


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A
COURSE
OF *Sam. J. Miller.*
LECTURES

ON THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS IN
PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS,
AND
DIVINITY:

WITH
REFERENCES TO THE MOST CONSIDERABLE AUTHORS ON
EACH SUBJECT.

BY THE LATE
REV. PHILIP DODDRIDGE, D.D.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,
A GREAT NUMBER OF REFERENCES,
AND MANY NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE VARIOUS
WRITERS, ON THE SAME TOPICS, WHO HAVE
APPEARED SINCE THE DOCTOR'S DECEASE.

By ANDREW KIPPIS, D.D. F.R.S. AND S.A.

VOLUME I.

LONDON:

Printed for G. G. and J. ROBINSON; R. BALDWIN; C. DILLY;
W. J. and J. RICHARDSON; F. and C. RIVINGTON; J. MATHEWS;
S. HAYES; W. OTRIDGE and SON; J. SCATCHERD; DARTON and
HARVEY; C. LAW; T. N. LONGMAN and O. REES; VERNOR and
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LETTERS

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BY THE FORMER EDITOR.

THIS work was originally drawn up for the use of the students under the Author's care; but it appears by a clause in his will, that it was his intention it should be published after his decease. And though it would, no doubt, have appeared to much greater advantage, if the Author had prepared it himself for the press; yet it is hoped that it will not be thought, even in its present form, unworthy of the public view.

The transcript from which it was printed, I have carefully compared with the original short-hand copy; and the public may be assured, that the Author's sentiments have been every where scrupulously preserved; no other alterations having been made, than such as are necessary in all posthumous works, that have not had the Author's last hand. A few references have been added, particularly to some books published since the Author's death, and others omitted, that seemed less important.

If the reader should think the referènces under the same head are sometimes too much alike; he will please to consider, that though the sentiments in each may be nearly the same, yet the different manner of expression will often serve more fully to explain and illustrate the subject: besides, that one Author may be at hand, when the other is not.

In order to assist the reader in consulting particular passages referred to, the reference is always made to the chapter and section, where that could be done: and as in many cases it could only be made to the page, an account is added at the end, of

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the Editions, to which such references are made, (where the books could be procured) with the number of pages in the volume, which, by the rule of proportion, may be some direction to find the passage in any other edition.

As to the work itself, it may be proper to acquaint the public, that the mathematical form, into which it is thrown, was taken from a work of the same kind, in manuscript, drawn up in Latin, by the Author's Tutor, the Reverend Mr. John Jennings of Hinckley, from whom he has borrowed some of the propositions and demonstrations, especially in the former part. But he has so much enlarged and improved upon the original plan, that the whole may properly be considered as a new work.

As my regard to the Author's memory, and my apprehension of the usefulness of the work itself, led me to comply with the request of the Author's widow, to inspect the publication of these Lectures, I thought it necessary to give this general account of what has been done in relation to them, for the satisfaction of the public; and heartily wish they may subserve the cause of learning, religion, and moderation.

Birmingham,
Jan. 31, 1763.

S. CLARK.

PRE-

P R E F A C E,
TO THE
T H I R D E D I T I O N.

IN the life of Dr. DODDRIDGE, prefixed to the seventh edition of his Family Expofitor, it is obferved, that in a future impreffion of the author's "Course of Lectures," it would be extremely ufeful to enlarge the lift of references, by introducing the names and productions of thofe writers who have treated upon the feveral matters in queftion fince the Doctor's deceafe. It is added, that to a perfon converfant in the hiftory of controverfies, this would be no very difficult task; and that it might, in particular, eafily be executed by any gentleman who, as a tutor, has made ufe of the Lectures as a Text Book, and who confequently has been in the habit of referring to fucceeding authors.

Though I do not compleatly answer to the whole of this description, (having only been occasionally a reader on a few detached parts of Dr. Doddridge's Lectures), I was, neverthelefs, readily induced to undertake the bufinefs fuggeded, from a confcioufnefs of the utility of the defign, and from the hope that I had fo far attended to the progreff of literature as to be in fome degree qualified for the employment. At

PREFACE.

the same time, I entertained no doubt of my being able to obtain assistance from the manuscript references of such tutors as had regularly gone through the Doctor's Course. In this respect I have happily succeeded. The Reverend Benjamin Edwards of Northampton, has favoured me with the use of his copy of Dr. Savage's notes, whence I have been supplied with a considerable number of references, several of which might have escaped my own recollection. It is still a superior aid which I have derived from the communication of the references of my late excellent friend, the Reverend Samuel Merivale, for some time Theological Tutor in a Protestant Dissenting Academy at Exeter. For this communication I am indebted to the Reverend James Manning of the same city, Mr. Merivale's relation. Mr. Manning, with that zeal for promoting every valuable undertaking which marks his character, and with that friendship which I have experienced in many pleasing instances, voluntarily undertook to transcribe the references in question, together with some other papers that might be conducive to my purpose. By such assistance, united with a due measure of diligence on my own part, the Lectures, in point of references, will be found to be very greatly augmented. This will be particularly apparent to any one who shall take the trouble of comparing the catalogue of authors inserted at the end of the present work, with that which is given in the former editions.

Besides

P R E F A C E.

Besides the new references which pervade the whole body of the text, I have added, at the bottom of the page, many notes of reference, the intention of which is not only to assist theological and other pupils during their academical course, but to point out such sources of information as may be serviceable to them in their future enquiries. It is not to be expected that in their state of pupilage they should be able to pay a due attention to one half of the books here specified: while, at the same time, it may be of great importance to know where hereafter to apply for fresh stores of knowledge and improvement.

There is one thing which I wish particularly to be remembered, and that is, that it is no part of my design to give general illustrations of the subjects treated upon, or either to confirm or to gainsay the opinions of Dr. Doddridge. This would have been the creation of a new work. It is the business of individual tutors to enlarge upon the Lectures in that way which accords with their own sentiments. My sole aim is to mention, with freedom and impartiality, the writers on all sides of the different questions which are the objects of discussion, that hereby the mind of the student may be duly enlarged, and that he may be able, with the greater advantage, to prosecute his searches after truth.

It is necessary to mention, that not having received Mr. Merivale's references till the work had been printed so far as to the sixty-seventh

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proposition, I have inserted in an Appendix those which preceded that proposition. A second Appendix contains a list of some productions which either did not occur to my remembrance at the proper time, or have been published since the Lectures were committed to the press.

I must acknowledge a great error into which I have fallen in the note subjoined to the 334th page of the first volume. In that note I have ascribed to Dr. Wm. Wagstaffe a Treatise on the future Existence and Immortality of the animal Creation. The book in question was written by a Dr. Hildrop. The reader will forgive the temporary failure of recollection with regard to a performance which was perused between forty and fifty years ago, and has not since been seen. Dr. Hildrop's work was, I believe, entitled, "Free Thoughts on the Brute Creation."

Westminster,
Aug. 5, 1794.

AND. KIPPIS.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION*.

IT may be not improper, in the entrance of this work, to give some general account of the plan of it, and some directions for studying it in the most useful manner.

The work itself, contains an abstract of the most important and useful thoughts I have any where met with, on the chief subjects which can be supposed to come under consideration, in the review of *Pneumatology*, *Ethics*, and *Divinity*. And as these sciences do insensibly run into each other, I judged it not proper to treat of each *separately*, and so to divide the whole into three distinct parts, the first Pneumatological, the second Ethical, and the third Theological; but have chosen to consider them in such a *connected* view, as might convey to the mind, with the greatest ease and advantage, the principal truths relating to each. The whole work is divided therefore into ten parts, and contains in all 230 Lectures. The *first* part, (Lect. 1—22.) considers the powers and faculties of the human mind.—The *second*, (Lect. 23—51.) the being of a GOD, and his natural perfec-

* This Introduction is to be considered as the Author's address to his own pupils, when they entered upon this course of Lectures, which will shew the propriety of some of the directions, which might otherwise appear too particular and minute.

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tions.—The *third*, (Lect. 52—90.) treats of the nature of moral virtue in general, and of the moral attributes of the Deity: of the several branches of virtue, and the nature of civil government.—The *fourth*, (Lect. 91—100.) of the immortality and immateriality of the human Soul, with its original; as also our general obligation to virtue, and the state of it in the world.—The *fifth*, (Lect. 101—110.) considers the reason to desire and expect a revelation, and the external and internal evidence with which we may suppose it should be attended.—The *sixth*, (Lect. 111—153.) asserts and vindicates the genuineness, credibility, and inspiration of the Old and New Testament.—The *seventh*, (Lect. 154—163.) contains an account of the scripture doctrine, relating to the existence and nature of GOD, and the Divinity of the SON and SPIRIT.—The *eighth*, (Lect. 164—187.) treats of the fall of human nature, and our recovery by the mediatorial undertaking of our Lord Jesus Christ, with the nature of faith in him, and of the covenant of grace established through him. So that the doctrine of Christ's atonement, and the Spirit's influences, are also comprehended in this part.—The *ninth*, (Lect. 188—209.) is a survey of the chief duties which the gospel requires; and more particularly of the positive institutions; in which the doctrine of the christian sabbath, the sacraments, and the constitution of the church are considered.—The *tenth* and last part, (Lect. 210—230.) contains the Scripture Doctrine of angels, and of the future state, includ-

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including the resurrection, and the most remarkable events to precede or attend it.

These are the great subjects of the work, and I believe the very mention of them is sufficient to shew, how important a part of an academical course it must make, and how much it must be the concern of every prudent and judicious student to give it a large share of his application.

For the more profitable studying this course of lectures, it will be adviseable, that, as soon as possible after the lecture has been given, it be carefully reviewed, and the chief *references* read and contracted. But in contracting them, it will be unnecessary to transcribe those passages, the substance of which is already inserted in the lecture: it will be sufficient to take some general hints of their contents; and to transcribe only those parts, which are very peculiar and observable. And here some distinction is to be made, between those books, which may very probably be always at hand in reviewing the lectures, and those which may not so probably be within your reach.

A diligent attendance on the course will, I hope, be both a pleasure and improvement: yet I would advise every pupil, (if he can) to go over it *twice*; for though the subjects themselves, at the second review, will want the advantage of novelty, yet more thoughts will often arise in lecturing, and the whole will be made more familiar to the mind: besides, that the student will by this means have an opportunity of reading and studying some
things,

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things, which accidental causes might have obliged him before to pass over without due attention.—And for this purpose, it may be very convenient to keep a catalogue of those lectures, which by absence, illness, or any other accidental circumstance, were not studied so carefully as might be wished; as likewise of those things, which did not, in the course of lecturing, appear solved and explained in a satisfactory manner. And if any difficulties arise, which seem peculiar, let them be drawn out in writing, to be lodged in the tutor's hands, or made the subject of a thesis, to be canvassed at large. In the mean time, full liberty will be given to make any objection or inquiry, from time to time, which will be examined in the hours of lecture, so far as the limits of time and other employments will allow.

Yet let it be remembered, that the student is supposed to be already acquainted with many things here brought into question. It would be a most fatal mistake, to act as if nothing were known of God and Christ, till the chief doctrines relating to both come to be examined in this course. Many small treatises, which may be read in a few hours, contain evidence enough, both of the being of a God, and the truth of the christian religion, to satisfy an upright mind: though it may be convenient, that those who are to be the teachers and guardians of these truths, or those who may be exposed to peculiar temptations to doubt or disbelieve them, should be acquainted with their evidence in a larger extent.

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extent. Let the great vital truths of christianity taught in scripture be constantly regarded. As to matters of *controversy*, let them be referred to their proper place, without any eagerness to anticipate them; which often produces great bigotry and error, as well as a neglect of what is proposed to immediate inquiry. And may it never be forgotten, that matters of abstruse speculation and laborious inquiry, are not, even to *Theological* students, the *one thing needful*, though they may be important in subordination to it.

I would remind you, dear Sir, (whoever you are that are going over these lectures) that you may enter into eternity, long before you can have attended, or even transcribed them: and therefore, I would beseech and charge you, by all your hopes and prospects there, that it be your daily and governing care, after having solemnly devoted your soul to God through Christ in the bonds of the christian covenant, to live like his servant, to keep yourself in the love of God, and to endeavour in all things to adorn his gospel. So will you be most likely to succeed in your inquiries, through the communication of light from the great Father of lights: and so will you be prepared for the infinitely nobler discoveries, enjoyments, and services of the future state; even though you should be deprived of the residue of your days here, and cut short, (as many of your brethren have been) in the intended studies and labours of this course.

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LECTURES

ON

PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS, AND DIVINITY.

PART I.

Of the Powers and Faculties of the HUMAN MIND.

AXIOM I.

EXISTENCE is a simple idea, which we get both by consciousness and observation. LECT. I.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. vii. § 7. l. iv. c. ix.

§ 3.—*Burnet at Boyle's Lect. vol. i.*

p. 2, 3.—*Grove's Post. Works, vol. iv.*

p. 3, 4.

DEFINITION I.

Whatever our thoughts are immediately employed about, whether as simply perceiving it, or as asserting or denying any thing concerning it, is called an IDEA.

SCHOLIUM.

The definition more frequently given is, that an *Idea* is the representation of a thing in the mind, which the mind immediately perceives; and the thing itself supposed to exist without our thoughts is called the *Archetype* of the idea.

But we do not yet chuse to assert or deny any thing concerning the external existence of such supposed archetypes, and for this reason have not thought it so proper to use this definition.

DEFINITION II.

Whatever exists is called a BEING.

SCHOLIUM.

We do not here enter largely into the distinction which the metaphysicians make between *Ens reale*, which exists without any dependence upon our thoughts, and *Ens rationis*, which owes its existence to its being the object of them; nor into the question between the *Realists* and *Nominalists*; but by *Being* in the process of this discourse we mean *Ens reale* *.

Watts's Ontology, c. xvi.—*Watts's Logic*, p. 27, 28.

DEFINITION III.

Whatever is contained in the adequate idea of any being, is called its PROPERTIES.

COROLLARY I.

A being is the same with all its properties taken together. And therefore

COROLLARY II.

We can have no conception of any substance distinct from all the properties of the being in which they inhere; for this would imply that the being itself inheres, and so on to infinity.

Jennings's Log. Def. 15.—*Locke's Ess.* l. i. c. iv. § 18. *ib.* l. ii. c. xiii. § 19, 20. *ib.* c. xxiii. § 2, 3, 6.—*Watts's Philos. Ess.* ii. § 1.

* The knowledge of these distinctions, and of the disputes carried on concerning them, by the schoolmen, may hereafter be sought for in Enfield's History of Philosophy, and in other works. Much information of this kind occurs in several articles of Bayle's Dictionary.

DEFINITION IV.

BODY is an extended solid being.

Gravesend's Phys. l. c. ii, iii. § 9, 12, 18.—Le Clerc's Phys. l. v. c. iii. § 1—3.—Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. iv.

A X I O M II.

THOUGHT is a simple idea which we get by reflecting on what passes in our own minds.

Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 277, 278.—Crouzaz's Log. vol. i. p. 10.

DEFINITION V.

SPIRIT is a thinking being, or a being which has the power of thought.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. § 18.

COROLLARY I.

We have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of body; the essential properties of each being equally known, and the inward constitution equally unknown.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 15.—Proced. of Understand. p. 74—78.

COROLLARY 2:

We are at least as certain of the existence of spirit as of body: the former we know by consciousness, which is always infallible; the other by the senses, which may be mistaken.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 7 & 11.—Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 31.

SCHOLIUM I.

The *Cartesians* thought that those primary and essential properties of body and spirit, mentioned *Def. 4 & 5*, were the respective substances whence all their other properties flow: and *Dr. Watts* maintains the same opinion; urging that they agree with the received definition of

substance, as they support the accidents of figure, size, colour, &c. in bodies, and doubting, fearing, willing, &c. in spirit; and both subsist independently on human power. He farther pleads, that we have no idea of the support of these properties, and that if these be destroyed, nothing will remain.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 53.—Watts's Eff. ii. præfert. § 2, 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

A power of communicating motion by impulse is improperly mentioned by Mr. *Locke* among the essential properties of body, and that of moving body by volition among those of spirit.

DEFINITION VI.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY is that branch of learning which relates to *body*, giving an account of its various phænomena, and the principles on which the solution of them depends.

DEFINITION VII.

PNEUMATOLOGY is the doctrine of *spirits*, or that branch of science which relates to them.

DEFINITION VIII.

ETHICS is that branch of learning by which our faculties are directed to that manner of acting, by which we may obtain the highest happiness, *i. e.* the supreme enjoyment of which our natures are capable.

DEFINITION IX.

LECT. II. The HUMAN MIND is that in or of a man which thinks.

Watts's Eff. ii. p. 59.

COROLLARY.

The human mind is a spirit. *Comp. Def. 5.*

SCHOLIUM.

Des-Cartes in his definition calls it “ a thinking, incorporeal, inextended substance, which shall survive the body to which it is united, and with which it was immediately created by God, in order to form a perfect man.” It is evident that on this definition it will be matter of much controversy whether man has a mind or not. Yet he defines it something otherwise in his *Principles*.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 8.

A X I O M III.

It is evident that men have not one COMMON CONSCIOUSNESS.

COROLLARY.

Every one has a mind peculiar to himself.

More's Immort. of the Soul, l. iii. c. xvi.
p. 212—216.—*Ditton on the Resurrect.*
p. 467—471.

A X I O M IV.

VOLITION is a simple idea which we get by reflection.

DEFINITION X.

ACTION signifies volition with the effect which we will.

COROLLARY I.

Nothing can act but spontaneously.

COROLLARY 2.

Nothing but a thinking being can act; for spontaneity implies an idea of the action to be performed.

SCHOLIUM.

Action is commonly, though in a less proper sense, applied to irrational, and even inanimate beings,

beings, when the body immediately employed in producing a new effect, is said to act upon that in which it is produced, as the sun-beams upon the earth, the fire upon fuel.

Watts's Ontology, p. 342.

DEFINITION XI.

As that being which acts is called the AGENT, so that which is acted upon is called the PATIENT, whether sensible or insensible, or whether the action produced be a pleasing or displeasing effect.

DEFINITION XII.

Pleasure and *Pain* are simple *Ideas*: that which tends to produce the former is called NATURAL GOOD, and that which tends to produce the latter NATURAL EVIL.

COROLLARY.

The loss of good is evil, and the removal of evil is good.

SCHOLIUM.

See an unnecessary description of *Pain* in *Collier's Eff. part iii. p. 1**.

AXIOM V.

POWER, whether ACTIVE or PASSIVE, is a sensible idea, which we get by observing the changes produced in the beings about us by agents and patients.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 1, 2.

DEFINITION XIII.

Those properties or powers of any spirit, whereby it is rendered capable of action, enjoyment, or suffering, are called FACULTIES.

* The design of this scholium, which has been severely censured, was only to convince the student, by a remarkable instance of the absurdity of attempting to describe simple ideas.

PROPOSITION I.

To take a survey of the principal faculties of the human mind.

SOLUTION.

1. We find within ourselves a power of perceiving, abstracting, compounding, comparing, discerning, judging, reasoning, which all lead us on in the pursuit of truth, *i. e.* in the right apprehension of the nature of things, and are called by the common name of *Understanding*.

Duncan's Logic, ap. Precept. vol. ii. l. i.
c. i. § 4. ib. l. ii. c. i. § 1. ib. l. iii.
c. i. § 1, 2.

2. The power of retaining and recollecting our ideas in the absence of their archetypes is what we call *Memory*. But when ideas or trains of ideas, occur, or are called up by Memory in a lively manner, and without regard to the order of former actual impressions and perceptions, it is said to be done by the power of the *Imagination* or *Fancy*.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. Introd. p. 3.—
Balguy's VI. Sermon. p. 44—46.—
Balguy's Sermons, vol. i. p. 357—359.

3. We perceive on many occasions various commotions in our minds; (which also produce changes and impressions not only on the nerves of the brain, but in the exterior parts of the body) which commotions we call *Passions*. Pleasure and pain are the great hinges on which they turn, and the more particular modifications of them will be considered *Prop. 13.*

Dr. *Watts* describes them thus: “ They are
 “ sensible commotions of our whole nature,
 “ both soul and body, which are occasioned
 “ by the perception of an object according to
 “ some special property that belongs to it.”

(*Watts on the Passions*, p. 5.) To excite them it must appear rare and uncommon, good, *i. e.* agreeable, or evil, *i. e.* disagreeable*.

4. A power of forming *volitions*; which *Locke* defines to be the act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in or with-holding it from any particular action: but what that *exerting its dominion* is, can only be known by consciousness. *Ax.* 4.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 15.

5. A power of moving some parts of the body. Others it has no immediate power over, the motion of some being always involuntary, as that of the heart. In other parts it is sometimes voluntary and sometimes otherwise, as in the lungs and intestines.

Des-Cartes de Pass. l. i. § 13, 16.

DEMONSTRATION.

We find by experience that these faculties are in our own minds, and we perceive by their effects they are in the minds of others.

COROLLARY 1.

Man is a being of great abilities and excellencies; so that if it shall hereafter appear that he was produced by any other intelligent being, it may reasonably be concluded, that he was designed for great and important purposes.

COROLLARY 2.

While these faculties continue in a degree of vigour, he must be capable of great and noble improvements; so that much of the difference between persons in other respects equal,

* With *Dr. Watts's Doctrine of the Passions* compare a *Short Theory of the Passions*, by *Dr. Thomas Balguy*, in the Appendix to his "Divine Benevolence asserted," an octavo pamphlet, published in 1781.

will depend upon the degree in which this natural furniture is cultivated or neglected.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It is not proper to speak of the understanding and other faculties of the soul as if they were distinct principles of action: the understanding is the *soul* understanding, the will is the *soul* willing: and to represent them as distinct agents produces confusion in our ideas.

Witsii Œcon. Fæd. l. iii. c. vii. § 4, 5.—

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 17—20.—

Crouzaz's Logic, vol. i. part i. c. viii.

§ 6. p. 144.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The power which the mind evidently has of moving the various parts of the body by nerves inserted in the muscles is truly wonderful, seeing the mind neither knows the muscles to be moved, nor the machinery, by which the motion in it is to be produced: so that it is as if a musician should always strike the right note on a very complex instrument, which he had never seen before. That no laws of mechanism can produce this, is proved by its being voluntary, as well as by other considerations.

Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 12. p. 29—35.—

Mathe, vol. i. p. 359, &c.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is questioned whether there be any motion in the human body which depends upon the mind, and yet is involuntary.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Berkley entirely denies the power of *abstraction*, as an evident absurdity and inconsistency, and says we have only a power of making one particular idea a representation of all the rest. But this is all grounded upon an unwary expression

pression of Mr. *Locke*. The truth is, that we do not positively exclude, but only overlook a part of the idea from which we abstract: *v. g.* when I conceive of a line by abstraction, I do not deny that it is either straight or crooked, but only think of the flowing of a point without determining its direction*.

Locke ib. l. ii. c. ix. § 9.—Berkley's Princ. Introd. § 6—20. —Proced. of Underst. p. 186—188.

PROPOSITION II.

LECT. To survey those phænomena observable in
 III. BRUTE ANIMALS, which seem to bear some resemblance to the faculties of the human mind.

SOLUTION.

They seem to have a power of *perception*; *v. g.* to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, and to feel; and it seems that it is by this power, that those bodies, which we call animal, are distinguished from those that are inanimate.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. ix. § 11.

2. They seem also to have *memory*; which appears by the marks of their recollecting a train of ideas, when one that has a relation to the rest is by sensation presented anew; and especially by birds perfecting themselves by practice in tunes they have imperfectly learnt.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 10.—Proced. of the Under. p. 158—162.

3. They appear capable of exerting *volitions*, and of putting them into execution by correspondent motions of their bodies.

4. They appear to be impressed with *passions*, as joy, sorrow, fear, hope, desire, gratitude, an-

* For a farther elucidation of this subject, recourse may be had to Reid's "Intellectual Powers of Man;" and Mr. Dugald Stewart's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind."

ger, &c. and sometimes in a very violent degree.

5. They appear not to have a power of *abstraction*, because they do not use articulate sounds as the signs of their ideas, though the organs of some are capable of pronouncing them.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 10, 11.—Proced. of Underst. p. 188, 189.

Gr. 5. | 6. They are incapable of any high degree of *reasoning*, since that evidently depends upon abstract ideas.—*Object.* Many of their actions seem rational. *Ans.* They are, and in so high a degree, that if they were governed by any reason of their own, they would exceed the sagacity of the generality of men: yet in other instances they appear mere idiots; and in the actions of the same species there is so little variety, that we cannot imagine this to be the case. This must therefore be granted to be a very strange phænomenon.

Speētat. N^o. 120. vol. ii. p. 139.—Speēt. de la Nat. vol. i. part ii. p. 70, 71.—Collib. Inq. into the Exist. p. 86, 87. Ed. 1. p. 100, 101. Ed. 3.—Beattie's Dissertations, p. 60—71.—Reimarus's Dissertations, p. 216—218.

COROLLARY I.

The *Cartesian* hypothesis, that Brutes are mere machines, is very incredible, since these phænomena can by no means be accounted for on any mechanical laws, nor upon any principles, which will not prove it possible, that those which appear to us human creatures may be mere machines, and not only irrational but insensible too*.

* This hypothesis was adopted for a time by some of the followers of Cartesius, and was embraced by Dr. Watts. It is now universally exploded, and was never worthy of any serious consideration.

Definition of a Man's own Body. PART I.

Des-Cartes de Method. § 5. p. 34—36.
 —*Le Clerc's Physf.* l. iv. c. xii. § 9—
 13.—*Ray's Wisdom of God*, p. 54—57.
 —*Proced. of Understand.* p. 170—174.
 —*Ess. upon Hunting*, p. 52—92.—*Reg.*
Philos. Conv. vol. iii. p. 83—85.—*Dit-*
ton on the Resurrection, p. 392—400.—
Watts's Ruin and Recovery. Appendix.
Essay 1st.

COROLLARY 2.

It is evident that man is a creature superior to the brutes, though some authors have endeavoured to sink him to a level with them. *Vid. Prop. 1.*

Blount's Anima Mundi, p. 40—46.—*Orig. adv. Celsum*, l. iv. p. 217—222.—
Gelli's Circe by Layng, pass.—*Ditton on the Resurrection*, p. 395.

SCHOLIUM.

That *Plants* are a species of animals, and have some sort of sensation, is strongly maintained, though with no appearance of reason, by

Redi de Generat. Insect. p. 245—249,
 257—260.—*Edwards's Exercit. N^o,*
 viii. *ad finem* *.

DEFINITION XIV.

LECT. That may be called a man's own BODY, which
 IV. is the animal system over which his will exer-
 cises an immediate power, and by the organs of
 which ideas are transmitted to his mind; and
 that is to be accounted a VITAL part of it which
 partakes of its vegetation.

* This idea has lately been revived, and seems to be rather growing into fashion. See an ingenious Essay on the subject, by Dr. Percival, in the Manchester Philosophical Transactions.

PROPOSITION III.

To enumerate the principal phænomena of the dependance of the human mind on the body.

SOLUTION.

1. When the nerves of the body are moved, ideas are presented to our minds whether we will or no, according to the different senses to which those nerves serve which are put into agitation; that is, certain ideas in the mind succeed to certain motions in the brain.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 25.—Cheyne's Princip. c. iii. § 39. p. 228, 229.—Des-Cartes de Pass. § 34.—Des-Cartes Prin. part iv. § 197. p. 216.

2. Passions are often excited by bodily motions; and on the other hand, when raised, produce changes in the body, sometimes even contrary to our volitions; *v. g.* in anger and blushing.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xx. § 17.—Des-Cartes de Pass. § 97—106, 113—135.

3. When the body is indisposed, the mind is often disabled from using its faculties; *v. g.* the understanding is disabled by drunkenness and sleep, motion by the palsy, memory by diseases, &c.

4. When the senses are gently and naturally shut up, and the command over the body intermitted, as in sleep, if we think at all we are said to dream; and generally wander through airy tracks of thought, which have no agreement with each other, nor are at all corrected by the judgment. Ideas fetched out of the memory, seem to us to be produced anew; and out of mere simple ideas laid up in the memory, new imaginary ideas of substances are formed,
and

and seem to be produced by external objects. When the senses are obstructed in a violent and unnatural manner, as in a swoon; if we think at all we may observe the same phænomena, but in a still more languid degree.

Lime-street Lect. vol. ii. p. 442, 443.—*Des-Cartes Dioptics*, c. vi. § 17.—*Robault's Phys.* l. iv. c. xix.—*Lucret.* l. iv. ver. 905—1024—*Herv. Med.* vol. ii. p. 43. note.

5. In a frenzy, though the senses be not shut up, nor the command of the mind over the body suspended, yet the same phænomena are found as in sleep, only in a more vivid and pathetic degree.

Aretæus de Morb. Acut. l. ii. c. iv, v. p. 17.
Boer. Ed. Vid. Boer. Not. in loc.

6. Sometimes by very intense thinking, we do not attend to impressions made on the organs of sensation, nor receive ideas from them. This in a very high degree may be called a trance or extasy.

Plutarch's Lives, vol. ii. p. 435, 436.—*Locke's Ess.* l. ii. c. ix. § 3, 4. *ib.* c. ii. § 19. p. 1—3.—*Flavel's Pneumat. ap. Opera*, p. 276, 277. *Edin. Ed. Vol. i.* p. 475, 476. *Lond. Ed.*—*Guelperius in Act.* x. 10.—*Col. Gardiner's Memoirs*, § 30—32.

COROLLARY.

Man is a very feeble creature, and we have little reason to boast of those intellectual powers, the exercise of which, by the very constitution of our nature, does not only depend upon an animal system, but is necessarily subject to frequent long interruptions, as in the state of sleep.

Burnet's

Burnet's Theory, vol. ii. p. 164.—*Camb. sur l'Exist.* p. 176, 177.—*Herv. Contempl.* vol. ii. p. 39, 40, 48—50*.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is queried to what we are to ascribe the difference to be found in the intellectual capacities of men. LECT. V.

ANSW. The principles of physiognomy, the decay of the faculties in old age, the destruction or restoration of them by corporeal accidents, and many of the phænomena mentioned in the proposition, may convince us, that the temperature and constitution of the body, has a great influence on the mind. It must also be allowed, that the circumstances of education and conversation, may make a considerable difference between persons in other respects equal. Yet if we attend to the variety there is in all the works of nature, we may be inclined to think there is a like variety in the internal constitution of human souls: which conjecture is confirmed by observing, that no visible difference has yet been discovered between the brain of the weakest and the most sagacious of mankind; as well as that persons in the same circumstances, and with the same opportunities, often make very different improvements †.

Des-Cartes de Method. sub. init. p. 1.—
Watts's Death and Heaven, p. 97—
102.

* From all these circumstances recent philosophers have deduced arguments to prove that the soul is not distinct from the body. On this side of the question, the subject has been copiously discussed by Dr. Priestley, in his *Disquisitions concerning Matter and Spirit*; and by Mr. Cooper, in his *Philosophical Essays*. On the other side, see Berington's "*Letters on Materialism*;" his "*Immaterialism delineated*;" Gifford's "*Outlines of an Answer to Dr. Priestley's Disquisitions*;" and Belsham's "*Essays*," vol. ii. p. 1—30.

† These objects of speculation, being more curious than immediately useful, may well be referred by young students to future consideration.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some have distinguished between the *rational* and the *animal* soul, as if they were two distinct Beings, calling the former the *Spirit*, the latter the *Soul*. They suppose the intellect and will are seated in the former, the passions and appetites in the latter; and that the *Soul* is a principle common to brutes, which therefore they sometimes call by very contemptible names, as the *horse*, the *brute*, &c. whereas they think the *Spirit* is peculiar to man. *Vid. Prop. i. Sch. i.*

Proced. of the Underst. l. ii. c. x. p. 367, 370—377.—Marc. Anton. l. ii. § 2. l. iii. § 16. l. xii. § 3. with Dac. Notes.—Des-Cartes de Pass. part i. § 47.—Pope's Iliad, l. xxiii. ver. 122. vol. vi. p. 61, 62.—Mason on Self Knowledge, l. i. c. ii. p. 14.—Vitring. Obs. l. iii. c. iv. præf. § 2—8.

DEFINITION XV.

The SOUL is said to be SEATED in that part of the body, where sensation terminates, and voluntary motion begins.

PROPOSITION IV.

The Soul is seated in the *Brain*.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The nerves on which sensation and motion evidently depend, terminate in the brain, or in the *medulla spinalis*, which is derived from thence, and whose fibres are probably all continued to it.

2. If a strait ligature be made on any nerve, or it be cut asunder, sensation continues in that part nearest the brain, and ceases in that which is more remote.

3. In men, and in most other animals, death immediately ensues, if the head be cut off, or the

the brains taken out, or the cerebellum wounded.

4. All known distempers that immediately take away sensation, are seated in the head.

Grad. 1—4. *Def.* 14. 15. The soul is seated in the brain. *Q. E. D.*

Keil's Anat. c. viii. § 1.—*More's Immort. of the Soul*, l. ii. c. vii. § 10.—*Watts's Ess.* iii. p. 78—80.

COROLLARY.

The ancients were mistaken in placing it in the *heart*; and *Van Helmont* in the *mouth of the stomach*. It may be observed by the way, that *Philo*, who with many ancients supposed the sensitive soul to be subdivided into the irascible and concupiscible, placed the former in the heart, the latter in the belly, while he thought the rational was seated in the head.

Vitringa ubi supra, § 4. *sub fin.*—*More*, *ibid.* l. ii. c. vii. § 5.—10.—*Des-Cartes de Pass.* § 38.

SCHOLIUM I.

It must still be matter of controversy, in what part of the brain the soul is seated. There is no reason to think, as some have imagined, that it is in the *meninges*; but whether it be in the *pineal gland*, as *Des-Cartes* supposes; or as *Dr. More* thinks, among the animal spirits in the *fourth ventricle*, or in the *corpora striata*, as has been lately maintained in *France*, or in some part different from any of these, we cannot certainly say*.

Des-Cartes de Pass. § 32.—*More*, *ibid.* l. ii. c. vii. § 12—18. c. viii. *per tot.*

* The question concerning the seat of the soul, for a long time excited the attention of philosophers, and has been the subject of various discussion. At present, we believe that it is deemed of little importance.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The constitution of some animals may perhaps be different from that of men in this respect. It is certain the phænomena mentioned *gr.* 3. are not always to be found in them; for wasps will live a long time after their heads are cut off; eels are soonest killed by striking them on the tail; and vipers will live some hours after their heads are cut off, and their bowels taken out.

More, ibid. l. iii. c. xv. § 1, 2.—Bacon's Nat. Hist. Cent. 4. N^o 400.

DEFINITION XVI.

LECT. VI. Any idea or proposition is said to be INNATE, when it is not acquired by the use of the faculties, but so implanted in the mind from its original, as to be common to the whole species, independently upon any circumstances in which individuals may be placed.

PROPOSITION V.

There are no innate ideas in the human mind.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. There can no *simple* idea be assigned, but may be traced up to *sensation* or *reflection*, or *both*: *v. g.* to *one sense* alone; as seeing green, hearing the sound of an organ, smelling a rose, tasting a peach, feeling solidity, &c. or *more*; as extension, motion, rest: to *reflection* only, as perception, volition, duration: or *sensation* and *reflection* both, as existence and various kinds of pleasure and pain. *Ans. 1.*

Locke, l. ii. c. iii. v—vii. Ibid. c. i. § 2, 7—9.

2. We see that simple ideas are acquired gradually, and the furniture of various persons differs according to their various circumstances in life.

Locke, l. ii. c. i. § 2, 5, 7, 20—23.

3. When

3. When the organs of sensation are destroyed, simple ideas proper to them are no more acquired; and those who from their birth want proper organs, want correspondent ideas, even though they be ever so important to the comfort and usefulness of life.

Locke, l. i. c. iv. § 20. Ibid. l. ii. c. iii. § 1.

Grad. 1—3. 4. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose, that any *simple* ideas are innate.

5. *Compound* ideas are made up of simple ones, nor can we by any operation of the mind produce any idea how chimerical soever, the materials of which we are not already possessed of.

Locke, l. ii. c. ii. § 2. Ibid. c. xii. § 8.

Grad. 4, 5. 6. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose any of our ideas innate. *Q. E. D.*

Proced. of Underst. p. 382-384.—More's Philos. Works, l. i. c. 5, 6.

SCHOLIUM I.

Dr. Watts supposes there are three sources of our ideas, viz. *Sensation, Reflection, and Abstraction*; but since he grants that the materials of the last are derived from the two former, this cannot be reckoned a third primary source any more than *compounding*.

Watts's Phil. Ess. iii. § 16. p. 93-97.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Brown, in his *Procedure of the Understanding*, maintains that we have all our ideas originally from *Sensation*: but his proof depends entirely upon his definition of the word *Idea*, which he takes for a picture or representation of some *sensible* object laid up in the imagination; which is different from our definition of it. *Vid. Def. 1.*

Proced. of Underst. p. 55, 63-66.—Dr.

Price's Review of the Morals, c. i. § 2.

—Lord Monboddo on the Origin and Progress of Language, v. i. p. 1-184.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Most of those ideas which arise from reflection, come into the mind later than those which arise from sensation:

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Many errors in our ideas of sensation are rectified by reflection.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. ix. § 8, 9.—Smith's Optics, vol. ii. Append. p. 27, 28.—Locke's Fam. Lett. p. 134—138.—Watts's Logic, part ii. c. iii. § 3. p. 200.

PROPOSITION VI.

LECT. VII. There are no innate propositions in the human mind.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. All propositions consist of ideas: therefore innate propositions would imply innate ideas, contrary to Prop. 5.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 19.

2. If any propositions could be supposed innate, it must be those that are intuitively discerned: but these, though assented to as soon as proposed, are not known before such proposal, even by those whose minds are least corrupted by education and custom: which shews (by the way) that they cannot be the principles of all our knowledge, not being themselves first known.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. ii. § 4, 16, 21—27.

3. All propositions relating to *identity* and *diversity* of ideas may be intuitively discerned, and consequently must be innate, if intuitive discerning were the mark of an innate proposition. But this would imply, that all our ideas were innate, which is evidently absurd.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 4, 5. Ibid. l. 4. c. vii. § 4.

4. Propo-

4. Propositions supposed innate cannot be distinguished from others, so that a complete catalogue of them should be made: yet this might reasonably be expected if any were so, and would be necessary to render them useful:

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iii. § 14. Ibid. c. iv. § 21.

5. Several of those propositions which are of greatest importance in morality, and seem most evident, and are therefore most likely to be innate, are unknown to some, and expressly contradicted by others, and all need proof.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 4—13.—Sale's

Pref. to the Koran, p. 131, 132.—

Watts's Eff. iv. § 1.—Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 381.

Gr. 1—5. | 6. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOLIUM I.

It may be granted, that there are certain circumstances, in which it is impossible for the mind to avoid receiving certain ideas, and assenting to certain propositions, and even taking them for granted in all its reasonings: and this is the necessary consequence of its constitution. It may also be granted, that there is something in natural temper disposing to gratitude, compassion, &c. as effectually as if propositions recommending them were inscribed upon the soul. But this is by no means inconsistent with what has been said above: and in this sense Mr. *Locke* owns innate practical principles, as the *desire of happiness*.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iii. § 2.—Watts's Eff.

iv. § 2—4. p. 100—102, 104—107.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The dream of innate ideas, seems to have arisen on the one hand, from the desire of teachers to impose their own sentiments upon their

disciples, as sacred truths stamp'd on their minds by the Author of nature; and on the other, from the ease with which such principles have been early received, and the assurance with which they have been assented to, so that people cannot remember that they have ever doubted of them*.

Locke's Ess. l. i. c. iii. § 21—26. Ibid. c. iv. § 24.—Enquiry concerning Political Justice, vol. i. p. 12—18.

PROPOSITION VII.

LECT.

VIII.

The same external qualities in objects, may excite different ideas in different persons.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If the organs of sensation be at all different, the ideas of the same object must be proportionably so, while the same laws of nature prevail.

2. It is probable, there may be some degree of difference in the organs of different persons; *v. g.* in the distance of the *retina* and *chrystalline* humour of the eye; in the degree of extension in the *tympanium* of the ear, in the acrimony of the *saliva*, &c. And the variety which is observable in the faces, the voices, and the bones of men, and almost through the whole face of nature, would lead us to suspect that the same variety might take place here.

* The doctrine of innate ideas, and innate propositions, was long maintained; and Mr. Locke was obliged to take much pains upon the subject. Though the system is now generally exploded, there has appeared in a few late writers a tendency to revive something like innate propositions, under the terms of the "Principles of Common Sense." Dr. Reid is guarded upon the subject; but his followers have not been equally prudent. See Beattie's "Immutability of Truth," and more especially Dr. Oswald's "Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion." Sentiments very similar to those maintained by these gentlemen had long before been advanced by Pere Buffier, in his "First Truths, and the Origin of our Opinions explained," a translation of which work, from the French, was published in 1780.

3. Those

3. Those things which are very pleasing to one, are extremely disagreeable to another.

4. Those things which are at one time very agreeable, are at another very disagreeable to the same person, when the organs of his body are indisposed, or when other disagreeable ideas are associated with those that had once been grateful.

Gr. 1, 2, and 4|5. *Valet propositio.*

Locke's Essay, b. ii. c. xxxii. § 15.—*Ars Cogitandi*, p. i. c. i.—*Le Clerc's Logic*, p. i. c. i. § 15.

SCHOLIUM.

Though the causes mentioned above may probably produce ideas which differ in *degree* in the minds of different persons, there is no apparent reason to suppose they differ in their *kind*; v. g. that what appears green to one, should constantly appear red to another, and *vice versa*.

Malebranche's Research, l. i. c. xiii. § 5, 6.—*Robault's Phys.* part i. c. xxvii. § 6. vol. i. p. 197.—*Philosophical Transactions*, vol. lxviii. part ii. For 1778.

PROPOSITION VIII.

To survey the phænomena of the human memory with the solutions that have been given of some of them. See *Prop.* 1. *gr.* 2.

SOLUTION.

1. A vast stock of ideas are treasured up in the memory, which it easily produces on various occasions.

The *Cartesians* say, that objects coming in by sensation and ideas got by reflection, make traces in the brain.—But how exquisitely fine must these be, when in so small a compass the names and images of so many objects, as well as so many propositions and arguments are inscribed. Who can sufficiently admire it, not only in such extra-

ordinary cases as are mentioned by *Derham*, &c. but in those cases which are most common?

Derham's Phys. Theol. l. v. c. i. p. 262.—
Des-Cartes de Pass. § 42.—*Cicero's Tusculanæ*
Disp. l. i. § 24, 25.—*Watts's Ess.* iii.
 § 13, 14.—*Rollin Maniere, &c.* vol. i.
 p. 275—277.—*August. Confes.* l. x. c. 7.
Senec. Controv. l. i. *sub init.*

2. We can distinguish ideas brought out of the memory from those that come in by sensation or reflection; perhaps by the liveliness of the impression, or by the train of relations.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. 10. c. vi. § 5, 6.—
Des-Cartes de Pass. § 26.

3. Ideas of which we have but a general and imperfect remembrance may often be recovered by recollection.

Watts's Ess. iii. § 15.—*Locke's Ess.* l. ii.
 c. x. § 7.

4. Memory in a great measure depends upon the body, and is often much injured by a disease, and afterwards recovered with recovering strength, which on the *Cartesian* hypothesis is accounted for, by supposing that those parts of the brain, on which these characters are written, are by such disorders relaxed, in the same manner as the nerves in the other parts of the body are liable to be weakened or disabled.

5. The memory differs at different ages. Children soon forget, as they soon learn: old people learn with difficulty, and remember best what they learnt when young. That is, say the *Cartesians*, because the brain growing by degrees more dry retains old characters, but does not easily admit new.

6. Dreams generally make little impression on the memory: because, say some, the animal spirits are then but gently moved.

Watts's Ess. No. v. § 2.

7. An idea attended with great pleasure or pain makes a deep impression on the memory, *i. e.* a deep trace on the brain, the spirits being then violently impelled.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. x. § 3.

8. The power of recollecting differs extremely at different times: and it is generally strongest, when we are most brisk and lively.

9. We remember that best in the morning, which we learnt just before we went to sleep: because, say the *Cartesians*, the traces made then are not apt to be effaced by the motions of the spirits, as they would, if new objects of sensation had presented themselves; and during this interval, they have (as it were) time to stiffen.

10. Sensible ideas gradually decay in the memory if they be not refreshed by new sensations; the traces perhaps wearing out: yet they may last many years.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. x. § 4, 5.

11. When a train of ideas is very familiar to the mind, they often follow one another in the memory without any laborious recollection, and so as to arise almost instantaneously and mechanically; as in writing, singing, &c. the traces between them being worn like beaten roads.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. § 6.

12. The memory is a faculty which is almost incessantly exercised while thought continues; (though the instances of laborious recollection are comparatively few:) nor do we ever find the human mind entirely stript of it, though it be often impaired.

DEMONSTRATION.

The probability of the *Cartesian* hypothesis will appear from considering, LECT.

1. How well it agrees with the various phæ- IX.
nomena mentioned above.

2. The

2. The analogy upon this hypothesis between sensation and memory, the one arising from impressions made on the brain, the other depending on traces continued there.

3. The instances in which memory has been almost wholly lost at once by a sudden violent blow upon the head; insomuch that a great scholar has entirely lost the knowledge of letters by it, and has been forced with infinite labour to begin again from the elements of them: and in other instances the recollection has been gradual, and the events of childhood and youth have been recovered first.

COROLLARY.

The memory is a useful faculty, which deserves to be carefully cultivated by attention and exercise, frequent reviews and conversation.

Free-Thinker, N^o. 72.—*Rollin's Man.* &c. vol. i. p. 277—279.—*Watts's Improv. of the Mind*, part i. c. xvii.

SCHOLIUM I.

The artificial methods which some have proposed must be allowed to be very ingenious; but perhaps are rather calculated to improve a memory already good, than to help a bad one.

Rollin's Maniere, &c. vol. i. p. 279, 280.
—*Grey's Memoria Technica.*—*Bruen's Life*, p. 56—58.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The excellency of the memory consists partly in its strength of retention, and partly in its quickness of recollection.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 3.

If the *Cartesian* hypothesis should be admitted, memory will still continue a great mystery: for it must be acknowledged impossible thoroughly to

to explain how either that or sensation should be affected by any impression on the brain, or what connection there can be between such impressions and thought in any of its modes.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Locke* accounts for the association of ideas, which is the cause of antipathies and many errors, with other strange phænomena, by memory; supposing such traces are worn on the brain as unite ideas, so that when the mind turns to one it should almost necessarily fall on the other too. See *Solution*, gr. II.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. § 7—18.—
Hartley on Man, Prop. X, XI. vol. i.
p. 65—72.

SCHOLIUM 5.

If the *Cartesian* hypothesis be admitted, it must be owned that nothing gives a greater idea of the minuteness of the parts into which matter may actually be divided, than the smallness of those traces, by which so many dictionaries, histories, poems, &c. are transcribed, and so many pictures exactly drawn in miniature*.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is probable the weakness of memory in infants may be one chief cause of their being so long before they come to the use of speech, as well as the want of dexterity in using the organs of it.

AXIOM VI.

We get our ideas of SUCCESSION, by observing the train of ideas passing through our minds one after another. *Locke's Eff.* l. ii. c. xiv. § 4. LECT.
X.

* That memory is an original faculty given us by the Author of our being, of which we can give no account, but that we are so made, is maintained by Dr. Reid, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," p. 303—310. For an account of the different theories concerning Memory, see the same author, p. 338—356.

PROPOSITION IX.

The swiftness and slowness of the succession of ideas in the human mind have certain limits.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Some motions are so swift, and others so slow, that they cannot be seen.

2. Motion is always successive.

3. Could our ideas succeed each other as fast as the bodies move in one case, and as slow as they move in the other, the motion would become visible.

1, 3. | 4. The swiftness and slowness of ideas coming in by sight have their limits.

5. There is equal reason to believe it with regard to other ideas: as some of the like phenomena may be observed concerning some ideas that come in by hearing.

6. We are not able to retain one idea long in the mind without any variation; nor can we call up any given number of ideas, in any given time; *v. g.* we cannot think over ten verses between one vibration of the pendulum, and another.

Gr. 4 and 5, and 6. | 7. *Valet propositio.*

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xiv. § 6—14.

SCHOLIUM.

It is evident that there are various degrees of velocity in the ideas of different persons, and of the same person at different times; partly according to the temper in which he is, and partly according to the degree in which he exercises his volitions: and where the velocity is the same, it will seem greater in proportion as the kinds of ideas are more various. *Watts's Eff.* N°. xii. § 2.

AXIOM VII.

The idea of DURATION is a simple idea, which we get by reflecting on the succession of our ideas.

Locke's Eff. *ib.* § 1—3.

COROLLARY.

When we are insensible of the succession of our ideas we are also insensible of duration.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 4, 5.

DEFINITION XVII.

TIME is a part of duration measured by some supposed equal succession, a certain number of which makes a *period* or *epocha*.

Locke ib. § 17.—August. Confess. l. ii. c. xiv. apud Jackson's Works, vol. i. p. 883.

SCHOLIUM I.

The revolutions of the heavenly bodies serve for a convenient measure of time, seeing they are long, various, publicly visible, and nearly equable. Yet any phænomena returning periodically and regularly, (*v. g.* the freezing of water, the blowing of flowers, a fit of the ague, &c.) might with regard to any particular person answer the same end.

Locke ib. § 19, 20.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless, in the absence of such assistance, the train of ideas passing through a man's mind may be to himself the measure of time: though neither this nor any other measure can be demonstrated entirely equable.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 21.

SCHOLIUM 3.

When the duration of any being is said to be either long or short, it is only as compared with that of other beings.

Free-Thinker, vol. iii. N°. 114.—Le Clerc's Logic, part i. c. iv. § 6.

COROLLARY I.

The same part of duration may appear of different lengths to different persons, and to the same

same

same persons at different times. See *Prop. 7. Schol.*
Spectator, vol. ii. N^o. 94.

COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may learn the reason why years (*cæteris paribus*) appear longer to us while very young, than as we grow up to riper age; because the objects being newer, strike the mind more forcibly, and so the succession is more observed than when they grow more familiar to the mind. The like may be observed of the day we spend in a strange place, or a road we are not used to travel. Yet if by frequent repetition a thing is grown tedious to us, it appears of a longer duration; because we mingle many other ideas with it, and therefore on the whole there is a greater succession.

COROLLARY 3.

If an almighty power be supposed, it may make that part of duration, which appears but a moment to one, appear a thousand years to another, or a much greater period, and *vice versa*; which is indeed an amazing thought.

COROLLARY 4.

Time is not (as it has often been said to be) the measure of motion, but motion is one, though not the only measure of time: for if there were no material world, and so no motion, there might still be time, if there were any intellectual being whose ideas succeed each other. See *Schol. 1.*

Locke's Ess. ib. § 22, 23.—Jackson's Works, vol. i. l. v. c. xiii. § 2. p. 881, 882.—Reid's Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 310—314. 322—331.

DEFINITION XVIII.

LECT.
 XI.

Those PROPERTIES OR QUALITIES of bodies, are called PRIMARY, which are in them, whether
 we

we perceive them or not: (*v. g.* bulk, number, figure, situation of their solid parts, motion, rest, &c.) But those ideas, which by means of these primary qualities are excited in our minds, as colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. being vulgarly but falsely supposed to be in bodies) are called SECONDARY QUALITIES.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. viii. § 8—22.—

Watts's Eff. N^o. iii. p. 81—85.

SCHOLIUM.

Mr. *Locke* farther divides secondary qualities into those that are *immediately* perceivable, *i. e.* by the ideas which the bodies themselves produce in us; and those that are *mediately* perceivable, *i. e.* by the changes which we see them produce in other bodies.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 23—26.*

PROPOSITION X.

To enumerate several instances and causes of the imperfection of human knowledge.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. We are ignorant of many things for want of ideas; perhaps wanting proper organs for such kind of ideas, and certainly wanting such an intenseness of those organs which we have, as would be necessary to discover many things which are now concealed from us by their distance or minuteness. This occasions great imperfections in our knowledge both of body and spirit.

Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. iii. § 23—27.

2. We are not able to discern the connection between many of those ideas which we have, particularly that between the primary and secondary

* See this whole matter amply discussed by Dr. Reid, in his "Intellectual Powers of Man," p. 75—302.

qualities of bodies, which is a great impediment to physical enquiries.

Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. iii. § 9—17. *ib.* c. vi. § 11—15.—*Watts's Eff.* N°. iii. § 9.

3. Few important propositions are intuitively known; and all demonstrative knowledge depends upon the memory, which being fallible brings some degree of uncertainty on what we learn by it.

Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. ii. § 4—7. *ib.* c. iii. § iii. c. xi. § 9—11.

4. We are often obliged to judge by analogy, the particulars of which are generally very imperfect, and come vastly short of a compleat induction.

Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. xii. § 9. c. xvi. § 12.

5. The various avocations of life, an indolent temper, and wrong methods of pursuing knowledge, hinder our attaining what might otherwise come within our reach.

Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. iii. § 30.

COROLLARY.

Since our knowledge is so limited, it must be of great use and importance to know the limits of it.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. i. § 4—6.—*Mason on Self Knowledge*, p. 62:—*Butler's Serm.* N°. xv.

SCHOLIUM I.

Nevertheless, we are not destitute of capacities and opportunities for coming to the knowledge of those things on which our happiness most evidently depends.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. i. § 5. *ib.* l. iv. c. xi. § 8.—*Fonval's Lett. in Nat. Displayed*, vol. i. p. 277—290.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The question, whether there be any material world or not, will come in with greater advantage hereafter: yet were the negative to be granted, (which Bishop *Berkley* maintains,) the same difficulties with those above-mentioned would occur, with a little alteration of phrase.

PROPOSITION XI.

To enquire wherein PERSONAL IDENTITY CONSISTS. LECT.
XII.

SOLUTION.

I. Mr. *Locke* supposes it consists in a *continued consciousness of the same actions*; and thence infers, that, if the consciousness of one spirit were to be transferred to another, they would both make but one person; and that, if any spirit should lose all consciousness of its former actions, it would from that time become a different person. To confirm this, he pleads that, when it is evidently apparent that consciousness is lost, *i. e.* in case of phrensy, when a man is besides himself, the sober man is not punished for the actions of the mad-man, nor the mad-man for the actions of the sober man. But I think this may be accounted for another way, without supposing that the law looks upon them as different persons.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxvii. § 9—27. |

2. To this Dr. *Watts* very justly objects, that fancied memory might make two men born in the most distant places and times the same person, or real forgetfulness might make the same man different persons; *v. g.* *Lee* the tragedian, when distracted, might be successively *Alexander, Socrates, Tully, Virgil, Luther, queen Elizabeth*; and therefore *Lee*, when distracted, might justly

be rewarded or punished for all the different actions which he ascribes to himself: and finally, several men might become the same persons. This he thinks is contrary to the common forms of speech and to true philosophy.

Watts's Eff. N^o. xii. § 7. p. 294—308.

3. He therefore concludes, that *the same person*, in an incompleat sense, *is the same intelligent substance or conscious mind*, but in a more compleat sense, *is the same soul united to the same body*; or in other words, that, while a spirit is united to a body, the same continued animal life, in union with the same spirit, generally attended with the same consciousness, goes to constitute the same person. If the question be started relating to a supposed resurrection, it is answered that if the resurrection precedes the dissolution of the body, it does not alter the common forms of speaking; but if the body be dissolved, we may refer it to an after enquiry how far and in what cases it may be said to be the same. Mr. *Locke* also acknowledges this to be most probable: so that the chief question between them is only about the application of the word *person* in a case that is never likely to happen, *i. e.* of transferred consciousness. Yet for this very reason I think Dr. *Watts's* notion is to be preferred. And to conclude, if God should utterly destroy the soul and body of any man whom we know, and afterwards create a new spirit, united to a new body and in form resembling the other, and give to it the exact consciousness of the man whose body and soul was destroyed, and should reveal to us what he had done, we could not converse with this new produced man as the same man we formerly knew, or approve that as an equitable conduct, by which he should be rewarded or punished for the actions of the annihilated man. This abundantly shews the impropriety of Mr.

Locke's

Locke's manner of stating the question, and how much Dr. Watts's is to be preferred to it.

Watts's Ess. ib. p. 301—306, 308—313.
 —*Locke's Ess. ib. § 25.*—*Le Clerc's Ontology, c. ii. § 7.*—*Butler's Analogy, Diff. i. p. 439—450. Oct. ed. p. 305—309. Quarto ed. of 1736.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. Locke seems to have been led into this mistake, by considering what we commonly call *ourselves*, rather than what we call *the same person* when speaking of *another*. (*Vide Locke ubi supra, § 16.*) Yet it is plain we do not make consciousness the *only* rule even here, since no one is conscious of his having been born, nor of many other events and actions of his life, which nevertheless upon the evidence of reason and testimony, without consciousness, he would not at all scruple to apply to himself.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If we have two ideas of *body* in all respects the same, for instance, of a book, or watch, we judge that they have the same archetype, if each of the ideas have the same relation to certain times and places; for we know that two bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place. As for the question, whether two *spirits* may or not, it depends upon the doctrine of the immateriality; and it is proper to defer the examination of it, till we have proved that there is some immaterial spirit.

Essay on Personal Identity, published for Robson, 1769.—*Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity, printed at Cambridge, and sold by Johnson, 1769.*—*Reid's Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 315—321. p. 332—337.*

PROPOSITION XII.

LECT. To enquire whether men think always without intermission.

XIII.

COMPARISON OF ARGUMENTS.

SECT. I. FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE.

If there be a time when the soul does not think, the existence of it as a spirit is destroyed: and we can imagine nothing to remain, unless it be something merely material. Now there is no apparent reason to think the soul thus exists by intervals; and therefore we must conclude it always thinks.

To this it is replied, that such a definition of the soul, as implies continual actual thought, is begging the question in dispute. When *actual thought* is suspended, there may remain some *secret power of thinking* resulting from the constitution of the soul, which will exert itself when the obstruction is removed. As a bow when bent has a disposition to straiten itself again, or a clock to strike, though the hammer be held back.

To this it is answered, we can have no idea of this power. If the power of thinking be not the very substance of the soul, there must be some unknown substance in which the power inheres; nor can we imagine how it awakes itself again to actual thought.

It is farther objected, that the various degrees of intenseness of thought, which we all perceive, seem to prove that thought is not the essence of the soul; for then it must be uniform and constant. (*Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xix.*)

But it may be replied, that the least degree of thought is thought, as the finest particle of matter is matter. On the whole it must be granted, that, if it be hereafter proved without this proposition, that the human soul is immaterial, there will

will be some considerable weight in the argument; if the contrary be proved, there will be very little.

Watts's Eff. N^o. v. § i. p. 116—118.—

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 10—19.—Enquiry concerning Political Justice, p. 335—340.

SECT. II. For the NEGATIVE.

Arg. 1. If we think in our sleep, we think in vain; and it is not to be thought we are so constituted as that this should be necessary.

Answer. If all our forgotten thoughts are in vain, many of our waking thoughts are so; for how few can we perfectly recollect? We may as well argue against our existing at all without thought, as a useless thing. Besides, there is perhaps in sleep some continued sense of pleasure, which the wise Author of nature might connect with so necessary a support of life as sleep is. To which we may farther add, that the uninterrupted thought of every rational spirit, whether remembered or forgotten, may make a part of a scheme, in the general right and useful, though the advantage of it in some particular instances may not appear. As we may suppose with respect to those minerals or metals in the bowels of the earth, which are never in fact discovered.

Locke, ib. § 15—Watts's Eff. ib. § 3. p. 127, 128.

Arg. 2. Infants, who have but few ideas, sleep much; probably before, and to be sure after their birth: but is it to be imagined they are all that while necessarily employed in thinking?

Ans. It is allowed they have few, or no ideas by *reflection*: (for the thought of a learned *Scotch* Anatomist, who pretends they are then forming the heart and lungs for their respective offices, seems too extravagant to be particularly examined)

mined). But ideas of *sensation* they have early; perhaps some strong sensations of the mother communicated to them before the birth: but when the soul is first united we know not.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 17, 21, 22.—Watts's Eff. ib. p. 129—131.

Arg. 3. As we fall asleep we seem gradually to approach to a state of insensibility; it is therefore probable that at length we arrive at it.

Ans. If by insensibility be meant incogitation, the phænomenon is denied: the same kind of argument may prove, that matter might be annihilated by continual division.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xix. § 3, 4.

Arg. 4. We do not remember that we think in many of our sleeping hours, therefore how can we know that we do?

Ans. Dreams may be entirely, or but imperfectly, or not at all remembered, according to the various degrees in which the nerves are impressed by the motion given to the animal spirits in sleep. Besides, daily experience shews us, that occurrences of the day bring to mind dreams, which in the morning we had forgotten; and we have often a general remembrance that we have dreamed, though we know not of what: to which it may be added, that people sometimes in their sleep discover marks of great emotion, when, if asked in the morning what it was that disquieted them, they do not perhaps know; so that though it would be very ridiculous to argue from universal experience that we always think in our sleeping hours, this will not be an unanswerable objection against any other argument; nor can it possibly prove that we ever cease from thinking, any more than breathing, which we also forget; or than forgetting the circumstances of our birth will prove we were never born.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 13, 14, 18.—

Watts's Eff. ib. § 2. p. 120—25.

Arg.

Arg. 5. It might be expected that those operations of the soul should be most rational, in which it is most abstracted from the body; whereas, by what we remember of our dreams, we perceive the contrary.

Ans. It may be a law of the creation, that, during our union with the body, a certain disposition of the nerves, generally wanting in sleep, should be necessary to rational and connected thought; and that such a wild play of the animal spirits as arises from the obstruction of the nerves should cause roving imaginations, which therefore by the way it is no dishonour or detriment to forget.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 16.—Watts's Eff. ib. § 3. p. 126, 127.

Arg. 6. If a man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two different persons.

Ans. If by *knowing* it, be meant *remembering* it, (which it must mean if it be at all to the purpose) they cannot be different persons, according to Mr. *Locke's* principles of identity, unless every instance of forgetfulness makes a man a new and different person: and then how many thousands and millions is every man! This objection would suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting in the same body by intervals, as in sleeping and waking; which none ever maintained.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 12. c. xxvii. § 23.—Watts's Eff. ib. p. 125, 126.

Arg. 7. If the soul always thinks, there must be some innate ideas, contrary to *Prop. 5.*

Ans. There must be some one idea at least or perception; but that it is this rather than that, does not arise from the original constitution of the soul, but from the circumstances in which the body to which it is united is placed: (thus it

might have been the idea of *colour* as well as *heat*). So that supposing the soul at the first moment of its union with the body to have the idea of *heat*, this would not prove heat to be an innate idea. Def. 16.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 17, 20, 21.—See on this subject, *Baxt. on the Soul*, vol. i. p. 330—346. and note (a) Oct. Ed.

SCHOLIUM.

It may not be amiss here to mention the argument which Mr. *Baxter* has drawn from the phænomena of dreams, to prove the existence of some immaterial spirits by which they are suggested; though the particular manner, in which that strange and seemingly inconclusive argument is managed, cannot here be largely represented, and need not be particularly confuted.

Baxter on the Soul, c. x. *passim*. Oct. Ed. vol. ii. § 1.

PROPOSITION XIII.

LECT. To take a more particular survey of the PAS-
XIV. SIONS of the human mind, according to Dr. *Watts's* distribution of them. See *Prop. I. Sol. gr. 3.*

SOLUTION.

An object may be considered as *rare* and uncommon, as *good* or *evil* in the *general*, or with respect to the various *kinds* of good or evil, and the particular *circumstances* that attend it.

1. If an object be in the general considered as *rare*, it excites *Admiration*: sudden wonder is *Surprise*, great wonder is *Astonishment*. This passion has no opposite. If an Object appear *good* in the general, it excites *Love*; if *evil*, *Hatred*.

N. B. These are primary passions, and those under the next head are derived from the two last of these.

2. As

2. As to the various *kinds* of good and evil; considering an object merely and absolutely as valuable, it excites *Esteem*, which in a very high degree is *Veneration*, and in a supreme degree is *Adoration*. If it be considered as worthless, it excites *Contempt*, especially if it be proposed as excellent. If it be considered as fit to receive good from us, it is the object of *Benevolence* or Good-will; if fit to receive evil, of *Malevolence* or Ill-will. But it is to be observed that this passion centers only on sensible objects, *i. e.* on objects capable of perception. If the object be considered as fit to do me good, or afford me any present pleasure, it produces *Complacency*, if the contrary *Displacency*. Complacency in any very high degree towards an inferior, or on considerations not adequate to that degree of regard, is *Fondness*; the opposite to which is *Disgust* or Loathing.

N. B. There may be benevolence where there is no complacency, but a high degree of complacency without benevolence is hardly conceivable.

3. As to the various *circumstances* in which the good or evil object is considered, it may be either *present* or *absent*.

(1.) Future good considered as possible excites *Desire*, which is the great spring of action: if evil be considered as possible, it excites *Aversion*.

(2.) If there be a probable prospect of obtaining absent good, it excites *Hope*; if evil be likely to come upon us, it produces *Fear*. The highest degree of hope is *Confidence* or Security; when little remains, there is *Despondency*; and when hope is entirely banished, *Despair* succeeds. Fear joined with foresight, is *Anxiety*; with careful contrivance to avoid it, is *Solicitude*; mingled with surprize and rising to a violent degree on a sudden, is *Terror*; and a high degree
of

of aversion attending the idea of any object we apprehend or reflect on, is *Horror*.

(3.) Good obtained awakens *Joy*: evil actually endured brings *Sorrow*. Moderate joy is *Gladness*: sudden and high joy is *Exultation*: habitual joy is *Cheerfulness*. Moderate sorrow is *Trouble*: great sorrow is *Distress* and *Anguish*: habitual sorrow is *Melancholy*. *Congratulation* is the sentiment and expression of joy arising from the happiness of another. *Pity* and *Compassion* is sorrow arising from the distress of another. *Sympathy* comprehends both: *Envy* is the contrary of both. *Jealousy* is a species of envy, arising from an apprehension of preference given to another person in the affections of one for whom we have a peculiar regard. *Shame* may be reckoned as a species of sorrow, attended frequently with blushing, arising from a consciousness, imputation, or apprehension of any thing that appears to be matter of disgrace, in ourselves, or others we are concerned for, *i. e.* when likely to expose us or them to the contempt of others.

(4.) When any intelligent being designedly brings good upon us, it excites *Gratitude*; when evil, *Anger*. With respect to our fellow-creatures, gratitude is a mixture of complacency and benevolence; anger is displicency with some degree of malevolence. When anger rises to an excessive degree, it is *Rage* and *Fury*; when it is deeply rooted, it is *Rancour* and *Spite*; when arising on trifling occasions, and expressed in little tokens of resentment, it is *Peevishness*.

When an affront is apprehended, beneath us or any other person to whom it is offered, it excites *Indignation*; and when anger is attended with a desire of hurting another it is called *Malice*; and when this is in consequence of an apprehended injury, *Revenge*.

Watts on the Passions, § 2. p. 4—9. *Ed. 2.*
 —*Fordyce's Mor. Philos. b. i. § 2—4.*—
Pope's Ethic Epist. ii. ver. 93—204.—
Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xx.—*Hutcheson's Treatise on the Passions.*—*Le Brun "Of the Characters of the Passions."*

SCHOLIUM I.

Des-Cartes divides the primary passions into six, *viz.* Admiration, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy and Sorrow: and though this is by no means an accurate distribution, yet his description of the passions contains many excellent passages.

Des-Cartes de Pass. part ii. § 69. p. 81.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As pain is useful for preserving the animal body from those injuries which might prove fatal to it, so many of the passions, which are disagreeable in their present operations, are useful and even necessary, both to individuals and societies.

Watts on the Pass. p. 85—88.—*Butler's Serm. N^o. viii. p. 150—154.*—*Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 4.*—*Foster's Serm. vol. ii. p. 122—125, and 128.*

PROPOSITION XIV.

To enquire into the Original of our passions.

LECT.

SOLUTION.

XV.

1. They may either arise from the motion of the body, impressions on the senses, or operations of the mind by which ideas are produced: as the sight of beauty, hearing of musick, or understanding a proposition.

2. From ideas recollected by the memory, which may be accompanied with some degree of pleasure or pain, which they at first gave. (*Prop. 8. gr. 7.*)

3. From

3. From the exercise of reason, which apprehends a probability of approaching good or evil.

Des-Cartes de Pass. part ii. § 51.—*Watts on the Pass.* § 3. p. 10—17.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The second and third source arise from the first; since there could have been no memory nor reasoning, without ideas presented to the mind as the ground-work of its operations.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some think the passions may be raised by means of the body, when no particular idea is presented to any one of the senses; that is, only from the temperature of the body: *v. g.* when we find ourselves chearful or sad, and cannot assign any reason for it: which if it be admitted, may in the judgment of some make it dubious, whether the first idea in the human mind be (as Mr. *Locke* maintains) an idea of sensation. But it may perhaps be answered, we have a sense of the temperature of the body; and that we are seldom in our waking hours destitute of some sensible impressions, which are at different times painful or pleasant, in different degrees, according as our organs are disposed.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 23, 24.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The passions cannot be immediately excited or suppressed by our volitions, but consequentially they may; especially those arising from the third spring, by which some arising from the two former may be balanced.

Des-Cartes de Pass. § 45—47.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is queried why objects are often found to affect the passions less when they are grown familiar, than they did before.—To this it may be answered,

answered, that admiration in a great measure proceeds from the novelty of objects. Perhaps in other instances it may be owing to some unknown connection between making the *first* impression on the brain and the excitation of the passions. Yet it is observable, that the degree in which we are impressed, is by no means proportionable to the novelty of objects alone; it depends much more upon the temperature of the body, and a variety of other particulars.

A X I O M VIII.

We find by experience that our minds are so constituted, that some degree of passion or desire is necessary to action; so that an entire suspension of them would be attended with a stagnation of all our faculties.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 3.—Des-Cartes de Pass. § 40.—Spectator, vol. iv. N^o. 255.

COROLLARY.

It must be of the greatest importance, in order to influence men to a due course of action, to know how to awaken or moderate their passions by proper application to them; and those who act as if they desired entirely to eradicate the passions, are ignorant of the constitution of human nature, and can expect but little success in their attempts to work upon the mind.

Doddridge's Dedication of x Serm. p. 10.

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. *Locke* maintains that *desire* is always a state of uneasiness: but it is certain, that in many cases the uneasiness is abundantly overbalanced by a probable prospect of the immediate enjoyment of good: and if some degree of uneasiness be universally necessary to action, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to conceive how any active being can be perfectly happy.

Locke's

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 32—34.—*Watts on Liberty, p. 23—25.*—*Grove's Posthumous Works, vol. iv. p. 136, 137.*—*Watts's Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and his Creatures. Octavo. Or his Works, vol. vi. p. 382, 383.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

We cannot mistake in judging of present pleasure or pain, as the incentives of desire or aversion; but in judging of future we often do.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 61—65.

DEFINITION XIX.

LECT. XVI. When a being is determined to the performance of any action, not by a view of the beneficial consequences that may attend it, but merely from a strong impulse leading to the action itself, that being is said to act by INSTINCT.

COROLLARY I.

There are many remarkable instincts in mankind, which greatly tend both to the good of individuals and the species. Those which are called natural appetites plainly come under this class; to which may be added parental affection, and some workings of compassion and gratitude: though it must be granted the force of all these is very different in different persons.

Baxter's Practical Works, vol. i. p. 379. col. 2.—*Andry apud Mem. of Literat. vol. i. p. 15.*—*Hutcheson's Enq. p. 143—147, 195—199.*

COROLLARY 2.

Brutes are governed by instinct in many of their actions, as was observed above, *Prop. 2. gr. 6.* The reason upon which many of their actions depend, could not be discovered without a penetration far beyond what is to be found in the

the generality of men. See particular instances of this in the Bee (*a*), in the Ant (*b*), in the Wasp (*c*), in the Raven (*d*), in the Formica Leo (*e*), in the Galli Sylvestres (*f*), in the Bohaques (*g*), in the Fox (*b*), in the Beaver (*i*), in the Turkey Hen (*k*), in the Common Hen (*l*), besides many others (*m*).

- (*a*) Ray's *Wisdom of God*, p. 132, 133.
 2 Ed. p. 122—124.—*Nat. Disp.* vol. i.
 p. 168—178, 182—184, 194—202.—
 —(*b*) *Guardian*, vol. ii. N^o. 156, 157.
 —*Plin. Nat. Hist.* xi. 30.—(*c*) *Nat.*
Displ. part i. p. 126—148.—(*d*) *Al-*
bert. Magnus, apud *Grad. Harm.* part ii.
 p. 67. note in the margin.—(*e*) *Nat.*
Disp. part i. p. 234—240.—(*f*) *Der-*
bam's Phys. Theol. p. 229.—(*g*) *Der-*
bam, *Ib.* p. 212.—(*b*) *Derbam*, *Ib.*
 p. 204.—(*i*) *Nat. Displ.* part ii. p.
 106—114.—(*k*) *Nat. Displ. Ib.* p. 23,
 24.—(*l*) *SpeEt.* vol. ii. N^o. 120.—
 (*m*) *Cicero de Nat. Deor.* l. ii. § 48—
 50.—*Cambray sur l'Exist.* § 23. p. 46,
 47.—*Scott's Christian Life*, vol. ii. p.
 211—220.—*Essay on Hunting*, p. 53, 54,
 —*Pope's Ethic Epist.* iii. ver. 172—
 198*.

SCHOLIUM I.

That instinct is not mere imitation, see proved by a remarkable story in

Galen, apud *Ray's Wisd. of God*, p. 349—
 353. 2 Ed. p. 133—135.

* Great light has been thrown upon the properties and instincts of animals by many recent authors. See particularly Buffon's *Natural History*, Pennant's *Arctic Zoology*, and George Edwards's *Works*; to which several other productions might be added. Many of the *Voyages and Travels* that have lately been published are worthy of being particularly studied in this view. The information given by Captain Cook, and the other circumnavigators of the globe, must not be forgotten.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is probable, that in most instances if not in all, the actions to which any being is determined by instinct, are accompanied with immediate pleasure.

DEFINITION XX.

LECT. XVII. A MENTAL HABIT is a facility of thinking or willing any action acquired by frequent acts.

PROPOSITION XV.

Mental habits do very much depend upon the memory.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Memory, furnishing us with ideas and relations, makes it easy for us to think upon any subject.

2. Furnishing us with motives, it makes it easy to will it.

3. When memory ceases, we see that mental habits are destroyed.

1 and 2, and 3. 4. *Valet propositio. (Def. 20.) Clerici Pneum. Sect. i. c. iv. § 18—22.*

COROLLARY 1.

Mental Habits must very much depend on the body, since memory plainly does so. *Prop. 8. Sol. gr. 4.*

COROLLARY 2.

The facility with which the body obeys the command of the mind, is a thing different from mental habit: yet it may have some affinity to it, as bodily motion depends upon volition.

COROLLARY 3.

No habits can in strict propriety of speech be said to be *infused*; since it is impossible the first act of any kind should be the effect of habit, according to the definition. Yet a disposition may

may be given to perform acts at first with as much readiness, as if they had been learnt by long practice. Neither can any habit be properly said to be *hereditary*: yet there may be, and it is plain in fact that there are certain hereditary dispositions towards contracting habits of one kind rather than another.

SCHOLIUM 1.

On these principles some account for the phenomenon which has frequently been observed, that a great degree of wit and judgment seldom meet in the same person; because wit is an habit of finding out the resemblance of ideas, and making an agreeable assemblage of them; whereas judgment is the habit of distinguishing accurately between those that have some resemblance, though they really differ. It is not to be wondered at, if two such different habits do not ordinarily occur in the same mind. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged highly probable, that habit is not the only thing that makes the difference between various persons in this respect, though it may serve very much to increase it*. See *Prop. 3. Schol. 1.*

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 2.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Idiots reason very little, and make few propositions; whereas the mad-man reasons very much, and often justly, but upon very precarious and false principles.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 12, 13.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The force of habit, both mental and corporeal, is so great, that it is an evident part of wisdom

* For the different accounts which have been given of Wit, recourse may be had to the *Spectator*, vol. 1. N^o 58—63; to Mr. David Fordyce's *Dialogues on Education*; and to Lord Kaims's *Elements of Criticism*, vol. ii. chap. xiii. p. 60—84.

to take care how habits are formed; and it is worth our while to use great labour to turn and fix them on the right side.

Tillotson's Serm. vol. i. N^o. 29. p. 301—304.—Dodsl. Præcept. vol. ii. p. 519—530.

DEFINITION XXI.

Those properties of any being are called **PERFECTIONS**, which directly tend to promote its happiness.

COROLLARY.

Only spirits are capable of perfection, since a capacity for happiness implies perfection, *i. e.* thought.

SCHOLIUM.

Nevertheless, in an inferior sense, or by analogy, insensible beings may be called perfect, *i. e.* as they are fitted to answer the purposes intended by them.

Watts's Ontol. c. viii. p. 353—355.

DEFINITION XXII.

LECT. XVIII. That mind is said to be possessed of **NATURAL LIBERTY**, or liberty of choice, which is so constituted, as that its volitions shall not be invincibly determined by any foreign cause or consideration whatever offered to it, but by its own sovereign pleasure.

COROLLARY I.

If any instance occurs, in which the mind can chuse no otherwise than it does, it is not in that instance naturally free; though it chuses with the greatest delight, and executes its volitions without any restraint.

Watts on Liberty, p. 8, 9.—Collins on Liberty, part ii. Ed. 2.—Limborch's Theology, l. ii. c. xxiii. § 20.

COROLLARY 2.

Natural liberty as before defined, includes what some have called a *liberty of contrariety*, as well as of *contradiction*; *i. e.* supposes the mind able to chuse the contrary, as well as to defer its choice: if indeed these two expressions do not signify in fact the same thing, which in some connections at least they may.

Hutcheson's Metaph. p. 22.

DEFINITION XXIII.

EXTERNAL LIBERTY, or liberty of action, is opposed to a constraint laid on the executive powers; and consists in a power of rendering our volitions effectual.

COROLLARY.

There may be external where there is not natural liberty, and *vice versa*.

Watts on Lib. p. 4, 5.

SCHOLIUM.

The liberty of which Mr. *Locke* generally treats, is a liberty of action not of choice, and that *Collins* expressly allows.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 7—13, 21—30, 71.—Collins on Lib. p. 115—118.

DEFINITION XXIV.

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY consists in a prevailing disposition to act according to the dictates of reason; *i. e.* in such a manner as shall, all things considered, most effectually promote our happiness. A disposition to act contrary to this is MENTAL SERVITUDE: and when the mind is equally disposed to follow reason, or act contrary to it, it is then said to be in a state of INDIFFERENCE.

Tillotf. Serm. vol. ii. p. 617, 618.—Pers. Sat. v. ver. 124—191.—Clarke's Serm. vol. iii. N^o. 1. p. 5—13. Ed. 12mo.

COROLLARY.

Philosophical liberty is a perfection of the mind; (*See Def. 21.*) since much of our happiness depends on our conduct, and by acting according to reason, much good may be obtained, and much evil avoided.

DEFINITION XXV.

A man is said to be MORALLY FREE, when there is no interposition of the will of a superior being, to prohibit or determine his actions in any particular under consideration.

Watts on Liberty, p. 4.

COROLLARY.

As the same man may be subject to the controul of various superiors, one of which may allow what another prohibits, he may as to the same action be said to be or not to be morally free, according to the persons whose will is in question. Nevertheless, where there is one who has a much greater power and authority over him than any of the rest, it is proper to judge of his moral freedom by considering the will of such a superior person.

DEFINITION XXVI.

Compleat liberty consists in the union of natural, external, moral, and philosophical liberty, without any struggle or difficulty.

Watts on Lib. p. 9—12.—Colliber's Enq. p. 47—59. Ed. 3.

COROLLARY I.

Compleat liberty on the whole is a perfection. (*See Def. 24. Cor.*)

COROLLARY 2.

Compleat liberty seems to consist in a certain symmetry or subordination of the faculties; and, when

when applied to such beings as ourselves, supposes a serene understanding, moderate passions rising in proportion to the nature of objects, the will chusing to follow such regular impressions, and the executive powers readily and vigorously performing its dictates.

COROLLARY 3.

When we speak of compleat liberty, it is not so proper to enquire whether the *will* be free, but rather whether the *man* be so. (*See Prop. 1. Schol. 1.*) Yet natural liberty evidently belongs to the *will*.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 14—19.—
Watts's Ess. N^o. xii. § 5.

SCHOLIUM.

What some call a *liberty of spontaneity*, consists merely in *chusing* to perform any particular action: nor does it at all enter into the question, whether we can chuse or perform the contrary. But since this is nothing more than *willing*, it does not deserve the name of liberty.

For the *Cartesian* notion of it, see

Des-Cartes Princ. i. § 37—39.—Watts
on Lib. p. 6.

PROPOSITION XVI.

The mind of man is possessed of natural liberty,
i. e. liberty of choice.

LECT.
XIX.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We are conscious to ourselves, that we have a power of chusing otherwise than we do in a multitude of instances.

2. We universally agree that some actions deserve praise and others blame; and we sometimes condemn ourselves as conscious of the latter: for which there could be no foundation at all, if we were invincibly determined in every valuation,

and had it to say, we had done the best we possibly could.

3. The laws of all nations agree to punish some actions in a man who is master of his reason, for which they would not punish one whom they knew to be distracted.

4. When equal objects are proposed to our choice, we sometimes determine to chuse one of them rather than another, without being able to assign any reason for such a preference.

1, 2, 3, 4. | 5. *Valet propositio.*

Grove of Hum. Lib. § 13—16.—*Watts on Liberty*, § 3, p. 28—39.—*Religion of Nature*, p. 63, 64. *Ed. 4to.*—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 85—89.

COROLLARY.

The will is not determined (as some have asserted) by the last dictate, or rather assent of the understanding, nor the greatest apparent good, nor a prevailing uneasiness, which last seems to coincide with the former.

Watts on Lib. p. 17—23, 25—27.—

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 35, 36.—

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 97—100.—

Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 403—415.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that we are formed with a necessary desire of happiness, and consequently cannot chuse any thing but what in present circumstances appears most conducive to it: and experience is appealed to as confirming the assertion, since we are always in fact most inclined to what we chuse.

Answer. This must be acknowledged a considerable difficulty.

It is granted that what we chuse must have some appearance of good; but the mind appears in fact, as well as from the reasoning in the proposition,

position, to have a power of preferring a smaller present to a greater absent and future good, though at the same time it condemns itself of folly in such a choice; which it could never do, if what it chose always appeared to be the greatest good; since then in every choice it would act according to the necessary impulse and constitution of its nature. And though we allow that there is always a greater inclination to what we chuse than what we refuse, yet till this inclination be proved invincible, the proposition may hold good.

Turretine, vol. i. Loc. x. Qu. ii. § 7, 15, 16.—Coll. on Lib. p. 40—44.—Burn. on the Art. p. 117, 118.—Watts on Lib. p. 70—74.—Grove on Lib. § 18, 19.—Grove's Mor. Philos. vol. i. p. 205—214.—Maclaurin's Newtonian Philos. p. 81—84.—Clarke and Leibnitz, Append. N^o. 3.—Cato's Letters, vol. iv. N^o. 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To the argument from self-accusation *Collins* replies, that it is only the sense of having acted against some rules, which on reflection we apprehend it would have been better for us to have followed, though it did not appear so when we did the action.—But how then could conscience condemn us, not only in our after reflections, but in the act itself? or how could we condemn ourselves for having done foolishly in chusing what did appear to us the greatest good, and could not but so appear?

Collins ib. p. 105, 106.—Grove's Posth. Works, vol. iv. p. 93—148. præf. § 3—7, and § 21.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is objected to the argument, *gr. 3.* that punishments are often inflicted where it is granted

there is no liberty at all, as on lunatics, drunkards, and brutes.

Ans. It may be debated how far it is proper to call the severities used with them in some cases punishments, or how far they may be destitute of all natural liberty. But as for *Collins's* argument, that were man a free creature rewards and punishments would signify nothing, because it would lie in his own breast to slight them; it is most evidently weak: for nevertheless they would be a probable means of answering their end, and that they are not always effectual is evident in fact.

Collins ib. p. 86—88, 91—98.

SCHOLIUM 4.

LECT.

XX.

To the fourth argument (which is generally called *choice ἐν ἀδιαφορίᾳ*) it is answered by the opposers of natural liberty, that no such case can occur that two objects should appear entirely equal: and if there did, then a choice would be impossible; for that would imply an effect without a cause, or a balance turning when the weights are equal.—But this is evidently taking the question for granted: for it will not be allowed that *willing* is a necessary effect, which must imply a compelling efficient cause; or the mind like a balance to be moved with weights. And as to the fact in question, a cause which we *cannot assign* is to us *no* cause: and yet in many such cases we determine.

Collins ib. p. 44—52, 57—59.—Watts on Lib. p. 68—70.—Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 38. § 1. p. 93—95, 121—123, 169, 173—177, 291. Append. N°. iv. ix. p. 165. § 14, 15, p. 281—287.—Cicero de Fato, § 24, 25.—Jackson on Liberty, p. 193—196.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther pleaded, that such a liberty would be an imperfection to the human soul; because
it

it would suppose it in some instances to act without reason.

Ans. Our scheme of liberty supposes a power of chusing rationally in all instances; of seeing and preferring a greater good; and chusing of two objects equally good, one, where there is reason for taking *one*, though not for taking *this* rather than *that*: whereas to deny this is plainly to limit the mind in its power of choice and capacity for happiness in some instances. Yet I think (though we allow that some particular pleasure may arise from the consciousness of having used this natural liberty aright, when it might have been abused) it must be granted, that a power of chusing worse rather than better is not necessary to the happiness of any being. But is mankind in such a perfect state, that we are under a necessity of maintaining that it could not have been greater or happier than it is?

Collins ib. p. 62—83.—Watts ib. p. 70—74.—Colliber's Enquiry, p. 50, 51.—Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 48—52.—Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 119—121.

SCHOLIUM 6.

The sentiments of many considerable moderns may be seen in *Collins on Lib. p. 14—31.* and those of several antients in

Collins ib. p. 59—62.—Jackson on Lib. p. 82—91, 98—113.—Lucas's Enquiry, vol. i. p. 163—185, 130—135.—Hutch. Metaph. Syn. c. iv. p. 22, 23, compared with p. 57.

SCHOLIUM 7.

What Mr. *Locke's* notion of liberty on the whole was, is much debated. The truth of the matter seems to be, that he changes his idea of it; sometimes meaning external liberty, of which he generally speaks, (see *Def. 23. Schol.*) some-
times

times philosophical, (as in the place quoted above, *l. ii. c. xxi. § 49.*) and sometimes he seems to recur to the notion of natural liberty again, especially when he says in so many words, that freedom consists in not being under a necessary determination of our will in any particular action, (§ 51.) and in a power of suspension: (§ 52.) by which last manner of stating it, he seems not to throw any light upon the question; since all the difficulty attending a possibility of determining to act one way or another, will attend a possibility of determining to act or not to act.

