et Belgrade fut bombardée derechef.

L'insuccès de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'élargir les mesures de précaution militaires.

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question à ce sujet, il lui fut répondu que la Russie était forcée de commencer ses armements pour se prémunir contre toutes éventualités.

Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et déclara être prête à accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par nous.

Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement allemand, le 18 (31) juillet, adressa au Gouvernement russe la demande d'avoir à suspendre ses mesures militaires à midi du 19 juillet (1^{er} août), en menaçant, dans le cas contraire, de procéder à une mobilisation générale.

Le lendemain, 19 juillet (1^{er} août), l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, au nom de

as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a decla-

son Gouvernement, la déclaration de guerre.

ration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 78.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives Abroad.

St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914.

(Translation.)

(Télégramme.)

IL est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès à présent de rejeter sur nous la responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a été provoquée par l'énorme responsabilité que nous aurions assumée, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à un moment où l'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers d'un caractère dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procédait à une mobilisation générale.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagé vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole à n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et après toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni avoir le droit de douter de notre déclaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignité et l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en étant complètement incompatible avec notre propre dignité, aurait certainement ébranlé l'équilibre européen, en assurant l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractère européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa décision de

(Telegram.)

IT is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By

nous déclarer la guerre à un moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre les Puissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde responsabilité.

(Signé) SAZONOW.

her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

No. 79.

Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (August 6) 1914, at 6 P.M.

(Translation.)


D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie ce qui suit :

ON the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows :—

“ Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec ladite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie à partir du présent moment.”

“ In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment.”

(Signé) SZAPARY.



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