Locke's Fam. Epist. p. 474, &c. præsert. p. 480.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Those who believe the being and perfections of God, and a state of retribution, in which he will reward and punish mankind according to the diversity of their actions, will find it difficult to reconcile the justice of punishment with the necessity of crimes punished. And they that believe all that the scripture says on the one hand of the eternity of future punishments, and on the other of God's compassion to sinners, and his solemn assurance that he desires not their death, will find the difficulty greatly increased. But as many of the words here used are not yet strictly defined, nor the evidence of the propositions stated, it may suffice briefly to have suggested the thought.

Cato's Letters, vol. iv. N^o. 110.—Jackson's Reply, passim.—Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 500—511.*

PRO-

* Since the preceding Lectures were written, the question concerning Liberty and Necessity has again received a most copious and acute discussion. See Jonathan Edwards's Enquiry into the Freedom of Will;—The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated, by Dr. Priestley;—A free Discussion of the Doctrines

PROPOSITION XVII.

The philosophical liberty of the mind is much impaired, and we are obnoxious to a lamentable degree of servitude. (*Def.* 24.)

LECT.
XXI.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The understanding is often so far influenced by the passions, as to be unwilling to enter on reasonings, which may seem to lead to a conclusion contrary to our interest.

2. The passions and prejudices of our minds insensibly mingle themselves with the whole process of reasoning when it is undertaken, leading into many embarrassments and inconsistencies, obscuring truth and gilding error; so that frequently the judgment is formed upon a very unfair hearing, agreeably to the bias the mind is under, and contrary to the evidence that might have been obtained.

3. We often find it difficult to excite our passions at the command of reason, and to fix them on objects which appear to our understanding most worthy of regard: on the contrary, they are often excited by such objects, as the under-

Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity, in a Correspondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Priestley;—Observations in Defence of the Liberty of Man, as a moral Agent, by the Rev. John Palmer;—Dr. Priestley's Letter to Mr. Palmer, in Defence of his Illustrations;—Mr. Palmer's Appendix to his Observations;—Dr. Priestley's second Letter to Mr. Palmer;—Mr. Jacob Bryant's Address to Dr. Priestley, upon his Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated;—Dr. Priestley's Letter to Mr. Bryant;—Dawes's Free Enquiry into the Merits of a Controversy between Dr. Price and Dr. Priestley;—The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity briefly invalidated;—Reid's Essay on the Active Powers of Man, p. 267—368;—The notes to the new edition of Hartley on Man;—Belsbam's Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary, vol. i. p. 1—15;—Essays, Philosophical and Literary, by Dr. Gregory of Edinburgh;—and Enquiry concerning Political Justice, vol. i. p. 283—317.

standing

standing has been by irresistible evidence compelled to disapprove, and thereby we are led to commit actions, which, while we do them, we condemn ourselves for.

4. Bodily constitution and appetite have sometimes almost a constraining power to hinder the execution of the wisest volitions. Yet it must be acknowledged, this impulse is not invincible: we may stop ourselves in the career; and enter upon a contrary course: so that upon the whole, the way to happiness is rather difficult than impossible. See *Prop.* 15. *Schol.* 3. and *Prop.* 16.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 47, 56—59.

COROLLARY.

It is plain from these phænomena, of which experience may convince us too surely, that the symmetry of the soul and subordination of its faculties, mentioned *Def.* 26. *Cor.* 2. in which compleat liberty consists, is in a great measure violated in the human soul. But whether it were originally in the same state, cannot be determined till we have examined other previous propositions.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 53—55.—*Seed's Sermon.* vol. ii. p. 339—344.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is greatly debated, how far the will has in our present state any influence on the judgment, in assenting to any proposition in question. Some maintain that it cannot have any influence at all; but I think experience proves the contrary: and though there must be some show of argument to determine the judgment, yet it seems to be the consequence of that natural liberty asserted *Prop.* 16. that the mind can divert itself from examining proofs which are likely to establish a disagreeable proposition; and by labouring to confirm and embellish arguments on the favourite

rite

rite side of the question, can bring itself to assent to what it wishes to find true, though vastly superior evidence on the contrary side were fairly within its reach. Yet it must be acknowledged, that this remark only takes place in propositions which have some certain limited degree of evidence, since there are some cases in which the truth will invincibly force itself upon the understanding, and no artifice can be sufficient to evade it.

Collins on Lib. p. 33—36.—Clerici Pneumat. l. i. c. iii. § 14.—Watts on Lib. p. 13—16.—Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. xx. § 6, 12—16.—Clarke and Leibn. p. 403—415.

SCHOLIUM / 2.

Many actions of brutes seem to discover some degree of liberty; but how far they are possessed of it seems impossible for us to determine, since all the principal proofs of the natural liberty of the human mind arise from what passes within ourselves, and what we learn by discoursing with other men; and not merely from what we observe in their most rational or capricious actions.

Reynault's Philos. Convers. vol. iii. p. 82—87.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

There are many particulars in which the knowledge we have of our own minds is very imperfect, and we are as it were a mystery to ourselves. LECT. XXII.

DEMONSTRATION.

I. We know not what our soul is, otherwise than by its operations; but are not able to determine what that constitution is, whence those operations proceed, or what particular and distinct idea is to be affixed to the word *principles*;

if we call it, as many do, an intelligent or conscious principle. See *Def. 3. Cor. 2. Def. 5. Schol. 1. Def. 9.*

2. We know not how the soul is united to the body, or what connection there is between impressions made upon the organs of sensation and the ideas arising in our minds, or between the volitions of our minds and the consequent motions of our bodies. *Prop. 1. Schol. 2.*

3. We know not certainly how ideas are laid up in the memory: it is not demonstrably evident that there are traces in the brain correspondent to those ideas: (*Prop. 8.*) but if it were, how recollection is performed, and in many cases why one idea is recollected rather than another, is not possible for us to say. *Prop. 8. Schol. 3.*

4. It still remains in some degree an uncertain question, whether we think always or only by intervals. *Prop. 12. Dem.*

5. It is extremely difficult to remove all the objections against liberty of choice, especially against that which is stated *Prop. 16. Schol. 1.*

6. The question wherein personal identity consists, how plain soever it may have appeared to some, has been differently determined by different persons of great learning and abilities; and is after all attended with some perplexities, perhaps chiefly arising from what is mentioned above *gr. 1. (Vid. Prop. 11.)*

7. The phænomenon of dreams does also contain some very unaccountable things. How ideas are then suggested to the mind, in the reception of which we are entirely passive: how dialogues are formed; and how the moral principles of action seem to be suspended, even while we continue to reason, (though often after a wild and inconclusive manner,) upon circumstances and events in which we imagine ourselves to be engaged. (*Vid. Prop. 3. gr. 5.*)

Baxter on the Soul, vol. ii. § 1. 8vo Ed.

8. The

8. The phænomenon of phrensy is likewise very unaccountable, and how the state of the nerves and juices of the body at that time should so strangely affect our rational powers, and make us creatures so very different from ourselves.

Prop. 3. gr. 6.

I—8. | 9. *Valet Propositio.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

The like may in some degree be said of the imperfection of the knowledge we have concerning our own bodies: in which, though great improvements and discoveries have been made, some very important questions still remain undecided, *v. g.* By what mechanism animal secretion, respiration, and muscular motion are performed: whence the systole and diastole of the heart arises: what is the use of the spleen and the cœcum: not to mention the rationale of many distempers, about which many celebrated physicians are much divided: and almost the whole doctrine of the nerves.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The phænomena mentioned in the proposition and the preceding scholium serve to illustrate *Prop. 10.*, and add a very important article to it.

COROLLARY 1.

It becomes us to maintain a deep and constant sense of the ignorance and weakness of our own minds, when we always carry about, in the very constitution of them and our bodies, such affecting demonstrations of it.

COROLLARY 2.

Since such a modest sense of our weakness and ignorance will have a great tendency to promote the honour and happiness of our lives, by teaching us to avoid many instances of arrogance and self-conceit, which expose men both to enmity
and

and contempt; therefore Pneumatology, which leads us into this humbling view, is a noble and useful study. (Compare *Prop. 3. Cor. Prop. 10,* and *17.*)*

COROLLARY 3.

If we should hereafter prove the existence of any being vastly superior to us, and especially of a being possessed of infinite perfections, it must be expected that there will be many things relating to him, which it is not possible for us fully to explain or comprehend; and our enquiries concerning such a being ought to be pursued with great modesty and humility.

Butler's Sermon. p. 303—305.—Spectator, vol. viii. N^o. 590.—Jonval's Letter, apud Nat. Disp. vol. i. part 2. p. 293, &c.

* Though it is the only design of the editor to point out new references and authors, he cannot forbear recommending the sentiments of these two corollaries to the attention of academical pupils. When it is considered how extremely difficult many questions in themselves are, and what different conclusions have been drawn concerning them, by men of the profoundest knowledge and the deepest reflection, there is a modest scepticism which it will become young students to preserve, till time shall have given them the opportunity of wider enquiry and larger observation. This remark would not have been made, if instances had not occurred of youth who have eagerly, and even arrogantly, adopted hypothesis, on one side or the other, without sufficiently exercising that patience of thinking, and that slow progress of examination, which are likely to be the most favourable to the acquisition of truth.

The END of the FIRST PART.

P A R T II.

Of the BEING of a GOD and his NATURAL
PERFECTIONS.

A X I O M IX.

IT is impossible that any thing should of itself LECT.
arise into being; or that it should be pro- XXIII.
duced without some producing cause, existing
in order of time, as well as of nature, prior to
the thing so produced; or in other words, which
must not only be *considered* before the effect, in
order to understand it thoroughly, but must also
be supposed to have *existed* before it.

DEFINITION XXVII.

That is said to be a SELF-EXISTENT, or NECES-
SARILY EXISTENT BEING, which does not owe
its existence to any other being whatsoever, ei-
ther as its cause or its support, but would exist,
or be what it is, were there no other being in the
whole compass of nature but itself.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 17, 18.—Burnet,
ib. vol. i. p. 7, 8.

SCHOLIUM.

It seems safer, in this momentous argument
on which we are now entering, to acquiesce in
this general and simple idea of self-existence,
gradually deducing from thence other ideas con-
nected with it, than to state it, as Dr. Clarke
has done, "That which cannot so much as be
" imagined not to exist, or that which has ne-
" cessity for the cause of its existence;" since if
there be any self-existent being at all, it seems

not proper to ascribe its existence to any cause whatsoever.

Law's Enquiry, p. 147—150.—*Aberne-
thy's Serm.* vol. i. p. 191—193. *Dubl.*
Ed. p. 203—205. *Lond.*

COROLLARY 1.

If any self-existent being does now exist, it has existed from all eternity: for if it ever began to exist, it must (by the 9th *Axiom*) have owed its existence to some prior being as its cause, which is plainly contradictory to the notion of self-existence stated above.

COROLLARY 2.

If there be or ever has been any self-existent being, it is also *everlasting*, *i. e.* it will never cease to be. For dissolution must arise from something external or internal: but nothing external can dissolve that which depends upon no other being for its support: and no imaginable reason can be assigned, why there should be any internal cause of dissolution in that being which has (by *Cor. 1.*) existed from eternity, or which was indeed in any single past moment self-existent and independent: which is so plain, that, whoever may have denied the existence of a self-existent being, none have ever asserted, that there was such a being, and that his existence is now extinguished and lost; or that there is some self-existent being, which, though now subsisting, will at length be destroyed or dissolved of itself. Yet it must be owned that a late writer, who seems determined to carry scepticism to the greatest excess, has presumed to call this matter into question. *Hume's Philos. Essays*, p. 253.

COROLLARY 3.

If there be any self-existent being, it is also *immutable*. For since a being is the same with all

all its properties taken together, (*Def. 3. Cor. 1.*) if any property were taken away from it, a part of the being would perish, which is inconsistent with its being necessary; (*Cor. 2.*) or if any properties were added, the being itself would not be eternal, and therefore not necessarily existent. (*Cor. 1.*)

Crouz. Log. vol. i. p. 426.—Abern. vol. i. p. 196—200. Dubl. Ed. p. 209—213. Dublin.

COROLLARY 4.

There is no medium between a self-existent and derived being: or in other words, whatever exists at all is either self-existent or derived.

COROLLARY 5.

The existence of every derived being may at length be traced up either mediately or immediately to what is self-existent, which in order to its producing it must according to the *Axiom* have existed before it. (*Cor. 4. Axiom 9.*)

COROLLARY 6.

From the Corollary above it will follow, that whatever is eternal is self-existent.

COROLLARY 7.

To maintain a *series* or succession of derived beings from eternity, is most absurd: for every series supposes some first, and to suppose that first to be derived is self-contradictory, (as above, *Cor. 5.*) with this farther absurdity, that the greater the series, the greater support it will need, as a chain consisting of many links will need a greater support than one consisting but of a few such links: and should a *circle* of causes be supposed, instead of solving it will if possible increase the absurdity; since this would suppose

every cause in the circle to have produced itself, and all the other causes too.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 11—14.—Woolast. Rel. of Nat. p. 65—68.

DEFINITION XXVIII.

That is said to be *simply infinite* in its kind, which has no bounds; or than which nothing in its kind can be conceived greater: but if it be conceived as bounded in some respects and unbounded in others, then it is said to be only infinite *secundum quid*, as a line infinitely produced one way from a given point: but this is a very improper sense of the word.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 1—3.—Watts's Ontology, c. xvii.

COROLLARY.

Whatever is self-existent, has all its properties infinite. (See *Def. 27.*) For if it be necessary in any time or place, (if it be its nature to exist in time and place) it must be necessary at all times and in all places; and since, whatever its other properties are, to set bounds to them, is to assert its non-existence beyond those bounds, whether of power, wisdom, &c. it seems extremely probable, not to say certain, that what hinders its existence beyond those bounds might hinder its existence entirely. But it could not be a self-existent being, if its existence might have been hindered, or could be destroyed.

Clarke ib. p. 458, 459, 462, 463, 465, 466, 469—476.

SCHOLIUM I.

On much the same principles, Mr. *Grove* directly infers, that a being necessarily existent must be infinitely perfect. Some perfections it must have, or it could not be any thing at all; and

and for the same reason that it has any one perfection, and in any one degree, it must be possessed of all possible perfections, and in all possible degrees. But this is a point of so great importance, that we chuse rather to infer it from other mediums of argument, than to rest the whole stress of it upon such a deduction: especially as upon the principles of *Def. 21. Cor.* this argument can have no place, till it be proved that whatever is self-existent is percipient, or endued with thought.

Grove's Posth. Works, vol. iv. p. 7.—Howe's Living Temple, part i. c. iv. § 2, 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is disputed, whether our idea of infinite be a *negative* or *positive* idea. Some have pleaded, that *bounds* imply a negation of continued existence beyond them, and consequently by removing this negation we form a positive idea.

Cambray sur l'Exist. p. 379—383.—Boyse's Translation, p. 145—151.—Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 13, 16—19.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It may also be queried, whether our idea of infinite be a *simple* or *compound* idea: yet I think it may more properly be said to be a simple idea, as no addition of finites can make up an infinite. It will be difficult to find out any idea more simple.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Something has existed from eternity.

DEMONSTRATION.

Ax. 1. It is evident that something does actually exist: *v. g.* we know that we ourselves do.

2. If something has not existed from eternity, the things which now are must have arisen *absolutely*

lutely from nothing, and without any producing cause, contrary to *Ax.* 9.

1, 2. | 3. We are certain something has existed from eternity.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 8, 9.—*Abern. Serm.* vol. i. p. 184—187. *Dub. Ed.* p. 195—198. *Lond.*

SCHOLIUM.

It must be acknowledged extremely difficult to conceive of any thing having existed from eternity; yet since there are such evident proofs of it, we learn that a thing may be true, the manner of which is entirely inconceivable to our limited minds, or against which some objections may lie which to us are unanswerable.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 9—11.

PROPOSITION XX.

There has from eternity existed some self-existent or necessary Being.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 19. | 1. There has from eternity existed something, either self-existent or derived. See *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 4.

Def. 27. | 2. If there were not so evident an absurdity as there seems to be, in supposing a derived being eternal, yet its existence, (even granting its eternity, and much more evidently supposing it not to be so,) may be traced up to a self-existent being, which as self-existent is eternal.

1, 2. | 3. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOLIUM.

The proposition follows directly from *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 6. but we chuse to keep it in its present form; that if any should think there may be an eternal necessary emanation from a self-existent principle,

ciple, as many have maintained, the foregoing proposition might rest on a foundation not to be affected by such an apprehension.

Introduction to the Ancient Universal History, p. 5. Octavo Edition.

PROPOSITION XXI.

The system of things which we call the material world, did not exist from eternity in its present form, but had a beginning. LECT.
XXIV.

DEMONSTRATION.

Arg. 1. We may not only conceive of many possible alterations which might be made in the form of it, but we see it incessantly changing; whereas an eternal being, for as much as it is self-existent, is always the same. *Def. 27. Cor. 8.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 22, 23.

Arg. 2. We have no credible history of transactions more remote than six thousand years from the present time; for as to the pretence that some nations have made to histories of greater antiquity, as the *Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, Chinese, &c.* they are evidently convicted of falshood at large in

Stillingsfleet's Orig. Sacr. p. 15—106.—
Millar's Propag. of Christ. vol. i. p. 100
—112.—Pearson on the Creed, p. 58—
60.—Fenkins of Christianity, vol. ii. pref.
p. 4—11.—Alix's Reflections, vol. i.
p. 95—120.—Winder's Hist. of Know-
ledge, vol. ii. passim.—Lucretius, l. v.
ver. 325—330.*

* The Hindoos make great pretensions to a very high antiquity, and credit has been given to their assertions. But the extravagancy of their Chronology has been shewn by the best of all judges, Sir William Jones, as may be seen in his Dissertation on the subject, published in the second volume of the Asiatic Researches.

Arg. 3. We can trace the invention of the most useful arts and sciences; which had probably been carried farther, and invented sooner, had the world been eternal.

Plin. Nat. Hist. l. vii, viii.—Lucret. l. v. ver. 331—339.—Nichol's Conf. vol. i. p. 76—87. 12mo. p. 45—51. OEt.—Cheyne's Princip. c. ii. § 24. p. 63—68.—Burnet's Theory, vol. i. p. 54—59.

Arg. 4. The origin of the most considerable nations of the earth may be traced; *i. e.* the time when they first inhabited the countries where they now dwell: and it appears that most of the western nations came from the east.

Newton's Chronology, passim.—Patrick on Genesis, c. x.—Wells's Geog. of the Old Test. vol. i. c. iii.—Pearson on the Creed, p. 60, 61.—Perezon. Cumberland, de orig. Gent. & Bochart's Phaleg. passim.—Bryant's Mythology, passim.—Michaelis's Spicilegium Geographiæ Hebræorum, passim.

SCHOLIUM.

If it be said that deluges, pestilences, conflagrations, &c. destroy men with their inventions, it may be answered, (1). If the world were eternal, there must have been an immense number of these devastations, and it is amazing (if there be, as this hypothesis supposes, no superior being that presides over them,) that they should not have destroyed the whole human race. (2). If any had survived, the most useful arts would have been preserved.

Lucret. l. v. ver. 339—352.—Pearson on the Creed, p. 61. margin.—Religion of Nat. p. 91, 92.

LECT. *Arg. 5.* The projectile force of the planets is
 XXV. continually diminishing, by the resistance of the
 ~~~~~ fluid through which they pass, *i. e.* the rays of  
 light;

light; which are every where diffused through all parts of their orbits in so vast a quantity, that multitudes of them fall on bodies too small to be discerned by the naked eye, as appears by microscopical observation. Now if we allow this diminution in the projectile force in one year or age to be ever so small, there must be a finite time in which it will be utterly destroyed; and consequently had the present system of things been eternal, (since on this supposition the same laws of nature must have prevailed) the planets would long ago have fallen into the sun.

*Watts's Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. x. § 1. p. 242—245.—*

*Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 20. p. 53—56.*

*Arg. 6.* The sun is continually losing some of its light, and consequently must long ere this time have been reduced to utter darkness, if the world had been eternal. If it be said, that every ray of light after a certain elongation falls back into the sun; we answer, some of them must in their return strike on the planets, falling on their dark hemisphere, by which means they would be absorbed, and the decay would be real though more gradual, according to the reasoning above. If it be answered, that there may be some kind of fuel provided, as suppose comets, by which the sun is fed; we reply, that fuel is or is not exactly adjusted to the expence of his flame; if it is not exactly adjusted, if too little, the consequence urged above will at length though still more slowly follow; if too much, the sun growing continually hotter, the earth and other planets must have been burnt up, and so an argument against its eternity will arise in another form, from the ever-growing heat of the sun: but if the adjustment be exact, it will be such a proof of design and government in the works of nature as would be so greatly serviceable in another view, that any friend of religion might willingly

lingly spare this argument against the world's eternity, when there are so many others unanswerably strong. And it may be observed, that a similar train of reasoning may take place as to some following particulars.

*Cheyne's Princ. c. i. § 42. p. 95—98.*  
*c. ii. § 19. p. 51, 52.*

*Arg. 7.* Since it is probable that the fixed stars and the sun attract each other, had they been eternal, they must long ere this have met in the centre of gravity common to the whole universe. And nearly akin to this, is the argument which may be drawn from the effect of the nearest access of the earth to *Mars*, or any other superior planet; in consequence of which it might be supposed to be drawn by such attraction a little from its orbit; the eccentricity of which would by this means be continually increased, till the earth were utterly destroyed. The like argument may be applied to the other planets, and especially to *Saturn*: but the thought is in general so much the same, that it has not been judged necessary to insist upon it.

*Cheyne's Princ. c. i, § 22. p. 58—60.*

*Arg. 8.* Sir *William Petty* has attempted to prove that the number of mankind doubles in 360 years: but though the exactness of his computation should be doubted, if there be any periodical and constant increase at all, it will prove the world not to be eternal; as from a limited distance of time it must ere now have been overrun with human inhabitants. Some have indeed maintained a decrease since the *Augustan* age: but if it could be proved that mankind do actually decrease periodically, or that the increase is exactly balanced, this argument will stand on the same footing with *Arg. 6*. As for plagues, by which some suppose the balance to be made, if we may judge by what we know of their history,

the diminution of mankind by them bears but a very small proportion to its increase, as computed by *Petty* \*.

*Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 62—76. OEt. Ed. p. 36—44.—Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 25. p. 68—72.—Pers. Lett. vol. ii. p. 148—158.—Refl. on Polyg. Diff. vii.*

*Arg. 9.* Many substances are continually petrifying and ossifying; so that, had the world been eternal, the whole earth would have been but one stone, or the petrification must have ceased of itself. But if it be said that these stones dissolve, and so there may be a kind of circulation; it is answered, that stones grow in one year which do not dissolve in many centuries.

The argument from the waste of fluids by the growth of animal and vegetable bodies is much the same as this, so far as there is any solidity in it: but it may be queried, whether the dissolution of those bodies, and separation of their consistent fluids in a series of years, may not answer this.

*Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 51—55. OEt. p. 30—32.—Clare on Fluids, p. 271, 272.*

*Arg. 10.* Hills are continually subsiding, which will in some finite time reduce the world to a level. If it be objected, that this is balanced by earthquakes, &c. which raise mountains; it is answered, the number of these so raised is comparatively small, and they being hollow would soon be washed away.

*Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 55—62. OEt. p. 32—36.—Ray's 3 Disc. N°. iii. p. 344—364.—Montfauc. Trav. p. 377, 378.—Burn. Theory, vol. i. p. 51—53.*

\* As to the question concerning the Decrease of Mankind since the Augustan age, see the subject ingeniously discussed in Hume's Essay on the Populoufness of Ancient Nations, and Wallace's Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind.

*Arg. 11.* According to the best calculations which have been made, comets appear on an average at least in 30 years; but whether this account be exact or not, if their return be periodical, there would within an imaginable time have been more than a thousand millions cutting the earth's orbit in various directions; in consequence of which the earth must have been exposed to such danger, either of being drawn into the sun or separated from it, that, without a particular providence, which this hypothesis opposes, its destruction must have happened long since.

*Arg. 12.* If the world be eternal, it is hard to account for the tradition of its beginning, which has almost every where prevailed, though under different forms, among both polite and barbarous nations.

*Hale's Orig. of Man, § 2. c. xii. § 3. c. i.*  
 —*Grot. de Ver. l. i. § 16. p. 26—40.*  
 —*Burnet's Arch. l. ii. c. i. p. 273—285.*

#### COROLLARY 1.

LECT. XXVI. There must have been some great and excellent being, superior to this whole material system, by which it was reduced into that beautiful order, in which it now appears.

#### COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may infer the vanity and falsehood of *Spinoza's* doctrine, who asserts, that the whole and every part of the material world is a self-existent being: for he expressly says, that one being or substance could not be produced by another, and that all things could be in no other order and manner than they are, *i. e.* that all things in their present form are necessary, and therefore eternal. *Def. 27. and Cor. 1, 3.*

Clarke

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 26—29.—*Camb. sur l'Exist.* p. 202—207. part ii. c. 2.  
 —*Toland's Pantheisticon*, p. 5—8, 54, 55. *apud*—*Sykes's Connect.* c. iv. p. 64—83.—*Orph. Carm. ap. Apul. Op. (de Mundo)*, p. 190.—*Ramsay's App. to Phil. Princ.* vol. i. p. 497, &c.—  
*Campbell's Necessity of Rev.* p. 368.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Those arguments which *Redi*, *Malpighius*, and several modern philosophers have advanced against the doctrine of equivocal generation either of animals or plants, have often been urged as conclusive against the eternity of the world: and if they will prove that every animal or plant of the present generation was not only contained in its immediate parent, but together with that parent in the remoter generation, and so on perpetually, it might indeed prove, that, how small soever the bodies now grown up might be at any given time, there is a certain distance of generation, at which the organized body containing them and all intermediate generations, each bigger than the embryo in question was at that time, must have been bigger than even the whole mass of the earth. But it may be answered, that allowing no animal or plant to rise into visible form but from pre-existing parents of the same kind, it may nevertheless in its first stamina be formed anew, from some fluid before making an unorganized part of the adult parent; and in that case there will be no peculiar force in this argument, as lying against the eternity of the world; for that which arises from the exquisite workmanship of an animal body, and the absurdity of supposing it produced from any fluid or solid merely by mechanical laws, properly belongs to another question.

*Redi*

*Redi de Gen. Insect. pass.*—*Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. i. c. xvi. § 9.*—*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm. iv. p. 127, ad fine.*  
 —*Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 23. p. 60—63.*—*Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 298—326.*  
 —*Varen Geog. vol. i. p. 226. Eng.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Neither do we argue from the probability that the Torrid Zone would have taken fire; which is examined in

*Ray's 3 Disc. p. 381—388.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

We likewise wave those arguments which are taken from the supposed absurdity and impossibility of the world's having been actually eternal, or having existed through an infinite succession; because the same objection seems to lie against every thing which is said to be eternal, and the argument turns on the supposition, that an infinite is made up of a number of finites.

*Burnet on the Art. p. 19, 20.*—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 35—37.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Some of the *Ancients*, who speak of the eternity of the world, do not seem to intend it in the sense in which *Spinoza* asserts it. The arguments are designed to prove either that something must be eternal, which is all that those of *Ocellus Lucanus* amount to, or that the world is a necessary eternal effect flowing from the energy of the divine nature, which *Aristotle* seems to have thought; or that it was an eternal voluntary emanation from a supreme and infinitely perfect cause, which was the opinion of *Plato's* followers. Nevertheless there is reason to believe, that some of them were properly *Pantheists*, in the same sense in which

which the term may be applied to the present followers of *Spinoza*. Compare *Cor.* 2.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 29—35.—*Nichols's Conf.* vol. i. p. 22—36.—*Off.* vol. i. p. 12—20.\*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

If any objection should be brought against the seventh argument, from the supposed infinite number of celestial bodies, which would occasion an equal attraction every way; we must defer the examination of that till we have proved that matter is not infinite, to which we shall quickly proceed.

## DEFINITION XXIX.

That is said to be an ESSENTIAL QUALITY, which cannot cease, unless the being itself should be supposed to be destroyed.

LECT.  
XXVII.

*Watts's Log.* p. 17, 18.

## PROPOSITION XXII.

Motion is not essential to matter.

## DEMONSTRATION I.

1. It is evident that when we have abstracted the idea of motion from any particle of matter, there will still remain the idea of extended solid substance, *i. e.* it will still be matter. See *Def.* 4, and 29.

2. If motion be essential to matter, then motion must either be an equal tendency every way, or a prevailing tendency one way.

3. An equal tendency every way would certainly produce rest.

4. A prevailing tendency one way rather than another must arise from some external cause;

\* A concise and elegant view of the different opinions of the ancient philosophers on this subject, may be read in *Dr. Enfield's History of Philosophy*.

and if these motions were various, from causes that act in various manners, and not from the necessary nature of body or matter itself.

1 and 2, 3, 4. | 5. Motion is not essential to matter. *Q. E. D.*

*Toland's Lett. to Seren. N<sup>o</sup>. 5. p. 186—*

*202.—Clarke at Boyle's Lett. p. 24, 25.*

#### DEMONSTRATION II.

Another proof may be drawn from the *vis inertiae*, which *Baxter* has proved to be essential to matter, and which is directly contrary to necessary motion. This argument is stated at large in *Baxter on the Soul*, and as it cannot conveniently be contracted here, we chuse to refer to the author himself.

*Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. p. 1—78.*

#### COROLLARY.

Since it appears that matter does move, (still supposing the reality of the material world) it is evident there must be some first mover, *i. e.* some superior immaterial being, from whom its motion is derived.

#### SCHOLIUM.

The argument which *Toland* brings, in the passage cited above, to prove motion essential to matter, amounts to little more than the universal gravitation observed to prevail in it; but this may be sufficiently accounted for, by supposing it always impressed upon it by the Creator, and that it might at his pleasure be suspended, though no single particle of the whole material world should be now exempted from the influence.

#### PROPOSITION XXIII.

Matter is not self-existent or necessary.

DEMON-

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Def.* 4. | 1. Tangibility, solidity, or resistance, is essential to matter.

1. | 2. If all space were full of matter, how fine soever the particles were, there must be on every side an invincible resistance to the motion of any one of those particles.

3. But we plainly see that there is motion in the corporeal world.

2, 3. | 4. There is therefore a vacuum; as will be farther illustrated in the scholium.

*Def.* 28. *Cor.* | 5. But if matter were self-existent or necessary, there must be an universal plenum.

6. Matter is liable to continual changes in its place, contexture, situation, &c. which is inconsistent with its being self-existent. *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 3.

4, 5 and 6. | 7. Matter is not self-existent.  
Q. E. D.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 503, 504, 25, 26.

—*Colliber's Enq.* p. 258—261. *Edit.* 3.

—*Bent. at Boyle's Lect.* § 6. p. 211—213.—*Howe's Living Temple*, part ii.

c. 2. § 5.—*Baxt. on the Soul*, vol. ii.

§ 3. *præf.* p. 345—351, 356—359, 373—383.

## COROLLARY.

There must be some immaterial self-existent being, by whom matter was at first created, supposing it now really to exist. See *Prop.* 22. *Cor.* *Def.* 27. *Cor.* 5.

## SCHOLIUM.

A vacuum may farther be proved from the different specific gravity of bodies, compared with the vibrations of pendulums of unequal bulk and equal length in equal times: *v. g.* one of ten pound, vibrates just as fast as another of one

pound whose rod is of the same length; it has therefore just ten times the momentum or force of motion, *i. e.* ten times the gravity; for here it is gravity that gives it the force; or in other words, the gravity is as the quantity of matter: when therefore the gravity under the same bulk is unequal, it proves there is more matter in one mass than in the other, and consequently pores (at least) in the lighter, though the heavier were to be supposed entirely solid: and the experiment of the feather and guinea descending together in the exhausted receiver establishes the argument on the same principles.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 503, 504.*

### A X I O M X.

LECT. XXVIII. If any being be the producing cause of another being, not merely occasionally, but by its own power, it is very reasonable to suppose, that it was more excellent or perfect than its production, or at least equally so.

### C O R O L L A R Y.

Seeing a thinking substance as such is more excellent than a substance destitute of thought, it is not to be imagined that spirit should be produced by a being which is not possessed of thought.

### P R O P O S I T I O N XXIV.

It is in the nature of things utterly inconceivable and incredible that thought should necessarily arise from matter.

### D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. If thought could proceed from matter, it must either arise from the general nature of it, or must be peculiar to matter in some certain configuration and agitation.

2. Thought cannot arise from the nature of matter in general; for then every particle of matter would have thought, which is evidently false and ridiculous to affirm.

3. Any supposed alteration in the figure of the particles of matter, *v. g.* from squares to cubes, or cones, &c. has no apparent influence on the production of thought.

4. Motion in general added to matter cannot produce thought; for then almost all matter known to us, being actually though not necessarily in motion, and some of it in a wonderful swift agitation, must be cogitative, contrary to fact.

5. The change of its motion, *v. g.* from a straight line to any kind of curve, or *vice versa*, or its collision against other particles of matter, seems to have no tendency to produce thought.

1—5. | 6. *Valet propositio.*

*Abern. Serm. vol. i. p. 107—117.—Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm. 2. p. 15—26.*

*Œt. Ed. p. 52—68.—Clarke ib. p. 52.—57.—Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 10.*

#### COROLLARY.

Since we are sure there is such a thing as thought, (*Ax. 2.*) this is another argument independent on *Prop. 23. Cor.* to prove that there is some immaterial being. See *Ax. 9.*

*Bentley ib. p. 29—36. Œt. p. 68—74.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

It is to no purpose to object, that there may be some unknown connection between certain modifications of matter and thought, from which thought may necessarily result, or that it may be produced from some unknown properties of matter, though not from those which are known; seeing many things are utterly incredible,

dible, which cannot be proved to be absolutely impossible.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be farther objected, that it is as inconceivable that matter should arise from thought, as thought from matter; it may be answered, that we are sure in fact, that if there be any material world, matter is moved by thought, though we know not how it is done, and that it was actually produced by some immaterial being; (*Prop. 23. Cor.*) but it cannot be proved in fact that thought is necessarily produced by matter, or that any thinking being has been mechanically produced from matter itself; though we allow that according to the constitution of some superior being thought is occasioned by it, *i. e.* that there is a certain wonderful harmony between impressions made on the material parts of our frame and thought; and that thinking beings are produced by a superior cause on certain concurrences in the material world\*.

*Shaftsb. Char. vol. ii. p. 296.—Baxt. on the Soul, vol. ii. p. 350. note.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It may not be improper here to collect the proof we have had of the existence of an immaterial being, which arises partly from the motion of matter, *Prop. 22. Cor.* and its existence, *Prop. 23. Cor.* and also from the existence of thought, which mere matter could not produce, *Prop. 24. Cor.* compared with *Ax. 10. Cor.*

\* It is scarcely necessary to say, how much the doctrine of this twenty-fourth Proposition is denied by several recent philosophers, of great eminence and ingenuity. See particularly Priestley's *Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit*, and T. Cooper's *Essays*. On the other side of the question, is Mr. W. Belsham, in the second volume of his *Essays*, p. 1—30.

## PROPOSITION XXV.

We are not ourselves necessary or self-existent beings.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is evident we are lately born into this world, and there is no proof of our existence before.

2. We evidently appear to be dependent on every thing about us.

3. The capacity and sentiments of our minds, as well as the powers of our bodies and our external circumstances, are almost continually changing.

*Def. 27. Cor. 1, 3.* 4. But every self-existent being is eternal, independent and immutable.

1, 2, 3, 4 | 5. We are not self-existent. *Q. E. D.*

*Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 185—188.*

## COROLLARY I.

There is some self-existent being, from whom we mediately or immediately derive our existence, and to whom ultimately we owe all the faculties of our nature and all the enjoyments of our lives. *Def. 27. Cor. 5.*

## COROLLARY 2.

There is great reason to believe that this being is naturally much more excellent than we.

## COROLLARY 3.

It is evident that as we are already under great obligations to this being, so we have a constant dependence upon him for every future period and circumstance of our existence.

## COROLLARY 4.

It must be of the greatest importance for us most attentively to enquire after him, and to

study his nature and properties, that we may if possible secure an interest in his favour.

*Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 188, 189.*

### PROPOSITION XXVI.

That self-existent being, from whom our existence was ultimately derived, (*Prop. 25. Cor. 1.*) is a spirit.

### DEMONSTRATION.

1. Originally and primarily to produce a being is an action.

*Grad. 1. Def. 10. Cor. 2.* 2. That must be a spirit, whereby any being whatsoever is originally and primarily produced.

*Prop. 25. Cor. 1.* 3. Our spirits were produced by some self-existent being.

*Ax. 10. Cor.* 4. To suppose a thinking being produced by an unthinking cause, would be more evidently absurd than to suppose an unthinking being so produced.

2, 3, 4. 5. That self-existent being, from whom our existence was ultimately derived, is a spirit.  
Q. E. D.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 49—52.—Abernethy, vol. i. Sermon. iv.*

### SCHOLIUM.

Though it seems more proper to state the evidence of this important proposition thus largely, it is in effect contained in *Prop. 25. Cor. 2.* since nothing that is not a spirit can be more excellent than our minds.

### DEFINITION XXX.

LECT. XXIX. That self-existent spiritual being, by whom we and the material world about us were originally formed, we call GOD.

*Vanini Amphitheatrum Providentiæ, p. 8—10. apud—Collib. Inq. p. 243, 244.—Shaft, Char, vol. ii. p. 10, 11.*

## COROLLARY.

It appears from this definition that our idea of God is very complex, and is made up of many ideas arising both from sensation and reflection.

*Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 33—36.*

## PROPOSITION XXVII.

There is a God.

## DEMONSTRATION I.

*Prop. 23. Cor. | 1.* The matter, of which this world or system consists, was originally created by a self-existent immaterial being.

*Prop. 22. Cor. | 2.* This matter was first put into motion by some superior, *i. e.* self-existent being. See *Def. 27. Cor. 5.*

*Prop. 21. Cor. 1. | 3.* This material world was reduced into the beautiful form wherein it now appears by some being superior to it.

4. There is no reason to assert, nor has it ever that we know of been maintained by any, that the being, by whom the matter of our world was at first produced, was a different being from that by which it was first moved and brought into the order in which it now appears\*.

*Prop. 25. Cor. 1 and 2. | 5.* Our spirits were also derived from some self-existent spirit of superior excellence and perfection.

6. There is no apparent reason to believe that the spirit, by whom our spirits were originally produced, is a being different from that, by which this material world about us was created and formed.

\* It may be observed here, that the Gnostics maintained the *Demiourgos* or Maker of this World to be different from the supreme Being; but then they held matter itself to be eternal, and evil *per se*. See Mosheim's *Commentarii de Rebus Christianorum in Seculo primo*, § 64. and his *Institutiones Majores Seculi primi, Pars secunda*, § 5. 6. S.

1—6. | 7. There is some self-existent spiritual being, by whom we and this material world were formed; *i. e.* there is a God. *Def.* 30. *Q. E. D.*  
*Locke's Ess.* l. iv. c. x. § 1—6\*.

## COROLLARY I.

God is a being more excellent than the material world, or than we, or than any other spirit, which may hereafter appear to be derived from him. See *Ax.* 10.

## COROLLARY 2.

There is something so great and excellent in self-existence, joined with a degree of other perfections superior to those which we can discover in any derived being whatsoever, that it seems most safe and reasonable, in all our farther inquiries into the nature of God, to ascribe to him what appears to us most noble and excellent, and to separate from our ideas of him whatever is defective or contemptible; *i. e.* in other words, to conceive of him as a being of infinite perfections: but of this more fully hereafter. See *Def.* 28. *Cor. & Schol.* 1.

*Howe's Liv. Temp.* p. i. c. iv.

## DEMONSTRATION 2.

The being of a God proved from universal consent.

1. Almost all men of every place and age have acknowledged a God, learned or unlearned, polite or barbarous, pious or wicked, fearful or courageous; and nations that have differed most in their genius and customs have generally agreed in this important point.

\* For other proofs of the being of a God, recourse may be had to Squire's "Irreligion Indefensible;" Priestley's "Institutes;" his "Letters to Philosophical Unbelievers," part the first; and Bryant's "Treatise on the Authenticity of the Scriptures," part the first.

2. This opinion must arise from prejudice or from right reason.

1. | 3. It is exceedingly difficult, or rather impossible, to find any prejudice common to all who have embraced this opinion. Fear could not affect the courageous, nor the invention of politic princes, princes themselves, or barbarous nations; blind credulity would not affect the most philosophic inquirers, nor religious hopes men of impious characters; and as for the authority of one person affirming it, how could the notion have been so universally propagated, or merely on this authority so universally believed? If education infused it through succeeding generations, why has it been so much more uniform than any thing else which is supposed to be so transmitted?

4. It does not appear that particular prejudices can be assigned to suit the case of all particular persons.

3, 4. | 5. This opinion does not appear to arise from prejudice.

2, 5. | 6. It seems founded on right reason: *i. e.* there is a God. *Q. E. D.*

*Wilk. of Nat. Rel. p. 41—49. p. 52—61.*

*—Tillotf. Works, vol. i. p. 14—17.—*

*Locke's Ess. l. i. c. iv. § 8, 9.—Lou-*

*biere's Siam, part 3. c. xxii, xxiii.*

*p. 130—132.—Burn. on the Art. p. 17,*

*18.—Gastrel of Nat. Relig. p. 26—38.*

*Ridgley's Divin. vol. i. p. 12—14.—*

*Millar's Prop. of Christ, vol. ii. p. 161.\**

#### SCHOLIUM.

The different notions that men have maintained of the deity, and the opinion of many

\* How far the universal consent of the Being of God is a fact, may now particularly be traced from the number of late Voyages and Travels to all parts of the world, and to men in all the forms of society.

concerning

concerning a plurality of gods, is urged as an objection against the argument stated above: but it may be answered, that their difference in other things makes their agreement in this great principle so much the more remarkable; and it is certain there is not such an agreement in any false notion of the deity, or plurality of gods, as there is in his existence in general: to which we may add, that the wrong notions particular persons have entertained concerning him may often be accounted for by the variety of their genius, condition, education, &c.

*Wilkins on Nat. Rel. p. 43—45.—Burn. on the Art. p. 18, 19.—Tillotf. Works, vol. i. p. 15, 16.*

#### DEMONSTRATION 3.

LECT. In which the being of a God is proved from a  
 XXX. brief survey of the works of nature.

#### LEMMA.

This system of things, which we call the visible world, is full of beauty, harmony and order.

#### DEMONSTRATION of the LEMMA.

1. This appears by a survey of the heavenly bodies: in which we may distinctly consider their magnitude, number, due situation, that they may not interfere with one another, and may lay a foundation for certain astronomical discoveries, which would otherwise have been impossible, had there been a perfect similarity in situation and size. Especially in our system we may remark the sun, that glorious fountain of light and vital influence, by which most of the other beauties of the creation around us are discovered; and the various planets with which he is surrounded; in which we may more particularly observe the correspondence between their distance from the central body about which they revolve,

revolve, and the times in which their revolutions are performed, *i. e.* that the squares of their periodical times are as the cubes of their distances; the supply of moons to most of the distant planets, with the addition of a ring to *Saturn*; the agreement both of primary and secondary planets in a spherical figure; as well as the agreeable variety that is observable in their size, and other phænomena relating to them.

*Derham's Astr. Theology, pass.*—*Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. iii.*—*Ray of Creat. p. 72—78.*—*Nat. Disp. vol. iv.*—*Baxt. Matbo.*—*Abern. vol. i. Serm. i.*

2. The proposition appears from a view of the globe of the earth: in which, not to urge the gravitation of bodies on or near its surface towards its centre, which is common to our whole system at least, if not to the whole material world, and is the great cement of it, we may more distinctly consider its diurnal and annual motion; the atmosphere with which it is surrounded; its constituent parts, as it is a teraqueous globe, and composed of bodies of very different kinds, lodged upon or beneath its surface.

*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. p. 310—314.*—*Nieuw. Rel. Phil. vol. ii. Cont. 17. p. 367—413.*—*Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 4—18.*—*Keil's Astron. Lect. xxi. sub init. 298, 299.*

3. The vegetable productions, with which the earth is furnished, so various, beautiful and useful.

*Nat. Disp. vol. i. Dial. 14, 15. part 2. p. 158—248.*—*Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 116—132.*—*Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 404—424.*—*Denne's Serm. on Veget.*

4. The animal inhabitants of it: in which we can never sufficiently admire the organs of sensation,

fation, especially the eye and ear, the organs of respiration, of motion, those for receiving and digesting the aliment, and those intended for generation and the nourishment of the fœtus. In the inferior animals, it is wonderful to observe, how their different organs are fitted for those different circumstances in life for which they are intended, and especially to the elements in which they are chiefly to live. To this head may be referred what was before said of their various instincts, *Def. 18. Cor. 2.* to which we may farther add the limitation of their instincts, as well as animal sensations, within such degrees, as the convenience of the animal requires. (*Vid. Eff. on Man, part 1.*) But above all, in human creatures we may justly admire the faculties of the mind, as well as the structure of the body, both which have been largely considered elsewhere.

*Monro's Compar. Anat. pass.—Derham's Phys. Theol. pass.*

5. On the whole it may be observed, that the more philosophy is improved and enquiries pursued, the more is the harmony and regularity of the works of nature illustrated, and the more evidently does it appear, that objections formerly made against them were owing to the ignorance of those that advanced them.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 55, 58, 103—106.—Nat. Disp. vol. i. p. 13—15.*

6. As these things are wonderful when considered apart, so when the whole is considered as a system, and in reference to man, for whose use this earth and what it contains seems principally to have been designed, many comparative beauties arise, which in a separate view could not have been discovered.

*Sbaft. Char. vol. ii. p. 285—290.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

These arguments are set in so strong and beautiful a light in the works of *Ray*, *Derham*, *Nieuwentyt*, *Bonet*, *Baxter* in his *Mattho*, and in *De la Pluche's Nature Displayed*, especially in the first and fourth volumes, that they deserve a most attentive perusal at leisure\*.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

As to those objections, which are brought from the noxious qualities of some vegetables, animals, or exhalations, from the limitation of our senses, from the helpless circumstances in which human infants are born; as well as from our being subject to diseases and death; besides those arising from the asperities of the surface of our globe, and the inclination of the axis of the earth to the plane of the ecliptic; they are most of them so evidently weak, and capable of being retorted as beauties rather than defects; and they are all so well considered and confuted in the following references, that we shall not more distinctly examine them here.

*Lucret. l. v. ver. 196—235.*—*Blackm. on the Creat. p. 78—92.*—*Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Serm. iii. p. 10—17. OEt. Ed. 5. p. 94—104.*—*Ibid. Serm. viii. p. 22—40. OEt. Ed. p. 83—90.*—*Shaft. Char. vol. ii. p. 298—309.*—*Ray on the Creat. p. 249—255.*—*Keil's Exam. of Burn. Theory, pass.*—*Pope's Ess. on Man, Epist. i. ver. 165—198.*—*Wilkins's World in the Moon.*—*Collib. Enq. p. 92—94.*—*Polign. Anti-Lucret. pass.*—*Clarke on the Origin of Evil, p. 160. ad fin. præf. p. 160—202; 233—264.*—*Reimarus on Nat. Relig. pass.*

\* The many curious volumes which have recently been published in the different parts of Natural History may be read in this view, though they are not, in general, applied by the authors of them to the purposes of religion.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

The noble powers and properties of the human mind are well worthy of being mentioned here, as a production incomparably more glorious than any thing in the vegetable or brutal creation. It may something assist our thoughts here, to consider how the face of nature is embellished and improved by the arts which mankind have introduced into life, and how much entertainment is given mankind by producing them as the effect of their own art and labour, beyond what they could find in them merely as the product of nature.

*Derham's Physf. Theol. p. 226 & 61—65.*  
*—Locke on Government.—Abernethy's*  
*Sermons on the Being and Attributes of*  
*God.*

## PROPOSITION 27. DEMONSTRATION 3.

LECT. XXXI. Proof of the being of a God from the Works of Nature.

Prop. 21. | 1. Seeing the world was made, it is universally allowed that it must have been produced by chance or design.

2. Chance is entirely an unmeaning expression, unless we ascribe that to it which is produced by mechanical laws, without the contrivance and purpose of the thinking being, whose agency may be the means of producing it.

*Watts's Ontol. p. 332.—Bentley at Boyle's*  
*Lect. Sermon. v. p. 9—12. OEt. Ed. p.*  
*147—153. 5th Ed. p. 170—174.*

2. | 3. It may generally be expected, that whatever is thus produced should be very confused and imperfect, especially when the effect is very complex.

Lem. | 4. This world, though a very complex system, is full of beauty, harmony and order,  
 incom-

incomparably superior to any work which we see produced by the design of the most curious artist.

3, 4. | 5. It is most incredible that it should be produced by chance.

1, 5. | 6. It was produced by the design or counsel of some intelligent agent.

*Prop.* 20. *Cor.* | 7. If any derived being were supposed the immediate former of the world, he must ultimately owe his wisdom and power to some original and self-existent being.

6, 7. | 8. The frame of the world proves that there is a God. *Q. E. D.*

*Lucret. l. v. ver.* 417—449.—*Camb. sur l'Exist. p.* 4—6. § 5—8.—*Bent. ib. Serm. v. p.* 12. and *fine. OEt. Ed. p.* 153—177.—*Howe's Works, vol. i. p.* 29—34.—*Collib. Inq. p.* 74—84.—*Rel. of Nat. p.* 79—85. *OEt. Ed. vol. i. p.* 72—92.

#### DEMONSTRATION 4.

A deity proved from the marks of divine interposition which appear in the support and government of the world.

#### L E M M A.

The author of *Matbo* has illustrated this topic of demonstration with incomparable strength and beauty: but some of his arguments are of such a nature as to be more properly mentioned in another place.

1. This appears in the continuance of the centripetal and projectile force of the planets, as a mutual balance to each other; neither of which appears necessary in itself, though a failure of either would be attended with a general ruin: and this thought appears with a force greatly increased, when we consider the various composition of that four-fold motion, by which a

secondary

secondary planet revolves about its primary, while both revolve about the sun.

*Baxt. Matho*, vol. ii. *Conf.* vii. p. 4—18:  
—*Coll. Inq.* p. 119, 120. *Ed.* 3. p. 143,  
144.—*Baxt. on the Soul*, § 2. N<sup>o</sup>. 6.  
p. 46, 47. 4<sup>to</sup>. vol. i. *Off. Ed.* p. 101—  
106.

2. In preventing the alteration of the obliquity of the earth's axis, or its receiving any other detriment from the approach of comets or any other cause; and likewise in preventing the inclination of the moon's orbit from becoming greater, or the moon itself from being brought nearer to or carried farther from the earth; any of which alterations would be attended with fatal consequences, especially the two last of them, which might be most easily affected by a comet's approach.

*Matho*, vol. ii. § 118, 119. p. 143, &c.  
§ 110. p. 91, &c.—*Collib. Ib.* p. 144.

3. In regulating the winds, so as may be for the preservation and benefit of the earth; though we are not able to assign any certain laws by which it is effected.

*Clarke's Robault*, part 1. c. xii. § 41.  
*Note.*—*Collib. Inq.* p. 144.

4. In the due proportion which is observed between males and females in the several species of animals, and especially in mankind.

*Nieuwent. ib.* vol. i. p. 351—363.—  
*Derb. Phys. Theol.* p. 175, 176. *Note.*

5. In preserving the balance of the several species of animals, so that none should over-run the earth and none be lost.

*Collib. ib.* p. 123. *Ed.* 3. p. 147—*Der-*  
*ham's Phys. Theol.* p. 168—179.—*Nat.*  
*Disp.* vol. i. part 1. p. 44—46.

6. In keeping the species of animals and vegetables the same through succeeding ages, and preventing

preventing their being corrupted by undue mixtures.

*Collib. ib. p. 122, 123. Ed. 3. p. 148, 149.*

7. In keeping the faces, voices, and handwriting so wonderfully distinct as they appear to be.

*Weems's Works, vol. iv. part 2. p. 12, 13.*

*Derb. ib. p. 308—310.—Ray's Wisd. p. 283—286.*

8. The regularity and steadiness with which the world is governed by the same laws in the most distant ages, is a farther noble argument of the divine interposition; and is perhaps in nothing more conspicuous than in this, that the instincts of animals are still the same.

*Shaft. vol. ii. p. 337.*

9. If in any instance these laws have been interrupted, and effects have been produced beyond the common course of nature; as these instances do not appear to have been so frequent as to overthrow the argument *gr. 8.* so they afford a farther argument of a being superior to this system of things, and prove that he attends to the affairs of his creatures.

*Limb. Theol. l. i. c. ii. § 17, 19, 25.—*

*Crellius de Dco, p. 23. in his Works, vol. iv.*

1—9. | 10. It appears that the world is under the government of some being of great power and exquisite contrivance, art and conduct; who is himself either necessarily existent, or derived from some other who is so.

### PROPOSITION XXVIII.

To give a view of those other arguments in LECT. proof of a deity, which seem not of equal force XXXII. with the former, and yet are urged by persons of considerable note.

## SOLUTION.

1. *Cartesius* argues that there must be a God, because necessary existence is contained in the idea of a God, as three angles are in the idea of a triangle; so that though essence and existence are in other things distinct, yet when considered with regard to the deity they are the same.

To this it is answered, that there is a difference between the notional truth of propositions and the real truth of ideas. In plainer terms, the fallacy lies in the ambiguity of those words, *God is a necessary existent being*: If the meaning of them be, *q. d.* “By the word GOD, I understand a being that is supposed to be self-existent,” they will be allowed; but then they prove not his real existence: but if they signify, “It is most certain there is such a being,” the sense is changed, and the proposition may still be disputed.

*Cartes. Princ. l. i. § 14—16.—Camb. Exist. p. 197—199.—Voyage to the World of Cart. p. 159—164.—Collib. Inq. p. 130—132. Ed. 2. p. 156—159.*

2. *Cartesius* farther argues, “The greater the objective perfection of any idea is, the more perfect must its cause be: but we have the idea of a being infinitely perfect, therefore there must be some infinitely perfect being to cause and produce it.”

But this seems still to take for granted the thing to be proved, *i. e.* the objective reality of the idea, or the reality of the object supposed to be represented by it. And it may be pleaded, that, without any such archetype at all, an idea of an infinitely perfect being, might be produced by the operation of our minds upon ideas arising from inferior objects, seeing we do not comprehend infinity, but only deny the bounds of an object which we suppose infinite.

*Cartes.*

*Cartes. ib.* § 17, 18, 22.—*Camb. ib.* p. 189  
—191.—*Voyage to the World of Cart.*  
p. 166—169.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 132, 133.  
*Ed.* 3. p. 159, 160.—*Clarke at Boyle's*  
*Lett.* p. 20—22. p. 19—21. *6th Edit.*  
—*Locke's Eff.* l. iv. c. x. § 7.

3. *Epicurus*, and many others, particularly Lord *Shaftesbury*, have argued, that the idea of God is universal as being innate, and therefore that his existence is certain: *Epicurus* therefore supposes it natural to admit it; and those who believe man to be God's work, argue from his having stamp'd this character of himself upon all his human creatures. But the foundation of this argument has been removed in *Prop.* 8, 6. gr. 5. and the references.

*Coll. Inq.* p. 128—130. *Ed.* 3. 154—156.  
—*Shaftesb. Lett. to a Clerg.*

4. *Tillotson* argues to this effect: "The idea of a God is possible, seeing it involves no contradiction to suppose a being of all possible perfections, therefore it is necessary: for if there be no God now, there never can be a God, seeing eternity is a part of our idea of him; so that on this supposition the existence of a God is impossible, contrary to the hypothesis." But this argument, which seems nearly equal to the first in a plainer dress, may be sufficiently answered by the known distinction between an *hypothetical* and an *actual* possibility: v. g. It may be said to be *hypothetically* possible, that the first man should have been created with wings, but since he was in fact created without wings, it is not *actually* possible; and this seems to be an instance parallel to the other.

*Tillotson's Works*, vol. i. p. 19.—*Collib. Inq.*  
p. 133, 134. *Ed.* 3. 161, 162.

## DEFINITION XXXI.

Those arguments which are brought from the existence of some of the attributes of God to prove the existence of a God, are called proofs *A PRIORI*: those taken from the phænomena observable in the works of nature, are called proofs *A POSTERIORI*.

## SCHOLIUM I.

The question, whether there be any proof of the being of a God *a priori*, depends upon the reality of space and duration, and their being the properties of some substance which will be examined hereafter.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

The proof of the *attributes* of a God *a priori*, is the arguing them from self-existence, shewing them to have a necessary connection with it: and in this sense some have denied there can be any proof *a priori*; because nothing can be prior to a self-existent being, and because all our proofs of the attributes of such a being are ultimately drawn from the consideration of some being derived from him. But this objection is evidently founded on a mistake of the sense in which these words are used by the most accurate writers.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

On the whole, it may be proper to distinguish the various ways of proving the being and attributes of God thus,

1. *Both* are proved *a priori*, when from the real existence of space and duration we infer the existence of a self-existent being whose properties they are, and from necessity of existence prove his wisdom, power, goodness, &c\*.

2. *Both*

\* Amidst the various attempts to prove the being of a God *a priori*, one of the most curious, and which seems to approach the

2. *Both* are proved *a posteriori*, when we argue from a survey of the system of nature, that there must be a wise, powerful and benevolent author.

3. The proof is *mixed*, when from the observed existence of any one derived being, whether material or immaterial, more or less perfect, we argue the existence of a self-existent being, and thus infer his attributes from a necessary connection with self-existence, as in the first case.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 494—498. and p. 501, 502.—Waterland's Diff. on the Arg. a priori, apud Law's Enq. ad Fin. præf. 51—54, 56—60.*

### PROPOSITION XXIX.

To take a survey of the chief sects of ATHEISTS amongst the ancient *Grecian* philosophers. LECT. XXXIII.

#### SOLUTION.

SECT. I. They all agreed in asserting, that there was nothing but *matter* in the universe: but differ as to the question, whether it was animate or inanimate.

SECT. 2. Those who held matter to be *animated*, were in general called *ύλοζοικοι*; who, (as they darkly expressed it) maintained that matter had some natural perception, but no animal sensation, or reflection in itself considered; but that this imperfect life occasioned that organization,

the nearest to a demonstration, is a short tract, written by the Rev. Moses Lowman of Clapham. The piece is now become very scarce, and indeed is almost forgotten. We mention it, that, in case it should be met with in any catalogue or sale of books, its value may be known. A Mr. Knight, a Dissenting Minister at Chertsey in Surrey, wrote a book on the same subject, a little more than forty years ago. See also the second edition of Dr. Price's Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals.

from whence sensation and reflection afterwards arose.

SECT. 3. Of these, some held only *one life*, which they called a *plastic nature*; and these were called the *Stoical* atheists, because the *Stoics* held such a nature, though they supposed it the instrument of the deity: others thought that every particle of matter was endued with life, and these were called the *Stratonici*, from *Strato Lampsacenus*: and *Hobbes* seems to have been of this opinion.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 57. marg.*

SECT. 4. Those atheists who held matter to be *inanimate* were called *ἀσώμωτοι*. Of these, some attempted to solve the phænomena of nature, by having recourse to the unmeaning language of *qualities* and *forms*, as the *Anaximandrians*, who thought they were produced by infinite active force, upon immense matter, acting without design: others by the figure and motion which they suppose to be essential to those atoms: these were the *Democritici*; whose philosophy differed but very little from the *Epicureans*, who evidently borrowed many of their notions from *Democritus*.

SECT. 5. *Diagoras* and *Theodorus* among the ancients, as *Vaninus* among the moderns, are reckoned martyrs for atheism.

*Collier or Bayle in Nom.—Buddæi Hist. Phil. c. iv. § 43—46, & 48.—Cudworth's System, l. i. c. iii. præf. § 34—36, 105, 134—136.—Cyrus's Trav. vol. ii. p. 27, 28, 31, 32.—Fenel. Phil. Lives, p. 110, & 253, 254.—Hale's Orig. of Man, § 4. c. iv. p. 340—342.—Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 17—25. fol.*

## SCHOLIUM 1.

Sir *William Temple* is said to have been an atheist of a kind different from any of these, and to have thought the present system of things necessary and eternal; consequently his notion has been confuted, by all the arguments brought to prove the world in its present form not to have been eternal, and that matter is not self-existent, nor motion essential to it, or thought producible from it alone.

*Burnet's Hist. of his own Times, vol. ii.  
p. 670. Oct.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

The *Chinese* have been represented by some as a nation of atheists; and *Burnet* declares that *Confucius* and his followers, of whom Sir *William Temple* was a great admirer, are to be reckoned amongst those who were atheists themselves and left religion to the people. But *Couplet* (in his *Declaratio Proemialis, p. 38.*) has largely endeavoured to prove, that though their modern writers, *i. e.* those from about the tenth century of christianity, have entertained and propagated atheistical notions among the philosophers of that nation, *Confucius* and their earlier teachers were notwithstanding votaries to pure religion. But it is very observable, that *Confucius* (if the writings, which *Couplet* and his brethren, the Jesuit missionaries, have published as his, do really contain a just representation of what he taught,) says little of those branches of duty which immediately relate to God; which leaves too much room for suspicion: though he does indeed speak of spirits surrounding men when they sacrifice, in such a manner, as to agree very well with the heathen notion of good dæmons, which perhaps differs not much from the christian doctrine of angels. (*Conf. Morals, l. ii. p. 50*

—52.) Yet I have not been able to find any part of his work in which he speaks expressly of God: for that very remarkable passage, (*l. ii. p. 88—90.*) in which he says so many sublime things of *him who is supremely holy*, must (when the whole of it is taken together) be understood of his *wise man*, and in that view is so impious and prophane, as to leave a great deal of room to imagine, that *Burnet* was not mistaken in the judgment he formed concerning him; nor will what he says of *the great spirit of heaven and earth* be sufficient wholly to remove the suspicion; as it is most probable, that it coincides with the notion of a plastic power, which some of the *Grecian* atheists held.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Besides the objections against design in the universe, (*Prop. 27. Lem. to Dem. 3. Schol. 2.*) other objections against a deity have been urged; the chief of which amount to this, that there is something in his nature, operations and conduct which we cannot fully comprehend: but if this argument be allowed as conclusive, we might be brought even to doubt of our own existence. See *Prop. 18. Cor. 3.*

Many other arguments or excuses brought for atheism do not deserve a particular place here, as will appear by consulting the passages here referred to.

*Cudworth's Syst. Book 1. c. ii. § 5—22.—  
Gassend's Nat. Rel. p. 187—212.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It seems reasonable to conclude, that the fear of punishment from a divine being, and a desire of seeming wiser than others, have been the chief causes of atheism; and perhaps the absurd notions which some have entertained of the deity, and the unworthy manner in which those who profess

profess to believe in him have acted, may be reckoned among the most fatal occasions of it.

*Gastr. ib. p. 230—248.—Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 84, 85. Works, vol. i. p. 221, 222.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It may not be improper here to hint at the strange conduct of *Tully* in his celebrated book *De Natura Deorum*, who only slightly touches on the opinion of *Anaxagoras*, that all things were produced by one infinite mind, and gives no patron to that opinion, nor so much as spends one page or section in discussing it; though he assigns proper advocates to defend at large the *Stoical* and *Epicurean* principles, as well as the *Academical*; and after all, leaves his reader under the impression of the *Epicurean* objections against providence; only coldly telling us, that they were not on the whole in his opinion so probable as the contrary doctrine. It is observable that the most religious passage in all *Tully's* works is only a fragment preserved by *Lactantius*.

*Middleton's Life of Cic. vol. iii. Oet. p. 350, 351.*

## SCHOLIUM 6.

Having thus established the proof of the existence of God, we now proceed in the following propositions to consider the chief of his perfections.

## PROPOSITION XXX.

God is eternal, *i. e.* he has existed, and will ever exist.

LECT.

XXXIV.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Def. 27. Cor. 1. | 1.* Whatever is self-existent is eternal.

*Def. 30. | 2.* God is self-existent.

1, 2. 3. God is eternal. *Q. E. D.*  
*Wilkins Nat. Rel. p. 120—123.—Abern.*  
*vol. i. p. 182—191.*

## COROLLARY.

God is immutable. *Vid. Def. 27. Cor. 3.*

*Wilkins ib. p. 115—117.—Collib. Inq. p. 56,*  
*57. Ed. 3. p. 66, 67.—Abern. p. 198*  
*—200.*

## SCHOLIUM.

It must be acknowledged there is something to us incomprehensible in the divine eternity, in whatever view we attempt to conceive of it. A *successive* eternity is what the mind can form no consistent idea of: for it seems, that, if there have been a fifth, a tenth, or hundredth, there must have been some first; and there can be nothing absolutely infinite, to which a continual addition is making. On the other hand, it is impossible for us to conceive of an eternity so *instantaneous*, as to exclude all past and future, and to be but one point of duration: this would make that space of time, to which millions of years are as nothing, but a small part of an hour or a minute, and is in effect declaring that God is now creating the world, and also now destroying it, supposing it ever to be destroyed. Indeed if all that were meant by an instantaneous eternity when applied to God were this, that all things whether past or future are as open to his view, as those things which exist in the present moment, this would be intelligible, but would not remove the difficulty of a successive eternity: and to reply (as some have done) that this eternity is not to be considered as duration at all, but as necessary existence, to which neither succession nor instantaneousness have any relation at all, more than colour to sound, leaves the question I think under the same darkness as before.

Never-

Nevertheless it is to be remembered, that this difficulty does not arise from the doctrine of the deity alone, but is common to every scheme that supposes any thing eterna', as something must certainly be; (*Prop.* 19.) and it would follow from supposing one atom to be so, besides all the other absurdities arising from the denial of an intelligent self-existent cause.

*Clarke's Serm.* vol. i. p. 81, 82, *Oct.*—  
*Collib. Inq.* p. 204—211. *Ed.* 3. p. 245  
 —253.—*Rel. of Nat.* p. 69, 70.—  
*Watts's Hymns*, l. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 17 & 67.  
 See also his *Ontology*, c. iv. p. 12—17.  
 —*Abern.* vol. i. p. 201—207.—*Soame*  
*Jenyns's Disquisitions*, N<sup>o</sup>. 4.

### PROPOSITION XXXI.

God is omnipotent; *i. e.* no effect can be assigned so great, but he is able to produce it.

### DEMONSTRATION.

*Def.* 30.|1. The very act of creating any being out of nothing, implies a power so great, that we can imagine nothing impossible to a being who can perform it by his own power.

*Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 3.|2. The amazing greatness and variety of the works of nature serve still more sensibly to illustrate the power of the creator.

3. We see nothing which betrays any marks of impotency or weakness in the deity.

1, 2, 3.|4. We have no reason to believe that any *internal* defect limits the divine power.

5. If there were any other being capable of controuling him, in the execution of his volitions, this being must be superior to him, and might (for any thing that appears) have prevented or destroyed his being as well as his operations, which would be inconsistent with the idea of God (*Def.* 30.) as a self-existent being.

5.|6. There

5. | 6. There is no *external* power to limit the operations of the divine being.

4, 6. | 7. His power is unlimited, and consequently can produce any effect be it ever so great. *Q. E. D.*

*Wilkins of Nat. Rel. p. 145, 146. p. 127—129. Oct. Ed.—Clarke's Serm. vol. i. p. 119, 120, 206—216.—Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 106, 107, 67—69.—Living Temple, vol. i. Oct. Ed. p. 207—215.—Abern. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. 8.*

#### COROLLARY.

If God be omnipotent, then nothing can be necessary to the production of any being in any supposed circumstance of time or place, but that God should will its existence in this circumstance.

*Jen. Pneum. Prop. 30.—Ralphson de Spatio reali, p. 67.—Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 23. Note.—Living Temple, p. 50, 51,*

#### SCHOLIUM 1.

**LECT. XXXV.** Another argument to prove that God is infinite in power is drawn from *Def. 28. Cor.* for it is certain he has some degree of power. A third from *Prop. 27. Dem, 1. Cor, 2.* since it is evident that to conceive of God as omnipotent, is much more honourable than to conceive of him as a being of limited power.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be objected to the fifth step of the preceding demonstration, that a power merely equal to that of God's might be sufficient to controul him in the execution of his volitions, and that we have not yet proved there is no being equal to him; it may be replied, that in some cases to controul the acts of another must argue some superiority; *v. g.* if A will that a creature should exist, and B that it should not exist, if it does  
not

not exist, then B in that instance triumphs over A, and appears superior to him. But if this answer should not be judged satisfactory, then it must be remembered, that we have shown that God's power is not limited by any internal defect, and that no external limiting power has yet been proved; and if it should hereafter be proved, by any argument not depending upon his omnipotence, that there is but one such self-existent being as we call God, then this proposition will be demonstrated in all its extent.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It must be owned that we have no conceptions of a creating power otherwise than by its effects: nevertheless that will not prove that there is no such thing: a blind man might as well argue against the existence of light.

*Collib. Inq. p. 60—64. Ed. 3. 70—75.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It is no limitation of the divine power, to assert that God is not able to do what implies a contradiction, for that is in effect to do nothing at all, and consequently, a pretended power of doing it, is no power at all.

*Coll. Inq. p. 180, 181. Ed. 3. p. 217, 218.*

—*Crouz. Log. vol. i. p. 403, 404.*—


—*Clarke's Serm. vol. i. p. 216—219.*

—*Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 104.*—

—*Living Temple, OEt. Ed. vol. i. p. 339*

—343.

## PROPOSITION XXXII.

All the creatures of God, whether they be LECT. corporeal or incorporeal, sensible or spiritual, XXXVI. owe their efficacy for producing any effect to the agency of a divine power in and upon them, at the very time when such effect is produced. 

## DEMONSTRATION I.

*Def. 27.* | i. Whatever is derived from another does not necessarily exist in the first moment of its being.

2. Whatever

2. Whatever does not necessarily exist in the first moment of its existence, cannot necessarily exist in the second, or in any following moment; but must owe its continued existence to the will of the being by whom it was at first produced: for by supposing its existence to continue when that will ceased, we should suppose it to be without the cause of its being. *Q. E. A.*

1, 2. | 3. All the creatures of God do every moment depend upon God for the continuance of their existence.

*Collib. Inq. p. 64, 65. Ed. 3. p. 75, 76.—Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 65.—Burnet on Art. p. 30.—Watts's Ess. l. ix. § 2. p. 201—208, 213.—Ib. N°. xi. p. 267, 268.—Cheyne's Princ. part i. § 9.—Baxt. on the Soul. vol. i. p. 225—227.—Sherlock on Providence, 9th Edit. p. 19, 20.*

4. The power of action implies something more than continued existence.

3, 4. | 5. Whatever is created by God depends continually upon him for the continuance of its active powers.

6. If from any constitution of nature whatsoever, there could necessarily arise any act of power independent on the concurrent volition of God, it is difficult to say where that independent power would stop; and for ought appears that being might be omnipotent.

7. The wisest and greatest philosophers have not been able to trace any connection between solidity and gravitation, or motion and thought: therefore a perpetual omnipotent agency seems to be the most probable way of accounting for those otherwise unaccountable phænomena.

*Baxter's Matho, vol. i. Conf. iv. § 44—49.—Baxt. on the Soul, vol. i. § ii. præf. p. 94—101. & note, p. 101—108, 128—139.—Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 300.*

5, 6 and

5, 6 and 7. | 8. *Valet propositio.*

*Virg. Æn. vi. ver. 724, &c.*—*Owen on Sp.*  
*p. 138—140. p. 77. p. 465, 466.*—  
*Camb. Exist. p. 111.*—*Clarke's xvii.*  
*Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. 7. p. 171.*—*Baxt. Works,*  
*vol. ii. p. 15. B. p. 27, A. p. 183. A.*  
*p. 100. B.*—*South's Serm. vol. iii. p. 461.*  
*—Reynolds's Works, p. 7.*—*Jenk. Rea-*  
*son. of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 484.*—  
*Marc. Anton. l. v. c. 40.*—*Abern. vol. i.*  
*Serm. vii. p. 240—244. Lond. Ed. p. 225*  
*—229.*—*Price's Four Dissertations, N<sup>o</sup>.*  
*1.*—*Dr. Stebbing's Discourse on Pro-*  
*vidence.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

To those who allow the universality of divine providence on principles independent on this proposition, which many do, another argument has been proposed; which will stand thus.

1. God must will that any creature should, or should not exist, with any given power, in any given moment; for not to will that it should so exist, would on the present supposition be in effect willing that it should not.

2. If he will that it should not so exist, it will not: otherwise God would not be omnipotent, contrary to *Prop. 31.*

1, 2, 3. | 4. Therefore its existence in such circumstances, *i. e.* its efficacy for producing any effect in question, is owing to the divine volition, *i. e.* to the agency of God in and upon it\*.  
 Q. E. D.

COR-

\* *N. B.* I lay but little stress upon this *second* demonstration, though it once appeared plausible: for perhaps the universality of divine providence cannot be demonstrated on principles independent of this proposition; so that at best it is but *argumentum ad hominem*: and the force of this reasoning may be so probably retorted with respect to the irrational volitions of free creatures,

## COROLLARY I.

LECT. What we generally call *second causes*, are not  
 XXXVII. causes in the strict propriety of speech; and what  
 we call the *laws of nature*, are only certain rules  
 and methods, by which God generally proceeds,  
 in those of his actions which fall under our cog-  
 nizance. Nevertheless, creatures may in an in-  
 ferior sense be called causes, as certain events  
 commonly follow certain changes in their condi-  
 tion and will.

*Boyle's Inq. into Nat. apud—Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 53, 54.—Seed's Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. 5. vol. ii. p. 127, &c.—Cheyne's Princ. part i. § 4. p. 4—6.—Nat. Disp. vol. iv. p. 50—52.—Ramsay's Princ. vol. i. p. 251—255.—Baxt. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 179—181.—Watts's Ontology, p. 329 and 365.—Clarke at Boyle's Lectures, part ii. p. 222. 6th Ed.*

## COROLLARY 2.

It evidently appears that the providence, *i. e.* the notice and care of God extends itself to all events, even the smallest as well as the greatest.  
*Vid. Prop. 27. Dem. 4.*

*Rel. of Nat. p. 95—98.—Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 162—166.—Baxt. on the Soul, p. 182, 183.*

## COROLLARY 3.

We hence learn, into what we are to resolve the power which our minds have of moving our bodies, *viz.* into a divine volition in such and such instances to produce motions in our bodies, correspondent to the volitions of our minds.

creatures, that it seems on the whole best to waive it, and to allow, that even while providence is attentive to an event, there may be a medium between absolutely willing either that it should, or should not exist, which is inconsistent with the first step. D.

To

To this agree the ease and swiftness with which those motions are performed on the act of our will, and the constancy of other involuntary, but always needful motions, which cannot be solved by any mechanical laws. *Prop. 1. Sch. 2.*

*Clarke and Leibnitz, N<sup>o</sup>. v. App.—Clerici Pneum. § 1. c. vi. § 12—16.—Camb. Exist. § 46, 47.—Mattho, vol. i. Conf. 6. § 79.—Seed's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 150.*

## COROLLARY 4.

The wonderful instances of instinct in brutes may most probably be accounted for this way: God, by some unknown impression upon them, moving them to and assisting them in such actions, as on the whole are most convenient; though the rationale depends on principles, which they cannot know. *Def. 19. Cor. 2.*

*Speet. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 120. sub fin. N<sup>o</sup>. 121. sub init.—Camb. Exist. § 23. p. 46—48.—Nat. Disp. vol. i. p. 285, 286. Ed. 2. p. 197, 198.—Mattho, vol. i. Conf. vi. § 82, 83.—Origen adv. Cels. l. iv. p. 217. Seed's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 148, &c.*

## COROLLARY 5.

Hence we infer the absurdity of the doctrine of a *Plastic nature*, which some have thus described. “It is an incorporeal created substance, “endued with a vegetative life, but not with “sensation or thought; penetrating the whole “created universe, being coextended with it; “and under God moving matter, so as to produce the phænomena, which cannot be solved “by mechanical laws: active for ends unknown “to itself, not being expressly conscious of its “actions, and yet having an obscure idea of the “action to be entered upon.”

As the idea itself is most obscure, and indeed inconsistent, so the foundation of it is evidently

weak. It is intended by this, to avoid the inconveniency of subjecting God to the trouble of some changes in the created world, and the meanness of others: but it appears from this proposition, that even upon this hypothesis he would still be the author of them; besides that to omnipotence nothing is troublesome, nor those things mean, when considered as a part of a system, which *alone* might appear to be so.

*Cudw. Int. Syst. book i. c. i. p. 149—172. præf. 178—181.—More's Imm. of the Soul, l. iii. c. 12.—His Philosophical Works, p. 212—215.—Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 51, 52.—Cheyne's Princ. part i. c. i. § 3. p. 3, 4.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. It is objected, that if God be thus the author  
 xxxviii. of all our ideas and of all our motions, then also  
 of all our volitions, which would be inconsistent  
 with that liberty of choice asserted, *Prop. 16.*

*Ans.* On the principles laid down above, the will is not properly an effect of any necessary efficient cause; but rather a tendency towards the production of an effect, so far as we apprehend it to be in our power; (*Prop. 1. gr. 4.*) and for any thing which appears in the objection, or is asserted in the proposition, when all the requisites to volition are supposed, it lies in our own breasts to determine one way or another; and though God, upon such a determination of ours, adds efficacy to the volition, even when it is most foolish and pernicious, that does not properly make him the author of the action. (*Vid. Def. 10.*) And they who suppose a stock of power lodged in the hand of the creature by virtue of its original constitution, (God at the same time knowing in every particular how it will be used,) will labour under the same difficulty in this respect with us; nay, their hypothesis at last will be found

found equivalent to our's: and if we allow that universal presence and inspection of God, which all who are not atheists admit, it will be nearly as difficult to account for his not interposing to prevent such actions, as for his adding efficacy to them in a natural way.

*Camb. Exist.* § 67.—*Howe on Prescience*, § 6, 7. *Op. vol. ii. p. 500—503.*—*Watts's Diff. on Trin. N<sup>o</sup>. 5. p. 142, 143.*—*His Works, vol. vi. p. 604, 605.*—*Mandeville's Free Thoughts, p. 108, 109.*—*Baxt. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 205—210.*—*Collib. Enq. p. 195—198. Ed. 3. p. 235—238.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that if God produces all our ideas by his own impression on the mind, then a material world was not necessary, and consequently it would be unbecoming the nature and character of God to produce it. *Vid. Prop. 31. Cor.*

*Ans. 1.* The denial of any material world at all, according to *Berkley's* and *Collier's* scheme, would remove the foundation of this objection: nevertheless, for reasons which will afterwards be mentioned, we do not chuse to have recourse to that solution; but add,

2. Allowing the creation of a material world to be to us utterly unaccountable on this supposition, we cannot therefore certainly say that it was in vain: and as for its not being absolutely necessary, it will not easily be granted, that any thing that God does, is so.

3. If we grant that God has a power of producing any idea in our minds without an external archetype, (of which dreams seem to be an evident proof, and which is so certainly included in omnipotence that few deny it,) then it will be as hard to account for the creation of the ma-

terial world, as if we admit the proposition to be true.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It is farther objected, that it is a dishonour to the divine being, to suppose him immediately concerned in the most mean and trifling events; and that it would be exceedingly ridiculous, were our discourse commonly to be formed upon the principles of this proposition.

*Anf.* We before (*Cor.* 5.) observed the usefulness and beauty of many things *on the whole*, which, when considered *in themselves*, may appear mean and vile (of which the discharge of the fæces from animal bodies is a remarkable instance :) and we may farther add, that there is no occasion at all for introducing a change in our common forms of speech, seeing there is a sense, in which those things may be said to be the actions of the creatures, which are done by the intermediation of their volition, though not by an active force of their own, at that time independent on the concurrent volition of God (*Cor.* 1.): so that upon the whole, they may be sufficiently distinguished from those, which are, with full propriety and in the highest sense, called the actions of God.

*Crouz. Log. vol. i. p. 436—440, 442.—*  
*Watts's Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. 3. c. iii. § 10—15.*  
*p. 87—90.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

LECT. XXXIX. It is farther objected, that it would be a dishonour to the divine being, that, whereas a common workman can make a machine, which shall go on for some time without his interposition, God should not be able to produce what can operate without his perpetual agency.

To this it is answered, 1, | All human arts are but the means of altering some circumstances in

the form and disposition of matter, which before existed under certain laws, entirely independent on the will of the artist: but it is the peculiar glory of God, to have a whole world of creatures in a perpetual dependance on himself.

2. That when we assert a perpetual divine agency, we readily acknowledge that matters are so contrived, as not to need a divine interposition in a different manner from that in which it had been constantly exerted. And it is most evident, that an unremitting energy, displayed in such circumstances, greatly exalts our idea of God, instead of depressing it; and therefore by the way is so much the more likely to be true. *Vid. Prop 27. Cor. 2.*

3. We may add, that this argument tends to prove, contrary to the opinion of most that have advanced it, that God might make a creature, which should subsist without his supporting presence and agency.

*Burn. on Art. p. 33. Watts's Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. ix. § 2. p. 201—208.—Collib. Inq. p. 195—198. Ed. 3. p. 235—238.—Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 3—7. § 4. p. 13—17. § 4. p. 27—31. § 6—9. p. 43—47. § 6—9. p. 363—365.*

### PROPOSITION XXXIII.

God is a being of perfect KNOWLEDGE: *i. e.* he knows in the most certain and perfect manner whatever can be the object of knowledge, *i. e.* whatever does not imply a contradiction.

#### DEMONSTRATION I.

*Def. 30. Prop. 27. 1.* God is a spirit, *i. e.* a thinking being.

1. 2. God must have some degree of knowledge.

I 3

2. *Def.*

2. *Def.* 28. *Cor.* | 3. There is no reason for setting bounds to his knowledge, *i. e.* he knows all things in the most perfect manner. *Q. E. D.*

## DEMONSTRATION 2.

*Def.* 30. *Prop.* 27. *Prop.* 32. | 1. God has made all the creatures, and continually actuates and supports them.

1. | 2. He must know all that relates to them.

3. He must by consciousness know himself.

2, 3. | 4. He must know all things. *Q. E. D.*

## SCHOLIUM.

To this it may be objected, that there may be some other self-existent creator, and that this being with his creatures may be unknown to God: and it is allowed, that the argument of this second demonstration cannot appear in its full evidence, till we have proved the unity of the Godhead: nevertheless the second step alone would be sufficient to prove, that he knew all things that belong to us; which is that in which we are chiefly concerned.

## DEMONSTRATION 3.

1. Knowledge is an attribute of so great importance, that without it, whatever conceptions we could form of the deity, would be very low and imperfect.

*Prop.* 27. *Cor.* 2. | 2. It is reasonable to conceive of God in the most honourable manner.

1, 2. | 3. It is reasonable to conceive of God as a being of great knowledge; and to remove from our idea of him, as much as possible, all degrees of error, ignorance and uncertainty.

4. There is no apparent reason for limiting his knowledge, so as to exclude from it any thing which can be the object of intelligence, to us or any other being.

3, 4. | 5. It

3, 4. | 5. It is reasonable to conclude that he is a being of perfect knowledge. Q. E. D.

*Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 248—252.*

*Nº. 11.—Wilk. Nat. Rel. p. 124—128.*

*—Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 599, 600, 602, 603,*

*609—611.—Howe's Works, vol. i. p.*

*102, 103.—Abernetby, vol. i. Nº. 9.*

*p. 290—306.*

SCHOLIUM.

That God is a being of boundless knowledge as well as power, was the opinion of the wisest heathens; as appears from the custom of swearing, as well as from many passages quoted from their writers in the references above.

COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears that God knows all the secrets of the heart, and therefore is most able to judge of the real characters of men.

COROLLARY 2.

It appears that any hypocrisy, when we are dealing with him, or addressing to him, is very great folly, though it may be most artfully disguised.

DEFINITION XXXII.

A SPIRIT is said to be PRESENT IN ANY PLACE, when it is capable of perceiving and immediately operating upon the body which fills that place, or on spirits united to such bodies, *i. e.* spirits perceiving and acting by them.

LECT.  
XL.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

God is OMNIPRESENT, *i. e.* present in every place.

DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 33. | 1.* God perceives the changes of bodies in whatever place they are, and of all spirits united to them.

*Prop.* 31. | 2. He is capable of operating upon them.

3. It is much more honourable to God, to conceive of him as present in all places, than as excluded from any.

1, 2, 3. *Def.* 32. and 28. *Cor.* 2. | 4. God is omnipresent. *Q. E. D.*

*Howe, ib. vol. i. p. 100—110.—Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 756, 757.—Collib. Inq. p. 71, 72. Ed. 3. p. 84, 85.—Abern. vol. i. Serm. vii.—SpeEt. vol. viii. N<sup>o</sup>. 565, 571.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

The first of these arguments only proves that God is where any of his creatures are; and it is only on supposition that there is *but one* God, that it will follow from hence, that he is every where. But it is to be remembered, that the argument, *Def.* 28. *Cor.* if allowed, will prove, that what can by a necessity of its own nature act upon a body in *any* place, may by a necessity of its nature act upon bodies in *every* place; which will be so far a proof of God's omnipresence, independent on his unity: and if it be his property to fill space, he must for the same reason fill all space.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

It is a great question, whether God be so present as to fill space. This depends upon another question, whether it be the property of an immaterial spirit to fill space: with reference to which I must confess, that when I conceive of spirit as diffused through any part of space, I immediately conceive of it as something *corporeal*; and consequently cannot conceive how it can be asserted of the Divine Being, by those who grant his immateriality, as most of the patrons of this doctrine

doctrine do. But this will be more largely considered below.

*Newt. Princip. p. 483.—Saur. Serm. vol. ii. p. 60—64.—Watts's Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. vi. § 5. p. 165—169.—Ramsf. Phil. Princ. Prop. viii. vol. i. p. 57—72.*

### DÉFINITION XXXIII.

An event not come to pass is said to be **CONTINGENT**, which either may, or may not be. What is already done, is said to *have been contingent*, if it might or might not have been.

#### COROLLARY 1.

Contingency is opposed to *necessity* not to *certainity*: for that is said to be certain, which will be, without considering whether it be necessary or not.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 100. p. 95. Edit. 6th.*

#### COROLLARY 2.

There are in fact various things, which are in their nature contingent; for such are all the actions of free creatures, considered as free. *Vid. Def. 22. and Prop. 16.*

*Watts's Ont. c. iii. p. 331—333.—Hutcheson's Metaph. part 1. c. 4. § 2. p. 23—25.*

### PROPOSITION XXXV.

Future contingencies are known to God.

*N. B.* Though this be comprehended in *Prop. 33.* yet we shall here give a distinct demonstration of it, because it has been so much controverted, and so much of what follows depends upon it.

### DEMONSTRATION.

**I.** So much depends upon future contingencies, that if they be unknown to God, almost every

every thing relating to those of his creatures which are free agents must be unknown to him too; so that our ideas of the divine knowledge and perfection will by this means be very much diminished.

2. Wise and sagacious men are capable of making very probable conjectures of future events; and therefore it seems dishonourable to deny that God has a power of forming an unerring judgment concerning them.

3. If God does not foreknow future contingencies, he is daily growing more and more knowing, in a prodigious and incomparable degree beyond any of his creatures; which would be inconsistent with his immutability, and therefore contrary to *Prop. 3. Cor.*

1, and 2, and 3. | 4. *Valet propositio.*

*Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 103—104.—*

*Rel. of Nat. p. 99—102.—Tillotf. vol.*

*ii. p. 605, 606.—Clarke's Post. Serm.*

*vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. 11. p. 258—268.—Abern.*

*vol. i. Serm. ix. p. 313—323.*

#### COROLLARY.

God always wills the same thing; for whatever appears to him eligible in any circumstances which actually are, must always have appeared eligible on the foresight of those circumstances, *i. e.* he must always have willed it; supposing, what we shall hereafter endeavour to prove, that his will is always agreeable to reason, and never changed without it.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. XLI. If it should hereafter be proved on the one hand, that God has foretold the evil actions of his creatures, and on the other, that he could not have made them necessary; then it will appear that this proposition is true in fact, whatever plausible objections may be raised against it.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

The principal objection to the proposition is, that certainly to foreknow contingencies is a contradiction; since nothing can be the object of knowledge, but what exists in itself or in its necessary cause: and consequently to deny their being known to God is no more limiting his knowledge, than it limits his power to own he is not able to do what is self-contradictory.

To this we answer, that the *certainty* of an event does not imply *necessity* (*Def. 33. Cor. 1.*); and consequently, that there may be a foundation for certain foresight, where the event itself is contingent; or in other words, the thing will not be because God foresees it, but God foresees it because it will certainly be. It may be added, that not to be able to do a contradiction, is in effect no limitation of the power of God, because a power to effect a contradiction is indeed no power at all. (*Prop. 31. Schol.*) But not to know what the will of a free creature will determine; is indeed a limitation of knowledge, or in other words, a difficulty, with which the divine understanding (if the proposition be denied) is puzzled and confounded.

It must be acknowledged, that the method, by which God foresees these contingencies, is unknown; for I think it not safe to say, as some do, that the mind is so constituted, that it does always in fact, though not necessarily, determine itself according to the preponderancy of the motive offered to it; which, if it were granted, would not be a certain foundation of prescience; since if this scheme could be reconciled with the doctrine of liberty as stated *Prop. 16.* yet it would subject the divine being to a possibility of error in every particular, and in all the schemes depending upon each. We are sure by *Prop. 33.* that God knows all things that actually are,  
whereas

whereas our own knowledge is limited to a very narrow sphere; and therefore, since we are sure the divine understanding does in that instance entirely exceed our comprehension, why may we not as well allow that it may exceed it in the manner of foreknowing future contingencies; or where is it we may more reasonably suppose the human mind to be puzzled, than when it would attempt to explain the method of divine knowledge?

*Crellius de Deo*, p. 67, 68. *ap. Op. vol. iv.*  
 —*Collib. Inq. p. 91. Ed. 3. p. 106—*  
 109—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 100—*  
 104.—*Rel. of Nat. p. 102, 103.*—*Til-*  
*lotf. vol. ii. p. 606—608.*—*Howe's*  
*Works, vol. i. p. 104—106. vol. ii.*  
*p. 503, 504.*—*More's Enchir. l. iii.*  
*c. ii. § 2.*—*Lettres Pers. vol. i. N°. 56.*  
 —*Jackson on human Liberty, p. 50—76.*

### SCHOLIUM 3.

To the second step it is answered, God may indeed form very probable conjectures, vastly beyond the reach of any human sagacity, though he cannot certainly foreknow the event.

To this the principal reply is, that to suppose God always in doubt, and ever liable to be mistaken, seems inconsistent with the perfections of his nature, and is a less honourable way of conceiving of him; especially if we consider, that as an event lies more and more distant, the possibility of an error in each intermediate circumstance will so much affect the rest, that in a little time there may be upon complicated schemes almost a total darkness. But should it ever appear that he has actually and positively without any hesitation foretold future contingent events, and that he has even put the evidence of his true divinity upon such predictions, that would abundantly confirm the second argument: nor would the

the

the hypothesis of a constant though not necessary determination of the will according to motives, (*Schol. 1.*) be sufficient to vindicate such a conduct; since still there was in every instance at least a possibility of mistake.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

To step the third it is objected, that such a change as is there supposed is not inconsistent with the immutability of the divine being; seeing his nature and attributes are still the same, though his ideas are supposed to be different at different times. But it is answered, this is only a partial immutability: whereas the arguments that prove the immutability of God in general will not admit of such a change in the divine views and purposes, as must be involved in the ignorance of future contingent events.

*Collib. Inq. p. 56, 57. Ed. 3. 66, 67.*---

*Ridgley's Div. vol. i. p. 62\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It seems strange, that many who grant the universal foreknowledge of what *will actually be*, should deny what they call *scientia media*, or hypothetical prescience, *i. e.* the knowledge of what would follow upon some certain suppositions, which are not fact; *v. g.* how king *George* would have acted, if he had been emperor of *Germany*, or the emperor, if he had been king of *Great Britain*; or how any child who died in infancy would have behaved, if he had grown up to manhood. To object, that this would suppose the divine mind filled with a variety of vain speculations, is very inconclusive; for it is

\* The question, whether future contingencies are known to God, unavoidably enters into the grand controversy concerning the Liberty or Necessity of the human Will. Accordingly, it will be found to have been more or less discussed in the authors to whom we have referred under the sixteenth proposition.

difficult

difficult to say, how God could in any instance select any scheme as best, if he had not a view of others with which he might be compared.

*Le Blanc's Thef. p. 454—458.—Juvenal's Sat. x. ver. 350—354.*

### DEFINITION XXXIV.

LECT. That being is said to be SPECULATIVELY WISE, XLII. who is able rightly to determine and judge of the relation of means to their respective ends, and the value and importance of those ends with respect to the person by whom they are pursued; and that being is said to be PRACTICALLY WISE, who determines his own choice in a manner agreeable to such right views, so as that his own greatest happiness may be most effectually promoted, if it be not yet perfect, and maintained, if it be.

#### COROLLARY 1.

A being of great sagacity, who in some instances chuses excellent ends and right means, yet neglects the greatest of all, may be said to have a partial practical, as well as speculative wisdom, yet must on the whole be accounted foolish.

#### COROLLARY 2.

Speculative wisdom is a part of knowledge.

### PROPOSITION XXXVI.

God is possessed of the highest degree both of speculative and practical wisdom.

### DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 27. Lem. to Dem. 3. and Dem. 4.* | 1. We can conceive no more exquisite degrees of wisdom, than are displayed in the formation and preservation of the world, where we evidently see a most astonishing subordination of means to ends, rising through numberless degrees, in

which the most penetrating human understanding is soon swallowed up.

2. We see nothing upon which we can with certainty pronounce that it is on the whole foolish, because we know not what its connection may be, and what end it may subserve.

*Pope's Essay on Man.*

1, 2. | 3. So far as we can judge from fact, God is speculatively wise.

*Def.* 34. *Cor.* 2. *Prop.* 33. | 4. Speculative wisdom being included in knowledge, which was before proved to belong to God, another argument arises independent on the former.

3 and 4. | 5. God is possessed of the highest degree of speculative wisdom.

6. To chuse and act, with an utter disregard to his own felicity, when known, (as by the preceding step he must know the most certain methods of maintaining it,) would be a character in a rational agent so unaccountable, and in so peculiar a manner unworthy of deity, that nothing could be more dishonourable than to ascribe it to him.

5—6. | 7. *Valet propositio.*

*Wilk. Nat. Rel.* p. 128, 129.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 106, 107.—*Tillotson's vol. ii.* p. 617, 618.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 65, 66. *Ed.* 3. p. 77, 78.—*Abern.* vol. i. *Serm.* x.

#### COROLLARY.

Philosophical liberty belongs to God in the most perfect degree; for that is indeed no other than the practical wisdom here defined: *Vid. Def.* 24. and that liberty of action belongs to him, appears from comparing *Def.* 23. with *Prop.* 31.

## SCHOLIUM.

It may be objected, that it is dishonourable to the divine being, to suppose that one thing can be more congruous to his happiness than another. To this we reply, that we most readily acknowledge, that it would be very absurd (for reasons afterwards to be mentioned) to suppose, that the divine felicity depended on the existence of his creatures, or on any action of theirs. Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe, that the divine nature is such, that unspeakable delight must arise to himself from some methods of acting, which so perfect an understanding cannot but approve; and that on the other hand, different methods of acting must appear to him the objects of aversion, as being in themselves absurd, contemptible and mean; *v. g.* for him to do homage to any of his creatures, as more excellent than himself; or to make a creature merely to torment it. It is so far from being dishonourable to God, to suppose his happiness inseparably connected with certain methods of acting rather than others, that we could think of nothing more reproachful, than to represent him as so arbitrary a being, that of all possible methods of acting which might be proposed to him, it would be as congruous to his nature and happiness to chuse one as the other.

*Fost. Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. 5.*

## PROPOSITION XXXVII.

LECT. XLIII. To enquire how far natural liberty belongs to God. *Vid. Def. 21.*

## SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Whenever any thing is more congruous to the divine felicity than another, God certainly chuses it, nor can we suppose him to do otherwise; for that were inconsistent with his wisdom, and therefore contrary to *Prop. 36.*

2. Never-

2. Nevertheless, when of many things which might be proposed any one is equally congruous to his felicity with the rest, in this he has a natural freedom of choice; and it seems that many things are indeed of such a nature. Now that this liberty is to be ascribed to him, appears from its being found in the human mind, and its being a perfection in its degree. *Prop.* 16. *Schol.* 5.

*Watts on Lib.* § 4. *Prop.* 11, 12, 14, 15.—*Traacts*, vol. iv. p. 41, 42, 44—48.—*Works*, vol. vi. p. 389—391.—*Grove on Wisd.* p. 24—26, 30—37.

## SCHOLIUM.

It is objected, that it is a reflection upon infinite wisdom, to suppose that God does not always chuse that one scheme which is of all others the best, *i. e.* the most congruous to his felicity.

It is replied, the objection goes upon the supposition that there is one fitter than the rest, which is begging the question. If it be enquired, whether God could not contrive such a scheme; it is answered, that we most readily allow, that he might form a scheme, fitter than the best which any created understanding could contrive; but to say, he could not form another equal to that, is speaking without proof: nor does it appear, that it would be any honour to divine wisdom to maintain it, more than to say, that having made one human face exceeding beautiful, it should be impossible for him to make another, whose beauty should on the whole be equal to it, even though some of the features were different: and when God chuses one of those many things than which nothing could be fitter and nothing better, he may agreeably to the common forms of speech be said to chuse the fittest and the best. Nevertheless we must acknowledge, that when

we weak creatures speak of the divine wisdom, we speak of what is to us an unsearchable thing\*.

*Price's Four Dissertations, Edit. 1. p. 121. Note.*

### PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

God is infinitely happy.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 36.* 1. His wisdom always enables him to know, and engages him to chuse what is most conducive to his happiness.

*Prop. 31.* 2. Being omnipotent, he is always able to do whatever he chuses, and above the possibility of being disturbed or hurt by any being whatsoever.

To suppose the divine happiness dependent on any creature, would be most absurd; for then before that creature was produced, he must have been unhappy: and as he had eternally existed before the production of that creature, he must have been eternally unhappy, *i. e.* of all other beings the most unhappy, which it would be most dishonourable and groundless to imagine.

1, 2 and 3. 4. God is infinitely happy. Q. E. D.

*Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 586—588.—Serm. 78.*

*p. 516, 517. Edit. 4.—Collib. Inq. p.*

*57—59. Ed. 3. p. 67—69.*

#### SCHOLIUM.

It may be asked, why does God act at all, if he be, as the proposition supposes, perfectly happy previously to action.

To this we may answer, that the divine being may find some unknown delight in those voli-

\* A doctrine very opposite to that of the text is maintained by Mr. Cooper in his Philosophical Essays.

tions, by which he communicates being and happiness to his creatures; nor does this suppose any change in him, since it is reasonable to believe he always wills the same thing; (*Prop. 35. Cor.*) viz. that at such times and in such circumstances beings should exist; and being secure of the execution of his volitions, (*Prop. 31. Cor.*) whatever delight he can be supposed to have in the actual production and happiness of those beings, he must have had in the purpose of producing them: so that in this respect, things that are not, are to him as if they were. And if it be said, that there is a change in him, when in consequence of his volition those creatures are produced, he being now their creator, supporter, benefactor, &c. which he was not before, it is answered, this is no change in *him*; a change of relations necessarily arising from the very idea of a creator, and being perfectly consistent with the highest conceivable immutability; else God is changing in numberless instances every moment, as the relations of his creatures change.

And if it were to be allowed, that we find some degree of *uneasiness* attending the desire necessary to produce action in *us*, which however seems not to be wholly the case, yet we could not thence argue, that it must be so with regard to *all* created beings; much less can we assert it of God, in whose volitions and motives of action, we must after all acknowledge there is something which we cannot fully explain.

*Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 505.*

### PROPOSITION XXXIX.

There is no self-existent being besides that, LECT.  
whose existence and attributes we have demon- XLIV.  
strated above. ~~~~~

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. If there were any other self-existent being, besides that whose existence we have demonstrated, he must in all respects be equal to him; for otherwise it would be natural to suppose some derivation or dependency, inconsistent with self-existence, and consequently with the hypothesis.

2. To suppose such another being, is to limit the omnipotence of God; for (not to plead God's supposed incapacity to annihilate or change him; because it may be said, that admitting him to be self-existent, this would be a contradiction, and therefore an incapacity of effecting it no limitation of power; nor to insist upon his inability to controul him on account of the supposed omnipotence of this other being, to which the same thought may be applied,) it seems he would be unable to act without his consent, at least tacitly implied. And if their volitions should in any respect contradict each other, which in things indifferent they might at least very possibly do, the one would be a restraint upon the other, and so neither would be omnipotent.

1.3. It would be impossible for God to conceal any of his counsels or purposes from the knowledge of such a being, which would in some degree derogate from his majesty: or if it were allowed, that he might conceal any thing from that other being, that other being might by a parity of reason conceal some things from him, and consequently he would not be omniscient; nay, supposing this being to be infinite, the number and variety of things so concealed might surpass any expression or imagination of ours.

4. It is a much greater glory to be the highest of all beings, than to be only one of a number of equals; now this supremacy of God would be destroyed

destroyed by the supposition of an equal, especially when it is considered, that no one can say how many they might be, for we might allow two millions as well as two.

2, 3, 4-|5. It would be much less honourable to God, to suppose any such other being as himself, than to suppose the contrary.

6. The unity of design, which seems to prevail in the works of nature, makes it reasonable to believe it had but one author, and that he operated in an uncontrouled manner\*.

7. There is no reason from the light of nature to conclude, that there are any more deities than one, or indeed to *imagine* there are any more; since one almighty and all-wise being can do as much as a thousand such beings can do; and if any revelation of it be pretended, it will be examined in its proper place.

*Gr. 5. Prop. 27. Cor. 2. gr. 6 and 7.*|8. It is reasonable to believe, there is no self-existent being, besides that one, whose existence and attributes we have already demonstrated. *Q. E. D.*

*Wilkin Nat. Rel. p. 113, 114.—Burn. on Art. p. 23, 24.—Clerici Pneum. Sect. iii. c. x. § 2—4.—Locke's Fam. Lett. p. 412—415.—Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 72, 73.—Living Temple, 8vo. vol. i. p. 226—228.—Grot. de Verit. l. i. c. iii. —Lactant. Instit. l. i. c. ii.—Abern. vol. i. Serm. v. præf. p. 164—177.—Priestley's Institutes, vol. i.—Letters to philosophical Unbelievers, part i.*

\* Though Abernethy's Sermons are referred to, it may not be amiss to remark, that he has stated the proof of the Unity of God, arising from the Unity of Design in the Works of Nature, with more force and advantage than has been done by almost any other writer. Mr. Lowman, in the tract formerly mentioned, has endeavoured to produce a strict demonstration of the Unity, as well as the Being of a God, from the argument a priori.

## SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. XLV. It is readily acknowledged, that these arguments, as well as many by which the foregoing proposition has been proved, do not arise to full demonstration: yet they carry a very strong degree of probability, in which the mind must acquiesce till farther proof can be offered from other principles.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

*Limborch* objects, that this proof is built on the supposition, that God is a being of all possible perfections: we reply, it goes on the supposition, that we are to conceive of him in the most honourable manner that we can; and it seems enough, if we can prove that it is dishonourable to the deity to suppose a plurality.

*Locke's Lett. p. 424—428.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

To the argument *gr. 6.* it is objected,

1. That we cannot see how far the unity of design is preserved, unless we knew the whole system.

2. That so far as we can judge by the specimen we have, it seems that unity of design is not preserved, since there is a mixture of good and evil; which makes it probable that there must be at least two self-existent beings, the one evil, and the other good.

To the first of these we answer, that we must judge by analogy in this respect as in many others; and particularly, that the unity of the divine being stands thus far on the same footing with his wisdom, which can only be proved from a comprehensive view of the whole scheme, and must be left an uncertain thing, by all created understandings, if the reasoning in the objection be admitted. As to the second, it will be more fully answered below: for the present it may be sufficient

sufficient to observe, that the quantity of good, being so much greater than of evil, there is no reason to believe two equal beings, one entirely benevolent, the other entirely malevolent; which yet must be the hypothesis, if the phænomena referred to could grow into an objection against the proposition.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Grove* argues the truth of the proposition, from our having no revelation of more deities than one; whereas if there were more, every one of them would be the reasonable object of veneration from all other beings, even though no benefits were conferred; and consequently any one wise self-existent being would reveal to all his creatures the general knowledge of his associates, that they might pay them all due veneration. But we do not chuse to insist upon this, because it depends upon those moral perfections of the deity, which we have not yet demonstrated; and might be liable to some objection, even if those moral perfections were granted.

*Grove's Post. Works, vol. iv. p. 27—29.*

*See also p. 85.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It seems not improper here to mention some other arguments, which have been urged by writers of considerable note, which yet appear not to carry along with them equal conviction with the former.

*Arg. 1.* *Clarke* and *Colliber* argue from the nature of *self-existence*, which is *simple, uniform, and universal*; whereas all *variety* must arise from some external cause, be dependent on it, and proportionable to the efficacy of it. But to this it is objected, that if it were allowed that extension and duration were not, (as Dr. *Clarke* supposes,) properties of God, (which if they are,

they are undoubtedly *distinct* properties,) yet *intelligence* and *volition*, which all allow in the deity, may be considered as various things: how then shall we account for this variety in him? or if we say he is, what the schoolmen called, *purus putus Aëtus*, what idea shall we fix to those hard words?

Clarke at Boyle's *Lect.* p. 46.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 26, 27. *Ed.* 3. p. 30—32.

*Arg. 2.* Tillotson and Clarke both argue, that if there were another self-existent being, then the existence of God would not be necessary, nay, that this would introduce atheism; for no one of the supposed number would be necessary, *i. e.* there would be no God: for you might suppose any one of them not to exist, if the other would suffice to account for all the phænomena of nature. But I confess this argument seems to me to arise from the ambiguity of the word *necessary*: in one place, it signifies what is *hypothetically* necessary, *i. e.* necessary in order to solve some apparent phænomena; in the other, it signifies *underived*.

Clarke at Boyle's *Lect.* p. 46, 47, 459—461, 463, 464, 466, 467, 470.—*Tillotson* vol. i. p. 491, 492.

*Arg. 3.* Wollaston argues, (as Mr. Locke has done in the preceding references) that if two or more such beings as we have described be supposed, their natures must be supposed either the same or different; if different, they must be contrary, or various; if contrary, each must destroy the operations of the other; if various, one must have what the other wants; both therefore cannot be perfect: but if their nature be perfectly the same, then they would coincide, and indeed be but one, though called two. But this latter branch of the argument seems not to be self-evident: for ought appears, they might  
be

be *specifically*, though not *identically* the same: and if it be self-evident, it supercedes all the former part of the argumentation, amounting indeed to nothing less than an assertion, that the existence of two all-perfect beings is a contradiction in terms.

*Rel. of Nat. p. 70, 71.*

All these arguments, with those mentioned in the proposition, are stated and urged in

*Camb. of Exist. p. 236—246. § 61, 62.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

If upon the whole that God, whose existence and attributes have been the subject of our former enquiries, were only a co-ordinate deity, and the God of our own system, he would nevertheless be the supreme object of our reverence, gratitude and obedience.

*Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 100, 101.—Living Temple, part i. c. vi. § 6. vol. i. p. 326—329.*

SCHOLIUM 7.

That several of the wiser heathens, notwithstanding the tales of their priests and their poets, believed the existence of one supreme deity, appears from many passages in their writings: and if the word *God*, wherever we find it used, were always to be considered, as signifying a being of all possible perfections, it would be difficult to prove, that there ever was such a thing as polytheism in the heathen world. It is the opinion of the learned and ingenious Dr. *Warburton*, that the mysteries of the *greater initiation*, among the heathens, was the discovery of the doctrine of the divine unity to the wiser part of the people: agreeably to which he supposes, that the song ascribed to *Orpheus*, preserved by *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Eusebius*, was the very hymn used upon that occasion. That of *Cleanthes* (see *Cudworth's*

worth's *Int. Syst.* p. 432, 433, and *West's Pindar*) must be allowed in the strongest sense to speak this language; and is perhaps the finest piece of pure and unadulterated natural religion, to be found in the whole heathen world\*.

*Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. i. l. ii. § 4. p. 131—160. *Ed.* 1.—*Tillard's Reply to Warb.* c. iv. p. 248—272.—*Ab. Taylor of Faith, Not.* p. 12—17.—*Sykes's Connect.* c. xiv. p. 364—383. *præf.* 364, 365.—*Cud. Int. Syst.* c. iv. § 10—31. *præf.* § 19—28. p. 184—186.—*Lact. Inst.* l. i. § 5.

### A X I O M XI.

LECT. Our idea of SPACE is a simple idea, which we  
 XLVI. get by observing the distance of one body from  
 another.

*Locke's Eff.* l. ii. c. xiii. § 2—4.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 213. *Ed.* 3. p. 256, 257.

### DEFINITION XXXV.

The PLACE of a body, is its situation with respect to some other body, with which it is compared.

*Watts's Ontology,* p. 380. *Edit.* 3.

### COROLLARY I.

According to the different surrounding bodies brought into comparison, any body under consideration may be said to continue in the same place, or be removed from it.

*Locke's Eff.* l. ii. c. xiii. § 7—9.

\* Dr. Warburton's opinion is disputed by Dr. John Leland, in his great work on the Christian Revelation, vol. i. chap. 8, 9.—For the sentiments of the several sects of the ancient philosophers concerning the Deity, recourse may be had to Brucker and Enfield. An account of different Treatises of Meiners relative to the same subject, may be seen in the Monthly Review, vol. liii. p. 176. vol. liv. p. 485. vol. lv. p. 469; and in Maty's Review, vol. vi. p. 378—390. 428—437.

## COROLLARY 2.

The universe has no place.

*Locke ib. § 10.*

## PROPOSITION XL.

Space is a mere abstract idea; and does not signify any thing which has a real and positive existence without us.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. Space is either something real and existing without us, or a mere abstract idea.

2. If space be something really existing without us, it is either a mode or a substance.

3. If space be a mode, it must be a mode of some substance, and this substance must be co-extended with space; and the great question will be, how space differs from the substance whose mode it is said to be, or how that can be said to be a mode which, if it exists at all, exists necessarily, and is so far from depending upon any support, that it is itself the support of accidents, such as length, breadth, capacity, &c.

3.4. Space is not a mode.

5. If space be a substance, it must be God: for those who assert its reality maintain, (as they needs must do) that it is self-existent, infinite, and immutable; and we have already proved (*Prop. 39.*) God to be the only self-existent, infinite and immutable being.

6. Space cannot be God; since mere space has neither wisdom nor power, and we have already proved God to be both omniscient and omnipotent. *Prop. 31, 33.*

5, 6.7. Space is not a substance.

1, 2, 4, 7.8. Space is a mere abstract idea, and does not signify any thing real and positive existing without us. *Q. E. D.*

*Locke's*

*Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xiii. § 17, 18.—Collib. Inq. p. 218. Ed. 3. p. 261—263.—Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 39, 40.—Watts's Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. i. § 2—5. p. 3—18. § 7. p. 23—25.—Rel. of Nat. p. 74, 75.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

By what operation of the mind, Dr. *Waterland* apprehends the idea of space to be formed; and what he thinks the foundation of our mistaking it for something real, see in

*Waterland ap. Law's Inq. p. 14—16.—Fackf. Exist. p. 75, 76.—Law ib. p. 26, 27, 30—33.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

To the proposition it is objected, that space is a simple idea, and therefore must have an *objective* reality.

To this some have answered, by denying that the idea of space is simple; since we necessarily conceive of it, as having *partes extra partes*: but it is more justly replied, that bare *privation* is sufficient to suggest positive ideas, as darkness and silence, though they have nothing of an *objective* reality.

*Fackf. on Exist. and Unity, p. 63—69.—Law's Inq. p. 33, 34.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It is said, that space forces its actual existence upon us.

*Ans.* If its idea forces itself upon us, it is only as mere emptiness: nor can we certainly argue the real existence of a thing, merely from our not being able to avoid the idea of it, or to suppose it not to be.

*Fackson ib. p. 69—73.—Law ib. p. 44—46. & p. 8—12.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It is farther objected, that *nothing* has no properties; whereas we talk of the properties of space, and settle its dimensions as well as those of body.

We reply, (as above, *Schol.* 2.) that we sometimes talk of mere abstract ideas, as if they were real beings; and though a shadow be only a privation of light, yet we often speak of it as a positive thing.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 16, 17.—*  
*Watts's Ess. l. i. § 8. p. 25—28. and*  
*§ 10. p. 31—39.—Jacks. ib. p. 77—81.*  
*—Law's Inq. p. 48—50.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther argued, that space is necessarily infinite, and therefore real.

*Ans.* This takes the question for granted: for this infinity supposes its reality; else, wherever body is, space is excluded: nor do we allow that our idea of space is *infinite*, though it may be *ever growing*: the same argument would prove number to be infinite, which seems a great absurdity at first view.

*Jacks. ib. p. 81—88.—Law's Inq. p. 54*  
*—65.*

## SCHOLIUM 6.

If space were not real, it is said there could be no *motion*, because no space to move in.

*Ans.* A body might move on to infinity; for there would be nothing to stop it; and since motion is only a change of place, *i. e.* in the situation of bodies with respect to each other, (*Def.* 35.) there needs no such medium through which the change should be made.

*Jacks. ib. p. 88—92.—Law ib. p. 65—*  
*88.*

To this Mr. *Jackson* answers, that according to this account of motion, God could not move the whole material creation in a strait line. To which Mr. *Law* replies, with *Leibnitz*, that this would not be real motion, since it is neither going to nor from any thing, but is still in the centre of infinite space. If it be said, it relates to the various parts of real space, the body going from one point of it to another; it is answered, that this is evidently taking the whole question for granted; and that a motion in a mere void is as conceivable, as a motion in a void space supposed ever so real. After all, the whole seems to amount to little more than a controversy about the definition of *motion*.

*Jackson ib. p. 93—95.—Law ib. p. 68—70.—Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 57. § 5. p. 79. § 4. p. 99. § 13. p. 133. § 13. p. 307. § 52, 53.*

#### SCHOLIUM 7.

It is farther objected, that supposing two bodies a yard asunder, and all intervening bodies annihilated, if space be nothing, they would be contiguous, since in that case there would be nothing between them.

*Ans.* To be *contiguous*, and to have *nothing between them*, are not synonymous terms. To be *contiguous*, signifies to *touch* one another; which is not a necessary consequence of their having nothing between them.

*Watts's Eff. N°. 1. § II. p. 39—43.—Jackson. ib. p. 92.—Law ib. p. 50—53.*

#### COROLLARY.

It is matter of humiliation, to think that there should be such weakness and darkness in the mind of man, that some of the greatest geniuses should

should dispute whether space be *God*, or whether it be *nothing*.

*Watts ib. N<sup>o</sup>. 1. § 6. p. 20—23.—Ramsf. Phil. Princ. Prop. 24. Schol. 2.*

## SCHOLIUM 8.

It seems that *time* is an abstract idea, as well as space: having gotten the idea of it from some things in a constant succession, we conceive it to flow uniformly on, and to take in all existences; thus it becomes a kind of common receptacle, as well as space. But many of the same arguments brought for and against the reality of space, may also be applied to that of time. Vid. *Ax. 6, 7. Def. 17.*

*Law's Inq. p. 79, 80.—Jacks. ib. p. 76. —Watts's Ontology, ch. xii. on Time, and ch. iv. on Duration.—Soame Jenyns's Disquisitions, Dissertation the 4th.*

## A X I O M XII.

It is impossible for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time. Vid. *Def. 3.*

LECT.

XLVII.

## PROPOSITION XLI.

God is incorporeal or immaterial.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 23.*|1. Materiality has already been proved incompatible with self-existence, therefore God being self-existent must be incorporeal.

*Prop. 32. Ax. 12.*|2. If God were corporeal, he could not be present in any part of the world, where body is: yet we have proved his presence to be continually necessary for the support and motion of body.

1, 2.|3. God is incorporeal. Q. E. D.

*Clarke's Serm. vol. i. p. 98. Oct.—Taylor of Deism, p. 259, 260.*

## COROLLARY.

God is invisible.

*Abern. Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. iv.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

The chief objection which has been urged against the proposition is, that unless God were corporeal, we could not imagine that he should produce body, since nothing can give what it has not. It is answered, that we grant nothing can produce an effect more excellent than itself; (*Ax. 10.*) but to be corporeal is not a greater excellency and perfection than to be incorporeal, but rather the contrary: nor would our conceptions of God's producing matter be at all helped by conceiving of him as material; unless that production were only making some alteration in the form and situation of some parts of himself, which is far from being the idea of creation: and indeed on the whole, creation is a thing of which we can form no distinct idea, whether we suppose the creator on the one hand, or the creature on the other, corporeal, or incorporeal.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Some who allow the immateriality of the divine being contend, that though it is impossible one body should penetrate another, yet it is not impossible that an immaterial being should penetrate body, for their natures will still be distinct; and the preeminence of the divine nature above all corporeal or derived natures is such, that there is not an equal reality in both, as there is in two particles of matter, which hinder them from coming into the same place.

*Ans.* Though we easily perceive what it is for a subtil fluid to penetrate a body rarer than itself, *v. g.* for water to fill the pores of a sponge, yet this does not help our ideas, when we apply  
penetration

penetration to an incorporeal substance; and it seems altogether as reasonable to suppose that an immaterial being moves bodies by contact, as that it does in a proper sense penetrate them. If that penetration mean no more, than that God can act in and upon every particle of matter where or however situated, this will be readily granted; but this seems not to be what is contended for by Mr. *Colliber*. On the whole, considering the immateriality of God, if any thing be asserted concerning his omnipresence, beyond what is expressed, *Def.* 32, it is to us mysterious and incomprehensible.

*Collib. Inq.* p. 218—221. *Ed.* 3. p. 263—265.—*Watts's Ont.* c. xii. p. 377—379.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Notwithstanding what has been asserted in the former corollary, it may be allowed possible for God to manifest himself to his creatures, by presenting some material phenomenon to their senses, and thereby communicating ideas to them: yet in this case, it is only in a secondary and less proper sense, that we may be said to see God, or hear his voice.

*Burnet on Art.* p. 25.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Some who have maintained that God is so present as actually to fill space, have differed in explaining the extent of that presence. Sir *Isaac Newton* and Dr. *Clarke* argue, that infinite space is possessed by him; but *Colliber* denies it: and though he maintains that the divine being penetrates all space, yet, as he denies the infinity of real space, he also denies the infinite extension of the divine being, and by a parity of reason, the infinity of the other properties of his nature: and as many of his thoughts are uncommon, it

will not be amiss to subjoin some account of the arguments on both sides\*.

*Newton's Princ.* p. 483.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 141, 142. *Ed.* 3. p. 170, 171.—*Mrs. Cockburne's Works*, vol. i. p. 400—402.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It appears, by the forementioned references to *Colliber*, that he denies God to be *infinite*, in our sense of infinity; for to have no bounds, is to be in its own nature incapable of end, which is the explication he gives of *positive* and *absolute infinity*. (Vid. *Def.* 28.) How far he is consistent with himself, in denying this, while he grants what he calls a *negative infinity*, may be afterwards considered. It is however apparent, that if he keeps to his own idea, in denying the infinity of God, he in effect asserts, that there are certain bounds, beyond which the extension, power, knowledge, &c. of the divine being do not exist: and indeed in his late treatise, which he calls, *The Knowledge of God*, he very evidently avows it, when he confesses that the deity must have some figure, and intimates it may probably be spherical.

*Collib. Knowledge of God*, p. 22—24.

\* “*Colliber*,” says Dr. Savage, in a note, “in his Denial of God’s Immensity, is not new. It was denied by Socinus and his followers, (see Socini Opera, tom. i. p. 685.) and by Vaortus, though not a Socinian. Compare Turretini Institutiones, locus iii. quest. 8, 9, vol. i. p. 213, 221. Geneva edition. *Colliber* seems to want clear notions of his subject, and was by no means a close judicious writer, nor deserving of so much attention as our author has paid him.” The fact is, that when Dr. Doddridge drew up his Lectures, *Colliber’s Inquiry* had excited considerable notice, as is apparent from its passing through three editions. The book is now nearly sunk into oblivion. It was formerly read by the present editor, who, in his opinion concerning it, entirely agrees with Dr. Savage.

## PROPOSITION XLII.

To propose and examine some of the most LECT.  
 considerable arguments, brought to prove the XLVIII.  
 absolute infinity of the divine being. ~

*Watts's Ontology, chap. xvii.*

## L E M M A.

The solution will consist of two parts: in the first, we shall produce the arguments brought to prove that *something* is actually infinite: and in the second, shall consider the arguments to prove that infinity belongs to the *divine being*.

## SOLUTION. PART I.

Arguments to prove that *something* is actually infinite.

*Arg. 1.* Some have argued from the nature of space, which (supposing it to be, as Mr. *Colliber* does, a real thing) is certainly infinite, and cannot be bounded so much as in thought. *Colliber* grants we can have no idea of the end of it; yet maintains there may be an end of universal space, as we know there is of particular: and if it be asked, what bounds it? he answers, *nothing*; but will not allow that it is therefore infinite. But it is plain he conceives of space only as the interstice betwixt bodies; and how this is more real than the void which lies on the other side the remotest body, I cannot imagine. But if *Prop. 40.* be true, this can be no solid argument: for nothing would be more absurd, than to ascribe infinity to *nothing*, or to a mere abstract idea.

*Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 4, 21.—Colliber. Inq. p. 150—153. Ed. 3. p. 185—193.*

*Arg. 2.* It is pleaded that the divine being is allowed to be eternal; now eternity, *i. e.* infinite

nite duration, is as incomprehensible as any other kind of infinity.

*Colliber* answers, eternity is not and cannot be an infinite duration, being limited on the one side by the present moment; and he adds, that *duration* does not belong to God. Yet still, if we consider him as a being without a beginning, (which surely we must confess him, or something to be) I see not how it is possible to separate duration from our idea of him: and if we cannot, surely here is an infinite in one respect, indeed in that respect in which it is most difficult to conceive of it.

*Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xvii. § 5, 20.—Collib. Inq. p. 149, 150, 153, 154. Ed. 3. p. 180—185.*

*Arg. 3.* Another argument is taken from the infinite divisibility of matter, since it is certain division can never annihilate.

This Mr. *Colliber* is obliged to omit. But he pleads, that this infinite divisibility does not imply an infinite number of parts in every particle of matter, but rather the contrary; for else the subject must be of an infinite bulk. Some have replied, these parts may be infinitely small; but he denies that any thing can be so; and if they were, matter could not be infinitely divisible. If it be said, that this infinite divisibility proves that there is an infinite distance between the smallest beings and nothing, he says, that creation proves the contrary. Nevertheless it may be answered, that we maintain the creator to be omnipotent, and that an almighty power may overcome that infinite distance; or rather, that when we talk of an infinite distance in this sense, we only mean a very great distance; so that nothing certain can be concluded from this argument.

*Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xvii. § 12.—Collib. Inq. p. 161—165. Ed. 3. p. 194—200. Arg. 4.*

*Arg. 4.* Others have pleaded that no limits can be set by our thoughts to the number and extent of *possibilities*, but more may be conceived to be produced, and still more without bounds; there must therefore be an actual infinity, in proportion to this possible one.

*Colliber* answers, this only proves that our imaginations may be perpetually going on in their operations; but that there is no reasoning from imagination to fact, without confounding possibilities and realities: and indeed it must be confessed, that all the utmost efforts of imagination will always be finite, though they be ever growing.

*Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 63, 64, 67.—Living Temple, part i. c. iv. § 4.—Collib. Inq. p. 176—179. Ed. 3. p. 213—216.*

SOLUTION. PART 2.

Arguments to prove the infinity of *the divine being*. LECT. XLIX.

*Arg. 1.* Some have argued, that if God be limited, it must either be by himself, or by another; but no wise being would abridge himself, and there could be no other being to limit God.

*Colliber* answers, that no cause can bestow absolute infinity upon its effect; and therefore there needs no cause of the finiteness of any created, why then of an uncreated being? And farther, the argument supposes it to be matter of choice with God, whether he would be finite or infinite, which it is unreasonable to suppose; and would indeed imply (what *Plato* and *Cartesius* are said to have maintained) that the deity produced himself by a proper causality; whereas not to abridge itself, can never make any being infinite. Thus it may be said, that as God did not make himself wise, nor did another being make him wise, yet he is wise; so he may not limit himself, nor be limited by another, and

yet he may be limited. If in answer to this it be urged, that as he is wise, so is he also unlimited by the necessity of his nature, which is all that can be replied, this argument thus founded will coincide with the next.

*Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 193, 194.*  
*Or, apud Opera, vol. i. p. 263.—Collib.*  
*Inq. p. 145—147. Ed. 3. p. 175—178.*

*Arg. 2.* Others plead that infinity follows from self-existence; for a necessity that is not universal, must depend on some external cause, (*Vid. Def. 28. Cor.*) which a self-existent being does not.—To this Mr. *Colliber* replies,

1. That though necessary existence has no relation either to place or limit, any more than to variety, yet as there is some sort of variety in God, (*Prop. 39. Schol. 2.*) so there may be limits.

2. That to be finite is not properly the effect of any cause, and therefore may consist with necessary existence.

3. That finiteness is in itself necessary; because every being has a compleat and positive nature, whereas our idea of infinite is negative.

4. That how absolute soever the necessity of a supposed infinite being can be, that of a finite may be equally so. He adds, we must not argue too much from abstract ideas to things: that may be necessary in its own nature, which we may conceive as not existing, *v. g.* perfect wisdom; and that may not be necessary in its own nature, which we may not be able to conceive not to exist, *v. g.* space.

It seems that the third of these answers is inconsistent with the first: that any being should be the less compleat, and the less positive, because it is infinite, I own I cannot conceive; though our idea of infinite should be allowed to be a negative idea.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 43.—Collib. Inq. p. 168—174. Ed. 3. p. 203—211.—Berry-Street Sermons, vol. i. p. 107. Second Edition.—Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 12—14.*

*Arg. 3.* It is urged that creation is so great an act of power, that we can imagine nothing impossible to that being who has performed it, but must therefore ascribe to him infinite power.

*Colliber* answers, the distance between being and not being may be said to be finite, because it has been passed over; and is indeed no other than between thinking and not thinking, moving and not moving; though they are irreconcilable with each other, there may be a possibility of passing from one to the other, without an infinite degree of power. Yet he adds, nothing on this side a contraction can be imagined less possible than a production from nothing, and therefore allows a proper omnipotence in God, which he takes to be infinite power: so that this argument seems to be given up. *Prop. 31. Schol. 4.*

*Collib. Inq. p. 147—149. Ed. 3. p. 178—180.*

*Arg. 4.* It is more honourable to the divine being to conceive of him as infinite than finite.

To this *Colliber* answers, by endeavouring to prove, that to conceive of him as infinite leads us into many absurd and dishonourable notions of him, which will be surveyed in the next proposition: yet he is forced after all to acknowledge a negative infinity, *i. e.* that there is nothing too great for the power of God, that nothing which can be the object of knowledge is unknown to him, and that no being can bound God, or even human imagination itself. *Vid. Prop. 41. Schol. 5.*

*Collib. Inq. p. 180—183. Ed. 3. p. 217—221.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

I have not here mentioned the argument taken from the supposed innate idea of infinity, nor from the immensity of matter; both which appear to me so evidently inconclusive, as not to deserve so large a survey as the former.

*Collib. ib. p. 144, 145, 154—161. Ed. 3. p. 174, 175, 200—203.——Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 191—197: § 50, 51.——Boyce's Translation, p. 135—137.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

The argument from the fulness of being supposed in God, if it imports any thing at all, must coincide with some of the former arguments, especially the fourth.

*Collib. ib. p. 175, 176, Ed. 3. p. 212, 213. —Howe's Living Temple, part i. c. iv. § 2.—Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 344, 345.—Works, vol. i. p. 320.*

## PROPOSITION XLIII.

LECT. To review and consider the arguments which  
L. Mr. Colliber has urged against the divine infinity, and by which he has endeavoured to prove it a pernicious doctrine.

## SOLUTION.

He asserts it to be attended with pernicious consequences, whether we consider the deity *in himself*, or *with respect to us*.

## PART I.

With respect to the *deity itself*, he maintains that it leads us into the following absurdities.

1. To assert his inextension; for all extension naturally implies bounds, therefore the *Platonists*, asserting the infinity of God, said he was a *mathematical point*, thereby making him infinitely

less than the least grain of sand; yet at the same time they asserted him to be *all in all*, and *all in every part*; than which nothing can be more absurd.

To this it is answered, 1. | That many maintain extension does not imply limits.

2. | That a mathematical point being only an abstract idea, God cannot properly be represented by it.

3. | That when it is said he is *all in all*, and *all in every part*, nothing more may be meant than this, that his almighty power can operate in every place, and is the support of all other beings; which *Colliber* himself allows.

But he replies, if we do not allow this way of speaking, we must go into the scheme of the *Nullibists*, and affirm that God is no where.—And what if it should be asserted, that it is not his property to be present in any place, by a diffusive presence?—It will be said that therefore he is not at all.—But this pretended axiom will require proof. *Prop. 41. Schol. 2.*

*Collib. Inq. p. 184—187. Ed. 3. p. 222—229.*

2. From the doctrine of God's infinity arises that of *absolute simplicity*; else each attribute would be infinite, whereas it is said there can be but one infinite.

*Ans.* This objection arises from an absurd confounding the idea of attribute with that of being. *Def. 12. Cor. 1.*

*Collib. ib. p. 190, 191. Ed. 3. p. 229—231.*

3. From infinity is inferred absolute omnipotence, which includes a power of working contradictions.—But it is sufficient to answer that this is not properly a power, as has been observed above. *Prop. 31. Schol. 4.*

*Collib. ib. p. 192. Ed. 3. p. 231, 232.*

4. From

4. From infinity follows absolute omniscience, which would establish the doctrine of decrees, inconsistent with liberty and therefore with virtue.

*Ans.* We have endeavoured to shew that the foreknowledge of God is not inconsistent with liberty. *Prop.* 35. *Schol.* 2.

*Collib. ib.* p. 193, 194. *Ed.* 3. p. 232—235.

5. Hence some have inferred, that God not only *does*, but *is* all things. This is *Spinoza's* scheme; who argues that an infinite being must comprehend all particular finite beings.—But it may be replied, that this argument arises from mistaking the word *infinite*, which implies, that the being to whom it is ascribed, has no bounds; now God is not at all bounded by the existence of creatures, whose natures are entirely different from his own. And how, on *Colliber's* own scheme, can God be where the creatures are, without a confusion of his being with theirs, if the foundation of *Spinoza's* argument, even on his own principles, be just.

*Collib. ib.* p. 198—200. *Ed.* 3. p. 238—241.—*Howe's Works*, vol. i. p. 69—72.—*Living Temple*, part i. c. iv. § 9. vol. i. p. 216—223.—*Works of the Learned*, for 1738. *Fan. Art.* iv.

#### SOLUTION. PART 2.

LECT. With respect to *ourselves*, Mr. *Colliber* asserts,  
LI.

1. That the doctrine of the divine infinity discourages our enquiries into the nature of God; because we must for ever despair of attaining to the knowledge of him.

*Ans.* On *Colliber's* own principles, we must acknowledge it to be impossible perfectly to know him; nor is it any wonder that it should be so. (*Vid. Prop.* 18. *Cor.*) But supposing him  
to

to be infinite, we may know as much of him as if he were finite, though more will continue unknown.

*Collib. Inq. p. 200. Ed. 3. p. 241—243.*

2. It is said this doctrine raises prejudices against his existence, because it makes it impossible to conceive clearly of him.—To this we may reply,

1. There can be no scheme, on which there will not be some difficulties: those of atheism will be still greater than would follow from supposing an infinite deity.

*Gurdon at Boyle's Lect. pass. præf. p. 79, 80.—Abadie Verit. de la Rel. part i. c. xvi, xvii. vol. i. p. 117—132.*

2. If *one* finite being could be supposed necessary, why may not *any other*? *i. e.* Why may not the doctrine of the finiteness of God, be a shelter for atheism in one view, as well as that of his infinity in another?

*Collib. Inq. p. 201—203. Ed. 3. p. 243.*

#### SCHOLIUM 1.

Mr. *Colliber* seems chiefly to have opposed the doctrine of the infinity of God, in order to establish his scheme of denying the divine decrees and foreknowledge, which must indeed suppose him a limited being.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

On the most accurate survey and examination of these two last propositions, we may perhaps see reason to remark,

1. That many arguments which have been brought to prove the infinity of God are inconclusive.

2. That to suppose him finite, would not free the mind from all difficulties in conceiving of him, especially those which are the consequences of

of his eternity ; but would plunge us into some new difficulties.

3. That though it be most honourable to the divine being, to suppose him infinite, yet if we conceive of him only as superior to all other beings, and possessed of perfections beyond the investigation of our minds, there will be a foundation laid for religion and virtue, in the several branches in which we shall afterwards endeavour to open it.

*The END of the SECOND PART.*

APPEN.

## A P P E N D I X.

*Concerning Dr. BERKLEY's Scheme, That there is no material World.*

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**I**N considering this scheme, we shall

I. Propose the scheme itself, and the arguments by which it is supported.

II. Examine the objections brought against it.

III. Consider how far our enquiries into natural philosophy are affected by it.

SECT. I. The scheme itself is not, that sensible objects have *no real existence*; or that all is but a waking dream: he disclaims both these: his principle is, that no sensible object exists *unperceived*; or more plainly, that *there is no material world*, and that *primary*, as well as secondary qualities, do only exist in the mind perceiving them; so that if all minds were annihilated, all bodies would be annihilated too; and the difference between dreaming and perceiving, is only that the latter is more active, regular and vivid than the former.

The arguments by which the Doctor supports this system are these:

1. The existence of a material world cannot be demonstrated; because an almighty power can always produce such sensations without any archetype, and it is plain in dreams he does so.

*Ans.* This will not prove that he *has* done it. We assert not that matter is a necessary being; but its actual existence may nevertheless be proved, as well as that of a created mind.

2. It is an useless incumbrance; because a divine influence is necessary to produce ideas from material archetypes.

*Ans.*

*Ans.* The divine power may be illustrated in such a harmony; and the actual support of bodies seem an act of great power, as well as the union of the soul and body, of great wisdom.

3. The supposition of it is very inconvenient, as it introduces disputes about the production and subsistence of bodies, the infinite divisibility of matter, the union of body and mind, &c.—But it may be replied, that if giving occasion to disputes could disprove the thing disputed about, we must also give up the existence of spiritual and immaterial beings.

4. It implies a contradiction. Sensible objects are the things we perceive by our senses; but we can perceive only our own ideas and sensations: now it is plainly repugnant, that any of our own sensations should exist unperceived, and therefore that sensible objects should so exist.

*Ans.* This is plainly taking the question for granted; yet he triumphs greatly in this argument, and says, the bare possibility of the existence of any extended moveable substance, or in general any idea, or any thing like an idea, but in a thinking mind, is absurd. But this triumph is extremely ill grounded; because if it were granted him, that sensible objects are in fact only the things which our senses immediately perceive, *i. e.* that they are our own ideas, (which is, as we observed above, begging the question) it will not follow from thence, that it is impossible there should be, or should have been, any external archetypes of them.

*Berkley's Princ.* § 22.

5. The various appearances of the same object to different persons at the same time, prove that it exists only in a perceiving mind; else the same thing must have different magnitudes, colours, &c.

*Ans.*

*Ans.* The various circumstances in which it is, seems to account for its different appearance; and if the object were material, it must be so.

6. The best philosophers have granted it as to *secondary* qualities, but the case is the same as to *primary*.—This is denied.

SECT. II. The objections against it are these.

1. To deny the possibility of matter, is plainly limiting the power of God.

2. This hypothesis, which supposes us under a continual deception, reflects upon the divine veracity.—He answers, the same objection will lie against supposing the earth to move about the sun.

3. The senses give us such an evidence, that if it is possible they may be true notices of what passes without us, we must certainly believe they are so.

4. Our ideas can have no parts; but the objects of them have parts: therefore the objects are something different from the ideas themselves.

5. Every thing real is banished out of the world.—This *Berkley* expressly denies.

6. Things on this supposition are continually annihilated and created anew.—He answers, the school-men allow a continual creation. But that is a weak reply. If *Adam* and *Eve* both slept, the sun for that time was annihilated: if it be said, it existed in the divine mind; it may be answered, so it did from all eternity, and at that rate all creatures must be eternal.

7. It makes all the apparatus of nature in the organization of plants and animals vain.

*Ans.* Not vainer than upon the supposition of a continued divine concurrence, asserted *Prop.* 32. they are rules which God has laid down, according to which he directs his own operations.

8. This doctrine destroys all the evidence of the existence of other created spirits; some also add,

add, of the divine existence; but I think not: yet it certainly weakens some proofs of it, especially that taken from the *vis inertiae* of matter.

SECT. III. How far our inquiries into natural philosophy are affected by it.

1. It cuts off a great part of our present inquiries.

2. In a strict sense, it would change a great part of our language.

3. Nevertheless, it leaves room for the observation of the phænomena of nature, and the connection between causes and effects, in many instances. On the whole, it is a scheme destitute of proof. The most we can assert is, that it is *possible*; and we are led every moment, whether we will or no, into an apprehension of the contrary. If we believe it to be true, we ought to act in every instance, and on every occasion, just as if it were false.—We conclude with observing, that as some have denied all *material*, and others all *immaterial* substances, each asserting one or the other *only* to be real, we may reasonably believe them *both* to be so.

*Berkley's Princ. & Dial. pass.—Collier's Immat. World.—Baxter on the Soul, vol. ii. § 2. OEt.—Lord Kaims's Ess. on the Princ. of Morality and Nat. Rel. part ii. Ess. iii. p. 237—239\*.*

\* A controversy concerning Berkley's hypothesis was carried on some years since in the Gentleman's Magazine. The subject has likewise excited the particular attention and confutation of Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie. See Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind. See also his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay ii. ch. 10, 11. p. 156—185; and Beattie on the Immutability of Truth, part ii. ch. ii. § 2. p. 169—191. Quarto edition.

## P A R T III.

*Of the Nature of MORAL VIRTUE in general,  
and the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of GOD. Of  
the several BRANCHES of VIRTUE, and the Na-  
ture of CIVIL GOVERNMENT.*

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### A X I O M XIII.

**F**ROM the *essences* of things (the ideas of LECT.  
which immutably exist in the divine mind) LII.  
arise certain DIFFERENCES, and from the circum-  
stances in which they are placed, certain RELA-  
TIONS, inseparable from those essences or cir-  
cumstances.

### A X I O M XIV.

The actions of an intelligent being may *agree*  
or *disagree* with the *nature, circumstances* and *re-*  
*lations* of things; or in other words, they may  
with respect to them be FIT or UNFIT: *v. g.* Evil  
is as unfit to be returned for good, as a cubical  
case is unfit exactly to contain a globe.

### DEFINITION XXXVI.

The *agreement* of the actions of any intelligent  
being with the *nature, circumstances, and rela-*  
*tion* of things, is called the MORAL FITNESS, or  
the VIRTUE of that action; the *disagreement* is  
therefore the MORAL UNFITNESS, OF VICE.

### COROLLARY.

There is really and necessarily a moral fitness  
in some actions, and a moral unfitness in others.  
Vid. *Ax.* 14.

*Wiskart's Reform. Serm. p. 5, 6.—Clarke  
at Boyle's Lect. p. 174—179, 181.—  
Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 5—11.—Chand.*

*Ref. Serm. p. 5—7, 14—19.—Benſon's Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. ii. p. 40—45.—Dr. Adams's Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue, p. 3—6\*.*

## SCHOLIUM.

To this ſome have objected the various opinions of learned men, and the difference in the laws of various nations concerning right and wrong.

We answer, that it does indeed from hence follow, that all the moral fitneſſes of things are not ſelf-evident; and we readily allow, that in ſome caſes it may be very difficult to pronounce concerning them, and in others the judgments of men may be ſo prejudiced by corrupt affections as to err, though the caſes themſelves are very clear. Nevertheless, there are ſome things ſo plain, that they were never denied to be more fit than their oppoſites: nor was it ever commanded or allowed by any known law, that every man might plunder or murder his fellow-citizens as he pleaſed; that no faith ſhould be kept, or compacts performed, &c.

*Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iii. § 9—12.—Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 181—183.—Paſſeran's Phil. Inq. paſſ†.*

## A X I O M XV.

The actions of an intelligent being appear to have a BEAUTY or excellency, when they are morally fit, and a TURPITUDE and deformity, when they are morally unfit.

\* For a moſt elaborate and ample vindication of the doctrine of moral Fitneſſes and Unfitneſſes, ſee Dr. Price's "Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals."

† This objection is particularly conſidered and answered in Dr. Beattie's Eſſay on the Immutability of Truth.

## SCHOLIUM I.

This answers the question, "What are moral fitnesses fit for?" Their mutual congruity and harmony is as fit to gain the approbation of an intelligent mind, as music to please an ear that is rightly formed.

*Grove's Wisd. of God*, p. 29. *Vol. iv. of his Works*, p. 44.—*Wishart's Ref. Sermon*. p. 11—15.—*Chand. Ref. Sermon*. p. 27—31. *Benf. Sermon*. N<sup>o</sup>. ii. p. 48—50.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

The apprehension of that beauty or deformity, which arises in the mind by a kind of natural instinct, previously to any reasoning upon the remoter consequences of actions, has been with great propriety called by many elegant writers the *Moral Sense*: but what is peculiar in some of their notions will be afterwards stated and examined.

*Hutcheson on the Pass.* p. 245—253.

## DEFINITION XXXVII.

An intelligent agent is said to be OBLIGED IN REASON, to that which appears to him on an impartial enquiry most *honourable* and decent; and to be OBLIGED IN INTEREST, to that which on an impartial enquiry shall appear most conducive to his *happiness* on the whole.

*Balg. Law of Truth*, p. 4—12. *In the vol. of his Tracts*, p. 372—380.

## SCHOLIUM.

Though an obligation in reason and interest may seem distinct, yet they are, at least in a great measure, if not entirely, connected: for on the one hand, the obligations of reason, honour and decency, cannot be broken through, without some *uneasiness* to a mind conscious of the violation of them; and on the other, it is a

reasonable, decent and honourable thing, to be influenced by a regard to our own happiness.

### DEFINITION XXXVIII.

THE MORAL RECTITUDE OR VIRTUE of any being consists, in acting knowingly and designedly in a manner agreeable to the moral fitnesses of things; and VICE, in acting contrary to them, when they are or might have been known to him.

*Balg. Inq. into the Foundation of Moral Goodness, part i. p. 30, 31. Vol. of Tracts, p. 67.*

#### COROLLARY 1.

There is a beauty inseparable from virtue of character, and a deformity from vice. Compare *Ax. 15.* and *Def. 36.*

*Shaftesb. Char. vol. ii. p. 28—36.*

#### COROLLARY 2.

Every intelligent being capable of discerning this beauty and deformity, is in reason obliged to the practice of virtue in every instance. Compare *Def. 37.*

*Price's Review, c. 6.—Burlamaguy's Elementa, part i. c. v. vi. Part ii. c. vii.*

#### COROLLARY 3.

The foundation of virtue and vice cannot depend upon the mere will of any being whatsoever. Vid. *Ax. 13, 14.*

*Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 11—15.—Grove of Wisd. p. 23—26. 36—40. Vol. iv. of his Works, c. i. § 1—2\*.—Mole's Serm. of Moral Virtue, p. 21—24, 27.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. LIII. Nevertheless, as the circumstances of things vary, the fitness of actions will proportionably vary; and therefore the will of a superior may

\* The doctrine of the third corollary is strongly asserted and maintained in Dr. Price's work, before referred to.

make some things fit, which otherwise would not be so; (*v. g.* a general's command to a soldier to march any particular way, or a magistrate appointing an execution, &c.) but while the same circumstances continue, the moral fitness of things will always be the same.

*Mole on Mor. Virtue, p. 27, 28.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

To what is said *Cor. 3.* some have objected, that this is setting up something different from, and independent on the divine being, to be the rule of his actions.—But it is replied, that as nothing can be prior to God, so nothing distinct from his nature is here asserted to be a law or rule of action to him. We cannot suppose the divine mind ever to have been without ideas; (for then God would have been without knowledge, and without volitions, and consequently without action; all which are most inconsistent with what we have before proved concerning him:) now perfectly discerning every idea, (*Prop. 33.*) he must have perfectly discerned all their relations, and therefore among the rest the moral fitness of some, and unfitness of other actions, in such and such supposed circumstances: so that on the whole, it is no more injurious to the divine being to assert, that he cannot alter his own sense of some moral fitnesses, than that he cannot change his nature, or destroy his being.

*Limestr. Lect. vol. ii. p. 579—581.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought themselves, on the premises laid down above, authorized to say, that supposing God to change his mind concerning these things, the things themselves would nevertheless continue the same.

But it may be observed with regard to such a manner of expression, that if we consider God as

existing alone and prior to all creation, and by a change of *mind* mean only a change of *will*; then to say, the things themselves would nevertheless continue the same, is only saying, that God would still continue to discern what is right, though his own actions were contrary to his judgment; which is a trifling proposition, as well as a blasphemous hypothesis. But if the supposition be, that his *ideas* are likewise changed, this would suppose the former ideas totally destroyed, seeing there would be no other mind in which they could exist; and then all the *relations* and *fitnesses* would be destroyed with them. But if we were to consider other minds as existing, and to suppose God either to change his ideas, or to act contrary to rectitude, while any one of his creatures retained this sense of it; it is granted that virtue would still be the same: but if it be hereafter proved, that God is a being of perfect rectitude, (since we have already demonstrated his immutability,) it will follow, that all these suppositions are in effect no other, than that God should cease to be God; and are so unreasonable and indecent, that they ought not to be made.

*Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 14, 15\*.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

If it should be hereafter proved to be the will of God, that all rational creatures should prosecute virtue; and also proved, that the will of God lays an obligation on his rational creatures; then from hence it will evidently appear, that no man, capable of knowing God, is obliged to

\* At the time when Dr. Clarke's scheme of eternal Fitnesses was in general estimation, some writers, in the extravagance of their zeal for it, expressed themselves in very strange and unjustifiable language, and such as the doctor himself could by no means have approved. The tracts to which we refer have justly sunk into oblivion.

any thing by the moral fitness of things, to which he is not also obliged by the will of God.

## SCHOLIUM 5.

If it be farther enquired, whether our obligations arising from the fitness of things, be *antecedent* to those arising from the will of God, we answer,

1. If God will the universal virtue of all his rational creatures, he must will it from the first moment of their existence; and taking the matter in a general view, no obligation in order of time can be prior to that arising from his will, nor reach farther, since universal virtue comprehends all moral fitnesses.

2. It must be acknowledged, that our sense of the fitness of some things may be prior to our discovery of the existence and nature of God; and that in proportion to the degree in which that sense is more or less strong, there will be a correspondent degree of obligation: nay it is hard to say, how any one could know that he *ought* to do a thing, which he knew to be the will of God, unless he had some previous sense of obligation in reason or interest, on which such a conviction should be founded.

3. Nevertheless, as children apprehend the ideas of *things*, sooner than they learn the names of *complex, moral modes*, the easiest and best way of forming them to a sense of virtue will be, to give them an early sense of the being and perfections of God, according to their feeble capacities of apprehending them; representing it as his command, that they should do every thing they know to be good, and forbear every thing they know to be evil. But

4. As to the order of our conception of things, when we come to examine them in riper years, if the rectitude of God should hereafter be proved to us on the one hand, and our obligation to

obey him on the other; then when we know any thing to be *fit*, we know it to be the will of God; and when we know it to be the will of God, we know it to be fit for us to do in present circumstances: and therefore we need not be very nice in adjusting, on which of these things the greatest stress is to be laid; since we should then consider the will of God not merely as an arbitrary thing, but as the will of a wise and a righteous being. And it is certain, that whatever might be conceived as fit from other abstract considerations, will appear yet more fit, when considered as the will of such a being: so that a regard to the divine authority, in doing a thing, can never diminish the degree of virtue in an action, but will always increase the sense of obligation to it.

*Wright against Mole, p. 41—43.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

On the whole it is proper to observe, that great care should be taken, especially in popular discourses, that we do not make any false suppositions of God's being changed from what we know him immutably to be; that we do not represent him as under the restraint of something superior to himself; nor ourselves as under greater obligations to something else than we are under to God. It is much more proper to say, (if the rectitude of the divine being be proved) that his unerring judgment is the rule of *his* actions, and his will as directed by it, (however that will may be known,) the rule of *ours*; and the foundation of moral good and evil should be asserted, not to be *previous* to, or merely consequent upon, but inseparably *connected* with the immutable will of God.

*Wright against Mole, p. 27—30, 44—51.*

—*Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxviii.*—*Warb.*

*Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 36—53.*—*Bott's*

*Answer*

*Answer to Warb. p. 228, ad fin. præf.  
p. 232—239.*

## DEFINITION XXXIX.

Moral rectitude is generally called HOLINESS, LECT. when applied to God; VIRTUE, when applied to LIV. the creature.

*Jos. Mede's Works, p. 8, 9\*.*

## SCHOLIUM.

*Virtue* is sometimes taken in a more limited sense, for the duties we owe to *ourselves* and our *fellow-creatures*: and then *Religion* is put to signify the duties we owe more immediately to *God*.

## AXIOM XVI.

Where there is any moral turpitude in the actions of a rational being, it is (*cæteris paribus*) proportionable to the degree, in which such a being understands the relations of things, and is free from temptation to act contrary to them.

## PROPOSITION XLIV.

God is a being of perfect HOLINESS, *i. e.* of the highest moral rectitude.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 33.* 1. His infinite understanding must enable him to discern all the relations of things as they really are.

*Prop. 31.* 2. He is almighty, and therefore has nothing to fear.

*Prop. 38.* 3. He is perfectly happy, and therefore has nothing to hope.

2, 3. 4. He is infinitely removed from all temptation to act contrary to moral rectitude.

\* Joseph Mede, in the passage referred to, did not mean philosophically to define the moral Rectitude of God, but to describe, in general, his singular Greatness and Holiness.

1, 4. *Ax.* 16. | 5. It would be highly dishonourable to the divine being, to suppose him in any respect to deviate from the exactest rectitude in his actions.

6. Without any temptation or advantage, to deviate from moral rectitude, must fill the mind of the divine being with uneasy reflections upon it. *Def.* 37. *Schol.*

6. | 7. It would be inconsistent with the divine felicity.

5, 7. | 8. *Valet propositio.*

*Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 15—28.—Scott's Christ. Life, vol. ii. p. 361—364.—Works, vol. i. p. 327.—Tillot's Works, vol. ii. p. 662.*

#### COROLLARY I.

It is reasonable to believe that it is the will of God, that all created beings, that are capable of virtue, should make it the great object of pursuit.

#### COROLLARY 2.

Since God is a being of almighty power, and has the final happiness or misery of all creatures in his hands, every creature capable of virtue must be obliged in interest, as well as reason, to cultivate the practice of it: (*Vid. Cor. 1.*) and thus it appears, that virtue and self-love can only be perfectly reconciled by *religion*. See *Dr. Watts's pamphlet on the subject; or his Works, vol. iii. p. 715, &c.*

#### COROLLARY 3.

Whatsoever shall hereafter be proved a branch of virtue, and does not imply some degree of weakness and dependence in the being by whom it is to be practised, is undoubtedly to be found in God.

## COROLLARY 4.

If we see God in fact doing any thing, we may assure ourselves that it is agreeable to the reason of things that it should be done, though we cannot shew how it agrees; and though there may be some objections to it, which, in consequence of the imperfection of our views, we are not able to answer.

*Butl. Anal. part i. c. vii.*

## SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be queried, whether this rectitude of the divine being be *necessary*, *i. e.* whether God can do what is morally unfit.

*Ans.* God has a natural power to do what is most unfit for him to do, if we consider merely the action itself; *v. g.* to put a period to the existence of the most excellent creature, &c. but considering all the circumstances of an evil action, which cannot but be known to him, he cannot so oppose and contradict himself as to do it: for it is as impossible for a free agent, of perfect immutable rectitude, to act contrary to reason, *i. e.* to destroy its own rectitude, as for necessary existence to destroy its own being; and if the rectitude of God were not immutable, then he might be changed from a most benevolent to a most malevolent being, from a most faithful to a most perfidious being; which surely is as inconsistent with self-existence, as a change from knowledge to ignorance, or from power to weakness. Nevertheless God may freely chuse this or that action, out of many others equally good and fit.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 115—119. p. 110—114. Ed. 6. —Grove on Wisdom, p. 30—33. —Works, vol. iv. p. 46—49. —Mole's Found. of Virt. p. 24. —Wright against Mole, p. 8, 9, 22—25.*

## DEFINITION XL.

LECT. That being may be said to be perfectly good  
 LV. OR BENEVOLENT, who promotes the happiness of  
 others so far as it is fit to be promoted.

## PROPOSITION XLV.

God is perfectly Good.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. We see a great deal of happiness in the creation, of which God is the author; and generally speaking, those things which contain displays of art and wisdom, are calculated to promote the happiness of his creatures: under which head we are to rank the benevolent instincts, which he has implanted in the human mind.

2. We see no mixture of evil, from whence good may not proceed; and are sure that in many instances good does actually proceed from those things which have the appearance of evil.

3. The greatest part of those evils which we here observe arise from the abuse of human liberty, and therefore are not directly to be charged upon God. *Prop. 16.*

1, 2, 3. 4. If we judge by the phænomena of nature, *i. e.* by the divine works of creation and providence obvious to us, it seems that God is a good being.

5. God is so great, as to have no need of seeking his own happiness in the causeless misery of his creatures; nor is it a conceivable thing how he should take any pleasure in it, or how he could be happy with a supposed malignant disposition.

6. Benevolence is the great glory of a rational being, and without it, no other perfection can appear amiable and honourable.

*Gr.* 4 and 5. *Prop.* 38. and *Gr.* 6. *Prop.* 27.  
*Dem.* 1. *Cor.* 2. | 7. We have reason to believe  
 that God is perfectly good. *Q. E. D.*

*Wilk. Nat. Rel.* p. 135—139. p. 119—  
 122. *Ed.* 7.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.*  
 p. 113.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 68—71. *Ed.* 3.  
 p. 81—84.—*Clarke's Post. Works, vol. i.*  
 p. 321—327, 337—341. *OEt.*—*Bays*  
*on Div. Benev.* p. 20—29.—*Abernu.*  
*Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 2\*.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

The great objection to this, is the mixture of evil in the world, natural evil, *i. e.* pain, and moral evil, *i. e.* vice: (Vid. *Def.* 38.) and it is questioned, how far the existence and prevalence of it in so great a degree can be reconcilable with what has been said of the divine goodness, since God has already been proved an almighty being.

*Ans.* 1. We cannot possibly judge as to the proportion there is between the quantity of happiness and misery in the creation, merely from what we observe in this part of it, which is our own abode. There may perhaps be regions incomparably more extensive and populous, in which neither natural nor moral evil are known, at least by experience.

2. It is possible there is no evil of any kind, from which a degree of good may not proceed, more than sufficient to counterbalance it.

3. When moral evil has been introduced, which (as was observed above, *gr.* 3.) might be by the use of liberty in free creatures, then penal evil is on the whole good, and well suited to a state of discipline, which may possibly in

\* For a curious and valuable tract on this subject, see Dr. Thomas Balguy's *Divine Benevolence asserted and vindicated.*

those circumstances be intended as a proper introduction to a state of enjoyment.

4. The scheme of things which we now see may perhaps be continually growing better and better; not to say, that for aught certainly appears by the light of nature, the time may come, when all natural and moral evil may cease.

*Rel. of Nat.* p. 71, 72.—*Baxt. Works*, vol. ii. p. 37—39, 90, 91.—*Scott's Christian Life*, vol. ii. p. 245—249.—*Works*, vol. i. p. 283.—*Balg. on Div. Reft.* p. 31—33, 38—40.—*Traçts*, p. 241—243, 249—251.—*Leibnitz Theod.* vol. i. p. 83—85.—*Mandev. Free Thoughts*, p. 99—102.—*Maim. More Nevoch.* part iii. c. xii.—*Travels of Cyrus*, p. 248—258. 12mo.—*Hallet on Script.* vol. ii. p. 310—318.—*Abern. Serm.* vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 3.—*S. Clarke on the Orig. of Nat. Evil*, præf. p. 60—77, & p. 160, ad fin.—*Bonet's Contemplation of Nature*.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

LECT. It will still be demanded, why was moral evil  
 LVI. permitted? To this it is generally answered, that  
 it was the result of natural liberty; and it was fit, that among all the other classes and orders of being, some should be formed possessed of this, as it conduces to the harmony of the universe, and to the beautiful variety of beings in it.

Yet still it is replied, why did not God prevent this abuse of liberty? One would not willingly say, that he is not able to do it, without violating the nature of his creatures; nor is it possible that any should prove this. It is commonly said, that he permitted it, in order to extract from thence greater good. But it may be farther queried, could he not have produced that

that greater good without such a means? Could he not have secured among all his creatures universal good and universal happiness, in full consistency with the liberty he had given them? I acknowledge I see no way of answering this question, but by saying, he had indeed a natural power of doing it, but that he saw it better not to do it, though the reasons upon which it appeared preferable to him are entirely unknown to us.

*Pope's Ethic Epist. N<sup>o</sup>. i. ver. 43—60. & 123—172.—Foster's Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. i. —Clarke on the Orig. of Mor. Evil, præf. p. 122—140. & p. 182—198\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought it more for the honour of the divine being to say, that the nature of things is such, that the happiness of the whole system will be more effectually promoted by the misery of some part of it; and therefore, that perfect benevolence would induce the creator to chuse such a mixed scheme rather than another in which there should have been unmixed virtue and happiness.—But granting that there is no evil, from which an equal or greater degree of good may not proceed, (*Schol. 1. gr. 2.*) yet it may justly be asked, what is here meant by *the nature of things*, or how can it possibly be imagined or believed, that a greater sum of happiness should arise from the mixture of evil, than omnipotence could have produced some other

\* To the writers here referred to may be added Bonet's "Contemplation of Nature." Among the works which exaggerate the evils of mankind, in order to promote atheistical purposes, may be reckoned the "Système de la Nature," ascribed to Mirabeau the father. On the question, Why God did not prevent the abuse of liberty? no one is more sceptically copious than Bayle, in several articles of his Historical Dictionary, and particularly under the heads of Manichæans and Paulicians.

way; or how can the view or experience of misery be necessary to give a virtuous being a more exquisite relish of happiness \* ?

SCHOLIUM 4.

If we still remain dissatisfied with the reply given to the objection, *Schol. 1.* it seems that the chief reason is, that we are apt to go on the mistaken principle, that God must needs raise the happiness of the universe to the highest possible degree. But we are to remember, on the one hand, that God is a being of infinite power, (*Prop. 31.*) and on the other, that to be *created* implies to be *limited* in point of *happiness*, as well as of *power*; and to be possessed of some limited degree of happiness, necessarily implies a possibility of receiving some higher degrees of it from an almighty power; so that it can never be said, that God has done his utmost for the happiness of any particular creature, or of the universe in general: and this is so far from being a reflection on him, that it is indeed his glory. Whatever the number of creatures be, it might have been multiplied to and beyond any given degree; there might have been as many beings of the highest order of all, as there are of them and all the subordinate classes; and whatever were supposed to have been done, there would still have been room for the inquiry, why was not more done: and if the answer is not to be resolved into mere sovereign pleasure, as perhaps it may, then it must be referred into some reason unknown to us; for the reason cannot be, that the

\* For the writers who maintain that both the natural and moral evil existing in the world are essential parts of the best possible system, recourse may be had to Hartley, Priestley, Cooper, and Godwin. Soame Jeayns may in part be mentioned in this view.

happinefs of the whole would have been lefs, which in this cafe it is a contradiction to affert.

*Boyle on Venerat.* p. 88, 89.—*Bayes on Div. Ben.* p. 65—70.—*Fenelon's Phil. Works,* vol. ii. p. 70—82. *præf.* § 9, 10. p. 72—76.—*Leibnitz Theod.* vol. ii. p. 251, &c.

## SCHOLIUM 5.

To this way of ftating the divine goodnefs, as purfuing the happinefs of the creation fo far as it is fit to be purfued, it is objected, that nothing can be fit, but what tends to produce happinefs; and that no being can be perfectly good, unlefs he does all the good he can poffibly do. But this laft principle cannot, for the reason above-mentioned, be allowed, when we fpeak of an almighty agent.

On the whole, it muft be owned to be a confiderable difficulty. Neverthelefs, we are fure there is a mixture of evil in the world; and it becomes us ferioufly to confider, whether it be more honourable to God, or decent in us to fay, that he could have prevented it, though for fome wife but unknown reason he did not chufe to do it; or to fay, he could not have prevented it, without chufing a fcheme, in confequence of which his creation might have been lefs happy than it now is.

*Balg. on Div. Reft.* p. 23—30. *Trafts* p. 241—248.—*Bayes on Div. Benev.* p. 29—33.—*Grove on Wifd.* p. 59—80. *Works,* vol. iv. p. 72—100.

## SCHOLIUM 6.

It may not be improper here to take fome notice of the celebrated controverfy, between Mr. *Balguy*, Mr. *Bayes* and Mr. *Grove*, concerning the *Spring of the divine actions*. *Balguy* refers them all to *Reftitude*, *Bayes* to *Benevolence*, and

LECT.  
LVII.

*Grove to Wisdom.* There is something which well deserves an attentive perusal in their writings on this subject, of which we shall give a short abstract in the following scholia, so far as they relate to the present question\*.

*Balguy* maintains, that God always does that which is right and fit, and that all his moral attributes, *viz.* justice, truth, faithfulness, mercy, patience, &c. are but so many different modifications of *rectitude*. He thinks it most agreeable to the divine simplicity, and most honourable to God, to conceive of him as always influenced by this uniform principle; and that this manner of conceiving of him would prevent much confusion in our ideas, which arises from considering his different attributes as having different interests and claims.

*Div. Rect. p. 3—8. Tracts, p. 212—217.*

He grants that the *communication of good* is one great and right end of the creator; but maintains that it is not the *only* end: he ultimately aims at *his own glory, i. e.* the complacential approbation of his own actions, arising from a consciousness of having inviolably preserved a due decorum, order and beauty in his works: and if ever the happiness of any particular creature, or of the whole system interfere with this, (as he thinks it sometimes may) it must so far give way to it.

*Div. Rect. p. 20—25. Tracts, p. 219—222.*

\* This controversy, though much celebrated in its time, is now nearly forgotten. There have lately been few or no specific speculations concerning the Spring of Action in the Deity, any farther than as it has generally been referred by recent philosophers to Benevolence. The tracts, however, of *Balguy* and *Grove*, as well as of *Mr. Bayes*, may still deserve the attention of a student, since they contain many important sentiments relative to the divine conduct.

This leads him into some reflections on the nature of *beauty* and *order*, in which he maintains that they are real and absolute in themselves, and are not merely relative to our faculties; otherwise, why this wonderful apparatus, this profusion of art and skill in the universe? He contends that Dr. *Hutcheson* grants this, when he places all beauty in *uniformity amidst variety*. Now whatever is beautiful in the universe, the creator must see it, and have a perfect view of all that is amiable and delightful in it. He concludes this part of his discourse with observing, that to suppose all the beauty, order and harmony of the universe subservient to the happiness of living creatures, is hardly to be reconciled with the appearance of things: so that on the whole, the increase of *happiness*, and love of *order*, being both agreeable to the rectitude and perfection of the divine nature, are joint ends, blended together both in the works of creation and providence.

*Div. Reet.* p. 16—23. *Tracts*, p. 223—230.

## SCHOLIUM 7.

To this Mr. *Bayes* objects, that to consider God first in general as doing all that is right, and then to deduce his particular moral attributes, as branches of this universal rectitude of his nature, is going farther about than is necessary, and leaves particular attributes entangled in just the same difficulty as before. But if it were otherwise, he says, that as nothing can be *fit* but what tends to promote happiness, the best idea we can entertain of the rectitude of God, is a disposition in him to promote the general happiness of the universe; and that we may as well consider all the other moral attributes as comprehended in this, and different modifications of it, as to consider them united in *Balguy's* view

of rectitude; but with this advantage, that here we shall have something certain to depend upon; whereas it must throw the mind into perpetual perplexity, if (for ought we know) God may have some ends in his actions and dispensations, entirely different from and perhaps opposite to the happiness of his creatures.

*Bayes on Div. Benev. p. 7—19.*

As for the ideas of *order* and *beauty*, he seems to query whether those objects which appear beautiful to us may appear so to the divine mind. He thinks that the only glory, which God can propose as the end of his actions, is the approbation of his own benevolent mind, as acting always in such a manner as shall be most for the happiness of the creation. He urges several objections against *Balguy's* notion of beauty, which it is not necessary to contract here, lest we deviate too much from the principal question.

*Bayes ib. p. 33—44.—Relig. of Nat. p. 116—119.*

On the whole, he concludes that the divine benevolence is not to be stated, as “an unbounded inclination to communicate the highest degree of happiness,” which is a contradiction, as it would be to suppose the greatest possible triangle actually described; (Compare *Schol. 4.*) but “as a kind affection towards his creatures, inclining him to confer upon that universe which he has made (and which he might have created or not, or have created with inferior or superior capacities for happiness) the greatest happiness of which it is capable.” But if it be asked, why it was not made capable of more, he supposes that must be referred into the will and pleasure of God.

*Bayes ib. p. 70, 71.*

## SCHOLIUM 8.

Mr. *Grove* refers all into the *wisdom* of God, which he says is “the knowledge that God has of what is fitting or unfit to be chosen in every imaginable circumstance;” and taking it for granted that he is under no wrong bias, concludes that he always chuses according to this fitness. He adds, that nothing can be fit to be chosen by any being, but what has some reference to *happinefs*, either that of the agent or some other; and that *beauty* and *order* are nothing any farther than as they tend to communicate pleasure to percipient beings: therefore the end of God in the creation must be *happinefs*; as to the degree and manner of attaining it, suited to the faculties, dependencies and freedom of his rational creatures. On the whole, he supposes it must be apparently fit, that no reasonable creature should be made miserable, before he deserves it. He farther adds, that he should be made for *happinefs*; but that he should be obliged as reasonable and free to chuse reason as his guide to it: and if he will not be persuaded to take the right way, it is fit he should be left to the ill consequences of his own wrong choice. All this therefore he supposes God must will.

LECT.

LVIII.

*Grove on Wisd. p. 1—7. Works, vol. iv.  
p. 7—13.—Rel. of Nat. p. 116.*

As *Bayes* and others have maintained, that benevolence is a *kind inclination* or affection in God, *Grove* endeavours to prove, that properly speaking, there is no inclination in him; and maintains, that to suppose such an inclination as depends not on the previous act of the divine understanding, will be in effect imputing to him a blind and irrational propensity; and that nothing could be more dishonourable to the Divine Being, than universally to assign this reason for his conduct in any instance, “that he was inclined, or

“ had a mind to do it.” But he farther maintains it, as probable at least, that there are no inclinations in God at all distinct from his actual volitions, but that the actings of the divine will are immediately and inseparably connected with those of his understanding: to suppose the contrary, he thinks would in effect be supposing, that reason would not be sufficient to determine the divine mind. If any determination be said to have proceeded from such inclination, that coincides entirely with the former exploded hypothesis of blind inclination: but if it be said, the action proceeded partly from reason and partly from inclination, he asserts, that it may as well be supposed to proceed entirely from reason.

*Grove ib. p. 14—23. Works, vol. iv. p. 22—31.—Balg. Div. Reft. p. 9, 10. Tracts, p. 217, 218.*

Hence Mr. *Grove* infers in the process of his discourse several things, relating to the divine liberty, the origin of evil, the divine happiness, and the duties of natural religion, which have been or will be referred to, so far as there appears any thing peculiarly remarkable in them.

#### SCHOLIUM 9.

From the survey we have taken of this controversy, it may be natural to make the following remarks.

1. That each of these ingenious writers discovers a pious temper, a concern for the honour of the Divine Being, and the advancement of virtue in the world.

2. That they all acknowledge that God does always what is right and good: nay, that when one thing is on the whole more fit than another, he invariably chuses it.

3. That both Mr. *Grove* and Mr. *Balguy* acknowledge the *communication of happiness*, to be a noble and

and excellent end, which the deity in some measure has always in view; and which he prosecutes, so far as to bring happiness at least within the reach of all his rational creatures; never inflicting any evil upon them out of caprice, or without some just and important reason.

4. That there is very little difference between the foundation of *Grove's* discourse, and that of *Balguy's*; *wisdom* in the former being so stated, that to be always governed by it coincides with the notion of *rectitude*, maintained by the latter.

5. That Mr. *Bayes* himself does not assert, that it would have been impossible for God to have produced a greater sum of happiness; and by granting the contrary, seems to overturn the foundation of those arguments, by which he attempts to prove, that God has made the creation as happy as its present capacity would admit.

6. It seems that a virtuous mind may be as easy, in considering God as a being of universal *rectitude*, as if we were to consider him as a being of unbounded *benevolence*: nay it seems, that in some respects the former will have the advantage; as it is impossible for us confidently to say, what will be for the greatest happiness of the whole; but on the other hand, we may naturally conclude, that *rectitude* will on the whole incline God to treat the virtuous man in a more favourable manner than the wicked.

7. That the scheme of universal benevolence in the highest sense seems evidently to imply *fatality*: for if all the sin and misery of the creatures were necessary to produce the greatest possible sum of happiness, and if the perfection of the divine nature determined him to produce this greatest sum, then sin and misery would be necessary; whereby the doctrine of liberty is destroyed, and such a seeming reflection thrown on the divine character, as few would be able to digest.

8. It seems therefore on the whole best to keep to that in which we all agree, and freely acknowledge, there are depths in the divine counsels unfathomable to us; so that though we may justly believe God has his reasons for suffering evil to be produced, we cannot certainly determine what those reasons are; and when we go about particularly to explain them, we find it difficult, according to the different schemes we embrace, on the one hand to vindicate his goodness, or on the other his omnipotence.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

God is INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

LECT.

LIX.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. This would follow merely from his being a spirit, endued with perfections vastly superior to our own. Vid. *Prop. 27. Cor.* and *Prop. 18. Cor. 1.*

2. There may be (for any thing we certainly know) attributes and perfections in God, of which we have not the least idea.

3. In those perfections of the divine nature, of which we have some idea, there are many things to us inexplicable, and with which, the more deeply and attentively we think of them, the more we find our thoughts swallowed up; *v. g.* his self-existence, his eternity, his omnipresence, whether it be conceived of as diffusive or not diffusive; his producing effects by mere volition, the creation of matter or even of spirit; his omniscience, where his knowledge of what is past from the creation of the world (how long soever you suppose it to have been) bears no given proportion to the knowledge of what is yet to come, if any creature be supposed immortal; especially his knowledge of future contingencies; how, being perfectly happy, and consequently having nothing to wish or desire, he was excited to act:  
how,

how, being perfectly good and omnipotent, he permitted evil to enter into the world; besides many other particulars touched upon in the preceding lectures.

I, 2, & 3. | 4. God is incomprehensible. Q.  
E. D.

*Abern. Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 6, 7.*

## COROLLARY I.

We have reason to believe, that as the perfections of God are infinite, if there be any orders of intelligent creatures superior to us, these perfections must also be incomprehensible to them.

*Tillois. Serm. vol. ii. p. 768.—Rel. of Nat. p. 93, 94.*

## COROLLARY 2.

It certainly becomes us to use great modesty and caution, when we are speaking of the divine perfections.

*Archbp. King of Predest. § 30, 31.*

## SCHOLIUM.

It ought to be remembered, that the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being is no sufficient reason for our allowing ourselves in self-contradictory language, when we are speaking of him; as some of the antients did, when they spoke of him as *more than unknown, without existence, without substance, a super-divine divinity, and as terminating infinity itself*, so that infinite space is but a small corner of his productions, and *beyond perfection*; which, though probably designed only as strong hyperboles, tend to expose the persons that use them to ridicule, rather than to exalt our ideas of the divine glory.

*Divine Analogy, p. 65, 66.—Fraser's Life of Nadir Schah, p. 12—18.*

## PROPOSITION XLVII.

The passions and affections of human nature are not in any degree to be ascribed to God; Compare *Prop.* 1. *Gr.* 3. and *Prop.* 13.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. Many of those passions are grievous and troublesome, as anger, envy, fear, shame, &c. and consequently there can be no room for them in a being perfectly happy, as God is. *Prop.* 38.

2. Others of them, which afford more pleasing sensations, are founded on some degree of weakness, and plainly imply a defect of happiness, as desire, and hope, &c. and consequently are inconsistent with the omnipotence, as well as the felicity of God.

3. The workings of the passions in us are always attended with some commotions in animal nature, and therefore imply corporeity; but God being incorporeal, such passions can have no place in him. *Prop.* 41.

1, 2, & 3. 4. God is free from human passions. Q. E. D.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Nevertheless in a *figurative* sense, love and joy, anger and pity, &c. may be ascribed to God; when we mean no more, than that God does such acts, as in us would be at least probable indications of such passions in our mind, *v. g.* supplying the necessitous, relieving the sorrowful, punishing the vicious, &c. Yet strictly speaking, we are to conceive of all these, as performed by him with the utmost calmness and serenity; and even that complacency, with which God contemplates his own perfections, and the actions and characters of the best of his creatures, is of a nature very different from, and vastly superior to, those sallies of joy, which we  
perceive

perceive in ourselves, in the most agreeable situations of life, and when our enjoyments are most refined.

*Limb. Theol. l. ii. c. x. § 3.*—*Burn. on the Art. p. 24—27.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be proper here to mention the scheme, which Mr. *Brown* advances in his *Divine Analogy* as of so great importance, and which is built upon a hint in Archbishop *King*.

He pretends, that all we know of God is merely by *Analogy*; *i. e.* from what we see in ourselves and observe in others, compared with events produced by the divine being, we conclude, that there is something in God, in some degree *answerable* to those phænomena, though indeed very *different* from them. This analogy, as he maintains, differs much from *metaphor*, which is a mere figure, *v. g.* when we speak of the eye of God, the hand of God, it is a metaphor, God being entirely incorporeal: but when we speak of the knowledge and power of God, it is by analogy.

If he means by this, that the divine manner of knowing and acting is different from ours, or that whatever degree of knowledge and power we possess, bears no proportion to that of the supreme being, it is what every one will very readily allow, and has generally been asserted by all who believe the existence and infinite perfections of God: but if he intends any thing else, his meaning seems either very unintelligible, or very absurd; so that the scheme, in either of these views, seems utterly unworthy of that vast parade, with which he introduces it, as if the whole of natural and revealed religion depended upon such an explication of the matter.

*Archbishop King of Predest. § 3—6, 8, 9, 37.*—*Grove on Wisd. p. 42, 43. Works, vol.*

vol. iv. p. 48, 49.—*Proced. of Understanding*, p. 3—6. & 132—143.—*Divine Anal. c. i.*—*Law's Notes on King, on the Orig. of Evil*, p. 67—70. *Quarrio Edition, Ed. 3. p. 89—93.*

## PROPOSITION XLVIII.

LECT. To consider some of the most celebrated definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, and to compare them with that given, *Def. 38.*

## SOLUTION AND DEMONSTRATION.

1. Dr. Clarke and Mr. Balguy have the same notion with that stated above; as evidently appears from the references to them, *Def. 38.* and *36 Cor.* And those of the *ancients*, who defined virtue, to be *living according to nature*, seem to have meant much the same.

2. Mr. Wollaston has placed it in a regard to *truth: i. e.* he supposes that not only our words, but our *actions* have a language; when this language is agreeable to the nature of things, then the action is virtuous, but when it implies a false assertion, then it is vicious. This account, though it differs in words, seems entirely to coincide with the former, or evidently to depend upon it.

*Rel. of Nat. p. 8—13. & 20—24.—Hutchef. on the Pass. p. 253—274.—Grove's Works, vol. iv. p. 50—54.*

3. Dr. Hutcheson defines *moral goodness*, “ to be a quality apprehended in some actions, which produces approbation and love towards the actor, from those who receive no benefit from the action;” and supposes what he calls a *moral sense*, implanted in our natures, or an instinct, like that of self-preservation, which, independently on any arguments taken from the reasonableness and advantage of any action, leads

us to perform it ourselves, or to approve it when performed by others.

*Hutches. Inq. Pref. p. 6—8. & p. 101—106. Edit. ii. p. 14—16. III—116.*

That there is indeed such a sense, as to some branches of virtue, though in many persons and instances much impaired, is not to be denied, and is well illustrated and proved in

*Hutches. Inq. p. 107—124. Edit. ii. p. 117—135.—Spe&t. vol. viii. N<sup>o</sup>. 588.*

Nor does it imply any innate idea, as some have supposed; any more than the intuitive discerning of self-evident propositions, implies the ideas connected with them to have been innate.

*Watts's Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. iv. § 5 p. 108—113.*

But Dr. *Hutcheson* has made this instinct to be the very *foundation* of virtue; and expressly says, that “every good action is supposed to follow from affection to some rational agent;” and that “the true spring of virtue is some instinct, which influences to the love of others, as the moral sense determines us to approve actions flowing from this principle.”

*Hutches. Inq. p. 143, 153. Edit. ii. p. 155—165.*

But Mr. *Balguy* pleads that this makes virtue an *arbitrary* thing, which might have been contrary to what it is, had the instinct been contrary: that it implies that a creature with intelligence, reason and liberty could not have performed one good action, without this affection: that it makes brutes capable of virtue, since they are capable of affections: that it estimates the excellency of characters by the strength of passions, by no means in our own power; and on the whole, gives us a much less honourable idea of virtue, than the method of stating it, which is taken above: to which we may add, that if we do not conceive of God as an *affectionate* being, such an  
idea

idea of moral goodness as this, would be inconsistent with that of the divine rectitude.

It may be observed by the way, that though Lord *Shaftesbury* uses many expressions, which Dr. *Hutcheson* has adopted, yet it seems that he in the main falls in with the account given above; since he considers virtue as founded on “the *eternal measure* and *immutable relation of things*,” or in other words as consisting “in a certain just disposition of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong.”

*Shaftesb. Char. vol. ii. p. 36, 40.*

We conclude this head with observing, that Dr. *Hutcheson's* definition is liable to some exception; as there may be room to question, what he means by the expression, “those who receive no advantage from the action:” if it be only *the generality of mankind*, it is evidently a vague, uncertain manner of speaking, and for that reason to be declined in so important a definition; but if he means *all rational beings*, then it will remain to be proved, that all these, or even the human species, do necessarily approve and love virtue in all its branches, and all that practise it.

*Balg. Found. of Goodness, part i. p. 7—15,  
20—22. Tracts, p. 46—54. 59—62.*

LECT. 4. Many writers, both ancient and modern,  
LXI. have placed virtue in *the imitation of God*: and it must be allowed to be a very noble view of it. Now as it has already been proved, *Prop. 44.* that God is a being of perfect rectitude, it follows, that taking virtue on our definition, it will also be an imitation of God.—But on the whole, this definition did not seem preferable, for two reasons, 1. Because it is difficult to prove the moral perfections of the divine being, otherwise than by the medium of an immutable difference in actions, the conformity to which shall be

be honourable, and the contrary dishonourable.

2. Because, when virtue is said to be an imitation of God, great allowance must be made for the different nature and relations of that blessed being and ourselves: since there are some things, in which it would be impossible or impious for us to attempt to imitate him; and others, in which it is impossible that he should be an example to us; *i. e.* in all those branches of duty, which suppose either dependence, corporeity, or guilt. There is indeed in these branches of virtue, a *correspondence* between the nature of God and our temper and conduct; but that cannot in strict propriety be called a *resemblance*.

*Plato ap. Howe's Blessedn. &c. Tit. Page.*  
 —*Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 581.*—*Howe ib. p.*  
 69—79. *Ap. Op. vol. i. p. 471—475.*  
 —*Evans's Christian Temp. vol. i. p. 59*  
 —66.

5. Others, and particularly Dr. *Cumberland*, in his *Law of Nature*, have placed the whole of virtue, as in men, in the *love of God*, and *our fellow-creatures*; or to express it in his own words, “The foundation of all natural law is  
 “ this, the greatest benevolence of every rational  
 “ agent towards all, forms the happiest state of  
 “ every and of all the benevolent, so far as it is  
 “ in their power; and is necessarily requisite to  
 “ the happiest state which they can attain, and  
 “ therefore the common good is the supreme  
 “ law.”

This is an amiable view of it, and well expresses that principle of gratitude and benevolence, whence all true virtue in us must flow: but it nearly coincides with Dr. *Hutcheson's* notion *gr. 3.* and in a great measure with *gr. 4.* for to love God, is to regard him as the centre of happiness, whom therefore we must in all things study to resemble and to please: and thus  
 it

it is an universal principle, of which the love of our neighbour is a very important branch: and when we are required, to do to others as we would have them do to us; the meaning is, that we must treat them as we could reasonably desire they should treat us, were they in our circumstances and we in theirs. So that here is a reference to the fitness of things according to present circumstances; which plainly shews that precept to be founded on the definition of virtue which we have advanced.

*Cumberl. Law of Nat. c. i. § 4.—Hobbe's Leviath. p. 140, sub fin.—Evans's Christian Temper, vol. ii. p. 186—194.*

6. *Aristotle*, and other ancient moralists have placed virtue in a *mediocrity*; supposing vice to consist in extremes. But it is evident, that merely from this definition none could know what virtue is; nor can it be determined what is an extreme, till we know what is agreeable to the nature of things: besides there are some branches of virtue, which cannot be carried to an extreme, *v. g.* resignation to the will of God, belief of his promises, &c.

*Aristot. Ethic. l. ii. c. vi.—Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, Prol. § 43—45.—Relig. of Nat. p. 24, 25.*

7. Some have placed all virtue in a *wise regard to our own interest*; which seems to have been the opinion of *Dr. Waterland*, *Mr. Clarke* of *Hull*, and *Dr. Rutherford*. Concerning which it may be observed, that the question is not, whether virtue be always most for our interest; (*Vid. Prop. 44. Cor. 2.*) nor whether there be any such thing in nature as disinterested benevolence; (which we shall afterwards examine, *Prop. 50. Schol.*) or whether, supposing there is, all virtue consists in it, so that our own interest should be disregarded; but whether a wise regard  
to

to it is the clearest, the most rational and amiable view of virtue in general; which from what has been said above, evidently appears not to be the case.\* †

## COROLLARY.

From a survey of all these it may appear, that the most considerable writers, whose notions we have examined in the five first steps, have differed from each other, more in expression, than in meaning, in the different views they have given of moral virtue.

## PROPOSITION XLIX.

To estimate the degree of virtue in any given action.

LECT.

LXII.

\* Dr. John Brown may be added to the number of those who have placed virtue in a wise regard to our own interest. See the second of his *Essays on the Characteristics of the Earl of Shaftesbury*.

† Other definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, have been given since the Lecture was written. Mr. Hume includes under his description of virtue whatever is agreeable to ourselves and others, and whatever is useful to ourselves and others. Dr. Adam Smith refers it to the principle of sympathy. Mr. Archdeacon Paley defines virtue to be, "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

*Hume* "on the Principles of Morals," as separately printed, *passim*, or in the Collection of his *Essays*.—*Adam Smith's* "Theory of Moral Sentiments," vol. i. p. 1—52. Sixth Edition.—*Paley's* "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. i. p. 41—53. Seventh Edition.—*Dr. Beattie's* "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 8—77.

For a view of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue, and of the different systems which have been formed concerning the principles of Approbation, see Dr. Adam Smith *ubi supra*, vol. ii. p. 195—358.

About fifty years ago, Mr. Jameson, a Scotch clergyman, published a treatise to shew, that the obligation of virtue is unitedly founded upon the reason and fitness of things, the moral sense, and the will of God.

## SOLUTION AND DEMONSTRATION.

1. There can be no virtue at all in any action, if the agent by whom it is performed has not some idea of the moral fitness of things. Vid. *Def.* 38.

2. There can be no virtue at all in it, if there be not an ultimate purpose of acting agreeably to that fitness, or from an end, which it is upon the whole virtuous to propose: for if the action be designed merely as a means of obtaining an end which it is vicious to desire and pursue, in that connection it participates of the meanness of the end, how excellent soever it might otherwise have been; and the nobler the motive is, *cat. par.* the more virtuous is the action.

*Scott's Christian Life, vol. i. c. iv. p. 251*  
—258. *Works, vol. i. p. 97—100.*—  
*Speet. vol. iii. N<sup>o</sup>. 213.*

3. The action must on the whole be *chosen* by the agent, in order to its being virtue in him; otherwise it is not so properly his action, as the action of some other being, whose instrument or organ he at that time is. Vid. *Def.* 10.

4. It is much debated, whether it be necessary that the being acting should have a *liberty of choice*, (*Def.* 22.) *i. e.* be able to chuse otherwise. It must be owned, this does not follow from our definition of virtue: nevertheless it may be allowed, that the virtue of a being in a *state of probation* must be founded in a liberty of choice.

*Balg. Div. Rect. p. 26—28.*—*Grove Div. Wisd. p. 61—63.*

5. It cannot be necessary, that there should be in the general some degree of *affection* in every agent, to render his actions virtuous; for then the divine being, if he be free from affections and passions, would be incapable of virtue, con-

trary to *Prop.* 43. But when passions are wrought into the constitution of any being, as in us, it is indeed very desirable that they should concur with the volition; but if they do not, and a fit action is performed, without any passionate impressions at all, from a rational principle of gratitude to God and regard to the happiness of man, it is still a virtuous action. *Vid. Prop.* 48. *gr.* 3. *Balg. Inq. part i. p.* 57—60. *Traſts, p.* 92—95.

6. Though the degree of virtue in any action is lessened by the degree in which it proceeds from a regard to any private advantage, distinct from virtue itself, (*Vid. gr.* 2.) yet if any be excited to virtuous actions, in hopes thereby of attaining to a state of complete virtue, the degree of virtue in such actions is not thereby lessened; but this is properly loving virtue for virtue's sake.

*Shaftesb. Charl. vol. ii. p.* 58—66.—*Balg. Lett. to a Deist, N<sup>o</sup>. i. p.* 33—36.—*Balg. Moral Goodn. part ii. p.* 33—38. *Traſts, p.* 129—132.

7. When the passions work in a powerful manner on the side of virtue, the force of virtue is in that case less seen, than when they work strongly against it, and a regard to the fitness of things surmounts them. Nevertheless, there may be as great virtue in a being, where there is no struggle at all, as where virtue triumphs over the most violent opposition; otherwise the deity would be incapable of virtue: nay there may be virtue, where the passions plead strongly on its side; otherwise a man would daily grow less capable of exalted degrees of virtue, as he gained a conquest over the irregularities of his passions, which is all most evidently absurd.

*Shaftesb. Char. vol. ii. p.* 36—38.—*Balg. of Moral Good. part ii. p.* 88, 89.—*Traſts, p.* 192—193.

## COROLLARY I.

LECT. On nearly the like principles, (*mutat. mutand.*)  
 LXIII. the degree of *Vice* in any given action may be  
 estimated. The matter is largely stated on both  
 sides in

*Hutcheson. Inq. p. 150—168. Edit. ii. p.  
 165—183.*

## COROLLARY 2.

It is impossible certainly to pronounce on the degree of moral good in any action, unless we exactly knew the heart of the agent, and also knew the whole of his circumstances and relations, so as to be able confidently to determine, what he could, and what he could not have known concerning the moral fitness, or unfitness of the thing in question. Vid. *Def.* 38.

## COROLLARY 3.

God alone can certainly and infallibly judge of the degree of virtue or vice in any given action: much more may this be affirmed concerning the whole of any *character*.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Dr. *Hutcheson* has attempted to introduce mathematical calculations into these subjects of morality; of which it may not be improper to give a little specimen. It is to be observed, that he undertakes to shew the method of stating the importance of a *character*, rather than the degree of virtue in any *particular action*; and his rules are these. Let *M* signify the *moment*, or degree of *good* produced by the person, whose character is under consideration; *B* the *benevolence* of his temper, and *A* his *ability*: then  $M = B \times A$ , *i. e.* in a compound ratio of his benevolence and ability: when in any two beings their abilities are the same,  $M = B$ : when their benevolence is equal,  $M = A$ . On the other hand, it appears  
 from

from the former view, that  $B = \frac{M}{A}$  *i. e.* directly as the moment of good, and *inversely* as the ability.

When present *interest* lies on the *side* of virtue, if I exprefs it, then  $B = \frac{M-I}{A}$ ; but if it lies *againſt*

virtue, then  $B = \frac{M+I}{A}$  He adds, that it is the

perfection of goodnefs, when  $M=A$ , for then the virtue of any two beings compared will be equal, *i. e.* :: 1 : 1 whatever their abilities are. This he ſuppoſes the *Stoics* meant, when they ſaid, the virtue of a wiſe man was equal to that of the gods. Yet here by the way, they took it for granted, that a wiſe man had no regard at all to his own intereſt, otherwiſe the aſſertion on theſe principles would be falſe: and if the reaſoning *Prop. 45. Schol. 4.* be allowed, this canon cannot be applied to the divine being; ſince A expreſſes an infinite quantity, and M can only expreſs a finite.

To expreſs the degree of *moral evil* in any character, let  $\mu$  ſignify the *degree of evil* produced, and H *hatred* or ill-will; and the former canon (*mut. mutand.*) may be applied.

*Hutch. ib. p. 168—174, 177, 178. Edit. ii. p. 182—188. 191, 192.*

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

How right ſoever this may be in the general, yet when particular circumſtances and characters come to be examined by it, it will be found of little uſe; ſince it is hardly poſſible to expreſs by proportional numbers, the degree of benevolence, the degree of ability for virtuous actions, and the degree in which intereſt is apprehended and conſidered for or againſt them; which muſt

all be exactly adjusted before the preceding canons can be applied.

## DEFINITION XLI.

LECT. LXIV. Those branches of virtue which more immediately respect God, are called DIVINE, those which respect our fellow-creatures, are called SOCIAL, and those which respect ourselves, HUMAN OR PERSONAL VIRTUES.

## PROPOSITION L.

To enquire into the principal branches of divine virtue.

## SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is fit we should often contemplate the divine being; since he appears by the foregoing propositions possessed of such illustrious perfections, as well deserve our most attentive thoughts; and since the knowledge of his nature must be of great use to direct us in the methods of pleasing him, and securing our own happiness.

*Wright's Great Concern, Edit. iii. p. 158—163. Ed. i. p. 151—157.—Scott's Christian Life, vol. i. p. 85—90.*

2. On account of those perfections, it is fit we should humbly adore him, as infinitely superior to all other beings; and that both our souls and bodies should concur in the expression of such adoration.

*Wright ib. Edit. iii. p. 182—185. Ed. i. p. 174—177.—Scott ib. p. 91—96. Works, vol. i. p. 33—36.*

3. Forasmuch as God is the most amiable being, it is fit we should love him with all our heart; *i. e.* should think of him with the highest complacency and delight; and as he is our great benefactor, that we should cherish the most lively sentiments of gratitude towards him; and that, seeing he is the source of being and happiness,

we should consider our own happiness as centred in him.

*Wright ib. Edit. iii. p. 200—205. Ed. i. p. 194—198.—Scott ib. p. 96—105. Works, vol. i. p. 38—41.—Collib. Inq. p. 11—17.—Evans's Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. viii. p. 167—173.—Abern. Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. x.*

4. Forasmuch as God is the author and disposer of all events, it is fit we should observe, acknowledge, and consider his providential interposition, in all the various occurrences of life.

*Wright ib. Edit. iii. p. 163—169. Ed. i. p. 157—163.*

5. In consequence of this his universal providence, in conjunction with his wisdom and goodness, it is fit, we should acquiesce in the determinations of his will, when most contrary to our present interest, or natural inclinations.

*Wright ib. Edit. iii. p. 196—199. Ed. i. p. 189—194.—Scott ib. p. 115—126. Works, vol. i. p. 45—49.*

6. Considering on the one hand his power, and on the other his evident and experienced wisdom and goodness, it is fit we should trust ourselves to his providential care, as to what is still before us.

*Wright ib. Edit. iii. p. 206—208. Ed. i. p. 200, 201.—Scott ib. p. 126—135. Works, vol. i. p. 49—53.—Abern. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. xi.*

7. Seeing all our happiness does entirely depend upon his favour, it is fit we should make it our highest care to please him, by complying with all the intimations of his will, and by imitating the moral perfections of his nature, so far as we are capable of such imitation; which, as was before observed, implies a regard to all the known branches of virtue (*Prop. 48. gr. 4.*):

nevertheless, when considered in this particular view, it is a branch of that duty which we immediately owe to God, and a regard to it should run through the whole of our lives; that even our minutest actions may as far as possible be dignified and sanctified by it.

*Wright ib. Edit. iii. p. 192—195. Ed. i. p. 185—189.*—*Scott ib. p. 105—115. Works, p. 41—45.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

See also on this subject the following writers,

*Amory's Dial. on Devotion.*—*Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 4.*—*Grove's Ethics, part ii. c. xix.*—*Butler's Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. xiii, xiv.*—*Xenoph. Mem. l. i. c. 4. l. iv. c. 3.*—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol. ii. p. 78—95.*—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 29—109.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Faith in the divine declarations is also a branch of divine virtue; but cannot so properly be considered here, as we have not yet examined the evidence of the divine veracity: and we may add, that a diligent inquiry into whatever bears any striking and probable marks of a declaration from heaven, will be a natural consequence of that veneration for God, that love to him, and that care to please him, which were specified in the 2d, 3d, and 7th steps, as branches of divine virtue.

## COROLLARY I.

It is vicious to ascribe supreme divine honour to any other than God alone. *Vid. Prop. 39.*

## COROLLARY 2.

It is also vicious to worship God by images, since it tends to sink our conceptions of him, g. 2 & 3.

*Limb. Theol. l. v. c. xxxiii.*—*Crellii Ethic. l. iii. c. vi. p. 329, 330. Vol. iv. among the Fratres Poloni.*

## COROLLARY 3.

The desire of foreknowing future contingencies, and all such astrological and magical arts, as some pursue in order to the discovery of them, are to be avoided; as not only tending to vex and disquiet the mind, but also, as in a degree inconsistent with the reverence, submission, and dependence, which we owe to the Divine Being.

*Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 137—144.*—*Turret. loc. v. quæst. 7. § 18.*—*Prid. Connect. vol. ii. p. 329—331.*—*More's Theol. Works, p. 240—255.*—*Welwood's Memoirs, p. 105—107.*—*Horace, B. i. Ode xi.*—*Jennings's Antiquities, vol. i. p. 381.*—*Limb. Theol. B. v. c. xxxv.*

## COROLLARY 4.

Great care should be taken, that our inquiries into the nature of the blessed God be made with a becoming reverence, and not in as loose and indifferent a manner, as if we were examining the properties of a mathematical figure, or a mechanical engine.

*Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. i. Pref. § 24.*—*Boyle on Venerat. p. 1, 2.*

## COROLLARY 5.

To blaspheme the name of God, *i. e.* to speak of him in a manner signifying contempt, or hatred, must be a most horrible degree of wickedness.

*Wits. Ægypt. l. i. c. v. § 4. l. ii. c. xvi. § 1.*—*Barrow's Works, vol. i. p. 133—135.*

## COROLLARY 6.

Forasmuch as our obligation to these branches of *divine virtue* is plainly founded on the nature of things, it is evident they give a very defective account of virtue, who confine it, (as the ancients generally did, and those who reject revelation often do,) to *sobriety*, and *benevolence*: and there is great reason to believe, that God as indispensably requires those regards to *himself* before described, as he does *social virtue*: for though on account of the infinite perfections of his nature he cannot require them for his own sake, *i. e.* to advance his own happiness, yet his love to rectitude and order on the one hand, and his regard to the truest happiness of his rational creatures on the other, must engage him absolutely to insist upon them.

*Leland against Tind. vol. i. p. 236—243. Edit. ii. p. 187, &c.—Leechm. Sermon on the Duty of a Min. p. 36—39. Glasg. Ed.—Leechman's Sermons, vol. i.*

## PROPOSITION LI.

LECT. To take a general survey of social virtue.  
LXV. Def. 41.

## SOLUTION.

The universal rule here is, that virtue obliges us to avoid whatever would be grievous to any of our fellow-creatures, if it be not necessary to procure some greater good; and that we labour to promote the happiness of all about us to the utmost of our power.

## DEMONSTRATION.

I. Our natures are so constituted, that we cannot but approve of kind and benevolent actions, and abhor those which are malevolent and cruel.

1. | 2. Every

1.|2. Every man, by an ill-natured conduct, must expose himself to the hatred and contempt of others.

1.|3. By an ill-natured conduct, a man would be exposed to the upbraidings of his own mind.

4. Mutual ill-offices naturally circulate; and it is exceedingly probable, that they will at last come home to the man who allows himself in them.

*Lettres Persannes, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. viii—xi.*

*Prop. 45. and Prop. 50. Gr. 7.|5.* God is good, and therefore a benevolent conduct is an imitation of him, and consequently a branch of virtue.

*Gr. 2, 3, 4 & 5.|6.* It is reasonable therefore, and consequently virtuous, to avoid doing what is grievous to others, and to do them all the good that we can, *i. e.* to be as benevolent as possible. *Q. E. D.*

*Hutches. Inq. Eff. ii. § 5. p. 195—222.—*  
*Rel. of Nat. p. 128, 129.—Puffend. de*  
*Off. l. i. c. viii. § 1—6.—Beattie's*  
*Elements of moral Science, vol. ii. p. 95*  
*—105.—Paley's Principles of moral and*  
*political Philosophy, p. 231—235. 241*  
*—259.*

#### COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears that the rule of loving our neighbour as ourselves is a summary view of social virtue; which, at the same time that it gives the *rule*, suggests the *reason*, as it is most apparent, that our conduct is to be determined, not by considering who the person is, with regard to whom we act, but what the circumstances of his case are.

*Rel. of Nat. p. 41.—Evans's Christian*  
*Temple, vol. ii. p. 168—176.—Butl.*  
*Serm, N<sup>o</sup>. xi. xii,*

## COROLLARY 2.

Since life is the foundation of happiness, virtue requires that we should not only forbear taking away the lives of our fellow-creatures, (unless when the good of the whole requires it,) but that we should be ready to preserve their lives, when we can do it without exposing our own, and in our own exposing the whole, to damage at least equal to the advantage that would arise from the preservation of the life or lives supposed to be secured at the expence of ours.

*Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. xxiii. p. 167. Tool. Ed.*

## COROLLARY 3.

The law of universal benevolence extends also to *ourselves*; and consequently obliges us to take care to secure our own lives, and to furnish ourselves with the necessary supports of them, if it lie in our power, that we may not be burthensome to others. It also obliges to act in such a manner, as to preserve our characters fair and untainted; for if they be damaged, our capacity of being useful to others will be proportionably impaired.

## COROLLARY 4.

The law of universal benevolence extends itself even to the *brutes*, supposing them capable of sensation, and consequently of pleasure and pain. And though there should be reason to suspect, that the arguments *Prop. 2.* are not conclusive, yet since it is difficult, if not impossible, certainly to prove, that they are mere machines, a virtuous man would be cautious how he abuses them, (especially since they are generally supposed to have sensation,) lest by any degree of cruelty towards them, an habit of cruelty might be contracted or encouraged: nevertheless, as they are capable of but small degrees of happiness

in comparison with man, it is fit that their interests should give way to that of the human species, whenever in any considerable article they come in competition with each other.

*Puff. Law of Nat. l. iv. c. iii. § 6.*—

*Hale's Contemp. vol. i. p. 293—295.*—

*Guard. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. 61.*—*Faſt. Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. iii. \**

#### SCHOLIUM.

As we here diſmiſs the conſideration of benevolence in general, and proceed to particular branches and effects of it; this ſeems to be the proper place to touch upon the celebrated queſtion, whether, and how far benevolence is to be conceived as *diſinterested*. With reſpect to which, the following remarks ſeem juſt and rational.

1. That every man cannot but deſire his own happineſs, whenever he thinks of it.

2. That this happineſs will be more effectually obtained, by a due regard to the public, than by ſeeking a ſeparate intereſt; as appears by principles laid down above.

3. That when the connection of ſelf-advantage with benevolent actions is thought of, it ſeems impoſſible that it ſhould not alſo be intended and conſidered: (*gr. 1.*) and the principle of univerſal benevolence, inſtead of forbidding, will require that ſome regard ſhould be paid to it, in ſuch a circumſtance.

4. That it would be very mean and ungenerous, if it were poſſible, to ſeek the happineſs of the public, without any affection to it, but merely as an inſtrument of private good.

\* The obligation of mercy to Brute Animals has been elaborately conſidered by Dr. Humphrey Primatt, in an expreſs Treatiſe on the ſubject. Mr. Granger publiſhed, alſo, a Sermon on the ſame ſubject, which, both on account of its ſize and price, is better adapted for the inſtruction of the lower orders of mankind.

5. That

5. That when a man feels the highest pleasure in doing good to the public, and even sacrificing his own separate interest to it, he must certainly have a real love for it, which may with some considerable propriety be called disinterested, if it be not so in the highest possible sense.

6. That as the happiness of *one* is of little importance, when compared with the happiness of *all*, it seems reasonable, that so far as it is regarded, it should not be made the chief end of actions profitable to the public, nor considered in any other view, than as subordinate to the good of the community, of which each is but one.

7. That the benevolent affections may be so strong, as to prevent any reflection upon the present pleasure, and much more the future advantage of a benevolent action to ourselves.

8. That the mind is so formed, as to reflect with great pleasure and delight on characters and actions, the consideration of which does not immediately affect our own personal interest; and to say, that our complacency in them arises from an apprehension, that the prevalency of such a temper in us would be advantageous to ourselves, seems asserting an evident falshood.

*Hutcheson on Pass. p. 13—26. Inq. p. 160—162\*.*

## PROPOSITION LII.

LECT. It is consistent with benevolence, and there-  
 LXVI. fore with virtue, that brute animals should be  
 slain for the food of men.

\* That there is no such thing as disinterested benevolence, is a favourite principle with many writers.—See, on this side of the question, Dr. Brown, in his “Second Essay on Shaftesbury’s Characteristics,” and Dr. Rutherford, in his “Moral Writings.”—On the other side of the question are Mr. Hume, in his “Principles of Morals;” and very recently, Mr. Godwin, in his “Enquiry concerning Political Justice,” Book iv. chap. viii. p. 341—361. See, also, Dr. Beattie’s “Elements of Moral Science,” Vol. i. p. 244—249.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. If animal food be used with moderation, it seems that hereby the happiness of mankind is promoted: this more generous kind of food may afford brisker spirits than a vegetable diet used alone: at least, it seems that those who have from their infancy been accustomed to eat flesh, would be exposed to considerable trouble and inconvenience, if not to distempers, by entirely leaving it off.

2. The happiness of the brutes is not on the whole diminished but rather promoted by this means: for a violent death does not seem to be nearly so painful as a natural death, coming upon them by the slow advances of a disease: their life, though it be shortened, yet is not embittered with fear and expectation of death, of which they seem not capable: to which we may add, that out of regard to our own advantage, we take care to feed and defend them, which renders their lives much happier than they would otherwise be; whereas, were they not to be used for food, we must either destroy them without eating their carcases, to prevent their multiplying too fast upon us, or they would destroy each other, consume the vegetable creation, and perhaps grow dangerous to us for want of sufficient food.

3. It is also to be remembered, that where the custom of eating flesh has long prevailed, it ought not to be laid aside without great and important reasons; considering what great numbers of mankind are subsisted, by keeping cattle, and trafficking in them alive or dead.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Whereas some have objected, that it is an invasion of the rights of God, as the great Lord of life, to make such havock of the lives of brute animals, it may be answered,

I. That

1. That by appointing it in the course of his providence, that they should multiply so fast, God has made it necessary that many of them should be slain, from whence we may reasonably argue, that he allows us to kill them for food.

2. That in the various classes of animals, it seems that the greater are generally supported by eating the less: not to say, (what yet some have urged,) that the teeth and stomachs of men are so formed, as to intimate that they were intended to feed upon flesh.

3. The agreeable variety of tastes, which God has given to the flesh of many birds, beasts and fishes, is a farther presumption that he designed them for our food, and consequently meant to give us a liberty of taking away their lives.

4. Most vegetables, when they come to be examined by microscopes, swarm with multitudes of small animals, which live in and upon them; so that a man, who should scruple destroying animals, would hardly be able to find a subsistence, at least not without resigning some of the finest vegetables, and so frustrating the kind purpose of providence in creating them.

*Reynolds's Lett. to a Deist, N<sup>o</sup>. i. præf. p. 24—61.—Thomps. Spring, ver. 336—378. Autumn, ver. 1089—1124.—Ovid's Met. l. xv. ver. 50—152.—Puff. Law of Nat. l. iv. c. iii. § 4, 5.—Nat. Disp. part i. p. 44—49.—Fitzosb. Let. N<sup>o</sup>. viii.—Clarke's Orig. of Evil, p. 266—295\*.*

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless care should be taken, not to add any unnecessary circumstances of terror and pain

\* Mr. Holwell and Mr. Oswald, both of whom have resided in the East-Indies, have embraced the principles of the Hindoos, and written against the use of animal food; Mr. Oswald in a distinct Treatise, very lately published.

to their death, nor should we accustom ourselves to sport with their lives.

*Dodd. on Educ. p. 22, 23.—Delany on Rel. Dut. p. 92—Thomson's Autumn, line 360—482.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have objected, that several of the arguments used in the proposition extend not to *fish*. But it is answered, that if a right of killing terrestrial animals for food be established, there seems little reason for scrupling to use fish in the like manner; it seems a part of the scheme agreeable to the rest: and the instinct, which brings them in shoals at certain times to the shore, seems an intimation that they are intended for human use.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It seems an instance of the goodness of the divine being, that he has in the course of his providence appointed the greater part of animals to die by some sudden violence, rather than by a lingering decay, in which on the whole they would suffer a great deal more, than they can do in the few painful moments which generally attend their death, when slain by men, or when devoured by each other, in which perhaps surprize and astonishment take off much of the sense of pain.

## PROPOSITION LIII.

To enquire how the parts and fruits of the earth ought to be distributed for the use of its inhabitants, before any mutual agreement is made between them, *i. e.* considering things in a *state of nature*.

LECT.  
LXVII.

## SOLUTION.

I. If there be enough of each, every one may take what he first lights on.

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2. When

2. When he has thus taken it, another person ought not to seize upon it without his leave, but should rather take some other part not so occupied.

3. Nevertheless, if there be not enough for each, he who has possessed himself of more than is necessary for his own subsistence, ought to impart some of it to him who is not capable of thus providing for himself. *Vid. Prop. 51.*

4. If necessary supplies be denied to a person incapable of providing otherwise for himself, he may seize on the possessions of another; nevertheless with this proviso, that no one shall be destroyed by such a seizure, whose life is of more importance to the whole community than that of the person who makes the seizure. *Vid. Prop. 51. Cor. 2.*

5. Nevertheless, it is not requisite that an equal distribution should be made; since on the one hand, each has in common cases a right to the fruits of his own industry, on the principles laid down above, *gr. 1, 2.* and on the other, it is for the good of society in general, that some should be richer than the rest, seeing there are many civil offices to be performed in life, which might become matter of dangerous debate, if some persons were not by the straitness of their circumstances induced voluntarily to perform them.

### DEMONSTRATION.

The demonstration appears from *Prop. 51. Sol.* and *Cor. 2.* for it is evident, that these rules will promote the happiness of mankind in general.

*Locke on Gov. l. ii. c. v.—Grot. de Jure Belli & Pac. l. ii. c. ii. § 2.—More's Utopia, p. 78—98.*

### SCHOLIUM I.

It seems that *usury* is not in general to be condemned, provided it be no more than is proportionable

tionable to that gain which the person borrowing receives from the loan; especially among men, who subsist not merely by agriculture and grazing and manual arts, but by trade or merchandize; since it is evident that among such, the money might turn to better account to the owners, than in the former case; and consequently the owners would have a just claim to some equivalent, for the advantage they forego in favour of the borrower. Nevertheless, in exacting this, virtue requires a compassionate regard to any calamitous circumstances, which may render the borrower incapable of paying interest, or perhaps the principal.

*Puff. Law of Nat. l. v. c. vii. § 8—12.—*  
*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xii. § 21\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Many things continue yet common, and are not become the property of any, there being enough to suffice all; some of them not being capable of occupation by one person alone, and others such that the property of them would not be useful to any, *v. g.* wild beasts and birds, air, insects, sea-water. Whether the *sea* can come into property, has been warmly disputed: *Grotius* denies it in his *Mare Liberum*, and *Selden* asserts it in his *Mare Clausum*: but it would be tedious and unnecessary to give a view of their arguments here.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. ii. § 3—5.—Puff.*  
*ib. l. iv. c. v. § 5—10.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Property in any degree ceases, when the thing is abandoned by the former possessor: and the security of mankind seems to require, that when

\* Mr. Bentham has lately published a curious Essay on Usury, in which the English laws upon this subject are examined, and the wisdom and propriety of them freely discussed.

any thing has been long in the possession of a person, family, or nation, it should continue with them, if for a considerable time the original possessor has entered no claim upon it. Perhaps hereby that former possessor may suffer some damage; yet there would be so much room for fraud and litigation, were antiquated claims often to be revived, that on the whole, they would undoubtedly occasion greater trouble than advantage to mankind; and it is impossible to lay down any general rules, which would not in some instances bear hard on the innocent and virtuous.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. iv. § 3—9.—Puff.  
ib. l. iv. c. xii. § 8.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

Perhaps upon these principles, that kind of theft, which was permitted by the *Spartan* law, might be justified; as by making such a law, the proprietors seemed voluntarily to have relinquished their property to those who could seize it in such circumstances: but how far it was on the whole prudent to do it, is difficult to determine, without stating the matter more largely than would be convenient here.

*Rollin Man. vol. iii. p. 340—347\*.*

DEFINITION XLII.

LECT. LXVIII. That verbal proposition is said to be ETHICALLY TRUE, in which we join those relations, attributes, or properties, which *seem to us* to belong to any idea, and separate those, which *seem to us* not to belong to it; but it is then LOGI-

\* Some singular opinions with regard to property are advanced by Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning Political Justice," vol. ii. p. 787—895.—The doctrine of property is particularly considered by Archdeacon Paley, in his "Moral and Political Philosophy," Book iii. chap. i. vol. i. p. 105—122. Seventh Edition.

CALLY TRUE, when we join those that *do really* agree, and separate those which *do not*.

## COROLLARY I.

A proposition *logically* true, may be *ethically* false, and *vice versa*.

## COROLLARY 2.

Propositions directly contrary to each other, in the mouths of different persons, may both be ethically, though not logically true.

## SCHOLIUM.

Ethical truth is sometimes divided into *veracity*, *i. e.* a conformity of our words to our thoughts, and *faithfulness*, *i. e.* a conformity of our actions to our words: the last seems to be limited to words expressing a purpose of doing *good* to another.

## DEFINITION LXIII.

That proposition, in which we culpably violate ethical truth, is said to be A LIE.

*Puff. ib. l. iv. c. i. § 8.*

## PROPOSITION LIV.

Virtue requires that ethical truth should be preserved among men in their discourses with each other.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. Speech may be useful in spreading the knowledge of those things, which may advance the happiness of mankind.

2. In order to render it thus useful, it is necessary that a person should be believed.

3. If ethical truth be not regarded, the person speaking cannot be believed.

4. The violation of ethical truth has generally been regarded as infamous, and persons who allow themselves in it, do thereby necessarily sub-

ject themselves to great contempt, and so greatly impair both their comfort and usefulness.

1, 2, 3 & 4. 5. *Valet propositio.*

*Puff. ib.* § 7, 10.—*Watts's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 168—170. *Works*, vol. i. p. 226.—*Grot. de Jure*, l. iii. c. i. § 11.—*Grove's Ethics*, vol. ii. part ii. c. xi.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 184—189. *Seventh Ed.*

#### COROLLARY 1.

It is injurious to virtue, to allow ourselves to abuse the ambiguity of words, in such a manner as thereby to lead others into a mistake, since most of the ill consequences which follow from direct lying, do also follow from such equivocations and mental reservations.

*Puff. ib.* § 13, 14.—*Grot. ib.* § 10.—*Burnet's Eff. on Queen Mary*, p. 63, 64.

#### COROLLARY 2.

Virtue forbids our deceiving others by *actions*, as well as by words; since the reasoning of the proposition does not depend upon making use of articulate sounds, or written characters, but upon any method taken to communicate our ideas to each other.

*Puff. ib.* § 2.

#### SCHOLIUM 1.

To this some have added a farther argument, taken from the *nature* of ethical truth, which, separate from all its *effects*, seems to imply something in it so sacred, that a violation of it is dishonourable and contemptible, and therefore vicious, though no damage should arise to ourselves or others from such a violation; especially considering, that God is the witness of every falsehood, and consequently it is a kind of indignity offered to him, to utter any thing in his presence

presence which he knows to be contrary to our own knowledge. This some have expressed by saying, God has given us *a sense*, by which we unavoidably delight in the truth, nor is it in our own power so far to reconcile ourselves to falsehood, as to approve of a scheme, in which any given degree of happiness should be produced by falsehood, so well as one, in which it should be produced by truth.

*Balg. Law of Truth, p. 4—12. Tracts, p. 373—383.—Butler's Anal. p. 316—318. 4th Ed. Oxf. Ed. iii. p. 462—464.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

From hence arises a question of considerable difficulty and importance; whether it may be in any case lawful, to speak what is ethically false.

Those who maintain the principles of the former scholium must deny it: but those who place the obligation to ethical truth merely on the principles laid down in the proposition, affirm, that if in any case, the happiness of mankind may be more effectually promoted by falsehood than truth, in that case, falsehood ceases to be a vice and becomes a virtue; and they suppose that many such cases actually occur: and that on these principles, it is lawful to use falsehood in our discourses with persons that are distracted, with infants and sick men, with a melancholy man, and those who enquire after the truth, with a design of doing that injury by the knowledge of it, which without it they would not have been able to effect.

This must be acknowledged a controversy of very great difficulty. Perhaps it is not possible for any human or finite understanding to determine, whether the universal observation of truth would be more for the advantage of the rational creation, than the violation of it in some ima-

ginable particulars: but as it is certain that the generality of mankind are too prone to artifice and deceit, and would be ready to abuse the doctrine of the innocence of falshood in any case, we should be very cautious of maintaining it; and an honest, generous, and religious man, if he errs at all, would rather chuse to err on the side of truth. And perhaps a regard expressed to it, even in circumstances, where it could not be maintained, without great danger and seeming ill consequences to ourselves, might make such impressions on the minds of very bad men, as might prove of service to the cause of virtue and the happiness of mankind; especially considering the unlimited power which God has over all the thoughts of mens hearts, and all the circumstances and occurrences of their lives: and it will be seen, when we come to enquire into the evidence of the divine veracity, that this attribute of the deity is incapable of being proved, if the opinion which we are here opposing be admitted. To all which we may add, that the supposed lawfulness of speaking falsely in great emergencies for the preservation of life, might also be extremely mischievous to mankind, by depriving them of all instances of martyrdom for religion; and is indeed a maxim so dangerous to human society, that it seems, that a wise and benevolent man, who firmly believes it, would on his own principles teach the contrary. And after all, if the principle itself were granted, yet many of the instances mentioned above, seem of too trivial a nature, to justify having recourse to a falshood; and in particular, nothing can be more dangerous to children, than to be taught to lie, by the example of their parents and governors.

*Puff. ib.* § 9, 10, 15, 16, 18.—*Barbeyrac's Notes, ib. l. iv. c. i.* § 7.—*Grot. ib. l. iii. c. i.* § 12—14.—*Watts's Serm. vol.*

*vol. ii. App. p. 207—219. Works, vol. i. p. 240—245.—Rel. of Nat. p. 29, 30.—Cambr. Telemach. l. iii. p. 57—59.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, allowance is to be made for the change which custom may have introduced into the signification of words, which has brought some expressions of complaisance and kindness, in most civilized nations, to so loose an import, that a man has no room to imagine, they will be interpreted rigorously, according to their utmost literal extent, and therefore need not be scrupulous about the use of them; *v. g.* as if he could not say, “he was at a friend’s service,” unless he intended thereby to make himself *a slave*.

*Puff. de Jure, l. iv. c. i. § 6.—Spect. vol. viii. N<sup>o</sup>. 557.—Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 5, 6.*

## DEFINITION XLIV.

A PROMISE is any speech, or other sign, by which we signify to another person a present determinate purpose, of transferring to him a part of our property or liberty, which nevertheless he is not actually to possess, till after some time.

LECT.

LXIX.

## DEFINITION XLV.

*A mutual promise*, or agreement of two or more persons with each other, may be called A COVENANT, whether the performance of one of the parties be, or be not the condition of obliging the other: but it is in the former case, called a *conditional covenant*.

## COROLLARY.

There is some foundation for distinguishing between *conditional promises*, and *pacts* or *covenants*; not only, as each party in a covenant may be absolutely bound to the performance of his part, without waiting to see whether the other

other will perform his, but also, as there may be a *conditional* promise, which is not *mutual*, whereas every covenant must necessarily be mutual.

*Puff. de Jure, l. iii. c. viii. § 8.*

### PROPOSITION LV.

Virtue requires that promises be fulfilled.

### DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 54.* | 1. Ethical truth, and therefore virtue requires, that when I declare a fixed purpose of giving or doing any thing, I should really intend it.

*Gr. 1. Def. 44.* | 2. The promisee, *i. e.* the person to whom the promise is made, acquires a property in virtue of the promise.

3. The uncertainty of property would evidently be attended with great inconvenience.

4. By failing to fulfil my promise, I either shew, that I was not sincere in making it, or that I have little constancy or resolution, and either way injure my character, and consequently my usefulness in life.

1, 3 & 4. *Prop. 51. Cor. 4.* | 5. Virtue requires that promises should be fulfilled.

*Watts's Serm. vol. ii. p. 146. Works, vol. i. p. 146.—Grove's Ethics, vol. ii. part ii. c. xii\*.*

### SCHOLIUM I.

A man is not bound by a naked *assertion*, as he is by a promise; nevertheless, when he makes such an assertion, he ought to intend to act according to it, (*Prop. 54.*) and when publicly made he should not lightly change it, lest his

\* A directly opposite doctrine to what is here advanced, is maintained by Mr. Godwin. See his "Enquiry concerning political Justice," vol. i. p. 150—156. This deduction is, that it is a part of our duty to make as few promises or declarations exciting appropriate expectations as possible.

character for wisdom and resolution should thereby suffer.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 2—4.—Puff. ib. l. iii. c. v. § 5—7.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless there are some excepted cases, in which virtue does not oblige us to fulfil our promises, because the reasons mentioned in the proposition do not extend to them, *v. g.*

1. If a promise was made by us, before we came to such exercise of reason, as to be fit to transact affairs of moment; or if by any distemper, or sudden surprize, we are deprived of the exercise of our reason, at the time when the promise is made.

*Puff. ib. l. iii. c. vi. § 5.—Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 5—7.*

2. If the promise made was on a false presumption, in which the promiser, after the most diligent enquiry, was imposed upon, especially if he were deceived by the fraud of the promisee.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 6. l. ii. c. xiii. § 4.—Puff. ib. l. iii. c. vi. § 6—8.*

3. If the thing itself be vicious; for virtue cannot require that vice should be committed.

*Puff. ib. l. iii. c. vii. § 6, 7.—Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 9.*

Under this head, we may rank the giving a reward for an evil action.

*Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 8.—Puff. ib. l. iii. c. vii. § 8.*

4. If the accomplishment of the promise be so hard and intolerable, that there is reason to believe, that had it been foreseen, it would have been an excepted case.

*Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xvi. § 27.—Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. x.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

If the promise be not accepted, or if it depend on conditions not performed, the non-performance of the promise is so evidently justifiable, that it seems hardly worth while to insert this among the catalogue of excepted cases.

*Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 14, 15. ib. l. iii. c. xix. § 14\*.*

## DEFINITION XLVI.

LECT.  
LXX.

AN OATH is a solemn appeal to God, as the witness of the truth of some facts asserted, or of our sincere resolution to perform some promise made, renouncing our claim to the divine favour, or imprecating his displeasure upon ourselves either implicitly or explicitly, in case of falshood.

## COROLLARY.

It is vicious to swear by any creature, since that is in effect ascribing to such a creature a degree of knowledge and power, which seems peculiar to God. Nevertheless, if without the express mention of the name of God, there be a secret appeal to him, in that case we swear by him ultimately, and not so much by the creature we mention, *v. g.* If I swear by my head, or my child, meaning thereby, “ may the divine vengeance fall on my head or my child, if I swear “ falsely.”

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § xi.—Puff. de Offic. Hom. l. i. c. xi. § 3.—Puff. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 3.—Paley’s moral and political Philosophy, vol. i. p. 190—197.—Godwin’s Enquiry concerning political Justice, vol. ii. p. 631—636.*

\* The whole subject of promises; from whence the obligation to perform them arises; in what sense they are to be interpreted; and in what cases they are not binding, is considered by Mr. Paley.—Principles of moral and political Philosophy, vol. i. p. 123—141. Seventh Edition.

## SCHOLIUM.

*A vow* is a promise made to God : if any express or implicit imprecation attend it, it is evidently *an oath* : but as vows are made with different degrees of solemnity, some of them may, and some of them may not be oaths. Yet as an address to God is made by them, they necessarily approach nearer to an oath than a promise made to our fellow-creatures.

*Paley's moral and political Philosophy, vol. i. p. 141.*

## DEFINITION XLVII.

PERJURY is the use of an oath in confirmation of an assertion, known, apprehended, or suspected to be false ; or the wilful violation of a promise, which by an oath we had bound ourselves to perform.

## COROLLARY.

As when a person swears that a thing is so and so, he is in all reason to be understood to assert, that he certainly knows that it is so ; the guilt of perjury may be contracted, even where a man believes a thing is as he asserts, if he has not a competent and determinate knowledge of the thing.

## PROPOSITION LVI.

Perjury is a very heinous crime.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is plainly inconsistent with the reverence due to the divine being ; as it implies, either that we do not believe his omniscience, or fear his displeasure, either of which is contrary to *Prop. 51.*

2. Mankind have in all ages professed some peculiar reverence for an oath, so that it has been used

used to determine controversies, and seal the most solemn mutual engagements.

2. [3. Faith among men would be still more injured by perjury, than by a false assertion, or promise uttered without an oath; since therefore these have been shewn to be detrimental to mankind, (*Prop.* 54, 55.) this must be yet more so.

4. Perjury has always been esteemed a very detestable thing, and those who have been proved guilty of it have been looked upon as the pest of society.

1, 3 & 4. [5. Perjury, being thus dishonourable to God, injurious to others, and to ourselves, is a great crime. *Q. E. D.*

*Occas. Paper*, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. vii. p. 5—12.—*Puff. de Jure*, l. iv. c. ii. § 2.—*Barrow's Works*, vol. i. *Serm.* xv.—*Paley's moral and political Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 197, 198.

#### COROLLARY I.

Care should be taken, that we do not impair the reverence due to an oath, by using or imposing oaths upon trifling occasions, or administering them in a careless manner.

*Occas. Paper*, *ib.* p. 22—24.

#### COROLLARY 2.

The reverence of an oath requires, that we take peculiar care to avoid ambiguous expressions in it, and all equivocation and mental reservation. *Vid. Prop.* 54. *Cor.* 1.

*Grot. de Jure*, l. ii. c. xiii. § 3.—*Puff. de Jure*, l. iv. c. ii. § 12—15.—*Tully de Offic.* l. i. § 13.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

Something of this kind may be said of *sub-*scription to articles of religion, these being looked upon as solemn actions, and nearly approaching

to an oath. Great care ought to be taken, that we subscribe nothing that we do not firmly believe. If the signification of the words be dubious, and we believe either sense, and that sense in which we do believe them is as natural as the other, we may consistently with integrity subscribe them: or if the sense in which we believe them be less natural, and we explain that sense, and that explication be admitted by the person requiring the subscription in his own right, there can be no just foundation for a scruple. Some have added, that if we have reason to believe, (though it is not expressly declared,) that he who imposes the subscription, does not intend that we should hereby declare our *assent* to those articles, but only that we should pay a compliment to his authority, and engage ourselves not openly to contradict them, we may in this case subscribe what is most directly contrary to our belief: or that if we declare our belief in any book, as for instance the bible, it is to be supposed that we subscribe other articles, only so far as they are consistent with that; because we cannot imagine, that the law would require us to profess our belief of contrary propositions at the same time. But subscription upon these principles, seems a very dangerous attack upon sincerity and public virtue, especially in those designed for public offices\*.

*Burn. on the Art. p. 6—9.—Clarke on the Trinity, Introd. Ed. 1. p. 20—26. Ed. 2. p. 23—29.—Conybeare's Serm. on Subscript. p. 24—31.*

SCHO-

\* The question concerning subscription to articles of religion has of late years received the most ample discussion. It would be almost endless to enumerate the various tracts that have appeared on the subject. The controversy was revived by the publication of the "Confessional," and carried on to still greater extent, by the distinct applications of a body of the clergy, and of the protestant dissenting ministers, for relief in the matter of subscription. The names of Blackburn, Jebb, Dawson, Firebrace,

## SCHOLIUM 2.

If we have bound ourselves by an oath to do a thing detrimental to our interests, we ought to submit to great inconveniencies rather than violate it: but if the nature of the oath be absolutely and evidently unlawful, we are not bound by it: and it is certain, that in some of the cases mentioned above, in which virtue allows the violation of promises, it may also permit our acting contrary to our oaths; with this proviso, that in proportion to the greater solemnity of the latter, the case should be more weighty and urgent.

*Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xiii. § 4.—Baxt. Works, vol. i. p. 572.—Puff. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 9, 10.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

If a conditional covenant, (*Def. 45.*) be mutually confirmed by an oath, the breach of the condition on one side evidently dissolves the other party from his obligation; which by the way justifies the *Revolution in England* in 1688, though many of the persons principally concerned had sworn allegiance to King *James*.

*Occas. Paper, vol. 1. N<sup>o</sup>. vii. p. 12—16.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

*Grotius* is mistaken, if he maintains (as some have asserted he does,) that by an oath we always promise something to God, and that for this reason an oath must in no case be violated. It

brace, Wyvil, Mauduit, Furneaux, Fownes, Radcliff, Wilton, and many others, occur in opposition to human articles of religion. On the contrary side might be mentioned Tucker, Rutherford, Randolph, Tottie, Powel, and a variety of writers besides. Mr. Paley has recently offered some thoughts on the matter, in his "Moral and Political Philosophy," vol. i. p. 218—220. Still more recently, a very elaborate Treatise against subscription has been published by Mr. Dyer,

appears

appears from the definition of an oath, that the former of these propositions is false, and from the second scholium, that if it were true, the inference drawn from it would be inconclusive: but the following passage, which some have quoted to prove this to be his opinion, is far from containing it.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 14, 15.*

#### DEFINITION XLVIII.

MARRIAGE is a covenant between man and woman, in which they mutually promise cohabitation, and a continual care to promote the comfort and happiness of each other. LECT.  
LXXI.

#### PROPOSITION LVII.

Virtue requires that mankind should only be propagated by marriage.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

1. A more endearing friendship, and consequently a greater pleasure arises from continued cohabitation, than could arise from the promiscuous use of women; where there could be little room for a tender, generous and faithful friendship between the sexes.

2. The promiscuous use of women would naturally produce a great deal of jealousy, bitter mutual contentions, and a variety of other passions, from which marriage, when preserved inviolate, very much secures.

3. Experience teaches that a promiscuous commerce between the sexes is very unfavourable to propagation, at least for producing a healthful offspring; and would prove the means of spreading to a fatal degree the venereal infection.

4. The weakness and disorders, to which women are subject during pregnancy, require, that both out of regard to them and the future race of mankind, they should be tenderly taken care

of; and that during their confinement they should be comfortably maintained: now there is none, from whom these offices of friendship can be so reasonably expected, as from the person who apprehends himself the father of the child; but without marriage, no man could ordinarily have the security of being so.

5. The education of children is much better provided for by this means, both with respect to maintenance, instruction and government, while each knows his own, and the care and authority of both parents concurs in the work; to which that of the father is generally on the whole of the greatest importance.

6. The regular descent of patrimony, being the consequence of fathers knowing their children, is better provided for by marriage, than it could be without it; which by the way is a great encouragement to industry and frugality.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6. 7. The happiness both of men and women, and of the rising generation, is on the whole more effectually secured by marriage, than it would be by the promiscuous use of women; therefore mankind ought only to be propagated this way. *Q. E. D.*

*Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 5.*—*Witsf. Ægypt. l. ii. c. vi. § 13—15.*—*Baxt. Works, vol. i. p. 314. A. vol. ii. p. 31. B.*—*Ostervald of Unclean. Sect. 1. c. i. § 2. p. 4—10.*—*Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 3. c. ii.*—*Milt. Parad. Lost, l. iv. ver. 750—770\**.

#### COROLLARY I.

Those unnatural lusts, commonly known by the name of bestiality and sodomy, are to be

\* Some extraordinary sentiments relative to marriage have been thrown out by Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning political Justice," vol. ii. p. 848—852.

greatly detested, not only as actions, whereby the dignity of human nature is in the most infamous degree debased, but also as alienating the mind from marriage, which is so important a band of society.

## COROLLARY 2.

Those who seduce single women to violate their chastity, are guilty of a very great crime; as thereby they discountenance marriage, and bring on persons so debauched, and the families to whom they are related, great calamity and indelible infamy.

*Guardian, vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 123.*

## COROLLARY 3.

All those things, which tend to cherish wandering lusts, are for that reason to be avoided; as lascivious actions, and unclean words, which generally lead on by a strong impulse to greater irregularities.

*Speët. vol. iv. N<sup>o</sup>. 286.—Osterv. of Unclean. Præf. p. 16. ib. Sect. I. c. vii. p. 60—72.—Evans's Sermons, vol. ii.*

## COROLLARY 4.

Since marriage is of so great importance to the happiness of mankind, it is plain that it ought not to be dissolved upon any trifling consideration; since uncertain marriages would be attended with many of the same inconveniencies, as the promiscuous use of women, and would differ from it little more than in name.

*Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 20.*

## PROPOSITION LVIII.

To enumerate the principal duties of the married state.

LECT.  
LXXII:

## SOLUTION.

1. Virtue requires that both parties preserve their fidelity to each other inviolate.

Q 2

2. They

2. They should study in every instance to promote each other's comfort and happiness.
3. They are to contribute their respective parts towards the maintenance and education of their children.

*Delany on Relat. Dut.* N°. ii, iii.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 339—344.—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science*, vol. ii. p. 124—140.

### DEMONSTRATION.

The obligation to perform these several duties arises, from the nature of the engagements into which the parties have entered; (*Def.* 48.) and from the tendency which such a conduct will have to secure their mutual happiness and that of their families.

### PROPOSITION LIX.

Virtue requires that no man should at the same time have more than one wife, and no woman more than one husband.

#### PART I.

No man should have more than one wife at a time.

### DEMONSTRATION.

1. The number of females, so far as we can judge by the best computation, is not entirely equal to the number of males, in the human species. *Vid. Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 4. *gr.* 4.

*Derham's Physf. Theol.* p. 175, 176.—*Reflect. on Polyg.* p. 4—7.

1. | 2. Should polygamy prevail, there would not be females enow to supply all the males; consequently many of them must be deprived of the advantage of marriage: not to mention, how

far it might be the occasion of those hateful and destructive practices, of sodomy and eviration.

*Reflect. on Polyg. p. 32—34.*

2. | 3. Quarrels would probably arise between those men, who endeavoured to possess themselves of more women than one, and those who were by this means deprived of partners in life; which might be attended with fatal consequences on both sides, should polygamy very much prevail.

4. The jealousy of the wives would probably make them very unhappy, were several women to share among them the affection and care of the same man; and it would occasion many cabalings, and mutual endeavours to supplant each other in his affections, by which the peace of families would be greatly disturbed; not to mention the frequent adulteries that might be expected, if there was not a strict guard. Vid. *Gen. xxix. xxx.*

5. The discords of the mothers might be communicated to the children; and so not only alienate their hearts from the father, and thereby prevent the efficacy of his care for their education, but also prevent a due harmony between them in riper years, and lay a foundation for quarrels to be transmitted to the next generation.

6. The master of the family would have his part in all this uneasiness; and would find it hardly possible to preserve his own quiet in any tolerable degree, without sacrificing the peculiar pleasure of having one intimate and best beloved friend, with whom to converse with the highest endearment: and if he had any true taste of the sublimest pleasures of friendship, the gratification of appetite with a variety of women must appear but a poor equivalent for such a sacrifice.

7. The practice of polygamy may leave room to a married man to be continually entering upon new amours and treaties with respect to other women; which would keep the mind in an uneasy agitation, and greatly divert him from applying to cares of the greatest importance to the happiness of his family and of the public, and expose him thereby to many obvious inconveniencies.

2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7. 8. Since polygamy is thus pernicious to the interest of the husband, wife and children, and, if it commonly prevailed, to that of so many single persons, virtue requires that one man should have but one wife at a time.

Q. E. D.

*Burn. Life of Rochest. p. 112, 113.—Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 16—19.—Salm. State of Turkey, p. 411—416.—Reflect. on Polyg. p. 13—19.—L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvi. c. ii—vii.\**

\* The question concerning Polygamy has recently been revived, in consequence of an elaborate treatise in defence of it, written by the late Mr. Martin Madan, and intituled "Thelyphthora." To this work many answers appeared, among which may be reckoned, "Polygamy unscriptural," by John Towers; "Remarks on Polygamy," by Thomas Wills; "Polygamy indefensible," by John Smith; "Remarks on Thelyphthora," by James Penn; "Blessings of Polygamy displayed," by R. Hill; "Examination of Thelyphthora," by John Palmer; and "Refutation of Polygamy," by T. Haweis. There were, also, several anonymous publications on the subject, of which it may be sufficient to mention "Anti-Thelyphthora;" "Marriage and its Vows defended," by a Female;" "The Unlawfulness of Polygamy evinced;" and the "Cobler's Letter to the Author of Thelyphthora." But the most decisive blow that was given to the "Thelyphthora," was in two articles which occur in the sixty-third volume of the Monthly Review. These articles were written by the late Rev. Samuel Badcock. Some general reflections on Polygamy may be seen in Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. i. p. 319—325; and in Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 127—129.

## COROLLARY.

It is yet more evidently unlawful for him who has married one wife, with a promise of confinement to her, afterwards to take a second. Vid. *Præp.* 55.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Some have argued in favour of the proposition, that it would prevent the over-stocking the world with inhabitants, which would be the consequence of polygamy. But we have waved that argument,

1. Because it seems that the contrary is true, *i. e.* that the number of mankind is lessened rather than increased by polygamy, which is a direct consequence from *grad.* 1. for it is plain, that ten women for instance would be like to have more children by ten men, than by one, especially in some length of years; considering how much the body might be weakened, by that luxury with which seraglios are generally attended: and accordingly it is found in fact, that there is the greatest increase of men, where polygamy is not used, as the author of the Reflections on that subject has proved, in an accurate and convincing manner. But

2. If it were fact, that polygamy would increase the number of mankind, it would be an argument *for* it, rather than *against* it: for it is certain, the earth with proper cultivation would be capable of maintaining a much greater number of inhabitants, than at present subsist upon it; and so many general calamities have from age to age interposed to thin their numbers, that it is hardly to be imagined, they will ever grow insupportably great. In the mean time, that polygamy lessens the number, is an additional argument that it is contrary to the happiness of the species, and therefore to virtue.

*Reflect. on Polyg. Diff.* vi, vii.

## PART 2.

One woman should have but one husband at a time.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. Several of the arguments urged in the preceding demonstration will (*mut. mutandis*) prevail here; especially those taken from the proportion of the sexes, mutual jealousy, and the want of peculiar endearments arising from one most intimate friend.

2. The offspring would be thereby rendered uncertain, and healthful propagation prevented, by which the main purposes of marriage would be evidently defeated. *Prop. 57.*

I & 2 | 3. *Valet propositio.*

*Puff. ib. l. vi. c. i. § 15.*

## SCHOLIUM.

This has appeared so intolerable a thing, that it has hardly been practised by any nation on earth, unless some very barbarous people are to be excepted. On the contrary, it has almost universally been made a main branch of the marriage covenant, that with regard to matrimonial converse, a wife should be the property of one husband alone; and those women have been accounted infamous, who have violated this engagement.

*L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvi. c. v.—  
Temple's Hist. of Engl. p. 14—16.*

## PROPOSITION LX.

LECT. To enquire to whom virtue prohibits marriage.  
LXXIII.

## SOLUTION.

1. In general, it is not advisable that marriage should be contracted by those, who, by reason of their unripe age, or some natural or accidental

accidental defect in their understanding, are destitute of reason, and so incapable of making a proper choice, or behaving themselves aright in their conjugal state.

*Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 26.*

2. It is prohibited to those who are evidently incapable of propagation, unless they marry with others in the like condition with themselves: otherwise, by their incapacity, the great end of marriage would be frustrated, and a foundation laid for a perpetual jealousy, and many other irregular passions.

*Puff. ib. § 25. — Ricaut's Ott. Court, p. 293.  
— Lettres Persannes, N°. 41.*

3. To those who labour under any distemper of body, or distraction of mind, which would probably be conveyed to their offspring.

4. To those who are already married, and whose consorts are yet living, virtue forbids marriage, upon the principles of the preceding proposition, while the former marriage continues undissolved: and whereas among us, one man and one woman have been mutually appropriated to each other, it is yet more evidently and universally unlawful for either to marry a third person, without the consent of the other, as it is a breach of the marriage covenant: whether it may be lawful when such consent is gained, even supposing the preceding proposition to hold good, *i. e.* whether marriage may be dissolved by mutual consent, will be enquired in the next proposition. *Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 11.*

5. It has generally been said, that marriage is unlawful to those who are nearly allied by blood or affinity. The chief reasons assigned against such marriages are,

1. That in some cases, the duties of other relations would be plainly confounded by them, as in case of a mother's marrying her son.

2. Friendship

2. Friendship by this means would be less widely diffused; and covetous parents would hinder their wealth from being communicated, perhaps on these principles even forcing the elder brethren to marry their sisters, however contrary to their inclination; which must be the source of great calamity to them, as well as detriment to others.

3. By prohibiting these marriages, provision is made against some temptations to unchastity, arising from the more frequent converse of near relations.

4. There seems to be something generally in the constitution of our natures abhorring such marriages, if the relations are near, which has rendered them infamous among most civilized nations: though it must be owned the *Egyptians* and *Persians* were an exception to this rule: however, among the *European* nations, it prevails in its full force.

*Puff. ib.* § 28, 32, 34.—*L'Esprit des Loix*, vol. ii. l. xxvi. c. xiv.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

Notwithstanding what has been said, it must be owned very difficult to fix the degrees of affinity, or consanguinity, within which marriage is unlawful, and if mankind ever have been or should be in such circumstances, that a brother could have no wife but his own sister, most of the arguments urged above would cease, and the rest must give way to such a necessity\*.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

The argument urged *gr.* 5. concludes much more strongly against marrying with those nearly related by *blood*, than by affinity.

*Puff. ib.* § 35.

\* This subject has been particularly treated of by a Mr. John Fry, in his "Case of Marriages between Kindred." See, also, "The legal Degrees of Marriage stated and considered," by John Alleyne, Esq.

## PROPOSITION LXI.

To enquire in what cases marriage may be rightly dissolved.

## SOLUTION.

1. It is no doubt dissolved by the adultery of either party, which is an apparent breach of the most fundamental article of the covenant. *Def.* 48. and *Prop.* 55.

2. For the same reason, it is dissolved upon the obstinate desertion of one of the parties, since thereby the covenant is also broken.

*Life of Galeacius Caracciolus* \*.

3. It is questioned whether marriage may be dissolved, on account of the unkind behaviour of one of the married persons. In one view it may appear reasonable that it should, since consulting their mutual happiness and comfort is a branch of the marriage covenant: yet when we consider what damage might arise to the innocent offspring, how frequently complaints of this kind occur among married people, how generally in this case both parties are to blame, and on these accounts how uncertain marriage would be rendered, if the dissolution of it in this case should be allowed, it seems on the whole more for the happiness of mankind, that some who are in these unhappy circumstances should bear their calamity, than that they should be eased of it on terms so hazardous to the security and happiness of many more. To which we may also add, that the consideration of marriage as an indissoluble bond may engage both husband and wife, out of regard to their own peace, to be careful to govern their passions, so as not to make it mutually intolerable; in which exercise of wisdom and

\* Galeacius Caracciolus is referred to, because his wife refused to cohabit with him on account of his religious principles.

virtue, each party may find a very great account.

4. Marriage may not be dissolved, as many other covenants may, by the consent of the parties; if it might, marriages might frequently be contracted almost in jest, or merely in some views of present indulgence: and when one party was weary of the bond, very indirect measures might be used to procure the consent of the other to dissolve it; and thus a state of things would probably be introduced into the world, little different from that which marriage was intended to prevent.

5. Neither ought marriage to be dissolved, merely on account of barrenness, unless one of the parties evidently appears to have been under some natural incapacity before the contract: otherwise it would be difficult to fix the time when such a dissolution should take place, and great room would be left for fraudulent separations.

6. Neither are marriages to be dissolved, on account of any concealed deformity of body, or flaw in estate; though it be allowed very criminal and foolish, for any to impose upon another in a matter of so great importance.

*Milton's Prose Works*, p. 5—12.—*Puff.*  
l. vi. c. i. § 20—22, 24.—*Lettres Persannes*, vol. ii. N°. 102.—*Locke on Government*, part ii. § 78—81.—*Reeves's Apol.* vol. i. p. 187, 188.—*More's Utopia*, p. 141—144.

#### COROLLARY.

Since the marriage bond is of so strict a nature, it ought never to be formed without the most mature consideration; nor should any be forced into it by the authority of superiors, contrary to their own inclinations.

## DEFINITION XLIX.

CONCUBINAGE is a sort of marriage, in which the woman by agreement of both parties is to be considered as a servant in the family, and express provision is made, that her children shall not have such a right of possession and inheritance, as the children of the primary wife.

LECT.  
LXXIV.

## SCHOLIUM.

It appears by *Prop. 59. part 1.* that the taking a concubine during the life of another wife is generally at least to be avoided: and it seems, that he who never marries any woman but as a concubine, neither pays due respect to the female sex, nor sufficiently consults his own happiness, in a free and ingenuous friendship: yet perhaps, in case of a second marriage, where the children by a former wife are living, concubinage is not altogether to be condemned, if the constitution of the country permit it.

*Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 36. l. iv. c. xi. § 9.—Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 15.*

## PROPOSITION XLII.

Virtue requires that parents should take peculiar care of their own children.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. The state of infancy is so feeble, that if tender care were not taken of young children, they would die quickly after their birth.

2. In childhood, on account of the weakness of reason, they are incapable of providing for themselves.

3. It is evidently of importance to themselves and the public, not only that their lives be taken care of, but that their minds be formed to virtuous and pious sentiments, of which they are at first

first void, not to say that many at least seem strongly inclined to the contrary.

1, 2, 3. *Prop.* 51. | 4. Virtue requires that some provision should be made for the education of children.

5. Those who have produced them ought not in reason to throw them as a burthen upon others, when they are capable of taking care of them themselves.

6. That *sopyn*, or natural affection, which parents feel towards the children, will render this task more easy and delightful to them, than it would be to others.

6. | 7. It is probable *cæt. par.* that children will be better taken care of by their parents than others.

4, 5, 7. | 8. Virtue requires that parents should take peculiar care of their own children. *Q. E. D.*

*Rel. of Nat.* p. 159, 160.—*Delany on Rel. Duties, Serm.* iv—vii.—*Fordyce's Mor. Phil.* § 3. c. iii.—*Paley's moral and political Philosophy, vol. i.* p. 345—367.—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol. ii.* p. 139—148.

#### COROLLARY I.

Virtue generally requires that those who have children should make them their principal heirs.

*Grot. ib.* l. ii. c. vii. § 5. N°. ii.—*L'Esprit des Loix, vol. ii.* l. xxvi. c. vi.

#### COROLLARY 2.

Virtue requires that remoter ancestors should be careful of grand-children, or other descendants; especially if the immediate parents be either taken away by death, or any other way rendered incapable of affording them assistance.

*Grot. ib.* § 6.

## SCHOLIUM I.

It does not appear necessary, that an equal distribution of goods be made among all the children: some proper regard should be had to the merit of each: yet great care should be taken, that the parent does not by an imprudent distinction sow such seeds of discord, as may counterbalance the advantage accruing to the most deserving child from a larger share.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It seems reasonable, that the eldest son should generally have a larger share of his father's possessions than the rest; that so the honour of the family may be supported, and that he may be a refuge to younger children, if they should fall into poverty; especially since (*cæt. par.*) it may reasonably be expected, that he will be more capable of managing what he has for the common good, and the distinction made in his favour will generally be less provoking to the rest, than if it were made in favour of any other child.

*Puff. de Jure, l. iv. c. xi. § 8.—Fleeto.  
Rel. Dut. p. 111—113.—Paley's Prin-  
ciples of moral and political Philosophy,  
vol. i. p. 359, 360\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, an elder son, or any other may be disinherited, or deprived of a part of what he would otherwise have had, upon account of his vicious disposition, if there be reason to believe that he will abuse it to the detriment of others:

\* The doctrine of this Scholium has lately been called in question, in a pamphlet published in Scotland, the title of which I do not recollect. M. Turgot and other philosophers have, likewise, declared against all rights of primogeniture, and have contended that the property of parents should, by law, be equally divided among their children. See Condorcet's Life of M. Turgot,

this

this the reason of things requires, and the laws of most nations admit of it, though *Plato* only allows it with the consent of near relations. As for the argument brought against it from *Deut.* xxi. 15, &c. as a law of God to the *Jews*; it may be answered, that the *Jews* had not that power of alienating their estates in general, which all allow to others not under such a peculiar appointment, and therefore no valid argument can be drawn from hence: and it is plain, God often interposed to transfer the inheritance; as in a most memorable instance *Jacob* did, and that (as all who believe scripture must suppose) by divine direction, *Gen.* xlv. 3. 1 *Chron.* v. 1, 2. not to mention that power, which the law of God gave to *Jewish* parents to put a wicked child to death, which might render a particular licence to disinherit him needless. *Deut.* xxi. 18, &c.

*Puff. ib.* § II.—*Fleetcw. ib.* p. 113—127.  
—*Burn. Life of Sir M. Hale*, p. 7, 8.

#### A X I O M XVII.

LECT. There is an evident fitness, that when one rational being has received a favour and kindness from another, he should have some sense of gratitude, and return good rather than evil.

*Puff. de Off.* l. i. c. viii. § 7, 8,

#### COROLLARY.

Virtue requires gratitude. Vid. *Def.* 37\*.

#### PROPOSITION LXIII.

To enquire into the duty of children towards their parents.

\* Some sentiments of a different kind, with respect to gratitude, are advanced by the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, in his "Essay on the Nature of true Virtue;" and by Mr. Godwin, in his "Enquiry concerning political Justice," vol. i. p. 83—85.

## SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Forasmuch as children have received important favours from their parents, gratitude, and therefore virtue requires that they should *love* them. *Ac.* 17. and *Cor.*

2. Considering the superiority of age, and the probable superiority of wisdom, which there is on the side of parents, and also how much the satisfaction and comfort of a parent depend on the respect shewn him by his children, it is fit that children should *reverence* their parents.

2. | 3. It is fit that while the parents are living, and the use of their understanding continued, their children should not ordinarily undertake any matter of great importance without *advising* with them, or without very cogent reasons pursue it contrary to their consent.

4. As young people need some guidance and government in their minority, and as there is (*cæt. par.*) some peculiar reason to trust the prudence, care, and affection of a parent, preferable to any other person, it is reasonable that children, especially while in their minority, should *obey* their parents; without which, neither the order of families nor the happiness of the rising generation could be secured: nevertheless, still supposing that the commands of the parents are not inconsistent with the will of God.

1, 2. | 5. Virtue requires, that if parents come to want, children should take care to furnish them with the necessaries of life, and so far as their ability will permit, with the conveniencies of it.

*Puff. de Jure*, l. vi. c. ii. § 4, 7, 11.—  
*Fleetwood on Rel. Duties*, p. 4—22, 51,  
 52.—*Delany*, *ib.* N°. viii, ix.—*Puff. de*  
*Off.* l. ii. c. iii. § 12.—*Rel. of Nat.*  
 p. 161, 162.—*Paley's moral and political*  
*Philosophy*, vol. i. p. 368—378.—

*Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol. ii. p. 148—150.*

## COROLLARY 1.

The like regards are in some degree due to remoter ancestors, if yet living; though if they come to want, they fall most properly under the care of their more immediate surviving descendants.

## COROLLARY 2.

If any generous and compassionate friend act the part of a parent, in taking care of an helpless child, he may justly expect from him the returns of filial duty.

## COROLLARY 3.

When the parent has delegated his authority to some other person, reverence and some degree of obedience are on that account to be paid to him, beyond what would otherwise be his due.

## COROLLARY 4.

Different degrees of obedience will be due to parents according to the different age and circumstances of the child, and in some degree according to the capacity and character of the parent.

*Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. iii. § 5—8.*

## COROLLARY 5.

It is the duty of parents, or of those who sustain their character and place, to behave to the children under their care in such a manner, as may most effectually conciliate their reverence and love, and make the yoke of obedience as light as possible; and for this reason all unnecessary severities are to be forborne.

*Fleetwood of Relat. Dut. p. 73—81.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

Many have chosen to build the right of parents to the obedience of the child, wholly or chiefly

chiefly on their having been the instruments of bringing it into existence, and have hence inferred a sovereign right in the parent to dispose of the life, liberty, and fortune of the child; but it appears from the preceding propositions, that parental authority, within moderate bounds, may be fixed on a basis less liable to exception.

*Grot. l. ii. c. v. § 7.*—*Filmer of Patr. Government, c. i. § 4—8.*—*Locke of Government, l. i. § 52—59.*—*Puff. ib. § 1—6.*—*Barbeyrac's Notes on ib. § 10. p. 606, 607.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It appears from the reasoning of the proposition, that *both* the parents have a right to the duties there mentioned: nevertheless, (*cæt. par.*) the authority of the *father* is chiefly to be regarded; though *Hobbes* is of a contrary opinion, and maintains, that a sovereign and unlimited power over the children resides in the *mother*, and that the authority of others over them is derived from her.

*Hobbes de Cive, c. ix.*—*Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 2, 3.*—*Puff. de Offic. l. ii. c. iii. § 3.*—*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 1. Not.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Though it appears from *Demonstration gr. 3.* that it is an irregular thing for children generally speaking to contract marriages without the advice or consent of their parents, nevertheless it might be attended with still worse consequences, if marriages so contracted were to be deemed invalid.

*Puff. ibid. § 14.*—*Grot. ibid. § 10.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

The indigence of human infants seems to have been wisely designed by providence, on purpose

to lay a foundation for those mutual offices of parental and filial duty, on which much of the happiness of life evidently depends.

*Cambray on Gov.* p. 26, 27.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It hence follows, that when the health of the mother, and the convenience of the family will admit of it, it is fit that mothers nurse their own children, or take care that they be nourished at home.

*Tillot's. Serm. vol. i. p. 523—525.—De-  
lany of Rel. Dut. Serm. iv. p. 79—88.  
Speñ. vol. iii. N°. 246\*.*

DEFINITION L.

LECT. LXXVI. A COMMUNITY is a company of men, which is so associated, that the whole body, either by themselves or their representatives, should judge concerning any disputed rights or properties of each member of it.

*Locke of Gov. l. ii. c. vii. § 87.*

DEFINITION LI.

Those men are said to be in a STATE OF NATURE, who are not by any mutual engagements, implicit or express, entered into communities.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

It is for the happiness of mankind, that men in a state of nature should form themselves into societies.

DEMONSTRATION.

I. The happiness of mankind requires, that controversies which arise among them should be determined.

\* On this question, recourse may be had to Dr. Cadogan's Essay on Nursing, and Mr. Nelson's Treatise on the Government of Children.

2. The prejudices of self-love would lead men to lay down different rules for themselves and others; it is proper therefore that there should be some universal rule.

3. When these rules are admitted, prejudice would bias particular persons in the application of them: therefore it is fit that particular cases should be determined by some other person, rather than by either of the parties, whose interest is in question.

4. Such determinations would often be in vain, if there were not some power to enforce the execution of them.

5. Where men are formed into communities, rules may be laid down, judges appointed, and determinations enforced, by the joint power of the whole body. Therefore

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Prop.* 51. | 6. The happiness of mankind, and therefore virtue requires, that men should form themselves into communities.

*Locke of Gov.* l. ii. c. ii. § 124—126.—

*Puff. de Jure,* l. vii. c. i. § 8—11.—

*Camb. of Gov.* p. 36—38\*.—*Thomf.*

*Seaf. Autumn,* ver. 43—144.

#### SCHOLIUM.

It is queried, who is to be considered as a *member of a community*. There can be no doubt as to those who have given their express consent to it: as for those who live under the protection of any community, it is to be taken for granted that while they so continue, they consent to bear the burthen, as some equivalent for sharing the happiness of it: but for ought that yet appears, such may withdraw themselves from it, when they shall judge it requisite.

*Locke of Gov.* l. ii. c. viii. § 119—122.

*Grot. de Jure,* l. ii. c. v. § 24. N<sup>o</sup>. ii.

\* The book intituled “*Cambray on Government,*” was not written by Fenelon archbishop of Cambray, but by the Chevalier Ramsay, upon the principles of that prelate.

## DEFINITION LII.

A LAW is a rule of action, prescribed by some superior, in such a manner, as at the same time to declare a purpose of favouring or punishing those under his power, as they shall act agreeably or disagreeably to it.

*Puff. de Jure, l. i. c. vi. § 1—4.*——

*Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 25, 26.*——

*Grot. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 9.*

## COROLLARY.

If it shall appear to us hereafter, that God has given us intimations, not only of his own delight in virtue and aversion to vice, but also that he will reward the one and punish the other, then it may properly be said, that the *law of God* requires virtue.

## DEFINITION LIII.

They are said to have the SUPREME CIVIL GOVERNMENT in any state or community, who have the supreme power of *making laws* for that community, and *executing* them in their own persons, or by such officers as they shall appoint.

## DEFINITION LIV.

When the supreme civil government is entirely in the hands of *one person*, it is called A MONARCHY: if in a *select number*, AN OLIGARCHY; which some have divided into an ARISTOCRACY, which is the government of the *nobles*, and AN OCHLOCRACY, which is the government of a few of the *meanest*, appointed and supported in a tumultuous manner; whereas A DEMOCRACY is the government of the *whole body* of the *people*: but a constitution of government compounded of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, like the *British* constitution, is called A MIXED MONARCHY.

## SCHOLIUM.

The composition in different governments is so various, that some have thought this distribution not sufficiently accurate, urging that neither *Poland* nor *Holland* fall under any of these.

*Temple's Ess.* vol. i. p. 47, 48.—*Voltaire's Hist. of Charles XII.* l. ii. p. 61—67.—*Temp. on Netb.* c. ii.—*Works,* vol. i. p. 30—43.—*Universal History,* vol. xxxiv. p. 6—30.—*Ibid.* vol. xxxi. p. 3—12.

## DEFINITION LV.

Laws made by the supreme civil power of any community, to be observed by all their subjects, are called CIVIL LAWS, and so differ from MUNICIPAL, made for particular towns and corporations.

## SCHOLIUM.

The word *civil law* among us is generally used to signify the laws of *the Roman empire*, which on account of their equity have been generally received in other nations: whereas those which have been established by *act of parliament*, are commonly called *statute*, though they be in our sense *civil laws*.

*Puff. de Jure,* l. viii. c. i. § 1\*.

\* Though the specific discussion of the Roman Law does not constitute a part of these Lectures, it may not be amiss to refer the student to a few general writers on a subject which may hereafter demand some attention. A foundation should be laid in Justinian's Institutes, which may be read in Harris's edition, comprehending both the Original and a Translation.—To this may be added Schomberg's "Historical and Chronological View of Roman Law;" Dr. Taylor's "Elements of the Civil Law;" the same gentleman's "Summary of the Roman Law," and Dr. Bever "On the Study of Jurisprudence," and his "History of the Legal Policy of the Roman State, and of the Rise, Progress, and Extent of the Roman Laws."

## PROPOSITION LXV.

LECT. To enquire into the probable original of civil  
LXXVII. government, or of communities.

## SOLUTION.

1. Considering the natural dependence of children upon their parents, it is certain that government would at first be *parental*: and it is exceedingly probable, that if, according to many of the most credible traditions, the human race descended from one pair, so long as the first man lived, and continued in the exercise of reason, he had a considerable influence over the councils and actions of his descendants, and was regarded by them as their common head.

2. From the nature of things, it is not probable that the power he had over his family descended entirely to the eldest son: it is certain, that the reason for being governed by an *elder brother*, is by no means the same as for being governed by a *father*; though we may naturally suppose, that (*cæt. par.*) the age and experience of the elder brother, together with the larger share of the inheritance which he probably had, would have given him some superiority; yet not so great, as an elder brother would now generally have; partly, as the world being thinly peopled, each might have as much land as he pleased, and partly, as in proportion to the length of mens lives in those early ages, (if we credit tradition as before,) the difference between the ages of the several elder brethren of a family would be very inconsiderable.

*Sidney on Gov. c. i. § 2.*

2.]3. Each family would probably on the death of the common parent become a kind of little sovereignty, whose governor would naturally be the father of it during his life; and such sovereignties as these would be greatly multiplied in the third, fourth, or following generations.

4. It

4. It is exceedingly probable, that among these lesser communities disputes would arise, for the determination of which they might judge it proper, on the principles mentioned *Prop. 64.* to form themselves into larger societies, including several of those domestic communities; and perhaps the form of these might be various, according to the various tempers, characters, and circumstances of the persons concerned.

5. As disputes arose between one and another of those larger societies, which no doubt they often did, it was necessary, that on their forcibly opposing each other, the command of their respective armies should centre in one person; and if he were not only remarkable for his valour, but also for his wisdom, humanity, eloquence, piety, and good success in affairs, any of these, but especially the conjunction of them all, would greatly tend to increase his authority in the community, and might engage them to acquiesce in his stated government.

*Sidn. on Gov. c. i. § 16.*

6. It is not to be supposed, that persons, families, or larger communities, before free and independent, would submit themselves to the government of any one person whatever, without some equivalent; which could probably be no other, than that of protecting them in their liberties and properties; so that there was no doubt some original *contract* between the prince and the people, in all those kingdoms where the prince gained his power by a peaceable election.

7. Some ambitious persons, partly by stratagem and partly by force, might possess themselves of power over others; yet even these conquests could not be settled without some agreement between the victor and the vanquished; for till such an agreement was made, there was evidently a state of hostility, and not a community.

*Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. iii. § 1, 5—9.—*

*Temple's Misc. vol. i. p. 55—82.—*

*Camb.*

*Camb. of Gov. c. vii. p. 49—54.—*  
*Locke of Gov. part ii. c. viii. § 95—*  
*112.—Roll. Anc. Hist. vol. i. Introd.*  
*—Lyttelt. Pers. Let. p. 33, &c.—*  
*Ancient Univ. Hist. Folio, l. i. p. 108—*  
*Oñ. p. 230.—Ibid. Folio, p. 71, 72.—*  
*Oñ. p. 385—388.—With. Baumgar-*  
*ten's Supplement, vol. i. p. 42—69.*

## COROLLARY I.

Hence it will follow, that though there might be various kinds of governments prevailing, and in monarchies various degrees of liberty in the people, and power in the prince, yet there must always have been some original *contract* between them, as the foundation of all government, except that of a father over his descendants.

*Sidn. on Gov. c. i. § 20\*.*

## COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may see, how far sovereignty may be said to have its original *from God*. We have reason to believe that it is the will of God that we should do our utmost to promote the happiness of mankind: now *some* government appears necessary for this purpose; (*Vid. Prop. 64.*) and when governments are formed, attempts to destroy them might in many instances be pernicious to ourselves and to the public: we have reason therefore to believe, that God wills not only that government in general should be, but that the present form of government should continue in any place, so long as the happiness of the whole may be promoted thereby; but there

\* In opposition to the notion of an original Contract, or Compact, see Hume's *Essays*, vol. i. *Essay 12*. Edinb. edit. of 1764; Paley's "*Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*," vol. ii. p. 130—141; and Dean Tucker's "*Treatise on Government*." Dr. Tucker has been answered by Dr. Towers, in his "*Vindication of the Political Principles of Mr. Locke*."

appears as yet no reason to believe, that God wills it should continue immutable, however it is administered, or that a prince can justly claim a commission from God in attempting the ruin of the community, which it is his business to protect. God's being the author of government in the sense explained above, will be a great aggravation of the guilt of such a tyrannical sovereign; and any pretence to divine authority in such outrages will only be adding impiety to treachery and cruelty: but this will be examined hereafter.

*Camb. of Gov. c. vi.—Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. iii. § 2—4.—Roll. Man. vol. i. p. 423, 424.—Sidn. on Gov. c. i. § 6.—Delany on Rel. Dut. Serm. xiv. p. 276—285.—Paley's Princ. of Moral and Political Phil. vol. ii. p. 141—163. 7th edit.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

The account of the original of civil government here given is illustrated, and something confirmed, by the constitution of several of the most considerable nations which we find in ancient history; particularly by the power of the *Ephori* and *General Assembly* amongst the *Spartans* (a), the *Amphictyones* of Greece (b), the *Suffetes*, *Senate*, and *Popular Assembly* of *Carthage* (c), the *Senate*, *Comitia*, and *Tribunes* of *Rome* (d), the *Saxon Wittenagemot* (e), which was the original of the *British* parliament, and the *Spanish Cortes* (f); not to mention the constitution of many other more modern governments.

*Sidney on Govern. c. ii. § 16. p. 130, &c.*  
 —(a) *Stanyan's Gr. Hist. vol. i. l. iii. c. iv. p. 80—82. Univ. Hist. vol. ii. p. 574.*—(b) *Potter's Archæol. l. i. c. xvi. vol. i. p. 83—85.—Stanyan ib. p. 119*

LECT.  
LXXVIII.

p. 119—120.—(c) *Rollin's Anc. Hist.* l. ii. § 3. vol. i.—(d) *Moyle's Works*, vol. i. p. 8, 9, 103—108. *Vertot's Rom. Rev.* vol. i. p. 7—9. *Kennet's Rom. Ant.* part ii. l. iii. c. ix, & xvi.—(e) *Rapin's Hist. of England*, vol. i. p. 152—156. *Squire of the Anglo-Sax. Gov.*—(f) *Geddes's Misc.* vol. i. p. 317, &c\*.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Some probable conjectures, why arbitrary monarchy prevailed more in the northern parts of *Asia*, and in *Africa*, than in *Europe*, may be seen in *Temple's Misc.* vol. i. p. 50—53.—*Works*, v. i. p. 390.—*L'Esprit des Loix*, vol. i. l. xvii. p. 377—385.—*Eng. Transl.* p. 390—395.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

The objection against this scheme, from our not having a right over our own lives, and much less over the lives of others, in a state of nature, goes upon a very false principle; for every man, previously to contract, has a right of using all his natural power for the public good, and when that seems to require it, even of taking away the life of another, or forbearing to defend his own: and all that any man promises in this respect, is

\* For farther, and extensive information on these subjects, recourse may be had to Mr. Mitford's and Dr. Gillies's Histories of Greece, the Travels of Anarcharis the Younger, Spelman's Translation of Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Hooke's Roman History, Ferguson's History of the Roman Republic, Dr. Adam's Roman Antiquities, Dr. Robertson's History of Charles the Fifth, volume the first, Hotoman's Franco Gallia, Acherly's Britannic Constitution, St. Amand's Essay on the British Legislative Constitution of England, Hurd's Dialogues, vol. ii. p. 29—331. Third Edition. Dr. Gilbert Stuart's Historical Essay on the English Constitution, and Lord Lyttelton's History of Henry the Second, vol. iii. p. 216—281. Ibid. p. 372—464. Third Edition.

submission to a sentence of death in certain cases; for no law ever condemns a man to execute himself.

*Burn.* iv. *Disc.* p. 10, 11.—*Locke of Gov.* part ii. c. xi. § 135.—*Puff. de Jure*, l. viii. c. iii. § 1.—*Hoadly on Gov.* p. 168—188.

## PROPOSITION LXVI.

To propose and confute that other hypothesis of the original of government, which is commonly called the *patriarchal scheme*.

## SOLUTION.

1. The foundation of it is, that the *first man* was absolute sovereign of all his posterity, so as to dispose of their possessions and their lives, without being accountable to any but God.

2. That on his death, his eldest son *Cain* having been disinherited by God, the supreme power devolved upon *Seth*, the next eldest son, and passed from him by a lineal succession to *Noah*.

3. That he, according to the divine direction, divided the earth after the deluge among *seventy* of his descendants, heads of so many nations, who were each of them made independent and absolute sovereigns; in whose successors (when they can be discovered) the right of government still continues.

4. That it is to be presumed, that in every country the *reigning prince* is that successor, and consequently, that such unlimited obedience is to be paid to him, unless it appears that some other person has an hereditary claim better founded than his.

*Hoadly on Gov.* p. 3, 4.—*Filmer's Patriarch. Scheme*, c. i. § 4—9. p. 12—22.

## CONFUTATION.

Admitting the credibility, and for argument's sake the inspiration of the *Mosaic* history, the following objections seem abundantly sufficient to overthrow this hypothesis.

1. It can never be proved, that *Adam* had such an unlimited power over his whole race: it is certain, the relation of a *father* does by no means imply it, (*Prop.* 63. *Schol.* 1.) and no text in the writings of *Moses* is alledged directly to prove it, unless *Gen.* i. 26—30. and iii. 16. the first of which, was a grant to the human race of the whole animal and vegetable creation for its use; and the second related only to *Eve*, and at most amounts to no more, than that, as woman had abused her husband's tenderness, she should sometimes find herself galled by the yoke of his authority; but this does not imply an absolute power: at least there is not a shadow of argument for any thing more than *Adam's* dominion over his own wife, and by no means over their descendants.

*Hoadly of Gov.* p. 5—35. *præf.* p. 5—13.

——*Locke of Gov.* part i. c. iv—vi.

*præf.* p. 23—31.

2. Allowing *Adam* to have been possessed of such a power, it will by no means prove that it was to descend from him, and centre in one of his children. It is certain that the right of a *father* and of an *elder brother* are in this respect very different, (*Prop.* 63, 65. *gr.* 2.) and as for the argument of a supposed divine appointment, drawn from *Gen.* iv. 7. though it may prove some *pre-eminence* in an elder brother, especially during the time that his younger lived with him, it will never prove an *absolute power* during life, over him and all his remotest descendants.

*Hoadly ib.* p. 35—38. —— *Locke ib.* c. viii.

*Sidney ib.* c. ii. § 4.

3. The

3. The distribution of mankind into seventy nations, with an absolute sovereign to each, supposes a contradiction to the right of primogeniture, as before asserted by *Filmer*, without any apparent reason; and is itself a most chimerical and arbitrary assertion. *Gen. x. 32.* is a most feeble foundation for such a grand superstructure; and only signifies, that the chief nations among whom the earth was divided sprang from the persons there mentioned. The division, which *Filmer* supposes, would make the parents subject to their children; besides, that some of those there mentioned were not born when the distribution is supposed to be made.

*Hoadly ib. p. 49—54.—Sidney ib. c. i.*

§ 7, 8.

4. Had God meant to establish the right of primogeniture in this manner, it is not probable he would so often have chosen *younger* sons to special favours, dignity and authority, as we are sure he did, if the truth of the old testament be granted.

*Sidney ib. c. i. § 13.—Hoadly ib. p. 55.*

—59.

5. The admission of such an hypothesis, grounded on so slender an evidence, would be attended with great damage to mankind; as it might destroy the settlement of many very considerable nations, as appears from the genealogy of their royal families. At best, this is an *useless* scheme; since no one person upon earth can be known to be the true heir: and since the number of sovereigns in the world is so vastly greater than *seventy*, it would upon *Filmer's* hypothesis, be (*cæt. par.*) a great probability against any one, that he was not one of those seventy, in whom the right lay.

*Locke ib. c. xi.—Sidney ib. c. i. § 14,*

17, 18.

6. The scheme is plainly consistent with itself: for if fatherhood give an absolute power over the

children, then it rests in all parents; and consequently, had *Seth* commanded his children to have resisted *Adam*, they would on this scheme have been obliged to do it, though by another part of it they were obliged to an unlimited obedience to *Adam*.

*Locke ib.* § 68—72.—*Hoadly ib.* p. 13—15.—*De Foe's Jus. Divin.* l. ii. p. 2—6.  
*Grove's Miscel.* p. 42—62.

## SCHOLIUM.

Some have argued for what they call *indefeasible hereditary right* in monarchs, from the right of elder children to succeed to the land of their parents. But it is certain that the elder son has not in equity a right to succeed to the whole paternal inheritance, so that the rest of the children should have no share of it; though it may generally be fit he should have a larger share than the rest; (*Prop.* 62. *Schol.* 2.) yet he may be disinherited, whenever a regard for the common good requires it: besides, that a succession to places of trust, power and dignity, is a thing of a very different nature from a succession to an estate.

*Camb. of Gov. c.* ix.—*Hutch. Syst.* 3. viii.  
3, 9—11.

## PROPOSITION LXVII.

LECT. Every man is born in a *state of freedom, i. e.*  
LXXIX. he is (so far as appears by the light of nature) no farther obliged to support or submit to the form of government, in the country where he is born, than he shall judge, upon a view of present circumstances, that a subjection to such government will be for the good of the whole.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. If a person were, by any argument which the light of nature suggests, universally bound to be subject to and support any government, farther than it appears to him for the public good in present circumstances, such obligation must be built, either on some natural right in the governors to unlimited obedience, or on such a power conferred upon them by some previous contract.

2. The natural right in favour of primogeniture has been considered and confuted above; *Prop. 66.*

3. A previous contract of parents, binding themselves and their offspring to unlimited subjection, is a thing which can hardly be supposed: but if we were sure that such a contract had been ever so expressly made, as they had no right to dispose of the lives and properties of their children according to their own will, the children could not be bound by such a contract.

1, 2, 3. | 4, *Valet propositio.*

## COROLLARY 1.

Hence it will evidently appear, that virtue will allow to resist the supreme governor, if any circumstances shall arise, in which such resistance shall appear to be most for the public good. *Vid. Prop. 65. Cor. 1. and Prop. 56. Schol. 3.*

*Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. viii. § 5.—Locke of Gov. part ii. § 202—222.—Sidney on Gov. c. iii. § 41.*

## COROLLARY 2.

Much more may it be allowed in a *mixed* monarchy, that the other branches of the legislative power should resist the monarch, when he goes about to subvert their constitution, in direct

rect violation of that contract on which he is admitted to the crown\*.

*Caermich. Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. ix. § 4.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Some, waving all pleas from a supposed donation of power from God to Kings, assert resistance to be universally unlawful, because it can never promote the public good, but must on the whole be detrimental to mankind. But it may be answered,

1. That cases may occur, in which the affections of the people may be so alienated from the government, that a revolution may be accomplished with very little blood-shed and confusion.

2. That by this means, the civil and religious liberties of a mighty nation may be, and often have been secured, when even on the brink of ruin.

3. That such an event may contain matter of very wholesome instruction to succeeding princes, in that country and elsewhere, and by preventing future oppressions, may greatly promote the good of mankind.

And whereas it is urged, that the encouragement which the doctrine of resistance might give

\* The great question concerning the Origin and Design of Government, the Rights of the People, and the Power of Resistance, have lately been amply considered, in consequence of the two grand political controversies of the age, occasioned, first, by Dr. Price's "Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty," and, still more recently, by Mr. Burke's "Reflections on the French Revolution." It would be endless specifically to refer to the variety of treatises and pamphlets which have appeared on both sides of the question in agitation. A list of these publications may be collected from the reviews of the time, and especially from the Monthly Review, which we the rather mention, as being more accessible to the generality of readers. Several years previously to these controversies, Dr. Priestley published an Essay on the first Principles of Government.

to insurrections and popular tumults would be an equivalent for all this, it is to be remembered,

1. That it may be concluded, a virtuous man will, as he certainly ought to do, attentively weigh the reasons and consequences of things, before he engages in so important an undertaking.

2. That the apparent danger attending it will deter men of prudence from embarking themselves in it, till there be a great prospect of succeeding; which probably there cannot be, till the people have been alienated from their governors, by long, frequent, and notorious oppressions.

3. That though it is true, this doctrine may be abused, and may in some cases be attended with ill consequences; yet, considering the temptations of royalty, the doctrine of *passive obedience* and *non-resistance* is likely to be much more abused, as it has certainly in fact been; so that upon the whole, the hazard seems to be abundantly balanced.

*Camb. of Gov. c. x. p. 74—76, 84.—*

*Locke on Gov. part ii. c. xix. § 223—230.—Sachev. Trial, p. 88—114.—*

*Sidn. on Gov. c. iii. § 40. p. 434—436.*

*—The Judgment of whole Kingdoms and Nations concerning the Rights, Power, &c. of Kings, and the Rights, Privileges, and Properties of the People. Printed in 1710. Hutch. Syst. § vii.*

3—7.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

Considering the many difficulties to which princes are exposed, how liable they are often to be imposed upon when they design best, and how impossible it is for the bulk of the people to enter into all the reasons of their coun-

fels and actions, we do most readily grant, that men ought to put the most candid interpretation upon the actions of their governors which they can in reason bear; and that they should never have recourse to violent methods, but in cases of very great extremity, and where the probability of promoting the public security and happiness by it is very apparent.

*Camb. of Gov. c. x. p. 78—83.—Evans's  
Christ. Temp. vol. ii. p. 308, 309.  
Sermon 14th.*

### PROPOSITION LXVIII.

To enquire what form of government is to be preferred, as generally most subservient to the happiness of mankind.

#### SOLUTION.

LECT. LXXX. *A mixed monarchy, generally to descend by inheritance, seems preferable to the rest.*

#### DEMONSTRATION.

I. An *arbitrary monarchy* would undoubtedly be most desirable, if the monarch were perfectly wise and good; seeing he would then have much greater opportunities of doing good to his subjects, than under a limitation of power he could possibly have; and the unavoidable imperfection of general laws would be greatly remedied by his integrity and wisdom. But considering the degeneracy and imperfection of mankind, it seems unsafe to trust so much power in one man: and it is generally in fact seen, that where this kind of government is admitted, tyranny, cruelty and oppression prevail with it.

2. An *aristocracy*, and much more a *democracy*, leaves too much room for the cabals of statesmen, makes the dispatch of business slower, and there are secrets of state of which it is impossible that the people should be proper judges, and

and which it is by no means convenient to lay before them; and when discords arise between one part of the people and another, it is much more difficult to compose them, when there is no monarch.

1, 2. 13. The chief advantages of all these constitutions are secured, and the chief disadvantages are avoided, by a *mixed monarchy*; especially in one that consists, like ours, of three states, one of which is to be chosen by the people, and to have the power of granting revenues to be raised on the subjects, while the prince has the power of making peace and war: such a constitution is therefore to be preferred.

4. That a kingdom should be *elective*, has indeed many advantages; especially, as it prevents the succession of an improper person, and moderates the temptation which the sovereign is under to enhance the prerogative of the crown, as also that which the nobles are under to oppress the people, if the people have any share in the election.

5. Yet it proves the occasion of so many factions, and where the kingdom is considerable, of so many destructive civil wars, that the danger seems to be more than equal to the advantage.

4, 5. 16. The proper balance between both seems to be, that the right of *succession* should generally prevail; but that in case of any evident incapacity or mal-administration, the next heir should be set aside by the other branches of the legislature.

3, 6. 17. *Valet propositio.*

*Camb. of Gov. c. xv. xvi.*—*Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. v. § 22.*—*Moyle's Works, vol. i. p. 57—61.*—*Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. viii. § 4—8.*—*Spect. vol. iv. N<sup>o</sup>. 287.*—*Hobbes's Leviath. c. xix.*—*Sidney on Gov. c. ii. § 16, 24, 27, 30.*—*L'Esprit des Loix, l. xi. c. vi. l. xix.*

c. 27.—*English Transl.* p. 321, 337-456—458.—*Preceptor*, vol. ii. p. 474—486\*.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Notwithstanding these general reasons, so much regard is to be had to the temper and usages of particular nations, that it might often be attended with dangerous consequences, to attempt a change, from a less to a more perfect form of government.

*Temple's Eff.* vol. i. p. 16, 17.—*Works*, vol. i. p. 70.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Instances of the oppression and misery, which have attended arbitrary governments, are to be seen every where, especially in

*Addis. Freeholder*, N<sup>o</sup>. x.—*Kroufinski's Rev. of Pers.* vol. i. pass.—*Knox's Ceylon*, l. iii, c. iii, iv.—*Hanway's Travels* vol. ii. p. 339—441.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

The *Commons* of *Great-Britain* have grown up to their present share in the government, by gradual advances. In the earlier reigns, particularly that of *Edward I.* (*A. D.* 1280.) the laws were enacted by the king and lords, the commons being only mentioned as *suppliants*. But what laid the foundation of their growing so considerable, was the grant, which according to *Cambray*, *Henry VII.* but indeed *Stephen*, *Henry II.* and *John* had long before his time made, to empower the lords to alienate their lands, which thus pass-

\* A most ample vindication of the mixed Form of Government, is given in Mr. Adams's *Defence of the Constitution of the United States of America*, in three volumes, octavo. Very different sentiments occur in *Godwin's "Enquiry concerning Political Justice,"* vol. ii. p. 423—453.

ing into the hands of the commons, who before were only their tenants, they became more considerable than before, as the proprietors of land in a state will always be.

*Rapin's Hist. of Eng. p. 155. Note.—*  
*Camb. of Gov. p. 138—140, 147.—149.*  
*—Bacon's Henry VII. p. 12.—Lyttel-*  
*ton's Persf. Lett. N°. 59—69.—Sydn.*  
*on Gov. c. iii. § 10. p. 297 & § 28.—*  
*Preceptor, vol. ii. on Government, ch.*  
*3, 4.—Hurd's Dial. N°. 5 and 6.*  
*passim\*.*

### PROPOSITION LXIX.

Virtue requires, that obedience should be paid LECT.  
 to civil rulers, in those things in which the au- LXXXI.  
 thority of God is not apprehended to contradict   
 their commands.

### DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 64.* | 1. Virtue requires that there should be communities.

2. Affairs cannot be administered in communities, unless some civil rulers are appointed to manage them.

3. This appointment would be vain, unless obedience were to be generally paid to them, as above.

2, 3. | 4. The refusal of such obedience to civil power tends to the ruin of communities.

\* Much information on this head may be derived from the early volumes of the Parliamentary History, Sullivan's Law Lectures, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. i. King on the English Constitution, Millar on the English Government, Bishop Ellys's Essays on temporal Liberty, Tract the fourth, and the several volumes of Dr. Henry's History of Great Britain. For a review of the British Constitution as it now stands, see Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 190—234; and Dr. Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 394—454. A still more copious discussion of the subject is presented in Mr. De Lolme's "Treatise on the Constitution of England."

I, 4. 15. Virtue requires they should be generally obeyed as above. Q. E. D.

*Puff. de Jure*, l. vii. c. viii. § 1.—

*Hutch. Syst.* § vii. 2. ix. 17, 18.

COROLLARY I.

Reverence is to be paid to rulers; and in dubious cases, virtue will require us to put the mildest construction upon their actions, which they will reasonably bear. Vid. *Prop.* 67. *Schol.* 2. *Puff. ib.* § 3.

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue will require us rather to acquiesce in their determinations, even where we imagine ourselves injured, than to disturb the public by taking our revenge into our own hands; unless it may be the probable means of freeing a country from an intolerable tyranny.

*Killing no Murther, pass. Ap. Harleian Miscell. now separately published.*

COROLLARY 3.

To chuse to determine points by single combat, rather than to refer them to the judgment of the magistrate, is to be condemned; as being a derogation from his authority, or opposition to his determination, as well as a rash exposing our own lives or that of others; and a probable means of introducing a wrong sense of honour, which may be detrimental to the lives and souls of many, who might otherwise be useful to the common-wealth.

*Hales's Gold. Rem.* p. 107—115. 8vo. p.

90—96. 4to.—*Speñ.* vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 97.

—*Montesq. Spirit of Laws*, vol. ii.

l. xxviii. c. xvii, xx, xxiv, xxv.—*Free-*

*thinker*, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. xv.—*Delany's*

*Serm.*

*Serm. on Duelling, vol. ii.*—*Watts on Self Murder, § 6. latter part.*—*Works, vol. ii. p. 387, 388 \**.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Marriages are to be made only as the civil law of any country directs, supposing there is nothing in the ceremony so directed, which shall appear unlawful to the parties concerned: and though private contracts are undoubtedly binding in the sight of God, yet they ought to be discouraged, and the offspring of such unauthorised marriages may justly be laid under some incapacities, in order to prevent the prevalency of them, which would be much more to the damage of society. And the same kind of observations and reasons may be applied to *divorces* and to *wills* in some degree, where the civil law determines the circumstances with which they shall be attended.

*Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 36, sub fin.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Princes are undoubtedly bound by their covenant with their people; for the reasoning *Prop. 55. Dem.* has a peculiar weight when applied to them. Some have questioned, whether a succeeding prince be bound by any concessions made by his predecessors: but there can be no room for such a debate, when a prince swears or even promises to govern according to law, and the concessions made by preceding princes have been, as they generally are, passed into civil laws. To say, that such concessions were some-

\* Dr. Hey has written a distinct tract against the practice of Duelling; and Mr. Moore has exposed it somewhat at large at the end of his work on Suicide. Concise views of the subject occur on Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. i. p. 272—276; and in Godwin's "Enquiry concerning political Justice," vol. i. p. 94—96.

times forcibly extorted, and therefore are not obligatory, would be to destroy all the faith of treaties, and is bringing the thing back to the exploded scheme of passive obedience.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiv. § 10, 11.*

### PROPOSITION LXX.

Briefly to enquire into the mutual duties of masters and servants.

#### SOLUTION.

1. Servants owe to their masters diligence in their business, fidelity in any other trusts reposed in them, and such a reverence in their behaviour, as may both promote and express their obedience.

2. Masters owe to their *hired* servants, a regular payment of their wages; to *all*, a proper care of their support during the time of service, and a kind and affable treatment: they are to see it, that they be neither unemployed, nor overwhelmed with business, beyond what their strength and time will admit, and that their minds be duly cultivated, according to the circumstances of life in which they are placed.

*Spect. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 107, & 137.—Delany on Rel. Dut. Serm. x, xi.—Paley's moral and political Philosophy, vol. i. p. 233—235.—Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. i. p. 150—153.*

#### DEMONSTRATION.

The obligation to these duties on both sides, is evident from the nature of the relation, and those mutual covenants which generally attend it, in which these things are either expressly or tacitly stipulated.

*Fleetwood of Rel. Dut. p. 279—281.—Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. iv. § 1, 2.—Hutch. Syst. § iii. 1.—Grove's Ethics, vol. ii. p. 509—511.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

It is disputed, whether it be unlawful to buy men as slaves, and forcibly compel them to do service for life or a term of years. Some have thought the strength of body, and stupidity of mind, to be found among some parts of the human species, especially the *Negroes*, intimate, that they were designed to be the drudges of the rest. But to admit such an argument might be attended with dangerous usurpations and contentions; for who does not think he has genius enough to command others? Nevertheless, if any case occurs, in which a man may be justly condemned to be a slave by the laws of his country, it seems very allowable to buy him and use him as such: and if purchasing men for slaves out of the hands of their enemies, by whom they are taken prisoners, may be a means of preserving their lives, which in *Guinea* is often the case, it seems very allowable to purchase them; unless it prove the means of encouraging unreasonable and destructive wars, and the mischief occasioned thereby be greater than the good arising from the preservation of the lives of those already taken, and the fruit of their labours; which may possibly make the matter a greater difficulty than some imagine. Yet virtue will require, even in this case, that the slaves be treated with as much humanity as may be consistent with the safety of their master, and with a prudent care of his affairs.

*Snelgrave's Guin.* p. 160, 161.—*Puff. de Off. ib.* § 3. § 4. *With Caermichael's Notes.*—*Monthly Review*, vol. xxiv. p. 160.—*Hutch. Syst.* 2. v. 3. xiv. 3. § iii. 2—5.—*Grove's Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 5, 11—13.—*Spirit of Laws*, l. xv. c. ii.

*c. ii. vol. i. p. 336—357. In another Edit. p. 348, 369\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It is questioned, whether a father may ever sell his child. Some have argued, but without reason, that fatherhood gives a right universally. It seems he only has it, when the constitution of a country appoints him the civil judge of his children; or when his circumstances are such, that the sale of his child in his minority is absolutely necessary for the supporting the lives of either or both of them. *Prop. 51. Cor. 3.*

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 5.—Hutch. Syst. c. ii. 5.—Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 9:*

## LEMMA TO PROPOSITION LXXI.

LECT. LXXXII. As the word *punishment* occurs in the proposition, and is not defined, it may be proper here to give a definition of it, as a *Lemma*, not to alter the number of the succeeding definitions; and it may be taken thus—PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted, in consequence of an offence committed against the person by whom it is inflicted or appointed, whether under a public or private character.

\* The question concerning Negro Slavery has lately received the most ample discussion. It may suffice to refer to Mr. Ramsay's treatise on the subject; to Mr. Clarkson's two publications, first on the Iniquity, and secondly on the Impolicy of the Slave-Trade; to Mr. Dickson's Letters on Slavery; and to Dr. Beattie's "Elements of Moral Science," vol. ii. p. 153—223. The poets have not been deficient in appearing on the side of justice and humanity. This is evident from Mr. Day's and Mr. Bicknell's "Dying Negro," Miss Helen Williams's Epistle to Mr. Pitt, Mrs. Barbauld's Address to Mr. Wilberforce, and "Slavery," a poem, written, as is supposed, by Mr. Roscoe, of Liverpool.

## PROPOSITION LXXI.

Virtue may permit, or even require the civil magistrate, not only to execute other heavy punishments upon offenders, but in some cases to take away their lives.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. Virtue requires that the civil magistrate endeavour to preserve the public peace and tranquillity, which is the design of his office.

2. In order to this, it is necessary that effectual methods be taken to deter men from such crimes, as are ruinous to society, *v. g.* murder, treason, theft, &c.

3. The corruption of men is so great, that it evidently appears in fact, that they rush on to the commission of those crimes, even though they are made capital by the laws of their country.

3,4. There is great reason to believe, that if such crimes were not severely punished, and even sometimes with death, they would be much more frequently committed, and the community in time destroyed by them.

1, 2, 4, 5. *Valet propositio.*

*Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. iii. § 6, 7.—Hutch. Syst. c. ix. p. 10—14.—Beccaria on Crimes and Punishments, with Voltaire's Commentary. passim.—“Principles of Penal Laws.” passim. Understood to have been written by William Eden, Esq. now Lord Auckland.—Paley's “Principles of moral and political Philosophy,” vol. ii. p. 268—302. Godwin's “Enquiry concerning political Justice,” vol. ii. p. 687—759.*

## COROLLARY.

A regard to the public good may in some cases require, that an innocent person should be given up to calamity and even to death: *v. g.* if a man infected with the plague, were, in a frenzy, to run up and down to the evident hazard of spreading the contagion; and many add, when an innocent person is demanded by an enemy, against whom the public cannot defend itself. It seems more justifiable to confiscate the estates of traitors, though thereby innocent children are impoverished; both that a regard to their family may prevent their conspiring against the government, and that the children of noble families may be less able to revenge the death of a father.

*Puff. ib. § 33. c. ii. § 5.—Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xxv. § 3.—Considerations on the Law of Forfeiture. passim.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

Considering how precious life is, and how much the fear of violent death would embitter the enjoyment of it, virtue requires that capital punishments should be sparingly used. For murder, none can doubt the reasonableness of them; but perhaps some methods might be found out in case of theft, that would strike the offender with so much terror, as to render capital punishments but seldom necessary; and the severity of *Draco*, in introducing them on the smallest occasions, was greatly to be condemned.

*More's Utopia, p. 145, 146.—Spirit of Laws, vol. i. l. vi. p. 16.—Whiston's Life, vol. ii. p. 415—470.—Stanyan's Gr. Hist. p. 145, 146.—Mitford's History of Greece, vol. i. p. 261, 262.—Gillies's Ditto, vol. i. p. 455.—"Thoughts on the Extension of Penal Laws." passim.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Public executions ought to be managed with very great solemnity; and it would be prudent to make a difference between the kinds of death inflicted for different crimes; since perhaps some may be found, who would dread the pain and shame of some executions, even more than death itself.

*Mandeville on Exec. c. iv. l. v.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It is questioned, whether a community have a right over its *exiles*: but that must be determined by the degree of severity attending the sentence; for if the exile possesses the revenues of an estate, in that country from whence he is driven, it is evident that community has a right and power over him, more than it would otherwise have had.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 25.——Warb.*

*Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 16, 17. and Notes.*

*—Bott against Warb. p. 73—78.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It is questioned, whether private persons have a right of killing those who invade them by violence. *Civilians* generally state it thus: where communities are formed, it is to be considered, whether it be the intent of the law, barely to *permit*, or also to *require* such executions: in the former case, *v. g.* if a man find another in adultery with his wife, or if a rape be attempted, or an assault made by a robber, the law, though it permits to kill the aggressor, and thereby frees the slayer from punishment, yet cannot justify the action before God. Yet where the law *requires* such resistance, as in the case of soldiers invading a country, then it becomes the duty of the subject to endeavour the destruction of such invaders. But it seems, that in the former

mer case it is a person's duty too, when, upon the best views he can form of the consequences, it appears probable, that the immediate slaughter of the aggressor will turn to the public good; otherwise, it is a vicious indulgence of the passion of revenge: and those who believe a future state ought to be peculiarly solicitous, that they do not plunge even an enemy into irrecoverable misery, by cutting him off unnecessarily in the act of his crime. *Prop. 51. Cor. 2.*

*Grot. ibid. l. ii. c. xx. § 17.*—*Puff. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 11, 14.*—*Grove's Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 353—364.*

### DEFINITION LVI.

LECT. LXXXIII. Those rules, which by a tacit consent are agreed upon among all communities, at least among those who are reckoned the polite and humanized part of mankind, are called the LAWS OF NATIONS.

*Grot. ibid. Proleg. § 17.*—*Grove's Mor. Phil. vol. ii. p. 96.*—*Spirit of Laws, vol. i. p. 7, 8.*

### PROPOSITION LXXII.

The laws of nations are to be regarded.

### DEMONSTRATION.

1. Communities have certain affairs, which must of necessity be transacted between them.

1.|2. Disputes may arise upon these, which cannot be determined by the peculiar civil laws of either of the contending parties.

2.|3. Recourse must in that case be had to the laws of nations, to prevent disputes which might otherwise be very mischievous.

3.|4. Mutual regard must be paid to these laws. *Q. E. D.*

*Hutch. Syst. vol. ii. p. 350, 351.*—*See Vattel's "Le Droit de Gens," and his "Questions*

“*Questions de Droit naturel.*” See also the *English Translation of the former Work.*

## DEFINITION LVII.

WAR is a state, wherein men endeavour by open violence to hurt and destroy the persons or possessions of each other.

*Grot. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 2.—Puffendorff de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 8.*

## COROLLARY.

War is a great evil, and virtue will require us to avoid engaging in it, unless circumstances should arise, in which it should appear necessary for the greater good of mankind. Vid. *Prop. 51.*

## PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Virtue may in some cases permit, and even require that men should engage in war.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. The injustice of some is so great, that men will not be able to secure their possessions and their lives in many cases, unless they oppose force to force.

2. Persons violently oppressing their inoffensive neighbours, without just cause, are so far from being valuable members, that they are the pests of society.

2. | 3. By attempting to destroy such invaders, we may not only secure ourselves, but also many others who might afterwards be swallowed up by them, especially if their power of hurting were strengthened by our submission or destruction.

1, 3. | 4. Cases may occur, in which opposing force to force may tend to the public good, *i. e.*

in which virtue may allow and require us to engage in war. (Vid. *Def.* 57. *Prop.* 51.) *Q. E. D.*  
*Grot. ibid. l. i. c. ii. § 1—3.*—*Puff. ibid. l. viii. c. vi. § 7.*—*Carmich. in Puff. de Off. l. i. c. v. § 17. p. 123, 124.*—*Paley's "Principles of moral and political Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 408—426.*  
*Godwin's "Enquiry concerning political Justice," vol. ii. p. 511—525.*

## SCHOLIUM.

The argument urged in this demonstration only proves a *defensive* war to be lawful: it is questioned whether it is ever lawful to engage in an *offensive* war.

*Ans.* It is certainly inhuman, and therefore vicious, to begin to hurt unprovoked; and considering the many calamities brought on mankind by war, virtue will require us to abhor the thought of increasing our dominions and possessions by the ruin of innocent persons: nevertheless, self-defence will require us to take up arms, before we are actually invaded, as it may prevent the intended invasion, and the mutual slaughter which would be consequent upon it, and will indeed be necessary in order to sustain the first shock, which would otherwise be fatal to the party unprepared: nay, a regard to our own safety may require us to invade and subdue the country of the aggressor, and to push on our conquest, till he is disabled from doing us farther mischief.

As to the question, whether it is lawful to take up arms, in defence of the injured subjects of another state, to preserve their civil and religious liberties, it must be determined by the prospect of good arising from such a war: if there be an apparent probability, that tyrannical power may be reduced, and the happiness of other states as well as that invaded may thereby be promoted,  
 it

it seems lawful on the common principles of humanity.

*Puff. ibid.* § 3.—*Burn. on Art.* p. 361.—

*Grot. ibid.* l. ii. c. xx. § 41—43.

## DEFINITION LVIII.

PUBLIC WAR is that which is undertaken and managed by the authority of the community; PRIVATE is that which is undertaken and managed without it. *Grot. ib. l. i. c. iii. § 1.*

## COROLLARY.

Private war may sometimes be necessary, where the assault is too sudden to allow an act of the community to authorize resistance. (*Vid. Prop.* 71. *Schol.* 4.) But generally where the prospect of danger is more remote, it is very unwarrantable for persons to form themselves into military bodies; without commission from the civil magistrate; even though it be on pretence of warding off the enemy. Yet it must be acknowledged, there may be cases of public danger so extreme, that the force of the civil law may seem for that time to be suspended; and it is the business of every good man, conscientiously to judge for himself, when these cases occur; and the business of every wise and good state, to indemnify by a law such acts as shall appear to have been so necessitated, though not being foreseen they could not have been provided for by laws *a priori*.

*Grot. ibid.* § 2.

## SCHOLIUM I.

Subjects may not, even when commanded by their prince, engage in any war which they are *fully persuaded* is unjust; but if it appears a *dubious point* to them, the same obligation does not hold; for otherwise, common soldiers could hardly ever engage at all, since they seldom have or can have a full view of all the circumstances

of the affair. Nevertheless officers in the higher ranks are under greater obligations to enquire critically into it, both as they have much better opportunity of information than their soldiers, and as the part they are to act in carrying on the war is of much greater importance.


*Grot. ibid. l. ii. c. xxvi. § 3—5.*—*Puff. ibid. § 4.*—*Burn. Art. p. 362.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

He who offered the injury may defend himself, when the party injured has refused an equitable satisfaction proposed: in that case, the party injured becomes the aggressor: much more may subjects defend themselves, even when their prince has been to blame, if the enemy endeavour to avenge the quarrel, not on the person of the prince, but on his innocent subjects.

*Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. i. § 18. c. xxvi. § 6.*  
—*Puff. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 19.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

LECT. LXXXIV  The violence of war is to be attempered, as much as may be consistent with securing the good ends proposed by it. An unnecessary waste of the enemies goods, (*Vid. Deut. xx. 19, 20.*) and much more of their blood, is to be avoided, and especially rapes, which injure the person by, as well as those upon whom, they are committed; nor are women and children to be slaughtered, unless women be found active in war, and then they are to be treated as other soldiers. But it is to be observed, that we here, and in all this part of the work, speak only of war as undertaken on the principles of the common rights of mankind, not pretending to dispute the right which God has to doom any of his creatures to death, in such circumstances as he shall see fit, and to make some of them executioners on others.

*Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. iv. § 19. c. xiii. § 4.*  
—*Hutch. Syst. 3 x 6.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It is questioned how far *stratagems* in war are lawful.

*Ans.* It may be lawful to deceive the enemy by dubious actions, which may probably be interpreted wrong; and the rather, as there is a kind of universal agreement to suspect each other, where no treaties are commenced, so that faith among men is not so much injured by these as by other deceits. Yet there is a degree of honour to be observed even towards an enemy, and a direct lie, especially a false oath, should by no means be allowed.

*Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 17, 20. c. xix.*

§ 1.—*Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. vi. § 6.*

—*Telemaque, l. xx. p. 246—432.—*

*Hutch. ibid. § 6.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

The laws of nations are to be observed in war; and these forbid violating the persons of *Embassadors*, (seeing this would make wars perpetual, as none would venture to mediate a peace) hiring soldiers to assassinate their general, or subjects their prince, and poisoning the enemy by weapons, water, or any other method.

*Grot. ibid. l. iii. c. iv. § 15—18. l. ii.*

*c. xviii. § 2, 3, 7.—Puff. ibid. § 18.*

—*More's Utopia, p. 158—164—*

*Hutch. ibid. § 12—14.*

## SCHOLIUM 6.

It is much queried, whether temples dedicated to God may be spoiled of their treasures by the conqueror.

*Ans.* Those treasures being in some degree still the property of the state, and therefore used in times of great extremity for its defence, the conqueror may justly seize them; yet care should be taken to avoid any circumstances of rudeness

and irreverence, left by that means religion should be brought into contempt.

*Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. xii. § 6.—Prideaux's Connēt. vol. ii. p. 25, 26.—Anno ante Christum, 278. vol. iii. p. 35.—Works of the learned for March 1738. Art. 16.*

### PROPOSITION LXXIV.

To enquire how far government may justly be founded in conquest.

#### SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. The victor in a just war may see it necessary (in order to repair the expences and losses sustained, in order to punish those who have been injurious to the public peace, and that he may prevent future assaults from the vanquished) to make himself king of a conquered country, and to model the laws of it in such a manner as he shall on the whole judge fit, and he may be justified in doing it. Nevertheless, if the persons so conquered enter themselves into no engagements to him, it may reasonably be expected that they should take the first opportunity to throw off his yoke, and they are not obliged to submit to it so much as that of their natural sovereign: yet virtue will require them to be cautious, that they do not make their own condition and that of the public worse, by a precipitate resistance.

2. If a prince, by an unjust war, or any other unrighteous method, have possessed himself of the government, and uses it well, though he gained it ill, virtue will require, that he be obeyed; at least till the person to whom it belongs be able and willing to assert his right, with some probable prospect of success: for it is certainly better, that an usurper should govern, than that there should be no government at all.

3. It

3. It seems reasonable, that if the rightful prince, or at least his immediate successor be not able to assert his claim, but the government continue for a considerable time in the hands or family of an usurper, long possession should make up the defect of an original title; lest the encouragement of antiquated claims should throw nations into confusion, and by a parity of reason private families too.

*Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. vi. § 24. l. vii. c. vii. § 3, 4. c. viii. § 9, 10.—Locke of Gov. part ii. c. xvi, xvii.—Camb. of Gov. c. viii.—L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. x. c. iii—ix.—Hutch. Syst. 3. viii. 4—8.*

## SCHOLIUM.

The rights of hostages and captives are to be settled by the law of nations: but it is plain, that neither hostages, when upon public faith, nor slaves, when they have by compact obliged themselves to their masters, may be allowed to desert, unless extreme injury be offered.

*Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. xiv. § 7. l. iii. c. xix. § 54.*

## PROPOSITION LXXV.

To enquire into the principal branches of human or personal virtue. LECT.  
LXXXV.

## SOLUTION AND DEMONSTRATION.

1. Since the happiness of a rational creature must chiefly depend upon the state of his own mind, virtue requires that great care be taken of it, particularly to furnish it with such knowledge as may be delightful and useful.

*Foster's Serm. vol. iv. 1.—Grove's Postb. Works, vol. ii. N°. 11—13.—Abernethy's Disc. vol. ii. N°. 5.*

2. As we may, by an heedless conduct, be betrayed into numberless evils, virtue requires that we should attentively consider our circumstances in life, and often reflect on our conduct.

*Lardner's Counsels of Prudence.*—*Grove's Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 221—242.

3. Since we are compounded of body as well as mind, virtue will require a proper care of the body, that on the one hand it may not want any thing necessary for its subsistence, health and vigour; and on the other, that it may not be indulged in such excesses, as however pleasant at first, might at length enfeeble and destroy it.

*Collier's Ess.* part ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 17.—*Stubbe's Dial. on Pleasure. Protest. Syst.* vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 12.—*Fordyce's Sermon on the Love of Pleasure.*—*Abern. Disc.* vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 16.

4. As it is impossible to be happy, while our minds are the sport of irregular appetites and passions, virtue will require a due guard upon these; that the agreeable things of life may not be objects of excessive desire, hope, or joy; and that the evils of it may not overwhelm us with fear, with grief, or resentment, nor its uncertainty with excessive solicitude.

*Watts on the Passions*, § 15—24.—*Grove's Posth. Works*, vol. iv. N<sup>o</sup>. 6.—*Grove's Ethics*, p. 257—287.

5. As many disorders of body and mind may take their rise from idleness, virtue will on the preceding principles require, that we keep ourselves in a series of useful employments, and labour to improve every proportion of our time well, proper allowance being made for such recreation as animal nature requires.

*Balguy's Sermons*, vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 8.—*Grove on Recreations*, *passim*.

6. That we may not be led into undertakings disproportioned to our strength, that we may  
not

not expect too high regard from others, nor be too keenly impressed with a sense of slights and injuries, as well as for many other important reasons, virtue will require us to moderate our opinion of ourselves, in proportion to the degree and value of our real advantages, whether of mind, of body, or estate.

*Col. Eff. part i. N<sup>o</sup>. 1.—Watts on Humility. passim.—Scott's Christian Life, vol. i. c. iii. § 1.—Part i. Works, vol. i. p. 18—23.—Carmich. Suppl. to Puff. de Off. l. i. c. v. § 2.—Wright's Great Concern, p. 113—125.—Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 2.—Grove's Ethics, vol. ii. part ii, c. ii.—v.—Grove's Serm. vol. v. N<sup>o</sup>. 10, 11.—Price on Morals, p. 258—263.—Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol. ii. p. 105—123.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

It may be observed, that the first and second of these steps comprehend *prudence* and *consideration*, the third *temperance*, *chastity*, and *mortification*, the fourth *fortitude*, *contentment*, *meekness*, and *moderation*, the fifth *diligence*, the last *humility*; and thus the distribution in effect coincides with those of *Scott*, *Wright*, &c.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Thoughts tending to vice are no farther criminal, than as they are approved and indulged by the will. *Def. 38.*

*Osterv. of Unclean. § 1. c. vii. p. 72—74.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Though a constant care should be taken (on the principles laid down *gr. 3.*) to maintain such moderation, in the articles of food, dress, sleep, &c. as may prevent the mind from being enslaved

flaved to the body; and though it be prudence in us to inure ourselves to such hardships, as may be expected in a worthy and honourable passage through life; it is by no means necessary to deny ourselves in every thing which gives pleasure to the senses: for God has placed us in such circumstances, that some pleasures are unavoidable, (the benevolence of his nature no doubt engaging him to delight in the happiness of his creatures;) it is therefore ingratitude to him, as well as injustice to ourselves, to throw back his gifts upon his hands, as if they were snares rather than favours. To which we may add, that in the circumstances in which mankind now are, were all the elegancies and ornaments of life to be renounced, many families must be undone, who are now maintained by an honest labour in furnishing them out, and maintained more chearfully, and indeed more safely, than they could merely by alms.

*Philem. to Hydaspes, part ii. præf. p. 26—64, 91, ad fin.*

### PROPOSITION LXXVI.

To enquire into some of the principal means of promoting virtue in the soul.

#### SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Virtue may be promoted by attentive hearing and reading discourses on divine subjects, and seriously meditating upon them; all which may serve to assist us in forming right notions of God, and in judging of our duty, and may awaken us to the practice of it.

2. External acts of adoration and praise may promote as well as express inward veneration.

*Atterb. Post. Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. vii. p. 191*

—203.

3. Earnest and frequent prayers to God may greatly tend to promote virtue: for though they can

can

can neither inform nor move him, yet they may bring us to a proper temper for receiving his mercies. And if any object, that God has established such an order of things, as he will not alter in compliance with the intreaties of his creatures; it may be replied, that this order was no doubt established in connection with, and in correspondence to the view, which the divine being always had of the prayers and temper of his rational creatures: and husbandry, and all the most necessary labours of life, might as reasonably be argued against as prayer, on the force of this objection.

*Burn. Life of Roch. p. 52, 53, 60—64.—*  
*Stebbing on Div. Rev. p. 36—42.—*  
*Benf. of Prayer, p. 13—21.—Ibbot's*  
*Sermons. vol. ii.—Sermons, 10, 11, 12.*  
*—On the Duty and Benefit of Prayer.*  
*—Sherlock on Providence. Edit. 9.*  
*p. 391—402.—Dr. Price's Disserta-*  
*tions. Dissertation the Second.—Ogden's*  
*Sermons on Prayer.—Kippis's Sermons,*  
*Sermon the 7th.—Paley's Principles*  
*of moral and political Philosophy, vol. ii.*  
*p. 31—47. Seventh Edit.—Relig. of*  
*Nat. p. 103, 104.—Leechman's Serm.*  
*on Prayer, præf. p. 14, 24—25. Glasg.*  
*Ed.—Grove on secret Prayer. Ess. i.*  
*—King's Origin of Evil, 5. v. 4. præf.*  
*par. 7—13.—Abernethy on Attrib.*  
*vol. ii. p. 401—415.*

4. It is proper that men should meet in religious assemblies, to join in divine worship; as thereby a public honour is done to God, and the hearts of men may be fixed and quickened by beholding the devotion of each other.

*Price, ibid. p. 257—267.—Protest. Syst.*  
*vol. ii. Sermon 8—Collib. on Nat. and*  
*Rev.*

*Rev. Rel.* p. 25.—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science*, vol. ii. p. 84—87\*.

4.15. It is proper that some person should be appointed, whose chief business it should be to preside in these assemblies; since by this means, religious offices will be performed in a manner most tending to common edification.

4.16. Lest the civil business of some should interfere with the religious appointment of others, it is proper that some time should be set apart by common consent for religious purposes: besides that, the rest of beasts and servants may require some such appointments; which therefore have made a part of the religious constitution of almost all nations.

*Watts's Holin. of Times and Places*, p. 3—5.  
—*Works*, vol. ii. p. 396.—*Fost. Sermon on the Morality of the Sabbath*.—*In his 4 Volumes of Sermons*, oct. vol. 4th.

\* The Authority, Propriety, and Utility of Public Worship have lately been called in Question by the Rev. Gilbert Wakefield, in an Enquiry concerning that Subject. To this Publication Answers were given by a Lady, under the Name of Eusebia, in “*Cursory Remarks on an Enquiry, &c.*” by Mrs. Barbauld, in “*Remarks on Mr. Wakefield's Enquiry;*” by James Wilson, M. A. in “*A Defence of public or social Worship;*” by Dr. Priestly, in “*Letters to a young Man;*” by the Rev. J. Bruckner, in “*Thoughts on Public Worship;*” by Mr. Burges, in “*Remarks, &c.*” by Mr. Parry, in “*A Vindication of public and social Worship;*” by Mr. Pope, in his Essay, entitled “*Divine Worship, founded in Nature, and supported by Scripture Authority;*” and in “*Remarks, &c.*” by a Layman. Two Sermons were likewise preached and published upon the Question; one by Dr. Disney, and the other by Mr. Simpson. Mr. Wakefield, in his “*General Reply to the Arguments against the Enquiry into public Worship,*” has partly given up the point; and in the second edition of his “*Enquiry,*” he has sketched a plan of public worship in which he could acquiesce. The controversy seems now to be for ever decided; and it has had the advantage of shewing that the practice of public and social worship stands supported upon the unquestionable foundation of reason and scripture.

7. It may be proper that fasting should sometimes be joined with other acts of divine worship to promote more intense devotion, to express our humiliation for sin, and to promote that command of the mind over the body, which is suited to the constitution of a rational being.

*Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxxv. § 3, 4.—*

*Amory's Dial. on Devot.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Those things are only to be asked of God in LECT. prayer, which are of some considerable impor- LXXXVI. tance, by which our truest happiness may probably be promoted, and which there appears some hope of obtaining: and where it is dubious, as with respect to many temporal enjoyments it is, whether obtaining our petitions will be on the whole for our advantage, we are to ask these things only conditionally, with a becoming submission to the superior wisdom of God.

*Juven. Sat. x.—Pluto's Alcibiades. ii.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is questioned, whether we may pray for what we are sure God will give or do.

*Ans.* There can be no doubt of this, if our asking it be the *condition* of its being bestowed or done: nor can we, without a revelation, be absolutely sure of any future event, how probable soever: and it seems, that if a promise were absolutely given, we might justly plead it with God in prayer, thereby to promote our conformity to the divine will, our expectation of the blessing, and fitness to receive it: but such prayers ought to be managed, so as not to intimate any doubt of the divine veracity, but on the contrary to express a firm and joyful reliance upon it.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is allowed, that *forms* of prayer may help the ignorant and weak, and may prevent public devo-

devotion from falling into that contempt, of which there might otherwise be danger, when such persons are to officiate; as also from being made the vehicle of conveying the errors and irregular passions, which particular persons so officiating might otherwise mingle with them: they may also be useful in secret and family-worship; and even to persons of the best capacity, in seasons when they are out of frame for the duty. Yet it is very unreasonable, that persons in public or private should be confined to forms; since they cannot suit all circumstances, and a frequent repetition of the same words tends to deaden those affections, which ought to accompany prayer.

The chief objections against *extemporary* or *free* prayer are,

1. That the mind cannot, without great disturbance and dissipation of thought, give that attention and examination to it, which is necessary to a rational assent and concurrence.

2. That the auditory may be disquieted with the fear, lest the person officiating should fall into some impropriety or absurdity of expression, inconsistent with the reverence due to the divine being, and the improvement of his fellow-worshippers.

To the *former* we reply, by appealing to experience as an evidence of the quickness of the mind in its operations, to which the quickness of words bears but little proportion. A probable guess may be made at the tendency of a sentence from its beginning, especially when due care is taken that sentences be not drawn out to an immoderate length, and when any book supposed sacred, furnishes out much of the language.—As to the *latter*, experience also shews, that persons of no extraordinary genius are capable of praying without gross absurdity or impropriety of expression; so that where the abilities of the  
per-

person are known, the probability of his running into them is so small, as not at all to affect the mind; and there is a possibility, that a reader may mistake.

*Bennet's Abridg. of Lond. Cases*, p. 72—78.  
 —*Rel. of Nat.* p. 122—124.—*Pierce's Vind. of Diss.* l. iii. c. iv. p. 398, 399, 404—406.—*Jacks. on Lord's Prayer*, pref. p. 7.—*Limb. Theol.* l. v. c. xxv. § 28.—*Halif. Char. of a Trimmer*, p. 45, 46.—*Baxt. Works*, vol. i. p. 671.—*Watts's Misc.* p. 202—213.—*Works*, vol. iv. p. 537—542.—*Dr. John Taylor's Scripture Account of Prayer.*—*“Public Prayer,” a Treatise against Forms, in two parts, in 12mo.* 1766. part i. ch. i—iv. p. 13—60.—*Disquisitions relating to the Dissenters*, 12mo, 1767, c. i—iv. for written Forms.—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 58—67.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Where liturgies are established by public authority, great care ought to be taken that there be no phrases in them likely to lead men into hurtful mistakes; seeing the veneration quickly contracted for such offices, would render it exceeding difficult to eradicate an error so imbibed.

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It is our duty to pray for *others*; since hereby our benevolence for them is expressed and increased, and it is the only way by which we can express it to far the greatest part of our species.

*Price's Dissertations*, N<sup>o</sup>. 2. p. 221—227, 237—239.

## SCHOLIUM 6.

It is the duty of the community to take care that there be able teachers, of a virtuous character, that so virtue may be promoted in it. Nothing therefore should be done to deter fit persons from undertaking the work, by subscriptions, oaths, &c. which would be most likely in some cases to exclude the most valuable men. It is also fit, that the community by whom they are employed should allow them such subsistence, that they may pursue their studies without avocation, and may be fitted for performing their office, in a manner most honourable to the divine being, and most edifying to those among whom they officiate.

*Rees of Maintenance.*—*Hutch. Syst. vol. ii.*  
p. 310—312.

## SCHOLIUM 7.

Great care ought to be taken that religion be not over-burthened with ceremonies; for the mind of man is of so limited a nature, that by an over-exact attendance to these, greater things will probably be neglected; and the diversity of tastes; education, &c. will probably lead men into differences with respect to them, which, if they be too much regarded, will be very detrimental to that benevolence which they ought to maintain for each other.

*Tind. Christianity as old,* &c. p. 123, 124.  
—*Geddes's Tracts, vol. iv. p. 205—225.*

## SCHOLIUM 8.

Though prayer and praise have been mentioned above, as the *means* of virtue, yet they are not *only* to be considered in that view; they are certainly a part of the duty we owe to God, as well as proper means of disposing us to the other branches of virtue: and it would appear unnatural, under a deep sense of our dependence upon,

upon, and our obligations to the Divine Being, never to express it in any kind of address to him, though we believe him continually present with us.

*Dr. Price's second Dissertation.*

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Virtue requires, that the civil magistrate should not so interpose in matters of religion, or rites of worship, as to inflict any penalties on his subjects upon account of them, so long as nothing is done prejudicial to the peace of the community.

LECT.  
LXXXVII.

DEMONSTRATION I.

*Prop. 49. gr. 23.* 2. Virtue, and consequently religion, which is that branch of it that more immediately relates to God, consists not merely in the external performance of an action, but in a correspondent temper and disposition of soul.

2. Compulsion only influences the external actions, and can by no means convince the understanding.

1, 2. 3. Such severities cannot make men religious, but are rather likely to make them hypocrites.

3. 4. Persecution for conscience-sake must be prejudicial to the public, by corrupting the characters of men.

5. The persons persecuted must probably be brought into a very unhappy condition by it: for if they renounce their profession, they subject themselves to great remorse, while they secretly believe it to be true; and if they maintain it, penalties are incurred, by which ruin may be brought on themselves and their families.

6. The minds of men are naturally prejudiced in favour of a religion, for which men suffer hardships, though they do nothing injurious to the public peace.

7. Persecutions may promote the cause they are intended to destroy, and by increasing the number of its votaries may occasion insurrections, which may be extremely detrimental to the public tranquillity.

*Tert. ad Scap. c. v. ad fin. Apol. c. i.*—

*Boyle's occas. Meditations, p. 145—148.*

§ 5. N<sup>o</sup>. 2.

4, 5, 7. [8. The magistrate by interposing in these cases, would prejudice the public rather than serve it, and therefore virtue requires him to forbear such interpositions.

*Moyle's Post. Works, vol. i. p. 24—26.*—

*Warburt. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 304, 305.*

—*Owen's Syn. Pneum. p. 137—139.*

—*Tind. Rights Christian Church, part i.*

*c. i. § 20.*—*Montes. Spirit of Laws,*

*l. xxv. c. xiii. vol. ii. p. 183—186.*—

*Doddridge's Serm. on Persec.*—

*Old Whig, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. v, vi, viii, ix, x.*—

*Fost. Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. vi.*—*Watts's*

*Essay on civil Power in Things sacred,*

§ 3, 7, 10. — *Appendix in the last vol.*

*of his Works.*—*Voltaire on Toleration.*

—*Fownes's Inquiry into the Principles*

*of Toleration. Ed. 3.*—*Furneaux's Essay*

*on Toleration.*—*Ditto's Letters to Mr.*

*Justice Blackstone. Ed. 2*—*Six Letters*

*on Intolerance.*

#### SCHOLIUM.

The history of religion in most countries, and the many calamities which have arisen from persecution, greatly tends to illustrate and confirm the last steps of this demonstration; and perhaps there is no part of history more instructive, though none be more melancholy.

*Occas. Pap. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. iv. p. 18—22.*—

*Temp. Netherl. p. 166—169, 175.*—

*Geddes's Account of the Inquisition, ap.*

*Traëts, vol. i.*—*Geddes's Hist. of the Expulsion of the Moriscoes, ibid. vol. i.*  
 —*New Advent. of Telemachus.*—  
*Chandler's Hist. of Persecut. pass.*

## DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. There are a variety of religions in the world, which are so inconsistent, that it is impossible they should all be true.

2. If it be the duty of the magistrate to establish and defend *any* religion by penalties, he must establish and defend that which he takes to be true.

3. There is reason to believe that the generality of men take their own religion to be true.

1, 2, 3. | 4. Many magistrates in the world, and perhaps the greatest part of them, would be obliged, (if the contrary to the proposition were true,) to persecute truth, and establish falsehood.

Q. E. A.

*Old Whig, vol. i. N°. xxxiii.*—*Price's Morals, p. 313, 314.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

To the whole reasoning in *Dem. 1.* it is objected, that some errors in opinion and in worship are so displeasing to God, that the toleration of them would quickly bring down his vengeance upon the public, which it is the magistrates business to endeavour to preserve.

*Ans.* It seems that opinions and practices so provoking to God must be highly contrary to reason, and therefore that the prevalency of them might be prevented by a rational debate, without having recourse to violence: and if in some few instances they should prevail, there may be danger, lest God should be more provoked by attempting to root them out, by methods so detrimental to human society, and to the cause of truth, (*Dem. 2.*) which this objection itself sup-

poses to be the cause of God. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that if God should give any nation convincing proofs, that he would visit it with some extraordinary calamity and judgment, if any particular religion were violated among them, this would indeed alter the case, and justify such a magistrate in fencing it with such penal laws, as in other cases would be unjustifiable: but if a magistrate rashly concludes this to be the case of the people under his government, he is answerable to God for all those injuries which he may do them and religion upon this false supposition: and as for *christianity*, it does not treat with *nations* as *such*; nor does the New Testament contain declarations of vengeance against the nations rejecting it, however virtuous they may be, but only treats with *particular persons*, as those who shall be finally happy or miserable, as it is received or rejected.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

To *Dem.* 1. *gr.* 5. it is objected, that it may be kindness to the person suffering, to endeavour by such severity to reclaim him from such notions and practices, which, (supposing what is generally granted in this debate, the immortality of the soul,) may expose him to the danger of eternal ruin.

*Ans.* It appears by *gr.* 3. of that *Demonstration*, that persecution is not the way to prevent it, but rather to bring on farther guilt, by adding hypocrisy to error: and if it be said, that by this means at least others are preserved; it is answered, that the evidence of truth itself may be sufficient, without violence, to preserve men from such gross and dangerous errors as the objection supposes. If it be farther pleaded, that the corruption of their natures will lead them to error, if human terrors be not employed to restrain them from it; it may be answered, persecution  
tends

tends to beget a suspicion in their minds of the cause to be supported by it: the magistrate cannot by any means prevent and cure all the secret abominations of the heart, but many of them must be referred to the judgment of God: and upon this principle, it might be allowable to persecute any notion whatsoever, which the fury and uncharitableness of the magistrate might call a damnable error.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

To *gr. 2. Dem. 1.* it is objected, that severity may bring men to examine, and examination may introduce a rational conviction.

*Ans.* Arguments so offered are not likely to work upon the mind, and the magistrate seems to have done his part, if he has taken care that the argument should be fairly, clearly, and strongly proposed; nor is it worth while to risk so much evil, for the sake of people that will not be persuaded to enquire; especially since the generality of such people usually go into the prevailing religion, which is that of the magistrate, and rest there.

*Grotius de Jure, 2, 20, 44.—Shaftesbury's Characteristics, vol. iii. p. 107.—Locke's Ess. 4. xvi. 4.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

To the argument of *Dem. 2.* it is generally replied, that none are obliged to use violence in defence of their religion, but those whose religion is true. But then the question returns, who is that person? Every man will say it is he; and the controversy will be eternal, and all the mischief arising from it perpetual, unless some one person or body of men can give the world convincing proof, that they are in the right; and

then there will be no farther room for persecution, even on the principles of our adversaries.

*Bayle's Philos. Comment on Luke xiv. 23.*  
 ———*Conyb. Serm. on Exped. of Rev.*  
*p. 17—21.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

Many insist upon the right of punishing those who *teach* false religions; though they confess that men are not to be obliged to profess the true. But seeing a man may think himself obliged in conscience, to endeavour the propagation of a religion, as well as himself to believe and practise it, most of the reasonings in both *Demonstrations* will take place here. Nevertheless, we readily allow, that the magistrate, or any religious community, may deprive a teacher of any salary or emolument, given him at first as a teacher of truth, if he appear in the judgment of that person or society to become a teacher of error: but this by no means comes within the case condemned in the proposition.

*Scotch Confess. Pref. p. 52—58.* ———*Old Whig, N<sup>o</sup>. iv. p. 37, 38.*

## SCHOLIUM 6.

The doctrines of atheism, human sacrifices, and community of women or goods, are so evidently detrimental to society, that many who have in general condemned penal laws in religion, have allowed them with regard to these, as well as to those who deny the essential difference between virtue and vice.

We readily allow, that if by any *overt act* in consequence of these doctrines, any subjects of the society be injured, the aggressor ought to be severely punished, and his pretences to conscience to be admitted as no excuse, in these cases or any others. But these notions are so notoriously absurd, that there is little danger, that upon a free

free examination they should prevail, especially in a civilized country; and the danger there would be of admitting persecution, on any pretence whatsoever, seems an equivalent for the damage the public would sustain, by permitting them to be publicly defended, while they reached no farther than speculation.

*Alliance between Church and State, p. 118*  
—121.—*Old Whig, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. xiii,*  
xiv, xvi, xviii, xxxvi.

## SCHOLIUM 7.

If a body of men, as the *Papists* among us, hold principles, which will not allow them to give the government security for their peaceable behaviour, and yet bring them under strong suspicion of being engaged in designs subversive of it, the government may in that case weaken them by heavier taxations than are laid upon other subjects; especially if the probable suspicion of their disaffection puts the public to any additional charge: and it seems only so far as this principle will justify it, that our laws against the *Papists* can be indicated, on the foot of natural religion, not now to enquire into any supposed revelation.

*Serm. against Popery, at Salter's Hall, vol. i.*  
p. 36—38.—*Locke on Tol. Let. i. pass.*  
—*Dod. Serm. on Perf. p. 6—19, 20—*  
28.—*Old Whig, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. xi\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 8.

Some have represented all encouragement given to one religious profession in preference to

\* The severity of the laws against the Roman Catholics, has of late years been exposed in various publications, and a general conviction been produced of their impolicy and injustice. Accordingly, these laws have been in part repealed. Dr. O'Leary and Mr. Berrington have appeared as able advocates for their Roman Catholic brethren.

another, as a degree of persecution: but this seems to be carrying the matter into a contrary extreme. Both a regard to the honour of God and the good of society, (which surely the magistrate is not the only person under no obligation to,) must engage him to desire and labour that his people may be instructed in what he takes to be truth; for which purpose it will be necessary that some provision be made for those that so instruct them, preferable to other instructors: that he may maintain such out of his private purse, none can doubt; and if he have a discretionary power with respect to any branch of the public revenue, it seems he may apply it to this purpose, even though most of his people were of a different religious persuasion from himself: and for any, who teach different doctrines, or will not submit to the ritual he thinks fit to establish, to claim the same emoluments from him, seems an invasion of that right of private judgment, which the magistrate and others joined with him must be allowed to have, as to the manner in which either his revenue or theirs shall be disposed of. But then it must be allowed, that it will be matter of duty and prudence in the magistrate, and those that join with him, to make his establishment as large as he can; that no worthy and good men, who might as established teachers be useful to the public, may unnecessarily be hampered and excluded; and for this he will be answerable to God.—If the majority of the people by their representatives join with the magistrate in such establishments, it will be the duty of the minority, though they cannot in conscience conform themselves, yet to be thankful that they are left in the possession of their own liberty, as by the reasoning above they certainly ought to be. If it be asked, whether such dissenters may regularly be forced by the magistrate and majority, to assist in maintaining established

teachers

teachers whom they do not approve; it is answered, that this will stand upon the same footing with their contributing towards the expence of a war, which they think not necessary or prudent. If no such coercive power were admitted, it is probable, that covetousness would drive many into dissenting parties, in order to save their tithes or other possessions. So that none can reasonably blame a government for requiring such general contributions: and in this case, it seems fit it should be yielded to, as the determination of those, to whose guardianship these dissenters have committed themselves and their possessions. But if the majority disapprove of the conduct of their governor in this respect, it must stand upon the same footing with the right of resistance in any other case, in which the people apprehend themselves to be betrayed by their governor.

*Dunlope's Pref. to Scotch Confess.—Abern.—Tracts, p. 170—176.—Furneau's Letters to Mr. Justice Blackstone, Letter I, latter part.*

### PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Virtue prohibits any man to put a period to his own life.

LECT.  
LXXXVIII.

### DEMONSTRATION.

1. Self-murder plainly implies a want of reverence for God, and resignation to his will, who is the Lord of life and death, and has assigned to every man his post in life to be maintained, till he shall dismiss him from it.

2. It is generally injurious to the public, in defrauding it of a member who might some way or other be useful to it, and introducing an example which might be very pernicious.

3. It brings great distress and often great infamy on surviving relatives and friends.

4. It

4. It argues a dishonourable weakness of mind, in not being able to endure the calamities of life, which many others, whose passions are well governed, support with serenity and cheerfulness.

5. If there be a future state, (which we shall afterwards prove,) it may, in consequence of the preceding arguments, bring irreparable damage on the person himself, who dies in an action highly displeasing to God, and cuts off the possibility of farther preparation.

1, 5. 16. Self-murder is contrary to the duty we owe to God, to ourselves, and our fellow-creatures, by the preceding propositions, and therefore contrary to virtue. Q. E. D.

*Watts against Self-Murder*, p. 4—8, 39—41, 47—52.—*Works*, vol. ii. p. 358, 359, and p. 368, 369.—*Clarke of Nat. and Rev. Rel.* p. 207—211.—*Puff. de Jure*, l. ii. c. iv. § 19.—*Cic. Somn. Scip. ap. Off.* p. 229. *Græv. c. iii. Ed. ibid. Tusc. Disp.* l. i. c. xxx.—*Gronovius*, p. 1150.—*Olivet. Tom. ii.* p. 325—327. *Geneva Edition.*—*Paley's Principles of moral and political Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 17—28.—*Spirit of Laws*, vol. i. p. 145, vol. ii. p. 29.—*Grove's Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 274—280\*.

#### COROLLARY I.

All lawful means are to be used to preserve our lives; for not to preserve is to destroy.

#### COROLLARY 2.

If bringing any temporary disorder upon ourselves may be the probable means of preserving

\* A Treatise on Suicide, in two volumes, quarto, has lately been written by the Rev. Mr. More. In this Treatise the subject is considered in every possible variety of lights; and the arguments of the apologists or extenuators of self-murder, whether ancient or modern, are amply refuted and exposed. There are two eloquent letters on the subject, including both sides of the question, in Rousseau's "New Heloise."

life, virtue will not only permit but require us to do it, though it may be attended with some hazard; provided that hazard be less than would arise from omitting it: and if *inoculation* for the small-pox be lawful, it is on these principles.

*Some of Inocul. pass.—Sowden on Ditto pass.*

SCHOLIUM I.

To *Dem. gr. 1.* it is objected, 1. That life was given as a *benefit*; and therefore may be returned, when it ceases to be so.

*Ans.* It was not given as a benefit merely to the person that enjoys it, but as a *trust* to be improved for the good of others: God intending, in the creation of each creature, not merely the happiness of that individual himself, but of the whole system of which he makes a part: this plainly follows from *Prop. 45.*

2. That we are such inconsiderable creatures, that there is no reason to believe, that God will be displeas'd with what affects the order of nature so little as our death would do.—But this argument would conclude for killing ourselves or each other at pleasure, and indeed at once overthrow the basis of all morality and virtue.

3. That we may conclude God gives us leave to retire, when our continuance in life will answer no good purpose. But to this it is answered, we can never say that this is the case; since we may be sometimes unexpectedly recovered from great calamities; or even when we lie under them, may be very serviceable to others, by affording them examples of patience and resignation. God alone is capable of judging certainly when our usefulness is quite over; and therefore his orders are to be waited.

4. As for *Gildon's* observation, that we do not come into life by our own consent, as a soldier does into an army; the answer is obvious, that God as our creator has a much greater right to  
our

our humble obedience, than a general can have to that of a soldier, how willingly soever he may have enlisted himself into his service.

*Blount's Orac. of Reas. p. 7—13.—In his Life, p. 10. 11.—Lettres Persannes, vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. lxiv, lxvii.—Passeran's Phil. Enq. pass.—Fitzosb. Lett. N<sup>o</sup>. xxii.—Montaigne's Ess. vol. ii. ch. iii.*

## COROLLARY 2.

To gr. 2. it is objected, that some people cannot in any respect be serviceable to the public, or that if they could, they have a right to retire from the community when they see fit.

*Ans.* This can only be allowed, when there may be a prospect of at least equal happiness to mankind by the remove; otherwise the general laws of benevolence oblige them to a continuance; and how this can be the case in self-murder, will be hard to shew.

*Watts, ibid. p. 12—14.—Works, vol. ii. p. 360.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

To prevent a tormenting death, (whether natural or violent,) certainly approaching, or the violation of chastity, seems the most plausible excuse for suicide. Yet as to the first of these, it is to be considered, (besides what was hinted *Schol. 1.*) that to die in torment for the sake of truth, is a glorious example of virtue, which may be exceedingly useful: and humbly to yield to a severe sentence of death for any crime committed, may deter others from it much more effectually than self-violence could do, and may be on the whole an action the most pious and the most beneficial a man can in these circumstances perform. As to the *latter*, such violence would not destroy the character and usefulness of the person

person suffering by it; or if it did, it were to be born with submission as a trial coming from the hand of providence.

*Watts, ibid. p. 65—69.—Works, vol. ii. p. 372, 373.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Nevertheless it seems, that if the magistrate condemns a man to death, and gives him his choice, whether he will die by his own hand, or by a more severe execution from the hands of another, he may in that case execute himself.

*Athen. Oracle.*

## PROPOSITION LXXIX.

God is true in all his declarations, and faithful in all his engagements to his creatures, if he enters into any engagements with them.

LECT.

LXXXIX.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 54, 55.* 1. Virtue requires us to be true to our declarations, and faithful to our promises.

2. Our obligations to truth and fidelity in our converse with our fellow-creatures does not arise from our own weakness and dependence, but from the general laws of benevolence: and if a being, beyond all possibility of receiving any personal advantage from falshood and treachery, were to be guilty of it, he would be so much the more inexcusable, and therefore so much the more odious. 1, 2. *Prop. 44. Cor. 3.* 3. *Valet propositio.*

*Abern. Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. v. p. 229—231.*

*Dublin. Ed. p. 216—218. London Ed.*

*p. 124, 125.—Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 654.*

*—Serm. 87. p. 579, 580. 4th Ed.—*

*Wiik. Nat. Rel. p. 140—142. Seventh Edition.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

If there be any force in what is said *Prop. 54. Schol. I.* to prove that there is a kind of *instinct* in favour of truth rooted in our nature, that may afford some presumption, that God the author of our nature is a lover of truth, as the *benevolent* instinct implanted in our nature, may be an argument of his benevolence.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Many have questioned, whether God, by the veracity and fidelity of his nature, be obliged to fulfil his *threatenings*. It is urged, that promises give another a right of a claim to what has been promised; but for a person not to accomplish his threatening, is to be *better* than his word; and consequently it would be no reflection on the divine being to suppose it thus with regard to him.

But it seems, this question is to be determined, by the manner in which the threatening is delivered. If any action be forbidden by God on such a penalty, and no farther declaration be added, he does not seem to be bound by it; but if he has in any case added a declaration, that he will in fact make his threatenings as well as his promises the rule of his final proceedings, it seems inconsistent with his *veracity*, though not his *fidelity*, to act contrary to them; especially if we consider, that as there is no change in the views and purposes of God, if he fail to act according to such minatory declarations, he must have intended to act contrary to them, even at the time he made them; which seems a mean and dishonourable artifice, infinitely beneath the majesty of God.

*Tillotf. vol. i. Serm. xxxv. p. 353, 354.*  
*Ed. 1704. p. 413, 414.—Watts's Serm.*  
*vol. ii. p. 146, 147.—Werks, vol. i.*  
*p. 218.*

## DEFINITION LIX.

That governor is said to administer his government with JUSTICE, who in proportion to his legal power distributes good to the virtuous and evil to the vicious, or in other words, treats his subjects on the whole according to their characters.

*Abern. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. v. p. 180—186. Lond. Ed.—p. 193—197. Dublin Ed.*

## SCHOLIUM 1.

*Justice*, sometimes signifies, “giving to every one that which is his own, or that which he has in reason a right to,” *i. e.* which virtue requires he should have; or in other words, treating him as virtue requires he should be treated: now in this sense of it, it is *universal rectitude*. (*Def. 38.*) Sometimes it stands distinguished from *charity*; and then he is said to be a *just* man, who gives to every one that to which he has by law a claim, and he is *good* or *charitable*, who abounds in good offices, to which human laws do not oblige him.

*Fost. Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. ii. p. 27—35\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Justice, as it respects *men*, is often divided into *commutative* and *distributive* justice: the former consists in an equal exchange of benefits, the latter in an equal distribution of rewards and punishments.

*Bury-street Lect. Edit. i. vol. i. p. 82, 83. Serm. iv. p. 71, 72. Ed. 2.*

\* Mr. Hume, in his *Essays*, vol. the second, on the *Principles of Morals*, § 3. p. 249, &c. founds the notion of justice entirely on utility, as Carneades and others have done before him. s.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It will not follow from the definition given above, that every governor is unjust, who does not carry the execution of the law to its utmost rigour upon offenders; all governments allowing a power of pardoning, in cases in which the governor shall judge it most agreeable to the public good to do it; and as the public good is the supreme law, justice is no farther a virtue than as it consists with it: but as injustice is always a term of reproach, it is not to be applied to those instances of favour, which, though contrary to the *letter* of the law, are consistent with and subservient to its general design.

## PROPOSITION LXXX.

God is with respect to his dispensations, on the whole just to all his rational and free creatures.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. All rational and free creatures are the proper subjects of moral government, *i. e.* are capable of being governed by a law, enforced by the sanction of rewards and punishments.

1.|2. It is in itself highly congruous, that they should be treated with favour or severity, as virtue or vice do on the whole prevail in their tempers and conduct.

2.|3. It would be justly accounted an infamous thing, for any created governor to act contrary to the rule of justice, in his treatment of any such creatures committed to his government.

4. The most excellent creatures might in some imaginable instances lie under some temptations of this kind, to which an omnipotent God cannot possibly be exposed.

3, 4, 5. It would be most dishonourable to conceive of the divine being, as acting contrary to those rules, and dispensing final good and evil with-

without regard to the moral character of his creatures. *Gr. 5. Prop. 44, Cor. 3.* | 6. *Valet propositio.*

*Abern. Serm. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. 5. præf. p. 186  
—280. Lond. Ed. p. 197—220. Dublin  
Ed.*

## COROLLARY.

GOD is just in all his dispensations to mankind. *Prop. 16.*

*Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 647.——Wilk. Nat. of  
Rel. p. 139, 140. p. 123, 124. Seventh  
Ed.——Butler's Anal. part i. c. iii, vii.  
——Bourn's Sermons, vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. ii.  
p. 123, 124.*

## SCHOLIUM.

The only considerable objection against this, arises from the unequal distribution of good and evil, observable in the present administration of providence: but it may be sufficiently answered by considering,

1. That we are often mistaken in the judgment we form concerning the characters and conditions of men.

2. That the interest of particular persons may sometimes clash with that of society, in such a manner as that public justice will require, that for the present the former be sacrificed to the latter.

3. That if a future state be admitted, it will solve those phænomena, which otherwise would appear the most unaccountable; and perhaps those inequalities may be permitted, to convince us of it: but of this more hereafter.

*Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 248—265.  
vol. i. p. 284—291.——Relig. of Nat.  
p. 110—114.——Abern. Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. v.  
p. 209—216. Dublin Ed.: London Ed.  
p. 197—205.——Bourn's Serm. vol. ii.  
N<sup>o</sup>. iii.*

## DEFINITION LX.

LECT. He is said to REPENT of a vicious action that  
 xc. he has committed, who is so convinced of the  
 folly of it, as heartily to wish that he had not  
 committed it, and stedfastly resolve that he will  
 no more repeat it.

*Tillotf. Serm. vol. iii. p. 63—69. Serm.  
 cxiii. p. 61—66. Ed. 4.*

## COROLLARY.

Wherever there is true repentance for an injury  
 offered to another person, the penitent will be  
 ready to make restitution, so far as it is in his  
 power to do it.

*Tillotf. Serm. iii. Serm. cxvi. p. 85—90.  
 p. 80—85. Ed. 4.—Puff. de Jure,  
 l. iii. c. i. § 5—11.—Grot. de Jure, l. ii.  
 c. xvii. § 13—17.—Granada's Mem.  
 p. 119—121.*

## SCHOLIUM.

If it be hereafter proved, that every man who  
 has committed a vicious action is obliged to  
 repent of it, then he who by an unjust war has  
 deprived any of their rights is obliged to make  
 restitution: and if any possessions came into the  
 hands of a conqueror in a just war, which did  
 not of right belong to the persons from whom he  
 took them; such a conqueror seems obliged to  
 restore them, when the claim of the former  
 owner is made and proved; proper allowance  
 being made for the trouble and expence of reco-  
 vering them.

*Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. x. § 4—6. c. xvi.  
 § 1—3.—Conti's Will, ap. Life, p. 7  
 —14.*

## DEFINITION LXI.

Those rules of action, which a man may dis-  
 cover by the use of his reason to be agreeable to  
 the

the nature of things, and on which his happiness will appear to him to depend, may be called THE LAW OF NATURE: and when these are considered as intimations of the divine will and purpose, they may be called the NATURAL LAWS OF GOD. Vid. *Def.* 52.

*Caermich. Puff. 1st Suppl. c. i. § 10, 19, 20.*

## DEFINITION LXII.

That part of the law of nature, which a man by the exercise of his reason *has actually discovered*, is to him at that time THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

## COROLLARY.

The light of nature and the law of nature may to the same, and yet more evidently to different persons, be different: yet they can in no instance be contradictory to each other.

## SCHOLIUM.

If by the *law of nature*, be meant in general the obligation arising from the nature of things, it can in all its extent be known only to him, to whom the nature of things is universally known, *i. e.* to God: and with respect to him, it can only improperly and figuratively be called a *law*, since there is no superior whose will is thereby signified to him. Vid. *Def.* 52.

*Conyb. against Tind. p. 11, 13—17.——*

*Leland against Tind. vol. i. c. ii.*

## PROPOSITION LXXXI.

The natural law of God requires the practice of universal virtue.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 44. *Cor.* 1. | 1. Since God is a being of perfect rectitude, it must be his will, that creatures capable of virtue should practise it in all its branches.

*Prop.* 80. | 2. As he is the just governor of the world, he will on the whole dispense good or evil, as virtue has been cultivated, or as it has been violated. *Gr.* 1, 2. *Def.* 61. | 3. *Valet propositio.*

*Cit. de Rep. ap. Laſtant. quod vide ap. Middlet. Life of Cic. vol. ii. p. 556, 557, 558. 4to Ed. vol. iii. p. 351, 352. 8vo Ed.—Beattie's Elements of moral Science, vol. ii. p. 8—77.*

## COROLLARY I.

A due reverence to the divine being, as well as a regard to our own happiness, will require us attentively to study the law of nature; especially seeing there are so many cases, in which it is exceedingly difficult to determine what it requires. *Sykes's Connect. c. i, ii.*

## COROLLARY 2.

The natural law of God must require, that those who have been guilty of vice, should repent of it. *Vid. Def. 60.*

## COROLLARY 3.

This natural and universal law of God, is of infinitely greater efficacy to restrain vice and promote virtue, than any human laws can be; since, whereas in human laws, *punishments* are generally the only sanctions, (the magistrate being neither capable of judging of the degree of virtue in any action, (compare *Prop.* 49. *Cor.* 2.) nor having a fund out of which he can universally reward men in proportion to it) the divine law has the sanction of *rewards* likewise, and extends itself to, what the civilians call, *duties of imperfect obligation, i. e.* those which cannot fall under the cognizance of human governors.

*Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 12—21.—Fitzosb. Lett. N°. xlvi.*

## COROLLARY 4.

It is highly for the interest of states, that the great principles of natural religion should be believed, *viz.* the being and providence of God, and the certainty of an exact retribution either here or hereafter; since it is on these principles alone, that the efficacy of such supposed laws must depend.

*Warb. ibid. p. 22—25.—Watts of Civil Power in Rel. p. 27—29.—Works, vol. vi. p. 139, 140.*

## COROLLARY 5.

For any to pour contempt upon this natural law of God, under pretence of extolling any supposed divine revelation, or intimation of God's will in an extraordinary manner, will appear very absurd; since our obligation to receive any such supposed extraordinary discoveries made by God, must depend upon our knowledge of his moral perfections; and no discovery can be supposed so particular, as not to need the use of reasoning upon the principles of the law of nature; in explaining and applying it to particular cases.

*Hodges's Elibu, Pref. p. 23—25.—Dove's Creed, p. 9, 10, 13.*

## SCHOLIUM 1.

That it will not at all follow from the usefulness of religion to communities, that therefore it is merely an engine of state-policy, is in a most sagacious and conclusive manner shewn in

*Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. iii. § 6. p. 443—471. part ii. p. 253—286.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

From the second *Corollary*, arises a most difficult and important question, *viz.* whether the justice of God will permit him to forgive the penitent; at least, whether we can have such

assurance of it, as chearfully to depend upon pardon, how great soever our offences may have been. Some have asserted the contrary in the strongest terms: and urge, that there is an infinite degree of evil in sin, from which it is impossible that any creature should recover himself; and that the infinite goodness of God must make every the least violation of the laws of eternal order and rectitude an incurable evil. But others have universally asserted, that we may on the principles of the light of nature be certain, that God will and must upon repentance fully and freely pardon every sin. But on the whole, we must answer in a medium between those two opinions,

1. There seems some probable reason to believe, that at least *some* sins may be forgiven by God; considering the known goodness of the divine being, and especially from observing the provision he has made in the world of nature for the necessities and calamities of mankind, even of many which are brought upon men by their own folly: and indeed had God determined to punish every sin without mercy, we can hardly believe that such a benevolent being would have placed mankind in circumstances of such strong temptation from within and without, that not a person on earth who is arrived at years of understanding should be free from it. Nevertheless,

2. We cannot *certainly* and *universally* conclude, that sin shall be pardoned on repentance: for the end of punishment is not merely, as some have rashly asserted, the amendment of the offender, (though even some punishment might be inflicted upon repentance, to make him more cautious, and to preserve him from future guilt;) but principally the maintaining the honour of the divine government, and the admonition of others: now it is impossible for us certainly to say, how far the right of his government and  
the

the interest of the whole rational creation may require severity even against penitents themselves, especially in cases of notorious provocation. So that, on the whole, it seems that unassisted reason could give us at best but a wavering and uncertain hope that *all* sin was pardonable, though it might show it to be highly probable, that *some* sins were so, or that the penalty inflicted for them might not be the utter destruction of the penitent.

*Tind. Christianity as old, &c. c. iv.*—  
*Conyb. against Tind. p. 114—131. or*  
*Leland against Tind. vol. i. c. vi.*—  
*Balguy on Redempt.*—*Fost. Disc. on*  
*Nat. Rel. vol. i. c. viii.*—*Hallet on*  
*Script. vol. ii. 326—343.*—*Taylor*  
*against Deism, c. i. p. 1, &c.*—*Watts's*  
*Strength and Weakness, &c. p. 72—87.*  
*—Works, vol. ii. p. 236—242.*—  
*Butler's Anal. part ii. c. v. § 2—4.*—  
*Howe's Living Temple, part ii. c. vi. § 3.*  
*c. vi. § 5, 6, 10.*—*Leibn. Theod. § 73,*  
*74.*—*Sykes on Redemption, p. 5—19.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, though it remains dubious how far God will pardon sin upon repentance, yet repentance will appear reasonable; since to be sure, if any pardon is to be expected, it must be received in that way; for it would be utterly unbecoming the dignity of the divine being, and his character as the universal judge, always to spare and always to bless an obstinate and incorrigible rebel: and if any punishment is after all to be expected, it must surely be much better to meet it in a posture of humble submission, than with a vain and obstinate resistance and opposition to a being infinitely superior to us, and who can continue us in a capacity of feeling punish-

ment as long as he pleases; for some mitigation of which punishment we might at least hope, in consequence of such humble submission as is recommended above.

*Collib. of Nat. and Rev. Rel. part i. § 8.*  
p. 27—35.

*The END of the THIRD PART.*

## P A R T IV.

*Of the IMMORTALITY and IMMATERIALITY of the SOUL: its ORIGINAL: the general Obligations to Virtue, and State of it in the World.*

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## DEFINITION LXIII.

**T**HE DEATH of the MAN is the universal cessation both of perception and of animal motion, and particularly respiration, and the circulation of the blood in the human body. LECT.  
XCI.

## SCHOLIUM.

Though perception and animal motion are not necessarily connected; yet, so far as our observation reaches, the latter being never found without the former, it seemed not improper to join them as we have done in the definition.

## DEFINITION LXIV.

The DEATH of the MIND is the utter destruction of its percipient and thinking powers.

## PROPOSITION LXXXII.

The soul does not die with the body; but survives in a state of greater happiness or misery than before, as it has behaved in a virtuous or vicious manner.

## DEMONSTRATION I.

*Prop. 80.* | I. As God is just, he will take care, that on the whole his creatures shall be more or less happy or miserable, according to the degree in which virtue or vice prevails in their characters.

2. No.

2. No such distinction is here made, correspondent to their characters; but virtuous men are often exposed to the greatest distress, whilst the worst of men live and die in a series of prosperity. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. iii. § 32—35.*

1, 2. | 3. There must be a future state of retribution. *Q. E. D.*

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 251—257.—*  
*Rel. of Nat. p. 199—203.—Balg. Six*  
*Sermons, p. 81—86. 1st. Ed.—Balguy's*  
*Sermons, Ed. 3. p. 396—401.—Burla-*  
*maqui Elementa Juris Naturalis, part ii.*  
*c. xii. § 1—14 c. xiii. § 1. and § 11—*  
*15.—Price on Morals, p. 449—466.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that the secret pleasure attending virtue is its own reward, and renders the good man happier in his most calamitous state, than the wicked man is in his greatest prosperity.

*Ans. 1.* That the support and comfort of a good man in his troubles, greatly depends on the expectation of a future state; and that this expectation being his greatest encouragement to persevere in virtue under its greatest disadvantages, we can hardly suppose that a wise, just, and good God would so order it, that the great foundation and support of virtue should be a false and vain expectation.

2. There are some sufferings of flesh and blood, to which good men even for conscience-sake have often been brought, so extreme, that without some extraordinary support from God, it is morally impossible the pleasure of rational thought should be enjoyed under them: and this case would be a sufficient answer to the objection, unless such supports were granted; which if they were, as they arise from views of a future state, the faithfulness of God, as well as those attributes

butes mentioned before, would seem to be injured, by supposing there were no such state.

3. Good men, in calmer seasons of life, often find the inward satisfaction arising from the consciousness of their own virtue interrupted, whilst they labour under disquieting doubts and fears as to the state and prevalency of it; and it is unreasonable to suppose that God would leave their minds under such distresses, if the present pleasure of virtue were its only reward. On the other hand, bad men often outgrow the remorse of conscience; so that those who are the most experienced in wickedness, and so deserve the heaviest punishments, do, so far as we can judge, suffer much less than others not equally criminal, and owe their tranquillity to their wickedness.

4. That all this passes in private, and is little taken notice of; whereas one would naturally expect that the justice of God should have its public triumphs, especially over those who, being in exalted stations of life, and therefore under the greatest obligation to virtue, have acted a very guilty part, without appearing to be in any measure proportionably miserable; and in favour of those who have suffered very hard things for virtue, without any visible retribution; and have perhaps even died in its defence.

*Relig. of Nat. p. 203—205 — Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 257—261. part ii. p. 108—111. — Balg. Six Serm. p. 88—91. — Baxt. Reas. of Christianity, part i. c. xiv. § 1. ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 46—48. — Fost. Disc. on Nat. Rel. vol. i. c. ix. — Parker's Law of Nature, part i. § 31.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Others urge, that this goes on a false supposition, that there are some good men; whereas the best, being but imperfectly virtuous, can claim no future rewards.

*Ans.*

*Ans.* 1. It must be acknowledged, that the best of men cannot in strict justice claim any reward from God as a debt, seeing they owe all to him; especially are they destitute of such a claim, when they have in any instance failed of the duty they owe him, as the best here do: nevertheless,

2. The vast difference there is in the characters of men will require that there should be some greater difference in the manner of treating them, than there is in the present state, where there is no proportion between their suffering and present demerit.

3. That considering the extraordinary progress some make in virtue, and consequently how fit they are for the most sublime and rational happiness, and how unavoidable some degree of imperfection is, considering the constitution of our nature and the temptations of life, there seems some probable though not certain reason to hope, that God will hereafter reward those who are in the main his faithful servants, with some greater degrees of felicity than they have here enjoyed.

*Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 226—229. & p. 236—240. —Grove's Thoughts on a future State, c. vii. p. 340, &c. —Kenrick's Poems, p. 148—150.*

#### SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless it must be confessed, that reason does not certainly assure us, that all good men do *immediately* pass into a state of happiness: least of all could we conclude it in favour of those penitents, who have been reclaimed but a little before their death, after a long course of vice, for which they have met with no remarkable calamity. It might seem more probable with regard to such, that they should either suffer an utter extinction of being, or pass through some state

state of purgation whereby at least some farther honour might also be done to the divine violated law.

*Virg. En. l. vi. ver. 719—748.*—*Plato's Phæd. § 44, 45.*—*Cyrus Trav. vol. ii. p. 110, 8vo.*—*Æschin. Dial. iii. § 19—21.*—*Fortin's Dissertations, N<sup>o</sup>. vi.*  
—*Pindar's 2d Olympiad, by West.*

## DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. The human mind is framed with capacities for perpetual improvement; whereas brutes soon attain to the utmost perfection of which their natures are capable. LECT. XCII.

1.|2. It seems not consistent with the divine wisdom, to form so excellent a being for so short a duration, and such low employments, as are to be found in this mortal life.

1.|3. The human mind is formed with a capacity for far greater happiness, than it can enjoy in the present state.

4. Men are necessarily exposed to a great variety of evils, from which even innocent infants are not exempted: and perhaps it may be acknowledged, that were immortality to be absolutely despaired of, the state of brutes would appear less calamitous and pitiable than that of men; at least that it would be so, were the whole human species to disbelieve a future state.

5. There is a strong desire of immortality possessing our natures, and it is strongest in the most virtuous minds.

3, 4, 5.|6. The circumstances of men in the present world are such, as we can hardly reconcile with the divine goodness, unless we suppose some other and better state of existence; especially considering, that in others, and those much inferior things, there is a correspondence between natural desire and the possibility at least of enjoyment.

Gr.

Gr. 2, 6. Prop. 42, 45. 7. The wisdom and goodness of God join in requiring that there should be a future state, and therefore it is reasonable to expect it. Q. E. D.

*Speēt. vol. ii. N<sup>o</sup>. cxi. — Rel. of Nat. p. 208 — 211. — Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 269. — Howe's Vanity of Man, &c. pass. præf. ap. Op. vol. i. p. 640 — 650. 8vo. Ed. p. 20 — 46. — Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 256 — 258, 272, 289. — Fost. Serm. vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. xv. p. 406 — 408 — Balg. Six Serm. p. 66 — 69. or Works, vol. i. p. 380 — 384. — Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence, N<sup>o</sup>. xi. — Grove against Hallet, c. iv. — Young's Night Thoughts, N<sup>o</sup>. vii. — Kenrick's Poems, p. 161 — 166.*

## SCHOLIUM.

Nearly akin to this argument, is that which Mr. *Balguy* draws from the sense of *friendship* rooted in the human heart, which engages virtuous friends to wish to continue for ever in the enjoyment of each other, and renders the thoughts of a final separation so shocking, that it is not to be imagined the great and benevolent author of nature should have implanted such a passion, had he not intended to leave room for the eternal gratification of it. And it may farther be observed, that whatever weight there is in this argument is increased by considering, that the notion of the mortality of the soul will be an additional grief to a virtuous mind, when he considers, that upon this supposition he must not only be deprived himself of the enjoyment of his friends, but they likewise must entirely perish, and lose all the delight which growing science and virtue have given, and which they seemed fitted for receiving, in yet farther and more exalted degrees. To which we may add, on like prin-

principles, that the love of God growing in the virtuous mind, will make the thought of the extinction of being more painful in proportion to that advance; as all enjoyment of God must of course cease. And the importance of this thought both illustrates *Balguy's* remark, and is strongly illustrated by it.

*Balg. Six Serm. p. 71—75.—Works, vol. i. p. 386—390.*

## DEMONSTRATION 3.

The lives of men, according to the ordinary course of nature, are continually in the power of themselves and others.

2. If the soul were mortal, a desperate villain might immediately deprive the most virtuous man of his being, and with it, of all the farther rewards which his virtue might have expected and received.

1. 3. Such a person might also upon that supposition put a period to all farther punishment intended for his crimes and due to them, by laying violent hands upon himself.

2, 3. 4. The justice of God might in a great measure be frustrated, if the soul were mortal.

*Prop. 31, and 80.* 5. Seeing God is an omnipotent and just being, we have reason to conclude that his justice cannot be frustrated.

4, 5. 6. The soul is immortal. *Q. E. D.*

*Watts's Reliq. Jurv. N<sup>o</sup>. lxxv. p. 334—336—Works, vol. iv. p. 594.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

To this it may be objected, that God will in an extraordinary manner interpose, to prevent such deaths as would interfere with the distribution of justice.

*Ans. 1.* So far as we can judge, many such deaths do in fact happen.

2. It would be unreasonable to expect a course of things to be established, in which without perpetual extraordinary interpositions the greatest irregularities must happen; this would reflect as much upon the wisdom, as the other on the justice of the divine being.

*Watts, ibid. p. 336, 337.—Works, vol. iv. p. 595.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

What is most solid and important in the argument for a future state, from the impossibility of governing the world without the belief of it, seems to coincide with this argument, or *Demonstration 1.*

*Baxt. Reas. of Christ. part i. c. xiv. § 5, 6. ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 49—51.—Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 334—337.—Hallet's Notes on Scripture, vol. i. p. 288—297.—Grove on fut. State, c. v.*

DEMONSTRATION 4.

1. There is in man a certain affection of mind, or principle of action, which is commonly called *conscience*, whereby we are capable of considering ourselves as under a divine law, and accountable to God for our conduct.

1.2. Hence arises self-approbation, or self-condemnation in men, as they apprehend their actions have been agreeable or disagreeable to the divine law.

3. The force of this often appears so great, that the worst of men cannot, at least without great difficulty, divest themselves of it; and that even when they are in such circumstances, as to have least to fear from their fellow-creatures, and especially in their dying moments.

*Juvenal, Satire 13, v. 192, &c.—Satire 1, v. 196.*

2, 3. | 4. It is exceedingly probable, that this principle is intended by God to intimate a future state of retribution, since it is chiefly to that it seems to refer.

1, 4. | 5. Both the wisdom and truth of God seem to require, that there should be a future state in some respect answerable to this apprehension. Q. E. D.

*Tillot's. Serm. vol. iii. p. 124, 125: p. 119, 120. 4th Ed.—Barrow, vol. ii. p. 334-335.—Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 259—263.—Fost. Serm. vol. ii. N°. iii. p. 55—68.—Balg. Six Serm. p. 75—79.—Vol. of Sermons, p. 390—394.—Juvenal. Sat. xiii. v. 192, &c.—Sat. i. v. 196.*

## DEMONSTRATION 5.

1. It appears that most nations, not excepting the most barbarous, have generally believed the doctrine in the proposition: and it is observable that most of their *funeral rites*, so far as we are informed concerning them, seem to imply some apprehension of it: as that very ancient kind of idolatry, the worship of the dead, (as well as all pretences to the art of *necromancy*, which were plainly founded on this persuasion,) contains a farther and most evident proof of it. To which we may also add, that the *lesser initiation* of the ancients seems to have been a sort of machinery, in which, especially in the *Eleusinian mysteries*, the seats both of the blessed and damned were represented.

*Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i: l. ii. § 4.—Grove on a future State, c. vi.*

1. | 2. The doctrine was probably inferred from some arguments level to every capacity, or it would not have been so universally believed. Compare *Prop. 27. Dem. 2.*

- 2.[3. It is reasonable to believe it. *Q. E. D.*  
*Tillotf. vol. iii. p. 116—118: 111—113,*  
*4th Ed.—Stev. against Pop. Serm. vii.*  
*p. 192—194.—Bp. Sherlock's Disc.*  
*vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. vi.—Customs of East Ind.*  
*and Jews comp. Art. vii. p. 39—42.—*  
*Balg. Six Serm. p. 70, 71.—Vol. of*  
*Sermons, p. 384—386.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. It is objected, that a great many ancient philo-  
 XCH. sophers disbelieved the immortality of the soul,  
 and some of the ancients tell us, it was first  
 taught by the *Egyptians*.

*Ans.* The common people seem to have had a  
 firmer persuasion of it than the philosophers,  
 many of whom do indeed speak dubiously about  
 it; and as for others of them, the accounts they  
 give of it are very low and absurd, and several of  
 the arguments which they bring for the support  
 of it are weak and inconclusive; and it may by  
 the way be observed, that in *Plato's Phædon*, the  
 argument in the *first* demonstration, though so  
 proper to the circumstances of *Socrates* at that  
 time, is strangely omitted, nor do any that I  
 remember mention it before *Seneca*.

*Dr. Warburton* has lately stated this matter  
 very particularly; and undertaken to prove, that  
 though the philosophers did indeed believe the  
 doctrine of the soul's *immortality*, they did not  
 believe that of the future state of *rewards and*  
*punishments*; which he proves to be inconsistent  
 with the essential principles, not only of the  
*Epicureans*, but also of the *Pythagoreans*, *Peripa-*  
*netics*, *Platonists* and *Stoics*, particularly with the  
 doctrine of the *τὸ ἐν*, or the refusion of souls into  
 their common eternal principle, and also with  
 that doctrine, which taught the deity to be inca-  
 pable of that resentment without which they sup-  
 posed he could not punish. So that all those  
 passages,

passages, in which these philosophers inculcate future retribution, are, according to this ingenious author, to be looked upon, merely as popular accommodations to doctrines commonly received; or at most, as what the philosophers thought fit to *teach*, though they did not themselves believe them, in a view to their being useful to society: and he imagines that the distinction between the *exoteric* and *esoteric* doctrines is of great importance here.—On the contrary, Dr. Sykes and Mr. Bott suppose these philosophers really to have believed a future retribution, and that the difference between the external and internal doctrine, was only in the manner of illustrating the kinds of those rewards and punishments which they asserted in both; and the doctrine of the *το εἶναι* is so explained by Bott as to be consistent with that of retribution.

*Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. iii. § 1—4.—*  
*Bott against Warb. § 2.—Sykes against*  
*Warb.—Critical Enquiry into the Prin-*  
*ciples and Practice of the Philosophers*  
*concerning a future State. pass.—Tillotf.*  
*vol. iii. p. 132—134.—Plato's Phæd.*  
*pass.—N. Taylor of Deism, p. 80—110.*  
*§ p. 119—144.—Grot. de Verit. c. i.*  
*§ 22. c. ii. § 9.—Whitby's Certainty of*  
*Christian Faith, c. x. § 11. with Annot.*  
*p. 312—315.—Cudworth's Intell. Syst.*  
*c. i. § 45.—Leland on Revelation, vol. ii.*  
*part iii. præf. c. ii.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Others account for the phænomenon by saying, that men might *wish*, and therefore *think* themselves immortal.

*Ans.* Most who held and taught a future state of distinct, personal existence, seemed to think it a state of *retribution*, which it is to be feared it was not their interest to desire; and the fears of

it are sometimes spoken of as a burthen: and if notwithstanding these fears, they wished the soul immortal, it is so much the greater confirmation of *Dem. 2. gr. 5.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

The principal objections against this doctrine are reckoned up by *Lucretius*: but most of them are so evidently weak as not to deserve a particular examination. The most plausible are those that arise from the sensible decay of the faculties of the mind with those of the body, and the supposed impossibility of action and perception without bodily organs: but to these it is replied,

1. That the soul does sometimes continue in full vigour, even when the body is under the greatest disorder, and death immediately approaching.

2. That it may be a law of nature, that while the spirit is united to the body, it should be so affected with the good or bad state of the bodily health as we often see it is; and that the memory should be impaired with age and sickness will not appear at all strange, considering how much it depends on the brain. *Vid. Prop. 8. Dem.*

3. That perhaps this may be a state of imprisonment to the soul, as many of the philosophers thought; and that when it is set at liberty from the body, it may obtain new and noble ways of perception and action, to us at present unknown.

4. That if a body were necessary, we might more reasonably believe God would give it a new body in the state immediately succeeding this, than suffer its faculties to perish, for the reasons assigned above.

*Lucret. l. iii. ver. 418—740.—Polignac's Anti-Lucretius.—Rel. of Nat. p. 194—199.—Cicero's Tusc. Disp. l. i. § 20. Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 79—81.—Plat. Phæd. § 9, 10.—Rochest. Life, p. 65*

p. 65—68. & p. 20, 21, 150.—*Baxt.*  
*on the Soul*, vol. i. § 5. *præf.* p. 395—  
 400.—*More's Immort.* l. iii. c. xiv, xv.  
 —*Kenrick's Poems*, p. 152—155.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Others attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, from the impossibility of governing the world without such hopes and fears on the one hand, (*Vid. Dem. 3. Schol. 2.*) or of God's governing it by a lye on the other, as they say it is plain he in fact does, if there be not a future state. They also argue from God's being the author of those hopes which arise in the mind of a good man; and from the probability there is, that there are other worlds inhabited by spiritual beings, to whom therefore the soul may go, and among whom it may dwell, after the dissolution of the body. It is likewise said, that since we see other beings ripening gradually to perfection, and animal life improved from low beginnings to noble heights; it is on the principles of analogy probable, that the human soul shall pass by death into some more elevated state of being, or at least may be a candidate for it\*. But as where these arguments are distinct from the former, the premises in some of them are liable to much dispute, and perhaps cannot be all sufficiently made out; and as in others, granting the premises, the conclusion may be disputed, we reckon it enough barely to have suggested these considerations, without entering into the more particular examination of them.

*Baxt. Works*, vol. ii. p. 55, 658.—*Butler's Anal.* part i. c. i.—*Young's Night-Thoughts*. N<sup>o</sup>. vi. p. 158, 159. Ed. 12mo.

\* The argument from the soul's employment in sleep, in favour of its capacity of perceiving and acting after death, may be seen in *Spectator*, vol. vii. N<sup>o</sup>. 487.—*Baxter on the Soul*, vol. i. p. 391—395.—*Young's Night-Thoughts*, N<sup>o</sup>. 6, p. 158. 12mo. Ed. p. 194—196. 8vo Ed. M.

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It may farther be questioned, whether allowing a future state, it can be proved *eternal* and *immutable*.

*Ans.* The soul seems originally designed for an eternal duration on the principles urged *Dem.* 2. but that the state on which it shall enter at death shall be eternal, the light of nature does not discover: there is no reason at all to expect eternal rewards, for so short and imperfect a virtue as can here be attained; and as for eternal punishments, though some of the heathens did assert them, and many have undertaken to infer them from natural principles; (all moral evil being a breach of order, and every instance and act of it having a natural tendency to harden the soul, universal and perpetual misery must follow, unless God interpose in an extraordinary manner, either to restore the health of the soul, or to end its being,) yet it seems that our natural apprehensions of the divine goodness would rather encourage us to hope, that he would leave some room for amendment, and recovery of happiness in a future state, or by annihilation would put an end to mens misery, when they appeared humbled by their punishment. But if it should prove that in a future state of chastisement, the sinner should harden himself against God, and go on still in his crimes, perpetual succeeding sins would justify perpetual succeeding punishments: for it is certain, every new crime committed after severe punishment is on that account so much the more aggravated. The same may be said concerning a series of eternal happiness, in case of continued virtue, and that very consistently with the preceding observation. Vid. *Prop.* 81. *Schol.* 2. *Prop.* 82. *Dem.* 1. *Schol.* 3.

*Lucret.* l. i. *ver.* 108—112.—*Taylor* of *Deism*, p. 149—167.—*Joseph. Bell.* *Judaic.*

*Judaic.* 3. vii. 5.—*Balguy's Serm.* vol. i. p. 409—413.

## SCHOLIUM 6.

It may be granted that the resurrection of the body, whatever change it may be supposed to undergo after death, may be possible to the divine power, and may be subservient both to render rewards and punishments the more compleat, and the triumphs of divine justice more conspicuous than they would otherwise be: but it by no means appears certain by the light of nature.

*Limeſt. Lect.* vol. ii. p. 376—384.—  
*Gale's Court of the Gent.* part i. l. iii. c. vii. p. 81, 82. part ii. l. ii. c. viii. p. 189.—*Phocylides*, ver. 98—101.—  
*Pearson on the Creed*, p. 365—367. p. 372—374. Ed. II.—*Baxt. on the Soul*, vol. i. p. 278—306.—*Leland on Revelation*, vol. ii. p. 436—441.—*Jackson on Mat. and Spirit*, p. 39, 40.

## SCHOLIUM 7.

The atheist cannot be infallibly certain that there shall be no future state, even though he should believe the existence of the soul to depend on that of the body, or thought to be no more than a power resulting from matter so disposed; since that omnipotent chance, which according to his principles formed the whole world, may possibly throw together into one body the particles of which he now consists, with such alteration, as to make him capable even of eternal misery, from which no virtue can secure him.

*Gurdon at Boyle's Lect.* p. 151—163.—  
*Fiddes of Mor. Pref.* p. 12—16\*.

\* In Edward Search's (Abraham Tucker's) "Light of Nature pursued;" is much curious matter relative to the proofs of a future existence, and the apprehended nature of that existence. See particularly the second and third volumes of the

## DEFINITION LXV.

LECT. XCIV. The MIND may be said to be CORPOREAL, if thought arise from and be inseparably connected with a certain system of matter; so that if such system so arranged exist, thought must exist with it, though no distinct being should be produced; or if that system were to be dissolved, or the arrangement of its particles to be altered, thought must immediately and necessarily cease with it, unless God were instantaneously to produce some new being which did not before exist.

## PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

To enquire into the most considerable arguments brought to prove the immateriality of the soul.

## DEMONSTRATION I.

*Prop. 23. Cor. i. Prop. 26, & 41.* | 1. God is an immaterial and almighty spirit.

1. | 2. There is no absurdity in supposing the existence of an immaterial spirit produced by him.

3. If the soul be material, its faculty of thinking must either necessarily arise from the nature and arrangement of its particles, or it must be superadded by God to a system of matter.

*Prop. 24.* | 4. It is in the nature of things entirely inconceivable and incredible, that thought should necessarily arise from matter, however figured or moved.

5. To say that a power of thinking is superadded by the divine will, is unintelligible, or in

work. For a farther view of the natural arguments in support of a life to come, recourse may be had to Andrew Baxter on the Immortality of the Soul, Bishop Porteus's Sermons, No. v, vi, vii. Dr. Sturges's Discourses, No. iv, and Dr. Beattie's "Elements of moral Science," vol. ii. p. 414—438. A distinct Treatise has, likewise, recently been published upon the subject, by the Rev. Thomas Watson of Whitby, entitled, "Intimations and evidences of a future State."

effect

effect granting the proposition; for there cannot be a power of thinking where there is not a thinking being, and the superaddition of this to matter is nothing more than the union of an immaterial being to a body, which none who assert the immateriality of the soul, (granting what is here supposed, the real existence of matter) pretend to deny. *Def. 65.*

3, 4, 5. | 6. There are insuperable difficulties attending the supposition that the soul is corporeal.

2, 6. | 7. It is reasonable to believe it incorporeal. *Q. E. D.*

*Ditton on the Ref. p. 430—460.—Cheyne's Princ. of Nat. Rel. c. ii. § 13. p. 36—40—Tillot's vol. iii. p. 127—129, 130.—Rel. of Nat. p. 186—189.—Abernethy, vol. i. Serm. iv.—Baxt. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 156—160, 186—192.—Dr. Price's Sermon at St. Thomas's, Jan. 1, 1766. p. 1—12.—Burlamaqui Elementa Juris naturalis, c. xiii. § 2—10.—Colliber on the Soul, Eff. i. § 3, 4.—Ramsay's Principles, vol. i. p. 230—233.*

#### SCHOLIUM.

To this it is objected, that it limits the divine omnipotence, to say that God cannot make matter think.—It is generally replied, that it is no more so than to say, that God cannot make a square circle. God may unite a soul to a system of matter; but then the matter to which it is united can only be said to think, as our body is said to feel: *i. e.* by the divine appointment, though without any necessary connection, it may become an organ of sensation and motion to that spirit: and it will be difficult to form any scheme, by which thought may be supposed to result from matter

matter any how modified and agitated by an omnipotent being; on which it might not be asserted to arise from it without the action of such a being, and consequently by which all religion might not be overthrown.

*Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 6. with Not.—*  
*Rel. of Nat. p. 189—193.—Howe,*  
*vol. i. p. 52, 53.—Living Temple, vol. i.*  
*c. iii. § 14, 15.—Baxt. on the Soul,*  
*vol. i. p. 192—195.—Jackson on Mat.*  
*and Spirit, p. 1—3, 12, 16.—Ramsf.*  
*Princ. vol. i. p. 235, 236.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. Matter is divisible, and consists of parts actually distinct.

1. | 2. Whatever system of matter can be supposed to be conscious, it is capable of being divided into several lesser parts; and they will be as really distinct, when laid or cemented together, as when separate, and removed to a distance from each other.

2. | 3. If any system of matter be conscious, it must either have a distinct consciousness in each lesser particle, or one consciousness resulting from the union of its several parts.

4. There cannot be in each system a number of distinct consciousnesses; for that would suppose a vast and unknown multiplicity of souls in every soul. *Q. E. D.*

5. An assemblage of various unthinking parts can never be supposed to make one thinking mass; so that thought should arise from the whole, and yet not exist in any given part.

3, 4, 5. | 6. The soul is not material. *Q. E. D.*  
*Clarke against Dodwell, p. 1—3. p. 73, 74.*  
*fifth Ed.—Jackf. on Mat. and Spirit,*  
*p. 4—11, 32—36.—Ramsf. Princ.*  
*Prop. 32.—Baxt. ibid. p. 227—239.*

## SCHOLIUM.

To the fifth step it is objected, that one indivisible power may reside in a system consisting of divisible parts, as sweetness in a rose: but it is replied, that sweetness is only a *secondary* power, (*Def.* 18.) and not properly speaking in the rose at all; and as for those *primary* powers or qualities, they do proportionably reside in every particle.

*Clarke, ibid. p. 8—15.—Letters between Clarke and Collins.*

## DEMONSTRATION 3.

*Prop.* 82. | 1. The soul is immortal.

2. What is immaterial has no internal tendency to corruption and dissolution; and is incapable of being hurt by a variety of accidents, which may destroy any material system known to us.

3. It is unreasonable to believe that God would make a being, which he intended for an immortal duration, with a tendency to corruption, or obnoxious to dissolving accidents.

1, 2, 3. | 4. It is unreasonable to suppose that God has made the soul material; even supposing it possible that matter might think. *Q. E. D.*

*Baxt. ibid. p. 239—247.—Law's Theory, Discourse on Death, and Appendix against the natural Immortality of the Soul.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

To this it may be replied, that neither is matter obnoxious to dissolution; nor does any immaterial substance tend to continue in existence, any otherwise than as God shall act in and upon it; (*Prop.* 32.) so that the whole demonstration is founded on a mistake: and it is said, that allowing the soul to be material does no more disprove its immortality, than owning the body shall

LECT.  
XCV.



shall be so, after the resurrection which christians expect, will be a sufficient objection against its perpetual duration.

*Locke's Third Letter to Still.* p. 420—429.  
 —*Baxt. Works*, vol. ii. p. 176—179.  
 —*Works*, vol. i. p. 565—568. Ed. 3.  
*Reason of Religion*, part ii. Conclusion.  
*Baxt. on the Soul*, 2, 5.—*Jacks. on Mat.*  
*and Spirit*, p. 11, 12.—*Ramsf. Princ.*  
*Prop.* 18.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless we allow, that if the immateriality of the soul were proved, it would something strengthen our natural argument for its immortality; as it would certainly shew us, that the destruction of the body does not imply the extinction of the mind; and would be a probable intimation that God intended it for a longer duration; as we have reason to believe, that though marble and freestone be equally dependent upon him, he intended the former should continue in its form longer than the latter.

*Grove's Thoughts on a future State*, c. iii.  
 —*Baxter on the Soul*, c. iii. p. 11.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have argued much to the purpose of *Dem.* 2. that an indivisible power cannot subsist in a divisible subject: but the power of thinking is an indivisible power; therefore the soul in which it exists is indivisible, and therefore immaterial.—But the foundation of this argument is liable to much dispute; and some attempt to retort it thus: “The idea of two feet is a divisible idea; but it exists in the mind; therefore “the mind is divisible.” But though we conceive of two feet as divisible, it is not proper to say, that the *idea* of two feet may be divided into  
 two

two ideas, each of which shall be half the former, as the *archetype* of it may.

*Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 216—219.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Much of the same kind is that argument taken from the limited nature of bodies, which are incapable of being extended beyond certain degrees, whereas the mind is continually opening itself to receive more and more knowledge, and never complains that an idea is too long, too broad, or too wide: but this goes on the supposition, that ideas are material things, otherwise they could not crowd or stretch a material mind.

*Serm. de Superville, vol. iii. p. 10, 11.*

## SCHOLIUM 5.

Some plead that the spirits and particles of the brain are in a continued flux, and therefore cannot be the seat of consciousness which is a fixed thing.—It is answered, that consciousness may inhere in some stable, solid and unchanged piece of matter, such as the *flamina vitæ* are by many philosophers supposed to be.

*Hallet ibid. p. 215, 216.*

## SCHOLIUM 6.

Against the proposition it is objected, that if thought infer immateriality, and immateriality immortality, then, as brutes may reasonably be supposed to have perception, (*Prop. 2.*) which is a species of thought, they must be immortal.—It is answered, that we know not what may become of them. God can no doubt put a period to their existence at their death, since immateriality cannot necessarily infer immortality. Vid. *Schol. 1.* As for *Ramsay's* notion, that brutes are degraded intelligences, which were once *Seraphim*, and are now doing penance in so base a state; it depends on so many uncertain principles, and is in itself at first appearance so improbable,

bable, that we shall not now stay to examine or confute it\*.

*Ramsay's Princ. part i. vol. i. p. 374—387.*—*Tillotf. vol. iii. p. 127—129.*  
*Clarke against Dodwell, p. 26—28. p. 88, 89. Ed. 5.*—*Burnet on the Art. p. 34.*  
 —*Edwards's Exercitations, part i. p. 125—129.*—*Baxt. on the Soul, § ii. 36—38. iii. 11.*—*Reyn. Lett. to the Deists, p. 61—68.*

## SCHOLIUM 7.

That the faculties of the mind are sometimes impaired by the decay of the body, will no more prove the soul material than mortal. *Prop. 82. Dem. 5. Schol. 3.*

*Burn. on the Art. p. 35.*—*Baxt. on the Soul, v. 6—20.*—*Ramsf. Princ. p. 233—235.*

## SCHOLIUM 8.

From comparing the arguments on both sides it appears, that allowing it not to be *demonstrable* that the soul is immaterial, it is at least *possible* it may be so, and even highly *probable* that it is. *Vid. Dem. 1. gr. 2.*

*Blount's Orac. of Reas. p. 185, 187—190.*  
 —*Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii.*

## SCHOLIUM 9.

Should the soul be immaterial, it is nevertheless possible that it may be always united to some

\* Taking it for granted that the principle of life in brutes is an immaterial principle, a Dr. Wagstaffe (not Dr. Thomas Wagstaffe, the celebrated Non-Juror, but Dr. Wm. Wagstaffe, a physician) wrote a treatise, in the earlier part of the present century, to prove the future existence and immortality of the animal creation. In doing this, he has employed all the arguments which are usually alleged in favour of the natural immortality of man; and he has urged them with great apparent zeal and earnestness. The performance exhibits a curious instance of what will be judged to be sophistical reasoning.

*vehicle*: our not seeing it go off at death can be no argument against it; since many things known to be corporeal are to us invisible, particularly the air, which is so extremely forcible, and the magnetic and electrical effluvia.

*More's Imm. of the Soul*, l. iii. c. i. § 2, 3.  
*Rel. of Nat.* p. 197. *Not.*—*Watts's Eff.* N°. vii. p. 173, 174.—*Baxt. on the Soul*, ii. 31. iv. 1—9, 17—21.—*Fackf. on Matt. and Spirit*, p. 41—47, 51—56.—*Collib. on Souls*, I. 5. iv. 1, 2.—*Cheyne's Essay on Regimen.*—*Discourses at the end.*

## SCHOLIUM IO.

As to the opinion which the heathen philosophers entertained on this subject, there is room for debate; but it seems the greater part concluded, that the soul consisted of, or was inseparably united to some system of matter; excepting those who held it be an ἀποσπασμα from the divine substance, and held that substance to be incorporeal.

*Locke's Third Lett. to Still.* p. 431—441.  
 —*Works*, vol. i. p. 570, 571.—*Clarke at Boyle's Lett.* p. 263—267.—*N. Taylor of Deism*, p. 131, 132.—*Plato's Phæd.* § 20.—*Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. i. book iii. § 4. p. 403, 404. *Ed.* 2.—*Campbell's Necess. of Rev.* p. 132—143\*.

## PROPO.

\* To the authors which have formerly been referred to, p. 15. as treating concerning the immateriality of the human soul, may be added Tucker's "Light of Nature pursued," chapter the fifth, volume the second; Lord Monboddo's "Ancient Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 176—180; *ibid.* vol. ii. p. 1—50; Rotherham's "Essay on the Distinction between the Soul and Body of Man;" Beattie's "Elements of moral Science,"  
 vol.

## PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

LECT. To enquire whether, supposing the soul to be  
 xcvi. immaterial, there is reason to believe that it is  
 extended, *i. e.* limited to some certain quantity  
 of space, so that it may be said to fill it.

## SOLUTION.

There is no reason to believe, that if the soul be immaterial, it is extended.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. If the soul be extended, seeing all acknowledge that extension must be limited, it must be of some shape or figure.

1. | 2. If the soul be extended, we may conceive of it as losing a part of its shape; and if it be supposed commensurate either to the whole or to any part of the body, a bullet, sword, or any thing else, which rends or cuts off a part of the body with which the soul is co-extended, may, for aught appears, also carry off a part of the soul with it; unless we were to suppose it, when in such danger, to shrink up into smaller dimensions.

vol. i. p. 404—414; and Dr. Ferriar's "Arguments against the Doctrine of Materialism," published in the Memoirs of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Manchester, vol. iv. part the first, p. 20—44. As the question of materialism is connected, in some degree, with the controversy concerning the freedom of the human will, I shall here take the liberty of referring to several treatises on the latter subject, which either escaped my recollection when the note p. 58, 59. was written, or which have very recently been published. The works I subjoin are, Rotherham's "Essay on Human Liberty," Dr. Benjamin Dawson's "Necessitarian," the notes and additions to the new edition of Hartley's "Observations on Man," Remarks on Dr. Gregory of Edinburgh's "philosophical and literary Essays," Butterworth's "Thoughts on moral Government and Agency," and Mr. Crombe's "Vindication of philosophical Necessity." Other tracts might be mentioned, but they do not seem important enough to merit particular notice.

2. | 3. This

2. | 3. This discription of the soul on the one hand, or condensation on the other, would imply some degree of solidity, *i. e.* corporeity, *Def.* 4. contrary to the hypothesis.

4. If the soul be extended, it may touch the body, or be touched by it: but it is utterly inconceivable, that there should be any contact between an immaterial being and matter.

5. Whatever absurdity could be supposed to follow from granting the *soul*, if immaterial, to be unextended, would follow from supposing *God* to be so: yet on the other hand, insuperable difficulties would arise from supposing *him* extended.  
*Prop.* 41. *Schol.* 2.

3, 4, 5. | 6. There is no reason to believe, that if the soul be immaterial it is extended. *Q. E. D.*  
*Watts's Eff.* N°. vi. § 2. p. 146—152.  
—*Ramsf. Princ.* vol. i. *Prop.* 27.—  
*King's Orig. of Evil*, p. 31—33.

## SCHOLIUM.

To this it is objected, that nothing acts but *where it is*: therefore if the soul were not extended, it could not act at all.

*Anf.* All matter acts upon other matter at a distance by gravitation: and it is inconceivable how the soul should move the nerves inserted in the brain, any better by being near, than by being farther off, unless we suppose it material: and we before observed, that, in whatever sense it is supposed to be seated there, it is impossible to explain the manner of its perception and action. (*Prop.* 1. *Schol.* 2. *Prop.* 8. *Schol.* 3.) God could no doubt give a soul a power of moving a stone or even a mountain, at several yards distance from the body to which it is united, *i. e.* he might appoint, that ordinarily the motion of such a distant body should follow on the volition of that mind; (*Vid.* *Prop.* 32.) which he could not, if the hypothesis in the objection were just;

seeing, if such a proximity were necessary, this could not possibly be effected, without such dilatation and contraction, as seems inconsistent with immateriality. It is moreover plain, that it is not this proximity, which gives the mind a consciousness of bodily motion: since the mind is least conscious of some things, which on that hypothesis must be nearest to it; being entirely unacquainted, otherwise than by foreign observation and analogy, with the structure of the brain, and the cause of its disorders, and not being able to determine by inspection or consciousness, where the common sensorium is. Vid. *Prop. 4. Schol. 1.*

*Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 45.—Living Temple, part i. c. iii. OEt. vol. i. p. 127, 128.—Sir Isaac Newton's third Letter to Dr. Bentley, Octavo, 1756.—Watts, ibid. p. 152—161. Essay vi. § 3.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that what is not extended is *no where*; and what is no where has no existence. But though this has been generally allowed as a maxim, it is not self-evident; and indeed it is no other than taking the whole question for granted.

*Watts, ibid. p. 161—164. § 4.—Jackson on Matt. and Spirit, p. 3, 4.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, when God has united a spirit to any body, so that it shall be to that spirit an organ of sensation and action; the soul may in a less proper sense be said to *be there*, where the body is; and spirits in general may be said to *be*, where bodies are, on which they are capable of acting. Vid. *Def. 15, 32.*

*Watts, ibid. p. 165—167. § 5.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

The objection, that if the soul were not extended, it could have no idea of an extended substance, is taking the matter for granted; and has been considered in the only view in which it is worthy of consideration, *i. e.* as an objection against its immateriality. *Prop. 83. Schol. 3, 4. Cudw. Int. Syst. p. 824—826.—Ralphi Epist. Misc. 5. ad Finem.*

## PROPOSITION LXXXV.

To propose and examine the principal hypotheses, relating to the original of the human mind. LECT. XCVII.

## SOLUTION.

The three chief hypotheses are those of *pre-existence*, of existence *ex traduce*, and of *immediate creation*.

## HYPOTHESIS I.

Some suppose the human mind existed at first, without this gross body in which it now dwells; but whether without any body at all, is not universally agreed. Some of the antient philosophers, particularly *Plato*, supposed it *eternal*, or as the *Latins* emphatically express it, *sempiternal*, as being a necessary emanation from the divine mind: but most of those who have embraced this doctrine of pre-existence, supposed it to have been created at some far distant period of time; and they all agreed, that in some unknown moment between generation and birth, perhaps say some the middle space, it was sent to inhabit this body.—The principal argument to support this hypothesis is taken from the justice of God, with which it is supposed to be inconsistent, that a pure and innocent spirit should be so incommodiously lodged: they say that this embodied state seems to be an imprisonment, to which it

is condemned for crimes committed in some better state of existence.

To this it is answered.

1. That the divine justice may admit, that an innocent creature in the first stage of its existence should be exposed to some inconveniencies, if they be counterbalanced by the advantages of its state, and especially by an opportunity of securing a more perfect happiness hereafter, which the patrons of this hypothesis allow to be our case.

2. If, as the generality of christians believe, the first parents of our race were in a happier state of existence, and were also under such a constitution, as made them the representatives of their whole posterity; and they in that state offended their maker; it is possible that the whole family might fall under some marks of his displeasure, which they would not otherwise have been subjected to; and this may perhaps be the easiest way of accounting for those phænomena on which the hypothesis is built.

3. That divine justice seems to require, that if a creature were punished for its own personal offence committed in a former state, it should have some consciousness of its guilt: our present calamities therefore, not being attended with such consciousness, cannot be a punishment for sins so committed.

#### SCHOLIUM.

It is a great objection against this hypothesis, that it is merely *gratis dictum*; forasmuch as no man can remember any such pre-existent state as is pretended, or the adventures that befel him in it.

*Brainerd's Journal, p. 221—223.*

*Plato* answers, that we have not entirely forgotten them, but that all our knowledge is entirely *remembrance*; and that without it no knowledge could be obtained. But that is evidently inconclusive, because at this rate the argument might  
be

be carried on *ad infinitum*, and an eternal, immutable, and self-existent being could know nothing.—It is much more reasonably replied, that it is the law of our present state of being, that we should remember only by the assistance of the brain, in which it is impossible that any traces of our former adventures should be drawn.

*Plato's Phæd.* § 16—18.—*Burn. Theory*, vol. ii. l. iv. *Præf.* p. 3—5.—*Phænix*, vol. i. N<sup>o</sup>. i. p. 16—30.—*Ramsay's Princ. Prop.* xlvii. vol. i. p. 147—156.—*Jenk. of Christian.* vol. ii. p. 243—245.—*Travels of Cyrus*, vol. ii. p. 145—152. 8vo. *Ed.* p. 248—252. 12mo.—*More's Immort. of the Soul*, l. ii. c. xii, xiii.—*Cudw. Int. Syst.* l. i. c. i. § 31, 32.—*Watts's Ruin and Recov. quæst.* ii. p. 94—105. *Ed.* 2.—*Works*, vol. vi. p. 221—225.—*New Practice of Piety*, 12mo. p. 41—44.—*Barrow's pre-existent Lapse of human Souls.* *passim.*—*Price's Dissertations*, No. i. p. 159.—*Lux Orientalis. præf.* c. 5, 6, 10. *with annot.*—*Colliber on Souls, Eff.* 3d. *passim.*—*Stonehouse on univ. Restit. Lett.* x. p. 213.—“*No Pre-existence.*” By E. W. *passim.*

## HYPOTHESIS 2.

The hypothesis of the soul's existence *ex tra-*  
*duce*, is this. From the observations made chiefly by *Leuwenhoek* of the animalcula existing in *femine maris*, some have supposed, that the first elements of the soul as well as the body were contained there; which gradually grow up to sense with the ripening fœtus, and to reason in the advance of life. Of the patrons of this hypothesis, some suppose that these animalcula are produced from the food of the immediate parent, others, that the elements of them are to be found

in the body of an infant, and that all those from which all mankind have arisen, besides an immensely greater multitude that have perished, were contained in the body of the first man, each generation being inclosed in the former, as the coats of an onion within each other, or, as perhaps it might be better illustrated, the kernel of a nut.—The chief arguments to prove this, are,

1. The existence of these animalcula.
2. The absurdity of supposing a kind of *equivocal* generation in the body of the parent. *Prop. 21. Schol. 1.*
3. The resemblance between parents and children, which seems to imply such a derivation or traduction of the *body*, which on principles of analogy may prove that of the *soul*.

SCHOLIUM.

To this it is replied,

1. That there is some reason to doubt whether there really be such animalcula as *Leuwenhoek* talks of: few but himself have ever been able to discover them with his glasses, and it is very possible the motion might arise from some spirituous particles of the fluid, as it was only observed while the fluid was in a degree of gentle warmth, but soon ceased, *i. e.* as it seems, those particles evaporated in the heat.
2. That if it be allowed that animalcula are really seen, it may be questioned whether they are originally in the seed, or in the water; since they must be diluted with water, before they can be discerned.
3. That if they be in the seed, it may still be questioned whether they be the stamina of the human body; not only, as it is doubtful whether they can pass the two teguments of the *ova*, but also considering how unlike the animal growing in an impregnated egg, as observed and delineated by

by *Malpighi*, is to that observed in the seed of the cock.

4. That allowing such animalcula in the seed of every adult male, and also allowing them to be the stamina from whence the next generation proceeds, it is groundless to assert that they contain the stamina of all future generations. It is allowed indeed, that the exquisite smallness of those removed at the greatest distance from the present is no objection against the possibility of their existence, since omnipotence could no doubt, in the compass of a grain of sand, make a system similar to our solar system: but there is no necessity of supposing this to be the fact here, since we are sure that the same omnipotence can, and perhaps does, by some settled law of nature to us unknown, produce animal bodies from particles of matter before existing under another form. And it is the more probable, as it seems hardly consistent with our views of divine wisdom, to form such multitudes of animal bodies for certain destruction, and to answer no imaginable purpose; for it is evident, that not one of many millions of them is ever born into the world: and if it be true with regard to *men*, it is so likewise with respect to *fishes* and *insects*, where this objection is vastly greater.

5. If such bodies were allowed, it would be unreasonable to suppose them all endued with souls: such low degrees of life, as in proportion we must have had at the distance of many generations, being hardly conceivable: nor can we imagine, that God would, for so many thousand years, continue human minds in so mean and contemptible a state of existence.

6. This hypothesis is most suitable to the *materiality* of the soul; the traduction of one *spirit* from another being inconceivable, and but poorly illustrated by the simile usually brought, of lighting one taper by another.

7. The destruction of a multitude of souls to every one that grows up or has life, is a still stronger objection against this doctrine than the destruction of bodies, *gr.* 4. and that these subsist in a future state none maintain.

*Baker of Microscopes, c. xvi. p. 152—167.*  
 ———*Leurwenboek Epist. vol. i. p. 1—12, 149, &c.—Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. i. Contempt. xvi. § 9, 11, p. 341—344, 345—348. p. 305—308, 310—313, in another Edition.—Lux Orientalis, c. iii.*  
 ———*Rel. of Nat. p. 88—91.* ———*Watts Phil. Eff. N<sup>o</sup>. ix. § 2. with Append. p. 201—208, & p. 307—311.* ———*Dennet's 2d Sermon of Veget. Pref.—Drake's Anat. vol. i. c. xxiv.* ———*Baxt. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 198—202.* ———*Chamb. Dict. on the Word Generation.*

#### HYPOTHESIS 3.

The hypothesis of *immediate creation* is, that at a certain time, generally supposed between conception and the birth, perhaps 20 weeks after the former, but some say in the birth itself, the soul is created; and from the first moment of its existence united to the body.—The weakness of the former hypothesis, seems the principal strength of this. It is indeed objected, that this supposes God to be always creating new souls: but it is not easy to see the force of that objection. We are sure he always acts; (*Prop. 32.*) and acts with infinite ease; (*Prop. 31.*) nor is continual new creation any reflection upon him. What if we should acknowledge, that his works may be ever growing, both in number, extent, and perfection? It is difficult to see how it would blemish either his wisdom or power.

*Gale's Court of the Gent. part ii. p. 344—346. § 3. p. 382—384. Ed. 2.* ———*Lux Orientalis, c. ii.*

## SCHOLIUM.

On the whole, it seems that this last hypothesis is rather the most probable: but it does not become us to be confident in so dark and dubious a matter. *Le Clerc's Pneum. part i. c. viii.*

## PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

It is highly probable, that there are some created spirits, which were in the first constitution of their nature superior to human souls. LECT.  
XCVIII.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. When we consider the vast variety there is in the inanimate, the vegetable, and the animal creation, and how one class and order of beings rises above another, almost by imperceptible degrees, it seems highly probable, that we, who are in part allied to the beasts that perish, and who are placed in so imperfect a state of being, are not the highest order of spirits, and the most glorious creatures of our almighty creator; but rather, that the scale of created beings rises abundantly higher.

*Baxter's Mathe, vol. i. Conf. v. p. 248—257, 270—290.*

2. Astronomers generally grant, and strongly prove, that some of the planets are abundantly larger than the earth: we can hardly think they were made merely to afford us that little light and benefit we derive from them; it is much more probable that they are habitable worlds; especially considering what discoveries have been made of the satellites of *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, and those varieties in the face of our moon, that seem like seas, land, and mountains. And it is highly probable, that some of these inhabitants may be spirits superior to us: not to mention the possibility there is, that the interstellar spaces may be inhabited: nor to insist on *Well's* conjecture, that there

there may be more planets than we commonly reckon revolving about the sun.

*Swind. of Hell*, p. 287.—*King's Orig. of Evil*, 4. i. 1, 2.

3. Most nations have believed the existence of *Demons*, i. e. created spirits superior to human souls: and the accounts that have been given of their intercourse with men might probably have some foundation in fact; though no doubt the greater part of them are fabulous\*.

1, 2, & 3. | 4. *Valet propositio*.

*SpeEt. vol. vii. N°. 519*.—*Locke's Eff.*

l. ii. c. xxiii. § 13. l. iv. c. iii. §. 24, 26.

l. iv. c. xvi. § 12.—*Wilkins's World in*

*the Moon*, Prop. vii—ix, xiii.—*Mattho*,

vol. ii. p. 55.—*Baxt. Works*, vol. ii.

p. 55, 56.—*Hier. in Pyth. Carm.*

ver. 3, 4. *Vid. Dacier's Not. ibid.*—

*Euseb. Prep. Evang. l. xv. c. xliiii.*—

*Voltaire's Misc. Of the Doctrin of the*

*Genii*.—*Night Thoughts*, p. 173, 174.

8vo. Ed.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

If it be objected, that perhaps those beings, now superior to us, were at first on a level with us, though perhaps something different; we answer, that the reasoning of the *first* step lies strongly against this. And as for what is objected against the *third* step, (though it must be acknowledged, according to Dr. Sykes's assertion, that many of those, whom the heathens called both good and bad *Demons*, were supposed to be *human souls*;) yet it is very evident they had a

\* The various publications of Mr. Farmer and his antagonists with regard to Demons, will be noticed hereafter. In the mean while, we content ourselves with referring to his general prevalence of the "Worship of Human Spirits, in the ancient Heathen Nations," and to Mr. Fell's "Idolatry of Greece and Rome distinguished from that of other Heathen Nations."

notion of some *Demons*, who were originally in a state superior to humanity, and never had dwelt in human bodies: compare *Hierocles* and *Eusebius* quoted above.

*Inq. into Demoniacs*, p. 1—4. — *Twells's Anf.* p. 5, 6. — *Farther Inq.* p. 2—20. — *Answer to it*, p. 8—24. — *Pegge of Demon.* p. 1—35. — *Just. Mart. Opera*, p. 28. *Col. Ed.* — *Pope's Iliad*, l. xix. ver. 93. *Not.* — *Still. Orig.* l. iii. c. iii. § 17. p. 514—516. *Fol. Ed.* p. 322. — *Euseb. Prep.* l. viii. c. xiv. p. 387. l. xiii. c. xi. p. 663. — *Gale's Court Gent.* l. ii. c. viii. § 11, 12. p. 186—188, & 337. 196—198. 375.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

However it may be granted, that the perfection and happiness of those spirits are growing and increasing, as (if we suppose them not subject to forgetfulness, which the extraordinary memory of some men makes probable) it is certain their stock of knowledge must always be; with the increase of which much pleasure is connected.

*Locke's Ess.* l. ii. c. x. § 9. — *Watts's Imp. of the Mind*, p. 253—254.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that whatever their perfection be, or can be at any imaginable most distant space of time, with any imaginable degree of continued improvement, they will still continue inferior to the divine being in knowledge and in power, and will still be equally dependent on him for their existence and every degree of their happiness; in which respect the noblest and meanest of his creatures are on a level, and so are to him as nothing.

And

And this, by the way, is a strong argument for the infinity of the divine being.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Let it be observed, that the proposition is to be taken only in a general sense; for we have not any assurance by the light of nature, that no human soul shall ever arrive in its improvement to an equality with the most excellent of those superior spirits: on the other hand, that there are some spirits now superior to what those of men are in this embodied state, is in effect no other than a corollary from *Prop. 82.*

*Republic of Letters, vol. vi, p. 282—284.*

## PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

LECT. XCIX. More fully to prove that it is the interest of every man to cultivate virtue through the whole course of his life, and in every particular action. Vid. *Prop. 44. Cor. 2.*

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Ax. 15. Cor. Schol. 1.* There is a secret and immediate pleasure attending virtuous actions, especially those of a benevolent kind, or those in which there is any remarkable degree of gratitude and piety towards God; which pleasure is of a very sublime and delightful kind, vastly preferable to any sensual gratification; as those who have tried both experimentally know: and pious philosophers will acknowledge that the immediate pleasures of virtue are superior to those of science.

2. In reflecting upon all virtuous actions, and particularly those which are attended with the greatest difficulty, there is a high satisfaction of mind.

3. Human nature and life are so constituted, that generally speaking health, reputation, and interest in the world, and in a moderate degree the

the possessions of it, may be most effectually secured by a virtuous course: at least it is seldom or never injurious to any of these.

4. A good man has or may have a source of happiness distinct from all these, in the present views of the favour of God, a confidence in his care, and the prospect of a future state of happiness after death, by which he may be delightfully supported under those calamities which are common to all; so that the painful sense of them may sometimes be swallowed up in vastly superior pleasure.

5. On the contrary to all this, a wicked man often finds a great deal of uneasiness in his vicious affections and actions, especially in his reflections upon them: he often brings upon himself diseases, infamy, poverty, and various kinds of distress in life, greatly aggravated by the apprehensions of the divine displeasure, and the fears of future evil to arise from it, in this life and in the next.

1, 5. | 6. If we consider only the present life, it appears that virtue does ordinarily on the whole tend to promote its happiness.

*Prop. 82.* | 7. Though it be granted that in some extraordinary cases, it may be otherwise than has been represented in the former steps, (*Vid. Prop. 82. Schol. 1.*) yet the future state will abundantly overbalance all the advantages, which there may in any imaginable circumstances be on the side of vice; even where the most gloomy fears have clouded the virtuous mind on the one hand, or on the other the vainest hopes have been entertained by the bad man, his conscience ever so much deadened and perverted, or where his course of prosperity in life has been ever so great.

6, 7. | 8. It is on the whole the interest of every man to cultivate virtue in every action. *Q. E. D.*

*Wishart's Ref. Serm. p. 15—29.—Hutch.  
on the Pass. c. v.—Wilk. Nat. Rel. l. ii.  
c. i.*

c. i—viii.—*Gast. Nat. Rel.* p. 129—136, & p. 178—181.—*Puff. de Jure*, l. ii. c. iii. § 14, 15.—*Shaftesb. Inq. after Virtue*, part ii. pass.—*Self-Love and Virtue reconciled by Relig.*—*Pope's Eſſ. Ep.* iv. præf. ver. 309—360.—*Balg. Serm.* vol. i. N°. iii.—*Sermons at Boyle's Lecture on the Certainty and Necessity of Religion.*—*Night-Thoughts*, vol. ii. p. 95—125. N°. viii.—*Beattie's Elements of moral Science*, vol. ii. p. 8—41.

## COROLLARY I.

It must be the interest of every one to prosecute and cultivate the proper means of virtue.

## COROLLARY 2.

It must be the interest of every person heartily to repent of every instance in which he has acted contrary to virtue. Vid. *Prop.* 81. *Cor.* 4.

## SCHOLIUM.

Some have argued the necessary connection between virtue and happiness from this consideration, that the divine being who is perfectly virtuous is perfectly happy; so that in proportion to the degree in which any inferior being resembles him in virtue, he must also resemble him in happiness. But so far as this argument is distinct from that stated in the preceding demonstration, it is inconclusive: for if it would prove any thing, it must be, that every virtuous man is in every moment of his existence happier than any vicious man is, or can be, which seems evidently contrary to fact.

*Clergyman's Lett. to Dr. Clarke*, pass.

## PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

It is on the whole for the benefit of societies to cultivate virtue. LECT.

c.



## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 87. | 1. It tends to promote the happiness of every individual member, and therefore by consequence of the whole.

*Prop.* 51. *Schol.* | 2. Virtue teaches each to consult the good of all, and to be willing to resign any private interest of his own to the interest of the society, when it comes in competition with it; so constituting each man in his sphere the guardian of the public happiness.

*Prop.* 80, 81. | 3. Virtue must ordinarily tend to bring down the favour and blessing of God upon societies, to which they must owe their surest foundation and best prosperity: and his interposition may the more reasonably be expected, since societies, as such, have no existence in a future state.

1, 2, 3. | 4. *Valet propositio.*

*Clarke's Serm.* vol. vi. N<sup>o</sup>. xiv. p. 207—

210. 12<sup>mo</sup> Ed.—*Works*, vol. i. p. 626,

627.—*Butler's Anal.* part i. article 5.

c. iii. p. 85—96. Ed. 2. 8<sup>vo</sup>.

## SCHOLIUM.

To this *Mandeville* has objected, that private vices are often public benefits; and that an universal reformation would necessarily produce the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, who subsist upon the public luxury and debauchery: but it may be replied,

1. That though some good may arise to particular persons from the vices of others, it does not thence follow, that greater might not arise to the whole from common virtues.

2. That virtue would allow the free use of many things, not absolutely necessary to the support

port of life, yet tending to make it more agreeable, as wine, tea, &c.

3. That public temperance and reformation would prevent the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, which is often aggravated by former splendor, and the consciousness of those extravagancies by which they have been reduced, as well as by the additional infamy attending poverty when occasioned by such means.

4. That during the time that the prosperity of families continues, we shall judge very wrong, if we estimate their happiness by their external circumstances, without allowing for the inward temper of their minds, the happiness of which virtue would always promote, and thereby be a noble equivalent for rendering them something less opulent and magnificent.

5. That the community would be better defended from foreign and domestic enemies by poorer citizens, that were temperate, generous and courageous, than by the effeminate, debauched and mercenary; besides all that extraordinary protection, which an universally virtuous people might justly promise itself from divine providence.

6. If the history of the most celebrated antient or modern states and kingdoms be examined, it will be found they have risen by virtue, and fallen by vice, agreeably to our argument in the proposition above, and contrary to those principles which we here oppose. See, (besides *Persian Letters* referred to *Prop. 51. gr. 4.*)

*Fable of the Bees*, pass.—*Warb. Div. Leg.* l. i. § 6. vol. i. p. 76—84.—*Innes of Virtue*, p. 99, &c.—*Brown's Ess. on the Charact.* N<sup>o</sup>. ii. § 5. p. 146—158.—*Law's Theory*, p. 235—239.—*Pinto's Essay on Luxury*, passim.

## PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

To take a survey of the state of virtue in the world.

## SOLUTION.

1. A great part of the world is over-run with pagan idolatry and superstition; many of their rites are impious, obscene or cruel; and as new countries are discovered, new scenes of wickedness are discovered with them: and it is by the way observable, that several of those writers which speak most favourably of the morals of newly discovered countries, have in other respects most of the air of a romance.

2. Though it is to be acknowledged, that the religious institutions of *Christians*, *Mahometans* and *Jews* contain many excellent lessons of morality in all its branches; yet it evidently appears, that under all these professions, the greatest part of mankind are strangers to real virtue.

3. Those who cultivate it with the greatest care are in many respects defective, and far from that perfection which they themselves desire.

## DEMONSTRATION.

The proof of all this is too evident from all the opportunities we have of knowing the moral characters of our fellow-creatures, by reading, travelling, or observation at home.

*Watts's Ruin and Recov. quest. i. § 5.*  
*p. 32—41.*—*Barrow on the State of*  
*Pre-existence, c. vi. Ed. 2\*.*

\* Great additional light has been thrown upon the history of the state of knowledge and virtue amongst mankind, in consequence of the vast number of voyages and travels, to and through every part of the world, which have been made and published within the course of the last thirty years.

## SCHOLIUM.

That the state of things in former ages, even amongst the most polite, learned, and celebrated nations of antiquity, was generally much the same, appears from all the strain of ancient authors; and farther from the known lewdness and cruelty of many of their religious rites, the custom of exposing children, and the public spectacles, besides many other things illustrated in

*Jenk. of Christ. vol. i. p. 353—364.—*  
*St. Real, vol. i.—England's Morals of*  
*the Ancients, c. ult.—Leland on Reve-*  
*lation, vol. i. particularly c. i. 18—20.*  
*vol. ii. part ii. c. iii. &c.—Law on the*  
*Theory of Religion, part ii. p. 116—124.*

## COROLLARY I.

There is great reason for adoring the divine patience, that the earth is still preserved, and made the seat of so much pleasure, considering the exact and circumstantial manner in which God knows all crimes, and the almighty power with which he is always armed to punish them.

## COROLLARY 2.

Those who are themselves truly virtuous have great reason to exert themselves to the utmost, to stem the torrent of vice, and to support the interests of virtue, which humanly speaking are so weak.

## COROLLARY 3.

There seems a great deal of reason to suspect, that mankind is degenerated from some better state, in which it may be supposed the race first came out of the hands of so holy and good a being as the blessed God is: and accordingly, we may observe among some ancient as well as mo-

— dern

dern nations remarkable traditions on that head, which will be more fully considered hereafter.

*Howe, vol. i. p. 150, 151. — Living Temple, part ii. c. iv. § 7. — Cyrus's Trav. part ii. Ap. p. 93—99.*

## COROLLARY 4.

Some farther discoveries from the Divine Being seem very desirable, to lead us into the paths of more perfect virtue and happiness: but the fuller discussion of this will be the business of the next part of this work\*.

\* Though many of the books hereafter mentioned have already been referred to in different places, it may not be amiss, at this close of the lectures on the several branches of moral philosophy, to make a general reference to some works which it will be proper for a student to become acquainted with, as far as may be, in the course of his academical education, and still more in his future enquiries. The more diligently he applies to the best sources of information, the more will his mind be enriched and strengthened, and his views of things become accurate and just. It is not of small importance to be master of what the antients have written on ethical subjects; in which view Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Cebes, Cicero, Seneca, Epicurus, Marcus Antoninus, and Plutarch will deserve to be closely studied. The great body of English sermons will furnish a vast fund of information concerning almost every moral question, and every part of human conduct. Among foreign authors, it may be sufficient here to mention Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, and Vattel. The English writers which occur immediately to recollection, are as follows: Bishop Wilkins of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, Dr. Henry More's Enchiridion, Bp. Cumberland on the Laws of Nature, Shaftesbury's Characteristics, Wollaston's Religion of Nature delineated, Hartley's Observations on Man, Hutcheson's Compendium, and his System of moral Philosophy, Fettiplace Bellers's Delineation of universal Law, Grove's moral Philosophy, Foster's Discourses on natural Religion and social Virtue, Fordyce's Treatise of moral Philosophy, Nelson on Virtue and Happiness, Hume's Principles of Morals, Lord Kaimes's Principles of Morality, Tucker's Light of Nature pursued, Priestley's Institutes of natural Religion, Harris's Dialogue on Happiness, Adam Smith's Theory of moral Sentiments, Dr. Price on Morals, Bruce's Elements of the Science of Ethics, Paley's Principles of moral and political Philosophy, Gisborne's Principles of moral Philosophy investigated, Beattie's Elements of moral Science, and Dr. Ferguson's Principles of moral and political Science.

## P A R T V.

*Of the Reason to expect and desire a REVELATION:  
and the internal and external EVIDENCE with  
which we may suppose it should be attended.*

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## DEFINITION LXVI.

LECT. CI. **T**HEOLOGY OF DIVINITY is that branch of  
Pneumatology, which relates in general to  
the knowledge of God, but especially to those ex-  
traordinary discoveries which he is supposed to  
have made of himself to mankind; and considers  
the probability, the certainty, and the contents  
of them.

## SCHOLIUM.

Forasmuch as *miracles* are generally urged in  
proof of such extraordinary discoveries, it seems  
proper here to enquire into the nature, use and  
importance of them.

## DEFINITION LXVII.

When such effects are produced, as (*cæteris  
paribus*) are usually produced, God is said to  
operate according to the common course of nature:  
but when such effects are produced, as are (*cæt.  
par.*) contrary to, or different from that common  
course, they are said to be MIRACULOUS.

*Conybeare on Mir. p. 6—12.—Fleetw.  
on Mir. p. 2—5. 8vo Ed. p. 22, 23.—  
Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 374—376.—  
Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 89. § 17. p. 113.  
§ 43—46. p. 149.*

## COROLLARY 1.

Nothing can be known to be miraculous, till the course of nature has been observed.

## COROLLARY 2.

If two opposite effects (*cæt. par.*) were to be alternately produced, neither of them would be properly miraculous; but the alternate succession of both would make up the course of nature: *v. g.* if the sun were to arise one morning in the east, and the next in the west.

## COROLLARY 3.

When the course of nature can be but imperfectly known, in particular instances we may be incapable of pronouncing in many respects concerning certain remarkable events, whether they be or be not miraculous.

## COROLLARY 4.

A miracle contains no greater exercise of divine power, than an operation according to the course of nature. *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 371, 372.*

## COROLLARY 5.

Miracles are possible in general, (*Cor. 4.*) and possible in any given instance, when the wisdom of God does not require that the course of nature should be preserved; which it is impossible for us to know that it always does.

It has indeed been asserted, that it is most honourable to God to suppose that he at first lays down the best possible laws, from which therefore it would be a defect of wisdom to deviate. But it may be answered, that at least for any thing we know, the best possible scheme may be that, in which there shall be some deviation from the stated rules, provided always that those stated laws be generally so far observed, as that men may know what it is their duty to do, and

what consequences are generally to be expected from their actions, which is apparently the case.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 376, 377.*—  
*Conybeare's Serm. on Mir. p. 12—17.*  
 —*Butler's Anal. part ii. c. ii.*—  
*Macknight's Truth of the Gospel History,*  
*c. iv. § 2.*—*Campbell on Miracles against*  
*Hume, part i.*—*Price's Dissertations,*  
*Nº. iv. passim.*—*Douglas's Criterion.*  
 —*Hartley on Man, vol. ii. prop. 28.*  
 —*Adams on Miracles, part i.*—*Hume's*  
*Essays, Nº. x. part i.*

### PROPOSITION XC.

To consider some other definitions which celebrated writers have given of miracles.

#### SOLUTION.

1. Mr. *Locke* defines a miracle to be “ a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, is *in his opinion* contrary to the course of nature, and taken by him to be divine.”

*Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 270. Fol. Ed.*

But on this account of the matter, every juggling trick, which I cannot understand, will while my ignorance continues, be a miracle to me. In answer to this, *Locke* urges, that if this definition be not taken, we can never know what a miracle is; because no man is acquainted with the whole course of nature. But though we acknowledge that great part of it is unknown, yet so much may be known, as that some instances may plainly appear to be above it: *v. g.* recovering the sight of the blind, or the life of the dead by a word speaking, or multiplying bread, so that one loaf should serve a thousand men, and more be left at last than there was at first.— Besides this, the extraordinary works apprehended

to be done by evil agents, would not be miracles on this definition.

*Locke's Post. Pieces, p. 217—220.*—

*Chandler of Mir. p. 9—11.*

2. Many others define a miracle to be “an extraordinary operation, above the power of all created beings, and performable by God alone.”

But this definition either goes on the false supposition, of such a proper agency in the creature, as is inconsistent with *Prop. 32.* or else supposes, contrary to fact, that we know the utmost limits of the power of created agents, allowing that to be called *their power*, which is usually communicated to them.

*Limb. Theol. l. i. c. ii. § 17.*—*Chand. on*

*Mir. p. 11—13.*—*Clarke at Boyle's*

*Lect. p. 372—374.*

3. Dr. *Chandler* says, “a miracle is an action done, or an operation visibly performed by any being, which is really and truly above the reach, natural power and capacity of that being who does it of himself and without the assistance of some superior agent to perform.”

This definition seems liable to the following objections.

1. It supposes created beings capable of doing something of themselves, and without the assistance of any superior agent, contrary to *Prop. 32.*

2. It makes it impossible for God to perform a miracle, without the interposition of some creature.

3. It supposes that it would be no miracle for God to send an angel to relieve a starving man, to open the prison-doors, or even to roll back the sun in his course, supposing I know the angel so employed to be ordinarily capable of producing such an effect; whereas in truth here would be a miracle, in suffering an angel in such a manner

to act out of his usual sphere, though not beyond his common strength.

*Chand. of Mir. p. 13—19.*

Dr. *Hutcheson's* definition, "that it is a work far exceeding human power, yet performed by the command or upon the volition of a man," nearly coincides with this of Dr. *Chandler's*, and is equally liable to the 2d and 3d objection.

*Hutches. Metaph. Synops. p. 89. p. 222, 223. 2d Ed.*

4. Dr. *Clarke's* definition of what he calls a *theological* miracle, includes several particulars in it, which may more properly be examined hereafter. *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 382, 383.*

According to Dr. *Sykes*, "a miracle is a designed effect, sensible, unusual in itself, beyond the art and power of man to do:" and he expressly declares against defining it, an event contrary to the course of nature. But to this it may be objected,

1. That if he does not by the word *unusual*, mean as much as *beyond the course of nature*, its being unusual is of no importance at all to prove any thing miraculous, as in the instance of the first *perihelion*

2. If by *sensible* be meant something made known in consequence of a sensation excited by external objects, distinguished from the inward perception of impressions upon our minds, it is no way essential to constituting a miracle.

3. That the expression of *designed* is either superfluous or improper; since considering it as the work of God, every thing is designed; and if it might happen without *human* design, it might still be miraculous; as if health should unexpectedly be restored, while another person was praying for it. *Sykes of Mirac. p. 16—28.*

6. Dr. *Chapman* defines it, "an unusual and sensible event, most evidently either in the  
" nature

“ nature or manner of it, above the power of all  
 “ natural material causes, and the art of man to  
 “ produce.”—To this it may be objected,

1. Against the words *sensible* and *unusual*, as in the last step, N<sup>o</sup>. i, ii.

2. That an event may really be a true miracle, though it is not *most evidently so*.

3. That it seems to intimate a distinction between *natural* and *supernatural* material causes; not to urge that a *material cause* can only be a passive power, nor to insist upon it, that it may be questioned, whether *dreams* be not miracles upon this supposition: so that here as well as in other instances, what is superadded to our definition appears to be an incumbrance rather than an advantage.

*Chapman's Euf. vol. i. p. 72—76\*.*

#### DEFINITION LXVII.

A DIVINE REVELATION is a discovery of some LECT.  
 proposition to the mind, which came in not by CII.  
 the usual exercise of its faculties, but by some   
 miraculous divine interposition and attestation,  
 either mediate or immediate.

#### SCHOLIUM.

We shall endeavour in the following propositions to prove, that a revelation is possible, (*Prop. 91.*) that it is desirable, (*Prop. 92.*) and that there is some reason to hope that God will grant it, (*Prop. 93.*) and then shall more particularly examine with what kind of internal and external evidence, we may reasonably suppose that it should be attended.

\* The question concerning the nature of miracles is treated of with great ability in Mr. Farmer's preliminary Considerations, in his “Dissertation on Miracles,” p. 1—51. The design of the whole work is to prove that miracles are never effected without a divine interposition.

## PROPOSITION XCI.

A divine revelation is a possible thing.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. God may, for any thing we can certainly tell, think proper to make some discovery to his creatures of what they did not before know, or what by the use of their faculties they could not find out.

*Prop. 31.* 2. Since God is almighty, we may assure ourselves, that he who has given us a power of communicating our ideas to each other, cannot be at a loss for some proper method to make it apparent to his creatures, that it is he who speaks to them.

3. The pretences that have from time to time been made to divine revelation, and the ready reception they have many of them met with, plainly shew, that the greater part of mankind have thought it not impossible.

1, 2, & 3. 4. A divine revelation is at least a possible thing. Q. E. D.

*Tillotf. vol. iii. p. 441, 442.—Conybeare on the Credib. of Rev. p. 17.—Leland's Advant. of Rev. vol. i. p. 17—27.—Farmer on Miracles, c. i. § 2. p. 24.*

## SCHOLIUM.

It would be most absurd to object, that God's goodness will oblige him to give his creatures by their natural faculties the knowledge of all that it is *necessary* for them to know, and that his wisdom will prevent his miraculous interposition to discover *unnecessary* things; for both these propositions universally taken are false. For since it is as easy for God to communicate knowledge to us by revelation, as by the use of our natural faculties, we cannot say universally, that he must make man in such circumstances as that no revelation should be necessary; much less,

less, that he can never suffer him to fall into such circumstances. On the contrary, on the first formation of mankind, (when that experience, which now instructs us in so many things of the greatest importance, could not possibly be our guide) it seems that some revelation was necessary with relation to his food; for surely, unless human nature were then vastly different from what it is now, appetite would have been but a very uncertain and dangerous rule: and it is certain, that the giving necessary intimations by revelation rather than by reason, would in some views be an additional favour; as it would so much the more sensibly illustrate God's care of his creatures and inspection over them; which, though it might be solidly reasoned out on principles laid down above, might become more obvious in this case, at least to weaker minds. Nor is it on the other hand true, that God bestows on his creatures nothing that is unnecessary: if by *unnecessary* be meant, what in the present connection it must mean, only something without which they might have enjoyed some considerable degree of happiness, sufficient to overbalance the evils to which they are exposed: nothing is more evident than the contrary, *i. e.* that God has consulted our convenience and delight in numberless instances.

*Delany's Rev. examined, vol. i. p. 2, 3.—*  
*Leland against Tind. c. i, ii, iii.—Ditto*  
*on the Advant. and Necess. of Rev. vol. i.*  
*p. 48—51. 4to Ed.—Hartley on Man,*  
*vol. ii. prop. 27.*

#### PROPOSITION XCII.

The circumstances of mankind are such, as to render a divine revelation highly expedient and desirable.

LECT.  
CIII.

DEMON-

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. In the generality of mankind, we too plainly see such indolence with regard to the things of religion, such strong passions, such early prejudices, and inveterate habits of vice, as render them very unfit for an impartial inquiry after divine truth.

2. The greater part of mankind, even those whose morals are least vitiated, are so entangled in secular cares, that they have little leisure for long and laborious inquiry.

3. It appears by the preceding parts of this work, that it is a very laborious and difficult task, to trace out the great principles of natural religion in their due connection and evidence.

1, 2, 3, 4. It is not to be expected that many will undertake it for themselves, or that if they do, they will succeed in it.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 273—278.*

5. There are some points, which the most diligent and impartial inquirer will find it hardly possible to clear up to himself, especially those relating to the pardon of sin, and the compleat happiness of a future state. *Prop. 82. Schol. 3. Prop. 83. Schol. 5.*

6. Of those things which such an inquirer may be able to clear up to *himself*, there will be many, which it will be difficult to communicate to *others*; considering how abstruse many of his arguments will be on the one hand, and on the other, that indolence, prejudice, and secular cares, will in their degree hinder the generality from inquiring into truth proposed by others, as well as from discovering it for themselves. *Vid. gr. 1, 2.*

7. Could the great doctrines of religion and rules of morality be settled, and proposed, and taught ever so plainly, and inculcated ever so frequently,

frequently, it would nevertheless be exceedingly difficult to *enforce* the *practice* of them. The credit of the person proposing them would do little, considering the pride of the generality of mankind, and the difference which might probably happen among those who should undertake to instruct others: and we have before (*Prop. 77.*) proved it not to be the business of the civil magistrate to establish religion by force; and it is certain, if he should attempt it, he could not by his secular power produce any single action truly virtuous, considering how much depends upon the temper and intention, with which an action is performed. *Prop. 49. gr. 1, 2.*

4, 5, 6, 7.]8. A revelation seems in *theory* highly expedient, and in a manner necessary to bring men to the knowledge of natural religion and the practice of virtue.

*Conyb. Sermon on Rev. p. 4—28.*

*Prop. 89.*9. If we consult *fact*, we shall find the ancient and modern world over-run with error, superstition and vice.

10. Though there have been in the heathen world some excellent teachers of morality, yet the number of those who have in good earnest set themselves about it has been but small; and some of those few have been entirely ignorant of some things necessary to be known, and very dubious about others, concerning which they had some glimmering of knowledge: where they appear to have been certain themselves, they have often been unable to advance a clear and distinct proof; and even where proofs have been most clear and distinct, they have wanted authority to enforce their instructions and precepts; so that they have availed but little to reform those parts of the world where they dwelt; of which the remarkable wickedness of *Greece*, in the age of *Socrates* and *Plato*, is a very melancholy instance, as that  
of

of Rome, in the days of their best moral philosophers, also was.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 281—302.—  
*Jenk. of Christ.* vol. i. p. 364—376, 384—389.—*In Ed. 5. part iii. c. v.* p. 367—379, 387—392.—*Dac. Plato,* vol. i. *Intr.* p. 7—9.—*Fiddes of Mor. Virt.* c. xix.—*Chandler of Mir.* p. 65—77.—*Campb. on the Necess. of Revelation.* *passim.*—*Leland on Adv. of Rev.* vi. *cb.* 10, 12, 21.—*Prot. Syst.* vol. i. *Nº.* xx. p. 450—464.—*Leland's View,* vol. ii. p. 192—195.—*Monthly Review,* vol. xi. p. 99—105.

8, 9, 10. | 11. Experience joins with theory, to prove a revelation so necessary to bring mankind to the knowledge and practice of virtue, that little is to be expected without it.

12. A revelation may make the knowledge of what the light of nature might discover to every man, more plain, easy, certain and affecting; not to say, that there may possibly be some things beyond the discovery of our unassisted reason, which might prove cogent motives to virtue.

*Prop.* 87, 88. | 13. The knowledge and practice of virtue is necessary to the happiness of private persons and societies.

11, 12, 13. | 14. A divine revelation is, in the present circumstances of mankind, highly expedient, and therefore greatly desirable. *Q. E. D.*

*Fost. against Tind.* p. 12—24.—*Campb. Necess. of Rev. pass. præf. c. v, vi.*—*Watts's Strength and Weakness of Human Reason.*—*Works,* vol. ii.—*Hodges's Sermons,* Nº. xiv. p. 297—309.—*Leland's Advant. of Revel.* vol. ii. p. 27—39.

## SCHOLIUM I.

The proposition may be illustrated (and especially *gr.* 10.) by observing, that the most celebrated *Lawgivers* of antiquity have thought it necessary to profess some intercourse with heaven, in order to enforce their laws, though many of them were armed with secular power; as appears, not only in the instances of *Moses*, but also of *Zoroaster*, *Pythagoras*, *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, *Seleucus*, *Numa*, *Hermes Trismegistus*, *Orpheus*, *Suphis* the Egyptian, *Minos*, *Zamolxis* the Getan, *Woden* the Saxon, *Melesagoras* the Eleusinian, *Zathraustes* the Arifmaspian, *Mango-Copal* the Peruvian, and *Phoe* the Indian: to which we may also add *Amasis*, *Mnevis*, *Radamanthus*, *Triptolemus*, *Zaleucus*, *Lycaon*, *Romulus*, and *Sertorius*.

*Shuckford's Conn.* vol. i. p. 319—323.—  
*Temple's Miscel.* part ii. *Ess.* ii. p. 87—  
 89.—*Lucas Inq.* vol. i. § 2. c. iii. p. 108,  
 109. p. 79. 7th Ed.—*Customs of Ind. and*  
*Jews compared*, p. 56, 57.—*Collier and*  
*Bayle in Nom.*—*Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. i.  
 p. 101—109.

It may not be improper to observe by the way, that whereas the rise of superstition is generally ascribed to the *priests*, it appears in fact, that *princes* and *legislators*, under pretence of inspiration, as well as by other methods, were the chief agents in introducing it into the world; as is with great accuracy and learning shewn at large by

*Chand. against Morg.* part ii. § 15. vol. i.  
 p. 556—585.—*Philemon to Hydaspes*,  
 part iii. p. 53, 54.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

To the reasoning in the demonstration above, LECT.  
 it is objected, by the author of *Christianity as old* CIV.  
*as the creation*, that natural religion is so plain, ~~~~~

as

as to need no explication, and so *perfect*, as to admit of no addition.

*Tind. of Christianity, c. ii. & vi.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

To the *first* of these assertions it is answered, that the differences there have been between many learned philosophers, about many branches of natural religion, do evidently prove it not to be so *plain* as is here supposed: and indeed this hypothesis would entirely supercede all *human* as well as divine teachings. And as to what is said of the *perfection* of it, we reply, that if *natural religion* only mean that which in the most extensive sense may be called the *law of nature, i. e.* the obligation on a rational agent arising from the whole nature of things, (*Def. 62. Schol.*) though the assertion be true, it is nothing to the present purpose; but if we mean by it merely the *light of nature, (Def. 62.)* then the assertion is evidently false, being contrary to fact; but if it be a sort of medium between both these, *i. e.* that rule of life, to the knowledge of which men might attain, if they would in general use their faculties well; then it seems, that it is neither so perfect nor so plain, as to supercede the usefulness of a revelation, though it should on the other hand be granted not to be so imperfect and obscure, as to render it universally of absolute *necessity*.—On the whole, *Tindal* is very little consistent with himself, when, shifting between these different ideas, he sometimes insists on such a *perfection* of it, as is inconsistent with any tolerable degree of *plainness*; and sometimes on such a *plainness*, as must suppose it very *imperfect*.

*Conyb. against Tind. p. 134—138. or Le-land against Tind. p. 4—10. vol. i.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected farther, that it seems injurious to the divine goodness, to suppose that God has suffered

suffered mankind to fall into such deplorable circumstances as the proposition represents. We answer,

1. That the proposition does not assert mankind to be left under an absolute *impossibility* of obtaining virtue and happiness.

2. That to leave men in great danger of error and vice, and that in such a degree, as will in *fact*, though *not necessarily* prove fatal to many, is certainly consistent with the divine perfections, because we plainly see it to be done; and is a difficulty by no means peculiar to those that believe revelation, but common to all that believe the goodness of the deity. And what *Tindal* says of the great evil of *superstition*, which he supposes worse than atheism, joined to the charge of superstition which he brings against the whole *christian* world, serves yet more to illustrate and confirm this reply.

3. To suppose the light of nature ever so perfect, will not infer the circumstances of mankind to be less deplorable: for the degree of wickedness and consequently misery prevailing in the world, being in other respects the same, will be aggravated in proportion to the degree in which their light and advantages are supposed perfect.

*Tind. Christian. as old, &c. p. 173, 174.—*

*Fost. against Tind. p. 64—70, 73—77.*

#### SCHOLIUM 5.

It is objected nearly to the same purpose as before, that if a revelation were thus expedient, it must have been *universal*; there being no imaginable reason, why God should give it to some rather than others. Reserving this to be more fully considered elsewhere, we here answer,

1. Since, on our principles, God was not obliged in strict justice to give it to *any*, he could not be obliged to give it to all.

2. That though we cannot tell why one nation should have it rather than another, there is no

reason to be surprized at such a distinction, considering in how different, and to us unaccountable a manner, all must acknowledge the means of virtue and happiness to be dispensed among the children of men.

3. That it is a very supposable case, that if ever God gave a revelation at all, suited to the general use of mankind, it was with such circumstances, that its not having an universal spread was owing to the folly and wickedness of men:—nay it is a very possible case, that God may already have given an universal revelation; *i. e.* a revelation made to the human family when very small, the tradition of which has been lost through their own folly, though their happiness might have been greatly promoted by keeping up the memory of it.

*Blount's Orac. of Reas. p. 211, 198, 199.*

*—Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 315—318.*

*—Fost. against Tind. c. ii. p. 78—86.*

*—Butler's Anal. part ii. c. vi.—Sykes*

*on Mir. p. 217—229.—Law's Theory*

*of Religion, part i.—Balguy's Tracts,*

*p. 324—334.—Second Letter to a Deist.*

#### SCHOLIUM 6.

Those who assert a revelation to be so absolutely necessary, that every man, how well soever he uses his reason, must inevitably perish without it, generally ground that assertion, not on principles of natural religion, but on those passages of *scripture*, which relate to the necessity of *faith in Christ*, which cannot here be properly examined.

*Jenk. Reas. of Christianity, vol. i. p. 2—14.*

#### PROPOSITION XCIII.

LECT. There is some reason to hope that God will  
 cv. grant a revelation.

## L E M M A.

It is to be observed, that we are far from saying, that a man could have any *certainty* in this point: but a *probable hope* might be produced by the following considerations.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop. 92.* | 1. The circumstances of mankind greatly need it.

1. | 2. The general goodness of the Divine Being may lead us to expect it: and it seems probable, that God would not have suffered mankind to have fallen into so great apostacy, unless he had intended them such an assistance.

3. The provision which God has made in the natural world for removing *bodily disorders*, gives us some additional reason to hope, that he will not be altogether regardless of the much more dangerous diseases of the *mind*.

*Prop. 92. Schol. 1.* | 4. The pretences to a divine revelation, which have been often made, and one and another of them so readily received, even sometimes upon very slender evidence, plainly shew that men have thought a revelation probable: and perhaps we may add, that there would not have been so many counterfeits, if there had been no true coin.

5. Some of the ancient philosophers, and especially *Socrates* and *Plato*, though they did not believe the pretences to revelation made by their *priests*, yet hoped that such a favour would be given to mankind, and express their comfortable expectation of it. 2, 3, & 4, 5. | 6. *Valet propositio.*

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 304—310.*—

*Jackson's Chronology, vol. ii. Sub Finem.*

— *Apud Monthly Rev. vol. vii. p. 47.*

48.

## SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be objected, that since mankind brought themselves into these deplorable circumstances by their own fault, there is the less reason to expect any extraordinary assistance.

*Ans.* We allow that no particular person can have any assurance that God will favour him in this manner; but since it is certain that God confers many unmerited favours upon his creatures, and that in the natural world many remedies are provided for evils, which men bring upon themselves by their own folly, this objection will not overthrow the preceding argument.

## DEFINITION LXIX.

That MIRACLE is said to be UNCONTROLED, the apparent design of which is not evidently *contradicted*, either by the *absurdity* of the thing it is intended to prove, or by some at least *equal miracle* opposed to it.

*Chandler on Mir. c. iii.*—*Sykes, ibid.*  
p. 130—134.

## SCHOLIUM.

A man may be said to perform miracles *in proof of a doctrine*, when he asserts the doctrine, and then works the miracle as an immediate confirmation of it; or when he does publicly and frequently assert himself to be a teacher sent from God, and appeals to a train of miracles to shew that he is so: for in that case such miracles, (if they be allowed to be any proof at all) do prove particular facts or doctrines asserted by him, even though no miracle be distinctly applied to such particulars.

*Fleetwood of Mir. p. 120, 121, 220—228.*

—*Works, p. 144. p. 159, 160.*—

*Farmer on Miracles, p. 515—521.*

## PROPOSITION XCIV.

When a man performs evident and uncontroled miracles as a proof of any doctrine, virtue requires those who have sufficient evidence of the reality of such miracles, to admit of the doctrine as true.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 91. | 1. God may see fit to reveal some things to his creatures, not discoverable by their natural light.

1. | 2. God's wisdom will require him to reserve to himself some certain *criteria*, by which his own testimony may be known and distinguished by us.

*Prop.* 32. and *Def.* 67. | 3. A miracle cannot be performed without an extraordinary divine interposition, either mediate or immediate.

3. | 4. If God would confirm the truth of a proposition to one man, by the testimony of another to whom it was immediately revealed, we can think of no method, by which he could do it in so effectual a manner, as by giving him a power to work a *miracle* in confirmation of it.

*Def.* 69. | 5. When a miracle is *uncontroled*, we can imagine no circumstance by which it can be distinguished from a miracle wrought to confirm a truth.

4, 5 | 6. If God were to suffer an uncontroled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falsehood, it seems he could have no criterion by which his testimony could be distinguished.

2, 6. | 7. It is inconsistent with the *wisdom* of God, to suffer an uncontroled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falsehood.

6 | 8. It would also be inconsistent with his *goodness*; seeing it would leave his creatures in a perpetual and melancholy uncertainty, as to the truth of any pretended revelation from him: an

uncertainty that would be most painful to the most virtuous and religious part of mankind.

7, 8 | 9. Seeing God is both wise and good, we may depend upon it, that a proposition attested by uncontroled miracles is attested by him.

*Prop.* 79, 9. | 10. Seeing God is true, virtue will require us to admit of a proposition so confirmed. Q. E. D.

*Barrow's Works*, vol. ii. p. 214—216.—

*Locke's Post. Works*, p. 219—222.—

*Works*, vol. iii. p. 453. Ed. 3.—

*Cband. on Mir.* c. ii.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

We have not mentioned that additional confirmation, which may arise to the proposition, from the regard which men in all ages and nations seem to have paid to miracles, as the surest proof of a divine revelation; that fact having been disputed, especially of late by the learned and ingenious Mr. *Weston*, though some considerable stress is laid upon it by Bishop *Atterbury*, in the place quoted below; and Mr. *Comber* has laboured to shew that miracles were greatly regarded by the Gentiles. It is observable, that few of the *legislators* mentioned above, (*Prop.* 92. *Schol.* 1.) though they pretended to revelations, (which by them must have been supposed miracles, see *Def.* 68.) ventured to prove the truth of them by professing a power to work miracles. Nevertheless, though the pretended miracles of the heathens were seldom proposed as in proof of any doctrine, (as will be farther noted) yet there was a sort of accidental credit derived to heathen establishments by such pretensions to them, which occasioned the multiplication of those pretences in opposition to christianity; and is a proof after all, that miracles were not disregarded by the pagans in general; as, considering the constitution of human nature, it would be

be strange if they were, at least by those who were themselves eye-witnesses of them, and that in instances where the facts could not be disputed.

*Atterb. Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 207—210\*.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

To this it is objected, that if we believe the *bible*, we shall find that it is not only supposed there, that miracles *may be* wrought in proof of a falsehood, but it is expressly asserted to *have been fact* in one case, and foretold as what *shall certainly be* in others. *Deut. xiii. 1—5. Matt. xxiv. 24. 2 Thess. ii. 9, 10. Exod. vii. and viii.* To these texts it has been answered by some, that they, especially the *first*, may be only *hypothetic*: by others, that all the wonders here spoken of are *tricks* and not real miracles; which may be true of *2 Thess. ii. 9*. But the justest answer seems to be, that none of these are supposed to be *uncontroled* miracles, but to be sufficiently confuted, either by the apparent absurdity of the thing they attempted to prove, or by other more and greater miracles wrought on the contrary side: and it is to be remembered in this view, that *Matt. xxiv. 24.* refers to the *apostolic* age; so that all the miracles of those false Christs were directly opposed, by the sum of all those wrought in the very same time in proof of christianity.

*Tillotf. Serm. vol. iii. p. 499, 500.—*

*Sermon 175, Ed. 4th. p. 476, 477.—*

*Limb. Theol. l. iii. c. xvii. § 2.—Fleetw.*

*of Mir. p. 173—209.—Works, p. 152*

*—157.—Chapman's Euseb. vol. i. p.*

*119—127.—Sykes of Mir. p. 175—*

\* Weston's "Inquiry into the Causes of the Rejection of the Christian Miracles by the Heathens," is a work which excited some attention at the time of its publication, but is now nearly forgotten. The author's scheme has been generally esteemed to be more fanciful than just. His Inquiry, however, is a book of learning.

179.—*Fortin's Rem. on Eccles. History*,  
vol. ii. p. 32—36.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Bishop *Fleetwood's* singular solution of the miracles of the *Egyptian Magi*, may be seen at large in

*Fleetwood, ibid. p. 52—61.*—*Works, p. 134, 135.*—*Shuckford's Connection*, vol. ii. p. 412—433.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Others assert, that by stating the case as in the proposition above, we fall into a round of proving the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine. But the contrary is plain; for though we readily allow, that nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature can be proved by a miracle, yet we maintain, that many doctrines, of which the light of nature could give us no information at all, and in which even when proposed we can see no innate mark of truth, may be proved by miracles; it being sufficient in this case to render the proof valid, that no apparent absurdity attend the doctrine to be established by them, where there are no contrary miracles to be compared with them: nor could miracles according to us in any imaginable case be proved by the doctrine, be it ever so apparently true.

*Fleetw. on Mir. p. 169—173.*—*Works, p. 151, 152.*—*Hadly's Tracts, p. 26—28.*—*Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 383—385.*—*Bp. Sherlock's Discourses, vol. i. p. 303, 304\**.

\* We should here distinguish, says Mr. Merivale, between the doctrines we *prove* by miracles (viz. those of revelation), and the doctrines by which we *try* miracles, (viz. those of natural religion.)

## SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther pleaded, that any *one* miracle is as good a proof of divine interposition as a *thousand*; and that *all* miracles are as to their evidence *equal*, since no work can to the divine power be greater or less than another.—We answer, though all things be equally easy to God, yet there are some of his works, which appear to us more grand and magnificent than others, and more indubitably miraculous: and the story of the *Egyptian Magi*, before referred to, plainly shews there may be circumstances, by which one miracle may appear evidently to triumph over another; in which case, it seems that all the evidence arising from the opposite miracle is in a manner even transferred to the victorious side.

*Fleetw. ibid. p. 30—37, 81—83, 211—213.—Works, p. 131, 132—138, 157, 158.—Hoadly's Tracts, p. 5—16.—Locke on Mir. p. 223—231.—Works, vol. iii. p. 453, 454. 3d. Ed.*

## SCHOLIUM 6.

It must be granted, that the evidence of miracles seems so strong, as to render it highly probable, that God will not suffer it to be applied in proof of a falsehood, without appearing by miracle to turn the balance on the side of truth: for should he suffer them often to be profaned, to confirm what is evidently contrary to the principles of natural religion or common sense, they would gradually grow into such suspicion and contempt, as we can hardly suppose his wisdom would permit; and the more illustrious any miraculous fact in question appears, the stronger will this argument be.

*Champ. Euseb. vol. i. p. 89—93, 96—116.*

## SCHOLIUM 7.

It is farther objected, that this method of stating the doctrine of miracles renders them of  
no

no use. But not to repeat what was said in answer to the objection in the 4th *Schol.* which is nearly equivalent to this; it is most evident they may, on this hypothesis, serve to awaken attention: to illustrate the goodness of the deity, when they are of a benevolent kind, and in all instances his power, and thereby impress the consciences of men with sentiments of religious reverence and awe: to command respect to the person speaking, who might otherwise, especially if in circumstances of external meanness, appear pragmatical and usurping: to increase the evidence of some things which may be less certainly known by natural light; and to discover many others, which though not contrary to reason, are not discoverable by it, nor capable of receiving immediate evidence from it.

*Flyter against Tind.* p. 50—63.—*Atterb.*

*Post. Serm.* vol. i. p. 210—216.—

*Jortin's Remarks,* vol. ii. p. 3.

#### SCHOLIUM 8.

It appears from the survey we have now been taking, that the question, whether evil spirits, if such there be, may work miracles, is not of so great importance as some have represented: since it is certain that on the principles of the proposition, God will not suffer them to work uncontrouled miracles; and if any such should be wrought in proof of a falshood, charging it upon an evil spirit would by no means remove the difficulty, since such a spirit could act no otherwise than by a divine energy communicated to him, *Prop.* 32. Nevertheless, if a miracle were ever wrought, which was controuled by the absurdity and wickedness of the doctrine to be proved by it, or by a series of opposite and greater miracles; in that case, it seems more congruous to the christian scheme, (if there appear to be reason for admitting it) to ascribe

such

such miracles to the power of evil spirits, than to speak of them as the work of God. Vid. 2 *Thess.* ii. 9. *Acts* xiii. 10. *Job* ii. 7. compare *Rev.* xiii. 2, 14. Vid. *Prop.* 32. *Schol.* 3.

*Clarke at Boyle's Lect.* p. 318—322.—

*Fortin's Remarks*, vol. ii. p. 3.—*Farmer on Christ's Temptation*, p. 25—27\*.

## DEFINITION LXX.

That is called the INTERNAL EVIDENCE of any LECT. revelation, which is drawn from the considera- CVII. tion of those declarations and doctrines which are contained in it: and that is called its EXTERNAL EVIDENCE, which arises from some other circumstances referring to it, *v. g.* predictions concerning it, miracles wrought by those who teach it, its success in the world, &c.

## PROPOSITION XCV †.

To enquire what kind of internal evidence,  
we

\* Most of the questions to which these scholia refer are amply considered by Mr. Farmer, in his *Dissertation on Miracles*.

† This and the ninety-seventh proposition seem liable to some objection. It must be owned that we are very little qualified to judge *à priori* what kind of evidence, and especially what *external* evidence should attend a divine revelation: and to select all the particulars of that evidence with which the *christian* religion was attended, and to propose this as the *standard*, by which revelation in *general* is to be tried, looks too much like an attempt to prepossess the mind in favour of christianity, before it is fairly examined. The author seems to have been aware of this objection himself; and has accordingly in his *Lemma* to the 97th proposition endeavoured to soften the manner of expression; as if the intention of the proposition was only to shew the *reasonableness* of such kind of evidence, if it should hereafter appear to have in fact attended any supposed revelation, without asserting that all the particulars of this evidence would have occurred to us as probable, when only reasoning upon it in theory: for it is evident that to see the reasonableness of any scheme when it is proposed to us, is a very different thing from making the discovery ourselves.—But though this way of stating the question must be allowed to be less exceptionable than the other, yet it seems on the whole, that this inquiry would be made with much greater

we may probably expect to find in a divine revelation †.

## L E M M A.

Let it be observed, that the divine revelation of which we here speak, is supposed to be one intended for the benefit of mankind *in general*, and introduced as that in which the whole scheme of revelation *terminates*: for otherwise it must be acknowledged, that there may be particular revelations on different occasions, which may be very credible, though not attended with all those internal evidences; nor could it be expected, that every discovery which God makes of himself to any particular person, or nation, should answer all these characters.

## S O L U T I O N.

1. We may be sure it can contain nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature, because that is the law of God, *Def.* 61. and he is too wise and too faithful to contradict himself.

2. It may be expected, that it should farther confirm some important truths known by the light of nature, and clear up the difficulties which hang on some articles in which our happiness is much concerned: particularly, that it should give us firmer assurance of the pardon of sin in a way consistent with the divine justice, and that

greater advantage, if it were reserved till the evidence which has in fact attended christianity were fully stated. We should then be better able to judge of any objections that are made to particular parts of the evidence, and should be prepared to make a more precise and determinate answer: whereas when the subject is only treated *in theory*, our reasoning upon it will of necessity be more indeterminate, and therefore less satisfactory; an instance of which we have in the objections that are urged in some of the following pages, against *positive institutions* and a *traditional* revelation. Former editor.

† See, says Dr. Savage, both the internal and the external evidences to be required in a divine revelation, well laid down in Bailey's *Essay on divine Inspiration*, part the second.

it should discover more of a future state of happiness, perhaps also of the entrance of sin and calamity in the world.

3. It may very probably contain a discovery of some doctrines as well as facts, which though not inconsistent with our natural light, are not discoverable by it.

4. As it is very probable that much of it will relate to the divine being and his operations, it is to be expected, that though some additional light may be given us as to many things concerning him, yet these discoveries may be connected with farther hints relating to what is yet unknown; so that there may be many things in it beyond our adequate comprehension, or in other words, some things *mysterious*. Vid. *Prop.* 18. *Cor.* 3.

5. Nevertheless, we may conclude that the most important things will be plainly revealed; so that every honest inquirer may come to a full satisfaction about them.

6. The end of all must be to subserve virtue, and so to promote the happiness of mankind: and those additional discoveries beyond what the light of nature could have found out, supposed *gr.* 3. will no doubt center in this, and not tend merely to amaze our minds and excite our curiosity.

7. Considering how greatly and how universally *pride* prevails in the minds of men, how detrimental it is to almost all the branches of virtue, and how much it taints and debases many actions which would otherwise be the most excellent, as likewise how ill it becomes any creature, and especially a mortal and a sinful creature; it is exceedingly probable, that the whole series of a divine revelation will evidently tend to exalt God and to humble man.

*Tillotf.* vol. iii. p. 442, 443.—*Dod.* x.  
*Serm.* N<sup>o</sup>. viii. p. 209—211.—*Duchal*

*on the presumptive Evid. of the Christ. Rel. p. 111—118.—Butler's Anal. part ii. c. iii.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

It is objected, that on these principles a revelation must be needless; since a man must understand the principles of natural religion before he can judge of a revelation, and if he can judge of these he does not need a revelation.

To what is said *Prop. 94. Schol. 7.* we may here add the following remarks.

1. We allow that the being and truth of God must be known, before we can judge of the internal evidence of a revelation as above.
2. That nevertheless a revelation may improve what is known, correct mistakes, and excite men by proper motives to the practice of virtue, which they generally need more than merely to be instructed in its nature.
3. That a revelation may be a means of leading a person into the knowledge and belief of those doctrines, which must be believed before that revelation can be admitted: *v. g.* miracles may convince an atheist of the being of a God.
4. That the report of a revelation, and some probable external evidence of its truth striking the mind, may lead into more attentive reflection on the principles of natural religion; and thereby farther promote the knowledge of them, and make way for a rational admission of the revelation itself, with a regard to its internal evidence as now better understood.
5. That the evidence with which a revelation is attended may farther convince even a wise and good man of those things which he before believed, and on the belief of which he admitted the revelation as probably true: *v. g.* remarkable appearances of God may farther prove his particular providence, and the accomplishment of prophecies.

prophecies and threatenings may introduce a farther and more lively conviction of its truth. To which we may add,

*Ans.* 6. That the whole objection is founded upon an evident mistake; since it lies against all methods of instruction whatsoever, and might be applied even to mathematical treatises; as it might be said, they cannot improve reason, since we must by reason judge whether the arguments are conclusive.

*Tind. of Christianity*, p. 369. *Ed.* 1. p. 77  
—82. *2d Ed.* Former part of c. xiv.  
p. 335.—*Fost. against Tind.* p. 41—51.  
part i.—*Leland against Tind.* vol. ii.  
p. 95—100.—*Butler's Anal.* part ii. c. i.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be questioned whether a revelation is to be admitted, which commands an action forbidden by the general rules of morality, *v. g.* to kill an innocent child, or put a whole nation of men to the sword.

*Ans.* 1. That cannot be a divine revelation, which requires any thing which all things considered is in present circumstances evil.

2. It is difficult for us to say, that such actions as those here mentioned are in all cases and circumstances unlawful, or even that human sacrifices are universally so; because it is possible they may be for the public good; and God, whose views are infinitely more extensive than ours, might see them to be so in circumstances when we could not possibly discern it.

3. Upon the whole therefore, we must judge by comparing the evidence on both sides: and if in any given instance, we have a stronger evidence that God requires a thing, than we have on the other hand that in present circumstances it is an evil, we are then to believe it good, and to obey the revelation requiring it; depending upon  
it

it that God will one way or another interpose, to prevent such an issue of the affair, as it would be contrary to his perfections to permit.

*Chubb's Prev. Quest. pass.—Butler's Anal. part ii. c. iii. p. 267, 268. 8vo Ed.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

Considering how liable the human mind is to mistake, great care should be taken that we do not admit any principle as certain, which may really be doubtful, with respect to natural religion; lest, trying revelation by this complex notion as a standard, we should reject any thing that is really authentic, and sufficiently proved to be so by external evidence. This therefore is to be diligently attended to upon the principles laid down above, and one part of the internal evidence weighed against another; as well as the sum of both with the external, in order to form a right judgment. *See Prop. 120. § 1, 3.*

DEFINITION LXXI.

LECT. CVIII. Those are called POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS OR PRECEPTS, which are not founded upon any reasons known to those to whom they are given, or discoverable by them, but which are observed merely because some superior has commanded them.

COROLLARY.

It is plain, that *positive* precepts may be distinguished from *arbitrary* precepts, *i. e.* those which are founded upon the mere will of the commander, and for which he himself can see no reason.

*Conyb. against Tind. p. 155—157.—*  
*Main Arg. p. 45, 46.—Hallet on*  
*Script. vol. iii. p. 187—191.*

## PROPOSITION XCVI.

There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. There are various relations of things unknown to us, and beyond the discovery of our natural faculties.

1.|2. It is possible those unknown relations may render some things fit to be done by us, which we cannot see ourselves under any obligation to.

*Prop.* 33.|3. These are most clearly known to the divine mind.

1, 2, 3.|4. God may have sufficient reasons to us unknown for appointing some particular actions, which we could not otherwise see ourselves obliged to.

5. There may be in other instances a general reason for appointing some test of our obedience, when there is no peculiar reason for preferring one to another.

6. Humility, and consequently virtue, may be in some circumstances more effectually promoted, when we are required to obey commands founded on reasons unknown to us, than if those commands carried their own apparent reason along with them; and it may be with this view that God sees fit to conceal from us the foundation of the commands in question.

7. Civil governors may make laws founded on reasons unknown to their subjects, and proper to be concealed from them.

8. God, as our creator and constant benefactor, has a right to command us incomparably superior to that of any civil governor.

9. Circumstances of worship will appear more solemn, when considered as matters of divine institution, than merely as matters of human in-

vention; and a greater solemnity may thereby be added to the worship itself: by which means they may have a remoter tendency greatly to promote those several virtues, which such acts of religious worship are intended to subserve.

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9. | 10. There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author. Q. E. D.

*Conyb. p. 158—170.—Fost. against Tind. p. 281—284.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that forasmuch as God is unchangeable, (*Prop. 30. Cor.*) his will and our duty to him must always be the same.

*Ans.* Our general duty will always be the same, but the *particular expressions* of it must vary as our circumstances vary; nor is there any change in the divine will implied in such a variety, or in his giving new commands to us, when those new circumstances arise, more than there is in his producing new creatures.

*Tind. ibid. p. 20. Oct. p. 118. c. x.—*

*Conyb. ib. p. 170—174.—Fost. ibid.*

*c. iv. p. 288, 289.*

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

It is also objected, that it is inconsistent with the divine wisdom to command *indifferent* things as *necessary*.—It is answered, they are not commanded as necessary, *i. e.* as *morally* and *universally* so, though in the present circumstance they may be *expedient*; and if they could never in any instance be expedient, they would not be indifferent, but universally and morally evil, contrary to the hypothesis.

*Tind. ibid. p. 131, 132.—Conyb. ibid.*

*p. 174—177.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It is said to be inconsistent with the goodness of God to fetter our liberty, and thereby impair our happiness, by requiring things under certain penalties, which we might else have been excused from; and that this will turn a revelation into a curse instead of a blessing.

To this it is replied,

1. It is not granted that every positive institution as such does necessarily impair our happiness, whether by restraining our liberty, or by multiplying our care in observing them; for the pleasure a pious mind will have in resigning to God's will, some of its enjoyments, and in finding itself continually employed in his service, may upon the whole make the observance of such positive precepts more delightful than a freedom from them.

2. The tendency these things may have in their consequences to promote virtue, may on the whole be vastly more than an equivalent for present pleasure forborne and labour and difficulty incurred.

3. If on the whole these positive precepts did diminish our happiness, a revelation of which they are a part might contain such advantages of another kind, as on the whole to make it a great blessing: nor can it by any means be proved, that every thing which God *requires* of us must *immediately* promote our happiness, any more than that all he appoints in the course of his *providence* must have this effect.

*Tind. ibid. p. 123, & 131. c. xi.—Conybeare, ibid. p. 177—182.—Limb. Collat. ap. Spect. vol. iii. N<sup>o</sup>. 213.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected, that it is self-contradictory to suppose God should *forbid* that by a revelation, which he has *allowed* by a natural law.

*Ans.* 1. No natural law allows it in *such circumstances*, as those in which it is by a revealed law forbidden, *i. e.* when God has expressly determined a case, in itself indifferent.

2. On the same principles, all those civil laws are to be condemned, by which things are forbidden, which are not directly contrary to the law of nature.

*Main Arg.* p. 52.—*Fost.* against *Tind.* p. 285—288.

#### SCHOLIUM 5.

It is also objected, that positive precepts overcharge the mind, and so lead to the neglect of moral virtue; and that if people come to believe these things good for any thing, they will soon suppose them good for every thing, *i. e.* place the whole of their religion in them, considering how prone men are to superstition. *Prop.* 76. *Schol.* 7.

*Ans.* 1. There is no arguing against the use of a thing from the possibility of its being abused; for then all the entertainments and supports of human life must be condemned.

2. It is reasonable to believe, that if God gives a revelation in which positive precepts are contained, he will take proper care to distinguish them from the great precepts of moral virtue.

3. A few positive precepts, given in a revelation declaring the rule of faith and practice, may more effectually prevent the increasing and idolizing such observances, than if none at all had been appointed.

*Tind. of Christianity,* p. 123, 124.—  
*Conyb. against Tind.* p. 182—193.—  
*Main Arg.* p. 48—51.—*Fost. against Tind.* p. 289—303.

#### COROLLARY.

It appears from this survey of the subject, that the insertion of some positive institutions, in a pro-

proper manner moderated, and declared subordinate to the precepts of moral virtue, is so far from being an objection against such a revelation; that it is rather to be considered as an additional part of its internal evidence; especially considering, that as a divinely instituted religion will probably require some association of its professors, there must in the nature of things be some form of entering into that association, and of maintaining a profession of continued adherence to it; which will have evident advantages, if supposed of divine appointment.

*Butler's Anal. part ii. c. i. p. 215—217.*

*OEt. Ed.—Letter to Wallace, p. 8—*

*II.—Answer, p. 27—33.—Leland*

*against Tind. vol. i. p. 51—92.—Lett.*

*of Posit. Inst. prefixed to Leland, vol. ii\*.*

### PROPOSITION XCVII†.

To enquire into the external evidence which LECT.  
CIX.  


#### LEMMA.

It is to be observed, that we do by no means limit the divine being to all the circumstances here mentioned; but only remark, that if a revelation offered should seem to be attended with such circumstances, in conjunction with the above mentioned internal evidences, each of these circumstances would concur to recommend it to our candid and diligent examination.

#### SOLUTION AND DEMONSTRATION.

I. We might reasonably suppose, that at least *most* of the persons chiefly employed in the first publishing the revelation would be persons of

\* Rather affixed to volume the first; but it is not in the second edition. s.

† See the note on *Prop. 95.*

piety and virtue; otherwise, we could neither imagine that God would favour them with such extraordinary discoveries of himself, nor could we depend upon their veracity in reporting them to us: yet we cannot say, that it is necessary that *all* the persons so employed, if there be a considerable number of them, should be good men, and much less that every one of them should be freed from every degree of sin, though perhaps, if any one person is to bear a much greater part in the revelation than the rest, he may be so distinguished.

*Tind. ibid. p. 8, & 243. Oñ. p. 219.*—

*Fost. against Tind. p. 113, 114. c. iii.*

*p. 112, 113.*—*Leland, ibid. vol. ii.*

*part ii. c. ii. p. 36—38, 49—53. 2d Ed.*

*p. 28—31, 39—43.*

2. It is possible that some *superior spirit* (*Vid. Prop. 86.*) may be employed as a messenger from heaven to bring this revelation; and if he should not only make a transient appearance on earth, but take up his abode here for a considerable time in a human form, giving an example of the most perfect virtue, we must acknowledge the circumstance extremely well chosen and worthy the divine wisdom, though we cannot pretend it to be of absolute necessity.

3. We may reasonably depend upon it, that the *chief* messenger, if such there be, or others commissioned by him, will, at the first publishing of such a revelation, be endued with a power of working evident, uncontroled, and probably most of them beneficial *miracles*; they being not only a very solid proof of a divine mission, (*Prop. 94.*) but upon many accounts the most plain, popular, and convincing, and best suited to the bulk of mankind, for whose benefit no doubt a revelation would be calculated.

*Atterb. Serm. vol. iii. p. 217—222.*

4. It

4. It is probable that the chief persons employed in opening such a revelation may appear in plain and low circumstances of human life, rather than with princely grandeur; since in this view their testimony might be less suspected of being a political contrivance, and their example would be more instructive to the generality of mankind. Nor is it on the whole incredible, that such persons, notwithstanding their own virtue, should be despised and persecuted, and perhaps put to death, for their attempts to reform the world: if this were the case, they would give a most edifying example of suffering virtue, and an evidence of the integrity of their character and testimony to all ages, beyond what we could conceive in other circumstances. And though for this reason God might probably leave some of them to die by their enemies hands, yet it is not unlikely, but in some remarkable instances he might interpose for the delivery of his servants in their extremity, either rescuing some of them by miracle, in order to their farther usefulness, or perhaps raising them from the dead.

*Plato de Rep. l. ii. ap. Dod. x. Serm. p. 206. Ed. 1. p. 131. Ed. 4.—Fost. against Tind. p. 317, 318.—Flem. Christol. vol. ii. p. 51—53, 76—85.*

5. It is not improbable, that a revelation should be *gradually* introduced, and the expectation of mankind awakened by *predictions* and previous miracles, before the greatest scene of all be disclosed: this is analogous to the usual method of divine operation in the works of nature; and would lay a foundation for a very convincing additional evidence of the truth of the revelation; if it should appear, that a variety of different persons, of different ages and perhaps different countries, had been led by the providence of God and his influence on their minds to carry on their proper distinct parts of one harmonious design,

design, the connection of which was unknown to each of them.

*Barringt. Eff. on Div. Disp. Pref. p. 22—28.*—*Butler's Anal. part ii. c. vii.*

6. It is probable that God may bear farther witness to such a revelation, by giving it at first remarkable success, notwithstanding strong opposition, and though it may be destitute of human support; and by making it visibly effectual for reforming the characters of its professors. Such facts might be capable of most convincing proof to future ages; on which account they seem peculiarly proper.

7. Forasmuch as miracles would lose much of their force, if they were frequently to be repeated for a long succession of ages, it is not reasonable to conclude, that such a revelation would always be attended with the same degree of sensible evidence, with which it was at first introduced into the world: it is more natural to imagine, that God would take care that the first publishers of it should deliver in *writing* the history, purposes, and contents of the revelation, and that their books should be transmitted to posterity with such kind of evidence as other ancient records have.

8. It is probable, that if this method of transmitting a revelation be taken, providence may so order it, that the evidence of the main facts on which it is built shall at least in part be drawn from the testimony and confession of those by whom it was opposed: at least we must confess that this would be a strong additional medium of proof.

*Dod. x. Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. viii. p. 215—218. Ed. 2. p. 206—208. Ed. 1.*

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT.

CX.

The principal objections against the preceding solution are those which affect the *seventh step* of it:

it: we shall therefore in the following *Scholia*, give a view of the chief arguments brought against the supposition of such a *traditional* revelation, (as *Tindal*, though with some partial ambiguity, has affected to call it) and propose the most obvious answers to them.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It is objected, that forasmuch as the credibility of any testimony is impaired by passing through a number of hands, all the evidence which any traditional revelation can be supposed to have, must in time be utterly worn out.

*Ans.* 1. Where the testimony of any traditional witness gives *indubitable persuasion*, the credibility of the thing testified suffers *no diminution* by passing through his hands; and the credit universally given to many facts in ancient history, proves that the decrease is exceedingly small even in a long succession of ages, when the intermediate witnesses are faithful, careful and knowing.

2. That a tradition preserved by *writing*, is evidently less liable to corruption than that which is merely *oral*; since when the facts are once recorded, there is no room left for a failure in memory, to which alone the mistakes of honest men will be owing in transmitting a testimony.

3. That the agreement of various witnesses, and many of them in separate interests, concerning such a revelation, may be more than an equivalent for the little defects mentioned above.

4. That the success of a revelation, or the accomplishment of some prophecies contained in it, and the illustration of many other branches of internal evidence, relating to the characters of historians, mutual connection, and correspondence of facts, &c. on the principles of the *fifth* step, may give it such an increase of evidence, as shall abundantly over-balance all that it can be

be supposed to lose, by being transmitted through many hundred years.

*Tind. ibid. p. 185. 4to, OEt. p. 163. 12mo. p. 165—168.—Fost. against Tind. p. 92—96.—Leland, ibid. vol. ii. p. 113—119.—Warb. Div. Leg. p. 1—3. vol. i.—Comber against Weston, Append. Jennings Log. Prop. xvii, xviii.—Ditt. on Resur. part ii. Prop. xv, xvi.—Flemming's three Monuments, confirming three plain Facts. passim.*

### SCHOLIUM 3.

It is also objected, that there are so many forgeries of books pretended to be ancient, that it is a difficult matter to distinguish the genuine from the spurious, and that since the bulk of the common people have neither leisure or ability to manage an enquiry of this nature, if they receive a traditional revelation, it must be by an implicit faith in the testimony of those who are the teachers of that religion; so that in reality they believe not *God* but the *Priest*.

*Ans. 1.* It is universally allowed that learned men may have sufficient evidence as to the genuineness of ancient books, and therefore of those which contain the substance of a supposed revelation: and as it is highly probable in the nature of things, that books of this kind would early pass into many hands, and be examined with the utmost rigour, and preserved with the greatest care, the evidence of their being genuine might (*cæt. par.*) be much greater than could be obtained as to any other books of equal antiquity.

2. Though the common people cannot of themselves enter minutely into the proofs, yet they may have some opportunity of gaining rational satisfaction, by consulting persons of learning and seeming integrity, not merely among the priests but the *laity*; and by reading books that  
give

give a view of the argument, in which they may reasonably take it for granted, that especially in a learned and inquisitive age, no man will cite vouchers notoriously false.

3. They may compare writers on both sides, if the revelation be opposed; and perhaps may see, from the manner in which the opposition is made, what may greatly confirm them in the truth opposed.

4. A person that cannot read himself may get some valuable treatises read over to him, perhaps again and again by different persons, whose partiality he has no reason to suspect, and concerning whom he might be confidently sure they read what was before them.

*Tind. ibid. p. 232—234. 4to. p. 209—212.*

*12mo. — Fost. ibid. p. 171—174, 178—*

*182. — Main Arg. p. 67—72. — Dodd.*

*First Lett. to the Author of Christ. not founded, &c. p. 52—56. — Benson's*

*Reas. of the Christ. Rel. part ii. Dial. 4.*

*præf. p. 144, 145, 153—155.*

#### SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected that the common people cannot be sufficient judges of the faithfulness of a *translation*, which yet is necessary in order to their understanding a traditional revelation, depending on books and designed for the use of various nations. We reply,

1. That though we acknowledge they cannot be so entirely satisfied as those who understand the original language; (which should recommend the study of the original to those who can conveniently engage in it;) yet the unlearned may very cheerfully depend upon the testimony of persons of acknowledged ability and known integrity, who have diligently compared the version with the original, and declare it as a fact on  
their

their own knowledge, that it is in the main agreeable to it.

2. Such a testimony acquires a very strong additional degree of evidence, when persons of different parties and sentiments in religion agree in allowing the same version; and when the originals are in the hands of those who are its greatest enemies.

*Main Arg. p. 73.——Dod. x. Serm. N<sup>o</sup>.  
viii. p. 228—231. Ed. I.*

#### SCHOLIUM 5.

It is farther objected, that there will be difficulties in the most literal and faithful translation of any ancient book, and in the original itself, arising from the different genius of languages; and especially if it be an oriental book, from the strong figures with which it will abound.

*Ans. 1.* Figurative language is not always obscure.

2. It is reasonable to suppose, that if God sees fit to communicate a revelation by books, he will take care that the most important things shall be expressed in such a manner, as to be very intelligible in a literal translation.

3. The objection here urged would equally affect all ancient books.

*Fost. against Tind. p. 186—191, 194.——  
Main Arg. p. 74, 75.——Leland against  
Tind. vol. ii. p. 232—246.*

#### SCHOLIUM 6.

To get clear of all these objections against a traditional revelation, some have asserted, that we may reasonably suppose, that if God communicates a revelation from age to age, every particular person will have the truth of a revelation so proposed immediately discovered to him by some divine agency on his mind; though perhaps this may be an argument only for his own use.

It cannot be denied, that such an immediate impulse on the mind of each individual is possible to divine power: but this manner of stating the case supposes the revelation to be a *personal* thing: so that those who have never experienced any thing of this kind, would probably look upon it as an enthusiastical pretence. Yet we may perhaps reasonably admit, that where men lie under great disadvantages for receiving the ordinary proofs, God may by some secret influence so dispose their minds, as that the *internal* evidence of a revelation, and its visible effects, shall produce a very strong degree of assent, though they are forced to take up with very slender *external* proofs: to which we may add, that God can if he pleases order such a correspondence between certain events in his providence, and certain impressions on the mind made in consequence of the supposed truth of a revelation, as shall greatly confirm the faith of the enquirer, and be almost equivalent to miracles wrought for his conviction; though he may not be able to make these things out fully to another. And if on the whole the belief of any revelation produces a virtuous temper, the great end of it is answered; even though the person so influenced and reformed by it may not be able to give a rational account of the grounds of this assent, or may build it upon some weak arguments.

*Lett. to Wallace, sub fin.*—*Christianity not founded on Arg. pass.*—*Dodd. Anf. N<sup>o</sup>. i. præf. p. 11—32.*—*Law's Theory, p. 18—23.*

## SCHOLIUM 7.

On a survey of the whole argument, we must confess that a traditional revelation will be attended with some difficulties and some defects; and that those who have it, will not enjoy altogether

gether the same advantages with those to whom the revelation was originally given: nevertheless it seems reasonable to conclude,

1. That strong degrees of internal evidence, and an experience of the reforming power of any religion upon the minds of its professors, and especially on our own, will make up the deficiency of some degree of external evidence, which might otherwise be very desirable: more especially, when on the one hand it concurs with some remarkable *personal experience*, (as above *Schol.* 6.) and on the other, there are no strong circumstances of suspicion attending what external evidence there is, *v. g.* the vices of the author of that revelation, its being first introduced by sanguinary methods, its acknowledging the want of miracles, or pretending to such as are palpably ridiculous, &c.

2. That if God gives a traditional revelation, he will give such evidence of one kind or another, as shall be sufficient to convince every honest and candid enquirer.

3. That it by no means becomes us to prescribe to God, what farther degrees of evidence, beyond what is barely sufficient for this purpose, shall be given to any revelation.

4. That a mixture of obscurity either in the proof or contents of a revelation may perhaps have its use; particularly to humble men's minds, and to serve as a *touch stone*, by which their true character may be distinguished.

*Grot. de Verit. l. ii. c. xix.*—*Dodd. Third Lett. ibid. p. 57—59.*—*Butler's Anal. part ii. c. vi. p. 226—235. 4to. 333—344. 8vo.*

#### SCHOLIUM 8.

In this argument, it may be very proper to review that excellent abstract of the controversy

verfy between *Tindal* and his antagonifts, which is given in *Main Arg.* p. 77—86\*.

\* “The main Argument,” the whole title of which I do not recollect, is a pamphlet that was published in 1733, and which excited much attention at the time of its appearance. It is now difficult to be procured. A collection of scarce and valuable tracts on moral and theological questions is a Defideratum in English Literature.

*The END of the FIFTH PART.*

PART

## P A R T VI.

*In which the GENUINENESS and CREDIBILITY  
of the Old and New Testament are asserted and  
vindicated.*

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## PROPOSITION XCVIII\*.

CHRISTIANITY is not a modern religion, but was maintained and professed by great multitudes quickly after the time in which CHRIST, its supposed founder, is said to have appeared, *i. e.* in the days of *Tiberius Cæsar*.

## DEMONSTRATION.

LECT. I. There is a series of books written by *Chris-*  
CXI. *tian* authors, who are said to have lived, some in  
the *first*, some in the *second* century, besides a multitude in those that follow; concerning the genuineness of which we have as much satisfaction as concerning that of any other ancient writers, whether *Jewish* or *Pagan*; particularly *Clemens Romanus*, *Ignatius*, and *Polycarp*, in less than an hundred years after the time mentioned; *Justin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Tatian*, *Athenagoras*, and *Theophilus Antiochenus*, in less than 200 years; for accounts of whom see any historical dictionary; not to mention a great many others, whose books are now lost, but whose writings are mentioned by *Eusebius* and other ancients, by whom also some considerable fragments of them are preserved; of whom see *Prop. 101*.

\* See a good view of the argument contained in this and the following proposition in *Dr. Leland's Reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's letters on the study of history*, p. 105—122, 307—315. Former Editor.

2. Some of the most ancient *Jewish* books, said to have been written about these 1700 years, expressly mention the *Christians*, and bitterly inveigh against them.

*Lardner's Jewish and Heathen Test.* vol. i. c. vii. § 1.—*Works*, vol. vii. p. 187—189.

3. It plainly appears that *Celsus*, *Porphyry*, *Hierocles*, *Julian*, and many other *heathen* writers, assaulted christianity with great bitterness; and several fragments of their writings are preserved in those of the christian apologists, by whom they were answered, and whose pieces are allowed to be genuine, though many of the *heathen* originals are unhappily lost. Their antagonists were *Origen*, *Methodius*, *Eusebius*, *Gregory Nazianzen*, and *Cyril*.

*Lardner's Jewish and Heathen Test.* vol. ii. c. xvii. vol. iii. c. xxxvii. § 9.—*Works*, vol. viii. p. 1—5, 220—226.

4. *Tacitus* assures us, that in *Nero's* days there was a multitude of christians, not only in *Judea*, where he tells us that religion began, but in *Rome*; against whom *Nero* raised a persecution, attended with such circumstances of ignominy and cruelty, as moved the compassion of their enemies; intimating also that this was not the first attempt to crush that sect.

*Tacit. Anal.* l. xv. c. 44.—*Lardner*, *ibid.* c. v. § 2.—*Works*, vol. vii. p. 253—255.

5. *Suetonius* also expressly mentions the punishment inflicted upon the christians by *Nero*.

*Sueton. Nero*, c. xvi.—*Pitisc. Annot. in Loc.*—*Lardner*, *ibid.* c. viii. § 3—*Works*, vol. vii. p. 266—268.

6. *Pliny Junior* informs *Trajan* at large of his proceedings against the christians in *Bithynia*, and after having borne a very honourable testimony to the morality and virtue of their cha-

racter, says, "that multitudes of both sexes of  
 " persons of every rank were infected with this  
 " superstition, which was got into villages as  
 " well as cities; so that, till he began to put  
 " the laws in execution against them, the tem-  
 " ples of the heathen deities were almost de-  
 " ferted, and few could be found to buy victims  
 " for them." *Plin. Epist. l. x. Ep. 97.*

To which we may add the answer of the em-  
 peror to him, forbidding the christians to be  
 sought out, but commanding them to be punish-  
 ed if they presented themselves: (*ibid. Ep. 98.*)  
 and also the epistle of *Tiberianus* governor of  
*Palæstina Prima* to *Trajan* on the same subject,  
 and nearly parallel to this of *Pliny*, which is pre-  
 served by *John Malala* in the second book of his  
 chronicles, and published by Archbishop *Usher*  
 in his *Appendix Tiberiana*, to the genuineness of  
 which nothing can be reasonably objected; so  
 that it is strange, that so many who collect tes-  
 timonies of this kind, should have entirely omit-  
 ted it\*.

Nearly a-kin to this also is the letter of *Serre-  
 nius Granianus*, proconsul of *Asia*, to *Adrian*, with  
 the rescript of *Adrian* himself in favour of the  
 christians, mentioned by *Justin Martyr*, and also  
 by *Melito* as quoted by *Eusebius*.

*Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. p. 449, 450.*—  
*Euseb. Hist. l. iv. c. viii, ix, & xxvi.*—  
*Just. Mart. Op. p. 99, 100.*—*Lardner,*  
*ibid. c. ix. § 3. c. ii. § 2, 3.*—*Works,*  
*vol. vii. p. 291—294. 358—364.*—  
*Jortin's Remarks on Eccles. Hist. vol. ii.*  
*p. 82, 83.*

\* The epistle ascribed to *Tiberianus* is not understood to  
 be genuine. Mr. *Dodwell* has examined it with particular at-  
 tention, and has argued that it is a downright forgery. His  
 argument has been approved of by *Pagi*, *Basnage*, *Le Clerc*,  
*Jortin*, and by learned critics in general. *John Malala* was a  
 writer near the end of the sixth century, and of little credit.  
*Lardner's Works, vol. vii. p. 321, 322.*

7. *Lucian*

7. *Lucian* expressly mentions the christians, as performing some extraordinary works, as resolutely bearing some extreme sufferings, as expressing a great contempt of heathen deities, and as remarkable for their mutual charity, as well as for the prophets and the missionaries of their churches; and though the author of the *Philopatris* be not certainly known, it is undoubtedly a very ancient piece, in which christians and their affairs are expressly mentioned in a great variety of circumstances.

*Moyle's Works*, p. 261—263.—*Post. Works*, vol. i. p. 285, &c.—*Huet. Dem. Evang.* p. 41, 42. *Prop.* iii. § 20. *ad fin.*—*Lucian de Morte Peregr.* ap. *Op.* vol. ii. p. 565—567.—*Pseudomant.* *ib.* vol. ii. p. 419—423.—*Biscoe at Boyle's Lect.* p. 450, 451.—*Lardner, ibid.* c. xix. *passim.*—*Works*, vol. viii. p. 69—81.

8. *Marcus Antoninus* expressly mentions the christians as examples of an obstinate contempt of death; and in his *Constitutions to the community of Asia*, (quoted from *Melito*, who wrote in this emperor's time, by *Euseb. Eccles. Hist.* l. iv. c. 13.) speaks of the christians as having for a considerable time been persecuted even to death. See also *Justin Martyr's* apology to *M. Anton.* ap. *Op.* p. 101, 102.—To which we may add, that *Epietetus* is generally supposed to have referred to them, when he speaks of the fortitude with which the *Galileans* endured the severest torments: and *Galen*, the celebrated physician, in the second century, uses the obstinacy of the christians in defending their tenets, as a proverbial expression.

*Marc. Anton.* l. xi. c. iii.—*Clerici Hist. Eccles.* p. 543.—*Arr. Epiet.* l. iv. c. vii. p. 400.—*Lardner's Heathen Test.* vol. ii. c. xxi. c. x. § 6. c. xiv. § 3. c. xv. § 2.

—*Works*, vol. viii. p. 90, 91. vol. vii. p. 354—357, 390—395, 398—406.—*Moyle's Post. Works*, vol. ii. p. 93—96, 243—255.—*Moyle's Discourse*, in the *Theological Repository*, vol. i.

9. *Justin Martyr*, in his dialogue with *Trypho*, mentioning the practice of the *Jews*, to curse the christians in their synagogues, charges it upon them as a known fact, “that after the death of Christ, and while *Jerusalem* was yet standing, they sent out chosen men from them into all the world, to inform them that the new sect of the christians was an atheistical sect; expressly to contradict the doctrine of Christ’s resurrection and ascension, and to warn them in the most solemn manner against receiving it.”

*Just. Mart. Trypho*, p. 169—171, & 368. *Ed. Thirlb.*—*Lardner's Cred.* vol. i. l. i. c. viii. § 2.—*Works*, vol. i. p. 171, 172.

10. The same *Justin Martyr*, not much above 100 years after the death of Christ, declares it as a notorious fact, “that there was no nation of men, whether *Greek* or *Barbarian*, not excepting even those wild stragglers the *Amazobii*, and *Nomades*, who had no fixed habitation, who had not learned to invoke the one father and former of all things, in the name of Jesus who was crucified:” and though one may allow something hyperbolical in the expression, it must undoubtedly contain a most important testimony to the fact asserted in the proposition, parallel to which is a celebrated passage in *Tertullian* referred to below.

*Just. Mart. Trypho*, p. 388. *Thirlb. Ed.*—*Tertul. Apol.* c. xxxvii. ap. *Op.* p. 30.—*Ap. Reeves's Apol.* vol. i. p. 323—326.—*Macknight's Truth of the Gospel History*, book iii. c. iv. § 1. p. 489—495.

## SCHOLIUM I.

It is observable, that most of these writers, at the same time that they mention the christians as a body of men then in being, do also mention the *persecutions* they endured; an important fact, which is also farther confirmed by the apologies of *Justin Martyr*, *Tertullian*, *Minutius Felix*, *Athenagoras* and *Origen*; which are undoubtedly to be reckoned among the most valuable remains of antiquity.

*Dodd. x. Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. viii. p. 226—230.—*

*Cband. of Persecut. p. 17—30.—*

*Macknight, ibid. § 2. p. 495—519.*

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It seems exceedingly probable, that when *Seneca*, (*apud August. Civ. Dei. vi. 11.*) *Tacitus*, *Dio*, *Numatian*, and other pagan writers, speak of the vast increase of the *Jewish sect*, about their age, and of the severe punishments inflicted upon them for their religion, they do at least include, if not principally refer to the *Christians*, whom they looked upon as a branch of the *Jews*; because the founders and first teachers of christianity were by birth of that nation\*.

*Huet. Dem. Pr. 3. § 21. p. 42.*

## PROPOSITION XCIX.

There was such a person as *JESUS of Nazareth*, the founder of the *christian* religion; and he was

LECT.  
CXII.

\* Mr. Merivale has added a third Scholium, which is as follows: "Several of the foregoing testimonies represent the Christians as extremely numerous indeed, even in the first and second centuries, particularly those quoted gr. 4, 6, 7, and 10. So that it should seem that in many places they vastly exceeded the heathens in number: which, nevertheless, from other considerations appear to be very improbable. We must, therefore, consider these representations rather as strains of rhetoric, than as strict truth, and plain matters of fact."

*Burnet's Letters, p. 168—170.—Moyle's Post. Works, vol. ii. p. 82, 83, 104—110. 142—162, 292—297, 320—327.*

crucified at *Jerusalem*, about seventeen hundred years ago, *i. e.* during the reign of *Tiberius Cæsar*.

### DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 98. | 1. There were a multitude of men, who called themselves by the name of Christ, and professed the religion which he was said to have founded, a little after the time in which we assert that he lived.

2. We can never imagine they would have done this, especially at so great a hazard of their possessions and their lives, (*Schol.* 1.) if they had not been well assured that he was a real person, and not merely a fictitious name.

3. *Tacitus* expressly says, “that he was the author of the christian name, and that he was put to death by *Pontius Pilate*, the Roman procurator for *Tiberius Cæsar*.”

*Tacit. Ann. l. xv. c. 44.*

And *Pliny*, in the passage quoted before, (*Prop.* 98. gr. 6.) asserts, “that the christians sang a hymn to Christ as to a God.”

4. The primitive christians appeal to the *acts of Pilate*, as giving an account of the innocence and death of Christ: and though we readily allow those now extant to be spurious, yet we can never think such writers would have made such appeals, especially to the very persons in whose keeping these monuments were, (if they were at all) had they not been satisfied of their existence and contents\*.

*Iust. Mart. Apol. p. 76. c. 84. e.*—

*Tertull. Apol. c. xxi.*—*Ditton on the*

*Res. p. 416—420. Ed. 1712. p. 467—*

*470. p. 354—356, of Edit. 1720.*—

*Vand. de Orac. p. 608—624.*—*Fabric.*

\* The question concerning the acts of Pilate, and his Letter to Tiberius, is particularly considered by Dr. Lardner, who in his general sentiments upon the subject coincides with Dr. Doddridge. *Lardner's Works*, vol. vii, p. 231—244.

*Cod. vol. ii. p. 298—301. vol. iii. p. 455—465.—Addison of Christianity, c. i. § 7.—Fortin's Remarks on Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 2—4.*

5. It is very probable, that *Suetonius* refers to *Christ*, when he says, “ that *Claudius Cæsar* expelled all the *Jews* from *Rome*, on account of “ the tumults which they raised, *impulsore Chrestiano*,” *i. e.* probably, on account of *Christ*, whom it is certain they often called *Chrestus*. Compare *Acts* xviii. 2.

*Sueton. Claud. c. xxv. N°. xii.—Pitisc. Not. in Loc. vol. i. p. 689.—Vand. de Orac. p. 604—607.—Lardner's Cred. vol. i. l. i. c. ii. § 3.—Works, vol. i. p. 246, 247. vol. vii. p. 266, 267.—Witf. Meletem. de Vit. Paul, § 7. N°. ii, iii.—Usher's Annals Jul. Per. 4767.—Dodd. on Acts, ch. 18. v. 2.*

6. *Ælius Lampridius*, assures us, that the emperor *Alexander Severus* entertained such high thoughts of *Christ*, that he would have admitted him among the number of his deities, and built a temple to him, had not his pagan subjects vigorously opposed it.

*Spart. de Vit. Serv. c. xxix, & xliii.—Lardner's Heath. Testimonies, vol. ii. c. ii. § 4. vol. iii. c. xxxv.—Works, vol. vii. p. 364—367.*

7. *Porphyry* also, though an inveterate enemy to christianity, not only allowed that there was such a person as *Christ*, but honoured him as a most wise and pious man, translated into heaven, as being approved by the Gods; and accordingly quotes some oracles, referring both to his sufferings and virtues, with their subsequent rewards.

*Euseb. Dem. Evang. l. iii. p. 134.—Lardner's Heath. Test. vol. ii. c. xxxvii. § 10.—Works, vol. viii. p. 176—248. præsertim, p. 226—248.*

8. *Celsus* likewise mentions numberless circumstances in the history of Christ; (indeed so many, that an abstract of the christian history might almost be taken from the very fragments of his book preserved by *Origen*;) and never pretends to dispute his real existence, or the truth of the facts.

*Ancient univ. Hist. vol. xv. p. 247. OEt.*  
*Edit.—Lardner's Heath. Test. vol. iii.*  
*c. xviii. § 4, 5, 12, 13.—Works, vol. viii.*  
*p. 5—69. præsertim, p. 18—43. p. 57*  
*—69.*

9. *Hierocles* also, under the fictitious name of *Philaletbes*, in a book which *Eusebius* has expressly quoted, and largely answered, speaks of *Jesus* as extolled by the christians as a God, for giving sight to the blind, and doing some other wonders of that kind; and also speaks of *Peter* and *Paul* as crying him up in so extraordinary a manner; though he foolishly endeavours to shew that *Apollonius* was equal and even superior to him, of which we shall afterwards treat.

*Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 512. cont. Hier.*  
*sub init.—Lardner, ibid. vol. iii. c.*  
*xxxix. § 2, 4.—Works, vol. viii. p. 254*  
*—266. See Prep. 113. Scholium 5.*

10. It is a most notorious fact, that (so far as we can learn) the enemies of christianity never disputed the existence of such a person as Christ, nor his dying as his followers assert; but on the contrary, upbraided them with it as their greatest reproach; the *Jews* calling him in derision תלוי, *i. e.* the crucified person, and his followers עברי תלוי; and many of the heathens, particularly *Lucian*, derided him as a crucified impostor; and *Julian* himself, who was one of the most learned as well as the most inveterate enemies against christianity, though he had himself been educated among the christians, and therefore probably knew this religion thoroughly, never  
 goes

goes about to dispute this fact; but owns, not only the being, but, as we shall afterwards observe, the *miracles* of Christ.

*Buxt. Lexic. Tal. in תלוי.*—*Lucian de Morte Peregr. ubi supra.*—*Ditton on the Res. part iii. § 3, 8.*—*Chapm. against Morg. vol. i. p. 364, 365.*—*Lightf. Hor. Heb. on Matt. xii. 24.*—*Lightfoot, apud Opera. vol. ii. p. 189.*—*Josephi Antiq. Lib. 18. c. iii. § 3.*

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. | II. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOLIUM I.

We do not here argue from that celebrated passage, in which *Josephus* bears such a remarkable testimony to Christ.

*Jos. Ant. l. xviii. c. iv. § 33. c. iii. § 3. p. 798. Hudson's Edition.*

It is most certain that it is to be found in all the manuscript copies of *Josephus*, and that it was very early quoted by the christian fathers, particularly *Eusebius* and *Jerom.* The two chief objections are,

1. That neither *Justin Martyr*, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, nor even *Photius*, in his extracts from *Josephus*, have cited it: but this negative argument against fact is not much to be regarded; especially considering, that *Justin* argues only out of *scripture*, and never mentions *Josephus*: that *Tertullian* in his controversial writings deals chiefly with *Gentiles*; that *Cyprian* does not professedly write in defence of christianity; and that *Photius's* extracts from *Josephus* are very imperfect. It is with more weight objected,

2. That the encomium upon the character and miracles of Christ is so great, that *Josephus* must have been a *christian*, or he could not have written as he did. To this *Lambesius* answers, that his words are to be understood *ironically*, and really contain a severe sarcasm: and Mr. *Whiston*, that

that Josephus was a Nazarene, Ebionite, or Jewish christian, afterwards bishop of Jerusalem: but Mr. Martin maintains, that Josephus, being a pensioner of the Roman court, and seeing Domitian something alarmed with the prophecy of the Jewish Messiah, for his own security and that of his people, chose rather to represent the matter, as if that messiah had already appeared, but through the mistake of their priests been rejected. But none of these things seem upon the whole a sufficient account of it; so that if he really wrote it, he must have been inwardly convinced of the truth of christianity; and wanting courage openly to profess it, left this testimony, perhaps in the last copies of his antiquities, in some measure to quiet his conscience, for not having more generously and faithfully pursued its dictates.

As for the other passages in Josephus, relating to the death of James the brother of Christ, *Ant. l. xx. c. viii.* it is of much less importance in the present question. But what Origen quotes as from him, concerning the death of that righteous man being the cause of the destruction of the Jews, it is no where to be found in Josephus, and seems to have been a slip of Origen's memory. Vid. *Huds. Notes in Loc. p. 896.*

*Ittigii. Prol. ad Jos. Ed. Col. præf. p. 25, &c.*—*Ditton on the Res. part iii. § 4*  
 —7.—*Huet. Dem. Evang. Prop. iii. § 11—18. p. 31—39.*—*Martin's Diff. pass.*—*Whist. Jos. Dis. i, & vi.*—*Chapman against Morg. vol. i. p. 386—389.*—*Orig. cont. Cels. l. i. p. 35.*—*Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. ii. c. 23\*.*

SCHO-

\* Since these references were made, two English tracts have appeared in defence of the famous passages in Josephus. The first is entitled, "A Dissertation upon the Account supposed to have been given of Jesus Christ by Josephus: being an Attempt to

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be asked, why facts of so great importance are not more frequently mentioned by ancient historians, whether *Jews* or heathens? To this it is answered,

1. That many books written in that age are lost, in which it is very possible some mention of these facts might be made.

2. That of the few remaining historians, who wrote about that age, most of them were by their subject otherwise engaged.

3. That several of those facts relating to Christ and his miracles, coming from the *Jews*, would be slighted by the *Gentile* writers as fabulous, especially considering on the one hand, how common prodigious and magical stories were, and on the other, how superstitious and credulous the *Jews* were thought to be.

4. That the first appearance of the christian scheme would shock them; as seeming so improbable, and so contrary to their received maxims, that it is no wonder if many of them cared but

to shew that this celebrated passage, some slight corruptions only excepted, may reasonably be esteemed genuine." This performance was published, without a name, at Oxford, in the year 1749; but is known to have been written by Dr. Nathaniel Forster. The other tract is Mr. Jacob Bryant's "Vindiciæ Flavianæ: or a Vindication of the Testimony given by Josephus concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ." Both these gentlemen have displayed much ingenuity and learning. The accurate and penetrating Lardner is on the opposite side of the question. He has fully considered the subject in his account of Josephus, and in his farther observations, occasioned by Dr. Forster's Dissertation. See Lardner's Jewish and Heathen Testimonies, vol. i. c. iv. § 2. and the preface to the second volume.—Works, vol. vii. p. 120—129. *ibid.* p. 273—286. The learned are divided in their opinions; but the larger number, and those who are esteemed the most judicious, believe the passage to be an interpolation. For the other passage in Josephus, concerning James the brother of Christ, see also Lardner, *ibid.* c. ii. § 3.—Works, vol. vii. p. 129—133. Some curious observations concerning Josephus's testimony to Christ will be found in the Rev. Mr. Henley's Letter to Dr. Kippis, published in the Appendix to Lardner's Life, N<sup>o</sup>. x. p. clix.—clxviii.

little to inquire into evidences and facts relating to it.

5. Many of those who did inquire no doubt became christians; and therefore their testimony is not here reckoned.

6. The facts mentioned above as recorded by some, are such as on the whole it was most reasonable to expect that they, continuing enemies, should know, observe and mention.

*Addison on Christianity, c. i. § 2—6. c. ii. §. 1, 2.—Jacks. Cred. vol. i. c. xi, xii. ap. Op. vol. i. p. 38—44.—Lardner's Jew. and Heath. Test. vol. ii. c. xxii. § 3.—Works, vol. viii. p. 94—97.*

### PROPOSITION C.

LECT. CXIII. The first publishers of christianity wrote books containing an account of the life and doctrine of their master: several of which bore the names of those books, which now make the *New Testament*.

### DEMONSTRATION.

1. The great importance, of which the primitive christians at least apprehended the facts and doctrines of their religion to be, (as appears by the extremities they endured for their profession of it. Vid. *Prop. 98. Schol. 1.*) would engage them to take the most effectual care they could to transmit the memory of it to future ages.

2. The age in which they lived was one of the most learned ages of antiquity; nor was there any, in which books were more common in the countries where they flourished.

1, 2. | 3. It is exceedingly probable in the nature of things, that there were some such ancient books as the proposition asserts.

*West on the Resurrection, p. 308—318.*

4. Writers of great antiquity do expressly mention *four* books, written by the disciples of Christ, whom they call *evangelists*: and some of them

them do particularly name *Matthew, Mark, Luke* and *John* as the four.

*Jones on the Can. part iv. Introd.*

5. *Eusebius*, the most accurate historian among the ancient christian writers, mentions it as a fact well known, and asserted particularly by *Origen*, a still older writer, that the *four gospels* of *Matthew, Mark, Luke* and *John*, the *epistles* of *St. Paul*, *one of Peter* and *one of John*, were *universally* received by the church; and he calls them *εὐαγγέλια ἀναβιβρημένα* and *ομολογούμενα*, as not being able to find they had ever been disputed; and though the *Acts* are not expressly mentioned in this catalogue by *Origen*, *Eusebius* himself, in the passage referred to in the next step, declares that he hath no scruple concerning it; and it is certain, from many passages in *Origen's* works still extant, that he paid the same regard to the *Acts* as to any other book of the New Testament: nay in the close of the passage referred to below, he also mentions them incidentally as written by *Luke*.

*Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. p. 507—509.—Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. iii. c. xxiv. l. vi. c. xxv.—Lardner's Cred. part ii. vol. iii. p. 234—237. vol. viii. p. 90—96.—Works, vol. ii. p. 465—468. vol. iv. 224—228.*

6. Though the other seven books of the New Testament, *i. e.* the epistle to the *Hebrews*, the epistle to *James*, the 2d of *Peter*, the 2d and 3d of *John*, *Jude* and the *Revelations* were *disputed*, (and therefore called by *Eusebius* *ἀντιλεγόμενοι*) yet he tells us they were at length introduced into the *canon*, *i. e.* into the number of those books, which christians regarded as the rule of their faith and manners, and which they distinguish from other books, written by persons, whom they thought less eminently under the

divine direction, whatever their sanctity might be.

*Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. iii. c. xxv.*—*Jones on the Can. vol. i. p. 23—27.*—*Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 116—118.*—*Lardner's Cred. vol. viii. p. 97—104.*  
—*Works, vol. iv. p. 228—234.*

7. We shall endeavour to shew at large in the following proposition, that at least all the most important of those books, were either expressly quoted by name or plainly alluded to by a series of primitive writers, several of them much more ancient than *Eusebius*; and indeed, that there is hardly any writer of christian antiquity, who has not either some express reference or allusion to some of them.

3, 4, 5, 6, 7. | 8. *Valet propositio.*

#### SCHOLIUM.

Whereas Mr. *Toland* in his *Amyntor*, and several other writers, have taken great pains to shew, that there were many ancient books; some of which are pretended to be still extant, but are evidently spurious, which yet are quoted by several writers of the primitive church with great regard; whence no doubt he would lead his reader to infer, that little regard is to be had to their opinion on this head; we shall not enter into the particulars here, but leave the reader to judge, by those passages referred to by *Toland*, compared with those enumerated below, as to the different manner in which they mention confessedly fictitious writers, and those of the New Testament: but the fullest and best account of this matter that I know of, is to be found in

*Lardn. Cred. of Gosp. Hist. part ii. vol. i. § ii. pass.*—*Works, vol. ii. p. 11—363,*  
*and in Jones's Hist. of the Can. vol. i, § ii. pass.*—*Toland's Amyntor, p. 28—68.*—*Nye on the Canon.*

## PROPOSITION CI.

To take a more particular survey of what the most considerable ancient ecclesiastical writers have delivered concerning the several books of the New Testament; at the same time giving a catalogue of those of the *three first centuries*, in the order in which they wrote.

LECT.  
CXIV.

## SOLUTION.

1. *Barnabas*, contemporary with the *Apostles*, who is mentioned *Acts* iv. 36, 37. *Acts* xi. 22—24. xiii. 1—4. *1 Cor.* xi. 6. is said to have written a general epistle in *Greek*; a *Latin* translation of which is by many maintained to be extant; though I think the arguments against its authority are so strong, as to leave little weight to any thing argued from thence; any farther than that so far as we can judge by the manner of the writing, it is indeed very ancient.

*Jones on the Can.* part iii. c. 37—42.—

*Lardn. Cred.* part ii. vol. i. p. 23—30.

—*Works*, vol. ii. p. 10—15.—*Wake's*

*Prelim. Dis.* p. 69—72.

In this epistle several words of Christ are quoted, which are recorded by the evangelists; v. g. *Matt.* xx. 16. ix. 13. xxii. 43. *Luke* vi. 30. and many of those scriptures quoted from the Old Testament in the New are likewise cited here. Many of the phrases and arguments used by *Paul* in his epistle to the *Hebrews* and elsewhere, are also inserted; v. g. *2 Tim.* iv. 1. i. 10. but not in the form of quotations, so that hardly any ancient work gives less assistance in this inquiry.

*Lardner, ibid.* p. 31—48. *præf.* p. 45, &c.

—*Works*, vol. ii. p. 15—22.—*Mos-*

*sheim's Eccles. Hist. seculum* i. § 53.—

*Fortin's Remarks on Eccles. Hist.* p. 329

—332.

2. *Clemens Romanus*, mentioned *Phil.* iv. 3. who is said to have been one of the first bishops of

of Rome, wrote an epistle to the *Corinthians*, probably about the year 96.

*Lardn. ibid. p. 51—61.—Works, vol. ii. p. 22—28.*

He quotes by name no book of the New Testament, excepting the *first* epistle to the *Corinthians*; which by the way is one of the most important in the whole volume for proving the truth of christianity, as will afterwards appear; and it is worth our notice, that it is here quoted by those who were the best judges of its being genuine, and quoted as of an authority acknowledged even by all the different parties among them: it is therefore not improbable, that the *original* might then be in their hands.

*Lardn. ibid. p. 61.—Works, vol. ii. p. 29.*

He evidently refers to some of Christ's words, which are also recorded by *Matthew*, *Mark*, and *Luke*: but we cannot lay much stress upon those passages, to establish the authority of these books, because *Clement* living so near the apostle's time might have learned them by *oral* tradition, and the *evangelists* are not named. Yet on the other hand it may be remarked, that he does not introduce those things as new, but refers to them as well known to the *Corinthians*; which we could hardly have been so sure they were, unless they had some books among them, (commonly also received among other christians) in which those passages were inserted: nor will *Acts* xx. 35. invalidate this observation, since it does not appear that *Clement* had lived among the *Corinthians*, as *Paul* had done with the elders of *Ephesus*, and probably taught them those traditions with his own mouth.

*Lardn. ibid. p. 65—68.—Works, vol. ii. p. 29—31.*

The following passages are transcribed with very little variation, *Rom.* i. 29. xii. 5. *1 Cor.* x. 24. xiii. 4, &c. *Eph.* iv. 4. *Phil.* i. 10. *Col.* i. 10.  
1 *Thess.*

1 *Theff.* v. 28. 1 *Tim.* v. 4. *Tit.* iii. 1. *Heb.* i. 3—5, 7—13. iv. 12. xi. 37. xii. 6. 1 *Pet.* iv. 8. He seems also evidently to allude to the following passages, *Rom.* xiv. 1. 1 *Cor.* xii. 12. xv. 20. 2 *Cor.* iii. 18. viii. 5. xi. 24. 1 *Tim.* iii. 13. *Heb.* vi. 18. *James* iii. 13. 2 *Pet.* ii. 5. iii. 4.

*Lardn. ibid. c. ii. præf. p. 102—105. — Works, vol. ii. p. 34—47.*

3. *Hermas* (mentioned *Rom.* xvi. 14.) is said to have been the author of several books under his name: one is called his *Pastor*, in three parts, the first of *visions*, the second of *commands*, the third of *similitudes*: we have only a *Latin* translation of it, and a few fragments of the original. It is probably an ancient book, but strong objections are brought against its being genuine.

*Wake's Prelim. Disc. c. viii. p. 79—87.*

—*Mosheim's Hist. Eccles. p. 51. Sec. i.*

§ 54. — *Fortin's Rem. on Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 337, 338.*

There are no express quotations of any book either of the Old or New Testament by name to be found in him; but there are many allusions to the latter, of which the most considerable are the following passages, *Matt.* v. 28. x. 32. xiii. 5, 7, 31. xviii. 3. xxviii. 18. *Luke* xvi. 18. *John* xiv. 6. *Acts* v. 41. 1 *Cor.* iii. 16, 17. *Eph.* iv. 4, 30. *Heb.* xii. 17. *James* i. 5. iv. 7, 12. 1 *Pet.* i. 6. v. 7. 1 *John* ii. 27. *Jude, ver.* 21. There are also many visions resembling those of the *Revelations*, but no mention is made of that book.

*Lardn. c. iv. præf. p. 144—146. — Works, vol. ii. p. 50—65. — Mosheim, ubi supra.*

4. *Ignatius* bishop of *Antioch* who was martyred about the year 116, wrote several epistles mentioned by *Eusebius*, *Irenæus*, *Jerom*, and many others: they are still said to be extant; but there are two different copies of them. Mr. *Whiston* has contended earnestly that the *larger* are genuine; but from comparing both, it appears much more probable, that the larger are a para-

phrase upon the *smaller*, than the smaller (as some suppose) an abridgment of the larger.

*Whist. Prin. Christ. vol. i.—Fortin's Rem: vol. i. p. 62—67, 363.*

Nor is it at all probable, that the epistles to *Tarsus*, *Antioch*, and *Hiero* are genuine; since they are not mentioned by *Eusebius*, who was so likely to have discovered them, and would no doubt have been glad to quote them. We shall therefore only take notice of those quotations and allusions, which are to be found in the *smaller* epistles, and which are as follow. He plainly quotes or alludes to *Matt. iii. 15. x. 16. xii. 33. xv. 13. xviii. 19. xix. 12. John iii. 8. viii. 29. x. 9. Acts x. 41. Rom. xv. 7. 1 Cor. i. 10. v. 7. vi. 9. xv. 8. Eph. v. 2, 25. Phil. ii. 3. 1 Theff. v. 17. 2 Tim. ii. 4. Philem. ver. 20. 1 Pet. v. 5.*

*Lardn. c. v. præf. p. 188—190.—Works, vol. ii. p. 65—85.—Fortin's Rem. vol. i. p. 54—61.*

To which we may add, that he speaks of the *Gospel* in such a connection with the *Law* and the *Prophets*, as seems to imply that he meant a *book*.

*Lardn. ibid. p. 180—184.—Works, ibid. p. 84, 85.—Seed's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 294—299.*

5. *Polycarp*, bishop of *Smyrna*, thought by some to be the *angel* of the church there mentioned in the *Revelations*, was martyred about the year 169. *Eusebius* mentions a letter written by him to the *Philippians*, which probably was that excellent epistle bearing his name, which is now extant in a *Latin* translation, and most of it in the *Greek* original. In this epistle he quotes by name *1 Cor. vi. 2.* as the words of *Paul*, and also *Eph. iv. 26.* as a saying of scripture, and also mentions *Paul's* epistle to the *Philippians* with the highest respect, as written by a wisdom which nothing could equal: he likewise most evidently transcribes the following passages, *Matt. v. 3, &c. vii. 1, 2. v. 44. xxvi. 41. Acts ii. 24. Rom. xii.*

xii. 9. xiv. 10. 1 *Cor.* vi. 9. 2 *Cor.* iv. 5. vi. 7. viii. 21. *Gal.* iv. 26. vi. 7. *Eph.* ii. 8, 9. *Phil.* ii. 10, 16. 1 *Thess.* v. 17, 22. 2 *Thess.* iii. 15. 1 *Tim.* ii. 1, 2. vi. 7. 2 *Tim.* ii. 11. iv. 10. 1 *Pet.* i. 8, 21. ii. 11, 12, 17, 22, 24. iii. 9. iv. 7. v. 5. 1 *John* iv. 3. Considering how short this letter is, the transcribing so great a number of passages in it from the new testament, is an evident proof of the regard he paid to that book.

*Lardn. ibid. c. vi. præf. p. 202, 203, & 222, 223.—Works, vol. ii. p. 86—100.*

6. That epistle from the church of *Smyrna*, giving an account of the martyrdom of *Polycarp*, evidently refers to 1 *Cor.* ii. 9. and gives the title of *gospel* to the history of Christ written by the *Evangelists*.

*Lardn. ibid. c. vii.—Works, vol. ii. p. 100—105.*

It may be observed, that the writings which have been enumerated under these six first steps, are those which are commonly called the works of the *Apostolic Fathers*, being published under that title by *Cotelerius*, in a very celebrated edition of them, and translated into *English* by Archbishop *Wake*, whose account of them all it may be convenient to peruse.

7. *Papias*, who is said to have been the companion of *John*, and who flourished about the year 115, wrote five books now lost, called an explication of the oracles of our Lord; in which *Eusebius* says he often quoted our four *Evangelists*, and mentions some remarkable particulars both relating to the gospel of *Matthew* and *Mark*: *Eusebius* also says, he brings testimonies out of the first of *John* and the first of *Peter*.

LECT.  
CXV.

*Lardn. ibid. c. ix.—Works, vol. ii. p. 106—115.*

8. *Justin Martyr* wrote his two apologies, and his dialogue with *Trypho* the Jew. He died at the latest about 163. The epistle to *Diognetus*, and *questions to the orthodox*, though they do not

seem to belong to *Justin Martyr*, (among whose works they are published) are however undoubtedly writings of great antiquity.

There are in his genuine works the following quotations and allusions, *Matt.* i. 20, 21. v. 28—32. xi. 27. xxv. 41. *Mark* viii. 31. *Luke* i. 31, 35, 38, x. 19. *John* i. 20. iii. 3. xiv. 24. He quotes also the *memoirs of the apostles*, which he adds are called *gospels*, as containing the institution of the eucharist, and *Luke* xx. 44. *Matt.* xxvi. 39. He introduces *Trypho the Jew*, speaking of the precepts delivered in the *gospel*, as what he had read; and expressly declares that the *written commentaries*, or memoirs of the *apostles*, as well as of the *prophets*, were read publicly in all christian assemblies for divine worship, which is a circumstance of vast importance.

*Just. Mart. Apol.* § 87.—*Reeve's Apol.*  
vol. i. p. 114.

He either quotes or refers to *Acts* vii. 22. xiii. 27. *1 Cor.* v. 7. xi. 18, 19. xii. 8—10. *Gal.* iv. 12. *Eph.* ii. 20. *Col.* i. 15. *2 Thess.* ii. 3, 4. *Heb.* v. 9, 10. *2 Pet.* iii. 8. *Rev.* xx. 4, &c. *Luke* xx. 35, 36.

*Lardn. ibid. c. x. præf. p.* 286—288.—  
*Works, vol. ii. p.* 115—129.

9. The epistle to *Diognetus*, which Mr. *Whiston* wildly thinks to have been written by the evangelist *Timothy*, is certainly ancient, though it was not written by *Justin*; and there are evident quotations or allusions to the following passages, *Matt.* vi. 25, &c. *John* i. 1. xvii. 14. *Rom.* v. 19, *1 Cor.* iv. 12. viii. 1. *2 Cor.* x. 3. iv. 8, &c. *Phil.* iii. 20. *1 Pet.* ii. 24. iii. 18. *1 John* iv. 19: and he also speaks of the *gospels* and *traditions* of the *apostles*, in such a connection with the law and the prophets, as seems plainly to intimate, that he referred to books of that name.

*Lardn. ibid. p.* 296, 297.—*Works, vol. ii.*  
p. 129—133.—*Justin's Rem. vol. i.*  
p. 342—348.

10. *Dionysius of Corinth* was a man of an excellent character, who flourished about the year 170. He wrote seven epistles, which are now lost; but in a fragment of one of them, preserved by *Eusebius*, he mentions the conversion of *Dionysius the Arcopagite* by *Paul*, agreeably to the account given in the *Acts* of the apostles; but it does not appear, that he speaks of that book.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xii. p. 300.—Works, ibid. p. 133—136.*

11. *Tatian*, who flourished about the year 172, wrote an elegant oration against the *Greeks*, which is still extant; and *Eusebius* (*Eccles. Hist. l. iv. c. 29.*) tells us, he wrote the harmony of the four gospels. In his *oration*, he quotes *Luke vi. 25. John i. 3, 5. 1 Cor. xv. 22.* besides some other passages, which *Clement* and *Irenæus* say he quoted from the epistles to the *Corinthians* and *Galatians*, in a work now lost; and *Jerom* says he allowed *Paul's* epistle to *Titus*.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xiii.—Works, ibid. p. 136—140.*

12. *Hegesippus*, a converted *Jew*, wrote the history of the christian church about the year 170, of which only some fragments are remaining: in which the following scriptures seem to be referred to, *Matt. xxvi. 64. Luke xxiii. 34. Matt. xiii. 16.*

*Lardn. ibid. c. xiv.—Works, ibid. p. 140—145.*

13. *Melito*, bishop of *Sardis*, in the year 170, wrote an apology to *Marcus Antoninus*, and many other books, particularly a commentary on the *Revelations*: and as he expressly speaks of the *old* testament, he seems by that phrase to imply, that there was in his time a collection of books called the *new*.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xv.—Works, ibid. p. 146—148.*

14. There is an epistle of the churches of *Vienne* and *Lyons*, preserved in *Euf. Eccles. Hist.* vol. iv. and written about the year 177; in which there are very express quotations from *Luke* i. 6. *John* xvi. 2. *Acts* vii. 60. *Rom.* viii. 18. *Eph.* vi. 5. *Phil.* ii. 6. *1 Tim.* iii. 15. *1 Pet.* v. 6. *1 John* iii. 16. *Rev.* xiv. 4.

*Lardn. c. xvi.—Works, ibid. p. 148—153.*

15. *Irenæus*, bishop of *Lyons*, wrote, about the year 178, besides many other books, five of *Heresy*, which are yet preserved in the *Latin* translation, and some fragments in the original *Greek*. In one of these fragments preserved by *Eusebius*, as well as in the translation, there is express mention of the four *gospels*, under the names of their respective authors, and they are likewise mentioned together. In two other passages of his works, he professedly vindicates the genuineness of each, and sets himself to give an account of the occasion on which they were written. He often expressly quotes the book of the *Acts*, and in many places the epistles of *Paul* by name, and mentions all which our new testament ascribes to him, excepting that to *Philemon*. He has many passages in sense parallel to several in the *Hebrews*, but he does not expressly quote that epistle, and *Photius* says he did not allow it to be *St. Paul's*. He has also passages in sense parallel to several of *James*, but no express quotations: the *first* epistle of *Peter* is quoted by him, and the *first* of *John*, and also the *second*, though by a mistake he calls it *the same with the former*. *Jude* is not quoted, though it would have been peculiarly proper to the occasion of his writing; but the book of the *Revelations* he very frequently and largely quotes.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xvii. præf. p. 381, 382.*

Et *Ind. ad Iren.—Works, ibid. p. 153—180.*

16. *Athen-*

16. *Albenagoras*, who before his conversion was a philosopher, between 166 and 178, wrote an *apology* for christianity, and quickly after a discourse on the *resurrection*, in which he expressly quotes, or evidently alludes to the following passages, *Matt.* v. 28, 44, 45. *Luke* xvi. 18. *John* x. 30, 38. *Acts* xvii. 25. *Rom.* i. 24, 27. *1 Cor.* xv. 32, 54. *2 Cor.* v. 10. *Gal.* iv. 9. *1 Tim.* v. 1, 2. vi. 16. He seems also to refer to *James* iii. 13. v. 7. *2 Pet.* i. 21. *Rev.* xx. 13.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xviii.—Works, ibid. p. 180—187.*

17. *Miltiades* is supposed to have written about the year 170 an elegant *apology*, which is now lost. He is celebrated by *Eusebius*, (*Eccles. Hist.* v. 17.) for his acquaintance with scripture; but no fragments remain. LECT. CXVI.

*Lard. ibid. c. xix.—Works, ibid. p. 188, —189.*

18. *Theophilus*, bishop of *Antioch*, wrote three books to *Autolytus* yet extant, published about the year 181. His book against *Hermogenes*, in which *Eusebius* says he quoted the *Revelations*, is lost, as also that against *Marcion*, and the *hermany of the Evangelists*, mentioned by *Ferom*, *Ep.* 151. but the *commentary* upon them, which goes under his name, is spurious. In those of his genuine works which remain, he quotes *Matt.* v. 28, 32, 44, 46. vi. 3. *Luke* xviii. 27. *John* i. 1, 3. *Rom.* ii. 6, *Ec.* xiii. 7, 8. *1 Cor.* vi. 9—11. *2 Cor.* xi. 19. *Eph.* ii. 2. iii. 10. *Phil.* i. 10. iii. 20. iv. 8. *Col.* i. 17. *1 Tim.* ii. 1, 2. *Tit.* iii. 5. *Heb.* xii. 9. *1 Pet.* i. 18. ii. 13. Some of these passages he mentions as spoken by a *divine word*, and he seems to allude to *2 Pet.* i. 20. *Rev.* xii. 19.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xx. præf. p. 447—449.—Works, ibid. p. 190—202.*

To this work is added, particularly in the *Cologn* edition, a little tract of *Hermias*, called

*Irrisio gentium*, which is written with great elegance and spirit; which begins with an express quotation of 1 Cor. iii. 19. as the words of the blessed apostle Paul in his epistle to the Corinthians.

Lardn. *ibid.* c. xxv. p. 553, 554.—*Works, ibid.* p. 246, 247.

19. *Pantænus*, once a philosopher of the *Stoic* sect, was president of the catechetical school of *Alexandria*, about the year 130, as *Eusebius* (*Hist.* v. 9, 10.) assures us: he wrote commentaries on scripture, which are now entirely lost; so that he is capable of doing no service in the present question, any farther than as *Jerom* testifies, he brought back the gospel of *Matthew* written in *Hebrew* from *India*, whither he was sent by *Demetrius* his bishop, to preach the gospel.

Lardn. *ibid.* c. xxi.—*Works, ibid.* p. 202—205.

20. *Clemens Alexandrinus* succeeded *Pantænus*, and wrote about the end of the second and beginning of the third century. His remaining works are his *Pædagogus* and *Stromata*, his *admonition to the Gentiles*, and a homily of the *salvation of the rich*. He is mentioned with great honour by the most valuable ancient writers that succeeded him; *Eusebius* tells us, that he speaks of *Mark's* gospel, as written from the account of things he had received from *Peter*, and in effect at least authorized by that apostle. (*Eccles. Hist.* ii. 15.) He also speaks of the epistle to the *Hebrews*, as written in *Hebrew* by *Paul*, but translated by *Luke*. *Ibid.* vi. 14.

Lardn. *ibid.* c. xxii. p. 468—473.—*Works, ibid.* p. 210—212.

He expressly mentions the *four gospels* of our evangelists, the *Acts*, the epistles to the *Romans*, *Galatians*, *Ephesians*, *Philippians*, *Colossians*, first and second to the *Thessalonians* and *Corinthians*, first and second to *Timothy*, *Titus*, *Hebrews*, the first of *Peter*, and the first of *John* by the name  
of

of his *larger* epistle, and *Jude* and the *Revelations*: but does not expressly mention *James* or the second of *Peter*. We refer not to particular passages, there being great numbers of them from the several books above-mentioned. It is true that he also quotes several *apocryphal* pieces, such as the *gospel* according to the *Hebrews* and the *Egyptians*, the *preaching of Peter*, the *shepherd of Hermas*; but not with titles of equal regard, nor in such a manner as to seem to lay any stress upon them.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xxii. p. 494—515. and Index to Clem. Alex.—Works, ibid. p. 206—243.*

21. *Polycrates*, bishop of *Ephesus*, about the close of this century, in an epistle of his, of which *Jerom* has preserved some fragments, refers to *Matt. xix. 12. John xxi. 20. Acts v. 29.* and speaks of the scripture as *the rule of faith*.

*Lardn. ibid. c. xxiii.—Works, ibid. p. 243—245.*

22. *Tertullian*, presbyter of *Carthage*, was contemporary with *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and survived him: his works are known and numerous. In them he expressly quotes all the books of the New Testament, but *James*, the second of *Peter*, the third of *John*: *Hebrews* he supposes to have been written by *Barnabas*. It is remarkable that there are more quotations from the New Testament in him, than from all the writings of *Tully* in all the ancient books in the world; the same may be said of those of *Irenæus* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

*Lardn. ibid. c. 27.—Works, ibid, p. 250—287.*

23. Dr. *Lardner* has also mentioned a great many other christian writers, of whose works only fragments are preserved, which serve to illustrate the present question, of which we shall not give so particular an account. The chief of them are *Serapion*, who speaks with great reverence

ence of our gospels, rejecting that of *Peter*; (*ibid.* c. xxvi) *Quadratus*, *Aristides*, *Claudius Apollinaris*, and *Symmachus*. (*Ibid.* c. xxviii. *pass.*) Besides these, he also mentions several supposititious writings forged in the second century, such as the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, the *Sibylline verses*, the testament of the 12 patriarchs, the *Recognitions*, *Homily* and *Epitome of Clement*: but they bring little light to the present question; which is not to be wondered at, considering that most of them pretend to be written before the books of the New Testament. But it is observed, that in the three last of these there are several references to facts recorded in the evangelists, and that phrases used especially in *Paul's* writings are introduced in these pieces.

24. The third century produced many famous christian writers, v. g. *Minutius Felix*, *Origen*, *Cyprian* and *Arnobius*; most of whose works abound with a vast many quotations from all the *uncontroverted* books of the New Testament, especially *Novation* on the trinity; and it would be almost an endless task to enumerate them all: much less is it necessary to enter into the particulars of those quotations, brought from *Lactantius*, *Athanasius*, *Eusebius*, *Optatus*, *Basil*, *Ephraim Syrus*, *Gregory Nyss*, and *Nazianzen*, *Ambrose*, *Cyril of Jerusalem*, *Chrysostom*, *Hilary*, *Jerom*, *Augustin*, and other authors of less note, who flourished in the *fourth* century, of whom see

*Spanh. Eccles. Hist. Sæc. iii. § 10. Sæc. iv.*

§ 12.—*Lardn. part ii. vol. iii. pass.—*

*Works, vol. ii. p. 247—249.—Ibid.*

*p. 287—310.—Ibid. p. 310—363.—*

*Ibid. p. 364, to the end of the volume\*.*

COROL-

\* Though Dr. Doddridge has judged it sufficient for the purpose of his lectures to stop here, it may not be improper to remind the theological student that he will hereafter find his full account

## COROLLARY I.

Hence we may easily collect and compare the evidence, which there is of each particular book of the New Testament, to prove it genuine.

## COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may see great reason to believe what is asserted *Prop.* 100, at least concerning the books which are called *ομολογούμενοι*. Vid. *ibid.* *gr.* 7.

## COROLLARY 3.

Hence it appears, that the evidence of those books which are called *ἀντιλεγόμενοι* is comparatively very small, so far as it depends upon the fathers of the two first centuries, especially with regard to *James*, the second of *Peter*, and *Jude*.

## COROLLARY 4.

Mr. *Dodwell* was grossly mistaken in asserting, that the books of the New Testament lay concealed till the year 130, and that there was nothing settled concerning the canon till the fourth century.

*Dodw. Diss. on Iren.* p. 65—73.—*Jenk. of Christian.* vol. ii. c. iv. p. 118—128.  
*Lardner's Cred.* vol. xii. p. 21—86. 90—126.—*Works*, vol. v. p. 352—398.  
*Macknighr's Truth of the Gospel Hist.* book iii. c. i. § 1, 2, 3.

account in reading and studying the whole of Dr. Lardner's *Credibility of the Gospel History*, which carries on the subject down to the beginning of the fourteenth century, and contains a great variety of important critical information. Should a student, from the number and rapidity of his academical employments, not have leisure to read the whole of the preceding references (some of which are long) it is earnestly requested that he will not fail in an immediate perusal of the admirable recapitulation of the evidence, given in the twelfth volume of the *Credibility*, and in the doctor's works, vol. v. p. 341, to the end.

## SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. It may not be improper here to add, that  
 cxvii. *Amelius*, the *Platonic* philosopher in the third  
 century, mentions the writings of *John*, and *Dio-*  
*nysius Longinus*, A. D. 250, those of *Paul*, with  
 considerable applause.

*Huet. Dem. Ev. Prop. i. § 6. p. 21. b.—*  
*Euseb. Præp. Evan. l. xi. c. xix.—*  
*Smith's Life of Longinus, p. 23, 24.—*  
*Lardner's Test. vol. iii. c. xxxiii, and*  
*xxxiv.—Works, vol. iii. p. 160—168.*

And it is yet of greater importance to observe,  
 that *Celsus*, who seems to have lived in the second  
 century, and perhaps not later than the middle  
 of it (*Orig. against Celsus, l. i. p. 3, & 8.*) not  
 only brings a great many citations from the New  
 Testament, but founds the main stress of his  
 argument against christianity upon the supposed  
 absurdity of that book; which is an illustrious  
 testimony, not only to its antiquity, but to its  
 high esteem among christians in that early age,

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be added here, that some have thought  
*Luke x. 7.* is expressly quoted by *Paul, 1 Tim. v.*  
*18.* and it is observable, that if it be so, then it  
 is put upon a foot of equal authority with *Deut.*  
*xxv. 4.* quoted in the same passage.

*Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 292.—Macknight's*  
*Truth of the Gospel Hist. p. 391.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Some may perhaps wonder, that (considering  
 how much christianity prevailed, and in how  
 great esteem the writers of the New Testament  
 are supposed to have been in those early ages)  
 there should have been no more quotations from  
 them within the first 150 years. It may be an-  
 swered,

1. That

1. That as most of the first christians were persons of a low station in life, (1 Cor. i. 26—28. James ii. 5.) the number of early christian writers was small, and of those who did write many of their works are lost, as evidently appears from *Eusebius*, *Photius*, and many more, who have given us some of their names and some account of them, and in part from several steps in the preceding proposition.

2. That several of the remaining pieces are but short.

3. That the subject of many of these was such, as to give little opportunity of quoting the writings of the New Testament; very few of them relating to any controversy of christians with each other, and in their controversies with the heathens, it is observed that they are employed more in demonstrating the falshood of paganism, than the truth of christianity, as that was the point most necessary to be laboured, considering the *sociability* of the heathen superstitions.

4. Several of the writers whom we have mentioned were so early, that it is exceedingly probable, they had not an opportunity of seeing some of the epistles, which could not circulate in the world so soon as papers now do by the assistance of printing.

5. Those books not being then divided into chapters and verses as now, quotations from them were not altogether so easy: not to say, that considering to what extraordinary divine assistances many of the primitive christians pretended, they might not seem to have so much need of a written rule; so that on the whole, it is wonderful, that we can trace so great evidence in such circumstances.

*Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. ii. § 6. p. 266—284. Ed. 2. p. 278—295. Edit. 4. vol. i. part ii. p. 36—56.—Macknight's Gospel Hist. p. 408, 409.*

## PROPOSITION CII.

To inquire more particularly into the evidence there is, that the ancient christians had books among them, which went by the name of those which *Eusebius* calls ἀντιλεγόμενοι. Vid. *Prop.* 100. gr. 6.

## SOLUTION.

1. With regard to the epistle to the *Hebrews*, many parallel thoughts and phrases are to be found in *Clemens Romanus*, *Justin Martyr*, and *Irenæus*. *Clemens Alexandrinus* quotes it as the words of the divine apostle, and elsewhere of *Paul*. *Origen* frequently speaks of it as *Paul's*; and *Eusebius* mentions it as received with great pleasure by the *Hebrews*, who were the most capable of judging whether it were genuine or not.

*Lardn. Cred. part ii. vol. i. p. 87—95, 368—373. vol. ii. p. 470—472, 501, 502. vol. iii. p. 234—238, 248—261, — Works, vol. ii. p. 39—43, 211, 212, 224, 467, 472—478. — Whitby Comment. on Heb. Pref. — New Transl. of New Test. p. 838—840. — Twells's Exam. part ii. c. ii. § 1. — Lardner's Supplement, vol. ii. c. xii. § 3, 4. — Works, vol. vi. p. 391—415. — Hallet on the Heb. Introd. § 1. — Sykes on Ditto. Introduction. passim.*

2. As for *James*, passages at least parallel to it are to be found in *Clemens Romanus*, *Irenæus*, and *Athenagoras*, and it is acknowledged by *Origen*, *Eusebius*, and *Ferom*, though the last tells us it was long doubted in the *Latin* church.

*Whitby Comment. on Jam. Pref. — Lardn. ib. in nom. Clem. Ignat. &c. — New Transl. p. 873—875. — Twells, ibid. § 2. — Lardner's Suppl. vol. iii. c. xvii. — Works, vol. vi. p. 502—509.*

3. The

3. The second of *Peter* seems to be quoted by *Justin Martyr*, and is ascribed to *Peter* by *Origen* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

*Whitby on 2 Pet. Pref.*—*New Transl.*  
p. 903, 904.—*Twells, ibid.* § 2.—  
*Benson on the second of Peter*, p. 1—9.  
*Lardner's Suppl. vol. iii. c. xix.* § 1.—  
*Works, vol. vi.* p. 563—566.

4. The second epistle of *John* is quoted by *Irenæus*, and by the council of *Carthage* in the year 256. *Clemens Alexandrinus* speaks by way of distinction of the larger epistle. *Origen* likewise mentions the second and third epistle, though something dubiously; and *Epiphanius* has some reference to them, speaking in the plural number of *John's epistles*.

*Whit. in Loc.*—*Benson on the Epistles of John*, p. 177, 178.—*Lardner's Suppl. vol. iii.* § 4, 5, 6.—*Works, vol. vi.* p. 593—607.

5. *Jude* is expressly quoted by *Origen*, *Tertullian* and *Cyprian*, but by no earlier writers.

*Whit. on Jude, ver. 1.*—*New Transl.*  
p. 943.—*Twells, ibid.* § 4.—*Benson on Jude*, p. 114.—*Lardner's Suppl. vol. iii.* § 21.—*Works, vol. vi.* p. 607—627.

6. *Justin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* allow the *Revelations* to have been an ancient book, and ascribe it to *John the apostle*: and if we may believe the testimonies of *Eusebius* and *Jerom*, who had in their hands the writings of many of the ancients which are now lost, *Papias*, *Melito*, *Theophilus of Antioch* and *Apollonius*, all in the second century, received and quoted it: and it appears to have been allowed by *Origen*, *Cyprian*, *Victorius*, *Methodius*, and *Pamphilus*, besides *Hypolitus*, earlier than any of them in the third: though it is certain  
some

some rejected it, as the work of an unknown and heretical writer.

*New Transl.* p. 1019—1022.—*Mills's Proleg. ad Nov. Test.* p. 24—28.—*Twells's Ex. part iii. pass. præf. part i. c. i. § 2. c. ii. p. 11—15.*—*Republic of Letters, vol. vii. article 9\**.

## COROLLARY 1.

It evidently appears, from comparing this demonstration with that of *Prop.* 101. that the evidence of the genuineness of the six former of these books is not equal to that of the rest, nor are they all equal to each other in this respect.

## COROLLARY 2.

Nevertheless it seems more reasonable to admit than to reject them, if we consider,

1. That several of these epistles, not being written as most of *Paul's* were, either to particular churches, or even particular persons, whose names and abodes are recorded in them, it could not be so easy to find out the originals.

2. That some of them are so short, and the contents of them so general, that there was (*cæt. par.*) less reason to expect quotations from them.

3. As they were more inquired into, they came to be generally received; and at last all opposition against them ceased. To which we may add,

4. That the accomplishment of many remarkable prophecies in the *Revelations*, especially those relating to the *Roman* and *Papal* empire,

\* M. Abauzit, a learned gentleman of Geneva, but a Frenchman by birth, in a discourse on the apocalypse, hath strongly denied the authenticity of the book. See his *Miscellanies on historical, theological, and critical Subjects*, translated by Dr. Harwood, in 1774, p. 213—376. On the other side of the question is Lardner, *Suppl. vol. iii. c. xxii.*—*Works, vol. vi. p. 627—638.*

in proportion to the degree in which it appears, must, to those that see it, be one of the strongest demonstrations that can be imagined, not only that the book itself was genuine, but that it was written by some extraordinary assistance and illumination from God: and when this is granted, and the external evidence considered, and compared with that of the rest of these seven pieces, it will farther prove, that a book, not more frequently quoted by the earliest writers than this, may yet be both genuine and divine.

*Blackball at Boyle's Lect. Serm. iii. p. 9.*

—12.—*Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p.*

106—116.

SCHOLIUM I.

Whatever be thought of the preceding arguments, it is to be remembered, that the agreement between these books and others of the New Testament is so great, that we need not be very solicitous about them: nor if the others should hereafter be proved to be of divine authority, need we be apprehensive of any dangerous consequences attending our referring to them in public discourses. This is especially observable with regard to those whose external evidence is the weakest; in which number the second and third of *John* and *Jude* are to be reckoned.

*Fost. against Tind. p. 143—147.—Sberlock on Proph. Diss. i. p. 199, &c.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

With relation to the books mentioned by *Toland* in his *Amyntor*, (compare *Prop. 100. Schol.*) such as the *aëts of Paul*; the *Revelation of Peter*; the *gospel of Peter, Andrew, and Matthias*; the *aëts of Peter and John*, &c. it is evident that *Eusebius*, in the place before quoted, (*Eccles. Hist. l. iii. § 25. p. 119.*) mentions these as *νοθοι*; which (though *Dr. Twells* maintains the contrary,)

trary,) is plainly different from the *ἀντιλεγόμενοι*, as well as the *ομολογούμενοι*: and it will appear, as was hinted above, that even when they are quoted, which they seldom are, by ancient writers, it is in such a language, as plainly to shew, that the regard to them was far inferior to that which they had for the *sacred* books. And it is farther remarkable, that though *Celsus* has one where or another given us a kind of abridgment of the history of the *evangelists*, (see *Prop.* 101. *Schol.* 1.) yet he has hardly ever if at all mentioned a single fact recorded in any of those pieces, though many of them would have afforded matter for much more plausible objections, than those which he endeavours to ground upon the facts recorded by the *evangelists*: (Compare *Evang. Infant. ap. Fabric. Cod. Apocriphus, vol. ii. p. 163—165, 182—185.*) which makes it probable that he was not acquainted with those pieces; for his candour was not so great, as to have waved any opportunity of aspersing christianity; and it is highly probable several of those forgeries were later than his time. We may also add that *Tertullian* tells us (*de Baptif. c. xvii.*) that *John* the apostle discovered the *acts of Paul and Thecla* to have been forged by a *presbyter*, and degraded the author on that account; which if true, is a very remarkable circumstance.

*Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 209—311.*

### PROPOSITION CIII.

LECT. The New Testament as we now have it in the CXVIII. original is *genuine*; i. e. it is in the main such as it came out of the hands of those, by whom the several pieces contained in it are said to have been written.

### DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 100. | 1. The primitive christians had books among them, said to have been written by

by those authors whose names are prefixed to those of our New Testament.

2. The primitive christians had as good opportunities of satisfying themselves as to the genuineness of them, as other ancients had with regard to the genuineness of their books; especially considering that several of those epistles were written to numerous societies of men, or to persons of a very public and sacred character; and those of *Paul's*, if not written by his own hand, were signed by him, to prevent as far as could be the very possibility of imposture. (1 *Cor.* xvi. 21. 2 *Theff.* iii. 17. *Comp. Rom.* xvi. 22. *Gal.* vi. 11.)

3. The great concern which christians had in these books, and the high value which they set upon them, (as appears in part already, and will hereafter more fully appear,) would no doubt engage them to be very careful and accurate in this inquiry.

*Lardn. Cred.* vol. i. p. 384, 385. vol. iii. p. 282—289. vol. viii. p. 197—203.—*Works*, vol. ii. p. 172, 173. *ibid.* p. 488, 492. vol. iv. p. 272—274.

4. We find there were many books going under the name of the *apostles*, which were rejected by the primitive christians; and that a vast difference was made between those of the New Testament, and other books allowed to have been written by persons of great eminence in the church. Vid. *Prop.* 100. *Schol.* and *Prop.* 102. *Schol.* 2.

*Lardn. ib.* vol. viii. p. 105—124.—*Works*, vol. iv. p. 231—240.—*Blackball at Boyle's Lect.* *Serm.* iii. p. 12, 13.

5. We do not find that either the *Jews* or the *Heathens*, with whom the christian apologists were engaged, disputed the genuineness of these records: nay *Julian* the apostate, who was so well acquainted with them, and afterwards proved

so inveterate an enemy to christianity, does in some of his writings allow them to be genuine; as we before observed that *Celsus* doth earlier, especially the evangelists. See *Prop.* 101. *Schol.* 1.

*Macknight's Truth of the Gosp. Hist. book ii. c. iv. p. 312—343.*—*West on the Resur. p. 319—331.*—*Leland's Views, vol. ii. p. 335—337.*

1, 2, 3, & 4, & 5. 6. There is great reason to believe that the books of the same title with those of our New Testament, which were in the hands of the primitive christians, *i. e.* those of the two first centuries, were genuine.

7. Considering the zeal which the primitive christians expressed for the New Testament, and the sufferings which they were ready to undergo rather than they would deliver it up, as the *Traditores* under the *Dioclesian* persecution did, we can hardly imagine, that if it had been in their power, they would willingly have corrupted it in any important instances; which would indeed have been introducing another religion, different from that for which they suffered such dreadful extremities.

*Suic. Thesaur. vol. i. p. 800.*—*Lardn.*

*ibid. vol. vii. l. i. c. 66. p. 210—217.*

—*Works, vol. iv. p. 88—91.*

8. If they had been ever so desirous of corrupting the New Testament, neither they nor any in succeeding ages could have effected such a design; considering how long the originals were preserved, how soon they were transcribed, and translated into various languages, how publicly they were read in their religious assemblies, so that wherever there was a christian church, there must have been a copy, by which any that attended might examine and correct their own; (*Vid. Prop. 100. gr. 8.*) considering also how widely they were dispersed in a very few years after they were written; and what a variety of sects

sects arose very early among christians, who were all a guard upon each other, to prevent any material alteration in the books which they professed to make the rule of their faith, and from which each pretended to defend his own opinions.

*King of the Prim. Church, part ii. c. i. § 2.*

*Tertull. de Præscript, c. 36.—Advers.*

*Marcion. ap. Biscoe at Boyle's Lect.*

*p. 491—493.—Lardn. ibid. vol. iii.*

*p. 289—293, 300—304.—Works, vol.*

*ii. p. 491—493. 495—497.*

9. There are numerous quotations from the New Testament in christian writers of all the latter ages, and even from the beginning of the third century; insomuch that if the books were to be lost, by far the greater part of them might be recovered from such quotations, and from the homilies and commentaries written upon several parts of it: and all these do in the main agree with our present copies, in sense at least, if not in words. *Comp. Prop. 101. gr. 22.*

7, 8, 9, 10. The New Testament, as we now have it in the original, is in the main agreeable to what it was in the first ages of christianity.

6, 10, 11. The New Testament as we have it in the original is genuine. *Q. E. D.*

*Limborch's Collatio, p. 46.—Script. iii.*

*Judæi. Quæst. iv. N°. viii. p. 144—*

*148.—Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 119. b.*

*120 a.—Reasons of Rel. part ii. c. vii.*

*§ 68—94.—Ditton on the Res. part iii.*

*§ 10—17.—Bennet on Script. p. 302*

*—306.—Fost. against Tind. p. 95—*

*105. 161.—Wels. New Test. Pref. p.*

*77—81.—Benson's Reas. of Christianity,*

*p. 63—75.—Macknight's Truth of the*

*Gosp. Hist. book iii. c. iii. p. 478—488.*

*—Fortin's Rem. on eccles. Hist. vol. i.*

*p. 41—45.—Leland. ubi supra.*

## COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears, that the evidence we have of the genuineness of the writings of the new testament, is abundantly greater than for that of any other book of equal antiquity; as may be seen by comparing the preceding argument with what could be said in proof of those writings, which go under the names of *Virgil, Tully, Cæsar, Suetonius, &c.*

*Blackball at Boyle's Lect. Serm. iii. p. 6—8.*

## COROLLARY 2.

From comparing the several steps of the preceding demonstration, particularly *gr. 3, 7, 8.* it will appear, that where the possibility of corrupting the books of the new testament, (if it had been desired) was greatest, *i. e.* in the time immediately following their being written, we have the strongest evidence of an aversion to do it; considering the known zeal and piety of the first professors and confessors of christianity, and that as the character of christians grew worse, the impossibility of changing these books increased. And it may not be unworthy of farther remark, that with respect to those epistles, which being written to particular persons might have been most easily altered, we have peculiar evidence that they were not; partly from the distinguishing piety of those persons, *i. e. Timothy and Titus*; and partly from the tenour of those epistles as they now appear, which is the very contrary to what dishonest, ambitious, and interested men, who alone would have been likely to have attempted a corruption, would have desired it should have been.

## SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXIX. If it be objected to *gr. 7, 8,* that the fathers  
 and that it is possible that all the copies or ver-  
 sions

sions now extant might be thus corrupted by them; to this we answer,

1. The corruption of scripture, to which they refer, was either by false interpretations, or at most by the alteration of a few particular passages.

2. The agreement between the doctrines of the fathers in some of those points, and the scriptures as now extant, shews that we have not corrupt copies of those passages.

3. We may conclude from the reasons urged above, that if the *Heretics* made any such attempts, they must have been unsuccessful; and the protest of the fathers against them shews it.

4. The copies now extant came from such different parts, and many of the translations, especially the *Syriac*, *Ethiopic*, and *Vulgate*, were so ancient, that the hypothesis proposed in the objection is utterly incredible. To which we add, that the fathers, who have several of them quoted the same passages of scripture, lived in very distant countries, at or near the same time; *v. g.* *Justin Martyr* and many others in *Asia*, *Irenæus* in *France*, *Clemens* at *Alexandria*, *Cyprian* at *Carthage*, some of his correspondents at *Rome*, &c. at all which places christian churches were founded, long before the time in which these authors respectively lived; yet these authors never in the least intimate any disapprobation of those anciently received copies, which greatly confirms the evidence drawn from this view of them. And whoever considers the alarm taken at the attempt of Pope *Celestine* I. about the year 425, to impose a forged canon, as established by the council of *Nice*, upon the *African* bishops, whereas it was only a canon of the council of *Sardica*, will be yet more sensible of the force of this argument.

*Bower's Hist. of the Popes, vol. i. p. 370,*  
*&c. — Welst. Prol. in New Test. § 2.*

p. 29—48. 12mo. Edit.——Fost. against  
Tind. p. 149—165.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

Nearly akin to this, is that objection taken from the passages in *Victor's Chronicle*, in which it is said, "that when *Messala* was consul, at the command of the emperor *Anastacius*, the holy gospels, as written by *Idiotis Evangelistis*, were corrected and amended:" which seems only to refer to the correcting a few copies at *Constantinople*, which were falsified by *Macedonius*; and were now restored to what the plain evangelists wrote. It is certain no thought could be wilder, than an universal corruption of all the copies of the new testament at such an age, (*A. D.* 500.) and among so many diversities of opinions, as well as in the vast tract of land where *Anastacius* had not the least power.

*Collins on Freethink.* p. 89, 90. Edit. 2:  
Edit. 1. p. 72, 73.——*Bentley Rem.* part  
i. § 33. p. 77—84.——*Sir Isaac New-*  
*ton's 2d Letter to Le Clerc, or rather to*  
*Mr. Locke*, p. 116.

## SCHOLIUM 3.

Many have objected the various readings, which *Dr. Mills* reckons to be more than 30000: but it may be replied,

1. That considering the bulk of the book, the vast number of copies which have been compared, the ignorance of many transcribers, and the nicety with which the least variations have been observed; and especially considering how many versions and quotations *Dr. Mills* brings into the account, we are rather to wonder there are no more; since in the few copies of *Terence* which have been compared, almost as many various reasons have been found.

2. There are but very few of these various numerous readings, which at all affect the sense,

at least in any important article; as appears by examining not only those of *Mills*, but those of *Wetstein*, which are by far the most significant of them.

3. That when copies come to be compared, there is often so great a number on one side against those of the other, that it is easy to settle the true reading, and to see what it was that led the transcriber into a mistake; and this is generally the case, where the variation from the received reading is the greatest.

*Canones Critici ap. Wetf. p. 11—16 and Pref. p. 77, 78.—Collins, ibid. p. 87—90.—Bent. Rem. part i. p. 60—68, 74—84.—Ditton on the Ref. part iii. § 18, 19\*.*

#### SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected, that it is improbable that the whole new testament should have been written in *Greek*: we answer,

1. That many great critics alledge, chiefly on the authority of *Papias*, as quoted by *Eusebius* (*Eccles. Hist. l. iii. cap. ult.*) that the gospel of *Matthew* and the epistle to the *Hebrews* were originally written in *Hebrew* †: but if that should be allowed to be dubious, we may farther add,

\* For much curious learning on this subject, recourse may be had to *Michaelis's* "Introduction to the New Testament," lately translated by *Herbert Marsh, B.D.* vol. i. p. 246—341. See also *Mr. Marsh's* notes, *ibid.* p. 489—522.

† *Dr. Williams*, in his enquiry into the authenticity of the two first chapters of *St. Matthew*, and in his appendix to that work, strongly contends that *Matthew's* gospel was originally written in *Hebrew*, or, to speak more properly, in *Syro-Chaldaic*. *Michaelis* is decidedly of the same opinion, which, indeed, is powerfully supported by the general testimony of the ancient fathers. It is likewise contended for by *Michaelis*, that the epistle to the *Hebrews* was composed in the same language. *Dr. Lardner's* reasons for embracing the opposite side of the question, (in which he coincides with several learned critics) will be seen in the references.

2. That

2. That great numbers of the christian converts were *Grecians* born, and others *Hellenists*, who used the *Greek* translation of the Old Testament.

3. That the *Greek* language had spread so much beyond any other in those days, that on the whole it was most convenient for books that were intended for universal use; which also in part appears from the writings of several of the ancients, who though they lived in *Asia* and *Egypt*, used this language, as *Josephus* also did, though he wrote at *Rome*, and seems to have designed his books principally for the use of the *Romans*.

*Brerewood's Inq.* c. i, & vi.—*Limb. Coll.* p. 144, 145, 183, 184.—*Jones against Whist.* c. xvii, &c.—*Hallet on Heb. Pref.*—*Lardner's Suppl.* vol. i. c. v. § 5. *ibid.* vol. ii. c. xii. § 14.—*Works,* vol. vi. p. 60—65. *ibid.* p. 381—415.

#### SCHOLIUM 5.

Mr. *Whiston* has endeavoured to prove the evidence of the genuineness of the *Apostolic Constitutions* to be equal to that of the New Testament. We own there are many curious and valuable articles, among many weak and ridiculous things, in that very miscellaneous collection. Nevertheless, when *Whiston's* arguments for them come to be compared with those in the proposition, it will immediately appear that they fall vastly short of them. And indeed these *Constitutions* contain many very evident marks of forgery; especially as they expressly determine the two grand controversies, relating to the time of *Easter*, and the re-admission of those who had fallen away after *baptism*: yet their authority is never pleaded for the decision of these controversies, even when those persons were engaged in them, in whose hands he supposes the originals of these *Constitutions*

tions to have been lodged: not now to insist upon the great improbability of keeping those things secret at first, which were intended to be a rule to christians in all succeeding ages; which very ill agrees with the plain and simple genius of christianity, or that courage in defence of the truth for which its earliest professors were above all mankind so eminent. There are likewise so many things in these *Constitutions*, different from and even contrary to the genius and design of the writers of the New Testament, that no wise man would believe, without the most convincing and irresistible proof, that both could come from the same hand.

*Whist. Prim. Christian. vol. ii, iii.*—  
*Saurin's Serm. vol. ii. p. 185—187.*—  
*Coci Censura Patr. p. 3—7.*—*Grabe's*  
*Ans. to Whist. pass.*—*Barratieri Opera.*  
*—Lardn. Cred. part ii. vol. viii. c. ult.*  
*—Works, vol. iv. p. 320—356\*.*

## P R O-

\* Mr. Merivale has added a sixth scholium, as follows: "Concerning the question whether, besides those books that make up the present canon of the New Testament, there might not have been other sacred writings of the apostles and evangelists that were very early lost, see Jones on the Canon, vol. i. part ii. c. ii. and Lardner's Suppl. vol. iii. c. xxv.—Works, vol. vi. p. 663—672 †.

† Not having Dr. Harwood's "New Introduction to the Study and Knowledge of the New Testament" at hand, (the work having become scarce) we refer in general to the first volume of it, and especially to the first, third, and fourth chapters. The authenticity of the New Testament is particularly considered by Michaelis. See his "Introduction to the New Testament," as lately translated by Herbert Marsh, B. D. vol. i. p. 1—69; to which may be added, Mr. Marsh's notes, p. 345—374. Recourse may, likewise, be had to Dr. Priestley's "Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever," part the second. In the latter end of these letters, the Doctor has examined Mr. Gibbon's insinuations against christianity, in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." Many other writers appeared in answer to Mr. Gibbon. A list of their publications is as follows: "Remarks on the two last chapters of Mr. Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;"

## PROPOSITION CIV.

LECT. The Jewish religion has been of considerable  
 CXX. antiquity; and according to the common chronology, was founded by *Moses* nearly 1500 years before *Christ's* time.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. That there was such a people as the *Jews* about the time of the christian æra, and that they were a little while after subdued by the *Romans* under *Vespasian* and *Titus*, is so apparent from the history of *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, as well as many other ancient writers and monuments, that

in a letter to a friend. "An Apology for Christianity, in a Series of Letters, addressed to Edward Gibbon, Esq." by Dr. Richard Watson, now Bishop of Landaff, first separately published, and since reprinted in the volume of the Bishop's Sermons and Tracts; "Some Strictures on Mr. Gibbon's Account of Christianity and its first Teachers," by the Rev. William Salisbury, B. D. in his translation of Bulmer's History of the Establishment of Christianity, compiled from Jewish and Heathen authors only; "Loftus's Reply to the Reasonings of Mr. Gibbon;" Dr. Aphthorp's Observations on a late History of the Decline of the Roman Empire, in his "Letters on the Prevalence of Christianity, before its civil Establishment;" Davis's "Examination of the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of Mr. Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" "A few Remarks on the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" Dr. Chelsum's "Remarks on the two last chapters of Mr. Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" The Rev. Henry Taylor's "Thoughts on the Nature of the grand Apostacy; with Reflections and Observations on the fifteenth chapter of Mr. Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" and Sir David Dalrymple's "Enquiry into the secondary Causes which Mr. Gibbon has assigned for the rapid Progress of Christianity," a book very valuable, though but little known.

In answer to Mr. Davis, Mr. Gibbon published "A Vindication of some passages in the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" to which Mr. Davis replied. In the publications referred to, not only the general authenticity and credibility of the gospel are vindicated, but several collateral questions of no small importance are considered.

The authority of St. Matthew's, St. Mark's, and St. John's gospels has lately been attacked by Mr. Evanston, in his work, entitled "The Dissonance of the four general received Evangelists, and the Evidence of their respective Authenticity examined." To this treatise Dr. Priestley has given an answer, in the second part of his "Letters to a young Man." As the controversy is of a very recent date, it will probably be productive of farther publications.

it has never been called in question, and therefore needs no more particular proof.

2. *Philo* and *Josephus*, the two most considerable writers who lived in that age, as well as a great many others of the same religion before and since, do expressly assert it as a notorious fact, that *Moses* was the author of their religion and polity, and that he lived about the time mentioned in the proposition.

3. There is a reason to believe, that as the *Hebrew* language is of acknowledged antiquity, and does indeed bear many of the peculiar marks of an original, they had among them some written and credible account of the beginning of their constitution and nation; especially considering how much their laws differ from those of any other people on the face of the earth.

4. Several of the *Pagan* writers, of whom we shall give a more particular account in the scholium, do mention *Moses* as undoubtedly the *Law-giver* of the *Jews*.

5. We cannot find that there was any contest between the *Jews* and the neighbouring nations, concerning the antiquity of *Moses*, and the origin of the *Jewish* religion, though several of them pretended their religious institutions to be much older; as appears especially by those two excellent books which *Josephus* has written against *Appion*, expressly on this subject.

1, 5. 6. There is reason to believe that the *Jewish* religion has been of considerable antiquity, and was founded by *Moses* about the time mentioned above. Q. E. D.

*Grot. de Verit. l. i. § 16. p. 63—66.—*

*Jenk. of Christian. vol. i. p. 95—100.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

It may not be improper here to illustrate *gr. 4.* by giving an account of several ancient authors among the *Pagans*, by whose testimony it is confirmed.

1. *Manetho*,

1. *Manetho, Chereimon, Apollonius, and Lysimachus*, besides some other ancient *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, whose histories are now lost, as expressly quoted by *Josephus*, as extant in his days, and passages are collected from them, in which they agree, that *Moses* was the leader of the *Jews* when they departed from *Egypt*, and the founder of their laws; though some of these writers intermix with their story many ridiculous and infamous circumstances, which the *Jews* have always denied, but from the quotation of which we may assure ourselves, that the authors quoting the passages in question took them honestly and exactly as they found them.

*Jos. against Apion. l. i. § 26. p. 1352—1354.*

*Ed. Hudf. p. 1055. Cologn.—Ibid. § 32.*

*p. 1357, 1358. ibid. § 34. p. 1359, 1360.*

And *Eusebius* brings passages to the like purpose from *Eupolemus* and *Artapanus*; but as for those long quotations he afterwards brings from the tragedies of *Ezekiel* and *Demetrius* upon the same subject; as the authors seem to have been *Jews*, if not *Christians*, they are placed with less propriety among the testimonies now under examination.

*Euf. Præp. Ev. l. ix. cap. 26—29.—*

*Clayton's Vind. of the Old Testament, p. 128.*

2. *Strabo*, (*Geog. l. xvi.*) gives an account of the law of *Moses* as forbidding images, and limiting divine worship to one invisible or rather universal being; and in consequence of this bears an honourable testimony to the *Jews*, as a pious and righteous nation.

*Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 417, 418.*

*—Leland against Morg. p. 212, 213.*

*Edit. 2.*

*Celsus* also refers to this passage of *Strabo*, and frequently mentions *Moses* and other persons recorded in the *Jewish* history, in such a manner

as plainly to shew he was familiarly acquainted with it.

3. *Justin* from *Trogus Pompeius* tells us, that *Moses*, whom by mistake he calls the son of *Joseph*, being driven from *Egypt*, and leading other exiles, encamped at mount *Sinai*, and there consecrated the seventh day as a sacred solemnity, or as he ignorantly expresses it, a perpetual *fast*.

*Just. Hist. l. xxxvi. c. ii.*

4. *Pliny* the elder speaks of *Moses*, as eminent among the magicians, probably referring to his power of working miracles.

*Pliny's Nat. Hist. l. xxx. c. i.—Lardner's Test. vol. i. p. 339, 340.—Works, vol. vii. p. 250.*

5. *Tacitus* mentions *Moses* as one of the exiles from *Egypt*, who persuaded the rest of them to commit themselves to him as a celestial guide, and takes farther notice of their being conducted by him through the wilderness, relieved in their thirst, and receiving a set of laws from him, of which he gives a large though a very faulty account.

*Tacit. Hist. l. v. c. iii.—v.—Gord. Tac. vol. iv. p. 476—482.—Clayton, ibid. p. 132—138.*

6. *Juvenal* mentions *Moses* as the author of a volume, which was preserved with great care among the *Jews*, by which the worship of images and eating swines flesh were forbidden, circumcision and the observation of the sabbath strictly enjoined.

*Juv. Sat. xiv. ver. 96—106.*

*N. B.* Before him, *Horace* has mentioned *Judeus Apella*, or a circumcised *Jew* as a sort of proverb of credulity, probably in reference to their believing so many miraculous events recorded in their sacred books: (*Hor. Sat. l. i. § 5. sub fin. comp. Sat. ix. ver. 69, 70.*) yet as he does not expressly mention *Moses*, (however some have thought he referred to him *Od. ii. ver. 19.* which

which we lay no stress upon, Vid. *Delph. Not. ibid.*) we chuse not to add him to the catalogue of these writers.

7. *Longinus* cites *Moses* as the law-giver of the *Jews*, and a person of no inconsiderable character, and adds, that he has given a noble specimen of the true sublime, in his account of the creation of the world.

*Long. de Sub.* § 9. p. 50. *Pearce's Ed.* 1732.

—*Lardner's Test.* vol. iii. p. 105.—

*Works*, vol. viii. p. 166—168.

8. *Numenius*, as quoted by *Eusebius* and *Origen*, mentions *Museus*, probably *Moses*, as a leader of the *Jews*, who by his prayers brought dreadful calamities on *Egypt*; which *Jannes* and *Jambres*, those celebrated magicians, were not able to resist: and *Eusebius* reports it as his saying, that “*Plato* was only *Moses* speaking *Greek*.”

*Euseb. Præp. Ev.* ix. 8. xi. 10.—*Orig.*

against *Cels.* l. iv. p. 198, 199.—*Lard-*

*ner's Test.* vol. iii. c. xxxv.—*Works*,

vol. viii. p. 168—172.

9. *Chalchidius* speaks of *Moses* as a person of eminent wisdom, more than human eloquence, and as one who pretended to divine revelation; but it is much to be doubted whether he were a *Pagan*, or, as both *Eusebius* and *Fabricius* maintain, a *Christian Platonist*. Vid. *Budæi Phil. Hist.* c. iv. § 22. not. p. 160, 161.

*Lardn. Ibid.* vol. iv. c. xlii.—*Works*,

vol. viii. p. 346—349.

10. *Hermippus*, an ancient writer of the life of *Pythagoras*, says that the philosophers did in many of their rules imitate the laws of the *Jews*; but I find not that he expressly mentions *Moses* as the author of them.

*Jos. against Appion*, l. i. § 22. p. 1345.

*Huds.*

11. The *Orphic* verses, which, though spurious, are generally reckoned of great antiquity, incul-

inculcate the worship of one God as recommended by that law, “ which was given by him  
“ who was drawn out of the water, and received  
“ two tables of stone from the hand of God.”

*Euf. Præp. Ev. l. xiii. c. xii. p. 666.*

12. *Diodorus Siculus*, in his catalogue of those law-givers who pretended to have received the plan of their laws from some deity, mentions *Moses*, as ascribing his to that God whom he calls *Joab*, which is probably a corruption of *Jehovah*.

*Diod. Sic. l. i. sub. init. English Translation, p. 49.—Gale's Court of Gent. part i. p. 308.*

And in an extract out of his fortieth book, which is preserved by *Photius*, he gives a large though in some respects erroneous account of the *Jews*; in which he speaks of *Moses* as a man of illustrious prudence and courage, who settled the *Jews* in their land, and instituted their religion and laws, forbidding them images, as he pretends, on *pantheistic* principles, divided them into twelve tribes, established the priesthood among them with a judicial power, and adds several other particulars, which though mingled with mistakes are of great importance.

*Diod. Sic. ap. Phot. Bib. N°. 244. p. 2051, 2052.*

13. *Dion Cassius*, l. xxxiii. speaks of the *Jews* as worshipping a being of unutterable majesty and of an invisible nature; but I find not that he mentions *Moses* as giving them those ideas of him.

14. *Varro* mentions the *Romans* as having agreed with the *Jewish* nation, in that first worship of theirs without images, of which he declares his approbation.

*Var. ap. Aug. de Civ. Dei, iv. 31.*

15. *Philemon*, in the days of *Alexander* the Great, has some verses which seem to be a kind

of translation from part of the decalogue; so that there can be no reasonable doubt of his being acquainted with it, though he says nothing of *Moses*. See the verses in

*Ridley of the Spirit, Serm. vii. p. 266.*

And if *Phocylides* were indeed, as is generally thought, a heathen poet, before Christ's time, he may justly be joined to *Philemon*, as he has plainly translated many of the *Mosaic* laws, though he does not expressly mention their author.

16. *Justin Martyr* expressly says, that most of the historians, poets, law-givers and philosophers of the *Greeks* mention *Moses* as the leader and prince of the *Jewish* nation; and particularly enumerates *Polemon*, *Appion of Possidon*, *Ptolemy Mendesium*, *Hellanicus*, *Philocorus*, *Castor*, *Thallus* and *Alexander Polyhistor*, besides those taken notice of above; and adds, what it is very important to observe, that they took their account of *Moses* not from the *Jews*, but the *Egyptian* priests; whence it is well known they collected most of their learning.

*Just. Cohortatio ad Gent. p. 9—11. —*

*Huet. Dem. Pr. iv. c. ii. p. 49, &c. —*

*Calm. Dict. vol. ii. p. 236—238.*

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

It may not be improper here to add, that *Josephus* has insinuated, that the *Shepherd kings*, whom *Manetho* mentions as making so great a figure in *Egypt*, and at length expelled, were *Israelites*; and *Dr. Morgan* has grafted a great many false and absurd things relating to the *Jewish* history upon that supposition: but a late ingenious writer has entirely overthrown the foundation of that notion, as well as justly exposed *Morgan's* wild superstructure; and has advanced some reasons worthy of consideration, to  
prove

prove that the shepherd kings were *Arabians*, and descendants of *Ishmael*.

*Morg. Mor. Phil. vol. iii. p. 73.*—*Theophilus Cantabrigiensis Vind. of anc. Heb. Hist. pass. præf. Rem. xxv. p. 53—64.*  
*Jos. Cont. App. l. i. § 14—16\*.*

## PROPOSITION CV.

The ancient *Jews* before the time of Christ had books among them, bearing the titles of those which make up what we protestants call the books of the *Old Testament*, and a catalogue of which may be seen at the beginning of any of our bibles. LECT.  
CXXI.

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. The books of the old testament are still extant in the *Hebrew* and *Chaldee* languages, with such marks of purity as prove them to be very ancient.

2. There was a *Greek* translation of them, in the days of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, which was laid up in the *Alexandrine* library collected by him.

*Prid. Con. vol. ii. p. 27—47. præf. p. 27—35, 44—47.*—*Jos. Ant. l. xii. c. ii.*  
—*Euf. Eccles. Hist. l. v. c. viii. Valef. Not.*

3. It is generally thought by learned men, that *Onkelos* published his *Targum*, *i. e.* the *Chaldee* paraphrase on the law, and *Jonathan* his on the

\* Much has been said by chronologers concerning the Shepherd kings, and different conjectures have been formed concerning them. The matter is not of great importance. Mr. Jackson refers the Shepherd Dynasty to the settlement of the Israelites in Egypt. Sir Isaac Newton supposes the Shepherds to have been the expelled Canaanites; and Mr. Bryant, if my recollection does not fail me, refers them to the Amonians. Mr. Breckell, in his “Dissertation upon the Subjects of Circumcision,” coincides in opinion with Theophilus Cantabrigiensis, who, I apprehend, was Dr. Squire, afterwards Bishop of St. David’s.

prophets, either before or very near the time of Christ, which plainly shews the original *Hebrew* to have been older.

*Calmet Dict. in Onk. and Jonath.*—*Prid.*

*Con. vol. ii. p. 531—538, 542—545.*

4. *Josephus* gives us an obscure kind of catalogue of the sacred books among the *Jews*, in which he expressly mentions the five books of *Moses*, 13 of the *Prophets*, 4 of *Hymns* and *Moral precepts*. Now if we with many critics allow, that *Ruth* was added to *Judges*, and *Lamentations* to *Jeremy*, then this number will agree with those which make up our Old Testament.

*Jos. against Appion, l. i. p. 1036. Col. Ed.*

*p. 1333. Hudf.*—*Prid. Con. vol. i.*

*p. 331, 332.*—*Jennings's Jewish Antiq.*

*vol. ii. p. 373.*

5. Both *Jews* and *Christians* from the time of Christ, have generally agreed to receive those books which make up our Old Testament as genuine. As to the attempt that has been made to introduce others called the *Apocrypha*, which will hereafter be examined, it does not affect the present question, any farther than as the *Jews* respecting these books may be considered as an argument of their care in examining those they admitted.

6. The quotations made from the Old Testament in the *New*, which we have already proved to be genuine, do evidently infer the existence of those books from whence they were taken; and also shew by the way, that the *Jews* did not only receive them as authentic but *divine*, as *Josephus* also in the preceding reference assures us that they did in the strongest terms: and it is observable, that all the books of the Old Testament are cited in the *New*, except *Judges*, *Ruth*, *Ecclesiastes*, *Canticles*, *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, *Esther*, and perhaps *Chronicles*; insomuch that on the whole, the express quotations from or references

to the Old Testament in the whole volume of the New, are computed at about 600. Vid. *Index to Mattaire's Ed. of the New Testament.*

7. *Melito, Gregory Nazianzen, Origen, Athanasius, Hilary, Epiphanius, Jerom,* and several later writers, have given us catalogues of the books of the Old Testament; in which none of ours are omitted, excepting *Ruth*, which is left out in some, because perhaps included in *Judges*.

8. The *Samaritans*, who separated from the *Jews*, many hundred years before the birth of Christ, have in their language a *Pentateuch*, in the main exactly agreeing with the *Hebrew*.

*Prid. Con. vol. i. p. 416—418.—Dupin on the Can. vol. i. c. i. § 2—5.—Calmet's Dict. vol. ii. p. 599, 600.—Kennicott's Dissert. on the Hebrew Text. vol. i. p. 337—&c.—Kennicott's Account of his Collation, p. 145.*

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. *Valet propositio.*

*Leusd. Diff. Phil. p. 54—62.—Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 84—94.*

## COROLLARY.

*Sir William Temple's* insinuation, that there are no *Hebrew* records now extant older than the *Augustan* age, is most wild and arbitrary; and so contrary to strong and direct evidence, and indeed to common sense, that one would believe he intended to except the Old Testament, though he expresses himself in so unguarded a manner.

*Temp. Misc. vol. ii. p. 36. Ed. 2.*

## SCHOLIUM.

Nothing is said above of that *Jewish chronicle*, called *Seder Olam Rabbah, i. e. the larger chronicle*, on which some have laid so great a stress, as the authority of it is disputed: but the regard which some very learned men have paid to it, makes one wish that the evidence of its authen-

ticity, and the importance of its contents, may be set in a clearer and easier light than that in which it has hitherto appeared; for if it be indeed true, that its author was master to the compilers of the *Mishna*, it must be worthy an attentive inquiry. *Prid. Con. vol. ii. Pref. p. 20.*

### PROPOSITION CVI.

The books of the Old Testament, which the ancient *Jews* had among them in Christ's time, were in the main genuine\*.

#### DEMONSTRATION I.

From *external* evidence.

*Prop. 104.* | 1. Considering what evidence there is, that there was such a person as *Moses*, and that he was law-giver of the *Jews*; there is reason to believe that he would write his institutions, since there was such proper and important occasion for doing it.

*Prop. 104. Schol. 1. N<sup>o</sup>. 6, 7, 9, 11.* | 2. Several of the authors enumerated above speak of *Moses* as a *writer*, as well as a law-giver.

3. In the nature of things it is very probable, that in a polity so founded as that of *Moses* appears to have been, occasions of writing histories and laws should have occurred; and that religious teachers, rising in different ages, should by their writings, as those of other religions have done, endeavour to enforce an institution, which they at least supposed to be divine.

4. The persons to whom the books of *Moses* and the succeeding writers were first proposed, were capable of judging whether they were genuine or no; and there is no reason to believe,

\* As a general reference on this subject, see *Leland's Answer to Balingbroke's Letters on the Study of History. p. 44—70.* Former Editor. See also *Leland's View of Deistical Writers, vol. ii. p. 286—305.* 4th Edition.

they would have received them with such extraordinary regard, as it is well known the *Jews* paid to them, if they had not been well satisfied on that head: and considering how highly those books were regarded by all the pious *Jews*, and how much even their civil affairs depended upon them, we cannot suppose that an entire change of them could have been attempted, without being discovered and rejected with the utmost indignation.

1—5. *Prop.* 105. | 6. There is reason to believe that the books of the Old Testament, which the ancient *Jews* had among them, were genuine.  
Q. E. D.

## DEMONSTRATION 2.

Taken from *internal* arguments.

1. Many of the facts recorded in the Old Testament are of so extraordinary a nature, that if the books giving an account of them had been forged, the very circumstance of their being before unknown, would have been a sufficient argument against receiving any books that contained an account of them.

2. Many of the institutions contained in their laws were so burthensome, and some of them, humanly speaking, so hazardous, or rather so certainly ruinous to any nation not secured by an extraordinary providence correspondent to them, (especially those relating to the *sabbatical year*, the resort of all the males to *Jerusalem*, and the prohibition of cavalry) that forged books containing such precepts would probably have been rejected with the greatest abhorrence.

*Bennet on Script.* p. 72—74.—*Sherlock on Proph. Diff.* iv.—*Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 462, 463.—*Discourse of the Proofs of the Books of Moses, at the End of Pascal's Thoughts.* French Edition.

3. The great variety observable in the *style* of these books, makes it improbable they should have been the work of *one*, and the *unity of design*, that they should have been the invention of *many*: for if these supposed inventors lived in different ages, they could not have consulted with each other: and if they lived in the same age, the largeness of their plan would only have subjected them to new difficulties, without being likely to answer any valuable end: and he who could be weak enough to embarrass a scheme with so many unnecessary articles, must probably have wanted a genius capable of managing them all so well.

*Fortin's Rem. on Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 41*

—45.

N. B. The same remark may also be applied to the *New Testament*, though the external arguments for the genuineness of it are so strong, that it did not seem necessary to insist upon this hint.

*Millar's Prop. vol. i. p. 98.*

4. The provision that was made for reading the law publicly every seventh year, at the feast of *tabernacles*, (when it is probable the copies kept in private hands might be compared with that laid up before the Lord) *Deut. xxxi. 9—13, 24—26.* and the injunction on the king to transcribe it with his own hand, *Deut. xvii. 18—20,* would be a probable means of preventing corruption; and adds an evidence to the genuineness of these writings, much greater than can be found with regard to others of the most ancient authors.

The charge also given to private persons to make themselves familiarly acquainted with the contents of the law, and to teach it their children, deserves to be mentioned under this head, as an institution of the greatest importance for keeping it uncorrupted: (*Deut. vi. 6—9. and sim.*) and which indeed according to the remark

of

of *Josephus* in the preceding reference, had an extraordinary efficacy to this purpose.

1, & 2, & 3, &c. 4. | 5. *Valet propositio.*

*Nich. Conf. vol. iv. p. 17—22. 12mo Edition. Ofl. Ed. vol. ii. part iv. p. 10, 13.*

— *Jenk. of Christian. vol. i. p. 169—187.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that the degeneracy of the *Jews*, according to their own history, and their disregard to the institutions of *Moses*, together with the scarcity of books in those early ages, and the various oppressions which they suffered under their enemies, might occasion the loss of authentic copies, and give some designing priests an opportunity of substituting others in their room: especially might this happen, when the *book of the law* was said to be found in the reign of *Josiah*, *2 Kings* xxii. 8, &c. or during the time of the *Babylonish* captivity. But to this it is answered,

LECT.  
CXXII.

1. This at best is no more than a conjecture, without any positive proof of such a forgery.

2. It is uncertain whether, if such a fraud had been attempted, it could have succeeded at either of the times mentioned, though they are indeed the most probable which can be assigned. For, not to insist upon the possibility there is, that the writing found in *Josiah's* reign was only the last chapter of *Deuteronomy*, that awakening passage of scripture; were we to suppose it to have been the *whole Pentateuch*, perhaps *Josiah* might before have had some copy of the law, though not equally perfect with the original which had been found in the temple; and he might be more powerfully struck with hearing it read in the circumstances there described, though he had not been before an entire stranger to the contents of it, which it is certain he was not, considering  
the

the reformation he had before made, 2 *Chron.* xxxiv. 3, &c. There were probably some copies of the law remaining in other hands, as there certainly were during the time of the captivity; See *Dan.* ix. 11—13. to which may be added *Ezra* iii. 2—5. vi. 18—21. 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 22. *Ezra* i. 1. *Neb.* viii. 1—8. So that it appears to be an idle tale, which so many of the christian fathers borrowed from the *Jews*, that *Ezra*, by divine inspiration restored the sacred books, after they had been entirely lost.

*Euf. Eccles. Hist.* v. 8. *Vales. Not.*—  
*Prid. Con.* vol. i. p. 329.—*Jennings's*  
*Jewish Antiq.* vol. i. p. 172.

3. There is not the least probability, that such laws as those which are now to be found in the Old Testament, were forged at any time, especially on such an occasion; since nothing could have been more imprudent, upon the principles of human policy, than such precepts as those mentioned *Prop.* 106. *Dem.* 2. gr. 2. which would have been peculiarly liable to exception, when *Israel* was so surrounded with enemies, and straitened in their possessions, as they were both in the days of *Josiah* and *Ezra*. Nor can we imagine, that to these *Ezra* would have added that precept, on which they were obliged to put away their strange wives, which was so tender a point, and might have produced such fatal divisions; considering how many had married such, and how considerable some of them were both by birth and alliance, and how many foreign families would be made their enemies by such divorces: some of them were also priests and *Levites*, who must have been privy to the forgery, if there had been any. So that upon the whole, there is so little reason to suspect *Ezra* as the inventor of these precepts, that it is an instance of the impartial regard he had for the original, that he would retain them at so great a hazard;

*Ezra*

*Ezra* ix, x. *Neb.* xiii. 23—29. a remark also applicable in some degree to *Josiah*.

*Burn. on the Art.* p. 83, 84.—*Evans's*

*Christian Temp.* vol. ii. p. 375—377.

—*Millar's Prop.* vol. i. p. 88—94.—

*Allix's Reflect.* vol. i. p. 32, 33.—

*Shuckford's Connection,* vol. ii. p. 337.

—*Leland against Tindal,* vol. ii. p. 123

—142.

## SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that it is impossible that *Moses* should have been the author of the *Pentateuch*, or *Samuel* or *Nebemiab* of those books which go under their name; since many circumstances are recorded in them, which did not happen till many years after their death; Vid. *Gen.* xii. 6. xxii. 14. xxxvi. 31. *Exod.* xvi. 35. (compared with *Josb.* v. 12.) *Numb.* xii. 3. *Deut.* ii. 12. iii. 11, 14. xxxiv. 5, &c. 1 *Sam.* xxv. to the end of the 2d of *Samuel*, *Neb.* xii. 10, 11. where the catalogue of high priests is carried down to the time of *Alexander the Great*.

To that part of this objection which may affect the *Pentateuch*, some have replied, that *Samuel* might have been the author of those books, which are called the books of *Moses*, because they treat of him, as those of *Samuel* are named after that prophet, because his history made so considerable a part of them. Among others, Sir *Isaac Newton* and Lord *Barrington* suppose *Genesis*, and the other historical books before *Moses's* time, to have been written by *Samuel*, and for this purpose quote *Acts* iii. 21, 24. But this is so directly contrary to many other scriptures, that it is strange that any should patronize the opinion; especially when comparing 1 *Sam.* ii. 10. and 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 3—5. which may afford so easy and beautiful an illustration of the above-mentioned

tioned text in *Acts*, on which *Barrington* lays his chief stress. (See *Grey* on the last words of *David*.)—The scriptures to which this hypothesis is most directly contrary, are 2 *Chron.* xxiii. 18. *Dan.* ix. 11, 13. *Mal.* iv. 4. *Mark* vii. 10. xii. 19. *Luke* xvi. 29, 31. xx. 28, 37. xxiv. 27, 44. *John* i. 45. v. 46, 47.

*Barring.* *Essays on Div. Dispensations.*  
App. N°. iv.—*Works*, vol. iii. p. 197  
—208.—*Newton on Daniel*, c. i.

Therefore waving this, it seems more reasonable to say, (as the most ancient *Jewish* writers since the time of the Old Testament assure us,) that *Ezra* published a new edition of the books of *Moses*, in which he added those passages as *notes*, which perhaps afterwards crept into the text, by the mistake of the transcribers: though indeed with regard to many of the passages alledged, it is evident there is no absurdity at all in supposing them to have been written by *Moses* himself. Perhaps *Simon the Just* might also make some additions to those books which were written after *Ezra's* time.

*Prid. Con.* vol. i. p. 342—345, 573—575.  
*Kidder on the Pent.* vol. i. *Diff.*

### SCHOLIUM 3.

As for *Father Simon's* hypothesis, that the *Pentateuch* was formed from some loose writings of the annals of *Moses*, and that many of the leaves were transposed; the reasons on which it depends are so inconsiderable, that it seems not necessary to give a more particular view of it.

*Sim. Crit. Hist. Old Test.* p. 36, &c.—  
*Dupin.* of the *Can.* vol. i, c. iii. § 1. p. 68  
—75.—*Nich. Conf.* vol. iv. p. 8—16.  
vol. ii. p. 5—10, 8vo.—*Marsh's Au-*  
*thenticity of the five Books of Moses con-*  
*sidered.*


## SCHOLIUM 4.

Under the 2d step of the 2d *Demonstration*, we might have mentioned the omission of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, on which *Dr. Warburton* has insisted so largely in his learned work, called the *Divine Legation of Moses*: but as that argument is intended to prove not only the genuineness, but also indeed the divine authority of those books, it may be proper to state it alone elsewhere. We shall only add here, that there is reason to suspect whether, allowing the argument to be valid, it be of so great importance as the ingenious author supposes; seeing it depends upon so many nice questions, *v. g.* how far it is certain that *Moses* has omitted it? how far such an omission is peculiar to him as a legislator? how far it proves its dependence upon an equal providence? what that equal providence was? whether personal or national? and how far the expectation of it, or ground for that expectation, was a thing peculiar to the *Jews*? On all these accounts, the argument is much more complex, and seems less certain and less striking, than similar arguments, drawn from *Moses's* having laid it down as a fact certainly to be depended upon, that a treble crop should attend the sixth year of tillage from the sabbatical, *Lev. xxv. 21.* and that the family of *Aaron* in its male line should never be extinct, nor ever want an adult heir free from those blemishes that would have rendered him incapable of service; which nothing but a full consciousness of a divine legation, could have warranted so wise a man in making fundamental to his system.

*Middleton's Misc. Works, vol. i. p. 381—*  
384.

## PROPOSITION CVII.

The Old Testament as now extant in the *Hebrew*, is in the main what it originally was. LECT.  
CXXIII.

DEMON-

## DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 106. | 1. The Old Testament, as extant in the time of the *Jews* who were contemporary with *Christ*, was genuine\*.

2. Such as it was in the time of *Christ*, it came early into the hands of the christians, and has continued in their hands ever since; so that the *Jews* could not have been able to make any considerable alteration in it, had they been ever so desirous of it, while the christians were such a guard upon them, in a matter on which so much of the evidence of christianity has at least been supposed to depend; nor on the other hand, could the christians corrupt it without the discovery of the *Jews*, who would never have spared them, could they have proved such an attempt on records which they esteemed so sacred, by persons for whom they had such an implacable aversion.

3. There have been many ancient *versions*, which are yet extant in the *Polyglot* bible, in which there is such an agreement in the main both with the original and with each other, as we cannot suppose there could have been, had the original been corrupted after the date of those versions, of which some are of considerable age.

*N. B.* The most considerable versions to which we refer above, besides the *LXX.* were the *Targums*, or *Chaldee Paraphrases*, which if later than *Christ's* time were yet very ancient; the *Greek* of *Theodotion*, *Aquila*, and *Symmachus*; the *Syriac*; the *Arabic*; *Ethiopic*, and *Persian*; besides the

\* A persuasion of the absolute integrity and purity of the Hebrew text was long current among the generality of protestant divines. But this opinion was so powerfully attacked by Dr. Kennicott, in his two Dissertations on the printed State of the Hebrew Text, and, at length, so completely and experimentally refuted by his collations, that it is now universally exploded.

old *Italic*: of all which see *Jones* and *Walton* referred to below.

4. In latter ages, the *Masorites* have expressed a great and even superstitious care, in keeping the copy of the Old Testament as incorrupt as possible, numbering even the lines, the words, and the letters in each book: and though this care may be said to come late, *i. e.* about the year 500, it is to be remembered, it extends to those ages in which christians were most ignorant of *Hebrew*, and the *Jews* had some learning; so that perhaps had they been disposed to corrupt their scriptures, they might have done it then with the greatest safety: in which view, there seems to be something very providential in this exact scrupulosity of theirs at such a period. See *Pref. to Van Hooft's Ed. of the Heb. Bib.*

1, 2, & 3, & 4. | 5. The Old Testament as extant in the *Hebrew* is in the main uncorrupted.

*Jones's Crit. Leſt. c. iv. § 70—74. c. xiii.*

xiv, xvi, xvii, xviii. *MS.*—*Turret.*

vol. i. *Loc. ii. quæst. x. § 5—13.*—

—*Walton's Prol. to Polyg. Bib.*—

*Dr. Gill's Preface to his Dissertation on the Hebrew Language, part i.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

To this some object the difference which there is in many places between the *LXX.* and the *Hebrew*; some of which variations are of great moment, especially in chronology. To this we may reply,

1. That it is reasonable to believe the *LXX.* may have been altered in some places, or the *Hebrew* mistaken by the first translators, which may account for several differences.

2. If it be supposed that the *Hebrew points* were of later invention, a supposed difference in them will account for a vast number of variations in

in the LXX. and the similarity of several *Hebrew* letters will account for many more.

3. The LXX. itself attests the truth and exactness of vastly the greater part of the *Hebrew* bible, even if it should be granted that this translation is preferable to the original; which yet is a concession by no means to be made: now the proposition does not assert, that there are no errors at all in the *Hebrew* copy; the contrary to which the difference between the *Keri* and *Kethib* does evidently shew.

*Prid. Con. vol. i. p. 331.*—*Shuckford's*

*Con. vol. i. p. 48—72.*—*Winder's*

*Hist. of Knowl. vol. i. c. xvi.*—*Hallet's*

*Notes on Scripture, vol. i. p. 118—129\**.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that many passages quoted in the New Testament, and in the writings of the christian fathers, are very different from the correspondent passages as they now stand in the *Hebrew*; and that some words are introduced as quotations, which are no where to be found.—Now if with some we suppose, that those early christian writers quoted from the LXX. the objection will then coincide with the former: but as for reasons to be given elsewhere, we do not grant that, we answer,

\* There is nothing in which the difference between the *Hebrew* Bible and the septuagint version is more striking and important than in the diversity of their chronology. To which the preference should be given has been much disputed among learned men, and there are great names on both sides of the question. Two of the latest English writers on the subject are Bishop Clayton and Mr. Jackson. The Bishop's work is entitled, "The Chronology of the *Hebrew* Bible vindicated; the Facts compared with other antient Histories, and the Difficulties explained, from the Flood to the Death of Moses; together with some Conjectures in Relation to Egypt, during that Period of Time." Mr. Jackson, in his "Chronological Antiquities," has sustained, with great ability and learning, the opposite hypothesis.

1. Perhaps they quoted from their memory; which is the more probable, as sometimes the same passage is quoted by different authors in very different words, even where the sense agrees.

2. The *sense* of the passages supposed to be lost is still to be found in the Old Testament, though the *words* be not, especially *Matt. ii. ult.* *John vii. 38.* Yet if it were to be granted, that some of the verses originally belonging to the Old Testament are lost, it would not be at all inconsistent with the truth of our proposition, which only opposes general, material, and designed corruption\*.

*Dod. Fam. Exp. in Loc. crit.*

### SCHOLIUM 3.

It is farther objected, that many of the christian fathers complain, that the *Jews* had corrupted the Old Testament, in order to weaken the proofs of christianity from thence.

*Ans.* *Justin Martyr*, and some others who advance this charge, were only acquainted with some *Greek Versions*, which whether it were the *LXX.* or not, must be hereafter considered; and believing the divine authority of them, they charge all the variations which are to be found in the *Hebrew*, as the *Jews* quoted it, to be corruptions of their own: and sometimes they may mean only *false interpretations*.

*Collins's Grounds*, part ii. c. i, ii, v.—

*Whist. Eff. &c. Prop.* xii.—*Carpzovius's Def. &c.* c. ix.—

*Jones's Crit. Lett.* c. iv. § 75—83. *MS.*—

*Middleton's Inq.* p. 41—43.

\* The question concerning the quotations from the Old Testament in the New is amply considered in Michaelis's Introduction to the New Testament, vol. i. p. 200—235. See also Mr. Marsh's notes, *ibid.* p. 466—389.

## SCHOLIUM 4.

Nevertheless, we may, consistently with the truth of the proposition, allow, that some alterations have happened in transcribing, many of which were undoubtedly undesigned, because they could answer no imaginable end. Sometimes a very small mistake in a transcriber would greatly alter the sense, as *Psal. xxii. 17.* And it seems, on comparing all the arguments, we may safely conclude, that if there have been any designed alterations in the Old Testament, they must have been made between the time of Christ and the rise of the *Masorites* in the third century; and then the alterations would be of such a kind, as to be prejudicial rather than favourable to christianity: so that whatever arguments in proof of christianity can be brought from the Old Testament, the force of them will not be at all diminished, should we allow some designed variations. But indeed it is not in the nature of things very probable, either that, leaving those important passages which yet remain, they would have corrupted the rest for so little reason, or that, believing (as we are sure they did) the divine original of the scriptures, they would upon any terms have corrupted them designedly, *i. e.* have destroyed what they thought divine, so far as in them lay, to substitute something human in its stead. Compare *Deut. iv. 2. xii. 32. Rev. xxii. 18, 19.*

*Hallet on Script. vol. ii. p. 109, 110.—*

*Leland's View of Deist. Writ. vol. ii.*

*p. 302—307.*

## PROPOSITION CVIII.

LECT. The history of the New Testament is in the  
 CXXIV. main credible: *i. e.* there is as great regard to  
 be paid to it, as is due to other histories of  
 allowed character and reputation.

## LEMMA TO DEMONSTRATION.

It is reasonable to believe, that the history recorded in the New Testament is in the main agreeable to those facts, which were asserted by the first preachers, and received by the first converts of christianity; for if there had been any remarkable inconsistency between them, those first converts could not have received the books of the New Testament as genuine, which yet we have already proved that they did.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 103. | 1. The several books of the New Testament were written by those who were personally concerned in many of the facts they relate, and who had the best opportunities of being informed concerning the most important of those other facts which they have recorded. This especially appears with respect to *Matthew, Peter, John, Paul,* and *Luke*, at least so far as he wrote of several of *Paul's* journies, in which he himself attended him.

1. | 2. The authors of the New Testament were capable of giving us a true account of the facts they have undertaken to record, and if what they have written were false, it must have been a designed forgery; for there is nothing which looks like lunacy in any of their writings: least of all can we imagine, that such a number of madmen could have agreed in so consistent a story.

3. There are the greatest marks of integrity in their writings, both in the simplicity of their style, and the faithful manner they relate circumstances, which might bring reflection on their own character and their master's.

*Roll. Man. d'etud. vol. ii. p. 420—426.*

*West on the Resur. p. 344—363.*

4. There are also in their writings, the most genuine traces of a pious and benevolent temper,

of a contempt of suffering and death itself, when they might be called to meet it in the cause of truth: upon the whole, it seems the design of their writings, to carry virtue in all its branches to the sublimest degree, even beyond what any of the heathen moralists did or attempted; and so far as we can judge by their strain and manner, they appear like good men, bringing out of the treasure of their hearts good things.

3, 4. 5. Their character seems on the whole such, as may give us a probable expectation, that they would speak the truth to the best of their knowledge; and there must have been at least some circumstances of strong temptation, to engage them knowingly to deviate from it, especially in points of so great importance, as those which by their writings they were labouring to carry: nor ought we by any means lightly to believe, that persons, whose characters at first view appear so fair and honourable, would engage in a design so much to the dishonour of God and injury of mens souls and bodies, as their's must have been, if their testimony were false; since they laboured to turn mens devotion into a wrong channel, and to engage the most upright of mankind, and those who were their best friends, in a cause which was likely to ruin both themselves and their families.

6. Considering how incredible their story seemed at the first hearing, and how contrary it was both to the passions and secular interests of mankind, they had no temptation to attempt a fraud of this nature in expectation of any worldly advantage; but might depend upon such persecutions and oppositions, as many of the first professors of christianity appear to have met with, and, as they themselves in their writings tell us they both encountered and expected. See the texts under *Schol. 4.*

5, 6. | 7. There is no reason to believe, that they would in this instance attempt to impose upon us.

8. The persons to whom they addressed themselves, would be inclined to do their utmost to discover the fraud, if there were room to suspect any; considering that the doctrines of the first teachers of christianity evidently tended to fix an odium upon the *Jewish* rulers, to destroy peculiar privileges and emoluments both of the *Jewish* and *Pagan* priests, to oppose all the superstitious regard paid to deified emperors, and the idolatries which mingled themselves in their most pompous games and spectacles; that it poured contempt upon those things, for which the Gentile orators and philosophers were ready to value themselves most, and on the whole required such eminent degrees of humility and universal virtue, as were exceedingly opposite to that pride and wickedness, which so generally prevailed both among *Jews* and *Gentiles*.

*West on the Resur. p. 410—428. præf.*

*p. 420—423.*

9. A fraud like this, if it were a fraud, might very easily have been detected; seeing they bore their first testimony in the very place and age, in which Christ is said to have been crucified, and to have risen from the dead: (as appears from what was observed of the early prevalency of christianity in *Judea*, *Prop. 98. Gra. 4.*) and as the persons, whose character and interest were chiefly affected by it, had the civil power in their own hands, no doubt the thing would be thoroughly canvassed, and if it had appeared false would have been immediately exposed. Besides, wherever they came, they attested facts of such a nature, as might easily have been discovered on the spot; not merely asserting, that they had seen Christ and some of his followers work miracles, but that they themselves had

such a power; nay, that they communicated extraordinary gifts of the Spirit to their hearers, producing so sensible an effect as the speaking languages they had never learned. *Paul* particularly appeals on this occasion both to the *Corinthian* and *Galatian* churches, and argues with them on these facts, even when his interest among them was beginning to decline: so that on the whole, multitudes must immediately and certainly have known, whether the great facts they asserted were true or not.

9. | 10. Had the story which the apostles told been a forgery, it would no doubt have been quickly discovered, and rejected with the utmost abhorrence.

*Prop.* 98, & 103. | 11. Nevertheless, it gained a very great degree of credit in *Judæa*, *Greece*, *Italy*, and other places; and vast numbers of persons, in that very age in which these things are said to have been taught and done, were so fully persuaded of the truth of christianity, that, as it appears from the writings of the apostles to the primitive churches, as well as from other ancient monuments, they cheerfully ventured their estates and lives, upon a confidence of the truth of those facts, which the first preachers of the gospel taught.

2, 7, 10, 11. *Lem.* | 12. Since the writers of the New Testament were neither liable to be deceived themselves in the facts they relate, nor would have been inclined to attempt imposing on the world by such a forgery; and since their history met with that acceptance and success in the world, which without the support of truth it could never have found, there is abundant reason to believe it is true. Q. E. D.

*Dod. x. Serm. N<sup>o</sup>. ix. per tot.*—*Gastrel's Certainty of Christian Rev. p. 250—272.*—*Bp. Burnet's iv Disc. p. 27—35.*—*More's Theol. Works, p. 223—*

- 227.—*Baxt. Works*, vol. ii. p. 110—  
 113. part ii. c. vii. § 17—29.—*Ditton*  
*on the Res:* part iii. § 21—34. p. 251  
 —278.—*Burnet on the Art.* p. 59—  
 64.—*Fost. against Tind.* p. 135—137.  
 —*Barrow's Works*, vol. ii. p. 304—  
 312.—*Sermons on the Creed*, N<sup>o</sup>. xxix.  
 —*Bulkley's Oeconomy of the Gospel*, I. 3.  
 —*Hodge's Sermons*, N<sup>o</sup>. viii. *passim*.  
 —*Macknight on the Truth of the Gosp.*  
*Hist. book iii. c. ii. p. 421—478.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

To the credibility of the gospel history, some have objected our Lord's not appearing in public after his resurrection, which might have been the most effectual method of convincing the *Jews*.—But it may be replied,

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1. It is not certain the *Jews* would have been convinced even by this, considering the great obstinacy that people shewed in a variety of instances, in the Old Testament as well as in the new. Compare *John* xii. 10, 11.

2. God is not obliged to give the highest possible degrees of evidence to any revelation; and those evidences, which the New Testament affirms to have been given, were so considerable, both with respect to the number of witnesses, and the confirmation of their testimony by miracles, that there is no room to complain, merely because one may imagine how the evidence might have been carried yet higher: especially if we consider, how incapable the enemies of christianity seem to have been of producing evidence on the contrary side.

3. As the former obstinacy of the *Jewish* people, and their wicked treatment of Christ, abundantly justifies this conduct of God towards them; so if it were to be granted that they would generally have believed, upon Christ's public

appearance among them; it is difficult to conceive how the prophecies of their rejection for rejecting Christ could have been fulfilled: or that evidence for the truth of christianity preserved, which now arises from the existence of the *Jews*, as a distinct people, with the records of the Old Testament in their hands. On the whole therefore, the conduct of providence in this affair is to be thankfully adored, rather than censured.

*Woolston's 6th Disc. p. 26—28. — Ditton on the Res. part iii. § 60—67. p. 338—352. § 69, 70. p. 361—368. — Bp. Burnet's 4 Dis. p. 52—56. — Sykes of Christianity, p. 162—170. — Fleming's Christol. vol. iii. p. 494—498. — Blackall, at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. iv. p. 25, 26. — Superville's Sermon. vol. iv. p. 9—12. — Atterb. Post. Sermon. vol. i. p. 182—190. — West on the Resurrect. p. 296—304. — Macknight's Harmony, p. 864—866. — Hodge's Sermon. N°. ix. — Leland's View, vol. i. p. 157, 158, and 295—298. — Miscell. sacra. vol. ii. p. 77, 78.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is farther objected, that there were but very few of the *Jews* who believed in Christ; and considering that they were the best judges of his claim to be the Messiah, there is reason to suspect that the evidences of it were not sufficiently convincing.

*Ans. 1.* According to the account given in the New Testament, there were some considerable numbers of the *Jews* converted on the first publication of the gospel, and even some who were *priests*, and consequently lay under peculiar prejudices, Vid. *Acts* ii. 41. iv. 4. vi. 7. xxi. 20. and also those texts in the epistles, which evidently refer to the *Judaizing Christians*, and therefore

fore prove that there were considerable numbers of *Jewish* converts.

2. That the *Jewish* nation in general lay under very strong prejudices, especially those arising from their expectation of temporal deliverance and grandeur from their Messiah, the peculiar dignity and privileges of their own nation, the perpetuity of the *Mosaic* law, and the sanctity of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees*, as well as the authority of their dictates in matters of religion, besides those arising from the wickedness and immorality of their own characters in that very corrupt age; so that it is not at all to be wondered at, that they had a very strong aversion to that teacher and religion, which seemed so expressly levelled against those prejudices. To which we may add, that the force of the argument arising from Christ's miracles would be much diminished, considering the notion they had of the power of magic, and the supposition they thought they had some reason to make, that a false prophet might possibly work them, of which there also remain many traces in the rabbinical writings.

3. We are not to conclude that all who refused to embrace christianity remained in their hearts unconvinced; for it is certain that the severity of persecution might engage many, who had not a deep principle of religion, to dissemble the inward conviction of their own mind; as it is expressly declared, many did, *John* xii. 42, 43, &c.

*Woolston's 5th Disc. p. 48.—Whitby's Cert. of Christian Faith, c. ix. § 9. ad fin. p. 276—280.—Burnet's 4 Disc. p. 38—41, 56—58.—Whitby on Rom. ii. 1. Note b.—Lardner's Test. vol. i. c. i. —Works, vol. vii. p. 1—24.*

## SCHOLIUM 3.

It is farther objected, that the apostles had nothing to lose, and they might at least gain a subsistence, and the fame of being divine messengers by such a forgery.

*Ans.* 1. They had at least their lives to lose, which the poorest of mankind regard as well as others.

2. That if it could be supposed that persons of such low circumstances and education had the most eager desire of fame, they could not reasonably expect to raise their reputation by such an undertaking, but on the contrary to expose it to the greatest infamy: besides that the simplicity, with which they refer the honour of all they did to their great master, most evidently shews, how far they were from that vain-glorious temper, which the objection pretends to have been so strong in them, *Acts* iii. 12, 13. xiv. 15. *2 Cor.* iii. 5. iv. 5. *1 Cor.* iii. 5—7.

3. That if they had been actuated by mercenary views, they might much more easily have raised their fortune, by renouncing the cause they had undertaken, and discovering the forgery they had invented.

*Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. III. b. — Limborch's Collat. p. 161—163.*

## SCHOLIUM 4.

It is also objected, that the apostles met with but little persecution among the *Gentiles*: but we answer,

1. That though we acknowledge that the *Romans*, whose maxim it was to tolerate conquered nations in their own religion, were often a refuge to them at first, yet the heathen populace in the several cities of *Greece* and *Asia* to which they came, frequently rose up against them in a tumultuous manner, and exposed them to the extremest danger.

2. That

2. That considering how absolutely all pagan superstitions were condemned by christianity, the first preachers of it had great reason to believe, what was indeed fact, that in proportion to the degree in which their doctrines came to be known among the heathens, persecutions would be raised by the magistrates, and penal laws enacted against them. (*Vid. Prop. 101. Schol. 3. and Warburt. quoted there.*)

3. That the number and power of the *Jews* was very great in the apostles days, not only in *Judea*, but also in other countries; so that upon the whole the persecutions of the primitive christian preachers and hearers were very grievous; as evidently appears from the whole tenour of the New Testament, especially the following passages, *Acts* v. 17, 18, 40. vii. 57—60. viii. 1. ix. 1, 2, 23, 24. xii. 1—4. xiii. 50. xiv. 5, 19. xvi. 22, &c. xvii. 5, 6. xviii. 12, &c. xix. 29. xx. 3. xxi. 27. 28. xxii. 22. xxiii. 14. xxvi. 10, 11. *Rom.* viii. 36. *1 Cor.* iv. 9—13. xv. 29—32. *2 Cor.* i. 8, 9. iv. 8—11. vi. 4, 5, 8, 9. xi. 23—27. *Gal.* vi. 17. *Phil.* i. 27—30. *Col.* i. 11, 24. *1 Thess.* i. 6. ii. 14—16. *2 Thess.* i. 4—7. *2 Tim.* i. 8. ii. 3, 9, 10. iii. 11, 12. *Heb.* x. 32—34. *James* ii. 6. v. 10, 11. *1 Pet.* ii. 19—21, iii. 14—17. iv. 1, 12—16. *Rev.* ii. 10, 13. iii. 10.

*Lardn. Cred. part i. l. i. c. viii. præf.*  
p. 225—229, 259—264.—*Works, vol. i.*  
p. 164—201.

## SCHOLIUM 5.

Some may perhaps think, that if such miracles as the christians pretend had really been wrought in proof of their religion, it would have been impossible that it should not have met with an earlier and more general regard in the world.—So far as the *Jews* are concerned in this objection, it has been considered above, and so far as it relates to the *Gentiles* only, it may be answered,

1. That

1. That it evidently appears in fact, that many of the pagans had at that time but a very low opinion of miracles, and paid but little regard to them. Mr. *Weston* has entered largely into several causes that might contribute to this; especially the many ridiculous pretences that were made to them by the professors of divination, and the pretences to oracles and magic; to all which the multitude and intercommunity of their Gods would not a little contribute.

2. That where any regard was paid to them, (though if there had been a fair and candid examination, it must soon have appeared, that those which were pretended to as countenancing heathenism, were by no means in point of evidence comparable to those by which christianity was supported,) yet the strong prejudices that would lie against it as a *new* religion, and especially as a religion so opposite to mens secular interests and sinful passions, would prevent a careful and impartial inquiry; and so would dazzle their eyes, and make them prone to disregard the gospel, notwithstanding its miracles were allowed.

3. That the great discouragements under which christianity lay, while the empire was in the hands of the pagans, would no doubt engage many to smother the secret conviction of their minds in its favour; but when *Constantine* declared himself a christian, most of the opposition against christianity ceased; which might in many be owing to the dictates of conscience, as being persuaded of the truth of that religion, though in others it might be only a conformity to an establishment.

*Weston's Inq. into the Rejeēt. of Christian Mir. pass. præf. c. iii. p. 17—79.*

#### SCHOLIUM 6.

As for those objections which Dr. *Tindal* has brought against the moral character of the apostles,

ties, in some instances, they are circumstantially confuted by Dr. *Foster*, Dr. *Leland*, and others who have written on the other side the question.

*Tind. of Christianity*, p. 220, 221.—

*Fost. against Tind.* p. 111—132.—

*Leland, ibid. vol. ii. c. ii.*

#### SCHOLIUM 7.

The objections which Mr. *Woolston* has advanced against several miracles related in the New Testament, in his discourse on the miracles of Christ, have been sufficiently answered by almost all his antagonists; the most valuable of which are Mr. *Stephenson*, Dr. *Lardner*, Bp. *Pearce*, and the author of the *Trial of the witnesses*. An abstract of their most curious and important thoughts may be seen in our notes on the harmony of the evangelists, on those texts which he has excepted against

*Stonehouse's Account of the Controversy* \*.

#### PROPOSITION CIX.

Many material facts, which are recorded in LECT.  
the Old Testament, are also mentioned by very CXXVI.  
ancient heathen writers. ~

\* For a general treatise in defence of the christian miracles, we refer to the "Criterion," a work published in 1754, without a name, but which is known to have been written by Dr. Douglas, the present Bishop of Salisbury. The design of this work is to shew, with regard to Pagan and Popish miracles, that they were such events as were either in their nature not miraculous, or in their evidence not true; whereas the miracles of the Christian Revelation are in their nature miraculous, and from their evidence true. It is to be regretted that the book is become scarce. With respect to the resurrection of our Saviour, the two treatises of Mr. Humphrey Ditton and Mr. Gilbert West deserve particular attention; to which may be added Dr. Priestley's Sermon on the Resurrection, preached at Buxton. For a consideration of the manner in which the evangelists have related the circumstances of the resurrection, see, in addition to West, Benson's View of the Evidence of Christ's Resurrection, Macknight's Harmony, Dr. Lardner's Remarks on ditto, and Bishop Newcome's "Review of the chief Difficulties in the Gospel History relating to our Lord's Resurrection."

D E M O N-

## DEMONSTRATION.

1. The heathens had a tradition among them concerning the original of the world, which bore some visible resemblance to the account which *Moses* has given of it; particularly the *Phœnicians*, *Indians*, *Egyptians*, *Greeks* and *Romans*: and though they differ considerably from *Moses*, as to the time of the creation, we have formerly shewn their accounts to be in this respect extravagant and incredible. Vid. *Prop.* 21. *Dem. gr.* 2.

*Cumberland's Sanchoniathon*, p. 1—23.—  
*Burnet's Archæol.* l. i. c. i—vi. l. ii. c. i.  
*Ray's 3 Disc.* N<sup>o</sup>. i. c. i.—*Ovid's Met.*  
*Lib.* i.—*Grot. de Verit. with Le Clerc's*  
*Notes*, l. i. c. xvi. p. 26—40.—*Univ.*  
*Hist.* vol. i. p. 11—17. fol. p. 23—34.  
*Œt. Edition.*

2. The division of time into weeks has long prevailed, not only among the inhabitants of *Greece* and *Italy*, as we learn from *Josephus*, *Philo Byblius*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and *Lucian*, but also among the *Celtæ* and *Indians*, as *Philostratus*, *Dion Cassius*, and *Justin Martyr* assure us; and which we may farther learn from the ancient names of the seven days.

*Grot. ibid.* p. 41, 42.—*Roll. Hist. Anc.*  
*tom.* iv. p. 416. *French.*—*Selden de*  
*Jure N. & Gent.* l. iii. c. xvi—xxiii.  
*præf.* c. xvi, & xix.

3. *Diodorus Siculus*, *Plato*, *Dicæarchus*, *Calanus* the *Indian* philosopher quoted by *Strabo*, and others quoted by *Maimonides*, and several other writers mention a state of innocence, and the fall of man; to which it is probable we are to refer what so many writers say of the *golden age*: nor is it an improbable conjecture, that the worship of *serpents*, which has prevailed among so many heathen nations, may have some reference to

that form in which *Moses* tells us the tempter appeared to the first human pair.

*Grot. ibid. p. 42, 43.*—*Burn. Arch. l. ii. c. ii, iii.*—*Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. i. p. 80, 81.*—*Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 246—248.*—*Still. Orig. Sac. p. 516—518.*—*Owen on Serp. Diff. iv, v. p. 216—232.*

4. The long lives of men in the early ages of the world are mentioned by *Berosus*, *Manetho*, *Hiromus*, and *Helanicus*, as also by *Hesiod*, and many other writers quoted by *Josephus*, and afterwards by *Servius* in his notes on *Virgil*.

*Grot. ibid. p. 44.*—*Jos. Ant. l. i. c. iii. § 9.*

5. The account which *Pausanias*, *Philostratus*, *Pliny*, and several other writers give us of the remains of gigantic bodies which have been found in the earth, serve in some degree to confirm *Moses's* account of the antediluvian giants.

*Grot. ibid. p. 45.*—*Pliny's Nat. Hist. l. vii. c. xv.*—*Solinus, c. i. with Salm. Not. p. 9.*—*Annual Register for 1764, part ii. p. 106, 107.*

6. *Berosus*, the *Chaldean* historian, quoted by *Josephus*, and *Abidenus* by *Eusebius*, *Plutarch*, *Lucian*, *Molo*, *Nicholas Damascenus*, as well as many of the heathen poets, mention the deluge; and some traditions concerning it are to be found among the *Americans* and *Chinese*; not to mention what some modern travellers have fabulously related concerning some ruins of the ark said to remain on mount *Ararat*, and to have been seen there but a few centuries ago.

*Grot. ibid. p. 47—52.*—*Ray's 3 Disc. N°. ii. c. i.*—*Saurin's Diff. vol. i. p. 131—134.*—*Still. Orig. Sac. l. iii. c. iv. § 8.*—*Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 112. fol\*.*

We

\* Many curious traces and evidences of the remembrance of the deluge, among the heathens, are scattered through Mr. Jacob

We may add under this head, (that we may not break the order of all that follow) that *Alexander Polyphistor* quotes *Artapanus* and *Eupolemus*, as mentioning the tower of *Babel*, and the former speaks of it as built by *Belus*. (*Eus. Præp. Evan. l. ix. c. xviii.*) *Abydenus* likewise (*ibid. c. xiv.*) and *Hestæus* (15.) mention the same building, with something of the circumstances attending the disappointment of that enterprize.

7. *Diodorus Siculus*, *Strabo*, *Tacitus*, *Pliny*, and *Solinus* agree in giving us an account of the destruction of *Sodom* and *Gomorrhah*, and the neighbouring cities, in the main agreeable to that of *Moses*: the truth of which is in some measure confirmed by what modern travellers of the best credit have related concerning the phænomenon of the dead sea: and *Alexander Trallianus* mentions an heathen form of exorcism, “in the name of the God that turned *Lot’s* wife into a pillar of salt.”

*Tacit. Hist. l. v. c. vii.*—*Whitby’s Cert. of the Christian Faith, p. 36—39.*—*Pliny’s Nat. Hist. l. v. c. xvi. l. xxxv. c. xv.*—*Solinus, c. xxxvi. with Salm. Not.*—*Grot. ibid. p. 58, 59.*—*Maunderel’s Trav. p. 83—85.*—*Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 576, 577. fol.*

8. *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Philo Biblius*, and some others mention *circumcision*, as a rite used by several of those nations into which, according to *Moses*, *Abraham* travelled, or which were descended from him, especially by *Hagar* of *Penteturab*: and if the hypothesis of a late learned author be admitted, that the *Egyptians* derived it from the *Ismaelite Shepherd-kings*, it

Jacob Bryant’s great work, entitled, “A new System, or an Analysis of ancient Mythology.” This work is only referred to as what will hereafter merit the notice of the literary student.

will be equally to the present purpose. Vid. *Prop.* 104. *Schol.* and the references there.

*Grot. ibid.* p. 59, 60 — *Saur. Diff.* vol. i. p. 246, 247.

9. *Berosus*, *Alexander Polybistor*, (from *Eupolemus* and *Melo*, more ancient writers than himself,) *Damascenus*, *Artapanus*, and other ancient historians cited by *Josephus* and *Eusebius*, make express and honourable mention of *Abraham* and some of his family, as some of them do also expressly speak of his interviews with *Melchisedeck*. To which we may add the account given of him by *Trogus Pompeius* as abridged by *Justin*; nay, *Josephus* tells us, that *Hæcæus* wrote a whole book of *Abraham's* life.

*Jos. Ant.* l. i. c. vii. § 2. — *Just.* l. xxxvi. c. ii. — *Mill. Prop. of Christian.* vol. i. p. 114, 115. — *Eus. Præp. Evan.* l. ix. c. 17 — 23.

10. Besides the express testimony concerning *Moses*, *Prop.* 104. which may properly be referred to this proposition, there are also many fabulous stories of *Thoth*, *Typhon*, *Hermes*, and others, in which many celebrated writers have endeavoured to prove that such traces of his history are to be found as shew he was the person represented under that variety of names.

*Hent. Dem. Evang. Pr.* iv. c. iii. p. 49 — 68. — *Dacier on Hor.* l. i. Od. x. — *Mill. Prop. Christianity*, vol. i. p. 167 — 169. — *Wits. Ægypt.* l. iii. c. iv. per tot. — *Jacks. Cred.* part ii, § 2. c. viii, ix. apud *Op.* vol. i. l. i. c. 14, 15. — *Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. i. l. iii. § 3. p. 354 — 358. vol. i. part ii. p. 130 — 135.

11. *Eupolemus* and *Dius*, as quoted by *Eusebius* and *Grotius*, mention many remarkable circumstances of *David* and *Solomon*, agreeing with the Old Testament story; and *Herodotus* has a

remarkable though much controverted passage, supposed to refer to the destruction of the *Assyrians* in the reign of *Hezekiah*, in which he mentions *Sennacherib* by name.

*Euf. Præp. Ev. l. ix. c. 30—34, & 39—41.*—*Jof. Ant. l. viii. c. ii.*—*contr. App. l. i. p. 1340.*—*Millar, ibid. vol. i. p. 123—127.*—*Prid. Con. vol. i. p. 25.*—*Herod. Hist. l. ii. c. 141.*

12. As for the mention of *Nebuchadnezzar*, and some of the succeeding kings of *Babylon*, as well as of *Cyrus* and his successors, it is so common in ancient writers, as not to need a more particular view of it.

1—12. | 13. *Valet propositio.*

#### SCHOLIUM I.

It would be very easy to prove, that many passages of the Old Testament are mentioned by *Celsus*, and objections against christianity formed upon them; but he comes too late to be esteemed a witness to them; and all that can be inferred from those passages is, that he had read the Old Testament, probably in the *Greek* version of it, and that he knew *Christians* paid a religious regard to it, neither of which facts are at present in question.

#### SCHOLIUM 2.

It may not be improper here to mention the monument which *Procopius* mentions as found in *Africa*, testifying “that they had fled from “the face of the robber *Joshua* the son of *Nun*;” though that coming through the hands of a *Christian* writer, and of one who lived so very long after christianity was introduced, it did not seem so convenient to insert it among the preceding testimonies.

PROPO-

## PROPOSITION CX.

The history of the Old Testament is in the main worthy of credit.

LECT.  
CXXVII.

## DEMONSTRATION.

*Prop.* 106, 107. | 1. The books of the Old Testament received by the *Reformed*, (of which alone we speak,) are genuine.

1. | 2. Many of the writers of the Old Testament have given us an account of things, in which they were themselves personally concerned, *v. g.* *Moses, Joshua, Samuel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Isaiab, Jeremiab, Ezekiel, Daniel*, and several of the minor prophets; and consequently they were capable of giving us a true account of what they represented, as having fallen within their own observation and experience.

3. There are great marks of integrity in their writings, not only as they tell their very amazing story with great simplicity, and without apology, excuse, digression, &c. but as they every where write with the deepest sense of God upon their spirit, regarding him as the author of all events, whose moral as well as natural perfections they every where celebrate, and in whom they seem to have reposed the confidence of their souls, seeking his favour above all, and referring their actions to his glory: they do also most candidly acknowledge their own faults, and the faults of the greatest heroes of their history; and as for *Moses*, whose credibility is of the greatest importance to support all the rest, his leaving his family in the circumstances of common *Levites*, without entailing any peculiar honours or possessions upon them, is as strong a proof of his uprightness as could well be imagined.

*Jacks. Cred. p. 20—38. 4to. apud Op. vol. i. l. i. c. iv. p. 15—28.*

3. | 4. There is no reason to believe they would attempt to impose upon us, at least unless we can find that they were under some strong temptation to have attempted it.

5. Considering the time in which their writings were published, and also the public and remarkable nature of many of those events which are there recorded, and how many witnesses there must have been to the falseness of them if they had been false, they could expect no advantage by attempting to impose upon the world by such forgeries, nor could they have reaped any thing but contempt from it.

*Prop.* 104 | 6. Nevertheless, we find that their writings were received as credible by those who were the most capable of judging in the case, and those institutions submitted to, (on the authority of these facts) which would otherwise have appeared very unreasonable and very grievous.

2, 4, 5, 6. | 7. There is reason to believe that the history of the Old Testament is true, so far as the authors wrote it upon their own personal knowledge.

8. As for the history of remoter ages, much might be known of it by tradition, considering the long lives of the first men; at least all that was necessary might be learnt by revelation, to which we well know that *Moses* pretended: and there is such an evident and close connection between what was written by *Moses* and other persons mentioned *gr.* 2. upon *their own knowledge*, and what they or others whose names are not certainly known have written in the Old Testament upon *tradition* or *revelation*, that he who believes the former to be credible, will easily admit the latter, especially considering that it is one leading fact of the history, that *Moses* himself was instructed in so extraordinary a manner by God.

*Prop.*

*Prop.* 109. | 9. The agreement there is between many facts recorded in the Old Testament, and the testimony of many heathen historians of considerable note, is a farther evidence in favour of its credibility.

7, 8, & 9. | 10. The history of the Old Testament is in the main credible. *Q. E. D.*

*Bennet on Script.* p. 116, 117.—*Mill.*

*Prop.* vol. i. p. 87, 88, 94—99.—

*Burnet on the Art.* p. 83.—*Still. Orig.*

*Sac.* l. ii. c. ii. § 1, 2, 7—9. c. iii. § 1,

2.—*Williams at Boyle's Lect.* p. 119

—121.—*Jenkins on Christianity*, part ii.

c. iii, vi, xi. vol. i. p. 132, &c. 151,

&c. 296, &c.—*Leland against Tind.*

vol. ii. p. 38—42. chap. ii. p. 30—33.

2d Edition.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

The great ignorance of those *Latin* and *Greek* writers which now remain, as to facts which happened very long before their own time, and the peculiar contempt which several of them had for the *Jewish* nation, arising from the diversity of its customs and institutions, concur with some other considerations mentioned *Prop.* 99. *Schol.* 2. to answer any objections, which might be raised against the credibility of the Old Testament history, from the silence of such writers as to many important articles of it.

*Jenkins's Reas. of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 95,

96.—*Leland's View*, vol. ii. p. 286—

294.


#### SCHOLIUM 2.

We do not particularly mention the supposed absurdities to be found in some parts of the history, because they do not affect the truth of the whole, and will much more properly be considered as objections against its *inspiration*.


## SCHOLIUM 3.


Nevertheless, as we have before proved that it is no absurd thing, that God should make a revelation of some things before unknown; (*Prop. 93.*) and as the main body of the *Jewish* story is taken up in giving an account of such revelations; the proposition must lay a reasonable foundation for our believing that series of *Prophecies*, which will be the subject of the two next propositions.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.













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